III 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 59 

Urging the European Union to maintain its arms export embargo on the 

People’s Republic of China. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 17, 2005 

Mr. SMITH (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. KYL, Mr. 

CHAMBLISS, Mr. ENSIGN, and Mr. SHELBY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION

Urging the European Union to maintain its arms export 

embargo on the People’s Republic of China.

Whereas, on June 4, 1989, the Communist Government of 

the People’s Republic of China ordered the People’s Liberation Army to carry out an unprovoked, brutal assault 

on thousands of peaceful and unarmed demonstrators in 

Tiananmen Square, resulting in hundreds of deaths and 

thousands of injuries; 

Whereas, on June 5, 1989, President George H. W. Bush 

condemned these actions of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and the United States took several concrete steps to respond to the military assault, including suspending all exports of items on the United 

States Munitions List to the People’s Republic of China; 
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Whereas, on June 27, 1989, the European Union (then called 

the European Community) imposed an arms embargo on 

the People’s Republic of China in response to the Government of China’s brutal repression of protestors calling for 

democratic and political reform; 

Whereas the European Council, in adopting that embargo, 

‘‘strongly condemn[ed] the brutal repression taking place 

in China’’ and ‘‘solemnly request[ed] the Chinese authorities . . . to put an end to the repressive actions against 

those who legitimately claim their democratic rights’’; 

Whereas the poor human rights conditions that precipitated 

the decisions of the United States and the European 

Union to impose and maintain their respective embargoes 

have not improved; 

Whereas the Department of State 2003 Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices states that, during 2003, ‘‘The 

[Chinese] Government’s human rights record remained 

poor, and the Government continued to commit numerous 

and serious abuses,’’ and, furthermore, that ‘‘there was 

backsliding on key human rights issues during the year’’; 

Whereas, according to the same Department of State report, 

credible sources estimated that as many as 2,000 persons 

remained in prison in the People’s Republic of China at 

the end of 2003 for their activities during the June 1989 

Tiananmen demonstrations; 

Whereas the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

continues to maintain that its crackdown on democracy 

activists in Tiananmen Square was warranted and remains unapologetic for its brutal actions, as demonstrated by that Government’s handling of the recent 

death of former Premier and Communist Party General 
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Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, who had been under house arrest for 15 years because of his objection to the 1989 

Tiananmen crackdown; 

Whereas, since December 2003, the European Parliament, 

the legislative arm of the European Union, has rejected 

in four separate resolutions the lifting of the European 

Union arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China 

because of continuing human rights concerns in China; 

Whereas the January 13, 2005, resolution of the European 

Parliament called on the European Union to maintain its 

arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China until 

the European Union ‘‘has adopted a legally binding Code 

of Conduct on Arms Exports and the People’s Republic 

of China has taken concrete steps towards improving the 

human rights situation in that country . . . [including] by 

fully respecting the rights of minorities’’; 

Whereas a number of European Union member states have 

individually expressed concern about lifting the European 

Union arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China, 

and several have passed resolutions of opposition in their 

national parliaments; 

Whereas the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, as a non-binding set of principles, is insufficient to 

control European arms exports to the People’s Republic 

of China; 

Whereas public statements by some major defense firms in 

Europe and other indicators suggest that such firms intend to increase military sales to the People’s Republic 

of China if the European Union lifts its arms embargo 

on that country; 
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Whereas the Department of Defense fiscal year 2004 Annual 

Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China found that ‘‘[e]fforts underway to lift the European Union (EU) embargo on China will provide additional opportunities to acquire specific technologies from 

Western suppliers’’; 

Whereas the same Department of Defense report noted that 

the military modernization and build-up of the People’s 

Republic of China is aimed at increasing the options of 

the Government of the People’s Republic of China to intimidate or attack democratic Taiwan, as well as preventing or disrupting third-party intervention, namely by 

the United States, in a cross-strait military crisis; 

Whereas the June 2004, report to Congress of the congressionally-mandated, bipartisan United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded that 

‘‘there has been a dramatic change in the military balance between China and Taiwan,’’ and that ‘‘[i]n the 

past few years, China has increasingly developed a quantitative and qualitative advantage over Taiwan’’; 

Whereas the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), 

which codified in 1979 the basis for continued relations 

between the United States and Taiwan, affirmed that the 

decision of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China was based on 

the expectation that the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means; 

Whereas the balance of power in the Taiwan Straits and, specifically, the military capabilities of the People’s Republic 

of China, directly affect peace and security in the East 

Asia and Pacific region; 
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Whereas the Foreign Minister of Japan, Nobutaka 

Machimura, recently stated that Japan is opposed to the 

European Union lifting its embargo against the People’s 

Republic of China and that ‘‘[i]t is extremely worrying as 

this issue concerns peace and security environments not 

only in Japan but also in East Asia as a whole’’; 

Whereas the United States has numerous security interests 

in the East Asia and Pacific region, including the security of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and other key areas, 

and the United States Armed Forces, which are deployed 

throughout the region, would be adversely affected by any 

Chinese military aggression; 

Whereas the lifting of the European Union arms embargo on 

the People’s Republic of China would increase the risk 

that United States troops could face military equipment 

and technology of Western, even United States, origin in 

a cross-strait military conflict; 

Whereas this risk would necessitate a reevaluation by the 

United States Government of procedures for licensing 

arms and dual-use exports to member states of the European Union in order to attempt to prevent the retransfer 

of United States exports from such countries to the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas the report of the United States-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission on the Symposia on Transatlantic Perspectives on Economic and Security Relations 

with China, held in Brussels, Belgium and Prague, Czech 

Republic from November 29, 2004, through December 3, 

2004, recommended that the United States Government 

continue to press the European Union to maintain the 

arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China and 

strengthen its arms export control system, as well as 
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place limitations on United States public and private sector defense cooperation with foreign firms that sell sensitive military technology to China; 

Whereas the lax export control practices of the People’s Republic of China and the continuing proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by state-sponsored entities in China remain 

a serious concern of the United States Government; 

Whereas the most recent Central Intelligence Agency Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, found that ‘‘Chinese entities continued to 

work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related 

projects during the second half of 2003,’’ and that 

‘‘[d]uring 2003, China remained a primary supplier of 

advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, Sudan, and 

Iran’’; 

Whereas, as recently as December 20, 2004, the United 

States Government determined that seven entities of the 

People’s Republic of China, including several state-owned 

companies involved in China’s military-industrial complex, should be subject to sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–178; 50 

U.S.C. 1701 note) for sales to Iran of prohibited equipment or technology; and 

Whereas the assistance provided by these entities to Iran 

works directly counter to the efforts of the United States 

and several European countries to curb illicit weapons activities in Iran: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 
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1 (1) strongly supports the United States embar2 go on the People’s Republic of China; 

3 (2) strongly urges the European Union to con4 tinue its ban on all arms exports to the People’s Re5 public of China; 

6 (3) requests that the President raise United 

7 States objections to the potential lifting of the Euro8 pean Union arms embargo against the People’s Re9 public of China in upcoming meetings with Euro10 pean officials; 

11 (4) encourages the United States Government 

12 to make clear in discussions with Governments in 

13 Europe that a lifting of the European Union embar14 go on arms sales to the People’s Republic of China 

15 would potentially adversely affect transatlantic de16 fense cooperation, including future transfers of 

17 United States military technology, services, and 

18 equipment to European Union countries; 

19 (5) urges the European Union— 

20 (A) to close any loopholes in its arms em21 bargo on the People’s Republic of China and in 

22 its Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; 

23 (B) to make its Code of Conduct on Arms 

24 Exports legally binding and enforceable; 
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1 (C) to more carefully regulate and monitor 

2 the end-use of exports of sensitive dual-use 

3 technology; and 

4 (D) to increase transparency in its arms 

5 and dual-use export control regimes; 

6 (6) deplores the ongoing human rights abuses 

7 in the People’s Republic of China; and 

8 (7) urges the United States Government and 

9 the European Union to cooperatively develop a com10 mon strategy to seek— 

11 (A) improvement in the human rights con12 ditions in the People’s Republic of China; 

13 (B) an end to the military build-up of the 

14 People’s Republic of China aimed at Taiwan; 

15 (C) improvement in the export control 

16 practices of the People’s Republic of China; and 

17 (D) an end to the ongoing proliferation by 

18 state-sponsored entities in China of technology 

19 related to weapons of mass destruction and bal20 listic missiles.

Æ