Docket No. 108184.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

GEORGE H. RYAN, SR., Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF

TRUSTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT

SYSTEM et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed February 19, 2010.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman,

and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Burke dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

The issue in this case is whether, as a result of his multiple federal

felony convictions, former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan, Sr., has

forfeited all of the pension benefits he earned from the General

Assembly Retirement System. For the reasons that follow, we hold

that he has.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are not in dispute. In 1966, Ryan was

appointed to the Kankakee County board of supervisors. Ryan was
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subsequently elected to and served on the Kankakee County board of

supervisors from 1966 to 1972, including a two-year period as

chairman. While serving on the Kankakee County board of

supervisors, Ryan contributed to the Illinois Municipal Retirement

Fund (IMRF).

In November 1972, Ryan was elected as a representative to the

General Assembly. He was reelected and served until 1982. While in

the General Assembly, Ryan was selected as the minority leader and

Speaker of the House. In November 1982, Ryan was elected

Lieutenant Governor. Ryan won reelection to that office in 1986. In

1990, Ryan was elected Secretary of State, and he served two terms

in this position. In November 1998, Ryan was elected Governor, and

he served in that office from January 1999 until January 2003.

When Ryan was first elected to the General Assembly in 1972, he

became a member of the General Assembly Retirement System (the

System). At that time, Ryan transferred the credits he had earned in

the IMRF into the System. Ryan continued to participate in the

System while serving as Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State and

Governor. In December 2002, Ryan applied for his retirement annuity,

to begin in January 2003.

In December 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Ryan on felony

charges for racketeering, conspiracy, mail fraud, making false

statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and income tax

violations. These charges were premised on conduct that arose out of

and was in connection with Ryan’s service as Secretary of State and

Governor. In April 2006, a jury found Ryan guilty on all counts. The

district court dismissed two of the counts after finding insufficient

evidence to support the claims and entered judgment on the remaining

counts. Ryan was sentenced to 78 months in prison.

Following Ryan’s felony convictions, the acting executive

secretary of the Illinois State Retirement Systems notified Ryan that

all of his pension benefits were being suspended pursuant to section

2–156 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Code) (40 ILCS 5/2–156

(West 2006)). That section provides that “[n]one of the benefits herein

provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any

felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her

service as a member.” 40 ILCS 5/2–156 (West 2006). Ryan was also

informed that the suspension included all of the insurance coverage for
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him and his wife. The suspension was made retroactive to the date of

Ryan’s sentencing.

Ryan sought review of the suspension of his pension benefits

before the System’s Board of Trustees (the Board). Ryan argued that

the benefits he earned as county board supervisor, member of the

General Assembly, and Lieutenant Governor were not subject to

forfeiture. The Board disagreed and ratified the acting executive

secretary’s decision to terminate completely Ryan’s retirement

annuity. Ryan sought administrative review, and the circuit court of

Cook County affirmed the complete termination of Ryan’s retirement

benefits. Ryan appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 388 Ill.

App. 3d 161. According to the appellate court, although Ryan clearly

had forfeited the pension benefits he earned while serving as Governor

and Secretary of State, he is entitled to receive the benefits he earned

while serving as Lieutenant Governor and as a member of the General

Assembly. 388 Ill. App. 3d at 168-69.

We allowed the Board’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.

315(a).

DISCUSSION

As noted earlier, the facts of this case are not in dispute. The

matter to be resolved relates solely to the proper interpretation of the

pension forfeiture provision that disqualifies a member of the System

from receiving pension benefits if convicted of a felony “relating to or

arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member.”

40 ILCS 5/2–156 (West 2006). Although the interpretation of a

statute by the agency charged with its administration is generally given

deference, the interpretation of a statute remains a question of law that

we review de novo. See Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois

Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005). Our primary

goal when interpreting the language of a statute is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the legislature. Devoney v. Retirement

Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 199 Ill. 2d 414,

424-25 (2002). The plain language of a statute is the best indication

of the legislature’s intent. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 364

(2005). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we

will enforce it as written and will not read into it exceptions,
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conditions, or limitations that the legislature did not express. In re

Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 364.

Here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Section

2–156 of the Code provides that “[n]one of the benefits herein

provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any

felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her

service as a member.” (Emphases added.) 40 ILCS 5/2–156 (West

2006). Section 2–105 of the Code, in turn, defines “member” as

“Members of the General Assembly of this State *** and any person

serving as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State,

Treasurer, Comptroller, or Attorney General for the period of service

in such office.” Thus, under the Code’s plain language, any person

who is convicted of any felony relating to his or her service as

Governor or Secretary of State shall receive none of the benefits

provided for under the System. Here, there is no dispute that Ryan

was convicted of multiple federal felonies relating to his service as

both Governor and Secretary of State. Accordingly, section 2–156

plainly mandates that none of the benefits provided for under the

System shall be paid to Ryan. The forfeiture, in other words, is total.

Ryan gets nothing.

This result is consistent not only with the plain language of the

governing statutes, but also with this court’s most recent pension

forfeiture decision. In Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois

Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590 (2005), Taddeo was

concurrently employed for several years both by Proviso Township as

a township supervisor and by the City of Melrose Park as mayor. In

1999, Taddeo was convicted of several felonies relating to his service

as mayor of Melrose Park. Following his convictions, the IMRF board

concluded that Taddeo had forfeited all of the pension benefits he had

earned as a participant in the IMRF–both those relating to his service

as mayor of Melrose Park and those relating to his service as a

Proviso Township supervisor. Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 593-95.

This court disagreed, holding that Taddeo had forfeited only those

benefits relating to his employment by Melrose Park. In so holding,

the court explained that “pension benefits are forfeited only if there is

a clear and specific connection between the felony committed and the

participant’s employment.” Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 597. In Taddeo’s

case, Taddeo’s felony convictions related solely to his employment as
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mayor of Melrose Park and “were not related in any way to his

employment as township supervisor for Proviso Township.” Taddeo,

216 Ill. 2d at 598. And without such a nexus, there was no basis for

disqualifying Taddeo from receiving his township supervisor’s

pension.

Moreover, under the plain language of the Code, Taddeo had

effectively earned two completely separate pensions–one for his

service as township supervisor, and one for his service as mayor. In

relation to municipal employees such as Taddeo, section 7–203 of the

Code provides:

“Separate reserves shall be maintained for each

participating employee in such detail as is necessary to

administer all benefits provided herein, and to segregate

accurately the separate liabilities of each participating

municipality and its instrumentalities, or of any participating

instrumentality, with respect to each participating employee.”

40 ILCS 5/7–203 (West 2004).

Likewise, section 7–204 of the Code provides that “each participating

municipality and its instrumentalities, and each participating

instrumentality, shall be treated as an independent unit within the

fund.” 40 ILCS 5/7–204 (West 2004). In other words, although

Proviso Township and Melrose Park both paid into the IMRF, the

controlling Code provisions specifically state that they are to be

treated as independent units–that is, as separate employers. And

notably, the relevant forfeiture provision in that case stated that

“[n]one of the benefits provided for in this Article shall be paid to any

person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or

in connection with his service as an employee.” (Emphasis added.) 40

ILCS 5/7–219 (West 2004). Thus, the court concluded, if Proviso

Township and Melrose Park are separate employers for purposes of

the Act, then Taddeo’s status as an “employee” must be treated

separately, as well. Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 598. In effect, Taddeo had

two different “employers” for purposes of the Act, and only one of

those employers suffered a breach of the public trust.

Thus, Taddeo stands for the principle that the conviction of a jobrelated felony results in the forfeiture of all pension benefits earned in

service of the public employer whose trust was betrayed. Here,

although Ryan held multiple public offices over the course of his time
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in the System, all of those offices were in service to a single public

employer–the State of Illinois. And it was the State of Illinois whose

trust Ryan betrayed when he committed 16 job-related felonies. Under

Taddeo, then, Ryan should expect to forfeit all of the pension benefits

he earned in service to the State of Illinois, which, in fact, is just the

outcome that section 2–156 compels.

Finally, we note that this outcome advances the important public

policy aims that underlie pension forfeiture statutes such as section

2–156. As this court has explained previously, pension forfeiture

statutes were enacted to “ ‘deter felonious conduct in public

employment by affecting the pension rights of public employees

convicted of a work-related felony.’ ” Devoney, 199 Ill. 2d at 418,

quoting Stillo v. State Retirement Systems, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1003,

1007 (1999). Their purpose is to “discourage official malfeasance by

denying the public servant convicted of unfaithfulness to his trust the

retirement benefits to which he otherwise would have been entitled.”

Kerner v. State Employees’ Retirement System, 72 Ill. 2d 507, 513

(1978). Here, the trust to which Ryan was unfaithful was that which

he owed to the People of the State of Illinois, who for 30 years placed

their confidence in him and whose continuing confidence he repaid by

transforming two of this state’s highest constitutional offices into an

on-going and wholly self-serving criminal enterprise. Allowing Ryan

to now collect any portion of his pension would not only run afoul of

the plain language of section 2–156, but also would undermine the

public policy underlying that statute, which is to ensure that the

retirement of a corrupt public servant is never financed by the very

constituency whose trust was betrayed.

CONCLUSION

Under section 2–156, under this court’s established precedent, and

under the basic notions of justice that inform provisions such as

section 2–156, George H. Ryan, Sr., has clearly forfeited all of the

pension benefits he earned from the General Assembly Retirement

System. As the victims of Ryan’s crimes, the taxpayers of the State of

Illinois are under no obligation to now fund his retirement.
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The judgment of the appellate court therefore is reversed, and the

judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting:

Today a majority of this court reverses the appellate court

judgment and reinstates the decision of the Board of Trustees of the

General Assembly Retirement System (Board) to deny former

Governor George H. Ryan, Sr., all of the pension benefits he would

have received as a result of his contributions to the System as a

member of the General Assembly, as Lieutenant Governor, as

Secretary of State, and as Governor. I believe, however, that the

majority incorrectly construes the forfeiture provision at issue here,

section 2–156 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/2–156 (West

2006)). In so doing, the majority ignores principles of stare decisis

and implicitly overturns our decision in Taddeo v. Board of Trustees

of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590 (2005). For

these reasons, I respectfully must dissent from the majority opinion.

 Section 2–156 of the Pension Code provides: 

“None of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid to

any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or

arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a

member.” 40 ILCS 5/2–156 (West 2006)

The Code also defines the term “member” as:

“Members of the General Assembly of this State including

persons who enter military service while a member of the

General Assembly and any person serving as Governor,

Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer,

Comptroller, or Attorney General for the period of service in

such office.” 40 ILCS 5/2–105 (West 2006).

Interpreting this forfeiture provision, the majority concludes that

section 2–156 is “clear and unambiguous” (slip op. at 4) and 

“under the Code’s plain language, any person who is

convicted of any felony relating to his or her service as
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Governor or Secretary of State shall receive none of the

benefits provided for under the System. Here, there is no

dispute that Ryan was convicted of multiple federal felonies

relating to his service as both Governor and Secretary of

State. Accordingly, section 2–156 plainly mandates that none

of the benefits provided for under the System shall be paid to

Ryan. The forfeiture, in other words, is total. Ryan gets

nothing. ” (Emphases in original.) Slip op. at 4.

 The majority also finds that “[t]his result is consistent not only

with the plain language of the governing statutes, but also with this

court’s most recent pension forfeiture decision, ” Taddeo v. Board of

Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590

(2005). Slip op. at 4. The majority is incorrect.

 In the majority’s view, it is irrelevant that the felonies for which

Ryan was convicted were related to, arose out of or were in

connection with his service as Secretary of State and Governor, but

that he was guilty of no wrongdoing while he served in the office of

Lieutenant Governor or as a member of the General Assembly. For

the majority, all that is required to establish complete forfeiture of all

of the benefits is that a felony be committed by a person while that

person was serving in any one position which falls within the

definition of “member” under the statute. In Taddeo, however, we

rejected the identical statutory analysis.

In Taddeo, we addressed the forfeiture of pension benefits under

section 7–219 of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund. This

forfeiture provision, which parallels exactly the forfeiture provision at

issue here, states:

“None of the benefits provided for in this Article shall be

paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to

or arising out of or in connection with his service as an

employee.” (Emphases added.) 40 ILCS 5/7–219 (West

2002). 

InTaddeo, the Pension Board argued the plain language of section

7–219 required us to find that “none of the benefits provided for” in

the relevant article of the Pension Code may be paid if the participant

commits “any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with

his service as an employee” and that “as an employee” should be
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interpreted to mean “as an employee of any IMRF employer.”

(Emphases in original.) Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 596. Stated differently,

the Board argued that if a participant commits a felony related to only

one position of employment, he should receive “none of the benefits.”

This is the same statutory argument that the majority adopts today.

In Taddeo, however, we rejected this argument, concluding that

the plain language of the statute simply “does not speak” (Taddeo,

216 Ill. 2d at 598) to those situations where a person is a participant

in a pension fund as a result of more than one position. Having

rejected the Board’s “plain language” interpretation, we concluded

that the statutory language was susceptible to more than one

interpretation, so that legislative intent had to be ascertained by

considering “ ‘the entire act, its nature, its object, and the

consequences resulting from different constructions.’ ” Taddeo, 216

Ill. 2d at 595-96, quoting Shields v. Judges’ Retirement System, 204

Ill. 2d 488, 494 (2003), citing Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of

Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990). We also noted that pension

statutes are to be “liberally construed in favor of the rights of the

pensioner.” Shields, 204 Ill. 2d at 494, citing Matsuda v. Cook County

Employees’ & Officers’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill. 2d 360,

365-66 (1997).

The majority in the case at bar fails to acknowledge that we

rejected the Board’s plain language argument in Taddeo and fails to

offer any rationale for why that argument is now controlling. Ignoring

the statutory analysis offered in Taddeo, the majority instead

emphasizes the fact that, in Taddeo, the plaintiff had two employers.

From this, the majority reasons that “Taddeo stands for the principle

that the conviction of a job-related felony results in the forfeiture of

all pension benefits earned in service of the public employer whose

trust was betrayed.” (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 6. In this way, the

majority reasons, Taddeo may be reconciled with its holding. The

problem, however, is that this reasoning is not consistent with the

majority’s own statutory analysis.

As noted above, according to the majority’s statutory analysis, a

felony conviction plus one position which permits a person to be a

“member” of the pension fund equals total forfeiture. By that same

logic, the result in Taddeo should have been different–a felony

conviction while Taddeo was an employee of one municipality which
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permitted him to participate in the pension fund should have meant

total forfeiture. This was not the result reached. The majority’s

reasoning in this case, and the result reached in Taddeo, are

irreconcilable. 

 Because we concluded in Taddeo that the statutory provision did

not cover the situation at hand, we looked to previous precedent,

specifically, Devoney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity

& Benefit Fund, 199 Ill. 2d 414 (2002). In Devoney, we held “[w]hen

applying the pension disqualification statutes, including section 5–227,

the pivotal inquiry is whether a nexus exists between the employee’s

criminal wrongdoing and the performance of his official duties.”

Devoney, 199 Ill. 2d at 419. Thus, in Devoney, we concluded that

without a connection between the wrongdoing and the performance

of official duties, there could be no loss of benefits.

In Taddeo, we applied this rationale and concluded that Taddeo’s

pension benefits could be forfeited only if there was a clear and

specific connection between the felony he committed and his

employment. Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 597. Thus, in Taddeo, we found

that, because there was a connection between the felony and Taddeo’s

position as mayor, but no such connection between the felony and his

position as township supervisor, there was no basis to disqualify

Taddeo’s supervisor pension. Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 598.

The nexus analysis was at the core of our decision in Taddeo.

Applying that analysis to the facts of the case at bar, I would conclude

there is a connection between the felonies and Ryan’s position as

Governor and Secretary of State. But, as in Taddeo, there is no such

connection between the felonies and Ryan’s position in the General

Assembly or as Lieutenant Governor. Thus, under Taddeo, without

such nexus, there is no basis to disqualify Ryan from receiving those

benefits related to these positions.

I note that, in support of our conclusion in Taddeo, we found that

Taddeo earned two completely separate pensions, one from each

independent employer, which were severable. Thus, the Board was

able to give Taddeo the pension he earned as a supervisor yet “still

adhere to the mandates of section 7–219 by providing Taddeo with

‘none of the benefits’ derived from his employment which was related

to or connected with his felony convictions.” (Emphasis omitted.)

Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 599. The same is true here. A “member” is only
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a member “for the period of service in such office.” 40 ILCS 5/2–105

(West 2006). This language indicates that each “membership” is

distinct. Thus, as in Taddeo, Ryan can retain his pension benefits

derived from his position in the General Assembly and as Lieutenant

Governor, yet we can still adhere to the mandates of section 2–156 by

providing Ryan with “[n]one of the benefits” derived from his

membership in the fund as a result of his position as Secretary of State

and as Governor–those positions which were connected with his

felony convictions.

By my analysis, as set forth above, I do not intend to diminish in

any way the seriousness of the criminal acts committed by the former

Governor. Also, I understand the very human impulse to want to

punish Ryan for his wrongdoings by depriving him of all of his pension

benefits. However, while I sympathize with such impulses, our

constitutional obligation is to follow the law, not our personal

preferences. Taddeo clearly mandates that Ryan receive the pension

benefits associated with his time in the General Assembly and as

Lieutenant Governor. Despite this, the majority reaches a contrary

conclusion and implicitly overrules Taddeo.Thisnecessarily implicates

stare decisis and the majority has not explained what good cause or

compelling reasons dictate that we disregard our analysis in Taddeo.

Because the majority opinion is the result of an unjustified

departure from precedent, I cannot join it. Accordingly, I respectfully

dissent.