Visit our website for other free publication 

downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP and

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development 

contributes to the education of world class senior 

leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides 

solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program 

supports the United States Army War College’s lines of 

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being 

education and support by developing self-awareness 

through leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor soldiers—past and present.

U.S. Army War College

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

SLDR
i

The

Letort Papers

In the early-18th century, James Letort, an explorer 

and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the 

Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was 

a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks 

lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was 

a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure 

point for further exploration. Today, as was the case 

over 2 centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home 

of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition 

and transformation. 

In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled 

the men and women who, like Letort, settled the 

American west, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press presents 

The Letort Papers. This series allows SSI and USAWC 

Press to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or 

essays of interest to the defense academic community 

which may not correspond with our mainstream 

policy-oriented publications. 

If you think you may have a subject amenable to 

publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish 

to comment on a particular paper, please contact 

Dr. Steven K. Metz, Director of Research, Strategic 

Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 

U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, 

PA 17013-5010. His phone number is (717) 245-3822; 

email address is steven.k.metz.civ@mail.mil. We look 

forward to hearing from you.

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

REFORMING THE POLICE IN POST-SOVIET 

STATES:

GEORGIA AND KYRGYZSTAN

Erica Marat

November 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War

College External Research Associates Program. Information on 

this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies

Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may 

also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted 

or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate 

credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and USAWC Press

publishes a monthly email newsletter to update the national 

security community on the research of our analysts, recent and 

forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored 

by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in 

receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-601-8
v

FOREWORD

In most Soviet successor states, the police (militia) are among the least trusted government agencies. 

The police are frequently seen as representatives of 

the state who are allowed to persecute ordinary citizens, extort bribes, and protect the real criminals. This 

leads to cycles of mutual antagonism in which society 

does not expect the police to perform their function 

properly, and the police are unable to enforce state 

regulation of society. In the examples of Georgia and 

Kyrgyzstan in this monograph, Dr. Erica Marat examines which domestic processes will likely fail and 

which have a chance to succeed in changing the postSoviet police from a punitive institution into a more 

democratic entity. 

Dr. Marat demonstrates that the fundamental element of police reform in the post-Soviet context must 

be a redefinition of what constitutes the legitimate 

use of violence against civilians to maintain order 

in everyday life and during mass protests. It means 

toning down the use of forceful methods against the 

unruly and redefining which crimes must be prosecuted. In the course of the reform, the government 

must relinquish its ability to control the thoughts and 

actions of opponents and the people. Instead of being 

used as a punitive instrument of oppression, the postauthoritarian police must learn to behave in a transparent, accountable way, by respecting the rights of 

citizens. Importantly, new venues and forms of interaction between society and the police should emerge, 

while a country’s chief police agency should become 

responsive to the concerns of the public. The police 

must begin to work on behalf of the public, not the 

regime, and to obey the rule of law, not government 
vi

orders. Essentially, “democratic police reform” in the 

post-Soviet—or any—context means entrusting the 

citizenry to police the police. 

This monograph contributes to the understanding 

of what it takes to promote institutional reform in the 

police by eliminating political barriers and enabling a 

more fruitful military-to-military cooperation. Understanding the components of a successful police reform 

in transitioning states falls under the Strategic Studies 

Institute’s requirements. If the United States is to continue its constructive cooperation with these states, 

it must understand what predetermines the success 

or failure of security reform. The success or failure 

of certain aspects of the reform defines the degree to 

which organized criminal groups are able to influence 

the political leadership. As Washington searches for 

ways to help countries transform from autocracies to 

democracies, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan provide useful 

insights into how state elites seek to reform the police, 

while trying to maintain social stability and strong 

central leadership.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ERICA MARAT is a visiting scholar at the Kennan 

Institute of the Wilson Center, specializing in security 

sector, national, and regional defense, as well as statecrime relations. Previously, she was a research fellow 

at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road 

Studies Program, which is affiliated with the Paul H. 

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of 

Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Marat has published 

widely in policy and academic outlets. Her book, The 

Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to 

Independence, explores the relationship between statebuilding and military institutions in the post-Soviet 

period. Dr. Marat holds a bachelor’s degree in sociology from the American University of Central Asia, a 

master’s degree in political sociology from the Central European University, and a doctorate in political 

science from the University of Bremen.

ix

SUMMARY

What does it take for a state to reform its police 

forces? In the post-Soviet space, the police remain one 

of the least-reformed government institutions, infamous for graft, collaboration with organized criminal 

groups, and human rights violations. The police still 

serve as a political instrument, even in more politically 

open countries. For countries that have embarked on 

police reform and, at the very least, sought to change 

the institution’s name from “militsya” to “politsiya,” 

suggesting a more Westernized understanding of the 

role of law-enforcement agencies, the change was 

made only in name, not in content. This monograph 

examines the forces driving police reform programs 

in former Soviet states and what leads to their success. 

Specifically, it examines a decade of reform efforts 

in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan from the perspective of 

political leaders, opposition forces, the homegrown 

nongovernmental organization community, and 

international actors. 

The two cases were chosen to show two drastically different approaches to reform played out in 

countries facing arguably similar problems with statecrime links, dysfunctional governments, and corrupt 

police forces. Both Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have 

undergone dramatic political transformations since 

the early 2000s. Both saw regimes change and political 

power turnovers that led to more open governments 

and declining corruption rates. Both have received 

large U.S. aid packages for democratization projects. 

Amid this time of far-reaching political change, the 

issue of police reform became a cornerstone in the 

fight against corruption for both Tbilisi, Georgia, and 

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate that, for the 

change to take place, both top-down and bottom-up 

efforts are necessary. A political regime must feel 

accountable to the broader public to guide reform 

and destroy the Soviet legacy of a militarized police, 

while also introducing the public’s voice into the discussion of how to proceed with the reform. Georgia 

and Kyrgyzstan each, however, lacked one of the 

two components. In Georgia, police reform programs 

redefined the role of the police in sustaining social 

order. However, these changes reflected the ideas of 

the educated elites, not the wider masses. The policesociety dialogue is still lacking, and the possibility of 

future change is uncertain after Georgia elected a new 

parliament and appointed a new prime minister. 

In Kyrgyzstan, the same old political elites who 

came to power as a result of two regime changes 

in 2005 and in 2010 have been trying to change the 

Interior Ministry by retraining personnel and amending the legal code. Political leaders were reluctant to 

introduce any major changes because many of them 

still had lucrative informal ties with Interior Ministry 

personnel. After many starts and stops and regime 

changes in Kyrgyzstan, the pace of reform quickened 

only after several local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) inserted themselves in the process of 

designing and overseeing the reform in 2010-13. The 

future of the reform is still uncertain, but its concept 

has become a matter of broad public discussion with 

several activists and NGOs involved in the process.

This report concludes with recommending that 

U.S. military-to military assistance in Georgia and 

Kyrgyzstan must focus on training and sharing best 

practices regarding the separation of military and 

police functions and stripping the military of its politix
xi

cal surveillance functions. A special panel/committee 

should be established to deal specifically with issues 

regarding the democratic reform of the security sector, and police reform must be part of that agenda. 

The U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command must consistently promote institutional reform 

to eliminate such political barriers and to enable fruitful military-to-military cooperation. Potentially, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan could instruct other post-Soviet 

as well as Middle Eastern states about what leads to a 

consistent reform and what delays it. 

1

REFORMING THE POLICE IN POST-SOVIET 

STATES:

GEORGIA AND KYRGYZSTAN

INTRODUCTION

Since 1991, all of the Soviet successor states have 

tried to restructure their inherited police forces, either 

to increase their capacity to protect the ruling regimes 

or to democratize law enforcement agencies as part 

of a broader political reform effort. In most cases, 

this included creating patrol police, cleaning up corruption, and changing the structure of the Interior 

Ministry. The states that underwent even the slowest 

police reform, like Azerbaijan and Russia, still sought 

to change the forces’ name from “militsya” to “politsiya,” suggesting a more Westernized, less martial, 

understanding of the role of law enforcement agencies. 

Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are regarded 

as the most successful examples of police reform, 

while the failed efforts in Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and 

Kazakhstan, among others, have shown that merely 

training and equipping police officers will not lead to 

structural changes within the police force itself.1

This monograph examines the forces driving 

police reform programs in former Soviet states and 

what leads to their success. Specifically, it examines 

a decade of reform efforts in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan 

from the perspective of political leaders, opposition 

forces, the homegrown nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, and international actors. The 

two cases were chosen to show two drastically different approaches to reform played out in countries facing arguably similar problems with state-crime links, 

dysfunctional governments, and corrupt police forces. 
2

Both Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have undergone dramatic political transformations since the early-2000s.2

Both saw regimes change and political power turnovers that led to more open governments and declining corruption rates. Amid this time of far-reaching 

political change, the issue of police reform became a 

cornerstone in the fight against corruption for both 

Tbilisi and Bishkek.

Yet, while Georgia represents swift change with 

arguably limited external donor guidance but ample 

financing, Kyrgyzstan’s futile efforts to reform the 

police included extensive donor involvement in the 

process. The success of the reform often measured 

with the changing levels of public trust in the police. 

In 2003, when reform began in Georgia, public trust in 

the police was roughly 10 percent; the latest survey, 

nearly a decade later, shows that 87 percent of people 

trust the police, while 98 percent said they never give 

bribes.3 In Kyrgyzstan, public trust in the police has 

continued to decline over the years, despite international donors’ prolonged support of reform efforts in 

the country.4

Georgia and Kyrgyzstan present an interesting 

comparison. While almost all post-Soviet countries 

have announced police reform programs, these two 

are the only states that have pursued the issue consistently for over a decade. In Georgia, the reform 

was implemented by the top political brass, while in 

Kyrgyzstan, Interior Ministry and civil society groups 

were entrusted to lead the reform. Both cases can 

boast of their respective strengths and weaknesses, 

with the Georgian model undoubtedly winning in 

terms of favorable results. In 2003, the Rose Revolution brought the new 36-year-old president, Mikheil 

Saakashvili, and a slew of even younger cadres into 
3

politics. In Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, two national 

regime changes merely recombined the same actors 

as they competed against each other or formed strategic alliances. Mikheil Saakashvili enjoyed strong 

popularity, and his efforts to combat organized crime 

and reform the police were widely supported by the 

public and the international community alike. In Kyrgyzstan, however, civil society activists trusted neither their political leaders’ stated desire nor their ability to reform the police. None of the four presidents 

who have ruled Kyrgyzstan since the early-2000s was 

trusted by the NGO community to genuinely pursue 

reform, instead each was suspected of carrying out 

mere window dressing. 

Finally, both have received large U.S. aid packages. 

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), for example, has 

spent over $65 million on law-enforcement and legal 

reform programs in Georgia5

 and $13.1 million in Kyrgyzstan.6

 Some U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs have also focused on promoting democracy, reforming governance, improving 

the observance of the rule of law, and transforming 

the sector.

Potentially, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan could instruct 

other post-Soviet states about what leads to a consistent reform and what delays it. Both countries also 

demonstrate that for the change to take place, both 

top-down and bottom-up efforts are necessary. A 

political regime must feel accountable to the broader 

public to guide the reform and destroy the Soviet legacy of a militarized police, while also introducing the 

public’s voice into the discussion of how to proceed 

with the reform. Georgia and Kyrgyzstan each, however, lacked one of the two components. 
4

This report begins with an examination of what 

constitutes police reform in former Soviet states. It 

then discusses Georgia and Kyrgyzstan in more detail. 

Georgia’s successful police reform demonstrates that 

political leadership’s strong will to reduce corruption 

at the grassroots level can bring sizable results in a 

relatively short period of time. Georgia’s case has its 

weaknesses that have stalled democratic development. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, demonstrates 

how external efforts are futile and cost-intensive 

because they seek to instill a culture of democratic 

police in authoritarian states. However, a protracted 

police reform program can engage the public’s participation in changing the work of the Interior Ministry. 

The report concludes with the lessons learned from 

other former Soviet states and recommendations for 

the U.S. military-to-military engagement in Central 

Asia and South Caucasus. 

WHAT CONSTITUTES POLICE REFORM

Police forces are a key link between state and 

society. At an individual level, the ordinary policeman walking his beat personifies the state’s attitude 

toward its involvement in the daily life of its citizens.7

Likewise, the society’s treatment of the police reflects 

its view of the state. Police that use brute force against 

the citizenry or that embrace extralegal treatment of 

segments of society or specific individuals point to an 

authoritarian regime. By contrast, a society in which 

individuals attack the police, resort to bribery, and 

exhibit a lack of trust in law-enforcement agencies 

exposes the state’s inability to maintain social order 

and provide security. 

Essentially, the existence of a police reform program implies an effort to redefine the rationale for 
5

police use of violence against civilians to maintain 

social order. It presumes that as states and societies 

democratize, the rates of violence exerted by the police 

against citizens, as well as among citizens themselves, 

will decrease.8

 The paths each country takes in transforming its law-enforcement sector vary according to 

the pace of democratic transformation, the structure 

of ruling elites, its openness to external influence, the 

society’s demand for more efficient police, and other 

factors dealing with the unique political development 

of any given country. 

In the context of former Soviet states, police reform 

typically seeks at least one of three outcomes. First, a 

police reform agenda entails disbanding institutions 

of oppression that allowed the former political leadership to use the police to protect themselves from the 

allegedly unruly masses. Instead of being used as a 

punitive instrument of oppression, the police learn 

to behave in transparent, accountable ways. Ideally, 

the post-Soviet police begin to work on behalf of the 

public, not the regime, and act by the law, not government orders.9

 The police abandon torture in favor of 

investigation and treat each citizen equally and fairly. 

The police uphold the law rather than merely enforce 

civilian obedience. This model of police reform therefore depends on the political liberalization of an exSoviet state.

Second, in the ex-Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), police reform implies a process in which 

the government and society establish control over an 

unruly element—be that an insurgent group, corrupt 

officials, or organized criminal group—that sprang 

from the collapse of the centrally planned economy. 

Two decades of poor policing, rampant corruption, 

and weak state structures encouraged and solidified 
6

the activity of such violent nonstate groups. At times, 

these groups become providers of alternative security 

by protecting criminals and corrupt politicians.10 This 

unruly mass refuses to obey state regulations, instead 

working to ensure that state policies are designed to 

favor their business interests and further undermine 

state authority. In the cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, like many ex-Soviet states, this often means eradicating the link between state actors and criminals, 

connections forged mainly in the waning years of 

the USSR.11

Finally, police reform means giving the newly liberalized society control over the police forces, entrusting the citizenry to police the police. It precludes forming new institutions and forms of interaction between 

society and the police. In short, the Interior Ministry 

must become responsive to citizens’ concerns. In this 

sense, there are parts of Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, 

and Turkmenistan where not only has such a shift not 

taken place, but the deteriorating post-Soviet police 

forces have, in fact, amplified the police control over 

citizens. The police in these areas not only resort to the 

worst authoritarian practices, they also have become 

deeply politicized and corrupt. 

With these arguments in mind, this report demonstrates that police reform is part of the larger process of redefining the functions of the state to reflect 

social and political changes. It includes dissolving 

old institutions, creating new ones, changing laws, 

and introducing new, pertinent policies. The decision 

to launch police reform almost uniformly comes as a 

response to a changing society and the emergence of 

new, nonstate threats. Tajikistan’s President Emomali 

Rakhmon, for instance, became interested in police 

reform after a series of guerrilla attacks swept the 
7

Rasht Valley in 2008 and 2009.12 The Russian government started reform after public discontent with the 

police soared in the early-2000s.13 Kazakhstan’s government pledged to overhaul the Interior Ministry 

only after police shot dead 16 protestors in Zhanaozen 

town during the December 2011 riots there.14

In the post-Soviet reality, however, even creating 

a viable reform strategy is a significant challenge. The 

government must learn how to be open to input from 

both the public and the parliament, and to consider 

the opinions and experiences of both civilian and military officials. In countries where the government has 

little experience in collaborating with civil society or 

where the parliament is controlled by the ruling elites, 

the strategy can be usurped by political leaders, leaving little room for input from civic actors. At the same 

time, post-Soviet elites often fail to design a long-term, 

comprehensive strategy that clarifies the need for and 

benefits of police reform. Instead, they launch a series 

of expensive, often overlapping, changes. 

Furthermore, attempts to design a comprehensive 

strategy are hindered by patronage networks linking law enforcement structures and political leaders. 

Police reform strategies almost always presume that 

personnel unable to meet the new standards of service will be removed and a new generation of police 

officers trained to take their place. This understanding 

makes Interior Ministry officials wary of reform, and 

they may merely pretend to enact reform in response 

to public criticism. Kyrgyzstan, where patronage networks between political leaders and Interior Ministry 

officials are strong, is a prime example of such antireform dynamics. 

At the same time, the greater openness that lawenforcement structures show toward civil society 
8

while conducting the reform, the stronger will be 

the criticism of their previous practices. In Kyrgyzstan, Interior Ministry officials have tried to build a 

dialogue with civil society activists and a parliamentary committee dealing with law enforcement issues. 

But this collaboration has been rife with distrust and 

mutual accusations. In 2010-11, the political leadership invited leading NGO activists to participate in 

public forums to reflect upon the work of the Interior 

Ministry. The criticism aired at these events presented 

the Interior Ministry leadership as violators of basic 

human rights enmeshed in widespread corruption. 

In Georgia, however, where reform was conducted 

during 2004-12 without public debate or civil society 

oversight, the police were not publicly attacked. The 

course of the reform reflected the will and vision of 

top political leadership seeking to meet expectations 

of the general public to clean up corruption after the 

Rose Revolution. Georgia’s record, as will be discussed 

later, suggests that police reforms carried out without 

public participation always run the risk of serving the 

needs of authoritarian leaders, regardless of whether 

the police have been trained to respect human rights. 

Furthermore, any reform effort must strike a balance among better procurement of equipment and 

supplies, improved service, and greater respect for 

human rights. There is an inherent danger that a 

reformed, better equipped, and more efficient police 

will actually strengthen government control over society. It is, therefore, vital that a police reform program 

reflects not only the government’s strategic plan or 

the international community’s recommendation, but 

it must also be the product of social deliberation. 
9

Often the ex-Soviet states face pressure from the 

international community to remedy the human rights 

situation long before police professionalism and procurement is improved. Post-Soviet Interior Ministry 

officials, as well as political leaders, do not understand why human rights should be considered when 

dealing with individuals who may have committed 

serious crimes such as homicide or acts of terrorism. 

Police frequently use torture to extract evidence or 

elicit confessions because of the perception by police 

that criminals deserve harsh treatment.15 Likewise, 

police officers justify brutality when they are faced 

with aggressive mobs and armed individuals. Human 

rights are considered to be an irrelevant, Western concept, and the police equate reform with losing these 

valuable tactics and placing themselves in danger. 

To a large extent, post-Soviet police officers are 

quick to ignore the rights of citizens because their 

own rights are disrespected both by political leaders and society. As with other public employees in 

the post-Soviet space, they receive low wages, little 

training, and do not have the equipment and technology needed to carry out their duties. Public distrust 

of public employees goes far beyond just the police; 

it also applies to teachers, doctors, tax collectors, etc. 

The only difference between those public servants 

and the police is that the latter carry weapons and are 

authorized to use violence. 

One common feature of post-Soviet police forces 

is a high rate of violence on the job.16 Because citizens 

believe the police regularly use harsh physical violence against suspects, they tend to approach police 

officers with aggression and hostility. This generates 

cycles of violence between corrupt police and the 

civilian population that distrusts the police. Statistics 
10

suggest that the fears are justified on both sides. With 

the rise of illicit nonstate activity, including organized 

criminal groups, paramilitary groups, and mafia in 

the post-Soviet era, the rate of violence between police 

and public has further increased. Society does not 

trust the police to perform their function properly, 

and the police are unable to enforce state regulation of 

society without violence. Instead, the police are seen 

as representatives of the state who are allowed to persecute ordinary citizens, extort bribes, and protect the 

real criminals.17

GEORGIA

Georgia is a unique example of rapid police reform 

engendered by broader political change. President 

Saakashvili came to power through the bloodless Rose 

Revolution in 2003, which launched a series of sweeping reforms in Georgia. Together with a small group 

of close confidants, Saakashvili pushed forward a 

broad range of reforms that have made Georgia one 

of the most Westernized post-Soviet states.18 During 

the earliest days of his presidency, he decided to begin 

reform with the patrol police—the highly visible 

police officer would embody the immediate results of 

his fight against corruption.19 The foremost goal was 

to curb the petty corruption plaguing virtually every 

encounter between ordinary citizens and the police. 

By 2006, such petty corruption had been virtually 

eradicated while the Interior Ministry has made great 

strides to boost its transparency and efficiency.20 Crime 

rates dropped, and, in a dramatic shift, the police have 

become one of the most trusted public institutions in 

the country. Georgia’s reformed police and public 

administration, as well as drastically reduced crime 
11

rates, have helped make state services more efficient 

and available to all citizens.21

The rapid transformation of the police is particularly impressive, given that in the early-2000s, Georgia’s police was perhaps among the worst force in the 

entire former Soviet space. The police extorted bribes 

reaching $20,000-$30,000 per favor and turned to 

drug dealing to make ends meet. A promotion in the 

Interior Ministry costs anywhere between $2,000 and 

$20,000, depending on where it fell in seniority.22 The 

corruption scheme was essentially pyramid shaped, 

with the top leaders getting a cut from all levels below. 

