If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

WOODSIDE BIBLE CHURCH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

September 30, 2024

12:20 PM

V No. 366944

Tax Tribunal

TOWNSHIP OF FORESTER, LC No. 21-002948-TT

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: RICK, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner-appellant Woodside Bible Church appeals as of right the Tax Tribunal order 

denying petitioner’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and granting that 

relief to respondent under MCR 2.116(I)(2). The result of the Tax Tribunal’s judgment was the 

affirmance of respondent’s denial of a property-tax exemption under MCL 211.7s on the ground 

that petitioner failed to establish that the subject property was predominately used for religious 

purposes as required by statute. Petitioner also challenges the tribunal’s denial of leave to amend 

its petition, and asserts that the result violated its equal-protection rights under the state and federal 

Constitutions. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner, an organization based in Troy with several other “campuses” located throughout

the metropolitan Detroit area, describes itself as an evangelical church with a mission to “help 

people belong to Christ, grow in Christ, and reach the world for Christ.” In 2016, petitioner 

purchased the subject property, a large residence located on the shores of Lake Huron in Forester 

Township. The property includes a large house that now has 12 bedrooms, a large dining room, 

and a great room, along with a pole barn and a garage. Petitioner’s hope for the property was to 

create “a place of retreat where people could have extended periods of time away from the 

busyness of life. In this place, marriages would be strengthened, leaders developed, and pastors 

encouraged.” Petitioner refers to the property as “The Lodge,” and markets it to other groups and 

organizations. It has created a brochure detailing the facilities available and highlighting its 

availability as a place of retreat and rest. Petitioner’s senior executive director of operations, Mike 
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Fisk, asserted generally by affidavit that from “2017 through 2020, the ministry retreat center [The 

Lodge] was used as an extension of Woodside, with missions to strengthen marriages, develop 

leaders, and encourage and counsel pastors, consistently taught from a biblical and prayerful 

perspective.” Because of the COVID-19 pandemic and its attendant “lockdown” restrictions, from 

March 2020 through May 2021, the property sat unused.

In 2021, the assessed value of the property was over $1.1 million. For each of the 2017 

through 2020 tax years, petitioner was granted exemptions from property tax on the property under 

MCL 211.7s, which provides exemptions to religious societies for “houses of public worship” and 

“parsonage[s].” In 2021, respondent changed its assessment of the subject property from “exempt” 

to “residential,” and assessed property tax for that year. Petitioner disputed this assessment before 

respondent’s board of review, which confirmed the assessment. Fisk asserted that the township 

supervisor told him that the reason for the reclassification and denial of an exemption was that the 

township believed that petitioner was renting out The Lodge for weddings. Fisk denied that 

petitioner ever rented out The Lodge for weddings, or that any wedding had ever taken place there, 

and respondent submitted no evidence indicating otherwise. Petitioner then filed an appeal with

the Tax Tribunal.1

Petitioner eventually filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that it was entitled 

as a matter of law to an exemption under MCL 211.7s for facilities owned by a religious society 

and used predominantly for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the 

society, on the ground that petitioner used the subject property exclusively for religious services 

or for teaching religious truths and beliefs. It attached to its motion Fisk’s affidavit, its marketing 

brochure advertising The Lodge, letters its attorney sent to respondent in 2016 and 2017, before 

and after respondent’s approval of an exemption for 2017, a document that petitioner offered as a 

profit-and-loss statement for the property for 2020 and 2021, its petition to respondent’s board of 

review, and the review board’s order denying the petition. Fisk’s affidavit was the only evidence 

plaintiff submitted of petitioner’s actual use of the subject property. Fisk generally described the 

retreats held at The Lodge as being intended to strengthen marriages, develop leaders and groups, 

and encourage and refresh pastors in a serene setting, and stated that “[a]ll such retreats are bible, 

prayer and worship centered . . . .” Fisk provided no specific example of an event that included 

such services, but stated that the property was used in its “mission” to “encourage and support 

pastors,” and as a place former pastors used “at times” to “counsel[] and encourage[]” “several 

pastors (and sometimes their wives).”

The marketing brochure for The Lodge does not detail any actual uses of the property, but

does describe the intended purpose and use of the facilities. The first page with substantive text 

discusses the history of, and goals for, The Lodge. It describes the property as a “place of retreat” 

for visitors to have “extended periods of time away from the busyness of life.” It closes with a 

hope that visitors “enjoy some time away,” and that “the Lord would encourage you in your 

marriage, your family, your ministry, or wherever you may be on life’s journey.” There is no 

mention of religious services, or of religious teaching or classes. A “What to Expect” page in the 

 

1 The prehearing statements included challenges to the 2021 and 2022 assessments, and the Tax 

Tribunal noted that the appeal automatically included 2023 under MCL 205.737(5)(a).
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brochure states that “[a]ll activities are planned by the group or organization hosting the retreat.” 

