United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 13, 2019

*

Decided March 13, 2019

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-3212

AMOS FINANCIAL, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee.

v.

JOSEPH SNEED,

Defendant-Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 14 cv 06688

Charles P. Kocoras,

Judge.

O R D E R

Joseph Sneed defaulted on his mortgage, so Sequoia Financial, the holder of the 

promissory note and assignee of the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings. After 

Sequoia transferred its interest in Sneed’s loan to Amos Financial, the court entered a 

judgment of foreclosure in favor of Amos and later authorized the sale of the property

 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18-3212 Page 2

and Sneed’s eviction. Sneed appealed, but because the district court has yet to rule on 

Sneed’s counterclaims, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

In 2006, Sneed executed and delivered a promissory note for $331,000 to New 

Century Mortgage, securing the loan with a mortgage on his home. As is common in 

the industry, the note and mortgage changed hands many times after its execution, 

eventually landing with Sequoia Financial. In arrears, Sneed entered into a Forbearance 

Agreement with Sequoia but later breached it.

Based on Sneed’s default, Sequoia initiated foreclosure proceedings in federal 

court, alleging diversity of citizenship based on its California citizenship (and Sneed’s in 

Illinois) and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Sneed 

answered and raised as an affirmative defense Sequoia’s lack of standing to initiate the 

foreclosure proceeding based on its failure to provide necessary documents that

established that it was the legal holder of the note and mortgage at the time that it filed 

the foreclosure action. He also counterclaimed for the common law tort of conversion

and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 

815 ILCS 505/2, and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601–1667f.

Sequoia moved for summary judgment, arguing that it held the senior interest in 

the property and that, as holder of the note and assignee of the mortgage, it was entitled 

to foreclose. Sequoia further contended that Sneed’s counterclaims were either waived, 

time-barred, or inapplicable to the foreclosure action. In response, Sneed maintained his 

contention that Sequoia lacked standing to foreclose because it had not shown that the 

note had been properly transferred into its possession. Sneed did not respond to the 

arguments about his counterclaims.

The district court agreed in part with Sequoia, concluding that Sneed indeed had 

defaulted on his mortgage. The court, however, determined that Sequoia had failed to 

establish its priority over two other liens on the property and was not yet entitled to 

foreclose. The court concluded that there were material disputes of fact regarding

“when Sequoia obtained the debt” and “Sequoia’s present interest in the property.” 

The court did not mention Sneed’s claims against Sequoia.

After transferring its interest in the note and mortgage to Amos Financial, 

Sequoia moved to substitute Amos “as the Plaintiff in this action” under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 25(c). The court granted the motion. At the time, Sequoia had a third 

motion for summary judgment pending, which Amos pursued. In support of the 
No. 18-3212 Page 3

motion, Amos submitted a number of documents to establish the chain of possession of 

the note and assignments of the mortgage, including the allonge by which it had 

acquired Sequoia’s interest. It did not seek judgment on the pending counterclaims. 

The district court agreed that Amos was the party entitled to foreclose on the 

mortgage because Amos’s submission of the endorsed note and mortgage assignment 

documents established a prima facie case of standing that Sneed had failed to rebut. 

See CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Sconyers, 16 N.E.3d 124, 127 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). Thus, the court 

entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. After the property was sold (to Amos), the 

court approved the report of sale and distribution and entered a deficiency judgment 

and an eviction order. Sneed appealed. 

We first must examine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. We have 

appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1292. A 

final judgment is one that resolves all claims against all parties. Chessie Logistics Co. 

v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2017). The district court entered 

judgment for Amos to foreclose on the property. But amid multiple summary-judgment 

motions and the substitution of Amos as plaintiff, Sneed’s compulsory counterclaims

against Sequoia—arising under common law tort, the Illinois consumer protection 

statute, and the TILA—remain unresolved in the district court. Those pending claims 

render the district court’s judgment nonfinal for purposes of our review. See India 

Breweries, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 612 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2010) (“If the parties’ 

dispute has not been fully resolved by the district court, the ‘remaining elements are apt 

to come back on a second appeal,’ and the decision cannot be considered final.”) 

(citation omitted).

Courts “may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than 

all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason 

for delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). The district court did not purport to enter a Rule 54(b) 

partial judgment or expressly determine that there was no reason to delay entering 

judgment on Amos’s foreclosure claim without resolving Sneed’s counterclaim. In its 

most recent motion for summary judgment, Sequoia did not ask for such a judgment or 

seek dismissal of the counterclaims (for example, for failure to prosecute); Amos has not 

done so at any time. Therefore, Sneed’s counterclaims are still pending. See Reed 

v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 545–46, 546 n.5 (7th Cir. 2018); Alonzi v. Budget Const. Co., 55 F.3d 

331, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (“When one or more of the claims in a litigation remain pending 

in the district court, any ‘judgment’ is nonfinal unless the district court enters a Rule 

54(b) judgment.”).
No. 18-3212 Page 4

The motion to substitute applied only to Amos “as the Plaintiff,” not counterdefendant. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25. And Sequoia answered the counterclaim, see FED. R.

CIV. P. 7(a)(3); Amos did not. But Sequoia did not participate in this appeal, and there is 

no indication that it believes that it is still a party in this case. The parties should sort 

this out in the district court. 

Finally, Sneed argues that because the district court failed to rule on his 

counterclaims, the court necessarily erred by granting foreclosure and affirming the sale 

of the property. Sneed is indirectly asking us to comment on the merits of the 

foreclosure judgment, which we cannot do. The final-judgment rule serves to combine 

the entire stage of litigation into one review. Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 758 

(7th Cir. 2011). Therefore, any review of the foreclosure must wait until the 

counterclaims are resolved or the district court enters an order pursuant to Rule 54(b).

We therefore DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.