IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–0506

Filed October 18, 2013

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

JAMES A. CLARITY III,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa. 

Grievance commission reports respondent committed ethical 

violations and recommends suspension of his license to practice law. 

LICENSE SUSPENDED. 

Charles L. Harrington and Nicholas Trè Critelli III, Des Moines, for 

complainant. 

Edward W. Bjornstad of Edward W. Bjornstad, LLC, Spirit Lake, for 

respondent. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

An experienced Iowa attorney, James A. Clarity III, neglected his 

clients and mishandled their cases and money while struggling with 

alcoholism. He has been under disability suspension since May 25, 

2012. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against Clarity, alleging he violated ten rules of professional 

conduct during his representation of seven clients in five different 

matters. Clarity stipulated to most of the underlying facts, nine of ten 

rule violations, and mitigating and aggravating circumstances. He 

contested the Board’s allegation that he charged an unreasonable fee in a 

criminal case. A division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme 

Court of Iowa found Clarity violated all ten rules and recommended his 

license be suspended for three years from May 25, 2012. Based on our 

de novo review, we find Clarity violated all ten rules and impose a oneyear disciplinary suspension from the date of this opinion. 

I. Scope of Review. 

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 171

(Iowa 2013). We give the commission’s findings respectful consideration, 

but we are not bound by them. Id. The Board must prove attorney 

misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. In 

determining the appropriate sanction, we can impose a more or less 

severe sanction than that recommended by the commission. Id. 

The parties are bound by their stipulations of fact. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Iowa 2012). 

“However, a stipulation is not binding as to a violation or a sanction. We 

will determine whether a violation occurred and the appropriate sanction 
3

based upon the facts we find from the stipulation and our review of the 

record.” Id. (citations omitted).

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

We find the following facts using the parties’ stipulation and our 

own review of the record. 

Clarity was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1976. At all times 

relevant to the Board’s complaint, Clarity resided in Dickinson County, 

Iowa. His practice was approximately forty percent criminal matters and 

sixty percent civil matters. Before his issues with alcoholism, Clarity had 

an unblemished career and enjoyed a reputation as a zealous advocate 

for his clients. He was a member of several prestigious trial lawyer 

organizations.

Clarity, by his own admission, became an alcoholic after his sister 

died in 2009. He received inpatient treatment for alcohol abuse from 

July 15 through August 13, 2010, at the Hazelden Treatment Center in

Center City, Minnesota. After relapsing, Clarity entered inpatient 

treatment a second time on February 12, 2011. During this second 

phase of treatment, on March 8, our court temporarily suspended 

Clarity’s license to practice law due to his disability and implemented a 

trusteeship. He was released from inpatient care on April 14. We held a 

hearing on April 26 on whether to lift his disability suspension. Clarity 

provided medical evidence of his successful treatment. He testified as 

follows:

I am asking the court to end this suspension so that I can go 

back to what I love doing. I have taken the necessary steps 

to put my life in order as would a cancer patient, patient 

with MS or any other patient with a treatment of a disease. 

Alcoholism is chronic, progressive, and it’s fatal. To that and 

in that there is no doubt. If I drink again, I will die. Simple. 

We lifted his temporary suspension the next day. 
4

Clarity relapsed again a year later. On May 25, 2012, we imposed 

another temporary disability suspension on Clarity’s license to practice 

law. Clarity consented to continuing this suspension, and it has 

remained in effect since that date. We now describe the matters giving 

rise to the Board’s complaint. 

A. Easton Representation. David and Jane Easton retained 

Clarity on January 20, 2010, to represent them in threatened federal 

criminal and civil charges relating to Medicare prescription fraud. The 

Eastons paid Clarity a $75,000 retainer and agreed to pay his hourly rate 

of $300. Clarity had previously handled similar matters. Shortly after 

retaining Clarity, David was indicted in federal court on 1080 criminal 

counts, and a federal civil suit was filed against the Eastons. 

The Eastons paid Clarity’s retainer in two installments: $50,000 on 

January 21 and $25,000 on February 10. Clarity deposited these funds 

in his trust account at The State Bank in Spirit Lake, Iowa. At the time 

these funds were deposited, the account contained no other client funds 

and had a prior balance of $118.93. Over the next several months, 

Clarity transferred $69,317.08 to his general firm account for the 

payment of legal fees and costs and paid the balance to a third party for 

chartered air travel. Clarity failed to contemporaneously notify the 

Eastons of these withdrawals or provide them with any accounting. By 

May 3, their retainer was depleted, leaving $119.93 in the trust account. 

Clarity contacted David on July 14 to notify him for the first time

that the $75,000 was depleted. Clarity asked for an additional $15,000 

to continue his work on the case. Clarity told David he needed the funds 

to travel to Washington, D.C. so that he could negotiate a settlement with 

the United States Department of Justice. At Clarity’s request, David met 

him in a grocery store parking lot and gave him a check for the requested 
5

amount. The next day, July 15, David went to Clarity’s law office to 

obtain a receipt, but was informed by Clarity’s secretary that he was 

home sick and that she knew nothing about the $15,000. David heard 

rumors the next day that Clarity had been committed for alcohol 

addiction and stopped payment on his check. No one from Clarity’s 

office notified the Eastons that Clarity would be unavailable for weeks. 

The Eastons retained new counsel, who required them to pay another 

retainer. Clarity’s office did not respond to multiple requests to transfer 

his file to the new attorney until mid-August. Clarity, despite repeated 

requests for a refund or explanation, also failed to provide any 

accounting of how the $75,000 was spent until after the Eastons filed a 

complaint with the Board on November 5. On November 12, Clarity sent 

to the Eastons his first and only statement describing his services 

rendered from January through June.

According to Clarity, due to record-keeping problems, he had to recreate his November statement by perusing his file. He said he originally 

handwrote his time entries during his representation of the Eastons and 

his legal assistant entered the information into the billing system. She

destroyed the handwritten time entries after entering the data.1 Clarity 

testified a computer virus compromised the electronic time records. 

Clarity hired a computer technician to address the problem, but the data 

could not be recovered. His reconstructed statement dated November 12 

included five pages of entries listing services performed without the date 

or time spent on any specific entry. At the end of the statement,

 

1Clarity later learned this legal assistant embezzled approximately $100,000 

from the firm, money that was allocated to pay Clarity’s malpractice insurance 

premiums. Clarity testified he does not believe she took any client funds. Clarity did 

not pursue any legal action against her. 
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aggregate figures were provided: “TOTAL TIME: 225 HOURS x $300.00 = 

$72,000[sic]” followed by “TOTAL COSTS ADVANCED: $3,299.32” and a 

final line stating, “TOTAL TIME AND COSTS ADVANCED: $75,299.32.” 

Clarity never refunded any of the Eastons’ $75,000. David Easton, 

represented by another attorney, ultimately was sentenced to prison. 

B. Buettner, Clark, and Leiss OWI Matters. Clarity represented 

three clients—Kenley Martin Buettner, Nichole Marie Clark, and 

Anthony Peter Leiss—in criminal and administrative proceedings arising 

from charges of operating while intoxicated (OWI). Buettner retained 

Clarity to represent him on May 12, 2010, after he was arrested for a 

third offense OWI and driving while barred. Buettner paid Clarity a 

$15,000 retainer by three credit card payments in March and June. 

These payments went into the firm’s general account and were not 

transferred into Clarity’s client trust account. Clark and Leiss, who were 

each charged with first offense OWI, also retained Clarity. Clark’s 

grandmother and Leiss each paid Clarity a retainer of $2500 in 

September and October, respectively. Clarity did not transfer these

retainers into his client trust account. 

On his 2011 “Client Security Commission Combined Statement 

and Questionnaire,” Clarity responded “yes” to a question that asked 

whether all retainers, regardless of their size, had been deposited into a 

client trust account. Although Clarity later asked how to correct his 

misstatement, he never filed an amended questionnaire with the Office of 

Professional Regulation. 

Clarity advised all three clients at the outset of his representation 

they did not need to attend any hearing unless he specifically told them

to do so. Arraignments were held for Clark and Leiss on November 4, 

2010, but Clarity failed to appear or notify his clients of the need to 
7

appear. The court continued the arraignments until November 18. 

Clarity again failed to inform Clark or Leiss of the new date and failed to

attend or continue their arraignments. As a result, the court issued 

bench warrants for Clark and Leiss, who were arrested and jailed. Clark 

and Leiss each had to post bond to secure their release. Clarity also 

failed to notify Buettner he needed to attend his pretrial conference 

scheduled for January 24, 2011. Because neither Clarity nor Buettner 

attended the pretrial conference, the court issued a bench warrant for 

Buettner’s arrest. Buettner too was jailed and had to post bond to 

secure his release. 

Clarity entered his second inpatient treatment on February 12, 

again without notifying these clients, the court, or the county attorney he 

would not be practicing during that period. Buettner, Clark, and Leiss 

each retained new counsel. Clark sued Clarity in small claims court and 

obtained a default judgment for her $2500 retainer with interest and 

$110 in court costs. As of the time of the commission’s hearing, Clarity 

had not yet satisfied the judgment. Clarity also had not refunded any

part of the Buettner or Leiss retainers. 

C. Rodrick and Jurine Williams Representation. Clarity 

represented Rodrick and Jurine Williams as plaintiffs in a civil action

filed in the Iowa District Court for Emmet County. The court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the defendants on September 13, 2010. 

Clarity filed a timely notice of appeal on October 11. But, because 

Clarity failed to file the combined certificate and to pay the filing fee, the 

clerk of this court sent Clarity a “Notice of Default and Assessment of 

Penalty” on November 2. Clarity failed to cure the default. As a result, 

we entered an order dismissing the appeal on December 8. Clarity 

moved to reinstate the appeal, alleging he had not received the notice of 
8

default because the post office would not deliver mail addressed to his 

street address. We denied the motion to reinstate on January 11, 2011, 

stating:

The order dismissing the appeal and the default notice were 

sent to the exact same address. Despite his earlier 

contentions that no mail will be delivered using that address, 

attorney Clarity states he received the order dismissing the 

appeal on December 8, 2010. The court also notes the

notice and the order dismissing the appeal were sent to the 

same address used by Clarity on his letterhead and previous 

documents filed with the district court and the appellate 

court. Finally, Clarity offers no explanation for why he failed 

to comply with Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.702(1)(a) 

(the filing fee for the notice of appeal shall be paid within 

seven days after filing the notice of appeal) and 6.804(1) (the 

combined certificate shall be filed within seven days of the 

filing of the notice of appeal). 

Consequently, Clarity’s inaction resulted in dismissal of his clients’

appeal. 

D. Procedural History. On March 1, 2012, the Board filed a 

complaint alleging Clarity violated ten rules of professional conduct in 

connection with the above-described matters. Clarity’s answer to the 

complaint, filed April 5, admitted some of the factual allegations, but 

denied he violated any of the rules identified by the Board. Pursuant to 

Iowa Court Rule 35.17, our court temporarily suspended Clarity’s license 

to practice law on May 25. On May 29, at the Board’s request, the 

commission stayed the proceedings because Clarity was incapacitated 

and hospitalized. On August 10, the Board applied to lift the stay to 

allow the ethics complaint to proceed to hearing. We granted the Board’s 

application. The commission held a one-day hearing on December 5. 

The parties submitted a twelve-page stipulation in which Clarity 

admitted to the underlying facts supporting violations of nine of the ten 

rules identified by the Board. Clarity stipulated that his conduct 
9

supports the following violations of the Iowa Court Rules and the Iowa 

Rules of Professional Conduct:

a. Rules 45.7(3) and 32:1.15(c) for not depositing 

Clark’s, Leiss’s and Buettner’s advanced fees into his 

attorney trust account;

b. Rule 32:8.4(c) for making misrepresentations to the 

Iowa Supreme Court Client Security Commission in his 

certified responses to the 2011 Questionnaire on whether or 

not retainers were deposited into his trust account;

c. Rule 45.2(2) for not providing his clients with 

proper accounting at the time services were rendered;

d. Rule 32:1.15(a) for not maintaining complete 

records of his clients’ account funds;

e. Rule 45.7(4) for not giving the Eastons proper 

notice of the withdrawal of fees and expenses from his 

attorney trust account;

f. Rule 32:1.4(3) for not keeping his clients 

reasonabl[y] informed of the status of their legal matters and 

his own inability to adequately represent their interests due 

to his inpatient treatments; 

g. Rule 32:1.4(4) for not promptly complying with his 

clients’ reasonable requests for information about their legal 

matters; and

h. Rule 32:1.3 for neglecting his clients’ matters 

which resulted in three of his clients being arrested and the 

Williams’ appeal being dismissed. 

Clarity denied he violated “Rule 32:1.5(a) for charging an unreasonable 

fee in the Easton matter.” 

The parties also stipulated to aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, which we discuss below in determining the appropriate 

sanction. The parties did not agree to the proposed discipline to be 

recommended. At the hearing, the commission heard testimony from 

Clarity and received twenty-three exhibits into evidence. The parties 

submitted posthearing briefs. The commission filed its “Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation” on April 1, 2013. The 

commission determined Clarity violated all ten of the rules alleged by the 
10

Board, including the contested rule violation for charging an 

unreasonable fee. The commission made the following recommendations 

regarding the appropriate sanction:

1. Suspension of [Clarity]’s license to practice law for

three (3) years commencing May 25, 2012, the date 

suspension was ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court under 

Rule 35.1[7]. 

2. Prior to reinstatement, [Clarity must] provide 

documentation showing he has maintained sobriety and 

continuously complied with in-patient and/or outpatient 

treatment for alcoholism. 

3. [Clarity must] contact and cooperate with the Iowa 

Lawyers Assistance Program. 

4. [Clarity must] satisfy the Judgment in Dickinson 

County, Iowa case number SCCV019610. 

5. [Clarity must] pay all costs in this matter. 

III. Ethical Violations.

As noted, the commission found Clarity violated all ten of the rules 

the Board alleged in its complaint, including the contested violation that

Clarity had charged the Eastons an unreasonable fee. We make the 

following determinations on our de novo review. 

A. Trust Account Violations. The Board alleged Clarity violated 

Iowa Court Rules 45.7(3), 45.7(4), and 45.2(2) and Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a) and (c). These rules govern attorneys’ 

responsibilities with regard to client trust accounts. 

1. Failure to deposit advanced fees into trust account. The Board 

alleged Clarity violated rules 45.7(3) and 32:1.15(c) when he failed to 

deposit the advance fees he received from clients Buettner, Clark, and 

Leiss into a client trust account. Rule 45.7(3) requires attorneys to 

“deposit advance fee and expense payments from a client into the trust 

account.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(3). Rule 32:1.15(c) provides that “[a] lawyer 

shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have 
11

been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are 

earned or expenses incurred.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(c); see also 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(a) (“Funds shall be kept in a separate 

account.”). “Rule 32:1.15 incorporates Iowa Court Rule 45.7, which 

directs a lawyer as to how to handle a retainer.” McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 

at 607. Taken together, these rules strictly prohibit lawyers from 

commingling unearned client funds with their own property. See Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d 910, 918–19 

(Iowa 2011) (finding a violation of rules 32:1.15 and 45.7 when the 

attorney failed to deposit a $500 retainer into a client trust account). 

Because Clarity admitted he did not deposit Buettner’s $15,000 retainer 

or the $2500 retainers he received from Clark and Leiss into his client 

trust account, we conclude the Board established Clarity violated these 

rules. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kersenbrock, 821 

N.W.2d 415, 419 (Iowa 2012) (concluding attorney violated rule 

32:1.15(c) by placing a retainer “in her ‘sock drawer’ for ‘a number of 

weeks’ ”). 

2. Failure to provide accounting. The Board alleges Clarity violated 

Iowa Court Rules 45.2(2) and 45.7(4) regarding his failure to promptly 

provide accounting statements. Iowa Court Rule 45.2(2) requires lawyers 

to “promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other 

property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and [to] 

promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.” Iowa Court 

Rule 45.7(4) requires “[a] lawyer accepting advance fee or expense 

payments [to] notify the client in writing of the time, amount, and 

purpose of any withdrawal of the fee or expense, together with a complete 

accounting.” Rule 45.7(4) further provides that this notice must be 

provided “no later than the date of the withdrawal.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4);
12

see also Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(d) (“[U]pon request by the 

client or third person, [a lawyer] shall promptly render a full accounting 

regarding [the] property.”). 

Not only did Clarity fail to provide an accounting to the Eastons 

when he withdrew funds from his client trust account, he also neglected 

for months to provide a billing statement to the Eastons after they 

repeatedly requested one. Clarity stipulated that from February to May 

2010, he made twenty withdrawals for the payment of legal fees and 

advanced expenses from his client trust account that fully exhausted the 

Eastons’ $75,000 retainer. Clarity admits he did not provide the Eastons 

with contemporaneous notice of the withdrawals. It was only after the 

Eastons filed a complaint with the Board in November that he created a 

statement and provided it to the Eastons. Accordingly, we find Clarity

failed to provide the notice required under Iowa Court Rules 45.2(2) and

45.7(4) and thereby violated those rules. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 586–88 (Iowa 2011) 

(sanctioning attorney for failing to render an appropriate accounting); 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCann, 712 N.W.2d 89, 94–95 

(Iowa 2006) (finding violation when attorney did not respond to client’s 

request for an accounting). 

B. Misrepresentation in 2011 Questionnaire. The commission 

found Clarity violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(c) 

because he “ma[de] misrepresentations to the Iowa Supreme Court Client 

Security Commission in his certified responses to the 2011 questionnaire 

regarding the deposit of retainers into his [client] trust account.” Rule 

32:8.4(c) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . 

engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). To establish a 
13

violation of this rule, “[t]he Board must prove the attorney acted with 

some level of scienter greater than negligence.” Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d 

at 421. “[A] ‘casual, reckless disregard for the truth’ warrants discipline.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Isaacson, 750 N.W.2d 104, 109 

(Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2002)). 

Clarity’s conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard for the 

truth. Clarity stipulated that Buettner’s $15,000 retainer, Leiss’s $2500 

retainer, and Clark’s $2500 retainer were deposited into his general fund

and never transferred to his client trust account. After falsely certifying 

all of his retainers had been deposited into a trust account, Clarity

inquired about how to file a corrected certification. This suggests he 

knew the one he initially filed was incorrect. Yet, he never followed 

through to correct his false certification. Clarity states in his posttrial 

brief that his “paralegal failed to deposit [the retainers] without his 

knowledge due to oversight on [his] part, [and] he was not aware that 

they were not deposited until long after the events had taken place.” We 

find Clarity’s excuse unconvincing. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Herrera, 560 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Iowa 1997) (“[W]e 

have a strong negative reaction to a lawyer’s attempt to blame 

professional shortcomings on an employee.”); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Postma, 430 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Iowa 1988) (noting that 

blaming legal staff for failings is a “timeworn” excuse that is viewed with 

“unbounded skepticism, and never with admiration”). We find Clarity 

violated rule 32:8.4(c). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Wengert, 790 N.W.2d 94, 100 (Iowa 2010) (finding the attorney’s false 

certification that her trust account was properly reconciled violated rule 

32:8.4(c)). 
14

C. Failure to Keep Clients Reasonably Informed of the Status 

of Their Legal Matters. The Board alleged, and the commission found,

Clarity violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3), which requires a lawyer to “keep the 

client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.4(a)(3). Clarity stipulated to facts that establish the rule 

violation. Specifically, Clarity failed to inform Clark and Leiss of their 

arraignments, which resulted in the issuance of bench warrants for 

failure to appear and their arrest and incarceration. He failed to inform 

Buettner of his pretrial conference, resulting in Buettner’s arrest and 

incarceration for failure to appear. Clarity failed to inform these OWI 

clients and the Eastons of his inability to represent them during his 

inpatient treatment. We conclude Clarity thereby violated rule 

32:1.4(a)(3). See McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d at 606 (finding erroneous 

communications regarding dates of court hearings violated rule 

32:1.4(a)(3)). 

D. Failure to Respond to Clients’ Reasonable Requests for 

Information. The Board alleged, and the commission found, Clarity 

violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4) by not complying with his clients’ reasonable 

requests for information about their legal matters. This rule requires a 

lawyer to “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.”

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(4). Clarity first told David Easton on 

July 14, 2010, shortly before entering inpatient treatment at Hazelden, 

that he had spent the entire $75,000 retainer. Easton sought to transfer 

his file to a new attorney, but was kept waiting until mid-August. Easton 

also repeatedly sought an explanation from Clarity for how the retainer

was spent. Clarity failed to respond with any explanation until 

November 12, after Easton filed an ethics complaint on November 5. We 

conclude Clarity violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 
15

Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 301, 307–08 (Iowa 2009) (failure 

to respond to repeated requests for information and to account for 

retainer fees violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4)). 

E. Neglect of Client Matters. The Board alleged, and the 

commission found, Clarity violated rule 32:1.3 by neglecting client 

matters. Clarity stipulated to the facts underlying this rule violation.

Rule 32:1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 

promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. 

This rule is violated when a lawyer fails to attend scheduled court 

proceedings. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hauser, 782 

N.W.2d 147, 150, 152–53 (Iowa 2010). Clarity missed the arraignments 

for Clark and Leiss, resulting in their arrests and incarcerations. Clarity 

missed Buettner’s pretrial conference, resulting in his arrest and 

incarceration. Rule 32:1.3 is also violated when an attorney’s neglect 

results in the client’s loss of a right to appeal. See Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d 

at 917. Clarity failed to cure his defaults in the Williams appeal, 

resulting in its dismissal with prejudice. We conclude Clarity’s neglect of

each of these matters violated rule 32:1.3. 

F. Charging an Unreasonable Fee. The Board alleged, and the 

commission found, Clarity’s $75,000 fee collected from the Eastons

violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a), which prohibits 

attorneys from “mak[ing] an agreement for, charg[ing], or collect[ing] an 

unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” Clarity 

contested this rule violation. 

The Board has the burden of proving by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence that Clarity charged or collected an 

unreasonable fee. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 

789 N.W.2d 756, 759–60 (Iowa 2010); see also Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d at 
16

171, 181. We consider the following factors in determining the 

reasonableness of the fee:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to 

perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 

acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 

employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for 

similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 

circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a). 

No expert testimony was offered on the reasonableness of Clarity’s 

hourly rate or fee. We find his $300 hourly rate to be reasonable for an 

Iowa attorney of his experience. He had practiced law since 1976. About

forty percent of his practice was criminal law. The Eastons faced 

complex felony criminal charges. They agreed to pay his hourly rate. 

Clarity had handled similar cases. Other experienced Iowa criminal 

defense lawyers charge a $300 hourly rate. 

The fighting issue is the number of hours charged by Clarity in 

light of the result obtained. As discussed above, he was unable to 

provide his original handwritten billing records or the computer records 

of the time entered by his legal assistant. Months later, he re-created a 

six-page statement listing tasks performed, without dates or the time 

spent on each task, but with a stated total time of 225 hours, which,

multiplied by his $300 hourly rate plus expenses, conveniently reaches 
17

the entire $75,000 retainer. The statement indicates he sent twentythree letters, reviewed nineteen letters he received, conducted twenty-six 

conferences by phone or at his office, and performed legal research on six 

occasions. The rest of the time was reportedly spent reviewing the claims 

identified by patient name. He claims no time for any trial, hearing,

depositions, motions, or briefs. He never showed that his many hours of 

research or claims review were summarized or memorialized to capture 

his analysis. Presumably, the time he spent researching and reviewing 

claims had to be redone by the attorney who took over the case. 

We have no doubt a lawyer defending a felony Medicare billing 

fraud case may spend significant time reviewing patient records. But, in 

a case like this in which the client never received a bill until months after 

the lawyer paid himself the retainer, and the belated, re-created billing 

statement is cryptic, the credibility of the billing attorney is of central 

importance. The commission found Clarity’s testimony was not credible. 

In finding the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence that Clarity had charged an excessive fee in violation of rule

32:1.5(a), the commission stated:

The trust account records, general account records of the 

law firm, along with the party’s Stipulations regarding when 

and how retainers were received support the Board’s 

allegation. [Clarity] testified regarding the special nature of 

the litigation, its complexity, volume of discovery, and the 

serious consequences both the criminal and civil cases 

brought against the Eastons. [Clarity] testified generally 

about time spent on the case and how time slips and time 

notes were kept. [Clarity] did not present any other evidence 

supporting the hourly rate charged, accounting of time or 

expenses, or the reasonableness of the retainer. Although 

the Eastons faced serious consequences both criminally and 

civilly, [Clarity]’s testimony about the reasonableness of the 

fees is not credible. The failure of [Clarity] to offer any 

corroborating evidence; the contrast of his testimony to the 

trust account records and general account records of the law 

firm; his extremely vague . . . generalizations of the work 
18

performed; his admitted neglect of his practice during this time 

frame; and, in light of the other evidence stipulated to by 

[Clarity] erodes completely the credibility of the testimony. 

(Emphasis added.) 

We give deference to the commission’s credibility determination

because the commission heard Clarity’s live testimony and observed his 

demeanor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v Bowles, 794 

N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011) (“This court gives special weight to the 

commission’s findings concerning the credibility of witnesses.”); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Plumb, 766 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Iowa 

2009) (“Granting appropriate deference to the commission’s credibility 

findings, we adopt the commission’s findings as our own.”); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 702 (Iowa 

2006) (“[T]his court does not often disregard the credibility 

determinations of the commission . . . .”); see also In re Marriage of 

Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984) (discussing the importance in 

credibility determinations of hearing live testimony to observe demeanor). 

We reach the same conclusion as the commission, relying on our 

own review of the record and the commission’s determination that 

Clarity’s testimony was not credible. The bank records show Clarity 

made twenty separate withdrawals from February 3 through May 3, 

2010, which collectively exhausted the $75,000 retainer. He made 

withdrawals on four consecutive days in February. He made three 

separate withdrawals on March 16 and two more on April 5, followed by 

matching $3000 withdrawals on April 15 and 16 and a $7000 withdrawal 

on April 20. Clarity’s pattern of withdrawals differs from the single 

monthly or quarterly withdrawal typical for a lawyer who periodically 

collects earned fees. The frequency and odd amounts of his withdrawals 

look more like a lawyer using his client trust account as a personal ATM. 
19

Another red flag is the urgency with which Clarity sought an additional 

$15,000 from the Eastons on the eve of his departure for inpatient 

treatment.

We consider the $75,000 Clarity collected from the Eastons in light 

of “the results obtained.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a)(4). Clarity 

claims credit for avoiding criminal charges against Jane Easton. 

Otherwise, he cannot show he accomplished anything for David Easton, 

who ultimately was sentenced to prison after his case was concluded by 

another lawyer. Clarity failed to show that any of his time spent 

researching the law or reviewing claims was memorialized in a form that 

assisted Easton’s new lawyer or avoided the need to replicate those 

efforts. 

We conclude the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of 

the evidence that Clarity charged the Eastons an unreasonable fee in 

violation of rule 32:1.5(a). 

IV. Sanction. 

There is no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 441 

(Iowa 2012). “Although prior cases are instructive, we determine the 

appropriate sanctions in light of the unique circumstances of the case 

before us.” Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d at 182.

When crafting a sanction, we consider the nature of the 

violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue in the practice of 

law, the protection of society from those unfit to practice law, 

the need to uphold public confidence in the justice system, 

deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a 

whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The commission recommended we suspend Clarity’s license to 

practice law for three years from the date his second disability 
20

suspension began, May 25, 2012. We give respectful consideration to 

the commission’s recommendation. The commission accurately recited

Clarity’s rule violations and the mitigating and aggravating 

circumstances as follows:

[Clarity’s] conduct resulted in multiple instances 

where he neglected client matters, neglected management of 

client funds and trust account records, and neglected client 

requests. [Clarity] cites his alcoholism as the primary cause 

of his violations and a mitigating factor. He also cites his 37 

years of practice, admission to practice in various federal 

courts, certifications held with several professional 

organizations, and prior military service. [Clarity’s] 

compliance with in-patient treatment for alcoholism and 

continued outpatient treatment are also commendable. 

A number of aggravating factors must be considered as 

well. [Clarity] has been privately admonished by the 

Attorney Disciplinary Board on three prior occasions. His 37 

years of experience as an attorney aggravates his neglect in 

handling client matters and the handling of client funds. 

The serious harm his clients suffered as a result of his 

misconduct is also aggravating: three clients were arrested 

and jailed, an appeal was dismissed with prejudice, clients 

had to retain other counsel, and retainers were not returned. 

Although [Clarity] repeatedly stated he was the “captain of 

the ship”, he did not acknowledge the harm caused to these 

clients. Instead of expressing any remorse for his clients, he 

cited computer problems, missing documentation, and 

employee theft. 

We first address Clarity’s alcoholism. In his stipulation, he 

“acknowledge[d] and admit[ted] that he is an alcoholic and the difficulties 

he has caused his clients were the result of his alcoholism.” Alcoholism, 

however, “is not a ‘legal justification, excuse, or defense’ ” for Clarity’s 

actions. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 812 N.W.2d 

4, 11 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2011)); see also Florida Bar v. Golub, 

550 So. 2d 455, 455 (Fla. 1989) (“While alcoholism explains the 

respondent’s conduct, it does not excuse it.”). Nevertheless, “[a]lcoholism 

can be a mitigating factor.” Weaver, 812 N.W.2d at 15; see also Iowa 
21

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Roush, 827 N.W.2d 711, 718–20 

(Iowa 2013) (considering the attorney’s rehabilitative efforts and 

surveying cases imposing sanctions ranging from thirty days to one year 

for disciplinary violations related to alcoholism and substance abuse); 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Axt, 791 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 

2010) (considering as a mitigating factor the attorney’s “rehabilitative 

efforts in actively attempting to control his addiction to alcohol”); Hauser, 

782 N.W.2d at 154) (noting that to the extent the attorney acknowledged 

his alcoholism and takes steps to address the problem, the court will 

consider these acts in fashioning an appropriate sanction). 

To be considered in mitigation, the alcoholism must have 

contributed to the ethical misconduct, and the lawyer must undertake

rehabilitative efforts to control his addiction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2013) (citing Weaver, 

812 N.W.2d at 13; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Ruth, 636 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Iowa 2001) (considering a lawyer’s efforts to 

remain sober as a mitigating factor)); see also Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n 

v. Toohig, 979 N.E.2d 332, 341–42 (Ohio 2012) (declining to consider 

alcoholism as a mitigating factor without a showing that it “contributed 

to cause the misconduct” and noting much of the charged misconduct 

occurred after lawyer gained sobriety); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 

950 N.E.2d 171, 176–77 (Ohio 2011) (mitigating sanction based on 

attorney’s successful treatment and cooperation with lawyer-assistance 

program); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Haave, 290 P.3d 747, 757 

(Okla. 2012) (Kauger, J., concurring specially) (“[A]lcohol abuse or 

alcoholism may serve as a mitigating factor where the offending attorney 

recognizes the problem and seeks and cooperates in treatment.”). 
22

“[O]ur primary goal is not to punish the attorney, but ‘to protect 

the public from lawyers rendered unfit from any cause.’ ” Weaver, 812 

N.W.2d at 15 (quoting Hauser, 782 N.W.2d at 154). We imposed a twoyear suspension in Weaver for an OWI third and third-degree 

harassment, noting that Weaver repeatedly refused “to seek the help that 

is necessary for him to successfully cope with his depression and 

alcoholism.” Id. By contrast, Clarity has repeatedly undergone weeks of 

inpatient treatment and ongoing outpatient treatment to cope with his 

alcoholism, albeit with mixed success. We consider his efforts to be a 

mitigating factor. Yet, Clarity has not demonstrated he has successfully 

rehabilitated himself to the point he is able to practice law at this time,

and he remains under disability suspension. See Nelson, ___ N.W.2d at 

___ (considering in mitigation the attorney’s successful rehabilitation and

return to the practice of law); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Khowassah, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2013) (considering as mitigating 

factor the attorney’s treatment for his alcoholism and depression). 

Mindful of Clarity’s struggle with alcoholism, we next consider the 

sanctions appropriate for his rule violations. Clarity committed multiple 

trust account and accounting violations and neglected his clients. We 

have imposed suspensions for such violations ranging from thirty days to 

four months. See Boles, 808 N.W.2d at 441–42 (collecting cases). His 

neglect resulted in the dismissal with prejudice of the Williams appeal 

and the jailing of three OWI clients. We have imposed suspensions of 

one to six months when the attorney’s neglect caused harm to clients. 

See Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 921–22 (reviewing cases); see also Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Box, 715 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 

2006) (“We have consistently held that harm to a client or third party is 

an aggravating factor with regard to disciplinary violations.”). 
23

In Hauser, we disciplined an experienced attorney who, like 

Clarity, struggled with alcoholism. Hauser failed to appear at a 

scheduled dissolution trial and failed to inform his client of the trial, 

resulting in entry of a default judgment. Hauser, 782 N.W.2d at 150.

Hauser, like Clarity, also committed multiple trust account violations. 

Id. at 151–53. At the commission hearing, Hauser admitted to being an 

alcoholic and testified to his current sobriety and involvement with 

Alcoholics Anonymous, but failed to show he had received or is seeking 

professional treatment for his alcoholism. Id. at 154. We imposed a sixmonth suspension for Hauser’s rule violations. Id. 

In addition, Clarity violated the rule against charging unreasonable 

fees. “We have imposed suspensions ranging from sixty days to two 

years for violations of the rule prohibiting excessive fees.” Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Laing, 832 N.W.2d 366, 374 (Iowa 2013) 

(collecting cases). 

We also consider that Clarity recently has been privately 

admonished by the Board on three occasions. The stipulation describes 

those private admonishments as follows:

The first, in March 29, 2010, was for failure to respond to a 

Board request for information pursuant to Rule 32:8.1. The 

second, April 1, 2011, was for failing to keep his client 

informed pursuant to Rule 32:1.4(a)(3). The third, dated 

September 27, 2011, was for failure to comply with the CLE 

reporting requirements of Rule 32:7.4(e). 

Clarity blames those transgressions on his drinking. “[T]his court has 

repeatedly considered prior admonitions as aggravating circumstances 

that relate directly to an appropriate sanction.” Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at

589. 

Finally, we consider that Clarity has been under disability 

suspension for alcoholism since May 25, 2012, and his ethical 
24

transgressions at issue now are attributable to that disease. Disability 

suspensions and disciplinary suspensions serve overlapping but distinct 

purposes. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Maxwell, 705 

N.W.2d 477, 480 (Iowa 2005). Both types of suspension protect the 

public. But, “a disability suspension is not a sanction and does not 

specifically address unethical conduct and the need to deter future 

conduct.” Id. Moreover, the standards for reinstatement differ for each

type of suspension. Id. at 480–81. Nevertheless, we can consider an 

interim suspension arising from the same conduct when calibrating the 

disciplinary suspension. See Nelson, ___ N.W.2d at ___ (taking into 

account attorney’s two-year interim suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 839 N.W.2d 355, 359–60 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he 

interim seven-month suspension weighs heavily in this case . . . .”). In 

Nelson, the attorney was under disability suspension for alcoholism for 

two years and eight days before his reinstatement on July 31, 2012. 

Nelson, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Nelson had been maintaining sobriety and 

practicing law without further incident for over thirteen months when we 

determined his disciplinary sanction. His successful rehabilitation was a 

significant mitigating factor. Clarity, on the other hand, has remained 

under his second disability suspension for more than fifteen months 

without seeking reinstatement. We conclude Clarity warrants a 

disciplinary suspension separate and apart from his ongoing disability 

suspension to “uphold public confidence in the justice system and 

maintain the reputation of the bar.” Powell, 839 N.W.2d at 360. We hold

a one-year disciplinary suspension is appropriate, to run from the date of 

this opinion. 
25

V. Disposition. 

For the reasons stated, we suspend Clarity’s license to practice law 

with no possibility of reinstatement for one year from the date of this 

opinion. Prior to reinstatement, Clarity must provide medical 

documentation from a licensed health care professional regarding his 

maintenance of sobriety and his fitness to practice law. Pursuant to rule 

35.13(3), this suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. All 

costs are taxed to Clarity pursuant to rule 35.27(1). As a condition of 

reinstatement, Clarity must satisfy the judgment obtained against him 

by Clark. 

Prior to reinstatement, Clarity must also show that he has not 

practiced law during the period of suspension, has notified his clients as 

required by rule 35.23, has paid all costs required by rule 35.27(1), and 

meets the requirements of rule 35.43. Following this suspension, 

Clarity’s disability suspension will remain in place until he has shown 

“by clear and convincing evidence[] that [his] disability has been removed 

and [he] is fully qualified to resume the practice of law.” Iowa Ct. R. 

35.17(7). 

LICENSE SUSPENDED.