RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5310-16T3

T.R.,

1

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

P.F.,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________

Argued June 5, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Mayer and Mitterhoff. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington

County, Docket No. FV-03-0021-18.

Ted M. Rosenberg argued the cause for 

appellant.

Scott A. Krasny argued the cause for 

respondent (Furlong and Krasny, attorneys;

Scott A. Krasny, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

 

1 We use initials to protect the parties' privacy interests.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

July 9, 2018
2 A-5310-16T3

Plaintiff appeals from a July 12, 2017 order dismissing her

domestic violence complaint and vacating the temporary restraining 

order (TRO) dated July 4, 2017 and the amended TRO dated July 10, 

2017. We affirm. 

Plaintiff obtained the TROs based on a series of text messages 

sent by defendant from June 29 through July 3, 2017. The parties 

had a nearly three year dating relationship, which was tumultuous. 

During her trial testimony, plaintiff described the dating 

relationship as "on and off." According to plaintiff, "every time 

[defendant] gets mad, he'll send some very mean things and then 

I'll block [his messages]. And then he'll just get through to me 

somehow, and I'll forgive him and I'll go back. He'll buy me 

something. He'll say nice things."

Plaintiff also told the judge that she had blocked defendant's

texts "at least a hundred" times before June 29. Each time prior 

to June 29, plaintiff would remove the block on her phone and 

continue dating defendant. 

At trial, the judge heard testimony regarding an Instagram 

message in which plaintiff told defendant's ex-girlfriend how to 

manipulate defendant to make him angry so that defendant would 

then apologize and buy her gifts. In that message, plaintiff told

defendant's ex-girlfriend "[y]ou have to play his game if [you]

want[] his attention." 
3 A-5310-16T3

Plaintiff also testified regarding two prior incidents of 

domestic violence. Immediately after one such incident, a tire 

slashing,2 plaintiff sent an overtly suggestive birthday card to 

defendant. In the birthday card, admitted as evidence during the 

trial, plaintiff expressed that defendant was "the greatest gift 

anyone could receive." In another described incident, during 

which defendant wrestled with plaintiff and grabbed her cellphone, 

plaintiff testified that defendant thereafter spent the night, the 

parties had consensual sex, and plaintiff never sought medical 

treatment or reported the incident. 

The text messages between June 29 and July 3, 2017, were 

admitted as evidence at trial. The tone and tenor of the messages

were coarse and intended to harass plaintiff. Plaintiff testified 

that she felt threatened and scared by defendant's text messages

sent during this time period. 

At the conclusion of the trial testimony, the judge issued 

an oral decision from the bench. The judge determined that 

defendant committed an act of domestic violence in accordance with 

the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 

 

2 Defendant testified that plaintiff's tire was damaged by a 

broken beer bottle. However, because he was angry as a result of 

a fight with plaintiff, defendant told plaintiff that he had the 

tire slashed.
4 A-5310-16T3

to -35. Specifically, defendant admitted his texts constituted

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c). 

However, the judge found no evidence of a reasonable fear of 

threats to plaintiff's life, health, or safety to support the need 

for a final restraining order (FRO). The judge determined that 

both parties had "some issues with credibility." The judge found 

that the parties participated in a "heightened" form of "domestic 

contretemps." The judge's finding was based on the parties' trial 

testimony wherein each admitted to "playing the game." 

Because plaintiff testified that defendant's text messages 

prior to June 29 made her feel "upset," as opposed to feeling 

threatened as she did upon receiving defendant's messages after 

June 29, the judge examined the entirety of the parties' 

relationship. The judge found the parties had "an up and down 

kind of relationship" and that "this was their relationship for 

good reasons, for bad reasons, for no reasons." The judge 

concluded that plaintiff, overall, was "annoyed, troubled, upset" 

by defendant but was not "fearful of this defendant." The judge 

stated:

They tried in my opinion to actually 

manipulate each other with their different 

forms of conduct. They each knew how to push 

each other's buttons. They each knew how to 

rise to the other one's level and as I said, 

I don't think that, while I totally disapprove 

of what was said here over those three or four 
5 A-5310-16T3

days, I don't think it is sufficient to 

constitute the type of fear that [plaintiff]

believes has been generated particularly given 

all of her testimony about this relationship 

over the course of time.

In his amplification of reasons pursuant to R. 2:5-1(b), the 

judge wrote:

the admitted acts of harassment were 

indicative of the ongoing tumultuous 

relationship that the parties had over a 

significant period of time as opposed to an 

escalation of harassing conduct by the 

[d]efendant that had arisen to the point that 

the element of fear was instilled in the 

[p]laintiff that caused her to seek the 

issuance of a [f]inal [r]estraining [o]rder 

to protect herself (and also her children).

The judge found that the text messages from June 29 to July 3, 

2017, leading to plaintiff's filing a TRO, "were not unlike the 

manner in which the parties conducted their on/off relationship 

over the course of approximately two years." 

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the judge improperly 

considered whether defendant would have to forfeit his weapon if 

an FRO was issued and misapplied the standard set forth in Silver 

v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super 112 (App. Div. 2006). 

Our review of a decision by a judge assigned to the Family 

Part is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). A 

family judge's findings should be affirmed if supported by 

"adequate, substantial, [and] credible evidence." Id. at 411-12 
6 A-5310-16T3

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J.

474, 484 (1974)). "Because of the family courts' special 

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts 

should accord deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 413. 

However, if a judge makes a discretionary decision under a legal 

misconception, we need not accord the usual deference. State v. 

Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966); see also Gotlib 

v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 309 (App. Div. 2008) (reversing 

where the court "ignores applicable standards").

We reject plaintiff's contention that the judge contemplated

defendant's occupation as a police officer or the forfeiture of

his weapons in deciding whether to issue an FRO. There is nothing 

in the record to indicate that the judge considered the potential 

seizure of defendant's duty weapon in reaching his determination. 

Plaintiff suggests we "infer" that the judge erroneously 

considered defendant's occupation as a police officer in rendering 

his decision. However, plaintiff proffers nothing more than 

improper conjecture and speculation in support of this argument,

rather than competent evidence in the record. 

We also reject plaintiff's argument that the judge misapplied 

the standard in Silver. In determining whether to grant an FRO, 

the family court applies a two prong analysis. Silver, 387 N.J. 

Super. at 125-27. The first prong is proof of the commission of 
7 A-5310-16T3

a predicate act in accordance with the PDVA. Id. at 125-26. The 

second prong is a finding that "relief is necessary to prevent 

further abuse." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011) (quoting 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)). In accordance with Silver, "the guiding 

standard is whether a restraining order is necessary . . . to 

protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further 

abuse." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. At issue in this case 

is whether plaintiff satisfied the second prong of Silver for the 

entry of an FRO.

Family Part judges "have been specially trained to detect the 

difference between domestic violence and the more ordinary 

differences that arise between couples, and . . . [because of that 

expertise,] their findings are entitled to deference." J.D., 207 

at 482. Consequently, we will not disturb the findings of a Family 

Part judge unless "they are so wholly insupportable as to result 

in a denial of justice." In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. 

Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 

483-84).

Here, we find that the evidence supports the judge's 

conclusion as to the second prong of the Silver analysis. Based 

on the testimony, the judge found that the on/off relationship of 

the parties over the course of nearly three years, the provoked 

fights by the parties in anticipation of subsequent gifts of 
8 A-5310-16T3

affection, the "playing the game" behavior of both parties, and 

the "tumultuous" nature of the parties' relationship failed to 

support a determination that plaintiff required an FRO to protect 

her from danger or further abuse. Based on the evidence, we agree 

with the Family Part judge that plaintiff was not in immediate 

danger or at risk of further abuse.

Affirmed.