III 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 351 

Responding to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 20, 2006 

Mr. BAYH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Responding to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. 

Whereas Iran is precipitating a grave nuclear crisis with the 

international community that directly impacts the national security of the United States and the efficacy of 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 

done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 

and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred 

to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’); 

Whereas the United States welcomes a diplomatic solution to 

the nuclear crisis, but the Government of Iran continues 

to reject a peaceful resolution to the matter; 

Whereas, although the Government of Iran agreed to suspend 

uranium enrichment activities and to sign and ratify the 

IAEA’s Additional Protocol on expansive, intrusive no-no-
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tice inspections in 2003, it has repeatedly failed to live 

up to its obligations under this agreement; 

Whereas the Government of Iran broke IAEA seals on some 

centrifuges in September 2004, converted uranium to a 

gas needed for enrichment in May 2005, limited IAEA 

inspectors to a few sites, and said it would restart uranium conversion activities; 

Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA declared in 

September 2005 that Iran was in non-compliance of its 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations; 

Whereas Iran announced on January 3, 2006, that it would 

resume uranium ‘‘research’’ activities at Natanz and invited IAEA to witness the breaking of IAEA seals at the 

facility; 

Whereas the Government of Iran has acknowledged deceiving 

the IAEA for the past 18 years for not disclosing an uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water 

production plant in Arak; 

Whereas the Government of Iran’s human rights practices 

and strict limits on democracy have been consistently 

criticized by United Nations reports; 

Whereas the Department of State stated in its most recent 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that Iran’s 

already poor human rights record ‘‘worsened’’ during the 

previous year and deemed Iran a country ‘‘of particular 

concern’’ in its most recent International Religious Freedom Report; 

Whereas the Government of Iran funds terror and rejectionist 

groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Lebanon, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan and is providing material support to groups 

directly involved in the killing of United States citizens; 
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Whereas Iran has been designated by the United States as 

a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, and the Department of State said in its most recent Country Reports on 

Terrorism that Iran ‘‘remained the most active state 

sponsor of terrorism in 2004’’; 

Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made 

repeated anti-American and anti-semitic statements, including denying the occurrence of the Holocaust and 

Israel’s right to exist, and called on people to imagine a 

world without the United States; 

Whereas Iran’s recent acquisition of new anti-ship capabilities to block the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the 

Persian Gulf and the decision by the Government of Russia to sell the Government of Iran $1,000,000,000 in 

weapons, mostly for 29 antiaircraft missile systems, is 

most regrettable and should dampen United States-Russian relations; 

Whereas the behavior of the Government of Iran does not reflect that country’s rich history and the democratic aspirations of most people in Iran; 

Whereas the people of the United States stand with the people of Iran in support of democracy, the rule of law, religious freedom, and regional and global stability; 

Whereas, although Iran is subject to a range of unilateral 

sanctions and some third country and foreign entities 

sanctions, these sanctions have not been fully implemented; 

Whereas Iran remains vulnerable to international sanctions, 

especially with respect to financial services and foreign 

investment in its petroleum sector and oil sales, few foreign nations have joined the United States in attempting 
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to isolate the regime in Iran and compel compliance with 

Iran’s international obligations; 

Whereas, although Iran may be one of the world’s largest exporters of oil, it does not have the refining capacity to 

make the gasoline necessary to make its economy run 

and currently imports 40 percent of its refined gasoline 

from abroad; 

Whereas more complete implementation of United States 

sanctions laws and the adoption of additional statutes 

would improve the chances of a diplomatic solution to the 

nuclear crisis with Iran; 

Whereas President George W. Bush has for 4 years given too 

little attention to the growing nuclear problem in Iran beyond rhetorical sound bites and has carried out an Iran 

policy consisting of loud denunciations followed by minimal action and ultimate deference of managing the crisis 

to Europe, a policy that has been riddled with contradiction and inconsistency and damaging to United States 

national security; 

Whereas, had President Bush effectively marshaled world 

opinion in 2002 and not wasted valuable time, diverted 

resources, and ignored the problem in Iran, the United 

States would not be faced with the full extent of the current nuclear crisis in Iran; 

Whereas action now is imperative and time is of the essence; 

and 

Whereas the opportunity the United States has to avoid the 

choice between military action and a nuclear Iran may be 

measured only in months: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that— 
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1 (1) the United States should cut assistance to 

2 countries whose companies are investing in Iran’s 

3 energy sector, including pipelines to export Iranian 

4 crude; 

5 (2) supplies of refined gasoline to Iran should 

6 be cut off; 

7 (3) there should be a worldwide, comprehensive 

8 ban on sales of weapons to Iran, including from 

9 Russia and China; 

10 (4) the United Nations Security Council should 

11 impose an intrusive IAEA-led weapons of mass de12 struction inspection regime on Iran similar to that 

13 imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf war; 

14 (5) the United Nations Security Council should 

15 adopt reductions in diplomatic exchanges with Iran, 

16 limit travel by some Iranian officials, and limit or 

17 ban sports or cultural exchanges with Iran; 

18 (6) the President should more faithfully imple19 ment the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 

20 U.S.C. 1701 note) (commonly known as ‘‘ILSA’’), 

21 and Congress should— 

22 (A) increase the requirements on the Presi23 dent to justify waiving ILSA-related sanctions; 

24 (B) repeal the sunset provision of ILSA; 
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1 (C) set a 90-day time limit for the Presi2 dent to determine whether an investment con3 stitutes a violation of ILSA; and 

4 (D) make exports to Iran of technology re5 lated to weapons of mass destruction 

6 sanctionable under ILSA; 

7 (7) the United States should withdraw its sup8 port for Iran’s accession to the WTO until Iran 

9 meets weapons of mass destruction, human rights, 

10 terrorism, and regional stability standards; and 

11 (8) the United States must make the Govern12 ment of Iran understand that if its nuclear activity 

13 continues it will be treated as a pariah state. 

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