HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Protective 

Service Continues to 

Face Challenges with 

Contract Guards and 

Risk Assessments at 

Federal Facilities

Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director

Physical Infrastructure Team

Testimony

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EST

December 17, 2013

GAO-14-235T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-235T, testimony before 

the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

December 2013

HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Protective Service Continues to Face 

Challenges with Contract Guards and Risk 

Assessments at Federal Facilities

Why GAO Did This Study

As part of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) is responsible for 

protecting federal employees and 

visitors in approximately 9,600 federal 

facilities under the control and custody 

of the General Services Administration 

(GSA). Recent incidents at federal 

facilities demonstrate their continued 

vulnerability to attacks or other acts of 

violence. To help accomplish its 

mission, FPS conducts facility security 

assessments and has approximately 

13,500 contract security guards 

deployed to federal facilities. 

This testimony discusses challenges 

FPS faces in (1) ensuring contract 

security guards deployed to federal 

facilities are properly trained and 

certified and (2) conducting risk 

assessments at federal facilities. It is 

based on GAO work issued from 2008 

through 2013 on FPS’s contract guard 

and risk assessment programs, and 

preliminary results of GAO’s ongoing 

work to determine the extent to which 

FPS and select federal agencies’ 

facility risk assessment methodologies 

align with federal risk assessment 

standards. To perform this work, GAO

reviewed FPS’s and eight federal 

agencies’ risk assessment 

documentation and compared it to the 

Interagency Security Committee (ISC)

standards. These agencies were 

selected based on their missions and 

types of facilities. 

What GAO Recommends

DHS and FPS agreed with the

recommendations in GAO’s 2012 and 

2013 reports to improve FPS’s contract 

guard and risk assessment processes. 

What GAO Found

FPS faces challenges ensuring that contract guards have been properly trained 

and certified before being deployed to federal facilities around the country. In its

September 2013 report, GAO found that providing active shooter response and 

screener training is a challenge for FPS. For example, according to officials at 

five guard companies, their contract guards have not received training on how to 

respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Without ensuring that all 

guards receive training on how to respond to incidents at federal facilities 

involving an active-shooter, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are 

prepared for this threat. Similarly, an official from one of FPS’s contract guard 

companies stated that 133 (about 38 percent) of its approximately 350 guards 

have never received screener training. As a result, guards deployed to federal 

facilities may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not 

qualified to use which raises questions about their ability to screen access control 

points at federal facilities—one of their primary responsibilities. GAO was unable 

to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have received active-shooter 

response and screener training, in part, because FPS lacks a comprehensive 

and reliable system for guard oversight. FPS agreed with GAO’s 2013 

recommendation that they take steps to identify guards that have not had 

required training and provide it to them. GAO also found that FPS continues to 

lack effective management controls to ensure its guards have met its training and 

certification requirements. For instance, although FPS agreed with GAO’s 2012 

recommendation that it develop a comprehensive and reliable system for 

managing information on guards’ training, certifications, and qualifications, it 

does not yet have such a system. 

FPS also continues to face challenges assessing risk at federal facilities. GAO 

reported in 2012 that FPS is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner 

consistent with federal standards. GAO’s preliminary results from its ongoing 

work on risk assessments at federal facilities indicate that this is still a challenge 

for FPS and several other federal agencies. Federal standards, such as the 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s risk management framework and ISC’s 

risk assessment provisions, state that a risk assessment should include threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence assessments. Risk assessments help decisionmakers identify and evaluate security risks and implement protective measures 

to mitigate the risk. Instead of conducting risk assessments, FPS is using an 

interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure 

Survey Tool (MIST) to assess federal facilities until it develops a longer-term 

solution. However, MIST does not assess consequence (the level, duration, and 

nature of potential loss resulting from an undesirable event). Three of the four 

risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does 

not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. Thus, 

FPS has limited knowledge of the risks facing about 9,600 federal facilities

around the country. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence 

information in MIST because it was not part of the original design. GAO will 

continue to monitor this issue and plans to report its final results early next year.

