Report to the President and Congress of the United States

JANUARY 30, 2014

National Commission on the 

Structure of the Air Force

January 30, 2014

President Barack Obama

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW

Washington, DC 22002

The Honorable Carl Levin The Honorable James Inhofe

Chairman, Committee Ranking Member, Committee

on Armed Services on Armed Services

United States Senate United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510 Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Howard McKeon The Honorable Adam Smith

Chairman, Committee Ranking Member, Committee

on Armed Services on Armed Services

United States House of United States House of

Representatives Representatives

Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. President, Chairmen and Ranking Members:

The National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force is pleased to submit its report of 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations for the legislative and administrative actions we believe 

will enable the Air Force to best fulfill current and anticipated mission requirements in the challenging 

years ahead.

In conducting the work that led to our report, the Commission held numerous open hearings in 

Washington and at Air Force installations and cities throughout the nation. We heard formal and informal 

testimony from Air Force leaders of many ranks; from the men and women serving in the ranks of all three 

components of the Air Force; from Governors, Senators, Representatives, and local officials; and from Air Force 

retirees and private citizens. We received and read hundreds of documents submitted for our consideration. 

This open and inclusive process gives us a high degree of confidence in our conclusions and recommendations.

Some of our recommendations represent fundamentally different approaches to the ways in which the Air 

Force has employed and managed its Total Force in the past. We recommend a greater reliance on the Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve; creating opportunities and incentives for longer service in uniform to 

minimize military personnel and family turmoil; and increasing opportunities for movement by Airmen within 

the components of the Air Force. These recommendations will lower overall military personnel costs, and they 

will produce a more ready and capable force by preserving funds for operations, maintenance, procurement, and 

recapitalization. The personnel-related actions we recommend make better use of the Air Force’s deep reservoir 

of talent and will also have the effect of maintaining the readiness of the Air Reserve Component that would 

otherwise be diminished by disuse. Accordingly, we conclude that these recommendations should be followed 

even if budget constraints did not exist.

National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force

Suite 200, James Polk Building

2521 South Clark Street

Arlington, VA 22202

(703) 545-9113

Dennis McCarthy

Chair

Erin C. Conaton

Vice chair

Les Brownlee

Janine Davidson

Margaret Harrell

Raymond Johns

F. Whitten Peters

Bud Wyatt
We also make recommendations in two areas that are addressed specifically because of the pressures imposed 

by declining budgets. Past Air Force efforts to reduce its overall inventory of equipment and installations 

have been driven primarily by the need to preserve capital for people and operations. We learned much about 

those pressures and the sometimes painful choices they require. We offer recommendations relating to aircraft 

inventory and to installations that we believe can mitigate the negative consequences associated with those 

choices.

We chose our cover photo with care. It reflects the fact that emerging mission areas such as the use of 

remotely piloted aircraft will become increasingly important in the future, and that such changes present both 

challenges and opportunities. The Airman’s component is neither apparent nor important. In the Total Air 

Force we envision, the seamlessness of Airmen, their skills and expertise is critical. 

We learned much about the role the Air Force can and should play in support of the nation’s governors when 

they are faced with recovering from natural or man-made catastrophes. We recommend actions that both the 

Department of Defense and the Air Force should take to improve their ability to provide defense support to 

civil authorities.

A capable and highly professional staff supported the Commissioners throughout our work and we are 

deeply grateful to them. They were drawn from various DoD offices, from multiple Air Force components and 

commands, from other services, and from the civilian world. In short order, they came together under the able 

leadership of our Executive Director, Dr. James Blackwell. The work of the Commission could not have been 

accomplished without Jim and his team. We depart slightly from Air Force tradition to say “Bravo Zulu” to 

them all.

Finally and most importantly, the Commissioners respectfully acknowledge our ultimate “customers,” 

the dedicated and spirited men and women of the U. S. Air Force and the families who support and enable 

their service. The Air Force of the future cannot look exactly like today’s force, and any significant change is 

inherently disruptive. We believe that the changes we recommend will serve those “customers” well, and that 

the force we envision will provide better and fuller opportunities for the men and women of the Air Force to 

thrive in the service of their nation. 

Respectfully submitted,

__________________________________ __________________________________

Dennis McCarthy, Chair Erin C. Conaton, Vice Chair 

__________________________________ __________________________________

Les Brownlee Janine Davidson

__________________________________ __________________________________

Margaret C. Harrell Raymond E. Johns Jr.

__________________________________ __________________________________

F. Whitten Peters Harry M. (Bud) Wyatt, III
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE COMMISSIONERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

CHAPTER 2: RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

CHAPTER 3: REBALANCING THE COMPONENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

CHAPTER 4: SIZING AND SHAPING THE FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

CHAPTER 5: MANAGING THE FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

APPENDIX A: ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

APPENDIX C: RECOMMENDATIONS: RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL VIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

APPENDIX E: CLASSIFIED ANNEX CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

APPENDIX F: COMMISSION ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

APPENDIX G: TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION . . . . . . . . . . . .71

APPENDIX H: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

APPENDIX I: RESOURCE CHAPTER CHARTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91

APPENDIX J: SELECTED STATUTES AND POLICIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

APPENDIX K: CORE FUNCTION BALANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

APPENDIX L: ADVANCED DECISION SUPPORT TOOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

APPENDIX M: NCSAF WAR GAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

APPENDIX N: AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

APPENDIX O: DISTINCTIONS AMONG HOMELAND OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

APPENDIX P: COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

APPENDIX Q: COMMISSION STAFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

APPENDIX R: SOURCES CONSULTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 5

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 

STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE

THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. MCCARTHY, 

CHAIR

Principal, Military Experts LLC

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 

2009-2011

Executive Director of the Reserve Officers 

Association, 2005-2009

Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret)

THE HONORABLE ERIN C. CONATON, 

VICE CHAIR

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness, 2012

Under Secretary of the Air Force, 2010-2012

Staff Director of the House Armed Services 

Committee, 2001-2005

Research Staff Director for the U.S. Commission on 

National Security/21st Century, also known as the 

Hart-Rudman Commission, 1998-2001

THE HONORABLE F. WHITTEN PETERS 

Partner, Williams & Connolly LLP

Secretary of the Air Force, 1999-2001, and Under 

Secretary and Acting Secretary of the Air Force, 

1997-1999

Principal Deputy General Counsel at the 

Department of Defense, 1995 - 1997

U.S. Navy Reserve officer, 1969-1972

THE HONORABLE R.L. (LES) BROWNLEE 

Acting Secretary of the Army, 2003-2004

Under Secretary of the Army, 2001-2004

Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, 1996-2001

Retired Army colonel who served two tours in 

Vietnam, earning a Silver Star with oak leaf cluster, 

a Bronze Star with two oak leaf clusters, and a 

Purple Heart. 

GENERAL (RET) RAYMOND E. JOHNS JR.

Senior Vice President, Flight Safety International

Commander, Air Mobility Command, 2009-2013

Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy, 

U.S. Air Force, 2006-2009

White House Fellow, Office of National Service and 

National Security Council, 1991-1992 

Retired Air Force General, a 1977 Air Force Academy 

graduate flying C-17, C-141, KC-10, and N/K/C-135V, 

and was chief test pilot and test program manager 

for the VC-25 Air Force One.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RET) HARRY M. “BUD” 

WYATT III

Director, Air National Guard, 2009-2013

Oklahoma Adjutant General, 2003-2009

Associate District Judge for the State of Oklahoma, 

1998-2003 

Retired Lieutenant General, entering the Air Force 

in 1971 and as a command pilot logged more than 

3,000 hours in the A-7, C-26, F-16, F-100, F-106, T-33, 

T-37 and T-38 aircraft

DR. JANINE DAVIDSON 

Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, 

2009-2012

Director in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict, 2006-2008

Air Force pilot who flew C-130 and C-17 in combat 

support and humanitarian air mobility missions 

in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East and was an 

instructor pilot at the U.S. Air Force Academy

DR. MARGARET C. HARRELL

Director of the Army Health Program and senior 

social scientist at RAND Corporation, for whom 

she’s worked more than 20 years

Senior Fellow and Director of the Military Veterans 

and Society Program at the Center for a New 

American Security, 2011-12

Author of several books on women in the military and 

Rand Publications on Guard and Reserve families

Ph.D. in cultural anthropology from the University 

of Virginia

For additional detail refer to:

Appendix P: Full biographies of the members

Appendix Q: Commission staff and Executive Director 

biography.
6
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

T

he Air Force faces many challenges 

in meeting its national security 

mission within the resources 

currently envisioned. Doing so will not 

be easy or without risk, nor will it permit 

the application of traditional methods 

of allocating missions, equipment, and 

resources among the Air Force’s three 

components. After conducting 19 days 

of hearings involving 154 witnesses and 

oral public comments, and listening to 

currently serving Airmen of almost all 

ranks from the three components at 13 

installations throughout the country, the 

Commission is convinced that the Air 

Force must change the way it organizes, 

aligns, and employs the great Americans 

who choose to serve in its ranks. 

Congress directed the Commission 

to “...undertake a comprehensive 

study of the structure of the Air Force 

to determine whether, and how, the 

structure should be modified to best 

fulfill current and anticipated mission 

requirements for the Air Force in 

a manner consistent with available 

resources.” The statute that created 

this Commission also specified that it 

address six considerations in its report 

to Congress and the President. The 

Commission fulfilled this mission in 

the time allotted.

Based on the record before it, 

the Commission arrived at a set of 

foundational conclusions that became 

its analytical starting point. Elements of 

that foundation are as follows.

• Past and current Air Force leaders 

have committed the resources and 

effort needed to allow the Reserve 

Components (RC) to maintain 

the same standards of skill and 

operational readiness as the Active 

Component (AC).

• “Part-time” force structure—that 

capability delivered by traditional 

Reservists and Guardsmen who do 

not serve continuously on active 

duty—costs less than the force 

structure provided by “full-time” 

personnel.

• Recognizing that some missions 

must be performed by the Active 

Component, the Air Force can, and 

should, entrust as many missions as 

possible to its Reserve Component 

forces.

• Transitioning missions from the 

Active Component to the Reserve 

Components will allow the Air 

Force to perform these missions 

with less expensive part-time 

Reservists while reducing the 
8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Active Component end strength, 

thus saving money in the military 

personnel accounts that can be put 

to use in readiness, modernization, 

and recapitalization accounts. In 

this way, all components of the 

force will remain more ready and 

mission capable, and the Air Force 

will retain the capacity to surge its 

forces when needed.

• There is an irreducible minimum 

below which the Air Force cannot 

prudently cut Active Component 

end strength without jeopardizing 

war-fighting capability, institutional 

health, and the ability to generate 

future forces.

• Although Reserve Component 

force structure, especially 

traditional Reservists, costs less 

than that of the Active Component, 

conducting operations with Reserve 

Component forces is not always less 

expensive than doing so with Active 

Component forces. 

The Commission determined the 

following principles of force structure 

and force management that will allow 

the Air Force to meet present and 

future mission requirements within 

the limit of resources the Commission 

believes will be available.

Principles of Force Structure

• Both the Active and Reserve 

Components provide unique 

value to the Nation. The Total 

Air Force cannot succeed without 

three strong components. 

Prudent reductions in the 

Active Component will produce 

meaningful cost-savings, mainly in 

the military personnel accounts, 

and can reduce the need for cuts 

to readiness, modernization, and 

recapitalization.

• The Air Force can maintain 

operational capacity and capability 

and reduce stress on the Active 

Component by maintaining or 

increasing the end strength of the 

Reserve Components, particularly 

in traditional part-time Reservists 

and Guardsmen, while increasing 

regular, periodic, and predictable 

use of the Air Force Reserve and the 

Air National Guard.

• Greater reliance on a larger Air 

Reserve Component provides a 

quick, reversible way to generate 

manpower cost savings (see Chapter 

4). It provides an ability to surge, 

when needed, and additional 

return on investment in the highcost, high-value training of Active 

Component Airmen. Shifting 

more capability to the Reserve 

Components also maintains a 

link to communities and states 

throughout the nation in our 

unique form of federalism.

• In order to gain maximum benefit 

from the Reserve Components, the 

Air Force must program sufficient 

operational support funding to 

permit utilization of individuals 

and units through volunteerism or 

under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 

§12304b.

• Increasing integration of Reserve, 

Guard, and Active Component 

Airmen at headquarters and units, 

and increasing the number of 

integrated or multi-component 

(“associate”) units will lead directly 

to improved processes as well 

as more effective and efficient 

employment of the Total Air Force. 

Further integration of the Air 

National Guard and the Active 

Component (as described in 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 9

Chapter 3) is a desirable goal but 

will require modifications to Titles 

10 and 32 of the U.S. Code before 

the full value of such integration 

can be achieved.

Principles of Force Management

• Removal of numerous barriers to a 

“Continuum of Service,” in which 

Airmen have greater flexibility 

to leave and re-enter Active and 

Reserve Components throughout 

their careers, will enable more 

effective and efficient utilization of 

an integrated Total Force. Some of 

those barriers are contained in law, 

but others reside solely in service 

policy, tradition, and culture.

• In addition to removing barriers to 

transitioning between components, 

Congress and the Department of 

Defense should modify laws and 

regulations that unnecessarily limit 

or restrict the length of service by 

qualified Airmen in certain career 

fields with high training costs. 

Doing so will allow the Air Force to 

more fully capitalize on the cost of 

training those Airmen. 

Specific Considerations

This summary will briefly address 

each of the specific considerations set 

forth by Congress. Congress directed 

the Commission to conduct a study 

that covers six specific considerations in 

evaulating the structure of the Air Force. 

In the report that follows, future 

force structure and force management 

issues will be addressed and actionable 

recommendations proposed. The 

Commission believes that increasing 

force integration and fully tapping 

the individual and organizational 

potential of all Airmen is not optional. 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

made specific recommendations 

for Presidential, Congressional, 

Department of Defense, and Air Force 

action to move these issues into a “must 

do” category.

A. Current and Anticipated 

Requirements of Combatant 

Commanders

The Commission formulated its 

force structure recommendations 

in relation to the forces called for in 

existing war plans and to what the 

Commission has learned are the daily 

demands for Air Force capability. Those 

day-to-day demands come from both 

the Combatant Commanders and 

from the Air Force’s own institutional 

requirements. The Commission 

concluded that the Air Force can field 

sufficient capability and capacity to 

meet both daily needs and surge-level 

requirements only if it effectively 

utilizes the full capacity of its Active 

and Reserve Components.

One specific conclusion in this area 

drove the Commission’s force structure 

recommendations: There are finite 

limits to the amount of air, space, and 

cyber power that the country can afford 

and that our Airmen can provide. The 

Commission found that the current 

force management system, in which 

Combatant Commanders generate 

day-to-day requirements, has proven so 

unconstrained as to be unsupportable. 

Accordingly, Combatant Commanders 

must be required to consider the 

budget and personnel impacts of their 

day-to-day planning to stay within the 

reasonable limits of manpower and 

budget authority that is available. In 

short, they must differentiate between 

needs and wants. 

B. Achieve an Appropriate Balance 

Between the Active and Reserve 

Components

In hearings and visits to Air Force 

installations around the country, 

the Commission learned about the 

strengths and capabilities resident in 

all components of the Air Force. Past 

policies of the Air Force have ensured 

that all units and individuals of the 

Active Air Force, the Air National 

Guard, and the Air Force Reserve train 

to the same level of excellence and are 

thus equally ready to fight tonight.

Every Reserve Component 

Airman that Commissioners spoke 

to—ranging from the most senior to 

the most junior—told of untapped 

potential in both Reserve Components. 

These Airmen asserted that over 

the past decades those components 

had provided what they were asked 

to provide rather than the full 

limit of what they could provide. 

Commissioners tested these statements 

every way possible, recognizing that 

such high self-confidence cannot always 

be accepted at face value. But these 

assertions were so unanimous and came 

from so many disparate sources that the 

Commission cannot discount them.

The Commission also heard that, 

to take full advantage of untapped 

potential in the Reserve Components, 

the Air Force must change the way 

it employs the Air National Guard 

and the Air Force Reserve. These 

components are complementary to the 

Active Component, not precise mirror 

images. The Air Force must sometimes 

employ and manage the Reserve 

Components in ways that are distinct 

from how the Active Component 

is employed; and commanders will 

require greater knowledge about 

these distinctions. Accomplishing 

these goals will require integrating 

headquarters, eliminating redundant 

command chains and staffs, increasing 

opportunity for service in various 
10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

components throughout an Airman’s 

career, increasing unit associations, 

and reducing administrative barriers 

between components. 

C. Ensure Sufficient Capacity for 

Homeland Defense and Disaster 

Assistance

The Air Force, particularly 

the Reserve Components, plays a 

significant role in both homeland 

defense and support of civil authorities. 

It can, and should, continue to do so; 

and, given the strategic environment 

and enhanced coordination with the 

Department of Homeland Security, 

the Air Force will have opportunities in 

the future to increase its contribution 

to these missions. Communication 

between state leaders and the 

Department of Defense can, and must, 

improve, particularly in the area of 

disaster assistance.

Although the Air Force should 

make no force structure decisions 

exclusively based on disaster assistance 

requirements, the use of the armed 

forces to address emergencies at 

home is a core mission of all military 

branches, including the Air Force. 

While the Commission does not 

propose the addition of force structure 

specifically for those missions, it 

recommends treating Homeland 

Defense and Defense Support to Civil 

Authorities as real priorities, and 

Governors as essential stakeholders 

in planning processes. Doing so will 

enhance the Air Force’s ability to 

contribute to the country’s well-being 

without sacrificing the ability to deliver 

the air power needed and expected in 

the “away game.”

D. Ensure the Regular Air Force 

Can Provide a Base of Trained 

Personnel for the Reserve 

Components

It is essential to maintain a strong 

Active Component that, among 

other contributions, provides a base 

of trained personnel who can either 

transfer to the Reserve Components 

when their active duty service is 

completed or serve for a period 

in a Reserve Component before 

returning to active duty. Thus, there 

is a limit to how small the Active 

Component can be. Additionally, 

the cost-effectiveness of the Reserve 

Components depends on an optimally 

sized Active Component. While 

no element of Air Force capability 

should reside exclusively in any one 

component, the Active Component 

generally is expected to perform certain 

core functions, such as procurement 

and RDT&E (research, development, 

test, and evaluation), that support 

all components of the Air Force. 

Given current capabilities, the Active 

Component force structure should 

comprise no less than approximately 

55 percent of the Total Air Force end 

strength. While individual percentages 

will vary by mission and platform, a 

Total Force mix should be spread across 

every Air Force core function and Air 

Force Specialty Code (AFSC).

E. Maintain Sufficient Force Structure 

to Meet Operational Tempo Goals 

of 1:2 for the Active Component 

and 1:5 for the Reserve Component

The deploy-to-dwell ratios specified in 

this Congressional consideration are less 

useful to the Air Force, which deploys 

in units smaller than wings or squadrons 

down to small groups of individual 

Airmen compared to land and naval 

forces that tend to deploy as regularly 

organized units (such as companies 

and ships). Because of the mismatch 

between the unit concept embedded in 

these ratios and Air Force deployment 

practices, different Air Force commands 

have chosen different methods for 

computing these ratios. Thus, the Air 

Force inconsistently applies these ratios 

across the force. As a result, attempts 

to use these ratios provide inconsistent 

and sometimes misleading information 

about the use rate of the Air Force’s 

components and individuals.

The Air Force should utilize a single 

metric for measuring the personnel 

tempo and stress on its forces, both 

Active and Reserve. The Commission 

also recommends that the Air Force 

utilize this “PERSTEMPO, stress on 

the force” metric (described in Chapter 

5 of this report) to determine goals 

for sustainable levels of employment 

for both the Active and Reserve 

Components and for specific elements 

of its force structure.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 11

Such an approach will provide a 

more holistic picture of the actual stress 

on, or under-utilization of, Airmen and 

allow the Air Force to employ the Total 

Force more efficiently.

F. Balance Affordability, Efficiency, 

Effectiveness, Capability, and 

Readiness

Over the past several years, many 

missions have shifted toward the 

Reserve Components. The Commission 

proposes additional shifts to the Reserve 

Components in certain missions, 

particularly focusing on mission areas 

where the Air Force can effectively 

utilize a part-time force that deploys 

on a rotational basis. A force structure 

more reliant on a larger proportion of 

the Reserve Components will not look 

exactly like the force the Air Force has 

successfully employed in recent decades. 

Changing that force is not a criticism 

of the preceding force structure; it is 

recognition that the current and future 

budgetary and security environments 

present challenges that require new 

solutions. Sacrificing readiness to 

preserve force structure would create 

a hollow force. Instead, the Air Force 

can preserve readiness by shifting force 

structure missions from the Active to the 

Reserve Components. 

If, as expected, the Air Force 

proposes to divest entire fleets, such 

as the A-10 and KC-10 aircraft, such 

retirements would likely project 

substantial cost savings. However, the 

units that operate those aircraft reflect 

decades of investments in those men 

and women who fly and maintain 

them, as well as in the facilities that 

the Air Force likely will need for 

emerging missions and new ways of 

using the Total Force. Because any 

such divestitures would be subject 

to Congressional approval, the 

Commission recommends that the Air 

Force develop and provide Congress a 

detailed, complete, and comprehensive 

plan explaining how the Air Force will 

achieve missions undertaken by such 

platforms in the future and how it will 

retain the highly trained personnel 

from these fleets. 

Shifting to a Total Force more 

reliant on Reserve Component parttime forces, combined with potential 

divestiture of complete aircraft fleets, 

will have significant implications for 

installations. Moreover, increasing the 

number of associate units could allow 

consolidation of support infrastructure, 

which would create added efficiencies. 

Air Force leaders repeatedly have 

pointed out that the Service already 

has significant excess of infrastructure. 

The trends described in this report 

likely will exacerbate that condition. 

The Commission recommends that the 

Congressional defense committees and 

the Air Force should consider, and the 

Congress should allow, the closing or 

“warm basing” of some installations. 

Attempting to operate all current bases 

at the same level of effort will require 

the Air Force to reallocate present and 

future funding and reduce some of the 

benefits that would otherwise be gained 

by the Commission’s force structure 

recommendations.

Many of the Commission’s 

recommendations have been 

considered before. Now, however, 

a new defense strategy focuses more 

on high-end warfare and fighting in 

denied environments while mission 

areas such as cyber, space, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(including the use of remotely piloted 

aircraft for these and other missions) 

continue to grow. With these trends 

and the need for fiscal discipline, the 

Commission believes that the Air Force 

can take additional risk by replacing 

some legacy capabilities with upgrades 

and new force structure investments 

that will increase the capability and 

lethality of the force that remains.

Other solutions to emerging 

challenges involve employing the 

Air National Guard and Air Force 

Reserve in some mission areas to 

a greater extent than previously 

thought possible. The last few decades 

have shown the nation and the Air 

Force what its Reserve Components 

can do when they are employed 

skillfully. Despite decades of combat 

deployments, the Reserve Components 

have additional capacity to serve the 

nation’s needs. The Air Force should 

integrate the components more 

completely, giving Reserve Component 

Airmen more opportunities to serve, 

reducing both statutory and regulatory 

barriers among the components, 

and more broadly inculcating and 

institutionalizing an awareness of the 

value of the Total Force throughout 

the Air Force. A true “Continuum of 

Service” approach should be available 

to all Airmen. These actions will enable 

the reduction of military personnel 

costs while maintaining realistic levels 

of operational capability or readiness.

Although many have discussed 

increased integration of the 

components for several years, today’s 

Air Force is ideally positioned to 

make further advances in this area. In 

testimony before the Commission, 

Air Force leaders have demonstrated a 

forward-thinking approach to greater 

operational integration. This increased 

confidence reflects their professional 

experience in an increasingly integrated 

Total Force that has, over the past two 

decades, proven it can deliver during 

peace and war. The Air Force has been 

a pioneer among the Armed Services 

in integrating its components and in 

operating as a Total Force. Now is 

the time to institutionalize these best 

practices across the Air Force and to 

capitalize on them. 
12
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 13

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Congress created the National 

Commission on the Structure 

of the Air Force to conduct a 

“comprehensive study of the structure 

of the Air Force” and to make 

recommendations the Commission 

considered necessary. Congress also 

laid out six specific factors for the 

Commission to consider.

Given the relatively short time 

available, the Commission concluded 

that proposing a specific allocation of 

forces in each of the Air Force’s 13 “core 

functions” or attempting a detailed 

laydown of the number and location 

of each weapons system within the Air 

Force would be impractical, though this 

report does present sample approaches 

to illustrate the Commission’s findings 

and recommendations. Rather, the 

Commission focused on principles 

that, if applied, would enable the Air 

Force to shape the details of its force 

structure to meet the national security 

challenges ahead.

The Commission therefore adopted 

for itself the following implied mission: 

The Commission will address the 

considerations established by Congress 

and recommend principles of force 

structure and force management that 

will allow the Air Force to meet present 

and future mission requirements within 

the limit of resources reasonably expected 

to be available.

The Commission conducted its 

work with several basic tenets in mind. 

“In the last 10 years we have gotten closer to the Total Force than ever because 

we shed blood together; so let’s not undo that. How we do it is as important as 

what we do. PB 13 was the first whiff of grapeshot; let’s get past that.” 

General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., Commander United States Northern Command and 

North American Aerospace Defense Command, in testimony before 

the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, Sept. 26, 2013.

DEFINITIONS (as used in this report)

FORCE STRUCTURE

The military service’s interconnected framework—Active, Reserve and Guard components, equipment, personnel, and real estate—that exists to accomplish specific 

missions in support of the President and the Secretary of Defense.

TOTAL FORCE

All U.S. Air Force organizations, units, and individuals—Active, Reserve, Guard, and 

civilian—that provide the capabilities to support the Department of Defense in implementing the national security strategy.
14 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Those were to be open and receptive to 

as wide a range of input as possible; to 

meet with and consider the opinions 

of the men and women currently 

serving in the Air Force; and to visit 

Air Force installations around the 

country. The Commission held 19 days 

of public hearings, heard from 154 

individual witnesses, received written 

comments from 256 individuals, 

received and reviewed thousands of 

pages of documents submitted for our 

consideration, and, when necessary, 

met in closed sessions to consider 

classified material. A classified annex 

supplement to this report is available, 

however the Commission offered no 

classified recommendations. Witnesses 

ranged from the Secretary and the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the 

most junior of Airmen. Commissioners 

heard from officers of almost every 

grade, from senior enlisted leaders, 

from federal and state elected officials, 

from retired service members, from 

business leaders, and from concerned 

citizens, all with a vital interest in their 

Air Force.

The Commission devised and 

conducted a seminar war game that 

enabled Commissioners to examine 

broadly divergent mixtures of force 

structure in light of existing war plans 

and defense planning scenarios. The 

alternative structures the Commission 

studied in this way were not intended 

to represent a “right answer” or 

alternatives to one another. Rather, 

they were nominal structures that 

Commissioners found useful in 

illuminating selected issues from 

radically different perspectives. The 

Commission was supported in this 

effort by the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments and benefited 

from a review of its methodology by 

a representative from DoD’s Office of 

Net Assessment. Although constrained 

by the available time, Commissioners 

gained insight into both fiscal impact 

and potential unintended consequences 

DEFINITIONS

ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC)

The unrestricted, continuously available personnel, units, and 

equipment of the Air Force. Section 8075 of Title 10 of the U.S. 

Code calls this component the Regular Air Force, but generally 

the services use the term Active.

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC)

The forces of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. 

“FULL-TIME” FORCES

A member of the Active Component, an Active Guard and Reserve member, or a Dual Status Military Technician. (See also 

“Part-Time” Forces.)

“PART-TIME” FORCES

Forces comprised primarily of traditional Reservists or drill 

status Guardsmen. The Commission recognizes that most, if 

not all, traditional Guardsmen and Reservists in the Air Force 

dedicate themselves fully to their service’s core principles and 

ideals. This report uses this term only to differentiate the pay 

status of those not on full-time active duty.

SURGE

A rapid or concerted increase in the commitment of forces to 

fend off an attack, meet a sudden demand, or accomplish a 

strategic military objective.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 15

of various adjustments to force mix.

The war game was designed as a 

table-top seminar for Commissioners, 

supported by staff analysts, to develop 

insight into the issues involved in the 

strategic choices for the structure of 

the Air Force. This was not aimed at 

the usual objectives of war games, such 

as campaign outcomes, institutional 

transformation, portfolio rebalancing, 

capabilities assessment, or warfighting concepts. One part of the 

game was a planning exercise in which 

three staff teams each developed a 

resource-constrained future Air Force 

structure given a particular assigned 

Active/Reserve mix as an analytic 

starting point. This event drew from 

authoritative current forecasts to 

provide constraining assumptions to 

the teams on future resources, fiscal 

guidance, force sizing, basing, and 

end strength. In the second event, the 

staff teams were required to play the 

role of the Air Force as force provider, 

employing the force structure they had 

developed in the planning exercise, 

during several phases of a hypothetical 

future crisis and conflict. This event 

adapted the scenario used in the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Strategic Seminars. Throughout the 

exercise, Commissioners considered 

alternative force structures from the 

perspective of the Air Force as well as 

that of the Combatant Commanders, 

Department of Defense Senior Leaders, 

and Governors confronting the 

challenge of allocating force structure 

assets to competing demands from 

multiple near-simultaneous crises 

and conflict. Commissioners found 

this exercise helpful in sharpening 

their focus on the key issues, applying 

credible analytic tools, and exploring 

the range of the art of the feasible in 

considering force structure options.

The Commission reached several 

broad conclusions that formed the 

basis for its detailed findings and 

recommendations. Some of those 

foundational conclusions might 

seem self-evident to some, but the 

Commission did not start with any 

preconceived notions. The following 

foundational conclusions, which might 

also be called “assumptions,” became 

ingrained in the Commission’s analysis 

gradually over the course of its work:

• Past and present Air Force leaders 

have committed the resources and 

effort needed to allow the Reserve 

Components to maintain the same 

standards of skill and operational 

readiness as the Active Component.

• The Air Force successfully has built 

capacity in its Reserve Components 

over time by adhering to, and 

funding, a single standard of 

operational readiness throughout 

all components. In other words, 

the Air National Guard and the Air 

Force Reserve are held to the same 

standards of operational readiness 

as is the Active Component.

• Part-time force structure—that 

capability delivered by traditional 

Reservists and Guardsmen who do 

not serve continuously on active 

duty—costs less than the force 

structure provided by full-time 

personnel.

• The Air Force can, and should, 

entrust as many missions as possible 

to its part-time force.

• Transitioning missions from the 

Active Component to the Reserve 

Components would allow the Air 

Force to perform these missions 

with less expensive part-time 

Reservists while reducing the end 

strength of its Active Component, 

saving money in the military 

personnel accounts that it can put 

to use in readiness, modernization, 

and recapitalization accounts. In 

this way, all components of the 

force will remain more ready and 

mission capable, and the Air Force 

will retain the capacity to surge its 

forces when needed.

• There is an irreducible minimum 

below which the Air Force cannot 

prudently cut Active Duty end 

strength without jeopardizing 

war-fighting capability, institutional 

health, and the ability to generate 

future forces.

• While Reserve Component 

force structure costs less than 

that of the Active Component, 

conducting operations with Reserve 

Component forces is not always less 

expensive than doing so with Active 

Component forces. 

These foundational conclusions will 

I became a part of Total Force Integration in May 2007 when the 192nd Fighter Wing of 

the Virginia Air National Guard was integrated with the First Fighter Wing at Langley Air 

Force Base. At that time I was serving as the E-7 Chief Host Aviation Resource Manager. 

Before our move to Langley, we felt confident in our abilities. It did not take long before 

our Guardsmen were considered experts and often viewed as the “go-to” people. Citizen Airmen bring unique and invaluable skill sets that are shared with our Active Duty 

counterparts. 

Guardsmen have consistently been great trainers who present significant knowledge 

bases for their Active Duty counterparts. Since Guardsmen do not PCS, they seem to be 

the new stability, “holding down the fort” as well as participating in deployments and 

other wartime efforts.

MSgt (Ret) Mary I. Meyer, Virginia Air National Guard

COMMENT
16 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

receive amplification in other parts of 

this report.

The Strategic Environment

Although the future security 

environment is unpredictable, the 

Commission assumes it will remain 

at least as complex and dangerous as 

it is today. The United States must 

prepare for an array of overlapping 

challenges from state and non-state 

actors, including transnational 

criminals, terrorists, and other violent 

actors. As emerging powers refine 

their capabilities and leverage new 

technologies, the permissive air and 

space environment the Air Force has 

enjoyed during the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan may not persist. 

The Air Force also must be prepared 

to respond in the context of other 

destabilizing global trends, such as 

urbanization, demographic shifts, 

competition for resources, insecurity in 

cyberspace and outer space, and natural 

disasters. Because adversaries have 

learned to engage us asymmetrically to 

avoid challenging us conventionally, the 

Air Force must be prepared to deal with 

enemies armed with weapons of mass 

destruction and those who will leverage 

anti-access, area-denial capabilities 

that increasingly challenge the nation’s 

traditional power projection strategies. 

Further, the Air Force must adapt to 

operate alongside traditional and new 

allies who may possess varying levels of 

military capability.

Meanwhile, the Commission 

assumes that even after the 

redeployment of most combat forces 

from Afghanistan, the steady-state 

demand on the Air Force—particularly 

air mobility capabilities, cyber forces, 

and intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) assets—will 

continue to be high. Unforeseen crises 

and natural disasters, as well as regular 

military engagement and partnership 

missions called for in the President’s 

strategy, will drive this demand. 

Although the Air Force will see periods 

of crises and “surge,” there will exist 

no bright-line distinction between 

peace and war. The high demand for 

airpower will be continuous. The Air 

Force must retain the ability to surge 

high-end war-fighting capabilities 

with little or no advance notice while 

also sustaining capabilities across the 

spectrum, from humanitarian assistance 

and peace-keeping operations to its 

part in the nation’s nuclear deterrence 

and assurance mission. Additionally, 

Lt Col Keven “Hitch” 

Coyle, Commander of 

the 960th Airborne Air 

Control Squadron at 

Tinker AFB, Okla., recently returned from 

his 12th deployment to 

Southwest Asia. He 

has deployed in five different weapon systems 

and three different 

mission sets: Airborne 

Warning and Control 

System (AWACS), the 

Control and Reporting Center (CRC), and Special Operations. He has been serving on active duty for 14 years and has worked and deployed with Guard and Reserve colleagues.

Lt Col Coyle has seen both sides of the 1:2 deployment target. AWACS is a high-demand, 

low-density asset. In order to meet the needs of the Combatant Commander (CCDR), his 

squadron’s current deploy-to-dwell is 1:1 with his crews serving 180-day deployments. 

He is fully aware that the CCDR’s needs drive the mission, but, as a squadron commander, 

he must balance that need with the needs of his people. He believes shorter deployment 

durations would provide a more balanced approach in meeting both needs. A 120-day 

deployment with a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell rotation would still satisfy CCMD mission requirements while enabling him to expand the pool of qualified aviators to deploy. This would 

keep his force fresh and build the unit’s experience, too. 

While deployed, his crewmembers flew approximately three times per week, but operations officer duties kept Lt Col Coyle on the ground more than he would like. “Flying often 

when deployed is a good thing,” he said. “Time flies when you are busy. It is during the 

down times when you really miss your family and deployments seem to drag on.” His 275 

enlisted members and officers continually impress him with their willingness to sacrifice 

for the good of the nation. This dedication does not come without a cost, and Lt Col Coyle 

admits his family—a wife of 16 years and three children—bears the greatest cost of his 

service. He has missed many birthdays, baptisms, anniversaries, and holidays due to 

deployments. 

“Team Tinker” includes units in all three Air Force components, and Lt Col Coyle sees 

cultural differences between the two Reserve Components and the Active Component 

resulting from operational tempo and laws. When working beside their Reserve and 

Guard colleagues, Active Component members see firsthand an opportunity to serve 

that offers relief from their deployment schedule and frequent moves. Lt Col Coyle said 

he has met many individuals who did not excel during their active duty time yet had 

fantastic Reserve careers. Conversely, he has met traditional Reservists who returned to 

active duty and continued to excel. The Active, Guard, and Reserve “complement each 

other very well,” he said.

AWACS COMMANDER
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 17

man-made and naturally occurring 

threats to Americans’ well-being at 

home will demand that the Air Force 

provide traditional air defense as well 

as contribute military support to both 

the nation’s Governors and non-DoD 

federal agencies.

The Air Force’s structure must 

be adaptable to this broad range of 

missions and unforeseen challenges. 

Given these strategic realities, the Air 

Force cannot organize force structure 

along traditional AC-RC lines. 

The Reserve Components cannot 

be a traditional strategic reserve. 

Accordingly, Air Force men and 

women must be capable of meeting 

shifting, diverse demands in near real 

time. Doing so will require a scalable 

blend of full-time and part-time 

Airmen who all maintain appropriately 

high degrees of readiness. The nation 

will require these changes in force 

management irrespective of budget 

limitations. 

The Force Structure Puzzle

Pentagon force managers repeatedly 

testified to the Commission about the 

difficulty they have in meeting day-today Combatant Commander (CCDR) 

“demand” for air power within the 

given supply. This phenomenon also 

is reflected in the Air Force’s struggle 

to meet the 1:2 deploy-to-dwell 

requirement in the Active Component. 

Yet, force planners from the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, and the Air Force consistently 

testified to the Commission that, by 

their calculations, there exists excess 

capacity in the Air Force. This apparent 

gap between planned requirements 

and actual day-to-day “demand” seems 

to stem from a discontinuity between 

force planning and force management 

processes and expectations. 

In the Pentagon’s force-planning 

process, force structure is designed 

based on predicted surge requirements 

for large-scale warfare scenarios, which 

can be envisioned up to 20 years in the 

future. This process is meant to ensure 

that the services are structured to meet 

the most stressful future war-fighting 

cases. Day-to-day operations, however, 

generate independent demands for 

capabilities such as Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR), airlift, and partner engagement, 

as do unforeseen crises from each 

Combatant Commander that are 

simultaneous, nearly continuous, and 

unrelated to the scenarios on which the 

force structure originally was planned. 

These unconstrained CCDR demands 

often exceed available capabilities. The 

day-to-day stress is exacerbated further 

if crises in the homeland generate 

demands from Governors for military 

support to civil authorities, which are 

also not well captured in the force 

planning process—or, if considered 

at all, assumed to be “lesser-included” 

cases. These phenomena create stress 

on the force that could be mitigated 

with more realistic force structure 

planning regarding steady-state 

peacetime missions including those at 

home, better management of CCDR 

demand, and more efficient balance and 

utilization of the Active and Reserve 

Components. 
18 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

NOBLE EAGLE

Traditional Guardsman Lt Col Tim Duffy and Maj Dan Nash, a fulltime Guardsman, were ordered to scramble their F-15 Eagles at Otis 

ANG Base, Mass., at 8:46 a.m. on Sept. 11, 2001. Five minutes earlier, having heard of a potential hijacking, they suited up and already 

were heading for their jets when the klaxon sounded. Lt Col Duffy 

actually had real-world experience, having intercepted a hijacked 

Lufthansa flight in 1993. 

When they took off less than a minute later, what would become 

Operation Noble Eagle began. In the ensuing six months, Guard, 

Reserve and Active fighter pilots flew more than 19,000 sorties 

compared with 147 sorties in the previous year. Through April 2013, 

Noble Eagle logged 64,000 total sorties, 65 percent flown by Air Reserve Component pilots. 

However, the air defense mission, which numbered about 1,200 interceptors in 1960, was nearly eliminated in the mid-1990s when the 

need for homeland air defense seemed unnecessary in the postCold War years. On Sept. 11, 2001, the responsibility for immediately 

defending continental U.S. airspace was in the hands of 14 aircraft 

standing alert at seven sites. Two sites were in the Northeast Air 

Defense Sector, at Otis and at Langley AFB, Va., each with two aircraft. 

Though Lt Col Duffy and Maj Nash had been ordered to scramble 

and others would soon receive similar orders, some 60,000 Guardsmen followed their militia principles, put their civilian obligations 

aside, and reported for duty that day. National Guard Airmen would 

fly 179 missions that day.

Among them was Col George Degnon, Director of Staff for the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. Then a major in 

the 121st Fighter Squadron, 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard, he flew F-16s out of Andrews AFB. His civilian job was 

as a first officer with United Airlines, but on Sept. 11, 2001, he had 

the day off. He heard of the attack on the World Trade Center as he 

and his wife were returning home from dropping their two children 

off for their first day of school. “I saw F-16’s flying up the Potomac 

on TV and realized it was time to call the squadron.” He was put on 

crew rest— ”I tried to nap, but that was useless”—before heading 

to Andrews at 5 p.m. 

“I wound up flying two times that first night, the first a 31⁄2 hour 

sortie on night vision goggles and the second a two-hour sortie 

during dawn.” The first sortie he was sent to check on an “unknown rider,” which turned out to be a state trooper helicopter 

landing at Manassas. For a week Col Degnon pulled the graveyard shift. “On the late nights it was some eerie flying. We were 

capping (combat air patrol) over Washington and Camp David. I 

was able to see water flowing into the burning Pentagon and see 

all of the devastation as I capped overhead.”

The current force-planning process, 

coupled with the high cost of some 

systems, has caused a decades-long 

shortage of high-demand, low-density 

assets, such as U-2 and J-STARS. For 

such assets and several other mission 

areas, the steady state has been more 

stressful than the wartime requirement. 

It would take tectonic shifts in the 

DoD planning process to account 

more realistically for manpower and 

systems required to meet steadystate requirements. Accordingly, 

the Commission has taken the 

force planning process as it is, but 

recognizes that the steady-state world 

is demanding of force structure. The 

best available cost-effective solution 

is to increase Reserve Component 

capacity to meet peacetime surges 

and to relieve the demands on the 

Active Component. A rotational force 

structure that includes significant use of 

the Reserve Components would help 

meet these requirements.

Guiding Principles of Force Structure, 

and Force Management

The Commission determined the 

following principles of force structure 

and force management that will allow 

the Air Force to meet present and 

future mission requirements within 

the limit of resources the Commission 

believes will be available.

Principles of Force Structure

• Both the Active and Reserve 

Components provide unique 

value to the nation. The Total Air 

Force cannot succeed without 

three strong components. 

Prudent reductions in the 

Active Component will produce 

meaningful cost-savings, mainly in 

the military personnel accounts, 

and can reduce the need for cuts 

to readiness, modernization, and 

recapitalization.

• The Air Force can maintain 

operational capacity and capability 

and reduce stress on the Active 

Component by maintaining or 

increasing the end strength of the 

Reserve Components, particularly 

in part-time Reservists and 

Guardsmen, and increasing the 

regular, periodic, and predictable 

use of those forces.

• Greater reliance on a larger Air 

Reserve Component provides 

a quickly reversible way to take 

manpower cost savings, maintain 

the ability to surge combat 

capability when needed, and gain 

additional return on investment 

of high-cost, high-value training 

received by Active Component 

Airmen. It also maintains a link to 

communities and states throughout 

the nation in our unique form of 

federalism.

• In order to gain maximum benefit 

from the Reserve Components, the 

Air Force must program sufficient 

operational support funding to 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 19

permit utilization of individuals 

and units through volunteerism or 

under the authority of 10 U.S.C. § 

12304b.

• Increasing Active-Reserve 

integration of headquarters and 

units as well as increasing the 

number of integrated or multicomponent (“associate”) units will 

lead directly to improved processes 

and more effective and efficient 

employment of the Total Air Force. 

Principles of Force Management

• Removing numerous barriers to a 

“Continuum of Service,” in which 

Airmen have greater flexibility 

to leave and re-enter Active and 

Reserve service throughout their 

careers, will enable more effective 

and efficient utilization of an 

integrated Total Air Force. Some of 

those barriers are contained in law, 

but others reside solely in service 

policy, tradition, and culture.

• In addition to removing barriers to 

transitioning between components, 

Congress and the Department of 

Defense should modify laws and 

regulations that unnecessarily limit 

or restrict the length of service by 

qualified Airmen. Doing so will 

allow the Air Force to capitalize 

more fully on the cost of training 

those Airmen. 

Contentious Related Issues

The Commission also learned that 

even large military personnel and 

force structure reductions cannot 

completely close the budget gap created 

by anticipated funding levels, especially 

for an Air Force that is transitioning 

to modern, multi-role aircraft and 

still in possession of an installation 

infrastructure that was built for a much 

larger force than exists today or should, 

in the Commission’s view, exist in the 

future. Instead, personnel and force 

structure cuts lead to inefficiencies as 

dwindling forces are spread in too small 

numbers across multiple bases.

Accordingly, the Commission 

addressed three issues that some have 

described as “third rails” of force 

structure. The Commission felt it 

would not be true to its charge from 

Congress if it did not do so.

• To provide more coherence 

between force structure as planned 

and day-to-day force management, 

and to mitigate stress on the force, 

the Commission recommends 

that Combatant Commanders 

not be permitted to take an 

unconstrained view as they plan 

for the employment of air power 

for contingencies or steady-state 

operations in their theaters. There 

is, and will be, only a finite amount 

of air, space, and cyber power 

the Air Force and its people can 

provide. Force planning “demand” 

must take into account the 

reasonable “supply” of capability 

available.

• The Commission recommends that 

both the Air Force and Congress 

consider ways to reduce the 

infrastructure footprint that the Air 

Force must maintain, giving due 

consideration to the importance 

of community presence and the 

vital role played by the National 

Guard in carrying out missions for 

Governors, the other commanders 

in chief in our federal system.

• If the Air Force determines that 

the elimination of entire aircraft 

fleets or other missions is required, 

the Commission recommends the 

development of a comprehensive 

plan that specifically addresses the 

locations and capabilities involved, 

the plan for the future utilization of 

the Airmen affected, and the means 

by which the mission capabilities 

that are lost will be replaced, if they 

will be replaced, and when that 

replacement will occur to ensure no 

gap in war-fighting capabilities.

In the chapters that follow, this 

report will address specific findings and 

recommendations regarding resources, 

force structure, and force management. 

For additional detail refer to:

Appendix A: The statute forming 

the National Commission on the 

Structure of the Air Force

Appendix B: The full list of the 

Commission’s recommendations

Appendix C: The officials 

responsible for implementing the 

Commission’s recommendations

Appendix F: The full list of 

Commission hearings, site visits, 

and staff visits

Appendix G: Individuals who 

testified and provided oral 

comments to the Commission

Appendix H: Glossary of terms 

and acronyms
20
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 21

“Today we face the danger that our current budget crisis and the steep, abrupt, 

and deep cuts imposed by sequestration will cause an unnecessary, strategically 

unsound, and dangerous degradation in military readiness and capability.”

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in a speech delivered to 

the CSIS Global Security Forum, Nov. 5, 2013

CHAPTER 2

RESOURCES

T

he Department of Defense, 

like the rest of the federal 

government, experiences budget 

reductions, especially in times of 

austerity and following periods of 

war when hostilities are winding 

down. Nonetheless, a decade of war 

has taken a heavy toll on weapon 

systems, equipment, and personnel. 

DoD must recapitalize and, in most 

cases, modernize old and battle-worn 

equipment for future threats. Because 

the Commission anticipates that over 

the next ten years funding levels are not 

likely to rise much above those specified 

by the Budget Control Act (BCA) and 

Sequestration, the Air Force must find 

innovative ways to manage its resources. 

In order to make responsible 

changes to resource management, 

the Air Force must have accurate and 

consistent ways to measure costs. 

The Air Force must also be allowed 

the flexibility to manage its various 

accounts in ways that optimize 

effectiveness and maximize efficiency. 

Heretofore, Congress has constrained 

the military from taking a holistic and 

strategic approach to managing this 

necessary down-sizing by prohibiting 

cuts in accounts such as installations. 

These constraints drive greater cuts to 

modernization and readiness than a 

more flexible approach would and thus 

increase operational and strategic risk.

Operational Support

Elsewhere, this report explains 

why the Commission believes that 

greater operational use of the Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve 

(together referred to as the Air Reserve 

Component or ARC) can mitigate 

the risk and potential stress caused 

by reducing Active Component end 

strength. The Commission repeatedly 

has heard formal and informal 

testimony, supported by written reports 

from Air Reserve Component leaders, 

that the ARC can do more if sufficient 

funding is provided. The Commission 

also has received testimony that “manday” or “man-year” funding, originally 

in the base budget to fund Air Reserve 

Component support for active duty 

missions, sometimes has become 

unavailable to operational commands 

because it is transferred to meet other 

priorities. 

If the Air Force Reserve and Air 

National Guard are to contribute in the 

manner the Commission recommends, 

it is important that budgetary plans 
22 CHAPTER 2: RESOURCES

are made for that use and that controls 

exist to ensure that the funds are 

executed as planned. Utilizing the 

part-time or traditional members of the 

Reserve Components on a rotational 

basis of approximately 1:5 (one period 

of active duty followed by five times 

that duration on traditional Reserve 

duty) would provide the Air Force with 

more than 18,000 additional man-years 

of service annually. In the integrated 

Total Air Force model the Commission 

recommends, such service could be 

provided both by individuals and units 

and would be in addition to the service 

already provided by Airmen who serve 

as Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), 

Air Reserve Technicians, and Federal 

Technicians.

Cost Methodologies

The Commission has learned 

through testimony and research about 

various methodologies for computing 

cost of personnel and operations 

beyond annual appropriations 

and outlays (for example, Military 

Personnel TOA seen in Figure 1). 

The Commission concluded that 

no one model incorporates all 

significant factors and satisfies all the 

measurements needed to make force 

structure decisions. The Commission 

also concluded that continuing to 

experiment on ways to modify various 

cost modeling tools in search of a 

perfect model is not productive. 

The Reserve Forces Policy Board 

(RFPB) conducted a study that 

sought to capture the “fully burdened 

cost” of Active Component and Air 

Reserve Component personnel. Its 

basic premise was that all elements of 

personnel costs—for example, salary, 

child care subsidies, commissaries, 

DoD schools, retirement pay accrual, 

health care, installation costs, and 

contributions by other government 

agencies such as the Veterans 

Administration—should be considered 

when trying to determine the actual 

cost of utilizing a component. The 

RFPB Chairman testified that its 

approach to this question was driven by 

what it considered the inadequate and 

misleading approaches to personnel 

costs currently used. 

Both the RFPB’s Chairman 

and its Military Executive testified 

and conceded that the question of 

which specific elements should be 

included in calculating the fully 

burdened cost was not settled. Their 

main recommendations were that 

DoD adopt a fully burdened cost 

approach to calculating the true cost 

of personnel, and that the Department 

should publish a specific methodology 

for use in calculating that cost. In 

responses to Commission requests 

for information, the Department of 

Defense Director for Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation (CAPE) 

indicated agreement with the principle 

of accepting a fully burdened cost 

approach, but disagreed with the 

RFPB as to what particular elements 

of cost should be included in such a 

calculation. 

In the Commission’s own 

examination of cost methodologies, 

it also found that most approaches 

to measuring cost do not connect 

expenditures with common measures of 

military outputs, further complicating 

the application of differing cost 

approaches. In other words, each 

DEFINITIONS

RECAPITALIZATION

Replacing an existing weapon system with another weapon system. Frequently, 

the new weapon system is more modern than the existing weapon system. 

MODERNIZATION

Updating an existing system to improve operational capability or technical performance.

MAN-DAY

Military funding paid to Reservists to perform duty over and above their minimum 

number of days for inactive duty training and annual tour. Each Man-Day pays the 

member one day’s base pay, housing allowance, subsistence allowance, and other 

appropriate military pay entitlements. 

LIFE-CYCLE COSTS

(1) The total cost of a piece of equipment from its development, fielding, and sustainment through retirement. (2) The total cost of an Airman in service to the nation, 

from entry into service through death, including the costs of training, service, and 

benefits. 

HOLLOW FORCE

A military force that appears mission-ready but, upon examination, suffers from 

personnel, equipment, and maintenance shortages or from deficiencies in training.

WARM BASE

An installation or part of an installation without permanent operational forces; such 

installations are maintained at a level that will allow rapid re-occupation by operational forces. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 23

approach to measuring cost does some 

things and does not do some things, 

and, in large part, the differences are 

related to differing assumptions and 

output metrics.

The Commission concluded that 

simply measuring the payroll cost 

of an individual service member is 

inadequate. “Life-cycle” or “fully 

burdened” cost that includes benefits 

and retirement for personnel must be 

considered. Moreover, how the nation 

intends to employ Active Component 

and full- and part-time Air Reserve 

Component personnel as a Total 

Force will affect the comparative cost 

of a given force mix. In addition, the 

Air Force must perform certain core 

functions, such as procurement and 

RDT&E (Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation), that support all 

components of the Air Force. Those 

costs must be accounted for but are not 

easily allocated to any one component. 

The Air Force has taken significant 

steps to adopt a fully burdened 

cost approach with its Individual 

Cost Assessment Model (ICAM), 

initially developed by the Air Force 

Reserve as an effort to provide a tool 

to estimate burdened life-cycle and 

annual manpower cost for the threecomponent Air Force. ICAM is a 

simulation that models individual 

Airmen over time along the myriad 

possible career paths beginning with 

accession and ending at separation 

from the Air Force (prior to earning 

retirement benefits) or death.

Notwithstanding differences in 

recent efforts to compare the cost of 

the Active Component against the 

Reserve Components, the Commission 

concluded that there is a consensus 

that a part-time force used on an 

individual or rotational basis should be 

significantly less expensive on a fully 

burdened basis than an Active force of 

equal size. Beyond the obvious point 

that part-time Airmen get paid only 

when they are in training or supporting 

real-world missions, there are several 

other considerations. 

First, Air Reserve Component forces 

are required to train fewer Airmen 

“from the ground up”; instead, the 

Reserve Components benefit from 

being able to acquire seasoned Airmen 

from the Active Component. 

Second, seasoned Airmen require 

less periodic training to retain 

wartime skills. In particular, Reserve 

Component flying squadrons can 

maintain proficiency with fewer flying 

hours per month than an Active unit, 

which amounts to tens of millions of 

dollars in savings each year. 

Third, Reserve Airmen sometimes 

have civilian occupations in fields 

closely aligned to their Air Force jobs, 

which also reduces costs associated 

with maintaining military skills. This is 

the case in areas as diverse as medicine 

and cyber defense. 

Fourth, Reserve Airmen cannot 

receive retirement pay until age 60 

and are generally not supported by 

Air Force–supplied housing, child 

Fiscal Year

FIGURE 1: Air Force Military Personnel TOA

Data from the Air Force’s FY 2014 President’s Budget Submission 

(http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/).

Current Dollars (in millions)

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

AF MILPERS TOA (CURRENT DOLLARS)

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
24 CHAPTER 2: RESOURCES

care, schools, health care, and Morale, 

Welfare, and Recreation facilities. 

There are, of course, some offsetting 

costs, such as the full-time pay of 

AGRs and Technicians who support 

Reserve units administratively and 

for training, in addition to the higher 

pay levels generally associated with 

more experienced forces. Compared 

to the Army, the Air Force has a 

greater proportion of its Air Reserve 

Component personnel on full-time 

duty. This level of full-time manning 

merits further analysis for the potential 

of additional cost savings. 

Based on the record before 

the Commission, and subject to 

all the caveats set out above, the 

Commission determined that the cost 

of a traditional Reservist, who is not 

performing active duty missions during 

a year, is approximately 1/6th the 

cost of a full-time Active Component 

Airman. Much more work can, and 

should, be done by DoD to arrive at 

an accepted measure of cost. Equally 

important, the costs of both Active 

and Reserve forces are essentially the 

same when each is providing full-time 

service. Therefore, the significant cost 

savings attributed to Reserve forces are 

only possible when those forces can be 

used on less than full-time basis until 

mobilized for a national emergency.

Pay and Benefits

As the DoD’s Comptroller, Robert 

Hale, testified to Congress in 2012, 

“The cost of pay and benefits has risen 

more than 87 percent since 2001.” 

Figure 1 on Page 23 illustrates the 

increasing Military Personnel costs 

for the Air Force over the past two 

decades. Such increases compete 

with modernization and readiness 

and necessitate more cost-effective 

utilization of the Total Force, including 

reductions in personnel spending. 

Thus, the Commission supports the 

recent establishment of the Military 

Compensation and Retirement 

Modernization Commission and 

anticipates that its conclusions 

will find savings by leveraging best 

business practices for retirement and 

benefits while still keeping faith with 

our Airmen and their families. The 

Commission’s recommendation to 

rebalance the Active Component 

and the full- and part-time Reserve 

Components should also create 

efficiencies in personnel accounts. 

These efficiencies should provide 

some relief to the resource pressure 

on readiness, modernization, and 

recapitalization imposed by the perfect 

storm of increasing personnel costs and 

declining Defense budgets.

Infrastructure and Installations

Shifting to a Total Force that 

is more reliant on the Reserve 

Components and characterized by 

more integrated associate units will 

have implications for installations. For 

example, associating an Active unit 

with a Reserve unit (or vice versa) will 

allow collocation of personnel and 

consolidation of support infrastructure. 

Greater utilization of Air National 

Guard bases is inherently less expensive 

because those bases tend to have fewer 

non-operational facilities than Active 

Component installations do. 

The Commission recognizes that 

movement of Active Component force 

structure to more austere bases at which 

assigned personnel and their families 

utilize community-based support 

services could have implications for 

retention. The Commission did not 

receive specific data on that question, 

but acknowledges it as one of many 

considerations involved in the review of 

infrastructure adjustments.

Likewise, the proposed divestitures 

of complete aircraft fleets will have 

obvious implications for the bases 

where those aircraft are located. 

Ignoring personnel shifts and 

reductions and attempting to operate 

the same number of bases at the same 

level of effort will require cuts to 

readiness funding accounts. Warmbasing may, in some cases, be a better, 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 25

THE GROUNDING

First Lieutenant Paul M. Baker arrived at Hill AFB, Utah, in February 2013 with about 80 flying hours at the F-16 Basic Course and 

was assigned to the 4th Fighter Squadron of the 388th/419th Total 

Force Integration (TFI) Fighter Wing. Less than two months later 

he was grounded. The reason: Sequestration.

The automatic budget cuts that went into effect last April under 

the Budget Control Act prompted the Air Force to stand down 17 

Combat Air Force squadrons. Air Combat Command (ACC) chose to 

ground units furthest from being tasked by Combat Commanders, 

and because the 4th FS had just completed a PACOM Theater Security Package deployment, it made the list. 

The stand-down lasted 31⁄2 months, during which time the squadron’s 24 assigned pilots and aircraft were unavailable for any missions. Though they continued classroom and simulator training, 

pilots could not maintain their readiness levels without actually 

flying. Thus, the grounding’s impact lasted long after July 15 when 

ACC authorized the 4th to return to the skies. To be considered 

combat mission ready (CMR), an inexperienced F-16 pilot must fly 

10 sorties per month or have flown 30 sorties in the past 90 days; 

an experienced pilot must fly eight sorties per month or have flown 

24 sorties in the past 90 days. The basic mission capable (BMC) 

rate is five sorties per month for experienced pilots and six sorties per month for inexperienced pilots. The sortie total is termed 

“look back,” and each month the squadron commander assesses 

each pilot’s 30-day look back; if the pilot has not met the 30-day 

look back, they can still meet the 90-day look back minimum to be 

considered CMR.

With the help of the attached 388th FW instructor pilots and the 

Reserve instructor pilots in the 419th Fighter Wing (AFRC), the 4th 

began its three-ride reconstitution spin-up program on July 16. 

It took until the end of August for 21 pilots to achieve CMR. That 

number fell to 18 in September when the end of the Fiscal Year 

2013 Flying Hour Program limited the number of sorties available. 

“Since there was only one half of a month of flying in July, no 4th 

FS pilot had the 90-day look back to make them CMR when they 

did not meet the 30-day look back requirement,” said 4th FS Commander Lt Col Todd “T-Bone” Robbins.

The 4th FS stood down again on Oct. 1 for eight days because of 

the government shutdown. “With the loss of eight operations and 

maintenance days, again only 18 pilots of 23 achieved CMR status,” Lt Col Robbins said. “Consequently, the 4th FS could not be 

considered CMR as a whole by all readiness standards.”

That the 4th even achieved the readiness level it did in August 

was due to the performance of the 4th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, 

“who surpassed expectations in terms of sortie production,” Lt Col 

Robbins said. “However, since the initial return to fly, the 4th FS 

CMR status has been very tenuous because the squadron does not 

have the long-term readiness levels to fall back on when additional 

training disruptions occur, such as the eight-day stand-down in October.”

The stand-down’s impact on individual pilots such as 1st Lt Baker 

could be far reaching. During the time he was grounded due to 

sequester, his peers at other F-16 squadrons accomplished 60 to 

80 flying hours of training. That means Lt Baker is 30 percent to 

50 percent less experienced in the F-16 cockpit compared to his 

peers. “This individual effect has a disproportionate impact on 

inexperienced pilots’ ability to survive in a combat environment 

because they lack a broad experience base,” Lt Col Robbins said.

more cost-effective option than closing 

bases as it can save in conversion 

costs while also leaving infrastructure 

available for future contingencies. 

However, without authorization 

from Congress to warm base or close 

installations, the Air Force would 

lose the financial advantages gained 

by the force structure reductions this 

Commission recommends. 

Air Force leaders repeatedly have 

pointed out that the Service already 

has significant excess infrastructure. 

The trends described in this report, 

combined with any divestitures of 

complete aircraft fleets, likely will 

increase that imbalance. Moreover, 

increasing the number of associate units 

will allow consolidation of support 

infrastructure, which would create 

added efficiencies. 

Additional mitigation of the stress 

on a smaller Active Component 

force could be achieved by reducing 

the total amount of infrastructure at 

some selected CONUS bases. In the 

near term, the Commission believes 

that can be done within authorities 

currently available to the Air Force 

by moving some force structure from 

Active Component installations to 

neighboring Air National Guard 

installations that have sufficient existing 

capacity to absorb additional force 

structure. 

Many Air Reserve Component 

bases have the infrastructure in place 

to absorb more aircraft, equipment, 

and the attendant manpower. The Air 

Force built these bases in such a way 

that they could handle a squadron the 

size of an Active Component squadron. 

Typically, Air Reserve Component 

mobility squadrons have eight aircraft 

compared to Active Component 

squadrons of 12, while Air Reserve 

Component combat squadrons 

have 18 aircraft compared to Active 
26 CHAPTER 2: RESOURCES

Component squadrons of 24. This 

presents an opportunity to realize 

efficiencies by shutting down or warm 

basing an Active Component base 

and increasing the footprint at nearby 

Reserve Component bases.

 For example, Mountain Home 

AFB, Idaho, has shrunk to only two 

Active Component F-15E squadrons 

with a total of 45 aircraft. Nearby Boise 

ANGB currently has one squadron of 

18 A-10s. A divestiture of the A-10s 

would present an opportunity to move 

up to 24 F-15Es to the Boise ANGB 

base in an integrated wing construct. 

The remaining F-15Es at Mountain 

Home could be moved to another 

location.

n RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Cost Approach: DoD should 

formally adopt the “fully burdened 

cost” approach to calculating military 

personnel costs, and it should apply 

analytic methods that focus on 

appropriate outputs along with lifecycle costs. The Department should 

then modify DoD Instruction 7041.04 

to establish a common list of the 

various elements of pay, benefits, and 

other costs that contribute to the “fully 

burdened” or “life-cycle” cost that all 

services would then use in calculating 

the cost of personnel. This will enable 

the Air Force to accurately assess force 

structure issues and choices in terms 

of fully burdened, total life-cycle costs 

of human capital, as well as operating 

costs of units and aircraft.

2. Budgeting Flexibility: In the Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2015 National Defense 

Authorization Act and Defense 

Appropriations Act, Congress should 

allow DoD increased flexibility in 

applying budget cuts across budget 

categories, including installations. 

3. Resourcing the Reserve 

Components: To ensure the Air 

Force leverages full capacity of all 

components of the force, in its FY 2016 

Program Objective Memorandum, 

the Air Force should plan, program, 

and budget for increased reliance 

on the Reserve Components. The 

Commission recommends: (1) the 

Air Force should include in all future 

budget submissions a specific funding 

line for “operational support by the 

Air Reserve Component” to clearly 

identify those funds programmed for 

routine periodic employment of the 

ARC either as volunteers or under 

the authority of 10 U.S.C. §12304b; 

(2) in its future budget submissions 

the Air Force should program for 

approximately 15,000 man years of 

operational support annually by the Air 

Reserve Component; (3) in succeeding 

years, the Air Force should monitor 

the execution of this program element 

to ensure it is utilizing the Air Reserve 

Component to its fullest extent.

4. Infrastructure: The Air Force 

should consider, and Congress should 

allow, the closing or warm basing of 

some installations. 

For additional detail refer to:

Appendix I: Charts on war and 

post-war spending cycles and Air 

Force end strength over time.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 27

CHAPTER 3

REBALANCING THE 

COMPONENTS

Since the end of World War II, the 

nation has maintained separate 

identities for the National Guard 

and Reserves despite several attempts at 

merger. Notable among them were the 

Gray Board of 1947 that recommended 

abolition of the National Guard, 

and Secretary of Defense Robert 

McNamara’s attempt in 1964 to 

merge both Reserve Components of 

the Army under the National Guard. 

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger’s 

introduction of the Total Force 

Policy in 1973 created momentum to 

integrate Reserve forces with Active 

Component forces, increasingly 

blurring the distinctions among the 

components. Each reform attempt has 

triggered strong opposition from some 

individual, organization, or faction.

In contrast, ever since the first 

large mobilization of the Reserve and 

National Guard in 1990, the Air Force 

steadily has embraced the evolution 

and, ultimately, total transformation of 

its Reserve Components from a ready, 

but essentially strategic, reserve force 

to today’s operationally capable and 

readily available force. Nevertheless, the 

Commission is convinced that the Air 

Force must change the way it organizes, 

functionally integrates, aligns, and 

employs the great Americans who 

volunteer to serve in its ranks. 

Within each component, the 

Commission observed an increase in 

headquarters structure and staff. The 

growing size and number of these 

headquarters increases tail, and the 

stovepipe nature of each component 

further insulates them from greater 

and healthier integration. Increasing 

integration of headquarters and units 

and the number of associate units will 

lead directly to improved processes 

and more effective and efficient 

employment of the Total Air Force. 

Successful integration will demand 

steadily increasing trust among Airmen 

at all levels of all components. The 

bonds of confidence that Airmen have 

built over more than a decade of service 

in war make it reasonable to believe 

that the necessary levels of trust among 

the components can be achieved and 

maintained.

Component Associations

As early as 1968, the Air Force 

broke new ground by “associating” an 

Air Force Reserve unit with an Active 

Component unit. The two units flew 

and maintained the same aircraft, 

”You can’t surge trust.”

Lieutenant General Bradley A. Heithold, Vice Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, 

in an interview with National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force staff, Oct. 29, 2013
28 CHAPTER 3: REBALANCING THE COMPONENTS

achieving efficiencies by increasing 

the crew ratio and thus the ability to 

utilize those aircraft. But they remained 

separate, collocated units. The Air 

Force now has 120 current or planned 

associate units.

Most of these units follow the 

original “classic association” model in 

which Air Force Reserve units collocate 

with Active Component units. A 

relatively small number involve “active” 

associations in which detachments 

of Active Component pilots and 

maintainers jointly operate aircraft on 

an Air National Guard base. Sometimes 

the Active Component personnel are 

permanently based at the Air Guard 

installation; in other cases, the Active 

Airmen commute from a nearby Active 

installation for duty at the Air Guard 

base. A few other active associations 

involve additional permutations of 

this mix of Active and Guard talent. 

In another type of association called 

the Air Reserve Component or ARC 

Associate unit, Air National Guard and 

Air Force Reserve units are collocated 

and share equipment that is owned by 

one or the other unit.

Commissioners visited associate 

units of each type and found them 

to be generally successful. However, 

the Commission concluded that 

opportunities remain for continued 

growth and improvement of the 

associate unit concept. 

ARC associates generally have been 

the least successful model. Where they 

operated the same aircraft, the two 

Reserve Component units competed 

for the same geographic pool of 

potential recruits. Such associations 

also create potential problems of access 

to Title 32 personnel and equipment 

during state emergencies.

Classic and Active associate units 

have not achieved their full potential 

because they continue to maintain dual 

chains of command. This unnecessarily 

increases overhead and creates, at least, 

the potential for divided loyalties that 

hold back the development of trust 

that should characterize a well-led and 

tightly bonded unit. The Commission 

also noted that fewer active associate 

units exist despite the fact that the Air 

National Guard maintains more units 

than the Air Force Reserve.

The i-Wing

The Commission concluded that 

two major changes should occur. The 

first is an increase in the overall number 

of associate units. The Commission 

believes that a “default position” should 

be that a unit of the Active Component 

or the Air National Guard should 

have an associate relationship with an 

element from another component, 

unless a substantial reason exists that 

prevents the formation of a classic or 

active association.

Secondly, the Commission believes 

that associate units should have a single, 

integrated chain of command. For the 

purposes of this discussion, this report 

calls these integrated units “i-Wings” 

(Figure 2).

Increasing use of integrated units, 

coupled with the changes in Active 

and Air Reserve Component end 

strengths, as recommended elsewhere 

in this report, will enhance the ability 

of the Air Force to scale its available 

forces to meet constantly changing 

demands. i-Wings with significant Air 

Reserve Component members can be 

adjusted to meet current demand by 

adjusting the man-year funding and the 

opportunities offered to RC Airmen to 

serve on active duty. Doing so allows 

easy adjustment to the number of 

crews, maintainers, or other operators 

FIGURE 2: i-Wing Integrated Leadership

1 Squadron

2 Squadron

3 Squadron

OG/CC MXG/CC MSG/CC Other

WG/CC

CV WG Staff

Active

ARC

Any Comp

i-Wing

Staff

OpsGroup

MXGroupMSGroup

Note: These 

positions are 

nominative but 

must be filled 

by a member 

of a different 

component than 

the A-head. 

Ex: if the A1 is 

Active AF, the 

deputy is nonActive AF

This is one 

of several 

possible 

integration 

variants.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 29

so that the i-Wing’s capability can be 

scaled to meet demand.

i-Squadrons could be structured 

with Reserve flights and Active 

Component flights or could just as 

easily be fully integrated. A squadron 

would be manned with Active, fulltime Reservists, and traditional 

Reservists, the composition determined 

by the Major Command (MAJCOM) 

and based on the projected wartime 

and peacetime operating tempo of that 

unit. For example, the C-17 active-toARC crew mix is currently 3.0 active 

to 2.0 ARC. As the nation reduces its 

presence in Afghanistan, and with it 

the probable reduction in peacetime 

airlift, the need for the high number 

of Active crews should go down, 

and the crew ratio could shift more 

heavily toward the ARC. So, the C-17 

squadron could change its composition 

to a greater percentage of traditional 

Reservists for the foreseeable future, 

reducing costs while still able to meet 

peacetime needs. It also would retain 

the capability to be recalled for major 

military responses. 

The additional benefit is to the 

Airmen, who can stay with their 

weapon system and location to a greater 

extent by being allowed to move freely 

among Active, full-time Reservist, and 

traditional Reservist statuses based on 

the needs of the Air Force. This open 

passage will significantly aid retention 

of our Airmen and reduce stress on the 

families.

Because legal issues (Titles 10 and 

32) as well as administrative control 

and operational or tactical control 

issues still need to be resolved, the 

Commission believes a number of 

i-Wing pilot programs should be 

conducted before moving the entire 

force in this direction.

The Commission recommends 

that in the i-Wing, unit leadership 

positions, both officer and enlisted, be 

filled by personnel of both components 

that make up the associate unit, and 

the unit operate as a single entity rather 

than two, side-by-side commands. The 

Commission recognizes that while 

this organizational structure creates a 

leaner and more efficient structure, it 

also reduces the number of command 

and leadership opportunities. Air 

Force leadership must carefully 

manage the implementation of this 

concept to ensure the fair allocation 

of opportunities. Failing to do so will 

destroy the trust relationship potential 

of the i-Wing.

Notwithstanding these risks, 

the i-Wing is a logical extension 

of the forward-thinking approach 

first instituted by associate units. 

Truly integrated units can create 

new opportunities for Air Reserve 

DEFINITIONS

STRATEGIC RESERVE

A Reserve force intended for use during later stages of a protracted or large-scale 

operation but not on a day-to-day basis.

OPERATIONAL RESERVE

A term used to describe the current situation in which the Air Force holds Reserve 

Component forces to the same standards of readiness as the Active Component, 

and regularly rotates these forces onto active duty service, whether in times of 

war or in peacetime. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 defines Operational Reserve as an 

“emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the support of a specific operation.”

CLASSIC ASSOCIATION

An integration model that combines Active and Reserve elements, with the Active 

Component retaining principal responsibility for a weapon system and sharing the 

equipment with one or more Reserve Component units. Today, the Active and Reserve units retain separate organizational structures and chains of command.

ACTIVE ASSOCIATION

An integration model that combines Active and Reserve elements, with the Reserve 

Component retaining principal responsibility for a weapon system and sharing the 

equipment with one or more Active Component units. Today, the Active and Reserve units retain separate organizational structures and chains of command.

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC) ASSOCIATION

An integration model that combines two Reserve Component elements, with one 

retaining principal responsibility for a weapon system and sharing the equipment 

with one or more of the other component’s units. Today, the units retain separate 

organizational structures and chains of command.

TRADITIONAL RESERVIST

A member of the Air Force Reserve who drills one weekend per month and two 

weeks per year. A traditional Reservist may be activated for contingency operations or extended assignments.
30 CHAPTER 3: REBALANCING THE COMPONENTS

Component leaders and increased 

opportunities for Active Component 

Airmen to gain knowledge and 

confidence in the capabilities of 

the Reserve Components. With 

appropriate revisions of some restrictive 

statutes and policies (see Appendix J), 

such units will increase the opportunity 

for mentorship and collaboration 

among Airmen of differing experience 

levels. I-Wing units create additional 

opportunities for Air Reserve 

Component personnel to deploy on 

a regular and recurring basis, making 

better use of their capabilities, keeping 

those capabilities sharp, and reducing 

somewhat the frequency and duration 

of deployments by Active Component 

personnel. 

Increased unit associations also will 

aid in proportionally and concurrently 

fielding new equipment. Instead of 

a “trickle down” approach in which 

older equipment is assigned to Air 

Reserve Component units as it is 

replaced by modern equipment in the 

Active Component, the Commission 

believes that new equipment should 

be “horizontally” fielded across all 

components annually. Current fielding 

plans for the KC-46A appear to 

follow a somewhat similar approach, 

while the current plans for the 

F-35 fall considerably short of this 

recommendation.

Integration at HQ Levels

The Commission received testimony 

from the leaders of the Air Force’s 

Total Force Task Force regarding a 

concept of individual integration of 

personnel from all three components at 

headquarters staffs. The Commission 

supports those initiatives, but with 

some revision. The Commission sees no 

reason why key leadership and decisionmaking positions on those staffs 

should not be nominative. Again, the 

Commission believes that integration 

needs to be carefully managed to 

ensure that choosing the “best and fully 

qualified” does not become a route to 

exclude Airmen of any one component. 

If the Air Force manages this 

process well, it will make full use of the 

talent available to it, and the process 

will produce more well-rounded, 

experienced leaders of all components 

for future assignments. Also, high-level 

decision making for the Total Air Force 

will be better informed by Air Reserve 

The Air Force rapidly expanded its manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and capacity over the past decade of war. It increased the number of Predator orbits in theater, improved the aircraft’s capabilities, 

fielded the Global Hawk and MC-12 Liberty aircraft, revived the U-2 program, and expanded the Distributed Ground System (DGS) footprint. The Air Force no longer views 

ISR as combat support; it is one of the five core mission. ISR manning mirrors that of the 

Total Air Force with 64 percent in the Active Component, 30 percent in the Guard, and 6 

percent in the Air Force Reserve. 

Much of the ISR progress has been focused on sensors and collection to meet an insatiable demand for intelligence at all levels, from strategic planners to the platoon 

patrolling a city block. While both quantity and quality of sensors and collection has 

expanded, advances in the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) of the data 

being collected—turning it into actionable information to be distributed to the ultimate 

users—has lagged. The sheer volume of collected data is driving a demand beyond the 

capacity of the Active force and requires augmentation that can be provided, full- or 

part-time, by the Reserve Components. 

Reserve Component augmentation can be adjusted like a rheostat; increased when demand is high and decreased as demand drops. To that end, the Air Force in December 

2013 activated two Air Force Reserve intelligence squadrons at JB Langley-Eustis, Va. 

The 63rd IS, reporting to the 480th ISR Wing and the 497th ISR Group, is responsible 

for operating the DGS-One, allowing it to exploit near real-time data from the U-2, RQ-4 

Global Hawk, MC-12 Liberty, MQ-9 Reaper, and the MQ-1 Predator. The 42nd IS supports 

current operations and contingency planning by providing products to the 36th Intelligence Squadron and the Air Force Targeting Center at JB Langley-Eustis.

Because the intelligence community is globally connected, PED is a suitable mission 

for the Reserve Components, which can deploy in place and conduct operations with 

minimal disturbance to home life and employers.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, 

AND RECONNAISSANCE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 31

Component perspectives.

However, as the Air Force 

progresses toward fuller integration 

at the unit level, the need for an Air 

Force Reserve Command as a “force 

providing” headquarters declines, 

as does the need for its subordinate 

Numbered Air Forces. Commanders 

of operational major commands (Air 

Combat, Mobility, Space, etc.) and 

their Numbered Air Forces can make 

decisions regarding the employment 

of integrated Air Force capabilities. 

The Commission believes the current 

mission of the Air Force Reserve 

Command and its Numbered Air 

Forces can be disestablished. However, 

the requirement for knowledgeable 

policy-making and advice regarding 

the Air Force Reserve and Air National 

Guard will remain (Figure 3).

Accordingly, the Commission 

recommends the retention of the 

positions of Chief of the Air Force 

Reserve and Director, Air National 

Guard as three-star officers with direct 

access to the Chief of Staff and with 

small but sufficient staffs to allow them 

to properly advise Air Force leadership 

on policies necessary to recruit, retain, 

and sustain talented and motivated 

Airmen in both the Air Force Reserve 

and Air National Guard.

The Commission believes that an 

enterprise approach to total Air Force 

integration can yield significant savings. 

Adopting the i-Wing construct could 

conservatively save more than 5,000 

Active Component positions. That 

could result in savings of as much 

as $2.8 billion over the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP). Integrating 

Mobility Air Force (MAF) wings offers 

the earliest and potentially greatest 

savings, though substantial savings 

A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8

ACC/CC

ACC/CV 1st AF

A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8

AMC/CC

AMC/CV 18th AF

FIGURE 3: Integration at the Corporate Level

Active

ANG

AFR

Any Comp

ARC

Civ

Note: These positions are nominative 

but must be filled by a member of a 

different component than the A-head. 

Ex: if the A1 is Active AF, the deputy 

is non-Active AF

A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10

CSAF

VCSAF

Dir ANG Chief AFR
32 CHAPTER 3: REBALANCING THE COMPONENTS

California’s 163rd Air National Guard Reconnaissance Wing flew into history 

last fall when it deployed its MQ-1 Predator 

to support firefighters battling the Rim Fire 

burning around Yosemite National Park. This 

was the first time a Guard RPA was employed 

for a Defense Support to Civil Authorities mission. The 163rd Predator launched on Aug. 28 

from the Southern California Logistics Airport 

in Victorville. Capable of flying for up to 22 

hours in a single sortie, the Predator captured 

real-time information that enabled officials 

on the ground to map the fire’s location and 

progress and identify safe routes of retreat for 

firefighters battling the 160,000-acre wildfire. 

