### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13

– 0506
Filed October 18, 20 13

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD , Complainant ,

vs.
JAMES A. CLARITY III , Respondent

.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa.

Gr ievance c ommission reports respondent committed ethical
violations and recommend s suspension of his license to practice law.
LICENSE SUSPENDED
.

Charles L. Harrington and Nicholas Trè Critelli III , Des Moines , for complainant

.

Edward W. Bjornstad of Edward W. Bjornstad, LLC, Spirit Lake , for respondent

.2

WATERMAN , Justice. An experienced Iowa attorney, James A. Clarity III, neglected his
clients and mishandled their cases and money while struggling with
alcoholism. He has been under disability suspension since May 25,
2012. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a complaint against Clarity, alleging he violated ten rules of professional
conduct during his representation of seven clients in five different

matters

. Clarity stipulated to most of the underlying facts, nine of ten
rule violations , and mitigating and aggravating circumstances. He contested the Board’s allegation that he charged an unreasonable fee in a
criminal case. A division of t he Grievance C ommission of the Supreme
Court of Iowa found Clarity violated all ten rules and recommended his license be suspended for three years from May 25, 2012. Based on our
de novo review, we find Cla rity violated all ten rules and impose a one

year disciplinary suspension from the date of this opinion

. I. Scope of Review.
We review attor ney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart , 827 N.W. 2d 169, 17 1 (Iowa 2013). We give the commission’s findings respectful consideration, but we are not bound by them. Id. The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. In determining the appropriate sanction, we can impose a more or less severe sanction than that recommended by the commission. Id. The parties are bound by their stipulations of fact. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy , 814 N.W.2d 5 96 , 601 (Iowa 201 2 ). “However, a stipulation is not binding as to a violation or a sanction. We will determine whether a violation occurred and the appropriate sanction3

based upon the facts we find from the stipulation and our review of the
record.” Id

. ( citations omitted ).
II. Background Facts and Proceedings
. We find the following facts using the parties’ stipulation and our
own review of the record

. Clarity was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1976. At all times
relevant to the Board’s com plaint, Clarity resided in Dickinson County,
Iowa . His practice was approximately forty percent criminal matters and sixty percent civil matters

. Before his issues with alcoholism , Clarity had an unblemished career and enjoyed a reputation as a zealous advocate
for his clients. He was a member of several prestigious trial lawyer organizations. Clarity, by his own admission, became an alcoholic after his sister
died in 2009. He received inpatient treatment for alcohol abuse from July 15 through August 13, 2010 , at the Hazeld e n Treatment Center in
Center City, Minnesota

. A fter relapsing, Clarity entered inpatient

treatment a second time on February 12, 2011

. During this second phase of treatment, on March 8, o ur court temporarily suspended Clarity’s license to practice law due to his disability and implemented a trusteeship. He was releas ed from inpatient care on April 14. We held a hearing on April 2 6 on whether to lift his disability suspension. Clarity provided medical evidence of his successful treatment

. He testified as
follows: I am asking the court to end this suspension so that I can go back to what I love doing. I have taken the necessary steps to put my life in order as would a cancer patient, patient with MS or any other patient with a treatment of a disease. Alcoholism is chronic, progressive, and it’s fatal. To that and in that there is no doubt. If I drink again, I will die. Simple

. We lifted his te mporary suspension the next day.4 Clarity relapsed again a year later

. On May 25 , 2012, w e imposed
another temporary disability suspension on Cl arity’s license to practice
law

. Clarity consented to continuing this susp ension , and it has
remained in effect since that date

. We now describe the matters giving rise to the Board’s complaint.
A
. Easton Representation
. David and Jane Easton retained Clarity on J anuary 20, 2010 , to represent them in threatened federal
criminal a nd civil charges relating to Medicare prescription fraud

. The
Easton s paid Clarity a $75,000 retainer and agreed to pay his hourly rate of $300. Clarity had previously hand l ed similar matters. Shortly after retaining Clarity, David was indicted in feder al court on 1080 criminal

counts , and a federal civil suit was filed against the Eastons.
The Eastons paid Clarity ’s retainer i n two installments : $50,000 on January 21 and $25,000 on February 10

. Clarity deposited the se funds
in his trust acco unt at The State Bank in Spirit Lake, Iowa. At the time these funds were deposited, the account contained no other client funds
and had a prior balance of $118.93. Over the next several months, Clarity transferred $69,317.08 t o his general firm account for the payment of leg al fees and costs and paid the balance to a third party for
chartered air travel. Clarity failed to contemporaneously notif y the
Eastons of these withdrawals or provide them with an y accounting. By May 3, the ir retainer was depleted, leaving $119.93 in the trust account. Clarity contacted David on July 14 to notify him for the first time
that the $75,000 was depleted

. Clarity asked for an additional $15,000 to continue his work on the case. Clarity told David he needed the funds to travel to Washington, D.C. so that he could nego tiate a settlement with
the United States Department of Justice

. At Clarity’s request, David met
him in a grocery store parking lot and gave him a check for the reques ted5

amount. The next day, July 15, David went to Clarity’s law office to obtain a receipt, but was informed by Clarity’s secretary that he was home sick and that she knew nothing about the $15,000. David heard

rumors the next day that Clarity had been committed for alcohol
addicti on and stopped payment on his check. No one from Clarity’s office notified the Eastons that Clarity would be unavailable for weeks.
The Eastons retained new counsel , who required them to pay another
retainer. Clarity’s office did not respond to multiple requests to transfer his file to the new attorney until mid

- August

. Clarity, despite repeated requests for a refund or explanation , also failed to provide any accounting of how the $75,000 was spent until after the Easton s filed a complaint with the Board on November 5. On November 12, Clarity sent
to the Eastons his first and only statement describing his services rendered from January through June. According to Clarity, due to record

- keeping problems, he had to re

create his November stat ement by perusing his file. He said he originally
handwrote his time entries during his representation of the Easton s and his legal assistant enter ed the information into the billing system. She destroyed the handwritten time entries after entering the d ata. 1 Clarity testified a computer virus compr om ised the electronic time records. Clarity hired a computer technician to address the problem, but the data
could not be recovered. His reconstructed statement dated November 12
included five pages of entri es listing services performed without the date or time spent on any specific entry. At the end of the statement ,

1 Clarity later learned this legal assistant embezzled approximately $100,000 from the firm, money that was allocated to pay Clarity’s malpractice insurance premiums. Clarity testified he does not believe she took any client funds. Clarity did not pursue a ny legal action against her

.6

aggregate figures were provided: “TOTAL TIME: 225 HOURS x $300.00 = $72,000[sic]” followed by “TOTAL COSTS ADVANCED: $3,299.32” and a
final li ne stating, “TOTAL TIME A ND COSTS ADVANCED: $75,299.32.” Clarity n ever refunded any of the Easton s ’ $75,000. David Easton, represented by another attorney , ultimately was sentenced to prison.
B
. Buettner, Clark, and Leiss OWI Matters. Clarity represented
three clients

— Kenley Martin Buettner , N ichole Marie Clark, and Anthony Peter Leiss

— in criminal and administrative proceedings arising from charges of operating while intoxicated (OWI) . Buettner retained Clarity to represent him on May 12, 2010 , after he was arrested for a third offense OWI and driving while barred. Buettner paid Clarity a $15,000 retainer by three credit card payments in March and June

. These payments went into the firm’s general account and were not transferred into Clarity’ s client trust account

. Clark and Leiss , who were
each charged with first offense OWI , also retained Clarity . Clark’s grandmother and Leiss each paid Clarity a retainer of $2500 in September and October, re spectively . Clarity did not transfer the se retainers into his client trust account.
On his 2011 “ Client Security Commission Combined Statement and Questionnaire, ” Clarity responded “yes” to a question that asked whether all retainers, regardless of their size, had been deposited into a
client t rust account. Although Clarity later asked how to correct his misstatement, he never filed an amended q uestionnaire with the Office of Professional Regulation

. Clarity advised all three clients at the outset of his representation they did not need to a ttend any hearing unless he specifically told them
to do so

. Arraignments were held for Clar k and Leiss on November 4, 2010, but Clarity failed to appear or notify his clients of the need to7

appear. The court continued t he arraignments until November 18. Clarity again failed to inform Clark or Leiss of the new date and failed to
attend or continue the ir arraignments. As a result, the court issued
bench warrants for Clark and Leiss , who were arrested and jail ed . Clark
and Leiss each had to post bond to secure their release. Clarity also failed to notify Buettner he needed to attend his pretrial co nference scheduled for January 24, 2011. Because neither Clarity nor Buettner

at tended the pretrial conference, the court issued a bench warr ant for
Buettner’s arrest. Buettner too was jailed and had to post bond to
secure his release. Clarity entered his second inpa tient treatment on February 12, again without notifying these clients, the court , or the county attorney he would not be pract icing during that period. Buettner, Clark, and Leiss
each retained new counsel . Clark sued Clarity in small claims court and obtained a default judgment for her $2500 retainer with interest and $110 in court costs. As of the time of the commission’s hea ring, Clarity had not yet satisfied the judgment . Clarity also had not refunded any part of the Buettner or Leiss retainers.
C
. Rodrick and Jurine Williams Representation
. Clarity

represen ted Rodrick and Jurine Williams as plaintiffs in a civil action
filed in the Iowa District Court for Emmet County. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on September 13, 2010. Clarity filed a tim ely notice of appeal on October 11. But , b ecause Clarity failed to file the combined certif icate and to pay the filing fee, the
clerk of this court sent Clarity a “Notice of Default and Ass essment of Penalty” on November 2. Clarity failed to cure the default. As a result,

we entered an order di smissing the appeal on December 8. Clarity
moved to reinstate the appeal, alleging he had not received the notice of8

default because the post office would not deliver mail addressed to his
street address. We denied the motion to reinstate on January 11, 2011, stating: The order dismissing the appeal an d the default notice were sent to the exact same address. Despite his earlier contentions that no mail will be delivered using that address, attorney Clarity states he received the order dismissing the appeal on December 8, 2010. The court also notes the notice and the order dismissing the appeal were sent to the same address used by Clarity on his letterhead and previous documents filed with the district court and the appellate court. Finally, Clarity offers no explanation for why he failed to comply wi th Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.702(1)(a) (the filing fee for the notice of appeal shall be paid within seven days after filing the notice of appeal) and 6.804(1) (the combined certificate shall be filed within seven days of the filing of the notice of appeal). Consequently, Clarity’s inaction resulted in dismissal of his clients’ appeal.
D
. Procedural History. On March 1, 2012, t he Board filed a complaint alleging Clarity violated ten rules of professional conduct in
connection with the above

- described matters

. Clarity’s answer to the complaint , filed April 5 , admitted some of the factual allegations, but denied he violated any of the rules identified by the Board. Pursuant to
Iowa Court Rule 35.1 7 , our court tem porarily suspended Clarity’s license to practice law on May 25. On May 29, at the Board’s request, t he commission stayed the proceedings because Clarity was incapacitated
and hospitalized

. On August 10 , the Board applied to lift the stay to allow the eth ics complaint to proceed to hearing

. We granted the Board’s application. The commission hel d a one

- day hearing on December 5. The parties submitted a twelve

- page stipulation in which Clarity admitted to the underlying facts supporting violations of nine of the ten rules identified by the Board

. Clarity stipulated that his conduct9

supports the following violations of the Iowa Court Rules and the Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct:

a. Rules 45.7(3) and 32:1.15(c) for not depositing Clark’s, Leiss’s and Buettner’s advanced fees into his attorney trust account; b. Rule 32:8.4(c) for making misrepresentations to the Iowa Supreme Court Client Security Commission in his certified responses to the 2011 Questionnaire on whether or not retainers were deposit ed into his trust account;

c. Rule 45.2(2) for not providing his clients with proper accounting at the time services were rendered; d. Rule 32:1.15(a) for not maintaining complete records of his clients’ account funds;

e. Rule 45.7(4) for not givi ng the Eastons proper notice of the withdrawal of fees and expenses from his attorney trust account; f. Rule 32:1.4(3) for not keeping his clients reasonabl [y] informed of the status of their legal matters and his own inability to adequately represent their interests due to his inpatient treatments; g. Rule 32:1.4(4) for not promptly complying with his clients’ reasonable requests for information about the ir legal matters; and h. Rule 32:1.3 for neglecting his clients’ matters which resulted in three of his clients being arrested and the Williams’ appeal being dismissed. Clarity d enied he violat ed “Rule 32:1.5(a) for charging an unreasonable
fee in the Easton matter.” The parties also stipulated to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which we discuss below in determining the appropriate
sanction . The parties did not agree to the pro posed discipline to be
recommended

. At the hearing, the commi ssion heard testimony from Clarity and received twenty

- three exhibits into evidence. The parties submitted post hearing briefs. The commission filed its “ Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of L aw, and Recommendation ” on April 1, 2013. The
commission determine d Clarity violated all ten of the rules alleged by the10

Board, including the contested rule violation for charging an unreasonable fee. The commission made the following recommendations regarding the appropriate sanction:

1. Suspension of [Clarity]’s li cense to practice law for three (3) years commencing May 25, 2012, the date suspension was ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court under Rule 35.1 [7]

. 2. Prior to reinstatement, [Clarity must ] provide documentation showing he has maintained sobriety and cont inuously complied with in

- patient and/or outpatient treatment for alcoholism. 3. [Clarity must ] contact and cooperate with the Iowa Lawyers Assistance Program. 4. [Clarity must ] satisfy the Judgment in Dickinson County, Iowa case number SCCV019610. 5. [Clarity must ] pay all costs in this matter.