The last page with substantive text describes a bedroom and related amenities, and closes with the 

slogan, “The Lodge is a place where rest, refreshment, and reflection meet.” Nothing in Fisk’s 

affidavit, or any of the other documentary evidence, contained specific examples of how the 

property was used in 2021 or later. And, nowhere in the brochure can one find references to 

religious services, worship, teaching, learning, or anything of the like. 

 Respondent filed a response to petitioner’s summary-disposition motion, arguing that the 

denial of an exemption under MCL 211.7s was proper because petitioner did not use the subject 

property predominantly for religious services, or the teaching of petitioner’s religious beliefs and 

truths, and supported that contention with evidence obtained from petitioner during discovery of 

who used the property on specific occasions, and how each organization used it. 

In its decision, the Tax Tribunal noted that there was no dispute about petitioner’s status 

as a religious society, and identified the controlling issue as whether petitioner used the subject 

property predominantly for religious services or for teaching its religious beliefs or truths. Citing 

the itineraries petitioner provided as discovery responses, the tribunal concluded that the 

predominant use of the property was by organizations other than petitioner for “leadership 

development and marriage renewal with an emphasis on rest and recreation,” and that most of the 

activities were “recreational activities such as golf, crafting, games, and general free time,” with

“little time devoted to teaching religious truths and beliefs.” The tribunal concluded that petitioner 

had not met its burden of establishing that it was entitled to an exemption, and denied petitioner’s 

motion for summary disposition. It further ruled that, under MCR 2.116(I)(2), respondent was 

entitled to summary disposition instead.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the tribunal denied. In that motion, petitioner 

also sought leave from the tribunal to amend its petition to assert that it was alternatively entitled 

to an exemption as a charitable institution under MCL 211.7o(3). The tribunal denied the motion, 

concluding that petitioner had not shown any palpable error, and that petitioner had ample time to 

either include the charitable-organization claim in its summary disposition motion, or to amend its 

petition before the tribunal decided the motion.

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court’s ability to review decisions of the Tax Tribunal is very limited.” President 

Inn Props, LLC v Grand Rapids, 291 Mich App 625, 630; 806 NW2d 342 (2011). “Michigan’s 

Constitution provides: ‘In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles, 

no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the administration of 

property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation.’ ” Id. at 630-631, quoting 

Const 1963, art 6, § 28. “ ‘[I]n the absence of fraud,’ ” this Court’s review “ ‘is limited to 

determining whether the tribunal made an error of law or adopted a wrong principle; the factual 

findings of the tribunal are final, provided that they are supported by competent and substantial 

evidence.’ ” President Inn Props, 291 Mich App at 631, quoting Antisdale v Galesburg, 420 Mich 

265, 277; 362 NW2d 632 (1984). When the tribunal’s decision involves a question of statutory 

interpretation, review is de novo. Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich 192, 202; 713 
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NW2d 734 (2006). “[B]ecause tax exemptions upset the desirable balance achieved by equal 

taxation, they must be narrowly construed.” Id. at 204.

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Corley 

v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 277; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). If a court considering a summary 

disposition motion determines, on the basis of the motion and any evidence submitted, that it is 

the nonmoving party, and not the moving party, that is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it 

may grant the nonmoving party summary disposition. MCR 2.116(I)(2).

Courts review a decision to deny leave to amend pleadings for an abuse of discretion. 

Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 53; 684 NW2d 320 (2004).

“[A]n abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances 

in which there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than 

one reasonable and principled outcome . . . . [W]hen the trial court selects one of 

these principled outcomes, the trial court has not abused its discretion and, thus, it 

is proper for the reviewing court to defer to the trial court’s judgment.” [Maldonado 

v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006), quoting People v 

Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).]

III. ANALYSIS

A. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION UNDER MCL 211.7s

The General Property Tax Act2provides that “all property, real and personal, within the 

jurisdiction of this state, not expressly exempted, shall be subject to taxation.” MCL 211.1. When

a taxpayer seeks an exemption, that taxpayer has the burden of proving entitlement to it by a 

preponderance of the evidence. ProMed Healthcare v Kalamazoo, 249 Mich App 490, 494-495; 

644 NW2d 47 (2002). Petitioner sought an exemption under MCL 211.7s, which provides:

Houses of public worship, with the land on which they stand, the furniture 

therein and all rights in the pews, and any parsonage owned by a religious society 

of this state and occupied as a parsonage are exempt from taxation under this act. 

Houses of public worship includes buildings or other facilities owned by a religious 

society and used predominantly for religious services or for teaching the religious 

truths and beliefs of the society.

There is no dispute that petitioner is a religious society, and no claim by petitioner that the subject 

property is a parsonage. The issue is whether the tribunal erred in concluding that petitioner had 

not proved that the property was used “predominantly for religious services or for teaching the 

religious truths and beliefs of the society.”

 

2 MCL 211.1a, et seq.
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Petitioner begins by asserting that the tribunal “failed to address” whether its use of the 

property “involved the teaching of its truths and beliefs and instead considered only whether it 

conducted traditional church services at the property.” But the tribunal’s conclusion was that there 

was no evidence that the property was used predominantly to hold any religious services, 

traditional or otherwise. And the tribunal similarly concluded that the property was predominantly 

used for recreational purposes, not for teaching of its religious beliefs. The tribunal expressly 

addressed both points, and rejected petitioner’s arguments. 

Petitioner’s apparent position is that everything it does furthers its mission, and thus must 

be considered either religious services or the teaching of its religious beliefs. While courts are 

cautioned to avoid “unnecessarily intrud[ing] into the affairs of religious organizations,” Institute

in Basic Life Principles, Inc v Watersmeet Twp (After Remand), 217 Mich App 7, 19; 551 NW2d 

199 (1996), that is not to say that courts are not permitted to engage in scrutiny of whether activities

actually occurred. Indeed, MCL 211.7s requires a society seeking a tax exemption to prove that it 

uses otherwise taxable property “predominantly” for religious purposes. Again, tax exemptions 

are to be construed narrowly, Wexford Med Group, 474 Mich at 204, but petitioner’s assertion that 

everything it does must be considered religious teaching or religious services requires the broadest 

possible construction of MCL 211.7s. If such a position were acceptable, the Legislature would 

not have found it necessary to attach any conditions to a religious organization’s ownership of 

property, and would simply have provided that any property owned by a religious organization 

was exempt from taxation. Also, while everything petitioner does may serve its mission, that does

not necessarily mean that everything petitioner does constitutes holding a religious service or 

teaching others about its religious beliefs. For example, engaging in maintenance of its buildings 

may help advance its mission by ensuring that there will be a safe, usable place for its congregants 

to gather, but the maintenance itself is neither a religious service nor teaching about petitioner’s 

belief. MCL 211.7s does not require merely that the use of a property further the mission of a 

religious organization, but instead more specifically requires that the property be predominantly

used to perform religious services or education. 

Here, the record evidence did not support petitioner’s claim that it used the subject property 

predominantly for religious services or the teaching of its religious beliefs, but rather overwhelmingly indicated that petitioner did not predominately use the property at all. Accordingly, 

we agree with the Tax Tribunal that petitioner was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and 

instead that respondent was so entitled. The evidence submitted with the motions showed that the 

property was predominately used by third parties, not petitioner, and appeared to be predominately 

used for recreational and other nonreligious purposes. And because there was evidence of neither 

petitioner’s, nor the third parties’, religious beliefs and truths, even if the third parties’ use of the 

property were primarily for teaching religious beliefs, there was no evidence that those third 

parties’ beliefs were also petitioners’ beliefs.3 The record evidence indicates only that petitioner 

 

3 Petitioner asserts that third-party use of its property is restricted to Christian and nonprofit 

organizations that conform to its specific beliefs, and that any potential renter of the property must 

agree to “respect” those beliefs. However, petitioner effectively conceded that it did not submit 

any evidence of its religious beliefs by arguing that the Tax Tribunal erred by granting respondent 

summary disposition without permitting petitioner to submit such evidence. The time for 
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predominately used the property as a rental venue for other Christian organizations, which itself 

constituted neither conducting religious services nor teaching religious beliefs.

We note that petitioner attached no evidence to show the specific uses to which the subject 

property was put. Fisk’s affidavit stated generally that the property was used for religious 

purposes, but offered no specific examples. The marketing brochure actually supported the 

tribunal’s conclusion that the property served as a primary place for recreation and retreat, because 

it reads much like flier from a secular hotel or vacation venue, speaking of only retreats, recreation, 

rest, and escaping “the busyness” of everyday life. And, contrary to the assertion that the property 

was intended to serve petitioner’s purposes of teaching its religious beliefs, the pamphlet made 

clear that organizations renting The Lodge were responsible for planning the itineraries for the 

events they held.

Respondent, however, submitted evidence of examples of specific, actual uses of the 

property. That evidence showed that the predominant use of the property was by third parties, and 

primarily for activities such as golf, crafts, games, and free time. Petitioner was not defending a 

summary disposition motion, it was the moving party. As such, it had the burden of proving its 

entitlement to the exemption to prevail in its Tax Tribunal appeal, and also of showing its 

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law when it filed its motion for summary disposition. Yet 

petitioner, who was the source of the evidence of the specific uses of the subject property, did not 

attach this evidence to its motion—respondent did while opposing the motion.

Petitioner relies on, Basic Life Principles, 217 Mich App 7, but that reliance is misplaced. 

The issue in Basic Life Principles was whether the taxpayer was a religious society, not whether 

the subject property was used for religious services. The tribunal concluded that it was not a 

religious society because it was not a church, but rather a corporation formed by members of 

several religious denominations intended to give seminars teaching a variety of commonly held 

beliefs; the society itself had no members. Id. at 9-10. This Court reversed, holding that the 

petitioner was a religious society because its “purpose is to teach religious principles,” and noting 

that “nothing within MCL 211.7s . . . requires that a religious society have members.” Id. at 16. 

Here, however, there is no dispute that petitioner is a religious society. Additionally, in Basic Life 

Principles there was “no dispute that the statutory requirement regarding the property being used 

for a religious purpose is satisfied,” id. at 17, whereas here that is precisely the dispute. In Basic 

Life Principles, the property was undisputedly used predominantly for religious services, 

conducting religious seminars, and preparing seminar and other educational materials. Id. at 10. 

But the Tax Tribunal had nevertheless premised its ruling in part on its conclusion that petitioner’s 

use of the property failed to satisfy the statute’s requirements under the so-called quantum-of-use 

test. Id. at 17-18.

 This Court held, however, that application of the quantum-of-use test was not appropriate, 

and that the proper inquiry was whether the statutorily required use of the property was the 

taxpayer’s predominant use. Id. at 19. Here, the quantum-of-use test is not at issue, as the tribunal 

 

petitioner to submit evidence of its beliefs was when it filed its motion for summary disposition, 

but it did not do so. Therefore, any “failure” of the Tax Tribunal to consider such evidence was 

wholly the result of petitioner’s failure to present it.
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analyzed whether the evidence tended to show that petitioner’s predominant use of The Lodge was 

for religious services or teaching its religious beliefs, and reasonably concluded that it was not.

Petitioner argues that the tribunal improperly granted respondent summary disposition 

because there was a question of fact regarding the use of the subject property. On this record, we 

hold not only that the Tax Tribunal correctly concluded that no question of fact existed, but that 

the tribunal correctly recognized that the submitted evidence could only support respondent’s 

position that petitioner was not entitled to the tax exemption. What evidence exists on the record

clearly showed that there was no predominant use, by petitioner or anyone else, of the property for 

religious services or the teaching of petitioner’s beliefs. Instead, the predominant use was rental 

to third parties, who in turn used the property mainly for recreation and relaxation. Again, 

petitioner protests that the tribunal granted respondent summary disposition without giving it the 

opportunity to present evidence of its beliefs, but petitioner in fact had, but passed on, that 

opportunity with its motion for summary disposition. 

The Tax Tribunal properly denied petitioner’s motion for summary disposition, and 

properly granted respondent summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2).

B. LEAVE TO AMEND

MCL 211.7o(1) provides that “[r]eal or personal property owned and occupied by a 

nonprofit charitable institution while occupied by that nonprofit charitable institution solely for 

the purposes for which that nonprofit charitable institution was incorporated is exempt from the 

collection of taxes under this act.” MCL 211.7o(3) extends that exemption to “property owned 

by a nonprofit charitable institution . . . that is leased, loaned, or otherwise made available to 

another nonprofit charitable institution . . . that is occupied by that nonprofit charitable institution

. . . solely for the purposes for which that nonprofit charitable institution . . . was organized . . . .”

MCL 211.7o does not define “charitable institution,” but the Supreme Court has set forth 

a six-factor test to evaluate whether a taxpayer is entitled to an exemption under the statute:

(1) A “charitable institution” must be a nonprofit institution.

(2) A “charitable institution” is one that is organized chiefly, if not solely, 

for charity.

(3) A “charitable institution” does not offer its charity on a discriminatory 

basis by choosing who, among the group it purports to serve, deserves the services. 

Rather, a “charitable institution” serves any person who needs the particular type 

of charity being offered.

(4) A “charitable institution” brings people’s minds or hearts under the

influence of education or religion; relieves people’s bodies from disease, suffering, 

or constraint; assists people to establish themselves for life; erects or maintains 

public buildings or works; or otherwise lessens the burdens of government.
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(5) A “charitable institution” can charge for its services as long as the 

charges are not more than what is needed for its successful maintenance.

(6) A “charitable institution” need not meet any monetary threshold of 

charity to merit the charitable institution exemption; rather, if the overall nature of

the institution is charitable, it is a “charitable institution” regardless of how much 

money it devotes to charitable activities in a particular year. [Wexford Med Group, 

474 Mich at 215.]

After the Tax Tribunal denied petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and granted it 

to respondent, petitioner sought in its motion for reconsideration for leave to amend its pleadings 

to alternatively claim that it was entitled to the tax exemption under MCL 211.7o(3).

MCR 2.116(I)(5)4provides that a court should allow amendment unless the evidence 

existing before the court at the time amendment is sought shows there is no justification to do so. 

“An amendment, however, would not be justified if it would be futile.” Ormsby, 471 Mich at 53. 

Further, courts should deny leave to amend when there is undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive 

on the movant’s part, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or where amendment would be futile. 

VHS of Mich, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 337 Mich App 360, 373; 976 NW2d 109 (2021).

The Tax Tribunal denied leave to amend, concluding that “[p]etitioner had ample

opportunity to appeal an exemption denial under MCL 211.7o(3) in its Motion for Summary 

Disposition or by amending its petition at any point prior to the rendering of the Tribunal’s decision 

and only sought relief for denial under MCL 211.7s.” The tribunal properly concluded that 

petitioner could have raised this issue at any time before the entry of the final order. As respondent 

argues, two years had passed since petitioner initiated the Tax Tribunal appeal, discovery was over, 

prehearing statements were exchanged, the parties briefed the issues in connection with 

petitioner’s summary disposition motion, and the tribunal issued a final order and judgment. 

Petitioner’s position that the evidence already of record supported it receiving a tax exemption 

effectively concedes that petitioner was dilatory about invoking MCL 211.7o(3). Petitioner on 

appeal does not offer, and the record does not bring to light, any reason why petitioner could not 

have raised this issue in its original petition, with its summary disposition motion, or in a motion 

for leave to amend filed at before the tribunal issued its decision. Accordingly, the tribunal’s 

denial of the motion to amend was appropriate in light of petitioner’s “undue delay” in the matter. 

See VHS of Mich, 337 Mich App at 373.

 

4 Petitioner cites MCR 2.118(C)(1) as the basis for seeking leave to amend, but that rule does not 

directly apply, because it operates in connection with issues not appearing in the pleadings that are 

nevertheless raised and litigated at trial, and there was no trial here. But under MCR 2.116(I)(5), 

where, as here, a summary disposition motion is filed under Subrules (C)(8), (C)(9), or (C)(10), a 

trial court “shall give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings as provided by MCR 

2.118, unless the evidence then before the court shows that amendment would not be justified.”
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On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the Tax Tribunal did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied petitioner leave to amend its petition.

C. PETITIONER’S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM

Petitioner’s final argument is that respondent and the Tax Tribunal violated its equalprotection rights under the Michigan and United States Constitutions when they denied petitioner 

its requested tax exemption. However, petitioner did not raise this issue in the Tax Tribunal, 

leaving it unpreserved. See Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227; 964 NW2d 809 

(2020). The failure to preserve an issue forfeits appellate review. Napier v Jacobs, 429 Mich 222, 

227-228; 414 NW2d 862 (1987). See also Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, 

LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 359090); slip op at 5 (“Lest 

there be further confusion on this point, we hold that the plain-error rule . . . does not apply to civil 

cases and it is error to do so as it contradicts established Supreme Court precedent, which 

controls.”); slip op at 5.

Additionally, the section of petitioner’s brief relating to this issue presents no pertinent 

facts, argument, or analysis. Instead, petitioner sets forth only the conclusory assertion that its 

rights were violated, with brief discussion of the legal authority underlying the argument, and no 

further discussion, analysis, or even conclusion. It is well-established that a party may not

“ ‘simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover 

and rationalize the basis for his claims,’ ” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 

(1998), quoting Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). That, however, is 

precisely what petitioner has done with respect to this issue. Because petitioner did not preserve 

this issue, and did not adequately brief it on appeal, we decline to address it.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado