GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Briefing Report to the Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

April 2000 BALKANS SECURITY

Current and Projected 

Factors Affecting 

Regional Stability

GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Contents

Letter 3

Briefing Section Briefing Section I: Background 12

Briefing Section II: Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia 24

Briefing Section III: Projected Security Situation in the Balkans 40

Briefing Section IV: Factors That Led to the Withdrawal of Yugoslav 

Security Forces From Kosovo 56

Briefing Section V: Selected Issues Related to U.S. and International 

Operations in the Balkans 60

Appendixes Appendix I: Distribution of Ethnic Albanians in the Former 

Yugoslavia 72

Appendix II: Bosnia Peace Operation 74

Appendix III: Kosovo Peace Operation 78

Appendix IV: International Civilian Activities in Albania, Macedonia, 

Croatia, Serbia (Excluding Kosovo), and Montenegro 82

Appendix V: The Stability Pact 84

Appendix VI: U.S. Military and Civilian Costs for Operations in the 

Balkans, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 2000 86

Appendix VII: Comments From the Department of Defense 88

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 90

Tables Table 1: Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo,

Fiscal Years 1992 Through 2000 86

Table 2: Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in the Balkans, Except 

in Bosnia and Kosovo, Fiscal Years 1996 Through 2000 87

Figures Figure 1: Estimate of Refugees and Displaced Persons Still Seeking 

Solutions in the Balkans, November 1999 43

Figure 2: Distribution of Ethnic Albanians in the Former Yugoslavia, 

as of February 1999 73

Figure 3: Map of Bosnia 75

Figure 4: Organization of Military and Civilian Operations in Bosnia 76

Figure 5: SFOR Organization 77

Figure 6: KFOR Brigade Sectors in Kosovo 79
Contents

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Figure 7: Organization of Military and Civilian Operations in Kosovo 80

Figure 8: KFOR Organization, as of January 2000 81

Figure 9: International Civilian Activities in Albania, Macedonia, 

Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro 82

Figure 10: The Stability Pact 84

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

KFOR Kosovo Force/International Security Force

SFOR Stabilization Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-284872 Letr

April 24, 2000

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since 1992, the international community has responded to a series of 

armed conflicts in the Balkans region by establishing numerous, complex, 

military and civilian peace operations there.1

 The United States and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) significantly increased the 

active participation of their military forces in resolving the region’s 

conflicts in late 1995, when they deployed the first NATO-led peace 

enforcement operation to Bosnia. Their involvement deepened again in 

1999 with the start of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and, 

after Yugoslavia decided in June 1999 to withdraw its security forces2

 from 

Serbia’s province of Kosovo, with the deployment of another NATO-led 

peace enforcement operation3

 to the province. 

We recently briefed your staff on our analyses of Balkans security issues. 

Specifically, we reported on (1) the current security situation in the 

Balkans, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia; (2) the projected security in 

the region over the next 5 years; and (3) factors in the decision to withdraw 

1

For purposes of this report, the Balkans region is defined as Albania; Bosnia; Croatia; the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro, hereafter referred to as 

Yugoslavia); and Macedonia. Bosnia’s official name is Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992, 

Serbia and Montenegro asserted the formation of a joint independent state called the 

“Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” but this entity has not been recognized as a state by the 

United States. “Macedonia” is an unofficial name for the state recognized by the U.S. 

government as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Socialist Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia, which dissolved in 1991, is referred to in this report as the “former 

Yugoslavia.” 

2

The term “Yugoslav security forces” refers to the Yugoslav army and the republic of Serbia’s 

police.

3

The U.N. Security Council provided the current NATO-led force in Bosnia with the authority 

to use force to enforce military provisions of the 1995 Dayton Agreement and force 

protection in Resolution 1088 on December 12, 1996. The U.N. Security Council provided the 

NATO-led force in Kosovo with the authority to use force to enforce military and public 

security provisions and force protection in Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999.
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Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. You also asked us to describe how 

the executive branch has defined U.S. interests in the region in the National 

Security Strategy and public statements. This report summarizes the 

contents of those briefings. 

Results in Brief Despite the presence of two large NATO-led forces in the Balkans, the 

security situation regionwide remains volatile, as many difficult political, 

social, and other issues remain unresolved. About 70,000 NATO-led military 

personnel were deployed in all five countries in the region (as of January 

2000), where they continued to ensure an absence of war in Kosovo and 

Bosnia. The international operations in both locations, however, face 

severe obstacles in their attempts to achieve their broad goals of promoting 

an enduring peace and lasting stability in the region. Most importantly, the 

vast majority of local political leaders and people of their respective ethnic 

groups have failed to embrace the political and social reconciliation 

considered necessary to build multiethnic, democratic societies and 

institutions. Further, the international community has not provided the 

resources to fully staff key elements of both peace operations. For 

example, U.N. members have failed to provide the amount of resources the 

U.N. mission in Kosovo says that it needs for its work, particularly with 

regard to staffing the U.N. international civilian police force. Because of 

this shortfall, it is not clear when the NATO-led force in Kosovo can turn 

over its public security responsibilities to the United Nations, even though 

the force had planned to do so by the end of September 1999.4

The election of opposition members to Croatia’s parliament and presidency 

during early 2000 holds out hope for positive change in the region over 

time; however, all areas of the Balkans continue to face major unresolved 

political, social, and other problems that will contribute to regional 

instability over the next 5 years. These problems—such as differences over 

definitions of what territory and ethnic groups constitute a state and the 

difficulties associated with returning refugees and displaced persons to 

their homes—will likely take a long time to resolve through political 

4

The U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, the lead civilian organization in the 

province, has more responsibilities and authority than does the lead civilian agency in 

Bosnia, in that the mission is responsible for running all levels of government in Kosovo. 

The NATO-led force in Kosovo also has more responsibility than its counterpart in Bosnia; 

specifically, it is responsible for providing initial public security operations, including all 

police activities, until the U.N. mission can assume those roles.
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processes. These problems also will require the continued security 

presence provided by NATO-led forces. If progress is not made in resolving 

these matters, conditions could evolve that might ultimately lead to an 

escalation of violent incidents or armed conflict in several areas of the 

region over the next 5 years, including in Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia, 

Montenegro, and Macedonia.

Senior Yugoslav, U.S., and NATO officials said that a number of factors 

contributed to the Yugoslav decision to withdraw its security forces from 

Kosovo. According to a senior Yugoslav official in Kosovo, Yugoslavia’s fear 

of a NATO invasion was the primary factor in this decision. This official, as 

well as senior U.S. and NATO officials, also said that Russia’s diplomatic 

efforts were important in persuading Yugoslavia’s President to agree to the 

withdrawal. Other factors mentioned by U.S. and NATO officials included 

the ability of the NATO alliance to remain united during the bombing 

campaign, the impact of NATO’s strategic air campaign against Yugoslavia, 

and the international war crime tribunal’s indictment of Yugoslavia’s 

President for war crimes in Kosovo.

In the December 1999 National Security Strategy, the President said that 

the United States has “vital” interests in European stability and “important” 

interests in NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.5

 The President also 

said that U.S. interests in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe are abiding 

because instability there threatens European security. Because the United 

States has important interests in Bosnia and Kosovo, other issues become 

relevant to the deployment of U.S. military forces there, such as the costs 

of U.S. military and civilian operations—estimated at $21.2 billion from 

fiscal years 1992 through 2000—and the relative contributions of U.S. and 

other NATO allies to recent and ongoing military operations. 

Background As of the late 1980s, the former Yugoslavia was a diverse federation of six 

republics, comprised of many different ethnic groups that were often based 

on religious affiliation. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 led 

to two sets of extended armed conflict, the first in Croatia and Bosnia from 

5

The National Security Strategy lays out three categories of U.S. national interests: vital, 

important, and humanitarian. The definitions of these interests are provided in Briefing 

Section V. According to the strategy, the decision to employ U.S. military forces is dictated 

first and foremost by U.S. national interests. 
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1991 through 1995 and the second in and around Serbia’s province of 

Kosovo from early 1998 through mid-1999. 

The warring parties to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia—specifically, 

Yugoslavia, Croatia, Croatian Serbs, and Bosnia’s three major ethnic 

groups—were all fighting over control of specific territories tied to each 

group’s own definition of its state, with some groups fighting for ethnically 

pure states. During and after the Kosovo conflict, the local combatants—

Kosovar Albanian insurgents and Yugoslav security forces—had mutually 

exclusive goals. While the insurgents fought for the independence of 

Kosovo, Yugoslav security forces, most of whom are Serb, fought to retain 

Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over the province. NATO entered this conflict on 

March 24, 1999, when it initiated a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia to 

force an agreement that would end Yugoslavia’s aggression in Kosovo.

The international community reached agreements with the former warring 

parties that ended the conflicts and allowed the establishment of large, 

complex peace operations, first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. Each 

operation included a large NATO-led force to enforce the military aspects 

of the agreements, as well as a substantial international civilian presence. 

These operations were designed, among other things, to assist the parties 

in complying with the agreements and to build democratic, multiethnic 

institutions. 

Scope and 

Methodology

To address our objectives, we interviewed and reviewed documents from 

U.S. and international officials in the United States—as well as from U.S., 

international, and local officials in Europe—and compared information 

from them with actual conditions in the region. In Washington, D.C., we 

obtained information from the State Department, the Department of 

Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development, the 

Central Intelligence Agency, the embassy of Croatia, a representative of the 

Serbian Orthodox Church, and numerous nongovernmental organizations. 

In New York, we obtained documents and interviewed officials from the 

U.S. Mission to the United Nations and the United Nations. 

We conducted three visits to Europe during October 1998, July 1999, and 

October and November 1999. During these visits, we obtained documents 

and interviewed officials from

• the U.S. Mission to NATO; the U.S. Agency for International 

Development; NATO headquarters, including the Supreme Allied 
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Commander, Europe; the European Commission, and the Stability Pact 

office in Belgium; 

• the U.S. embassy and the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense in 

England; 

• the U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe in Germany; 

• the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other 

International Organizations, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 

the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and other international 

organizations in Switzerland;

• the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 

Vienna, Austria; 

• the U.S. embassy in Zagreb, Croatia; the U.S. Agency for International 

Development; Croatia’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense; the 

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees; the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; the U.N. Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (a 

territory disputed by Croatia and Yugoslavia); and nongovernmental 

organizations in Croatia;

• the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia; the U.S. Agency for International 

Development; the headquarters of NATO’s Stabilization Force and two 

of its three multinational divisions; governments at the national, entity, 

and municipal levels; the Office of the High Representative; the U.N. 

High Commissioner for Refugees; the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 

and nongovernmental organizations in Bosnia;

• the U.S. diplomatic office in Pristina, Kosovo; the U.S. Agency for 

International Development; headquarters and regional offices of the 

U.N. interim administration mission throughout Kosovo; the NATO-led 

Kosovo Force headquarters and five multinational brigade headquarters; 

Kosovar Albanian organizations, including the Kosovo Protection Corps; 

nongovernmental organizations; Kosovar Albanian political leaders; 

Yugoslavia’s office in Pristina; and municipal Kosovar Albanian and Serb 

leaders throughout the province; 

• the U.S. embassy in Tirana, Albania; the U.S. Agency for International 

Development; the government of Albania; the headquarters of the 

NATO-led Albania Force; the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees; the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; the Western 

European Union; and nongovernmental organizations in Albania;

• the U.S. embassy in Skopje, Macedonia; the U.S. Agency for 

International Development; the government of The Former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia; the headquarters of the Kosovo Force support 

element; the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees; the Organization for 
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Security and Cooperation in Europe; the ethnic Albanian party in the 

ruling coalition; other ethnic Albanian leaders; and nongovernmental 

organizations in Macedonia; and 

• the U.S. diplomatic office in Dubrovnik, Croatia, which manages 

U.S.-funded programs in Montenegro; the U.S. Agency for International 

Development; the government of the republic of Montenegro; the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; nongovernmental 

organizations; and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 

representative from Belgrade, Serbia, in Montenegro.

We attempted to but could not obtain visas to travel to Belgrade or other 

areas of Serbia outside of Kosovo during our October-November 1999 visit 

to the region, a task made difficult by the lack of diplomatic relations 

between the United States and Yugoslavia. 

Our report includes estimates of the number of people in Bosnia who 

returned home to areas controlled by another ethnic group (“minority 

returns”) from 1996 through 1999. In reporting these estimates, we relied 

primarily on data obtained from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 

because, according to U.S. and international officials in Bosnia, these 

represent the official estimates of returns. For 1999, the U.N. High 

Commissioner for Refugees reported that 31,234 people had registered as 

having returned home across ethnic lines. The refugee agency estimated 

that 41,007 minority returns had actually occurred during 1999 based on a 

comparison of registered and actual minority returns in selected areas of 

Bosnia. An official from the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo told us that the U.N. 

estimate accurately portrays the number of minority returns during 1999, 

while an official from the Office of the High Representative estimated that 

the number of minority returns during the year was much higher, about 

70,000 people. Because the data for 1997 and 1999 did not include minority 

returns to Brcko, Bosnia, we supplemented them with data from the office 

of the Brcko Supervisor, which has the special authority to oversee the 

return process to the Brcko area. 

We also relied on data from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for 

numbers of people who became refugees or internally displaced persons as 

a result of the Kosovo conflict. According to a February 2000 document 

prepared by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the methodology 

used in compiling these data did not extend to systematic recording of 

population figures. Figures, where available, were drawn by the refugee 

agency from a variety of sources—including community leaders, the

NATO-led force in Kosovo, and the U.N. international police force—and are 
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estimates only. They should not be taken to represent a consensus among 

international or local actors. 

Our report also discusses the presence of paramilitaries in Kosovo and 

Bosnia. The term “paramilitary” has many different definitions. DOD 

defines “paramilitary forces” as forces or groups that are distinct from the 

regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, 

equipment, training, or mission. Webster’s dictionary defines a paramilitary 

as a group formed on a military pattern, especially as a potential auxiliary 

military force (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed. 

[Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1993]). The U.S. government 

differentiates between groups organized to carry out “pausibly deniable 

activities on behalf of the state” and locally organized defense groups. 

People with whom we met in Kosovo referred to the organized groups of 

armed Serbs as paramilitaries. While some U.S. and international officials 

have said that control of these groups extends to the Yugoslav leadership in 

Belgrade, another U.S. official told us that this link has not been proven. 

Further, according to a U.S. official, although SFOR considers armed 

groups in Bosnia to be paramilitaries, they do not meet the more restrictive 

U.S. definition of paramilitaries, that is, groups organized to carry out 

“plausibly deniable activities on behalf of the state.” 

We conducted our work from October 1998 through April 20006

 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Agency Comments The State Department and DOD were provided an opportunity to review 

and comment on a draft of this report. The State Department—specifically, 

the Office of the President’s and the Secretary of State’s Special Advisor for 

Kosovo and Dayton Implementation (through the Deputy Special Advisor 

for Kosovo Implementation), the Office of the Legal Adviser, and selected 

country desk officers—provided oral comments. State substantially agreed 

with the report and provided technical comments that we discussed with 

relevant officials and, where appropriate, incorporated them in the report. 

6

We issued two interim reports during this period: one classified report on NATO’s 

operations and contingency plans in the Balkans, and an unclassified version of that report 

titled NATO’s Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans

(GAO/NSIAD-99-111R, Mar. 11, 1999). 
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In written comments to our report, DOD said that the report presents a 

factual account of the current U.S. involvement in the Balkans but took 

issue with our discussion of U.S. national interests. Specifically, DOD said 

that our report misrepresented the three categories of national interests by 

including “abiding” as a type or category of interest and omitting 

“humanitarian and other” interests. We modified the text of the report to 

(1) clarify that the three categories of national interests defined by the 

National Security Strategy do not include the term “abiding” and (2) more 

fully describe “humanitarian and other” interests. DOD also provided 

separately technical comments that we discussed with relevant officials 

and included in the text of the report, where appropriate. DOD comments 

are reprinted in appendix VII.

We also provided a draft of the report to the National Security Council; the 

U.S. European Command; NATO’s military headquarters; the U.S. 

diplomatic office in Pristina, Kosovo; the Kosovo Force headquarters; the 

U.S. embassy in Bosnia; the Stabilization Force headquarters; the U.S. 

embassy in Macedonia; the Central Intelligence Agency; and selected 

international organizations in the region. We received a response back from 

all of these organizations, with the exception of NATO’s military 

headquarters. We incorporated their technical comments, where 

appropriate, into the report. 

Briefing Section I provides background information on the region. Briefing 

Section II discusses the current security situation in Kosovo and Bosnia. 

Briefing Section III describes the projected security situation in the 

Balkans. Briefing Section IV provides information on the factors that led to 

the decision to withdraw Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. Briefing 

Section V provides information on selected issues related to U.S. and 

international operations in the Balkans. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable 

Madeleine K. Albright, the Secretary of State; the Honorable William S. 

Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; General Wesley K. Clark, the Commander 

in Chief, U.S. European Command, and his successor, General Joseph W. 

Ralston; and other appropriate congressional committees. Copies will also 

be made available to other interested parties upon request.
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If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix VIII.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin F. Nelson

Director, International Relations and Trade Issues
Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Briefing Section I

Background BrenifgSecotinI

The Balkans Region

Note: The 1999 conflicts in Serbia and Montenegro were the same event, specifically, the NATO 

bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.

Source: GAO based on Central Intelligence Agency maps.

Unclassified

Serbia

Montenegro

Pristina

ALBANIA

TIRANA

Adriatic

Sea

Serbia and Montenegro

have asserted the formation

of a joint independent state,

but this entity has not been

formally recognized as a state

by the United States.

GREECE

Kosovo

(province)

ITALY

ROMANIA

HUNGARY

AUSTRIA

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

Vojvodina

(province)

Novi Sad

BELGRADE

0 50 Kilometers

50 Miles

LJUBLJANA

ZAGREB

PODGORICA

Unclassified

SARAJEVO

BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA

MACEDONIA

SKOPJE

BULGARIA

1991-1995

1992-1995

1999

1998-1999

1997

1999

Date of

conflicts
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

For purposes of this report, the Balkans region is defined as Albania and 

five of the six republics that made up the Socialist Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia, hereafter referred to as the former Yugoslavia.1

 The five former 

republics included in this report are (1) Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter 

referred to as Bosnia; (2) Croatia; (3) Macedonia; 2

 (4) Montenegro; and 

(5) Serbia, which includes the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In 

1992, after four of the republics had declared independence, the two 

remaining republics−Serbia and Montenegro−formed the Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia (hereafter referred to as Yugoslavia) as the self-appointed 

successor to the former Yugoslavia.3

1

The sixth republic of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, was outside of the scope of our 

review. The “Balkan peninsula” covers more countries than does our definition of the 

Balkans region, including Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey. 

2

“Macedonia” is an unofficial name for the state recognized by the U.S. government as The 

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

3

The United States and the United Nations do not recognize the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia as the sole successor to the former Yugoslavia. Further, the United States does 

not recognize it as a state.
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Ethnic Composition of the Former Yugoslavia and Albania Prior to the Dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia

Note: These figures are from the 1981 censuses of the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The 1981 

census is considered to be the last reliable census of the former Yugoslavia. 

Source: Central Intelligence Agency.

Other 9%

Slovenes 91%

Population: 1,948,000

Slovenia

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA

Other 13%

Serbs 12%

Croats 75%

Population: 4,683,000

Croatia

Other 11%

Albanians 7%

Muslim nationals 13%

Montenegrins 69%

Population: 639,000

Montenegro

Other 10%

Croats 18%

Serbs 32%

Muslim nationals 40%

Population: 4,479,000

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Other 6%

Serbs 2%

Turks 5%

Albanians 20%

Macedonians 67%

Population: 2,111,000

Macedonia

Other 2%

Greeks 8%

Albanians 90%

Population: 2,761,000

Albania

Other 16%

Hungarians 4%

Albanians 14%

Serbs 66%

Population: 9,830,000

Serbia (includes Kosovo

and Vojvodina)

Albanians

No majority presence

Hungarians

Slovenes

Serbs

Macedonians

Montenegrins

Muslims

Croats

Majority presence

ALBANIA

Kosovo

MACEDONIA

Vojvodina

Serbia

Montenegro
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The three largest ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia were (1) Serbs, 

that is, Slavs who are Eastern Orthodox Christian, specifically Serbian 

Orthodox Christian, comprising more than a third of the former 

Yugoslavia’s population in 1981; (2) Croats, who are Roman Catholic Slavs 

(about 20 percent of the total population); and (3) Muslim Slavs, who are 

referred to as “Bosniaks”4

 in Bosnia and some other areas of the former 

Yugoslavia (about 9 percent of the total population). 5

 These three ethnic 

groups lived, and continue to live, mainly in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As 

shown on the map, many areas of Bosnia were ethnically mixed, so that no 

one ethnic group was in the majority. 

The Balkans region also includes Montenegrins and Macedonians. Both 

groups are ethnic kin to Serbs, as they consist of Slavs who are Eastern 

Orthodox Christian. Montenegrins generally belong to the Serbian 

Orthodox Church. 6

 Many historians maintain that Montenegrins are Serbs, 

although the two groups have distinct identities arising from their different 

histories of occupation under the Ottoman Empire. Macedonians belong to 

a separate Macedonian Orthodox Church that is not recognized by the 

Serbian church. They have cultural links to Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks. 

The latter two groups at times have claimed that Macedonians are actually 

Bulgars or Greeks, respectively, rather than Slavs. 

A large minority population of ethnic Albanians also lived, and continue to 

live, in the former Yugoslavia, mainly in areas along the country’s border 

with Albania. They reside in Serbia, particularly in Serbia’s province of 

Kosovo; Macedonia; and, in smaller numbers, Montenegro (see app. I). 

Ethnic Albanians constitute the majority of the population in Kosovo, in 

some western areas of Macedonia, and in a small area of southern 

Montenegro. Most Albanians are Muslim, but about 20 percent in Albania 

are Albanian Orthodox Christian, and about 10 percent in Albania and in 

Kosovo are Roman Catholic. 

4

This report defines “Bosniaks” as “Muslims,” the definition used in State Department 

human rights reports. 

5

The other five major ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia were Slovenes (7.8 percent of 

the total population), Albanians (7.7 percent), Macedonians (6.0 percent), Montenegrins 

(2.6 percent), and Hungarians (1.9 percent). 

6

In 1993, some Montenegrins in the republic asserted the reestablishment of a separate 

Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which had been consolidated into the Serbian Orthodox 

Church in 1920. 
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

S

Note: The European Union recognized Croatia’s independence in January 1992 and Bosnia in April 

1992. The United States recognized Croatia and Bosnia in April 1992.

Strategic Goals of Warring Parties to Major Conflicts in

the Balkans, 1991 Through the Year 2000

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Spring 1992-October 1995

War in Bosnia

Spring 1992-October 1995

War in Bosnia

June 1991-November 1995

War in Croatia

June 1991-November 1995

War in Croatia

January-April 1997

Large-scale civil

unrest in Albania

January-April 1997

Large-scale civil

unrest in Albania

February 1998-June1999

War in Kosovo

February 1998-June1999

War in Kosovo

March 24,1999-June 20,1999

NATO bombing campaign

against Yugoslavia

March 24,1999-June 20,1999

NATO bombing campaign

against Yugoslavia

April 1992

Bosnia declares independence

April 1992

Bosnia declares independence

June 1991

Croatia declares independence

June 1991

Croatia declares independence November and December 1995

Dayton and other peace agreements signed

November and December 1995

Dayton and other peace agreements signed

June 1999

Military and political agreements reached for Kosovo

June 1999

Military and political agreements reached for Kosovo
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia led to two sets of extended armed 

conflict, the first in Croatia and Bosnia, and the second in and around 

Serbia’s province of Kosovo. The first set−the wars that coincided with the 

independence moves of Croatia and Bosnia−was a complex, interrelated 

series of conflicts. The warring parties to these conflicts pursued the 

following strategic goals:

• Yugoslavia, particularly its dominant republic of Serbia, sought to create 

a “Greater Serbia” and supported Serb paramilitary and military 

operations in Croatia and Bosnia. Croatian Serbs and Bosnian Serbs−

with support from Yugoslavia−fought for and declared states separate 

from Croatia and Bosnia. In Bosnia, this area was referred to as 

“Republika Srpska.” 

• Croatia fought against Serb military and paramilitary forces on its 

territory, and supported the creation of a “Greater Croatia” that would 

include part of Bosnia’s territory. During the war in Bosnia, Bosnian 

Croat leaders−with support from Croatia−fought for and declared the 

establishment of an ethnically pure state separate from Bosnia known 

as “Herceg-Bosna.”

• The Bosniaks—who in 1991 were the largest ethnic group in Bosnia with 

about 44 percent of the population−fought for a unified, multiethnic 

Bosnia, but with Bosniaks in control.

The second set of conflicts consisted of (1) the war in Kosovo between 

Yugoslav security forces7

 and Kosovar Albanian insurgents and (2) the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign against 

Yugoslavia. During and after the conflicts, Kosovar Albanian insurgents and 

Yugoslav security forces had mutually exclusive goals. The insurgents 

fought for the independence of Kosovo. On the other hand, Yugoslav 

forces, most of whom are Serb, fought to retain Yugoslavia’s sovereignty 

over the province, an area referred to as a cradle of Serbian culture and 

national heritage. The NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia is 

discussed in Briefing Section IV.

7

For purposes of this report, the term “Yugoslav security forces” refers to Yugoslavia’s 

military and the republic of Serbia’s police.
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Refugees and Displaced Persons at the End of the

Balkans Conflicts (1991 Through 1999)

Approximately 4.4 million people were displaced as

a result of the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Approximately 4.4 million people were displaced as

a result of the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Croatian Serbs in Banja Luka, Bosnia

Source: U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Refugee camp for Kosovars in Macedonia

Source: U.S. Agency for

International Development.

U.N. peacekeepers escorting Bosnians

Source: United Nations.

Croatia: 0.6 million

Bosnia: 2.3 million

Kosovo: 1.5 million
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo resulted in the displacement of an 

estimated 2.4 million refugees and 2 million internally displaced persons.8

The largest population flows were associated with the war in Bosnia, 

during which an estimated 2.3 million people became displaced. During the 

war, most of the 1 million people who became displaced within Bosnia had 

moved to areas controlled by their own ethnic group; as a result, most 

areas of the country, with the exception of central Bosnia, were populated 

and controlled by a predominant ethnic group at the end of the war (see 

app. II). By the end of the war in Croatia, an estimated 300,000 Croatian 

Serbs had become refugees. During the Kosovo conflict, an estimated 1.5 

million Kosovars, primarily Albanians, either fled or were forced out of 

their homes by Yugoslav security forces; about 800,000 of them left 

Yugoslavia. About 60,000 people, largely Serbs, fled the province before the 

start of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia. An estimated 200,000 Serbs 

lived in Kosovo at that time.

8

This paragraph is based on data from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Legend

KFOR = Kosovo Force/International Security Force

The international community used various agreements to end the conflicts 

in Bosnia and Kosovo and establish conditions for deploying two large, 

complex peace operations. 

Goals:

Goals:

Goals:

International Agreements for Bosnia and Kosovo

• Provide security for the people of Bosnia.

• Create a unified, multiethnic, democratic Bosnia based on the rule of law, including

cooperating with the international war crimes tribunal.

• Rebuild the economy.

BOSNIA

• Ensure the right of people to return to their prewar homes.

