UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ERNELL HAILES, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:12-cv-00687 

 v. Judge Michael H. Watson 

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

MR. COLLIER, et al.

 

 Defendants. 

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff, Ernell Hailes, an inmate in the custody of the Chillicothe Correctional 

Institution (“CCI”) who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, filed this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Corrections Officer Elam 

(“Officer Elam”) and Corrections Lieutenant Collier (“Lieutenant Collier”) impeded his ability 

to exercise his religion in violation of his First Amendment rights. This matter is before the 

United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ renewed 

Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 48.) For the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED. 

 This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion to Seek Leave 

to Add Lawrence Freeman, Amy Hamilton, and Deputy Warden Cunningham as Defendants 

(ECF No. 50), and Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 52). For the reasons that 

follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 

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I. 

The Court incorporates by reference the factual background set forth in its January 27, 

2014 Order. (ECF No. 40.) The Court sets forth the following procedural background as it 

relates to the instant Motion. 

Defendants filed their initial Motion for Summary Judgment on July 22, 2013. (ECF No. 

23.) Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on August 2, 2013. (ECF No. 25.) The Response, 

however, appeared to be an objection to the Ohio Attorney General’s representation of 

Defendants in this case. The Court overruled the objection and granted Plaintiff additional time 

to file a proper Response. (ECF No. 27.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed two documents: one titled 

“Objection to Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment” (ECF No. 28) and 

“Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplement” (ECF No. 29.) 

Defendants filed a timely Reply on September 23, 2013. (ECF No. 30.) The Court then granted 

Plaintiff leave to file a Sur-Reply. (ECF No. 34.) 

 When the previous Motion for Summary Judgment was fully briefed, Plaintiff filed a 

Motion for Leave for Further Discovery. (ECF No. 37.) The Court construed this Motion as a 

request for discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and granted the Motion to 

allow Plaintiff to properly respond to Defendants’ pending Motion for Summary Judgment. 

(ECF No. 40.) The Court allowed Plaintiff limited discovery into his misconduct summary 

judgment dismissal document, and denied Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment without 

prejudice to refilling after the limited discovery was completed. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff filed his next response on February 14, 2014. (ECF No. 41.) In this document, 

Plaintiff indicates that Defendants already provided the document he sought in discovery. 

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Because no additional information was acquired in discovery, the Court therefore directed 

Defendants to re-file or supplement their Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 47.) 

Plaintiff filed several additional documents on February 14, 2014. First, he filed a 

document titled Notice of Exhibits, which consists of unrelated or previously filed grievances 

and his previously filed religious accommodation paperwork. Next, Plaintiff filed a signed 

affidavit of fellow inmate Bruce Wilson (ECF No. 43) and an unsigned affidavit of CCI Chaplain 

Dr. Lawrence E. Freeman (ECF No. 44). Finally, he filed a Motion to Add Lieutenant Shane 

Clark as a Defendant. (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiff did not indicate whether the affidavits were 

intended to be in support of the Motion to Add Lieutenant Shane Clark, or in support of the thenunfiled Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court denied Plaintiff’s pending request 

to add Lieutenant Shane Clark as a Defendant. (ECF No. 47.) 

 Defendants timely filed their renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 48) and 

their Exhibits. (ECF No. 49.) In their Motion, Defendants assert that they are entitled to 

summary judgment for four reasons. First, they assert that Plaintiff’s claims for verbal 

harassment fail as a matter of law. Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations 

establish only negligence, and not intentional retaliation. Third, Defendants posit that Plaintiff 

fails to establish two of the three elements required to establish a claim of retaliation. Finally, 

Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Rather than filing another 

response, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Seek Leave to Add Party Defendants. (ECF No. 50.) 

Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s Motion on April 1, 2014. (ECF No. 52.) The matter is now fully 

briefed.1

 

1

 Defendants’ renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is nearly identical to their previous 

Motion for Summary Judgment. The only change is a footnote indicating that the parties 

conducted limited discovery. (Def.’s Mot. 7 n.4, ECF No. 48.) They also object to Plaintiff’s 

February 14, 2014 affidavits. Because Defendants have not raised any new issues in their 

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II. 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial 

burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the court must draw all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stansberry v. Air 

Wisc. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of 

fact” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). 

 “Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must ‘designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Kimble v. Wasylyshyn, No. 10–3110, 2011 

WL 4469612, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

324 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring a party maintaining that a fact is genuinely 

disputed to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record”). “The nonmovant must, 

however, do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts, . . . there must be evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of 

the non-moving party to create a genuine dispute.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 

Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving 

party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case, 

summary judgment is appropriate.” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

322–23). 

 

renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s previous responses 

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent needed to rule on the instant Motion. 

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III. 

A. Joinder Under Rule 20 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Motion to Seek Leave to Add Party Defendants lacks 

merit and is DENIED. As set forth in the Court’s February 21, 2014 Order, 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 permits joinder of defendants in one 

action if claims arise out of the “same transaction [or] occurrence” and “any 

question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); see also Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-9, No. 2:07-cv-961, 

2008 WL 2982265, at *8 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2008) (“For proper joinder of 

multiple parties, both requirements of Rule 20(a) must be satisfied . . . .”). “‘In 

making a joinder decision, the district court is guided by the underlying purpose 

of joinder, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite the resolution of 

disputes, thereby eliminating unnecessary lawsuits.’” Damron v. Sims, No. 

2:09-CV-050, 2010 WL 4809090, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2010) (quoting Swan 

v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002)). 

(Opinion and Order 2, ECF No. 47.) 

Plaintiff’s claims against Lawrence Freeman, Amy Hamilton, and Deputy Warden 

Cunningham do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as his claims against the 

current Defendants. Plaintiff’s claims against the current Defendants arise out of an incident that 

occurred on January 14, 2012, in which Plaintiff asserts that Lieutenant Collier and Officer Elam 

took an adverse action against him for refusing to work on his Sabbath. To support his position 

that the addition of Mr. Freeman, Ms. Hamilton, and Deputy Warden Cunningham is proper, 

Plaintiff indicates that Mr. Freeman, the prison’s chaplain, improperly refused to sign an 

affidavit Plaintiff prepared. Plaintiff provides the unsigned affidavit as an attachment to his 

Motion. The affidavit addresses the procedure for acquiring a religious accommodation as well 

as a statement that Mr. Freeman visited Plaintiff when he was housed in solitary confinement. 

According to Plaintiff, Ms. Hamilton advised Mr. Freeman not to sign the affidavit. Plaintiff 

filed an informal complaint against Mr. Freeman and Ms. Hamilton. Plaintiff indicates that 

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Deputy Warden Cunningham returned the complaint “with an [in]comprehensible response, 

saying something to the effect of [‘]he could not tell what [Plaintiff] was seeking but that 

[Plaintiff’s] time had expired.’” (Pl.’s Mot. 3, ECF No. 50.) 

Plaintiff does not assert that the proposed Defendants retaliated against him for exercising 

his religion. The situation he describes with the proposed Defendants occurred in March 2014, 

nearly two and a half years after Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint. See Ratcliff v. Moore, 614 

F. Supp. 2d 880, 888 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (finding that plaintiff failed to meet the “same transaction 

or occurrence” requirement under Rule 20 where he attempted to add a new party based on an 

incident that took place a year after the initial incident in which his injury arose); Kunin v. 

Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 10-11456, 2011 WL 6090132, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2011) 

(“When claims involve different conduct during different time periods, they should not be tried 

together”). 

As best as the Court can discern, Plaintiff may be indicating that the proposed Defendants 

took action in retaliation for his filing of the instant lawsuit. For example, Plaintiff contends that 

the proposed Defendants took action to “pervert [Plaintiff] out of the justice he seeks” in 

attempting to “right a wrong . . . perpetrated against him by the State of Ohio . . . .” (Pl.’s Aff. 3, 

ECF No. 50-1.) Joinder of parties under Rule 20, however, ‘“is a matter highly dependent on 

judicial discretion.’” Konica Minolta Bus. Solutions, U.S.A., Inc. v. Allied Office Prods., Inc., 

No. 2:06-cv-71, 2006 Wl 3827461, at *5 n.2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2006). A court has the 

discretion to deny joinder under Rule 20 when it concludes that “the difference between parties, 

time frames, and circumstances makes joinder improper.” Ratcliff, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 888. 

Here, Plaintiff attempts to name three new Defendants years after he filed his Complaint, based 

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on completely different circumstances. The Court declines to join the proposed Defendants as 

parties to this action. Plaintiff’s Motion is therefore DENIED. 

B. Summary Judgment 

 As a preliminary matter, the Court will address the various documents Plaintiff filed after 

the Court granted his Motion for Limited Discovery under Rule 56(d). First, Plaintiff filed a 

document titled Notice of Exhibits Response. (ECF No. 42.) In this Notice, Plaintiff identifies 

and provides forty-five pages of documents, including grievance forms about unrelated topics 

and again submitted his previously-provided Religious Accommodation paperwork. He further 

provides grievance records related to his attempts to add as Defendants Lieutenant Shane Clark, 

Lawrence Freeman, Amy Hamilton, and Deputy Warden Cunningham. The Court concludes 

that the documents in Plaintiff’s Notice are unnecessary, redundant, or irrelevant to the current 

Motion, and therefore will not be considered. 

 Plaintiff also provides the affidavit of Bruce Wilson. (ECF No. 43.) Mr. Wilson is an 

inmate at CCI who asserts that he was a witness to the events that occurred on January 14, 2012. 

In his affidavit, Mr. Wilson sets forth that he has personal knowledge of the incident and is 

competent to testify to the matters stated. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or 

declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out 

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to 

testify on the matters stated.”) Importantly, Mr. Wilson avers that Plaintiff showed his 

accommodation paperwork to Officer Elam, who then escorted Plaintiff to “Post 5.” (Wilson 

Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 43.) In the interest of viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

the Court will consider Mr. Wilson’s affidavit for the purpose of disposing the instant Motion. 

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need only consider the cited materials, but it may 

consider other materials in the record”). 

1. Verbal Harassment by Officer Elam and Lieutenant Collier 

 Plaintiff’s sole claim for relief is that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his 

right to engage in religious practices. In this case, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants called him 

names such as “baby raper” and threatened him on the night he did not report for work duty. 

(April 3, 2012 Grievance 1, ECF No. 3.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation 

based on verbal harassment fails for two reasons. First, they assert that Plaintiff has failed to 

provide competent summary judgment evidence because he did not file an affidavit or sign his 

complaint under the penalty of perjury.2

 Second, Defendants argue that for all matters arising 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including retaliation for exercising religion, courts have consistently 

held that verbal harassment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

 Defendants’ argument that verbal harassment does not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation is persuasive. “Mere insults are generally not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 

Siggers v. Renner, 37 F. App’x 138, 141 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Wingo v. Tennessee Dept. of 

Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455 (“Verbal harassment or idle threats by a state actor do not create a 

constitutional violation and are insufficient to support a § 1983 claim for relief.”); Carney v. 

Craven, 40 F. App’x 48, 50 (6th Cir. 2002) (“An inmate has no right to be free from verbal 

abuse, and minor threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation” (internal citations 

omitted)). Here, Plaintiff alleges only verbal harassment and generalized threats. Such conduct 

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under § 1983. Accordingly, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment to the 

 

2

 Although they are correct that most of Plaintiff’s claims in this regard are unauthenticated, 

Defendants do not address Mr. Wilson’s Affidavit, in which he avers that Officer Elam made a 

verbal threat that he would slap Plaintiff if he did not hurry. (Wilson Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 43.) 

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extent that Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ rude conduct and offensive comments constitute 

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. 

2. Negligence 

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that prison officials burdened 

his free exercise rights under the First Amendment because he only points to an “isolated 

incident of negligence in failing to remove his name, or check first for religious accommodation 

prior to issuing the list” of available Yard Workers to perform snow removal duties. (Mot. for 

Summ. J. 17, ECF No. 48.) They contend that mere negligence in the administration of the 

religious accommodation policy is insufficient to prove intentional retaliation. In his previous 

Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are not permitted to interfere with 

his religious rights, whether the incident is “isolated or not.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. 4, ECF No. 

29.) Plaintiff also provides the affidavit of Bruce Wilson, in which Mr. Wilson avers that 

Plaintiff showed Defendant Elam his accommodation paperwork on the night he was awakened 

by Officer Elam. (Wilson Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 43.) 

“Negligent acts by officials causing unintended denials of religious rights do not violate 

the Free Exercise Clause.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, 

Plaintiff requested and was granted a religious accommodation that excused him from working 

on his Sabbath day. His normal schedule only required him to work Monday through Friday 

“except for short-notice emergency work details requests such as snow removal.” (Johnson Aff. 

¶ 7, ECF No. 49-2.) In the nearly year-long period in which he was employed as a Yard Worker, 

Plaintiff only points to this one instance in which he was required to work on his Sabbath day. 

Defendants do not, however, address Mr. Wilson’s affidavit, in which he avers that 

Plaintiff showed his accommodation paperwork to Officer Elam. Mr. Wilson’s affidavit is 

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sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants knew about 

Plaintiff’s religious accommodation and therefore acted intentionally to deprive Plaintiff of his 

free exercise rights. A reasonable jury could determine that, if Defendants were aware of the 

religious accommodation and nonetheless punished Plaintiff by forcing him to work on his 

Sabbath, this conduct could rise above the level of mere negligence. Defendants, therefore, are 

not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. Nevertheless, as set forth below, the 

Undersigned concludes Plaintiff has failed to prove all the requisite elements and that 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the only remaining claim of retaliation. 

3. Retaliation 

The elements of a First Amendment Retaliation Claim are as follows: 

(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken 

against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from 

continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between 

elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part 

by the plaintiff’s protected conduct. 

 

Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 

F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on all three elements. Barhite 

v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 06-CV-11292, 2007 WL 2657098, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 5, 

2007). Defendants concede that Defendant Collier’s placement of Plaintiff into segregation 

constituted an adverse action for the purposes of element two.3

 (Mot. for Summ. J. 19, ECF No. 

49.) Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment if Plaintiff cannot meet element one or 

three. 

According to Plaintiff, he engaged in protected conduct by refusing to report to an 

emergency work detail on his Sabbath. He indicates that Defendants retaliated against him by 

 

3

 Defendants note, and the Court agrees, that the only action Plaintiff alleges as to Defendant 

Elam is that he woke Plaintiff and told him to report to work. This action does not amount to an 

adverse action. 

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putting him in solitary confinement. The parties dispute whether, on the night in question, 

Plaintiff showed his religious accommodation to Defendants. (Wilson Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 43, 

Elam Inter. ¶ 6, ECF No. 49-9, Collier Inter. ¶ 6, Id.) Defendants assert, however, that even if 

Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff’s accommodation, a prison inmate is not engaged in 

protected conduct when he or she violates legitimate prison regulations. (Mot. for Summ. J. 19, 

ECF No. 48.) 

The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff was not engaged in a protected activity when he 

failed to report for work during the snow event. “[I]t is generally much harder for a prisoner to 

show that his conduct is protected because prison regulations are allowed to infringe on 

prisoners’ rights as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate penological concern.” 

Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 (1987)); see also Heard 

v. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1, 10 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has explained that although 

‘incarceration does not divest prisoners of all constitutional protections,’ the ‘constitutional 

rights that prisoners possess are more limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by 

society at large.’”) (quoting Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228-29 (2001)); Treesh v. Bobb-Itt, 

No. 2:10-CV-211, 2011 WL 3837099, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2011) (“[A] prisoner’s right to 

religious freedom must be balanced against, and at times made subservient to, the legitimate 

interests of penological safety, order, and the corrections process.”). Further, “if a prisoner 

violates a legitimate prison regulation, he is not engaged in protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X, 

175 F.3d at 395 (internal quotations omitted). Here, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction’s policy on Institutional Religious Services provides as follows: 

The opportunity for inmates to engage in particular religious practices shall be 

subject to the legitimate departmental or institutional interests and concerns, 

including security, safety, health, discipline, rehabilitation, order, and the 

limitations of and allocation of resources. 

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(ODRC Policy 72-REG-01, ECF No. 49-5.) Defendants have provided an affidavit from Cassie 

Johnson, whose duties include supervising and overseeing prison-inmate job assignments. Ms. 

Johnson affirms that Plaintiff’s job duties include “being summoned to remove snow and spread 

salt upon walkways outside prison buildings but inside the prison compound, often times with 

little to short-notice, and often times at non-scheduled times when Yard Workers are not already 

working, or scheduled to work.” (Johnson Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 49-2.) CCI’s penological concern 

in ensuring snow-removal is as follows: 

Because of the frequent mass movement of large numbers of prison inmates to 

and from the Chow Hall, as well as to other locations within the prison 

compound, and prison staff’s needs to access buildings by walking on exterior 

walkways and paths, snow removal is a necessary and essential function for the 

safety and good order of the institution, its inmates and employees during such 

snow and ice events. 

(Id. at ¶ 7.) Defendants have adduced sufficient evidence to show that Defendants took adverse 

action against Plaintiff for violating a legitimate prison regulation. Plaintiff refused to report to 

work during a snow emergency in violation of ODRC Policy 72-Reg-01. Plaintiff has not met 

his burden of proof to show that he engaged in protected conduct. 

 Moreover, even if Plaintiff had engaged in protected activity, his claim would still fail 

under element three. In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants engaged in “[r]etaliation 

and punitive punishment for practicing Religious Belief set forth by the traditions of Seventh 

Day Adventist.” (Compl ¶ 4, ECF No. 3.) He has failed to plead any facts, let alone adduce 

sufficient evidence, to demonstrate that the exercise of his protected right was a motivating 

factor in Defendants’ purported retaliatory actions. Plaintiff has “simply allege[d] retaliation 

without establishing causal connection.” Lewis v. Turner, 16 F. App’x 302, 304 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be 

GRANTED.

4

 

IV. 

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment be GRANTED. (ECF No. 48.) Further, Plaintiff’s Motion to Seek Leave 

to Add Lawrence Freeman, Amy Hamilton, and Deputy Warden Cunningham as Defendants is 

DENIED. (ECF No. 50.) 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and 

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex 

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate 

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district 

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

 

4

 The Court dispenses with an analysis of qualified immunity given this recommendation to grant 

summary judgment to Defendants on the merits. 

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appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation 

omitted)).

 

 

 

Date: June 3, 2014 /s/ Elizabeth Preston Deavers 

 Elizabeth Preston Deavers 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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