J-A15032-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JANA DIANE HATCH 

Appellant

v.

MARK ALLEN HATCH, SR.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1297 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered October 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2018-0672-CIVIL

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2022

Jana Diane Hatch (“Ms. Hatch”) appeals from the order denying her

motion to disqualify Alaine Generelli, Esquire (“Attorney Generelli”) and the 

law firm of Geary, Loperfito & Generelli, LLC (“the GLG firm”) from 

representing Mark Allen Hatch, Sr. (“Mr. Hatch”). We affirm.

While employed at the office of Gregory W. Swank, Esquire (“Attorney 

Swank”), Shea Kraft, Esquire (“Attorney Kraft”) represented Ms. Hatch in a 

divorce and equitable distribution case against Mr. Hatch. Attorney Generelli, 

a member of the GLG firm, represented, and continues to represent, Mr. Hatch

in that case. Thereafter, Attorney Kraft left Attorney Swank’s employ to work 

for the GLG firm. See N.T., 10/20/21, at 11-15, 19-20, 47. 

Ms. Hatch filed a motion to disqualify Attorney Generelli and the GLG 

firm, in which she averred that Attorney Kraft learned secret and confidential 

information relating to her case while representing her, and that Attorney 
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Generelli’s and the GLG firm’s continued representation of Mr. Hatch

constituted a conflict of interest and a violation of Pennsylvania Rules of 

Professional Conduct 1.9 and 1.10 (“Rules 1.9 and 1.10”). See Motion to 

Disqualify, 10/19/21, at 2-3 (unnumbered). Other clients whom Attorney 

Kraft had represented while working for Attorney Swank filed similar 

disqualification motions against Attorney Generelli and the GLG firm.1 On 

October 20, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on all the 

disqualification motions.

We summarize the testimony at the evidentiary hearing as follows. In 

August 2021, Attorney Swank began reducing Attorney Kraft’s workload and 

expressed a clear intent to terminate his employment. See N.T., 10/20/21, 

at 11-13. Attorney Kraft had exploratory employment discussions with the 

GLG firm. See id. at 13-15. Later that month, Attorney Kraft told Attorney 

Swank that he intended to find a new job, and they discussed some of Attorney 

Kraft’s active case files. Thereafter, Attorney Kraft found that his key no 

longer opened the door to the main office of Attorney Swank’s firm. See id. 

at 15-18. At that time, the GLG firm had not yet hired Attorney Kraft and he 

was considering a number of employment possibilities. See id. at 14, 23-26.

____________________________________________

1 Three of those cases are now on appeal before this Court, Wheatley v. 

Wheatley; Fetterman v. Cochran; and Dietrich v. Dietrich, are listed 

before this panel at J-A15031-22, J-A15033-34, and J-A15034-22. We 

address those appeals in separate decisions. 
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Prior to hiring Attorney Kraft, the GLG firm had a series of consultations 

with an ethics attorney, Beth Ann Lloyd, Esquire (“Attorney Lloyd”), to 

determine, if it hired Attorney Kraft, what actions it would need to take to 

comply with the screening requirements of Rule 1.10 in Ms. Hatch’s case and 

any other active case in which Attorney Generelli had been Attorney Kraft’s 

opponent (the “conflict cases”). See id. at 47, 57-58. Attorney Lloyd 

explained to the GLG firm that Attorney Kraft would have to withdraw from 

representation in the conflict cases, and that the GLG firm would need to 

screen him from any contact with the physical or electronic files in those cases, 

prevent him from hearing any discussion of them, and not share with him any 

of the fees in those cases. See id. at 47, 58-59. Attorney Generelli also told 

the entire GLG staff that screening procedures would be put into place if 

Attorney Kraft were hired. See id. at 50-51.

The GLG firm hired Attorney Kraft, having told him that his employment 

was contingent upon his compliance with the ethical rules, and directed him 

to follow all of Attorney Lloyd’s recommendations. See id. at 47-48, 57-59, 

75.2 Attorney Lloyd helped Attorney Kraft write a letter which he sent to Ms. 

Hatch one week before he began working at the GLG firm. See id. at 21, 32.3 

____________________________________________

2 Attorney Swank immediately removed Attorney Kraft from his offices when 

Attorney Kraft told him about his new employment, which prevented them 

from discussing the remainder of Attorney Kraft’s active cases. See N.T., 

10/20/21, at 16-18.

3 Attorney Kraft sent similar letters to his former clients in the other conflict 

cases. See N.T., 10/20/21, at 22-28.
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The letter stated that Attorney Kraft would be joining the GLG firm, would 

withdraw from representing Ms. Hatch, would not participate in the case at 

the GLG firm in any way or reveal confidential information about Ms. Hatch, 

the case, or the litigation strategy, and had not taken any case files or 

materials concerning the case. The letter also explained to Ms. Hatch the 

procedures the GLG firm would use to protect Ms. Hatch’s confidences and to 

isolate Attorney Kraft from access to the physical and electronic files in the 

case. See id. at 24-28. Additionally, the letter stated that Ms. Hatch’s case 

would not be discussed in Attorney Kraft’s presence, and that Attorney Kraft 

would not share in any of the fees paid to the GLG firm in the case. See id. 

at 23-26, 28, 30, 43, 47. Attorney Generelli’s testimony confirmed Attorney 

Kraft’s testimony. See id. at 53, 56-59. The letter provided Ms. Hatch with 

Attorney Kraft’s cell phone number, personal email address, fax number, and 

mailing address. See id. at 24-25.4

By the time Attorney Kraft began work at the GLG firm in midSeptember 2021, the firm had expended substantial time and effort and 

implemented all of Attorney Lloyd’s suggested screening procedures: physical 

documents in the conflict case files, other than those kept in Attorney 

Generelli’s office, are maintained in a locked filing cabinet; and the electronic 

files in those cases, and Attorney Generelli’s email, are password-protected 

____________________________________________

4 At the hearing on the joint disqualification motions, neither Ms. Hatch nor 

any other former client in the conflict cases introduced evidence of responding 

to Attorney Kraft’s letter or alleged that Attorney Kraft disclosed confidential 

information in any conflict case. 
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and segregated from other electronic case files. See id. at 48-49, 59-61, 64, 

70-72, 75. Additionally, prior to the time Attorney Kraft began working at the 

GLG firm, Attorney Generelli advised the entire firm and staff5 about the 

screening procedures and directed them to: promptly remove conflict case 

documents from the copier; put faxes6relating to conflict cases in special 

folders and take them to her office; and print documents in conflict cases on 

their own printers and bring them directly to her. See id. at 47-54, 59-60, 

67-69. The GLG firm also changed its docketing system. See id. at 59. 

Employees must seek assistance to see written documents in a conflict case. 

See id. at 65-66, 72-73.

Attorney Kraft testified that the GLG firm explained the screening 

procedures to him before he began working at the firm. See id. at 43. Since 

he joined the GLG firm, he has not seen, or had access to, any of the conflict 

case files, has not discussed any of the conflict cases with anyone at the GLG 

firm, has not disclosed any confidential information concerning the conflict 

cases, has not heard any discussion of those cases, and recognizes his duty 

under the Rules of Professional Conduct to maintain the confidences of his 

former clients. See id. at 26-30, 38-43. Attorney Generelli also testified that 

Attorney Kraft has been screened from all of the conflict cases and has never 

____________________________________________

5 Attorney Kraft testified that the GLG firm now has four lawyers and also 

employs a paralegal, a secretary, an office manager/paralegal, and a 

receptionist, which Attorney Generelli’s testimony corroborated. See N.T., 

10/20/21, at 35-37, 39, 50, 65-66, 70.

6 Attorney Generelli receives faxes infrequently. See N.T., 10/20/21, at 70.
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disclosed confidential information to her concerning those cases. See id. at 

52, 54. Attorney Kraft’s employment contract specifies that he can be fired 

for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. See id. at 38.

Attorney Generelli, the primary attorney who works on the conflict 

cases, has instructed her paralegal, the only employee who works with her on 

those cases, not to discuss them in front of Attorney Kraft. See id. at 45-46, 

50, 67. Attorney Generelli testified that she has been “pretty firm and direct” 

with staff about what they must do to comply with the screening protocols and 

continues to discuss them with staff on an ongoing basis. See id. at 52, 60. 

Additionally, all of the GLG staff observed the time and energy the firm 

expended putting the protocols in place and understood that the firm took the 

matter very seriously. See id. at 64. Though the firm did not create a 

separate, written screening document for staff, it used Attorney Lloyd’s 

written advice about the necessary elements of a screen to formulate its 

screening protocols, all of which it implemented prior to the inception of 

Attorney Kraft’s employment and all of which Attorney Generelli conveyed to 

the entire GLG firm. See id. at 48-49, 59-61, 64, 67, 70-73, 75-76.

Testimony at the disqualification hearing established that when 

employed by Attorney Swank, Attorney Kraft performed thirty-four hours of 

work on Ms. Hatch’s case over three years, which included preparing

appraisals and an inventory of the marital estate and preparing for a full 

master’s hearing. N.T. 10/20/21, at 46, 78-79. 
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The day after the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Ms. 

Hatch’s disqualification motion and all of the other disqualification motions. 

The trial court found that Attorney Kraft, Attorney Generelli, and the GLG firm 

had not violated Rule 1.9 or Rule 1.10. See Trial Court Order, 10/21/21. Ms. 

Hatch filed a notice of appeal and, days later, filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. The trial court complied with Rule 1925(a).

Ms. Hatch raises the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err in concluding that [Ms. Hatch’s] trial counsel, 

having left his employment with the law firm representing [Ms. 

Hatch] in active litigation and then immediately becoming 

employed by the law firm representing the opposing party in the 

same litigation, did not violate the terms of Rule 1.10 of the Rules 

of Professional Conduct requiring that [Attorney Kraft’s] new 

employer be disqualified from representing the opposing party in 

the litigation?

Ms. Hatch’s Brief at 8.7

As a preliminary matter, we note that an order denying a motion to 

disqualify a law firm for an alleged conflict of interest is immediately 

appealable as a collateral order. See Rudalavage v. PPL Elec. Util. Corp., 

____________________________________________

7 Ms. Hatch makes no argument concerning the Rule 1.9 violation claim she 

raised in the trial court. Accordingly, we will not review it. See

Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 785 (Pa. 2009) (indicating that 

a claim is waived where appellant fails to cite pertinent authority or relevant 

detail in his brief). We note that Rule 1.9 precludes an attorney from 

representing a party in a litigation where he has previously represented the 

party’s opponent. Ms. Hatch does not allege that Attorney Kraft represents

Mr. Hatch.
J-A15032-22

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268 A.3d 470, 478 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also Pa.R.A.P. 313 (governing 

collateral orders).

Ms. Hatch asserts that Rule 1.10(b) compels the disqualification of 

Attorney Generelli and the GLG firm from continuing to represent Mr. Hatch in 

the case against her because her former counsel, Attorney Kraft, now works 

at the GLG firm. Under Rule 1.10(b), when a lawyer leaves one law firm for 

another, his new firm may represent a person on a matter he previously 

worked on for a client with materially adverse interests (and acquired 

protected information that is material to the matter) if: (1) the firm screens 

the lawyer from any participation in the matter and he receives no fee for it, 

and (2) the lawyer gives prompt, written notice to his former client so that 

the client may ascertain the lawyer’s compliance with the rule. See Rule 

1.10(b). Screening requires the lawyer’s isolation from participation in the 

matter through “the timely imposition of procedures . . . reasonably adequate 

under the circumstances to protect information that the lawyer is obligated to 

protect . . ..” Rule 1.0(k).

When reviewing a trial court’s order on the disqualification of counsel, 

this Court employs a plenary standard of review. See Darrow v. PPL 

Electric Utilities Corp., 266 A.3d 1105, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2021). The law 

recognizes that it is appropriate to sanction attorneys for violating ethical 

rules. See McCarthy v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 772 

A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2001). However, disqualification is not freely 
J-A15032-22

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granted. Pennsylvania courts assign particular importance to protecting a 

party’s right to counsel of his choice. See Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 478. 

Disqualification, therefore, is only appropriate when another remedy is not 

available and, more important, when the right to counsel of one’s choice 

interferes with the essential need to ensure that the party seeking 

disqualification receives their due process right to a fair trial. Id. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court reserves for itself the power to punish attorney 

misconduct. See Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. 

Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 1299 (Pa. 1985) (stating that violations of the Rules 

of Professional Conduct are not a proper subject for consideration of the lower 

courts to impose punishment for attorney misconduct).

To assess the reasonable adequacy of a law firm’s screening procedures 

when it hires an attorney who previously worked for the opposing party in an 

active case, our Courts weigh a series of factors federal courts have identified. 

See Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 479 (citing Dworkin v. General Motors 

Corp., 906 F.Supp. 273, 279-80 (E.D. Pa. 1995)); see also Darrow, 266 

A.3d at 1112 (same). The “Dworkin” factors include: (1) the substantiality 

of the relationship between the attorney and the former client; (2) the time 

lapse between the matters in dispute; (3) the size of the firm and the number 

of disqualified attorneys; (4) the nature of the disqualified attorney’s 

involvement; and (5) the timing of the wall. See Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 

479; see also Darrow, 266 A.3d at 1112. Rule 1.10 and the Dworkin factors 
J-A15032-22

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place particular emphasis on the creation by the attorney’s new firm of a 

reasonably adequate wall or screen8to protect information the disqualified 

attorney is obligated to protect. The critical factors concerning the screen are 

whether it: (1) prohibits the discussion of sensitive matters; (2) restricts the 

circulation of sensitive documents; (3) restricts access to sensitive files; and 

(4) manifests a strong firm policy against breach, including sanctions, physical 

and/or geographical separation. See Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 480 (citing 

Dworkin, 906 F.Supp. at 280); see also Darrow, 266 A.3d at 1112 (also 

citing Dworkin).

On appeal, Ms. Hatch argues that Mr. Hatch failed to show that the GLG 

firm complied with Rule 1.10(b). She contends that Attorney Kraft’s prior 

involvement in her case and the substantiality of their attorney-client 

relationship, as well as the short time lapse between the matters in dispute, 

and the small size of the GLG firm, support disqualification. She also asserts 

that the screen was deficient since it was not in writing and did not explicitly 

state the penalties for staff for violating the screen. Ms. Hatch further asserts 

that her continuing interest in Attorney Kraft’s loyalty weighs heavily in favor 

of disqualification of the entire GLG firm. To that end, Ms. Hatch requests that 

the Court follow Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Reading Blue Mountain and 

____________________________________________

8 Courts use the terms “wall” and “screen” somewhat interchangeably. 

Because Rules 1.10 and 1.0(k) use the terms “screened” and “screen,” we 

primarily use those terms.
J-A15032-22

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Northern Ry. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 551 (M.D. Pa. 2005), which disqualified 

a law firm from representation under what she asserts were similar factual 

circumstances. 

As the trial court noted, the GLG firm retained a legal ethics attorney 

and followed all of her recommendations, which resulted in Attorney Kraft 

sending prompt letters to his clients that complied with the requirement of 

Rule 1.10(b)(2), and the GLG firm instituted screening protocols prior to

Attorney Kraft’s start date at the GLG firm under which it keeps the physical 

conflict files in a locked filing cabinet and password-protects the electronic 

conflict files (and Attorney Generelli’s email) to screen them from Attorney 

Kraft. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/21 at 1-2, 4. Therefore, as the trial 

court stated, Ms. Hatch’s motion sought prophylactic relief unconnected to any 

actual Rule of Professional Conduct violation. See id. at 4. The trial court 

also recognized that its ability to disqualify lawyers under the Rules of 

Professional Conduct is narrow, and that disqualification is a serious remedy 

that should not interfere with a party’s right to choose counsel unless due 

process and the opposing party’s right to a fair trial is affected. See id. at 3-

4 (citing In re Estate of Pedrick, 482 A.2d 215, 221 (Pa. 1984)). The trial 

court found no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and therefore no 

basis for the disqualification of Attorney Generelli or the GLG firm. See id. at 

4-5.
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We agree with the trial court that Attorneys Kraft and Generelli and the 

GLG firm did not violate Rule 1.10(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/21, at 

1-2, 4 (relying upon the testimony at the disqualification hearing). We further 

conclude that because there was no violation of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct, Ms. Hatch did not suffer an impairment of her due process right to a 

fair trial that would require disqualification. Further, the “Dworkin” factors 

that might weigh in favor of disqualification do not compel the extreme 

remedy Ms. Hatch seeks.

At the outset, Attorney Kraft satisfied the requirement of Rule 

1.10(b)(2) by sending a prompt letter to Ms. Hatch and all the other clients 

he had represented in the conflict cases. Ms. Hatch offered no evidence that 

she replied to the letter Attorney Kraft sent to express a concern about 

Attorney Kraft’s move to the GLG firm.

This case turns on the reasonable adequacy of the GLG firm’s screen. 

The very short lapse of time between Attorney Kraft’s representation of Ms. 

Hatch and his move to the GLG firm, which represents Ms. Hatch’s opponent, 

supports Ms. Hatch’s position. However, that factor would weigh more heavily 

if Attorney Kraft had actively represented Mr. Hatch or had the GLG firm’s 

screen been defective, and neither is the case in this matter.

9

____________________________________________

9 Given the limited evidence Ms. Hatch presented at the hearing, it is difficult

to assess the factors relating to the substantiality of the relationship between 

the attorney and the former client, and the nature of the disqualified attorney’s 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The GLG firm undertook timely and good-faith efforts to create a set of 

screening procedures “reasonably adequate under the circumstances” to 

protect information that Attorney Kraft was obligated to protect. See Rules 

1.0(k), 1.10(b). The firm consulted with an ethics attorney to construct the 

screen, and substantially restructured its physical storage, computer, and 

document circulation policies to prevent any sensitive material from reaching 

Attorney Kraft. Further, the firm erected its screen before Attorney Kraft 

joined the firm. See Dworkin, 906 F.Supp. at 280 (noting the importance of 

instituting a screening protocol when the potentially disqualifying event 

occurs). Additionally, neither Ms. Hatch nor any other conflict case client has 

alleged that the screen has been breached, and the evidence at the 

disqualification hearing did not show a breach. Attorney Generelli, the primary 

attorney on the conflict cases, testified that she instructed her paralegal, the 

only other person who worked with her on those cases,10 not to discuss them 

____________________________________________

involvement in the case. Ms. Hatch’s evidence established that Attorney Kraft 

billed thirty-four hours on her case over the course of three years and

prepared for a forthcoming master’s hearing. See N.T., 10/20/21, at 79. It 

is not clear whether that proves a substantial attorney-client relationship. 

Because we decide this case on other grounds, we do not determine whether 

there was a substantial attorney-client relationship between Ms. Hatch and 

Attorney Kraft or whether Attorney Kraft had substantial involvement in the 

case. 

 

10 Attorney Generelli testified that Attorney Loperfito, another member of the 

firm, has some limited involvement in family law cases. Attorney Loperfito 

assists on some financial issues, but he does not directly represent any family 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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in front of Attorney Kraft. See N.T. 10/20/21, at 67. Attorney Kraft testified 

that he never discussed any conflict case at the GLG firm or heard any of the 

cases discussed. See id. at 21, 30, 41-42. Additionally, all the members of 

the firm understood the screening protocols. See id. at 48-54, 76.

The screen also effectively restricted circulation of, and restricted access 

to, sensitive documents and files. The GLG firm implemented many 

procedures to screen conflict matters before Attorney Kraft’s arrival. These 

included the protection of the physical and electronic conflict case files, the 

change in the firm’s docketing system to separate out all of Attorney 

Generelli’s clients, and the creation of a new protocol requiring removing 

sensitive documents from copiers and immediately placing incoming faxes in 

a closed mail folder in Attorney Generelli’s office. Those undertakings 

prevented Attorney Kraft from having any exposure to sensitive documents or 

files. See id. at 27, 29, 41-42, 44-46, 48-50, 59, 61, 67-71.11

____________________________________________

law client in court unless Attorney Generelli needs him to fill in, and he has 

declined to try any custody cases. See N.T., 10/20/21, at 73.

11 Attorney Kraft testified on cross-examination at the disqualification hearing 

that he had seen ten or eleven disqualification motions “roll in” on the fax 

machine. See N.T., 10/20/21, at 41-42. Attorney Swank asked him no 

further questions about that incident, which: (1) was Attorney Kraft’s only 

exposure to anything related to the conflict cases while at the GLG firm, (2) 

did not risk his disclosing information he was obligated to protect under Rules 

1.10(b) and 1.0(k), and (3) concerned documents Ms. Hatch’s attorney, 

Attorney Swank, elected to fax to the GLG firm. This single incident does not 

undermine the effectiveness of the screen. As noted, Attorney Generelli 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The GLG firm’s screen contained a reasonably adequate firm policy 

against breach, including sanctions, physical and/or geographical separation. 

See Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 470; see also Darrow, 266 A.3d at 1112. 

Attorney Kraft testified that he was informed that if he breached the Rules of 

Professional Conduct, he could face disciplinary action and be fired. See N.T., 

10/20/21, at 30-31, 38. Attorney Generelli confirmed Attorney Kraft’s 

testimony. See id. at 53. Attorney Generelli also testified that everyone at 

the GLG firm knew the screening protocols as a result of an open discussion 

prior to Attorney Kraft’s hiring, and she has ongoing communications with the 

staff to ensure that the recommended procedures remain in place. See id. at 

49-50, 52, 60, 64. Further, the entire GLG firm saw how seriously the firm 

regarded the screen. See id. at 64. Under these circumstances, we do not 

find it dispositive that the staff was not explicitly informed of the consequences 

of violating the screen.12

____________________________________________

testified that the GLG firm’s screening protocol requires personnel to take 

faxes quickly to her office when they are received. See id. at 68.

12 Some courts have assessed the strength of a law firm’s screen by focusing 

on whether it expressly includes a termination penalty for all violators. See, 

e.g., Norfolk Southern, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 555. We are aware that a 

comment to Rule 1.0 states that appropriate screening measures will depend 

on the circumstances but may include written notice and instructions to all 

firm personnel other than lawyers forbidding any communication with the 

screened lawyer relating to the matter. See Rule 1.0, cmt. 9. The Comment 

does not state that a firm’s employees must be informed of the consequences 

for violating the rule. Additionally, under the circumstances here, the GLG 

firm clearly conveyed its screening protocols orally to its employees. Because 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We note that some courts have held that a law firm’s small size is a 

detriment to implementing an effective screen because the attorneys at a 

small firm have more opportunity for contact with each other than at a large 

firm. See Dworkin, 906 F. Supp. at 280 (collecting cases). We believe that 

a firm’s size is not in itself a determinative measure of the firm’s ability to 

maintain an effective screen. Indeed, Dworkin itself implicitly recognizes the 

limitations of such a blunt measuring device. See id. at 283 (stating that 

“[t]he effectiveness of any ethics screen depends upon the integrity of the 

individuals who comply with it”). There is a further problem with using the 

size of a firm as an absolute measure of its ability to maintain an effective 

screen. Many of Pennsylvania’s counties do not have large law firms, and 

many counties are comprised of mostly small to mid-size firms. We cannot 

countenance a one-size-fits-all rule, especially where it will have an 

unreasonably disparate effect on attorneys who practice in smaller counties 

and wish to change their employment. Thus, while we do not discount the 

consideration of a firm’s size as a factor in assessing the effectiveness of a 

screen, we agree with the Dworkin court that it is the integrity of the people 

in a firm, and the protocols they adopt and implement, not the size of the firm 

itself that is relevant to the effectiveness of a screen under Rule 1.10(b). 

____________________________________________

GLG’s employees heard repeated discussion of those protocols and saw the 

changes in the operation of the firm, we find that they were clearly and 

properly alerted to the firm’s screening protocols.
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Nothing in the record before us suggests that the GLG firm’s size affected its 

ability to maintain an effective screen.13

We also do not agree with Ms. Hatch that the decision in Norfolk

Southern compels a different result in this case. This Court is not bound by 

decisions of federal courts other than the United States Supreme Court. See

In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1221 (Pa. 2012). Moreover, in Norfolk

Southern, the law firm opposing disqualification failed to establish that their 

new attorney, who had previously worked for the other side in an ongoing 

case, would not receive any of the fees in the case. That failure alone 

warranted disqualification. See Norfolk Southern, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 

Additionally, the new law firm in that case failed to provide prompt written 

notice to the attorney’s former firm of the conflict and failed to prohibit the 

discussion of sensitive matters in the presence of the new attorney. See id. 

For these reasons, the facts of the Norfolk Southern case do not establish 

____________________________________________

13 We recognize that the Rudalavage and Darrow courts viewed the small 

size of a firm as a factor favoring disqualification, and cited Dworkin for the 

proposition that there is more contact between attorneys at a small firm. See 

Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 481; Darrow, 266 A.3d at 1114. As stated, 

although the size of a firm may favor disqualification, the facts developed at 

the hearing in this case show that the substantial screen the GLG firm erected, 

and the efforts it devoted to enforcing the screen, outweighed the concern 

about the small size of the firm. Moreover, as explained infra, other factors 

of concern present in Rudalavage and Darrow are not present here. 
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requirements critical to Rule 1.10 and the case is not substantially similar to 

the matter before this Court.14

Rudalavage and Darrow, recent cases in this Court (which neither 

party cites), found a law firm’s Rule 1.10(b) screening procedures deficient 

under significantly different circumstances. In Rudalavage, an attorney and 

his law firm filed a wrongful death suit against PPL Electric Utilities Corporation 

(“PPL”). The attorney had previously represented PPL in other cases while 

employed by a previous law firm, during which he acquired confidential 

knowledge about PPL’s litigation strategies. This Court determined that the 

new law firm should be disqualified. Among the reasons for disqualification 

cited were: (1) the departing attorney did not provide PPL with prompt written 

notice of the conflict;15 (2) the departing attorney served as de facto counsel 

____________________________________________

14 Norfolk Southern also states a third set of factors for assessing 

disqualification that involves examining the affected party’s right to attorney 

loyalty, the effect on other person’s right to counsel, and the desire not to 

unreasonably hinder attorney movement. See Norfolk Southern, 397 F. 

Supp. 2d at 556. No published Pennsylvania appellate court decision has 

adopted this test. We do not opine on the relevance of this third set of factors 

given our conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding that there was 

no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and, more important, no 

impairment of Ms. Hatch’s right to a fair trial. 

15 The Court found the failure to make prompt disclosure of a change in 

employment to be compelling proof of a Rule 1.10(b)(2) violation. The Court

stated that a client should not discover from his current attorney that his 

former attorney now works for the opposition and that former counsel’s failure 

to disclose that fact created “a specter of impropriety that no ex post 

facto . . . [w]all can contain.” Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 483 (citation 

omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Darrow, 266 A.3d at 1115 (same).
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on the case at the new firm by visiting the accident site and reviewing the 

complaint; (3) the new firm did not erect a screen until almost two years 

after the departing attorney had already worked on the case; (4) the new 

firm did not have a written policy, and (5) the departing attorney 

acknowledged that in his previous employment he had gathered significant 

information concerning how to defend such suits. See Rudalavage, 268 A.3d 

at 481-83.16

Here, Attorney Kraft promptly disclosed the conflict in writing to Ms.

Hatch, his former client, there is no evidence that Ms. Hatch responded to 

Attorney Kraft’s letter, and Attorney Kraft has not worked as opposing counsel 

on the Hatch litigation at the GLG firm. Further, there is no evidence that 

Attorney Kraft used or disclosed Ms. Hatch’s confidential information, and the 

GLG firm erected its screen before he began working there. For these 

reasons, Rudalavage and Darrow address substantively distinguishable 

facts and are not determinative of whether the GLG firm’s screen was 

reasonably adequate under the factual circumstances here.

____________________________________________

16 Darrow involved the same attorney and law firm whose disqualification we 

found to be required in Rudalavage. In Darrow, the attorney and the new 

law firm filed a personal injury suit against PPL three years after the attorney 

left the law firm at which he represented PPL. Among other factors supporting 

disqualification, the Court noted: (1) the attorney was privy to proprietary 

information about PPL; (2) the attorney did not promptly disclose the conflict 

in writing to his former client; (3) the attorney was counsel of record for two 

years in the personal injury case; (4) the new law firm is small; (5) the screen 

was not erected for two years after the filing of the suit; and (6) the screening 

policy was not in writing. See Darrow, 266 A.3d at 1113-15.
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We also agree with the trial court that on this record, Ms. Hatch has 

failed to show that disqualification of Attorney Generelli and the GLG firm is 

necessary to ensure her due process right to a fair trial. See McCarthy, 772 

A.2d at 989. Our Supreme Court has clearly stated that violations of the Rules 

of Professional Conduct are not a proper subject for the lower courts to impose 

punishment for attorney misconduct. See Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1299; see also 

Pedrick, 482 A.2d at 221 (stating that counsel may be disqualified only when 

necessary to ensure the right to a fair trial, and that trial courts are not 

accorded the power to punish attorney misconduct). Because Attorney 

Generelli and the GLG firm did not violate Rule 1.10(b), there was no basis for 

disqualification and no interference with Ms. Hatch’s right to a fair trial.17 

Thus, the trial court properly denied Ms. Hatch’s disqualification motion.

Order affirmed. 

Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.

Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.

____________________________________________

17 We do not ignore Ms. Hatch’s assertion of her expectation of attorney 

loyalty. However, Ms. Hatch has not demonstrated that the trial court erred 

when it found that the record did not support the disqualification of Attorney 

Generelli and the GLG firm from participating in the case, and there was no 

evidence at the hearing that Attorney Kraft disclosed any privileged or 

confidential information about Ms. Hatch’s case to the GLG firm. Moreover, 

we will not lightly disturb Mr. Hatch’s right to representation by counsel of 

his choice. See Rudalavage, 268 A.3d at 478.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2022