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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JEFFERY A. JOHNSON, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. Civil Action 2:13-cv-0025 

 Judge Watson 

 Magistrate Judge King 

MUSKINGUM CO. SHERIFF’S DEPT., 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Jeffery A. Johnson, an inmate currently incarcerated in 

the Franklin Medical Center (“FMC”),1

 brings this action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Department, 

Muskingum County Sheriff Matthew Lutz, Sheriff’s deputies Dale Fuller 

and Trudy LeCocq, the “Sheriff’s Department Food Personal” [sic] 

(collectively, “Muskingum County Defendants”), Nurse Shane Love and 

Dr. Anthony Khoury (collectively, “the Medical Defendants”), alleging 

civil rights violations “under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment[s]” to the United States Constitution for “refusing 

[plaintiff] medical care.” Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 32, p. 5.2

 

This matter is now before the Court on the Muskingum County 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 68 (“Motion for 

 

1 Plaintiff was formerly incarcerated at Noble Correctional Institution. 

Order, Doc. No. 55; Order, Doc. No. 59. 2 The Court previously dismissed other claims and parties. See Order, Doc. No. 

64; Order, Doc. No. 74. See also Report and Recommendation, Doc. No. 76 

(recommending that the claims against the Medical Defendants be dismissed). 

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Summary Judgment”). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED

that the Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Muskingum County Jail from 

March 1, 2012 through June 27, 2012. Deposition of Jeffrey Johnson, 

pp. 7, 9, Doc. No. 67-1 (“Johnson Depo.”). On March 9, 2012, while he 

was detained in that jail, plaintiff ate an apple crisp. Id. at 15-

16. While eating this dessert, plaintiff began to choke. Id. at 15-

17. He stood up, staggered forward and hit his head on jail bars, 

knocking him unconscious. Id. 

When plaintiff regained consciousness after some undefined 

period, he noticed that there was vomit next to him and that 

defendants Fuller and LeCocq and other people were present. Id. at 

16-21. Defendant Fuller asked plaintiff if he was alright. Id. at 

18-19. Defendant LeCocq took pictures while another person collected 

parts of the apple core and stem from the vomit. Id. at 15-17, 23-24. 

At 12:10 p.m., defendant Love was called to the fourth floor and 

examined plaintiff who was found lying face down on the floor. Doc. 

No. 67-2, p. 10 (using Clerk’s pagination) (nursing progress notes). 

Plaintiff told defendant Love that he was “OK.” Id. Defendant Love 

checked plaintiff’s vitals. Id. Defendant Love’s progress notes 

reflect that there were no signs or symptoms of injuries. Id. The 

second shift nurse recorded vital signs and the accompanying progress 

note reflects that plaintiff voiced no complaints. Id. 

On March 15, 2012, plaintiff completed a “Request for Medical 

Treatment” form. Doc. No. 67-2, p. 11. In response to that request, 

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defendant Love examined plaintiff on March 16, 2012. Id. Defendant 

Love’s notes reflect that plaintiff reported that his throat was still 

a little sore from choking the previous week and that plaintiff has a 

small amount of blood when he gargles with salt water. Id. at 10-11. 

Defendant Love, however, noted that upon examination that he was 

unable to see any areas from which blood could be coming. Id. 

Although plaintiff experienced some pain when swallowing, he 

nevertheless stated that his throat was getting better. Id. For 

example, eating soft food did not bother plaintiff. Id. at 11. 

Defendant Love discussed his findings with defendant Khoury. Id. at 

10-11. 

On June 27, 2012, plaintiff was transferred from the Muskingum 

County Jail to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s 

Correctional Reception Center (“CRC”). Plaintiff Depo., p. 75. An 

examination of plaintiff on that date revealed, inter alia, that his 

throat was normal. Doc. No. 67-2, p. 2. 

Thereafter, plaintiff was transferred to the Noble Correctional 

Institution (“NCI”). Plaintiff Depo., pp. 75-76. While at NCI, 

plaintiff had access to medical care and was examined by physicians 

and nurses. Id. at 76-78. Plaintiff did not ask for treatment for 

his throat. Id. at 82. 

On January 11, 2013, plaintiff, proceeding without the assistance 

of counsel, initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint, 

Doc. No. 4. On June 4, 2013, plaintiff amended his complaint, naming 

various defendants, including the Muskingum County Defendants, 

alleging civil rights violations “under the Fifth, Eighth, and 

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Fourteenth Amendment[s]” to the United States Constitution for 

“refusing [plaintiff] medical care.” Amended Complaint, p. 5. 

On August 29, 2013, plaintiff was transferred to the FMC. Id. at 

75-76, 79-82. According to plaintiff, he simply asked to be 

transferred to the FMC; there was no medical reason why he left NCI. 

Id. at 76, 79-81. While at the FMC, plaintiff has talked to a 

physician about pain in his throat and difficulty swallowing. Id. at 

81. However, no physician has ordered any diagnostic tests, x-rays or 

other studies of his throat. Id. at 81-82. 

The Muskingum County Defendants move for summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s claims against them, which plaintiff opposes. Plaintiff 

[sic] Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s [sic] Motion for Summary Judgement 

[sic], Doc. No. 72 (“Memo. in Opp.”). With the filing of the 

Muskingum County Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 73 (“Reply”), this matter is ripe for 

review. 

II. STANDARD 

The standard for summary judgment is well established. This 

standard is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

which provides in pertinent part: 

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the evidence 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Summary judgment 

will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, “that 

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is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242 (1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the 

opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which 

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla 

of evidence in support of the opposing party’s position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 

 The party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 

323. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden 

then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 250 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); Talley v. Bravo Pitino 

Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1995)(“nonmoving party 

must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact 

making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial”). “Once the 

burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary 

judgment cannot rest on the pleadings or merely reassert the previous 

allegations. It is not sufficient to ‘simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Glover v. Speedway 

Super Am. LLC, 284 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (S.D. Ohio 2003)(citing 

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986). Instead, the non-moving party must support the assertion that 

a fact is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment “[a] district court is 

not ... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for 

some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.” 

Glover, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (citing InteRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 

889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989)). Instead, a “court is entitled to 

rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 

on a particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on 

file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to 

its attention by the parties.” Id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(3). 

III. ANALYSIS 

As an initial matter, plaintiff has named as defendants, inter 

alios, the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Department and “the Sheriff 

Dept. Food Service Personal.” Amended Complaint, pp. 1, 4. However, 

a county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued 

under Section 1983. See, e.g., Petty v. County of Franklin, 478 F.3d 

341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against 

these defendants are without merit. 

Even if they were entities capable of being sued, plaintiff’s 

claims against these defendants and the remaining Muskingum County 

Defendants must fail. Plaintiff brings claims of denial of medical 

care pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in pertinent part: 

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Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, 

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 

or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress. . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a claim for a violation of § 1983, a 

plaintiff must establish that (1) a person (2) acting under color of 

state law (3) deprived him of his rights secured by the United States 

Constitution or its laws. See Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 

353, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2001). Because § 1983 is a method for 

vindicating federal rights, and is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the 

specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. 

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Section 1983 merely provides a 

vehicle for enforcing individual rights found elsewhere and does not 

itself establish any substantive rights. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 

536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002). Moreover, a plaintiff must show the 

personal involvement of each defendant with respect to the alleged 

constitutional violation. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 

(6th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, liability based on a theory of 

respondeat superior is not cognizable under § 1983. See Turner v. 

City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 643 (6th Cir. 2005); Hays v. Jefferson 

Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). In order to be held 

liable under § 1983, a defendant with supervisory authority must have 

either “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some 

other way directly participated in it.” Turner, 412 F.3d at 643. 

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Here, as to the Muskingum County Defendants, plaintiff first 

alleges that defendant Lutz is the Sheriff for Muskingum County and 

therefore “is in command of daily operations at” Muskingum County Jail 

and “is the supervisor over Deputies Fuller and LeCocq[.]” Id. at 5. 

In other words, plaintiff has alleged liability based on defendant 

Lutz’s supervisory position. However, as discussed supra, liability 

on the basis of respondeat superior is not cognizable under § 1983. 

See Turner, 412 F.3d at 643; Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. To the extent 

that plaintiff offers a handwritten diary in opposition to the Motion 

for Summary Judgment, the Court notes that the proffered exhibit is 

neither sworn nor made under penalty of perjury. Memo. in Opp., pp. 

4-42. Under Rule 56, a party must support factual assertions with 

admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). Plaintiff’s pro se

status does not relieve him of this obligation. See Viergutz v. 

Lucent Techs., No. 08-3626, 375 Fed. Appx. 482, at *485 (6th Cir. 

April 23, 2010). See also Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 27051, at *6-7 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010) (“The liberal 

treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of 

substantive law . . . and the liberal standards that apply at the 

pleading stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary 

judgment stage[.]”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. 

Brown, 7 Fed. Appx. 353, at *354 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2001) (affirming 

grant of summary judgment where, inter alia, pro se litigant offered 

relevant factual allegations, but “did not file an affidavit to this 

effect nor did he sign any pleading under penalty of perjury”). 

Therefore, the Court cannot consider plaintiff’s unsworn assertions in 

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opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment. See id. See also Harris v. 

J.B. Robinson Jewelers, 627 F.3d 235, 239 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (“‘[A] 

court may not consider unsworn statements when ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment.’”) (quoting Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 

942 F.2d 962, 968-69 (6th Cir. 1991)). 

Plaintiff further alleges that defendants Fuller and LeCocq 

placed a stem from the apple crisp “inside a bag for evidence[.]” Id. 

at 6. However, this allegation does not support plaintiff’s claim of 

a constitutional violation of denial of medical care. 

Plaintiff also goes on to allege that although he was in a great 

deal of pain and requested medical treatment, “no treatment was ever 

provided by the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Department.” Amended 

Complaint, p. 5. The Eighth Amendment3

 prohibits cruel and unusual 

punishment. To prevail on his claims, plaintiff must prove that the 

Muskingum County defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to 

[his] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 

(1976). This standard includes both an objective and a subjective 

component. The Court will address each in turn. 

A. Objective Component 

 

3 Plaintiff may have been a pretrial detainee during some or all of the 

relevant time. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, pp. 5-6. A claim of deliberate 

indifference to the serious medical needs of a pretrial detainee arises under 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Revere v. Mass. 

Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). However, the standard governing such 

claims is the same as that arising under the Eighth Amendment. Border v. 

Trumbull County Bd. of Comm’rs, 414 Fed. Appx. 831, 835 (6th Cir. 2011) (“It 

is well-established that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 

unusual punishment provides the basis to assert a claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs; a 

similar claim brought on behalf of a pretrial detainee is equally viable 

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.) (citing Phillips 

v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2008)). 

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The objective component requires that a plaintiff establish a 

“sufficiently serious” medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834 (1994). A medical need is “sufficiently serious” when it “‘has 

been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so 

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 

for a doctor’s attention[.]’” Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 

(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 

2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, when a plaintiff 

bases a claim on “‘the prison’s failure to treat a condition 

adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or 

non-obvious,’” id. (quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 

890, 898 (6th Cir. 2004)), “the plaintiff must ‘place verifying 

medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of 

the delay in medical treatment[.]’” Id. (quoting Napier v. Madison 

Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Plaintiff therefore bears the burden of establishing that 

his medical need is “sufficiently serious.” Santiago, 734 F.3d at 

590. 

Here, plaintiff has offered no “verifying medical evidence” 

establishing a detrimental effect of any alleged failure to provide 

medical treatment. As an initial matter, the medical record does not 

establish a serious medical need. As recounted supra, plaintiff’s 

testimony and medical records establish that plaintiff advised 

defendant Love that he was “OK” and voiced no complaints to the second 

shift nurse following the choking incident on March 9, 2012. Doc. No. 

67-2, p. 10. During a March 16, 2012 examination, defendant Love 

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could find no areas of bleeding and plaintiff reported that his throat 

was doing better. Id. at 10-11. Subsequent examination revealed no 

abnormalities and plaintiff sought no treatment for his throat while 

he was incarcerated at NCI. Plaintiff Depo., pp. 75-78, 82; Doc. No. 

67-2, p. 1. 

Moreover, plaintiff has offered no evidence from a medical 

professional establishing any detrimental effect of an alleged delay 

in medical treatment. Instead, plaintiff argues that his throat was 

not given “a clear and proper examination”; that he was denied 

physician visits; that there was pain and constant bleeding for 85 

days; and that “none of these facts were recorded by the defendant’s, 

[sic] to protect their interest from a pending claims [sic].” Memo. 

in Opp., p. 2 (citing to “the records,” which the Court construes to 

be the 39-page handwritten diary or log attached thereto). These 

arguments fail for several reasons. First, as discussed supra, the 

Court cannot consider these factual assertions and the handwritten log 

attached to the Memo. in Opp. because they are neither sworn nor made 

under penalty of perjury. In addition, even if these allegations had 

been sworn, they do not qualify as “verifying medical evidence.” 

Plaintiff admits that he has no medical training and no education in 

any healthcare field. Plaintiff Depo., pp. 8, 64. 

In contrast, the Muskingum County Defendants point to verifying 

medical evidence. Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9 (citing to the 

affidavits of defendant Khoury and Stephen Payne, M.D., attached to 

the Medical Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 66). 

More specifically, the Medical Defendants offered the affidavit of 

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Stephen Payne, M.D., a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in 

the State of Ohio. Affidavit of Stephen Payne, M.D., Doc. No. 66-3, ¶ 

2 (“Payne Affidavit”). Dr. Payne reviewed plaintiff’s medical records 

from Muskingum County Jail and NCI and plaintiff’s deposition 

transcript. Id. at ¶ 3. Based on his education, training, experience 

and review of the record in this case, Dr. Payne opines, to a 

reasonable degree of medical probability, that plaintiff fainted after 

choking while swallowing food. Id. at ¶ 4. According to Dr. Payne, 

plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury and plaintiff was not a 

candidate for radiologic testing. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Based on his 

education, training, experience and review of the record in this case, 

Dr. Payne further opines, to a reasonable degree of medical 

probability, that the Medical Defendants met the applicable standards 

of care. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. See also Affidavit of Anthony Khoury, D.O., 

Doc. No. 66-4, ¶ 11; (concurring to a reasonable degree of medical 

probability that the Medical Defendants met all applicable standard of 

care). Similarly, Dr. Payne avers, to reasonable degree of medical 

probability, that nothing the Medical Defendants did, or failed to do, 

caused any injury to plaintiff. Payne Affidavit, ¶¶ 10-11. Based on 

this record, plaintiff has failed to meet the objective prong of his 

claim. 

B. Subjective Component 

Even if plaintiff could satisfy the objective component ofhis 

claims, he has not satisfied the subjective component. The subjective 

component requires that a plaintiff “allege facts which, if true, 

would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts 

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from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in 

fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” 

Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 837). Although officials may not deliberately disregard a 

medical need, “[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional 

violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 106. Deliberate indifference “describes a state of mind more 

blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Nevertheless, 

“a plaintiff need not show that the official acted ‘for the very 

purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.’” 

Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). 

“Instead, ‘deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious 

harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that 

risk.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). Liability can result 

if a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of 

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 

measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. 

Here, plaintiff argues that his throat was not properly examined 

and that he was repeatedly denied care by a physician. Memo. in Opp., 

p. 2. However, these unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations fall 

short of demonstrating that the Muskingum County Defendants 

“subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to 

the prisoner, that [they] did in fact draw the inference, and that 

[they] then disregarded that risk.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703. As 

recounted above, defendant Love examined plaintiff on the day that 

plaintiff choked and again within the week in response to plaintiff’s 

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written “Request for Medical Treatment.” After the first examination, 

defendant Love also instructed the second shift nurse to assess 

plaintiff. Plaintiff also underwent subsequent examinations, which 

revealed no abnormalities. Far from establishing deliberate 

indifference, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that plaintiff 

received medical treatment and that his throat was properly treated. 

Indeed, plaintiff does not criticize the medical assistance that 

has been administered. Plaintiff Depo., p. 40. Instead, plaintiff 

simply believes that he should have been provided with additional 

medical attention, including diagnostic testing and x-rays. Id. at 

40-41, 55-56, 97-98. However, “[w]here the plaintiff has received 

some medical treatment, ‘federal courts are generally reluctant to 

second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which 

sound in state tort law.’” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 476 (6th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 

1976)). Accordingly, plaintiff’s belief that he should have received 

more testing amounts to nothing more than a difference of opinion, 

which is not actionable under the Constitution. In short, the Court 

concludes that plaintiff, having failed to satisfy either prong of his 

claim for deliberated indifference, has not established a 

constitutional violation on the part of the Muskingum County 

Defendants. 

WHEREUPON, it is RECOMMENDED that the Muskingum County 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 68, be GRANTED. 

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report 

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file 

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and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part 

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 

U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must 

be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy 

thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to 

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to 

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the 

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 

May 13, 2014 s/Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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