This time-sensitive data on the fire’s behavior 

directly streamed to the incident commander 

on the ground and considerably improved 

firefighters’ ability to contain the fire several 

days earlier than originally anticipated. 

The number of wildfires in the United States 

over the past 12 years have ranged between 

67,000 and 92,000 per year. In the past year 

alone, wildfires burned more than 9.2 million 

acres. Civil authorities have been using satellites to provide imagery and assistance to 

firefighters, but satellite time is expensive and 

in high demand, and obtaining data can be 

cumbersome. With the right authorities and 

permissions, RPAs can provide continuous, 

near-real-time data in almost any area at a 

fraction of the cost of satellites. 

Other benefits:

• RPAs can provide greater loiter time because they are not subject to manned pilot 

fatigue. 

• From altitudes above 40,000 feet, RPAs are 

well away from the hazards of smoke and 

terrain that other aerial fire surveillance 

aircraft encounter. 

• Forest Service regulations prohibit manned 

aircraft from flying during darkness, so 

firefighters are forced to fight fires blind 

after dark. RPAs can fly 24 hours per day, 

their sensors gathering and feeding data to 

firefighters around the clock. In fact, thermo sensors on RPAs can actually map fire 

lines with greater accuracy at night due to 

the earth’s surface cooling. 

• The large volume of data RPAs collect can 

help fire management experts better understand the science of giant fires.

In 2006, NASA operators flew the Ikhana, 

a civil variant of the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Predator B in support of 

the Western States Fire Missions. Throughout the year, the Ikhana’s operators used its 

thermal infrared sensors to map wildfires in 

six states on missions of up to 20 hours in duration. From an altitude of 40,000 feet, Ikhana’s sensors were able to produce imagery 

that mapped the exact boundaries of the fire. 

Teams supporting the wildfire missions utilized on-board sensors to identify hotspots 

and collect other information that was then 

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT IN WILDFIRES

“We all remember the tragedy on June 30th in Arizona that claimed the lives of 19 

young firefighters. Given the RPA’s extraordinary victory in the Rim Fire this summer 

and the Air Force’s success in having Air National Guard Reconnaissance Wings fly 

RPAs overseas in contingency operations, RPA force structure in the ANG must not 

only be continued, it is a moral imperative.”

Statement for the Record: 

Major General David Baldwin, The Adjutant General, California 

can be achieved with a like measure 

in the Combat Air Forces (CAF), Air 

Education and Training, and Cyber.

According to December 2013 Air 

Force Reserve data (www.afrc.af.mil), 

the Air Force Reserve has real estate 

interests at 66 locations: five Air 

Reserve bases; four Air Reserve 

stations; as tenant at 42 Air Force 

locations, one ANG installation, 

four Army locations, and three Navy; 

four ranges; and three miscellaneous 

locations. The Air Force Reserve 

operates 33 flying wings, 12 flying 

groups, and one space wing: most are 

on Air Force bases. 

Exploratory manpower analysis 

yields the following potential savings 

of fully integrating Air Force associated 

units, such as Travis AFB, California 

(MAF), or Hill AFB, Utah (CAF): 

• MAF i-Wing FT manning savings 

are about 200–300 FT billets;

• CAF i-Wing FT manning savings 

are about 100-200 FT billets.

Adopting the i-Wing construct 

could conservatively save 5,800 Active 

Component positions [5000 (25 tenant 

wings x 200) + (9 host wings x 30 = 

270) + (28 other locations x 20 = 560)]. 

This is a savings of about $560 million 

per year or $2.8 billion over FYDP; 

i.e. 2 percent of AC manpower or 

approximately 2 percent of the total AC 

MILPERS account, which is $28 billion 

in the Air Force’s FY 2014 President’s 

Budget Submission (http://www.saffm.

hq.af.mil/budget/). For additional 

information, see figure 4, Page 36.

n RECOMMENDATIONS

5. Air Force Reserve Command: 

Congress should amend 10 U.S.C. 

§10174 to retain the statutory rank, 

roles, responsibilities, and functions 

of the Director, Air National Guard, 

and Chief of the Air Force Reserve 

but disestablish the Air Force Reserve 

Command. The Air Force should 

inactivate the Reserve Numbered Air 

Forces, wings, and squadrons. The 

roles, responsibilities, and functions 

of disestablished organizations should 

be assumed by the Secretary of the Air 

Force, Headquarters Air Force, and 

MAJCOMS, all of which will have 

increased representation by Air Reserve 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 33

provided fire commanders on the ground 

using Google Earth maps. With this integrated 

data, firefighters were able to map a complex 

strategy for fighting the fire. 

Despite these benefits, significant challenges 

hinder RPA use in the United States. The FAA 

requires RPAs to follow the same guidelines 

as those of manned aircraft, including the 

ability to “see and avoid,” which conventional 

pilots can do using peripheral vision; RPA pilots do not have that capability. RPAs similar 

to the Ikhana are testing automated collision 

avoidance technology to see if such systems 

can avoid contact with other vehicles in the 

air as well as on the ground.

In the meantime, RPAs are required to have a 

Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, commonly known as a COA, in order to operate in 

the national airspace. These COAs contain information regarding the platform’s mission and 

emergency procedures if the pilot in command 

happens to lose contact with the aircraft. Natural disasters do not permit authorities the time 

to build and approve these waivers, so, in highthreat fire locations, COAs are processed for 

approval in advance. 

A large percentage of RPA assets remain 

overseas. In Remote Split Operations, Air National Guard units perform the Mission Control Element (MCE) function at CONUS bases 

while the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) 

serves close to the assigned mission area. 

Civil and military authorities already coordinate through the Modular Airborne FireFighting System (MAFFS) established in 1974. 

Operated by the Department of Defense, the 

Air National Guard, and the National Forest 

Service, a DoD-owned C-130 is configured 

to carry a Forest Service-owned 3,000-gallon aerial fluid dispersal system. RPAs could 

either mirror the MAFFS program or be folded 

into it, allowing the Guard to start operations 

more quickly. Alternately, the Forest Service 

could own RPA assets similar to MAFFS while 

the Air National Guard provides the MCE.

U.S. Annual Wildfire Activity (2000–2012)

110,000 12,000,000

100,000 10,000,000

80,000 8,000,000

60,000 6,000,000

40,000 4,000,000

20,000 2,000,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Number of Fires

Acres Burned

Number of Fires Acres Burned

Component Airmen, as determined by 

the Secretary of the Air Force. 

6. Staff Integration: The Air Force 

should integrate the existing staffs of 

the Headquarters Air Force, the Air 

Force Reserve, and Air National Guard, 

similar to the principles recommended 

by the Total Force Task Force. 

7. AFR Unit Integration: The Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force should direct 

the integration of Air Force Reserve 

associations of flights, squadrons, 

groups, and wings into corresponding 

Active Component organizations 

in order to eliminate the current 

redundant organizational overhead 

found in classic associations.

8. Full-Time and Part-Time Mix: The 

combination of full-time and part-time 

positions should be determined for 

each unit depending on weapon system 

requirements, deployment, and rotation 

schedule based on optimum matching 

of the needs of the Air Force, family, and 

employers. The unit should determine 

this composition in accordance with 

the mission assigned and in line with 

the full-time and part-time ratios 

represented by the current, independent, 

Active Air Force and Air Force Reserve 

units currently sharing missions. 

9. ANG Unit Integration: The Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force should direct 

the integration of Air Force flights, 

squadrons, groups, and wings into 

corresponding Air National Guard 

organizations in order to eliminate 

the current redundant organizational 

overhead found in active associations. 

10. ANG Unit Size: The Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force, in coordination with 

the Director of the Air National Guard, 

should change wing-level organizations 

to group organizations where the 

Airmen population and associated 

equipment are more realistically sized 

at the group level. The unnecessary 

recent growth of ANG wings from 

groups created excessive overhead 

positions that detract from availability 

to directly support training, peacetime, 

and wartime missions. 

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT IN WILDFIRES
34 CHAPTER 3: REBALANCING THE COMPONENTS

11. Concurrent Fielding of 

Equipment: As the Air Force acquires 

new equipment, force integration 

plans should adhere to the principle of 

proportional and concurrent fielding 

across the components. This means 

that, in advance of full integration, new 

equipment will arrive at Air Reserve 

Component units simultaneously 

with its arrival at Active Component 

units in the proportional share of each 

component. As the Air Force Reserve 

and Active Component become fully 

integrated, the Air Force should ensure 

that the Air National Guard receives 

new technology concurrent with the 

integrated units. The Air Force should 

no longer recapitalize by cascading 

equipment from the Active Component 

to the Reserve Components. 

12. Policy Revisions: Integrating units 

will require manpower and personnel 

policy revisions. The Air Force should 

modify AFI 90-1001 “Responsibilities 

for Total Force Integration” to establish 

selection and assignment criteria, the 

minimum proportion of leadership 

positions that must be filled by the 

associating components, and the 

methods to ensure compliance. The 

AF/A1 and Air Force Personnel 

Center should then reassign Airmen in 

disestablished Air Force Reserve units 

to integrated Title 10 units composed 

of Active Air Force, Reserve, full-time 

and part-time Airmen. 

13. DOC Statements: The Air Force 

should discontinue the practice 

of separate designated operational 

capability (DOC) documents for 

Active and Reserve units of the same 

type and place the i-Units under single 

DOC statements. An initial i-Wing 

pilot program should be conducted 

at an associate wing that has already 

established a record of success.

14. Key Leadership Positions: The 

Air Force should ensure that integrated 

units are filled competitively by qualified 

Airmen irrespective of component, 

but key deputy positions (such as 

vice, deputy, subordinate echelon 

commander) should always be filled by 

an “opposite” component member.

15. Effective Control Measures:

The Air Force must establish effective 

control measures to ensure that both 

Active and Air Reserve Component 

Airmen have adequate paths and 

opportunities for advancement and 

career development. 

16. Awards, Decorations, and 

Promotions: The integrated chain 

of command must take special care 

in managing personnel issues such as 

awards and decorations, promotions, 

and assignment opportunities, both 

for those who seek to compete 

for increasingly higher levels of 

responsibility and for those who opt 

to sustain longevity in exercising and 

developing a particular skill set.

17. Professional Military Education 

Positions: Commander, Air University 

should develop a new baseline for its 

student and instructor positions to 

achieve a proportionate representation 

of the components on faculty and in 

the annual student body by FY 2018. 

18. Total Force Competency 

Standard: Commander, Air Education 

and Training Command (AETC) 

in coordination with the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs and 

AF/A1, should develop a Total Force 

competency standard for officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted 

Airmen across all specialties and career 

fields before the end of FY 2016. The 

AETC Commander should conduct 

a comprehensive curriculum review, 

similar to the one it completed for the 

Nuclear Enterprise in 2008–2009, to 

support professional and technical 

military education goals necessary for 

Airmen of all components to acquire 

cross-component skills, knowledge, 

comprehension, and analytic capability. 

The review should be completed by 

FY 2017, and the Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force should ensure a Total Force 

competency standard is implemented 

by FY 2018, such that it is available and 

resourced for all Airmen. 

19. Access to Non-Resident 

Education: Commander, AETC 

should ensure that revised curriculum 

and competency standards are 

achievable by appropriately structured 

non-resident education programs 

equally accessible to personnel of all 

components. This must include special 

attention to the numerous ancillary 

training requirements that impose 

extraordinary burdens on traditional 

Air Reserve Component Airmen who 

must complete much of their training 

via distance learning but lack time 

and access to required information 

technologies to complete those training 

requirements in a timely manner 

while on drill status. A goal should 

be set to reduce unnecessary training 

requirements and to add flexibility 

to acceptable methods of completing 

those requirements that remain. 

For additional detail refer to:

Appendix J: Selected Statutes and 

Policies
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 35

“We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war 

may be fought by airplanes with no men in them at all. It certainly will be fought 

with planes so far superior to those we have now that there will be no basis for 

comparison. Take everything you’ve learned about aviation in war, throw it out of 

the window, and let’s go to work on tomorrow’s aviation. It will be different from 

anything the world has ever seen.”

Quote attributed to General Hap Arnold, U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), on VJ Day, 1945, 

in U.S. Air Force Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America.

CHAPTER 4

SIZING AND SHAPING 

THE FORCE

During hearings and visits to Air 

Force installations around the 

country, the Commission learned 

about the strengths and capabilities 

resident in all components of the Air 

Force. Air Force policies have ensured 

that all units and individuals of the 

Active Air Force, the Air National 

Guard, and the Air Force Reserve train 

to the same level of excellence and are 

thus equally ready to “fight tonight.”

Because all components are held 

to the same standard of readiness, the 

Air Force can maintain capacity and 

capability and reduce stress on the 

Active Component by maintaining 

or increasing the end strength of the 

Reserve Components and increasing 

regular, periodic, and predictable use 

of those forces. Prudent reductions in 

the Active Component will produce 

meaningful cost-savings, mainly in 

military personnel accounts, and can 

reduce the need for cuts to readiness, 

modernization, and recapitalization.

 Greater reliance on a larger Air 

Reserve Component provides a quickly 

“reversible” way to take manpower cost 

savings. (“Reversibility” is called for in 

the President’s 2012 “Priorities for 21st 

Century Defense,” where it is described 

as “the ability to regenerate capabilities 

that might be needed to meet future, 

unforeseen demands.”) It provides 

the ability to surge combat capability 

when needed. It provides additional 

return on investment of high-cost and 

high-value training received by Active 

Component Airmen. It maintains 

a link to states and communities 

throughout the nation in our unique 

form of federalism.

A force structure more reliant on 

a larger Air Reserve Component will 

not look exactly like the force the Air 

Force has successfully employed in 

recent decades. The Commission’s 

recommendation to make changes 

to that force is not a criticism of 

the preceding force structure; it is 

recognition that the future budgetary 

and security environments present new 

challenges that require new solutions. 

Sacrificing readiness to preserve force 

structure would create a hollow force. 

Instead, the Air Force can preserve 

readiness by shifting force structure 

from the Active to the Reserve 

Components.

End Strength Shift

Every Air Reserve Component 

Airman that Commissioners spoke 
36 CHAPTER 4: SIZING AND SHAPING THE FORCE

AFR ANG ARC Active Duty 

Total

Total Force 

Total

$1,758,639.00 $3,177,961.00 $4,936,600.00 $28,519,877.00 $33,456,477.00

70,494 105,400 175,894 332,056 507,950

35% 65%

$28.07 $/Position $85.89 $/Position

3100 1700 4800 $134,715.68 23000 $1,975,441.40

135M Cut 309,056 $1.98B Cut

27800 Positions Cut $2,110,157.09

(27,800) New “Proportional” Air Force $31,346,319.91 Remaining Personel $$$

AD 332,056 295,563 (36,493) 58%

212,387 $5,960,815.06 ARC ARC 175,894 212,387 36,493 42%

295,563 $25,385,504.86 AD

$31,346,319.91

with—from the most senior to the most 

junior—told of untapped potential 

in the Reserve Components. They 

conveyed that, over the past decades, 

the Reserve Components had provided 

only what they were asked to provide 

rather than the full limit of what they 

could provide. Commissioners tested 

these statements every way possible, 

recognizing that high self-confidence 

cannot always be accepted at face value. 

But this assertion was so unanimous and 

came from so many disparate sources that 

it could not be discounted.

The Commission estimated that 

it is feasible to shift the Air Force 

component mix from the current 69 

percent Active and 31 percent Reserve 

to 58 percent Active and 42 percent 

Reserve. This would result in the shift 

of approximately 36,600 personnel 

and yield savings of perhaps $2 billion 

per year in manpower costs with no 

reduction in Total Force end strength. 

If this shift were proportionally 

allocated to the Air National Guard 

and the Air Force Reserve, the resultant 

increases would amount to 14,100 

Airmen in the AFR and 22,500 in the 

ANG; nearly all would be part time. 

To continue to meet the steady 

state mission requirement, this shift 

would require increased routine, 

periodic use of a portion of the Reserve 

Components serving on temporary 

active duty, either as volunteers or 

under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 

§12304b. This practice will be more 

cost effective than cuts limited to 

Active Component end strength 

because it allows for some reduction 

in the Active Component while also 

reducing stress on remaining Active 

Component forces, many of which 

have been operating at less than a 1:2 

deploy-to-dwell ratio under the current 

force structure. Finally, such regular 

use of the Reserve Components will 

help sustain its readiness and increase 

familiarity in the Active Component 

with Air Reserve Component 

operations, making Reserve and Guard 

units more useful when called to active 

duty in times of emergency.

Re-Balance Missions

Other solutions to emerging 

challenges involve employing the Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve 

in other mission areas to a greater 

extent than might once have been 

thought possible.

Cyber

In the Cyberspace Superiority core 

function, the Reserve Components 

provide about 11,000 Airmen 

representing 43 percent of total 

manpower for this mission—among 

the most integrated of the core 

functions. The Air Force has ambitious 

plans to expand its role in cyber 

operations and to increase the number 

FIGURE 4: Alternative Force Mix Calculation

Military manpower cost 

of FY14 force mix (before 

additional cuts due to 

BCA/Sequestration)

Hypothetical additional 

end strength cuts due to 

further BCA/Sequestration 

reductions

Military manpower cost 

after hypothetical cuts

Alternate force mix to 

achieve same savings 

shift end strength from 

Active to Reserve 

Component)
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 37

of Airmen in career fields associated 

with this emerging domain of war. 

Much of that increase should be met 

by the Reserve Components, which are 

well situated to recruit and retain from 

the specialized talent available in the 

commercial cyber labor market. The Air 

Force could apply to the cyber warfare 

domain its successful experience in the 

rated force, where the use of Reserve 

Component officers who are airline 

pilots creates a synergistic and positive 

effect. The commercial cyber world is 

at the leading edge of technology, and 

the Reserve Components would be able 

to recruit from that world, allowing 

the Air Force to benefit from a similar 

synergistic effect. 

Research reported in May 2013 

by the Institute for Defense Analyses 

(IDA Paper P-4986) found that the Air 

Force could perform this mission with 

higher value by using an integrated 

blend of Active and Air Reserve 

Component personnel and could lower 

total personnel costs by encouraging 

Reservists and Guardsmen to volunteer 

for service beyond the required 39 days. 

These findings were corroborated by 

testimony provided to the Commission 

by senior military and civilian officials 

from U.S. Cyber Command.

Space and GIISR

Similar opportunities are available 

for expanded employment of Reserve 

Components in other growing mission 

areas, including Space and Global 

Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (GIISR.) The 

Air Force should build more Reserve 

Component opportunities in the 

space domain, especially in predictable 

continuity of operations missions and 

round-the-clock shift work. The Air 

Force should also build more Reserve 

Component opportunities in GIISR. 

In the high-deployment parts of Global 

ISR—such as RPA: MQ-1 Predator 

and MQ-9 Reaper launch and recovery 

teams—an increased Air Reserve 

Component presence will mitigate 

some Active Component deployment 

stress. Likewise, and consistent with 

the Commission’s recommendations in 

Chapter 3, these new units should be 

integrated with the Active Component, 

but the preponderance of new 

billets should be for Reservists and 

Guardsmen.

Special Operations

Increased Reserve Component 

presence across the spectrum of Special 

Operations missions is also feasible 

and appropriate. The Commission 

found several unique opportunities 

already being filled by the Reserve 

Components, not only in some MC130 flying squadrons, but also in the 

Building Partnerships core function. 

The Air Force should increase Reserve 

Component presence in Special 

Operations through greater integration. 

This will mitigate some Active 

Component PERSTEMPO stress in 

the Special Operations community 

and foster an environment that retains 

skilled Airmen.

Nuclear Deterrence Operations

Even Nuclear Deterrence 

Operations, where the Active 

Component dominates, has room 

for increased Reserve Component 

involvement. The 219th North Dakota 

Air National Guard Security Forces 

Squadron, in a classic association, 

already provides missile field security 

for the 91st Missile Wing at Minot 

Air Force Base, N.D., and serves as 

The state of Michigan wants to stay on top of cyber security as a public welfare issue 

and a jobs-building core competency for the state, using cyber training and development 

in order to prepare future cyber leaders and warriors to serve the state and nation. The 

Michigan National Guard is integral to this effort.

One element of this strategy is the Cyber Range. Much like a traditional firing range, the 

Cyber Range is available for individuals and organizations to test their cyber security 

skills and take classes to improve them. The state established its first Cyber Range at 

Eastern Michigan University in Ypsilanti and plans to expand to Ferris State University 

in Big Rapids and the Michigan National Guard’s 110th Airlift Wing in Battle Creek. The 

Range is connecting with Selfridge ANG Base and National Guard installations at Camp 

Grayling and Fort Custer. 

Operating on the Merit Fiber Network out of Ann Arbor, Michigan’s Cyber Range is available to students, researchers, businesses, institutions, and governments. Users can 

bring their cyber security systems to the Range where expert teams test them for vulnerabilities. Classes are available at three experience levels and include certifications for 

various levels of security expertise, disaster recovery, computer forensics, and incident 

management. 

Michigan Governor Rick Snyder is the co-chair for the National Governors Association 

Cyber Committee and actively supports the National Guard Bureau Cyber Steering Committee. Michigan recently began holding an annual Cyber Summit, and The Adjutant 

General, MG Gregory J. Vadnais, was featured at the latest summit in October. 

The 110th Communications Flight at Battle Creek is one of five cyber mission flights 

across the nation, along with a combat communications squadron, created in 2009 to 

undertake the new Guard Global Information Grid Net Assessment coverage for every 

Federal Emergency Management Agency region. The Guard units work with state governments and the defense industrial base to evaluate vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and key resources.

CYBER RANGE
38 CHAPTER 4: SIZING AND SHAPING THE FORCE

an exemplar. The 219th is effective 

at maintaining nuclear certification 

and Personnel Reliability Program 

compliance. As a pilot program, the 

Air Force should expand Reserve 

Components’ contributions to the 

ICBM mission by duplicating the 

219th Security Forces Squadron model 

across all three ICBM wings. This 

should be done by the end of FY 2016. 

As lessons are learned, the Air Force 

should expand the SFS model to missile 

maintenance and helicopter functions 

between FY 2017 and FY 2019.

Training

Considerable opportunity exists 

for cost-avoidance in the Training and 

Education core function by shifting 

effort to the Reserve Components. 

We commissioned a cost analysis by 

the Institute for Defense Analysis 

(IDA) which reported that increased 

reliance on the Reserve Components to 

provide permanently assigned part-time 

instructor pilots offers a significant 

opportunity for cost-avoidance.

IDA found that most initial pilot 

training is currently provided by 

Active Component instructors. Active 

pilots assigned to instructor positions 

must be replaced in the operational 

force. Their replacements must (over 

the long run) be recruited, trained, 

and compensated. In addition, after a 

three-year instructor tour, these pilots 

must go through a retraining program 

to allow them to return to operational 

billets. Some of the 1,800 Active 

instructor pilots could be replaced 

with prior-service volunteers from the 

Reserve Components who would not 

rotate back to operational squadrons, 

thus avoiding retraining costs. The 

result of IDA’s analysis is that such an 

Active-to-Reserve force structure shift 

could potentially save $1.3 million per 

instructor billet in the short run, as 

instructors are replaced over a threeto five-year period, and $2.8 million 

per instructor billet in the long run as 

unneeded facilities are closed.

A New Active–Reserve Component Mix

The Commission found multiple 

paths to redistributing Active and 

Reserve Component personnel 

across core functions and Air Force 

specialties. For example, Space, GIISR, 

Special Operations, Nuclear Deterrence 

Operations, and Training mission 

areas could readily accommodate 

such shifts because the associated 

core functions are predominantly 

manned by the Active Component. 

Moreover, several other Air Force core 

functions, including Global Precision 

Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, and 

Agile Combat Support, already are 

accustomed to rotational operations 

into which Reserve Component units 

and individuals play a significant role. 

An example of such an alternative mix 

compared to the current mix for each 

core function is illustrated in Appendix 

K.

Homeland Defense and DSCA

Homeland Defense and Defense 

Support to Civil Authorities 

(DSCA) are important missions for 

the Department of Defense. State 

Governors and other federal agencies 

rely on the Air Force to provide 

capabilities when natural and man-made 

disasters overwhelm local responders. 

The President’s Strategic Guidance to 

DEFINITIONS

CAPABILITY

The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to 

achieve military objectives. Entails force structure, modernization, readiness, and 

sustainability. 

CAPACITY

The force structure required to meet a single or multiple military objectives. 

HOMELAND DEFENSE

The protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats or aggression or other threats as identified by 

the President. 

HOMELAND SECURITY

A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; 

and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies that occur. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

Support provided by the Department of Defense, including the National Guard and 

other U.S. federal military forces, in response to requests from civil authorities 

for assistance with domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other 

domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. National Guard 

forces may be utilized when the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces under Title 32 

of the U.S. Code.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 39

the Department of Defense specifies 

this mission as one of the 10 primary 

missions of the Armed Forces. For 

the DSCA mission, Governors 

need to know that when disasters 

occur, sufficient federal capacity and 

capabilities will be available to support 

their needs. 

Although both DoD and the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) have processes to assess 

requirements for their respective 

responsibilities in addressing 

homeland contingencies, neither 

has fully developed, prioritized 

Brig Gen Peter Byrne of the Colorado Air National Guard does not 

wear two hats; he wears a dual hat. As a dual status commander 

(DSC), he can be activated under Title 10—under the command of 

the President, Secretary of Defense, and NORTHCOM—but still remain in Title 32 status under the command of his Governor and The 

Adjutant General. This gives him legal authority to coordinate and 

command both Title 10 and Title 32 forces responding to an emergency in Colorado even though the lines of command above him 

and the forces below him remain separate. 

Such dual status authority has been in existence since 1916, allowing Title 10 military personnel to occupy the role. However, it had 

never been used for a response to a no-notice event. After 9/11, 

political leaders recalibrated the doctrines of homeland defense, 

homeland security, and first response to allow better coordination 

among federal, state, and local authorities. With states concerned 

about ceding too much command and control authority to the federal government and the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibiting 

the federal military’s involvement in law enforcement, Congress 

amended Title 32 with the National Defense Authorization Act of 

Fiscal Year 2004 to give designated National Guard officers legal 

authority to serve as dual status commanders. A National Guard 

officer may now remain on state status while serving on active duty 

with the authorization and consent of the President and Governor.

With this new authority, dual status commanders were first used at 

national security special events, such as summit meetings, national 

political party conventions, and National Boy Scout Jamborees. In 

2005 a dual status commander was used for the three-month northern border security operation, Winter Freeze. In the past few years, 

dual status commanders have been tapped to handle no-notice and 

consequence management responses such as the wildfires in California, Hurricane Irene (one each for five states), Hurricane Isaac 

(two), and Hurricane Sandy (six). The Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA also 

requires dual status commanders to be used as the “usual and customary” command arrangement when federal and National Guard 

forces are simultaneously employed. This command construct 

could also be used in associated air wings combining Guard and 

Reserve or Active units.

The dual status commander is the single point of contact between 

the two chains of command. With two independent staffs, one 

Guard and one federal, the dual status commander must maintain 

completely separate commands of forces. Title 10 forces may only 

be used for Title 10 missions, and Title 32 may only be used for Title 

32 missions. The only time their chains of command meet is in the 

dual status commander. But these chains do not cross, even with 

the dual status commander: the purpose of the position is not to 

consolidate commands but to foster coordination and promote unity 

of effort. 

Brig Gen Byrne served as dual status commander for Colorado’s 

two major wildfires in 2012 and 2013 and for the 2013 flood. He said 

his biggest challenges were anticipating unmet needs while supporting the incident command and maintaining situational awareness on decisions made by other organizations supporting the incident command. Another challenge was the “effective command 

transition of DoD forces responding under Immediate Response 

Authority (DoDD 3025.18) into a joint task force...all the while maintaining effectiveness in the disaster area.” 

Airmen of both federal and state components are eager to engage. 

The dual status commander’s mission is to help them engage more 

efficiently as separate but collaborative forces.

DUAL STATUS COMMANDER

“DSC is a force multiplier to the Incident Command when 

clarity of unity of command is established early in the operation.” 

Brig Gen Peter Byrne, Director, Joint Staff 

and Joint Task Force—Centennial Commander, 

Colorado Air National Guard, in correspondence 

to the National Commission on the Structure of 

the Air Force, Dec. 16, 2013.

POTUS GOV

SECDEF TAG

NORTHCOM

T10 FORCES T32 FORCES

T10 STAFF T32 STAFF

DSC
40 CHAPTER 4: SIZING AND SHAPING THE FORCE

When the Department of Defense 

practiced responding to a “complex 

catastrophe” in 2011, its scenario was a 

large earthquake that caused widespread 

property damage, critical infrastructure 

degradation across eight states, and “numerous casualties.” On Oct. 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the mid-Atlantic and Northeast United States. The storm affected 29 

states, left 8.5 million people without power, 

and knocked out 2,500 gas stations. Maryland saw 15.3 inches of rain; New York saw 

a 14-foot storm surge. At least 162 people 

were killed. Yet, Sandy did not qualify as a 

“complex catastrophe.” 

It was, nevertheless, historic, not only in its 

intensity and breadth but also in military annals as the first natural disaster in which the 

Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act Section 515 was applied: “When a 

Governor requests Federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency 

... the Secretary of Defense may, without 

consent of the member affected, order any 

unit, and any member not assigned to a unit 

organized to serve as a unit, of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, 

and Air Force Reserve to active duty for a 

continuous period of not more than 120 days 

to respond to the Governor’s request.” 

The first time testing such authority is likely to 

have hiccups, but confusion at the command 

and control (C2) level prompted the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to issue 

a September 2013 study descriptively titled 

Civil Support: Actions are Needed to Improve 

DoD’s Planning for a Complex Catastrophe. 

DoD concurred with the GAO’s findings. Said 

a DoD and Department of Homeland Security Senior Steering Group after-action brief: 

“Effective senior leadership helped overcome these gaps, but in a true complex catastrophe, this will not be enough.”

The federal military response to Sandy compared favorably to that of Hurricane Katrina 

in 2005. Newly legislated authorities governing dual status commanders and use of Title 

10 forces in Title 32 missions removed many 

legal barriers that had hindered federal military forces participating in Katrina recovery 

as well as other major disasters. For Sandy, 

a total of 86 Air Force aircraft flew 284 sorties moving 640 personnel and 3,400 tons of 

cargo. Airlift conducted about 80 percent of 

missions, with 39 percent of sorties conducted by the Air Guard, 38 percent by Active, 

and 23 percent Reserve. One of the key missions was airlifting 241 public utility vehicles 

from western air bases to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and John F. Kennedy 

International Airport. 

Helpful as the military assistance was, operations were plagued by C2 issues. Tellingly, 

the AF/A9-Lessons Learned report says, 

“The Total Force response was largely a 

success because of Airmen’s ingenuity, innovation, experience, and ability to modify 

or circumvent formal processes to overHURRICANE SANDY

“Sandy was not a complex 

catastrophe, but you could ‘see’ a 

complex catastrophe from Sandy.” 

General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., 

Commander, North American 

Aerospace Defense Command and 

U.S. Northern Command, in DoD 

Sandy After-Action Report

COMPLEX CATASTROPHE

The Department of Defense 

defines a complex catastrophe 

as a natural or man-made 

incident, including cyberspace 

attack, power grid failure, and 

terrorism, which results in 

cascading failures of multiple 

interdependent, critical, lifesustaining infrastructure sectors 

and causes extraordinary levels 

of mass casualties, damage, or 

disruption, severely affecting 

the population, environment, 

economy, public health, national 

morale, response efforts, or 

government functions.

DEFINITION

requirements set in place for foreseeable 

homeland missions or an agreedupon process for working with states 

to assure homeland requirements are 

systematically generated and addressed. 

Without a better mechanism to capture 

the Governors’ needs and other DSCA 

requirements, the Air Force and DoD 

risk building a force structure that does 

not adequately account for the DSCA 

mission.

Two initiatives are meant to address 

this shortfall. First, the National 

Guard Bureau has drafted, but not 

yet adopted, Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau instructions regarding 

a Joint Capability Assessment and 

Development Process. This process 

is designed to provide DoD a better 

picture of the capabilities required by 

the states for the federalized and nonfederalized Homeland Defense and 

DSCA missions. If fully integrated into 

the Department’s planning processes, 

this effort could prove valuable. 

Second, Executive Order 13528, 

issued Jan. 11, 2010, established a 

Council of Governors. The Council 

includes officials of other executive 

departments and agencies to provide 

consultation and advice on matters 

involving the National Guard of the 

various states; homeland defense; 

civil support; synchronization and 

integration of state and federal 

military activities in the United 

States; and other matters of mutual 

interest pertaining to National Guard, 

Homeland Defense, and civil support 

activities. Although the Secretary 

of Defense designated the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and America’s Security Affairs 

(ASD HD/ASA) as the executive 

agent for the joint consultative process, 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 41

come remaining organizational and doctrinal shortfalls.” The primary entities involved 

were Army North (ARNORTH) as the joint 

force land component commander, and the 

dual status commanders (DSC) appointed 

by the Secretary of Defense for each heavily 

impacted state: Maryland, New Hampshire, 

New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and 

Rhode Island. Seeing a need for a C2 element 

between these dual status commanders and 

Northern Command, NORTHCOM created a 

joint coordinating element (JCE) in the days 

after Hurricane Sandy made landfall. 

After-action reports mentioned the following 

C2 problems:

• The JCE’s role, which was not based on 

doctrine, was neither well-defined nor 

well-communicated, thus contributing to 

the confusion.

• Title 10 personnel did not clearly understand the C2 structure for DSCs, the JCE, 

or high headquarters. They did not know 

which commander they were accountable to.

• DSC staff, reporting to two headquarters, 

had to de-conflict mixed guidance.

• On requests for DoD support, First Air 

Force (AFNORTH) senior leadership 

communicated directly with commercial 

entities and local government representatives rather than follow basic National 

Response Framework doctrine. 

• Barriers to formal information sharing often compelled decision-makers to rely on 

personal relationships. 

Matters of funding were also an issue. President Obama signed emergency declarations 

for Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 

Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 

New York on the day before Sandy made 

landfall, and for Delaware, Pennsylvania, 

Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia on 

the day of landfall. These triggered Stafford 

Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act authorities. The president afterward declared 

major disasters for Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. In testimony before this 

Commission, Todd M. Rosenblum, Principal 

Deputy Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, said that the 

Secretary of Defense disapproved a request 

for Title 32, 502(f) resourcing forwarded him 

from the National Guard Bureau “because all 

support needs were already being met, and 

to have approved the request would have 

circumvented the Stafford Act process.” Under the Stafford Act, FEMA pays 75 percent 

of response costs, localities pay 25 percent. 

Under Title 32 utilization, the Department of 

Defense would have covered 100 percent of 

the National Guard costs.

HURRICANE SANDY

testimony to Commissioners indicated 

that progress in identifying and 

codifying holistic DSCA requirements 

has been slow. 

The Air Force, particularly the Air 

National Guard and the Air Force 

Reserve, plays a significant role in both 

Homeland Defense and support of 

civil authorities. It can, and should, 

continue to do so; and, given the 

strategic environment and enhanced 

coordination with DHS, the Air Force 

will have opportunities in the future 

to increase its contribution to these 

missions. Communication between 

state leaders and DoD can, and must, 

be improved, particularly in the area of 

disaster assistance.

Although no force structure 

decisions should be made exclusively 

based on disaster assistance 

requirements, the use of the Armed 

Forces to address emergencies at 

home is a core mission of all military 

branches, including the Air Force. 

Re-structuring to a Total Force more 

reliant on part-time mission support 

forces in the Reserve Components 

would provide more available capacity 

for DSCA and disaster assistance. 

This especially would be the case in 

the instance of Agile Combat Support 

units that have dual-use opportunity, 

such as Civil Engineering, Security 

Forces, and Communications 

units, that have great value to their 

communities for disaster assistance. 

The Commission recommends DoD 

and the Air Force treat Homeland 

Defense and DSCA as real priorities 

and Governors as essential stakeholders 

in planning processes. Doing so will 

enhance the Air Force’s ability to 

contribute to the country’s well-being 

without sacrificing the ability to deliver 
42 CHAPTER 4: SIZING AND SHAPING THE FORCE

the air, space, and cyber power needed 

and expected in the “away game.”

The Commission’s recommendations 

to rebalance the Active and Reserve 

Components will accomplish a number 

of desirable goals:

• Enable significant monetary savings 

in Military Personnel Accounts 

without unreasonably increasing 

operational risk;

• Preserve funds for operational 

readiness and investment;

• Increase operational integration 

among components;

• Increase the number of 

opportunities for Airmen of 

all components to develop 

appreciation of each other’s 

capabilities by serving in integrated 

units;

• Increase the readiness of Air 

Reserve Component units and 

personnel by enabling them to 

utilize their military skills on a 

routine basis; 

• Reduce installation maintenance 

burdens to better match the size of 

the current and projected Air Force;

• Enhance Air Force presence 

within American communities by 

preserving Air Reserve Component 

installations and basing more 

personnel at those locations. This 

action will result in more Airmen 

and their families living in those 

communities. 

n RECOMMENDATIONS

20. Increase ARC Capacity: The Air 

Force should increase its utilization 

of the Air Reserve Component by 

increasing the routine employment of 

ARC units and individuals to meet 

recurring rotational requirements. The 

measure of success in this increased use 

of the ARC should be the execution of 

at least 15,000 man years annually.

21. Operational ARC Funding: The 

Air Force should include in all future 

budget submissions a specific funding 

line for “operational support by the Air 

Reserve Component” to clearly identify 

and program those funds intended to 

permit routine, periodic employment 

of the ARC either as volunteers or 

under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 

§12304b. 

22. Council of Governors: The 

Secretary of Defense should revise 

its agreement with the Council 

of Governors to enable Air Force 

leadership to consult directly with the 

Council of Governors when requested, 

including discussion of pre-decisional 

information.

23. Non-Disclosure Agreements:

The Secretary of the Air Force should 

discontinue use of Non-Disclosure 

Agreements in the corporate process.

24. State Adjutants General: The 

Secretary of the Air Force should 

continue to advance current informal 

practice and mechanisms for engaging 

with The Adjutants General in 

development of the Air Force Program.

25. Cyberspace Airmen: As it 

increases the number of Airmen 

in career fields associated with 

Cyberspace, the Air Force should fill 

much of that demand with the Reserve 

Components, which are well situated to 

recruit and retain from the specialized 

talent available in the commercial cyber 

labor market.

26. Space Domain: The Air Force 

should build more Air Reserve 

Component opportunities in the 

space domain, especially in predictable 

continuity of operations missions and 

round-the-clock shift work. 

27. GIISR Billets: The Air Force 

should integrate all of its new Global 

Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance units, and the 

preponderance of new billets should be 

for Reservists and Guardsmen.

28. Special Operations: The Air 

Force should increase Air Reserve 

Component presence in Special 

Operations through greater integration.

29. ICBM Mission: As a pilot 

program, the Air Force should, by the 

end of FY 2016, expand Air Reserve 

Component contributions to the 

ICBM mission by replicating the 219th 

Security Forces Squadron model across 

all three ICBM wings. As lessons are 

learned, the Air Force should expand 

the Security Forces model to Missile 

Maintenance functions between FY 

2017 and FY 2019. The Air Force 

should also shift the Missile Field 

Helicopter mission to the Reserve 

Components.

30. Instructor Pilots: The Air Force 

should replace some of the 1,800 

Active instructor pilots with priorservice volunteers from the Air Reserve 

Component who would not rotate 

back to operational squadrons. 

