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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

NATO MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE 

EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH: 

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BURDEN SHARING 

AND THE UNDERAPPRECIATED ROLE 

OF THE U.S. ARMY

Steven J. Whitmore

John R. Deni

October 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

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official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

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iii
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The authors wish to thank the many anonymous interview 

subjects at the Army Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, U.S. Army 

Europe, and NATO’s Ramstein Air Component Command in 

Germany who gave generously of their time. The authors are 

also indebted to Dr. Stephen J. Blank, Dr. Peter Dombrowski, 

Dr. James Fergusson, and Dr. Daniel Goure for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this monograph, and to Ms. 
v

Jenny Silkett of the U.S. Army War College Library for her research assistance. Nevertheless, any errors of omission, fact, or 

interpretation remain the authors’ alone.

*****

This monograph was made possible in part through the Senior Enterprise Talent Management (SETM) program, developed 

collaboratively as a Civilian Workforce Transformation initiative 

and administered by the Civilian Senior Leader Management Office (CSLMO) under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. A SETM temporary duty (TDY) Assignment allowed Mr. Whitmore, an employee of the U.S. Army 

Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering 

Center (AMRDEC) currently assigned as an Acquisition Project 

Director to the U.S. Army’s Program Executive Office (PEO) for 

Missiles and Space (MS), to take a 4-month leave of absence from 

his fulltime position as a Department of the Army civilian engineer to research and write at the SSI on a project of strategic 

interest to the U.S. Army and Mr. Whitmore’s command. The 

SSI and the USAWC are proud to support the SETM-TDY program, and are grateful to have had the chance to gain the benefit of Mr. Whitmore’s knowledge and experience in completing 

this monograph.

ISBN 1-58487-590-9

vii

FOREWORD

In 2010, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) decided to significantly expand its ballistic 

missile defense program to include the defense of European member state territory and populations. Previously, when it came to ballistic missile defense, the 

NATO Alliance had focused solely on deployed forces 

and so-called “lower tier” systems. The Alliance’s policy change was based on several factors, but especially 

important were the decisions by the administration of 

President Barack Obama to redesign the U.S. plan for 

the use of American ballistic missile defense assets in 

Europe—known as the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach (EPAA)—and to offer the EPAA to NATO 

as the cornerstone of theater-wide Alliance ballistic 

missile defense, with the understanding that the European members of NATO would contribute to the 

common effort as well.

However, for a number of reasons, which co-authors Mr. Steven J. Whitmore and Dr. John R. Deni 

explain in terms accessible to laymen as well as strategists and other national security experts not necessarily well-versed in technical missile defense issues, 

it seems that the United States will continue to carry 

the lion’s share of the ballistic missile defense burden 

in Europe. This will have significant implications for 

the U.S. Army, which plays an important, though 

largely underappreciated, role in the EPAA and hence 

in NATO ballistic missile defense. Mr. Whitmore and 

Dr. Deni describe and explain the important role of 

the Army, and they analyze the specific implications 

for the Army of current and potentially growing U.S. 

commitments to ballistic missile defense of NATO’s 

European members. In doing so, Mr. Whitmore and 
Dr. Deni make an important contribution to both 

policy and academic debates over Alliance burdensharing and ballistic missile defense. For this reason, 

the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this 

monograph on the role of the U.S. Army and the manner in which it can best serve the nation today and in 

the future.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JOHN R. DENI joined the Strategic Studies Institute 

in November 2011 as a Research Professor of Joint, 

Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational 

(JIIM) Security Studies. He previously worked for 8 

years as a political advisor for senior U.S. military 

commanders in Europe. Prior to that, he spent 2 years 

as a strategic planner specializing in the military-tomilitary relationship between the United States and 

its European allies. While working for the U.S. military in Europe, Dr. Deni was also an adjunct lecturer 

at Heidelberg University’s Institute for Political Science. There, he taught graduate and undergraduate 

courses on U.S. foreign and security policy, the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European security, and Alliance theory and practice. Before working in Germany, he spent 7 years in Washington, 

DC, as a consultant specializing in national security 

issues for the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, 

and State. Dr. Deni is the author of Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st 

Century, as well as several journal articles. He has 

published op-eds in major newspapers such as the 

Los Angeles Times and the Baltimore Sun, and has spoken at conferences and symposia throughout Europe 

and North America. Dr. Deni holds an undergraduate degree in history and international relations from 

the College of William & Mary, an M.A. in U.S. foreign policy from American University in Washington, 

DC, and a Ph.D. in international affairs from George 

Washington University.

STEVEN J. WHITMORE is the Project Director for the 

Upper Tier Project Office under the Program Execu-
x

tive Office Missiles and Space (PEO MS), at Redstone 

Arsenal, AL. Mr. Whitmore was previously the Javelin Product Director, Close Combat Weapon Systems 

Project Office (PO) for the U.S. Army (2007-10). His 

previous Army acquisition assignments included Test 

Chief, Cruise Missile Defense Systems PO; Test Lead, 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated 

Netted Sensor System (JLENS) Project Office; Assistant Product Manager for Radar Systems, Apache Helicopter Project Management Office (PMO); and CH47F Test Lead, Cargo Helicopter PMO. Mr. Whitmore 

has more than 20 years of professional experience in 

science, engineering, and management, covering a 

broad spectrum of activities. He is Level III certified 

in Program Management, Test & Evaluation (T&E) 

and Systems Planning, Research, Development, and 

Engineering (SPRDE). Mr. Whitmore has attended 

numerous leadership courses, including the Darden 

Business School Leadership program, and the Sustaining Base Leadership and Management (SBLM) course 

at the Army Management Staff College. He is a Fellow 

of both the Competitive Development Group (CDG) 

and the Defense Acquisition Senior Service College. 

Mr. Whitmore holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering from the University of Alabama, Huntsville, and 

a master’s degree in engineering from Southeastern 

Institute of Technology.
xi

SUMMARY

The 2010 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) decision to expand its ballistic missile defense 

program was somewhat surprising for several reasons, including lukewarm European public support 

for ballistic missile defense and tightening defense 

budgets on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, 

the Alliance has moved forward, with a significant 

expansion of its ballistic missile defense program, 

stating its intent to defend all European member 

state territory and populations, and declaring at 

the Chicago summit in 2012 that the Alliance had

achieved an interim capability.

The reasons for the Alliance decision in 2010 were 

several, but critical among them was the U.S. Government’s offer to include the new European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA), announced by the 

Barack Obama administration in September 2009, as 

the centerpiece of the NATO ballistic missile defense 

program. For cash-strapped European members of the 

Alliance eager to influence NATO’s ballistic missile 

defense efforts but unable to devote funds on par with 

the United States, Washington’s proposal to include 

the EPAA framework in an expansion of the Alliance 

missile defense effort comprised an offer too attractive 

to refuse. 

Nonetheless, and despite the American offer to 

provide the EPAA as the lion’s share of NATO’s expanded ballistic missile defense program, Washington 

made clear to its allies that it expected them to contribute to the common defense. In response, several 

allies have offered land or facilities, and many have 

pledged to provide future capabilities and assets. 

However, few have actually contributed tangible ballistic missile defense assets to date in terms of missile 
xii

interceptors, radars or other sensors, or ballistic missile defense-related platforms. Given differing threat 

perceptions and declining defense budgets, it seems 

very likely that tangible Alliance contributions, in the 

form of sensors and interceptors in particular, will remain minimal over the next decade.

A lack of tangible allied contributions is likely to 

have significant implications for the U.S. Army, which 

has an important but largely underappreciated role in 

NATO missile defense today. In particular, the Army 

is likely to face increased manpower demands, materiel requirements, and training needs in order to meet 

the demand created by the NATO ballistic missile 

defense program. Additionally, Army units involved 

directly in or in support of ballistic missile defense are 

likely to face a higher operating tempo (OPTEMPO) 

than currently projected. As a result of all these increased requirements—some of which the Army and 

the Department of Defense (DoD) currently foresee, 

and some they do not—it seems unlikely that current 

Army and DoD budget projections in this regard will 

prove valid. Instead, all available evidence currently 

points to increased budgetary requirements as well. 

In conclusion, it appears that the Alliance’s decision in 

2010 to cover all Alliance territory and populations in 

Europe coupled with Washington’s offer of the EPAA 

as the centerpiece of the new NATO ballistic missile 

defense system will together require the U.S. Army 

specifically, and the United States more broadly, to 

contribute more than expected to the ballistic missile defense of European territory and populations. In 

turn, this will exacerbate the perceived imbalance in 

transatlantic burden-sharing, particularly if the EPAA 

provides little, if any, benefit to the defense of U.S. territory, given Washington’s decision to cancel Phase 4 

of that framework.
1

NATO MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE 

EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH: 

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BURDEN SHARING 

AND THE UNDERAPPRECIATED ROLE 

OF THE U.S. ARMY

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) decided to significantly expand its ballistic 

missile defense (BMD) program. Years prior, the Alliance had committed itself to developing the capability 

to defend deployed forces against ballistic missiles. 

But at the November 2010 Lisbon (Portugal) Summit, 

Alliance heads of state and government agreed to ultimately defend all Alliance territory and populations 

in Europe against ballistic missiles, not just deployed 

forces. Given the tenor of transatlantic discussions on 

BMD in previous years and decades, the Alliance’s decision represented a significant change.

One of the reasons why NATO agreed to expand 

its missile defense program was that the United States 

had offered to provide the vast majority of capabilities—in terms of sensors and interceptors—necessary to defend all Alliance territory and populations 

in Europe through its European Phased Adaptive 

Approach (EPAA). Nonetheless, and in spite of the 

EPAA offer, the United States made clear at Lisbon 

and in various other venues since that it expects the 

European members of the Alliance to contribute to 

common BMD efforts.

When the EPAA was first announced by the Barack 

Obama administration in September 2009, much of the 

attention focused on how the new plan emphasized 
2

ship-based systems, at least initially. This stood in 

contrast to the George W. Bush administration’s landbased plan for a so-called “third site” for U.S. homeland defense against ballistic missiles, which would 

have involved radars in the Czech Republic and 

ground-based interceptors in Poland.1

 Given this new 

system architecture and the U.S. offer to include the 

EPAA in the Alliance’s BMD program, it seems obvious that the U.S. Navy is set to play an important role 

in the EPAA and hence in NATO BMD. However, the 

U.S. Army has come to play a critical, though largely 

underappreciated role as well. 

