[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-12177

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-00393-RWS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LEVORE JONES-TIDWELL,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(May 13, 2015)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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In 2009, in the Northern District of Illinois, Levore Jones-Tidwell pleaded 

guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of 

possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. In sentencing him for 

those offenses, the district court used the 2008 Sentencing Guidelines Manual to 

determine that he had ten criminal history points: seven points based on his prior 

convictions, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a)–(c) (2008); two points because he committed 

the offenses of conviction while on parole for another offense, see id. § 4A1.1(d)

(2008); and one “recency” point because he committed the offenses of conviction 

less than two years after he had been released from imprisonment, see id.

§ 4A1.1(e) (2008). Ten criminal history points meant that Jones-Tidwell’s 

criminal history category was V. The court sentenced Jones-Tidwell to 42 months 

imprisonment and 3 years supervised release. His term of supervised release began 

in February 2012, and jurisdiction over his case was transferred to the Northern 

District of Georgia in November 2012. 

In 2014, a probation officer petitioned the district court to revoke JonesTidwell’s supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the district court 

calculated an advisory guidelines range of 18 to 24 months imprisonment, which it 

based on a criminal history category of V — the criminal history category 

applicable at the time Jones-Tidwell was originally sentenced — and a violation 

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grade of B. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). It then sentenced Jones-Tidwell to 18 

months imprisonment. 

Jones-Tidwell contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable 

because the court erroneously calculated his advisory guidelines range based on a 

criminal history category of V. He relies on the fact that, in 2010, the Sentencing 

Commission prospectively eliminated the consideration of recency points under the 

former § 4A1.1(e). See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 742 (2010); see also id.

§ 1B1.10(c) (2010) (showing that Amendment 742 does not apply retroactively). 

Without that recency point, Jones-Tidwell would have had only nine criminal 

history points and a criminal history category of IV when he was originally 

sentenced. He argues that, in light of the Sentencing Commission’s elimination of 

recency points, the court should have recalculated his criminal history category at 

his revocation hearing and sentenced him based on an advisory guidelines range of 

12 to 18 months instead of 18 to 24 months. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). We review 

the procedural reasonableness of Jones-Tidwell’s sentence only for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010); 

see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). 

Jones-Tidwell’s argument is meritless. The district court did not recalculate 

his criminal history category for purposes of imposing a revocation sentence

because the sentencing guidelines specifically instruct that “[t]he criminal history 

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category is not to be recalculated” for purposes of imposing a revocation sentence. 

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.1. In calculating Jones-Tidwell’s advisory guidelines 

range based on a criminal history category of V, the district court did exactly as the 

sentencing guidelines say to do: It used the criminal history category “applicable 

at the time [Jones-Tidwell] was originally sentenced to a term of supervision.” Id.

§ 7B1.4(a). 

Facing an uphill battle, Jones-Tidwell acknowledges that “a formalistic 

reading of the text of [U.S.S.G.] § 7B1.4 might suggest that the district court need 

not entertain subsequent favorable changes in the guidelines affecting the criminal 

history score when a defendant is sentenced” for violating the conditions of his 

supervised release. Nonetheless, he contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in doing exactly as § 7B1.4 says for two reasons. First, he argues that 

the district court’s failure to recalculate his criminal history score violated U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.11’s instruction that the court “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the 

date that the defendant is sentenced,” which in his case was the 2013 Guidelines 

Manual. But the court did use the 2013 Guidelines Manual in imposing JonesTidwell’s revocation sentence, and that manual specifically instructs courts not to 

recalculate a defendant’s criminal history score. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) & cmt. n.1 

(2013). 

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Second, Jones-Tidwell argues that the court violated 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(5)’s instruction that the court consider relevant policy statements of the 

Sentencing Commission, and he quotes at length the commentary accompanying 

the amendment that eliminated recency points. That argument fails too. Although 

the district court was free to consider the elimination of recency points under 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) as a basis for a downward variance, Jones-Tidwell did not 

request a downward variance, and, even if he had, the court would not have been 

required to grant one. The court did not abuse its discretion in using a criminal 

history category of V to calculate Jones-Tidwell’s advisory guidelines range at his 

revocation hearing. 

AFFIRMED. 

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