FIRST DIVISION

									OCTOBER 9, 2001

No. 1-98-3715 

IN RE K.C., K.C., S.C., S.C., T.D., and T.D.,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

Minors,						)	of Cook County, Illinois, Department

							) 	of Juvenile Justice and Child 

							)	Protection Division	

							)	

(The Department of Children and Family Services,	)	Nos. 96 JA 6575, 96 JA 6576,	

							)	96 JA 6577, 96 JA 6578,			

		Appellant;				)	96 JA 6579, 96JA 6580

							) 	

K.C., K.C., S.C., S.C., T.D., and T.D., Minors,	)	

							)	The Honorable   

							)	Fe Fernandez

		Appellees).				)	Judge Presiding		

							)

	JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:

	The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) appeals from an order of the circuit court directing DCFS to remove the team of caseworkers it assigned to a case

concerning the abuse and neglect of the minors K.C., K.C., S.C., S.C., T.D., and T.D. and

ordering DCFS to assign a new team of caseworkers to the matter.  On appeal, DCFS argues that

the circuit court's order should be reversed and vacated because : (1) the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction and authority under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act or

Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.  (West 1996)) to order DCFS to remove and replace caseworkers; (2) the circuit court's action violated the doctrine of the separation of powers under

article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.  Const. 1970, art. II, § 1). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301(134 Ill. 2d R. 301).  We affirm for the following reasons. 

Background 

	On December 27, 1996, the State's Attorney filed a petition for adjudication of wardship

on behalf of six minor children, KC, KC, SC, SC, TD, and TD,K.C., K.C., S.C., S.C., T.D., and T.D., alleging the children had

been abused and neglected by their parents.  The State's Attorney simultaneously filed a motion

for temporary custody, which motion the court granted, ordering that the minors be removed

from their home and awarded to the DCFS Guardianship Administrator, and directing DCFS to

prepare and file a case plan, pursuant to section 2-10.1 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS

405/2-10.1 (West 1996)). On June 18, 1997, the court entered adjudication orders, pursuant to

section 2-21 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West 1996)), finding the minors were abused and

neglected and at substantial risk of physical injury.  On August 12, 1997, the court entered

disposition orders, pursuant to section 2-27 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-27 (West 1996)),

adjudging the minors wards of the court, finding the mother and fathers of the minors unable and

unwilling to care for, protect, train or discipline the children and finding that no reasonable efforts

had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minors from the home.  The

court also ordered the termination of temporary custody, and, in the best interests of the children,

that the DCFS Guardianship Administrator be granted custody of the minor children with the right

to place them. The court set the matter for a permanency planning hearing on October 22, 1997.

	On October 22, 1997, the court entered a continuance, and ordered that DCFS and

caseworker William Horton conduct an administrative case review and provide the parties with a copy of the case review on or before December 18, 1997. On December 18, 1997, the case was 

continued, and the court entered an order to compel caseworkers William Horton and Edie

Washington-Gurley, and case management supervisor, Leonard Johnson, to provide the parties

with a current copy of the case plan by January 14, 1998, and to appear in court to provide

testimony and other evidence at the permanency hearing. On January 28, 1998, the case was

continued. On March 18, 1998, the court again continued the matter, and entered an order to

compel case management supervisor,  Leonard Johnson, and caseworker, Detrina Moore, to appear

in court on May 28, 1998 for purposes of a permanency hearing.  On May 28, 1998, Detrina

Moore appeared in court, but Leonard Johnson did not. The Assistant State's Attorney made an

oral motion that the current team of caseworkers be removed from the case and a new team of

caseworkers be assigned because the current caseworkers had repeatedly failed to abide by the

court's orders. The court observed that the case had been before it five times since October of

1997, and in spite of repeated orders to compel, the caseworkers still had not performed an

administrative case review. The court entered and continued the Assistant State's Attorney's

motion to remove the caseworkers, made a finding of no reasonable efforts against Leonard

Johnson, directed that an administrative case review be conducted by June 30, 1998, and ordered

that all parties be provided with a copy of the case plan by personal distribution in court on July 1,

1998. 

	On July 13, 1998, the parties appeared in court for the permanency review hearing. Case

supervisor, Leonard Johnson and caseworker, Detrina Moore were present. At the hearing,

Johnson testified that the goal of the current case plan was to provide substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Detrina Moore testified this goal was based on the children's

mother's refusal to participate in drug treatment programs and her expressed desire that the

children be adopted by relatives. Moore represented that although the mother indicated she was

not currently using drugs, no referrals for random urine drops had been given to her. Moore also

represented that none of the three fathers of the children had been spoken to concerning adoption.

Moore further represented  that the youngest child, who had been born drug exposed, had not

received a one- to three-year-old developmental evaluation. Based on these omissions, the

Assistant State's Attorney, joined by the county public guardian, renewed the motion that the

current team of caseworkers be removed and a new team of caseworkers be assigned to the case. 

The attorney for DCFS objected, urging that DCFS be allowed to handle the problem as an

internal matter. Over objection, the court continued the permanency hearing, entered a finding of

no reasonable efforts against Johnson, Moore, and DCFS, and  ordered that the current team of

caseworkers be removed and that a new team be assigned within seven7 days. 

	Pursuant to the court's order, DCFS  removed the caseworkers and assigned a new team

of caseworkers to the matter.  On August 10, 1998, DCFS moved to reverse and vacate the

court's July 13, 1998 order, arguing that the court's order was void because the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act to order DCFS to remove and replace the

caseworkers it assigned to a case. The pPublic Ddefender, on behalf of the minors' mother, filed a

response to the motion, arguing that the issue was moot because DCFS had already complied

with the order and replaced the team. On September 1, 1998, the circuit court denied DCFS's

motion to vacate. On the same date, the court entered a permanency order, finding the appropriate permanency goal was substitute care pending a determination of the termination of

parental rights, the services contained in the service plan were appropriate and reasonably

calculated to facilitate achievement of the permanency goal, and that DCFS had made reasonable

efforts in providing services to facilitate achievement of the permanency goal.  On September 30,

DCFS filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court's order denying its motion to reverse

and vacate the court's July 13, 1998 order. 

						Discussion   

	We note, initially, that neither the Assistant State's Attorney, nor any other party, has filed

an appellee's brief in this appeal. Nevertheless, we elect to dispose of the appeal on its merits.  

First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128 (1976).  

	Appellant, DCFS, argues first that the circuit court's July 18, 1998, order must be reversed

and vacated on appeal because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and authority under the

Juvenile Court Act to remove and reassign new caseworkers to a matter. Alternately, DCFS

argues the circuit court's action violated the separation of powers doctrine under the Illinois

Cconstitution because it impermissibly infringed upon the discretion of the DCFS and, by extension,

infringed upon the power of the executive branch. 

	Before addressing the merits of appellant's arguments, we first must determine whether the

issue is moot because the DCFS has already removed and reassigned new caseworkers to the matter.

Generally, a court of review will dismiss an appeal where it has notice of facts thaytt which show

that only moot questions or mere abstract propositions are involved or where the substantial

questions raised in the trial court no longer exist.  People v. D.T., 287 Ill. App. 3d 408, 410 (1997).  An appeal becomes moot where the issues involved at the trial level no longer exist

because events have occurred that render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective

relief.  In re A.D.W., 278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 480 (1996).  However, a court of review may resolve an otherwise moot issue if it involves a substantial public interest.  In re J.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d 175, 179 (1999).  The criteria for the application of the public interest exception are: (1) the public

nature of the question;  (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of

guiding public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1989).  A clear showing of each criterion is required to bring a case within the

public interest exception.  In re J.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 179.

	For practical purposes, it would be impossible for us to grant effectual relief at this point

in view that DCFS removed and reassigned new caseworkers to the matter in 1998. Regardless,

we do not find the appeal is moot as a matter of law, as it meets all the criteria for the public

interest exception to the mootness doctrine. To begin, the case raises an issue of public concern,

as it involves the right of a court to supersede the discretion of  DCFS in determining which

caseworkers may be assigned to a particular matter.  See  In re R.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 860, 867 (1997) (The DCFS's interest in being able to conduct investigations without judicial interference is a

public concern).  Moreover, the issue is most likely to recur in juvenile proceedings and

clarification of the issue for judges in the future would be desirable. See  In re A.H., 312 Ill. App. 3d 638, 646 (2000) (aAppellate court would consider technically moot issue of whether the circuit 

court had authority to preempt the authority of the DCFS in removing a child from a foster home

where issue was likely to recur and clarification was desirable.)). Mootness aside, the case therefore qualifies for review.  