As the NATO BMD architecture continues to develop in the coming years—and depending in great 

measure on the nature and scope of European contributions—there is a strong possibility that the U.S. Army’s role may actually grow beyond that envisioned 

by American officials at the time of the Lisbon decision. 

To assess this potential and the modalities by which 

the Army’s role might grow, this monograph will first 

explain why the Alliance decision in 2010 to expand 

its BMD program represented a significant change. 

Knowing why NATO decided to expand its missile 

defense program is vital to understanding whether 

and how the U.S. Army role is likely to change in 

the coming years. The monograph will then examine 

what the allies have committed or contributed to date 

before outlining the specific role of the U.S. Army. As 

will be shown later in this monograph, it appears as if 

the Army’s role is indeed likely to grow, perhaps well 

beyond that currently envisioned by resource managers and policymakers, and bringing with it potentially 

significant budgetary and operational implications.
3

NATO’S DECISION TO EXPAND 

MISSILE DEFENSE

In a major announcement at the 2012 Chicago summit, NATO declared an interim capability to defend 

parts of Europe from limited ballistic missile attacks. 

Just 2 years prior, during its previous 2010 summit in 

Lisbon, NATO formally took on theater-wide missile 

defense of member state territory and populations in 

Europe—the aim, declared Alliance heads of state and 

government, is to, “develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces.”2

 In doing so, the Alliance essentially 

agreed to expand its Active Layered Theater Ballistic 

Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program. Begun in 2005, 

the ALTBMD Command and Control (C2) architecture was originally designed to defend just deployed 

allied forces against short- and medium-range (up to 

3,000 kilometers [km]) ballistic missile threats.

At the Lisbon summit, the Alliance also formally 

adopted the U.S.-proposed EPAA as an “indispensible contribution” to the NATO BMD architecture. 

The EPAA would form such an indispensible component of the ALTBMD expansion, that it would soon be 

described as “by far the lion’s share” of the planned 

NATO BMD system expansion.3

Although missile defense is not a new issue for the 

Alliance, NATO’s decision in 2010 to go beyond the 

protection of deployed forces and instead to include 

homeland defense of allied populations and territory 

in Europe was a major shift in at least three respects. 

First, European publics have never strongly embraced 

missile defense. Second, the expansion of the Alliance’s appetite in this area comes as defense budgets 

on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly squeezed. 

Finally, there remain major technical challenges asso-
4

ciated with missile defense in general, much less the 

BMD of 900 million people spread across 28 democracies in North America and Europe. The next several 

sections will examine in detail NATO’s decision to 

take on BMD of Alliance territory and populations in 

Europe in light of these factors.

EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION

Since the Prague summit of 2002, Alliance summit 

statements have acknowledged the growing ballistic 

missile threat. However, in agreeing to expand ALTBMD in 2010, European leaders appeared to be leading public opinion vice following it. Since the days of 

the Ronald Reagan administration’s strategic defense 

initiative, European publics have never been as supportive of BMD as the American public, which itself 

has been riven by discord on this issue over most of 

the last 30 years.4

 In more recent debates over missile 

defense in Europe, there appears to have developed 

a significant gap between the views of policymakers—which over time have generally become more 

open toward American missile defense proposals, if 

only as a means of ensuring more American boots on 

the ground in Poland and the territories of other new 

NATO allies—and those of the public, which have 

continued to oppose much of what Washington has 

been pushing.5

Even among those European allies which stood 

to gain most from a deployment of American missile defense assets to Europe—such as Poland and 

the Czech Republic—most public opinion surveys 

showed strong opposition.6

 Much of this was based 

on concerns over sovereignty but also over the risk 

of antagonizing Russia, which has long opposed U.S. 

missile defense systems in Europe.7
5

More recently, even within those member states 

that were among the stronger supporters of missile 

defense—such as the Netherlands—it seems clear to 

some that national political elites have been in front 

of public opinion. For example, with respect to missile 

threats and the likelihood of a ballistic missile attack 

on the Netherlands, the Hague Centre for Strategic 

Studies found that, “There is a significant gap between 

the ‘expert community’ [which is concerned about the 

missile threat] and the [Dutch] public at large [which 

is far less concerned].”8

Opinions in Europe have been divided over not 

only missile defense as a concept but also with regard 

to the most likely ballistic missile threat facing Europe, 

namely Iran. Europeans typically have not shared 

Americans’ perceptions on the gravity of the Iranian 

threat. For example, as shown in Figure 1, a survey 

conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project in 2006 found that Americans were far 

more concerned than citizens in several of Washington’s closest European allies about a potential attack 

from Iran.

Similarly, a survey conducted in 2007 found that 

only 54 percent of Europeans believed a nuclear Iran 

would threaten Europe, while 67 percent of Americans felt the same.9

More recently though, there is some data to suggest that the Iranian threat has become more salient to 

Europe publics. In a fall 2009 survey conducted by the 

Pew Center, the perception of a nuclear Iran as a major 

threat certainly appeared to have increased over just a 

few years prior in several European countries, as seen 

in Figure 2.
6

Figure 1. If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, 

do you think they would be likely to 

1) attack the U.S. and/or Europe, or 2) not attack the 

U.S. and/or Europe?

Figure 2. If Iran developed nuclear weapons, 

would this be a major threat, a minor threat, 

or not a threat to the well being 

of your country?
7

Nonetheless, among some other European NATO 

member states, such as France, even if the missile 

threat from Iran is acknowledged, there appears to 

be a consensus among some policymaking elites that 

nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter Tehran, and 

that BMD is not vital.10

In sum, the evidence regarding whether Europeans 

share American perceptions of the threat from Iran, or 

American preferences for what to do about it, is somewhat mixed. Regardless of whether a new trend—that 

is, a convergence of transatlantic threat perceptions 

and policy preferences—was underway in the late 

2000s, the 2010 decision to expand ALTBMD represented a significant change from attitudes and preferences of just a few years prior, and something of an 

unexpected outcome when gauged against the history 

of transatlantic deliberations over missile defense. 

DEFENSE BUDGET CHALLENGES

Perhaps more significant than edging out in front 

of public opinion, Alliance commitment to expanding 

the ALTBMD program meant taking on a new mission at a time when defense budgets on both sides 

of the Atlantic were beginning to come under great 

downward pressure. By 2008, economies in Europe 

and North America were reeling from the effects of 

the global financial crisis. 

In Europe, this manifested itself in the form of several related sovereign debt crises, compelling Cyprus, 

Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Portugal to seek “bailout” 

loans in order to meet their sovereign obligations. 

Across the entire continent, European members of the 

Alliance slashed public expenditures. Defense budgets were a particularly easy target, given the lack of 
8

major security threats and collective public exhaustion 

following nearly a decade of conflict in Afghanistan.11

Even before the financial crisis, many in Europe felt 

that defense spending was too high. In a 2006 study 

conducted by the International Social Survey Programme, 60 percent of Dutch, 57 percent of Danes, 

49 percent of French, 56 percent of Germans, and 52 

percent of Poles all felt that their governments should 

spend less or “much less” on defense.12

As a result of both the sovereign debt crisis as well 

as public support for reduced defense expenditures, 

European defense spending—which has actually 

been fairly steady in real terms over the last decade 

or more—indeed has dropped since 2009, as indicated 

in Figure 3.

Figure 3. European Defense Spending

in Constant 2010 Billions of U.S. dollars.13

Meanwhile, the U.S. defense budget also became 

the object of significant cuts after 2010, as public exhaustion over two long wars mounted and as the government faced an increasingly dire budgetary situation following the collapse of the U.S. housing market 
9

and the onset of the global recession. Most recently, 

the decision to cancel the fourth and final phase of the 

EPAA was reportedly based in part on the need to reprioritize available budget resources from Europe to 

the Pacific theater.14 Figure 4 highlights the U.S. defense budget since 2001.

*Years 2013-17 Are Estimates.15

Figure 4. U.S. Defense Spending in Billions

of 2012 Dollars.

To be sure, American officials recognized from the 

outset that the United States would be providing the 

bulk of the Alliance’s expanded missile defense capability through the EPAA. Nonetheless, American 

officials have been equally clear that they hope and 

expect the European allies to contribute to the common effort. In its 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

Report, the Department of Defense (DoD) argued that, 

“Regional deterrence must be built on a solid foundation of strong cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing between the United States and 
10

its allies.”16 When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

spoke to the press as the administration unveiled 

the EPAA, he noted that Washington expected allies 

to contribute: 

One of our guiding principles for missile defense remains the involvement and support of our allies and 

partners. We will continue to rely on our allies and 

work with them to develop a system that most effectively defends against very real and growing threats.17

Similarly, during a press conference in February 

2012, Gates’ successor, Leon Panetta, emphasized that 

Washington was urging its European allies to contribute to NATO’s missile defense effort.18 More recently, 

Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, the Deputy Director 

for Plans, Policy and Strategy at U.S. European Command, addressed burden sharing during the Allied 

Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrade Conference held in 

Berlin, Germany, on September 13, 2012, noting: 

We must share the burden—to address capability and 

capacity shortfalls to close the gap for robust coverage 

and defense of all NATO European populations, territory and forces.19

In fact, Montgomery was quite explicit in noting 

that additional allied capabilities—specifically, upper 

tier surveillance and target cueing as well as additional shooter capacity—may be necessary to fully defend, 

versus simply “cover,” all European NATO territory, 

and would welcome European contributions.20

For their part, European members of the Alliance 

appeared to commit themselves to just such a course 

at Lisbon, in which NATO declared that its missile 

defense program would be based upon several prin-
11

ciples, including the “equitable sharing of risks and 

burdens.”21 However, during an era of declining defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic—and increasingly vocal American concerns about burden 

sharing—the ability and willingness of the European 

members of the Alliance to make good on such principles remains in doubt.22

THE TECHNICAL CHALLENGES OF 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Even if European leaders had the financial means 

and the political will to equitably share with their 

U.S. allies both the risks and burdens associated with 

Alliance-wide BMD, the question remains whether 

they will be able to overcome the technical challenges 

associated with “hitting a bullet with a bullet.” Such 

concerns—that is, the major technical challenges—

have been at or near the core of European objections 

to BMD for decades.

The four key technical challenges in missile defense are target acquisition, discrimination, interception, and data networking.23 Target acquisition is accomplished through extraordinarily powerful radar 

systems. Effective, powerful radar systems—in conjunction with early-warning satellites—are critical not 

simply for detecting and finding incoming missiles 

and warheads in general, but for enabling the launch 

of interceptors early in the trajectory of enemy missiles, which has particular benefits for the defender 

outlined in greater detail below. The NATO BMD system will rely on an advanced x-band radar developed 

and produced by the United States and based near 

Kürecik in central Turkey.24 This radar system—the 

Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance Sys-
12

tem, otherwise known as the AN/TPY-2 radar—is the 

same as that used in the Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD) BMD system.25

Unfortunately, the DoD Defense Science Board 

(DSB)—a civilian advisory panel whose purpose is to 

provide independent advice and recommendations on 

scientific and technical matters—concluded recently 

that the advanced x-band radar system employed in 

the EPAA and hence in the NATO BMD program is 

not, in some cases, fully adequate for a robust defense 

of Alliance territory. The DSB found that:

The current Aegis shipboard radar is inadequate to 

support the objective needs of the EPAA mission. For 

this reason, the TPY-2 land-based radars and the future Navy ship-based Air and Missile Defense Radar 

(AMDR) upgrade become critical components of the 

European defense scenarios. In some situations, even 

the TPY-2’s superior tracking range is not adequate for a 

robust defense, and a moderate increase in sensitivity would 

be very useful.

26

Additionally, the DSB argued that extremely high 

speed, high quality data exchange mechanisms are 

required, so the utility gained from even a powerful 

x-band radar could be greatly limited. Sharing of data 

among multiple sensors, including the x-band radar in 

Turkey, as well as among fire control nodes and interceptors, is absolutely critical to defending the largest 

amount of Alliance territory possible and hence the 

greatest number of member state citizens. Whether 

and how NATO is able to achieve a fully networked 

system is discussed in detail further below.

Assuming though that a target is acquired, the defender must next determine if the target is a threat, 

such as an incoming missile or warhead, and not a 
13

separated rocket booster stage or a penetration aid/

decoy. Target discrimination is essential to ensuring 

that the defender does not waste interceptors by shooting at missile “junk” or decoys, which is especially 

important given sometimes extraordinarily expensive 

interceptors.27 Time is perhaps the most important factor in effective discrimination—that is, time to examine incoming objects with a variety of ground-based 

and interceptor-based sensors.28 Nonetheless, target 

discrimination—which must occur during the midcourse phase of the trajectory to be an effective tool 

in husbanding scarce interceptor resources—is one 

of the most formidable technical challenges involved 

in mid-course defense.29 Moreover, even if an x-band 

radar and an optical sensor on a launched interceptor 

gather data useful for discrimination, that data must 

be fused effectively and efficiently to be of any use.

Assuming target discrimination has successfully 

occurred, the next step in the process of missile defense 

is target interception. Even though the Aegis missile 

defense system—which will provide the backbone of 

NATO’s interceptor network—was actually designed 

during the Cold War as a means of defending against 

Soviet cruise missile attacks, upgrades have made it 

quite effective against ballistic missiles in tests conducted to date. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) claims that from January 2002 to October 2012, 

the SM-3 missile successfully intercepted 20 of 23 targets.30 It was only in April 2011, though, that an SM-3 

missile successfully intercepted a target while relying 

on data conveyed to it by an x-band radar hundreds of 

miles away—this was the first time that the radar used 

to track an incoming target missile had been located 

off of the ship firing the interceptors and was a major 

achievement. But in a similar test in October 2012, an 
14

SM-3 Block IA interceptor failed to hit an incoming 

short-range ballistic missile target.31 This failure and 

other developmental challenges strongly suggest to 

some experts that the deployment of the SM-3 Block 

IB and the subsequent Block IIA could be significantly 

delayed beyond current timelines.32 Moreover, the recent decision by the Obama administration to cancel 

Phase 4 of the EPAA and “restructure” the SM-3 Block 

IIB program suggests that the challenges regarding 

interceptor technology indeed remain serious. In the 

case of the SM-3 Block IIB, these challenges amounted 

to “good technical and economic reasons” for essentially cancelling the program.33

Even if most technical challenges can be overcome, in order to achieve the shoot-assess-shoot firing 

doctrine that experts agree is the most cost-effective 

means of conducting BMD, interceptor speeds are 

nonetheless critical—without a fast interceptor, there 

is not enough time to fire additional rounds.34 The National Research Council postulates that with two interceptor sites—at least one of which would be located 

in northern Europe, such as the planned site in Poland 

under the terms of NATO’s missile defense plan—and 

an interceptor speed of 4.0 km per second (km/s), the 

Alliance could achieve a shoot-assess-shoot firing 

doctrine.35 Unfortunately, the maximum speed of the 

SM-3 Block IA missile—the type currently deployed 

on the USS Monterey and in operation today as part 

of the NATO BMD system—is reportedly between 3.0 

and 3.5 km/s.36 The SM-3 Block IB—the next iteration 

of the Standard Missile scheduled to be fielded by 

the MDA as part of the NATO BMD architecture in 

2015—has the same speed. The more advanced SM-3 

Block IIA, scheduled for deployment in 2018 under 

current plans, reportedly will be capable of traveling 
15

at speeds of up to 4.5 km/s.37 In theory then—and 

again assuming technical challenges uncovered during the test and evaluation phases of the SM-3 Block 

IIA’s development are overcome—the Alliance would 

be able to achieve a shoot-assess-shoot firing doctrine. 

In the meantime, it is also theoretically possible 

to cover more Alliance territory with more interceptor sites. To cover all Alliance territory full-time with 

fielded technology would require, according to one 

estimate, eight ships armed with interceptors. Assuming an A-B-C rotation model common to NATO and 

U.S. military operations—in which one unit is training for deployment, one unit is deployed, and one 

unit is undergoing post-deployment refit and rest—24 

ships would therefore be necessary for round-theclock, complete coverage of Alliance territory.38 This 

is roughly equivalent to the total number of frigates 

in the entire inventory of the European member states 

capable of being equipped with interceptors; perhaps 

unsurprisingly, few allies are interested in pursuing 

this objective in the short- or mid-term.39

The final great technical challenge involved in successfully implementing BMD—especially in a multinational context exemplified by the NATO BMD 

plan—is that of data fusing/networking. Ideally, all 

space-, ground-, and interceptor-based sensors are 

networked in real time with all command and control nodes, allowing for data fusion and hence an effective defense. Indeed, the DSB noted that effective 

networking of dispersed sensors and interceptors is 

a critical enabler for regional missile defense, such 

as envisioned in the NATO BMD plan. Without it, 

operationally useful large-area defense is practically 

impossible, unless, of course, the Alliance was willing 

and able to field many more sensor and interceptor 
16

assets than is currently envisioned or even realistically possible.40 As seen in Figure 5, without effective 

networking of at least the forward-based radar in 

Turkey with the planned interceptor sites in Poland 

and Romania, the defended area—represented by the 

black rings—is indeed quite small and falls short of 

“regional” missile defense.41 If, on the other hand, 

the “remote” radar in Turkey is networked effectively with the interceptor sites, regional missile defense—at least that represented by the white rings—is 

theoretically possible.

Figure 5. Larger Defended Areas Made Possible 

Through Fully Networked Remote Sensing.

In addition to the engineering challenges associated with real-time networking of sensors and interceptors, the Alliance faces “techno-political” challenges 

in this realm as well. The very nature of NATO—an 

intergovernmental organization comprised of sovereign states—means the Alliance will need to overcome hurdles related to sovereignty. One of the ways 

in which concerns over sovereignty manifest themselves is with regard to sensor data classification. In 
17

some cases—particularly with regard to the sensitive 

technology behind the AN/TPY-2 radar—such hurdles are significant, and individual allies such as the 

United States must use caveats to govern the releasability of raw data feeds to its allies.42

Data networking, plus the three other major challenges outlined above—target acquisition, discrimination, and interception—have, in fact, served to 

dissuade many in the West from even attempting to 

muster the budgetary and political resources necessary to overcome these hurdles. Additionally, on top 

of all this sits a more theoretical argument against 

investing in missile defense—rooted in technology, 

but not of such a technical nature as the subjects discussed above—that has served to inhibit America’s 

NATO allies from jumping on board with missile defense in years past. That is, some Europeans—as well 

as many on the left of the political spectrum in the 

United States—have long believed that any system of 

missile defense would undermine the global nonproliferation regime as well as notions of deterrence such 

as mutually assured destruction. The implications of 

missile defense could include an imperative among 

nuclear-armed countries to place their arsenals on a 

hair trigger—to avoid losing the initiative and having 

their nuclear weapons made irrelevant by an effective missile defense system. Thus, a nuclear arms race 

would develop as nuclear powers strived to develop 

sufficient numbers of arms to overwhelm any enemy’s 

missile defense system.43

In sum, technological challenges and related issues, budgetary belt-tightening, and a lack of unambiguous public support all stood in the way of NATO 

expanding its appetite for missile defense. And yet, 

the Alliance moved forward anyway.
18

SO WHY DID THE ALLIES AGREE?

In the face of significant reasons for not doing so 

discussed above, the NATO Alliance nonetheless decided in 2010 to dramatically expand the ALTBMD 

program to cover all Alliance territory and populations in Europe. The reasons for this appear to be fourfold.44 First, as discussed above, there was a growing 

consensus in the late 2000s among European elites—

that is, political and military decisionmakers inside 

government as well as the informed, engaged epistemic community outside of government—that the 

threat to Europe of ballistic missiles was growing, not 

receding.45 This meant that governments that were adamantly opposed to expanding NATO’s BMD efforts 

in the past—such as Germany, Norway, and Spain, 

and which, in some cases, appeared to almost parrot 

Russian talking points on the same—found themselves gradually getting behind efforts to include the 

defense of NATO territory and populations in Europe 

in Alliance missile defense planning and programs.46

In some ways, NATO BMD appealed to many of these 

same allies because it represented a return to classic 

Article 5 sorts of concerns. Article 5 is the part of the 

NATO treaty that essentially commits the allies to 

consider an attack against one to be an attack on all. In 

this light, expanding BMD to include European member state territory and populations appealed to many 

in the Alliance because it would be a great example of 

NATO contributing directly to the defense and protection of its member states. This stands in contrast to 

the far-flung missions in Afghanistan or off the Horn 

of Africa, which perhaps lack the same appeal among 

average European citizens.47
19

Second, and most importantly, the United States 

made it clear to its European allies that Washington 

would be willing to have the EPAA comprise “by far 

the lion’s share” of NATO’s missile defense program, 

as noted earlier.48 This was particularly gratifying to 

European ears; given the defense budget challenges 

outlined above, there would be no requirement for the 

European members to contribute much of anything in 

terms of sensors or interceptors. Instead, Washington 

only asked that NATO include the EPAA as part of 

the alliance’s broader missile defense program—specifically, the ALTBMD program designed to provide 

a command and control framework. Doing so would 

essentially require the European allies to agree to expand ALTBMD from focusing primarily on lower-tier, 

tactical missile defense to addressing more directly 

upper-tier, theater-wide missile defense. According to 

NATO officials, in a study conducted after the Lisbon 

summit, the estimated cost to expand ALTBMD in 

this way—specifically through expansion of the command and control mechanisms—would amount to 

less than €200M, funded with NATO common funds, 

spread out over 10 years.49 Even for European allies 

facing shrinking defense budgets, most in Europe perceive this as a relatively small outlay. Washington’s 

offer therefore represented a serious bargain for the 

European members of NATO, at least from a costbenefit perspective. 

Third, viewed from another perspective, for a 

relatively small collective price and little in the way 

of national commitment, all of the European allies received a seat at the table of theater missile defense. 

Under the George W. Bush administration’s plan for 

a European “third site,” the United States negotiated 

bilateral arrangements with Poland for the emplace-
20

ment of interceptors and with the Czech Republic for 

the construction of a radar site, leaving other Alliance 

members and the Alliance organization itself on the 

sidelines. In contrast, the Obama administration’s 

proposal to place the EPAA under NATO auspices—

and the Alliance’s approval of same—meant that all

of the allies would have a voice and hence the chance 

to influence the future shape of Alliance BMD policy 

and operations.

Finally, many allies have decided that some limited BMD coverage is better than no coverage at all.50

As explained above, there are significant technical 

challenges involved in missile defense, and as will be 

described below, there are major gaps in coverage of 

allied territory at present that are likely to persist for 

years. Nonetheless, several allies believe that at least 

a minimally capable system provides some deterrent 

benefit vis-à-vis potential adversaries that may consider using or developing ballistic missiles.

ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO DATE

Having committed to expanding ALTBMD and 

hence NATO BMD to include defense of allied European territory and populations during the Lisbon 

summit in mid-November 2010, the Alliance was 

prepared to promulgate a draft technical study on 

the broad outlines of its BMD system, including the 

number, type, and ideal locations of systems necessary to augment the EPAA.51 Interestingly, that study 

concluded that NATO needed not one, but two, 

AN/TPY-2 radar systems.52 However, that broad, system-wide study—written by a multidisciplinary team 

within NATO headquarters called the Missile Defense 

Project Group—was never approved for release be-
21

cause of disagreements among the member states on 

whether and how to identify the threats against which 

any theater-wide NATO BMD system would defend.53

Instead, the Missile Defense Program Group at 

NATO headquarters pushed forward with a technical 

study that only addressed the necessary command and 

control elements, hence excluding sensors and shooters. That study—the Battle Management, Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence (BMC3

I) 

architecture study—lays out the command and control requirements for ALTBMD expansion as well as 

for interoperability with the counterpart American 

system known as the Command and Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system. 

In October 2012, the study was submitted to Alliance 

member states for review, with at least two noteworthy characteristics: 

First, the study—perhaps somewhat naively—reflects the Alliance’s assumption that there will be no 

“bolt from the blue” attack against NATO territory.54

Put another way, the Alliance expects to have advance 

warning of any emergent ballistic missile threat, and 

it has explicitly ruled out planning for a surprise attack. Advance warning will then permit the Alliance 

to position the BMD-capable Aegis ship(s) and deploy 

point air and missile defense capabilities—such as Patriot systems—for the radar site in Turkey. 

Assuming there will be some period of forewarning reflects the significant confidence NATO has—

perhaps overconfidence—in member state national 

technical means of surveillance and early warning. It 

also may reflect the simple fact that the Alliance believes defending against a surprise attack is impossible given finite resources and capabilities.
22

The second noteworthy characteristic of the BMC3I 

architecture study is that, perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, it did not define in any detail the Initial 

Operating Capability (IOC) or Full Operating Capability (FOC) for Alliance missile defense. Typically, military capability requirements for IOC and FOC would 

be initially addressed in a document like the BMC3

I 

architecture study, and then spelled out in greater detail in a subsequent defense planning process document developed by NATO’s military authorities. That 

set of capability requirements would then be used by 

NATO’s Force Generation staff to solicit contributions 

from the member states. NATO member states—specifically the defense establishments in each country—

would also use that list of requirements to justify defense budget requests in domestic bureaucratic battles 

over resource prioritization.55

In the NATO BMD context though, the situation 

has been completely reversed. In 2012, NATO force 

generation staff officers began informally soliciting 

member states for potential contributions, even before 

a formal defense planning process had begun. Those 

member state offers—all of which are accepted by 

NATO—will then be used to build the statement of 

requirements that will define IOC and FOC.56

At the same time, the €200M figure cited in the 

2010 cost study has effectively capped the capabilities of the Alliance’s BMC3

I system. In order to fit the 

system within that spending cap, NATO planners 

have had to accept increased risk associated with 

the BMC3I design, relative to the initial architecture 

study of the broader system completed in 2010 but 

never promulgated.57

Therefore, it appears that NATO will reverse-engineer its way into both a command and control architecture as well as a broader missile defense system 
23

architecture that will be virtually useless against a 

surprise attack, driven only in part by a realistic assessment of the threats the Alliance faces, and shaped 

decisively by the fiscal and political wherewithal of 

member states to contribute assets to the collective 

effort. While it is certainly not unusual for Alliance 

decisionmaking to be driven by factors other than or 

in addition to an objective assessment of threats, the 

degree to which the Alliance has placed the cart before the horse—in essentially building its BMD system 

statement of requirements based on what the allies offer—seems particularly noteworthy in this case.

Meanwhile, the Alliance has at least committed to 

the €200M figure. In fact, NATO’s mid-term resource 

plan, which looks ahead 5 years, has a specific BMD 

line item that will fund BMC3

I expansion. In July 2013, 

the Alliance affirmed its commitment by issuing a decision to program the necessary funds according to 

the resourcing plan.58

Some Alliance members have also stepped up to 

make tangible contributions. Foremost among them 

have been Germany, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and 

Spain, which have each offered facilities or land, 

signed basing agreements, or otherwise agreed to 

host U.S. and allied elements of the NATO BMD system. For example, Germany hosts a NATO BMD cell 

at Ramstein Air Base. The BMD cell’s multinational 

staff is currently 10 strong, with a plan to increase to 

22 personnel under NATO’s impending reorganization and following the establishment of a BMD Operations Center (BMDOC) at Ramstein.59 This operational hub synthesizes real-time data from the NATO 

BMC3

I and U.S. C2BMC networks, relays it to shooters for cueing, and provides notifications to all other 

NATO commands.
24

Elsewhere, Poland and Romania will each host 

an Aegis Ashore interceptor site—at a base near 

Redzikowo in Poland and at the Deveselu Air Base 

in Romania—and have each signed agreements with 

the United States to do so.60 After a lengthy period of 

internal deliberations, Turkey agreed to host an AN/

TPY-2 radar site operated by the United States but 

under NATO operational control.61 Spain has agreed 

to home port four additional U.S. BMD-capable 

Aegis ships.62

American officials recognized quite clearly though, 

that unless Washington applied at least some minimal 

level of pressure, the allies were unlikely to contribute 

much toward common missile defense efforts beyond 

basing rights.63 Hence, even before the 2012 Alliance 

summit in Chicago—and certainly well before a statement of requirements existed for the Alliance-wide 

missile defense architecture—the United States began 

pushing its European allies to offer tangible missile defense assets.64 However, only two European member 

states—Germany and the Netherlands—have offered 

actual missile defense assets. Germany has committed roughly one-quarter of its Patriot units to Alliance 

missile defense—it was unable to commit more largely 

because the rest of its Patriot systems are not configured for missile defense or are otherwise unavailable 

for NATO missions. The Dutch have committed Patriot forces as well.65 Additionally, the Netherlands is 

in the process of upgrading the radar systems of four 

De Zeven Provincien-class frigates, at a cost of roughly 

€250M. The upgraded volume search radars will support missile defense efforts with improved tracking 

capability of threats during the boost phase.66

The paucity of upper tier BMD contributions reflects the reality that few of the European allies have 
25

any existing capabilities in this area. However, several 

European allies have expressed interest in investing 

further in missile defense:

• Germany may purchase SM-3 missiles for its 

Sachsen-class frigates, as well as upgrade several frigates with more advanced sensors, delivering one per year starting in 2018.67

• France is developing an over-the-horizon radar and an infrared, space-based observation 

system, as well as Surface-to-Air Missile Platform/Terrain (SAMP/T) interceptors for use in 

BMD.68

• Senior leaders in Poland have declared their 

intent to acquire a national missile defense 

system.69

• The United Kingdom (UK) is considering upgrades that might enable it to contribute Type 

45 Destroyers to the theater missile defense 

effort.70

• Norway could upgrade its Fridtjof Nansen-class 

frigates with modifications to the SPY-1F radar 

system.71

• Italy has expressed interest in contributing its 

two new Horizon-class frigates, further developing its Aster air defense interceptor capabilities 

for use against ballistic missiles, and using the 

design and development results from the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) 

program in its national contribution to NATO 

missile defense.72

Despite these intentions, there remain serious 

questions about whether the European allies will have 

the wherewithal to make the future investments and 

upgrades they have committed to—or in some cases 

are merely considering—particularly in light of the 
26

dire budgetary situation facing their defense establishments as discussed earlier. For example, by one 

estimate, the German share of future NATO BMD 

efforts over the next decade or more could climb up 

to €8B, a staggering figure for a country that has decided to cut €8.3B from its defense budget between 

2011 and 2015.73 Indeed, on a related point, Germany 

already has plans to cut 50 percent of its Patriot units 

as part of broader defense restructuring.74 Similarly, 

there has already been speculation that new French 

President Francois Hollande may ultimately reduce 

France’s already limited role in NATO’s missile defense program.75 The UK has not given any indication 

that it intends to acquire a national missile defense 

system. Even though Norway may upgrade the radar 

on some of its frigates, it still considers the Russian 

submarine threat a much higher priority. Hence, according to one analyst, most of the planned European 

member state contributions seem destined to remain 

illusions.76 At best, it seems that most of the European 

allies are determining first what they need for national 

defense capabilities and only then examining whether 

and how those capabilities can contribute to NATO 

efforts. According to one NATO official, “We’ll be relying mainly on the U.S. contribution for quite a long 

time for now.”77

Some in the U.S. Congress have also become suspicious regarding the ability of the European allies to 

contribute meaningfully to the missile defense effort. 

In the House version of the fiscal year 2013 (FY13) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the House 

Armed Services Committee made clear its view that, 

“NATO [should] provide financial support for the 

U.S. contribution to Europe’s missile defense given the 

budget environment.”78 In fact, the House went so far 
27

as to hold back 25 percent of the EPAA funding until 

the Secretaries of Defense and State provided a report 

on the cost-sharing arrangements for missile defense 

in Europe and until the Secretary of Defense submitted 

to NATO a pre-financing request for expenses related 

to missile defense in Europe.79 Ultimately, the funding exclusion and pre-financing requirement were 

watered down in House-Senate negotiations over a 

final version of the FY13 NDAA, but that compromise (or conference) version of the NDAA bill, now 

signed into law by President Obama, still obligates the 

Secretary of Defense to provide a report to Congress 

on the financial, in-kind, and other forms of support 

provided by non-U.S. members of NATO to Alliance 

missile defense.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN 

NATO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

While the European allies determine their contributions beyond hosting and basing, the DoD has 

been implementing the first phase of the EPAA and 

hence of NATO BMD. When most uninformed observers think about missile defense and the military 

services, they typically think of the roles played by 

the Air Force and the Navy. The U.S. Army is usually an after-thought, with some justification. After all, 

the Navy owns and operates the BMD-capable Aegis 

ships, and the Air Force is more often associated with 

missiles than the Army. Nevertheless, the Army has 

played and continues to play a critical role in NATO 

BMD in two ways—in establishing and now operating 

the AN/TPY-2 radar site in Turkey, and in providing 

Title 10 support and services to all DoD entities in the 

European theater.80
28

In establishing the AN/TPY-2 radar site in Europe, 

the Army faced significant challenges. First among 

them was that, generally speaking, it seemed there 

were few lessons learned from previous, similar efforts 

in establishing AN/TPY-2 sites in Israel and in Japan. 

So, for example, there were no checklists on what was 

needed in terms of personnel, training, organization, 

materiel, and facilities—the result was that, in the view 

of one observer the MDA arrived in Turkey ready to 

set up the radar system, but did not plan for or bring 

anything else like communications equipment, which 

is vital for the operation of the radar system.81 Instead, 

much of this responsibility rested with the Army.

Figure 6. The BMD elements of “Homeland 

Defense” as envisioned by the MDA.

C2BMC=Command, Control and Battle Management Network

EWR= Early Warning Radar

SBX= Sea-based X-Brand Radar

OPIR= Overhead Persistent Infrared

UEWR= Upgraded Early Warning Radar

*Future Upgrade

Approved for Public Release 12-MDA-6972 (10 August 2012)
29

Site selection and preparation was also challenging for the Army. Officials from the MDA chose the 

Kürecik site over another location in Turkey that was 

much better suited with respect to infrastructure, citing homeland defense as the primary justification. 

Interestingly though, while the MDA’s own briefing 

slide (Figure 6) on homeland missile defense includes 

foreign facilities in the UK and Greenland, the Kürecik 

site is not featured.82 Outside analysts also concluded 

that the radar site in Turkey—as well as the broader 

EPAA—would be, “at best less than optimal for homeland defense.”83 More recently, the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) cast significant doubt on 

the EPAA’s utility for homeland defense.84

In any case, the MDA also claimed that the Kürecik site had fiber optics, a septic system, water supply, 

and power lines, even though the site had been abandoned by the Turkish military a decade prior, and the 

odds that all of these systems were in good working 

order were therefore poor. The result was that initially 

at least, much of the infrastructure was nonfunctional. 

Amidst what one official termed “a desolate expanse,” 

the Army personnel sent to establish and operate the 

radar at the site had to live in what another official 

called, “deplorable conditions,” including living in 

tents during the harsh, snowy winter.85 Today, the U.S. 

Army transports water to the hilltop site via a route 

that must be cleared of snow on an almost daily basis 

during winter. Additionally, there are few signs that 

the Turkish government is prepared to upgrade the 

electrical lines, which are inadequate for meeting the 

massive power demands of the AN/TPY-2 radar.86 As 

a result, generator fuel must be constantly supplied 

along a treacherous route up the mountain to operate 

the radar and facility.
30

In managing the radar site at Kürecik, which has 

been operational since December 2011, the Army is 

also responsible for rotating military personnel to the 

site. The Turkey site had been predominantly contractor, but plans are underway to staff the facility almost 

entirely with military personnel. The 10th Army Air 

& Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) based in Kaiserslautern, Germany, and consisting of roughly 150 

personnel, oversees the site in Turkey. But it has been 

stretched thin by its responsibilities to manage and 

lead the operation of the AN/TPY-2 radar in Israel as 

well. The 10th AAMDC has operational control over 

a smaller missile defense detachment of roughly 43 

personnel that is tasked with actually operating the 

site in Turkey. Unfortunately though, and as suggested above, roughly 120 personnel are necessary to 

fully operate, protect, and sustain the site at Kürecik. 

This difference of about 80 personnel must be filled 

by 10th AAMDC personnel, contractors, or others 

from U.S. Army Europe (to which the 10th reports).87

When considered in combination with the personnel requirements for the site in Israel, it seems clear 

the 10th AAMDC is simply not structured to handle 

both missions—“There aren’t enough soldiers . . . it’s 

a nightmare to manage.”88

In addition to operating the radar site in Kürecik, 

the Army is also responsible for providing Title 10 

support throughout the European theater of operations. Specifically, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)—

the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) for 

the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)—provides 

Army support to all other services. USAREUR is the 

DoD executive agent in Europe for conventional ammunition, military immunization, mortuary affairs, 

the Armed Services Blood Program Office, veterinary 
31

services, military postal services, and customs inspection. This means that even if the U.S. Navy operates 

the Aegis Ashore equipment planned for Poland and 

Romania—which is the current plan—the U.S. Army 

will still retain responsibilities with regard to some 

base operations and security.89

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY 

AND THE U.S. MILITARY

If optimistic expectations for European contributions to NATO’s missile defense program do not come 

to fruition as a result of any of the many factors discussed earlier in this monograph, there is reason to 

expect that the United States will carry most, if not all, 

of the burden of providing missile defense for Europe 

well into the future.90 Given the Army’s limited but 

vital role in NATO BMD, this could mean significant 

implications for the Army—including but also going 

beyond those challenges identified above—in terms 

of materiel, personnel, organization, training, operations, and budgets. Admittedly, it is somewhat difficult to determine with any degree of specificity the 

precise implications, since the EPAA is designed by 

definition to be “adaptive.” Nonetheless, some implications seem clear given the direction of NATO BMD 

efforts and U.S. BMD policy today. 

Materiel.

The DoD is planning on procuring a total of 11 

AN/TPY-2 radar systems, at a cost of roughly $200M 

each. Six of those are designated for use in THAAD 

batteries, leaving five radars for use in the “forwardbased mode.” Of the five forward-based mode AN/
32

TPY-2 radars the United States has planned for, three 

are currently operating around the world—in Israel, in 

northern Japan, and in Turkey. A fourth is reportedly 

operating in Qatar, and a fifth is likely destined for 

southern Japan.91 Yet another radar has been discussed 

for Asia, perhaps in the Philippines.92 As described 

earlier in this monograph, there is already evidence 

that another Europe-based AN/TPY-2 forward-based 

radar, in addition to the one currently operating in 

Turkey, may be required for effective coverage of 

NATO member state territory—this will be especially 

so if European sensor contributions do not materialize. Given the state of European defense budgets noted earlier, it seems the United States will indeed need 

to procure at least one and possibly several more AN/

TPY-2 forward-based radars, particularly if NATO is 

going to fulfill its stated objective of covering all member state territory. Additional AN/TPY-2 radars will 

also be necessary for training purposes and to provide 

some minimal back-up capability should one of the 

deployed radar systems break and need repair—it is 

highly likely that the Army—not the MDA—will need 

to fund these purchases.93

The DoD faces a similar dilemma—that is, growing demand and insufficient supply—with regard to 

THAAD batteries.94 In Europe, the MDA has proposed 

using a THAAD battery—and the AN/TPY-2 radar 

that accompanies it—in a surge capacity, presumably 

if threats justify an additional, temporary deployment 

of American missile defense assets.95 Given the lack 

of interest among the European allies in investing in 

and fielding interceptors, this appears to be prudent 

planning. However, it is unclear whether six THAAD 

batteries will be sufficient to meet demands of the U.S. 

military in Europe and elsewhere around the globe, 
33

especially when considering the need to have a battery available for training purposes and the necessity 

of having back-ups available. For example, in response 

to provocations from North Korea, the United States 

decided in April 2013 to deploy a THAAD battery to 

Guam, and shortly thereafter Guam’s Congressional 

Delegate requested that the unit be permanently based 

there.96 Ironically though, the DoD has steadily cut the 

number of planned THAAD batteries from nine in its 

Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) budget proposal, to seven in 

its FY12 proposal, to six in its FY13 budget proposal.97

Personnel and Organization.

Given the likelihood that additional U.S. radar 

systems will be necessary in Europe and the possibility that additional THAAD batteries need to be 

developed, the Army faces a potential manpower 

management challenge. This will be compounded by 

the plan98 to replace the vast majority of contractor operator/maintainers with military personnel between 

2014 and 2016.99

As noted in the previous section, the 10th AAMDC based in Germany is already finding it difficult to fully staff both the deployment in Israel and 

the deployment in Turkey today. As the U.S. Army 

downsizes from its wartime peak of the last decade, 

it will likely continue to face significant challenges 

in filling today’s requirements as well as potentially 

larger, future requirements—this will be especially so 

if the Army must develop additional AN/TPY-2 radar 

and/or THAAD units. Unfortunately, there is not yet 

a dedicated Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 

for AN/TPY-2 radar operator/maintainers, and the 

Army may face other challenges as it seeks to rotate 
34

Soldiers to an overseas, months-long hardship tour 

at a remote site on a hilltop in the middle of Turkey 

or elsewhere.100

Training.

With increased manpower demands come increased training demands. The Army is planning on 

acquiring radar training devices and simulation tools, 

but with so few actual radars, and most, if not all, of 

them deployed, the Army is likely to face difficulties in 

training Soldiers for these missions. BMD is taking on 

increased importance in U.S. defense policy—the 2010 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) report notes, 

“Missile defenses are an integral part of U.S. military 

and diplomatic strategies wherever the United States 

has security commitments.”101 Indeed, plans are underway to develop “phased adaptive approaches” 

not just in Europe, but in other locations around the 

world.102 Despite this though, BMD is not yet in the 

core curriculum or even offered as an elective at the 

U.S. Air Force Air War College, at the U.S. Army War 

College, or in any of the Army’s leadership schools.103

The result is that Army officers—such as those commanding AAMDCs around the world—are serving 

in strategic BMD positions with only limited formal 

military training and education in their specialty, relying mostly on on-the-job-training.104 Moreover, the 

Army will not have an institutional training base for 

developing AN/TPY-2 operator/maintainers until 

sometime in fiscal year 2015 (FY15). Until then, all 

training for this mission will be conducted by defense 

contractors.105
35

Operations.

As described above, the Army’s current contribution to the implementation of the EPAA is a single 

AN/TPY-2 radar site in Turkey, as well as Title 10 

support for all U.S. forces in the European theater that 

support NATO BMD. However, it is quite possible that 

the Army’s involvement will grow from an operational 

perspective. Part of this growth—such as an additional AN/TPY-2 radar in Europe—will likely result from 

the lack of appropriate sensor contributions by the 

European allies, assuming complete coverage of allied 

territory is the objective.106 But part may also stem from 

the need to augment the planned Aegis Ashore sites 

with point defense systems such as U.S. Patriot batteries, or to base a THAAD battery in Europe for use in 

the event of a crisis, all of this largely because the 

European allies appear unwilling or unable to invest 

in interceptors. 

Budgets.

Increased operating tempo (OPTEMPO), new 

training mechanisms, more manpower, additional 

units dedicated to the BMD mission, and more hardware acquisitions all add up to increased spending. 

Unfortunately, the budgetary picture as it exists today looking forward—even without these additional 

requirements—is somewhat murky. The MDA is currently developing a complete or “life-cycle” cost estimate for the systems that will comprise the EPAA, 

in part as a response to GAO recommendations. 

Those recommendations were based on a study that 

found that: 
36

DOD has not established life-cycle cost estimates for 

EPAA and therefore is missing an important management tool for preparing budgets, monitoring progress 

and assessing long-term affordability of its revised approach to BMD in Europe.107

The DoD faces some challenges in pulling together 

accurate life-cycle cost estimates, since some of the 

costs are unknowable at present. Those costs are unknowable because the DoD cannot predict the future 

with complete accuracy, but more specifically because, 

thanks to different manufacture dates, the AN/TPY-2 

radars are not all perfectly identical and because the 

EPAA is designed by definition to be “adaptive” as 

circumstances demand. In any case, most of the currently identifiable costs for operating the AN/TPY-2 

radar in Turkey will transfer from the MDA to the 

Army between 2014 and 2016. At present, the Army 

is planning to allocate roughly $21M per year for the 

operation and maintenance of the AN/TPY-2 radar 

in Turkey.108 This figure is far less than the MDA had 

estimated for future operations and maintenance costs 

at similar radar sites in northern Japan and Israel—

roughly $39M per year per site.109

Whether the Army’s estimates on future costs 

prove accurate or not, those costs will be borne out 

of existing Army budget plans, not out of defensewide budget plans. Perhaps more worrisome from 

the Army’s budgetary perspective is the prospect of 

needing to fund the operations and maintenance of 

additional sites and assets, whether they be AN/TPY2 radars, THAAD batteries, or Patriot battalions in the 

event that European contributions to NATO BMD do 

not materialize, and the DoD is directed to fill the gap. 

Any additional such costs will most likely be taken 

out of the Army’s existing budget plan.
37

In addition to the more obvious acquisition, operations, and maintenance costs, there are also less visible 

costs to the DoD and the Army:

• To grow the military manpower necessary 

to staff additional BMD units or operate and 

maintain additional BMD assets;

• To form new BMD units necessary to meet the 

operational demand;

• To develop the institutional capacity and the 

facilities necessary to train military personnel 

in the operation and maintenance of BMD assets; and,

• To educate military leaders at various echelons 

in the strategic importance and employment of 

BMD assets.

Mitigating the negative repercussions of taking 

on these and other costs will require a detailed, allencompassing planning effort, only parts of which 

appear to be underway today.

CONCLUSION

As described and explained above, NATO’s decision to expand the Alliance’s BMD program was 

somewhat surprising in several respects. In particular, 

lukewarm support for BMD, tightening defense budgets, and major technical challenges together would 

have led one to expect that the Alliance would not

expand the ALTBMD program to include defense of 

all European member state territory and populations. 

Despite these inhibitors, the Alliance has moved forward with a significant expansion of ALTBMD.

The reasons for this expansion included the fact 

that the majority of the new BMD systems would be 
38

developed and fielded by the United States in the 

form of the EPAA. For cash-strapped European members of the Alliance eager to influence NATO’s BMD 

efforts but unable to devote funds on par with the 

United States, Washington’s proposal to include the 

EPAA in an expanded ALTBMD effort comprised an 

offer too attractive to refuse. Additionally, many allies have come to believe that a limited BMD, however 

imperfect, is better than nothing. Finally, there is some 

evidence indicating that public opinion in Europe has 

become more favorably disposed toward BMD than 

has ever been the case.

Despite the American offer to allow the EPAA to 

constitute the lion’s share of NATO’s expanded BMD 

program, Washington made clear to its allies that it 

expected them to contribute to the common defense. 

Several allies have offered land or facilities, and many 

have pledged to provide future capabilities and assets. 

However, hardly any have actually contributed tangible upper tier BMD assets to date. Given the lukewarm 

public support for BMD, declining defense budgets 

and the cost of overcoming technical hurdles, it seems 

very likely that tangible Alliance contributions in the 

form of sensors and interceptors will remain minimal 

in the extreme over the next decade.

The lack of tangible allied contributions—as well 

as the major technical challenges facing components 

of the NATO missile defense system still in development—will have significant implications for the U.S. 

Army, which has a vital role in NATO missile defense today. In particular, the Army is likely to face 

increased manpower demands, materiel requirements, and training needs. Additionally, Army units 

involved directly in or in support of BMD are likely to 

face a higher OPTEMPO than currently projected. As 
39

a result of all these increased requirements, it seems 

unlikely that current Army and DoD budget projections will prove valid—instead, all available evidence 

currently points to increased budgetary requirements. 

There is evidence indicating that the Army and the 

DoD are planning to address some of these additional 

requirements, but not necessarily all of them. Regardless, it appears that the Alliance’s decision in 2010 to 

expand ALTBMD to cover all Alliance territory and 

populations in Europe will exacerbate the perceived 

imbalance in transatlantic burden sharing. This will be 

the case particularly if the EPAA provides little if any 

benefit to the defense of U.S. territory, which the cancellation of Phase 4 appears to have now affirmed.110

Some have dismissed the burden sharing issue associated with the U.S. role in NATO BMD, arguing 

that the system envisioned under the EPAA is vital 

to U.S. national interests, which have always included 

the security of Europe.111 While European security is 

without a doubt vital to U.S. national interests, it is 

equally clear that the lack of burden sharing in BMD 

is nonetheless likely to become a perennial irritant in 

transatlantic relations.

ENDNOTES 

1. See, for example, Peter Baker, “Obama Reshapes a Missile 

Shield to Blunt Tehran,” The New York Times, September 18, 2009, 

p. 1; Michael D. Shear and Ann Scott Tyson, “Obama Shifts Focus 

of Missile Shield,” The Washington Post, September 18, 2009, p. 1; 

and Amy Butler, “U.S. Scraps European Ground-Based Interceptors in Favor of SM-3s,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 18, 2009, p. 1. For a more thorough treatment of the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) roll-out plus key challenges, see Daniel Goure, “The Obama Administration’s Phased 

Adaptive Architecture: Technological, Operational and Political 

Issues,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 2012, 

pp. 17–35.
40

2. Lisbon Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 20, 2010, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.

3. Robert G. Bell, “The Why, What, and How of Missile Defense at NATO,” speech delivered at the American Institute of 

Aeronautics and Astronautics annual Missile Defense Conference 

in Washington, DC, March 21, 2011, available from nato.usmission.

gov/speeches/mdatnato.html.

4. The degree to which European publics have been aware 

of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) issue in the first place is, of 

course, open to question. Certainly during the 1980s—when Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative—and during 

the early 2000s—when George W. Bush secured American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) treaty—European publics have been very aware.

5. Missile Defence in Europe—The Political and Security Dimensions, Paris, France: European Union Institute for Security Policy, 

February 2008, available from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/

policyBrief_001.pdf. 

6. Jan Červenka, “Citizens on U.S. Anti-Missile Radar Base in 

Czech Republic,” press release by the Public Opinion Research 

Centre (Prague), December 3, 2010, available from cvvm.soc.cas.cz/

en/international-relations/citizens-on-u-s-anti-missile-radar-base-inczech-republic-december-2008; see also Steven A. Hildreth and Carl 

Ek, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 

26, 2010, pp. 12, 16.

7. The U.S. decision to cancel Phase 4 of the EPAA has evidently not changed Moscow’s perspective. See Gabriela Baczynska, “Russian Lawmaker not Reassured by U.S. Missile Defense 

Plan,” Reuters, March 17, 2013, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2013/03/17/us-russia-usa-defence-idUSBRE92G0CU20130317.

8. Stephan de Spielgeleire, “Missile Defense—A Collaborative Dutch Policy Analysis,” Briefing presented at the RUSI Missile Defense Conference in London, May 31, 2012.
41

9. Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007, pp. 19-20, available 

from trends.gmfus.org/files/archived/doc/2007_english_key.pdf.