31. Homeland Security and Disaster 

Assistance: The President should 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 43

direct the Departments of Defense 

and Homeland Security to develop, 

in full coordination with the Council 

of Governors, national requirements 

for Homeland Security and Disaster 

Assistance, both foreign and domestic.

32. Homeland Defense and DSCA:

DoD and the Air Force should treat 

Homeland Defense and DSCA as real 

priorities and Governors as essential 

stakeholders in planning processes. 

For additional detail refer to:

Appendix J: Selected statutes and 

policies

Appendix K: Core function 

balance

Appendix O: Distinctions among 

homeland operations
44
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 45

“So here we find ourselves now at the end of another extended period of combat 

operations, a new military strategy. I think it’s time for us to take a hard look.”

General (Ret.) Ronald R. Fogleman, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, in testimony before the 

National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, July 23, 2013.

CHAPTER 5

MANAGING THE FORCE

I

nnovation in force management 

processes to make better use of 

carefully selected and expensively 

trained Airmen is critical for the Air 

Force to sustain a high-quality work 

force in the midst of shrinking budgets 

and an increasingly competitive labor 

market. Effective force management 

policies enable quality recruitment, 

training, retaining, and utilization of 

the force. The Commission identified 

the following counterproductive 

human capital policies that currently 

undermine optimal employment of the 

Total Force.

Duty Statuses and Data Collection

More than 30 different duty statuses 

govern activation and employment of 

Airmen. Because of the specific legal 

restrictions governing the allowable 

DEFINITIONS

DEPLOY-TO-DWELL

Ratio of time Active Component military organizations spend deployed compared to 

the amount of time they spend not deployed. Thus, 1:2 means that for the period deployed the organization would spend two periods at home. (For Reserve Component 

forces, see Mobilization-to-Dwell.)

MOBILIZATION-TO-DWELL

Ratio of time Reserve Component organizations or individuals spend mobilized for 

active duty compared to the amount of time they spend in a ready reserve state. 

Thus, 1:5 means that for each period mobilized the organization or individual would 

spend five periods at home.

PERSONNEL TEMPO (PERSTEMPO)

The time an individual spends away from home station, whether for deployment, 

unit training events, special operations and exercises, or mission support temporary duty.
46 CHAPTER 5: MANAGING THE FORCE

duties within a specific status, each 

status has its own data categories and 

collection processes. This unnecessary 

and costly bureaucracy is a source of 

frustration among Airmen and stands 

in the way of recruiting, accession, and 

retention for the Reserve Components. 

For example, aircrew members 

from different components flying a 

strategic airlift mission together will 

each log operational and training hours, 

but they will log them differently. 

Regulations might allow the Active 

Component Airmen to log both 

operational and training hours while 

the Reserve Component Airmen 

may only log training hours. When 

management later aggregates the data, 

the Reserve Component Airmen does 

not have the operational contribution 

credited to his or her service records, 

and the Air Force has an inaccurate 

picture of what type of mission each 

aircrew member flew. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) 

has recently revised deploy-to-dwell 

and mobilization-to-dwell policy 

to characterize and manage the 

employment of the Total Force in 

order to preclude the overexposure of 

personnel to combat and operational 

deployments. The guidance affirms the 

deploy-to-dwell ratio for the Active 

Component is set at 1:2 or greater, 

and the mobilization-to-dwell ratio 

for the Reserve Components is 1:5 or 

greater. The Commission learned much 

regarding the workload and Personnel 

Tempo (PERSTEMPO) associated 

with alert missions, employed-inplace missions (such as Space and 

ICBM), high-demand missions, airlift, 

and combat search and rescue, and 

traditional rotations such as bomber 

and tanker presence on overseas bases.

The Air Force strives for compliance 

with USD(P&R) guidance, but the 

ratios specified in this guidance are 

less useful to the Air Force, which 

The following is an excerpt of a farewell address Lt Col Ryan Samuelson published 

prior to relinquishing command of the 64th Air Refueling Squadron at Pease ANG Base, 

N.H. The squadron is part of the 157th Air Refueling Wing, a Total Force Enterprise 

Active Associate Unit. Lt Col Samuelson is Active Air Force. The full address is part of 

a written comment submitted to the National Commission on the Structure of the Air 

Force by Major General William N. Reddel III, The Adjutant General of New Hampshire.

“What’s with these Guard guys?!” This was a saying I heard many years ago in a land 

filled with sand: a time when I had never served side-by-side with someone from the 

Air National Guard; a time when the Total Force was beginning to serve overseas together more and more. The tone was derogatory, the question stated with antipathy. 

Maybe it was said in frustration or resentment; likely it was said out of ignorance born 

of unawareness and inexperience. At the time, I didn’t ponder it much, but here is what 

I wish I could have conveyed as a response: “Well, let me tell you what I have learned 

about ‘these Guard guys’—let me rephrase that: ‘Guard professional Airmen.’”

I have learned the Guard is about working in a collaborative environment, where ideas 

from all are shared both up and down the chain of command. 

I have learned the Guard is about managing personnel who operate in a multitude of 

statuses while supporting more mission sets, both federal and state, than many Active units do. A single ANG aircrew compliment could be comprised of four personnel 

who all are governed by Title 10 rules overseas but each may operate under different 

statuses and management rules back home. I still haven’t figured out how they do it.

I have learned the Guard, through its development of the ANG Strategic Plan and Domestic Operations Equipment Requirements process, fully supports and greatly enhances the capabilities of the Total Force—not simply ANG efforts, and not simply a 

subset of Active Component plans. 

I have learned the Guard is a learning organization, capable of achieving any task it is 

given. In standing up the Active Associate squadron here, the ANG, in partnership with 

the Active Component, solved complex issues—often with little clear written guidance 

from higher headquarters. In the absence of an approved Integration Plan, which was 

held up in staffing, the ANG established Memos of Understanding, internal policies, 

and previously untested processes. In the numerous instances where existing Air 

Force instructions used different criteria for Active Duty and ANG personnel, this wing 

found integrated answers to codify into a local operating instruction or process. In 

light of the fact we often operate in the “?” realm, our daily focus has always been to 

ensure we were meeting Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s direction to fully integrate Active personnel into the structure of our host wing in order to best serve the Combatant 

Commanders’ needs. 

I have learned the Guard provides roughly 33 percent of the Air Force’s capability at 7 

percent of the budget with a force that is 70 percent traditional. The ANG is structured, 

budgeted, and funded as a strategic reserve yet operates as a fully viable operational 

force—and a busy one at that. 

I have learned the Guard is proud of its culture—and should be. It is a culture where 

people blend friendship and camaraderie perfectly with a burning desire to rapidly 

respond to any mission, state or federal. 

I have learned the Guard is about taking care of the people who make up the organization, the families, the communities, and the country. 

I do hope the education and understanding of both Active Duty and ANG patriots continue as we serve together in the coming years of fiscal challenges. The Guard has 

taught me so much. It is an organization I have come to know and immensely respect. 

I’m glad we’re on the same team.

“WHAT’S WITH THESE GUARD GUYS?”
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 47

has different deployment processes 

compared to those of land and naval 

forces. The Air Force often deploys 

not only in classical units like wings or 

squadrons, but also in portions of such 

units, down to the deployment of one 

or two Airmen. Some elements of the 

unit may have deployed while others 

have not, and other elements may have 

“deployed” by increasing time spent 

at home station facilities that directly 

support forward-deployed units. Thus, 

the deployment-to-dwell ratio of a unit 

is both difficult to measure and difficult 

to associate with how hard a unit or 

Airman is working, how much stress 

has been placed on the unit’s families, 

or what contribution the unit or 

Airman has made to the war fight. 

The Air Force currently does not 

have a method of applying these 

ratios across the force; attempts to 

use these ratios provide inconsistent 

and sometimes misleading 

information about the rate at which 

the components and their members 

deploy. The Commission found that 

MAJCOMs use greatly varied processes 

for accounting deploy-to-dwell. In 

some cases, the accounting skewed the 

numbers to support an end state not 

supported by the facts. In other cases, 

the methodology did not adequately 

measure the two primary forms of stress 

on the force and families: the length 

of time an Airman is deployed in a 

period of time and the unpredictability 

of assigned missions, whatever their 

length. 

Clearly, whenever an Airman 

is tasked to support a Combatant 

Commander—from alerts and 

high-velocity special operations and 

mobility missions to what has become 

traditional 180-day deployments 

and Theater Security Packages—the 

Airman is engaged in a mission, even if 

it is not a mission that takes the Airman 

away from home. A single metric, 

such as PERSTEMPO, is necessary 

to measure accurately and uniformly 

the contribution and sacrifice across 

all mission types and components. 

However, in the DoD Instruction 

1336.07, Reporting of Personnel Tempo 

(PERSTEMPO) Events, the guidelines 

for a non-deployed PERSTEMPO 

event for the Reserve Components 

limit the definition of active duty to 

those events that render the activated 

Reservist or Guardsman unable “to 

spend off-duty time in the housing in 

that (sic) they reside.” This limitation 

fails to account for the disruption to 

an Air Reserve Component member’s 

civilian job or attending school.

The Air Force needs a common 

approach across all components that 

measures stress on the force and that 

will respectfully measure and account 

for every Airman’s contributions. It 

is critical to serving Airmen that the 

Air Force values their service; this 

validation is just as critical to the family 

members, and, for members of the 

Reserve Components, their employers. 

If, as the Commission recommends, 

the Air Force would routinely and 

periodically employ the Reserve 

Components as an integrated part of 

an operational force, then the Air Force 

must develop metrics that accurately 

measure the impact of their military 

service.

Capturing the data necessary to 

understand the important human 

capital issues is challenging. In large 

part, the lack of data derives from 

the multiplicity of duty statuses and 

authoritative metrics. This lack of 

data does not reflect an unwillingness 

of agencies to share the data; rather, 

the existing data is incomplete, 

incorrect, or nonexistent. Moreover, 

the personnel systems and associated 

information technologies are not up to 

the complexities of force management 

under these conditions.

Stove-piped Personnel Systems

Additional inefficiencies 

stem from the three separate 

personnel systems, each with its 

own information technology and 

administrative bureaucracy. Disparate 

personnel policies and pay systems 

make communication among the 

components difficult and result in 

significant inaccuracies in crediting Air 

Reserve Component Airmen for their 

service. These errors undermine Air 

Force decision-making by presenting 

leadership with inaccurate information 

when they are crafting policy changes 

that subsequently drive timeconsuming and expensive corrections. 

Improved data integration technologies 

will mitigate part of this problem, but 

DEFINITIONS

ACTIVE DUTY

Full-time duty in the active military service, including members of the Reserve Component serving on active duty or full-time training duty (but not including full-time 

National Guard duty serving the state).

CONTINUUM OF SERVICE

A concept that removes or mitigates legal, procedural, and cultural barriers for personnel to transition among different components over the course of a career without derailing their professional advancement while also maximizing the service’s 

investment in that individual.
48 CHAPTER 5: MANAGING THE FORCE

Kurt Peterson was managing a Harley Davidson Dealership in Jonesboro, Ark., on Sept. 11, 2001, when one of his salesmen said something 

was happening on the TV. “After seeing that an airplane had hit the 

Towers, I said ‘I have to leave’ and drove to Scott Air Force Base,” Col 

(Ret.) Peterson said. “I immediately started working the tanker desk, 

supporting Air Force missions.” Col Peterson served at the Tanker 

Airlift Control Center (TACC) from its activation in 1992 until he retired 

from the Air Force Reserve in 2009 as the Reserve Advisor to the TACC 

Commander.

Every three minutes, somewhere around the globe, an Air Force cargo 

hauler (C-5 Galaxy, C-17 Globemaster III, or C-130 Hercules) or aerial 

refueler (KC-10 Extender or KC-135 Stratotanker) is scheduled to take 

off on a sortie. The scheduling and direction of this fleet of 1,300 aircraft is the responsibility of the 618th Air and Space Operations Center, 

also known as the TACC. 

TACC manages an average of 470 point-to-point flights every day in 

support of Air Mobility Command (AMC) operations, including airlift, 

air refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and combat airdrops. Many of 

those missions support Operation Enduring Freedom, delivering food, 

equipment, and other supplies to U.S. and coalition troops. TACC also 

provides command and control oversight for humanitarian missions 

overseas and at home. 

And on occasion, TACC must juggle three surges in three different theaters of operations at one time, as occurred in March 2011 in what Air 

Force officials called “March Madness”: a 9.0 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, air strikes against Libya, and a Presidential airlift for 

President Barack Obama’s trip to South America, all on top of ongoing 

operations that included a surge of forces in Afghanistan and a drawdown—and transportation home—of troops in Iraq. 

Within the first 24 hours of the disaster in Japan, three C-17 missions 

launched in support of Operation Tomodachi (“friend”) as the United 

States started shipping 2 million gallons of water, 189 tons of food, 

11,960 gallons of fuel, and 100 tons of relief supplies. Because of the 

significant damage from the tsunami, U.S. forces coordinated support 

in and out of Japan through a hub-and-spoke concept, with the TACC 

flowing major cargo movements into U.S. installations and outlying 

areas of Japan and Okinawa and then transporting supplies to the 

to truly integrate the Total Force, the 

Air Force must manage the personnel 

systems holistically as one Total Force 

system. 

The Commission commends the 

Air Force for recognizing this shortfall 

and for its ambitious “3 to 1” Initiative. 

However, “3 to 1” Total Force Human 

Resources Management, though 

designated as the “new normal” way 

of doing business, lacks a definitive 

implementation date. Also, it stops 

short of integrating human capital 

management across the components. 

Illustratively, the first Air Force 

Instruction for Total Force Human 

Resources Management consists of 

different volumes for each component 

instead of one Air Force-wide 

instruction. 

The Air Force has identified some 

of these problems and proposed a new 

enabling system. It should improve 

tracking of different statuses in 

accordance with the different purposes 

of law as well as support proposals to 

reduce the number of legal statutes 

and authorities. Unfortunately, the Air 

Force does not expect the Air Force 

Integrated Personnel and Pay System 

(AF-IPPPS) to become operational 

until FY 2018. Airmen cannot wait 

that long. 

Continuum of Service 

Continuum of Service is an 

important enabler of many of the 

Commission’s recommendations 

regarding increased integration and 

holistic management of the Air Force’s 

components. Continuum of Service 

presumes the ability of an Airman to 

transition more seamlessly among the 

three components. Historically, the 

characterization of transition from 

the Active Component to the Reserve 

Components has been “separation.” In 

public forums, Commissioners heard 

of Airmen who transfered from the 

Active Component to the Reserve 

Components being called “quitters,” 

even if they stepped back into uniform 

the next day and continued to support 

the overall mission of the Total Force. 

While service in the Air Reserve 

Component is increasingly extolled 

by Air Force senior leaders who state 

RC members are equal to their Active 

counterparts in training, readiness, 

and performance, there is room for 

improvement throughout the Air Force 

culture. The Air Force must embrace 

the idea that service in the Reserve 

TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL CENTER
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 49

TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL CENTER

Components does not constitute 

“separation” or “getting out of the Air 

Force,” but rather is a way for Airmen 

to continue to serve and for the nation 

to maintain capability and preserve 

its investment in highly trained and 

dedicated people.

The first step toward Continuum 

of Service is to make affiliation to 

the Reserve Components not just 

attractive, but an expected norm for 

Airmen who choose to leave fulltime active duty. Current practices 

regarding pilot retention bonuses are 

illustrative. The Air Force offers Active 

Component pilots retention bonuses 

of hundreds of thousands of dollars to 

remain in the Active Component for 

an additional term of years. That same 

pilot is offered no affiliation bonus to 

transfer to the Reserve Components, 

and no pilot bonus is available for 

traditional Reservists who extend their 

service. Only Active Component and 

Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) 

pilots are eligible for the bonus, despite 

the well-recognized and acknowledged 

equity in training and readiness among 

all members of the Total Force. Given 

the multi-million-dollar investment 

to train each pilot, a substantial 

incentive to affiliate with the Reserve 

Components is a wise investment. 

Such an incentive should include the 

availability of a proportional bonus for 

traditional Reserve members based on 

the days they actually serve. A similar 

approach needs to be taken for other 

career fields (e.g., cryptology or cyber), 

where extensive, expensive training 

is required to build a fully mature 

Airman. 

Another important purpose of 

Continuum of Service is to offer 

Airmen more on- and off-ramps for life 

events, such as pregnancy, spouse career 

opportunity, enduring family medical 

issues, and education. This concept is 

not new: but in the past the continuum 

has flowed only toward the Reserve 

Components because a combination 

of law and tradition has made it 

exceptionally difficult for Airmen to 

return to Active Component service. A 

proper Continuum of Service approach 

would allow members to transition 

to a part-time Reserve Component 

position with the potential to return 

to the Active Component when 

circumstances change. This concept 

also applies to moving freely between 

the Air Force Reserve and the Air 

National Guard to accommodate Air 

disaster-affected areas with helicopters and smaller fixed-wing aircraft. Additionally, the U.S. government evacuated nearly 5,000 U.S. 

citizens, primarily using partner programs with civilian air carriers. 

All told, AMC aircraft flew 127 sorties, carried 6,213 passengers, and 

transported 816 tons of cargo in support of Operation Tomodachi. 

Seven days after the crippling Japanese earthquake, Operation Odyssey Dawn began with President Obama’s announcement that the 

U.S. military would support NATO and Arab League allies enforcing 

the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 establishing the 

no-fly zone in Libya. In a matter of hours, the 171st Air Refueling Wing, 

Pennsylvania Air National Guard, mobilized and deployed to Moron 

Air Base in Spain. In less than 24 hours, the 171st ARW sent 40 tons 

of cargo and more than 160 personnel to support Operation Odyssey 

Dawn. Over the next 48 hours, KC-135 and KC-10 tankers from 10 Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command air refueling wings 

would be sitting on the ramp in Moron. Eventually 20 different bases 

would provide tankers and personnel in support of Odyssey Dawn 

and the subsequent Operation Unified Protector.

For both Libya operations, TACC managed missions flying from Moron 

AB and NAS Rota in Spain, RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, NAS Sigonella 

in Italy, and NAS Souda Bay in Greece. In the 13 days of Operation 

Odyssey Dawn, the United States flew 876 of the Coalition’s 2,132 

aircraft sorties, tallying approximately 9,418 of the total 13,930 hours 

flown. U.S. tanker aircraft flew 311 missions offloading more than 17.3 

million pounds of fuel. U.S. airlift aircraft flew 151 missions transporting 3,177 passengers and 2,372 short tons of cargo.

TACC’s pace indicates the impact simultaneous requirements for Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation New Dawn, Operation Unified 

Protector, and Operation Tomodachi had on AMC. From January to 

March 2011, TACC managed a 60 percent increase in C-5 utilization 

and a 26 percent increase for C-17s. AMC also maximized its KC-10 

and KC-135 fleet, which flew 1,706 missions and offloaded 57.8 million 

pounds of fuel. 

Even at a normal steady-state pace, the amount of global movement 

requires TACC staff to operate 24 hours a day and emphasizes the 

need for experience. Approximately 20 percent of the center’s 700 

personnel are members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, including Individual Mobilization Augementees assigned to 

TACC and personnel on Military Appropriation Orders assigned to 

other commands.

Prior to September 2001, a limited number of Reserve Component 

members worked in the 618th; their presence and role have increased dramatically since. “The experience that Guardsmen and 

Reservists bring to the table is invaluable,” Col Peterson said. They 

create continuity for the organization, he said, and often the Guard 

and Reserve personnel demonstrate practices or procedures to Active Component members new to TACC. 

TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL CENTER
50 CHAPTER 5: MANAGING THE FORCE

Reserve Component members who 

move to a different geographic area.

A further personnel change that 

would facilitate Continuum of 

Service is lengthening the officer 

career trajectory. Lengthening of that 

trajectory for selected Airmen would 

benefit the Air Force by allowing it to 

retain its highly skilled workforce for 

a longer time. Current law and policy, 

including Defense Officer Personnel 

Management Act and Reserve Officer 

Personnel Management Act provisions 

that mandate high-year tenure and an 

“up-or-out” personnel policy, cause 

the Air Force to apply a one-size-fitsall method of career development. 

Providing additional flexibility 

to selected Airmen in both the 

Reserve Components and the Active 

Component in terms of their career 

goals and the length of their service 

would result in less churn and greater 

time in service for highly trained 

Airmen. This will, in turn, allow the 

service to realize substantial savings in 

recruiting, training, and development 

costs. The “up-or-out pyramid” that 

arbitrarily eliminates highly qualified 

people while the Air Force still needs 

them and before they are ready to stop 

serving is a poor approach to talent 

management.

n RECOMMENDATIONS

33. Duty Statuses: Congress should 

reduce the number of separate duty 

statuses from more than 30 to no more 

than six, as has been recommended by 

the Quadrennial Review of Military 

Compensation and, more recently, 

by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. 

Reducing the number of duty status 

categories will make it easier for Air 

Reserve Component Airmen to serve 

in an operational capacity. The Air 

Force can implement this change 

in a way that does not diminish the 

overall compensation of Air Reserve 

Component members. Numerous 

provisions in current law that may 

require change are identified in 

Appendix J.

34. Integrated Personnel 

Management: The Air Force should 

unify personnel management for 

all three components under a single 

integrated organization (A1) in 

the Headquarters Air Staff. This is 

a different concept than an office 

that would oversee and integrate the 

activities of three separate component 

A1s. The Air Force should aggressively 

implement the “3 to 1” process 

but widen and amplify the effort 

to include integration of the three 

components’ personnel management 

processes for such matter as recruiting, 

assignments, force development, and 

force management. A unified personnel 

management organization could best 

manage the portfolio of Air Force 

Specialty Codes and achieve the most 

favorable utilization rates, retention 

rates, and human capital cost controls. 

35. Integrated Pay and Personnel 

System: The Air Force should 

accelerate the development of an 

Integrated Pay and Personnel System 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 51

(AF-IPPS). The goal should be 

completion not later than 2016. The 

Air Force should ensure that this 

single system is capable of properly 

producing orders as well as accounting 

for and paying Airmen from all 

three components with a focus on 

providing a clear, simple structure 

under which the Air Force calls Air 

Reserve Component members to serve. 

This will result in an increased ability 

to plan, program for, and gain access 

to Air Reserve Component Airmen 

for any training and operational 

purposes. It will provide the means 

to capture the legal purpose and 

method of reimbursement of the 

Reserve Components for tracking and 

analyzing data.

36. PERSTEMPO Metric: The 

Air Force should use a single metric 

for measuring the personnel tempo 

and stress on its forces, both Active 

and Reserve. The Commission also 

recommends that the Air Force utilize 

this “PERSTEMPO, stress on the 

force” metric to determine sustainable 

levels of employment for the Active 

Component, and for the Reserve 

Components when partial mobilization 

authority is not used.

37. Non-Deployment 

PERSTEMPO: USD(P&R) should 

update the definition of a nondeployment PERSTEMPO event for 

the Reserve Components to include 

those situations where placement on 

active duty orders under either Title 

10 or Title 32 causes the Air Reserve 

Component member to be away from 

his or her civilian job or attendance at 

school.

38. PERSTEMPO and AF-IPPS: 

The Air Force should include 

PERSTEMPO accounting in AF-IPPS.

39. Continuum of Service: The Total 

Force Continuum should develop and 

supervise implementation of a pilot 

project for the implementation of 

Continuum of Service to commence by 

Oct. 1, 2014. 

40. Active Duty Service 

Commitments: The Air Force should 

revise the rules for current Active 

Duty Service Commitments to enable 

members to meet the commitment in 

some combination of Active, Reserve, 

and Guard service.

41. Multiple Career Track Options:

The Air Force should develop a new 

service construct consisting of multiple 

career track options, each with different 

high-year tenure controls, where such 

additional tenure serves the needs 

of the Air Force. At a minimum, the 

following career tracks require study: 

tactical or technical excellence and 

enterprise leadership.

42. “Up or Out”: Congress should 

amend restrictive aspects of current 

statutes that mandate “up-or-out” 

career management policies to enable 

the Air Force to retain Airmen of all 

components actively working in career 

fields where substantial investment 

in training and career development 

has been made and where it serves the 

needs of the Air Force. 
52
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 53

APPENDIX A

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239, —Jan. 2, 2013),

Subtitle G—National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force

SEC. 361. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force Act of 2012.”

SEC. 362. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (in this subtitle 

referred to as the “Commission”).

(b) MEMBERSHIP–

(1) COMPOSITION.—The Commission shall be composed of eight members, of whom—

(A) four shall be appointed by the President;

(B) one shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(C) one shall be appointed by the Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(D) one shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 

Representatives; and

(E) one shall be appointed by the Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 

Representatives.

(2) APPOINTMENT DATE.—The appointments of the members of the Commission shall be made not later than 90 

days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) EFFECT OF LACK OF APPOINTMENT BY APPOINTMENT DATE.—If one or more appointments under 

subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) is not made by the appointment date specified in paragraph (2), the authority to make 

such appointment or appointments shall expire, and the number of members of the Commission shall be reduced by the 

number equal to the number of appointments so not made. If an appointment under subparagraph (B), (C), (D), or (E) of 

paragraph (1) is not made by the appointment date specified in paragraph (2), the authority to make an appointment under 

such subparagraph shall expire, and the number of members of the Commission shall be reduced by the number equal to the 

number otherwise appointable under such subparagraph.

(4) EXPERTISE.—In making appointments under this subsection, consideration should be given to individuals with 

expertise in reserve forces policy.

(c) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT; VACANCIES.—Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any 

vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(d) INITIAL MEETING.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been 

appointed, the Commission shall hold its first meeting.

(e) MEETINGS.—The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chair.

(f ) QUORUM.—A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members 

may hold hearings.

(g) CHAIR AND VICE CHAIRMAN.—The Commission shall select a Chair and Vice Chair from among its members.
54 APPENDIX A: ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION

SEC. 363. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.

(a) STUDY.—

(1) In General.—The Commission shall undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Air Force to determine 

whether, and how, the structure should be modified to best fulfill current and anticipated mission requirements for the Air 

Force in a manner consistent with available resources.

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In considering the structure of the Air Force, the Commission shall give particular 

consideration to evaluating a structure that—

(A) meets current and anticipated requirements of the combatant commands;

(B) achieves an appropriate balance between the regular and reserve components of the Air Force, taking 

advantage of the unique strengths and capabilities of each;

(C) ensures that the regular and reserve components of the Air Force have the capacity needed to support current 

and anticipated homeland defense and disaster assistance missions in the United States;

(D) provides for sufficient numbers of regular members of the Air Force to provide a base of trained personnel from 

which the personnel of the reserve components of the Air Force could be recruited;

(E) maintains a peacetime rotation force to support operational tempo goals of 1:2 for regular members of the Air 

Forces and 1:5 for members of the reserve components of the Air Force; and

(F) maximizes and appropriately balances affordability, efficiency, effectiveness, capability, and readiness.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 2014, the Commission shall submit to the President and the congressional 

defense committees a report which shall contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission as a 

result of the study required by subsection (a), together with its recommendations for such legislation and administrative actions 

it may consider appropriate in light of the results of the study.

SEC. 364. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.

(a) HEARINGS.—The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and 

receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this subtitle.

(b) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.—The Commission may secure directly from any Federal 

department or agency such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this subtitle. Upon request of the 

Chair of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.

(c) POSTAL SERVICES.—The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same 

conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

(d) GIFTS.—The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 55

SEC. 365. COMMISSION PERSONNEL MATTERS.

(a) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.—Each member of the Commission who is not an officer or employee of the 

Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for 

level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during 

which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Commission. All members of the Commission who are 

officers or employees of the United States shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services as 

officers or employees of the United States.

(b) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—The members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 

subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while 

away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.

(c) STAFF—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Chair of the Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, 

appoint and terminate an executive director and such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the 

Commission to perform its duties. The employment of an executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the 

Commission.

(2) COMPENSATION.—The Chair of the Commission may fix the compensation of the executive director and 

other personnel without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to 

classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive director and other 

personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

(d) DETAIL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.—Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the 

Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

(e) PROCUREMENT OF TEMPORARY AND INTERMITTENT SERVICES.—The Chair of the Commission may 

procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals which 

do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 

5316 of such title.

SEC. 366. TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION.

The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on which the Commission submits its report under section 363.

SEC. 367. FUNDING.

Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2013 and available for operation and maintenance for the Air Force as 

specified in the funding table in section 4301 may be available for the activities of the Commission under this subtitle.

Source: Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ239/pdf/PLAW-112publ239.pdf.
56 APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX B

RECOMMENDATIONS

1—Cost Approach: DoD should formally adopt the “fully 

burdened cost” approach to calculating military 

personnel costs, and it should apply analytic methods 

that focus on appropriate outputs along with life-cycle 

costs. The Department should then modify DoD 

Instruction 7041.04 to establish a common list of the 

various elements of pay, benefits, and other costs that 

contribute to the “fully burdened” or “life cycle” cost 

that all services would then use in calculating the cost 

of personnel. This will enable the Air Force to assess 

accurately force structure issues and choices in terms of 

fully burdened, total life-cycle costs of human capital, as 

well as operating costs of units and aircraft. [Chapter 2]

2—Budgeting Flexibility: In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 

National Defense Authorization Act and Defense 

Appropriations Act, Congress should allow DoD 

increased flexibility in applying budget cuts across 

budget categories, including installations. [Chapter 2]

3—Resourcing the Reserve Components: To ensure the Air 

Force leverages full capacity of all components of the 

force, in its FY 2016 Program Objective Memorandum, 

the Air Force should plan, program, and budget for 

increased reliance on the Reserve Components. The 

Commission recommends: (1) the Air Force should 

include in all future budget submissions a specific 

funding line for “operational support by the Air 

Reserve Component” to clearly identify those funds 

programmed for routine periodic employment of the 

ARC either as volunteers or under the authority of 10 

U.S.C. §12304b; (2) in its future budget submissions 

the Air Force should program for approximately 

15,000 man years of operational support annually by 

the Air Reserve Component; (3) in succeeding years, 

the Air Force should monitor the execution of this 

program element to ensure it is utilizing the Air Reserve 

Component to its fullest extent. [Chapter 2]

4—Infrastructure: The Air Force should consider, and 

Congress should allow, the closing or warm basing of 

some installations. [Chapter 2]

5—Air Force Reserve Command: Congress should amend 

10 U.S.C. §10174 to retain the statutory rank, roles, 

responsibilities, and functions of the Director, Air 

National Guard, and Chief of the Air Force Reserve 

but disestablish the Air Force Reserve Command. The 

Air Force should inactivate the Reserve Numbered Air 

Forces, wings, and squadrons. The roles, responsibilities, 

and functions of disestablished organizations should be 

assumed by the Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters 

Air Force, and MAJCOMS, all of which will have 

increased representation by Air Reserve Component 

Airmen, as determined by the Secretary of the Air Force. 

[Chapter 3]

6—Staff Integration: The Air Force should integrate the 

existing staffs of the Headquarters Air Force, the Air 

Force Reserve, and Air National Guard, similar to the 

principles recommended by the Total Force Task Force. 

[Chapter 3]

7—AFR Unit Integration: The Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force should direct the integration of Air Force Reserve 

associations of flights, squadrons, groups, and wings 

into corresponding Active Component organizations in 

order to eliminate the current redundant organizational 

overhead found in classic associations. [Chapter 3]

8—Full-Time and Part-Time Mix: The combination of fulltime and part-time positions should be determined for 

each unit depending on weapon system requirements, 

deployment, and rotation schedule based on optimum 

matching of the needs of the Air Force, family, and 

employers. The unit should determine this composition 

in accordance with the mission assigned and in line with 

the full-time and part-time ratios represented by the 

current, independent, Active Air Force and Air Force 

Reserve units currently sharing missions. [Chapter 3]

9—ANG Unit Integration: The Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force should direct the integration of Air Force flights, 

squadrons, groups, and wings into corresponding Air 

National Guard organizations in order to eliminate the 

current redundant organizational overhead found in 

active associations. [Chapter 3]

10—ANG Unit Size: The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 

in coordination with the Director of the Air National 

Guard, should change wing-level organizations to 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 57

group organizations where the Airmen population and 

associated equipment are more realistically sized at the 

group level. The unnecessary recent growth of ANG 

wings from groups created excessive overhead positions 

that detract from availability to directly support 

training, peacetime, and wartime missions. [Chapter 3]

11—Concurrent Fielding of Equipment: As the Air Force 

acquires new equipment, force integration plans should 

adhere to the principle of proportional and concurrent 

fielding across the components. This means that, in 

advance of full integration, new equipment will arrive at 

Air Reserve Component units simultaneously with its 

arrival at Active Component units in the proportional 

share of each component. As the Air Force Reserve 

and Active Component become fully integrated, the 

Air Force should ensure that the Air National Guard 

receives new technology concurrent with the integrated 

units. The Air Force should no longer recapitalize by 

cascading equipment from the Active Component to 

the Reserve Components. [Chapter 3]

12—Policy Revisions: Integrating units will require 

manpower and personnel policy revisions. The Air 

Force should modify AFI 90-1001 “Responsibilities 

for Total Force Integration” to establish selection 

and assignment criteria, the minimum proportion 

of leadership positions that must be filled by the 

associating components, and the methods to ensure 

compliance. The AF/A1 and Air Force Personnel 

Center should then reassign Airmen in disestablished 

Air Force Reserve units to integrated Title 10 units 

composed of Active Air Force, Reserve, full-time and 

part-time Airmen. [Chapter 3]

13—DOC Statements: The Air Force should discontinue 

the practice of separate designated operational 

capability (DOC) documents for Active and Reserve 

units of the same type and place the i-Units under single 

DOC statements. An initial i-Wing pilot program 

should be conducted at an associate wing that has 

already established a record of success. [Chapter 3]

14—Key Leadership Positions: The Air Force should ensure 

that integrated units are filled competitively by qualified 

Airmen irrespective of component, but key deputy 

positions (such as vice, deputy, subordinate echelon 

commander) should always be filled by an “opposite” 

component member. [Chapter 3]

15—Effective Control Measures: The Air Force must 

establish effective control measures to ensure that both 

Active and Air Reserve Component Airmen have 

adequate paths and opportunities for advancement and 

career development. [Chapter 3]

16—Awards, Decorations, and Promotions: The integrated 

chain of command must take special care in managing 

personnel issues such as awards and decorations, 

promotions, and assignment opportunities, both for 

those who seek to compete for increasingly higher 

levels of responsibility and for those who opt to sustain 

longevity in exercising and developing a particular skill 

set. [Chapter 3]

17—Professional Military Education Positions:

Commander, Air University should develop a new 

baseline for its student and instructor positions 

to achieve a proportionate representation of the 

components on faculty and in the annual student body 

by FY 2018. [Chapter 3]

18—Total Force Competency Standard: Commander, 

Air Education and Training Command (AETC) in 

coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and AF/A1, 

should develop a Total Force competency standard 

for officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted 

Airmen across all specialties and career fields before the 

end of FY 2016. Commander AETC should conduct a 

comprehensive curriculum review, similar to the one it 

completed for the Nuclear Enterprise in 2008–2009, to 

support professional and technical military education 

goals necessary for Airmen of all components to acquire 

cross-component skills, knowledge, comprehension, 

and analytic capability. The review should be completed 

by FY 2017, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

should ensure a Total Force competency standard is 

implemented by FY 2018, such that it is available and 

resourced for all Airmen. [Chapter 3]

19—Access to Non-Resident Education: Commander, 

AETC should ensure that revised curriculum and 

competency standards are achievable by appropriately 

structured non-resident education programs equally 

accessible to personnel of all components. This must 

include special attention to the numerous ancillary 

training requirements that impose extraordinary burdens 

on traditional Air Reserve Component Airmen who 

must complete much of their training via distance 

learning but lack time and access to required information 

technologies to complete those training requirements in 

a timely manner while on drill status. A goal should be 

set to reduce unnecessary training requirements and to 

add flexibility to acceptable methods of completing those 

requirements that remain. [Chapter 3]
58 APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDATIONS

20—Increase ARC Capacity: The Air Force should increase 

its utilization of the Air Reserve Component by 

increasing the routine employment of ARC units and 

individuals to meet recurring rotational requirements. 

The measure of success in this increased use of the ARC 

should be the execution of at least 15,000 man years 

annually. [Chapter 4]

21—Operational ARC Funding: The Air Force should 

include in all future budget submissions a specific 

funding line for “operational support by the Air Reserve 

Component” to clearly identify and program those 

funds intended to permit routine, periodic employment 

of the ARC either as volunteers or under the authority 

of 10 U.S.C. §12304b. [Chapter 4]

22—Council of Governors: The Secretary of Defense 

should revise its agreement with the Council of 

Governors to enable Air Force leadership to consult 

directly with the Council of Governors when requested, 

including discussion of pre-decisional information. 

[Chapter 4]

23—Non-Disclosure Agreements: The Secretary of the 

Air Force should discontinue use of Non-Disclosure 

Agreements in the corporate process. [Chapter 4]

24—State Adjutants General: The Secretary of the Air 

Force should continue to advance current informal 

practice and mechanisms for engaging with The 

Adjutants General in development of the Air Force 

Program. [Chapter 4]

25—Cyberspace Airmen: As it increases the number of 

Airmen in career fields associated with Cyberspace, the 

Air Force should fill much of that demand with the 

Reserve Components, which are well situated to recruit 

and retain from the specialized talent available in the 

commercial cyber labor market. [Chapter 4]

26—Space Domain: The Air Force should build more Air 

Reserve Component opportunities in the space domain, 

especially in predictable continuity of operations 

missions and round-the-clock shift work. [Chapter 4]

27—GIISR Billets: The Air Force should integrate all of 

its new Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance units, and the preponderance of 

new billets should be for Reservists and Guardsmen. 

[Chapter 4]

28—Special Operations: The Air Force should increase Air 

Reserve Component presence in Special Operations 

through greater integration. [Chapter 4]

29—ICBM Mission: As a pilot program, the Air Force 

should, by the end of FY 2016, expand Air Reserve 

Component contributions to the ICBM mission by 

replicating the 219th Security Forces Squadron model 

across all three ICBM wings. As lessons are learned, the 

Air Force should expand the Security Forces model to 

Missile Maintenance functions between FY 2017 and 

FY 2019. The Air Force should also shift the Missile 

Field Helicopter mission to the Reserve Components. 

[Chapter 4]

30—Instructor Pilots: The Air Force should replace some 

of the 1,800 Active instructor pilots with prior-service 

volunteers from the Air Reserve Component who 

would not rotate back to operational squadrons. 

[Chapter 4] 

31—Homeland Security and Disaster Assistance: The 

President should direct the Departments of Defense 

and Homeland Security to develop, in full coordination 

with the Council of Governors, national requirements 

for Homeland Security and Disaster Assistance, both 

foreign and domestic. [Chapter 4]

32—Homeland Defense and DSCA: DoD and the Air 

Force should treat Homeland Defense and DSCA as 

real priorities and Governors as essential stakeholders in 

planning processes. [Chapter 4]

33—Duty Statuses: Congress should reduce the number of 

separate duty statuses from more than 30 to no more 

than six, as has been recommended by the Quadrennial 

Review of Military Compensation and, more recently, 

by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Reducing the 

number of duty status categories will make it easier 

for Air Reserve Component Airmen to serve in an 

operational capacity. The Air Force can implement 

this change in a way that does not diminish the overall 

compensation of Air Reserve Component members. 

