Report of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

DoD Energy Strategy 

“More Fight – Less Fuel” 

February 2008 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal 

Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of 

Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not 

necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

The DSB Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy completed its information gathering in 

July 2007. This report is UNCLASSIFIED and releasable to the public. 






ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

The Chairmen acknowledge the exceptional commitment of several Task Force 

members who, as volunteers, devoted an enormous amount of time and effort in the 

development and writing of this report. The four Task Force panels drafted their 

respective sections but the challenge of rationalizing and integrating the substance 

rested primarily on the shoulders of Mr. Tom Morehouse who has done a superb job. 

As part of the substantial integration and editing effort, the skilled contributions of Mike 

Canes, Gueta Mezzetti and General "Speedy" Martin, USAF, (Ret), in assisting Tom 

Morehouse merit special mention. 

________________________________________________________________________TABLE OF CONTENTS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY________________________________________________________i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword........................................................................................................................ 1

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 3

Chapter I: Introduction................................................................................................ 9

Chapter II: DoD’s Energy Posture............................................................................ 11

2.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................................11

2.2 Petroleum Supply and Demand .............................................................................................12

2.3 Electricity..................................................................................................................................18

2.4 Global Warming and Our Energy Choices............................................................................21

Chapter III: Managing Fuel Demand – A Business Process Re-Engineering 

Challenge ..................................................................................................................... 23

3.1 Unfinished Tasks from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force ...............................23

3.2 Recent Initiatives to Implement the 2001 Task Force Report .............................................24

3.3 Means to Increase the Endurance of Combat and Combat Related Systems...................25

3.4 Strategic Technology Vectors................................................................................................35

3.5 Opposition to Change .............................................................................................................35

3.6 National Spinoff Benefits........................................................................................................36

Chapter IV: Technologies for Energy Efficiency and Alternative Supplies.......... 37

4.1 Technologies to Improving Combat Endurance...................................................................37

4.2 Fuel Supply Technologies ......................................................................................................50

Chapter V: Managing Risks to Installations............................................................ 53

5.1 DoD’s Approach to Assured Power at Installations ............................................................53

5.2 A Confluence of Events Adds to Already Unacceptable Risks ..........................................53

5.3 Four Sources of Risk for Grid Outages.................................................................................54

5.4 National Security Implications of Reliability Standards......................................................56

5.5 Assessing Risk ........................................................................................................................57

5.6 Risk Management ....................................................................................................................58

Chapter VI: Findings and Recommendations......................................................... 63

6.1 Task Force Findings................................................................................................................63

6.2 Task Force Recommendations ..............................................................................................65

Appendix A: Terms of Reference.............................................................................. 73

Appendix B: Task Force Membership ...................................................................... 77
TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________

ii__________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Appendix C: Briefings Received............................................................................... 81

Appendix D: New Technologies................................................................................ 95

Appendix E: Energy KPP and Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel Policy Memos .......... 99

Appendix F: Acronyms and Glossary of Terms .................................................... 107

Appendix G: Classified............................................................................................ 121
___________________________________________________________ TABLES AND FIGURES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY________________________________________________________iii 

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2 1: Petroleum Exporting Countries..................................................................... 12

Table 4.1: Army Fuel consumption in peacetime & wartime (million gallons per year).. 44

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: DoD Fuel Delivery Cost Responsibility........................................................ 15

Figure 2.2: DoD Energy Consumption by Type of Fuel................................................. 16

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Cost Locked in by Phase ..................................................... 27 

Figure 4.1: Examples of Fundamental Energy Efficiency Disruptive Breakthrough 

Technologies................................................................................................................. 38

Figure 4.2: BWB Efficiency from Aero and Structural Advantages................................ 39

Figure 4.3: Cruise Efficiency, Speed of Vertical Lift Aircraft Compared......................... 40

Figure 4.4: Badenoch Vehicle Concept......................................................................... 41

Figure 4.5: Biomimetic Screw........................................................................................ 49
TABLES AND FIGURES___________________________________________________________

iv__________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
__________________________________________________________________________________ FOREWORD

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY________________________________________________________1 

FOREWORD

This report summarizes the work of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD 

Energy Strategy. The report consists of an Executive Summary; Introduction; major 

sections on DoD’s Energy Posture, Improving the Effectiveness of Tactical Systems, 

Managing Risk to Critical Infrastructure and Installations, Crosscutting Issues and 

Findings and Recommendations, and appendices. 

Appendix A: Terms of Reference 

Appendix B: Task Force Membership 

Appendix C: Briefings Received 

Appendix D: New Technologies 

Appendix E: Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of August 17, 2006 

(JROCM 161-06), endorsing a Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

decision to establish an Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter 

(KPP) and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics Memorandum of April 10, 2007 requiring the use of the Fully 

Burdened Cost of Fuel for all acquisition trade analyses 

Appendix F: Acronyms and Glossary of Terms 

Appendix G: Classified 
FOREWORD___________________________________________________________________

2__________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
________________________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY________________________________________________________3 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 2, 2006 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (USD(AT&L)) directed the Defense Science Board to create a Task Force to 

examine DoD Energy Strategy. Citing significant risks to both our nation and our 

military forces, he challenged the Task Force to find opportunities to reduce DoD’s 

energy demand, identify institutional obstacles to their implementation, and assess their 

potential commercial and security benefits to the nation. 

Overview 

Based on its study and deliberations, the Task Force concluded that DoD faces two 

primary energy challenges: 

• Unnecessarily high and growing battlespace fuel demand that: 

o compromises operational capability and mission success; 

o requires an excessive support force structure at the expense of 

operational forces; 

o creates more risk for support operations than necessary; and 

o increases life-cycle operations and support costs. 

• Almost complete dependence of military installations on a fragile and vulnerable 

commercial power grid and other critical national infrastructure places critical 

military and Homeland defense missions at an unacceptably high risk of 

extended disruption. 

These observations lead to the following set of findings and recommendations. 

Finding #1: The recommendations from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task 

Force Report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” have 

not been implemented. 

The main Task Force recommendation in 2001 was that DoD re-engineer its business 

processes to make energy a factor in the key Departmental decisions that establish 

requirements, shape acquisition programs and set funding priorities. This was based on 

their findings that these decisions were not informed about their energy consequences, 

yet ultimately drove operational fuel demand, and that high fuel demand compromised 

operational effectiveness. This Task Force finds these situations have not changed. 

Finding #2: Critical national security and Homeland defense missions are at an 

unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the grid. 

In addition to their warfighting responsibilities, installations have taken on significantly 

expanded Homeland defense missions. Installations now serve as a base of operations 

to coordinate the full range of national relief and recovery efforts; and a source of skilled 

personnel to provide rescue, recovery, medical and other emergency services required 

by survivors. They rely almost entirely on the national power grid and other critical 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY___________________________________________________________

4__________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

national infrastructure, which is highly vulnerable to prolonged outage from a variety of 

threats, placing critical missions at unacceptably high risk of extended disruption. 

Backup power is often based on diesel generator sets with limited on-site fuel storage, 

undersized for new Homeland defense missions, not prioritized to critical loads, and 

inadequate in duration and reliability. 

Finding #3: The Department lacks the strategy, policies, metrics, information, 

and governance structure necessary to properly manage its energy risks. 

Decisions that create energy demand are dispersed organizationally across the 

Department and throughout the Services. There is no unifying vision, strategy, metrics 

or governance structure with enterprise-wide energy in its portfolio. Information 

collected about energy end-use is inadequate for the purposes of establishing a 

baseline, establishing metrics or making management decisions. DoD efforts to 

manage energy are currently limited to complying with executive orders, legislation and 

regulations which are mostly limited to facilities, non-tactical fleet vehicles, purchase of 

renewable energy from utilities, and procurement of commercial products. There is a 

senior political appointee responsible for these activities, which encompass about a 

quarter of DoD energy consumption. There are currently few efforts to manage energy 

demand by operational forces, which consume about three quarters of DoD energy, 

perhaps because no one is in charge. The lowest organizational level where all 

decisions that drive DoD energy use come together is the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

implying the need for a senior energy official, and oversight of the Department’s energy 

strategy and program by the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG). 

Finding #4: There are technologies available now to make DoD systems more 

energy efficient, but they are undervalued, slowing their implementation and 

resulting in inadequate future S&T investments.

The Task Force heard over a hundred presentations on technologies that addressed all 

categories of end use, covering the full range of maturity from basic research to readyto-implement. Many appear quite promising, but DoD lacks accepted tools to value 

their operational and economic benefits. As a result, cost effective technologies are not 

adopted, science and technology programs significantly under-invest in efficiency 

relative to its potential value, and competitive prototyping to accelerate deployment of 

efficiency technologies is not done. 

Finding #5: There are many opportunities to reduce energy demand by changing 

wasteful operational practices and procedures. 

Operational practices and procedures affect energy consumption by aircraft, land 

vehicles, ships, installations, forward operating bases (FOBs), and battery powered 

equipment carried by individual soldiers. The Task Force found no strong, sustained 

focus by senior leadership to change the culture that assumes readily available energy, 

or to create a culture that inherently recognizes the clear linkage between energy 

productivity and combat effectiveness. The Task Force found this to be one of the most 

significant barriers to changing wasteful practices. 
________________________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY________________________________________________________5 

Finding #6: Operational risks from fuel disruption require demand-side remedies; 

mission risks from electricity disruption to installations require both demand- and 

supply-side remedies. 

Moving fuel to deployed forces has proven to be a high risk operation. Reducing 

operational fuel demand is the single best means to reduce that risk, but DoD is not 

currently equipped to make informed decisions on the most effective way to do so. 

Fixed installations are 99% dependent on the commercial power grid and other critical 

national infrastructure, which is fragile and vulnerable and poses serious risks to critical 

missions. Significantly increased end-use efficiency to reduce demand combined with 

alternative energy generated nearby or on-site offer the best opportunities to reduce 

that risk to acceptable levels. 

Recommendation #1: Accelerate efforts to implement energy efficiency Key 

Performance Parameters (KPPs) and use the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF), 

to inform all acquisition trades and analyses about their energy consequences, 

as recommended by the 2001 Task Force. 

The Task Force recognizes two key initiatives recently launched by the Joint Staff (JS) 

and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to implement the 2001 Task Force 

recommendations: 

3⁄4 An August 17, 2006, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) 

memorandum (JROCM 161-06) endorsing a Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) decision to establish an Energy Efficiency Key Performance 

Parameter (KPP). 

3⁄4 An April 10, 2007 USD(AT&L) memorandum establishing Department policy 

to use the “fully burdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) for all acquisition trade 

analyses. 

While these are essential reforms, little progress has been made in implementing them 

and little action has been taken to develop the necessary analytical capabilities to 

establish meaningful values for either initiative. The Task Force recommends that the 

Department accelerate the following tasks: 

• Build fuel logistics into campaign analyses and other analytical models and 

simulations to inform the requirements process of the operational, force structure 

and cost consequences of varying battlespace fuel demand; 

• Establish outcome-based energy KPPs; and 

• Use FBCF as a factor in all Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) / Evaluation of 

Alternatives (EoAs) and throughout all acquisition trades. 

The Task Force recommends these apply to all actions that create demand for energy, 

including “black” programs, and non-developmental systems used at forward operating 

locations. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY___________________________________________________________

6__________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Recommendation #2: Reduce the risk to critical missions at fixed installations 

from loss of commercial power and other critical national infrastructure. 

The Task Force recommends DoD launch a comprehensive program to mitigate 

mission risk using an integrated risk management approach, based on importance of 

missions, likelihood and duration of outage, and cost effectiveness of risk management 

options. The Department should take immediate actions to “island” the installations 

listed in Appendix G and increase the efficiency of critical equipment to reduce the 

burden for backup systems. Successfully executing this program will require a joint 

effort by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security 

Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), the Mission Assurance Division at Dahlgren, the Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) (ODUSD(I&E)) and 

the Services. 

Recommendation #3: Establish a Department-wide strategic plan that establishes 

measurable goals, achieves the business process changes recommended by the 

2001 DSB report and establishes clear responsibility and accountability. 

Fixed installations use about one quarter of DoD’s total energy. There are policies, 

metrics, reporting requirements and a senior official in charge. Deployed systems use 

about three quarters of DoD’s total energy. There are few policies, procedures or 

reporting requirements; no metrics and no one in charge. The lowest level at which all 

decisions affecting energy use by the Department converge is with the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. It is very difficult to achieve sustained focus and accountability 

for performance on energy use at this level. The Task Force concluded that lack of 

leadership is a root cause of DoD’s energy problem. 

In addition to oversight, DoD needs a comprehensive energy plan that addresses both 

fixed installations, to include critical Defense Industrial Base (DIB) plants, and 

operational forces. It should include both measurable goals for energy demand 

reduction and reduction in energy risks. Implementing new analytical products to better 

inform key decisions will be essential to enabling effective energy management. For 

operational forces, this requires adding energy to force planning analyses, and 

implementing the energy KPP and FBCF. For fixed installations and industrial base 

plants, it includes applying integrated risk management principles to reduce the 

likelihood of prolonged loss of critical missions due to commercial power and other 

critical national infrastructure outages. 

These basic business process changes will enable the Department to more effectively 

manage the amount of fuel and electricity it requires to accomplish its missions and 

reduce its risk from supply disruptions. 

Recommendation #4: Invest in energy efficient and alternative energy 

technologies to a level commensurate with their operational and financial value. 

The same lack of analytical tools that prevent the requirements and acquisition 

processes from developing more efficient systems also prevent science and technology 

investments from identifying the most effective investments in energy efficiency 
________________________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY________________________________________________________7 

technologies. Investments should be guided by a common understanding of their 

operational, force structure and cost value, but the tools and business processes 

needed to establish this understanding do not exist. The Task Force recommends 

USD(AT&L) accelerate development efforts on the following innovative concepts based 

on the Task Force’s qualitative assessment: 

• Blended Wing Body Aircraft 

• Variable Speed Tilt Rotor Vertical Lift 

• Lightweight Composite ‘Blast-Bucket’ Tactical Vehicle 

• Advanced electro-mechanical actuators 

• Semi-rigid, lighter-than-air high altitude lifting bodies 

• Advanced micro-generators 

• Biomimetic design for platform components 

• Very high efficiency electronics for soldier systems (National Research 

Council recommendation) and other combat systems applications 

The Task Force also recommends USD(AT&L) re-establish early competitive 

prototyping for key Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) programs to accelerate the adoption 

of high payoff, innovative energy efficient technologies and concepts. 

The Task Force recommends the Department invest in basic research to develop new 

fuels technologies that are too risky for private investments and to partner with private 

sector fuel users to leverage efforts and share burdens. The Task Force also 

recommends the Department work with commercial partners to conduct full “well-towheel” life cycle assessments of each synthetic fuel technology under consideration. 

This is to fully assess environmental, cost, material flow and scalability issues. Synfuel 

production technologies that can be adapted to forward deployed locations using local 

materials (such as bio-waste) would be valuable because it would directly reduce the 

amount of fuel that would have to be moved and protected in theater. 

Recommendation #5: Identify and exploit near-term opportunities to reduce 

energy use through policies and incentives that change operational procedures. 

Since WWII, energy has been abundant and cheap, with the exceptions of two short 

periods during the 1970s and 1980s, and very recently. During WWII, tankers moving 

fuel to U.S. forces were attacked, and the response was to devise ways to avoid using 

tanker ships, such as building pipelines to mitigate the risk. During Korea and Vietnam, 

energy security was not a concern. Changing a culture that considers energy cheap 

and abundant is one of the most difficult challenges facing the Department and the 

nation. The business changes recommended by the Task Force will take time to show 

results, but changing operational practices to conserve energy can show immediate 

results. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY___________________________________________________________

8__________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Leadership sets the tone. The Task Force recommends the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense (DEPSECDEF) and the VCJCS direct all Components to review current 

practices to identify opportunities to reduce energy use, to include expanded use of 

simulators, emulators and task trainers; and limiting afterburner use; that can be 

enacted without affecting operations and provide incentives to save energy throughout 

the Department. Regular reviews of actions taken and their results across Components 

will help track progress and validate techniques. 
____________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY________________________________________________________9 

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In May 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 

commissioned a Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy. The 

Terms of Reference asked the Task Force to investigate four broad areas: 

1. Opportunities to reduce fuel demand by deployed forces; assessing the effects 

on cost, operational and force structure. 

2. Opportunities to deploy renewable and alternative energy sources for facilities 

and deployed forces. 

3. Institutional barriers to making the transitions recommended by the Task Force. 

4. Potential national benefits of DoD deployment of new energy technologies. 

To address these issues, 77 Task Force members and government advisors divided 

into four panels to examine policy issues, combat platforms, facilities and infrastructure, 

and research and technology. From May 2006 to March 2007, the Task Force 

conducted 37 meetings, heard 143 briefings, examined numerous studies, and held 

many discussions to arrive at its findings and recommendations. This report reflects the 

integrated assessment of the panels and deliberations of the entire Task Force. It is 

organized as follows. 

Chapter II provides an overview of DoD’s energy posture in terms of the fuel used for 

combat and deployed systems, including forward operating bases, and the electricity 

needed to power fixed installations and their critical missions. It identifies several key 

issues regarding DoD fuel demand management, decision processes that drive energy 

demand patterns, data collection and organization of energy management. The 

Chapter also examines security threats to missions and installations that come from 

potential attacks on a national electrical grid characterized by small capacity margins, 

vulnerable components and infrastructures, limited availability of spares and insufficient 

resilience. 

Chapter III describes risks to DoD operations from fuel disruptions and describes means 

available for DoD to better manage its use of fuel. It reinforces the findings of the 2001 

Defense Science Board report, “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel 

Burden,” that DoD’s fuel-related problems are in large part the consequence of poor 

business processes. The chapter identifies the burdens that high battlespace fuel 

demand places on combat success and identifies concrete steps the Department can 

take to reduce such burdens. It focuses on making fuel logistics an integral 

consideration in warfare analysis and system design, resulting in greater force 

endurance through higher levels of energy productivity. 

Chapter IV identifies a wide range of technologies that appear capable of improving the 

efficiency of deployed systems. Some of these technologies are radical but offer the 

promise of very substantial gains while others are more conventional but provide solid 

prospects for nearer-term efficiency improvement. The Chapter also considers 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION________________________________________________________

10_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

technologies to increase fuel supply to DoD, particularly synthetic fuels derived from 

coal, biomass and other feedstocks. 

Chapter V addresses methods to better assess the risk to DoD of long term power 

outages, to formulate options for managing those risks, and to build business cases for 

making the necessary investments. Risk mitigation options include much higher 

efficiency levels for buildings, distributed generation near- or on-base, islanding from the 

commercial grid, renewable energy sources, and where necessary higher levels of local 

grid reliability and conventional power sources on-base. Identifying the appropriate mix 

of options will involve business and decision processes based on risk assessment and 

mitigation, new operational practices and new relationships with external organizations. 

The discussion addresses both supply and demand side options. 

Chapter VI offers the findings and recommendations of the Task Force. 

A list of priority installations for mitigating risk from commercial power outage is 

contained in Appendix G. 
_________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________11 

CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE

2.1 Introduction 

The Department of Defense is the largest single consumer of energy in the United 

States. In 2006, it spent $13.6 billion to buy 110 million barrels of petroleum fuel (about 

300,000 barrels of oil each day), and 3.8 billion kWh of electricity. This represents 

about 0.8% of total U.S. energy consumption and 78% of energy consumption by the 

Federal government. Buildings and facilities account for about 25% of the Department’s 

total energy use. DoD occupies over 577,000 buildings and structures worth $712 

billion comprising more than 5,300 sites. In 2006, the Department spent over $3.5 

billion for energy to power fixed installations, and just over $10 billion on fuel for combat 

and combat related systems. These figures exclude energy used by some contractors 

that performed “outsourced” DoD functions, but are as accurate as current accounting 

systems permit. 

At the national level, dependence on foreign sources of energy is mainly a petroleum 

issue. The U.S. currently imports some 60% of its oil from foreign sources and the 

percentage is increasing. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Current high 

prices adversely affect our trade balance. Much of the global petroleum endowment 

resides in countries that are not friendly to the U.S., or exhibit political values antithetic 

to our own. While the international petroleum market is relatively open and fungible, 

approximately 94% of the known global reserves are controlled by governments directly 

or indirectly, mainly through state-owned companies. As a result, the amount of 

petroleum that remains to be extracted is imprecisely known. Further, estimates of 

remaining reserves are considered state secrets by many oil exporting nations. There 

are two main elements of uncertainty. First, the estimates of currently inaccessible 

reserves are questionable. Second, the extent to which existing fields can be extended 

through new or more costly technologies is unknown. Our need to maintain good 

business relations with oil exporting countries complicates our foreign policy options. 

Some of them are known to support extremist groups. In effect, through our imports of 

oil we help to fund both sides of the global war on terror. 

The electricity problem is wholly different. The U.S. has adequate domestic resources 

to meet its electricity needs into the foreseeable future, from coal, nuclear, natural gas, 

hydropower and other renewable sources such as wind, geothermal and solar. The 

main problems with electricity are the fragility, and as we shall see vulnerability, of the 

national grid which transmits and distributes electricity from large central generating 

stations to individual users across the country and into Canada. It is susceptible to 

extended outage from natural disaster or sabotage. There is an important distinction 

between failure from natural disaster or overloading, and the kinds of disruption possible 

from sabotage. Informed and capable saboteurs can inflict damage that would take 

down significant portions of the grid and other critical infrastructure for long periods and 

make restoration, even work-around measures, difficult, costly, time consuming and 

marginally effective. Consequently, deliberate attacks represent a different kind of 

threat, requiring different mitigation strategies. 
CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE_______________________________________________

12_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Interconnected, interdependent infrastructure and the potential for cascading grid 

failures makes the resilience of the grid important to other essential services, such as 

telecommunications, water supplies and treatment, and operation of the pipeline 

systems that distribute oil and natural gas around the country. These critical national 

infrastructures, in turn, are needed for the recovery and operation of the power grid. 

Grid failure could shut down the systems that deliver petroleum and natural gas to end 

users, and to generating stations that power military installations. Emergency 

communications, transportation systems, medical institutions and other essential 

services would also be disrupted. The Task Force finds that any assessment of the risk 

to military missions from grid failure must also take into account the ability of the 

national pipeline system to provide fuel to installations where it critically warrants. 

2.2 Petroleum Supply and Demand 

The world presently consumes about 86 million barrels per day (mbpd). Of this, the 

U.S. consumes about 21 mpbd, or, about 24%. While DoD is the single largest user of 

energy in the nation, its requirement is small 

relative to the total market. To provide 

perspective, DoD’s recent wartime petroleum 

consumption has been slightly larger than a 

major international airline. The Defense Energy 

Support Center (DESC) maintains a robust 

global network of supply points and sources for 

all types of DoD fuels, and has established 

contracts with strategically placed refineries 

around the world. In addition, if needed for 

national security, DoD could exercise eminent 

domain over commercial energy contracts. 

Therefore, the Task Force finds it difficult to 

imagine a scenario where DoD would be unable 

to obtain the petroleum it needs to perform its 

mission from commercial sources. 

DoD uses military specification fuel produced 

from petroleum in its combat systems and the 

systems that support them – aircraft, ground 

systems, and naval vessels. Electricity needed 

to power forward operating bases, such as those 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, is generated using the 

same fuel that powers combat and support 

systems. Commercial grade petroleum products can be converted in the field to military 

grade by blending with additives. 

Alternatively, DoD systems can operate on commercial grade fuels if military grade are 

not available, with little compromise in performance. Since operational forces do not 

Table 2.1: Petroleum Exporting Countries
_________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________13 

ship fuel from the U.S. into theater but buy it from sources near theater, DoD operations 

are entirely dependent on the commercial global petroleum market for its supplies. 

From a geo-strategic perspective, most of the countries exporting oil are far from free 

and democratic (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Iran), are hostile to the United States (Iran and 

Venezuela) or are corrupt and fragile (such as Nigeria). On page 12, Table 2.1 shows 

the top oil exporting nations. Citizens of some of these nations are suspected of using 

their oil revenue to sponsor terrorist activities against the U.S. 1 Reduced fuel 

consumption has long been a national aim, yet demand continues to grow. By 

addressing its own fuel demand, DoD can serve as a stimulus for new energy efficiency 

technologies, and help limit national dependence on foreign oil. 

2.2.1 Price Volatility in a Tight Global Market 

Recently, tight supplies and strong demand have characterized the oil market, putting 

upwards pressure on prices. Fiscal Year (FY) 07 is the first year the DESC has 

changed its standard price in mid-year. This price is used by government customers to 

budget for fuel purchases. In real terms, world oil prices are currently near historic 

highs, approaching those of the oil crisis of the early 1980s. From 2004 to 2006, DESC 

fuel sales more than doubled from $5.9 B to $13.6 B., most of the increase being due to 

rising prices for petroleum products. 

Such rapid increases in the commodity cost of fuel get leadership attention because of 

their effect on budgets. DoD operates on a six year Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) 

funding horizon. Increases of this magnitude mean that large sums of money must be 

re-programmed in order to meet operating costs, wreaking havoc on programs from 

which the funds are taken. 

2.2.2 Peak Oil 

Peak oil is the point in time at which roughly half of the extractable oil on the planet has 

been used, and future production enters terminal decline. Such a decline would put 

strong, persistent upwards pressure on prices. The theory was first advanced by 

Marion King Hubbert, an American geophysicist with Shell Oil, who created a method of 

modeling the production curve for an oil field. His theory said all oil fields follow the 

same bell-shaped production curve over their lifetimes. He based this on the 

observations that the amount of oil is finite and that the rate of discovery initially 

increases quickly, reaches a maximum, and then declines irreversibly. The factors that 

indicate the point of maximum production include discovery rates, production rates and 

cumulative production. However, these are difficult if not impossible to know with 

certainty. Early in the curve, production increases due to the discovery of new fields 

and the addition of production capacity. Post-peak production declines due to resource 

depletion. In 1956, Hubbert predicted U.S. oil production would peak in approximately a 

decade, and fourteen years later it did. Today, in the lower 48 states the U.S. produces 

 

1

 See Frank H. Denton Nexus, Oil and Al Qaeda, available at <http://www.americanenergyindependence.com/nexus.html>; and 

George P. Shultz and R. James Woolsey, A Committee on the Present Danger Policy Paper: OIL & SECURITY, 10 June 2005, 

available at <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=282100&attrib_id=10197>. 
CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE_______________________________________________

14_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

roughly half the oil it produced in 1970. However, Hubbert’s predictions were incorrect 

with respect to ultimate U.S. production. Improved technology and higher prices have 

resulted in far greater production since 1970 than predicted by Hubbert’s model. 

Numerous studies have estimated the timing of global peak oil. In 2005, Robert Hirsch 

produced a study for the Atlantic Council called “Peaking of World Oil Production: 

Impacts, Mitigation, and Risk Management.” In it, he compared twelve expert 

projections of when global peak oil would occur. They ranged between 2006 and “2025 

or later.” In July 2007, the National Petroleum Council (NPC), an industry advisory 

group, conducted a study for the Secretary of Energy titled “Facing the Hard Truths 

about Energy: A comprehensive view to 2030 of global oil and natural gas.” 2 It 

concluded that while the world is not running out of energy resources, there are 

significant challenges to meeting projected total energy demand. Until this report, the 

NPC had been generally optimistic about future petroleum supplies. It found the U.S. 

must moderate its growing demand for energy by increasing the efficiency of its 

transportation, residential, commercial, and industrial sectors; expanding and 

diversifying production from other energy sources; enhancing long-term research into 

energy supply and demand; and developing the legal and regulatory framework to 

enable carbon capture and sequestration. 

In February 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a study 

entitled “Uncertainty about Future Oil Supply Makes It Important to Develop a Strategy 

for Addressing a Peak and Decline in Oil Production.” It identified 22 separate studies 

on peak oil conducted since 1996 and noted that most predict peak oil to occur between 

now and 2040. It noted there is no coordinated federal strategy to reduce uncertainty 

about the peak’s timing or to mitigate its consequences. 

Among the implications for DoD are that after peaking, prices for fuel will be even higher 

than today. The Task Force did not discuss the geopolitical, economic or national 

security implications of peak oil, but the recommendations in this report regarding 

reduced fuel demand would help mitigate its effects. 

2.2.3 Understanding and Managing Fuel Demand 

2.2.3.1 Fuel Demand Data 

Figure 2.1 shows who is responsible for specific fuel delivery costs. The costs incurred 

from Points A to D are included in the “standard” price DESC charges its customers for 

the commodity. Costs incurred beyond Point D are typically paid by the military 

services through the support force structure they maintain, operate and sustain. These 

costs are borne by budgets not attributed to fuel. They are the total ownership costs of 

assets such as tanker aircraft, fuel trucks and oiler ships; and personnel, parts, training 

and fuel needed to keep them operational. They also include protection required to 

assure delivery of the fuel from Point D to the point of use. The costs of protection are 

 

2

See National Petroleum Council, Draft Report: Facing Hard Truths about Energy, available at 

<http://downloads.connectlive.com/events/npc071807/pdf-downloads/Facing_Hard_Truths-Report.pdf>. 
_________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________15 

difficult to measure and are often not monetary costs. They include reduced combat 

effectiveness, risk to mission, and casualties. In Iraq and Afghanistan, combat forces 

are dedicated to supply line protection rather than combat operations. As of November 

2007, approximately 80 convoys travel continuously between Kuwait and Iraq 

destinations, all protected by uniformed forces. This degrades combat capability, 

resulting in real costs, 

even if not attributed to 

the supplies themselves. 

Effectively managing fuel 

demand requires an indepth understanding of 

the activities that are 

creating the demand. 

Unfortunately, data on 

energy usage are 

unevenly collected 

across the Department, 

making it difficult to form 

a comprehensive picture. 

For operational systems, 

DESC operates an 

accounting system for 

the purpose of tracking purchases, but data showing where it is used, for what purpose, 

and by which end-items are inconsistent. The Air Force keeps excellent records of 

aircraft fuelings by tail number, quantity, date and location. Data on use by ground 

systems are not collected. This makes it difficult to establish baselines by system, 

establish metrics or manage demand. It also makes it difficult to establish priorities 

based on systems creating the greatest demand. For installations, electricity is metered 

for the purpose of billing by utility companies, but metering within the installation for 

energy management purposes has been spotty. Policies to meter all buildings are very 

recent, were directed by Congress, and will be implemented as new buildings are 

constructed or renovated. 

The Task Force was struck by the contrast between the energy demand data collected 

by DoD and that collected by another very large energy consuming entity – Wal-Mart. If 

a single freezer cabinet door remains open too long at an individual store, an alarm is 

triggered at Wal-Mart’s headquarters in Bentonville, AR. Wal-Mart uses detailed 

demand and consumption data to inform corporate wide decisions that affect energy 

demand including capital investments, maintenance policies and operational 

procedures. 

On the next, page Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of DoD energy consumption by end 

use in FY06. It gives a broad idea of DoD energy use but is insufficiently detailed to 

understand the causes of fuel demand. For example, jet fuel is by far the largest use, 

but is not used just for aviation. It is the main battlefield used to power land combat and 

Figure 2.1: DoD Fuel Delivery Cost Responsibility 
CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE_______________________________________________

16_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

support vehicles and generator sets at deployed locations. Aircraft use is well 

documented by tail number, but airlift is difficult to link back to the source of lift demand. 

For example, significant airlift resources are used to transport Army and Marine assets. 

Linking a reduction in the weight or volume of those assets to a reduction in airlift fuel 

requirements may be 

difficult. But it is a key 

input in determining the 

best choice among 

competing options for 

Army or Marine assets 

that are transported by 

air, and would 

significantly increase 

the benefit of lighterweight and more fuelefficient land platforms. 

2.2.3.2 Valuing Fuel 

The 2001 DSB report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” found 

that DoD was systematically underestimating the true cost of supplying fuel to its 

battlespace forces. It recommended use of a burdened cost for such fuel, the burden 

capturing the assets (force structure) required for delivery and protection of fuel from the 

point of commercial supply to the point of use. Fuel delivery costs include the part of 

Military Sealift Command that delivers fuel, the Air Force airborne tanker fleet, the 

amount of F-18 flying time spent serving as airborne tankers delivering fuel to other 

aircraft and the attendant refueling equipment, and the refueling vehicles owned by the 

Army and Marine Corps. The amount of fuel delivery equipment required to support 

specific units is included in tables used by the Services to build deployment packages. 

These are the Tables of Allowances (TOA), Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) 

and Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Fuel delivery costs also include 

assets used to protect the fuel as it transits from the point of commercial supply to the 

battlespace. Improving the efficiency of a deployed system would reduce the amount of 

fuel needed for battle, and hence the number of the fuel logistics assets the DoD would 

need to buy, maintain, train on, buy fuel for, and protect. The costs of those assets 

should be included in calculating the true cost of fuel to DoD, and should be compared 

with the cost to make deployed systems more efficient. 

The Task Force found that while some progress has been made since the 2001 DSB 

report, the fully burdened cost of fuel is not yet calculated nor well integrated into DoD’s 

business processes. In consequence, potential gains in operational effectiveness from 

Figure 2.2: DoD Energy Consumption by Type of Fuel
_________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________17 

increasing combat system fuel efficiency have not been realized. Integration of the fully 

burdened cost of fuel into DoD business processes remains a significant challenge. 

2.2.3.3 Managing Fuel Demand 

The Task Force found that there is no enterprise wide strategy for managing DoD’s 

energy usage. No one office is in charge; there are few objectives or metrics, and no 

one is accountable. Decisions that affect DoD’s demand for energy cut across multiple 

Undersecretaries, all the Services, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands 

(COCOMs) and Defense Agencies. Facility energy managers, specialty functions (e.g., 

medical, laboratory, industrial), fleet vehicles, non-developmental deployed systems, 

procurement policy governing commercial equipment purchase, and combat and 

support systems all drive DoD energy use, but are disconnected from each other 

organizationally, functionally and culturally. 

There are a number of external mandates driving energy practices, such as executive 

orders and legislation, but these are limited to non-tactical vehicles and installations. 

For example, Executive Order (EO) 13423, “Strengthening Federal Environmental, 

Energy and Transportation Management,” requires each Agency to improve the energy 

efficiency of its facilities and to utilize alternative fuels in its non-tactical alternative 

fueled vehicles. However, the Executive Order covers only about 25% of DoD’s energy 

use. The remaining 75% used for combat and combat related systems is not subject to 

its mandates – these functions are exempt. Hence, no one has been assigned 

responsibility for energy strategy or management for DoD’s largest category of energy 

use. The implications of this management vacuum are significant because once 

required, developed, acquired and fielded, inefficient platforms lock DoD into decades of 

large fuel logistics force structure and high fuel costs. 

2.2.3.4 Benefits of Better Fuel Management 

The Task Force found that combat and combat related systems generally are inefficient 

in their use of fuel. This represents a major constraint on the operational effectiveness 

of U.S. forces and translates directly into poor endurance and persistence in the 

battlespace. Platforms are forced to use time transiting to fuel sources instead of 

residing on station, and more of them are needed to maintain a continuous presence. 

Improvements in the efficiency of platforms therefore would enable U.S. forces to 

increase their in-theater effectiveness by spending more time on station relative to 

transit, and by allocating fewer of their assets to sustain a given number at that station. 

Platform inefficiency affects operational effectiveness in other ways as well. Moving 

and protecting fuel through a battlespace requires significant resources. It constrains 

freedom of movement by combat forces, makes them more vulnerable to attack, and 

compels them to redirect assets from combat operations to protection of supply lines. 

Thus, the need to move and protect fuel detracts from combat effectiveness in two 

ways; by adding to sustainment costs and by diverting and endangering in-theater force 

capability. 
CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE_______________________________________________

18_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

The payoff to DoD from reduced fuel demand in terms of mission effectiveness and 

human lives is probably greater than for any other energy user in the world. More 

efficient platforms would enhance range, persistence and endurance. They also would 

reduce the burden of owning, employing, operating and protecting the people and 

equipment needed to move and protect fuel from the point of commercial purchase to 

the point of use. An important implication is that increased energy efficiency of 

deployed equipment and systems will have a large multiplier effect. Not only will there 

be direct savings in fuel cost, but combat effectiveness will be increased and resources 

otherwise needed for resupply and protection redirected. Truck drivers and convoyprotectors can become combat soldiers, increasing combat capability while reducing 

vulnerabilities caused by extensive convoys. In short, more efficient platforms increase 

warfighting capability. 

2.3 Electricity 

Unlike petroleum, the U.S. possesses sufficient domestic resources to generate the 

electricity it needs for the foreseeable future. Coal is used to generate about 52% of the 

nation’s electricity. Estimates of the remaining resource range between 50 and 250 

years, depending on assumptions and accounting for uncertainties in methodologies 

used to estimate reserves. Current estimates show the U.S. is endowed with a larger 

coal supply than any other nation in the world, although recent National Research 

Council (NRC) reports cast question over the validity of those estimates and growing 

concerns over warming suggest that future use will depend in part on the ability to 

manage carbon dioxide in the combustion process. Nuclear produces about 20% of the 

nation’s electricity from 104 central plants. Natural gas produces about another 20%. 

The remainder is produced by hydroelectric (~6%), petroleum (~ 3%) and renewables 

such as wind, geothermal and solar. Wind is currently the fastest growing renewable 

source, but all renewables taken together still provide only a small percentage of the 

nation’s electricity demand. The U.S. is currently the top producer of electricity in the 

world with about 25% of the total, followed by China, Japan and Russia. 

DoD’s key problem with electricity is that critical missions, such as national strategic 

awareness and national command authorities, are almost entirely dependent on the 

national transmission grid. About 85% of the energy infrastructure upon which DoD 

depends is commercially owned, and 99% of the electrical energy DoD installations 

consume originates outside the fence.3

 As noted below, however, the grid is fragile, 

vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DoD control. In most cases, neither 

the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of 

critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long 

term (several months) outage. 

2.3.1 State of the Grid 

The U.S.-Canadian electric grid is very efficient and cost effective but its design metric 

is efficiency more than resiliency. As a consequence, it is vulnerable to natural disaster 

 

3

 Department of Defense Naval Surface Warfare Center – Dahlgren, Mission Assurance Division Briefing, 6 September 2006. 
_________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________19 

or deliberate attack. The Task Force received several briefings from the Mission 

Assurance Division at Dahlgren (MAD), the Department of Energy and the utility 

industry. Based on these briefings, the Task Force is concerned about the condition of 

the grid and the ability to effect timely repairs. 

This concern extends not only to the complete dependency of critical national security 

missions on the grid, but also to its centrality to all facets of the nation’s economic life. 

To appreciate the seriousness of the impacts of an extended disruption, consider the 

2003 Northeast blackout. At around 4:15pm EST on August 14, 2003 about 50 million 

people living in a 9,300 square mile area in the U.S. and Canada lost electrical power. 

More than 500 generating units at 265 power plants shut down during the outage, 22 of 

which were nuclear. Those plants took about two weeks to regain full capacity, and lost 

an average of more than half their capacity for 12 days. The shutdown was in part 

precautionary in nature. If an imbalance between load and supply occurs, power lines 

grow longer and sag from overheating and other hardware can fail. These imbalances 

can damage equipment that is hard-to-repair, requires long lead time to produce and is 

expensive. So, the grid quickly disconnects itself when a threatening imbalance is 

detected. Nuclear plants are required for safety reasons to shut down when the grid 

they’re connected to is de-energized.4

A U.S.-Canada Task Force found the main cause of the blackout to be the failure of a 

utility in Ohio to properly trim trees near a power line, causing the first in what became a 

set of cascading failures.5 Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham said there would be 

no punishment for the utility because current U.S. law does not require electric reliability 

standards. However, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) gave the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) new authority to direct the industry to develop 

reliability standards. It directs FERC to designate an Electric Reliability Organization 

(ERO) to develop and propose reliability standards, which only after agreement by the 

industry become mandatory. The ERO chosen by the FERC is a volunteer, industry run 

organization. While FERC oversight of industry developed standards is an 

improvement over the previous situation, the Task Force remains concerned that FERC 

may be unable to reduce the risk to critical DoD missions to acceptable levels in a 

reasonable timeframe. 

Some have argued that the August 2003 incident shows that the protections built into 

the grid worked. Within several hours electricity was restored to many areas, though a 

few areas waited nearly a week. However, the incident highlights how easily the power 

grid could be taken down. Also, quick restoration was possible because no significant 

equipment was damaged, something that might not occur in future incidents. Further, 

during the blackout most systems failed that would detect unauthorized border 

crossings, port landings, or unauthorized access to vulnerable sites. Future such 

 

4

 Information derived from the US-Canada Power Systems Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the 

United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, April 2004, available at <https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinalWeb.pdf>.

5

 Ibid. 
CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE_______________________________________________

20_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

blackouts could be exploited for terrorist activity, with potentially far more catastrophic 

results. 

These risks exist elsewhere than in the U.S. For example, on September 28, 2003 Italy 

experienced the largest of a series of blackouts suffered through that year, affecting a 

total of 56 million people, and spilling into Switzerland. 6 It was also the most serious 

blackout in Italy in 20 years. DoD installations located outside the continental United 

States (OCONUS) are dependent on the commercial grids serving their locations. 

Security of their power supplies and continuation of their missions is as important as 

within the U.S. 

2.3.2 Consequences of Prolonged Outage 

Briefings to the Task Force on grid vulnerability generally, and to military installations 

specifically, were alarming because they highlighted single-point-failures and the 

difficulty of restoration. 

Unfortunately, the current architecture of the grid is vulnerable to even simple attacks. 

In addition to physical attacks, cyber attacks could take down parts of the grid for 

extended periods.7

 Grid control systems are continuously probed electronically, and 

there have been numerous attempted attacks on the Supervisory Control and Data 

Acquisition (SCADA) systems that operate the grid. None have yet resulted in major 

problems in the U.S., but the potential exists for major outages. Recently discovered 

types of cyber attacks illustrate this vulnerability and would impose unique DoD 

consequences.8 They are discussed further in the classified annex to this report. 

A long term major power outage would have significant consequences for both DoD and 

the nation. To begin with, there is the threat to critical DoD missions. A number of 

installations in the U.S. and OCONUS host missions that are critical in strategic and 

tactical terms and must function 24/7. The resilience of these missions is wholly 

dependent on continued power to the buildings and equipment involved.9

There is also the threat to DoD installations. Historically, DoD has viewed the mission 

of each installation to be to launch or deploy combat forces when directed. Beyond 

that, the installation itself has been viewed as less critical. However, this is changing. 

Concern over domestic terrorist attacks, the establishment of the Department of 

Homeland Security and a new Homeland defense mission for DoD have created a new 

 

6 Lessons Learned from the Power Outage in North America and Europe, 15 December 2004, available at 

<http://www.iea.org/textbase/speech/2004/nvh_tokyo.pdf>. 

7

 Information derived from CRS Report for Congress, Government Activities to Protect the Electric Grid, 4 Feb 2005, available at 

<http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21958.pdf>. 

8

 Information derived from Mike Burks Control Systems Vulnerabilities, July 2003, available at 

<www.dtic.mil/ndia/2003triservice/burk.ppt>; and Calvert L. Bowen, Timothy Buennemeyer and Ryan Thomas, Next Generation 

SCADA Security: Best Practices and Client Puzzles, 2005, available at 

<http://www.itoc.usma.edu/Workshop/2005/Papers/Follow%20ups/WP%20IEEE%20(Jun%202005)%20-

%20Next%20Gen%20SCADA%20Security.pdf>. 

9

 Information derived from Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense, The Effects of Hurricane Katrina on the Defense 

Information Systems Agency Continuity of Operations and Test Facility, 12 December 2006, available at 

<http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/FY07/07-031.pdf>. 
_________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________21 

role for military installations.10 Not only is there now a critical need for installations to 

continue functioning 24/7, but the power needed is significantly greater than that 

needed to support only specific critical missions. 

Finally, there are the consequences to the nation. While assessing this is beyond the 

scope of the Task Force, a review of the consequences of the August 2003 outage is 

instructive. The outage caused cascading failures of critical infrastructure. Some areas 

lost drinking water because pumps or treatment systems or both failed. In at least one 

case, a chlorine leak at a chemical plant caused by the outage went undetected for 

nearly a week. Sewage systems failed as well, causing raw sewage to spill into 

waterways, including the ocean and rivers. People became sick from consuming 

unclean water. Rail service was significantly curtailed or stopped completely along 

Amtrak’s northeast corridor, on Long Island and in Canada. Air travel was affected 

because passenger screening stopped at most airports, electronic ticketing did not work 

and air traffic could not function reliably. Gas stations closed because they could not 

pump fuel, hindering not only commutes, but also transportation of goods. Price 

gouging took place in some instances, and gas lines were reminiscent of those in the 

1970s and early 1980s. Many oil refineries on the East Coast shut down. Cellular 

communications were disrupted because of inadequate backup power at 

communications towers and because customers could not recharge their phones. This 

overwhelmed some land line systems, and those with only cordless phones could not 

recharge them either. A number of television and radio stations went off the air 

temporarily though many had backup power. Cable television systems stopped 

broadcasting, some internet service providers were taken down and desktop computers 

not on backup power did not work. Large numbers of factories closed. And because of 

the interconnectedness of supply chains, many not directly affected by the outage had 

to close or slow because of supply problems. Border check systems did not work and 

truck traffic became severely backed up. This can be a serious economic problem 

when a "just-in-time" supply system depends on these trucks. Some industries took 

over a week to return to full production. Also, looting incidents were reported, though 

not to the level seen in New York City during the 1977 blackout. Overall, the nation lost 

output, some 50 million people in the U.S. and Canada were adversely affected, and 

U.S. national security was compromised. 

Because DoD faces substantial risks to its missions via grid and other critical 

infrastructure vulnerability, it must find means to manage these risks. Chapter V 

discusses how. 

2.4 Global Warming and Our Energy Choices 

An important and growing issue affecting energy is global warming. In the U.S., oil, coal 

and natural gas supply about 85% of total energy, and all produce greenhouse gas 

emissions (GHGs). Since the U.S. is responsible for more than 20% of annual 

worldwide emissions, global warming has become a major geopolitical issue, with 

 

10 Information derived from CRS Report for Congress, Homeland Security: The Department of Defense’s Role, 14 May 2003, 

available at <.http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31615.pdf>.
CHAPTER II: DOD’S ENERGY POSTURE_______________________________________________

22_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

international pressure growing for the U.S. to take a more active leadership role to 

address it. Many of our closest allies consider global warming among their most 

important issues. 

On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced the Administration’s Global Warming 

Initiative, with a key goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas intensity by 18% between 

2002 and 2012.11 Since then the U.S. has reduced this intensity by about 11%, though 

absolute emissions have not declined. In April 2007, the Supreme Court decided that 

EPA has the legal authority to regulate carbon emissions as a pollutant. In addition, a 

number of legislative proposals have been introduced to limit U.S. GHG emissions, and 

several regions of the United States have adopted or are adopting their own carbon 

cap-and-trade systems. Many senior energy industry executives have suggested the 

inevitability of future carbon regulation, and a number have publicly advocated federal 

regulation as preferable to a patchwork of state and local laws.12

The global movement toward constraints on future carbon emissions is gaining support. 

DoD cannot be oblivious to this trend. Thus, the Task Force recommends that if DoD 

decides to provide financial backing to synthetic fuel production plants, it should avoid 

investing in processes that exceed the carbon footprint of petroleum. The Task Force 

recommends DoD continue to invest in low carbon synthetic fuel technologies that 

address unique, pressing DoD needs. For example, equipment capable of producing 

fuel at forward deployed locations using locally available renewable or waste feedstock 

reduces gallon for gallon the amount needed to be moved and protected in theater. 

DoD should continue to invest in research into alternative, non-petroleum, renewable 

and low-carbon footprint fuels for the long term. 

 

11 Greenhouse gas intensity is the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output. The U.S. goal is to lower emissions from 

an estimated 183 metric tons per million dollars of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002, to 151 metric tons per million dollars of 

GDP in 2012. For more information see < http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/intensitygoal.html>. 

12 “Energy Firms Come to Terms With Warming,” Washington Post, 25 November 2006: A1. 
____ CHAPTER III: MANAGING FUEL DEMAND – A BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING CHALLENGE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________23 

CHAPTER III: MANAGING FUEL DEMAND – A BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING CHALLENGE

3.1 Unfinished Tasks from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force 

The 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force report “More Capable Warfighting 

Through Reduced Fuel Burden” found that: 

• Fuel logistics represent a significant portion (~70%) of the tonnage the Army 

ships into battle. 

• Multiple technologies are available for all categories of deployed systems and at 

all levels of maturity that could reduce fuel demand. 

The key finding was that warfighting, logistics and monetary benefits occur when 

weapons systems are made more fuel-efficient, but those benefits are not valued or 

emphasized in the requirements and acquisition processes. This is because DoD’s 

business processes do not explicitly, routinely or systematically consider either the 

energy problem or opportunities to address it. The report found that the requirements 

process does not require energy efficiency in deployed systems, the acquisition process 

does not value it, the procurement process does not recognize it, and the Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) process does not provide it 

visibility when considering investment decisions. 

The 2001 report made 5 recommendations: 

• Base investment decisions on the fully burdened cost of fuel and on warfighting 

and environmental benefits. 

• Strengthen the linkage between warfighting capability and fuel logistics 

requirements through wargaming and other analytical tools. 

• Incentivize fuel efficiency throughout DoD. 

• Target fuel efficiency improvements through investments in Science and 

Technology and systems design. 

• Include fuel efficiency in requirements and acquisition processes. 

It asserted that DoD’s warfighting capability could be greatly strengthened through 

implementation of these recommendations because it would result in more resources 

available to fight (more tooth), with fewer needed for support (less tail). It asserted too 

that DoD’s budget challenges would be eased through reductions in Operations and 

Support costs and less exposure to volatile energy prices. 

The present Task Force again examined DoD’s business processes, investments, 

policies and practices as they relate to the energy efficiency of combat and combat 

related systems. It concluded that while some progress has been made, it is limited and 
CHAPTER III: MANAGING FUEL DEMAND – A BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING CHALLENGE____

24_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

late, stimulated mainly by recent high oil prices rather than the fundamental forces that 

affect DoD energy costs. 

In essence, the Task Force found that many of the same problems that existed in 2001 

still exist today. A great deal of work goes into identifying options across the DOTMLPF 

(Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and 

Facilities) spectrum that produce warfighting “effects.” Yet too little attention is paid to 

the amount of effort necessary to achieve those effects, where effort encompasses the 

delivery of necessary logistics, particularly fuel logistics. 

Following release of the 2001 report, some encouragement was given to 

implementation of its recommendations. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense signed a memo (undated), stating “...include fuel efficiency as a Key 

Performance Parameter (KPP) in all Operational Requirements Documents and 

Capstone Requirements Documents.” However, the Director, Joint Staff, non-concurred 

with the DSB recommendation to make energy efficiency a requirement, saying “We do 

not agree that ‘fuel efficiency’ should be a mandatory performance parameter 

expressed in operational requirements documents.” 

In Sep 2001, H.R. 2586 passed the Congress: “It is the sense of Congress that DoD 

should implement recommendations by the Defense Science Board to incorporate fuel 

efficiency in terms of procurement requirements, warfighting capability and logistics 

requirements, and base investment decisions on the true cost of fuel.” However, a 

sense of Congress is not binding on DoD, and the Task Force was unable to identify 

tangible evidence that the Department took tangible action to implement the 

recommendations until August 2006. 

3.2 Recent Initiatives to Implement the 2001 Task Force Report 

In August 2006, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff signed a memorandum, “Key 

Performance Parameter Study Recommendations and Implementation” announcing a 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) decision to endorse “selectively applying 

an Energy Efficiency KPP...as appropriate” (JROC 161-06). In May 2007, CJCSI 

3170.01F “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System” was released which 

incorporates the requirement for an energy related KPP and assigns the Joint Staff 

Director J4 to review and comment on the analysis and recommendations. 

On April 10, 2007 the USD(AT&L) signed a memo “Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel Pilot 

Program” making it “DoD policy to include the fully burdened cost of delivered energy in 

trade-off analyses conducted for all tactical systems with end items that create a 

demand for energy and to improve the energy efficiency of those systems, consistent 

with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.” To develop the procedures and 

guidance needed to implement the policy, the USD(AT&L) identified three pilot 

programs (the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint 

Forces alternative ship propulsion and efficiency options AoA, and the Next-Generation 

Long-Range Strike concept decision) and is providing support to the programs to help 
____ CHAPTER III: MANAGING FUEL DEMAND – A BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING CHALLENGE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________25 

perform the trade analyses. A preliminary analytic effort identified some key elements 

of the fully burdened cost of fuel delivered to platform in theater in wartime, but at this 

writing the analysis remains incomplete. 

The Task Force views these as positive developments, but believes significant work 

remains to be done to: 

• identify the data and analytic products needed to inform these decisions; 

• develop and deploy the necessary analytical tools and data collection systems to 

produce accurate and relevant analytical products; 

• issue an unambiguous policy that use of energy KPP and FBCF extends to 

“black” programs; and 

• develop the policies and procedures necessary to ensure these analytical inputs 

are integrated into relevant decision processes at the right time. 

Without follow-through on these steps, the Task Force is skeptical that energy 

considerations will be quantified to the degree necessary to be accurately factored into 

key requirements, acquisition and PPBES decisions. 

3.3 Means to Increase the Endurance of Combat and Combat Related Systems 

In thinking about how to improve the endurance of operational forces by producing more 

“effect” for less “effort,” the Task Force identified three core approaches that could be 

applied across the spectrum of DoD activities that generate battlespace fuel demand. 

They are: 

• DoD Business Processes; 

• Operational Practices and Procedures; and 

• Technology Advancement, to include Research, Development and 

Demonstration. 

3.3.1 DoD Business Processes – Uninformed About Fuel Burden 

There are three key business processes operating in DoD that collectively determine 

the size and character of the force structure. The first establishes military requirements 

across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, 

Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. This process is called the Joint 

Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The second is the Acquisition 

system. It produces equipment in response to requirements for materiel solutions to fill 

gaps in military capability. The third is the budget adjudication process, currently called 

the PPBES. It establishes a six year investment program with the ultimate objective of 

providing operational commanders the best mix of forces, equipment, and support 

Endurance: ability to sustain operations for an extended time 

without support or replenishment. 
CHAPTER III: MANAGING FUEL DEMAND – A BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING CHALLENGE____

26_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

attainable within fiscal constraints. A simplistic, but useful, model to think of these three 

processes is as an internal DoD market: the requirements process as the customer, the 

acquisition process as the product developer, the research community as the 

technology provider, and the PPBES as the source of capital. It is only after these 

decisions have been made that satisfying their resulting fuel demand becomes a 

planning factor. Since the Combatant Commanders are suffering operationally from 

high fuel burden, the Task Force concluded greater COCOM input to the requirements 

process would improve its ability to value fuel efficiency. 

The processes are logical, but they do not function properly with respect to energy. 

This is not to say that fuel is never considered, but it must reach a high threshold before 

it becomes an issue. For example, in the 1970s the F-16 was selected over a twoengine competitor due to its lower fuel consumption. Mach number decisions for 

specific aircraft have been influenced by their fuel demands. But to manage fuel 

effectively, it must become an integral part of the decision processes, rather than just 

when it reaches a level where singular decisions can have significant operational and 

force structure consequences. If the requirements process does not understand energy 

efficiency in terms it values – operational capability, combat vulnerability, and force 

structure balance – it will have no reason for making efficiency a requirement. If the 

acquisition process does not understand the total ownership cost of buying, moving and 

protecting fuel to systems in combat (fully burdened cost of fuel), then its business case 

analyses will use only the commodity price for fuel. This distorts the results to make 

high return investments in efficiency look much worse than they really are. The PPBES 

process has two barriers to overcome. First, it cannot compare options that have not 

been developed. The inability of the requirements and acquisition processes to properly 

value efficiency means they are unable to produce a business case for such efficiency. 

And second, the PPBES process is current-year focused, making it very difficult for 

investments with paybacks of more than one year to compete for funds. Paying current 

year bills is a higher priority than making investments to reduce multi-year operating 

costs. 

Because of these flaws, the JCIDS process is good at knowing the operational 

capabilities it needs, but not at finding the most efficient way of providing them. Suboptimal choices are delivered to the acquisition process to develop. The Task Force 

concluded that giving the COCOMS the analytical capability to better understand the 

fuel logistics “price” of specific weapons systems “capabilities” and a stronger voice in 

the JCIDS process would benefit efforts to better capture the value of fuel in JDICS 

decisions. The acquisition process does not properly value energy efficiency and hence 

programs are designed that consume too much of it. Program designers do not know 

how much they should pay for energy efficiency, or how much of it to buy. Options to 

invest in technologies that would make new systems more efficient and reduce future 

fuel logistics demand are not identified, and often not even developed; hence are not 

visible to the PPBES process, nor, often, brought to maturity for adoption. 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________27 

3.3.1.1 JCIDS and Pre-JCIDS Service Planning 

JCIDS is a Four-Step Process. The Functional Area Analysis (FAA) defines operational 

success in terms of tasks to be accomplished. It does not include the need to move and 

protect fuel. The Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) assesses the ability of current and 

programmed capabilities to satisfy the FAA, and identifies gaps. The Functional 

Solutions Analysis (FSA) identifies possible approaches across the DOTMLPF 

spectrum to fill the capability gap and determines the optimum approach. Fuel logistics 

becomes a task for the logisticians to solve after these decisions have been made. 

However, each of the possible approaches identified in the FSA may impose different 

fuel demands. Rather than treating battlespace fuel as a problem to be solved after the 

FSA decision has been made, the fuel consequences of each option should be an input 

to the FSA decision. As shown in Figure 3.1 below, Percentage of Cost Locked in by 

Phase, the earlier in the planning cycle these issues are considered, the more control 

decision makers have over the outcome. The Task Force strongly urges the JROC to 

require battlespace fuel demand to be a factor in the FAA phase of JCIDS, and that fuel 

logistics and protection be explicitly modeled by the Service planning functions in the 

pre-JCIDS process. 

Modeling and simulation conducted during 

JCIDS and the Service pre-JCIDS 

planning functions lack the capability to 

quantify the contribution of system 

efficiency to battlespace outcome or force 

structure requirements. Force-on-force 

models and simulations used to explore 

new concepts and test new systems do 

not explicitly include logistics; this is a 

serious shortcoming. The Task Force 

recognizes that the models make 

simplifying assumptions for the sake of 

looking at battlefield effects and outcomes 

under certain constraints and limitations, 

but it strongly recommends that analysts 

not turn a blind eye to the need to account 

for logistics in the capability documents. Lessons learned and military judgment 

sometimes get applied as sanity checks and programmatic goals, but in the absence of 

explicit modeling it becomes easy to minimize what is inherently inconvenient. Such 

explicit modeling of logistics assets would better reflect reality, and would have 

significant impacts on concepts and the way required capabilities are developed. 

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Cost Locked in by Phase 
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3.3.1.2 Acquisition 

Acquisition translates capability needs into material solutions. Technology evaluations, 

engineering studies and trade-off analyses occur at the interface between JCIDS and 

acquisition, as well as throughout the acquisition process. These analyses identify the 

best technologies and designs to keep the program on target in terms of cost, schedule 

and performance and to address the myriad of “ilities” (maintainability, reliability, 

transportability, etc.) imposed on programs. The rules and methodologies that 

acquisition programs use to conduct cost-benefit analyses dictate their outcome. 

Generally, technologies must have achieved a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 to 

be considered mature enough for an acquisition program. TRL 6 means a prototype 

has been tested in a high fidelity laboratory environment or in a simulated operational 

environment. TRLs are used to manage the technical risk to programs. They range 

from TRL 1 where basic principles have been observed and reported and scientific 

research begins to be applied; to TRL 9 where technologies are being used under 

operational mission conditions. 

Technologies that could reduce the fuel demand of a deployed system but which do not 

appear cost effective if the fuel cost is assumed to be $2.50 per gallon might be 

extremely compelling if the actual cost of moving and protecting the fuel were used 

instead. According to preliminary estimates by OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation 

(PA&E) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) the cost of delivering fuel to battle 

begins at around $15 per gallon and increases the deeper into the battlespace the fuel 

moves, assuming no force protection requirements for the supply convoys. Fuel 

delivered in-flight has been estimated to be on the order of $42 per gallon. The Task 

Force estimates these values to be low, and not accounting for much of the force 

structure needed to deliver the fuel demanded by deployed assets. In order to 

implement FBCF, the Department will need to undertake a rigorous effort to develop a 

methodology for estimating the values, and establish a policy formalizing them. As of 

this writing, the Department has yet to establish appropriate values to use for FBCF. 

Using FBCF drastically changes the calculus of system energy efficiency. 

The rules by which these processes function are themselves the primary barriers to 

reducing fuel burden. Changes in the rules would improve the “tooth to tail ratio,” or put 

another way would achieve maximum operational effect through reduced logistics effort. 

Change the rules, change the outcome. 

Another important observation of the Task Force is that what JCIDS currently calls 

“capability” is actually the theoretical performance of a platform or system unconstrained 

by the logistics tail required for its operation. But tail takes money, people, and materiel 

that detract from tooth. True net capability, constrained by sustainment, is thus the 

gross capability (performance) of a platform or system times its “effectiveness factor” - 

its ratio of effect to effort: 

Effectiveness Factor = Tooth / (Tooth + Tail) 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________29 

Also, in an actual budget, Tooth = (Resources – Tail), so: 

Effectiveness Factor = (Resources – Tail) / Resources 

Effectiveness factor ranges from zero (with infinite tail) to one (with zero tail). If tail > 0, 

true net capability is always less than theoretical (tail-less) performance; but DoD 

consistently confuses these two metrics, and so misallocates resources. Buying more 

tooth that comes with more (but invisible) tail may achieve little, no, or negative net gain 

in true capability. While the Department recognizes the need to reduce tail, the 

analytical tools needed to inform decisions on how to do so are not in place. Focusing 

on reducing tail can create revolutionary capability gains and free up support personnel, 

equipment, and budget for realignment. The Task Force recommendations are 

intended to build the analytical and policy foundation to begin introducing this way of 

thinking into the requirements, acquisition and budget forecasting processes. 

The Task Force was encouraged to see the April 10, 2007 policy memo by USD(AT&L) 

requiring use of the fully burdened cost of fuel to be used for all acquisition trade 

analyses. Establishing rules for who determines the costs, how they will be determined 

and how they will be used by both government and industry Program Managers (PM) 

will be challenging. This is especially true since the fully burdened cost of fuel is 

strongly scenario dependent. Nevertheless, recognition that calculation of the fully 

burdened cost is a necessary component of system evaluation will move system design 

and program management in the right directions. 

3.3.1.3 Non-Developmental Deployed Systems 

In addition to combat systems, equipment, systems and infrastructure at forward 

operating bases also create significant battlefield fuel demand. According to the 2001 

DSB report, of the top 10 battlefield fuel users only 2 were combat systems. The rest 

were support systems. For example, the water heater for the field kitchen created a 

larger battlefield fuel demand than the AH-64D attack helicopter. 13 According to 

briefings received by the Task Force, the situation today is no better than the campaign 

plans suggested in 2001. 

Based on energy use patterns found by the Rapid Equipping Force (REF), the Task 

Force finds it difficult to conclude that much, if any, consideration has been given to the 

 

13 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through

Reduced Fuel Burden, January 2001, p. 43, available at < http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/fuel.pdf>. 

Fuel that is transported at great risk, great cost in lives and money, 

and substantial diversion of combat assets for convoy protection, is 

burned in generator sets to produce electricity that is, in turn, used 

to air condition un-insulated and even unoccupied tents. 
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30_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

battlefield fuel demand created by equipment designed, developed or purchased for 

FOBs. One recently analyzed FOB used about 95% of its genset electricity for this 

purpose, and about one-third of the Army’s total wartime fuel use is for running gensets 

(see Table 4.1 on page 44). The inefficient use of electricity at deployed locations 

raised grave concerns. However, the Task Force is encouraged by the work of the REF 

and hopeful that its findings will result in a new emphasis on efficiency for deployed 

equipment and a new focus on wasteful operational procedures. 

3.3.1.4 Energy as a Key Performance Parameter 

The Task Force welcomes DoD policy requiring selective application of an energy 

efficiency KPP, interpreting it to mean applying it to all systems that create significant 

battlespace fuel demand. It is concerned, however, with implementation of the 

recommendation. Presentations by the Joint Staff indicate little progress to date toward 

defining how an energy efficiency KPP will be developed, how it will be applied or how a 

milestone authority will determine whether it has been satisfied. Further, the intended 

outcome of an energy related KPP is to drive the development and adoption of 

technologies that reduce battlespace fuel demand. The Department has not yet 

developed the analytical tools needed to do so. The objective is to develop tools that 

enable milestone authorities to understand the battlespace fuel consequences of the 

options identified in the JCIDS FSA and to use that information as a factor in the 

Concept Decision. This has not been done, and the Task Force was unable to discover 

plans to do so. 

3.3.1.5 Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) 

Previous efforts have been made to quantify the effects of including logistic 

infrastructure, delivery and protection costs in the full cost of fuel. The results indicate 

that the FBCF far exceeds its commodity price. For example, estimates by the 2001 

DSB, JASON, OSD(PA&E), IDA and Service cost groups have shown delivered costs 

for fuel to range from a low of $4 per gallon for ships on the open ocean to $42 per 

gallon for in-flight refueling to several hundred dollars per gallon for combat forces and 

FOBs deep within a battlespace. By comparison, the DESC standard price for JP-8 

was $2.14 per gallon on April 1, 2007. On October 1, 2007 it increased to $2.31 and on 

December 19, 2007 it increased to $3.04 per gallon.14 

The use of FBCF is needed to answer the question “how much should DoD invest in 

efficiency to the demand for fuel into the battlespace?” The FBCF figure is to be used 

to inform decisions at all levels, from design concepts, to choice of propulsion system to 

technology choices made at the component level by systems engineers to the types of 

equipment deployed to field installations. DoD currently has no analytical function 

dedicated to answering this question. While the OSD(PA&E) Cost Analysis and 

Improvement Group (CAIG) have been given the task of developing guidance for 

producing the estimates, it is unclear which office will be assigned the task of actually 

doing so. The Task Force questions whether program offices have the analytical 

 

14 See Defense Energy Support Center, <http://www.desc.dla.mil/DCM/DCMPage.asp?LinkID=DESCCutomerService>. 
____ CHAPTER III: MANAGING FUEL DEMAND – A BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING CHALLENGE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________31 

capability to make this determination, and whether leaving it to individual program 

offices will result in consistency of approach across programs. 

The Army has centralized this function in its Sustain the Mission Project (SMP). SMP 

developed a methodology for estimating the FBCF based on the 2001 DSB “More 

Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” report. It estimates the energyrelated resources and costs to sustain Army missions in the training base and in 

theaters of operation, and has been validated by the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics. The Army has chosen to establish this 

capability through contract, rather than as an organic capability. This relieves program 

offices of the task, provides consistency across programs, and gives it independence 

and transparency. 

However, its use is not mandatory for Army acquisition programs, and it does not 

explicitly measure or analyze the effects of energy demand on combat effectiveness, 

mobility, and other mission goals. Steps to implement the use of SMP in acquisition 

and to fully understand the implications of energy demand on combat effectiveness 

could help identify a variety of means for improved Army operations. 

The Task Force has one concern with how the Department is implementing FBCF. The 

OSD(PA&E) guidance memo for estimating FBCF cautions “the fully burdened cost of 

fuel should generally assume peacetime OPTEMPO. Using “worst case” or combat 

scenarios to evaluate alternatives for the entire life cycle of a platform will skew the 

burdened rates, making some technologies appear to have a greater return on 

investment than they are likely to achieve in actual practice during a life cycle exceeding 

30 years.” 

The Task Force does not support this approach. FBCF is a wartime capability planning 

factor, not a peacetime cost estimate. Because it is scenario dependent, it should be 

estimated across the range of scenarios and missions envisioned for the system in 

question. The logistics structure needed to deliver fuel for those scenarios and 

missions and the operational assets used to protect that fuel during transit are part of 

the FBCF for that system. 

The challenge is to translate reductions in battlespace fuel demand into the savings that 

would result from retiring or diverting the equipment and systems no longer needed to 

deliver that fuel. The methodology developed by OSD(PA&E) provides the most 

comprehensive estimate of the costs of fuel in peacetime at installations and in specific 

operational situations but has not yet been converted into a full analysis ready to apply. 

The task of relating reductions in these costs to specific reductions in battlespace fuel 

demand also remains to be done. 

3.3.1.6 Reset Opportunities 

While not acquisitions, reset (or recapitalization) programs direct substantial sums of 

money to rebuilding existing equipment to original specifications. The net effect is to 
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32_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

refurbish yesterday’s equipment buys to yesterday’s vehicle technology baseline. A 

refurbished 1970s technology High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is 

still a 1970s vintage HMMWV. The Army estimates its current reset requirement at 

about $85 billion.15 The Task Force views this investment as an opportunity to move 

technology forward. While there are limitations imposed by the basic configuration of 

the equipment, the Task Force strongly recommends explicitly exploring opportunities to 

improve the energy efficiency of systems scheduled for reset. 

3.3.2 Operational Procedures 

How systems are operated also significantly affects fuel consumption. Despite a few 

programs to induce careful operator use of energy, the Task Force found that 

commanders generally are not incentivized to reduce fuel consumption. More programs 

are needed like the Navy’s Incentivized Energy Conservation program (i-ENCON) that 

allows ship commanders to keep a portion of the money saved through operational 

efficiency measures and use it for morale, welfare and recreation or investments in 

further efficiency measures; or the Air Force Model Base Energy Initiative which 

includes operational practices in its effort to minimize installation energy footprint. Many 

further improvements in operational procedures among all the Services and Defense 

Agencies appear possible. Some examples of steps that could be taken follow: 

Aircraft

• Reduce unnecessary equipment aboard aircraft to reduce weight and accurately 

manage cargo center of gravity. 

• Avoid tank “top off” when not needed. 

• Use single engine taxiing. 

• Avoid use of afterburners as much as possible. 

• Plan and execute efficient flight routing. 

• Make more extensive use of simulators. 

• Refuel in-flight only when absolutely necessary. 

• Move fuel by air as little as possible. 

• Plan missions to minimize any need to “dump” fuel. 

Ships

• Slow steam ships on only one engine running at peak efficiency instead of 

multiple engines at lower efficiency. 

 

15 CSA & CMC Testimony before House Armed Services Committee, as reported by Army News Service, 26 January 07. 
____ CHAPTER III: MANAGING FUEL DEMAND – A BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING CHALLENGE

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________33 

Ground Forces

• Reduce battery re-supply in the field through use of lightweight portable 

photovoltaic systems. 

• Reduce air conditioning losses at hot weather FOBs through tent insulation. 

Logistics and Planning

• Make maximum use of ocean shipping to avoid the need for air shipping. 

• Plan air logistics transport to maximize load factors. 

Aircraft and Ground Vehicles

• Use Auxiliary Power Units (APUs), or batteries when power is needed for 

stationary vehicles instead of running main propulsion engines. 

Facilities and Shipboard Hotel Loads

• Use only Energy Star or Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) 

designated efficient products where available. 

• Maintain heating and cooling systems in top performance through continuous 

commissioning. 

• Manage thermostat settings. 

• Use compact fluorescent light bulbs or solid state / light-emitting diode (LED) 

lighting. 

• Use occupancy sensors to turn lights on and off. 

• Eliminate requirement for computer systems to be on 24/7 through better 

scheduling of software updates and other maintenance activities. 

Procurement Policy

• Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Government Services Administration (GSA) 

to offer only Energy Star or FEMP designated products as required by the 

Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 104. 

• Prohibit government credit cards from being used to purchase non-Energy Star 

or FEMP designated products. 

The Task Force found that the key barrier to implementing actions such as these is 

people taking the availability of energy for granted. Overcoming this will require a 

campaign linking saved energy to national security and strong leadership attention 

focused on strategy, metrics and accountability. It will require inculcating energy 

considerations into business processes, fitness and performance reports, education and 

training programs and incentive programs. The challenge is now greater than it was in 

the 70s and 80s and the consequences of failure even greater. Creating both 

incentives and awareness at all levels will focus people’s attention and make 
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34_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

implementing many of the recommendations of this report easier by unleashing the 

creativity of the Department’s best assets – its people. 

3.3.3 Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) Investments 

in Efficiency 

As the technology supplier to acquisition programs, DDR&E is in a difficult position 

regarding technologies that improve efficiency. Big ticket items such as new propulsion 

systems or new design concepts get attention, but because they apply across a wide 

range of platforms and systems their constituency is diffuse. Technologies with the 

potential to make incremental improvements often are not significant enough to attract 

much funding and are disadvantaged in their competition for deployment into programs. 

As the warfighting value of efficiency becomes recognized by the requirements process 

and cost effectiveness becomes recognized by the acquisition process through the use 

of FBCF for trade analyses, this situation should improve. 

3.3.4 Competitive Prototyping 

Operators are risk averse, quite understandably so. New technologies, such as 

lightweight composite armor, new design concepts or new propulsion technologies may 

look good on paper but operators risk their lives and prefer the comfort of proven 

systems. Incremental improvements may be acceptable, but disruptive breakthrough 

technologies are seen as too risky to chance. Yet it is exactly such technologies that 

can propel the U.S. to superior combat position. They need to be tested under realistic 

conditions to see whether they will work. To accelerate the process of validating new 

concepts and making them more acceptable to operators, the Task Force recommends 

expanded use of competitive prototyping. 

The Task Force recognizes that proving new concepts at scale through competitive 

prototyping requires significant investment. But DoD has used this approach before and 

by doing so has achieved rapid advancements in shorter periods than required today. 

Unfortunately, DoD abandoned this practice a few decades ago as unaffordable. 

The Task Force concluded that DoD cannot afford not to do competitive prototyping. 

Such prototyping reduces the risk of deploying advanced technologies more quickly in 

multi-billion acquisition programs. The Task Force also noted the competitive 

prototyping program should include several important features to ensure effective 

execution: 

• It must remain uncoupled from Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) approved 

programs in order to avoid risk-aversion and “dumbing-down” by program 

advocates, whether contractor or government. 

Cost effective energy efficiency is an unqualified good that DoD 

should recognize. 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________35 

• The prototypes should be administered by an independent organization with 

experience in these types of programs in order to: a) streamline the contracting 

process, b) minimize program management interference with the contractor, c) 

avoid Service bias, and d) demonstrate contractor’s claims. 

• The competitive prototype program should fund at least two competitors per 

vehicle category in order to: a) broaden the number of technological 

approaches, b) maintain competitive pressure, and c) ensure industrial design 

base continuity. 

• The funding should be from Budget Activity 4 accounts (“Advanced Component 

Development and Prototypes”), and not Science and Technology (S&T) (Budget 

Activity 1-3), to ensure strong ties to acquisition. The Task Force’s Platform 

Panel suggests a dedicated level on the order of $500M per year. 

An effective program would provide operators and program manager’s confidence in 

innovative technologies through real world testing. It would also provide the industrial 

base with experience in using new technologies, help to secure technological leadership 

and improve the competitive position of the defense industry. 

3.4 Strategic Technology Vectors 

Technology does not develop in a particular direction for arbitrary reasons. It does so in 

response to a perceived need. The Task Force noted recent DSB summer studies on 

the subject of strategic technology vectors to guide research investments and 

concluded DoD’s energy problems sufficiently critical to add two new strategic vectors: 

endurance and resilience.16 This Task Force concluded they would compliment the 

current vectors of speed, stealth, persistence and networking. 

Endurance exploits improved energy efficiency and autonomous energy supply to 

extend range and dwell—recognizing the need for affordable dominance, requiring little 

or no fuel logistics, in persistent, dispersed, and remote operations, while enhancing 

overmatch in more traditional operations. Resilience combines efficient energy use with 

more diverse, dispersed, renewable supply—turning the loss of critical missions from 

energy supply failures (by accident or malice) from inevitable to near-impossible. 

3.5 Opposition to Change 

Opposition expressed to the Task Force for the changes being recommended fall into a 

number of categories. The one most often heard for not valuing or investing in 

efficiency was based on a presumption that the benefits will never be realized because 

the Services will not give up the logistics assets made redundant by the improved 

efficiency. The Task Force did not consider this valid. What DoD decides to do with the 

extra logistics capacity does not diminish its value. Presuming that leadership will 

decide to use the extra logistics capacity to deploy the force more quickly rather than 

 

16 See Defense Science Board, < http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm>. 
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36_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

reduce logistics force structure is not a reason to not want to know that the option 

exists. How leadership decides to use the benefit is a separate issue. 

A second reason cited is the “split incentives” argument. This is a well known 

management issue and one DoD recognizes. It says the owner of one corporate 

account is not incentivized to make investments that only benefit the owners of other 

accounts, even if the investment is in the best interest of the corporation overall. For 

DoD, the issue is investing acquisition funds to reduce operating and support costs. If a 

more efficient combat system requires more acquisition investment, DoD could decide 

to increase the acquisition budget at the expense of the operating and support budget. 

The argument goes that the logistics community will not permit their budgets to be 

reduced, so the acquisition programs will not get the increased funding. But again, this 

is no reason for choosing not to understand that the option exists. Additionally, there 

are other reasons for making combat systems more efficient beyond the logistics budget 

– operational vulnerability and force protection demands may be more important issues. 

Understanding the full range of costs, benefits and risks of making deployed systems 

more efficient reveals options to decision makers that would not otherwise be visible. 

Having more options available is better than having fewer. 

Another reason cited is the large investment in modeling and simulation (M&S) needed 

to develop accurate logistics modules. While such M&S is not without effort, a few 

million dollars per year to provide better tools to the warfighters and acquisition 

community and new insights to senior leaders is negligible relative to the improvements 

to multi-billion dollar acquisition decisions it can generate. 

3.6 National Spinoff Benefits 

Finally, there are spin-off benefits addressed in the TOR - the national benefits. OSD 

(PA&E) estimated it is worth $42 to avoid delivering a gallon of fuel through aerial 

refueling and at least $15 to avoid delivering a gallon of fuel to the forward edge of a 

battlefield. If the cost of force protection for fuel convoys in Afghanistan and Iraq were 

used, the $15 figure likely would be far higher since it is based on minimal force 

protection. It is unlikely that energy efficiency has a higher value to any other 

organization in the country, possibly the world. If DoD were to invest in technologies 

that improved efficiency at a level commensurate with the value of those technologies to 

its forces and warfighting capability, it would probably become a technology incubator 

and provide mature technologies to the market place for industry to adopt for 

commercial purposes. The overall national outcome of changing DoD business 

processes to accurately value efficiency is difficult to predict but doing so would be 

consistent with best business practices used by the world’s most successful companies 

and likely would develop multiple technologies for use in the civilian sector as well as by 

DoD itself. 
______________ CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________37 

CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND 

ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES

The Task Force examined the special challenges associated with combat systems and 

identified technical options for addressing those issues. The Task Force also examined 

fuel supply technologies and made some recommendations on research investments 

and the potential of alternative fuels’ to mitigate DoD’s energy risks. 

4.1 Technologies to Improving Combat Endurance 

There are huge gaps between the efficiency of current platforms and what is technically

and economically achievable in the future. Fortunately, technology exists to enhance 

the fuel efficiency of air, maritime and ground platforms. Some of this is potential 

breakthrough technology that can increase force effectiveness many times over while 

others will produce more modest gains but is lower in risk and in many cases can be 

done more quickly. 

Technical improvement in platform fuel efficiency can be achieved via three pathways: 

• fundamental – new vehicle configurations that affect overall aerodynamics and 

structural efficiency; new propulsion architecture and over the longer term, 

fuels.17 

• major subsystem increments – step improvements in engines, pervasive 

introduction of new structural materials, etc. 

• small component evolution – such things as all-electric actuation, winglets, more 

efficient generators, thrusters, material substitution, etc. 

We discuss examples of each of these pathways. All need to be pursued for DoD to 

maximize the operational effectiveness of its fighting forces. Based on briefings, 

papers, reports, and other sources made available to the Task Force, the Task Force 

believes there is enormous technical potential to cost effectively become more fuel 

efficient and by so doing to significantly enhance operational effectiveness. 

4.1.1 Potential Fundamental Breakthrough Technologies 

The Task Force reviewed literally hundreds of technologies with potential to improve 

fuel efficiency. All have merit but most individually offer incremental, often single digit 

percentage, improvements over current technology. This is not to say they are not 

worth pursuing—the collective effect of many incremental improvements would have a 

major cumulative effect. However, there are three technologies with the potential to 

fundamentally alter DoD capabilities and enable new concepts of operations. These 

offer the potential of double digit percentage improvements in energy efficiency over 

 

17 In the long term, fuels that are lighter per unit of energy produced, such as liquid methane and liquid hydrogen, may prove 

advantageous for long range and high speed aircraft; however, many technical and operational hurdles must be overcome first. 
CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES ____________

38_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

current technologies, and to propel our domestic industrial base to new levels of 

performance. They have the potential not only to improve DoD’s capabilities, but to 

benefit the nation through commercial adoption. A more detailed description of these 

technologies is contained in Appendix D. The three technologies are: 

• Blended Wing Body for fixed-wing, heavy-lift aircraft; 

• Variable Speed Tilt Rotor for vertical lift aircraft; and 

• Blast-Bucket design concept for light armor ground vehicles. 

The three are shown in Figure 4.1 below with rough estimates of their operational gains 

and fuel savings. 

In addition, alternate fuels 

for specific missions and 

systems (e.g. cryogenic 

liquid methane and 

hydrogen fuels for longrange and/or high speed 

aircraft) could offer the 

potential for much higher 

energy densities than 

current fuels. Such fuels 

could impart important 

operational capability 

benefits in the future, but 

their availability is beyond 

the timeframe of the other 

technologies addressed in 

the report. The potential for 

such fuels suggests basic research in this area should continue. 

4.1.1.1 Blended Wing Body (BWB) 

The BWB design would fundamentally alter the design of heavy aircraft such as tankers, 

bombers and transports (DoD’s single largest fuel use). It offers the possibility of 2x 

gains in range and payload, and of 5-10x in system level fuel efficiency (see Figure 4.2). 

If the technology can be successfully applied to both tankers and bombers, the potential 

exists for far fewer sorties needed to accomplish a given mission. The enhanced range 

of both bombers and tankers would offer the possibility of far fewer aircraft devoted to a 

single mission, freeing aircraft to conduct other missions or to focus more firepower on a 

given target.

The overall efficiency and productivity improvements enabled by BWB designs are 

striking. For example, the enhanced fuel efficiency of a BWB relative to a B52 bomber 

and a KC-10 tanker could mean that a mission to deliver 100K lbs of munitions that 

today requires 11⁄2 B52 bombers and 9 KC-10 tankers might be replaced by 11⁄2 B52s 

Figure 4.1: Examples of Fundamental Energy Efficiency Disruptive 

Breakthrough Technologies 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________39 

and 3 BWB tankers; or by 1 BWB bomber and only 1 BWB tanker. The combination of 

efficiency improvements to both the combat and support aircraft creates the possibility 

of order of magnitude savings to achieve this particular mission, freeing up resources 

for other purposes. It is a prime example of how enhancement of fuel efficiency can 

translate into enormous potential for increased operational effectiveness. 

4.1.1.2 Variable Speed Tilt Rotor 

Current rotorcraft and those in development continue to embody decades-old 

technology that allows only small incremental gains in fuel efficiency and performance. 

However, emerging vertical lift technologies and new rotorcraft designs, specifically 

advanced tilt rotor designs exploiting variable speed rotors, hold promise of far greater 

range, speed and operational flexibility (e.g., Sea Base operations), with substantially 

reduced fuel consumption. Figure 4.3 compares the cruise efficiency and speed of 

various vertical lift aircraft. NASA and DoD analyses show advanced tilt rotors with 100 

– 150% greater aerodynamic cruise efficiency than the V-22 and 300 - 400% better 

efficiency than current or new design helicopters based on improved Lift/Equivalent 

Drag. Additionally, new technologies available in engines, structures, drives, flight 

controls and subsystems make significant improvements possible in empty weight, 

propulsive efficiency, and overall fuel economy. In effect, such aircraft may be able to 

achieve efficiency capabilities approaching that of the C-30 cargo plane, and do so with 

a short takeoff and landing capability. They hold promise of rapid, long-range vertical 

insertion of ground forces for mounted maneuver—a capability currently unobtainable. 

Figure 4.2: BWB Efficiency from Aero and Structural Advantages

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400

Efficiency,

Productivity

MTOW

(nm)

Productivity*, Payload x Range x Mach (million lb x nm)

400,000 lb

1,200,000 lb

1,000,000 lb

800,000 lb600,000 lb

1,400,000 lb

Current & Future Widebody Freighters

*Using Maximum Payload, Range at 

Maximum Payload, and Cruise Mach Number 

MTOW =

200,000 lb

Note: Lower efficiency of military transports due

to aft ramps, high wing, large gear, etc.

Military Airlifters

BWBs

Used with permission of the Boeing Company, Copyright © 2006. All rights reserved.

BWB Efficiency from Aero and Structural Advantages

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400

Efficiency,

Productivity

MTOW

(nm)

Productivity*, Payload x Range x Mach (million lb x nm)

400,000 lb

1,200,000 lb

1,000,000 lb

800,000 lb600,000 lb

1,400,000 lb

Current & Future Widebody Freighters

*Using Maximum Payload, Range at 

Maximum Payload, and Cruise Mach Number 

MTOW =

200,000 lb

Note: Lower efficiency of military transports due

to aft ramps, high wing, large gear, etc.

Military Airlifters

BWBs

Used with permission of the Boeing Company, Copyright © 2006. All rights reserved.

BWB Efficiency from Aero and Structural Advantages
CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES ____________

40_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Army analysis indicates that the operational benefits of advanced tilt rotor designs with 

variable or advanced configuration rotors are compelling. As an example, a notional 

Future Combat System 

(FCS) Brigade Combat 

Team (FBCT) requires 

approximately 2,215 short 

tons of cargo, including 

fuel, every three days. 

Using current platforms, a 

typical delivery scenario 

covers a distance of 600 

km and requires using an 

intermediate staging base 

and a combination of C130s and CH-47Fs. A tilt 

rotor aircraft employing a 

variable speed rotor would 

eliminate the need to 

transit the forward 

operating base and the 

need to use 2 types of 

aircraft. It would 

accomplish the mission in one third the flight time with 70% fewer sorties and less than 

half the fuel. Operationally, forces in the field could move more quickly, with less 

exposure time to hostile fire and with fewer aircraft resources, so that a given fleet could 

perform a broader set of lift or maneuver operations than current aircraft and do so with 

far greater fuel efficiency. This also creates the possibility of eliminating the FOB 

altogether, including the ground time, personnel, resources and attack vulnerability 

associated with offloading the fixed wing assets and reloading the Vertical Take-Off and 

Landing (VTOL) aircraft. 

In a Joint Multi Role (JMR) configuration, an advanced variable speed tilt rotor or other 

advanced rotorcraft design has the potential to greatly improve the range, mission loiter 

time and speed of the Army and Marine rotary wing attack / escort and armed 

reconnaissance / VTOL Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) fleet 

while providing up to a 50% reduction in fuel demand when operating over extended 

(expeditionary) distances. These advancements in mission performance would be 

essential to support escort for advanced lift fleets and landing zone security and 

protection operations for mounted vertical maneuver operations. These designs would 

also be much more suited for operations for naval vessels and future advanced sea 

bases. 

4.1.1.3 “Blast Bucket” Light Armored Ground Vehicle. 

In Iraq, Army ground vehicles have proven highly vulnerable to Improvised Explosive 

Devices (IEDs). To mitigate this problem, the Army has “up-armored” its vehicles. 

Figure 4.3: Cruise Efficiency, Speed of Vertical Lift Aircraft Compared 
______________ CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________41 

However, this has reduced fuel mileage from about 10 mpg for a standard HUMVEE to 

about 4 mpg. This significantly reduces their range and increases the amount of fuel 

they require. Further, the additional weight puts the vehicle beyond the design limit for 

its suspension, brakes and tires. This results in frequent tire blowouts, vehicle rollovers 

and other accidents with serious or fatal consequences for soldiers. 

There are currently two programs intended to replace the HMMWV: the Joint 

Lightweight Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the Mine-Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) 

Vehicle. Both are significantly heavier than the current up-armored HMMWV, sending 

battlefield fuel demand in the opposite direction it needs to go. But there may be 

another way. Research on lightweight structural materials and innovative design 

concepts have demonstrated the potential to produce survivable, militarily capable 

ground combat systems that weigh less and use less fuel than current systems. One 

example, known as the Badenoch vehicle, was 

developed at the Georgia Tech Research 

Institute with funding from the Office of Naval 

Research. 

The Badenoch vehicle weighs less than half as 

much as an up-armored HMMWV, has much 

greater fuel efficiency, carries as many soldiers, 

provides better ability to fight from the vehicle, 

and vastly improves protection against blast and 

projectiles. It packages NASCAR tested safety 

and reliability features into an agile, multipurpose vehicle to replace the familiar HMMWV, 

which was not intended to be used in combat situations involving shoulder fired rocket 

propelled grenades and IEDs. The concept and a number of technical innovations are 

shown in Figure 4.4. The “blast bucket” vehicle could be fitted with hybrid electric and 

Opposed Piston Opposed Cylinder engine technology to achieve a 50% increase in fuel 

efficiency in wartime conditions and a 200% increase in garrison or local use. 

The fuel savings alone would result in reduced logistics needs and significant gains in 

range. Moreover, the blast bucket concept would better protect soldiers utilizing light 

vehicles and provide them more combat options. If the concept works as designed, it 

would greatly reduce the ability of enemy combatants to hinder light mobility assets and 

to inflict casualties on U.S. forces. 

The Task Force concluded that this problem of an efficient, survivable, lethal ground 

combat system is of such high importance to DoD’s ability to fight, that the next 

generation vehicle should be the subject of intense development, design and 

competitive prototyping. There are many examples in the areas of commercial vehicles, 

racing, and aerospace where survivability has not required more mass. Armor 

constitutes half the total gross vehicle weight of some variants. The Task Force was not 

satisfied that sufficient creative effort has gone into employing innovative shock 

deflection, dispersion, absorption and packaging concepts to light vehicles to address 

Figure 4.4: Badenoch Vehicle Concept 
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42_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

the problem of protecting occupants against mines, IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades 

(RPGs) and small arms. 

4.1.2 Other Important Platform Fuel Efficiency Technologies 

If technology is to be used to enhance platform fuel efficiency, it makes sense to do so 

where fuel consumption is greatest. U.S. forces currently consume about 300,000 

barrels of petroleum-based fuels per day. Of this, between 70% and 75% are 

consumed by aircraft. Therefore, the Task Force particularly looked to those 

technologies that could significantly affect aircraft fuel consumption. Other technologies 

offer potential to increase the fuel efficiency and operational effectiveness of naval and 

ground platforms, and some are applicable to a variety. Several of the more promising 

are described below. 

4.1.2.1 Aircraft Fuel Efficiency Technologies 

Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engine (VAATE)

The VAATE program has two principal components: 

• Highly Efficient Embedded Turbine Engine (HEETE) 

• Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) 

The goal of the VAATE program is to improve specific fuel consumption by 25% 

compared to a FY2000 State of the Art (SOA) engine, such as that for the Joint Strike 

Fighter. The technologies involved could also be used on current systems such as the 

F/A-22, the B-1B and the C-17, and future systems such as the Long Range Strike 

fighter, Advanced Mobility Aircraft and Air Breathing Launch Vehicles. 

HEETE expects to reduce engine weight relative to FY2000 SOA design by about 3000 

lbs, double its bypass ratio and increase its overall pressure ratio by 75-100%. It also 

would reduce exhaust temperature by about 40%. Overall, its thrust to weight would 

increase by 60% compared to a SOA design. The Air Force expects over 25% 

improvement in fuel efficiency from the HEETE program, and estimates it can achieve a 

2x increase in loiter time and 100-400 kW of power extraction needed for onboard multisensor suites. Both of these latter features would increase the operational effectiveness 

of air and ground forces in the field. 

 

ADVENT would allow engines to adjust fan and core airflow and cycle on-the-fly for 

optimized performance at all flight conditions. The engines would increase fuel 

efficiency and reduce drag. The Air Force expects up to 35% improvement in subsonic 

performance and 14% in supersonic performance compared to FY2000 SOA engines. 

Structural Design and Configuration

Advances in materials and design processes will enable the design of stronger, lighter 

aircraft with simpler, unitized structures that are easier to manufacture. Composite 

materials in particular will allow bonded joints and reinforcement technologies for 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________43 

complex loads. Lighter weight structures based on advanced materials and computer 

aided design will allow significant fuel savings without compromising performance or 

structural integrity. Such fuel savings will extend to fighters, lift and tankers, and 

possibly to helicopters. 

Aircraft configurations can be modified to reduce drag, e.g., from skin friction. A 

blended wing body, for example, reduces wetted area by about one third relative to a 

tube and wing configuration. According to the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), 

new configurations can be up to 40% more fuel efficient than conventional designs. 

Savings of such magnitude would significantly reduce aircraft fuel use, enabling greatly 

enhanced mission performance. 

Lightweight Composite Materials

Lightweight composite materials such as carbon laminate, carbon sandwich and 

fiberglass and aluminum, are estimated to be the most important single factor in 

achieving fuel savings of 20% in the new Boeing 787 Dreamliner compared to a 

conventionally built aircraft of the same shape. Composites such as these also resist 

fatigue and corrosion, reduce maintenance, and curb emissions. Further advances in 

the use of composites in aircraft are possible, however. AFRL is examining tailorable 

materials that can morph and repair themselves as well as dissipate heat, thus 

increasing force endurance. Nano-tailored complex hybrid materials promise further 

weight savings, improved durability, and yet more heat resistance. Improved 

understanding and better modeling of the performance properties of complex materials 

architectures will allow less expensive manufacture with fewer parts. Also, composites 

being developed by AFRL for future aircraft appear to have application to ships, boats 

and ground vehicles. The potential energy savings over all DoD platforms and the 

resulting performance enhancement from increased use of advanced composites 

appear very considerable. 

Multimegawatt Electric Power System (MEPS)

MEPS would provide a substantial boost in power capability aboard aircraft while cutting 

generator weight by 1000 lbs and reducing thermal load. It is based on cryogenic 

cooling and high RPM generator technology, and has application for directed energy 

weapons and Naval vessel distributed power. It offers 4-8x the kW/lb of existing or 

developmental aircraft power systems. The weight savings and reduced thermal load of 

power onboard power generation will allow for more energy efficient flight and enable 

more accurate, more powerful weaponry. 

Powered Wheels

Electric motors placed in the wheels of aircraft can provide sufficient power to move 

them on the ground without use of the main engines, thereby saving fuel and extending 

range or loiter time. A more advanced version of electric wheel motors may be able to 

capture kinetic energy from landings and convert that energy into electric energy for 

powering the aircraft on the ground. The result would be even further fuel savings. 
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44_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

4.1.2.2 Land Forces and Forward Operating Bases 

While the Army consumes less fuel than the Air Force, that fuel is generally difficult to 

move and protect. As shown in Table 4.1, the Army’s peacetime and wartime fuel 

consumption patterns differ considerably. During peacetime, fuel consumption by Army 

aircraft makes up almost 50% of its total. But during wartime, generators become the 

largest single fuel consumers on the battlefield. Gensets in Iraq, overwhelmingly used 

for space-cooling, seem especially amenable to innovative technical solutions for 

improved fuel and load efficiency. Solutions such as non-refrigerative cooling systems 

that can provide more cooling per unit of electricity, coupled with design improvements 

that keep tents passively cooler. In addition, solar powered refrigeration units have 

been successfully used by the UN and other international aid agencies in a number of 

developing countries. 

Foot soldiers also consume energy via 

the equipment they carry. U.S. foot 

soldiers probably are the most 

electronically equipped in history. While 

this gives them high capability, it also 

increases the weight they carry, 

particularly the batteries they need. 

Approximately 15-20% of a soldier’s 70-

90 lb pack consists of batteries. Also, 

obtaining replacement batteries adds to 

the fuel consumed by resupply lines 

while the task of recharging batteries 

adds to the load on generators at 

forward bases. But far fewer batteries 

would be needed if end-use devices 

were as efficient as is justified by the fully burdened cost of batteries delivered to the 

warfighter in theater. 

4.1.2.2.1 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Reduce Fuel 

Demand at Forward Operating Bases. 

Last summer, in order to “improve the security posture of the al-Anbar province of Iraq,” 

Command officials certified as “priority 1” a Joint Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing 

Request on behalf of Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, seeking a “renewable and 

self-sustainable energy solution to support forward operating bases, combat outposts 

and observation posts throughout MNF-W’s battlespace.” The Resourcing Request 

went on to say “[b]y reducing the need for [petroleum-based fuels] at our outlying bases, 

we can decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the road, thereby reducing the 

danger to our Marines, soldiers, and sailors.” 

This is a two part problem – end use inefficiency drives up electrical demand, and 

increases the difficulty of meeting power requirements using renewable energy. 

Table 4.1: Army Fuel consumption in peacetime & 

wartime (million gallons per year) 
______________ CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________45 

Conversely, efficiency is the key enabler – improving end use efficiency reduces 

demand and makes it possible to satisfy a greater proportion of the load using 

renewable sources. 

The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) at Fort Belvoir has taken on this request for 

action.18 It was created in 2003 to quickly address material needs in connection with 

the global war on terror, especially in cases where existing systems acquisition and 

procurement processes are incapable of responding to urgent requests. REF’s goal is 

to respond to requests from operating forces by fielding a solution within 90 days when 

possible. Four off-the-shelf renewable energy supply systems are currently being 

tested before shipment to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Although 

the purchase price for these systems is higher than for a similar capacity diesel 

generator, MG Zilmer’s request showed that they are expected to pay for themselves by 

offsetting fuel use in just 3-5 years depending on conditions.19 It was not clear to the 

Task Force whether this payback calculation was based on FBCF. The Task Force 

suspects it was not, and that based on the true cost of delivering fuel to al-Anbar 

province the payback would be measured in months, not years. After this time, the 

energy produced by these systems is essentially free of cost when compared to other 

options. MG Zilmer’s request listed a requirement for 183 systems of various power 

capacities. At least one U.S. manufacturer has estimated that this quantity could be 

produced in six months to one year.20 

Another system being utilized by the Army’s REF in Afghanistan is enhanced insulation 

for tents. The insulation dramatically curbs demand for air conditioning, thus reducing 

power demand and therefore fuel demand. The expected payoff for this system is 

measured in months rather than years, and fuel resupply costs and risks are 

significantly reduced. 

4.1.2.3 Land Force Energy Efficient Technologies

Energy Starved Electronics for Land Warriors

As stated earlier, a principal problem facing the land warrior is the weight of batteries 

needed to power the equipment carried into combat. Various supply-side solutions 

have been proposed, including lightweight high energy density batteries, rechargeable 

batteries, and fuel cells powered by methanol, JP-8, propane or some other source. 

Another approach is to severely reduce the power demands of the end use equipment. 

A recent NRC study recommended that the Army make energy efficiency a first-order 

design parameter and provide direct monetary incentives to manufacturers to reduce 

power demand in all procurements for soldier electronics, and especially for 

communications gear. That study recommended that the Army aim for a future soldier 

system that would require no more than 2W average power and 5W peak power, a very 

 

18 Wall Street Journal 9 January 2007. 

19 Commander MNF-W Renewable Energy System Request 25 July 2006. 

20 SkyBuilt Power, Arlington VA. 
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substantial reduction from what soldier systems require today. Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is supporting a program (“Energy Starved 

Electronics”) to reduce the power consumption of conventional signal processor 

electronics by >10x while maintaining comparable throughput. Such performance would 

exceed that of already power-efficient portable consumer electronics, but would indeed 

be feasible using new technologies already nearing commercialization. 

Significant soldier equipment efficiency improvements coupled with improved batteries 

and new lightweight, portable, collapsible solar collectors for recharging batteries in the 

field could significantly reduce the weight soldiers carry. The improvements would 

reduce soldier requirement for power and also the number of batteries required to 

supply it. This could lighten packs and reduce jump injuries, or could permit more food, 

water, munitions, etc. to be carried, increasing endurance. 

 

Ground Source Geothermal Cooling at Forward Operating Bases

Even in hot desert climates the ground temperature just a few feet below the surface is 

usually much cooler and more stable than the air temperature. While summer air 

temperatures can exceed 120F, the subsurface temperature at a depth of only 10 to 20 

feet can be 70F. By circulating a working fluid from the surface to this depth and back, 

cooling can be provided to supplement or, in some cases, eliminate the need for 

conventional air conditioning. Coupled with insulation for the tents and renewable solar 

and wind power to circulate the coolant and operate fans, the process can be self 

sustaining, requiring no fuel powered generators at all. The example illustrates the 

power of coupling efficiency with renewable energy sources. 

Fresh Water at FOBs

In the great majority of cases, water comes from municipal supplies and is purified using 

reverse osmosis systems, then trucked to FOBs over long distances. This creates an 

additional demand for transportation fuel and exposes more delivery trucks to attacks. 

An alternative is to check the subsurface availability of water at each FOB itself, and if 

the check confirms an accessible water table, then combat engineers or civilian 

contractors can drill a water well on site. Where an FOB is expected to remain in place 

for many months or longer, an onsite water supply offers many advantages: less fuel 

demand to move water and the potential to use evaporative cooling in lieu of air 

conditioning. 

Efficient Generators

According to U.S. Army data shown in Table 4.1 on page 44, generators are the single 

largest user of fuel for that Service during wartime. In addition to their fuel use, 

generators impose very significant logistical burdens, particularly a need for transport to 

the battlefield, trailers and tow capability once there, and ongoing maintenance and 

repair. A 3 kW tactical quiet generator (TQG) weighs 325 lbs, a 5kW TQG 888 lbs. 

Further, tactical generators often are over-powered relative to the loads required of 

them. This both wastes fuel and causes maintenance problems, e.g., wet stacking. A 

new generation of 5-60 kW generators called Advanced Medium-size Mobile Power 
______________ CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________47 

Sources (AMMPS) has been developed and will be fielded shortly. These generators, 

which utilize variable speed motor technology, are designed to be lighter and more fuel 

efficient than their predecessors and are expected to impose fewer maintenance 

requirements, thus directly reducing logistics load in several ways. Attempts also are 

being made to integrate these generators with renewable energy sources to provide 

hybrid systems that are more efficient than either system operating alone. When 

logistic considerations are taken into account, the return on investment to these lighter, 

more efficient generators appears to be very high. 

Another technological alternative is the development of micro generators, capable of 

producing 0.5 to 1 kW. Such generators appear to have practical application in the field 

as they would impose much less weight burden per kilowatt of power produced than 

existing generators, while using about the same amount of fuel. A concept 0.5 kW 

version, for example, is projected to weigh only 8 lbs, compared with a commercial 1 

kW gasoline-powered version weighing less than 30 lbs. Full scale testing and 

evaluation of this technology could bring lightweight generators into the field within 5-6 

years. 

4.1.2.4 Naval Vessel Fuel Efficiency Technologies 

Though fuel supply generally is less of a problem for naval vessels than for air or 

ground platforms, ships at sea nevertheless can become more effective fighting 

platforms through enhanced energy efficiency. The following technologies are 

particularly promising. 

Reduced Hotel Loads 

The 2001 DSB study identified a number of retrofit technologies for current Naval ships 

that would decrease energy use. These include occupancy sensors, centralized light 

pipe systems, and waste heat-using fresh water production systems. The 2001 Task 

Force estimated that cost effective savings of 20-50% in hotel load demand were 

possible. It further noted that reduced hotel energy demand would help enable 

additional combat system electrical loads and facilitate progress towards the Navy’s 

goal of an all-electric ship. Since most current ships are likely to operate for many more 

years, hotel load efficiency gains will provide operational benefits for long periods. 

Further, the return on investment is even more favorable now than in 2001 because fuel 

prices are significantly higher now than they were then. 

Shipboard Contra-rotating Propellers

Contra-rotating propellers offer opportunity for propulsion efficiency improvements in the 

5-10% range, achieved mainly through improved hydrodynamics. Test evidence 

suggests that contra-rotating propellers can achieve significant power consumption 

reduction at design speeds and some improvement in cavitation at inception speed 

when compared to a controllable pitch propeller with shaft and strut configuration. It 

appears likely that energy efficiency gains obtainable through this technology would be 

augmented by gains in speed and signature reduction. 
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Advanced Waterjets

High power density water jets offer opportunities to move ships and boats more 

efficiently than with present water jet technology. The Office of Naval Research 

estimates that a compact high power density waterjet under development may be as 

much as 50% more efficient than existing models, with even higher efficiencies 

obtainable in future and reduced noise signature. The efficiency gain would come about 

through better cavitation control, jet thrust augmentation and advanced blade forms. 

Greater Power Requirements to Support Net-Centric Warfare

The newest generation of Cruisers, and possibly Destroyers in the near future, are 

fielding ever more powerful radar and electronics combat systems with ever larger 

electrical demands. The loads are becoming so large that the cost effectiveness of 

nuclear plants on surface ships other than aircraft carriers is again being debated. The 

Task Force is concerned that the benefits of amending the radar’s electronic and power 

architecture to improve its energy efficiency are not being examined, with the result that 

the cost of providing a sufficiently large power plant to power the combat loads in their 

current configuration is taken as a given. A total systems approach to maximizing 

efficiency in this context could reveal very worthwhile trades. 

4.1.2.5 Other Energy Efficiency Technologies

Several energy efficiency technologies apply to platforms of all kinds and hence are not 

specific to a given type. Several particularly promising technologies are discussed 

below. 

Unmanned Vehicles (UAVs, UGVs, UUVs)

Unmanned vehicles can significantly reduce energy use in the battlespace while 

providing increased persistence, intelligence, survivability and lethality. According to 

AFRL, one possible UAV system has the potential to replace the ISR functions of three 

separate manned systems: Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 

(JSTARS), Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Rivet Joint. No inflight 

refueling would be required over a 50 hour period, and on average, given the large 

increase in system fuel efficiency, 1 UAV sortie could provide the same reconnaissance 

services as 9 ISR sorties and 9 tanker sorties. The compounding effects of less fuel 

needed per sortie (of given length) and fewer sorties result in fuel savings estimated at 

as much as 97%. While such savings estimates are case specific and need to be 

demonstrated in practice, it seems clear that where UAVs can adequately substitute for 

manned systems they offer breakthrough potential in terms of persistence and 

endurance. There is strong reason to invest in this technology to determine and 

develop its full efficiency potential. 

Investment in other types of agile and intelligent unmanned vehicles will allow them to 

perform a broader range of functions. The Army, for example, is investing in the 

Multifunction Logistics/Equipment (MULE), an unmanned vehicle that will carry supplies 

and provide power for soldier battery recharge. The Navy is investing in robotic 
______________ CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________49 

undersea vehicles both to more effectively gather intelligence and to carry and utilize 

weapons. In the longer term, use of robotic vehicles for an ever-increasing set of 

military functions should not only increase fuel efficiency but enhance operational 

capability and hence overall force effectiveness. 

Electro-mechanical Actuators

Actuators drive anything that moves within aircraft as well as ships and ground vehicles. 

They vary widely in complexity and performance envelope. Recent developments 

appear to offer the potential to replace aircraft hydraulics with electrical actuators, 

significantly reducing weight, increasing maintainability and fault tolerance, and 

producing better controllability. One source estimates that modern electro-mechanical 

actuator technology aboard military aircraft would reduce weight by up to 50% relative 

to comparable hydraulic systems, increasing range through greater fuel efficiency and 

enabling greater weapon capacity. 21 Logistics savings from the use of electromechanical actuators also are available on Naval vessels. For example, full application 

of electro-mechanical actuators to an aircraft carrier (to weapons handling and elevator, 

aircraft elevator, rudder mechanism, anchor windlass, etc.) is estimated to reduce each 

carrier’s onboard weight by 1.4 million lbs, space requirements by 61,000 sq ft, and 

personnel by 500 billets, while reducing overall costs by $20-25 million per year.22 

Biomimetics 

Biomimetic design mimics natural design characteristics that minimize energy usage 

through reduced friction and drag. Biomimetic spiral type designs streamline fluid 

movement through management of turbulence and 

allow reduced weight to strength ratios with greater 

output and efficiency. Such designs are applicable 

to fans, pumps, propellers, turboexpanders, heat 

exchangers and compressors, and to surface 

profiles and vortex generators. For example, a 

biomimetic propeller is estimated to reduce energy 

consumption on the order of 25% while reducing 

system noise. Figure 4.5 shows a biomimetic 

propeller design. The concept would apply to 

platform components, not to major subsystems, but 

if valid in practice and extensively employed, it could provide substantial energy 

efficiency gains in a wide variety of platform types. Some specific Naval and aeronautic 

applications could be quickly tested and deployed.

4.1.2.6 Non-Tactical (Fleet) Vehicles 

Non-tactical vehicles (NTVs) are not used for combat purposes, but support operations 

at DoD installations that ultimately are related to combat purposes (e.g., training). 

 

21 Professor Dale Tesar, University of Texas, Briefing to the Defense Science Board, May 26, 2006. 

22 Ibid. 

Figure 4.5: Biomimetic Screw 
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50_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Further, DoD’s non-tactical vehicles are covered under energy legislation pertaining to 

domestic fleets and by Executive Orders regarding energy efficiency goals. For these 

reasons, DoD needs to focus attention on its non-tactical fleet and the fuels that it uses. 

DoD has approximately 164,000 non-tactical vehicles, primarily located at CONUS 

bases and facilities. To date, it has purchased about 41,000 light duty flexible fuel 

vehicles (FFVs) under 8500 pounds gross vehicle weight. While FFVs are no more 

energy efficient than conventional vehicles, they can reduce petroleum use by using 

non-petroleum based fuels. However, in many areas of the country there are no 

alternative fuels available and, on bases where only conventional gasoline is available, 

FFVs offer no advantage. While some Services have acquired FFVs only in locations 

with alternative fuels available, others have met their legislative requirement for a 

specific number of vehicles without regard to their ultimate destination. The result is 

that many DoD FFVs use conventional gasoline because they were acquired for 

locations where no flex fuel is available. 

Rather than considering legislative and executive order mandates drive policy, DoD 

could look for opportunities to reduce its overall energy consumption and stimulate 

market adoption of nascent commercial products. Plug-in hybrid vehicles are expected 

to become available by 2010, with GM announcing its intent. DoD could work with GSA 

and GM to begin using these vehicles when they become available to help generate 

market acceptance. DoD should also investigate expanding the use of the most cost 

effective hybrids available to meet functional requirements as well. DoD could also use 

its fleet to test new battery technologies being developed for plug-in hybrid vehicles. 

This might include conversion kits with retrofitted batteries. On most military bases, 

speeds above 40 mph are normally not needed and usually prohibited. Conventional 

light trucks and SUVs are capable of speeds over 100 mph and are highly overpowered for use only on bases. The Air Force has recently announced a plan to 

purchase low speed vehicles (LSVs) that use all-electric propulsion on its bases. Its 

goal is that by FY10, 30% of all vehicles on Air Force bases will be LSVs. These 

vehicles use electricity that is the equivalent of gasoline purchased for less than 

$1/gallon, and do not rely on any petroleum since almost no electricity is produced from 

oil. The Task Force encourages the Department to view mandates as a minimum 

performance level, be creative in finding effective ways of using its extensive NTV fleet 

to reduce energy consumption, and to look for opportunities to offer broader national 

benefits as a demonstration for new vehicles. 

4.2 Fuel Supply Technologies 

The U.S. is an expeditionary oriented force. When it fights, it uses fuel closest to the 

point of engagement. Yet, DoD is currently pursuing a number high profile, high cost 

demonstrations of domestically produced synthetic fuel. For example, the Air Force 

Domestically produced synthetic fuel does not contribute to DoD’s 

most critical fuel problem – delivering fuel to deployed forces. 
______________ CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________51 

recently completed a $35M test program which showed that a jet fuel comprised of 50% 

Fischer-Tropsch synthetic fuel and 50% commercial fuel performs well in TF-33 engines 

on B-52 aircraft. This result is not unexpected since South African Airways have been 

flying a 50/50 mix of synthetic and commercial fuel for about 8 years. The expressed 

purpose of the initiative is to stimulate a domestic market for synthetic jet fuel. Further, 

the Air Force has stated a goal of obtaining half its domestic fuel consumption from 

domestic synthetic sources by 2016. Specifically, the Air Force has stated its intent to 

secure this fuel from a coal-to-liquid Fischer-Tropsch process. 

The Task Force has strong concerns about the viability of this technology for a variety of 

reasons. Capital costs and production costs are high, putting investments at long term 

risks. The environmental control technologies needed to allow the plants to operate 

over the long term have only been demonstrated at limited scale and their costs are 

highly uncertain. Water demand also is very high using current production technology, 

and many coal reserves are in arid regions. The process produces large amounts of 

contaminated wastewater that must be treated. Further, a recent National Academy of 

Sciences report has raised questions about the estimates of coal reserves.23 The Task 

Force concluded these large expenditures could be used for more productive 

contributions to DoD’s most pressing energy challenges, rather than demonstrating 

synthetic fuel technologies that do not appear to have a viable market future or 

contribute to reducing battlespace fuel demand. 

The Task Force recommends the Department continue investing in basic research to 

develop new fuels technologies that are too risky for private investments and to partner 

with other fuel users, such as airlines and engine manufacturers, to leverage efforts. 

The Task Force also urges the Department to work with partners to conduct 

comprehensive and objective “well-to-wheel” life cycle assessments of each synthetic 

fuel technology. It should include issues such as environmental footprint and its 

mitigation costs and risks, resource availability and scalability, all of which can affect the 

viability of alternative fuel technologies. The Task Force notes that in order to be viable, 

any synthetic fuel technology must have a full life cycle carbon footprint less than 

petroleum. 

Mobile, in-theater synfuels processes would address DoD’s fuel problem by reducing 

battlespace fuel demand. The Task Force was briefed on experimental processes that 

may be able to produce fuel in the field from military or indigenous biological or waste 

sources. Such a technology could have high value for military operations because it 

would replace gallon for gallon the amount of fuel needed to be delivered by fuel convoy 

into the battlespace. The Task Force recommends DoD continue research in this area 

and invest in full scale development because it addresses a unique military need. 

 

23 “Coal - Research and Development to Support National Energy Policy,” NAS, June 2007. 
CHAPTER IV: TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES ____________

52_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER V: MANAGING RISKS TO INSTALLATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________53 

CHAPTER V: MANAGING RISKS TO INSTALLATIONS

5.1 DoD’s Approach to Assured Power at Installations 

Historically, the mission of DoD installations has been to train combat forces and deploy

them when needed. Critical missions at most installations were limited to those needed 

to execute the deployment of forces. In the event commercial electric power failed, 

small diesel generators with short-term fuel supplies were adequate to power those 

activities. Installations with substantial Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and military 

strategic deterrence missions have higher mission criticality and greater power 

requirements. Backup power systems at these installations are larger, but are still 

based on diesel generators and fuel supplies sized for only short-term commercial 

outages and seldom properly prioritized to critical loads because those are often not 

wired separately from non-essential loads. DoD’s approach to providing power to 

installations is based on assumptions that commercial power is highly reliable, subject 

to infrequent and short term outages, and backup can meet demands. Unfortunately, 

DoD’s assumptions about commercial power and other critical infrastructure reliability 

are no longer valid and DoD must take a more rigorous risk-based approach to assuring 

adequate power to its critical missions.24

5.2 A Confluence of Events Adds to Already Unacceptable Risks 

Critical missions at DoD installations have expanded significantly in recent years. 

During Hurricane Katrina, military installations became central to recovery efforts in 

three key ways: by serving as the base of operations for relief and rescue missions 

using military assets; as the central command and control hubs to coordinate the work 

of other deployed national resources; and as a source of skilled personnel to provide 

rescue, recovery, medical and other emergency services required by survivors.25 Under 

DoD’s new homeland defense mission, military installations would serve a similar 

function in the event of a terrorist attack on the homeland, becoming operational bases 

in theater.26 As a result, a much larger portion of the installation becomes a critical 

mission requiring highly reliable power. This drives a fundamental rethinking of what it 

means to provide power to these installations. 

Similarly, C4ISR and strategic deterrence missions have taken on new real-time tactical 

and strategic criticality. They directly support real-time operations, and must be an 

uninterrupted, dependable, credible and trusted source of command, control and 

 

24 Information derived from Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense, The Effects of Hurricane Katrina on the Defense 

Information Systems Agency Continuity of Operations and Test Facility. 12 December 2006., available at 

<http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/FY07/07-031.pdf>. 

25 Information derived from CRS Report for Congress Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response, 19 September 2005, available at 

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf>. 

26 Information derived from CRS Report for Congress. Homeland Security: The Department of Defense’s Role, 14 May 2003, 

available at <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31615.pdf>. 
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54_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

execution capability. As a result, their power requirements and need for resiliency have 

also increased.27 

For various reasons, the grid has far less margin today than in earlier years between 

capacity and demand. The level of spare parts kept in inventory has declined, and 

spare parts are often co-located with their operational counterparts putting both at risk 

from a single act. In some cases, industrial capacity to produce critical spares is 

extremely limited, available only from overseas sources and very slow and difficult to 

transport due to physical size.28 

In many cases, installations have not distinguished between critical and non-critical 

loads when configuring backup power systems, leaving critical missions competing with 

non-essential loads for power. The Task Force finds that separating critical from noncritical loads is an important first step toward improving the resilience of critical missions 

using existing backup sources in the event of commercial power outage. The 

confluence of these trends, namely increased critical load demand, decreased 

resilience of commercial power, inadequacy of backup generators, and lack of 

transformer spares in sufficient numbers to enable quick repair, create an unacceptably 

high risk to our national security from a long-term interruption of commercial power. 

5.3 Four Sources of Risk for Grid Outages 

The first risk is from overload. As wires become overloaded, they heat up and sag, 

making them vulnerable to entanglement with trees and other objects. This happened 

near Cleveland, Ohio on August 14, 2003. According to the U.S.-Canada Power 

System Outage Task Force, high demand caused a high-voltage line to come in contact 

with overgrown trees. The resulting cascade of failures plunged many of the 50 million 

people in the Northeast U.S. and Canada living in an area covering 9,300 square miles 

into darkness. It shut down more than 500 generating units at 265 power plants, 

including 22 nuclear plants.29 

A second risk comes from natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, electrical 

storms or other extreme weather events. The consequences could be very much as 

described above, but with the added risk of physical damage to the infrastructure. 

Favorable commentary about the performance of the grid following the August 2003 

outage focused on the fact that restoration occurred fairly quickly. Within a few days 

power was restored virtually everywhere, with much of the area back up within a few 

hours. This was largely because safety features built into the grid successfully 

prevented damage to critical equipment such as generators, breakers and 

transformers.30 However, the Task Force is concerned that such an extensive outage 

 

27 See Footnote 24 on p. 53. 

28 Information derived from CRS Report for Congress Government Activities to Protect the Electric Grid, 4 February 05, available at 

<http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21958.pdf>. 

29 Information derived from the US-Canada Power Systems Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in 

the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, April 2004, available at <https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinalWeb.pdf>.

30Ibid. 
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER V: MANAGING RISKS TO INSTALLATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________55 

could be caused by such a commonplace event – a single line contacting a tree. This 

inevitably raises the next issue below: what the result might have been had there been 

physical damage to infrastructure, such as from a deliberate attack by knowledgeable 

adversaries? 

A third risk comes from sabotage or terrorist activity, whether local, trans-national, or 

state-sponsored, and including both conventional and nuclear attack. Nuclear attack 

could take place either directly or through the generation of a high altitude 

electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The grid is a relatively easy target for a terrorist. It is 

brittle, increasingly centralized, capacity-strained, and largely unprotected from physical 

attack, with little stockpiling of critical hardware. Although the system is designed to 

survive single points of failure, increasing demand on the system and increasing 

network constraints make multiple points of failure more likely. These are difficult to 

anticipate and more likely to result in cascading outages and catastrophic outages that 

cover large areas for long periods of time. Network Single Points of Failure (NSPF) are 

abundant. High voltage transformers, breakers, and other long-lead time items are 

particularly critical system elements.31 They can be easily targeted and destroyed. Grid 

sections could be taken down for months even if replacement transformers and 

breakers could be found; or for years if certain components need to be newly 

manufactured and transported. There are only limited backups located around the 

country—generally co-located with operating equipment. For some of the largest 

equipment, there is no domestic supply and only limited overseas production capacity 

which is fully booked years ahead. 32 For example, 765 kV transformers are 

manufactured only by one company in Canada. Armed with the right knowledge, a 

small number of people could shut down electricity over significant areas for an 

extended period of time, including power to critical DoD missions. The grid is not 

designed to withstand a coordinated multi-pronged or wide-area attack.33 The Task 

Force noted that attacks on the grid are one of the most common and effective tactics of 

insurgents in Iraq, and are increasingly seen in Afghanistan.34

In addition to physical attacks on the grid, there is the potential for cyber attacks. U.S. 

grid control systems are continuously probed electronically, and there have been 

numerous attempted attacks on the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 

systems that operate the grid. None have yet resulted in major problems in the U.S., 

but the potential exists for major outages in the same way successful hackers can 

disrupt computer networks. 35 Further details regarding the potential for deliberate 

 

31 See footnote 28 on p. 54. 

32 Information derived from sources “Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power grid,” CNN, 26 Sep 07, available at 

<http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html>. 

33 Information derived from Massoud Amin, Security Challenges for the Electricity Infrastructure, available at 

<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/2/21810/01012423.pdf?arnumber=1012423>. 

34 “Iraq’s national electricity grid nearing collapse: Residents ‘fed up’ as power, water become increasingly scarce,” MSNBC, 4 

August 07, available at < http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12784358/>. 

35 Information derived from John D. Fernandez and Andres E. Fernandez, SCADA Systems: Vulnerabilities and Remediation, 

Journal of Computing Sciences in Colleges, April. 2005: 160-168, available at

<http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1050000/1047872/p160-

fernandez.pdf?key1=1047872&key2=1178971021&coll=GUIDE&dl=GUIDE&CFID=52726045&CFTOKEN=41522929>. 
CHAPTER V: MANAGING RISKS TO INSTALLATIONS____________________________________ __

56_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

attacks to the grid and their potential consequences are contained in a classified annex 

to this report. 

A fourth risk comes from interruptions in supplies to generating plants, which can be 

caused by natural events, infrastructure failures, attack or even market forces. This 

occurred in California during 2000 and 2001 when supplies of natural gas were 

interrupted and forced a reduction in electricity generation. 36 Approximately 20% of 

U.S. electricity is generated by natural gas and market prices have swung wildly over 

the past several years.37 Approximately 52% of U.S. electricity is generated by coal and 

transportation routes that move coal from mines to generating plants are sometimes 

remote and lacking in alternatives. Critical rail lines or bridges could be taken out by 

determined saboteurs. For example, in May 2005, 43 rail cars came off the tracks. The 

disruption to coal deliveries caused prices to spike, and raised electricity prices by 6% 

nationally, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 100 mile length of rail line 

through Wyoming that carries the output of the Western coal belt to power plants is the 

most heavily traveled in the nation.38 So in addition to risks from grid outage, there are 

risks to the supply chain that enables the grid to work—not least from electricity supply 

failures themselves, which could disable the pipelines and controls used by other forms 

of energy, notably oil and gas. 

5.4 National Security Implications of Reliability Standards 

The Task Force noted that in addition to degrading national military and homeland 

defense capabilities, failure of the grid for any extended period could significantly affect 

national economic and social stability. Pumps that move natural gas and oil through 

pipelines rely on electricity, as do refineries, communications systems, water and 

sewage systems, hospitals, traffic systems, first response systems, border crossing 

detection systems and major transportation hubs such as airports. 

Despite the criticality of the grid to the very functioning of the nation, until the EPAct 

2005, we relied on industry to establish reliability standards. EPAct 2005 gave the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to direct the industry to 

develop reliability standards and the authority to designate an Electric Reliability 

Organization (ERO) to develop and propose mandatory reliability standards for all 

owners, users and operators of the bulk power system. Once such standards are 

approved by FERC, the ERO and regional entities may enforce the standards, subject 

to FERC oversight. FERC selected the North American Electric Reliability Counsel 

(NERC), a voluntary private industry coordinating body, as the ERO in 2006 and, by 

rulemaking, approved 83 reliability standards proposed by NERC in March 2007. 39 

 

36 See PBS Frontline – The California Crisis, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blackout/california/>. 

37 See Energy Information Agency Summary of Statistics for the United States, 

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epates.html>. 

38 Elliot Blair Smith “A mountain of coal waits for a ride,” USA TODAY, 7 December 2006, available at 

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/07/ap/business/mainD8LRQAB00.shtml>. 

39 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 18 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. RM06-22-000] Mandatory 

Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection (July 20, 2007). 
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER V: MANAGING RISKS TO INSTALLATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________57 

While the regulatory structure created by EPAct 2005 is an improvement, it is not the 

same as government authority to directly establish and enforce reliability standards. 

From a commercial utility’s perspective, risk mitigation actions such as hardening 

facilities and systems and stockpiling critical spare parts incur significant costs that it 

may not be possible to fully pass on to customers. This lack of proper economic 

incentives is one reason the grid is not as secure as it could or should be. 

5.5 Assessing Risk 

The Task Force observes that DoD has conducted vulnerability analyses of its 

installations regarding energy supply disruption but has not developed a risk 

management strategy to deal with those vulnerabilities. The latter requires 

understanding of the potential impacts on its operations, identifying options to deal with 

the vulnerabilities, and selection of those that are most cost effective. 

5.5.1 Vulnerability Assessments 

DoD and DoE (Department of Energy) have conducted many vulnerability assessments 

of critical infrastructure. Taking the next step requires understanding the threats to 

specific locations, their likelihood of occurring, and their consequences. 

The vulnerabilities briefed to the Task Force described points and modes of power 

failure. The Task Force was briefed in depth on points of failure on the grid, at 

installations in the U.S. and OCONUS, with emphasis on infrastructure that powers 

some of DoD’s most critical missions. Modes of failure relate to how something failed. 

A transmission line coming into contact with a grounded object is a failure mode. 

Equipment failure and information compromise are two key vulnerabilities that represent 

failure modes not usually discovered until after the fact. Understanding these modes 

before the fact is an element of risk assessment. Specific vulnerabilities identified are 

discussed in the classified annex (Appendix G) to this report. 

5.5.2 Potential Impacts 

Assessing risk also requires understanding the consequences of a failure. The events 

of the August 2003 outage provide insight into the scale of destruction that could be 

caused by a sophisticated and multi-pronged terrorist attack. It is useful to think of two 

separate types of consequences. 

The first is the threat to critical missions hosted on installations, including some defense 

industrial base facilities. There are a number of installations and industrial locations in 

the U.S. and OCONUS which host missions that are critical in strategic and tactical 

terms and must function 24/7. The resilience of these missions is wholly dependent on 

continued power to the buildings and equipment involved. The size and scope of the 

critical missions vary greatly among installations. Concern over domestic terrorist 

attacks, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and a new 
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58_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

homeland defense mission for DoD has also expanded the critical loads at some 

installations. 

The second is to the physical and economic security of the nation, as described in 

Section 2.3.2 on page.21. 

5.6 Risk Management 

The Task Force found that there is little understanding of the risk or consequences of

power failure at DoD installations. To improve awareness and formulate a program to 

more effectively manage risk involves a number of specific tasks. First, is to assess the 

relative risk of power outage at each installation. The Navy’s Dahlgren Mission 

Assurance Division’s (MAD) vulnerability assessments are an important first step. In 

the interim, the Task Force identified a number of critical missions with single point 

failures that would require long lead times to restore. DoD may want to use this list as a 

starting point while assembling the capacity to conduct a more comprehensive risk 

assessment. The list is provided in the Appendix G. 

Second is to identify and assess the cost and feasibility of options to satisfy power 

requirements for the possible duration of a serious outage. Both demand and supply 

side options can help to do so and both should be investigated and applied. 

Third is to develop the business case to identify the options or mix of options that brings 

risk to within acceptable limits for the least cost. 

5.6.1 Demand Side Options 

Demand side approaches can significantly reduce the amount of energy necessary to 

sustain operations, making it easier and cheaper for alternative electricity sources to 

meet the load. Such approaches could include investing in LED and other advanced 

efficient lighting systems, geothermal and other highly efficient heating and air 

conditioning, advanced electrical use controls, passive efficient-building designs, datacenter efficiency retrofits, energy-starved electronics and other techniques. Efficiency 

can be a powerful enabler. An efficiency improvement of 50% turns a six month backup 

source into a 12 month backup source, or reduces the size of needed supply by half, or 

doubles the amount of functionality that a backup supply can support. In this context, 

rapid improvements in the electrical efficiency of DoD facilities has a national security 

value far greater than the economic value of its reduced consumption. 

The Task Force found DoD’s efforts in this area to be modest compared to what can be 

technically and economically justified. The risks and consequences of grid outage 

should be the basis for a business case to pursue higher levels of efficiency at 

installations. Unfortunately, these risks are not currently considered during installation 

planning or PPBES investment decisions. Further, when budget constraints create a 

need to find cost reductions, efficiency investments are among the first to be eliminated. 
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER V: MANAGING RISKS TO INSTALLATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________59 

The Task Force concluded that DoD’s current approach to building energy efficient 

buildings and installations is conservative. Uniform Facility Guide Specifications 

(UFGS) and Uniform Facilities Criteria (UFC) are generally based on Energy Star and 

FEMP standards and use Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) as a 

rating system. LEED is a nationally accepted benchmark for the design, construction, 

and operation of high performance green buildings. But the Task Force believes there 

are two problems with LEED and DoD’s use of it. First, energy is only one portion of the 

rating and can be “traded” against other features to achieve a higher rating. Thus, for 

example, implementation of the LEED Silver rating level for DoD buildings may improve 

their environmental performance, but does not guarantee a specific improvement in 

energy efficiency. DoD will need to set a minimum acceptable level of energy 

performance within the LEED system. Second, application of these sustainable 

design/development and high-performance building concepts has varied among the 

Components and is generally underutilized and under-funded. If DoD were to establish 

a minimum energy efficiency level for all of its buildings, budget reductions would have 

less impact on investments in such efficiency. It is important to DoD’s energy future to 

aggressively increase the efficiency levels of buildings and infrastructure, not 

compromise them. 

5.6.2 Supply Side Options 

A supply side approach includes consideration of expanded backup power supply 

capability (e.g., more or larger protected generators and more fuel storage to supply 

them). This strategy would extend an installation’s capability to support critical 

missions, but is unlikely to fully satisfy an installation’s power needs over an extended 

grid outage and would do little to relieve stress on surrounding communities. 

A supply side approach also would involve building resilient local power sources, sized 

according to the mission load and the duration of an outage the installation is at risk of 

experiencing. The Task Force recommends DoD pursue the concept of “islanding,” 

which would isolate critical loads, and selectively entire installations, from the grid and 

make them self-sufficient. A combination of much higher end-use efficiency coupled 

with alternative power supply sources would move the Department in this direction. The 

Task Force recommends that DoD collaborate closely in these endeavors with other 

agencies, especially the DoE and its national laboratories, whose mission is energy 

research and technology deployment. DoE national laboratories have historical energy 

advisory relationships with the Services that can accelerate results. Completely 

isolating installations from the grid is not practical, and islanding with distributed 

generation of local electricity sources can mitigate the risks. 

DoDI 1470.11 §5.2.3 states it is DoD policy to use onsite, self-contained power for 

critical functions, DoD-facilities-based microgrids, and netted area microgrids for 

extended strategic islanding, coupled with end-use energy efficiency measures. The 

Renewable Electricity Purchasing and On-Base Development Plan developed in 2004 

by the Renewables Assessment Working Group was designed to quickly improve 

energy reliability and security at installations by working in deregulated states where no 
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60_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

utility cooperation is required to make them less vulnerable through islanding, as 

recommended by the National Research Council. Thus, policy and plans are in place to 

move towards islanding for critical mission purposes. 

However, the Task Force could find no evidence that DoD has taken tangible steps to 

implement this policy or plans beyond a very small number of high profile projects. This 

is so even though renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and geothermal are 

often economically advantageous and resilient, reducing the risk of mission interruption. 

Buying renewable energy credits, while an admirable step toward reducing carbon 

footprint, accomplishes nothing toward mitigating risks from power loss to critical 

missions. 

At specific locations where remedies within DoD’s ability to implement are not 

technically or economically feasible, it may be necessary to engage local utility 

companies, regulatory agencies, and possibly State governments or the Congress to 

improve the reliability of the grid. In principal this might be done through regulatory or 

legislative action. However, it would require building redundancy at key nodes, 

redundant substations or buying spare equipment. Where DoD is the sole requesting 

party, it will probably have to fund these improvements. 

“Decoupling” is a recent regulatory trend enacted in a number of states that has the 

potential to reduce stress on the grid.40 Historically, utility regulators have set electric 

and gas rates based on projected sales volume. Since this also sets a utility’s 

revenues, it is a disincentive for them to promote efficiency or to make it easy for 

customers to install on-site generation. “Decoupling” breaks the linkage between the 

amount of electricity or gas a utility sells and its ability to generate profits. This 

approach has the potential to enable utilities to remain profitable while investing in 

improved efficiency and reliability. Some states let utilities keep a small part of what 

they save for their customers as extra profit. This fully aligns utilities with customers’ 

incentives and can strongly motivate utilities to help customers use electricity more 

efficiently. DoD may wish to include supporting such legislation as a possible approach 

to reducing risk at high-risk locations. 

The Task Force concluded that as the world's energy sources transition from fossil fuels 

(petroleum, natural gas, and coal) to renewable energy sources (wind, solar and 

biomass), the energy infrastructure will become more distributed and will consist of 

smaller, more numerous plants. Some of these will produce multiple products such as 

liquid fuels, electricity, and industrial chemicals. The electric power distribution grid, 

pipelines, and rail beds will change to accommodate this distributed production trend. 

DoD’s move toward islanding and local generation can help move this trend along. In 

general, such distributed energy systems, properly designed, should gradually reduce 

the brittleness and increase the resilience of the nation’s energy system, and enhance 

our national security. 

 

40 Decoupling refers to disassociation of a utility’s profits from its energy sales. Instead, a rate of return is aligned with meeting 

revenue targets, and rates are adjusted up or down to meet the target at the end of the each period. This makes the utility 

indifferent to selling more vs. less energy, and improves the ability of energy efficiency and distributed generation to operate within 

the utility environment. By early October 2007, decoupling had been adopted (docketed) in 5 (6) states for electricity and in 13 (11) 

for natural gas. 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________61 

5.6.3 Net Zero Installations 

The Task Force considered whether it was possible to build net-zero energy capability 

at critical installations, and found a range of emerging enabling technologies. The 

concept is based on combining significantly greater end-use efficiency with onsite power 

generation from renewable sources and distributed generation. The Energy Policy Act 

of 2005 and Executive Order 13423 already move DoD in this direction by requiring 

DoD to: reduce energy use by 30% by 2015; build buildings that are 30% more efficient 

than ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning 

Engineers) standards; supply 7.5% of its energy from renewable sources by 2013; 

reduce fleet vehicle petroleum use by 20% by 2015; increase use of non-petroleum fuel 

by 10% annually; and switch to plug-in hybrid vehicles when they become life cycle cost 

effective. Other concepts such as passive design features to minimize heating and 

cooling loads, higher insulating levels and other design and technology approaches will 

be needed, but the Task Force recommends DoD carefully select candidate 

demonstration installations and establish this as a goal. 

5.6.4 Overseas Considerations 

What is true for CONUS installations is even more relevant outside the U.S. where 

commercial systems are often less reliable and less well protected than domestically. 

Reliability standards vary significantly from country to country and often are not 

enforced. In some locations, poor maintenance and political or social instability create 

further risks. Yet DoD conducts little or no planning to cope with long-term blackouts at 

its OCONUS installations. As in CONUS, military installations frequently rely on a 

single commercial power feed, providing a single point of failure that is weaker than the 

overall grid. Few OCONUS installations can generate enough power on their own to 

meet their missions. The typical backup plan is the same as in CONUS; a series of 

(diesel) generators designed for limited run-time, with short-term on-site fuel storage 

and not networked to ensure continuity of supply in the event one of the generators 

fails. The solutions—end-use efficiency and properly deployed islandable on- or nearsite supplies that are inherently resilient and preferably renewable—are the same as in 

CONUS but will often provide even greater value for mission continuity and often for 

operating budgets. 
CHAPTER V: MANAGING RISKS TO INSTALLATIONS____________________________________ __

62_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________63 

CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force arrived at six findings and five recommendations, with numerous 

supporting tasks needed to fully implement the recommendations. 

6.1 Task Force Findings 

Finding #1: The recommendations from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task 

Force Report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” have 

not been implemented. 

The principal finding of the 2001 DSB report was that DoD systematically 

underestimates the cost of fuel to its tactical forces by failing to recognize the costs of 

the support structure and the protection necessary to bring that fuel to the systems that 

use it. As a consequence, significant warfighting, logistics and monetary benefits are 

available from making weapons systems more fuel-efficient, but those benefits are not 

valued or emphasized in DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes. The report 

found that the requirements process does not require energy efficiency in deployed 

systems, the acquisition process does not value it, so the PPBES process cannot not 

provide it visibility when considering investment decisions. 

These findings remain valid today. Few of the recommendations of that study have 

been implemented to date. Those that have begun; making energy efficiency a 

selective Key Performance Parameter in system design, and using the fully burdened 

cost of fuel in life cycle costing of alternative systems; are in their early stages of 

implementation. Focused leadership will be required to complete the recommendations 

of the 2001 study and similar recommendations made herein. 

Finding #2: Critical national security and Homeland defense missions are at an 

unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the grid and other 

critical national infrastructure. 

In addition to their warfighting-related responsibilities, installations have taken on 

significantly expanded Homeland defense missions. DoD is now responsible for serving 

as a base of operations to coordinate the full range of national relief and recovery 

efforts, and as a source of skilled personnel to provide rescue, recovery, medical and 

other emergency serviced required by survivors. In addition, certain industrial facilities 

are critical because of their role in supplying operational forces. 

These installations rely almost entirely on the national power grid. According to 

estimates by the Navy’s Dahlgren Mission Assurance Division, 99% of the electricity 

DoD installations consume is from the commercial grid. Yet, the grid is highly 

vulnerable to prolonged outage from a variety of threats. This places critical mission 

assets at unacceptably high risk of extended disruption. 
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_____________________________________ __

64_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Backup power at installations is based on diesel generator sets with limited on-site fuel 

storage and not prioritized to critical tasks. As the reliability of the national grid has 

declined, the adequacy of backup power has become an issue. For both warfightingrelated activity and the new Homeland defense mission, backup power is inadequate in 

terms of size, duration and reliability. 

Finding #3: The Department lacks the strategy, policies, metrics, information or 

governance structure necessary to properly manage its energy risks. 

Decisions that create energy demand are dispersed organizationally across the 

Department and throughout the Services, OSD, the Joint Staff and Defense Agencies; 

and functionally throughout JCIDS, pre-JCIDS planning, acquisition, procurement, 

policy, installations management, privatization, logistics, and so on. There is currently 

no unifying vision, strategy, metrics or governance structure with enterprise-wide energy 

in its portfolio. DoD efforts to manage energy are limited to complying with executive 

orders, legislation and regulations which are mostly limited to facilities, non-tactical fleet 

vehicles, purchase of renewable energy from utilities, and procurement of commercial 

products. These activities consume approximately a quarter of the Department’s total 

energy. Efforts to manage energy to combat forces are generally limited to building 

logistics capacity to meet warfighter needs. These activities drive approximately three 

quarters of the Department’s and have no single point of leadership, no policies, no 

metrics and no accountability. 

The lowest level at which all activities that create energy demand come together is the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. This implies that in order to effectively manage energy, a 

governance body operating at this level, such as the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group 

(DAWG) will need to exercise active and ongoing oversight. 

Finding #4: There are technologies available now to make DoD systems more 

energy efficient, but they are undervalued, slowing their implementation and 

resulting in inadequate S&T investments. 

The Task Force heard over a hundred presentations on technologies that addressed all 

categories of end use, covering the full range of maturity from basic research to readyto-implement. Many of these appear quite promising. But because the operational and 

economic value of energy efficiency is not visible to decision making processes, cost 

effective technologies are not adopted, and science and technology programs underinvest in efficiency relative to the potential value of this attribute. 

The Task Force found the defense acquisition process to be inherently risk-adverse, not 

incentivized to be energy efficient, and generally preferring to support incremental 

improvements over new system designs. From an operator’s perspective this is 

understandable, but it also forecloses disruptive technology that could greatly enhance 

operational effectiveness through order of magnitude changes in energy efficiency. 

Competitive prototyping provides a means to test whether such ideas are worthwhile 

and to select the best of them. 
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________65 

Finding #5: There are many opportunities to reduce energy demand by changing 

wasteful operational practices and procedures. 

Operational practices and procedures involve choices made by personnel regarding 

how they use the equipment under their charge. These choices occur at the scale of an 

aircraft, land vehicle, or ship; an installation; a forward operating base; or battery 

powered equipment carried by individual soldiers. 

DoD must change its energy culture to value efficiency. Here, there is no substitute for 

strong, sustained attention by senior leadership. The ingrained belief that energy will 

always be cheap and plentiful must be replaced with the clear linkage between energy 

efficiency and operational success. The Task Force found the lack of understanding of 

this linkage to be the most significant barrier to addressing unnecessary and wasteful 

practices. 

Finding #6: Operational risks from fuel disruption require demand-side remedies; 

mission risks from electricity disruption to installations require both demand- and 

supply-side remedies. 

The most significant energy-related risk to DoD’s combat capability is the burden of 

moving fuel from the point of commercial purchase to the combat systems that need it. 

Greater efficiency in the use of fuel within the battlespace is the single best means to 

reduce that risk, with potential to provide multiple benefits in terms of operational 

effectiveness, reduced logistics and budgetary costs. 

The most significant risk to critical mission at fixed installations is the fragility and 

vulnerability of the commercial power grid. Significantly increased end-use efficiency to 

reduce demand combined with alternative energy generated close- or on-site and 

enhanced backup capability offer and the best opportunities to reduce that risk to 

acceptable levels. 

6.2 Task Force Recommendations 

Recommendation #1: Accelerate efforts to implement energy efficiency Key 

Performance Parameters (KPPs) and use of the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel to 

inform all acquisition trades and analyses about their energy consequences, as 

recommended by the 2001 DSB Task Force. 

Task 1.1: By July 2008, the DEPSECDEF require the Defense Acquisition Board to 

apply milestone exit criteria to all programs to determine whether an energy related KPP 

has been appropriately applied, and whether FBCF has been appropriately used as a 

factor for acquisition trade studies and systems engineering activities. “Black” programs 

should not be exempt from this requirement. 
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_____________________________________ __

66_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Task 1.2: By May 2008, establish a policy requiring all force-on-force campaign 

analyses and other models and simulations used to support AoA or EoAs to incorporate 

energy, energy related logistics, and energy protection requirements. 

Task 1.3: By May 2008, VCJCS establish a policy requiring: 

• All wargames, major unit field training, and joint exercises include fuel and fuel 

logistics. 

• Establish a fuel battle-lab to experimentally find ways to achieve successful 

battlespace outcomes with reduced ener inputs. 

Task 1.4: By June 2008, USD(AT&L) establish a policy requiring application of FBCF 

and efficiency related capability improvements to engineering decisions affecting 

modifications made to legacy systems during reset programs. The Task Force 

recommends these also apply to non-developmental systems used at forward operating 

locations, since these create large demand for fuel in theater. 

Task 1.5: By April 2008, USD(AT&L) publish initial official values for FBCF to be used 

in all acquisition trade analyses, and establish a schedule and process for their periodic 

updating. 

Recommendation #2: Reduce the risk to critical missions at fixed installations 

from loss of commercial power and other critical national infrastructure. 

Task 2.1: By June 2008, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 

Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), in coordination with the JS and Office of 

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment 

(ODUSD(I&E)), develop a program plan to assess the risks to mission from power 

failure, identify mitigation options, assess their efficacy and develop a phased 

investment plan to bring the risks to within acceptable limits at CONUS and OCONUS 

installations. 

Task 2.2: By June 2008, ASD(HD&ASA), in coordination with the JS and ODUSD(I&E), 

establish metrics for acceptable risks to installation missions from failure of energy 

supplies, with priority given to critical C4, ISR, strategic deterrence and Homeland 

defense missions. 

Task 2.3: By August 2009, ASD(HD&ASA), in coordination with the JS and 

ODUSD(I&E), complete risk assessments for critical C4, ISR, and strategic deterrence 

missions and identify the most cost effective risk mitigation options to assure mission 

resilience, to include efficiency to reduce the demand for on-site power, enhanced 

backup capability via greater on-site generator capacity, and provision of on-site 

alternative sources of power. 
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________67 

Task 2.4: By June 2008, ODUSD(I&E) develop a plan to “island” critical missions from 

the grid by December 2009. A preliminary list of Joint Staff identified assets is 

contained in Appendix G. 

Task 2.5: By June 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) develop a 

legislative proposal to make grid reliability a factor in future Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) decisions. 

Task 2.6: By June 2008, ODUSD(I&E) update its 2004 Renewable Energy Assessment 

by adding biomass, waste-to-power, geothermal power generation systems, and biobased ground transportation fuels; and by October 2009 develop a comprehensive 

efficiency and renewables investment roadmap to exploit the resources identified in the 

assessment. The results should be incorporated into the net-zero-energy installations 

plan. 

Task 2.7: By October 2008, ODUSD(I&E) require all new Military Construction 

(MILCON), Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and privatized construction and all 

facility renovations that exceed 50% of replacement cost to meet energy efficiency 

standards that are at least 50% better than ASHRAE 90.1.2004. 

Task 2.8: By April 2008, ODUSD(I&E) issue a policy requiring all installation 

maintenance, whether by contract or in-house, to install only Energy Star and FEMP 

designated products, and maintain equipment to at least that standard of efficiency. 

Task 2.9: By April 2008, USD(AT&L) issue a policy requiring the DLA to carry only 

Energy Star and FEMP designated products, as established by the Energy Policy Act of 

2005, Section 104; requiring GSA to offer only those products to DoD customers, and 

prohibiting DoD personnel or contractors from using Government credit cards to 

circumvent this policy. 

Task 2.10: By October 2009, ODUSD(I&E) require that electricity and fuel/gas meters 

be installed on all DoD buildings and facilities in order to more effectively manage 

energy consumption. 

Task 2.11: By October 2008, ODUSD(I&E) require that all new MILCON, O&M and 

privatized construction started in FY 2020 and later meet a “net zero” energy 

consumption specification. 

Task 2.12: By October 2008, ODUSD(I&E) require that all DoD installations meet a “net 

zero energy standard by 2025. 
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_____________________________________ __

68_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Recommendation #3: Establish a Department-wide strategic plan that establishes 

measurable goals, achieves the business process changes recommended by the 

2001 DSB report and establishes clear responsibility and accountability. 

Fixed installations use about one quarter of DoD’s total energy. There are policies, 

metrics, reporting requirements and a senior official in charge. Deployed systems use 

about three quarters of DoD’s total energy. There are few policies, procedures or 

reporting requirements; no metrics and no one in charge. The lowest level at which all 

decisions affecting energy use by the Department converge is with the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. It is very difficult to achieve sustained focus and accountability 

for performance on energy use at this level. The Task Force concluded that lack of 

leadership is a root cause of DoD’s energy problem. 

In addition to oversight, DoD needs a comprehensive energy plan that addresses both 

fixed installations, to include critical Defense Industrial Base (DIB) plants, and 

operational forces. It should include both measurable goals for energy demand 

reduction and reduction in energy risks. Implementing new analytical products to better 

inform key decisions will be key to enabling effective energy management. For 

operational forces, this requires adding energy to force planning analyses, and 

implementing the energy KPP and FBCF. For fixed installations and industrial base 

plants, it includes applying integrated risk management principles to reduce the 

likelihood of prolonged loss of critical missions due to commercial power outages. 

Currently, energy demand is an unplanned consequence of poorly informed decisions. 

Analytical tools are needed to develop meaningful and achievable energy goals, and 

business process changes are needed to enable new information to be considered 

when making key decisions that affect energy use. Success will require a plan that is 

horizontally and vertically integrated throughout the Department, with participation by all 

functional areas that make decisions affecting energy use with sustained oversight at 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense level. 

Task 3.1: By June 2008, establish a senior energy official responsible for development 

of policies and procedures and oversight of their implementation. This official should 

have a voice at the key decision bodies throughout the requirements, acquisition, and 

funding processes to ensure energy considerations have been accurately factored into 

key decisions that affect DoD’s energy demand patterns and risks from disruptions in 

commercial energy supplies. 

Task 3.2: By June 2008, USD(P) incorporate the concepts of resilience of critical 

missions at installations and endurance of combat forces as tactically and strategically 

important metrics to be included in future strategy and planning documents. While the 

names of these documents change frequently (e.g., Quadrennial Defense Review, 

National Military Strategy, Strategic Planning Guidance (being renamed Guidance for 

Development of the Force / Guidance for Employment of the Force)) these concepts 

should guide the formulation of Department goals and strategy for managing energy. 
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________69 

Task 3.3: By July 2008, USD (AT&L) direct the establishment of partnerships with: 

• ODUSD(I&E) and the Department of Energy office of Energy Efficiency and 

Renewable Energy (DoE/EERE) to identify technologies related to renewable 

and distributed energy supplies for installations that have the potential to 

contribute to resilience metrics for installations. 

• DDR&E and DoE/EERE to identify technologies with the potential to contribute to 

endurance metrics by reducing battlespace fuel demand by deployed forces and 

at forward operating bases. 

Task 3.4: By July 2008, DEPSECDEF establish an interagency oversight group in 

cooperation with the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the 

Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to: 

• ascertain the risks to DoD missions from commercial grid outages; 

• determine the adequacy of actions being taken under current legislative authority 

to establish and enforce grid reliability standards; and 

• propose case specific remedies, as needed, to achieve grid reliability standards 

needed to support the level of mission resilience considered necessary by DoD 

and DHS. 

Task 3.5: By October 2008, develop and implement a Department-wide plan to 

integrate energy into appropriate education and training programs, to include 

professional military education, to include Senior Service Schools, Capstone and Apex; 

and specialty-specific education, such as acquisition corps and engineering. Curricula 

should include risk to mission, cost and force structure aspects of energy as addressed 

in this report and appropriate to the course. 

Recommendation #4: Invest in energy efficient and alternative energy 

technologies to a level commensurate with their operational and financial value. 

Combat and Combat Related Systems: 

Task 4.1: USD(AT&L) accelerate development efforts on innovative concepts and their 

enabling technologies applicable to prime mover platforms with the potential to change 

ConOps to significantly improve operational capability and reduce demand for 

battlespace fuel and fuel logistics assets: 

• Blended Wing Body Aircraft 

• Optimum Speed Tilt Rotor Vertical Lift 

• Lightweight Composite Blast-Bucket Tactical Vehicle 

• Electrical actuators 

• Semi-rigid, lighter-than-air high altitude lifting bodies 

• Micro-generators 
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_____________________________________ __

70_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

• Biomimetic design for platform components 

Task 4.2: By July 2008, USD(AT&L) issue a policy re-establishing early competitive 

prototyping for major ACAT I programs. These programs have been all but abandoned 

by the Department due to cost, but their ability to accelerate technology maturation to a 

readiness level appropriate for program adoption, overcome reluctance by operators to 

consider and adopt new technologies, and to guide multi-billion dollar development and 

acquisition investments, suggests to the Task Force that their value far exceeds their 

cost. The Task Force recommends dedicating on the order of $500M a year in order to 

better leverage the billions dedicated to major acquisition programs. 

Task 4.3: By July 2008, DDR&E initiate a research program to identify the 

characteristics of synthetic fuels likely to be producible at deployed locations, and 

identify, or develop as needed, materials for use in propulsion systems compatible with 

that range of fuel types. Technologies to produce synthetic fuels on a small scale using 

indigenous feedstocks are under development, and the ability of deployed systems to 

use those fuels would be operationally advantageous. Locally available feedstocks 

could include kitchen and human waste, other biological materials or used motor oil. 

Task 4.4: April 2008, USD(AT&L) direct all acquisition programs for soldier electronics 

systems, especially communications equipment, to implement the National Research 

Council (NRC) study recommendation that energy efficiency be a first-order design 

parameter, and provide direct monetary incentives to manufacturers to reduce power 

demand. The study recommended future soldier systems should require no more than 

2W average power, 5W peak power, substantially less than current systems. 

Task 4.5: The Task Force recommends the Department continue to invest in basic 

research to develop new alternative fuels technologies that are too risky for private 

investments, and to partner with private sector fuel users to leverage efforts and share 

burdens. The Task Force also recommends the Department work with commercial 

partners to conduct full “well-to-wheel” life cycle assessments of each synthetic fuel 

technology to assess environmental, cost, material flow and scalability issues. The life 

cycle carbon footprint of alternative fuels should be less than petroleum. The Task 

Force recommends DoD give priority to synfuel production adaptable to forward 

deployed locations using local materials. Such technologies could reduce the amount 

of fuel needed to be moved and protected in theater gallon for gallon. 

Installations and Infrastructure: 

Task 4.6: By June 2008, DUSD (Logistics and Material Readiness (L&MR)) issue a 

policy to convert fleet vehicles used at installations to all electric or plug-in-hybrid as 

rapidly as vehicle availability and suitability for end-use permit in order to accelerate 

commercialization of the technologies and reduce DoD petroleum use. 

Task 4.7: By July 2008, ODUSD(I&E) establish a policy requiring all buildings to 

incorporate renewable energy (e.g., solar, wind and ground geothermal) into their 
_______________________________________________ CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________71 

design, as appropriate to the location and function of the building in order to reduce the 

requirement for power from the commercial grid. 

Task 4.8: By April 2009, ODUSD(I&E) identify five installations for strategic islanding 

demonstration projects, with a roadmap for implementation within 18 months. 

Cross-Cutting Technologies: 

Task 4.9: By budget year FY10, DDR&E increase investments in energy storage 

technologies to improve the performance of electrically powered vehicles, and enable 

storage of electricity generated by renewable sources at forward operating bases. 

Recommendation #5: Identify and exploit near-term opportunities to reduce 

energy use through policies and incentives that change operational procedures. 

Task 5.1: By April 2008, DEPSECDEF and VCJCS direct the Services to initiate a 

comprehensive review of how the Services currently employ simulators, emulators and 

task trainers, the extent to which their use could be increased while maintaining mission 

qualification, and to identify technical improvements that could permit increased use. 

The review should include authoritative experts in the field of cognitive responses to 

ensure the results and recommendations will lead to a better trained and more capable 

force 

Task 5.2: By July 2008, VCJCS commission a study of military and DoD-funded civilian 

airlift practices to ensure the DoD is using the most effective and efficient means of lift, 

optimum equipage of DoD aircraft to take advantage of commercial air traffic 

management systems that permit optimum routing and separation, and to ensure that 

force sizing for airlift and sealift systems are commensurate with the validated weight, 

cube, volume and timing requirements of the deployed and forward based forces. 

Task 5.3: By July 2008, DEPSECDEF and VCJCS issue a joint directive prohibiting 

unnecessary operational practices that increase fuel usage and costs, such as use of 

afterburner on takeoff when conditions allow safe operations with military power, multiengine taxi operations, sprint and drift steaming operations; and requiring annual 

reviews to determine the completeness of the list, effectiveness of the policy, and 

recommended changes to further reduce unnecessary fuel use. 
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_____________________________________ __

72_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_________________________________________________APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE 

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________73 

APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE
APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE______________________________________________ __

74_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_________________________________________________APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE 

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________75 
APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE______________________________________________ __

76_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
______________________________________________APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP 

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________77 

APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CO-CHAIRMEN

Dr. James Schlesinger The MITRE Corporation 

Gen. Michael P.C. Carns, USAF (Ret) Private Consultant 

FACILITIES PANEL 

VADM Albert Konetzni, USN (Ret), Panel 

Chair 

Private Consultant 

Mr. Bill Browning Browning & Bannon, LLC 

Ms. Bobi Garrett Strategic Development and Analysis NREL 

Mr. Dan Harrison Private Consultant 

Mr. Duncan Holaday Private Consultant 

Dr. Thomas Hughes Penn State University 

Mr. William Kosik EYP Mission Critical Facilities, Inc. 

Mr. James Little Washington Safety Management Solutions 

Mr. Scott McCain Booz Allen Hamilton 

Mr. Gary Merrow Turner Facilities Management Solutions 

Mr. Tom Neelands GM 

Mr. Stephen Piccolo Private Consultant 

RADM Chris Weaver, USN (Ret) Private Consultant 

Mr. Mike Whearty Private Consultant 

Mr. Tom Zidow Washington Group International 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Mr. Alex Beehler ADUSD(Environment, Safety & Occupational 

Health) 

Mr. Paul Bouley HQ Marine Corps 

Dr. Craig College DASA(Infrastructure Analysis) 

CAPT Tony Ermovick, USN USN (LFF) Facilities Branch 

Ms. Kathleen Ferguson Deputy Air Force Civil Engineer, HQAF 

CDR Brad Hancock, USN ODUSD (Installations and Environment) 
APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP_____________________________________________

78_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Mr. Don Juhasz Office of Assistant Army Chief of Staff for 

Installation Management 

Dr. Get Moy ODUSD (Installations and Environment) 

Mr. Michael Ostrom U.S. Army 

Mr. Robert Sperberg U.S. Army 

Mr. Bill Tayler U.S. Navy 

Mr. Chris Tindal Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

Headquarters 

Ms. Andrea Valentine U.S. Army 

PLATFORM PANEL

ADM Gregory Johnson, USN (Ret), Panel CoChair Private Consultant 

Gen. Gregory Martin, USAF (Ret), Panel CoChair Private Consultant 

Dr. Michael Canes LMI 

Brig. Gen. John Douglass, USAF (Ret) Aerospace Industries Association 

Dr. Paris Genalis Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Mr. David Hawkins Natural Resources Defense Council 

LTG Larry Jordan, USA (Ret) Burdeshaw Associates 

Dr. Dan Kammen UC Berkeley 

Mr. Ira Kuhn Directed Technologies, Inc 

Mr. Amory Lovins Rocky Mountain Institute 

Mr. Tom Morehouse Institute for Defense Analyses 

CAPT Scott Pugh, USN (Ret) U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

VADM Richard Truly, USN (Ret) Private Consultant 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Mr. Michael Aimone USAF Logistics, Installations & Mission Support 

Mr. Bill Budden U.S. Air Force 

CoL Donald Jurewicz, USAF U.S. Air Force 

Mr. Erik Kallio U.S. Army 

Col Gregory Lengyel, USAF U.S. Air Force; The Brookings Institution 
______________________________________________APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP 

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________79 

Dr. Lourdes Maurice Federal Aviation Administration 

CAPT William Porter, USN OSD(AT&L) 

Dr. Jonathan Protz Duke University 

Dr. Alan Roberts U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Research 

POLICY PANEL

Mr. R. James Woolsey, Panel Co-Chair Booz Allen Hamilton 

Ms. Gueta Mezzetti, Panel Co-Chair Private Consultant 

Dr. Lee Buchanan Private Consultant 

Mr. Frank Gaffney Center for Security Policy 

Mr. Hugh Montgomery Institute for Defense and Homeland Security 

Mr. Robert Taylor Private Consultant 

Dr. Mike Telson Private Consultant 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Ms. Kay Bushman Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 

Mr. Mike Burks Mission Assurance Division J60 NSWCDD, 

Dahlgren 

Mr. Jeff Fulmer Mission Assurance Division J60 NSWCDD, 

Dahlgren 

Mr. Dan Mathis Mission Assurance Division J60 NSWCDD, 

Dahlgren 

Mr. Andy Pittman Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 

Mr. Gary Seifert Idaho National Laboratory (INL) 

Ms. Pam Serino Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 

Mr. Mike Warwick Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 

Mr. Jon Wellinghoff Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

(FERC) 

Ms. Mitzi Wertheim CNA 

RESEARCH &TECHNOLOGY (R&T) PANEL

Dr. Ed Reedy, Panel Co-Chair Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) 

Dr. Jeff Tester, Panel Co-Chair Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Dr. Feng An Energy and Transportation Technologies, LLC 
APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP_____________________________________________

80_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Dr. Stan Bull National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 

Dr. Sam Fleming Private Consultant 

Gen Richard Lawson, USAF (Ret) Energy, Environment & Security Group, Ltd 

Dr. Terry Michalske Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) 

Mr. Hugh Montgomery Institute for Defense and Homeland Security 

Dr. David Parekh Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Col. Jocelyn Seng, USAF U.S. Air Force 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES 

Mr. Christopher DiPetto OUSD(AT&L) 

Mr. Jack Taylor DDR&E 

DSB SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Charles Lominac, USAF Defense Science Board 

SUPPORT 

Ms. Michelle Ashley SAIC 

Ms. Diana Conty SAIC 

Mr. Jonathan Hamblin SAIC 

Ms. Amely Moore SAIC 

Ms. Lauren York SAIC 
_____________________________________________________________APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________81 

APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

PLENARY BRIEFINGS

10 May 2006 

DSB Legal Considerations Ms. Judy Kim DoD Office of the General Council 

30 May 2006 

 

R&D Overview Jack Taylor DDR&E 

DoD Energy/Fuel Mr. Dick Connelly Defense Energy Support Center 

(DESC) 

Authorities/Legislation Ms. Kay Bushman Defense Energy Support Center 

(DESC) 

Facilities Dr. Get Moy ODUSD (&E)) 

Services Overview: Air 

Force Mr. Mike Aimone Asst DCS/Logistics, Installations, 

and Mission Support 

Services Overview: Army Dr. Marilyn Freeman Army Tank Automotive Research & 

Engineering Center (TARDEC) 

Services Overview: Navy Mr. Bill Tayler Navy 

28 June 2006 

 

Army Energy Initiatives Dr. Marilyn Freeman OASA DAS(R&T) 

The activities of the DOE 

relative to substitutes for oil 

in the form of fuel liquids 

David Garman Undersecretary of Energy 

NRAC Study on Fuels John C. Sommerer 

Director of Science & Technology, 

and Chief Technology Officer 

JHU/APL 

DARPA Energy Programs Dr. Valerie Browning DARAPA 

2001 Fuel Burden DSB 

Report Mr. Tom Morehouse IDA 

 

18 July 2006 

IDA Fuel Efficiency Study Dr. Lisa Veitch IDA 
APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED _________________________________________________

82_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Air Force Science Advisory 

Board (AFSAB) Quick Look 

Study on Technology 

Options for Improved Air 

Vehicle Fuel Efficiency 

Prof Ann Karagozian UCLA 

DoD’s Joint Capability 

Integration & Development 

System (JCIDS) 

MG Mike Vane, USA JCS J-8 

6 September 2006 

 

DOD Electricity and Fuel 

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 

CONUS: Locations, 

Recommendations, Visions 

and Policy Challenges 

E. Daniel Mathis 

Mission Assurance Division (J605), 

Naval Surface Warfare Center 

(NSWC), Dahlgren 

JASONS Paul Dimotakis California Institute of Technology 

Carbon Capture and 

Storage 

Professor Robert 

Socolow 

Princeton University 

Distributed Generation into 

combat in Iraq and 

Afghanistan 

Hugh Jones Energy Consultant 

Biotechnology for DoD 

Renewable Energy Systems 

- Example: The Tactical 

Biorefinery 

Jerry Warner Defense Life Sciences, LLC 

Overview of Wal-Mart's 

initiatives related to 

transportation and facilities 

energy savings 

Mr. Charles Zimmerman Prototype and New Format Dev., 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 

10 October 2006 

Environment Energy 

Connections - Policy Issues, 

Energy Efficiency, Energy 

Usage and the 

Environmental Impact 

Dr. Jeff Marqusee ODUSD(Installations and 

Environment) 

Economics of the Nuclear 

Industry (Power Sources) 

ADM Skip Bowman, 

(Ret.) and Dr. Merle 

Prater 

Nuclear Energy Institute 

PSU Energy Future Study Dr. Thomas Hughes Penn State University 
_____________________________________________________________APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________83 

Energy Security IPT 

Outbrief Mr. Al Shaffer DDR&E 

29 November 2006 

Maritime Industry Briefing Mr. Steve Carmel and 

Mr. Bob Bowers MAERSK 

Advanced Energy 

Technologies: Challenges 

and Opportunities 

Floyd Kvamme President’s Council of Advisors on 

Science and Technology (PCAST) 

PA&E Fully Burdened Cost 

of Fuel Study Mr. Matt Kastantin PA&E 
APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED _________________________________________________

84_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

PANEL BRIEFINGS

Facilities Panel

25 August 2006

 

The Air Force Infrastructure 

Energy Strategy Lt Col Brian Weidmann U.S. Air Force 

Army Energy and Utilities Mr. Don Juhasz Chief Utilities and Energy, 

U.S. Army 

Department of Defense 

Facilities and Vehicles Energy 

Use, Strategies and Goals Dr. Get Moy DoD 

Department of the Navy Shore 

Energy Program 

Ms. Mary Lingua U.S. Navy 

Brief to DSB Energy Strategy 

Task Force 

Mr. Mark Warner Johnson Controls 

11 October 2006 

Role of Energy Manager in 

General Motors 

Mr. Tom Neelands General Motors 

Department of Defense Energy 

Strategy Task Force 

Presentation 

Mr. Mitch Jackson FedEx 

Emerging Market in Tradable 

Energy Efficiency Certificates 

(White TagsTM) 

Mr. Mel Jones Sterling Planet 

14 November 2006 – NREL 

Renewable Energy Applications 

in Department of Defense 

Facilities 

Dr. Andy Walker NREL 

Influencing Future Vehicles 

Using Systems Analysis 

Mr. Aaron Booker NREL 

Status and Outlook for 

Renewable Electricity & 

Buildings Technologies 

Dr. Stan Bull NREL 

Renewable Energy 

Communities: Base 

Development Perspectives 

Ms. Nancy Carlisle NREL 

Alternative Fuels Data Center 

Tools and Resources 

Ms. Wendy DaFoe NREL 
_____________________________________________________________APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________85 

Practical Applications of 

Renewable Energy 

Mr. Jeff Dominick NREL 

Status and Outlook for 

Renewable Fuels & Vehicle 

Technologies 

Mr. Dale Gardner NREL 

Sustainable Communities Ms. Bobi Garrett NREL 

National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory Mr. Bill Glover NREL 

Building Efficiency 

Tools/Sustainable Design Ms. Sheila Hayter NREL 

Alternative Fuel Vehicles and 

Fuels: Requirements and 

Status Ms. Kathleen Nawaz NREL 

Practical Applications of 

Efficiency and Sustainable 

Design 

Mr. Bob Westby NREL 

13 December 2006 

Energy Efficiency in Buildings Ms. Kelly Speakes United Technologies 

LEED Mr. Tom Hicks U.S. Green Building Council 

Energy Star Opportunities Dr. Kathleen Hogan EPA 

Platform Panel

17 July 2006 

Joint Staff/J8: Force Structure 

and CONOPS 

COL Camile Nichols, 

USA Joint Staff/J8 

Overview of Warfighting 

Analysis on the Joint Staff 

COL Walter S. Barge, 

USA Joint Staff/J8 

U.S. Air Force: Force Structure 

and COBOPS 

Lt. Col. Randy Brawley, 

USAF HAF/A3OC 

15 August 2006 

Shell Mahogany Oil Shale 

Research Project Site Tour 

N/A Shell Piceance Basin 

Rifle, Colorado 

 
APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED _________________________________________________

86_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

24 August 2006 

The Army: At War and 

Transforming 

COL Ben Rivera Army G-37, Force Management 

U.S. Navy: Force Structure and 

CONOPS 

CAPT Douglass E. 

Otte 

Integration & Force Structure 

Branch Head 

Assessment Division (N81) 

U.S. Marine Corps: Force 

Structure and CONOPS Mr. Mike Boyd Engineer Advocacy Center 

25 August 2006 

ULTRA Armored Platform 

Vehicle Mr. Scott Badenoch Badenoch, LLC 

Boeing Energy Strategy Dr. W. James Renton 

Mr. Ronald Mutzelburg Boeing 

Blended Wing Body: FuelEfficient, Multi-Role Platform Mr. Robert Liebech Boeing 

GE Aviation: More Efficient 

Turbine Engines and Alternate 

Fuels Discussion 

Mr. Brad Buswell 

Mr. Bill Dwyer 

Mr. Steve Newbold 

General Electric 

GE Energy Strategy Dr. Sanjay Correa & 

Dr. Vlatko Vlatkovic 

General Electric 

Naval Reactors, Propulsion 

Trends, and Future Propulsion 

Mr. Howard Fireman & 

RDML Kevin McCoy 

Mr. John Pazik 

NAVSEA and Office of Naval 

Research 

ULTRA Armored Platform 

Vehicle Mr. Scott Badenoch Badenoch, LLC 

7 September 2006 

Electro-magnetic Actuator 

Devices Dr. Delbert Tesar 

University of Texas at Austin, 

Department of Mechanical 

Engineering 

AFRL S&T Overview Dr. Jimmy Kenyon AFRL/PRT 

Aero Configurations Mr. Dieter Multhopp AFRL/VAAA 

Lightweight Aero Structures Mr. Dick Holzwarth AFRL/VASA 

Lightweight Composite 

Materials Dr. Tia Benson-Tolle AFRL/MLBC 

Versatile Affordable Advanced 

Turbine Engine (VAATE) Mr. Jeff Stricker AFRL/PRT 
_____________________________________________________________APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________87 

High Temperature Materials Ms. Dallis Hardwick AFRL/MLLMD 

Alternative Fuels Mr. Bill Harrison AFRL/PRTG 

Multi-Megawall Electric Power 

System (MEPS) 

Mr. Scott Rubertus ODUSD(S&T)/WS 

Air Transportation Association 

(ATA) Brief 

Mr. John Heimlich ATA 

11 October 2006 

Ultra-light Airframes/Near 

Space Vehicles 

MG John Hawley, 

USAF (Ret) Teledyne Technologies 

FedEx Fuel/Energy Initiatives Mr. Mitch Jackson FedEx 

Meeting the Energy Needs of 

Future Warriors 

Mr. Bruce Braun 

Dr. Millard Rose 

The National Academy of 

Sciences 

30 November 2006 

Force Protection in Theater 

(Fuel Convoys) Lt. Col. Eric Buer USMC, DAU 

Biomimetic Rotor Applications 

Mr. Jay Harman 

Mr. Peter Fiske 

Dr. Mark Young 

PAX Scientific, Inc. 

Cost of Fuel: An IDA Business 

Case 

Dr. Lisa Veitch IDA 

13December 2006 

New Tilt Rotor Configurations 

LTG Jack 

Woodmansee, USA 

(Ret) 

Army Science Board 

Assessment of Foreign 

Platforms Mr. John Pazik Office of Naval Research 

17January 2007 

Assessment of Foreign Army 

and U.S. Army Platforms 

BG Genaro Dellarocco 

Dr. Jim Cross 

Dr. Ed Shaffer 

Mr. Tom Nguyen 

RDECOM 

PM-MRP/CERDEC 

ARL 

SOSI 

Concept Development Path 

Planning 

Lt. Col. Emily Andrew, 

USMC 

CDR Joan Oldmixon 

Ms. Amy Grom 

Mr. Darrel Morben 

JFCOM 
APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED _________________________________________________

88_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Foreign Review of Energy 

Efficiencies Dr. Daniel Atkins NASIC 

 

Policy Panel

27 June 2006 

Policy, Planning, and 

Cooperation Challenges to 

Mission Assurance 

(Conventional and evolving 

homeland defense missions) 

Associated with Energy and 

Interconnected Infrastructures 

Paula Scalingi The Scalingi Group, LLC 

Dahlgren Mission Assurance 

Overview Mike Strain Mission Assurance Division (J60) NSWCDD, Dahlgren 

Electricity - Mission Assurance 

Division Brief Mike Burks Mission Assurance Division 

(J60) NSWCDD, Dahlgren 

Fuel - Mission Assurance 

Division Brief Jeff Fulmer Mission Assurance Division (J60) NSWCDD, Dahlgren 

5 September 2006 

DOD Electricity and Fuel 

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 

CONUS: Locations, 

Recommendations, Visions and 

Policy Challenges 

E. Daniel Mathis Mission Assurance Division 

(J60) NSWCDD, Dahlgren 

DOD’s Renewable Energy Plan 

– Plan Synopsis, Policy Issues 

and Implementation Challenges Mike Warwick DOE Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories 

Decentralizing Fuel Production 

and Delivery with Clean Oil 

from Organic Recycling 

(Thermal Depolymerization) 

Brian Appel Changing World Technologies, 

Inc. 

DESC Clean Fuels and 

Challenges in Logistics 

Deliveries and Purchasing 

Pam Serino Defense Energy Support Center 

(DESC) 

Environmental Issues with Coal 

to Liquids 

Alex Farrell Energy and Resources Group, 

UC Berkeley 
_____________________________________________________________APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________89 

7 September 2006 

Coal Waste to Fuel and BioGasification to Fischer-Tropsch 

Fuel 

John Rich Ultra Clean Fuels 

Prospects for Algae to Jet Fuel Michael A. Pacheco National Renewable Energy Lab 

(NREL) 

23 October 2006 

Saving Energy Paul MacCready AeroViroment 

N/A Abe Karem Karem Aircraft, Inc. 

Vulnerability of New York City 

Energy Infrastructure Adam Victor TransGas Energy Systems, LLC 

Review of Legal and Regulatory 

Authorities Kay Bushman Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 

13 November 2006 

How DESC Buys and Moves 

Various Fuels 

Robert Short 

John Nelson 

Bruce Blank 

Patricia Wilkins 

Defense Energy Support Center 

(DESC) 

Bio Conversion of Coal to 

Methane Dr. Damon Walia ArchTech 

Huge Fuel Efficiency Gains are 

Available from Practicable Air 

Vehicle Improvements 

Ira Kuhn Directed Technologies, Inc. 

Plug-in Hybrids Andy Frank UC Davis 

28 November 2006 

Power Surety Dan Nolan Army Rapid Equipping Force 

Energy Planning for the Military Amory Lovins Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) 

Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania Initiatives to 

Secure Alternative Energy 

Resources & Infrastructure 

Katie McGinty 

Secretary of the Pennsylvania 

Department of Environmental 

Protection 

Elements of Micro-Grid Power 

Structures for the Military Mike Warwick DOE Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories 

 
APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED _________________________________________________

90_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

30 November 2006 

Transformers Joe McClelland Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) 

Micro-Grid Capabilities in the 

Southwestern United States Richard Sweetser Exergy Partners, Inc.

Small Nuclear Dr. James Powell and 

Dr. Paul Farrell 

Brookhaven Technology 

Associates 

The Global Nuclear Energy 

Partnership Victor Reis 

11 December 2006 

Industry Response to 

Vulnerabilities Ms. Laura Hussey Edison Electric Institute 

An EERE and DOD 

Relationship for Current Times Andy Karsner 

Assistant Secretary for Energy 

Efficiency and Renewable 

Energy, DOE 

17 January 2007 

Space Solar Power - An 

Opportunity for Strategic 

Leadership 

Lt. Col. Mike 

Hornitschek U.S. Air Force 

State of PV Technology and 

Applicability to Zero Energy 

Bases 

Gary Wayne PowerLight 

Army Energy Program Don Juhasz Chief Utilities and Energy, US 

Army 

Air Force Energy Strategy Bill Budden Logistics, Installations and 

Mission Support, HQ USAF 

Alternative Financing Mike Telson 

Advanced Vehicle Program John Waters Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) 

Energy Related Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Bill Bryan Director of Critical Infrastructure Protection OSD(HD) 

Power Grid Michael Assante 

Barry Kuehnle Idaho National Laboratory 

Naval Reactors Mr. Steve Trautman Deputy Director, Naval Reactors 

5 March 2007

Tax Proposals Currently Under 

Consideration to Stimulate 

Growth in the Alternative 

Distributed Energy Sector 

Dave Briedenbach Energy Tax Solutions 
_____________________________________________________________APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________91 

What the Solar Industry Needs 

in Terms of Technology 

Assistance, Model Contracting 

and Procurement 

Methodologies, and other DoD 

Investments 

Scott Sklar National Defense University 

R&T Panel

5 – 6 October 2006 - NREL 

Analysis at NREl Dr. Doug Arent NREL 

RE/EE Portfolio Dr. Stan Bull NREL 

NREL Distributed Energy 

Research Mr. Dick DeBlasio NREL 

Technology and Site Selection 

Tools Mr. Jeffrey Dominick NREL 

Solar – Photovoltaics Dr. Larry Kazmerski NREL 

Concentrating Solar Power Dr. Chuck Kutscher NREL 

Influencing Future Vehicles 

Using Systems Analysis Mr. Tony Markel NREL 

Geothermal Energy Dr. Gerry Nix NREL 

The Potential of Biofuels to 

Meet the Military’s Jet Fuel 

Needs 

Dr. Mike Pacheco NREL 

Advanced Vehicles Ms. Terry Penny NREL 

Modeling Uncertainty in Major 

Drivers in U.S. Electricity 

Markets: Stochastic Energy 

Deployment Systems Model 

(SEDS) 

Mr. Walter Short NREL 

The Renewable Resource Mr. Tom Stoffel NREL 

Hydrogen Technologies for the 

U.S. Energy Economy Dr. George Sverdrup NREL 

Wind Energy Status and Future Dr. Robert Thresher NREL 
APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED _________________________________________________

92_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Creating Zero-Energy Buildings Dr. Paul Torcellini NREL 

The Renewable Resource Mr. Steve Wilcox NREL 

Technology and Site Selection 

Tools Mr. Jeffrey Dominick NREL 

Solar – Photovoltaics Dr. Larry Kazmerski NREL 

Concentrating Solar Power Dr. Chuck Kutscher NREL 

Influencing Future Vehicles 

Using Systems Analysis Mr. Tony Markel NREL 

Geothermal Energy Dr. Gerry Nix NREL 

The Potential of Biofuels to 

Meet the Military’s Jet Fuel 

Needs 

Dr. Mike Pacheco NREL 

Advanced Vehicles Ms. Terry Penny NREL 

Modeling Uncertainty in Major 

Drivers in U.S. Electricity 

Markets: Stochastic Energy 

Deployment Systems Model 

(SEDS) 

Mr. Walter Short NREL 

The Renewable Resource Mr. Tom Stoffel NREL 

Hydrogen Technologies for the 

U.S. Energy Economy Dr. George Sverdrup NREL 

Wind Energy Status and Future Dr. Robert Thresher NREL 

Creating Zero-Energy Buildings Dr. Paul Torcellini NREL 

The Renewable Resource Mr. Steve Wilcox NREL 

11 October 2006 

Trash to Ethanol Technology Mr. Ray Crabbs BRI Energy, LLC 

FedEx – Energy/Fuel Initiatives Mr. Mitch Jackson FedEx 

Soldier Survivability and 

Sustainable Energy – Progress 

and Innovation through 

Dr. William Peters MIT 
_____________________________________________________________APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________93 

Nanotechnology 

Future Soldier Energy – 

Batteries and Fuel Cells Dr. Frank Rose NAS 

Bio Conversion of Coal to 

Methane Dr. Damon Walia ArchTech 
APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED _________________________________________________

94_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
__________________________________________________APPENDIX D: NEW TECHNOLOGIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________95 

APPENDIX D: NEW TECHNOLOGIES

RECOMMENDED PLATFORM TECHNOLOGIES - PROPULSION

TECHNOLOGY

EXPECTED 

ENHANCEMENT 

TO MILITARY 

EFFECTIVENESS

MAGNITUDE 

OF 

EXPECTED 

ENERGY 

SAVINGS

RISK ASSOCIATED 

WITH THIS 

TECHNOLOGY

WHEN THE 

TECHNOLOGY 

LIKELY WILL BE 

READY FOR FIELD 

USE41

PROPULSION -

SHORT TERM

 

1. Advanced Hybrid 

Electric Vehicle powertrain 

technology. 

Med 

Low 

(Conventional 

Vehicles) 

Med 

(Mil Specific 

Vehicles) 

Med Short/Med 

PROPULSION -

MEDIUM TERM

 

1. Highly Efficient 

Embedded Turbine Engine 

(HEETE). 

Low/Med High Med Med 

2. Adaptive Versatile 

Engine Technologies 

(ADVENT). 

Low/Med Med Med Med 

3. Electric power wheel 

technologies for aircraft & 

land vehicles. 

Low Low Med Med 

4. Fuel cell technology for 

supplemental power 

onboard ships. 

Med Med Med Med/Long 

PROPULSION - 

LONG TERM 

1. Advanced aircraft 

engine materials. Low Med High Long 

2. Advanced water jet 

propulsion systems. Low Low Low/Med Long 

3. Contra-rotating 

propellers. Low Low Med Long 

4. Variable Speed Tilt 

Rotor aircraft. High High High Long 

 

41 In the context of time, short = 0-5 yrs; med = 5-15 yrs; long = >15 yrs. 
APPENDIX D: NEW TECHNOLOGIES _________________________________________________

96_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

RECOMMENDED PLATFORM TECHNOLOGIES - WEIGHT 

TECHNOLOGY

EXPECTED 

ENHANCEMENT 

TO MILITARY 

EFFECTIVENESS

MAGNITUDE 

OF EXPECTED 

ENERGY 

SAVINGS

RISK ASSOCIATED 

WITH THIS 

TECHNOLOGY

WHEN THE 

TECHNOLOGY 

LIKELY WILL BE 

READY FOR FIELD 

USE

WEIGHT -

SHORT TERM

 

1. Advanced UAVs, 

UUVs & UGVs. Med Low/Med Med Short/Med 

2. Micro-generators. Med Med Med Short/Med 

3. Lightweight, high 

strength steels for use 

in tactical vehicles. 

Low Low Low Short 

WEIGHTMEDIUM TERM

 

1. Electrically 

powered actuators. Med Low Low Med 

2. Mega-watt 

Electrical Power 

System (MEPS). 

Med Low Med Med 

3. Advanced 

composite materials 

for use in platform 

bodies (e.g., advanced 

resins, ceramic-matrix 

composites, nanotechnology materials). 

Med/High Med/High High Med 

4. Unitized 

construction of air & 

land platforms. 

Med Low Med Med 

5. Blast absorption 

design & materials for 

land vehicles. 

Low Med Med Med 

WEIGHT - 

LONG TERM 

1. Semi-rigid, lighter 

than air, solar 

powered, high altitude 

(near-space) UAV. 

Med Med Med Long 
__________________________________________________APPENDIX D: NEW TECHNOLOGIES

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY_______________________________________________________97 

RECOMMENDED PLATFORM TECHNOLOGIES - DRAG

TECHNOLOGY

EXPECTED 

ENHANCEMENT 

TO MILITARY 

EFFECTIVENESS

MAGNITUDE 

OF EXPECTED 

ENERGY 

SAVINGS

RISK ASSOCIATED 

WITH THIS 

TECHNOLOGY

WHEN THE 

TECHNOLOGY 

LIKELY WILL BE 

READY FOR FIELD 

USE

DRAG -

SHORT TERM

 

1. Adaptive Wing 

Technologies. Low Low Low Short 

2. Advanced hull and 

propeller coatings. Low Low/Med Low Short 

DRAG -

MEDIUM TERM

 

1. Biomimetic 

concepts for platform, 

propeller, fan, pump & 

weapon design. 

Med Med Low/Med Med 

2. Blended Wing 

Body aircraft design. High High High Med 
APPENDIX D: NEW TECHNOLOGIES _________________________________________________

98_________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

RECOMMENDED PLATFORM TECHNOLOGIES – SYSTEM DEMAND

TECHNOLOGY

EXPECTED 

ENHANCEMENT 

TO MILITARY 

EFFECTIVENESS

MAGNITUDE 

OF EXPECTED 

ENERGY 

SAVINGS

RISK ASSOCIATED 

WITH THIS 

TECHNOLOGY

WHEN THE 

TECHNOLOGY 

LIKELY WILL BE 

READY FOR FIELD 

USE

SYSTEM DEMAND -

SHORT TERM

 

1. Tactical solar 

power generation. Low Low/Med Low Short 

2. Tactical wind 

power generation. Low Low Low Short 

SYSTEM DEMAND -

MEDIUM TERM

 

1. "Energy-starved" 

electronics for Land 

Warrior components. 

Med 

Low 

(context of DoD 

total energy 

usage) 

High 

(context of 

soldier usage) 

Med Med 

SYSTEM DEMAND - 

LONG TERM 

1. Fuel cells for 

ground use including 

battery recharge. 

Med Med High Long 

2. Space-Based Solar 

Power beamed to 

FOBs to circumvent 

conventional base 

power fueldependence. 

High Med High Very Long 
_______________________________________________________APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________99 

APPENDIX E: ENERGY KPP AND FULLY BURDENED COST OF FUEL 

POLICY MEMOS
APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS______________________________________________________

100________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_______________________________________________________APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________101 
APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS______________________________________________________

102________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_______________________________________________________APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________103 
APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS______________________________________________________

104________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_______________________________________________________APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________105 
APPENDIX E: POLICY MEMOS______________________________________________________

106________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_____________________________________APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________107 

APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

A

ACAT Acquisition Category 

ACSIM Assistant Chief of Staff of Installation 

Management 

ADVENT Adaptable Versatile Engine Technology 

AFCESA Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency 

AFRL Air Force Research Lab 

AFVs Alternative Fuel Vehicles 

AMMPS Advanced Medium-size Mobile Power Sources 

AOA Analyses of Alternatives 

AOR Area of Responsibility 

APU Auxiliary Power Unit 

A/S Assistant Secretary 

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense 

ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas Security Affairs. 

ASD(HD&ASA) is under the USD(P). 

ASD(SO/LIC) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. 

ASD(SO/LIC) is under the USD(P). 

ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and 

Air-Conditioning Engineers 

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

ATD Advanced Technology Demonstration 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 
APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERM______________________________________

108________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

B

BBL Billion Barrels 

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 

Btu British thermal unit 

BWB Blended Wing Body 

C

C4 Command, Control, Communications & 

Computers 

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

CBRNE Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear 

Explosive 

CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

CDD Capabilities Development Document 

CENTCOM United States Central Command 

CHUs Containerized Housing Units 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIP Critical Infrastructure Program 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CMU Central Monitoring Unit 

COCOM Combatant Command 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

CONUS Continental United States 

CPD Capabilities Production Document 

CTL Coal-to-Liquid 
_____________________________________APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________109 

D

DAB Defense Acquisition Board 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DAWG Deputy’s Advisory Working Group 

DCIP Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 

DCS Distributed Control System 

DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering 

DEPSECDEF Deputy Secretary of Defense 

DESC Defense Energy Support Center 

DFSP Defense Fuel Support Points 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIB Defense Industrial Base 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

D-MAD Dahlgren Mission Assurance Division 

DOC Department of Commerce 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOE (EERE) Department of Energy (Office of Energy Efficiency 

and Renewable Energy) 

DOE (OE) Department of Energy (Office of Electricity 

Delivery & Energy Reliability) 

DOI Department of Interior 

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, 

Leadership and Education, Personnel & Facilities 
APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERM______________________________________

110________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

DPS Defense Planning Scenarios 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSB Study “More Capable 

Warfighting Through Reduced 

Fuel Burden” 

The 2001 DSB Report “More Capable Warfighting 

Through Reduced Fuel Burden” also referred to in 

the report as the 2001 DSB study can be located 

at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/fuel.pdf

DSS Defense Security Service 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DUSD Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

DUSD(I&E) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment 

DUSD(L&MR) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics 

and Material Readiness 

E 

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse 

EMS Emergency Management System 

Endurance The ability of a system to sustain operations for an 

extended period of time without requiring 

additional support or replenishment activities. 

Energy Policy Act 2005 

(EPAct 2005) 

Includes provisions for renewed and expanded tax 

credits for landfill gas; provides bond financing, 

tax incentives, grants, and loan guarantees; 

extends renewable energy production incentives 

to landfill gas. It sets forth an energy research 

and development program covering: (1) energy 

efficiency; (2) renewable energy; (3) oil and gas; 

(4) coal; (5) Indian energy; (6) nuclear matters and 

security; (7) vehicles and motor fuels, including 

ethanol; (8) hydrogen; (9) electricity; (10) energy 

tax incentives; (11) hydropower and geothermal 

energy; and (12) climate change technology. For 

text of the full bill, visit: Energy Policy Act 2005. 

EO Executive Order 

EOA Evaluation of Alternatives 
_____________________________________APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________111 

EOP Executive Office of the President 

ERO Electric Reliability Organization 

ESPC Energy Savings Performance Contracts 

F

FAA Functional Area Analysis 

FBCF Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 

FBCT Future Brigade Combat Team 

FCBs Functional Capabilities Boards 

FCS Future Combat System 

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

FFV Flexed Fueled Vehicles 

FNA Functional Needs Analysis 

FOB Forward Operating Base 

FEMP Federal Energy Management Program. 

FEMP is a DOE program that works to reduce the 

cost and environmental impact of the Federal 

government by advancing energy efficiency and 

water conservation, promoting the use of 

distributed and renewable energy, and improving 

utility management decisions at Federal sites. 

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

FFV Flexible Fuel Vehicle 

Fischer Tropsch Is a catalyzed chemical reaction in which carbon 

monoxide and hydrogen are converted into liquid 

hydrocarbons of various forms. Typical catalysts 

used are based on iron and cobalt. The principal 

purpose of this process is to produce a synthetic 

petroleum substitute, typically from coal or natural 

gas, for use as synthetic lubrication oil or as 

synthetic fuel. 

FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERM______________________________________

112________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

FSA Functional Solutions Analysis 

FY Fiscal Year 

FYDP Future Year Defense Plan 

G

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GCC Government Coordinating Council 

GHGs Greenhouse Gas Emissions 

GOCO Government Owned, Contractor Operated 

GSA General Services Administration 

GWOT Global War on Terrorism 

H 

HD Homeland Defense 

HD/CIP Homeland Defense/Critical Infrastructure 

Protection 

HEETE Highly Efficient Embedded Turbine Engine 

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

(Hummvee) 

HS Homeland Security 

HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 

I 

ICD Initial Capabilities Document 

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses 

i-ENCON Incentivized Energy Conservation 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

IHPTET Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine 

Technology program 
_____________________________________APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________113 

INL Idaho National Laboratory 

IO Information Operations 

Islanding Electrical islands are created when parts of an 

interconnected power grid become separated from 

the main grid. This typically occurs during grid 

failures when portions of the area served are able 

to isolate themselves from the main grid and 

provide loads within that area sufficient power 

from generation within the area, the “island.” 

Islands can be created intentionally by 

establishing electrical boundaries using relays and 

controls that are able to isolate loads and 

sufficient generation to meet them, by ensuring 

loads and resources can be in balance. 

ISOs Independent System Operators 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance 

J 

JASON An independent scientific advisory group that 

provides consulting services to the U.S. 

government on matters of defense science and 

technology. It was established in 1960. JASON 

typically performs most of its work during an 

annual summer study, and has conducted studies 

under contract to the Department of Defense 

(frequently DARPA and the U.S. Navy), the 

Department of Energy, the U.S. Intelligence 

Community, and the FBI. Approximately half of 

the resulting JASON reports are unclassified. 

JCIDS Joint Capability Integration and Development 

System 

JCTD Joint Combat Technologies Demonstration 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JLTV Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle 

JMR Joint Multi Role 

JPD Joint Potential Designator 
APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERM______________________________________

114________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

JROCM Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

Memorandum 

JS Joint Staff 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar 

System 

JWCA Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment 

K

KPP Key Performance Parameters 

kV Kilovolt 

kW Kilowatt 

kWh Kilowatt-hour 

L

L/D Lift to drag 

LED Light-emitting diod 

LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 

LSV Low Speed Vehicle 

M 

MAD Navy’s Dahlgren Mission Assurance Division 

MBPD Million Barrels Per Day 

MDA Milestone Decision Authority 

MEPS Mega-watt Electrical Power System 

MILCON Military Construction 

MISER DARPA’s Mobile Integrated Sustainable Energy 

Recovery 

MNF-W Multi-National Force-West 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________115 

MRAP Mine-Resistant, Ambush Protected vehicle 

MOA Memorandum of Agreement 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

MSFD Multi-Service Force Deployment 

MULE Multifunction Logistics/Equipment 

MW Megawatt 

M&S Modeling and Simulation 

N

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation 

Net Zero Plus The plus in net zero plus refers to the capability of 

a base to provide power to its nearby surrounding 

area in the event of a grid outage. 

Network Single Point of 

Failure (NSPF) 

A single network component that, if it fails, results 

in a nonfunctional service or network. 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NORTHCOM US Northern Command 

NPC National Petroleum Council 

NRAC Naval Research Advisory Committee 

NRC National Research Council 

NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSC National Security Council 

NSPF Network Single Points of Failure 

NSSO National Security Space Office 
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NTV Non-Tactical Vehicle 

NZP Net Zero Plus 

O

OCONUS Outside Continental United States 

ODASD(HD) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense 

ODP Office for Domestic Preparedness 

OD/PA&E Office of the Director, Program Analysis & 

Evaluation 

ODUSD(I&E) Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations & Environment) 

OPTEMPO Operating Tempo 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

ONR Office of Naval Research 

OPOC Opposed Piston Opposed Cylinder engines 

OPTEMPO Operating tempo 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSD(PA&E) Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program 

Analysis & Evaluation) 

OSTR Optimum Speed Tilt Rotor 

OUSD(AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

P

PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation 

PCII Protection of Critical Infrastructure Information 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________117 

PLC Programmable Logic Controller 

PM Program Manager 

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

POM Program Objective Memorandum 

POR Program of Record 

PPBES Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution System 

PUC Public Utility Commission 

Q

R

RAMCAP Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset 

Protection 

R&D Research and Development 

R&T Research and Technology 

RD&D Research, Development and Demonstration 

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

RECs Renewable Energy Credits 

REDCOM Army Research Development & Engineering 

Command 

REF Rapid Equipping Force 

Resilience The ability of a system to resist failure and provide 

rapid recovery from breakdowns, should they 

occur. 

Rivet Joint Air Force primary reconnaissance platform. 

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenades 

RTO Regional Transmission Operator 

RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
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S

S&T Science & Technology 

SBSP Space-Based Solar Power 

SCC Sector Coordinating Council 

SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition system 

SCADA systems are used in utility infrastructures 

as a computer-based monitoring and control 

system that centrally collects, displays, and stores 

information from remotely-located data collection 

transducers and sensors to support the control of 

equipment, devices, and automated functions. 

SDD System Development & Demonstration Group 

SECDEF Secretary of Defense 

SME Subject Matter Expert 

SMP Sustain the Mission Project 

SOA State of the Art 

SPF Single Point of Failure 

STRACNET Strategic Rail Corridor Network 

STRAHNET Strategic Highway Network 

Synfuels Any liquid fuel obtained from coal, natural gas, or 

biomass. It can sometimes refer to fuels derived 

from other solids such as oil shale, tar sand, 

waste plastics, or from the fermentation of 

biomatter. 

T

TARDEC Army Tank Automotive, Research and 

Engineering Center 

TDA Table of Distribution and Allowance 

A table, which prescribes the organizational 

structure, personnel, and equipment 

authorizations, and requirements of a military unit 

to perform a specific mission for which there, is no 
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________119 

appropriate table of organization and equipment. 

(AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army 

Terms, 15 October 1983). 

TOA Table of Allowance 

(DoD). An equipment allowance document that 

prescribes basic allowances of organizational 

equipment, and provides the control to develop, 

revise, or change equipment authorization 

inventory data. (Joint Pub1-02, Dept of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 

March 1994). 

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment 

1. See JCS Pub 1 for definition. (A) 2. A table 

that prescribes the normal mission, organizational 

structure, and personnel and equipment 

requirements for a military unit, and is the basis 

for an authorizations document. See also 

modification table of organization. 

TPFDL Time Phased Force & Deployment List 

TRAC TRADOC Analysis Center 

TRAC-LEE TRADOC Analysis Center – Fort Lee 

TRAC-Leavenworth TRADOC Analysis Center – Fort Leavenworth 

TRAC-WSMR TRADOC Analysis Center – White Sands Missile 

Range 

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSWG Technical Support Working Group 

TQG Tactical Quiet Generator 

U 

UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
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UESC Utility Energy Services 

UFC Uniform Facilities Criteria 

UFGS Uniform Facility Guide Specifications 

UGVs Unmanned Ground Vehicles 

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics 

USD(C) Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

USD (P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

US United States 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USC United States Code 

USMC United State Marine Corps 

USN United States Navy 

UUVs Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 

V 

VAATE Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines 

VCJCS Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

VTOL Vertical Take-Off and Landing 

W 

W Watt 

WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction 

X Y Z
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DOD ENERGY STRATEGY______________________________________________________121 

APPENDIX G: CLASSIFIED 

A copy of the classified annex is located in the Defense Science Board office. Please 

contact Major Chad Lominac for more information. 

Phone: 703-571-0081 

NIPRNET: Charles.Lomican@osd.mil 

SIPRNET: Charles.Lominac@osd.smil.mil