J-A28019-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

E.G.O-R.

 

 Appellant

v.

D.J.R. 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 480 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Civil Division at No(s): 

2010-1941, 2013-00087-S, 622113826

E.G.O-R. 

v.

D.J.R.

 Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 509 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Civil Division at No(s): 

2010-1941, 2013-0087S

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 06, 2019

In this consolidated appeal and cross-appeal, E.G.O-R. (hereinafter 

“Mother”) and D.J.R. (hereinafter “Father”)1 separately challenge the trial 

____________________________________________

1 As this case involves issues regarding child support, we identify the parties 

by their initials so as to protect the identity of the minor child. We have 

amended the caption accordingly.
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court’s order, entered on February 13, 2018, granting Father’s petition to 

modify child support and petition for special relief. We affirm. 

The trial court has ably summarized the underlying facts and procedural 

posture of this case:

[Mother] and [Father] were married on May 25, 1991. During 

the marriage, the parties had three children: [G.O.R. (born 

in April 1995), K.O.R. (born in September 1997), and S.O.R. 

(born in March 2000)]. . . .

Mother filed a divorce complaint on May 7, 2010. On 

September 2, 2010, the parties executed a Marriage 

Settlement Agreement (MSA)[,] which was incorporated, but 

not merged, into a final decree in divorce entered on October 

18, 2010. In the MSA, the parties addressed all aspects of 

their divorce, including dividing their assets and liabilities, 

establishing custody, and determining child support. In 

pertinent part, under the [MSA], Father received full 

ownership of [redacted], which owns and operates 

[redacted], a student bar in downtown State College, 

Pennsylvania[,] and a parcel of real estate; Mother received 

ownership of another company, [redacted], the remaining 

real estate, and all marital debts; and[,] Father agreed to pay 

Mother [$3,000.00] monthly in child support until their 

youngest child’s emancipation. [Specifically, the child 

support provision reads:

3.15 SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN

The parties agree that Father shall pay Mother child 

support in the sum of $3,000.00 per month, which 

support shall be modifiable based on changed 

circumstances pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(b). The 

parties acknowledge that said sum is currently 

appropriate under the Pennsylvania Child Support 

guidelines given the parties’ respective incomes and cash 

flow available for support and the expenses that the 

parties have maintained with respect to the children. Said 

monthly payment of support shall terminate when the 
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parties’ youngest child graduates from high school or 

reaches age 18, whichever last occurs. . . . 

MSA, dated 9/2/10, at 25-26.] . . .

[Under the MSA,] the remaining real estate included the 

marital property and the mortgages encumbering the 

property[;] Mother was required to refinance the mortgages 

so that Father [was] no longer jointly liable or list the 

property for sale within four [] years. [The MSA provision 

regarding the marital residence reads:

[Mother] shall, on a regular basis, attempt to transfer the 

Marital Residence Mortgages to her name alone and shall 

do so when permissible by the lenders involved. In the 

event [Father] is not released from the liability of the 

Mortgages and the notes securing the same within 4 years 

from the date of execution, [Mother] shall, at [Father’s] 

request, list the Marital Residence for sale and exercise 

her best efforts to sell the same as soon as possible so 

that [Father] is relieved of liability with respect to the 

Mortgages or the notes securing the same.

Id. at 7].

On February 26, 2013, Father filed a [petition to modify his 

child support obligation. Within the petition, Father claimed 

that the emancipation of the oldest child constituted a change 

in circumstances warranting a reduction in his child support 

obligations. On December 30, 2014, the trial court denied 

Father’s petition. The trial court concluded that, under the 

MSA, Father was required to pay $3,000.00 per month in 

child support and that, under the agreement,] . . . the 

emancipation of the oldest child did not constitute a change 

in circumstances. 

Father appealed [and, on March 1, 2016, the Superior Court 

affirmed the trial court’s order. E.G.O.-R. v. D.J.R., 144 

A.3d 185 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum) at 

1-3]. . . .

Father filed a Petition to Modify Support Nunc Pro Tunc on 

April 8, 2016[,] alleging a change in Mother’s circumstances. 

. . . [Further, on November 19, 2016,] Father filed a Petition
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for Special Relief . . . [,] seeking to enforce the provision in 

the MSA requiring Mother to either remove Father from the 

mortgages encumbering the marital residence within four [] 

years of the execution of the MSA or sell the property. Father 

remains liable on the mortgages encumbering the property. 

Mother filed an Answer to the Petition for Special Relief[,] 

arguing Father’s support arrearages prevented her from 

refinancing the marital property. 

A hearing was held on December 12, 2016 and . . . April 21, 

2017. [At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made

the following findings of fact]:

1. Mother sold [redacted] and the rental properties 

distributed to her in the MSA, and used the proceeds to 

pay off the debt distributed to her in the MSA. Mother no 

longer has any income from [redacted].

2. Mother invested $100,000.00 of the proceeds from the 

sale of the properties into a real estate fund in Las Vegas. 

Mother predicts this investment will have a 10% return 

per year.

3. Mother was employed with AssetMark earning 

$75,000.00 per year, possibly $80,000.00 after a raise, 

but has since ended her employment there as the 

company moved operations to the west coast and Mother 

opted to remain in Centre County. Mother was laid off 

effective March 1, 2017 and received a severance 

package of $2,500.00 plus [four weeks’] pay.

4. Mother now receives unemployment [compensation] 

benefits of $570.00 per week.

5. Mother retains ownership of the martial residence and 

rents out the residence for events in the area and earns 

approximately $3,000.00 per year by doing so.

6. Only one minor child remains residing with Mother. 

The other two are enrolled at the Pennsylvania State 

University and do not reside with Mother full time.
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7. Father received $29,389.00 in 2015 from employment 

with [redacted], but ended his employment there in order 

to care for his mother, who has since passed away.

8. Father received $122,106.00 in distributions from 

[redacted] in 2015, and $116,258.00 in 2016.

9. Father was working full time on the Karoondinha Music 

Festival without compensation. 

10. Father also received an inheritance in 2016 consisting 

of $100,000.00, a 1/3 interest in an apartment building 

on Corl Street [(hereinafter “the Corl Street Property”)], 

and permission to reside in his mother’s former residence, 

which he owns with his brother and sister-in-law, for five 

years without paying rent other than upkeep and property 

taxes. 

11. The Corl Street Property was jointly owned by Father, 

his brother, and his sister-in-law. Father and his brother 

purchased the 1/3 interest of Father’s sister-in-law for 

$350,000.00, and the two plan on doing renovations.

12. Father’s truck payment of $589 per month is covered 

by the income generated by the Corl Street Property.

13. Mother has not secured a release of liability for Father 

on the Marital Residence despite requests to do so, and 

Father’s name remains on the mortgages for which he 

may be held personally liable. Mother has not listed the 

residence for sale.

14. Mother has taken out a line of credit on the residence 

and pays $1,550.00 per month in addition to the 

$2,733.00 she already pays on the mortgages and taxes 

associated with the property.

15. Father and his mother sold the Fairwood Lane 

property they jointly owned and Father used his 50% of 

the proceeds to pay all support arrearages in full. He has 

remained current on support.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/17, at 1-5 (some internal capitalization omitted).
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On November 14, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting 

Father’s petition to modify child support and petition for special relief. As to 

the petition to modify child support, the trial court noted that the parties’ MSA 

permitted modification of Father’s child support obligation upon a showing of 

changed circumstances. Id. at 6; MSA, 9/2/10, at 25-26; see also 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(b) (“A provision of an agreement regarding child support . . 

. shall be subject to modification by the court upon a showing of changed 

circumstances”). The trial court concluded that Father proved a change in 

circumstances because: since the signing of the MSA, Mother’s earning 

capacity increased significantly; “Mother no longer has liabilities to pay off 

after the sale of the businesses and has an investment in Las Vegas she 

believes will yield 10% or more per year;” and, “two of the children have been 

emancipated since the MSA [was] signed[] and no longer reside primarily with 

Mother.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/17, at 7. The trial court thus granted 

Father’s modification petition and remanded the case to the domestic relations 

section, “for calculation of [child] support consistent with [the trial court’s] 

findings.” Id. at 11. Further, with respect to Father’s petition for special 

relief, the trial court concluded that Mother was required to “refinance the 

mortgages so that Father is no longer jointly liable or list the Marital Residence 

for sale within 120 days.” Id. at 10.

Mother filed a motion to reconsider the November 14, 2017 order and, 

on December 12, 2017, the trial court entered a timely order expressly 

granting reconsideration of the order. See Trial Court Order, 12/12/17, at 1.
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On January 22, 2018, the trial court held argument on Mother’s motion 

to reconsider and, on February 13, 2018, the trial court entered an order 

partially modifying and partially reaffirming its prior, November 14, 2017 

order. The February 13, 2018 order declares:

AND NOW, this 13th day of February, 2018, [Mother’s] Motion 

for Reconsideration is GRANTED in part. The [trial c]ourt 

concludes its [prior] determination that [a change in 

circumstances was established because] the two oldest 

children are emancipated was in error. Emancipation is not 

a change of circumstances, and support shall be calculated 

for three children based on the incomes set forth in the 

November 14, 2017 Order. The remainder of the Motion for 

Reconsideration is DENIED.

Trial Court Order, 2/13/18, at 1.

On February 22, 2018, the trial court calculated Father’s child support 

obligations, in accordance with its November 14, 2017 and February 13, 2018 

orders and findings. The trial court’s February 22, 2018 order declared that 

Father was required to pay $2,045.00 per month in child support.2 Trial Court 

Order, 2/22/18, at 1.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court’s February 13, 2018 order did not resolve all claims related to 

the award of child support, as the order contemplated that there would be 

further proceedings to establish Father’s specific monthly payment 

obligations. See Trial Court Order, 11/14/17, at 11 (the trial court remanded 

the case to the domestic relations section, “for calculation of [child] support 

consistent with [the trial court’s] findings”). Thus, the February 13, 2018 

order was not a final, appealable order as to the award of child support. See 

Deasy v. Deasy, 730 A.2d 500, 502-503 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding that, in 

the context of a child support award, the final, appealable order is the one 

that “dispos[es] of all claims as related to [the] award of child support”); 

D.L.H. v. R.W.L., 777 A.2d 1158, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“[i]n a support 

case, the final order is the order directing payment of support or dismissing 
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Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on March 15, 2018 and Father filed 

a timely cross-appeal on March 26, 2018. Mother raises three claims to this 

Court:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining 

Father met his burden of proving a change in circumstances

and thereafter reviewing the parties’ incomes and 

circumstances de novo?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the de novo

determination of Father’s income?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by requiring Mother 

to refinance the liens encumbering the marital residence 

within 120 days given the extended length of time Father 

carried substantial arrears in this support matter, the damage

Mother suffered relative to her credit rating, and the amount 

of marital debt Mother assumed in exchange for a 

bargained-for child support amount pursuant to the parties 

Marital Settlement Agreement?

Mother’s Brief at 4 (internal emphasis and some internal capitalization

omitted).

Father raises one claim on appeal:

____________________________________________

the support complaint”); see also West v. West, 446 A.2d 1342, (Pa. Super. 

1982) (“‘interim order’ compelling [the husband] to pay [the wife] ‘$180 per 

week for support and maintenance until further order’” was not a final, 

appealable order because it “invite[d the husband] back into court”) (some 

internal capitalization and corrections omitted). Nevertheless, on February 

22, 2018, the trial court entered its final child support award, which directed

that Father pay $2,045.00 per month in child support. Trial Court Order, 

2/22/18, at 1. We note that Mother filed her notice of appeal on March 15, 

2018 – which was within 30 days of both the February 13, 2018 and February 

22, 2018 orders. Father then filed his cross-appeal on March 26, 2018 – which 

was within 14 days of the date Mother filed her notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(b). Therefore, the appeals in this case were timely filed and we have 

jurisdiction over the entirety of this appeal. 
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1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to properly 

apply the Pennsylvania Support Guidelines in establishing 

Father’s obligation for child support, as required by 23 

Pa.C.S. § 4322, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4323(a), Pa.R.A.P. No. 

1910.16-1(b), and the prevailing jurisprudence of the 

Pennsylvania appellate courts by forcing [Father] to pay child 

support for two children to which he no longer owes a duty 

of support?

Father’s Brief at 7.

We will initially review Mother’s claims.

Mother’s first two claims on appeal contend that the trial court erred 

when it modified Father’s child support obligations. As our Supreme Court 

explained:

We review child support awards for an abuse of discretion. A 

court does not commit an abuse of discretion merely by 

making an error of judgment. Rather, a court abuses its 

discretion if it exercises judgment that is manifestly 

unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will as shown by the evidence of record. Th[e Pennsylvania 

Supreme] Court has further observed that we will not disturb 

a support order unless the trial court failed to consider 

properly the requirements of the rules governing support 

actions. Additionally, [where an] appeal presents questions 

of law, . . . our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary for such questions.

Hanrahan v. Bakker, 186 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa. 2018) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted).

Father’s child support obligations towards Mother were originally

established in the parties’ marital settlement agreement (“MSA”). The trial 

court found, and the parties agree, that the MSA was incorporated, but not 

merged, into the divorce decree. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/17, at 2; 
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Mother’s Brief at 13; Father’s Brief at 10. As we have held, “parties can make 

an agreement as to child support if it is fair and reasonable, made without 

fraud or coercion, and does not prejudice the welfare of the children.” 

Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2007). With 

respect to marital settlement agreements in general:

Marital settlement agreements are private undertakings 

between two parties, each having responded to the “give and 

take” of negotiations and bargained consideration. A marital 

support agreement incorporated but not merged into the 

divorce decree survives the decree and is enforceable at law 

or equity. A settlement agreement between spouses is 

governed by the law of contracts unless the agreement 

provides otherwise. . . .

. . .

When interpreting the language of a contract, the intention 

of the parties is a paramount consideration. In determining 

the intent of the parties to a written agreement, the court 

looks to what they have clearly expressed, for the law does 

not assume that the language was chosen carelessly. When 

interpreting agreements containing clear and unambiguous 

terms, we need only examine the writing itself to give effect 

to the parties' intent.

. . .

In ascertaining the intent of the parties to a contract when 

unclear from the writing itself, the court considers the parties' 

outward and objective manifestations of assent, as opposed 

to their undisclosed and subjective intentions. [When the 

intent of the parties is unclear, t]he court may take into 

consideration the surrounding circumstances, the situation of 

the parties, the objects they apparently have in view, and the 

nature of the subject-matter of the agreement. The court will 

adopt an interpretation that is most reasonable and probable 

bearing in mind the objects which the parties intended to 

accomplish through the agreement.
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Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal 

citations and some internal quotations omitted). 

In conducting our review of a marital settlement agreement, we note 

that “contract interpretation is a question of law [and, therefore,] this Court 

is not bound by the trial court's interpretation” of the agreement. Id. at 1257 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “However, we are bound by the 

trial court's credibility determinations” and, “[w]hen interpreting a marital 

settlement agreement, the trial court is the sole determiner of facts.” Id. at 

1257-1258. We will not overturn a trial court’s factual determination in the 

absence of an abuse of discretion. Id.

Mother claims that the trial court erred when it determined that Father 

met his burden of proving a change in circumstances, so as to warrant a 

modification of his child support obligations. In particular, Mother claims, the 

trial court erred in determining that she had a material change in her income

because: 1) “the trial court could not possibly determine that either of the 

parties experienced a [] change in income . . . when[, in the trial court’s 2010 

and 2014 rulings,] the trial court [] determined it could not compute either of 

the parties incomes” and 2) Father suffers from unclean hands because he 

“purposefully placed Mother in a position where she had no choice but to sell 

a portion of the marital business and obtain employment.” Mother’s Brief at 

28. These claims fail.

First, Mother claims that the trial court erred in finding that she 

experienced a material change in income because, in 2010 and 2014, it had
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determined that it could not compute her income. Mother’s Brief at 30. This 

claim is absolutely meritless, given that, during the December 12, 2016 

modification hearing, Mother specifically testified that her “income has gone 

from around $50,000 in 2010, to $36,000 in 2012, to zero in 2013, up to 

[$75,000 or] $80,000 presently.” N.T. Modification Hearing, 12/12/16, at 22. 

Therefore, the trial court had ample grounds for determining that Mother 

experienced a material change in income since the 2010 signing of the MSA, 

thus warranting a modification of Father’s support obligations. Mother’s claim 

to the contrary fails.

Next, Mother argues that “the doctrine of unclean hands” should prohibit 

Father from experiencing a downward modification in his child support 

obligations because “Father’s repeated attempts to avoid his child support 

obligation to Mother” forced Mother to enter the workforce and sell a portion 

of the marital business. Mother’s Brief at 33. This claim is also meritless.

“The doctrine of unclean hands requires that one seeking equity act 

fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy at issue. The doctrine 

is derived from the unwillingness of a court to give relief to a suitor who has 

so conducted himself as to shock the moral sensibilities of the judge.” 

Morgan v. Morgan, 193 A.3d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal 

quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted). “Application of the unclean 

hands doctrine is confined to willful misconduct which concerns the particular 

matter in litigation.” Shapiro v. Shapiro, 204 A.2d 266, 268 (Pa. 1964). 
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Mother claims that the doctrine of unclean hands prohibits Father from 

receiving a downward modification of his child support obligations. However, 

this claim immediately fails, as the trial court never made any finding that 

Father was guilty of willful misconduct, fraud, or deceit related to his payment 

of child support – and Mother does not claim that the trial court erred in failing 

to make such a finding. See Mother’s Brief at 31-33. Moreover, to the extent 

Mother could be found to have raised such a claim of error, the claim would 

fail because, when the trial court ruled against Mother’s claim, the trial court 

necessarily made a factual finding that Father did not act fraudulently, 

deceitfully, or with willful misconduct related to his payment of child support

– and this factual finding, in no way, constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

For Mother’s second numbered claim on appeal, Mother contends that 

the trial court erred in determining Father’s income. In her brief to this Court, 

Mother contends that the trial court erred when it limited its review of Father’s 

income to his Federal Income Tax Returns and that the trial court should have 

considered a number of additional sources of Father’s income. See Mother’s 

Brief at 36-37. Mother also claims that, “[d]ue to the unavailability of 

information relative to the Estate of [Father’s mother] and the complete lack 

of reliable information regarding the rental income generated by the Corl 

Street property, the appropriate remedy is for [this Court] to remand the 

matter to the trial court for a full and accurate determination of Father’s 

income available from all sources.” Id. at 38.
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Mother’s claims are waived, as she did not specify any of these claims 

in her Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal and the trial court, consequently, did not address any 

of these claims in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/18, 

at 1-6. Certainly, Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement vaguely and simply 

claimed: “the trial court erred in the determination of [Father’s] income.” 

Mother’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 4/24/18, at 2 (some internal capitalization 

omitted). This statement does not specify how the trial court erred in 

determining Father’s income and the statement does not declare that the 

record was undeveloped regarding income from the estate of Father’s mother

or the rental income generated by the Corl Street Property. See id. Further, 

because of Mother’s vague Rule 1925(b) statement, the trial court’s Rule 

1925(a) opinion simply declared:

[Mother] alleges the [trial] court erred in determining 

[Father’s] income. The [trial] court found [Father’s] income 

to be $155,358.00 based on income from the [redacted], 

income and benefits from rental property, charitable 

contributions, and potential income from employment. 

[Father,] his brother, and [Father’s] accountant all testified 

regarding [Father’s] income. The [trial] court properly 

determined [Father’s] income.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/18, at 5 (some internal capitalization omitted).

We have explained:

issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed 

waived for review. An appellant's concise statement must 

properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal. In 

other words, the Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific 

enough for the trial court to identify and address the issue an 
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appellant wishes to raise on appeal. A concise statement 

which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues 

raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no concise 

statement at all. The court's review and legal analysis can 

be fatally impaired when the court has to guess at the issues 

raised. Thus, if a concise statement is too vague, the court 

may find waiver.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal 

quotations, citations, and corrections omitted).

Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement was overly vague and did not 

challenge the trial court’s decision regarding Father’s income on any specific

basis. See Mother’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 4/24/18, at 2. As a result, 

Mother did not place the trial court on notice that she was challenging the 

decision on any of the grounds first raised in her brief. Mother’s current claim 

on appeal is, thus, waived.

Finally, Mother claims that the trial court erred in requiring that she 

refinance the liens encumbering the former marital residence or sell the 

former marital residence within 120 days. According to Mother, the trial 

court’s decision was an abuse of discretion because, during the period between 

March[] 2013 and April[] 2017, Father’s [child support] arrears balance grew 

to in excess of $82,000.00” and this “created the circumstance of Mother not 

being able to refinance the marital residence.” Mother’s Brief at 40. Mother’s

claim fails. 

Our Supreme Court has emphasized:

When a court comes to a conclusion through the exercise of 

its discretion, there is a heavy burden to show that this 
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discretion has been abused. It is not sufficient to persuade 

the appellate court that it might have reached a different 

conclusion, it is necessary to show an actual abuse of the 

discretionary power. An abuse of discretion will not be found 

based on a mere error of judgment, but rather exists where 

the court has reached a conclusion which overrides or 

misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will. Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will 

not disturb the ruling of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1140 (Pa. 2007) (internal 

citations omitted).

The trial court explained the basis for its decision:

The MSA is clear that Mother cannot keep Father liable for 

the mortgages on the Marital Residence, and must make 

efforts to have him removed from these mortgages. Mother 

has failed to remove Father from the loans, and has further 

put Father at risk by taking out additional lines of credit on 

the Marital Residence. Mother was granted a reprieve due to 

Father owing substantial support arrearages, but Father has 

now paid all support arrearages in full and is current on his 

support payments. Mother does not appear to have 

attempted to comply to remove Father’s name, but has 

continued to argue the provision is unenforceable because of 

Father’s unclean hands.

The MSA was executed over seven years ago, and Mother has 

not complied with the provision requiring her to release 

Father from liability on the mortgages. Father is completely 

up to date on support payments, and Mother must refinance 

so that Father is no longer jointly liable or list the Marital 

Residence for sale within 120 days.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/17, at 10.

Here, given the provision in the MSA (which specifically directs Mother 

to transfer the mortgage to her name alone or sell the property within four 

years of the date of the MSA), the fact that Mother has not complied with the 
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MSA provision (despite the fact that the MSA was executed in 2010), and the 

fact that Father is current on his support payments, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to “refinance so that 

Father is no longer jointly liable or list the Marital Residence for sale within 

120 days.” See Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/17, at 7. Simply stated, given the 

facts of this case, it cannot be said that the trial court’s decision was

“manifestly unreasonable” (and it certainly cannot be said that the trial court’s 

decision was “the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will”). As such, the 

trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion and Mother’s claim on 

appeal fails.

Father raises one claim on appeal. According to Father, the trial court 

erred when it “forc[ed Father] to pay child support for two children to which 

he no longer owes a duty of support.” Father’s Brief at 43. This claim fails.

“In Pennsylvania, the duty to support a child generally ceases when the 

child reaches the age of majority, which is defined as either [18] years of age 

or when the child graduates from high school, whichever comes later.” Style 

v. Shaub, 955 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, two of the parties’ 

three children are over the age of 18 and attend Penn State University; only 

one child is under the age of 18 and lives at home. Therefore, looking solely 

to the general rule, Father would be correct in asserting that his duty to pay 

child support has concluded with respect to two of his three children. 

Nevertheless, parties may, obviously, agree to support their children past the 

age of majority. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(e)(3) (recognizing an exception to 
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the general rule of non-support for a child who has reached the age of 

majority, where there exists an “agreement between the parties requiring 

payments for the benefit of the child after the child has reached age eighteen 

(18) or graduated from high school”).

In this case, the trial court found the parties agreed that Father’s child 

support obligations would be “for all three children until the youngest is 

emancipated, which [was not going to] occur until 2018.” Trial Court Opinion, 

5/8/18, at 3. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the MSA. 

Indeed, the trial court previously interpreted the child support provision of the 

MSA and held that, contrary to Father’s interpretation, “a more reasonable 

interpretation of the [MSA] is that the level of $3,000 monthly child support 

payments shall terminate when the youngest child[] ‘graduates high school or 

reaches age 18, whichever last occurs,’ irrespective of either older child’s 

emancipation.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/30/14, at 2-3 (emphasis added). 

Father then challenged the trial court’s interpretation in a previous appeal to 

this Court and we concluded that Father’s claim on appeal failed on the merits. 

E.G.O.-R. v. D.J.R., 144 A.3d 185 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished 

memorandum) at 2-3.

Essentially, Father is now asking this Court to revisit the trial court’s 

express finding – which we affirmed on appeal – that the child support 

provision in the parties’ MSA expressly contemplated that Father would, in 

fact, support two of his three children past the age of majority. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 12/30/14, at 2-3; E.G.O.-R. v. D.J.R., 144 A.3d 185 (Pa. 
J-A28019-18

- 19 -

Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum) at 2-3. We will not do so. Father’s 

claim on appeal, thus, fails.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/06/2019