Numerous provisions in current law that may require 

change are identified in Appendix J. [Chapter 5]

34—Integrated Personnel Management: The Air Force 

should unify personnel management for all three 

components under a single integrated organization 

(A1) in the Headquarters Air Staff. This is a different 

concept than an office that would oversee and 

integrate the activities of three separate component 

A1s. The Air Force should aggressively implement 

the “3 to 1” process but widen and amplify the effort 

to include integration of the three components’ 

personnel management processes for such matter 

as recruiting, assignments, force development, and 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 59

force management. A unified personnel management 

organization could best manage the portfolio of Air 

Force Specialty Codes and achieve the most favorable 

utilization rates, retention rates, and human capital cost 

controls. [Chapter 5]

35—Integrated Pay and Personnel System: The Air Force 

should accelerate the development of an Integrated Pay 

and Personnel System (AF-IPPS). The goal should be 

completion not later than 2016. The Air Force should 

ensure that this single system is capable of properly 

producing orders as well as accounting for and paying 

Airmen from all three components with a focus on 

providing a clear, simple structure under which the 

Air Force calls Air Reserve Component members to 

serve. This will result in an increased ability to plan, 

program for, and gain access to Air Reserve Component 

Airmen for any training and operational purposes. It 

will provide the means to capture the legal purpose and 

method of reimbursement of the Reserve Components 

for tracking and analyzing data. [Chapter 5]

36—PERSTEMPO Metric: The Air Force should use 

a single metric for measuring the personnel tempo 

and stress on its forces, both Active and Reserve. The 

Commission also recommends that the Air Force 

utilize this “PERSTEMPO, stress on the force” metric 

to determine sustainable levels of employment for the 

Active Component, and for the Reserve Components 

when partial mobilization authority is not used.

[Chapter 5]

37—Non-Deployment PERSTEMPO: USD(P&R) 

should update the definition of a non-deployment 

PERSTEMPO event for the Reserve Components to 

include those situations where placement on active duty 

orders under either Title 10 or Title 32 causes the Air 

Reserve Component member to be away from his or 

her civilian job or attendance at school. [Chapter 5]

38—PERSTEMPO and AF-IPPS: The Air Force should 

include PERSTEMPO accounting in AF-IPPS.

[Chapter 5]

39—Continuum of Service: The Total Force Continuum 

should develop and supervise implementation of a 

pilot project for the implementation of Continuum of 

Service to commence by Oct. 1, 2014. [Chapter 5]

40—Active Duty Service Commitments: The Air Force 

should revise the rules for current Active Duty 

Service Commitments to enable members to meet the 

commitment in some combination of Active, Reserve, 

and Guard service. [Chapter 5]

41—Multiple Career Track Options: The Air Force should 

develop a new service construct consisting of multiple 

career track options, each with different high-year 

tenure controls, where such additional tenure serves the 

needs of the Air Force. At a minimum, the following 

career tracks require study: tactical or technical 

excellence and enterprise leadership. [Chapter 5]

42—“Up or Out”: Congress should amend restrictive 

aspects of current statutes that mandate “up-or-out” 

career management policies to enable the Air Force to 

retain Airmen of all components actively working in 

career fields where substantial investment in training 

and career development has been made and where it 

serves the needs of the Air Force. [Chapter 5]
60 APPENDIX C: RECOMMENDATIONS: RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL

APPENDIX C

RECOMMENDATIONS: RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL

President

31—Homeland Security and Disaster Assistance: The 

President should direct the Departments of Defense 

and Homeland Security to develop, in full coordination 

with the Council of Governors, national requirements 

for Homeland Security and Disaster Assistance, both 

foreign and domestic. [Chapter 4]

Congress

2—Budgeting Flexibility: In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 

National Defense Authorization Act and Defense 

Appropriations Act, Congress should allow DoD 

increased flexibility in applying budget cuts across 

budget categories, including installations. [Chapter 2]

4—Infrastructure: The Air Force should consider, and 

Congress should allow, the closing or warm basing of 

some installations. [Chapter 2]

5—Air Force Reserve Command: Congress should amend 

10 U.S.C. §10174 to retain the statutory rank, roles, 

responsibilities, and functions of the Director, Air 

National Guard, and Chief of the Air Force Reserve 

but disestablish the Air Force Reserve Command. The 

Air Force should inactivate the Reserve Numbered Air 

Forces, wings, and squadrons. The roles, responsibilities, 

and functions of disestablished organizations should be 

assumed by the Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters 

Air Force, and MAJCOMS, all of which will have 

increased representation by Air Reserve Component 

Airmen, as determined by the Secretary of the Air Force. 

[Chapter 3]

33—Duty Statuses: Congress should reduce the number of 

separate duty statuses from more than 30 to no more 

than six, as has been recommended by the Quadrennial 

Review of Military Compensation and, more recently, 

by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Reducing the 

number of duty status categories will make it easier 

for Air Reserve Component Airmen to serve in an 

operational capacity. The Air Force can implement 

this change in a way that does not diminish the overall 

compensation of Air Reserve Component members. 

Numerous provisions in current law that may require 

change are identified in Appendix J. [Chapter 5]

42—“Up or Out”: Congress should amend restrictive 

aspects of current statutes that mandate “up-or-out” 

career management policies to enable the Air Force to 

retain Airmen of all components actively working in 

career fields where substantial investment in training 

and career development has been made and where it 

serves the needs of the Air Force. [Chapter 5]

Secretary of Defense

1—Cost Approach: DoD should formally adopt the “fully 

burdened cost” approach to calculating military 

personnel costs, and it should apply analytic methods 

that focus on appropriate outputs along with life-cycle 

costs. The Department should then modify DoD 

Instruction 7041.04 to establish a common list of the 

various elements of pay, benefits, and other costs that 

contribute to the “fully burdened” or “life cycle” cost 

that all services would then use in calculating the cost 

of personnel. This will enable the Air Force to assess 

accurately force structure issues and choices in terms of 

fully burdened, total life-cycle costs of human capital, as 

well as operating costs of units and aircraft. [Chapter 2]

22—Council of Governors: The Secretary of Defense 

should revise its agreement with the Council of 

Governors to enable Air Force leadership to consult 

directly with the Council of Governors when requested, 

including discussion of pre-decisional information. 

[Chapter 4]

32—Homeland Defense and DSCA: DoD and the Air 

Force should treat Homeland Defense and DSCA as 

real priorities and Governors as essential stakeholders in 

planning processes. [Chapter 4]

37—Non-Deployment PERSTEMPO: USD(P&R) 

should update the definition of a non-deployment 

PERSTEMPO event for the Reserve Components to 

include those situations where placement on active duty 

orders under either Title 10 or Title 32 causes the Air 

Reserve Component member to be away from his or 

her civilian job or attendance at school. [Chapter 5]
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 61

Secretary of the Air Force

3—Resourcing the Reserve Components: To ensure the Air 

Force leverages full capacity of all components of the 

force, in its FY 2016 Program Objective Memorandum, 

the Air Force should plan, program, and budget for 

increased reliance on the Reserve Components. The 

Commission recommends: (1) the Air Force should 

include in all future budget submissions a specific 

funding line for “operational support by the Air 

Reserve Component” to clearly identify those funds 

programmed for routine periodic employment of the 

ARC either as volunteers or under the authority of 10 

U.S.C. §12304b; (2) in its future budget submissions 

the Air Force should program for approximately 

15,000 man years of operational support annually by 

the Air Reserve Component; (3) in succeeding years, 

the Air Force should monitor the execution of this 

program element to ensure it is utilizing the Air Reserve 

Component to its fullest extent. [Chapter 2]

6—Staff Integration: The Air Force should integrate the 

existing staffs of the Headquarters Air Force, the Air 

Force Reserve, and Air National Guard, similar to the 

principles recommended by the Total Force Task Force. 

[Chapter 3]

7—AFR Unit Integration: The Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force should direct the integration of Air Force Reserve 

associations of flights, squadrons, groups, and wings 

into corresponding Active Component organizations in 

order to eliminate the current redundant organizational 

overhead found in classic associations. [Chapter 3]

8—Full-Time and Part-Time Mix: The combination of fulltime and part-time positions should be determined for 

each unit depending on weapon system requirements, 

deployment, and rotation schedule based on optimum 

matching of the needs of the Air Force, family, and 

employers. The unit should determine this composition 

in accordance with the mission assigned and in line with 

the full-time and part-time ratios represented by the 

current, independent, Active Air Force and Air Force 

Reserve units currently sharing missions. [Chapter 3]

9—ANG Unit Integration: The Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force should direct the integration of Air Force flights, 

squadrons, groups, and wings into corresponding Air 

National Guard organizations in order to eliminate the 

current redundant organizational overhead found in 

active associations. [Chapter 3]

10—ANG Unit Size: The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 

in coordination with the Director of the Air National 

Guard, should change wing-level organizations to 

group organizations where the Airmen population and 

associated equipment are more realistically sized at the 

group level. The unnecessary recent growth of ANG 

wings from groups created excessive overhead positions 

that detract from availability to directly support 

training, peacetime, and wartime missions. [Chapter 3]

11—Concurrent Fielding of Equipment: As the Air Force 

acquires new equipment, force integration plans should 

adhere to the principle of proportional and concurrent 

fielding across the components. This means that, in 

advance of full integration, new equipment will arrive at 

Air Reserve Component units simultaneously with its 

arrival at Active Component units in the proportional 

share of each component. As the Air Force Reserve 

and Active Component become fully integrated, the 

Air Force should ensure that the Air National Guard 

receives new technology concurrent with the integrated 

units. The Air Force should no longer recapitalize by 

cascading equipment from the Active Component to 

the Reserve Components. [Chapter 3]

12—Policy Revisions: Integrating units will require 

manpower and personnel policy revisions. The Air 

Force should modify AFI 90-1001 “Responsibilities 

for Total Force Integration” to establish selection 

and assignment criteria, the minimum proportion 

of leadership positions that must be filled by the 

associating components, and the methods to ensure 

compliance. The AF/A1 and Air Force Personnel 

Center should then reassign Airmen in disestablished 

Air Force Reserve units to integrated Title 10 units 

composed of Active Air Force, Reserve, full-time and 

part-time Airmen. [Chapter 3]

13—DOC Statements: The Air Force should discontinue 

the practice of separate designated operational 

capability (DOC) documents for Active and Reserve 

units of the same type and place the i-Units under single 

DOC statements. An initial i-Wing pilot program 

should be conducted at an associate wing that has 

already established a record of success. [Chapter 3]

14—Key Leadership Positions: The Air Force should ensure 

that integrated units are filled competitively by qualified 

Airmen irrespective of component, but key deputy 

positions (such as vice, deputy, subordinate echelon 

commander) should always be filled by an “opposite” 

component member. [Chapter 3]

15—Effective Control Measures: The Air Force must 

establish effective control measures to ensure that both 
62 APPENDIX C: RECOMMENDATIONS: RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL

Active and Air Reserve Component Airmen have 

adequate paths and opportunities for advancement and 

career development. [Chapter 3]

16—Awards, Decorations, and Promotions: The integrated 

chain of command must take special care in managing 

personnel issues such as awards and decorations, 

promotions, and assignment opportunities, both for 

those who seek to compete for increasingly higher 

levels of responsibility and for those who opt to sustain 

longevity in exercising and developing a particular skill 

set. [Chapter 3]

17—Professional Military Education Positions:

Commander, Air University should develop a new 

baseline for its student and instructor positions 

to achieve a proportionate representation of the 

components on faculty and in the annual student body 

by FY 2018. [Chapter 3]

18—Total Force Competency Standard: Commander, 

Air Education and Training Command (AETC) in 

coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and AF/A1, 

should develop a Total Force competency standard 

for officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted 

Airmen across all specialties and career fields before the 

end of FY 2016. Commander AETC should conduct a 

comprehensive curriculum review, similar to the one it 

completed for the Nuclear Enterprise in 2008–2009, to 

support professional and technical military education 

goals necessary for Airmen of all components to acquire 

cross-component skills, knowledge, comprehension, 

and analytic capability. The review should be completed 

by FY 2017, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

should ensure a Total Force competency standard is 

implemented by FY 2018, such that it is available and 

resourced for all Airmen. [Chapter 3]

19—Access to Non-Resident Education: Commander, 

AETC should ensure that revised curriculum and 

competency standards are achievable by appropriately 

structured non-resident education programs equally 

accessible to personnel of all components. This must 

include special attention to the numerous ancillary 

training requirements that impose extraordinary burdens 

on traditional Air Reserve Component Airmen who 

must complete much of their training via distance 

learning but lack time and access to required information 

technologies to complete those training requirements in 

a timely manner while on drill status. A goal should be 

set to reduce unnecessary training requirements and to 

add flexibility to acceptable methods of completing those 

requirements that remain. [Chapter 3]

20—Increase ARC Capacity: The Air Force should increase 

its utilization of the Air Reserve Component by 

increasing the routine employment of ARC units and 

individuals to meet recurring rotational requirements. 

The measure of success in this increased use of the ARC 

should be the execution of at least 15,000 man years 

annually. [Chapter 4]

21—Operational ARC Funding: The Air Force should 

include in all future budget submissions a specific 

funding line for “operational support by the Air Reserve 

Component” to clearly identify and program those 

funds intended to permit routine, periodic employment 

of the ARC either as volunteers or under the authority 

of 10 U.S.C. §12304b. [Chapter 4]

23—Non-Disclosure Agreements: The Secretary of the 

Air Force should discontinue use of Non-Disclosure 

Agreements in the corporate process. [Chapter 4]

24—State Adjutants General: The Secretary of the Air 

Force should continue to advance current informal 

practice and mechanisms for engaging with The 

Adjutants General in development of the Air Force 

Program. [Chapter 4]

25—Cyberspace Airmen: As it increases the number of 

Airmen in career fields associated with Cyberspace, the 

Air Force should fill much of that demand with the 

Reserve Components, which are well situated to recruit 

and retain from the specialized talent available in the 

commercial cyber labor market. [Chapter 4]

26—Space Domain: The Air Force should build more Air 

Reserve Component opportunities in the space domain, 

especially in predictable continuity of operations 

missions and round-the-clock shift work. [Chapter 4]

27—GIISR Billets: The Air Force should integrate all of 

its new Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance units, and the preponderance of 

new billets should be for Reservists and Guardsmen. 

[Chapter 4]

28—Special Operations: The Air Force should increase Air 

Reserve Component presence in Special Operations 

through greater integration. [Chapter 4]

29—ICBM Mission: As a pilot program, the Air Force 

should, by the end of FY 2016, expand Air Reserve 

Component contributions to the ICBM mission by 

replicating the 219th Security Forces Squadron model 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 63

across all three ICBM wings. As lessons are learned, the 

Air Force should expand the Security Forces model to 

Missile Maintenance functions between FY 2017 and 

FY 2019. The Air Force should also shift the Missile 

Field Helicopter mission to the Reserve Components. 

[Chapter 4]

30—Instructor Pilots: The Air Force should replace some 

of the 1,800 Active instructor pilots with prior-service 

volunteers from the Air Reserve Component who 

would not rotate back to operational squadrons. 

[Chapter 4] 

34—Integrated Personnel Management: The Air Force 

should unify personnel management for all three 

components under a single integrated organization 

(A1) in the Headquarters Air Staff. This is a different 

concept than an office that would oversee and 

integrate the activities of three separate component 

A1s. The Air Force should aggressively implement 

the “3 to 1” process but widen and amplify the effort 

to include integration of the three components’ 

personnel management processes for such matter 

as recruiting, assignments, force development, and 

force management. A unified personnel management 

organization could best manage the portfolio of Air 

Force Specialty Codes and achieve the most favorable 

utilization rates, retention rates, and human capital cost 

controls. [Chapter 5]

35—Integrated Pay and Personnel System: The Air Force 

should accelerate the development of an Integrated Pay 

and Personnel System (AF-IPPS). The goal should be 

completion not later than 2016. The Air Force should 

ensure that this single system is capable of properly 

producing orders as well as accounting for and paying 

Airmen from all three components with a focus on 

providing a clear, simple structure under which the 

Air Force calls Air Reserve Component members to 

serve. This will result in an increased ability to plan, 

program for, and gain access to Air Reserve Component 

Airmen for any training and operational purposes. It 

will provide the means to capture the legal purpose and 

method of reimbursement of the Reserve Components 

for tracking and analyzing data. [Chapter 5]

36—PERSTEMPO Metric: The Air Force should use 

a single metric for measuring the personnel tempo 

and stress on its forces, both Active and Reserve. The 

Commission also recommends that the Air Force 

utilize this “PERSTEMPO, stress on the force” metric 

to determine sustainable levels of employment for the 

Active Component, and for the Reserve Components 

when partial mobilization authority is not used.

[Chapter 5]

38—PERSTEMPO and AF-IPPS: The Air Force should 

include PERSTEMPO accounting in AF-IPPS.

[Chapter 5]

39—Continuum of Service: The Total Force Continuum 

should develop and supervise implementation of a 

pilot project for the implementation of Continuum of 

Service to commence by Oct. 1, 2014. [Chapter 5]

40—Active Duty Service Commitments: The Air Force 

should revise the rules for current Active Duty 

Service Commitments to enable members to meet the 

commitment in some combination of Active, Reserve, 

and Guard service. [Chapter 5]

41—Multiple Career Track Options: The Air Force should 

develop a new service construct consisting of multiple 

career track options, each with different high-year 

tenure controls, where such additional tenure serves the 

needs of the Air Force. At a minimum, the following 

career tracks require study: tactical or technical 

excellence and enterprise leadership. [Chapter 5]
64 APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL VIEWS

In addition to, and separately from, the views of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force that are expressed 

in this report, the undersigned add the following statement in the hope that it will be useful to Congress and the President in the 

conduct of future efforts of this type.

Congress created the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force in the National Defense Authorization 

Act. It set forth the organization and appointment of commission members, provided specific provisions for calling 

and holding meetings, establishment of a quorum, selection of a Chair and Vice Chair, and specified certain personnel 

provisions. Air Force funds were provided, and the Commission was directed to report to the President and the 

congressional defense committees by February 1, 2014, exactly nine months from the date of the first Commission 

meeting.

At that first meeting, the Department of Defense’s Director of Administration and Management advised that his office 

was the “sponsor” of the Commission, that the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) would govern the work of the 

Committee, and that a “Designated Federal Officer” (DFO) was assigned to the Commission with the responsibility of 

monitoring compliance with FACA. As the Commission proceeded with its work, it became increasingly clear that the 

DoD interpretation of FACA’s purpose would have a significant, and frequently negative, impact on the Commission’s 

work.

All Commissioners have consistently made strong and sincere efforts to comply with the FACA restrictions announced 

by the DFO. The Commissioners determined in their first meeting their desire to actively solicit the views of government 

leaders and the military and to provide members of the public a full opportunity to be heard and to be aware of the 

Commission’s progress. The Commission also committed itself to the maintenance of a full and comprehensive record of 

its work and a publicly available archive of the papers it generated and collected. 

When one looks to the U. S. Supreme Court’s analysis of what Congress intended from FACA, the following quotation 

seems both clear and illustrative:

“However, since FACA was enacted to cure specific ills—particularly the wasteful expenditure of public funds 

for worthless committee meetings and biased proposals by special interest groups—it is unlikely that Congress 

intended the statute to cover every formal and informal consultation between the President or an Executive 

agency and a group rendering advice.” Public Citizen, et al. v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989)

There has been no indication that the Department of Defense was concerned that the Commission was wastefully 

expending public funds, nor that it would be subject to biased proposals by special interest groups, but the Department’s 

FACA interpretations severely constrained Commissioners when it came to scheduling hearings and writing our report. 

Two interpretations caused the most problems.

• Any discussion among a quorum of commissioners was deemed to be a “deliberation” that required these 

deliberations to be held as public hearings, with announcements in the Federal Register and monitoring by the DFO. 

Since more than 30-day lead times were involved to complete those requirements, Commissioners were unable to 

respond to some emerging issues as they arose.

APPENDIX D

ADDITIONAL VIEW ON IMPACT OF DOD IMPLEMENTATION 

OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 65

• “Deliberations” were also said to include any discussion involving two or more commissioners, even if the discussion 

was whether to use “happy” or “glad” in describing in the report a recommendation we had already agreed upon. 

DoD interpreted FACA to prevent Commissioners from exchanging drafts of the report among themselves. DoD 

counsel directed the Commissioners to establish a “choke point” (the Executive Director) to whom they could 

communicate individually and who could then send their drafts and comments to the other Commissioners for 

comment back to him. How this cumbersome process served the public interest is not clear.

Since nothing in the statute that created the Commission made its work subject to FACA, and since many of the 

specific provisions in the statute are contrary to the processes contained in FACA, it is reasonable to question whether 

FACA should have ever been invoked. But the Department of Defense position has consistently been “if the statute doesn’t 

exempt you from FACA, you are covered by FACA.” We recommend that Congress be aware of this interpretation when it 

considers the creation of future commissions to work on Defense-related issues.

The restrictive interpretations applied by DoD have not derailed the work of the Commission. Fortunately, the men 

and women appointed to the Commission remained steadfast and refused to allow those restrictive interpretations to deter 

them from completing their task and delivering well researched and reasoned recommendations to the President and the 

Congress within the allotted time. However, future deliberative and collaborative efforts of this type would be aided by 

clearly stated Congressional intent permitting the Commissioners to enter into deliberative dialogue in the same manner as 

the legislative and executive branches do when they discharge their public trust. 

Respectfully submitted,

__________________________________ __________________________________

Dennis McCarthy, Chair Erin C. Conaton, Vice Chair 

__________________________________ __________________________________

Les Brownlee Janine Davidson

__________________________________ __________________________________

Margaret C. Harrell Raymond E. Johns Jr.

__________________________________ __________________________________

F. Whitten Peters Harry M. (Bud) Wyatt, III
66 APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL VIEWS
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 67

In addition to, and separately from, the views of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force that are expressed in 

this report, the undersigned adds the following statement to clarify that the report of the National Commission on the Structure 

of the Air Force applies only to the U.S. Air Force, and that the recommendations of the Commission are not directly applicable to 

the other military services, including their Active and Reserve Components.

These views are provided, not to voice a disagreement with any particular issue, finding, or recommendation in the 

Commission’s report, but to emphasize and make clear that the findings and recommendations provided in this report were 

based on and are intended to be applied solely to the U.S. Air Force, including both its Active and Reserve Components. 

While the U.S. Army faces a similarly restrictive budgetary environment and difficult reductions in personnel end 

strength, it is clear that Congress, in creating the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, intended the 

Commission to focus its attention solely on the U.S. Air Force. The recommendations within the Commission’s report 

should not be reflexively extrapolated from this report with the intent of applying these recommendations to any other U.S. 

military service or any of their Active or Reserve Components. 

The differences among the military services and the characteristics of their Reserve Components are significant. Only 

the Army and the Air Force have Reserve Components that include both a Reserve element as well as a National Guard 

element. The Navy and the Marine Corps only have relatively small Reserve forces. A likely misapplication, therefore, might 

be to attempt to apply to the Army some of the report’s recommendations that are intended only for the Air Force. 

 The primary difference between the Army and the Air Force underlying the foundational conclusions cited in this 

report is the level of readiness and responsiveness the Air Force accords to its Reserve Component units. The Reserve 

Component of the Air Force, because it is able to maintain the same high standards of readiness as its Active Component, 

may be called upon for immediate combat deployments and high-priority missions. Army Reserve Component units, on 

the other hand, are generally unable to attain the same high levels of readiness as Army Active Component units. Collective 

training requirements for Army units (not generally required for Air Force flying units) and the limited number of training 

days available to Army Reserve Component units make it extremely difficult for them to reach and maintain the high 

levels of readiness required for Army Active Component units. Thus, before Army Reserve Component formations can 

be committed to high-priority missions or deployed to combat areas, they must undergo periods of supplemental combat 

training—primarily, collective training—in order to meet required levels of combat readiness.

Respectfully submitted,

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONERS R.L. (LES) 

BROWNLEE AND MARGARET C. HARRELL ON 

THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE
68 APPENDIX E: CLASSIFIED ANNEX CONTENTS

APPENDIX E

CLASSIFIED ANNEX CONTENTS

The classified annex is a compendium of the major 

classified source documents, testimony notes, briefings and 

staff products that served the following purposes:

• Described the strategic environment within which the Air 

Force will operate;

• Delineated the planning guidance and fiscal constraints 

that bounded Commissioner deliberations and eventual 

recommendations; 

• Presented analysis to Commissioners providing 

alternative solutions to achieve mandated resource targets, 

accomplished by generating different assumptions, 

modifying tools, and developing comparative, 

computational assessments; 

• Provided the framework for Commissioner and staff team 

preparation and participation in the war game.

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR CLASSIFIED FILE

Report: Chapter 1 – Introduction

Core Function Integration Guides

FY 2014 Defense Planning Guidance

War Game Volume

Advanced Decision Support Tool (ADST) with examples

National Defense Strategy

National Security Strategy

Integrated Priority Lists

Integrated Security Construct (ISC, Warfare Scenarios) 

Strategic Framework

Testimony notes from Major General Anthony J. Rock 

(USAF), Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy ( J-5), 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Testimony notes from Mr. David Ochmanek, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Report: Chapter 2 – Resources 

FY 2015 Alt-POM/POM, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs (ASD-RA)

Testimony notes from Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE)

Report: Chapter 3 – Rebalancing

Advanced Decision Support Tool (ADST)

Cost of an Airman 

Air Force Units Installations and Priorities Document

Testimony notes from General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., 

Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM

Testimony notes from Air Force Total Force Task Force 

general officers 

ICBM/Western Air Defense Secto staff study

Commission staff briefing on Space

Management Control Activity briefing—CAPE

Report: Chapter 4 – Sizing and Shaping

Core Function Integration Guides

FY 2015 Alt-POM/POM ASD-RA

Advanced Decision Support Tool (ADST)

1st Helo Squadron example

Nuclear Deterrence Option (NDO) Helo Support

NCSAF Cyber Brief

24th Air Force Cyber Briefing

Notes from CYBERCOM Reserve Component Advisors

Report: Chapter 5 – Managing

Testimony notes from MG Schweizer on GPM Process
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 69

APPENDIX F

COMMISSION ACTIVITIES

COMMISSIONER SITE VISITS

Greenville, S.C., June 17, 2013, public hearing

Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J., July 16, 2013, with 

public hearing in Toms River

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, July 29, 2013

Springfield ANGB, Ohio, July 29, 2013

Rickenbacker ANGB, Ohio, July, 30, 2013

Columbus, Ohio, July 30, 2013, public hearing

Mansfield-Lahm Airport ANGB, Ohio, July 31, 2013

Joint Base Langley-Eustis AFB, Va., August 5, 2013

Tinker AFB, Okla., August 20, 2013, with public hearing in 

Oklahoma City

Alpena CRTC, Mich., September 13, 2013

Selfridge ANGB, Mich., September 14, 2013, with public 

hearing min Chesterfield Township

Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, September 22-23, 

2013

Hurlburt Field, Fla., September 30, 2013

COMMISSIONER CAPITOL REGION HEARINGS

Arlington, Va., June 3, 2013

Rayburn House Office Building, June 4, 2013 

Arlington, Va., June 25, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va., June 26, 2013

Arlington, Va., July 22, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va., July 23, 2013 

Arlington, Va., August 27, 2013 

Arlington, Va., September 26, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va., October 14, 2013

Arlington, Va., October 24, 2013 (partially closed)

Arlington, Va., October 25, 2013 

Arlington, Va., November 5, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va., November 12, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va. November 18-19, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va. December 3-5, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va., December 10, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va., December 17, 2013 (closed)

Arlington, Va., January 8, 2014 (closed)

Arlington, Va., January 9, 2014 

STAFF-ONLY SITE VISITS

USNORTHCOM, Peterson AFB, Colo., September 9–11, 

2013

Maxwell AFB, Ala., September 25–27, 2013: School of 

Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air War College, Air 

Force Research Institute

USTRANSCOM/AMC, Scott AFB, Ill., October 21, 2013

Joint Base San Antonio-Randolf, Texas, November 12–13, 

2013

Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas, November 12–13, 

2013

Hanscom AFB, Mass., November 21, 2013: 

STAFF-ONLY MEETINGS

Air Staff (A5XW, A3CX, A6CX), August 22, October 17, 

November 26, 2013

National Governors Association, August 29, 2013

Council of Governors, August 29, 2013

National Guard Association of the United States, September 

15, 2013

Gov. Rick Snyder’s staff, September 20, 2013

Michigan Chief Information Officer, September 26, 2013

Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Homeland 

Defense Integration and DSCA and for Homeland 

Defense Strategy and Force Planning, September 26, 2013

Ohio National Guard leaders (cyber issues), October 22, 

2013

Maryland National Guard leaders (cyber issues), October 29, 

2013

USSOCOM (at Pentagon), October 29, 2013

Director, Civil Support, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense, November 11, 2013

USCYBERCOM, November 13, 2013

USSOUTHCOM (at Pentagon), December 3, 2013
70 APPENDIX F: COMMISSION ACTIVITIES

PUBLIC COMMENTS

The Commission received 256 public comments from the following sources:

Congressional 17

State and local officials 18

Current military 15

U.S. Air Force 10

Adjutants General 5

General Public 206

Industry 82 

(identifying themselves with their business interest or as Chamber of Commerce)

Academia 4

Former military 21

All other 94

Not Germane 5

(unrelated to Commission’s mission)
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 71

APPENDIX G

TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS

TO THE COMMISSION

TESTIMONY AND PUBLIC ORAL COMMENTS BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT OPEN MEETINGS

Rayburn House Office Building, Washington D.C., June 4, 2013

Major General William D. Wofford (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Arkansas and President, Adjutants General Association 

of the United States 

General (Ret.) Craig R. McKinley (ANG), President, Air Force Association 

Mr. Peter Duffy, Director of Legislation, National Guard Association of the United States 

Colonel (Ret.) Walker M. Williams, III (USAF), National President, Reserve Officers Association of the United States

Major General Emmett R. “Buddy” Titshaw Jr. (ANG), The Adjutant General of Florida

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Dick Newton (USAF), Executive Vice President, Air Force Association

Captain (Ret.) Marshall Hanson (USNR), Legislative Director, Reserve Officers Association of the United States

Major General (Ret.) Jim Bankers (USAF), President, Department of Georgia, Reserve Officers Association 

Ms. Mary Catherine Ott, Legislative Manager, Air Programs and Cyber Security, National Guard Association of the United 

States

Major General Howard M. “Mike” Edwards (ANG), The Adjutant General of Colorado

Major General (Ret.) Paul Weaver (ANG), former Director of the Air National Guard

Drury Inn Ballroom - Greenville, South Carolina, June 17, 2013

Major General Robert E. Livingston Jr. (ARNG), The Adjutant General of South Carolina

Major General Timothy Orr (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Iowa, representative to the Council of Governors

General Don Dunbar (ANG), The Adjutant General of Wisconsin, Chairman for Homeland Security and Emergency Response 

Committee

General William Reddel (ANG), The Adjutant General of New Hampshire

General David Sprynczynatyk (ARNG), The Adjutant General of North Dakota and Director of Emergency Services for North 

Dakota

Major General Edward Tonini (ANG), The Adjutant General of Kentucky

Major General Emmett R. Titshaw Jr. (ANG), The Adjutant General of Florida, Chair of the TAG’s Committee on Air 

National Guard Force Structure and Modernization

General Bill Burks (ANG), The Adjutant General of Nevada

General James Campbell (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Maine

Major General (Ret.) Philip Killey (ANG), former Adjutant General of South Dakota and Director of the Air National Guard
72 APPENDIX G: TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION

Arlington, Virginia, June 26, 2013

Major General (Ret.) Arnold Punaro (USMC), Chairman of the Reserve Force’s Policy Board but testifying in individual 

capacity as a long serving military officer, congressional staff leader, and a member of a number of boards and commissions 

that have had an impact on the Department of Defense.

Major General James N. Stewart (USAF), Director, Reserve Forces Policy Board (Major General Stewart testified before the 

Commission on August 27, 2013, presenting his personal views; on this day, he testified as a representative of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board.)

Colonel Robert Preiss (ARNG), Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor, Army National Guard

Mr. Michael Dominguez, Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analyses 

Dr. Stanley Horowitz, Assistant Division Director, Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Colin Doyle, Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Albert Robbert, Senior Policy Researcher, RAND, former active duty Air Force

Ms. Heather Hogsett, Director, National Governors’ Association Health and Homeland Security Committee

Major General Timothy Orr (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Iowa, representative to the Council of Governors

Toms River, New Jersey: Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, July 16, 2013

Congressman Jon Runyan, 3rd Congressional District, New Jersey

Brigadier General Robert C. Bolton (ANG), Commander, New Jersey Air National Guard

Mr. David Stapelkamp, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senator Robert Menendez

Mr. Michael Francis, Staff Assistant, U.S. Congressman Frank LoBiondo, 2nd Congressional District, New Jersey

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Cruff (USAF), Commander, 78th Air Refueling Squadron, 514th Air Mobility Wing, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Wenckus (USAF), Commander, 21st Air Mobility Operations Squadron, 621st Contingency 

Response Wing, JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Henske (ANG), Commander, 108th Force Support Squadron, JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, 

New Jersey

Major Mark Szatkowski (USAF), Commander, 305th Maintenance Squadron, 305th Air Mobility Wing, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Chief Master Sergeant Lisa Menser (USAF), Air Reserve Technician, Chief Enlisted Manager, 514th Maintenance Group, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Chief Master Sergeant Matt Sanders (USAF), 87th Civil Engineers Squadron, 87th Air Base Wing, JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, 

New Jersey

Chief Master Sergeant Stephen Zinner (ANG), Superintendent, 204th Intelligence Squadron, New Jersey ANG, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Senior Master Sergeant Joey Bailey (USAF), Superintendent, 605th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Mr. Joseph Donnelly, Director, Burlington County Board of Chosen Freeholders

Mr. Gerry P. Little, Director, Ocean County Board of Chosen Freeholders

Mr. Lewis Nagy, Executive Director, Defense Enhancement Coalition

Mr. David McKeon, Planning Director, Ocean County, New Jersey

Ms. Nino DePasquale, President, The Armed Forces Heritage House Museum
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 73

Arlington, Virginia, July 23, 2013

General (Ret.) Ronald R. Fogleman (USAF), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Senator Lisa Murkowski, Alaska

Lieutenant General Michael R. Moeller (USAF), Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs (A8), 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Major General Joseph G. Balskus (USAF), Military Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs 

(A8), Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Mr. Russell Rumbaugh, Director for Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense, Senior Associate at the Stimson Center

Mr. Mark Gunzinger, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Congressman Steve Palazzo, 4th Congressional District, Mississippi

Mr. Al Garver, Executive Director, Enlisted Association of the National Guard

Columbus, Ohio: Wright-Patterson AFB, Mansfield ANG, Springfield ANG, Rickenbacker ANG, July 30, 2013

The Honorable Mary Taylor, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Ohio

Major General Deborah Ashenhurst (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Ohio

Ms. Nancy Dragani, Director, Ohio Emergency Management Agency

Brigadier General Mark Stephens (ANG), Director of Joint Staff, Ohio National Guard

State Senator Chris Widener, Senate District 10, Ohio

State Representative Rick Perales, House District 73, Ohio

Colonel (Ret.) Robert Decker (ARNG), Chairman, Toledo Military Affairs Commission

State Senator Frank LaRose, Senate District 27, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hrynciw (ANG), Operations Flight Commander, 200th Red Horse Squadron, 

Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Major General Joe Logan (ANG), Commander, 200th Red Horse Squadron, Detachment 1, Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Master Sergeant Mike Schaefer (ANG), Recruiting Office Supervisor, 179th Airlift Wing, Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Major Robert Cunningham (ANG), Commander, 179th Maintenance Squadron, Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Major Philip Townsend (USAF), 757th Airlift Squadron, Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Chief Master Sergeant Troy Rhoades (USAF), Command Chief Master Sergeant, 910th Airlift Wing, Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Sarachene (USAF), Commander, 757th Airlift Squadron, 910th Air Wing, Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel John Boccieri (USAF), Commander 773rd Air Squadron Assistance Squadron, 910th Airlift Wing, 

Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Lieutenant Brady Minich (ANG), Maintenance Operation Officer, 121st Air Refueling Wing, Rickenbacker ANGB, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Rob Mitrix (USAF), Commander, 89th Airlift Squadron, 445th Air Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Chief Master Sergeant Peri Rogawski (USAF), Command Chief, 444th Airlift Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Eric Kaufman (ANG), 121st Air Refueling Wing, Rickenbacker ANGB, Ohio

Chief Master Sergeant John Mazza (USAF), 88th Air Base Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Buddelmeyer (USAF), Chief of Safety, 88th Air Base Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Chief Master Sergeant Mark Poole (ANG), Operations Chief, 251st Alderson Reporting Company, Cyber Engineering 

Installation Group, Springfield ANGB, Ohio

Master Sergeant Paul Wong (ANG), 125th Intelligence Squadron, 178th Fighter Wing, Springfield ANGB, Ohio

Master Sergeant Steven Rybitski (USAF), Superintendent of Plans and Programs, 88th Security Forces Squadron, 

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell Richardson (USAF), Commander, 89th Airlift Squadron, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
74 APPENDIX G: TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION

Mr. Michael Dalby, President and CEO of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, former Air Force

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) John McCance (USAF), Air Reserve Technician, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Mr. Jeffrey Hoagland, President and CEO, Dayton Development Coalition

State Representative Mike Sheehy, House District 46, Ohio, former U.S. Army, Retired Adjutant General

Colonel (Ret.) Joseph E. Zeis Jr. (USAF), Executive Vice President of the Dayton Development Coalition, 

Chair of the Ohio Air, Space, and Aviation Council

Oklahoma City: Tinker AFB, August 20, 2013

Major Scott C. Czuba (USAF), Commander, 552nd Maintenance Squadron, 552nd Air Control Wing, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Chief Master Sergeant Patrick Wilson (USAF), Superintendent, 552 Air Control Group, 552nd Air Control Wing, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Major Carl V. Jones III (USAF), Commander, 552nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Senior Master Sergeant Taunya Latrice Avery (USAF), Production Supervisor, 507th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Lieutenant Colonel Alan L. Priest (USAF), Director of Maintenance, 513th Air Control Group, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Lieutenant Colonel Steven England (USAF), Director of Operations, 970th Airborne Air Control Squadron, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Major Christopher J. Davis (ANG), Commander, 137th Logistics Readiness Squadron, Will Rogers ANGB, Oklahoma

Chief Master Sergeant Jeffrey Glenn Elders (ANG), Superintendent for Flight Line, 137th Air Refueling Wing, 

Will Rogers ANGB, Oklahoma

The Honorable Mary Fallin, Governor of Oklahoma

Major General Myles Deering (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Oklahoma

Brigadier General Gregory L. Ferguson (ANG), Assistant Adjutant General of Oklahoma

Senator James Inhofe, Oklahoma

Major General (Ret.) Rita Aragon (ANG), Secretary of the Veterans Administration of Oklahoma, Secretary of the Military, 

former Commander of the Oklahoma Air Guard

Mayor Jack Fry, Mayor, Midwest City, Oklahoma

Mr. Kurt Foreman, Executive Vice President of Economic Development, Greater Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce

Arlington, Virginia, August 27, 2013

Major General (Ret.) Tommy Dyches (USAF), Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Reserve Matters

Major General (Ret.) H.H. “Bugs” Forsythe (USAF), Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, 9th Air Force, 

Shaw AFB, South Carolina

Major General (Ret.) Andy Love (ANG), former Assistant to the Commander of U.S. Northern Command for 

National Guard Matters 

Major General (Ret.) Richard A. “Dick” Platt (ANG), former Assistant to the Director of the Air National Guard

Major General (Ret.) Frank Scoggins (ANG), former Assistant Adjutant General of the Washington National Guard

Major General (Ret.) Andrew Davis (USMC), Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association of the United States 

Major General James N. Stewart (USAF), (Major General Stewart testified before the Commission on June 26, 2013, 

as a representative of the Reserve Forces Policy Board; on this day, he presented his personal views.) 

