COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Before Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

WILLIAM COURTNEY RYAN, JR. 

v. Record No. 2197-94-1 OPINION 

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

CYNTHIA D. KRAMER OCTOBER 24, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 

 Cheshire I'Anson Eveleigh (Wolcott, Rivers, Wheary, 

 Basnight & Kelly, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Paul M. Lipkin (Goldblatt, Lipkin & Cohen, P.C., 

 on brief), for appellee. 

 William Courtney Ryan, Jr. (husband), the appellant, and 

Cynthia D. Kramer (wife), the appellee, were formerly husband and 

wife. They divorced in 1991. One child was born of the marriage 

on August 4, 1985. Husband appeals, and wife cross-appeals from 

a decree of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (trial 

court). 

 Although husband alleges several trial court errors that he 

asserts are grounds for reversal of the decree, all stem from the 

trial court's imputation to husband of his monthly earnings at 

the time he quit his job as an airline pilot he had held for more 

than twenty-six years. 

 The following are relevant excerpts from the trial court's 

decree: 

 THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on June 23, 

1994 upon the appeal of [husband] from a 

support order entered in the Norfolk Juvenile 
- 2 - 

and Domestic Relations District Court on 

April 4, 1994 and again came on to be heard 

on July 21, 1994 upon a continuance of the 

June 23 hearing, both parties being present 

in proper person at both hearings as well as 

the attorney for the defendant being present; 

and was argued by counsel. 

 And it appearing to the Court from the 

testimony of the parties on June 23, 1994 

that for 26 1/2 years, [husband] was an 

airline pilot for U.S. Air, who voluntarily 

accepted early retirement January 1, 1994 at 

age 51, his average monthly gross income for 

the year 1993 having been $12,443.00; that 

since his early retirement, [husband] has 

been engaged as a real estate agent with GSH 

having earned nothing to date in 1994; that 

[Kramer] who was not working at the time of 

the separation of the parties, at the time of 

their divorce on April 12, 1991, or at the 

present time, now has a six-month old child 

with her current husband; that [Kramer] has 

legal and physical custody of the minor child 

of the parties, [son], who was born August 4, 

1985; that in the past year or more, 

[husband] has had visitation with [son] 120 

days out of the year, thus entitling him to 

the shared custody provisions of Virginia 

Code Section 20-108.2(G)(3) ("the 

Guidelines"); that the presumptive amount of 

child support payable by [husband] to 

[Kramer] under the Guidelines based upon zero 

gross income of [husband] and zero gross 

income of [Kramer] is $7.91; that the 

application of the Guidelines is unjust and 

inappropriate in this case for the reason 

that [husband's] average gross monthly income 

for 1993 of $12,443.00 ought to be imputed to 

him, he having voluntarily terminated his 

employment; that it is inappropriate to 

impute income to [Kramer], she having never 

been significantly gainfully employed during 

her marriage to [husband] or thereafter; that 

[husband] ought to be given credit in the 

application of the Guidelines for a child 

born to him and his wife since his divorce 

from [Kramer], and he further should be given 

credit for a portion of a premium on his life 

insurance which he carries for [son's] 

benefit in the event of his untimely demise. 

 And it further appearing to the Court from 
- 3 - 

the testimony of [husband] on July 21, 1994 

that as of August 1994, he has accepted 

employment with Saudi Arabian Airlines, which 

requires his move with his family to Saudi 

Arabia and hence will not be able to exercise 

shared custody of [son] that would entitle 

him to the shared custody provisions of the 

Guidelines. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who 

prevailed below, here the appellee/wife, we hold that the 

evidence sufficiently supports the trial court's finding of fact, 

and that it did not err when it found that husband voluntarily 

left his employment of more than twenty-six years, at which he 

earned $12,443 per month. In a similar case, the Supreme Court 

of Virginia affirmed the trial court's imputation of income and 

said: 

 The effect of the chancellor's decision to 

deny the reduction was to hold that the 

father gambled with the children's ability to 

receive his financial support, and lost. Of 

course, a father is not prohibited from 

voluntarily changing employment. But, the 

chancellor, in the exercise of judicial 

discretion, implicitly held that when the 

father who was under court order to pay a 

certain sum for child support, which he was 

able to pay given his employment, chose to 

pursue other employment, albeit a bona fide 

and reasonable business undertaking, the risk 

of his success at his new job was upon the 

father, and not upon the children. We cannot 

say that this demonstrates the chancellor 

imposed an erroneous standard of proof in 

denying the father relief. 

Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 156, 409 S.E.2d 117, 119-20 

(1991). 

 Because we find that the trial court did not err when it 
- 4 - 

imputed income to husband, the other issues raised pursuant to 

that finding are moot. 

 Husband further asserts that the trial court erred when it 

failed to hold that wife had a financial obligation to provide 

for the child of the parties. We disagree. While both parties 

owe a duty of support, Yohay v. Ryan, 4 Va. App. 559, 359 S.E.2d 

320 (1987), decisions concerning child support rest within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on 

appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. 

Young v. Young, 3 Va. App. 80, 81, 348 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1986). 

There is evidence to support the judgment of the trial court and 

there is no showing of an abuse of trial court discretion. 

 Husband further contends that the trial court erred by 

refusing a full evidentiary hearing concerning his current 

employment. The record discloses that husband, taking a business 

risk that he was not forced to take, voluntarily resigned from 

his more than $12,000 monthly income to try realty sales at which 

he earned no income. It further appears that husband wanted to 

show that after failing in his real estate venture, he obtained 

another position as a pilot at which he earned only $4,000 per 

month. It was not error on these facts for the trial court to 

exercise its discretion to limit the evidence concerning 

comparative income. 

 We have carefully examined the record and find that this 

child support case involved no infringement on any constitutional 
- 5 - 

right that could be applied to this case. 

 Finally, each issue raised by wife in her cross-appeal is 

governed by the rule of trial court discretion. Upon our 

examination of the record, we find no abuse of trial court 

discretion on those issues. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.