2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-4-2002

Fricker v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 1-1361

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Recommended Citation

"Fricker v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 3.

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 NOT-PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

 No. 01-1361 

 

 DANIEL FRICKER 

 v. 

 *WILLIAM A. HALTER, 

 ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

 

 Appellant 

 *{Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c)} 

 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-02796) 

 District Judge: Honorable Marvin Katz 

 

 

 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 December 6, 2001 

 

 Before: MANSMANN, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 

 (Filed January 3, 2002) 

 

 OPINION 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

 Defendant Commissioner of Social Security appeals an Order of the 

U.S. District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, reversing the decision of 

the 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to deny Plaintiff Daniel Fricker social 

security 

disability insurance (SSDI) benefits, and remanding the case with an order 

to award 

Fricker benefits. The Commissioner contends that the District Court 

committed two 
errors. First, the District Court impermissibly considered evidence which 

had not been in 

the record before the ALJ but was submitted for the first time to the 

Appeals Council 

with Fricker's request for review. Second, the District Court erred by 

not treating the 

ALJ's findings as conclusive, even though they were supported by 

substantial evidence. 

For the reasons which follow, we will reverse the District Court's Order 

and remand this 

case to the District Court to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner. 

 I. Facts and Procedural History 

 On September 16, 1996, Fricker filed an application for SSDI benefits 

under 42 

U.S.C. section 423 (2001), alleging that a back injury and related pain 

had disabled him 

since September 17, 1987. In this application, Fricker averred that as of 

December 31, 

1992, his date last insured, his disability rendered him entirely unable 

to work. After the 

appropriate state agency denied, reconsidered and re-denied his 

application, Fricker 

sought and was granted a hearing before an ALJ. 

 During a May 18, 1998, hearing, the ALJ considered the testimony of 

Fricker and 

of a vocational expert, together with certain evidence of Fricker's 

medical history. This 

evidence included various physicians' assessments of Fricker's ability to 

work. Much of 

the medical evidence considered by the ALJ suggests that, as of the date 

Fricker was last 

insured, he was able to perform some types of work. See, e.g., Appendix 

at 114-17, 121, 

131-33, 143-44, 287-365, 367-68, 486-89, 517, 529. An April 9, 1998, 

letter of Dr. 

Sofia Lam, considered by the ALJ stated, however, that Fricker "is not 

capable of 

performing any type of gainful employment at the present time or in the 

future." 

(emphasis added). Based on the evidence before her, the ALJ found 

Fricker's allegations 

"excessive [and] not fully credible" and found Fricker "capable of light 

and sedentary 

work." Accordingly, the ALJ denied Fricker's request for SSDI benefits. 

 On June 2, 1998, six days before the ALJ's decision, Dr. Joseph 

Pongonis, a 

physician who had earlier provided an assessment supporting Fricker's 

employability, 

wrote a letter stating "I feel that [Fricker] is unable to perform any 

type of work at this 

time or in the future." (emphasis added). The Pongonis Letter was not 

presented to the 

ALJ, and the ALJ did not consider it in rendering her decision. Fricker 

presented the 
Pongonis Letter for the first time to the Appeals Council in connection 

with a request for 

review of the ALJ's decision. 

 The Appeals Council denied Fricker's request for review, making the 

ALJ's 

decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. 

404.955, 404.981, 

422.210 (2001). See also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106 (2000). 

Thereafter, Fricker 

commenced this civil action by filing a complaint with the District Court 

pursuant to 42 

U.S.C.  405(g) (2001). On December 11, 2000, the District Court denied 

the 

Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and granted Fricker's motion 

for 

summary judgment. In reaching its decision, the District Court considered 

and relied 

upon the Pongonis Letter which had been presented for the first time to 

the Appeals 

Council. 

 II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 

 The District Court had jurisdiction over Fricker's request for 

judicial review of the 

Commissioner's denial of SSDI benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 

405(g) (2001). 

Because the District Court's December 11, 2000 Order was a final judgment 

that 

disposed of all of the parties' claims, we have jurisdiction over the 

instant appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291 (2001). We exercise plenary review over the 

question of 

whether it was proper for the District Court to consider evidence not 

before the ALJ. See 

Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Tubari Ltd., 

Inc. v. NLRB, 

959 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1992)). We review de novo the issue of whether 

the 

Commissioner's denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence. 

See Plummer 

v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3rd Cir. 1999) ("The role of this Court is 

identical to that of 

the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial 

evidence to support 

the Commissioner's decision."). 

 III. Discussion 

 The first issue raised in this appeal - whether the District Court 

erred by 

considering evidence not before the ALJ - is controlled by our decision in 

Matthews v. 

Apfel. In Matthews, we held that "when [a] claimant seeks to rely on 

evidence that was 

not before the ALJ, the district court may remand to the Commissioner but 

only if the 
evidence is new and material and if there was good cause why it was not 

previously 

presented to the ALJ." Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593 (citing Keeton v. DHHS, 

21 F.3d 

1064, 1067 (11th Cir. 1994); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 286 (3d 

Cir. 1985)). 

See also 42 U.S.C.  405(g) (2001) ("[The District Court] may at any time 

order 

additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social 

Security, but only 

upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there 

is good cause 

for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior 

proceeding."). 

Fricker and the District Court relied on the Pongonis Letter, which was 

not brought 

before the ALJ. However, Fricker has not shown that the Pongonis Letter 

was new, that 

it referred to the relevant period when Fricker was insured, or that there 

was good cause 

for failing to present it to the ALJ. Therefore, the District Court erred 

when it considered 

and relied upon the Pongonis Letter. 

 Turning to the second of Commissioner's objections - the District 

Court's 

determination that the ALJ's findings were not supported by substantial 

evidence - we 

also find error. As we noted in Plummer, we are "bound by the ALJ's 

findings of fact if 

they are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Plummer, 186 

F.3d at 427 

(citing 42 U.S.C.  405(g); Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 

1986)). For 

purposes of our review, substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence 

as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 

900, 901 (3d 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). We 

find that a 

reasonable mind certainly might accept as adequate the ample medical 

evidence 

suggesting Fricker's employability as of his date last insured. We note, 

moreover, that 

the Lam and Pongonis letters referred not to the period on or before 

December 31, 1992, 

when Fricker was last insured, but to a date over five years later. For 

these reasons, we 

find that the ALJ's findings regarding Fricker's employability are 

conclusive. 

 We will, therefore, reverse the District Court's Order and remand 

this case to the 

District Court with directions to enter an order granting judgment in 

favor of the 

Commissioner. 
 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing Opinion. 

 By the Court, 

 /s/ Jane R. Roth 

 Circuit Judge