IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

PATRICIA A. GLASS-HILL,

 

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DONALD L. GORDON and

STATE FARM MUTUAL 

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, a foreign corporation,

 

 Defendants. 

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) C.A. No. N21C-11-204 SPL

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Submitted: June 20, 2023

Decided: August 14, 2023

Upon Defendant Donald L. Gordon’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTED.

Upon Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIED.

ORDER

This 14

th day of August, 2023, upon consideration of Defendant State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) Motion for Summary 

Judgment,1 Defendant Donald L. Gordon’s (“Gordon”) Motion for Summary 

1 D.I. 22. 
2

Judgment,2 Patricia Glass-Hill’s (“Glass-Hill”) responses,3and oral argument,4it 

appears to the Court that:

BACKGROUND

1. On the evening of October 21, 2020, Glass-Hill drove northbound on 

Philadelphia Pike, passed through the intersection with Darley Road, then slowed to 

a stop and signaled her intent to turn left into the Church of the Ascension parking 

lot.

5 While Glass-Hill stopped to “wait for clear traffic,” a truck stopped opposite 

her in the left lane of southbound Philadelphia Pike, and its driver “waved her on.”6 

Meanwhile, Gordon, returning home from work in New Jersey, exited Interstate 495 

southbound onto southbound Philadelphia Pike.7 After turning onto Philadelphia 

Pike, Gordon positioned his vehicle in the right lane because “there was a truck in 

the left hand lane impeding traffic.”8 Glass-Hill explained that she “made the left 

turn . . . because the gentleman in the white truck told [her] to go ahead.”9 As Gordon 

passed the stopped truck, “it was almost as if the person whomever was in the green

2 D.I. 23.

3 D.I. 25, 26.

4 D.I. 30.

5 Gordon Mot. Summ. J., (D.I. 23), Ex. A at 13, 96.

6

Id. at 13. 

7 Gordon Mot. Summ. J., Ex. B at 12-15.

8

Id. at 16.

9 Gordon Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A at 16.
3

pickup was sending somebody across in an immediate danger zone.”10 Gordon 

struck Glass-Hill as she turned left in front of his vehicle.11 The “waving driver” of 

the pickup truck, identified only as a white male,12 did not remain at the collision 

scene.13

2. A Delaware State Police officer responded to the collision scene and, 

following his investigation, concluded that Glass-Hill failed to yield the right of way 

to Gordon.14 The officer issued Glass-Hill a citation for failing to yield the right of 

way, and she subsequently admitted guilt to the charge by submitting payment to the 

Voluntary Assessment Center.

15

3. On November 24, 2021, Glass-Hill filed a complaint alleging 

negligence on the part of Gordon and the unidentified motorist who waved her to 

proceed.16 At the time of the accident, Glass-Hill maintained uninsured motorist 

coverage through State Farm; thus, State Farm sits in the position of the unidentified 

10 Gordon. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B at 20.

11 Id. at 21-22; Gordon Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 20.

12 Id. at 104.

13 Id. at 33.

14 Gordon Mot. Summ. J., Ex. C at 14 - 15.

15 Gordon Mot. Summ. J., Ex. D.

16 D.I. 1.
4

driver of the truck. On February 10, 2023, Gordon and State Farm filed motions for 

summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

4. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56, summary judgment will be granted 

where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”17 

On a motion for summary judgment, this Court “(i) construes the record in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party; (ii) detects, but does not decide, genuine 

issues of material fact; and (iii) denies the motion if a material fact is in dispute.”18

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts 

support claims or defenses.19 If the motion is properly supported, then the burden 

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact 

for the resolution by the ultimate fact-finder.20

17 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).

18 US Dominion, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2023 WL 2730567, at *17 (Del. 

Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2023) (quoting CVR Refin., LP v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 2021 

WL 5492671, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2021) (cleaned up)).

