Filed 1/9/14 Kristina T. v. Super. Ct. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KRISTINA T., Petitioner,

v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY, Respondent;

MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest. F068337 (Super. Ct. No. JP000880)

O P I N I O N

THE COURT  ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for ex traordinary writ review. Brian L. McCabe, Judge. Kristina T., in pro per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and Sheri L. Damon, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. -ooOoo- * Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Detjen, J.2 Kristina T. in propria persona seeks ex traordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s orders denying her reunification se rvices under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) 1 because of her mental disability and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her four-month- old son, Justin. We deny the petition. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY In August 2013, the Merced County Human Services Agency (agency) took then newborn Justin into protective custody out of concern his mother, Kris tina, could not take care of him. According to the hospital sta ff, Kristina appeared mentally unstable and delusional. Kristina’s mother told the staff Kristina was diagnosed with schizophrenia and refused medication and treatment becaus e she did not believe there was anything wrong with her. The previous March, the agency removed Kristina’s other three minor children because of negl ect and placed them with their fathers. The agency filed a depende ncy petition on Justin’s beha lf and identified Jason as his father. Jason’s wher eabouts were unknown. The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem for Kristina and ordered Justin detained. The juvenile court also adjudged Justin a depende nt child and ordered Kristina to undergo a psychological ev aluation to determine if she could benefit from reunification services. If the result of the first psycholo gical evaluation was that Kristina would not benefit from services, then the court’s order included a second eval uation. The agency placed Justin in foster care. In October 2013, Kristina was evalua ted by two clinical psychologists who confirmed a diagnosis of schizophrenia and opined she had a ment al disability that rendered her incapable of benefiting from reunification services. One of the

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.3 psychologists stated Kristina was experiencing a thought disorder ma nifested by unusual perceptual experiences, inappropriate and c onstricted affect and odd, eccentric, and unusual behavior. Kristina, however, denied having any psychological disturbance and refused psychological treatment. Both psyc hologists believed that Kristina had been suffering from psychological problems fo r some time, possibly years. In light of the psychologists’ reports, the agency recommended the juvenile court deny Kristina reunification services under s ection 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) because of her mental disability. In November 2013, the juvenile cour t convened the dispositional hearing. Kristina’s attorney informed the court that Kristina had been taking psychotropic medication for almost a week and asked for a six-week continuance so that she could be reevaluated after the medication had taken effect . The juvenile court declined to do so, ordered Justin removed from Kristina’s cust ody, denied her reunification services as recommended, and set a section 366.26 heari ng for March 2014. This petition ensued. DISCUSSION Kristina contends the juvenile court erre d in removing Justin from her custody and denying her reunification se rvices under section 3 61.5, subdivision (b)(2). 2
Kristina seeks an extrao rdinary writ directing the juvenile court to order reunification services for her and/or to return Justin to her custody. We decline to provide relief for the reasons we now explain.

2 Real party in interest contends Kristina’ s writ petition is facially inadequate and should be dismissed because Kristina did not include a statement of facts and a memorandum of points and authorities and di d not support her claims of error with proper citation to the appellate record and to legal authority as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.452(b ). We decline to dismiss the writ petition and will liberally construe it in favor of its sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a)(1).)4 The juvenile court can remove a child from parental custody, if it finds “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the mi nor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s phys ical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s ... physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The court must also determine whether reas onable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need fo r the child’s removal. (§ 361, subd. (d).) The juvenile court can also deny a parent reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is desc ribed by any of the exceptions set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b). (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1)-(16).) We review the juvenile court’s orders for substantial evidence, bearing in mind that clear and convincing ev idence requires a heightened burden of proof. ( In re Kristin
H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 16 54.) Further, we confine our review to the record that was before the juvenile court for consideration. ( In re Zeth S . (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) Kristina in essence contends there was no need to remove Justin from her custody because he was never in danger of being physically, verbally or sexually abused. Instead, she argues, he was removed because her house was dirty and she neglected him. Further, she argues, it was safe to re turn him to her custody beca use she was living with her mother and her mental state had improved w ith medication. She included with her writ petition a letter from her physician dated Dece mber 11, 2013, stating her thoughts were “much more clear” since she began taking medication. As we stated above, this court can only re view evidence considered by the juvenile court. Since the physician’s progress letter was not before th e juvenile court, we will not review it. Further, in reviewing the record , we determine whether substantial evidence supports the order the juvenile court made, not whether it supports a contrary order.5 Here, there was compelling evid ence that Justin could no t be safely returned to Kristina’s custody. According to the psycho logists, she was so delusional that she was unable to care for herself much less Justin. Further, the j uvenile court was aware that Kristina was living with her mother yet determ ined that placing Jus tin with Kristina was not an alternative to removal. Given the se verity of Kristina’s illn ess at that time, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude Justin would not be safe living with Kristina even if the grandmother were there. Further, substantial evidence supports th e juvenile court’s order denying Kristina reunification services. The juvenile court ma y deny a parent reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), if it finds by clear and convinci ng evidence that the parent suffers “from a mental disability that is described in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7820) of Part 4 of Division 12 of the Family C ode and that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services.” (§ 361 .5, subd. (b)(2).) Family Code section 7827, subdivision (a) defines the “mentally disabled” parent as one suffering a mental incapacity or mental disorder that renders the parent unable to adequately care for and control the child. A finding of mental disab ility must be supported by the opinion of two mental health experts who meet the qualifica tions set forth in Family Code section 7827, subdivision (c). In this case, the juvenile court had th e expert opinion of two psychologists that Kristina suffers from a mental disability that renders her in capable of adequately caring for Justin. Kristina does not dispute the substance of the psychologists’ opinions. Instead, she offers medical information that her mental state subsequently improved with medication. Based on that information, she contends, the juvenile court should reevaluate whether she has a mental disa bility and whether with time and proper treatment she could properly care for Justin.6 For the reason stated above, we cannot consider the physician’s letter. Nevertheless, Kristina may petiti on the juvenile court under section 388 to modify its order denying her reunificati on services on the grounds that her improved mental health constitutes a change in circumstances subsequent to the juvenile court’s denial order. In doing so, Kristina would also have to show that reunification services would serve Justin’s best interests. 3 We conclude substantial evidence suppor ts the juvenile court’s orders removing Justin from Kristina’s custody and denying he r reunification services under subdivision (b)(2) of section 361.5 and deny the petition. DISPOSITION The petition for extraordinary wr it is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.

3 Section 388 allows the parent of a child adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court to petition the court to change, modify or set aside any order upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.