10. Interview with a senior French field grade officer and a 

senior German field grade officer, both assigned to NATO’s international staff, October 16, 2012; see also Justin Vaisse, “French 

Views on Missile Defense,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, April 2001, available from www.brookings.edu/research/

articles/2001/04/france-vaisse.

11. Stephen Fidler and Alistair MacDonald, “Europeans Retreat on Defense,” The Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2011; Zachary Selden, “The European Debt Crisis and American Security 

Policy,” Parameters, Vol. XLII, No. 1, Spring 2012, pp. 17-26.

12. “Role of Government IV,” International Social Survey 

Programme, 2006, available from zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.

jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy/ZA4700.

13. Military Expenditure Database, 1988-2011, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 

available from milexdata.sipri.org.

14. David M. Herszenhorn and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. 

Cancels Part of Missile Defense That Russia Opposed,” The 

New York Times, March 16, 2013, available from www.nytimes.

com/2013/03/17/world/europe/with-eye-on-north-korea-us-cancels-missile-defense-russia-opposed.html?_r=1&.

15. National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2013, Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2012, available from comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/

fy2013/FY13_Green_Book.pdf.

16. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 23.

17. Robert Gates, DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and 

Gen. Cartwright from the Pentagon, September 17, 2009, available 

from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4479.
42

18. Leon Panetta, Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, February 1, 2012, available from www.defense.

gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4967. “We’re going to 

continue to push on missile defense, and we are making gains 

there,” said Secretary Panetta.

19. Mark Montgomery, Allied BMD Upgrade Conference Opening Remarks, unclassified briefing delivered in Berlin, Germany, 

on September 13, 2012.

20. Ibid.

21. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/

natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.

22. Oliver Thränert, “NATO and Missile Defense: Opportunities and Open Questions,” Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, December 2010. What the Europeans have contributed 

to date is addressed later in this monograph.

23. While these challenges apply to all BMD systems, this 

monograph will focus mostly on the systems that comprise the 

planned NATO BMD system.

24. The AN/TPY-2 radar system was established at Kürecik, 

Turkey, in December 2011. See Randall M. Hendrickson, “Ballistic 

Missile Defense Update,” Briefing delivered to the 2012 Space and 

Missile Defense Conference in Huntsville, AL, August 14, 2012, 

available from missilethreat.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/

uploads/2012/10/Ballistic-Missile-Defense-Update-August-14-2012.

pdf. In the fourth and final phase of the EPAA, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans on adding an as yet undeveloped Precision Tracking Satellite System (PTSS), with the U.S. Air Force 

as lead service, but this is in addition to the AN/TPY-2, not a 

replacement.

25. For simplicity’s sake and unless otherwise noted in this 

monograph, any reference to the “AN/TPY-2” radar refers specifically to the AN/TPY-2 in “forward-based mode” (FBM). In this 

mode, the radar operates independent of Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors, utilizes different software, 

and functions as part of a broader missile defense network. 
43

26. Emphasis added. “Science and Technology Issues of Early 

Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility,” Washington, DC: 

Defense Science Board, September 2011, p. 26. The AN/TPY-2 radar system was chosen for the EPAA, in part because of its limited ability to see into Russian airspace. See “SM-3 BMD, in from 

the Sea: EPAA & Aegis Ashore,” Defense Industry Daily, February 

14, 2013, available from www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Land-BasedSM-3s-for-Israel-04986.

27. The SM-3 Block IA interceptor—the kind used today in 

NATO’s interim capability—costs between $9 million and $10 

million per unit. The SM-3 Block IB is estimated at $12-15M per 

interceptor. Meanwhile, The Economist estimates that a ballistic 

missile might cost as much as $1 million per unit. See www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/chinese_missile_ranges.

28. L. David Montague and Walter B. Slocombe, in a letter 

from the National Research Council in response to questions 

posed by Representatives Michael Turner and Loretta Sanchez, 

April 30, 2012, available from hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/

documents/nas_response.pdf. 

29. Intercepting enemy missiles as early as possible in their 

trajectories enables the defender to determine whether his initial defensive shot was successful and, if not, to launch another 

round—this is the so-called “shoot-assess-shoot” firing doctrine. 

However, at least two major studies have concluded that due to 

extremely short time windows, early intercept is not realistically 

achievable, even under the most optimistic set of deployment, 

sensor capability, and missile technology assumptions. The current NATO BMD architecture consists of SM-3 missiles launched 

from Aegis ships—those missiles currently deployed as well as 

future upgraded variants to be launched from Aegis Ashore sites 

are all mid-course interceptors. See “Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility,” p. 33; 

and National Research Council, “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile 

Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. BoostPhase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives,” 

Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012, p. S-6.

30. Missile Defense Agency fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” October 2012, available from www.mda.mil/

global/documents/pdf/aegis_tests.pdf.
44

31. “Ballistic Missile Defense System Engages Five Targets 

Simultaneously During Largest Missile Defense Flight Test in 

History,” Missile Defense Agency news release, October 25, 2012, 

available from www.mda.mil/news/12news0011.html.

32. “SM-3 BMD, in from the Sea: EPAA & Aegis Ashore,” 

Defense Industry Daily, December 13, 2012, available from 

www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Land-Based-SM-3s-for-Israel-04986. 

The SM-3 IB was to be deployed by 2015, but current estimates 

point to 2018.

33. “U.S. Announces EPAA Phase IV cancellation, increase in 

number of GMD national missile defense interceptors from 30 to 

44,” Mostly Missile Defense, March 15, 2013, available from mostlymissiledefense.com/2013/03/15/u-s-announces-epaa-phase-iv-cancellation-increase-in-number-of-gmd-national-missile-defense-interceptorsfrom-30-to-44-march-15-2013/.

34. “Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility,” p. 26. In addition to allowing for 

a shoot-assess-shoot firing doctrine, intercepting enemy missiles 

as early as possible in their trajectories enables the defender to 

limit debris from a destroyed enemy missile falling on its territory or that of other countries along the missile’s trajectory. It also 

reduces the odds that the attacker can deploy penetration aids or 

decoys designed to fool the defense, and it essentially expands 

the scope of defended territory by casting a larger so-called “defended shadow.”

35. “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense,” p. S-11.

36. Laura Grego, “The Anti-Satellite Capability of the Phased 

Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System,” Federation of 

American Scientists, Public Interest Report, Winter 2011, p. 2, 

available from www.fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-AntiSatellite.pdf. Robert Wall, “Intercept Starts Long Road to SeaBased Missile Defense,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 2002, p. 34.

37. “The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance,” 

The Arms Control Association factsheet, November 2012, available from www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach.
45

38. Interview with a civilian official from the Missile Defense 

Agency, October 16, 2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade 

officer based in Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012. The U.S. 

Navy’s force generation model does not follow the A-B-C model 

precisely, but the math is nearly the same—that is, for every three 

ships in the inventory, one can be deployed at any given time.

39. Spain has five, The Netherlands has four, Germany has 

three, Denmark has three, the UK has six, Italy has two, and 

France has two. Jeroen de Jonge, “The European Contribution to 

BMD,” briefing given at the Royal United Services Institute, June 

2012, available from www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/deJonge_Part_

One.pdf.

40. “Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic 

Missile Defense Feasibility,” p. 28.

41. Nancy Morgan, “Ballistic Missile Defense Overview,” 

briefing offered to the Royal United Services Institute, May 30, 

2012, available from www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Ms_Nancy_

Morgan.pdf.

42. Interview with an official from Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Policy (OSD[P]) September 19, 2012.

43. George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “A Flawed and 

Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control Today, May 

2010, available from www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol.

44. Another analyst has argued that the European allies 

agreed to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ballistic 

Missile Defense (NATO BMD) for use as a bargaining chip in trying to get the United States to withdraw nuclear weapons from 

Europe. However, the authors uncovered no evidence supporting 

this hypothesis. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO’s Chicago Summit: A Thorny Agenda,” NATO Defense College Research Paper, 

No. 70, November 2011, available from www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=308.

45. Interview with a civilian official from the Missile Defense 

Agency, October 16, 2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade 

officer based in Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012; interview 
46

with a senior French field grade officer and a senior German 

field grade officer, both assigned to NATO’s international staff, 

October 16, 2012.

46. Interview with an official from OSD(P), September 19, 

2012.

47. “Article 5” refers to what many believe to be the most 

important part of the treaty establishing NATO—the article that 

essentially means an attack on one is an attack on all. Interview 

with a senior French field grade officer and a senior German 

field grade officer, both assigned to NATO’s international staff, 

October 16, 2012.

48. Robert G. Bell, “The Why, What, and How of Missile Defense at NATO,” speech delivered at the American Institute of 

Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Missile Defense Conference, March 21, 2011, available from nato.usmission.gov/speeches/

mdatnato.html.

49. Interview with officials of the NATO international staff, 

October 16, 2012.

50. Interview with a civilian official from the Missile Defense 

Agency, October 16, 2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade 

officer based in Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012.

51. Interview with officials of the NATO international staff, 

October 16, 2012. The 2010 architecture study was preceded by a 

2009 scenario development effort that was itself based on a 2007 

ballistic missile threat assessment.

52. Interview with officials of the NATO international staff, 

October 16, 2012.

53. Interview with a civilian official from the Missile Defense 

Agency, October 16, 2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade 

officer based in Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012.

54. Interview with two field grade officers assigned to 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Operation Center (BMDOC)

October 18, 2012.
47

55. This became the subject of significant discussion in the 

halls of NATO headquarters during the deliberations on the stillborn, broad 2010 NATO BMD requirements study, as several European member states pushed to have most technical capabilities 

described using the word “shall,” rather than “should”—the former would provide them with strong defense budget request justifications in their respective capitals, while the latter would not. 

Interview with a civilian official from the Missile Defense Agency, 

October 16, 2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer 

based in Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012.

56. Interview with a senior field grade officer involved in 

NATO force generation, October 17, 2012.

57. Interview with officials of the NATO international staff, 

October 16, 2012.

58. Interview with an official of the NATO international staff, 

October 17, 2013. 

59. Interview with two field grade officers assigned to the BMDOC, October 18, 2012. This is particularly noteworthy since most 

directorates and offices within NATO will see cuts, not growth, as 

a result of the reorganization.