Dr. Scott Comes, Deputy Director for Program Evaluation, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 75

Lieutenant General James F. “J.J.” Jackson (USAF), Chief, Air Force Reserve

Mr. Matthew Schaffer, Deputy Director, Analysis & Integration, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Selfridge, Michigan, September 14, 2013

Major General Gregory J. Vadnais (ARNG), The Adjutant General for Michigan

Brigadier General Leonard Isabelle (ANG), Commander, Michigan Air National Guard 

Colonel Michael T. Thomas (ANG), Commander, 127th Wing, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan

Colonel Ronald W. Wilson (ANG), Commander, 110th Airlift Wing, W.K. Kellogg ANGB, Michigan 

Colonel Bryan Teff (ANG), Commander, Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, Michigan 

Colonel Sean Southworth (ANG), Commander, 217th Air Operations Group, W.K. Kellogg ANGB, Michigan

Lieutenant Colonel Matt Trumble (ANG), Director of Operations, Grayling Air Gunnery Range, 

Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, Michigan 

Lieutenant Colonel Constantine Leon (ANG), Commander, 127th Comptroller Flight, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan

Chief Master Sergeant Raymond Carroll (ANG), 127th Civil Engineer Squadron, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan

Dr. Joe Schwarz, Battle Creek Unlimited, former Member of Congress

The Honorable Matt Waligora, Mayor of Alpena, Michigan

Brigadier General (Ret.) Mike Peplinski (ANG), former Commander, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan, 

on behalf of employers of the National Guard

Colonel (Ret.) Rodger Seidel (ANG), former Commander, W.K. Kellogg ANGB, Michigan

Ms. Jan Frantz, Executive Director, BC CAL KAL Inland Port Development Corporation

Mr. Philip Handelman, Historian, Selfridge Base Community Council

Mr. Bill Servial, Chairman, Economic Development Corporation of Harrison Township

Mr. Alan Parks, Garrison Manager, U.S. Army Garrison, Detroit Arsenal, was unable to attend but 

submitted a statement to the meeting.

Captain Chris Kelenske, Deputy Director, Michigan State Police, was unable to attend but 

later submitted his statement as a public comment.

Arlington, Virginia, October 24–25, 2013 

Lieutenant General James F. “J.J.” Jackson (USAF), Chief, Air Force Reserve

Lieutenant General Stanley E. Clarke III (USAF), Director, Air National Guard

Chief Master Sergeant James A. Cody (USAF), Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force

Mr. Richard O. Wightman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Mr. Paul Patrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization)

Mr. Ronald G. Young, Director (Family and Employer Programs and Policy), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs

Mr. Trey Carson, Principal Director (Resources), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Mr. Todd Rosenblum, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs

Mr. Thomas LaCrosse, Director of Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs

Chief Master Sergeant Cameron B. Kirksey (USAF), Command Chief Master Sergeant, Air Force Reserve

Chief Master Sergeant James W. Hotaling (ANG), Command Chief Master Sergeant, Air National Guard
76 APPENDIX G: TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION

Arlington, Virginia, January 9, 2014

The Honorable Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force

Colonel Ralph J. Waite IV, USAF, Analyst, Tactical Air Forces Division, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense

Dr. F. Matthew Woodward, Analyst, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Ms. Elain Simmons, Director, Land Forces Division, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense

Peter DeFluri, Director, Projection Forces Division, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense

Dr. Scott Comes, Acting Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION AT CLOSED MEETINGS

Arlington, Virginia, June 3, 2013

Lieutenant General James F. “J.J.” Jackson (USAF), Chief, Air Force Reserve

Lieutenant General Stanley E. Clarke III (USAF), Director, Air National Guard

The Honorable Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force

General Mark A. Welsh III (USAF), Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force

Major General Anthony Rock (USAF), Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy ( J-5), The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Ms. Lisa Disbrow, Vice Director, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment ( J-8), The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Michael Altomare, Chief, Force Division ( J-8), The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Arlington, Virginia, June 25, 2013

Ms. Christine Fox, Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

General Frank J. Grass (USA), Chief, National Guard Bureau 

Major General Brian Meenan (USAF), Total Force Task Force (TF2) 

Major General John Posner (USAF), Total Force Task Force (TF2)

Major General Joseph G. Balskus (USAF), Total Force Task Force (TF2)

Arlington, Virginia, July 22, 2013

Mr. David Ochmanek, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Major General Timothy Ray (USAF), Director, Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy 

Major General James McLaughlin (USAF), Commander, 24th Air Force and Commander, Air Forces Cyber, 

JB San Antonio–Lackland, Texas
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 77

Arlington, Virginia, September 26, 2013 

General Charles H. Jacoby Jr. (USA), Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and 

U.S. Northern Command (via secure video teleconference)

Arlington, Virginia, October 24, 2013

Major General Brian Meenan (USAF), Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois 

and member of the Total Force Task Force (TF2)

Major General John Posner (USAF), Director of Global Power Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 

Acquisition, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and member of the Total Force Task Force (TF2)

Major General Mark Bartman (ANG), Assistant Adjutant General–Air, Ohio National Guard, and member of the Total Force 

Task Force (TF2)

Arlington, Virginia, November 18–19, 2013

The Honorable Eric Fanning, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Air Force

General Mark A. Welsh III (USAF), Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. 
78 APPENDIX G: TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION

Mr. Michael Altomare, Chief, Force Division ( J-8), The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Major General (Ret.) Rita Aragon (ANG), Secretary of the Veterans Administration of Oklahoma, Secretary of the Military, 

former Commander of the Oklahoma Air Guard

Major General Deborah Ashenhurst (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Ohio

Senior Master Sergeant Taunya Latrice Avery (USAF), Production Supervisor, 507th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Senior Master Sergeant Joey Bailey (USAF), Superintendent, 605th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Major General Joseph G. Balskus, Military Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs (A8), 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Total Force Task Force (TF2) (twice)

Major General (Ret.) Jim Bankers (USAF), President, Department of Georgia, Reserve Officers Association 

Major General Mark Bartman (ANG), Assistant Adjutant General–Air, Ohio National Guard, 

and member of the Total Force Task Force (TF2)

Lieutenant Colonel John Boccieri (USAF), Commander 773rd Air Squadron Assistance Squadron, 910th Airlift Wing, 

Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Brigadier General Robert C. Bolton (ANG), Commander, New Jersey Air National Guard 

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Buddelmeyer (USAF), Chief of Safety, 88th Air Base Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

General Bill Burks (ANG), The Adjutant General of Nevada

General James Campbell (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Maine

Chief Master Sergeant Raymond Carroll (ANG), 127th Civil Engineer Squadron, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan

Mr. Trey Carson, Principal Director (Resources), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Lieutenant General Stanley E. Clarke III, Director, Air National Guard (twice)

Chief Master Sergeant James A. Cody (USAF), Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force

Dr. Scott Comes, Acting Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Office of the Secretary of Defense (twice, 

first time as Deputy Director for Program Evaluation for CAPE)

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Cruff (USAF), Commander, 78th Air Refueling Squadron, 514th Air Mobility Wing, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Major Robert Cunningham (ANG), Commander, 179th Maintenance Squadron, Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Major Scott C. Czuba (USAF), Commander, 552nd Maintenance Squadron, 552nd Air Control Wing, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Mr. Michael Dalby, President and CEO of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, former Air Force

Major General (Ret.) Andrew Davis (USMC), Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association of the United States 

Major Christopher J. Davis (ANG), Commander, 137th Logistics Readiness Squadron, Will Rogers ANGB, Oklahoma

Colonel (Ret.) Robert Decker (ARNG), Chairman, Toledo Military Affairs Commission

Major General Myles Deering (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Oklahoma

Peter DeFluri, Director, Projection Forces Division, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense Ms. Nino DePasquale, President, The Armed Forces Heritage House Museum

Ms. Lisa Disbrow, Vice Director, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment ( J-8), The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Michael Dominguez, Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analyses

The Honorable Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Joseph Donnelly, Director, Burlington County Board of Chosen Freeholders

Dr. Colin Doyle, Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses

Ms. Nancy Dragani, Director, Ohio Emergency Management Agency

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION (ALPHABETICAL)
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 79

Mr. Peter Duffy, Director of Legislation, National Guard Association of the United States 

General Don Dunbar (ANG), The Adjutant General of Wisconsin, Chairman for Homeland Security and 

Emergency Response Committee

Major General (Ret.) Tommy Dyches (USAF), Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Reserve Matters

Major General Howard M. “Mike” Edwards (ANG), The Adjutant General of Colorado

Chief Master Sergeant Jeffrey Glenn Elders (ANG), Superintendent for Flight Line, 137th Air Refueling Wing, 

Will Rogers ANGB, Oklahoma

Lieutenant Colonel Steven England (USAF), Director of Operations, 970th Airborne Air Control Squadron, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

The Honorable Mary Fallin, Governor of Oklahoma

The Honorable Eric Fanning, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Air Force

Brigadier General Gregory L. Ferguson (ANG), Assistant Adjutant General of Oklahoma

General (Ret.) Ronald R. Fogleman (USAF), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Mr. Kurt Foreman, Executive Vice President of Economic Development, Greater Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce

Major General (Ret.) H.H. “Bugs” Forsythe (USAF), Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, 9th Air Force, 

Shaw AFB, South Carolina

Ms. Christine Fox, Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

Mr. Michael Francis, Staff Assistant, U.S. Congressman Frank LoBiondo of the 2nd Congressional District of New Jersey

Ms. Jan Frantz, Executive Director, BC CAL KAL Inland Port Development Corporation

Mayor Jack Fry, Mayor, Midwest City, Oklahoma

Mr. Al Garver, Executive Director, Enlisted Association of the National Guard

General Frank J. Grass (USA), Chief, National Guard Bureau 

Mr. Mark Gunzinger, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Mr. Philip Handelman, Historian, Selfridge Base Community Council

Captain (Ret.) Marshall Hanson (USNR), Legislative Director, Reserve Officers Association of the United States

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Henske (ANG), Commander, 108th Force Support Squadron, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Mr. Jeffrey Hoagland, President and CEO, Dayton Development Coalition

Ms. Heather Hogsett, Director, National Governors’ Association Health and Homeland Security Committee

Dr. Stanley Horowitz, Assistant Division Director, Institute for Defense Analyses

Chief Master Sergeant James W. Hotaling (ANG), Command Chief Master Sergeant, Air National Guard

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hrynciw (ANG), Operations Flight Commander, 200th Red Horse Squadron, 

Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Senator James Inhofe, Oklahoma

Brigadier General Leonard Isabelle (ANG), Commander, Michigan Air National Guard 

Lieutenant General James F. “J.J.” Jackson (USAF), Chief, Air Force Reserve (three times)

General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command 

(via secure video teleconference)

The Honorable Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force

Major Carl V. Jones III (USAF), Commander, 552nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Lieutenant Colonel Eric Kaufman (ANG), 121st Air Refueling Wing, Rickenbacker ANGB, Ohio

Captain Chris Kelenske, Deputy Director, Michigan State Police, was unable to attend but later submitted his statement as a 

public comment

Major General (Ret.) Philip Killey (ANG), former Adjutant General of South Dakota and Director of the Air National Guard

Chief Master Sergeant Cameron B. Kirksey (USAF), Command Chief Master Sergeant, Air Force Reserve
80 APPENDIX G: TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION

Mr. Thomas LaCrosse, Director of Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs

State Senator Frank LaRose, Senate District 27, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Constantine Leon (ANG), Commander, 127th Comptroller Flight, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan

Mr. Gerry P. Little, Director, Ocean County Board of Chosen Freeholders

Major General Robert E. Livingston, Jr. (ARNG), The Adjutant General of South Carolina

Major General Joe Logan (ANG), Commander, 200th Red Horse Squadron, Detachment 1, Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Major General (Ret.) Andy Love (ANG), former Assistant to the Commander of USNORTHCOM for 

National Guard Matters 

Chief Master Sergeant John Mazza (USAF), 88th Air Base Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) John McCance (USAF), Air Reserve Technician, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Mr. David McKeon, Planning Director, Ocean County, New Jersey

General (Ret.) Craig R. McKinley (ANG), President, Air Force Association 

Major General James McLaughlin (USAF), Commander, 24th Air Force and Commander, Air Forces Cyber, 

JB San Antonio–Lackland, Texas

Major General Brian Meenan, Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., 

and member of the Total Force Task Force (TF2) (twice)

Chief Master Sergeant Lisa Menser (USAF), Air Reserve Technician, Chief Enlisted Manager, 514th Maintenance Group, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

Lieutenant Brady Minich (ANG), Maintenance Operation Officer, 121st Air Refueling Wing, Rickenbacker ANGB, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Rob Mitrix (USAF), Commander, 89th Airlift Squadron, 445th Air Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Lieutenant General Michael R. Moeller (USAF), Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs (A8), 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Senator Lisa Murkowski, Alaska

Mr. Lewis Nagy, Executive Director, Defense Enhancement Coalition

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Dick Newton (USAF), Executive Vice President, Air Force Association

Mr. David Ochmanek, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Major General Timothy Orr (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Iowa, representative to the Council of Governors (twice)

Ms. Mary Catherine Ott, Legislative Manager, Air Programs and Cyber Security, National Guard Association 

of the United States

Congressman Steve Palazzo, 4th Congressional District, Mississippi

Mr. Alan Parks, Garrison Manager, U.S. Army Garrison, Detroit Arsenal, was unable to attend but submitted 

a statement to the meeting 

Mr. Paul Patrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization)

Brigadier General (Ret.) Mike Peplinski (ANG), former Commander, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan, on behalf of 

employers of the National Guard

State Representative Rick Perales, House District 73, Ohio

Major General (Ret.) Richard A. “Dick” Platt (ANG), former Assistant to the Director of the Air National Guard

Chief Master Sergeant Mark Poole (ANG), Operations Chief, 251st Alderson Reporting Company, 

Cyber Engineering Installation Group, Springfield ANGB, Ohio

Major General John Posner, Director of Global Power Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 

Acquisition, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and member of the Total Force Task Force (TF2) (twice)

Colonel Robert Preiss (ARNG), Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor, Army National Guard

Lieutenant Colonel Alan L. Priest (USAF), Director of Maintenance, 513th Air Control Group, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Major General (Ret.) Arnold Punaro (USMC), Chairman of the Reserve Force’s Policy Board but testifying in individual 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 81

capacity as a long serving military officer, congressional staff leader, and a member of a number of boards and commissions 

that have had an impact on the Department of Defense.

Major General Timothy Ray (USAF), Director, Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy 

General William Reddel (ANG), The Adjutant General of New Hampshire

Chief Master Sergeant Troy Rhoades (USAF), Command Chief Master Sergeant, 910th Airlift Wing, Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell Richardson (USAF), Commander, 89th Airlift Squadron, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Dr. Albert Robbert, RAND, Senior Policy Researcher, former active duty Air Force

Major General Anthony J. Rock (USAF), Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy ( J-5), The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Chief Master Sergeant Peri Rogawski (USAF), Command Chief, 444th Airlift Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Mr. Todd Rosenblum, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs

Mr. Russell Rumbaugh, Director for Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense, Senior Associate at the Stimson Center

Congressman Jon Runyan, 3rd Congressional District, New Jersey

Master Sergeant Steven Rybitski (USAF), Superintendent of Plans and Programs, 88th Security Forces Squadron, 

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Chief Master Sergeant Matt Sanders (USAF), 87th Civil Engineers Squadron, 87th Air Base Wing, JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, 

New Jersey

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Sarachene (USAF), Commander, 757th Airlift Squadron, 910th Air Wing, Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Master Sergeant Mike Schaefer (ANG), Recruiting Office Supervisor, 179th Airlift Wing, Mansfield Lahm ANGB, Ohio

Mr. Matthew Schaffer, Deputy Director, Analysis & Integration, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Dr. Joe Schwarz, Battle Creek Unlimited, former Member of Congress

Major General (Ret.) Frank Scoggins (ANG), former Assistant Adjutant General of the Washington National Guard

Colonel (Ret.) Rodger Seidel (ANG), former Commander, W.K. Kellogg ANGB, Michigan

Mr. Bill Servial, Chairman, Economic Development Corporation of Harrison Township

State Representative Mike Sheehy, House District 46, Ohio, former U.S. Army, Retired Adjutant General

Ms. Elain Simmons, Director, Land Forces Division, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense Colonel Sean Southworth (ANG), Commander, 217th Air Operations Group, W.K. Kellogg ANGB, Michigan

General David Sprynczynatyk (ARNG), The Adjutant General of North Dakota and Director of Emergency 

Services for North Dakota

Mr. David Stapelkamp, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senator Robert Menendez

Brigadier General Mark Stephens (ANG), Director of Joint Staff, Ohio National Guard

Major General James N. Stewart (USAF), Director, Reserve Forces Policy Board (twice, second time presenting 

his personal views)

Major Mark Szatkowski (USAF), Commander, 305th Maintenance Squadron, 305th Air Mobility Wing, 

JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

The Honorable Mary Taylor, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Ohio

Colonel Bryan Teff (ANG), Commander, Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, Michigan 

Colonel Michael T. Thomas (ANG), Commander, 127th Wing, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan

Major General Emmett R. “Buddy” Titshaw Jr. (ANG), The Adjutant General of Florida, Chair of the TAG’s 

Committee on Air National Guard Force Structure and Modernization (twice)

Major General Edward Tonini (ANG), The Adjutant General of Kentucky

Major Philip Townsend (USAF), 757th Airlift Squadron, Youngstown ARS, Ohio

Lieutenant Colonel Matt Trumble (ANG), Director of Operations, Grayling Air Gunnery Range, 

Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, Michigan 

Major General Gregory J. Vadnais (ARNG), The Adjutant General for Michigan
82 APPENDIX G: TESTIMONY AND ORAL PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION

Colonel Ralph J. Waite IV, USAF, Analyst, Tactical Air Forces Division, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Matt Waligora, Mayor of Alpena, Michigan

Major General (Ret.) Paul Weaver (ANG), former Director of the Air National Guard

General Mark A. Welsh III (USAF), Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force (twice)

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Wenckus (USAF), Commander, 21st Air Mobility Operations Squadron, 

621st Contingency Response Wing, JB McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

State Senator Chris Widener, Senate District 10, Ohio

Mr. Richard O. Wightman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Colonel (Ret.) Walker M. Williams, III (USAF), National President, Reserve Officers Association of the United States

Chief Master Sergeant Patrick Wilson (USAF), Superintendent, 552 Air Control Group, 552nd Air Control Wing, 

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Colonel Ronald W. Wilson (ANG), Commander, 110th Airlift Wing, W.K. Kellogg ANGB, Michigan 

Major General William D. Wofford (ARNG), The Adjutant General of Arkansas and President, 

Adjutants General Association of the United States 

Master Sergeant Paul Wong (ANG), 125th Intelligence Squadron, 178th Fighter Wing, Springfield ANGB, Ohio

Dr. F. Matthew Woodward, Analyst, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. Ronald G. Young, Director (Family and Employer Programs and Policy), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs

Colonel (Ret.) Joseph E. Zeis Jr. (USAF), Executive Vice President of the Dayton Development Coalition, 

Chair of the Ohio Air, Space, and Aviation Council

Chief Master Sergeant Stephen Zinner, Superintendent, 204th Intelligence Squadron, New Jersey Air National Guard
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 83

APPENDIX H

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

Glossary of Terms

ACTIVE ASSOCIATION

An integration model that combines 

Active and Reserve elements, with 

the Reserve Component retaining 

principal responsibility for a weapon 

system and sharing the equipment 

with one or more Active Component 

units. Today, the Active and Reserve 

units retain separate organizational 

structures and chains of command.

ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC)

The unrestricted, continuously available 

personnel, units, and equipment of 

the Air Force. 10 U.S.C. §8075 calls 

this component the Regular Air Force, 

but generally the services use the term 

Active.

ACTIVE DUTY

Full-time duty in the active military 

service, including members of the 

Reserve Component serving on active 

duty or full-time training duty (but 

not including full-time National Guard 

duty serving the state).

ACTIVE GUARD AND RESERVE (AGR)

National Guard and Reserve members 

who are on active duty providing 

full-time support to National Guard, 

Reserve, and Active Component 

organizations for the purpose of 

organizing, administering, recruiting, 

instructing, or training the Reserve 

Component. 

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC)

The forces of the Air National Guard 

and Air Force Reserve. 

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC) 

ASSOCIATION

An integration model that combines 

two Reserve Component elements, 

with one retaining principal 

responsibility for a weapon system 

and sharing the equipment with one 

or more of the other component’s 

units. Today, the units retain separate 

organizational structures and chains of 

command.

CAPABILITY

The ability to maintain the necessary 

level and duration of operational 

activity to achieve military objectives. 

Entails force structure, modernization, 

readiness, and sustainability. 

CAPACITY

The force structure required to meet a 

single or multiple military objectives. 

CLASSIC ASSOCIATION

An integration model that combines 

Active and Reserve elements, with the 

Active Component retaining principal 

responsibility for a weapon system and 

sharing the equipment with one or 

more Reserve Component units. Today, 

the Active and Reserve units retain 

separate organizational structures and 

chains of command.

COMPLEX CATASTROPHE

The Department of Defense defines 

a complex catastrophe as a natural 

or man-made incident, including 

cyberspace attack, power grid 

failure, and terrorism, which results 

in cascading failures of multiple 

interdependent, critical, life-sustaining 

infrastructure sectors and causes 

extraordinary levels of mass casualties, 

damage, or disruption severely affecting 

the population, environment, economy, 

public health, national morale, response 

efforts, or government functions.

CONTINUUM OF SERVICE

A concept that removes or mitigates 

legal, procedural, and cultural barriers 

for personnel to transition among 

different components over the course 

of a career without derailing their 

professional advancement while also 

maximizing the service’s investment in 

that individual.

DEFENSE PLANNING SCENARIOS 

(DPS)

Secretary of Defense-approved 

depictions of threats to international 

security, corresponding missions for 

U.S. military forces, and strategic-level 

concepts of operation for carrying out 

these missions. Services use DPS as a 

starting point for analyses supporting 

planning, programming, and 

acquisition efforts.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL 

AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

Support provided by the Department 

of Defense, including the National 

Guard and other U.S. federal military 

forces, in response to requests from 

civil authorities for assistance with 

domestic emergencies, law enforcement 

support, and other domestic activities, 

or from qualifying entities for special 

events. National Guard forces may be 

utilized when the Secretary of Defense 
84 APPENDIX H: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

in coordination with the Governors of 

the affected states, elects and requests 

to use those forces under Title 32.

DEPLOY-TO-DWELL

Ratio of time Active Component 

military organizations spend deployed 

compared to the amount of time they 

spend not deployed. Thus, 1:2 means 

that for the period deployed the 

organization would spend two periods 

at home. (For Reserve Component 

forces, see Mobilization-to-Dwell.)

DESIGNED OPERATIONAL 

CAPABILITY (DOC)

The mission for which a measured 

unit has been equipped, organized, 

or designed. A measured unit is an 

Active, Reserve, or Air Guard unit with 

a descriptor code indicating combat, 

combat support, or combat service 

support.

DRILL STATUS GUARDSMAN

A member of the National Guard who 

drills one weekend per month and 15 

days per year. A drill status Guardsman 

may be called upon by the Governor 

in the event of a natural or manmade 

disaster (under state active duty or, if 

approved by the Secretary of Defense, 

under U.S. Code Title 32), and may be 

activated by the President for federal 

duty (under U.S. Code Title 10). 

DUAL STATUS COMMANDER (DSC)

A commander who may, by law, serve 

in two statuses, federal and state, 

simultaneously. In state status, the 

DSC is a member of the state chain 

of command, subject to the orders of 

the Governor and Adjutant General of 

the DSC’s state, and, on their behalf, 

exercises command of assigned state 

National Guard forces. At the same 

time, the DSC exercises command of 

assigned federal forces on behalf of the 

President through a chain of command 

established by a combatant commander. 

Both the President and Governor must 

consent to the dual status. 

DUAL STATUS MILITARY 

TECHNICIAN 

A Reserve Component member who 

serves in a position as both a full-time 

federal civil service employee and as a 

traditional Reservist. Generally, during 

the week, the technician receives 

civilian compensation, but during drill 

periods and annual training receives 

military compensation. Such fulltime employees serve in organizing, 

administering, instructing, or training 

of the Selected Reserve or in the 

maintenance and repair of supplies 

and equipment. The Air Force Reserve 

Command refers to these personnel as 

Air Reserve Technicians or ARTs. 

DWELL

For the Active Component, dwell 

is the period between mandatory 

deployments. For the Reserve 

Component, dwell is the period 

between the release from involuntary 

active duty and the reporting date for 

a subsequent tour of involuntary active 

duty. For the Reserve Component, 

dwell includes any voluntary active 

duty performed between the two 

periods of involuntary active duty, 

and may include any Individual Skill 

Training Required for Deployment and 

Post-Mobilization Leave that has been 

excluded by the Secretary of Defense 

from counting against the 12-month 

mobilization period.

END STRENGTH

The number of personnel authorized by 

legislation for a given fiscal year.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The military service’s interconnected 

framework—Active, Reserve and 

Guard components, equipment, 

personnel, and real estate—that 

exists to accomplish specific missions 

in support of the President and the 

Secretary of Defense.

“FULL-TIME” FORCES

A member of the Active Component, 

an Active Guard and Reserve member, 

or a Dual Status Military Technician. 

(See also “Part-Time” Forces.)

HIGH-DEMAND, LOW-DENSITY 

ASSET

A combat, combat support, or service 

support capability, unit, system, 

or occupational specialty that the 

Secretary of Defense determines has 

funding, equipment, or personnel levels 

that are substantially below the levels 

required to fully meet or sustain actual 

or expected operational requirements 

set by regional commanders 

HOLLOW FORCE

Military forces that appear missionready but, upon examination, 

suffer from shortages of personnel, 

equipment, and maintenance or from 

deficiencies in training.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

The protection of U.S. sovereignty, 

territory, domestic population, and 

critical infrastructure against external 

threats or aggression or other threats as 

identified by the President. 

HOMELAND SECURITY

A concerted national effort to prevent 

terrorist attacks within the United 

States; reduce America’s vulnerability 

to terrorism, major disasters, and other 

emergencies; and minimize the damage 

and recover from attacks, major 

disasters, and other emergencies that 

occur. 

INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION 

AUGMENTEE (IMA)

Traditional members of the Air 

Force Reserve assigned to an Active 

Component, Selective Service System, 

or Federal Emergency Management 

Agency organization’s billet. IMAs 

drill and deploy with that Active unit. 

An individual Reservist attending 

drills who receives training and is 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 85

pre-assigned to an Active Component 

organization, a Selective Service 

System, or a Federal Emergency 

Management Agency billet that 

must be filled on, or shortly after, 

mobilization. IMAs train on a parttime basis with these organizations 

to prepare for mobilization. Inactive 

duty training for IMAs is decided by 

component policy and can vary from 

zero to 48 drills a year.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR)

A manpower pool consisting of 

individuals who have had some training 

or who have served previously in the 

Active Component or in the Selected 

Reserve and may have some period 

of their military service obligation 

remaining. Members may voluntarily 

participate in training for retirement 

points and promotion with or without 

pay.

INTEGRATED WING (I-WING)

An integration model that combines 

Active and Reserve elements within 

one organizational structure and chain 

of command, with members of all 

components contributing to a common 

unit mission.

LIFE-CYCLE COSTS

(1) The total cost of a piece of 

equipment from its development, 

fielding, and sustainment through 

retirement. (2) The total cost of an 

Airman in service to the nation, from 

entry into service through death, 

including the costs of training, service, 

and benefits. 

MAN-DAY

Military funding paid to Reservists 

to perform duty over and above their 

minimum number of days for inactive 

duty training and annual tour. Each 

Man-Day pays the member one 

day’s base pay, housing allowance, 

subsistence allowance, and other 

appropriate military pay entitlements. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL 

APPROPRIATION (MPA)

Active Component military funding 

paid to Reservists to support the 

short-term needs of the Active force. 

Each Man-Day pays the member one 

day’s base pay, housing allowance, 

subsistence allowance, and other 

appropriate military pay entitlements.

MOBILIZATION-TO-DWELL

Ratio of time Reserve Component 

organizations or individuals spend 

mobilized for active duty compared 

to the amount of time they spend in 

a ready reserve state. Thus, 1:5 means 

that for each period mobilized the 

organization or individual would spend 

five periods at home.

MODERNIZATION

Updating an existing system to improve 

operational capability or technical 

performance.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY 

(NMS)

A document approved by the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

for distributing and applying military 

power to attain national security 

strategy and national defense strategy 

objectives. 

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 

(NSS)

A document approved by the President 

of the United States for developing, 

applying, and coordinating the 

instruments of national power to 

achieve objectives that contribute to 

national security. 

OPERATING TEMPO (OPTEMPO)

A measure of the pace of an operation 

or operations in terms of equipment 

usage. For example, the Air Force 

measures aircraft flying hours to gauge 

OPTEMPO. 

OPERATIONAL RESERVE

A term used to describe the current 

situation in which the Air Force holds 

Reserve Component forces to the 

same standards of readiness as the 

Active Component, and regularly 

rotates these forces onto active duty 

service, whether in times of war or 

in peacetime. Joint Publication ( JP) 

5-0 defines Operational Reserve as 

an “emergency reserve of men and/or 

materiel established for the support of a 

specific operation.” 

“PART-TIME” FORCES

Forces comprised primarily of 

traditional Reservists or drill status 

Guardsmen. The Commission 

recognizes that most, if not all, 

traditional Guardsmen and Reservists 

in the Air Force dedicate themselves 

fully to their service’s core principles 

and ideals. This report uses this term 

only to differentiate the pay status of 

those not on full-time active duty.

PERSONNEL TEMPO (PERSTEMPO)

The time an individual spends away 

from home station, whether for 

deployment, unit training events, 

special operations and exercises, or 

mission support temporary duty. 

RAINBOWING

When personnel and aircraft from 

more than one unit combine to 

form one designated unit in order 

to meet the requirements of an Air 

Expeditionary Force, 

READINESS

The ability of a military unit to respond 

to and meet the demands of missions 

assigned in its Designed Operational 

Capability statement.

READY RESERVE

Individuals and units liable for active 

duty. This includes the Selected 

Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and 

inactive National Guard.
86 APPENDIX H: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

RECAPITALIZATION

Replacing an existing weapon 

system with another weapon system. 

Frequently, the new weapon system is 

more modern than the existing weapon 

system. 

RESERVE PERSONNEL 

APPROPRIATION (RPA)

That portion of the Military Personnel 

Appropriation designated to pay 

Reserve and Guard members, including 

drill and training pay and allowances. 

SELECTED RESERVE

Those units and individuals within 

the Ready Reserve designated by their 

respective Services and approved by 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential 

to initial wartime missions that they 

have priority over all other Reserves. 

Selected Reservists actively participate 

in a Reserve Component training 

program. The Selected Reserve also 

includes persons performing initial 

active duty for training.

STRATEGIC RESERVE

A Reserve force intended for use during 

later stages of a protracted or large-scale 

operation but not on a day-to-day basis.

SURGE

A rapid or concerted increase in the 

commitment of forces to fend off 

an attack, meet a sudden demand, 

or accomplish a strategic military 

objective. 

TOTAL FORCE

All U.S. Air Force organizations, units, 

and individuals—Active, Reserve, 

Guard, and civilian—that provide the 

capabilities to support the Department 

of Defense in implementing the 

national security strategy.

TRADITIONAL RESERVIST

A member of the Air Force Reserve 

who drills one weekend per month 

and two weeks per year. A traditional 

Reservist may be activated for 

contingency operations or extended 

assignments.

WARM BASE

An installation or part of an installation 

without permanent operational forces; 

such installations are maintained at a 

level that will allow rapid re-occupation 

by operational forces. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 87

1st Lt First Lieutenant

2nd Lt Second Lieutenant

A-10 Fairchild Republic A-10 

Thunderbolt II, a twinengine close-air support 

attack jet aircraft 

A1C Airman First Class

ABU Airman Battle Uniform

AC Active Component

ACC Air Combat Command

ACO Airspace Control Order

ACS Agile Combat Support

ACSC Air Command and Staff 

College

ADAG Aircraft Design and 

Aeroflight Dynamics 

Group

ADCON Administrative Control

A SUPT DSW Active Duty for 

Special Work

AEF Air Expeditionary Force

AETC Air Education and 

Training Command 

(formerly ATC)

AFA Air Force Association

AFB Air Force Base

AFGSC Air Force Global Strike 

Command

AFIPPS Air Force Integrated 

Personnel and Pay System

AFRC Air Force Reserve 

Command

AFSC Air Force Specialty Codes

AFSPC Air Force Space 

Command

AFFOR Air Force forces

AFMC Air Force Materiel 

Command

AFTOC Air Force Total 

Ownership Cost

AGR Active Guard and Reserve

ALS Airman Leadership 

School

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMDS Aerospace Medicine 

Squadron

Amn Airman

ANG Air National Guard

ANGB Air National Guard Base

ANGS Air National Guard 

Station

AOC Air Operations Center

AOG Air Operations Group

AOR Area of Responsibility

APS Aerial Port Squadron

AR Air Refueling

ARB Air Reserve Base

ARC Air Reserve Component

ARS Air Reserve Station; Air 

Refueling Squadron

ART Air Reserve Technician

ARW Air Refueling Wing

AS Airlift Squadron

ASD Assistant Secretary of 

Defense

ASD HD/ASA Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and America’s 

Security Affairs

ASOC Air Support Operations 

Center

AT Antiterrorism

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATO Air Tasking Order

ATP Air Transport Pilot Rating 

(an FAA term)

AW Airlift Wing

AWACS Airborne Warning and 

Control System

B-1 Rockwell B-1 Lancer, a 

four-engine jet supersonic 

variable-sweep wing 

bomber

B-2 Northrop Grumman B-2 

Spirit, a wing-shaped 

stealth bomber

B-52 Boeing B-52 

Stratofortress, an eightengine jet bomber aircraft

BAH Basic Allowance for 

Housing

BAS Basic Allowance for 

Subsistence

BOG Boots on the Ground—

number of days at 

deployment location

BOS Base Operations Support

BRAC Base Realignment and 

Closure 

Brig Gen Brigadier General

BS Bomb Squadron

BW Bomb Wing

BX Base Exchange

C2 Command and Control

C4ISR Command, Control, 

Communications, 

Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance

C-5 Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, 

a large four-engine jet 

military transport aircraft

C-17 Boeing C-17 Globemaster 

III, a four-engine jet 

military transport aircraft

C-23 Short C-23 Sherpa, 

a small two-engine 

propeller transport aircraft

Glossary of Acronyms
88 APPENDIX H: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

C-26 Fairchild C-26 Metroliner, 

a twin-turboprop electronic 

surveillance aircraft

C-27 Alenia C-27 Spartan, a twinengine turboprop military 

transport aircraft

C-130 Lockheed C-130 Hercules, 

a four-engine turboprop 

military transport aircraft

C2P Command and Control 

Protection

CAF Combat Air Forces

CAPE Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation

Capt Captain

CAS Close Air Support

CBCS Combat Communications 

Squadron

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High-Yield Explosives

CBT Computer-Based Training

CC Commander

CCDR Combatant Commander 

CE Civil Engineer

CES Civil Engineer Squadron

CFACC Combined Forces 

Air Component 

Commander

CMAS Command Military 

Allocation System

CMSAF Chief Master Sergeant of the 

Air Force

CMSgt Chief Master Sergeant

C-NAF Component Numbered Air 

Force

Col Colonel

CONUS Continental United States

CRTC Combat Readiness Training 

Center

CS Communications Squadron

CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CV Vice Commander

CVT Criticality-VulnerabilityThreat

DCA Defense Communications 

Agency; Defense 

Cooperation Agreements; 

defensive counterair; dualcapable aircraft

DCAPES Deliberate and Crisis Action 

Planning and Execution 

Segments

DeCA Defense Commissary Agency

DEERS Defense Enrollment 

Eligibility Reporting System.

DFO Designated Federal Officer

DMAG Deputy’s Management 

Advisory Group

DMDC Defense Manpower Data 

Center

DOC Designed Operational 

Capability

DoD Department of Defense

DPS Defense Planning Scenarios

DSCA Defense Support to Civil 

Authorities

DSN Defense Switched Network

DTAC Defensive Tactics

EADS Eastern Air Defense Sector

ECM Electronic Counter Measure

EMAC Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESGR Employer Support Group for 

the Guard and Reserve

EW Electronic Warfare

F-4 McDonnell Douglas F-4 

Phantom II, a two-seat, twinengine jet fighter

F-15 McDonnell Douglas F-15 

Eagle, a twin-engine jet 

fighter

F-16 General Dynamics F-16 

Fighting Falcon, a singleengine jet fighter

F-22 Lockheed Martin F-22 

Raptor, a twin-engine jet 

multirole fighter

F-35 Lockheed Martin F-35 

Lightning II, a single-engine 

jet multirole fighter

FAA Federal Aviation 

Administration

FACA Federal Advisory Committee 

Act

FCOM Flight Crew Operations 

Manual

FEMA Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

FFRDC Federally Funded Research 

and Development Center

FGC Flight Guidance Computer

FS Fighter Squadron

FSS Force Support Squadron

FTU Formal Training Unit

FW Fighter Wing

FY Fiscal Year (October 1 to 

September 30 for the U.S. 

