IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA No. COA 18

- 1222 Filed: 17 March 2020 Guilford County, No. 16 JA 181 IN THE MATTER OF: A.K.G.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 26 March 2018 by Judge Lora C. Cubbage in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 October
2019

. Christopher L. Carr and Taniya Reaves for petitioner

- appellee Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services. A nné C. Wright for respondent

- appellant father. Administrative Office of the Courts, by GAL Appellate Counsel Matthew D. Wunsche, for guardian ad lit e m.

DIETZ , Judge.
Respondent appeals a permanency planning order that chang ed the permanent plan for his daughter Adele

. 1 While this appeal was pending, Adele reached the age of majority , thus terminating the trial court’s juvenile jurisdiction

. T his Court ordered supplemental briefing to address whether th e appeal is now
moot. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, we hold that Respondent’s appeal does not fall within any applicable exception s to the mootness doctrine.

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the juvenile’s identity.I N RE : A.K.G. Opinion of the Court

- 2

- The challenged order, which merely chang ed Adele’s permanent plan, does not create the sort of collateral consequences that exist with an order adjudica ting a juvenile as neglected or an order terminating parental rights. Similarly, there is nothing about the trial court’s fact

- bound permanency planning decision , unique to this particular case, that could warrant application of the public interest excepti on . Finally, the particularized trial court errors that Respondent asserts in this appeal

are not the sort of issues that are “ capable of repetition yet evad ing review” so as to preclude mootness. We therefore dismiss this appeal as moot. We note, however , that our State’s appellate system goes to rather extraordinary lengths to expedite these juvenile cases and it is, and should be, rare for a juvenile case to be rendered moot in this way. Facts and Procedural History In 2016, the Guilford County Departme nt of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging Adele was a neglected and dependent juvenile and took custody of Adele later that day

. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Adele to be a neglected and dependent juvenile. The court set Adele’s primary permanent plan of care as reunification with a parent and set her secondary plan as guardianship with a relative. Following this initial adjudication , the trial court conducted a series of permanency planning review hearings. In 2017, the trial court changed the primaryI N RE : A.K.G. Opinion of the Court

- 3

- permanent plan to guardianship with a relative with reunification as the secondary plan. Then, i n 2018, the trial court changed the primary permanent plan to adoption and the secondary plan to guardianship with a relative , th us ceasing reunification efforts with Respondent

. The court found R espondent was making some progress on his case plan, but that he fail ed to address his past issues with domestic violence

. Respondent appealed the trial court’s order on 25 September 2018. The case was heard by this Court on 31 October 2019. Adele reached eighteen years of age several days later. Analysis Respondent appeals the trial court’s permanency planning order, argu ing that the trial cour t failed to make sufficient findings and improperly ceased reunification efforts and set Adele’s permanent plan as adoption

. While this appeal was pending, Adele reached eighteen years of age. In a juvenile proceeding, “jurisdiction shall continue until te rminated by order of the court or until the juvenile reaches the age of 18 years or is otherwise emancipated, whichever occurs first.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 201(a)

. Thus, the trial court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding and the permanent plan is no longer in effect

. This , in turn, means tha t even if this Court determined that the trial court erred in its order changing Adele’s permanent plan, we could not remand th e matterI N RE : A.K.G. Opinion of the Court

- 4

- to correct that error and our ruling would have no practical effect

. Id

. ; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 1000(b). Ordinarily, this Court must dismiss an appeal as moot when “ a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” In re B .G. , 207 N.C. App. 745, 747, 701 S.E.2d 324, 325 (2010). But there are a narrow set of exceptions to the mootness doctrine, some of which apply to juvenile proceedings . W e asked the parties for supplemental briefing to assess whether this appeal is moot

. R espondent offered three arguments against mootness. We address those arguments in turn below. First, Respondent contends th at the challenged permanency planning order might have adverse “ collateral consequences ” for him

. A n appeal from a juvenile ruling “ which creates possible collateral legal consequences for the appellant is not
moot

. ” In re A.K. , 360 N.C. 449, 453, 628 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2006). In other words, although the juvenile (now an adult) is no longer affected by the challenged order, the case mig ht not be moot if the order could have future adverse effects on the parent who filed the appeal. For example, our Supreme Court has held that a n order adjudicating a child

as neglected is not mooted when the juvenile reaches th e age of majority because the finding of neglect can be used to support an adjudication of neglect for other children living in the same home. Id. at 456