19 Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1970) (citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 

180 A.2d 467 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962)).

20 See Brzoska v. Olsen, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
5

ANALYSIS

A. Gordon’s Motion for Summary Judgment

5. Gordon argues that “there are no facts which demonstrate that [he] was 

the proximate cause of the motor vehicle accident or was negligent in any way 

thereby causing [Glass-Hill’s] injuries.”21 Further, Gordon asserts that Glass-Hill

“understood she had to yield the right of way to oncoming traffic[,] . . . [and] [h]er 

failure to observe [Gordon] [did] not negate her duty to yield to his right of way.”22 

Finally, Gordon contends that Glass-Hill’s “guilty plea of the citation is an 

admission that she failed to yield the right of way thereby causing this motor vehicle 

accident.”23

6. Glass-Hill responds that “Gordon was negligent by failing to maintain 

a proper lookout, operating his vehicle in a careless manner, failure [sic] to control 

the speed of his vehicle, and failing to operate his vehicle with due regard for road 

and traffic conditions then existing.”24 She posits that Gordon took no “precautions 

due to the stopped vehicle in the left turn lane of southbound Philadelphia Pike.”25 

And, Glass-Hill argues that her “payment of the voluntary assessment . . . does not 

21 Gordon Mot. Summ. J. at ¶ 7.

22 Id. at ¶ 8.

23 Id. at ¶ 9. 

24 Glass-Hill Resp. Gordon Mot. Summ. J., (D.I. 26), at 2, ¶ 2 (citing Compl. at ¶ 6).

25 Id. at 3-4, ¶ 6
6

conclusively establish her negligence as the sole proximate cause of the accident.”

26

 

Rather, she posits that “whether [her] payment of a voluntary assessment constitutes 

an admission of guilt is an issue of fact for the trial.”27

7. “In order to prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s negligent act or omission breached

a duty of care owed to plaintiff in a way that proximately caused the plaintiff 

injury.”28 “If the defendant establishes that [he] owed no duty to the plaintiff, [he] 

is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.”29 “Delaware tort law has long 

imposed a duty on motorists to use reasonable care, drive at a reasonable rate of 

speed under the circumstances, and slow or stop to avoid imminent danger, 

regardless of the posted speed limit. Motorists, however, need not slow down in 

anticipation of danger that has not yet become apparent.”30 While issues of 

negligence are generally not decided in summary judgment, “this does not mean that 

26 Id.at 4, ¶ 7. 

27 Id.

28 Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Co-op., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 828 (Del. 1995) (citing 

Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1096-97 (Del. 1991)). 

29 Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue, LLC, 107 A.3d 1074, 1078 (Del. 2014). 

30 Hudson v. Old Guard Ins. Co., 3 A.3d 246, 251 (Del. 2010) (cleaned up). 
7

summary judgment is never appropriate in negligence actions.”31 Such is the case 

here.

8. Glass-Hill asserts that, despite Gordon’s awareness of a vehicle stopped 

ahead of him, he “continued to travel at 30 to 35 mph and did not take any further 

precautions to determine if it was safe to proceed past the vehicle stopped in the lefthand southbound lane.”32

 She contends that “[t]here are questions of fact as to 

whether Gordon’s failure to take any precautions as he approached the stopped 

traffic in the left-hand southbound lane of Philadelphia Pike was negligent and 

whether this negligence was a proximate cause motor vehicle accident.”33 Viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to Glass-Hill, the Court concludes that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact.

9. Individuals, such as Gordon, are responsible for “reasonably 

foreseeable events,” and, in cases where an unforeseeable event occurs, such as 

where a child darts into traffic, “Delaware applies the common law rule that no one 

has a duty to anticipate another’s negligence.”34 There is no reason to deviate from 

this rule here. Gordon traveled within his lane and within the speed limit, and Glass31 Gibson v. Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 2017 WL 

5606714, at *2 (cleaned up).

32 Glass-Hill Resp. Gordon Mot. Summ. J. at 5, ¶ 8.

33 Id. at 6, ¶12.

34 Hudson, 3 A.3d at 250.
8

Hill unexpectedly turned into his path of travel. “Motorists . . . need not slow down 

in anticipation of danger that has not yet become apparent.”35 The Court declines to 

accept Glass-Hill’s invitation to impose an enhanced duty upon drivers to reduce 

speed and take “further precautions” when passing a stopped vehicle on a multi-lane 

roadway under the circumstances described here.

10. Duty is measured in terms of reasonableness and is equated to the

conduct of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.36 Whether a 

defendant is “under a legal obligation - a duty - to protect the plaintiff from the risk 

of harm which caused [her] injuries ... is entirely a question of law” for the court to 

determine.37 Here, Gordon’s conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person under 

the circumstances, and he had no reason to expect Glass-Hill, or any other motorist, 

would cross his lane of travel. There is no evidence that Gordon failed to exercise 

due care or drove at an unreasonable speed. Accordingly, Gordon’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment is granted.

38

35 Id. at 251.

36 McLaughlin v. Dover Downs, Inc., 2008 WL 2943392, at *12 (Del. Super. Ct. July 

17, 2008).

37 Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 469, 471 (Del. 2002) (citing Bryant v. Delmarva Power 

& Light Co., 1995 WL 653987, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1995)).

38 The Court reaches this conclusion without considering Glass-Hill’s payment of 

the citation issued to her after the crash. “[P]ayment of the voluntary assessment 

does not conclusively establish negligence.” Torres v. Bishop, 2021 WL 6053870, 
9

State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment

11. State Farm contends that “summary judgment is appropriate because 

the undisputed facts demonstrate that the unidentified driver’s alleged wave was not 

a proximate cause of the motor vehicle accident.”

39 And, State Farm argues, because 

Glass-Hill’s “decision to continue across the right-hand lane of southbound 

Philadelphia Pike in front of Gordon was based upon her own independent judgment 

of the traffic conditions[,] . . . the actions of the unidentified pick-up driver cannot

be a proximate cause of the accident between [Glass Hill] and Gordon.”40

12. Glass-Hill responds that it is typically for a jury to “determine whether 

a reasonable person would have interpreted the wave as an indication that it was safe 

to cross and whether a duty should be imposed.”41 She contends that she relied upon 

both her independent assessment of the conditions and the opposing driver’s wave 

to initiate her left turn across oncoming traffic.42 

13. Under Delaware law, when a driver relies on an unidentified driver’s 

wave as an indication to cross all lanes of traffic, the unidentified driver may be a 

at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2021) (cleaned up). Rather, “the finder of fact [may] 

consider payment of a voluntary assessment as evidence of negligence.” Id.

39 State Farm Mot. Summ. J. (D.I. 22) at 3, ¶ 4.

40 Id. at 6, ¶ 12. 

41 Glass-Hill Resp. State Farm Mot. Summ. J., (D.I. 25), at 5, ¶ 9 (citing Evans v. 

Lattomus, 2011 WL 664046, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2011)). 

42 Glass-Hill Resp. State Farm Mot. Summ. J. at 4, ¶ 5.
10

proximate cause of the accident. “[I]t is normally a question of fact as to whether or 

not the waving driver was negligent. The jury determines whether a reasonable 

person would have interpreted the wave ‘as an indication that it was safe to cross’

and whether a duty should be imposed.”

43

14. During her deposition, Glass-Hill was asked several questions about the 

unidentified pickup truck driver’s wave:

Q: Can you describe for me how this accident occurred?

A: Yes, ma’am. . . . I stopped waiting for clear traffic. When the white 

truck came up, he stopped and he waved me on. I proceeded to go 

slowly. And as I proceeded to go slowly, I looked to my right, didn’t 

see nothing and went on. And that’s when the guy just slammed 

me.44

*****

A: I made the left turn, ma’am because the gentlemen in the white truck 

told me to go ahead.45

*****

A: I made the left turn because I was advised to do so and I saw no 

oncoming traffic.46

*****

43 Evans, 2011 WL 664046, at *1 (citing Singleterry v. H.H. Moore, Jr. Trucking 

Co., Inc., 1996 WL 527313, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 20, 1996)).

44 Gordon Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A at 13.

45 Id. at 16.

46 Id. at 20.
11

Q: And because you could not see you still had that duty [to ensure that 

the roadway is clear before entering the oncoming lane] even if you 

could not see you still had that duty, correct?

A: Yes, ma’am. But I assumed that the driver knew what he was saying 

when he told me to go ahead.

Q: Okay. And did he say something or did he wave at you?

A: He waved.

Q: So he didn’t actually speak to you?

A: No, ma’am.

Q: And when he waved was it your understanding that he was waving 

you across the entire intersection or just in front of him?

A: For me to go ahead in front of him and, you know, to proceed.47

*****

A: I understood his wave to tell me to go ahead, I was clear.

Q: To go across the entire intersection or just in front of the white truck?

A: To go across the entire street. It was not an intersection.48

*****

Q: Do you agree that you failed to yield the right of way to oncoming 

traffic?

A: I can only say what I said before, ma’am, is that I assumed the driver 

of the white truck, you know, knew that it was safe for me to go 

ahead and that’s all that --

49

*****

47 Id. at 23-24.

48 Id. at 24-25.

49 Id. at 28-29.
12

A: Again, as I stated before, I was given the right of what by the driver 

in the white truck.50

*****

Q: All right. At that point in time had you already started to cross that 

median area or not?

A: When he gave me the wave?

Q: Correct.

A: When he gave me the wave, yes, I started to go across.

Q: All right. So you first crossed across the median area?

A: Yes sir.

Q: All right. When you got to the end of the median area, did you keep 

proceeding or did you pause?

A: I slowly went in front of the truck and then I slowly as I came out 

into the right-hand lane looked to my right and proceeded on.51

*****

Q: But my question is. Were you able to take a look down the pike? 

Did you have a view of what was coming down?

A: Yes, for a split second. When I looked, I saw nothing, sir.52

15. Glass-Hill relied upon the unidentified truck driver’s wave and, to the 

best of her ability under the circumstances, assessed roadway conditions before 

crossing into Gordon’s path. But, it is clear that the truck driver’s wave factored 

50 Id. at 30. 

51 Id. at 106-7.

52 Id. at 109. 
13

into her decision. In short, while not exclusively, she relied upon the wave in making 

her decision to cross the southbound lanes of Philadelphia Pike. 

16. This Court may grant summary judgment where a driver’s wave had no 

influence on the actions of another. In Stansbury v. Goodwin, the driver of a truck 

signaled for Goodwin to enter the roadway.53 Goodwin testified that he “did not rely 

on the truck driver in any way” and confirmed that his decision to pull out of the 

parking lot was “100%” based on his own judgment.54 This Court granted summary 

judgment because the truck driver was not a proximate cause of the accident.55 In

Evans v. Lattomus, the unidentified driver of an SUV waved Lattomus into an 

intersection.56 This Court granted summary judgment because “[t]he undisputed 

facts indicate that Lattomus did not rely on the unidentified driver’s motion into the 

intersection.”57 And, in Johnson v. Magee, an unidentified bus driver waved to 

Magee;

58 Magee understood the bus driver’s wave to express her need to “clear the 

intersection so she could make the turn.”59 This Court granted summary judgment 

53 2016 WL 3619920, at *1.

54 Id.

55 Id. at *3.

56 2011 WL 664046, at *2.

57 2011 WL 664046, at *2.

58 Johnson v. Magee, 2007 WL 4248523, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2007). 

59 Id.
14

because “[t]he evidence clearly establishe[d] the bus driver did not wave Magee to 

come into the intersection[, and] [t]here was no confusion on Magee’s part as to the 

meaning of the wave.”60

17. But where a driver’s wave influences the actions of another, summary 

judgment is not appropriate. In Hearn v. Garver,61 this Court denied summary 

judgment where an unidentified bus driver waved Garver to proceed through the 

intersection.62 Garver then inched forward to check for oncoming traffic, at which 

time she collided with Hearn’s vehicle.63 Garver believed the bus driver’s wave 

signaled that it was “okay” to proceed asshe could not see beyond the bus.64 Further, 

Garver looked around the bus as she began her turn to make sure there was no more 

oncoming traffic.65 The court held:

Whether or not Garver relied on the unidentified bus driver's wave as 

an indication that she could complete her turn is material to whether 

Geico, as the uninsured motorist provider, faces liability. Therefore, 

insofar as Geico disputes that Garver fully relied on the wave, despite 

her sworn testimony to the contrary, there exists a genuine issue of 

material fact precluding summary judgment.66

60 Id. at *3. 

61 Hearn v. Garver, 2013 WL 6039980, at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 7, 2013).

62 Id.

63 Id.

64 Id. at *2.

65 Id.

66 Id. (internal citations omitted).
15

18. So, too, here. After seeing the pickup truck driver’s wave, Glass-Hill 

checked for oncoming traffic as she entered the right-hand lane but could not see 

down the length of the truck.67 Her decision to make the left hand turn across 

southbound lanes of Philadelphia Pike was influenced by the wave and her 

independent judgment. The Court finds that where, as here, a driver is influenced 

by a wave yet exercises a degree of independent judgement, it is for the factfinder to 

assess the negligence of the waving driver. As such, there exists a genuine issue of 

material fact precluding summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION

19. Gordon’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. State Farm’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

Sean P. Lugg, Judge

67 Glass-Hill Resp. to State Farm Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A at 117.