Most encounters with the police ended up with citizens bribing the police to not file charges. Organized 

criminal groups often received police protection from 

other state institutions. The country’s police became a 

symbol of the failing Georgian state, one in which the 

government is not only not accountable to the citizens, 

it actually preys on society by expropriating revenues 

from licit and illicit sources. Corrupt police, controlled 

by criminals and uninterested in maintaining public 

safety, became one of the greatest points of public 

dissatisfaction with President Eduard Shevarnadze’s 

regime in the 1990s and early-2000s.23

A closer look, however, reveals that Georgia’s 

fast-paced reform has its weaknesses.24 Powerful state 

officials imposed reform from above, not bothering 

with public accountability or debate. Although the 

parliament is formally charged with controlling the 

Interior Ministry, in reality police reform has always 

been a collaboration between the interior minister and 

the president. Post-reform, parliamentary oversight 

of the Interior Ministry’s work remains weak, and 

the Interior Ministry has arguably become the most 

powerful structure in the country. The interior minis-
12

ter, who must have a civilian background, takes both 

strategic and operational decisions without public 

input or parliamentary oversight.25 The interior minister, in effect, has the right to order the use of force in 

any given situation. This sweeping power is likely to 

change following the October 1, 2012, parliamentary 

elections, in which the opposition coalition, Georgian 

Dream, gained 55 percent of the vote. With a broader 

spectrum of political forces in the new parliament 

and government, the debate over the future course of 

police reform is likely to be intense. The new government faces the challenge of ensuring that the police is 

depoliticized and does not serve the interests of one 

political leader or faction, while also preserving its 

image as an efficient and uncorrupt institution.

The Reform.

Georgia’s police reform was launched under Shevarnadze’s presidency in the early-2000s. It followed 

a path similar to that of other former Soviet states—a 

few minor changes were made in police operations 

with the help of the international community. Shevarnadze was able to secure ample democracy-funding 

packages by Western donors.26 Most initiatives failed 

to decrease corruption inside the Interior Ministry, 

and regime members remained reluctant to break their 

ties with organized criminal groups. According to former Interior Ministry press-secretary Shota Utiashvili, 

Shevardnadze tried to crack-down on criminal leaders, only to use their services during elections. 

Saakashvili’s government took a radically different approach. The Interior Ministry was fundamentally restructured, becoming the largest government 

body by the mid-2000s. Sixteen former departments 
13

were placed under the umbrella of the ministry, 

including the Counter Intelligence Department, the 

Counter Terror Center, the Special Operative Department (SOD), the Constitutional Security Department 

(KUD), the Special Tasks Main Division, the General 

Inspections Bureau, the Criminal Police Department, 

the Security Police, the Border Police, the Police Academy, and the Ministry of Emergencies. According to 

government officials, there is now a strong checks and 

balances system among the departments.27 The Interior Ministry has grown significantly in importance, 

while decreasing the number of uniformed security 

personnel. Before the merger, 65,000 people worked 

in the law enforcement system; today the ministry has 

27,000 employees, including 4,000 border guards. The 

ratio of police officers per citizen has shrunk from 1:21 

to 1:89.28

Known for his excellent leadership skills, Ivane 

(Vano) Merabishvili headed Georgia’s Interior Ministry between December 2004 and July 2012. However, 

his formal and informal duties went far beyond those 

of a typical interior minister. Throughout his tenure 

at the Interior Ministry, Merabishvili was widely 

regarded as one of the most powerful public officials

in Georgia, and he advised Saakashvili on domestic 

and regional security issues.29 Formally, Saakashvili 

entrusted the minister with absolute power over the 

course of police reform. Merabishvili’s authority and 

managerial skills meant that policy decisions regarding police reform were executed quickly, encountering little opposition from the lower ranks of bureaucrats and police officers. Merabashvili was granted the 

Order of St. George for “heroism and courage in protection of the motherland and its unity” and contributions “to building independent Georgian statehood.” 
14

In July 2012 Saakashvili appointed Merabishvili as 

prime minister. He served in this position very briefly, 

as the ruling United National Movement party lost the 

parliamentary elections 3 months later.30

Although Merabishvili studied examples of successful police reform in other countries, Georgia’s Interior Ministry reform was an ad hoc series of changes 

without any written or negotiated concept for shortterm and long-term goals.31 Various features of police 

functioning were borrowed from Estonia, Kosovo, 

and the United States. Italy’s anti-mafia law and the 

U.S. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization 

(RICO) Act served as the basis for laws against organized crime.32 The spontaneous nature of Georgia’s 

reform effort has, nevertheless, led to visible results. 

Within a few years, the patrolman’s mission has transformed from crime-focused operations into service 

providers who help society by carrying out the rule 

of law.33 The police have learned the importance of 

respecting human rights in their everyday interaction 

with citizens. Off-the-record, one Interior Ministry 

official admitted that this change has been a pleasant 

and unexpected byproduct of the greater professionalism of police work as well as better procurement of 

equipment and supplies.34

The reform was essentially composed of four main 

dimensions: downsizing the police force and hiring 

new personnel, restructuring the Interior Ministry, 

boosting professionalism among rank-and-file personnel, and changing the procurement process.35 Within 

the first 2 years, the government fired roughly 16,000 

policemen.36 Furthermore, most of the policemen who 

lost their jobs had been part of the Gosudarstvennaya 

avtomobil’naya inpektsiya (GAI) (a Soviet version of 

road militsiya), which was eliminated as part of the 
15

process of restructuring the ministry. In 2004, there 

was a period of about a month without any patrol 

police on the streets of Tbilisi before the new personnel were hired. 

The reform aimed at breaking ties between the 

police and criminal groups. According to Utiashvili, 

the initial reaction was to just reduce the power of 

GAI personnel, many of whom were alleged to have 

strong ties with the criminal underground world. “But 

after some deliberation, the ministry came to a conclusion that all policemen were corrupt and realized that 

there is nothing we can change about them,” he said. 

“So we retired them all in summer 2004.”37 The firing 

of police personnel proceeded gradually, yet the pace 

was fast enough to produce positive results within 

2 months. After the reform was launched, about 500 

police officers were arrested in 2 years for some type 

of illegal activity—taking bribes, having connections 

with criminal groups, and violating human rights. Of 

those, 90 percent were former police who had worked 

in the ministry before the reform.38

By 2012, the Interior Ministry described the Georgian patrol and community police as law abiding 

professionals who both obey and represent the law.39

The contemporary image is a far cry from the earlier reputation for extorting bribes from the public.

“Instead of old, fat policemen, people saw young lads 

well dressed and well equipped; instead of Zhiguly 

[cars], they saw VW,” Utiashvili says. Refusing bribes 

is perhaps the most important professional code that 

new recruits must follow. “We told the new hires that 

we will give you good payment, uniform and require 

from them one thing—don’t take bribes,” Utiashvili recalls. Policemen interviewed for this report 

expressed high satisfaction with their job, saying they 
16

honor their professional mission to serve and protect 

ordinary citizens. Police personnel receive generous social benefits, including health insurance and a 

retirement plan. 

Establishing transparency and increasing the Interior Ministry’s capacity to execute its own misson 

were the reform’s top priorities from the start. The 

Interior Ministry’s headquarters are famously located 

in a new glass curtain-wall building, literally signifying the transparency of the public institution. By 2012, 

the majority of police stations across the country had 

been renovated to feature similar glass exteriors.40

While the glass is used to signify transparency, the 

headquarters’ grandiose design and estimated $500 

million price tag also signify the government’s sheer 

superiority over criminal leaders. “It is meant to show 

criminals that we are stronger than they are,” one government official explained.41 Police cars are equipped

with portable computers, while every policeman carries a tablet computer listing legal statutes. Police also 

have ready access to a new database of all registered 

cars and drivers. 

Perhaps the most impressive achievement of the 

reform has been the elimination of special treatment 

for government officials or politically well-connected 

individuals when detained for routine incidents such 

as drunk driving and traffic accidents. Such special 

treatment, when political officials are able to get away 

with crimes, is a common predicament across the 

former Soviet region. 

Finally, the overhaul of the Police Academy 

became one of the reform’s hallmarks. The Sovietstyle 5-year curriculum was abandoned in favor of 

roughly 4 months of intensive training. New screening tests were introduced to select physically fit, edu-
17

cated men and women to join the law enforcement 

sector. Only candidates with BA or MA degrees may 

apply, because Interior Ministry officials believe that a 

university degree allows future police officers a better 

understanding of the nature of police work, including 

legal codes and concepts such as human rights.42 Candidates must pass a written test and an interview with 

the academy’s professors and psychologists. 

Admission to the Police Academy is highly competitive. While in 2006 there were five applicants for 

each spot, in 2012 the number of candidates increased 

to 50 per spot. Female candidates comprise roughly 

20 percent of all candidates, and 15 percent of them 

are accepted. After swearing into active duty, all 

officers are expected to be dedicated to their profession “because it is difficult, dangerous, routine, you 

deal with crazy people.”43 Most servicemen return 

for postgraduate specialized training twice a year. 

In order to receive a promotion, police officers must 

satisfactorily complete additional training courses 

and receive recommendations from the academy. By 

2006, policemen’s salaries had increased, and a standardized recruitment system was in place. The Police 

Academy’s head is specifically chosen from a civilian 

background, so they may bring new ideas for further 

improvements in the curriculum. 

The reform reinforced Saakashvili’s popularity at 

home and abroad, becoming the signature component 

of his reform agenda and political will. According to 

one former Interior Ministry official, Saakashvili was 

very lucky to have early results from his rapid anticorruption reform, because it would have been much 

more difficult to conduct it later in his presidency. 

The “euphoria and optimism” that accompanied the 

Rose Revolution greatly facilitated public support for 

the reforms.44
18

At the reform’s outset, the Interior Ministry consulted with international donors. However, Georgian officials insist that external actors did not play 

any substantial role in guiding the reform process, 

and that most initiatives were internally generated. 

Government officials also deny that donor funds 

played any substantial role, insisting that financial 

resources were sought locally. They argue that the 

new post-Shevardnadze government created a special 

development fund to finance reforms using domestic 

donors.45 Cleaning up corruption and legalizing the 

shadow economy helped Saakashvili’s government 

to collect more taxes, which were then spent on additional reforms. International funds were mostly used 

to maintain the country’s financial stability. Indeed, 

Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 9 

percent in 2004, largely as a result of legalizing the 

shadow economy.46

Furthermore, Georgian NGOs argue that Saakashvili’s government generated a stream of funds through 

plea bargain deals in which former members of Shevarnadze’s government agreed to invest in the development fund in return for having corruption charges 

against them dropped.47 Finally, some members of the 

political opposition argue that, when still aligned with 

President Saakashvili, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili 

invested $600 million in various government projects, 

including the police reform.48

While Saakashvili’s government was determined 

to find the right formula to transform its police, its 

reform efforts were still bankrolled by generous foreign aid. Between 1993 and 2010, Georgia received 

a total of $3.37 billion in U.S. aid. At least $1 billion 

of this amount was provided in the wake of the Rose 

Revolution in 2003. Following the August 2008 war 
19

with Russia, the U.S. Government pledged another 

$1 billion in humanitarian aid and reconstruction 

assistance, reinforcing Washington’s position as the 

country’s largest single donor.49 Starting in 2002, the 

United States trained and equipped members of the 

Georgian armed forces so they could participate in 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the U.S.-led 

Multinational Force-Iraq.50 In addition, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a private U.S. Government foreign aid agency, allocated $395 million for 

the period 2006-11. These funds were used to rebuild 

roads, water and energy systems, and the agricultural 

sector.51 Altogether, this makes Georgia one of the 

highest recipients of U.S. aid on a per capita basis.

When reforms began, the international community was skeptical about the initiative. However, the 

reform process proceeded so swiftly that international 

donor organizations did not have time to formulate 

their own assessment. Instead, they had to rely on 

reports from the Georgian government.52 By 2010, the 

police reform had become a symbol of Georgia’s modern statehood, earning generous praise from the international community. For instance, one World Bank 

report gave the following qualitative, rather than 

analytical, assessment:

The government viewed its strong-handed approach 

toward establishing law and order as essential to 

making people think differently, destroying respect 

toward the criminal underworld, and demonstrating the authority of formal legal institutions over 

informal ones.53

Likewise, a popular book by Larisa Burakova, 

Pochemu u Gruzii poluchilos’? (Why did Georgia Make 

It?), argues that the fact that public support in the 
20

police remains so high and the crime rate so low testifies to the reform’s success.54 She further claims that, 

to date, regime critics have yet to uncover a single 

corruption scheme among the Saakashvili-era higher 

political leaders.55 The Saakashvili administration 

enthusiastically endorsed both the book and the World 

Bank’s report.

In May 2011, Saakashvili said that police reform 

was the “first reform we carried out and remains the 

first symbol of our transformation and the creation of 

our new statehood.”56 He added: 

The main difference is that the Soviet militsia considered people [as if they were] their property and 

objects of humiliation, extortion and torture. Today’s 

police consider that they belong to the people, [they] 

represent, protect, and serve them. That’s why people 

respond with love. You feel it in your job, your family 

members feel it in everyday life.

Saakashvili further compared the achievements in 

police reforms with Georgia’s most powerful historic 

symbols of statehood: 

We have managed to create a modern statehood. 

This is the historic legacy of the current generation, 

which will live on for the next 10 centuries, like it has 

remained in our history that [Georgian King] David 

the Builder [1089-1125] managed to do the same 10 

centuries ago.57

The president sees the reform as a phase 

leading to Georgia’s further Westernization and 

Europeanization.58
21

A “Police State.”

The positive reputation of Georgia’s neighborhood 

patrolman has reinforced similar positive images 

of the police and the Interior Ministry in general.59

Importantly, however, such evenhanded, serviceoriented treatment of all citizens is merely the standard operating procedure for trivial, everyday public 

interaction with the police. The transformation of the 

law enforcement sector did not curb corruption at the 

highest levels, among top officials who have access 

to economic resources.60 It is difficult for the general 

public to understand what is really happening within 

the Interior Ministry.61 Unless an individual openly 

supports the opposition or has relatives who do so, 

the population at large has no interaction with the 

politicized sectors of the Interior Ministry.

Formally, Interior Ministry staff are not allowed to 

intervene in the political process or even be members 

of a political party. But the quick reform generated by 

the political leadership has inevitably led to the politicization of the Interior Ministry. Under Merabishvili‘s 

leadership, the ministry often promoted police personnel based on their individual loyalty to the political leadership, not their skills or professionalism. In 

many rural areas, local police chiefs enjoy strong 

political power on par with local government officials. 

Furthermore, the Police Academy still lacks a 

robust human resources system that would prevent 

promotion based on patronage networks.62 According 

to the Transparency International office in Georgia, 

the international community has pressed the Interior 

Ministry to improve human resource management, 

but this recommendation was never implemented. 

“They prefer to have loyal people rather than professionals,” one technical information (TI) expert said.63
22

Finally, the police reform model is now being 

applied to other institutions. Encouraged by the apparently successful reform of the police, the government 

has been using the Police Academy to train security 

guards for other government agencies, including the 

Ministry of Education.64 Although those employees 

have civilian status, they are trained within the premises of the Interior Ministry. 

Saakashvili’s opponents insist that Georgia has 

essentially turned into a “police state” where the Interior Ministry spies on regime opponents. As a former 

opposition leader, Georgia’s Defense Minister Irakli 

Alasania argues that before October 2012 elections, the 

Constitutional Security Department (KUD) regularly 

wiretaped phone numbers belonging to him, members of his family, and members of his political party. 

He also claims that the Interior Ministry’s undercover 

representatives follow him whenever he meets with 

his constituents. The KUD also has “limitless power 

to investigate” the work of the political opposition, 

Alasania claims. Conveniently, ministry officials are 

immune to prosecution in cases when they break the 

law when dealing with the opposition. 

The ministry’s pervasive oversight of the opposition’s activities undermined opposition parties’ ability 

to campaign effectively and freely. In the run-up to the 

election, Bidzina Ivanishvili, then leader of the Georgian Dream coalition, openly alleged that the police 

are loyal to the regime and protect the president by 

engaging in illegal activities against his opponents.65

Ivanishvili claimed the police were on standby to carry out politically motivated orders against opposition 

forces. In one incident, the police seized 300,000 satellite television dishes distributed to the population to 

help them access pro-opposition TV channels.66 Oppo-
23

sition leaders further complained that their relatives 

were constantly harassed and threatened with arrest. 

The government critics’ main concern is Saakashvili’s “zero-tolerance” policy toward corruption and 

criminal charges, meaning that anyone suspected of 

corruption is subject to prosecution. Merabishvili and 

former Justice Minister Zurab Adeishvili have been the 

primary masterminds behind the policy, which since 

the Rose Revolution has caused Georgia’s prison population to reach 24,244 in 2012, compared to 6,654 in 

2004.67 The government publicizes arrests of criminals 

and politicians suspected of corruption on TV, demonstrating their own resolve to prosecute anyone not 

complying with the law. There have been cases when 

political figures were publicly accused of corruption 

without having a proper trial.68 Multiple reports suggest that plea bargain funds are used to finance the 

state budget to such a degree that the judicial system 

almost entirely depends on this income.69 Georgia’s 

Ombudsman’s office insists that, now that the level of 

petty corruption crimes has dramatically decreased, 

the government’s zero-tolerance policy should end 

as well.70

The Georgian Public Defender’s office is also concerned about police officers who still use excessive 

force or intentionally drag out criminal investigations. 

The Ombudsman’s office has detected several cases of 

police restricting detainees’ access to family members 

and not documenting cases of arrests. Police officers 

still often use excessive force during detention, and 

investigators are aware of several cases of inhumane 

treatment. Finally, Georgia’s Public Defender argues 

that police detain citizens without cause to interrogate 

them on their activities. 
24

Dealing with Mass Riots.

Georgian police’s response to mass demonstrations in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012 has evolved as 

well. Before the November 2007 riots, when opposition leaders from the National Council gathered over 

50,000 people to demonstrate in Tbilisi against Saakashvili’s corruption, the Interior Ministry had only 

600-700 policemen trained to deal with large crowds. 

Unprepared and ill-trained, the policemen resorted 

to fist fighting and excessive violence to subdue the 

protestors.71 The protests lasted for several days 

before being dispersed by tear gas and water cannons. 

The police were widely criticized by human rights 

organizations for their brutal suppression of civilian 

demonstrations.72

Since the 2007 protests, the Interior Ministry has 

increased the number of trained riot police, now estimated at 5,000 men, many of whom serve in various 

police units. The government was better prepared for 

protests that took place in May 2011 when roughly 

10,000 people walked the streets together with the 

Democratic Movement-United Georgia movement 

led by former prime minister Nino Burjanadze. The 

opposition blamed the police forces for brutally suppressing the demonstrations, in which two protesters 

died, accusing the police of acting unprofessionally. 

The government denied such reports, instead blaming 

the opposition for poor crowd management. While the 

government and opposition accounts of police actions 

differed, the Ombudsman’s office determined that 

police did use excessive force against demonstrators. 

Both the government and opposition forces condemn some of the police’s violent treatment of demonstrators during mass protests in Tbilisi, Kalheti, and 
25

other parts of Georgia. However, whereas the government argues that the police were not prepared to handle mass protests and that some opposition leaders 

were guilty of initiating violence, nongovernmental 

actors regard the actions by the police as confirmation 

of their willingness to support Saakashvili’s regime at 

the cost of the welfare of the masses. 

NGOs have collected complaints that participants of mass demonstrations received threatening 

phone calls during the demonstrations.73 The Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) reports 

that policemen openly expressed their support of the 

president by shouting his name during the 2011 protests. Policemen were spotted accusing the crowds of 

being Russian spies paid by Moscow to stage the rallies. In situations like this, the police have shown that 

“they are not the protector of people, but they protect the regime,” GYLA executive director Ekaterine 

Popkhadze said.74 Those arrested during mass protests undergo unfair trials conducted by a politicized 

judiciary.75 Even minor, small-scale protests result 

in arrests.

Saakashvili’s strong political will is a common 

explanation for the fast-paced reforms of the police 

and other government sectors.76 However, the Georgian example demonstrates that political will can look 

a great deal like personal power grabs to ensure continuity. Georgia’s case also vividly demonstrates that 

the public perception of corruption depends highly 

on the visibility of corruption at the grassroots levels. 

Once petty corruption is eliminated, the population 

believes the political regime is carrying out similar 

anti-corruption fights across the board.77

Yet, because the reform was conducted without 

public oversight, public suspicion about high-level 
26

corruption in the Interior Ministry continues to mount. 

Just 2 weeks before the October 1, 2012, parliamentary 

election, videos appearing to document cases of torture and rape in Gldani prison in Tbilisi were leaked 

to the Internet, raising widespread concerns about 

human rights abuses in detention facilities. The video 

showed prisoners, some of them underage, beaten, 

raped, and forced to confess by prison guards.78 The 

videos triggered spontaneous anti-government rallies across Georgia. Newly appointed Interior Minister Bacho Akhalia and prison officials were forced 

to resign. The videos may have affected the final outcome of the elections and helped cause Saakashvili’s 

party to lose its majority in the parliament. 

 KYRGYZSTAN 

Ten years into the effort to reform Kyrgyzstan’s 

police, corruption is still pervasive at the Interior 

Ministry, which has become infamous for widespread 

human rights abuses. Although some minor changes 

to police operations were introduced over the past 

decade, such as elements of community policing and 

using rubber bullets to disperse protestors, these 

changes are dwarfed by the increase in some of the 

worst Soviet legacies: forced confessions, petty graft, 

and police readiness to serve the political regime at 

the expense of society. At best, the police are considered to be inefficient at maintaining social order, at 

worst, they are a source of injustice and a threat to 

public security. In most rural areas, police are afraid 

of local organized criminal groups and limit their own 

contacts with society.79

Kyrgyz human rights activists have uncovered 20 

cases of police torture that led to the death of detainees 
27

from 2008 to 2011. Not all instances of police misconduct are reported, and various forms of torture and 

coercion are commonly used by cops to extract evidence and confessions.80 The situation is even murkier 

in southern Kyrgyzstan. In the June 2010 bloodshed in 

Osh, the police and armed forces joined the conflict, 

rather rather than resolving it. They acted unprofessionally and reportedly provoked the Uzbek minority and protected the Kyrgyz majority. Their lack of 

adequate training to deal with ethnic-driven civic 

unrest and the shortage of equipment exacerbated 

the problem. 

