FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Lack of Haitian

Commitment Limited

Success of U.S. Aid to

Justice System

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and

Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on International Relations, House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EDT

Tuesday,

September 19, 2000

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257
Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our review of U.S.

assistance provided to Haiti’s justice system.

In September 1994, the United States and other countries intervened militarily in Haiti to

restore the democratically elected government that had been overthrown by the Haitian

military in September 1991. Before this intervention, the Haitian military controlled the

police and the judicial sector. Military and political cronyism dominated these

institutions, and the military influenced the appointments of magistrates and the

decisions made by them. These justice institutions were widely regarded as ineffective

and corrupt.

After the intervention, the United States stepped in to provide assistance to the Haitian

justice system -- both the police and the judicial sector -- aimed at developing a

professional civilian police force, enhancing the effectiveness of existing judicial

organizations, and improving the Haitian people’s access to justice. This assistance also

aimed at supporting a broader reform of the judicial sector that the Haitian government

intended to pursue over time. The objectives of this assistance program were consistent

with U.S. justice assistance objectives in other countries in Latin America.1

As you know, U.S. assistance to the judicial sector was suspended in July 2000, because

the United States was not able to negotiate an agreement with the Haitian government

for continuing these assistance efforts. As of September 2000, most of the U.S.

assistance to the Haitian police has stopped, due to congressional concerns related to

events surrounding the May 2000 Haitian parliamentary and local elections. The U.S.

Department of State is currently reassessing several aspects of the U.S. relationship with

Haiti, based on concerns about how votes were counted in Haiti’s May 2000

parliamentary and local elections.

My statement today is based on work we are currently concluding for your committee

and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. First, I will discuss the results of the U.S.

assistance provided to the Haitian police and judicial sector and the major problems that

continue to affect these justice institutions. Second, I will discuss the primary factors

that have affected the success of the assistance.

Our work is based on meetings with officials of the U.S. Departments of State and

Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Coast Guard,

and other U.S. agencies. To examine the results of assistance provided, in June 2000, we

went to Haiti, where we met with officials of the Haitian government, other donor

countries (Canada and France), the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and

1

See Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-98

(GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999); Foreign Assistance: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance to

Five Latin American Countries (GAO/NSIAD-99-195, Aug. 4, 1999); and Foreign

Assistance: Status of Rule of Law Program Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-00-8R, Oct. 13,

1999).
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

U.S. contractors. We also performed an extensive review of program documents. We

expect to issue our report in October 2000.

SUMMARY

Over the last 6 fiscal years, the United States provided about $97 million in assistance to

help Haiti establish its first civilian-controlled police force and improve aspects of its

judicial sector, which includes various judicial institutions, procedures, and legal codes.

About $70 million in U.S. assistance helped Haiti recruit, train, organize, and equip a

basic police force, including specialized units, such as an antinarcotics unit, a special

investigative unit, and the Haitian Coast Guard. During the same period, the United

States provided about $27 million in assistance that led to improvements in training

magistrates and prosecutors, management practices of judicial institutions, and in the

access of the Haitian people to justice services. However, despite these achievements,

the police force has not effectively carried out its basic law enforcement responsibilities,

and recent events suggest that politicization has compromised the force, according to

U.S. and other donor officials. The judicial sector also has serious weaknesses, according

to U.S. and other donor officials. The sector has not undergone a major reform and, as a

result, lacks independence from the executive branch and has outdated legal codes and

cumbersome judicial proceedings. Further, the judicial institutions have personnel

shortages; inadequate infrastructure and equipment, such as shortages of vehicles and

legal texts; and an ineffective internal oversight organization unable to stem corruption.

Overall, these institutions provides justice services to only a small segment of the

population, because the institutions rely heavily in judicial proceedings on the use of

French rather than Creole—the language of the majority of the population.

The key factor affecting the lack of success of U.S. assistance has been the Haitian

government’s lack of commitment to addressing the major problems of its police and

judicial institutions. U.S. assistance to the police has been impeded because the Haitian

government has not acted, for example, to (1) strengthen the police organization by

filling currently vacant key leadership positions, such as the Inspector General; (2)

provide the human and physical resources needed to develop an effective police force;

(3) support vigorously police investigations of serious crimes; and (4) keep the police

force out of politics. U.S. assistance to the judicial sector has been largely undercut

because the Haitian government has not, for instance, (1) followed through on

implementing the broad reforms needed to address its major problems, (2) assumed

responsibility for adopting many of the improvements made possible by U.S. assistance,

and (3) provided the physical and human resources needed to operate effectively.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and two organizations within

the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division--the International Criminal Investigative

and Training Assistance Program and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,

Assistance, and Training--implemented the majority of assistance provided to the Haitian

police and judicial sector. The Department of State has overall responsibility for

coordinating this assistance. It also funds training programs implemented by U.S. law
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

enforcement agencies and, immediately after Haiti’s return to democracy in 1994, carried

out some training programs, mainly in support of the Presidential Palace Guard, which

protects the Haitian President.

Several other U.S. agencies have also been involved in supporting the Haitian police. For

example, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Defense played key roles in

helping to build the Haitian Coast Guard—a main component of the Haitian National

Police. Also, the Drug Enforcement Administration helped to support the police’s

antinarcotics unit. In addition, the U.S. Customs Service helped to train Haitian customs

and police officers on countersmuggling techniques.

U.S. ASSISTANCE HELPED IMPROVE THE POLICE AND

JUDICIAL SECTOR, BUT MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS PERSIST

U.S. assistance to Haiti’s justice sector totaled about $97 million since fiscal year 1995,

with about $70 million going to help build a civilian-controlled police force and about $27

million going to improve certain aspects of Haiti’s judicial system, such as case

registration and tracking systems. Appendix I provides a breakdown of U.S. assistance

to the Haitian police and justice sectors.

U.S. Assistance Helped Build a New Haitian Police Force

U.S. assistance was intended to help Haiti create and strengthen a civilian-controlled

police force that would be professional and respect the rights of the population. The

assistance was used to recruit, train, organize, and equip a new police force and was

administered under the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative

Training and Assistance Program.

The U.S. assistance helped Haiti

• recruit an interim police force of about 4,000 police officers and U.N. police monitors

to work with this force;

• establish and equip a new civilian-controlled police organization and several

specialized units, such as an investigative division and its antinarcotics and forensics

units, the special investigative unit,2 the crowd control unit, the special weapons and

tactics unit,3 and the Haitian Coast Guard;

• create a police academy and recruit and train a new police force of about 6,500 police

officers;

• train police officers for the specialized units;

• develop managerial and supervisory skills at all levels of the police force; and

• establish an Inspector General’s office for monitoring the police force.

2

This unit has focused on investigating high profile crimes, including extrajudicial

killings. The U.S. assistance’s long-term goal is to help integrate this unit into the

mainstream judicial police.

3 The special weapons and tactics unit responds to crises in the Port-au-Prince area. This

unit receives orders directly from the Director General of the police.
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

Other U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Drug Enforcement

Administration, and the U.S. Customs Service, provided some assistance. For example,

the U.S. Coast Guard provided over $4.6 million to help organize, train, and equip the

Haitian Coast Guard. This assistance helped Haiti establish one Coast Guard base in

Port-au-Prince, refurbish three vessels, maintain equipment, and develop capabilities for

dealing with drug smuggling and illegal migration, for example.

Major Weaknesses Persist in the Police Force

Despite some initial achievements made possible by U.S. assistance, the current Haitian

police force has major deficiencies and is considered by many U.S. and other donor

officials as a largely ineffective law enforcement body. According to these officials, the

police force suffers from organizational weaknesses, shortages of personnel and training,

shortages of vehicles and equipment, and limited investigative capabilities. Over the past

year, particularly, U.S. and other donor officials have expressed concern over the Haitian

police’s crippled internal oversight organization, continued corruption, and increased

signs of politicization related to recent Haitian elections.

Starting in late 1994, the United States helped Haiti organize its police force so as to have

the major components of a modern civilian police organization. However, the current

organization of the Haitian police is weak, according to U.S. and other donor officials.

For example, several key police units are not fully operational, such as the Maritime, Air,

Border, Migration, and Forest Police Directorate. Also, a few individuals manage the

police organization in a highly centralized manner, delegating little authority from

headquarters to the field and within the police institutions in the field. As a result, the

police force in the field shows little initiative, tending to be reactive rather than actively

patrolling the community. Furthermore, the police force has not yet developed a strong

esprit de corps and discipline. During our visits to several police units, we saw that many

lower ranking police officers did not show much respect for high-ranking officers and

were milling around police facilities, reading newspapers, or watching soccer games on

television.

Initially, the United States sought to help Haiti recruit and train police officers, and by

1998 the police force had reached a peak of about 6,500 officers. However, shortages of

personnel plague the current police force. According to U.S. and other donor officials,

the current police force is estimated to range between 3,500 and 4,500 police officers.

Compared with a country like El Salvador, with 19,000 police officers serving about 6

million people, Haiti – with its approximately 8 million people – has a relatively small

police force. In addition, the Haitian police has a shortage of qualified commanders and

supervisors.

According to U.S. officials, there has been serious attrition in police ranks, partly as a

result of the police’s failure to provide professional opportunities, to implement a work

schedule better than the current schedule of 12 hours a day 6 days a week, and to

provide work opportunities in locations near the officers’ families. U.S. officials noted

that police officers have also left the force to join the growing private security industry,
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

which offers fewer risks and better pay and working conditions. Also, more than 1,100

police officers were dismissed from the force since 1995, as a result of the police

Inspector General’s investigations into police misconduct. In addition, the police’s

failure to recruit new officers regularly has exacerbated the attrition of the police force.

Initially, the United States placed great emphasis on training the new force and setting up

the police academy to continue such training. However, most of the current police force

has received only basic training. For instance, police officers attend an initial 6-month

training course at the academy, but they receive very little or no follow-on training unless

they are assigned to a specialized unit. Although officers in the specialized units receive

more training, they still have limited technical capabilities to prevent or investigate

crimes. Most police officers do not get regular qualification training in firearms use, and,

as a result, many officers are not qualified to use their weapons and cannot properly

maintain their firearms, according to U.S. officials.

U.S. assistance helped Haiti equip its police force by supplying police vehicles,

communications systems, and other equipment and supplies. However, the Haitian

police force still faces severe shortages of all these items. For instance, during our visits

to Saint-Marc and Jacmel, we noticed that the police stations had few vehicles,

communications equipment, and other police equipment to service the large populations

and territories under their jurisdictions. Moreover, U.S. officials told us that the special

weapons and tactics unit could not train with its issued weapons because it did not have

enough ammunition. According to U.S. officials, the effectiveness of Haitian Coast

Guard is seriously constrained by its lack of bases, personnel, and equipment,

particularly in the southern part of the country where the main cocaine trafficking routes

are located. As a result, this unit has a limited capability to stop vessels suspected of

carrying illegal cargo and emigrants.

The United States sought to help Haiti improve the investigative capabilities of its police

force by providing training, technical assistance, and donations of equipment. However,

the current force has made little progress in improving its investigative capabilities. For

instance, U.S. officials indicated that the judicial police does not have enough trained

officers to investigate crime—its primary mission—and the antinarcotics unit is too

small to carry out major drug investigations. The antinarcotics unit also has limited

investigative capabilities; it was until recently without a leader for months; and it

consists of only 28 officers. According to an assistance agreement between the United

States and Haiti, this unit was to have had about 75 officers.

Recent Problems Raise Particular Concerns About the Haitian Police

Over the past year, several problems have arisen with the Haitian police force that have

raised particular concern for U.S. and other donor officials. These concerns relate to (1)

the weakened position of the police Inspector General’s unit, (2) the inability of the

police to deal with the growing drug-trafficking threat, and (3) the signs of politicization

of the police force during this past year’s extended election period.

In 1995, the United States helped Haiti establish an oversight structure to monitor the

conduct of its police. However, over the past year the police oversight structure has
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

been crippled by the unexpected departures of the Secretary of State for Public Security

and the Inspector General of the police, according to U.S., Haitian, and other donor

officials. These two positions are key to ensuring the internal accountability of the

police force. The U.S. Department of State noted that groups reportedly associated with

former President Aristide’s political party mounted a public campaign calling for the

resignation of the Secretary of State for Public Security. On October 7, 1999, the

Secretary resigned from his position, which remains vacant, and left the country.

According to U.S. officials, the Inspector General–who was conducting investigations

into human rights violations, narcotrafficking, corruption, and other offenses allegedly

committed by police officers-–unexpectedly left the force in April 2000 and has not been

permanently replaced. According to U.S. and Haitian officials, the Inspector General’s

investigations had led to the dismissal of over 1,100 police officers for misconduct. As

reported by the Department of State, at least 58 police officers were in prison as of

September 1999 on a variety of charges. The Department noted that the police more

often simply discharged officers caught committing flagrant abuses, rather than initiating

legal proceedings against them. Since the departure of the Inspector General,

investigations of police misconduct have dramatically decreased, opening the door to

increased corruption within the force, according to U.S. and Haitian officials.

The United States also helped establish the antinarcotics unit and the Haitian Coast

Guard to address the growing drug trafficking problem. U.S. estimates indicate that the

percentage of cocaine coming into the United States through Haiti increased from 10 to

14 percent from 1998 to 1999. However, the Haitian police has been generally ineffective

in countering the growing drug threat, due to the limited capabilities and resources of its

antinarcotics unit and Coast Guard. As a result, the police has conducted few major

drug-related investigations successfully. Moreover, the Haitian police does not have the

resources to stop airdrops of cocaine loads to waiting land vehicles or maritime vessels.

The United States sought to help Haiti establish a professional and impartial police force.

However, events over the past year have raised serious concerns about the impartiality

of the force. In addition to concerns over the weakened role of the police oversight

structure, as noted earlier, U.S. and other donor officials have serious concerns over the

partisan role played by the police during the May 2000 parliamentary and local elections.

During the extended election period, for example, the police on occasion failed to

protect legal demonstrations by the opposition. According to U.S. officials, the police

also arrested some opposition candidates after the elections and failed to successfully

investigate major killings, including political assassinations, committed before the

elections.

Assistance Helped Improve Certain Aspects of the Judicial Sector

From fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the United States provided about $27 million to

support Haiti’s judicial system. The aid was intended to help Haiti improve the

effectiveness of existing judicial organizations and enhance the access of the population

to justice. It also was intended to help Haiti develop and implement a broad reform of

the judicial sector that would enhance its independence, modernize criminal codes, and

restructure judicial organizations and processes.
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

USAID, its contractors, and the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial

Development, Assistance and Training provided most of this assistance under the USAID

Administration of Justice Program. The bulk of the assistance, about $23 million, funded

(1) administrative enhancements for judicial institutions, such as case registration and

tracking systems; (2) judge and prosecutor training; and (3) the establishment and

operation of the magistrate school. The remaining assistance, $4 million, funded legal

assistance and education as a means of improving the access of the population to justice.

Serious Problems Remain in the Judicial Sector

Despite U.S. assistance, the Haitian judicial sector continues to exhibit major

shortcomings. This sector has not undergone a major reform, and, as a result, it has

outdated legal codes and cumbersome judicial proceedings. Also, it has inadequate

infrastructure and shortages of personnel and equipment, and limited investigative

capabilities. Furthermore, it suffers from corruption and a lack of effective internal

oversight, and it serves only a small portion of the population.

Despite the constitutional mandate for an independent judicial sector, the executive

branch, through the Ministry of Justice, continues to control the judicial sector, including

the judicial budget and judicial appointments, training, evaluation, and removal. The

lack of independence compromises the impartiality of the judicial sector, according to

U.S., Haitian, and other donor officials. For instance, the Haitian government has not

vigorously supported investigations and prosecutions of major crimes, including drug

trafficking, major killings, and political violence. Investigations and prosecutions have

moved slowly and produced very limited results, according to U.S. officials.

The judicial system is characterized by outdated legal codes and complex, timeconsuming procedures. In criminal cases, many people are put behind bars in preventive

detention. Some judicial institutions have large case backlogs, and criminal courts hold

few jury trials every year.4During our visits to judicial facilities in Port-au-Prince and

Jacmel, judicial officials emphasized the urgent need for developing and implementing a

comprehensive reform of the judicial sector to modernize legal codes and streamline

judicial proceedings.

The judicial sector receives only 11.5 percent of the Ministry of Justice budget, and as a

consequence, the sector has serious personnel shortages and inadequate infrastructure.

For example, during our visits to judicial institutions in Port-au-Prince and Jacmel,

Haitian officials emphasized that their institutions did not have enough personnel to

conduct business adequately, given the size of the populations and territories they had to

serve. We also found that prosecutors’ offices, justice of the peace courts, and other

courts had very basic infrastructure. One of the courts that we visited had no doors,

windows, bathrooms, running water, or electricity. The courts also had serious supply

shortages, including vehicles, legal texts, telephones, and office supplies. Haitian officials

noted that the dire conditions of judicial facilities such as this one projected a bad image

4 Juries are convened only for serious criminal offenses, such as murders.
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

and did not inspire respect for their institutions, seriously undermining the people’s

confidence in the judicial sector.

The judicial sector also has limited capabilities to investigate and prosecute cases.

Judicial officials have received little professional training; have minimum resources to

conduct investigations, prosecutions, and trials; have received limited support from

specialized units, such as the judicial police and forensics unit; and do not have many

incentives to solve major crimes. In addition, some judicial officials stated that, because

they have little personal protection, they fear for their personal safety when dealing with

high-profile cases, such as drug trafficking and political assassinations.

In addition, the judicial sector suffers from corruption and lacks adequate oversight to

monitor the behavior of judicial officials. For instance, U.S. officials noted that the

cumbersome and lengthy judicial proceedings create opportunities for corruption among

judicial officials willing to accept bribes in return for advancing cases in their offices.

Also, according to these officials, the Ministry of Justice has a judicial inspection unit

that has limited capabilities and has done little to address corruption and other major

problems of the judicial sector. Despite efforts to enhance this unit, it remains largely

ineffective, according to U.S. officials.

The judicial sector continues to provide only limited access to justice for the majority of

the Haitian population. For example, by not having a public defender’s office, by not

systematically providing legal assistance to the population, and by conducting most of its

business through written procedures in French, the judicial sector remains unavailable

to the majority of the population, which is poor and illiterate and speaks only Creole.

KEY FACTOR AFFECTING SUCCESS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IS THE HAITIAN

GOVERNMENT’S LACK OF COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING JUSTICE

INSTITUTIONS

The primary factor affecting the success of U.S. assistance has been the Haitian

government’s lack of clear commitment to supporting the police and judicial sector and

dealing with the main problems affecting these institutions.

The Haitian Government Lacks Strong

Commitment to Strengthening the Police Force

U.S. assistance to the police has been undermined because the Haitian government--after

showing a strong initial commitment to establishing a civilian-controlled police force--

failed to (1) strengthen the organizational capabilities of the force, (2) support

investigations of police corruption and serious crimes, and (3) keep the police out of

politics, particularly during the past election year.

The Haitian government’s failure to strengthen the organizational capabilities of the

police has hindered U.S. efforts to improve the capabilities of the force, according to U.S.

officials. Although the Haitian government has allocated the bulk of the Ministry of

Justice budget to the police and prisons--about 83 percent of the 1996-97 budget--the
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

government has weakened the police by not filling key leadership positions, such as the

Inspector General and the head of the antinarcotics unit, and by not strengthening key

units. For instance, since the unexpected departure of the Inspector General, his office

has stopped vigorously investigating police misbehavior, including corruption. Also,

some key police units, such as the antinarcotics unit, have limited capabilities because

the government has not provided needed resources and personnel. According to the

Department of State, the Haitian government failed to increase the size of the

antinarcotics unit, as had been agreed to by the U.S. and Haitian governments.

U.S. assistance to improve the investigative capabilities of the police has been

constrained by the failure of the Haitian government to support investigations of police

corruption and serious crimes, including drug-related crimes and political assassinations.

In March 2000, the State Department reported that the Haitian government had failed to

investigate drug-related corruption involving police officers. The State Department also

reported that little progress had been made in bringing to justice persons responsible for

major killings, such as political killings, in Haiti. U.S. officials are concerned about the

Haitian government’s lack of support for the police’s special investigations unit, which is

responsible for investigating major killings. This unit’s human resources have declined

by about 80 percent since 1997.

U.S. assistance to the Haitian police has also been undermined by the Haitian

government’s failure to keep the police out of politics during this past election year. The

force’s inaction during several violent campaign incidents and its arrests of several

political candidates seriously compromised the perception of police impartiality.

Haitian Government Lacks Strong Commitment

to Improving the Judicial Sector

U.S. assistance to the judicial sector has been undercut because the Haitian government,

after initially supporting the assistance effort, failed to follow through in implementing

broad reform of the judicial sector, adopt and institutionalize many of the improvements

made possible by the assistance, provide the resources needed to operate the sector

adequately, build an oversight capability to monitor the sector, and vigorously support

the prosecution of major crimes.

The Haitian government did not follow through in implementing a broad reform of its

legal codes and judicial organization and processes -- some of the measures that donors

consider key to addressing the main problems of the judicial sector. The Haitian

government has taken some steps since 1995 that may eventually lead to the

implementation of a broad reform of the judicial sector. These steps include enacting

judicial reform-related legislation in 1998, increasing judicial salaries, and pursuing

further reform plans, such as expanding the use of Creole in judicial proceedings.

However, none of these steps has moved significantly toward addressing the main

shortcomings of the judicial sector.

Many improvements to the judicial sector made possible by the U.S. assistance have not

been institutionalized because the Haitian government did not adopt and fund them.
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign

Assistance

Although the Haitian government assumed responsibility for most of the funding for the

magistrate school that was created with U.S. and other donor support, the government

did not assume ownership of the improvements, such as case registration and tracking

systems, made possible by U.S. assistance in the justice of the peace courts and

prosecutors’ offices. As a result, according to U.S. officials, after USAID stopped its

assistance to the justice of the peace courts, the improvements made by this assistance

disappeared.

The Haitian government has not provided the resources needed to operate judicial

institutions. During our visits to judicial institutions in Port-au-Prince, Saint-Marc, and

Jacmel, we saw that the judicial institutions were overwhelmed by the lack of personnel

and equipment and by their poor physical conditions.

The improvements to the judicial sector made possible by U.S. assistance have also been

limited because the Haitian government has not put in place an effective oversight

capability to monitor the judicial sector. The Ministry of Justice has a judicial inspection

unit that has limited capabilities and physical and human resources to deal with the

problems of the sector, such as judicial corruption.

The Haitian government’s failure to vigorously support investigations and prosecutions

of serious crimes, such as drug-related crimes and political assassinations, has hindered

the improvements in the prosecutorial capabilities of the judicial sector made possible

by the U.S. assistance. According to U.S., other donor, and Haitian officials, prosecutors

and investigating magistrates do not have an incentive to investigate and prosecute

major criminal cases and, if they do investigate, they do it with the knowledge that they

are risking their personal security.

-----

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I

would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128.

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Virginia Hughes, Juan

Tapia-Videla, David Bernet, Lee Kaukas, Richard Seldin, Steve Iannucci, Douglas Ferry,

and Rona Mendelsohn.
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

11 Page GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE HAITIAN

POLICE AND JUSTICE SECTOR, FISCAL YEARS 1995-2000

Table 1 shows U.S. assistance to the Haitian police force.

Table 1: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program Assistance to

the Haitian Police, Fiscal Years 1995-1999

Activity Amount

Police training and

donations of equipment $34,402,963

Construction of police

academy 18,680,474

Program headquarters

expenses 6,357,274

U.S. embassy support

and program expenses 2,477,990

Staff salaries and

benefits 1,838,928

Staff travel expenses 967,604

Antinarcotics training 347,029

Program audits 221,738

Total $65,294,000

Source: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

12 Page GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

Table 2 shows the overall assistance provided to Haiti’s judicial system under the USAID

Administration of Justice Program.

Table 2: USAID Administration of Justice Program Assistance to Haitian Judicial Sector,

Fiscal Years 1993–2000

Dollars in millions

Organization and activity Amount

USAID

Direct aid to Ministry of Justice

Other technical and equipment assistance

USAID management

Audit of Checchi

$5.4

2.4

0.8

2.0

0.2

RONCO Consulting Corporation

Interim Administration of Justice Program

2.8

Checchi & Company Consultants, Inc.

Legal assistance and education

Case registration and court management

Judicial mentoring

Other technical and equipment assistance

11.5

4.0

3.2

1.8

2.5

Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas

Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training

Magistrate school

Case tracking system

Model jurisdiction program and related assistance

7.0

2.1

0.5

4.4

Total $26.7

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

USAID provided $2.4 million in direct aid and $0.8 million in technical and equipment

assistance to the Haitian Ministry of Justice in fiscal years 1993-2000 and incurred $2.2

million in management costs for its Administration of Justice Program.

RONCO provided $2.8 million in aid from June 1995 to July 1996. This contractor
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

13 Page GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257 Foreign Assistance

primarily focused on refurbishing, equipping, and providing administrative and logistical

support to the magistrate school established in 1995.

Checchi provided $11.5 million in assistance August 1995 to August 1999. Under its

contract with USAID, Checchi focused its efforts on three activities: legal assistance and

education, case tracking and court management, and judicial mentoring.

(711564)
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