View GAO-14-235T. For more information, 

contact Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or 

GoldsteinM@gao.gov
Page 1 GAO-14-235T 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and Members of the 

Committee:

We are pleased to be here to discuss the efforts of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) to protect 

the nearly 9,600 federal facilities that are under the control and custody of 

the General Services Administration (GSA), including the challenges 

associated with FPS’s use of contract guards and risk assessments. The 

2012 shooting at the Anderson Federal Building in Long Beach, 

California, the results of our 2009 covert testing, and FPS’s ongoing 

penetration testing demonstrate the continued vulnerability of federal 

facilities. Although FPS does not protect the Washington Navy Yard, the 

recent killing of 13 people there once again showed how federal facilities 

can become targets of violence. The challenge of protecting federal 

facilities is one of the major reasons why we have designated federal real 

property management as a high-risk area.1

FPS is authorized to (1) protect the buildings, grounds, and property that 

are under the control and custody of GSA, as well as the persons on the 

property; (2) enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting 

such property and persons on the property; and (3) investigate offenses 

against these buildings and persons.2

• physical security activities—conducting security assessments and 

recommending countermeasures aimed at preventing incidents—and

FPS conducts its mission by 

providing security services through two types of activities:

• law enforcement activities—proactively patrolling facilities, responding 

to incidents, conducting criminal investigations, and exercising arrest 

authority. To accomplish its mission, FPS currently has almost 1,200 

full-time employees and about 13,500 contract guards deployed at 

 1

GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2013). 

2

Section 1315(a) of title 40, United States Code, provides that: “To the extent provided for 

by transfers made pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security...shall protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, 

occupied, or secured by the Federal Government (including any agency, instrumentality, 

or wholly owned or mixed-ownership corporation thereof) and the persons on the 

property.”
Page 2 GAO-14-235T 

federal facilities across the country. It expects to receive 

approximately $1.3 billion in fees for fiscal year 2013.3

Since 2008, we have reported on the challenges FPS faces with carrying 

out its mission, including overseeing its contract guards and assessing 

risk at federal facilities. FPS’s contract guard program is the most visible 

component of the agency’s operations, and the agency relies on its 

guards to be its “eyes and ears” while performing their duties. However, 

we reported in 2010 and again in 2013 that FPS continues to experience 

difficulty ensuring that its guards have the required training and 

certifications. Before guards are assigned to a post (an area of 

responsibility) at a federal facility, FPS requires that they all undergo 

employee fitness determinations4 and complete approximately 120 hours 

of training provided by the contractor and FPS, including basic training 

and firearms training. Among other duties, contract guards are 

responsible for controlling access to facilities; conducting screening at 

access points to prevent the introduction of prohibited items, such as 

weapons and explosives; and responding to emergency situations 

involving facility safety and security.5

This testimony discusses challenges FPS faces in (1) ensuring contract 

security guards deployed to federal facilities are properly trained and 

certified and (2) conducting risk assessments at federal facilities. It is 

based on our reports and testimonies issued from 2008 through 2013 on 

FPS also faces challenges 

assessing risks at the 9,600 facilities under the control and custody of 

GSA. For instance, in 2012, we reported that FPS’s ability to protect and 

secure federal facilities has been hampered by the absence of a risk 

assessment program that is consistent with federal standards. To address 

this issue, we made several recommendations which FPS agreed to 

implement. These recommendations and their status are discussed later 

in this statement.

 3

To fund its operations, FPS charges fees for its security services to federal tenant 

agencies in GSA-controlled facilities.

4

A contractor employee’s fitness determination is based on the employee’s suitability for 

work for or on behalf of the government based on character and conduct.

5

In general, contract guards may only detain, not arrest, individuals at their facility. Some 

contract guards may have arrest authority under conditions set forth by the individual 

states.
Page 3 GAO-14-235T 

FPS’s contract guard and risk assessment programs.6

We conducted our ongoing work from August 2012 to December 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Also, 

our previously issued testimonies and reports were conducted in 

accordance with these standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

A list of these 

related products appears at the end of my statement. As part of the work 

for these products, we reviewed relevant statutes and federal guidance; 

examined FPS contract guard and risk assessment processes and 

procedures; reviewed a sample of contract guard files; conducted site 

visits to FPS’s 11 regions where we interviewed FPS officials; and 

interviewed FPS’s 31 guard companies and 4 risk management experts. 

This testimony is also based on preliminary results of our ongoing effort to 

determine the extent to which FPS and select other federal agencies 

assess risk in accordance with federal risk assessment standards. We 

plan to issue our report early next year. As part of that work, we reviewed 

and analyzed risk assessment documentation and interviewed officials at 

nine federal agencies and compared each agency’s methodology to 

Interagency Security Committee (ISC) standards. The nine selected 

agencies include: Department of Energy, Office of Health, Safety, and 

Security; Department of Interior; Department of Justice, Justice Protective 

Service; Department of State, Diplomatic Security; Department of 

Veterans Affairs; Federal Emergency Management Agency; Federal 

Protective Service; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and Office of 

Personnel Management. These agencies were selected to achieve 

diversity with respect to the number and types of agencies’ facilities, as 

well as the agencies’ missions.

 6

GAO, Federal Protective Service: Challenges with Oversight of Contract Guard Program 

Still Exist, and Additional Management Controls Are Needed, GAO-13-694 (Washington, 

D.C.: September 2013); GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk 

and Better Manage Contract Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO-12-739 (Washington, 

D.C.: August 2012), GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service’s Contract 

Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards,

GAO-10-341 (Washington, D.C.: April 2010) and GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal 

Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal 

Facilities, GAO-08-683 (Washington, D.C.: June 2008).
Page 4 GAO-14-235T 

Additional details about the scope and methodology can be found in each 

of these related reports.

According to FPS officials, since 2010 the agency has required its guards 

to receive training on how to respond to an active-shooter scenario. 

However, as our 2013 report shows,7 FPS faces challenges providing 

active-shooter response training to all of its guards. Without ensuring that 

all guards receive training on how to respond to active-shooter incidents, 

FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat. 

According to FPS officials, the agency provides guards with information 

on how they should respond during an active-shooter incident as part of 

the 8-hour FPS-provided orientation training. FPS officials were not able 

to specify how much time is devoted to this training, but said that it is a 

small portion of the 2-hour special situations training.8

 7

According to FPS’s 

training documents, this training includes instructions on how to notify law 

enforcement personnel, secure the guard’s area of responsibility, 

appropriate use of force, and direct building occupants according to 

emergency plans.

GAO-13-694.

8

This training is provided during a block of training on special situations, which includes 

information on how guards should respond to situations other than their normal duties, 

such as reports of missing or abducted children, bomb threats, and active-shooter 

scenarios. FPS officials stated that guards hired before 2010 should have received this 

information during guard-company-provided training on the guards’ post orders (which 

outline the guards’ duties and responsibilities) as part of basic and refresher training.

FPS Faces 

Challenges Ensuring 

Contract Guards 

Have Been Properly 

Trained and Certified 

before Being 

Deployed to Federal 

Facilities

Some FPS Contract 

Guards Have Not 

Received Required 

Training on Responding to 

Active-Shooter Scenarios
Page 5 GAO-14-235T 

We were unable to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have 

received active-shooter response training, in part, because FPS lacks a 

comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight (as discussed 

below). When we asked officials from 16 of the 31 contract guard 

companies we contacted if their guards had received training on how to 

respond during active-shooter incidents, responses varied.9

• officials from eight contract guard companies stated that their guards 

had received active-shooter scenario training during FPS orientation;

For example, 

of the 16 contract guard companies we interviewed about this topic:

• officials from five guard companies stated that FPS has not provided 

active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPSprovided orientation training; and

• officials from three guard companies stated that FPS had not provided 

active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPSprovided orientation training, but that the topic was covered at some 

other time.

DHS and FPS agreed with our 2013 recommendation to take immediate 

steps to determine which guards have not had screener or active-shooter 

scenario training and provide it to them and, as part of developing a 

national curriculum, decide how and how often these trainings will be 

provided in the future.

As part of their 120 hours of training required by FPS, guards must 

receive 8 hours of screener training from FPS on how to use x-ray and 

magnetometer equipment. However, in our September 2013 report,10 we 

found that FPS has not provided required screener training to all guards. 

Screener training is important because many guards control access 

points at federal facilities and thus must be able to properly operate x-ray 

and magnetometer machines and understand their results. In 2009 and 

2010, we reported that FPS had not provided screener training to 1,500 

contract guards in one FPS region.11

 9

The remaining 15 guard companies did not respond to this question.

In response to those reports, FPS 

10GAO-13-694.

11GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial Steps to 

Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist, GAO-09-1047T (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 23, 2009) and GAO-10-341.

Some FPS Contract 

Guards Have Not 

Received Required 

Screener Training
Page 6 GAO-14-235T 

stated that it planned to implement a program to train its inspectors to 

provide screener training to all its contract guards.

