“ T h e Su pr eme Cour t ma y , a t i t s di s cr et i on , a n s we r qu es t i on s of l aw ce r t i f i ed t o i t by t h e Su pr eme Cour t of 1

t he U ni t ed St at es , a Court of Ap peal s of t he U ni t ed St at es , a D i s t r i ct C our t of t he U ni t ed St at es i n T enn es s ee, or a U ni t ed Stat es B ankruptcy C o urt i n T enness ee. T hi s rul e m ay b e i nvo ked when t h e c e rtifyi n g c o urt de t erm i nes t hat
, i n a p ro c e e d ing b e fo re it , t h e re a re q u e stio n s o f la w o f this state w h ic h w ill b e d e te rm ina tive o f the c a u se a n d a s to w h ic h it

a p p e a rs to the c e rtifyi n g c o u rt the re is no c o n tro lli n g p re c e d e n t i n the d e c isio n s o f t h e S u p re m e C o u rt o f T e n n e sse e .” T en n

. Su p. Ct

. R. 23, § 1.



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Ja nuary 200 5 S es sio n

CAROLYN CURTIS v . G. E. CAPITAL MO DULAR SPACE, ET AL.

Rule 23 Cer tified Q uestion of Law United States Distr ict Court for the Eastern Distr ict of Tenn essee No. 2:04-C V-44 J. Ronnie G ree r, Judge

No. M2004- 01304-SC-R23- CQ - F iled Fe bruary 18, 2005

Pursuant t o R u l e 2 3 o f t he Supreme Court of Tenne ssee, this Court acce pted ce rtification of the 1 following two questions from the United States District Court for the Easte rn District of Te nnessee , at Gre eneville:

(1 ) I n a n a c tio n ins titute d a g a ins t a n e mpl oy e r for worke rs ’

compensation benef

its and in which the employ er f iles an answe r or
ame n d e d a n s w e r

n a mi n g a th ir d p ar ty

a s h a v in g c a u s e d a ll o r

a part of the plaintiff’ s injuries, does Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 20- 1-119 extend the limit ation period and allow the filing of an a mended complaint ag ainst the third party named by the employ er a nd/or other persons na med as tortfe asors(s) by the third party

in its answer?

I n the eve nt the first question is answer ed in the af firmative, then the second que stion is pos ed:

(2) In Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 20-1-119(a ), does the term “applica ble statute of limit ations” appea ring in the phrase “or na med in an amende d complaint fi led within the applicable statute of limit ations” re fer

to the one y ear limit ation period for persona l injury only or to t h e limitation period as extended by the ninety -day “w i ndow” pr ovided by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 20-1- 119(a) ?T ho ugh n ot r el ev an t t o t h e i s s u es pr es en t l y bef or e u s , we k n ow of n o au t h or i t y wh i ch wou l d al l ow t he 2

de fe n da n t e mp l oy e r , T RW
, t o a s s e r t t h i r d pa r t y f a u l t a s a n a f f i r ma t i v e de fe n s e i n a w or k e r s ’ c om pe n s a t i on a c t i on

. As wi l l be di s cus s ed i nf

r a, f aul t i s not an i s s ue i n a wor ker s ’ comp ens at i on ac t i on, an d t hi r d part y f aul t ca nn ot be as s er t ed
to o ff -se t an e m p lo ye r’s w o rk e rs ’ co m p e n sa tio n li a b ili ty. C o n se q u e n tly, it a p p e a rs tha t t h e c irc u it c o u rt im p ro v id e n tly
g ra n te d p e rm issio n a llo w ing T R W to a m e n d it s o rig ina l an sw e r in this re sp e c t.

-2- As to the first question, we answe r in the neg ative. We hold that because Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 20-1- 119 ap p l i es only to case s in which compar ative fault is or becomes a n issue, and beca use worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits are awa rded w ithout re g ard to fa

ult, section 20-1-119 may not be invoked as authority to amen d a complaint in a wor kers’ compensation action to include a

c la im a g a ins t a

thi rdpa rt y tortf e a so r that wo uld oth e rw ise be tim e -b arr e d. B e c a us e ou r ans we r t o this first question render s the second que stion moot , we do not addr ess it at this ti me.

Tenn. S up. Ct. R. 23 Cer tified Q uestion of Law

W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III
, C.J
., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J J ., joined.

Ric h a r d M. Cur ri e , Jr. , K ing sp ort, T e nn e sse e , f or the de fe nd a nt/

pe tit ion e r, B e nn e tt T ru c k T rans po rt , I nc.
Mark S. Stapleton, Roge rsville, Tenne ssee, an d W

. L ew is J enkins, J r., Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, f or the plaint if

f/ re sp on de nt, Caro ly n Cu rt is.

J . Randolph Bibb, J r. , Nashvil le, Tenne ssee, f or the de fenda nt/respondent G. E. Capital Modular Space.

OP IN ION

Fa ctual and Proc edura l Ba ckg round

T h i s m a t t e r

ar i s e s f r o ma n a c t i o n f

o r w o rk e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s

. T h e p l a i n t i f

f
, C ar o l yn Curtis , an e mpl oy e e of

TRW, I nc . ( “ TRW” ) i n Ro g e rs vil le , T e nn e sse e , tripp e d a ndfe ll w hil e walking acr oss the TRW parking lot on Fe bruary 27, 2002. Curtis appar ently tripped over a metal sp ike or ro d th a t ha d b e e n le ft

ly ing on the lot . J us t short of a y e ar l a te r, on F e br

ua ry 11 , 2 00 3, Curtis filed a c omplaint in Hawkins Count y Circuit Court seeking worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits for the injuries she sustained fr om the fall. TRW filed an answe r to the complaint on April 22, 2003, and then filed a n am en d ed an s we r o n J une 13, 2003, in which it alleg ed for the first time that a third party , G. E. Capital Modu l ar S p ac e (“G.E.”), ha d cre ated the ha zard on TRW’s property causing Curtis ’s fa ll a ndinj urie s. 2-3-

On J uly 8, 2003, twenty -five day s after TRW fil ed its amende d answe r and more than one y ear afte r C urtis sustained her injury
, Curtis filed an amende d complaint alleg ing neg lige nce on the pa rt of G. E. in l e a vin g the sp ike or ro d o n T RW’ s p arking lot . G .E . th e re a ft er file d a mot ion to dismiss on the g rounds that the ac tion ag ainst it w as t i m e- barr ed by the applica

ble statute of limit ations. Howeve r, in response , Curtis cited to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 20-1-119 (1994) a s a u th o r it y

a ll o w in g f

o r s u c h a n a me n d me n t. A c c o r d in g to Cu r ti s , s e c ti o n 2 0 -1-119 provided a

ninety -day

period following the filing of TRW’s answ e r d u rin g which Curtis could amend her origina l complaint to add parties alleg ed by TRW to have been responsible for he r injury . G.E.’s motion to di smiss was subsequently denied, a nd on September 30, 2003, G .E. filed an answe r alleg ing that another pa

rty , Be nnett Truck T ransport, I nc. (“ Be nnett”), w as solely responsible for

the de liv e ry , p la c e me nt andre mov a l of the ob je c t on TR W ’s lot wh ic h h a d c a us e d Cu rt is’ s f a ll. Th e re fo re , G .E . a sse rt e d in its a ns we r that B e nn e tt w a s r e sp on sib le fo r C urtis ’s inj urie s.

Curtis then filed a sec ond amende d complaint on October 22, 2003, in which she a lleg ed lia bil it y aga ins t B e nn e tt f

or ne g lig e ntl y

faili ng to r e mov e the sp ike or ro d f ro m th e pa

rking lot

. Be nnett, in turn, responde d by filing a motion to dismiss, arg uing that the claim was ba rre d by the statute of limitations. C urtis ag ain ar g ued that ame nding the complaint to add B ennett as a def endant

wa s app ro pria te un de r se c tio n 20 -1 -1 19

. Me a nw hil e , the c la im fo r w or ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts

a g a ins t T RW wa s se ttl e d, le a vin g on ly the c la ims a g a ins t G .E . a ndB e nn e tt t o b e re so lve d. At thi s point, based upon fe dera l diversity juris diction, G.E. and B ennett had the case remove d from Hawkins County Circuit Court to U nited States District Court f or the Eastern District of Tenne ssee. With the c a se no w b e fo re the Un ite d St a te s D ist ri c t Co urt, b othG. E. a nd B e nn e tt h a ve re ne we d th e ir arg ument that the claims ag ainst them are time-barr ed. I n response , Curtis a g ain cites to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 20-1-119 a s providing a ninety -day

“win d o w” fo llowing the f iling of the defe ndants’ ame nded answ ers during w hi ch a co mplaint may be prope rly

amende d to include

a d d i t i o n a l c l a i m s a g a i n s tt h i r d p ar t i e s , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a n y s t a t u t o r y t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s t o t h e c o n tr ar y. To resolve this iss ue, the United States District Court, upon a joint motion byCurtis and Be nnett and pu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt Rul e 23 , c e rt if

ie d to thi s Co urt the qu e sti on s dis c us se d h e re in

conce rning the application of Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 20-1-119 (1994).

