UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

DOMINIC RANDY QUEEN, 

Defendant. 

Crim. Action No. 17-58 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

I. Introduction 

Defendant Dominic Randy Queen (“Mr. Queen”), proceeding pro 

se, is serving a sixty-month concurrent term of imprisonment at 

the Rivers Correctional Institution in Winton, North Carolina, 

after pleading guilty to two counts in the five-count 

indictment: (1) unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) unlawful 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841 (b)(1)(D). See J., ECF No. 47 at 1-

3.1 Mr. Queen claims that the Court’s written judgment conflicts 

with the Court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence—

specifically, the written judgment fails to state that he will 

receive credit for the time he served in custody before 

sentencing. Def.’s Mot. for Amend. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 49 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document.
2 

at 2-3. Id. 

Mr. Queen understands, based on the oral pronouncement, 

that he is entitled to receive credit for all of the time that 

he served in custody from his initial arrest on February 25, 

2017 until his sentencing hearing on September 25, 2018. Id. at 

3. Mr. Queen contends that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 

is subjecting him to an eighty-four month prison term rather 

than a sixty-month prison term because BOP calculated his 

sentence from the sentencing hearing instead of the initial 

arrest. Id. Mr. Queen urges this Court to amend the written 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Id. 

at 1, 5. 

 The government opposes Mr. Queen’s motion, arguing that 

there is no clerical error in the written judgment. Gov’t’s Mot. 

to Transfer (“Gov’t’s Mot.”), ECF No. 53 at 1. According to the 

government, BOP correctly calculated Mr. Queen’s jail-time 

credit in this case as required by federal law, and BOP 

attributed most of Mr. Queen’s jail-time credit to his parole 

revocation proceedings in the Superior Court of the District of 

Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”). Id. The government moves to 

transfer Mr. Queen’s motion, construed as a habeas corpus 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the district 

where Mr. Queen is presently incarcerated. Id. 
3 

 Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant’s Motion for 

Amendment of the Written Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 36; and (2) United States’ Motion to Transfer 

Defendant’s Rule 36 Motion, Construed as a Habeas Petition Under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the Eastern District of North Carolina. 

Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the 

applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court 

construes Mr. Queen’s motion as a petition for habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and such a petition must be brought in 

the district in which Mr. Queen is presently incarcerated. 

Therefore, the government’s motion is GRANTED. Mr. Queen’s 

motion shall be TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of North Carolina. 

II. Background 

On February 25, 2017, officers from the District of 

Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) arrested 

Mr. Queen after conducting a traffic stop and recovering a 

loaded firearm and drugs from his vehicle. Statement of Offense, 

ECF No. 33 at 2-3. Eleven days later, on March 7, 2017, the 

United States Parole Commission issued a warrant based on 

Mr. Queen’s violation of the conditions of release in his D.C. 

Superior Court case. Warrant, ECF No. 36 at 1-2. On March 22, 

2017, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Queen on five related 

drug and firearm charges in this case. Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 
4 

1-3. 

On May 31, 2018, Mr. Queen pled guilty to being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(“Count One”); and possessing with the intent to distribute 

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841 (b)(1)(D) 

(“Count Four”). Plea Agreement, ECF No. 32 at 1 ¶ 1. Pursuant to 

the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the parties agreed that a 

total sentence of sixty months of imprisonment, to be followed 

by four years of supervised release, was an appropriate 

sentence. Id. at 2 ¶ 4. Later, the parties agreed that three 

years of supervised release was the appropriate period. Gov’t’s 

Mot., ECF No. 53 at 4. To address the parole warrant detainer 

from the D.C. Superior Court case, the Court released Mr. Queen 

to the custody of the United States Marshals Service on June 22, 

2018. Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53 at 3. 

The United States Parole Commission revoked Mr. Queen’s 

parole in the D.C. Superior Court case and imposed a revocation 

sentence of twenty-one months. Id. (citing Gov’t’s Ex. 1, ECF 

No. 53-1 at 11). Mr. Queen completed his parole revocation 

sentence on September 14, 2018, after receiving jail-time credit 

from the date of the issuance of the parole warrant (March 7, 

2017) through June 21, 2018, in addition to good time credit. 

Id. On the same day, BOP erroneously released Mr. Queen from 

federal custody despite the pending charges in this case. Id. On 
5 

September 19, 2018, this Court scheduled a status hearing for 

September 21, 2018, and the Court ordered Mr. Queen to selfsurrender at the status hearing. See Min. Order of Sept. 19, 

2018; see also Def.’s Mot. to Continue Hearing/Defendant 

Released by Error, ECF No. 40 at 1. Mr. Queen complied with the 

Court’s Order. Min. Entry of Sept. 21, 2018. 

On September 25, 2018, the Court sentenced Mr. Queen. At 

sentencing, the Court accepted the parties’ proposed sentence 

under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Sentencing Hr’g Tr. (Sept. 25, 2018), 

ECF No. 52 at 14. Before the oral pronouncement of the sentence, 

the Court asked the government for its position on whether the 

Court should run the sentence concurrently with or consecutively 

to any other sentence. Id. at 6. “[W]ith respect to the parole 

sentence,” the government stated that it did not take the 

position that the sixty-month prison term should be consecutive 

to the parole sentence. Id. Neither party, however, informed the 

Court that Mr. Queen had already completed his parole revocation 

sentence on September 14, 2018. See id. at 6-12. The Court 

decided that the sentence in the instant case would run 

concurrently with Mr. Queen’s parole revocation sentence. Id. at 

12. 

The Court sentenced Mr. Queen to a sixty-month concurrent 

term of imprisonment as to Counts One and Four. Id. at 18. The 

Court imposed a three-year concurrent term of supervised 
6 

release. Id. The Court ordered the prison term to run 

concurrently with the parole revocation sentence. Id. 

Following the oral pronouncement, the Court informed 

Mr. Queen that he would receive credit for the time that he had 

served in custody. Id. at 14. The Court engaged in a discussion 

with the United States Probation Officer regarding the estimated 

jail-time credit: 

THE COURT: But I’m going to run the sentence

-- I’m going to accept the sentence. It’s 60 

months. You’ll get credit for the time served. 

I’m not sure how much time remains. I don’t 

know, maybe -- I don’t know. I hate to guess 

because I’m always wrong, but it’s about three 

years or so. Ms. Kraemer-Soares, I don’t know.

THE PROBATION OFFICER: That sounds about 

right. 

THE COURT: That’s about right. It could be 

less than, I just don’t know because you’re 

getting credit for -- you’ve been incarcerated 

for 19 months, right, so 15 percent every year 

will be reduced, so it’s going to be reduced, 

so it’s somewhere around 36 months or so. I 

don’t know. You have a better calculation. And 

that’s with credit, so it’s not quite 36 

months. Do you understand that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

Id. at 14-15. 

The Court reiterated the sentence to Mr. Queen: “I’ll run 

the sentences -- It’s Count 1 and Count 4, so I’ll run the 

sentence of 60 months concurrent, impose a period of supervision 

of three years on each count concurrent, and that’s concurrent 
7 

with the parole sentence that you are serving, all right.” Id. 

at 18. 

Consistent with the oral pronouncement, the Court entered 

the written judgment on October 4, 2018. J., ECF No. 47 at 1-8. 

The written judgment states that Mr. Queen shall serve a sixtymonth concurrent term of imprisonment as to Counts One and Four. 

Id. at 3. And the sixty-month concurrent term of imprisonment 

would run concurrently with the term of imprisonment imposed by 

the United States Parole Commission. Id. Mr. Queen did not 

appeal the sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). See generally

Docket for Crim. Action No. 17-58. 

Less than a year after the entry of the written judgment, 

the Clerk of Court filed Mr. Queen’s pro se Rule 36 motion on 

July 28, 2019. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 49 at 1. On September 3, 

2019, the government filed its motion to transfer Mr. Queen’s 

Rule 36 motion, construed as a Section 2241 petition, to the 

Eastern District of North Carolina. See Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53 

at 1. Mr. Queen filed his response, styled as “Defendant’s Reply 

to the Government’s Motion for Order to Transfer His Rule 36 

Motion, Construed as a Habeas Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 

to the Eastern District of North Carolina.” See Def.’s Resp., 

ECF No. 55 at 1. The government then filed its reply brief. See 

Gov’t’s Reply, ECF No. 57 at 1. On April 21, 2020, Mr. Queen 
8 

submitted a letter to the Court. See Def.’s Letter, ECF No. 58 

at 1. The motions are ripe for the Court’s adjudication. 

III. Analysis 

Under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

“the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a 

judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an 

error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 36 (emphasis added). Mr. Queen seeks an amendment to 

the written judgment to: (1) reflect “the Court’s intent to 

credit the nineteen (19) months he had already served prior to 

his sentencing”; and (2) “conform the sentence [to] the Court’s 

intentions pronounced orally on September 25, 2018.” Def.’s 

Mot., ECF No. 49 at 7. In Mr. Queen’s view, the written judgment 

should include an explicit statement that he will receive credit 

for time served. See id. at 3; see also Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 55 

at 7-8. Mr. Queen, however, is not entitled to relief under Rule 

36. 

Having carefully reviewed the transcript from the 

sentencing hearing, the Court cannot find that the written 

judgment contains a clerical error within the meaning of Rule 

36. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 52 at 14-15; see also J., 

ECF No. 47 at 3. During the sentencing hearing, the Court did 

not state that an express term of the sentence would include 

credit for the time that Mr. Queen had already served in 
9 

custody. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 52 at 14-15. Although 

the Court stated that Mr. Queen would receive “credit for the 

time served,” the Court made clear that its prediction could be 

“wrong” with respect to the specific amount of Mr. Queen’s jailtime credit. Id. at 14 (“I’m not sure”; “I hate to guess”; “I 

don’t know”; “I just don’t know”). The Court’s statement—that 

Mr. Queen would receive credit for the time served in custody—is 

consistent with the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). 

By its terms, Mr. Queen “shall be given credit toward the 

service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in 

official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . 

. that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3585(b). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]fter a 

district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney 

General, through the BOP, has the responsibility for 

administering the sentence,” which includes calculating jailtime credit. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). 

“Because the offender has a right to certain jail-time credit 

under § 3585(b), and because the district court cannot determine 

the amount of the credit at sentencing, the Attorney General has 

no choice but to make the determination as an administrative 

matter when imprisoning the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2011) is 

illustrative. There, a sentencing judge stated during the 
10 

sentencing hearing that “the time [the defendant] served to date 

will be credited to this conviction.” Blood, 648 F.3d at 206. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third 

Circuit”) held that the sentencing judge’s statement, “when read 

in context, merely reflect[ed] the [sentencing judge’s] 

prediction that the BOP would credit the disputed time toward 

the [state] sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).” Id. The Third 

Circuit explained that “district courts have no authority to 

credit time toward a sentence under § 3585(b)—that function 

rests in the sole authority of the BOP.” Id.2 

2 Mr. Queen’s argument—that the Court has the authority to award 

him credit for time served under Section 5G1.3 of the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines—is unavailing. See Def.’s Resp., 

ECF No. 55 at 3-10. Section 5G1.3 did not apply to Mr. Queen’s 

sentence because he was not subjected to an “undischarged” term 

of imprisonment or an “anticipated” state term of imprisonment. 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. In fact, Mr. Queen’s parole revocation 

sentence was discharged as of September 14, 2018. Gov’t’s Reply, 

ECF No. 57 at 4. Mr. Queen’s reliance on the Third Circuit’s 

decision in Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002) is 

misplaced. In that case, the Third Circuit held that a federal 

district court had authority under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) to adjust 

a sentence for time served on a state conviction. Ruggiano, 307 

F.3d at 131. As the government correctly notes, the “holding [in 

Ruggiano] has been superseded by more recent amendments to the 

Sentencing Guidelines, which the Third Circuit expressly 

acknowledged in Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 

2011).” Gov’t’s Reply, ECF No. 57 at 5 n.1. Finally, the Court 

rejects Mr. Queen’s contention that this Court “intended to 

exercise [its] authority to adjust [his] sentence to account for 

all the 19 months of time he had served prior to his sentencing 

including the time served on his parole sentence.” Def.’s Resp., 

ECF No. 55 at 6. The Court expressly accepted the agreed-upon 

sentence in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and imposed 

sixty months of imprisonment without any adjustments. See

Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 52 at 14, 18. 
11 

Here, the government argues—and the Court agrees—that a 

district court lacks the authority to “assess its own 

calculation of credit for time served in a particular case” 

because “‘that authority rests exclusively with the BOP.’” 

Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53 at 6 (quoting United States v. Ross, 

219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000)). That being said, the 

government contends that the Court should construe Mr. Queen’s 

motion as a challenge to: (1) BOP’s calculation of his jail-time 

credit attributable to this case; and (2) BOP’s computation of 

his release date. Id. at 7. Mr. Queen asserts that he “is NOT 

challenging how the BOP calculated his sentence.” Def.’s Resp., 

ECF No. 55 at 9. 

Nonetheless, the Court is not bound by the label that 

Mr. Queen attaches to his pro se Rule 36 motion. See Castro v. 

United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–82 (2003). The Court may 

recharacterize Mr. Queen’s motion to, among other things, 

“create a better correspondence between the substance of [his] 

pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis.” Id. The 

Court liberally construes Mr. Queen’s motion and filings given 

his status as a pro se prisoner. See Davis v. U.S. Sentencing 

Comm’n, 716 F.3d 660, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In doing so, it is 

clear that Mr. Queen disagrees with the BOP’s calculation of his 

jail-time credit attributable to the sixty-month term of 

imprisonment in this case. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 49 at 1-7. 
12 

The crux of Mr. Queen’s motion challenges BOP’s calculation 

of the length of his confinement. See id. Based on his own 

calculations, Mr. Queen claims that his projected release date 

should be May 31, 2021 with good time credit and the nineteen 

months that he served in custody prior to sentencing in this 

case. See id. at 3. But the government explains that “[t]he 

discrepancy between the BOP’s calculation and the proposed 

release date in [Mr. Queen’s] motion is because [he] seeks to 

attribute all of the time he spent in custody from his arrest 

(February 25, 2017) until his sentencing hearing (September 25, 

2018) as jail credit in this case.” Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53 at 

7. 

The government confirms that “BOP did calculate 

[Mr. Queen’s] jail credit in this case, as it does for every 

inmate pursuant to federal law.” Id. at 6. According to BOP’s 

calculation, Mr. Queen “had only 20 days of jail credit 

attributable to this case: 10 days for the period from [his] 

arrest (February 25, 2017), until the parole warrant was issued 

for [his] [D.C.] Superior Court case (March 7, 2017), plus 10 

days for the period after [his] completion of his parole 

revocation sentence (September 15, 2018), until the day before 

[he] was sentenced in this case (September 24, 2018).” Id. at 7. 

The government asserts that BOP attributed most of Mr. Queen’s 

jail-time credit to his parole revocation proceedings in the 
13 

D.C. Superior Court case. Id. (stating that “[a] BOP 

representative informed government counsel . . . that the BOP 

believes it properly attributed most of that time to defendant’s 

parole revocation proceedings in his [D.C.] Superior Court 

case”). And the government correctly notes that “federal law 

prohibits [Mr. Queen] from receiving dual credit.” Id. 

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper vehicle for challenges to the 

execution of a defendant’s sentence, the administration of his 

sentence, or the length of his confinement. See Wilkinson v. 

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (explaining that challenges to 

the fact or duration of confinement lie at the core of habeas 

corpus). The government contends—and the Court agrees—that 

“[Mr. Queen’s] motion should be construed as a challenge to the 

BOP’s calculation of his jail credit attributable to this case, 

and to the BOP’s determination of his release date.” Gov’t’s 

Mot., ECF No. 53 at 7. 

“A federal court can only issue a writ of habeas corpus if 

(1) the petitioner is physically confined within the court’s 

territorial jurisdiction, and (2) the court has personal 

jurisdiction over the petitioner’s immediate custodian.” Jeong 

Seon Han v. Lynch, 223 F. Supp. 3d 95, 109 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing 

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 444, 447 (2004)). “This means 

that, as a general matter, courts may grant habeas relief only 
14 

‘within their respective jurisdictions.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241(a)); see also Stokes v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 374 F.3d 1235, 

1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]n habeas cases involving present 

physical confinement, jurisdiction lies only in one district: 

the district of confinement.” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Here, Mr. Queen is serving his sentence at the Rivers 

Correctional Institution in Winton, North Carolina, and the 

warden is his immediate custodian. This Court does not have 

personal jurisdiction over the warden because the warden is 

located in the Eastern District of North Carolina. See Padilla, 

542 U.S. at 447 (“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to 

challenge his present physical custody within the United States, 

he should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in 

the district of confinement.”). Where, as here, the Court lacks 

jurisdiction over a Section 2241 motion, the Court “has the 

authority to dismiss the action or transfer it [to the 

appropriate district] in the interest of justice.” Stern v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 601 F. Supp. 2d 303, 306 (D.D.C. 2009). 

Having construed Mr. Queen’s motion as a habeas petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court will exercise its authority, in the 

interest of justice, to transfer Mr. Queen’s motion to the 

appropriate forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
15 

IV. Conclusion and Order 

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Queen is not entitled 

to relief under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. Mr. Queen’s Rule 36 motion, construed as a habeas 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, shall be transferred to the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of North 

Carolina, the district in which Mr. Queen is incarcerated. 

Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the United States’ Motion to Transfer 

Defendant’s Rule 36 Motion, Construed as a Habeas Petition Under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the Eastern District of North Carolina, ECF 

No. 53, is GRANTED; it is further 

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Amendment of the 

Written Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

36, ECF No. 49, is TRANSFERRED to the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina; it is further 

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate Mr. Queen’s 

motion, ECF No. 49, and mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion 

and Order to Mr. Queen’s address of record. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 May 27, 2020