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41–289 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–311

THE ANTIDRUG PACKAGE FOR MEXICO AND

CENTRAL AMERICA: AN EVALUATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, statement ............................ 5

Johnson, Hon. David, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ........... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. ............ 43

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Robert Menendez ................. 55

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3

Menendez, Hon. Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening

statement .............................................................................................................. 1

Shannon, Hon. Thomas, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere

Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................. 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Gerard, Leo W., International president, United Steelworkers, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 35

(III)

(1)

THE ANTIDRUG PACKAGE FOR MEXICO AND

CENTRAL AMERICA: AN EVALUATION

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez,

presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Webb, Lugar, Corker, and

Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator MENENDEZ. The hearing of the Committee on Foreign

Relations will now come to order.

It’s my pleasure to welcome our witnesses today, Assistant Secretary Shannon and Assistant Secretary Johnson. We appreciate

you coming before the committee.

We’ve called this hearing to review the President’s proposed Plan

Mexico. I call it Plan Mexico because it sounds, in many respects

as I’ve seen it, like Plan Colombia. It’s a plan that raises serious

questions about our Nation’s priorities within the hemisphere.

To begin with, this request has been categorized as an emergency. When some of us have known for years the problems and

needs of our southern neighbors, while we have been ringing the

alarm bells, it seems to me that the administration has repeatedly

hit the snooze button. Now they’re finally awake, but running late,

so they’ve come to Congress without any consultation declaring an

emergency.

With Plan Mexico, the President is requesting emergency supplemental funding to help combat the drug and gang problem in Mexico and Central America to the tune of $500 million for Mexico and

$50 million for Central America. That is a first tranche.

I certainly take a backseat to no one in my ongoing efforts over

the last 15 years in the House and now on this committee to increase resources for a variety of issues, as it relates to Latin America, especially on the development side and, on the protection of

human rights. But this proposal is long on military support and

falls far short when it comes to support for the people in the region.

Again, I find it particularly disturbing that the plan was negotiated and developed without any consultation with Congress whatsoever. That being said, the area where we seem to have some

agreement is in recognizing that the current drug-related killings,

2

insecurity, and fear continue to pose major problems for Mexico

and for the United States.

The current level and senseless manner of violence in Mexico is

both alarming and disturbing, especially considering the common

border we share. Unfortunately, corruption continues to plague institutions at all levels, and on top of that, Mexico now faces an increasing consumption and production problem.

For the South, Central America continues to grapple with gangs

and gang violence, as well as increasing rates of drug trafficking.

There is no question help is needed. The question however is how

we go about it in the most effective way to reach our goals. And

that is the question I hope will guide the hearing today and how

we will debate and amend this package in the future.

On that note, while this proposal has certainly brought the problem to the forefront, I’m not convinced it is the most effective solution to reach our goals. There are some serious shortcomings,

which I will address today.

First, I believe this package takes a one-dimensional approach to

a multidimensional problem. In your own budget justification, the

administration cites a quote from former U.N. Secretary General

Kofi Annan, which rings true to me and is worthy of mention. He

says, and you used this quote, ‘‘We will not enjoy development

without security. We will not enjoy security without development.

And we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.’’ That’s the

end of that quote, and I couldn’t agree more.

But as I look at this funding request, I see a very one-sided approach to a very multifaceted problem. That means this proposal

fails to deal with many of the components that must be addressed

in order to successfully tackle this problem. I see things like eight

new helicopters, two new surveillance planes, new gamma ray

scanners, communications equipment, all of which are important

catalysts for security, but have little to do with development or

human rights. In fact, the State Department itself, has stated that

40 percent of the assistance in this supplemental request will be

provided to the Mexican military.

I’m already concerned about Mexico’s increased reliance on its

Armed Forces for counterdrug activities, because increased militarization does not address long-term development and reform

needs within Mexico, not to mention the human rights implications

of militarization and of giving money to Mexican institutions,

which, according to Amnesty International, ‘‘Have a long history of

serious human rights violations, lack of independence, transparency, and ineffectiveness.’’

Finally, it’s ironic to me that the genesis for this request was

during the President’s March 2007 trip to Latin America, a trip in

which he emphasized the need for more social and development assistance to our southern neighbors.

Second, I’m surprised by the nature of this request. To come and

ask Congress for this money in an emergency supplemental request, as akin to now fixing the levies in New Orleans. This problem has existed for a while in both Mexico and Central America,

and I certainly hope this emergency request is not just a way for

3

the administration to avoid the obligation of paying for what we

should have done for years.

The emergency nature of the request raises other serious questions. What is the expected length of this package, 2 years, 3 years?

President Calderon will be in office for more—for 5 more years. Are

we expecting to end this aid before his term is over?

Finally and most importantly, how will this package effect overall funding to Latin America in the fiscal year 2009 budget? I, for

one, cannot support a package that cuts further into funding for a

region that has the highest social inequity in the world and that

has seen proposed cuts for funding and core development assistance every year since 2001.

The fact that this request is considered an emergency, goes to

what I believe is a core problem. We have no comprehensive policy

in Latin America, otherwise we wouldn’t be here today. We would

have been doing the right thing all along and avoided this emergency altogether.

I have several other concerns, but I’ll wait until the questioning

to pursue them. I hope today will be the beginning of an honest

and forthright debate on this package. I hope the discussion will

prompt a broader debate about our foreign assistance priorities to

Latin America.

If there are no objections, I ask that a statement from the United

Steel Workers be submitted to the record, on behalf of Senator

Biden.

Without objection, so ordered.

Senator MENENDEZ. And with that, I turn to the distinguished

ranking member of the committee, Senator Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR.

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

thank you especially for chairing this important hearing on the

President’s supplemental funding request to combat narcotrafficking through Mexico and Central America, known as the

Merida Initiative.

Since entering office last December, Mexican President Felipe

Calderon moved to improve public security in his country. And the

Mexican Government has committed $2.5 billion to combat drug

trafficking next year, launched aggressive antidrug operations in

10 Mexican States, replaced numerous high-ranking Federal police

officers in anticorruption campaigns, and created a unified national

crime database.

The Calderon government has strengthened law enforcement cooperation, extraditing close to 80 criminals to the United States

this year, including cartel kingpins. It has also made record

seizures of cocaine, methamphetamine precursors, cash, and other

assets. The ongoing public security campaign has reduced the legal

impunity that the drug cartels have traditionally enjoyed in Mexico, but it’s come at a high cost.

Mexico has suffered approximately 2,650 drug-related killings

since the beginning of this year, compared to 2,120 in 2006. The

Merida Initiative is an attempt to seize the opportunity created by

Mexico’s invigorated anticrime campaign by funding key programs

4

and building stronger cooperation between Mexico and the United

States. It recognizes that 90 percent of the cocaine entering the

United States transits Mexico and that our efforts to combat this

drug flow and associated criminal activities depend on a partnership with the Mexican Government. To assist Mexico’s efforts, the Merida Initiative provides $500 million, including $306 million for counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and border security; $100 million for institution-building

and the rule of law; and $56 million for public security and law enforcement. In addition, the administration has proposed $50 million

to boost counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and law enforcement in

Central America.

I’m concerned that this portion of the request falls short of what

is required. Though Mexico has made progress against organized

crime, the strength of criminal gangs in Central America is growing. Gangs in Central America have emerged as major social factors and they’ve been expanding their influence in relatively

ungoverned areas as they exploit for their drug trafficking

operations.

Central American leaders and public opinion, especially in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have characterized this situation as a regional emergency requiring an urgent response. Central

America is the primary transit point for people and drugs destined

for the United States from Colombia. Increasing crime in Central

America threatens regional stability, debilitates national economies, and exacerbates illegal migration to the United States.

In the past, political wrangling and resource constraints have

hampered Central America’s response to the drug trade. But recently, Central American countries have agreed to strengthen

regional security through the Central America Integration System.

Together they have produced a comprehensive regional security

strategy.

The Central American officials feel that they will not be able to

confront threats effectively without more assistance. They fear the

gang members and drug traffickers will flee Mexico for Central

America, where it will be easier to operate.

As one senior Central American Government official stated, ‘‘In

this case, Mexico’s gain could be our loss.’’ In this context, I’m

hopeful that additional funds will be found for Central America, as

this initiative goes forward, perhaps during the fiscal year 2009 appropriations cycle. It’s especially important that the Merida Initiative be implemented as a regional plan and progress be evaluated

according to what is happening in both Mexico and its neighbors

to the south.

In Mexico, President Calderon is laying the groundwork for

deeper cooperation with the United States, articulating a message

that makes clear that coordination in sensitive areas will require

more compromise, more mutual trust, and respect for each other’s

sovereignty.

One area that requires more cooperation is arms trafficking. A

member of my senior staff returned this month from a visit to

Mexico City, where he met with Mexican Government officials and

members of the Mexican Senate regarding attitudes toward the

Merida Initiative. He found Mexican officials generally supportive,

5

but they consistently called on him to relay their concerns about

the flow of guns and explosives from the United States into Mexico.

American Embassy officials confirmed that the United States is

a major source of weapons for Mexican gangs and drug runners. As

the Merida Initiative goes forward, American agencies must work

closely with Mexican officials to address this problem. We do not

want to create a self-defeating situation in which a critical foreign

assistance program, meant to assist a neighbor and enhance U.S.

security, is being undercut by an illegal flow of weapons originating

from within our own borders.

I look forward to the insights of our distinguished witnesses on

these and other issues related to this initiative. And I thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Is there any other Senator who has an opening statement?

Senator BOXER. Senator Menendez, I——

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. I don’t have an opening statement.

I just want to say that I have a lot of concerns about this, on many,

many levels, that I understand you, Senator Menendez, really, I

think, spoke for me in some of those concerns.

It’s—as I see this President veto bills that give our people a lot

of hope and then he vetoes these bills, education, health research,

war on cancer, because we don’t have money. And now we’re looking at a huge amount of money for a military type of project,

which, I don’t know, at the end of the day does really help our relations. I have just a lot of concerns about this.

Drug trafficking in Mexico is a horrific, horrific problem, and no

one knows more than my State. I’ll tell you, I’ve looked at treatment for all. It’s a lot cheaper than this thing. We haven’t even approached the demand side. So, I get confused about this, I get confused about this.

We don’t have treatment for the people who want treatment.

They’re—they’re part of the problem because they’re demanding

these drugs. We’ve got horrible trafficking in Mexico, which we all

want to end, and it’s a one-dimensional type of approach. We have

all the money in the world for this, but no money for our kids here

at home, like a million of them waiting for after school. I don’t get

it, I don’t get the balance here.

So I—I’m going to listen and—but I’m a skeptic on this.

Thanks.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

Senator Isakson, do you have anything?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM

GEORGIA

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Senator Menendez, and I

won’t make a long statement, but I have a keen interest in this

issue. Some months back I called on an emergency supplemental

for border security between the United States and Mexico in total,

because of the immigration issue that this country faces. I notice

in this proposal, there’s some $300 million, as I understand it, for

border security, which in part, may help us with some of the immigration problem that we have.

6

Second, it is my understanding that since we passed the legislation in the Senate last year, restricting access to many of the components to methamphetamine, that the demand is now being met

by those components coming over from Mexico into the United

States of America. And I know in the South, there is no greater

scourge than the scourge of methamphetamine. So I am anxious to

hear the testimony. I think it does rise to the level of an emergency

supplemental, if in fact it is comprehensive and targeted in those

two areas.

So, I appreciate the two of you being here today testifying and

look forward to hearing your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

With that, Secretary Shannon, we’ll start with you. We’ll have

both of your full statements be entered into the record. We’d ask

you to summarize in about 5 minutes or so, so that we can maximize our time for an exchange. And we recognize you and welcome

you to the committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS SHANNON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking

Member Lugar, other members of the committee. Thank you for the

opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative and the new paradigm

that it represents for regional security cooperation among the

United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America.

As noted, the President has asked for $550 million for the

Merida Initiative in the supplemental budget request; $500 million

of that funding would go to Mexico as the first tranche of what we

hope will be a $1.4 billion multiyear security cooperation package;

and $50 million would target Central America, with the hope that

as we deepen our discussion with Central America on the basis of

their security strategy, that we would be able to look to additional

funding in the future.

This is an important moment in the fight against transnational

drug trafficking and organized crime and one that requires urgent

action on the part of all nations involved. President Bush recognized that the United States has an unprecedented opportunity to

reduce the economic and human toll in our cities and towns emanating from cross-border organized crime. The governments and

citizens of Mexico and Central America have recognized the threat

to their own stability and prosperity. They are taking courageous

steps to confront these criminal elements, and are now seeking

U.S. support to ensure a comprehensive and integrated regional

effort.

Over the past decade, drug trafficking and other criminal organizations have grown in size and strength, aggressively seeking to

undermine and intimidate government institutions in Mexico and

Central America, compromising municipal and state law enforcement entities, and substantially weakening these governments’

ability to maintain public security and expand the rule of law. This

proliferation has generated a surge in crime and violence throughout the region, including in the United States.

7

None of what I have described above will come as a surprise to

our partners in the region. These leaders have used some of the

same language to describe and acknowledge the challenges they

are facing and they are acting on it. The leaders of these nations

are already working to beat back violence and crime for their citizens and they have turned to us to join them as partners.

In Mexico, President Calderon has acted decisively, using the

most effective tools at his disposal. He is reorganizing the Federal

police, putting new and additional resources in the hands of his security services, deploying military units to support police operations, rooting out corrupt officials, attacking impunity, arresting

major crime figures, and extraditing a record number of drug kingpins and other criminals to the United States.

However, President Calderon has recognized that leadership and

political will are not enough, he needs greater institutional and

material resources to ensure both near-term success and long-term

institutional change. In an unprecedented step, he has asked the

United States to launch a new partnership with Mexico and to help

him strengthen Mexican law enforcement, public safety, and border

security to defeat the drug and criminal organizations.

At the same time, the nations of Central America have committed to collective action to address these common security concerns. Through the Central American Integration System, SICA,

the governments have expressed the political resolve to join forces

to strengthen regional security, however they lack sufficient tools

and capacity to execute that will.

The impetus for the Merida Initiative, as noted, came out of the

President’s March trip to the region, particularly his visits to Guatemala and Mexico, where security concerns dominated the conversations with President Berger and President Calderon. In the

course of these discussions and the followup consultations with

both Mexico and Central America, we have been able to develop

the framework of a new regional security partnership.

Throughout this process, we have tried to shape the Merida Initiative to be comprehensive, balanced, and timely. The initiative is

comprehensive in that it deals with security in all its components

and builds on a variety of initiatives that are taking place now in

the United States, Mexico, and Central America.

The initiative is balanced because it involves a range of security

institutions in Mexico and Central America, with a particular focus

on building capacity and capability in civilian sectors.

Finally, the Merida Initiative is timely because it responds to a

real-time threat, as organized crime attempts to overwhelm the

stability and well-being of democratic States in Mexico and in Central America.

Just as our partners in the region acknowledge the extent of the

threat, President Bush has accepted that the United States shares

responsibility and is prepared to step up to do our part. This request reflects how the United States would like to work with the

Governments of Mexico and Central America through the use of

foreign assistance funds.

As President Bush has stated, ‘‘Regional problems require regional solutions.’’ The Merida Initiative is where each nation’s

domestic efforts are combined with regional cooperation and colVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:53 Mar 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 ANTIDRUG sforel1 PsN: sforel1
8

laboration to multiply the effects of our actions. It clearly shows we

realize that drug trafficking and criminal organizations do not respect political boundaries and that we must synchronize our tactics

and confront the problem together.

The President’s vision for this hemisphere is rooted in partnership, the type of partnership that the Merida Initiative represents.

He has stressed that all in the region, including the United States,

have a shared responsibility for combating this crime and violence

that so gravely affect our citizens. We have far-reaching geographic, economic, and demographic links to Mexico and Central

America and a compelling national security interest in helping the

governments of this region succeed in the battle against crime and

insecurity. We believe the Merida Initiative represents the best

hope for tackling the problem in a thorough manner with our willing partners.

Mr. Chairman, we welcome your offer to have an honest and

thorough debate and discussion on the initiative. We acknowledge

that there has been concern expressed regarding the lack of prior

consultations before the public announcement of the supplemental

request. We regret we were unable to engage in such consultations.

Our intention was to present to the Congress a credible security cooperation package that reflected the best work of our interagency

community and discussions with our Mexican and Central American counterparts.

This process took longer than expected. As we proceed, Mr.

Chairman, we commit to work closely with you and your committee

and other relevant committees and staff, to ensure that together

we can craft a security cooperation package that will meet national

security interests and take full advantage of the historic opportunity that lies before us.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shannon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS A. SHANNON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank

you for the opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative and the new paradigm that

it represents for regional security cooperation among the United States, Mexico, and

the countries of Central America.

The President has asked for $550 million for the Merida Initiative in the supplemental budget request; $500 million of that funding would go to Mexico as the first

tranche of what we hope will be a $1.4 billion multiyear security cooperation package, and $50 million would target Central America.

This is an important moment in the fight against transnational drug trafficking

and organized crime; and one that requires urgent action on the part of all nations

involved. President Bush recognized that the United States has an unprecedented

opportunity to reduce the economic and human toll in our cities and towns emanating from cross-border organized crime. The governments and citizens of Mexico

and Central America have recognized the threat to their own stability and prosperity. They are taking courageous steps to confront these criminal elements, and

are now seeking U.S. support to ensure a comprehensive and integrated regional

effort.

Over the past decade, drug trafficking and other criminal organizations have

grown in size and strength, aggressively seeking to undermine and intimidate government institutions in Mexico and Central America, compromising municipal and

state law enforcement entities, and substantially weakening these governments’

ability to maintain public security and expand the rule of law. This proliferation has

generated a surge in crime and violence throughout the region, including in the

United States.

9

We have seen the emergence of gangs as major social actors, the corruption of the

police, judiciary, and prison systems, and a growing popular demand for governments to respond to the threat posed by these criminal organizations. The effects

of this growing problem are also readily apparent in the United States in the form

of gang violence, crime, and higher rates of trafficking in persons and illegal drugs—

all of which threaten our own national security and impose mounting economic

costs.

None of what I have described above will come as a surprise to our partners in

the region—these leaders have used some of the same language to describe and acknowledge the challenges they are facing. And they are acting on it. The leaders

of these nations are already working to beat back violence and crime for their citizens and they have turned to us to join them—as partners.

In Mexico, President Calderon has acted decisively, using the most effective tools

at his disposal. He is reorganizing the Federal police, putting new and additional

resources in the hands of his security services, deploying military units to support

police operations, rooting out corrupt officials, attacking impunity, arresting major

crime figures, and extraditing a record number of drug kingpins and other criminals

to the United States. The determination and commitment shown by the Calderon

administration is historic; and the early results impressive. In the course of 1

month, two seizures alone have netted over 30 tons of cocaine destined for Mexico

and/or the United States, shattering all previous records for drug seizures in Mexico. In fact, our understanding is that Mexico has confiscated more cocaine in the

first year of the Calderon administration than any other since they began keeping

records.

However, President Calderon has recognized that leadership and political will are

not enough; he needs greater institutional and material resources to ensure both

near-term success and long-term institutional change. In an unprecedented step, he

has asked the United States to launch a new partnership with Mexico and to help

him strengthen Mexican law enforcement, public safety, and border security to defeat the drug and criminal organizations. This is not a ‘‘traditional’’ foreign assistance request. It is, as our joint declaration called it, ‘‘a new paradigm for security

cooperation.’’

At the same time, the nations of Central America have committed to collective action to address these common security concerns. Through the Central American

Integration System (SICA), the governments have expressed the political resolve to

join forces to strengthen regional security; however they lack sufficient tools and capacity to execute such will. Despite these challenges, national authorities remain

committed to the fight; using their own limited resources and equipment to interdict

narcotics, arrest drug cartel members, and extradite high-profile drug traffickers to

the United States for prosecution. The countries of Central America are also committed to working among themselves as well as with the United States. In March,

the Government of Panama, working with DEA and Coast Guard, seized a record

17 metric tons of cocaine. And just last week, in a combined operation involving U.S.

law enforcement and the National Police of both Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 250

kilograms of cocaine were confiscated in Nicaragua. These examples demonstrate

that in Central America, as in Mexico, there are courageous partners with whom

we can work cooperatively.

The impetus for the Merida Initiative came out of the President’s March trip to

the region; particularly his visits to Guatemala and Mexico, where security concerns

dominated the conversations with President Berger and President Calderon. In the

course of these discussions and the follow-on consultations with both Mexico and

Central America, we have been able to develop the framework of a new regional security partnership.

Throughout this process, we have tried to shape the Merida Initiative to be comprehensive, balanced, and timely. The initiative is comprehensive in that it deals

with security in all its components and builds on a variety of initiatives that are

taking place now in the United States, Mexico, and Central America. Combined

with the push we have made against drug trafficking and the flow of other illicit

goods elsewhere in the region, the Merida Initiative represents an effort to integrate

security programs from the Andes, through the isthmus of Central America and into

Mexico, up to the Southwest border of the United States. This is a hemispheric assault to cripple drug trafficking and criminal organizations, disrupt and dismantle

their networks, and help fortify state institutions to ensure these groups can no

longer operate effectively.

The initiative is balanced because it involves a range of security institutions in

Mexico and Central America, with a particular focus on building capacity and capability in civilian sectors. The entire Central America portion of the supplemental request and nearly 60 percent of the Mexico portion is going to civilian agencies in

10

those countries. Our goal in balancing the package is to assist Mexico and Central

America in their immediate fight against organized crime, to improve connectivity

and communications among the various law enforcement agencies, and to support

the institutional reform necessary to fortify the state institutions of justice and rule

of law that are essential for the long-term protection of civil and human rights.

Finally, the Merida Initiative is timely because it responds to a real-time threat,

as organized crime attempts to overwhelm the stability and well-being of democratic

States in Mexico and in Central America. Our allies in this region have already

begun to act and have called on us to assist them as quickly as possible. The urgency of their appeal is palpable, and we should not miss the opportunity to capitalize on the successes we have witnessed so far, as well as to forge a stronger alliance with willing partners.

Just as our partners in the region acknowledge the extent of the threat, President

Bush has accepted that the U.S. shares responsibility and is prepared to step up

to do our part. This request reflects how the United States would like to work with

the Governments of Mexico and Central America through the use of foreign assistance funds. And I have already spoken to the increased efforts by which these governments have begun the fight themselves. What is not captured in this supplemental request is what the United States is doing domestically to contribute to this

partnership.

While I defer to U.S. domestic law enforcement agencies to provide you details,

I can tell you that the Merida Initiative was designed to complement what the

United States has been doing on our side of the border to address issues such as

arms and bulk cash trafficking, gangs, and demand for drugs. Through a number

of domestic strategies and programs—such as the Southwest Border CounterNarcotics Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the U.S Strategy for

Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico—we are working domestically to enhance our efforts against the trafficking of drugs, arms, money, and

humans, as well as to reduce the demand for drugs within the United States.

However, each nation working on its own is not enough. As President Bush has

stated, regional problems require regional solutions. The Merida Initiative is where

each nation’s domestic efforts are combined with regional cooperation and collaboration to multiply the effects of our actions. It clearly shows we realize that drug trafficking and criminal organizations do not respect political boundaries and that we

must synchronize our tactics and confront the problem together.

This new paradigm is not without its challenges, but we believe they are challenges that can be overcome. Oversight and accountability are essential in this process and we have structured the package in such as way as to assure this. We also

plan to build on the efforts of the Governments of Mexico and Central America in

protecting human rights and rooting out corruption; all participants agree that

these are indispensable components of any security cooperation partnership.

Having visited Mexico with Deputy Secretary Negroponte 2 weeks ago, and having led the U.S. delegation to the first U.S.–SICA Dialogue on Security in Guatemala in July, I can tell you that I am struck by the immediacy of the threat. Equally, I have been impressed by the commitment of the governments involved to work

together to finally put an end to the growing violence and crime.

The President’s vision for this hemisphere is rooted in partnership; the type of

partnership that the Merida Initiative represents. He has stressed that all in the

region, including the United States, have a shared responsibility for combating this

crime and violence that so gravely affect our citizens. We have far-reaching geographic, economic, and demographic links to Mexico and Central America and a

compelling national security interest in helping the governments of this region succeed in the battle against crime and insecurity. We believe the Merida Initiative

represents the best hope for tackling the problem in a thorough manner with our

willing partners.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Secretary Johnson.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW

ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman——

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you put your microphone on?

11

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator

Lugar, Senator Boxer, Senator Isakson, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative to confront narcotics trafficking in Mexico and Central America.

I’ve submitted a written statement for the record, which I will

summarize briefly. As Assistant Secretary Shannon noted, Mexico

and Central America have already made considerable progress

against criminal networks, and have shown an unprecedented willingness to work together to address these threats. We’re beginning

to see some positive signs that these efforts, together with successful counterdrug programs in the Andean source zone, may be having a measurable impact on the availability of drugs here in the

United States. Clearly, this is a compelling moment of opportunity

further to advance our common national security interests.

Through bilateral and multilateral initiatives, the Governments

of Mexico and Central America are demonstrating unprecedented

will to work with us and each other to address these issues. This

is a compelling opportunity to advance our common national security interests.

U.S. support through the Merida Initiative will focus on three

broad areas. First, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and border

security. Second, public security and law enforcement. And third,

institution-building and rule of law.

The primary goal is to diminish the power and impunity of criminal organizations by strengthening border controls, enhancing law

enforcement capacity, and improving justice and correction systems. Of the $550 million included in the supplemental request,

$500 million would support reinvigorated cooperation with Mexico.

As Senator Lugar noted, approximately 90 percent of the cocaine

bound for the United States transits Mexico and Mexico is the principal foreign source for methamphetamine and marijuana consumed in the United States.

Drug-related violence has spread to all parts of Mexico and into

the United States. Through this initiative, U.S. assistance will seek

to build upon existing programs in the areas of border security,

interdiction, and criminal justice reform.

For example, supplemental funding would provide specialized inspection equipment and canine teams, communications technology,

and aircraft to support interdiction activities. Our assistance would

also provide technical assistance in areas such as vetting of Mexico’s newly established Federal police force, case management software, and the establishment of witness protection programs.

We also plan to enhance information-sharing, related to terrorist

travel, through the advanced passenger information system. The

proposal also seeks to address money laundering and drug demand

in the region. In Central America, programs will be tailored to the

needs of individual countries in areas such as criminal gang activity and small arms trafficking.

The Merida Initiative represents a rare, perhaps even a unique

opportunity to address security concerns in our hemisphere. But we

also recognize that it requires a significant investment on the part

of the American taxpayer. Proper financial management of a program of this size and scope is a significant challenge. Should Congress approve funding for this worthwhile initiative, my top priVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:53 Mar 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 ANTIDRUG sforel1 PsN: sforel1
12

ority will be to ensure that effective financial controls are in place,

and that we have the staffing necessary for effective oversight.

Like our other counterdrug and law enforcement programs, funding would be obligated through bilateral letters of agreement and

include safeguards, such as end-use monitoring for equipment and

screening of trainees.

Mr. Chairman, in response to the concerns that you and others

have expressed, concerning the lack of prior consultations, I regret

that we did not provide you with more detailed information earlier.

We have now sought to provide Congress with this credible and as

defensible proposal as possible, and the process of validating

requirements took longer than we wished. We look forward to continued dialog with you to shape this proposal into a plan that is

in the best interest of the United States, Mexico, and Central

America.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I look

forward to working with you on these important issues, I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,

BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, other members of the committee, thank you for the

opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative to confront transnational narcotics trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America.

As Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon explained, our partners in Mexico and Central America have already made considerable progress in their own efforts to fight

these transnational organized criminal networks, and they would like our help to

do more. Through bilateral and multilateral initiatives, the Governments of Mexico

and Central America are demonstrating unprecedented will to work with us and

each other to address these issues. This is a compelling opportunity to advance our

common national security interests.

Roughly 90 percent of all the cocaine consumed in the United States transits Mexico. The country is also the largest foreign supplier of marijuana and the largest foreign source of methamphetamine consumed in the United States. Central American

officials have identified gangs, drug trafficking, and trafficking of arms as the most

pressing security concerns in that region. The Merida Initiative will respond to

those security threats and build on existing strategies and programs. We are confronting vulnerabilities posed from the increasingly violent nature of the security

situation in Mexico and Central America that if left unchecked, could open the way

for more dangerous threats to emerge.

Through the Merida Initiative, the United States seeks to strengthen our partners’ capacities in three broad areas: (1) Counter-Narcotics, Counterterrorism, and

Border Security; (2) Public Security and Law Enforcement; and (3) Institution Building and Rule of Law. Through this cooperative effort, we intend to achieve the following strategic goals: Break the power and impunity of criminal organizations;

strengthen border, air, and maritime controls from the Southwest border of the

United States to Panama; improve the capacity of justice systems in the region to

conduct investigations and prosecutions, consolidate the rule of law, protect human

rights, and reform prison management; curtail criminal gang activity; and reduce

the demand for drugs throughout the region.

This cooperation is designed to build on activities already underway in the region.

For example, Mexico is undertaking historic efforts to improve coordination among

security agencies, modernize law enforcement agencies and professionalize their

staff. Since his inauguration in December 2006, President Calderon has taken decisive action against transnational criminal organizations by deploying 24,000 troops

to support joint police-military counternarcotics operations in 10 Mexican States, increasing extraditions, and initiating large scale police reform.

The results of these efforts are striking. The Calderon administration has extradited a record 79 fugitives to the United States this year, including prominent memVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:53 Mar 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 ANTIDRUG sforel1 PsN: sforel1
13

bers of the gulf drug trafficking organization. Mexican law enforcement authorities

have seized over $200 million in cash from a methamphetamine trafficking organization, and have seized record amounts of narcotics. Seizures of cocaine, marijuana,

opium gum, heroin, and methamphetamine are on pace to exceed last year’s totals.

As noted by Assistant Secretary Shannon, cocaine seizures in recent weeks have

shattered all previous records in Mexico. We are also beginning to see encouraging

signs that these achievements, together with successful programs in the Andean

source zone, may be having a measurable impact on the availability of cocaine here

in the United States.

Mexico has also made great strides in its efforts to root out official corruption.

Since coming into power, the Calderon administration has conducted thousands of

inquiries and investigations into possible malfeasance or misconduct. These investigations resulted in the dismissal of over 1,600 employees, the suspension of nearly

2,000, as well as thousands of reprimands. The imposition of economic sanctions

against corrupt Federal employees brought the equivalent of over $300 million in

fines and reimbursements into the Mexican treasury.

Existing U.S. programs complement and support the historic counternarcotics

efforts of the Calderon administration. For example, we are conducting programs

supporting professionalization and justice system restructuring. These efforts include training and other support to police reform, and development of Federal police

institutions and infrastructure. These programs support the vetting of Mexican law

enforcement agents and assist State and Federal police and prosecutors. We provided training for 4,627 Government of Mexico officials in 2007, and have plans to

train about 5,800 in 2008. Our Good Governance programs support rule of law education programs and promote anticorruption initiatives within the Mexican Federal

bureaucracy.

Looking into the future, the Merida Initiative, if approved, will include various

efforts to improve crime prevention, modernize the Mexican police force, and provide

institution-building and the rule of law. Case management software, technical assistance programs, and equipment will support Mexico’s judicial and police reforms

by enhancing their ability to investigate, convict, sentence, and securely detain

those who commit crimes. Technical assistance and training programs will support

Mexico’s development of offices of professional responsibility, inspectors general, and

new institutions designed to receive and act on citizen complaints. Increased training for prosecutors, defenders, and court managers in Central America, will assist

with judicial reform. The initiative will expand needed technical assistance on prison management and aid in severing the connection between incarcerated criminals

and their criminal organizations.

One of our existing programs supports antimoney laundering efforts by the Government of Mexico, by assisting the Government’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

and by supporting police and prosecutors who investigate money laundering-related

crimes. As part of the Merida Initiative, we plan to support the FIU through the

expansion of software for data management and data analysis associated with financial intelligence functions and law enforcement.

Nearly half of our current programs focus on interdiction, including support for

the Mexican counterparts of our Federal law enforcement agencies. To further advance this cooperation, funding under the Merida Initiative focuses support for a

Consolidated Crime Information System; purchasing special investigative equipment, vehicles and computers for the new Federal Police Corps; creating special police units to focus on high-profile criminal targets and deploy at major airports and

seaports; assessing security and installing equipment at Mexico’s largest seaports;

and procuring additional clandestine laboratory vehicles and safety gear to assist

the Government of Mexico in combating methamphetamine. This program includes

specialized equipment and training to safely and effectively dismantle methamphetamine super labs.

Our existing programs focus on border security by principally providing inspection

equipment and associated tactical training to support inspection capabilities of police, customs, and immigration. Funds also provide equipment and specially trained

canine teams to pursue arms trafficking and explosives. Through linkages with the

USG’s Advanced Passenger Information System, we also facilitate the real-time

interchange of information related to potential counterterrorism targets.

The Merida Initiative includes several programs to support interdiction and border security efforts such as information technology support that will assist Mexico’s

Federal migration authorities improve their database and document verification capabilities. Additional communications equipment will improve their ability to conduct rescue and patrol operations along Mexico’s southern border. Equipment for a

secure communications network, data management, and forensic analysis will

strengthen coordination among Mexican law enforcement agencies and greatly enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:53 Mar 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 ANTIDRUG sforel1 PsN: sforel1
14

hance Mexico’s ability to prosecute narcotrafficking and other transborder crimes.

Technologies such as gamma-ray scanners, density measurement devices, and commodity testing kits will help prevent the cross-border movement of illicit drugs,

firearms, financial assets, and trafficked persons. Expansion of weapons tracing programs will enable increased joint and individual country investigations and prosecutions of illegal arms trafficking. Enhanced information systems in Mexico will

strengthen analytical capabilities and interconnectivity across law enforcement

agencies and improve information-sharing with U.S. counterparts. Additional transport and light aircraft in Mexico will give security agencies the capability to rapidly

reinforce law enforcement operations nationwide.

In Central America, maritime assistance and both fixed and mobile nonintrusive

inspection assistance, will allow regional migration officials to better defend national sovereignty from land and sea incursions by illegal traffickers. In addition,

technical assistance, training, and nonlethal equipment will improve policing and

promote preventative and community policing. Specialized antigang units in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala will also improve investigation and prosecution of

dangerous gang members in the United States, Central America, and Mexico. Moreover, the Merida Initiative will provide funding to implement all five elements of

the U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs, including improved processes for repatriation and strong community action programs to prevent youth from joining gangs.

We will also begin a focused program to address illicit trafficking of small arms and

light weapons throughout the region by providing a regional adviser, training and

stockpile management and destruction assistance.

Finally, an existing U.S. program supports demand-reduction efforts by Mexican

governmental and nongovernmental entities that pursue drug remediation, rehabilitation, and public awareness activities. The Merida Initiative will build significantly

on these small programs by providing technological support to the Mexican National

Network for Technological Transfers in Addictions, which will improve its ability to

deliver drug treatment and prevention services across Mexico.

The Merida Initiative will be implemented through bilateral Letters of Agreement

with the host governments that will include provision for end-use monitoring. We

will work with the interagency to identify implementers for the various programs

under the Merida Initiative, building on the results of interagency validation teams

that verified the proposals in consultation with Mexican and Central American government agencies, and by expanding ongoing interagency cooperative relationships

at the various embassies and consulates in the region.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you both.

We’ll start the questioning with 7-minute rounds and since this

is the only panel that we have on the issue, we’ll probably go

through a second round again. And the Chair will recognize himself

to start off with.

Mr. Secretary, you’ve cited a series of things. I want to ask you,

very briefly tell me, a, b, c, this is what we’re going to accomplish

with this initiative. What is your strategic objective, a, b, c? If

there’s an a, b, and c, there might be only a, but whatever.

Mr. JOHNSON. The strategic objectives are several-fold. First, in

Mexico and Central America: Work with our partners to fight organized crime and drug cartels. This means ending the ability of organized crime to threaten the democratic States of Mexico and

Central America. This is why we believe it’s an emergency today.

We believe these organized crime institutions are indeed threatening the democratic States of Mexico and Central America.

Second, in the process of breaking down organized crime groups

and cartels, reduce the flow of narcotics to the United States, and

look for ways to ensure that as we reduce that flow of narcotics,

it does not move elsewhere in the region. This is why we have Central America as part of this package. In order to address a regional

approach, and it’s why we are beginning a deeper conversation on

security with our Caribbean partners.

Third, build new and enduring relationships with law enforcement institutions in the region, especially in Mexico and Central

15

America. We have been approached by the Mexicans and by the

Governments of Central America in an unprecedented fashion. We

believe this is an opportunity to break down longstanding taboos

in our national relationships and build new levels of cooperation

that will not only enhance security cooperation, but will enhance

broader political and diplomatic cooperation throughout the region.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, if part of what we are trying to do is

stop the flow of narcotics into the United States and to deal with

the drug cartels, why do we not deal with the fact that, in this initiative, with the report, Secretary Johnson, that was issued by your

Bureau in March of this year, that Mexico supplies a large share

of the heroin distributed in the United States. It is the largest foreign supplier of marijuana to the United States market, and a

major supplier and producer of methamphetamine. And the World

Drug Report of 2007, from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, estimates that Mexico is one of the top two marijuana producers of

the world.

And there’s other information about how Mexico is now facing a

consumption issue, as well. So we have a huge production part, forgetting about the transiting of drugs through Mexico from other

places. We have a huge production of some of these issues within

Mexico itself. Nothing, nothing, in this initiative is going to deal

with that. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. I’d say, on the contrary. Unlike——

Senator MENENDEZ. What exactly are you going to do as it relates to production?

Mr. JOHNSON. The effort here is focused not on eradication, as

you recognize, but is focused on interdiction. And it is focused on

confronting the organized criminal networks, which are multifaceted in nature, in the sense that their products are across the

board.

So, by confronting these—these criminal networks, I think we do

make the best investment of the taxpayers money to deal with all

of these questions of illicit product, illicit narcotics that are destined for the United States, as well as transiting Mexico.

Senator MENENDEZ. But I listened to both your testimonies and

looked at your backup offerings that you’ve given the committee

and members. You talk a lot about the violence, which of course is

a real concern. Certainly if we arm the military, giving 40 percent

of this initiative to the military, there will be a reduction of violence, but we will not get to the core issues of production and we

will not get to the core issues of consumption. These cartels are

very strategic, so we move the problem out of Mexico and we move

it, maybe, to the Caribbean.

I mean, I don’t understand how we can take a one-faceted approach to a multifaceted problem.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don’t think this is a single-faceted approach. A

significant portion of the monetary investment, because of the expensive aircraft, is dedicated to acquisition of both helicopters and

fixed-wing aircraft. So in terms of the proportion, that is a significant part, but those are expensive things to do. But there is, within

this proposal, demand reduction, programs for the rule of law, programs to support the vetting of the entire Mexican national police

force of approximately 35,000 individuals.

16

So, I think there is—there is a comprehensive approach here, one

that seeks to get at the threat to the Mexican State that comes

from organized crime and the——

Senator MENENDEZ. Can you point out, to the demand reduction

part of this package?

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe it is about $7 million.

Senator MENENDEZ. And what is the intention of the demand

reduction?

Mr. JOHNSON. The intent would be to assist the Mexican Government in its own ongoing programs, providing it with expertise that

we’ve generated here in the United States, in order for them to

help deal with the same type of challenge that we face.

Senator MENENDEZ. So they will have a better demand reduction

than we’ve had here in the United States?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think that we would like to provide them

with some of the expertise that we’ve developed.

Senator MENENDEZ. I hope we get better expertise than that.

Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, How much money, and are you

going to cut any aid to the rest of Latin America as a result of it?

Mr. SHANNON. Right now we’re envisioning a 3-year program for

Mexico of $1.4 billion. We have a $50 million request for Central

America. We will have further discussions with Central America to

determine what else we will be able to fund in Central America,

as we take a deeper look at the security strategy that their heads

of state are about to approve.

This is a supplemental request now. It will not affect fiscal year

2008 levels. We are in discussion on fiscal year 2009. We understand and share your concern about our larger effort to promote investment broadly in our interests in Latin America, and it is not

our intention to have this program reduce our social spending in

Latin America.

Senator MENENDEZ. It is not your intention. That’s a diplomatic

word——

Mr. SHANNON. Well, it’s——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Phrasing, not your intention.

The question is, Can the administration say to this committee, that

the resources it seeks for this initiative, will not come out of

already-cut development assistance to this hemisphere?

Mr. SHANNON. We’re in the process of preparing the 2009 budget

to present to the Congress.

Senator MENENDEZ. So you cannot tell us that at this point?

Mr. SHANNON. So, until that budget is complete, I cannot give

you final figures, but I——

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you intend to continue to ask for the

other parts of this as emergency supplementals as well, or do you

intend to work that within the budget for the next 2 years that you

project?

Mr. SHANNON. Our intention is to work within the budget.

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Certainly, if the figure often utilized now, that 90 percent of the

cocaine trade that enters the United States comes through Mexico,

one point of oversight that we might be able to exercise in the committee, with your help, is to try to devise what metrics that are

17

available for measuring progress of the Merida Initiative. In other

words, can we suggest that during the coming year, we would note

a decrease of the amount of cocaine coming from Mexico or for that

matter, if 90 percent is coming through Mexico now from anywhere

else? And if so, obviously this is of consequence to the American

people.

The cost of cocaine usage and trade in our country is very, very considerable. And therefore, a $500 million investment on this

basis alone might be shown to have good returns. But how would

be able to gauge that? Have you thought about the metrics of

measuring our progress here?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the two easiest to count, but perhaps the,

somewhat misleading ones, would be to count increases in successful extradition requests and in seizures. But I think that only gets

to the part that is most easily divided into numbers. What we’re

aiming for here, is a reduction that is difficult to quantify, and the

threat to the Mexican State that comes from organized crime. And

ultimately, it will be in the form of significantly reduced violence

among those individuals, or among those groups that affects our

own border.

But, I think it’s going to be difficult to quantify that in the same

way that you would count the other issues.

Senator LUGAR. I’m sure it would be, but at the same time, this

is being billed as an eradication of a drug issue, and I don’t deny

the consequences of having greater stability in Mexico, and the initiative the Mexicans have taken, to want to work with us more cooperatively. But I—it just appears to me and may, if you haven’t

worked this out thus far with the Mexicans or ourselves, perhaps

this is an invitation to do so.

I think this is a way of making an impact in terms of public opinion, which is significant. As you say, you might make a judgment

as to whether the Government in Mexico is more stable or not, but

the current government really wants to take constructive action, is

why the President of the country has approached you. So, please

take a look at that if you will.

Let me just ask about the Central Americans. At least we’ve had

some conversation with Central American officials who feel that

this might be effective as a matter of fact, so effective that the traffic would move in their direction. Now, some would say it’s already

coming through many of their countries, but what they’re talking

about literally, is that the organized criminals or those doing vast

amounts of cocaine traffic, would find some new nexus for their activities. And therefore, they would say, take hold of this. Now, you’re spending $500 million on Mexico, albeit in a broad gamut of activities you’ve mentioned, and $50 million for us. But

if, in fact, your $500 million is effective, we may be overrun by your

success there. Have you had conversations with Central Americans

along those lines, and what has been their testimony to you?

Mr. SHANNON. Yes; we have. In fact, we’re involved in quite extensive discussions with Central America. Effectively the Mexico

program and the Central American programs are running along

parallel tracks, but they’re operating at different speeds. One, because with Mexico we’re dealing with a single country, in Central

America we’re dealing with many.

18

And what we’ve been doing with the Central Americans is working through the Central American Integration System, SICA, in

order to construct a broader regional security dialog. This has

taken place. It’s the first time in recent Central American history

that the Central American civilian security agencies have met at

ministerial level, have identified security priorities, met with the

United States in a security dialog—which took place in July, and

I led our delegation to that dialog—established broad priorities for

security strategy for fighting organized crime and drug trafficking,

fighting weapons trafficking, and fighting gangs—and then began

to work with their security ministry to develop a larger Central

American security strategy.

They have done that, it has been approved at a ministerial level,

it will be approved by the Central American Presidents on December 12. Following that approval, we will then begin the technical

discussions with Central Americans, similar to what we had with

the Mexicans. And, we see the initial $50 million in this supplemental request as an important component in building off this regional cooperation, linking law enforcement and intelligence agencies to better understand the flow of organized crime in the region,

and building some communications and interoperability among the

Central American countries.

It’s our hope that as we deepen these discussions, we will understand better where else we can provide assistance.

Senator LUGAR. So in years 2 and 3, based on this December conference and others, you might have a different type of request for

moneys or for assistance for those Central American countries?

Mr. SHANNON. This is our hope. We believe this will be necessary, sir.

Senator LUGAR. Now, can you make a comment—in my opening

statement, I touched upon a common lament of Mexican officials,

as that is, they say drugs may be flowing through our country from

Central America or from wherever, but on the other hand, arms

are flowing from you folks in the United States into Mexico. The

very instability that you decry, may be caused by whatever you are

unable to control. What are we doing with regard to that? It may

or may not be a part of this program, but I think you’ve intimated

it is, because you’re talking about security of the Mexican State?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, if I could respond to that. It is outside the

scope of this request, because it’s, in fact, a domestic expenditure,

but we’re under discussions with Treasury and with Justice’s Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau, about the moneys that might

be necessary to improve their registry program to take better account of Hispanic name conventions, so that we can more easily exchange data with the Mexican authorities and seek to curb the flow

of arms from the United States into Mexico.

Senator LUGAR. Perhaps we can have some metrics on that in

due course, too. It would be reassuring, at least, to Mexicans who

want more cooperation with us.

Mr. SHANNON. Senator, if I may. As Assistant Secretary Johnson

noted, we are very focused on working with the Mexicans on the

issue of weapons trafficking. Part of our national Southwestern

border strategy focuses on weapons trafficking into Mexico.

19

And as noted, we hope to be able to share information with the

Mexicans that will allow us to identify where these weapons are

coming from in the United States, as the Mexicans interdict them.

And since improving interdiction is part of the broader initiative,

we believe that as the Mexicans improve their interdiction capabilities along the northern border, they will be capturing more weapons shipments. We will be able to use serial numbers to identify

where those weapons come from, and this will allow us to do the

necessary prosecutions here.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

It’s interesting that while we’re going to spend maybe $1.5 billion, with part of it being gun trafficking from the United States

to Mexico, we have prohibitions against gun tracing. Ironic, isn’t it.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Lots of irony.

As we bleed red ink here in this country, I want to ask you

again, how much is this emergency request?

Mr. SHANNON. The entire request is $550 million.

Senator BOXER. And how are you paying for it?

Mr. SHANNON. Through the supplemental request.

Senator BOXER. Well, how is that paid for? Just tell the truth to

the American people; what does that mean?

Mr. SHANNON. Well, it’s money appropriated and authorized by

the Congress.

Senator BOXER. Yeah; go on. And how is it paid for? It’s asked

for in emergency supplemental.

Mr. SHANNON. Correct.

Senator BOXER. Is there an offset to pay for it? And are you asking that we cut something else to pay for this?

Mr. SHANNON. No, ma’am.

Senator BOXER. Why not?

Mr. SHANNON. Well——

Senator BOXER. Why not?

Mr. SHANNON. Ma’am, I regret that—that I’m not from the Office

of Management and Budget, so I can’t talk about the broader——

Senator BOXER. OK, well let me say——

Mr. SHANNON [continuing]. Possibility.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. I think everybody has, in my opinion, should feel a responsibility to pay for something they want.

This is going downhill quickly. We are in debt, debt, debt, all on

the backs of our kids. And listen, I want to stop this drug abuse

in our country. I’ve had treatment on demand forever. I voted for

every dollar to send more Border Patrol to stop crime at the border.

The U.S. attorneys in San Diego, at my request, are focusing on

these problems. And I would say, if this was adding to the Border

Patrol, how many more Border Patrol do we put on in this, on our

side of the border, in this proposal?

Mr. SHANNON. Ma’am, this is a foreign assistance proposal, so

the moneys can only be spent as part of the foreign assistance

budget——

Senator BOXER. OK.

20

Mr. SHANNON [continuing]. So they won’t be putting more Border

Patrol.

Senator BOXER. No more Border Patrol. OK. Because Senator

Isakson mentioned that, I wanted to make that clear. Because any

day of the week I’d vote to put more Border Patrol on our side, focusing on the drugs and the crime, because that’s what we really

want to get at, at the border.

You know, I don’t know if you saw this article, ‘‘How Hard is

Mexico Fighting Drugs,’’ in Time Magazine, Friday, November 9.

So it’s pretty new. And I’ll just read from this if I can, Mr. Chairman.

‘‘Every time Mexico wants U.S. helicopters, mountains of methamphetamine suddenly get intercepted on their way to the border.

The problem is, once Mexico wins the prize, a lot of its law enforcement usually repays the favor by joining up again with the country’s drug cartels. That was the case a decade ago, when Washington agreed to begin sharing important antidrug intelligence with

Mexico. And no less than Mexico’s drug czar—the drug czar in

Mexico, Army General Jesus Gutierrez Ribollo—was discovered to

be in the pocket of Mexico’s major drug lord.’’

We’ve seen this movie before. It’s gotten to be almost a ritual.

Now what protections do you have against corruption?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the major one we are seeking through this

program is two-fold. One is to provide assistance to the Mexican

authorities through both training and other assistance, so that they

can investigate, provide polygraph testing to their entire new Federal police service.

In addition to that, DEA and the Immigration Customs Enforcement Office are, or have already created and will create additional,

what they call vetted units, individuals that are organized into

groups, with whom they work, that they have conducted background investigations on, that they have conducted polygraph tests

on, and they can be as sure as one can be that they are individuals

in groups with whom they can work and share information.

Senator BOXER. So this pattern doesn’t disturb you, this past pattern, that’s described in this particular article? Does it disturb you?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that’s at least part of the motivation for,

throughout the world, when we’re working on these types of programs, to take steps, as I described, to avoid compromise.

Senator BOXER. Yeah; because you know what, I like to be Uncle

Sam, I don’t like to be Uncle Sucker. I don’t like to see taxpayers,

in this case, our grandkids have to pay for this program, because

you admit you’re not—you’re not paying for it, that’s not your suggestion. And yet, we’ve seen in the past when we give them assistance what has happened. So, I’m going to hold you to that if this

goes forward.

Now, I talked before about supply and demand. And if no one

here wanted drugs, what a beautiful world it would be, huh? And

so, I wonder whether you know what the administration’s proposed

budget is this year on antidrug spending in America—in America—

to help our people get off drugs and to keep them off drugs. Do you

know? Are you aware of it?

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Mr. JOHNSON. It’s outside the scope of my work, but I understand

that it’s $4.6 billion to a variety of Federal prevention and treatment initiatives.

Senator BOXER. OK, well let’s just say it’s a $166.7 million decline from 2007 spending levels. It cuts prevention spending, while

continuing to increase funding for overseas and interdiction. This

is an outrage. You know, I think we should take care of our youngsters over here and give them some help, then talk to me about giving, you know, $1.4 billion to another country. Cutting—cutting

prevention here, it’s very bizarre. We’ve got to do both, we’ve got

to do both, because it’s supply and demand.

I would just say, Mr. Chairman, California has a lot at stake

here, and I want to see improvement here, but I don’t like to see

good California taxpayers and American taxpayers, whether from

Georgia or Indiana or New Jersey or anywhere else, paying money

and then finding out the people we were dealing with turn around

and play footsy with the drug lords. And I think it’s really important that we know what we’re doing, and that’s why the point

about consultation, is not just an afterthought. A lot of us care a

lot about this.

And I know the President had a press release and said he

wanted to help and we’re all—we want to help Mexico. Mexico’s our

neighbor, Mexico’s our friend, and when Mexico doesn’t do well, it

certainly hurts—hurts my State. It hurts my State a lot. So, I want

to—I want to be helpful here.

My last question in the last couple of seconds has to do with extradited fugitives. In your opening statement, Secretary Johnson,

you state that the Calderon administration has extradited a record

79 fugitives. And this is a positive development.

I was involved in one of those cases, one of those fugitives was

Jorge Arroyo-Garcia, a drug dealer who killed a California Sheriff’s

deputy in 2002. And I’ve been working with the widow to get him

extradited. Now, he finally was handed over in 2007, was a very,

very difficult time for the widow. She was frustrated and angry, he

was allowed to hide in Mexico for years. And after all of our work

together, we—we wound up seeing Garcia sentenced to life without

parole for the brutal murder, which is a very positive thing. And

the reason he was finally arrested and extradited, was because the

Mexican Supreme Court ruled that life sentences without the possibility of parole were constitutional.

Should this initiative be conditioned on the continued cooperation

of Mexican authorities to extradite wanted criminals like Garcia?

Because I can tell you, it would be a nonstarter for me if we didn’t

make that part of this, because we had to fight too, too long to

make sure this murderer went to prison.

So, have you thought about a condition such as that, continued

cooperation on the extradition of wanted criminals like Garcia?

Mr. JOHNSON. As far as I am personally aware, we have not had

a discussion with the Government of Mexico on conditionality with

that respect. We have, though, had the experience of continued improvement in the extradition relationship over the course of the

last several years. That has been quite pleasing, not just in this

case, but across the board.

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Senator BOXER. Well, if it’s quite pleasing, we ought to make it

part of this deal, because I can tell you, it wasn’t quite pleasing to

work with this widow for 3 years and see her pain at the fact that

this guy was running around. So, I would, again, consultation,

that’s an issue I would have raised, and we are going to have it

raised later.

Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank both of you for your service. I appreciate you coming

before us today. Secretary Shannon, you talked about, in your prepared comments, that 60 percent of the money that is going to

Mexico is going to civilian organizations. And I know that there’s

been some discussion about our oversight of you, and I don’t know

if we’ve touched on this or not—I stepped out for one moment—but

how are you all going to conduct oversight of these civilian organizations? And then, on issues of sovereignty or conflict, explain to

us a little bit about how that will work between the countries, our

country, their country, and how those conflicts will be settled.

Mr. SHANNON. Happily, Senator. I’ll also allow my colleague to

talk a bit about how we use letters of agreement and end-use monitoring, in order to track the use of equipment and training.

But first, let me highlight the fact, that in the $550 million that

we’re asking for, there will not be money transfers to either Mexico

or to Central American countries. Everything will be either equipment or training. And this equipment and training will be provided

through letters of agreement that we negotiate with the Mexicans

that do have end-use monitoring requirements, that Ambassador

Johnson can address.

In terms of sovereignty, in Mexico, the Mexican fight against organized crime and drug trafficking will be a Mexican fight. All

operational activities will be undertaken by Mexican authorities.

We will be in a position to provide equipment and training and information through arrangements we have currently from the Drug

Enforcement Agency, U.S. Customs, and other Department of

Homeland Security agencies working in Mexico.

But we are effectively looking for ways to enhance the ability of

Mexican institutions to protect the Mexican State, because this is

really the central challenge that Mexico faces at this point.

The purpose of organized crime, in its engagement with the

state, unlike political insurgencies, is not to conquer the state, it’s

to debilitate it, it’s to weaken it to the point that it cannot undertake its functions of fighting crime, which creates space that allows

organized crime to operate in. One of the things we’re attempting

to do—working with the Mexicans, working with the Calderon administration—is to enhance the capability of Mexican institutions

to fight their own fight.

What is significant about the request that we received from Mexico and the negotiations and the effort to build a partnership with

Mexico at this point, is that Mexico has never asked for this level

of assistance in the past. It has never opened itself to this kind of

dialog with us, it has never proposed this kind of cooperation. And,

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from our point of view, this is indicative of the gravity of the situation, but also the opportunity that presents itself to us.

Mr. JOHNSON. If I could just say a couple more words about the

end-use monitoring issue. We do undertake to provide both the provision of the equipment and the supplies and spares, as well as the

training, with specific provisions for how we will have access to this

equipment, how it will be used, and an ability to have an audit

trail, so that we can examine so that we’ll know that these conditions under which it’s been transferred have been complied with.

With respect to the training, that will be carried out by both U.S.

Government entities, where appropriate elements of the Department of Justice or Homeland Security, as well as, in the cases

where it’s more appropriate and efficient, by the U.S. private sector. Some of that will take place in Mexico, some of it in the United

States. The individuals who are—who take part, the Mexican nationals who take part in that training, their names will be provided

to us ahead of time, we will undertake to determine and ensure

that none of those individuals have been involved in any criminality or any abuse of human rights that has been documented in

the past, and so that we can be as—as sure as one can be that

we’re providing training to people who, that is both appropriate

and will be effective to do so.

Senator CORKER. You know, we have a tendency around here,

we’re probably the worst, those of us sitting up here, at creating

new initiatives all the time, that don’t take into account other

things that are occurring. I’m sure that’s not the case here, but

would you explain how this is working in concert with—with other

activities right now? And then, after speaking to that, talk a little

bit about how it ties into some of the things inside of our country.

I know we have some, in the southeast part of our country for sure

and I’m sure other places also, that’s what I’m familiar with, we

have cartels operating inside our country, and I’d love to hear a little bit about how those are—those efforts are being coordinated

with eradicating that inside our country.

Mr. SHANNON. Senator, in regards to how this links to our other

activities in the region, we are trying to build, with the Merida

Initiative, a larger regional approach to fighting organized crime

and drug trafficking throughout Latin America and into the United

States. We have focused, for quite some time, on source countries,

especially those countries in the Andes, such as Colombia, where

the vast majority of cocaine is produced, recognizing that there are

other source countries for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines.

But we’re also focused now on the transit lanes of drugs as they

move out of the Andes through Central America and Mexico. As

has been noted in some of the statements, we now believe that

about 90 percent of all the cocaine entering the United States

moves through Mexico. This is because of a change in nature of

organized crime and cartels in the region, but also because of success that we’ve had in interdicting the movement of cocaine in the

Caribbean.

So, what we want to do is link our source-zone strategies with

our transit and end-market strategies, so that we have a single regional approach. And as we do this, also begin conversations in the

24

Caribbean and enhance the ability of Caribbean nations to make

sure that drugs don’t slip back into the Caribbean.

The one problem we have in addressing the larger Caribbean

strategy, at this point in time, is Venezuela, because most of the

cocaine that’s moving through the Caribbean at this time, is moving through Venezuela—with Venezuela acting as a trampoline—

either moving to Hispaniola, to either Haiti or the Dominican

Republic, or moving to West Africa, and from there it moves up

into Europe.

At one point we had a fairly robust counterdrug cooperation

strategy with Venezuela that has suffered over the past several

years, under the government of Hugo Chavez. We have negotiated

a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Venezuela, in an effort to improve our drug cooperation, and especially

improve the activity of U.S. agencies in conjunction with Venezuelan agencies. And although we’ve concluded that treaty, the

Government of Venezuela has yet to sign it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Just to add quickly. We have, currently, a set of

programs working with Mexico, principally on the—in the border

area. They are funded at the level of about $25 million. But this

program we’re talking about is a quantum leap beyond that, both

because of the threat that we face, as well as the opportunity that

we think is unique, that’s been provided here.

Senator CORKER. If you would, just—and how that ties to some

of the things that are happening inside of our country, though

there’s full coordination both ways.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. There, I mean, there—we are working

hand in glove, if you will, with this program, coordinating with our

law enforcement authorities, our Federal ones, the FBI and the Immigration and Customs enforcement people in particular. They are

supportive of this program, believe it will help them in their work

along the border.

I can’t tell you how it would impact things, you know, well into

the interior of the country though.

Senator CORKER. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, are either of you comfortable with the level of law

enforcement efforts inside this country, with respect to drugs?

Mr. SHANNON. Sir, do you mean the activity of U.S. law enforcement agencies?

Senator WEBB. Yes. Inside this country, governmental entities

addressing the drug situation inside this country. Are either of you

comfortable with the level or are you satisfied with the effectiveness inside the country?

Mr. SHANNON. Well sir, we can always do more and we have to

do more.

Senator WEBB. We do have to do more.

Mr. SHANNON. But——

Senator WEBB. Are either of you comfortable with the effectiveness of the antigang law enforcement efforts inside this country?

Mr. SHANNON. By comfortable, well obviously we need——

Senator WEBB. Satisfied as an American.

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Mr. SHANNON. No. Satisfied, no. We need to do more. We always

need to do more.

Senator WEBB. This is—this is the difficulty that I’m having with

this proposal. And I salute you for all the efforts that you’re doing,

in terms of coordinating with other countries and that sort of thing.

I mean, when you talk about the threat to the Mexican State, we

have a threat to the American State. And I’d love to have a $1.4

billion, particularly in the area of gangs.

I mean, when we talk about drugs, the difficulty with drugs, it

is global, not, you know, not simply, heavily Mexico, but not simply

in that part of the world. But it’s also local. There was an article

in the Economist a couple of weeks ago that said the No. 1 agricultural crop in California is marijuana. And wherever it starts, and

we talk about demand reduction programs, you know, the difficulty

in the United States is it’s a demand-pull problem. And where the

these different entities are trafficking just depends on, it’s almost

like guerilla warfare. You know, it’s where you push here, they’re

going to be over here.

And the situation with gangs is a very serious problem here.

Northern Virginia is second only to certain areas in California, in

terms of gang activity, violent gang activity. In fact, I would—I

would like to hear your thoughts on the gang activity in the United

States that has its roots in Mexico and Central America. MS13 is

all over northern Virginia. How do we address that situation with

what you’re doing?

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much for raising this Senator.

This is a very important issue and as an American, I have a interest in this, but I also have a special appreciation. Both of my brothers are special agents in the FBI. One was head of the FBI Dallas

Violent Crimes Task Force. He is currently stationed at our Embassy in Baghdad. I have another stationed in California, who will

be also going on temporary duty to Baghdad shortly as part of a

FBI contingent.

So, I’ve been around law enforcement officers for quite some

time. I’ve lived with them. And I understand the tough nature of

their job. I would note that as we attempt to find a successful strategy against organized crime, as we try to find a successful strategy

against gangs and drug cartels, we have to recognize the transnational nature of these criminal phenomenon.

And yes indeed, we can spend more money inside the United

States and maybe we should be doing that, but we can’t, at the

same time, ignore what’s happening outside the United States. And

the degree to which weakened democratic States in Mexico and

Central America will enhance the ability of organized crime to

function and operate inside the United States.

And we’re seeing this especially in regard to gangs. You mentioned the Central American gangs, which really are a scourge in

northern Virginia and in parts of California. And one of the things

we have been attempting to do in our security dialog with Central

America is develop an antigang strategy, which will attempt to address gang violence in Central America, recognizing that there is

communication, movement, and cooperation between gangs operating out of Central America and in several of the municipal areas

in the United States.

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And this is why, in the Central American portion of this package,

we will be fully funding a gang strategy, which is designed, not

only to improve the capacity of law enforcement agencies in Central America to identify and address gang issues, but also, it has

a social or preventative side to it that recognizes that many of the

gang members join gangs because of a fundamental breakdown in

families and society, and attempt to help the countries of Central

America, especially the focal points of gang activity, like El Salvador and Honduras and Guatemala, to begin to build some preventative programs that will address at-risk youth.

Senator WEBB. Well, to a certain extent, these violent gangs are

businesses. To a certain extent, they’re insurgencies, quite frankly.

I mean, you can go into Central America and see MS13 bumper

stickers on cars like we have Redskins up here. You know, it’s not

necessarily a stigma to be a member of one of these gangs down

there, and we have a problem here.

I learned a long time ago, as a Marine rifle platoon and Company

Commander fighting a guerilla war, you can chase them in the

mountains all you want and you will get one or two, but you figure

out where they have to go and that’s where you set up your ambushes, you know. The people who are trafficking this stuff and the

people who are conducting this activity, many of them have to come

here. And this is where we need to have really robust enforcement.

And I’m very concerned as an American that that’s not occurring.

And to give you just another analogy, having spent time as a

journalist in Afghanistan a few years ago, all of the stuff we’ve

been doing in Afghanistan and we hardly ever end up talking about

it up here in the Senate. We can talk about corruption of government, we can talk about alternate agricultural crops, et cetera, but

the truth of it is, I can’t tell you that every village in Afghanistan

had an opium patch. I can tell you every village I was in, in Afghanistan, had an opium patch, and I was in nine different places.

And it’s a demand-pull problem again, you know, they know that

there’s a market and you can’t run around Afghanistan and pull up

every poppy plant. You come back here, where the source of the

problem, and that’s where you put your energy.

And, again, in all due respect to what you’re doing—and I do respect what you’re doing and what your brothers are doing—I think

we need to have the right kind of strategy, in order to kind of work

this from the inside out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Shannon, I want to discuss the border security piece

for a second. A significant part of illegal immigration into the

United States is drug related or drug induced. Is that not correct?

Mr. SHANNON. I believe, sir, that the majority of illegal immigration coming in the United States is economically driven. It’s people

leaving Central America and Mexico in search of jobs in the United

States.

Senator ISAKSON. But aren’t a number of the drugs coming into

this country flowing through illegal entries?

27

Mr. SHANNON. Oh, I’m sorry, I misunderstood the question. Without a doubt, most of the drugs are flowing through illegal entries.

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Johnson, you made a statement which I

caught very quickly, and I’ve been trying to find it in the printed

speech and I can’t, but you said, ‘‘We’ve finally broken through

some longstanding taboos.’’ I am curious what you were referring

to, in terms of longstanding taboos.

Mr. SHANNON. Well sir, our relationship with Mexico has been a

complicated relationship historically. And Mexican nationalism is a

powerful, emotional, psychological, political force in Mexico. And,

the Mexicans have always sought, as they have engaged with us,

to do so in a way that ensures their sovereignty is respected, and

they believe that they are entering, not in a relationship of a donor

and client, but a partnership. And therefore, they’ve jealously

guarded certain aspects of their relationship with us.

The fact that they have approached the United States and underscored a willingness to work with us in a fashion that they’ve never

done before, is striking. And, this reflects, not only the political will

of President Calderon, but it also reflects an understanding by the

President and his political advisors that Mexican citizens recognize

the danger that Mexico faces right now. And that Mexican citizens

themselves, are prepared for a deeper, different kind of relationship

with the United States. And that’s the taboo that’s being broken

down.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, that’s what I hope you meant, because I

went to the border in January, both San Luis and Yuma section,

as well San Diego. And we were finding, for the first time, increased cooperation by the Mexican Government, in terms of their

law enforcement on their side of the border, vis-a-vis, the illegal

immigration issue.

I’m really not going to put you in the position of responding to this statement, but I find it interesting that $31.3 million of this

proposal is money going to the Mexican Immigration Agency’s National Migration Institute, and a good portion of this on the interdiction and border security is for the type of equipment you need

in securing the Southwestern border. I find it further interesting

that $1.4 billion is almost half of the $3 billion we had put in the

Defense bill, which got taken out recently for border security.

And the point I want to make is this, I sense for the first time

in Calderon—President Calderon—a sense different from what was

true under Vicente Fox. I think there is a new paradigm. I think

some old taboos are going away. And I know in one of the questions

you referred to not leveraging or conditioning U.S. participation in

this to anything from Mexico, but this is the type of thing when

we should begin striking agreements with the Mexican Government in the bigger picture of border security.

We think it’s a $3 to $4 billion capital investment to do what we

need to do to get the border secure. If we do that, it makes your

job, and what you’re trying to do here a whole lot easier, because

ultimately, inability to transit across the border, easily, is the best

thing we can do to stop the flow of drugs, at least on the land border, then you have to deal with other areas.

So, Mr. Chairman, my only comment on this, is that when we

talk about $550 million, which is a third of the $1.4 billion, which

28

is 50 percent of the $3 billion that is what we think we need, albeit

it was taken out of the Defense authorization bill.

I hope as you bring programs like this forward, that are United

States-Mexican programs—whether it’s immigration or whether it’s

illegal drugs—it would be a part of a bigger plan to ultimately do

what we’ve got to do, and that is secure the border between the

United States and Mexico, because that, in the end, is the solution

to a lot of the microproblems we’re attempting to address.

And like I said, that was a speech, that wasn’t a question, you

don’t have to answer it, but I had to get that in, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Senator MENENDEZ. And you did it successfully. [Laughter.]

We’ll go through a second round of questions and the Chair will

recognize himself.

Secretary Johnson, what did we spend on Plan Colombia, about

$5 million so far? Secretary Shannon, is that about right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Roughly.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, $5 billion later in Plan Colombia, we

are largely at the level of production of cocaine that we were at before we started Plan Colombia. If we talk about the reduction of violence, yes, we have helped Colombia succeed in that respect.

But, as an effort on the narcotics front, I don’t know that we can

consider it a success, $5 billion later. And it seems to me that if

the administration wants to present this initiative in that context,

it hasn’t learned much from Plan Colombia.

It seems to me, if you want to talk about this initiative as largely

being to create greater security and help reduce violence in Mexico

and along the United States-Mexican border, that’s one thing. But

to suggest that it is going to help us significantly in the narcotics

flow is another, because we had that experience. At $5 billion later

with Plan Colombia, we’ve got largely the production that we had

before, and we still have—as your own testimony has talked

about—the flows from Colombia, through maybe, Central America,

through Mexico, to the United States. So it seems we didn’t achieve

anything there.

My point is, you’d think we’d learn from 5 billion dollars’ worth

of experiences, that you need to have a multifaceted approach to

achieve this problem.

Which goes back to the statement that you put all in your justification documents to the Congress. I want to quote Kofi Annan’s

statement where he says, ‘‘We will not enjoy development without

security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we

will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.’’ And it’s

human rights that I now want to talk about.

In 2003, the U.N. Committee Against Torture found that the

‘‘Mexican police commonly use torture and resort to it systematically as another method of criminal investigation, readily available,

whenever required, in order to advance the process.’’

In November 2005, the Mexican National Commission on Human

Rights reported that torture remained widespread in Mexico. According to human rights organizations, judges often ignore reports

of the use of torture to extract information or confessions from

criminal suspects, lending way to statements potentially made

under duress.

29

The role of the Mexican military has been expanded to include

law enforcement operations, and active military personnel are

working side by side with police in Oaxaca, where there have been

social movements met with reported excessive use of force, by

State, municipal, and Federal police.

And then, the State Department put out in its Human Rights

Report for 2006, which was issued in March of this year, saying,

‘‘A deeply entrenched culture of impunity and corruption persisted

in Mexico, particularly at the State and local level. Among the

human rights problems reported were, unlawful killings by security

forces, kidnappings—including by police—torture, arbitrary arrests

and detention, corruption, inefficiency, and a lack of transparency

in the judicial system.’’

This is the framework of which we’re going to give 40 percent of

resources to the Mexican military. My concern is—what is being

done in this process to make it very clear to prevent that all of

these resources that the use—the widespread use of torture in the

public security and criminal justice systems under the very entities

that are going to be the end receivers of the President’s proposal—

are going to the people who have this history or, the institutions

that have this history? How are we going to guarantee that the

very money that we’re trying to provide for the purposes of security, I’ll call it security, I won’t call it the rest, because I don’t think

it does very much about the rest—don’t go to the very entities that

are going to continue to commit a history that has been documented, both internationally and by the State Department? Are we

going to only allow these moneys to go through vetted battalions,

or vetted police forces? What’s your control here to guarantee that

our money isn’t being used to perpetuate human rights violations?

Mr. JOHNSON. That’s exactly our intention—to take these

money—take the training programs, to take the provision of equipment, and to provide it only to individuals and groups that we can

assure ourselves have not been engaged in these activities.

One of the key things you said in quoting, I believe, the State

Department report, that we’re not going to get at, and that is the

State and local. This is focused, at this point, exclusively on Federal forces. And I would, I think at least in that report, the indication was that this type of activity takes place, if I’m remembering

correctly, from what you said, mostly at the State and local level.

So that——

Senator MENENDEZ. It’s not only at the State and local level.

Mr. JOHNSON. No; I did not mean to say that.

Senator MENENDEZ. I just wanted to——

Mr. JOHNSON. I think, in terms of the training, the provision of

training and the provision of equipment that is included in this

request——

Senator MENENDEZ. How are you going to vet those entities?

Mr. JOHNSON. We’re going to use the materials that we have in

the United States, as well as our Embassy in Mexico, national

name checks, the databases that we have access to, to determine

whether any of the individuals concerned or if it’s a—concerns a

unit, any of the units that we might be providing equipment for,

have been engaged in any activities that you described.

30

Senator MENENDEZ. Do we have such a database that would tell

us who our human rights violators in the military and the national

police in Mexico?

Mr. JOHNSON. We use those databases worldwide when we’re—

in order to comply with the law, as to what’s required in terms of

providing equipment or providing training, providing any assistance.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, Mexico understands that we’re only

going to let them have the helicopters and the resources only to

vetted entities, is that what you’re telling me?

Mr. JOHNSON. To vetted individuals, or vetted entities. Training,

to individuals. It’s in the law. We——

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’d like to pursue that a little bit more.

Mr. JOHNSON. OK.

Senator MENENDEZ. The reality is, I’d like to see how we are

going to vet these entities. Because, I certainly have heard from

more than my share of entities within Mexico who are concerned

about how these resources get used by those entities within Mexico,

those law enforcement and military entities in Mexico, some which

have the history that I recited earlier.

And, we cannot as a country, at the same time that we want to

help, be in the midst of giving resources to those parts of the Mexican Army and/or the Mexican national police that might very well

be engaged in human rights violations.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I’m curious about your general overview of relations with Mexico.

The third paragraph in your opening statement, Secretary Shannon, indicates, ‘‘President Bush recognized the United States has

an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the economic and human

toll in our cities and towns, emanating from cross-border crime,’’

and then you follow through in the second page of your testimony,

that ‘‘President Calderon has acted decisively, using the most effective tools at his disposal, reorganizing the Federal police, and putting new and additional resources in the hands of security services,

deploying military units to support operations, arresting crime figures, extraditing record number,’’ as evidence that there is something different here.

And I gather, one of the reasons why you’re approaching with

some urgency, as an emergency situation is to pay tribute to the

fact that there is this kind of initiative, and an invitation for us,

the United States, to participate with the President and his officials in Mexico. But, I don’t want to overstate the rationale, I really

want you to state it.

In other words, leaving aside the particulars of the initiative,

what is the shape of the relationship now? Why is it new, or unprecedented or different than any we’ve had before, and offers you

such encouragement through this, that you’re coming forward at

this point for this emergency appropriation?

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Senator.

I think in some ways the question goes to the very heart of why

we have presented this as a supplemental, and the opportunity

that we think is before us at this point in time.

31

Obviously, Mexico is a longstanding neighbor and a country with

which we have a long and complicated relationship. But we saw,

following the election of Vicente Fox, a desire and a willingness to

reestablish, or transform in some fashion, the nature of the bilateral relationship, and focus on those specific issues that link the

United States and Mexico, as opposed to those that separate it.

With the election of Felipe Calderon, we found that that same

kind of commitment to transformation of relationship, but also a

recognition that there was one key issue—which was the fight

against organized crime and drug cartels—that threatened Mexico,

that opened an opportunity for cooperation with the United States,

in the interests of both countries.

And it was the commitment from President Calderon and concomitant commitment from President Bush to recognize our responsibility in addressing this shared threat that really opens this

unique and important space.

Because, as I noted earlier to Senator Isakson, President

Calderon is taking a political risk. He’s taking a political risk by

reaching out to the United States in this fashion. The fact that he

is doing it, I think, underscores the seriousness of the problem, but

it also highlights what we might be able to accomplish through successful cooperation and partnership. Because it is evident from

polling data and elsewhere, that the Mexican people themselves

are ready for a different kind of relationship with the United

States, one built on partnership.

And if we can accomplish that, not only will we achieve important national security goals in the United States and in Mexico, but

we will be transforming the nature of the diplomatic and political

relationship that will allow, I think, the United States and Mexico

to cooperate more fully in other areas of interest to us.

Senator LUGAR. I think that’s very important, and that’s why I

appreciate your underlining that.

At the beginning of President Bush’s administration, there was

hope that there would be—through his own understanding as Governor of Texas—a new chapter in the relationship, and I think that

was moving ahead.

Many have testified before this committee that the events of

9/11, the preoccupation of the United States, understandably, with

a different set of circumstances led to disappointment by President

Vicente Fox.

I would just say, personally in that period of time, which there

was an emphasis with Mexico, I made a personal appeal to President Fox, to send a consult from Mexico to Indianapolis, to relieve

the difficulties in Chicago that were servicing all of the Mexican

citizens in the Midwest, and this consult performed extraordinary

service to our State and likewise to all the citizens that he was

serving, both Americans and Mexican.

And, so I’ve seen, and am enthused about the prospects, when

the green light is there.

But, at the same time, it would appear that with the new Presidency, as you would say, he’s prepared to take some political risk.

He’s taken some action so it’s a track record. The appeal, therefore,

to us. And that seems to me to be an important underline.

32

I think without mitigating the importance of each of the personal

or technical circumstances we’ve talked about today with the program, it’s the overall relationship that really has to be in focus

here, at a time that we’ve had very, very difficult debates on immigration issues and other ways in which we have discussed Mexico

and the relationship and the border.

So, I just take this opportunity for this second round of questioning to emphasize that part, the importance of the relationship,

and I appreciate your testimony.

Mr. SHANNON. Well, Senator, thank you very much. As we work

with the Congress on this proposal, I would emphasize that we are

open to an honest, comprehensive debate about all aspects of this

proposal. But I would underscore that history lies before us. This

is an opportunity that has not been presented before, we should not

let it go.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

I just have one or two other questions. I certainly agree with

Senator Lugar, that the relationship is of incredible importance.

And any opportunity, in a change in that relationship for the better, should be pursued.

But by the same token, the creation of an opportunity for a relationship does not create an emergency for the asking of half a billion dollars. That’s a different dynamic, that’s a question as to

whether or not we have an emergency, which does not get paid for,

which goes on to the national debt. And that certainly, in my view,

should be judged independently.

Let me ask you this, you said in response—I forget which one of

you answered that—there is not a money transfer here to the Mexican Government. There is only equipment, training, and information. The information, I assume, is that intelligence?

Mr. JOHNSON. The information is basically intellectual property,

the training itself, training individuals, training trainers. The exchange of information, in terms of what we commonly call intelligence, is going on already.

Senator MENENDEZ. So we are sharing intelligence already?

Mr. JOHNSON. We’re sharing information, with respect to joint

operations with units that are already vetted, working with the

DEA, for example.

Senator MENENDEZ. But are we sharing other forms of intelligence with the Mexican Government, intelligence that is sensitive

for these purposes already, are we doing that?

Mr. JOHNSON. In terms of law enforcement, absolutely. I’m not

sure what you’re——

Senator MENENDEZ. And are we satisfied that the sharing of our

intelligence isn’t misused by entities—Senator Boxer referred to

some of the entities that have actually then joined with the cartels—against the Mexican Government itself, and obviously would

be against our own interests.

Mr. JOHNSON. How——

Senator MENENDEZ. My point is, you said we’re going to share

information. Information about systems and procedures, that’s one

thing, intelligence is another. And how we share that intelligence

33

and making sure that we are sharing it in such a way that we are

convinced that the intelligence we are sharing is being used with

vetted entities, in which that intelligence will not be used against

our vital interests, is very important. Can you guarantee the committee that that’s being done now and that’s what’s going to be

done here?

Mr. JOHNSON. That’s exactly what’s being done now. That takes

place within the law enforcement framework, as opposed to this

training and assistance framework. We will be providing the training for individuals and groups and equipment for them, so that this

exchange of information can be more effective and that they will

have the capability, when we are working on joint operations, to actually carry them out. But we’ve already—in terms of the Drug Enforcement Administration, already undertakes to background

checks, polygraph examinations for the individual groups with

which they work on these operations.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well let me ask you this, some 40 percent

of the proposal for Mexico is focused on 10 aircraft, 8 helicopters,

and 2 maritime surveillance planes. What is the strategy that is

being committed to purchase the 10 aircraft, and how are these

going to contribute substantially to breaking the backs of the

cartels?

Mr. JOHNSON. The aircraft in question have been looked at, in

terms of their interoperability, both with us and with what the

Mexicans already have. So the type of helicopters are being purchased, ones that they already—similar to ones they already have

in their inventory.

In terms of the fixed-wing aircrafts, they are the same kind and

equipped similarly to the one that our U.S. Coast Guard uses, so

that we can work together—they’re for the Mexican Navy—so that

we can work together, where our joint surveillance works in the

Gulf of Mexico, as well as in the Pacific. I mean, that’s our intention, is to provide them with the platforms, so that they can work

cooperatively with us on what we believe to be a joint threat.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate the interoperable aspects and

that they are similar to our own. The question is, if you’re going

to dedicate 40 percent of the money to Mexico based on this, this

is 40 percent of your proposed solution. The question is, What is

the strategy being deployed by the use of this equipment, that is

going to be part of, being 40 percent of the solution? How is this

going to make a difference in breaking the backs of the cartels?

Mr. JOHNSON. It’s going to provide both the collection platform,

as well as the mobility, so that when operations are undertaken for

interdiction and to deter the operations of these cartels, you can actually move people to where they need to be.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, in that regard, let me ask you, What

role did the United States, Mexican, and Central American law enforcement entities play in the development of this aid package?

Mr. SHANNON. Within the United States, our interagency community on the United States side, which meant all Federal United

States agencies—DEA, FBI, Customs, and DHS, with its corresponding agencies—engaged with all the Mexican public security

ministries, including the counterparts of the different United

34

States institutions, such as DEA and Customs, and had a series of

technical meetings in the United States and in Mexico.

And then we also had what we called validation teams that traveled from the United States, again, with representatives from all

the relevant agencies and law enforcement entities, to meet with

their counterparts in Mexico to discuss the different items that we

were looking at to determine how they linked to a broader strategy

and how they could be used effectively.

In Central America, our engagement was two-fold. It was

through civilian, public sector, public security ministries, in terms

of building our larger SICA–U.S. security dialog, but also, each of

our Embassies, working through our narcotics assistance section,

engaged with the law enforcement entities that they normally work

with.

Senator MENENDEZ. Did we engage our military with the Mexican military?

Mr. SHANNON. Yes; we did. Although the money that’s being requested now is INCLE money, in other words, it’ll be money managed through the Department of State, our Defense Department

participated in validation teams, looking at the different aircraft

requirement, especially the helicopters and the aircraft.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me thank you both for your testimony today.

Let me close by saying, I think many of us I should say—want

to take full advantage of any opportunity to enter into a more comprehensive relationship with Mexico. It is an incredibly important

partner of the United States, we share a common border, and we

share a common interest. So, those of us, however, that have criticisms of the package as devised, should not be viewed as not wanting to engage in that relationship and not wanting to be helpful to

the Mexican Government, and certainly to the Central American

Governments to achieve the goal.

However, the question is how do we best achieve that. And some

of us believe that the package as devised, does not meet our collective goals. Some of us are concerned about ensuring that human

rights provisions are safeguarded in this process. Some of us are

concerned if development issues are considered, because we learned

if you tell a poor coca farmer in Colombia that you’re just going to

eradicate his field, then he goes to another field to go plant coca.

He’s going to do whatever he has to do to sustain his family. If you

give him a sustainable development alternative, then maybe he

will move away from that.

And the reality is, $5 billion later, and Plan Colombia is only in

the late stages of that and, we have some understanding that development assistance might be part of the solution.

We have our friends who are concerned about immigration, as we

all are in this country, and undocumented immigration. You know,

people flee for basically two reasons: Dire economic necessity or

civil unrest. And so the reality is we are doing nothing about dire

economic necessity, so we still have people come to the north.

And then we have a demand in this country for illicit drugs. We

don’t do what we need to do in order to reduce the demand, and

therefore, we continue to draw the flow of narcotics to this country.

35

1See Amnesty International, ‘‘Laws Without Justice’’ (Feb. 7, 2007); Human Rights Watch,

‘‘Lost in Transition’’ (2006). 2See El Paso Times, ‘‘Judge Halts Deportation of Juarez Drug Informant,’’ October 26, 2007.

3See Lance Compa, ‘‘Justice for All: The Struggle for Worker Rights in Mexico,’’ AFL–CIO Solidarity Center 2004; Public Communication to the U.S. National Administrative Office under the

North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) Concerning the Introduction of

Reforms to the Federal Labor Code of Mexico, 17 February 2005.

So, it just seems to me that having spent billions of dollars in

similar initiatives, we have yet to learn some of those lessons. I

hope the administration will be thinking about some of those lessons as we move forward in however shape this initiative might

take place.

I appreciate both of you coming and your answers to questions.

The record will remain open for 2 days so that committee members

may submit additional questions to our witnesses. And we ask our

witnesses to respond expeditiously to those questions.

If no one has any additional comments, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEO W. GERARD, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, UNITED

STEELWORKERS

CONGRESS SHOULD NOT PROVIDE FUNDING FOR PLAN MEXICO UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT

ENDS ITS POLITICAL PERSECUTION OF THE NATIONAL MINERS’ AND METALWORKERS’

UNION

Introduction

The United Steel Workers (‘‘USW’’) is deeply concerned that an emergency funding package the administration recently requested for the Government of Mexico

(‘‘GOM’’) may be used to undermine labor rights, civil rights, and human rights in

that country and further may be used to target political opposition arising from

labor and other social movements in Mexico. Like Plan Colombia, a Plan Mexico

could result in gross violations of human rights, which would have the effect of undermining the rule of law in Mexico and creating a climate of terror and fear instead of cultivating individual freedom and justice for all Mexicans. As leading

human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights

Watch have documented, Mexican security forces operate in an environment of impunity which has given them a free rein to commit serious human rights violations.1

Indeed, on October 11 a U.S. immigration judge stopped the deportation proceedings

of a former drug informant based on the grounds that under the U.N. Convention

Against Torture the informant would be at risk of torture by the Mexican Government if deported to Mexico.2

Mexico has systematically repressed independent, democratic labor unions who

have attempted to challenge the government-dominated system of labor relations—

a system established under 70 years of one-party rule and which continues to this

day.3 In particular, the USW is very concerned about the political persecution of the

National Miners’ and Metalworkers’ Union (‘‘Los Mineros’’) and its democratically

elected leader, Napoleon Go ́mez Urrutia (‘‘Go ́mez’’). This persecution has lead to

continued labor strife, the wrongful killing of three union members and the willful

disregard of mine safety, which caused a horrific mine explosion at the Pasta de

Conchos mine in 2006 leaving 65 miners dead. Continuing impunity has also meant

a complete failure to hold accountable the parties responsible for the deaths of those

65 mineworkers.

Go ́mez was illegally removed from office and threatened with arrest on trumped

up charges because he was fighting hard for better wages and working conditions,

forming alliances with other international unions to increase the bargaining power

of Los Mineros, and opposing labor law reforms promoted by the government that

would have weakened workers’ rights. While the Mexican Federal courts have reinstated Go ́mez to his union position and acquitted him of baseless criminal charges,

36

4See ‘‘Impugna PGR amparo a Go ́mez Urrutia’’ (translation: PGR challenges Go ́mez Urrutia

on appeal), Reforma, Nov. 6, 2007. 5The formal abbreviation for the National Union of Mine and Metal Workers is SNTMMSRM.

6 ‘‘Exigen a AHMSA sindicalizar a subcontratados’’ (translation: Demand that AHMSA

unionize subcontractors), El Siglo de Torreon, June 29, 2004.

the GOM has appealed that acquittal,4 and at the same time is working to undermine Los Mineros. Thus, it is imperative that the GOM understand that its blatant

abuse of power against legitimate unions and their leaders will not be condoned.

Background of Plan Mexico

On October 22, 2007, the administration sent Congress a supplemental war

spending proposal exceeding $1.96 billon. That emergency spending request includes

$500 million for the Mexican Government to combat transnational crime and illicit

drugs. The $500 million is a downpayment on a multiyear, $1.4 billion aid package

to Mexico and is the culmination of a deal struck behind closed doors between Presidents Bush and Calderon without consultation with or advice from the members of

the U.S. or Mexican Congress. The administration has released few details about

Plan Mexico, preferring to simply ram it through Congress by wrapping it into other

war spending.

According to news stories, the bulk of the first tranche of funding would be for

several transport helicopters and two surveillance planes, with lesser amounts to

purchase inspection equipment and upgrade technology for the Mexican attorney

general’s office. Yet, how the funds would be spent is a matter of conjecture, as the

moneys provided under Plan Mexico come with no human rights or other conditions

attached.

The Political Persecution of Napoleon Go ́mez Urrutia and Los Mineros

The plight of Napoleon Go ́mez is a wakeup call to all in Congress who are concerned with labor and civil rights in Mexico and with that government’s establishing

and adhering to a rule of law and not men. Independent labor unions have been

a particular target of government repression. Before any funding is approved, Congress should understand the story of Mr. Go ́mez and should call upon the GOM to

end its persecution of this union leader by dropping its appeal of his acquittal on

criminal charges—charges that were blatantly false—so that he may return to Mexico and resume his rightful position as the democratically elected leader of Los

Mineros union. The GOM also should cease in its efforts to undermine Los Mineros

by supporting pro-company unions, and should act immediately to enforce and to

strengthen health and safety protections in the mining industry.

As described in detail below, the GOM and Grupo Mexico, a privately owned

Mexican multinational that is the third largest privately held copper mining company in the world, engaged in a broad-scale attack aimed at eviscerating the union

and eliminating Go ́mez as the head of Los Mineros by:

• Improperly withdrawing legal recognition of Go ́mez as a union official;

• Using excessive force during a strike that wrongfully killed union members;

• Installing a pro-company union once Go ́mez was illegally ousted;

• Ignoring life-threatening mine safety problems that lead to the mine explosion

at Pasta de Conchos mine and 65 dead miners;

• Filing baseless charges in Federal and State courts against Go ́mez.

Los Mineros Under the Leadership of Napoleon Go ́mez: A New Direction

Los Mineros 5 was founded in 1934 and represents Mexican workers in the mine

and metal industries under some 80 collective bargaining agreements with Mexican

employers. Los Mineros was led for 40 years by Napoleon Go ́mez Sada and during

that time maintained a close relationship with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In 2002, Napoleon Go ́mez Urrutia, the son of Go ́mez Sada, became the new General Secretary of Los Mineros.

Go ́mez, an Oxford-trained economist, had a different approach; he instituted a

democratic union structure and started to fight for improved wages, benefits, and

working conditions. Go ́mez demanded that jobs that had been contracted out by the

mining companies be ‘‘contracted in,’’ thereby adding thousands of new members for

Los Mineros.6 Go ́mez fought for increased wages arguing that Mexican and multinational companies were reaping immense profits from the global boom in basic

metals fueled by demand from China, yet wage increases were stuck at levels negotiated from an earlier time when the Mexican Government owned the mines. With

Mr. Go ́mez in power, in 2005 steelworkers at the Sicartsa mill, Mexico’s largest

37

7 ‘‘Huelga en Sicartsa, por ‘anomalı ́as’ de Villacero’’ (translation: Strike in SICARTSA over

‘‘anomalies’’ of Villacero), La Jornada Michoaca ́n, 1 August 2005; Termina huelga en la

sideru ́ rgica Sicartsa que duo ́ mes y medio’’ (translation: Strike at SICARTSA that lasted a

month and a half ends), EFE, September 19, 2005; ‘‘Sindicato minero gano ́ en conflictos’’ (translation: Miners’ union wins in conflicts), Excelsior, February 23, 2007. See ‘‘CEREAL, a cien an ̃ os de cananea: el protagonismo minero bajo el acoso del estado Mexicano’’ (translation: A hundred

years after Cananea, the mineworkers’ actions under attack by the Mexican state), December

2006. 8Go ́mez’s actions brought him into conflict with the PRI-dominated national union body, the

Labor Congress, which favored a more conciliatory approach. Go ́mez upset the party leadership

by opposing proposed labor law reforms which, he argued, would impose labor flexibility measures on workers with little in return. On February 15, 2006, a group of dissident unions, including Los Mineros, split off from the Labor Congress. See ‘‘Fractura en el CT; entre golpes

elı ́gieron a dos lı ́deres’’ (translation: Rupture in the CT; two leaders elected amid blows), La

Jornada, February 16, 2006. 9See ‘‘Normalidad en Grupo Me ́xico tras huelga en apoyo a otros mineros’’ (translation: Situation normal at Grupo Mexico after strike in support of other mineworkers) EFE, August 16,

2005. 10Grupo Mexico, which is owned by the Larrea family, is the third largest copper producer

in the world with major holdings in Peru, including the Southern Peru Copper Company, as well

as the largest copper mine in Mexico, the Cananea mine. All told, Grupo Mexico owns 11 mines

in Mexico, many acquired through government privatization. It also owns Asarco, a mining company with properties in Arizona and Texas. 11See International Metalworkers’ Federation (‘‘IMF’’): Report of IMF Fact Finding Mission

to Mexico at (2006); see also IMF complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association,

Case No. 2478. 12See ‘‘Guerra minera’’ (translation: Mine war), El Norte, July 6, 2007. 13The oversight committee is termed the Vigilance and Justice Commission of Los Mineros. 14See ‘‘Go ́mez Urrutia acusa a Minera Me ́xico de ‘homicidio industrial’ y mentir a deudos’’

(translation: Go ́mez Urrutia accuses Grupo Mexico of ‘‘industrial homicide’’ and lying to the survivors), La Jornada, February 28, 2006; see also ‘‘La STPS desconoce a Go ́mez Urrutia como

dirigente nacional de mineros’’ (translation: The STPS derecognizes Go ́mez Urrutia as national

leader of the mineworkers), La Jornada, March 1, 2006. 15See ‘‘Mexican Court Reinstates Union Leader,’’ Associated Press, April 11, 2007; ‘‘Court Orders Restoration of Go ́mez U.,’’ El Universal, April 12, 2007.

steel producer, went on strike and finally gained a 42-percent increase in wages and

benefits that reflected the market boom in basic metals.7

In addition, Go ́mez recognized the need to forge international alliances with mining unions in other countries to counter an industry increasingly dominated by large

multinational companies. Los Mineros became active in the International Metalworkers Federation and entered into a strategic alliance with the United Steel

Workers.8 When the USW struck Asarco in July 2005, Los Mineros held a 1-day nationwide solidarity strike.9

Finally, Go ́mez was able to help bring closure to a protracted 15-year court battle

between Los Mineros and the company, Grupo Mexico, over moneys owed to the

union by the company.10 When the Cananea and Nacozari mines were privatized

in 1990, as part of the privatization agreement Grupo Mexico was required to pay

5 percent of the purchase price into a trust fund to be administered by Los Mineros

in accordance with the union’s bylaws.11 The company simply refused. Los Mineros

sued, but it was not until Go ́mez took over and carried out a strike in 2004, that

the company, after a court order, agreed to pay the funds into the union trust.12

What ensued was a campaign by the GOM and Grupo Mexico to eviscerate the

union’s hard-fought gains and to strip all power from Go ́mez in his leadership position. The result has been continued labor strife, the wrongful killings of union members, and the willful ignoring of mine safety, which lead to a terrible explosion in

2006 that left 65 miners dead at Grupo Mexico’s Pasta de Conchos mine.

GOM’s Illegal Ouster of Go ́mez as Head of Los Mineros

The GOM illegally ousted Go ́mez and the entire executive committee on February

17, 2006. At that time the GOM also froze all union assets, as well as the personal

assets of Go ́mez. The alleged basis for the removal was a letter from members of

the union’s oversight committee 13 to the Labor Secretariat alleging embezzlement

of the trust fund moneys. The GOM’s action was not made public until February

28, after Go ́mez had denounced the Government for ‘‘industrial homicide’’ in the

deaths of 65 mineworkers at Pasta de Conchos.14

Go ́mez was not restored to office until April, 2007, when a Mexican Federal court

ruled that the signatures on the letter used to remove him were forged and ordered

the Secretary of Labor to officially recognize Go ́mez as the General Secretary of Los

Mineros.15

The GOM’s action was a blatant violation of Mexican and international labor law.

First, under Mexican labor law, the election and removal of union officers is govVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:53 Mar 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 ANTIDRUG sforel1 PsN: sforel1
38

16The Vigilance and Justice Commission had no legal authority to elect a new slate of officers—this may be done only by the union convention. See Submission of the United Steelworkers to the National Administrative Office under the North American Agreement on Labor

Cooperation, November 9, 2006. 17The GOM is a signatory to ILO Convention No. 87. The International Metalworkers Federation filed a complaint with the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association in October 2006 (ILO

Case No. 2487), claiming violations of the Convention by the GOM in its dealings with Go ́mez

and Los Mineros. 18See ‘‘PGR Confirms That Elias Morales Falsified a Signature to Replace Go ́mez-Urrutia,’’

La Jornada, April 10, 2007. 19See ‘‘Mexican Court Reinstates Union Leader,’’ Associated Press, April 11, 2007; ‘‘Court Orders Restoration of Go ́mez U.,’’ El Universal, April 12, 2007. 20See ‘‘Evidence of Forgery Pilfered From PGR,’’ El Universal, April 14, 2007. 21See ‘‘La negociacio ́n de contratos, con Elı ́as’’ (translation: The negotiation of contracts, with

Elias, Milenio, January 19, 2007; ‘‘Continu ́ an disputas en el sindicato minero’’ (translation: Disputes in mineworkers’ union continue), El Economista, 1 February 2007. 22See ‘‘Estalla violencia en al 14,’’ (translation: Violence flares in Section 14), Zo ́calo, January

13, 2007; ‘‘Despiden a 7 mineros; denuncian represio ́n de Minera Me ́xico,’’ (translation: Seven

miners fired; they denounce repression in Grupo Mexico), Zo ́calo, 14 January 2007. 23See ‘‘Steel Workers in Mexico Clash With Police,’’ upsidedown.org, April 26, 2006. 24The National Human Rights Commission found that excessive force resulted in two workers

killed, 21 wounded by gunfire, and 33 others injured. On the other hand, the police sustained

only minor injuries. See National Human Rights Commission: Recommendation 037/2006, Oct.

11, 2006. 25 National Human Rights Commission: Recommendation 037/2006, Oct. 11, 2006.

erned by union constitutions. The constitution of Los Mineros states that officers

can be removed for malfeasance only by the union’s national convention and only

following an investigation and trial conducted by the union’s Vigilance and Justice

Commission. That did not occur here.16

Second, the GOM has a longstanding practice requiring government authorization

for union officials to enter into contracts. The infamous ‘‘toma de nota’’ (the name

given to the authorization) obviously interferes with union governance and thus is

subject to political manipulation. Such a requirement violates the International

Labor Organization Convention No. 87, which mandates that public authorities refrain from any interference that would impede the right of unions to elect their representatives and to organize and conduct their activities and programs.17

Third, the underlying allegation which formed the basis for his ouster from the

union by the Labor Secretariat—embezzlement of the union trust fund—was a blatant fabrication.18 On April 11, 2007, a Mexican Federal court found signatures on

the letter at issue were forged. A unanimous three-judge panel ordered the Secretary of Labor, Javier Lozano Alarcon, to officially recognize Go ́mez as the General

Secretary of Los Mineros. The court specifically found that the Labor Secretariat

had overstepped its authority and failed to comply with established procedures.19

Indeed, in a bizarre twist that indicates an attempt to tamper with the evidence,

the key documents used to allege the forgery actually were stolen from the Federal

prosecutor’s office.20 While copies were made which were then shown to be forgeries,

the theft of the original forged documents essentially means that no one could be

prosecuted for the forgery.

New Pro-Company Union Results in Labor Strife and Union Members Killed in

Strike

When the GOM illegally ousted Go ́mez and the executive committee, it replaced

them with a new slate headed by Elias Morales, a former union member. Morales

proceeded to renegotiate a number of union contracts on terms more favorable to

the companies.21 Morales also purged union members who supported Go ́mez.22

The union fought back against the government’s interference. In response to the

attacks on Go ́mez and the union leadership, the union called a nationwide strike.

In the town of La ́zaro Cardenas workers struck the largest steel mill in Mexico,

Sicartsa. As thousands gathered in the streets in support, Federal and State police

surrounded the strikers and on April 20, 2006, shot and killed two union members—

Jose Lu ́is Castillo Zu ́n ̃iga and He ́ctor Alvarez Go ́mez—and many were injured.23

The GOM’s National Human Rights Commission investigated the killings and

found that (1) the police operation was not approved by the courts in direct violation

of the Mexican Constitution, (2) the police engaged in excessive force,24 and there

was a lack of diligence and professionalism in investigating the excessive force

used.25 No one has ever been charged.

Grupo Mexico’s Continued Efforts to Break Los Mineros

With Go ́mez on the defensive, Grupo Mexico used its control over his governmentappointed replacement, Elias Morales, to slash payrolls, wages, and benefits. At the

39

26See ‘‘Termina Grupo Me ́xico relacio ́n con mineros de Sonora’’ (translation: Grupo Mexico terminates its relation with miners in Sonora), La Jornada, June 10, 2006; ‘‘Comienza GM la

recontratacio ́n de ex obreros en la mina La Caridad’’ (translation: GM begins rehiring exworkers

at the La Caridad mine), La Jornada, August 2, 2006. 27See ‘‘Mexico Mine Disputes Intensify; Miner Killed In Clash,’’ Dow Jones Newswires, 13 August 2007; ‘‘One Dead After Miners Fight at Mexico Copper Pit,’’ Reuters, 12 August 2007. 28See ‘‘Mexico’s Cananea Copper Miners To Set Up New Union—Report,’’ Dow Jones

Newswires, July 12, 2007; ‘‘Labor Unions Demand Mexico Drop Charges Vs Miners Leader,’’

Dow Jones Newswires, September 5, 2007; ‘‘Otorgan toma de nota a otro sindicato minero’’

(translation: Toma de nota authorized for another miners’ union), Milenio, November 1, 2007;

‘‘Consigue registro cuarto sindicato minero’’ (translation: Fourth mineworkers’ union obtains registration), El Imparcial, November 6, 2007. 29 CEREAL Bulletin, September 4, 2007. The GOM’s undemocratic practice of forcing workers

to vote publicly in union elections has continued despite the lack of any legal foundation and

despite the Joint Declaration signed by the U.S. and Mexican Labor Secretaries in which Mexico

pledged to ‘‘promote secret ballots and neutral voting places.’’ Agreement on Ministerial Consultations, U.S. NAO Submissions 9702 and 9703, May 18, 2000. 30 In December 2006, Grupo Mexico summarily fired all of its union employees at Pasta de

Conchos and replaced them with independent contract employees. See ‘‘Pierden derechos con tal

de trabajar’’ (translation: Right to work is lost), Excelsior, 16 January 2007; ‘‘Emplean a novatos

en mina’’ (translation: Newcomers hired at mine) Excelsior, 17 January 2007. 31 Informe de la comisio ́n especial para conocer las responsabilidades y origen de la tragedia

de la mina Pasta de Conchos, de resultados finales de las investigaciones objeto de este o ́rgano

legislativo, Gaceta Parlamentaria, Ca ́mara de Diputados, nu ́mero 2308–I, martes 31 de julio de

2007. 32 Comisio ́n Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Recomendacio ́n No. 26/2006, Sobre el caso de los

trabajadores de la empresa industrial Minera Me ́xico, S.A. DE C.V. (Unidad Pasta de Conchos),

17 July 2006. 33See Attachment A, Conclusions of the Special Congressional Committee to Determine the

Responsibility for the Explosion at Pasta de Conchos Mine (Mexican Legislature). 34 ‘‘Arbitrators Order Mexican Miners Back to Work,’’ San Antonio Express-News, August 8,

2007. 35 In the 6 years prior to the 2006 explosion, it was reported that the Federal Government

had found 188 safety violations at Pasta de Conchos. See ‘‘Gov’t. Was Aware of Safety Violations.’’ El Universal, 26 February 2007. 36See ‘‘Gov’t. Was Aware of Safety Violations.’’ El Universal, 26 February 2007.

La Caridad mine in Nacozari, Grupo Mexico broke its contract with the union in

the summer of 2006 and fired 900 of its 1,300 workers. The company then rehired

some of the workers as contractors with lower pay and no benefits, while carefully

screening out supporters of Go ́mez.26 When workers who had been fired attempted

to meet with company officials on August 11, 2007, they were attacked and one

union member, Reynaldo Herna ́ndez Gonza ́lez, was shot and killed.27

After these efforts to oust Los Mineros failed, Grupo Mexico began setting up company unions to further undermine that union.28 The Federal Labor Board ordered

‘‘elections’’ in eight Grupo Mexico mines across the country with only 36 hours notice to Los Mineros. Workers were locked in the mines, intimidated, and forced to

cast their votes publicly in front of Grupo Mexico officials.29 Los Mineros is appealing this ham-fisted power grab by Grupo Mexico.

The Pasta de Conchos Coal Mine Disaster: A Ticking Time Bomb Waiting to Explode

On February 19, 2006, an explosion of methane gas in Grupo Mexico’s Pasta de

Conchos coal mine in the north of Mexico brought into sharp focus what is at stake

in this labor battle. Sixty-five miners were trapped inside. To date, the bodies of 63

dead have not been recovered.30 After the explosion, Go ́mez spoke out forcefully, accusing Grupo Mexico and the Minister of Labor of ‘‘industrial homicide.’’

Several investigations were conducted, including one by a special committee of the

Mexican Legislature.31 The investigations uncovered a pattern of negligence and

gross omission. For instance, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)

found that the Labor Secretariat was responsible for failing to properly provide adequate resources to enforce mine safety and for allowing Grupo Mexico to operate despite so many mining safety violations.32 The special investigative committee of the

Mexican Congress, in a report presented last month, reached the same conclusions,33 as did the Labor Secretariat’s own report on the disaster.34

In fact, the mine had a history of serious violations.35 In July 2004, Federal inspectors found numerous safety violations, including, most critically, failure to use

antistatic powder that prevents machine sparks from igniting a methane gas explosion, as well as other potential fire hazards. Apparently, none of these violations

was corrected.36 In February 2006, just 2 weeks before the disaster, the inspectors

determined that Grupo Mexico had not taken several required corrective measures,

most importantly measures to contain methane gas within acceptable levels and the

use of antistatic powder to contain sparking that could ignite methane gas. See

40

37See ‘‘Investiga la PGR a Go ́mez Urrutia por corrupcio ́n, informa Presidencia’’ (translation:

The PGR is investigating Go ́mez Urrutia, says the Presidency), La Jornada, March 3, 2007. 38For instance, state claims that the $55 million trust was created on behalf of the workers

at the privatized mines and not the union—have been systematically rejected by the courts,

which have held that the funds were rightfully the union’s property. See ‘‘Napo gana en

definitiva la libertad vı ́a amparo’’ (translation: Napo definitively wins freedom on appeal),

Milenio, June 14, 2007. 39See ‘‘Mexican Union Leader Cleared of Graft,’’ San Antonio Express-News, 18 October 2007. 40See ‘‘Napo gana en definitiva la libertad vı ́a amparo’’ (translation: Napo definitively wins

freedom on appeal), Milenio, June 14, 2007 41See ‘‘Go ́mez Urrutia, exculpado de fraude contra el gremio minero’’ (translation: Go ́mez

Urrutia exonerated of fraud against miners’ union), La Jornada, June 8, 2007. 42 Horwath Berney Audit S.A: Special review of the use of funds received by Los Mineros from

Grupo Mexico, August 3, 2007. The study was conducted on behalf of the International Metalworkers’ Federation.

Attachment A: ‘‘Conclusions of the Special Congressional Committee to Determine

the Responsibility for the Explosion at Pasta De Conchos Mine’’ (Mexican Legislature).

Trumped Up Corruption Charges Brought to Silence Go ́mez

On March 2, 2006, the GOM brought criminal charges for alleged fraud and embezzlement of the $55 million Los Mineros trust fund.37 The GOM froze the bank

accounts of Los Mineros and Go ́mez and seized his personal property. Fearing for

the safety of himself and his family, Go ́mez took refuge in Canada, where he

remains.

Over the past year, the GOM’s legal case against Go ́mez has slowly collapsed.38

In October of 2007, a Mexican Federal Court acquitted Go ́mez of criminality with

regard to the trust fund.39 The GOM, however, continues its attack by appealing

this decision. Likewise, similar charges were rejected by state courts 40 or simply

abandoned by prosecutors.41

Additionally, an independent audit conducted by the Swiss auditing firm of

Horwath Berney, S.A.42 determined that all of the trust fund moneys were accounted for and that payments made from the trust fund were made with the approval of the union’s executive committee, as required by the original privatization

agreement.

Conclusion

The USW urges the GOM to drop its appeal of the acquittal by the Mexican Federal Court, which, as described above, cleared Go ́mez of wrongdoing and instead to

let Go ́mez return home to resume his duties as the head of Los Mineros without

fear of further persecution. As discussed above, in April 2007 a Federal court in

Mexico ruled that Go ́mez was improperly removed as head of the union and has ordered him reinstated.

Mexico needs strong, independent union leaders to honestly represent workers

and fight for their well-being and dignity and to prevent tragic disasters. Go ́mez is

such a leader. It seems evident that labor strife and serious safety problems will

continue if independent union leaders like Go ́mez are not permitted to conduct lawful union activities. In fact, a report issued this week about the mine safety issues

at Grupo Mexico’s Cananea copper mine shows that the GOM is still not enforcing

basic mine safety, and that workers’ health and lives are being needlessly jeopardized. See Attachment B: ‘‘Executive Summary of Cananea Mine Safety Report by the

Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network’’ (MHSSN) available at http://

mhssn.igc.org/CananeaOHSReport.pdf. Mexican mine workers deserve better.

Congress should not provide funding for Plan Mexico until Go ́mez is permitted to

return to Mexico without fear of further politically motivated retribution. The USW

urges Congress to hold hearings on violations of labor rights and human rights in

Mexico to allow for the victims of this and other cases to speak to you directly. Intimidation and violence against workers and unions and reckless indifference to safe

working conditions should be part of Mexico’s past, not its future.

ATTACHMENT A—CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO

DETERMINE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXPLOSION AT PASTA DE CONCHOS MINE

(MEXICAN LEGISLATURE)

The following conclusions were presented to the Chamber of Deputies on October

3, 2007:

1. The established hypothesis of an event caused by negligence and omission was

proved, and responsibility was established

41

2. The tragedy of the Pasta de Conchos Mine was the product of a great explosion

caused by an excessive concentration of methane gas and coal dust, which caused

the collapse of practically the entire mine.

3. The presence of methane gas was a product of the negligence and omission of

the company holding the concession [Grupo Mexico], based on the following considerations:

a. Failure to complete the blocking off of the old passages 1 East and West,

which generated the concentration of methane;

b. The lack of continuous spraying to avoid the suspension of coal dust, which

is a highly flammable material;

c. Inadequate spreading of antistatic powder throughout the entire mine;

d. Inefficient ventilation;

e. The lack of sufficient methane meters, which had been requested repeatedly by the Joint Safety and Health Committee; and

f. The failure to isolate high-voltage electrical lines inside the mine, as well

as the failure to isolate the control panels and to keep them clean, as reflected

in the Minutes of the Joint Safety and Health Committee.

4. There was no system of internal communication within the mine, resulting in

the trapped group of miners being cut off and the failure of the watchman to notify

the mine manager until 30 minutes after the explosion. The manager, in turn, did

not notify the Federal and State authorities until after 7 in the morning.

5. There were no emergency exits or alarm systems, which would have given the

trapped miners a better chance of survival.

6. The authorities of the Federal Labor Delegation in Coahuila committed serious

and culpable negligence and omission by ignoring the noncompliance with safety

measures by the concession holder Industrial Minera Mexico, S.A. de C.V., which

cut short the lives of the workers on the third shift. They have administrative and

criminal responsibility for not carrying out their duty as established by the Political

Constitution of the United Mexican States, the Federal Law of Administrative

Responsibility of Public Functionaries, the Federal Labor Law and other applicable

norms.

7. The Secretariat of the Economy did not comply with its duties established in

the Mining Law (artı ́culo 7, fraccio ́n XII, 53 y 58); and concealed the reports of the

Mexican Geological Service concerning the compliance by the concession holder Industrial Minera Mexico with safety norms at the Pasta de Conchos Mine.

8. There is responsibility on the part of Industrial Minera Mexico, and therefore

of Grupo Mexico, as the parent company of IMMSA with mutual responsibility, and

of General de Hulla, in the deaths of the Pasta de Conchos miners.

9. The Federal Labor Delegation in the State of Coahuila is also responsible for

the deaths of the miners at Pasta de Conchos.

10. There is responsibility on the part of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare and the Secretariat of the Economy, for noncompliance with their duties, which

is subject to the sanctions established in the Political Constitution of the United

Mexican States in its Article 109 and 110, the Law of Administrative Responsibilities of Public Functionaries, the Federal Penal Code and applicable legislation.

11. From the Recommendation No. 26/2006 of the CNDH we infer the responsibility of the Mexican State for the negligent behavior of the public servants of the

STPS, Coahuila Delegation. For this reason the CNDH recommends the payment

of compensation to the families of the deceased workers. It should be mentioned that

this recommendation was accepted on behalf of the STPS by the responsible officials. Nonetheless as of today the corresponding payments have not been made, with

the result that the families have been forced to file lawsuits in the Federal Tribunal

of Fiscal and Administrative Justice. It is necessary to state that this Special Commission infers that the recommendation of the CNDH is correct in the facts that

it establishes and in the corresponding legal conclusions. For this reason we concur

that the State must take responsibility based on the negligence of the aforementioned public servants.

ATTACHMENT B—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CANANEA MINE SAFETY REPORT BY THE

MAQUILADORA HEALTH AND SAFETY SUPPORT NETWORK

An independent team of safety and health professionals organized by the

Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network (MHSSN) conducted an inspection

of the Cananea mine from October 5–8, 2007, and performed tests on a sample population of 68 workers (available at http://mhssn.igc.org/CananeaOHSReport.pdf).

The conclusion of the survey team is that there are serious health and safety

hazards at the Cananea mine that require immediate attention and other that require long-term corrections in order to protect workers at the facility from both inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:53 Mar 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 ANTIDRUG sforel1 PsN: sforel1
42

stantaneous accidents and chronic exposures generating occupational diseases. The

MHSSN investigation revealed:

• The conditions observed inside the mine and processing plants, and the work

practices reported by the interviewed workers, paint a clear picture of a workplace being ‘‘deliberately run into the ground.’’ A serious lack of preventive

maintenance, failure to repair equipment and correct visible safety hazards, and

a conspicuous lack of basic housekeeping has created a worksite workers have

been exposed to high levels of toxic dusts and acid mists, operate malfunctioning and poorly maintained equipment, and work in simply dangerous surroundings. • The deliberate dismantling of dust collectors in the concentrator area processing

plants by Grupo Mexico approximately 2 years ago means that workers in these

areas have been subjected to high concentrations of dust containing 23 percent

quartz silica, with 51 percent of sampled dust in the respirable particle-size

range, protected only by completely inadequate personal respirators. Occupational exposures to silica can lead to debilitating, fatal respiratory diseases including silicosis and lung cancer. • Semiquantitative calculations indicate workers in the concentrator area are exposed to dust levels of at least 10 milligrams per cubic meter of air (mg/m3).

The respirable quartz silica component of this dust would be at least 1.2 mg/

m3, or 10 times greater than the Mexican maximum permissible exposure limit

(LMPE) of 0.1 mg/m3. Without any operating dust collection equipment, workers

in the concentrator area must be provided with powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs), or supplied-air respirators in continuous flow mode, to protect

them against inhalation exposures to silica dust, instead of the paper filtering

face pieces currently in use. • Implementation of Grupo Mexico’s overall safety program at the mine has not

resulted in effective, comprehensive protection of workers. There are serious

health and safety hazards created by industrial-scale mining, crushing and pulverizing, acid leaching and electro-plating, and milling operations to produce

fine powder copper ore from a huge open-pit, hard-rock mine. The required

Joint Management-Labor Safety Committee is small—six members total—and

unable to conduct or oversee effective safety inspections, hazard corrections, accident investigations, and employee training. • Grupo Mexico has not conducted sufficient industrial hygiene monitoring to

identify, evaluate, and later control health hazards to miners including exposure to mineral dusts (including silica), acid mists, airborne solvents, high noise

levels, high vibration levels, hot and cold conditions. The employer has failed

to inform, as required by Mexican law, monitored employees of their measured

exposures to hazardous substances. • Grupo Mexico has not conducted a comprehensive medical surveillance program

to determine the health status of workers exposed to airborne contaminants

(silica, heavy metals like lead, acid mist, solvents) and physical hazards such

as noise and vibration. The employer has failed to inform, as required by Mexican law, the few workers who have been examined of the results of the medical

tests. • Grupo Mexico has not provided the training required by Mexican law to workers

with hazardous exposures that trigger the training requirement. Despite high

noise levels, exposure to chemicals, and exposures to energized machines, 91

percent of the interviewed mines had not received noise training, 58 percent

had not received chemical hazards training, 70 percent had not received electrical hazards training, and 75 percent did not get training on lockout/tagout

procedures for operating and repairing energized equipment. • Grupo Mexico has failed to install effective ventilation and source pollution controls in the two ESDE plants to prevent hazardous exposures to sulfuric acid

mists to workers. One marker of the levels of acid mist is that the floors and

structural steel frame of ESDE II building have been eaten away by highly concentrated acid mist. • In addition to disassembling or failing to install effective local exhaust ventilation to reduce worker exposure to airborne contaminants, Grupo Mexico has

relied on personal protective equipment (PPE), inappropriate N–95 paper respirators, to protect workers from particulates, acids and vapors. Moreover, respirator users have not been medically evaluated, fit-tested and trained in the

use of the PPE.

• Although the OHS survey team could not verify the exact circumstances of the

50 separate accidents reported to have occurred onsite in the last 12 months,

the anecdotal reports of broken limbs, amputations, electrocutions, falls, burns,

and at least one fatality, suggest these incidents were the result of unsafe workVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:53 Mar 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 ANTIDRUG sforel1 PsN: sforel1
43

ing conditions, poorly maintained machinery and equipment, and inadequate

safety procedures. Such root causes of the reported accidents would closely coincide with the onsite observations of the OHS survey team.

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS SHANNON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question 1. In the Joint Declaration dated October 22, 2007, the United States

and Mexican Governments announced this aid as the first installment of a

multiyear $1.4 billion aid package. Over how many years is the aid projected to

last? What is the breakdown for the succeeding 2 years?

Answer. We currently envision the Merida Initiative as a 3-year package of secu- rity cooperation with Mexico. We have asked Congress for $500 million for Mexico

in the fiscal year 2008 emergency supplemental. The fiscal year 2009 foreign assistance budget is still under discussion with OMB. We look forward to reviewing it

with you once it is presented to the Congress.

Question 2. The administration frames this as a 3-year security cooperation package, but I understand that the Mexican Government views this as the beginning of

a long-term financial commitment by the United States. Assuming Congress funds

the proposal at the President’s requested level ($1.4 billion), would you expect the

financial component of U.S. assistance to cease at the end of the 3-year period? If

not, what sort of assistance do you envision beyond 3 years?

Answer. The Merida Initiative is a 3-year security cooperation package. It responds to a request made by the Government of Mexico and has a specific set of

goals and objectives. We believe the Merida Initiative will foster even closer ongoing, cooperative relations between the United States and Mexico. This may require some expenditures above the baseline of recent years, but we do not anticipate

an ongoing financial component of the magnitude we are proposing now.

Question 3a. The joint statement notes that Mexico has increased its security spending aimed at drug trafficking networks to $2.5 billion annually.

In total, what is the Mexican Government contributing from its budget to combat

drug trafficking and major criminal organizations?

Answer. Out of an approximate overall security budget for 2007 of $7 billion (depending on exchange-rate variations), the Government of Mexico is dedicating approximately $2.4 billion to the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking.

It is important to remember that the states and municipal governments expend far

greater amounts on security and law enforcement, since they have primary jurisdiction. According to the Embassy of Mexico, the Federal budget for 2007 includes

funding directed to the fight against organized crime in the following areas, in millions of dollars:

National Council Against Addictions ................................................................... 78.6

Ministry of Communications and Transport ....................................................... 10.2

Customs .................................................................................................................. 11.7

Financial Intelligence Unit ................................................................................... 5.1

Ministry of the Interior ......................................................................................... 277.7

Ministry of National Defense ................................................................................ 131.8

Ministry of the Navy ............................................................................................. 21.1

Office of the Attorney General .............................................................................. 36.5

Public Security Support Fund (FASP) ................................................................. 459.3

Ministry of Public Security ................................................................................... 1,255

Federal Preventive Police—(433.7)

Prevention and Social Rehabilitation—(222.5)

Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System—(106)

Other areas (including Security Council and Minors Council)—(492.8)

Total ............................................................................................................. 2,386

Question 3b. Has it committed to this level of funding—or even increased funding—for the next 2 or 3 years?

Answer. President Calderon has publicly stated that restoring public safety and

security is the top priority of his administration. As such, he has committed to taking those steps necessary to ensuring this priority.

Question 3c. In Colombia, an additional tax was imposed to fund programs for

‘‘Plan Colombia.’’ Is Mexico seeking additional revenue sources domestically to pay

for increased security efforts?

44

Answer. According to published Government of Mexico (GOM) figures, spending

for 2008 on the Ministry of Public Security will increase by 39.4 percent, for the

Ministry of Defense by 4.6 percent, for the Navy by 2.1 percent, for the Office of

the Attorney General by 6 percent, and the Secretariat of the Interior by 28 percent.

More detailed breakdowns for component agencies and specific projects are not yet

available.

GOM revenues for 2008 will increase by 1.2 percent of GDP, or approximately

USD 11.7 billion, as a result of tax changes in the Public Finance Reform legislation, which was approved September 2007.

Question 4. Your testimony failed to provide any detail to a key question: What

will success look like? Beyond amorphous goals of ‘‘reduced violence’’ and increased

stability, can you provide specific performance metrics that we intend to achieve?

Please provide a detailed list of goals and performance metrics for this package.

Answer. The fight against organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico and

Central America is tough, complex, and long term. The commitment made by these

countries is significant, and their democratically elected governments will be held

to account by voters. The metric used by the citizens of Mexico and Central America

will be palpable and reflect their individual experiences: Can they win back control

of their communities and institutions, and build lives free of intimidation and fear?

Our role in this great struggle is specific and immediate. In the short term, we

will determine the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative by:

• Increased arrests of drug traffickers and gang members, and the harassment

and dismantling of organized crime syndicates; • Increased interdiction of illegal drugs and weapons; • Improved effectiveness of the national judicial systems, leading to a reduction

in criminal case backlogs, a reduction in the average length of trials, and increased confidence in the courts; • Improved law enforcement cooperation across institutional and national boundaries, leading to greater coordination of police action, and the ability to pursue

and arrest criminals throughout Mesoamerica.

In the long term, we will measure the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative by

its ability to transform the tone and substance of our bilateral and regional cooperation. The Merida Initiative represents a new and innovative method to address

shared responsibilities and shared challenges. Its success, or failure, will shape the

future of our relationships.

Question 5. Many of the criminal organizations in Mexico fund themselves

through the drug trade. If one of the major goals of the initiative is to dismantle

these criminal organizations, shouldn’t another logical goal be reduced drug trade

and flow into the United States? If so, given your expectation that our assistance

will lead to ‘‘significantly reduced violence,’’ how much concomitant reduction in

drug flow to the U.S. can we expect to see?

Answer. We strongly believe that by assisting Mexico and the countries of Central

America in confronting drug trafficking and criminal organizations—as well as helping them strengthen their state institutions—a reduction of illicit drugs flowing into

the United States from Mexico and Central America is likely.

The four primary goals of the Merida Initiative are to (1) break the power and

impunity of criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America; (2) assist the

Governments of Mexico and Central America in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls from the Southwest border of the United States to Panama; (3) improve the capacity of justice systems in the region to conduct investigations and

prosecutions, implement the rule of law, protect human rights, and sever the influence of incarcerated criminals with outside criminal organizations; and (4) curtail

gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish the demand for drugs

in the region.

The Merida Initiative is a key component in the U.S. Government’s efforts to enhance security and the rule of law in the region. These include cooperation with

other governments in the hemisphere to reduce the production and trafficking of,

as well as demand for, illegal drugs. In the Western Hemisphere, these programs

include the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, joint interdiction programs

with the countries of the Caribbean and the United Kingdom, as well as our efforts

with our South American neighbors to attack drug production at its source.

The supply of drugs flowing into the United States is, therefore, subject to a number of complex factors that are beyond the scope of the Merida Initiative. However,

by focusing on attacking and dismantling the drug trafficking and criminal organizations, strengthening state institutions in Mexico and Central America, and reducing the levels of demand for drugs throughout the region, it is our hope that a

45

reduction in violence, strengthening of state institutions and the rule of law, and

increased demand reduction will be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in

the flow of drugs entering the United States from Mexico and Central America.

For our part, it is important to address domestic drug consumption. Reducing

demand for illegal drugs will be critical to reducing the volume of illicit drugs entering the United States. As we implement the foreign assistance programs under the

Merida Initiative, we are coordinating with U.S. agencies engaged in demand

reduction.

Question 6. Senator Menendez pointed out that in 2003 the U.N. Committee

Against Torture found that the Mexican police commonly use torture as a method

of criminal investigation, and a report 2 years later by the Mexican National Commission on Human Rights reported that torture remains widespread in Mexico.

What assurance can you provide the committee that our assistance, in whatever

form, will not be used to facilitate these tactics? What assurances have you received

from the Mexican Government that human rights standards, in general, will be respected in the policies and programs supported through this aid package?

Answer. Mexican law prohibits torture and does not allow the use of coerced confessions. Nevertheless, it continues to be a serious problem. The Mexican Government has taken steps in recent years to prevent any unlawful use of torture or

coerced confessions by police or military personnel.

In 2003, the Mexican Government promulgated guidelines that require prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel to receive training on human rights and

police practice according to the Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This is commonly known as the ‘‘Istanbul Protocol’’ and was adopted by the

Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. It establishes assessment, investigation, and reporting guidelines and procedures in accordance with international

human rights standards and international instruments.

The Merida Initiative includes funding to help strengthen and expand the Office

of Inspector General within the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, the Office of Professional Responsibility within the new Mexican Federal Police, civilian complaint

centers, and civilian watchdog organizations. These tools will help maintain public

accountability of law enforcement and justice sector institutions, and are strongly

supported by the Calderon administration, which has recognized the need to enhance their functions.

In late September 2007, in response to allegations of human rights violations, the

Mexican military accepted all of the recommendations of Mexico’s National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH). The Mexican Secretariat of Defense affirmed its

commitment to collaborating with CNDH on all outstanding investigations. In October, a civilian court found four soldiers guilty of rape and sentenced them to up to

41 years in prison. This represented the first time that military personnel have been

tried in a civilian court in Mexico.

Question 7. What lessons have you learned from our assistance program in Colombia, and how specifically are these lessons applied to the Mexico proposal?

Answer. There are significant differences between Plan Colombia and the Merida

Initiative. Plan Colombia had components, such as eradication and the fight against

armed groups seeking to overthrow the state that the Merida Initiative does not

have. The Merida Initiative is a more focused program with the vast majority of resources flowing to civilian institutions.

We learned several important lessons in Colombia. First, the fight against drug

trafficking and organized crime is not simply a matter of eradication or interrupting

the transit of illicit goods. Organized criminal organizations today seek to control

institutions of the state through violence and corruption. To address that, we are

working with Mexico and the countries of Central America on building institutions

that respond efficiently and democratically to the legitimate needs of communities

and cities. These institutions must be transparent and accountable if they are to

displace organized crime. Our common approach with Mexican and Central American partners involves attacking not only the leaders of organized crime, but also

the financial and personal networks these leaders use to manage their criminal

operations.

Another lesson is the importance of working with communities to counter the negative influence of criminal organizations. This will require improved communication

by authorities with communities in which the fight against organized crime is being

conducted.

Finally, our experience in Colombia has clearly demonstrated the importance of

committed national leadership, as we have seen in President Uribe. President

46

Calderon and his colleagues in Central America have also demonstrated strong leadership in confronting these threats.

Question 8. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported that

while the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) had completed a congressionally mandated Southwest Border Strategy, it had not completed an accompanying implementation plan. The GAO recommended that ONDCP and the U.S.

counternarcotics interagency community coordinate with the Government of Mexico

before it completed the implementation plan. How does this initiative relate to the

Southwest Border Strategy and its implementation plan? Does it supplant it? Does

it add to it? Are the two plans coordinated with each other?

Answer. The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (SWBS) was

formally approved by the administration on March 23, 2006. An Implementation

Working Group (IWG) was subsequently formed under the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, and Department of Justice Office of the Deputy Attorney General, to oversee the implementation of the strategy’s objectives. A classified implementation plan was completed in

the summer of 2007, and following consultations with Congress and the Government

of Mexico, the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy was announced

publicly in October during a visit by ONDCP Director Walters to San Diego.

Although the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy was developed through the interagency process prior to the Merida Initiative, we have made

sure that the two programs are complementary. The SWBS is primarily a domestic

coordination plan, focused on what the United States can do on its side of the border

to reduce the flow of illegal drugs. However, key aspects of the strategy include

measures to enhance border controls and coordinate with the Government of Mexico

to conduct seizures, investigations, and prosecutions. A key distinction between the

two initiatives is that the Southwest Border Strategy primarily seeks to improve

operational coordination, while the Merida Initiative provides the tools to improve

the Government of Mexico’s counterdrug and public security capacities, in addition

to seeking enhanced cooperation in law enforcement and security matters.

We believe that by coordinating each nation’s domestic efforts, working jointly

through improved cooperation and communication, and providing additional resources and support to Mexico and Central America under the Merida Initiative, we

will have the foundation to establish a new, fully integrated framework of cooperation for law enforcement partnership throughout this region.

Question 9. How was this aid package developed and what input did the Government of Mexico have? Please be specific.

Answer. United States-Mexico Process: In March, President Bush concluded his

five-country visit of Latin America with a meeting with President Calderon in

Merida, Mexico. Not only did the two of them build upon their initial conversation

of November 2006, but President Bush also carried up the ideas of regional cooperation he had just discussed with President Berger in Guatemala.

In May, Mexican Foreign Minister Espinosa presented the Mexican Government’s

proposal for U.S. Government security cooperation. Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon led a group of senior U.S. officials to Mexico City to discuss the broad outlines

of the request with our Mexican counterparts.

Thereafter, Mexican officials met with U.S. officials from a wide variety of agencies. GOM officials presented the broad outlines of their plans to combat drug trafficking and related violence. USG officials asked questions about how the GOM request supported those plans. Over the course of 2 months, validation teams—composed of USG experts from among the interagency—traveled to Mexico for several

days at a time to discuss specific program components with their counterparts.

United States-Central America Process: In March, the President also met with

President Berger of Guatemala. During that meeting, they discussed the need for

a comprehensive regional security plan to address citizen insecurity in the region.

The interagency began planning in Washington, while the Central American Integration System (SICA) worked to finalize their regional security strategy. Assistant

Secretary Shannon led the U.S. delegation to the first U.S.–SICA Dialogue on Security, where SICA identified drug trafficking, illicit trafficking of arms, and gangs as

the most pressing security concerns.

The USG interagency community reviewed the SICA request process, making use

of needs analyses conducted by posts, to develop an appropriate response to the

Central American threat and needs analysis.

We will continue to work with SICA and the Central American governments as

we move forward.

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Question 10. What is the Government of Mexico’s strategy for attacking the drug

trafficking threat in Mexico? How does the aid proposal relate to this strategy? Does

it simply provide aid in furtherance of it, or does it involve changing Mexico’s current strategy, priorities, and programs?

Answer. Under President Calderon, the Government of Mexico has already taken

bold action to confront and dismantle the drug trafficking and criminal organizations that have spread violence throughout the country. U.S. assistance under the

Merida Initiative seeks to support Mexico by implementing specific strategies

through which both governments agree the U.S. can contribute valuable and unique

assistance.

Mexico’s strategy against these criminal organizations falls under four areas: (1)

To recover public spaces from the cartels and maximize full operational control of

Mexican territory; (2) to dismantle the drug trafficking and organized crime groups

that are threatening public order in Mexico; (3) to strengthen the criminal justice

organizations necessary to apprehend and prosecute the traffickers, and (4) to reduce domestic demand for drugs within Mexico.

Question 11a. The largest single category of assistance for Mexico—some 40 percent—is for eight Bell 412 helicopters for the Mexican Air Force, and two CASA

CN–235–300 maritime patrol aircraft for the Mexican Navy. In the past, Mexico has

had trouble maintaining U.S.-provided aircraft. In the late 1990s, 73 UH–1H helicopters were returned to the United States as unflyable. More recently, GAO said

the Department of Defense was discontinuing support for other UH–1H helicopters;

it also indicated that the Government of Mexico did not provide the necessary funding to upgrade the C–26 aircraft surveillance capability.

How were the helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft selected? What are the

mission requirements for each platform?

Answer. The GOM determined their mission requirements (range, payload, etc.)

and identified aircraft that best met those requirements. In addition, a USG interagency validation team with representatives from the Department of State, the

Department of Defense, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security reviewed the Mexican mission analysis and aircraft selection process. The

present request includes helicopters for the Mexican Army/Air Force (SEDENA) and

surveillance aircraft for the Navy (SEMAR). The aircraft requested in the proposal

now before Congress reflects the outcome of those working sessions.

Key requirements identified by SEDENA for the helicopters included: Night vision

capability; hard points and wiring; cargo hook; armored crew seats; state-of-the-art

navigation and communication equipment; MEDEVAC equipment; sufficient cargo

and equipment capacity in Mexico’s geographic/atmospheric conditions (8,000+ feet

altitude); and a robust capacity for operational response. The fact that Mexico already operates four BH–412 helicopters was another key factor in determining

which helicopter is the best operational, maintenance, and training fit for SEDENA.

SEMAR defined the requirements for the maritime patrol aircraft as including:

Electronic cockpit instrument displays; palletized system to outfit the aircraft for

different missions; Forward Looking Infrared/Electro-optics (FLIR/EO); Inverted

Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) system; Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver; Electronic Support Measures (ESM); Flare launch system; and a 2,300 nm

range. In addition, SEMAR noted that it was interested in an aircraft that lent

itself to using operational techniques similar to those of the U.S. Coast Guard,

which is integrating the same aircraft into its fleet.

Question 11b. How will the Government of Mexico use the aircraft? What end-use

restrictions will the United States place on the aircraft? How will the United States

monitor the use of these aircraft?

Answer. SEDENA’s mission for the helicopters is multipurpose, to include transporting troops and police to fight organized crime and drug trafficking; supporting

civilian populations in case of disaster; reconnaissance; transporting supplies; undertaking search and rescue; MEDEVAC; and providing a surveillance platform for

counterterrorism. Most importantly, these helicopters will give the Mexican Air

Force a complete squadron of BH–412 helicopters (the Mexican Air Force has four

BH–412 helicopters on hand) that can provide mobility to rapid reaction forces.

SEMAR’s mission for its maritime patrol aircraft is aerial surveillance patrol used

to establish better control over maritime territorial limits and to deny the use of

the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean to transnational criminal organizations

and terrorists.

The proposed funding source for the acquisition of these aircraft for the military

is the INCLE account. As such, Mexico is required to employ these aircraft in a

manner consistent with the agreed purposes of the funding. The U.S. will monitor

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the status of these aircraft to determine that they are being used and maintained

appropriately and to continually be aware of the location of these aircraft. The USG

will employ onsite visits, reports, and inspections to verify that Mexican use of the

equipment complies with the purposes of the Merida Initiative and letters of agreement between Mexico and the United States.

Question 11c. What are the operational flying rates for the Bell 412 helicopters

currently in service for the Mexican Air Force?

Answer. SEDENA’s operational cost per flight hour is roughly US$2,000, which

includes fuel, depreciation, and operation time into account. During a visit to Santa

Lucia Air Base in November, the Bell 412 squadron indicated that they were able

to keep the four aircraft at an operational flying rate near 90 percent. One of the

aircraft was undergoing a 150-hour inspection, and it appeared to be in excellent

condition. Technicians were performing the maintenance in accordance with applicable manufacturer’s technical manuals in English.

Question 11d. What are the operational flying rates for the CASA 212 aircraft currently in service for the Mexican Navy?

Answer. SEMAR’s operational flying rate for the CASA 212 is currently 400 hours

per year with a planned increase to 600 hours per year.

Question 11e. The detailed justification states that Mexico’s short-term objective

is to build a fleet of six CASA 235s and seven CASA 212s for maritime surveillance.

Over what time period is this goal expected to be met?

Answer. SEMAR has not shared an acquisition timeline, although it has indicated

its need to begin purchasing CASA 235s in the near-term if the USG does not provide them. SEMAR has noted that all of its six CASA 212–CEs were purchased in

1982 and have an expected remaining service life of 6 years, which suggests an urgent need to purchase new aircraft.

Question 11f. Have decisions been made about where these aircraft will be based?

What role did, or will, the United States have, in making such decisions?

Answer. The Mexican AF has indicated that the Bell 412s will be based at Santa

Lucia Air Base, near Mexico City. Although the squadron is based at Santa Lucia,

the aircraft will be deployed throughout Mexico to meet operational requirements.

Aircraft are deployed with the necessary operational, logistics, and maintenance elements to operate in the deployed environment. Additionally, if a higher level of

maintenance skill is required, more skilled teams would be deployed to the helicopter location to bring the aircraft to an operational condition.

SEMAR has 25 years experience working with CASA 212–CEs, operating them

out of three bases—La Paz, Baja California Sur; Veracruz, Veracruz; Tapachula,

Chiapas. (A fourth base is planned for Campeche, Chiapas.) These bases have hangars and workshops adequate to service more than SEMAR’s present fleet of seven

CASA C–212–CEs. USG experts are familiar with these bases and agree that they

are adequate for fulfilling the mission and for maintaining the equipment.

Question 11g. What is the anticipated procurement and production schedule for

the aircraft? If the funds are appropriated within the next few months, when would

you anticipate the aircraft will come off the line?

Answer. In November meetings with Bell Helicopter and the ODC (Office of Defense Coordination) Mexico, Bell indicated that the aircraft is anticipated to come

off the line approximately 1 year after an order is made for the first two or three

aircraft, and within the following calendar year after that for the remaining aircraft.

We anticipate delivery of the first aircraft for SEMAR 18–20 months after contract

award, with the second aircraft delivered 1 month later.

Question 11h. How many pilots will be needed to fly the aircraft? How much pilot

training will be necessary before the Mexican Armed Forces can utilize the aircraft?

Where will the training be conducted? Who will pay for it? At what cost? How long

will such training take?

Answer. Both the Bell 412s for SEDENA and the CASA 235s for SEMAR will be

provided through a Foreign Military Sales framework, a total package approach,

which includes recommended training, supply support, and technical assistance. All

of these items have been incorporated into the supplemental request. Transition

training (training experienced pilots to fly a new type of helicopter) for the aircraft

and systems is normally provided by the equipment manufacturer as part of the

purchase package.

The Mexican Air Force has about 60 pilots for the Bell 212, which is a similar

airframe as the 412. The current plan is to transition 212 pilots to the 412. Mexican

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officials indicated they currently have the internal capability to conduct transitional

training. Additionally, because the 412 would replace aging 212s, maintenance and

logistics personnel would also be transitioned to the Bell 412. The similarity in airframes for maintenance purposes would require minimal training for maintenance

personnel to transition to the 412. It is anticipated that the GOM would be able

to absorb the 412s mostly using internal resources for training. It is not anticipated

that the Mexican AF would need any long-term training/contractor support for operations or maintenance. Initial training for maintenance and operations will be provided with the acquisition of the Bell 412s. However, the long-term approach is for

the Mexican Air Force to train its own pilots through train-the-trainer programs.

Transition training is of limited duration, accomplished over the period of several

months.

For the CASA 235s for SEMAR, the notional crew for each of the two additional

aircraft is five personnel, two of whom are pilots. For 25 years SEMAR pilots have

capably flown CASA 212s, which are similar in configuration to the requested CASA

235s. With this pool of experienced pilots, we do not anticipate the need for initial

training, and the package includes funding for transition training. Training is

planned for up to eight pilots per airframe, covering 20 working days of ground

training, 128 hours in a simulator, and 36 flight hours. All training would occur in

the U.S. The cost of conducting the pilot and maintenance training is included in

the proposed assistance and is budgeted for $1.4 million. SEMAR would fund student travel and living allowances separately.

Question 11i. How many maintenance personnel will be needed to sustain the new

aircraft? Is additional training required for them? If so, what is the plan for such

training?

Answer. As discussed in section (h), Mexican AF (MAF) personnel are currently

maintaining Bell 212s, a similar airframe. The MAF intends to decommission older

Bell 212s with the arrival of the 412s. This would enable these maintenance personnel with similar maintenance training requirements to transition to the 412 with

limited transition training. The plan for this transition training is to send personnel

to training provided by Bell during the acquisition period of the aircraft. Additional

technicians would be trained internally by the MAF.

The MAF indicated that air force units host maintenance personnel with equipment maintenance capability. Additionally they have developed intermediate and

depot level maintenance capabilities for their helicopters. Their maintenance plan

enables the MAF to conduct all these levels of maintenance at home station and at

any deployed locations in Mexico.

The proposed training for SEMAR would provide up to six maintenance technicians per airframe, including 40 working days of powerplant/systems, electrical/

instruments/avionics and engine run-up training. All training would occur in the

U.S. The cost of conducting the pilot and maintenance training is included in the

proposed assistance and is budgeted for $1.4 million. SEMAR would fund student

travel and living allowances, separately.

Question 11j. What degree of contractor support will be necessary for logistics and

maintenance of the aircraft? For how long?

Answer. We anticipate that the MAF will not require any long-term contractor

support for the operation, logistics, and maintenance of the Bell 412s. With the acquisition of the helicopters, the plan is to purchase the necessary parts for a 2-year

operational period. This support period will allow the MAF to develop internal logistics capabilities to meet the increased demand for the additional eight aircraft. It

is envisioned that the development of this capability will be mainly through internal

MAF resources with minimal assistance from outside contractors.

The proposed initial logistic support for the SEMAR aircraft includes notional operation-level spares for a period of 3 years, assuming 700 flight hours per year, plus

one spare turbo-prop engine per airframe. The budget for spares included in the proposed assistance is $6 million per airframe. Additionally, the proposed assistance includes $3.5 million for full in-service technical support provided by in-country vendor field representatives for a period of 3 years. In combination, this logistic support

proposal should provide aircraft operational availability of 90 percent.

Question 12. The most recent National Drug Threat Assessment issued by the National Drug Intelligence Center indicated that the trafficking of drugs in the eastern

Pacific increased substantially in the last couple of years. That suggests a need for

significant assets in maritime interdiction. Yet the request is for only two maritime

patrol aircraft (CASA 235) that cost $50 million apiece. What other measures are

the two governments taking, or planning to take, to confront trafficking in this corridor?

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Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard and Mexico are working closely in many areas to

improve maritime cooperation. In early December, a delegation from the Mexican

Navy (led by Secretary of the Navy Admiral Sanyez) visited U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters to discuss ways to improve cooperative efforts. The Secretariat of the Navy

(SEMAR) is itself looking to procure small boats to improve law enforcement presence along their coasts and discussed various options with U.S. Coast Guard

officials.

Over the past year, the Coast Guard has noted a significant improvement in Government of Mexico’s responsiveness to inquiries on vessels claiming Mexican nationality. The Mexican Navy officials stated that the GOM is working hard to improve

coverage of their maritime regions through an automated information system, which

will provide greater transparency of the maritime traffic in the eastern Pacific

Ocean. The USG, through the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) and the

USCG’s Eleventh District, continues to conduct detection, monitoring, and drug

interdiction operations in the eastern Pacific narcotics trafficking transit zone. The

USG has discussed establishing agreed interdiction principles with Mexico, which

would improve our ability to more quickly reach decisions on tactical maritime cooperation; however, no formal agreement or process has been established.

Question 13. I have long been concerned with corruption in the Mexican Government, including in its law enforcement institutions. What specific measures will be

taken to ensure that assistance is provided only to vetted units? Who will conduct

the vetting, by what standard, and in what capacity?

Answer. Some Mexican Federal law enforcement agencies are beginning to use

polygraphs as one aspect of a developing comprehensive vetting program to weed

out corrupt officers. USG law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) are all helping train Mexican Federal LEA personnel

in administering polygraph examinations. USG LEAs and NAS will continue to

independently vet units they work with directly.

The Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) has announced plans to hire an additional 8,000 investigators, adding to an already existing Federal police force of about

27,000. Our understanding is that this additional capacity will allow all new recruits to undergo initial vetting, while all SSP personnel will be subject to periodic

vetting.

To ensure that assistance is only provided to the intended recipients, such as

vetted units, the Embassy has in place end-use monitoring systems, which allow

Foreign Service Officers staffing the Narcotics/Law Enforcement Affairs Sections

(NAS) in our Embassies in Mexico and the Central America countries to oversee the

programs. These individuals are supported in Washington by Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) subject and country experts,

as well as budget and management experts. For example, INL regularly sends inhouse experts to evaluate procedures and records at NAS operations throughout the

world, conducting Management Assessment Visits that review NAS policies and procedures for internal management controls, property management (including end-use

monitoring), contracting and procurement, financial management and human resources management.

Each NAS monitors the condition and maintenance of commodities provided to the

recipient agency of the host governments. They use this information to produce an

end-use monitoring report which forms part of a comprehensive annual report to

Congress. The State Department considers end-use monitoring one of the critical

management tasks for which field offices are responsible.

The Merida Initiative will also combat corruption through programs for police

professionalization and training, including ethics and anticorruption training, support for the Government of Mexico’s Federal anticorruption agency (Secretariat of

Public Administration); an expansion of an existing Culture of Lawfulness project

designed to develop public support for the rule of law; assistance to the Office of

the Attorney General (PGR) in establishing citizen complaint offices to provide a

venue for the public to register complaints of malfeasance or abuse; and strengthening the PGR’s Office of Inspector General, and the SSP’s Office of Professional

Responsibility, to improve internal integrity mechanisms in the Mexican law enforcement community. The initiative will also provide training for civil society NGOs

to educate the general populace concerning their rights, responsibilities, and recourse to redress grievances; and will encourage NGO participation on advisory

boards to monitor the effectiveness of citizen complaint centers and internal oversight bodies.

Question 14. The aid proposal calls for $37 million for ‘‘additional staff, equipment, and technical assistance and evaluation costs needed’’ to implement and monitor the Mexico program. In a press briefing on October 22, Assistant Secretary

51

Shannon stated that we are ‘‘not going to have to increase . . . our personnel footprint in Mexico.’’ This statement was preceded by a reference to law enforcement

officers. Was the statement about not increasing personnel focused only on law enforcement officers, or all personnel?

Answer. On October 22, Assistant Secretary Shannon was speaking about law enforcement and military personnel. Initial estimates indicate that providing the full

level of program support and oversight functions will require up to 75 additional

personnel. The majority would be foreign national staff filling financial management

(accounting, voucher examination) and logistics support capacities, but would also

include several personal services contract (PSC) personnel focusing on contract and

project management and oversight. They would be based in Washington, DC, Mexico, and Central America.

Question 15. How many additional U.S. personnel, whether direct hires or contractors, will be necessary to implement and monitor the Mexico program? Where

will they be located? What funds may be needed to provide necessary office space

in Embassy Mexico City?

Answer. Initial personnel estimates indicate that providing the full level of program support and oversight functions for the programs requested will require up to

75 additional personnel in Mexico, Central America, and Washington, DC; most of

these would be involved in managing the resources provided to Mexico. The majority

of these additional personnel would be foreign national staff filling financial management (e.g., accounting and voucher examination) and logistics support capacities.

These additional personnel would also include personal services contract (PSC) personnel focusing on contract and project management, project oversight, and financial

and contacts audits.

The Embassy in Mexico City is still considering the best means to provide adequate office space for these staff. Any arrangement must meet all relevant regulations regarding security.

The funds requested for overhead ought to be adequate to cover the administrative requirements for managing these resources appropriately.

Question 16. Please provide a breakdown, by agency, of the number of personnel

in Embassy Mexico City working on law enforcement matters (including the NAS,

DEA, FBI, DHS, etc.) as of the start of fiscal 2008.

Answer. There are 284 personnel working on law enforcement matters across Mission Mexico, which includes the constituent posts. Of these, 220 are U.S. direct hires

or personal service contractors (U.S. DH/PSC) and 64 are Locally Employed Staff

(LES). For the agency and post breakdown, please see the chart below.

Agency LES U.S. DH/PSC Total

State/Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 10 7 17

Total ........................................................................................................... 10 7 17

DOJ/Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 6 44 50

Ciudad Juarez ................................................................................................ 1 6 7

Guadalajara ................................................................................................... 2 7 9

Matamoros ..................................................................................................... .................... 6 6

Merida ............................................................................................................ 1 5 6

Monterrey ........................................................................................................ 2 7 9

Nogales .......................................................................................................... .................... 6 6

Nuevo Laredo ................................................................................................. .................... 6 6

Tijuana ........................................................................................................... 2 8 10

Mazatlan ........................................................................................................ 4 7 11

Hermosillo ...................................................................................................... 1 6 7

Total ........................................................................................................... 19 108 127

DOJ/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... .................... 22 22

Ciudad Juarez ................................................................................................ .................... 2 2

Guadalajara ................................................................................................... .................... 3 3

Monterrey ........................................................................................................ .................... 3 3

Tijuana ........................................................................................................... .................... 2 2

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Agency LES U.S. DH/PSC Total

Hermosillo ...................................................................................................... .................... 1 1

Total ........................................................................................................... .................... 33 33

DOJ/Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms and E. (ATF)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 2 4 6

Monterrey ........................................................................................................ .................... 2 2

Total ........................................................................................................... 2 6 8

DOJ/Office of International Affairs (OIA)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... .................... 2 2

Total ........................................................................................................... .................... 2 2

DOJ/U.S. Marshall (USMS)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 2 3 5

Total ........................................................................................................... 2 3 5

DHS/U.S. Citizen & Immigration Services (CIS)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 7 6 13

Ciudad Juarez ................................................................................................ 3 3 6

Monterrey ........................................................................................................ 3 2 5

Tijuana ........................................................................................................... 3 1 4

Total ........................................................................................................... 16 12 28

DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 5 14 19

Ciudad Juarez ................................................................................................ 2 3 5

Monterrey ........................................................................................................ 2 5 7

Tijuana ........................................................................................................... .................... 3 3

Hermosillo ...................................................................................................... .................... 5 5

Total ........................................................................................................... 9 30 39

DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 3 7 10

Total ........................................................................................................... 3 7 10

DHS/U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 1 3 4

Total ........................................................................................................... 1 3 4

DHS/Transportation Security Administration (ATS)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 1 1 2

Total ........................................................................................................... 1 1 2

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... 1 2 3

Total ........................................................................................................... 1 2 3

Treasury/Internal Revenue Service/Criminal Investigation Division (IRS–CID)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... .................... 2 2

Total ........................................................................................................... .................... 2 2

DOD/Information Analysis Center (IAC)

Mexico City ..................................................................................................... .................... 4 4

Total ........................................................................................................... .................... 4 4

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Agency LES U.S. DH/PSC Total

Grand total ................................................................................................ 64 220 284

Question 17. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office noted the

United States and Mexico have cooperated on maritime interdiction in recent years

but that the two countries have not agreed to a bilateral maritime cooperation

agreement to allow U.S. law enforcement personnel to board and search Mexicanflagged vessels without asking the Government of Mexico for authority to board on

a case-by-case basis.

a. What measures are currently in place for boarding suspect vessels?

b. Are we seeking such an agreement that would provide authority to board in

advance, and what obstacles are there to achieving such an agreement?

Answer. The Calderon administration has been noticeably more responsive to U.S.

requests to board suspect Mexican-flagged vessels than were previous administrations. While there is currently no formal maritime agreement between the United

States and Mexico, Government of Mexico (GOM) permission to board a Mexicanflag vessel is accomplished by approaching the GOM on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to article 17 of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.

Question 18. In March 2007, the Bureau of Western Wemisphere Affairs issued

a fact sheet stating that the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in firearms will ‘‘make the citizens of the hemisphere safer.’’

But just a month earlier, in a letter to this committee setting forth its priorities for

treaties in the 110th Congress, the Department stated that it did not support Senate action on this convention.

If the convention will make the citizens of the hemisphere safer, and the Government of Mexico is asking for our help in reducing firearms trafficking, why does the

administration not support Senate action on this convention?

Answer. The Department of State continues to believe that the Organization of

American States’ Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Material (CIFTA) will make the

citizens of the hemisphere safer by helping shut down the illicit transnational arms

market that fuels the violence associated with drug trafficking, terrorism, and international organized crime. We therefore share your interest in the CIFTA and appreciate the importance you attach to it.

We are in the process of reviewing the convention and consulting with the interagency community, industry, and civil society on the importance we attach to ratification of this convention.

Question 19a. Information provided to the committee indicates that of the funds

for Central America, nearly $15 million, or nearly 30 percent, are not allocated to

a specific country. The material indicates that it will be determined based on consultations with the Central American Integration System.

Why was this proposal submitted at this time, given that you have not yet finished even preliminary planning for how you would spend the funds?

Answer. The administration’s plan calls for $14.8 million of the $50 million request to be spent on prison reform and basic nonlethal equipment for police forces.

During USG consultations with the Central American Integration System (SICA) on

the Merida Initiative, the State Department requested that each Central American

Government provide a list of prioritized nonlethal equipment and prison reform

needs. Central American nations are in the process of finalizing their requirements.

Once we receive these, we will send expert teams to the region in early 2008 to refine these requests, which will allow us to rapidly finalize our proposed allocations

in these two categories.

Question 19b. When do you expect to complete these consultations and then be

able to provide Congress with more specific information?

Answer. These consultations at the Embassy level have been ongoing and build

on our existing counternarcotics and law enforcement programs. We expect to begin

sending Washington-based, specialized interagency teams to Central America in

early 2008. We should be able to provide more specific information to Congress as

soon as possible after the assessments are completed.

Question 19c. What assessments have been conducted in preparation of this

request?

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Answer. Our Embassies in Central America have ongoing relationships with public and security forces that form the basis for assessing and determining individual

countries’ needs. Following President Bush’s important consultations with President

Berger in March, Assistant Secretary Shannon led the U.S. delegation to the first

U.S.–SICA Dialogue on Security in July. There, SICA identified drug trafficking,

illicit trafficking of arms, and gangs as the most pressing security concerns. In August, embassies in the region provided to the Department their own comprehensive

assessment of needs. Throughout September and October, multiple Washington

interagency meetings considered this information and compiled the program proposals for Central America submitted under the Merida Initiative supplemental

request. The SICA regional security plan that was presented in September (and

formally approved by the SICA presidents on December 12 at their SICA summit)

provided valuable information for these deliberations. In November, USG officials

formally presented and briefed the administration’s Central America request to the

SICA vice-ministers.

Question 20. What additional U.S. personnel will be needed—whether direct hires

or contractors—to implement the Central American portion of this request? Where

will they be located?

Answer. The additional personnel overseeing the Central American portion of the

request will be located at the embassies in the region. The majority would be foreign

national staff filling financial management (accounting, voucher examination) and

logistics support capacities, but would also include several personal services contract

(PSC) personnel focusing on contract and project management, project oversight,

and financial and contacts audits. As many as 18 staff could be required in the Central America region out of total 75 personnel.

Question 21. You testified that you regret that you were unable to engage in consultations with Congress prior to the announcement of this aid proposal. Why were

such consultations not undertaken?

Answer. Our intention was to provide the Congress a credible security cooperation

package that reflected the best efforts and work of our interagency community, including conversations with our Mexican and Central American counterparts. We believe we have prepared such a package and we commit to work closely with the Congress to craft a security cooperation relationship with Mexico and Central America

that will meet our national security interests and take full advantage of the historic

opportunity we now have.

Question 22. It has been reported that the Central American countries are concerned that the robust $500 million request for Mexico and only $50 million earmarked for all seven Central American countries would shift drug trafficking operations from Mexico to Central America. Do you believe there are sufficient resources

allocated to Central America to prevent this from occurring? What specific steps are

being taken to ensure that such a shift does not happen? What funding requests

within the initiative would help Central America fight against any increased trafficking in its countries as a result of what we hope will be disrupted drug flow in

Mexico?

Answer. Drug trafficking and criminal violence are very serious problems in Central America. The $50 million request for Central America is part of a continuing

assistance program. The Central America portion of the package was formulated to

support the regional security strategy developed by the Central American Integration System (SICA). The requested $50 million would directly respond to their identified training and material shortfalls as we continue to define more effective joint

approaches and measures to address transnational threats.

As the Merida Initiative was developed, we discussed internally, as well as with

Central American governments, the possibility of traffickers using alternative routes

through Central America if the proposed programs are successful in Mexico. Our

goal is to develop a substantive, mutually beneficial security partnership with our

Central American neighbors that will improve the security of the region as a whole.

The Merida Initiative’s Central American component was designed as a regional

approach. For example, the package includes training and equipment for port, airport, and border security in Central America; upgraded maritime interdiction assets

(Costa Rica); expansion of sensitive investigation police units focused on counternarcotics; and enhanced information-sharing and collection, such as upgrading crime

and fingerprint databases.

We intend to use this program to build a the stronger political will among SICA

member states to work with each other, as well as with Mexico and the USG.

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RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS SHANNON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question 1. You continually said in the hearing that you, ‘‘regret that you were

unable to consult Congress over this package.’’ • a. Why were you unable to consult with Congress?

Answer. Our intention was to provide the Congress a credible security cooperation

package that reflected the best efforts and work of our interagency community, including conversations with our Mexican and Central American counterparts. We believe we have prepared such a package and we commit to work closely with the Congress to craft a security cooperation relationship with Mexico and Central America

that will meet our national security interests and take full advantage of the historic

opportunity we now have.

Question 2. The situation in Mexico has grown increasingly complex. In addition

to violence and corruption, Mexico has become a drug producing country itself. Also,

Mexico now also faces a growing problem with drug consumption.

• a. Do you recognize these two developments as threats in Mexico? • b. What specifically in the packages addresses these two threats?

Answer. The increase in drug production and consumption is a threat in Mexico,

and along the U.S. border. The Government of Mexico recognizes this threat and

has taken decisive actions to address it.

The Merida Initiative proposes to increase U.S. support and cooperation in interdiction activities, information-driven operations, and enhanced law enforcement cooperation. For example, the proposed inspection equipment and canine units will

help Mexico deter production and inhibit the transport of drugs and drug precursors, including those used to produce methamphetamines. The advanced IT equipment will help facilitate law enforcement information-sharing and expedite crime

scene analysis to target major drug production centers; and the support for institution-building will help strengthen Mexico’s judicial and law enforcement institutions’

capacity to dismantle Mexico’s criminal organizations and have a real impact on

drug production and trafficking.

The programs proposed as part of the Merida Initiative, however, are only supplemental to the leadership Mexico has taken in addressing organized crime and drug

production, which includes combined efforts on interdiction, eradication, public

awareness campaigns, and economic development. In addition to our cooperation on

interdiction, we have supported Mexico’s efforts against domestic production and its

internal demand.

On demand reduction, we propose to support Mexico’s considerable efforts in drug addiction treatment and prevention by providing $15.157 million of communications

technology. This will be used to build a nationwide network to link the over 300

centers to reduce drug consumption and enable the delivery of Mexican Government

drug addiction prevention and treatment programs throughout the country. In September, the Government of Mexico announced the creation of 300 specialized treatment medical units nationwide (70 ready in 2007) and 64 new Community Centers

for Comprehensive Addiction Treatment. The Government of Mexico has an annual

budget of $110 million for prevention and treatment of addictions. Approximately

$27 million supports the Youth Integration Centers and $14.5 million is directed toward the prevention and treatment of addictions. Mexico’s asset forfeiture law requires that 33 percent of assets seized be used for demand reduction programs.

Question 3. Despite having brought up Central American gang violence policy recommendations in a hearing over 2 years to solve a problem that has plagued Central America for well over 2 years, we now see this request in an emergency supplemental. And this is true for the $500 million to Mexico. I’m concerned over how this

will affect future Latin American foreign assistance.

• a. How will this package affect overall U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America

in the FY09 budget?

• b. Will this package continue to be paid for over the existing level or do you

predict some sort of cuts?

Answer.

3a. The FY 2009 budget is still under discussion with OMB. We look forward to

reviewing it with you once it is finalized. The Merida Initiative is a high priority,

as is existing funding to the hemisphere; however, we are unable to predict future

funding levels.

3b. On July 18, at the inaugural, U.S.–SICA Security Dialogue, I announced the

U.S. Strategy to Combat Gangs from Central America and Mexico. Under this comprehensive strategy, the United States is working with partner countries to combat

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transnational and other gangs that commit crimes in Central America, Mexico, and

the United States. The U.S. Gang Strategy focuses efforts in five areas: Diplomacy,

repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention.

Work has begun under all five pillars. In addition to work being done throughout

the interagency to confront the gang issue in Central America, at the July meeting,

the U.S. Government committed $3 million for prevention efforts and we have recently reprogrammed $16 million that will help fund portions of the gang strategy

also.

The Merida Initiative, if funded, would permit us to fully implement the gang

strategy. The package contains elements to improve law enforcement capabilities in

Central America as well as increased funding for prevention programs, including

funding for community policing and reintegration programs.

Question 4. The $50 million in assistance for the Central American States is onetenth of that slated for Mexico.

• a. Is not the problem of drug trafficking and criminal violence just as serious

in those countries? • b. Are there plans to increase funding to Central America in the future? • c. When will those proposals be presented to Congress?

Answer. Drug trafficking and criminal violence are very serious problems in Cen- tral America. Like the funds requested for Mexico, the $50 million request for Central America is a first step. We expect to request additional funds in support of the

Merida Initiative as a part of the regular budget cycle.

The Central America portion of the package was formulated to support the regional security strategy developed by the Central American Integration System

(SICA). The targeted assistance at this time would directly respond to their request

as we seek to define more effective joint approaches and measures to address

transnational threats. On November 20, a technical team traveled to Guatemala to

hold consultations and continue our dialog on deepening security cooperation. Additional teams will travel to Central America later this month.

Question 5. Documents provided to this committee this week indicate that some $11 million of the $50 million requested—over 20 percent of the request—is for

equipment for the police for the nations of Central America. The allocations to the

individual countries have not been determined.

• a. What assessments have been conducted to determine the amount of assistance required? • b. When do you expect to determine these country allocations? • c. Why should Congress provide this assistance when the administration has

not even engaged in such basic allocations between countries?

Answer. To ensure the most effective use of resources, it was very important for

us to consult with the Central American countries to determine their police equipment needs before allocating funding to individual countries. With that information,

the United States will be able to provide underequipped Central American countries

with the equipment that will best allow civilian law enforcement forces to respond

to the most pressing threats they deal with on a daily basis.

We have identified initial funding levels, but we are still in the process of confirming these amounts. We have and continue to work closely with our embassies

and personnel on the ground to assess and determine individual countries’ law enforcement needs. In response to our November 20 request during USG consultations

with the Central American Integration System (SICA) on the Merida Initiative, we

have received lists of prioritized nonlethal equipment needs from each Central

American Government. We are using this information, together with that provided

by our experts in the region, to refine our decisions. Additionally, expert teams will

travel to the region in mid-January to conduct further assessments. Once we have

a complete picture of the requirements, we will work with Congress to allocate

funds to individual countries.

Question 6. In the hearing you mentioned that you will vet agencies/units who

would receive U.S. funding to make sure that the funding will not be used to suppress human rights or any crimes.

• a. How exactly does this vetting process work?

• b. What safeguards are proposed to ensure that the proposed assistance is used

for its intended purpose and to ensure that our partners are not cooperating

with the drug cartels?

Answer. The Embassy vets Mexican Government officials from law enforcement

agencies who attend USG-sponsored training or receive other direct benefits, in accordance with the provisions of the Leahy amendment, to determine whether they,

57

or the units of which they are members, are known to have been involved in any

past human rights abuses. This process involves name checking through databases

at the Embassy and in Washington.

The proposed support will be provided in the form of equipment and training. The

Embassy has in place end-use monitoring systems to ensure that the elements provided are used for their intended purposes. The programs will be overseen by Foreign Service Officers staffing the Narcotics/Law Enforcement Affairs Sections (NAS)

in our Embassies in Mexico and the Central America countries; these individuals

are supported in Washington by Bureau of International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs (INL) subject and country experts, as well as budget and management experts. For example, INL regularly sends in-house experts to inspect NAS

offices throughout the world, conducting Management Assessment Visits that review

NAS policies and procedures for internal management controls, property management (including end-use monitoring), contracting and procurement, financial management, and human resources management.

Each NAS monitors the condition and maintenance of commodities provided to the

recipient agency of the host governments. They use this information to produce an

end-use monitoring report which forms part of a comprehensive annual report to

Congress. The State Department considers end-use monitoring one of the critical

management tasks for which field offices are responsible.

Additionally, the Mexican Government is undertaking great efforts to monitor the

reliability of its own staff. Mexican law enforcement agencies are developing their

own vetting systems that include the use of polygraphs to weed out corrupt officers.

USG law enforcement agencies train the Mexican personnel who administer these

tests in the proper use of the polygraph.

On November 16, 2007, 22 new Mexican Federal Police (SSP) polygraph examiners graduated from a course given by the Texas Department of Public Security

(DPS) Police Academy in Austin, TX, that was organized by the FBI and financed

by NAS/Mexico. During this intensive 10-week training course, the DPS and the

FBI also provided a 1-week inservice ‘‘Senior Polygraph Examiners’’ training course

to the SSP’s existing 15 seasoned (and vetted) polygraph staff, so that they could

serve as mentors to the new recruits and train other entrants.

Question 7. The joint statement notes that Mexico has increased its security

spending aimed at drug trafficking networks to $2.5 billion annually.

• a. What is Mexico contributing from its budget?

Answer. Out of an approximate overall security budget for 2007 of $7 billion (depending on exchange-rate variations), the Government of Mexico is dedicating approximately $2.4 billion to the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking.

It is important to remember that the states and municipal governments expend far

greater amounts on security and law enforcement, since they have primary jurisdiction. According to the Embassy of Mexico, the Federal budget for 2007 includes

funding directed to the fight against organized crime in the following areas, in millions of dollars:

National Council Against Addictions ................................................................... 78.6

Ministry of Communications and Transport ....................................................... 10.2

Customs .................................................................................................................. 11.7

Financial Intelligence Unit ................................................................................... 5.1

Ministry of the Interior ......................................................................................... 277.7

Ministry of National Defense ................................................................................ 131.8

Ministry of the Navy ............................................................................................. 21.1

Office of the Attorney General .............................................................................. 36.5

Public Security Support Fund (FASP) ................................................................. 459.3

Ministry of Public Security ................................................................................... 1,255

Federal Preventive Police—(433.7)

Prevention and Social Rehabilitation—(222.5)

Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System—(106)

Other areas (including Security Council and Minors Council)—(492.8)

Total ............................................................................................................. 2,386

• 7b. Has it committed to this level of funding—or even increased funding—for

the next 2 or 3 years?

Answer. President Calderon has publicly stated that restoring public safety and

security is the top priority of his administration. As such, he has committed to taking those steps necessary to ensuring this priority.

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• 7c. In Colombia, an additional tax was imposed to fund programs for ‘‘Plan Colombia.’’ Is Mexico seeking additional revenue sources domestically to pay for

increased security efforts?

Answer. According to published Government of Mexico (GOM) figures, spending

for 2008 on the Ministry of Public Security will increase by 39.4 percent, for the

Ministry of Defense by 4.6 percent, for the Navy by 2.1 percent, for the Office of

the Attorney General by 6 percent, and the Secretariat of the Interior by 28 percent.

More detailed breakdowns for component agencies and specific projects are not yet

available.

GOM revenues for 2008 will increase by 1.2 percent of GDP, or approximately

USD 11.7 billion, as a result of tax changes in the Public Finance Reform legislation, which was approved September 2007.

Question 8. My concern is that by attacking the supply side and not the demand

side, we will only squeeze the cartels, drug trafficking and violence to a different

region. The Caribbean, and specifically Haiti, are likely new destinations.

• a. What is in this package to prevent that from happening?

• b. What are our current efforts to prevent that from happening?

Answer. This package focuses on improving the capacity of the Mexican and Central American governments to meet their security and law enforcement challenges,

and does not provide for increased assistance to Caribbean governments. Nevertheless, we are cognizant of the possibility that success in Mexico and Central America

may force drug trafficking and other organized criminals to seek new routes and

methods.

Current U.S. counternarcotics assistance, administered by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides training, equipment, travel, and technical assistance for a number of law enforcement and drug

demand-reduction efforts in the Caribbean. The primary purpose is to improve the

capacity of law enforcement agencies to target trafficking organizations and conduct

more efficient interdiction operations. INL assistance often supports specialized

units, such as canine detection and vetted investigative units. INL funding also supports demand reduction programs, participation in interoperability conferences, and

in some cases participation in the Container Security Initiative. In the Eastern Caribbean, INL assistance also supports restoration and ongoing maintenance of interdiction patrol boats. In Haiti, U.S. counternarcotics and security assistance focuses

on reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Haitian Coast Guard. USGprovided equipment and technical assistance is aimed at transforming the HNP into

an effective law enforcement institution. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard supports

Haitian Coast Guard operations with leadership and technical courses and visits by

Mobile Training Teams on such areas as boat maintenance, law enforcement techniques, and port security operations.

In addition to the counternarcotics assistance provided INL, several Caribbean

countries are participating in Operation Enduring Friendship, a maritime security

program designed to help defend the southern approaches of the United States by

increasing the maritime domain awareness and interdiction capabilities of the participating countries. While Operation Enduring Friendship is intended to help protect the United States and the region from the full range of maritime threats, its

improvements to regional maritime cooperation and interdiction will help to deter

illegal trafficking in the region.

It should also be noted that since the heyday of Caribbean trafficking, the U.S.

and its regional partners have taken several important steps to make illegal trafficking through the region more difficult. The aforementioned programs as well as

Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), an interagency counternarcotics

operation in cooperation with the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, provide striking

examples. A 2005 GAO report noted that improved intelligence, better regional maritime cooperation, and the use of armed helicopters against go-fast boats, have combined to make the Caribbean a more dangerous environment for drug traffickers.

The result was a string of recordbreaking years for drug seizures and disruptions

in the drug transit zone from 2000–2005. The same report emphasized the importance of the 25 Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements between

the U.S. and regional governments.

We believe that our assistance programs, excellent regional cooperation, and support for USG agencies such as Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South, will deter illegal trafficking organizations from moving the bulk of their activity to the central

and eastern Caribbean. However, we will be in close contact with the intelligence

and law enforcement communities, as well as our partners in the region, looking at

any indications that such a transition is underway.

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Question 9. The State Department Human Rights Report for 2006 (issued in

March 2007) states that ‘‘a deeply entrenched culture of impunity and corruption

persisted’’ in Mexico, ‘‘particularly at the state and local level.’’ Among the human

rights problems reported were unlawful killings by security forces; kidnappings, including by police; torture; arbitrary arrests and detention; corruption, inefficiency,

and lack of transparency in the judicial system.’’

• a. What measures will be taken as part of this assistance program to improve

the human rights record of Mexico’s security forces?

• b. What is being done in Mexico to address the widespread use of torture in

the public security and criminal justice systems, the same institutions that are

primary recipients of U.S. assistance under the President’s proposal?

Answer.

a. The protection of human rights is an integral part of all USG training programs, both in the course curriculum and in the selection and vetting of the individuals and units to be trained. The Merida Initiative includes $3.5 million specifically

for human rights training of security forces and support for NGOs and other civil

society groups involved in human rights and citizen participation activities.

The Merida Initiative includes funding to help strengthen and expand the office

of inspector general at the Attorney General’s Office, the Office of Professional Responsibility, which has authority to investigate both police and civilians, the Secretariat of the Public Function, which has governmentwide investigative authority, civilian complaint centers, and support for civilian watchdog organizations. These

tools will help maintain public accountability of law enforcement and justice sector

institutions, and those within the Mexican Government are strongly supported by

the Calderon administration already, which has recognized the need to enhance

their functions. In late September 2007, in response to allegations of human rights

abuses, the Mexican military accepted all of the recommendations of Mexico’s National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH). Mexico’s Army, SEDENA, affirmed

its commitment to collaborating with CNDH on outstanding investigations. In October, a civilian court sentenced 8 soldiers up to 41 years in prison for raping 16

women in June 2006 in Coahuilla. This represented the first time that troops have

been tried in a civilian court.

b. Recent Mexican governments have taken steps to reduce the use of torture and

coerced confessions. In 2003, the Mexican Government promulgated guidelines that

require prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel to receive training on

human rights and police practice according to the Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, known as the ‘‘Istanbul Protocol,’’ adopted by the Human

Rights Commission of the United Nations. Mexican law prohibits torture and does

not allow the use of coerced confessions. It establishes assessment, investigation,

and reporting guidelines and procedures in accordance with international human

rights standards and international instruments. The move to an oral judicial system

will also have the added benefit of lessening the possibility of coerced confessions

by police investigators and/or prosecutors.

Question 10. The most recent National Drug Threat Assessment issued by the National Drug Intelligence Center indicated that the trafficking of drugs in the eastern

Pacific increased substantially in the last couple of years. That suggests a need for

significant assets in maritime interdiction. Yet the request is for only two maritime

patrol aircraft (CASA 235) that cost $50 million apiece.

• a. What other measures are we taking or planning to take? Will Mexico purchase any of these aircraft with its own funds?

Answer. In order to deny the use of the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean

to transnational criminal organizations and terrorists, the Government of Mexico

(GOM) has requested that the USG provide it with two CASA 235 maritime patrol

aircraft to complement the existing seven CASA 212 aircraft currently operated by

the Mexican Navy (SEMAR.) This support would complement purchases to be made

by the Government of Mexico of additional aircraft and sea craft; it also standardizes with equipment utilized by the U.S. Coast Guard, providing for greater interoperability. Mexico’s short-term objective is to build a fleet of six CASA 235s and

seven CASA 212s to enable it to conduct maritime surveillance over the eastern Pacific and the western Caribbean. In addition, SEMAR has stated its intentions to

increase its fleet of naval patrol vessels.

The addition of CASA 235 maritime patrol aircraft will further enhance the ability of SEMAR to conduct long-range maritime patrols. This will improve Mexico’s

maritime domain awareness and, together with other Mexican enhancements to

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their interdiction capabilities, should result in increased seizures, ultimately reducing the use of Mexico’s littoral waters by transnational criminals and terrorists.

Question 11. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office noted the

United States and Mexico have cooperated on maritime interdiction in recent years

but that the two countries have not agreed to a bilateral maritime cooperation

agreement to allow U.S. law enforcement personnel to board and search Mexicanflagged vessels without asking the Government of Mexico for authority to board on

a case-by-case basis. At present, the process requires a time-consuming effort to obtain permission from the government in such cases.

• a. Are we seeking such an agreement that would provide authority to board in

advance, and what obstacles are there to achieving such an agreement?

Answer. The Calderon administration has been noticeably more responsive to U.S.

requests to board suspect Mexican-flagged vessels than were previous administrations. While there is currently no formal maritime agreement between the United

States and Mexico, Government of Mexico (GOM) permission to board a Mexicanflag vessel is accomplished by approaching the GOM on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to article 17 of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.

Question 12. In March 2007, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs issued

a fact sheet stating that the Inter-American convention against Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms will ‘‘make the citizens of the hemisphere safer.’’

But just a month earlier, in a letter to this committee setting forth its priorities for

treaties in the 110th Congress, the Department stated that it did not support Senate action on this convention.

• a. If the convention will make the citizens of the hemisphere safer, and the Government of Mexico is asking for our help in reducing firearms trafficking, why

does the administration not support Senate action on this convention?

Answer. The Department of State continues to believe that the Inter-American

Convention against the illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) will make the citizens of

the hemisphere safer by helping shut down the illicit transnational arms market

that fuels the violence associated with drug trafficking, terrorism, and international

organized crime. We share your interest in the CIFTA and appreciate the importance you attach to it, and are in dialog with the interagency community, industry,

and civil society on the importance we attach to ratification of this convention.

Question 13. The administration’s proposal included $37 million in program support, including U.S. personnel costs.

• f. How many additional U.S. personnel will be needed to support the proposal

in Mexico?

• g. Will there be an increase in U.S. law enforcement agents in Mexico?

• h. Will contractors be used?

• i. If so, how?

Answer. The estimated program support costs for the Merida Initiative are based

on an evaluation of support and oversight requirements in light of current programs

in the Western Hemisphere Area (WHA) region and oversight initiatives implemented for the Iraq and Afghanistan programs.

Such funds would be used primarily for personnel costs (some direct hire, but

mostly contract U.S. and foreign national staff); additional office and residential

space; International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs;

and other administrative expenses for program planning, design, and implementation.

The program support funds will also encompass a proposed management support

group to ensure compliance with U.S. Government internal controls for financial

management, contract oversight, end-use monitoring while providing a platform

dedicated to quality assurance, monitoring, and evaluation of the individual country

programs.

Initial personnel estimates indicate that providing the full level of program support and oversight functions will require up to 75 additional personnel in Mexico

and Central America. The majority would be foreign national staff filling financial

management (accounting, voucher examination) and logistics support capacities, but

would also include several personal services contract (PSC) personnel focusing on

contract and project management and oversight.

Question 14. How specifically will success be measured?

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Answer. The fight against organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico and

Central America is tough, complex, and long term. The commitment made by these

countries is significant, and their democratically elected governments will be held

to account by voters. The metric used by the citizens of Mexico and Central America

will be palpable and reflect their individual experiences: Can they win back control

of their communities and institutions, and build lives free of intimidation and fear?

Our role in this great struggle is specific and immediate. In the short term, we

will determine the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative by:

• Increased arrests of drug traffickers and gang members, and the harrassment

and dismantling of organized crime syndicates;

• Increased interdiction of illegal drugs and weapons;

• Improved effectiveness of the national judicial systems, leading to a reduction

in criminal case backlogs, a reduction in the average length of trials, and increased confidence in the courts;

• Improved law enforcement cooperation across institutional and national boundaries, leading to greater coordination of police action, and the ability to pursue

and arrest criminals throughout Mesoamerica.

In the long term, we will measure the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative by

its ability to transform the tone and substance of our bilateral and regional cooperation. The Merida Initiative represents a new and innovative method to address

shared responsibilities and shared challenges. Its success, or failure, will shape the

future of our relationships.

Æ