1995

Goals:

Dayton Agreement Dayton Agreement

KOSOVO

1999

Interim Framework for Kosovo: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 Interim Framework for Kosovo: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244

KFOR -Yugoslavia Military Technical Agreement KFOR -Yugoslavia Military Technical Agreement

KFOR-Kosovo Liberation Army Demilitarization and Transformation Agreements KFOR-Kosovo Liberation Army Demilitarization and Transformation Agreements

• Create and manage an interim civil administration for Kosovo that maintains civil law

and order, ensures the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, monitors

human rights, and rebuilds the economy.

• Authorize KFOR to serve as an international military presence.

• Facilitate the process to decide Kosovo’s future status.

• Require the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces within 12 days.

• Require the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army within 90 days.

• Allow for the transition of the Kosovo Liberation Army into a civilian organization.
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The Bosnia peace operation was established by the Dayton Agreement9 in 

mid-December 1995. This operation now consists of the NATO-led 

Stabilization Force (SFOR), which has the authority to use force to enforce 

compliance with the military aspects of the agreement, and four principal 

international civilian organizations. The lead civilian organization, the 

Office of the High Representative, was created by the agreement and given 

many responsibilities, including making the final interpretation in Bosnia of 

the agreement’s civil provisions. In December 1997, the international 

community supported the decision of the High Representative to more 

actively exercise his Dayton authority to include imposing temporary 

solutions when Bosnia’s political leaders were stalemated. The Dayton 

Agreement defined Bosnia as consisting of two entities that had been 

created during the war—Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat 

Federation10—and divided them by the “interentity boundary line.” (See 

app. II for a map of Bosnia and an organization chart of the Bosnia Peace 

operation.) 

The overall political framework for Kosovo−as articulated in U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999−called for, among other things, 

(1) the deployment of the Kosovo Force/International Security Force 

(KFOR) as an international security presence led by NATO, which has the 

authority to use force to enforce military agreements with the former 

warring parties and to ensure public safety and order; and (2) the 

establishment of a civilian U.N. interim administration mission to serve as 

the interim government for Kosovo. The U.N. mission is responsible for 

leading economic and social reconstruction, conducting elections, 

monitoring human rights, ensuring the protection and right to return of all 

refugees and displaced persons, and eventually facilitating the process to 

decide Kosovo’s future status. The U.N. Security Council resolution did not 

exclude or call for the possibility of Kosovo’s independence in the future. 

The resolution called for substantial autonomy for the people of Kosovo 

while retaining Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over the province, even after the 

withdrawal of all Yugoslav security forces. 

9

“The Dayton Agreement” is the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and its supporting annexes. The U.N. Security Council authorized this 

operation in Resolution 1031 on December 15, 1995. 

10The Federation had been established in March 1994. Prior to this, the Bosniak and Bosnian 

Croat armies were fighting each other in central Bosnia. 
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The specific military commitments of the former warring parties in Kosovo 

are contained in three separate agreements. The June 9, 1999, military 

technical agreement between NATO and the governments of Yugoslavia 

and the republic of Serbia required the phased withdrawal of Yugoslav 

security forces from Kosovo within 12 days. According to U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1244, after the withdrawal, an agreed number of 

Yugoslav and Serbian personnel (hundreds, not thousands) would be 

permitted to return to Kosovo for selected functions. As of April 3, 2000, no 

date had been specified for the return of these personnel. The military 

technical agreement also created a “ground safety zone”, a 5 kilometer 

wide zone extending beyond the Kosovo boundary with the rest of 

Yugoslavia. No Yugoslav security forces —military or police— are allowed 

to enter or remain in the ground safety zone. 

The June 20, 1999, agreement between NATO and the Kosovo Liberation 

Army called for the army’s demilitarization.11 Under the September 20, 

1999, regulation of the U.N. mission and the accompanying statement of 

principles from the KFOR commander, the Kosovo Liberation Army was to 

transform into a civilian organization known as the “Kosovo Protection 

Corps”--an organization intended to be a multiethnic, emergency service 

agency of 5,000 civilian personnel (3,000 active and 2,000 reserve)--as well 

as into the Kosovo Police Service. The statement of principles allowed for a 

significant portion of the corps to be drawn from the leadership and ranks 

of the Kosovo Liberation Army. In addition, members of the army were 

given preference in the recruitment of the Kosovo Police Service. 

The Kosovo Liberation Army officially ceased to exist on September 20, 

1999, when KFOR certified it as “demilitarized.” In September 1999, the 

provisional Kosovo Protection Corps consisted of 9,200 personnel, 

primarily former Kosovo Liberation Army members. The corps was 

formally established in January 2000. (See app. III for a map of Kosovo and 

organization charts of the Kosovo peace operation.) KFOR and the U.N. 

mission in Kosovo currently share responsibility for transitioning the 

Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection Corps.

11This agreement is the “Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK.” 

“UCK” is the Albanian acronym for the Kosovo Liberation Army. 
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia BerinfgSecotinI

Note : All personnel numbers are as of January 2000. The main elements of KFOR and SFOR are 

located in Kosovo and Bosnia, respectively; all other troops are support troops. The KFOR Macedonia 

figure includes 163 personnel in Greece. SFOR figures exclude another 350 U.S. troops in Hungary 

who are directly supporting SFOR.

Sources: GAO analysis of personnel data from KFOR and SFOR headquarters. 

The large presence of NATO-led military personnel in the region—about 

70,000 troops located in five countries—has greatly reduced the ability of 

the former warring parties in Kosovo and Bosnia to restart the conflicts in 

those locations. However, the former warring parties largely retain their 

LEGEND

=10,000 troops =1,000 troops

NATO-led Forces in the Balkans Are Preventing a

Resumption of War

SFOR Croatia

1,200

(50 U.S.)

SFOR Croatia

1,200

(50 U.S.)

KFOR Albania

1,400

(0 U.S.)

KFOR Albania

1,400

(0 U.S.) KFOR Macedonia

5,100

(1,000 U.S.)

KFOR Macedonia

5,100

(1,000 U.S.)

SFOR Bosnia

23,100

(5,350 U.S.)

SFOR Bosnia

23,100

(5,350 U.S.)

SFOR Total 24,300

U.S. 5,400 

KFOR Total 45,700

U.S. 7,000

Total 70,000

U.S. total 12,400

SFOR Total 24,300

U.S. 5,400 

KFOR Total 45,700

U.S. 7,000

Total 70,000

U.S. total 12,400

KFOR Kosovo

39,200

(6,000 U.S.)

KFOR Kosovo

39,200

(6,000 U.S.)
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

wartime goals, and, according to western observers, would resume war if 

the NATO-led troops were withdrawn. 

The NATO-led force in Kosovo continues to deter a resumption of 

hostilities there by (1) ensuring that uniformed Yugoslav security forces, 

who withdrew from Kosovo as scheduled, remain outside of the province; 

and (2) monitoring the demilitarization and transformation of the Kosovo 

Liberation Army into the civilian Kosovo Protection Corps. Although the 

NATO-led force considers the former Kosovo Liberation Army to be in 

compliance with its demilitarization agreement, KFOR and U.N. 

international police said that they have detained members of the 

provisional protection corps for carrying unauthorized weapons and 

engaging in violence and intimidation against ethnic minorities. Moreover, 

a large number of undeclared weapons remain hidden. Further, according 

to western observers and their reports, the Kosovo Protection Corps−

which is considered by its leadership to be the core of Kosovo’s future 

army−has retained the army’s overall structure and remained capable of 

resuming hostilities on short notice. In addition, armed Kosovar Albanian 

insurgent groups outside of the control of the former Kosovo Liberation 

Army continued to operate in the province, as did Serb paramilitaries, 

specifically, locally organized groups of armed Serbs. 

The NATO-led force in Bosnia, SFOR, has continued to enforce the ceasefire and ensure the separation and progressive reduction of the Bosniak, 

Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb militaries, but paramilitaries—

specifically, small groups of armed thugs organized and controlled by 

extremist political leaders−continued to operate in the country. SFOR also 

continued to provide a military presence in critical areas or “hot spots” 

where the international community expects violent resistance to Dayton 

implementation, for example, in locations where people are attempting to 

return to their prewar homes across ethnic lines. 

Parties to the wars in Kosovo and Bosnia, largely supported by their 

respective ethnic groups, still retain their wartime goals. According to fall 

1999 polls from the U.S. Information Agency, almost all Kosovar Albanians 

are willing to fight for the independence of Kosovo, while about half of 

Serbs in Serbia are willing to fight to retain Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia. 

Further, the vast majority of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats continued 

to want states separate from Bosnia, while almost all Bosniaks support a 

unified, multiethnic Bosnia, but, according to some observers, with 

Bosniaks in control.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Since the end of the NATO bombing campaign, according to reports of the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others, the 

overall level of violence in Kosovo has declined significantly, but 

retaliatory, ethnically related violent incidents still regularly occur and 

recently increased with the approach of spring. In many incidents, Kosovar 

Albanians harass or violently intimidate ethnic minority populations, such 

as Serbs and Roma (Gypsy), frequently forcing them to leave their homes 

for Serb-controlled areas of Kosovo or locations outside the province. In 

other cases, Serb paramilitaries or armed groups have harassed and 

•Overall violence has declined, but ethnically

related violent incidents occur regularly and

have recently increased.

•Mitrovica has become the major “hot spot”

for violence.

•Continuing hostilities and a lack of political

and social reconciliation overshadow positive

developments, such as

•the creation of interim administrative

structures, and

•the return of 800,000 Kosovar Albanian

refugees.

Violent Incidents and Lack of Reconciliation in Kosovo

French KFOR street patrol in Mitrovica

Source: KFOR.

Kosovar Albanian refugees

Source: The U.S. Agency for International Development.

Historic Turkish market destroyed by Yugoslav

forces in Pec, Kosovo

Source: GAO.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

intimidated Kosovar Albanians. In late February 2000, the U.N. 

international police reported increasing violence against Serbs in the 

province. 

During early 2000, the city of Kosovska Mitrovica emerged as the most 

difficult “hot spot” in Kosovo after a series of escalating violent incidents 

among Kosovar Serbs and Albanians occurred there.1

 According to U.N. 

and other reports, the incidents included (1) Albanians striking with an 

antitank rocket a U.N. bus transporting Kosovar Serbs, killing two elderly 

people on board; (2) a crowd of Serbs going on a retaliatory rampage in the 

predominately Serb northern side of Mitrovica, leading to the deaths of 8 

ethnic Albanians and the exodus of another 1,650 from the northern part of 

the city; (3) both ethnic groups attacking KFOR personnel and U.N. 

property; and (4) violence associated with Kosovar Albanians returning 

home to northern Mitrovica. In public statements, U.S. and international 

officials blamed extremists from both ethnic groups for causing the 

incidents, while a U.S. government official also blamed Yugoslavia’s 

leadership for using Yugoslav security forces to foment the security 

problems.

The continuing hostilities and lack of political and social reconciliation 

between Kosovar Albanians and non-Albanians have overshadowed 

positive developments that have occurred in Kosovo since the end of the 

NATO bombing campaign. For example, the U.N. mission has established a 

number of interim administrative structures for governing the province, 

including the provisional judicial panel and the provincewide Kosovo 

Transition Council formed by the U.N. mission in July 1999; however, 

Kosovar Serbs either have never joined or have withdrawn from them. 

Further, while at least 800,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who had fled 

Kosovo during the conflict had returned there by December 1999, about 

243,000 non-Albanians had left the province for other parts of Serbia and 

Montenegro by November 19992

 and, as of February 2000, an estimated 

10,000 to 15,000 Serbs were displaced from their homes within Kosovo as 

they had moved to Serb majority areas. 

1

This is an important city due to (1) the presence of a large mining and industrial complex 

and (2) the belief by many Serbs that the city should be ethnically partitioned.

2

Many of these people left the province as Yugoslav forces withdrew. As of

mid-November 1999, estimates of the number of Serbs remaining ranged from 60,000 to 

100,000. 
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Low-level Violence and Political Obstruction in Bosnia

House destroyed in Stolac, Bosnia

Source: SFOR.

Bosnian Serb minority returnees

Source: SFOR.

•Political leaders continue to obstruct

progress on the Dayton Agreement.

•People returning to their homes across

ethnic lines face attacks and violent

intimidation in some locations.

•The number of minority returns is

increasing but much lower than hoped.

•The High Representative continues to

impose laws and remove officials.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

While SFOR has ensured an absence of war in Bosnia, political leaders of 

the country’s three major ethnic groups continued to obstruct the 

implementation of the Dayton Agreement’s political, humanitarian, and 

economic provisions. For example, institutions of the national government 

and the joint Bosniak-Croat Federation still largely do not function due to 

lack of cooperation among the parties. In addition, the Republika Srpska 

government has been unstable since early March 1999, when the High 

Representative removed from office the entity’s democratically elected 

President, a hard-line Serb nationalist, for his deliberate attempts to 

obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Moreover, the 

economy remains stagnant, largely because Bosnia’s political leaders 

continue to resist implementing meaningful economic reforms. 

Further, people attempting to return home to areas controlled by another 

ethnic group continue to face sporadic attacks and violent intimidation in 

some locations, as well as political and legal obstruction. According to the 

SFOR Commander, in late 1999 and early 2000 the NATO-led force 

increased the number of “hot spots” its troops patrol, as well as the number 

of patrols in some areas, in response to violent incidents related to these 

returns. Recent polling data3

 show that of those refugees and displaced 

persons who did not wish to return to their prewar homes, 58 percent said 

that the lack of security for themselves and their property is the primary 

reason they will not return. In contrast, many international officials in 

Bosnia, including the SFOR Commander, believe that the primary obstacle 

to minority returns is the poor economy, primarily unemployment and a 

lack of funding to repair homes, rather than a lack of personal security.

The number of “minority returns” in Bosnia−that is, people returning to 

their prewar homes across ethnic lines−continues to increase each year, 

though the number in 1999 was significantly lower than the 120,000 

minority returns hoped for by the international community. About 9,500 

minority returns occurred in 1996; 39,000 in 1997; 41,275 in 1998; and 42,500 

in 1999 for a total of about 132,275 minority returns since the signing 

3

The poll of 3,000 refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia was conducted in November 

1999 by the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, at the 

request of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The poll showed that about 76 percent 

of all Bosniak, 73 percent of all Bosnian Croat, and 36 percent of all Bosnian Serb refugees 

and displaced person respondents wished to return to their prewar homes.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

of the Dayton Agreement.4 According to the 1999 State Department Human 

Rights report and a senior SFOR officer, political leaders of all three ethnic 

groups have continued their attempts to take or maintain control of 

strategically important terrain through the return process. They may either 

organize or discourage the return of people from their own ethnic group to 

areas across ethnic lines or obstruct the return of people from other ethnic 

groups to their areas of control. 

In an attempt to accelerate progress, the High Representative during 1999 

and early 2000 continued to use his authority to revoke or amend existing 

laws, to impose new laws, and to remove government officials from office. 

For example, he imposed (1) a law that established a state border service5

after Bosnian Serb delegates to Bosnia’s parliament refused to pass the law 

and (2) laws that instituted a judicial framework to combat crime and 

corruption in the Federation. Moreover, to help promote minority returns, 

in late November 1999 he removed 22 local officials from their positions for 

fostering “the poison of division” and obstructing Dayton implementation. 

4

In addition, the number of people who registered as returning home across ethnic lines 

increased from 15,531 in 1998 to about 31,234 in 1999, a trend cited as positive by U.S. and 

international civilian officials in Bosnia.

5

The proposed state border service would be a national-level institution whose duties would 

include, among other things, police surveillance of Bosnia’s borders, control of cross-border 

traffic, and search for persons within the border zone. The service’s ethnic composition 

would be based on Bosnia’s 1991 census data.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

As originally envisioned by NATO planners, KFOR would conduct public 

security functions in Kosovo for a period of at least 3 months. After that, 

the U.N. international civilian police force would assume full responsibility 

for policing until the establishment of a local police service in Kosovo by 

the end of 2002. In November 1999, U.N. and KFOR officials were unable to 

specify a date by which the U.N. international police force would assume 

Civilian and Military Police Issues

Multinational Specialized Unit

Source: SFOR.

SFOR and KFOR face shortages in their specialized policing

units, known as multinational specialized units (“MSU”).

SFOR and KFOR face shortages in their specialized policing

units, known as multinational specialized units (“MSU”).

Shortfalls in U.N. international police have indefinitely delayed the transition of public security

tasks from KFOR to the United Nations.

Shortfalls in U.N. international police have indefinitely delayed the transition of public security

tasks from KFOR to the United Nations.

Military

tasks

United

Nations

Civilian

tasks Public

security

Transition period

with international

civilian police

International civilian

police take over all

public security

Initial public

security provided

by military
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

primary responsibility for public security in Kosovo.6 According to a senior 

KFOR officer, even after the public security function transitions to the 

United Nations, KFOR could reduce its presence by no more than one 

military police battalion of about 650 troops from each of the five military 

sectors, given the security situation and the force’s other missions.

KFOR is still performing most of the tasks that were to have been 

transferred to the U.N. international police force by September 1999, 

largely because of delays in fully staffing the U.N. international police 

force, according to KFOR and U.N. officials. As of April 7, 2000, according 

to U.N. documents, the U.N. international police force was significantly 

understaffed at 2,886 personnel, about 1,830 fewer that the number 

authorized by the United Nations and almost 3,115 less than requested by 

the U.N. mission in Kosovo. Of these amounts, about 1,100 positions were 

for specialized police, that is, police trained in riot control duties. Because 

of these shortfalls, the U.N. police force had assumed primary 

responsibility for public security in only 4 of Kosovo’s 29 municipalities as 

of January 2000. 

The NATO-led forces in Kosovo and Bosnia both face a shortfall in their 

respective specialized police units, also known as “multinational 

specialized units.” These units are intended to be specially trained and 

equipped military units7

 that would assist regular soldiers in dealing with 

civil disturbances associated with events such as returns of refugees and 

displaced persons and installation of elected officials. SFOR’s multinational 

specialized unit has been significantly understaffed since its establishment 

in late August 1998, operating with only 1 of 2 required battalions, or 450 of 

the required 750 personnel. Similarly, KFOR’s multinational specialized unit 

is only partially staffed. According to a U.N. official, KFOR is in effect 

competing with the U.N. international police force for these specialized 

police assets, as the NATO-led force’s multinational specialized unit 

consists of the same types of police personnel being sought by the United 

Nations.

6

This primary responsibility for public security, referred to as “police primacy,” includes 

control of the following: enforcing criminal codes, conducting investigations, making 

arrests for criminal offenses, and providing community interface. KFOR plans to transfer 

primacy to the international police in stages and sector by sector as the U.N. police develop 

sustainable posts, communications, and detention facilities.

7

These units have been described as constabulary- or gendarmerie-type units, that is, groups 

of soldiers serving as an armed police force for the maintenance of public order.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

In mid-July 1999, about the time most of KFOR was deploying into Kosovo, 

senior NATO officials told us that many allies were considering reducing 

their troop contributions to SFOR, largely because they could not provide 

resources for two concurrent military operations in the Balkans. Based on 

a study by NATO’s military headquarters, the North Atlantic Council−

NATO’s political leadership−concluded in October 1999 that a significantly 

reduced SFOR could maintain a secure environment in Bosnia, assuming 

that the force would be restructured to allow a more flexible response to 

outbreaks of violence and would focus only on the force’s key military 

Other Constraints on Military Resources

Blackhawk helicopters conducting exercises in Bosnia Source: SFOR.

• Two concurrent Balkans operations are straining

national defense resources of NATO members.

•SFOR drawdown will reduce key assistance for civilian

operations.

• After an initial drawdown, NATO is considering an

increase in KFOR force levels.

• KFOR and SFOR operate under geographic and

operational constraints.

SFOR operational reserve exercise

Source: SFOR.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

tasks associated with controlling the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian 

Serb militaries. About the same time, NATO revised KFOR’s operations 

plan and force structure and authorized a reduction in its force levels, 

based on its assessment that improving security conditions in the province 

and the start-up of the U.N. mission in Kosovo allowed a modification to 

the force’s mission and tasks.

The SFOR drawdown−from about 32,000 troops (as of September 1999) to 

about 20,000 troops (as of April 2000)8

−will substantially reduce the 

amount of assistance the force provides to civilian efforts, including 

general security for the operations of international organizations, area 

security for returns of people across ethnic lines, and support for the 

conduct of elections. After SFOR announced its drawdown and the U.N. 

mission in Bosnia decided on a more robust implementation strategy, the 

U.N. mission developed a request for U.N. authorization of an armed 

protection group; as of April 7, 2000, this request had not yet been approved 

by U.N. headquarters.9

 The proposed group would consist of about 270 

armed police and would provide protection for U.N. police monitors10 and 

other U.N. personnel. According to U.N. officials, with protection from the 

armed protection group, U.N. staff would be able to credibly and safely 

pursue more robust actions to remove political/criminal obstructionists 

and complete earlier its mission of local police reform and restructuring. 

NATO is currently reviewing the KFOR statement of requirements, which 

could increase the force size or change the force composition, in response 

to changing conditions in and around Kosovo. After initially deploying a 

force of about 43,000 NATO nation troops to Kosovo,11 NATO nations 

contributing to KFOR reduced their troop strengths to 33,000 during the 

November 1999 troop rotation. However, after a rapid escalation of violent 

incidents occurred in Kosovska Mitrovica during February 2000, the 

8

After the drawdown, the United States will have about 4,600 troops in Bosnia. 

9

A U.N. official told us that the mission initially decided to make this request after being 

informed that SFOR troops may be delayed in responding to violent incidents against U.N. 

monitors due to the reduced number of troops available. 

10The U.N. mission in Bosnia includes the International Police Task Force, a police 

monitoring mission of about 1,800 unarmed police. Because the force is 300 personnel 

below its authorized strength, the U.N. mission could establish the proposed armed 

protection group without increasing its authorized personnel levels.

11KFOR’s peak strength was about 51,000 troops during late August 1999 due to overlapping 

troop rotations. 
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, asked for two additional battalions 

for Kosovo. As of March 17, 2000, two NATO countries had agreed to 

provide the equivalent of one additional battalion for this purpose, and, 

according to DOD officials, the United States had agreed to deploy an 

additional 125 military personnel to the U.S. sector. According to executive 

branch officials, it may ultimately be necessary for NATO to consider 

reviewing the KFOR operations plan to (1) better meet the staffing 

demands of the force’s existing public security mission and (2) control 

Kosovo’s provincial boundary to prevent armed Albanian groups from 

operating in southern Serbia from bases in Kosovo. (See Briefing Section 

III for more discussion of the security situation in southern Serbia.)

The two NATO-led forces also operate within geographic and operational 

constraints placed on participating forces by their respective national 

command authorities. Participating countries allow their forces to 

participate in SFOR and KFOR within specific areas and with specific rules 

of engagement.12 These restrictions at times could prevent the commanders 

of the NATO-led forces from deploying their troops outside of specific 

geographic areas or using them for certain tasks within assigned areas, 

thereby reducing the forces’ ability to respond quickly and effectively. 

12The operation plans for the NATO-led forces contain the most permissive rules of 

engagement for countries participating in the forces. The plans also permit each 

participating country to issue clarifying instructions to ensure compliance with national law.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Shortfalls in Other Civilian Resources

U.N. efforts in Kosovo are hindered by a

lack of civilian resources.

U.N. efforts in Kosovo are hindered by a

lack of civilian resources.

Kosovo children return to school

Source: U.S. KFOR.
Briefing Section II

Current Situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

U.N. efforts to establish a functioning civil administration and create a 

democratic, multiethnic society in Kosovo are hindered in part by a lack of 

civilian resources.13 For example, the U.N. mission was tasked with 

creating municipal administrative structures based on democratic 

principles. However, according to U.N. officials in Kosovo, the U.N. mission 

was slower to deploy international administrators to the field than had 

been hoped, due largely to a lack of available personnel at the start of the 

endeavor. These officials told us that the slow deployment of U.N. staff 

allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army to gain control of municipal 

administrations in an undemocratic manner and made it difficult for U.N. 

administrators to effectively control them. Moreover, the United Nations 

was unable to do advance planning for the mission’s operations, including 

staff deployment, because it was informed that it would be leading the 

mission only a short time before its start.14

13As of March 1999, the U.N. mission consisted of over 1,500 international civilian personnel 

plus about 2,390 international civilian police. 

14According to a senior U.N. official in New York, the United Nations was informed on 

June 8, 1999, that it would lead the international civilian effort in Kosovo. This was 2 days 

before the U.N. Security Council passed the resolution that established the U.N. mission. 

According to DOD, the United Nations was unofficially informed of the potential for this 

mission during May 1999.
Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans BrenifgSecotinI

Note: Croatia’s former ruling nationalist party pursued policies that helped create these current 

conditions. The country’s newly elected government has pledged to change many of these policies, as 

discussed later in this section. 

Sources: GAO analysis of documents from and interviews with officials from the State Department, 

including the U.S. Information Agency; NATO, including SFOR and KFOR; the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe; the United Nations, including the U.N. High Commissioner for 

Refugees; western observers; and nongovernmental organizations.

Summary of Unresolved Issues That Will Likely Affect

Regional Security Over the Next 5 Years

Post-conflict locations Other locations

Issue Bosnia Croatia Kosovo Montenegro Serbia Albania Macedonia

Disputes over what

territory and ethnic

groups constitute a

state

Destabilizing influence

of Milosevic

Poor economies

exacerbated by violent

conflicts, sanctions

against Yugoslavia,

and failure to make

market reforms

Continued dislocation

of refugees and

displaced persons

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X X X X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X X

X

X

X
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Throughout the Balkans, many of the region’s major ethnic groups continue 

to dispute the definitions of what geographic territory and ethnic groups 

constitute their states. As discussed earlier, parties to the wars in Bosnia 

and Kosovo, largely supported by their respective ethnic groups, still retain 

their wartime goals. Croatia’s former ruling nationalist party, which in early 

2000 was defeated in parliamentary and presidential elections by 

democratic opposition groups, (1) politically, economically, and militarily 

supported Bosnian Croat aims to maintain a state separate from Bosnia; 

and (2) denied citizenship rights to and obstructed the return of Croatian 

Serb refugees. Over the past 2 years in Montenegro, as Slobodan Milosevic 

was consolidating Yugoslavia’s federal power at the expense of the 

republic-level governments, segments of the population of Montenegro 

have begun calling for independence from Yugoslavia. In Albania, the U.S. 

Secretary of State told the Albanian parliament during mid-February 2000 

that “the international community would no sooner accept a Greater 

Albania than it would a Greater Serbia or Croatia.” According to some 

western observers, people in the region, especially in Macedonia, fear that 

Albanians in the region do support a “Greater Albania.”1

 In Macedonia, 

where political and social tensions have increased between the country’s 

two largest ethnic groups, Macedonians and Albanians, neither group 

appears fully committed to developing a unified, multiethnic state. 

Milosevic retains authoritarian power over both Yugoslav and republic of 

Serbia governmental structures—including their security forces—and uses 

their combined power to further his political goals in Kosovo, Montenegro, 

and other areas in the region, as described later in this section.

Economies in the region, many of which were poor before the wars, suffer 

from years of wars, sanctions against Yugoslavia, and limited progress on 

making market reforms.2

 The destruction of infrastructure during the wars 

in Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia, as well as the months of civil unrest in 

Albania, led to economic turmoil in each of these locations and put stress 

on neighboring economies that depended on these locations as trade routes 

1

See appendix I for a map showing the distribution of ethnic Albanians in the former 

Yugoslavia. 

2

According to a January 2000 report by the Council on Foreign Relations, the region’s 

average per capita gross domestic product is less than 7 percent of the European Union’s 

average. Per capita gross domestic product in the region ranges from an estimated $400 in 

Kosovo to about $4,500 in Croatia, continuing an historical pattern of economic disparity in 

the former Yugoslavia. 
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

and markets. U.S., European Union, and U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia 

and Serbia’s economic war against its neighbors have caused economic 

decline in Serbia and trade losses for the rest of the region, since Serbia 

represents a large market for many of the region’s countries. Balkan 

countries generally have been unable to implement the free market reforms 

necessary to attract foreign investment, due to constant political instability 

or a lack of political will on the part of their leaders, according to 

international officials and observer reports. 

As shown in figure 1, approximately 2.4 million refugees and displaced 

persons from the conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo have not 

returned to their prewar homes or found durable solutions to their 

displacement.3

 As of November 1999, about 97 percent of these people 

were residing within the Balkans region, either as refugees (624,630 

people) or displaced persons within their own country (1.74 million 

people). The remaining 79,200 people were refugees located in countries 

outside of the Balkans region. According to observer reports and U.S. 

Information Agency polling data, the reasons for their continued 

displacement include the intransigence of political leaders, the lack of 

security for returnees, the unavailability of housing, and poor economic 

prospects. 

3

These solutions include humanitarian/refugee status, other resident status, resettlement, 

and repatriation.
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 1: Estimate of Refugees and Displaced Persons Still Seeking Solutions in the Balkans, November 1999

Source: U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Serbia

Montenegro

Pristina

ALBANIA

TIRANA

Kosovo

(province)

CROATIA

Vojvodina

(province)

Novi Sad

BELGRADE

ZAGREB

PODGORICA

SARAJEVO

BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV

REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

SKOPJE

Refugees 27,030

Displaced persons 48,200

Subtotal 75,230

Croatia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

68,000

820,300

888,300

Refugees

Displaced persons

Subtotal

Macedonia

Refugees 22,000

Displaced persons 0

Subtotal 22,000

Albania

3,500

0

3,500

Refugees

Displaced persons

Outside the region Subtotal

50,000

6,000

4,900

Germany

Switzerland

Austria

3,300

15,000

79,200

Slovenia

Other countries

Total

Serbia

Montenegro

Refugees 0

Displaced persons 631,000

Subtotal 631,000

Refugees 480,900

Displaced persons 195,400

Subtotal 676,300

23,200

47,800

71,000

Refugees

Displaced persons

Subtotal

Total 1,378,300

FRY

Kosovo
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Unresolved Issues, by Location

Bosnia

Kosovo

Bosnia

Kosovo

Montenegro Montenegro

Macedonia Macedonia

Serbia Serbia

Albania Albania

Croatia Croatia

• The former warring parties retain their wartime

goals.

• Power struggle exists between Milosevic and

President of Montenegro.

• Population is divided over moves toward

greater autonomy or possible independence.

• Political and social tensions between ethnic

Albanians and Macedonians have increased.

• Milosevic retains power, but low-level violence

occurs regularly, particularly in southern Serbia,

where armed ethnic Albanian groups operate.

• Crime and corruption are pervasive and

contribute to political instability.

• Security situation stable, but former nationalist

government pursued policies that contributed to

regional instability.

Former Yugoslavia

Map source: Central Intelligence Agency.
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

This slide summarizes the key unresolved issues by location. For Bosnia 

and Kosovo, these issues, as well as the international community’s attempts 

to resolve them, were discussed in Briefing Section II. The following four 

slides discuss in more detail the key security issues in Croatia, Serbia, 

Montenegro, and Macedonia. 

The international community has attempted to resolve political, social, and 

other problems throughout the region through a variety of programs 

intended to develop democratic institutions and practices; reform and 

regenerate economic systems; and provide humanitarian assistance for 

refugees, displaced persons, and others in need. In late July 1999, the 

international community formally established a regional assistance 

framework called the “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.” The 

Stability Pact is intended to coordinate and prioritize economic and other 

assistance going to the region, including Romania and Bulgaria, and to 

accelerate and deepen the integration of a reformed region into the EuroAtlantic community. (See app. IV for more information on the major U.S. 

and international military and civilian programs in locations other than 

Bosnia and Kosovo and app. V for information on the Stability Pact 

initiative.)
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Prior to its defeat in elections in early 2000, Croatia’s nationalist ruling 

party destabilized the region by, among other things, providing economic, 

political, and military support to Bosnian Croat attempts to maintain a 

separate state and obstructing the return of Croatian Serb refugees.4

 The 

leaders of Croatia’s new government have publicly pledged to change many 

Prospects for Change in Croatia

Croatia’s newly elected leaders have promised policy changes

that are viewed by U.S. and international officials as positive for

Croatia’s relations with Bosnia and the region.

Croatia’s newly elected leaders have promised policy changes

that are viewed by U.S. and international officials as positive for

Croatia’s relations with Bosnia and the region.

President of Croatia Stipe Mesic

Source: Embassy of Croatia.

Prime Minister of Croatia Ivica Racan

Source: Embassy of Croatia.

At this time, it is unclear when and to what extent the new

government will implement the changes.

At this time, it is unclear when and to what extent the new

government will implement the changes.

Croatia has recently reached agreements on refugee returns and

the transparency of funding to Bosnian Croats.

Croatia has recently reached agreements on refugee returns and

the transparency of funding to Bosnian Croats.

4

About 64,500 Croatian Serbs had returned to Croatia as of November 1999, out of an 

estimated 300,000 who had fled the country. 
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

of the earlier policies. Specifically, the new President pledged that Croatia 

would allow the return of all Croatian citizens to the country, regardless of 

ethnicity; recognize that Croats form an element of Bosnia, make 

transparent its support for Bosnian Croats; and cut off funds for the 

military of their “quasi-state.” In public statements, U.S. and international 

leaders welcomed the change in government as a positive step in 

establishing a democratic system and economic reforms in Croatia and in 

improving the country’s relations with neighboring countries, as well as 

with the rest of Europe. Further, according to international officials in 

Bosnia, the elections signify to Bosnian Croats, whose political leaders 

belong to Croatia’s former ruling nationalist party, that they must give up 

their hope of becoming part of Croatia. 

In late February and early March 2000, Croatia’s new government took 

steps toward changing government policies on Croatian Serb refugee 

returns and making transparent funding for Bosnian Croat institutions. For 

example, the new government announced a program for the return of 

16,500 refugees to Croatia and reached an agreement with the Republika 

Srpska Prime Minister for the two-way return of Bosnian Croat and 

Croatian Serb refugees to their prewar homes. Further, under U.S. 

auspices, Croatia’s Defense Minister reached an agreement with the 

Federation Defense Minister (a Bosnian Croat) that provides for Croatia’s 

continued financing of the Bosnian Croat army through the Standing 

Committee for Military Matters, an institution established by the Dayton 

Agreement to coordinate the activities of the three militaries in Bosnia.

Despite these moves, however, it is not clear (1) to what extent Croatia’s 

new government will be able to implement these changes; (2) whether all 

of Croatia’s political leaders have given up the dream of a “Greater 

Croatia”; or (3) how Bosnian Croats would react to significant changes, if 

any, in their relationship to Croatia. For example, Croatia’s refugee return 

program and two-way return agreement with Republika Sprska may be 

obstructed by property laws that continue to favor Bosnian Croat refugees 

over Croatian Serbs5

 and a lack of progress in returning Bosnian Croats to

5

A large obstacle to the return of Croatian Serb refugees is that Bosnian Croat refugees 

occupy their homes in Croatia. Under Croatia’s current property law, if alternative 

accommodations cannot be found for the current user of the property, the property is not 

returned to its rightful owners. In February 1998, the Republika Srpska Prime Minister set a 

goal of returning 70,000 non-Serbs to their prewar homes in Republika Srpska. However, as 

of the end of 1999, only 19,975 non-Serbs had returned.
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

their homes in Bosnia. Further, if Croatia does threaten to cut all ties with 

Bosnian Croats, a significant number of them may react by choosing to 

revoke their Bosnian citizenship, retain their Croatian citizenship, and 

move to Croatia, instead of opting to effectively join Bosnia’s institutions 

and become part of Bosnia.6

 About 77 percent of Bosnian Croats want to 

join Croatia or become an independent state rather than remain part of 

Bosnia, according to late 1999 polling data from the U.S. Information 

Agency.

6

According to the High Representative, Bosnian Croats, who currently can hold dual 

citizenship in Croatia and Bosnia, must select one country for citizenship by 2003. 
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Prospects for Change in Serbia

Excerpts from reward poster for Slobodan Milosevic

Source: State Department.

If the Serbian opposition did defeat

Milosevic, it is not clear to what extent it

will improve regional security.

U.S. officials call Milosevic the single

most destablizing influence in the region.

The Serbian opposition’s inability to unite

may prevent them from unseating

Milosevic.
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

According to senior U.S. and NATO officials, Slobodan Milosevic is the 

single most destabilizing influence in the Balkans. These officials believe 

that Serbia cannot democratize or integrate with the rest of Europe until 

Milosevic is removed from power. Further, according to a U.S. official, the 

people of Kosovo will not settle for anything short of independence, 

including autonomy, while Milosevic retains his power in Yugoslavia. Many 

western officials believe that whoever replaces Milosevic would be easier 

to negotiate with, less inclined to engage in armed conflict, and less likely 

to destabilize the region. 

It is unclear whether international efforts to replace Milosevic with the 

Serb opposition would succeed, as the opposition remains disunited. 

According to DOD officials, it is not a forgone conclusion that the 

opposition will replace Milosevic, as current members of Milosevic’s 

regime may stay in power in his absence. Western observers have noted 

from recent polling data that Serb opposition parties could defeat Milosevic 

in a democratic election, if they are able to unite on a single platform. The 

opposition parties, however, remain unable to unite and capitalize on 

popular dissent after the NATO bombing campaign, thus far only unifying in 

a call for early elections. According to statements by the U.S. Secretary of 

State, the election of democratic opposition parties in Croatia will help this 

situation by showing Serb opposition parties that they can win if united. 

Further, if the efforts to remove Milosevic from power and replace him 

with the Serbian opposition were to succeed, it is unclear to what extent 

the change would improve regional security. While a senior U.S. official 

stated that Milosevic’s removal would result in Kosovar Albanians agreeing 

to remain in Yugoslavia, political leaders and people in the region told us 

that a change in Yugoslavia’s leadership from Milosevic to the opposition 

would have no impact on the security or political situation in Kosovo. They 

and western observers in Kosovo explained that Serb opposition leaders 

strongly support continued Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo and would 

not agree to Kosovo’s independence, the primary political demand of 

Kosovar Albanians during and after the war. Further, according to recent 

public statements, Serb opposition leaders have close links to Bosnian Serb 

political leaders who, while many of them are anti-Milosevic, are 

nationalists who retain the goal of maintaining “Serb unity” and a Serbian 

state separate from Bosnia.
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

In Serbia, low-level violence has occurred regularly since late 1999 in the 

form of attacks against the republic’s police in southern Serbia−a 

predominately ethnic Albanian area outside of Kosovo but near Kosovo’s 

boundary−by ethnic Albanian insurgents who believe Kosovo’s territory 

includes this area. In early March 2000, a U.N. official reported that 5,000-

6,000 ethnic Albanians had fled southern Serbia since June 1999. Many of

Prospects for Violence Over the Next 5 Years in Serbia,

Kosovo, and Bosnia

Ethnic Albanian attacks against

Yugoslav forces are destabilizing

southern Serbia.

KFOR soldiers collecting illegal weapons in Kosovo

Source: KFOR.

Violence in Kosovo may escalate

due to unresolved political issues

 and attacks in southern Serbia.

Sporadic violence in Bosnia may

escalate as people attempt to 

return home across ethnic lines.
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

these people had reported an increase in Yugoslav forces in that area, 

stating that the security situation for ethnic Albanians there had 

deteriorated to such an extent that life had become intolerable. The U.N. 

official added that his agency is concerned that if the conflict between the 

ethnic Albanian extremist groups and Serbia’s police is allowed to 

continue, there may be larger refugee flows from southern Serbia.7

Current low-level violence in Kosovo and Bosnia is likely to continue and 

may escalate given the slow pace of political and social reconciliation in 

both locations. As long as KFOR maintains a credible deterrent presence, 

the likelihood of renewed armed conflict is low; however, low-level 

violence will likely continue and may escalate due to the unresolved 

political status of Kosovo, competition for power among ethnic Albanian 

political parties, and an absence of reconciliation among the province’s 

ethnic groups. Further, the previously discussed violence in southern 

Serbia may also destabilize the security situation in Kosovo. The 

Commander of KFOR stated on March 10, 2000, that the situation in 

southeastern Serbia constitutes a threat to the peace and security of 

Kosovo and could develop into a regional security issue. He also stated that 

KFOR is prepared to take all action necessary to ensure Kosovo is not used 

as a staging base by either ethnic Albanians or Serbs wishing to “export 

violence” into southeastern Serbia. 

According to U.S. and NATO officials, as long as SFOR remains, the force 

will continue to prevent an outbreak of war among the three militaries in 

Bosnia. However, as SFOR draws down, there will still be a requirement to 

maintain a presence significant enough to deter violence associated with 

people returning home across ethnic lines or against international civilian 

organizations operating in Bosnia. These types of violent incidents, 

according to a U.N. official, will likely increase as more people return to 

areas with few or no minority returns and as the international community 

attempts to implement other civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement. DOD 

officials told us that SFOR, as part of its transition strategy, will look more 

to the local police forces in Bosnia to provide security for these situations. 

According to the 1999 State Department Human Rights report, local police 

in Bosnia−which are still largely organized along ethnic lines−continue to 

use excessive force, or do not ensure security, to discourage minority 

resettlement in majority areas. 

7

The United Nations has estimated that 60,000-70,000 ethnic Albanians live in southern 

Serbia near its border with Kosovo. (See app.1.)
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The security situation in Montenegro has become more volatile over the 

past year due to the controversy within the republic over its discreet moves 

toward greater autonomy or independence and the Yugoslav leadership’s 

aggressive action against the republic. The ruling coalition government of 

Montenegro−which consists of people who support either greater 

autonomy or independence−controls the republic’s 20,000-strong police 

force. The anti-independence movement is led by the former President of 

Montenegro (now the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia) and is supported by 

Milosevic, who controls the 14,000 Yugoslav army troops and 1,000 federalProspects for Armed Conflict Over the Next 5 Years in

Montenegro and Macedonia

?

Armed conflict could develop in Montenegro or Macedonia if

unresolved political issues are not addressed.

Serbia and Montenegro

Source: U.S. European Command.

Macedonia

Source: U.S. European Command.
Briefing Section III

Projected Security Situation in the Balkans

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

level police in Montenegro and has used them and other federal institutions 

to intimidate the republic’s coalition government. According to late 1999 

polling data from the U.S. Information Agency, about 30 percent of 

Montenegro’s population support independence, 36 percent greater 

autonomy for the republic within Yugoslavia, and 27 percent the status quo. 

The likelihood and extent of armed conflict in Montenegro depend on a 

number of complex factors, such as how far the President of Montenegro is 

willing to push Milosevic to gain greater autonomy, whether Milosevic 

would intervene in Montenegro short of a referendum on independence, 

and whether the current governing coalition of Montenegro would stay 

together if a referendum on independence is not held this spring. Western 

observers in Montenegro hold differing views on whether developments in 

Montenegro would lead to armed conflict. Some believe that the past close 

relationship between the President of Montenegro and Milosevic would 

encourage them to reach an understanding before violence occurs, while 

others believe that the moves toward greater autonomy or independence 

will lead to possibly armed conflict.

While ethnic Macedonians and Albanians are currently working together in 

the ruling government coalition, several western observers told us that 

interethnic tensions between these two groups could ultimately result in 

armed conflict. Structures are in place on both sides that could serve as the 

basis for future ethnically based militaries. Specifically, Macedonia’s 

military and internal security forces are predominantly ethnic Macedonian, 

and armed, radical Albanian groups are operating in Macedonia. 

These observers offered a range of views about how soon and under what 

scenario armed conflict may occur in Macedonia. Armed conflict could 

develop (1) if ethnic Albanian parties pulled out of the coalition 

government due to a lack of progress in resolving political issues; 

according to a western observer, it would most likely occur sometime over 

the next year; or (2) if radical Albanian groups began to violently target 

Macedonian institutions, leading Macedonia’s police to crack down on 

ethnic Albanians. A western observer in Macedonia is most concerned with 

this second threat in the near term, stating that these radical groups have 

been emboldened by what the Kosovo Liberation Army was able to 

accomplish. Either of these scenarios could lead to a spiral of violent 

incidents and ultimately armed conflict among the country’s two major 

ethnic groups, similar to the violence that occurred in Kosovo. Other 

observers told us that ethnic tensions in Macedonia could result in violence 

between the two communities in 10 to 20 years.
Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Briefing Section IV

Factors That Led to the Withdrawal of 

Yugoslav Security Forces From Kosovo BrenifgSecotinIV

• February 1998: Large-scale conflict began in Kosovo, largely 

characterized by ethnic Albanian attacks against Yugoslav security 

forces followed by excessive, indiscriminate, and disproportionate 

military responses of those forces against ethnic Albanian insurgents 

and the civilian population. 

• October 1998: Under threat of NATO airstrikes, Milosevic agreed to 

allow unarmed international monitors and a NATO air verification 

mission to verify Yugoslav compliance with cease-fire and force 

reduction agreements. About this time, the Kosovo Liberation Army 

Events Leading Up to and During the NATO Bombing

Campaign

1998 1999

March 24, 1999

NATO bombing 

begins

War in Kosovo begins

October cease-fire

agreement

Massacre of 45

Kosovar Albanians

in Racak, Kosovo

NATO expands targets

President indicates

policy change on

ground troops

Milosevic accepts

Russian/European Union

peace plan

June 3, 1999

Result of NATO bomb on post office used by Yugoslav forces in Pristina, Kosovo

Source: GAO.
Briefing Section IV

Factors That Led to the Withdrawal of 

Yugoslav Security Forces From Kosovo

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

agreed to exercise self-restraint. In late 1998 and early 1999, there was a 

continuous deterioration of the security situation as both sides violated 

their agreements.

• January 15, 1999: The retaliatory massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians by 

Yugoslav security forces at Racak led the international community to 

renew efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict. This occurred 1 week 

after the Kosovo Liberation Army ambushed a Yugoslav police patrol 

and reportedly killed three officers, an act called a terrorist attack and 

serious breach of the cease-fire by international monitors.

• February 1999: NATO and the United States agreed to deploy troops to 

Kosovo in a “permissive environment”—one where all parties to the 

conflict agree to the presence and mission of NATO-led forces. The first 

round of peace talks in France ended with neither party signing the 

proposed interim agreement.

• March 19-23, 1999: Peace talks broke down after Kosovar Albanian 

leaders signed the proposed agreement but Yugoslav officials did not. 

After the international monitors withdrew from Kosovo, Yugoslav forces 

began a massive offensive. U.S. negotiators failed in their attempts to 

secure a last-minute settlement with Milosevic.

• March 24, 1999: In announcing the NATO airstrikes, the President said 

he did not intend to put U.S. troops in Kosovo to fight a war.

• April-May 1999: NATO escalated the bombing to include strategic targets 

throughout Yugoslavia. NATO deployed ground troops to Macedonia 

and Albania for humanitarian and possible war fighting missions.

• May 6, 1999: The West and Russia agreed to a basic strategy and terms 

for a possible peace settlement.

• May 18, 1999: In responding to a question about the possible use of 

ground troops to end the Kosovo conflict, the U.S. President stated that 

no military option had been ruled out.

• May 25, 1999: NATO endorsed an operational plan for a NATO-led peace 

enforcement mission in Kosovo and later approved a force level of 

about 50,000 troops for the mission.

• May 27, 1999: Milosevic and four senior officials from the governments 

of Yugoslavia and Serbia were indicted for war crimes in Kosovo by the 

international war crimes tribunal.

• June 2, 1999: The President committed 7,000 U.S. troops to the proposed 

NATO-led mission, reiterating that no military option had been ruled out.

• June 3, 1999: Milosevic agreed to a settlement brought by Russian and 

European Union envoys. NATO suspended the air campaign on June 10 

after some Yugoslav withdrawals, and officially ended it 10 days later.
Briefing Section IV

Factors That Led to the Withdrawal of 

Yugoslav Security Forces From Kosovo

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Factors in the Decision to Withdraw Yugoslav Security

Forces From Kosovo

• Fear that a NATO ground invasion would

lead to Yugoslavia losing Kosovo

• Timely offer presented by Russia;

interpreted by Yugoslav officials as allowing

Yugoslavia to keep Kosovo on paper

• Impact of NATO air campaign on Serbia’s

infrastructure

• Fear that a NATO ground invasion would

lead to Yugoslavia losing Kosovo

• Timely offer presented by Russia;

interpreted by Yugoslav officials as allowing

Yugoslavia to keep Kosovo on paper

• Impact of NATO air campaign on Serbia’s

infrastructure

Other

views

Other

views

View of

Yugoslav

official

View of

Yugoslav

official

• Fear of ground invasion

• Russia’s diplomatic efforts and loss of

support from Russia

• Impact of NATO’s strategic air campaign

• NATO cohesion and ability to take all action

necessary

• Indictment of Milosevic for war crimes

• Loss of support within Serbia for the war

• Fear of ground invasion

• Russia’s diplomatic efforts and loss of

support from Russia

• Impact of NATO’s strategic air campaign

• NATO cohesion and ability to take all action

necessary

• Indictment of Milosevic for war crimes

• Loss of support within Serbia for the war

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.
Briefing Section IV

Factors That Led to the Withdrawal of 

Yugoslav Security Forces From Kosovo

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Senior U.S., U.N., and NATO officials, as well as a senior Yugoslav civilian 

official in Kosovo, offered a number of views on the decisive factors in 

Milosevic’s decision to withdraw Yugoslav security forces from the 

province. According to the senior Yugoslav official, the fear of a NATO 

ground invasion, combined with the timely offer from Russia’s envoy, was 

the primary factor in the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the province. 

According to this official, the Yugoslav leadership believed that NATO 

would invade Kosovo if the air campaign alone could not defeat Yugoslav 

forces and feared that an invasion would result in Yugoslavia losing Kosovo 

completely. This official said that the Yugoslav leadership saw the offer of 

Russia’s envoy as the best possible option, deciding that it was better to 

withdraw than be conquered, if NATO honored the proposed agreement. 

Senior U.S., U.N., and NATO officials also noted the significance of 

Milosevic’s fear of a ground invasion and the positive role played by 

Russia’s diplomatic efforts, particularly because of their impact in 

convincing Milosevic that Russia no longer supported his war. These 

officials also cited the following factors as key to the decision to withdraw 

Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. 

• The impact of NATO’s air campaign. According to U.S. and NATO 

officials, NATO’s air campaign against strategic, military-industrial, and 

national command-and-control targets in Yugoslavia was a significant 

factor in the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. Some 

of these officials said that this air campaign had an economic impact on 

Yugoslavia’s leadership because it hurt the ability of Milosevic and his 

associates to make money. 

• NATO’s continued cohesion and ability to take the military action 

necessary. Senior NATO and U.S. officials stated that Milosevic thought 

that the alliance would fall apart after collateral damage began to occur, 

and he was no longer willing to sustain the bombing once he felt NATO 

would remain cohesive. Also, NATO and U.S. officials believed that 

Milosevic was affected by the fact that NATO leaders showed resolve to 

use all force necessary to prevail.

• The indictment of Milosevic. NATO and U.S. officials also told us that 

this indictment was to a lesser extent a factor in Milosevic’s decision to 

withdraw his forces. 

• Loss of support for the war within Serbia. A U.N. official stated that 

he believed Milosevic withdrew his forces because he had lost support 

from his inner circle. Similarly, U.S. officials noted that unrest within 

Serbia helped put pressure on Milosevic to end the war.
Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans BerinfgSecotinV

The executive branch has described U.S. interests in the Balkans in a 

number of ways. The National Security Strategy1

−the most authoritative 

statement on the President’s definition of U.S. interests and military 

commitments worldwide—lays out three categories of national interests: 

vital, important, and humanitarian. The strategy directly links U.S. interests 

Executive Branch Descriptions of U.S. Interests in the

Balkans

Vital Vital

Important Important

European continent

NATO emblem

Balkans and southeastern Europe

1

A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 

Dec. 1999).
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

in the Balkans to two of these three types of interests, stating that the 

decision to use military force is dictated first and foremost by the definition 

of U.S. national interests. 

• European stability is described in the strategy as a “vital” U.S. interest. 

Vital interests are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, 

and vitality of the United States, for example, the physical security of 

territory belonging to the United States and U.S. allies. According to the 

strategy, the United States will do what it must to defend these interests, 

using military force decisively and, if necessary, unilaterally. The U.S. 

commitment to European security includes U.S. leadership in NATO and 

the forward presence of 100,000 military personnel in Europe.

• NATO operations to end the conflicts and restore peace in Bosnia and 

Kosovo are presented as “important” U.S. interests, rather than as vital 

interests. According to the strategy, important interests do not affect the 

survival of the United States but do affect national well-being and the 

character of the world in which Americans live. In cases where 

important U.S. interests are at stake, the strategy states that the use of 

military forces should be selective and limited.2

The National Security Strategy indicates that United States has a 

continuing interest in “peace in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe” 3

 but 

does not directly link vital or important interests in the region to when, 

how, or for how long U.S. military forces would be employed there. The 

strategy states that continued instability in the region threatens European 

security, an area that it had previously defined as a vital U.S. interest. In 

commenting on our report, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 

reiterated that the National Security Strategy reads, “’The United States has 

an abiding interest in peace in this region because continued instability 

there threatens European security.’ The identified interest here is clearly 

instability threatening European security − a vital interest in and of itself.”

2

Although the executive branch initially said that the U.S. military mission in Bosnia would 

be limited to 1 year, the Bosnia and Kosovo operations now have missions of indefinite 

duration. 

3

The strategy defines the “Balkans and Southeastern Europe” as Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 

Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo), and Slovenia. 
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The National Security Strategy does not directly link humanitarian interests 

to the Balkans region, although executive branch officials on many 

occasions have cited humanitarian interests there. The report cites the 

following as examples of humanitarian and other interests that may require 

a U.S. military response: (1) natural and manmade disasters; (2) promoting 

human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; and (3) 

supporting democratization, adherence to the rule of law, and civilian 

control of the military. According to the strategy, the military is generally 

not the best tool for addressing humanitarian concerns, but under certain 

conditions it may be appropriate to use U.S. military forces for these 

purposes. The strategy states that such efforts by the United States will be 

limited in duration.
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Considerations for Continuing Operations in the

Balkans

• What are the costs and risks of operations?

• What is the likelihood that operations will

accomplish their objective?

Have objectives been 

clearly defined?

Will the international community 

 provide the required resources?

What is the appropriate

 U.S. contribution relative to 

that of U.S. allies? 
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

According to the National Security Strategy, U.S. military forces should be 

used when important interests are at stake only if, among other things, the 

costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the 

importance of U.S. interests, and they are likely to accomplish their 

objectives. In making a determination on these matters, key issues to 

consider include (1) the appropriate level of the U.S. military contribution 

relative to that of other NATO countries, (2) whether strategic and 

operational objectives for operations in the region have been clearly 

defined, and (3) whether the international community is willing and able to 

provide the necessary military and civilian resources for the operations. 

The following three slides contain information on estimated U.S. costs for 

operations in the Balkans from fiscal years 1992 through 2000 and the 

relative contributions of the United States and other NATO allies to NATO 

air and ground operations in the Balkans. 
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

a

Includes the U.S. Agency for International Development; the U.S. Information Agency; and the 

Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce Justice, and the Treasury.

b

DOD’s incremental costs include the costs of operations in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. 

c

In fiscal years 1996 and 1997, U.S. civilian cost estimates were available only for Bosnia and Albania. 

We used 1998 cost data for the remaining countries—about $100 million−to estimate civilian costs 

during fiscal years 1996 and 1997.

Estimated U.S. Costs for Military and Civilian Operations

in the Balkans, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 2000

-

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

Fiscal Years

Annual civilian costs $166 $315 $712 $390 $705 $644 $538 $1,059 $931 

Annual DOD costs 6 139 292 347 2,520 2,283 1,963 4,538 3,628

Annual total $172 $454 $1,004 $737 $3,225 $2,927 $2,501 $5,597 $4,559 

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Total estimated costs = $21,176 Dollars in millions

a

b

c c
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

According to executive branch data, as of March 29, 2000, the United States 

will have provided about $21.2 billion to support efforts to stabilize the 

Balkans from fiscal years 1992 through 2000: about $15.7 billion in DOD 

incremental costs4

 for military-related operations, and about $5.5 billion for 

activities of civilian agencies. U.S. costs increased significantly in 1995 and 

again in 1999, when the United States first deployed military forces to 

Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. By the end of fiscal year 2000, the United 

States will have spent an estimated $18.2 billion in these two locations, or 

about 86 percent of its total estimated costs. Furthermore, almost half−

about 48 percent−of the estimated U.S. costs in the Balkans from fiscal year 

1992 through 2000 will have been incurred in the last 2 years of this period. 

Appendix VI provides more information on U.S. costs for operations in the 

Balkans.

4

As used in this report, “incremental costs” are those costs that would not have been 

incurred if it were not for the operation. It should be recognized that DOD’s financial 

systems cannot reliably determine costs and only the total obligations are captured by 

DOD’s accounting systems. The services use various management information systems to 

identify incremental obligations and to estimate costs. Although we use the term “costs” in 

this report, in the case of DOD, we are actually referring to DOD’s obligation of funds. 
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Note 1: DOD and NATO define a “sortie” as an operational flight by one aircraft.

Note 2: DOD and NATO define a “strike” as an attack intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy 

an objective. 

Note 3: “Support sorties” consist of both combat and noncombat missions. They include intelligence 

and reconnaissance, combat air patrols to protect strike missions, combat search and rescue, and 

aerial refueling.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

U.S. and Non-U.S. Participation in Operation Allied

Force, 1999

Other 

NATO

31%

U.S.

69%

Military aircraft deployed

Total: 1,058 Other 

NATO

38%

U.S.

62%

Total number of sorties

Total: 37,200

Other 

NATO

47% U.S.

53%

Total number of strike

sorties

Total: 9,500

Legend

 U.S. Other NATO
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

At the height of Operation Allied Force, the 79-day NATO air campaign 

against Serbia and Montenegro, the air forces of the allied countries had 

about 1,058 aircraft deployed for the operation. The United States provided 

731 aircraft, or 69 percent of the total. The United States also conducted 

over 23,200 of all sorties, or 62 percent of the total, and 5,035 strike sorties, 

or 53 percent. 
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Note: SFOR and KFOR personnel numbers are as of January 2000.

Sources: GAO analysis of SFOR and KFOR data.

As of January 2000, NATO members had contributed about 60,150 troops, 

or 86 percent of both forces, to the two NATO-led forces in the Balkans. 

The remaining 9,850 troops were provided by 21 non-NATO countries, 

including 4,800 from Russia. 

Current and Possible Relative Contributions of U.S. and

European Forces to Balkans Peace Operations

Other 

NATO

69%

NonNATO

16%

U.S. 15%

Non-NATO

 10.4%

Other NATO

66%

U.S. 23.6%

KFOR

Total - 45,700

SFOR

Total -- 24,300

No official link exists between recently proposed European military force

and any changes in the relative contributions of U.S. and non-U.S. forces.

U.S. force protection requirements impact force levels.
Briefing Section V

Selected Issues Related to U.S. and 

International Operations in the Balkans

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The United States—with about 12,800 troops in the two NATO-led forces−is 

the largest force provider to NATO-led operations in the Balkans. The next 

largest force provider, Italy, has contributed about 8,100 military personnel 

to these operations. The U.S. military currently provides about 15.4 percent 

and 23.6 percent of all military personnel in KFOR and SFOR, respectively, 

or 18 percent of the total military commitment to the Balkans. Americans 

hold the key NATO military positions that control the operation in Bosnia 

and, to a lesser extent, in Kosovo. While the SFOR commander is an 

American general officer, the KFOR commander is a European general 

officer. 

The U.S. military has instituted and follows the most stringent force 

protection measures among NATO allies, according to U.S. and European 

military officials, measures that have a significant impact on the number of 

troops needed for U.S. operations. For example, in Bosnia, the U.S. military 

employs up to 55 percent of its ground combat forces on “presence patrols” 

and 40 percent on duties associated with force protection.5

 In contrast, 

according to a senior U.K. defense official, the United Kingdom generally 

devotes 14 percent of its ground combat forces to force protection. This 

relatively small force protection requirement allows the United Kingdom to 

conduct operations with fewer troops on the ground.

In December 1999, member nations of the European Council of the 

European Union agreed that by 2003 they should be able to deploy and 

sustain a force of up to 50,000-60,000 troops. As currently envisioned, these 

forces should be capable of a full range of military missions and tasks, 

including the most demanding, and should also be able to deploy within

60 days and be sustained for at least 1 year. However, there has been no 

official link between the development of this European military force and 

European agreement to the eventual withdrawal of U.S. military forces 

from the Balkans once the European force is established. Over the past 

2 years, U.S. and European military and civilian officials have told us that if 

the United States were to withdraw its military personnel from Bosnia, 

European countries would follow and withdraw their troops.

5

According to a senior SFOR officer, these percentages reflect tactical situations that dictate 

heightened force protection measures; the general situation for U.S. troops in Bosnia 

requires a significantly lower percentage of the force to be dedicated to force protection. 

Further, the U.S. military is reducing the number of soldiers dedicated to guarding base 

camps by installing electronic surveillance and monitoring devices to provide early warning. 
Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix I

Distribution of Ethnic Albanians in the 

Former Yugoslavia ApendxiI

This appendix contains a map showing the distribution of ethnic Albanians 

in the former Yugoslavia, as of February 1999 (see fig. 2). We note that the 

distribution of ethnic groups in Kosovo has changed significantly since 

then. Many areas of the province have become almost all ethnic Albanian 

due to the displacement of non-Albanians within and from the province 

since the end of the NATO airstrikes. Updated population figures, however, 

were not available for this report.
Appendix I

Distribution of Ethnic Albanians in the 

Former Yugoslavia

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 2: Distribution of Ethnic Albanians in the Former Yugoslavia, as of February 1999

Source: Central Intelligence Agency.

Unclassified

Serbia

Montenegro

Serbia and Montenegro have

asserted the formation of a joint

independent state, but this entity

has not been formally recognized

as a state by the United States.

Cro.

Italy

GR

Albanian

majority

Albanian

minority

100%

90

75

50

25

10

5

0

0

50 Kilometers

50 Miles

•

Skopje

• Urosevac

Gnjilane

 • 

•

Debar

•

Tetovo

•

Pec

Kosovska

Mitrovica

 •

Kosovo

•

 Dakovica

• Prizren

• Pristina

Tirana

Podgorica

•

Sarajevo

Malisevo

•

Adriatic

Sea

Lake

Orhid

Lake

Prespa

ALBANIA

BOSNIA

AND

HERZEGOVINA

GREECE

MACEDONIA

BULGARIA
Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix II

Bosnia Peace Operation ApendxiI

This appendix provides information on the organization of civilian and 

military efforts in the Bosnia peace operation. Figure 3 is a map of Bosnia 

detailing (1) ethnic distribution; (2) the “interentity boundary line” that 

divides the country’s two entities−the Federation and the Republika 

Srpksa; (3) the location and division of the three military sectors of the 

Stabilization Force (SFOR); and (4) the Brcko district.1

 Figure 4 shows the 

organization of military and civilian operations in Bosnia. Figure 5 shows 

the SFOR organization as of January 2000. 

1

Because the warring parties were unable to agree on which of Bosnia’s ethnic groups would control 

the strategically important area in and around the city of Brcko, the Dayton Agreement instead called 

for an arbitration tribunal to decide this issue. On February 14, 1997, the tribunal called for the 

international community to designate a supervisor under the auspices of the Office of the High 

Representative, who would establish an interim supervisory administration for the Brcko area. In the 

final arbitration award of March 5, 1999, the tribunal determined that the international supervisory 

regime must continue in force indefinitely in the Brcko area and gave the supervisor responsibility for 

scheduling and implementing the establishment of a new “Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 

The district was established on March 8, 2000.
Appendix II

Bosnia Peace Operation

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 3: Map of Bosnia

Drvar

Pale

Mostar

Banja Luka

Bihac

Doboj

Belgrade

Srebrenica

CROATIA

CROATIA

Serbia

MND

(UK Sector)

(SW)

MND

(French Sector)

(SE)

Ploce

Neum

MND (SW)

MND (N)

MND (SE)

= Multinational Division (Southwest)

= Multinational Division (North)

= Multinational Division (Southeast)

Montenegro

Bosniak control

Brcko supervisory district

Federation Bosnian Croat

control

Bosnian Serb control - Republika Srpska

Interentity boundary line

NATO military sectors

Gorazde

Split

MND (N) Tuzla

(US Sector)

BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA

Brcko

Sarajevo
Appendix II

Bosnia Peace Operation

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 4: Organization of Military and Civilian Operations in Bosnia

Legend

CIMIC = Civil Military Cooperation

EBRD = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IMF = International Monetary Fund

IPTF = International Police Task Force

NAC = North Atlantic Council

OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PIC = Peace Implementation Council

SHAPE = Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

UNMIBH = United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

UNHCR = United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

Note: Coordination in Bosnia occurs at all levels of among these organizations.

Bilateral

donors

Bilateral

donors

World Bank

European Union

IMF EBRD

World Bank

European Union

IMF EBRD

United

Nations

United

Nations PIC Steering

Board

PIC Steering

OSCE Board

NATO OSCE

NAC

NATO

NAC

SHAPE SHAPE

UNHCR UNHCR Economic

reconstruction

projects

Economic

reconstruction

projects

SFOR SFOR

Ground

operations

Ground

operations

Air

operations

Air

operations

Naval

operations

Naval

operations

CIMIC CIMIC

OSCE

mission

OSCE

mission

Elections Elections

Human rights Human rights

Democracy

building

Democracy

building

Arms control Arms control

High

Representative

High

Representative

Reconstruction and

Return Task Force

Reconstruction and

Return Task Force

Other working

groups

Other working

groups

Brcko Supervisor Brcko Supervisor

UNMIBH UNMIBH

IPTF IPTF

Civil affairs Civil affairs

 Authority Coordination Outside Bosnia Inside Bosnia
Appendix II

Bosnia Peace Operation

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 5: SFOR Organization

Legend

AIRSOUTH = Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe

COMSFOR = Commander, Stabilization Force

NAVSOUTH = Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe

SACEUR= Supreme Allied Commander Europe

STRIKEFORSOUTH = Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe

Note: The Aviation Task Force is a dual function unit that provides SFOR operational reserve for all of 

Bosnia and sector support for the U.S.-led Multinational Division (North).

 Operational control Direct support by elements of NATO’s Allied Forces, Southern Europe

 Outside Bosnia Inside Bosnia

SACEUR SACEUR

Multinational Division (North)

Lead nation: United States

Multinational Division (North)

Lead nation: United States Multinational Division (Southwest)

Lead nation: United Kingdom

Multinational Division (Southwest)

Lead nation: United Kingdom Multinational Division (Southeast)

Lead nation: France

Multinational Division (Southeast)

Lead nation: France

Support 

Command

Support 

Aviation Task Command

Force

Aviation Task

STRIKEFORSOUTH Force

STRIKEFORSOUTH NAVSOUTH NAVSOUTH AIRSOUTH AIRSOUTH

COMSFOR COMSFOR

Multinational

Specialized

Unit

Multinational

Specialized

Unit

Balkans Strategic

Reserve Force

Balkans Strategic

Reserve Force
Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix III

Kosovo Peace Operation ApendxiI

This appendix provides information on the organization of civilian and 

military efforts in the Kosovo peace operation. Figure 6 is a map of Kosovo 

detailing the location and division of the five military sectors of the Kosovo 

Force/International Security Force (KFOR). Figure 7 shows the 

organization of military and civilian operations in Kosovo. Figure 8 shows 

the KFOR organization as of January 2000. 
Appendix III

Kosovo Peace Operation

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 6: KFOR Brigade Sectors in Kosovo

MNB North

(France)

MNB East

(U.S.)

MNB Central

(U.K.)

MNB West

(Italy)

MNB South

(Germany)

Kosovo

(Province)

Prizren

Gnjilane

Kosovska

Mitrovica

Skopje

Pristina Pec

Montenegro

Serbia

ALBANIA

MACEDONIA Provincial boundary of Kosovo

NATO military sector

MNB = Multinational Brigade
Appendix III

Kosovo Peace Operation

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 7: Organization of Military and Civilian Operations in Kosovo

Legend

EU = European Union

NAC = North Atlantic Council 

OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

SHAPE = Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

UNMIK = United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 

UNHCR = United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Note: Coordination in Kosovo occurs at all levels among these organizations. 

European

Union

World Bank

European

Union

World Bank

United

Nations

United

Nations OSCE NATO OSCE

NAC

NATO

NAC

SHAPE SHAPE

 Authority Coordination Outside Kosovo Inside Kosovo

Ground

operations

Ground

operations

KFOR KFOR

Air

operations

Air

operations

Naval

operations

Naval

operations

Interim Civil

Administration

(United Nations)

Interim Civil

Administration

(United Nations)

International

Civilian Police

Force

International

Civilian Police

Force

Public

administration

Public

administration

Judicial system Judicial system

Humanitarian

Affairs

(UNHCR)

Humanitarian

Affairs

(UNHCR)

Winterization Winterization

U.N. Mine Action

Coordination

Center

U.N. Mine Action

Coordination

Center

Elections Elections

Human rights Human rights

Media Media

Democracy

building

Democracy

building

Kosovo Police

Service training

Kosovo Police

Service training

Institution

Building

(OSCE)

Institution

Building

(OSCE)

Reconstruction

(EU)

Reconstruction

(EU)

Shelter Shelter

Infrastructure Infrastructure

Agriculture Agriculture

Economic and

social

development

Economic and

social

development

UNMIK UNMIK
Appendix III

Kosovo Peace Operation

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Figure 8: KFOR Organization, as of January 2000

Legend

AIRSOUTH = Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe

COMKFOR = Commander Kosovo Force/International Security Force

NAVSOUTH = Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe

SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander Europe

STRIKEFORSOUTH = Naval Stiriking and Support Forces, Southern Europe

SACEUR SACEUR

COMKFOR COMKFOR

Multinational Brigade (Center)

Lead nation: United Kingdom

Multinational Brigade (Center)

Lead nation: United Kingdom

Multinational Brigade (North)

Lead nation: France

Multinational Brigade (North)

Lead nation: France

Multinational Brigade (East)

Lead nation: United States

Multinational Brigade (East)

Lead nation: United States

Multinational Brigade (South)

Lead nation: Germany

Multinational Brigade (South)

Lead nation: Germany

Multinational Brigade (West)

Lead nation: Italy

Multinational Brigade (West)

Lead nation: Italy

NAVSOUTH NAVSOUTH AIRSOUTH AIRSOUTH STRIKEFORSOUTH STRIKEFORSOUTH

KFOR Support Rear

(Macedonia)

KFOR Support Rear

(Macedonia) Multinational

Specialized

Unit

Multinational

Specialized

Unit

KFOR Support

 Albania

KFOR Support

 Albania

Balkans Strategic 

Reserve Force

Balkans Strategic 

Reserve Force

KFOR Support

Macedonia/Greece

KFOR Support

Macedonia/Greece

 Operational control Direct support by elements of NATO’s Allied Forces, Southern Europe

 Outside Kosovo Inside Kosovo
Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix IV

International Civilian Activities in Albania, 

Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia (Excluding 

Kosovo), and Montenegro ApendxiIV

This appendix discusses the programs that the international community, 

including the United States, carries out to improve economic and political 

conditions in the Balkans region outside of Bosnia and Kosovo, specifically, 

in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro (see fig. 9). 

Figure 9: International Civilian Activities in Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro

Legend

OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

UNHCR = U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

Albania and Macedonia The activities of the international agencies in Albania and Macedonia 

include providing and/or assisting with democratization and institutionbuilding programs, economic restructuring, and the development and 

growth of the private sector. In addition, international agencies have 

provided humanitarian assistance for refugees, asylum seekers, and host 

families of refugees, to help Albania and Macedonia deal with the effects of 

the Kosovo crisis. The Kosovo crisis had a particularly overwhelming effect 

on both Albania and Macedonia. In Albania, one of the poorest countries in 

Europe, the crisis led to an influx of nearly 500,000 Kosovo refugees 

between March and June 1999. In Macedonia, the conflict led to nearly 

300,000 refugees entering the country, hindered access to markets, and 

Yugoslavia

Organization Albania Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia

United Nations

U.N. Development

Program

   

UNHCR    

Office of the High

Commissioner for

Human Rights

 

European Union    

OSCE   

World Bank  

United States    
Appendix IV

International Civilian Activities in Albania, 

Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia (Excluding 

Kosovo), and Montenegro

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

blocked the movement of imports and exports. Macedonia has been 

affected most severely by the cessation of economic relations with 

Yugoslavia, previously Macedonia’s largest trading partner and a conduit to 

other East, Central, and West European markets.

Croatia International organizations have aimed primarily at developing democratic 

institutions and practices in Croatia and assisting in the return of refugees 

and displaced persons to their pre-war homes. The international 

community has restricted economic assistance and development funding to 

Croatia until it fulfills its commitments under the Dayton Agreement and 

makes economic reforms.

The parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2000 have provided 

great promise for a renewed commitment to political and economic reform 

in Croatia. In response to the election results, the U.S. Department of State 

has submitted a supplemental funding request for $35.7 million to 

encourage positive political and economic change under the new 

government. The U.S. government is considering extending other benefits 

as well, depending on progress achieved in political reform.

Serbia and Montenegro Most international assistance to Serbia (excluding Kosovo) and 

Montenegro has been limited by trade and visa sanctions imposed by the 

United States and European Union in 1998 in response to the Yugoslav 

government’s actions in Kosovo. U.S. assistance programs, as well as those 

of the international community, are structured around achievement of two 

strategic objectives: democratization assistance aimed at increased, betterinformed citizen participation in political and economic decision-making; 

and humanitarian assistance to help Serbia and Montenegro deal with the 

effects of the Kosovo crisis. Activities related to these programs include 

encouraging the creation of participatory and effective civil society 

organizations, a more independent and responsive media, and legal 

systems that better support democratic processes and market reforms and 

providing assistance for refugees and internally displaced persons living in 

Montenegro and Serbia. While the United States does not have a formal 

presence in either Serbia or Montenegro, it does run a small assistance 

program for Serbia from U.S. offices in Budapest, Hungary, and for 

Montenegro from a U.S. office in Dubrovnik, Croatia.
Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix V

The Stability Pact ApendxiV

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe is a framework for identifying, 

discussing, and coordinating the developmental assistance needs of the 

countries of southeastern Europe and accelerating and deepening the 

integration of a reformed region into the Euro-Atlantic community(see fig. 

10). According to a senior U.S. official, the Stability Pact is a political 

commitment to a comprehensive, coordinated, and strategic approach to 

the region. Initiated by the European Union on June 10, 1999, the Stability 

Pact’s major participants include Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, 

Hungary, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Turkey, the United States, 

Canada, Japan, the European Union, and several multilateral organizations 

and lending institutions, including the United Nations, NATO, the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International 

Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. 

Figure 10: The Stability Pact

Legend

FRY = Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYR Macedonia = Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Organization Organization

Overview Overview

Working table I

 Democratization

 and human rights

Working table I

 Democratization

 and human rights

Working table III

Security

Working table III

Security

Working table II

Economic reconstruction,

development, and cooperation

Working table II

Economic reconstruction,

development, and cooperation

Southeastern Europe

Regional Table

Southeastern Europe

Regional Table

• The Stability Pact is the primary regional framework for

stabilizing the Balkans.

• It serves to help the international community identify,

discuss, and coordinate assistance to southeastern

Europe.

• International donors recently committed $2.3 billion to

Stability Pact projects.
Appendix V

The Stability Pact

Page 85 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The overall objectives of the Stability Pact are to 

• secure lasting peace, prosperity, and stability for southeastern Europe;

• foster effective regional cooperation and good-neighborly relations 

through strict observance of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 

1975;1

• create vibrant market economies based on sound macroeconomic 

policies; and

• integrate the countries of southeastern Europe fully into the European 

and Atlantic cooperation structures, primarily the European Union.

To achieve these objectives, a governing body has been established, known 

as the “Southeastern Europe Regional Table,” to oversee three working 

groups, called “working tables.” The working tables have established 

workplans that identify priorities as well as key initiatives and projects that 

they intend to address.

In late March 2000, international donors pledged more than $2.3 billion to 

Stability Pact projects aimed at developing infrastructure; promoting 

private sector development; supporting policy and institutional reforms; 

and encouraging democratization, reconciliation, and security. Included in 

this amount is $1.7 billion devoted to financing a comprehensive “Quick 

Start” package for regional projects and initiatives over the next 12 months. 

Despite this funding, the Stability Pact may be unable to meet the growing 

expectations of the countries in southeastern Europe. According to a 

senior Stability Pact official, many countries in the region expect the 

Stability Pact to provide a great deal of funding for an almost unlimited 

number of projects.

1

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, also referred to as the Helsinki Accords, is a nonbinding 

agreement that outlines a broad basis for peaceful relations in Europe. It includes 

provisions related to confidence building measures, commercial exchanges, and human 

rights. 
Page 86 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix VI

U.S. Military and Civilian Costs for Operations 

in the Balkans, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 

2000 ApendxiVI

This appendix contains detailed information on U.S. civilian and military 

costs in support of Balkans operations and other activities to stabilize the 

region from 1992 through the year 2000. Table 1 details the total 

Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agency spending in Bosnia and 

Kosovo. Table 2 delineates the total DOD and civilian agency spending in 

other areas of the Balkans. 

Table 1: Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, Fiscal Years 1992 Through 2000

a

DOD costs from 1992 to 1995 include support for humanitarian airdrops over Bosnia, operation of a 

hospital in Croatia, the airlift of food and supplies to Sarajevo, enforcing a no-fly zone over Bosnia, and 

airstrikes in Bosnia but do not include munitions expended in these operations. DOD costs from 1996 

to 1998 include over $40 million spent on U.S. participation in a U.N. peacekeeping operation in 

Macedonia. 

b

DOD’s cumulative incremental costs as of September 1999 include Operation Joint Forge and 

Operation Deliberate Forge.

c

Civilian costs from 1992 to 1995 include funding from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development, and the Departments of Transportation and Treasury for the former 

Yugoslavia as a whole and are not delineated by country (see table 2).

d

This figure represents the State Department’s cost estimate as of 1996. It includes costs for the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Departments of State, 

Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and the Treasury.

e

DOD’s cumulative incremental costs as of September 1999 include Operations Balkan Calm, Joint 

Guardian, Allied Force, Eagle Eye, and Sustain Hope.

f

Assistance in fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1997 is included in a U.S. Agency for International 

Development estimate of total assistance to the Balkans (see table 2).

g

Figure includes civilian agency costs for all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the bulk of which 

was dedicated to U.S. programs in Kosovo. 

Sources: State Department and DOD cost estimates.

Dollars in millions

Fiscal years

Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Bosnia

DODa $6 $139 $292 $347 $2,520 $2,283 $1,963 $1,538b $1,603 $10,691

Civilian agencies cc c c 560d 500d 301 295 211 1,867

Subtotal 6 139 292 347 3,080 2,783 2,264 1,833 1,814 12,558

Kosovo

DOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,000e 2,025 5,025

Civilian agencies cc c c f f 34g 256 302 592

Subtotal 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 3,256 2,327 5,617

Total $6 $139 $292 $347 $3080 $2,783 $2,298 $5,089 $4,141 $18,175
Appendix VI

U.S. Military and Civilian Costs for 

Operations in the Balkans, Fiscal Years 1992 

Through 2000

Page 87 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Table 2: Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in the Balkans, Except in Bosnia and Kosovo, Fiscal Years 1996 Through 2000

a

The total U.S. assistance to Albania for fiscal years 1992 to 1998 is $300 million and for fiscal year 

1998 alone is $31 million. To represent these costs over several years, we have estimated that the 

United States spent an average of $45 million each year for fiscal years 1992 through 1996 and $44 

million in fiscal year 1997.

b

DOD’s reported incremental costs for the operation of a hospital in Croatia in fiscal years 1992 to 1995 

are included in its Bosnia costs (see table 1).

c

Based on regional civilian costs in 1998 of $98 million, we estimated that the United States spent 

$100 million in regional assistance to the Balkans outside of Bosnia in 1996 and 1997.

d

DOD’s reported incremental costs for U.S. participation in a U.N. peacekeeping operation in 

Macedonia in fiscal years 1996-1998 are included in its Bosnia costs (see table 1). 

e

Civilian costs from 1992 to 1995 include funding from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development, and the Departments of Transportation and Treasury for the former 

Yugoslavia as a whole and are not delineated by country. 

f

Civilian agency costs for Montenegro and Serbia in 1998 are included under Kosovo in table 1.

Sources: State Department and DOD cost estimates.

Dollars in millions

Fiscal years

Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Albania $45a $45a $45a $45a $45a $44a $31 $82 $36 $418

Croatia bb b b c c 25 23 21 69

Macedoniad ee e e c c 49 82 36 167

Montenegro ee e e c c f 39 51 90

Serbia ee e e c c f 21 33 54

Regional civilian costs 121e 270e 667e 345e 100c 100c 98 261 241 2,203

Total $166 $315 $712 $390 $145 $144 $203 $508 $418 $3,001
Page 88 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix VII

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix VII

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 89 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated April 6, 2000.

GAO Comments 1. We have deleted the word “abiding” from the slide to ensure that it is 

not mistaken as a category of U.S. national interests. 

2. We have clarified the text by specifying the three categories of national 

interests to ensure that the term abiding is not included as a type or 

category of U.S. national interests. We also added DOD’s discussion of 

the U.S. abiding interest in the Balkans to the text of the report on 

page 61. 

3. We modified the narrative on page 62 to say that the National Security 

Strategy does not directly link humanitarian interests to the Balkans 

region, although executive branch officials on many occasions have 

cited humanitarian interests there. We also added to the text specific 

examples of humanitarian interests from the strategy.
Page 90 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR Balkans Security

Appendix VIII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contacts Harold J. Johnson, Jr. (202) 512-4128

Judith A. McCloskey (202) 512-4128

Acknowledgments In addition to those named, above E. Jeanette Espínola, M. Elizabeth 

Guran, B. Patrick Hickey, and Jody L. Woods also made key contributions 

to this report.

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