	The first contention raised by appellant is that the circuit court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act to order DCFS to remove the caseworkers assigned to

the matter and to reassign new caseworkers. Appellant contends, citing to In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (1993), that because juvenile proceedings are special statutory proceedings, having no

counterpart in common law or equity, a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction is strictly limited

to that conferred by the legislature under the Juvenile Court Act.  We find this argument  to be

without merit as it ignores the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re Lawrence M.,  172 Ill. 2d 523 (1996). In Lawrence M., the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act to order DCFS to provide and

pay for the inpatient drug treatment of a mother whose children were removed from her custody.

There, the court adopted the special concurrence of Chief Justice Miller in M.M.., stating that because jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution and not by statute, except as to administrative

review, circuit courts "no longer seek statutory justification for the exercise of jurisdiction."  

Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 529.  Applying the rationale of Lawrence M. to the instant case, it is clear that because the circuit court's jurisdiction was constitutional, rather than statutory, its

subject matter jurisdiction was not limited by the Juvenile Court Act.   	

	Appellant also attacks the statutory authority of the circuit court under the Juvenile Court

Act to order the removal and reassignment of DCFS' caseworkers. Although appellant frames this

argument as an extension of its attack upon the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is actually a

separate issue. While a circuit court's jurisdiction is constitutionally derived, a court still may not act in ways inconsistent with controlling statutory law.  Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 529.  Here, the question of whether the circuit court acted contrary to the provisions of the Juvenile Court

Act is an issue separate and apart from the issue of jurisdiction. As resolution of this issue entails

statutory interpretation, we employ a de novo standard of review.  In re D.D., 312 Ill. App. 3d 806, 809 (2000). 

	 In interpreting a statute, the court may consider the reason and necessity for the law, the

evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). However, any judicial inquiry must always begin with the language of the statute, which is the

surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42.  A statute's language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the statutory language is clear

and unambiguous, a court will not resort to aids of construction. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42.  In ascertaining the legislative intent, the court examines the language of the statute as a whole, and

considers each part or section in connection with every other part or section. Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 146 Ill. 2d 477, 484 (1992).  

	There is no question under the Juvenile Court Act that DCFS, through its caseworkers,

has an affirmative duty to provide full, accurate and timely reports and case plans to the court and

to the parties.  In the context of permanency hearings, section 2-28(2) specifically provides: 

		" The public agency that is the custodian or guardian of the minor, or

another agency responsible for the minor's care, shall ensure that all parties to the permanency hearings are provided a copy of the most recent service plan prepared

within the prior 6 months at least 14 days in advance of the hearing. If not

contained in the plan, the agency shall also include a report setting forth (i) any

special physical, psychological, educational, medical, emotional, or other needs of

the minor or his or her family that atrtre relevant to a permanency or placement

determination and (ii) for any minor age 16 or over, a written description of the programs and services that will enable the minor to prepare for independent

living." (Emphasis added.) (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West1996). 

Section 2-28(1) further provides: 

	"The Court may require any legal custodian or guardian of the person appointed

under this Act to report periodically to the court or may cite him into court and

require him or his agency, to make a full and accurate report of his or its doings in

behalf of the minor. *** Upon the hearing of the report the court may remove the

custodian or guardian and appoint another in his stead or restore the minor to the

custody  of his parents or former guardian or custodian." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(1)

(West 1996).

In conjunction, section 8.3 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act mandates: 

	"The Department shall assist a Circuit Court during all stages of the court

proceedings in accordance with the purposes of this Act and the Juvenile Court

Act of 1987 by providing full, complete, and accurate information to the court and

by appearing in court if requested by the court." 325 ILCS 5/8.3 (West 1996). 

	Where DCFS fails to perform its statutory obligation to provide timely and complete

reports, however, the Juvenile Court Act and the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act set

forth particular remedies. Specifically, section 2-28(2) of the Juvenile Court Act provides that the

rights of wards of the court will be "enforceable against any public agency by complaints for relief

by mandamus."  705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1996). Section 2-28(1) of the Act further provides

that "[u]pon the hearing of the report the court may remove the custodian or guardian and

appoint another in his stead or restore the  minor to the custody of his parents or former guardian

or custodian.***" 705 ILCS 405/2-28(1) (West 1996).  In conjunction, section 5/8.3 of the Abused and

Neglected Child Reporting Act indicates that "[f]ailure to provide assistance requested by sathe court

shall be enforceable through proceedings for contempt of court." 325 ILCS 5/8.3 (West 1996). 

Thus, where DCFS fails to satisfy its statutory obligation to report, three potential remedies exist: removal of the guardian and the appointment of another (705 ILCS 405/2-28(1) (West 1996)), a

mandamus action to compel the performance (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1996)), and the initiation of contempt proceedings (325 ILCS 5/8.3 (West 1996)).  Before a guardian may be

removed or a public agency compelled to perform its duty, however, the court first must be

satisfied by proof that the guardian has not performed its duty.  In rethe Interest of F.B., 206 Ill. App. 3d 140, 156 (1990).  

	In this case, after repeated orders to compel were ignored, and after the caseworkers

tendered a report lacking certain information necessary to a permanency determination, the court

ordered the removal of the caseworkers and the assignment of new caseworkers. This action, we

find, was within the court's express statutory authority under section 2-28(1), which allows the

court, after hearing a guardian's report, to order the removal and replacement of the guardian.

That DCFS, as an entity, was retained as guardian, while the case workers handling the case were

ordered to be removed and replaced, is a fact without practical significance in our opinion. Under

the Act, a court is empowered  to enter any order necessary to "fulfill the service plan" (705 ILCS

045/405/ 2-23(3) (West 1996)) or  "effectuate the completion of a plan or goal" (705 ILCS 405/2-

28(3)(b)(v)) (West 1996)) in a dispositional or permanency hearing. Here, the court's

determination to order the removal and reassignment of alternative caseworkers fell within the 

reach of this broad statutory authority.

	In reaching our determination, we recognize that sections 2-23(3) and 2-28 specifically

deny courts the power to order "specific placements, specific services, or specific service

providers" even where DCFS abuses its discretion in setting a current case plan or permanency goal. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2), 2-23(3) (West 1996). We also recognize, as a general principle,  that

courts do not have the authority to dictate the manner in which an agency of the executive branch performs a statutory duty.  In re Detention of Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3d 178, 192-93 (2001). However, there is a distinction between ordering the removal and the reassignment of alternative

caseworkers and ordering that specific caseworkers be assigned to a case. See In re A.L., 294 Ill. App. 3d 441 (1998) (A court's order dictating placement in a specific foster home differed from

an order directing removal from a foster home and alternative placement, in that the latter order

still allowed DCFS to exercise its discretion in determining placement). In this case, the circuit

court, while ordering the removal of specific caseworkers from the case, still left to the discretion

of  DCFS theo determineation of  which alternative caseworkers to assign to the matter.  This fact

distinguishes the present case from cases cited by appellant as analogous, wherein the circuit court

simply substituted its discretion for that of DCFS by ordering specific services and  providers. See

In re P.F, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1092(1994) (trThe circuit court does not have statutory authority to order a caseworker from a private agency, with whom DCFS has contracted, to remain the

caseworker on a case).); In re R.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 860 (1997) (tThe circuit court does not have statutory authority to order DCFS to videotape all interviews with a minor in a case involving

allegations of sexual abuse). By contrast, the circuit court here, acting within the bounds of its

statutory authority, left the decision of which specific caseworkers to assign to the matter to the

discretion of DCFS.       

	Finally, appellant contends that the circuit court's order violated the separation of powers

doctrine, in that the court impermissibly infringed upon the internal administrative discretion of DCFS, an executive agency.    

	Under the Illinois Constitution, the legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate

and no branch may exercise powers properly belonging to another. Ill. Const.1970, art. II, § 1. 

However, the doctrine of separation of powers was not designed to achieve a complete divorce

among the three branches of government, nor does it require governmental powers to be divided

into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments.  Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 191. "When the legislature creates a statute that contemplates an interplay between the courts and the executive branch,

court orders directing the actions of the executive agencies do not violate the doctrine of the

separation of powers." Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 529. Under the Juvenile Court Act, where the legislature intends an interplay between DCFS and the courts in determining the appropriate

services for neglected and abused children, the evil of the court's usurping the executive discretion

is absent. Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 528-29. 

	We do not find the court's action, in ordering the removal and reassignment of alternative

case workers, impermissibly infringed upon the administrative discretion of  DCFS, as an agency

of the executive branch.  As previously pointed out, the court here did not order that specific

caseworkers be assigned to the matter.  Rather, the court, having determined the current team of

caseworkers had not fulfilled its statutory obligation to report, simply ordered the removal and

reassignment of an alternative team. The ultimate determination of which caseworkers to assign to

the matter, therefore, remained within the discretion of  DCFS. In our judgment, this interplay

between DCFS and the court, in a situation where assigned caseworkers fail to satisfy a duty to

report, is one thaytwhich the legislature specifically contemplated and sanctioned under the Act   

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 

	Affirmed.

	McNULTY, J., and COUSINS, JJ., concur.