Selected Supreme Court Cases on

Sentencing Issues

 

 

Prepared by

the Office of General Counsel

U.S. Sentencing Commission

July 2015 

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Disclaimer: This document provided by the Commission=s Legal Staff is offered to assist in understanding and applying the sentencing 

guidelines. The information in this document does not necessarily represent the official position of the Commission, and it should not be 

considered definitive or comprehensive. The information in this document is not binding upon the Commission, courts, or the parties in 

any case. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (2007), some cases cited in this document are unpublished. Practitioners should be advised that 

citation of such cases under Rule 32.1 requires that such opinions be issued on or after January 1, 2007, and that they either be “available 

in a publicly accessible electronic database” or provided in hard copy by the party offering them for citation.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT MATTER INDEX.................................................................................................. 3

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). ................................................................... 5

Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014). ................................................................... 6

Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014)................................................................... 6

United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014). ................................................................ 7

Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014)....................................................................... 7

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).................................................................. 7

Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). ..................................................................... 8

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013). ....................................................................... 9

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). .................................................................... 10

Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012)....................................................................... 11

Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012). .............................................. 12

DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011).................................................................. 13

Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).................................................................. 13

McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011). .................................................................. 14

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011). ........................................................................ 14

Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). ...................................................................... 15

Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010). ............................................................................. 16

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010)........................................................................... 17

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010)....................................................................... 18

United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010). ...................................................................... 18

Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009). ................................................................... 20

Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009).......................................................................... 21

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)........................................................................... 22

Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008). .................................................................... 23

Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008). ....................................................................... 25

United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008). ................................................................... 26

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).................................................................... 28

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)................................................................................ 28

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). ................................................................... 29

Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007). ........................................................................... 31

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). ............................................................................. 32

Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007)........................................................................... 33

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006)....................................................................... 34

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). ........................................................................ 35

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)......................................................................... 35

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). ......................................................................... 37

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)...................................................................................... 38
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Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004)............................................................................ 38

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)...................................................................................... 39

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).......................................................................... 40

Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001). .......................................................................... 40

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)......................................................................... 41

United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000)......................................................................... 42

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000)....................................................................... 42

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). .......................................................................... 43

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999). ...................................................................... 43

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)..................................................... 43

Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998)....................................................................... 44

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). ................................................................. 44

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997).......................................................................... 45

United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997)....................................................................... 45

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997)............................................................................ 45

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). ............................................................................. 46

Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996). .................................................................... 46

Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). ............................................................................ 47

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). .................................................................. 47

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995)........................................................................... 48

Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995). ........................................................................... 48

Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994)........................................................................... 48

Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). ....................................................................... 48

United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994). .................................................................. 49

Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993). ............................................................................ 49

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). .......................................................................... 50

Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993)........................................................................... 50

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). ..................................................................... 50

United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). ......................................................................... 50

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992). ........................................................................ 51

Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992)............................................................................ 51

Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992). ..................................................................... 51

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991). ...................................................................... 52

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)..................................................................... 52

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). ..................................................................... 52

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................................. 53
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SUBJECT MATTER INDEX

ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 

Serious Drug Offense

o McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011) 

o United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008)

Violent Felony

Physical Force Element

o Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) 

Enumerated Offenses

o Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013)

o Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)

Residual Clause

o Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)

o Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009) 

o Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) 

Exempt Convictions

o Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) 

CAREER OFFENDER

o Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001)

o United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997)

o Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993)

CATEGORICAL APPROACH

o Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)

o United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014)

o Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013)

o Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) 

o Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) 

o Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009)

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY / RESTITUTION 

o Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014)

CONSECUTIVE / CONCURRENT SENTENCES

o Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012)

o Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010)

o United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) 

o Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) 

CRACK/POWDER DISPARITY

o Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) 

o Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009) 

o Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)

REHABILITATION

o Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011) 

o Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) 
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RETROACTIVITY, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)

o Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) 

o Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011)

o Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) 

SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

Increasing Statutory Maximum

o Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) 

o Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007)

o Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006)

o Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 

o Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) 

o Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) 

o Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)

o Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)

Increasing Mandatory Minimum

o Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)

Sentencing Enhancements

o Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010)

o United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)

Right to Counsel

o Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994)

o Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) 

SUPERVISED RELEASE

o United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000)

o Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) 

USE OF FIREARM IN CRIME OF VIOLENCE, 18 § U.S.C. 924(c)(3)

o United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010) 

o Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) 

USE OF FIREARM IN DRUG DRAFFICKING CRIME, 18 § U.S.C. 924(c)(2)

o Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011)

o Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010)

o Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007)

o Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) 

o United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) 

o Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995)

o Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)
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Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

The Supreme Court held unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause,” 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B)(ii), of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Accordingly, the Court reversed 

the defendant’s increased sentence due to ACCA.

Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g). The government sought an enhanced sentence under ACCA, which imposes a 

mandatory minimum 15-year prison term on a felon-in-possession defendant with three prior 

convictions for a “violent felony,” a term defined in the residual clause to include any felony that 

“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The district court and the Eighth Circuit agreed that Johnson’s prior state 

conviction for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun met this definition (it was 

undisputed that Johnson had two other qualifying convictions). The Supreme Court reversed and 

remanded, finding that imposing an increased sentence under ACCA’s residual clause violates 

the Due Process Clause.

The Court found that two features of the residual clause combined to make it 

unconstitutionally vague. First, the Court’s precedents applying the “categorical approach,” in 

which the sentencing court pictures the kind of conduct that the crime involves in “the ordinary 

case” instead of applying a real-world factual inquiry, leaves too much uncertainty and 

speculation to the residual clause application. Second, the residual clause leaves too much 

uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony. In particular, 

the clause’s reference to offenses that “otherwise” pose the necessary risk suggests a link to the 

four “enumerated offenses” listed just before the residual clause, but the nature of that link is 

confusing and causes additional uncertainty. A court is left to determine in what sense a 

particular offense poses a risk comparable to burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives, 

even though those offenses themselves appear to involve varying, and uncertain, levels of risk.

The Court rejected the argument that the residual clause is constitutional merely because 

“some conduct clearly falls within the provision’s grasp,” electing instead to strike down the 

language altogether. The Court also made clear that other laws using terms like “substantial 

risk” are not touched by this opinion because they generally involve an assessment of risk related 

to real conduct, not an “idealized ordinary case.” 

The Court also rejected the argument that the doctrine of stare decisis barred it from 

finding ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague. While some prior opinions such as 

Sykes v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), and James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), 

had briefly opined the clause was not vague, they had done so without full briefing or argument, 

and thus did not constrain the Court. Moreover, the Court found, continued adherence to those 

decisions would undermine, rather than promote, the goals of even-handedness, predictability, 

and consistency served by stare decisis.

Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred in the judgment only, each stating separately 

their view that the residual clause was not unconstitutionally vague but also that Johnson’s 

offense did not qualify as a violent felony.

Justice Alito dissented, defending the residual clause because of stare decisis and because 

the residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague in his view. Justice Alito also argued for 

abandoning the traditional, elements-based categorical approach, in favor of a conduct-based 
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inquiry, solely for application of ACCA’s residual clause. Under either approach, he maintained 

that Johnson’s prior conviction did qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause.

Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).

The Supreme Court held that mandatory restitution for offenses that involve the sexual 

exploitation of children and child pornography, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259, is proper only to 

the extent that the defendant proximately caused the victim’s losses. The Court maintained that 

even mere possessors of child pornography cause proximate harm to the victims. Id. Because 

child pornography victims suffer “continuing and grievous harm as a result of [knowing] that a 

large, indeterminate number of individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of the 

sexual abuse she endured[,]” all persons who reproduce, distribute, or possess child pornography 

play a part in this tragedy and are liable for restitution. Id. However, the Supreme Court further

addressed the more difficult task of determining the appropriate amount of restitution—i.e. how 

much of the victim’s losses are attributable to the defendant’s conduct. 

The defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography and admitted to possessing 

a total of 150-300 images, two of which were images of the victim at issue. The victim sought 

$3.4 million in damages, and the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc held that each defendant who 

possessed the victim’s images should be made liable for the victim’s entire loss of $3.4 million 

from the trade in her images. In vacating and remanding, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that there 

is a general proximate cause requirement for all losses under section 2259, and that “where it can 

be shown both that a defendant possessed a victim’s images and that a victim has outstanding 

losses caused by the continuing traffic in those images but where it is impossible to trace a 

particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant” through the more traditional butfor causal inquiry, the court “should order restitution in an amount that comports with the 

defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim's general losses.” 

The Court provided further guidance to district courts by enumerating factors to consider 

in determining the amount of restitution: the victim’s total losses caused by traffic in her images, 

the number of past criminal defendants who contributed to those losses, reasonable predictions of 

the number of future offenders likely to be caught and convicted for contributing, an estimate of 

the broader number of offenders involved, whether the defendant reproduced or distributed the 

images, whether the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images, and 

how many images of the victim the defendant possessed. In the case of a “possessor like 

Paroline” who played a relatively small part in the victim’s overall losses, the Court held that the 

amount would “not be severe” but would also not be “a token or nominal amount.” However, 

the Court declined to “prescribe a precise algorithm” and urged the courts to use “discretion and 

sound judgment.”

Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014).

In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split, holding that a straw buyer 

made a material false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) when he represented

himself as the actual transferee/buyer of a firearm on the sales record. Although Abramski was 

purchasing a firearm on behalf of his uncle, Abramksi answered “Yes,” affirming that he was the 

“actual buyer” of the firearm on the form used and maintained by federally licensed firearms 

dealers for gun sales. The Fourth Circuit held that regardless of whether the straw buyer or the 

actual buyer can legally obtain a handgun, answering the “actual buyer” inquiry falsely does 
7

constitute a material misrepresentation. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that “the 

identity of the actual purchaser of a firearm is a constant that is always material to the lawfulness 

of a firearm acquisition under § 922(a)(6).”

United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).

The Supreme Court held that a defendant could be convicted for illegally possessing a 

firearm if he had a prior conviction of “intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to” a 

family member because that offense constituted a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 

See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). In particular, the Court held that the 

domestic violence offense did involve “the use or attempted use of physical force” as required by 

section 922(g)(9). The Court interpreted its prior opinion in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 

133 (2010), to require it to conclude that the common law definition of “force” applied to this 

statute. The Court then applied the modified categorical approach discussed in Descamps v. 

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), to conclude that the prior conviction did involve such 

force. 

Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, disagreeing with the 

Court that the broader definition of “force” should apply but concluding that the defendant’s 

prior conviction also qualified under a narrower definition. Justice Alito, joined by Justice 

Thomas, also concurred in the judgment, expressing their view that Johnson was wrongly 

decided.

Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).

The Supreme Court held that a defendant who distributes drugs cannot receive an 

enhanced penalty when a victim suffers death or serious bodily injury as a result of using the 

drugs unless the victim’s use of the drugs is a but-for cause of the death or injury, at least where 

the use of the drug was not independently sufficient to cause the death or injury. 

The victim in the case died following an extended drug binge involving a mixture of 

several drugs, only one of which he had purchased from the defendant. Expert testimony 

showed that the drug purchased from the defendant contributed to the victim’s death, but not that 

the use of that drug alone would have caused the death. The Court determined that this type of 

causation does not meet the standard required by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which provides for 

an enhanced sentence if the death or bodily injury “results from” the drug distributed by the 

defendant. The Court stated that this statute required actual causation for the enhanced penalty 

to apply.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurred in the judgment on the basis of 

the rule of lenity.

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).

The Supreme Court held that, when evaluating whether a prior state conviction 

constitutes “burglary” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), a 

federal sentencing court may not apply the modified categorical approach to a non-divisible state 

statute of conviction.

Descamps argued that his California burglary conviction did not count as ACCA burglary 

because the California statute did not contain all the elements of generic burglary; specifically, 

California’s burglary statute does not require that a defendant’s initial entry into a building be 
8

unlawful. The district court and court of appeals accepted the government’s argument that the 

“modified-categorical approach” allowed the court to examine certain documents, including the 

original state-court plea colloquy, in order to determine that Descamps had in fact committed 

conduct that would constitute generic ACCA burglary. The Ninth Circuit’s holding deepened a 

circuit split over whether the modified categorical approach, in which such documents may be 

consulted, applies only to statutes that are “divisible” into multiple, alternative possible elements, 

any of which suffice for commission of the offense, or also, as here, to a statute that is 

“indivisible” but overbroad, encompassing a broader array of conduct than the generic offense.

The Court reversed, finding that its existing precedent “all but resolve[d] this case.” The 

Court stated that it had long emphasized that courts should “look only to the statutory 

definitions” of offenses, and focus on the “elements, not facts” underlying a particular 

conviction, but that in a “narrow range of cases” courts could look beyond the statute of 

conviction to such documents as the “charging paper and jury instructions” to determine when 

ACCA was satisfied. That range of cases consisted of “statute[s] with alternative elements,” 

such as burglary statutes applying to both automobiles and dwellings. This analysis became 

known as the modified categorical approach. In Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), 

the Court held that the purpose of the modified categorical approach was only to determine what 

“version” of the statute a defendant had pled guilty to. For that reason, “the only way” the Court 

had ever endorsed the use of the modified categorical approach was to evaluate statutes with 

alternativ1e elements.

Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing his concern that a 

defendant pleading guilty to a state criminal offense will not typically be thinking of the 

possibility of “later consequences under ACCA,” and finding “troubling” the proposition that 

inadvertent admissions might later lead to significant sentencing enhancements. 

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment only, and wrote separately to reaffirm his view 

that ACCA violates the Sixth Amendment because it permits courts to find facts increasing the 

sentence that could be imposed on a defendant.

Justice Alito dissented. He stated that he would give “ACCA a more practical reading,” 

and hold that “when it is clear that a defendant necessarily admitted or the jury necessarily 

found” that a defendant committed generic burglary, a prior conviction should qualify.

Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).

The Supreme Court held that facts that increase a mandatory minimum penalty are 

elements that must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. The opinion 

overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), in which the Court held that judicial 

factfinding that increases the mandatory minimum sentence but does not affect the maximum 

penalty is permissible under the Sixth Amendment. The Alleyne Court concluded that Harris is 

inconsistent with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and with the original meaning of 

the Sixth Amendment. 

The Court held that the Sixth Amendment, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, 

requires that each element of a crime be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Shortly 

after Apprendi, the Court decided Harris, which involved the same statutory provision and issue 

before the Court in Alleyne. The Harris Court declined to apply Apprendi to facts that altered 

only the mandatory minimum sentence, and not the maximum penalty. Harris reasoned that 
9

such facts do not implicate the Sixth Amendment, because the verdict “authorized the judge to 

impose the minimum with or without the finding.” Such a finding was not “essential” to the 

defendant’s punishment and merely limited the sentencing judge’s “choices within the 

authorized range.”

The Alleyne Court relied on the logic of Apprendi to overrule the holding in Harris. The 

Court concluded that the definition of “elements” necessarily includes facts that not only 

increase the maximum penalty, but also those that increase the minimum, because both affect the 

sentencing range to which a defendant is exposed. The Court stated, “[i]t is impossible to 

dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the crime.” Increasing the 

legally prescribed floor indisputably aggravates the punishment and “heightens the loss of liberty 

associated with the crime”, because the government can invoke the mandatory minimum to 

require a harsher punishment than would have resulted otherwise. “This reality demonstrates 

that the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a 

new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury.”

Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined, 

discussing in more detail the question of when the Court should overrule existing precedent. 

Justice Breyer filed a separate concurring opinion in which he discussed his vote in Harris and 

expressed continuing disagreement with the holding in Apprendi. However, Justice Breyer 

acknowledged that “Apprendi has now defined the relevant legal regime for an additional 

decade” and stated that “the law should no longer tolerate the anomaly that the Apprendi/Harris

distinction creates.” 

Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined, dissented. The 

Chief Justice argued that increasing the mandatory minimum penalty does not affect the 

defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, but rather affects the role of the 

sentencing judge by limiting discretion. Here, because the jury’s verdict authorized a sentence of 

anywhere between five years to life in prison, “[n]o additional finding of fact was ‘essential’ to 

any punishment within the range.” The resulting sentence was within the discretion of the judge, 

and “entirely consistent with Apprendi.”

Justice Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion, stating that the Court should not overrule 

“well-entrenched precedent” so easily.

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 

constitution prohibits a court from sentencing a defendant pursuant to a guideline that produces a 

higher range than the guideline in effect at the time the defendant committed the offense, despite 

the fact that the guidelines themselves are advisory. To determine whether an ex post facto 

violation occurred, the Court analyzed whether, post-Booker, an increased guideline range 

“presents a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered 

crimes.” The Court concluded that three features of the system together presented sufficient 

“procedural hurdles” to imposing a sentence outside the guidelines to trigger the Ex Post Facto 

Clause. These features are: (1) the requirement that sentencing courts properly calculate the 

guidelines; (2) the possibility that appellate courts may apply a presumption of reasonableness 

when reviewing within guideline sentences; and (3) the fact that courts of appeal may review a 

sentence more closely the farther it varies from the guideline range.
10

Because the Court’s ex post facto jurisprudence has proceeded on a case-by-case basis 

rather than setting forth a definitive test, the Court compared the federal system to the Florida 

guideline system it had previously held did present a sufficient risk in Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 

423 (1987), and acknowledged that “the federal system’s procedural rules establish gentler 

checks on the sentencing court’s discretion than Florida’s did.” Nonetheless, the Court concluded 

that the federal rules “impose a series of requirements on sentencing courts that cabin the 

exercise of [] discretion.” The Court noted that there was “considerable empirical evidence 

indicating that the Sentencing Guidelines have the intended effect of influencing the sentences 

imposed by judges,” noting that “[i]n less than one-fifth of cases since 2007 have district courts 

imposed above- or below-Guidelines sentences absent a Government motion” and that “the 

Sentencing Commission’s data indicate that when a Guidelines range moves up or down, 

offenders’ sentences move with it.”

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, also stated that the 

Ex Post Facto Clause does not simply protect a defendant’s “reliance interest” in a particular set 

punishment knowable by the defendant before commission of the offense; “[i]t also reflects 

principles of fundamental justice.” The Court then disagreed with the Government’s argument 

that, after Booker, “the Guidelines are just one among many persuasive sources a sentencing 

court can consult, no different from a policy paper,” stating that “[i]t is simply not the case that 

the Sentencing Guidelines are merely a volume that the district court reads with academic 

interest in the course of sentencing.” Although courts may consider the newer, higher version of 

the guidelines, the higher version “will have the status of one of many reasons a district court 

might give for deviating from the older Guidelines, a status that is simply not equivalent for ex 

post facto purposes.” Finally, the Court stated that its Ex Post Facto Clause holding did not 

undermine the Sixth Amendment remedial holding in its Booker line of cases, emphasizing the 

distinction between the Sixth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause inquiries and concluding 

that “[t]he Booker remedy was designed, and has been subsequently calibrated, to exploit 

precisely this distinction: it is intended to promote sentencing uniformity while avoiding a Sixth 

Amendment violation. In light of the statistics invoked by petitioner [regarding the rate of 

variances], it appears so far to be achieving this balance.”

Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito, dissented 

based on the view that the advisory guidelines “merely influence[] the exercise of the sentencing 

judge’s discretion” within the broader statutory ranges. Justice Thomas alone also stated that 

application of the Ex Post Facto Clause should be limited to increases in statutory penalties.

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012).

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Fair Sentencing Act’s (FSA) more 

lenient mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, which reduced the crack-to-powder cocaine 

sentencing disparity from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1, applied to offenders who committed cocaine 

offenses prior to the FSA’s effective date but were sentenced after that date. The issue was 

framed as one of congressional intent: whether Congress intended the FSA to apply retroactively 

by virtue of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which says that “regardless of when the 

offender’s conduct occurs, the applicable Guidelines are the ones ‘in effect on the date the 

defendant is sentenced,’” or whether an 1871 saving statute, which provides that no new criminal 

statute may change penalties “unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide,” governed to 

preclude retroactivity. 
11

In holding that there was “indicia of clear congressional intent” to apply the FSA’s new 

minimum penalties, the Court said it was convinced by six considerations. First, despite its 

“expressly provide” language (which the FSA did not do), the saving statute permits Congress to 

apply a new act’s more lenient penalties to pre-FSA offenders because “one Congress cannot 

bind a later Congress” and it remains free to express its intentions as it chooses. Second, 

Congress must have been aware of the SRA’s “background principle” directing judges to apply 

the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing when it passed the FSA. Third, language in the 

FSA implies that Congress intended to follow the SRA’s background principle to achieve 

consistency with other guideline provisions. Fourth, applying the prior drug law’s mandatory 

minimums to pre-FSA offenders sentenced post-FSA “would create disparities of a kind that 

Congress enacted the [SRA] and the [FSA] to prevent.” Fifth, not applying the FSA to these 

offenders “would do more than preserve a disproportionate status quo; it would make matters 

worse” by creating “a new disparate sentencing ‘cliff.’” Sixth, “no strong countervailing 

consideration[s]” argued against applying the FSA. In dissent, Justice Scalia said he would 

require that the “‘plain import of a later statute directly conflict[]’” with the earlier one in order 

to override the saving statute’s default rule; because the FSA was silent on the issue of 

retroactivity, the saving statute precluded its application.

Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012).

The Supreme Court held that a district court has authority to order a federal sentence be 

served consecutive to an anticipated (i.e., yet-to-be-imposed) state sentence. While on probation 

for a drug offense, Setser was arrested for possessing methamphetamine. Setser was indicted in 

state court for the possession offense, and the state moved to revoke his probation. Setser was 

also indicted in federal court for the drug possession, to which he pleaded guilty. At the federal 

sentencing, the district court imposed a 151-month sentence and ordered it to run consecutive to 

any state sentence on the probation violation, but concurrent with any state sentence for the 

possession charge. Setser appealed, arguing the district court lacked authority under the SRA to 

order a consecutive sentence and that the concurrent/consecutive decision should be made by the 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) once the state sentence was known. While the appeal was pending, the 

state court sentenced Setser to five years’ imprisonment for the probation violation and 10 years’ 

imprisonment for the possession charge, both to run concurrently, effectively “thwart[ing]” the 

district court’s intended sentence.

According to the majority, in determining how state and federal sentences “fit together” 

under these circumstances, it is “fundamental” that the Court construe the SRA and related 

statutes “in light of ‘the common-law background against which the statutes . . . were enacted.’” 

The Court explained that judges have long had discretion to impose sentences that will run 

concurrently or consecutively to other sentences, including those imposed in state proceedings, 

and that nothing in the SRA indicates otherwise. The Court rejected Setser’s reading of the SRA 

as conferring authority to impose consecutive sentences only when the terms are imposed 

simultaneously, or when the defendant is already subject to another, undischarged term of 

imprisonment. The Court based its analysis on statutory interpretation and policy grounds. The 

Court concluded Setser’s reading of the statute was inconsistent with the undisputed notion that 

someone, either the district court or the BOP, must make the concurrent/consecutive decision. 

Further, rather than conferring specific authority on the district court (and thereby implying 

other, non-specified authority is withheld), the statute’s language was a “mere acknowledgment 

of the existence of certain pre-existing authority. . . .” In addition, the Court determined that 
12

principles of federalism and good policy dictate that the district court, rather than BOP 

“employees of the same Department of Justice that conducts the prosecution,” decide whether 

the defendant’s term will be served concurrently or consecutively. Justice Breyer’s dissent 

focused on practical implications of the law, arguing that until the state sentence is imposed, 

federal judges lack valuable information necessary to make an informed concurrent/consecutive 

decision. 

Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012). 

The Supreme Court held that the proposition established in Apprendi – that the Sixth 

Amendment reserves to juries the determination of any fact (other than the fact of prior 

conviction) that increases a criminal defendant’s maximum potential sentence – applies to 

criminal fines. Southern Union, a natural gas company, was tried and convicted of storing 

hazardous material without a permit in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 

Act, which provides for “a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation.” At 

sentencing, the government argued that, consistent with the indictment and general verdict form, 

762 days of violation occurred for a maximum fine of $38.1 million. Southern Union argued that 

this would violate Apprendi because the jury instructions allowed a conviction based on a 

violation of a single day and any fine imposed greater than the one-day penalty of $50,000 would 

require judicial factfinding prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The district court imposed an 

$18 million fine. Although the First Circuit found that the jury did not necessarily find a 762-

day violation, it affirmed the sentence and held that Apprendi is inapplicable to criminal fines. P

The Court reviewed the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right as construed in 

Apprendi. According to the Court, Apprendi’s rule is “rooted in longstanding common-law 

practice.” The Court supported this argument by providing examples in which Apprendi has 

been applied to “a variety of sentencing schemes that . . . increase a defendant’s maximum 

authorized sentence.” The Court found “no principled basis” to treat the punishments in the 

examples differently than criminal fines. “Apprendi’s ‘core concern,’” explained the Court, “is 

to reserve to the jury ‘the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory 

offense,’” and “[t]hat concern applies whether the sentence is a criminal fine or imprisonment or 

death.” The Court also found that the First Circuit incorrectly relied on Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 

160 (2008), which held that Apprendi does not forbid a judge from determining facts that 

authorize the imposition of consecutive sentences. The Court cited a series of cases from the 

1800s to demonstrate the “‘two longstanding tenets of common-law jurisprudence’ on which 

Apprendi is based: [f]irst, the ‘the truth of every accusation’ against a defendant ‘should be 

confirmed’” by a jury; “[a]nd second, ‘an accusation which lacks any particular fact which the 

law makes essential to the punishment is . . . no accusation within the requirements of the 

common law . . . .’” Finally, the Court dismissed the government’s arguments, particularly that 

judicially-found facts related to fines “typically involve only quantifying the harm caused by the 

defendant’s offense . . . as opposed to defining a separate set of acts for punishment.” 

In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that when a criminal fine is at issue, the Sixth 

Amendment allows a sentencing judge to determine facts relevant to the amount of the fine to be 

imposed. The dissent concludes, based primarily on the historical record and the Court’s earlier 

opinion in Ice, that the finding of this type of “particular fact” was ordinarily a matter for a judge 

and not within the jury’s domain. 
13

DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011). 

The Supreme Court resolved a circuit conflict to hold that the term “cocaine base” in 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) applies to all forms of cocaine base and is not limited to “crack 

cocaine.” The term “cocaine base” defines cocaine in its chemically basic form which includes 

“crack cocaine” as well as coca paste and freebase. Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion joined 

by all the justices (except for a discussion of legislative history which J. Scalia did not join). The 

Court observed that, because of the significant difference in penalties, Congress wanted to 

distinguish between powder cocaine and cocaine base products. The Court found that this 

reading of “cocaine base” was consistent with the structure of section 841(b)(1). The Court was 

unpersuaded by four additional arguments put forth by DePierre. The Court found that records 

of the congressional hearings did not show that Congress was only concerned with crack

cocaine. Second, reading “cocaine base” to mean chemically basic cocaine does not lead to 

absurd results. Third, the fact that the Sentencing Guidelines defined “cocaine base” as “crack” 

does not require that the statutory term be interpreted the same way. Fourth, because normal 

rules of statutory construction made clear what Congress intended, the rule of lenity did not 

apply.

Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011). 

A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that the defendant, William Freeman, was 

eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after pleading guilty to drug and 

firearm charges under a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement (“Type 

C agreement”). The five justices who formed the majority split, however, on the reasons the 

defendant was so eligible. 

Under a Type C agreement, the parties agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range 

is the appropriate disposition of the case and the agreement binds the court once the court accepts 

it. In 2005, Freeman pleaded guilty under a Type C agreement specifying a sentence of 106 

months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the applicable guideline range. The Sentencing 

Commission later amended the guidelines to lower the base offense level for drug-trafficking 

offenses involving crack, and made those amendments retroactive. In light of those 

amendments, the petitioner filed a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), 

which allows a defendant to move for a reduction in a term of imprisonment if he or she “has 

been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently 

been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court, consistent with existing circuit 

precedent, denied the motion on the grounds that the defendant was ineligible for a sentence 

reduction because the sentence was imposed pursuant to a Type C agreement. The Sixth Circuit 

affirmed.

A plurality of the court concluded that Freeman is eligible for a sentence reduction as a 

result of a retroactively-applicable guideline amendment because the district judge, in accepting 

such a plea agreement, had an “independent obligation to exercise its discretion” in imposing the 

sentence, and part of that exercise was consideration of the guidelines, including the crack 

cocaine guideline that was subsequently amended and given retroactive effect. As a result, the 

sentence was “based on” that guideline, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) permits the sentence to be 

reduced. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, but did so after finding that the Type C 

agreement at issue “expressly use[d] a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged 
14

offense to establish the term of imprisonment,” and that because it did, the sentence was “based 

on” the crack cocaine guideline. 

The dissent wrote that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Type C agreement is not “based 

on” the guidelines in any way, but instead is based on the parties’ agreed recommendation. As a 

result, the dissent argued, no defendant who is sentenced pursuant to a Type C agreement is 

eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The dissent also criticized Justice 

Sotomayor’s approach as being difficult for lower courts to apply.

McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011).

The Supreme Court unanimously held that, when determining whether “an offense under 

State law” is a “serious drug offense” for purposes of the ACCA, the sentencing court should 

consult the “maximum term of imprisonment” applicable to the defendant’s offense at the time 

of the state conviction. Under the ACCA, a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm is subject 

to a 15-year minimum prison sentence if he has three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or 

“serious drug offense.” As relevant here, "serious drug offense" is defined as “an offense under 

State law . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by 

law.” The district court found that the ACCA sentencing enhancement applied to the defendant 

based in part on drug trafficking crimes he committed when they carried a maximum 10-year 

prison term, even though the legislature had subsequently reduced the maximum sentence. The 

Fourth Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court affirmed for three reasons. First, it held that “the plain text of ACCA

requires a federal sentencing court to consult the maximum sentence applicable to a defendant’s 

previous drug offense at the time of his conviction for that offense.” The Court noted that the 

issue of the maximum penalty for a past offense is “a backward-looking question” that can only 

be answered by “consult[ing] the law that applied at the time of that conviction.” Second, the 

Court discussed the “broader context of the statute as a whole,” and how the Court had in other 

cases looked to the historical statute of conviction when determining whether the defendant was 

convicted of a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Finally, the Court pointed out that absurd 

results would follow from adopting McNeill's position, including situations where a prior 

conviction would “disappear” for ACCA purposes if a state revised its definition of an offense 

after it was committed. 

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011).

In a 7-1 decision with several concurrences, the Supreme Court held that “when a 

defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider 

evidence of the defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation and that such evidence may, in 

appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the now-advisory Federal Sentencing 

Guidelines.” Pepper had pleaded guilty to methamphetamine distribution conspiracy and was 

sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, well below the 97-to-121-month guideline range. 

Pepper’s sentence was appealed and remanded to the district court, which imposed the same 24-

month sentence based on explicit evidence of Pepper’s postsentencing rehabilitation, including 

his recovery from drug addiction, enrollment in college, and full-time employment. The 

government re-appealed and the Eighth Circuit concluded that postsentencing rehabilitation was 

an impermissible factor to consider in granting a downward variance from the advisory guideline 

range. Pepper was resentenced to a 65-month prison term and appealed.
15

Justice Sotomayor explained that over the history of federal sentencing reform, 

sentencing courts have been permitted to consider the widest possible breadth of information 

about a defendant. Although the SRA constrained the discretion of district courts in various 

ways, the Court’s cases since United States v. Booker made the formerly mandatory system 

effectively advisory. Therefore, district courts could now consider evidence of postsentencing

rehabilitation to support a downward variance from the guidelines. As support for this 

conclusion, the Court noted that the SRA made no distinction between an initial sentencing and 

any subsequent resentencing on remand, and postsentencing rehabilitation is relevant to many of 

the statutory SRA factors. Because this conclusion conflicted with 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2), 

which precludes a court on resentencing from imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range 

except upon a “‘ground of departure’ that was expressly relied upon in the prior sentencing,” the 

Court invalidated it as inconsistent with Booker. Similarly, even though the guidelines expressly 

preclude a district court from considering postsentencing rehabilitation, the majority opinion 

made clear that a district court “may in appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence 

based on a disagreement with the Commission's views,” especially “where, as here, the 

Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the 

sentencing statutes Congress enacted.” Finally, the court resolved a second question presented in 

Pepper by concluding that, at re-sentencing, a court is not bound by the law of the case to apply 

a departure percentage applied at the initial sentencing. 

Justice Breyer and Justice Alito concurred in separate opinions on the principal issue in 

the case but each cautioned courts not to disregard the guidelines unreasonably. Justice Alito 

also dissented in part to the extent he believes sentencing judges must still give significant 

weight to guidelines provisions and policy statements. Justice Thomas also dissented because of 

his ongoing belief that the Booker remedy cannot be meaningfully applied and therefore he 

would defer to the judgment of Congress and the Commission that evidence of postsentencing 

rehabilitation may not be considered.

Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).

The Supreme Court held that the SRA precludes a sentencing court from imposing or 

lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’s rehabilitation. Alejandra 

Tapia was convicted of alien smuggling, among other things. She was sentenced to a term of 51 

months' imprisonment, at least in part because the district court apparently wanted to ensure that 

she served a prison term to qualify for and complete the Bureau of Prison’s 500-hour Residential 

Drug Abuse Program. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. 

The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Kagan began with 

the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which instructs courts to “recognize[e] that imprisonment is not 

an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” According to the Court, this 

language clearly commands a district court to “consider the specified rationales of punishment 

except for rehabilitation, which it should acknowledge as an unsuitable justification for a prison 

term.” Moreover, the Court explains, the “context of section 3582(a) puts an exclamation point 

on this textual conclusion.” For one thing, because 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) similarly directs the 

Sentencing Commission to ensure the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a 

sentence for rehabilitation purposes, “Congress ensured that all sentencing officials would work 

in tandem to implement the statutory determination” to preclude courts from considering 

rehabilitation in imposing or lengthening prison terms. And “[e]qually illuminating” is “the 

absence of any provision granting courts the power to ensure that offenders participate in prison 
16

rehabilitation programs,” in contrast to a sentencing court's power to order appropriate treatment 

in imposing probation or supervised release. The Court also found the legislative history 

supported the textual interpretation, and rejected various other arguments of the amicus curiae, 

who was appointed to defend the Ninth Circuit’s judgment. In the opinion’s final section, Justice 

Kagan stated that a sentencing court commits no error by discussing options for prison 

rehabilitation or urging the BOP to place an offender in a prison treatment program. What it may 

not do, however, is “impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a 

treatment program or otherwise promote rehabilitation.” Finally, in a brief concurrence, Justice 

Sotomayor (joined by Justice Alito) agreed with the Court that section 3582(a) precludes 

sentencing courts from considering rehabilitation when imposing or lengthening a prison 

sentence but was skeptical that the court did so in Tapia’s case.

Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010).

In this case, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split on the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)’s “except” clause, holding that “a defendant is subject to a mandatory, consecutive 

sentence for a section 924(c) conviction, and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of 

receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction.” Section 924(c) 

requires imposition of at least 5 years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively for using or 

carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime “[e]xcept to the 

extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other 

provision of law.” This latter phrase is commonly referred to as the “except” clause. Defendants 

Abbott and Gould were each convicted of gun and drug crimes, and each were sentenced to a 5-

year term of imprisonment on the section 924(c) offense to run consecutively to the terms of 

imprisonment they received for their other offenses, each of which carried higher mandatory 

minimums. The Third and Fifth Circuits affirmed their respective sentences on direct appeal; the 

Second and Sixth Circuits adopted, however, a contrary interpretation of the “except” clause. 

The Supreme Court affirmed their sentences, holding that a defendant is subject to 

consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for both the predicate offense and the section 924(c) 

offense, even if the predicate offense carries a greater mandatory minimum than the section

924(c) offense. Although the defendants argued that the “except” clause meant that they could 

not be sentenced to consecutive mandatory minimum terms under section 924(c) because they 

were also subject to other, higher mandatory minimums, the Court felt that this interpretation 

would “undercut” the congressional purpose of imposing additional punishments for possessing 

a firearm, as many defendants subject to section 924(c)’s five-year mandatory minimum are also 

subject to lengthier mandatory minimums for their predicate offenses. The Court also noted 

other “anomalies” that rendered the defendants’ interpretation implausible, as in the case of 

defendants who sell enough drugs or have an extensive enough criminal history to trigger high 

mandatory minimums and therefore would manage to avoid being punished at all for the section

924(c) offense. After reviewing the “except” clause in its textual context, the Supreme Court 

concluded that “Congress intended the ‘except’ clause to serve simply as a clarification of 

section 924(c), not as a major restraint on the statute’s operation.” Finally, the Court noted that 

the rule of lenity was inapplicable because, “[a]lthough the clause might have been more 

meticulously drafted,” the defendants’ interpretation of the statute reflected an implausible 

reading of congressional purpose. 
17

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010).

The Supreme Court, in a 7-1 opinion with Justice Alito recused, considered what the 

impact of its Booker decision should be on sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

The Court concluded that Booker does not apply to proceedings under section 3582(c)(2) and 

that U.S.S.G. §1B1.10 is binding on courts reducing sentences under that provision. 

The Court began its analysis of the case by addressing the petitioner’s argument that 

proceedings under section 3582(c)(2) are “resentencing” proceedings, concluding that the plain 

language of the statute does not support this characterization. The Court also noted that the 

statute only applies to those prisoners whose guideline range was subsequently reduced by the 

Commission. These two factors, the Court concluded, demonstrate Congress’s intent that such 

proceedings not be complete resentencings. The Court went on to state, however, that “[t]he 

substantial role Congress gave the Commission with respect to sentence-modification 

proceedings further supports this conclusion,” stating that both 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o) and (u)

“constrain[]” a district court’s power under section 3582(c)(2).

The statute, the Court stated, requires a two-step approach in such cases: in the first step, 

the court must “follow the Commission’s instructions in §1B1.10 to determine the prisoner's 

eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.” In the second 

step, the court must “consider any applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors and determine 

whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step 

one is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” The Court 

further stated: “Because reference to § 3553(a) is appropriate only at the second step of this 

circumscribed inquiry, it cannot serve to transform the proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) into 

plenary resentencing proceedings.”

The Court held that section 3582(c)(2) proceedings do not implicate the Sixth 

Amendment right at issue in Booker because they “represent[] a congressional act of lenity 

intended to give prisoners the benefit of later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in 

the Guidelines.” The Court also held that the remedial Booker opinion does not apply to section

3582(c)(2) proceedings, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 

1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court again distinguished section 3582(c)(2) proceedings from 

other sentencing proceedings, concluding that “requiring courts to honor §1B1.10(b)(2)’s 

instruction not to depart from the amended Guidelines range at [§ 3582(c)(2)] proceedings will 

create none of the confusion or unfairness that led us in Booker to reject the Government’s 

argument for a partial fix.”

The Court finally addressed Dillon’s argument that the district court should have 

corrected his criminal history calculation, holding that because §1B1.10(b)(1) instructs the court 

to leave other guideline application decisions unchanged, the district court correctly declined to 

do so.

In dissent, Justice Stevens set forth his view that Booker’s remedial opinion should apply 

to section 3582(c)(2) proceedings, conceding that “[a]s a matter of textual analysis, divorced 

from judicial precedent, it is certainly reasonable for the Court to find that the Commission can 

set mandatory limits on sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2)” but disagreeing that this 

analysis is sufficient to decide the case. Justice Stevens expressed his view that “[t]he only fair 

way to read the Booker majority’s remedy is that it eliminated the mandatory features of the 
18

Guidelines—all of them.” Additionally, Justice Stevens expressed his view that the majority’s 

decision raises separation-of-powers and delegation concerns.

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010).

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that the petitioner’s prior conviction under 

Florida law for the felony offense of battery by “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another 

person did not constitute a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.

The defendant’s ACCA sentencing enhancement was based, in part, on a 2003 conviction 

for battery in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1). The government may prove a battery under that 

statute “in one of three ways. . . . It can prove that the defendant ‘[i]ntentionally caus[ed] bodily 

harm,’ that he ‘intentionally str[uck]’ the victim, or that he merely ‘[a]ctually and intentionally 

touche[d]’ the victim.” In determining whether the battery conviction was a “violent felony” for 

the purpose of the ACCA, the Supreme Court applied the “modified categorical approach,” 

whereby the court may “determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by 

consulting the trial record.” In this case, the record did not provide a basis for this determination. 

Therefore, the Court was required to determine whether a conviction for the least of the acts 

enumerated in the Florida battery statute (actually and intentionally touching another person) had 

as an element the use of force against the person of another.

The Court held that it does not. First, the Court held that it was bound by the Florida 

Supreme Court’s interpretation of the elements of the battery statute, and that that court had held 

that “the element of ‘actually and intentionally touching’ . . . is satisfied by any intentionally 

physical contact, ‘no matter how slight.’” The Court went on to reason that, absent a definition 

within the ACCA of “physical force,” it must give the term its ordinary meaning, and that the 

ordinary meaning of “force” “suggest[s] a degree of power that would not be satisfied by the 

merest touching.” The Court then held that although force was an element of common law 

battery (which itself encompassed “even the slightest offensive touching”), in the context of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)(B)(i), “physical force” must mean “violent force—that is, force capable of 

causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 

In his dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the Court should look 

to the traditional, common law definition of battery, which includes the element of physical 

force. Since battery may encompass even slight touching, Alito reasoned, slight touching must 

therefore involve the element of physical force, and battery under the Florida statute must be a 

violent felony.

United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010).

The Supreme Court unanimously held that, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which prohibits the 

use of a firearm in relation to or in furtherance of a crime of violence, the fact that the firearm is 

a machine gun is an element of the offense that must be proved to a jury. The Court considered 

this issue in an earlier case, Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000), interpreting an earlier 

version of the statute, and held that the machine gun provision was an element of the offense. 

The Court reconsidered the issue in light of changes made to section 924(c) in 1998.

In this case, the defendant was charged with the attempted robbery of an armored car. 

Among the weapons recovered by authorities was a pistol that allegedly operated as a fully 

automatic weapon. The defendant disputed whether this pistol was in fact a machine gun. Under 

section 924(c), the defendant would be subject to a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence if the 
19

gun were determined to be a machine gun. The district court ruled that the machine gun 

provision of section 924(c) was an element of the offense. The First Circuit affirmed, basing its 

decision on Castillo. The First Circuit held that even though Castillo had been decided using an 

earlier version of the statute, the changes to the statute simply amounted to breaking up a lengthy 

sentence into subparagraphs that were easier to read, and the changes in no way altered the 

meaning of the statute. 

The Supreme Court did not interpret the statute anew, but rather asked only if the analysis 

of Castillo must change in light of the 1998 restructuring of the statute. In Castillo, the Court 

examined five factors to determine whether Congress intended the machine gun provision to be 

an element or a sentencing factor: (1) language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) risk of unfairness, 

(4) severity of the sentence, and (5) legislative history. The Court held that the main effect of the 

1998 changes “was to divide what was once a lengthy principal sentence into separate 

subparagraphs.” This change, the Court held, would change the analysis only as to the first 

Castillo factor. The Court described the 1998 version as making three main changes to the 

statute, two of which it called substantive and the last structural. The substantive changes were: 

1) what were once mandatory sentences became mandatory minimum sentences; and 2) the 

revised statute added the word “possesses” to “uses or carries,” and added mandatory minimums 

for the acts of brandishing and discharging the firearm. The third change, which the Court called 

structural, consisted of moving the machine gun provision from the main paragraph of the statute 

to a separate subsection. The Court held that this change “does not provide a clear indication 

that Congress meant to alter its treatment of machineguns as an offense element.” Rather, the 

Court determined, Congress more likely sought to break up a lengthy paragraph before adding 

the substantive changes. 

As for the other Castillo factors, the Court held that the second—legal tradition and past 

congressional practice—was unaffected by the 1998 changes, noting that “[s]entencing factors 

traditionally involve characteristics of the offender—such as recidivism, cooperation with law 

enforcement or acceptance of responsibility . . . . Characteristics of the offense itself are 

traditionally treated as elements, and the use of a machinegun under section 924(c) lies closest to 

the heart of the crime at issue.” The Court rejected the government’s argument that the SRA, 

and thus the sentencing guidelines, treat possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor, and that 

whether a firearm is a machine gun should likewise be treated as a sentencing factor. The Court 

pointed out that the SRA was enacted before the original section 924(c) was enacted, and thus 

would already have been considered in Castillo. Next, the court held that the third Castillo

factor, potential unfairness, was not changed by the 1998 amendments. The Castillo court noted 

that a judge might not be aware of which among many firearms a jury had determined a 

defendant had used in the course of a crime, and that thus a judge’s sentencing determination 

could be at odds with a jury’s factfinding. The Court in the present case held that this holding of 

Castillo remained unaffected. The Court further held that the restructuring of the statute had no 

effect on the fourth factor in Castillo, the potential severity of the sentence. In each instance, the 

shift from a mandatory minimum of five years to one of thirty years represents “a drastic, sixfold 

increase that strongly suggests a separate substantive crime.” The fifth Castillo factor was 

legislative history, and in both Castillo and the present case, the Court held that the legislative 

history was “of little help” in resolving the question presented. Given that four out of five 

Castillo factors were unaffected, and that there was no strong support for changing the analysis 

of the first factor, the Court reached the same conclusion that it had in Castillo: whether the 
20

firearm possessed or used under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was a machine gun is an element of the 

offense and not a sentencing factor.

Justice Stevens authored a concurring opinion, in which he wrote that the principles of 

Apprendi should apply with equal force to statutes that trigger mandatory minimums. Stevens 

contended that a preferable solution to the issue presented “would be to recognize that any fact 

mandating the imposition of a sentence more severe than a judge would otherwise have 

discretion to impose should be treated as an element of the offense.” This would mean 

overruling the Court’s earlier holdings in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) and 

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).

1

 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. 

Justice Thomas cited his own dissent in Harris, writing, “it is ultimately beside the point whether 

as a matter of statutory interpretation [the machinegun enhancement] is a sentencing factor. . . . 

[A]s a constitutional matter, because it establishes a harsher range of punishments, it must be 

treated as an element of a separate, aggravated offense that is submitted to a jury and proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009).

The Supreme Court, in a 9-0 decision, reversed the Seventh Circuit’s opinion upholding 

the district court’s conclusion that the defendant's prior offense of failure to report for periodic 

incarceration qualified as a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA. Justice Breyer authored 

the opinion; Justice Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

The ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), requires a 15-year minimum term of imprisonment if an 

individual convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm has three prior convictions “for a 

violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both. . ..” The issue before the district court was 

whether the defendant's prior conviction for failing to report to a penal institution qualified as a 

“violent felony” as that term is used in the ACCA because it “otherwise involve[d] conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The district court held that the 

failure to report was a type of escape, which qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA. The 

Seventh Circuit affirmed this classification, and the Supreme Court granted review in light of 

conflicting case law on this point among the circuits. 

The Court reaffirmed the use of the categorical approach in applying the ACCA, stating 

that “[t]he nature of the behavior that likely underlies a statutory phrase matters in this respect.” 

The Court referred back to its opinion in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), in which 

it examined a Massachusetts statute that combined various breaking and entering offenses into 

one section and “found that the behavior underlying, say, breaking into a building, differs so 

significantly from the behavior underlying, say, breaking into a vehicle, that for ACCA purposes 

a sentencing court must treat the two as different crimes.” The Court took a similar approach to 

the Illinois statute at issue, separating the “failure to report” sections of the statute from the 

sections involving escape from secured custody or from the physical custody of a law 

enforcement officer on one hand, and the failure to abide by conditions of home detention on the 

other. For ACCA purposes, then, the Court said, the Illinois statute involved “at least two 

separate crimes”: escape from secured custody or physical custody of a law enforcement officer, 

which would qualify as a violent felony; and failure to report, which would not qualify as a 

violent felony. The Court further observed that the statute (1) “lists escape and failure to report 

 

1 Later overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
21

separately (in its title and its body);” and (2) “places the behaviors in two different felony classes 

(Class Two and Class Three) of different degrees of seriousness.”

As so defined, the Court held that the crime of failure to report does not qualify as a 

violent felony under the ACCA:

Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of inaction, a far cry from the 

“purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct” potentially at issue when an offender 

uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or 

engages in certain forms of extortion. Cf. [Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145

(2008)]. While an offender who fails to report must of course be doing something at the 

relevant time, there is no reason to believe that the something poses a serious potential 

risk of physical injury. Cf. James [v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203-204 (2007)]. To 

the contrary, an individual who fails to report would seem unlikely, not likely, to call 

attention to his whereabouts by simultaneously engaging in additional violent and 

unlawful conduct. 

In so holding, the Court rejected the government’s argument “that a failure to report reveals the 

offender’s special, strong aversion to penal custody” and that this aversion suggests that this 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. The Court disagreed, citing a Commission 

report that it said “helps provide a conclusive, negative answer” to the question of whether this 

connection exists. The Court discussed the information provided in the report, concluding that it 

“strongly supports the intuitive belief that failure to report does not involve a serious potential 

risk of physical injury.” As a result, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and 

remanded the case.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a separate concurring opinion, noting a 

continuing disagreement with the use of the categorical approach in these cases, but recognizing 

the precedential value of earlier cases on the issue. Additionally, Justice Alito emphasized the 

view that action from Congress is required to properly address the issue.

Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009).

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 per curiam opinion, granted certiorari and summarily 

reversed and remanded this crack cocaine case to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice 

Kennedy disagreed with this approach, preferring to grant review and schedule the case for oral 

argument. Justice Thomas dissented without comment, and Chief Justice Roberts, joined by 

Justice Alito, wrote a dissenting opinion.

The defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack and powder cocaine; in 

determining his sentence, the district court declined to impose a sentence within the guideline 

range, concluding that the 100:1 crack to powder ratio inherent in that range produced too long a 

sentence. Instead, the district court determined what the defendant’s guideline range would be if 

the drug guideline contained a 20:1 crack to powder ratio, and imposed a sentence near the 

middle of that range. The en banc Eighth Circuit, prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in 

Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), held that this sentence was unreasonable because, in its view, 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Booker did not permit district courts to substitute a different ratio. The 

Supreme Court concluded that this decision was inconsistent with its opinion in Kimbrough.

Discussing Kimbrough, the Supreme Court explained that it “holds that with respect to 

the crack cocaine Guidelines, a categorical disagreement with and variance from the Guidelines 
22

is not suspect.” In fact, the Court said, this “was indeed the point of Kimbrough: a recognition of 

district courts’ authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement 

with them, and not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive 

sentence in a particular case.” It necessarily follows from this authority, the Court held, that a 

district court also has authority to substitute “a different ratio which, in his judgment, corrects the 

disparity.” The Court noted that, in this case, the election of the 20:1 ratio “was based upon two 

well-reasoned decisions by other courts, which themselves reflected the Sentencing 

Commission’s expert judgment that a 20:1 ratio would be appropriate in a mine-run case.”

Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, expressed disagreement with the Court’s decision to 

summarily reverse the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, though acknowledging that the majority’s 

holding “may well” follow from Kimbrough.

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion, held that a conviction for felony driving under the 

influence (DUI) is not a “violent felony” that can trigger the mandatory 15-year minimum under

the ACCA. Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 

Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Justice Scalia, writing separately, concurred in 

the judgment; Justice Alito, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas, dissented. 

The Court was asked to construe the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), 

which defines a “violent felony” as, inter alia, a crime punishable by more than one year’s 

imprisonment that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The 

petitioner challenged the enhancement of his sentence on the basis of the prior DUI, arguing that 

the “otherwise” clause of the above provision was not intended to encompass DUI. The 

government argued that, because DUI presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another, it falls within the scope of the statute and therefore qualified the petitioner for the 

enhanced sentence. The district court accepted the government’s view of the statute and applied 

the enhancement, and the court of appeals upheld the sentence. 

The Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts had erroneously construed the 

statute, holding that a prior conviction for DUI should not expose a defendant to the 15-year 

mandatory minimum. The Court began with the presumption that “the lower courts were right in 

concluding that DUI involves conduct that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.’” The Court then faced the issue of why Congress included the enumerated offenses 

(burglary, arson, extortion, and offenses involving “use of explosives”) in the provision. The 

Court rejected the government’s argument that the examples were intended “to demonstrate no 

more than the degree of risk sufficient to bring a crime within the statute’s scope,” concluding 

that “the examples are so far from clear in respect to the degree of risk each poses that it is 

difficult to accept clarification in respect to degree of risk as Congress’ only reason for including 

them.” Rather, the Court concluded, “we should read the examples as limiting the crimes . . . to 

crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples 

themselves.” The Court held that the legislative history of the ACCA supported this conclusion. 

Applying this standard, the Court concluded that DUI does not sufficiently resemble the 

enumerated crimes to bring it within the ambit of the statute. The most significant distinction, 

according to the Court, is the fact that DUI offenses are essentially strict liability crimes, whereas 

the enumerated offenses typically involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct . . . 
23

[which] makes it more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun 

deliberately to harm a victim.”

In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia followed the analysis set forth in his dissent in 

James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), a case from the prior term in which the Court 

addressed whether attempted burglary fell within the statute. Under this analysis, Justice Scalia 

concluded that, without further evidence, he could not find that DUI “pose[s] at least as serious a 

risk of physical injury to another as burglary” and that the rule of lenity therefore required the 

conclusion that the defendant’s sentence could not be enhanced under the ACCA.

In dissent, Justice Alito argued that the text of the statute requires only the analysis of 

whether the offense in question presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and 

concluded that the DUI in this case did pose such a risk.

Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008). 

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 opinion, held that an appeals court was not permitted to 

order an increase in a defendant’s sentence where the government did not appeal the sentence. 

Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 

Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined. Justice Breyer wrote separately, concurring in the 

judgment. Justice Alito dissented; Justice Stevens joined the dissent in full and Justice Breyer 

joined it in part. 

The petitioner was convicted of seven counts of an eight-count indictment arising out of 

his participation in a crack cocaine trafficking scheme. The charges included two section 924(c)

counts; the district court, in direct contravention of prior Supreme Court precedent, held over 

government objection that the second count was not considered a “second or subsequent 

conviction” because the two counts were charged in the same indictment. As a result, the district 

court erroneously imposed a sentence of 442 months’ imprisonment, which fell below the 

required mandatory minimum of 622 months’ imprisonment. Nevertheless, the defendant 

appealed the sentence; in defending the sentence, the government noted that the sentence was 

erroneously low, but did not file a cross-appeal of the error. The Eighth Circuit, relying on the 

“plain error” rule set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), vacated the sentence and remanded to the 

district court with instructions that it impose the statutorily mandated sentence. The defendant 

then sought rehearing and rehearing en banc, and the petitions were summarily denied. The 

defendant and the United States agreed that the appeals court erred in vacating and remanding 

the sentence; therefore, the Court invited an amicus brief in support of the Eighth Circuit’s 

position. 

The majority opinion began by noting the general “principle of party presentation” that 

characterizes the United States’ adversary system in which courts “rely on the parties to frame 

the issues for decision” and themselves play “the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties 

present.” Derived from this principle is the “cross-appeal rule,” which the Court described as an 

“unwritten but longstanding rule” that “an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a 

nonappealing party.” The Court noted the split among the circuits regarding the question of 

whether this rule is “jurisdictional,” and therefore not subject to exception, or a “rule of practice” 

to which courts may create exceptions. As in previous cases, the Court declined to resolve the 

circuit split, concluding that resolving the issue was not necessary to deciding the case at bar.
24

The Court discussed 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), which provides that the government may not 

proceed with an appeal of a criminal case “without the personal approval of the Attorney 

General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general designated by the Solicitor General.” 

The Court concluded that “[i]t would severely undermine Congress’ instruction were appellate 

judges to ‘sally forth’ on their own motion . . . to take up errors adverse to the Government when 

the designated Department of Justice officials have not authorized an appeal from the sentence 

the trial court imposed.” The Court said that “[t]hat measure should garner the Judiciary’s full 

respect.” The Court then addressed the relationship between Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) and the 

cross-appeal rule, concluding that no plain-error exception to the cross-appeal rule existed where 

the error was to the detriment of the government in a criminal appeal.

The Court then rejected the arguments of amicus supporting the Eighth Circuit’s position. 

In so doing, the Court discussed at some length the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3742, the part of 

the SRA dealing with appellate review standards, supports the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. The 

argument relies on a comparison of section 3742(f)(1) and (f)(2); the former sets the standard of 

review for “sentences imposed ‘in violation of law’ and Guideline application errors” and the 

latter sets the standard of review for “sentences ‘outside the applicable Guideline range.’” For 

sentences outside the range, the provision specifies that remand is proper “only where a 

departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines harms the appellant;” for sentences that are 

“imposed ‘in violation of law’” or that result from an erroneous guideline application, no limit is 

specified. “The inference amicus draws from this distinction is that Congress intended to 

override the cross-appeal rule for sentences controlled by section 3742(f)(1), i.e., those imposed 

‘in violation of law’ (or incorrectly applying the Guidelines), but not for Guideline departure 

errors, the category covered by section 3742(f)(2).” The Court rejected this interpretation, 

instead concluding that, since the cross-appeal rule was well-settled at the time of the SRA, 

“Congress was aware of the cross-appeal rule, and framed section 3742 expecting that the new 

provision would operate in harmony with the ‘inveterate and certain’ bar to enlarging judgments 

in favor of an appellee who filed no cross-appeal.” In support of its interpretation, the Court 

noted that earlier crime control legislation had included a specific exception to the cross-appeal 

rule, which was repealed by the SRA. Additionally, the Court noted that “the construction 

proposed by amicus would draw a puzzling distinction between incorrect applications of the 

Sentencing Guidelines . . . and erroneous departures from the Guidelines.” Finally, the Court 

supported its application of the cross-appeal rule by discussing what it called the “auxiliary” 

roles of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in ensuring “fair notice and finality” to permit 

strategic decisions in appellate litigation. 

The Court concluded by distinguishing its holding in this case from what it viewed as 

proper treatment of “sentencing package cases” in which a defendant successfully attacks his 

sentence on one or some of the multiple counts, and the appellate court vacates “the entire 

sentence on all counts so that, on remand, the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing plan to 

assure that it remains adequate to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” This 

procedure, the Court said, “is not at odds with the cross-appeal rule” and “simply ensures that the 

sentence ‘will suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant.’”

In concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer expressed the view that the Eighth Circuit 

had authority to vacate the sentence, but that its decision to do so in this case was an abuse of 

discretion because the decision was “based solely on the obviousness of the lower court’s error,” 

a standard which is explicitly disapproved by prior Supreme Court precedent. 
25

In dissent, Justice Alito expressed the view that the cross-appeal rule is not jurisdictional 

but rather a rule of practice, and therefore subject to exceptions. Further, Justice Alito argued 

that application of the rule in this instance is not as important to the interests of justice as the 

majority believed it is, and would in fact “disserve[] . . . the interest of the Judiciary and the 

public in correcting grossly prejudicial errors of law that undermine confidence in our legal 

system.” Because the parties did not brief the issue of whether, if the Eighth Circuit did have 

such authority, it abused its discretion in the case at bar, Justice Alito noted that he would affirm 

without reaching the question.

Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008). 

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, held that a district court was not required to provide 

advance notice to the parties when imposing a sentence that represents a variance from the 

guideline range. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice 

Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring 

opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissent, in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. 

Petitioner Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to one count of making a threatening interstate 

communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Irizarry admitted to sending a number of emails threatening to kill his ex-wife and her new husband, and that his emails were intended to 

be true threats to kill or injure them. The PSR described the threatening emails and added that 

the petitioner had asked another inmate to kill his ex-wife’s new husband. As possible grounds 

for departure, the PSR stated that Irizarry’s criminal history category might not adequately 

reflect his past criminal conduct or the likelihood that he would commit other crimes. The 

government noted in its response to the PSR that it intended to call Irizarry’s ex-wife as a 

witness at the sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Irizarry’s ex-wife testified regarding incidents 

of domestic violence, the basis for the restraining order against Irizarry, and the threats he had 

made against her and her family. A special agent of the FBI also testified, describing documents 

recovered from Irizarry’s car indicating that he intended to find his ex-wife and their children. 

And Irizarry’s cellmate testified that Irizarry “was obsessed with the idea of getting rid of” his 

ex-wife’s husband. Irizarry also testified. After listening to the witnesses and hearing from 

counsel, the district court concluded “that the maximum time that [the defendant] can be 

incapacitated is what is best for society, and therefore the guideline range . . . is not high 

enough.” The court varied upward from the Guidelines range, and sentenced Irizarry to the 

statutory maximum term of imprisonment. The court’s decision was based on its determination, 

after hearing Irizarry’s ex-wife testify at the sentencing hearing, that Irizarry “will continue . . . 

in this conduct regardless of what this court does and regardless of what kind of supervision he’s 

under.” Following the court’s imposition of sentence, Irizarry objected, stating that he “didn’t 

have notice of [the court’s] intent to upwardly depart.” The court overruled this objection, 

finding that notice was not required now that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are advisory. The 

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Rule 32(h) did not apply in this 

case because the above-Guidelines sentence was a variance, not a departure. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that Rule 32(h) does not 

apply to a variance from a recommended Guidelines range. The Court’s holding rests on its 

decision in Booker, “which invalidated the mandatory features of the Guidelines.” According to 

the Court, “[t]he due process concerns that motivated the Court to require notice in a world of 

mandatory Guidelines no longer provide a basis for this Court to extend the rule set forth in 
26

Burns [v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991)] either through an interpretation of Rule 32(h) itself 

or through Rule 32(i)(1)(c).” 

In Burns, the Court had previously held that the text of Rule 32 required “‘notice of any 

contemplated departure.’” Justice Souter’s dissent, which argued that the text itself did not 

require notice, discussed due process concerns. The Court in this case stated that its decision in 

Burns “applied in a narrow category of cases,” namely, departures “authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(b) which required ‘an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 

adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines 

that should result in a sentence different from that described.’” Such departures had to be based 

on “the sentencing guidelines policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing 

Commission.” Further, the notice requirement set forth in Burns “only applied to the 

subcategory of those departures that were based on ‘a ground not identified as a ground . . . for 

departure either in the presentence report or in a pre-hearing submission.’”

Because, post-Booker, “there is no longer a limit comparable to the one at issue in Burns 

on the variances from Guidelines ranges,” the Court held that Rule 32(h) does not apply to 

variances. The Court also voiced more practical concerns that a special notice requirement in 

such circumstances might “create unnecessary delay.” The Court stated that the proper approach 

to cases in which “the factual basis for a particular sentence will come as a surprise to a 

defendant or the Government” is for the “district court to consider granting a continuance when a 

party has a legitimate basis for claiming that the surprise was prejudicial.” 

The dissent (written by Justice Breyer) contended that Rule 32(h) applies to section

3553(a) variances by its terms. The dissent argued that by distinguishing “departures” from 

“variances” in this context, the Court is “creat[ing] a legal distinction without much of a 

difference.” According to the dissent, “[s]o-called variances fall comfortably within” the 

Guidelines’ definition of “departure.” Further, “[v]ariances are also consistent with the ordinary 

meaning of the term ‘departure,’” and “conceptually speaking, the substantive difference 

between” the two terms “is nonexistent.” The majority rejected this argument, stating that 

“‘[d]eparture’ is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines sentences 

imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.” 

The dissent also found the majority’s concerns about delay to be “exaggerated,” noting 

that in most cases in which the district court varies outside the Guidelines range, the PSR or the 

parties have identified the ground for the variance. In other cases, the parties might be able to 

address the “unconsidered” issue at the hearing without the need for a continuance. In all other 

cases, according to the dissent, “fairness justifies notice regardless” of “burdens and delay.” 

United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008). 

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion, held that a previous offense for which the statutory 

maximum sentence was 10 years’ imprisonment only because the defendant was a repeat 

offender qualified as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Justice Alito, writing for Chief 

Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer concluded that the recidivism 

enhancement applied under state law should be used to calculate the “maximum term of 

imprisonment” for ACCA purposes. Justice Souter authored a dissenting opinion, which was 

joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. 
27

In the case at bar, the defendant had two California burglary convictions and three 

convictions in Washington State for delivery of a controlled substance. The district court, in 

sentencing the defendant on a federal felon-in-possession charge, declined to apply the ACCA

enhancement because the defendant was subject to the ten-year maximum in Washington state 

only because he was a repeat offender; under that law, first offenders face only a statutory 

maximum of five years. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that its holding on this issue was in 

conflict with law from the Seventh Circuit and “in tension” with precedent from the Fourth and 

Fifth Circuits. 

The Court held that the government’s interpretation of the ACCA was the correct one, 

focusing on the statute’s definition of three terms: “offense,” “law,” and “maximum term.” The 

Court said: 

The “offense” in each of the drug-delivery cases was a violation of §§69.50.401(a)(ii)–

(iv). The relevant “law” is set out in both that provision, which prescribes a “maximum 

term” of five years for a first “offense,” and §69.50.408(a), which prescribes a 

“maximum term” of 10 years for a second or subsequent “offense.” Thus, in this case, the 

maximum term prescribed by Washington law for at least two of respondent’s state drug 

offenses was 10 years.

The Ninth Circuit’s approach, the Court said, “contorts ACCA’s plain terms” and is 

“inconsistent with the way in which the concept of the ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ is 

customarily understood by participants in the criminal justice process.” 

Addressing the respondent’s arguments, the Court rejected the argument that the term 

“offense” as used in the ACCA should be defined as the elements of the offense, of which a 

recidivism enhancement (at least of the kind in this case) is not one. The Court held that this 

reading added a limitation to the ACCA that was not part of the plain language of that statute. 

Additionally, the court rejected the respondent’s argument that the government’s reading 

contradicted the “manifest purpose” of the ACCA. The respondent argued that, since the 

sentence length was used essentially as a proxy for the seriousness of the offense (thus limiting 

application of the ACCA enhancement to those convicted of more serious prior offenses), 

including recidivism enhancements skews this measurement. The Court stated that “[t]his 

argument rests on the erroneous proposition that a defendant’s prior record of convictions has no 

bearing on the seriousness of an offense,” instead noting that “an offense committed by a repeat 

offender is often thought to reflect greater culpability and thus to merit greater punishment” and 

that “a second or subsequent offense is often regarded as more serious because it portends 

greater future danger and therefore warrants an increased sentence for purposes of deterrence and 

incapacitation.” Additionally, the Court observed that “the ACCA itself is a recidivist statute,” 

concluding that this fact “bolster[ed]” its reading of the statute in that “Congress must have had 

such provisions in mind and must have understood that the ‘maximum penalty prescribed by 

[state] law’ in some cases would be increased by state recidivism provisions.” 

Finally, the Court rejected the respondent’s arguments that the Court’s prior decisions in 

United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997) and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), 

as well as the policy and practical implications of the government’s reading, support the 

respondent’s interpretation of the statute. With respect to LaBonte, the Court rejected the 

respondent’s argument that Congress’s decision not to make reference to a “category of 

offenders” in the ACCA as it did in 18 U.S.C. § 994(h) (which the Court interpreted in LaBonte) 

supported his interpretation of the ACCA. The Court said: “Respondent does not explain how 
28

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) could have easily been reworded to mirror 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). But in 

any event, the language used in ACCA, for the reasons explained above, is more than clear 

enough.” The Court similarly rejected the respondent’s argument that the Court’s decision in 

Taylor, adopting the categorical approach, supported his interpretation, finding “no connection . . 

. between the issue in Taylor . . . and the issue here. . . .”

In dissent, Justice Souter argued that the majority “chooses one reading of the [ACCA] 

over another that would make at least as much sense of the statute’s ambiguous text and would 

follow the counsel of a tradition of lenity in construing perplexing criminal laws” and that the 

majority’s interpretation “promises hard times for the trial courts that will have to make the

complex sentencing calculations this decision demands.” 

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).

The Supreme Court in a 6-3 opinion struck down California’s Determinate Sentencing 

Law (DSL) on grounds that it violated the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right, as interpreted by 

the Supreme Court in the Apprendi line of cases. The specific question presented in the case 

was: “Whether California’s Determinate Sentencing Law, by permitting sentencing judges to 

impose enhanced sentences based on their determination of facts not found by the jury or 

admitted by the defendant, violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” The Court 

concluded that it did, holding that the relevant statutory maximum for Sixth Amendment 

purposes under California’s DSL was the middle term sentence because a judge was required to 

find no facts beyond the jury’s verdict to impose it. In so holding, the Court overruled a 

California Supreme Court case, People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005), which had 

determined that the DSL did not violate Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 

In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the abuse of discretion standard of review 

applies equally to all sentences, rejecting the form of proportionality review employed by the 

court of appeals in the case. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 

Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justices Scalia 

and Souter filed concurring opinions, and Justices Thomas and Alito filed dissenting opinions.

The Court held that “while the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and 

the recommended Guidelines range is surely relevant, the court of appeals must review all 

sentences -- whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range--under a 

deferential abuse of discretion standard.” The Court further held that the appellate rule 

“requiring ‘proportion’ justifications for departures from the Guidelines range is not consistent 

with” Booker. The Court also stated: “Our explanation of ‘reasonableness’ review in the Booker

opinion made it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse of discretion standard of review now 

applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions.” 

In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the range, the Court said, appellate 

courts “may therefore take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a 

deviation from the Guidelines.” An inappropriate standard of appellate review, the Court said, is 

one: “that requires ‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines 

range.” The Court also disapproved “the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the 

percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications 

required for a specific sentence.” The Court reasoned that such an approach would “come too 
29

close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the 

Guidelines range.” The Court also stated that the “mathematical approach also suffers from 

infirmities of application” and “assumes the existence of some ascertainable method of assigning 

percentages to various justifications.” The Court also observed that these practices “reflect a 

practice . . . of applying a heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines 

range,” which, the Court said, “is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse of discretion standard 

of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions – whether inside or outside the 

Guidelines range.” 

The Court then discussed the proper analysis for sentencing courts, beginning with proper 

calculation of the guideline range, followed by consideration of the section 3553(a) factors, and 

noting that if the court determines that a sentence outside the guideline range is appropriate, the 

court “must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently 

compelling to support the degree of the variance.” The Court went on to state: “We find it 

uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification 

than a minor one.” After making this determination, the Court said, the sentencing court must 

adequately explain the reasons for the sentence. With respect to appellate review, the Court 

acknowledged that reviewing courts “will, of course, take into account the totality of the 

circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” In so doing, the 

Court said, the appellate court “may consider the extent of deviation, but must give due 

deference to the district court’s decision that the 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the variance. 

The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was 

appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”

The Court then concluded that, in the case at bar, the Eighth Circuit failed to give the 

proper deference to the district court’s decision, and reversed the judgment.

Justice Alito, dissenting, stated that he would hold that “a district court must give the 

policy decisions that are embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines at least some significant weight” 

and would therefore affirm the Eighth Circuit’s decision.

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 

In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that a sentencing judge may consider the disparity 

between the Guidelines’ treatment of crack and powder cocaine when determining a sentencing 

range. 

The Court summarized the history of the crack/powder disparity, noting the 

circumstances surrounding its inclusion in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (the 1986 Act) and 

the assumptions that underlay the conclusion that crack offenders should be punished 

significantly more severely than powder cocaine offenders. The Court observed that, in creating 

the drug guidelines, the Commission varied from its usual practice of employing an “empirical 

approach based on data about past sentencing practices,” instead adopting the “weight-driven 

scheme” used in the 1986 Act, and maintaining the 100-to-1 quantity ratio throughout the drug 

table. The Court then discussed the Commission’s subsequent criticisms of the ratio, quoting 

from the various Commission reports to Congress on the issue, and discussed Congress’s 

previous responses to Commission actions and recommendations. The Court finally discussed 

the Commission’s 2007 amendments, and observed that the Commission considered them “only 

. . . a partial remedy” for the problems caused by the disparity.
30

The Court then discussed the status of the relevant guidelines in light of Booker, 

examining the government’s arguments that “the Guidelines adopting the 100-to-1 ratio are an 

exception to the general freedom that sentencing courts have to apply the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)

factors.” The Court first rejected the government’s grounding of the proposition in the text of 

the 1986 Act, “declin[ing] to read any implicit directive into [the] congressional silence” on the 

appropriate length of sentences not dictated by the mandatory minima and maxima in the 1986 

Act itself. The Court observed that “[d]rawing meaning from silence is particularly 

inappropriate here, for Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in 

express terms,” citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)’s direction regarding career offenders. Additionally, 

the Court looked to its earlier decision in Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996), in which it 

held that the Commission’s method for calculating the weight of LSD did not dictate the method 

used for determining the applicable statutory mandatory minimum. 

Next, the Court rejected the government’s argument that Congress’s 1995 disapproval of 

the Commission’s implementation of the 1:1 ratio in the guidelines “made clear that the 1986 

Act required the Commission (and sentencing courts) to take drug quantities into account, and to 

do so in a manner that respects the 100:1 ratio.” The Court observed that “nothing in Congress’ 

1995 reaction to the Commission-proposed 1-to-1 ratio suggested that crack sentences must 

exceed powder sentences by a ratio of 100 to 1. To the contrary, Congress’ 1995 action required 

the Commission to recommend a ‘revision of the drug quantity ratio of crack cocaine to powder 

cocaine.’” The Court further observed that the 2007 amendments result in a crack/powder ratio 

that is not consistently 100-to-1, but that Congress did not disapprove of the amendments.

Finally, the Court rejected the government’s arguments that consideration of the 100-to-1 

ratio would result in unwarranted sentencing disparities in violation of section 3553(a)(6). The 

two kinds of disparities considered were those arising from “cliffs” in the guideline ranges near 

and at the mandatory minima, and those arising from different sentencing judges’ opinions 

regarding the proper relationship between crack offenders and powder cocaine offenders. The 

Court observed that both are inherent in the guidelines system and that “advisory Guidelines 

combined with appellate review for reasonableness will . . . not eliminate variations between 

district courts, but . . . Booker recognized that some departures from uniformity were a necessary 

cost of the remedy [Booker] adopted.” The Court finally noted that, if an unwarranted disparity 

arises, the district court is required to address it under section 3553(a)(6).

The Court then discussed the Commission’s ongoing role in determining sentencing 

ranges, noting that “while the Guidelines are no longer binding, closer review may be in order 

when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the 

Guidelines range ‘fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ even in a mine-run case.” 

The Court held that the crack cocaine guidelines “do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of 

its characteristic institutional role” and noted the Commission’s opinion that the crack cocaine 

guidelines produce “disproportionately harsh sanctions.” In light of this, “it would not be an 

abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that 

the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s 

purposes, even in a mine-run case.” 

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the sentence in the instant case did 

not constitute an abuse of discretion, and reversed the Fourth Circuit’s order vacating the 

sentence. 
31

In dissent, Justice Thomas expressed his continuing disagreement with the opinion of the 

Booker remedial majority, and Justice Alito wrote that he would vacate the Fourth Circuit’s 

decision and remand for reconsideration in light of Booker’s holding that a court of appeals may 

not “treat the Guidelines’ policy decisions as binding.”

Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that, under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(1), a violent felony offense for which the defendant’s civil rights were never revoked is 

not excluded from qualifying as a predicate for an enhanced sentence. Such a prior offense, the 

Court ruled, does not fall into the category of those offenses “for which a person . . . has had civil 

rights restored.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). The case addressed a circuit split arising out of two

main cases: McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005 (2d Cir. 1995), holding that such 

convictions are not excluded, and United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627 (1st Cir. 1996), 

holding the opposite. In the case at bar, the Seventh Circuit adopted the McGrath analysis.

The petitioner pleaded guilty in the Western District of Wisconsin to a violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. His sentence was enhanced pursuant to the 

ACCA, and the district court imposed the relevant 15-year mandatory minimum. The court 

based the enhancement on the petitioner’s three Wisconsin misdemeanor battery convictions, 

each punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment. Although these convictions would 

otherwise count as “violent felonies” for ACCA purposes pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B), 

the petitioner argued that, because none of them caused the revocation of his civil rights, they 

were exempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). That statute excludes from the relevant 

definition of a qualifying predicate offense:

Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been 

pardoned or has had civil rights restored . . . unless such pardon, expungement, or 

restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, 

possess, or receive firearms.

In support of his position that the term “restored” should be construed to include offenses for 

which civil rights were never revoked, the petitioner argued inter alia that the McGrath

construction would contravene the purpose of the statute and produce absurd results. He argued 

that the purpose of the statute was to expand the reach of the exemption provision and to permit 

its application to be dictated by state law. He further argued that less serious offenders (i.e., 

those whose offenses did not result in the revocation of civil rights) would receive harsher 

treatment than more serious offenders (i.e., those whose offenses did result in revocation, but 

whose civil rights were later restored). In response, the government relied largely on textualist 

arguments, emphasizing the plain meaning of the term “restored” and its implication that 

something never lost may not be restored. 

The Supreme Court examined Congressional intent, and summarized it as follows:

Congress framed § 921(a)(20) to serve two purposes. It sought to qualify as ACCA

predicate offenses violent crimes that a State classifies as misdemeanors yet punishes by 

a substantial term of imprisonment, i.e., more than two years. Congress also sought to 

defer to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a 

conviction. Had Congress included a retention-of-rights exemption, however, the very 

misdemeanors it meant to cover would escape ACCA’s reach.
32

(Internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court further observed that the petitioner’s reading of 

the statute would also produce absurd or anomalous results, noting that Maine does not revoke 

any offender’s civil rights, and so offenders who committed the most dangerous offenses in 

Maine would receive less punishment than offenders who committed less serious offenses in 

other states. The Supreme Court also noted that Congress must have been aware that allowing 

state laws, which vary, to dictate application of the ACCA would produce some anomalous 

results. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that it had “no warrant” to move beyond the plain 

language of the provision and observed: “We are not equipped to say what statutory alteration, if 

any, Congress would have made had its attention trained on offenders who retained civil rights; 

nor can we recast § 921(a)(20) in Congress’ stead.”

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held that courts of appeals may apply a 

presumption of reasonableness when reviewing a sentence imposed within the sentencing 

guideline range, and affirmed the within-guidelines sentence imposed in the case. Writing for 

the majority, Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, 

Ginsburg, and Alito, emphasized the close relationship between the guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors. 

First, the Court discussed the statutory provisions governing the promulgation of the 

guidelines and how those provisions mirror the factors that section 3553(a) requires sentencing 

courts to consider, noting that “. . . the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and 

the Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other 

at wholesale.” Second, the Court discussed the process that the Commission used to initially 

promulgate and subsequently amend the guidelines, concluding that the guidelines “seek to 

embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice” and that they “reflect a 

rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” In sum, the Court 

said “. . . [T]he courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than having independent 

legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge’s discretionary 

decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the 

mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable.” The majority also emphasized 

that circuits are not required to employ a presumption when conducting reasonableness review, 

and that the presumption is applied on appeal and not by the sentencing judge. 

The majority opinion also discussed the procedural issues raised by the advisory 

guidelines scheme. Specifically, the Court (and in this it was joined by Justices Scalia and 

Thomas) examined the district court’s statement at sentencing to determine whether it complied 

with the requirement in section 3553(c) that the judge “state in open court the reasons for its 

imposition of the particular sentence.” The Court emphasized that the amount of detail required 

in such a statement would vary depending on the circumstances of the case, but that the district 

court “should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ 

arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” 

Further, the Court said, when imposing a within-guidelines sentence, a brief explanation may be 

sufficient: “Unless a party contests the Guidelines sentence generally under § 3553(a) - that is 

argues that the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or, for example, that they do not 

generally treat certain defendant characteristics in the proper way - or argues for departure, the 

judge normally need say no more.” The Court said that, where such arguments are made, the 

sentencing judge will typically explain why he has rejected them; it noted again, however, that a 
33

brief explanation may be sufficient. The Court approved the sentencing judge’s very brief 

explanation in sentencing Mr. Rita, noting that the judge had clearly heard and considered the 

arguments relating to Mr. Rita’s military service, his health issues, and his vulnerability in 

prison, but “simply found [them] insufficient to warrant a sentence” below the guideline range. 

On this issue, the Court concluded: “Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at 

hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and 

arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.”

In dissent, Justice Souter argued that it is impossible, under the current system, to 

“recognize such a presumption and still retain the full effect of Apprendi in aid of the Sixth 

Amendment guarantee.” In his view, the proper resolution to the tension between the Sixth 

Amendment jury trial right and Congressional concerns about uniformity would be for Congress 

to “reenact the Guidelines law to give it the same binding force it originally had, but with 

provision for jury, not judicial, determination of any fact necessary for a sentence within an 

upper Guidelines subrange.” Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia 

(with whom Justice Thomas joined), criticized the Court because, he said, “the Court has failed 

to establish that every sentence which will be imposed under the advisory Guidelines scheme 

could equally have been imposed had the judge relied upon no facts other than those found by 

the jury or admitted by the defendant.” In his view, “reasonableness review cannot contain a 

substantive component at all,” but procedural reasonableness review can provide some 

sentencing uniformity. Applying this standard, Justices Scalia and Thomas concluded that the 

sentence imposed in this case was reasonable. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 

concurred, also concluding that the sentence was reasonable, but emphasized that the 

presumption was a rebuttable one and that even an outside-the-guidelines sentence would be 

reviewed “under traditional abuse-of-discretion principles.” 

Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007). 

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c)(1)(A), a person who receives a firearm in a drugs-for-firearms transaction does not “use” 

the firearm “during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime.” The Court observed that a 

circuit conflict had arisen regarding the construction of the term “use” in this context, and 

reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in this case, remanding for proceedings consistent with the 

opinion.

The Court began by noting that section 924(c)(1)(A) prescribes a mandatory minimum 

sentence for a defendant who “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking 

crime[,] . . . uses or carries a firearm,” but does not define the term “uses.” The court further 

observed that it had addressed the definition of the term in two earlier cases, Smith v. United 

States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) and Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). In Smith, the 

Court held that a person who trades a firearm for drugs does “use” the firearm for purposes of the 

statute; the Watson court observed that this ruling relied mostly on the “ordinary or natural 

meaning” of the term “use” in the context of the statute. In Bailey, the Court held that possessing 

a firearm when the firearm was stored near the scene of drug trafficking did not constitute “use” 

for purposes of section 924(c)(1). The Watson court again observed that this construction relied 

on the “ordinary or natural” meaning of the term and held that the statute “requires evidence 

sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the 

firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.”
34

The Court observed that neither Smith nor Bailey answered the question presented in the 

case at bar, and stated: 

With no statutory definition or definitive clue, the meaning of the verb “uses” has to turn 

on the language as we normally speak it; there is no other source of a reasonable 

inference about what Congress understood when writing or what its words will bring to 

the mind of a careful reader. 

(Internal citations omitted.) The Court concluded that “regular speech would not say that” the 

person in these circumstances had “used” the item received in the barter. 

The Court then turned to the government’s arguments for a different construction of the 

term, rejecting each in turn. The government’s first argument asked the Court to read section

924(c)(1)(A) in conjunction with section 924(d), arguing that the Smith court’s observation that 

section 924(d) supported its reading of 924(c) means that the Court must construe the two 

provisions to give the same meaning to the term “use” in both sections. The Court rejected this 

reading of Smith, and concluded that the differences between the two provisions render section

924(d) unhelpful in this case. This is because, the Court said, “[section 924(d)] tells us a gun can 

be ‘used’ in a receipt crime, but not whether both parties to a transfer use the gun, or only one, or 

which one.” Since the two provisions operate at different levels of specificity, the Court held, 

construing them differently does not bring them into conflict.

The government’s second argument was, the Court said, essentially a policy argument; 

the government characterized the ordinary meaning of the statute as leading to “unacceptable 

asymmetry” with Smith. The Court held that if Congress concluded that the asymmetry was 

unacceptable, it could amend the statute, noting that “law depends on respect for language and 

would be better served by a statutory amendment . . . than by racking statutory language to cover 

a policy it fails to reach.”

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment and wrote separately to observe that 

distinguishing between the two parties to the gun-for-drugs transaction “makes scant sense,” but 

that she joined the judgment because she had since concluded that Smith was wrongly decided 

and would overrule it, holding that the term “use” in section 924(c)(1) was limited to using the 

firearm “as a weapon, not . . . in a bartering transaction.”

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006). 

In this 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Washington. The 

Court held that failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not “structural” error which 

always invalidates a conviction. Rather, Blakely violations may be subject to harmless error 

review.

Recuenco was convicted of second-degree assault based on the jury's finding that he was 

armed with a “deadly weapon.” Rather than requesting the one-year enhancement corresponding 

to a finding of the involvement of a deadly weapon, the state sought a mandatory three-year 

enhancement because the defendant was armed with a firearm. Under Washington law, a firearm 

qualifies as a deadly weapon, but the jury form did not require the jury to make the specific 

finding that a firearm was used. The trial court found that the weapon was a firearm and 

imposed the higher penalty. The state conceded before the Washington Supreme Court that a 

Sixth Amendment violation occurred under Blakely. The Washington Supreme Court refused to 
35

apply harmless-error analysis to the Blakely error, vacated the sentence, and remanded for 

sentencing based on the deadly weapon enhancement.

In reversing the state court, the Court noted that it has repeatedly recognized that 

“commission of a constitutional error at trial alone does not entitle a defendant to automatic 

reversal. Instead, most constitutional errors can be harmless.”

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 

The Supreme Court, in a plurality decision (5-1-2), held that a sentencing court cannot 

look to police reports in making a “generic burglary” decision under the ACCA. 

The ACCA mandated a fifteen-year minimum sentence for any person found to have 

committed certain federal firearms violations if that person had three prior convictions for 

“violent felonies.” Congress specified that the term “violent felony” included “burglary,” and 

the Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), held that the ACCA’s use of the term 

“burglary” encompasses only “generic burglary.” A “burglary” was considered a “generic 

burglary” if three elements were present: “[i] unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining 

in, [ii] a building or structure, [iii] with intent to commit a crime.” In Taylor, the Court stated 

that a sentencing court, in determining whether a previous trial-based conviction is for a “generic 

burglary,” can look to the statutory definition, charging documents and jury instructions. 

Taylor, therefore, does not require that recidivism be proved beyond a reasonable doubt for the 

purposes of sentencing under the ACCA. The Court in Shepard, however, did not expand Taylor

to allow a sentencing court to examine the police record and complaint to determine whether an 

earlier guilty plea to burglary counts as a “generic burglary,” and thus considered a “violent 

felony,” for the purposes of sentencing pursuant to the ACCA. 

Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III, concluded that 

judicial inquiry under the ACCA, as to whether a guilty plea to burglary is a “violent felony,” “is 

limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of 

colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by 

the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.” In Part III of the 

plurality opinion, Justice Souter attempted to distinguish the situation found in Shepard from all 

other situations where a jury need not find the factor of recidivism beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ginsburg, explained that the 

fact of a prior conviction in the Shepard context “is too far removed from the conclusive 

significance of a prior judicial record” because the sentencing judge would have to “make a 

disputed finding of fact about what the defendant and the state judge must have understood as the 

factual basis of the prior plea.” 

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that any fact (other than a prior conviction) 

which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts 

established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a 

jury beyond a reasonable doubt. “The Sixth Amendment, as construed in Blakely, does apply to 

the Sentencing Guidelines.” A separate majority determined that the remedy was to excise two 

provisions of the SRA, rendering the federal sentencing guidelines advisory. 

Booker was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The defendant’s 

criminal history and drug quantity resulted in a recommended guidelines range of 210 to 262 
36

months. The sentencing judge later found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 

defendant possessed a greater amount than the jury found and increased the defendant’s 

sentence. Booker appealed arguing that the sentence enhancement violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to a jury trial because it permitted the judge to find facts not admitted by the 

defendant nor found by the jury. The Seventh Circuit held that the sentence enhancement 

violated the Sixth Amendment because it limited Booker’s right to have a jury find facts. The 

court affirmed the conviction but overturned the sentence and ruled that the Guidelines violated 

the Sixth Amendment in cases where they limit the defendant’s right to a jury trial.

The Government raised two issues before the Supreme Court to determine “whether the 

Apprendi line of cases applies to the Sentencing Guidelines and, if so, what portions of the 

guidelines remain in effect.” The Court noted that in Apprendi it expressly declined to consider 

the Guidelines because a statute, not guidelines, was considered in that case. However in Blakely

the Court stated that “there was no distinction of the constitutional significance between the 

federal sentencing guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue.” “The availability of a 

departure in specified circumstances does not avoid the constitutional issue, just as it did not in 

Blakely itself.” The Court rejected the government’s argument that there would only be a Sixth 

Amendment violation if the final sentence exceeded the applicable statutory maximum for the 

offense. The Court concluded that application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the 

Sixth Amendment. Having rejected that argument, the Court answered the question of remedy 

“by finding the provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory, 

18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. IV), incompatible with today’s constitutional holding.” 

In a separate opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 

O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Ginsberg, the Court concluded that “the two provisions 

of the [SRA] that have the effect of making the Guidelines mandatory must be invalidated in 

order to allow the statute to operate in a manner consistent with congressional intent.” The Court 

concluded that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e), which depend upon the Guidelines’ 

mandatory nature, must be severed and excised. “So modified, the Federal Sentencing Reform 

Act of 1984 . . . makes the Guidelines effectively advisory.” With this modification, the 

sentencing courts would be required to consider Guidelines ranges, but also be permitted to tailor 

the sentence in light of other statutory concerns.

Four dissenting opinions (dissenting in part) were filed. Justice Stevens dissented in part, 

joined by Justice Souter and Justice Scalia, who joined except for Part III and footnote 17 of the 

dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens addressed the Court’s decision to excise and sever the two 

statutory provisions which made the application of the Guidelines mandatory. Justice Stevens 

asserted that the Court’s decision to do so represented a policy choice that Congress had 

considered and decisively rejected. “While it is perfectly clear that Congress has ample power to 

repeal these two statutory provisions if it so desires, this Court should not make that choice on 

Congress’ behalf.” Justice Stevens recognized the Court’s action as an “extraordinary exercise 

of authority” that violated “the tradition of judicial restraint that has heretofore limited our power 

to overturn validly enacted statutes.”

Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, dissenting in part to the excision of the provision 

governing appellate review of sentences, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which had, as its sole purpose, 

enabling the appellate courts to enforce conformity with the Guidelines. Justice Scalia asserted 

that “if the Guidelines are no longer binding, one would think that the provision designed to 

ensure compliance with them would, in its totality, be inoperative.” 
37

Justice Thomas’s dissent concluded that the presumption of severability had not been 

overcome in Booker. According to Justice Thomas, the question remains “whether the 

unconstitutional application of certain statutory provisions and guidelines applied to Booker are 

severable from the constitutional applications of the same provisions to other defendants.”

Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and 

Justice Kennedy, disagreeing with the Court’s conclusion requiring a jury, not a judge, to find 

sentencing facts. Justice Breyer stated that he found “nothing in the Sixth Amendment that 

forbids a sentencing judge to determine (as judges at sentencing have traditionally determined) 

the manner or way in which the offender carried out the crime of which he was convicted.” “The 

upshot is that the Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions – Apprendi, Blakely, and today’s – deprive 

Congress and state legislatures of authority that is constitutionally theirs.”

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the defendant’s sentence violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, because the sentencing judge increased his sentence above 

the prescribed guideline range based on an aggravating factor found by the judge and not 

admitted by the defendant in his guilty plea. The State of Washington charged defendant Ralph 

Blakely with first-degree kidnaping. Blakely pleaded guilty to second-degree kidnaping for 

which the statutory maximum sentence was ten years of imprisonment. Under the state’s 

sentencing guidelines, the “standard sentencing range” or presumptive sentence for the kidnaping 

charge was 49 to 53 months. Under the Washington guidelines, the sentencing court must 

impose a sentence within the standard sentencing range, unless the court finds aggravating or 

mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence that justify an “exceptional 

sentence.” After conducting a sentencing hearing, the judge found that Blakely acted with 

deliberate cruelty, one of the specified statutory aggravating factors, and sentenced Blakely to 90 

months of imprisonment. The Supreme Court found that this increase beyond the presumptive 

range was unconstitutional.

The Court held that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that raises the penalty beyond 

the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” The Court defined “statutory maximum” as the “maximum sentence a judge may 

impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 

In other words, the Court said, “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a 

judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 

additional findings” beyond what the jury found in its verdict or what was admitted by the 

defendant. The majority did not address the application of the case to the federal sentencing 

guidelines.

Three dissenting opinions were filed. Justice O’Connor wrote a dissent joined by Justice 

Breyer in its entirety, and by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, except as to the 

section addressing the possible impact on the federal guidelines. Justice O’Connor warned that 

the majority’s opinion may bring an end to 20 years of sentencing reform. Prior to the enactment 

of the Washington guidelines, there was unguided discretion that resulted in racial disparity and 

a general lack of uniformity in sentencing. The new system “placed meaningful restraints on 

discretion” and eliminated parole. Justice O’Connor noted that the sentencing system sought 

uniformity, transparency, and accountability, and that it had largely met those goals. Justice 
38

O’Connor also wrote of the far-reaching impact the decision could have on other states’ 

sentencing guideline systems and the federal sentencing guidelines. 

Justice Kennedy wrote a brief separate dissent joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Kennedy 

described sentencing as a collaborative process between the legislatures and the courts. Justice 

Kennedy cited Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), as recognizing that this 

interchange among the branches of government “is consistent with the Constitution’s structural 

protections.” 

Justice Breyer also wrote separately in dissent joined by Justice O’Connor. Justice 

Breyer stated that this holding “threatens the fairness of our traditional criminal justice system” 

and distorts historical sentencing practices. Justice Breyer concluded that, as a result of this 

opinion, legislatures will have several options for sentencing systems in the future, but that these 

alternative approaches are problematic because they shift power to the prosecutor, they lack 

uniformity, or they are too complex and expensive to implement. Lastly, Justice Breyer 

questioned whether it will be possible to distinguish the federal sentencing guidelines from the 

Washington system. 

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 

In this unanimous opinion the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 

Le v. United States Attorney Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999), which held that a conviction 

under the Florida DUI statute qualified as a crime of violence. In doing so, the Court resolved a 

split among the circuits on the question of whether state DUI offenses similar to Florida’s, which 

either require only a showing of negligence or do not have a mens rea requirement, can qualify 

as a crime of violence. The petitioner, a Haitian citizen, was a lawful permanent resident of the 

United States convicted under Florida law of DUI and causing serious bodily injury. He was 

ordered deported after his DUI conviction was classified as a “crime of violence” under 18 

U.S.C. § 16 and therefore deemed an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality 

Act (INA). The Supreme Court disagreed. “Many states have enacted similar statutes, 

criminalizing DUI causing serious bodily injury or death without requiring proof of any mental 

state, or, in some states, appearing to require only proof that the person acted negligently in 

operating the vehicle.” “The critical aspect of § 16(a) is that a crime of violence is one involving 

the “use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another.” “The key phrase in § 

16(a) – the ‘use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another’ – most naturally 

suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” The Court 

concluded that petitioner’s DUI offense, a third-degree felony, did not require proof of any 

particular mental state and thus would not qualify as a “crime of violence” under sections 16(a) 

or (b). However, the Court did conclude that an underlying offense requiring proof of a reckless 

use of force would qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 

The Supreme Court held that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), did not apply 

retroactively to death penalty cases already final on direct review, because it was a procedural 

rule rather than a substantive rule and because Ring did not announce a watershed rule of 

criminal procedure. When the Supreme Court announced Ring, it established a new rule that 

applied to all criminal cases still pending on direct review. The Court held that Ring established 

a procedural rule because it allocated decisionmaking authority by demanding that a jury rather 
39

than a judge make findings regarding aggravating factors in death penalty cases. However, new 

rules of procedure generally do not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. 

The exception is that "watershed rules of criminal procedure" that implicate the fundamental 

fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding will be applied retroactively. The Court did not 

find that this was a watershed rule because judicial factfinding did not so seriously diminish the 

accuracy of the proceeding so at to create an impermissibly large risk of punishing conduct 

inappropriately.

Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 

Ginsberg. The dissenters view the right to have jury sentencing in the capital context as both a 

"fundamental aspect of constitutional liberty and also significantly more likely to produce an 

accurate assessment of whether death is the appropriate sentence." Justice Breyer states that 

juries are more capable of making community-based value judgments that are important in death 

penalty cases, that retroactivity assures more uniformity among similarly situated defendants, 

that death is different so greater accuracy is needed, and that giving this rule retroactive effect 

would not inordinately burden the criminal justice system because of the small number of 

prisoners affected (approximately 110 persons on death row). 

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that the Sixth Amendment entitles defendants 

in capital cases to a jury determination of any aggravating factors that increase their maximum 

punishment from life imprisonment to death. The Court overruled its prior decision in Walton v. 

Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had upheld the Arizona state capital sentencing scheme. In 

Ring, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder. The sentencing judge 

then conducted a sentencing hearing and found the existence of aggravating factors beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and sentenced the defendant to death. The Supreme Court noted that the 

defendant could not receive the death penalty unless the court found the existence of at least one 

aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, such a finding increases the maximum 

punishment from life imprisonment to death. The Court held that, because Arizona’s 

enumerated aggravating factors operate as the "functional equivalent of an element of a greater 

offense," the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.

Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia noted

that he never agreed with the line of cases beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 

(1972), that invalidated the death penalty and caused states to enact death penalty schemes with 

aggravating factors. His concurrence in this case was based on the holding of Apprendi that the 

jury must find facts that are used to increase the sentence beyond what is authorized by the jury’s 

verdict. 

Justice Kennedy filed a brief concurrence noting that he still believed Apprendi was 

wrongly decided, but that Apprendi and Walton cannot stand together. Justice Breyer filed an 

opinion concurring in the judgment but not the opinion of the majority because he believes that 

jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth Amendment and not by the Sixth 

Amendment analysis of the majority (Justice Breyer dissented in Apprendi). Justice Breyer 

discussed the continued difficulty of justifying capital punishment and concluded that the 

“danger of unwarranted imposition of the penalty cannot be avoided” unless a jury makes the 

determination.
40

Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice 

O’Connor stated that the decision in Apprendi “was a serious mistake.” Justice O’Connor did

not agree that the Constitution requires that any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be 

treated as an element and found by a jury. Justice O’Connor also discussed the increase in 

habeas filings and the disruption of the criminal justice system caused by Apprendi.

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that defects in an indictment do not 

automatically require reversal of a conviction or sentence. The respondents were charged with 

conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a “detectable” amount of powder 

and cocaine base. The respondents were later convicted and received a sentence based on the 

district court’s drug quantity finding of at least 50 grams of cocaine base. The district court did 

not sentence the defendants under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which would have provided a 

statutory maximum penalty of 20 years, but instead implicated the enhanced penalties of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b) which provided a sentence up to life imprisonment. Two of the respondents 

were sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment, while those remaining received life imprisonment.

The respondents argued on appeal that the court was deprived of jurisdiction because the 

indictment was defective due to the omission of a fact that enhanced the statutory maximum. 

They further argued that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi because the issue of drug 

quantity was neither alleged in the indictment nor before the jury. The Fourth Circuit reviewed 

for plain error and held that the district court had no jurisdiction to sentence based on 

information not contained in the indictment. The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the 

Fourth Circuit and noted that the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit was based on Ex parte Bain, 

121 U.S. 1 (1887), a nineteenth century case that addresses the jurisdiction of the courts to 

interpret a revised indictment. 

The Court here overruled Bain and held that (1) a defective indictment does not by its 

nature deprive a court of jurisdiction, and (2) the omission from a federal indictment of a fact 

that enhances the statutory maximum sentence does not justify a Court of Appeals’ vacating the 

enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court. 

Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the appellate court properly 

reviewed the district’s court’s “functional consolidation” decision deferentially in light of the 

fact-bound nature of the decision, the comparatively greater expertise of the district court, and 

the limited value of uniform Court of Appeals precedent. The Court reviewed the standard of 

review that applies when determining whether an offender’s prior convictions are consolidated, 

thus “related,” for the purposes of sentencing. The defendant pleaded guilty to armed bank 

robbery, a crime of violence, but he also had five prior state convictions, four of which were 

robberies. The four bank robberies were considered related because the court found that the 

robberies had been the subject of a single criminal indictment and the defendant had pleaded 

guilty to all four at the same time in the same court. The fifth conviction was for a drug crime. 

The defendant argued that all five priors, including the drug crime, were related because they 

were “functionally consolidated,” without the entry of a formal order of consolidation, because 

the sentencing judge was the same, and all five cases were sentenced at the same time in a single 

proceeding. The government disagreed, stating that the drug offense was handled by a different 
41

judge, a different state prosecutor, and with a separate judgement. The district court ruled 

against the defendant and held that the drug case was unrelated to the robbery cases and had not 

been consolidated for sentencing, either formally or functionally. The Seventh Circuit stated that 

in this case “the standard of appellate review may be dispositive” and elected to review the 

district court’s decision “deferentially” rather than “de novo.” 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a New Jersey statute that 

increased the maximum penalty of the defendant’s weapon possession offense from 10 to 20 

years based on the trial court’s finding by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant 

committed a “hate crime.” “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

The Court addressed the issue of whether constitutional protections of due process and 

rights to notice and jury trial entitled the defendant to have a jury, not a judge, decide bias 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court rejected the State’s three primary arguments that (1) the 

biased purpose was a traditional sentencing factor of motive; (2) McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 

U.S. 79 (1986), authorizes a court to find a traditional sentencing factor by a preponderance of 

evidence; and (3) under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), a judge may 

sentence beyond the maximum. Merely labeling a provision a sentencing factor is not 

dispositive: “The defendant’s intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope 

to come to a core criminal offense ‘element.’” Recognizing that application of the statute could 

potentially double the defendant’s sentence, the Court rejected the State’s reliance on McMillan: 

“When a judge’s finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase 

in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately characterized as ‘a tail which wags the dog of 

the substantive offense.’” In rejecting the State’s reliance on Almendarez-Torres, the Court 

distinguished the recidivist provision from the “biased purpose inquiry, [which] goes precisely to

what happened in commission of the offense.” The Court further asserted that “there is a vast 

difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a 

proceeding in which the defendant had . . . the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser 

standard of proof.” The Court also noted that “it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was 

incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the 

recidivist issue were contested,” but that revisiting that decision was not necessary to resolve the 

case.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, asserted that “the 

Constitution requires a broader rule than the Court adopts. . . . If a fact is by law the basis for 

imposing or increasing punishment–for establishing or increasing the prosecution’s entitlement–

it is an element.” 

Justice O’Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer 

dissented, finding that the majority’s “increase in maximum penalty rule” is “unsupported by 

history and case law” and rests on a “meaningless formalism.” The dissent asserted that the 

majority was overruling McMillan, and that as a result there will be a significant impact on state 

and federal determinate sentencing schemes. “The actual principle underlying the Court’s 

decision may be that any fact (other than prior conviction) that has the effect, in real terms, of 
42

increasing the maximum punishment beyond an otherwise applicable range must be submitted to 

a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The principle would thus apply not only to 

schemes . . . under which a factual determination exposes the defendant to a sentence beyond the 

prescribed statutory maximum, but also to all determinate-sentencing schemes in which the 

length of a defendant’s sentence within the statutory range turns on specific factual 

determinations.” 

United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), a 

supervised release term does not commence until an individual “is released from imprisonment.” 

Therefore, the length of supervised release is not reduced by excess time served in prison. The 

defendant had two of his convictions declared invalid, pursuant to Bailey v. United States, 516 

U.S. 137 (1995), and had served 24 months extra prison time. The defendant was released from 

prison, but a three-year term of supervised release was yet to be served on the remaining 

convictions. The defendant filed a motion to reduce his supervised release term by the amount 

of extra prison time he served. The district court denied the relief, explaining that supervised 

release commenced upon respondent’s actual release from incarceration, not before. The Sixth 

Circuit reversed and held that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left 

prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired. The Supreme Court, in its decision to 

reverse the Sixth Circuit, resolved a circuit split over whether the excess prison time should be 

credited to the supervised release term. Compare United States v. Blake, 88 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 

1996) (supervised release commences on date defendants should have been released, not dates of 

actual release) with United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 1998) (supervised release 

cannot run during any period of imprisonment) and United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 

1997) (same) and United States v. Douglas, 88 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). The Supreme 

Court examined the text of section 3624(e) which states: “[t]he term of supervised release 

commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment.” The Court concluded that the 

ordinary commonsense meaning of release is to be freed from confinement. The Court found 

additional support in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) which authorizes the imposition of a “term of 

supervised release after imprisonment.” Furthermore, the objectives of supervised release would 

be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release. 

Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life. 

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000). 

The Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuits by holding that post-revocation 

penalties relate to the original offense, and under the Ex Post Facto Clause, a law “burdening 

private interests” cannot be applied to a defendant whose original offense occurred before the 

effective date of the statute. Absent a clear indication by Congress that a statute applies 

retroactively, a statute takes effect the day it is enacted. 

In the case below, the Sixth Circuit held that application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) 

(explicitly authorizing reimposition of supervised release upon revocation of supervised release) 

did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause even though the defendant’s original offense occurred in 

1993, a year before the statute was enacted. The lower court held that revocation penalties 

punish a defendant for the conduct leading to the revocation, not the original offense. Thus, 

because the statute was enacted before the defendant violated his supervised release, there was 

no ex post facto violation. United States v. Johnson, No. 98-5664, 1999 WL 282679 (6th Cir. 
43

1999) (unpublished table decision). The government disavowed the position taken by the lower 

court of appeal, and “wisely so” opined the Supreme Court “in view of the serious constitutional 

questions that would be raised by construing revocation and reimprisonment as punishment for 

the violation of the conditions of supervised release.” 

In addition to making the determination that ex post facto analysis for revocation conduct 

relates to the date of the original offense, the Supreme Court found that no ex post facto analysis 

was necessary in the defendant’s case because Congress gave no indication that section 3583(h)

applied retroactively. The statute could not be applied to the defendant because it did not 

become effective until after the defendant committed the original offense. Nevertheless, the 

version of section 3583(e)(3) in effect at the time of the original offense authorized a court to 

reimpose a term of supervised release upon revocation. Congress’s unconventional use of the 

term “revoke” rather than “terminate” would not preclude additional supervised release, and this 

reading is consistent with congressional sentencing policy. 

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 

The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2119, the federal carjacking statute, establishes 

three separate offenses, each of which must be charged in the indictment, proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict. The Court’s decision emphasizes the 

features of the carjacking statute that distinguish it from the illegal re-entry statute that was the 

focus of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). According to the Supreme 

Court, the structure of the statute and the legislative history indicate that Congress intended that 

the jury determine the facts which control the statutory sentencing range. To hold otherwise 

would raise serious constitutional issues.

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that a defendant could plead guilty, assert the 

privilege against self-incrimination at the sentencing hearing, and not have a judge draw an 

adverse inference from the defendant’s sentence. The defendant had refused to testify at a 

sentencing hearing about her involvement in a cocaine conspiracy. The judge sentenced the 

defendant to ten years’ imprisonment, stating that he drew a negative inference from the 

defendant’s refusal to discuss the details of the crime. The Third Circuit affirmed the district 

court’s decision, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court held that neither the 

defendant’s guilty plea nor her statements at a plea colloquy functioned as a waiver of her right 

to remain silent at sentencing. Furthermore, the Court held that the defendant should have been 

allowed to remain silent without it being held against her. The Court relied on Griffin v. 

California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the Court held that it was constitutionally 

impermissible for the prosecutor or judge to comment on a criminal defendant’s refusal to 

testify. The majority concluded that there is no reason not to apply this rule to sentencing 

hearings. 

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit conflict, affirming the Fifth 

Circuit’s opinion holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision which authorizes an 

enhanced penalty for a recidivist; it does not define a separate crime. The Fifth Circuit had 

joined the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that 

subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision, in opposition to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that the 
44

subsection constituted a separate crime. Subsection (a) of section 1326 prohibits an alien who 

once was deported to return to the United States without special permission, and it authorizes a 

prison term of up to two years. Subsection (b)(2) authorizes a prison term of up to 20 years for a 

deported alien under subsection (a) whose initial deportation “was subsequent to a conviction for 

commission of an aggravated felony.” The petitioner pleaded guilty to violating section 1326, 

admitting that he had unlawfully returned to the United States following deportation, and that 

such initial deportation was subsequent to three convictions for aggravated felonies. Inasmuch 

as subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision, the Government is not required by the Constitution or 

the statute to charge the earlier aggravated felony convictions in the indictment.

Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s opinion that 

the sentencing guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the 

amount and kind of drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy. The defendant had been charged under 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute mixtures 

containing cocaine and cocaine base (“crack”), and the jury had returned a general verdict which 

did not specify the object of the conspiracy. The petitioners argued that the drug statutes and the 

Constitution required the judge to assume that the jury had convicted them of a conspiracy 

involving the lesser object, cocaine. The Supreme Court stated that it was of no consequence 

whether the conviction was based solely on cocaine, because the Guidelines instruct the 

sentencing judge to sentence a drug conspiracy based on the offender’s relevant conduct, under 

U.S.S.G. §1B1.3. Relevant conduct requires the sentencing court to base the sentence on not 

only the conduct which constitutes the offense of conviction, but also conduct that is “part of the 

same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” See U.S.S.G.

§1B1.3(a)(2). The Court noted that the statutory and constitutional claims were not implicated in 

this case, inasmuch as the sentences imposed were “within the statutory limits of a cocaine-only 

conspiracy.” 

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the phrase “carries a firearm” in 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys a firearm in a 

vehicle—including in a locked glove compartment or in the trunk of the car—in relation to a 

drug trafficking offense. In affirming the decisions of the First and Fifth Circuits, the Court 

noted that the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have unanimously concluded that the word 

“carry” “is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly on the person but can include their 

carriage in a car.” The Court examined the legal question of whether Congress intended to limit 

the scope of the word “carry” to instances in which a gun is carried “on the person,” and 

concluded that “neither the statute’s basic purpose nor its legislative history support 

circumscribing the scope of the word ‘carry’ by applying an ‘on the person’ limitation.” The 

Court addressed the dissent’s argument that the rule of lenity should be applied because there is 

ambiguity in the statute. In disagreeing with the dissent, the majority noted that for the rule of 

lenity to apply, a court must conclude that there is “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” in the 

statute, such that the court could make “no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” 
45

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997). 

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

mandating an additional five-year term of imprisonment that “shall [not] . . . run concurrently 

with any other term of imprisonment” means any other term of imprisonment, whether it be state 

or federal. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which

had delved into legislative history to support its conclusion that the statute must have been 

limited to cases involving prior federal sentences. The Tenth Circuit had split from other circuit 

courts of appeals which had addressed the issue. The Supreme Court held that there was no 

ambiguity in the text of the statute, and “no basis in the text for limiting § 924(c) to federal 

sentences.”

United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997). 

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, resolved a split among the Courts of Appeals, 

deciding that Amendment 506, promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, amending 

commentary to U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, the career offender guideline, is “at odds with the plain 

language of § 994(h).” In 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), Congress directed the Commission to “assure” 

that prison terms for categories of offenders who commit a third felony drug offense or crime of 

violence be sentenced “at or near the maximum term authorized” by statute. The Supreme Court 

held that by the language “maximum term authorized,” Congress meant the maximum term 

available for the offense of conviction, including any applicable statutory sentencing 

enhancements. The enhanced penalty, from 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment, is brought before the 

court by the prosecutor by filing a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). The amendment to 

§4B1.1's commentary at Application Note 2 had provided that the unenhanced statutory 

maximum should be used, in part because the unenhanced statutory maximum “represents the 

highest possible sentence applicable to all defendants in the category,” because section 851(a)(1) 

notices are not filed in every applicable case. The Supreme Court responded that “Congress 

surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission 

render them a virtual nullity.” “[T]he phrase ‘at or near the maximum term authorized’ is 

unambiguous and requires a court to sentence a career offender ‘at or near’ the ‘maximum’ 

prison term available once all relevant statutory sentencing enhancements are taken into 

account.” The judgment of the First Circuit was reversed. The Commission’s amended 

commentary was at odds with the plain language of statute at 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), and “must give 

way.” Cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (guidelines commentary “is 

authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute”).

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997). 

The Supreme Court ruled that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the 

sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that 

conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” The Court granted the 

Government’s petition pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 12.4, and issued this per curiam opinion 

resolving a split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals by reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 

United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386 

(9th Cir. 1996). Only the Ninth Circuit had refused to permit consideration of acquitted conduct. 

The Court held that the guidelines did not alter the sentencing court’s discretion granted by 

statute at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the 

information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an 
46

offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing 

an appropriate sentence.” The Court cited Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 402 (1995) 

(quoting United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.)): “‘[V]ery 

roughly speaking, [relevant conduct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances that courts 

typically took into account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines’ enactment.’” The Supreme 

Court noted that Guideline §1B1.4 “reflects the policy set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3661” and that the 

commentary to guideline §1B1.3 also provides that “[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is 

not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable 

guideline sentencing range,” and that all acts and omissions that were part of the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction (relevant conduct) must be 

considered whether or not the defendant had been convicted of multiple counts. The Ninth 

Circuit’s opinions also seemed to be based “on erroneous views of our double jeopardy 

jurisprudence,” in asserting that a jury verdict of acquittal “rejects” facts. See Dowling v. United 

States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990) (“an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the 

Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a 

lower standard of proof”). 

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 

The Supreme Court unanimously held that an “appellate court should not review the 

[district court’s] departure decision de novo, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court 

abused its discretion.” In applying this standard, the Court noted that “[l]ittle turns, however, on 

whether we label review of this particular question [of whether a factor is a permissible basis for 

departure] abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse of discretion standard does not mean a 

mistake of law is beyond appellate correction.” “The abuse of discretion standard includes 

review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” The 

Court divided, however, in its determination of whether the district court abused its discretion in 

relying on the particular factors in this case. The majority of the Court held that the Ninth 

Circuit erroneously rejected three of the five downward departure factors relied upon by the 

district court. The district court properly based its downward departure on (1) the victim's 

misconduct in provoking the defendants' excessive force, U.S.S.G. §5K2.10; (2) the defendants' 

susceptibility to abuse in prison; and (3) the “significant burden” of a federal conviction 

following a lengthy state trial which had ended in acquittal based on the same underlying 

conduct. However, the district court abused its discretion in relying upon the remaining two 

factors, low likelihood of recidivism, and the defendants’ loss of their law enforcement careers, 

because these were already adequately considered by the Commission in U.S.S.G. §§2H1.4 and 

4A1.3. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was affirmed in part and 

reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996). 

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that the district court properly concluded that 

a Government motion under U.S.S.G. §5K1.1 requesting a sentence below the applicable 

guideline range did not authorize the district court to depart below the lower statutory minimum. 

Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and 

Ginsburg. Justices O’Connor and Breyer joined in Parts I and II of the opinion. Justice Stevens 

filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. The Court noted that a separate government motion 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) is required in order for a court to depart below a statutory 
47

minimum. The Court rejected the argument that the Sentencing Commission had created a 

“unitary” motion system in promulgating the §5K1.1 policy statement. The Court agreed with 

the Government that “the relevant parts of the statutes [18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 

994(n)] merely charge the Commission with constraining the district court’s discretion in 

choosing a specific sentence after the Government moves for a departure below the statutory 

minimum. Congress did not charge the Commission with ‘implementing’ § 3553(e)’s 

Government motion requirement, beyond adopting provisions constraining the district court’s 

discretion regarding the particular sentence selected.” Justice Breyer, with whom Justice 

O’Connor joined, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, stating the view that 

“the Commission had the power to create a ‘unitary motion system.’” 

Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, rejected the defendant’s argument that the 

Commission’s revised system for calculating LSD sentences under the guidelines (.4 milligrams 

per dose) requires reconsideration of the method used to determine statutory minimum sentences. 

As a threshold matter, the Court was doubtful that the Commission intended its new 

methodology to displace the actual-weight method required by Chapman v. United States, 500 

U.S. 453 (1991). According to the Court, “principles of stare decisis require that we adhere to 

our earlier decision.” The Court expressed concern about overturning an earlier precedent 

without intervening statutory changes casting doubt on the Chapman interpretation of the statute. 

While the Commission, entrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments, can abandon one 

method for what it considers a better approach, the Court does not have the same latitude to 

forsake prior interpretations of statutes.

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure “authorizes defendants to examine Government documents material to the 

preparation of their defense against the Government’s case-in-chief, but not to the preparation of 

selective prosecution claims.” The defendants moved for discovery or dismissal of the 

indictment, asserting that they were singled out for prosecution under the much more stringent 

statutes and sentencing guidelines in Federal Court on crack and firearms violations because they 

are black. In support of their motion, they offered an affidavit from a paralegal in the Office of 

the Public Defender stating that the defendant was black in every one of the cases prosecuted to 

completion during 1991 under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The district court granted the 

discovery motion, and upon the Government’s notice that it would not comply, dismissed the 

case. To meet the threshold showing of materiality necessary to obtain such discovery, the 

defendant must “produce some evidence of differential treatment of similarly situated members 

of other races or protected classes.” “A selective prosecution claim asks a court to exercise 

judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 

832 (1985). Because the Attorney General and United States Attorneys have been designated by 

statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional duty to see that “the 

Laws be faithfully executed,” they have broad discretion to enforce federal criminal laws. There 

is a strong presumption of regularity supporting a prosecutor’s decisions, and a claimant of 

selective prosecution “must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy ‘had a 

discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.’” “The 
48

justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus 

require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such claim.”