– 57, 628 S.E.2d at 757

– 58

. Similarly, this CourtI N RE : A.K.G. Opinion of the Court

- 5

- has held that an order terminating parental rights has possible collateral consequences because it can be used to support termination of the parent’s rights to another child. In re C.C. , 173 N.C. App. 375, 379, 618 S.E.2d 813, 816

– 17 ( 2005)

. Respondent concedes that th e legal effect of a n order chang ing a juvenile’s permanent plan, unlike an order adjudicati ng a juvenile as neglect ed or terminating parental rights, does not have any collateral consequences. But Respondent contends that the challenged order has collateral legal consequences because it includ es unfavorable findings of fact , including a finding that Respondent failed to address his ongoing domestic violence issues

. Respondent argues that in a future proceeding , such as a custody dispute involving a future child , a court might either take judicial notice of th ose unfavorable fact finding s or rule that Respondent is collaterally estopped from disputing them. We reject this argument. First , Respondent mischaracterizes the way judicial notice works. A judicially noticed fact is “one not s ubject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” N.C. R. Ev id. 201 (b). Findings of fact in a court order from a n unrelated legal proceeding are not proper subjects of judicial notice

. See In re K.A. , 233 N.C. App. 119, 128 n.4, 756 S.E.2d 837, 843 n.4 (2014); State v. Cooke , 248 N.C. 485, 493

–I N RE : A.K.G. Opinion of the Court

- 6

- 94, 103 S.E.2d 846, 852 (1958). Thus, Respondent’s judicial notice argument is meritless. Second , Respondent ignores that the challenged findings are duplicative of other unchallenged findings made by the trial court in orders throughout this juvenile proceeding. Thus, e ven i f a court were to permit the highly disfavored use of non

mutual collateral estoppel to bar Respondent from challenging these unfavorable findings in “a custody dispute regarding a later born child”

— and that is, at best, an exceedingly remote possibility

— other substantially identical findings would still be available even if those in this order were not. Thus, Respondent has not shown that the challenged order exposes him to any adverse collateral consequences that would not exist without it. Next, Respon dent argues that his appeal falls under the public interest exception to mootness. Again, we reject this argument

. A court may choose to hear a n otherwise moot appeal if it “involves a matter of public interest, is o f general importance, and deserves promp t resolution.” N.C. State Bar v. Randolph , 325 N.C. 699, 701, 386 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1989). However, “ this is a very limited exception that our appellate courts have applied only in those cases involving clear and significant issues of public interest. ” Anderson v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections , 248 N.C. App. 1 , 13, 788 S.E.2d 179, 188 (2016).I N RE : A.K.G. Opinion of the Court

- 7

- Respondent contends that “[t]he best interests of children and the effect of trial court decisions related to these best interests is of public interest an d general importance.” But that mischaracterizes the scope of the challenged order. The order is, at most, a fact

- bound ruling involving the permanent plan for a particular juvenile in a case with particularized facts. The proper resolution of every juveni le case is important both to the litigants and to society as whole. But this case does not present anything so exceptionally important to the public interest that it should be treated as different from all other juvenile cases. Finally, Respondent argues that the issues raised in this appeal are capable of repetition, yet evading review. This argument, too, is meritless. Th e capable

- of

rep e tition exception applies only when “ (1) the challenged action [ is ] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [ is ] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Boney Publishers, Inc. v. Burlington City Counc il , 151 N.C. App. 651, 654, 566 S.E.2d 701, 703

– 04 (2002). Th us, this exception applies to cases in which the underlying lawsuit involves some action that is capable of repetition. It does not apply in a case like this one, where a litigant argues that the trial court made legal errors in its fact findings and legal conclusions that are particular to the case

. In sum, this appeal is moot and we are unable to adjudicate the merits of Respondent’s claims. We note that our State’s appellate system has taken a numberI N RE : A.K.G. Opinion of the Court

- 8

- of steps to ensure that juvenile cases will not be mooted on appeal, including rather extraordinary departures from the usual rules governing preparation of the record, drafting of briefs, and the availability of extensions of time. See N.C. R. App . P. 3.1. Juvenile cases that are rendered moot while an appeal is pending are rare. But it can happen and here it did. The challenged order, which did nothing more than change the permanent plan for Adele, was rendered moot when Adele reached the age of

m ajority, depriving the trial court of any further jurisdiction over the matter. Conclusion W e dismiss Respondent’s appeal as moot

. DISMISSED

. Judge s STROUD and HAMPSON concur .