III. Ethical Violations.
As noted, t he commission found Clarity violated all ten of the rules
the Board alleged in its complaint, incl uding the contested violation that Clarity had charged the Eastons an unreasonable fee. We make the following determinations on our de novo review

. A. Trust Account Violations. T he Board alleged Clarity violated
Iowa Court Rule s 45. 7 (3) , 45.7(4), and 45.2(2) and Iowa Rule s of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a) and (c) . These rules govern attorneys’ responsibilities with regard to client trust accounts

. 1. Failure to deposit advanced fees into trust account. The Board alleged Clarity violated rules 45.7(3) and 32:1.15(c) when he failed to deposit the advance fees he received from clients Buettner, Clark, and
Leiss into a client trust account. Rule 45.7(3) requires attorney s to “deposit advance fee and expense payments from a cli ent into the trust account.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(3). Rule 32:1.15(c) provides that “[a] lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have11

been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees a re earned or expenses incurred.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(c) ; see also Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(a) (“Funds shall be kept in a separate account.”). “Rule 32:1.15 incorporates Iowa Court Rule 45.7, which directs a lawyer as to how to handle a r etainer.” McCarthy , 814 N.W.2d

at 607. Taken together, these rules strictly prohibit lawyers from commingling unearned client funds with their own property. See Iowa Supreme Ct

. Att ’

y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal , 796 N.W.2d 910, 918

– 19 (Iowa 2011) (find ing a violation of rules 32:1.15 and 45.7 when the attorney failed to deposit a $500 retainer into a client trust account)

. Because Clarity admitted he did not deposit Buettner’s $15,000 retainer or the $2500 retainers h e received from Clark and Leiss into his client trust account, we conclude the Board established Clarity violated these
rules. See Iowa Supreme Ct

. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kersenbrock , 821 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Iowa 2012) (concluding attorney violated rule 32:1.15(c) by placing a retainer “in her ‘sock drawer’ for ‘a number of
weeks’ ”)

. 2. Failure to provide accounting. The Board alleges Clarity violated
Iowa Court Rule s 45.2(2) and 45.7(4) regarding his failure to promptly provide accounting statements. Iowa Court Rule 45.2(2) requ ires lawyers to “promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and [to] promptly render a full accoun ting regarding such property.” Iowa Court Rule 45.7(4) requires “[a] l awyer accepting advance fee or expense payments [to] notify the client in writing of the time, amount, and purpose of any withdrawal of the fee or expense, together with a complete accounting.” Rule 45.7(4) further provides that this notice must be provid ed “no later than the date of the withdrawal.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4);12

see also Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(d) (“[U]pon request by the client or third person, [a lawyer] shall promptly render a full accounting regarding [the] property.”). Not only d id Clarity fail to provide an accounting to the Eastons
when he withdrew funds from his client trust account, he also neglected for months to provide a billing statement to the Eastons after they repeatedly requested one. Clarity stipulated that from Febr uary to May 2010, he made twenty withdrawals for the payment of legal fees and advanced expenses from his client trust account that fully exhausted the Eastons’ $75,000 retainer. Clarity admits he did not provide the Eastons with contemporaneous notice of the withdrawals. It was only after the Eastons filed a complaint with the Board in November that he created a statement and provided it to the Eastons. Accordingly, we find Clarity failed to provide the notice required under Iowa Court Rule s 45.2(2) and
4 5.7(4) and thereby violated those rule s
. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish , 801 N.W.2d 580, 58 6

– 88 (Iowa 2011) (sanctioning attorney for failing to render an appropriate accounting); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’ y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCann , 712 N.W.2d 89, 9 4

– 9 5 (Iowa 2006) (finding violation whe n attorney did not respond to client’s request for an accounting).
B. Misrepresentation in 2011 Questionnaire. The commission found Clarity violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(c)
b ecause he “ma[de] misrepresentations to the Iowa Supreme Court Client Security Commission in his certified responses to the 2011 questionnaire regarding the deposit of retainers into his [client] trust account.” Rule 32:8.4(c) states that “[i]t is profess ional misconduct for a lawyer to .

. . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). To establish a13

violation of this rule, “[t]he B oard must prove the attorney acted with
some level of sc ienter greater than negligence.” Kersenbrock , 82 1 N.W.2d

at 421. “[A] ‘ casual, reckless disregard for the truth ’ warrants discipline.” Iowa Supreme Ct

. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd. v. Isaacson , 750 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Iowa 2008) ( quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett , 653 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2002) ). Clarity’s conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard for the
truth. Clarity stipulated that Buettner’s $15,000 retainer , Leiss’s $2500
retainer , and Clark’s $2500 retainer were deposited into his general fun d
and never transferred to his client trust account. After falsely certifying all of his retainers had been deposited into a trust account, Clarity inquired about how to file a corrected certification . This suggests he
knew the one he initially filed was incorrect. Yet , he never followed through to correct his false certification. Clarity states in his post trial brief that his “paralegal failed to deposit [the retainers] without his knowledge due to oversight on [his] part , [and] he was not aware that they were not deposited until long after the events had taken place.” We find Clarity’s excuse unconvincing. See Iowa Supreme Ct

