UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ALFRED BROOKS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MARIA ROBINSON; SHIRLEY MAY; JIMMY MARTIN, Defendants - Appellees. No. 22-6057 (D.C. No. 5:18- CV-01014-G) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before McHUGH , MORITZ , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Alfred Brooks, pro se, 1 appeals the district court’ s grant of summary judgment to defendants on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Okla homa prison officials due

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Brooks proceeds pro se, we construe his argumen ts liberally, but we “cannot take on the responsibility of serv ing as [his] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (1 0th Cir. 2005). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 30, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 22-6057 Document: 010110775489 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 12 to his failure to exhaust available administ rative remedies prior to bringing suit. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND Mr. Brooks is an inmate incarcerated at North Fork Correctional Center (NFCC) in Sayre, Oklahoma. Ms. Robinson is a certified medica tion aide at NFCC, Ms. May is the Correctional Health Services Administrator at NFCC, and Mr. Martin is the warden at NFCC. Mr. Brooks alle ged Ms. Robinson, Ms. May, and Mr. Martin violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amen dment rights when, on March 17, 2017, Ms. Robinson gave him the wrong eye medicati on. He alleged this caused damage to his eye, extreme pain, and loss of vision. He further alleged Ms. Robinson acted intentionally in retaliati on for his refusal to identif y another inmate who made disparaging remarks about her. He allege d Ms. May refused to purchase the correct medication or to implement stop orders th at would have prevented the prison from dispensing the wrong medication to him. He alleged Mr. Martin failed to appropriately hire and s upervise NFCC staff. Before bringing suit, Mr. Brooks pur sued grievances consistent with Oklahoma Department of Correc tions policy OP-090124 (2016). 2 Under that policy, an inmate must first pursu e informal resolution before submitting a grievance. OP-090124 § IV. If an oral request to staff does not reso lve an inmate’s issue, the inmate must submit a written request to staff (RTS). Id. § IV(B),(C). If this does not

2 We cite the 2016 version of OP-090124 because that wa s the version in effect when Mr. Brooks subm itted his grievances. Appellate Case: 22-6057 Document: 010110775489 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 23 resolve the issue, the inmate may submit a written grievance “to the appropriate reviewing authority.” Id. § V(A). Finally, an inmate ma y appeal an adverse decision on a formal written grievance to the “Adm inistrative Review Authority” (ARA). Id. § VII(B). Mr. Brooks submitted an RTS to Ms. May on April 23, 2017. On June 22, he filed grievance 17-28, stati ng he had not received an answer to his RTS. NFCC Medical Services Manager Buddy Honake r responded to Mr. Brooks on July 26, stating he was extending the time to cons ider the grievance. On August 25, Mr. Honaker notified Mr. Brooks by lett er he was returning the grievance unanswered because Mr. Brook s should have submitted it to Ms. May as the proper reviewing authority. Mr. Brook s appealed this disposition, but the ARA returned the appeal unanswered. The ARA advised Mr. Brooks he “may correct the errors within 10 days of receipt of the notice,” and that fa ilure to do so would re sult in the return of the grievance unanswered and the forfeiture of the opportunity to participate in the grievance process. R. vol. 1 at 132 (underline omitted). Mr. Brooks did not resubmit grievance 17-28. Instead, Mr. Brooks filed a separate grievance, 17-53, 3 on October 13. In grievance 17-53, Mr. Brooks acknowledged Ms. May had answered the April 23 RTS he filed, but he did not agree with her di sposition. The “reviewing authority,” who in

3 As the district court noted , this grievance was, at ti mes in the record, referred to as grievance 17-55, but there is no i ndication that any po tential misnumbering affected the grievanc e’s disposition. Appellate Case: 22-6057 Document: 010110775489 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 34 this case was also Ms. May, responded to the grievance on November 2, but NFCC did not deliver the response to Mr. Brooks until December 21. The response included statements headed “Partial Re lief” and “Partial Denial.” R. vol. 1 at 136. In the “Partial Relief” section, th e decision stated the medicati on Mr. Brooks requested had been ordered but was awaiting approval from the NFCC health care provider. Id. In the “Partial Denial” section, the decision stated the gr ievance improperly included “[m]ore than one issu e or incident.” Id. Mr. Brooks appealed to the ARA, which notified him it was returning his grievance to the reviewing authority “for further investigation and an amended response.” Id. at 139. The reviewing authority— Ms. May—issued an amended response, agai n granted only partial relief, and stated he “may appeal to the [ARA].” Id. at 141. Mr. Brooks did not appeal or further pursue grievance 17-53. Mr. Brooks sued Ms. Robinson, Ms. May, and Mr. Martin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing Mr. Brooks failed to exhaust his admi nistrative remedies. Adop ting the recommendations of a magistrate judge, the district court converted the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment and granted them . This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION We review the grant of su mmary judgment de novo. May v. Segovia , 929 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Similarly, “[w]e Appellate Case: 22-6057 Document: 010110775489 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 45 review de novo the district court’s finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [§ 1983] . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The doctrine of administrative exhaustion “provi des that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or th reatened injury until the pres cribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 88–8 9 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exhaustion is mandatory and applicab le “even where the relief sought—monetary dama ges—cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Id. at 85. “[T]o properly e xhaust administrative remedies prisoners must complete the administrative review pr ocess in accordance with th e applicable procedural rules—rules that are defined not by the PL RA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (i nternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Brooks presents four arguments on a ppeal. He asserts (1) prison officials hindered him from exhausting his administrativ e remedies, (2) he was not required to further appeal the partial denial of grie vance 17-53 after the ARA remanded it to the reviewing authority, (3) he did, in fact , exhaust his administrative remedies, and (4) the district court should have required the defendants to “prove the existence of a remedy,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13 (typeface normalized), sti ll available to him in the grievance process. We consider these arguments in turn. Appellate Case: 22-6057 Document: 010110775489 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 56 Regarding the first argumen t, although we have held that “[w]here prison officials prevent, thwart, or hinder a pr isoner’s efforts to avail himself of an administrative remedy, they render that re medy ‘unavailable’ and a court will excuse the prisoner’s failure to exhaust,” Little v. Jones , 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010), Mr. Brooks did not show such hinderance occurred here. As the magistrate judge observed, despite a numbe r of unexplained defi ciencies in NFCC’s initial handling of Mr. Brooks’s grievances , there nevertheless came a time where Mr. Brooks declined to appeal the partial denial of his grie vance, and therefore failed to exhaust his remedies: [T]he handling of Plaintiff’s a ttempts to exhaust certainly leaves room for improvement on the part of Defendants and/or NFCC administrators. Fo r example, it is unclear why Mr. Honaker required an add itional month to investigate Plaintiff’s initial grievance, only to return it unanswered because Plaintiff submitted it to the wrong individual. Additionally . . . Defendant Robinson has offered no explanation as to why Plain tiff did not receive Defendant May’s November 2, 2017 respon se to Plaintiff’s grievance until December 21, 2017. Defendant Robinson does not address the undersigned’s previous remarks on NFCC’s failure to efficiently addre ss Plaintiff’s administrative procedure efforts. Instead, she attempts to gloss over the mismanagement of the same. Ne vertheless, the fact remains that based on the record presented, Plaintiff never appealed, and thereby failed to exhaust, th e denial of [grievance 17-53]. R. vol. 1 at 303 (citations omitted). Regarding Mr. Brooks’s sec ond, third, and fourth arguments, the partial resolution of his grievance at an intermediate stage did not relieve him of the obligation to complete the administrative process. See Jernigan , 304 F.3d at 1032 Appellate Case: 22-6057 Document: 010110775489 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 67 (“An inmate who begins the grievance pr ocess but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim under PLRA for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.”). This is so even if the relief Mr. Brooks sought was unavailable through the grievance process. Woodford , 548 U.S. at 85. Mr. Br ooks had an available remedy—§ VII(C)(4) of OP-090124 expressly contemplated appeal to the ARA of a reviewing authority’s amended response—but he did not pursue it. So, the district court correctly concluded Mr. Brooks did no t exhaust his administ rative remedies and dismissed his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 22-6057 Document: 010110775489 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 7