SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0706-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

DONG B. LIN, a/k/a DONG 

BIAO LIN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Submitted on January 31, 2024 – Decided February 16, 2024 

Before Judges Susswein and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 10-10-

1964.

Dong B. Lin, appellant pro se. 

 

Raymond Scott Santiago, Monmouth County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Daniel Ian

Bornstein, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0706-22

 Defendant Dong B. Lin appeals from an August 17, 2022 order dismissing 

a second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) contending his appellate and 

first PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Judge Richard W. English 

found defendant's second PCR petition to be procedurally time-barred. Based 

upon our review of the record and well-settled legal principles governing 

limitations on filing PCR petitions, we affirm. 

 The salient facts and procedural history were previously detailed in our 

decision on defendant's first PCR petition, State v. Lin, No. A-0929-20 (App 

Div. Dec. 28, 2021) (Lin II). We briefly set forth the facts material to our 

determination of defendant's second PCR appeal. 

 On June 16, 2010, defendant and co-defendant, Zeng Liang Chen, broke 

into the home of a former employer in Freehold armed with a knife and brass 

knuckles. Upon entering the home, they tied up the male victim with telephone 

wire. Defendant proceeded to search the home for valuables and subsequently 

found a female victim upstairs in bed. Defendant then stabbed the female victim 

repeatedly through her bedding. Upon hearing the male victim yelling 

downstairs, defendant returned and stabbed him until his knife broke. Defendant 

then found another knife in the home and used it to continue the attack. Both 
3 A-0706-22

victims died from multiple stab wounds. Approximately an hour later, police 

arrested defendant and co-defendant walking nearby.

 On January 8, 2014, defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree 

murder, N.J.S.A. 20:11-3(a)(2) (counts two and three), and two counts of firstdegree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (counts four and five). On May 

5, 2015, Judge Anthony J. Mellaci, Jr., imposed the recommended sentence 

negotiated by the parties: life imprisonment with an eighty-five percent parole 

bar and five years of parole supervision upon release from incarceration on count 

two pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a 

concurrent sentence of thirty years with no parole and five years of parole 

supervision upon release from incarceration on count three. Defendant appealed 

and we affirmed the entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence on April 

12, 2018 in State v. Lin, No. A-4559-14 (App. Div. Apr. 12, 2018) (Lin I). On 

October 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied defendant's petition 

for certification. State v. Lin, 235 N.J. 456 (2018). 

 On December 4, 2018 defendant filed his first PCR petition, alleging that 

trial counsel was ineffective by misleading him into believing he would get a 

thirty-year sentence without parole if he pled guilty. Defendant also alleged that 

his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. 
4 A-0706-22

 On March 4, 2020, Judge Paul X. Escandon heard oral argument on 

defendant's first PCR petition. On March 9, 2020, Judge Escandon denied that 

petition in a written decision finding defendant failed to present a prima facie 

case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found "defendant engaged 

in colloquy with the [c]ourt indicating that plea counsel explained the 

consequences of the plea, that he fully understood the plea, and that he was 

satisfied with plea counsel's representations." Defendant appealed. 

 On December 28, 2021, we affirmed Judge Escandon's decision and 

concluded that defendant failed to set forth a prima facie case of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Lin II, slip op. at 16-17. In affirming, we determined 

"[t]he court reasonably exercised its discretion to deny defendant an evidentiary 

hearing under Rule 3:22-10 because defendant's ineffective assistance claim was 

resolvable by reference to the plea record." Ibid. Defendant and his counsel, 

with the aid of an interpreter, reviewed the plea together. Id. at 6. Defendant 

confirmed he was pleading guilty "freely and voluntarily." Ibid. On May 3, 

2022, the Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Lin, 250 

N.J. 503 (2022). 

 On July 1, 2022, defendant filed the second PCR petition which is the 

subject of this appeal. On August 17, 2022, Judge English dismissed the second 
5 A-0706-22

PCR petition pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) and (3). Judge English entered an 

order stating that since defendant's first PCR petition was denied by the court 

on March 9, 2020, defendant's second petition was time-barred under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(3), because it was not filed within 90 days of the date of the December 28, 

2021 judgment on direct appeal. Judge English also found that defendant's PCR 

petition was untimely pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which required the second 

PCR petition to be filed within one year of the March 9, 2020 denial of the first 

petition. This appeal followed. 

 Defendant raises the following arguments for our consideration: 

POINT I 

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S SECOND PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AS TIME BARRED AND 

THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 

POINT II 

PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE 

SHOWING SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE 

ORDER OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. State v. 

Preciose, 129 N.J 451 (1992); Rule 3:22-10. 

POINT III 

PETITIONER IS NOT PROCEDURALLY (OR 

OTHERWISE) BARRED FROM RAISING THE 

CLAIMS ADVANCED HEREIN. 
6 A-0706-22

We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris, 

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of 

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). The de novo standard also applies to 

mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 420. Where an evidentiary hearing has 

not been held, we "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id. at 421. 

PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State 

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 

(1992)). It is the vehicle through which a defendant may, after conviction and 

sentencing, challenge a judgment of conviction by raising issues that could not 

have been raised on direct appeal and, therefore, "ensures that a defendant was 

not unjustly convicted." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997). 

To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which our Supreme Court adopted in 

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show . . . . 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Defendant must then show counsel's "deficient 
7 A-0706-22

performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. To show prejudice, defendant must 

establish by "a reasonable probability" that the deficient performance 

"materially contributed to defendant's conviction . . . ." Id. at 58. 

We need not address whether defendant's second PCR petition meets the 

Strickland standard as we affirm Judge English's determination that defendant's 

petition is time-barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) and (3).

The rules governing PCR petitions are set forth in Rule 3:22. Second or 

subsequent PCR petitions must comply with the requirements of Rule 3:22-4(b) 

and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). Rule 3:22-12(a)(3) requires a PCR petition to be filed 

within ninety days of the date judgment is entered on direct appeal. To avoid 

dismissal of a second—or subsequent—PCR petition, the petition must be 

timely filed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). R. 3:22-4(b)(1). Rule 3:22-4(b) contains 

no exceptions to the time-bar for second or subsequent PCR petitions. Rule 

3:22-12(a)(2)(C) specifically provides "no second or subsequent petition shall 

be filed more than one year after . . . the date of the denial of the first . . . 

application for [PCR]" based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Defendant was required to file the second PCR petition before us within 

one year of March 9, 2020, the date his first PCR petition was denied. However, 

he did not file his second PCR petition until July 1, 2022, and, therefore, it is 
8 A-0706-22

time-barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C). The second petition could also be 

deemed untimely under Rule 3:22-12(a)(3), because it was not filed within 

ninety days of the date of the December 28, 2021 judgment on direct appeal. 

Because defendant's second PCR petition was not filed in accordance with 

the time limitations proscribed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) and (3), dismissal was 

mandatory. Therefore, we do not reach the substantive merits of the second 

PCR petition. 

Affirmed.