The Honor able William H. St aff ord , J r., Untied States District Judge f or the Nor

thern * District of F lorida, sitting by desig nation. NOT RECOMMENDED F OR P UBLICATION

F ile Nam e: 07a0754n.06 F iled: October 24, 2007 No. 05-6776 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE CA RL WA YN E M AR CO , EA STER N D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE Defendan t-Appellant. ____________________________________/ BE F ORE: BATC HE LD ER a nd G I LM A N , C ir c ui t J ud g e s ; a nd ST A F F OR D , D is t r ic t * Judge. STAFF ORD, Distric t Judge. Th e de fe nd ant, Ca rl W ay ne Ma rc o ( “ Ma rc o” ), a pp e a ls h is jury conviction and 188- month sentence for c onspiracy to distribute and to posse ss w ith the intent to distribute methamphetamine. We AF F IRM
. I. BACKG ROUND On M arc h 8, 2005, Marc o and his g irlfriend, A ng ela B ry ant (“ Br y ant”) , wer e cha

rg ed in a
one-c ount indictment with conspiring to distribute, and to possess with the intent to dis tribute, 50 g ra ms o r m or e of

me tha mph e tamin e in v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U. S.C. § 8 46 . Wh ile B ryant p le a de d guil ty and bec ame a

cooper ating witness for the pr osecution, Mar co wa s convicted by a jury of the c harg ed offe nse. At trial, the g overnme nt called Investig ator Willi am Gr egg(“G reg g ”), of the WashingtonPag e 2 of 15

County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment (“WCSD”), who arr ested Mar co on the nig ht of Fe bruar y 1, 2005. Gre g g explained that, at approximately 9:45 that e vening , while he was staking out the residenc e of

a man a rr e sted earl ier in the e ve nin g on dr ugtr a ff ic kin g c ha

rg e s, a man d ri vin g a bla c k Co rv e tte stopped at the re sidence , approa ched the door of the r esidenc e ca rry ing a small bag , then re turned to his car whe n no one answ ere d the door. B elievi n g that he had w itnessed an unsuc cessf ul drug transac tion, Greg g beg an following the Corvette. Gre g g soon after saw the dr iver c ross the ce nter line of the roa d sever al times, causing Gre g g to activate his unmarke d car ’s bl ue li g hts. Base d on the driver ’s er

ratic dr iving, Gr eg g suspected that the driver might be a lcohol-impaired. When the driver failed to stop, Gre g g called for assistance from WC SD L ieutenant B rian Hor ton (“Hor ton”), who was ne arby

in a marke d patrol ca

r. Horton took over the pursuit of the Corvette no more than a minute later

. Horton testified that his marke d p a tr o l c ar w as equippe d with spotli g hts, a siren, top-mounted blue lights, a

nd a video c amer a. All of the equipment was operating as he pursued the Corvette at
s p e e d s o f 5 5 to 6 5 mi le s p e r h o u r in an ar e a w h e r e th e s p e e d li mi t w a s 4 0 to 4 5 mi les per hour

. During the pursuit, Horton obser ved the Corve tte veer onto the s houlder of the roa d at least six or
se ve n ti me s. Ho rt on

a lso ob se rv e d s ome thi nghit the pave me nt in fr on t of his c ru ise r i mme diate ly afte r he sa

w the drive r of the Corve tte make a t h ro wi n g -ty

pe motion toward the pa sseng er- side window. Whil e Horton could see that a passe ng er w as in the Corvette, he did not see the pa sseng er throw any thing f rom the ca

r. Af te r s ome min

ute s, Ho rt on

and Gr e g g , a lon g wi th ano the r of fi c e r wh o ha d be e n c a lle d to

a ssi st, we re a

ble to ef fe c tuate a sto p of t

he Cor ve tte by us ing the ir ve hic le s to “ bo x in” the Cor ve tte at an inter section. Horton a nd Gre g g there afte r appr oache d the Corvette with guns drawn, or dere dPag e 3 of 15

the driver out of the ca

r, t h en h an d cuff

ed him and patted him down. The driver w as identified a s Marc o. Duri ngthe pat- do wn se arc h o f Marc o’ s p e rs on , H or ton fo un d a pp ro xima te ly

$3 ,2 16 in c a sh and a sma ll plastic vial containing a white powde ry substance. Asmall b ag co n t aini ng a pink,
c ry sta l- ty pe su bs tanc e wa s fou nd du ri ng a se arc h o f t

he Cor ve tte . G re g g ’s fi e ld t e sts on bo th substances pr oduced positive re sults for methamphetamine. Marc o was a

rre sted and take n to jail. I n the jail, Marc o’s phone c alls were monitored and ta pe d. I n part ic ula

r, Marc o ha d fr e qu e nt pho ne c on ve rs a tio ns wi th his g ir lf ri e nd , B ryant, and

the se
conver sations were copied onto a CD that was admitted into e vidence and play ed at tria l. There was also live testimony

from B ry ant, who explained her c onversations with Marco as the CD w as play ed fo r t he jur y . Am on g oth e r thi ng s, B ry ant e xpla ine d that Ma rc o be g an his fi rs t c a ll by a sk ing he r t o
re tr ie ve a pa

pe r ba g that he ha d thr ow n out on the sid e of the ro a d be fo re his arr e st. Ma rc o in iti a lly told Bry ant that the bagcontained “ tools” that were worth about “ 5 to 6,000.” FollowingMarc o’s direc tions about where to find the bag , Br y ant made one unsucce ssful attempt to locate the ba g , then,
on a sec ond attempt, found a pa per ba g not far f

rom wher e Mar co wa s arr ested. The bagcontained a set of sc ales a

nd a substantial amount—about six oun ces—of what B ry ant re cog nized as methamphetamine. I n a no the r c a ll, a ft e r l e arn ingthat B ryant ha d re tr ie ve d the pa pe r ba g , M arc o to ld B ry a nt t o g et rid of the six “horse s.” He also mentioned “f eed ba g s” for

the “hor ses.” B ry ant explained that “horse s” mea

nt methamphetamine, e ach “ horse” repr esenting one ounce of methamphetamine. The

“ fe e d b a g s” re fe rr e d to th e sm a ll p la sti c ba g g ie s th a t sh e wa s su pp os e d to us e to d ivi de up the six ounces of methamphetamine. Ma

rco tol d Br y an t that she should be able to g et $11,000 for the “horse s.” Bry an t , wh o was a methamphetamine use r her self, ca lculated that six ounces ofPag e 4 of 15

B ry ant a nd he r c hil dr e n w e re liv ingin w hat ha d be e n Ma rc o’ s re sid e nc e . M arc o h ims e lf 1 had moved out of the residenc e two months ear lier. methamphetamine should be worth consider ably more than $11,000. During another

of his calls fr om the jail, Ma rco a sked B ry ant to retrie ve some “ tools” from the bac k of a f

our-whe eler

that was pa

rked outside B ry ant’s house. I n fac t, B ry ant found a handg un, 1 not “tools,” in the bac k of the four -whe eler . Br y ant hid the handgun in the house. After retrie ving the bag of m ethamphetamine from the side of the r oad, B ry ant took the bag to h e r re sid e nc e and hid it in a Crow n Roy a l bag

. Th e ne xt day , n ot w anti ngthe dr ug s in the ho us e with her c hildren, B ry ant aske d a friend, Eddy Presley (“Pre sley ”), to move t he drugs from her house

. Presley conce aled what he thought was all of t he methamphetamine i n Br y ant’s hair

dry er, the n took the ha ir dr

y e r to the ba se me nt of his pa re nts ’ hou se . Un

be kn ow ns t to B ryant an d Pr e sle y , a sma ll

am o u n to f t h e m et h am p h et am i n e w as l ef ti nBry an t ’s h o u s e i nt h e C ro wn R o y al b ag. A s ear ch warra

nt was e x ecute d at B ry ant’s house se vera l day s after Marc o’s ar

rest. B ry ant
was pres ent at t he t im e. O ffi cers fou nddi git al s cal es, man ual scal es, baggies , m ari ju ana, an H &K .45 caliber

semi-automatic pistol (the g un found by Br y ant in the back of the four whe eler ), ca sh, and a Crown Roy al bagcontaining approximately one ounce of a c ry stal-ty pe substance

. The ne x t day , having deci d ed t o cooper ate with law e nforc ement, B ry ant led Hor ton and
so me oth e r o ff

ic e rs to P re sle y ’s pa

re nts ’ h ou se . A ft e r o bta ini ngc on se nt to se arc h th e Pr e sle y s’ house, the off

icer s found a cooler containing a bag , a canister , and Br y ant’s hair dry er, a ll of which contained w hat appe a

r e d to be methamphe tamine. B ry ant later told Marco dur ing a

monitored phone call that law e nforc ement off icer s had seized the “stuff” in the Presley s’ house. Mar co re sponded that the seizure had c ost him $11,000.Pag e 5 of 15

The substanc es seized from Ma rco at the time of his a

rre st, a long w ith the substances seized from B ry ant’s and the Pres l ey s’ re sidence s, were analy zed by TBI chemist Denise Mor

rissey (“ Mo rr iss e y ” ). Mo rr iss e y te sti fi e d th a t th e su

bs tanc e s ta

ke n f ro m Ma rc o’ s p e rs on

tot a le d 4 .9 g ra

ms of methamphe tamine, with vary ing purity levels. The substances taken f rom the re sidence s totaled 121 g rams of pur e methamphe tamine. On J uly 6, 2005, at t he conclusion of a one -day trial, a jury

found Mar co g uilty

of conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to dist ribute 50 g rams or more of methamphe tamine. A probation off

icer there afte r pre pare d Marc o’s presentence repor t (“PSR”) usi ng the 2004 version of the United States Sentenc ing G uidelines (“U .S.S.G.” or “Guide lines”). The office r ca lculated a
se nte nc ingra

ng e of 15 1 to 18 8 mon th s— th e res ult of (1 ) a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of

32 purs ua

nt t o U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)( 3)(c )(4) (2004) (setting the base offe nse leve l at 32 wher e the of fense involved at least 50 g rams but less than 150 gra m s of methamphe tamine); (2) a two-le vel enha nceme nt for Marc o’s leade rship role in the c onspiracy pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c ); and (3) a cr iminal hist ory cate g ory of I pursuant to U.S.S.G. ch.5, pt. A. Be fore sentenc ing, Marco submit ted no objections to the probation office r’s c alculation of the Guidelines r an g e. At sente ncing , Marc o’s counse l urg ed the c ourt to impose the minimum sentenc e within the rang e calc ulated by the probation office r, but he did not objec t to the rang e itself. Mindful that the statutory rang e of imprisonment wa s ten y ear s to life, the district court sente nced Marc o to a 188-month term of imprisonment. The district c ourt thus imposed a sentence at the top of the ra ng e, explaining that, in choosinga sente nce w ithin the ad v iso ry rang e, it h ad co n s idere d Marc o’ s la c k o f r e mor se and la c k of ac c e pta nc e of re sp on sib ili ty . T he c ourt a lso e xpla ine d th a t, i n its view, Marc o’s cr iminal hist ory s core understate d his actual c riminal history . After imposingPag e 6 of 15

sentenc e and advising Marc o of his r ight to a ppeal, the district c ourt asked the par ties if either ha d any objections to the sentenc e that had not alre ady been r aised. Thr oug h counsel, Mar co re sponded in the neg ative. This appe al followed. II. AN AL YSI S A. Marc o first contends that Greg g and Hor ton lacked pr obable c ause to stop him on the day of his arre st. As a re sult, he say s, the evidenc e seized from his pe rson and his vehic le should not have been a dmitted at trial. Marc o did not file a m otion to suppress such evidenc e, and he did not object to t he a dmi ssi on

of that e vid e nc e a t tr ia l. Ma rc o c on c e de s that his c la im of e rr or in t his re g ard mus t be re viewed f

or plain er

ror. To establish plain err or, Mar co must demonstrate ( 1) that er ror oc curr ed; (2) that the err or was obvious or clear; (3) t hat t he error affe cted his substantial rig hts; and (4) that the neg ative impact aff ecte d the fa irness, integ rity , or public re putation of the judicial proc eeding s. United States v. Koe be rle in , 161 F.3d 946, 949 ( 6th Cir. 1998). Marc o falls fa

r short of e stablishing that the di strict court c ommitt ed plain er ror by admitting the evidenc e seized by

Gre g g and Hor

to n o n the day

of Mar co’s a

rre st. Greg g testified that he at t em p t edt o s t o p M ar co af t er M ar co cr o s s edt h e cen t er l i n e of t h e ro ads ev er al t i m es , l ea d i n g Gr egg to b e lie ve that Marc o wa s dr ivi ng un de r t he inf lue nc e of dr ug s o r a lc oh ol. Marc o f

a ile d to sto p in response to the office rs’ blue lig hts and wailing siren and, instead, l ed the office rs on a hig h-spee d chase during which he w as see n throwing something f rom the window of the car . Clearly , Marc o’s actions provided the office rs with probable cause to stop the Corvette and arr est its driver. See, e .g. , United States v. Carlton , 44 F e d. Ap px. 72 0, 72 2 (6 th Cir

. 20 02 ) (h old ingthat of fi c e r h a d p ro ba

blePag e 7 of 15

c a us e to b e lie ve tha

t an i nd iv id ual wa s d

ri vin g wh ile imp a ir e d b a se d o n th e ind ivi du a l’ s “ e rr a tic dr ivi ng ” ); Ne lso n v . R idd le , 217 Fe d. Appx. 456, 460 (6th C i r. 2007) (noting that, whe re the de fe nd ant f

a ile d to sto p h is c ar w he n s ig na le d to do so by of fi c e rs us inge me rg e nc y

lig hts and

sir e ns , pr ob a ble c a us e e xiste d to arr e st the de fe nd ant fo r f le e ingfr om t

he po lic e ); United States v. W illiams , 79 Fe d. Appx. 677, 682 (5th C ir. 2003) (f inding pr obable c ause f

or a w arr antless ar

rest whe re the de fe nd ant fl e d fr om pol ic e and wa s se e n d isc ard ingan o bje c t w hil e fl e e ing ). Marc o’ s a rgume nts to the c on tr ary

are wi tho ut m e ri t. Fur thermore , the law is we ll-established that an of fi ce r m ay conduct a full sear ch of a n
arr estee ’s person during the cour se of a lawful a rre st. United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218, 234- 35 (1 97 3) (h old ingthat “ in the c a se of a lawf ul c us tod ia l arr e st a fu ll se arc h o f t he pe rs on is n ot o nly an exception to the war

rant requireme nt of t he Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasona ble’ sea rch
un de r t hat A me ndme nt” ); Un ite d States v. Montgom e ry , 377 F.3d 582, 586 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “ [u] nder the ‘sea rch- incident-to-a -lawf

ul-arr est’ exception to the war rant
re qu ir e me nt, a

law e nf or c e me nt of

fi c e r may c on du c t a

fu ll s e arc h o f a

n a rr e ste e ' s p e rs on

inc ide nt t o a lawf ul custodial arr est”). I

n addition, an offic er ma y sear ch a ve hicle incident to the law ful custodial arr est of a r ece nt oc cupant of that vehicle. See, e .g. , Thornton v. United States , 5 41 U. S. 61 5, 62 3- 24 (2 00 4) (h old ing tha t “ [s]o lon g a s an arr e ste e is [a] .
. . ‘r e c e nt o c c up ant’ of a ve hic le . . . , office rs may

sear ch that vehicle incident to the ar rest”) . Be cause , in this case, the of fice rs had pr ob a ble c a us e to ar re st Ma rc o ba se d on his er

ra tic dr ivi ng , his at te mpt s to fle e de sp ite the of fi c e rs ’ clea r sig nals to stop, a n d h i s ac t o f di scar ding a n object fr om his vehicle duringthat flig ht, the incident-to-a

rre st searc hes of Ma

rco’ s person a

nd vehicle w ere proper . The district cour t did not err,
muc h le ss c omm it pla in e rr or , wh e n it a dmi tte d the me tha mph e tamin e se ize d d

ur ingtho se se arc he s.Pag e 8 of 15 B. Marc o next contends that the distric t court er red w hen it admitted into evidence the
me tha mph e tamin e that w a s se ize d f ro m th e tw o re sid e nc e s. Ag a in, be c a us e he ne ith e r o bje c te d to this evidence at trial nor f iled a pre -trial motion to suppress, Marc o conce des that we must review this claim for plain er

ror. Acc ording to Marco, it was “impossible for any one, even Angela Br y ant, t o testify with any
cer tainty that the drug s she alleg edly rec overe d from the side of the roa d wer e the same drug s that
wer e re cover ed as a

result of the se arc hes by

police.” A

ppellant’s B r. at 28. Mar co points to two alleg ed bre aks in the “c hain of c ustody .” First, there was purpor tedly nothing to esta

blish that the bagof methamphe tamine found by Br y ant on the side of the r oad wa s the bagthrown by Marc o from his car se vera l day s ear lier; and sec ond, there was purpor tedly nothing to prove that the methamphetamine f

ound in the P resley s’ hous e was the methamphetamine that was re moved from Br y ant’s house day s ear lier. Acc ording to Ma rco, the evidenc e was admitted withou t p roper

“ a uth e nti c a tio n” be c a

us e the br e a ks in t

he “ c ha in o f c us tod

y ” pr e c lud e d B ry

ant f ro m kn ow ingwh os e drug s were whose. I n Un ite d S

tat es v . B ro wn , No. 96-3074, 1996 WL487597, *4 (6th Cir. Aug . 26, 1996) (unpublished dec ision), this court reve rsed the district c ourt’s dec isio n t o exclude two bag s of
coca ine on chain- of-c ustody and authe ntication g rounds. The ba g s of coc aine in Br own wer e found two wee ks after , and nea

r the location where , the def endant abandoned his vehicle f ollowing a

highspeed c hase by

police off icer s. The dist rict court excluded the bags of coca ine, finding that (1) ther e
was a n insufficient link betwe en the de fenda nt and the two bag s containing the evidenc e; and ( 2) the g overnme nt could not prove that the ba g s remaine d intact from the time they wer e re portedly

seenPag e 9 of 15

I n his reply brief, Marc o raises an argument not pr eviously made: namely , that there was 2 insufficient e vidence to establish Marco’ s g uilt because t here was no e vidence to corrobor ate the t es t i m o n y o f hi s co co n s p i ra t o r, Br y an t
. Be ca u s e ap p el l at e is s u es ra i s ed fo r th e fi rs t t i m e in a p ar t y 's in the defe ndant’s possession until they wer e found some two w eeks lat er. The appellate court reje cted the district c ourt’s cha in- o f

- c u s to dy and authe ntication analy sis, finding that the issue boiled down to one of r eleva

nce—a n issue that g oes t o the weig ht of evidenc e and not its admissibili ty
.

As the cour

t did in Br own , this court finds Marc o’s cha in-of-c ustody and aut h entication arguments inapposite. I nstead, his argument “boils down to an asse rtion about the re levanc e of the evidenc e.” Id. at *3. “Rele vant evidenc e” is “ evidenc e havingany tendenc y to make the ex istence of any fa c t th a t is of c on se qu e nc e to the de te rm inatio n of the a c tio n mor e pr ob a ble or le ss p ro ba

ble tha n it wo uld be wi tho ut the e vid e nc e .” F e d. R. E vid . 4 01 . G ive n th e dr ugc on sp ir a c y

c ha rg e a g a ins t Marc o, the methampheta

mine found in the Presley s’ and Br y ant’s residenc es, if linked to Marco, ha d

a “t en d en cy t o make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the action more probable or less proba ble than it would be without the evidenc e.” Id. Her e, the g overnme nt, throug h Br y ant, introduce d evidenc e to establish the nece ssary link be tw e e n M a rc o a

nd the me tha

mph e tamin e fo un d in the tw o re sid e nc e s. Th e jur or s w e re e nti tle d to consider that evidence —namely , Br y ant’s testimony

about her conver sations with Marco and about wh a t sh e did

in r e sp on se to t

ho se c on ve rs a tio ns —a

nd to a c c or d it

wh a tever wei ght the y

fe lt appropr iate whe n decidingwhether the methamphetamine seized from the two re sidence s was linke d , b ey o n d a re asonable doubt, to Marco. The district court committed no err or, plain or otherwise, by

failing to su a s

po nte suppress the methamphetamine that was seized fr om Bryant’s and the Pr e sle y s’ re sid e nc e s. 2Pag e 10 of 1 5

reply brief a re de emed wa ived, we de cline to re ach this issue. United St ates v. Moore , 376 F.3d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). C. Marc o c o n te n d s th a t h is c o n v ic ti o n c an n o t s ta n d b e c a u s e 2 8 U
. S. C. § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) d o e s not
re qu i re , an d

t h e go v ern m en tfa i l ed to p ro v e, t h at h i s co n d u ct af fe ct edi n t er s t at e c o m m er ce . Al t h o u gh

w e n o r ma ll y r e v ie w c o n s ti tuti o n a l c h a ll e n g e s to a s tatute de novo , here we r eview f or plain er

ror beca use the issue wa s not raised in the district cour t. United States v. Suarez , 2 63 F .3 d 4 68 , 4 76 (6 th Cir. 2001). Th at t h er e was no plain err or is made c lear by controlling law. See U

nited States v. Tucker , 9 0 F .3 d 1 13 5, 11 40 -4 1 ( 6th Cir . 199 6) (n oti ng that (1) that “dr ug tr a ff ic kin g is an

‘e c on omi c enter prise’ that substantially

aff ects interstate commer ce in numer ous clea r wa y s;” (2) Cong ress ha s the power

under the Commerce Clause “to regulate an a ctivity as cle arly

commerc ial as drug traff icking ;” and ( 3) a c ase- by -ca s e ju r is d ic ti o n a l f

in d ingis unnece ssary

"w here the ac tivity , like drug tr a ff ic kin g , is of

a kin d th a t a lw ay s im

pli c a te s in te rs ta te c omm e rc ia l c on c e rn s" ); see also United States v. Collier , No. 06-5 3 5 4 , 2007 WL 2461870, *13 (6th Cir. Aug . 29, 2007) (unpublished decision) ( holding that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) doe s not violate the Commerce Clause, on its face or as applied to the de fenda

nt, beca use sec tion 841(a)( 1) “a ddresse s a clearly commerc ial activity

that h as l o n g b ee nwi t h i nfe d er al p o we r t o re gu l at e” ) ( q u o t i n g Tucker

90 F .3 d at 11 40 ); United St ates v. Genao , 7 9 F .3 d 1 33 3, 13 36 (2 d Ci r. 19 96 ) ( up ho ldi ngse c tio n 8 46 a g a ins t a Com me rc e Cla

us e
a tta c k, no tin g that " [b]e c a us e na rc oti c s tr a ff

ic kin g re pr e se nts a

ty pe of act ivity

that Co ng re ss
rea so n ably

found substantially

aff ecte d interstate c ommerce , the ac tual eff ect that e ach dr

ug conspirac y

has on interstate commerc e is constitutionally irrele vant" ). D.Pag e 11 of 1 5 Citi n g Un i t ed States v. Book er , 5 43 U. S. 2 20 (2 00 5) , M arc o c on te nd s th a t hi s Sixth Am e ndme nt r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l w a s v iol a te d w he n th e dis tr ic t c ourt ma de a fi nd ingof

fa c t a s to his supervisory

role in the off

ense, a finding that incre ased his advisory Gu i d eli nes ra ng e but did not
cause his sentence to exceed t h e s t at u t o ry maxi mum. Marco did not ra ise a Six th Amendment challeng e to hi s sentence befor e the district cour t. Accor dingly , the plain-e rror standard of

revie w applies t o Marc o’s S ix th Amendment claim. United States v. Sosebe e , 419 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2005). Th is c ir c uit

ha s c on sis ten tl y re c og nize d th a t ju dic ia l f a c t- fi nd inga t se nte nc ingis constitutional, so long as the court rec og nizes that the Guidelines a re a dvisory

and not binding. See, e.g. , United St ates v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 461 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[i] t is clear unde r the law of this Circuit that a district c ourt may make its own fac tual finding s reg ar d i n g rele vant
se nte nc ingfa c tor s, a nd

c on sid e r t

ho se fa c tor s in

de te rm ini ng a de fe nd ant' s se nte nc e ” ); United States v. Fe rguson , 4 56 F .3 d 6 60 , 6 65 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (n oti ng that th is c ourt and oth e rs ha ve re pe a te dly

he ld since Booke r

that district judge s can f

ind the facts nece ssary to calc ulate the a ppropriate Guidelines

ra n ge u s ing the same pre pondera nce- of-the- evidenc e standa rd that g overne d prior to Bo ok e r”) ; United States v. Cook, 453 F.3d 775, 777 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[b] eca use the g uidelines are now advisory

and not mandator

y , a District Court may rely on extra-ver dict fac ts or on those other than which the de fenda

nt has specif

ically admitted when it ca lculates his sentenc e”) . Her e, the district court made clea

r dur i n g the sentenc ing he aringthat it considered the Guidelines to be advisory . Thus, under w ell-established la w, the district cour

t was entitled to enha

nce Ma rco’ s sentenc e base d upon its own f actua l f indings reg arding Marc o’s role in the conspirac y . Marc o has utterly failed to e stablish plain error in this reg ard.Pag e 12 of 1 5

Se c tio n 3 55 3( a ) r e qu ir e s th e se nte nc ingc ourt to c on si der th e fo llo wi ngfa c tor s in 3 deter mining a r easona

ble sentenc e: (1) the nature a

nd circ umstances of the offe nse and the history and cha rac teristics of the de fe nd ant; (2) the ne ed for

the sentenc e imposed- (A) to reflec t the s eriousness of the offense, to promote respec t for the law, and to pr ovide just punishment for the offe nse; (B ) t o a ff or d a de qu a te de te rr e nc e to c ri min a l c on du c t; (C) to protec t the public from fur ther c rimes of the de fenda nt; and (D) to pr ovid e the defenda nt with needed e ducational or vocational tr a ini ng , me dic a l c are , o r o the r c or re c tio na l tr e atm ent in the mos t eff ective ma nner; (3) the kinds of se ntence s available ; (4) the kinds of se ntence and the se ntencingrang e esta blished for- (A ) t he app li cab le c a te g or

y of of fe ns e c omm itt e d b y

the a pp lic a ble cate g ory of def endant a s set forth in the g uidelines ... (5) a ny pertinent policy

statement ... (6) the ne ed to avoid unwa rra nted sentenc e disparities amo ng defe ndants with simil ar rec ords who have been f

ound g uilty

of similar conduc t; and (7) the ne ed to provide r estitution t o any victims of the offe nse. E. Marc o c on te nd s th a t, in se nte nc ing him , th e dis tr ic t c ourt fa ile d to dis c us s th e fa c tor s se t f or th in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Be cause Marc o failed to objec t to the alleg ed inade quacy of the district 3 court’s se ntencingrationale , he conc edes that this court should review the suf ficienc y of the district court’s se ntencingexplanation for plain er ror. After Bo ok

e r mad e th e Gu id eli nes adv is ory , d is tr ict cou rt s have been requ ir ed t o i mp os e "a sentenc e sufficie nt, but not g reater than nece ssary to c omply with the purposes of § 3 5 5 3 (a)(2)." Un i t ed S t a tes v. Cage , 4 5 8 F
. 3 d 5 3 7 , 5 4 0 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( in te r

n a l q u o tati o nma

r k s an d c it a tion omitted). A sentenc e must be upheld o n appea l if it is s ubstantively and proc edura lly

rea sonable. Id. I n this case, Ma

rco c laims that his sentence w as proc edura lly unrea sonable.Pag e 13 of 1 5

A sentenc e that fa l l s wi thin a proper ly calc ulated Guidelines r ang e is cre dited with a 4 rebuttable presumption of re as o n ab l eness. Rita v. United States , 127 S. Ct . 2546 (2007) ; United States v. W

illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 708 ( 6th Cir. 2006), cert. de nied , 127 S. Ct . 3043 (2007). "Asentenc e may

be proc edura lly

unrea sonable if the district judg e fa ils t o co n sider the applicable Guidelines rang e or neg lects t o consider the other fa ctors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and i n s te a d

s im p ly s e le c ts w h a t t

h e ju d g e d e e ms ana

p p r o p r iate s e n te n c e w it

h o u t s u c h r e qu ir ed consideration.” United States v. J ones , 489 F.3d 243, 250- 51(6th Cir. 2007) (i n t ernal quotation

ma rk s an d

c i t a t i o no m i t t e d )

. S a t i s f a c t i o no f t h e p r o c e d

u r a l r e a s o n a

b l e n e s s r e qu i r e m e n td o e s n o t, howeve r, depe nd on a district court' s eng ag ing in “ a rote listi ng or some other r itualisti c inca ntation” of those fa ctors. Un ite d Sta te s v . D e x ta , 470 F.3d 612, 614- 15 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. de nied , 1 27 S. Ct. 30 66 (2 00 7) . Ins te a d, a se nte nc e is p ro c e dura lly

re a so na ble if the di st ric t c ourt

art ic ulate s it s
rea sons for a pa

rticular se ntence “to a suff icient deg ree to allow fo r reasonable appellate revie w.” Id. at 614. Her e, the district cour

t hear d Marc o speak at leng th during the sentenc ing he aring . Marc o g ener ally criticized the "pr ejudicial" nature of the PSR ; he complained a bout his attorney ' s failure t o fi l e c er t ai nm o t i o n s fo r h i m ; h e d en i edt h at h e h ad t h ro wn an y dru gs fr o m t h e ca r d u ri n g t h e h i gh speed c hase; he contra dicted portions of Bry ant’s testi mony ; and he tried t o minimaliz e the e x tensive criminal history

set forth in his PSR . The district cour t list ened to what Marco ha d to say , then sug g ested that Mar co had " talked [himself] into some difficulty " w ith his comments. Whil e noti n g that an above -the-G uidelines sentenc e may have be en appr opriate g iven the circ umstances of this case, the district c ourt nonethele ss selecte d a within-the-G uidelines sentenc e, 4 stating that—in selecting such a se ntence —it had "c onsidered the nature and cir cumstance s of the offe nse, the history

and chara cter istics of t he defenda nt, the advisory

g uideline ra

ng e esta blished byPag e 14 of 1 5 the United States Sentenc ing Commission and all the oth er fa ct o rs set forth in sec tion 3553(a), p u rs u an tt o t h e S en t en ci n g R ef o rm Ac to f 1 9 8 4
. " I np ar t i cu l ar , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt s t re s s edM ar co 's

" tot a l la c k o f a c c e pta

nc e of re sp on sibili ty " and

" tot a l la c k o f r e mor se ," fi nd ing s th a t w e re , if any thing, c onfirmed by

Marc o' s comments at sentenc i n g. The c ourt found equa lly signific ant Marc o' s ext ensive c riminal rec ord , t h e ser iousness of which—in the district cour t's vie w—was inadequately

ref lected in the c alculation of Ma rco' s criminal history

cate g ory . Whil e the dist rict
c ourt did no t e nume rate and

dis c us s e a c h o f t

he 35 53 (a ) f

a c tor s e xplic itl y , it

" e xpla in[e d] it s
rea soning to a

sufficie nt deg ree to allow for r easona ble appe llate re view.” De x ta , 470 F.3d at 614. I ndeed, b ec au s e our re view of the rec ord re veals that the district c ourt not only considere d the rele vant statut ory

fac tors but also g ave a

detailed e x planation of its rea sons for the pa rticular sentenc e imposed, we reje ct Marc o’s argument that the district c ourt committed pla in e rror by failing to adequately

explain it s sentencingrationale

. F. Marc o contends that, c ontrary to Booke r , the di strict court treated the Guidelines sentenc ing

ra n ge a s m an d at o ry . He co n ce d es t h at , b ec au s e he fa i l ed t o o b j ec t at s en t en ci n g t o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt 's
a pp lic a tio n o f t

he g uid e lin e s, thi s c ourt

mus t r e vie w h is Booke r

claim for pla in error

. At the sentenc ing he aring , the district cou rt expressly stated—on more tha

n one
occa s i o n

— t h at i t considere d the Guidelines to be a dvisory in nature. A t the beg inning of the
s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, t h e c o u rt an n o u n ce d t h at t h e P S R

h ades t ab l i s h ed"an ad v i s o ry gu i d el i n e r an ge of 151 to 18 8 m o n t h s ." J.A. at 224. I t then noted that Marc o had filed no obje ctions to the cal cul ati on of "t he ad vi so ry guid eli ne ra nge." Id. L a te r, wh ile e xpla ini ngthat Booke r re qu ir e d it

to consider a

number of f

actor s, including " the advisory g uideline ra

ng e es t ab l i s h ed by

the UnitedPag e 15 of 1 5 States Sentencing Commi ssion for the off ense of convicti o n , " the court noted that the "a dvisory guid eli ne ra nge is a fact or . . . ent it led to su bs tan ti al wei ght i n t he s ent enci ng pro cess ." Id. at 235-36. Finally , the district court e x plained that it was imposing a sentenc e " within the advisory g uideline rang e," despite the fa ct that—g iven the cir cumstan ce s o f Mar co' s case —it could have imposed a sentenc e above the applic ab l e Guidelines rang e. Id. at 240. Clearly , the district court re cog nized t h a tt h e G u i d e l i n e s s e n t e n c i n g r an g e w a s a d v i s o r y r a t h e r t h anm an d a t o r

y. To the extent Mar co argues that the district cour t committed plain error

by g iving too much
we ig ht t o th e a dv iso ry

Gu ide lin e s r ang e , h is a

rgume nt i s f

ri vo lou s. Se e Un ite d S

tat es v . D av is , 2007 WL 906332, *6 (E.D. Te nn. Marc h 21, 2007) (explaining that substantial w eig ht is ordinarily g iven to the a dv iso ry Gu ide lin e s r a ng e ); United States v. Clay , 2005 WL 1076243, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 6 , 2 0 0 5 ) (hol ding that the “g uidelines, althoug h advisory and only one fa ctor among othe rs to be considere d in a

rriving at a rea sonable sentenc e, are entitled to substantial we ight in the se ntencing decision”)

. At the sentenc ing he aring , Marc o acknow ledg ed—throug h counsel—the c orre ctness of the Guidelines c alculation; he did not re quest a sente nce be low the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e; and he did not offe r any mitigating fac ts that w ould ha ve supported a below-the -Guide l i n es sentenc e. Under the circ umstances, we ca n n o t fa ult the district court for g iving substantial we ight to the Guidelines ra

ng e. III . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons explained above, w e AF F IRM Marc o’s conviction and se ntence
.