U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS

STRATEGY FOR

AFGHANISTAN

August 2007 

Compiled by the 

Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan 

Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, U.S. Department of State
2007 UNODC Rapid Assessment Survey 
CONTENTS 

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................. 1 

2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM............................................................................ 13 

Security Issues........................................................................................... 14 

Economic Issues – Undermining Development........................................ 15 

Political Issues – Corruption, Narcotics, and the Insurgency ................... 15 

Problems for Afghanistan’s Neighbors..................................................... 16 

3. CURRENT STRATEGY.................................................................................. 17 

U.S. Five Pillar Plan .................................................................................. 17 

Afghanistan’s Eight Pillar Plan ................................................................. 19 

Counternarcotics Partners.......................................................................... 20 

Improving Implementation of the Five Pillar Plan ................................... 23 

4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................... 24 

Bifurcation................................................................................................. 24 

Challenges This Year ................................................................................ 26 

The Narcotics/Insurgency Relationship .................................................... 30 

Helmand .................................................................................................... 30 

5. ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY .................................................................... 32 

A. Public Information............................................................................... 32 

B. Alternative Development..................................................................... 39 

C. Poppy Elimination/Eradication............................................................ 48 

D. Interdiction/Law Enforcement Operations.......................................... 53 

E. Justice Reform/Prosecution ................................................................. 61 

F. Political Will ........................................................................................ 68 

G. Unity of International Effort................................................................ 68 

H. Integrating Counternarcotics (Particularly Interdiction) Into The 

Comprehensive Security Approach........................................................... 70 

I. Countering “Silver Bullet” Approaches................................................ 73 

6. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ......................................................................... 77 
U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY FOR 

AFGHANISTAN 

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper evaluates the current counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan, 

examines issues, obstacles, and lessons learned, and presents a way forward 

on key elements of the strategy, including public information, alternative 

development, poppy elimination/eradication, interdiction, and justice reform. 

The drug trade has undermined virtually every aspect of the Government of 

Afghanistan’s (GOA) drive to build political stability, economic growth, and 

rule of law and its capacity to address internal security problems. While the 

last two years have seen only localized progress in the struggle to contain the 

drug trade, the consensus among U.S. policymakers is that the current “Five 

Pillar” plan (Public Information, Alternative Development, Eradication, 

Interdiction, Justice Reform) provides the appropriate balance of incentives 

and disincentives. However, changing trends in poppy cultivation and 

trafficking, the security situation, the political climate, and economic 

development require significant and, in some cases, dramatic changes in the 

way Afghanistan and the international community implement the 

counternarcotics strategy. 

For example, while there appears to be a trend of reduced poppy cultivation 

in the northern half of Afghanistan that could make it close to poppy-free by 

2009, poppy cultivation in Helmand and the rest of southern Afghanistan is 

increasing at a rate that more than offsets the successes in the north. 

Although Governor Led Eradication (GLE) figures are greater this year than 

they were last year, political obstacles have closed the door on opportunities 

for much greater success in eradication. 

The north-south security dynamic greatly impacts the efficacy and reach of

the Five Pillar strategy. While the permissive security environment in the 

north permitted a robust person-to-person community outreach campaign, 

instability in the south hindered a parallel public information effort in the 

areas of greatest poppy cultivation that need it the most. While USAID 

support for farmers has secured long-term contracts for Afghan fruit and 

vegetable exports in poppy cultivation areas and developed a wide ranging 

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rural credit system, the Taliban has improved its own system of lending 

money to poppy farmers and taxing their crops. 

With respect to law enforcement, Operation Containment has seized more 

than 26 metric tons of Afghan heroin in the last two years – compared to 

only 407 kilograms in years prior—and resulted in the arrest of heads of 

major Afghan drug trafficking organizations. At the same time, vast 

networks of traffickers operate virtually untouched in Afghanistan’s rugged 

terrain, capacity to build evidence against major traffickers remains limited, 

and the nexus between drug traffickers and insurgents continues to increase. 

While justice sector reforms to date have been noteworthy, including the 

passage of a Counternarcotics Law, construction of over 40 courthouses and 

justice facilities, and the training of professionals from throughout the justice 

sector, the continued absence of rule of law in Afghanistan, particularly in

the provinces, has had a crippling effect on security, governance, and 

economic development. Finally, although over 71,000 Afghan police 

officers have been provided basic training, the police force still lacks a 

sufficient presence in rural districts and is often perceived by the Afghan 

public as corrupt and lacking discipline. 

This paper improves implementation of the counternarcotics effort in 

Afghanistan. Strategy elements are based on input from an interagency 

group of experts representing the Department of State, Department of 

Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, Department of 

the Treasury, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

The basic strategy shift outlined below involves three main elements: 1: 

dramatically increasing development assistance to incentivize licit 

development while simultaneously amplifying the scope and intensity of 

both interdiction and eradication operations; 2: coordinating 

counternarcotics (CN) and counterinsurgency (COIN) planning and 

operations in a manner not previously accomplished, with a particular 

emphasis on integrating drug interdiction into the counterinsurgency 

mission; and 3: encouraging consistent, sustained political will for the 

counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, our allies, and 

international civilian and military organizations. 

A.

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Public Information

 

1. Improve Counternarcotics (CN) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) 

Public Information Coordination: Given the increasing ties between 

drug trafficking and the insurgency, it is essential that the CN and 

COIN public information campaigns be consistent and wellcoordinated. Those who grow poppy or traffic in drugs in the south of 

the country need to know that they will be defeated just as the 

insurgents will be, and that contributing to the Taliban financially, 

with people, or with weapons is equivalent to insurgent activity. 

Public information campaigns should highlight the joint successes of 

counterterrorism, narcotics interdiction, and poppy 

elimination/eradication campaigns to undermine insurgent claims of 

victory and to enforce the message that narcotics-related activity is as 

non-negotiable as insurgent activity is. Organizations involved in 

counternarcotics should work closely with Afghan and allied military 

forces to coordinate this campaign through weekly meetings of a 

standing counternarcotics public information working group.

2. Enhance Focus on Grassroots and Word of Mouth Initiatives: This 

year, for the first time, public information campaigns attempted to 

engage local leaders on a more systematic basis. There was some 

success in these efforts in Balkh and a few other northern provinces. 

This program should be dramatically expanded by enlisting the 

assistance of Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) teams, military 

organizations, and PRTs. Public information campaigns need to bring 

the Poppy Elimination Program to local tribal leaders and shura 

members through word of mouth and a grassroots empowerment 

campaign. Each PEP team, PRT, and military command should have 

a written plan for local outreach and should keep track of contacts 

and both successes and failures. Pre-planting campaigns should 

include community outreach. PEP operations should be strengthened 

and regionalized. 

B. Alternative Development

1. Strengthen the Good Performers Initiative (GPI): The objective of the 

Good Performers Initiative is to provide high-impact development 

assistance to encourage the Government of Afghanistan, provincial 

administrators, and local actors to take decisive action to halt the 

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cultivation of opium poppy. The GPI will be significantly expanded 

and improved, providing significant financial and political incentives 

($25 to $50 million) to provinces for reductions in net cultivation, as 

reported in the annual UNODC cultivation survey. An information 

campaign could publicize the Good Performers Initiative widely. In 

addition, efforts could be made to accelerate the expenditure rate of 

the UN-administered Counternarcotics Trust Fund (CNTF). So far 

only 2.5% of the CNTF’s $70M has been distributed. Funding should 

be more rapidly distributed to provincial governors in order to 

maximize their political capital during periods of poppy planting and 

eradication. 

2. Develop Refined Plan for Crops and Livestock: USAID has 

continuously refined its crop and seed programs by promoting higher 

value crops and farming methods that result in higher profits for 

traditional crops and livestock. USAID should focus on the 

development of marketable high-value crops and livestock that can 

give rural households increased income in the short-run (e.g. 

vegetables) as well as the long-term (e.g. fruits and nuts).

3. Increase Private Sector Involvement: Farming households must be 

provided with viable, lasting economic alternatives to opium poppy 

cultivation. The private sector must be the driver of this change. 

Alternative development programs could begin establishing 

businesses that issue contracts that give farmers guaranteed sales and 

favorable prices for their crops, thereby lowering the risk of switching 

to new crops. Short-term crops that yield immediate income, such as 

animal fodder grains and high-value vegetables, could be produced, 

processed, packaged, and sold throughout Afghanistan and the 

region, thereby generating job opportunities on and off the farm for 

rural households. Contract farming, alongside grant assistance to 

farmers for farm equipment, infrastructure, and other inputs is

preferable to direct crop subsidies, which might undermine 

competitive markets, distort economic activity, and be prohibitively 

difficult to administer. 

4. Provide Additional Support for National Solidarity Program Targeted 

at Rural Areas Critical to the CN Effort: The NSP program operates 

in 34 provinces and has been responsible for nearly 4,000 irrigation 

sub-projects and hundreds of other village-level projects. The 

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program could benefit from a timely infusion of funds and also serve 

as an Afghan-led complement to the counternarcotics strategy. 

5. Engage Land Grant Universities: USAID and USDA could expand 

their programs for U.S. land grant universities. USDA could support 

this role for the agricultural sector through development of technical 

capacity-building activities with appropriate GOA officials and 

Afghan universities. 

 

C. Poppy Elimination/Eradication

1. Governor Accountability: The GOA could announce a national net 

poppy reduction target before the fall 2007 planting season to create 

an atmosphere of accountability. 

2. Governor Rewards: A comprehensive pre-planting strategy could 

include public recognition and rewards for governors who have 

excelled in suppressing poppy planting and carrying out GovernorLed Eradication (GLE), along with the announcement of future 

incentives. 

3. Improve Mechanized Eradication and Targeting: The Afghanistan 

Eradication Force (AEF) could focus on using more mechanized 

eradication, supported by manual eradication. This would primarily 

mean using tractors and ATVs in terrain suitable for mechanized 

operations. In conjunction with the enhanced Good Performers 

Initiative, this approach could raise eradication figures to match— 

and even exceed—the national growth rate of opium poppy cultivation 

in Afghanistan. Eradication verification capability could also be 

improved by having the USG deploy more observers to verify AEF 

eradication on the ground, or by employing technology that provides 

detailed imagery as well as the coordinates of eradicated fields. 

4. Improve Quality and Quantity of Eradication: No herbicidal spray 

program would be implemented without the consent of the GOA. This 

being said, in order to ensure that eradication is equitable, efficient, 

and capable of eradicating poppy on a sufficient scale, the USG 

advocates a policy of GOA-led non-negotiated forced eradication. 

One method of implementing forced eradication would entail the 

deployment of force-protected ground-based spray (GBS) teams. 

5
There are many misconceptions about the safety, health, and 

environmental impact of glyphosate, the active ingredient in groundbased spray. A public education campaign should be initiated to 

address the health concerns associated with spray, broadcast the 

benefits of farm herbicides via public information targeting, and 

dispel misconceptions about GBS. Another way to accomplish the 

objective of non-negotiated forced eradication would be to employ 

aerial spray. 

 

D. Interdiction/Law Enforcement Operations

1. Provide the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) with the 

Capacity to Protect All Elements of the Five Pillar Strategy: Develop 

an implementation plan for building a security capacity within the 

CNPA for CN enforcement operations in non-permissive 

environments. The CNPA security capacity will not assume the role 

of a maneuver force; rather, it will focus on enforcing Afghan civil 

law and supporting all the activities included in the Five Pillar CN 

strategy when confronted by determined opposition. This capability 

will be entirely resident within the MOI and will not increase ANP 

manning above the 82,000 currently authorized. 

2. Increase the Number of DEA Agents or Other Law Enforcement 

Advisors for CNPA: In order to provide comprehensive mentor 

support and training of a large CNPA special protection police force, 

the USG should significantly increase the number of DEA agents or 

other law enforcement mentors/trainers assigned to Kabul. 

3. Expand DEA Investigative and Operational Capacity: DEA believes 

its Afghan counterparts could more effectively employ their strategy 

of attacking the command and control structure of Afghanistan drug 

High Value Targets (HVTs) with greater investigative capacity and 

improved operational capacity, including increased airlift capability. 

Establishment of the Vetted Unit Program and continued support for 

drug HVT extraditions are also crucial elements.

4. ASNF & NIU: More cooperation between the Afghan Special 

Narcotics Force (ASNF) and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) 

could maximize resources, improve intelligence gathering 

6
capabilities, and increase the ability to successfully prosecute High 

Value Targets. 

5. Publicize Successful Interdiction Operations and Prosecutions: An 

aggressive public information campaign down to the village level 

could publicize the success of interdiction operations to the local 

population and traffickers. These successes should also be publicized 

to the international community.

6. Improve Interdiction and Prosecution of High Value Targets (HVTs): 

In FY2007, the USG will contribute $343 million towards interdiction 

efforts. The USG must continue to improve the interdiction 

capabilities of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) by 

building up specialized units, continuing support for the Foreigndeployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST), assigning additional DEA 

agents to Kabul, expanding the core of the CNPA with a five-year 

plan, and more aggressively implementing the northern, eastern, and 

southern Enforcement Strategies. 

E. Justice Reform/Prosecution

1. Expand Central and Provincial Counternarcotics Justice Capacity: 

The Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) in Kabul investigates and 

prosecutes mid- and high-level narcotics and narcotics-related cases 

before the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), which has exclusive 

nationwide jurisdiction for such cases. Counternarcotics justice 

reform should include expansion of the CJTF and CNT in Kabul. 

Other support to the Afghan criminal justice system, such as that 

provided by the nine already-deployed provincial justice advisors, 

will assist these counternarcotics efforts by directing appropriate 

cases arising in the provinces to the CJTF in Kabul.

2. Improve Anti-Corruption Initiative: The USG should improve 

assistance to the Afghan Attorney General’s anti-corruption 

campaign by providing security, secure facilities, equipment, and 

technical assistance. The Department of Justice, with assistance from 

the State Department, should expand its anticorruption programs in 

Afghanistan along the lines recommended by a recent DOJ 

assessment team. The Ministry of Interior should make whatever 

7
organizational changes are necessary to bring itself into compliance 

with this initiative. 

3. Develop an Extradition Policy: The USG should develop guidelines 

with the GOA and the international community defining the 

circumstances under which extradition is appropriate. Given that full

Afghan capacity to prosecute kingpins is still a few years away, a 

more clearly defined extradition policy is imperative for successful 

prosecution of selected High Value Targets (HVTs). 

4. Increase Justice Sector Salaries: Increasing justice personnel salaries 

is critical to building the rule of law and should be supported by the 

U.S. The European Union is considering augmenting justice salaries 

through a trust fund. The U.S. could offer a substantial financial 

contribution to this effort over the coming two years. 

5. Expand Counternarcotics Justice Infrastructure: Over the coming 

year, a number of U.S. and international initiatives will substantially 

accelerate CN law enforcement efforts. Most importantly, the 

Counternarcotics Justice Center will be completed in 2007, providing 

a secure facility for investigation, detention, trial, and conviction of 

major narcotics offenders. 

F. Political Will 

1. Central, Provincial, and District Leaders: One of the principal 

obstacles to greater success in interdiction and eradication is the 

intervention of corrupt officials. The USG and international 

community should assist wherever possible to ensure that central, 

provincial, and local government officials are strong and uncorrupt, 

and will not succumb to pressure to limit or stop interdiction and 

eradication operations. 

G. Unity of International Effort

1. Develop a Plan to Ensure Allied Unity in Messaging: The USG and 

partners should work to improve the delivery of a clear and consistent 

counternarcotics message. This plan would need to be executed 

concurrently by civilian and military authorities from all allied 

nations and the GOA. 

8
2. Regional Cooperation and Border Security: Coordination among 

countries bordering Afghanistan needs to improve. The U.S. should

strive to foster improved regional cooperation on Afghan drug transit 

and enhanced Allied-Afghan border security efforts. The U.S. should 

identify useful ways to engage resources, expertise, and assistance to 

counter the drug-related transit in and out of Afghanistan without 

undermining our larger goals in Afghanistan. 

3. Increased Coordination on Interdiction Strategies and Justice Sector 

Development: Coordination is needed to avoid conflicting initiatives 

and improve disbursement of funds. 

H. Integrating Counternarcotics (Particularly Interdiction) Into The 

 Comprehensive Security Approach

1. Work with Afghan and Allied Military Forces to Integrate 

Counternarcotics Into Our Broader Security Strategy: There is a clear 

and direct link between the illicit opium trade and insurgent groups in 

Afghanistan. The Taliban and other anti-government elements exploit 

the opium trade to facilitate their financial, logistical, and political 

objectives, jeopardizing the prospect of long-term security and 

stability, reconstruction, and effective governance. Successful 

counternarcotics operations, particularly interdiction operations, 

dismantle criminal enterprises, capture narco-terrorists, and weaken 

the insurgents’ areas of strength. Therefore, progress in the CN 

mission, and drug interdiction in particular, is essential to achieving 

our security objectives in Afghanistan. Combating the insurgency 

requires an integrated strategy that incorporates CN target sets, 

operations, and resource priorities as components of the overall 

security effort. DOD will work with DEA and other stakeholders to 

develop options for a coordinated strategy that integrates and 

synchronizes counternarcotics operations, particularly interdiction, 

into the comprehensive security strategy. 

2. Establish a Command and Control Cell: In addition to building a 

CNPA protection force, an Afghan Command and Control (C2) cell 

could be established to provide command and control for all 

government CN forces operating in a specific region. This C2 cell 

will ensure that there is a single command structure for all 

9
government CN efforts in the region, and will coordinate with the 

respective local governments, NGOs, PRTs, military headquarters, 

etc. 

3. Develop Coordinated Plans for Afghan and Allied Military Support 

for Counternarcotics Operations, Particularly Interdiction Operations: 

Establishing liaison relationships with Afghan and allied planning 

cells, drug interdiction mission planners, eradication specialists, and 

public information specialists would help develop more integrated 

plans, policies, and procedures. 

4. Support Afghan and Allied Partners’ Public Information Efforts: The 

Afghan and allied militaries could support the GOA and international 

community’s counternarcotics public information campaign. 

I. Countering “Silver Bullet” Approaches

1. Provide Information to Expose the Flaws of an Imbalanced 

Interdiction-Only Approach: Various actors have expressed support 

for an interdiction-only approach to combating narcotics in 

Afghanistan. While interdiction is a critical piece of the U.S. 

government’s counternarcotics strategy, it will not solve the problems 

absent the other pillars. Interdiction at the expense of the other 

pillars would have a negative impact on the entire CN effort. 

2. Impossibility of Legalizing and Buying Out the Opium Crop: The 

USG has considered the arguments for legalizing and/or buying out 

the opium crop. The biggest problems with this idea are that it would 

encourage the 87% of Afghans who do not grow opium poppy to begin 

cultivation, there exists no infrastructure to manufacture and 

distribute legal opium, there is already an oversupply of legal opium, 

and a licit opium program would require multi-billion dollar annual 

subsidies. The international community needs a consolidated response 

to get out the message that “legalizing the crop” is not a viable 

option. 

3. No Miracle Crop: Many outside observers continue to assume that 

there is one single miracle crop that can replace poppy. This simply 

is not true. There is no legal crop that can match the value of the 

opium poppy. Instead, a balanced approach combining several crops, 

10
in conjunction with agricultural market and business development, 

can provide farmers with a reasonable livelihood.

Short-Term Action Items for Helmand and Other High-Concern

Provinces

In the section below, specific strategic elements are discussed for 

especially problematic provinces, notably Helmand. Counternarcotics 

success hinges on GOA and international support for a robust 

counternarcotics effort in Helmand, Afghanistan’s most active opiumgrowing province, and secondarily in other regions. 

Although many of these options will take time, now that the U.S. is more 

than two years into the implementation of the Five Pillar strategy it is 

crucial that the USG demonstrates concrete progress in assisting the 

GOA with counternarcotics. For 2008, one of our main objectives should 

be to achieve a net reduction in total opium poppy cultivation in 

Helmand. To achieve this, we must make immediate progress in the 

following five areas:

1. Make Eradication a Counternarcotics Priority 

2. Encourage the GOA to Set Eradication Goals for 2008

3. Encourage the GOA to Employ Non-Negotiated Methods of 

Forced Eradication 

--Encourage the GOA to consider the use of force-protected GBS 

eradication in 2008, particularly in insecure areas. 

--Make available to the GOA the tremendous amount of research 

done on health, safety, and environmental concerns about 

glyphosate. 

4. Improve the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) 

--To date, rewards under the Good Performers Initiative have only 

been disbursed to poppy-free provinces, which have each 

received $500,000 for achieving poppy-free status as defined by 

a confirmed crop of less than 100 vestigial hectares. To 

11
incentivize poppy reduction in high-concern provinces such as 

Helmand, the USG and GOA will announce an expanded Good 

Performers Initiative before the 2007 planting season that will 

reward poppy reduction in all provinces, and offer special 

performance incentives for high-concern provinces that stabilize 

or reverse cultivation trends through aggressive governor-led 

action. 

5. Improve CN-COIN Public Information

--The USG will develop and implement an action plan to improve 

coordination of message delivery on the CN-COIN nexus in 

Afghanistan. 

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2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The drug problem in Afghanistan is a serious health and social problem, a 

serious obstacle to the international community’s efforts to defeat global 

terrorism, and a serious impediment to achieving regional stability. 

Resolving this problem is a priority of the USG. Afghanistan provides 93% 

of the world’s opium, almost solely supplying the world’s heroin demand. 

While the U.S. is one of the few countries that does not receive significant 

amounts of Afghan heroin, that trend could change with the development of 

increasingly sophisticated drug transit networks. 

UNODC figures estimated last year’s Afghan opium crop as the largest in 

recorded history, rising 59% over the previous year’s crop to 165,000 

hectares (Ha). According to UN estimates, 2007 may see another record 

year of opium poppy cultivation and resulting heroin overproduction. This 

crop could translate into more than 650 tons of heroin, supplying the entire 

world’s demand for over a year. By comparison, U.S. users consume 15 

tons of heroin a year. 

Increased cultivation means lower prices, increasing purity, increasing 

numbers of users, and more drug-related deaths. The number of new addicts 

will also increase because heroin of higher purity can be consumed not only 

through needles, but also by smoking, snorting, and ingesting. 

But the Afghan opium trade is much more than a drug problem. In 2006, the 

total export value of Afghanistan’s opium was $3.1 billion, representing 

approximately 32% of the country’s total (licit and illicit) GDP. This 

represents an improvement over the 2005 percentage (34%), but still 

requires significant action in order to reach controllable levels. When 

refined into heroin, the London street value of Afghan opium rises to $38 

billion. 

Afghanistan’s drug money weakens key institutions and strengthens the 

Taliban. In many regions, the economy operates by and for drug traffickers. 

Since Afghanistan’s financial institutions are still developing, money 

primarily goes through the informal hawala system, making it difficult to 

track and therefore cutting out the nascent banking system. Further, the 

illicit drug trade’s corrupting influence and provenance of funding for 

insurgents threatens the efforts of the United States and its allies to help the 

13
Afghan people bring stability to their country. Some studies indicate that the 

Taliban receives between 10% and 50% of its funding from trade in illegal 

narcotics. In sum, Afghanistan’s drug money corrupts the government, 

weakens institutions, and strengthens the Taliban. 

Figure 1 Opium poppy cultivation from 1986 to 2006 (hectares)

Security Issues 

Security problems greatly impede counternarcotics efforts. With improved 

security, the USG could better deliver CN assistance in all areas. Eradication 

efforts in 2007 met with more resistance and violence from Taliban and 

local elements than in prior years, with 16 reported deaths during eradication 

operations. The hectares eradicated in Afghanistan in 2007 were hard won, 

and in the future eradication could become increasingly difficult to carry out 

if the security situation continues to deteriorate. Non-permissive 

environments such as Helmand limit eradication efforts. Lacking force 

protection, eradicators are forced to negotiate how and where eradication 

takes place with farmers and local officials, slowing down operations and 

lessening the deterrent effect of the threat of eradication. 

14
Economic Issues – Undermining Development 

While the UNODC estimates that approximately 46% of Afghan licit GDP 

derives from opium exports, only 12.6% of Afghans are involved in drug 

cultivation. The largest opium poppy cultivation areas are also distinct from

Afghanistan’s more populated areas, which minimizes the political 

constituency in support of poppy. 

In Helmand and Konduz, traffickers and poppy farmers use roads and 

irrigation canals developed for licit farming for drug transit and improved 

poppy yields. Under pressure from insurgents or local warlords, some 

farmers take out loans to cultivate large amounts of opium poppy, creating a 

vicious cycle of debt that cannot be broken by shifting back to licit crops. In 

other cases, farmers turn down alternative crops to grow poppy simply 

because it is more lucrative. 

Although the narco-economy has been reduced as a percentage of licit and 

illicit GDP in recent years, this is due to the proportionate growth of the licit 

Afghan economy. The drug economy remains entrenched, and continues to 

present a serious impediment to national sustainable development. 

Political Issues – Corruption, Narcotics, and the Insurgency 

Corruption

Narco-corruption is present at all levels of the Afghan government. 

Executive branch officials, legislators, police chiefs, and governors have 

been implicated in trafficking, enabling, bribery schemes, and related narcocorruption. Decades of war and economic dislocation have eroded 

institutions, so that an informal system of favors and payoffs has become the 

normal process for resolving issues. In this environment, narcotics 

corruption thrives. For example, the judicial system has difficulty 

prosecuting corrupt officials, due to low salaries, limited infrastructure and 

the lack of a professionalized bureaucratic infrastructure. 

Integrating CN Into The Comprehensive Security Approach

Increasingly, indicators show a growing relationship between narcotraffickers and Taliban-related insurgent groups, prompting the need to 

15
integrate drug enforcement into the comprehensive security strategy and 

operational planning. While the Taliban eliminated poppy production for 

one year during their rule (largely to gain favor with the West and keep 

opium prices high), some reports indicate that the Taliban has now formed 

direct alliances with narco-traffickers to raise money for a national counteroffensive against Afghan and ISAF forces, especially in southern 

Afghanistan. Unless the Afghan government and the international 

community can disrupt the narcotics trade, insurgent groups will use drug 

funding to consolidate territorial gains in the south, build a force capable of 

going toe-to-toe against ISAF and Afghan forces, and threaten Afghan unity 

and regional stability. 

The insurgents profit from every aspect of Afghanistan’s opium trade. They 

tax farmers and traffickers, offer protection for travel on drug transit routes, 

and develop high-level contacts for joining the Jihad with narco-trafficking. 

Currently the insurgents are moving from opportunistic profiteering—e.g., 

taxing farmers—to more organized profiteering, whereby they develop 

regional strategies to maximize narco-trafficking profits at all levels of the 

production ladder. Although Afghanistan’s insurgents are not yet totally 

integrated into the drug trade, they are moving in that direction, as the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have done in Colombia. 

Problems for Afghanistan’s Neighbors 

The transit of Afghan heroin has become a national security issue for its 

neighbors. Afghan heroin transits through Iran, Pakistan, and the Central 

Asian states. This transit flow has a similarly corrosive effect on the 

economic and social stability of these countries and provides a ready source 

of income for internal criminal and insurgent elements. Russia, for example, 

has expressed considerable concern over the flow of Afghan heroin through 

the Central Asian States and possible ties between drug traffickers and 

insurgent elements. Pakistan is also attempting to address the effects of 

narcotics funding on tribal stability in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Area (FATA). 

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3. CURRENT STRATEGY

The Afghan Government’s own Afghan National Drug Control Strategy lays 

out the basic framework for counternarcotics success in Afghanistan. While 

the USG and its coalition partners can provide funding and training 

assistance, Afghanistan as a sovereign nation must develop its own methods 

of implementation to defeat the drug problem over the long term. 

U.S. Five Pillar Plan 

The USG strategy focuses on helping the GOA disrupt Afghanistan’s 

opium-based economy and strengthen the central government’s control over 

the country. To address these objectives comprehensively, the USG has 

focused on helping the GOA implement the first five parts of the Afghan 

National Drug Control Strategy: 

1. Public Information (PI) - (State/INL and DOD): Designed as a yearround, nationwide program focused on helping the GOA achieve sustainable 

reductions in poppy cultivation and production through public information, 

engagement, and education. In 2006, the campaign increased its emphasis 

on person to person community outreach initiatives that engage trusted local 

opinion leaders. UNODC reporting indicates a significant reduction in 

poppy cultivation in the northern provinces, attributed in part to improved PI 

efforts. 

2. Alternative Development (AD) - (USAID): Designed to help the GOA 

establish economic alternatives to the cultivation of poppy for Afghan 

people. The AD campaign, with annual expenditures of $120 million to 

$150 million, includes short-term cash-for-work projects, comprehensive 

agricultural and business development projects, and high-visibility 

programs. Over the past few years, agricultural production has nearly 

doubled, increasing farmers’ incomes. The USG has paid $32 million in 

cash-for-work salaries for infrastructure rehabilitation resulting in the 

construction of 1,000 km of rural roads and improved irrigation for 3% of 

Afghanistan’s arable land. $3.1 million in credit has been disbursed, and 

over 100,000 farmers have been trained in improved agricultural practices. 

17
3. Elimination/Eradication - (State/INL): Designed to help the GOA deter 

and reduce the cultivation of opium poppy by launching a major program of 

prevention incentives while also building a credible forced eradication 

capability. It includes support for Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) and the 

600-man Afghan Eradication Force (AEF). Political will and security 

problems have impeded eradication efforts since the AEF program began in 

2004. While AEF made some notable progress during the first eight weeks 

of the 2007 eradication season, armed attacks and deficient political will on 

all levels obstructed eradication efforts later in the season. Despite setbacks, combined AEF and GLE efforts succeeded in eradicating more than 

19,000 Ha in the 2007 eradication season, outpacing last year’s total 

eradication of 15,300 Ha by nearly a third. 

4. Interdiction - (DEA, DOD, and State/INL): Focuses on decreasing 

narcotics trafficking and processing in Afghanistan by helping the GOA 

build its capacity to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug 

trafficking organizations. Groups such as the DEA-trained Counternarcotics 

Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force 

(ASNF), and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) of the CNPA are being 

equipped to arrest and prosecute the command and control elements of 

narcotics trafficking organizations. Over the past two years, interdiction 

initiatives have resulted in the seizure of more than 26 metric tons of heroin, 

the initiation of hundreds of investigations, and the arrest of more than 1,000 

individuals. 

5. Law Enforcement/Justice Reform - (DOJ and State/INL): Encompasses 

both police and justice sector efforts to help the GOA increase overall rule of 

law, specifically in the area of narcotics-related law enforcement. Programs 

are closely tied to police-sector and justice-sector efforts at large. USG 

advisors mentor the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force’s (CJTF) pursuit of 

narcotics and public corruption cases through the Central Narcotics Tribunal 

(CNT) in Kabul. All narcotics cases involving over 2 kilograms are handled 

by the CNT. Concurrently, the USG is helping the GOA implement its 

Justice Sector Strategy, which to date has built or renovated 40 judicial 

facilities, distributed more than 11,000 copies of the Afghan Constitution, 

built the central justice system, and trained more than 1,250 Afghan judges, 

lawyers, prosecutors, and corrections personnel. The GOA’s CN law has 

been the foundation for these programs. Building the overall justice system

has a direct impact on expanding the rule of law and thus on 

counternarcotics law enforcement efforts. 

18
Afghanistan’s Eight Pillar Plan 

The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy establishes eight priorities for 

eliminating the drug trade: public information, alternative development, 

eradication, interdiction/law enforcement, prosecution/criminal justice 

reform, demand reduction, institution building, and international and 

regional cooperation. 

USG and international efforts support the GOA’s eight pillar 

counternarcotics strategy. Although the USG spent over $600 million last 

year supporting all eight pillars, the primary focus is on the first five, as 

described above. While this paper details the USG commitment to the first 

five pillars throughout, USG support for the remaining three pillars is briefly 

outlined below. 

Demand Reduction

The USG contributes several million dollars annually to help the GOA 

prevent and reduce Afghanistan’s domestic drug abuse problem. By 

providing technical and training assistance, the USG supports the GOA’s 

creation of a national drug abuse prevention, intervention, and treatment 

program. 

USG demand reduction efforts in Afghanistan have resulted in leading 

Muslim clerics and organizations issuing fatwas and resolutions that 

strongly support U.S. policies and programs designed to reduce drug 

production, trafficking, and abuse. Additionally, USG collaboration with the 

Afghan Religious Affairs Ministry (3,000 mullahs) has provided rare access 

to mosques for establishing prevention and outreach centers. 

Institution Building

Continued USG and international efforts are needed to help the GOA build 

up the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, and other Afghan 

institutions involved in the fight against drugs. Justice sector capacitybuilding is also a high priority, and the U.S. and international community are 

increasing assistance to the justice system overall. The USG intends to 

double its justice sector support over the next several years, especially 

focusing on building prosecution capabilities. For the USG, this includes 

supporting over 70 justice and corrections advisors in Kabul and five 

19
provinces in 2007 (including INL, DOJ, and USAID advisors) to implement 

the U.S. Justice Sector Strategy of (1) building the central justice system, (2) 

expanding to the provinces, and (3) increasing coordinated international 

justice assistance. 

 

International and Regional Cooperation

The USG contributes to a variety of international efforts to support regional 

cooperation. Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all 

now have major drug problems as a result of large influxes of Afghan 

heroin, taxing their law enforcement capabilities. Further, the Afghan drug 

trade corrupts bordering countries’ political systems with large amounts of 

narco-money. To combat this problem, the USG has programs in all 

neighboring countries (except Iran) that help to interdict narcotics and 

improve law enforcement and prosecution capabilities in those countries. 

The newly-formed Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Center 

(CARICC) will also help combat trafficking throughout Central Asia by 

acting as an information sharing venue for all intelligence and law 

enforcement agencies operating in the area. 

Counternarcotics Partners 

International

As part of the 2002 Bonn Agreement, the United Kingdom initially assumed 

the role of “lead nation” for counternarcotics support. Germany led on 

police reform, Italy on justice reform, and the United States on the military. 

Lead nations, however, soon realized that Afghanistan’s needs were more 

extensive and expensive than they had originally expected. 

 

In January 2006, a new agreement, the Afghanistan Compact (“the 

Compact”), came into force. The Compact states that Afghanistan is the 

lead nation; the concept of other lead nations consequently no longer exists. 

Mindful that Afghanistan’s reconstruction and stabilization will require 

strong international engagement for the foreseeable future, the Compact 

establishes a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. The Afghan 

government and the United Nations co-chair this board, implementing the 

Compact’s political commitments. 

20
Multilateral cooperation is critical to making progress in drug control. The 

USG and UN continually work to ensure that their counternarcotics 

strategies are in lockstep. 

USG Interagency

The USG plays a critical role in all areas related to the GOA’s 

counternarcotics efforts, contributing – through an interagency effort – 

hundreds of personnel and over $600 million in counternarcotics support last 

year alone. Since 2001, the total USG counternarcotics contribution to 

Afghanistan has totaled around $1.6 billion. 