AN AL YSI S

I . First Certifie d Question

Tennessee Code Annotated sec tion 20-1-119

I n 1992, Tenne ssee a dopted a sy stem of comparative fault to be uti liz ed in t ort litigation. See McI ntyre v. B alentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992). Among the seve ral re asons cited f or adopting this approac h, this Court i n McI n t y re s t ated that “fairne ss and ef ficienc y require that defe ndants ca lled upon to answer alleg ations in neg lige nce be permitted to alleg e, as a n aff irmative defe nse, that a nonpa

rty cause d or contributed to the injury or damag e for which re covery

is sought.” I d. at 58. I n 1993, in response to the decision i n McI nty re, the Gene ral Asse mbly

enac ted Tenne ssee-4-

Code Annotated se ctio n 2 0-1-119 ( 1994) to provide a means whe reby

a plaintiff c ould amend a comp laint to add as a de fenda nt any third party

alleg ed by

another defe ndant to have c aused or

c on tr ibu te d to the inj ury , e ve n if the app lic able statut e of lim itatio ns wo uldoth e rw ise ba r the c la im ag ainst the third party

. 1993 Tenn. P ub. Acts ch. 407, § 1; see Brow n v. Wal-Mart Disc. Cities, 12 S.W .3d 785, 788 (Tenn. 2000) ; Owens v. Tr uckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Te nn. 1996). Spe c if ic a lly , s e c tio n 2 0- 1- 11 9 p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art :
(a) I n civil actions wher e compa rative f ault i s o r b ecome s an issue, if a de fenda nt named in an orig inal complaint initiating a suit filed within the applica ble statute of limit ations, or named in a n amende d complaint filed within the applica ble statute of limit ations, alleg es in an a nswer or amende d an s we r to the orig inal or ame nded complaint that a per son not a party to the s uit cause d or contributed to the injury or damag e for

which the plaintiff seeks recove ry , and if the pla intiff’s cause or c auses of ac tion ag ainst such per son would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations but for the ope ration of this section, the plaintiff may , within ninety (90) day s of the filing of the first answe r or f

irst amended answer a lleg ing suc h person’ s fault, either : (1 ) A me ndthe c omp la int

to a dd su c h pe rs on a s a def e nd a nt pur su a nt t o Ru le 15 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure and ca use proc ess to be issued for that person; or (2) Institut e a se parate ac tion ag ainst that person by filing a summons and

c omp la int . I f the plaint if

f e le c ts t o p ro c e e d un der th is s e c tio n b y fi lin g a se pa rate action, the c omplaint so filed sha ll not be considere d an “orig inal complaint initiating the suit” or “an amende d complaint” for purposes of this subsec tion. (b) A cause of ac tion broug ht within ninety(90) day s pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be barr ed by any statute of limit ations. This se ction shall not ext end any applicable statute of re pose, nor sha ll this section permit the plaintiff to maintain an action aga i n s ta p er s o n wh en s u ch an ac tion is barred by an applica

ble statute of repose. (c) Thi s s ec t i o n shall neither shorte n nor leng then the applica ble statute of limit ations for a ny

cause of ac tion, other than as pr ovided in subsection (a ).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20- 1-119 (1994) (empha sis added).

Interpretation and Application of Section 20-1-119

Wit h these provisions of section 20-1-119 in mind, the first question ce rtified to this Court require s us to determine whe ther this statute provides a ny authority under w hich a c omplaint seeking

wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts m a y be a me nd e d in or de r t o a ddpo te nti a l th ir d p art y tortf e a so rs

. I n con s t rui ng statutes, we f irst look to the langua g e of the statute itself, kee ping in mind that the pr o p e r r o l e o f t h e C o u r ti s “ t o a s c e r t a i n a n d g i v e e f f e c tt o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n tw i t h o u tu n du ly restric ting or

expanding a

statute’s cove rag e bey ond its int ended sc o p e. ” Owens v. State, 908 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). To this end, we are restric ted t o apply ing the natura l and ordinary meaning of the lang uag e used. B rowde r v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998). When the lang uag e of the statute is plain, clear and unambig uous, the leg islative intent must be derived from-5-

the statute’s fa ce. See Bry ant v. Genc o Stamping & M fg

. Co., 33 S.W .3d 761, 765 (Tenn. 2000)

. Th e re fo re , c ou rt s mus t fo llo w the natur a l a nd or din ary me a nin g of a statut e un le ss an amb igu ity require s resort e lsewher e for clarification. I d.

By its plain terms, Te nnessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 applies only to civil cases in which “c omparative fault is or bec omes an issue.” This nece ssarily leads us to inquire whethe r compar ative fault is, or can eve r bec ome, an issue in a w orker s’ compensation action.

W or k e rs’ Com

pe ns ati on Cla im s a nd

Com pa ra tiv e Fa ult

Th e ri g ht t o w or

ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n be ne fi ts is a un iqu e c on c e pt in the la w, de ri ve d s ole ly from statutory

provisions r ather than from the common law. See 99 C.J.S

. W orkers’ Compe nsation § 23 (2004). The primar y p u rp o s e of worker s’ compensation is t o aff ord bene fits for job-re lated injuries reg ardle ss of fault. Woods v. Har ry B. W oods Plumbi ng Co., 967 S.W .2d 768, 772 (Tenn. 1998); see a lso Te nn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103 (1999). Ba sed upon a mutual renunc iation of common law rig hts and defe nses, see Woods, 967 S .W.2d at 772, the s y stem operates to provide quick a nd

e ff ic ie nt c omp e ns a tio n to inj ur e d wo rk e rs in e xch a ng e fo r imm un izin g e mpl oy e rs fr om t ort li abil ity and limiting their damag es. See, e .g ., Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W .2d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1996) (discussing the under ly ing policy of t he workers’ compensation sy stem); see also Tenn. Code An n. § 5 0- 6- 10 8( a ) ( 19 99 ) ( pr ov idi ng that th e ri g ht t o r e c e ive wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts “ sh a ll exclude all other rig hts and re m ed i es” of the injured e mploy ee) ; Sny der v. LTG L ufttechnische GmbH , 9 55 S.W. 2d25 2, 25 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) (n oti ng that “ the e mpl oy e r i s im mun e fr om t ort li abil ity under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-108( a).” ).

I n Ridin g s , a n e mp lo y e e s u s tain e d o n

- th e

- jo b in ju r ie s w h e n h e f

e ll f r o m a la d d e r

. 9 14 S.W. 2da t 80 . T he e mpl oy e e the n f ile d s uit a g a ins t th e ma nu fa c tur e r o f the la dd e r, a lle g ing lia bil ity based on the ories of ne g lige nce, g ross neg lige nce and strict liability . L ater , the de fendant manufa cture r soug ht leave to a mend its origina l answer to alleg e, as an aff

irmative def

ense, that the plaintiff’s employ er w as neg lige nt. The trial court denied this re quest. I n later revie wing the issue on appea l, this C ourt held t h at a d ef en d ant in a tort ac tion could not assert fault on the part of the plaintiff’s employ er as an af firmative de fense . Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 82. Basing our dec ision upon the principles of compar ative fault as announce d in McI ntyre, w e stated that “fault may be attributed only to tho s e p er s o n s against whom the plaintiff ha s a cause of a ction in tort.” I d. at 81. Recog nizi ng that employ ers are immune f rom tort liability for job-related injuries, we rea soned that “[s] ince t h e plaintiff’ s employ er c annot be made a party to the plaintiff’s tort ac tion for per sonal inj urie s su sta ine d in the c ou rs e a nd sc op e of his e mpl oyme nt, the ratio na le of Mc I nty re , b otha s to principle and proce dure, w ill not permit fault to be attributed to the plaintiff’s e mploy er.” I d. at 82. I n further analy zing the employ er/e mploy ee r elationship, we stated that “[t] he duty owed a worke r by the employ er is not measure d by the standar d of ca

re a pplicable in ac tions based on neg lige nce
or stric t li abil ity .” I d. a t 83. Th e ho ldi ng in Ridi ng s wa s lat e r re a ff ir me d in Sny de r, in w hic h w e a lso stated that in worke rs’ c ompensation case s “liability [i s] imposed upon the employ er w ithout reg ard to the employ er’ s neg lige nce .” Sny der, 955 S.W.2d at 255.T h e empl oy er ’ s s u b r o g a t i o n i n t e r e s t i s f u r t h er pr ot ec t ed by T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 50- 6- 112( d) ( 2) 3
(19 9 9 ) whi ch pro vi d es t hat i f an i njured wo rker f ai l s t o bri ng an act i o n agai nst t he t hi rd part y t o rt feasor wi t hi n one y ear, t he wo rker’ s cause o f act i o n i s ass i gned t o t he em p l o y er and wo rkers ’ co m p ensat i o n carri er who t hen have si x m o nt hs
t o co m m ence t he act i o n. See als o C rai g v. R

. R

. St. & C o

. , 79 4 S.W

. 2 d 35 1
, 35 8 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 9 0 ).

-6- The ba sic premise of the holdings in both Ridings and Sny der was that a def endant in a tort action could not alleg e, as an aff irmative defe nse, compar ative fault on the part of a nonpa rty who was immune fr om tort liabili ty . Howeve r, we should note at this juncture th at t h i s rea soning w as lat er abro gate d in larg e pa rt by Carr oll v. Whit ne y , 2 9 S. W.3 d 1 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . In Ca rr oll , th is Cou rt he ld that a

jury in a me dic a l malp ra c tic e c a se c ou ld al loc a te fa ult to phy sic ia ns wh o, a s st a te emplo y ee s , we re i m m u ne fr om suit. I d. at 19. Howe ver, w e also re cog nized in C arr oll that the worke rs’ c ompensation sy stem was distinctly differ ent from tra ditional t o rt l aw. I d. at 20. Th e re fo re , w e no te d th a t Rid ing s and Sny de r w e re no t ov e rr ule d, “ [r]a the r, the y

re ma in u niq ue ly applicable with reg ard to the allocation of fault to e mploy ers in wor kers c ompensation ca ses.” I d.

a t 19 . F urthe r, we no te d th a t th e iss ue of a n e mpl oy e r’ s li abil ity in a wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n c a se is “g overne d exclusivelyby the [Tennessee ] W orker s’ Compensation L aw.” I d.

L ooking to the T ennesse e Workers’ Compensation L aw, se e Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-101 to -705 (1999), w e fi n d fu rt her support for the pr oposition t hat fault play s no part in assig ning liabilityfor wor

kers’ compensation benefits. For instance, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6- 103(a) (1999) pr ovides that “[e]very employ er and employ ee subject to the Workers’ Compensation L aw sha ll, respec tively , pay and ac cept c ompensation for pe rsonal injury or death by

acc ident arising out of and in the c ourse of employ ment without reg ard to fa ult as a ca u s e o f t h e injury or death.” (empha sis added). A lso, Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-111 ( 1999) specific ally bars a n
e mpl oy e r f

ro m a ssert in g n eglig e nc e on the pa rt of a n e mpl oy e e a s a

de fe ns e to a

wo rk e rs ’

c omp e ns a tio n c la im. F urthe rm or e , T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 11 2( a ) ( 19 99 ) s ta te s:

Whe n th e inj ury

or de a th f or wh ic h c omp e ns ati on is p a y able un de r the Wor ke rs ’ Compe ns a tio n L a w w a s c a us e d u nd e r c ir c ums ta nc e s c re a tin g a le g a l li abil ity a g a ins t

som e person other

than the employ er to pa y damag es, the injured w orker , or such injured wo rk er ’s dependents, shall have the rig ht to take compensation under such law, and such injured worke r, or those to w hom suc h injured worke r’s rig ht of ac tion survives at law, may pursue such injured worker’s or their re medy by proper action in a court of compete nt jurisdiction against such other per son. (emphasis adde d).

We wish to emphasize that, as the fore g oing statut o ry provision makes cle ar, a n injured

e mpl oy e e wh o is a wa

rd e d wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n be ne fi ts do e s no t r e lin qu ishhis or he r rig ht t o a lso pur s u e to r t c laim s a g a in s t th ir d p ar ti e s

. I n f a c t, a n e mp lo y e e may

s e e k w o rk e r s ’ c o mp e n sation benef its and simult aneously file sui t ag ainst a third party tortfea sor. I f the e mploy ee suc cee ds in an action ag ainst a third party , the employ er is then entitled to a subrog ation lien ag ainst the employ ee’ s
re c ov e ry . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 0- 6- 11 2( c ) ( 19 99 ); Carr oll , 2 9 S.W .3 d at 19

. Ne ve rthe le ss, 3 althoug h the worke rs’ c ompensation claims and tort c laims may arise f rom one inj ury , involve the

sa me plaint if

f andpr oc e e d s imu lta ne ou sly , th e y ma y no t b e c omb ine d in to o ne la ws uit . T o d o s o-7-

w o u ld c o n f

u s e th e f a u lt

- b a s e d li ab il it y o f to r t w ith th e s tatu to r il y imp o s e d “ n o f a u lt ” li ab il ity of

wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n. Th e jus tif ic a tio ns fo r imp os ing lia

bil ity up on a n e mpl oy e r are ent ir e ly separ ate a nd distinct from those supporting imposition of lia b i l i t y u p o n a third party tortfea sor. Acc ording ly , an employ er c annot allocate fault to a third party and neither may an employ ee c ombine worke rs’ c ompensation and tort cla ims in one a ction. I n these instances, fault may not be compar ed and appor tioned betwee n the employ er a nd tortfea sor, and a ny such claims must be broug ht in two separ ate a ctions. See Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 8 4 (noting that “the plaintiff’ s rig ht to recove r on alleg ations of [tort li ability ] . . . i s determined w ithout refer ence to the employ er’ s conduct” ).

As previo u s l y n oted, the wor kers’ compensation sy stem is purely a cr eatur e of statutory construct, with the rights a nd responsibilities of t h e p ar t i es being de rived solely from the statutes themselves. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. I ns. Co. v. St evenson, 368 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tenn. 1963) (d isc us sin g in g e ne ra l the pu re ly statut ory natur e of wo rk e rs ’ co mpe ns a tio n la w a ndno tin g that it is a “ c ompl ete su bs titute fo r p re vio us re me die s in tort on the pa rt of a n e mpl oy e e ” ). Wha t is appar ent from these afor ementioned statutes, both fr om the ir plain lang uag e and from prior c ase la w int e rp re ta tio ns , is that th e iss ue of fa ult play s n o p art

wh a tso e ve r i n a sse ssi ng lia bil ity fo r a wo rk e rs ’ compensation claim. I n fac t, one of the primary purposes of the Tenne ssee Worker s’ Compensation Act i s t o “a fford worker s compensation for job-related injuries re g ardle ss of fault.” Woods, 967 S.W .2d at 772. Simpl y put, the i ssue of fault never enters the picture in a worke rs’ c ompensation

case . Consequently , an employ er ma y not assert third party

fault as a n aff

irmati v e d ef

ense to a worke rs’ c ompensation claim. As a c orollary , an employ ee m ay not rely upon Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 20-1-119, whic h by its plain terms a

pplies only

to case s in which “c omparative fault is or bec omes an issue,” as support for a mending a wor kers’ compensation complaint to include

c la ims a g a ins t po te nti a l th ir d p art y tortf e a so rs

.

I I . Second Certifie d Question

Our a nswer to the first certified question eff ectively resolves the issues presently befor e the

certify ing c ourt, there fore , we ne ed not addr ess the sec ond question at this tim e.

CO NC LU SION

For the re asons set forth above, the f irst q u es t i o n certified to this C ourt is answer ed in the neg ative. We hold that in an ac t ion insti tuted ag ainst an employ er f or worke rs’ c ompensation benef its and in which t h e employ er f iles an answe r or a mended a nswer naming a third party

as having cause d all or a part of the plaintiff’s injuries, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 20-1-119 is inapplicable a nd does not extend the limi tation period to allow for the fili n g o f an a mended complaint ag ainst the third party named by the employ er and/or other persons named as tortfe asors by the third party

in its answer.-8-

The c lerk shall tra nsmit t his opinion in acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 23, section 8. Costs in thi s Court are ta x ed to the plaintiff/re spondent, Caroly n Curtis.

_______________________________ WI LL I AM M. B AR KE R, JUS TI CE