18-1496

Singh v. Barr

BIA

Tsankov, IJ

A208 179 126

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 30th day of September, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT:

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

SUKHWINDER SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. 18-1496

NAC

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Amy Nussbaum Gell, Gell & Gell, 

New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General;

Brianne Whelan Cohen, Senior 
2

Litigation Counsel; Mona Maria 

Yousif, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Sukhwinder Singh, a native and citizen of 

India, seeks review of a May 2, 2018, decision of the BIA 

affirming a May 22, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge 

(“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Sukhwinder Singh, No. A 208 179 126 (B.I.A. 

May 2, 2018), aff’g No. A 208 179 126 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City

May 22, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen 

v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 

standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 

(2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination 
3

under a substantial evidence standard). “Considering the 

totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . 

the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written 

and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each 

such statement, the consistency of such statements with other 

evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods 

in such statements, . . . or any other relevant factor.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no 

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 

2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial 

evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

determination. 

First, as the agency found, there were inconsistencies 

between Singh’s testimony and asylum application and internal 

inconsistencies in his testimony regarding whether he was 

threatened and left India in 2013 and why he traveled to Cuba. 

In his asylum application, Singh alleged that he supported 

the Akali Dal Amritsar Party (“SADA Party” or “Mann Party”), 
4

and that he fled to Cuba in January 2013 after members of the 

rival Akali Dal Badal Party (“Badal Party”) threatened to 

kill him. However, he testified that he did not want to 

leave India before June 2014, when he alleged he was first 

beaten. When confronted with this inconsistency, he changed 

his testimony to say that he had left India in 2013. 

His explanations were also inconsistent or not 

responsive. When asked to explain why he testified that he 

had not wanted to leave India before June 2014, he stated

that he went “for tourist purposes,” which did not explain 

the statement in his application that he fled because Badal 

Party members threatened to kill him. And his ensuing 

testimony was internally inconsistent regarding whether he 

was threatened in January 2013. The IJ was not required to 

credit Singh’s explanation that he did not previously recall 

the threat, as he was unlikely to forget a death threat that 

caused him to flee to another country. See Majidi v. 

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must 

do more than offer a plausible explanation for his 

inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate 

that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit 
5

his testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)). 

Second, Singh’s asylum application was also inconsistent 

with his initial credible fear interview, at which he also 

did not mention the threat or trip to Cuba. When asked about 

this inconsistency, Singh testified that he could not recall 

at the time of the credible fear interview that he was 

threatened. The IJ was not required to accept this 

explanation. See id.

These inconsistencies regarding whether Singh was 

threatened with death in January 2013 by Badal Party members 

and why Singh went to Cuba are significant because they relate 

to when and why Singh first started to fear harm by the Badal 

Party. See id. at 79–80 (“Where the IJ’s adverse credibility 

finding is based on specific examples in the record of 

inconsistent statements by the asylum applicant about matters 

material to his claim of persecution, . . . , a reviewing 

court will generally not be able to conclude that a reasonable 

adjudicator was compelled to find otherwise.”). Furthermore, 

these “dramatically different” accounts of why Singh traveled 

to Cuba provide substantial evidence for the adverse 
6

credibility determination and call into question Singh’s 

credibility as a whole. See id. (determining that 

“dramatically different” accounts of incident are substantial 

evidence for adverse credibility determination); see also 

Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] 

single false document or a single instance of false testimony 

may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of 

the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”). 

Singh challenges the IJ’s reliance on the fact that he 

did not provide testimony or a letter from his father’s 

friend. However, as determined by the BIA, there is 

sufficient support for the adverse credibility determination, 

even without this finding. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

Singh also argues that the agency ignored affidavits 

corroborating his claim and that the agency could have 

considered his CAT claim regarding the actions of the police. 

However, Singh did not exhaust these arguments before the 

BIA. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 

122–23 (2d Cir. 2007) (requiring petitioner to exhaust all 

issues before the BIA). Because Singh’s claims were all 

based on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility 
7

determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 

removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 

156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court