We were unable to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have 

received screener training, but information from guard companies we 

contacted indicate that guards continue to be deployed to federal facilities 

who have never received this training. For example, an official at one 

contract guard company stated that 133 of its approximately 350 guards 

(about 38 percent) on three separate FPS contracts (awarded in 2009) 

have never received their initial x-ray and magnetometer training from 

FPS. The official stated that some of these guards are working at 

screening posts. Further, officials at another contract guard company in a 

different FPS region stated that, according to their records, 78 of 295 

(about 26 percent) guards deployed under their contract have never 

received FPS’s x-ray and magnetometer training. These officials stated 

that FPS’s regional officials were informed of the problem, but allowed 

guards to continue to work under this contract, despite not having 

completed required training. Because FPS is responsible for this training, 

according to guard company officials no action was taken against the 

company. Consequently, some guards deployed to federal facilities may 

be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not qualified to 

use─thus raising questions about the ability of some guards to execute a 

primary responsibility to properly screen access control points at federal 

facilities.

As noted above, FPS agreed with our 2013 recommendation to determine 

which guards have not had screener training and agreed to provide it to 

them.

In our September 2013 report, we found that FPS continues to lack 

effective management controls to ensure that guards have met training 

and certification requirements. For example, although FPS agreed with 

our 2012 recommendation to develop a comprehensive and reliable 

system for contract guard oversight, it has not yet established such a 

system. Without a comprehensive guard management system, FPS has 

no independent means of ensuring that its contract guard companies 

have met contract requirements, such as providing qualified guards to 

federal facilities. Instead, FPS requires its guard companies to maintain 

files containing guard-training and certification information and to provide 

it with a monthly report containing this information. In our September 

2013 report, we reported that 23 percent of the 276 guard files we 

reviewed (maintained by 11 of the 31 guard companies we interviewed) 

FPS Lacks Effective 

Management Controls to 

Ensure Contract Guards 

Have Met Training and 

Certification Requirements
Page 7 GAO-14-235T 

lacked required training and certification documentation.12

Table 1: Total Missing Documents Identified in 64 of 276 Guard Files GAO Reviewed 

As shown in 

table 1, some guard files lacked documentation of basic training, semiannual firearms qualifications, screener training, the 40-hour refresher 

training (required every 3 years), and CPR certification.

Requirement

Number of instances of each 

missing document

Copy of driver’s license/State ID 1

Domestic Violence “Lautenberg” Form 1

Medical certification 1

Verified alien/immigration status 3

Current baton certification 3

Basic training 3

Firearms qualifications 3

First-aid certification 5

FPS screener training—8 hours 5

FPS orientation 8

Contractor employee fitness determination 12

CPR certification 12

AED certification 12

Refresher training 15

Pre-employment drug testing 16

Initial weapons training 17

Total 117

Source: GAO analysis of contract guard company data reported in 2013.

a

Note: These results are nongeneralizeable and based on a review of 276 randomly selected guard 

files for 11 of 117 FPS guard contracts.

a

FPS has also identified guard files that did not contain required 

documentation. FPS’s primary tool for ensuring that guard companies 

comply with contractual requirements for guards’ training, certifications, 

and qualifications is to review guard companies’ guard files monthly. 

Some of the files that did not comply with requirements were missing more than one document, for a 

total of 117 missing documents.

 12See GAO-13-694. During our nongeneralizeable review of 276 randomly selected guard 

files, we found that 64 files (23 percent) were missing one or more required documents.
Page 8 GAO-14-235T 

From March 2012 through March 2013, FPS reviewed more than 23,000 

guard files.13 It found that a majority of the guard files had the required 

documentation but more than 800 (about 3 percent) did not. FPS’s file 

reviews for that period showed files missing, for example, that 

documented screener training, initial weapons training, CPR certification, 

and firearms qualifications. However, as our September 2013 report 

explains, FPS’s process for conducting monthly file reviews does not 

include requirements for reviewing and verifying the results, and we 

identified instances in which FPS’s monthly review results did not 

accurately reflect the contents of guard files. For instance, FPS’s review 

indicated that required documentation was present for some guard files, 

but we were not able to find documentation of training and certification, 

such as initial weapons training, DHS orientation, and pre-employment 

drug screenings.14

DHS and FPS agreed with our 2013 recommendation to develop and 

implement procedures for monthly guard-file reviews to ensure 

consistency in selecting files and verifying the results.

As a result of the lack of management controls, FPS is 

not able to provide reasonable assurance that guards have met training 

and certification requirements.

We reported in 2012 that FPS is not assessing risks at federal facilities in 

a manner consistent with federal standards. The preliminary results of our 

ongoing review of risk assessments of federal facilities indicate that this is 

still a challenge for FPS and several other federal agencies. Federal 

standards such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (NIPP)

risk management framework and ISC risk assessment provisions call for 

a risk assessment to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence 

assessments. Risk assessments help decision-makers identify and 

evaluate security risk and implement protective measures to mitigate risk. 

Moreover, risk assessments play a critical role in helping agencies tailor 

protective measures to reflect their facilities’ unique circumstances and 

enable them to allocate security resources effectively.

 13FPS has approximately 13,500 contract guards, but FPS may review a guard file more 

than once annually.

14For more information on this review and our methodology, see GAO-13-694.

FPS Continues to 

Face Challenges with 

Assessing Risk at 

Federal Facilities
Page 9 GAO-14-235T 

Instead of conducting risk assessments, FPS uses an interim vulnerability 

assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool 

(MIST), with which it assesses federal facilities until it develops a longerterm solution. According to FPS, MIST is allowing it to resume assessing 

federal facilities’ vulnerabilities and recommend countermeasures—

something FPS has not done consistently for several years. However, 

MIST has some limitations. Most notably, it does not assess 

consequence (the level, duration, and nature of potential loss resulting 

from an undesirable event). Three of the four risk assessment experts we 

spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate 

consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. FPS 

officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST 

because it was not part of the original design and thus requires more time 

to validate. MIST also was not designed to compare risks across federal 

facilities. Consequently, FPS does not have the ability to take a 

comprehensive approach to risk management across its portfolio of 9,600 

facilities and recommending countermeasures to federal tenant agencies.

As of December 2013, according to an FPS official, FPS had used MIST 

to complete vulnerability assessments of approximately 1,800 federal 

facilities and have presented approximately 1,000 of them to the facility 

security committees. We will continue to monitor this issue and plan to 

report the results early next year.

DHS agreed with our 2012 recommendations to incorporate NIPP’s risk 

management framework in any future risk assessment tool; coordinate 

with federal agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in FPS’s 

assessments; and address limitations with its interim tool to better assess 

risk at federal facilities. However, it has not yet implemented them.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark Goldstein 

at (202) 512-2834 or by email at GoldsteinM@gao.gov. Individuals 

making key contributions to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, 

Assistant Director; Geoff Hamilton; Bob Homan; and Sara Ann 

Moessbauer.

Contact Information
Related GAO Products

Page 1 GAO-14-235T 

Homeland Security: Challenges Associated with Federal Protective 

Service’s Contract Guards and Risk Assessments at Federal Facilities. 

GAO-14-128T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2013.

Federal Protective Service: Challenges with Oversight of Contract Guard 

Program Still Exist, and Additional Management Controls Are Needed. 

GAO-13-694. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2013.

Facility Security: Greater Outreach by DHS on Standards and 

Management Practices Could Benefit Federal Agencies. GAO-13-222. 

Washington, D.C.: January 24, 2013.

Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk and Better 

Manage Contract Guards at Federal Facilities. GAO-12-739. Washington, 

D.C.: August 10, 2012.

Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service. 

GAO-11-813T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2011.

Federal Facility Security: Staffing Approaches Used by Selected

Agencies. GAO-11-601. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective 

Service’s Workforce Analysis and Planning Efforts. GAO-10-802R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2010.

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service’s Use of Contract Guards 

Requires Reassessment and More Oversight. GAO-10-614T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2010.

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guard Program 

Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards. 

GAO-10-341. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2010.

Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective 

Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. GAO-10-506T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 16, 2010.

Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve 

the Federal Protective Service’s Approach to Facility Protection. 

GAO-10-142. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 2 GAO-14-235T 

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial 

Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist. 

GAO-09-1047T. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2009.

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human 

Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants. GAO-09-749. 

Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2009.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective 

Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered by 

Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. GAO-09-859T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2009.

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several 

Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. 

GAO-08-897T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008.

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several 

Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. 

GAO-08-914T. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several 

Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. 

GAO-08-683. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective 

Service’s Efforts to Protect Federal Property. GAO-08-476T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 8, 2008.

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