. Bd. of Prof’ l
Ethics & Conduct v. Herrera , 560 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Iowa 1997) ( “[W]e
have a stron g negative reaction to a lawyer’ s attempt to blame professional shortcomings on an employee.” ); Comm. on Prof’ l Ethics &
Conduct v. Postma , 430 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Iowa 1988) (noting that blaming legal staff for failings is a “ timeworn” excuse that is viewed with “unbounded skepticism, and never with admiration”). We find Clarity violated rule 32:8.4(c). See Iowa Supreme Ct

. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wengert , 790 N.W.2d 94, 100 (Iowa 2010) (finding the attorney’s false
certification that her trust account was properly reconciled violated rule 32:8.4(c)).14

C. Failure to Keep Clients Reasonably Informed of the Status of Their Legal Matters. The Board alleged , and the commission found , Clarity violated rule 32:1.4 (a) (3) , which requir es a lawyer to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:1.4 (a) (3). Clarity stipulated to facts that establish the rule
violation. Specifically, Clarity failed to inform Clark and Leiss of their

arra ign ments, which resulted in the issuance of bench warrants for failure to appear and their arrest and incarceration. He failed to inform Buettner of his pretrial conference, resulting in Buettner’s arrest and incarceration for failure to appear. Clarity failed to inform these OWI clients and the Eastons of his inability to represent them during his inpatient treatment. We conclude Clarity thereby violated rule
32:1.4 (a) (3). See McCarthy , 814 N.W.2d at 606 ( finding erroneous communication s regarding dates of court hearings violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3)).
D. Failure to Respond to Clients’ Reasonable Requests for
Information. The Board alleged , and the commission found , Clarity
violated rule 32:1.4 (a) (4) by not complying with his clients’ reasonable

r equests for information about their legal matters. This rule requires a lawyer to “ promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4 (a) (4). Clarity first told David Easton on July 14, 2010 , shortly before enterin g inpatient treatment at Hazelde n, that he had spent the entire $75,000 retainer. Easton sought to transfer his file to a new attorney, but was kept waiting until mid

- August. Easton also repeatedly sought an explanation from Clarity for how the retainer was spent. Clarity failed to respond with any explanation until
November 12, after Easton filed an ethics complaint on November 5. We conclude Clarity violated rule 32:1.4 (a) (4)

. S ee Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y15

Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley , 774 N.W.2d 301, 30 7

– 08 (Iowa 2009) (failure to respond to repeated requests for information and to account for retainer fees violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4) ).
E. Neglect of Client Matters. The B oard alleged , and the
commission found , Clarity violated rule 32:1.3 by neglecti ng client

matters. Clarity stipulated to the facts underlying this rule violation. Rule 32:1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. This rule is violated when a lawyer fails to attend scheduled court proceedings. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hauser , 782 N.W.2d 147, 150, 152

– 53 (Iowa 2010). Clarity missed the arraignments for Clark and Leiss, resu lting in their arres t s and incarceration s
. Clarity missed Buettner’s pretrial conference, resulting in his arrest and
incarceration . Rule 32:1.3 is also violated when an attorney’s neglect results in the client’s loss of a right to appeal. See Dolezal , 796 N.W.2d

at 9 17. Clarity failed to cure his defaults in the Williams appeal, resulting in its dismissal with prejudice. We conclude Clarity’s neglect of
each of these matters violated rule 32:1.3.
F
. Charging an Unreasonable Fee. The Board alleged , and the
commission found , Clarity ’s $75,000 fee collected from the Eastons violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from “mak[ing] an agreement for, charg[ing], or co llect[ing] an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” Clarity
contested this rule violation. The Board has the burden of proving by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Clarity charged or collected an unreasonable fee. Iowa Supreme Ct

. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon , 78 9 N.W.2d 756, 759

– 60 (Iowa 2010); see also Rhinehart , 827 N.W.2d at16

171, 181. We consider the following factors in determining the
reasonableness of the fee:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a). No expert testimony was offered on the reasonableness of Clarity’s hourly rate or fee. We find his $300 hourly rate to be reasonable for an Iowa attorney of his experience

. He had practiced law since 1976

. About forty percent of his practice was crimina l law

. The Eastons faced complex felony criminal charges

. They agreed to pay his hourly rate. Clarity had handled similar cases. Other experienced Iowa criminal
defense lawyers charge a $300 hourly rate. The fighting issue is the number of hours cha rged by Clarity in light of the result obtained

. As discussed above, he was unable to provide his original handwritten billing records or the computer records of the time entered by his legal assistant. M onths later , he re

- created a
six

- page statement li sting tasks performed, without dates or the time spent on each task, but with a stated total time of 225 hours, which , multiplied by his $300 hourly rate plus expenses , conveniently reaches17

the entire $75,000 retainer. The statement indicates he sen t twenty

three letters , reviewed nineteen letters he received , conducted twenty

- six conferences by phone or at his office , and performed legal research on six
occasions. The rest of the time was reported ly spent reviewing the claims identified by patient n ame
. He claims no time for any trial , hearing , deposition s, motions , or briefs. H e never showed that his many hours of
research or claims review were summarized or memorialized to capture his analysis. P resumably , the time he spent researching and revie wing
claims had to be redone by the attorney who took over th e case. We have no doubt a lawyer defending a felony M edicare billing fraud case may spend significant time reviewing patient records. But , in
a case like this in which the client never recei ved a bill until months after
the lawyer paid himself the retainer , and the belated, re

- created billing

statement is cryptic, the credibility of the billing attorney is of central importance. The commission found Clarity’s testimony was not credible.
In finding the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence that Clarity had charged an excessive fee in violation of rule 32:1.5(a) , the commission stated : The trust account records, general account records of the law firm, along with the part y’s Stipulations regarding when and how retainers were received support the Board’s allegation. [Clarity] testified regarding the special nature of the litigation, its complexity, volume of discovery, and the serious consequences both the criminal and civ il cases brought against the Eastons. [Clarity] testified generally about time spent on the case and how time slips and time notes were kept. [Clarity] did not present any other evidence supporting the hourly rate charged, accounting of time or expenses, or the reasonableness of the retainer. Although the Eastons faced serious consequences both criminally and civilly, [Clarity]’s testimony about the reasonableness of the fees is not credible. The failure of [Clarity] to offer any corroborating evidence; the contrast of his testimony to the trust account records and general account records of the law firm; his extremely vague

. . . generalization s of the work18 performed; his admitted neglect of his practice during this time frame; and, in light of the othe r evidence stipulated to by [Clarity] erodes completely th e credibility of the testimony

. (Emphasis added

. ) We giv e deference to the commission’s credibility determination
because the commission heard Clarity’s live testimony and observed his
demeanor

. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v Bowles , 794 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011) (“ This court gives special weight to the
commission’ s findings concernin g the credibility of witnesses.” ); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Plumb , 766 N.W.2d 626 , 632 (Iowa 2009) ( “ Granting appropri ate deference to the commission’ s credibility findings, we adopt the commission’ s findings as our own .” ); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath , 713 N.W.2d 682, 702 (Iowa 2006) (“ [T] his court does not often disregard the credibility
determinations of the commission

. . . . ”); see also In re Marriage of
Vrban , 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984) (discussing the importance in credibility determinations of hearing live testimony to observe demeanor).
We reach th e same conclusion as the commission , relying on our
own review of the record and the commission’s determination that Clarity’s testimony was not credible. The bank records show Clarity made twenty separate withdr awals from February 3 through May 3,
2010 , which collectively exhausted the $75,000 retainer. He made
withdrawals on fo ur consecutive days in February. He made three separate withdrawals on March 16 and two more on April 5, followed by matching $3 000 withdrawals on April 15 and 16 a nd a $7 000 wit hdrawal on April 20. Clarity’s pattern of withdraw al s differs from the single monthly or quarterly withdrawal typical for a lawyer who periodically
collects earned fees. The frequency and odd amounts of his withdrawals
look more like a lawyer using his client trust account as a personal ATM.19

Another red flag is the urgency with which Clarity sought an additional $15,000 from the Eastons on the eve of his departure for inpatient

treatment. We consider the $75,000 Clarity collected from the Eastons in light
of “the results obtained.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a)(4). Clarity claims credit for avoiding criminal charges against Jane Easton. Otherwise, he cannot show he accomplished anything for David Easton,
who ultimat ely was sentenced to prison after his case was concluded by another lawyer

. Clarity failed to show that any of his time spent researching the law or reviewing claims was memorialized in a form that assisted Easton’s new lawyer or avoided the need to repli cate those
efforts. We conclude the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Clarity charged the Eastons an unreasonable fee in violation of rule 32:1.5(a).
IV. Sanction. There is no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles , 808 N.W.2d 431, 441 (Iowa 2012). “Although p rior cases are instructive, we determine the appropriate sanctions in light of the unique circ umstances of the case
before us.” Rhinehart , 827 N.W.2d at 182

. When crafting a sanction, we consider the nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from those unfit to practice law, th e need to uphold public confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Id. ( internal quotation marks omitted ). The commission recommended we suspend C larity’s license to practice law for three years from the date his second disability20

suspension beg an, May 25, 2012

. We give respectful consideration to
the commission’s recommendation

. The commission accurately recited Clarity’s rule violations and the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances as follows :

[Clarity’s] conduct resulted in multiple instances where he neglected client matters, neglected management of client funds and trust account records, and neglected client requests. [Clarity] cites his alcoholism as the primary cause of his violations and a mitigating factor. He also cites his 37 years of practice, admission to practice in various federal courts, certifications held with several professional organizations, and prior military service. [Clarity’s] compliance with in

- patient treatment for alcoholism and continued outpatient treatment are also commendable. A number of aggravating factors must be considered as well. [Clarity] has been privately admonished by the Attorney Disciplinary Board on three prior occasions. His 37 years of experience as an attorney aggravates his neglect in handling client matters and the handling of client funds. The serious harm his client s suffered as a result of his misconduct is also aggravating: three clien ts were arrested and jailed, an appeal was dismissed with prejudice, clients had to retain other counsel, and retainers were not returned. Although [Clarity] repeatedly stated he was the “captain of the ship”, he did not acknowledge the harm caused to these clients. Instead of expressing any remorse for his clients, he cited computer problems, missing documentation, and employee theft. We first address Clarity’s alcoholism. In hi s stipulation, he “acknowledge[d] and admit[ted] that he is an alcoholic and the difficulties
he has caused his clients were the result of his alcoholism.” A lcoholism , however , “is not a ‘legal justification, excuse, or defense’ ” for Clarity’s
actions

. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver , 812 N.W.2d 4, 11 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Schmidt , 796 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2011)) ; see also Florida Bar v. Golub , 550 So. 2d 455, 455 (Fla

. 1989) (“While alcoholism explains the respondent’s conduct, it does not excuse it.”). Nevertheless, “ [a]l coholism can be a mitigating factor .” Weaver , 812 N.W.2d at 15 ; see also Iowa21

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Roush , 827 N.W.2d 711, 718

– 20 (I owa 2013) (considering the attorney’s rehabilitative efforts and surveying cases imposing sanctions ranging from thirty days to one year for disciplinary violations related to alcoholism and substance abuse); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Axt , 791 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2010) (considering as a mitigating factor the attorney’s “rehabilitative efforts in actively attempting to con trol his addiction to alcohol”) ; Hauser , 782 N.W.2d at 154) ( noting that to the extent the attorney acknowledged
his alc oholism and takes steps to address the problem, the court will consider these acts in fashioning an appropriate sanction )

. To be considered in mitigation, the alcoholism must have
contributed to the ethical misconduct, and the lawyer must undertak e rehabilitative efforts to control his addiction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson , ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2013) (citing Weaver , 812 N.W.2d at 13; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth, 636 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Iowa 200 1) (considering a lawyer’s efforts to remain sober as a mitigating factor) ) ; see also Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Toohig, 979 N.E.2d 332, 341

– 42 (Ohio 2012) (declining to consider
alcoholism as a mitigatin g factor without a showing that it “contributed

t o cause the misconduct” and noting much of the charged misconduct occurred after lawyer gained sobriety); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel , 950 N.E.2d 171, 176

– 77 (Ohio 2011) (mitigating sanction based on attorney’s successful treatm ent and cooperation with lawyer

- assistance program) ; State ex rel. Okla

. Bar Ass’n v. Haave , 290 P.3d 747, 757 (Okla. 2012) (Kauger, J., concurring specially) (“[A]lcohol abuse or alcoholism may serve as a mitigating factor where the offending attorney recognizes the problem and s eeks and cooperates in treatment.”)

.22 “[O]ur primary goal is n ot to punish the attorney, but ‘ to protect the public from lawyers rendered unfit from any cause.’ ” Weaver , 812
N.W.2d at 15 (quoting Hauser , 782 N.W.2d at 154)

. We imposed a two

year suspension in Weaver for an OWI third and third

- degree
harassment , noting that Weaver repeatedly refused “to seek the help that is necessary for him to successfully cope with his depression and
alcoholism.” Id. By contrast, Clarity has repeatedly undergone weeks of inpatient treatment and ongoing outpatient treatment to cope with his alcoholism, albeit with mixed success. We consider his efforts to be a mitigating factor. Yet , Clarity has not demonstrated he has successfully
rehabi litated himself to the point he is able to practice law at this time , and he remains under disability suspension. See Nelson , ___ N.W.2d at ___ ( considering in mitigation the attorney’s successful rehabilitation and return to the practice of law) ; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Khowassah ,

___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2013) (considering as mitigating factor the attorney’s treatment for his alcoholism and depression)

. Mindful of Clarity’s struggle with alcoholism, we next consider the

sanc tions appropriate for his rule violations. Clarity committed multiple trust account and accounting violations and neglected his clients. We have imposed suspensions for such violations ranging from thirty days to
four months. See Boles , 808 N.W.2d at 44 1

– 4 2 (collecting cases). His neglect resulted in the dismissal with prejudice of the Williams appeal and the jailing of thr ee OWI clients. We have imposed suspensions of one to six months when the attorney’s neglect caused harm to clients.
See Dolezal , 796 N.W.2d at 92 1

– 22 (reviewing cases); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Box , 715 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 2006) (“We have consistently held that harm to a client or third party is an aggravating factor with regard to disciplinary violation s.”).23

In Hauser

, we disciplined an experienced attorney who, like Clarity, struggled with alcoholism. Hauser failed to appear at a scheduled dissolution trial and failed to inform his client of the trial, resulting in entry of a default judgment. Hauser , 782 N.W.2d at 150. Hauser, like Clarity, also committed multiple trust account violations.
Id . a t 15 1

– 53. At the commission hearing, Hauser admitted to being an alcoholic and testified to his current sobriety and involvement with
A lcoholics A non ymous , but failed to show he had received or is seeking professional treatment for his alcoholism. Id. at 154. We imposed a six

month suspension for Hauser’s rule violations

. Id. In addition, Clarity violated the rule against charging unreasonable
fees. “We have imposed suspensions ranging from sixty days to two years for violations of the rule prohibiting excessive fees.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Laing, 832 N.W .2d 366, 374 (Iowa 2013) (collecting cases).
We also consider that Clarity recently ha s been privately admonished by the Board on three occasions. The stipulation describes those private admonishments as follows: The first, in March 29, 2010, was for failure to respond to a Board request for information pursuant to Rule 32:8.1. The second, April 1, 2011, was for failing to keep his client informed pursuant to Rule 32:1.4(a)(3). The third, dated September 27, 2011, was for failure to comply with the C LE reporting requirements of Rule 32:7.4(e). Clarity blames those transgressions on his drinking. “ [ T ] his court has repeatedly considered prior admonitions as aggravating circumstances
that relate directl y to an appropriate sanction.” Parrish , 801 N.W. 2d at
589. Finally, we consider that Clarity has been under disability suspension for alcoholism since May 25, 2012 , and his ethical24

transgressions at issue now are attributable to that disease

. Disability suspensions and disciplinary suspensions serve overlapping but distinct

purposes. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Maxwell , 705 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Iowa 2005). Both types of suspension protect the public. But , “a disability suspension is not a sanction and does not specifically address u nethical conduct and the need to deter future
conduct.” Id. Moreover, the standards for reinstatement differ for each type of suspension

. Id. at 480

– 81. Nevertheless , we can consider an interim suspension arising from the same conduct when calibrating the disciplinary suspension. See Nelson , ___ N.W.2d at ___ (taking into account attorney’s two

- year interim suspension) ; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell , 839 N.W.2d 355, 359

– 60 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he
interim seven

- month suspension weighs heavily in this case .

. . .”)

. In
Nelson , the attorney was under disability suspension for alcoholism for two years and eight days before his reinstatement on July 31, 2012.
Ne lson, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Nelson had been maintaining sobriety and practicing law without further incident for over thirteen months when we
determined his dis ciplinary sanction

. His successful rehabilitation was a significant mitigating factor. Clarity, on the other hand, has remained
under his second disability suspension for more than fifteen months without seeking reinstatement

. W e conclude Clarity warrants a disciplinary suspension separate and apart from his ongoing disability suspension to “uphold public confidence in the justice system and maintain the reputation of the bar.” Powell , 839 N.W.2d at 360. We hold

a one

- year disciplinary suspension is appropriate, to run from the date of this opinion.25

V. Disposition
. For the reasons stated, we suspend Clarity’s license to practice law with no possibility of reinstatement for one year from the date of this opinion. Prior to reinstatement, Clarity must provide medical documentation from a licensed health care profession al regarding his maintenance of sobriety and his fitness to practice law. Pursuant to rule
35.1 3 (3), this suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. All costs are taxed to Clarity pursuant to rule 35.2 7 (1). As a condition of reinstatement, Clarity must satisfy the judgment obtained against him by Clark. Prior to reinstatement, Clarity must also show that he has not practiced law during the period of suspension, has notified his clients as required by rule 35.2 3 , has paid all costs required by rule 35.2 7 (1), and meets the requirements of rule 35. 4 3. Fol lowing this suspension, Clarity’ s disability suspension will remain in place unt il he has shown “by clear and convincing evidence[ ] that [his] disability has been removed and [he] is fully qualified to resume the practice of law.” Iowa Ct. R.
35.1 7 (7).
LICENSE SUSPENDED
.