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THE SIX–PARTY PROCESS: PROGRESS AND PERILS

IN NORTH KOREA’S DENUCLEARIZATION

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND 

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 2007

Serial No. 110–145

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

LISA WILLIAMS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DAVID RICHMOND, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

NIEN SU, Republican Professional Staff Member 

VILI LEI, Staff Associate

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

TED POE, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

DON MACDONALD, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JOHN BRODTKE, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

TOM SHEEHY, Republican Professional Staff Member 

KINSEY KIRIAKOS, Staff Associate 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................... 7

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 2

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 4

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Illinois: Prepared statement ................................................................. 5

The Honorable Christopher R. Hill: Prepared statement .................................... 12

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida: Article entitled ‘‘What Happened in Syria?’’ ......................... 31

(1)

THE SIX–PARTY PROCESS: PROGRESS AND 

PERILS IN NORTH KOREA’S DENUCLEARIZATION 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC,

AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o’clock p.m. in 

room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H. 

Faleomavaega (chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, 

and the Global Environment) presiding. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The joint subcommittee hearing this afternoon will be brought to order. We are very, very happy to have our 

distinguished visitor here as our witness for this afternoon’s hearing. And I want to thank also my co-chairman, the gentleman from 

California, who is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and his 

ranking member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Royce. My 

ranking member, my dear friend, the gentleman from Illinois, is 

not here with us yet, Mr. Manzullo. But certainly I welcome the 

members of both of our subcommittees for this hearing this afternoon. 

For the sake of time, I have just been informed that Assistant 

Secretary Hill is really taken for time because of his schedule this 

afternoon, and we are due to complete this hearing hopefully by 

4:15 this afternoon. So for the sake of time I am just going to 

present my opening statement to be made part of the record. And 

certainly I would like to give the opportunity, and I will be very 

strict in giving the allotted time to both the subcommittee chairman and our ranking members, 5 minutes for their opening statements. And then following that, I will then allow our witness for 

his testimony. 

So at this time I would like to give the opportunity now for the 

opening statement to the gentleman from California, the subcommittee chairman of Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. 

Sherman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

2

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTA- TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

On October 3, 2007, the six parties announced an agreement concerning the implementation of Phase Two which calls for a ‘‘complete declaration of all nuclear 

programs’’ by North Korea and ‘‘disablement of all existing nuclear facilities’’ in 

North Korea. I commend Secretary Christopher Hill for his role in these historic negotiations and I welcome him to today’s hearing which is being held jointly with the 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade which is chaired by my 

good friend, Congressman Brad Sherman, who I commend for his leadership on this 

issue. I also commend our Ranking Members, Mr. Don Manzullo, and Mr. Ed Royce, 

and look forward to their comments. 

Given that this is a joint hearing and in consideration of the Secretary’s time, we 

will recognize Chairman Sherman, and Ranking Members Manzullo and Royce for 

any opening statements they may have and as much time as they may consume. 

We will also recognize other Members of the subcommittee for two minute opening 

statements and we ask that all Members limit their questioning to 5 minutes. 

By December 31, 2007, the new agreement specifies the disablement of North Korean nuclear installations and a complete and correct declaration of North Korea’s 

nuclear programs. In return, the US will fulfill its commitment by removing NK 

from the US list of state sponsors of terrorisms and terminating economic sanctions 

in parallel with North Korea’s actions. The US and North Korea will also increase 

bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. 

Upon completion of Phase Two, a separate negotiation could begin over a Korean 

pace agreement to replace the 1953 Korean armistice. A Korean peace agreement 

negotiation is a high priority for the government of South Korea and I support such 

efforts. 

The Bush Administration has also joined South Korea, China, and Russia in financing the provision of the one million tons of heavy oil that North Korea is to 

receive under the February 2007 agreement. I support these efforts, too, and applaud the Administration, Secretary Rice, and Assistant Secretary Hill for the way 

they have successfully managed the North Korean crisis thus far. I also give due 

credit to China which is often overlooked for the positive role it has played in these 

negotiations. 

While diplomacy is working, we can agree that serious problems still lie ahead 

especially as we try and determine to what extent North Korea has shared nuclear 

know-how with Iran and Syria. I continue to also have serious concerns about Pakistan. North Korea’s began its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program with Pakistani assistance. The US also continues to subsidize Pakistan’s military at about 

$80 million per month which is roughly equal to one-quarter of Pakistan’s total defense expenditures. What the public may not know is that North Korea and Pakistan have been engaged in conventional arms trade for over 30 years and, in 2006, 

General Musharraf admitted that Pakistan has transferred nuclear technology to 

North Korea, and other rogue nations. 

What does a Pakistan-North Korea alliance mean for India and why does the US 

continue to turn a blind eye? These questions are daunting and given the dangerous 

circumstances of our times and the potential for nuclear proliferation in the Asia 

Pacific region, I believe our most important responsibility is to do all in our power 

to further peace. 

Again, I commend Secretary Hill for the work he is doing and I look forward to 

his testimony regarding the progress and perils in North Korea’s denuclearization. 

At this time, I recognize Chairman Sherman for any opening remarks he may 

have.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish I could be as 

brief as you. I am unable to do so. I want to thank Secretary Hill 

for coming before us. I know you can only be here for 1 hour and 

15 minutes, and I know we are going to have votes on the floor. 

Eni’s special status may absolve him of that. And that is why I 

called you earlier today. And I want to thank you for your commitment to come back soon if that is necessary, given our limited time 

today. 

This is a foreign policy administration. That is how historians 

will view it. Iraq is probably not going to be regarded as an overwhelming positive. The centrifuges are probably going to be turnVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Mar 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\APGE\102507\38544.000 Hintrel1 PsN: SHIRL
3

ing in Isfahan come the end of this administration. And so the administration is somewhat desperate for a foreign policy success. 

Your boss, Secretary Rice, has thrown a Hail Mary pass in the 

direction of Jerusalem. I am not so sure that that is going to work 

out. So when it comes to a shining foreign policy success for the 

Bush years, Secretary Hill, you are it. 

There is of course pressure to get a deal done. And often the easiest deal to make is one that is vague, illusory, or lacks adequate 

enforcement. And that is especially true with the North Koreans, 

who have a history of violating agreements and, as you have discovered, as we have all discovered watching you, a process of making an agreement and then backing out of it, even if it is specific. 

So we look at what are the specifics as best we can determine 

in the deal points that have been announced this month. The key 

issues that the North Koreans give us is at least unplugging 

Yongbyon. That is good, but they can plug it back in. The deal calls 

for decommissioning of that facility. But then the question is: Are 

we talking about hard decommissioning, or soft decommissioning 

or, as I would use the term, squishy decommissioning? 

A soft decommission is something that can be obviously reversed 

in less than a year. My definition of a hard decommissioning is 

what we saw at Chernobyl. You pour the concrete in and it gets 

hard. And then you have hard decommissioning of the site. Squishy 

decommissioning is a circumstance where there is some decommissioning, but within a few months, perhaps within a year, perhaps 

less, the facility can be turned back on. So we do need to determine 

what level of decommissioning. My fear is that we will settle for 

something less than hard decommissioning. 

When we look at what North Korea gets out of this deal, it is 

1 million tons of fuel oil; 150,000 of those tons to be delivered by 

the end of October. That is, at today’s prices as I understand it, between $600 million and $700 million. And they are supposed to get 

normalization, removal from the terrorist list, and subject to some 

recent discussions at the head of state level, it appears to be a 

peace treaty as well. What they want most immediately is removal 

from the terrorist list. And it will be interesting to see whether 

they get that removal for something less than a hard decommissioning of Yongbyon. 

There are a number of other commitments that they have made. 

One is about this declaration they are supposed to issue. A recent 

report prepared for these subcommittees by the Congressional Research Service at least interprets the agreement as it by no means 

being clear that they are supposed to tell us about their HEU program, and that it is uncertain that this declaration should disclose 

stockpiled plutonium and the number of atomic bombs made from 

the plutonium. So all that we can tell from what the North Koreans have officially agreed to is that there will be a statement. Then 

the issue will arise as to whether we have any rights to, as Reagan 

says, trust but verify. And we will be interested in looking at that. 

I believe my time has expired, and I look forward to hearing from 

the witness. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sherman follows:]

4

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

I want to thank our distinguished witness, Assistant Secretary Christopher R. 

Hill for joining us today to provide an update on our efforts towards North Korea’s 

denuclearization. 

The stated goal of the Six Party process is the peaceful and verifiable 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The importance and urgency of this task 

has never been greater, and its implications extend far beyond the Peninsula. 

Today, we know that the nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, Libya and now 

perhaps Syria, share a common thread. In August 2003, the world learned of a vast 

illegal international nuclear proliferation network led by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. 

Khan. Khan sold nuclear equipment and related technologies to Libya, Iran and 

North Korea. Thankfully, in large part because of a concerted multilateral sanctions 

regime led by the United States and its allies, Libya saw it in its interest to give 

up its nuclear program. Unfortunately, the centrifuges in Iran continue to turn to 

this day due, in part, to the Khan network. We know that North Korea’s uranium 

enrichment program was aided by the Khan network. 

Last month, we learned that Israel conducted an air strike against a facility in 

northern Syria, which allegedly was connected to a nuclear program. The Washington Post reported yesterday that, based on commercial satellite photos, some experts believe that the destroyed site was similar in design to a North Korean reactor 

capable of producing nuclear material for bombs. This has fueled speculation of 

North Korean complicity in the matter. 

The lesson from these events is clear: denuclearization of nations such as North 

Korea and Iran is not limited to those countries alone; it has global consequences. 

We need to be sure that we are not duped. At the end of the day, North Korea must 

give up its own nuclear materials and must never be in the business of forward proliferation. 

It is in that context that we review the Administration’s strategy known as the 

Six Party process. Despite the Administration’s efforts over the last seven years, 

tangible results remain illusive: by all accounts, should it choose to, North Korea 

is capable of producing more weapons today than in the past. According to David 

Albright, a renowned expert on North Korea’s nuclear program, the vast majority 

of North Korea’s separated plutonium—between 80 and 99 percent—was produced 

since North Korea lifted the freeze on production and reprocessing in 2003. The remainder was separated before 1992. 

Nevertheless, the agreement reached this month in Beijing contains the elements 

of a successful roadmap for a lasting solution to this problem. The agreement exacts 

commitments on the part of North Korea of a scope not seen in a decade. It may 

be the best hope we have, but it cannot be allowed to morph into a nuclear Munich. 

According to the agreement, North Korea has agreed to provide a complete and 

correct declaration of all its nuclear programs by the end of this year. North Korea 

has also agreed to disable all of its existing nuclear facilities. Disablement of 

Yongbyon’s 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor, Reprocessing Plant, and Nuclear 

Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility will be completed by December. Appropriately, the 

United States will lead these activities and provide the initial funding. 

Notably absent from those commitments is specific mention of North Korea’s alleged uranium program, which originally triggered this nuclear crisis in 2003. Also 

absent is reference to existing nuclear weapons or devices in North Korea’s arsenal. 

Most observers assess that the North so far has reprocessed 40–50 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for roughly six to eight bombs. Denuclearization must include disarmament of the existing nuclear weapons that continue to pose a threat to the region. If the Yongbyon nuclear complex is allowed to operate as business as usual, 

North Korea could produce one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year for the next few 

years. 

Pyongyang has also reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, 

technology, or know-how to other nations. Recent events with regard to Syria’s alleged nuclear program illustrate the importance of this. Not only do we have to 

denuclearize and disarm North Korea of its nuclear weapons, we have to verify that 

North Korea is not sharing sensitive information with the likes of Iran and Syria. 

In return, the United States will provide substantial economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea. The United States has also agreed to begin 

the process of normalizing relations with North Korea, including eventual removal 

of North Korea from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. 

The agreement reached is a milestone and I applaud today’s witness for his efforts 

at getting us this far. The commitments made by North Korea seem to represent 

5

real and positive change. However, the issue of nuclear disarmament of North Korea 

is not without its history. What were heralded in the past as great achievements 

turned out to be hidden failures. The weight of that history suggests prudence. It 

suggests that the United States must remain vigilant in its verification that North 

Korea fully complies with its commitments. 

As we review testimony from today’s witness, we need an explanation of how the 

Administration intends to monitor North Korea’s commitments. This is all the more 

important given the IAEA’s marginal involvement in the verification process. Will 

you have the resources, access and information needed to provide unequivocal confirmation that North Korea is meeting its obligations? For instance, how does the 

Administration plan to remove or discard 8,000 fuel rods from the reactor? I am told 

that they just can’t be buried. These fuel rods must first be reprocessed before being 

safely disposed. 

We also need to know how the outstanding issues such as uranium enrichment 

and North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal will be handled. 

I would also like the witness to comment on the Administration’s plan to remove 

North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, to provide additional 

shipments of fuel and other aid, and other commitments made on the U.S. side of 

the equation. 

Lastly, Congress obviously has a role to play in this process. My colleagues and 

I remain committed to ensuring rigorous oversight is applied in the months ahead. 

I welcome your views on what legislative authorities are needed to implement various aspects of the agreement and facilitate its success. 

I look forward to hearing from our witness. Thank you.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank the chairman of our Subcommittee 

on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, and the ranking member of our Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Subcommittee. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very 

important hearing on the Six-Party Talks process. I want to take 

this opportunity to welcome Chris Hill to Congress, and yet again 

commend him for again making Capitol Hill outreach a priority. 

Let me begin by saying again thank you for your tireless efforts. 

In fact, Ambassador Hill will be traveling to my district on the 

weekend to give an important briefing at Rockford College on peace 

in the Korean Peninsula. We were on our way to take him to Chicago, but we had to cancel that end of it because he is on his way 

to Beijing. So I know the transparency of this man. In talks before 

the Congress, in meeting with the public, in trying to form a consensus as to not only the importance of denuclearizing the Korean 

Peninsula, he is always making sure the American people are informed at all times as to the steps of what are necessary, and that 

they also give him the things we would like to see done. So Ambassador Hill, I commend for your openness and willingness to really 

include everybody in this important process. 

I am going to submit the rest of my statement for the record because I want to hear Ambassador Hill. I would also like to submit, 

at the request of Congressman Hoekstra and Congresswoman RosLehtinen an article that they wrote——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Without objection. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manzullo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the Six Party 

Talks process. I want to take this opportunity to welcome Chris Hill to Congress 

yet again, and to commend him for making Capitol Hill outreach a priority. So, let 

me begin by saying ‘‘thank you’’ for your tireless efforts. 

6

The complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a goal 

that we must all support. The Six Party Talks process, which in addition to the 

United States and North Korea, includes Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia, 

is a good framework for such a sensitive topic. I commend the Administration for 

taking this measured, deliberate, and multilateral approach. Now, we are at the 

critical Phase Two juncture where the future of the talks is very much at stake. 

I have reviewed both the February 13th Agreement and the October 3rd Joint 

Statement in detail. Both agreements are vague in terms of a detailed timeline and 

specific commitments. The February 13th agreement called for North Korea to 

freeze its nuclear facility at Yongbyon (YONG BEE ON) and to invite international 

monitors back into the country to monitor the freeze. Bilateral discussions, in the 

form of five working groups, were also to commence. In exchange for these actions, 

the February agreement called for the United States to provide 50,000 tons of heavy 

fuel oil. I note that the State Department has notified Congress about the funding 

needed to purchase this oil. I also note that an American-led team has recently returned from North Korea, and another one is scheduled to return in the near future. 

Mr. Chairman, much has been said about the quality of the February agreement 

and the October statement. The Phase Two implementation plan raises a lot of 

questions that I hope our distinguished witness will address. I understand that we 

should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, but knowing full well the bizarre regime in North Korea is unreliable, we’ve got to get this agreement right 

from the start with solid verification mechanisms in place. But there are still many 

important questions that the people we represent will want answered. For example, 

how do we verify that the upcoming declaration by North Korea regarding its nuclear programs will be truthful and complete? There currently is no verification 

mechanism in the agreement that allows for widespread inspections inside the country. How will we know that the regime has not hidden more nuclear material somewhere else in the mountainous regions of North Korea? Also, will the Administration remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list even if there is 

not significant progress on resolving the kidnapping of Japanese citizens? Finally, 

the question of whether North Korea is continuing to engage in proliferation activities is most troubling. The Administration’s decision to limit access to information 

concerning Israel’s strike in Syria is a cause for concern. 

The complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea is such an important 

matter that we should take all deliberate efforts to ensure that this is done right. 

What is at stake here is nothing less than world peace. But what we do not want 

is a repeat of the past where agreements are broken. I commend our witness for 

tackling such an important job, and I want to assure him that his efforts are for 

the broader good.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank the gentleman from Illinois. And now 

I would like to have the ranking member of our Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, the gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, for his opening statement. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and welcome, 

Ambassador Hill. 

There is no cookie-cutter approach when it comes to dealing with 

proliferation and checking proliferation. The Agreed Framework 

failed, but that doesn’t doom another agreement today. But if we 

are trying to redo, skepticism is required. 

That is especially the case because the February agreement is, 

frankly, so vague. North Korea’s commitment to giving up its nuclear weapons is uncertain. Nothing has been agreed to on 

verification. There are concerns about its reversibility or, as my colleague said, soft decommission. 

In Libya’s case the path was clearer. This agreement has costs. 

Compromising our legal principles by sending back to North Korea 

ill-gotten gains parked in Banco Delta. We should be cracking 

down hard on this regime’s illicit activities, including its counterfeiting, not easing up. Criminal activities have helped the regime 

pursue WMD and missile programs, and to survive. 

Second would be downplaying North Korea’s drug trafficking. 

7

Third would be giving way on North Korea’s demand to be removed from the terrorist list. Our ally, Japan, is distraught. 

Fourth would be accepting a North Korean missile test in May 

as a routine event. 

Lastly would be helping keep the wheels on a shaky, repressive, 

and dangerous regime with fuel payments. The administration has 

asked Congress this week for $106 million for energy and economic 

assistance. The press has reported that North Korea is assisting 

Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism, to build nuclear facilities. What 

other nuclear activities might North Korea be undertaking as it negotiates? North Korea of course has an alarming proliferation history, including dealing with A.Q. Khan. 

I advise the administration to be forthcoming regarding North 

Korean activities, including their activities in Syria. 

Meanwhile, as the North Korean regime continues its brutal repression, we have sort of sidelined ourselves on human rights. 

Human rights abuses are important because North Koreans are 

suffering, and they also tell us something about the regime we are 

expecting to carry out commitments. 

Summing up, my concern is that this process has us putting up 

carrots and putting down sticks while North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is protected by the regime’s delaying and denying, and I look 

forward to hearing why that is not the case. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman from California. 

Without objection, all of the statements of the members of the committee will be made part of the record. 

We have with us this afternoon the Assistant Secretary with the 

East Asian Bureau and Pacific Affairs, Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill, a member of the Senior Foreign Service at the State 

Department. This gentleman is a graduate of Bowdoin College in 

Maine, and received his Master’s from the Naval War College. A 

distinguished career in the Foreign Service as a former Ambassador to Poland, to Macedonia. Also a negotiator dealing with Bosnia and Kosova, and a former Peace Corps volunteer to Cameroon. 

So I can’t say enough about your service, Secretary Hill, than the 

tremendous contributions that you have made as a servant of our 

Nation, and certainly to the world, in trying to establish peace, especially with the tremendous amount of responsibility that you 

bear as Assistant Secretary of State. 

And with that, Ambassador Hill, I would like to give you now the 

floor to make your statement. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador HILL. Thank you very much, Chairman 

Faleomavaega. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, and Mr. Manzullo, 

Mr. Royce. It is good to have this opportunity to appear before you. 

I have a prepared statement which I would like to put into the 

record. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Without objection, your statement will be 

made part of the record. 

8

Ambassador HILL. Thank you. And what I will do is perhaps 

summarize from this. But also I think because of some of the concerns that have been expressed, maybe I can just speak directly to 

some of the issues that all of you have particular concerns about. 

Our goal remains to achieve the complete and verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

and nuclear programs. And to achieve that, we are embarked on 

a step by step process. And as we achieve each step, it doesn’t 

mean we have achieved our goal. We have to keep going to that 

goal. And should we stall, and should we not be able to move forward, the steps that we have achieved I don’t think in and of themselves will have been valuable. In short, they are only valuable insofar as they play a role in getting to our ultimate goal. 

So what we have done in this process is to break it up and to 

try to deal in specific steps. The first of these steps was to get together in a six-party process because this is not a bilateral matter, 

this is not a matter between North Korea and the United States, 

this is a matter that involves many other countries, especially the 

countries in the neighborhood. So we brought together a process 

that includes China, that includes South Korea, Russia, Japan, and 

the United States. And in putting together this process, I think we 

have a good framework, a good framework for building something. 

And so the first thing we sought to build was a set of principles 

so that we could always refer back to what is the real goal of this 

and what has everyone agreed to? And the first—and what we 

were able to do in September, 2005, was to agree on a joint statement which sets clearly at the outset that the six parties unanimously reaffirm the goal is verifiable denuclearization. And importantly, right after that initial sentence, the DPRK, that is the 

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, North Korea, committed to 

abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, 

and returning at an early date to the Treaty of Nonproliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. So it is set out there. 

And now we need to begin the process of implementing this. 

In February of this year, after many delays, we were able to 

agree on a statement by which North Korea would begin the process of denuclearization. And that first step was to shut down the 

Yongbyon facility. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, you made the very valid point that if you 

shut something down you can turn it back on. But on the other 

hand, you have to shut it down before you can do anything else. 

We are not going to be able to disable a reactor that is working or 

dismantle a reactor that is working, so shutting it down is an essential step. And it was a step that was taken. In addition to shutting down the reactor, we had international verifiers from the 

IAEA to come and put seals on the equipment, and put cameras, 

and to assure that the shutting down of these facilities is in fact 

verifiable. And today, as we sit here, we have IAEA personnel in 

Yongbyon continuing to monitor the shutdown. 

But of course if we just left it at shutting down the facility, we 

wouldn’t be getting very far. And that is why we have moved now 

to a second phase. And this second phase involves a number of key 

elements. The first is that by the end of this calendar year, by December 31st, North Korea is obliged to give us a complete listing 

9

of all of their nuclear programs. And all of these nuclear programs 

must of course be slated for their eventual abandonment, because 

they agreed to that in September 2005. So we anticipate that within the next 2 weeks they will begin to share with us their list. Now, 

the initial list may not be precisely the list we would want to see. 

And for that reason we want to get going on this process as early 

as the next couple of weeks, so that by December we can have a 

list that is fully agreed on as representing the totality of their nuclear programs. 

A second key element of this process is that the nuclear facility 

at Yongbyon, now shut down, should be disabled. Now, the disabling must be a process by which in order to reverse disabling it 

should be expensive and time-consuming. And so we have sent two 

teams already to Yongbyon to work with the North Korean engineers there on processes that could be undertaken that would allow 

us to begin this disabling so that they cannot reverse this. And so 

we believe we will have disabling, we will have a set of measures 

to disable these facilities that will mean that even should North 

Korea want to restart these facilities, it would take them over a 

year to do so. 

Now, we think it is—while we want to have it be over a year, 

whether it takes them 12 months or 14 months to restart the facilities, I think it is worthwhile to pause and think that if they are 

in that direction we have a big problem. That is if they are going 

to restart these facilities again and put them back together, we 

have a big problem. So I think it behooves us not to get too hung 

up on whether it is 12 months or 14 months or 16 months. We need 

to understand we have a problem. And therefore, the real purpose 

of this disabling is to enable us to move on to the next phase. 

So we expect a team of experts to go in starting in the beginning 

of November, that is next Thursday, and begin disabling activities. 

This has never been done before. In the past we had the reactor 

and facilities shut down, as we do now have them shut down. But 

when these disabling steps take place beginning next Thursday on 

the 1st, it will be the first time that the North Korean facilities 

have been disabled. In addition to the disabling and to the full disclosure of all of their nuclear programs, there is one issue that has 

been very important to us and that we have pressed the North Koreans on throughout, and that is our very real concerns that they 

may have a clandestine nuclear—a highly enriched uranium program. And so we have agreed with them that by the end of the 

year we will have this resolved to mutual satisfaction. I can’t tell 

you as we sit here at the end of October precisely how we will do 

that, but I can tell you that we have had some good conversations 

on this matter. And it is my professional judgment that by the end 

of this year we will have a clarity on their uranium enrichment 

such that we can be assured that uranium—that a highly enriched 

uranium program is no longer a threat to our country. 

So we will be proceeding on these tracks to get ready for what 

will be, I think, a very important year in 2008; that is, starting the 

day after December 31st. We will then begin what we hope to see 

to be the final process of getting North Korea to give up its—to 

abandon its fissile material, the separated plutonium, the plutonium that is available for bomb making, and indeed it is plutonium 

10

that has been used to test a nuclear device in October of last year. 

The estimates of this plutonium vary. Some people say it is about 

60 or 70 pounds. Some people say it is more like 120 pounds. The 

North Koreans will give us the declaration on this, and we will 

have—by the end of this year, and we will have a means by which 

to verify how much, precisely how much plutonium will need to be 

abandoned pursuant to the agreement. 

We will also look forward to moving from this disablement phase 

to a dismantlement phase. And dismantlement needs to be looked 

at as irreversible disabling. Now when we talk about irreversible, 

one has to remember that it took North Korea some 5 or 6 years 

to initially build the entire Yongbyon complex. So if we even took 

Yongbyon down to the grass and then tried to rebuild it again, you 

are talking about 5 or 6 years of disablement. But the point is to 

take—that it would have to be a long time, it would have to be very 

expensive, and it would have to be totally, from the North Korean 

perspective, a wrong decision to try to reverse this. 

So we will begin in 2008 to deal with the dismantlement and the 

ultimate abandonment of the fissile material that has already been 

produced. Obviously, the measures we are taking today in this second phase, that is this phase of disablement and full disclosure of 

their programs, are not in and of themselves the end of the game. 

We must get on to 2008. And a lot of people ask do we have enough 

incentives for the North Koreans to do this? We believe we do have 

an incentive structure, and it goes in the following. 

The North Koreans very much need energy. And we have an 

agreement among participants in the six parties, among four of the 

participants to provide energy. You recall in previous efforts to deal 

with North Korea’s nuclear threat we had an energy component, 

and it was one done almost entirely by the United States. This 

time we have four different countries providing energy to the tune 

or to the total of 950,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil. It is worth noting 

that Heavy Fuel Oil is a kind of fuel oil that can be used in certain 

factories, in heating facilities. It cannot be used, for example, in 

military vehicles. So that is one element. 

Another element is that the DPRK has been very interested in 

being removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and also 

removed from the trading—from application of the Trading with 

the Enemy Act. In February we did agree to begin this process. We 

believe it is important for our country to work with countries that 

are on that list to see if we can create the circumstances by which 

they are taken off the list of state sponsors of terrorism. 

We cannot take a country off that list unless the country is no 

longer a state sponsor of terrorism; that is, that is not some prize 

one gets for doing something in another field. You have to deal 

with the issue of terrorism. You have to look very carefully at when 

were the last examples of state sponsorship of terrorism. You have 

to look to see whether the country is signing up to certain international covenants on terrorism. You have to look to see whether 

they have agreed in the future, made statements to the effect that 

they will refrain from or halt such support for terrorism. All of 

these issues; that is, related to being removed from the list of state 

sponsors of terrorism, would need to be looked at quite apart from 

the issue of the disablement of the nuclear reactor. And we will do 

11

that such that at the time that the administration comes forward 

to first of all inform Congress of its intention to remove DPRK from 

this list, the Congress needs to be assured that there is adequate 

reasons for doing this and that we are justified in our approach on 

this. 

So this is something that we will continue to work with the 

DPRK on because it is in our interest to see if we can get countries 

off of this list. Because when they are off of that list it means that 

they are no longer a threat to our country. 

Of course this next year, as we try to move to this final stage 

of getting the DPRK to abandon their fissile material, of getting 

them to dismantle these facilities once and for all, it is going to be 

a difficult phase and it is going to be a tough negotiation. One of 

the benefits we believe that will be there for North Korea is our 

commitment to normalize with North Korea. But we have made it 

very clear we will not establish diplomatic relations until such time 

as North Korea is out of this nuclear business. So we will not go 

to any kind of full normalization until they have gone to a full 

denuclearization. That is one issue. 

Another issue that we have been prepared to work with them on 

is the idea of establishing a peace treaty, a peace mechanism on 

the Korean Peninsula. Again we are prepared to engage in this 

process. We are not prepared to finalize it until North Korea gets 

out of the nuclear business. 

And finally, we are also prepared to work with North Korea, and 

also work with the other states in the region on creating a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism. Now a lot of people look 

at a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism and say why 

do we need another forum for just talking? Why is there any need 

for more diplomatic fora of this kind? Actually, I would argue in 

Northeast Asia there has not been enough of a sense of community, 

there has not been enough of a sense of countries working together 

to solve common problems, whether they be environmental or 

other. And we believe it is high time that we get this kind of process going in Northeast Asia. And it is perhaps ironic that we could 

get to this process via the very difficult task of dealing with North 

Korea’s nuclear ambitions, but that is indeed what we are going to 

be trying to do. 

Mr. Chairman, I have been in the Foreign Service 30 years this 

month and I have never seen a problem as tough as this one. And 

what I can assure you I will continue to do, and what I can assure 

you that my team, especially in the Korea Desk and my bureau, 

but throughout the multi-agency process, that we will commit our 

best efforts, we will work as hard as we can, and importantly, we 

will continue to be in very close contact with the Congress. 

Chairman Sherman, I want to assure you that even though I 

don’t have a lot of time today, I am prepared not only to come to 

any other committee meeting, but also come to your office if there 

is anything I can do, because it is very important that we stand 

together, because when the Congress and the administration are 

together on this issue we are going to be able to move this thing 

ahead. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]

12

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Chairman Faleomavaega and Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member 

Manzullo and Ranking Member Royce, and distinguished Members for inviting me 

to discuss with your subcommittees recent developments in our efforts to achieve 

the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party process. I am pleased to report several positive and significant steps toward achieving our 

goal. Most recently, on October 3, 2007, the Six Parties announced an agreement 

on ‘‘Second-Phase Actions for Implementation of the Joint Statement’’ which outlines a roadmap for a declaration of all of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear programs and disablement of its three core nuclear facilities 

at Yongbyon by the end of the year. These Second-Phase actions would effectively 

block the DPRK’s known ability to produce plutonium—a major step towards the 

goal of achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We are 

working closely with the other parties to implement this agreement expeditiously, 

and in the past few weeks we have taken several steps forward on implementation 

of the agreement. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF FEBRUARY 13 ‘‘INITIAL ACTIONS’’ AGREEMENT

The October 3 agreement builds on the February 13, 2007, agreement on ‘‘Initial 

Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement.’’ Pursuant to the February 

13 agreement, the DPRK in July shut down and sealed the core nuclear facilities 

at Yongbyon and invited back the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 

conduct monitoring and verification activities, as provided for in the February 13 

agreement. Upon returning to the DPRK in July, the IAEA verified the shutdown 

status of the 5–MW(e) reactor, fuel fabrication facility, reprocessing facility, an 

uncompleted 50–MW(e) reactor, and an uncompleted 200–MW(e) reactor. The IAEA 

continues to monitor and verify the shutdown status of those sites. 

The IAEA has reported excellent cooperation from DPRK authorities, and we have 

urged the DPRK to continue to provide full cooperation to the Agency’s personnel 

working at Yongbyon. To support the work of IAEA monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK, the United States provided $1.8 million from existing funds 

as the U.S. voluntary contribution to the IAEA to help cover associated expenses. 

Japan has also pledged $500,000 to support this effort, and we would welcome voluntary contributions from other member states to support the IAEA’s ongoing work 

in the DPRK. 

Under the February 13 agreement, the Six Parties agreed that as the DPRK implements its commitments to denuclearization, the other parties would provide the 

DPRK with energy assistance in the form of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) or its equivalent 

in alternative economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance. Thus, as agreed, once 

the DPRK implemented its Initial-Phase commitments to shut down and seal 

Yongbyon facilities and invite back the IAEA, it received 50,000 tons of HFO. As 

the DPRK has taken steps to implement its Second-Phase commitments to provide 

a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs and to disable facilities at Yongbyon, the other parties have begun implementing their commitment to 

provide an additional 950,000 tons of HFO or equivalent. Additionally, as part of 

beginning the movement toward normalization of relations between the United 

States and the DPRK, the United States committed to begin the process of removing 

the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) with 

respect to the DPRK. To help implement these tasks, the February agreement established five working groups, all of which have met at least twice and reported 

their results to the Heads of Delegation. 

OCTOBER 3 AGREEMENT ON SECOND-PHASE ACTIONS

Building on the successful implementation of these Initial-Phase actions, the Six 

Parties announced on October 3 an agreement on a set of Second-Phase actions. 

Under this latest agreement, the DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct 

declaration of all its nuclear programs by the end of the year. The declaration will 

include all nuclear facilities, materials, and programs. As the President said last 

week, it must include ‘‘plutonium that has been manufactured and/or the construction of bombs.’’ The DPRK also agreed to address concerns related to any uranium 

enrichment programs and activities. 

13

The DPRK also agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to the September 2005 Joint Statement and February 13 Agreement. As a start, the core nuclear facilities at Yongbyon—5–MW(e) nuclear reactor, reprocessing plant, and fuel 

rod fabrication facility—are to be disabled by the end of the year. Specific disablement actions will be based on the findings of the U.S.-China-Russia experts who visited the DPRK in September to survey the facilities at Yongbyon and the U.S. technical team that visited from October 11 to 18. At the request of the Six Parties, the 

United States has agreed to lead disablement activities. We will provide initial funding for these activities and expect to have our technical experts back on the ground 

in Yongbyon shortly. They will begin the actual work of disabling the facilities in 

a manner that should ensure that the DPRK would have to expend significant time 

and effort to reconstitute its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. 

The task of disablement will not end with the core facilities at Yongbyon, and it 

will not end on December 31, 2007. The Parties have agreed that disablement will 

extend to all existing nuclear facilities and that this process will extend beyond December 31, 2007. But by the end of the year, implementation of the October 3 agreement will have effectively blocked the DPRK’s known ability to produce plutonium, 

and it would take the DPRK a significant period of time to restart those activities. 

And as the President has said, he is pleased with the progress we’re making but 

believes that there is work to be done. This is not the end point of the process, and 

we hope to move forward early next year to the Third and final Phase, which will 

be aimed at dismantling all of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, capturing all fissile 

material the DPRK has produced, and the abandonment of its nuclear weapons and 

existing nuclear programs. 

The United States also has several commitments under the February 13 and October 3 agreements. As I mentioned earlier, the other Parties agreed to provide the 

DPRK with one million tons of HFO or equivalent in return for its actions in the 

Initial and Second phases. The Republic of Korea supplied the first shipment of 

50,000 tons of HFO, and China provided the second. The United States is providing 

the third shipment, which is set to arrive in the DPRK in late October. Russia has 

indicated it will provide the next shipment of HFO. At this point, the Japanese government is not yet participating in energy assistance to the DPRK because of its 

outstanding concerns regarding Japanese abductees, and we continue to press the 

DPRK to address Japan’s concerns. The working group on Economy and Energy Cooperation will continue to meet to review options for other forms of energy assistance that could be provided to the DPRK as HFO-equivalent under the agreement. 

Under the October 3 agreement, the United States also reaffirmed its intent to 

fulfill its commitments regarding the removal of the designation of the DPRK as a 

state sponsor of terrorism and the termination of the application of the TWEA with 

respect to the DPRK. U.S. action related to the terrorism designation and TWEA 

application will depend on the DPRK’s fulfillment of its Second-Phase commitments 

on providing a complete and correct declaration and disabling its nuclear facilities, 

as well as on satisfaction of legal requirements. The legal criteria for removing a 

country’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism are set forth in U.S. law. The 

Administration intends to consult closely with Congress and follow appropriate procedures on any decision to take action on the terrorism designation or TWEA application with regard to the DPRK. 

We remain very concerned about nuclear proliferation—the potential for such proliferation has always been one of our major concerns about the DPRK’s pursuit of 

nuclear weapons programs. In the October 3 agreement the DPRK reaffirmed its 

commitment ‘‘not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how,’’ and we 

intend to hold North Korea to its word. We have discussed this issue with the North 

Koreans many times and will remain vigilant about proliferation concerns. The 

North Koreans are cognizant of the fact that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 remains in effect. 

The United States recognizes that some issues remain unresolved, including remaining questions about Japanese abductees, and we continue to urge the DPRK 

at every opportunity to address Japan’s concerns. Japan is an important friend and 

ally of the United States, and we will continue to consult closely with the Japanese 

government as we move forward on this issue. 

TRANSFORMING NORTH KOREA’S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

As the October 3 agreement is implemented and we move forward into the next 

phase of actions in early 2008 toward complete denuclearization, I believe the Six 

Parties can begin to make real progress on transforming North Korea’s relations 

with the international community, and indeed transforming Northeast Asia. The 

United States and DPRK have committed to improving bilateral relations and workVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Mar 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\APGE\102507\38544.000 Hintrel1 PsN: SHIRL
14

ing toward full diplomatic relations. One way we will seek to do this is to increase 

bilateral exchanges between the United States and DPRK aimed at enhancing mutual trust. Our goal through this process will remain improving the lives of the people of North Korea. On a separate track to address humanitarian assistance needs, 

the United States announced in August that we are prepared to provide substantial 

food aid to the DPRK, subject to appropriate monitoring procedures. We have also 

made clear to the DPRK that discussion of outstanding issues of concern, including 

the DPRK’s human rights record, would be part of the normalization process. 

We also remain committed to replacing the 1953 Armistice with a permanent 

peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. The United States believes that discussions of a Korean Peninsula peace regime could begin among the directly related 

parties once the DPRK has disabled its existing nuclear facilities, has provided a 

complete and correct declaration of all of its nuclear programs, and is clearly on the 

road to complete denuclearization. We can achieve a permanent peace arrangement 

on the Korean Peninsula once the DPRK fully discloses and abandons its nuclear 

weapons programs. 

We also hope to move forward on developing a Northeast Asia Peace and Security 

Mechanism, which would help transform the cooperative relationships built through 

the Six-Party process into an enduring security framework for Northeast Asia. To 

advance all of our goals, the Six Parties remain committed to holding a ministerial 

level meeting in the near future. 

THE ROAD AHEAD

What I have outlined here today—the agreements implemented to date and commitments still to be fulfilled—represent an important set of achievements on the 

road to verifiable denuclearization of the DPRK through full implementation of the 

September 2005 Joint Statement. But much remains to be done. Full implementation of the October 3 agreement, including follow-on disablement activities, should 

effectively block the DPRK’s known ability to produce plutonium, but we must continue to move forward in the Six-Party process to realize the DPRK’s abandonment 

of all fissile material and nuclear weapons in accordance with the September 2005 

Joint Statement, as well as its return to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. We will continue to work closely with our SixParty partners as we move forward on the tough tasks that lie ahead. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to answer 

your questions.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Secretary Hill. Yesterday in my 

opening statement before our Secretary of State, and I want to repeat myself in commending both you and Secretary Rice for giving 

diplomacy and statesmanship an opportunity, a chance. This could 

be one of the basic and fundamental foreign policy developments of 

what we want to do as a government, both in the Congress as well 

as the administration, that we pursue this line of conducting our 

foreign policy through diplomacy. 

Now I would like to turn the time over to the chairman of our 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman. You are given 5 minutes because of the time frame we are under. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Obviously, the most important question is whether you will come to my district, since you are coming 

to Manzullo’s district. 

Ambassador HILL. I will be delighted. Any time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. As soon as the fires are out. It is my understanding from this agreement, and I agree with the prioritization. 

To me it is all about nuclear weapons. But it is my understanding 

that North Korea could get off the terrorism list even if they didn’t 

address the issues of counterfeiting, drug smuggling or missile proliferation. Is that true? 

Ambassador HILL. What we are doing is, with respect to the financial issues, we are going to have a meeting with the North Koreans in the next couple of weeks to discuss this issue further. As 

15

you know, we had a number of discussions in connection with this 

Banco Delta Asia matter before. So we are going to meet with them 

and continue to work through this issue. And we are also going to 

be in very close contact with the Japanese, because it is very important that Japan also make progress on its bilateral agenda. So 

we are going to be moving forward, but we are going to be doing 

it in close coordination. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You mentioned Japan. Could you imagine yourself 

recommending to the President that North Korea should be removed from the terrorist list prior to the time when North Korea 

gives the Japanese a full accounting of what happened to the missing Japanese citizens? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, let me put it this way, Chairman Sherman. I have personally, on every occasion that I have met with the 

North Koreans I have personally raised the issue of abducted Japanese citizens. This is not just a matter for the Japanese. This is 

a matter for the entire international community to speak out clearly about. So I believe, I am hopeful that the North Koreans understand the message that this is important, and that ultimately their 

relations with Japan are extremely important to their future, and 

that this issue can be addressed. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is a little short of giving the Japanese an assurance, but still shows the concern. Let’s talk about the 

verification called for by this agreement. Let’s say you get the declaration and it doesn’t happen to mention anything going on in, 

say, an area 50 miles west of Nangnim, if I am pronouncing that 

right. And the CIA comes to you and says, hey, we got these pictures, we think they are doing something nuclear there. And you 

turn to the North Koreans and you say this whole area, you don’t 

have anything on the list. And they say, yeah, there is nothing to 

list. Does the IAEA, the United States or anyone else have a right 

to go to this site and find out whether it is a fertilizer factory or 

whether the CIA is right and it is a nuclear facility? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have to, in working 

with them on this list, indeed, if we have concerns, we have to be 

able to make sure those concerns are addressed. We cannot have 

a situation where they pretend to denuclearize and we pretend to 

believe them. So indeed I can assure you that if we have information that is not reflected in their declaration we have to run that 

down. And so one of the reasons we want to get going on this, not 

by the end of December, when we look at a—we unwrap a list and 

look at it at Christmastime, but rather get going on it now to make 

sure that by the time we get to the end of December it will be a 

list that we can all be comfortable with. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now, speaking of this declaration, Congressional 

Research Service looks at what has been stated and says that the 

declaration may not include stockpiled plutonium and the number 

of atomic bombs that North Korea has created therefrom. Could 

you imagine yourself recommending removing North Korea from 

the terrorist list if their declaration failed to include a description 

of their stockpiled plutonium and bombs? 

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Chairman, I cannot imagine myself recommending further steps if their declaration failed to include an 

accurate description of the separated plutonium, because ultiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Mar 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\APGE\102507\38544.000 Hintrel1 PsN: SHIRL
16

mately the weaponized plutonium is what we are after. And but 

the reason we start with shutting down the reactor is let’s say we 

have 50 kilos of this weaponized plutonium. I don’t want this to become a 100-kilo problem or a 200-kilo problem. We want it to be 

a 50-kilo problem. And therefore we need to get an accurate rendition of it, and then go after it and see that it is abandoned pursuant to the agreement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. North Korea has promised not to engage in 

nuclear proliferation. They repeated that promise. But you can’t believe the repetition if you didn’t believe it initially. Do events in 

Syria demonstrate that North Korea’s pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology cannot be taken at face value? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, what I can assure you is our concerns 

about proliferation are really one of the main reasons that we came 

together in the six-party process in the first place. So we cannot 

conclude this process without getting to the heart of any—of proliferation concerns. So what I can assure you of is in past months, 

and especially in the months ahead, proliferation concerns are 

going to be very much in the top of our agenda. 

Mr. SHERMAN. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Chairman Sherman. We would 

like to turn now to our senior ranking member of the Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Subcommittee, the gentleman 

from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. Mr. Sherman, you might be interested in knowing that the Korean Ambassador to the United States 

and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States have also been 

in my district. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No one wants to come to mine. 

Mr. MANZULLO. You have to ask them, and they both had an opportunity to discuss this. And I have been doing that for a reason, 

is that I believe that it could very well be the most important thing 

that this Congress does or this administration does is to end up 

with a nuclear-free Korea. The stakes are tremendous. It is a life 

and death situation if it is done wrong. 

Ambassador, I have got a list here of several things, counterfeiting, that Mr. Royce has done a lot of work on that, drug trafficking, human rights, Japanese abduction. I have got an attorney 

in my district who represents members of the Pueblo, and they 

want the ship returned. And there is the matter of the $25 million 

in money that had been scrubbed in Macao and finally was released. And in trying to cobble together the best agreement that 

you can, while having the assurance that there is verification, that 

the nuclear capability has been eliminated, that the stockpiles have 

been removed, how many of these issues can you blend into an 

agreement at the same time and still come up with a six-party 

agreement? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, to be sure all of those issues need to be 

addressed. And whether they can be addressed in nuclear talks is 

hard to say, but they need to be addressed. No country, certainly 

not ours, but no country in the world can be indifferent to the counterfeiting of its currency. This is a fundamental issue that every 

country has to be fundamentally concerned about. So we have to 

deal with that issue. And but we have to find mechanisms, ways 

17

to talk to the North Koreans about this. And that is what we are 

trying to do. You know, there are a lot of issues about should you 

be having bilateral talks and this sort of thing, but we need these 

talks in order to address some of these issues. That is why we have 

used this platform of a working group to address some of our concerns. 

Now, for example, North Korea wants access to the international 

financial community. Now one of the reasons they don’t have access 

is for precisely the reasons that you mentioned. A lot of banks don’t 

want to take their money. And I would say that the issue of Banco 

Delta Asia and the return of this money to North Korea, I can assure you this got people’s attention in North Korea. So I think this 

whole effort in Banco Delta Asia did make them understand that 

whether they like it or not, they are going to have to play by the 

rules financially and the international financial system. 

So we are going to have a meeting with them in the next couple 

of weeks to discuss some of these issues. I think we need to remain 

seized on it. I think our law enforcement people, who have been 

very active on this, need to be continually active on this. We cannot 

have a situation where our currency is being counterfeited. 

Mr. MANZULLO. The reason I raise these issues, and obviously 

they are all important, as I read the agreement, it is vague, and 

it is not inclusive, but it is something that you take step by step 

and you add to it as steps occur. For example, the reactor is shut 

down. Then you want to disable it. Then you want to irreversibly 

dismantle it. So the people who are interested in these other 

issues, would it be correct to say that what you are asking for is 

to have a system of absolute verification with which everybody 

agrees, and then move through the agreement and discuss these 

issues as that agreement is being processed? Would that be a correct interpretation of it? 

Ambassador HILL. With respect to these other issues, including 

these financial issues? 

Mr. MANZULLO. Yes, the counterfeiting, the drug trafficking, and 

all that. 

Ambassador HILL. Yes, but I think we want to get going on some 

of those even now. So while in Beijing in the six-party process we 

are very much engaged on some of these nuclear issues, you know 

just getting these teams launched into North Korea, going down to 

Yongbyon, figuring out how you dismantle a reactor, you know, 

things like that, we are moving on that. But in a parallel process, 

as we move to—as we move ahead in our bilateral relationship we 

need to address these financial issues. So I think we can do both. 

And some of them I don’t think can be done in a six-party context. 

For example, the Japanese have a number of issues, including financial issues as well, that they have to deal with in their working 

group. And what I do is stay in pretty much daily contact with my 

Japanese counterpart to see how they are doing on their issues. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The ranking member of our Subcommittee 

on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is speculation 

about North Korea’s involvement with Syria, Ambassador Hill. And 

18

my colleagues, Peter Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who have 

been briefed, wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. And I will 

quote from that. Based on what we have learned, that it is critical 

for every Member of Congress to be briefed on this incident, and 

as soon as possible. David Albright, a nonproliferation expert, has 

released imagery which I have seen of Syria that shows structures 

roughly similar to design of a North Korean reactor. If North Korea 

was continuing to pursue its nuclear program or to proliferate outward while this six-party process moves forward, I think that 

would be a pretty damning indictment of Pyongyang’s intentions in 

that regard. And can you assure this committee that post-shutdown 

of Yongbyon, North Korea has ceased its nuclear program and 

ceased proliferation, including proliferation outside the country? 

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Royce, I am not sure I am in a position 

to make a certification on this issue except to say that what I can 

assure you of is the central importance that we attach to proliferation. And clearly, we cannot be reaching a nuclear agreement with 

North Korea if at the same time they are proliferating. It is not acceptable. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think we concur on that. But the reaction from the 

government there this week has been to send a high ranking delegation to Damascus. So if we are pressing them hard, one would 

have assumed this trip would have been pulled in light of what the 

press is already reporting. And that is the reason for my question. 

Ambassador HILL. Well, first of all, they have a number of things 

going with Syria, including missiles, which is a big problem. Missile proliferation is a very big problem, and one that we have to get 

to. We can’t get to it in the middle of a nuclear negotiation, but 

we do have to get to that problem. They also have other things 

going on with Syria that are a lot more benign. But, you know, 

clearly we need to work very closely, be very vigilant. 

I mean we worked very hard to take down this whole A.Q. Khan 

nuclear smuggling operation a few years ago. We need to continue 

to do that sort of thing. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you this. 

Ambassador HILL. But what I can assure you is we are not playing trust me in this negotiation. We are doing things in a very 

verifiable way. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, after North Korea’s test the President said the 

transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states 

or nonstate entities would be considered a grave threat to the 

United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of 

the consequences of such action. And I just ask is that still the policy of the United States in light of what transpired in Syria? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, I can assure you what the President 

said remains the policy of the United States. 

Mr. ROYCE. Okay. Let’s go to another question. You testified that 

North Korea’s declaration will include all nuclear facilities, materials, and programs. Now, when you look at the text of the October 

3rd agreement, I think it allows for a little more wiggle room. It 

states that they are to provide a complete and correct declaration 

of all its nuclear programs. 

Now, one of the difficulties we have is we read that experts are 

asserting that it is uncertain that the number of atomic bombs that 

19

North Korea has manufactured will be part of that declaration. So 

I would ask would that be part of the declaration and will the 

North’s declaration be made available to the public or to share with 

Congress? 

Ambassador HILL. With respect to the latter question, I am not 

sure how the declaration will be publicized, but I think clearly relevant committees in the Congress must be fully informed on it. 

With respect to the issue of what will be included, I would say to 

you, Mr. Congressman, that all means all. And what is especially 

important to us is they have weaponized plutonium. They have plutonium. We are not sure how much yet. But we need to know precisely how much and we need to be able to verify how much. This 

is the key question. Plutonium. That is the fissile material. That 

is what you make weapons out of. So that is what we have to keep 

our eye on, and that is a key part of the declaration. 

Mr. ROYCE. I understand that. We are considering taking North 

Korea off the terrorist list. Syria is a terrorist state today. I am 

just raising the questions here about them being able to verify the 

parts of this agreement in light of what we are discovering and in 

light of some of the questions that experts on nonproliferation have 

given us in terms of will that include these atomic bombs. 

In the October 3rd agreement, the United States indicated a willingness to terminate the application of the Trading With the 

Enemy Act with respect to North Korea. I think the result of that 

is going to be at least $30 million being unfrozen and released to 

the North Korean regime. At least that is I think CRS——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Could you respond to his question because 

his time is up? 

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Congressman, I think all of these assets 

are in dispute and would be—would not be—it is not envisioned 

that any of them would be returned to the DPRK. Certainly not at 

this time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Ambassador Hill. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. The gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador 

Hill, do you trust the North Koreans? 

Ambassador HILL. I trust but verify. I mean clearly, Congressman Scott, we——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do the North Koreans trust us? 

Ambassador HILL. These sorts of negotiations, as I said to Mr. 

Royce, this is not a matter of playing trust me. I mean trust comes 

in in things like, well, by next Tuesday can you get this done because we will have our thing done? And then there is some trust 

factors there. But overall these agreements must be based on 

verification. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me focus my follow-up questions and the reason 

for asking you the trust factor because I am very troubled about 

North Korea and the possibility, the very real possibility, and 

maybe the truthful fact that they are indeed selling their nuclear 

technology. And I want to focus that particularly as it relates to 

Syria, and quite possibly Iran. Syria and Iran are closely connected. They are certainly allies. And they are both certainly sponsors of terrorism. And they both sponsor Hezbollah, in which we 

20

know from credible information that North Korea has been aiding 

Hezbollah, which I do want to get at and ask you a question about 

that as well. 

When we examine the recent Israeli air strike in Syria, it was 

against a nuclear reactor that was under construction, but it was 

against a nuclear reactor that had very similar technology to that 

used in the reactor in North Korea. So my question is, is there evidence that North Korea did in fact sell technology to Syria? 

Ambassador HILL. I am not in a position here to discuss intelligence matters, which is the level that one would need to discuss 

questions of whether they did or did not. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Ambassador. Was this 

issue brought up in your talks privately——

Ambassador HILL. Yes——

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. With the North Koreans? 

Ambassador HILL. Yes. I have raised this issue. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I won’t pursue that any further because I do 

not want to get into sensitive intelligence issues. But I am glad 

that you did. And this is one Congressman who is very concerned 

about that. And I also want to know will this issue temper the carrots that we offer North Korea in any future negotiations? And if 

so, will that cause the North Koreans to pull back from their promises? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, I think throughout the process we have 

made it clear that we cannot accept any agreement that has us 

winking at proliferation issues. So proliferation or nonproliferation 

need to be at the heart of any agreement. 

Mr. SCOTT. When the Israelis made the air strike in Syria, were 

there any North Korean technicians at that site that Israel bombed 

in September 2007? 

Ambassador HILL. I am not in a position to confirm or not confirm. I don’t know. And I think the answer to a question like that 

would have to come in a different forum, whether or not. I don’t 

know. 

Mr. SCOTT. Oftentimes it is the question that is raised that gives 

the portent as opposed to the answer. So I think it is very important that we as Congressmen raise these important questions to 

make sure that we are not flying blind. This is a very, very serious 

issue of nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons in the hands of 

North Korea, especially as we are moving with the threats of nuclear capability in the very volatile Middle East. And if North 

Korea is playing with a dirty hand in this it certainly needs to be 

exposed that some of us here in Congress are very concerned about 

this, and we do not have a blind eye, but we have a very jaundiced 

eye, and that we didn’t just fall off the turnip truck. 

Let me go to the issue. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The gentleman has one more question. Your 

time is about up, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Has North Korea provided arms and training to 

Hezbollah, including during the period before the 2006 IsraeliHezbollah war? 

Ambassador HILL. I am not aware of any credible information 

that would confirm such an accusation. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Ambassador. 

21

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe, for his 

questions. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, thank you for 

your service. Thirty years as a diplomat, God bless you. I have 

been called a lot of things in my life, but a diplomat is not one of 

them. I frankly don’t believe anything the North Korean Government says about anything. They would lie when the truth would 

suit them better. And as questions have been asked already, I am 

concerned about what they are doing in Syria. And I would like for 

you to tell me why you can’t tell us what they are doing in Syria. 

I don’t understand that. So if you would explain that to me, and 

you don’t have to be diplomatic about it. Just tell me why you 

won’t tell us what you know about Syria and the North Koreans 

working together. 

Ambassador HILL. With respect to the Syrian issue, I think the 

answers to the questions of whether or not they are involved are 

of a classified nature, and this is an open hearing. And it does relate to intelligence matters, and this is not an intelligence hearing. 

So I am not in a position here to discuss their presence or lack of 

presence in a Syrian nuclear program. 

What I can tell you is what I am doing in the six-party process, 

and to assure you, as I assured Mr. Scott, that our concerns about 

proliferation are profound, and that we cannot reach an agreement 

when proliferation issues are ignored. And so we cannot have an 

agreement in which North Korea is allowed to go ahead and have 

nuclear proliferation. So the issue is, and the issue is always in our 

six-party process how to come up with a verification method so we 

are not, as I said earlier, playing trust me in any way, that we are 

in fact looking for measures that we can agree on and that can be 

verified. 

In shutting down the reactor, which we did in July, I can assure 

you we can verify today the reactor is shut down. In disabling the 

reactor, when that starts next week, I can assure you that when 

it is disabled we can verify that it is disabled. So as we move forward, when they provide a declaration, we will verify what is on 

that declaration. When they give us an amount of weapons grade 

plutonium, we will be able to verify the weapons grade plutonium. 

Mr. POE. Let me ask you another question, because of my time. 

And I hope we don’t have to find out what is happening in Syria 

out of the Washington Post. I hope we can learn sooner than having 

to read it through the media. You made the comment that can’t 

deal with the issue of the North Koreans supplying missiles to 

Syria because you are dealing with the issue of nuclear proliferation. Why not? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, I would very much like to get engaged 

in a missile negotiation with the North Koreans. I think it is very 

important to us. It is very important to the Japanese. I would hope 

that we could address missiles at some stage. I think they ultimately are a very destabilizing factor in the entire North Korean 

equation. I think we should get to a missile regime. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. You know, you work hard. And you have a very difficult job. I serve on the Government Reform Committee and the 

22

Foreign Affairs Committee, and we have had the honor of having 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice before both committees in the 

last 2 days. Yesterday on the Foreign Affairs Committee the question was asked about the nuclear technology coming from Korea to 

Syria. And today it was asked again. And both times, and now 

today you are saying the same thing, that it is classified and we 

shouldn’t know about it. 

Now let me just say this to you. You can’t give it to us. We have 

been asking for this, and they haven’t said that we will give it to 

you in a classified briefing. They haven’t said they will have a 

closed briefing to give it to all the Members of Congress. But I 

want to tell you, you are going to be asking us, the administration, 

for $106 million in a supplemental for Korea. You are going to be 

asking for removal from the terrorist list, which is going to free up 

about $30 million of their money. 

Now in 1994, during the Clinton administration, they gave them 

light water reactor technology in exchange for them stopping their 

nuclear program. They didn’t do it. And now we are going to try 

to give away half of the store, while at the same time there is a 

very distinct possibility that they gave nuclear technology to Syria, 

which is a terrorist state right next to Iran. And the whole Middle 

East is a tinderbox right now. I can’t believe that Israel is going 

to sit around waiting for both of those countries to develop nuclear 

weapons and threatening their existence. And so we could have a 

real tragedy over there if we don’t deal with this thing properly. 

Now, the people that are going to have to help in the decisionmaking process is the Congress of the United States. And I have 

high regard for Secretary Rice. She is one of my favorite people in 

the whole world. But you guys over there at State can’t keep this 

from Congress. You have got to tell us what is going on. And you 

know, for you to say, well, you know, this is a classified—we are 

all cleared for classified. And if somebody violates that then those 

people should be censured. But since we are asked to participate 

in giving North Korea, a known terrorist state who wants to be 

taken off the terrorist list, who wants more things from us, money 

included, then by golly we need to know if they are dealing honorably with us or fairly with us. They didn’t in the past. They lied 

to us consistently in the future. They have lied to the whole world. 

And we need to know if we should be appropriating this money or 

being willing to deal with it. 

Now I know it is a very sensitive issue. I understand that. And 

I know you are in a tough position, as is the State Department. But 

if we are going to be able to deal with them and try to stop nuclear 

proliferation, we need to know what is going on. And you guys over 

at State, and you can tell Condoleezza Rice, as I said, who I think 

is dynamite, that they have got to tell us. And if it is a closed hearing, a closed briefing, that is fine. But it needs to be done and it 

needs to be done very quickly. And with that I yield back my time. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank the gentleman from Indiana. The 

gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu. 

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Hill, I have just 

one very brief question for you, which—and I will take the answer 

in writing afterwards, unless you are prepared to answer it right 

now. And I will not assume that. I have received a request from 

23

humanitarian groups at home in Oregon to be supportive of an effort to build or help support parts of a college or university to be 

built in Pyongyang. And I believe that the acronym is PUST, the 

Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Now the people 

making this request are very well-intentioned individuals whom I 

know. I have no idea what will happen, if there is any assistance 

with any funds or technology that goes to a college or university 

there. I would like to think that education generally makes a positive difference, but I am concerned about the hijacking perhaps of 

any equipment or other things that are transferred if I choose to 

participate, as I have been requested to by various humanitarian 

groups in Oregon to help in this effort with the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. And I would like to lay that out 

here in this hearing. And when your staff has had an opportunity 

to research the issue, I would take what you said back under very 

serious consideration in any further action that I decide to take. 

Ambassador HILL. Okay. We will be happy to look at that and 

get you answer in writing. 

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE DAVID WU

In the October 3 agreement on ‘‘Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of 

the Joint Statement,’’ the United States and the DPRK stated that each country remains committed to improving bilateral relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship. The ‘‘Second-Phase’’ Actions agreement also states that the two 

sides will increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. We strongly support the expansion of educational and exchange opportunities, and will continue to 

do so in a way that is consistent with our international obligations, including 

UNSCRs 1695 and 1718, as well as U.S. law.

Mr. WU. And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Wu. 

Now I had purposely withheld asking questions simply because 

I wanted to extend the courtesies to my colleagues, so it is my turn 

now. Thank you. 

One of the issues that has always been dear to my heart at the 

times that I have had the privilege of visiting with the Korean 

leaders was one of the policies initiated by the former President 

Kim Dae-Jung. It was then known as the sunshine policy. 

The opportunities that I had in meeting with some of our Korean 

counterparts, I was taken by the statement that one of the Korean 

leaders made to me. He said, the United States is our friend, but 

the North Koreans are our brothers. And that really hit me to the 

extent that I wanted to ask you, Mr. Ambassador—because I know 

at first the administration was very critical on any efforts on the 

part of the South Korean Government—is to try to reach out. 

The problems of the division and North and South Korea not of 

their doing, by the way; and so for 50, 60 years these people have 

been divided—the same culture, the same language, same people—

and now they are trying to make an effort to conduct these negotiations or by way of someday hopefully many of them believe that 

they would like to reunite together, not only as families but as a 

people and as a country. 

24

And I would like to ask you where is the administration’s position on the summit meetings that have been held recently by President Roh and Kim Jong-Il and some of the, I think, negotiated 

statements that have been made in their efforts in trying to reach 

out and to hopefully work out a better relationship between the two 

Koreas. I would like to ask you that. 

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure we have official 

policies toward those issues, but let me try to answer it in the following way. That I have said this before, I feel it is very important 

that Americans understand the great tragedy that befell the Korean people in the middle of the 20th century, the division of their 

land, a division that goes on now into this next century. And so I 

think it behooves us all as Americans to understand the great 

yearning of Korean people to somehow if not be together in one 

state but at least have the opportunity to have contacts and to 

meet together. So I think as Americans we need to respect that desire, and we don’t want to put ourselves in the position of appearing to stand between or preventing this kind of context. 

Now, of course we have a great security interest in the Korean 

Peninsula. We have U.S. troops stationed there. We have a security 

commitment to the Republic of Korea to defend it against attack. 

So, therefore, we have to be concerned about development, security 

developments on the Peninsula; and of course, we must be very, 

very concerned about some of the strategic problems that have 

emerged, including and especially nuclear weapons. 

So what we have tried to do as the Republic of Korea has 

reached out to North Korea in various configurations, sunshine policy being one of them, is that we have tried to maintain a very 

close relationship with South Korea and especially our ability to coordinate and to consult as these things happen. That is, we try to 

avoid a situation where we or the South Koreans surprise each 

other, but rather we try to be in very close contact so that when 

thing things do happen, we anticipate them. 

So I would say the essential issue is: What is the strength of our 

relationship these days with South Korea?; and I would say, Mr. 

Chairman, that we have a very good relationship with South 

Korea. 

It is not for us to say who the South Koreans elect for their 

President or for their National Assembly. That is for the Korean 

people. But we do have a good relationship or a good diplomatic relationship with them. We have cultural relations. We have a lot of 

things going with Korea, such that their decisions to reach out to 

North Korea, sunshine policy or whatever, are ones that we know 

about. We are in close communication, coordination with. And I 

would say our relationship with South Korea is one of the best we 

have in the world. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Just one more question. I know my time is 

up. 

Recently, your former colleague, former U.S. Ambassador to the 

United Nations, had a meeting with 42 Members of Congress here 

on the Hill. It made the headlines, making some very strong statements objecting to the process and the initiative that you and Secretary Rice and the President himself about how we deal with 

North Korea. Would you care to comment about that? 

25

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Chairman, he is a private citizen. He is 

certainly entitled to his views. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, that is real nice, sweet and short. 

The gentleman from California, our chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I also have a question about your good friend, John Bolton. 

He said recently that closing down Yongbyon is not a major deal 

because it is, ‘‘an old facility at or near the end of its useful life.’’ 

How much more kick did that facility have in it and what are we 

getting by them terminating it at this point? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, it was working. It was producing spent 

fuel which could be reprocessed into plutonium. It was working 

right up until the day it was shutdown. And from what we can understand is, yes, the reactor there is a 50-year-old design. So it is 

a very old design first developed in Europe. It’s probably not a design anyone would want to build today. But, nonetheless, they were 

producing weapons grade plutonium through this process as late as 

a few months ago, so I think our country is safer for having shut 

it down. It will be safer still when we disable it, and it will be safer 

still when we dismantle and get rid of these nuclear programs. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do you believe they could have, if they kept it 

going, created enough plutonium for one or two more nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador HILL. Absolutely. And continued to do so. There are 

no signs that it was on its last legs. 

We have had people actually go visit it in recent months. I don’t 

know if the private citizen you are referring to has actually been 

there, but people who have been there say that it was very much 

able to operate. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would like to ask my friend from California if he could have one more question, and then I will give my 

friend from California also one question because we have 3 more 

minutes left. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I gotcha. 

The declaration you are supposed to get from North Korea 

should, as you pointed out, cover their HEU program. There are 

three subparts it could deal with. It could tell you what they got 

from A.Q. Khan. It could tell you what they got and imported from 

other countries in the way of technology and identify who the vendors were. And it could tell you what the infrastructure is that 

they have created and how much highly enriched uranium they 

have produced. 

Do you expect to see all three of those sub-items included in the 

declaration before you feel the declaration is adequate? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, Mr. Chairman, as we try to resolve the 

issue of highly enriched uranium, I think what we are looking for 

is acknowledgment. We are looking for an explanation, and that 

gets to some of your points there. And we are also looking for disposition, that is, equipment and what is going to become of it. So 

I think, ultimately, we are looking for real transparency so we 

know exactly what they have and what they have now. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But you are not going to insist that they disclose 

the names of the vendors and give you a chance to roll those up? 

26

Ambassador HILL. I can assure you we will go for as much as we 

can, because we not only want this problem stopped in North 

Korea, we want it stopped elsewhere. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, for 

his one question. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Ambassador, you mentioned U.N. Security Council Resolution 

1718 in your testimony, but, as you know, these resolutions are 

somewhat meaningless without enforcement. I would ask how this 

resolution is being put into practice, because we had a report that 

during the reporting period the committee has received no requests 

for designation with respect to the targeted financial sanctions and 

travel ban. And I just wonder if the rhetoric surrounding what the 

U.N. does there matches the reality, because I just don’t see anything concrete with respect to 1718. I was going to ask you about 

that. 

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Congressman, that is a very fair question. 

I do know that the United States has taken a number of steps, and 

what I could do is take your question and get back to you with a 

written answer to give you precisely what we have done. 

I can say in a general sense that some countries have done a 

good job and some countries have not done a good job in enforcement of this. My understanding is we have taken a number of 

measures with respect to trade and with respect to the issue of 

traveling of certain persons, but I would have to get back to you 

with a specific answer in writing. 

Mr. ROYCE. I’d appreciate that, because the committee that was 

set up under that resolution is the one that gave us the report that 

said that during the reporting period that committee received no 

requests for designation with respect to the financial sanctions and 

the travel ban, and so it makes it look as though absolutely no impact at all from the——

Ambassador HILL. I understand your very valid point and will 

get you an answer. 

Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate it. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE

It is essential that all United Nations Member States implement their obligations 

under UNSCR 1718 fully and effectively, and the United States has taken numerous 

measures on its own part to implement UNSCR 1718. These measures include imposition of further trade and assistance restrictions, where appropriate or required by 

U.S. law, and working with other states to prevent trade prohibited by the resolution. The following discussion outlines U.S. actions on the provisions of UNSCR 

1718. 

In regards to Paragraph 8(a)(i) of the resolution, in general, U.S. export control 

restrictions include, but are far broader in scope than, the items listed in UNSCR 

1718, subparagraph 8(a)(i). The United States does not permit the export to North 

Korea of any items on the U.S. Munitions List (22 CFR 126.1(a)). The United States 

also does not approve the export and re-export to North Korea of any dual-use item 

covered by Paragraph 8(a)(i) of UNSCR 1718 that is included on the U.S. Commodity Control List (CCL). The United States also works with like-minded countries, including through the Wassenaar Arrangement, to prevent the transfer to or 

from North Korea of conventional arms, and transfers to North Korea of related 

dual-use technologies that could contribute to its conventional weapons programs as 

well as to the development, production, or delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

27

and their delivery systems. The United States continues to monitor and assess reports of possible munitions and dual-use technology transfers to and from North 

Korea. 

In regards to paragraph 8(a)(ii) of the resolution, the United States does not permit the export to North Korea of any items that could contribute to North Korea’s 

nuclear programs, including all of the items identified by the United Nations 1718 

Committee and specifically listed in UN document S/2006/814. The United States 

also works with like-minded countries, including through the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group, the Zangger Committee, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and through 

outreach programs to non-member countries, to prevent the transfer of nuclear and 

nuclear-related equipment, materials, software and related technology to or from 

North Korea that could contribute to the development, production, or delivery of nuclear weapons. 

The United States does not permit the export to North Korea of any items that 

could contribute to North Korea’s missile programs, including all of the items identified by the 1718 Committee and specifically listed in UN document S/2006/815. The 

United States also works with like-minded countries, including through the Missile 

Technology Control Regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative to prevent the 

transfer of missile-related materials to or from North Korea that could contribute 

to the development or production of missiles. 

All items on the dual-use chemical and biological list, as set forth in by the United 

Nations in UN document S/2006/853, require a license from the U.S. Department 

of Commerce for export or re-export to North Korea. Applications for export and reexport to all end users in North Korea of the items contained on this list are subject 

to a policy of denial. The United States also works with like-minded countries, including through the Australia Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative, to 

prevent the transfer of chemical- or biological-related materials to or from North 

Korea that could contribute to the development, production, or delivery of chemical 

or biological weapons. It is also important to note that the United States controls 

the export to North Korea of more items than those set forth in the UN document. 

In response to Paragraph 8(a)(iii) of the resolution banning the transfer of luxury 

goods to North Korea, on January 26, 2007, the United States Department of Commerce imposed restrictions on exports and reexports of luxury goods to the DPRK. 

To this end, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to impose license requirements for the export and reexport of virtually all items subject to the EAR to North Korea, except food and medicines not listed on the CCL. BIS will generally deny applications to export and reexport luxury goods. BIS has published an illustrative list of luxury goods on the BIS 

website (www.bis.doc.gov). BIS also now reviews on a case-by-case basis applications 

to export and reexport all other items subject to the EAR. 

In regards to Paragraph 8 (b) of the resolution, permanent imports of defense articles into the United States are regulated by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives under the direction of the Attorney General (see 27 CFR parts 447, 478, 479 and 555). Sections 73 and 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b and 2797c) provide for sanctions against foreign 

persons who, among other activities, export, transfer or otherwise engage in the 

trade of any Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) equipment or technology 

that contributes to the acquisition, design, development, or production of missiles 

in a country that is not an MTCR adherent and would be, if it were US-origin equipment or technology, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the Arms 

Export Control Act. 

In regards to Paragraph 8 (c) of the resolution, U.S. restrictions on transfers of 

lethal military equipment, nuclear-related items, missile-related items, and chemical-biological items to North Korea include restrictions on providing related software, technology, assistance, training, advice or services. The United States works 

with like-minded countries, including through the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and through outreach programs to nonmember countries, to prevent transfers to North Korea of technical training, advice, 

services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of 

the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) of operative paragraph 8 of UNSCR 

1718. 

In regards to Paragraph 8(d) of the resolution, the UNSCR 1718 Committee has 

not named any persons or entities for the purposes of the asset freeze in Paragraph 

8(d) at this time. The United States, however, has designated 12 entities and one 

individual under Executive Order 13382 for DPRK-related proliferation activities. 

In June 2005, the President signed Executive Order 13382 (Blocking Property of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters). The Order allows 

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the United States to block or ‘‘freeze’’ the property and assets, subject to U.S. jurisdiction, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters. 

Persons that are designated under the Order are denied access to the U.S. financial 

and commercial systems, and U.S. persons, wherever located, are prohibited from 

engaging in transactions with them. 

In regards to Paragraph 8(e) of the resolution, the UNSCR 1718 Committee has 

not designated any persons at this time as subject to the travel ban provisions. 

In regards to Paragraph 8(f) of the resolution, the United States cooperates closely 

with allied and partner states to scrutinize closely North Korean exports and imports, in accordance with domestic law and international legal frameworks, that 

pass through their ports, airports, on their flagged ships, and border crossings, and 

takes appropriate steps to prevent the transfer of items prohibited by the resolution. 

The United States emphasizes that these actions are not intended to implement a 

blockade on North Korea. 

U.S. efforts to take cooperative action to prevent the trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials by North 

Korea and other proliferating states are generally implemented under the auspices 

of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is an international 

counterproliferation effort aimed at preventing and disrupting shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to or 

from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern. 

Attachment: 

UNSCR 1718, paragraph 8.

8. Decides that:

(a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer 

to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of: 

(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, 

combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or 

related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security 

Council or the Committee established by paragraph 12 below (the Committee); 

(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists 

in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of 

this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also 

taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or 

the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes; 

(iii) Luxury goods; 

(b) The DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs (a) (i) 

and (a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such 

items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, 

and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK; 

(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals 

or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, 

of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above; 

(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, 

freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which 

are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time 

thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in 

or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and 

ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from 

being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their 

territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities; 

(e) All Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or 

transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by 

the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missilerelated and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with 

their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state 

to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory; 

29

(f) In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, and 

thereby preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their 

means of delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to take, 

in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with 

international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and 

from the DPRK, as necessary;

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, I’m going to have the record 

open for 5 days, and members will also have an opportunity to submit questions in writing to your office, and the responses will be 

made a part of the record. 

I cannot thank you enough, Mr. Secretary, for taking time from 

your busy schedule in coming to meet with the members, assure 

again our absolute support in whatever we can do to be of help in 

the very delicate and the very important job that you are doing on 

behalf of our Nation. 

With that, Mr. Secretary, have a good trip to Beijing and come 

back in one piece. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the joint subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(31)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

ARTICLE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

WHAT HAPPENED IN SYRIA?

By PETER HOEKSTRA and ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN

October 20, 2007; Page A10

Over the last few weeks, State Department officials have reported major diplomatic breakthroughs that will roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, 

allow Pyongyang to be removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terror list, and normalize relations between our two countries. 

North Korea reportedly has agreed to disable its nuclear facilities and has, as it 

has done many times before, promised to give a full accounting of its nuclear program. The latest deadline is Dec. 31, 2007. Congress has been asked to support this 

agreement, which State Department officials claim will benefit our nation and promote regional stability. 

Then, early last month, Israel conducted an airstrike against a facility in northern 

Syria that press reports have linked to nuclear programs by North Korea, Iran or 

other rogue states. If this event proves that Syria acquired nuclear expertise or material from North Korea, Iran or other rogue states, it would constitute a grave 

threat to international security for which Syria and any other involved parties must 

be held accountable. 

The Bush administration, however, has thrown an unprecedented veil of secrecy 

around the Israeli airstrike. It has briefed only a handful of very senior members 

of Congress, leaving the vast majority of foreign relations and intelligence committee members in the dark. We are among the very few who were briefed, but we 

have been sworn to secrecy on this matter. However, we are prepared to state, 

based on what we have learned, that it is critical for every member of Congress to 

be briefed on this incident, and as soon as possible. 

We are concerned that, although the Bush administration refuses to discuss the 

Israeli airstrike with the American people or with the majority of Congress, it has 

not hesitated to give information on background to the press to shape this story to 

its liking. New York Times writer David Sanger authored and coauthored articles 

on Oct. 14 and 15 that appeared to reflect extensive input from senior policy makers. Washington Post writer Glenn Kessler coauthored an article on Sept. 21 that 

also cited inside information from the administration. We believe this is unacceptable. 

We want to remind President Bush that the Constitution invests Congress with 

various powers and authority over foreign policy. Not only does Congress have an 

obligation to conduct oversight over these matters, but it is accountable to the people of this country to ensure that their security and interests are safeguarded. 

The proposed deals with North Korea will involve substantial expenditures of U.S. 

funds to pay for heavy fuel oil deliveries. Congress will be asked to approve the authorization of funds for this expenditure. We cannot carry out our duties when we 

are being denied information about these critical national security matters. 

We all want to secure agreements that address the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and unconventional weapons. However, for these agreements 

to have long-term viability, they must be transparent, and based on close consultations and collaboration with the Congress. 

If the Israeli airstrike last month is related to covert nuclear collaboration involving Syria and either North Korea, Iran or other rogue states, this may or may not 

32

be an issue that can be easily addressed by negotiations alone. It is certain, however, that such a serious international security issue will not stay secret forever. 

Congress, therefore, needs to be fully briefed, not just on the details of the airstrike, but on how to address this matter and how, if press reports are true, rogue 

states will be held accountable for what could amount to a very serious case of 

WMD proliferation. 

We regret that the administration has ignored numerous letters from Congress 

asking that all members be briefed on the Israeli airstrike. Failing to disclose the 

details of this incident to the legislative branch, preventing due diligence and oversight—but talking to the press about it—is not the way to win support for complex 

and difficult diplomatic efforts to combat proliferation by rogue nations. 

Until Congress is fully briefed, it would be imprudent for the administration to 

move forward with agreements with state proliferators. Congress must be a full 

partner in this process and, from this point forward, must be kept dutifully and currently informed about this matter.

Mr. Hoekstra is the senior Republican member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen is the senior Republican member of the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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