Government)

FYDP Future Years Defense 

Program

Gen General

GIISR Global Integrated 

Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance

GMD Group Manning Document

HAF Headquarters Air Force

HUMINT Human Intelligence

ICAM Individual Cost Assessment 

Model 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missile
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 89

IDA Institute for Defense 

Analyses

IDT Inactive Duty Training; 

Individual Drill Training

IG Inspector General 

IMA Individual Mobilization 

Augmentee

IO Information Operations

IP Instructor Pilot

IS Intelligence Squadron

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance 

JB MDL Joint Base McGuire-DixLakehurst

JFACC Joint Forces Air Component 

Commander

JMD Joint Manning Document

JOA Joint Operations Area

JP Joint Publication

JROC Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council

J-STARS Joint Surveillance Target 

Attack Radar System

JTAC Joint Terminal Air 

Controller

KC-10 McDonnell Douglas K-10 

Extender, a three-engine jet 

military transport and aerial 

refueling aircraft

KC-46 Boeing KC-46, a military 

aerial refueling and transport 

jet aircraft based on the 767 

jet airliner

KC-135 Boeing K-135 Stratotanker; 

four-engine jet military aerial 

refueling aircraft

LIMFAC limiting factor 

LOX Liquid Oxygen

LRS Logistics Readiness 

Squadron

Lt Col Lieutenant Colonel

Lt Gen Lieutenant General

MAF Mobility Air Forces

Maj Major

Maj Gen Major General

MAJCOMMajor Command

MAP Military Assistance Program

MC-12 Medium to low altitude 

twin-turboprop ISR aircraft

MEOC Mobile Emergency 

Operation Center 

MILCON Military Construction

MLR Management Level Review

MOB Mobilization

MOS Maintenance Operations 

Squadron

MPA Military Personnel 

Appropriation

MPF Military Personnel Flight

MQ-1 General Atomics MQ-1 

Predator, a remotely piloted 

aircraft

MQ-9 General Atomics MQ-9 

Reaper, a remotely piloted 

aircraft

MSG Mission Support Group

MSgt Master Sergeant

MSS Mission Suppor Squadront

MWR Morale, Welfare, and 

Recreation

MXG Maintenance Group

NAF Numbered Air Force

NCSAF National Commission on the 

Structure of the Air Force

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NCOA Non-Commissioned Officer 

Academy

NDO Nuclear Deterrence 

Operations

NGAUS National Guard Association 

of the United States

NGB National Guard Bureau

NMS National Military Strategy

NORAD North American Aerospace 

Defense Command

NSS National Security Strategy

O&M Operations and Maintenance

OCO Overseas Contingency 

Operations

OCONUS Outside the Continental 

United States

OEF Operation Enduring 

Freedom

OG Operations Group

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMLT Operational Mentor and 

Liaison Team

OPCON Operational Control

OPR Office of Primary 

Responsibility; Officer 

Performance Report

OPSEC Operations Security

OPTEMP Operating Tempo 

OSD Office of the Secretary of 

Defense

OSS Operations Support 

Squadron

OT&E Operational Test and 

Evaluation; Organize, Train, 

and Equip

OTS Officer Training School

PAA Primary Assigned Aircraft

PACAF Pacific Air Force

PCS Permanent Change of 

Station

PERSTEMPO Personnel Tempo

PJ Pararescue 

PMAI Primary Mission Aircraft 

Inventory

PME Professional Military 

Education

POL Petroleum, Oil, and 

Lubricants
90 APPENDIX H: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

POM Program Objectives 

Memorandum

POTUS President of the United 

States

PPBE Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Execution

PRP Personnel Reliability 

Program

QRMC Quadrennial Review of 

Military Compensation

RC Reserve Component

RDT&E Research, Development, Test 

& Evaluation

REA Reserve Enlisted Association

RED HORSE Rapid Engineer 

Deployable Heavy 

Operational Repair 

Squadron Engineers

RFF Request for Forces

RFPB Reserve Forces Policy Board

RIF Reduction in Force

ROA Reserve Officers Association

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training 

Corps

RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft

RQ-4 Northrop Grumman RQ-4 

Global Hawk, a remotely 

piloted aircraft

RQ-170 Lockheed Martin RQ-170 

Sentinel, a remotely piloted 

aircraft

RQS Rescue Squadron

RQW Rescue Wing

SAD State Active Duty 

SAM Surface to Air Missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SCMR Strategic Choices and 

Management Review

SDP Strategic Distribution 

Platform

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force

SFS Security Forces Squadron

SLEP Service Life Extension 

Program

SMSgt Senior Master Sergeant

SOCOM Special Operations 

Command

SOPS Space Operations Squadron

SOS Squadron Officer School

SOW Special Operations Wing

SPO Specialty Program Office

SrA Senior Airman

SSgt Staff Sergeant

STS Special Tactics Squadron

STU Secure Telephone Unit

SUPT Specialized Undergraduate 

Pilot Training

SVTC Secure Video Telephone 

Conference

SW Space Wing

T-38 Northrop T-38 Talon, twoseat, twin-engine jet trainer

TACAIR Tactical Air

TACON Tactical Control

TAG The Adjutant General

TDY Temporary Duty

TFI Total Force Integration

TO Technical Order

TOA Total Obligational Authority

TR Traditional Reservist

TRW Training Wing

TSgt Technical Sergeant

TTHS Trainees, Transients, 

Holdees, and Students 

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures

T-X Designation for a twoseat fast jet trainer under 

development

U-2 Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady, 

a single-engine, high-flying 

reconnaissance aircraft

UCI Unit Compliance Inspection

UPT Undergraduate Pilot 

Training

USAF United States Air Force

USAFA U.S. Air Force Academy

USAFE U.S. Air Forces Europe

USAFRICOM U.S. Africa Command

USCENTCOM U.S. Central 

Command

USD(P&R) Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness

USERRA Uniformed Services 

Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act

USEUCOM U.S. European 

Command

USNORTCHOM U.S. Northern 

Command

USPACOM U.S. Pacific 

Command

USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern 

Command

USSOCOM U.S. Special 

Operations 

Command

USTRATCOM U.S. Strategic 

Command

USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation 

Command

UTA Unit Training Assembly

UTC Unit Type Code

vPCGR Virtual Personnel Center 

Guard Reserve

WADS Western Air Defense Sector

WG Wing
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 91

APPENDIX I: RESOURCE CHAPTER CHARTS

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

194819501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102014

0

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

1200000

TOTAL UNIFORMED

SELECTED RESERVES

ANG

ACTIVE

194819501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102013

AF Outlays in Millions of Constant 2014 Dollars

Number of People

Fiscal Year

Fiscal Year

FIGURE 5: Spending Cycle

FIGURE 6: Air Force End Strength
92 APPENDIX J: SELECTED STATUTES AND POLICIES

APPENDIX J

SELECTED STATUTES AND POLICIES 

Command Structure and Headquarters

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §175—Reserve Forces Policy Board.

• Establishes the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

• See also 10 U.S.C. §10301 for functions, membership, 

and organization of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. 

10 U.S.C. §10174—Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC).

• Subsection (a) establishes the AFRC as a separate 

command of the Air Force.

• Subsection (b) establishes the Chief of Air Force 

Reserve as also holding the position of Commander of 

the AFRC. 

• Subsection (c)(1) requires Secretary of the Air Force 

to assign to the AFRC all Air Force Reserve forces 

stationed in CONUS except those assigned to the 

Combatant Commanders for special operations forces. 

10 U.S.C. §10201—Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs.

• In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 138(b)(2), the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is the 

DoD official with responsibility for the supervision of 

Reserve Component affairs. 

10 U.S.C. §10203—Reserve affairs: designation of general 

or flag officer of each armed force.

• Permits Secretary of the Air Force to designate an 

Air Force general officer to be directly responsible for 

reserve affairs to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

10 U.S.C. §8038—Office of the Air Force Reserve: 

appointment of Chief.

• Subsection (a) establishes an Office of the Air Force 

Reserve within the Department of the Air Force. 

Subsection (a) also establishes that Office of Air Force 

Reserve is headed by a chief who is the adviser to the 

Chief of Staff on Air Force Reserve matters. 

• Subsection (b) requires the President to appoint, with 

advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief of Air 

Force Reserve from AFR general officers with at least 

10 years of commissioned service in the Air Force. 

• Subsection (c)(1) permits the Chief of the Air Force 

Reserve to be appointed for a period of four years with 

a potential reappointment for an additional four-year 

period.

• Subsection (c)(2) permits the Chief of the Air Force 

Reserve to hold the grade of lieutenant general. 

• 10 U.S.C. §10211—Policies and regulations: 

participation of Reserve officers in preparation and 

administration.

• Each armed force shall have officers of its Reserve 

Components on active duty (except for training) at the 

seat of government and at headquarters responsible for 

Reserve affairs. The statutory purpose is to participate 

in preparing and administering the policies and 

regulations affecting the Reserve Component. 

10 U.S.C. §10301—Reserve Forces Policy Board.

• Establishes the Reserve Forces Policy Board within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

• Sets forth membership and organization requirements 

as well as matters within the Board’s purview. 

10 U.S.C. §10305—Air Force Reserve Forces Policy 

Committee.

• Establishes the Air Reserve Forces Policy Committee 

within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. 

• Sets forth organization of the Committee and general 

matters within its purview. 

10 U.S.C. §10501—National Guard Bureau.

• Establishes the National Guard Bureau within the 

Department of Defense. 

• Sets forth the purposes of the National Guard Bureau. 

10 U.S.C. §10502—Chief of the National Guard Bureau: 

appointment; adviser on National Guard matters; grade; 

succession.

• Establishes appointment process and requirements for 

the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

• Also establishes duties of the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 93

10 U.S.C. §10503—Functions of National Guard Bureau: 

charter.

• Requires the creation of the National Guard Bureau 

charter to set forth the full scope of the duties and 

activities of the Bureau. 

• Delineates matters within the scope of the duties and 

activities of the Bureau. 

10 U.S.C. §10507—National Guard Bureau: assignment of 

officers of Active or Reserve Components.

• Permits the President of the United States to assign to 

duty in the Bureau as many Active or Reserve officers 

of the Army or Air Force as considered necessary. 

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTIONS

AFI 10-205—Availability of key headquarters Air Force 

personnel and Major Command Commanders. September 

27, 2010. 

• Requires Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (HQ USAF) 

key personnel and major command (MAJCOM) 

commanders to keep HQ USAF informed of their 

location and identify any designated alternates when 

leaving his or her permanent duty station. 

• Contains tables of Key Headquarters Personnel and 

MAJCOM Commanders. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVES

DoDD 5015.77—National Guard Bureau. May 21, 2008. 

• Establishes DoD policy for and defines the 

organization, management, responsibilities and 

functions, relationships and authorities of the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau. 

Council of Governors

EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Ex. Ord. 13528 of January 11, 2010 (Published at 75 FR 

2053)— Establishment of Council of Governors.

• Establishes the Council of Governors and sets forth its 

organization. 

• Sets forth participants in Council meetings and issues 

that are within the Council’s purview. 

• Department of Defense Directives

DoD Memorandum—State-Federal consultative process 

for programming and budgetary proposals affecting the 

National Guard. February 25, 2013. 

• Sets forth DoD policy that DoD and the states, 

territories, and the District of Columbia, represented 

through the Council of Governors, will engage in a 

sustained process to exchange views, information, 

and advice on programming and budgetary proposals 

affecting the National Guard. 

• Establishes objectives and implementation to 

consultations and dialogue between the DoD and 

states (through Council of Governors). 

Defense Support for Civil Authorities 

(DSCA)

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §372—Use of military equipment and facilities. 

• Permits The Secretary of Defense to make available any 

DoD equipment, base facility or research facility to any 

Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement official 

for law enforcement purposes. 

10 U.S.C. §373—Training and advising civilian law 

enforcement officials.

• Permits the Secretary of Defense to make available 

DoD personnel to (1) train federal, state, and local 

civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and 

maintenance of equipment and (2) provide “expert 

advice” to law enforcement officials. 

10 U.S.C. §374—Maintenance and operation of 

equipment. 

• Sets forth the purposes for which the Secretary of 

Defense can make DoD personnel available to operate 

DoD equipment for DSCA purposes. 

10 U.S.C. §375—Restriction on direct participation by 

military personnel.

• Requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe 

necessary regulations to ensure that any activity, 

provision of equipment or facility, or assignment 

of personnel does not include or permit direct 

participation of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine 

Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or similar activity 

unless otherwise authorized by law. 
94 APPENDIX J: SELECTED STATUTES AND POLICIES

10 U.S.C. §376—Support is not to adversely affect military 

preparedness.

• DSCA support, activities, provision of equipment or 

facilities, or assignment of personnel is prohibited if 

provision of that DSCA support will adversely affect 

the military preparedness of the United States. 

10 U.S.C. §377—Reimbursement.

• A civilian law enforcement agency to which DSCA 

support is provided is required to reimburse DoD for 

the costs of that support. 

• Contains language on credits for support by National 

Guard and waiver of reimbursement for support under 

32 U.S.C. §502(f ). 

10 U.S.C. §380—Enhancement of cooperation with civilian 

law enforcement officials.

• Requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct an 

annual briefing of law enforcement personnel of 

each state regarding information, training, technical 

support, and equipment and facilities available to 

civilian law enforcement personnel from DoD. 

• Also contains information required to be included in 

the Secretary of Defense’s annual briefing. 

10 U.S.C. §381—Procurement of equipment by State and 

local governments through the Department of Defense: 

equipment for counter-drug, homeland security, and 

emergency response activities. 

• Requires the Secretary of Defense to establish 

procedures under which states and units of local 

governments may purchase equipment through DoD 

suitable for counter-drug, homeland security, and 

emergency response activities. 

• Includes requirements for purchasing procedures and 

requests. 

10 U.S.C. §382—Emergency situations involving weapons 

of mass destruction.

• The Secretary of Defense may authorize DoD 

resources to be used to provide assistance in support 

of U.S. Department of Justice activities related to 

an emergency situation involving a weapon of mass 

destruction. 

• Defines “emergency situation involving a weapon of 

mass destruction” and forms of assistance permitted 

under this section. 

Duty Statuses and Definitions

STATUTES

10 USC §101—Definitions.

• Defines various duty statuses for military personnel. 

• Defines “full-time National Guard duty.” (See also 32 

U.S.C. § 101(19) for corresponding National Guard 

section.)

• Defines “active Guard and Reserve duty,” but does not 

include support of Active Component units assigned 

to train with or be trained by Reserve Component 

personnel. 

10 U.S.C. §10216—Military technicians (dual status).

• Defines dual-status military technician and their duties 

and management. 

• Does not contain language for support of Active 

Component units assigned to train with or be trained 

by Reserve Component personnel.

10 U.S.C. §10217—Non-dual status technicians. 

• Defines non-dual status technicians and their 

employment opportunities and personnel caps by 

component. 

10 U.S.C. §12310—Reserves: for organizing, 

administering, Reserve Components.

• Does not contain language for support of Active 

Component units assigned to train with or be trained 

by Reserve Component personnel.

10 U.S.C. §12314—Reserves: any kind of duty.

• A member of a Reserve Component who is on active 

duty other than for training may, under regulations 

prescribed by the Secretary concerned, be detailed or 

assigned to any duty authorized by law for members of 

the Active Component for the Air Force. 

10 U.S.C. §12318—Reserves on active duty: duties; 

funding.

• Establishes Reserve Component duties while on 

active duty as those contained within the applicable 

mobilization authority. 

• Establishes authorities under which funding will be 

available for the pay and allowances of Reserves. 

32 U.S.C. §101—Definitions. 

• Defines active duty for National Guard. 

• Defines “full-time National Guard duty” (See 10 

U.S.C. § 101(d)(5) for corresponding section.)
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 95

32 U.S.C. §328—Active Guard and Reserve duty: 

Governor’s authority. 

• Does not contain language including support of Active 

Component units assigned to train with or be trained 

by Reserve Component personnel. 

32 U.S.C. §502—Required drills and field exercises. 

• Contains language permitting a member of the 

National Guard to be ordered to perform training or 

other duty in addition to what is set forth in subsection 

(a) of the statute. 

• Contains examples of training or other duties 

permitted to be performed by the National Guard 

under this section. 

32 U.S.C. §709—Technicians: employment, use, status.

• Does not contain language including support of Active 

Component units assigned to train with or be trained 

by Reserve Component personnel. 

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTIONS

AFI 36-2132V2—Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program. 

• Section 2.9. Deployment of AGRs. Does not include 

in the AGR duties language permitting support of 

Active Component units who train or deploy with 

Reserve Component units or personnel. 

End Strength

STATUTES

Note: End Strength levels also contained within National 

Defense Authorization Act for each fiscal year. 

10 U.S.C. §12001—Authorized strengths: Reserve 

Components.

10 U.S.C. §12002—Authorized strengths: Army and Air 

Force Reserve Components, exclusive of members on active 

duty.

10 U.S.C. §12003—Authorized strengths: commissioned 

officers in an active status.

10 U.S.C. §12004—Strength in grade: Reserve general and 

flag officers in an active status.

10 U.S.C. §12005—Strength in grade: commissioned 

officers in grades below brigadier general or rear admiral 

(lower half ) in an active status.

10 U.S.C. §12006—Strength limitations: authority to 

waive in time of war or national emergency.

10 U.S.C. §12008—Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve: 

warrant officers.

10 U.S.C. §12009—Army and Air Force Reserve 

Components: temporary increases.

10 U.S.C. §12011—Authorized strengths: Reserve officers 

on active duty or on full-time National Guard duty for 

administration of the Reserves or the National Guard.

10 U.S.C. §12012—Authorized strengths: senior enlisted 

members on active duty or on full-time National Guard 

duty for administration of the Reserves or the National 

Guard.

Funding and Procurement

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §231a—Budgeting for life-cycle cost of aircraft 

for the Navy, Army, and Air Force: annual plan and 

certification.

• Sets forth requirements for procurement plans 

for aircraft and itemizes aircraft covered by these 

procurement plans. 

10 U.S.C. §235—Procurement of contract services: 

specification of amounts requested in budget.

• Sets forth requirement for the Secretary of Defense 

to include in his or her annual budget request the 

numbers of projected full-time contractor employees 

and amount requested for procurement of these 

services. 

10 U.S.C. §377—Reimbursement.

• See also DSCA section, above. 

10 U.S.C. §381—Procurement of equipment by state and 

local governments through the Department of Defense: 

equipment for counter-drug, homeland security, and 

emergency response activities. 

• See also DSCA section above.
96 APPENDIX J: SELECTED STATUTES AND POLICIES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVES

DoDD 7045.14—The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 

and Execution (PPBE) process. January 25, 2013. 

• Updates established policy and assigned 

responsibilities for the PPBE process. 

• Provides PPBE process descriptions and data release 

restrictions. 

• This directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Military Departments, the Office of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint 

Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the 

Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the 

Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all 

other organizational entities within DoD. 

DoD Memorandum—State-federal consultative process 

for programming and budgetary proposals affecting the 

National Guard. February 25, 2013. 

• See also Council of Governors section above.

Human Capital

Continuum of Service

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §10213—Reserve Components: dual 

membership prohibited.

• Prohibits any individual from being part of more than 

one Reserve Component at the same time. 

10 U.S.C. §12103—Reserve Components: terms.

• Sets forth terms under which enlisted members of the 

Reserve Components serve. 

• Includes time required on active duty and the Ready 

Reserve. 

10 U.S.C. §12014—Reserve Components: transfers.

• Sets forth ability for a member of the armed forces to 

transfer into the Reserve Component of that armed 

force.

• Limits ability for a member of the armed forces to 

transfer into the Reserve Component of another 

military branch in lieu of the transferring between 

components of the same armed force. 

10 U.S.C. §12105—Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve: 

transfer from Guard Components.

• Permits the Secretary of the Air Force to prescribe 

regulations governing transfer of an enlisted member of 

the Air National Guard of the United States (federal) 

into the Air Force Reserve. 

• Requires consent of governor or other appropriate state 

authority for the transfer. 

10 U.S.C. §12106—Army and Air Force Reserve: transfer 

to Reserve upon withdrawal as member of National Guard.

• An enlisted member of the Air National Guard 

who ceases to become a Guardsman automatically 

becomes a member of the Air Force Reserve unless also 

discharged from that component. 

• Upon becoming a member of the Air Force Reserve, 

the enlisted member no longer is a member of the Air 

National Guard of the United States. 

10 U.S.C. §12108—Enlisted members: discharge or 

retirement for years of service or for age.

• Each Reserve enlisted member of the Air Force who is 

in active status and has reached either maximum age 

or maximum years of service shall be transferred to the 

Retired Reserve, if qualified. 

10 U.S.C. §12214—Officers; Air Force Reserve: transfer 

from Air National Guard of the United States.

• An officer of the Air National Guard of the United 

States may be transferred in grade to the Air Force 

Reserve. This requires consent of the governor and 

other appropriate authorities of the state concerned. 

• Upon becoming an officer of the Air Force Reserve, 

the officer ceases to be a member of the Air National 

Guard of the United States. 

Promotion Boards

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §14101—Convening of selection boards.

• Selection boards are convened only for promotion or 

selective early separation. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 97

Promotion, Failure of Selection 

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §627—Failure of selection for promotion.

10 U.S.C. §14501—Failure of selection for promotion.

• Addresses failure of selection for promotion for 

Reserve officers below the grade of colonel or those 

twice failed of selection. 

10 U.S.C. §14503—Discharge of officers with less than six 

years of commissioned service or found not qualified for 

promotion to first lieutenant or lieutenant (junior grade).

10 U.S.C. §14504—Effect of failure of selection for 

promotion: Reserve first lieutenants of the Army, Air 

Force, and Marine Corps and Reserve lieutenants (junior 

grade) of the Navy.

10 U.S.C. §14505—Effect of failure of selection for 

promotion: Reserve captains of the Army, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps and Reserve lieutenants of the Navy.

10 U.S.C. §14506—Effect of failure of selection for 

promotion: Reserve majors of the Army, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps and Reserve lieutenant commanders of the 

Navy.

10 U.S.C. §14513—Failure of selection for promotion: 

transfer, retirement, or discharge.

Promotion Timing, Zones, and Opportunity

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §14301—Eligibility for consideration for 

promotion: general rules.

10 U.S.C. §14311—Delay of promotion, involuntary.

10 U.S.C. §14312—Delay of promotion: voluntary.

10 U.S.C. §14315: Position vacancy promotions: Army and 

Air Force Officers.

Retirement for Age and Years Of Service

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §633—Retirement for years of service: Active 

lieutenant colonels and commanders.

• Contains language requiring Air Force lieutenant 

colonels not on the promotion list to be retired upon 

completion of 28 years of Active commissioned service. 

10 U.S.C. §8911—Twenty years or more: Active or Reserve 

commissioned officers.

• Corresponding statutes for other armed forces are 10 

U.S.C. §3911 (Army) and 10 U.S.C. §6323 (Navy and 

Marine Corps). 

• Permits retirement of an Active or Reserve 

commissioned officer with at least 20 years of service, 

10 of which must have been as an Active commissioned 

officer. 

10 U.S.C. §10218—Army and Air Force Reserve 

technicians: conditions for retention: mandatory 

retirement under civil service laws. 

• Sets forth requirements for when an Air Force Reserve 

technician loses dual status due to age. 

• Sets forth requirements for when a non-dual status Air 

Force Reserve technician is retired. 

10 U.S.C. §12108—Enlisted members: discharge or 

retirement for years of service or for age.

• Requires a Reserve enlisted member on active status 

who has reached maximum years of service or age to be 

transferred to the Retired Reserve or discharged. 

10 U.S.C. §12108—Enlisted members: discharge or 

retirement for years of service or for age.

• Requires a Reserve enlisted member on active status 

who has reached maximum years of service or age to be 

transferred to the Retired Reserve or discharged. 

10 U.S.C. §12646—Commissioned Officers: retention 

of after completing 18 or more, but less than 20, years of 

service.

10 U.S.C. §14509—Separation at age 62: Reserve officers 

in grades below brigadier general or rear admiral (lower 

half ). 

10 U.S.C. §14510—Separation at age 62: brigadier generals 

and rear admirals (lower half ).
98 APPENDIX J: SELECTED STATUTES AND POLICIES

10 U.S.C. §14511—Separation at age 64: officers in grade 

of major general or rear admiral and above.

10 U.S.C. §14512—Separation at age 66: officers holding 

certain offices.

10 U.S.C. §14513—Failure of selection for promotion: 

transfer, retirement, or discharge.

10 U.S.C. §14514—Discharge or retirement for years of 

service or after selection for early removal.

10 U.S.C. §14515—Discharge or retirement for age.

Selective Continuation and Retention

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §637—Selection of regular officers for 

continuation on active duty.

10 U.S.C. §12308—Retention after becoming qualified for 

retired pay.

• Permits any person who has qualified for retirement 

pay to be retained on active duty or in the service of a 

Reserve Component. Retention may be done with the 

consent of the individual Airman and by order of the 

Secretary concerned. 

10 U.S.C. §14701—Selection of officers for continuation 

on the Reserve active-status list.

Total Force Management

General Policy

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §129a—General policy for total force 

management. 

• Provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to 

establish policies and procedures for mix of military, 

civilian and contractor personnel. 

• Requires use of certain planning documents and 

inventory in determining total force mix. 

10 U.S.C. §194—Limitations on personnel.

• Caps total numbers of armed forces and civilian 

employees assigned or detailed to Defense Agencies 

and Department of Defense Field Activities, both at 

headquarters and other support levels. 

10 U.S.C. §10102—Purpose of Reserve Components. 

• Describes purpose of Reserve Components as 

providing trained units and qualified persons available 

for active duty in the armed forces under certain 

circumstances. 

10 U.S.C. §10103—Basic policy for order into federal 

service.

• Sets forth basic policy for ordering Title 10 Reserve 

forces and Title 32 status National Guardsmen into 

active duty. 

10 U.S.C. §12301—Reserve Components generally.

• Sets forth circumstances under which Reserve forces 

may be ordered into active duty. 

10 U.S.C. §12302—Ready Reserve.

• Sets forth circumstances under which Ready Reserve 

may be ordered into active duty. 

10 U.S.C. §12304—Selected Reserve and certain 

Individual Ready Reserve members; order to active duty 

other than during war or national emergency.

• Sets forth authority and circumstances under which 

the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve 

members may be ordered into active duty. 

10 U.S.C. §12304a—Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine 

Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve: order to active duty 

to provide assistance in response to a major disaster or 

emergency.

• Sets forth authority and limitations for when Air Force 

Reserve may be ordered into active duty following a 

Governor’s request for federal assistance pursuant to 

the Stafford Act. 

10 U.S.C. §12304b—Selected Reserve: order to active 

duty for preplanned missions in support of the Combatant 

Commands.

• Sets forth authority and limitations for when Selected 

Reserve may be ordered into active duty to augment 

active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a 

Combatant Command. 

10 U.S.C. §12306—Standby Reserve.

• Sets forth circumstances under which Standby Reserve 

may be ordered into active duty. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 99

10 U.S.C. §12307—Retired Reserve.

• Sets forth circumstances under which a member of the 

Retired Reserve may be ordered into active duty. 

Military Discipline

STATUTES

10 U.S.C. §§801-941—Uniform Code of Military Justice.

• The UCMJ courts-martial have jurisdiction over 

certain categories of airmen, including: 

• Active Component service members, including 

those awaiting discharge, inductees, and retirees;

• Aviation cadets;

• Members of the Air Force Reserve, including 

activated Reservists, traditional part-time Reservists 

performing either full-time active duty for a 

specific period or inactive duty training, or retirees 

receiving hospitalization from an armed force; 

• Persons serving with or accompanying an armed 

force in the field in a time of declared war or 

contingency operation; and

• Air National Guard service members only when in 

Federal service.

32 U.S.C. §326—Courts-martial of National Guard not in 

federal service: composition, jurisdiction, and procedures.

• When the Air National Guard is not in federal service, 

it is subject to separate Title 32 courts-martial. Title 

32 courts-martial are like UCMJ courts-martial for 

Air Force service members as to forms and procedures. 

Where they are different is in punishment by the laws 

of the respective states instead of those proscribed by 

the UCMJ courts-martial system. Additionally, State 

systems do not provide for automatic post-trial review 

of convictions, as does the UCMJ. 
100 APPENDIX K: CORE FUNCTION BALANCE

APPENDIX K

CORE FUNCTION BALANCE

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

AFR

ANG

ACTIVE

NUCLEAR DETERRENT OPERATIONS 

SPEC OPS

AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT

RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY

CYBER

SPACE

EDUCATION & TRAINING

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

COMMAND & CONTROL

GLOBAL INTEGRATED ISR

GLOBAL PRECISION ATTACK

AEROSPACE SUPERIORITY

TOTAL FORCE

FIGURE 7: Current Component Share of Total Manpower by Core Function

Source: Air Force PB14 data. Does not include certain personnel such as unassigned students, separations, retirements, medical, and prisoners.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 101

Examples of specific shifts from Active 

Component to Reserve Component 

• Air Superiority: Savings derived 

from the i-Wing construct allows a 

shift of 1,875.

• Global Precision Attack: Savings 

derived from the i-Wing and 

specific force redistributions, such 

as bomb loaders, results in a shift 

of 3,750; included would be the 

reassignment of the B-1 to the 

Air Force Reserve, to prepare for 

concurrent proportional fielding 

of Long-Range Strike Bomber, and 

500 to Special Operations.

• Global Integrated ISR: A small 

percentage shift of 3,875 Offensive 

Cyber Operations (OCO)–type 

intel and data analysis positions.

• Command and Control: no change. 

• Personnel Recovery: no change.

• Building Partnerships : A shift of 

250 for training development and 

partner education.

• Education and Training: Additional 

and significant cost savings, as well 

as the shift of some pilots to the 

Active Component operational 

force can be accomplished by the 

shift of 3,725.

• Space Superiority: A small shift of 

1,125 to the Reserve Component in 

areas suited for 24/7 augmentation. 

• Cyberspace Superiority: Some 

additional cost savings could be 

realized by incorporating 450 of 

the planned Cyber growth in the 

Reserve Component.

• Rapid Global Mobility: Savings 

derived from the i-Wing construct 

allows additional shift of 3,800.

• Agile Combat Support: A force 

redistribution retains the Air 

Force’s capacity by the shift of 

14,100 (examples include NDO 

bomb loaders).

• Special Operations: A small growth 

of 1,000 in the Reserve Component 

of which 500 would be shifted. 

• Nuclear Deterrence Operations: 

Rife with new Reserve Component 

mix opportunities; as many as 2,500 

NDO positions could be shifted 

(missile maintenance, ICBM 

helicopter support, security forces, 

and some B-52 operations and 

support).

0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000

AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT

(119,741)

RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY

(97,015)

GLOBAL PRECISION ATTACK

(74,231)

EDUCATION & TRAINING

(33,087)

GLOBAL INTEGRATED ISR

(28,950)

AIR SUPERIORITY

(28,956)

COMMAND & CONTROL

(24,350)

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 

OPERATIONS (21,960)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(16,256)

CYBERSPACE SUPERIORITY

(15,342)

SPACE SUPERIORITY

(10,791)

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

(7,271)

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

(2,146)

AFR FT

AFR PT

ANG PT

ANG FT

ACTIVE AF

FIGURE 8: Example of Alternative Core Function Mix from 65%:35% AC:RC to 58%:42% AC:RC

AF FY14 Budget Submission

LEGEND

NCSAF Recommendation 

The Commission found that certain 

NDO activities, such as missile 

maintenance, security forces, ICBM 

helo support, and bomb loaders (ACS), 

could be shifted.

Additional and significant SUPT/FTU 

cost savings (approx. $2M/pilot) 

could be achieved by shifting 

additional pilots from AC to RC RC forces shifted to GPA 

are already accustomed 

to rotational operations 

and units and individuals 

can play an increased 

role, e.g. long-range strike 

missions (B-1)

Source: FY14 Unit Manning Data Provided by the Air Force, December 2013. Does not include certain personnel such as unassigned students, separations, 

retirements, medical, and prisoners.
102 APPENDIX L: ADVANCED DECISION SUPPORT TOOL

APPENDIX L

ADVANCED DECISION SUPPORT TOOL

The starting point for the ADST was previous analysis 

and graphical design developed by AF/A9 to inform and 

illustrate Air Force force structure decisions in the FY13 PB 

submission.

The Advanced Decision Support Tool (ADST) is a 

model which can analyze and evaluate future force structure 

alternatives based on various data inputs of the decision 

maker’s choosing. The ADST is specifically designed to 

inform cost and equipment inventories, as well as AC/RC 

mix decisions. This is a decision support tool and is not 

intended to provide decision makers with final optimized 

solutions. Rather, it can rapidly calculate and portray a range 

of feasible decision options for force structure and policy 

decisions based on variable inputs. 

A key feature of the ADST is the design format that 

allows for a variety of variable inputs that are scalable with 

“sliders” to dynamically visualize the changes to cost as a 

result of manipulating the input variables. Example input 

variables used by the NCSAF staff were force structure, crew 

ratios, and readiness factors. These variables provided the 

groundwork for the tool’s analytic calculations. The ADST 

allows decision-makers to consider numerous alternatives to 

meet reduced budget funding levels, such as adjusting the 

crew ratio, changing readiness, or modifying the dwell period, 

singularly or collectively; all variables are linked to overall 

cost to the enterprise and are displayed in real time. While 

data sources are of the user’s choosing, data sources used by 

the NCSAF staff include, but are not limited to, open source 

information, AFTOC data, ISC assumptions and AFI 65-

503 references. 

Following are pictorial representations of the ADST, along 

with narrative descriptions of its use.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 103

FIGURE 9: Cost Calculator and Rotational Capacity

Tails Needed 525 656.25 385 Pool after FP & Fenced

656.25 475 available to rotate

Forward Pres. 140 525 100% 140 Min Active 385 Max ARC

656.25 400 New Surge

Fenced 50 794.0625

635.25 121% 104 Rotational 350 New Surge-Fenced

Rotation Req 104 260 New Surge-Forward

% increase ARC current CR 1.25 % increase

AD current CR 1.25 0 0 ARC Future CR 1.5125 21 0.21

AD Future CR 1.25 79

100

Manpower per Aircraft % full time ARC % officer

28 28% O E

43 % AD Aircraft 8 2 26

225 # AD Aircraft

Active Duty Deploy to dwell AD

AD Cost (AFTOC) 4.27 Readiness 1.00 1: 2.1

ARC Cost (AFTOC) 2.51 Rotation Ready Factor 100

ARC Deploy to dwell ARC

1: 5.1

ARC CR

AD CR FUTURE CHANGE

NEW SURGE

Notional Weapons System Characteristics

AD Crew Ratio (CR) of 1.25

ARC CR of 1.25

Future change to 1.5

New Surge requirement was modified to 400

**Above is a pictorial representation of notional 

inputs to the tool. On the following page is the 

resulting graphic illustrating the result of the 

calculations and the effects on the cost curves.
104 APPENDIX L: ADVANCED DECISION SUPPORT TOOL

Forward Presence

New

Cost Curve $2,459.51, 400, 86%

Lowest Cost Force Mix

$2,445, 400, 86%

Retain Ratio

$1,968, 400, 43%

Current Position $2,583.53, 525, 43%

Down Current $2,555, 525, 41%

New CR $2,327, 519, 27%

100

0%

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800

FIGURE 10: Rotational Demand Impacts on Force Mix

Total # of Units

% Active Component

Graphical depiction of the range of force mix options, tailorable to input variables.

Rotational Requirement

Surge

Fwd Presence

Current Position

New Crew Ratio (new cost curve)

Rotational Ready

Down Current

Retain Ratio

Lowest Cost Force Mix

Current Force Mix

Optimum Force Mix

Lowest Cost Force Mix V2
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 105

FIGURE 11: Cost Calculator and Rotational Capacity

Tails Needed 525 656.25 370 Pool after FP & Fenced

656.25 469 available to rotate

Forward Pres. 155 525 100% 155 Min Active 370 Max ARC

656.25 455 New Surge

Fenced 56 794.0625

635.25 121% 124 Rotational 399 New Surge-Fenced

Rotation Req 97 300 New Surge-Forward

% increase ARC current CR 1.25 % increase

AD current CR 1.25 0 0 ARC Future CR 1.5125 21 0.21

AD Future CR 1.25 79

100

Manpower per Aircraft % full time ARC % officer

28 28% O E

43 % AD Aircraft 8 2 26

225 # AD Aircraft

Active Duty Deploy to dwell AD

AD Cost (AFTOC) 4.27 Readiness 0.85 1: 2.1

ARC Cost (AFTOC) 2.51 Rotation Ready Factor 85

ARC Deploy to dwell ARC

1: 5.1

**The above represents changing variables 

for decision makers to consider. Following 

is a graphical portrayal of the outcome.
106 APPENDIX L: ADVANCED DECISION SUPPORT TOOL

From this second graphic you can see the range of options in both cost and capability that are 

nearly instantly available for decision makers to evaluate. A notional force of 450 aircraft at 

85% readiness are lower cost than a 100 % ready force with only 400 aircraft that has a Higher 

percentage of Active Component manpower. It also has greater Surge and more aircraft 

available in 72 hours. The tool allows the Decision Maker to explore all variables to meet both 

defined and undefined options.

Graphical depiction of the range of force mix options, tailorable to input variables.

Rotational Requirement

Surge

Fwd Presence

Current Position

New Crew Ratio (new cost curve)

Rotational Ready

Down Current

Retain Ratio

Lowest Cost Force Mix

Current Force Mix

Optimum Force Mix

Lowest Cost Force Mix V2

Forward Presence

New Cost Curve $2,872.74, 455, 93%

Lowest Cost Force Mix

$2,866, 455, 93%

Retain Ratio

$2,190, 455, 43%

Current Position 

$2,527.19, 525, 43%

Down Current $2,901, 525, 67%

New CR $2,655, 619, 25%

100

0%

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800

FIGURE 12: Rotational Demand Impacts on Force Mix

Total # of Units

% Active Component
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 107

APPENDIX M

NCSAF WAR GAME

Purpose

This war game was designed to provide the Commissioners 

with insight into issues under their consideration through a 

force planning game. In this seminar game, Commissioners 

and Staff players progressed through a series of challenging 

decisions that were intended to reveal planning results and 

implementation difficulties of alternative force structures, 

informing Commissioners on how to balance the equation 

between the cost of preparing for an uncertain future 

and the risk of not doing so . As a result of this war game, 

Commissioners took away a sharper understanding of the 

policy choices they considered, a more rigorous analytic 

assessment of the implications of their emerging findings, 

and a more credible basis upon which to articulate their 

recommendations.

Objectives

• Assess the advantages and disadvantages of contending 

approaches to the future structure of the Air Force;

• Identify current policies, procedures, practices and 

legislation that need to change in order to make the future 

structure of the Air Force more effective;

• Understand stakeholder interests in the future structure 

of the Air Force and assess their likely responses to the 

Commissions’ findings and recommendations.

This war game focused on the implications of potential 

changes to the force structure mix among the three 

components (Active, Reserve and Air National Guard) across 

and within the range of Air Force capabilities. It did not 

aim to focus on other objectives sometimes war-gamed such 

as campaign outcomes, institutional revolutionary change, 

major investment portfolio rebalancing, future warfighting 

operational and organizational concepts, or Joint Capabilities 

Analysis. The game design did, however, seek to reveal 

potential strengths and weaknesses to force planning changes 

that affected those factors through additional post-game 

review, research and analysis. An additional objective of the 

game was to evaluate potential repeatable decision support 

processes for either further evaluation, post-Commission 

change implementation, or future evaluation of potential 

choices for the other Services.

Concept

The Commissioners expressed a strong preference to conduct 

a war game exercise as a way to provide a rigorous and 

repeatable process to evaluate force structure decisions. 

In seeking a way to rigorously test any potential reorganized 

Air Force force structure, the Research staff discussed future 

security and organization trends with the Office of Net 

Assessment (ONA) and ONA’s assessment of war gaming 

best practices. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessment (CSBA) and CSBA agreed to support the 

Commission’s seminar-style war game with their Portfolio 

Rebalancing Tool, which has been applied to a number 

of DoD decision-making processes. The war game teams 

were urged to examine all Air Force enterprise areas for the 

potential for change, including infrastructure, human capital 

management, and operating costs. CSBA staff also acted as 

team advisors and force structure experts during the game.

The NCSAF Force Structure War game was designed 

for two stages. The first stage was a planning exercise in 

which three teams each developed a resource-constrained 

Air Force over the 2015-2023 planning period. A key 

assumption given to all three teams was that the current 

budget environment would remain constrained. In the 

second stage, the teams played the role of the Air Force 

as force provider to the COCOMs, who had competing 

requirements, in a demanding scenario that occurred in or 

about 2018. Across both events, the independent variable of 

interest was force structure, while the dependent variables 

were cost-effectiveness and mission-effectiveness. Players were 

provided analytic tools to enable them to build their assigned 

force structure by manipulating a set of control variables that 

enabled costed force structure choices.

Assumptions

• Resources available were constrained by BCA and 

Sequestration in accordance with the most stressing 

forecast developed by CAPE in the course of the Strategic 

Choices Management Review (SCMR).

• Each alternative force structure considered was 

based upon the FY15 Alternative Program Objective 

Memorandum (FY 15 Alt POM) as a starting point.

• Compensation changes did not begin to produce 
108 APPENDIX M: NCSAF WAR GAME

significant fiscal effects for Service budgets during the 

game planning horizon.

• Current basing infrastructure must be maintained for 

the near term, but adjustments could be considered in 

order to adapt to force structure changes in future years. 

Teams could vary the stationing of forces, but could not 

close bases nor reap the fiscal payoff during their planning 

horizon.

• Total Air Force End Strength at the beginning of the 

exercise would be consistent with FY15 Alt POM levels.

• Economic influences on recruiting and retention was 

derived by Game Control based on an economic forecast 

that presumed steady but slow growth over this time 

period.

• Invert the planning paradigm for sizing the force as 

follows:

• Assume AF will continue to sustain readiness and 

proficiency levels at which Active, Guard and Reserve 

units are held to the same goals;

• Assuming 1:5 Deploy-To-Dwell ratio for the Reserve 

Components, and 1:2 for the Active Component, 

resource 20% of the RC for Full-Time service to meet 

Day-To-Day Requirements on the Air Force. If the 

DTD ratios are changed, resource the RC Full-Time 

forces proportionately;

• Resource to creatively access the remaining 80% of 

the RC as Traditional Guard/Reserve to apply against 

remaining Day-to-Day demands on the Air Force;

• Assume streamlined authorities maintain or improve 

accessibility as needed;

• Assess policies and practices needed to sustain 

sufficient rates of volunteerism;

• Resource the Active Component to meet: 

• Remaining Day-to-Day requirements;

• Additional Support to the Institutional Air Force for 

Training, Schools and seasoning;

• All forces thus planned and programmed would be 

available for surge to Go-To-War, assess risk against the 

Go-To-War scenarios.

Basic Design Construct

One team was instructed to develop a future Air Force with 

an active-reserve Component mix as was the case for FY15 

(approximately 65% AC-35% RC). A second team built a 

future Air Force with a somewhat larger Active Component 

(75% AC 25% RC). The third team programmed and 

planned for a larger Air Force Reserve and Air National 

Guard (35% AC – 65% RC). These were analytic constructs 

and not to be construed to imply Commissioner preferences 

for any particular force structure. It was envisioned that 

the analysis of alternatives may reveal where one or more 

design may fail, or alternatively that there are no significant 

differences among them. Such outcomes, however 

counterintuitive they may be, were intended to provide 

insight, not final answers. These three alternatives were then 

subjected to assessment in a subsequent war game event. 

Stage 1 was a simulated Air Force Planning Force build; 

Stage 2 was a hypothesized Crisis Planning Exercise in which 

the teams acted as the Force Provider to meet contending 

Combatant Command requirements and other national 

priorities. 

Implementation

• The entire war game was classified as it applied 

Programming and Planning guidance and information 

employed by the DoD, particularly the classified 

Integrated Scenario Constructs (ISCs) future warfighting 

scenarios applied by the CJCS in the Chairman’s Strategic 

Seminars.

• FACA compliance was enabled by advance notice of 

the Closed Meetings for Events 1 and 2 as well as the 

classified portion of the hotwash. Public comment was 

invited in advance of this war game design, and there 

was an open unclassified war game hotwash report and 

deliberation to which the public was invited.

• War game was conducted at the Commission’s Crystal 

City facility on Dec. 5 (Force Provider Crisis Planning 

Exercise) and Dec. 6 (Hotwash).

Stage One: Capstone Force Planning Exercise

Each team built a future Air Force within their assigned 

structure mix among the components, using more detailed 

resource and planning guidance to supplement the 

assumptions specified above. In order to fit their planned 

force structure within the constraints of their guidance, each 

team was allowed to vary other dimensions such as readiness 

levels, deploy-to-dwell ratios, component mix among and 

within core functions and mission sets, total capacity available 

within a particular mission set or core function (teams could 

opt to divest a specific MDS so long as the mission could 

be accomplished by other Air Force capabilities within 

the delineated constraints. This was a limiting factor to 

exploring alternatives, considering that the CSBA Portfolio 

Rebalancing Tool used by the teams supported the entire 

DoD capabilities portfolio), mobilization authorities and 

human capital management policy and practice. The objective 

for each team was to develop a future force structure that 

optimized cost effectiveness, as determined by the teams’ 

collective judgment of capability vs. cost. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 109

A Control Team comprised of key analysts, researchers, and 

assigned CSBA personnel applied the quantitative boundaries 

of the exercise and supported the respective analytic 

approaches employed by all 3 teams. This included the use of 

a decision support tool developed by the Air Force A9 staff 

and then modified by NCSAF Analysis to govern trade-offs 

among the control variables. The Control Team adjusted 

the Portfolio Rebalancing Tool through NCSAF Research 

to meet specific cost assumptions and allow Teams to focus 

on developing a balanced total force mix across the range of 

choices for all mission sets and core functions. Rapporteurs 

were assigned to each team in order to capture the discussion 

and decision-making dialogue for each team as well as the 

interaction with the stakeholders during the scheduled team 

briefs and hotwash discussion.

In the Capstone event on Dec. 5, each team briefed their 

force structure plan to a panel of Commissioners who 

developed their questions with key stakeholders’ interests 

in mind, including The Congress, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the States (Governors, Adjutants General, 

Congressional Delegations, Emergency Preparedness 

Directors, State Legislatures, Communities, etc.), Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff Air 

Force, Associations. After reviewing each Blue Team’s plan, 

Commissioners and Staff held a hotwash discussion that 

collected insights gained and instructions to the Blue teams 

for preparation for Stage 2.

Analysis

Upon conclusion of Stage 1, the Control Team conducted 

an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of each of the final 

force structures produced by the three teams. This analysis 

was guided by the ongoing results of the Lines of Analysis 

outlined in the Commission’s Analysis Plan and documented 

in the Issue Papers, Themes and Research Reports.

Stage Two: Force Provider Crisis Planning Exercise

Stage 2 was a crisis planning exercise the next day at the 

strategic level of conflicts that occur in 2018. The scenario 

employed was adapted from the Chairman’s Strategic Seminar 

involving a stressful crisis that rapidly devolves into a multitheater conflict that also requires maintaining a sizable force 

in CONUS for Homeland Defense events. Stage 2 was 

classified S/NF, where each team would play the role of the 

USAF as Force Provider to the Combatant Commands and 

had available the force structure that they had developed 

in Stage 1. Each team was presented with a briefing on the 

starting conditions presented by the adversary and a set of 

adjudicated Combatant Command requirements that the 

Air Force was directed to meet by the Secretary of Defense. 

Control provided these requirements in advance and each 

Team was given an identical set of briefing slides to complete, 

identifying which forces would be proposed to meet each 

requirement and the timelines that those forces would be 

available to the COCOM. Commissioners organized their 

questions to focus on stakeholder interest areas.

Assessment

On completion of Stage 2, Commissioners and Staff held a 

hotwash to develop an overall assessment of the implications 

of the war game for Commissioners’ consideration in their 

development of findings, conclusions and recommendations. 

The assessment included consideration of such issues as:

• Whether the three components should be integrated into 

a different arrangement,

• Can the forms of mobilization be further reduced and 

rationalized,

• Can additional functions be transferred to the civilian or 

contractor work forces,

• Infrastructure implications to force structure changes

• What legislative changes may be needed, and

• What additional issues were identified by the war game 

(impacts upon the Joint Force and the other Services).

The game control staff and CSBA staff offered the teams 

the following questions to answer as a baseline to assist the 

Commissioners’ engagement and exploration of challenges 

encountered:

• For Steady-State Requirements of the Operationally 

Stressing Case:

Compared to the Alternative Program Objective 

Memorandum 2015 (FY 15 Alt POM) force, what is the 

capability / capacity of your rebalanced force to:

• Meet geographic COCOMs’ theater presence 

requirements, including prepared to deploy 

requirements?

• Substitute for other Service capabilities that are 

unavailable to meet COCOM requests (e.g., 

substitute for carrier air wings to support presence)?

• Continue to support limited presence commitments 

in other theaters?

• Support COCOMs with more robust flexible 

deterrent options for two theaters?

• What are your most significant shortfalls?

• What actions did you take to offset / mitigate these 

shortfalls (force structure changes, force management 

initiatives)?

• For Crisis (Surge) Requirements of the Operationally 

Stressing Case:

Compared to the FY15 Alt POM force:

• Importance of early warning? Ability to respond to 
110 APPENDIX M: NCSAF WAR GAME

the scenario given little or no prior warning?

• Importance of mobilization and degree of 

mobilization required? 

• Ability of your force to sustain crisis (surge) level of 

effort for an extended (12 month) period of time?

• Ability to rapidly “swing” between the two 

operational theaters? 

• In addition to the two contingency operations, 

ability to support an EPP or large-scale crisis in the 

Homeland?

• What are your most significant shortfalls?

• What actions did you take to offset / mitigate these 

shortfalls (force structure changes, force management 

initiatives)?

Analysis

On conclusion of Stage 2, an analysis was conducted of the 

mission-effectiveness of each of the force structures produced 

by the three teams.

• Hotwash discussion – After completion of Stage 2, 

the teams produced a short presentation of their major 

findings as well as a recap of stakeholder questions that 

were asked. Each team spent two hours recounting the 

factors driving their decisions and answering follow on 

questions.

• Team Reports – each team spent a week writing a report 

on their war game results after receiving a report outline 

template from the Control Team, assisted by CSBA.

• Findings / Conclusions / Recommendations – using 

the results of the war game, the three teams were 

regrouped into teams that supported various draft 

Report chapters and provided draft findings, conclusions, 

and recommendations for consideration by the 

Commissioners.

Commissioners’ / Team Leaders’ Key Insights

• In general, Commissioners wanted to better understand 

how recommended changes by the teams could be 

implemented and what a solid estimate of those costs 

incurred would be.

• For a force structure with less active duty endstrength 

and more Reserve component endstrength, surge 

requirements that boosted the need for part-time reserve 

component personnel should be studied for statutory and 

policy changes needed to provide the same capabilities 

required by COCOMs in the same timelines. There was 

not sufficient time to study these issues during the war 

game.

• 65% Active Duty / 35% Reserve Component Team: 

• The team was able to achieve the desired 65/35 AC/

RC mix in a sustainable, fiscally-achievable model

• 65/35 Air Force maintains the current combat 

capability demanded by COCOM Commanders 

in order to fly, fight, and win in Air, Space, and 

Cyberspace

• 65/35 Air Force’s targeted cuts to the O&M budget 

through lowered accessions and reduced training and 

readiness costs allows the AF to maintain it’s status 

quo capability and capacity while meeting the FY15 

sequestered funding line

• Policy/Law/Human Capital Management proposals 

must ALL be met in order to create the environment 

for this model to succeed.

• Leadership must be willing to accept the risk 

associated with increasing the average age of the 

force, thinning accessions, and changing our readiness 

paradigm.

• 35% Active Duty / 65% Reserve Component Team:

• Force Management Risks:

• RC may encounter multiple, simultaneous risks in 

shouldering many more staff billets, absorbing 2X 

number of inexperienced pilots, a looming “gray 

wave,” and 1⁄2 of RC is full time.

• RC personnel could be seen as “second class 

citizens,” not good enough for AC and potentially 

resulting in morale decreases, personnel problems 

increase, retention decreases.

• Employer push back strongly increases at pace 

with RC participation rates, a real concern already 

for RC Airmen.

• New force mix career options are potentially 

unpopular and damage recruiting, undermining 

the historic AF advantage in attracting the best 

and brightest young people; well-known legacy 

examples of morale damage from Human Capital 

policies in a closed military system - takes years or 

decades to recover.

• Timeline Risks:

• Long term sustainability 

• AC feeding RC

• Recruitment, retention, affiliation

• Unintended consequences and second/third order 

effects

• No suitable models available

• Timeline: Is it possible in 2 FYDPs?

• Limited available assets for crisis management

• Future resources uncertainty
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 111

• Operational Risks:

• Increased risk to meet surge (MCO) operation(s) 

demand in terms of time

• Accessibility of “first to fight” forces different 

(warning times vs. mobilization authority)

• Availability of “first to fight” forces different 

(larger rotational force focused on steady-state 

vs. smaller active surge force) [Dependent 

upon where contingency kicks off ]

• Smaller “high-end” capacity may take longer 

to win the war or seize initiative in one theater 

as well as prolong ability to achieve deny in 

second theater

• Increased risk of slight degradation in skill and 

proficiency of the force

• Decreased size of the active force may result in 

temporary decrease in “seasoning” throughput 

to RC

• Sequester resulting in both overall Air Force 

TAI and readiness decline potentially will 

negatively impact tooth-to-tail ratio in RC

• 55% Active Duty / 45% Reserve Component Team:

• Retains the Alt POM 15 choices, and increases F-35 

buys by 5 annually

• Replacing 43,242 AC full-timers with 43,242 RC 

part-timers would:

• Replace 40K AC FT wing mission support with 

40K RC PT mission support in Associations on 

AC bases (~450/base) due to low deployed usage,

• Replace 3,242 AC FT in strategic airlift, tankers, 

and bombers with 3,242 RC PT in Associations 

on AC bases due to mission fit,

• Buys back flying hours/enhances readiness with 

~$1.5B annual savings generated by replacing FTs 

with PTs

• The 55/45 Team speculated that moving 43K Mission 

Support personnel positions to part-time Reserve 

Component positions would also have the following 

force impacts:

• Maintain or increase Operational Capabilities 

with an increased F-35 buy,

• Maintain or reduce manpower costs through FT 

to PT conversion,

• Maintain or increase Readiness by plowing back 

assumed Manpower savings,

• Maintain Capacity with minor availability deficits,

• Increase DSCA capacity by absorbing additional 

DSCA missions with new PT force structure,

• Increase service Quality of Life by requiring some 

active duty members to move less,

• Better community relations and recruitment/retention/

affiliation through improved active duty stability and 

increased Reserve Component presence, 

• Increased Reserve Component part time service 

OPSTEMPO.

Future Improvements to the Work

Due to the time constraints involved, significant amounts 

of potential analysis is still present to be explored by follow 

on research and analysis efforts. The entirety of costing 

out enterprise changes that would need to accompany any 

significant force structure and/or human capital policy 

shifts remains to be explored. This effort could potentially 

avoid deeper cuts to capabilities or readiness and should 

be supplemented by a highly capable consulting firm with 

significant accounting experience assisting large, global 

corporations in conducting internal reorganizations or 

mergers. This approach is not without precedent as OSD 

and the Services currently employ such firms to discover and 

implement enterprise best practices. The depth of knowledge 

and experience in such efforts by these firms would likely be 

the difference between a successful transformation by the Air 

Force or another Service or Agency, and much more limited 

success if done internally. Numerous business case studies 

confirm the probability of success, depending upon the path 

taken.

There would be a significant advantage in further evaluating 

alternative force structure using a combination of the 

Decision Support Tool (as generated by the NCSAF staff ), a 

Portfolio balancing Tool such as that provided by CSBA, and 

an enterprise, back office transformation effort with costed 

options that would be completed with the assistance of a 

qualified consulting firm. The efforts would work together 

synergistically to provide a deeper understanding of the costs 

of any transitions and efficient ways of reducing support 

costs as well. This modular approach would complement 

the war game findings and any potential follow on research. 

The Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) for DoD 

is the executive agent for DoD management best practices 

and would be well-suited as a supporting office and body of 

knowledge repository for similar efforts by any Service or 

Agency.
112 APPENDIX N: AUTHORITIES

State Active Duty

(SAD)

Title 32 Title 10

Command and Control Governor Governor President

Funding State Federal Federal

Mission Types State law Training and/or other federally 

authorized missions within 

CONUS

Federal Missions and duty 

performed within 

CONUS/OCONUS

Military Discipline State Military Code State Military Code UCMJ

Posse Comitatus Act Does not apply, but state law may 

have limitations

Does not apply, but state law may 

have limitations

Applies

Stafford Act 

Reimbursement

FEMA reimburses minimum of 

75% to state

FEMA may reimburse DOD for 

per diem and travel for MA 

performance; reimbursement for 

P&A under consideration

Per diem and travel for 

performance of MA

Benefits State law • Federal P&A

• Federal retirement points

• FTCA

• Medical/Disability

• Family medical (>30 days)

• USERRA

• SCRA (>30 consecutive days 

and for National Emergency)

• Death Gratuity

Generally the same as T32

APPENDIX N

AUTHORITIES

FIGURE 13: Duty Status Comparison Chart

Source: USNORTHCOM/NORAD, Staff Visit, September 9-11, 2013.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 113
114 APPENDIX O: DISTINCTIONS AMONG HOMELAND OPERATIONS

APPENDIX O

DISTINCTIONS AMONG HOMELAND OPERATIONS

IS IT DSCA,

HD, OR HS?

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

Is the mission to 

protect the air, space, 

or military installations 

of the U.S.?

Has the 

sovereignty or 

territorial integrity 

of the U.S. been 

compromised?

Is it an internal 

threat?

Is the event 

planned?

FIGURE 14: Is it Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), 

Homeland Defense (HD), or Homeland Security (HS)?

THE ANSWER DEPENDS ON THE QUESTION.

It’s Homeland Defense. 

Defense of the sovereign territory, 

air space, and military installations 

against external threat or aggression 

is Homeland Defense. DoD is the lead 

federal agency. 

YES

It’s Homeland Security. 

Homeland Security focuses 

on preventing, preparing, and 

recovering from attack or disaster. 

Homeland Security works with 

Homeland Defense. DHS is the lead 

federal agency. 

It’s Homeland Defense. 

Homeland Defense is the 

protection of the U.S. 

against external threats and 

aggression. DoD is the lead 

federal agency. 

Is the mission to 

prevent or recover 

from an attack?

It’s Homeland Security. 

Homeland Security focuses on 

protecting the U.S., reducing 

potential vulnerabilities and 

damages, and recoving from attack 

or disaster. DHS is the lead federal 

agency. 

Does the mission 

require support to law 

enforcement?

If law enforcement requires support and the SecDef 

approves, this can be a DSCA mission. Title 10 federal 

forces’ response efforts are limited by the Posse 

Comitatus Act. The National Guard in Title 32 or State 

Active Duty status may be better suited for these 

missions. State Active Duty forces can provide state 

support independent of DoD and SecDef approval.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 115

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

Are local response 

capabilities exceeded? 

Have local authorities 

requested the support of 

a federal agency?

Has the SecDef 

received a DSCA 

request?

Is there risk 

of loss of life, 

human suffering, 

or great property 

damage?

YES

Are local authorities 

able to prepare for and 

execute the mission with 

their own capabilities?

YES

This is not DSCA.

DSCA is only used when local 

capabilities have been exhausted or 

exceeded.

NO

This is DSCA.

DSCA can be used for National 

Security Special Events (NSSE)– 

large, planned events such as 

political conventions or Boy Scout 

National Jamborees. 

This is not DSCA without an 

approved request that meets the 

standards in DoD Directive 3025.18.

This is DSCA.

DoD Directive 3025.18 gives DoD 

officials immediate response 

authority to commit any DoD assets 

in support of local authorities under 

imminently serious conditions for 

up to 72 hours until the President or 

SecDef can give approval. 

YES

This is not DSCA.

DSCA is only used when 

local capabilities have been 

exhausted or exceeded.

Does it meet the 

SecDef approval 

criteria: 1) legality, 

2) lethality, 

3) risk, 4) cost, 

5) appropriateness, 

and 6) readiness?

NO

This is DSCA. 

DSCA requests must be made in writing 

to be evaluated against the six criteria 

set forth in DoD Directive 3025.18. 

SecDef must approve all DSCA missions 

and National Guardsmen used in 

Title 32 status. 
116 APPENDIX P: COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

APPENDIX P

COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

CHAIR, HONORABLE DENNIS M. MCCARTHY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USMC (RET)

Dennis McCarthy began his Marine 

Corps service in 1967 as a platoon 

leader in Vietnam and completed it 

in 2005 as Commander of Marine 

Forces Reserve. He led the Marine 

Forces Reserve for four years during the 

Corps’ largest reserve mobilization in 

its history. His primary responsibility 

was setting the conditions that enabled 

Marines to successfully serve their 

nation in combat in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and around the world.

After completing his service in 

uniform, he was Executive Director 

of the Reserve Officers Association 

of the United States, an organization 

of 60,000 members with a historic 

commitment to promote national 

security. Operating from its iconic 

headquarters on Capitol Hill, ROA 

continued its 90- year tradition of 

leadership and innovation during 

Chairman McCarthy’s tenure.

While serving as Executive Director, 

Chairman McCarthy was nominated 

by President Barack Obama and 

confirmed by the Senate to be Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs. As Assistant Secretary of 

Defense, he was responsible for policy 

development and execution for over 

one million members of the National 

Guard and Reserves of all services. His 

office also supervised activities relating 

to reserve mobilization, training, and 

facilities. He worked closely with key 

budget officials and with Members 

of Congress and with Congressional 

Committee staffs.

From 1978 to 1999, Chairman 

McCarthy was a civil trial lawyer 

in Columbus, Ohio. He was Board 

Certified by the National Board of Trial 

Advocacy, an Adjunct Faculty member 

at Capital University Law School, a 

leader in state and national trial lawyer 

organizations, and a frequent CLE 

lecturer and contributor. During this 

period, he was active in the Marine 

Corps Reserve and was recalled to 

active duty as a Marine infantry officer 

on multiple occasions, including 

command of the Third Marine 

Division. He returned to active duty 

full time in 1999 and served until his 

retirement in 2005, completing more 

than 40 years of Active and Reserve 

military service.

In 2010, he was awarded an 

Honorary Doctor of Laws degree by 

Capital University Law School and was 

named the Distinguished Alumnus for 

2011. He currently serves on several 

advisory boards. Prior to his return 

to government service in 2009, he 

was Vice Chairman of the Board of 

Medifast, Inc. (NYSE: MED) and was 

a member of the Board of Directors of 

Rivada Networks, Inc.

He is now Counsel to McCarthy 

Law Offices (a firm founded by his son, 

attorney Michael D. McCarthy) and a 

Principal in Military Experts, LLC, a 

consulting firm that combines military 

expertise with government and business 

leadership to provide analysis, advice, 

and assessment to business leaders and 

attorneys. He also serves on the Board 

of Counselors at the Capital University 

Law School and is a founding member 

of the Ross Leadership Institute of 

Columbus, Ohio.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 117

VICE CHAIR, HONORABLE ERIN C. CONATON

HONORABLE F. WHITTEN PETERS

Erin C. Conaton is currently President 

of Conaton Strategies, LLC, and a 

consultant with J.A.Green & Co. She 

has 15 years of experience in defense 

policy, programs, and budgeting; 

military strategy; and military 

personnel policy and readiness. She 

recently left government service after 

serving three years as a senior Senateconfirmed appointee, first as Under 

Secretary of the Air Force and most 

recently as Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness.

As Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, she served 

as the senior policy advisor to the 

Secretary of Defense and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense on all matters 

concerning recruitment, career 

development, military health care, and 

pay and benefits for 1.4 million Active 

military personnel, 1.3 million Guard 

and Reserve personnel, and more than 

782,000 DoD civilians. She was also 

responsible for overseeing the overall 

state of military readiness and for 

managing the Department of Defense’s 

relationship with the Department of 

Veterans Affairs

Ms. Conaton served as Under 

Secretary of the Air Force from 

March 2010 until early June 2012. As 

Under Secretary of the Air Force, Ms. 

Conaton was responsible for the affairs 

of the Department of the Air Force 

including the organizing, training, 

equipping, and providing for the 

welfare of its 680,000 members and 

their families. She also served as the 

Air Force Chief Management Officer, 

oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget 

of more than $119 billion, and served 

as Acting Secretary of the Air Force in 

the Secretary’s absence.

Prior to becoming Under Secretary 

of the Air Force, Ms. Conaton served 

as Staff Director of the U.S. House 

of Representatives Committee on 

Armed Services, where she served as 

primary adviser on defense matters 

to the Chairman and 61 other 

Members; directed overall operations, 

and strategic planning; and led the 

substantive agenda of the committee, 

including drafting and overseeing 

the National Defense Authorization 

Act. Ms. Conaton also previously 

served as Minority Staff Director and 

Professional Staff Member on the 

committee.

Ms. Conaton has served as the 

Research Staff Director for the U.S. 

Commission on National Security/21st 

Century, also known as the HartRudman Commission. The commission 

was charged by the Secretary of Defense 

to design a national security strategy 

for a changing global environment 

through 2025 and to recommend plans 

for implementing this strategy. She 

has held several fellowships, including 

those at the Central Intelligence 

Agency, where she worked within 

the Office of Asia-Pacific and Latin 

American Analysis; and at the National 

Security Council, with the Directorate 

of Nonproliferation and Export 

Control. She has also served as a Term 

Member of the Council on Foreign 

Relations.

Ms. Conaton earned a Master of 

Arts in law and diplomacy from The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University, 

Medford, Mass., and a Bachelor 

of Science in foreign service from 

Georgetown University, Washington 

D.C.

Whit Peters is a partner at Williams 

& Connolly LLP in Washington, DC. 

From 1999 to 2001 he served as the 

Secretary of the Air Force.

Previously, from 1997 to 1999, 

he was Under Secretary and Acting 

Secretary of the Air Force. From 1995 

to 1997, Mr. Peters was Principal 

Deputy General Counsel at the 

Department of Defense. Before his 

service at the Department of Defense, 

he practiced law at Williams & 

Connolly, which he joined in 1978.

Mr. Peters joined the Navy as 

a Reserve officer in January 1969 

and graduated as a distinguished 

graduate and company commander 

the following June. He served at the 

Atlantic Fleet Intelligence Center in 

Norfolk, Va., running the systems and 

programming division of the computer 

center. He was released by the Navy in 

February 1972 and immediately hired 

back as a civilian employee to complete 

a project. In August 1972 he earned 

a Frank Knox Traveling Fellowship 

from Harvard University to attend 

the London School of Economics 

where, the following year, he earned 

a Master of Arts with distinction in 

economics. He entered Harvard Law 

School where for two years he served as 

president of the Harvard Law Review 

and graduated magna cum laude with a 

Doctor of Laws degree in 1976.

He holds a Bachelor of Arts from 

Harvard University, a Master of Science 

from the London School of Economics, 

and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.
118 APPENDIX P: COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

HONORABLE LES BROWNLEE

GENERAL RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., USAF (RET)

Les Brownlee served as the Acting 

Secretary of the Army from May 

10, 2003 until Nov. 18, 2004. He 

became the 27th Under Secretary of 

the Army Nov. 14, 2001, following 

his nomination by President George 

W. Bush and confirmation by the 

U.S. Senate. Mr. Brownlee served 

concurrently as both Acting Secretary 

of the Army and Under Secretary of the 

Army for 18 months, thereby becoming 

the longest-serving Acting Secretary of 

the Army in history.

Mr. Brownlee’s statutory 

responsibilities as Acting Secretary 

included recruiting, organizing, 

supplying, equipping, training and 

mobilizing the Army and managing 

its $100 billion annual budget and 

more than 1.3 million Active, National 

Guard, Army Reserve and civilian 

personnel. Mr. Brownlee also served 

concurrently as Acting Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Civil Works 

from March 2002 to August 2003. 

Mr. Brownlee served previously on the 

Republican staff of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee beginning in 

January 1987 under both Sen. Strom 

Thurmond and Sen. John Warner. 

From 1987 to 1996, he was the 

principal professional staff member 

responsible for Army and Marine 

Corps programs, Special Operations 

forces and drug interdiction policy. 

As deputy staff director, he was deeply 

involved in policies and programs 

relating to ballistic missile defense; 

strategic deterrence and naval strategy; 

shipbuilding; and weapons programs. 

In March, 1996, Mr. Brownlee was 

designated Staff Director of the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services by then 

Chairman, Sen. Strom Thurmond. In 

January, 1999, he was designated Staff 

Director by then Chairman, Sen. John 

Warner, serving through a change in 

control of the Senate in mid-2001.

Mr. Brownlee is a retired Army 

colonel. He was commissioned in 1962 

as a lieutenant of infantry through the 

ROTC program at the University of 

Wyoming. He is a distinguished honor 

graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger 

Course, an honor graduate of both 

the Infantry Officer Advanced Course 

and the Command and General Staff 

College, and a graduate of the Army 

Airborne course as well as the U.S. 

Army War College. He holds a master’s 

degree in business administration 

from the University of Alabama. Mr. 

Brownlee served two combat tours in 

Vietnam. Before retiring in 1984, he 

was Military Executive to the Under 

Secretary of the Army. His military 

decorations include two Silver Stars, 

three Bronze Stars and the Purple 

Heart. He has been inducted into 

the Ranger Hall of Fame and was 

named winner of the U.S. Army 

Infantry’s prestigious “Doughboy 

Award” for 2012. Mr. Brownlee served 

as a commissioner on the National 

Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserve Forces. He is a member 

of the board of directors of Blue Star 

Families and is currently the senior vice 

president for business development for 

Enersol Technologies, Inc.

Ray Johns retired from active duty 

in January 2013. He joined Flight 

Safety International as the Senior 

Vice President for Government 

Business in January 2014. Prior to 

retirement, he served as Commander, 

Air Mobility Command, Scott Air 

Force Base, Ill. From 2006 to 2009 

General Johns served as Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and 

Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 

Washington, D.C., where he developed, 

integrated, evaluated and analyzed the 

U.S. Air Force Future Years Defense 

Program and the Air Force Long Range 

Plan. From 2004 to 2006, General 

Johns served as Director of Programs, 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Strategic Plans and Programs.

General Johns graduated from the 

U.S. Air Force Academy in 1977. His 

aviation career includes C-141, C-17, 

KC-10, N/K/C-135, T-38 instructor 

pilot, as well as the chief test pilot and 

test program manager for the VC-25 

Air Force One. He was chosen as a 

White House Fellow in 1991, where he 

was a Senior Staff Member in the Office 

of National Service. The general has 

served at Headquarters U.S. European 

Command in security assistance 

and congressional affairs, and at 

Headquarters U.S. Pacific Command as 

Deputy Director of Strategic Plans and 

Policy. Within Headquarters U.S. Air 

Force, he served as Deputy Director 

and, later, Director of Air Force 

Programs. The general commanded a 

test squadron, operations group, and 

airlift wing, and he was the Director 

of Mobility Forces for operations in 

Bosnia.

General Johns was a command pilot 

and experimental test pilot whose 

aviation career included more than 

5,000 flying hours in more than 80 

different aircraft. He holds a Bachelor 

of Science from the U.S. Air Force 

Academy, and a Master of Science from 

Central Michigan University.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 119

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF (RET)

DR. JANINE A. DAVIDSON

Bud Wyatt retired from active duty on 

January 30, 2013, finishing his U.S. Air 

National Guard career as the Director 

of the Air National Guard. Prior to that 

assignment, Lt. Gen. Wyatt served as 

the Adjutant General of Oklahoma, 

responsible for commanding units of 

the Air and Army National Guard. As 

the Director of the Air National Guard, 

he was responsible for formulating, 

developing and coordinating all 

policies, plans, and programs affecting 

more than 106,700 Guard members 

in more than 88 flying wings and 

200 geographically separated units 

throughout the United States, Puerto 

Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

Lt. Gen. Wyatt entered the Air 

Force in 1971 and graduated from 

undergraduate pilot training at Laredo 

Air Force Base, Texas, in 1973. He is a 

command pilot with more than 3,000 

hours in the A-7, C-26, F-16, F-100, 

F-106, T-33, T-37 and T-38 aircraft. 

His personal decorations include 

the Air Force Distinguished Service 

Medal, the Legion of Merit, and the 

Meritorious Service Medal with oak 

leaf cluster.

He holds a Bachelor of Arts from 

Southern Methodist University and a 

J.D. from the University of Tulsa.

Janine Davidson is a Senior Fellow 

at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Previously she had been an Assistant 

Professor in the School of Public 

Policy at George Mason University, 

where she taught courses on national 

security, civil-military relations, and 

public policy. From 2009 to 2012, 

she served as the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Plans, where 

she oversaw the development of 

guidance for military campaign and 

contingency plans. She also led policy 

efforts for U.S. global defense posture 

and international agreements related 

to U.S. forces stationed overseas while 

co-chairing the U.S.–Australia defense 

posture working group. In 2012, she 

was awarded the Secretary of Defense 

Medal for Outstanding Public Service.

Dr. Davidson began her career in 

the U.S. Air Force, where she was an 

aircraft commander and senior pilot 

for the C-130 and the C-17 cargo 

aircraft. She flew combat support and 

humanitarian air mobility missions 

in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, 

and was an Instructor Pilot at the U.S. 

Air Force Academy. Previous positions 

include serving as Director for Stability 

Operations Capabilities in the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict (2006 to 2008), associate at 

DFI International (2003 to 2004), 

research and non- resident fellow at the 

Brooking Institution (2004; 2008), and 

director at Hicks and Associates (2005 

to 2006).

Dr. Davidson holds a Ph.D. and 

a Master of Arts in international 

studies from the University of South 

Carolina, and a Bachelor of Science 

in architectural engineering from the 

University of Colorado at Boulder. She 

is a member of the Council on Foreign 

Relations, a non-resident Senior Fellow 

at the Center for New American 

Security, and author of Lifting the Fog 

of Peace: How Americans Learned to 

Fight Modern War.
120 APPENDIX P: COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

DR. MARGARET C. HARRELL

Meg Harrell is the Director of 

the Army Health Program and a 

senior social scientist at the RAND 

Corporation. 

During her tenure at the RAND 

Corporation, Dr. Harrell’s research 

has addressed military manpower 

and personnel, military families and 

quality of life, and veterans’ issues. She 

has led or co-led projects addressing 

the resiliency of military families; 

the effects of deployment on Active 

and Reserve Component families; 

the promotion and management 

of military generals and admirals; 

assignment policies for military 

women; how best to promote, develop, 

and assign military officers; and how to 

ensure the well-being of veterans. 

From July 2011 to August 2012 she 

served concurrently as Senior Fellow 

and Director of the Military, Veterans, 

and Society Program at the Center for a 

New American Security (CNAS).

While at CNAS, she co-authored 

Losing the Battle: The Challenge of 

Military Suicide; Well After Service: 

Veteran Reintegration and American 

Communities; and Employing America’s 

Veterans: Perspectives from Businesses.

She holds a Bachelor of Arts with 

Distinction from the University 

of Virginia, a Master of Science in 

systems analysis and management from 

George Washington University, and 

a Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology 

from the University of Virginia, where 

her dissertation was entitled, “Brass 

Rank and Gold Rings: Class, Race, 

Gender, and Kinship with the Army 

Community.”
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIR FORCE 121

APPENDIX Q

COMMISSION STAFF

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: DR. JAMES A. BLACKWELL, JR. 

Confirmed as Executive Director by 

the Commissioners on May 3, 2013, 

Dr. Blackwell has previously been 

called upon by Defense Secretaries 

Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates 

to serve as Executive Director for 

investigatory task forces on DoD 

Detention Operations (2004) and 

DoD Nuclear Weapons Management 

(2008). He is detailed to the 

Commission from his duties as Special 

Advisor to the Assistant Chief of Staff, 

Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 

Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air 

Force, Washington, D.C. In this 

capacity he is responsible for providing 

expertise and intellectual leadership 

to the Air Force on policy, strategy, 

planning, and budgeting for deterrence 

as well as engaging in arms control and 

intelligence analysis. Dr. Blackwell 

assists and advises the Air Force in 

establishing and sustaining a culture 

of critical self-assessment, excellence, 

precision, and reliability in the nuclear 

mission.

Dr. Blackwell is a 1974 graduate 

of the U.S. Military Academy at West 

Point and has directed a number of 

ground-breaking studies and analyses 

of complex problems confronting 

the armed forces. He also is an 

internationally recognized author 

and military analyst. He has served as 

an executive in both think tanks and 

corporate enterprises in defense studies 

and analysis. In the 1990s he regularly 

appeared in global broadcast media 

as an expert in military operations. 

He was an Assistant Professor at West 

Point. He had an exemplary term of 

service as an Army officer in a variety 

command and staff positions prior to 

his medical retirement in 1987. He 

holds a Ph.D. in international security 

studies and a Master of Arts in law and 

diplomacy from The Fletcher School 

of International Law and Diplomacy at 

Tufts University, Medford, Mass.

Marcia Moore, Designated Federal 

Officer

Col George Degnon, USAF, Director 

of Staff

Maj Gen Greg Schumacher, USA 

(Ret.), Director of Analysis

Dr. Kathleen Robertson, SES (Ret.), 

Director of Research

Doug Nichols, Chief of Operations

Trevor Grange, Chief of Support

Eric Minton, Chief of Strategic 

Communications

Bill Nieusma, Chief of Governmental 

Relations

James McCleskey, Chief of State and 

Local Government Relations

Barry Willey, Chief of Public Affairs

Col Terrence Dunne, USMC, Senior 

Analyst

CAPT Andrew Westerkom, USN, 

Senior Analyst

Patrick Harding, Senior Analyst

John Thurman, Senior Analyst

Darryl Taylor, Senior Analyst

Dr. Shirley Ross, Senior Analyst

Dwayne Baxter, Senior Analyst

King Gillespie, Senior Analyst

Dr. Deron Hurst, Senior Analyst

Jeffrey Cohen, Senior Analyst

Eric Jorgensen, Senior Analyst

Lt Col Tracy Smith, USAF, Senior 

Analyst

Lt John Swisher, USAF, Analyst

Maj David Willard, USAF, Analyst

Cathy Haverstock, Senior Researcher

Maj Jason Sander, USAF, Senior 

Researcher

Christie Jones, Research Analyst

Jaime Hastings, Research Analyst

Amy Grace Peele, Research Analyst

Chase Ludwig, Research Analyst

Rachael Wylie Chestnut, Research 

Analyst

Dustin LeClair, Research Analyst

Elizabeth Irwin, Research Analyst

Carol Winick, Research Analyst

Sean F. Conroy, Military Executive

Webster Bridges, Planning Officer

LTC Tim Smith, USA, Planning 

Officer

MSgt Chris Smith, USAF, Security 

Manager

Zachary Sherrod, Operations Assistant

Emily Pickett, Operations Assistant

Christopher Bisett, Executive Assistant

Beverly Parker-Freeman, Executive 

Assistant

Gabrielle Mazurek, Assistant to the 

DFO

SPC(P) Vannessa Morris, USA, 

Archivist

Gunnar Almgren, Facilities Manager

Omar Ismail, Webmaster

Laurel Moran, Graphic Designer

Ken O’Reilly, WHS Representative to 

NCSAF

Al Lopez, EITSD Representative to 

NCSAF

Jamal Turner, EITSD Representative to 

NCSAF
122 APPENDIX R: SOURCES CONSULTED

APPENDIX R

SOURCES CONSULTED

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for Support of Civil Authorities after Certain Incidents. 

2010. Before disaster strikes: Imperatives for enhancing 

Defense Support for Civil Authorities. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office.

Ahmann, LTC Luke, and LTC Liesl Carter. 2012. Total 

Force Optimization. Boston: John F. Kennedy School 

of Government National Security Program http://

www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Total%20Force%20

Optimization%20Study-Harvard%20LTC%20

Ahmann.pdf (accessed September 24, 2013). 

Air, Land, Sea Application Center. 2013. Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support 

of Civil Authorities and Integrating with National Guard 

Civil Support.

American Forces Press Service. 2012. DOD provides update 

for Hurricane Sandy response, 2 Nov. http://www.

defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118385

Barno, LTG David W., Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp. 

2011. Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of 

Austerity.

Bigelow, James H. and Albert A. Robbert. 2011. Rand 

Project Air Force – Balancing Rated Personnel 

Requirements and Inventories. Santa Monica: RAND 

Corporation. 

Bowman, Steve, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco. 

2005. Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response. 

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Branstad, Terry, Governor, and Martin O’Malley, Martin, 

Governor. Letter to Senators Charles T. Hagel and 

Ashton B. Carter, August 20, 2013.

Brauner, Marygail, Harry Thie, and Roger Brown. 1992. 

Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and 

Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy during 

the Persian Gulf Conflict. Santa Monica: RAND 

Corportation.

Cantwell, Gerald T. 1994. Citizen Airmen: A History of the 

Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Government Printing Office. 

Carwile, William. 2005. Unified Command and the StateFederal Response to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi. 

Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 2 : 1-13.

Conroy, MAJ Sean. 2011. “Accessibility: Improving the 

Mobilization Framework in Order to Leverage 

Availability of the Air National Guard.” Air & Space 

Power Journal 25, no. 1 : 17-25. 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. 2008. 

Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 

21st-Century Operational Force. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office.

Conway, James T., Gary Roughead, and Thad W. Allen. 

2007. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower. http://www.navy.mil/maritime/

maritimestrategy.pdf (accessed September 24, 

2013).

Cook, Cynthia, Albert Robbert, and William Williams. 

1999. Principles for Determining the Air Force 

Active/Reserve Mix. Santa Monica: RAND 

Corportation.

Boyd, Donald C., Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and 

Keith L. Barr. 2012. Turning Point Air Force Reserve in 

the 21st Century 2001-2011. Washington, D.C.: Air 

Force Reserve Command Directorate of Historical 

Services.

Doyle, Colin, David Graham, Tim Ni, and Steven Walser. 

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Page 14, U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Katherine Windish

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Page 50, U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Chad Chisholm
Report to the President and Congress of the United States

JANUARY 30, 2014

National Commission on the 

Structure of the Air Force