POISONED PATRIOTS: CONTAMINATED DRINKING

WATER AT CAMP LEJUENE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 12, 2007

Serial No. 110–56

(

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POISONED PATRIOTS: CONTAMINATED DRINKING

WATER AT CAMP LEJUENE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 12, 2007

Serial No. 110–56

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

energycommerce.house.gov

POISONED PATRIOTS: CONTAMINATED DRINKING WATER AT CAMP LEJUENE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland

GENE GREEN, Texas

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

Vice Chairman

LOIS CAPPS, California

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JANE HARMAN, California

TOM ALLEN, Maine

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

HILDA L. SOLIS, California

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas

JAY INSLEE, Washington

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

JOE BARTON, Texas

Ranking Member

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING,

Mississippi

VITO FOSSELLA, New York

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

MARY BONO, California

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

DENNIS B. FITZGIBBONS, Chief of Staff

GREGG A. ROTHSCHILD, Chief Counsel

SHARON E. DAVIS, Chief Clerk

BUD ALBRIGHT, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman

DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

Vice Chairman

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

GENE GREEN, Texas

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

JAY INSLEE, Washington

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio)

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

Ranking Member

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio)

(II)

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan,

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1

Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth

of Kentucky, opening statement ......................................................................... 4

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 5

Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 6

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, prepared statement ...................................................................................... 30

WITNESSES

Jeff Byron ................................................................................................................. 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

Mike Gros, M.D, ....................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15

Jerome Ensminger ................................................................................................... 17

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21

Major General Robert Dickerson, Jr., Commanding General, Camp Lejeune,

NC ......................................................................................................................... 44

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46

Kelly Dreyer, Environmental Restoration Program Manager, U.S. Marine

Corps Headquarters ............................................................................................. 45

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46

Pat Leonard, Director, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Claims, Investigations, and Tort Litigation .............................................................................. 48

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48

Thomas Sinks, deputy director, National center of Environmental Health,

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ATSDR, accompanied

by Frank Bove, senior epidemiologist, ATSDR, and Morris Maslia, environmental engineer, ATSDR ..................................................................................... 49

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 54

ATSDR handout ................................................................................................ 157

Peter J. Murtha, Director, Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and

Training, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency .................................................................................... 79

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 82

Marcia D. Crosse, Director, Public Health and Military Health Care Issues,

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 89

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 91

Franklin Hill, director, Superfund Division, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, Region 4 .................................................................................................. 128

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 131

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 144

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Letter of June 6, 2007 to Dr. Howard Frumpkin, from Messrs. Barton and

Whitfield ............................................................................................................... 147

Preliminary response to the letter .................................................................. 151

Notice to Residents of Tarawa Terrace, April 1985, from Major General L.H.

Buehl ..................................................................................................................... 176

Page

IV

Letter of June 11, 2007 from Granta Y. Nakayama, Assistant Administrator

for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA, to Chairman Dingell ....... 178

TCE Levels in Drinking Water, chart, submitted by Mr. Stupak ....................... 180

Inaccuracies in ATSDR’s HazDat Database, submitted by Mr. Walden ............. 181

Miscellaneous exhibits ............................................................................................. 182

(1)

POISONED PATRIOTS: CONTAMINATED

DRINKING WATER AT CAMP LEJUENE

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND INVESTIGATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room

2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Inslee, Solis, Dingell, Whitfield, Walden, and Burgess.

Staff present: John Sopko, John Arlington, Joanne Royce, Scott

Schloegel, Kyle Chapman, Alan Slobodin, Dwight Cates, and Matthew Johnson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. STUPAK. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we have a hearing entitled ‘‘Poisoned Patriots: Contaminated Drinking Water At Camp Lejeune.’’ Each Member will be

recognized for a 5-minute opening statement. I will begin.

This is the first in a series of hearings this committee will be

holding to examine whether the Pentagon is adequately protecting

the American people, including military personnel and their families, from risks associated with environmental contamination at its

facilities. In this hearing we will explore the tragic narrative of

why tens of thousands of Marines and their families were exposed

to highly contaminated drinking water at Marine Corps Base Camp

Lejeune for nearly 30 years.

Three years ago this committee heard testimony from Jerry

Ensminger, a 24-year-old Marine Corps veteran, who raised serious

questions about why both the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps waited 5 years before notifying Camp Lejeune residents

that the drinking water was highly contaminated. Mr. Ensminger

also raised questions about whether the Navy and Marine Corps

were cooperating with the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease

Registry, ATSDR, which has been engaged for the last 8 years in

studying the connection between exposure to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and the increased instance of cancer

and birth defects of children at the base.

2

Over 20 years after the Marine Corps finally took the contaminated wells out of service, these and countless other questions remain unanswered or inadequately addressed.

The purpose of this hearing today is to get some answers.

When did the Marine Corps learn that the drinking water at

Camp Lejeune, a military base, nearly 100,000 residents were contaminated with dangerous chemicals?

If the contamination was first discovered in 1980, why did the

Marine Corps wait until 1985 before it closed its wells?

Why were the closed wells not immediately capped and abandoned, but continued to be used to supply water at various times

up to and through 1987?

When and how were the residents told about the contamination?

Was the notification adequate?

Did exposure to drinking water cause cancer and birth defects in

children conceived at the base? What about adults who drank the

water?

How has the Marine Corps responded to those affected? Has it

taken care of its own? Has the Marine Corps continued with Semper Fidelis, or always faithful?

Why is the ATSDR study taking so long? Will the study be published as scheduled by December 2007? Has the military intentionally delayed the study?

Today we welcome back Mr. Ensminger who knows firsthand the

horrible consequences of the military’s failure to detect and clean

up the toxic drinking water at Camp Lejeune. His daughter Jane

was born in 1976 at Camp Lejeune; 61⁄2 years later she was diagnosed with leukemia. Jane died when she was 9 years old in 1985,

the same year that the poisoned wells were first shut down.

Mr. Ensminger is joined on the first panel by Michael Gros and

Jeff Byron who likewise painfully know only too well the devastation caused by exposure to the poisoned drinking water at Camp

Lejeune.

Jeff Byron, a former air traffic controller, moved his family into

base housing at Camp Lejeune in 1982, 3 months after his first

daughter Andrea was born, and 2 years before Rachel was born.

Rachel is developmentally disabled, has spina bifida, and was born

with a cleft palate. Andrea has a rare bone disease known as aplastic anemia.

Dr. Michael Gros, a Navy obstetrician at the time at Camp

Lejeune, contracted T-cell lymphoma and can no longer practice

medicine. Dr. Gros spent his entire time in the Marine Corps at

Camp Lejeune and he and his family lived in base housing.

We are deeply grateful to these three witnesses for coming forward to share their painful stories with our committee.

We will also hear from officials at the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry, ATSDR, about the study initiated in

1999 which examines whether individuals born between 1968 and

1985 to mothers who drank contaminated water while they were

pregnant and living at Camp Lejeune are at increased risk of developing certain childhood cancers and/or birth defects. We will

hear whether the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps

have been forthcoming in their efforts to assist ATSDR in this critical study. We also hope to learn why the Department of the Navy

3

was resistant to funding the ATSDR study despite a Federal statute requiring that it do so. Why did DoD refuse to fund ATSDR activities at Camp Lejeune for 3–4 years from 1998 through 2000?

Did military obstruction and lack of funding delay completion of

the study? More importantly, does ATSDR have accurate information on which to base its study? Why aren’t all the Marines and

their families who were exposed to this contaminated water included in the study?

The principal contaminant of the drinking water at Camp

Lejeune was a volatile organic compound referred to as TCE, or trichloroethylene. TCE, a volatile organic compound, is an industrial

cleaning solvent widely used in defense and commercial and industrial applications. TCE is the most widespread water contaminant

in the Nation, and almost every major military base has a Superfund site with TCE contamination.

TCE was also the main contaminant at the Woburn, Massachusetts Superfund site made famous by the best selling book, A Civil

Action. That book and the movie based on it illustrated very well

the horrible toll that TCE can take on the human body. But here

is an important frame of reference. As bad as the contamination

was at Woburn, the concentrations of TCE at Camp Lejeune were

as much as 10 to 15 times higher.

We have a chart. Here is what EPA has proposed. There is a current standard, 5 parts per billion; Woburn is 267; Hadnot, which

is one of the wells, was 3,400. In Hadnot on February 7, 1985, over

18,000 parts per billion in the water.

In 2001, EPA attempted to issue a risk assessment that found

TCE to be at least twice as carcinogenic as originally thought, and

possibly 40 times as carcinogenic. The Defense Department aggressively opposed the EPA’s finding, labeling it ‘‘junk science’’ and

sided with the White House to derail issuance of the tough new

TCE standard. Instead, the issue was referred for study by the National Academy of Sciences, delaying for years any conclusions

about whether millions of Americans, including the residents at

Camp Lejeune, were contaminated by TCE. The EPA standard was

vindicated and accepted a year ago by the National Academy of

Sciences.

Nevertheless, this obstruction of environmental prerogative has

been the modus operandi of the Defense Department for years now,

since at least 2001. The Pentagon has sidetracked environmental

regulations, opposed EPA efforts to set strict reclusion limits,

stalled and underfunded cleanups and ignored Federal and State

environmental regulators. Moreover, every year, right up through

2006, the Defense Department has sought to exempt itself from environmental laws.

Those days are over. Nearly 1 out of 10 Americans live within

10 miles of a military site listed on the Superfund National Priority

List for hazardous waste cleanup. The American people, military

and civilian alike, deserve to work and live in communities where

drinking water is safe and the air they are breathing does not

threaten their lives.

I next turn to my friend from Kentucky, Ranking Member of the

subcommittee, Mr. Whitfield, for an opening statement, please.

4

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Mr. WHITFIELD. Chairman Stupak, thank you very much. And we

thank you for holding this important hearing. For many years,

Congress has demanded answers about drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune, and today we will get an update on what

we’ve learned in that study. In particular, we look forward to the

testimony from the Government Accountability Office that will detail the findings of its May 2007 report on Camp Lejeune. Congress

mandated this study in the 2005 Defense Authorization Act.

Just last year Congress passed several legislative provisions relating to Camp Lejeune. Section 318 of the 207 Defense Authorization Act requires the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a

comprehensive review and evaluation of the available scientific and

medical evidence regarding associations between prenatal, child,

and adult exposure to drinking water contaminated with trichloroethylene, TCE, and PCE, perchloroethylene at Camp Lejeune. This

comprehensive study will expand on the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry’s ongoing study at Camp Lejeune.

The 2007 defense bill also requires the Marine Corps to notify

Camp Lejeune residents and employees who may have been exposed to contaminated drinking water of the results of the ATSDR

study. Congress wants to know the facts and we want to provide

that information to our service members and their families.

Last week, Ranking Member Barton and I sent a letter to

ATSDR requesting information on exposures to contaminated

drinking water at 22 other military facilities. Committee staff identified these facilities based on a search of contamination records in

ATSDR databases. At several facilities the level of TCE contamination in drinking water is comparable to levels found at Camp

Lejeune. For instance, McClellan Air Force Base in California and

the Wurtsmith Air Force Base in Michigan each had extensive TCE

contamination in drinking water at levels of public health concern.

In its public health assessment of the Wurtsmith Air Force Base,

ATSDR concluded past exposure to groundwater may have posed

an increased risk of developing adverse health effects. ATSDR assumes tap water was contaminated with TCE at 1,100 parts per

billion between 1962 and 1977. Unfortunately, no one has investigated this matter, and we don’t know the real extent of exposure

or whether any adverse health effects occurred. We need to have

these questions answered.

In response to our letter, ATSDR has provided a list of nine military bases where past exposures to TCE and PCE were considered

a public health hazard. Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can use this

list as a starting point to conduct more oversight at these facilities.

The military personnel at these sites deserve to know if they were

exposed to contaminated drinking water and what the potential

public health implications are for them and their families.

Drinking water contaminated with TCE and other volatile organic compounds is not just a problem at military facilities. In my

own district, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant has extensive

groundwater contamination, including several contaminated residential drinking water wells. Fortunately, relatively few residents

5

were exposed to the contaminated drinking water and detailed information on health impacts is available from independent research

conducted by the University of Cincinnati.

Today we are also releasing information regarding TCE contamination at several municipal and private sites. According to ATSDR

the Sol Lynn Industrial Transformer Site in Houston, Texas, had

tap water with TCE concentrations of 953,000 parts per billion.

The Barnhart site in Illinois had tap water with TCE concentrations of 730 parts per billion. Further, the San Fernando Valley aquifer in North Hollywood, California, had TCE concentrations as

high as 18,000 parts per billion. Unfortunately, little is known

about the possible health impacts of the 800,000 residents of Los

Angeles, Burbank, and Glendale who drank water from this contaminated aquifer for years. These sites also deserve our attention.

Mr. Chairman, the more we learn about this problem, the more

we believe we may actually need to craft legislation to ensure that

professional public health officials can help find the answers to

these concerns. And I know I look forward to working with you on

whether or not we need to identify whether ATSDR and other

health agencies need more authority and more funding to investigate past exposures to TCE and other volatile organic compounds.

And, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that an opening

statement of the ranking member, Mr. Barton, be inserted into the

record. He is unable to be with us. And then also the letter that

I referred to that we wrote to ATSDR about these other sites, and

the records that they provided to us about the contamination at the

other sites. I would ask consent that we will enter those into the

record.

Mr. STUPAK. without objection, the opening statement of Ranking

Member Joe Barton will be entered into the record, and also the

June 6, 2007 letter to you and Mr. Barton with attachments will

also be part of the record as well as any other statements by members for the record.

[The prepared statements of Mr. Barton and Mr. Green follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF TEXAS

I thank the chairman for holding this hearing. This problem at Camp Lejeune is

hardly a new one, but it is important that we get to the bottom of why military

personnel there were exposed to contaminated drinking water for so long. As early

as 1980, significant contamination was discovered in the drinking water, but 5 years

passed before the Navy finally identified the contaminated wells and shut them

down.

I am not persuaded by the Navy’s justification that they did not know the contamination was significant in 1980, or that the drinking water met regulatory requirements in place at that time. The fact is the contaminated wells should have

been identified and shut down immediately. This is a simple matter of right and

wrong. The delay may not have been criminal, but it was unmistakably immoral.

Stories conflict on why it took so long, and they involve a complicated series of

events. Unfortunately, the committee staff has not had enough time to thoroughly

investigate. The minority staff first learned of this hearing just 4 weeks ago, and

the first briefing from the Navy occurred just 3 weeks ago. On important matters

such as this, 3 weeks is simply not enough time to conduct serious, thoughtful oversight.

Fortunately for the subcommittee, several Federal agencies have devoted the time

and energy necessary to fully review drinking water contamination at Camp

Lejeune. Today we will hear from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Government Accountability Office, and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease

Registry on their extensive research.

6

Camp Lejeune is the poster boy for contaminated drinking water on a military

base, but it certainly is not the only one. I think we can anticipate learning of even

worse problems at other bases. Last week, Representative Whitfield and I sent a

letter to ATSDR to obtain information regarding extensive drinking water contamination at nearly two dozen military facilities.

Based on the data we have uncovered, some of these facilities likely had exposures in excess of what we know occurred at Camp Lejeune. Past contamination is

also a problem at civilian municipal facilities, and we need answers on those facilities as well.

Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to dig into these issues. We have laid the groundwork for a serious investigation of drinking water contamination at military and civilian facilities. I hope that we can work on a bipartisan basis. There is no reason

why we shouldn’t.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on contaminated drinking

water at Camp Lejeune.

This hearing is the first in a series of hearings on contaminated drinking water

on our military bases.

We ask our military personnel to protect and defend our country. It is my belief

that we have a responsibility and an obligation to protect our military personnel

and their families when they are living on military bases.

We know the chemicals TCE and PCE were contaminating at least eight sights

in the water system in and around Camp Lejeune.

The exact date of contamination is unknown, but it seems that Camp Lejeune officials may have known about the TCE and PCE in the wells as early as 1980. They

did not close the contaminated wells until 1985 and even reopened the wells periodically from 1985 until 1987.

TCE and PCE are clear and have no odor. For 7 years the military personnel and

their families at Camp Lejeune were unknowingly bathing, drinking, and cooking

with this contaminated water.

The EPA recommends contamination levels for TCE and PCE in drinking water

at 5 parts per billion. Those living at Camp Lejeune were in some cases exposed

to TCE and PCE levels over 1,000 parts per billion.

Camp Lejeune was declared a Superfund in 1989 and the DoD’s remediation process has been ongoing since that time. The EPA expects the cleanup to be completed

in 2011.

Currently, our office is wading through the process of having a toxic waste site

in our district declared a Superfund. We are just beginning the process, but I certainly hope that it would not take some 18 years to clean up our site.

There are many unanswered questions surrounding the contaminated water at

Camp Lejeune. I know many of us on the committee want to know why military

personnel who may have been exposed to TCE and PCE while living at Camp

Lejeune still have not been notified of their potential health risks.It seems to me

that Camp Lejeune is an example of how we failed to responsibly protect our troops

and their families. This hearing is an opportunity to shed some light on the unresolved issues at Camp Lejeune.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I think you and your staff were given copies of

those, and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Mr. STUPAK. I know there’s a Health Subcommittee going on so,

Mr. Walden, you will be next then.

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I am going

to waive an opening statement. I would like to hear from the witnesses. I will have comments to make during expanded Q&A.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Burgess, you are welcome to make an opening

statement.

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too will waive an

opening statement. I would just respectfully suggest there’s probVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
7

ably more sites than the one we have under discussion today, and

perhaps this committee could gently urge the Department of Defense to use the money appropriated to clean up the sites around

the country for which cleanup has already been authorized.

I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STUPAK. Very good. That concludes all the opening statements of members. Other members may be coming. We will allow

them an opening statement if they so choose at the appropriate

time. As I said there’s a couple other hearings going on of the Energy and Commerce Committee. So that concludes the opening

statements by members of the subcommittee.

I will call our first panel of witnesses to come forward. They are

already here. Mr. Ensminger, Dr. Gros, and Mr. Byron. Gentlemen,

it’s the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under

oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right to counsel to

be present while they testify and be advised by counsel during testimony.

Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel today? No one

indicating they are, so I will take that as a ‘‘no.’’ and I’m going to

ask you, would you please rise and raise your right hand to take

the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. STUPAK. let the record reflect the witnesses replied in the affirmative. You are now under oath. We will now go with opening

statements from our witnesses. Let’s start on my right.

Mr. Byron, if you would, please, sir, if you press that button in

front of you to turn on your mike.

STATEMENT OF JEFF BYRON

Mr. BYRON. Thank you. Good morning, my name is Jeff Byron.

I served my country honorably in the United States Marine Corps

from June 1981 to June 1985. I have been invited to give testimony

here today on the events surrounding the toxic water contamination that occurred at Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base. The contamination took place between the years 1957 through 1987. I am

here to tell you of the negative impact that exposure to VOCs has

had on my family’s medical history, past and present.

After boot camp and air traffic controller school, I was assigned

a permanent duty station at Marine Corps Air Station, New River,

Jacksonville, North Carolina. The Air Station provides air support

for Camp Lejeune. When we arrived in Jacksonville, I applied for

base housing. None was available. It would be a 6-month wait, and

therefore we lived out in town.

My oldest child Andrea was born in June 1982. Two months later

our family moved to Midway Park base housing complex. Midway

Park is directly across from the main gate at Camp Lejeune. In August 1983, renovation of Midway Park forced our family to move

to other base housing. We were assigned quarters at 3114 Bougainville Drive and Tarawa Terrace base housing complex. During our

stay in base housing, my daughter Andrea was seen by doctors at

the Naval Hospital on Camp Lejeune 57 times in 30 months for

such illnesses as rashes, urinary tract infections, yeast infections,

and unexplained fevers. Most of the time the medical personnel on

8

base did not have an explanation for her symptoms. We were told

to give her tepid baths and children’s Tylenol to reduce the fevers.

During this time my wife and I conceived our second child, Rachel. She was born April 27, 1985, 6 weeks prior to my discharge

from active duty. On her initial newborn profile from Onslow Memorial Hospital, there were no abnormalities listed. But when we

took her to the base hospital for her first newborn checkup, the

hospital officials noted the following medical concerns: She had

slow weight gain, a heart murmur, a double ear infection, umbilical

hernia, brachial dimples and posteriorly rotated ears, a large

hemangioma—which is a birthmark—on her lower back, and what

they listed as ASD. I’m not sure what that is.

It was also noted to speak to a pediatrician as soon as we arrive

home and shows that the patient is leaving in 4 days and may need

an EKG, a CRR, and a cardiac referral. She had to be fed in an

infant seat because of projectile vomiting. She was labeled ‘‘a failure to thrive baby.’’ Two weeks later, June 25, 1985, I was discharged from Active Duty service from the United States Marine

Corps.

Six months after being discharged from the Marine Corps, Andrea, our first born, was diagnosed with a rare bone marrow disorder called aplastic anemia. Andrea was treated at Cincinnati

Children’s Hospital Medical Center, which at the time was considered the No. 2 hematology department in the country. The head of

the hematology department asked us: What chemicals have you

been exposed to? Our answer was none. They asked us for all the

names of cleaning and hygiene products that we used. All of the

products were ruled out. Andrea was in the hospital under quarantine for 30 days. Andrea was given blood and platelet transfusions. She was treated at Children’s Hospital until she was 12

years old.

Can you imagine, I had my oldest daughter in the hospital with

a bone marrow disease, under quarantine, while my youngest

daughter was seeing multiple medical specialists for birth defects,

and my wife, 6 months pregnant with twin boys. I don’t know how

we did it.

Andrea’s aplastic anemia is in remission now, but her doctors

have told her there is a 50 percent chance the disease could return

if Andrea decides to have children of her own.

It was 15 years after my discharge, May 27, 2000, when we received a letter from the National Opinion Research Center, who

was contracted on behalf of the Department of Health and Human

Services to do the survey and contact people that lived at Marine

Corps Base Camp Lejeune. They were requesting that our family

participate in a survey concerning toxic water contamination, specifically those children who were in utero and born while residing

in base housing, Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point. They requested

that our youngest daughter Rachel participate in a survey.

When the survey results came out, we were shocked to find out

our daughter was not identified as a study participant since her

documented medical records confirmed that she had two of the

births defects of interest: cleft palate and spina bifida.

After we confronted ATSDR officials about her medical records

which we had provided previously to them, they agreed that she

9

had one of the birth defects of interest and therefore qualified as

a study participant. It was quite clear to me after reading questions that were part of the survey that the Marine Corps had been

aware of this situation for a very long time. From documents we

obtained through the Freedom of Information Act request, we were

able to determine that Marine Corps/DoD environmental personnel

on base were well aware of the VOC contamination before our family moved into base housing, and therefore could have intervened

and prevented the adverse health effects suffered by my family as

well as other families whose medical history is similar to my own.

It was supposedly a notice to the residents of Tarawa Terrace

that was distributed by the base commander in April 1985 that

showed the base officials were more concerned with water usage

than informing the residents of the risk of drinking, bathing, and

cooking with contaminated water. The GAO report on page 29 does

not reflect this point because they have not presented the document in its entirety.

The Marine Corps was morally responsible for providing clean,

potable water, no matter who the contaminator was, especially

after the contamination was discovered. According to the GAO report, GAO repeats over and over that Headquarters Marine Corps,

DoD, and Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune officials took no action.

Our family had already scheduled a vacation in North Carolina

in 2000. We wanted to show our daughters where they were born.

While we were in Jacksonville we went to Onslow Memorial Hospital to request copies of our daughters’ birth records. We were

very surprised to find out that all records were destroyed after 7

years. We then went to ABC 1-hour dry cleaners, which was a primary source of contamination from PCE at Tarawa Terrace base

housing.

I took my 35 millimeter camera and took pictures of the facility

that cost taxpayers $4.3 million to clean up. After the film had

been developed, it was apparent that safe operating procedures

were not in place. There was also a Marine Corps warehouse across

the street and base housing that had several blue barrels surrounding the brick structure. On subsequent visits to Camp Lejeune,

these barrels were no longer visible.

I would like to thank the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee personnel for inviting me to give testimony here today.

And I would like to thank the members of the House Energy and

Commerce Committee for hearing my testimony. I would like to especially thank the former residents of Marine Corps Base Camp

Lejeune for being here.

Thank you very much. That’s my statement.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you Mr. Byron.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byron follows:]

STATEMENT OF JEFF BYRON

Good morning. My name is Jeff Byron. I served my country honorably in the

United States Marine Corps from June 1981 through June 1985. I have been invited

to give testimony here today on the events surrounding the toxic water contamination that occurred at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune. The contamination took

place between the years 1957 through 1987. I am here to tell you of the negative

10

impact that exposure to VOCs has had on my family’s medical history, past and

present.

After boot camp and Air Traffic Controller school I was assigned a permanent

duty station at Marine Corps Air Station, New River, Jacksonville, North Carolina.

The Air Station provides air support for Camp Lejeune. When we arrived in Jacksonville I applied for base housing. None was available, it would be a 6-month wait,

and therefore we lived out in town. My oldest child, Andrea, was born in June of

1982. Two months later our family moved to Midway Park base housing complex.

Midway Park is directly across from the main gate of Camp Lejeune. In August of

1983 renovation of Midway Park forced our family to move to other base housing.

We were assigned quarters at 3114 Bougainville Drive in Tarawa Terrace base

housing complex. During our stay in base housing my daughter, Andrea, was seen

by doctors at the Naval Hospital on Camp Lejeune 57 times in 30 months for such

illnesses as rashes, urinary tract infections, yeast infections and unexplained fevers.

Most of the time the medical personnel on base did not have an explanation for her

symptoms. We were told to give her tepid baths and children’s Tylenol to reduce

the fevers. During this time my wife and I conceived our second child, Rachel. She

was born April 27, 1985, 6 weeks prior to my discharge from active duty.

On her initial newborn profile from Onslow Memorial Hospital there were no abnormalities listed. But when we took her to the base hospital for her first new-born

check, up the hospital officials noted the following medical concerns:

• Slow weight gain

• A heart murmur

• Double ear infection

• Umbilical hernia

• Brachial dimples and posteriorly rotated ears

• A large hemangioma (raised birthmark) on her lower back

• ASD

It was noted ‘‘Speak to pediatrician as soon as arrive home-are leaving in 4 daysmay need EKG, CRR & cardiac referral’’. She had to be fed in an infant seat because of projectile vomiting. She was labeled ‘‘a failure to thrive baby’’. Two weeks

later, June 25, 1985, I was discharged from active duty service from the Marine

Corps.

Six months after being discharged from the Corps, Andrea, our first born, was diagnosed with a rare bone marrow disorder called aplastic anemia. Andrea

was treated at CCHMC (Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center), which at

that time was considered the #2 hematology department in the country. The head

of the hematology department asked us what chemicals we had been exposed to, our

answer, none. They asked us for all of the names of cleaning and hygiene products

that we were using. All of the products were ruled out. Andrea was in the hospital

under quarantine for 30 days. Andrea was given blood and platelet transfusions.

She was treated at Children’s Hospital until she was 12 years old. Can you imagine,

I had my oldest daughter in the hospital with a bone marrow disease, under quarantine. While my youngest daughter was seeing multiple medical specialist for birth

defects, and my wife 6 months pregnant with twin boys. I don’t know how we did

it. Andrea’s aplastic anemia is in remission now, but her doctor has told her that

there is a 50 percent chance the disease could return, if Andrea decides to have children of her own and becomes pregnant.

It was 15 years after my discharge, May 27, 2000 we received a letter from The

National Opinion Research Center who was contracted on behalf of the Department

of Health and Human Services to do a survey and contact people that lived at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. They were requesting that our family participate

in a survey concerning toxic water contamination, specifically those children who

were in utero and born while residing in base housing, (Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot

Point). They requested that our youngest daughter, Rachel, participate in the survey. When the survey results came out we were shocked to find out that our daughter was not identified as a study participant, since her documented medical records

confirmed that she had two of the birth defects of interest, cleft pallet, and spinabifida. After we confronted ATSDR officials with her medical records, which we had

previously provided to them, they agreed that she had one birth defect of interest,

and therefore qualified as a study participant. It was quite clear to me after reading

questions that were part of the survey, that the Marine Corps had been aware of

this situation for a very long time. From documents that we obtained through the

Freedom of Information Act requests, we were able to determine that the Marine

Corps/DoD environmental personnel on base were well aware of the VOC contamination before our family moved into base housing. And therefore could have interVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
11

vened and prevented the adverse health effects suffered by my family as well as

other families, whose medical history is very similar to my own.

There was supposedly a Notice to the Residents of Tarawa Terrace, that was distributed by the base commander in April of 1985. That showed that base officials

were more concerned with water usage than informing the residents of the risk of

drinking, bathing, and cooking with contaminated water. (The GAO report page 29,

does not reflect this point because they have not presented the document in its entirety) The Marine Corps was morally responsible for providing clean potable water,

no matter who the contaminator was, especially after the contamination was discovered. According to the GAO report, GAO repeats over and over that Head Quarters

Marine Corps/DoD, and MCBCL officials took no action .

Our family had already scheduled a vacation to North Carolina in 2000. We wanted to show our daughters where they were born. While we were in Jacksonville, we

went to Onslow Memorial Hospital to request copies of our daughters’ birth records;

we were very surprised to find out that all records were destroyed after seven years.

We then went by ABC 1 hour dry cleaner, which was the primary source of contamination from PCE at Tarawa Terrace base housing. I took my 35mm camera and took

pictures of the facility that cost tax payers 4.3 million dollars to clean up. After the

film had been developed it was apparent that safe operating procedures were not

in place. There was also a Marine Corps well house across the street in base housing that had several blue barrels surrounding the brick structure. On subsequent

visits to Camp Lejeune, these barrels were no longer visible.

To me it was apparent that the Marine Corps had known for 20 years, before they

had decided to tell my family of the exposure. I felt that they had wronged my family and others that had served this country as patriots. It was quite obvious that

‘‘Semper Fi’’, always faithful, did not apply to us. I was raised to believe that to get

something done you had to do it yourself. That is what I and others are doing. Those

of us that have become activists want to ensure that this American tragedy never

happens again. I have attended all of the ATSDR meetings concerning Camp

Lejeune with the exception of the Water Modeling Scientific Panel. I am a sitting

member of the Community Assistance Panel with the ATSDR, tasked with evaluating the possibilities of doing further studies on children and adults exposed at Camp

Lejeune. I accompanied Jerry Ensminger to the hill when he gave testimony to a

subcommittee hearing for Energy & Commerce concerning DoD’s request to obtain

exemptions from environmental law. I am happy to say that with Jerry’s testimony,

DoD was denied exemption. I attended the Commandant’s fact finding panel in

Jacksonville, NC. where according to the GAO report (page 46) the panel made several finding criticizing Camp Lejeune and Department of the Navy. One said, ‘‘Communications to Camp Lejeune residents regarding drinking water contamination

was not detailed enough to completely characterize the contamination found at the

time of the well closures’’ Notice to Residents of Tarawa Terrace—from the base

commander. In my opinion, misleading at best. We started a web site, The Few, The

Proud, The Forgotten, www.tftptf.com, in an attempt to provide documented history

to the former residents so that they can make informed decisions regarding their

future. To educate the public and government officials, to the events surrounding

toxic water exposures at Camp Lejeune.

Because of my involvement with ATSDR as a cap member the Government Accountability Office allowed me and others to read, and comment on a copy of their

draft report, ‘‘Defense Health Care Activities Related to Past Drinking Water Contamination at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune’’. After reading the draft report I

have come to the conclusion that the GAO had not done its homework and it had

depended upon the Marine Corps Headquarter explanation of documentation, and

did not check their source. A Marine Corps document providing the sampling result

stated that ND meant ‘‘none detected.’’ (page 28 1st note of the GAO report) The

document that is being referred to, GAO has removed the column that shows the

instrument’s detection limit. On this same document a zero at the end of one PCE

reading was missing, miss leading the reader to think that the meter read 158 parts

per billion, in reality the reading was 1580 parts per billion. This is just one deception that I have uncovered in the GAO report.

While ATSDR did not always receive requested funding and experienced delays

in receiving information from DoD for its Camp Lejeune related work, ATSDR officials said this has not significantly delayed their work. This was stated no less than

5 times in the GAO report. When something is overstated, it tends not to be true.

I was also shocked to find out that ATSDR had come up with 548 Comparison Individuals for the in-utero study group, from the same base! Even after ATSDR officials repeatedly told CAP members that to do a credible study they did not need

to use individuals from Camp Lejeune. Since I am a member of the CAP I thought

it might be important for me to know about this group. What happened to trust and

12

transparency? I provided GAO with documents to refute many of their statements.

When the final draft came out I was surprised to see that they had not listened

to very much of what I had to say. They had written a biased report in defense of

the DoD and Marine Corps. I will be happy to dispel the rest of the GAO report

with Congress at the upcoming hearing.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Gros.

STATEMENT OF MIKE GROS, M.D.

Dr. GROS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of

the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak before you regarding the unfortunate water contamination issue which we have

all heard about. My name is Michael L. Gros, M.D.

My involvement with this event spans the time period from July

1980 to July 1983 when I lived at H–57 MOQ and worked at the

Naval Hospital as a staff Ob/Gyn physician. I provided in my written testimony a chronology of my dates of education and my qualifications.

I come before you as a representative of many individuals and

families who were adversely affected over a 40-or-more-year time

frame by contaminated water at Camp Lejeune. I am, unfortunately, well qualified by virtue of a harrowing and life-altering experience with non-Hodgkins lymphoma and its treatment involving

a bone marrow transplant and the development of severe chronic

graft versus host disease, from which I now suffer continuously.

My family and I moved to Camp Lejeune in July 1980 after finishing a Navy internship and residency at Naval Regional Medical

Center in Portsmouth, Virginia. Ironically, we desired Camp

Lejeune as a duty station, since it was stateside and, at the time,

seemed safe for my family. Little did we know that quite the opposite was true. Unknown to us, Camp Lejeune had groundwater contamination, which we’ve discussed, with various organic chemicals

such as trichloroethylene and perchloroethylene, among other

chemicals, that may have originated as early as the 1950’s. This

was due to improper disposal of these agents used in machinery

overhaul and improper location of wells in areas affected by seepage into the water table.

Our house at H–57 MOQ was supplied by the Hadnot Point

water system. As noted in the table, acceptable levels of TCE are

less than 5 parts per billion. Our house had 1,400 parts per billion

and one well providing our water, and one well, number 651, had

an astounding 18,900 parts per billion TCE when it was finally

taken offline in 1985, 2 years after we left.

So, for all of our 3 years living at H–57, we were ingesting and

inhaling this poisonous water and its vapor from showering and

bathing. It’s noted that the poisoning is even worse if the water is

heated up because the materials volatilize easier than water boils.

Our food and the baby formula and toddlers’ Kool-Aid were mixed

with the seemingly clean water.

This poisoning has no taste, it has no smell, and so it’s

undetectable by usual means. The cancerous effects do not appear

until 10 to 15 years post-exposure, the so-called latency period

which is noted in ATSDR’s own documents. From 1980 onwards,

Camp Lejeune’s own documents revealed that routine water tests

typically performed on chlorinated water systems looking for subVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
13

stances called trihalomethanes showed the presence of major contamination with other organic chemicals which required further action. Levels of these contaminants were so high so as to preclude

THM testing. No records of any further action on Camp Lejeune’s

part exist. In fact, this THM testing was simply again repeated in

intervals with similar results and, again, a shocking lack of further

clarification.

Where was Camp Lejeune’s concern for the safety of its residents? The technology involved in finding these poisons was readily

available, but was either neglected due to incompetence or deliberately not done for unknown reasons. It is incomprehensible that

this happened. Who made such bad decisions? Why was this ghoulish experiment performed on our military volunteers and their families? Such a failure to follow up on abnormal tests in my profession would have caused me to lose my medical license and, at best,

face a malpractice suit I was sure to lose.

I’m sorry that I think like a doctor, but I feel people in charge

of the welfare of others, such as managers of public water systems,

should be held to standards of conduct commensurate with the serious nature of their jobs.

In spite of multiple handwritten warning notes on repeated test

reports over several years’ period of time, the advice of the base’s

outside water consultants to further identify and quantitate the

poisoning chemicals was repeatedly ignored. Amazingly, no tests

were ever done in follow-up to identify the nature of these compounds or their sources.

Even more incredible was the Marine Corps’s attempt to later

justify this gross neglect with the tack that no law existed requiring them to exercise the normal good judgment and caring that any

other contemporary water supplier would have had for its customers. For example, the well 651 was not taken offline until 1985,

2 years after we left Camp Lejeune. Were we all unwitting lab

rats? Such chemicals such as TCE and PCE are undetectable by

usual taste and smell. So when we left active duty for Houston,

Texas, in 1983, I was completely unaware that we had been systematically, unethically, and heartlessly poisoned during 3 years of

living at Camp Lejeune.

I began a private practice of Ob/Gyn in Houston, Texas. Although

I felt well, I began to show subtle lab abnormalities as early as

1993 and 1994. Definitely by 1997 these lab tests showed a marked

shift in my complete blood count with an elevation of a lymphocyte

fraction. To make a long story short, from 10 to 15 years removed

from living at Camp Lejeune I had developed a slowly progressive

and untreatable non-Hodgkins lymphoma called cutaneous T-cell

lymphoma. My only treatment option would eventually be a bone

marrow transplant when the disease reached such a point that my

resistance to infection would be so low I could no longer see patients.

As I was seeing patients one day in November 1999, I was contacted out of the blue by Marie Sochia from the Agency for Toxic

Substances and Disease Registry. She informed me that my younger son, Tom, conceived and born at Camp Lejeune, was to be studied as part of an in utero study due to his chemical exposure. This

was my first knowledge of any toxic water in my former base. It

14

was then that I made the connection between my disease and the

TCE and PCE exposure which I had suffered during 3 years of continuous exposure at Camp Lejeune. My son seemed fine. However,

I had progressive lymphoma.

I was happy to know that an infant study was to be done, but

I was shocked to learn that there were no studies planned and no

studies were felt to be warranted on the thousands of adults who

were similarly exposed. I vigorously dispute this conclusion.

In May 2002, my disease had progressed to the point where I

had dangerously low immunity and the lymphoma was replacing

50 percent of my bone marrow. I had to abruptly abandon my practice and be admitted for the only remaining chance of a cure, which

was a bone marrow transplant. As many of you know, this is not

a walk in the park. BMT carries a significant mortality risk related

to acute and long-term complications. Thankfully, the procedures

rather quickly put the lymphoma in remission, but unfortunately

has left me with severe chronic graft versus host disease. The quality of my life has really degenerated as a result. Most of my ability

to recreate and travel has been largely destroyed, and I can no

longer tolerate much sun exposure or outside activity. But at least

I’m still alive and kicking, and am finally here at long last to

present this story to you all.

I have enclosed a list of most of the medical setbacks I have had

over the last 5 years in the written testimony. My battle to stay

healthy and out of the hospital has easily exceeded $4.5 million at

this point in time. No telling what my total medical bills will

amount to, but while I lay in bed in the aphaeresis unit for 4 hours

at a time, getting my blood circulated in the photophaeresis apparatus, I have plenty of time to worry about how I’m going to stay

alive and still avoid bankruptcy.

I was awarded 100 percent service-connected disability for my

disease, but have found funding for anything other than pharmacy

items to be very difficult to access at the VA hospital in Houston,

Texas. I was forced to give away my practice at a great financial

loss. Because of my need for chronic immune suppression, I will

probably never be able to see patients again. All of the dedication

and years of training I invested from the seventh grade onward

have been wasted by a career cut short in its prime by this debacle.

My wife and I now have two new full-time careers, just staying

alive and figuring out how to pay for it all.

I am here today to urge you to compel ATSDR, or preferably another truly impartial agency, to investigate the fates of those adults

exposed as I was. I continue to receive phone calls from adults

similarly exposed, suffering from lymphomas, who are just now

finding out about this event. I am certain most of the hapless victims of this silent disaster are either dead or unaware that they

are sick at an early age with cancer. They need help with their

medical expenses and monitoring for future medical and possible

developmental problems in their progeny.

This is not a faceless disaster. There are many people undoubtedly involved in the initial mismanagement and subsequent coverup of this entire event. There certainly has to be some credible explanation for at least the period in which my family was involved

from 1980 to 1983.

15

There is a chain of command in the Navy and Marine Corps. Decisions surrounding management of the public water system on a

Marine base are not made in a vacuum. A complete investigation

needs to be initiated, with congressional oversight and congressional subpoena power as needed. Some victims even feel that possible criminal activity may have been involved.

The criminal investigation begun several years ago at the request

of a number of victims and their families needs to be reopened. We

also need to make sure this is not something akin to a version of

the infamous Tuskegee experiment.

Members of the committee, I thank you for allowing me to speak

before you today and I would be happy to answer any questions

you might have.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gros follows:]

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL L. GROS M.D.

Good morning ladies and gentlemen of the committee, and thank you for inviting

me to speak before you regarding the unfortunate water contamination issue involving the Marine base at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

My name is Michael L. Gros, M. D.

My involvement with this event spans the time period from July 1980, to July

1983, when I lived at H–57, MOQ and worked at the Naval Hospital as a staff Ob/

Gyn. A brief chronology of my service dates is provided below:

• B. A. 1974, Trinity University, San Antonio, TX • M.D. 1976, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX, Navy Scholarship • Internship and Residency in Ob/Gyn, 1976–1980, NRMC, Portsmouth, VA. • Staff Ob/Gyn, July 1980-July1983, Camp Lejeune, N. C., LCDR, MC, USNR • Private practice Ob/Gyn, 1983 to 2002, Houston, TX. • Medically retired May 2002 to present due to Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma

I come before you as a representative of many individuals and families who were

adversely affected over a forty or more year time frame by contaminated water at

Camp Lejeune. I am unfortunately well qualified by virtue of a harrowing and life

altering experience with Non-Hodgkins lymphoma and its treatment involving a

bone marrow transplant (BMT) and the unfortunate development of severe chronic

graft vs. host disease (GVHD) from which I now suffer, continuously.

My family and I moved to Camp Lejeune in July 1980, after I finished my U.S.

Navy internship and residency in Ob/Gyn at NRMC, Portsmouth, VA. Ironically, we

desired Camp Lejeune as a duty station since it was stateside and, at the time,

seemed safe for the family. Little did we know that quite the opposite was true.

Unknown to us, Camp Lejeune had ground water and well water contamination

with various volatile organic compounds such as trichloroethylene (TCE) and

perchloroethylene (PCE), among other chemicals, that may have originated as early

as the 1950’s. This was due to improper disposal of these agents used in machinery

overhaul and improper location of wells in areas affected by seepage into the water

table. Our house at H–57 MOQ was supplied by the Hadnot Point water system.

Acceptable levels of TCE are <5ppb. Our house had at least 1,400 ppb TCE (maybe

higher), and one well, No. 651 in the Hadnot Point field had an astounding 18,900

ppb TCE when finally taken off line 1985, two years after we left.

So for all of our three years living on base at H–57 MOQ we were ingesting and

inhaling this poisonous water and its vapor from showering and bathing (worse

when heated up). Our food and the baby’s formula and toddler’s Kool Aid were

mixed with this seemingly clean water. This poisoning has no taste and no smell

and so is undetectable by usual means. The cancerous effects do not appear until

10–15 years post exposure (latency period noted in ATSDR documents).

From 1980 onwards, Camp Lejeune’s own documents reveal that routine water

tests typically performed on chlorinated water systems (trihalomethanes, THM)

showed the presence of major contamination from other organic compounds requiring further action. Levels of these contaminants were so high as to preclude THM

testing. No records of any further action on Camp Lejeune’s part exist. In fact, this

THM testing was simply again repeated at intervals with similar results and again

a shocking lack of further clarification. Where was CLNC’s concern for the safety

of its residents?

16

The technology involved in finding these poisons was readily available, but was

either neglected due to incompetence or deliberately not done for unknown reasons.

It is incomprehensible that this happened. Who made such bad decisions? Why was

this ghoulish experiment performed on our military volunteers and their families?

Such a failure to follow up on abnormal tests in my profession would have caused

me to lose my medical license or at best, face a malpractice suit I was sure to lose.

I am sorry that I think from a doctor’s perspective, but I feel people in charge of

the welfare of others, such as managers of public water systems, should be held to

standards of conduct commensurate with the serious nature of their jobs.

In spite of multiple handwritten warning notes on repeated test reports over several years period of time, the advice of the base’s own outside water consultants to

further identify and quantitate the poisoning chemicals was repeatedly ignored.

Amazingly, no follow up tests were ever done to even identify the nature of the

interfering chemicals or their sources. Even more incredible was the Marine Corp’s

attempt to later justify this gross neglect with the tact that no ‘‘law’’ existed requiring them to exercise the good judgment and caring that any other contemporary

water supplier would have had for its customers. For example, the horribly polluted

well, No. 651, (drilled next to the dump!) was not taken off line until 1985, two

years after we left Camp Lejeune. Were we all unwitting lab rats?

Since chemicals such as trichloroethylene and perchloroethylene are undetectable

by the usual modes of taste and smell, when I left active duty to move to Houston,

Texas, I was completely unaware that we had been systematically, unethically, and

heartlessly poisoned during our 3 years at Camp Lejeune.

I began a private practice in Ob/Gyn in Houston, TX. Although I felt well, I began

to show subtle lab abnormalities as early as 1993 and 1994, and definitely by 1997,

these lab tests showed a marked shift in my complete blood count with an elevation

of lymphocytes. To make a long story short, from 10–15 years removed from living

at Camp Lejeune, I had developed a slowly progressive and untreatable Non-Hodgkins lymphoma called Cutaneous T-Cell lymphoma (CTCL), otherwise known as mycosis fungoides.

My only treatment option would eventually be a bone marrow transplant when

the disease reached such a point that my resistance to infection would be so low

that I could no longer see patients.

As I was a seeing patients one day in November 1999, I was contacted out of the

blue by Marie Sochia from the Agency for the Toxic Substance and Disease Registry

(ATSDR). She informed me that my younger son, Tom, conceived and born at Camp

Lejeune, was to be studied as part of an ‘‘in utero’’ study, due to his chemical exposure at Camp Lejeune. This was my first knowledge of any toxic water at my former

base.

It was then that I made the connection between my disease and TCE and PCE

exposure, which I had suffered during three years of continuous exposure at Camp

Lejeune, North Carolina. My son seemed fine. However, I had progressive

lymphoma. I was happy to know that an infant study was to be done, but I was

shocked to learn that no studies were felt by ATSDR to be warranted on the thousands of exposed adults. I vigorously dispute this conclusion.

In May 2002, my disease had progressed to the point where I had dangerously

low immunity with the lymphoma replacing fifty percent of my bone marrow. I had

to abruptly abandon my practice and be admitted for my only remaining chance at

a cure, a bone marrow transplant (BMT).

As many of you know, this is not a walk in the park. BMT carries a significant

mortality risk related to acute and long-term complications. Thankfully, the procedure rather quickly put the lymphoma in remission, but, unfortunately, has left me

with severe chronic graft versus host disease. The quality of my life has really degenerated as a result. Most of my ability to recreate and travel has been largely

destroyed. I can no longer tolerate much sun exposure or outside activity. But at

least I am still alive and kicking and am finally here at long last to present this

story to you all.

Here is a list of most of the major medical setbacks I have endured over the last

5 years:

• Graft versus host disease of liver, lungs, skin, eyes, gastrointestinal tract

• Pneumonia-bacterial

• Pneumonia-Pneumocystis carinii

• Cellulitis

• Acute and chronic renal failure

• Cataracts—both eyes

• Diabetes

• Heart failure

17

• Gastroenteritis

• Toxoplasmosis of the brain

• Squamous cell carcinoma of the skin

• Osteopenia

• Baldness

• Depression

• Hearing loss secondary to medications

• Anemia

• Fatigue

• Septicemia from a central line

My battle to stay healthy and out of the hospital has easily exceeded $41⁄2 million

at this point in time. No telling what my total medical bills will amount to, but

while I lay in bed in the aphaeresis unit for 4 hours getting my blood circulated

in the photophaeresis apparatus, I have plenty of time to worry about how I am

going to stay alive and still avoid bankruptcy.

I was awarded 100 percent service connected disability for my disease, but have

found funding help for anything other than pharmacy items to be very difficult to

access at the V.A. hospital in Houston, TX.

I was forced to give away my practice at a great financial loss. Because of my

need for chronic immune suppression, I will probably never be able to see patients

again. All of the dedication and years of training I invested from the seventh grade

onward have been wasted by a career cut short in its prime by this debacle.

My wife and I now have new full time careers—just staying alive and figuring

out how to pay for it all.

I am here today to urge you to compel ATSDR, or preferably another truly impartial agency, to investigate the fates of those adults exposed as I was. I continually

receive phone calls from adults similarly exposed, suffering from lymphomas, yet

just now finding out about this event. I am certain most of the hapless victims of

this silent disaster are either dead or unaware why they are sick at an early age

with cancer. They need help with their medical expenses and monitoring for future

medical and possible developmental problems in their progeny.

In my opinion, there is an ongoing coverup involving this disaster, and ATSDR

may well be ‘‘running the point’’ for the responsible governmental agencies or chemical manufacturers. The absence of relevant documents showing any reasonable

chain of responsibility, combined with the trumped up and utterly unbelievable attempts at public relations put out by the Marine Corps, are very telling in this regard. Instead of wisely spending the tax payors money finding and assisting all

those exposed to this chemical cocktail, the Marine Corp has seen fit to hire a public

relations and strategy firm (Booze Allen Hamilton) to arrange misleading town

meetings, whose predetermined exculpatory findings insult our intelligence. It

seems no one is responsible for any of this man-made disaster. Ladies and gentlemen, I do not believe any of this rubbish.

This is not a faceless disaster. There were many people undoubtedly involved in

the initial mismanagement and subsequent cover up of this entire event. There certainly has to be some creditable explanation for at least the period in which my family was involved from 1980 to 1983. There is a chain of command in the Navy and

Marine Corps. Decisions surrounding management of a public water system on a

Marine base are not made in a vacuum.

A complete investigation needs to be initiated with congressional oversight and

congressional subpoena power as needed. Some victims even feel that possible criminal activity may have been involved. The criminal investigation begun several years

ago at the request of a number of the victims and their families needs to be reopened. We also need to make sure this is not something akin to a version of the

infamous Tuskegee experiment.

Members of the committee, I thank you for allowing me to speak before you today.

I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Ensminger, your opening statement, please, sir.

STATEMENT OF JEROME ENSMINGER

Mr. ENSMINGER. Good morning. My name is Jerry Ensminger,

and I served my country faithfully for 241⁄2 years in the United

States Marine Corps.

18

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the chairman, the

committee members and their staffs for all the hard work that

went into making these hearings possible.

I must say that it has been inspiring for me to have tuned in to

C-SPAN these last several months and witnessed our Congress

doing what our Founding Fathers intended. You have been taking

on the tough issues that matter to the majority of our citizens, not

just the issues that affect special interest groups and big business.

And I am quite sure most Americans applaud you for your efforts.

I am appearing here today as one spokesperson for the hundreds

of thousands of Marines, sailors, their families, and the loyal civilian employees who were unknowingly exposed to horrendous levels

of toxins through their drinking water at Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina.

Camp Lejeune is quite possibly one of, if not the worst, water

contamination incidents in history. I can confidently make this

claim based on the potential numbers of people who were exposed

and the documented levels of contaminants that were present in

the finished drinking water at this base. Ironically, most of these

people still do not have any idea that they were exposed to these

contaminants at Camp Lejeune. They have not been notified, and

the United States Marine Corps has to date refused to institute

any type of legitimate notification plan or policy.

I can assure you that there are many more individuals and families who are now literally spread out all over this country, if not

this world, that are wondering, what happened to me, ‘‘What happened to my family member?’’ these people deserve an answer. It

is time for the United States Marine Corps to live up to our motto,

which is Semper Fidelis, which is Latin for ‘‘always faithful.’’

My daughter Janey was conceived while her mother and I lived

in one of the base family housing units that was affected by the

contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune. Just like our other

children, Janey was born seemingly normal; that is, until she was

diagnosed with acute lymphocytic leukemia at the age of 6.

In 1997, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry,

or ATSDR, proposed a childhood leukemia/non-Hodgkins lymphoma

study for children exposed to VOCs in utero while their parents

lived at Camp Lejeune between the years of 1968 and 1985. The

proposal, which was sent to the Secretary of the Navy, stated that

the expected occurrences of these illnesses in a group of 10,000 to

12,000 births for that same time period was 7.2 cases. ATSDR has

now already confirmed 14 cases of leukemia and two cases of childhood non-Hodgkins lymphoma out of 12,598 respondents to their

survey. This is more than a 100 percent increase in the instances

of these childhood cancers.

Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is this: DoD officials had been repeatedly notified by three different analytical laboratories over a

span of 4.5 years about the existence of these chemicals in Camp

Lejeune’s finished drinking water. One laboratory wrote a letter on

August 10, 1982, to Camp Lejeune’s commanding general, telling

him that the high levels of chemicals that they had found in their

water were more important from a health standpoint than what

they had sent their water to be tested for in the first place, which

was TTHMs.

19

DoD authorities took no action to identify the source of these

chemicals in their water for 4.5 years following their discovery. We

have discovered documents where DoD representatives have admitted that the ATSDR had incorrect water system data for Camp

Lejeune.

Ms. Kelly Dreyer of Headquarters Marine Corps wrote a 16 November 2000 e-mail to a Mr. Neil Paul at Camp Lejeune’s Environmental Management Department citing the incorrect data and directing its correction. Ms. Dreyer wrote in her e-mail that it was

important that we set the record straight. She asked Mr. Paul to

prepare a memorandum to the ATSDR with all of the correct information, and placed a 1 December 2000 deadline for its completion.

Then I discover another e-mail from Ms. Dreyer, dated 16 March

2001, 4 months later; this time to a Mr. Rick Raines, a subordinate

of Mr. Paul’s at Camp Lejeune, repeating the very same request.

This information was related to the incorrect water system data

which caused the ATSDR to overlook more than 1,500 babies in an

earlier study. We now know that the memorandum never got written. ATSDR never found out that they had been provided incorrect

water system data for Camp Lejeune until I informed Dr. Frank

Bove in a telephone conversation in 2002.

The credit for the discovery of the incorrect water system data

belongs to Major Tom Townsend, United States Marine Corps (retired). He now lives in Moscow, Idaho. It was through Major Townsend’s diligent and aggressive letter writing and Freedom of Information Act request campaign that much of the factual information

about Camp Lejeune was uncovered. Major Townsend lost an infant son and, more recently, his wife of more than 50 years to this

contamination.

Over the nearly 10 years that I have been involved in this situation, I have had much interaction with the various DoD personnel

who have been involved in this situation. While some have been

understanding, others have been just as, if not more, hurtful and

arrogant.

During the 1990’s and early 2000’s, there have been, in my estimation, multiple violations of the CRCLA and RCRA laws in regards to Camp Lejeune. It is suspected that 6 years ago the United

States Environmental Protection Agency granted our Department

of Defense the authority not to list anymore of their contamination

sites on the national priority list. I must also assume that this was

executed with the full blessing of the Bush administration, or else

the EPA’s decision would have been overturned.

There is something that a lot of Americans do not understand.

The United States Department of Defense is our Nation’s largest

polluter. Prior to the EPA granting authority, DoD had 172 highly

contaminated sites on the national priority list. I realize that it is

of the utmost importance that we maintain a strong defense. I also

understand firsthand what happens if we do not maintain our environment at the same time. What will we have left to defend? A

toxic waste dump.

Yes, our Department of Defense should be held to the same

standards as every other industry in our Nation. The Department

of Defense would not tell the truth about their own accidental killing of our own soldiers in a combat zone; i.e., Pat Tillman. What

20

makes anyone believe that they would not lie about the contamination on their installations right here in the United States?

My daughter Janey lost her battle against her malignancy nearly

21⁄2 years after it started. Janey went through hell, and all of us

who loved her, we went through hell with her. Janey died at 3:35

p.m. on 24 September 1985. She was only 9 years old.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to share with the committee the dialog of a telephone conversation I had recently with someone from

headquarters Marine Corps.

Mr. STUPAK. Go ahead.

Mr. ENSMINGER. On the 10th of April I called Headquarters Marine Corps to find out what happened to the funding for the National Academy of Sciences review, funding that was authorized by

the defense authorization bill, and I got Ms. Kelly Dreyer on the

phone, and we were discussing this and several other issues. And

Ms. Dreyer accused me of having a lot of pent-up anger. I couldn’t

believe that she said that.

But I recounted to Ms. Dreyer, and the fact that she’s a mother,

what I went through as a parent through the illness of my daughter. I informed her of the shock that happens to a parent when

their child’s diagnosed with one of these catastrophic illnesses. I

had to have letters written so that I could attain a humanitarian

transfer so my daughter could be transferred to Penn State University Medical Center where my home’s at, where my family was for

support. And one of the doctors wrote a letter and I read it, and

it said at her diagnosis, her white blood count was over 150,000,

which put her in a high-risk category and limited the ability or the

chances that she would have long-term survival.

I lived that nightmare every day from the time I saw that letter.

Every day that entered my mind. And then I reminded Ms. Dreyer

about what she went through in the treatment rooms. Every time

she got stuck with a needle, I was there holding her. She was

screaming in my ear. Every time they stuck a needle through her

bone in her hip to pull out bone marrow, I held her and she

screamed in my ear, ‘‘Daddy, ‘‘Daddy, don’t let them hurt me.’’ And

the only thing that I could say to her was, ‘‘Honey, the only reason

they’re hurting you is they’re trying to help you.’’

And then I reminded Ms. Dreyer about every time Janey got hit

with chemotherapy, and she was heaving her guts out, and all I

could do was stand and rub her back and soothe her.

And then when Janey came home from school, when she could

finally go back to school, crying because the other kids at school

picked on her because her treatments made her look like a freak.

And then on the day of her death, I started crying. I hadn’t cried

in front of Janey before that time because she was pulling her

strength from me. And I had to be strong for her. If I had to cry,

I went somewhere else. But that day I started crying, and she

looked up at me, and she had pneumonia that bad she could hardly

talk, but she said, ‘‘Stop it.’’ and I said, ‘‘Stop what?’’ she said,

‘‘Stop crying, Daddy. I love you.’’

That was the last words my daughter said to me. She went into

a coma. Thirty-five minutes later, she took her last breath, and I

since that conversation with Ms. Dreyer I have thought about that

21

statement she made to me. And you know what? Through these

people’s misconduct and their deceit, they haven’t filled me with a

lot of pent-up anger. What they have filled me with is a terrible

resolve to expose their misconduct, their arrogance, and their incompetence. And I want to expose the truth.

Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. thank you for your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ensminger follows:]

TESTIMONY OF JEROME M. ENSMINGER

Good morning, my name is Jerry Ensminger and I served my country faithfully

for 241⁄2 years in the United States Marine Corps. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the chairman, the committee members, and their staffs for all of

the hard work that went into making these hearings possible. I must say that it

has been inspiring for me to have tuned into C-SPAN these last several months and

witnessed our congress doing what our founding fathers intended. You have been

taking on the tough issues that matter to the majority of our citizens, not just the

issues that affect special interest groups and big business. I, and I am quite sure

most Americans, applaud you for your efforts.

I am appearing here today as one spokes person for the hundreds of thousands

of Marines, Sailors, their families, and the loyal civilian employees who were unknowingly exposed to horrendous levels of toxins through their drinking water at

Camp Lejeune, N.C. Camp Lejeune is, quite possibly, one of , if not the worst, water

contamination incidents in history. I can confidently make this claim based on the

potential numbers of people who were exposed and the documented levels of contaminants that were present in the finished drinking water at the base. Ironically,

most of these people still do not have any idea that they were exposed to these contaminates at Camp Lejeune. They have not been notified and the United States Marine Corps has to date refused to institute any type of legitimate notification plan/

policy. I can assure you that there are many more individuals and families who are

now literally spread out all over the country that are wondering, ‘‘What happened

to me?’’ ‘‘What happened to my family member?’’ These people deserve an answer.

It is time for the United States Marine Corps to live up to their motto ‘‘Semper

Fidelis’’ which is Latin for ‘‘Always Faithful.’’

My daughter Janey was conceived while her mother and I lived in one of the base

family housing units that was affected by the contaminated drinking water at Camp

Lejeune. Just like our other children, Janey was born seemingly normal, that is

until she was diagnosed with Acute Lymphosytic Leukemia at the age of six. In

1997, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) proposed a

childhood Leukemia /Non-Hodgkins Lyphoma study for children exposed to VOCs

in-utero while their parents lived at Camp Lejeune between the years 1968-1985.

The proposal (CLW 2815-2832) which was sent to the Secretary of the Navy, stated

that the expected occurrences of these illnesses in a group of 10,000–12,000 births

for that time period was 7.2 cases. ATSDR has now confirmed 14 cases of leukemia

and two non-hodgkins lymphoma out of 12,598 respondents to their survey. This is

more than a 100 percent increase in the incidence of these childhood cancers.

On October 1, 1980, representatives from Navy Facilities Engineering Command,

Atlantic Division from Norfolk, VA. Came to Camp Lejeune. They took a composite

water sample of all eight water systems that were operating on Camp Lejeune at

that time. The results of this composite sample (CLW 0430) showed VOC contamination that exceeded today’s Maximum Contaminate Level (MCL) of 5ppb. We must

remember that this was composite (combined) sample of which 6 of the contributing

water systems were not deemed to be contaminated. Ms. Elizabeth Betz, Supervising Chemist at Camp Lejeune’s Quality Control Laboratory wrote a memorandum (CLW 0613) dated 31 August 1982 that specifically addressed the 1 October

1980 sampling event. First and foremost, the analytical results for this sample were

not provided to Camp Lejeune until 12 August 1982 and Ms. Betz points out errors

that were committed during the sample collection process. Also, during October of

1980 the United States Army Environmental Hygiene Team from Fort McPhearson,

GA. Began testing certain water systems aboard Camp Lejeune for total

Trihalomethanes (TTHMs). Their analysis of the 30 October 1980 water samples

taken form the Hadnot Point Water Distribution System had the following hand

written remark: ‘‘Water is highly contaminated with low molecular weight halogenated hydrocarbons.’’ (CLW 0436) On 29 December 1980 another sample was

taken from the Hadnot Point system and again the U.S. Army laboratory wrote a

22

note on the analytical form, Heavy organic interference at CHCL2BR. You need to

analyze for chlorinated organics by GC/MS. (CLW 0438) Once again samples were

taken of the same system on 30 January 1981 and the U.S. Army laboratory wrote

on the analytical result form You need to analyze for chlorinated organics by GC/

MS (GC/MS is an abbreviation for Gas Chromatograph / Mass Spectrometer.) Finally, on 9 March 1981 more samples of Hadnot Point water system were collected

and analyzed. The U.S. Army laboratory once again wrote a note at the bottom of

the analytical result form Water highly contaminated with other chlorinated hydrocarbons (solvents)! (CLW 0443) These analytical result forms were being sent by the

U.S. Army directly to the Navy Facilities Engineering Command, Atlantic Division,

Norfolk, VA. No action was taken. In fact, officials at Camp Lejeune were unaware

of the U.S. Army’s finding until the Summer of 1982. When the EPA’s MCLs for

TTHMs went into effect in 1982, Camp Lejeune was required to use a North Carolina state certified laboratory for the analysis of their water. Grainger Laboratories

of Raleigh, N.C. was contracted by Camp Lejeune to analyze their water samples.

In May 1982, a Grainger laboratory representative phoned Ms. Betz of Camp

Lejeune and informed her that they had found high levels of Volatile Organic

Chemicals (VOCs) during their analysis of the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace

water systems. They had a problem with some of the sample bottles and they requested that Camp Lejeune take new samples. On 10 August 1982, Mr. Bruce A.

Babson, a chemist with Grainger laboratories, wrote a letter to the Commanding

General of Camp Lejeune. (CLW 0592,0593) In his letter Mr. Babson stated ‘‘Interferences which were thought to be chlorinated hydrocarbons hindered the quantitation of certain trihalomethanes. These appeared to be at high levels and hence more

important from a health standpoint than the total Trihalomethane content. For

these reasons we called the situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune personnel.’’

Mr. Babson went on in his letter to describe the levels of the chemicals they had

found in the samples. Tetrachloroethylene (PCE) 104 ppb in the Tarawa Terrace

(TT) sample and Trichloroethylene (TCE) 1,400 ppb in the Hadnot Point sample.

There was absolutely no action taken by Camp Lejeune officials after they received

this warning. On 19 August 1982, Ms. Betz wrote another memorandum (CLW

0606-0607) to Mr. Sharpe, Supervisory Ecologist, Environment Section. In her

memorandum Ms. Betz outlines the Grainger laboratory results and she also discusses the EPA suggested no adverse response levels (SNARLS) for the chemicals

found in Camp Lejeune finished drinking water. In paragraph 8 of her memo Ms.

Betz writes that the levels of PCE for the Terawa Terrace system exceed the EPA’s

guidance. In fact, they were more than doubled. Grainger laboratories continued to

test Camp Lejeune’s finished drinking water for TTHMs throughout 1982-1983 and

each time they detected high levels of VOCs. They contacted Camp Lejeune and

they annotated it on their analytical result form. (CLW 0693, 0953) No action was

taken!

In 1982 the U.S. Navy began their Navy Assessment and Control of Installation

Pollutants (NACIP) Initial assessment study (IAS) of Camp Lejeune. This program

was started in 1980 by the U.S. Navy to identify any possible ‘‘Love Canals’’ at any

Naval shore installations (CLW 4994). The NACIP IAS was completed for Camp

Lejeune and they issued their report in April 1983. The general finding of the

NACIP IAS report stated in paragraph 2.2.2 ‘‘Seventy six waste disposal sites have

been identified; however, most (54) do not contain hazardous waste or do not pose

a significant threat to human health or the environment.’ and 2.2.4 ‘‘No industrial

or municipal wastes were found to be migrating onto base property.’’ I would like

to know how these ‘‘experts’’ came to this conclusion. Did they take water samples

from the groundwater aquifers or did they make this assumption from a quick drive

around the boundary of the base? Camp Lejeune officials, quick to seize on this IAS

report, wrote a letter to the State of North Carolina, Division of Health Services,

Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Branch (CLW 0948). In their letter to the

state, a Camp Lejeune official wrote ‘‘The study concludes that none of the 76 sites

pose an immediate threat to human health or the environment,’’ There is quite a

big difference in the definition of the words ‘‘most’’ and ‘‘none’’ , especially when they

are used in reference to hazardous waste sites and human health! There are some

very pertinent questions about the NACIP IAS that remain unanswered. Did Camp

Lejeune inform the NACIP IAS team that VOCs had already been detected in their

finished drinking water? Did the NACIP IAS team ask for existing analytical results

of Camp Lejeune drinking water when they inspected the water treatment plant?

The NACIP IAS was on-going when Camp Lejeune received the 10 August 1982 letter (CLW 0592) from Grainger Laboratories. Did Camp Lejeune provide this letter

to the NACIP/IAS team? It would be my guess that none of this information was

shared with the NACIP IAS team. I make this assertion based on a letter dated

October 25, 1985 from the State of North Carolina to Mr. Larry Fitzpatrick. The

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attachment to this letter was an assessment written by Mr. Rick Schiver of N.C.s

Department of Environmental Management concerning the groundwater contamination at Camp Lejeune. In his assessment, Mr. Schiver wrote ‘‘During July 1984, confirmation studies were begun at eighteen (18) priority sites. The results of these

groundwater studies were documented in a report provided to the Marine Corps in

February 1985: as the Marine Corps disagrees with the conclusion in this report,

it will not release a copy of it to any outside agency. It is my estimation that when

the NACIP team came back to Camp Lejeune in July 1985, officials at the base,

realizing that the NACIP confirmation study would reveal the existing groundwater

contamination, they informed them of the existing analytical results. It is my opinion that the NACIP team was both professionally embarrassed and appalled by the

fact that this information had been available during their IAS of the base in 1982.

They had neither asked for it and worse, Camp Lejeune officials concealed the information from them. I suspect that the NACIP team wrote a scathing confirmtion

study report about Camp Lejeune. No one with whom I have personally spoken, has

seen this report. It is imperative that Congress obtain a copy of this original report.

I believe that it is the smoking gun in relation to the drinking water contamination

at Camp Lejeune.

As stated previously, the NACIP Confirmation study began in July 1984 (Note:

The U.S.E.P.A. issued RMCLs for VOCs in June 1984) and they began testing the

individual water supply wells in October. The results of these samples began to

trickle back in during November and December of that year. It was more than 4

years after the initial discovery of VOCs in Camp Lejeune’s finished drinking water

before they took any action to remedy the situation. During the months of November

and December of 1984, Camp Lejeune removed (7) contaminated water supply wells

from service in the Hadnot Point system. In January 1985, the Chief of Staff’s wife

smelled fuel in the tap water at their quarters on Paradise Point officers’ housing

area. This housing area was served by the Holcomb Blvd. water treatment plant

since August 1973. (Note: Remember this water system and date; it becomes very

important later in time) Camp Lejeune maintenance workers discover that an emergency back-up generator fuel line had burst, allowing fuel to enter the water system.

The Holcomb Boulevard plant was immediately taken off line and this area was provided Hadnot Point water via an existing inter-tie between the two systems. Camp

Lejeune officials notified N.C. state health and environmental authorities of the accidental contamination. After thoroughly flushing the Holcomb Boulevard system

with Hadnot Point water, military and N.C. state authorities began testing the

water to ensure that the fuel had been sufficiently flushed out of the system. What

they found was worse! At the Berkley Manor Elementary School they found Trichloroethylene (TCE) at 1,148.4 ppb and Dichloroethylene (DCE) at 406.6 ppb.

(CLW 2254) This is when well No. 651 of Hadnot Point water system was discovered. This well was located at the back corner of Lot No. 203, the Defense Revitalization Management Office yard; (The base junk yard!) (Note: Well No. 651 was constructed in 1971, 30 years after operations began at Lot No. 203). This well tested

at 18,900 ppb of Trichloroethylene (TCE) and 655 ppb of Vinyl Chloride during early

February 1985 testing. It should be pointed out that well No. 651 was the only contaminated well that was still pumping during the January, February 1985 time

frame. This one contaminated well caused finished drinking water samples to exceed the 1,000 ppb for TCE alone. One can only imagine what the levels of contaminates were prior to the November/December 1984 time frame when several of these

contaminated wells would have been pumping at the same time. Hopefully, the

ATSDR’s on-going computerized water modeling will answer that question. During

this same time frame, the water system for the Tarawa Terrace (TT) base family

housing area was found to be contaminated with high levels of Tetrachloroethylene

(PCE). It should be pointed out at this time that the highest contaminated water

supply well for TT (TT—26 @ 1,580 ppb PCE) was constructed at the property line.

TT’s well field was constructed down gradient and directly across the street from

a dry cleaning establishments, gasoline stations, automotive repair facilities, and

known septic sewage ground absorption systems.

On 11 March 1985, Mr. Julian Wooten, Director of Camp Lejeune’s Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs Division wrote what I can only describe as a

C.Y.A. letter. (CLW 1179-1180) In his letter, Mr. Wooten explained, in remarkable

detail, the recommendations of, and the sources contacted (and not) by Mr. Hubbell.

My only regret about this letter is that Mr. Wooten concurred with Mr. Hubbell’s

recommendations. (See paragraph No. 3, CLW 1180) Mr. Wooten was a personal

friend of mine. When I discovered this letter, I was greatly disheartened and disillusioned by his actions (or lack there of). I lost a lot of respect for this man. It is quite

obvious that these authorities were playing a selective game of Ostrich; put your

head in the sand and do not look back where you know the damming Information

24

lies. That way if all of this comes up later, they can say, ‘‘We did not know any

better.’’ This is the exact tactic that has been employed by the D.O.N. and the

USMC ever since this situation truly became public in 1997. Mr. Wooten retired in

the 1990s; Mr. Hubbell holds a flag rank civilian Position at HQMC. His biography

can be viewed on the USMC’s official Web site www.usmc.mil General officer biographies.

On October 4, 1989, (CLW 4976) Camp Lejeune was placed on the National Priority List (NPL) for contamination sites. This appointment automatically required the

ATSDR to execute their Congressionally mandated mission and perform an assessment at Camp Lejeune for human exposures to the contamination. Initially, the

USMC provided information to the ATSDR (see PHA for Camp Lejuene) and the

public about the Tarawa Terrace Hadnot Point and Holcomb Blvd. service areas

that was incorrect and blatantly untrue! When the ATSDR began their assessment

of the contamination at Camp Lejeune, there were several letters written requesting

data on the water systems and the contamination sites on the base. On February

23, 1993, Ms. Nancy L. Sonnenfeld of the ATSDR’s Epidemiology and Surveillance

Branch Wrote a letter to Mr. Neal Paul of CLNC, Environmental Management Department (CLW 2245, 2246). In her letter, Ms. Sonnenfeld explained exactly what

information / data the ATSDR was looking for, drinking water distribution systems

data. I would like to point out the statement made by this scientist at the beginning

of paragraph No. 3 in this letter. It is my opinion that statements such as these

are considered pandering and gives the impression that the ATSDR is willing to

play on both sides of the fence! While I did obtain this letter, none of the enclosures

have ever been made public. A letter written to CLNC on March 5, 1993 (CLW

2247) ATSDR environmental engineers were requesting copies of site related materials appropriate for the preparation of public health assessments. The author of

this letter, Mr. Stephen S. Aoyama, P.E. was very thorough in his request. Please

note the hand-written comments that were made on the letter at CLNC. ‘‘Final Reports Only—Send 2 or 3 Final R1/FS.’’ This was not what ATSDR asked for; this

was a deliberate stalling / harassment tactic. Then, on September 2, 1994 (Note: 6

days prior to their initial release of the Camp Lejeune PHA) the ATSDR’s Office

of Assistant Administrator wrote a letter to the Engineering Support Department,

Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC), Norfolk, VA. (CLW 2407) This letter

states ‘‘We have sent MCB, Camp Lejeune several requests for information and, in

most cases, the responses were inadequate and not supporting documentation was

forwarded.’’ (Note: All of the handwritten notes were on this letter when it appeared

on the PDF file. (Please note the ‘‘knee jerk’’ comment at the lower left.) Then I find

a letter from the Commanding Officer of the NEHC (CLW 2406) a subordinate command to CLNC ‘‘recommending’’ that they cooperate with the ATSDR and provide

them with the requested data. Please note that higher headquarters was copied on

this letter and the enclosure. I have found no documented involvement from higher

headquarters where they chastised CLNC authorities for their lack of cooperation

with the ATSDR. The fact that there is no documented corrective action from any

of the higher headquarters is a clear signal that they complied with and were party

to the tactics being employed by CLNC in this situation. I have found many data

requests (in writing) from the ATSDR. I have never found any written submissions

of data to the ATSDR from CLNC, not one! We have submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the ATSDR and the USMC for any and all documents

pertaining to data submissions from CLNC to the ATSDR. None of these FOIAs

have ever been fulfilled. In fact, the Director of the ATSDR sent me a letter dated

4 May 2007 that his agency can not produce the supporting documents for their 4

August 1997, PHA of Camp Lejeune. Dr. Frumkin stated that all of these reference

documents had been ‘‘mistakenly’’ destroyed by a private contractor? It would be interesting to find out how many other N.P.L. sites P.H.A. supporting Documents

have been lost or destroyed by this agency or is it only the Camp Lejeune documents?

At the same time the ATSDR was conducting the PHA for Camp Lejeune, (1992–

97) the ATSDR proposed an adverse pregnancy outcome study for the years 1968–

1985. (CLW 2528–2529) This study was conducted and it became the basis for the

Camp Lejeune Health Survey (1999–2003) and the epidemiological study that is still

in progress. There is a problem with the findings of this initial study. Camp Lejeune

officials provided the ATSDR with incorrect water system/distribution data for the

Holcomb Blvd. and Tarawa Terrace service areas. The ATSDR had been led to believe that the Holcomb Blvd. water service area had received their drinking water

from the Holcomb Blvd. water treatment / distribution plant. This water treatment

plant was not constructed until 1972 and the Camp Lejeune Plant Account records

show it as becoming operational in August 1973. (CLW 3238) Prior to 1973, the base

family housing in this area, Berkley Manor, Paradise Point, and Midway Park, reVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
25

ceived their water from the presumed contaminated Hadnot Point system. Furthermore, CLNC officials misled the ATSDR and the public to believe that when the 2

wells in the Tarawa Terrace (TT) system had been taken off line because of contamination, they shut the entire TT water distribution system off. They proclaim in

many documents (CLW 3075, 3076, 3077, 3161) that without the production from

those two contaminated wells, the TT plant could not meet the water demand. Since

1985 TT received their water from the Holcomb Blvd. system. We know that this

was not the truth, the Tarawa Terrace water system stayed in production and online until March 1997. Because of the incorrect information for the Holcomb Blvd.

service area an estimated 1,500 pregnancies were overlooked in the 1968–1985 ‘‘Adverse Pregnancy Outcome’’ study. I have no idea how many babies were excluded

because of the erroneous data on TT. We also know from internal USMC documents

that Camp Lejeune officials turned on one of the known contaminated TT wells to

meet water demand during peak demand periods. (CLW 1132) An action bried

(CLW 1129—1131) written by the Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities on 1 March

1985 outlined the alternatives for providing water to the Tarawa Terrace (TT) base

housing area. The USMC constantly states that their highest priority is the Health

and welfare of their Marines, Sailors, their families, and the civilian employees on

their bases. I can assure you that this document, and the alternatives that we now

know were chosen, do not support those claims. According to the alternatives that

we now know were selected from this document, health and welfare took a back seat

to money and favors. In 1999, Major Tom Townsend, USMC (Retired) began a very

aggressive letter writing / FOIA campaign. His intent was to procure as much information pertaining to the situation as he could. It was Tom Townsend who, in 2000,

discovered the incorrect water system data for the Holcomb Blvd. service area for

the years of 1968–1973. He immediately notified USMC officials (in writing) of the

error. On 16 November 2000, Ms. Kelly Dreyer, Project Officer, Camp Lejeune

Water Contamination, Installations and Logistics Branch, Headquarters Marine

Corps (HQMC) sent an e-mail to Neal Paul at CLNC, EMD. In her email Ms.

Dreyer outlined the incorrect water system data situation to Mr. Paul. She told him

that it was ‘‘important to set the record straight’’ and she wanted him to write a

memorandum to ATSDR with the correct information. Ms. Dreyer went on to spell

out in detail what information she wanted on the memo and gave him a ‘‘by date’’

for completion and signature of 1 December 2000. She also directed that the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the NEHC be copied. Four months later, March

16, 2001, Ms. Dreyer sends another e-mail to CLNC, EMD requesting the very same

information. (CLW 3307) The only difference is that this time she addresses her request to Mr. Rick Raines, a subordinate of Mr. Neal Paul who received the first directive. Needless to say, this memorandum was never written. The ATSDR never

knew they had incorrect water system data until I told Dr. Frank Bove During a

telephone conversation in 2002. The USMC had corrected their error by placing a

new entry on their chronology which is located on their official Web site. The USMC

never informed the ATSDR that their ‘‘Adverse Pregnancy Outcome’’ study had been

skewed by the incorrect water system data. What is just as appalling is the fact that

the USMC did not correct this error knowing full well that the ATSDR was well

into their Childhood Cancer and Birth Defects study. Had it not been for Tom Townsend’s diligence, this lie may never have been uncovered. The lies about the Tarawa

Terrace water system were never rectified. It is unknown how many babies that

were exposed to these contaminates have been overlooked by the ATSDR’s studies.

When the ATSDR announced their proposal for a Childhood Cancer study on June

23, 1997 (CLW 2815) it caused a firestorm of lies and deceit amongst the USMC

and DoN spin doctors. When any press interviews or press releases were issued concerning the Camp Lejeune water contamination, they always pointed to the Tarawa

Terrace base housing area. This was because they had an off-base scapegoat on

which to focus the attention of the media and the public. When the ATSDR went

to the Secretary of the Navy to acquire funding for their proposed Childhood Cancer

study in 1997, Ms. Elsie Munsell wrote a letter to the ATSDR. (CLW 2917) In her

letter, Ms. Munsell wrote ‘‘the volatile organic chemicals found in the water supply

under investigation came from an off base source, ABC One Hour Cleaners. According to our investigation, this off site source of contamination is a National Priorities

Listed Site under the jurisdiction of the EPA. Therefore, in accordance with

CERCLA 107(a), it is more appropriate for you to seek funding for the study from

the responsible party.’’ The USMC /DoN’s incorrect water system data had worked

wonders for them thus far. They had the ATSDR believing that the only one small

housing area, the 21 housing units at Hospital Point, were exposed to contamination

caused by the military. In reality, it was 1,929 units for the years of 1968–1973.

They had the Secretary of the Navy’s Office baffled as well and they got away with

not funding the ATSDR’s study because of it. The ATSDR then proceeded to pursue

26

the funding from the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB); they

succeeded. OMB authorized the funding based upon III phases; if the 1st phase (the

survey) showed enough data (cases), then it would proceed to the 2nd phase (verification of reported ailments). If the 2nd phase showed enough medically verified

cases, then it would proceed into the 3rd and final phase, the epidemiological study

of the confirmed cases. It is my opinion that the DoD agencies involved in the process did everything possible to kill this study in the 1st phase. They held the keys

to all of the data that The ATSDR needed. To ensure the validity of the 1st phase

of this study, 80 percent of the estimated 16,500 Pregnancies that occurred at Camp

Lejeune between the years of 1968–1985 need to be contacted. DoD agencies initially pledged their support of these efforts, but it quickly degraded into

stonewalling and delaying tactics. What better way to kill this study than by ensuring that the ATSDR did not contact the 80 percent of pregnancies required by OMB

to validate the 1st phase? This very scenario was alluded to by Ms. Kathy Skipper

of the ATSDR, Public Affairs Office in an e-mail to Ms. Kelly Dreyer of HQMC

(CLW 3130).

Upon OMB approval of the ATSDR funding, ATSDR personnel proceeded with the

writing and peer review for the protocol of their proposed study. Once all of this

was accomplished, it was time to start mailing out the questionnaires to the small

number of subjects that had thus far been identified. The Survey (Phase No. 1) was

supposed to begin in January 1999; this did not happen because of an objection by

DoN and USMC authorities in October 1998. Their objection was based on the release of the Hollywood movie A Civil Action! (CLW 2996—2999) It would appear

(CLW 2995) that they had partial success in their efforts when they got the beginning of the survey kicked back by one month. In reality, the survey never started

until October of 1999 when the USMC posted the ‘‘Camp Lejeune Area Water Survey’’ information sheet on their official USMC Web site. (CLW 3161) This document

which cited the dates 1968–1985 carried on the lies; it only referred to Tarawa Terrace and Hospital Point housing areas as being affected by the contamination. It

also continued the lie about Tarawa Terrace base family housing area being provided drinking water from the Holcomb Blvd. system since 1985. These people delayed the very mechanism (the study) that I was looking to for an answer to a question that had nagged at me for 15 years by this point. I wanted to know what

caused my daughter’s illness and her subsequent death. I still do not have that answer, but I do have a very good idea. To have discovered that this answer got delayed for another 9 months because of the release of a Hollywood movie was, to say

the least, infuriating! DoD agencies never fully cooperated with the ATSDR’s study

efforts until the September/October 2000 time frame. This is when the ATSDR announced that they were going to execute a nationwide media blitz to locate enough

(80 percent) of the estimated 16,500 pregnancies in order to validate Phase No. 1

of their study. It was at this point that the USMC finally somewhat relented. They

(USMC) did not want the ATSDR to pursue this media campaign without their involvement. (It would make the USMC look bad.) On 1 November 2000, a joint Pentagon Press conference took place which included Marine Corps and ATSDR representatives. It is quite obvious by reviewing the packet of documents that I printed

from the Internet in November 2000, that the USMC was starting to correct some

of their lies, but it is quite obvious from the conflicting information on different documents that they (USMC) were having a difficult time conveying the truth. CLW

1194 Procedures for operating the new well at Tarawa Terrace really makes me

wonder if these people (USMC) ever really did stop using this well. Mysteriously,

most of the water treatment plant log book entries concerning water levels and

booster pump operation for Tarawa Terrace ceased in May 1985. It is my suspicion

that the contaminated TT new well (TT-23) continued to be operated until March

1987 when the Tarawa Terrace water treatment plant was closed. What other explanation is there for this document (CLW 1194) to have been generated?

There have been numerous federal agencies who have looked into the Camp

Lejeune water contamination incident and they have issued reports, the most recent

being the GAO. In February 2004, The Commandant of the Marine Corps named

his Blue Ribbon panel to look into the issues surrounding the Camp Lejeune water

contamination incident. This panel was appointed by the Commandant as a damage

control tactic following the January 2004 Washington Post article concerning the

contamination. When they (USMC) named the members of this panel, I knew that

this was going to be one more white wash attempt. Senator Elizabeth Dole (R,N.C.)

even called the Marine Corps selection of panel members absurd. They named

former Congressman Ronald Packard (R,CA.) as the chairman; it did not take me

long to figure out Mr. Packard’s connection to this situation. He had previously represented southern California 48th district whose largest industry was Marine Corps

Base, Camp Pendleton. It just so happened that Camp Pendleton was where the

27

Commandant (General Hagee) had done the majority of his command time as a

General Officer. Secondly, he chose retired General Hearney, the former Assistant

Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) for the years of 1994–96. I am quite certain that General Hearney had Attended briefings during his tenure as (ACMC) concerning the CLNC water situation. Thirdly, he appointed Mr. Robert Piere, the

former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment. It was

this man’s office who turned down the ATSDR’s request for funding of the Camp

Lejeune Childhood Cancer study in October 1997! When these panel members were

named, there was such an overwhelming outcry of foul that the Marine Corps was

forced to name (2) additional independent members to this panel. They appointed

Dr. Robert Tardiff and Dr. William Glaze to the panel. I quickly vetted both of these

new additions and found the following. Dr. Robert Tardiff was the President /CEO

of the Sapphire Group. This company was nothing more than environmental hired

guns; they performed risk assessments on chemicals and products for the highest

bidder. Dr. William Blaze was the only member of this panel that could truly be

considered objective and non-biased. The first meeting of this panel took place at

Camp Lejeune in April / May time frame. After their meeting aboard the base, the

panel members attended a press conference / meeting at the Jacksonville, N.C.

U.S.O. This took place on a Friday and Dr. Glaze did not appear at the press interview the following Monday. His resignation from the panel was announced by the

Chairman, Ron Packard. Mr. Packard stated that because Dr. Glaze was on the

E.P.A.’s science advisory board, he (Dr. Glaze) feared that those duties might be a

conflict of interest if they (EPA Science Advisory Board) were called upon to review

the findings of the Commandant’s Panel! No, Dr. Glaze who cherished his position

in the world of academia saw the handwriting on the wall after he attended the first

meeting at Camp Lejeune. If he wanted to retain his high standing that he had attained in academia and the scientific Community, he needed to distance himself

from this fiasco. Then when the Commandant revealed his charter for this panel,

I knew that is was a hoax. The charter charged the panel to review only the circumstances surrounding this situation from 1980–85. I knew right then that his entire panel was nothing more than a farce. It was akin to placing a band-aid over

a sucking chest wound; too little, too late! This panel completed their charter and

filed their report and while they found some fault with the actions of some departments the end result was no harm, no foul. This was what I predicted; this is what

we got.

The EPA Inspector General’s office did a small investigation into some of the complaints pertaining to this situation. It was very small; they interviewed me once in

person and then they issued their report. I was not even aware that they had issued

a report until it was cited by the GAO.

The EPA Criminal Investigation Division conducted a criminal investigation into

the circumstances surrounding the Camp Lejeune water contamination. I went to

a briefing on the findings of this investigation on 25 August 2005 at the Department

of Justice in Washington, D.C. At the briefing, it was stated that there were no

crimes committed by DoD personnel or their representatives. In a recent telephone

conversation with Special Agent Tyler Amon, the agent in charge of the Camp

Lejeune investigation, he stated that he had recommended charges against personnel involved in this investigation. It was the judgment of the Department of Justice

prosecutors that they could not successfully prosecute those charges in Federal

Court. The GAO cited the EPA, CID investigation in their report. They wrote that

the EPA, CID investigator reported that the Marine Corps admitted that if failed

to adequately address concerns and data requests from the public and ATSDR.

Failed to address data requests from the ATSDR? Is this not a violation of federal

law? The fact that Marine Corps officials knew that the ATSDR had incorrect water

system data for Camp Lejeune (provided by them) and they did nothing to correct

it; is this not a violation of federal law? The fact that Marine Corps officials changed

the answers to an interview for the media from the truth to a lie; is that not a violation of federal laws? I can assure you that had I pulled some of these very same

stunts while on active duty, I would probably still be in Fort Leavenworth Federal

prison. The fact that Mr. Townsend and I were only provided an abbreviated version

of the investigation report, we still have some very valid questions that have not

been answered. Was the DoD main-frame computers and servers searched for all emails pertaining to this matter? I can assure you, the number of e-mails that we

now possess are only a fraction of the ones that were generated on this subject. The

e-mails that currently exist were captured from personal computers or files that

someone had printed off. If we are ever going to find the truth in this situation,

it is my belief that it is lying in the servers of DoD and the CDC.

Most recently, (May 2007) the GAO published a report on a study that they had

conducted on the circumstances surrounding the Camp Lejeune water contaminaVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
28

tion incident. First, I would like to point out that since the beginning of the GAO’s

efforts related to this situation, their principle investigator changed no less than (4)

times. When this study began, Mr. John Oh was the principle. He left and his responsibilities were assumed by a Ms. Bonnie Anderson. When Ms. Anderson left a

Ms. Danielle Organek took over and then she was finally replaced by a Ms. Karen

Doran. It is no wonder that this report is so full of errors, omissions, and halftruths. How do you conduct a valid study into a situation that spans nearly thirty

years and is as sorted and twisted as the Camp Lejeune situation without at least

maintaining continuity? Furthermore, this report was written n consolatory language that wreaks of cover-up. There are too many areas in this report that are erroneous for me to list in this testimony. I am, instead, providing you with my own

copy of the GAO report which I have thoroughly highlighted and annotated.

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has been a bitter

sweet experience for me. It is my opinion that the ATSDR’s Department of Health

Assessments and Consultations (DEHAC) has become an excuse mechanism for polluters and the chemical production industry. All anyone need do is review several

of their Public Health Assessments and you will notice the trend. While they have

become very skilled at changing their wording, the end result is always the same.

No harm, no foul! They constantly state that there are too few studies available for

them to draw any firm conclusions from. Then they recommend that no further

studies are required for these exposures! How are they ever going to increase the

scientific knowledge on the effects these chemicals have on humans if they do not

recommend studies? The only reason that a further study was recommended at

Camp Lejeune was Nancy Sonnenfeld who was working with the ATSDR while pursuing her PHD performed the Small for Gestatonal Age and Adverse Pregnancy

Outcome study as her dissertation and her findings were apparently very profound.

This is when the ATSDR recommended the Childhood Cancer / Birth Defects in

utero study at Camp Lejeune. This all mainly happened because of a dissertation!

It really makes me wonder how many other N.P.L. sites that have been played down

by one of ATSDR’s Public Health Assessments (PHA) that truly deserved further

studies.

The recent GAO report cites ATSDR officials as saying that their work at Camp

Lejeune has not been delayed because of either a lack of cooperation from DoD entities or funding. If this is true, why is it that the exposure information in the Camp

Lejeune final PHA is incorrect? If the DoD representatives who provided ATSDR

this data were not at fault, I would assume that ATSDR staff incompetency was responsible. The fact is that the adverse pregnancy study overlooked 1,500 plus births

in the Holcomb Blvd. service area. There is an unknown number of births at Tarawa

Terrace that have been overlooked. Was this not because DoD representatives provided ATSDR staff with erroneous data? If it was not DoD’s fault, then it must

again be related to the incompetency of ATSDR staff. We know that the survey

(Phase 1) was scheduled to start in January 1999, but it never started until late

September of that year. We have also seen the e-mails recommending the delay of

that survey because of the release of the movie A Civil Action. This delay was not

requested by DoD entities? We know that the study covered the years of 1968–1985

and we now know that the Tarawa Terrace water system continued to operate until

March 1987. Previously, we were told that it ceased operation in 1985. The ATSDR

missed fifteen months worth of births at this base housing area. Since DoD entities

have not done anything to hinder ATSDR’s efforts at Camp Lejeune, then once

again, this can only be attributed to the incompetence of ATSDR staff. How does

the ATSDR explain all of the letters that have been written by them complaining

about the lack of cooperation of DoD entities in the Camp Lejeune situation? They

were cooperating, but the ATSDR just decided to write letters of complaint? The

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is, in my opinion, seriously deficient of an extremely important requirement, Intestinal Fortitude (GUTS). I realize

that there is a need for cooperation between Federal agencies and departments. I

also understand that every precaution should be taken to nurture and preserve a

good working relationship between one another. The ATSDR needs to understand

that respect is a two way street; there should be a limit to the evident lack of respect and cooperation that the ATSDR accepts from the DoD! I travel through rural

North Carolina every day. During my travels, I pass through many poor, underprivileged, and under educated neighborhoods. Many of these people do not even have

a grasp of the English language. God forbid that something like what happened at

Camp Lejeune would happen to one of these neighborhoods. Who would be their

champion? Who would stand up and fight for them? The ATSDR? They will not even

make a stand to defend themselves! Would our EPA be there to defend these people?

Evidently not. We had a panel of expert scientists recommend in their report last

summer that our EPA should lower the protective standard for trichloroethylene

29

(TCE) in drinking water without any further delay. It has been almost a year since

that report was released. We still do not have a new standard. No, I am afraid that

if an incident such as the contaminated water at Camp Lejeune happened in one

of the afore mentioned neighborhoods, it would be dead and buried along with their

family members. It is my honest opinion that the citizens of our country would be

better served if our Congress dissolved the ATSDR. Why pay for the up-keep of an

agency that is quite obviously not accomplishing the mission for which they were

created? I believe that our citizens and our environment would be better served if

we contracted universities to perform the assessments at our NPL sites. I truly believe that we would get a more honest and thorough assessment than what we are

getting now! Lastly, the ATSDR can not even produce the references (supporting

documents) for their PHA of Camp Lejeune. (See my letter of April 16, 20007 to

ATSDR and their response dated May 4, 2007.) The ATSDR stated in their 4 May

2007 letter to me that the references for the Camp Lejeune PHA had been destroyed

by a private contractor. I would like to remind you that the GAO cited the EPA,

CID investigation report which stated the documents had not been destroyed. It

would appear Mr. Chairman that we have several Federal agencies involved in this

fiasco who can not seem to get their answers straight!

In closing, I would like to say that the last 10 years have been a real experience

for me. For an organization that supposedly prides itself on honor and integrity, the

United States Marine Corps has certainly turned a blind eye to the documented

misconduct and incompetence exhibited by their civilian employees and officers in

this situation. The fact that these people are still on their payroll or in their ranks

is a silent nod of approval of their actions by headquarters. In fact, most of these

individuals, with the exception of one, have been promoted and given more responsibility and authority. This is a scary scenerio; do you not agree?

My daughter, Janey, fought valiantly against her illness, but the malignancy was

too strong. Janey succumbed to her disease at 3:35pm, Tuesday, 24 September 1985.

She was only 9 years old.

Mr. STUPAK. With consent of the committee, I’m going to ask Mr.

Dingell, would you like to make an opening statement? Mr. Dingell

is chairman of the full committee.

Chairman DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, the opening statement I have

is an excellent one. I would like to have it inserted in the record,

please.

Mr. STUPAK. without objection.

Chairman DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing accommodations for this hearing. Mr. Ensminger, welcome. I am

pleased we are seeing you again. How long ago was it that we first

met, you and I?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Spring of 2004, sir.

Chairman DINGELL. Well, I told you at that time we would approach this matter, and we will. I want to say that we will pursue

it, not only for you and your loved ones but also for all of the others.

I find myself somewhat troubled that the military—and I was an

infantry man in World War II—doesn’t adhere to the maxim that

the Marine Corps has, and that is that the Marines take care of

their own. When I was in the infantry we also tried to take care

of our own, too.

I would make the observation that we’re not only going to pursue

the situation with regard to the Defense Department, but we’re

also going to pursue the situation with regard now to EPA where

there is some curious behavior going on which involves lack of enthusiasm for pursuing this matter.

CID agents being used as drivers and personal bodyguards for

the Administrator rather than investigating important environmental crimes, which they would do, interestingly enough, under

30

legislation that came out of this committee, of which I was one of

the principal authors.

I want to say, we will find out why the Navy balked at funding

health impact studies, why the Marine Corps delayed in initiating

these studies, and why the Marine Corps has failed to properly

produce documents on many occasions necessary for health impact

studies. And also why the Navy failed for years to close down a

contaminated drinking water system despite knowledge of such

contamination and the risk that it imposed to our military personnel.

Bad enough to have our people shot at over there in Iraq without

having the Department for which they work engage in the kind of

practices which we see here, which have the kind of brutal impact

upon military personnel and patriotic Americans and their families

who are trying to serve their country.

So, Mr. Chairman, I commend you for what you are doing. I welcome our witnesses, and I would just make the observation, we’ve

had some comments from some of the departments, particularly the

EPA. They might not be as cooperative as we would like, and I’m

going to remind them, Mr. Chairman, as we always choose to, that

they can cooperate two ways: One is pleasantly, and one is painfully. And we’re going to leave the choice to them, and I would urge

them to take the more pleasant choice.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dingell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this critically important hearing. The sorry

treatment of the wounded at Walter Reed Hospital was a national scandal and so

is the treatment of the Marine casualties of Camp Lejeune’s poisoned water.

Although the drinking water contamination, which is the subject of this hearing,

happened decades ago—the victims of that contamination continue to suffer both

physically and emotionally.

They suffer the ill effects of exposure to the toxic water; they suffer watching their

babies get sick and die; they suffer waiting decades for scientific studies; and they

suffer from the apparent mean spirit, penny-pinching, and indifference of their formerly revered commands, the U.S. Marine Corps and Department of Navy.

It is hard to believe, also, that to this day, former Marines and their families have

not been notified that the water they drank at Camp Lejeune was carcinogenic—

a fact that our Government has known for decades.

Indeed, the members of our first panel—retired Master Gunnery Sergeant Jerry

Ensminger, Dr. Michael Gros, and Mr. Jeff Byron—each served at Camp Lejeune

and, along with their families, consumed the poisoned water for years, but they did

not learn of the contamination until 1997, 1999, and 2000, respectively. Each has

a story of tragedy and courage to share with us, and I deeply appreciate their appearance before us today.

I welcome also agency representatives from the Environmental Protection Agency

and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry who will help answer

some of the tough questions about what may be one of the largest contaminated

water cases in our country’s history.

In particular, I want to welcome Special Agent Tyler Amon of the EPA’s Criminal

Investigations Division who single-handedly conducted an extensive criminal investigation of this matter. His work offers insight into this tragedy and exemplifies the

excellent work CID can do if allowed to do its job.

Almost 20 years ago, I sponsored the legislation that provided EPA criminal investigators with law enforcement powers so they could more effectively carry out

their duties. Unfortunately, in the course of conducting our inquiry, we have learned

that CID may not have the resources or leadership to do its job. As you recall, the

Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 required a dramatic increase in the number of

31

EPA agents assigned to CID. A dozen years after this requirement took effect; EPA

still has not met this requirement.

In addition, I am concerned that of those CID agents who are supposed to be conducting important environmental crimes investigations, a large number of them are

being used as drivers and personal bodyguards for the Administrator or assigned

to do homeland security work that appears duplicative of what the FBI is already

doing.

These are but a few of the things we are hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I hope you

will consider looking further into this matter. Otherwise, this may be the last time

we see such excellent work coming from agents such as Mr. Amon.

Finally, I welcome our distinguished Department of Navy and Marine Corps officials. I sincerely hope these officials can explain some of the very troubling evidence

that this committee has reviewed:

• Evidence that the Navy balked at funding health impact studies—despite statutory requirements that Department of Defense fund such studies;

• Evidence that the Marine Corps delayed initiating these studies over concerns

about bad publicity;

• Evidence that the Marine Corps repeatedly failed to produce documents necessary for the health impact studies; and

• Evidence that the Navy failed for years to close down a contaminated drinking

water system despite knowledge of contamination.

The Marine Corps takes great pride in its maxim, ‘‘Marines take care of their

own.’’ But if this principle is to be anything but an empty slogan, the Corps needs

to do more to notify all former Lejeune residents of their possible exposure and provide prompt and adequate medical coverage to them and their families.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your recognition.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. Ms. Solis, opening statement.

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to be here with you. I want to commend you for having this

hearing. I recall very vividly the last time we had our witnesses

that are here today speak to us. And at that time, I felt it was a

very compelling argument for us as a committee to delve into why

it is that DoD and EPA have not really been held accountable and

been more transparent in their deliberations. And thank goodness

that we have a new direction now, and we are trying to take hold

of this discussion and debate and trying to get to the real facts

about what is happening.

I have a bill that’s looking at perchlorate water contamination,

which is due to rocket fuel, a little different from what you are discussing here today, but nevertheless again the DoD has failed to

work in cooperation with EPA to really get at why this is happening, to provide cleanup funds, and to make sure that families, first

and foremost, are taken care of. I know that you have very compelling information that we have heard before and that you have restated here, and I just thank you for being here. And as our chairman of our committee says, Mr. Dingell, we will get to the bottom

of this. So thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Inslee, I take it you are waiving your open?

Mr. INSLEE. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. I thank all members, and I realize we will go back

and forth. We will begin questioning of 5 minutes each. I will begin

the questioning. Mr. Ensminger, in your written testimony, you

state that a Special Agent Tyler Amon informed you that he had

recommended charges against certain individuals based on the

EPA’s criminal investigation regarding water contamination at

Camp Lejeune. Can you elaborate further on that?

32

Mr. ENSMINGER. It was during a telephone conversation with the

agent several weeks ago. And I asked him about these certain instances that we have discovered in these documents where either

these people had identified the fact that ATSDR had been provided

this incorrect data and had never done anything to correct it. If

this had been an accident, I asked him, then why didn’t they voluntarily correct it? Why did they continue to just allow this to go on?

What these people did, the Marine Corps, they have a Web site,

and they have a chronology on that Web site. What they did was

very quietly make a new entry on their chronology which corrected

the error and never notified the investigating agency, which was

ATSDR. And I asked the agent about that. And then I found emails from 1999, where a local media outlet in eastern North Carolina, channel 12, was doing a story, a three-part story covering the

water contamination on the base.

The public affairs officer, a Major Scott Jack, made the reporter

submit his questions in writing. There was five of them. And then

the major worked up answers for those questions and then he

shotgunned them around to several different people aboard the

base that were involved in this. One of them was a Mr. Scott Brewer, who worked at Camp Lejeune’s environmental management department. The major sent these questions with his answers around

at 7:09 a.m. in the morning. By 12-something p.m. he received an

e-mail back from Mr. Scott Brewer, which took the answer to question No. 3 which the public affairs officer had the truthful answer

to, where he stated that the Tarawa Terrace water system remained in operation until March 1987. Mr. Brewer completely

changed his answer and said that two contaminated wells at

Tarawa Terrace were taken off line, and since that time, Tarawa

Terrace has been provided their drinking water from the Holcomb

Boulevard water system.

And I asked the agent, I said this was no accident. I said this

was deliberate. This man took the truth and turned it into a lie.

I said and that’s not a crime? And he said, hey, Jerry, he said, I

didn’t say I didn’t recommend any criminal charges. And he said

but it was deemed by the Department of Justice that the charges

that I did recommend could not be successfully prosecuted in Federal court, so they were dropped.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you ever receive any notification from the Marine Corps about the water at Tarawa Terrace? That is where you

were living, right?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Sir?

Mr. STUPAK. You were living at Tarawa Terrace?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. I think Dr. Gros said 1999, Mr. Byron said 2000.

Did you ever receive any notification?

Mr. ENSMINGER. No, sir. I was not there at that time. I was gone.

Mr. STUPAK. But after that, they didn’t follow you? You were in

the Marine Corps for 24 years, Right?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Yes, sir. No. I never got anything.

Dr. GROS. I don’t recall ever receiving anything.

Mr. STUPAK. You never received anything? Your son was part of

a study in 1999?

33

Dr. GROS. I was notified in 1999, but we lived there from ’88

through, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Notified of your son being the subject of the study?

Dr. GROS. Correct.

Mr. STUPAK. No information that place you lived in at Camp

Lejeune was being investigated for contamination?

Dr. GROS. That was the first time I heard of that.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Byron, yours was 2000?

Mr. BYRON. Sir, I was there until June 1985, and supposedly a

letter had come out from the base commander——

Mr. STUPAK. In 1985?

Mr. BYRON. Yes, sir, to the residents of Tarawa Terrace. But my

daughter was being born with multiple birth defects at the exact

same time, so I don’t remember getting that. The way I found out

about that document was through the Freedom of Information Act.

And that was after 2000. That is the first time.

Mr. STUPAK. So 2000?

Mr. BYRON. 2000 was the first time.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Gros, your disability is based upon your service

to the military?

Dr. GROS. Based upon my military service and my disease.

Mr. STUPAK. But yet you are not included in any study?

Dr. GROS. No.

Mr. STUPAK. So that they will put you on a disability based upon

drinking the water at Camp Lejeune, but they won’t include you

in the study determining the health effects of the water at Camp

Lejeune?

Dr. GROS. That seems correct.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. My time is up. We may come back for another

round of questioning. I turn to Mr. Whitfield for questioning.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I want to thank all three of you for taking time

to be with us today on this important issue. And your testimony

was certainly quite moving. And I noticed that in the 2003 report,

the ATSDR stated that they determined that exposure to volatile

organic compounds in on-base drinking water was unlikely to result in cancer and non-cancer health effects in adults. Now Dr.

Gros, of course you went to medical school. And are you familiar

with that 2003 report of ATSDR?

Dr. GROS. I recall reading that, and at the time I could not believe that when I read that sentence.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And Mr. Byron, had you read that report?

Mr. BYRON. Yes, I have read that report, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And Mr. Ensminger, you read that as well?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Yes, sir. ATSDR, the people at the Department

of Health Assessments and Consultations, if the committee would

just take some time and pull a bunch of the Public Health Assessments that have been done by ATSDR where these very same

chemicals were identified, it is the same wording every time. Only

it is changed around, modified a little bit. But it always has the

same meaning. No harm, no foul. And the way these people act,

you would think they would be serving this stuff on the drink bar

at McDonald’s.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes. Mr. Ensminger, in your testimony you had

mentioned specifically that DoD had been notified by three sepaVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
34

rate laboratories of the problems with the drinking water at Camp

Lejeune. Do you remember the time frame of those lab reports that

were given to DoD?

Mr. ENSMINGER. LANTDIV, which is the Atlantic Division of the

Naval Facilities Engineers out of Norfolk, came down and did a

composite water sample on 1 October 1980. The composite water

sample was water from eight different systems combined into one

sample. And they sent that off to an analytical laboratory. The results of those samples, with six clean systems included in it, exceeded the standards for today for some of the VOCs. That was

one. Second, the U.S. Army’s Environmental Hygiene Team had

been brought to Camp Lejeune to start testing the water for the

TTHMs, which had come into effect, the standards for them.

They identified multiple times and told Camp Lejeune how to

test for this stuff, which was with the gas chronometer, mass spectrometer system, the GCMS, told them repeatedly they needed to

test for organic hydrocarbons, chlorinated hydrocarbons. Finally,

the laboratory chief wrote it in parentheses, solvents, with exclamation points. And then in 1982 Grainger Laboratories from Raleigh, North Carolina, a State-certified laboratory, the very same

people that wrote the letter on 10 August 1982 to the commanding

general, stating that this stuff was more important from a health

standpoint than what they had sent the water in to be tested for.

They did nothing. And on the Marine Corps chronology these people say, well, we knew we had NACIP, which was a program to

identify contaminants. They said, well, since we knew they were

coming, we pondered this thing for a year-and-a-half, mind you,

how we were going to take care of this.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. So it has been documented that there were

at least three labs that gave them specific information about a

problem with the drinking water. And the first one was October 1,

1980, and then the last was 1982, and then somewhere in-between?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Well, the Grainger Laboratory, there are multiple analytical results after 1982 all the way through, up through

1984 that identify these chemicals and the presence in the water,

and each time they found them they annotated it.

Mr. WHITFIELD. My point is as early as 1980 they were aware

or should have been aware.

Mr. ENSMINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And what years did you live at Camp Lejeune.

Mr. ENSMINGER. I lived at Camp Lejeune multiple times, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. When Janey was born.

Mr. ENSMINGER. From 1973 through 1975 my wife spent her first

trimester of the pregnancy with Janey at Tarawa Terrace. And

then I was at the time in drill instructor school at Parris Island.

When I finished DI School, I was transferred, and we left there December 20, 1975.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And Dr. Gros, what years were you there?

Dr. GROS. July 1980 to July 1983.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And Mr. Byron?

Mr. BYRON. I was there approximately February 1982 to June

1985.

35

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. And you had mentioned, Mr. Byron, in your

testimony that, at page 29, that the GAO did not present the document in its entirety.

Mr. BYRON. Yes, sir. I have the document right here.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Which document is that?

Mr. BYRON. That is the notice to residents of Tarawa Terrace. It

is kind of fuzzy, but it is definitely dated April 1985. It looks like

April 30. My daughter was born April 27, with birth defects, that

same year.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. And what was lacking in this notification?

Mr. BYRON. The actual what was missing was the body of the information that should have been provided to the residents. And

what they were more concerned with, like I said, I can read it to

you. It says, until, however, daily use consumption must be reduced significantly. You are the only ones who can make this happen.

I solicit your cooperation and assistance and implementation of

the following water use restrictions. Reduce domestic water use.

Don’t let water run while washing, shaving, brushing teeth, et

cetera. Wash clothes only when you have a full load. Flush toilets

only for sanitation purposes. And this is the one that I really am

concerned with, store cold water in refrigeration or for drinking. So

they want me to store poisoned water for my children to drink. But

they don’t spell out that—No. 1, it says that these are—they found

minute trace amounts of several organic chemicals. 1,580 parts per

billion is not minute or trace.

I take offense to that personally, because I lived there at the

time, and GAO tried to represent that it’s 158 parts per billion versus 1,580. And once I corrected that they also put that in their appendix still at 158 parts per billion. They didn’t do their homework.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Byron, if I may, I am going to have one of our

clerks grab that document from you, and we will make a copy so

we have it for our committee.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And my time has expired. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Inslee for questions?

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. Mr. Byron, what was the document,

what was the date of the document you were just reading?

Mr. BYRON. The document it looked to me——

The CLERK. April 30, 1985.

Mr. STUPAK. April 30, 1985.

Mr. INSLEE. In your view, speaking from your position, what

would you suggest should be a requirement for notification for people in those circumstances? Now you have told us essentially they

described this as quote, trace amounts, in the document they gave

a resident.

Mr. BYRON. Yes, sir. They also called it organic chemicals instead

of saying volatile organic chemicals. The word volatile would have

clued me in immediately if that document had showed up at my

home. And it probably would have clued me anyway, just the fact

that it said chemicals.

Mr. INSLEE. So what do you think should be our standards either

in the Marine Corps or Environmental Protection Agency or any

other——

36

Mr. BYRON. The standard at present is 5 parts per billion. So if

it exceeds 5 parts per billion, I believe governmental officials, military and civilian, should be held responsible for not notifying individuals. They went 15 years before a letter came to my house,

which looked like junk mail by the way. I have it here. The front

of this letter, this document it says nothing official from the Government on it.

Mr. INSLEE. What does it say?

Mr. BYRON. It says NORC, University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center, 3050 Finley Road, Downers Grove, IL, 60515.

Please forward. Address correction requested.

I only lived two places the whole time. It doesn’t say anything

about being an official document from the Government.

Mr. INSLEE. It seems to me that under these circumstances, the

Government ought to have some protocol of language it uses so

that a person will understand that there is an enhanced health

risk associated with this, something like either a higher health risk

or danger or toxic information enclosed or something to that effect.

Mr. BYRON. That would have helped.

Mr. INSLEE. Would that make sense to you?

Mr. BYRON. Yes, sir, it does. And that would have helped.

Mr. INSLEE. I hope that we are going to try to find the right

mechanism of doing that to have this not happen again. I have to

tell you this is so disturbing, after the Tillman incident to have this

continued failure is very disturbing. Yes.

Mr. ENSMINGER. Yes, Congressman, I have found discussions, internal e-mails at Camp Lejeune between Camp Lejeune and Headquarters Marine Corps where they systematically changed the

wording about these chemicals to volatile organic compounds to

make it sound better. They have been playing a game. I mean it

was a game of minimization.

Mr. INSLEE. Dr. Gros, you said that your disability is associated

with this, but you are not included in any of the studies. I just

can’t comprehend how that could happen. Do you have any explanation for it? Is it a glitch or is this programmatic failure or what?

Dr. GROS. Well, when we were facing the enormity, the financial

enormity of the transplant, losing my practice, we were looking at

every possible source of help we could find. I visited with my representative, Representative Kevin Brady at the time, and went

with a toxicologist and my wife. And we had prepared a dossier

and gave a presentation of what had happened. And he was impressed that this was a problem. He also saw the ATSDR documents, which had shown that they were admitting that the water

was highly contaminated. And he immediately expedited my trip to

the VA in Houston. And after that, I was declared 100 percent

service-connected disabled. I don’t know how that process comes

about. But I was certainly happy to have some help. And it has

been very useful for pharmacy items. However, some of the more

expensive things, the bone marrow transplant was refused by the

VA. And some of the more expensive items like photopheresis and

hemodialysis, I had to be dialized for 6 months for temporary renal

failure, and I still have chronic renal failure. That funding for that

has been very difficult to obtain. There is a real problem over there

with——

37

Mr. INSLEE. But with a medical background, how could you explain not being included in any of the screens, any of these studies?

Dr. GROS. That is a good question, Congressman. That’s why I

said when I saw that initial document, the health assessment in

1997, I just said oh, come on. I said this is a joke. I said just because you have thousands of people here that are going to be a little hard to find doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be studied.

Mr. INSLEE. I saw in one of your testimonies I was reading you

made reference to a movie, A Civil Action, another one was Erin

Brockovich, that came out about some similarities to this situation.

Dr. GROS. Right.

Mr. INSLEE. Do you have a concern that a concern about claims

has led to some poor judgments here along the way by the various

Government agencies or not?

Dr. GROS. Well, I definitely think so. It would seem that way.

When you inquire about this, apparently there is a lot of defensiveness. I know Jerry has done a lot more of this inquiry than I have.

I have been busy being sick and trying to get well. I don’t have any

time to work on the Base Commission at Camp Lejeune, and I

don’t live there, so Jerry could probably answer that question better than I can.

Mr. ENSMINGER. There are several e-mails, internal e-mails

where they are discussing liability. And it was if not the No. 1 driving force behind the deceit——

Mr. INSLEE. We just hope these agencies will be more concerned

about your health than the claims prospects. We hope that will

start. And we will try to do what we can. Gentlemen, thank you

for your continued service to the country. You are doing it today.

And we thank you for your many years of service. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank the gentleman. Do you have that chart back

up there, Jerry? Mr. Inslee, I don’t know if you were here when we

introduced it earlier in the opening testimony there. It shows the

different levels. You mentioned Woburn and Erin Brockovich. It is

267. It is 18,000 at some point at Camp——

Mr. BYRON. May I make a statement there?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. BYRON. According to the GAO report, on table 3, where they

are listing the levels of toxicity at Hadnot Point, I don’t see 18,000

there. And that says February 7. And these readings are from the

4th and the 8th of February of the same year.

So I can’t understand why GAO is reluctantly—by the way, this

is the same table that they had 1,580 parts was listed at 158 during the draft report. So I gave them a copy of the document that

shows the levels of toxicity, and 18,000 is not on there I see. And

here is another thing concerning the GAO report. I don’t understand why it wasn’t possible to scan the original documents and

show them in their true form so that members of Congress can

make their own judgment, instead of having GAO try to convince

them that there was some low levels of toxicity.

There are several places where footnotes are stated that the detection limit for the instrument used to analyze the samples was

10 parts per billion. Well, sir, that is not on that document. And

every table that they show says that. And I challenge them to show

me, other than one document, the Jennings document, which by

38

the way they took out the detection limit column to where you

could tell whether or not on your own and didn’t need them to tell

you how to read it, but this concerns me that they did not show

the original documents in their original form.

And all these documents that I have in front of me were from

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and indicate high levels of toxicity. Yet when GAO shows their report, they are only interested

in showing you those documents that show lower levels. And they

even have levels of toxicity missing in their tables. So my personal

opinion is that the Marine Corps Headquarters, whoever gave them

the information, has tried to perpetrate a fraud here. And that, in

my estimation, is criminal, because the American taxpayer is paying for the money for this report to Congress, and it should be accurate and concise, and not full of conjecture with legal ramblings

on it looks to me to be a document that they might present in a

legal matter later. And that is how it has been presented.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Byron, if I may, the document we noticed to

residents of Tarawa Terrace——

Mr. BYRON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. On the bottom there is handwriting. We want to put

it in as hard part of the record. But at the bottom here, there is

handwriting that says ‘‘suggested no adverse effect. Recommended

levels.’’ is that your handwriting?

Mr. BYRON. No, sir, that is not, but I do have a document that

refers to that.

Mr. STUPAK. I know. I just wanted to know if it was your handwriting.

Mr. BYRON. That is not my handwriting, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection, we will have this document of

April 30th, 1985, be made part of the record. Thank you. I have

to go to Mr. Walden here, and we can come back. Mr. Walden for

questions.

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman I want to thank our witnesses today, and all of you for coming forward. I know it is difficult from every perspective. I can’t imagine, begin to imagine

what you all have been through. But it is our job to make sure it

doesn’t happen again to anybody else. And those who are going

through this elsewhere we need to help as well. My understanding,

Mr. Byron, and we will get at this issue you have raised, because

I have some datapoint issues of my own, is that the Marines did

give the GAO all the information. Whether GAO chose to use it or

not is a question we are going to get to. And that that 18,000 figure

actually was apparently a sample taken after the well was closed.

So we will get into all that, because I am concerned about some of

the data as well.

Our staff followed up on some of the lists, and maybe we can put

that chart up for a moment. There is an attachment that goes

through various readings at the various facilities over the years.

And when we probed to find out which were the worst cases we got

this response back, indicating that of the top five that we were

looking at. We came back and said, well, actually three of the

datapoint sets were wrong for various reasons and two are correct.

So it brings into, at least for this member of Congress, that the

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39

ing at originally. I am concerned, too. They are doing a epidemiological study here, right? What happened at Camp Lejeune?

Dr. GROS. Just in utero.

Mr. BYRON. Children in utero.

Mr. WALDEN. OK. And in stereo apparently there. And I guess

the question I am going to have for the military later is given the

extraordinary and awful circumstances you all have been through

with yourselves and your children, are they doing epidemiological

studies elsewhere?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Where?

Mr. WALDEN. At sites with contamination?

Mr. ENSMINGER. You mean at other sites?

Mr. WALDEN. Yes.

Mr. ENSMINGER. Not on adults, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. Adults or children. On anybody. Do any of you

know?

Mr. ENSMINGER. As far as I know, and like I said before, every

Public Health Assessment that I have seen come out of the Department of Health Assessments and Consultations at ATSDR, the

wording is different, but it always means the same. No harm, no

foul.

They don’t hurt adults.

Mr. WALDEN. They do the health assessments, but I am talking

about the epidemiological.

Mr. ENSMINGER. Sir, if DHAC kills the thing in the Public

Health Assessment no studies get done. It is a dead issue at that

point.

Mr. WALDEN. Literally.

Mr. ENSMINGER. Literally.

Mr. WALDEN. How does that make you feel?

Mr. ENSMINGER. Well, they constantly make the claim in there

that there is not enough studies to relate to—based on exposures

to these chemicals, but then in the next sentence they say, well,

we don’t recommend any study on this exposure either.

Mr. WALDEN. Dr. Gros?

Dr. GROS. Congressman, if I can make a statement, I am not an

epidemiologist, but it would seem to me that with the number of

people involved in this one incident that we could probably do a

pretty darn good study if the will is there to do it. But that is the

problem. As you had this incredible number of people that have

been exposed over these years, they dispersed because of the nature of military personnel. When they retired they leave, they go

all over the country and the world. But they still have Social Security numbers, they still pay taxes, I assume. They still are as

findable as I was. When they wanted to do the in-utero study on

my child they had no problem finding me. I was a phone call out

of the blue. I was amazed. So they have a way of finding you.

Mr. WALDEN. Sure they do.

Dr. GROS. So I don’t buy the argument that these people cannot

be found to do a look back study or to examine.

Mr. WALDEN. You think a look back given your professional.

Dr. GROS. At least to get some sort of information certainly.

Mr. WALDEN. One of the things that deeply concerns me is that

at Wurtsmith Air Force Base in October 1977, they first detected

40

TCE in the drinking water. And I am told that officials immediately took steps to identify the contaminated wells, and within 1

month began closing the contaminated wells. So by November

1977, they were closing the wells. Now contrast that with Camp

Lejeune, where significant drinking water contamination was discovered in 1980 and 1982, but officials waited years before they

identified the contaminated wells, and then closed them down in

1985.

Any of you, in all of your research, and obviously Mr. Ensminger,

you have done incredible research, and we appreciate you bringing

that to us and to the public, can you explain why the Air Force

acted in a matter of a month and the Navy——

Mr. ENSMINGER. Sir, even the Department of the Navy did the

same thing at another site. There was Warminster Naval Air Development Center outside of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 1979 they

identified these same chemicals in water supply wells at that facility. They took them off line immediately. But we must have two

different Departments of Navy and two different standards somewhere in the mix here.

Mr. WALDEN. What was the EPA standard at that time for these

chemicals in drinking water? What did they say was safe or unsafe?

Mr. ENSMINGER. They had SNARL, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. Which means——

Mr. ENSMINGER. The GAO report stated that Camp Lejeune officials stated that the contaminant levels in the drinking water at

the main part of the base had not exceeded the SNARLs at that

time. They did, however, exceed the SNARLs at Tarawa Terrace for

PCE. The GAO said they never exceeded the SNARLs. I have a

memorandum written in August 1982 by the base quality control

chemist, Ms. Elizabeth Betz, that states right there in paragraph

8.

Mr. WALDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENSMINGER. Well 651 tested 3,400 parts per billion of TCE

in the samples that were pulled on 16 January 1985. They didn’t

get them back until 4 February. And the 4 February sample—when

they closed the well on the 4th of February, they pulled another

sample that day, and the well was running, and it tested—they got

the results back for that on the 7th of February. And it was 18,900

parts per billion of TCE, 8,070 per billion of DCE, 400 parts per

billion of PCE, and 633 parts per billion of vinyl chloride. And, sir,

this one well caused the levels of finished drinking water on that

base, where they were pulling samples because of the fuel that had

gotten in there, to exceed 1,000 parts per billion at the tap at an

elementary school. One well. They had already pulled seven wells

off line previously.

Only God knows what levels were in that water when three or

four of these contaminated wells were pumping at the same time

in conjunction with well 651. The highest recorded levels that had

been found were 1,400 parts per billion.

Mr. BYRON. May I make a statement? I have the document that

Jerry has alluded to, August, 1982. And on paragraph 5 if says

tetrachloroethylene at high doses——

41

Mr. STUPAK. Exhibit No. 6 in that book, if anyone cares to look.

It is exhibit No. 6.

Mr. BYRON. Tetrachloroethylene in high doses has been reported

to produce liver and kidney damage and central nervous system

disturbances in human beings. EPA SNARLs for

tetrachloroethylene is 2,300 parts per billion for one day, 175 parts

per billion for 10 days, and 20 parts per billion for long-term exposure. Where I was living was 1,580 parts per billion PCE exposure

at the time. And they tried to say through the GAO report that the

individuals and environmental department at Marine Corps Base

Camp Lejeune were not educated enough and were not informed

enough by LANTDIV and NACIP. And I consider this a fraud. I

don’t believe that. I believe they were well notified. This document

from the chemist at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune shows that

they were well notified. And I think the GAO, like I said, is biased.

Mr. STUPAK. No other questions?

Mr. WALDEN. My time has expired.

Mr. STUPAK. Your time has expired, but go ahead.

Mr. ENSMINGER. You had asked earlier about standards and different standards. Sir, I found the BMID instruction, which is dated

25 August, 1972. And the subject is standards for potable water.

I would like to point out to the Congressman subparagraph E of

paragraph 5, where it outlines pollution. Now this is the Navy’s

own standard. As pollution as used in these standards means the

presence of any foreign substance. And then in parentheses it says

organic, inorganic, radiological or biological in water which tends to

degrade its quality so as to constitute a hazard or impair the usefulness of the water. That was in 1972.

Mr. STUPAK. That is document No. 20 in the book, Mr. Gros, if

you are looking for it. Let me ask this question, if I may. Mr.

Byron, any of your children apply for disability?

Mr. BYRON. Through the VA, sir?

Mr. STUPAK. Yes.

Mr. BYRON. No, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Any suggestions——

Mr. BYRON. On previous trips to Washington I have been to the

Veterans Administration and spoke to Assistant Director Mark

Brown, and he had advised me that before the Veterans Administration could get involved that it would have to go through the

Armed Services Committee, and be basically giving them permission to take care of these individuals. And I am aware of no legislation at present that allows for that.

Mr. STUPAK. There are 853 claims, I believe, being made. Are

your children involved in any of those claims?

Mr. BYRON. My children are involved in those claims, yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. They are?

Mr. BYRON. Yes, sir. Because I feel that the Marine Corps is negligent and responsible.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. You said in your testimony, your daughter

went to 57 visits in 30 months?

Mr. BYRON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Did they ever refer her off base to a children’s hospital or——

42

Mr. BYRON. No, sir, they didn’t, but they did take blood tests.

And after I was identified as a family—my one child to be part of

the study—we got our medical records. And I had to ask for copies

of my medical records before I left the Marine Corps, because my

one daughter had been seen so many times.

So I am a very fortunate one of very few that has their medical

records, because the base has said that many of those records were

destroyed in storage somehow. But she was seen 57 times, and we

were never recommended outside of base. But levels of her hemoglobin or whatever they check for were below the levels that were

listed on the form. And no one notified us and no one took action.

And 6 months later she came down with this bone marrow disease

called aplastic anemia, which is the opposite of what Jerry’s daughter has, but also to cure it requires a bone marrow transplant. Now

she went into remission, so she never did require that, but our

daughters also went through the bone testing that he is familiar

with and that his daughter was crying in his ear about. And ours

also experienced the same thing, where they took bone marrow

samples from her hip.

Mr. STUPAK. When you say your daughter was below the level,

you mean indicative of a problem?

Mr. BYRON. Of a problem, yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Not within the normal range.

Mr. BYRON. Not within the normal range, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Gros, you were a doctor there at the base. In

looking back now, was there any increased number of miscarriages

or anything that you noticed?

Dr. GROS. That is a frequent question. But I don’t know how to

answer it, because we didn’t have the big picture. We basically

were working in the forest, surrounded with the trees. 240 deliveries a month, busy, busy clinic. We didn’t have any inkling at the

time that there may have been that type of a problem. I don’t think

that anyone ever brought that up as an issue. The pediatrics department certainly didn’t alert us.

Mr. STUPAK. All the women there are basically child bearing

years, right?

Dr. GROS. Well, it is a very large population of young women,

that is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. And generally a healthy population.

Dr. GROS. Very healthy population. I would say that the incidence of abnormalities that you would frequently see with older

moms, moms over the age of 35—they don’t like to be called older

moms anymore—but how should we say the more experienced

mothers that have more kids, they tend to have a greater instance

of genetic abnormalities. And we didn’t see much of that in our

population. I really don’t think that it came out at the time. I think

the pediatrics statistics would probably be more telling than what

we saw as obstetricians.

Mr. STUPAK. But your medical records for these patients would

document it if there was a miscarriage, would it not?

Dr. GROS. Correct. There is a log kept. In labor and delivery,

usually most of the patients would have a D&C under sedation,

and just to make sure there weren’t any complications, and then

43

there was a record kept of that. So we should have that record. I

would think so anyway.

Mr. STUPAK. One would hope so.

Dr. GROS. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. You had a question, Mr. Walden?

Mr. WALDEN. No.

Mr. STUPAK. If not, I would like to thank this panel for their testimony. I know at times it has been very difficult. But without you,

I don’t think the story could get out about what we are trying to

do here, not just Camp Lejeune, but any places throughout this

country—DoD properties that have to be cleaned up. Mr.

Ensminger?

Mr. ENSMINGER. I would like to inform you of one other issue.

Well 651, which was the highest contaminated well at Hadnot

Point, was constructed in 1971 at the back corner of the base disposal yard. The back corner of the junk yard. And the Navy facilities engineers people did the site survey for the location and the

construction of that well. And that lot had been in operation for

some odd 30 years by that point.

Mr. BYRON. Sir, may I make one last comment also?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. BYRON. I was quite concerned by reading the GAO report to

find out that for the in-utero study for the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry they had found a comparison group of individuals at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune of 548 children. It

is my contention, and I believe everyone here, that those individuals were more than likely exposed because of their connection to

the base. If they lived around the base and were military personnel, they went on base. If the women were pregnant at the time

and drank from the water fountain, they were exposed in the first

trimester. So birth defects and so forth might show up.

What disturbs me is that after being on the Citizens Advisory

Panel of the Agency for Toxic Substances for 2 years that I had no

idea that they had a comparison group until I read the GAO report.

I don’t know why that has occurred, and I think that should be a

question asked by individuals of the ATSDR. But it does not lend

itself to transparency. And in this case that is the most important

thing, that we be able to determine that what is being told to us

is the truth. And the reason that we are here is to stop this from

happening at any other bases in the future. So thank you very

much.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. This panel is dismissed. Thank you,

gentlemen.

I will call up our next panel, Major General Robert Dickerson,

Jr., Commanding General at Camp Lejeune; Ms. Kelly Dreyer, Environmental Restoration Program Manager at the U.S. Marine

Corps Headquarters; Ms. Pat Leonard, Director of the Office of

Judge Advocate General, Claims Investigation and Tort Litigation;

Mr. Thomas Sinks, Deputy Director of the National Center of Environmental Health, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ATSDR; and Frank Bove, senior epidemiologist at ATSDR;

and Morris Maslia, environmental engineer at ATSDR. Would you

all come forward, please?

44

As you know, it is the policy of the subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right

to be, under the rules of the House, to be advised by counsel during

their testimony. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel?

If so, we need the name of your counsel. General? Anyone? No? Everyone’s indicating no. So while you rise, I ask you to raise your

right-hand, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect everyone has answered affirmatively as to the oath. They are now under oath. And we will begin

with opening statements. We will start to my left. General

Dickerson, please.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT DICKERSON, JR.,

COMMANDING GENERAL, CAMP LEJEUNE

General DICKERSON. Mr. Stupak and distinguished members of

the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before

you and participate in this hearing regarding past contamination

of two of Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune’s drinking water systems. We are here today because the health and welfare of our Marines and their families remains a top priority. We continue to support and fully cooperate with the Agency for Toxic Substance and

Disease Registry to determine if contaminated water aboard our installation harmed Marines and their families. In 1982 and 1983,

two of Camp Lejeune’s eight public drinking water systems were

determined to be contaminated by two chemicals, trichloroethylene,

TCE, and perchloroethylene, PCE, also known as

tetrachloroethylene, commonly found in degreasing agents and dry

cleaning solvents.

At the time, no environmental standards or regulations in regard

to the use and disposal of TCE or PCE were in place. In fact, initial

regulation of these volatile organic compounds under the Safe

Drinking Water Act began in 1987 and 1991, respectively. Volatile

organic compounds were first discovered in the Camp Lejeune

drinking water in 1980, while a Navy contractor was conducting

tests for trihalomethanes. It was determined that an interference

chemical was present in the water at the treatment plant and tap.

However, the type of chemical or source was unknown.

Base personnel continued to sample the water over the next several years, utilizing various laboratories. Sampling results varied,

calling into question the validity of the test. In 1982, TCE and PCE

were determined to be the interference chemicals, and in late 1984,

the groundwater was determined to be the source. As data on individual wells was received, impacted wells were removed from service. In total, 10 drinking water wells aboard the installation were

immediately removed from service. Subsequent investigation by the

State of North Carolina revealed leaks from an off base dry cleaner

had contaminated the wells near the Tarawa Terrace housing area,

while on base sources contributed to the contamination of the

Hadnot Point water systems. This unfortunate situation happened

over 20 years ago. And while there are still large gaps of knowledge on potential health implications due to exposure to TCE or

PCE today, these gaps were even greater back in the 1980’s. What

the Nation accepted as environmental standards and regulations

45

20 years ago has drastically changed as a result of scientific knowledge and awareness. Camp Lejeune has been investigated by the

Environmental Protection Agency’s Criminal Investigative Division

and the General Accountability Office. Both investigating agencies

reported that Camp Lejeune’s response to the contamination was

appropriate at that time and consistent with existing environmental standards and regulations. Additionally, the Commandant

of the Marine Corps chartered his own expert panel to look at past

activities, which also concluded appropriate actions were taken

based upon the guidance and information provided by Federal

agencies. We have relied on the expertise of ATSDR to determine

whether or not the past contaminated water on our installation

harmed our Marines and their families.

Although we are not part of the design or implementation of the

ATSDR survey or study, we remain committed and fully support

their efforts. Full access to personnel, infrastructure, installations

and requested documentation was granted to ATSDR from the

start and will be available for the duration of their study. Additionally, we act as a liaison with Federal and State agencies to insure

ATSDR obtains all resources necessary to move forward with their

work, ultimately bringing us one step closer to an answer.

In order to educate and communicate with family members and

Marines that may have been exposed to the contaminated water,

a robust communications campaign was initiated to encourage participation in the ATSDR survey. An official Web site regarding the

Camp Lejeune water was developed with frequently asked questions, maps, press releases and advisories, as well as contact numbers and links for additional information. This Web site is currently in the process of being updated. To help better understand

public exposure to TCE and PCE from drinking water and any potential health effects, the Marine Corps is funding a new effort by

the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of all medical and scientific information available on the link between TCE and PCE exposure via drinking

water and adverse health effects.

Ultimately, everyone is here today for the same reason, to determine whether or not our Marines and their families were harmed

in any way by contaminated water. We fully complied with environmental laws and regulations, and we remain committed to

working with ATSDR and other Federal agencies involved with the

study. We must rely on the experts for the answers. We are pleased

to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, General. Ms. Dreyer.

STATEMENT OF KELLY DREYER, ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM MANAGER, U.S. MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

Ms. DREYER. Chairman Stupak, Congressman Whitfield, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and participate in this hearing regarding past contamination in two of Marine Corps Base Camp

Lejeune’s drinking water systems. My name is Kelly Dreyer, and

I am an environmental engineer, and the Installation Restoration

Program Manager At Headquarters Marine Corps. As the InstallaVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
46

tion Restoration Program Manager, my job is to establish Marine

Corps policy and guidance on cleanup issues across the Marine

Corps. In addition, I serve as a liaison between the Marine Corps

and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, which executes

the cleanup program for the Navy and the Marine Corps, as well

as other agencies involved in the cleanup program, particularly

when issues cannot be resolved at an installation level. As General

Dickerson stated, the health and welfare of our Marines and their

families is very important to the Marine Corps. As part of the

cleanup program, all military installations on the National Priorities List of Hazardous Waste Sites, including Camp Lejeune,

which was listed in 1989, undergo a Public Health Assessment conducted by the Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease Registry,

ATSDR, to determine if there are any current or past health concerns resulting from past practices.

My significant involvement in the Camp Lejeune past water

issue began in 1997, when the Public Health Assessment for Camp

Lejeune was being completed by ATSDR. The Public Health Assessment concluded that adverse health effects as a result of the

impacted water were unlikely in adults, but recommended a follow

on study of children in the womb, the most susceptible population

to the potential chemical impacts. At that time I participated in

meetings between health scientists and the Department of Navy

and ATSDR about how such a study might be designed. In 1999,

the health study began as a survey to determine whether or not

a statistically significant study population could be reached for a

case control study.

In 2000, ATSDR requested assistance from the Marine Corps to

reach additional participants for the survey. At that time, the number of participants was approximately 6,500. ATSDR needed over

12,000 for a statistically valid study. Over the next year, I worked

with our Headquarters Marine Corps and Department of Defense

offices to develop and implement a communications strategy, which

included two administrative messages to all Marines, press releases to over 3,500 media outlets, searches of Marine Corps databases, and working with the Department of Defense Privacy Office

to enable the release of manpower information to ATSDR. As a result of this effort, ATSDR closed the survey in January 2002, after

reaching 12,598 participants. Since that time, I have been working

with Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune to provide information requested by ATSDR for their water model and study activities. Although ATSDR has had full access to all information, sometimes

such information is difficult to locate due to the fact that the

records requested are over 20 years old and may have been destroyed or because offices have moved around the base.

The Marine Corps recently hired a contractor to perform a comprehensive search of Camp Lejeune to provide a better confidence

level that all relevant documents have been found. ATSDR has

been provided access to all documents that were found during this

search. In addition, we have been working with agencies outside of

the Marine Corps to ask them to provide information that is under

their control. I have personally spoken with numerous people who

feel they may have been harmed by the impacted water. Their stories are emotionally compelling. That is one of the reasons why we

47

continue to support and fully cooperate with ATSDR. We have

funded the National Academies of Sciences study because we all

have a common goal, to determine if the Camp Lejeune drinking

water harmed any of our Marines or their families. I am also

pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of General Dickerson and Ms. Dreyer

follows:]

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT DICKERSON AND KELLY DREYER

Chairman Stupak, Congressman Whitfield, distinguished members of the subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and participate in

this hearing regarding past contamination of two of Marine Corps Base Camp

Lejeune’s drinking water systems. We are here today because the health and welfare of our Marines and their families remains a top priority. We continue to support and fully cooperate with the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry

to determine if contaminated water aboard our installation harmed Marines and our

families.

In 1982 and 1983, two of Camp Lejeune’s eight public drinking water systems

were determined to be contaminated by two chemicals—trichloroethylene (TCE) and

perchlorethylene (PCE; also known as tetrachloroethylene)—commonly found in

degreasing agents and dry cleaning solvents. At the time, no environmental standards or regulations in regards to the use and disposal of TCE or PCE were in place.

In fact, initial regulation of these volatile organic compounds under the Safe Drinking Water Act began in 1987 and 1991 respectively.

Volatile Organic Compounds were first discovered in the Camp Lejeune drinking

water in 1980, while a Navy contractor was conducting tests for trihalomethanes.

It was determined that an interference chemical was present in the water at the

treatment plant and tap; however, the type of chemical or source was unknown.

Base personnel continued to sample the water over the next several years, utilizing

various laboratories; sampling results varied, calling into question the validity of the

tests. In 1982, TCE and PCE were determined to be the interference chemicals, and

in late 1984, the groundwater was determined to be the source. As data on individual wells was received, impacted wells were removed from service. In total, 10

drinking water wells aboard the installation were immediately removed from service. Subsequent investigation by the State of North Carolina revealed leaks from an

off-base dry cleaner had contaminated the wells near the Tarawa Terrace housing

area, while on-base sources contributed to contamination of the Hadnot Point water

system.

This unfortunate situation happened over 20 years ago and while there are still

large gaps of knowledge on potential health implications due to exposure to TCE

or PCE today, these gaps were even greater back in the 1980s. What the Nation

accepted as environmental standards and regulations 20 years ago has drastically

changed as a result of scientific knowledge and awareness.

Camp Lejeune has been investigated by the Environmental Protection Agency’s

Criminal Investigation Division and the General Accountability Office. Both investigating agencies reported that Camp Lejeune’s response to the contamination was

appropriate at that time and consistent with existing environmental standards and

regulations. Additionally, the Commandant of the Marine Corps chartered his own

expert panel to look at past activities which also concluded appropriate actions were

taken based on the guidance and information provided by Federal agencies.

We have relied on the expertise of ATSDR to determine whether or not the past

contaminated water on our installation harmed our Marines and their families. Although we are not part of the design or implementation of the ATSDR survey or

study, we remain committed and fully support their efforts. Full access to personnel,

infrastructure, installations and requested documentation was granted to ATSDR

from the start and will be available for the duration of their study. Additionally,

we act as a liaison with Federal and state agencies to ensure ATSDR obtains all

resources necessary to move forward with their work, ultimately bringing us one

step closer to an answer.

In order to educate and communicate with family members and Marines that may

have been exposed to the contaminated water, a robust communications campaign

was initiated to encourage participation in the ATSDR survey. An official Web site

regarding the Camp Lejeune Water was developed with frequently asked questions,

maps, press releases and advisories, as well as contact numbers and links for additional information. This Web site is currently in the process of being updated.

48

To help better understand public exposure to TCE and PCE from drinking water

and any potential health effects, the Marine Corps is funding a new effort by the

National Academy of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of

all medical and scientific information available on the link between TCE/PCE exposure via drinking water and adverse health effects.

Ultimately, everyone is here today for the same reason: to determine whether or

not our Marines and their families were harmed in any way by contaminated water.

We fully comply with environmental laws and regulations and we remain committed

to working with ATSDR and other Federal agencies involved with the study. We

must all rely on the experts for the answers.

We are pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Ms. Dreyer, I didn’t think you were going to do

an opening because you never submitted it to this committee. That

is fine, but I would like your opening statement. And I want to

make copies, so we have a chance to look at it, because I am glad

you did make an opening, because we have many questions for you.

Ms. Leonard, you want to give your opening statement?

STATEMENT OF PAT LEONARD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF JUDGE

ADVOCATE GENERAL, CLAIMS, INVESTIGATION, AND TORT

LITIGATION

Ms. LEONARD. Good morning. I am Pat Leonard, and I am the

director of the Claims and Tort Litigation Division at the Office of

the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. I am here to answer your

questions about the administrative claims process under the Federal Tort Claims Act and how it relates to these claims. I know you

have a copy of my statement. I am not going to read that to you,

but I would like to offer some additional information for your consideration. As of this date, we have received a total of 853 claims

that allege either personal injury or death as a result of exposure

to contaminated drinking water while living or working on board

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. The majority of the claims are

from family members of former service members stationed at Camp

Lejeune.

Included in that total number are 115 claims from civilian employees who worked on board the base. My written statement describes the administrative claims process in more detail, but I

would just like to add that these claims involve some very complex

scientific and medical issues. It is the Navy’s intention to wait for

the ATSDR study to be completed in order to insure that we have

the best scientific research available so we may thoroughly evaluate each and every claim on its own merits. We truly believe this

approach is in the best interests of both the claimants and the Department of the Navy.

Mr. STUPAK. That is your conclusion? OK.

Ms. LEONARD. Yes, sir.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Leonard follows:]

STATEMENT OF PAT LEONARD

The Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Claims and

Tort Litigation Division (OJAG Code 15), has been designated by the Secretary of

the Navy as the office responsible for the adjudication of claims against the Navy

and Marine Corps filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), as well as various other claims statutes. OJAG Code 15 also provides support to the Department

of Justice (DoJ) and United States Attorneys for claims that result in litigation.

All claims alleging personal injury or death caused by contaminated drinking

water at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune must be evaluated under the legal requirements of the FTCA. The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for

49

claims against the Federal Government for personal injury, property damage, or

death caused by the negligence of a Federal employee acting within the scope of his

or her employment.

Administratively, the FTCA requires that a claimant first present a claim to the

Federal agency alleged to have caused the injury before he or she may file a lawsuit

against the United States.

• The claim must be presented in writing within 2 years after the claim ‘‘accrues’’

(i.e., knew or should reasonably have known they were injured as a result of government negligence) or the claim is forever barred. • The claimant must allow the Federal agency at least six months to adjudicate

the claim. • If the Federal agency does not pay or deny the claim within six months, the

claimant may file suit against the United States. Alternatively, the claimant may

also choose not to file suit and wait for the Federal agency to adjudicate the claim. • If the claim is denied by the Federal agency, the claimant must file suit within

6 months after the date of denial, or the suit is forever barred.

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), part of the Public Health Service, performed a Public Health Assessment pursuant to the requirements of CERCLA in 1997. ATSDR also conducted an Adverse Pregnancy Outcome

Health Study in 1998. Although this research indicated that no health problems

would be expected for adults, ATSDR could not rule out the possibility of an association between exposure to volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in drinking water at

Camp Lejeune and adverse pregnancy outcomes. ATSDR has continued its study of

former Camp Lejeune residents and is currently conducting an epidemiological

study of children focusing on childhood cancer and birth defects. We have been informed this study is on-track to be completed in 2008.

To fairly adjudicate all claims based on available and appropriate objective information, we have decided not to adjudicate the claims until the ATSDR completes

its study. Once completed, each claim will be independently adjudicated under the

legal requirements of the FTCA to determine its merit.

In the meantime, while the scientific study is being conducted, we have been compiling information as claims are submitted. Each claimant receives a letter requesting specific information, including their medical records, as well as a survey to help

ensure that we have all the information necessary for final adjudication.

The Navy’s FTCA settlement authority is $200,000 per claim. However, when

there are multiple claims arising from a single incident and payment will likely exceed the Navy’s settlement authority of $200,000 in the aggregate, the Department

of Justice must approve all settlements arising from the single incident. Therefore,

once the claims are adjudicated, the DoJ must approve any payment if recommended by the Navy.

Again, it is very important to us, as well as the claimants, that we thoroughly

analyze each and every claim utilizing the best scientific research available in order

to fairly adjudicate them.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Sinks, your opening statement, please.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS SINKS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, AGENCY

FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, ATSDR,

ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK BOVE, SENIOR EPIDEMIOLOGIST,

ATSDR, AND MORRIS MASLIA, ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER,

ATSDR

Mr. SINKS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the

subcommittee. I am Tom Sinks, Deputy Director of the Agency For

Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, or ATSDR. Dr. Frank Bove,

our senior epidemiologist on the Camp Lejeune investigation, is sitting text to me. And next to him is Morris Maslia, our senior water

system modeler. As a father of three young children, even though

I am 56, I have a 13-year old and 11-year old and a 4-year old, I

just wanted to comment on the moving and compelling testimony

of the earlier panel. And as someone who has seen their own

daughter go through medical procedures, I certainly understand

some of the pain and powerlessness you feel when your child is afVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
50

fected. Our current work at Camp Lejeune concerns selected birth

defects and childhood cancers, and we are also exploring the feasibility of additional studies, including adults.

Effective today, former Camp Lejeune Marines and their families

can find out their exposure levels to PCE by visiting the ATSDR

Web site and entering the dates they lived in Tarawa Terrace housing. ATSDR is examining two Camp Lejeune drinking water systems that served family housing and were contaminated with PCE

or TCE between 1968 and 1985. A third system was not contaminated. The contaminated wells were shut down by 1985, several

years before the current EPA maximum contaminant levels were

established. Dr. Maslia’s models—from his models we are confident

that finished water from the Tarawa Terrace system was contaminated with PCE for roughly 30 years, beginning in 1957 and into

1987. The maximum simulated PCE concentrations in finished

water exceeded 180 parts per billion, or 36 times the 1992 MCL established by EPA.

There were approximately 83,000 people exposed to this water

from 1958 through 1985. Dr. Maslia has not finished his work on

the Hadnot Point system, which was contaminated primarily with

TCE. One tap water sample there measured 1,400 parts per billion,

but we know that levels in finished water ranged substantially.

There were approximately a thousand people exposed to Hadnot

Point water from 1958 through 1985 who lived there. The third

system supplied uncontaminated drinking water to families living

at Holcomb Boulevard. We now know that housing in Holcomb

Boulevard was built several years before the Holcomb Boulevard

water system came on line in June 1972.

As a result, approximately one-fifth of the 56,000 people living in

Holcomb Boulevard from 1968 through 1985 were likely exposed to

TCE from Hadnot Point water. This discovery will not, and I repeat, not, adversely impact the current study, nor will it cause us

to fail to include in the study any of the families or children who

we collected information on. It does require us to reanalyze the

completed study that has previously been published on adverse reproductive outcomes. That reanalysis will not begin until the current study is completed. In the meantime, we have placed an erratum notice on the ATSDR Web site and notified the journal that

published the study of the error.

Camp Lejeune is unique for conducting a epidemiologic study of

this type. The concentrations of TCE and PCE in the finished

drinking water are extremely high. Thousands of people living in

family housing were exposed to high levels of TCE or PCE. And importantly, thousands of others were unexposed. Our studies were

intended to focus on the most vulnerable population, the unborn

child. And we also had computerized birth certificates of over

12,000 live births on base. Finally, housing records were available

that linked each family to TCE or PCE. We have contacted the parents of over 12,000 children who reported if their child was born

with a birth defect or developed a childhood cancer of interest. Our

team has confirmed the diagnosis of 57 of the 106 children who reported to us with conditions of interest. 42 additional children were

either confirmed not to have the condition, parents refused to participate, or no medical records were available. This work is difVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
51

ficult. We are trying to accurately reconstruct systems and events

as far back as 39 years ago. Nobody involved at the time could

have foreseen the work we are doing today. Our work requires

close collaboration with the affected families and individuals and

agencies across DoD. I believe there is a shared commitment to accomplish this difficult task. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sinks follows:]

STATEMENT OF THOMAS SINKS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to provide testimony on behalf of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)

regarding our activities at U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune (Camp Lejeune)

in North Carolina. I am Dr. Thomas Sinks, Deputy Director of ATSDR and of the

National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

I will briefly summarize ATSDR’s mission and general experience in addressing

trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE) at Superfund sites, including

contamination of drinking water sources and supplies. I then will focus on ATSDR’s

scientific activities in evaluating potential health effects of exposures to PCE and

TCE contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune, including conducting health

assessments and epidemiologic research, and convening panels to obtain input from

experts outside the Agency and from other persons concerned about potential health

effects of exposures at Camp Lejeune.

I must preface my remarks with an important point: Since ATSDR has not completed its current epidemiologic study, we have not yet determined whether there

is an association between exposure to contaminated water and certain birth defects

and cancers among children born between 1968 and 1985 to women who lived at

Camp Lejeune during some portion of their pregnancy. However, I will discuss findings that were released earlier today concerning contamination of the drinking

water supply at one of the three areas of family housing at the Base.

BACKGROUND

ATSDR is a statutorily created Operating Division within the Department of

Health and Human Services (HHS). Created by the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), more commonly

known as Superfund, ATSDR’s role complements those of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other Federal agencies under Superfund, by focusing on the

health of people and the communities in which they live. Our work is framed into

four functional areas: protecting the public from hazardous exposures, increasing

knowledge about toxic chemicals, delivering health education about toxic chemicals,

and maintaining health registries.

ATSDR is required by law to conduct a public health assessment (PHA) or its

equivalent at each site proposed or listed on EPA’s National Priorities List of hazardous waste sites. In a PHA, ATSDR evaluates releases of hazardous substances

into the environment to determine if people are being or have been exposed to hazardous substances and, if they are being exposed, whether those exposures are at

levels likely to be a health hazard. The PHAs also provide recommendations for

eliminating or reducing harmful exposures. A PHA may also identify factual or scientific data gaps and make recommendations for additional actions such as health

education, epidemiological health studies, disease registries, surveillance studies, or

research on specific hazardous substances.

Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, HHS and the

Department of Defense (DoD) are required to enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the manner in which ATSDR will carry out its responsibilities at DoD sites, and to establish a manner to transfer funds from DoD to

ATSDR to fund these activities. Under the MOU, ATSDR sends an Annual Plan of

Work to DoD each year, identifying planned work and funding needed for that work

for the coming year.

ATSDR’s primary health concern at Camp Lejeune involves potential exposure to

drinking-water supplies contaminated with two common volatile organic compounds

(VOCs): TCE and PCE. TCE is a colorless liquid which is used as a solvent for

cleaning metal parts. Occupational exposure to TCE may cause nervous system effects, kidney, liver and lung damage, abnormal heartbeat, coma, and possibly death.

Occupational exposure to TCE also has been associated with adult cancers such as

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52

ing water has been associated with childhood leukemia in two studies and with specific birth defects such as neural tube defects and oral clefts in one study.

PCE is a manufactured chemical used for dry cleaning and metal degreasing. Occupational exposure to PCE can cause dizziness, headaches, sleepiness, confusion,

nausea, difficulty in speaking and walking, unconsciousness, and death. Exposure

to PCE-contaminated drinking water has been linked with adult cancers such as

non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, leukemia, bladder cancer, and breast cancer.

Inhalation and ingestion are important routes of exposure for both TCE and PCE.

Both chemicals are listed in the 11th Report on Carcinogens from the National Toxicology Program as reasonably anticipated to be human carcinogens. The United

States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established Maximum Contaminant

Levels for drinking water of 5 parts per billion (ppb) for PCE in 1991 and for TCE

in 1987.

ATSDR has extensive experience related to TCE and PCE. The Agency has published Toxicological Profiles on both chemicals, and our Profile on TCE is included

in our Case Studies for Environmental Medicine, a series of self-instructional publications designed to increase primary care providers—knowledge of hazardous substances in the environment and to aid in the evaluation of potentially exposed patients.

CAMP LEJEUNE

Public Health Assessments: In 1989, the EPA placed U.S. Marine Corps Base

Camp Lejeune and ABC One-Hour Cleaners, which is located very close to the Base,

on its National Priorities List. Releases of chemicals from both the ABC One-Hour

Cleaners and activities at Camp Lejeune contributed to contamination of the water

supply system serving certain areas of housing at the Base. In August 1990, ATSDR

completed a PHA addressing contamination from the ABC One-Hour Cleaners. This

assessment found that PCE, detected in on-site and off-site wells, was the primary

contaminant of concern. In 1997, ATSDR completed a PHA for contamination from

the Camp Lejeune Base.

In these PHAs ATSDR determined that current conditions at the site did not

present a current health hazard because the contaminated wells were no longer in

use. However, ATSDR did identify three past public health hazards. Of those, the

one we are focused on currently is the contamination of drinking water systems

serving several areas of family housing on Base, referred to as Tarawa Terrace,

Hadnot Point, and Holcomb Boulevard. Tarawa Terrace was contaminated primarily

by PCE and Hadnot Point was contaminated primarily by TCE. ATSDR also reported that Holcomb Boulevard, the third major system, was not contaminated, except for during a two-week period in late January and early February 1985 when

the Holcomb Boulevard system was down for repairs and the area was served by

the Hadnot Point system.

In 1997, ATSDR concluded that likely exposures to PCE and TCE were significantly below levels shown to cause adverse health effects in animal and adult

human studies and therefore not expected to result in cancer or other health effects

in adults. However, because scientific data relating to the harmful effects of VOCs

on a child or a fetus were limited, ATSDR recommended conducting an epidemiological study to assess risk to infants and children from maternal exposure during

pregnancy to the VOC-contaminated drinking water.

Health Studies: Following up on the recommendations in the PHA, ATSDR has

undertaken two related epidemiologic studies, both of which focused on the health

of children born from 1968 through 1985 whose mothers were exposed to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune during their pregnancies. These dates were

selected because 1968 is the first year for which computerized birth certificates from

North Carolina are available, and in early 1985 contaminated water-supply wells

were removed from regular and continuous service.

First Study: ATSDR’s first study, completed in 1998, was based on information

collected from the birth certificates of 12,493 live births on base. Housing records

for families who lived on base were used to determine mother’s residence during

pregnancy and to assign VOC exposure categories based on our knowledge of contamination across the three drinking water systems. We identified an association

between women who drank PCE-contaminated drinking water from Tarawa Terrace

during pregnancy and their babies being born small for gestational age. This association was limited to those mothers older than 35 years of age or who had experienced two or more fetal losses. An additional finding was that baby boys born to

mothers who drank TCE-contaminated water from Hadnot Point were also more

likely than unexposed babies to be born small for gestational age.

53

Second Study: In its PHA ATSDR also identified as a priority the need to study

the relationship between maternal exposures to TCE and PCE and the occurrence

of several birth defects and childhood cancers, which would require information beyond that available in birth certificates. The current study began in the late 1990’s

and is ongoing. The study protocol for the study has been subjected to peer review

by scientific experts outside of the Agency. The two primary components of the current study are to identify and confirm particular birth defects and cancers and to

conduct water modeling to determine which housing units received contaminated

water during what time period and the level or concentration of the contaminated

water.

The study initially focused on neural tube defects (i.e., spina bifida and

anencephaly), cleft lip and cleft palate, major heart defects, choanal atresia, and two

forms of childhood cancers (all leukemias and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma). ATSDR

contacted the parents of 12,598 children born during the period 1968–1985 to mothers who resided at the base anytime during their pregnancy to confirm mother’s residence and determine if the child had one of the health conditions that are focused

on in the study. Parents reported 35 children with neural tube defects, 42 with cleft

lip and/or palate, 29 with leukemia or lymphoma, no children with choanal atresia,

and 3 with a major heart defect (this condition was dropped because of the small

number of possible case-children).

Since the initial phone interview, ATSDR has collected medical records to confirm

the diagnoses of the reported cases. Fifty-seven children confirmed as having a condition of interest include 17 children with a neural tube defect, 24 children with a

cleft lip or palate, and 16 children with leukemia or non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. An

additional 42 possible case children were either confirmed not to have the condition,—refused to participate, or had no available medical records. The status for

an—additional 7 children is still pending. As noted earlier, the information on birth

defects and cancer does not, by itself, tell us whether these conditions are associated

with exposure to contaminated water.

To obtain estimates of historical concentrations of PCE at Tarawa Terrace and

TCE at Hadnot Point, ATSDR is using water-modeling techniques and the process

referred to as historical reconstruction. ATSDR began these analyses in 2003. The

historical reconstruction process for Tarawa Terrace is complete. Water modeling activities for the other water system, the Hadnot Point system, are expected to be

completed later this year.

ATSDR’s goal is to estimate monthly levels of contaminants in these drinking

water systems from the early 1950’s until the contaminated wells were shut down

in 1985. The effort involves extensive information gathering (e.g., geohydrology,

sources of contamination, drinking water well locations and pumping rates, contaminant transport and degradation byproducts, and water distribution system). The

modeling effort also requires simulating the fate and transport of the contaminants

from the pollution sources through the soil and into the ground water, to the drinking water wells, and finally to the water treatment plant and water distribution system that provides the water to the family housing units. After the historical reconstruction of both water systems is complete, the information on birth defects and

cancers will be linked to the information concerning which housing units received

contaminated water during what timeframes.

The historical reconstruction of the Tarawa Terrace system is summarized in an

Executive Summary report we released earlier today. The results indicate that PCEcontaminated drinking water distributed to family housing units at Tarawa Terrace

exceeded 5ppb, which in 1991 was established as the Maximum Contaminant Level,

for the first time during the period October 1957–August 1958, with the most likely

date of first exceedance being November 1957. The maximum PCE concentration in

drinking water delivered to family housing units was estimated at 183 ppb in March

1984. During the period November 1957–January 1985, PCE levels in the finished

water at the water treatment plant exceeded 5 ppb for every month except when

the most contaminated well was off-line twice for repairs (a total of 4 months). The

contaminated wells were removed from regular service in February 1985. Effective

today, former Camp Lejeune Marines and their families can find out their estimated

exposure levels to PCE and PCE degradation by-products, calculated through modeling, by visiting the ATSDR Web site www.atsdr.cdc.gov/sites/lejeune and entering

the dates they lived in Tarawa Terrace housing. The executive summary of the analyses also is available at this Web site.

Once the historical reconstruction of both the Tarawa Terrace system and the

Hadnot Point system have been completed, the monthly quantitative estimates of

contaminant concentrations in each of these drinking water systems will be linked

with the case-control interview data on birth defects and childhood cancers. ATSDR

will analyze the data to determine if exposures to the drinking water contaminants

54

are associated with neural tube defects, cleft lip/cleft palate, or childhood leukemia/

non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.

Update of First Study: During the work conducted for the historical exposure reconstruction, ATSDR discovered an error in the exposure classifications used in its

first Camp Lejeune study, the 1998 study of adverse birth outcomes. This may have

affected the results of this study. The error was the result of a lack of information

on the date the Holcomb Boulevard Treatment Plant began operation. The study assumed that the plant was operating during the entire period of the study, 1968–

1985. However, as a result of the historical exposure reconstruction, the Agency has

learned that the Holcomb Boulevard Treatment Plant did not begin operation until

June 1972. Prior to June 1972, the Hadnot Point system provided drinking water

to the Holcomb Boulevard service area. This means that many of the births during

the period, January 1968–May 1972 that were classified as unexposed in the 1998

study were actually exposed in utero to drinking water contaminated with TCE and

other solvents. ATSDR regrets the error that was made in the 1998 study, and

plans to reanalyze the 1998 study using the monthly contaminant estimates from

the historical exposure reconstruction. Utilizing the more detailed estimates will

considerably improve the quality of the 1998 study.

Community and Expert Input: In response to public concerns that ATSDR’s study

was too narrowly focused since drinking water contamination may have caused

adult cancers as well as non-cancer diseases among children and adults, ATSDR

convened a scientific panel in February, 2005, to provide advice on whether additional epidemiological studies on the health effects of exposures to contaminated

water at Camp Lejeune should be conducted. ATSDR accepted panel recommendations, including recommendations to establish a Community Assistance Panel for

Camp Lejeune, and to assess the feasibility of conducting a mortality and cancer

incidence study and additional potential studies by evaluating DoD databases.

ATSDR also convened a panel on its approach to historical reconstruction of

groundwater and finished water contamination at the Base. On March 28–29, 2005,

ATSDR held an ‘‘Expert Peer Review Panel on Water Modeling’’ to assess and review water modeling approaches and activities at Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point,

and Holcomb Boulevard. Panel members approved ATSDR’s approach but made additional recommendations, which we adopted. They were unanimous in their recommendation that ATSDR conduct additional extensive data discovery to obtain all

the information necessary to fully understand the historical operations of the watersupply systems. Panel members also recommended that the Agency undertake a rigorous uncertainty or probabilistic analysis and consider modeling PCE degradation

by-products. Lastly, the panel recommended that a more simplified approach to

water-distribution system modeling could be used (i.e., simple mixing model), unless

we could definitively prove—using historical information and data—that there were

lengthy periods (exceeding several months) when the Tarawa Terrace water-distribution system was interconnected with the Holcomb Boulevard water-distribution

system. These recommendations were accepted by the Agency and were implemented.

CONCLUSION

In summary, ATSDR has an essential role in providing public health support to

people and communities impacted by hazardous substances. ATSDR expects the

study on the association between health effects and exposure to the drinking water

contaminants to be completed in 2008. Our assessment of the feasibility of additional work is expected to be completed this year. On a personal note, my staff and

I have truly enjoyed interacting with the former Marines who lived at Camp

Lejeune. As an Agency, we take very seriously the trust placed in our organization

by members of the public like these former Marines.

At this time, I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

ANSWERS TO SUBMITTED QUESTIONS BY MR. GREEN

Question: Mr. Sinks, in your testimony, it states that the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR) has conducted studies on children that may have

been exposed to trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE) at Camp

Lejeune. Has ATSDR considered studying adults who may have been exposed to

TCE and PCE at Camp Lejeune?

Answer: ATSDR’s current and previous epidemiological studies at U.S. Marine

Corps Base, Camp Lejeune have focused on the health effects to the fetus and child

from maternal exposures to drinking water contamination because the fetus is the

most vulnerable to these exposures and because there are only a very few studies

55

that have evaluated the effects on the fetus of trichloroethylene (TCE) and

tetrachloroethylene (PCE) exposures. Because of this gap in our scientific knowledge, and because the fetus is the most vulnerable to these exposures, ATSDR studied specific health effects in children that may be associated with maternal exposures to these drinking water contaminants. ATSDR is currently evaluating the feasibility of conducting a study of adult mortality and cancers among a cohort of Marines who were stationed at the base during the period when the drinking water

was contaminated with TCE and PCE. The assessment of the feasibility of such a

study will be completed by the end of 2007.

Question: In the studies that ATSDR has conducted, you have contacted the parents of children that have been exposed to TCE and PCE at Camp Lejeune. If you

can contact those people to ask them to participate in a study and create a registry,

then why not notify everyone who may have been exposed to water contamination

at Camp Lejeune?

Answer: ATSDR does not have access to data on everyone who may have been exposed to water contamination at Camp Lejeune. The Department of Defense is the

agency that may have data on this population. For the study ATSDR is conducting,

we have been able to contact many of the parents of children whose mothers were

on base during pregnancy. This sub-population does not cover the entire population

of those who may have been exposed, but ATSDR does plan to provide study participants with the results of our findings.

Another aspect of the agency’s work is conducting water modeling to determine

which housing units at Camp Lejeune received contaminated water during what

time period and the level or concentration of the contaminated water. ATSDR has

posted to its Web site a summary of the findings from its historical exposure reconstruction work and also the full technical findings. These are available at

www.atsdr.cdc.gov/sites/lejeune/watermodeling.html

We have publicized the availability of these data by issuing a press release, and

we are working closely with the Community Assistance Panel to identify other

methods of effective outreach to the affected community concerning ATSDR work.

Similar outreach efforts will be undertaken for the study results when they are

available.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Bove, were you going to have an opening statement? Dr. Maslia?

Mr. MASLIA. No.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Then we are going to move to 10-minute

questions then. On this panel, we are going to do 10 minutes. I will

begin. Dr. Sinks, did you say you are going to do an adult study?

That’s in the planning works for Camp Lejeune?

Mr. SINKS. Yes. Thank you. We have not committed to do an

adult study. A decision was made to do the childhood study because

the data gaps were greatest in that area. We wanted to look more

closely at the most vulnerable population, and we had records to

do that.

Mr. STUPAK. I thought you said in your opening——

Mr. SINKS. We are doing a feasibility study right now.

Mr. STUPAK. Feasibility study to do determine if there should be

a study?

Mr. SINKS. To determine if we should or should not move ahead

to do a study of adults. That is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. And when you do your studies areas you are looking

at what? From what year, 1968 to 1985?

Mr. SINKS. We define the study beginning date as 1968. Now

that is for the children. And that was decided on the basis of the

availability of computerized birth certificate records, so we wouldn’t

have to go back and contact all of the families before 1968 in order

to determine who there might have been.

We cut the study off in 1985 because the information we had at

that time was exposure had stopped in 1985.

56

Mr. STUPAK. You are aware that these wells were used through

1987?

Mr. SINKS. Dr. Maslia’s work with Tarawa Terrace shows us that

there may have been some much lower contamination in the finished water from 1985 through 1987. I think you have a chart that

shows that. It may be a little difficult to read, but the levels are

significantly lower. These are not sampled.

Mr. STUPAK. More than 5 parts per billion?

Mr. SINKS. A little more than 5. Possibly somewhere between 5

and 10, but certainly nowhere approaching the levels of 180 which

we saw prior to 1985.

Mr. STUPAK. So you don’t dispute the fact that the wells were

used up through 1987? But you are cutting the study off in 1987.

Mr. SINKS. Well I am not an expert. There were some wells used.

The two primarily contaminated wells were shut off. I think one of

them may have been used in a mixture for a short period of time.

Morris, if you want to answer that.

Mr. MASLIA. Yes. The two primary contaminated wells known as

TT–26 and TT–23 were shut down from continuous use.

Mr. STUPAK. But used periodically after——

Mr. MASLIA. If they have to obtain a water sample, you have to

turn the wells on, so they would turn them on. There was a period

in April that they turned TT–23 on for 7 hours, for 7 different

hours but they were not used continuously. Those two wells were

not used continuously. All the wells were shut down when the

treatment plant was shut down in March 1987.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Dr. Sinks, I asked Dr. Gros about miscarriages.

Have you looked at miscarriages during that period of time from

1968 to 1985?

Mr. SINKS. We did use adverse reproductive outcomes using birth

certificates, so we limited that first study to a study using available

vital statistics.

Mr. STUPAK. So the answer is no, you didn’t look at miscarriages?

Mr. BOVE. We did look at fetal deaths. Using fetal death certificates we found 83 fetal deaths during that period. We expected,

based on the ratio of fetal deaths to live births, about three times

more than that. So the fetal death certificates from North Carolina

were seriously underestimating or under-ascertaining the fetal

deaths occurring in that population. I don’t know why that was the

case. That would be something for North Carolina to answer.

Mr. STUPAK. How many fetal deaths versus how many women

did you look at?

Mr. BOVE. We decided not to pursue the fetal deaths because we

saw that we were under-ascertaining them by a factor of I think

3. We didn’t know why we were seeing so few fetal deaths in this

population, OK, so if we did a study we would have to figure out

why, for example, the fetal death rate was so slow.

Mr. SINKS. Based on a proportion of live births?

Mr. BOVE. That is based on a proportion of fetal deaths to live

births. You expect a certain portion of fetal deaths given the number of live births in a population.

Mr. STUPAK. Looking for a number of fetal births compared to

the rest of the country, not necessarily when you have a large conVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:20 Apr 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-56 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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centration in a population, why wouldn’t you look at another part

of the country?

Mr. BOVE. In the study, they look at adverse reproductive outcomes, and in the current study too. They are looking at comparing

those exposed at the base to those unexposed at the base. That’s

the idea. We want to see if contamination levels are associated

with these outcomes. So if you compare it to some other base, we’d

have to get birth certificates and fetal deaths from another base.

It’s not clear—we would have to figure out whether there were exposures occurring at another base. It made sense to limit the studies to Camp Lejeune.

Mr. STUPAK. How about the 12,598 children that were born between 1968 and 1985? Did you take into consideration if those children died?

Mr. BOVE. Did we take into consideration the children died?

Mr. STUPAK. Right. You said you looked for birth defects and

that, from 1968 to 1985.

Mr. BOVE. Right. Some of those children did die.

Mr. STUPAK. What percentage?

Mr. BOVE. I will have to get back to you on that one.

Mr. STUPAK. More than the national standard?

Mr. BOVE. No. We didn’t look at that.

Mr. STUPAK. In your study when you make these comparisons,

these conclusions, you are comparing against different DoD bases?

Mr. BOVE. No. We’re comparing exposed—mothers exposed at

Camp Lejeune to mothers unexposed at Camp Lejeune. What you

want to do in an epidemiologic study is to have two comparable

groups, an exposed and an unexposed, so they are similar in all respects, if you can, except for the exposure.

Mr. STUPAK. The only way you determine whether exposed or unexposed is whether they had water from these wells.

Mr. BOVE. Right.

Mr. STUPAK. So if they are swimming at the Tarawa Terrace

swimming pool but they didn’t drink the water there, then you are

unexposed?

Mr. BOVE. Right.

Mr. STUPAK. But if you are a pregnant lady, you certainly could

be exposing your child while you are in that swimming pool, is that

right?

Mr. BOVE. There are other exposures too. You pump gas. There

are all kinds of exposures. What you try to do is compare two populations that are similar, OK, and the population in Tarawa Terrace

and the population of Holcomb Boulevard——

Mr. STUPAK. Why don’t you just——

Mr. BOVE. Can I finish?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. But you don’t get 10 minutes to answer because that’s all I have to question.

Mr. BOVE. One second. The populations there are similar, we

hope. And this is how epidemiologic studies are done. We hope they

are similar in all other risk factors except for the exposure of interest.

Mr. STUPAK. What’s the percentage of birth defects at Camp

Lejeune of those 12,598 compared to the rest of the country?

58

Mr. BOVE. We don’t have the data on all birth defects at Camp

Lejeune. We just focused on those birth defects we were interested

in based on previous studies.

Mr. STUPAK. So if someone says birth defects are 15 times greater than the rest of the Nation, you have no way to dispute that.

Mr. SINKS. May I just interject here on a couple of things? We

do have information on the numbers of children who reported to us

with birth defects from those 12,000, because in fact we went out

and interviewed all of those parents. We collected that information.

We did have priorities in terms of which were the conditions we

were most interested in because of previously published scientific

studies. Those were the ones we focused on.

We did find there were a couple conditions we were interested in

where we had insufficient numbers of children who were born with

those birth defects; and in fact, one of those conditions we actually

saw less than we would have expected based on national data.

What Frank was saying regarding fetal deaths as a proportion of

total live births is not a comparison internal to Camp Lejeune.

That’s a comparison based on what nationally——

Mr. STUPAK. I realize that. I guess what I’m trying to say, if you

are at Camp Lejeune, how can you sit here and say this person was

exposed, this person was not exposed? They go over to someone’s

house and not have a drink of water?

Mr. SINKS. Let me just say this. There is no question that there

are other folks at Camp Lejeune we’re not studying who were exposed. And if your question is essentially one of have we included

in our studies everybody who was potentially exposed, the answer

is no.

But part of that answer has to do with how do we do epidemiologic studies? How do we do it in a timely way? Because I don’t

think you want us to be here in 5 years and——

Mr. STUPAK. You are telling us you won’t have that report done

until next year now, right?

Mr. SINKS. We will probably have it done, I’m hoping, early 2008.

It is a difficult thing to do. The water modeling is a particularly

difficult thing to do, and the Hadnot Point system is what we have

to do.

Mr. STUPAK. Of these 12,598 children born between 1968 and

1985, you’ve talked to all these parents?

Mr. SINKS. Well, I haven’t personally. But the people working for

us have interviewed—was it the total? Was that 12,000?

Mr. STUPAK. So someone talked to Mr. Gros, then, who was in

the first panel?

Mr. SINKS. I believe all three of them had been contacted by us.

Let me just point out, that’s why they found out about the issue.

Mr. STUPAK. All right.

General Dickerson, I assume your opening statement that DoD

refused to fund between 1998 and 2000, that’s our activities at

Camp Lejeune. Why was that, do you know? You have to use your

mike, please, sir.

General DICKERSON. I’m sorry sir. The 1998 funding for ATSDR

activity provided by the Department of the Navy was handled by

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59

ed—and the Marine Corps has stepped up and it’s funded it out of

our accounts right now—we are not at the Secretarial level.

Mr. STUPAK. So you have no idea what happened between 1998

and 2000?

General DICKERSON. No, sir. I do not.

Mr. STUPAK. Do we have to get the Secretary of the Navy in here

to answer that question then?

General DICKERSON. His staff has the background on how that

was appropriated. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. OK, we can do that. My time has expired.

Mr. Whitfield for 10 minutes. I think we’ll be coming back.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you for your testimony.

Dr. Sinks or Ms. Leonard, either one. On the earlier panel I referred to the 2003 study of ATSDR in which it said that ATSDR

has determined that exposures to volatile organic compounds in onbase drinking water is unlikely to result in cancer and noncancer

health effects in adults.

Now, how do you all come to that conclusion?

Mr. SINKS. I think this one’s for me. This was the 1997 health

consultation that we published on Camp Lejeune, and it basically

characterized what our health assessors saw in terms of exposure

levels, potential pathways, and tried to look at the duration of exposure, the concentration of exposure, and compare that with existing scientific literature that was out there. Those individuals who

were doing that made a conclusion that they did not expect to see

cancers in adults.

However, I will tell you that as a carcinogen, there is no threshold dose to where we would or wouldn’t know a cancer had occurred. And we wouldn’t conclude that no cancers would have occurred on the basis of that.

I’m sorry. I kind of lost my train of thought there. But we did

make the decision to go ahead and study it in adults because we

had previously—you showed some data on Woburn—that was a

study that we were involved in, and that did indicate some risks

to childhood cancers, and we wanted to follow up with that, and we

felt that this was the proper place to do that.

Mr. WHITFIELD. It’s a little bit surprising, I guess, to hear that

sort of determination, saying that it is unlikely to result in cancer,

particularly since these wells—and water was coming from these

wells from 1968.

Mr. SINKS. Mr. Whitfield, let me say that what hasn’t been mentioned is that the health consultation does indicate that a past public health hazard had occurred, and that we clearly stated this was

a past public health hazard. Now the individuals were looking,

then, at would we have expected to see certain health outcomes,

and they made the conclusion they didn’t expect to. But they clearly did indicate that there was a past public health hazard presented by this exposure.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. You are saying there was a health hazard.

But it’s unlikely that it would have caused cancer?

Mr. SINKS. That was their conclusion at the time. But I will say

that as a carcinogen with no threshold dose, we probably should be

cautious about concluding that no cancers did occur. There may

have been some cancers. I can’t tell you if there were or there were

60

not. But I’d also tell you that epidemiology would not be able to tell

you if any individual’s cancer was due to this——

Mr. WHITFIELD. If I’m a plaintiff’s lawyer, I’m sure that I can

come forth with scientific evidence and would make the argument

that it did cause cancer. I mean that wouldn’t be surprising to you

that we would be able to find evidence to that effect, would it?

Mr. SINKS. Well, I think these chemicals are reasonably anticipated to be human carcinogens. That’s well documented. The issue

becomes one of duration and dose, and at what dose we see that.

And I think the human epidemiology at the time was mostly focused on adults in occupational settings where their exposures are

much greater.

Mr. WHITFIELD. We were talking about 2003, and you made the

statement that in 2003 there was a position, and you’ve sort of

made me think that maybe you are rethinking that. But in this report that was issued today, the Executive Summary, it says on

page ES–3, thus ATSDR determined that exposure to VOCs in onbase drinking water was unlikely to result in cancer and noncancer

health effects in adults.

Mr. SINKS. Well, that’s quoting our 1997 public health hazard.

Those were the conclusions of the people doing that health assessment. And again I want to repeat, while we use the word ‘‘unlikely,’’ which is low probability, it doesn’t mean they would not

could not have occurred. We would not be able to exclude that possibility.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, Ms. Leonard, you are in charge of administering the 850-some claims filed by personnel at Camp Lejeune

who are seeking damages, and in your testimony you state you are

waiting for ATSDR to complete its study before you take action on

the claims.

Ms. LEONARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. It seems to me they’re taking the position here

that there’s no correlation here. Is that what you think?

Ms. LEONARD. Are you speaking only about the adults?

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes.

Ms. LEONARD. Yes. It does sound like that. We are waiting particularly for the water modeling part of the scientific study so that

we can figure out what doses, during what time periods, at what

housing areas, what levels, and when the medical piece comes

through, we’ll draw the correlation between specific illnesses or injuries at that point.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Have you filed any medical claims on behalf of

children?

Ms. LEONARD. We have not at this point.

Mr. WHITFIELD. When do you expect that some decisions will be

made on children’s issues?

Ms. LEONARD. As soon as we get the water modeling. I believe

part of that was just released. I have not seen that nor have I been

briefed on it. When the entire modeling is released and then the

medical evidence tying particular illnesses or injuries to those levels of exposure, at that time we will adjudicate that group of claimants that are claiming about those particular illnesses.

61

Mr. WHITFIELD. What would you say of the time line on all of

this would be? Or maybe Dr. Sinks could help or someone could

help.

Mr. SINKS. The Tarawa Terrace study is complete and it’s out

today. The Hadnot Point piece is not completed. Mr. Maslia believes it will be done later this summer or in the fall, and the ‘‘epi’’

study which will be connecting the childhood conditions with these

exposures would be sometime I hope in the spring.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now these are being followed under the Federal

Tort Claims Act?

Ms. LEONARD. Yes, sir, they are.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you all make the initial administrative decision?

Ms. LEONARD. Yes, sir. Once a claim is filed, the law requires

that the claimant allow the agency 6 months to adjudicate the

claim. And when the 6-month time period expires, at that time

they are able to go into Federal District Court to go sue the United

States of America.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So you would make a decision then, and they

would go to Federal court and contest that decision?

Ms. LEONARD. They could go now if they wanted to, because the

6 months has expired since the claims were filed, the majority of

them. So they could go now if they wanted to. The claimant always

has the right to allow the agency more time to adjudicate the

claim, as in this case, it’s been more than 6 months. It’s been years

on many of them. So we are waiting for the further evidence to adjudicate those claims.

Mr. WHITFIELD. All right. Dr. Sinks, not too long ago, Ranking

Member Barton and I sent a letter to you all talking about other

military bases. And in some of the data that you provided back to

us as answers—could you all put on the monitor this table regarding the HazDat Databases on Nebraska Ordnance Plant, Mather

Air Force Base. It’s hard to read that. But tab 21.

Mr. SINKS. This is what we sent you yesterday.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes. On tab 21, we specifically talked about five

bases: Nebraska Ordnance Plant, the Mather Air Force Base, the

Air Force plant No. 4, McClellan Air Force Base, and Wurtsmith

Air Force Base. And your response, according to the documentation

that we have, was wrong in three out of five of those facilities. The

data in the HazDat Database was wrong in three out of five. Were

you aware of that?

Mr. SINKS. We spoke with your staff yesterday about this. Let me

say that your request came to us late Friday afternoon. It was a

list of many bases, and asking us to respond to you in detail, I believe, around the 26th. We were asked to look at the five specific

bases, and we did find that some of the numbers in there may not

have fit a category that certainly I would have expected them to

fit. I will not tell you that means they are necessarily wrong.

The system that you are describing, HazDat, was a system designed in 1991. It was specifically designed not for us to use to

identify places where we would do human health research, but it

was designed as a tool to provide individuals and communities information that they might readily access through the Internet

62

about a site of interest. What we have is a list that you’ve come

up with of several bases. I don’t know how many—20, 30.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well I think we want to get with you after this

hearing, because the evidence shows quite clearly that the response

was wrong, your response was wrong.

Mr. SINKS. Let me say there very well may be some errors in

some of the data in HazDat, which contains hundreds of thousands

of data bits and thousands of sites over 20 years of ATSDR involvement. The issue of how do we identify those sites where TCE is exposing large numbers of people where we might want to do health

studies is not one where we would necessarily rely on using that

interbase tool.

So yes, there are things we should be doing with HazDat to correct it. We have been trying to put it on a new platform and to correct some of those things. But it does not surprise me that we could

find one or two errors in there, or more, or the interpretation of

them.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, I think the thing is, we’re focusing on

Camp Lejeune today. But we know that there are at least 22 other

military bases around the country with some contaminated water.

And in this—just taking the Nebraska ordnance plant, it says

630,000 parts per billion of TCE in municipal public groundwater

contamination. And in the response it says that there was less than

700 parts per billion.

Mr. SINKS. Well let’s split the difference here between what may

be inaccurate with HazDat and how we can identify other places

to do research on TCE. There are two different issues. Let me say

we have done human epidemiologic research on other areas involving TCE, several of them non-DoD sites. So the work that was done

in Woburn involved that. We’ve been involved in any number of

human health studies. This particular error that you are looking at

was apparently a transpositional error by an abstracter who looked

at a value of PCBs—no TNT in soil at this ordnance plant and

somehow put it in as TCE.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, I mean, you all are called to a high duty

of responsibility and accuracy here, because when we have military

men and women serving our country and they have their families

with them, they expect, certainly, safe water to drink. And I think

what’s happened at Camp Lejeune is a real blight on all of us, and

the fact that 22 other military bases have been identified with

problems as well calls this to a very high standard. And I think

that’s what these hearings are all about.

And I want to commend the Chairman once again for holding the

hearing and it’s something we will continue to look at. And I think

my time has expired.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Walden, please.

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield 2

minutes to my colleague from Texas who has some specific questions involving Texas, and then I will have some questions.

Mr. BURGESS. I thank my friend for yielding. I apologize for having missed part of this hearing. We have several hearings going on

at the same time.

Dr. Sinks, on the list of 20 that Ranking Member Whitfield was

just referring to, the top of that list is the General Dynamics plant

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in Fort Worth, Texas, with a reported contamination with trichloroethylene of 11,000 micrograms per liter. If I do the math right,

that’s 11 milligrams per liter. That’s a strikingly large amount.

Can I just ask what is being done currently? Is this the current situation that exists at these other installations?

Mr. SINKS. That report, I believe, particularly identified that

level, but not at tap water where people were drinking. I believe

that we did not indicate a public health hazard from TCE exposures at that site. Most of these sites I think, were involved where

these levels exist. There is not ongoing exposure because they’ve

documented the exposure and they’ve taken corrective action.

Mr. BURGESS. Not to interrupt, but that’s my biggest concern.

We’re doing something presently to keep ongoing exposure from

happening, particularly at these wells or these sites that seem to

have alarmingly astonishingly high levels.

Mr. SINKS. Absolutely.

Mr. BURGESS. And are we also in the process of notification of

individuals who might have been exposed? Because this is likely

something that’s been going on for some time.

Mr. SINKS. Our agency makes it a very specific practice to make

sure our information is available. When we have a community that

is currently there, we work very directly with the community to

educate them on what we’ve found and provide them that information. We would have difficulty having to go back to people who

were essentially in a military base and then left that base in terms

of tracking them down and providing them that information on a

one-by-one basis. We do make our information readily available

publicly, but it’s on the Web and that type of——

Mr. BURGESS. General Dickerson, I realize this is the Air Force

and not the Marine Corps. But would the military have the ability

to access those records and be able to participate in information

dissemination if that appeared to be necessary?

General DICKERSON. Sir, I couldn’t answer for the Air Force. But

I would hope that OSD and the other services have these records

available for review, but I cannot testify to this committee that

those records are available.

Mr. BURGESS. Well, Dr. Sinks, I will just echo what Mr. Whitfield

said. I encourage you to get that information to the committee so

we can make an informed judgment about that. And I thank Mr.

Walden for yielding. I will yield back my time.

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Dr. Burgess. I appreciate your participation in the committee.

Dr. Sinks, I want to ask you, if you had been on these bases, especially Camp Lejeune, at the time that these other gentlemen

were there, would you have felt—and known about the contamination—would you have felt comfortable drinking that water?

Mr. SINKS. Well, I think that I personally would have been using

different water and I think that I would have been recommending

that an alternative water source was used at that time.

Mr. WALDEN. And I think most of us—all of us—I don’t know

anybody that would say the opposite of that. The question then becomes: Where the database indicates that there were similar higher levels or different levels around the country and that we had

men and women in uniform on bases consuming that water, doesn’t

64

it make sense then to look at those folks and do an epidemiological

study?

Mr. SINKS. Thank you for the question. For us to do an epidemiologic study there needs to be a number of things available to us.

One, we wouldn’t do an epidemiologic study unless we were convinced there was a completed pathway of exposure and there were

people actually exposed. Usually in environmental epidemiology

this issue of trying to determine who was exposed, who wasn’t exposed, is, frankly, the most difficult thing to determine.

Mr. WALDEN. If I can just interrupt you a second, because I don’t

do what you do.

Mr. SINKS. And I don’t do what you do.

Mr. WALDEN. Well, you may be better off then. In Fort Riley,

there are 2,550 people that have been identified, estimated exposed

population at 330 parts per billion BCE and 96 parts per billion of

TCE. Does anybody know who those 2,550 people are?

Mr. SINKS. I would not know.

Mr. WALDEN. Does anybody in your agency know?

Mr. SINKS. We would not generally collect personal identifying

information unless we were going ahead to do an epidemiologic

study, and then we have a burden to very closely protect that information in confidentiality.

Mr. WALDEN. I understand. I guess what I’m trying to get at,

how do we take care of the people who may have been exposed?

How do we determine if there’s a connection here and how do we

get them help if there is? And it sounds like you can’t do that. Is

that correct?

Mr. SINKS. There are things that I can do.

Mr. WALDEN. What can you do?

Mr. SINKS. I can do a health consultation and determine if there

was a completed pathway.

Mr. WALDEN. What does that mean, completed pathway?

Mr. SINKS. Well, that simply is reviewing the available information to determine if a contaminant in air, water, soil, food, was at

a level that would have constituted a health risk and people actually consumed it or inhaled it.

Mr. WALDEN. Sure. And I understand that. But at 330 parts per

billion of BCE, does that constitute that pathway if one of

these——

Mr. SINKS. It would if it’s in our drinking water at the tap. Now,

let me point out that there are other issues for when you would do

a study. You would do a study if you had sufficient numbers to

study and you know who they are, and you have the ability to

track them, and you can identify specific health outcomes that they

may have had. And that can be a very difficult thing when we’re

going back 10, 20 years to try to reconstruct that history.

Mr. WALDEN. All right. I’m sure it is.

Mr. SINKS. Let me give you one example. If we did find a very

high level in a well off base that was exposing a family, our recommendation would be to get them alternative water.

Mr. WALDEN. Right.

Mr. SINKS. Our recommendation would not be to do an epidemiologic study. We would not do a study of a single family, or even 20

families, because we wouldn’t have enough people to study.

65

Mr. WALDEN. OK. With 2,550 families or individuals?

Mr. SINKS. It could be, if we also had an appropriate control

group who were unexposed and we were able to identify who those

people were, and we knew what the health outcomes we were looking for were, and we had the availability to get information on

that.

Mr. WALDEN. I guess what I’m struggling with—and I’m probably

not alone—it seems like we would err on the side of the men and

women in uniform, that we would be doing everything possible to

contact every person who was on these bases and to find out if

there is this connection.

And I may be not hearing you correctly, but I get the sense that

we’re not making that effort; that there aren’t enough people, there

aren’t enough people sick, we don’t know about a pathway yet. We

have this database that shows pretty high levels of concentration

of these chemicals in the water. Am I missing something here?

Mr. SINKS. Let me separate out this issue of why you are wanting to go back and contact those individuals.

Mr. WALDEN. Right.

Mr. SINKS. For a specific reason.

Mr. WALDEN. Right.

Mr. SINKS. Versus needing to do an epidemiologic study. The

study we’re doing at Camp Lejeune right now looking at these

birth defects should be very sufficient to tell us whether or not levels of exposure in this range are associated with risk, with these

conditions, and we wouldn’t make a recommendation to go out and

look at every single instance when that occurs. We want to inform

the science. We want to learn from it.

Mr. WALDEN. So you would use the science from that study and

apply it across——

Mr. SINKS. Right.

Mr. WALDEN. Are there already epidemiologic studies, already

done outside of the military application, involving these chemicals

in drinking water?

Mr. SINKS. Yes, there are.

Mr. WALDEN. What did they show?

Mr. SINKS. Actually, let me ask Frank to talk about Woburn and

the other studies that he’s done.

Mr. WALDEN. Did they show a connection and the pathway that

Dr. Sinks——

Mr. BOVE. There have been two studies that looked at childhood

leukemia and these chemicals specifically: Woburn, which we funded; and a northern New Jersey study which I participated in, and

was funded also by ATSDR. In both studies, trichloroethylene was

associated with childhood leukemia. The only wrinkle here is that

in Woburn most of the cases were males, and in the New Jersey

study, the excess was—it was entirely in females. So we don’t understand what that is all about.

But there’s also been a study done of birth defects and TCE and

PCE. That’s a study I did in northern New Jersey. That was also

funded by ATSDR and I found associations there between trichloroethylene and neural—two defects and oral clefts. That’s why we’re

studying them at Camp Lejeune. As for PCE, it was much fuzzier

and not clear, but there seemed to be an association with oral

66

clefts, cleft lip and cleft palates, so that’s another reason we are

looking at those end points there.

Mr. WALDEN. So from the studies you’ve done or the science

you’ve studied, the information you’ve seen from perhaps other

studies, would it be reasonable for somebody like me to conclude

that if there are certain levels of these chemicals in the water that

was consumed by men and women in uniform, or anybody anywhere, that that’s a likelihood they could come down with the diseases, or their kids could, that we heard about from the first panel?

Mr. BOVE. The problem here is that both the New Jersey study

that I worked on, both studies, and the Woburn study are still in

dispute of what they show. There are, of course, industry people

that will say that they are not sufficient to show anything. So there

is this dispute and controversy in the scientific community.

Mr. WALDEN. Should there be other studies done?

Mr. BOVE. Absolutely.

Mr. WALDEN. Would you recommend that studies be done on people from these other bases?

Mr. BOVE. We want to do credible studies, though, because if we

don’t do a credible study, a strong study, they won’t provide the

evidence we want. We have to pick exposure, those situations

where there’s good exposure data, and there also has to be a large

enough number.

Now, if you remember, there are 12,000 or so births we looked

at at Camp Lejeune. And at the end of the day, we have relatively

small numbers of cancers and birth defects to look at, and that’s

because these are rare outcomes. So if we want to do more of these

kinds of studies—in northern New Jersey, I looked at 80,000

births. I still had small outcomes at the end. So that’s how difficult

these studies are.

You cannot recommend doing these studies anywhere and everywhere. You have to have good outcome data. You have to have good

exposure data. You have to have large numbers of people in order

to have a strong enough study to make a dent in the controversies

around these chemicals.

Mr. WALDEN. All right. So then are you suggesting that, given

the testimony we heard in the first panel and the data on water

quality we’ve seen, that there isn’t enough there to do more studies?

Mr. BOVE. No. I’m always looking for an opportunity to do a

study. My frustration has always been that the States oftentimes

do not have this kind of data available in the drinking water in

their municipalities so we could do studies. I would love to repeat

the New Jersey studies I did back in the early 1990’s. I would love

to do that all across the country.

The problem appears to be that there’s not enough data on drinking water contamination in this country to be able to do these studies. The other side also is that you need good registries, you need

cancer registries, you need birth defect registries. In North Carolina they didn’t have a birth defect registry until 1996, and a statewide cancer registry until 1990.

Other States are in somewhat similar state. New Jersey was fortunate. We had both in place early enough and good drinking water

data so I could do these studies.

67

Mr. WALDEN. Weren’t there medical records on the base that you

would be able to search back through, or the individual service

members’ records.

Mr. BOVE. We were able to use the medical records to verify the

cases in the current study, although we have some cases where

there are no medical records available. Medical records do not stay

at the Naval Hospital. They get shipped to another location for

storage. I’m not sure exactly when I can get back to you on that.

But they are stored. They’re not destroyed.

Mr. WALDEN. So they do exist?

Mr. BOVE. But they’re not easy to access and they are not filed

in any way that would be very easy to link the population with the

outcome.

Mr. WALDEN. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. We’re going to go another round. I will let you go

over because I know you gave some time to Mr. Burgess.

After you do your study, and Ms. Leonard, you are going to pay

your claims based upon the study; right?

Ms. LEONARD. Yes, sir. When we have the information, we will

adjudicate the cases at that time, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. So if their study shows there’s a connection between

childhood birth defects, you are just going to pay these claims for

the childhood defects?

Ms. LEONARD. Well, there’s a little more that goes into it besides

that. We have to take all of the information and analyze each case

on a case-by-case basis, the facts.

Mr. STUPAK. Even if they do their study, you are still going to

look at this case by case? You may not do anything with these

claims?

Ms. LEONARD. Absolutely. We have to adjudicate each case on its

own merits.

Mr. STUPAK. Why are we spending all this money on studies? It

seems like we’re just delaying here. Delay, delay, delay.

Mr. SINKS. The reason that we do the studies is to add to the

science base to inform groups like——

Mr. STUPAK. I understand that. But I want to know about the

victims at Camp Lejeune. How are these studies helping them? Because it doesn’t look like it’s helped them at all.

I will take that back. You did point out today that through your

investigation based on this report, you did today on page ES–10

from 19 January 1955—I will take it back—first exceeded the minimum content level was October 1957. So the pollution at Tarawa

Terrace has been going on since 1957. Your study has only gone

on from 1968 forward. Can you go back to 1957 and take a look

at this? If you take a look at it from 1957 on, according to your

chart, you are way above the minimum content level.

Mr. SINKS. Let me point out that the purpose of our study is not

to identify individuals who were affected for compensation. That is

not the purpose of our study. The purpose of our study is to do the

most credible work we can do from a scientific point of view.

Mr. STUPAK. On TCE and PCEs, right?

Mr. SINKS. TCE and PCE contamination at Camp Lejeune. We

made a decision to start in 1968, not because that’s when pollution

68

started, but because that’s when we could identify the cohort of

births that we wanted to look at in order to do our study.

It was really an issue of efficiency.

Mr. STUPAK. So you are saying the information is not available

between 1957 and 1968 for the births?

Mr. SINKS. It may be available. We do not have it.

Mr. STUPAK. Wouldn’t you want to go back to 1957 now and

move forward?

Mr. SINKS. I don’t think so. We have more than 12,000 births.

We have terrific information, particularly on Tarawa Terrace on

the exposure, and we believe that the size of the group we’ve collected will be sufficient to answer the questions that we’ve posed.

The issue of going back has to do with whether or not our study

is sufficient to answer those questions.

Mr. STUPAK. All right.

Mr. SINKS. Now, I will also say that, unfortunately, epidemiology

is not the right tool to identify whether an individual has developed

a disease from a specific cause.

Mr. STUPAK. I agree. That’s where Ms. Leonard can still dispute

it, right?

Mr. SINKS. Well, Ms. Leonard will have to decide what she decides. That’s not in our court.

Mr. STUPAK. Ms. Leonard, this committee has asked for the litigation report. I understand it’s 400-and-some pages. When can we

expect that report?

Ms. LEONARD. Sir, I turned that over to the legislative counsel

at DoD yesterday, and they will be responding to your request. I’m

not the person that would be producing that.

Mr. STUPAK. When?

Ms. LEONARD. I don’t have that information. There is a legal review ongoing right now.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. I still get the impression from the first

panel——

And General Dickerson, let me ask you this. Why has DoD not

notified those residents at Camp Lejeune who were there during

the time these wells were in use, that they may have been exposed

to TCE or PCE?

General DICKERSON. Sir, there have been numerous communications from the commanding general at the time, from Headquarters

Marine Corps, through media surveys, contacted over 3,500 media

outlets, whether that be weekly publications, daily publications.

Mr. STUPAK. I realize that. The people who were there, you can’t

tell me the Marine Corps doesn’t know who was at Camp Lejeune

from 1965 to 2007.

General DICKERSON. We could probably get the data who was

stationed at Camp Lejeune. Would it be 100 percent complete? I’m

not sure. We’ve made every attempt to get the information out and

work with ATSDR to make sure——

Mr. STUPAK. Right. I mean military—don’t you think you have

a responsibility to let these people know they may have been exposed?

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Why don’t you do it?

69

General DICKERSON. We are doing everything we possibly can to

get the media out.

Mr. STUPAK. Not the media.

General DICKERSON. Message.

Mr. STUPAK. Not the media, not the message. I’m talking about

notice those individuals who lived there. Why not contact them?

General DICKERSON. Some people, we haven’t got an address to

get to. Some of the records are not complete on everybody that was

stationed there.

Mr. STUPAK. Have you made an effort?

General DICKERSON. We have made every effort to get the word

out. That is why the Web site was set up.

Mr. STUPAK. No no, not the word out. Notice directly these people. If you can track down Dr. Gros who is down in Beaumont,

Texas, for his son, I would think the military could do it if they

wanted to; don’t you think?

General DICKERSON. We have a media campaign to go out, based

on the study——

Mr. STUPAK. As an officer, wouldn’t you expect your Marine

Corps would tell you? Were you at Camp Lejeune during this time?

General DICKERSON. The Marine Corps, sir, has tried——

Mr. STUPAK. Were you at Camp Lejeune during this time?

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir, I was. I was stationed there from

1974 to 1978, from 1983 to 1986.

Mr. STUPAK. Would you expect to be notified?

General DICKERSON. I was. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. How would you notified?

General DICKERSON. By letter, by communications, and base papers.

Mr. STUPAK. Don’t you think everybody, then, should get a letter?

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir. To my knowledge, everybody who

was in affected areas had a letter.

Mr. STUPAK. That’s not what the first panel said.

General DICKERSON. I understand what the first panel said. Yes,

sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Sinks, have you been told by DoD why they

didn’t fund your study from 1998 to 2000? Have you been told?

Mr. SINKS. No, I have not. I was not with ATSDR at that time.

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have any reason? Have you drawn any conclusions why they did not fund you?

Mr. SINKS. I can’t draw any conclusions about that. I can tell you

that we did not stop our work and that we went ahead and funded

it with our CERCLA dollars to ramp up to begin the study.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Has the Marine Corps promptly and fully disclosed to you all information pertaining to the contamination so

that accurate studies of adverse health effects could be conducted?

Mr. SINKS. Since I have been involved in this, which is about the

past 3 years, every time I have made a request they have made the

information available, and most of this information Mr. Maslia has

been involved with, and I believe he’s gotten very good cooperation.

Morris, do you want to add anything?

Mr. MASLIA. Yes, sir. We have received the information that we

have requested. Some of the issues involved is identifying who may

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have the information, and in our vernacular or our jargon, from a

modeling standpoint, an epidemiologist identifying it so the people

on base understand exactly the type of information we’re looking

for.

Mr. STUPAK. OK.

Dr. Sinks, of these 57 children with confirmed illnesses or children of interest, as you call them, how many of these 57 are still

alive?

Mr. SINKS. I’m going to defer that to Dr. Bove. He may know

that. I don’t have the information.

Mr. BOVE. I don’t have the information in front of me. I will have

to get back to you.

Let me say one thing though; that the neural tube defects, including in particular anencephaly, they die pretty much right after

birth, so those would definitely be dead. Some of the spina bifida

cases would be dead because the leukemias would be dead. So I

would—but I will get back to you.

Mr. STUPAK. It doesn’t sound like very many would be alive,

then.

Mr. BOVE. The majority are still alive, as of the survey which is

the last time we checked on their vital status. The majority are

alive, but I don’t have the exact number, and I’ll get back to you

with it. But whether they’re alive or dead, they were in our study,

and they stay in our study.

Mr. STUPAK. OK.

Dr. Sinks, do you want to say something?

Mr. SINKS. I was just going to add that most of the clefts, cleft

palate, cleft lip, would not be fatal. We’ve had a tremendous success in treating childhood cancers over the past 15–20 years, so I

would think that a significant number of the kids with leukemia

would have survived. And the neural tube defects, most of the

spina bifidas, probably would still be alive.

Mr. STUPAK. If the Marine Corps provided you all the names of

all the people who are living in Tarawa Terrace from; 1957 until

1997, would that help you?

Mr. SINKS. In terms of this childhood study or additional studies?

Mr. STUPAK. The information you need.

Mr. SINKS. Well, we have the information we need.

Mr. STUPAK. I get the feeling you would study this thing to death

if we let you. I am trying to bring this to some kind of end here.

Mr. SINKS. We would be pleased with the opportunity to use our

skills in environmental measurements in epidemiology to do more

work. There’s no question about it.

Mr. STUPAK. My time’s just about up. You keep talking about

water modeling, OK. That’s TCE, PCEs, in the water, how much

at certain times; like that, right?

Mr. SINKS. It’s more detailed than that. We have just a few data

points that were collected between 1982 and 1985.

Mr. STUPAK. But there’s no doubt in this area we’re talking

about Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point, people were exposed to TCE

and PCE.

Mr. SINKS. Well, certainly our water modeling——

71

Mr. STUPAK. You don’t know if it’s one glass of water that would

trigger childhood leukemia or if it’s 3 years of drinking the water,

do you?

Mr. SINKS. I wouldn’t know how much it is.

Mr. STUPAK. Right. So why is water modeling so important when

you have statistics like you show here, off the charts?

Mr. SINKS. Because we don’t rely simply on saying there’s an association because somebody drank one glass and someone drank no

glasses.

Mr. STUPAK. That’s right. And you don’t ask them how many

glasses they drank. From a scientific point, they’re exposed or

they’re not exposed.

Mr. SINKS. No, that’s not the point. The point is the risk increases with the amount somebody took. We do look for a dose response. It’s very important for looking at causal relationships, and

without it——

Mr. STUPAK. So what’s the minimum you look for for exposure

here at Camp Lejeune?

Mr. SINKS. What do you mean by ‘‘minimum?’’

Mr. STUPAK. What’s minimum exposure?

Mr. SINKS. Minimum concentration?

Mr. STUPAK. No. What’s the exposure? How many days do I have

to be exposed before I would be included in your study? The question is, is are we categorizing people in an exposed category for

having been in this area 1 day, 30 days, 60 days?

Mr. BOVE. We do everything on the month, not by the day.

Mr. STUPAK. How many months do I have to be exposed?

Mr. BOVE. For neural tube defects and for oral clefts, the timing

of the dose would be first trimester. After the first trimester, no

matter what you are exposed to, will not cause those outcomes.

OK? They are caused early in the pregnancies. It’s part of the difficulty of studying them. For the neural tube, it’s day 20 of gestation to day 27.

Mr. STUPAK. So a 3-month period.

Mr. BOVE. Well, in that case, the third to fourth week of pregnancy, when the person doesn’t even know they’re pregnant oftentimes, is when the dose would cause that neural tube defect. OK.

So it depends on the outcome. For childhood leukemia from the

Woburn study, we get the idea that the exposures during pregnancy are more important—the exposures during gestation are

more important than the exposures after birth, although there’s

still some controversy about that in the literature.

Mr. STUPAK. How long did it take you to do the Woburn study?

Mr. BOVE. There were two Woburn studies.

Mr. STUPAK. How long did it take to do two of them? Because

we’re on 10 years here.

Mr. BOVE. The first Woburn study started in 1982 and finished

in 1987.

Mr. STUPAK. Five years.

Mr. BOVE. The second one started in the early 1990’s and didn’t

finish until the late 1990’s. The difference between Woburn and the

Camp Lejeune study, there are several. First, they did not do

groundwater transport. They just used the one sample they had,

267 parts per billion, and modeled the drinking water system.

72

We’re doing much more than that in terms of modeling. In order

to determine when the contamination started, we don’t know that

without the modeling. The 1957 day you keep mentioning, we

would have no idea without the modeling. We would have no idea

what the levels were before 1980 because there are no data before

1980. In fact, we wouldn’t know the levels pretty much until 1982

when we start getting some specific numbers for the particular

VOCs.

But we know that the exposures happened before that. The only

way to know that is through modeling. There’s no other way to do

it. It takes a long time to do this kind of modeling. This is cuttingedge technology here we’re talking about. There’s no other study

that’s done this. I just want to get that across.

Mr. STUPAK. It would be a lot more—I won’t even go there. Any

other questions from this side?

Mr. WHITFIELD. Just one more.

General Dickerson, I would like to ask you a question. TCE was

first detected in drinking water at the Wurtsmith Air Base up in

Michigan in October 1977. And the Air Force officials immediately

took steps to identify those wells, and within 1 month they basically closed those wells down. Now, you were not the commanding

general certainly at Wurtsmith which is an Air Force Base, and

you were not commanding general at Lejeune. But in Lejeune, the

first notice was in 1980 and then in 1982, and they didn’t close

these wells down until 1985. So a period of 3 to 5 years at Lejeune

for them to make that decision. From your personal knowledge or

your discussion with other people involved, what was the difference

in the speed of closing down Wurtsmith and Lejeune? Why was

there that kind of discrepancy?

General DICKERSON. Sir, I can’t speak for the Air Force on what

they did. But I can say everybody at Camp Lejeune reached out to

the State environmental, to the EPA, to everybody, to find out

what was the causes of the VOCs in the water at the time, to find

out what the impact was. They did not know. They didn’t find out

the source of the contamination until 1984 when they found the

contaminated wells; and as soon as they found they were contaminated, they shut them down.

There were no standards. That’s part of the complicating factor

here on what to expect. There were snarls that had been put out,

but there was never any consistent data when they did sample the

water. Now, I’m talking finished water to come up with the conclusion of what the impact was going to be on the consumption, once

it was discovered that the wells were contaminated they shut the

wells down.

Mr. STUPAK. Can I jump in?

Mr. WHITFIELD. Sure.

Mr. STUPAK. The big black binder there, go to exhibit No. 20,

General. Because, man, when I read it as early as 1972, the Navy

regulations regulated your water, what contaminants could be in.

What could that be in, 1972? So all this stuff about standards in

the 1980’s doesn’t make sense.

When you look at exhibit No. 20, it says Navy regulations required regular drinking water testing, and although TCE and PCE

are not specifically mentioned, these regulations set limits for

73

chlorinated hydrocarbons at 3 parts per billion. That’s lower than

the 5 parts per billion EPA has right now. That’s 1972.

So in answer to Mr. Whitfield’s question, I don’t think that would

be quite right, according to the exhibit from the Navy.

General DICKERSON. Sir, I am not familiar with this

BUMEDINST description. But I can say the water was tested. All

finished products were tested.

Mr. STUPAK. Based upon 1972 standards, right, sir?

General DICKERSON. I can’t say that.

Mr. STUPAK. Read it. It says right there, 1972.

General DICKERSON. I see this. Yes sir.

Mr. STUPAK. So it’s 1972, right? You see that?

General DICKERSON. I would hope it was by this instruction.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. So there was a standard as early as 1972. So

your answer to Mr. Whitfield would not be responsive or accurate.

General DICKERSON. It was tested, but I cannot say specifically

if these standards were employed at that time.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, Marine Corps was required to follow Navy

regulations, were they not?

General DICKERSON. Marine Corps does follow Navy regulations.

Mr. STUPAK. Is it a violation of your military code if you ignore

the regulations?

General DICKERSON. No, sir. We do not ignore any regulations.

We hold ourselves to the highest standard.

Mr. STUPAK. So then, 1972 for hydrocarbons, 3 parts per billion.

General DICKERSON. If that’s what this instruction says, yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Exactly what it says. So you had a standard in the

1980’s. Someone chose to ignore it.

Ms. DREYER. Sir, if I can add a little to this. Also suggested no

adverse response level values which ranged from 2,000, 2,300 down

to——

Mr. STUPAK. That’s not what the document says. Navy regulations says 3 parts per billion. You are required to follow Navy regulations if you are in the military, and Camp Lejeune would be one

of those installations under Navy control. Therefore you would expect they would follow 3 parts per billion, would you not?

Ms. DREYER. I’m not familiar with that document either, but you

would expect it. Let me also say that the source of the chemicals,

the TCE and PCE was in the well water. When Camp Lejeune figured out that the well water was the source of these chemicals, the

day they sampled that well, they shut the well down. Yes, it did

take a long time between 1982 and 1984 when they actually sampled the well. This is during the time when there were concerns

about asbestos-coated piping as well. And they did do some research to try to determine what was the cause of these chemicals.

Ultimately it was determined to be the wells.

So it didn’t take a month, once the well was sampled and the

chemicals were identified. It was more in terms of days.

Mr. STUPAK. Are you telling me the military’s response is—even

though we know we are extremely higher than 3 parts per billion,

way over our Navy regulations, we would continue to expose people

because we can’t find the source? That’s ludicrous. If you are concerned about the health and safety of the people you are dealing

with, if they’re being exposed to it, you would bring in potable

74

water, you would take other action. Your CID, Criminal Investigation Division, basically the investigation found that they were not

forthcoming in questions, were not diligent in providing expertise,

coached in their answers, steered away from admitting knowledge

of organic interference from solvents.

It’s been there since 1972. Your people were exposed to it, and

you didn’t do anything.

General DICKERSON. I wouldn’t say that the Marine Corps, that

Camp Lejeune didn’t do anything at that time. I will say that they

did work closely with the State of North Carolina environmental to

detect and find out what was contaminating the water, see what

the level of contaminants were and what the impact was. They

didn’t know. There were no standards for these contaminants at

that point in time. I understand the view of what you have pointed

out to us today.

Mr. STUPAK. I yield back. Sorry.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Ms. Dreyer, you are responsible today for the environmental restoration program for the Marine Corps; is that correct?

Ms. DREYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. So all of the bases around the U.S.?

Ms. DREYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. And are there other bases that are being operated

today that have water problems, water quality problems?

Ms. DREYER. We have other bases across the Marine Corps that

have these chemicals in the soil and groundwater. But I’m not

aware that any of these chemicals have entered into the drinking

water system or have impacted drinking water, no.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Walden, any questions?

Mr. WALDEN. I just want to go back to this document, see if I

understand what you are saying here. This is the one on tab 20

that deals—25 August, 1972, the BUMEDINST 6240.3C, where it

limits the chlorinated hydrocarbons. First, I am not a chemist. Did

these two chemicals that we are referencing today fall under this

category of chlorinated hydrocarbons?

General DICKERSON. I would defer that to——

Ms. DREYER. I believe they did, yes.

Mr. WALDEN. That is a yes then?

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. OK. So then the level that is referenced here on

page six of that document, the 0.003 to 0.1 concentrations in milligrams per million, that would have been way below what you were

reading coming out of the tap; right?

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir.

Ms. DREYER. Yes, that is correct. Generally, at that time period,

the method detection limit or the laboratory’s capability of detecting chemicals in water was generally about 10. If Camp Lejeune

officials during that time got a reading of 10, it could be reported

as nondetect or otherwise not present in the sample. That is correct.

Mr. WALDEN. And at that time, what were their readings?

Ms. DREYER. They varied. That was part of the problem. In many

instances they would have nondetect. We have seen as high as

75

1,400 in tap water. I will point out that 18,000 figure is from a well

sample. And that well would not have been provided directly to

anybody to drink. It would have been transported to the water

treatment plant and mixed with other wells that were pumping at

that time. So the highest reading that I am aware of right now at

the Hadnot Point system is 1,400 parts per million, which is well

above today’s standard.

Mr. WALDEN. Was it above this standard from the 1972 document?

Ms. DREYER. It would be, because this is three, and that would

be five, and the only question I would have—and I am not a laboratory analyst, so I don’t know what the method detection limit was.

It could have been 5; it could have been 10. It varied depending

upon the laboratory and their credentials.

Mr. WALDEN. And who was in charge then at Camp Lejeune to

make sure that these levels were being followed?

General DICKERSON. All of the officials, sir. All of the officials at

Camp Lejeune would have been in charge, just like they are today,

monitoring this, trying to detect what the levels of the particles are

per——

Mr. WALDEN. And General, have you gone back and looked to see

if anybody who was in charge over the last 20 years did anything

when a detection level exceeded the one listed here occurred? Is

there any documentation that would indicate somebody said, wait

a minute, we are over the limit?

General DICKERSON. I can say that there has been an EPA

Criminal Investigative Division investigation, there has been a

GAO investigation, and six separate studies, to include the Commandant’s panel looking into the past to find if there was any

wrongdoing. And everybody has come back and said there were no

criminal intentions. Everybody did the best with the information

they had at the time. Unfortunately, some of the levels on a dayto-day basis were above the acceptable levels for drinking water.

Ms. DREYER. If I can add to that, the base chemist at Camp

Lejeune during the early 1980’s did make handwritten notes on

some analytical data suggesting that it was highly contaminated,

and that is in the record. I will also note that the Navy, the chairman mentioned a quote about LANTDIV. LANTDIV is the Atlantic

Field Division of the Navy Facilities Engineering Command. And

during the early 1980’s, I don’t know when it transitioned to Camp

Lejeune, but during the early 1980’s and possibly before that, the

Navy was supporting the Marine Corps with some engineering

services, including this water sampling. And that is part of trying

to reconstruct the history and figure out, when did Camp Lejeune

know? It is unclear to us even today. But we do have the information that, in the 1980’s, we had interferences, and we do have analytical data in 1982.

Mr. WALDEN. So then I just want to make sure I understand

what you are saying, what did you say, the LAN——

Ms. DREYER. The Navy, one of the field divisions of the Navy.

Mr. WALDEN. So they were maybe responsible for ensuring that

these regulations were followed, water was——

Ms. DREYER. They were conducting the water sampling and analysis. And at that time, they were trying to comply with the future

76

regulation of the disinfection byproduct process, TTHMs. And that

is when this all came about, when they were gearing up to find out

if those chemicals were in the water. And they were masked by

these other chemicals when those came to light.

Mr. WALDEN. I see. I guess what I am struggling with, and I

imagine some of my colleagues are, is, if you were seeing this pollutant in the tap water, wouldn’t it have made sense in less time

than 4 years to go to the sources and see where it was coming

from?

Ms. DREYER. Yes, it does.

Mr. WALDEN. We are looking back, so we have got 20/20 vision.

Ms. DREYER. That is correct. And through my research, through

everyone’s research, including the first panel, the second, all three

panels, we have all been trying to figure out what happened. We

are looking back 20 years, trying to put it into context, trying to

figure out, could we have done things better? Should we do things

better? But trying to reconstruct that is very, very difficult.

Mr. WALDEN. Right. I am not trying to pit one branch against

the other. My understanding is the Air Force took that action in

a matter of what, a month’s time or something when they discovered at Wurtsmith that the tap water was bad. They went right to

the wells.

Ms. DREYER. Right.

Mr. WALDEN. So why wouldn’t that have occurred?

Ms. DREYER. I am not familiar with their water distribution systems. I really think it would be more appropriate if they were in

the room to answer. But we could have different systems. I am not

sure.

Mr. WALDEN. General, did you have something?

General DICKERSON. Sir, I would just add, if this was to occur

today and there were no levels that had been determined by the

EPA, the water would be shut down until they could find the ingredient that is being introduced into the water. We have learned a

lot from what happened back in the early 1980’s.

Mr. WALDEN. Yes.

General DICKERSON. We had to rely upon the science, the data

that is coming out of ATSDR to find out what was the impact.

Mr. WALDEN. And I hope you understand where we are coming

from. We want to make sure it never happens again first. And that

is our job on the oversight committee all the time is to figure out,

what went wrong; why did it go wrong; and how do we prevent it

from going wrong again on all these topics we take up. But second

is, I think you hear the passion in our voices about taking care of

those especially who have worn our Nation’s uniform, who have

been injured by this. And I realize you are doing the studies and

all that, but these people are sick and dying along the way and

fighting for benefits and help for illnesses that it looks to me like

there is a pretty good relationship here. But I am not a scientist.

But we need to take care of those people.

General DICKERSON. Our most precious resources are our Marines and families, and we are going to do everything possible to

take care of them.

Mr. WALDEN. I am sorry to interrupt you. I am going to run out

of time here. I want to go to one other point you said, because you

77

talked about, you got a letter notifying you of potential health risks

from Camp Lejeune.

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. Do you know how many of those letters went out?

General DICKERSON. It was my information and knowledge that

everybody living on the base got one of those official letters. Now

whether they were received or not I cannot testify to this committee.

Mr. WALDEN. I understand, but this is everybody living on the

base at the time you were living on the base?

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. Not that they tracked down those who had lived

on the base.

General DICKERSON. No, sir, at that point in time, from the commanding general, it was those who were living on the base.

Mr. WALDEN. At that time?

General DICKERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. This would explain why some people in the room

say I didn’t get a letter, because they may have not been living on

the base at that time. Is that correct?

General DICKERSON. To my knowledge, that is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. So I think the other piece we are after here is,

what would it take to reach out to anybody who had lived on the

base? I am assuming somewhere in their military files that OSD

has, or somebody, there is a chronology of where everybody was at

any time, or Camp Lejeune probably has records that would indicate who lived there and who didn’t. Is that correct?

Ms. DREYER. There is a lot of information out there about that.

I will say that, upon conclusion of the ATSDR study, the Marine

Corps is going to conduct full notification in conjunction with

ATSDR to get the result, not only the potential exposure but the

effects of that. What does it mean?

Mr. WALDEN. Sure.

Ms. DREYER. Right now, the Marine Corps, ATSDR has just completed their water modeling, so they have their estimations of how

much people may have been exposed to. They mentioned also that

they have not yet completed the Hadnot Point water modeling system. So those people still don’t have answers to these important

questions. The third thing that they don’t have yet is, what does

this mean? And I think you are getting at that here. We know that

people were exposed. We know there were chemicals in the water.

What does that mean? A lot of people want to know that same

question. I know ATSDR does. That is why we need to have the

study completed. But one other thing, it is not as easy to contact

people individually, especially prior to the early 1970’s, when people did not have Social Security numbers, and they had service ID

numbers in the military. So that would be a very difficult and laborious task. We could try. But I could never commit to finding 100

percent of people who may have been exposed that. It would be

very difficult. The best way to reach them is probably through

mass media and every alternative possible, being as broad as possible.

Mr. WALDEN. We just don’t want to leave anybody behind.

Ms. DREYER. I agree, sir.

78

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a comment. All of us have the highest respect and admiration for our

men and women serving in the military, and those who have

served, but I think the bottom line of this incident at Camp

Lejeune can be summarized in just a few comments from the EPA

Criminal Investigation Division of the Naval Facilities Engineering

Command Atlantic Division on this incident. And they said, in a

number of different places, this investigation found the staff of the

LANTDIV was not forthcoming when questioned about these

issues. This investigation found that LANTDIV as a technical advisory organization to Camp Lejeune was not diligent in providing

the technical expertise on this issue. LANTDIV personnel consistently steered away from admitting any knowledge of organic interference from solvents. The biggest area of concern were the seemingly rehearsed statements provided by the personnel of LANTDIV.

The greatest concern lay in the fact that investigators found

LANTDIV personnel to have been coached. Something I think there

may not have been any criminal charges, but I think it is a sad

day that the investigation shows quite clearly that people were not

forthcoming. And like I said, we are very proud of our military, but

I think, in this incident, the military leadership failed the men and

women who serve this country and their families.

General DICKERSON. Sir, if I could comment on that, it would be

beneficial if you could get representatives from LANTDIV to answer that question directly.

Mr. STUPAK. We plan on having them in. I just don’t do one hearing and stop it. This thing is going to go on. LANTDIV is the Naval

Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic Division. So the military

certainly knew about it. And as Mr. Whitfield didn’t say, he didn’t

go on and talk about even far more, that it wasn’t until 1984 that

the Natural Resources Environment Affairs Division at Camp

Lejeune personnel ever sampled individual wells, as opposed to finished drinking water at the water treatment plants. Self-admittedly, this was the most significant lapse in judgment. Not only

didn’t do it until 1984, but you actually had your Naval regulations

in 1972, so for 12 years they did nothing because your Naval regulations under tab number 20 is very clear, the presence of the following substances in excess of the concentrations listed shall constitute grounds for rejection of supply—rejection of the water supply; 3 parts per billion. You were way over that. Way over that.

Your own rules said you should have rejected it. And you didn’t do

anything. So that is why we are here.

This, also, lack of notice; you can’t notify people. When you take

a look at the report, whether it is GAO, they tell you how many

people were on base, how many people came on base. I can’t believe

the military cannot provide that information to either, whether it

is Dr. Sinks’ group or whatever, or they could get a letter, like you

indicated. My chief of staff here sits here and says, man, I moved

three times in the last few years, but still I get a recall notice on

a car that I owned three moves ago. And if a private company can

still notify you about your clunker, which is probably already no

longer on the road, but can give you recall notices, I would think

the military could contact people who were exposed. And I would

79

go from 1957 until 1987, that 30-year period. I just can’t believe

you can’t do that. That’s inconceivable to me.

Any further questions? We will dismiss this panel. Thank you.

Dr. Sinks, you had something you wanted to add?

Mr. SINKS. Yes, just to remind you that we are involved in the

feasibility study. The feasibility study is looking at adults. It would

look at cancer incidence and total mortality. We are working with

the Department of Defense to identify records of individuals who

were at Camp Lejeune during that time period. And we have had

a good amount of cooperation from them to determine if we can get

access to those records and construct the cohort of individuals you

are suggesting.

Mr. STUPAK. I am sure if you are wanting all these studies done,

I am sure if you just reach out to those people who were exposed

to TCEs and PCEs from 1957 to 1987 in Camp Lejeune, sent them

a letter and put it in their hot little hand, so there is no dispute

whether or not they got notice, I am sure they would give you a

waiver so you could get all the medical records you wanted. But

until they get that letter, they have got to rely on media. And even

though we have a little coverage of this hearing today, 99 percent

of them will never hear about this hearing we had today. That’s

why it is so important to have direct contact with those individuals.

And those people who were off base but worked on base, they certainly drank that water, too. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Our next panel, a third panel, as this

panel vacates, I will ask the following witnesses to come forward

for our third panel: Dr. Peter Murtha, Director of EPA’s Office of

Criminal Enforcement; Mr. Tyler Amon, Special Agent for EPA’s

Criminal Investigation Division; Mr. Frank Hill, Director of Superfund Division at EPA’s Region 4 Office; and Dr. Marcia Crosse, Director of Public Health and Military Health Care issues in the Government Accountability Office, GAO.

Mr. Amon, are you going to testify? OK. We got everybody at the

table.

As you know, it is the policy of this committee to take testimony

under oath. Please be advised that, under the rules of the House,

you have the right to be advised by counsel during your testimony.

Any of you wish to be advised by counsel during your testimony?

There are no indications. I think everyone does not wish to be represented by counsel. I am going to ask you to rise and raise your

right-hand, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. STUPAK. I would like the record to reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. We will now begin with our 5-minute

opening statements from our witnesses. We will start on the righthand side.

Mr. Murtha.

STATEMENT OF PETER J. MURTHA, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT, FORENSICS AND TRAINING, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee, I am Peter J. Murtha, and have been Director of the

80

Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training, at U.S.

EPA since November 2003. Previously, I spent over 16 years as a

Federal prosecutor. Thank you for inviting me to appear today to

discuss the agency’s criminal investigation relating to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and the decision not to proceed with Federal criminal charges. Mr. Chairman and members of

the subcommittee, EPA respects your oversight interests.

I would like to acknowledge that Special Agent Amon is present

here today at the committee’s request. However, I would like to

note for the record that EPA has objected to the subcommittee

seeking the testimony of a field agent such as Special Agent Amon.

We have outlined our reasons and offer of accommodation in a letter that we sent to the subcommittee. Nonetheless, given the

unique and compelling circumstances surrounding this hearing,

Special Agent Amon is available to testify if the subcommittee finds

that necessary.

In bringing this investigation, we were acutely aware of the anguish and deeply held feelings of the former military and civilian

residents of Camp Lejeune who brought the allegations. And I can

say that we were especially careful to conduct this investigation as

comprehensively as possible. The criminal investigation was opened

in October 2003. The investigation was conducted by a senior

criminal investigator out of the CID’s division in Charlotte, North

Carolina. I have conferred extensively with that investigator for my

testimony here today. The investigation was also closely monitored

by CID headquarters in Washington. Close and ongoing consultation was maintained with both DoJ’s Environmental Crimes Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Raleigh, North Carolina. Investigators examined events surrounding the generation of the

1980 through 1982 water sampling results provided by the U.S.

Army Environmental Hygiene Agency and by the Grainger Laboratory. The latter report definitively identified the presence of TCE

and PCE in Camp Lejeune’s drinking water in 1982.

The initial reaction to and decisions made by the military after

having received these two sets of data was important background

information for the investigation. CID investigators interviewed 26

individuals, including personnel from Camp Lejeune and the Navy

Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic Division, or LANTDIV,

which had oversight responsibility for environmental conditions at

the base during this period; consulted extensively with an expert

in public health and drinking water regulation; and reviewed thousands of pages of relevant documents during the course of this investigation. After about 18 months of investigation, and a thorough

review of all the pertinent evidence, the agency and DoJ mutually

agreed that criminal charges should not be sought in this matter.

That decision was primarily based on the following findings.

First, the Safe Drinking Water Act provided no enforceable limits

on TCE and PCE at the time that military officials became aware

of the presence of these chemicals in the water supply at the base.

EPA did not pass enforceable regulations relating to these chemicals until 1989 and 1991, respectively.

I should also mention, parenthetically, even if those standards

had been in place, the Safe Drinking Water Act does not provide

criminal penalties for knowingly providing drinking water which

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violates standards. Rather, the act only provides criminal penalties

for introducing contaminants with specific intent to harm.

Second, the statute of limitations for all substantive Federal

crimes is 5 years. Thus, even had there been criminal conduct committed in the 1980’s, it would not have been prosecutable in 2005

unless it formed a part of a criminal conspiracy that continued to

a point within the limitations period. The investigation found no

such ongoing conspiracy by any persons with a role providing

drinking water at Camp Lejeune. The investigation concluded that

there was no conspiracy to conceal records and prevent persons

from talking with ATSDR regarding the congressionally mandated

health study or to conceal FOIA records from the public. The investigation further determined that the Marine Corps did not make

false statements to Federal investigators and that there was no

basis on which to prosecute LANTDIV personnel for false statements or obstruction of the investigation.

Finally, with regard to the allegations regarding the ATSDR, the

investigation did not substantiate allegations of a conspiracy to improperly administer its health study or destroy ATSDR records.

In summary, DoJ and EPA concluded that when all the available

evidence was considered under the environmental requirements applicable at the time of the relevant activities in this case, the evidence did not support the bringing of Federal criminal charges.

Harm occurred at Camp Lejeune and individuals suffered. However, after a thorough investigation, it was determined that the

criminal enforcement process was not a viable means of addressing

those wrongs. Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today,

and I would be glad to answer any questions from the subcommittee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murtha follows:]

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Mr. STUPAK. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Amon, you wish to say anything?

Mr. AMON. I have no opening remarks.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Dr. Crosse?

STATEMENT OF MARCIA G. CROSSE, DIRECTOR, PUBLIC

HEALTH AND MILITARY HEALTH CARE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ms. CROSSE. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,

I am pleased to be here today as you examine issues relating to

drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. My remarks today

are based on GAO’s recent report on efforts to identify and address

the past contamination; the provision of funding and information

from DoD to ATSDR for its work; and an assessment by an independent panel of experts of the design of the current ATSDR health

study.

Efforts to identify and address past drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune began when the Navy started water testing

to prepare for upcoming drinking water regulations. In 1980, volatile organic compounds, VOCs, were first detected during an analysis that combined treated water from all base water systems. During the same year, the Navy began monitoring Camp Lejeune’s

treated water for total trihalomethanes, TTHMs, contaminants

that are a byproduct of the water treatment process. These tests

reported interference from unidentified chemicals. In 1982 and

1983, additional testing identified two VOCs, trichloroethylene,

TCE, a metal degreaser, and tetrachloroethylene, PCE, a dry cleaning solvent in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. Sampling results indicated that the levels of TCE and PCE

found in the treated water varied.

Former Camp Lejeune environmental officials told us that they

did not take action to address the contamination because, at that

time, they had little knowledge about TCE and PCE, and there

were no drinking water regulations that gave enforceable limits for

these chemicals. In addition, the variation in water testing results

raised questions about the validity of the tests. Camp Lejeune officials told us that, in retrospect, it was likely that rotation of wells

in these water systems contributed to the variation in results.

Also, in 1982, a Navy environmental program began investigating potentially contaminated sites at many Marine Corps and Navy

bases, including Camp Lejeune. Testing initiated under that program in 1984 and 1985 identified individual wells in the Hadnot

Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems that were contaminated

with TCE, PCE and other VOCs. Ten wells were subsequently removed from service in late 1984 and early 1985.

Since 1991, ATSDR has been examining whether individuals who

were exposed to the contaminated drinking water are likely to have

adverse health effects. DoD is required to provide funding and data

as necessary for ATSDR to carry out certain health-related activities, including Public Health Assessments. In conducting its Camp

Lejeune related work, ATSDR has not always received requested

DoD funding and has experienced delays in receiving information

from DoD. For example, for 3 out of the 16 fiscal years, no funding

was provided by any DoD entity to ATSDR for its Camp Lejeune

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related work because the agencies could not reach agreement about

the funding. ATSDR also had difficulties getting documents needed

from Camp Lejeune while it was conducting a Public Health Assessment for the base. However, ATSDR officials told us that, while

funding and access to records were probably slowed down and

made more expensive by DoD, this did not significantly impede

ATSDR’s efforts. These officials also stated that situations such as

limitations in access to data are normal during the course of a

study.

ATSDR’s current study is examining whether individuals who

were exposed in utero are more likely to have developed certain

childhood cancers or birth defects. To review the design of this

study, we contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene an expert panel. Panel members generally agreed that many

parameters of the current study are appropriate, including the

study population, the exposure time frame and the selected health

effects. Some panel experts said that the projected December 2007

completion date appeared to be reasonable, while others said that

the date might be optimistic.

Finally, these experts said that the ATSDR study could be

strengthened by expanding it to include an additional comparison

population of individuals who were not exposed to the contamination but that this would likely extend the time needed to complete

the study. They also noted that while the in utero population being

studied was the most vulnerable to the contamination, other health

conditions, such as adverse neurological or behavioral effects and

pregnancy loss, could be related to this exposure.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be

happy to respond to questions that you or other members of the

subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Crosse follows:]

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Mr. Hill, you opening statement, please?

STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN HILL, DIRECTOR, SUPERFUND DIVISION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4

Mr. HILL. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am

Franklin Hill, Director of the Superfund Division for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in region 4 in Atlanta.

The Superfund Division oversees cleanups of private and public

property that is on the National Priorities List, a list of the country’s most polluted sites. And we do that with a goal of protecting

human health and the environment.

Currently, there are 165 private sites and 19 Federal sites on the

NPL in region 4. I appreciate the opportunity to provide you with

an overview of EPA’s involvement in the Superfund cleanup activities at Camp Lejeune Military Reservation and Marine Corps Base.

During the 18 years that EPA has been involved in cleanup at

Camp Lejeune, we have made significant progress in cleaning up

contaminated soil and groundwater. To date, we have selected remedies at 30 sites within Camp Lejeune and anticipate selection of

the last remedy in the year of 2011. EPA region 4 received a letter

dated April 25, 1986, from the Department of the Navy which provided sampling data from water samples taken from groundwater

monitoring and drinking water wells at Camp Lejeune. The letter

informed EPA that the Navy had shut down 10 drinking water

wells at Camp Lejeune because 1985 sampling results showed contamination in those wells. The State of North Carolina, in a separate investigation, concluded that the likely source of contamination found in two of those wells was the ABC One-Hour Cleaners,

a private business located outside the boundaries of Camp Lejeune.

Subsequent investigations have revealed additional sources of

groundwater contamination.

The ABC One-Hour Cleaners: the ABC Cleaners site is located

at 2127 Lejeune Boulevard Jacksonville, Onslow County, NC and

encompasses an area of approximately 1 acre. In 1984, as part of

a routine water quality evaluation, the Navy collected groundwater

samples and determined that volatile organic compounds, including

dichloroethylene, trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene, were

present in 10 of 40 well samples. Two of the 10 wells were located

within the Camp Lejeune Tarawa Terrace well field in the vicinity

of the ABC Cleaners.

In 1985, the Wilmington Regional Office of the Division of Environmental Management, North Carolina Department of Natural

Resources and Community Development, conducted a groundwater

pollution study to find the source of PCE in wells within the

Tarawa Terrace well field. The study concluded that most likely

the source of groundwater contamination was ABC Cleaners. The

ABC One-Hour Cleaners was proposed to the National Priorities

List by EPA on June 24, 1988, which became final on March 31,

1989.

A record of decision, as we refer to as a ROD, for contaminated

groundwater was signed in 1993 and required remediation of VOCcontaminated groundwater by a treatment system. A second ROD

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was signed in 1994 to address soil contamination using soil vapor

extraction. The SVE system has been operating since August 2000

to remove a source of groundwater contamination. ABC Cleaners

site is a private Superfund lead site and is not part of the Camp

Lejeune military base. However, contaminated groundwater from

ABC Cleaners has migrated onto the base.

The responsible parties have been identified by EPA as the ABC

Cleaners owners and operators. On July 17, 2000, EPA entered

into an Administrative Order of Consent with ABC Cleaners and

its owners and operators for settlement. The AOC required that, if

settling parties ever receive payment on an insurance claim, then

50 percent of any insurance proceeds must be paid to EPA. At this

time, the terms of the settlement have been completed, and there

is no evidence that the parties collected insurance money.

Camp Lejeune: Under CERCLA, section 120, the EPA has evaluated releases at this Federal facility using its Hazard Ranking System criteria. The EPA conducted an initial investigation in 1988

and proposed Camp Lejeune for the NPL on June 24, 1988, which

became final on October 4, 1989. The basis for the listing of Camp

Lejeune on the NPL was pesticide-contaminated soil at an area on

the base where pesticides were mixed and application equipment

were cleaned.

Pursuant to CERCLA 120(e)(2), an interagency agreement, referred to as a Federal Facilities Agreement, was signed by EPA

and the Navy and the State of North Carolina in February 1991.

The FFA requires, among other things, that the facility prepare a

Site Management Plan for EPA approval that identifies all of the

sites and operating units that require further investigation and/or

response action by the Navy. The Navy’s Installation Restoration

Program is responsible for implementation of the CERCLA cleanup

under the FFA. The Site Management Plan also includes a list of

enforceable milestones related to CERCLA that are enforceable by

EPA.

Additional activities: 46 sites have been identified for cleanup at

Camp Lejeune. The Navy and EPA have selected remedies for 30

of those sites, and the remaining 16 are under active investigation.

The first ROD was signed in September 1992 and addressed contamination of groundwater in the Hadnot Point area. Remedies to

address groundwater contamination include groundwater pump

and treatment systems, in situ chemical oxidation, and monitoring

natural attenuation. Six pilot studies are under way to evaluate

treatment options for remaining VOC-contaminated groundwater

areas at Camp Lejeune. EPA prepared 5-year review reports in November 1999 and February 2005, which evaluated the protectiveness of selected remedies. Below is a summary of the cleanup.

Eleven pilot studies have been completed or are under way to

evaluate remediation techniques for volatile organic compounds.

Removal actions have been completed at two sites, which resulted

in disposal of 696 tons of PCB-contaminated soil and source treatment of 7,500 cubic yards of dense nonaqueous phase liquids. A removal action is under way to treat VOC-contaminated groundwater

of depths of 20 to 47 feet below ground surface. Two RODs were

signed in 2006. One ROD required treatment of contaminated

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groundwater underneath a half acre of the base. This remedy is

underway.

The other ROD determined that no action was necessary. One

Operable Unit has met its remediation goals and achieved site closure. Three sites have undergone site investigations, with two requiring no further action, and the remaining site requiring a soil

removal. At this point in time, Camp Lejeune is scheduled to have

the last remedy selected by 2011 and all remedies in place by 2014.

In conclusion, in the 18 years since EPA listed Camp Lejeune on

the NPL, 46 sites have been investigated. To date, there are 19

signed RODs, encompassing 30 sites at the Camp Lejeune base,

which reflect a remedy selection rate greater than one ROD per

year. The remaining 16 sites are undergoing active investigation.

EPA anticipates that the last remedy will be in place by 2015.

Thank you for this opportunity, and I am available to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

We will begin questioning. Mr. Hill, if I may start with you, you

said you are going to finish in up by 2015?

Mr. HILL. Well, in the Site Management Plan, that is the schedule to address getting the remedies in place. Now what I will tell

you is that those remedies will go on for years after 2015. Pump

and treat is a complicated technology.

Mr. STUPAK. I am familiar with it.

Mr. HILL. And it takes quite some time to get there.

Mr. STUPAK. Camp Lejeune was listed in 1989. That was when

it was final, you said. Here we are 18 years later, and nothing has

been cleaned up; has it?

Mr. HILL. Well, we have a couple of sites that we have removed,

or we have decided that they have reached their remedial goals.

We have had some soil——

Mr. STUPAK. You are close?

Mr. HILL. We have had a number of cleanups on the site. So the

answer to your question, sir, is yes, there have been some cleanups.

Mr. STUPAK. Of the 46 sites, how many have been cleaned up?

Mr. HILL. That is a good question. I don’t want to guess at that,

but I know that there are several removals that have been completed.

Mr. STUPAK. OK.

Mr. HILL. I can get you those specifics, but I don’t have the specific numbers.

Mr. STUPAK. You won’t even get to your last ROD, I think your

testimony said, until, what, 2014?

Mr. HILL. Right.

Mr. STUPAK. Your Record of Decision; so that is 25 years after

Camp Lejeune was named a Superfund site. What is causing the

delay? Lack of money? Lack of resources? Why delay? Why 25

years?

Mr. HILL. Well, I think it is a combination of things. I think it

is, resources, clearly, is one option or one issue.

Mr. STUPAK. Who should be providing the resources for this?

EPA? DoD? Who should be providing the resources to clean up

Camp Lejeune?

Mr. HILL. DoD should be providing those resources.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Has DoD been forthcoming in bringing resources to the table to help clean up Camp Lejeune?

Mr. HILL. They have been. Of course, as all budgets, we are seeing those budgets start to diminish.

Mr. STUPAK. But the pollution at Camp Lejeune is not diminishing.

Mr. HILL. I would say that it is. Based upon some of the monitoring data, those numbers are going down.

Mr. STUPAK. Based upon migrating over somewhere else or

where?

Mr. HILL. No. Actually, we have three pump and treat systems

in place right now at the Hadnot Point area. And we can demonstrate from the monitoring data that those concentrations that

were listed in the GAO report are now going down.

Mr. STUPAK. The part that bothers me a little bit, you mentioned

ABC Cleaners, which is just on the outside of Camp Lejeune. The

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ROD was what, 1989, and it was cleaned up in 1994? It took about

5 years to do that. That is on an acre. And that was the contamination that drifted over to Tarawa Terrace. How come you got that

one cleaned up in like 5 years, and yet we are 25 years and not

even getting cleaned up?

Mr. HILL. Chairman, let me correct you. First of all, ABC Cleaners is not cleaned up. We have a remedy in place, and it is construction complete. We have built a groundwater pump and treat

system, and we have an SVE system addressing soils on-site.

Mr. STUPAK. So it is still going?

Mr. HILL. It is still going.

Mr. STUPAK. So the ROD was 5 years.

Mr. HILL. Right.

Mr. STUPAK. And your last ROD still isn’t done for Camp

Lejeune. So there is a pumping station. How long will that go on,

that pumping station at ABC Cleaners?

Mr. HILL. It will go on until we achieve the remedial goals for

that site. And right now, we are looking at North Carolina standards, which is about 2.8 parts per billion for TCE. So that is quite

a conservative number. And it will take us some time to achieve

that.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Amon, were you here for the first panel testifying? Were you

in the room?

Mr. AMON. Sir, I believe I walked in towards the end of that testimony.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Are you familiar with Mr. Ensminger?

Mr. AMON. I am.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. In his written testimony, he states you told him

you recommended criminal charges against certain subjects. That

was part of your investigation. Is that correct?

Mr. AMON. That is not correct.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. You didn’t make any recommendations?

Mr. AMON. I just collect the facts, the evidence, and present that

to my supervisors, and then, in this case, the Department of Justice, for consideration.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Do you present that in writing or orally?

Mr. AMON. Both.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And you made no recommendations of any

charges?

Mr. AMON. That is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And why did you recommend no criminal

charges?

Mr. AMON. In this matter, based upon the evidence in all forms

that I was able to review, I presented that to the Department of

Justice, I presented that to my supervisors, and based upon that

analysis, a determination was made that the statute did not call

for Federal charges. And I concurred with that analysis.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. I realize, and testimony has been clear, that

Justice Department decided not to prosecute because of a lack of

EPA standards on TCE and PCE in drinking water in the early

1980’s. But given the report that we reviewed, and I believe it is

your report, that the evidence of witness coaching and witnesses

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not being forthcoming, shouldn’t you have at least thought about

obstruction of justice charges?

Mr. AMON. And those charges were considered.

Mr. STUPAK. So criminal charges were considered on obstructing

justice?

Mr. AMON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And then who determined not to bring forth the

charges?

Mr. AMON. The Department of Justice ultimately makes decisions on what is charged.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you recommend that there would be obstruction

of justice charges brought forth? Did you recommend?

Mr. AMON. Did I personally, Tyler Amon?

Mr. STUPAK. Yes.

Mr. AMON. In this matter, specifically as it pertains to the obstruction charges that you are indicating from, I believe, a report

that I generated during the course of this case, I concurred with

the Department of Justice’s decision not to proceed with charges.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. But I am trying to ask you, did you recommend

that obstruction charges be brought? Obstruction of justice charges.

Mr. AMON. As a field agent, recommend is an action that is

not——

Mr. STUPAK. OK. When you do your investigation, you send it to

the prosecutor for action; right?

Mr. AMON. That is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. And you indicated you submitted that written and

orally; correct?

Mr. AMON. That is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. So, in your oral discussions with Justice Department, did you ask for, did you seek obstruction of justice charges?

Mr. AMON. In my report, which would be written, I do identify

areas of concern related to obstruction of justice; that is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. Correct. OK. So did you ask for a warrant? Let me

put it bluntly.

Mr. AMON. No, I did not.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. How about the doctor who destroyed the

records as to the telephone logs? Did you ask for obstruction of justice there?

Mr. AMON. I am sorry, refresh my memory.

Mr. STUPAK. Page 56 of your report, if you have it there in front

of you, unredacted report. You must have it with you there; right?

It is on page 56.

Mr. AMON. That is correct. I see that here. Could you repeat the

question, please?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. And if you go down there, that report, about

third paragraph says, while it is not clear blank gave a direct order

to destroy the records, it is clear that blank fully expected and specifically advised blank not to take any Camp Lejeune records from

the Division of Health Studies. And you go down that those records

never made it to the records, and they were destroyed. Did you recommend obstruction of justice charges there?

Mr. AMON. Sir, in regard to the ATSDR records, those records actually never were destroyed.

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Mr. STUPAK. OK. Not the ATSDR, but the individual’s notes. And

those notes are important because it identifies names, numbers

and medical information that this individual had conducted over a

year in their capacity. And those personal records were destroyed;

not ATSDR, but those personal records, which would be useful, as

you indicate, in this investigation.

Mr. AMON. Sir, the records that you speak of that pertain to a

doctor who was involved in the Camp Lejeune matter on behalf of

ATSDR, had records that were kept in the course of that doctor’s

work at ATSDR. But I think, fairly, as you are indicating, they

were records that were taken in booklets and whatnot that that

doctor retained. I actually seized those records from that doctor

and retained those in evidence in the criminal investigations file in

Charlotte, North Carolina, until the conclusion of this case.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Where are they now then?

Mr. AMON. They are now at ATSDR.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. You indicate in your criminal investigation that

the biggest area of concern were the seemingly rehearsed statements provided by personnel at LANTDIV. That is on page 29. And

you go on to page 30, greatest concern lay in the fact that investigators found LANTDIV personnel—that’s Naval Facilities Engineering Command personnel—to have been coached. Is that true?

Mr. AMON. That is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. And there were no violations of any laws there, obstruction of justice, there in all the coaching?

Mr. AMON. Again, I provided those to the Department of Justice

in my hierarchy for consideration. Those statements, those statements you see there in the report were a summary of what the evidence in this case, referring to both documentary and testimony

evidence, that I was able to review. And based upon that, I wrote

how I saw it.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Whitfield for questions.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murtha referred to a letter that he wrote to Mr. Dingell regarding this hearing. And if there is not any objection, we would

just like to enter that into the record. I think you all have a copy

of it as well.

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection, the letter of June 11, 2007, is entered in the record. And we should enter in the record my response

is, Mr. Amon will be here and will testify.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Great. Thank you. Now, Mr. Hill, ABC Cleaners,

that was one of the primary sources of this contamination. Who

was the owner of ABC Cleaners?

Mr. HILL. I don’t have the name. I just have a reference to the

owner and operators.

Mr. WHITFIELD. But, at that time, there was not any criminal activity or any criminal charges that could be brought against ABC

Cleaners?

Mr. HILL. No, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Because there were no laws on the books relating to contaminating groundwater and so forth?

Mr. HILL. I wouldn’t say that there were no laws on the books,

that if there was criminal activity.

Mr. WHITFIELD. It was probably negligent activity.

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Mr. HILL. I would possibly agree with that. But it was never investigated as a criminal act.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So it was never investigated as a criminal act.

Now, do you have any idea of what the dollar cost will be for the

cleanup of Camp Lejeune, the total cleanup?

Mr. HILL. I don’t. And we were trying to get to some final dollar

figures. We have estimated that we have already spent upwards of

$100 million, but I don’t have the detailed dollar amounts.

Mr. WHITFIELD. $100 million has already been spent?

Mr. HILL. That is an estimate on my part, just based upon some

discussions I had this morning. We would have to talk to DoD to

get those figures.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And since there hasn’t been very much of a

cleanup, I am assuming that we can multiply that by a relatively

large number.

Mr. HILL. Well, again, we make reference that there has not

been much of a cleanup. I just want to go back and reassure you

that there has been a tremendous amount of work.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK.

Mr. HILL. A lot of aggressive soil surface excavation work has

been done. Groundwater pump and treatment systems are in place.

Treatability studies in the field. So a lot of work has been done

here.

Mr. WHITFIELD. But the ultimate costs, would it be equal to a billion dollars? Would you say that is possible?

Mr. HILL. I would hate to speculate on the costs, but I can get

back with you on an estimate.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. Of course, the dollar cost is very small considering the health costs that have been incurred and the deaths

that have been incurred. But ultimately the taxpayers will be paying for this. Is that correct?

Mr. HILL. Yes.

Mr. WHITFIELD. You did indicate that you had reached an agreement or a settlement with ABC Cleaners. But I assume the only

dollar amount you would get from them was from the insurance

policy, and they never received any compensation. Is that correct?

Mr. HILL. We actually have an ability-to-pay process where we

looked at the owners and operators’ capability to pay, and there

was an amount that they were able to pay. And they came forward

with that amount.

Mr. WHITFIELD. They did?

Mr. HILL. Yes.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So they did pay something?

Mr. HILL. They did pay something.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And they are no longer in business?

Mr. HILL. The individuals at that time I am not sure are still operating the business, but it is my understanding that it is now still

a drop-off cleaners operation.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Oh, it is? OK.

Mr. Amon, do you work for the Department of Justice or EPA?

Mr. AMON. I work for the Environmental Protection Agency.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you report to Mr. Murtha?

Mr. AMON. Through a series of a hierarchy, yes.

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Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. But when you do criminal investigations for

EPA, the Department of Justice, they actually bring any charges

through their U.S. Attorneys if there are charges. Is that correct?

Or do you all have the authority to bring charges as well?

Mr. MURTHA. No, sir, we work through the Department of Justice, both the U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Environmental

Crimes Section of main Justice. Both were involved in this particular investigation.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I know that—I am sure, Mr. Murtha, that you

and Mr. Amon both sat in with the Department of Justice when

you were considering the criminal charges in this case. And I am

not defending Mr. Libby at all, Vice President Cheney’s chief of

staff who is now in prison for divulging—he is not in prison yet.

He has been convicted. He has been sentenced. But for divulging

the name of an undercover agent. And in this instance, we have

many people who have died. We have had many people who have

suffered significant health problems. We have huge environmental

costs involving cleanup. And some of the phrases used regarding

the Navy Engineering’s testimony and how they were not forthcoming, how they had been coached, how they seemed to be concealing,

and it seems sort of puzzling that there were not some sort of obstruction of justice charges levied in that case.

Mr. MURTHA. Sir, if I may respond to that?

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes.

Mr. MURTHA. I was not in fact involved in any of the discussions

concerning whether or not charges would be brought in this case.

I felt a lot of comfort in knowing that both the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Environmental Crimes Section had assigned very experienced and talented prosecutors to this case to work along with Special Agent Amon. And I really felt that a very strong team had

been put together in that connection and that they would be closest

to the evidence and would be in the best position to assess whether

or not charges would be advisable.

I think one also has to bear in mind, although clearly there is

some derogatory information in the investigation that we put together, that it is really a higher bar to bring criminal charges.

Under the principles of Federal prosecution, the Department of

Justice prosecutors need to make sure that they have a reasonable

probability of succeeding on the charges that they bring. And I

think the feeling must have been here that, even though there was

evidence of not being forthcoming, that that evidence didn’t quite

reach the level where there could be a reasonable probability that

convictions would be obtained.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. Thank you.

Ms. Crosse, the GAO spent a lot of time investigating this drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. And I would ask you,

we know that there are some other military bases with similar

problems, and would you have any recommendations on how the

committee should proceed with a review of contamination at other

military bases?

Ms. CROSSE. Sir, I’m not familiar with the circumstances of contamination at other installations. We were mandated by Congress

in the Defense Authorization Act to undertake this review. I just

don’t have information to know about the level of documentation or

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the kinds of circumstances involved. Certainly GAO is available to

review cases, individual cases, or to take a broader look at environmental contamination on military installations around the country.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK.

Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any other questions.

Mr. STUPAK. Just a few, if I may.

Mr. Hill, where’s the water source now for Camp Lejeune? Are

they getting it from nearby cities? Have they drilled other wells?

Mr. HILL. They’re getting it from the Castle Hayne aquifer on

the base.

Mr. STUPAK. Still wells then?

Mr. HILL. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Are you monitoring at all to see if there’s going to

be migration of these contaminants into the other wells on the

base?

Mr. HILL. We do have monitoring wells throughout the base, and

also the Drinking Water Program is monitoring the distribution of

the drinking water for Camp Lejeune.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Thanks.

Mr. Amon, if I may, Mr. Whitfield asked some good questions

about, whatever happened or why weren’t obstruction of justice

charges brought forth on this? When you did your report, who

would you have had to have briefed within your own agency at

EPA then in seeking these charges? Who would you brief?

Mr. AMON. The special agent in charge. In this case that would

have been the SAC in Atlanta, Georgia, that has coverage over

multiple States, including North Carolina.

Mr. STUPAK. So that’s special agent in charge or something?

Mr. AMON. That’s correct.

Mr. STUPAK. Who would that be?

Mr. AMON. Fred Burnside.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Did you ever deal directly with Department of

Justice then? U.S. attorney?

Mr. AMON. I did.

Mr. STUPAK. Who did you deal with there?

Mr. AMON. I dealt primarily with two line prosecutors. In this

case, there was one assigned by the United States Attorney’s Office

in Raleigh, NC, which falls in the eastern district of North Carolina. And the second was, as the director referenced before, main

Justice has a Special Environmental Section. In that case, that was

a trial attorney named Stacey Mitchell.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Who was the gentleman out of North Carolina?

Mr. AMON. Banu Rangarajan. She is female

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Anything else? Nothing further for this panel.

You are dismissed. Thank you again.

Mr. Whitfield, without objection, I would like to put the full binder into the record, and your June 11 record is also in there, that

one document. No objections.

The record will remain open for 30 days for further statements,

opening statements of members or any other documents which the

committee has requested. If people would get them into us, they

will be made part of the record. That concludes all of our questions.

We will dismiss this panel, and that concludes our hearing.

143

Without objection, this subcommittee meeting is adjourned.

Thank you all.

[Whereupon, at 2:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

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EXHIBIT 22

MUNICIPAL/PUBLIC TAP WATER CONTAMINATED WITH TCE AT CONCENTRATIONS

ABOVE EPA MCL 5 PPB

DOORMA DOOR CONTROLS INC HSCA PAD002295376 17 parts per billion

(ppb)

FORMER HULETT LAGOON MOSFN0703530 23.7 parts per billion (ppb)

GEAUGA INDUSTRIES OHD061722575 30 parts per billion (ppb)

GRAFTON WISCONSIN RESIDENTIAL WELL WI0001906981 200parts per billion (ppb)

BOHN HEAT A-C&R DV ILD065243172 730 parts per billion (ppb)

HAWTHORNE MUNICIPAL WELLS NJD980771679 48.6 parts per billion (ppb)

ICELAND COIN LAUNDRY AREA GW PLUME NJ0001360882 41.7 parts per

billion (ppb)

LEE CHEMICAL MOD980853519 36 parts per billion (ppb)

NEWTON COUNTY WELLS MOD985798339 190 parts per billion (ppb)

SOL LYNN/INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMERS TXD980873327 953,000 (ppb)

VEGA ALTA PUBLIC SUPPLY WELLS PRD980763775 42 parts per billion (ppb)

Groundwater Used as Municipal/Public Drinking Water Contaminated with TCE

at Concentrations Above EPA MCL 5ppb

ARIVEC CHEMICALS INC GAD990740714 39000 parts per billion (ppb)

AVCO LYCOMING (WILLIAMSPORT) PAD003053709 250 parts per billion (ppb)

BALLY GROUND WATER PAD061105128 1127 parts per billion (ppb)

BREWSTER WELL FIELD NYD980652275 77parts per billion (ppb)

CARRIER AIR CONDITIONING CO. TND044062222 8.8 parts per billion (ppb)

CHARLEVOIX MUNICIPAL WELL MID980794390 100 parts per billion (ppb)

CLARE WATER SUPPLY MID980002273 1400 parts per billion (ppb)

CROSSLEY FARM PAD981740061 20000 parts per billion (ppb)

CSX/LEWISBURG DERAILMENT TND987775566 45300 parts per billion (ppb)

DELAVAN MUNICIPAL WELL #4 WID980820062 1300 parts per billion (ppb)

FARIBAULT MUNI WELL FIELD MND982074569 180 parts per billion (ppb)

FRIDLEY COMMONS PARK WELL MND985701309 79 parts per billion (ppb)

FULTON AVENUE NY0000110247 1000 parts per billion (ppb)

GEIGY CHEMICAL CORP. (ABERDEEN) NCD981927502 330 parts per billion

(ppb)

GROVELAND WELLS MAD980732317 118.8 parts per billion (ppb)

HAWTHORNE MUNICIPAL WELLS NJD980771679 572 parts per billion (ppb)

HOOKER CHEMICAL & PLASTICS CORP NYD002920312 87 parts per billion

(ppb)

INDIAN BEND WASH AREA AZD980695969 1400 parts per billion (ppb)

INDUSTRIAL LATEX CORP. NJD981178411 89 parts per billion (ppb)

INDUSTRIAL WASTE PROCESSING CAD980736284 390 parts per billion (ppb)

JACKSON STEEL NYD001344456 250 parts per billion (ppb)

KELLOGG-DEERING WELL FIELD CTD980670814 600 parts per billion (ppb)

KENTUCKY AVENUE WELL FIELD NYD980650667 130 parts per billion (ppb)

LASALLE ELECTRIC UTILITIES ILD980794333 5 parts per billion (ppb)

LIBERTY INDUSTRIAL FINISHING NYD000337295 16 parts per billion (ppb)

LODI MUNICIPAL WELL NJD980769301 324.0 parts per billion (ppb)

MAYWOOD CHEMICAL CO. NJD980529762 324.0 parts per billion (ppb)

METALTEC/AEROSYSTEMS NJD002517472 5140 parts per billion (ppb)

MOSES LAKE WELLFIELD WAD988466355 32.2 parts per billion (ppb)

NORTH PENN - AREA 7 PAD002498632 190 parts per billion (ppb)

NORTH RAILROAD AVENUE PLUME NMD986670156 8.3 parts per billion

(ppb)

OAK GROVE VILLAGE WELL MOD981717036 70.8 parts per billion (ppb)

OGALLALA GROUND WATER NED986369247 220 parts per billion (ppb)

OLD ROOSEVELT FIELD NYSFN0204234 170 parts per billion (ppb)

PALERMO WELL FIELD WA0000026534 15.0 parts per billion (ppb)

PASLEY SOLVENTS & CHEMICALS, INC NYD991292004 145 parts per billion

(ppb)

PETOSKEY MUNICIPAL WELL FIELD MID006013049 1000 parts per billion

(ppb)

PINE STREET DUMP MND985739051 48 parts per billion (ppb)

POTTER CO. MSD056029648 848 parts per billion (ppb)

RAILROAD AVENUE GROUNDWATER IA0001610963 6.8 parts per billion (ppb)

REICH FARMS NJD980529713 33 parts per billion (ppb)

ROCKY HILL MUNICIPAL WELL NJD980654156 650 parts per billion (ppb)

400

ROCKAWAY TOWNSHIP WELLS NJD980654214 362 parts per billion (ppb)

RODALE MANUFACTURING CO. PAD981033285 150 parts per billion (ppb)

SAEGERTOWN INDUSTRIAL AREA PAD980692487 310 parts per billion (ppb)

SAN GABRIEL VALLEY (AREA 1,2,3,4) CAD980818512 1800parts per billion

(ppb)

SAN FERNANDO VALLEY (AREA 1) CAD980894893 18000 parts per billion

(ppb)

SAVAGE MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY NHD980671002 244 parts per billion

(ppb)

SOLID STATE CIRCUITS, INC. MOD980854111 290 parts per billion (ppb)

SOUTH MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY NHD980671069 25 parts per billion (ppb)

SPACE ORDNANCE SYSTEMS SAND CYN 511 parts per billion

STURGIS MUNICIPAL WELLS MID980703011 152 parts per billion (ppb)

TOWN GARAGE/RADIO BEACON NHD981063860 148.4 parts per billion (ppb)

TUCSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AZD980737530 2200 parts per billion

(ppb)

TUTU WELLFIELD VID982272569 711 parts per billion (ppb)

VALLEY PARK TCE MOD980968341 600 parts per billion (ppb)

VEGA ALTA PUBLIC SUPPLY WELLS PRD980763775 574 parts per billion

(ppb)

VESTAL WATER SUPPLY WELL 4–2 NYD980652267 974 parts per billion (ppb)

WAITE PARK WELLS MND981002249 5100 parts per billion (ppb)

WELLS G&H MAD980732168 267.40000 parts per billion (ppb)

WHITEHALL MUNICIPAL WELLS MID980701254 68 parts per billion (ppb)

ZANESVILLE WELL FIELD OHD980794598 330 parts per billion (ppb)

Source of information: ATSDR HazDat Database

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