60. Tom Z. Collina, “Turkey to Host NATO Missile Defense 

Radar,” Arms Control Today, October 2011, available from www.

armscontrol.org/act/2011_10/Turkey_to_Host_NATO_Missile_Defense_Radar.

61. Ibid.

62. F. Oliva, “Spain Gives ‘Green Light’ to US Anti-Missile 

Defense Shield in Rota,” The Gibraltar Chronicle, October 6, 2012.

63. Interview with an official from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD), September 19, 2012.

64. Interview with a senior field grade officer involved in 

NATO force generation, October 17, 2012.

65. Ivo Daalder, “A New Shield Over Europe,” The International Herald Tribune, June 7, 2012, p. 6.
48

66. “Dutch Order Navy Radar Improvement,” United Press 

International, Inc., June 27, 2012, available from www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2012/06/27/Dutch-order-navy-radarimprovement/UPI-43601340825309/.

67. Nicholas de Larrinaga, “Germany considers SM-3 BMD 

capabilities,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 3, 2012; interview with 

a civilian official from the Missile Defense Agency, October 16, 

2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer based in 

Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012.

68. Interview with a civilian official from the Missile Defense 

Agency, October 16, 2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade 

officer based in Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012; “SAMP / T 

Successful on a Franco-Italian Missile Defense Test,” Defense Update, March 7, 2013, available from defense-update.com/20130307_

samp-t-successful-on-in-a-franco-italian-missile-defense-test.html.

69. Marcin Sobczyk, “Poland Wants Missile Defense System 

of Its Own,” The Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2012.

70. Simon Pavitt, “United Kingdom,” briefing delivered at the 

Allied BMD Upgrade Conference in Berlin, Germany, on September 13, 2012.

71. Erik Gustavson, “Possible Norwegian Contributions to 

Allied BMD Capabilities,” briefing delivered at the Allied BMD 

Upgrade Conference in Berlin, Germany, on September 13, 2012.

72. Tom Kington, “Italy Plans To Use Aster Against Ballistic 

Missiles,” Defense News, October 25, 2012, available from www.

defensenews.com/article/20121025/DEFREG01/310250003/ItalyPlans-Use-Aster-Against-Ballistic-Missiles; “SAMP/T Successful on 

a Franco-Italian Missile Defense Test,” Defense Update, March 7, 

2013, available from defense-update.com/20130307_samp-t-successful-on-in-a-franco-italian-missile-defense-test.html; and Tom Kington, “Italy, Germany Warn U.S. Against MEADS Cancellation,” 

Defense News, June 14, 2012, available from www.defensenews.com/

article/20120614/DEFREG02/306140007/Italy-Germany-Warn-U-SAgainst-MEADS-Cancellation.
49

73. Bernd Kreienbaum, “European Missile Defence Architecture—A Chance for European and Russian Defence Technologies?” 2012 RUSI Missile Defence Conference, London, UK, May 

30-31, 2012, available from www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Bernd_

Kreienbaum.pdf; and Clara Marina O’Donnell, ed., “The Implications of Military Spending Cuts of NATO’s Largest Members,” 

Analysis Paper, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Center on the United States and Europe, July 2012, available from 

www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/7/military%20

spending%20nato%20odonnell/military%20spending%20nato%20

odonnell%20pdf.

74. Interview with a German field grade officer, October 

18, 2012.

75. Tom Withington, “French Defence Policy: A New President, a New Era?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 10, 2012.

76. Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO’s Chicago Summit: A Thorny 

Agenda,” NATO Defense College Research Paper, No. 70, 

November 2011, available from www.ndc.nato.int/download/

downloads.php?icode=308.

77. Interview with a civilian official from the Missile Defense 

Agency, October 16, 2012; interview with a senior U.S. field grade 

officer based in Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2012; and, interview with a senior French field grade officer and a senior German 

field grade officer, both assigned to NATO’s international staff, 

October 16, 2012.

78. House Report (H.R.) 112-479 on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, May 11, 2012, p. 113.

79. H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on 

May 18, 2012, pp. 72-73.

80. “Title 10” refers to the title in U.S. Code that pertains to 

the roles, functions, and missions of the armed services. In this 

context, “Title 10 support and services” refers to requirements to 

organize, equip, train, and maintain Army forces in the theater 

and provide support to other services in accordance with executive agent responsibilities. 
50

81. Interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer assigned to 

the U.S. Army in Europe, October 19, 2012.

82. Randall M. Hendrickson, “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,” briefing presented at the 2012 Space and Missile Defense 

Conference in Huntsville, AL, August 14, 2012, available from 

missilethreat.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/

Ballistic-Missile-Defense-Update-August-14-2012.pdf.

83. L. David Montague and Walter B. Slocombe, in a letter 

from the National Research Council in response to questions 

posed by Representatives Michael Turner and Loretta Sanchez, 

April 30, 2012, available from hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/

documents/nas_response.pdf.

84. Desmond Butler, “Flaws Found in U.S. Missile Shield,” 

The Miami Herald, February 9, 2013, available from news.yahoo.com/

apnewsbreak-flaws-found-us-missile-shield-081826501--politics.html.

85. Interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer assigned to 

the U.S. Army in Europe, October 19, 2012; interview with a senior civilian official assigned to the U.S. Army in Europe, October 

19, 2012.

86. The AN/TPY-2 radar reportedly requires up to 1.3 

megawatts of electricity. See raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=

43&item=1329.

87. Correspondence with a U.S. field grade officer from the 

10th Army Air & Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), January 

31, 2013.

88. Interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer assigned to 

the U.S. Army in Europe, October 19, 2012; interview with a U.S. 

field grade officer from the 10th AAMDC, October 18, 2012. These 

challenges may become magnified as the U.S. Army downsizes 

following the end of war in Afghanistan.

89. Interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer assigned to 

the U.S. Army in Europe, October 19, 2012.
51

90. Moreover, even if the Europeans provide all that they have 

committed to date, the United States will still likely surge forward 

additional air and missile defense assets in the event of a crisis.

91. Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “Pentagon Bulks Up 

Defenses in the Gulf,” Wall Street Journal (Online), July 17, 2012, 

available from online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304388004

577531331722511516.html; Karen Parrish, “U.S., Japan Begin Coordination on Second Radar Installation,” American Forces Press 

Service, September 17, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=117880.

92. Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Plans New Asia 

Missile Defenses,” The Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012, p. A1.

93. Correspondence with a civilian official from the Army 

staff involved in missile defense issues, January 29, 2013.

94. Interview with officials from the Army staff involved 

in missile defense issues, September 20, 2012; interview with a 

U.S. civilian official from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Army G8, September 19, 2012. The Army has identified a requirement for nine THAAD batteries, three more than the six currently 

planned.

95. Randall M. Hendrickson, “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,” briefing presented at the 2012 Space and Missile Defense 

Conference in Huntsville, AL, August 14, 2012, available from 

missilethreat.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/

Ballistic-Missile-Defense-Update-August-14-2012.pdf.

96. Karen DeYoung, “U.S. to Deploy Anti-Missile System 

to Guam,” The Washington Post, April 3, 2013, available from 

articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-03/world/38241106_1_northkoreans-missile-threat-defense-secretary-chuck-hagel; Sabrina Salas 

Matanane, “Bordallo Wants Missile Defense System Permanently 

on Guam,” KUAM, April 12, 2013, available from www.kuam.com/

story/21950116/2013/04/12/bordallo-wants-missile-defense-systempermanently-on-guam.

97. “Missile Defense Agency Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget 

Estimates,” January 15, 2010, available from www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy11.pdf; “MDA Fiscal Year 2012 Budget 
52

Outline,” available from www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy12.pdf; and “Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Fiscal Year 2013 

Budget Outline,” available from www.mda.mil/global/documents/

pdf/budgetfy13.pdf.

98. According to an agreement with the MDA, beginning in 

fiscal year 2014, the Army is responsible for the funding of the operation, security, common support equipment maintenance, military pay, and other associated costs such as housing and quality 

of life facilities for the AN/TPY-2 radar site in Turkey. It is during this time that the Army will begin to replace all MDA-funded 

contractors with Soldiers.

99. Current estimates are that roughly 100 military personnel—largely security and operator/maintainers—will be necessary for each AN/TPY-2 forward-based mode radar site.

100. Interview with two U.S. officials from the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology, September 19, 2012. The Army may have in place a 

Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) for radar operator-maintainers by late 2014.

101. U.S. Department of Defense, “Ballistic Missile Defense 

Report Report,” February 2010, p. 24, available from www.defense.

gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20

web.pdf.

102. Ibid., pp. 25-27; see also Frank A. Rose, “U.S. Missile Defense and Regional Security, remarks at the Second Annual Israel 

Multinational Missile Defense Conference, Tel Aviv, Israel, July 

25, 2011,” available from www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/169023.htm.

103. Interview with two U.S. officials from the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology, September 19, 2012.

104. Interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer assigned 

to the U.S. Army in Europe, October 19, 2012.

105. Interview with two U.S. officials from the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
53

Technology, September 19, 2012. Both the institutional training 

base and the training devices are slated for late 2014.

106. The Alliance heads of state and government stated clearly in 2010 at Lisbon, Portugal, that they had decided to “develop a 

missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces.” During the Chicago summit in 2012, 

they reiterated, “Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a 

NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces.”

107. “Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in 

Europe,” GAO-11-220, Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, January 2011, p. 13, available from www.gao.gov/assets/320/315170.pdf.

108. Interview with two U.S. civilian officials from U.S. Army 

Europe involved in budgetary matters, October 19, 2012.

109. Interview with a U.S. civilian official from the Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G8, September 19, 2012.

110. Even if the SM-3 Block IIB missiles intended for Phase 4 

were developed and deployed, the utility of this missile in U.S. 

homeland defense would most likely be limited. Although the 

SM-3 Block IIB was expected to be faster than its predecessors 

and potentially capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBMs), the Defense Science Board argued that Iranian 

ICBMs launched against California, for example—which would 

follow a trajectory almost due north and over central Russia—

could not have been intercepted by fixed SM-3 Block IIB interceptor assets based in Europe. See “Science and Technology Issues of 

Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility,” p. 21.

111. See arguments attributed to Jim Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe/NATO Policy, in James 

Joyner, “NATO Missile Defense: An American Affair,” October 

12, 2010, available from www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-missiledefense-american-affair.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Mr. Steven J. Whitmore

Dr. John R. Deni

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil