Filed 4/26/22 P. v. Barrientos CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALFONSO BARRIENTOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B312858

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA070845)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lisa M. Strassner, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Bruce W. Nickerson and Bruce W. 

Nickerson, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Colleen M. Tiedemann, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

In 2017, appellant Alfonso Barrientos met someone he 

thought was a 16-year-old girl online and arranged to have sex 

with her. The girl was in fact a police decoy. Appellant pled no 

contest to meeting a minor for lewd purposes in violation of Penal 

Code section 288.4, subdivision (b),1 which required him to 

register as a sex offender under section 290. In 2021, the 

superior court terminated appellant’s probation early, but denied 

his motion to terminate the registration requirement. 

On appeal, appellant poses an equal protection challenge to 

section 290, asserting that registration for certain sex offenders is 

discretionary, and he should not be subject to mandatory 

registration because he did not interact with a real minor. We 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to appellant, in January 2017 he was “searching 

for adult companionship on an adult site called Backpage.” 

Appellant, then age 47, responded to an ad by “Mandy,” who was 

purportedly 19 years old. However, “Mandy” soon told appellant

she was 16, about to turn 17. Appellant replied, “Oh good, you 

are younger. I love it.” However, “Mandy” was a police decoy. 

When appellant arrived at the motel where he and “Mandy” 

arranged to meet, he was arrested. 

Appellant was charged with felony meeting a minor for 

lewd purposes in violation of section 288.4, subdivision (b), and 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

pled no contest.

2 In July 2017, the court sentenced appellant to 

four years in prison, suspended, and five years’ formal probation. 

Appellant was required to register as a sex offender for life under 

section 290. 

In March 2021, appellant moved for early termination of 

probation, relief under section 1203.4,

3 and termination of the 

requirement that he register as a sex offender. The superior 

court noted that, effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 

1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) modified section 1203.1 to reduce 

felony probation terms to two years. (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).)

Because appellant had already served two years, the court 

terminated probation. The court also granted appellant’s motion 

under section 1203.4. The court denied appellant’s request to 

terminate the sex offender registration requirement, noting that 

the registration requirement was not discretionary. 

Appellant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant states that he is “asking this court to carve out 

an exception to the registration requirement” under section 290 

“based solely on” the fact that “this crime was created by decoy 

2 Appellant was also charged with a misdemeanor of the 

same crime under section 288.4, subd. (a)(1). He pled no contest 

to the felony count only. 

3 Section 1203.4, subdivision (a) requires the court to 

permit a defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of probation 

to obtain relief from the conviction. “‘[S]ection 1203.4 does not, 

properly speaking, “expunge” the prior conviction. The statute 

does not purport to render the conviction a legal nullity. Instead, 

it provides that, except as elsewhere stated, the defendant is 

“released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the 

offense.”’” (People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.)
4

police conduct.” He argues that although sex offender 

registration involves legislative “concern over the exploitation of 

children,” this case “was generated not by a child . . . but rather 

by police themselves.” He contends he should not have to 

“register for the rest of his life because he simply swallowed the 

ruse.” He also asserts that registration is discretionary for a 

violation of section 261.5—“unlawful sexual intercourse” with a 

minor—and contends that mandatory registration for his 

conviction, by contrast, violates the Equal Protection Clause of 

the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. He 

argues that “making an agreement to meet a minor mandatorily 

registrable makes no sense” when registration for “actual 

consummation of that meeting” would only be discretionary. 

Respondent Attorney General asserts that appellant’s 

claim has been forfeited, because he did not object to the sex 

offender registration requirement at the time of his sentencing. 

We agree. The registration requirement was imposed at 

sentencing in 2017. Appellant did not object at the time, and he

cannot now, years later, contend that this requirement should be 

inapplicable to his crime. (See, e.g., People v. Rogers (2006) 39 

Cal.4th 826, 854 [an equal protection claim may be forfeited 

where the defendant does not timely object].)

Even if appellant had not forfeited this argument, however, 

we would reject it.4 Appellant acknowledges that the Supreme 

Court in Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871

(Johnson) rejected a similar equal protection argument regarding

mandatory registration under section 290. In that case, the 

defendant pled guilty to one count of nonforcible oral copulation 

4 “We review an equal protection claim de novo.” (People v. 

Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469.)
5

by a person over 21 years of age with a minor under 16 years of 

age under section 288a, subdivision (b)(2), which required the 

defendant to register as a sex offender under section 290. (Id. at 

p. 876.) The defendant argued that the registration requirement 

violated the equal protection doctrine under the reasoning of

People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 (Hofsheier), which 

“interpreted the federal and state equal protection clauses as 

invalidating mandatory sex offender registration for a 22-year-old 

defendant convicted of nonforcible oral copulation with a person 

16 years of age (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)), for the reason that a sameaged defendant convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a 

same-aged minor (§ 261.5) is subject to discretionary 

registration.” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 874.) 

In Johnson, however, the court found that “Hofsheier’s 

constitutional analysis [was] faulty. In particular, it mistakenly 

concluded that no rational basis exists for subjecting intercourse 

offenders and oral copulation offenders to different registration 

consequences.” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 875.) The court 

observed, for example, that “the very real problem of teen 

pregnancy and its costly consequences, as well as legislative 

concern that stigmatization might interfere with employment 

opportunities and the support of children conceived as a result of 

unlawful intercourse, offer more than just plausible bases for 

treating section 261.5 offenders differently than other types of 

sex offenders.” (Id. at p. 886.) The court therefore found “a 

rational basis for the difference in registration consequences as 

between those convicted of unlawful intercourse and those 

convicted of nonforcible oral copulation.” (Id. at p. 889.)

Appellant acknowledges that his argument does not survive 

Johnson, but he nevertheless asserts that we should follow 
6

Justice Werdegar’s dissent instead of the majority opinion in that 

case. Justice Werdegar found the disparity between the 

registration requirements to be “an anachronistic holdover from a 

period . . . when oral copulation and sodomy were regarded as 

abhorrent sexual perversions closely associated with 

homosexuality and were therefore outlawed regardless of the 

participants’ ages.” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 890 (dis. 

opn. of Werdegar, J.).) However, decisions of the Supreme Court 

“are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of 

California.” (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa 

Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) We decline appellant’s 

invitation to depart from the Johnson precedent. 

Finally, appellant asserts that a recent change to section 

290 “warrants reevaluation of this issue.” As respondent 

accurately points out, appellant “provides absolutely no 

explanation or authority to support this argument.” This 

contention has therefore been forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. 

Harper (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4 [perfunctory 

appellate arguments are forfeited].) In addition, the changes to 

section 290, subdivision (c)(2) enacted in 2021, which appellant 

cites, address registration for violations of sections 286, 

subdivision (b); 287, subdivision (b); and 289, subdivisions (h) and 

(i)—none of which is relevant here.

We therefore find no error in the superior court’s denial of 

appellant’s motion. 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, ACTING P.J.

CURREY, J.