January 2014

The American Voting Experience:

Report and Recommendations 

of the 

Presidential Commission 

on Election Administration

Presidential Commission on Election Administration

Robert F. Bauer, Co-Chair

 

Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Co-Chair 

Brian Britton

Joe Echevarria

Trey Grayson

Larry Lomax

Michele Coleman Mayes

Ann McGeehan

Tammy Patrick

Christopher Thomas

Senior Research Director: Nathaniel Persily
the Presidential Commission

on Election Administration

January 2014

Dear Mr. President:

We are pleased to submit this Report and Recommendation called for in your Executive 

Order 13639, which established this Commission on Election Administration and defined its 

mission. 

Our examination spanned six months of public hearings and included consultations with 

state and local election officials, academic experts, and organizations and associations involved in one form or another with voting or election administration. In connection with 

testimony provided to the Commission, the Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project also 

conducted a comprehensive survey of the views of thousands of local election officials around 

the country. As a result, the Commission presents its unanimous recommendations, together 

with an array of best practices in election administration, which will significantly improve the 

American voter’s experience and promote confidence in the administration of U.S. elections. 

The Commission’s focus in this Report remained resolutely on the voter. We discovered, 

as officials, experts, and members of the public from across the country testified, that voters’ expectations are remarkably uniform and transcend differences of party and political 

perspective. The electorate seeks above all modern, efficient, and responsive administrative 

performance in the conduct of elections. As the Commission sets out in its Report, election 

administration must be viewed as a subject of sound public administration. Our best election administrators attend closely to the interests, needs, and concerns of all of our voters — 

in large and small jurisdictions, and in urban and rural communities — just as well-managed 

organizations in the private sector succeed by establishing and meeting high standards for 

“customer service.” 

This view of administration will not only reduce wait times where they occur, but also 

improve the quality of administration in many other ways, from the registration process 

through the selection and design of polling places, to improved access for particular communities of voters, such as those with disabilities or limited English proficiency, and overseas 

and military voters. The Commission has found that the problems encountered with election 

administration overlap and intersect, and improved management at one stage in the process 
will yield benefits at later stages. Improving the accuracy of registration rolls, for example, 

can expand access, reduce administrative costs, prevent fraud and irregularity, and reduce 

polling place congestion leading to long lines. 

Consistent with this approach, the Commission’s key recommendations call for:

•	 modernization of the registration process through continued expansion of online voter 

registration and expanded state collaboration in improving the accuracy of voter lists;

•	 measures to improve access to the polls through expansion of the period for voting before 

the traditional Election Day, and through the selection of suitable, well-equipped polling 

place facilities, such as schools;

•	 state-of-the-art techniques to assure efficient management of polling places, including 

tools the Commission is publicizing and recommending for the efficient allocation of 

polling place resources; and, 

•	 reforms of the standard-setting and certification process for new voting technology to 

address soon-to-be antiquated voting machines and to encourage innovation and the 

adoption of widely available off-the-shelf technologies. 

The Commission is grateful for the opportunity to present this Report and Recommendations on issues central to the quality of voter participation and confidence in our democratic 

process.

 Respectfully submitted,

 Robert F. Bauer, Co-Chair

 Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Co-Chair

 Brian Britton

 Joe Echevarria

 Trey Grayson

 Larry Lomax

 Michele Coleman Mayes

 Ann McGeehan

 Tammy Patrick

 Christopher Thomas
i

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Key Recommendations

 Voter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

 Access to the Polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

 Polling Place Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

 Voting Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I. Definition of the Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. Setting the Stage: Background for the Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

A. Variation in Administration: “Does One Size Fit All?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The diversity and decentralization of the U.S. election system 

cautions against nationwide rules, but all jurisdictions face 

some common challenges in registering voters, casting 

ballots, and counting votes.

B. The Issue of Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Election needs are often the last to receive attention from 

state and local budgetary authorities, well behind public 

safety, education, and transportation. 

C. The Technology Challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A large share of the nation’s voting machines are now almost 

a decade old and starting to break down. With no federal 

appropriations on the horizon, election authorities are on 

their own to do more with less. 

D. Addressing Long Lines—and the Standard for Judging What Is “Long”. . . . 13

No citizen should have to wait more than 30 minutes 

to vote; jurisdictions can solve the problem of long lines 

Table of Contents and 

Summary of Recommendations
ii

through a combination of planning, including use of the 

tools noted in this Report, and the efficient allocation of 

resources.

E. Disproportionate Impacts and Enforcement of Existing Federal Law . . . . . . 15

Compliance with numerous existing laws continues to be 

inconsistent or inadequate, and enforcement must be 

strengthened. 

•	 UOCAVA and the MOVE Act for military and 

overseas voters

•	 Sections 203 and 208 of the Voting Rights Act for 

voters with limited English proficiency

•	 Americans with Disability Act and Help America 

Vote Act for voters with disabilities

•	 The National Voter Registration Act for voters 

who register with a Department of Motor 

Vehicles or other covered agency

F. Professionalism in Election Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Because the selection of election officials on a partisan basis 

can risk public confidence in the quality and impartiality 

of administration, the responsible department or agency in 

every state should have on staff individuals chosen solely on 

the basis of experience and expertise.

G. Incorporation of Recommendations Made by 

 Other Commissions and Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

III. Recommendations and Best Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

A. Voter Registration: List Accuracy and Enhanced Capacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 Recommendation: States should adopt online voter registration. . . . . . . . . 23

 Best Practice: Online registration tools, like the ones made

 available on the Commission’s website, can facilitate registration 

 through web portals of other state agencies and outside groups. . . . . . . . 27
iii

 Recommendation: Interstate exchanges of voter 

 registration information should be expanded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 Best Practice: States should join interstate programs that 

 share data and synchronize voter lists so that states, on their 

 own initiative, come as close as possible to creating an

 accurate database of all eligible voters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 Recommendation: States should seamlessly integrate 

 voter data acquired through Departments of Motor Vehicles 

 with their statewide voter registration lists. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 Best Practice: States should adopt procedures like those 

 in Delaware that lead to the seamless integration of 

 data between DMVs and elction offices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

B. Improved Management of the Polling Place. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 1. Polling Place Location and Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

 Best Practice: Polling places should be located 

 close to voters and designed to have sufficient space 

 and parking, accessibility for voters with disabilities, 

 and adequate infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

 Best Practice: Local officials should maintain a 

 diagram of every polling place used in the jurisdiction 

 that provides room dimensions, location of power outlets, 

 the proposed positioning of voting and voter processing 

 equipment, the entry and exit routes, and signage required 

 by the Americans with Disabilities Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 Best Practice: The diagrams should be maintained in the 

 clerk’s office, provided to the election official responsible 

 for the polling location on Election Day, and updated 

 before every election. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 Recommendation: Schools should be used as polling places; 

 to address any related security concerns, Election Day should 

 be an in-service day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
iv

 Recommendation: States should consider establishing 

 vote centers to achieve economies of scale in polling place 

 management while also facilitating voting at 

 convenient locations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

 2. Management of Voter Flow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 Best Practice: Employ “line walkers” to address potential 

 problems among voters before they reach a check-in station 

 where their registration is verified. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 Best Practice: Voters should be given better information 

 on line length before they go to the polling place, such as 

 providing an internet feed from individual polling places. . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 Best Practice: Election officials should employ insights 

 from queuing theory concerning the flow of voters, the points 

 of service in the polling place, and the time it takes to verify 

 registration and to vote. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

 Best Practice: To prepare for Election Day, jurisdictions 

 must accurately estimate the number of registered voters 

 per precinct and the share that will turn out, and be able 

 to react to data gathered in the critical three-month period 

 prior to an election when the factors affecting turnout are 

 most relevant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

 Best Practice: Election officials should pretest the length 

 of time it takes an average voter to vote a ballot in order 

 to accurately estimate how many poll workers, machines and 

 voting stations will be needed at each voting location. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

 Best Practice: The sample ballot, along with polling locations 

 and times, should be made available to voters no later than the 

 beginning of in-person early voting or three weeks before Election Day 

 so that voters will be able to make their choices before entering 

 the polling place. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

 Best Practice: If the state law allows, jurisdictions 

 should reduce the length and complexity of the ballot in 

 Presidential election years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
v

 Recommendation: Jurisdictions should develop models and 

 tools to assist them in effectively allocating resources across 

 polling places. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

 Best Practice: Election officials need greater access to 

 industrial engineering tools that are regularly employed 

 by the private sector to help manage customer service 

 queues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

 Best Practice: Election officials should take advantage 

 of the “resource calculators” available through the Commission 

 web site at www.supportthevoter.gov and hosted by the 

 Cal Tech-MIT Voting Technology Project to aid in making 

 decisions on how to allocate limited voting resources. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

 Best Practice: Election officials should keep track of wait

 times at individual polling places using simple management 

 techniques, such as recording line length at regular intervals 

 during Election Day and giving time-stamped cards to voters 

 during the day to monitor turnout flow.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

 Best Practice: In polling places with a history of long lines, 

 local election officials should analyze the reasons for excessive 

 wait times and develop plans for avoiding the problem 

 in the future. Local election officials should provide copies 

 of these plans to the relevant chief state election official. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

 Recommendation: Jurisdictions should transition to

 electronic pollbooks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

 

 3. Poll Workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

 a. Recruitment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

 Best Practice: Jurisdictions should utilize the many 

 recommendations made available in the relevant EAC report, 

 Successful Practices for Poll Worker Recruitment, 

 Training and Retention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
vi

 Recommendation: Jurisdictions should recruit public and 

 private sector employees, as well as high school and college students, 

 to become poll workers.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

 Best Practice: State-developed programs should be 

 implemented that recognize employers for supporting 

 their employees who wish to work on Election Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

 b. Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

 Recommendation: States should institute poll worker 

 training standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

 Best Practice: Different equipment used in different 

 counties necessitates different training programs, but 

 states must still achieve uniform application of their 

 legal standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

 4. Management of the Polling Place to Address the Needs of 

 Particular Communities of Voters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

 Recommendation: Election authorities should establish advisory 

 groups for voters with disabilities and for those with limited 

 English proficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

 Best Practice: Election authorities should make every effort

 through their own websites and traditional communication 

 outlets (especially through non-English language media) 

 to reach these voters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

 a. Voters with disabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

 Recommendation: States and localities must adopt 

 comprehensive management practices to assure 

 accessible polling places. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

 Best Practice: A checklist ensuring that each polling place

 is accessible should be kept by the responsible election 

 official for each election and kept on file to prepare for 

 the next election. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
vii

 Best Practice: Within the polling place, elderly voters 

 and voters with disabilities waiting their turn to vote 

 must have access to chairs while waiting and then, when 

 their turn to vote comes, to the machinery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

 Best Practice: Video guides from San Francisco on how 

 to set up an accessible polling place and from Pennsylvania 

 on educating poll workers on voters with disabilities are 

 models for other jurisdictions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

 Recommendation: States should survey and audit 

 polling places to determine their accessibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

 b. Voters with limited English proficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

 Recommendation: Jurisdictions should provide bilingual 

 poll workers to any polling place with a significant number of 

 voters who do not speak English. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

 Recommendation: Jurisdictions should test all election 

 materials for plain language and usability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

C. Voting Before Election Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

 Recommendation: States should expand opportunities 

 to vote before Election Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

 Best Practice: States should not simultaneously expand 

 early voting and excessively reduce the resources available

 for Election Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

 Best Practice: States should adopt safeguards for mail 

 balloting, including online tracking of absentee ballots 

 so voters can verify the status of their ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

D. Military and Overseas Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

 Recommendation: States should provide ballots 

 and registration materials to military and overseas 

 voters via their websites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
viii

 Best Practice: Both the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot 

 and the Federal Postcard Application should be considered 

 as valid voter registration applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

 Best Practice: However they may transmit their ballot, overseas 

 and military voters would benefit from a system that allows 

 them to create on their attached printer a ballot with a barcode 

 that can be read by the local election administrator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

E. Growing Challenges with Election Equipment and Voting Technology. . . . . 62

 Recommendation: The standard-setting and certification process 

 for voting machines must be reformed.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

 Recommendation: Audits of voting equipment must be 

 conducted after each election, as part of a comprehensive 

 audit program, and data concerning machine performance must 

 be publicly disclosed in a common data format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

F. Collection and Distribution of Election Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

 Recommendation: Local jurisdictions should gather 

 and report voting-related transaction data for the purpose 

 of improving the voter experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

 Best Practice: Wisconsin has a model election data-gathering 

 program. Voting machine manufacturers should add 

 functionality to their machines to help gather data, which 

 jurisdictions should widely disseminate in a standard 

 data format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

IV. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1

Introduction

The United States runs its elections unlike any other country in the world. Responsibility for elections is entrusted to local officials in approximately 8,000 different jurisdictions. In turn, they are subject to general oversight by officials most often chosen 

through a partisan appointment or election process. The point of contact for voters in 

the polling place is usually a temporary employee who has volunteered for one-day duty 

and has received only a few hours of training. These defining features of our electoral 

system, combined with the fact that Americans vote more frequently on more issues 

and offices than citizens anywhere else, present unique challenges for the effective administration of elections that voters throughout the country expect and deserve.

Other countries exhibit one or another of these features in their election systems, but 

none have the particular combination that characterizes administration in the United 

States. Decentralization and reliance on volunteers ensure that the quality of administration varies by jurisdiction and even by polling place. The involvement of officials 

with partisan affiliations means that the rules or their interpretations will be subject to 

charges of partisanship depending on who stands to win from the officials’ decisions. 

The sheer frequency and volume of democratic choices from persistent elections tax 

voters’ attention and capacity. 

The problems observed in recent elections stem, in part, from these defining characteristics of our electoral system. Long wait times at select polling places result from a 

combination of mismanagement, limited or misallocated resources, and long ballots. 

Problems faced by military voters and their dependents in receiving and transmitting 

ballots, and then having them counted, still remain. Accommodations for voters with 

disabilities or with limited English proficiency vary widely, dependent on the attention 

they receive from local officials and compliance with statutory protections. Bloated and 

inaccurate voter registration lists — the source of many downstream election administration problems — arise in the absence of a national list of voters that is updated when 

voters move, die or change their names.
2

Some of the differences in approaches to election administration may be explained by 

cultural differences between states. For instance, the manner in which early voting is 

conducted, or whether it is allowed at all, varies considerably between states. Vote-bymail and no-excuse absentee voting is increasingly popular in the West, while in-person 

early voting is more popular in the South. The same could be said for provisional ballots, which are used for different purposes in different states. In some states, voters who 

are permanently registered as absentee must cast a provisional ballot if they show up 

at the polls. In others, voters can update their address in the polling place by voting a 

provisional ballot. In still others, provisional ballots serve the narrow purposes for which 

they were intended under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), namely as a stop gap 

measure for the poll worker who gives a provisional ballot to the voter who claims to be 

registered but whose name does not appear on the rolls.

Although the diversity of election processes spawns problems, the variety of practices 

localities use to combat them can also be a fruitful source of context-specific solutions. 

There is no shortage of good ideas when it comes to election administration. The tasks 

presented to the Commission were to collect the best programs, innovations, and practices from around the country to address current challenges, as well as to identify the 

next generation of problems that will confront the American electoral system.

After a six-month extensive examination of how elections are conducted throughout the 

United States, we, the members of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration, conclude that problems that hinder the efficient administration of elections are 

both identifiable and solvable. This Report sets forth many recommendations and best 

practices derived from our examination. 

Some problems in election administration affect only a limited number of jurisdictions, 

while others are more broadly shared. In general, we view the recommendations as 

broad-based solutions to common problems evident on a national scale. In addition to 

these recommendations, the Commission urges adoption or consideration of other best 

practices, highlighted throughout the Report in italics, that are usually applicable to focused situations in individual jurisdictions or sometimes particular polling places. These 

highlighted best practices are not the only ones of potential use or value to jurisdictions 

around the country, and numerous others worthy of consideration are included in the 

Appendix.
3

The key recommendations of the Commission are:

Voter Registration:

Online Registration: The steady trend toward online voter registration 

should continue as every state should allow eligible citizens to register to vote 

and to update their registrations via the internet.

Interstate Exchange of Voter Lists: States should update and check 

their voter registration lists against each other, as is done with the “IVRC” 

and “ERIC” projects, to ensure that voters are correctly registered at one 

location, that registration lists are more accurate and not a source of polling 

place congestion, and that these more accurate lists can assist in identifying 

individuals who are eligible to vote, but are not registered.

Access to the Polls: 

Expansion of Voting Before Election Day: In order to limit congestion 

on Election Day and to respond to the demand for greater opportunities 

to vote beyond the traditional Election Day polling place, states that have 

not already done so should expand alternative ways of voting, such as mail 

balloting and in-person early voting.

Schools as Polling Places: States should encourage the use of schools as 

polling places. Because they often provide the best facilities to meet voters’ 

needs, roughly one-third of voters currently vote in schools. To address 

security concerns, Election Day should be scheduled as an in-service day for 

students and teachers.

Polling Place Management: 

Adoption of Resource Allocation Tools: Local officials should employ 

a resource allocation calculator, akin to the ones presented at www.

supportthevoter.gov, in order to optimize the number of voting machines 

and staff at polling places, thereby reducing the potential for long lines.
4

Voting Technology:

Addressing the Impending Crisis in Voting Technology: By the end of 

the decade, a large share of the nation’s voting machines, bought 10 years 

ago with HAVA funds, will reach the end of their natural life and require 

replacement. To address this impending challenge and to usher in the next 

generation of voting machines, the standards and certification process for 

new voting technology must be reformed so as to encourage innovation and 

to facilitate the adoption of widely available, off-the-shelf technologies and 

“software-only” solutions.

This Report focuses not only on the problem of election administration for all voters, 

but also the effect of administrative failures on discrete populations such as voters with 

disabilities, those with limited English proficiency, and military and overseas voters. Just 

as certain problems in election administration are more pronounced in some jurisdictions, they also burden some populations more than others. Inaccessible polling places 

are a problem for the general population, for example, but they can be a major barrier to 

participation for those with mobility problems. Similarly, poorly designed and complex 

ballots pose problems for all voters, but they can prove particularly daunting for voters 

with limited English proficiency. Any solutions in this realm must be made with an 

eye toward addressing the problems faced by voters as a whole while also ensuring that 

the needs of these discrete populations are met. However, the best way to perform this 

dual task is to “bake in” these targeted solutions to the recommendations applicable to 

the system as a whole. The Commission’s recommendations are proposed with this 

strategy in mind. They should be adopted not only because they address problems 

broadly shared, but also because they address more severe challenges faced by particular 

populations.
5

I. Definition of the Charge 

The Presidential Commission on Election Administration was established by Executive 

Order on March 28, 2013. Its mission was to identify best practices in election administration and to make recommendations to improve the voting experience. 

The Executive Order focused the Commission’s work on several areas of concern:

i. the number, location, management, operation, and design of polling places;

ii. the training, recruitment, and number of poll workers;

iii. voting accessibility for uniformed and overseas voters;

iv. the efficient management of voter rolls and poll books;

v. voting machine capacity and technology;

vi. ballot simplicity and voter education;

vii. voting accessibility for individuals with disabilities, limited English 

proficiency, and other special needs;

viii. management of issuing and processing provisional ballots in the polling place 

on Election Day;

ix. the issues presented by the administration of absentee ballot programs;

x. the adequacy of contingency plans for natural disasters and other emergencies 

that may disrupt elections; and

xi. other issues related to the efficient administration of elections that the 

Co-Chairs agree are necessary and appropriate to the Commission’s work. 

The charge requires consideration of a multiplicity of election administration problems 

and contexts. The Commission was asked in considering each of these issues to propose 

common sense, non-partisan solutions that would prove useful to state and local officials in administering successful elections that meet the needs and legitimate expectations of voters. 
6

The guiding principle for these recommendations, however, is to improve the voter 

experience. By improving the voter experience, we mean that:

•	 Voters at all points of contact with the electoral process should find that it is 

accessible and dependable. 

•	 Voters should not need to wait more than half an hour to vote.

•	 Ballots should be well-designed and simple to understand.

•	 The registration process should be efficient and reliable.

•	 Voter rolls at the polling place should be accurate.

•	 Voting information provided by officials should be clear and comprehensive.

•	 Ballots delivered by mail should arrive in a timely fashion and should be 

tracked from delivery to return.

•	 Military and overseas voters should receive their ballots on time and be 

confident that the election authority has received them in time to be counted.

•	 Polling places should be well-organized, well-equipped, and accessible.

•	 Well-trained and informed poll workers should supply useful guidance, 

answer questions, and resolve issues as they arise. 

•	 Accommodations should be made for populations requiring specialized 

support, such as voters with disabilities or limited English proficiency.

Accessibility and dependability are the criteria for excellence and success in the private 

sector, and the Commission believes that those goals should also guide the administration of elections. 

The Commission was not charged with proposing federal or state legislation or evaluating ongoing and often controversial legislative enactments or proposals. To be sure, 

several of the problems described in the Executive Order were covered by existing federal legislation, and drawing attention to gaps in enforcement and compliance is within 

the ambit of this Report. In addition, while not taking on the task of drafting a model 

state election code, the Commission did uncover instances where state laws require 
7

modernization to accommodate changes in technology or legal developments in other 

settings. For example, all states should update their laws governing design and font size 

for ballots to reflect the new technologies of balloting, as well as to incorporate modern 

lessons concerning the principles of design. Similarly, the experience with Hurricane 

Sandy made it evident that states must be certain their laws are updated to establish clear 

procedures for the rescheduling or conduct of elections in the event of a natural disaster. 

They also must be updated to accommodate voting for first responders from outside the 

disaster areas and those who are unable to return to their jurisdiction for Election Day 

due to the emergency.

In formulating its recommendations, the Commission sought out and received extensive testimony, data, and information from election administrators, experts, academics, 

and the public. It did so through several different channels. In addition to four public 

hearings the Commission held around the country,1 subgroups of commissioners were 

invited to and attended meetings of election officials, interest groups, and academics.2

Members of the public, moreover, submitted written testimony that was considered by 

the Commission and posted on its website: www.supportthevoter.gov.

Several people and institutions were helpful in constructing this report. John Fortier and 

Matthew Weil from the Bipartisan Policy Center and Doug Chapin from the Hubert 

Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota ably and expertly 

advised the Commission in its research. Annie Donaldson and Lynn Eisenberg were 

extremely helpful in the production of the report.

A group of academic experts on election administration, led by Professors Stephen Ansolabehere, Daron Shaw and Charles Stewart III, provided extensive research that was very helpful to the Commission. They conducted a national survey of local election officials that asked a series of questions related to 

the Executive Order. The data from that survey and their report are available at 

www.supportthevoter.gov. Along with Stephen Graves, Mark Pelczarski, Aaron Strauss, 

and Heather Smith, the academic experts also helped assemble the online “Election 

Toolkit,” which is available through www.supportthevoter.gov and is housed at the 

Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project’s website. The website presents two sets of 

tools that election administrators can use: resource allocation tools to avoid polling place 

congestion and tools to assist jurisdictions in implementing online voter registration. 

The Commission strongly encourages local officials to examine and improve upon these 

online tools.
8

The Commission concludes this introduction with the acknowledgement of a special 

debt to the state and local election officials who testified in public hearings and gave 

generous amounts of their time and expertise to the Commission. The country’s election officials find themselves second-guessed and heavily criticized when elections run 

into problems, and praise is not forthcoming in comparable volume — or at all — 

when the process runs smoothly. At the same time, these officials are all too often given 

inadequate resources with which to carry out this critical function. Over the months 

of its preparation of this Report, the Commission arrived at a renewed appreciation of 

how hard, diligently and effectively the vast majority of the country’s election officials 

work to provide well-run elections for voters — and how difficult the job is. This Report 

reflects significant contributions from officials around the nation, and the Commission 

hopes that the recommendations and best practices set out here will contribute to the 

work ahead in making elections run still better for America’s voters. 
9

II. Setting the Stage: Background 

for the Recommendations

A. Variation in Administration: “Does One Size Fit All?” 

At the threshold of its work, the Commission was confronted with what multiple election administrators repeatedly described as the “one size does not fit all” problem.3

 Given the complexity and variation in local election administration, the argument goes, no 

set of practices can be considered “best” for every jurisdiction. Some reforms that work 

well in certain contexts will be unnecessary or fail in others. There is certainly merit to 

this position; no one can doubt the limits of nationwide reforms of the American electoral system when local institutions, rules, and cultures differ considerably. 

That being said, most jurisdictions that administer elections confront a similar set of 

challenges. They must register voters and verify voter eligibility. They must design ballots, find people to staff polling 

places, and procure machinery 

to cast and count votes. They 

must arrange for the results 

of the votes cast on or before 

Election Day to be transmitted 

to a central election office and 

verified for accuracy. Jurisdictions also must comply with an 

array of federal requirements 

concerning accessibility and 

anti-discrimination. And even 

amidst the diversity of local jurisdictions, similar types of jurisdictions — by size, legal 

regimes, cultures, etc. — often share similar problems and can learn from each other 

about the best solutions to common problems.

Even amidst the diversity of local 

h

jurisdictions, similar types of jurisdictions 

. . . often share similar problems and 

can learn from each other about the best 

solutions to common problems. 

h
10

The recommendations in this Report are targeted at common problems shared by all or 

most jurisdictions. For the most part, they are of a size that should fit all. At the same 

time, the Report notes best practices that might apply to jurisdictions to a greater or 

lesser degree depending on their circumstances.

B. The Issue of Resources

The most universal complaint of election administrators in testimony before the Commission concerned a lack of resources.4

 Election administrators have described themselves as the least powerful lobby in state 

legislatures and often the last constituency 

to receive scarce funds at the local level.5

Although local elections may occur quite 

frequently, issues of election administration draw the attention of the public only 

every two or four years. Likewise, budget 

authorities tend to view elections as a periodic need, not a persistent — much less 

urgent — one. This is despite the fact that 

some election functions, such as voter registration, demand continual attention, and 

preparation for the next election must begin 

as soon as the current election is over. When 

states and localities experience fiscal pressures, elections tend toward the lower end of the scale of priorities, behind education, 

public safety, and health care, to name just a few resource competitors.

In the midst of intense competition for budget dollars, election officials often face significant difficulty in advocating for their cause. Few such officials can articulate service 

standards that would guide what budgets “should” be for personnel and equipment. 

Elected representatives who control the purse strings may appreciate what election officials want, but are less sure of what they truly need. As a result, legislators are often disinclined to spend marginal tax dollars on administering elections, as opposed to other 

areas of local government.6

Election administrators have 

h

described themselves as the 

least powerful lobby in state 

legislatures and often the last 

constituency to receive scarce 

funds at the local level. 

h
11

C. The Technology Challenge

The question of resources will become increasingly important in the coming years as 

jurisdictions look to replace aging voting technology. A large share of the voting machines currently in operation was purchased with federal money appropriated pursuant 

to the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Jurisdictions used that money to replace 

archaic punch card and other ballot technology with electronic or optical scan voting 

machines.7

Now a decade old, these systems, like much computer technology of that age, are reaching the end of their operational life.8

 Before HAVA, jurisdictions purchased voting 

technology on a rolling basis across the country; each year a fraction of jurisdictions 

were buying new voting systems. After HAVA was enacted, and in just a short window 

of time, most jurisdictions purchased new voting systems, upgrading from paper, lever 

or punch card systems to optical scan or direct recording electronic (DRE) machines. 

Few jurisdictions have budgeted to purchase new voting systems, often at a cost of millions of dollars. Without a comparable infusion of federal funds, jurisdictions will be 

on their own to replace aging machines or to alter the voting process so as to serve more 

voters with fewer machines.9

Compounding the problem is the dissatisfaction of local officials with the array of voting machines currently available — a complaint heard at many hearings. State and 

local election officials told the Commission that the machines available do not meet the 

needs (technical, operational, regulatory or otherwise) of the jurisdictions.10 Indeed, the 

voting machine manufacturers themselves sympathized with their potential customers’ 

plight.11 However, the vendors maintain that administrative and legal obstacles currently discourage existing manufacturers (or new market entrants) from investing resources 

in the development of new equipment that would meet their customers’ demands.

Much of the problem is the direct result of both a dispersed market with approximately 

8,000 jurisdictions and the fact that the standard-setting process for new voting machines has broken down.12 The federal standards in operation are now eight years old, 

and many states require by law that any voting machines used in their localities pass the 

applicable federal standards.13 Newer standards (that is, a newer version of the “Voluntary Voting System Guidelines,” or “VVSG”) were proposed six years ago by the Tech-
12

nical Guidelines Development Committee of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) and the National Institutes on Standards and Technology (NIST).14 Such standards can only be adopted, however, by the EAC, which, due to a lack of commissioners 

and the related problem of disagreement over the agency’s mission and past direction, 

cannot currently carry out this task. Some new voting technologies can be certified 

according to the standards developed in 2005 (or under an “extension clause” to those 

standards). However, the confusion surrounding the operative guidelines creates uncertainty in an area where those investing in the next generation of voting technology need 

greater clarity. Without a fully functioning EAC to adopt the new standards, many new 

technologies that might better serve local election administrators are not being brought 

to the marketplace.15

This lack of up-to-date standards has impeded the inevitable and much-needed transition of the voting process to off-the-shelf technology, such as tablets and laptop computers. Jurisdictions that use electronic voting machines usually deploy 

machines for a few days per year and 

then lock them up in storage for the 

rest. For cash-strapped jurisdictions 

that wish to keep pace with evolving 

technology, the purchase of hundreds 

of expensive, specialized pieces of 

hardware good for only one purpose 

— elections — no longer makes sense. 

The existing legally operational standards were developed five years before 

the product launch of the first generation iPad. Any firm that wishes to invest in election applications for commercial off-the 

shelf-tablets or computers does so in an uncertain regulatory environment. The confusion surrounding the standards has had the perverse effect of complicating the move to 

certification of the very technologies most current and familiar to voters.16

A divide has also developed between election officials, on the one hand, and the information technology community, on the other, about the use of computer technology 

in elections. Concerns among the computer science community about the security of 

computers in the conduct of elections have led to a slow-down in the adoption of new 

technologies, and a continued reliance on single-use machines that are expensive and 

The lack of 

h

up-to-date standards has impeded 

the inevitable and much-needed 

transition of the voting process to offthe-shelf technology. 

h
13

increasingly impractical to buy and maintain. More effective vehicles for practical collaboration between technical specialists and election officials are needed for the development of voting technology that balances security concerns with a consistent focus on 

innovation. From the frustrations of finding adequate voting equipment technology on 

the market, promising collaborations have arisen in communities such as Los Angeles 

County, California,17 and Travis County, Texas,18 that may inform the setting of standards for future technologies.

D. Addressing Long Lines—

and the Standard for Judging What is “Long”

The image of voters waiting for six or more hours to vote on Election Day 2012, as in 

the two previous Presidential contests, spurred the call for reform that led to creation of 

this Commission. Research suggests that, although a limited number of jurisdictions 

experienced long wait times, over five million voters in 2012 experienced wait times 

exceeding one hour and an additional five million waited between a half hour and an 

hour.19 In some jurisdictions, the problem has recurred for several presidential elections,20 while in others, a particular confluence of factors led to unprecedented lines in 

2012.21 It became clear to the Commission as it investigated this problem that there is 

no single cause for long lines and there is no single solution. But the problem is solvable. 

The problem of long Election Day lines, it should be emphasized, is a problem largely 

limited to Presidential elections.22 Even in Presidential elections, a small share of jurisdictions and typically a small share of polling places within “problem jurisdictions” 

experience long lines. However, when the population of the problem jurisdictions and 

polling places are added up, it does mean that several million of our 130 million voters 

are standing in line for an unacceptably long time.

The causes of long lines are not uniform across jurisdictions that experienced them. 

One line may be the result of a poorly laid out polling place. Down the street, the 

line may be due to equipment malfunction. Across town, a strong personality conflict 

amongst poll workers or disagreement on process can create a bottleneck. 

Although isolated incidents can cause long wait times, systemic problems can also in-
14

crease the likelihood that lines will develop. Lengthy propositions and constitutional 

amendments can clog the ballot. Poor methodology in resource allocation or turnout 

forecasting can lead to shortages of staff and machines where they are most needed. 

Inadequate facilities or insufficiently trained poll workers can increase the “transaction 

time” for each voter, as can an inaccurate voter list that leads more voters to cast provisional ballots. And of course, the more 

limited the opportunities to vote, the 

greater will be the number of voters who 

will vote during the constricted hours of 

a single Election Day. All of these factors 

can result in stress to the foundation of 

the election and have a direct impact on 

a large number of voters.

Throughout the Report, we address issues and offer recommendations that 

can address the management of lines. 

But a key question in the first instance 

is how to establish the standard for what is properly deemed a “long” line. The Commission has concluded that, as a general rule, no voter should have to wait more than half an 

hour in order to have an opportunity to vote. 

Of course, there will be circumstances that strain this goal, such as when a busload of 

people shows up unexpectedly at a polling location, or a hundred-person line of enthusiastic voters is waiting to greet the poll worker who opens the polling place in the 

morning. Nonetheless, local officials should be able to plan the allocation of their resources such that during the normal course of the day, nearly all voters can be processed 

within the 30-minute standard. Any wait time that exceeds this half-hour standard is 

an indication that something is amiss and that corrective measures should be deployed. 

Furthermore, knowing that the process will inevitably break down somewhere within a 

jurisdiction on Election Day — it may not be possible to predict exactly where breakdowns will happen — these corrective measures need to be developed in advance and 

activated as necessary to handle these situations. Excessive wait times are avoidable if 

the jurisdiction has undergone proper planning and develops systems to inform the 

responsible authorities when a breakdown occurs.

The Commission has concluded 

h

that, as a general rule, no voter 

should have to wait more than 

half an hour in order to have an 

opportunity to vote.

h
15

E. Disproportionate Impacts and Enforcement of Existing 

Federal Law 

The Executive Order directs the Commission to pay specific attention to the voting 

difficulties experienced by certain populations. In particular, the Commission is to take 

account of the problems experienced by military and overseas voters and voters with 

disabilities or limited English proficiency. These are populations for whom specific 

federal laws provide protection or assistance. Throughout its review, the Commission 

heard complaints from advocates for each of these groups that the applicable laws are 

underenforced.

Military and overseas voters raised concerns about the implementation of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)23 and the Military and 

Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act.24 Great strides have been made in facilitating voting by soldiers and others overseas due to these laws. However, many voters 

covered by these Acts still find difficulties registering to vote, receiving their ballot in 

time to be voted, or having their voted ballot reach the election office in time to be 

counted.25 There is inconsistency in how the states implement and administer the various stop gap measures that federal law provides to ensure military and overseas voters are 

registered and vote. The Federal Postcard Application (FPCA) is designed to facilitate 

registration and serve as an absentee ballot request by military and overseas voters, and 

the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB) serves as an emergency ballot in the event 

such voters never receive their absentee ballot. But states vary as to the length of time 

an FPCA is operable and the extent to which an FWAB also serves as a voter registration application. As described below in our recommendations, online voter registration 

should be pursued by all jurisdictions as a service to all voters. However, military and 

overseas voters represent the population most likely to benefit from increased use of the 

internet in the registration process.

Moreover, the Commission heard about the inconsistency of the assistance military 

voters receive from Installation Voting Assistance Offices tasked by federal law with 

facilitating voter registration for uniformed personnel.26 In some instances, the Commission heard, these difficulties may arise from discomfort of some members of the 

military about getting involved with anything “political.” In other instances, similar to 

the plight of election officials in dealing with local governments, voting assistance may 
16

simply be considered a lower priority than the many other critical responsibilities of unit 

commanders. Whatever the cause, the law requiring voting assistance for military voters is clear and must be enforced. 

For language minorities, the Commission heard from witnesses and experts about failures to comply with Sections 203 and 208 of the Voting Rights Act.27 Section 203 

requires language assistance in communities with large non-English speaking populations. In many instances, such required assistance, either at the polling site or in the 

ballot materials has not been made consistently or reliably available. Section 208 allows a voter unable to read the ballot to gain assistance in voting from a person of their 

choosing. Many poll workers are not aware of or do not comply with this provision of 

federal law.

Language difficulties can affect voter participation throughout the electoral process. If 

ballot materials and election agency websites are only in English, then voters with limited English will be less able to navigate the registration process.28 Inadequate supplies of 

bilingual poll workers or ballots in other languages will make it more difficult for them 

to vote. These problems are then compounded for certain groups, such as Alaskan Native voters, who face additional logistical problems due to other forms of geographic and 

social isolation from election authorities.29

The issues language minorities face are not limited to inconsistent compliance with 

federal law. Of central importance is the quality of administration. Limited English 

proficiency voters should expect support at the polling place that is not defined by the 

“floor” set by law. From signage to ballots to the availability of assistance from bilingual 

poll workers, the administration of the polling place should reflect the understanding 

that limited English proficiency should not be experienced as a limited or second-class 

citizenship. 

Disability rights groups also noted concerns with the enforcement of the relevant provisions of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) and HAVA. They described the 

continued inaccessibility of many polling places and voting machines, as well as more 

direct impediments such as statutory bans on voting faced by those with cognitive 

impairments.30 Perhaps the largest share of concerns revolved around training of poll 

workers and election officials. Advocates stressed the importance of training regarding 

legal requirements, specifically the right to receive assistance from someone of the voter’s 
17

choosing, and the operation of assistive technologies for voting.31 In addition, they 

urged targeted training to educate poll workers about how best to interact and to serve 

voters with a variety of accessibility needs.32

However, the election statute most often ignored, according to testimony the Commission received, is the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA or “Motor Voter”).33 Designed to assist prospective voters by facilitating registration, the statute requires Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) and public assistance agencies to provide registration 

materials and to ensure that their customers have the opportunity to register to vote. By 

all accounts, states vary considerably in the degree to which such agencies register voters 

and transfer registration data to election administrators.34 (Also, as evidenced by the 

biennial NVRA report issued by the EAC, several states are unable to account for the 

source for many, if not most, of their new registrations.35)

DMVs, which are supposed to play the most important registration role in the statute, 

are the weakest link in the system. Some DMVs appear to disregard the law. Others 

erect impediments to the seamless transfer of registration data to election offices managing statewide registration lists.36 This noncompliance leads to preventable inaccuracies 

in the voter registration lists. Voters who think they registered or updated their address 

at the DMV show up at polling locations only to find out they are not registered or are 

in the wrong polling location. 

The DMVs do not shoulder all of the blame; the other public assistance agencies required by the NVRA to register voters also often fail to comply with the law. Disability 

rights groups identified the lack of voting assistance available at state offices for the 

disabled.37 Military advocates offer similar criticisms of recruitment centers.38 As assistance agencies shift their client services to online channels, compliance with the NVRA 

often drops further because voter registration is left out of the online portals and website 

designs of these agencies.

When the NVRA was passed two decades ago, the revolution in data sharing and integration was just beginning. Now, Americans experience every day a world in which 

data-sharing is commonplace and expected. Indeed, the challenge of data-sharing envisioned and required by the NVRA — principally, exchanging names and addresses 

between agencies — pales in comparison to most modern-day data integration challenges. However, by all accounts, the root of many registration difficulties occurs at the 
18

point where one agency receiving a registration form or updated address fails to transmit 

that information accurately and seamlessly with the voter registration database held by 

the election authority.

F. Professionalism in Election Administration

One of the distinguishing features of the American electoral system is the choosing of 

election officials and administrators through a partisan process. Some are appointed 

and others elected, but almost all are selected on a partisan basis. Critics have argued 

that under this arrangement public confidence suffers, as may the quality of administration. Those who run our elections are subjected to competing pressures from partisans 

and political constituencies, on the one hand, and their obligation to the voting public 

as a whole, on the other. Defenders of this practice note that the role of elected officeholders, such as Secretaries of State, is embedded in the legal structure and long-standing practice of American election 

administration. They also note 

that these officeholders generally perform capably and with 

accountability under close public 

scrutiny.

Whatever the view taken of the 

role of elected officials, the Commission found general agreement 

that election administration is 

public administration. That 

means that in every respect possible, the responsible department or agency in every state should have on staff individuals who are chosen and serve solely on the basis of their experience and expertise. The 

Commission notes that this is often the case in departments across the country, and it is 

a model to which all jurisdictions should aspire.

Elected officials are well-served having professional support, and it would also bolster 

the voting public’s confidence in the voting process. Professionalism in administration assumes particular importance in a field characterized by scarcity of resources and 

In every respect possible, the responsible 

h

department or agency in every state 

should have on staff individuals who 

are chosen and serve solely on the basis 

of their experience and expertise. 

h
19

increased public demand for a high quality of administration with keen political sensitivities. It is evident to the Commission that the core competencies required of today’s 

election administrator are different from those in the past. The last decade’s heightened 

demand for more professional administration of elections and modernization of the 

process demonstrates that there is an increasing need for technology acumen, public 

relations skills, and data savvy.39

Indeed, the Commission would go further and urge the integration of election administration in university curriculums of public administration. For the most part, election 

officials now migrate into their positions from other areas of government or political 

party service. Once there, certification and training programs run by Secretaries of 

State, state associations of clerks, or national organizations, such as the Election Center 

and IACREOT, become the forums for professional development. It is time that election administration is also counted among those fields for which graduate training in a 

professional school can constitute preparation for a career.

G. Incorporation of Recommendations Made by Other 

Commissions and Organizations

Before progressing to the principal recommendations, the Commission wishes to acknowledge that it is not the first body convened to examine best practices in election 

administration. Since the 2000 Election, if not well before, professional organizations 

of election officials and those in related fields have been making suggestions for improving the U.S. election system. The Commission views this Report as building on 

and augmenting the important recommendations made by these other organizations in 

light of recent experience and data.

Because this Report seeks to focus attention on certain important reforms rather than 

to repeat the entire list of recommended best practices available elsewhere, the Report 

places in its online Appendix other documents that the Commission urges policy makers to consider. These other reports, recommendations and best practices, while useful, 

are of a style that focuses often on the (admittedly, very important) “trees” of election 

administration instead of the “forest.”
20

First, the Commission recommends consideration of the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) Report on Natural Disasters40 and the Congressional Research 

Service’s Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 Election: Fact Sheet.

41 The NASS task force was 

created in response to the problems in the 2012 Election due to Superstorm Sandy.42

The task force reviewed all state laws concerning elections and disaster preparedness. 

It highlighted best practices concerning, for example, losses of electricity and internet 

connectivity in polling places on Election Day, last-minute absentee voting by first responders from outside the affected jurisdiction who respond to the disaster, and plans to 

reschedule an election in the event the disaster makes voting impossible. Following the 

recommendations made by NASS would go a long way toward preparing jurisdictions 

for the next potential disaster that could disrupt an election.

Second, since the famed confusion concerning the 2000 Palm Beach “butterfly ballot,” 

several organizations specializing in design have offered recommendations concerning 

ballots and other election materials. Working with AIGA, the professional association for design, the EAC produced Effective Designs for the Administration of Elections,

43

which provides important design recommendations for multiple stages of the voting 

process. Another team of usability experts led by Dana Chisnell, Drew Davies and 

Whitney Quesenbery created a series of “field guides” on a range of election-related design and usability issues. The Commission recommends consideration of the guidelines 

prepared in the EAC Report and the field guides. 

Third, the Election Center, a highly regarded professional organization for election 

administrators, set forth its recommendations for election reform following the 2004 

election.44 Many of these recommendations go beyond the scope of the Executive Order and also advocate for changes in federal law. However, the Commission suggests 

consideration of the many recommendations concerning provisional ballots, statewide 

voter registration databases, electronic pollbooks, early and absentee voting, vote centers, and poll worker recruitment and retention. 

Fourth, the EAC, which was created by the HAVA, has provided a series of best-practices documents concerning election administration through its Election Management 

Guidelines program.45 Its publication on poll worker recruitment, training, retention 

and management offers important recommendations in those areas as well.46
21

Fifth, the EAC’s Quick Start Guides provide a wealth of suggestions concerning most 

areas covered by the Executive Order.47 The Commission urges local and state election 

authorities to consider the recommendations made by the EAC in these easy-to-use 

guides for election administration.

Sixth, the Future of California Elections project (FOCE) provided to the Commission 

a series of best practices recommendations, now posted on www.supportthevoter.gov. 

Its recommendations concerning limited English proficiency voters were particularly 

comprehensive and deserve recognition and consideration. As one of the nation’s most 

ethnically diverse states, of course, California has had unsurpassed experience in dealing 

with voters of limited English proficiency. The Commission urges consideration of the 

best practices concerning limited English proficiency voters identified by FOCE.

Finally, and of a similar fashion, the National Council on Disability made available to 

the Commission best practices documents concerning accessibility and disability. The 

voluminous material includes poll worker guides, polling place and ballot design recommendations, and a host of other documents describing the problems faced by voters 

with disabilities and potential solutions. The Commission urges consideration of the 

proposals contained therein, as well.
22

III. Recommendations and

Best Practices

Against this background, the Commission agreed unanimously on the following recommendations that address the specific issues identified in the President’s Executive 

Order. 

A. Voter Registration: 

List Accuracy and Enhanced Capacity

Whether the goal is ensuring that only duly qualified registered voters vote or that more 

people are able to vote more easily, election 

officials across the political spectrum recognize the value of accurate and manageable 

voter rolls. Yet most statewide voter registration systems aggregate county and local lists 

and registration records that originate on 

paper. With so many jurisdictions responsible for the registration lists, their quality is 

uneven and too many records are inaccurate, 

obsolete, or never entered into the system.48

To achieve efficiency and accuracy, state and 

local election officials should consider incorporating the recommendations and best 

practices discussed below into their standard operations. All these best practices must 

include stringent privacy and security procedures.

Accurate voter lists are essential to the management of elections.49 Keeping track is 

a Herculean task. On Election Day 2012, the registration system had 191.8 million 

records and 130.3 million voters managed by officials in 50 states and approximately 

8,000 local election offices, with the lists used at 186,000 precincts.50 The quality of the 

list can affect the ability of people to vote, of election offices to detect problems, and of 

courts and others monitoring elections to detect election fraud or irregularities. A list 

Election officials across the 

h

political spectrum recognize 

the value of accurate and 

manageable voter rolls.

h
23

with many incorrect records can slow down the processing of voters at polling places 

resulting in longer lines.

State, county, and local election officials face two major challenges. First, the record 

keeping system is largely based on outdated paper-based registration systems requiring 

data entry by government employees.51 Second, 12 percent of people in the United 

States move every year from one residence to another.52 This mobility, not surprisingly, 

leads to: incorrect information in records; obsolete information, such as changes in 

names or signatures; duplicate or out-of-date records, such as when a person moves but 

does not notify the election office; and improperly dropped records, such as when a 

person has not moved but is dropped from the rolls. While no single measure fully captures the “accuracy” of state voter registration lists, the latest research suggests as many 

as eight percent of registration records (representing 16 million people) are invalid or 

significantly inaccurate.53 That figure also masks great variation over time and among 

states: In some states in recent years, over 15 percent of the records on the registration 

lists have been inaccurate.54

To be sure, the country is now much better off with the statewide voter registration lists 

mandated by HAVA. Prior to HAVA, counties were in charge of voter registration lists 

in most states. Voters who moved between counties, even within the same state, often 

appeared on two (or more) county registration lists for a considerable time. 

The statewide lists go a long way toward addressing that problem, but their potential 

has not yet been fully realized. Local jurisdictions continue to serve as middlemen between voters and the statewide list, as they are often the repositories for forms gathered 

through registration drives and the like. Moreover, as previously noted, Departments of 

Motor Vehicles (the agency most often responsible for a voter’s registration or updating 

of records) often fail to integrate the data they receive with the statewide list. Finally, 

state websites vary considerably in quality and ease of use for voters seeking to check or 

correct their information.55

Recommendation: States should adopt online voter registration. 

Online voter registration is rapidly establishing itself in the states as an invaluable tool 

for managing the accuracy of voter rolls and reducing the costs of list maintenance. As 

of August 2013, 19 states have authorized or implemented a complete on-line voter 
24

registration system, while five others offer a more limited version.56 The significant 

and growing experience of these states has also allowed for examination of the results 

to date. The data suggest that these systems have performed to expectations and have 

earned high confidence among voters, as well as support among election officials across 

the political spectrum.57

The Commission received consistently affirmative assessments of the benefits that online registration can provide to the overall objectives of election administration.58 An 

online voter registration system: 

•	 reduces the high potential for error that exists with traditional paper-based 

systems; 

•	 saves jurisdictions a significant amount of money; 

•	 increases the accuracy and currency of the voter rolls, thereby reducing delays 

and congestion at the polling place; and 

•	 improves the voter experience because voters get immediate feedback when 

they are registered or when their information (e.g., address, party, etc.) has 

been updated.59

Implementing online registration would address a range of problems the Commission 

was charged with examining. 

An accurate voter registration 

list is often a prerequisite to effective election planning and 

administration. A list filled 

with inaccuracies, likewise, produces downstream problems 

throughout the administration 

of an election.60 With the enhanced accuracy and efficiency 

that online registration systems 

provide, election administrators are able to respond more effectively to a number of 

recurring challenges:

Implementing online registration 

h

would address a range of problems 

the Commission was charged with 

examining.

h
25

•	 Lines: Error-ridden voter rolls contribute to congestion and lines on Election 

Day. Voters whose information is missing from the rolls or incorrectly 

entered require the time and attention of officials. This necessarily delays the 

movement of other voters through the polling place.61

•	 Security: Online systems also provide additional reassurance of wellmaintained, “clean” rolls that protect against the potential or appearance of 

vulnerability to fraud. As for any web-based system, questions about security 

will require close attention to ensure that unauthorized changes to voter 

registration cannot be made. One of the advantages of a properly run online 

system is that states are able to authenticate the registration immediately and 

provide protections unavailable in paper-based systems.62 The voter registering 

online controls more directly the dissemination of the information than 

when entrusting forms with personal information to unknown individuals 

representing parties, candidates, or third party organizations. The voter 

usually receives an email confirmation that the registration was received and 

processed. Moreover, as demonstrated by the wide and growing popularity 

of online registration, voters seem to have confidence in such systems. This 

is not surprising when an increasing number of voters are using the internet 

to manage many core functions of their everyday lives.

•	 Provisional Ballots: In 2008, half of the provisional ballots issued to voters 

nationwide were attributable to problems with the rolls.63 When voters arrive 

at the polling place and the poll worker cannot find their names on the list, 

the voters are given a provisional ballot. Errors in the registration process 

often cause the list inaccuracies that lead to increased numbers of provisional 

ballots. Such errors include transcription and data entry problems that 

lead to misspelling of voters’ names, addresses and identifying information. 

Because it eliminates the middlemen between the voter and the registration 

list, online registration can help produce lists that lead to fewer disagreements 

between poll workers and voters about their registration status, and therefore 

fewer provisional ballots.
26

•	 Overall Effects on Participation: The ease of online registration makes it 

more certain that some types of voters will be registered, and then eventually 

turn out to vote. Studies of online registration show that younger voters 

are more likely to register when online tools are available.64 In Arizona, 

registration rates increased from 29 percent to 53 percent among voters aged 

18 to 24 with the adoption of an online system.65 There is also evidence 

that turnout may be higher among those registering online than those who 

register through traditional paper systems. In Arizona in 2008, 94 percent 

of online registrants voted compared to 85 percent of those who registered 

by paper.66

•	 Removing Barriers to Participation by Voters with Disabilities: Systems 

that facilitate in-home management of registration are helpful to voters with 

limited mobility.67 Online registration systems provide such convenience for 

voters with disabilities who, once registered, may also use those systems to 

update their registration records.

•	 Cost: Paper-based management of the rolls is costly and stresses an already 

burdened administrative infrastructure.68 County and local election officials 

spend roughly one-third of their budgets on registration,69 and the evidence 

is clear that online registrations provide election officials with significant cost 

savings over the traditional paper systems. Maricopa County, Arizona, has 

seen 80 cents in labor cost savings for each online registration and averages 

325,000 transactions a year, while Washington State has experienced 18 

cents savings per registration received and Delaware has achieved savings of 

$100,000 over a four-year period.70

•	 Integration and Promotion: Online registration allows state election 

authorities to partner with other state agencies and outside groups to facilitate 

registration. The portal to the online registration process can be housed on 

any state or private website. When voters register through those alternate 

websites, their information in the voter registration file is immediately 

updated. Organizations, such as Rock the Vote, have been successful in 

placing online widgets on various websites that facilitate the transfer of voter 

information to election authorities.71
27

By and large, the experience across all states appears to have mirrored that of Arizona 

and Washington State, which have led the way nationally in establishing and effectively 

implementing online registration. State officials report that overall “both the online and 

automated systems [have] met little resistance; some people voiced security concerns, 

but in time were generally convinced of the program’s reliability.”72 In the majority of 

the states that have adopted online registration, the legislation establishing the systems 

has been approved on a bipartisan basis. Indeed, the relevant webinar produced by the 

National Conference of State Legislatures is titled “Online Registration: the Bipartisan 

Trend in Elections.”73

To assist jurisdictions that have not yet moved toward online voter registration, the Commission has placed as an example on its website (through a link to the Caltech-MIT Voting 

Technology Project) computer code that facilitates interaction between an outside website 

and a state’s registration system. Of course, creating an online registration system involves 

more than just copying this code, which was created by Rock the Vote.74 But the “widget” available on the website highlights the way that voter information can be entered 

by a user in one setting and, through a simple platform, seamlessly integrated with a 

state’s registration list. Such systems allow any agency or group with state authorization 

to provide a secure direct portal to the state’s election site. Online registration, therefore, 

not only facilitates state agencies’ efforts to register voters, but it enables outside groups 

to empower users of their websites to register directly into the state’s system. In doing so, 

it reduces the chances of fraud and other irregularities of a paper-based system, in which 

outside groups may destroy registration forms or submit fraudulent registrations. The 

Commission strongly recommends not only that states adopt online voter registration, 

but that they do so in a way that allows secure and direct data entry by prospective voters 

through multiple web-based internet portals approved by the state.

Recommendation: Interstate exchanges of voter registration information should 

be expanded. 

The decentralized nature of the administration of American elections may have its most 

pronounced and demonstrable effects in the registration system. Unlike other countries, the United States does not maintain a list of registered voters at the national level, 

let alone eligible voters or citizens. The states, therefore, are responsible for maintaining 

a list of “who” is registered to vote “where” in their jurisdictions. States have historically not coordinated with each other, and federal law does not require them to do so. 
28

Consequently, the millions of voters who move between states each year often appear 

on more than one state’s registration list. 

As noted above, prior to HAVA’s requirement of statewide voter registration lists, it was 

fairly common for an individual voter to appear on several local registration lists in different counties within a state. The extraordinary mobility of the American population 

has combined with decentralized election authority to produce bloated and inaccurate 

lists. Problems with these lists, as described earlier, make every aspect of election administration more difficult, and are also seen by some as rendering the system vulnerable to 

fraud.

Every effort needs to be made to facilitate coordination among the states in the development of accurate and up-to-date registration lists. States should also take advantage of 

other publicly available databases that 

indicate which voters have moved or 

died. All these efforts must, of course, 

remain compliant with NVRA rules 

concerning voter notification and 

removal from rolls. Protecting the 

privacy of voter data must also be a 

top priority. However, data-matching tools have advanced to the point 

where seemingly intractable registration problems can be addressed by 

simple coordination between the 

states using publicly available databases concerning “who” lives “where.” Two existing 

projects are emblematic of these efforts. 

The first is the Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program (IVRC). Twenty-nine 

states have joined that program.75 Participating states exchange and compare voting 

data after a federal election to ascertain whether voters in different states, sharing the 

same name, birthdate and other information, voted in the same election. Matched 

records are then forwarded to the participating states that can then cull them to see 

if any such matches represent attempts at double voting that should be forwarded to 

law enforcement. To ensure privacy, the project uses a secure FTP site that deletes all 

participating states’ data after running the crosscheck.

Every effort needs to be made to 

h

facilitate coordination among the 

states in the development of accurate 

and up-to-date registration lists.

h
29

The second project is the Electronic Registration Information Center or “ERIC,” started 

by the Pew Charitable Trusts but now independently run by seven participating states.76

States that participate in ERIC are able to check their voter registration lists against data 

gathered from other states and several nationally available lists, such as those maintained 

by the U.S. Postal Service or the Social Security Administration. ERIC provides information to participating states as to which voters may have moved (either between states 

or within them), which voters may have died, which may have changed their names, 

and which eligible voters might not be registered. It protects the privacy of voter data 

by anonymizing each voter’s data before that data leaves a state’s control, so that no 

birthdates or like information gets revealed in the process.

The interstate data that ERIC provides to participating states allows those states to account for ongoing changes in voters’ names, addresses, and registration statuses and to 

prepare for upcoming elections. For the 2012 election, for example, ERIC identified 

more than 750,000 records of voters who appeared to have moved within a state participating in ERIC. It also identified more than 90,000 records of voters who appear to 

have moved from one ERIC state to another, and more than 23,000 records of deceased 

individuals still on the rolls. Moreover, it identified 5.7 million potentially eligible but 

unregistered voters in the participating states.77

The Commission endorses state programs to share data and to collaborate in the synchronization of voter lists so that the states, on their own initiative, come as close as possible to creating 

an accurate database of the eligible electorate. The Commission recommends that these 

programs be structured to consolidate and integrate all compatible functions. Such 

projects should strive to improve the accuracy of voter registration records, enhance the 

ability to detect ineligible voting and prosecute voter fraud, reduce administrative costs, 

and increase registration rates. Doing so will help achieve management efficiencies and 

enhance these programs’ appeal to the states that have yet to join in these collaborative 

ventures. Thus far, programs of this kind have shown the ability to safeguard any voter 

information they receive.78
30

Recommendation: States should seamlessly integrate voter data acquired through 

Departments of Motor Vehicles with their statewide voter registration lists.

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), known in each state as the agency issuing 

driver’s licenses and state personal identification cards, plays a pivotal role in the registration of America’s voters. As a critical actor in the creation and maintenance of each 

state’s voter registration file, the DMV can also contribute to the degree of orderliness 

and efficiency of operation in each community’s polling places on Election Day. The 

NVRA, enacted more than 20 years ago, mandates that each state’s DMV offer an opportunity to register to vote for every citizen applying for a driver’s license or state personal identification card or changing an address on one of those documents. If there is 

any identification document that citizens will keep current, it is the state-issued driver’s 

license or personal identification card. Universally, this NVRA program, commonly 

known as “Motor Voter,” is embraced across political party lines because such a wide 

swath of the American electorate frequents these offices on a regular basis.

Yet the data compiled biennially by the EAC reflect poorly on the efficacy of Motor 

Voter. Significantly less than one-third of new registrations are processed through motor vehicle departments. Only seven states and the District of Columbia report total 

motor vehicle department registrations accounting for more than 50 percent of the total 

registrations received in the 2011-2012 election cycle.79 The low level of participation 

by DMVs leaves no doubt that Motor Voter is not working as intended.80

Delaware and Michigan have designed systems that seamlessly integrate the Motor Voter transaction into the DMV driver’s license application program in such a manner as to 

keep a large number of voter records current and to save the DMV money in reduced 

staff time committed to this program.81 The Delaware DMV Director and the Election 

Commissioner together developed an interface called “e-signature.”82 It began because 

of the number of voters who appeared at polling places believing they had registered at 

the DMV, but were not on the voter rolls. When citizens go to the DMV for driver’s 

license services, they provide their information to the DMV clerk. By following a script 

on their computer screen, the DMV clerks now ask citizens if they would like to register to vote or update their information if they are already registered. They view their 

information on a screen that is also a credit card-style signature device. On that screen, 

voters certify that they are citizens, select their party affiliations and sign the forms. All 
31

of this information is then transmitted in real-time to the Department of Elections for 

the voter’s county. The election office no longer processes registration applications from 

the DMV by hand. All information is now entered and transmitted electronically, saving time every day and especially on Election Days.

An improperly functioning DMV can naturally lead to Election Day confusion. Voters who appear at their polling place after moving can find that their voter registration 

records have not been updated 

to conform to their new driver’s 

license addresses. As a result, a 

greater number of provisional 

ballots are cast, leading to congestion in the polling place and 

unnecessary post-election verification work for county and local election officials.83 In other states, the voters are directed to their old polling places 

to vote, which may be located in another jurisdiction within the state. The Commission 

strongly recommends that states follow the Delaware model and adopt procedures that lead to 

the seamless integration of data between DMVs and election offices. 

The Commission notes that the adoption of online registration will provide DMVs 

with a ready-made portal to facilitate seamless transmission of voter registration data to 

the election office. An online registration portal can open at a specific point during the 

driver’s license transaction, thus providing the convenient opportunity to register contemplated by the NVRA. Indeed, with online voter registration, a registration widget 

or portal can be placed on any state website to facilitate registration either by a voter or 

an administrator who is filling in a voter’s information for other purposes.

B. Improved Management of the Polling Place

Securing access to the vote depends on sound polling place management. The issues 

that election administrators confront in organizing and managing polling locations relate directly in one form or the other to the matters the Commission was charged with 

examining. The task is not an easy one. With limited resources, election administrators 

must have suitable and well-designed facilities, effective line management techniques, 

and the capacity to recruit and train poll workers.

An improperly functioning DMV can 

h

naturally lead to Election Day confusion. 

h
32

A well-managed polling place can be the most important factor contributing to the 

quality of the voter experience. Effective polling place management will keep lines short 

and moving, keep the number of provisional ballots to a minimum, and ensure that the 

voting machines are working properly. Well-trained poll workers can answer voters’ 

questions with accurate information and respond to the needs of particular communities of voters requiring special support, such as voters with disabilities or with limited 

English language proficiency.

Over the course of the hearings, the Commission received testimony about excellent 

programs in place and tested tools for assuring the efficient allocation of resources. 

More discouragingly, the Commission also heard about recurring problems that election administrators are expected to address without adequate support from the public 

or private sectors. There is a way forward however, and we have organized our discussion of recommendations and best practices around the following critical points in the 

management of a polling place:

•	 Polling place location and design

•	 Management of the flow of voters

•	 Poll worker recruitment

•	 Poll worker training

1. Polling Place Location and Design

The Commission received a substantial amount of testimony indicating that election 

administrators are too often scrambling to identify suitable facilities to serve as polling 

places.84 Not every potential location is adequate to meet the requirements of a polling location. A polling place must (1) have room to comfortably accommodate voters, (2) 

provide accessibility for voters with disabilities, (3) have adequate infrastructure such as the 

capacity for appropriate levels of internet and telephone connection, (4) offer adequate parking, and (5) be located in reasonable proximity to the population of voters that it is intended 

to serve. Because there is no such thing as a permanent polling place — it is necessarily 

set up only for Election Day, then disbanded and turned over to its other standard purposes — facilities generally in use throughout the rest of the year must be identified and 
33

easily converted to their periodic electoral function. Moving polling places often leads 

to voter confusion and other administrative problems. Therefore, to the extent possible, 

election administrators hope to retain the same facilities from one election to the next.85

Effective polling place management requires, at the outset, that the officials understand 

the constraints imposed by the facility in which balloting will take place. Each facility should be evaluated to assess parking availability, the path of travel for voters to the 

actual polling location, and the room itself. Local officials need to maintain a diagram of 

every polling place used in the jurisdiction to include at a minimum: room dimensions, location of power outlets, the proposed positioning of voting and voter processing equipment, the 

entry and exit routes, and signage required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

All such layouts should be maintained in the clerk’s office, provided to the election official 

responsible for the polling location on Election Day, and updated before every election. These 

evaluations can identify where temporary measures need to be taken to guarantee that 

the polling place is accessible with the placement of curb or threshold ramps, compliant 

signage, voter call buttons, etc. Some jurisdictions, such as Jefferson County, Colorado, 

also include an assessment of where voter lines would form to ensure that they would 

occur inside of the facility so that voters are not waiting in the cold or rain.86

Recommendation: Schools should be used as polling places; to address any related security concerns, Election Day should be an in-service day. 

With almost no exception, the testimony received from state and local election administrators identified schools as 

the preferred venue for polling places.87 They have the 

needed and desirable space, 

are inexpensive, widespread, 

conveniently located, and 

accessible for people with 

disabilities. About a quarter 

of voters nationwide voted 

in schools in the 2008 and 

2012 elections, and close to 

one third of Election Day voters did so.88 Recognizing the importance of schools in 

elections, some states mandate or explicitly authorize their use as polling locations.89

With almost no exception, the testimony 

h

received from state and local election 

administrators identified schools as the 

preferred venue for polling places. 

h
34

Since the tragic events in Newtown, Connecticut, some states have considered imposing additional limitations on access to schools for voting.90 It is this concern — security 

— that has presented the largest obstacle to widespread use of schools.91 Even in states 

where schools are authorized to serve as polling places, the Commission heard that 

many school districts resist using schools as polling places for this reason.92 This resistance can even extend to cases where the schools appear obligated to make themselves 

available by statute, but have adopted strategies to avoid being pressed into service.

Sensitive to this issue, some state laws and jurisdictions have focused on the possible use 

of schools on days when students are not in the classroom. Professional training or “in 

service” days offer an opportunity for the schools to remain on their academic schedule. 

If Election Day were an in-service day, students would not be present and teachers could 

use the day to perform administrative functions and conduct professional training.93

The Commission recommends that states authorize the use of schools as polling place 

locations, while at the same time taking all the steps necessary to address these legitimate 

security concerns. In the end, there is no better alternative than schools, and there are 

few locations more familiar and convenient to voters. Most communities do not have 

adequate alternative sites for polling places. Experience in jurisdictions where schools 

are used as polling places suggests that if schools are made unavailable, there may be 

either a crisis of access or a removal of polling places from the proximity of voters. It is 

known that the farther a polling place is moved from a voter the less likely that the voter 

will turn out to vote.94

State legislators working with school boards and election officials should be able to craft 

legislatively authorized programs that effectively balance school and electoral administrative needs. The Commission strongly recommends that all states review their state 

laws and contemporary practices within their jurisdictions to ensure the continued and 

future use of schools as polling places. The Commission more specifically recommends 

close attention to the use of professional or in-service training days to enable voting to 

take place on days when students would not be on location in school.
35

Recommendation: States should consider establishing vote centers to achieve 

economies of scale in polling place management while also facilitating voting at 

convenient locations.

The need to increase the number of schools used as polling places is representative of 

a larger set of issues concerning the optimal location for polling places to facilitate voting most efficiently. One recent innovation to address this problem is the use of “vote 

centers.” A vote center is “a polling place at which any registered [voter] in the political 

subdivision holding the election may vote, regardless of the precinct in which the [voter] 

resides.”95 Because they are intended to make voting more convenient, vote centers are 

often located in places that are proximate to the everyday activities of local residents, 

such as in shopping centers. Instead of siting polling places nearest to voters’ residences, 

vote centers are placed along common travel and commuting routes. 

Vote centers provide benefits to election administrators and voters alike. Election administrators like them because they can concentrate resources in a large location that 

can service multiple voters from many different precincts. Voters like them because 

they are often located in places where they would travel in the normal course of their 

day.96 They also help to address the long-standing problem of confusion among voters 

about their correct precinct polling locations.97 Polling place confusion accounts for a 

disproportionately high number of provisional ballots, as voters arriving at the wrong 

polling place cannot be offered a regular ballot.98 County-wide vote centers also tend to 

be established in locations superior in capacity and infrastructure to many used for more 

traditional precinct locations.

Indeed, jurisdictions that conduct in-person early voting effectively adopt the vote center model, given that early voting almost always takes place at centralized locations rather than in the multitude of polling places available for Election Day. Many jurisdictions 

with in-person early voting have already established the internet connectivity between 

polling locations and a centralized database necessary to ensure immediate updating of 

the list of who voted to prevent double voting. For them, adding Election Day vote 

centers takes advantage of the early voting infrastructure and computer systems to provide voters with additional options for casting their ballot.

The testimony received by the Commission indicates that vote centers can allow for a 

more efficient conduct of elections through the consolidation of precincts into smaller 
36

numbers of vote center locations and a reduction in the number of poll workers needed. 

In Bernalillo County, New Mexico, for example, the number of poll workers required 

for Election Day was reduced by two-thirds and the county realized substantial savings.99 There is also some evidence that vote centers may contribute to increased turnout — a measure of the value to voters of having the opportunity to cast their ballots at 

conveniently located and adequately equipped facilities.100

However, vote centers are not appropriate for every jurisdiction, and election authorities 

need to take a number of key factors into account if and when they transition to them. 

An insufficient number of vote centers or insufficient staffing and resources could increase, rather than decrease, voter wait times.101 Moreover, if they are inconveniently 

located, as compared to neighborhood polling places, any turnout benefit may not be 

realized and indeed, turnout could decrease. Such considerations are especially important for populations that must use public transportation to reach their voting location. 

The value of vote centers will depend on residential and transportation patterns. The 

decision on whether to transition to vote centers will often turn on whether more voters 

can be better served through large, highly-resourced and conveniently located polling 

locations or whether a larger number of smaller, traditional polling places can better 

meet voter needs.

2. Management of Voter Flow

Even with adequate facilities, election officials must efficiently allocate resources. They 

must position staff and voting machines at polling locations to provide an optimal flow 

of voters and to minimize the possibility of long wait times. The Commission heard 

extensive testimony on different techniques that administrators have used to accommodate the flow of voters without the risk of long lines.102 It also heard from industry 

leaders about innovative ways they have dealt with long wait times.

For example, many jurisdictions employ “line walkers” to address potential problems among 

voters before they reach a check-in station where their registration is verified. Doing so allows polling place officials to identify and resolve problems before voters reach the first 

choke point in the voting queue. Line walkers can identify, for example, which voters 

on line might be at the wrong polling place, have a problem with their registration, or 

need to cast a provisional ballot. Identifying such voters as early in the process as pos-
37

sible ensures that their problems will not result in congestion at the check-in station 

where research suggests most election lines develop.103

Other jurisdictions seek to give voters better information on line length before they go to the 

polling place, so they can plan accordingly. For example, Orange County, California, and 

Travis County, Texas, issued internet feeds on Election Day that described wait times at 

specific polling places.104 Especially in jurisdictions with vote centers where any voter 

in the county can vote in addition to their polling place, this kind of publicly available 

information can help spread out the flow of voters to alleviate congestion.105

The private sector employs other techniques to deal with long lines. Whether in restaurants or theme parks, customers are quite familiar with the notion of “taking a number” 

or “making an appointment” instead 

of waiting in line. By analogy, voters could be offered a “virtual wait” 

and an opportunity to spend the 

“wait time” elsewhere — running errands, or having lunch — with the 

assurance that upon returning to the 

polling place, they would be able 

to cast their ballot promptly. Voters judged to be in line at the point 

that they would experience an hour’s 

delay prior to voting could be issued 

cards with a proposed time of return. 

They could then leave the polling place or the line, should they wish to do so, and return at the appointed time and move through an expedited or special line to vote. This 

tool would be beneficial for the voters who remained in line as well as those who took 

advantage of this offer. Lines would be shorter, and the speed and comfort of voting is 

sure to improve the experience. Additionally, if the polling place had sufficient space, 

voters could “take a number” when they arrive, and then wait at a central location with 

chairs until their number was called, rather than having to stand in a long line. 

To be sure, there are imperfections in the analogy between lines at the polls and those 

at places of business. Voters waiting in line might not be too thrilled to see those with 

pre-appointments to vote pass them by. Moreover, any favorable treatment in the votThe private sector employs other 

h

techniques to deal with long lines . . . . 

Voters could be offered a “virtual 

wait” and an opportunity to spend 

the “wait time” elsewhere.

h
38

ing process due to skill in navigating new procedures might be seen by some as troublesome. As these practices have not yet been adopted by jurisdictions, the Commission 

would not describe them as “best practices” yet. Pilot programs should be considered 

that take the lessons learned from industry and apply them to the polling place.

Queuing theory, developed to deal with problems of industrial organization, however, can be 

helpful in identifying analogous phenomena in the polling place. Literature on that topic 

emphasizes that lines form when large numbers of people arrive at the same time, when 

there are too few points of service, and when the transaction time takes too long.106

Drawing on such literature, experts who testified before the Commission emphasized 

the stages in the voting process that bear on wait times:

Check-in: The first stage includes the check-in station when voters identify 

themselves to the poll worker who checks their registration status. At this 

stage their identification or signature can be checked. If the jurisdiction 

uses paper ballots, one is given to the voter at this time. Research suggests 

that most voters who experience long wait times did so at this stage.107 The 

factors generating wait times at this stage include inadequate numbers of poll 

workers, pollbooks, or check-in stations, as well as poor design of polling 

places and the inaccuracy of registration lists. High rates of provisional 

ballots can also lead to longer lines, as voters and poll workers attempt to 

address confusion regarding a voter’s registration status and to provide the 

appropriate ballot.

Voting Station Entry: The second stage begins after check-in when voters 

wait for a machine or privacy booth in order to mark their ballot. Here, 

inadequate supply of such machines or booths can lead to lines as voters 

wait for one to become available. The length of time it takes a voter to cast 

a ballot will affect wait times upstream in the process. The factors affecting 

how long it takes a voter to vote include the length and complexity of the 

ballot, the preparation and sophistication of the voter, and the functionality 

of the voting machine.108

Ballot Casting: Finally, for jurisdictions that rely on scanned paper ballots for 

in-person voting, the process of verifying and depositing a ballot can impose 

delays that migrate back upstream, particularly when ballots are more than 

one page.109 In jurisdictions with multiple ballot cards, bottlenecks can form 

at the optical scan machines and cause delays.
39

Whether the necessary resources include polling places, poll workers, tables, pollbooks, 

privacy booths, or voting machines, the problem of long lines is principally a problem 

of the deployment of resources.110 If the “one size does not fit all” slogan has any validity in addressing the problem of lines, it is this: local jurisdictions deploy a variety of 

different equipment to meet their functional demands, and they face a variety of different constraints in terms of the facilities available for voting. Proper deployment of 

resources in a particular precinct requires detailed planning and knowledge of expected 

voter turnout, average service times at check-in tables, and the likely flow of voters at 

peak times throughout the day. 

Thousands of service-related businesses across the country deal with similar challenges 

each day. General knowledge about how to meet these location-specific challenges is 

well known in the fields of industrial engineering and management science. The challenge is marrying more completely these common management tools with the election 

process.

If a jurisdiction either does not have sufficient resources or does not devote them to its 

voting process, then lines can form. Research shows that voters in a small number of 

states (or localities within states) persistently endure long lines.111 In these states, a topto-bottom review of resource allocation and standard operating procedures may be in 

order. However, for the most part, the problem of long lines usually only afflicts a limited share of the polling places within a county.112 This suggests that more often, it is the 

allocation of resources between polling places, rather than the total resources available, 

that causes long lines. In these cases, local jurisdictions may need to reconsider how 

resources are allocated, or how the addition of well-targeted resources could ameliorate 

the bottlenecks that do arise.

Although insufficient resources or their misallocation may be the primary and most obvious reasons for long lines, other factors can also play a significant role in delaying the 

voter. Statutes that require large numbers of voters to cast provisional ballots slow down 

the voting process.113 Inaccurate voting rolls increase the number of unregistered voters or voters in the wrong polling place who must be processed. Polling place changes 

can also cause lines if voters’ confusion leads many to show up at the wrong location.114

Finally, poorly trained poll workers can drastically slow down the voting process.115
40

Nothing is more important to the success of an election than planning. In most jurisdictions, it is very difficult to make many adjustments to address issues that arise 

on Election Day, so the validity, accuracy and detail of the plan is critically important. 

Planning for an Election Day begins with assessments of the number of registered voters and 

predictions as to how many of these voters will turn out during the early voting period and 

on Election Day.116 These predictions require accurate data concerning past turnout, as 

well as the historical pace of registration for past elections. If the jurisdiction is blindsided by the number of voters who show up at the polls, and cannot accommodate 

unplanned turnout, then long lines will occur. Many allocation decisions need to be 

made a half-year in advance of an election. However, the best-prepared jurisdictions react 

to data gathered in the critical three-month period prior to an election when the factors affecting turnout are most relevant. In that period the registration lists change considerably 

and the jurisdiction can learn what share of the voting population is using alternative 

means of voting, such as absentee ballots.

Predicting turnout is the beginning, not the end, of the process of preventing long lines. 

Jurisdictions must decide how to allocate their scarce resources between polling places 

on Election Day and during any applicable early voting period. To estimate how many 

poll workers, machines, and voting stations are needed on Election Day, jurisdictions must 

pretest their ballots to gauge the time it will take an average voter to vote the ballot.117 If a 

voter takes 10 minutes to vote a ballot and the balloting period for a day is twelve hours, 

for example, then a maximum of only 72 voters can be served on any given voting 

machine in a day. Similarly, at the check-in station, if it takes three minutes for a poll 

worker to check in an average voter, then only 20 voters can be checked in per hour, per 

poll worker. Service times such as these can be estimated by conducting actual pretesting of all aspects of the election under simulated conditions prior to Election Day. Of 

course, administrators must plan for peak traffic periods and not make the mistake of 

assuming that voters will apportion themselves evenly throughout the day. The number 

of voters a machine can theoretically serve if used during an entire day, for instance, is 

irrelevant if most voters arrive at the polls during a compressed four-hour period.118

There is much that states and localities can do to reduce wait times. Most obviously, 

increasing the number of voters who vote before Election Day can relieve Election Day 

traffic.119 However, some states that have adopted in-person early voting have simultaneously reduced Election Day polling places, leading to no net gain from the standpoint 

of Election Day administration.120 Even during the period of early voting, moreover, 
41

states must plan for increased turnout. Although voters appear to have a greater tolerance for waiting in line during the early voting period (since they chose to come at 

that particular time), wait times, on average, were higher in 2012 during early voting 

than they were on Election Day.121 Therefore, election officials not only must plan for 

the glut of voters who wish to vote early, but also must ensure that sufficient resources 

remain to keep lines short on Election Day. Many states, therefore, limit by statute the 

number of registered voters per precinct to ensure that polling place consolidation or 

population growth over time does not lead to turnout that overwhelms polling place 

capacity.

Well-informed voters can also help reduce wait times. An uninformed voter who sees 

the ballot for the first time in a polling booth will take longer to vote than one who 

comes prepared to vote having viewed a sample ballot either on a state’s website, through 

the news media, or perhaps in a mailer. The sample ballot should be available to all voters 

no later than the beginning of in-person early voting or three weeks prior to Election Day.

Voters can then have the ballot in hand and the opportunity to make up their mind before entering the polling place. Moreover, if the law allows, states should reduce the length 

and complexity of the ballot in Presidential Election years (which are generally the elections in 

which we experience long lines) to ensure that voters can vote more quickly.122 The jurisdiction should also provide voters the information they need, such as polling locations and 

hours, ballot and candidate information, absentee and UOCAVA ballot information, 

registration deadlines, and voter identification requirements. The easier it is for voters 

to obtain election-related information, the more likely they will show up at the correct 

polling place informed and ready to cast their ballot.

Systems that allow voters to mark a sample ballot prior to Election Day can also reduce 

the time a voter spends at the polls. In fact, technology now could allow a voter to fill 

out and download a sample ballot at home. A voting machine can then scan the sample 

ballot (or its barcode) so as to populate the ballot on the screen for the voter to verify his 

or her choices. The voter could still make changes to the ballot in the privacy booth, 

of course. However, a significant amount of the voter’s time could be saved by reading 

the sample ballot and making choices before casting the final ballot itself in the voting 

booth. 
42

Before experimenting with particular innovations to address long lines, jurisdictions 

must plan for the pace and volume of voters throughout the voting period. Every election official who is responsible for allocating a jurisdiction’s limited voting resources 

(ballots, voting booths, voting machines, voter check-in tables, pollbooks, qualified 

election workers, etc.) to polling locations must be able to predict how many voters will 

show up and how long they will take to vote. This knowledge is required to allocate 

voting resources efficiently to polling locations and to determine prior to the election 

if sufficient resources are available or if lines will be an issue due to a lack of resources. 

While most election officials do this to some degree, testimony showed that some do 

not. Lines were simply anticipated as part of the election process.123

Recommendation: Jurisdictions should develop models and tools to assist them 

in effectively allocating resources across polling places. 

To assist local jurisdictions in planning for the logistical challenges facing them on Election Day, election officials need greater access to industrial engineering tools that are regularly 

employed to help manage customer service queues. We can imagine a number of models 

for developing richer collaborations between industrial engineers and election officials. 

In some larger counties and cities, local governments may already employ the needed 

talent, so the issue may be one of developing inter-agency agreements to allow industrial 

engineers to consult with the election department as needed. Another model may be 

collaborations between election offices and universities. Land grant universities particularly would be the logical starting points for such collaborations in many states.

Although we sense a pressing need for a major effort to be made to foster a higher level 

of engagement between election officials and industrial engineers, important first steps 

have been taken to develop simple computer applications that demonstrate the value of 

industrial engineering tools in managing resource allocation for in-person voting. These 

resource calculators enable administrators to plan for efficient Election Day operations 

by judging the resources needed to accommodate the projected traffic through the polling place.124

To aid jurisdictions in making such calculations, the Commission identified examples 

of resource allocation calculators to illustrate the types of models jurisdictions can use 

to better allocate resources between their polling places. None of these is a universally 
43

applicable model for all types of jurisdictions; however, they stand as examples that jurisdictions can modify to suit their particular circumstances. The Commission, having 

heard impressive testimony on 

the models now available, is 

publicizing them and strongly recommending their use. 

The Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project is now hosting 

these models on its site, and are 

available through a link from 

www.supportthevoter.gov. The 

Commission urges the further 

development and tailoring of 

these tools so that they can be adopted across the widest range of jurisdictions. 

To be clear, the Commission is not recommending the use of resource calculators as certain solutions to polling place lines. They are tools that, prior to the election, allow the 

administrator to allocate limited voting resources most effectively based upon predicted 

turnout and expected time required for voting. Together with other sound polling place 

management practices, these tools can help ensure that a polling place quickly processes 

the volume of voters who will pass through on Election Day. They are guides, not 

answers, but indispensable guides nonetheless. Any kit of best practices would have to 

include these resource calculators, which, in turn, will continue to improve with experience and further development. It is the hope of the Commission that these models will 

serve as springboards for better models, adapted and refined for the particular circumstances of individual jurisdictions. 

Such calculators, however, are only as good as the data entered into them, and they can 

only be improved if their predictions are evaluated after each election. Addressing long 

lines requires systematic procedures to spot when and where long lines occur. Keeping track of wait times at individual polling places can be done using simple management 

techniques, such as recording line length at regular intervals during Election Day and giving 

time-stamped cards to voters during the day to monitor turnout flow.

After each election, moreover, jurisdictions must evaluate and account for any lines that 

were reported. In polling places with a history of long lines, local election officials should 

h

The Commission, having heard impressive 

testimony on the resource calculators now 

available, is publicizing them and strongly 

recommending their use.

h
44

analyze the reasons for excessive wait times and develop plans based on that analysis for avoiding the problem in the future. The Commission further recommends that, in the interests of 

coordination and communication among all responsible election officials, the local officials 

should provide copies of these plans for remedying line problems to the relevant chief state election official.

Recommendation: Jurisdictions should transition to electronic pollbooks. 

Numerous witnesses before the Commission testified to the extraordinary value that 

they have derived from the use of electronic pollbooks.125 An e-pollbook is an electronic 

version of the paper pollbook. It is simply a list of eligible voters in the relevant jurisdiction, which traditionally has been organized alphabetically or by address of the voter. 

The e-pollbooks provide poll workers with the ability to locate a voter’s information 

quickly and accurately, to confirm a voter’s registration status, and to prescribe the appropriate ballot. The e-pollbook provides greater flexibility to those who are checking in 

people to vote, compared to the traditional paper list. In some cases, the e-pollbook has 

real-time access to the county or state voter list, which allows poll workers even greater 

flexibility in dealing with voter registration problems that emerge on Election Day.

E-pollbooks can make a singular contribution in resolving registration problems at 

check-in stations. Preprinted paper pollbooks only contain the names of voters eligible 

to vote in a specific precinct. If the 

voter is in line for the wrong precinct 

or in the wrong polling place and 

reaches the front of the line, the election worker with the paper pollbook 

cannot resolve the issue. Thus, the 

voter must be removed from the line 

until the issue is resolved—often by 

contacting the central election office, 

which may be overwhelmed with 

other calls. Even in the best of circumstances, the voter is inconvenienced and the capacity of the central election office is taxed.126

E-pollbooks significantly reduce this burden.127 Some newer implementations of epollbooks give poll workers the flexibility to “walk the line,” to make sure that those 

h

E-pollbooks can make a singular 

contribution in resolving registration 

problems at check-in stations.

h
45

waiting in line are registered to vote and at the correct polling place. If not at the correct 

polling place, they can then be directed to the right one. If they do not appear to be 

registered, these voters can then be taken out of line well before reaching the check-in 

station, so that their registration-related problem can be solved without holding up the 

rest of the voters.

E-pollbooks benefit election officials as well as voters. They can help to reduce poll 

worker errors frequently associated with paper-based voter check-in processes. Poll 

workers sometimes fail to check-in voters, distribute the wrong ballots, or send voters 

to the wrong polling place. E-pollbooks can help mitigate, if not solve, each of these 

problems. E-pollbooks can also be instrumental in gathering data on wait times and 

traffic, as they can keep track of when voters arrive and check-in. These data can later 

assist election officials in planning for peak flow times throughout the day. Finally, epollbooks can save money otherwise spent each election on the generation of thousands 

of pages of voter rolls. It is no wonder then, that in the national survey of election officials, e-pollbooks was one of the most frequently identified innovations that respondents desired.128

3. Poll Workers

Poll workers represent the primary point of contact with the electoral process for most 

voters. Effective polling place management requires personnel on location who are 

well-trained and able to work on what will ultimately be a long and grueling Election 

Day.129 They must administer the polling place and provide information as necessary 

to the voters. One of the signal weaknesses of the system of election administration 

in the United States is the absence of a dependable, well-trained trained corps of poll 

workers.130 Workers report for duty only a few days a year, possibly as infrequently as 

once. The days are long and the pay is low. Training is spotty and often consists of no 

more than a couple of hours.131 The quality of training in approximately 8,000 election 

jurisdictions varies markedly.132

Because many citizens who might otherwise volunteer for poll worker duty cannot take 

the time off from work, the responsibility falls throughout the United States predominantly on senior citizen volunteers. Surveys show that just under half of the community 

of poll-workers is retired, and that more than half of poll workers are older than 60.133
46

A survey of local election administrators on the issues specified in the President’s Executive Order identifies poll worker shortages as one of the leading concerns.134 The Commission heard consistent testimony that effective poll worker recruitment, training and 

staffing are among the most important factors in determining the quality of the voter 

experience. There is evidence to this effect in studies that show that voter satisfaction 

and confidence correlate with positive appraisal of poll worker performance.135

a. Recruitment

Recruitment of poll workers is a persistent challenge. Election administrators surveyed 

on the point report considerable difficulties in locating dependable poll workers; across 

states, large numbers of officials reported that recruitment is “very” or “somewhat” difficult.136 Several steps could be taken immediately to significantly address the undersupply of poll-workers. The Commission recommends that election administrators consider 

the many recommendations made available in the relevant EAC report, Successful Practices 

for Poll Worker Recruitment, Training and Retention.137 The Commission wishes to highlight and recommend two policies in particular: the recruitment of high school and 

college students and the recruitment of employees from the public and private sector.

Recommendation: Jurisdictions should recruit public and private sector employees, as well as high school and college students, to become poll workers.

Finding a sufficient number of capable poll workers with the free time to work on Election Day can be one of the most difficult challenges election officials face. Retirees are, 

therefore, a natural resource to draw upon to fill the need. However, jurisdictions facing 

shortages need to diversify the 

population pool from which 

they draw poll workers. To 

do so will require cooperation 

from schools and other private 

and public entities.

Jurisdictions that allow students 

to work at polling places have 

generally found that the practice is an effective way to have sufficient staff on Election 

Day and to expand the future pool of poll workers.138 Half of the states already allow 16 

h

However, jurisdictions facing shortages 

need to diversify the population pool

 from which they draw poll workers.

h
47

and 17 year olds to work at the polls.139 For credit or other recognition, these students 

are given Election Day off from school (if school is in session) to serve at polling places. 

With systematic attention to creative programs for encouraging student participation, 

the pool of available support for poll working could be significantly expanded. As an 

exercise in civic education, certainly, this alternative has much to be commended.

In recent years, some programs have also been instituted to encourage employers to 

make opportunities for poll worker service available to their employees.140 Two states 

provide by law that employers must afford their employees these opportunities without 

penalty. Other states have developed programs to recognize employers for supporting those 

employees who wish to work on Election Day. Examples include the “Champions for Democracy” program in Franklin County, Ohio,141 and in the Kansas City metropolitan 

area, “Making Voting Popular.”142 

The Commission recommends that each state establish or upgrade programs for encouraging employee service at the polls. State statutory authorization has the evident 

virtue of clearly setting out state policy in this regard and guarding against the possibility 

that employees wishing to serve will be discouraged by fear that they will suffer penalties in the workplace. In the end, however, the success of these programs depends on 

broad community support, including recognition of both the employee’s service as a 

poll worker and the employer’s willingness to give the employee the day off for that 

service. Beyond mere statutory authorization, voluntary initiatives of this nature may 

establish these programs more firmly within the communities these poll workers serve. 

Taken together, recognition at law and informal recognition in the community have the 

combined potential for adding appreciably to the number of poll workers prepared to 

serve on Election Day.

The public sector also has a significant contribution to make through the encouragement of poll worker service by county employees. County employee participation is 

authorized and encouraged in some jurisdictions, but not in others. The Commission 

recommends that jurisdictions throughout the country study and adopt various ways 

of bringing the county workforce in to support the electoral process. We recognize 

that certain safeguards might be appropriate, such as disallowing county employee poll 

worker service if the official to whom they report is a candidate on the ballot. However, 

for most county employees a day of service as a poll worker does not pose challenges 

different than those faced by private sector employees. 
48

b. Training

Election administrators must also contend with the difficulty finding adequate time 

and resources for the training of poll workers.143 As noted, poll workers are paid little 

and some show up only for the days on which elections are held. Their availability for 

training is necessarily limited, and high rates of turnover in some jurisdictions lead to 

losses of institutional memory from one election to the next.144

Given the variety of tasks facing modern poll workers, different poll workers may require different skills. Together, however, the team of poll workers can determine the 

quality of the voting experience in the polling place. Depending on their familiarity 

and facility with the check-in process, poll workers can be the critical determinant of 

the length of a line. Similarly, poll worker familiarity with the voting equipment, especially with features designed to make machines accessible, can determine in the most 

basic way whether a voter can cast a ballot.145 Finally, poll workers unaware of various 

legal requirements, such as those governing provisional ballots, may unintentionally 

turn away eligible voters.

Poll worker training programs vary widely among jurisdictions and are not generally 

rigorous or thorough.146 On average, poll workers receive two-and-a-half hours of training.147 However, many receive such 

training only once, while others are 

retrained for each election. In some 

cases, the teaching mode is interactive 

and may include Election Day simulation, while in others it is primarily 

“lecture” style.148 A few jurisdictions 

evaluate poll worker progress in mastering the information, but not all 

do.149 Even fewer evaluate poll workers to determine if they can perform their Election Day responsibilities. Given the scarcity of poll workers, many who fail at the most basic tasks are nevertheless retained for 

Election Day. 

Poll worker training programs vary 

h

widely among jurisdictions and are 

not generally rigorous or thorough. 

h
49

Recommendation: States should institute poll worker training standards. 

The Commission strongly recommends that states prescribe statutorily required training regimens and allocate the resources necessary to give those programs the chance to 

succeed. Online coursework presents a fresh opportunity for more intensive training 

and can include mechanisms for feedback and evaluation. Working with the state’s colleges and universities, election officials can avail themselves of the growing capacity to 

design and deliver highly effective online courses that go well beyond traditional online 

and video classes of the past. By taking programs online, jurisdictions can save money 

and make training materials and interactive tools available to poll workers on a virtually 

continuing basis.

Because of the variety of voting systems that may be used in a given state, counties may 

be best situated in some states to train on the specific equipment used in their jurisdictions. States could support the counties by preparing a template that permits each county 

to further customize the program suitable for their training purposes, while still achieving 

uniform application of the state’s legal standards. There are examples, such as in the state 

of Michigan,150 or Dallas County, Texas,151 where significant time and attention has 

been paid to the development of online training programs that, the Commission was 

advised, have proven effective.

4. Management of the Polling Place to Address the Needs of Particular 

Communities of Voters

The President’s Executive Order identifies among the issues the Commission must consider problems of accessibility faced by voters with disabilities and with limited English 

language proficiency. As mentioned in the introduction, the Commission believes that 

the needs of these voters must be considered at all stages of the electoral process. Indeed, 

just as election authorities should “bake in” accessibility to each aspect of election administration, this Report attempts to do so by not limiting its discussion of such needs 

to a separate section. That being said, polling place management presents a range of issues concerning voters with disabilities and limited English proficiency that a discussion 

of some specific best practices may be necessary.
50

Recommendation: Election authorities should establish advisory groups for voters with disabilities and for those with limited English proficiency.

As a threshold matter, an election official must work with community groups in order to understand the needs of voters with disabilities and limited English proficiency, as well as to gain assistance and advice as to how to meet those needs. Advisory 

groups from these communities can play a critical role in fostering cooperation between 

their members and the election authorities. Their advice is also indispensable as an 

election authority makes decisions on resource allocation to accommodate accessibility 

concerns.152

Advisory groups play a critical communication function as well. When election authorities need to inform voters with accessibility needs of the resources available, advisory groups can serve as a conduit between their members and the election authorities. 

Election authorities must make every effort through their own websites and traditional communication outlets (especially through non-English media) to reach voters with accessibility 

needs. However, sometimes the advisory groups through their email lists, websites and 

communication modes specifically tailored to those with accessibility needs can partner 

with election officials to reach voters more easily.

Advice from these groups can be particularly useful when it comes to training poll workers and managing polling places. The Commission heard on several occasions how poll 

workers were poorly trained to deal with voters with accessibility needs and how polling 

places and election materials were not designed with these needs in mind. If the relevant 

groups are brought in early enough into the decision-making process, many of these 

concerns regarding poll workers and polling places can be alleviated.

a. Voters with disabilities

The population of voters with 

disabilities is large and growing. Roughly 35 to 46 million Americans of voting age 

— amounting to one in seven 

potential voters — have accessibility needs.153 The share of 

the voting population with disabilities will also grow considerably as the Baby Boomer 

The population of voters with disabilities 

h

is large and growing.

h
51

population ages. Issues of voting and accessibility, therefore, are not ones for a discrete 

subset of the population. Rather, they are issues that many, if not most, voters may 

experience at some point in their lives.

Recommendation: States and localities must adopt comprehensive management 

practices to assure accessible polling places.

Federal law requires that all polling places be accessible to voters with disabilities in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Civil Rights Division of the 

Justice Department has published a pamphlet and checklist (http://www.ada.gov/votingchecklist.htm) that can and should be used to ensure each polling place is accessible 

to voters with disabilities. The responsible election official should keep the completed checklist for each polling place on file in the office, and it should be updated before each election.

For voters with disabilities, the first question is one of physical access, both inside and 

outside the polling place.154 Outside the polling place, impediments to access present 

in a variety of ways, such as parking lots and spaces located far from the polling place, 

and a lack of navigable space between the parking lot and the polling place entrance.155

Within the polling place, elderly voters and voters with disabilities waiting their turn to 

vote must have access to chairs while waiting and then, when their turn to vote comes, to 

the machinery.156 Corridors and doorways must be wide enough for wheelchair ramps 

in the location, and the voting machines must not be set too close to a wall and must 

otherwise be reachable.157 Over time, the Government Accountability Office has found 

that significant improvement has been made in the accessibility of polling places. But 

additional improvement is still required.158

Testimony on this issue highlighted the importance of ensuring that poll workers are 

trained on how to interact with voters with disabilities and how to configure and operate the equipment.159 Training films already developed by both election officials and 

organizations representing voters with disabilities are also available on the internet. The 

Elections Department of the County and City of San Francisco has provided an extremely 

helpful video guide160 to setting up an accessible polling place and the Pennsylvania Department of State has an equally helpful video guide for poll workers to educate them about voters 

with disabilities.161 The Commission regards them as models that other jurisdictions should 

emulate.
52

Recommendation: States should survey and audit polling places to determine 

their accessibility.

States must routinely audit their polling places to determine their accessibility. Polling 

places change with each election: some are removed due to consolidation, new ones 

might be added, and others’ architectural features may change. Moreover, as states 

shift to alternative modes of voting, such as vote centers and early voting locations, or 

change their voting technology, new accessibility concerns may arise and need addressing. Only a routine audit that evaluates polling places for accessibility can ensure that 

state authorities are kept up to date about any problems in polling place design affecting 

voters with disabilities.

The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board performs a survey and audit of polling places that stands as a model. Its Polling Place Accessibility Survey162 asks a series of 

questions regarding parking, pathways, entrances, interior routes, and voting areas. The 

Board’s 2013 Report163 was derived from 1,614 polling place audits conducted over the 

course of 16 elections, which required the visiting of 921 municipalities located in 66 

Wisconsin counties. The audit was comprehensive and identified shortcomings that 

deserved attention. Following the audit, localities then worked to address the problems 

the audit revealed.

b. Voters with limited English proficiency

Voters with limited English proficiency confront a range of barriers in voting. According 

to census statistics, approximately 10 million citizens of voting age do not speak English 

“very well.”164 Language barriers may 

prevent effective participation at each 

stage of the voting process: navigating 

an election website, learning about 

the registration process, registering to 

vote, gaining information about the 

election (sample ballot, polling place 

location and hours, etc.), navigating 

the polling place, interacting with 

poll workers, and finally, casting a ballot. Election authorities must be aware of the 

challenges faced by voters with limited English proficiency and adapt their communications accordingly. 

Language barriers may prevent 

h

effective participation at each stage of 

the voting process. 

h
53

As noted in the introduction, sections 203 and 208 of the Voting Rights Act provide 

a series of protections for voters of limited English proficiency. If a language minority 

exceeds five percent of the voting population of a jurisdiction, it must provide election 

materials and polling place assistance in that language. Even for voters outside of jurisdictions meeting that threshold, however, voters with difficulty reading English are entitled to voting assistance from a person of their choosing. Compliance with these legal 

requirements varies considerably by jurisdiction and by polling place. As elsewhere, the 

Commission urges strong enforcement of these existing federal laws.

Recommendation: Jurisdictions should provide bilingual poll workers to any 

polling place with a significant number of voters who do not speak English.

A serious problem highlighted throughout the Commission’s review of the barriers to 

access faced by limited English proficiency voters was the inadequate supply of bilingual 

poll workers. Once again, where adequate assistance is not available at the polls, errors 

in communication can lead to logjams that contribute to problems such as lines.165 The 

Commission recommends that election officials develop and implement plans to work 

with members of minority language groups in their jurisdictions to address the issue. 

As in the case of voters with disabilities, poll workers must exhibit an understanding 

of the specific issues that limited English proficiency voters face. No voter, for any 

reason, should be made to feel unwelcome or in any way a “second-class” citizen. To 

have personnel on hand, properly trained, who can speak the language of the voter is 

indispensable to establishing a polling place that runs appropriately and treats and supports all voters alike. Election administrators must consider the number of workers 

necessary to accommodate the language minority population. The should also ensure 

that poll workers hired to provide language assistance have the necessary skill set to do 

so effectively and should provide them with all of the tools necessary to be successful. 

The EAC has published glossaries of election terminology in many languages that can 

be invaluable in establishing an effective program.166

The Commission believes that this recommendation might be considered, and its objective satisfied, in conjunction with its emphasis on the importance of opening up 

more successful channels of poll worker recruitment in our educational institutions. 
54

Students with bilingual capabilities could be recruited and given credit for their service. 

The same could be true for bilingual teachers in the school system, who can be a critical 

resource both for recruiting students and serving as poll workers on Election Day.

Recommendation: Jurisdictions should test all election materials for plain 

language and usability.

Even in jurisdictions without large non-English speaking populations, steps should be 

taken to address the barriers that language can place in front of limited English proficient voters. Voting materials and ballots are notoriously complex and difficult to read 

for all voters. Often this is the fault of an election code that heaps one requirement onto 

another without consideration for the physical limits of a printed page or the attention 

and capabilities of a voter. Such laws need to be reformed, but even acting within those 

constraints, election officials should adapt their materials to make them as easy as possible for voters to understand.

The Commission urges jurisdictions to engage in usability testing of their voting and 

polling place materials, with particular attention to adopting “plain language” guidelines.167 Forms and notices that may seem clear to one schooled in the procedures 

of a polling place will be difficult for many, if not most, non-experts to comprehend. 

All materials and designs need to be tested before an election to ensure that voters of 

varying proficiency with English can understand them. This includes not only native 

English speakers and those who speak foreign languages, but also those with cognitive 

challenges who can often be confused by directions written in a bureaucratic language.

C. Voting Before Election Day

Voting in the United States has undergone what has been described as a “quiet revolution” in the expansion of the time allotted for voting.168 Nearly a third of voters in the 

2012 Election cast their ballot before Election Day, more than double the rate of the 

2000 election.169 Of the more than 47 million Americans who cast ballots early in 

2012, 29 million were cast by mail and 18.5 million early in-person.170

Whatever the form and design of in-person or mail voting in any one state, the trend 

toward increasing the time period for voting is certain to continue. Stated simply, early 

voting offers Americans opportunities to participate in the electoral process that simply 
55

cannot be afforded by the contained twelve-hour period of the traditional Election Day. 

Election officials from both parties 

testified to the importance of early 

voting in alleviating the congestion 

and other potential problems of a 

single Election Day.

Early voting takes several forms and 

the type of early voting available varies considerably by region. In the 

West, vote-by-mail and no-excuse 

absentee voting predominate, with 

Washington and Oregon running 

their elections exclusively by mail. In 

27 other states and the District of Columbia, no-excuse absentee voting is available.171

In some, such as Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Montana, New Jersey, and Utah, a voter can permanently register as an absentee voter. In 32 

states plus the District of Columbia, some form of early in-person voting is available. 

Although available in Western states, it is used with greater frequency in the South.172 In 

addition to these two paradigmatic forms of early voting, many hybrids also exist, such 

as where voters can apply for, vote and drop off their absentee ballots at a county office, 

an early voting site, or at a polling place on Election Day. Indeed, the state of Oregon 

has “all mail” elections, but 60 percent of their ballots are not returned by mail, they are 

dropped at drop-boxes provided for voters across the state.173 Some states also allow for 

what is cryptically named “in-person absentee voting,” where a voter can obtain and cast 

an absentee ballot before Election Day at an election headquarters with the ballot then 

tabulated along with all the other absentee ballots received.

The testimony received by the Commission uniformly reflected the view that Americans will continue to expect choices in when and how they can vote prior to Election 

Day. Some states have proposed legislation to limit the length of time during which 

in-person early voting would be available. However, in most states discussions concern 

how early voting should be structured, not whether it would be offered at all. Variations 

remain in the formats provided for early voting. Some states still require excuses for 

absentee voting by mail, while Oregon and Washington provide for all-mail elections. 

Election officials from both parties 

h

testified to the importance of early 

voting in alleviating the congestion 

and other potential problems of a 

single Election Day. 

h
56

In-person early voting is also characterized by diversity. Early voting states, on average, 

provide 19 days for voting. But that average does not reflect the considerable variation 

among states in the number of days, which days, and which hours early voting is available (whether it includes the weekend before the election, for example).174

The Commission recognizes that each form of early voting has its critics. Some criticize 

the practice, in general, for permitting voters to cast ballots at different stages of a campaign with different levels of information about the candidates. In-person early voting, 

in particular, is criticized because it requires more extensive staffing both for the election 

authority and the campaigns that monitor polling places. No-excuse absentee voting 

and vote-by-mail, moreover, often lead to errors in balloting on the part of the election 

authority or the voter. Ballots can be lost in the mail (either in delivery or return), they 

can be mailed out or received too late for timely voting, and voters occasionally make 

mistakes in complying with various signature and other requirements that make an absentee ballot legal. Fraud is rare, but when it does occur, absentee ballots are often the 

method of choice.175 Finally, absentee ballots are usually paper ballots, and are therefore 

not accessible to many persons with disabilities, such as those with visual or dexterity 

challenges.

What does emerge from evidence about the experience of voters is that their tolerance 

for wait times is considerably higher with early voting. Having chosen the day and 

time for voting that is convenient for them, early voters are described as being in a more 

“celebratory” frame of mind than under the often rushed circumstances they face on 

Election Day when they must vote at a specific location on a specific day. The Commission has found that in early voting our electoral process is increasingly reflecting the 

expectations that voters have about the choices that should be available to them in their 

day-to-day lives. As noted in testimony from the National Conference of State Legislatures, “no state . . . abandoned these early voting options once they’ve tried them.”176

Recommendation: States should expand opportunities to vote before 

Election Day. 

Early voting is here to stay,177 and the Commission recommends that states that have 

not yet offered voters choice on when to cast their ballot commit to study the alternatives and adopt those that would work best for them. Different states will prefer different types of voting before Election Day, as well as different durations for the early voting 
57

period. However, the bipartisan consensus of election administrators in favor of voting 

before Election Day was evident in the testimony heard by the Commission and the 

response of voters around the country when it has been made available.178

Whatever its preferred format, early voting addresses many of the current and future 

challenges to voting in America. As discussed above, polling places are becoming more 

difficult to locate and staff. Early in-person voting allows election authorities to use the 

facilities available to them for longer periods of time to relieve some of the traffic that 

would occur on Election Day. Similarly, for jurisdictions facing a crisis in the acquisition of new voting machines, extending the early voting period will allow the jurisdiction to service more voters per machine.

The benefits of pre-Election Day voting can only be realized, however, if jurisdictions 

do not, at the same time, overly reduce resources dedicated to Election Day. All things 

being equal, extending the period for voting should relieve the congestion on Election 

Day. However, if jurisdictions overcompensate by significantly reducing the number 

of polling places, staff, and other resources available for Election Day, that may not be 

the case. Therefore, the Commission emphasizes that expansion of pre-Election Day voting 

should not come at the expense of adequate facilities and resources dedicated to Election Day.

A similar cautionary note applies to vote centers, as well. As noted above, jurisdictions 

that allow early in-person voting usually have the physical and computer infrastructure 

to establish Election Day vote centers. However, any management benefits from voting 

in larger more convenient locations will not be realized if the number of vote centers is 

inadequate or if insufficient resources are deployed to deal with the larger number of 

voters a vote center necessarily experiences. 

Likewise, expansion of no-excuse absentee or mail balloting must be done with an 

awareness of the risks and downsides of that method. As a threshold matter, to the extent that these methods rely on the U.S. Postal Service, they depend upon an institution 

under increased strain and undergoing major restructuring, as highlighted for example 

by recent consolidation of processing plants and proposed abolition of Saturday mail 

delivery. Jurisdictions must account for these changes in the schedule for mailing and 

receiving absentee ballots.
58

Problems with the mail are indicative of larger challenges with absentee and mail voting. 

Unlike voting in a polling place, voting by mail requires successful delivery and receipt 

of the ballot at many stages in the voting pipeline.179 A jurisdiction must receive the 

voter’s properly executed application for an absentee ballot before the relevant deadline. 

The voter then must receive the ballot on time and properly execute it by, for example, 

providing some identifying information and signature.180 The ballot then must be received by the election office in time to be counted. At each stage of this process, ballots 

can get lost by fault of the voter, the election administrator, the mail, or someone else.

Therefore, while endorsing the expansion of no-excuse absentee voting, the Commission also 

encourages the increased use of safeguards. One such safeguard is online tracking of absentee 

ballots. County election websites should enable voters to verify that their absentee ballot request was received, that their ballot was mailed out, and then later that it was received and 

counted (and if not counted, the reason why).181 Barcoding technology has empowered 

jurisdictions to automate this process and to empower voters to check that their votes 

have not been “lost in the system.”182 Moreover, jurisdictions that recognize a problem 

with the absentee ballot or application of a voter should follow up with that voter if sufficient time exists to cure any technical defects that might prevent the voter’s vote from 

being counted.

Furthermore, establishing communication with the local Postmaster is essential to ensure that issues are addressed and that mailings comply with postal regulations. Inconsistent interpretation of these regulations surrounding mailing content and Official 

Election Material Mailings is an ongoing concern for election administrators. Rejections of election-related mail, rate differentials, and delay of service to the voter have led 

some to call for simplified pricing and a service regime for Official Election Material, 

such as a single rate without content restrictions. Finally, some election administrators 

have advised that officials should retrieve ballots at the post office itself to ensure they 

are all received by the appropriate deadline.183

The Commission endorses expanded use of pre-Election Day voting. Although the 

Commission considers the trajectory of early voting to be clear and irreversible, different 

states, of course, will adopt the type of early voting that best fits their needs and capabilities. Whatever the form early voting may take, it must be administered in an equitable 

manner so all voters can have equal opportunity to vote. Indeed, enabling voters to cast 

a ballot at a time convenient to them, not the election authority, is the whole point of 

allowing voting before Election Day.
59

D. Military and Overseas Voters 

Military and overseas voters confront problems similar to other absentee voters, but 

their geographic distance from local election officials often magnifies the challenges of 

registering, receiving ballots, returning them, and having them counted.184 While all voters can benefit 

from the increased availability of 

online tools, the internet is the election lifeline for many military and 

overseas voters, in particular. Any 

process in the election administration pipeline that relies on the mail 

is one that necessarily has a disparate impact on overseas and military 

voters, for whom mail (whether 

that of a foreign government or 

the Military Postal Service) is often slow and unreliable.185 However, jurisdictions vary 

wildly in the quality of the tools and information on their websites, and the degree to 

which they specifically seek out and assist uniformed and overseas (UOCAVA) voters.

Through federal legislation, such as UOCAVA and the MOVE Act, the nation has 

made great strides in recent years in facilitating participation by military and overseas 

voters.186 In particular, the MOVE Act’s requirement that ballots be mailed 45 days before an election has helped address the previously intractable problem of overseas voters 

not receiving their ballots on time.187 Likewise, the innovations of the Federal Postcard 

Application (FPCA) and Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB) serve as important 

stop gaps to ensure that service members can register and vote in the event the normal 

state methods fail.

With these innovations and legal changes have come some problems, however. Because 

of changes with the MOVE Act, there is great uncertainty as to how long an FPCA 

remains in effect — one election, a two-year election cycle, or more. Prior to MOVE, 

requests made through the FPCA would lead to ballot delivery for the next two federal 

elections. Although the MOVE Act now reduces the requirement to one year, some 

states still abide by the two-year standard.188 Some states take the FPCA at face-value 

Jurisdictions vary wildly in the quality 

h

of the tools and information on their 

websites, and the degree to which 

they specifically seek out and assist 

uniformed and overseas voters.

h
60

as a “voter registration and absentee ballot application” and utilize it to fully register a 

covered voter and simultaneously slate the voter to receive an absentee ballot. Other 

jurisdictions treat the FPCA as a temporary registration mechanism, only registering the 

voter for the period of time the FPCA designates and then canceling the voter’s registration at the end of that time period. 

Second, jurisdictions vary in their tendency to count a FWAB simultaneously as a voter 

registration application — some do and some do not.189 The FWAB is used by voters 

who swear and attest that they have made a previous attempt to register and request a 

ballot and have not received the standard ballot to vote. Yet some jurisdictions reject a 

FWAB if they do not have a previous request on record.190 These inconsistencies lead to 

great confusion among service members and overseas voters over whether their registrations are effective. 

Any consistent standard regarding the FWAB and FPCA is better than no rule at all. 

Because the FWAB and FPCA were both intended to enable voter registration by military 

and overseas voters, states should recognize them, at a minimum, as voter registration applications akin to those filed by other voters. With respect to the FPCA, the MOVE Act’s 

permission for states to treat the FPCA as a ballot application for one year only was 

motivated by the fact that the extreme mobility of the military population often leads 

their addresses on voter rolls to become quickly out of date. However, now two soldiers, 

both using the same form in different states, could have their registrations and ballot 

requests become inoperative at different times. Unless the MOVE Act is amended to 

require a fixed period for which a FPCA will serve as a ballot application, states need to 

coordinate among themselves to establish consistency in the determination of whether 

a FPCA will enable a military or overseas voter to receive a ballot for one or two years. 

Recommendation: States should provide ballots and registration materials to 

military and overseas voters via their websites.

Looking toward the future, even though the internet is not yet secure enough for voting, we should expect that military and overseas voters will continue to be the testing 

ground for greater use of the internet for communications between election authorities 

and UOCAVA voters.191 Because of the unique needs of UOCAVA voters and the 

importance of the internet as the primary mode through which election officials communicate with them, it is imperative that jurisdictions provide a targeted website and 
61

assistance for those voters.192 The websites of state and local election authorities must 

be improved to provide customized and comprehensive information for military and 

overseas voters.

A survey of state election websites by the Overseas Voter Foundation has detailed the 

shortfalls in the quality of materials and instructions for overseas and military voters:193

•	 26 jurisdictions offer a direct link to military and overseas voter services on 

their voting/elections homepage.

•	 Rather than offering their own state-specific instructions, 20 states redirect 

military and overseas voters to FVAP for instructions on how to vote from 

abroad.

•	 15 states have no on-site option for UOCAVA “voter registration” on the 

state website (they either redirect the user to FVAP or provide no assistance).

•	 13 states have no on-site option for “absentee ballot request” on their state 

website (they either redirect the user to FVAP or provide no assistance).

•	 35 states have no on-site option for use of the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot 

(FWAB) (they either redirect the user to FVAP or provide no assistance).

•	 19 states provide no extra assistance to military and overseas voters, such 

as a specific e-mail address, an interactive help desk, or a frequently asked 

questions (FAQ) section.

Many of the innovations that will assist domestic voters will have payoffs for military 

voters as well. Like other highly mobile voters, members of the military suffer from a 

registration system that requires re-registration whenever the voter changes addresses. 

As they move from one base to another and then another, service members must reregister to vote (if they are moving residences within the U.S.) or notify their home 

election official of their new mailing address (if they are moving but not changing their 

legal residence). In either case, the ease with which a voter can navigate the registration 

process from afar will be a determining factor to overcoming the first hurdle on the way 

to voting. All the benefits of online registration for domestic voters, therefore, are even 

greater for military and overseas voters.
62

The same holds for innovations in voting technology that will allow voters to create and 

fill in their ballot online, even if they do not cast it over the internet. However they may 

transmit their ballot, overseas and military voters would benefit from a system that allows 

them to create on their attached printer a ballot with a barcode that can be read by the local 

election administrator.194 Doing so should also cut down on the work often required by 

election officials who must re-mark ballots received from overseas so that the machine 

counter can read them. As with all other absentee ballots, the voter must verify his or 

her identity. But the more that the transmission and receipt of such ballots are free from 

human error, the greater the likelihood that the ballot will be received, cast, and counted 

correctly.

E. Growing Challenges with Election Equipment and 

Voting Technology

Perhaps the most dire warning the Commission heard in its investigation of the topics in 

the Executive Order concerned the 

impending crisis in voting technology.195 Well-known to election 

administrators, if not the public at 

large, this impending crisis arises 

from the widespread wearing out 

of voting machines purchased a 

decade ago, the lack of any voting machines on the market that 

meet the current needs of election 

administrators, a standard-setting 

process that has broken down, and 

a certification process for new machines that is costly and time-consuming. In short, jurisdictions do 

not have the money to purchase 

new machines, and legal and market constraints prevent the development of machines 

they would want even if they had the funds.

When most people think of the crisis in voting technology, they think it passed with the 

2000 election. Ballots became notorious in that election as the cause of many problems. 

Indeed, the cross-eyed vote counter in Florida remains to this day the poster child of 

sorts for election dysfunction.

The most dire warning the Commission 

h

heard in its investigation of the topics 

in the Executive Order concerned the 

impending crisis in voting technology 

. . . [which] arises from the widespread 

wearing out of voting machines 

purchased a decade ago. 

h
63

The voting technology crisis the country will soon experience has its roots in the 2000 

election, but the nature of the problem is quite different than a decade ago. A large 

share of the voting machines currently in operation were purchased with federal funds 

appropriated in 2003 as part of HAVA’s provisions assisting in the transition away from 

punch card ballots and mechanical lever machines toward Direct Recording Electronic 

(DRE) and optical scan machines.196 Those machines are now reaching the end of their 

natural life cycle, and no comparable federal funds are in the pipeline to replace them.197

Notwithstanding their budgetary constraints, election officials consistently told the 

Commission they are dissatisfied with the current offerings of voting equipment and 

technology, as they consider purchases that will carry them through the next decade. 

The options available do not meet their needs and do not employ the sorts of advances 

that have become commonplace in consumer products and other industries.198 For a 

number of reasons, the existing election equipment marketplace consists almost solely 

of complex, single-use, end-to-end systems. For the most part, these systems are not 

customizable or interchangeable, and employ software that is stagnant. The choices are 

so unsatisfactory that at least two large jurisdictions (Los Angeles County and Travis 

County, Texas199) have opted to try to build their own systems. Many other jurisdictions are watching those counties with anticipation, while also searching for another 

solution.

The remaining vendors in the industry are in a difficult position. They face a fragmented market where buying decisions are often left to a multitude of county and local 

jurisdictions so that a consistent market with which to fund innovation is elusive.200

While the industry has developed some promising new technologies into their prototypes for the future, bringing those innovations to market is handicapped by the current 

standard-setting and certification process.

As the Commission heard repeatedly, the current standard-setting and certification process is unworkable and must be fixed.201 If the system worked as intended, the Technical 

Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) of the EAC, working with the National 

Institute on Standards and Technology, would periodically propose “Voluntary Voting 

System Guidelines” that would be adopted by the EAC. Because the EAC does not 

have a quorum of commissioners, though, any proposals from the TGDC cannot be 

adopted. As a result, the only standards currently operational are ones passed in 2005, 

which merely supplement the 2002 Voting System Standards promulgated by the Fed-
64

eral Election Commission at a time before the widespread adoption of many of the 

technological innovations routinely used today, such as tablet computers.202 

To be sure, some voting machines are being certified according to an “extensions clause” 

to the old standards, and new guidelines were drafted as early as 2007. Because many 

states incorporate and rely on the operative federal guidelines, though, new technologies must pass the 2005 guidelines if they are to be brought to market. Manufacturers 

of voting machines, however, are caught in a regulatory netherworld where the precise 

requirements are unclear and the rules going forward are unknowable. 

As a result, the extant standards not only fail to incentivize innovation, they arguably 

discourage it.203 Although economic factors play a role, the uncertainty surrounding the 

standards is at least partially responsible for the failure of the industry to make an effective and efficient transition to off-the-shelf technologies, software-only solutions, and 

“component” products. The 2005 standards were primarily designed for end-to-end 

products rather than components that can be interchangeable with other products to 

increase customization, updating technologies, and usability.204

Even when it works as designed, the certification process is costly and burdensome. 

Vendors complain about the length of time and expense (well over $1 million for a new 

voting machine) of receiving certification from one of the few approved testing labs.205

Indeed, the certification process even retards improvement of existing, certified equipment as it requires additional certification for even small modifications or upgrades. As 

a result, the certification process simply does not fit with an election calendar. Because 

of the time it takes to discover flaws following an election, to develop a “fix,” and then 

to have it certified, it is likely that the known solutions to problems discovered in one 

election will not be in operation for the next one.206

Recommendation: The standard-setting and certification process for voting 

machines must be reformed.

The existing certification system must be reformed. Having a certification process is 

fundamental to ensure the accuracy and functionality of equipment, compliance with 

legal requirements, and other basic standards and guidelines. It is key to addressing 

comprehensively a wide range of the issues the Commission has been charged with examining. But the current standards and certification process must be reformed to allow 
65

for innovation in voting technologies, faster and less-costly certification of new products, and the certification of component (customizable and interchangeable) products 

and voting systems, not just end-to-end equipment. 

At a minimum, the authority for standards adoption and the certification of testing 

laboratories cannot depend on a quorum of EAC Commissioners. The EAC has been 

the subject of considerable partisan and other disagreement about its broader mission. 

There is little prospect that these conflicts will be fully or significantly resolved, even if a 

fresh complement of EAC Commissioners were to take office. Either some other body 

within or apart from the EAC must be in charge of approving standards or the states 

should adapt their regulations such that federal approval is unnecessary.207 A move 

away from federal certification will still require states, with the appropriate independent 

technical advice, to join together (as they did before HAVA with the National Association of State Election Directors) to endorse standards that give vendors and innovators 

sufficient guidance.208

Whatever form the standard-setting body might take, however, it must address the shortfalls of the existing regime. In particular, it must facilitate the development, certification 

and adoption of off-the-shelf and software-only products. Software-only products can 

be integrated with off-the-shelf commercial hardware components such as computers, 

laptops, tablets, scanners, printers, and even machine-readable code scanners and signature pad products.209 Tablet computers such as iPads are common components of 

these new technologies.210 They can be integrated into the check-in, voting, and verification processes in the polling place.211 They are also capable of accepting accessibility 

components (or even personal devices) as plug-ins to assist voters with disabilities. In 

addition, solutions combining software with off-the-shelf commercial hardware have 

the added benefit of compatibility with recent trends in some jurisdictions toward using 

vote centers that require a number of different ballots in one location or require ballot 

print-on-demand technology.212

As mentioned earlier, promising technologies also exist that allow voters to “pre-fill” 

sample ballots at home, which can speed up the voting process in a polling place. These 

technologies allow the voter to read and mark a sample ballot that can be scanned at 

the polling place to populate the actual ballot in the privacy booth. Voters can then 

change and verify their choices before printing their final ballot and submitting it for 

counting.213 Such technologies may improve polling place efficiency. In particular, they 
66

might improve the voting experience for voters with disabilities who may find that their 

own assistive devices facilitating the creation of such sample ballots function better than 

what the jurisdiction provides.

The principal objection to some of these recommendations concerns the security advantages of end-to-end systems over component off-the-shelf products. These concerns 

are well-taken and must be considered by jurisdictions in their procurement decisions. 

Indeed, the Commission recognizes that most jurisdictions have come to agree with 

(or at least acquiesce to) scientists and advocates demanding a voter verified paper audit 

trail (VVPAT) from electronic voting machines. So long as such a paper trail exists, the 

move toward the types of technologies described here merely alters the type of device 

that creates the paper ballot, not the discarding of paper altogether. The Commission is 

convinced that commercial off-the-shelf technology can have security and auditability 

features built in that rival end-to-end systems. The fact that a tablet or off-the-shelf 

computer can be hacked or can break down does not mean such technology is inherently less secure than existing ballot marking methods if proper precautions are taken.

Recommendation: Audits of voting equipment must be conducted after each 

election, as part of a comprehensive audit program, and data concerning machine 

performance must be publicly disclosed in a common data format.

Post-election audits are a best practice of election administration in general, and especially so when it comes to the performance of voting technology.214 The Commission 

recommends that jurisdictions audit their election machinery following each election 

to ensure both that the vote totals match the votes cast and that any problems related 

to machinery are reported and resolved. A critical component of this audit must be 

public reporting of machine performance so that jurisdictions using similar equipment 

become aware of any problems before they cause an election crisis.

Different types of audits perform different functions. The Commission endorses both 

risk-limiting audits that ensure the correct winner has been determined according to a 

sample of votes cast,215 and performance audits that evaluate whether the voting technology performs as promised and expected. Too often the shortfalls of voting technology are discovered in the heat of a recount once the damage has already been done. 

Performance of voting equipment can and must be evaluated when election outcomes 

do not depend on it.
67

The full benefit of election audits of voting technology can only be realized if jurisdictions publicize their results. It is imperative that jurisdictions using similar machines 

be able to learn about problems each is experiencing.216 The voting machine market is 

dominated by a relatively small number of manufacturers. It is very likely that a problem experienced by one jurisdiction is one soon to be experienced by another using the 

same or similar equipment. Whether the voting equipment performs as promised or 

fails in one or another respect, the jurisdiction must publicize the results of its audit so 

that all similarly situated jurisdictions can promptly learn about and fix any problems.217

F. Collection and Distribution of Election Data 

The Commission has endeavored to ground its findings and recommendations in the 

best dispassionate research that has been conducted by government agencies, academic 

institutions, and private citizen organizations. This research has been illuminating and 

helpful. At the same time, we have been struck by the gaps that remain in the endeavor 

to improve election administration through the use of modern management tools —

tools that are regularly applied to other critical public services such as health care, transportation, and law enforcement.

Earlier in this report, we identified the need to further develop the field of election 

administration as a profession. A key feature of most professions is the existence of 

widely held performance standards about individuals and systems and established ways 

to assess actual performance against ideals. Indispensable to this aspiration to improve 

performance are data and measures concerning actual performance.

The scarcity of data concerning voting machine performance that we addressed in the 

prior section is emblematic of the more general data vacuum in election administration, 

and thus the struggles to identify which areas of election administration demand toppriority attention.218 To be sure, jurisdictions generate mountains of data concerning 

elections, the most obvious of which are the vote totals for candidates. However, candidate vote totals are rarely relevant data for assessing election performance and tracking its improvement. What is needed, instead, are data about how (and when) voters 

encounter points of service.

The case of Election Day lines is a prime example. The lion’s share of our analysis of 

the “line problem” comes from post-election surveys that, at best, survey a few hundred 
68

respondents in a state. Those data are indispensable and revealing. However, the testimony the Commission heard suggests that long lines were mostly concentrated in a few 

counties in a state, or even among a limited number of precincts within those counties. 

We cannot be sure, though, because no comprehensive set of data tracks wait times, arrival times, and resource allocation across all precincts.

In contrast, it has become the norm for businesses that are concerned about customer 

service to gather and analyze performance data at the point of contact with customers. The parallel “big data” revolution is transforming management 

in many areas of the private and 

public sector. This revolution has 

helped improve customer service 

and build organizational efficiencies by capturing and analyzing auxiliary data associated with 

customer transactions. Despite 

the fact that elections drown in 

data, and political campaigns have transformed American politics by gathering and 

analyzing data about their supporters, election administration has largely escaped this 

data revolution.

Recommendation: Local jurisdictions should gather and report voting-related 

transaction data for the purpose of improving the voter experience.

Whenever a voter interacts with an election office, there is — or should be — a trace 

left of that transaction, whether it be registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot, 

checking in at a polling place, or casting a ballot. The trace we are talking about is not 

who the voter voted for, but a series of hows, whens, and whys: How did the voter register? When did the voter check in at the precinct? Why was an absentee ballot rejected? 

Information like this — the auxiliary data associated with elections — should be an 

indispensable tool for making elections better.

Traditional methods of data gathering and analysis are already being used by governments at all levels to create a basic data infrastructure that helps policymakers and the 

public assess the quality of elections at the state and national levels. At the federal level, 

Despite the fact that elections drown 

h

in data . . . election administration has 

largely escaped this data revolution.

h
69

this includes the biennial Voting and Registration Supplement of the Census Bureau’s 

Current Population Survey and the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) 

conducted by the EAC.

Data from these federal programs, especially those sponsored by the EAC, are indispensable for assessing whether localities are complying with federal voting laws, such as 

the NVRA, HAVA, UOCAVA, and the MOVE Act. In this regard, it is disappointing 

that many counties and states still do not report to the federal government basic data, 

such as the number of UOCAVA ballots rejected because they missed the deadline for 

return or the number of voter registrations processed by motor vehicle departments. 

This failure to report in some instances naturally raises the question about compliance 

with federal voting laws — without the required data, how is anyone to know?

There is much more to using election performance data than simply checking on 

whether federal voting laws are being followed. Just as important are data that inform 

us about the positive and negative experiences of individual voters. We cannot learn 

much about the quality of the individual voter experience from these federal surveys, 

and must rely instead on state and local data programs.

Unfortunately, local efforts to gather and disseminate performance statistics at a more 

finely tuned level have lagged far behind the federal programs. All jurisdictions know 

their election returns; nearly all know how many individuals voted. Together, this information can be useful in allocating resources for future elections and diagnosing problems with voting machines. However, turnout data are rarely disseminated widely, nor 

analyzed in a publicly accessible way that explains the connection between, for instance, 

turnout and the allocation of voting booths to polling places. 

It is rarer still for local jurisdictions to capture and analyze the auxiliary information 

that is produced by computerized voting equipment, such as the time-of-day when voters cast their ballots, so that personnel and resources can be managed more efficiently. 

Rarest of all are the handful of jurisdictions that organize their own data-gathering programs, such as Travis County, Texas and Orange County, California’s efforts to record 

how long the lines are at the polling places at various times on Election Day.219 

Provisional ballot usage is another fertile area for data collection, analysis, and data-
70

based progress. By identifying the reasons that provisional ballots are being cast, both 

those that do not count as well as those that do, jurisdictions can use the other tangential 

data (how a voter signed up for a permanent early voting list, where they last registered, 

etc.) to review statutory requirements, administrative procedures, and poll worker training curriculums, and to target outreach messages to stem the rise in costly and delayed 

provisional voting.

If the experience of individual voters is to improve, the availability and use of data by local jurisdictions must increase substantially. States and localities are usually not equipped 

to gather the data they need, or to analyze it. However, we see some feasible steps that 

can be undertaken to help local jurisdictions become more sophisticated consumers 

of the auxiliary election data they are often already producing, without overwhelming 

these jurisdictions. 

First, local jurisdictions can learn a lot from the state of Wisconsin, which, despite having 

the most decentralized election administration system in the country, also has one of the most 

thorough election data-gathering programs.220 Second, election machine vendors should add 

functionality to their voting machines, by creating standard applications that convert raw 

data from system log files into reports that help election administrators get a better picture of 

how the overall election system is performing. Third, states and localities should develop partnerships with universities and colleges, where data analytics is a growing and vibrant field. 

Finally, jurisdictions should more widely disseminate the auxiliary data they do produce, in 

standardized formats, so that members of the public who are skilled at data analytics can do 

their own analysis, which can be brought to the attention of local officials.

Much has been made in recent years of the puzzling gap between the technological 

revolution in the lives of most Americans and the technological systems voters encounter when they register and when they cast their ballots. A new technological gap is 

beginning to emerge, between the data analytical capacity that has improved customer 

service in the private sector, and the lack of data-driven efforts to improve the experience 

of voters. Without new management capacities and tools that draw on what is available in the private sector, the problems that gave rise to this Commission’s creation are 

guaranteed to recur in the future.
71

IV. Conclusion

The United States electoral system remains a work in progress, as it has for more than 

230 years. Each election reveals weaknesses in the system, which leads to calls for reform, followed by discoveries of different problems. There has never been a perfectly 

run election in the United States or elsewhere, and perhaps there never will. Any process that depends on human management of hundreds of millions of people, machines 

or paper will inevitably produce some errors.

The challenge for the system, and for this Commission, is to confront the problems 

revealed with each election and to institutionalize processes that allow the system to 

learn from one election to the next. This Report has attempted to highlight the reforms 

that can make a substantial difference in addressing the most recent set of concerns as 

well as ones that loom ominously on the horizon. Just as the Executive Order does not 

describe every problem related to American elections, so too this Report does not pretend to provide the only solutions. For that reason, we have included along with this 

report an online Appendix including more than 1,000 pages of best practices and other 

materials recommended by federal agencies, nonprofits, and organizations of election 

officials. The Commission hopes that the greatest contribution of this report will be to 

focus institutional energy on a select number of important policy changes, while at the 

same time spawning experimentation among the thousands of local officials who share 

the same concerns that motivated the Commission’s creation.
72

Endnotes

1 The Commission held its first public meeting in Washington, DC, on June 21, 2013. At that meeting, 

the Commission set forth its intended schedule for the next few months. It also received a briefing from 

Senior Research Director Nathaniel Persily on the scholarly literature concerning the topics included in the 

Executive Order.

The Commission held four public hearings. The first of these was held in Miami, Florida, on June 28; 

the second in Denver, Colorado, on August 8; the third in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on September 

4; and the final hearing was held over two days in Cincinnati, Ohio, on September 19 and 20. At each 

hearing, the Commission heard testimony from election administrators, academics and other experts, 

and the general public. On December 3, the Commission held a final public meeting in Washington, DC, which reviewed the hearings and research presented to the Commission over the previous 

six months.

Each of the public meetings and hearings was webcast. Transcripts and the archived webcast of the hearings and public meetings, along with the materials submitted, are provided in the Appendix, and are 

available at www.supportthevoter.gov.

2 Members of the Commission attended conferences of various organizations and met with groups interested in the Commission’s business. Commissioners attended meetings of the National Association of 

Secretaries of State, National Association of State Election Directors, the Election Center, the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers (IACREOT), National Conference of State Legislatures, and the Future of California Elections.

Groups that invited Commissioners to speak with them included the Heritage Foundation, Brookings 

Institution, Federal Voting Assistance Program, Reserve Officers Association, Lawyers Committee for 

Civil Rights Under Law, Bipartisan Policy Center, Republican National Lawyers Association, Pew Voting 

Information Project, Alaska Federation of Natives, Asian-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 

LatinoJustice-PRLDEF, Military Voter Protection Project, Overseas Vote Foundation, Brennan Center 

for Justice, National Council on Disability, U.S. Postal Service, Election Assistance Commission, and the 

American Association of Retired Persons.

At a virtual public meeting held by conference call on November 14, a recording of which was made 

available on the website and a transcript of which is provided in the Appendix, Commissioners summarized these meetings for the Commission as a whole and the public.

3 See Matt Masterson, Deputy Elections Administrator, Office of the Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 19 (Sept. 19, 2013); Mark Andersen, Bay County Supervisor of Elections, 

PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 12 (June 28, 2013); Bill Cowles, Orange County Supervisor of 

Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 16 (June 28, 2013); Penelope Townsley, Miami-Dade 

County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 23 (June 28, 2013).

4 See, e.g., Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013); Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013); Scott Gessler, Colorado Secretary 

of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 11 (Aug. 8, 2013); Hillary Hall, Boulder County 

Clerk and Recorder, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 65 (Aug. 8, 2013).
73

5 See, e.g., Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 2 (Sept. 4, 2013) (comparing schools, whose “lobby is bigger than me”).

6 See John Carbone, International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers 

(IACREOT), PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 40 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“Most election offices 

are at the bottom of the political feeding chain for funding.”).

7 Each state was required by HAVA to submit a state plan to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) detailing how it would spend federal funds. Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, §§ 253-54, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 15403-04 (2009). State plans are available at http://www.eac.gov/payments_and_grants/

state_plans.aspx. Audits of state plans by the EAC Office of the Inspector General are available at http://

www.eac.gov/inspector_general/hava_funds_audits.aspx.

8 See Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, 

PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013).

9 See Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 4 (Sept. 20, 

2013).

10 See Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 18 (Sept. 

19, 2013); Dean Logan, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 4 (Aug. 8, 2013). In the nationwide survey of election officials conducted by 

Ansolabehere, Shaw, and Stewart, 24% of respondents listed “voting technology and voting machine capacity” as an area of election administration in significant need of improvement or update—the highest 

percentage of any of the categories in the survey. Stephen Ansolabehere, Daron Shaw, & Charles Stewart 

III, Overview of Local Election Officials Survey 17 (2013); see also Charles Stewart III, PCEA Public 

Meeting Presentation, Washington, DC, at slide 37 (Dec. 3, 2013).

11 See Eddie Perez, Hart Intercivic, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 8 (Sept. 19, 2013); 

Penelope Chester, Dominion Voting Systems, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 6 (Sep. 

19, 2013).

12 Matt Masterson, Deputy Elections Administrator, Office of the Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 10 (Sept. 19, 2013); James Long, Wyle Laboratories, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 28-29 (Sept. 19, 2013); Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel, 

Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 33 (Sept. 

19, 2013).

13 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, State Requirements and the Federal Voting System Testing and 

Certification Program, at 3, available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/State%20Requirements%20

and%20the%20Federal%20Voting%20System%20Testing%20and%20Certification%20Program.

pdf (35 states mandate at least one element of the EAC testing and certification program.) The first and 

second volumes of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines are available at http://www.eac.gov/

assets/1/workflow_staging/Page/124.PDF (Volume 1) and http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/workflow_staging/Page/125.PDF (Volume 2); Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Cincinnati, OH, at 18 (Sept. 19, 2013).
74

14 Josh Franklin, National Institute of Standards and Technology, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, 

OH, at 27 (Sept. 19, 2013). Information about the Technical Guidelines Development Committee is 

available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/tgdc.cfm.

15 R. Doug Lewis, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 31 (Sept. 19, 2013) (“The process is 

broken. It doesn’t work. States now are moving to do their own testing and their own standards and [hire] 

their own laboratories to do some of this.”); James Long, Wyle Laboratories, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Cincinnati, OH, at 28 (Sept. 19, 2013).

16 See McDermot Coutts, Director of Research and Development, Unisyn Voting Solutions, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 6 (Sept. 19, 2013); Eddie Perez, Hart Intercivic, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 8 (Sept. 19, 2013).

17 Dean Logan, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 5 (Aug. 8, 2013).

18 Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 13 (Sept. 19, 

2013).

19 Charles Stewart III, Final Report: 2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections 124 (Draft of 

Feb. 25, 2013).

20 See Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, 

PA, at 3 (Sept. 4, 2013); Susan Bucher, Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Miami, FL, at 14 (June 28, 2013); Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 Journal 

of Law & Politics 439 (2013).

21 See Ken Detzner, Florida Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 9 (June 28, 2013); 

Bill Cowles, Orange County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 16 (June 

28, 2013).

22 In the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), 3.9% of respondents reported waiting 

more than 30 minutes to vote, compared to 16.6% in the 2008 study and 12.4% in the 2012 study. To 

take a single state as an example, although the Survey of the Performance of American Elections (SPAE) 

found that 30.5% of Virginia voters waited more than 30 minutes to vote in 2008 and 27.9% waited 

more than 30 minutes in 2012, only 1.7% waited more than 30 minutes to vote in the 2009 gubernatorial election, 0.2% in 2013. (Data from the 2006 CCES suggest that 5.3% of Virginia voters waited 30 

minutes or more to vote in that midterm election.) See Charles Stewart III, Final Report: 2012 Survey 

of the Performance of American Elections (2013); Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, available 

at http://research.yougov.com/services/cces/.

23 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff et. seq., Pub. L. No. 99-410.

24 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-7, Pub. L. No. 111-84.

25 Pew Charitable Trusts, No Time to Vote: Challenges Facing America’s Overseas Military Voters (2009), 

available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Election_reform/

NTTV_Report_Web.pdf.
75

26 See Donald Inbody, Senior Lecturer, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 

30 (June 28, 2013); Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense, SPO-2010-004, 2009 

Evaluation of the DoD Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) (2010), available at http://www.

dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=342.

27 See Taeku Lee, Professor of Political Science and Law, University of California at Berkeley, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 46 (Sept. 4, 2013); Michael Jones-Correa, Professor of Government, 

Cornell University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 48 (Sept. 4, 2013); Jerry Vattamala, 

Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 71 

(Sept. 4, 2013); Will Gonzalez, Executive Director, Ceiba, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, 

at 78 (Sept. 4, 2013).

28 The EAC has voter glossaries available in six languages other than English, see U.S. Election Assistance 

Commission, Election Resource Library: Glossaries of Election Terminology, http://www.eac.gov/

resource_library/default.aspx?CategoryId=13, as well as voter guides available in eleven languages, see 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Resource Library: Voter’s Guides, http://www.eac.gov/

resource_library/default.aspx?CategoryId=12&pg=1.

29 See PCEA Public Meeting Conference Call, at 14-15 (Nov. 14, 2013) (describing meeting with the 

Federation of Alaskan Natives).

30 See National Disability Rights Network, PCEA Hearing Submission, Philadelphia, PA, at 2-4. (Sept. 4, 

2013); Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-538SP, Voters with Disabilities Challenges to Voting Accessibility (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654099.pdf.

31 Lisa Schur, Associate Professor, Labor Studies and Employment Relations, Rutgers University, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 42 (Aug. 8, 2013); Faith Gross, Legal Center for People with Disabilities and Older People, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 64 (Aug. 8, 2013); Kermit Davis, 

Secretary-Treasurer, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, 

OH, at 73 (Sept. 20, 2013); Diana Mairose, Hamilton County Developmental Disabilities Services, 

PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 75 (Sept. 20, 2013); Cheryl Jansen, Equip for Equality, 

PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 77 (Sept. 20, 2013).

32 Resources on accessible voting include the EAC’s Election Management Guidelines chapter, “Accessibility.” U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Management Guidelines, ch. 19, available at http://

www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EMG%20chapt%2019%20august%2026%202010.pdf.

33 See Estelle H. Rogers, The National Voter Registration Act at Fifteen 3 (2009), available at http://

www.projectvote.org/images/publications/NVRA/THE%20NVRA%20at%20FIFTEEN--A%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf (“[P]oor training requirements and lack of oversight and accountability 

of motor vehicle offices have led to problems with noncompliance, failing to forward applications to 

election officials in a timely manner, and non-integrated applications that violate the mandates of the 

NVRA.”); David Becker, Director of Election Initiatives, Pew Charitable Trusts, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 33 (Sept. 20, 2013).

34 See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on 

the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012, A Report to the 113th Congress 47, Table 

2b (2013), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EAC_NVRA%20Report_lowres.pdf; 

David Becker, Pew Charitable Trusts, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 3 (Sept. 20, 2013).
76

35 See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 

on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012, A Report to the 113th Congress, 

Tables 10-11 (2013), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EAC_NVRA%20Report_

lowres.pdf.

36 Estelle H. Rogers, The National Voter Registration Act at Fifteen (2009) available at http://www.projectvote.org/images/publications/NVRA/THE%20NVRA%20at%20FIFTEEN--A%20Report%20

to%20Congress.pdf.

37 See Paul O’Hanlon, Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 61 (Sept. 4, 2013).

38 See Paul Lux, Okaloosa County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 17 

(June 28, 2013); Donald Inbody, Senior Lecturer, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Miami, FL, at 30-31 (June 28, 2013).

39 See Matt Masterson, Deputy Elections Administrator, Office of the Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 10 (Sept. 19, 2013) (“[E]lection officials must be challenged to 

think of themselves as IT managers.”); Merle King, Executive Director, Center for Election Systems at 

Kennesaw State University, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 2 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/Merle-King-PCEA-Cincinnati-2013.pdf (“The 

required core competencies [of election officials] must embrace the reality that every election official 

is an Information Technology (IT) manager. In addition to competencies related to IT management, 

additional core competencies in the following disciplines should be defined: Testing and validation of 

systems, project management, auditing, training, ethics, information security, communication, election 

law and practice, accessibility and disability mitigation, human resource manage[ment], and an end-toend knowledge of all the election systems that support elections in that jurisdiction.”).

40 NASS Task Force on Emergency Preparedness for Elections, Update on Task Force Findings and Activities (2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/NASS-Task-Force-on-Emergency-Prepardedness-for-Elections.pdf.

41 Eric A. Fisher & Kevin J. Coleman, Congressional Research Service, R42808, Hurricane Sandy and 

the 2012 Election: Fact Sheet (2012), available at http://www.nass.org/index.php?option=com_

docman&task=doc_download&gid=1427&Itemid=.

42 More information on the NASS task force is available on the NASS website at http://www.nass.org/

index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=362&Itemid=515.

43 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Effective Designs for the Administration of Federal Elections 

(2007), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/EAC_Effective_Election_Design.pdf.

44 The Election Center, National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2004: Review and Recommendations by the Nation’s Election Administrators (2005), available at http://www.electioncenter.org/

documents/Task%20Force%20Final%20PDF.pdf.

45 These guidelines are available on the EAC’s website at http://www.eac.gov/election_management_resources/election_management_guidelines.aspx.
77

46 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Successful Practices for Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and 

Retention (2007), available at http://www.eac.gov/election_management_resources/poll_worker_best_

practices.aspx.

47 These guides are available on the EAC’s website at http://www.eac.gov/election_management_resources/

quick_start_guides.aspx.

48 State law regulation of the voter registration process, including implementation of the NVRA and HAVA 

mandates, is truly a “patchwork quilt.” R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Resolving Voter Registration Problems: Making Registration Easier, Less Costly and More Accurate 2 (Caltech/MIT Voting 

Technology Project Working Paper No. 87, 2009), available at http://vote.caltech.edu/sites/default/files/

wp_87_pdf_4acfa68b61.pdf. A compilation by the National Association of Secretaries of State of statutory requirements and procedures for list maintenance describes the wide variations among states in the 

use of list maintenance procedures authorized by the NVRA, and how those procedures are implemented. National Association of Secretaries of State, NASS Report: Maintenance of State Voter Registration Lists 4-14 (2009). For example, state laws and regulations vary in how jurisdictions confirm 

addresses, cross-reference voter registration applications with driver’s license databases, remove names 

upon a change-of-address notification, notify other states when a voter moves into the state, and remove 

convicted criminals. Id.

49 Stephen Ansolabehere & Eitan Hersh, Voter Registration: The Process and Quality of Lists, in The Measure of American Elections 1, 6, 7 (Barry C. Burden & Charles Stewart III eds.) (forthcoming 2014). 

An earlier version of the study is available as Stephen Ansolabehere & Eitan Hersh, The Quality of Voter 

Registration Records: A State-by-State Analysis 1, (2010), available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/sites/

default/files/quality_of_voter_report_pdf_4c45d05624.pdf.

50 Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Report on Registration Systems in American Elections 

(2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/06/Stephen-Ansolabehere-Voter-Registration-White-Paper.pdf.

51 Voter registration systems as a whole, even after HAVA, still rely largely on outdated systems that create 

systemic inefficiencies and raise costs. Pew Center on the States, Upgrading Democracy: Improving 

America’s Elections by Modernizing States’ Voter Registration Systems (2010), available at http://www.

pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/Upgrading_Democracy_report.pdf. In particular, paper 

voter registration applications and manual data entry increase the risk of clerical error, and many computer systems still rely on rudimentary data matching techniques. National Research Council, Committee on State Voter Registration Databases, Improving State Voter Registration Databases: Final Report, at 

B-1 to B-5 (2009), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/workflow_staging/Page/52.PDF (discussing 

matching algorithms); Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, & Ana Muñoz, Brennan Center for Justice, Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration 4-5 (2006), available at 

http://brennan.3cdn.net/96ee05284dfb6a6d5d_j4m6b1cjs.pdf (discussing types of clerical and matching errors). Even simple typographical errors can come in a variety of forms. R. Michael Alvarez & 

Thad E. Hall, Resolving Voter Registration Problems: Making Registration Easier, Less Costly and More 

Accurate 7 (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project Working Paper No. 87, 2009), available at http://

www.vote.caltech.edu/sites/default/files/wp_87_pdf_4acfa68b61.pdf (discussing typographical errors 

found in Ohio’s 2009 voter registration list). 
78

52 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports National Mover Rate Increases After a Record Low in 2011 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/mobility_of_the_population/cb12-240.html.

53 See Stephen Ansolabehere & Eitan Hersh, Voter Registration: The Process and Quality of Lists, in The 

Measure of American Elections, Table 1 (Barry C. Burden & Charles Stewart III eds.) (forthcoming 

2014).

54 See id. at Figure 9.

55 Pew Center on the States, Being Online is Still Not Enough: Reviews and Recommendations for State 

Election Websites (2011), available at http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/being-online-is-stillnot-enough-85899376525; U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Voter Information Websites Study 

(2008), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/workflow_staging/Page/64.PDF.

56 The states that have authorized or implemented full online registration systems are Arizona, California, 

Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, 

Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. The states utilizing a 

more limited version of online registration are Delaware, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Ohio. 

National Conference of State Legislatures, Online Voter Registration (2013), available at http://www.

ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-or-online-voter-registration.aspx.

57 Matt A. Barreto et al., Online Voter Registration (OLVR) Systems in Arizona and Washington: Evaluating Usage, Public Confidence and Implementation Processes 16-23 (2010), available at http://www.

pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/online_voter_reg.pdf.

58 Wendy Underhill, NCSL Senior Policy Specialist, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 52, 55 

(Aug. 8, 2013); Scott Gessler, Colorado Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 3 

(Aug. 8, 2013); Linda Lamone, Maryland State Administrator of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Philadelphia, PA, at 5 (Sept. 4, 2013); Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 10 (Sept. 4, 2013); Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State 

Board of Elections, Philadelphia, PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013); Josh Franklin, National Institute of Standards 

and Technology, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 27 (Sept. 19, 2013); David Becker, 

Director of Election Initiatives, Pew Charitable Trust, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 30 

(Sept. 20, 2013); Heather Smith, President, Rock the Vote, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, 

at 41 (Sept. 20, 2013).

59 See Rock the Vote, Connected OVR: A Simple Durable Approach to Online Voter Registration (Dec. 

2013); Matt A. Barreto et al., Online Voter Registration (OLVR) Systems in Arizona and Washington: 

Evaluating Usage, Public Confidence and Implementation Processes 5 (2010), available at http://www.

pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/online_voter_reg.pdf (citing Arizona’s use of a confirmation number for online registration transactions); Heather Smith, President, Rock the Vote, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 1 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/

files/2013/06/FOCE.23-Rock-The-Vote-PCEA_Aug8-Remarks.doc.

60 Pew Center on the States, Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration 

System Needs an Upgrade 6-8 (2012), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Upgrading_Voter_Registration.pdf; Jonathan Brater, Brennan Center for Justice, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 73 (Sept. 4, 2013).
79

61 Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, 

PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013), Jonathan Brater, Brennan Center for Justice, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 73 (Sept. 4, 2013); Heather Smith, President, Rock the Vote, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Cincinnati, OH, at 42 (Sept. 20, 2013).

62 Linda Lamone, Maryland State Administrator on Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, 

PA, at 5 (Sept. 4, 2013).

63 Pew Center on the States, Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade 7 (2012), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Upgrading_Voter_Registration.pdf.

64 Matt A. Barreto et al., Online Voter Registration Systems in Arizona and Washington: Evaluating Usage, 

Public Confidence, and Implementation 2 (2010), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/

PCS_Assets/2010/online_voter_reg.pdf (“In Arizona, voters under 34 years old who registered via the 

Internet turned out at 93 percent in 2008 compared to a turnout rate of 73 percent for younger voters 

that registered ‘offline.’ In Washington, the same trend holds whereby young voters who registered online 

turned out at much higher rates than young voters who did not register online.”).

65 Christopher Ponoroff, Brennan Center for Justice, Voter Registration in a Digital Age 2 (Wendy Weiser 

ed.) (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Paperless_

Registration_FINAL.pdf.

66 Matt A. Barreto et al., Online Voter Registration Systems in Arizona and Washington: Evaluating Usage, Public Confidence, and Implementation 2 (2010), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/online_voter_reg.pdf; see also Monique Garcia, Quinn Signs Bill Allowing 

Online Voter Registration in Illinois, Chicago Tribune (July 27, 2013), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-07-27/news/chi-quinn-to-sign-bill-allowing-online-voter-registration-in-illinois-20130726_1_online-voter-registration-voter-turnout-quinn-signs-bill (citing Cook County Clerk 

David Orr for the proposition that “those who register online in other states have proven more likely to 

vote than those who register through more traditional routes...because they usually wait until closer to 

Election Day to sign up, when they are paying more attention to issues and candidates.”).

67 Heather Smith, President, Rock the Vote, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 43 (Sept. 20, 

2013); Linda Lamone, Maryland State Administrator of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 11 (Sept. 4, 2013).

68 Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, 

at 2 (Sept. 4, 2013); Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 

3 (Sept. 20, 2013); David Orr, Cook County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 20 

(Sept. 20, 2013); David Becker, Director of Election Initiatives, Pew Charitable Trusts, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 30 (Sept. 20, 2013); Heather Smith, President, Rock the Vote, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 42 (Sept. 20, 2013).

69 Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be 51 (July 1, 2001), available 

at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/drupal/node/10.

70 Pew Center on the States, Upgrading Democracy: Improving America’s Elections by Modernizing States’ 

Voter Registration Systems 3 (2010), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_As-
80

sets/2010/Upgrading_Democracy_report.pdf; Washington State Online Voter Registration, at 11, available at https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/ElectionStatistics/vrdata/documents/

electronic%20registrations/2010onlinevoterregistrationinfopacket.pdf.

71 See Rock the Vote, Connected OVR: A Simple Durable Approach to Online Voter Registration (2013).

72 Brennan Center for Justice, Voter Registration in a Digital Age: Arizona 6 n.1 (2010), (quoting telephone 

interview with Craig Stender (Jan. 27, 2010)), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/

files/legacy/Democracy/Paperless%20Report%20Appendix_Final%20(Arizona).pdf; see also Brennan 

Center for Justice, Voter Registration in a Digital Age: Washington (2010) http://www.brennancenter.

org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Paperless%20Report%20Appendix_Final%20(Washington).

pdf.

73 See Online Voter Registration: the Bipartisan Trend in Elections, NCSL.ORG (Nov. 12, 2013), http://

www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/online-voter-registration-webinar.aspx (“Allowing citizens to register to vote online has proven to be astoundingly cost effective in some cases, and has improved accuracy in our nation’s voter rolls. It’s also a rare issue in elections administration that appeals to 

Democrats and Republicans alike.”); Christopher Ponoroff, Brennan Center for Justice, Voter Registration in a Digital Age 9 (Wendy Weiser ed.) (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/

default/files/legacy/Democracy/Paperless_Registration_FINAL.pdf.

74 See Rock the Vote, Connected OVR: A Simple Durable Approach to Online Voter Registration (2013).

75 The states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, 

Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, 

and West Virginia. See Kris W. Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 9 (Sept. 20, 2013) (figure and list of states updated to reflect recent additions); Reid Wilson, 

Here’s how to clean up messy voter rolls, The Wash. Post GovBeat (Nov. 3, 2013), available at http://

www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/11/03/heres-how-to-clean-up-messy-voter-rolls/.

76 The states currently participating are Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See Electronic Registration Information Center, available at www.ericstates.org.

77 See Shane Hamlin & Ericka Haas, ERIC: Electronic Registration Information Center, slides 19-21 

(2013), available at http://ericstates.org/images/documents/ERIC_July_2013_VR_Conference_Notes.

pdf (powerpoint presentation); Delaney Turner, Day Two Recap: Big data in action drives big gains for 

democracy, IBM: The Big Data & Analytics Hub (Nov. 5, 2013), available at http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/IOD/2013/blog/day-two-recap-big-data-action-drives-big-gains-democracy.

78 The IVRC uses a secure FTP site, deletes all participating states’ data after running the crosscheck, 

and compares only certain data types (e.g., name, date of birth, address and Social Security number). 

Kris W. Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State, Photo ID and Electronic Poll Books and Interstate Voter 

Registration Crosscheck, PCEA Hearing Presentation, Cincinnati, OH, at slides 12-13 (Sept. 20, 2013). 

ERIC anonymizes the confidential data it receives from states when it leaves state control, rendering it 

unreadable to unauthorized parties; maintains tamper-proof audit logs; requires states to adhere to security standards-setting agreements; and retains an advisory board of security experts to review and improve 

systems. Pew Charitable Trusts State and Consumer Initiatives, Electronic Registration Information 
81

Center (ERIC): Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.pewstates.org/research/analysis/ electronic-registration-information-center-eric-frequently-asked-questions-85899426025.

79 The states in which over 50% of total registrations come from the DMV are Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island (plus the District of Columbia). U.S. Election Assistance Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012, A Report to the 113th Congress, Table 2a (2013), 

available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EAC_NVRA%20Report_lowres.pdf. 

80 The Election Assistance Commission’s NVRA studies dating back to the 2003-2004 report and the 

Federal Election Commission’s NVRA studies dating back to the inaugural NVRA report in 1995-1996 

are available on the EAC website. See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Research and Data, http://

www.eac.gov/registration-data.

81 Pew Center on the States, Bringing Elections into the 21st Century: Voter Registration Modernization 

4 n.9 (2009), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Election_reform/Voter_Registration_Modernization_Brief_web.pdf. During the 2011-12 election cycle, 

Delaware processed nearly 75% of its new voter registrations via its motor vehicles department; Michigan processed approximately 90%. This is in contrast to the nationwide rate of 30%. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration 

of Elections for Federal Office 2011-2012, A Report to the 113th Congress, Table 2b (2013), available 

at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EAC_NVRA%20Report_lowres.pdf.

82 See Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Submission, Philadelphia, 

PA, at 2 (Sept. 4, 2013) (describing eSignature). 

83 See Matt Crane, Arapahoe County Clerk and Recorder, PCEA Hearing Submission, Denver, CO, at 2 

(Aug. 8, 2013) (noting increased number of provisional ballots lead to longer wait times).

84 See, e.g., Dawn Williams, Marshall County Auditor and Recorder/Commissioner of Elections, PCEA 

Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 3 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.

gov/files/2013/09/Dawn-Williams-PCEA-Testimony.pdf (discussing the problem of “facility shortage” 

in the context of early voting). 

85 Resources on polling place management include the EAC’s Election Management Guidelines chapter, 

“Polling Place and Vote Center Management.” U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Management Guidelines, ch. 9, available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/workflow_staging/Page/266.pdf.

86 Judd Choate, Colorado State Elections Director, Remarks at NASED Roundtable, Anchorage, Alaska 

(July 20, 2013), described in PCEA Public Meeting Conference Call, at 16 (Nov. 14, 2013).

87 Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 

2 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“Schools. This has become my hot topic. Half of our schools are public polling places 

in Delaware.”); Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Presentation, 

Philadelphia, PA, at slide 8 (Sept. 4, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/

Elaine-Manlove-Delaware-PCEA-Presentation.ppt (“We could not conduct elections without these 

buildings which are accessible, well-located with adequate space and parking.”); David Orr, Cook 

County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 2 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at https://

www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/David-Orr-Testimony-to-Presidential-Commission.pdf (“Elec-
82

tion authorities need access to schools, park districts and other public buildings to hold efficient elections. Public schools in particular often have the right attributes to make elections run more smoothly.”); 

Doug Chapin, Election Official as Bloodhound: Newby on Searching for Polling Sites, Election Academy, Univ. of Minn. Humphrey Sch. of Pub. Affairs (Oct. 4, 2013), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2013/10/election_official_as_bloodhoun.php.

88 R. Michael Alvarez et al., 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections, question q7 (2008), 

available at http://vote.caltech.edu/sites/default/files/Final%20report20090218.pdf; Charles Stewart III, 

2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections, question q6 (2012).

89 These states include Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wyoming. National Conference of State Legislatures, Polling Place 

Requirements (2013).

90 As of July, six states had considered bills to restrict access to schools on election days in 2013, compared 

to three last year. None passed the legislature. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Iowa joining trend of decreasing 

school polling places, USA Today (July 16, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/

nation/2013/07/15/iowa-decreases-school-polling-places/2519611/. See also Wendy Underhill, Legislatures Rethinking Schools as Polling Places, NCSL’s The Thicket (Feb. 5, 2013), http://ncsl.typepad.com/

the_thicket/2013/02/legislatures-rethinking-schools-as-polling-places.html.

91 Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, 

at 1-2 (Sept. 4, 2013); Wendy Underhill, NCSL Senior Policy Specialist, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Denver, CO, at 50-51 (Aug. 8, 2013).

92 PCEA Public Meeting Conference Call, at 11, 16 (Nov. 14, 2013) (summarizing findings from meeting 

with the Bipartisan Policy Center (July 2, 2013), NASED (July 20, 2013), and Election Center (August 

15-16, 2013)); see also Doug Chapin, School’s Out—As a Polling Place? NJ Town Seeks New Voting 

Locations, Election Academy, Univ. of Minn. Humphrey Sch. of Pub. Affairs (July 30, 2013), http://

blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2013/07/schools_out_-_as_a_polling_pla.php.

93 Wendy Underhill, NCSL Senior Policy Specialist, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 50 (Aug. 

8, 2013) (discussing “cases where the students are not in the school but perhaps professional development 

for the teachers is going on”). Six states (California, Montana, Illinois, Rhode Island, New Mexico, and 

North Dakota) specify that schools may be closed when used as polling places, and three states specify 

that schools are to be used as polling places when requested, but that they should not interfere with 

school functions. National Conference of State Legislatures, Restrictions on Schools as Polling Places 

(2013); see also Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Presentation, 

Philadelphia, PA, at slide 9 (Sept. 4, 2013).

94 Henry E. Brady & John E. McNulty, Turning Out to Vote: The Costs of Finding and Getting to the 

Polling Place, 105 American Political Science Review 115 (2011); Joshua J. Dyck & James G. Gimpel, 

Distance, Turnout, and the Convenience of Voting, 86 Social Science Quarterly 531 (2005); Moshe 

Haspel & H. Gibbs Knotts, Location, Location, Location: Precinct Placement and the Costs of Voting, 

67 Journal of Politics 560 (2005).

95 Larimer County, Colorado, “Vote Center Defined,” http://www.co.larimer.co.us/elections/votecenter/

votecenters_defined.htm. See also Robert M. Stein & Greg Vonnahme, Election Day Vote Centers 
83

and Voter Turnout, available at http://www.nonprofitvote.org/doc_download/164-election-day-votecenters-and-voter-turnout-stein-and-vonnahme.

96 See Maggie Toulouse Oliver, Bernalillo County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Submission, Denver, CO, at 7-9 

(Aug. 8, 2013); Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 25-

28 (Aug. 8, 2013); Leslie Hoffman, Yavapai County Recorder, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, 

at 65-66 (Aug. 8, 2013).

97 See Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 26 (Aug. 8, 

2013).

98 See id.; Matt Crane, Arapahoe County Clerk and Recorder, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 

28 (Aug. 8, 2013) (noting that most Colorado counties with vote centers saw a sharp decline in provisional ballots). About 11% of provisional ballots in 2008 were cast due to voters attempting to vote at 

the wrong location. Daron Shaw & Vincent Hutchings, Report on Provisional Ballots and American 

Elections, PCEA Hearing Submission, Denver, CO, at 7 (Aug. 8, 2013) (accompanying oral testimony 

of Daron Shaw). The EAVS survey suggests that showing up at the wrong polling place is the second 

most common reason for casting a provisional ballot. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey 13 (2013), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/990-

050%20EAC%20VoterSurvey_508Compliant.pdf.

99 See Maggie Toulouse Oliver, Bernalillo County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 7 

(Aug. 8, 2013).

100 See Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, Vote Centers Add Voter Convenience, Reduce Election 

Day Problems, and Provide Long-Term Cost Savings, PCEA Hearing Submission, Denver, CO (Aug. 

8, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/PCEA-Dana-Debeauvoir-TravisCounty-Tx-County-Clerk-Vote-Centers.pdf; Robert M. Stein, Professor of Political Science, Rice University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 33 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“But, if you look at election 

day vote centers, as practiced in Colorado, Texas — soon to come in some other states like Indiana — it’s 

had a significant effect and nontrivial effect. Five to eight points on turnout.”).

101 Matt Crane, Arapahoe County Clerk and Recorder, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 29 (Aug. 

8, 2013) (noting increase in wait times due to provisional ballots in Arapahoe County after adoption of 

vote centers).

102 See, e.g., Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013) (noting that “inaccurate or inactive registration often cause[s] delays in 

a polling place, as [poll workers] try to fix the problem for the voter” and arguing for technological solutions).

103 See Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 Journal of Law & Politics 439, n.37 (2013) (noting 

that 68% of early voters and 60% of Election Day voters reported waiting in line primarily at the checkin phase, as opposed to waiting for an available machine).

104 Neal Kelley, Orange County Registrar of Voters, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 22 

(Sept. 20, 2013) (“[O]ur website allows voters to ascertain their polling place location, provides a map 

and route information from their home address and more importantly relays information about expected 

turnout and wait time at their polling place in real time on Election Day.”); Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis 
84

County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 2 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“Initially, we used Twitter 

reports from citizens to provide information on voting wait times. We now electronically gather information from each polling location that shows how many people have voted and approximately how long 

someone will have to wait in line. This information is provided on an internet page available for public 

viewing.”).

105 Some jurisdictions utilize a “dashboard” function on their website or downloadable application that is 

periodically updated with current wait times. See Maggie Toulouse Oliver, Bernalillo County Clerk, 

PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 8 (Aug. 8, 2013).

106 Charles Stewart III & Stephen Ansolabehere, Waiting in Line to Vote 15–17 (2013), available at https://

www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/Waiting-in-Line-to-Vote-White-Paper-Stewart-Ansolabehere.

pdf; Justin Levitt, “Fixing That”: Lines at the Polling Place, 28 Journal of Law and Politics 465 (2013).

107 Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 Journal of Law & Politics 439, n.37 (2013) (noting that 

68% of early voters and 60% of Election Day voters reported waiting in line primarily at the check-in 

phase, as opposed to waiting for an available machine); David Kimball, Professor of Political Science, 

University of Missouri-St. Louis, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 34-35 (Sept. 19, 2013).

108 See Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, 

PA, at 3 (Sept. 4, 2013); Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission Executive Director, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013). See also Douglas M. 

Spencer & Zachary S. Markovits, Long Lines at Polling Stations? Observations from an Election Day 

Field Study, 9 Election Law Journal 13, 13-17 (2010).

109 Charles Stewart III, Professor of Political Science, MIT, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 28 

(June 28, 2013).

110 Stephen Graves, Professor of Management Science, Mechanical Engineering, and Engineering Systems, 

MIT, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 38 (Sept. 4, 2013); Shane Hamlin, Washington 

Deputy Director of Elections and ERIC Chair, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 31-32 

(Sept. 20, 2013).

111 Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 Journal of Law & Politics 439, 455 (2013). 

112 Id. at 452-55.

113 Susan Bucher, Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 

14 (June 28, 2013); Bill Cowles, Orange County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Miami, FL, at 16 (June 28, 2013); Matt Crane, Arapahoe County Clerk and Recorder, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Denver, CO, at 29 (Aug. 8, 2013).

114 Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Philadelphia, PA, at 6-7 (Sept. 4, 2013); Tom Schedler, Louisiana Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing 

Submission, Philadelphia, PA, at 23 (Sept. 4, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/

files/2013/09/Tom-Schedler-LA-SOS-PCEA-Testimony.pdf. 

115 Barry C. Burden & Jeffrey Milyo, The Recruitment and Training of Poll Workers: What We Know 

from Scholarly Research, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 12 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/Barry-Burden-Jeff-Milyo-The-Recruitment-and-
85

Training-of-Poll-Workers.pdf; Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission, 

PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013); Nina Ahmad, Chair, Philadelphia 

Mayor’s Commission on Asian-American Affairs, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 76 

(Sept. 4, 2013); Carolyn Gele, SEIU, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 38 (June 28, 2013).

116 Doug Chapin, The Secret to Fixing Long Lines? Math. [Yes, Math.], Election Academy, Univ. of 

Minn. Humphrey Sch. of Pub. Affairs (Nov. 12, 2012), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2012/11/the_secret_to_fixing_long_line.php; Doug Chapin, Report on Anchorage Ballot Problems 

Highlights importance of Turnout to Election Planning, Election Academy, Univ. of Minn. Humphrey 

Sch. of Pub. Affairs (July 9, 2012), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2012/07/report_on_

anchorage_ballot_pro.php; Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel, Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 6 (Sept. 20, 2013); David Orr, Cook 

County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 19 (Sept. 20, 2013).

117 Dana Chisnell, Field Guides to Ensuring Voter Intent: Designing Usable Ballots 27 (2013), available at 

https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/Field-Guide-Vol-01-20130620.pdf.

118 The standard models used in operations research and industrial engineering tend to recommend the 

allocation of more equipment to meet service demands than these simple baseline calculations. For 

instance, Edelstein and Edelstein recommend, as a rule of thumb, allocating twice as many machines to 

polling places as these baseline models would suggest. See William A. Edelstein & Arthur D. Edelstein, 

Queuing and Elections: Long Lines, DREs, and Paper Ballots, Proceedings of the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ‘10), available at https://

www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evtwote10/tech/full_papers/Edelstein.pdf.

119 Ken Detzner, Florida Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 2 (June 28, 2013); 

Bill Cowles, Orange County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 16 (June 

28, 2013); Robert M. Stein, Professor of Political Science, Rice University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Philadelphia, PA, at 28 (Sept. 4, 2013).

120 Charles Stewart III, Professor of Political Science, MIT, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO at 39 

(Aug. 8, 2013); Charles Stewart III & Daron Shaw, Lessons from the 2012 Election Administration and 

Voting Survey 9-11 (2013).

121 Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 Journal of Law & Politics 439, 460 (2013).

122 Steve Trout, Oregon State Elections Director, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 6 (Aug. 8, 

2013); Sarah Johnson, Colorado Springs City Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 30 

(Aug. 8, 2013); David Orr, Cook County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 18 

(Sept. 20, 2013).

123 Penelope Townsley, Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, 

FL, video 9 at 51:06 (June 28, 2013) (“There may be an assumption that because of the long lines...there 

was poor planning, but I can tell you that my historical analysis told me that I was going to have a 30 

percent Election Day turnout for the general election. I planned for 35 percent and above. We actually 

had 31 percent. I had long lines. So the issue was entirely not planning.”).

124 See Stephen Graves, Professor of Management Science, Mechanical Engineering, and Engineering Systems, MIT, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 33 (Sept. 4, 2013); Doug Chapin, Aaron 
86

Strauss’ Election Day Resource Calculator, Election Academy, Univ. of Minn. Humphrey Sch. of Pub. 

Affairs (Aug. 13, 2013), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2013/08/aaron_strauss_election_day_res.php.

125 Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, 

PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“The use of electronic poll books in Virginia has dramatically improved the 

accuracy and integrity of the voter check-in process, with fewer errors and more accurate voter history.”); 

John Carbone, IACREOT, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 37 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“[I]f we 

had the electronic poll books, [we would not have had] backups and lines.”).

126 See Penelope Townsley, Miami Dade County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, 

FL, at 23 (“[E]lection [D]day polling place [in]efficiencies have been largely attributed to our outdated 

voter check-in process. The paper-base[d] process significantly impacted wait times at some precincts, 

as voters had to be manually located on hardcopy precinct registered pages and often waited inordinate 

periods of time for poll workers to make phone calls to the department to determine voter eligibility.”).

127 See Stephen Ansolabehere, Professor of Government, Harvard University, Election Administrators Survey, PCEA Hearing Presentation, Cincinnati, OH, at slides 5-7 (Sept. 20, 2013) available at https://

www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/Steve-Ansolabehere-Survey-Presentation-PCEA.pdf (noting 

that electronic poll books were one of the most desired technologies among election administrators).

128 Stephen Ansolabehere, Professor of Government, Harvard University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH (Sept. 21, 2013).

129 Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Philadelphia, PA, at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“Hundreds of thousands of [well-trained] poll workers are needed 

on election day to effectively run polling places across the country.”); Thad Hall, J. Quin Monson & 

Kelly D. Patterson, Poll Workers and the Vitality of Democracy: An Early Assessment, 36 PS: Political 

Science & Politics 647 (2003) (“Poll workers have a multitude of duties on Election Day ranging from 

setting up and closing down voting machines to determining when to check a voter’s identification to 

deciding when to allow a voter to cast a provisional ballot.”).

130 Doug Hill, Executive Director, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 52 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“Getting training and keeping poll worker[s] is, by 

far and always, our biggest hurdle.”); Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“Poll workers are valuable 

resources, but they are basically volunteers who receive limited training, they work a few days every other 

year, and in some cases they earn less than minimum wage.”); Barry C. Burden & Jeffrey Milyo, The 

Recruitment and Training of Pollworkers: What We Know from Scholarly Research, PCEA Hearing 

Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 5 (Sept 20, 2013) (showing the difficulty that states have in attracting 

poll workers).

131 Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, 

at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013) (stating that pollworker training typically lasts two and a half hours); see also Stephen Ansolabehere, Daron Shaw & Charles Stewart III, Overview of Local Election Officials Survey 

19 (2013); Charles Stewart III, Professor of Political Science, MIT, PCEA Meeting Presentation, Washington, DC, at 22 (Dec. 3, 2013). The small number of hours of training revealed in the 2013 survey 

reported by Ansolabehere, Shaw, and Stewart is consistent with results reported in surveys conducted 
87

in the past. See, e.g., Eric A. Fischer & Kevin J. Coleman, Congressional Research Service, RL34363, 

Election Reform and Local Election Officials: Results of Two National Surveys 50 (2008) (“On average, 

pollworkers received 3.5 hours of training in 2006.”).

132 See David C. Kimball, et al., Poll workers and Election Administration: The View from Local Election 

Officials 14-16 (2009), available at http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/dk_bb_June09.pdf.

133 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey: A Summary of 

Key Findings 14 (2013).

134 Stephen Ansolabehere, Daron Shaw & Charles Stewart III, Overview of Local Election Officials Survey 

15 (2013); Charles Stewart III, Professor of Political Science, MIT, PCEA Meeting Presentation, Washington, DC, at slide 20 (Dec. 3, 2013). 

135 Thad Hall, J. Quin Monson & Kelly D. Patterson, Poll Workers and the Vitality of Democracy: An Early 

Assessment, 37 PS: Political Science & Politics 647 (2003) (noting that poll worker error “generated 

news coverage that could undermine the public’s confidence in the electoral process.”).

136 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey: A Summary of 

Key Findings 14 (2013).

137 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Successful Practices for Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and 

Retention (2007). For additional EAC resources, see U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Poll Worker 

Best Practices, http://www.eac.gov/election_management_resources/poll_worker_best_practices.aspx.

138 Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, 

at 15 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“In Delaware...we employ 16 and 17 year old poll workers. I think it’s one of the 

best things we’ve ever done.”).

139 As of 2007, 27 states and the District of Columbia have programs whereby students age 16 and older 

may serve as pollworkers. Those states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 

Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Compendium of State Poll Worker Requirements, at iv-a (2007), available at http://www.eac.

gov/assets/1/Page/Poll%20Worker%20Requirements%20by%20State.pdf.

140 Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, 

at 13 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“[W]e also in Delaware use corporate poll workers. . . . Corporations share one of 

their employees with us for the day.”).

141 See Press Release, Franklin County Board of Elections, Champions of Democracy Poll Worker Training 

Starts Monday (Feb. 17, 2013), available at http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/assets/pdf/press-releases/2012-02-17-1.pdf; Press Release, Columbus Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Encouraging Participation in Champions of Democracy Program (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.columbus.org/

news/press-releases.dT/chamber-encouraging-participation-in-champions-of-democracy-program/.

142 See Johnson County Election Office, Making Voting Popular—Bi-State Outreach Program, available at 

http://www.jocoelection.org/workers/MVP-Program.htm.
88

143 Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Philadelphia, PA, at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“While this model for staffing polling places is necessary, it also 

creates issues, such as difficulty in finding poll workers, inadequate training of poll workers, [and] poll 

workers who are uncomfortable with the technologies that have been deployed.”).

144 Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 

17 (Sept. 4, 2013) (discussing turnover rates for poll workers).

145 Clyde Terry, National Council on Disability, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 58 (Sept. 4, 

2013) (discussing the importance of training poll workers in use of the equipment and in basic disability 

etiquette and awareness).

146 Barry C. Burden & Jeffrey Milyo, The Recruitment and Training of Poll Workers: What We Know From 

Scholarly Research, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 15-16 (Sept. 20, 2013).

147 See id.; Elaine Manlove, Delaware State Election Commissioner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 16 (Sept. 4, 2013) (noting that training is typically two and a half hours).

148 Lisa Schur, Associate Professor, Labor Studies and Employment Relations, Rutgers University, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 42 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“[A] two year study found that the interactive 

training methods were more effective than just having poll workers look at lectures.”).

149 Barry C. Burden & Jeffrey Milyo, The Recruitment and Training of Poll Workers: What We Know From 

Scholarly Research, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 16 (Sept. 20, 2013).

150 Sally Williams, Director, Election Liaison Division, Michigan Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 47 (Sept. 19, 2013).

151 Poll Worker Training Information, DallasCountVotes.org, http://www.dallascountyvotes.org/trainingand-education/poll-worker-information/.

152 EAC’s Election Management Guidelines chapter, “Building Community Partnerships,” provides a resource for working with community groups. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Management Guidelines, ch. 12, available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EMG%20chapt%20

12%20august%2026%202010.pdf.

153 Lisa Schur, Reducing Obstacles to Voting for People with Disabilities: White Paper prepared for Presidential Commission on Election Administration 1 (2013).

154 Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-538SP Voters with Disabilities: Challenges to Voting Accessibility 1 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654099.pdf.

155 Id., at 9.

156 National Council on Independent Living, Position Statement on Polling Location Wait Times (2013); 

Jim Dickson, National Council on Disability Rights, Remarks at the Roundtable on Voting Accessibility 

at 6 (July 11, 2013); Deborah Vagins, ACLU, & Kathy Hoell, SILC, Remarks at the Roundtable on 

Voting Accessibility (July 11, 2013), summarized in PCEA Public Meeting Conference Call at 13 (Nov. 

14, 2013); see also Dana Farmer, Disability Rights Florida, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 46 

(June 28, 2013).
89

157 Lisa Schur, Associate Professor, Labor Studies and Employment Relations, Rutgers University, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 41 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“Among those who said they had difficulty getting inside the polling place, the most common problems were that there were steps, or that there was a 

long walking distance.”).

158 Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-538SP, Voters with Disabilities: Challenges to Voting Accessibility 7 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654099.pdf.

159 Hillary Sklar & Fred Nisen, Disability Rights California, Best Processes to Reduce and Eliminate Accessibility Barriers for Voters with Disabilities, Presentation to the PCEA at 13-14 (Aug. 6, 2013), available 

at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/06/FOCE.12-DRC-Barriers-and-Best-Processes-Voterswith-Disabilities.pdf.

160 City and County of San Francisco, Department of Elections, Pollworker Training Videos, http://sfgov2.

org/index.aspx?page=837.

161 Pennsylvania Deparment of State, Election Officials’ Training to Assist Voters with Disabilities (undated), available at http://www.dgsweb.state.pa.us/CMSUploads/vod/cms_asx_generator.

asp?videoname=090108_program_state_electiontrainingwithdisabilities.wmv.

162 Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Elections Division, 2009 Polling Place Accessibility Survey (2009) available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/page/2009_polling_place_accessibility_survey_pdf_86432.pdf.

163 Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Elections Division, Impediments Faced by Elderly 

Voters and Voters with Disabilities (2013), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/65/2013_accessibility_report_pdf_44525.pdf.

164 U.S. Census Bureau, “Citizenship status by age by language spoken at home and ability to speak English 

for the population 5 years and over,” 2010-2012 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates.

165 James Tucker, Attorney, Wilson Eisner, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 73 (Aug. 8, 2013) 

(“[Language assistance] is something that consistently across the board we’ve seen election officials fail, 

sometimes intentionally, sometimes they just don’t know any better, sometimes they’re just completely 

under staffed and don’t have the resources.”).

166 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Glossaries of Election Terminology, http://www.eac.gov/election_

management_resources/glossaries_of_election_terminology.aspx. 

167 The Greenlighting Institute, Recommendations 1 (2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/

files/2013/06/FOCE.07-Greenlining.Recommendations.docx; Whitney Quesenbery, Center for Civic 

Design, Accessibility as Innovation: Creating a Voting System for Everyone, PCEA Hearing Submission, 

Philadelphia, PA, at 4-5 (Sept. 4, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/

Whitney-Quesenbery-Accessibility-as-Innovation-PCEA.pdf; Future of California Elections, Report and Recommendations for the PCEA 14 (2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/

files/2013/06/FOCE-PCEA-report-FINAL.pdf.

168 Paul Gronke, Professor of Political Science, Reed College, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 47 

(Aug. 8, 2013).
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169 Id. at 40 (“Early voting rates climbed rapidly, growing by approximately 50% in each cycle from 2000 

until 2008, finally leveling off in 2012.”).

170 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey datasets, available for download at http://www.eac.

gov/research/election_administration_and_voting_survey.aspx (as analyzed by Charles Stewart III with 

data supplemented by local officials). Discrepancies with the Voting and Registration Supplement to the 

Census Current Population Survey are attributable to the different definitions the surveys and respondents may have for what constitutes an absentee or an in-person early vote, as well as the completeness of 

state reporting to the EAC or other sampling error in the CPS. The 2012 CPS data indicate that roughly 

18 percent voted by mail or absentee and 13 percent voted in person early. See Census Bureau, Voting 

and Registration Supplement, Current Population Survey, available at http://dataferrett.census.gov/ (as 

analyzed by Paul Gronke).

171 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 

Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all offer no-excuse absentee voting. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Absentee and Early Voting, 

http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx#no_excuse.

172 The states with some form of early in-person voting include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 

Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 

Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 

See id.

173 Steve Trout, Oregon State Elections Director, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 21 (Aug. 8, 

2013).

174 Paul Gronke, Professor of Political Science, Reed College, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 47 

(Aug. 8, 2013) (“Most states begin early in-person voting 10 to 20 days before Election Day, and most 

end the Friday, Saturday, and some even the Monday before election day. More than one third of the 

states require early voting on at least one Saturday or Sunday.”).

175 Id. at 48 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“It’s true. I tell reporters ever[y] election cycle, where vote fraud occurs is most 

often associated with absentee voting, but it’s also true that the frequency of vote fraud is miniscule.”).

176 Wendy Underhill, NCSL Senior Policy Specialist, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 51 (Aug. 

8, 2013).

177 See Dean Logan, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Denver, CO, at 15 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“[I]t’s clear that the voters today and certainly in the future are going to expect options.”); see also Robert M. Stein & Greg Vonnahme, Voting at Non-Precinct Polling 

Places: A Review and Research Agenda, 10 Election Law Journal 307 (2011) (finding more positive voter 

experiences in states with early voting); Connie Schmidt, CERA Administrator, Election Center, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 17 (Sept. 20, 2013) (noting the benefits of early voting).

178 See, e.g., Ken Detzner, Florida Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 2 (June 28, 

2013) (explaining Florida is one of the states that offers both early voting and no-excuse absentee voting 

and touting the expansion of early voting opportunities that passed in 2013 as one method to deal with 
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wait times in Florida); Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, 

at 2 (Sept. 20, 2013) (explaining his support of expanding no-fault absentee voting to alleviate the lines 

during 2004 election and that “absentee voting has continued to grow in popularity with voters and 

elections officials alike.”); Maggie Toulouse Oliver, Bernalillo County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Denver, CO, at 7 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“The success of our election process is heavily dependent on early 

voting.”); see also Paul Gronke, Professor of Political Science, Reed College, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Denver, CO, at 47 (“Early voting options were added to states across the nation [between 1986 and 

2010] without much debate, primarily as a means to increase accessibility and convenience. Other than 

high profile adoptions at the election cycles in 2000 and 2004, this truly has been a quiet revolution, 

dramatic yet bipartisan.”).

179 See Charles Stewart III, Losing Votes by Mail, 13 N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 573, 

579-80 (2010).

180 Id. at 597-98.

181 Amber McReynolds, Denver Director of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 69 (Aug. 

8, 2013) (describing Denver’s TRACE system for mail ballot tracking); Nicholas Martinez, Miami 

Downtown Development Authority, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 47-48 (June 28, 2013) 

(describing Miami’s intelligent mail barcode for election mail); Seth Flaxman, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 80-81 (Sept. 4, 2013) (testifying to local election officials’ demand for intelligent mail barcode tracking); U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Voter Information Websites Study 

11 (2008), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/workflow_staging/Page/64.PDF.

182 See Press Release, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, EAC Issues Best Practices for Voter Information 

Websites (Nov. 24, 2008), available at http://www.eac.gov/eac_issues_best_practices_for_voter_information_web_sites_/. Orange County’s website, for example, allows voters to track and verify the status 

of their absentee ballots. Neal Kelley, Orange County Registrar of Voters, PCEA Hearing Testimony, 

Cincinnati, OH, at 23 (Sept. 20, 2013). 

183 Candace Grubbs, Butte County Clerk-Recorder/Registrar of Voters, Comment at Election Center National Conference, Savannah, GA (Aug. 15, 2013), summarized in PCEA Public Meeting Conference 

Call, at 20 (Nov. 14, 2013).

184 See Josh Franklin, National Institute of Standards and Technology, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 27 (Sept. 19, 2013) (describing obstacles facing overseas voters). In 2008, civilian absentee 

ballots were returned at a 13% greater rate than UOCAVA ballots. Charles Stewart III, Professor of 

Political Science, MIT, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 39 (Aug. 8, 2013).

185 See Donald Inbody, Senior Lecturer, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 

29-31 (June 28, 2013) (outlining problems with mail and military voters); Paul Lux, Okaloosa County 

Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 17-18 (June 28, 2013) (“Voters in 

forward deployed areas receive mail less frequently and have problems getting mail out when the decision 

is do we send casualties or supplies in the helicopter versus mail. Guess who wins?”).

186 See R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director, The Election Center, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, 

OH, at 9 (Sept. 20, 2013) (“In terms of military and overseas voters, we have made gigantic improvements . . . .”); Donald Inbody, Senior Lecturer, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, 

FL, at 33 (June 28, 2013) (“The MOVE Act was clearly successful, two things, one the 45 days, giving 
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more time for the turn around process, the second one was the changing of how you treat the FPCA.”); 

Dan Nolan, Vice President of Strategic Planning and Government Operations, SOE Software, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 4 (Sept. 19, 2013) (praising the MOVE Act for authorizing 

UOCAVA voters to receive ballots electronically); Overseas Vote Foundation, OVF and US Vote 2012 

Post-Election Survey Report 2 (2013), available at https://www.overseasvotefoundation.org/files/OVF_

ElectionReport_2013_web.pdf.

187 In one survey, 22% of overseas voters reported that the ballots they requested were either missing or 

late. Donald Inbody, Senior Lecturer, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, 

at 30 (June 28, 2013); Overseas Vote Foundation, OVF and US Vote 2012 Post-Election Survey 

Report 2 (2013), available at https://www.overseasvotefoundation.org/files/OVF_ElectionReport_2013_web.pdf .

188 Overseas Vote Foundation, OVF and US Vote 2012 Post-Election Survey Report 6 (2013), available at 

https://www.overseasvotefoundation.org/files/OVF_ElectionReport_2013_web.pdf.

189 Id. at 7. 

190 See Donald Inbody, Senior Lecturer, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Presentation, Miami, FL, at 

slide 5 (June 28, 2013) (noting one-third of FWABs are rejected, usually because the voter is not registered).

191 See Independent Review, Final Report for the Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS) (2006) (discussing earlier efforts of online assistance for military voters). 

192 Orange County, California, has a web portal allowing military and overseas voters to register, verify and 

update military or overseas status, print a ballot, and request future ballots, among other features. Neal 

Kelley, Orange County Registrar of Voters, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 23 (Sept. 20, 

2013). Wisconsin’s voter portal website securely delivers absentee ballots to service members overseas, 

among other services. Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel, Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 7 (Sept. 20, 2013). See also Paul 

Lux, Okaloosa County Supervisor of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 18 (June 28, 

2013) (advocating expanded electronic delivery and return of ballots to UOCAVA voters, though not 

“pure internet voting”); Donald Inbody, Senior Lecturer, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 31 (June 28, 2013).

193 Overseas Vote Foundation, State Website UOCAVA Support Summary 1 (2013).

194 See Donald Inbody, Texas State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 31-32 (June 28, 

2013) (recommending printable barcoded ballots as a good practice for military voters); Linda Lamone, 

Maryland State Administrator of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 5 (Sept. 4, 

2013) (describing Maryland’s use of barcoded electronic ballot delivery for military voters).

195 According to testimony received at the Denver hearing, the National Conference of State Legislatures 

“has identified voting technology as the coming crisis in elections.” Wendy Underhill, NCSL Senior 

Policy Specialist, National Conference of State Legislatures, PCEA Hearing Submission, Denver, CO, at 

3 (Aug. 8, 2013). 

196 Each state is required by HAVA to submit a state plan to the EAC detailing how it will spend federal 

funds. State plans are available at http://www.eac.gov/payments_and_grants/state_plans.aspx. 
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197 See Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 5 (Sept. 20, 

2013) (“The next time we go to the polls to elect a president, these machines will be twelve years old. 

That’s a lifetime when it comes to technology. The cost of this falls on already strapped local governments.”); Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“Virginia faces an issue that many states across the nation face. How 

do we transition and upgrade to the next generation of voting equipment as aging equipment, purchased 

after the enactment of HAVA, reaches the end of its lifespan[?]”). 

198 See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere, Professor of Government, Harvard University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 56 (Sept. 20, 2013) (discussing results from survey of local election officials 

indicating wide dissatisfaction with available technology); Dean Logan, Los Angeles County RegistrarRecorder/County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 15 (Aug. 8, 2013) (describing Los 

Angeles County’s “very outdated voting system”); Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel, Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 33 (Sept. 19, 

2013) (“[W]e’re not serving the voter with the type of equipment that’s available. We’re not serving the 

election official with the type of equipment that’s available.”); Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State 

Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“The lack of innovation often results in states and localities paying for expensive but antiquated equipment.”); Dana 

DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 36 (Aug. 8, 2013) (“We’re 

extremely unhappy with what the market has offered us.”); Sarah Johnson, Colorado Springs City Clerk, 

PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 37 (Aug. 8, 2013) (lamenting that voting machines “haven’t 

been upgraded in years”); Kenneth Bennett, Information Technology Manager, GIS, Ballot Management, and Election Tally Systems Division, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 15 (Sept. 19, 2013) (describing the difficulty of 

finding effective voting systems for large jurisdictions); see also Stephen Ansolabehere, Daron Shaw & 

Charles Stewart III, Overview of Local Election Officials Survey 17 (2013); Charles Stewart III, PCEA 

Public Meeting Presentation, Washington, DC, at slide 37 (Dec. 3, 2013).

199 Dean C. Logan, Towards a Voter-Oriented Voting System: General Voting System Principles for Los 

Angeles County (2011), available at http://www.lavote.net/Voter/VSAP/PDFS/VotingSystemPrinciples.

pdf; Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis STAR Voting System: Draft Flow of Polling Place Operations, available at 

https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/Dana-Debeauvoir-STAR-Voting-System-Diagram.pdf.

200 See Kathy Rogers, Senior Vice President of Government Affairs, Election Systems & Software, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 4-5 (Sept. 19, 2013) (describing the diversity of current and 

future market demands across jurisdictions); Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 20-21 (Sept. 19, 2013) (noting the difficulty for vendors in creating 

innovative systems given uncertain revenue streams); R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director, The Election 

Center, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 31-32 (Sept. 19, 2013) (stating that political 

constraints, not voter demands, drive election system manufacturing choices). 

201 R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director, The Election Center, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, 

at 4 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/Doug-Lewis-Testimony-for-Presidential-Commission-on-Elections.pdf (“Much has been reported by states and local jurisdictions, as well as the voting equipment manufacturers, that indicate there is a continuing problem 

with improving and updating voting equipment. We hear continuously that the current process stifles 

innovation and is so convoluted that voting equipment is out of date before it gets through testing let 

alone before it gets purchased or implemented by a local jurisdiction.”); Dana DeBeauvoir, Some of the 
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Challenges That Can Be Addressed with a New Type of Voting System, available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/Dana-Debeauvoir-Challenges-That-Can-Be-Addressed-w-New-VotingSystem.pdf (“The use of proprietary software and a difficult certification process has created a disincentive for vendors to maintain updated versions of software.”); Kenneth Bennett, Information Technology 

Manager, GIS, Ballot Management, and Election Tally Systems Division, Los Angeles County RegistrarRecorder/County Clerk’s Office, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 2 (Sept. 19, 2013) 

(“We saw a dysfunctional regulatory environment. We saw a voting systems market that was not offering 

products that would support our elections.”); Matt Masterson, Deputy Elections Administrator, Office 

of the Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 9-10 (Sept. 19, 2013) 

(describing the problem of stretching existing IT systems amid uncertainty as to what new systems will 

be available). 

202 Kenneth Bennett, Information Technology Manager, GIS, Ballot Management, and Election Tally Systems Division, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 4 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/

Kenneth-Bennett-Written-Testimony-PCEA-Cincinnati-2013-.pdf (“In light of [technology] trends in 

the general population, future voters are increasingly more likely to be engaged and interconnected technologically . . . . They will expect technology to be a ubiquitous utility. . . . [W]e find [some] voters who 

expect technology to improve the voting experience and improve the administration of election[s], by 

making it more efficient, convenient, informative, and accessible.”); Eddie Perez, Hart Intercivic, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 8 (Sept. 19, 2013) (describing the public’s desire for voting systems that use “familiar, accessible technology”); Marci Andino, Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 12 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“Voters want to 

be able to vote using their personal electronic device, whether it’s a smartphone or an iPad or some other 

type of tablet. And I would like to see that incorporated into the next generation of voting systems.”).

203 Josh Franklin, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Cincinnati, OH, at 26-27 (Sept. 19, 

2013) (testifying that the current standards are not adapted to new technologies states want to use, 

and that because of fears of wasting money on new systems that could be made obsolete by subsequent 

standards, new standards are needed to drive innovation); Merle King, Executive Director, Center for 

Election Systems at Kennesaw State University, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 30 (Sept. 

19, 2013) (arguing that static standards restrict the certification process’s ability to adapt to new threats).

204 David Wallick, Everyone Counts, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 74-75 (Aug. 8, 2013) (advocating software solutions instead of single-use products, and arguing that slow certification procedures 

hinder the implementation of off-the-shelf technology); McDermot Coutts, Director of Research and 

Development, Unisyn Voting Solutions, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 6 (Sept. 19, 

2013) (describing the problem of standards not keeping pace with technology); Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis 

County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 13 (Sept. 19, 2013) (stating that standards 

are one factor pushing officials back to inefficient paper-based voting systems).

205 Brian Hancock, Director, Voting System Testing and Certification, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, PCEA Hearing Submission, Cincinnati, OH, at 3 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/Brian-Hancock-Testimony-for-Presidential-Commission-9.19.13.pdf

(“The EAC continues to respond to both real and perceived criticisms of our current process. These criticisms have included: Time –Testing still takes too long. Cost – Testing remains too expensive. Relevance 

– Time and cost factors may contribute to State and local jurisdictions seeking alternatives to this process 

in order to run effective elections, even though they may support the EAC program in principle.”); Don-
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ald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 

4 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“The current process is expensive and time-consuming.”); R. Doug Lewis, Executive 

Director, The Election Center, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 31-32 (Sept. 19, 2013) 

(“[T]esting takes forever and standards development take[s] forever.”); John Wack, Format Developer/

Researcher, Voting System Standards, National Institute of Standards and Technology, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 44 (Sept. 19, 2013) (expressing frustration with the time it currently takes 

to update the standards); James Long, Wyle Laboratories & Brian Hancock, Director, Voting System 

Testing and Certification, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, 

OH, at 35-37 (Sept. 19, 2013) (discussing the cost of testing); see also Josh Franklin, National Institute 

of Standards and Technology, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 26 (Sept. 19, 2013) (“Currently I think there are two voting system test labs and one . . . awaiting EAC accreditation.”); Brian Hancock, Director, Voting System Testing and Certification, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 38 (Sept. 19, 2013) (noting that with a manufacturer declaration of conformity process, some testing could be done more quickly by non-specialized hardware labs).

206 Matt Masterson, Deputy Elections Administrator, Office of the Ohio Secretary of State, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 10 (Sept. 19, 2013) (testifying that “you’re talking about a one maybe 

two month window” after an election to submit modifications for certification).

207 R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director, The Election Center, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 

31 (Sept. 19, 2013) (“States now are moving to do their own testing and their own standards and [hiring] 

their own laboratories to do some of this.”); Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel, Wisconsin 

Government Accountability Board, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 33 (Sept. 19, 2013) 

(“The reason why states including Wisconsin are stepping outside of the system is because we have to.”); 

Lori Edwards, Supervisor of Elections for Polk County, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Miami, FL, at 45 

(June 28, 2013) (urging the Commission to “resist the temptation of centralization and uniformity” with 

regard to technology standards).

208 Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel, Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, PCEA 

Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 33-34 (Sept. 19, 2013); Donald Palmer, Secretary, Virginia State 

Board of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 4 (Sept. 4, 2013) (“The states need 

a timely certification process that enhances competition and the development of new technologies.”); 

R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director, The Election Center, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, 

at 31 (Sept. 19, 2013).

209 This mirrors the Travis County, Texas approach. See Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis STAR Voting System: 

Draft Flow of Polling Place Operations, available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/09/

Dana-Debeauvoir-STAR-Voting-System-Diagram.pdf. 

210 In fact, iPads have been used to display and mark ballots in pilot programs for voters needing special 

assistance. They may be combined with a number of accessibility tools such as headphones for screen 

reading, alternate input devices (e.g., paddles, “sip-and-puff” devices, keyboards) and their screens can be 

magnified for visibility enhancement. See Steve Trout, Oregon State Elections Director, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Denver, CO, at 12 (Aug. 8, 2013).

211 Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Senior Staff Technologist, Center for Democracy & Technology, PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 41 (Sept. 19, 2013) (extolling the benefits of “[o]ptical scan voting systems, ballot marking devices, poll books that you can walk through a line. They would require only quick 
96

interactions with voters and allow voters to mark ballots and register and check in very quickly.”). 

212 See John Carbone, IACREOT, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 40 (Sept. 4, 2013) (detailing benefits from using technologies such as iPads, including making it easier to “vote anywhere”).

213 See Kenneth Bennett, Information Technology Manager, GIS, Ballot Management, and Election Tally 

Systems Division, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 12 (Sept. 19, 2013); Drew Davies, Oxide Design Co., PCEA Hearing 

Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 46 (Sept. 20, 2013) (describing one such “pre-fill” system using voters’ 

own mobile devices); Linda Lamone, Maryland State Administrator of Elections, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Philadelphia, PA, at 5 (Sept. 4, 2013) (explaining Maryland’s new mark-and-print ballot tool); 

Dianne Golden, Association of Assistive Technology Act Programs, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 42 (Sept. 19, 2013) (describing potential benefits of such pre-fill systems for voters with 

disabilities).

214 See Brennan Center for Justice, PCEA Hearing Submission, Philadelphia, PA, at 27 (Sept. 4, 2013), 

available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/11/Testimony-of-the-Brennan-Center-forJustice-before-the-PCEA.pdf. More than half of states conduct some form of post-election auditing, 

and risk-limiting audits are being conducted by a few states as a way to further test their results and 

procedures. Verified Voting, Post-Election Audits (2012), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/

files/2013/09/VerifiedVoting-Post-Election-Audits.pdf.

215 See P.B. Stark & D.A. Wagner, Evidence-Based Elections, http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/

evidenceVote12.pdf; Philip B. Stark, Conservative Statistical Post-Election Audits, 2 Annals Applied Statistics 550 (2008), available at http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/conservativeElectionAudits07.pdf; Lawrence Norden et al., The Brennan Center for Justice, Post-Election Audits: Restoring 

Trust in Elections (2007), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_50227.pdf.

216 The Brennan Center has proposed a national database, accessible by election officials and others, that 

identifies voting system malfunctions and trends. See Lawrence Norden, Brennan Center for Justice, 

Voting System Failures: A Database Solution (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/

default/files/legacy/Democracy/Voting_Machine_Failures_Online.pdf. 

217 For machines that are EAC-certified, the EAC’s Quality Monitoring Program can alert election officials 

to any anomalies. More information is available at http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/quality_monitoring_program.aspx.

218 See generally Heather Gerken, The Democracy Index (2012).

219 See Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 2 (Aug. 8, 

2013); Neal Kelley, Orange County Registrar of Voters, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Cincinnati, OH, at 

22 (Sept. 20, 2013).

220 Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel, Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Pew 

Voting in America Conference 2012: The Price of Elections (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.

pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/KevinKennedy.pptx.
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