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) “requires 

evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that 

makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” According to the 

Court, the term “use” connotes more than mere possession or storage of a firearm by a person 

who commits a drug offense.

Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995). 

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held that “because consideration of relevant 

conduct in determining a petitioner’s sentence within the legislatively authorized punishment 

range does not constitute punishment for that conduct,” a second prosecution involving that 

conduct “does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against the imposition of 

multiple punishments for the same offense.” The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that his 

indictment for cocaine offenses violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the cocaine 

offenses had already been considered as relevant conduct in sentencing for an earlier marijuana 

offense. The majority relied on the Court’s previous decision in Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 

576 (1959), specifically rejecting the claim that “double jeopardy principles bar a later 

prosecution or punishment for criminal activity where that criminal activity has been considered 

at sentencing for a second crime.” The majority further noted that the consideration of relevant 

conduct punishes the offender “for the fact that the present offense was carried out in a manner 

that warrants increased punishment, not for a different offense (which that related conduct may 

or may not constitute).”

Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994). 

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion, held that with the sole exception of convictions 

obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing procedure does 

not have a right to collaterally attack the validity of previous state convictions that are used to 

enhance his sentence under the ACCA. The defendant argued that his previous convictions were 

invalid because of ineffective assistance of counsel, because his guilty plea was not knowing and 

intelligently made, and because he had not been adequately advised of his rights in opting for a 

“stipulated facts” trial. According to the Court, “[n]one of these alleged constitutional violations 

rises to the level of jurisdictional defect resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all.” The 

Court refused to extend the right to collaterally attack a prior conviction used for sentencing 

enhancement beyond the right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 

(1963).

Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that “consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the Constitution, an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott [v. 

Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979),] because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to 

enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.” The case arose when the district court assessed 

one criminal history point against the defendant for a state misdemeanor conviction—driving 

under the influence (DUI) — for which the defendant was fined but not imprisoned. The 
49

majority of the Court reaffirmed that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to 

criminal proceedings in which imprisonment is not imposed. The logical consequence of that 

holding is that if the conviction is valid, it can be relied on to enhance a subsequent sentence. 

According to the Court, reliance on such a conviction is consistent with traditional sentencing 

practices of using a lesser standard than that for proving guilt. For example, consistent with due 

process, the defendant could have been sentenced more severely based simply on evidence of the 

conduct underlying the DUI. The government would only have to prove the conduct by a 

preponderance of evidence. Therefore, it must be constitutional to use a prior conviction, where 

that conduct has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In deciding the case, the Court 

overruled Baldesar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).

United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994). 

The Supreme Court, in a plurality decision (5-1-1-2), interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a), 

which provides that if a person on probation possesses illegal drugs “the court shall revoke the 

sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one-third of the original 

sentence.” The Court held that, as that term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a), “original sentence” 

refers to the original potential imprisonment range under the guidelines. Accordingly, upon 

revocation of probation for possession of drugs, the minimum sentence is one-third of the 

maximum of the original guideline range, and the maximum sentence is the maximum of the 

original guideline range. Granderson, whose original guideline range was 0-6 months, had 

received a five-year term of probation. Upon revocation for possession of illegal drugs, the 

district court sentenced him to one-third of the five years: 20 months’ incarceration. In 

reversing, the Eleventh Circuit invoked the rule of lenity and held that “original sentence” 

referred to the original range, which set the maximum term of imprisonment upon revocation at 

six months and the minimum at two months. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 

Eleventh Circuit was affirmed.

Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993). 

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, upheld the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c) to a five-year prison term for his first conviction, and five 20-year sentences for five 

additional section 924(c) convictions, to be served consecutively (105 years total). The 

defendant had committed six bank robberies on six different dates, using a gun each time, but 

was convicted and sentenced for all of the offenses in one proceeding. The Court was not 

persuaded by the defendant’s assertion that the language of section 924(c) requiring a 20-year 

sentence for a “second or subsequent conviction” was ambiguous and should be construed under 

the rule of lenity in his favor. The court held that the use of the word “conviction” refers to the 

finding of guilt that necessarily precedes the entry of a final judgment of conviction. Each 

subsequent conviction carried a 20-year term. This is unlike statutes that have been interpreted 

to impose an enhanced sentence for “subsequent offenses” only if the subsequent offense was 

committed after the sentence for the previous offense had become final. Nor could the rule of 

lenity be invoked based on the total length of the sentence, which the defendant characterized as 

“glaringly unjust.” Whether the defendant was convicted of six counts in one proceeding, or in 

six separate trials, the result mandated by the statute would be a 105-year total sentence. 
50

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that the exchange or barter of a gun for illegal 

drugs constitutes "use" of a firearm for purposes of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)

which sets penalties for offenses where a defendant “during and in relation to any crime of 

violence or drug trafficking crime[,] uses or carries a firearm.” The Supreme Court agreed with 

the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that the plain language of the statute 

“imposes no requirement that the firearm be used as a weapon.” Rather, any use of the weapon 

to in any way facilitate the commission of the offense is sufficient. United States v. Smith, 957 

F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 261-62 (per curiam) 

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 362 (1992), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit so held, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Phelps, 877 

F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1989), held that trading the gun for drugs could not constitute “use,” and the 

Supreme Court decided this issue to resolve the conflict among the circuits.

Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that “commentary in the Guidelines 

Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution 

or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” 

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit erred in concluding that commentary was not binding and 

using that as a basis for not applying an amendment to the commentary of §4B1.2 which stated

that felon-in-possession is not included in the term “crime of violence.” The Supreme Court 

concluded that guideline commentary should be treated like an agency’s interpretation of its own 

legislative rules. “According this measure of controlling authority to the commentary is 

consistent with the role the Sentencing Reform Act contemplates for the Sentencing 

Commission. The Commission, after all, drafts the guidelines as well as the commentary 

interpreting them, so we can presume that the interpretations of the guidelines contained in the 

commentary represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the 

guidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guidelines Manual as a whole as well as 

the authorizing statute.” According to the Supreme Court, “Amended Commentary is binding on 

the federal courts even though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial constructions of 

a particular guideline cannot prevent the Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation 

that satisfies the standard we set forth today.”

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that a sentence enhancement pursuant 

to §3C1.1 when there has been a proper determination of perjury “is not in contravention of the 

privilege of an accused to testify in her own behalf.” According to the Supreme Court, “the 

arguments made by the [Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals to distinguish [United States v.] 

Grayson [, 438 U.S. 41 (1978),] are wide of the mark.” 

United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). 

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held that 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B), which limits 

the sentence of a juvenile to “the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the 

juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult,” refers to the maximum sentence that could be 

imposed if the juvenile were being sentenced after application of the sentencing guidelines. The 

Court's holding does not require plenary application of the guidelines to juvenile proceedings. 
51

According to the Supreme Court, “a sentencing court’s concern with the guidelines goes solely 

to the upper limit of the proper guideline range as setting the maximum term for which a juvenile 

may be committed to official detention, absent circumstances that which would warrant 

departure under § 3553(b).” The Court rejected the government's argument that the term 

“authorized” in section 5037(c)(1)(B) means the maximum term of imprisonment provided for in 

the statute defining the offense. Justice O’Connor in the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 

Blackmun, stated that the Court should have honored “Congress’ clear intention to leave settled 

practice in juvenile sentencing undisturbed.” According to the dissent, “we should wait for the 

Sentencing Commission and Congress to decide whether to fashion appropriate guidelines for 

juveniles.”

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992). 

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) authorizes the 

Attorney General, rather than the district court, to calculate the credit toward the term of 

imprisonment for any time the defendant spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence 

commences. According to the majority opinion, the statutory language shows that Congress 

intended that the computation of the credit occur after the defendant begins his sentence. Thus, a 

district court judge cannot apply section 3585(b) at the sentencing hearing. Although section

3585(b) does not specifically refer to the Attorney General, the Court found that when Congress 

rewrote 18 U.S.C. § 3568 and changed it to its present form in section 3585(b) that it was likely 

“that the former reference to the Attorney General was simply lost in the shuffle.”

Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that “federal district courts have 

authority to review a prosecutor’s refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a

remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive.” According to the 

Supreme Court, “a claim that the defendant merely provided substantial assistance will not 

entitle a defendant to a remedy or even discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Nor would 

additional but generalized allegations of improper motive.” In the instant case, the defendant 

failed to show or allege that the government refused to file the motion for suspect reasons such 

as his race or his religion. The Court noted that it did not decide whether §5K1.1 implements 

and therefore supersedes 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) or whether the two provisions pose separate 

obstacles. The defendant also did not claim that the government-motion requirement was itself 

unconstitutional, or that the requirement was superseded in this case by any plea agreement by 

the government to file a substantial-assistance motion. According to the Supreme Court, the 

government-motion requirement in both sections 5K1.1 and 3553(e) limiting the court’s 

authority “gives the government a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has 

substantially assisted.”

Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992). 

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that the appellate court in reviewing a 

departure decision based on both proper and improper factors, must conclude that the district 

court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor, before it can affirm the 

sentence based on its independent assessment that the departure was reasonable pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2). According to the Supreme Court, the use of a departure factor which is 

prohibited by a policy statement can be an incorrect application of the guidelines under 18 
52

U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). However, a remand is not automatically required under section 3742(f)(1)

in order to rectify an incorrect application of the guidelines. The majority opinion disagreed with 

the dissenters that the reasonableness standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2) was the sole provision 

governing appellate review of departure decisions.

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991). 

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, acknowledges that the initial and primary 

task of eliminating conflicts among the circuit courts with respect to the statutory interpretation 

of the guidelines lies with the Commission. According to the Supreme Court, “in charging the 

Commission ‘periodically [to] review and revise’ the guidelines, Congress necessarily 

contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the work of the courts, and would 

make whatever clarifying revisions to the guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might 

suggest.” Since the Commission has the authority to “periodically review and revise” and the 

“unusual explicit power” to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing 

sentences will be given retroactive effect, Justice Scalia suggests that the court should be more 

“restrained and circumspect” in using its certiorari power to resolve circuit conflicts. The 

Supreme Court decided not to address the first issue presented in the case because the 

Commission had requested public comment on a change to §1B1.2 which would eliminate the 

conflict and because the case could be decided on other grounds.

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). 

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that the statutory construction of 21 U.S.C. § 

841(b)(1)(B)(v) requires that the carrier weight be included in determining the lengths of 

sentences for trafficking in LSD, and that this construction does not violate due process nor is it 

unconstitutionally vague.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, upheld the SRA, which established the United 

States Sentencing Commission, against claims that it violated the doctrine of separation of 

powers and excessively delegated Congress's legislative authority. The Court upheld Congress’s 

placement of the Commission in the Judicial Branch of government, and with respect to the 

composition of the Commission, upheld the requirement that three federal judges serve on the 

Commission with non-judges. The Court held that the Commission was an essentially “neutral 

endeavor” in which judicial participation is “peculiarly appropriate.” The Court also found no 

fault with the power of the President to appoint members of the Commission and remove them 

for cause, holding that neither power significantly threatened judicial independence.
53

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) ........................................................................ 6

Baldesar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) ..................................................................................... 49

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)......................................................................... passim

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991)............................................................................. 52

Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) ............................................................................ 7

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).................................................................... 47, 52

Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994)................................................................................ 48

Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993).................................................................................. 49

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) ....................................................................... 7

Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990).................................................................... 46

Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998) ........................................................................... 44

Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887).................................................................................................. 40

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)..................................................................................... 39

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) .................................................................................... 28

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ................................................................................ 48

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) ................................................................................... 43

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).............................................................................. 47

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) .......................................................................... 5

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) ............................................................................ 42

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ........................................................................ 7, 18

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)................................................................................... 46

Le v. United States Attorney Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999)............................................. 38

McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005 (2d Cir. 1995)............................................................... 31

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)...................................................................... 20, 41

Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996) .......................................................................... 46

Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987)......................................................................................... 10

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) ............................................................................ 43

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) ....................................................................... 44

Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) ............................................................................. 48

Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2008).............................................................................................. 12

Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014)...................................................................... 3, 6

People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005)................................................................................... 28
54

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)..................................................................................... 38, 39

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)............................................................................................ 48

Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).................................................................... 45, 50

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)......................................................................... 27, 35

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996.......................................................................... 47

United States v. Blake, 88 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1996)..................................................................... 42

United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014)................................................................... 3, 7

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)............................................................................... 40

United States v. Douglas, 88 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 1996)................................................................. 42

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993)............................................................................ 50

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997)............................................................................... 45

United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994) ........................................................................ 49

United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).............................................................................. 50

United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 261-62 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 

362 (1992)................................................................................................................................. 50

United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007)....................................................... 17

United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627 (1st Cir. 1996) .............................................................. 31

United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 1998) ................................................................. 42

United States v. Johnson, No. 98-5664, 1999 WL 282679 (6th Cir. 1999).................................. 43

United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 1997).................................................................... 42

United States v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................... 50

United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1996)................................................................... 45

United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992) ............................................................................... 50

United States v. Smith, 957 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992)......................................................... 50

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) ................................................................................ 45

United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995)..................................................................... 45

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) .............................................................................. 51

United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989).......................................................... 46

Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) ................................................................................ 51

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)....................................................................................... 39

Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959)................................................................................ 48

Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992) ........................................................................... 51

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 16............................................................................................................................... 38
55

18 U.S.C. § 2119........................................................................................................................... 43

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ............................................................................................................... passim

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).................................................................................................................. 30

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).......................................................................................................... 26, 36, 51

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) ................................................................................................................. 36

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) ................................................................................................................ 32, 46

18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) ................................................................................................................ 47, 51

18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) ...................................................................................................................... 49

18 U.S.C. § 3568........................................................................................................................... 51

18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) ...................................................................................................................... 15

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)...................................................................................................... 13, 14, 17

18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) ...................................................................................................................... 42

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).................................................................................................................. 43

18 U.S.C. § 3583(h)...................................................................................................................... 43

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)...................................................................................................................... 51

18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) ...................................................................................................................... 42

18 U.S.C. § 3661..................................................................................................................... 45, 46

18 U.S.C. § 3742........................................................................................................................... 24

18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)...................................................................................................................... 24

18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) ...................................................................................................................... 36

18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2).................................................................................................................. 51

18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) ................................................................................................................. 15

18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) ...................................................................................................... 50, 51

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) ........................................................................................................................ 25

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).................................................................................................................. 31

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) ......................................................................................................... 7

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ................................................................................................................... 31

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) ..................................................................................................................... 7

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ................................................................................................................. passim

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)........................................................................................................ 33, 34

18 U.S.C. § 924(d)........................................................................................................................ 34

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).................................................................................................................... 31

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) ......................................................................................................... 22

18 U.S.C. § 994(h).................................................................................................................. 27, 45
56

18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1)(B)(i)............................................................................................................ 18

21 U.S.C. § 841....................................................................................................................... 44, 47

21 U.S.C. § 841(b).............................................................................................................. 7, 13, 40

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)........................................................................................................ 13

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) ......................................................................................................... 52

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).......................................................................................................... 7, 40

21 U.S.C. § 846....................................................................................................................... 44, 47

21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1).................................................................................................................... 45

28 U.S.C. § 994(h).................................................................................................................. 28, 30

28 U.S.C. § 994(k)........................................................................................................................ 15

28 U.S.C. § 994(n)........................................................................................................................ 47

28 U.S.C. § 994(o)........................................................................................................................ 17

28 U.S.C. § 994(u)........................................................................................................................ 17

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) ................................................................................................................... 43

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986................................................................................................. 29, 30

Armed Career Criminal Act................................................................................................... passim

Fair Sentencing Act................................................................................................................. 10, 11

Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)..................................................................................................................... 18

Sentencing Reform Act.......................................................................................................... passim

Rules

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C)......................................................................................................... 13

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C)......................................................................................................... 47

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h)............................................................................................................. 25, 26

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(c)........................................................................................................... 26

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)............................................................................................................. 23, 24

U.S.S.G. §1B1.10.......................................................................................................................... 17

U.S.S.G. §1B1.2............................................................................................................................ 52

U.S.S.G. §1B1.3...................................................................................................................... 44, 46

U.S.S.G. §1B1.4............................................................................................................................ 46

U.S.S.G. §2H1.4 ........................................................................................................................... 46

U.S.S.G. §4A1.3 ........................................................................................................................... 46

U.S.S.G. §4B1.1............................................................................................................................ 45

U.S.S.G. §4B1.2............................................................................................................................ 50

U.S.S.G. §5K1.1 ..................................................................................................................... 46, 51
57

U.S.S.G. §5K2.10 ......................................................................................................................... 46

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. VI........................................................................................................... passim

U.S. Const. amend. VIII................................................................................................................ 39

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ......................................................................................................... 28, 48