Within the U.S. interagency process, ONDCP sets overall counternarcotics 

policy, and the National Security Council (NSC) has the coordinating role 

on Afghanistan issues, including counternarcotics. The State Department’s 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 

serves as the lead implementing agency on narcotics issues in Afghanistan. 

To disseminate messages on all counternarcotics programs and increase 

confidence in the Government of Afghanistan, the State Department works 

to improve public information engagement and education. 

The State Department also works to improve Afghan elimination and 

eradication capacity by supporting provincial governors (through GovernorLed Eradication, or GLE) and improving the capacity of the 

Counternarcotics Ministry’s centrally led eradication force (the Afghan 

Eradication Force, or AEF). The State Department is also responsible for 

funding the programs associated with the eradication pillar, including the 

provision of aerial protection for ground-based eradication forces through 

INL’s air wing. 

DEA and DOJ, DOD, and State Department programs are building the 

capacity of the counternarcotics police, border management forces, and the 

Afghan court system. With regard to justice reform, the State Department 

funds a program implemented by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to train, 

mentor, and build the capacity of the Criminal Justice Task Force, which is

based in Kabul. DOJ has also provided assistance to the Central Narcotics 

Tribunal. 

On police training and assistance programs, DOD provides equipment, 

airlift, heavy arms support, salary support for most Afghan law enforcement 

21
personnel and other operational assistance, while State Department support 

includes operations and maintenance support for facilities, provision of 

training advisors and curricula for police training programs, nearly 500 

advisors for field based and Ministry of Interior mentoring programs, and 

related program administrative assistance. 

DEA’s mission in Afghanistan is to help the government target the 

command and control structures of the largest drug organizations in the 

country. DEA does this by building Afghan law enforcement institutions 

and by directly combating Afghan narcotics trafficking networks. DEA’s 

contributions extend beyond the borders of Afghanistan with Operation 

Containment, an international effort involving 19 countries that work to stop 

the flow of drugs and precursor chemicals into and out of Afghanistan. 

USAID coordinates and funds efforts to establish legitimate economic 

alternatives to poppy cultivation. The alternative development program, 

operating in nine provinces, has realized significant accomplishments in 

supporting the overall counternarcotics effort and in promoting new 

infrastructure and economic activities that provide rural jobs and increase 

farmers’ income from legal crops. USAID is improving the infrastructure, 

business capacity, and agricultural productivity needed to create jobs and 

increase Afghanistan’s revenues from licit sales in domestic, regional, and 

international markets. 

Government of Afghanistan (GOA)

In December 2004, the Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) became the 

Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN). It was upgraded to the ministerial 

level in order to tackle the scale and intensity of the problem of illegal drugs 

in Afghanistan. On behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, the Ministry 

of Counternarcotics leads the coordination, policy making, monitoring and 

evaluation of all counternarcotics activities and efforts. The Ministry of the 

Interior (MOI) supports the MCN, with particular emphasis on law 

enforcement and eradication. All counternarcotics activities are carried out 

in accordance with the Afghan Constitution, Afghan Drug Law and 

Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).

Responsibilities for administering justice are divided between the Ministry 

of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney 

General. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for police forces and the first 

22
stages of criminal investigations; the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) 

initiates prosecutions and manages the prosecution service; the Supreme 

Court, the highest judicial authority, manages the nationwide judicial 

system; and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is responsible for the corrections 

system, legislative drafting, civil law matters, legal aid (pending 

Parliamentary approval), oversight over implementation of laws throughout 

the government, and coordination of the justice sector. USG experts are 

working with both the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General’s Office 

to deconflict perceived overlaps in legal authority, which has led to 

interagency rivalry. 

Improving Implementation of the Five Pillar Plan 

The U.S. has on multiple occasions evaluated the soundness of the basic five 

part strategy described above. While the USG has concluded that it is the 

right general strategy, the U.S., the GOA, and the international community 

need to deliver the strategy more effectively. We now have additional data, 

summarized below, on how the counternarcotics problem is developing 

across the country. 

23
4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

Bifurcation 

According to UNODC’s 2007 Rapid Assessment Survey, this year may be 

another record-setting year for Afghanistan’s opium crop. Recent trends in 

opium cultivation, however, fall along a clear north-south divide in the 

amount of poppy cultivation among provinces. Due to increasing ties 

between narcotics traffickers and elements of the insurgency in southern 

Afghanistan, poppy cultivation in the south has increased. In contrast, 

northern provinces contributed to a decline in opium cultivation due to a 

combination of political will and incentives and disincentives, such as 

effective public information, alternative development, and eradication. 

The U.S. and UN have jointly agreed on a strategy to help the GOA sustain 

reductions and maintain poppy-free provinces in the north while integrating 

a security component into the counternarcotics plan for the south. 

24
Northern Progress

Several northern provinces with very low amounts of poppy—two to three 

hundred hectares—are well on their way to becoming poppy free. Due to 

strong political will and a successful Governor-Led Eradication campaign, 

Balkh, which cultivated 7,232 Ha in 2006, will likely be certified poppy-free 

in 2007. 

 

Likewise, in Bamyan the central government delivered an effective public

information campaign through the Poppy Elimination Program’s teams and 

advisors which contributed to a strong decrease in hectarage. This part of 

Afghanistan will either be poppy free or on its way to becoming poppy free 

within the next two years if our strategy continues to be aggressive. 

Nangarhar is the one exception to this generally positive trend in 

Afghanistan’s north. While cultivation in Nangarhar is still well below 

historic highs of 30,000 Ha, the 2007 growing season witnessed a resurgence 

of cultivation in Nangarhar which needs to be addressed. 

Southern Challenges

The generally positive outlook in the north contrasts dramatically with the 

situation in the south, which has seen poppy cultivation increases in virtually 

every province. In 2007, the USG is supporting a GOA-led eradication 

campaign in central Helmand which focuses eradication in areas with 

available agricultural alternatives. As the Afghan Eradication Force works to 

increase its daily rate of eradication, there has been a corresponding increase 

in local resistance, partly encouraged by local officials. 

Until May, Oruzgan had almost no counternarcotics activities this season, 

with provincial authorities failing to launch a credible GLE campaign. 

Farmers currently have a free hand to grow poppy. The eradication 

campaign lost credibility because the AEF was unable to follow through on 

forced eradication. A strong increase in poppy cultivation in Oruzgan could 

bring negative, contagious effects on neighboring provinces. 

25
Challenges This Year 

Political Will and Security

Strong political will enables effective eradication and interdiction programs

and judicial system development. In Kandahar, despite unfavorable security 

conditions, the governor managed to suppress the acceleration of poppy 

cultivation to keep 2007 cultivation estimates nearly level with last year’s. 

While most of the southern provinces posted increased cultivation numbers, 

Kandahar’s governor successfully suppressed cultivation through 

commitment to the poppy elimination mission. Yet corruption in 

Afghanistan too often impedes progress and erodes political will. 

In areas where more security exists, as in the north, political will can 

eliminate the drug problem. In Balkh, for example, the governor decided to 

show authority over his area and proved to be a key player in making 

dramatic reductions in poppy cultivation. Where insecurity exists, it is 

harder to deliver services and maintain a central government presence. For 

example, USAID had twelve contractors killed from 2005-06 trying to 

deliver alternative development programs. 

Interdiction/Prosecution

The GOA needs help in improving its interdiction and prosecution capacity. 

Last year, less than two percent of the total opium crop of Afghanistan was 

interdicted inside Afghanistan. Porous borders and mountain terrain 

continue to impede interdiction efforts. The USG is working closely with 

the international community to improve border control and to take some of 

the lessons learned from countries with successful interdiction activities, 

such as Colombia, and apply those lessons in Afghanistan. 

The interdiction strategy also needs to better address stockpiled narcotics. 

Since Afghanistan produces more opium than global demand can absorb, 

traffickers can store opium for up to three years and use it for currency. Even 

when the Taliban outlawed opium production in 2000 they continued to 

profit from huge stockpiles. 

DEA is working with the Departments of State and Defense to help the GOA 

build its investigative and interdiction capabilities through the funding and 

26
training of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). Without a 

dedicated narcotics police investigative agency like the CNPA, interdiction 

efforts will be left to roadside checkpoint discoveries. A dedicated 

investigative agency will utilize contemporary investigative techniques to 

infiltrate drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), interdict shipments of 

drugs, and gather evidence against the heads of the DTOs needed for 

prosecution. Efforts for the creation and training of these specialized units 

are underway. 

Afghanistan’s ability to prosecute high-level cases also remains a challenge. 

In December 2005, the GOA passed a comprehensive CN Law and is 

currently revising criminal justice procedures and laws. Further, the central 

tribunal for narcotics is still in its infancy. To date, the Central Narcotics 

Tribunal (CNT) has received over 320 cases that meet the minimum

threshold for heroin and opium, involving over 520 defendants and resulting 

in approximately 225 defendants being found in guilty. In addition to the 

CNT, the Department of Justice trains and mentors the Afghan CN Criminal 

Justice Task Force (CJTF) of 30 prosecutors and 35 investigators to prepare 

for higher level cases over the coming year, including cases involving 

narcotics-related corruption. 

Information Campaign

The insurgents exploit information to meet their ends. They claim 

counternarcotics efforts hurt poor farmers and will lead to a collapse of the 

GOA. Cultivation, however, has significantly decreased in the northern part 

of Afghanistan and the GOA remains stable. Early shortcomings in the 

public information effort involved a reliance on radios, television, posters, 

billboards and stickers, rather than effectively using local leaders, 

particularly religious leaders, to deliver counternarcotics messages. The 

public information campaign has shifted this past year to focus more on 

word of mouth and working with Muslim leaders than in the past. In close 

coordination with the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP), the campaign has 

worked to engage trusted local opinion leaders, including tribal leaders, 

religious leaders (mullahs, ulama, and imams), elders, police chiefs, district 

leaders, and teachers. While this strategy has worked successfully in the 

north, campaigns have not been able to get the message out as well in the 

south because of the security situation. If campaigns can eventually persuade 

the religious leaders in the south to give the same message, it will help curb 

the cultivation of poppy and drug trafficking there as well. 

27
Alternative Development/Eradication Balance

In FY2006, $120 million of alternative development projects accompanied 

eradication in major poppy growing provinces. FY2007 funds include $20 

million for an enhanced Good Performers Initiative to reward provinces that 

have sustained poppy reductions. The USG has also had some success in 

ensuring that the GOA’s poppy eradication campaigns and alternative 

development programs are co-located in the same geographic areas in order 

to reinforce the “carrot and stick” aspects of the program. 

Critics of the USG-supported eradication effort say the government should 

stop eradicating and provide drug-cultivating farmers with economic 

assistance without strings attached. However, there is no successful 

precedent anywhere in the world where drug cultivation was abandoned 

purely through economic rewards. Successful USG drug cultivation 

reduction programs, specifically in the Andes with coca cultivation, and in 

Pakistan and Thailand, have succeeded by presenting a forced/voluntary 

eradication component with the offering or withholding of economic 

benefits. 

USG supported counternarcotics efforts must encourage alternative 

development programs that combine both short and longer-term incentives 

for individual rural households – where it is important to instill a sense of 

confidence that our assistance is a sustainable alternative to opium poppy 

cultivation. Surveys suggest that once farmers are provided with a viable 

alternative subsistence crop – not necessarily comparable to poppy— they 

will grow legal crops for quality of life reasons, including consistency with 

religious beliefs. 

Thus, it is critical to focus resources on programs that persuade farmers to 

switch crops while ensuring that the switch is a sustainable livelihood 

choice. Indeed, such sustainability requires integration with the private 

sector. In the current environment, however, the private sector will only 

develop over the medium-term. The most effective programs will therefore 

link immediate needs with the hoped for medium-term integration and be 

balanced with eradication programs in the same region.

28
Eradication/Elimination

The number of hectares eradicated thus far in 2007 has increased over 

previous years’ totals. The Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) and GovernorLed Eradication (GLE) teams collectively eradicated more than 19,000 Ha in 

the 2007 eradication season. 

Kandahar’s governor eradicated 8,157 Ha in 2007 simply by making it his 

personal initiative. His province currently cultivates about half the hectarage 

it did ten years ago. This sort of effort demonstrates to his people that he has 

control over his province, not the Taliban. 

The governor of Badakhshan greatly reduced cultivation through personally 

and actively engaging in PEP’s pre-planting campaign. In addition to 

calling for strict enforcement of the CN law by all provincial authorities and 

declaring that “no excuses” for cultivation would be accepted, he visited and 

spoke with those residents who initially demonstrated resistance to 

eradication. His hands-on approach was instrumental in demonstrating the 

importance of political will to back eradication. 

Balkh also achieved positive results in the 2006/2007 season because of the 

governor’s political will. According to UNODC estimates, in 2006 the 

province cultivated over 7,000 hectares of poppy. In 2007, the province will 

likely achieve poppy-free status. Balkh’s governor enabled this achievement 

by strictly enforcing the counternarcotics law with help from PEP and 

others. He prevented planting through a strong public information 

campaign, involvement of community leaders and students, and effective 

follow-through on development options in the province. His continued 

ability to attract development projects and build the province’s licit economy 

will be essential to keeping the province poppy-free. 

Despite large gains in governor-led and central-led eradication, success will 

take time and renewed efforts. Lack of security in some areas forces 

eradication teams to negotiate the terms of eradication with local elders. The 

resulting loss of effectiveness necessitates a more aggressive non-negotiated 

forced eradication strategy. The GOA should also consider a plan for a 

stronger set of incentives and disincentives for farmers. 

29
The Narcotics/Insurgency Relationship 

More and more information indicates that local Taliban commanders receive 

funding from the drug trade. These activities include taxation of opium

poppy farmers, laboratories, and narcotics transporters passing through 

Taliban checkpoints. Taliban commanders are also providing security/safe 

passage for drug shipment and are collecting “donations,” both money and 

supplies, such as vehicles from wealthy traffickers, to support the Taliban 

cause. The increasing linkage between the region’s major drug trafficking 

organizations and insurgencies prompts the need to elevate the drug 

enforcement mission and integrate it appropriately into the comprehensive 

security strategy. 

Evidence suggests that eradication and other strong counternarcotics 

measures need not alienate the rural population and drive them to the 

Taliban insurgency. According to Australian counterterrorism expert David 

Kilcullen: 

“The facts do not support this view [that eradication alienates 

farmers]. According to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 

figures [from 2005], less than 10% of the Afghan population is 

engaged in poppy cultivation. Thus even the harshest efforts to

eradicate poppy would not alienate the majority of the population. 

Similarly, by far the largest areas of cultivation are Helmand and 

Badakshan provinces. Together, these provinces account for 49.9% of 

poppy cultivation...but only 5.6% of the Afghan population. The 

largest pockets of cultivation—in rural northern Helmand province—

are in the least populated areas of Afghanistan. The insurgency is 

where the people are, but the poppy is not.” 

Helmand 

This year, eradication in Helmand depended heavily on the GOA’s 

continued support of the central government-led Afghan Eradication Force 

(AEF). The AEF worked in Helmand, despite increased security problems. 

However, the AEF continues to face significant management challenges. 

Local shura representatives—embedded with the AEF—have provided 

misleading targeting advice, preventing the AEF from maximizing 

30
eradication efforts on many days. Shura members have allegedly taken 

bribes from local villages, farmers, and traffickers to direct the AEF away 

from certain areas. 

An increase in the number of protests against the AEF and the potential for 

violence forced the GOA to request that the AEF depart Helmand this year. 

The AEF eradicated 3,000 Ha, well short of its eradication goal. 

This year’s experience in Helmand is instructive for its insights into the need 

for better coordination. Provincial officials initially helped the AEF 

establish local connections, appointing an eradication commission and local 

jirga to assist the AEF in obtaining community consent to operate. 

Allegations of corruption, however, plagued these ad hoc bodies. When the 

AEF ignored the jirga's guidance, it encountered security threats, civil 

disobedience, and political opposition that shut down its operations. 

Furthermore, some officials were uncooperative with the Poppy Elimination 

Program’s (PEP) mandate to engage in province-wide public information 

and alternative development outreach with farmers and local leaders. 

Helmand’s Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) efforts have also fallen short of 

expectations. Despite having more resources than any other province, 

Helmand’s GLE teams eradicated only 2,037 Ha in the heartland of 

Afghanistan's poppy-belt. By comparison, neighboring Kandahar has 

eradicated 8,157 Ha this year and Helmand's previous governor led a GLE 

effort that eradicated 3,166 Ha of poppy in 2006. 

31
5. ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY 

A. Public Information 

To counter insurgents’ claims about the risks and rewards of poppy 

cultivation and narcotics trafficking, the USG-supported public information 

campaign informs the Afghan public about success in eradication, law 

enforcement, justice reform, and alternative development programs; thereby 

increasing confidence in the GOA. Public information campaigns could also 

more effectively use PEP to work with local opinion leaders, shuras, and 

other grassroots and person-to-person initiatives to spread messages by word 

of mouth. 

The pre-planting component of the public information pillar aims to reduce 

national planting levels by at least 15%, increase the number of poppy free 

provinces, and sustain poppy reductions in provinces that experienced 

decreases during the 2006-2007 planting season. As part of the public 

information pillar, pre-planting campaigns aim to promote lasting behavioral 

change among poppy farmers by transforming their perceptions of the risks 

and rewards of poppy cultivation. Any strategy must target all levels of 

players involved with the problem. A successful strategy requires that the 

GOA furnish political will and create accountability; that provincial level 

government officials prevent poppy planting in their provinces; that farmers 

be dissuaded from planting; and that there be provision of ample alternatives 

to opium poppy farming. At all levels, the USG strategy supports the 

application of benefits and deterrents, such as those listed below. 

1. Improve Counternarcotics (CN) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) 

Public Information Coordination: Given the increasing ties between drug 

trafficking and the insurgency, it is essential that CN and COIN public 

information campaigns be consistent and well-coordinated. Those who 

grow poppy or traffic in drugs in the south of the country need to know that 

they will be defeated just as the insurgents will be, and that contributing to 

the Taliban financially or with people or weapons is equivalent to insurgent 

activity. Public information campaigns should highlight joint successes of 

counterterrorism, narcotics interdiction, and poppy elimination/eradication 

campaigns to enforce the message that narcotics-related activity is as nonnegotiable as insurgent activity is. Organizations involved in 

32
counternarcotics should work closely with Afghan and allied military forces 

to coordinate this campaign through a weekly standing counternarcotics 

public information working group. 

At the most basic level, communicating concrete success stories serves to 

demonstrate tangible improvements in the Government of Afghanistan’s 

capacity and reach of its authority, thereby enhancing public confidence in 

the central government. Increased emphasis on interdiction and eradication 

success stories also serves to interject a heightened degree of risk into the 

decision to plant poppy or engage in the drug trade. Publicizing any 

advances in central government and governor-led provincial eradication 

demonstrates to poppy farmers that the threat of eradication is real and 

imminent. To the extent possible, messages on tangible successes should be 

communicated at the village, district, and provincial levels to imprint the 

risks of poppy growing into local collective memory – as well as the idea 

that supporting the drug trade equates with supporting terrorism, particularly 

in the south. During the fall pre-planting season, public information efforts 

should remind farmers of both the effectiveness of eradication campaigns 

and the guaranteed markets for licit crops. 

Throughout the year, interdiction successes and the arrests of high value

targets should be widely publicized throughout the Afghan media. Public 

information emphasis on interdiction serves to dispel misinformation that 

counternarcotics programs only target poppy farmers and to demonstrate that 

no one group is being unfairly targeted. Rather, all groups of people – from

poppy farmers to international narco-traffickers – must adhere to the rule of 

law. Similarly, the GOA should highlight the Taliban’s links to poppy 

cultivation as part of a targeted information campaign to discredit them in 

the eyes of the Afghan population, international donors, and local leaders. 

This activity should include publicizing the detention of high-profile 

corruption figures associated with poppy cultivation. 

 

Coordination of key messages and public information programs is essential 

to promoting cohesion among allied partners and delivering coherent and 

unified messages on these themes to the Afghan people. For example, the 

Government of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior and Ministry of 

Counternarcotics determine the message themes for INL-led 

counternarcotics public information programs, in coordination with the U.S. 

and UK embassies in Kabul. There is a critical need for a unified, security 

sector-oriented communications working group that engages all stakeholders 

33
equally and that works to devise a Strategic Communications Plan for 

Afghanistan that specifies short term and long term information objectives, 

specific programs to achieve these objectives, programmatic responsibilities 

of USG and coalition partners, plans for engaging with and building capacity 

within the GOA’s communications sector, and standardized protocols and 

processes for disseminating information. 

An effort is currently underway to coordinate messages among and build 

capacity in relevant GOA Ministries through the National Communications 

Coordination Center (NC3), which was established in December 2006. As it 

matures, the NC3 will serve as the primary GOA tool for disseminating 

information to the Afghan and international public. These operational 

efforts are vital and receive INL support and input, but must be integrated 

into a coordinated strategic framework in order to be effective. 

2. Enhance Focus on Grassroots and Word of Mouth Initiatives:

This year, for the first time, the public information campaign engaged local 

tribal and religious leaders at the grassroots level. Success in these efforts 

was achieved in Balkh and several other northern provinces. This initiative 

should be dramatically expanded through the Poppy Elimination Program 

Teams, “Message Multipliers” program, military organizations, and PRTs. 

Each province should have a written plan for local outreach that engages 

the PEP team, PRT, and military command, and should keep track of 

contacts, successes and failures. Pre-planting campaigns should include 

community outreach. PEP operations should be strengthened and 

regionalized. 

Face-to-face engagement of prominent members of the community is critical 

because these actors are often capable of changing farmers’ risk-reward 

calculus. For example, there were reports from eastern Nangarhar, which 

experienced a sharp decrease in poppy cultivation in 2005 due to the efforts 

of the former governor, that community elders encouraged farmers to plant 

poppy during the pre-planting season. In turn, Nangarhar experienced a 

strong increase in poppy cultivation for the 2006/2007 growing season. 

In 2006, the security situation had a great impact on the efficacy of 

community outreach programs. A permissive security environment allowed 

robust community outreach campaigns to be carried out during the preplanting season in the northern provinces of Ghor, Sari Pul, Samangan, and 

Badakhshan, where UNODC reported there was a significant reduction in 

34
cultivation. The fragile security situation in Helmand and Uruzgan, 

however, prevented the pre-planting public information campaign from

gaining traction, according to reporting from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. 

The local leaders and the general public can be engaged in any number of 

ways. In Balkh, for example, PEP achieved success in engaging farmers and 

entire families in the CN message by distributing candies to children while 

they spoke about the need to eradicate poppy. This simple approach has 

proven effective in boosting the receptivity to PEP officers who travel from

village to village explaining Afghan law and consequences for planting 

poppy. In Nangarhar, the PEP team has actively engaged local 

entrepreneurs by hosting small business seminars, with particular focus on 

capacity-building for women. In Kandahar, PEP multiplied its CN outreach 

by educating teachers from multiple districts on the CN law, as well as the 

legal, social, economic and political consequences of poppy cultivation. The 

teachers then disseminate the same information to students and their parents 

throughout each district. PRT and military commands could begin to adopt 

these tactics to further the CN message. 

The “Message Multipliers” program supplemented PEP activities by 

allowing the GOA to identify key communicators to encourage noncultivation in 10 different provinces, including five non-PEP provinces. 

Implemented in October/November 2006, message multipliers reached 

363,804 people in 1,941 villages by working with the provincial governors 

to convene shuras that were attended by district governors, chiefs of police, 

ulama, and members of provincial councils. 

Moving forward, these community outreach activities should be expanded 

significantly and implemented in an increasingly strategic manner to target 

districts with the highest levels of cultivation. The PEP teams and Message 

Multipliers must continue to devise creative projects that spread the CN 

message in a grassroots fashion. PRT and military commands should begin 

to adopt these types of tactics to further the CN message. In the future, the 

PEP teams will create a project approval and funding mechanism to identify 

and fund priority outreach activities. In addition, given the success of the 

Message Multiplier program in several northern provinces, the GOA should 

complement these gains by engaging with mullahs and tribal leaders. 

 

a. Strengthen Pre-Planting Activities: Innovations to the 2006/2007 

public information pre-planting campaign – namely in the arena of 

35
community outreach – proved successful in lowering poppy cultivation 

levels in certain areas. These activities should remain a component of 

future pre-planting campaigns, but should be intensified and begin 

earlier in the pre-planting season. 

Poppy planting begins as early as September in the south of the country and 

continues throughout the fall with a smaller secondary planting in upland 

areas in February and March. Because farmers must make their planting 

decisions prior to this time, the window of opportunity to influence and 

impact these planting decisions occurs from the time of harvest (generally, 

April-July, but primarily in May) until planting season ends in

November/December. 

Those who facilitate and profit from the drug trade in Afghanistan work 

during the pre-planting season to provide loans to and obtain poppy growing 

commitments from farmers. While warnings about possible eradication 

remain an important deterrent that provides teeth to pre-planting season 

activities, increased emphasis and resources must be dedicated to the 

provision of incentives, public outreach efforts, and rural development 

programs during the pre-planting season to proactively prevent poppy 

planting before it occurs. 

The pre-planting public information campaign for the 2006/2007 growing 

season began in September 2006 and included community outreach activities 

as well as traditional radio and television messaging. In future years, a 

comprehensive pre-planting strategy must be finalized much sooner than

this, since planting begins as early as September in some locations. 

During the 2006/2007 growing season, each of the seven PEP teams 

developed a set of pre-planting activities designed to influence farmers and 

other decision makers, such as tribal elders and district officials, not to plant 

poppy. Examples of these activities included educating farmers about the 

risk of eradication, establishment of a farmers’ cooperative to discuss 

development needs and garner local support for non-cultivation initiatives, 

conducting CN seminars for teachers, meeting with local elders, head men, 

and mullahs to win support for CN efforts, and holding farmers shuras at the 

district level. PEP’s active outreach in each of its provinces has made it an 

indispensable “coordinator” of multiple efforts at the provincial level and 

has served as the link between functional actors in each PEP province 

throughout the growing cycle. Continued development of this role and 

36
adding PRT and military support will facilitate greater coordination, 

cooperation, and focus of the range of CN efforts in each PEP province. 

In addition to continuing these traditional pre-planting activities, certain PEP 

teams could be tasked with conducting written analyses of the factors that 

have motivated notable good performers in preventing planting and 

eradication in the past to determine whether this “model” can be replicated 

elsewhere. This assessment could begin as soon as possible so its findings 

can be applied to the upcoming pre-planting season and next year’s 

eradication season. 

The public information campaign could also highlight enhanced rural 

development (alternative development) programs during the pre-planting 

season to make the pursuit of licit livelihoods a more attractive and available 

option to farmers. Alternatives to poppy must be presented to farmers prior 

to the time when they make their planting decisions. 

b. Regionalize the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP): The USG could

strengthen existing PEP operations in its seven operating provinces. The 

PEP concept also could be regionalized through the incorporation of 

surrounding provinces and by delegating financial authority to the 

provincial teams. Regionalizing PEP would maximize central

government presence in opium poppy areas with minimal addition of 

resources. 

Supported by the USG, PEP began in 2005 under the Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics (MCN) as a fledgling outreach program based in what were then 

seven of the highest poppy-producing provinces (Badakhshan, Balkh, 

Nangarhar, Kandahar, Oruzgan, Helmand, and Farah). By mid-2006 the

program had overcome initial logistical and staffing hurdles and has since 

become a key resource at the provincial level. The GOA and international 

community regard PEP as the primary “bridge” for the counternarcotics 

pillars in each of its seven provinces. Under the supervision of International 

Advisors (IAs), the Afghan-staffed PEP teams provide a range of functions, 

including monitoring and verification of poppy planting, growth, and 

eradication; monitoring of – and a repository for information about – 

provincially-based alternative development programs; public information 

outreach; and guidance and recommendations for provincial governors on 

eradication planning and factors necessary to build an environment 

conducive to eradication and alternatives to poppy cultivation. 

37
Strengthening and regionalizing PEP’s outreach to local populations in host 

provinces as well as provinces surrounding the original seven will provide 

further insight into and feedback on local attitudes toward poppy cultivation 

and the elements needed to prevent future planting and cultivation of poppy. 

Furthermore, its capacity to coordinate provincial, national, and international 

actors and to serve as a “sounding board” for provincial governors will 

ensure continued focus and cooperation on the CN campaign. To effectively 

regionalize PEP in the short-term, additional personnel would be required to 

allow PEP team members to serve a wider geographic area. In the medium

and long term, new teams could be established in provinces without PEP 

presence. 

As employees of an MCN program, Afghan nationals employed in PEP may 

soon face an approximately 80% reduction in salary under the Priority 

Reform and Restructuring (PRR) of the Civil Service salary scale. Many of 

the current staff have developed considerable expertise in their subject area, 

and their departure from the MCN would represent a considerable 

knowledge deficit for the Ministry. The GOA could establish a program 

budget for PEP and budgetary flexibility for teams to prioritize funding. 

This includes agreement by MCN and international donors on how to retain 

Afghan PEP members under the PRR process, including through the 

possible appointment of PEP staff as “advisors” to the MCN. 

Public Information in Helmand

Recognizing the unique counternarcotics, communications, and security 

challenges present in Helmand, there is a need to supplement traditional 

community outreach activities and radio, television, and print media 

messaging with specialized information initiatives. 

CN Programming to VOA’s Deewa Pashto station: In spring 2007, INL 

initiated an agreement with the Voice of America’s (VOA) recently-created 

Pashto language radio station Deewa, which broadcasts in the Pashto areas 

along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, including Helmand. Under the terms 

of the agreement, Deewa will provide dedicated coverage of 

counternarcotics, law enforcement, and related news and successes. Deewa

joins Radio Television Afghanistan-Helmand and Radio Sabawoon in 

carrying CN and related broadcasting in Helmand. Given the tenuous 

security situation in Helmand, radio becomes a very important conduit 

38
through which to relay critical counternarcotics news and information to the 

local population. 

B. Alternative Development 

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world; two-thirds of the 

country’s population subsists on less than two dollars per day. Extreme 

economic deprivation, low life expectancy, endemic illiteracy, and 

widespread unemployment are among the fundamental drivers that have led 

rural households to cultivate opium poppy, despite moral and religious 

strictures against intoxicants. 

Additionally, many rural households are mired in debt.1

 Estimates as to the 

total debt of poppy growers in Afghanistan are in the hundreds of millions of 

dollars. Many of the indebted have little choice but to grow a crop which 

yields the necessary income to meet obligations, as the repercussions of 

default in Afghanistan are severe. Moreover, eighty percent of 

Afghanistan’s population depends directly or indirectly on agriculture for 

subsistence, yet only an estimated twelve percent are engaged in illicit crop 

cultivation. Providing rural households with viable economic alternatives 

does not entail that the sales of legal crops will replace household income 

derived from opium poppy sales. Unfortunately, no licit crop has yet come 

close to equaling the revenue that opium poppy generates because of the 

elasticity of the farm gate price of poppy, which is manipulated by a cartel of 

large brokers, traders, and narco-criminal networks. 

Therefore, coercive measures, such as eradication, must be combined with

both short and long-term economic incentives in order to alter the 

risk/reward calculus of rural households to be in favor of licit crop 

cultivation. Only a vibrant, dynamic and strong private sector can provide 

the jobs and drive the economic growth required to provide these incentives. 

Economic growth must be widespread, however, and provide employment 

opportunities both on and off the farm, in rural areas as well as cities, in 

order to counter the rapid mobility and elasticity of opium poppy cultivation. 

Increasing employment opportunities is also important in order to reduce the 

amount of surplus labor available during the poppy harvest season. 

 

1 Field work in Nangarhar (2004), for example, has indicated that around 57% of households obtain 

seasonal loans. More recent work in Herat, Kapisa, and Ghor indicates respective percentages of indebted 

households as 41%, 67%, and 89%. 

39
Economic growth and job creation must be sustained over time given that 

Afghanistan’s workforce is expanding rapidly, since 70% of the country’s 

population is under the age of thirty. 

In recent years, economic growth has lessened the Afghan economy’s 

dependence upon opium poppy cultivation. Significantly, while the total 

export value of Afghanistan’s opium rose from $2.7 billion in 2005 to $3.1 

billion in 2006, the value of opium exports as a percentage of licit GDP fell 

from 52% to 46% during the same period thanks to the even faster growth of 

Afghanistan’s licit economic sectors. Afghanistan’s licit GDP grew by 29% 

between 2005 and 2006, from $5.2 billion to $6.7 billion. If robust 

economic growth continues, increased opportunities in the licit economic 

sector will lead to an increasing number of alternatives to opium poppy 

cultivation for rural households. 

The Alternative Development program (AD) targets the principal poppy 

producing provinces of Afghanistan to establish economic alternatives to the 

cultivation of the opium poppy for rural households. The Alternative 

Development program provides both short and long-term economic 

incentives for rural households, as well as political support to proactive 

provincial leaders through the Good Performers Initiative. 

Short-term incentives to rural households include improvements to livestock 

health, cash-for-work opportunities to rehabilitate rural infrastructure, and 

the provision of seed, fertilizer, and other inputs to spur the production of 

high-value vegetables, animal fodder, and other crops that have short 

cultivation cycles. While these short-term incentive programs occur 

throughout the year, particular emphasis is placed during the poppy planting 

and harvest season, in order to maximize impact on household decisionmaking during those critical periods. 

Short-term assistance is complemented by long-term programs that establish 

the foundation for sustained job creation and economic growth. These 

projects improve the entire agricultural value chain, from seed to end 

consumer. Long-term comprehensive development programs include preplanting assistance (such as credit, agricultural input delivery, and training) 

as well as post-production assistance with harvesting, sorting, grading, 

packaging and marketing. Targeted products include high-value nut and 

fruit crops, such as pomegranates, as well as vegetables, oilseed, and animal 

feed. Farmer associations, such as the Dried Fruit and Nut Exporters 

40
Association of Kandahar, are strengthened through training, financing, 

equipment leasing, and other assistance. Farmer associations and 

cooperatives, as well as successful individual farmers, provide the quantity 

and quality of crops required by private agribusiness firms. 

Agribusinesses and agro-industries are being supported with marketing, 

planning, credit, and other business development assistance that will add 

value to farm products and enable Afghan producers to compete in local and 

external markets. The long-term goal is to create competitive, sustainable 

businesses that provide jobs, expand markets, and spur economic growth in 

order to remove the economic incentives that drive poppy cultivation. 

The Alternative Development program also provides financial incentives to 

proactive provincial leaders that eliminate or prevent poppy cultivation 

through the Good Performers Initiative. The initiative may target provinces 

that are not covered by alternative development programs. These initiatives 

demonstrate the GOA’s concern for such provinces and rewards local 

initiatives to reduce poppy cultivation. 

The challenges of implementing the alternative development program are 

daunting. Economic growth in Afghanistan is hampered by massive 

infrastructure deficits (especially lack of electric power), a shortage of 

skilled human capital, insecurity, corruption, weak legal and regulatory 

regimes, and poor access to seaports, among other factors. The USG and 

other donors are addressing these structural problems, and much progress 

has been made, but given Afghanistan’s incredibly low starting point, years 

of work remain in order to build a modern and regionally competitive 

Afghan economy. 

Lack of security also makes program implementation, particularly in the 

south, difficult, slow, and expensive. Twelve persons associated with the 

alternative development program were killed during the program’s 

implementation from 2005-6. 

1. Strengthen the Good Performers Initiative (GPI): In 2006, the 

Government of Afghanistan launched a Good Performers Initiative to 

reward provinces that had achieved poppy-free status. Prior to the start of 

the 2007 planting season, the GPI will be significantly expanded and 

improved. The objective of the Good Performers Initiative is to provide 

high-impact development assistance to encourage the Government of 

41
Afghanistan, provincial administrators, and local actors to take decisive 

action to halt the cultivation of opium poppy. The GPI will provide 

significant financial and political incentives ($25 to $50 million) to 

provinces for reductions in net cultivation as reported in the annual 

UNODC cultivation survey. In addition to the GPI, the UN-administered 

Counternarcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) must disburse funds sooner to enable 

delivery on approved CN-related development projects. So far only 2.5% of 

the CNTF’s $70 million has been distributed. 

In 2006 President Karzai announced the launch of a Good Performers 

Initiative to reward poppy-free provinces for aggressive counternarcotics 

performance. Provinces were promised an additional $500,000 worth of 

quick-impact, high-priority development projects, with the prospect of 

another $500,000 if they maintained their poppy-free status in 2007. Under 

the expanded GPI, to be released before the fall 2007 planting season, 

rewards for poppy-free provinces will be continued. Disbursement under 

this category will probably expand significantly this year, as the number of 

poppy-free provinces is likely to climb from six in 2006 to at least eleven in 

2007. 

Under the terms of the expanded Good Performers Initiative, which will be 

announced in Kabul in the near future, provinces can also qualify for 

rewards for significantly reducing net cultivation and for other meritorious 

counternarcotics performance. 

The proposed expansion of the GPI will be easy to understand, administer, 

and verify. It will also reduce opportunities for corruption and cause no 

perverse incentives. It will provide substantial material and political 

incentives to provincial administrations to drive down opium poppy 

cultivation. It will also provide villages, neighborhoods, and rural 

communities with the opportunity to directly improve their lives in ways that 

matter to them. 

a. Accelerate Counternarcotics Trust Funds (CNTF) Payouts: The 

UN-administered CNTF must disburse funds sooner to enable delivery 

on approved CN-related development projects. So far only 2.5% of 

CNTF funds (now totaling approximately $70M) have been disbursed 

 

The Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) was established in October 2005 

by the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations Development 

42
Programme (UNDP) and donor nations to confront illicit drug cultivation, 

production, and trafficking in Afghanistan. The broad objectives of the 

CNTF are to provide greater resources for the Government of Afghanistan’s 

counternarcotics efforts, ensure transparency and accountability in the 

allocation and use of those resources, enable increased government 

ownership over counternarcotics implementation, and promote greater 

coherence in the funding of counternarcotics related activities. 

As of July 2006, the CNTF had received contribution pledges totaling 

approximately $70 million. The USG and other contributing donors should 

work with the GOA to streamline the process of receiving and reviewing 

project proposals, providing approval and funding, and enhancing oversight 

to ensure delivery. 

2. Develop Refined Plan for Crops and Livestock: USAID has 

continuously refined its crop and seed programs by promoting higher value 

crops and farming methods that result in higher profits for traditional crops 

and livestock. More attention could be focused on the development of 

marketable high value crops and livestock that can give rural households 

increased income in the short-run (e.g. vegetables) as well as the long-term 

(e.g. fruits and nuts).

The development of crops to provide rural households with alternatives to 

poppy cultivation must be driven by market demand. Once market demand 

is established, the entire value chain of a product—from the provision of 

seed to the final sale to the consumer—must be developed to maximize 

market value. Alternative development programs could continue to facilitate 

linkages between input suppliers, farmers, and traders, and ensure that rural 

households cultivate products that meet the market variety, price, volume, 

quality, packaging, and timing requirements. 

USDA could increase assistance to the GOA to enable Afghan products to 

meet international sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards. 

There is no single licit crop that can replace poppy, however. Instead, a mix 

of marketable high-value licit crops must be promoted, alongside the 

implementation of coercive measures such as eradication.

3. Increase Private Sector Involvement: Farming households must be 

provided with viable, lasting economic alternatives to opium poppy 

43
cultivation. The private sector must be the driver of this change. Alternative 

development programs could begin establishing businesses that issue 

contracts that give farmers guaranteed sales and favorable prices for their 

crops, thereby lowering the risk of adopting new crops. Short-term crops 

that yield immediate income, such as animal fodder grains and high-value 

vegetables, could be produced, processed, packaged, and sold throughout

Afghanistan and the region, thereby generating on and off the farm job 

opportunities for rural households. Contract farming, alongside grant and 

micro-finance assistance to farmers for farm equipment, infrastructure, and 

other inputs is preferable to direct crop subsidies, which would undermine 

competitive markets, distort economic activity, and be prohibitively difficult 

to administer. 

Afghanistan’s private sector must be the driver of the economic growth and 

job creation that provide rural households with the incentives needed to 

move away from poppy and towards the cultivation of licit crops. USAID 

could begin focusing on developing large-scale agribusinesses, based in 

provincial capitals such as Lashkar Gah, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-eSharif, and Herat, that would refine, process, add value to, and distribute licit 

agricultural products bought from farmers in poppy-growing regions. 

Agribusinesses will enter into contracts with farmers, farmer associations, 

and cooperatives in order to guarantee a favorable purchase price for certain 

products. A guaranteed market would greatly reduce the risk farmers face in 

moving from poppy to licit crops. USAID could also provide 

complementary agricultural inputs, such as seed, fertilizer, credit, 

machinery, and irrigation, as well as farm-to-market roads and other 

infrastructure. This assistance would target specific poppy-producing 

provinces, and will stimulate the private-sector development of particular 

product lines. 

At the same time, USAID will encourage a mix of long and short-term

crops, so that farmers are given both immediate and long-term economic 

incentives. Short-term crops such as animal feed crops (e.g. alfalfa, 

sorghum) and high-value vegetables (e.g. lettuce, carrots, tomatoes) will 

give farmers immediate sources of income, while longer-term horticultural 

crops (e.g. pomegranates, almonds, grapes) mature. 

The agro-industrial facilities that will process and distribute these 

agricultural goods will generate off-farm employment in transport, 

44
manufacturing, and services, thereby creating additional job opportunities 

for rural households. Current plans include the creation of a nationwide 

animal feed industry centered in Helmand, pomegranate concentrate and 

other horticultural product manufacturing in Kandahar, vegetable and 

horticultural production in Jalalabad, and canned vegetables and fruits in

Mazar-e-Sharif. Since off-farm employment opportunities are of critical 

importance to the creation of licit economic alternatives to poppy, other 

industries such as marble and carpets may be concurrently developed. 

The development of major infrastructure, particularly transport and energy, 

is vital to ensuring the success of this endeavor. Timely completion of the 

southern and northern electrical power systems are key examples. Because 

of the importance of air transport and reliable cold chain storage for 

perishable high value products such as flowers, fruits and vegetables, 

opening Kandahar Airport - the largest in the country - to commercial air 

freight and passenger traffic could have a transformational impact on 

southern Afghanistan’s economy. 

Crop subsidies have been duly considered, but the option is not viable 

because subsidies would undermine competitive markets, distort economic

activity, and be prohibitively difficult to administer. Countries where 

subsidies are currently practiced require enormous bureaucracies to 

distribute the payments. Afghanistan’s administrative capacity is too weak 

to execute a subsidy program; further, such a program could lead to 

significant corruption. It would also be costly and cumbersome for donor 

agencies, such as USAID or the UN, to administer a subsidy program. 

Moreover, the program would require a prohibitively expensive yearly 

appropriation. The private sector program proposed in this section already 

provides a type of subsidy by grant-financing the development of alternative 

crops that yield income in the short and long-term, as well as financing rural 

infrastructure and markets for the crops. Unlike crop subsidies, which do 

not spur long-term, sustainable growth, the development of a viable private 

sector will provide lasting economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, 

both on and off the farm. 

The Afghan private sector is currently underdeveloped, however, and will 

not be able to provide the necessary income for quite some time. Therefore, 

in the interim it will be critical to provide additional resources for the 

previously mentioned grant programs, as well as new micro-finance 

facilities that help rural Afghans meet their obligations while improving 

45
their productive capacities. Such facilities would be conditioned upon 

alternative crop growth, and could be unfolded in a number of pilot 

programs to rapidly perfect oversight practices. 

4. Provide Additional Support for National Solidarity Program 

(NSP) Targeted at Rural Areas Critical to the CN Effort: The NSP 

program operates in 34 provinces and has been responsible for nearly 4,000 

irrigation sub-projects and hundreds of other village-level projects. The 

program could benefit from a timely infusion of funds and also serve as an 

Afghan-led complement to the counternarcotics strategy. 

The NSP program, funded through the donor-supported Afghan 

Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), is operating in 34 provinces and has 

been responsible for nearly 4,000 irrigation sub-projects and several hundred 

rural development efforts at the village level. The program could benefit 

from a timely infusion of funds and also serve as an Afghan-led complement 

to the counternarcotics strategy. NSP has a good track record of 

engendering local level support for the Afghan government and, if focused 

in poppy production areas, could have similarly productive results. While 

the World Bank, as manager of the ARTF and large contributor to NSP, 

would likely balk at targeting the program explicitly for CN purposes, the 

USG could work with Afghan authorities to target NSP projects on areas 

critical to the CN effort.

5. Engage Land Grant Universities: USAID and USDA could expand 

their programs for U.S. Land Grant Universities. USDA could support this 

role for the agricultural sector through development of technical capacity 

building activities with appropriate GOA officials and Afghan universities. 

Since 2004, USAID and USDA have been working with U.S. land grant 

universities (LGUs) in Afghanistan on agricultural extension, natural 

resources management, biodiversity conservation, animal health services, 

and trade. To date, thirteen LGUs have worked with USAID in Afghanistan. 

Examples of ongoing LGU programs include specialized training programs

for Afghan agricultural experts and policy makers; the establishment of a 

national livestock disease surveillance system; and applied in-country 

training to improve Afghan agricultural research and extension. Future 

plans anticipate spending up to an additional $20 million to fund LGUs 

through a competitive award process. 

46
Alternative Development Investment in Helmand

USG investment in Helmand’s development currently totals more than $270 

million and includes infrastructure, health, education, democracy and 

governance, agriculture, and alternative development programs. Helmand is 

one of the highest recipients of USAID assistance in Afghanistan. Indeed, if 

Helmand were a country, it would be the fifth largest recipient of FY2007 

USAID funding in the world. 

This year, the Alternative Development Program will intensify efforts in 

Helmand. The centerpiece of this activity is the renewed rehabilitation of 

the Kajaki hydroelectric dam, which was delayed in 2006 due to security 

problems. Alternative development programs will support the Kajaki 

project by providing cash for work and other programs along the Sangin 

Valley, where the Kajaki access road is scheduled to be built. 

Construction of an industrial park in Lashkar Gah, like those already built in 

Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, will be the locus of agro-industrial 

production in Helmand. For example, USAID will develop an animal feed 

industry centered in Lashkar Gah, which will be supplied by farms 

surrounding the provincial capital. USAID plans to establish a privately 

owned and operated animal feed mill that will enter into contracts with 

farmers in the Helmand river valley to provide them with a guaranteed 

market, favorable prices, and the inputs required to produce crops such as 

alfalfa and sorghum, which can be harvested up to five times per year, 

thereby providing an immediate source of income for Helmand’s farmers. 

These crops, once transported to Lashkar Gah, will be milled and packaged 

and shipped through a nationwide network of agricultural stores and 

veterinarians present in every district of Afghanistan, feeding demand for 

meat and dairy products and creating a nationwide industry based in 

Helmand. The feed industry will also create off-farm employment 

opportunities in transport, manufacturing, and services. 

Other short-term crops, including peppers and other high-value vegetables, 

will also be developed as long-term fruit and nut crops mature. 

Concurrently, ADP will continue to improve Helmand’s infrastructure, 

including farm to market roads and major irrigation works such as the 

Darweshan Irrigation Canal. USAID will also upgrade the Lashkar Gah 

Electrical Sub-Station and Distribution System to prepare it for an increased 

electricity load once the Kajaki project is completed. 

47
C. Poppy Elimination/Eradication 

A successful counternarcotics strategy requires both strong incentives and 

strong disincentives. The current use of tractors and ATVs to eradicate large 

poppy fields has been helpful in the 2007 season and could be continued and 

improved. Additionally, the GOA could reconsider Ground Based Spray 

(GBS) after the USDA and State/INL conduct an education program on the 

safety and effectiveness of herbicides for Afghanistan’s government 

officials. The AEF appears to need significant management improvements 

regarding the quality of eradication and verification. Additionally, more 

aggressive GLE is needed in order to supplement the shortcomings 

associated with the AEF when operating in volatile areas. 

The most critical improvement to current eradication methodology, 

however, would be the wide-spread implementation of GOA-led nonnegotiated forced eradication. Negotiated eradication greatly limits the 

capabilities of the AEF not only by slowing down operations, but also by 

weakening eradication’s deterrent effect on farmers’ planting decisions. A 

stronger force protection component for the AEF (discussed more fully 

under Interdiction/Law Enforcement operations) would allow the AEF to 

operate more effectively in hostile environments such as Helmand, where 

eradication currently often occurs after an inequitable negotiation process 

with local authorities. Aerial eradication should also be considered as a 

potential method for implementing non-negotiated forced eradication. No 

aerial spray program would be implemented without the consent of the 

GOA.

Although controversial and difficult, eradication is essential to controlling 

the narcotics industry in Afghanistan. USG-funded eradication efforts date 

back to late 2003, when USG and UNODC surveys began to show a very 

large increase in poppy cultivation was underway in Afghanistan. Under the 

five-pillar plan, the USG focuses on providing support to Afghanistan’s 

central and provincial governments in their elimination and eradication 

efforts. 

As discussed earlier, the USG is collaborating with the GOA to launch a 

Good Performers Initiative (GPI) as a means of encouraging governors and 

local leaders to pro-actively reduce net poppy cultivation in the 2007/8 

48
poppy season. The GPI will serve as the "carrot" to accompany the "sticks" 

of suppressing poppy planting and forced eradication. 

Concerning eradication in Afghanistan, the USG currently supports two 

forms of eradication—mechanized and manual – in two eradication efforts. 

One effort, centrally-led by the GOA, is called the Afghan Eradication Force 

(AEF) and consists of a group of 600 Afghan police trained in eradication 

and security. The AEF operates in self-contained units and eradicates with 

tractors and high-tech equipment. The GOA sends the AEF where either a 

governor requests aid because of insecurity, or where the provincial 

government is underperforming. Some governors want to prevent central 

GOA eradication in their province, and the threat of AEF intervention 

encourages them to eradicate on their own. The second effort, GovernorLed Eradication (GLE), accounts for the bulk of Afghanistan’s eradication, 

but is subject to corrupt practices and perverse incentives. Some provincial 

authorities solicit bribes to bypass fields while eradicating the fields of 

farmers who don’t pay bribes. Verifiers are vulnerable to pressure to inflate 

the amount of verified eradication. Some areas treat GLE as a “tax,” 

wherein each farmer agrees to have a small portion of his crop eradicated to 

satisfy GLE goals. The enhanced GPI would eliminate many of these faults 

and would replace USG reimbursements for GLE. 

In 2006, the AEF began using tow bar drags, made of iron bars and chains, 

behind tractors and ATVs to accelerate poppy eradication beyond what is 

possible using stick labor. This method reduces the amount of time that 

AEF needs to spend per field and also reduces its personnel commitment and 

security risks. With mechanized eradication, it is estimated that the AEF can 

destroy 300-1,000 hectares per day. Theoretically, in an entire season the 

AEF could potentially cut up to 30,000 hectares, given sufficient political 

will and proper security precautions and conditions. 

Obstacles to eradication in general, and specifically to increased mechanized 

eradication, include lacking political will on the local, district, provincial, 

and central levels; bribery, corruption, protests, and demonstrations; attacks 

on the AEF; and growing instability in the south, where mechanized 

eradication could perform the best. 

1. Governor Accountability: The GOA could announce a national net 

poppy reduction target before the fall 2007 planting season to create an 

atmosphere of accountability. 

49
The GOA could announce 2007/2008 net poppy reduction targets for each 

province that will be assigned to each governor in September. The GOA’s 

announcement could include listing corresponding rewards (see section 

below) for those meeting/exceeding their assigned poppy reduction targets 

via a combination of proactively discouraging planting and eradication and a 

gradation of specified sanctions for governors who fall short. Governors 

could face explicit outcomes for success or failure for which they have been 

publicly forewarned. Widespread media coverage of the GOA’s 

announcement could also occur. 

2. Governor Rewards: A comprehensive pre-planting strategy includes 

public recognition and reward for governors who have excelled in 

suppressing poppy planting and encouraging GLE, along with the 

announcement of future incentives. 

Possible rewards recognizing positive performance include USG financial 

support for targeted expansion of the governor’s budget; special grants for 

projects important to the governor; international recognition and rewards, 

such as international trips; promotions to career-enhancing or otherwise 

prestigious positions; invitations to an official GOA awards reception; and 

naming successful governors “leaders of excellence.” Recognition and 

rewards must be meaningful enough to influence other governors to follow 

suit and could commence as soon as possible to serve as an incentive for 

governors during the coming pre-planting season. 

3. Improve Mechanized Eradication and Targeting: The AEF could 

focus on using more mechanized eradication, supported by manual 

eradication. This would mean primarily using tractors and ATVs in 

terrain suitable for mechanized operations. In conjunction with the 

enhanced Good Performers Initiative, this approach could match - and 

even exceed – the national growth/expansion rate of opium poppy 

cultivation in Afghanistan. Eradication verification capability could also 

be improved by having the USG deploy more observers to verify AEF 

eradication on the ground or employ technology that provides detailed 

imagery as well as coordinates of eradicated fields. 

In order to maximize mechanized eradication, security could be removed as 

a criterion for targeting an area as it has only an indirect impact on the 

availability of licit livelihoods. The AEF must also know how to properly 

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operate and maintain vehicles through taking part in comprehensive training 

program prior to the start of the season. Finally, it will be particularly 

important to support the UK target-mapping initiative in Helmand. This 

initiative focuses eradication efforts on the “greedy” over the “needy” and 

areas where farmers have viable alternatives with better irrigation and access 

to markets. 

4. Improve Quality and Quantity of Eradication: No herbicidal spray 

program would be implemented without the consent of the GOA. This 

being said, in order to ensure that eradication is equitable, efficient, and 

capable of eradicating poppy on a sufficient scale, the USG advocates a 

policy of GOA-led non-negotiated forced eradication. One method of 

implementing forced eradication would entail the deployment of forceprotected ground-based spray (GBS) teams. There are many 

misconceptions about the safety, health, and environmental impact of 

glyphosate, the active ingredient in ground-based spray. A public 

education campaign should be initiated to address the health concerns 

associated with spray, broadcast the benefits of farm herbicides via 

public information targeting, and dispel misconceptions about GBS. 

Another way to accomplish the objective of non-negotiated forced 

eradication would be to employ aerial spray. 

The USG could encourage the future use of GBS eradication, particularly in 

high-concern provinces, and lay the groundwork for GOA acceptance of 

GBS by educating senior officials throughout the GOA regarding the health 

concerns associated with spray; broadcasting benefits of farm herbicides via 

public information targeting; and dispelling misconceptions about GBS. 

The USG could send GBS education and implementation teams to 

Afghanistan to address health and safety concerns. These teams, comprised 

of USDA and DOS representatives, could meet with GOA senior officials 

and scientists to provide information on the commonplace use of spray 

worldwide since 1974, both in commercial and government-sponsored 

programs. Along with public information campaigns, the implementation 

teams could clarify glyphosate's extensive worldwide use on food crops,

non-food crops, and on general vegetation control. 

In addition to implementation teams, the USG could facilitate an exchange 

between Afghan and Colombian agricultural and policy-making experts to 

share experiences on crop control and glyphosate use. The Organization of 

American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 

51
(OAS/CICAD) could serve as an educational link by providing Latin 

American experts on spray eradication. For example, CICAD has 

undertaken a test field project with glyphosate in Colombia over the last few 

years. If glyphosate test sites were established in Afghanistan, they would 

likely mirror the OAS/CICAD study experience and could serve to enhance 

familiarity with spray on the part of key stakeholders. 

Radio messages and community outreach activities are a critical component 

of increasing awareness of the safety of GBS. PEP teams could work with 

provincial governors to disseminate information on the safety of glyphosate 

in each of the seven PEP provinces. Additionally, PEP could coordinate 

community outreach efforts that include organizing district and village 

shuras and community events as well as engaging local leaders on CN 

efforts and glyphosate education activities. 

While herbicidal spray eradication is a more efficient and effective option 

than mechanized or manual eradication, it is also more politically volatile. 

Although differences of opinion on herbicidal eradication exist, the USG 

ultimately defers to the GOA’s decision with respect to its use. If and when 

the GOA decides to use herbicidal spray, the USG would be ready to assist. 

UNODC calculates that eradicating about 25% of the opium crop will 

introduce sufficient fear of future eradication into farmers’ minds to prevent 

planting next year. The Afghan government wants to try to reach the 25% 

eradication threshold. This may prove impossible, however, without the use 

of herbicides. Regarding the various concerns about glyphosate, numerous 

studies show that glyphosate is safe, efficacious, and cost-effective; it has 

been used globally for over 30 years. Glyphosate has a low toxicity, is not 

carcinogenic, and presents little other toxicological concerns to animals or 

humans. Additionally, the patent on glyphosate has expired, and supplies 

are plentiful. Further, spraying glyphosate will improve the yield of 

eradication, as seen in other USG-supported eradication programs. For 

example, last year the Colombians sprayed more illegal crops than 

Afghanistan’s entire opium poppy harvest. 

 

Additionally, in order to accomplish the objective of non-negotiated forced 

eradication, the GOA could study aerial eradication as a potential policy 

option. 

Eradication in Helmand

52
This season, the governor of Helmand asked the AEF to eradicate in 

Helmand. Despite making progress due to the AEF’s heavy use of 

mechanized eradication, insecurity and waning political will hindered the 

AEF’s efforts. Helmand will likely continue to be Afghanistan’s largest 

opium cultivating province. Any future eradication strategy for Helmand 

needs to first account for security and political will. 

It should be noted that 75% of the opium poppy cultivation in Helmand is 

new cultivation that did not exist two years ago. By definition, then, at least 

75% of the poppy in Helmand is not being grown by poor farmers who lack 

licit economic alternatives—two years ago these farmers were doing 

something else. 

In other words, the vast majority of the poppy in Helmand is not being 

grown by poor farmers who have been growing poppy for generations and 

lack economic alternatives. The reality is that cultivation has expanded 

rapidly in the past two years as opportunists have scrambled to exploit 

Helmand’s lawlessness for profit. Many of Helmand’s poppy growers are 

wealthy land-owners, corrupt officials, and other opportunists. Helmand’s 

land is fertile; infrastructure and access to markets is good, and alternatives 

to poppy are available. Moreover, if Helmand were a country, it would be 

the fifth largest recipient of U.S. development aid in the world, having 

received over $270 million in USAID funds in recent years. Opium poppy 

grown by wealthy land-owners and corrupt officials funds the insurgency. 

There is no reason to avoid eradicating their poppy fields aggressively. 

D. Interdiction/Law Enforcement Operations 

DEA will continue to identify, target, and dismantle drug high-value targets 

(HVTs) operating throughout Nangarhar province. In December 2006, DEA 

agents deployed to the Konduz area in furtherance of the northern Border 

Strategy. This strategy was created to target large-scale traffickers moving 

drug and money shipments over the northern border of Afghanistan and into 

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Additional HVTs are being targeted that are 

directly associated with Taliban terrorist activity and are being supported by 

the illicit narcotics trade. These drug HVTs are mostly operating in southern 

Afghanistan and are located predominately in the Kandahar, Nimruz, and 

Helmand provinces. 

53
DEA believes its Afghan counterparts could more effectively execute their 

strategy of attacking the command and control structure of Afghanistan drug 

High Value Targets (HVTs) with greater investigative capacity and 

improved operational capacity, including increased airlift capability. 

Establishment of the Vetted Unit Program and continued support for drug 

HVT extraditions are also crucial elements. 

1. Provide the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) with 

the Capacity to Protect All Elements of the Five Pillar Strategy: 

Develop an implementation plan for a security capacity within the CNPA for 

CN enforcement operations including, but not limited to, eradication and 

interdiction in non-permissive environments. The CNPA security capacity 

will not assume the role of a maneuver force; rather training and equipping 

will focus on enforcing Afghan civil law and supporting all the activities 

included in the Five Pillar CN strategy when confronted by determined 

opposition. This capability will be entirely resident within the MOI and will 

not increase ANP manning above the 82,000 currently authorized. Other 

segments of the criminal justice system will also need to be increased 

accordingly. 

Force protection capacity for eradication, interdiction, and aid delivery 

operations is lacking. DOD intends to work on an implementation plan that 

defines the scope, roles/responsibilities, desired effects, timelines, and 

priorities for establishing such a force protection capacity within the CNPA. 

Moreover, DOD will examine potential interim options to fulfill this role by 

leveraging existing or already planned capabilities. DOD will then report 

the findings of this assessment to the interagency and begin refining the 

details of a way forward with this matter. Because of the difficulty of 

working in an environment like Helmand, this initiative is especially critical 

to the success of AEF and interdiction operations. 

Building this CNPA force would require training, equipment, and 

maintenance. The force could be modeled on the successful U.S.-trained 

Colombian Army Counterdrug Brigade, the new ANA Commando Battalion 

structure, the Colombian police “Mobile Carabinero Squadrons” and/or the 

Colombian Police “Junglas.” The USG could provide training, equipment, 

and mentors for the force until they are capable of conducting operations on 

their own. The Colombians have offered to assist with the training. Special 

54
Protection Force operations would initially focus on the southern provinces 

of Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimruz. 

In Helmand, a percentage of the local population supports the Taliban and 

insurgents both willingly and through coercion. Only very limited 

interdiction activity is occurring at present due to the hostility of the local 

populace to the operations. If a force protection unit could ensure the 

security of operations, the interdiction arms of the CNPA would be able to 

conduct more operations and exhibit central government authority. In 

addition, the volatility and insecurity of Helmand hinder not only 

interdiction efforts but also eradication efforts by the AEF. Force protection 

is critical for the success of AEF operations in Helmand and throughout the 

south. 

The need for force protection for interdiction operations is underscored by 

the numerous examples of attacks on interdiction and eradication missions 

where a dedicated protection force would have reduced reliance on local 

forces whose allegiance was uncertain or questionable. 

2. Increase the Number of DEA Agents or Other Law Enforcement 

Advisors for CNPA: In order to provide comprehensive mentoring support 

and training of a large CNPA special protection police force, as well as to 

support widespread interdiction operations, the USG should significantly 

increase the number of DEA agents or other law enforcement 

mentors/trainers assigned to Kabul. 

Although the DEA 90-day Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Teams 

(FAST) have proven very effective, successful training of a large selfsustaining CNPA investigative and special protection force will require a 

substantial increase in the number of DEA agents and law enforcement 

mentors and trainers assigned to Kabul. DEA could take the lead role in 

identifying the most effective mix of DEA agents, other USG law 

enforcement agents and/or law enforcement contractors required to support 

the enhanced CNPA protection force to be developed by DOD for 

interagency community review. 

3. Expand DEA & CNPA Investigative and Operational Capacity:

a. Increase Airlift Support for Drug Interdiction Operations: DOD 

will continue to develop an Afghan CN aviation capacity for the 

55
Ministry of Interior as planned. While this capacity is being built, 

mechanisms are in place in Afghanistan for DEA to request DOD, 

State Department, and ISAF airlift support. Supporting elements will 

weigh the requirements against available resources and competing 

priorities as appropriate and provide airlift if available. 

A lack of sufficient airlift support has severely hampered DEA and Afghan 

counterparts’ ability to operate throughout Afghanistan. Interdiction 

operations will increase in 2007 if DEA and its counterparts have airlift 

capacity, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), in extremis support, and close air 

support. Airlift and air coverage are the vital components for effectively 

targeting the drug trafficking networks that are operating with impunity 

throughout the country. When these requirements are met, the USGsupported program will be able to improve interdiction efforts at a greater 

pace and dramatically impact the drug trafficking organizations operating in 

and around Afghanistan. 

Assets have been – and for the foreseeable future will continue to be– 

limited to both primary (military) and supporting tasks. 

b. Enhance Technical Investigative Capacity: The USG should 

support expansion of CNPA technical investigative capacity. 

Afghan drug trafficking organizations are extremely difficult to penetrate. 

Technical and investigative capacities are a vital and necessary tool to gather 

evidence against these traffickers for use in criminal prosecutions. 

c. Reliable Partner/Vetted Units: DEA’s ultimate goal is to create a 

DEA Afghanistan with the ability to develop into a self-sustaining 

counternarcotics police force. 

The Afghanistan vetted units will be DEA’s primary counterparts and will 

be tasked with the investigation of High Value Targets. Training for the SIU 

began in May 2007 at the DEA Academy at Quantico. Personnel from the 

TIU are slated for training to begin July 2007. It must be understood that as 

the Afghan Counternarcotics police force is created and expanded, so too 

must the Afghan prosecutor and judicial numbers and capacity be expanded. 

56
4. ASNF and NIU: A coordinated ASNF and NIU interdiction strategy 

could maximize resources, improve intelligence gathering capabilities, and 

increase the ability to successfully prosecute High Value Targets. 

The Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF) operates as a narcotics 

enforcement element of the Afghan MOI. The Counternarcotics Police of 

Afghanistan (CNPA) Narcotics Investigation Unit (NIU) is a narcotics 

investigation element of the Afghan MOI. ASNF is tasked with conducting 

tactical raids directed at opium conversion laboratories. ASNF historically 

has not focused on the apprehension and prosecution of HVTs or even 

laboratory operators. In contrast, the NIU, trained by DEA, focuses on 

targeting HVTs, collecting evidence, and apprehending and prosecuting 

HVTs. 

DEA agents and NIU officers are now embedded with ASNF. While 

conducting laboratory raids, DEA/NIU secure evidence and apprehend the 

operators for prosecution in Afghan courts. ASNF has its own consolidated 

air assets. DEA/NIU has utilized these assets, along with ASNF officers, to 

assist in the execution of Afghan search and arrest warrants. Additionally, 

all enforcement operations, either ASNF or NIU, are coordinated through 

the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC). 

Drug enforcement activities in Afghanistan have demonstrated the need for 

the CNPA to establish a specialized Afghan Vetted Unit Program (AVP) to 

support ongoing investigations against priority organizations and high value 

targets. DEA views the vetted unit program AVP as a force multiplier. This 

program will increase the number of drug investigators significantly. 

5. Publicize Successful Interdiction Operations and Prosecutions: 

An aggressive public information campaign down to the village level could 

publicize the success of interdiction operations to the local population and 

traffickers. These successes should also be publicized to the international 

community. 

This campaign could inform the public of successes, including the 

destruction of labs, the seizure of drugs, precursor chemicals, and weapons, 

and successful arrests, trials, incarcerations, and extraditions. This campaign 

could also correct misperceptions and rumors, and reinforce the GOA’s 

public commitment to combating drugs. Public information campaigns 

could also publicize activities of all U.S.-led and UK-led interdiction forces. 

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6. Improve Interdiction and Prosecution of High Value Targets 

(HVTs): In FY2007, the USG will contribute $343 million towards 

interdiction efforts. The USG must continue to improve the interdiction 

capabilities of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) by 

building up specialized units, continuing support for the Foreign-deployed 

Advisory Support Teams (FAST), assigning additional DEA agents to Kabul, 

expanding the core of the CNPA with a five-year plan, and more 

aggressively implementing the northern, eastern, and southern Enforcement 

Strategies. 

a. CNPA Special Units: In FY2007, the USG will contribute $343 

million to help the GOA build drug interdiction capacity, up from 

$118 million in FY2006 . The USG must continue to improve the 

interdiction capabilities of the Counter-Narcotics Police of 

Afghanistan (CNPA), to take down labs, to stop shipments when they 

go across the borders, and to improve its interdiction capability. 

Continued efforts could improve interdiction and prosecution of High 

Value Targets (HVTs) by building up the CNPA’s specialized units, 

and by developing a CNPA presence in the major population centers 

of Afghanistan. 

All USG interdiction efforts in Afghanistan form a single, unified effort 

under the umbrella of Operation Containment. In response to September 11, 

2001, the USG began working with 18 countries from Central Asia, the 

Caucasus, Europe, and Russia through Operation Containment to reduce the 

flow of Afghan heroin into world markets; to prevent Afghanistan from 

becoming a major heroin supplier to the United States; and to disrupt drugrelated insurgent activities. Through the USG-led Operation Containment, 

nineteen countries are working with the USG to disrupt the flow of drugs 

and precursor chemicals into and out of Afghanistan before they spread to 

broader markets. It brings together nations that historically have had little or 

no interaction from a law enforcement perspective and it facilitates the 

sharing of intelligence and exchange of operational initiatives. 

Four major drug trafficking heads targeted by Operation Containment have 

been arrested, including Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Baz Mohammed. The 

operation has also led to significant seizures of narcotics and precursor 

chemicals and the dismantlement and disruption of organizations involved in 

the southwest Asian drug trade. Prior to the initiation of Operation 

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Containment, only 407 kilograms of heroin had been seized. In the past two 

years, Operation Containment initiatives have resulted in the seizure of more 

than 26 metric tons of heroin, the initiation of 267 investigations, and the 

arrest of more than 1,000 individuals. 

b. FAST Teams and DEA Agents: Continue support for the USGformed Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST), and 

increase the number of DEA agents assigned to Kabul in order to 

augment Afghanistan’s interdiction and training operations in support 

of Operation Containment. 

In April 2005, the first two FAST teams arrived in Afghanistan. The FAST 

teams are deployed on cycled rotations and work directly with elements of 

the newly USG trained National Interdiction Unit of the CNPA. There are 

five NIU teams. These law enforcement activities, despite difficult 

conditions, are succeeding in identifying, targeting, and disrupting the 

highest level traffickers and their organizations. Operations have led to 

record-breaking seizures, arrests of kingpins, dissolution of major trafficking 

organizations, and the first-ever extradition between Afghanistan and the 

United States. 

Despite resource limitations, DEA has had good operational results, and 

should therefore consider increasing the number of agents assigned to Kabul. 

Increasing the number of permanently assigned agents would allow DEA to 

pursue multiple, long term, and complex cases simultaneously, greatly 

expanding the number of potential prosecutions of HVTs. 

c. Five Year CNPA Plan: Expand the core CNPA to create an Afghan 

Vetted Unit Program, expand CNPA facilities, place CNPA officers in 

Regional Law Enforcement Centers outside Kabul and establish a 

plan for staffing the various ranks of CNPA with narcotics trained 

police officers.

The USG has begun to provide training and equipment for an Afghan Vetted 

Unit Program. The Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU) will identify, target 

and dismantle those DTOs that are having the greatest impact on 

Afghanistan’s sovereignty, to include those with a nexus to Taliban and 

Anti-Coalition elements 

59
Working with the CNPA, the USG will utilize all intelligence and evidence 

gathered by each component of the CNPA for furtherance of drug 

prosecutions of HVTs in either Afghanistan or the United States. In order to 

capitalize on intelligence gathered by the CNPA, agents and officers must be 

able to move enforcement personnel and have the ability to travel from 

Kabul to the locations where the drug traffickers are operating. 

d. Northern, Eastern, and Southern Enforcement Strategies: These 

strategies will initiate operations in three areas of Afghanistan to 

attack major drug trafficking organizations. Initial efforts have 

started in Kabul and have been followed by the Eastern Strategy in 

the Province of Nangarhar. 

The Northern Strategy comprises interdiction efforts in the provinces of 

Kunduz, Takhar and Badakshan. This region is less troubled by insurgent 

activity and the reduced security concerns allow for freer access to sources 

of information and local counterparts. 

The Eastern Strategy is the CNPA’s organizational attack of several major 

drug trafficking organizations termed the Nangarhar Consortium. Studies 

indicate that a significant amount of Afghanistan’s heroin conversion occurs 

in Nangarhar. Opium and heroin exit Nangarhar through a variety of means 

including convoys, single load truck and couriers. 

The Nangarhar drug trafficking organizations control a network of labs in

Nangarhar, and often own storefronts in the bazaars which provide 

laboratory equipment or chemicals for the conversion labs. Many Nangarhar 

drug trafficking organizations run their drug operations in Afghanistan from

outside the country, typically from Dubai or Pakistan, with little interference 

from local law enforcement authorities. Ongoing Nangarhar investigations 

show a clear link between the drug traffickers and anti-coalition activities. 

The Southern Strategy focuses on the drug trafficking organizations 

operating from the critical provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. This 

turbulent area is the home region of the Taliban and is the focus of a large 

degree of the coalition’s anti-insurgency efforts. It is also the region that 

produces most of Afghanistan’s opium and its most notorious drug lords. 

Interdiction efforts target traffickers who comprise the most significant lab 

operators, brokers and traffickers in Afghanistan and the region. Effective 

CN operations in the South will significantly enhance stability efforts there. 

60
In this troubled region, however, better cooperation between the GOA and 

allies will be necessary for success. 

Interdiction in Helmand

The situation in Helmand is especially difficult due to the concentration of 

Taliban and insurgents and additional cross-border insurgent activity from

Pakistan. The local population supports the Taliban and insurgents both 

willingly and through coercion. Presently, only very limited interdiction 

activity is occurring. This is an area where a force protection capability 

within the CNPA would enable more effective interdiction. 

The USG could press for increased security to garner support from the local 

populace, and coalition forces must provide reliable and available airlift and 

security support to interdiction forces. The USG could also improve CNPA 

capacity to establish forward operating bases, and secure and properly equip 

CNPA office facilities in Helmand. The CNPA must train and equip officers 

supported by Helmand’s provincial government and must develop strong 

links to a central/national office. Helmand also should be the first to receive 

support from the proposed CNPA Special Protection Force for CN 

operations. 

Intelligence collection capacity in Helmand could also be improved for more 

effective border control and regional monitoring of the borders with Pakistan 

and Kandahar. USG-supported efforts could increase coordination with 

border forces for integrated cross-border interdiction operations. Further 

efforts could develop provincial investigation capacity to target HVT’s, 

MVT’s, and major DTO’s and forward an increasing number of case 

packages for trial to the Central Narcotics Tribunal, until provincial justice 

reform takes place. 

E. Justice Reform/Prosecution 

As part of a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy, high level traffickers 

and corrupt officials involved in the narcotics trade must be prosecuted and 

incarcerated. As related to the other pillars, effective prosecution shows the 

Afghan public that poppy farmers, drug traffickers, and corrupt officials are 

all vulnerable to punishment. Moreover, the Afghan government could go a 

long way toward increasing its legitimacy in the eyes of the populace by 

61
reforming the Ministry of the Interior. MOI reforms could include ridding 

the Ministry of corrupt officials and developing a new strategy to properly 

staff and rotate provincial police leadership. 

Justice sector capacity-building is a high priority, and the U.S. and 

international community are increasing assistance to the overall justice 

system. The USG intends to double its justice sector support over the next 

several years, especially focusing on building prosecution capabilities. For 

the USG, this includes supporting over 70 justice and corrections advisors in 

Kabul and five provinces in 2007 (including INL, DOJ, and USAID 

advisors) to implement the U.S. Justice Sector Strategy of (1) building the 

central justice system, (2) expanding to the provinces, and (3) increasing 

coordinated international justice assistance. The July 2007 Rome 

Conference on Afghanistan Rule of Law endorsed an overall justice 

assistance strategy and secured contributions including for a justice sector 

trust fund. This overall Afghan and international effort will significantly 

improve the justice sector over the coming years, which will have a positive 

effect on counternarcotics law enforcement efforts. 

The Kabul-based Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) investigates drug 

cases involving two kilos or more, and the Counternarcotics Tribunal (CNT) 

tries these cases. There are approximately 80 pending cases in the CNT. 

Most of those are mid-level cases, but with the training and mentoring of 

DOJ and other international mentors, the CJTF and CNT are slowly gaining 

the capacity to successfully investigate and prosecute high-value traffickers. 

1. Expand Central and Provincial Counternarcotics Justice 

Capacity: The Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) in Kabul prosecutes 

and investigates mid- and high-level narcotics and narcotics-related cases 

before the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), which has exclusive 

nationwide jurisdiction for such cases. Counternarcotics justice reform 

should include expansion of the CJTF and CNT in Kabul. Other support to 

the Afghan criminal justice system, such as that provided by the nine already 

deployed provincial justice advisors, will assist these counternarcotics 

efforts by directing appropriate cases arising in the provinces to the CJTF in 

Kabul. To be more effective, counternarcotics justice reform should include 

expansion of the CJTF in Kabul and improvement of provincial capacities to 

direct cases to the CJTF. 

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To be more effective, counternarcotics justice reform should include 

expansion of the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and the Central 

Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) in Kabul. DOJ, through its Senior Federal 

Prosecutors Program, has been working with the assistance of international 

advisors from the U.K. and Norway to train and mentor Afghan prosecutors 

and police investigators in the CJTF and judges in the CNT. While most of 

these convictions have been of low-level or mid-level traffickers, the Task 

Force is increasingly developing the capacity to pursue more high-level 

targets. To help build Afghan counternarcotics justice capacity, the USG 

should recruit, vet, train, and mentor additional Afghan prosecutors, police 

investigators, and judges; increase the number of DOJ and other 

international advisors working to guide and support the CJTF and CNT; 

establish, train, and mentor a specialized CJTF sub-unit dedicated to the 

investigation and prosecution of narcotics-related corruption cases; and 

develop an aggressive public information campaign to increase awareness of 

the provisions of the Afghan Counternarcotics Law, to explain the special 

nationwide jurisdiction of the CNT, and to describe the work and 

achievements of the CJTF. 

 

In addition to the efforts in Kabul, the GOA needs to improve its capacity to 

investigate drug crimes at the provincial level, including in both poppyproducing and poppy-trafficking provinces. Developing the capacity of 

provincial Chief Prosecutor’s offices to handle the initial stages of narcotics 

cases will improve the effective transfer of cases to the CJTF for trial before 

the Central Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul. Expanding counternarcotics justice 

in the provinces will require additional resources for provincial justice 

advisor teams. DOS and State/INL Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) 

has 3-person teams based in Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Konduz provinces 

which are providing an intensive training and mentoring program to 60 

police investigators and 30 prosecutors focused on basic laws, criminal 

procedure, and police-prosecutor coordination in the investigative stage of 

criminal justice. These teams could also build capacity to investigate and 

prosecute narcotics cases locally, and assist in preparing mid-level and highlevel narcotics cases for transfer to the CJTF in Kabul. This could be 

accomplished by adding an additional justice advisor focused on narcotics 

prosecutions, or by giving the current teams an additional responsibility. 

DOJ will augment the efforts of JSSP by providing in-depth training in the 

Counternarcotics Law and in narcotics prosecution to several of these 

provincial units. 

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Deploying justice advisors to all 355 districts of Afghanistan is not feasible 

at this time. Justice assistance must be closely paired with police assistance, 

as neither can be effective without the other. The police program is 

operational in most major provincial centers and key districts, but is not 

operating in many districts. Thus, State/INL is implementing a systematic 

expansion of JSSP advisors to the seven police Regional Training Centers. 

The preferred approach in the area of expanding and improving narcotics 

prosecutions is to use existing provincial JSSP advisors. JSSP teams are 

currently deployed in three provincial regional training centers, and will 

expand to seven by the end of 2009. This expansion was integrated into an 

overall donor plan for provincial justice which was endorsed at the Rome 

Conference. 

Together with the Government of Afghanistan and international community, 

the USG is also developing a comprehensive plan to coordinate and 

reinvigorate provincial justice sector reform. This plan was also endorsed at 

the Rome Conference. 

2. Improve Anti-Corruption Initiative: The USG should improve 

assistance to the Afghan Attorney General in his anti-corruption campaign 

by providing security, secure facilities, equipment, and technical assistance. 

The DOJ, with assistance from the State Department, should expand its 

anticorruption programs in Afghanistan along the lines recommended by a 

recent DOJ assessment team. Additionally, a reform of the Ministry of 

Interior is essential to dismantling the narco-government nexus.

The Afghan Attorney General’s Office, consisting of thousands of 

prosecutors nationwide, is responsible for investigating and prosecuting 

crimes. Tackling corruption—much of which is narco-corruption—is one of 

the highest priorities of the Attorney General’s Office. Since 2006, the 

Attorney General’s Office has initiated over 150 corruption investigations in 

eight provinces, resulting in 138 arrests and a conviction rate of 71%. The 

current Afghan Attorney General has made anti-corruption his top priority. 

To promote better institutional relations, the USG is establishing an 

assistance package for the Attorney General to assist in the development of 

solid investigations and prosecutions in accordance with Afghan laws and 

procedures. Additionally, the USG must continue to work with the 

international community to coordinate donor assistance for the justice sector 

including institutional and provincial justice plans. 

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USG and international assistance to the CN CJTF have plans to expand to 

include narcotics-related corruption. Development of narcotics-related 

corruption cases could be closely tied to assistance provided to the Afghan 

Attorney General’s Anti-Corruption Unit to ensure uniformity of procedures 

and effective case transfers. The JSSP and DOJ programs each have 

advisors assigned on a full-time basis to the Attorney General’s Office to

provide advice and assistance in anti-corruption and other criminal law 

matters. While narcotics-related corruption cases can be heard before the 

CNT, non-narcotics related cases will need to be brought before normal 

Afghan courts. The U.S. and international community could work more 

extensively with the GOA to improve the effectiveness of those courts that 

will handle high-level corruption cases. The CJTF is already proceeding on 

a number of narcotics-related corruption cases. 

The USG should look for ways to assist the MOI in ridding itself of corrupt 

officials, and in developing a new strategy to properly staff and rotate 

provincial police leadership. 

3. Develop an Extradition Policy: Extradition can be a controversial 

issue. Extradition needs to be understood as the international process to 

bring to justice those criminals who have caused harm to the people and/or 

interests of another nation. The USG should review a series of criteria with 

the GOA that would be considered on a case-by-case basis in determining 

whether extradition would be requested. Full Afghan capacity to 

investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate kingpins is still a few years away. 

The United States has been successful in disrupting and dismantling major 

drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating throughout the world by 

extraditing organization heads and members to the United States to face 

charges. The USG identifies, targets, and indicts drug traffickers operating 

at the highest levels of the drug trafficking industry. Subsequent to these 

investigations, the USG requests extradition of organization leaders and 

members to the United States. These various extraditions disrupt and 

dismantle DTOs and ultimately convict and incarcerate traffickers in the 

U.S. This is a process that DOJ is committed to not only in the short-term, 

but that DOJ will urge in the long term as well, as it does with many nations 

of the world. It is a process not just for drug traffickers but for all criminals 

who harm or threaten harm to U.S. persons or interests. These extradition 

efforts are consistent with USG practices around the globe. 

65
 

When brought to justice in the U.S., extradited drug traffickers face a legal 

system prepared to adjudicate complex drug trafficking conspiracy cases and 

which typically imposes appropriately severe prison sentences following 

convictions. Extraditing drug traffickers to the U.S. can aid in breaking the 

narcotics-insurgent links of financial and other support. As President Karzai 

commented in his remarks to the United National General Assembly on 

September 20, 2006, “The menace of narcotics feeds terrorism and threatens 

the foundation of legitimate economic development of Afghanistan.” 

The priority and long-term goal of the USG is to help strengthen the Afghan 

criminal justice system and promote public confidence in its justice 

institutions. At the same time, and on a case-by-case basis, the U.S. should 

consider requesting extradition of any high-value target who has caused or 

threatened harm to U.S. persons or interests. The USG should encourage 

European countries to do the same. To date, the USG has extradited only 

one individual from Afghanistan, and European countries have extradited 

none. DOJ, in consultation with Afghan justice officials, has drafted a 

proposed extradition law that will authorize extradition from Afghanistan for 

any offense covered in a United Nations Convention or other multi-lateral 

treaty to another signatory country. 

4. Increase Justice Sector Salaries: Increasing justice personnel 

salaries is critical to building the rule of law, and should be supported by 

the U.S. The European Union is considering increasing justice salaries 

through a trust fund. The U.S. could offer a substantial financial 

contribution to this effort over the coming two years. 

The U.S. justice strategy provides for a robust and expanded U.S. role in 

building Afghanistan’s justice sector over the coming years, together with 

broader international and Afghan justice sector plans. In addition, it is vital 

that the U.S. and international community augment capacity-building and 

training with an increase in justice personnel salaries. Currently, prosecutors 

and judges earn less than army and police recruits, but are charged with 

enforcing and adjudicating serious crimes in accordance with the Afghan 

Constitution and Afghan law. The lack of basic living wages has led to 

bribery and high-level corruption by justice officials, which has a direct 

negative impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the courts, derails 

convictions of narcotics-related and other serious crimes, and undermines 

Afghan efforts to build public confidence in the central government’s 

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authority. Consequently, lack of competitive wages limits the enforcement 

of the rule of law, which undermines counternarcotics law enforcement. 

5. Expand Counternarcotics Justice Infrastructure: Over the coming 

year, a number of USG and international initiatives will materialize to 

substantially accelerate CN law enforcement efforts. Most importantly, the 

Counternarcotics Justice Center will be completed in 2007 to serve as a 

secure facility for investigation, detention, trial, and conviction of major 

narcotics offenders. 

The CNJC will house the CN Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), the 

Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), and a detention center for pre-trial and 

trial. Upon completion, this facility will provide a secure platform for major 

narcotics prosecutions by the Afghan Government. The U.S. Marshals 

Service, as an adjunct project to the Department of Justice Senior Federal 

Prosecutors Program, has provided on-site security consultation and advice 

on the proposed design, construction, and operation of the CNJC. The UN 

also recently completed renovation of a cell block at Pol-e-Charkhi prison 

for convicted narcotics offenders (who will be transferred there from the 

CNJC once sentenced). The USG could focus resources on these ongoing 

efforts and ensure that the CJTF is effectively linked to the National 

Interdiction Unit and the Sensitive Investigations Unit over the coming year. 

Further, the USG could work to ensure that all justice sector efforts ensure 

that similar attention and growth are contemplated for the full spectrum of 

justice reforms needed so that one segment does not expand unless a 

complementary expansion is prepared for other segments as well. 

Justice Reform in Helmand

The current security conditions in Helmand are not conducive to the 

deployment of justice advisors and mentors at this time. However, the 

Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) in Kabul has national jurisdiction over 

significant narcotics cases (those involving over two kilos of heroin), and the 

U.S. is establishing the above mentioned Counternarcotics Justice Center 

(CNJC), which will be completed in the fall or winter of 2007. Combined 

with efforts by the National Interdiction Unit, major drug offenders from

Helmand must be transferred to the CNJC for prosecution and trial before 

the CNT. In addition, the UK has deployed several justice advisors to its 

Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand to begin working with the local 

judicial system. 

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F. Political Will 

Corruption in Afghanistan continues to impede progress in all areas of the 

counternarcotics effort. Strong political will enables effective eradication 

and interdiction programs and judicial system development. Despite 

vigorous eradication efforts, the UNODC estimates that this year’s poppy 

crop will exceed that of 2006. Steps must be taken now to assist uncorrupt 

GOA officials in engendering political will for CN efforts next year. 

1. Central, Provincial, and District Leaders: One of the principal 

obstacles to greater success in interdiction and eradication is the 

intervention of corrupt officials. The USG and the international community 

should discuss ways to help the GOA foster political will, such as by: 

a. Developing a working system of specific goals for each province, with 

rewards for reaching the goals, firing for incompetence, and 

prosecution for corruption. 

b. Highlighting successes at the provincial level, publicly praising and 

rewarding leaders who have demonstrated political will with effective 

poppy elimination/eradication programs, and denouncing and firing 

leaders with poor or no programs. 

G. Unity of International Effort 

The USG and its partners must deliver a clear and consistent 

counternarcotics message and must execute efforts cooperatively. While 

Afghanistan is the lead nation on counternarcotics issues, according to the 

Afghanistan Compact, strong international engagement could continue to be 

required in the foreseeable future. 

1. Develop a Plan to Ensure Allied Unity in Messaging: The narcotraffickers have attempted to undermine allied unity, particularly in the 

areas of eradication and interdiction. The USG and allies should work to 

improve the delivery of a clear and consistent counternarcotics message. 

This plan would need to be executed concurrently by civilian and military 

authorities from all allied nations and the GOA.

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An allied effort is currently underway to coordinate messages among, and 

build capacity in, relevant GOA ministries through the National 

Communications Coordination Center (NC3), which was established in 

December 2006. As the NC3 matures, it will serve as the primary GOA tool 

for disseminating information to the Afghan and international public. 

2. Regional Cooperation and Allied Border Security: Enhance 

regional cooperation on Afghan drug transit and enhance Allied-Afghan 

border security efforts. 

Drugs are trafficked through Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia. The USG 

should identify useful ways to engage resources, expertise, and assistance to 

counter the drug-related transit in and out of Afghanistan without 

undermining our larger goals in Afghanistan. The Central Asian Regional 

Information Coordination Center (CARICC) is a potential building block for 

enhancing law-enforcement cooperation beyond the sharing of information. 

The USG should urge all countries participating in CARICC to 

operationalize CARICC headquarters in Almaty without delay 

3. Increased Coordination on Interdiction Strategies and Justice 

Sector Development: 

a. Improve Coordination of CNTF Alternative Development 

Programs: The Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) could benefit 

from greater allied unity in approving funding disbursements for 

counternarcotics projects.

The CNTF Management Board is comprised of the following members: the 

Government of Afghanistan represented by the Ministries of 

Counternarcotics and Finance; the Asian Development Bank (ADB); the 

Government of the United Kingdom, as the former lead partner for 

counternarcotics; the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 

(UNAMA), which may exercise its membership role through the United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); and the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP). The World Bank acts as an observer. 

This CNTF Management Board is responsible for ensuring that projects 

received comply with sound project design principles, are consistent with the 

policies and aims of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), and the 

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priorities approved by the Cabinet Sub-Committee for Counter Narcotics. 

USAID has initiated the process to request Board membership for the USG 

on the CNTF. 

The GOA’s Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) could greatly benefit from 

an improved allied effort to assist with coordinating, selecting, monitoring 

and evaluating counternarcotics projects. The allied effort could also assist 

with coordinating the development and implementation of the National Drug 

Control Strategy, work plans, policies and guidelines. 

b. Work to Improve Coordination of Interdiction Strategies: While 

the U.S. and UK enjoy an excellent counternarcotics working 

relationship, both countries could improve operational coordination, 

de-confliction, targeting, and in-country planning to respond to the 

fluid situation within Afghanistan. Improved coordination will 

maximize resources and improve cooperative intelligence gathering. 

c. Improve Justice Sector Donor Country Coordination: Improve 

donor country coordination which has severely limited development of 

Afghanistan’s justice sector. 

Some prosecutors and police investigators from the Criminal Justice Task 

Force, with training and mentoring from DOJ, UK, and Norwegian mentors, 

are beginning to employ the modern investigative techniques authorized by 

the Afghan Counternarcotics Law to develop broader and higher-level 

narcotics and narcotics-related cases. Considerably more could be done with 

better coordination among the donors. 

H. Integrating Counternarcotics (Particularly Interdiction) Into 

The Comprehensive Security Approach 

The increasing link between drug trafficking organizations and insurgents 

prompts the need to integrate the counternarcotics mission, particularly drug 

interdiction planning and operations, more closely into counterinsurgency 

strategy and operations. Recent UNODC survey data indicate a strong link 

between the dangerous security conditions and poppy cultivation. Security 

is good in the provinces where poppy cultivation is dropping, and 

government institutions are better able to assert their authority to influence 

farmers’ planting decisions. The converse is true as well. The figures 

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demonstrate that 75 percent of surveyed villages subject to “poor” or “very 

poor” security conditions showed evidence of poppy cultivation compared to 

22 percent in regions with “very good” security. 

Moreover, reports clearly indicate increasing ties between narcotics and the 

insurgency. The narcotics trade in Afghanistan is a significant source of 

revenue to the insurgency, and insurgent forces exploit drug-related 

corruption and resulting lack of governance to weaken central government 

influence. The small Afghan drug interdiction forces are unable to achieve

persistent effect against the burgeoning drug trade. The fledgling Narcotics 

Interdiction Unit of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and the 

equally small but capable Afghan Special Narcotics Force are not designed 

or resourced to forcefully dismantle the drug networks in Afghanistan, since 

they cannot remain in areas contested by drug traffickers and insurgents. 

Likewise, the State/INL-sponsored Afghan Eradication Force is not designed 

nor resourced to remain in these hostile areas over long periods of time. 

1. Work with Afghan and Allied Military Forces to Integrate 

Counternarcotics Into Our Broader Security Strategy: There is a clear 

and direct link between the illicit opium trade and insurgent groups in 

Afghanistan. The Taliban and other anti-government elements exploit the 

opium trade to facilitate their financial, logistical, and political objectives, 

jeopardizing the prospect of long-term security and stability, reconstruction, 

and effective governance. Successful counternarcotics operations, 

particularly interdiction operations, dismantle criminal enterprises, capture 

narco-terrorists, and weaken the insurgents’ areas of strength. Therefore, 

progress in the CN mission, and drug interdiction in particular, is essential 

to achieving our security objectives in Afghanistan. Combating the 

insurgency requires an integrated strategy that incorporates CN target sets, 

operations, and resource priorities as components of the overall security 

effort. DOD will work with DEA and other stakeholders to develop options 

for a coordinated strategy that integrates and synchronizes counternarcotics 

operations, particularly interdiction, into the comprehensive security 

strategy. 

Implementing the integrated CN/security strategy will require close 

coordination and synchronization of the CN operational entities with 

military operations. To this end, it is critical for all CN stakeholders to 

embed personnel in the military headquarters to advocate for and explain 

planned operations, participate in the targeting and resource allocation 

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processes, provide advice to the operational commander, and serve as a link 

to various CN organizations. 

2. Establish a Command and Control Cell: In addition to building a 

CNPA protection force, an Afghan Command and Control (C2) cell could be 

established to provide command and control for all government CN forces 

operating in a specific region. This C2 cell will ensure that there is a single 

command structure for all government CN efforts in the region, and will 

coordinate with the respective local governments, NGOs, PRTs, military 

headquarters, etc.

3. Develop Coordinated Plans for Afghan and Allied Military 

Support for Counternarcotics Operations, Particularly Interdiction 

Operations: Establishing liaison relationships with Afghan and allied 

planning cells, drug interdiction mission planners, eradication specialists, 

and public information specialists would help develop more integrated 

plans, policies, and procedures. 

Recent attacks upon the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) highlight the need 

for coordinated measures to support Afghan CN operations. Routinely 

operating in non-permissive environments, CN forces require military 

support in the event of overwhelming hostilities, such as medical evacuation 

(MEDEVAC), indirect fire support, and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 

support in the form of a CNPA special protection force. 

The USG must liaise with Afghan and allied military commands to define – 

and implement – field plans, policies and procedures for support to CN and 

law enforcement elements. Combating the insurgency and its logistical, 

financial, and political areas of strength requires the synchronization of CN 

target sets, operations, and strategies with broader COIN objectives. 

Therefore, integration of the CN mission within the broader COIN effort

could enhance opportunities for access to military support for CN 

operations. 

4. Support Afghan and Allied Partners’ Public Information Efforts: 

The Afghan and allied militaries could support the GOA and international 

community’s counternarcotics public information campaign. 

Allied military forces play a very active role in public information activities. 

Currently, allied forces are working to revise their overarching public affairs 

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strategy by increasing the effectiveness of their messaging, upgrading their 

information dissemination capabilities, and expanding their outreach to both 

the international and Afghan media. These efforts demonstrate allied forces’ 

understanding of the value of public information, and this improved 

capacity, once operational, could improve allied forces’ ability to play a 

larger role in the CN public information campaign. 

I. Countering “Silver Bullet” Approaches 

There is no simple solution, shortcut, or “silver bullet” which can address 

the drug trade in Afghanistan. Over the past year, some organizations and 

government officials in partner countries have suggested radical options, 

such as legalizing and buying out opium poppy produced in Afghanistan, or 

relying solely on interdiction to solve problems. The U.S. has carefully 

examined these ideas but rejects them. Based on the experiences of other

nations in the fight against illicit drugs, the United States remains committed 

to supporting a mix of deterrence, prevention, and economic development 

assistance. 

1. Provide Information to Expose the Flaws of an Imbalanced 

Interdiction-Only Approach: Some people have expressed the need to

focus attention on interdiction exclusively as a way to solve the 

counternarcotics problem. While interdiction is a critical piece of the U.S. 

government’s counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan, it will not solve the 

problems without the other pillars. 

Currently, the international community, the Department of State, the 

Department of Justice, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration are 

working to develop Afghan law enforcement and criminal justice 

institutions, but they are not yet sufficiently developed to prosecute complex 

narcotics cases on a scale that would deter poppy cultivation or drug 

production. The reality in Afghanistan is that a lack of infrastructure 

combined with wide stretches of barren desert and extensive mountain 

ranges make detecting hidden cargo and interdicting drugs extremely 

difficult. While the USG needs to do more in this regard, the simple fact is 

that interdiction alone will not in the foreseeable future eliminate a 

significant percentage of the opium trade. 

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2. Impossibility of Legalizing and Buying Out the Opium Crop: The 

USG has considered the arguments for legalizing and buying out the opium 

crop. The biggest problems with these recommendations are that they 

encourage poppy cultivation and would make Afghanistan’s economy 

dangerously reliant on one commodity. 

Reliance on one agricultural commodity, legal or otherwise, leaves a country 

extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of that commodity. This 

has proven disastrous in Latin America, Africa, and other parts of the world. 

The long-term goal is to diversify Afghanistan’s economy and make it less 

dependant on agriculture in general and poppy cultivation in particular. 

Additional reasons for rejecting the proposed legalization of poppy include 

the following: 

First, the licit opium market is not lucrative enough to entice Afghan 

farmers. The price difference between licit and illicit opium is so substantial 

that Afghan farmers would continue to sell to the black market. To make up 

for the price difference, exorbitant subsidies would have to be offered, which 

would prove prohibitively expensive—billions of dollars per year. 

Moreover, the Government of Afghanistan would purchase all opium stocks 

at a high price, resulting in exponential expansion of poppy as more farmers 

would grow it to take advantage of a guaranteed source of income. 

Second, there is no legitimate world demand for legally produced opium

from Afghanistan. According to the United Nations International Narcotics 

Control Board, world demand for opium-based medicines is fully met. 

World stockpiles are also sufficient to meet any conceivable future or 

increased demand. 

Third, it is not feasible. Countries which produce licit opium have strict 

controls, sophisticated law enforcement, and licensing systems – and still 

admit to significant illegal diversion. The lack of security in Afghanistan 

has led to the explosion of the current illicit poppy crop, so a licit industry 

which relies on legal controls could not work. Without safeguards, licit and 

illicit opium would be indistinguishable. 

Fourth, historical experience argues against this approach. Lessons from 

India, Pakistan, Bolivia, and other countries show the often disastrous effects 

of legalizing drug production without the requisite market demand or law 

enforcement and control mechanisms. Each of these countries attempted to 

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regulate a legal trade in narcotics and, as a result, saw an increase in 

cultivation or significant diversion into the black market. 

Finally, legalization is ultimately counterproductive and dangerous. 

Legalization would expand and entrench the drug trade, undermining 

ongoing efforts to bring security and sustainable economic development. 

This would benefit insurgent groups such as the Taliban who profit from the 

trade, as well as criminals and corrupt government officials. Afghanistan 

would suffer from more violence, lawlessness, and corruption as a result of 

legalization, not less. Expanding opium cultivation would also come at the 

expense of important efforts to diversify Afghanistan’s economy, making 

the country’s welfare dangerously reliant on one commodity. 

A related idea is to use eradication funds to purchase poppy crops. While a 

recent report recommended spending up to $375 million to do so, this 

recommendation would have very serious negative consequences. Schemes 

to purchase illicit crops have been tried in the past and have failed for one 

simple reason: if a government commits to purchasing an illicit crop, more 

farmers will grow it. This perverse incentive expands cultivation and makes 

farmers more reliant on poppy and future buy outs. This was the case in 

Bolivia during the mid-1990s when the Government of Bolivia attempted to 

purchase illicit coca from farmers. Cultivation expanded and moved from 

farmland into the national parks, where thousands of hectares of rainforest 

were destroyed. After the government changed its policy to forced 

eradication and interdiction operations, along with community-based 

alternative development projects, Bolivia's coca cultivation dropped from

45,800 hectares in 1997 to 19,600 hectares in 2000. 

This strategy would also cost significantly more money than its proponents 

suggests. While the 2006 farm-gate value of Afghanistan’s poppy was 

roughly $560 million, the area under cultivation would expand exponentially 

in response to a preemptive buy, making this strategy prohibitively 

expensive. By way of comparison, commitments to the Afghan Counter 

Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) for development projects total approximately 

$70 million after two years. 

Both practical and economic, impediments not only argue against legalizing 

opium inventories and crops, but prove that it would be a dangerous course. 

Fringe ideas, while they may seem appealing at first glance, can seriously

impede counternarcotics progress in Afghanistan. 

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3. No Miracle Crop: Many outside observers continue to assume that 

there is one single miracle crop that can replace poppy. This simply is not 

true. There is no legal crop that can match the value of the opium poppy. 

There is no single crop that can replace the income farmers receive from 

opium poppy cultivation. USAID has reviewed several alternative crop 

suggestions including soy, cotton, sunflower, jathropa (for bio-diesel) and 

others. There are isolated cases where, under certain conditions, the price of 

licit crops can equal that of poppy. However, the farm gate price of opium 

poppy can be manipulated to regulate supply by the small cartel of brokers, 

traders and narco-criminal networks that control opium processing and 

trafficking in Afghanistan. Therefore, because of the high profit margins of 

the narco-criminal networks, the price of poppy can be adjusted upwards to 

surpass any licit crop in order to guarantee supply. 

After careful review of each licit crop suggestion, the conclusion is the 

same: there is no miracle crop. Instead, a balanced approach combining 

several high-value crops, agricultural and business development, and 

comprehensive infrastructure-building is the key to a successful alternative 

livelihoods strategy. 

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6. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AD: Alternative Development 

ADB: Asian Development Bank 

ADP: Alternative Development Program

AEF: (GOA) Afghanistan Eradication Force 

AGO: (GOA) Attorney General’s Office 

AIFWG: Afghan Illicit Finance Working Group 

ANP: (GOA) Afghan National Police 

ARTF: Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund 

ASNF: (GOA) Afghan Special Narcotics Force 

ATV: All Terrain Vehicles 

AVP: Afghan Vetted Unit Program 

CARICC: Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Center 

CJTF: (GOA) Criminal Justice Task Force 

CN: Counternarcotics 

CND: (GOA) Counter Narcotics Directorate 

CNJC: (GOA) Counter Narcotics Justice Center 

CNPA: (GOA) Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan 

CNT: (GOA) Central Narcotics Tribunal 

CNTF: (GOA) Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

COIN: Counterinsurgency 

DEA: (U.S.) Drug Enforcement Administration 

DOD: (U.S.) Department of Defense 

DOJ: (U.S.) Department of Justice 

DOS: (U.S.) Department of State 

DTO: Drug Trafficking Organizations 

FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

FAST: (DEA) Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams 

FATA: (GOP) Federally Administered Tribal Area 

GBS: Ground Based Spray 

GDP: Gross Domestic Product 

GLE: Governor-Led Eradication 

GOA: Government of Afghanistan 

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GOP: Government of Pakistan 

GPI: Good Performers Initiative 

Ha.: Hectares 

HVT: High Value Targets 

IA: (PEP) International Advisors 

INCB: (UN) International Narcotics Control Board 

INL: (DOS) Bureau for International Narcotics Control and Law 

Enforcement Affairs 

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force 

JCMB: Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 

JSSP: (DOS) Justice Sector Support Program

JTF: Joint Task Force 

LGU: (U.S.) Land Grant Universities 

MCN: (GOA) Ministry of Counternarcotics 

MEDEVAC: Medical Evacuation 

MOI: (GOA) Ministry of Interior 

MOJ: (GOA) Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 

MVT:Medium Value Targets 

NC3: National Communications Coordination Center 

NDCS: (GOA) National Drug Control Strategy 

NIU: (GOA) National Interdiction Unit 

NIU: (GOA) Narcotics Investigation Unit 

NSC: (U.S.) National Security Council 

NSP: (GOA) National Solidarity Program

OAS/CICAD: The Organization of American States Inter-American Drug 

Abuse Control Commission 

OFAC: (U.S.) Office of Foreign Assets Control 

ONDCP: (U.S.) Office of National Drug Control Policy 

PEP: Poppy Elimination Program 

PI: Public Information 

PRR: Priority Reform and Restructuring 

PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team

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QRF: Quick Reaction Force 

RTC: Regional Training Center 

SOCA: (UK) Serious Organized Crime Agency 

SIU: (GOA) Sensitive Investigation Unit 

“The Compact”: Afghanistan Compact 

TIU: (GOA) Technical Intercept Unit 

U.S.: United States 

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations 

UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USG: United States Government 

VOA: Voice of America 

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