For the most part, Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry preserved the Soviet institutional foundations of 

law enforcement, including the ministry’s Soviet-era 

departments, mission statement, and educational system. Policemen spend 5 years training at the Police 

Academy, yet they remain the least respected professionals in society. Corruption and abuse of power 

begins the day after a cadet graduates from the Police 

Academy.81 In summer 2011, to celebrate their graduation, new policemen in uniforms blocked an intersection in central Bishkek and openly drank vodka 

disregarding traffic jams caused by them. In 2012 

they started a massive brawl in one of Bishkek cafes, 

destroying private property and ignoring warnings 

from their Interior Ministry superiors to stop.82

When the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) first began collaborating with 

the Kyrgyz government in 2002 to implement a 10-year 

police reform program, the organization sought to 

make Kyrgyzstan a model case for police reforms in 

other post-communist countries.83 Together with the 

Kyrgyz government, the OSCE developed a long-term 

strategy that would change the structure of the police, 

making it accountable to the population, not politi-
28

cal leaders. Kosovo’s successful police reform in the 

early-2000s has served as an inspiration for the OSCE 

office in Bishkek.84

The most common criticism is that the OSCE tried 

to apply other international experiences in Kyrgyzstan 

without trying to understand the local context. Some 

of the attempts at collaboration between, for example, 

Georgian and Turkish experts and their Kyrgyz counterparts brought little result. International donors did 

not fully understand the basic patterns of interaction 

between society and police before doling out advice 

to the Kyrgyz authorities. Instead, donors used their 

existing playbook, prescribing reforms that worked 

in other countries and relied on gossip and chitchat 

about how the local Interior Ministry works.85

Throughout the 2000s, the Kyrgyz government 

continued to push police reform despite growing 

authoritarianism under both the Askar Akayev and 

Kurmanbek Bakiyev regimes. The OSCE prioritized its 

reform assistance efforts on developing police capacity to fight transnational threats such as terrorism, 

drug trafficking, and organized crime. Still, most of 

OSCE projects were ad hoc, not following any coherent strategy.86 International donors have also helped 

Kyrgyzstan’s police forces to become better skilled at 

peacefully dispersing mass riots.87 Civil society activists, however, depicted the Akayev-OSCE collaboration as a case of the international community helping 

a corrupt, authoritarian regime to more effectively 

suppress civilian protests and opposition groups.

As the international community’s interest in Kyrgzstan’s attempts at police reform continued, a group of 

high-ranking Interior Ministry officials became gatekeepers, accepting donor funds on behalf of the ministry, but were more interested in keeping the money 

channel open than conducting any reform.88 By 2011, 
29

these gatekeepers blamed Akayev and Bakiyev for 

failing to overhaul the police and continued to request 

greater and greater financial assistance to try “real 

reform” now that these obstructions were out of the 

picture. Corruption among Interior Ministry officials 

and political leaders has stalled any effort to reform 

the police, but it also helped the Interior Ministry to 

continue functioning when its official budget shrank 

in the 1990s.89 With their own source of “independent” 

funding, the Interior Ministry and the police became 

increasingly detached from both state and society. The 

police became a separate marketplace funded through 

graft, organized crime, and extortion.90 Hence, the 

Interior Ministry does not need to depend on state 

funding or civilian oversight. 

Police reform in Kyrgyzstan was further slowed 

by the chaotic political situation. Two regime changes 

within 5 years (March 2005 and April 2010), coupled 

with rotation among the OSCE staff in Bishkek, have 

forced the reform into a reset mode, resulting in many 

repetitive and redundant activities. Since most of the 

OSCE representatives dealing with the reform spent 

between 2 and 4 years in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz Interior Ministry officials often intentionally stalled the 

reform effort. At the same time, Kyrgyz NGOs preferred to see large-scale, long-term, and well-funded 

police reform projects. The Interior Ministry, on the 

other hand, defends its limited progress, complaining 

that international donors expect the police to respect 

human rights under conditions in which law enforcement agencies in relatively underdeveloped countries 

still use paper to communicate between agencies and 

across different parts of the country. 

Kyrgyzstan’s experience demonstrates that international pressure can make it relatively easy for Inte-
30

rior Ministry officials to adopt policies, but it may not 

be sufficient reason to trigger genuine institutional 

change. Much of the criticism from the expert community centered to the fact that international assistance usually meant providing better equipment, not 

implementing structural reforms.91 As a result, over 

the years the better-equipped police became a more 

efficient instrument of repression in the hands of 

authoritarian leaders. 

Kyrgyzstan’s case thus shows that external pressure and financial aid alone will not lead to a thorough 

police reform. OSCE representatives, as well as U.S. 

and European Union (EU) donors understated the 

Kyrgyz leadership’s reluctance to transform the police 

forces to serve the interests of the broader population. 

Like Georgia, Kyrgyzstan has received ample U.S. 

aid over the past 2 decades. Between 1992 and 2010, 

the United States provided aid packages that totaled 

$1.22 billion.92 This includes $90 million in humanitarian assistance allocated following the regime change 

and ethnic violence in 2010. Since late-2001, Kyrgyzstan has also received U.S. payments for rent and costs 

associated with the U.S. air base (Transit Center) at 

the Manas airport. Bakiyev. Later President Almazbek Atambayev secured up to $150 million in annual 

payments for use of the base, with at least $100 million earmarked for rent.93 U.S. humanitarian programs 

associated with the Transit Center had spent $1.7 

million by 2010.

Reform Programs and Authoritarian Leadership. 

President Askar Akayev became interested in 

police reform in March 2002, following an unprecedented incident in which police shot at civilian dem-
31

onstrators, killing six. The OSCE was quick to respond 

to Akayev’s pleas for assistance in transforming the 

country’s police forces. Akayev’s initiative with the 

OSCE, however, encountered strong resistance from 

civil society activists. Kyrgyz NGOs warned that 

Akayev, whose popularity was rapidly sinking due 

to pervasive corruption, would use a more professional police force to suppress his opponents 

more efficiently.

Nevertheless, in August 2003, the OSCE and the 

Kyrgyz government signed a Memorandum of Understanding on transforming the Interior Ministry.94 This 

marked the beginning of the restructuring program, 

which identified critical areas: improving the quality 

of investigations conducted, strengthening the forces 

and means to curb drug trafficking, creating service 

centers for emergency calls, strengthening the capacity of law enforcement bodies for conflict prevention 

and peaceful resolution of social unrest, and implementing pilot projects in community-based policing 

in Bishkek.

Under the Memorandum, the OSCE would help the 

Interior Ministry to develop a community-based system that would meet international standards of policing. International experts were invited to train Interior 

Ministry personnel, while Kyrgyz officials could participate in courses abroad. Between 2003-08, roughly 

4,000 Interior Ministry employees were trained under 

the banner of the OSCE reform program. In addition, the ministry received 88 vehicles and roughly 

200 computer stations, and five training centers were 

established within the ministry’s academy. Within 

the OSCE’s more narrowly targeted Police Assistance 

Program (PAP), Kyrgyzstan’s police received new 

computers, over 800 surplus hand-held radios, and 
32

specialized vehicles with crime-scene equipment.95

OSCE introduced the concept of community policing 

early on, but years passed before it spread throughout 

Bishkek and then the country at large. 

Other projects were created to improve the professionalism of ministry personnel, such as strengthening the capacity of the Chief of Staff of the Ministry 

of the Interior to monitor the activities of all units, 

analyzing decisionmaking processes, and improving psychological counseling for ministry personnel. 

Furthermore, 10 projects were developed specifically for the Police Academy, including establishing a 

research institute within the ministry. To improve the 

work of community-based policing, the Interior Ministry planned to improve investigative units, forensic

departments, the emergency call center, and analytical 

services; upgrade crime labs; and implement targeted 

programs to prevent crime, religious extremism, juvenile delinquency, livestock theft in rural areas, and 

domestic violence.

By 2008, when Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek 

Bakiyev, organized rigged parliamentary elections 

and significantly limited media freedom, police reform 

stalled. By then, mass protests were banned, and Bakiyev had built a robust security apparatus to protect 

him from his opponents. Law enforcement agencies 

and security institutions became highly politicized. 

Bakiyev appointed cronies—individuals who valued 

political loyalty over professional qualifications—to 

head all power ministries, including the Interior Ministry.96 The Soviet-inherited ranking system inside the 

Interior Ministry was disrupted, with many professionals leaving the ministry and those ready to support the regime unconditionally moving into higher 

ranks. Nevertheless, the OSCE continued to fund the 

reform under Bakiyev’s regime. 
33

In March 2008, the Interior Ministry and the OSCE 

began to improve the legal framework for police 

operations, data collection and legal support, human 

resource capacity and the ministry press office, the 

ministry’s education system, and the work of criminal investigators and community police, and worked 

to introduce principles of international law into the 

national legal code.97 During 2008-10, a special emphasis was made on improving information sharing, both 

within the ministry and between the ministry and 

citizens. According to the plan, the ministry would set 

up an online database containing key ministry documents as well as biometric data to improve searches 

based on the physical characteristics of suspects.98

The OSCE and other international donor efforts to 

overhaul Kyrgyzstan’s police during 2002-12 largely 

failed to bring about changes in institutional practices 

and attitudes. Shamshybek Mamyrov, deputy head 

of the Chief Administration for Legal and Criminal 

Analysis at the Interior Ministry since the late 1990s,

attributed the failure to what he described as “double 

standards” employed by former presidents Akayev 

and Bakiyev: the two leaders wanted police to improve 

professionalism in their ranks without trying to clean 

up corruption at the highest echelons of power.99 In 

addition, politicians during the Akayev and Bakiyev 

eras frequently used law enforcement agencies to 

promote their personal agendas, not necessarily to 

uphold the law. Mamyrov, however, is often criticized 

for intentionally stalling the reform as the ministry’s 

“gatekeeper” for international donors.

Reports of police misconduct have continued 

shortly after Bakiyev’s regime crumbled. For example, the police failed to prevent looters from acquiring weapons during the violent regime change in 
34

April 2010.100 As happened during the regime change 

in March 2005, police forces in Bishkek stopped functioning immediately following the collapse of the government. This led to several days of looting and arson, 

forcing the population to organize their own civilian 

security units. Law enforcement officials have been 

accused of collaborating with criminal groups and of 

selectively targeting minorities during the June 2010

ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan. There were 

also ongoing reports in southern Kyrgyzstan of police 

involvement in torture, unwarranted arrests, and the 

harassment of ethnic Uzbeks.

Moving the Reform Out of the Interior Ministry. 

After the regime change in 2010, police reform 

has once again become the cornerstone of the Kyrgyz 

government’s effort to boost public trust in the new 

regime. As prime minister and later as president, 

Atambayev has preferred to outsource responsibility for the reform to the Interior Ministry, NGOs, and 

MPs. The Interior Ministry opted to begin the post2010 reform effort by changing laws and regulations. 

Shortly after Bakiyev’s fall in April 2010, the Interior Ministry formulated a reform concept that offered 

nothing new; instead, it merely changed some laws 

and increased salaries for police personnel. It lacked 

a conceptual base that explained why new laws were 

needed and described in what ways police would be 

different after the transformation. At the insistence 

of the OSCE’s Vienna office, Mamyrov agreed to formulate a concept for the draft laws put forward after 

the regime change.101 But ethnic violence in southern 

Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 and parliamentary elections 

in October 2010 postponed discussion of reform for 

another year. 
35

Starting in 2011, Kyrgyz NGOs have shown 

increased interest in the reform effort, largely criticizing the Interior Ministry’s lack of progress. The 

OSCE welcomed the involvement of NGO experts 

in designing police reform despite resistance from 

ministry officials. Coordinating the work of multiple 

NGOs was a complex process in itself. Members of 

NGOs, in turn, insisted that the concept be widely 

discussed with society at large. Several NGO activists traveled across the country to talk to local groups 

about the reform. This exercise was not very helpful, as the activists discovered that the population 

had very limited understanding of what reform 

should entail.102

By mid-2011, a special Working Group comprised 

of MPs, government officials, and NGO activists was 

formed to define a vision for police reform. Together 

with OSCE representatives, the group regularly met 

to discuss the reform goals and desired outcomes. 

Often, members discussed the police reform programs 

in Georgia and the Baltic states. The meetings rarely 

produced specific recommended actions, while Interior Ministry officials tended to ignore recommendations from civil society or even other members of the 

Working Group.103 In the summer of 2011, for example, the ministry launched a month-long pilot police 

patrol program in Bishkek. The ministry also unilaterally decided to install street cameras in Bishkek and 

other cities. 

By mid-2012, the Working Group had formulated 

a joint police reform concept that included four main 

points: democratization, demilitarization, depoliticization, and technology procurement. The concept

further suggested reorganizing the Interior Ministry 

into three departments: patrol police, detectives, and 
36

community policing. Some among the NGO community were driven by the Georgian example, borrowing heavily from their collaboration with Georgian 

government officials. When NGOs cited the Georgian precedent during Working Group discussions, it 

almost uniformly portrayed it in rosy terms, leaving 

no space for doubt or criticism.104

This positive evaluation coincided with the Atambayev government’s decision to follow Georgia’s 

example and to begin by transforming the traffic 

police. Former Deputy Prime Minister and former 

Interior Minister Shamil Atakhanov visited Georgia 

to observe their program and is leading the efforts to 

implement a similar program in Kyrgyzstan. He was 

able to secure 10 million soms ($220,000) for this program from the state budget. Atakhanov has declared 

that the reform effort’s main goal is to boost public 

trust in the police by reducing corruption, unwarranted arrests, and the use of torture. The pilot project 

started in August 2011 and was suspended in October 

2011 for the presidential election campaign and never 

resumed again. 

It took roughly a year to develop the concept 

because Working Group members had to accommodate the desire of several NGOs to contribute their 

vision of the reform. At least two concept papers competed for attention, with NGOs, Interior Ministry, and 

government officials each suggesting their own vision. 

Since the perception in the parliament and government is that international donors are more likely to 

trust NGOs than state officials, all realized that civil 

society’s participation in the creation and implementation of the concept was necessary. 

Multiple voices within civil society competed 

over what type of concept to propose, delaying their 

endorsement of the document until mid-2012. Some 
37

Interior Ministry officials viewed the battle for controlling policy formulation as a competition over 

potentially managing external grants and raising their 

personal profile inside the country.105

The bulk of the discussion centered on whether 

the reform should proceed gradually or rapidly. 

Advocates of gradualism spelled out stages for the 

reform and considered the Interior Ministry’s vision 

for the process, while the latter insisted on laying off 

all police personnel and rehiring them again based on 

the results of testing. 

Another major point of debate was how to manage 

property belonging to the ministry. The liberal-minded NGO Central Asia Free Market Institute (CAFMI) 

wanted to privatize resorts belonging to the ministry 

and increase salaries for personnel, while the leader 

of the human rights NGO “Nashe pravo,” Kalicha 

Umuralieva, argued that it would not be possible to 

increase rank-and-file policemen’s salaries to a level 

that would allow them to still afford vacations at 

similar resorts. That is, social benefits after the reform 

would not match pre-reform levels. 

After months of debate, the NGOs came to a conclusion that instead of firing corrupt police personnel, 

the Interior Ministry will be restructured to decrease 

the number of nonpolice staff. This approach includes 

moving civilian personnel into the nongovernmental 

sector and using their services on a contract basis. 

In June 2012, Umuralieva predicted that up to 7,000 

people would be downsized as part of the reform.106

CAFMI, on the other hand, insisted that the reform 

must be conducted swiftly and, as in Georgia, all 

police personnel should be fired and made to pass 

exams if they want to regain their jobs.107
38

Nevertheless, by mid-2012, the concept was formulated after the locus of responsibility was moved 

out of the Interior Ministry to the Working Group 

that involved motivated NGO leaders, as well as MPs. 

The initiative for forming such a group originated in 

the NGO community and was supported by MPs and 

Prime Minister Babanov. The group also attracted 

police personnel who showed interest in the reform 

and were willing to convince their fellow colleagues. 

NGO representatives worked with the parliament and 

each MP individually, persuading them to support 

the concept. They chose to persuade, not criticize, in 

hopes of motivating MPs and Interior Ministry officials to move the reform forward.

The concept seeks to copy many elements of the 

Georgian reform, including reducing the training 

period to a few months and shutting down the 5-year 

programs at the Police Academy. Candidates now 

must have an undergraduate or graduate degree to 

be accepted. Community police and patrol police 

candidates are to take courses for a few weeks, while 

aspiring detectives will train for at least a year. This 

change is expected to significantly cut costs for training new conscripts. Under the old system, 600 students graduated from police training every year, but 

only 8 percent stayed within the Interior Ministry system, as the rest chose other career paths immediately 

after graduation.108

The concept paper’s three fundamental principles 

are interpreted as follows: 

• Democratization includes respect for human 

rights and collaboration with civil societygroups.109

• Demilitarization includes appointing a civilian minister and transforming the Interior 
39

Ministry into a civilian agency. The new interior minister’s efficiency will depend upon the 

level of public trust. Furthermore, under this 

clause, the concept suggests increasing police 

officers’ salaries and introducing a bonus system for achievements beyond expectations. The 

concept suggests delinking the current bonus 

system from the number of cases solved by 

the policemen, instead rewarding their rapid 

deployment to crimes. Importantly, the ministry is to lay off 3,000 personnel in specialized 

units. Overall, the number of police personnel 

would decrease from 17,000 to 12,000. 

• Depoliticization presumes detaching police 

forces from the political leadership. This would 

include preventing police forces from participation in political events and from harassing 

political figures. 

• Procurement means improving the equipment 

and technology provided to police and opening new opportunities for continuing education within the Police Academy. As part of the 

reform a starting salary for the Interior Ministry personnel would more than double, to $400-

600 per month. 

According to MP Ravshan Jeenbekov, the Interior 

Ministry has agreed to implement the reform but is 

against the idea of appointing a civilian to head the 

police.110 The ministry staff are also afraid that most 

of their benefits will be taken away in exchange for 

higher salaries. The MP alleges that the ministry’s 

recreation centers, hospitals, and other state-funded 

facilities provide multiple opportunities for corruption. Most of the facilities were left over from the Sovi-
40

et period, but the Interior Ministry later opened them 

to the broader population as a source of income. 

Downsizing Interior Ministry personnel will be 

a challenging task for the government as well. The 

process inevitably increases tensions inside the parliament because some parties will lose control over 

public offices.111 A number of high-ranking Interior 

Ministry personnel have strong ties with the criminal 

underworld and are not interested in changing how 

the ministry works. 

The Policeman’s Dilemma.

The police in Kyrgyzstan, like their colleagues 

in other former Soviet states, suffer from a negative 

image that is reinforced through the behavior of rankand-file personnel in daily contact with society. They 

are seen as individuals willing to abuse their power, 

use violence against civilians, and collaborate with 

organized criminal groups. Some police officers openly admit that since most civilians disrespect them and 

are ready to break the law, they must themselves use 

their own judgment about what is “good” and “bad” 

when extorting bribes from the “bad” and “real criminals.”112 For others, this separation was not important, so they treat all violators of law as potential 

sources of bribes. Some policemen see their jobs primarily as fundraising for the Interior Ministry’s higher leadership.113

This negative image is propped up by a network 

of informal relations within the Interior Ministry that 

reinforces corruption on all levels. In this system, 

the very top level of Interior Ministry personnel are 

very comfortable financially because the entire system works for them, as they reap returns from petty 
41

corruption in the lower ranks. Fresh graduates of 

the Police Academy earn meager salaries, or no salary at all, and are expected to collect petty bribes to 

meet informal requests for cash by their superiors. 

Moving up in the organization’s hierarchy means 

gaining access to larger sums of informal income and 

lavish lifestyles, while promotions are distributed 

mostly according to a policeman’s ability to bribe 

his superiors. As David Lewis describes a Central 

Asian example: 

Informal payments rapidly turned into a more formal 

parallel system of funding, in which money collected 

at the bottom of the force by ordinary police officers 

and traffic policemen was channeled up through the 

system to mid-level and high-level officers, with a 

final cut reserved for the minister, and in most cases, 

for his political masters.114

 Indeed, once a policeman reaches the rank of minister, he achieves the rank of Police General and will 

enjoy generous state benefits for the rest of his life.115

In this system dominated by patronage relations 

rather than professional conduct, a small group of 

policemen are interested in reform as a way to gain 

the trust and respect of the population.116 “My work is 

obsolete in this country,” one policeman said. “I have 

a feeling of permanent injustice.”117 But these few individuals feel powerless to break the cycle of corruption 

maintained by their superiors. Furthermore, because 

the police are inefficient, alternative sources of justice and order have emerged throughout the country, 

arrangements that often sabotage the efforts of honest 

policemen. Organized crime, elders’ courts, private 

security organizations, and corrupt policemen thrive 

in rural areas.
42

Most lower-ranking police personnel are therefore caught between an aggressive society wary of 

their work and corrupt leadership in the ministry and 

government. Ordinary rank-and-file police personnel 

often must decide whether they serve according to 

the formal mission of the police, survive on a low salary, and compete for professional promotion, or succumb to corruption and its unlimited opportunities 

for personal enrichment. Some police choose to cover 

up criminals instead of trying to make sense of their 

professional mission. They may structure their careers 

around opportunities for enrichment. For example, a 

narcotics squad officer in Issyk-Kul oblast in northern Kyrgyzstan might prefer to be relocated to Osh 

where drug routes offer more lucrative opportunities 

for bribes.118 Similarly, most policemen prefer to work 

in larger cities rather than in rural areas because of 

the greater population density and concentration of 

wealth. Officers stationed in rural areas may seek to 

bribe their way into a transfer to a more populous area. 

The Working Group has identified Interior Ministry officials and rank-and-file personnel interested in 

genuine reform and tried to involve them in the process so they might persuade their colleagues to accept 

the upcoming changes. MPs, however, complain that 

although some Interior Ministry members want to 

reform, they are thinking only within the limits of 

Kyrgyzstan’s experience, without considering policies 

that have worked in other countries. “All they want 

to change is the structure, equipment, and salaries,” 

Jeenbekov says. A group of NGO activists and MPs 

genuinely interested in the reform trusts neither the 

Interior Ministry nor the OSCE to move forward with 

the change. Their ability to push the reform past these 

obstacles will be revealed in the coming years.
43

By late-2012, Kyrgyzstan’s new Interior Minister, 

Shamil Atakhanov, faced the challenge of implementing ideas developed by MPs and civil society leaders 

who were, in turn, inspired by the top-down police 

reform program in Georgia. The appointment of 

Atakhanov, a former Soviet police officer who more 

recently had spent 20 years in the civilian sector, was 

the government’s first step toward implementing the 

Working Group’s recommendations. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Analyzing police reform in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan helps U.S. military engagement policymakers to 

better understand the challenges and opportunities 

that former Soviet republics face when reforming their 

security sectors. Both countries have made conscious 

attempts to build on existing democratic practices 

and to change the character of the militarized police 

inherited from the Soviet era. To date, however, external assistance programs have, at times, contributed 

to even greater political manipulation of the police. 

The politicization predicament is characteristic of the 

broader security sector in these countries, although 

the police are a unique component because they have 

direct contact with citizens. 

Georgia and Kyrgyzstan present two different 

models of post-Soviet police reform. The major difference between the two cases is that Georgia vigorously 

carried out one man’s vision using his substantial 

political skills and took advantage of the post-Rose 

Revolution “honeymoon” period. The government’s 

reform program has fundamentally transformed the 

police, but it also reinforced the Saakashvili regime’s 

reliance on the police. The larger question Georgia is 
44

facing today is whether the reformed police will retain 

their new efficiency at the grassroots level under the 

new government? More pertinent, how will the police 

react to public dissent under Georgia’s newly split 

government? 

After many starts and stops and regime changes in 

Kyrgyzstan, the pace of reform quickened only after 

several local NGOs inserted themselves in the process 

of designing and overseeing the reform in 2010-13. The 

future of the reform is still uncertain, but its concept 

has become a matter of broad public discussion with 

several activists and NGOs involved in the process. 

Small steps have been made toward implementing the 

reform in 2012. 

Current and future U.S. military-to-military cooperation could potentially foster the transformation of 

the security sector in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Surrounded by Russia and China, these regions 

are under constant pressure to broker military and 

security deals with Moscow and Beijing, deals that 

would hinder their democratic development. Particularly in Central Asia, where the EU is a marginal 

actor, U.S. military-to-military engagement could 

be beneficial.

Over the past decade, however, U.S. policy in 

Afghanistan has dominated the Pentagon’s security 

sector programs with the Soviet successor states. The 

primacy of Afghanistan often trumped democratization efforts promoted by other U.S. Government 

agencies. To date, Central Asian and South Caucasus 

governments have readily accepted U.S. materiel and

technical support as part of anti-terrorism efforts, 

but they have refrained from taking steps to increase 

public involvement in security sector oversight. The 

distance separating the security sector, including the 
45

police, from the civilian population remains as large 

as during the Soviet period. 

To reverse this trend, the U.S. military must prioritize democratic security sector reform over improving 

a country’s military technical capability. To do that, 

military-to-military assistance must focus on training 

and sharing best practices regarding civilian control 

of the armed forces, separation of military and police 

functions, and stripping the military of its political 

surveillance functions. A special panel/committee

should be established to deal specifically with issues 

regarding the democratic reform of the security sector, 

and police reform must be part of that agenda. Technical assistance to Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as 

other post-Soviet countries, must be provided only 

when indisputably democratic elements of security 

policy oversight are in place. Technical and material 

assistance provided by the U.S. military to post-Soviet 

counterparts must be transparent as well.119

Policymakers should expect government leaders 

in the former Soviet republics to resist demands for 

greater security sector transparency. While some of 

these states have appointed civilian Defense and Interior ministers, their security sectors remain exempt 

from external oversight. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) must consistently promote institutional reform 

to eliminate such political barriers and to enable fruitful military-to-military cooperation. 

Greater security sector openness will help demilitarize the police, something police reform advocates 

throughout the former Soviet region have been promoting for the past several years. Georgia’s experience 

confirms that trust in one security institution reinforces trust in other state institutions. That is, greater pub-
46

lic trust in the police may potentially also boost public trust in the military. In turn, police forces that are 

able to maintain public order in a democratic way will 

reduce the potential need for military operations to 

counter nonstate challenges. Reformed police should 

be able to prevent violence generated by criminal syndicates, drug cartels, and violent entrepreneurs.

As part of these efforts, security sector efficiency 

must be evaluated according to criteria other than the 

technical sophistication of equipment and the number 

of military and police personnel. Instead, the Pentagon 

must assist efforts to expand the number of groups 

involved in public oversight of the security sector 

by bringing the parliament and NGOs into the process. Transformation of the security sector should be 

measured according to how transparent and accountable the military, police, and other components are 

becoming. Likewise, the success of programs to create 

interoperability between the Pentagon and security 

structures in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan should be measured by how well the shared vision of transparency 

and accountability of the military and police to civilian leadership and public oversight is implemented. 

EUCOM and CENTCOM are therefore faced with 

the challenge of identifying which security sector actors 

are genuinely interested in creating greater transparency and institutional change, as well as identifying 

which civil society groups appreciate the urgent need 

to improve democratic control of the security sector. 

When possible, EUCOM and CENTCOM should prioritize the training of local military and police trainers 

and boost the participation of local experts to promote 

security sector reform. The Pentagon should also collaborate with local civilian experts to assess the security sector’s democratization process. In Georgia par-
47

ticularly, EUCOM has a unique opportunity to engage 

both the President's office and members of the opposition in the process of depoliticizing the security sector 

and strengthening the sector’s capacity to deal with 

state and nonstate threats, thanks to the broad consensus among competing political forces. Kyrgyzstan, 

where a number of civic activists have been engaged 

in the reform process, must be further encouraged 

to invest in building peace-keeping contingents that 

could undertake regional and international missions.

Finally, the Pentagon’s security sector assistance 

program must strive for better synchronization with 

the democratization efforts of other agencies, including USAID and INL. This is particularly important, 

since countries like Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have 

shown interest in building on existing democratic 

practices. Assistance to transform the security sector 

in former Soviet states will, in the long term, build 

partners who will act in a more transparent way and 

prioritize security threats that affect the entire population, not just a narrow circle of political elites.

ENDNOTES

1. Arie Bloed, “The Slow Process of Police Reform in Central 

and Eastern Europe: Some Lessons Learned,” Niels Uildriks, ed., 

Police Reform and Human Rights: Opportunities and Impediments in 

Post-Communist Societies, Cambridge, UK: Intersentia, 2005, pp. 

35-39; Mark Galeotti, “Medvedev’s Police Reform Is More About 

Control Than Reform,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/

RL), January 7, 2010, available from www.rferl.org/content/Medvedevs_Police_Reform_Is_More_About_Control_Than_Reform/1923207.

html.

2. For more on political change in both countries, see Lincoln 

A. Mitchell, The Color Revolutions, Philadelphia, PA: University of 

Pennsylvania Press, 2012; Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: 
48

Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia, Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 2012.

3. For more information, see the International Republican 

Institute’s survey of public opinion in Georgia, January 5, 2012, 

available from www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-expanded-nationwide-survey-georgian-public-opinion. 

4. According to the International Republican Institute’s 

survey of public opinion in Kyrgyzstan, 59 percent of respondents 

viewed the police’s work unfavorably in 2012, April 11, 2012,

available from www.iri.org/newsevents-press-center/news/iri-releasespost-presidential-election-survey-kyrgyzstan-public-opinion. 

5. See Data for 2005-11, “State/INL Georgia Program,” December 6, 2011, available from www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/178347.

htm. Georgia was the largest INL aid recipient in the South Caucasus, compared to $21 million for the same time period in Armenia 

and $10.6 in Azerbaijan.

6. See Data for 2006-2011, December 6, 2011, “State/INL Kyrgyzstan Program,” available from www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/ 178372.

htm. Likewise, Kyrgyzstan was the largest recipient of INL aid in 

Central Asia, compared to $1.7 million in Uzbekistan and $3 million in Turkmenistan. Tajikistan was the only country where INL 

spent more over the same time period - $46.3 million. 

7. For more, see David H. Bayley, “Democratizing the Police 

Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It,” Issues in International 

Crime, Washington, DC, 2001; Barry J. Ryan, Statebuilding and Police Reform: The Freedom of Security, London, UK: Routledge, 2011, 

pp. 50-54; Renate Weber, “Police Organization and Accountability: A Comparative Study,” Andras Kadar, ed., Police in Transition, 

Budapest, Hungary: Central European University, 2001; David 

Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2008.

8. Hans Toch, J. Douglas Grant, and Raymond T. Galvin, 

Agents of Change: A Study in Police Reform, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975; John Keane, Violence and Democracy, Cambridge, 

UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
49

9. Peter K. Manning, Democratic Policing in a Changing World, 

Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, p. 13.

10. For more on state-crime relations in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, see Alexander Kupatadze, Organized Crime, Political Transitions, and State Formation in Post-Soviet Eurasia, Basingstoke, 

Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

11. For more on violence and organized crime in former Soviet republics, see Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of 

Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. 

12. “OSCE, Tajikistan to Sign MoU on Supporting Tajikistan’s 

Police Forces,” Asia-Plus, April 4, 2011.

13. Gilles Favarel-Garrigues’s presentation, “Usual Suspect?: 

Police on Trial in Russia,” at the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), Pittsburgh, PA, November 

20, 2011. 

14. Opposition forces claim that the real number of casualties 

reached 50 people. A video report from Zhanaozen by “K Plus” 

TV channel, available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=10wXcFu 

A6IQ&feature=share.

15. See, for example, numerous reports by Human Rights 

Watch and Amnesty International, chapters on Uzbekistan and 

Kyrgyzstan in Annual Report for 2012 by Amnesty International, 

New York; “Kyrgyzstan: Torture, Detentions Escalate Tensions,” 

Human Rights Watch, New York, July 15, 2010; “Kazakhstan: 

Protect Detainees From Torture, Ill-Treatment,” Human Rights 

Watch, New York, December 22, 2011. 

16. Ibid., Uildriks, pp. 8-10.

17. Multiple interviews with law enforcement officials, political leaders, and NGO activists in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, 

March-October 2012. 

18. On how reforms are implemented in Saakashvili’s government, see Thomas de Waal, “Georgia’s Choices: Chart-
50

ing a Future in Uncertain Times,” Washington, DC: Carnegie 

Endowment, 2011. 

19. Interveiw with Levan Izoria, member of Alliance for Georgia and former rector of the Interior Ministry Academy (2004-06), 

Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2012. 

20. Georgia’s World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (ranking 16th out of 183 countries in 2011) and Transparency International (ranking 4.1 in 2011) ratings have improved over the past 

decade and are considerably higher compared to other former 

Soviet countries. 

21. Ibid.; de Waal. 

22. Fighting Corruption in Public Services: Chronicling Georgia’s 

Reforms, Washington, DC: World Bank, January 2012, p. 13.

23. Matthew Delvin, “Seizing the Reform Moment: Rebuilding Georgia’s Police, 2004-2006,” Innovations for Successful 

Societies, 2010. 

24. Matthew Light, “Police Reform, Civilian Control, and National Security in the Republic of Georgia (former USSR),” Paper 

presented at the annual meeting of The Law and Society Association, Renaissance Chicago Hotel, Chicago, IL, May 27, 2010.

25. Ibid.; Izoria. 

26. For more on U.S. and international funding in Georgia, see 

Lincoln A. Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and 

Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

27. Interview with Tornike Turmanidze, then Deputy Secretary National Security Council, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2012. 

28. Ibid.; World Bank, p. 8. 

29. “Georgia: The Risk of Winter,” Crisis Group, Brussels, 

Belgium, November 26, 2008, p. 6.
51

30. “Blood Feud,” The Economist, July 13, 2012. 

31. Interview with Shota Utiashvili, former head of Georgian Interior Ministry’s analytical department, Tbilisi, Georgia, 

February 2012. 

32. Ibid., interview with Turmanidze. 

33. Interview with a patrol police officer who served since 

2004, Tbilisi, Georgia, March 2012. 

34. Interview, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2012. 

35. Ibid., interview with Utiashvili. However, unlike commonly stereotyped, these employees were not fired in a single day; 

rather, it was done over a span of several months.

36. Interview with Gela Kvashilava, Deputy Director Department of Information and Analysis, Interior Ministry, Tbilisi, 

Georgia, March 2012. 

37. Ibid., interview with Utiashvili. 

38. Interveiw with Khatia Dekanoidze, former head of Police 

Academy, Tbilisi, Georgia, March 2012. 

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., World Bank, p. 18.

41. Interview with government official, Tbilisi, Georgia, 

March 2012. 

42. Ibid., interview with Dekanoidze.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., interview with Utiashvili.

45. Ibid.
52

46. Utiashvili’s estimate; according to the World Bank, during 2003-04, the share of Georgia’s shadow economy to real GDP 

changed only slightly—from 65.9 percent to 62.1 percent. Friedrick Schneider et al., “Shadow Economies All Over the World: 

New Estimates for 162 countries from 1992 to 2007,” Policy Research Working Papers, 5359, July 2010. 

47. Interview with NGO activists, Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012. 

48. Haley Sweetland Edwards, “Tajikin on Saakashvili,” April 

4, 2012, available from atitude.blogs.nytimes.com. 

49. Jim Garamone, “U.S. to Provide $1 Billion for Georgia 

Reconstruction, Humanitarian Aid,” American Forces Press 

Service, September 3, 2008. 

50. Jim Nichol, “Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments 

and U.S. Interest,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, July 13, 2012.

51. “Georgia: Attracting investments, contributing to economic growth,” Washington, DC: Millenium Challenge Corporation, August 25, 2011.

52. Interview, representative of European External Action 

Service, Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012. 

53. Ibid.; Wold Bank, p. 14.

54. Larisa Burakova, Pochemu u Gruzii poluchilos’? (Why 

Does It Work in Georgia?), Moscow, Russia: Al’pina biznes buks, 

2011, p. 22.

55. Ibid., p. 21. 

56. “Police Reform is the Main Symbol of creating Georgian 

New Statehood,” InterPressNews, December 28, 2009, available 

from www.interpressnews.ge/en/politics/28129-police-reform-is-mainsymbol-of-creating-georgian-new-statehood.html. 

57. “Saakashvili Praises Police, Interior Minister,” Civil 

Georgia, May 6, 2012.
53

58. Ibid. 

59. Interview with Eka Gigauri, head of Transparency International-Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012. 

60. “Ex-Defense Minister Kezerashvili Accused of Corruption,” January 31, 2013, available from Civil.ge; interview with 

Gigauri. Also see Lincoln A. Mitchell, “Uncertain Democracy: 

U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolition,” University 

Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania State, 2008, chaps. 2 and 5. 

61. Interview with Ekaterine Popkhadze, Executive Director, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Tbilisi, Georgia, 

June 2012. 

62. Ibid.; interview with Gigauri. 

63. Interview, Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012.

64. Interview with corruption and development specialist, 

Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012. 

65. “Ivanishvili Warns Police against ‘Fulfilling Illegal Orders’,” Civil Georgia, May 5, 2012.

66. Nana Kurashvili, “Political Channel-Hopping in Georgia,” July 8, 2012, available from IWPR.net. 

67. “Public Defender Releases 2011 Human Rights Report,” 

March 29, 2012, available from Civil.ge; “Public Defender Releases 

2010 Human Rights Report,” April 4, 2011, available from Civil.ge. 

68. Ibid., interview with Gigauri. 

69. Interview with NGO activist, Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012. 

70. Interveiw with representative of Ombudsman’s office, 

Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012.

71. Ibid., interview with Utiashvili. 
54

72. “Crossing the Line: Georgia’s Violent Dispersal of Protestors and Raid on Imedi Television,” Human Rights Watch, 

December 20, 2007. 

73. Ibid., interview with NGO expert. 

74. Interview, Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012. 

75. Ekaterine Popkhadze et al., “Legal Analysis of Cases of 

Vriminal and Administrative Offences with Alleged Political 

Motive,” GYLA, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2011. 

76. Ibid., World Bank, p. 10.

77. Interview with corruption and development specialist, 

Tbilisi, Georgia, June 2012. 

78. “Georgia: Investigate Sexual Abuse in Prison,” New York: 

Human Rights Watch, September 19, 2012. 

79. Interview with police officer, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 

May 2012. 

80. Aziza Abdirasulova’s presentation during Kyrgyz Interior Ministry Public Council meeting, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 

September 2011.

81. Leila Saralaeva, “Akademiya MVD i ‘Monte Karlo’,” (“Interior Ministry Academy and ‘Monte Karlo’”), July 6, 2012, available from Chalkan.kg. 

82. Zairbek Baktybayev, “Kursanty MVD ustroili draku” (Interior Ministry Cadets Provoked a Fight), June 21, 2012, available 

from Azattyk.org. 

83. Ibid.; Bloed.

84. Interview with NGO expert, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 

June 2012. 

85. Interview with representative of an international donor 

organization, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, June 2012.
55

86. David Lewis, The Reassessment of the Role of OSCE Police Assistance Programming in Central Asia, Central Eurasia Project, New 

York: OSI, April 2011. 

87. Interview with MP Ravshan Jeenbekov, Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan, June 2012. 

88. Voice of Freedom’s interview with Kalicha Umuralieva, 

initiater of a working group on the police reform, available from 

vof.kg/?p=4862; interviews with several NGO activists, Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan, October 2011-June 2012. 

89. Ibid.; Lewis, p. 17. 

90. For more on corruption in Kyrgyzstan’s state structures, 

see Johan Engvall, “Flirting with State Failure: Power and Politics in Kyrgyzstan since Independence,” Washington, DC: Central 

Asia—Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, July 2011. 

91. Ibid.; Lewis, p. 10. 

92. Jim Nichol, “Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. 

Interests,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

January 19, 2012. 

93. White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Kyrgyzstan,” 

Washington, DC: The White House, September 24, 2010. 

94. More details on early reform efforts is available from www.

mvd.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=184&Itemi

d=68&lang=ru.

95. Ibid.; Lewis, p. 31. 

96. Interview with representative of Defense Ministry, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, October 2010. 

97. Interview with Kyrgyz Interior Ministry official, Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan, May 2012. 
56

98. More details are available from www.mvd.kg/index.php? 

option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=69&lang=ru. 

99. Interview with Shamshibek Mamyrov, deputy head of the 

Chief Administration for Legal and Criminal Analysis at the Interior Ministry, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, September 2011.

100. During protests in central Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 95 were 

killed and hundreds injured by government troops. 

101. Interview with NGO activist Kalicha Umuralieva, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, June 2012.

102. Ibid. 

103. Ibid.; interview with Jeenbekov.

104. Erica Marat, “Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek Following Georgia’s 

Lead of Police Reform,” October 28, 2011, available from Eurasia 

net.org. 

105. Interview with Kyrgyz MP, June 2012, Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan.

106. Ibid., interview with Umuralieva. 

107. “Timur Shaihutdinov: Reformiriovat’ MVD bez obnovleniya kadrv nevozmozhno” (“Timur Shaihutdinov: It Is Impossible to Reform Interior Ministry without New Cadre”), Voice of 

Freedom, May 5, 2012, available from vof.kg/?p=4725; “Mirsuljan 

Namazaliev: ‘Rezul’tat realizatsii Al’ternativnoi kontseptsii reformy MVD ne zastavit sebya zhdat’” (It Won’t Be Long Before 

the Results of the Alternative Interior Ministry Reform Concept 

Will Be Seen), May 2, 2012, available from K-news.kg.

108. Interview with Kyrgyz Interior Ministry official, Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan, June 2012. 

109. “Osnovnye polozheniya proekta Kontseptsii reformirovaniya organiv vnutrennih del Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki na period s 

2012 g. por 2015 god” (The Main Positions of the Project of Kyrgyz 
57

Republic’s Interior Ministry Reform Concept for the Period from 

2012 until 2015), unpublished version of the reform’s concept. 

110. Ibid., interview. 

111 . Ibid.; Voice of Freedom. 

112. Multiple interviews with Kyrgyz Interior Ministry personnel, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 2011-12. 

113. Ibid., Voice of Freedom. 

114. Interview with rank-in-file policeman, Karakol, Kyrgyzstan, August 2008. 

115. “Kalicha Umuralieva: ‘Neobhodimo otkazat’sya ot prak -

tiki prisvoeniya zvaniya generalov glavam MVD Kyrgyzstana’” 

(“Kalicha Umuralieva: ‘It is necessary to get rid of the practice 

of assigning the rank of general to Interior Ministers of Kyrgyzstan’”), July 15, 2012, available from www.24.kg. 

116. Multiple interviews with Kyrgyz Interior Ministry personnel, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 2011-12. 

117. Interveiw with GAI personnel, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 

Septermber 2011.

118. Interview with a local policeman, Karakol, Kyrgyzstan, 

August 2009. The policeman drove “Nissan,” but he hoped he’d 

be driving a “Lexus” if he was to be relocated to Osh. 

119. More on this in Ibid.; Joshua Kucera, U.S. Military Aid to 

Central Asia: Who Benefits? New York: Open Society Foundation, 

September 2012. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Erica Marat

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil