NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________
No. 18

- 1385

________________ CHUN YAO LIN,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A200

- 174

- 211) Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley

______________
Submitted Under Third C ircuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a)

September 27, 2018

______________

Before: SMITH

, Chief Judge

, McKEE , RE STREPO

, Circuit Judge s

(Filed: August 20, 2019 )

____________

OPINION 

____________

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

M c KEE, Circuit Judge

.

Chun Y ao L in petitions for review of the BIA’s dismissal of his app eal of the IJ’s

decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relie f under

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)

. For the reasons that follow, we will d e n y the

petition for review.

The Attorney General may gran t asylum to a refugee who can show that he is

unable or unwilling to return to his country because of a “well

- founded fear of

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group , or political opinion.” 1 To establish such a f ear, the refugee must demonstrate both

a subjective, genuine fear of persecution and, “objectively, that ‘ a reasonable person in

the alien’s circumstances would fear persecution if returned to the country in question. ’ ” 2

To satisfy the objective prong, t he refugee “must show she would be individually singled

out for persecution or demonstrate that ‘there is a pattern or practice in his or her country

of nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant

on account o f [ ,] ’” inter alia

, “religion.” 3

1 Lie v. Ashcroft , 396 F.3d 530, 534

– 3 5 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a )(42)(A) )

. 2 Id. at 536 (quoting Zubeda v. Ashcroft , 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003)).
3 Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)).3

The standard for withholding of removal is similar to , but higher than, the standard

for asylum. 4 Accordingly, any petition er who fails to satisfy the standard for asylum

necessarily cannot meet the standard for withholdin g of removal. 5

Finally, a n applicant who see k s to remain in the United States under the CAT must

establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tort ured if removed to the

proposed country of removal.” 6 Torture is defined as

[A] ny act by w hich severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person ha s committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or ac qu iescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 7

After reviewing th is record

, we are satisfied that the BIA’s denial of the petition

for relief is supported by substantial evidence. 8 Petitioner has not established that he

4 Shardar v. Ashcroft , 382 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lukwago v. Ashcroft

, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003)).
5 Id

. (quoting Lukwago , 329 F.3d at 182)

. 6 Id. at 325 (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft , 290 F.3d 166, 172 (3d Cir. 2002)).

7 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
8 See Shardar

, 382 F.3d at 323 (“Whether a petitioner has demo nstrated past persecution or a well

- founded fear of futur e persecution is a factual question that is reviewed by this Court under a substantial evidence standard, and will be upheld to the extent it is supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evi dence on the record considered as a whole.” (internal quo tations and citation omitted)). The scope of review under the substantial evidence standard is narrow, and we will not disturb the conclusions of the BIA “unless the evidence not only supports a cont rary conclusion, but compels it. ” Id. (quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft , 242 F.3d 477, 483

– 84 (3d Cir. 20 0 1)).4

wo uld be singled out for his Christian beliefs or that he would be subjected to a pattern or

practice of persecution

. He could not identify a church he would attend in China, there

was no evidence in the record of persecution towards Christians in his home p rovince,

and even the reports he relie d upon indicate that membership in “unregistered” churches

is “tacitly approved of” in certain areas of the country. 9 W e also agree that Petitioner has

not demonstrated that he would proselytize when he returned to Chi na as there is

insufficient proof of his proselytization efforts in the United States. 10

Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown he identified evidence

compelling a conclusion that he will be subject t o persecution or torture

, and we will

th erefore d e n y the petition for review of the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of

relief.

9 JA 244.
10 Lin asserts that the BIA and IJ incorrectly discounted his testimony despite finding him credible. We disagree. Although the IJ found that Lin was credible “in a general sense,” JA 71, he also co ncluded that much of Lin’s testimony was not substantiated. See, e.g.
, JA 72

– 73.