IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

PATRICIA ANN ADAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

HON. BRENDEN J. GRIFFIN, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 

ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA,

Respondent,

and

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Real Party in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA 2023-0072

Filed November 30, 2023

Special Action Proceeding

Pima County Cause No. CR20232794001

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Mary Trejo, City of Tucson Public Defender’s Office

By Marianne Vaiana, Associate Public Defender and Kristina Bohn, Supervising City 

Public Defender, Tucson

Counsel for Petitioner

Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney’s Office

By Alan L. Merritt, Deputy City Attorney and Mari L. Worman, Senior Assistant

Prosecuting City Attorney, Tucson

Counsel for Real Party in Interest
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Kelly authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Brearcliffe and Judge O’Neil concurred.

K E L L Y, Judge:

¶1 This special action involves a challenge to a ruling of the 

Tucson City Court mental health judge dismissing charges against Patricia 

Adams, who has repeatedly been found incompetent to stand trial. The 

parties dispute the meaning and effect of A.R.S. § 13-4504, specifically 

whether the city court properly dismissed the charges under that provision 

or should have transferred the matter to the superior court for a 

competency evaluation. For the reasons that follow, we accept jurisdiction 

and grant relief.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 Patricia Adams was arrested in August 2022, at which time 

there were multiple misdemeanor charges pending against her in various 

Tucson City Court cases. Adams filed a motion to dismiss the charges 

pursuant to § 13-4504, noting that she had previously been found 

incompetent to stand trial, and not restorable to competence, three times in 

the past, most recently in August 2018. The state responded that there were 

reasonable grounds for a new competency examination based on Adams 

having received mental health services under title 36 since her last 

incompetency determination. The state asked that the matter be transferred 

to the superior court for a competency examination, expressing “concern 

that if th[e City] Court dismisse[d]” the charges, it lacked the authority “to 

order the initiation of civil commitment proceedings” or a guardianship 

pursuant to § 13-4504(B). 

¶3 The city court rejected the state’s arguments and dismissed 

the charges without prejudice. Noting that Adams was “subject to an order 

for court-ordered treatment,” the court concluded it did not need to “order 

or request that any agency initiate civil commitment proceedings,” and

declined to issue orders pursuant to § 13-4504(B). The state appealed from 

that decision. 

¶4 On appeal in the superior court, the state argued the city court 

had “incorrectly interpreted A.R.S. § 13-4504” and “exceeded its 
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

3

jurisdiction when it acknowledged there were reasonable grounds to 

question Adams’s competence to stand trial but refused to transfer the cases 

to Superior Court.” Although acknowledging the city court had not 

actually ordered it to initiate guardianship proceedings, the state further 

asserted the city court could not do so.1 The respondent superior court

judge determined the city court “lacked jurisdiction” to conduct hearings 

under § 13-4504(A) and Rule 11.2(f), Ariz. R. Crim. P. He remanded the 

matter to the city court to determine if reasonable grounds existed for 

further competency proceedings, and if so, to transfer the matter to superior 

court for an evaluation. Adams’s petition for special action relief with this 

court followed.

Jurisdiction

¶5 “The decision to accept or reject special action jurisdiction is 

highly discretionary.” Cicoria v. Cole, 222 Ariz. 428, ¶ 4 (App. 2009); see also

Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3 bar committee note (“The special action requests 

extraordinary relief, and acceptance of jurisdiction of a special action is 

highly discretionary with the court to which the application is made.”). 

This proceeding originated in the city court, and Adams therefore has no 

right of appeal beyond the superior court. See A.R.S. § 22-375(B). Further,

special action jurisdiction is appropriate when, as the parties assert here,

the question presented is a purely legal one. See Blake v. Schwartz, 202 Ariz. 

120, ¶ 7 (App. 2002). Accordingly, we exercise our discretion and accept 

jurisdiction.

Discussion

¶6 Adams argues the respondent superior court judge

improperly “reversed the [city court’s] determination that reasonable 

grounds for further Rule 11 examinations d[id] not exist” and improperly 

interpreted § 13-4504(A). The state contends the city court’s ruling under 

§ 13-4504(A) was essentially an incompetency determination, which it 

lacked the authority to make. As relevant here, on special action review,

this court must determine whether the respondent “failed . . . to perform a 

duty required by law as to which he has no discretion,” “has proceeded . . .

without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority,” or abused his 

discretion. Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3. When reviewing an order dismissing 

1Because the city court did not enter any such orders, we need not

address these arguments.
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

4

criminal charges, this court assesses whether the dismissing court abused 

its discretion. See State v. Medina, 190 Ariz. 418, 420 (App. 1997).

¶7 Our review of Adams’s petition involves the intersection of 

two sets of statutes and Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We address these in turn

and, because the language of the statutes and rules is plain, it controls the 

outcome here. See 4QTKIDZ, LLC v. HNT Holdings, LLC, 253 Ariz. 382, ¶ 5 

(2022). First, the criminal code sets forth various provisions relating to a 

defendant’s competency to stand trial in title 13, chapter 41. See A.R.S. 

§§ 13-4501 to 13-4519. A defendant cannot “be tried, convicted, sentenced 

or punished for an offense if the court determines that the person is 

incompetent to stand trial.” § 13-4502. After a defendant is charged, the 

process to determine competency begins with the filing of a request for a 

competency evaluation, which may be filed by “any party” or may be 

initiated by “the court on its own motion.” § 13-4503(A). The court may 

request the assistance of a mental health expert to determine if reasonable 

grounds for an examination exist. § 13-4503(B). Generally, once a court

determines that such grounds exist, the superior court has exclusive 

jurisdiction to hold competency hearings. § 13-4503(C). A limited 

jurisdiction court may “exercise jurisdiction over a competency hearing in 

a misdemeanor case” arising in such a court only if the presiding judge of 

the superior court has authorized it to do so. § 13-4503(D). 

¶8 If the court initially finds the defendant incompetent, it must

order treatment for restoration of competency “unless there is clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant will not be restored to competency 

within fifteen months.” § 13-4510(C). When a treatment order is issued, it 

is valid for 180 days or until the treating agency reports either that the 

defendant has been restored or is not substantially probable to regain 

competency within twenty-one months, the charges are dismissed, or the 

maximum sentence has expired. § 13-4512(I); see also § 13-4514. If the court 

determines there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will 

regain competency within twenty-one months, it is to “proceed pursuant to 

[A.R.S.] § 13-4517.” § 13-4514(F). Otherwise, an order issued under §§ 13-

4512 or 13-4514 remains in effect for not more than twenty-one months or 

the maximum possible sentence. § 13-4515(A). 

¶9 If the court proceeds under § 13-4517, any party may request 

that the court dismiss the charges, remand the defendant to an evaluating 

agency “for the institution of civil commitment proceedings,” or “[a]ppoint 

a guardian ad litem.” § 13-4517(A). “If the defendant is remanded, the 

prosecutor shall file a petition for evaluation . . . .” § 13-4517(A)(1). The 
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

5

court may also “retain jurisdiction” over the defendant until commitment 

under title 36 or appointment of a guardian. § 13-4517(C); see also § 13-

4517(D)-(E). 

¶10 Separate from the process set in motion by a request to 

determine incompetency under § 13-4503, § 13-4504(A) provides that,

“[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary,” a “court may hold a hearing 

to dismiss any misdemeanor charge against [an] incompetent person” who 

“has been previously adjudicated incompetent to stand trial.” If the charge 

is dismissed, “the court may order the prosecutor to initiate civil 

commitment or guardianship proceedings.” § 13-4504(B). 

¶11 Second is the statutory scheme for civil commitments, set 

forth in title 36, chapter 5. This chapter includes articles for both courtordered evaluations, A.R.S. §§ 36-520 to 36-531, and court-ordered 

treatment, A.R.S. §§ 36-532 to 36-544. An application for a court-ordered 

evaluation may be filed by “[a]ny responsible individual.” § 36-520(A). 

Upon receiving an application, a screening agency is to provide a 

prepetition screening and, if it finds reasonable cause to believe the patient 

should be subject to court-ordered evaluation, file a petition for evaluation. 

§ 36-521(A)-(D). The county attorney may also file such a petition if ordered 

by a court to do so. § 36-521(F). If after the evaluation the patient is found 

to require court-ordered treatment, the evaluating agency or the county 

attorney is to file a petition for treatment under § 36-533. § 36-531(A)-(C). 

¶12 “If a petition for court-ordered evaluation is filed by a 

prosecutor pursuant to § 13-4517, a prior application for court-ordered 

evaluation or prescreening is not necessary.” § 36-521(I). And, § 36-531(E)

directs that when a prosecutor files a petition pursuant to § 13-4517, and the 

evaluating agency intends to release the person, the agency must give the 

“prosecuting agency” notice of that intent. See also § 36-540(Q) (“If the court 

does not find a person to be in need of treatment and a prosecutor filed a 

petition pursuant to § 13-4517, the evaluation agency, within twenty-four 

hours, shall notify the prosecuting agency of its finding.”). “Prosecuting 

agency” is defined to include “the county attorney, attorney general or city 

attorney who applied or petitioned for an evaluation or treatment pursuant 

to this chapter.” § 36-502(38).

¶13 Third, there are procedural rules under Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. 

P., that set forth the processes for conducting incompetency hearings and 

mental examinations in criminal proceedings. Rule 11.2 sets forth the 

requirements for a motion for an evaluation, including the information the 

motion should include. The rule also includes a provision outlining the 
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

6

jurisdiction of the superior and limited jurisdiction courts. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 11.2(d). Consistent with § 13-4503(D), it allows the presiding judge of the 

superior court to issue an order authorizing a limited jurisdiction court to 

hear competence issues in misdemeanor cases, but it otherwise gives 

“exclusive jurisdiction over all competence hearings” to the superior court. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(d). In a separate subsection, however, the rule states, 

“[i]f the court finds that a person has been previously adjudicated 

incompetent to stand trial under this rule, the court may hold a hearing to 

dismiss any misdemeanor charge against the incompetent person under 

A.R.S. § 13-4504.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(f). 

¶14 When viewed in the context of this scheme as a whole, § 13-

4504 creates a separate pathway for dismissal with its own discrete criteria. 

Unlike proceedings seeking an evaluation of competency, § 13-4504 relies 

on a finding that the “person has been previously adjudicated incompetent 

to stand trial” pursuant to chapter 41. Thus, the proceedings outlined in 

the remainder of the chapter—a request for an evaluation, an evaluation, 

and a finding of incompetency—have already taken place. Accordingly, 

dismissal under § 13-4504 does not require a new evaluation, and allows 

dismissal based solely on a previous adjudication. § 13-4504(A). 

¶15 And although a proceeding under § 13-4504(A) might involve 

a court’s consideration of evidence similar to that presented at a 

competency evaluation, that does not itself make the determination 

equivalent to a competency hearing under § 13-4503(C). The statutes 

simply provide two separate pathways. When competency is at issue, a

limited jurisdiction court is empowered to determine whether reasonable 

grounds exist for further competency proceedings. § 13-4503(A)-(C). A 

court may consider evidence, including the assistance of a mental health 

expert, in doing so. § 13-4503(B). Once a court determines that dismissal is 

appropriate based on a prior adjudication of incompetency under § 13-4504,

however, the dismissal obviates any need for new competency proceedings 

under § 13-4503(C). Thus, the two statutes provide authority for a court to 

take two different actions. See State v. Windsor, 224 Ariz. 103, ¶ 6 (App. 

2010) (court considers “each word and phrase” in interpreting statute and 

will not make any part of statute superfluous); see also Vera v. Rogers, 246 

Ariz. 30, ¶ 11 (App. 2018) (court construes related statutes together).

¶16 The parties present considerable argument about the meaning 

of “the court” in § 13-4504(A), but we need not go beyond the statutory 

language as to that point—particularly in view of the preparatory phrase, 

“[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary.” The language is plain—if a 
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

7

person stands charged with a misdemeanor and the person has been 

previously adjudicated incompetent, “the court” hearing the charge may 

dismiss it. Id.; see also A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words . . . shall be construed 

according to the common and approved use of the language.”). Because 

there is no requirement for “the court” to conduct a competency evaluation

in order to dismiss misdemeanor charges under § 13-4504, there is no 

reason to limit jurisdiction to the superior court.

¶17 The state argues, however, that § 13-4504 was “combined” 

with § 13-4503 “into Rule 11.2 in 2017.” It contends the rule therefore 

“clarifies that, procedurally, the dismissal provisions of [§] 13-4504 apply 

after reasonable grounds to question competency to stand trial have been 

found.” Citing State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, ¶¶ 35-37 (2021), it argues the 

rule must control. But the state later acknowledges that the statutes and 

rules in this area have been determined not to conflict. See State v. Bunton, 

230 Ariz. 51, ¶ 6 (App. 2012). In any event, Rule 11.2(f) is not significantly 

different from § 13-4504. It includes language directing dismissal based on 

a previous adjudication, and it cites § 13-4504 expressly. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

11.2(f). Further, because Rule 11.2(f) does not include a limitation as to the 

court in which it applies, we read the word “court” to refer to courts “in all 

criminal proceedings in Arizona state courts.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.1. 

Although another subsection of Rule 11.2 does distinguish between the 

jurisdiction of the superior and limited jurisdiction courts, subsection (f) 

does not. Thus, we agree with Adams that the respondent superior court 

judge abused his discretion by concluding that a hearing pursuant to § 13-

4504(A) is essentially a competency hearing under Rule 11. 

¶18 The state, however, also cites Johnson v. Hartsell, 254 Ariz. 585 

(App. 2023), arguing that § 13-4504(A) should not be interpreted “to apply 

to new charges,” based on the Johnson court’s having limited “the rebuttable 

presumption of continuing incompetency” to a single charged offense in 

that case. In that case, the trial court had declared Johnson “incompetent 

and not restorable,” which led to a “presumption of continued 

incompetency.” Johnson, 254 Ariz. 585, ¶ 20 (quoting State v. Hehman, 110 

Ariz. 459, 460 (1974)). Based on this presumption, the state could not, 

without court permission, refile the same charges “against a presumptively 

incompetent defendant without reasonable grounds showing that the 

defendant is now competent.” Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. Relying on the standard for 

incompetence set forth in Rule 11.1(a)(2), the Johnson court concluded that 

“the incompetency presumption is charge-specific.” Id. ¶ 27. The state 

contends that allowing the dismissal of new charges under § 13-4504(A) is 

“incompatible” with this conclusion. 
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

8

¶19 The presumption of incompetency, however, arises from the 

defendant’s due process rights, see State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 485-87 

(1967), and relates to the standard the state must meet in order to ensure an 

incompetent person is not tried for a crime. Id. at 486. The Johnson court 

employed that presumption to set forth the procedural mechanism the state 

must use in charging a defendant. 254 Ariz. 585, ¶¶ 25-26. In contrast, § 13-

4504 is a statutory provision allowing a court to dismiss charges against a 

defendant on the basis of a prior adjudication of incompetence. Such a 

dismissal does not implicate the due process problem underlying the 

presumption.2

¶20 Here, the question concerns the scope of the limited

jurisdiction court’s authority to dismiss a charge and what it is to consider 

in making its ruling. The state argues the city court “exceeded its 

jurisdiction when it dismissed” the charges against Adams. But this 

confuses the court’s jurisdiction with its authority to make a particular 

ruling. “Jurisdiction can refer to the authority to do a particular thing or to 

‘the power of the court to entertain an action of a particular subject matter.’” 

Major v. Coleman, 251 Ariz. 345, ¶ 8 (App. 2021) (quoting Taliaferro v. 

Taliaferro, 186 Ariz. 221, 223 (1996)). A municipal court has jurisdiction to 

entertain misdemeanor actions when committed within the limits of the 

municipality. A.R.S. §§ 22-402(B), 22-301(A)(1); see also Ariz. Const. art. VI, 

§ 32(C). Thus, the city court had subject matter jurisdiction over the charges 

against Adams, and the propriety of its ruling dismissing those charges was 

a question of its authority to do so based on its conformity to the provisions 

of § 13-4504. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 32(B) (jurisdiction of inferior courts 

is “as provided by law”).

¶21 Section 13-4504(A) sets no parameters for dismissal, and we 

have found no guiding Arizona authority citing that statute. We have, 

however, addressed dismissal under Rule 11.6(e), which allows for 

dismissal of “charges against a defendant found to be incompetent at any 

time.” State v. McPherson, 158 Ariz. 502, 504 (App. 1988). In that context, 

we concluded that dismissal was “left to the discretion of the trial court, 

subject only to the requirements of reasonableness and accepted legal 

principles.” Id.; see also State v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 432, 433-34 (1976)

2Nothing in the record before us suggests that Adams has since been 

found competent after being found not competent and not restorable in 

2018. We therefore do not address what impact, if any, an intervening 

finding of competency would have on the application of § 13-4504(A). 
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

9

(upholding as constitutional rules allowing dismissal of criminal charges 

“merely on the basis of mental incompetency” subject to court’s discretion). 

Likewise, a trial court has discretion in determining whether to dismiss 

charges based on other due process considerations. See State v. Smith, 242 

Ariz. 98, ¶¶ 22-23 (App. 2017) (denying motion to dismiss after two 

mistrials); State v. Pickett, 121 Ariz. 142, 145 (1978) (court has discretion to 

dismiss as discovery sanction).

¶22 Indeed, as we explained in discussing a trial court’s discretion 

to dismiss either with or without prejudice, a former comment to Rule 

16.6(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P., stated that although that subsection expressly 

addresses dismissal for insufficiency, a trial court may dismiss charges 

“based on any legally recognized ground.” State v. Huffman, 222 Ariz. 416, 

¶ 10 (App. 2009); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P., Prefatory Comment to the 2018 

Amendments (we “may continue to refer to comments to pre-2018 versions 

of the ARCrP” when they apply). In dismissing a case, the court is generally 

to “balanc[e] the defendant’s interest against the state’s.” Huffman, 222 

Ariz. 416, ¶ 12; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981)

(due process requires assessing various interests at stake). A reviewing 

court should give “great deference to trial court determinations of 

conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations.” State v. 

Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 445 (1985). Simply disagreeing with a trial court’s 

conclusion is not sufficient to conclude that the court abused its discretion. 

See Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, ¶ 34 (2023).

¶23 Against the due process underpinnings of § 13-4504 and the 

plain language of § 13-4504(A), we presume the legislature knew of this 

existing law and intended for dismissals under this section to function 

compatibly with the others. See Ariz. State Bd. of Dirs. for Junior Colls. v. Phx.

Union High Sch. Dist. of Maricopa Cnty., 102 Ariz. 69, 72 (1967); see also 82 

C.J.S. Statutes § 363 (2023) (“Courts presume that the legislature intended a 

statute to be harmonious and consistent with the existing body of law.”). In 

order to do so, we read the statute to require a court determining whether 

to dismiss misdemeanor charges to balance the state’s interest in 

prosecuting a crime, the risk of trying an incompetent defendant, and, 

arguably, the judicial resources required to undertake a competency 

evaluation. See State v. Johnson, 147 Ariz. 395, 399 (1985). 

¶24 Taking this view of the city court’s decision, the respondent 

superior court judge abused his discretion by concluding that the city court 

had exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the charges against Adams. The 

respondent should have instead evaluated the city court’s dismissal for an 
ADAMS v. HON. GRIFFIN

Opinion of the Court

10

abuse of discretion. See Medina, 190 Ariz. at 420. We therefore vacate the

respondent superior court judge’s order vacating the city court’s dismissal 

and remand the matter for the respondent to reconsider the appeal in a 

manner consistent with this decision. Additionally, the respondent should 

address in the first instance the state’s argument that the city court 

improperly took judicial notice of evidence regarding Adams’s medical 

treatment and records.

¶25 We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief.