U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

★ 69–011 2008

110th Congress, 2d Session – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 110–100 

VETO MESSAGE ON H.R. 2082 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

NOTIFICATION OF THE VETO OF H.R. 2082, THE ‘‘INTELLIGENCE 

AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008’’ 

MARCH 10, 2008.—Ordered to be printed 


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To the House of Representatives: 

I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2082, the ‘‘Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.’’ The bill would 

impede the United States Government’s efforts to protect the 

American people effectively from terrorist attacks and other threats 

because it imposes several unnecessary and unacceptable burdens 

on our Intelligence Community. 

Section 444 of the bill would impose additional Senate confirmation requirements on two national security positions—the Director 

of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) observed that the 

effectiveness of the Intelligence Community suffers due to delays in 

the confirmation process; section 444 would only aggravate those 

serious problems. Senior intelligence officials need to assume their 

duties and responsibilities as quickly as possible to address the 

pressing requirements of national security. Instead of addressing 

the 9/11 Commission’s concern, the bill would subject two additional vital positions to a more protracted process of Senate confirmation. Apart from causing such potentially harmful delays, this 

unwarranted requirement for Senate confirmation would also risk 

injecting political pressure into these positions of technical expertise and public trust. 

Section 413 would create a new Inspector General for the Intelligence Community. This new office is duplicative and unnecessary. 

Each intelligence community component already has an Inspector 

General, and the Inspector General of the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence has been vested with all the legal powers of 

any inspector general to carry out investigations on matters under 

the jurisdiction of the Director of National Intelligence. There is no 

reason to commit taxpayer resources to an additional inspector general with competing jurisdiction over the same intelligence elements. Creating duplicative inspectors general, who may have inconsistent views on the handling of particular matters, has the potential to create conflicts and impede the Intelligence Community 

from efficiently resolving issues and carrying out its core mission. 

In addition, the creation of a new inspector general would add yet 

another position in the Intelligence Community subject to Senate 

confirmation, contrary to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. 

Section 327 of the bill would harm our national security by requiring any element of the Intelligence Community to use only the 

interrogation methods authorized in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations. It is vitally important that the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) be allowed to maintain a separate and classified interrogation program. The Army Field Manual is directed at guiding 

the actions of nearly three million active duty and reserve military 

personnel in connection with the detention of lawful combatants 


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during the course of traditional armed conflicts, but terrorists often 

are trained specifically to resist techniques prescribed in publicly 

available military regulations such as the Manual. The CIA’s ability to conduct a separate and specialized interrogation program for 

terrorists who possess the most critical information in the War on 

Terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, 

including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in 

Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown 

London. While details of the current CIA program are classified, 

the Attorney General has reviewed it and determined that it is 

lawful under existing domestic and international law, including 

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. I remain committed 

to an intelligence-gathering program that complies with our legal 

obligations and our basic values as a people. The United States opposes torture, and I remain committed to following international 

and domestic law regarding the humane treatment of people in its 

custody, including the ‘‘Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.’’ My disagreement over section 327 is not over any particular interrogation technique; for instance, it is not over waterboarding, 

which is not part of the current CIA program. Rather, my concern 

is the need to maintain a separate CIA program that will shield 

from disclosure to al Qaeda and other terrorists the interrogation 

techniques they may face upon capture. In accordance with a clear 

purpose of the ‘‘Military Commissions Act of 2006,’’ my veto is intended to allow the continuation of a separate and classified CIA 

interrogation program that the Department of Justice has determined is lawful and that operates according to rules distinct from 

the more general rules applicable to the Department of Defense. 

While I will continue to work with the Congress on the implementation of laws passed in this area in recent years, I cannot sign into 

law a bill that would prevent me, and future Presidents, from authorizing the CIA to conduct a separate, lawful intelligence program, and from taking all lawful actions necessary to protect 

Americans from attack. 

Other provisions of the bill purport to require the executive 

branch to submit information to the Congress that may be constitutionally protected from disclosure, including information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, 

the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of 

the Executive’s constitutional duties. Section 326, for example, 

would require that the executive branch report, on a very short 

deadline and in accordance with a rigid set of specific statutory requirements, the details of highly classified interrogation techniques 

and the confidential legal advice concerning them. The executive 

branch voluntarily has provided much of this information to appropriate members of Congress, demonstrating that questions concerning access to such information are best addressed through the 

customary practices and arrangements between the executive and 

legislative branches on such matters, rather than through the enactment of legislation. 

In addition, section 406 would require a consolidated inventory 

of Special Access Programs (SAPs) to be submitted to the Congress. 

Special Access Programs concern the most sensitive information 

maintained by the Government, and SAP materials are maintained 


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separately precisely to avoid the existence of one document that 

can serve as a roadmap to our Nation’s most vital information. The 

executive branch must be permitted to present this information in 

a manner that does not jeopardize national security. The executive 

branch will continue to keep the Congress appropriately informed 

of the matters to which the provisions relate in accordance with the 

accommodation principles the Constitution contemplates and the 

executive and legislative branches have long and successfully used 

to address information sharing on matters of national security. 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 8, 2008. 

Æ 


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