GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2000 BIOLOGICAL 

WEAPONS

Effort to Reduce 

Former Soviet Threat 

Offers Benefits,

Poses New Risks

GAO/NSIAD-00-138

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-138 Biological Weapons

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of State 38

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 41

Figures Figure 1: Large Aerosol Test Chamber at Russia’s State Research

Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector), 

Koltsovo, Russia 11

Figure 2: Small Aerosol Test Chamber at the State Research Center

for Toxicology and Hygienic Regulation of Biopreparations, 

Serpukhov, Russia 12

Figure 3: Smallpox Repository (building on right) at the Vector 

Research Institute, Koltsovo, Russia 13

Figure 4: U.S. Funds Provided for Science Center Biotechnology 

Projects (U.S. portion only), 1994-99 18

Figure 5: Number of Science Center Biotechnology Projects Funded

(U.S. portion only), 1994-99 19

Figure 6: Energy Department Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 

Funding for Biotechnology Projects, 1994-99 20

Figure 7: Number of Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 

Biotechnology Projects Funded, 1994-99 21

Figure 8: Number of Former Soviet Biological Weapons Staff 

Receiving Science Center Grants, 1994-99 23

Figure 9: Department of Defense’s Dismantlement of the World’s 

Largest Anthrax Production Facility in Stepnorgorsk, 

Kazakhstan 26
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Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-138 Biological Weapons

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282985 Letr

April 28, 2000

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Pat Roberts

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging 

 Threats and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Although it signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,1

 the 

former Soviet Union covertly developed the world’s largest offensive 

biological weapons program, which relied on a network of military and 

nonmilitary scientific institutes, according to a January 2000 Department of 

Defense report to Congress.2

 Many of these nonmilitary institutes were 

overseen by Biopreparat—an ostensibly civilian pharmaceutical enterprise 

that exploited the inherent dual-use nature of biotechnology to mask Soviet 

development of biological weapons using specially engineered strains of 

dangerous pathogens, including anthrax, plague, and smallpox. Russia 

renounced the Soviet program in 1992 and subsequently cut funding for 

Biopreparat institutes; nonetheless, the United States remains concerned 

about the extent of Russia’s compliance with the Convention. Reasons for 

concern include Biopreparat’s retention of its Cold War leadership and 

existing ties to former Soviet nonmilitary biological weapons institutes in 

Russia, although Biopreparat no longer funds them. Although Russia has 

generally allowed the United States access to its nonmilitary institutes that 

receive U.S. nonproliferation assistance, Russia has consistently rebuffed 

1

The Convention’s full title is the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 

Destruction” (26 U.S. Treaty 583, Apr. 10, 1972).

2

Section 1308: Report on Biological Weapons Programs in Russia (Arlington, VA: 

Department of Defense, Jan. 2000). This report is required under the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-261).
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U.S. efforts to inspect its military institutes currently managed by the 

Ministry of Defense. 

Notwithstanding these concerns, in 1994 the United States began funding 

collaborative research projects with former Soviet biological weapons 

scientists3

 because it feared that these scientists might be driven by 

financial pressures to sell their skills to countries of proliferation concern 

or to terrorist groups.4

 The executive branch initially funded this effort at 

modest levels and used it to redirect scientists to peaceful activities; 

however, it is now expanding the program’s size and scope. Because of this 

shift, you asked us to review U.S. efforts to address the threat of biological 

weapons proliferation from the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, we 

examined 

• the potential threats that the former Soviet biological weapons institutes 

could pose to the United States, 

• current and future U.S. efforts to address these threats, and

• risks associated with the expanded U.S. effort and executive branch 

plans to mitigate them.

Key sources of information for this report include policy and program 

officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, as well as 

other U.S. government agencies and nongovernmental organizations. We 

also obtained information about the former Soviet biological weapons 

program from the former Deputy Chief of Biopreparat (1988-92), who now 

lives in Virginia. In December 1999, we visited six former Soviet 

nonmilitary biological weapons institutes in Russia that receive U.S. 

assistance. We also visited and met with officials from the International 

Science and Technology Center in Moscow. We developed this report based 

on unclassified sources and information; however, we also obtained 

classified information from the Departments of State and Defense.

3

Early engagement efforts were funded through the International Science and Technology 

Center using Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction funds. Funding 

responsibility for the Science Center was transferred to the Department of State in 1996.

4

We defined terrorists as non-state actors that are not provided with a state-developed 

weapon. Terrorists could be of foreign or domestic origin and would be operating illegally 

and outside a state-run laboratory infrastructure or weapons program.
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Results in Brief The former Soviet Union’s biological weapons institutes continue to 

threaten U.S. national security because they have key assets that are both 

dangerous and vulnerable to misuse, according to State and Defense 

Department officials. These assets include as many as 15,000 underpaid 

scientists and researchers, specialized facilities and equipment (albeit 

often in a deteriorated condition), and large collections of dangerous 

biological pathogens. These assets could harm the United States if hostile 

countries or groups were to hire the institutes or biological weapons 

scientists to conduct weapons-related work. Also of concern is the 

potential sale of dangerous pathogens to terrorist groups or countries of 

proliferation concern. State and Defense officials told us that since 1997, 

Iran and other countries have intensified their efforts to acquire biological 

weapons expertise and materials from former Soviet biological weapons 

institutes. In addition, deteriorated physical safety and security conditions 

could leave dangerous pathogens vulnerable to theft or distribution into the 

local environment. Finally, much of the former Soviet biological weapons 

program’s infrastructure, such as buildings and equipment, still exists 

primarily in Russia. While most of these components have legitimate 

biotechnological applications, they also harbor the potential for renewed 

production of offensive biological agents. 

The U.S. strategy for addressing these proliferation threats at the source 

has been to fund collaborative research activities with the institutes to 

(1) reduce their incentives to work with hostile states and groups and 

(2) increase their openness to the West. While the executive branch initially 

implemented this strategy with a modest level of funding, it is now seeking 

a tenfold increase in funding in response to intensified proliferation 

attempts by Iran and other countries of proliferation concern. The 

increased funding will support an expanded array of collaborative 

activities, including biodefense research5

 against biological agents, 

security upgrades to select facilities, and dismantlement of unneeded 

facilities. 

• For fiscal years 1994 through 1999, the United States allocated about 

$20 million, primarily from the Departments of State, Defense, and 

Energy, to fund collaborative research projects to help redirect former 

biological weapons scientists to peaceful research activities. Key 

5

Biodefense research focuses on civilian and military protection against the use of biological 

agents, including developing medical countermeasures, vaccines, and diagnostic systems.
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program benefits during this period included providing grants to fund 

more than 2,200 former Soviet biological weapons personnel—including 

more than 745 senior biological weapons scientists—and gaining some 

access to more than 30 of about 50 nonmilitary institutes. State and 

Defense officials told us that the U.S. programs have denied 

proliferators such as Iran access to biological weapons expertise and 

scientists at over 15 former Soviet biological weapons institutes.

• For fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the executive branch plans to spend 

about $220 million to expand its efforts to engage former Soviet 

biological weapons institutes. About half of these funds will be used to 

continue efforts to redirect scientists toward peaceful civilian research. 

• In an emerging area of emphasis, Defense and State plan to spend about 

$36 million to fund collaborative research with Russian institutes on 

dangerous pathogens. This research is intended to improve the U.S. 

defenses against biological weapons threats. The Department of 

Defense also plans to spend (1) $40 million to upgrade security and 

safety systems at select facilities in Russia and (2) $39 million to 

consolidate and dismantle biological weapons facilities in Russia as it 

has done in Kazakhstan—if Russia agrees. 

We found that expanding the program will pose certain risks to the United 

States. The key risks include sustaining Russia’s existing biological 

weapons infrastructure, maintaining or advancing Russian scientists’ skills 

to develop offensive biological weapons, and the potential misuse of U.S. 

assistance to fund offensive research. Although seeking to add 

international transparency and compliance provisions to the Biological and 

Toxin Weapons Convention, the United States relies on safeguards 

implemented at the institute and project levels to mitigate risk. Such 

safeguards include (1) securing assurances from the institutes that they 

will abstain from offensive research or proliferation activities, 

(2) performing interagency reviews of all proposed projects, and 

(3) implementing a set of financial and programmatic oversight 

mechanisms for all projects. To mitigate risks associated with research on 

dangerous pathogens, the United States plans to use U.S. experts residing 

in Russia and—if Russia permits—at the institutes to monitor the projects. 

None of these measures, however, would prevent Russian project 

participants or institutes from potentially using their skills or research 

outputs to later work on offensive weapons activities at any of the Russian 

military institutes that remain closed to the United States. 
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Background Biological weapons are viral or bacterial pathogens, or toxins that have 

been developed to cause disease in humans, animals, or plants or lead to 

the destruction of materials. They are considered to be weapons of mass 

destruction, as are nuclear, chemical, and radiological weapons.

The United States halted its biological weapons program in 1969. In 1972, 

the United States, the Soviet Union, and a number of other states signed the 

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which prohibits the stockpiling 

and production of microbial and other agents for offensive purposes. 

Unlike other arms control treaties, the Biological and Toxin Weapons 

Convention contains no verification provisions to assess compliance. The 

Convention also permits research on biological agents for peaceful 

purposes, which may include the development of new vaccines and other 

medical countermeasures to infectious agents. This type of research is 

difficult to distinguish from offensive research because of the inherent 

dual-use nature of biotechnology. For example, equipment that can be used 

to produce vaccines can also be used to produce biological weapons. 

Research that supports medical responses to infection can also be applied 

toward offensive weapons development. 

Following its ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 

in 1972, the Soviet Union established Biopreparat as a civilian 

pharmaceutical and biotechnology enterprise, which also served as the 

civilian focal point of the Soviet biological weapons program. According to 

the former Deputy Chief of Biopreparat, by the late 1980s, the Soviet 

biological weapons complex included about 50 institutes and employed 

60,000 personnel. Capitalizing on post-1972 advances in biotechnology such 

as genetic engineering, the Soviet Union program researched and produced 

a range of weapons employing smallpox, anthrax, plague, and other 

dangerous pathogens. In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin 

acknowledged the existence of the Soviet Union’s offensive biological 

weapons program and pledged that Russia would comply with the terms of 

the Convention. 

The current U.S. strategy to combat the proliferation of biological or other 

weapons of mass destruction focuses on preventing the supply or 

acquisition of such weapons, adapting U.S. military forces and emergency 

assets to respond to their use, reducing existing foreign capabilities, and 

deterring the use of such weapons. Increasing concerns regarding the 

potential use of biological weapons by countries of proliferation concern or 

terrorist groups led the United States to allocate about $1.4 billion in fiscal 
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year 1999 for governmentwide biological defense programs, including 

civilian and military force protection, bioterrorism countermeasures, and 

emergency preparedness. 

The United States is currently funding two key programs designed to 

prevent the proliferation of former Soviet scientists who have expertise in 

developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and 

biological weapons.

• Since 1994, the United States has provided assistance to former Soviet 

weapons of mass destruction scientists and engineers through the 

International Science and Technology Center in Moscow. The Science 

Center was established by the United States, the European Union, 

Russia, and Japan in November 1992 to provide peaceful research 

opportunities to former Soviet weapons scientists and redirect their 

skills away from producing weapons of mass destruction. The Science 

Center provides most of its assistance in the form of tax-free grants that 

are deposited directly into the individual accounts of participating 

scientists and engineers. The Science Center maintains a staff of over 

100 to provide management and financial oversight. U.S.-funded 

projects are also subject to audits by the U.S. Defense Contract Audit 

Agency.6

The Department of State serves as the U.S. coordinator to the Science 

Center. State has used FREEDOM Support Act7

 and the Department of 

Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to fund core 

collaborative research projects. Since 1997, the National Academy of 

Sciences, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Departments of Agriculture 

and Health and Human Services signed partnership agreements with 

the Science Center that allow them to fund their own biotechnology 

projects through the Center. 

6

Through 1999, the Defense Contract Audit Agency had issued audit reports for 

10 biotechnology projects. 

7

The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support 

Act of 1992, or the FREEDOM Support Act (P.L. 102-511), provides for economic and 

nonproliferation assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union.
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• The Department of Energy launched the Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention program in 1994 to engage former Soviet nuclear, chemical, 

and biological weapons scientists in research that is oriented toward 

commercial activities. The program relies on U.S. national laboratories 

to take the lead in working with former Soviet weapons institutes. The 

program funds its research projects through firm fixed-price contracts 

with the institutes and pays the institutes for specified deliverables. Our 

1999 review of the program raised numerous concerns, including the 

extent to which program funds went to U.S. national laboratories versus 

former Soviet institutes, and the extent to which some of its projects 

involved dual-use research.8

Former Soviet 

Biological Weapons 

Assets Continue to 

Pose Threats

Former Soviet biological weapons institutes continue to pose serious 

threats to U.S. national security, particularly in light of Russia’s continued 

economic distress. Primarily located in Russia, these institutes possess 

significant assets in terms of human capital, physical infrastructure, and 

dangerous pathogen collections. These assets could pose a potential threat 

through (1) proliferation of biological weapons expertise to countries or 

terrorist groups seeking such weapons; (2) proliferators seeking to engage 

these institutes in weapons research; (3) theft, sale, transfer or industrial 

accidents involving dangerous pathogens; and (4) Russia’s use of these 

assets to reconstitute an offensive biological weapons program.

Former Soviet Biological 

Weapons Institutes Still 

Possess Dangerous Assets

About 50 former Soviet biological weapons institutes continue to exist 

today—most of which are in Russia. Defense Department officials told us 

that the Russian Ministry of Defense still manages at least four former 

Soviet military biological weapons institutes to which Russia has 

consistently refused to grant the United States access. A senior Science 

Center official noted that the Russian government has not restricted the 

Center’s access to former Soviet nonmilitary biological weapons institutes 

that receive U.S. assistance. While the Science Center has funded projects 

and gained access to more than 30 such institutes, the official noted that at 

least 15 other nonmilitary institutes have not received Center funding.

8

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by 

Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists (GAO/RCED-99-54, Feb. 19, 1999).
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The Science Center official also estimated that there may be as many as 

5,000 senior former Soviet biological weapons scientists who could pose 

significant proliferation risks and another 10,000 personnel who have 

weapons-relevant skills. At the six institutes that we visited in December 

1999, institute officials said their institutes had lost as much as one-half of 

their former workforce but noted that they had released administrative and 

technical support staff in efforts to retain their senior scientists. The senior 

Science Center official also said these highly trained senior scientists, 

many with doctorates or other advanced degrees, represent the intellectual 

core of the world’s largest and most sophisticated biological weapons 

program. 

During our visit to the six institutes, we observed that many of these 

institutes have retained physical assets that could be applied to biological 

weapons research. Officials at two of the Russian institutes—the State 

Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State 

Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk)—said they continue 

to conduct research on live pathogens for legitimate purposes. Research on 

dangerous live pathogens, whether for legitimate or illicit purposes, 

requires advanced biosafety containment laboratories, which these 

institutes maintained. 

• At the Russian State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology 

(Vector), we observed one of the institute’s two large aerosol test 

chambers, which institute officials said are the largest in Russia or 

Europe (see fig. 1). Aerosol test chambers are used to test and refine the 

aerosolization of biological agents—a critical aspect of biological 

weapons delivery. Defense Department officials told us that neither 

chamber had been used in years. 
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Figure 1: Large Aerosol Test Chamber at Russia’s State Research Center for 

Virology and Biotechnology (Vector), Koltsovo, Russia

Source: GAO. 

• At Russia’s State Research Center for Toxicology and Hygienic 

Regulation of Biopreparations, we observed 10 advanced aerosol test 

chambers in which researchers currently conduct toxicology studies for 

chemical and biotechnology research (see fig. 2). 
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Figure 2: Small Aerosol Test Chamber at the State Research Center for Toxicology 

and Hygienic Regulation of Biopreparations, Serpukhov, Russia

Source: GAO.

• At the Puschino branch of the Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute, we 

toured a large animal breeding and testing facility. U.S. and institute 

officials told us the facility—constructed by the Soviet Ministry of 

Defense for $18 million in 1989—is the most modern facility among the 

former Soviet biological weapons institutes. A U.S. scientist 

accompanying us during our tour stated these state-of-the-art animal 

facilities would be an asset to Russia’s biotechnology field. Institute 

officials noted that in 1999, the United States provided about $500,000 to 

upgrade a small rodent breeding facility. This upgrade will allow the 

facility to conduct internationally certified clinical testing and to breed 

animals for use in other biotechnical research and development projects 

throughout Russia.9

Several former Soviet biological weapons institutes continue to maintain 

vast collections of dangerous pathogens that could be used for legitimate 

public health research or for an offensive biological weapons program.

9

All U.S. government funded projects must meet U.S. scientific and safety regulatory 

requirements.
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• Vector is one of the world’s two authorized smallpox repositories (see 

fig. 3).10 In addition to smallpox, the Department of Defense has 

reported that Vector continues to maintain a culture collection that 

includes over 15,000 viral strains, including the highly lethal Marburg 

and Ebola viruses.

Figure 3: Smallpox Repository (building on right) at the Vector Research Institute, 

Koltsovo, Russia

Source: GAO.

• According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development, the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology 

(Obolensk) contains a 2,000 microorganism collection that includes 

genetically engineered strains of anthrax and other dangerous 

pathogens. 

• A December 1999 Russian journal article identified the Russian Ministry 

of Defense’s Microbiology Scientific Research Institute at Sergiyev 

Posad as maintaining a national collection of dangerous pathogens, 

including Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses.11

10The World Health Organization has authorized Vector and the U.S. Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, as the two official smallpox repositories.

11Fedor Smirnov, “Taming Viruses: Center for Special Diagnosis and Treatment of 

Ultradangerous and Exotic Infectious Diseases Created” (Moscow, Russia: Moscow 

Meditsinskaya Gazeta, Dec. 29, 1999). 
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• According to a recent Henry L. Stimson Center report,12 several 

agricultural and anti-plague institutes in Russia and Kazakhstan 

maintain dangerous pathogen collections for their research.

Assets Are Vulnerable to 

Misuse

These threat assets could be misused if third parties obtained access either 

to the scientists, the institutes, or the pathogens themselves. The assets 

could also be subject to unauthorized access or used to sustain or renew an 

offensive biological weapons program.

Proliferation of Weapons 

Expertise

State, Defense, and Energy Department officials said the dire financial 

conditions at former Soviet biological weapons institutes could encourage 

the proliferation of weapons expertise to countries or groups of concern. 

This proliferation could occur either if former Soviet biological weapons 

scientists emigrate to countries of proliferation concern in search of higher 

pay or if such countries or terrorist groups engage impoverished institutes 

in research that would augment their biological weapons programs. State 

and Defense officials told us that since 1997 Iran and other countries of 

proliferation concern have intensified their efforts to acquire biological 

weapons expertise and materials from at least 15 former Soviet biological 

weapons institutes. An unclassified Central Intelligence Agency report 

notes that these countries and terrorist groups could make dramatic leaps 

forward in their biological weapons programs by importing talent from 

Russia.13 Another unclassified Central Intelligence Agency report notes that 

Russia is a significant source of biotechnology expertise for Iran and that 

Russia’s world-leading biological weapons program makes it an attractive 

target for Iranians seeking technical information and training on biological 

weapons production processes.14

12Amy Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet 

Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 

Dec. 1999).

13Statement of Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Nonproliferation 

John A. Lauder on the Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat to the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence as Prepared for Delivery on March 3, 1999 (Langley, VA: Central 

Intelligence Agency, Mar. 3, 1999).

14Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1 to June 30, 1999

(Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, Feb. 2, 2000).
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Five of the six institute directors told us of significant reductions of funding 

since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Officials at Russia’s State 

Research Center for Applied Microbiology told us that their operating 

budget dropped from about $25 million in 1991 to about $2.5 million in 

1999. Institute officials said the actual purchasing power of the scientists’ 

salaries had decreased by more than 75 percent during this time. Numerous 

senior scientists told us their current salaries ranged from $40 to $80 a 

month. 

Institute officials at the six institutes we visited said most of the scientific 

staff that had left their institutes had gone to the United States or Europe. 

Although none of the institute officials reported knowledge of scientists 

moving to countries of proliferation concern, the former Deputy Chief of 

Biopreparat and various media reports identify instances in which 

scientists have moved to such countries. Officials at three institutes we 

visited reported that, in the past, representatives of countries of 

proliferation concern had approached them seeking to initiate questionable 

dual-use research. Officials at the three institutes told us they had refused 

these offers because of a pledge made to U.S. executive branch officials as 

a condition of receiving U.S. assistance. The pledge includes avoiding 

cooperation both with countries of proliferation concern or with terrorist 

groups. 

Theft, Sale, Transfer or 

Accidental Release of Dangerous 

Pathogens 

Officials from the Departments of State and Defense said they are 

concerned that dangerous pathogen stocks could be stolen and used for 

illicit purposes or that an industrial accident could occur. These officials 

cited a recent nongovernmental report that identified several instances of 

theft or diversion of dangerous pathogens, including smallpox, plague, and 

anthrax, from institutes in Russia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.15 The Defense 

Department notes that providing physical security is difficult because of 

the small size of pathogen vials. Also, pathogens cannot be detected using 

X-ray machines. For example, a seed culture of dried anthrax spores could 

be carried in a sealed plastic vial the size of a thumbnail, making detection 

almost impossible. Also of concern is the potential sale of dangerous 

pathogens to terrorist groups or countries of proliferation concern. 

Although some institutes had impressive equipment and modern facilities, 

we also observed that much of the infrastructure was severely deteriorated 

15Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, “Preventing the Proliferation of Chemical and 

Biological Weapons Materials and Know-How”, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 

(Spring 2000).
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or often unused. Deteriorated conditions may be compounded by potential 

human error such as the case of the 1979 accidental release of anthrax from 

a Soviet military facility in Sverdlovsk, Russia (now Yekaterinburg), which 

resulted in the deaths of at least 66 people. 

Potential for Sustaining or 

Renewing an Offensive Program

Russia could potentially sustain or renew an offensive biological weapons 

program by using the former Soviet program’s existing human and physical 

assets, according to State and Defense Department officials. Such assets 

include the institutes, which supported a covert national offensive 

biological weapons program that continued in spite of the Biological and 

Toxin Weapons Convention. The Department of Defense has reported16 that 

the United States remains concerned about Russia’s biological weapons 

capabilities and its compliance with the Convention. State and Defense 

officials told us in March 2000 that they remain concerned that offensive 

research may continue to take place at the Russian Ministry of Defense 

facilities to which the United States has no access. Another issue of 

concern is that the leadership of the former Soviet biological weapons 

program remains largely in place. In a January 2000 report,17 the Defense 

Department stated that the same generals who directed the Soviet 

biological weapons program continue to lead the greatly reduced Russian 

military defensive biological weapons program, while the same Soviet-era 

general continues to direct Biopreparat.

U.S. Effort to Address 

Former Soviet 

Biological Weapons 

Threat Is Expanding in 

Size and Scope

To address the continued threat posed by former Soviet biological weapons 

assets, the executive branch is expanding its cooperative engagement 

efforts with the former Soviet biological weapons institutes. Initial efforts 

were designed to address the U.S. strategic objectives of reducing 

proliferation by discouraging institutes and their scientists from 

cooperating with countries of proliferation concern or terrorist groups 

while increasing their openness to the United States and the international 

community. Through 1999, the United States had provided more than 

$20 million to fund civilian collaborative research project grants to more 

than 2,200 personnel from former Soviet biological weapons institutes. As a 

result of these activities, the United States obtained some degree of access 

to more than 30 former Soviet biological weapons institutes. State and 

Defense officials told us that the U.S. programs have denied proliferation 

16Section 1308: Report on Biological Weapons Programs in Russia.

17Section 1308: Report on Biological Weapons Programs in Russia.
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attempts by Iran and other countries of proliferation concern to more than 

15 former Soviet biological weapons institutes. In addition, the United 

States has provided $4 million to dismantle the world’s largest anthrax 

production and weaponization facility in Stepnorgorsk, Kazakhstan. In 

response to the intensified proliferation attempts by Iran and other 

countries of proliferation concern, the executive branch now plans to 

greatly expand its program to increase the civilian research component and 

broaden the scope to include biodefense research, security enhancements 

at select facilities, and—if Russia agrees—the consolidation and 

dismantlement of select former Soviet biological weapons facilities in 

Russia.

Initial U.S. Program 

Centered on Redirecting 

Biological Weapons 

Scientists 

U.S. program efforts to date have relied primarily on two mechanisms to 

fund nonproliferation activities at former Soviet biological weapons 

institutes—the International Science and Technology Center and the 

Department of Energy’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program.18

From 1994 through 1999, the United States channeled about $8.5 million 

through the International Science and Technology Center to fund 

61 biotechnology projects in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia.19 As shown 

in figures 4 and 5, this assistance and the number of projects funded have 

risen sharply since 1996.

18The U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation for the Independent States of the 

former Soviet Union provided $829,813 to fund 16 biomedical and behavioral sciences 

cooperative scientific research activities in Russia (8), Kazakhstan (4), Ukraine (3), and 

Georgia (1) through 1999.

19From January 1, 2000, through February 1, 2000, the Science Center funded an additional 

eight biotechnology projects totaling about $2.5 million.
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Figure 4: U.S. Funds Provided for Science Center Biotechnology Projects (U.S. 

portion only), 1994-99

Note: Some projects are jointly funded with other Science Center financing members, including the 

European Union, Japan, Norway, and the Republic of Korea.

Source: GAO analysis of International Science and Technology Center data.
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Figure 5: Number of Science Center Biotechnology Projects Funded (U.S. portion 

only), 1994-99

Source: GAO analysis of International Science and Technology Center data.

The research projects have primarily focused on biotechnology research 

and development projects, including research on new vaccines and 

environmental remediation. Since 1998, four executive branch agencies 

have become Science Center partners.20 As partners, the agencies develop 

and manage their own collaborative research activities but rely on the 

Science Center for administrative support, including tax-free direct 

payments to project participants. 

For fiscal years 1994 through 1999, the Department of Energy’s Initiatives 

for Proliferation Prevention has provided $11.7 million to fund 

53 biotechnology projects in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. As shown in 

figures 6 and 7, the assistance and number of projects implemented have 

increased dramatically since 1996. 

20The four executive branch partners participating in biotechnology projects are the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the 

Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services.
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Figure 6: Energy Department Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Funding for 

Biotechnology Projects, 1994-99

Source: Department of Energy.
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Figure 7: Number of Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Biotechnology Projects 

Funded, 1994-99

Source: Department of Energy.

For the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, the assistance 

totals are divided between the institutes, the U.S. national laboratories that 

develop and manage the projects, and to support U.S. industries’ 

participation in the program. In 1999, we reported21 that a considerable 

portion of program funds—63 percent—was used to pay for the costs of the 

U.S. national laboratories (51 percent) and to support U.S. industries’ 

participation in the program (12 percent), while about 37 percent was 

actually provided to the institutes. Program officials stated that the 

program’s use of U.S. national laboratory staff as project managers is 

essential but noted that as of fiscal year 2000, they have implemented a 

congressional restriction22 that limits the laboratories’ portion to 

35 percent of the total program funding. We also reported that while the 

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program’s goal is to redirect former 

biological weapons scientists to nonmilitary activities that have 

21Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by 

Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists.

22National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 3136 (P.L. 106-65).
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commercial potential, no biotechnology projects to date have resulted in 

commercialization. To address this issue and enhance the commercial 

viability of its projects, program officials said that beginning in fiscal 

year 2000 the program no longer uses the traditional basic research 

approach of a national laboratory working with a former Soviet institute. 

Instead, it is emphasizing larger U.S. industry cost-shared projects, 

whereby corporations agree to fund a portion of the research and 

development costs. 

Senior State, Defense, and Energy Department officials told us the Science 

Center and Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention programs have helped to 

discourage scientists from cooperating with countries of proliferation 

concern and terrorist groups, while promoting openness at more than 

30 former Soviet biological weapons institutes. State and Defense 

Department officials identified at least 15 former Soviet biological weapons 

institutes in which the United States has evidence that these programs have 

discouraged the institutes and scientists from cooperating with countries 

of proliferation concern such as Iran. These officials provided classified 

evidence that could not be included in this report. However, as an 

additional measure of performance, they noted that the Science Center 

database indicates that about 1,655 employees associated with the former 

Soviet biological weapons program received Science Center funding in 

1999 (see fig. 8). 
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Figure 8: Number of Former Soviet Biological Weapons Staff Receiving Science 

Center Grants, 1994-99

Source: International Science and Technology Center.

Our analysis of 61 U.S.-funded biotechnology related project plans funded 

by the Science Center through 1999 indicated that about 745 of the project 

participants were former senior weapons scientists,23 while about 910 were 

a combination of less senior scientists with weapons-related skills and 

various support staff. According to Science Center project plans, these 

senior scientists devoted an average of 174 days to Science Center projects. 

Most of the senior scientists we met with told us they spend between

25 and 75 percent of the year on these projects. Institute directors told us 

that the Science Center grants were crucial to their institute budgets and 

that this support helped them retain their core scientific staff. In fiscal 

year 1999, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program began 

tracking the number of scientists and level of expertise employed in its 

program. Program officials from the U.S. national laboratories reported 

that 570 employees, including scientists and support staff, from former 

Soviet biological weapons institutes have received funding from 1994 

through 1999. Most of the employees worked at institutes located in Russia.

23From January 1, 2000, through February 1, 2000, the Science Center funded an additional 

87 senior weapons scientists. 
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Officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy told us that 

through these collaborative research projects, the United States has 

achieved some access to more than 30 former Soviet biological weapons 

institutes in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Armenia. For example, the 

Science Center has funded projects at 29 institutes, including 19 primary 

institutes where projects were developed and managed and 10 institutes 

that provided support. In addition, the Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention program has funded contracts at 15 former Soviet biological 

weapons institutes, including 10 funded by the Science Center. Of 

particular significance is that projects funded by the two programs have 

provided some access to 15 of the 20 former Soviet biological weapons 

institutes in Russia that are considered key by the State Department. 

U.S. project officials said these projects have provided access and 

openness to facilities and scientists that would not have been available 

otherwise. The Department of Defense informed Congress in a January 

2000 report24 that the access gained through the collaborative research 

programs has provided “high confidence” that Biopreparat institutes such 

as Vector and Obolensk are not presently engaged in offensive activities. 

During our visits to six institutes in December 1999, institute officials 

invited us to tour buildings and laboratories associated with U.S.- funded 

projects. We talked with scientists participating in the programs and were 

allowed to take photographs. The institute directors reported regular visits 

from the international community, including congressional delegations, 

U.S. executive branch officials, Science Center and Initiatives for 

Proliferation Prevention program and financial managers, scientific 

collaborators, auditors, and private sector officials. 

Another key benefit of the U.S. assistance effort has been the internal 

dismantlement of the world’s largest anthrax production and 

weaponization facility (see fig. 9) in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, which is on 

target for completion in May 2000. Dismantlement includes removing all 

production equipment and capabilities from the facility. Department of 

Defense officials note that this $4 million project has gone relatively 

smoothly. They attribute its success to a good working relationship with 

the Kazakhstan government and a formal implementing agreement that 

allows for dismantlement activities. Institute officials have recently 

requested additional U.S. assistance of up to $10 million to totally destroy 

the production facility. As of March 2000, Department of State and Defense 

24Section 1308: Report on Biological Weapons Programs in Russia.
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officials said plans are underway to fund this effort and told us that the 

total elimination of this production facility would substantially reduce U.S. 

concerns about a reconstituted biological weapons production capability in 

Kazakhstan.
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Figure 9: Department of Defense’s Dismantlement of the World’s Largest Anthrax Production Facility in Stepnorgorsk, 

Kazakhstan

Source: Department of Defense. 

Building 600 (foreground) Research Facility and Building 231 Anthrax Milling and Drying Facility.

"Butterfly" Airflow Valve Outside a Former Biosafety Containment 

Laboratory.

Discarded "Butterfly" Airflow Valves Removed from Building 231.
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Biological Weapons 

Program Broadens Scope 

and Increases Funding

The initial U.S. program funded a modest effort to redirect former 

biological weapons scientists to peaceful research. In late 1997, in response 

to intensified attempts by Iran and other countries of proliferation concern 

to acquire biological weapons expertise and materials from former Soviet 

institutes, the United States decided to expand its activities and provide a 

substantial increase in funds. The expanded program will be funded 

through the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative.25 For fiscal years 2000 

through 2004, the executive branch plans to spend about $220 million to 

further engage former Soviet biological weapons institutes. Approximately 

half of these funds will be used to continue efforts to redirect scientists 

toward peaceful civilian research, including participation by the 

Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture as new 

Science Center partners. In addition, the executive branch has allocated at 

least $36 million to support research by former Soviet biological weapons 

scientists on improving defenses against biological threat agents, $40 

million to upgrade security and safety of select facilities, and $39 million to 

destroy biological weapons facilities in Russia as it has done in 

Kazakhstan—if Russia agrees. 

State and Defense Department officials have decided to fund collaborative 

research efforts with Russian scientists on dangerous pathogens to help 

improve U.S. military and civilian defenses against biological threat agents. 

Several Defense Department officials and the former Deputy Chief of 

Biopreparat told us that former Soviet biological weapons scientists have 

at least a 20-year lead over the United States in their understanding of 

biological weapons. Defense officials maintain that this knowledge should 

be useful in conducting research on how to protect the United States 

against the use of such pathogens. The Department of Defense will manage 

its collaborative biodefense research projects through the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. In addition, the Department 

of Agriculture also plans to support projects aimed at improving U.S. 

defenses against the use of agricultural biological weapons such as foot 

and mouth disease and wheat rust. 

25The executive branch’s Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, dated April 1999, provides a 

5 -year funding proposal (fiscal years 2000-2004) to reduce international security threats 

associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet 

Union.
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One important bioterrorism research initiative is the World Health 

Organization’s international research program on smallpox. As part of this 

initiative, the Departments of Health and Human Services and Defense will 

provide funds to Russia’s Vector institute to research smallpox, a disease 

supposedly eradicated in 1980. In 1996, the World Health Organization 

decided to destroy all remaining declared smallpox stocks at the two 

official repositories—the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and 

Vector. However, concerns that smallpox may have proliferated to 

countries of proliferation concern or terrorist groups, combined with 

public health issues, prompted the World Health Organization to delay the 

destruction of the official stocks until 2002 and focus on medical treatment 

and prevention. Thus, U.S. officials working with Russian scientists at 

Vector have developed proposals for research aimed at addressing three 

key World Health Organization research priorities. These include 

(1) prompt recognition and diagnosis of the disease, (2) pathogenesis (the 

process by which a pathogen creates a disease in an organism) using 

animals, and (3) development of an antiviral drug for smallpox patients. As 

of March 2000, U.S., Russian, and World Health Organization officials were 

reviewing at least four projects involving smallpox research with requested 

project funding of about $5 million.

To reduce the risk that dangerous pathogens could be stolen or 

accidentally released from former Soviet biological weapons institutes, the 

executive branch plans to spend $40 million over the next 5 years to 

provide safety and security upgrades to select facilities. Funding projects 

through the Science Center, the Department of Defense recently signed 

agreements to secure facilities at two of Russia’s largest repositories of 

dangerous pathogens—Vector and Obolensk. The security enhancement 

program will focus on the protection, control, and accounting of biological 

materials and will be conducted in two phases. Phase I work will include 

upgrading physical security by installing fences, sensors, and electronic 

surveillance systems; upgrading safety conditions inside the labs to ensure 

that future pathogen research is conducted in a safe and reliable manner; 

and training security personnel. Phase II will involve the development of 

biological material protection, control, and accounting verification 

procedures. The estimated cost of the initial security enhancements at 

Vector and Obolensk will be about $1 million to $1.5 million each. 

Additional institutes and facilities in Russia and Kazakhstan are being 

assessed for future upgrades. 

The Department of Defense is presently assessing the possibility of 

providing security upgrades to two repositories of large pathogen 
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collections in Russia: the Institute for Animal Health (Vladimir) and the 

Institute of Phytopathology (Golitsino). In addition, the Defense 

Department has recently awarded contracts for security upgrades at two 

institutes in Kazakhstan: the Institute for Research on Plague Control in 

Almaty and the State Research Institute for Agricultural Science. 

Approximately $4 million has been allocated for the Kazakhstan projects. 

Department officials hope that once the security enhancement projects are 

successfully completed in Russia and Kazakhstan, collections from 

less-protected institutes will be transferred to these facilities for safe and 

controlled storage. 

To reduce the infrastructure of former biological weapons research and 

production facilities, the executive branch plans to spend $39 million for 

consolidation and dismantlement of select facilities. Using the Stepnogorsk 

dismantlement project as a model, the Department of Defense is currently 

assessing facilities in Russia for future consolidation activities. Defense 

officials acknowledge that work cannot start on such activities until the 

Russian government signs an implementing agreement to permit this work. 

Defense officials continue to seek an agreement with the Russian 

government; however, they do not yet have one. 

The United States Has 

Taken Steps to Address 

but Has Not Eliminated 

All Risk

In attempting to address the primary proliferation risks, the United States 

may exacerbate some existing risks or create new ones. With Russia’s 

intentions regarding its inherited biological weapons capability still 

unclear, the United States may exacerbate the risk of a reconstituted 

Russian offensive biological weapons effort by sustaining these institutes 

through its funding of collaborative research and other activities. U.S. 

funding of biodefense research (research that focuses on civilian and 

military protection against the use of biological agents) poses the particular 

risk that Russian scientists could sustain or advance their knowledge and 

skills related to developing dangerous pathogens or biological weapons 

technologies. While pursuing transparency and compliance provisions in 

the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, the United States has 

developed a set of safeguards primarily for the institute and individual 

projects to prevent the misuse of funds or other inappropriate activity. U.S. 

officials also plan to augment existing safeguards that would mitigate—but 

not eliminate—the particular risks associated with engaging former Soviet 

biological weapons scientists in collaborative biodefense research. 
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U.S. Efforts May Exacerbate 

or Create Risks, Including 

Potentially Sustaining 

Russian Biological Weapons 

Capabilities

State and Defense Department officials agreed with our observation that 

sustained U.S. support of institutes, especially through research aimed at 

advancing U.S. biodefense capabilities, may help to preserve Russian 

scientists’ knowledge and skills and otherwise help to maintain these 

institutes’ capacity to research and develop biological weapons. This view 

is buttressed by the former Deputy Chief of Biopreparat’s belief that the 

Biopreparat leadership tolerates international funding of its former 

institutes because it has no funds to do so and this assistance allows the 

institutes to remain intact and scientifically active in the absence of 

Russian funding. In addition, a senior Science Center official cited 

Biopreparat’s recent firing of the director of a leading former Soviet 

biological weapons institute that has received substantial U.S. funding as 

an example of Biopreparat’s continued interest in, and leverage over, the 

institutes it formerly funded. 

In addition to funding the scientists’ salaries, the United States is sustaining 

these Russian institutes by providing research equipment, upgrading safety 

and security conditions, and improving some other facilities, such as an 

animal-breeding center, which could theoretically be used to support future 

research on biological weapons. Besides sustaining Russia’s biological 

weapons capability, the United States may exacerbate or create other types 

of risks. For instance, (1) U.S. collaborative research funds could be 

diverted to covert offensive weapons research, proliferation activities, or 

other inappropriate use; (2) illicit research could potentially take place 

during a U.S.- funded biodefense or other research project; or (3) Russian 

scientists working on U.S.- funded biodefense research could potentially 

advance or maintain their skills relating to weapons-usable pathogens and 

technologies that could later be applied to offensive weapons research. 

The United States Is Taking 

Several Steps to Mitigate 

Risks 

The United States has taken a number of steps to try to mitigate some of 

these risks at the national, institute, and project levels in Russia. To address 

the risk that the United States may be sustaining Russia’s biological 

weapons capability at the national level, the United States continues its 

efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to add 

transparency and compliance provisions, as well as negotiating further 

agreements with Russia on biological weapons. The Department of 

Defense has also initiated a dialogue with the Russian Ministry of Defense 

to increase transparency and address concerns about whether offensive 

biological weapons work continues at Ministry of Defense facilities, 

although the United States has not yet achieved access to these facilities. A 

trilateral inspection regime initiated by the United States, the United 
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Kingdom, and Russia in 1992 led to inspections of some nonmilitary 

Russian facilities. However, Russia halted these inspections in 1994 and 

other steps, such as adding transparency and compliance provisions to the 

Convention, have not been successful. 

For nonmilitary institutes receiving U.S. assistance, U.S. officials said the 

executive branch is considering a number of “graduation models” whereby 

institutes would be permanently transformed into self-sustaining entities 

that the United States would no longer consider to be threat risks and 

would no longer require U.S. assistance. Such graduation models would 

build on previous U.S. and international efforts to promote openness, 

expose these institutes to commercial and other opportunities, and 

integrate them into the international scientific community. An example of a 

graduation model currently being considered is the conversion of a leading 

former Soviet biological weapons institute into a fully transparent 

international research center attracting scientists from around the world. 

Officials from the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program said they 

are developing an exit strategy that plans to stop funding new projects by 

fiscal year 2005 and to successfully commercialize their ongoing projects.

Until an institute graduates into a peaceful, self-sustaining organization, 

however, the United States will continue to implement safeguards at the 

institute and individual project levels to mitigate risks. U.S. officials told us 

that these safeguards are not intended to serve as substitutes for arms 

control provisions. Prior to the funding of any U.S. collaborative research 

project, Russian institute officials must pledge that their institute will not 

perform offensive weapons research or engage in proliferation activities. 

According to a January 1999 State Department report,26 engaging in such 

inappropriate behavior would have an immediate and negative impact on 

any U.S. assistance. Institute officials with whom we met consistently told 

us that they are no longer involved in offensive biological weapons 

activities and that they clearly understand the conditions of U.S. 

collaborative research assistance. However, this pledge only applies to 

institutes receiving U.S. assistance and not to those former Soviet 

biological weapons institutes that do not receive U.S. assistance. 

Additionally, U.S. assistance to select institutes may allow Russia to 

26U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent 

States of the Former Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1998 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: 

Department of State, Jan. 1999). 
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reallocate funding to other institutes not receiving U.S. support and to 

which the United States does not have access. 

The United States has implemented a number of safeguards at the project 

level, including (1) interagency reviews of proposals; (2) financial oversight 

of projects; and (3) varying degrees of scientific project monitoring based 

on the perceived risk of the project. Prior to funding projects, the executive 

branch performs an interagency review of proposed U.S. collaborative 

research projects to assess policy implications and scientific merit, and to 

characterize potential dual-use risks. Agency officials incorporate these 

assessments into their decisions about whether to fund the projects, to 

amend them to reduce the risk, or to forego them altogether. Because of the 

concern over sponsoring potentially sensitive dual-use projects, 

Department of Energy officials said the Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention program will not fund any new projects that have been assessed 

as high risk. Officials involved in the interagency review process note that 

the existing review process often takes many months to complete. These 

officials attributed the delays to the increased number of proposals needing 

review and the limited staff available to conduct the reviews. 

Once a project is underway at an institute, the United States uses several 

means to guard against the misuse of project funds. Since 1994, the 

International Science and Technology Center has directly deposited grant 

payments into project participants’ individual bank accounts, which 

prevents the institutes from diverting funds for unauthorized purposes. In 

November 1999, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program 

contracted with a tax-exempt organization to provide a similar direct 

deposit system for its projects. Program managers from the Science Center 

review programmatic and financial documents on a quarterly basis, and the 

Science Center requires a final audit of every project before it releases an 

overhead payment to an institute. In addition, the U.S. Defense Contract 

Audit Agency has conducted internal control audits for 10 Science Center 

biotechnology projects through 1999.27

While these projects are underway, the executive branch also monitors 

projects to ensure that they are implemented according to the project plan 

and to prevent inappropriate activities from occurring during a U.S.-funded 

27Our review of the 10 biotechnology audit reports identified various accounting and 

timekeeping weaknesses, which Science Center officials said they are working with the 

institutes to address.
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project. Executive branch agencies assign a U.S. or international scientist 

to collaborate with the former Soviet scientists. These scientists monitor 

the progress of the project, identify any problems, and ensure that the 

research is of sufficient quality. Although the degree of contact varies, U.S. 

and international collaborators typically meet with the former Soviet 

scientists who serve as project managers at least once a year and 

supplement these meetings through regular email and other 

communications. We did not, however, evaluate the sufficiency and 

effectiveness of these safeguards.

Executive branch officials told us that they plan to augment existing 

safeguards to limit the unintended consequences associated with the 

expanding U.S. portfolio of biodefense research projects. These officials 

acknowledge that these steps will mitigate, but not fully eliminate, the risks 

associated with this type of research. For moderately sensitive projects, the 

Department of Defense plans to place a former U.S. military biologist in 

Moscow by May 2000 to provide greater in-country monitoring and 

oversight for the Department’s portfolio of projects, especially during 

critical research phases of a project. This scientist would travel on a 

regular basis to institutes where the Department is funding research and 

review the progress of these projects. 

For the most sensitive projects that pose the greatest dual-use risks, the 

United States will seek to place U.S. scientists in residence at the institute 

where the research is taking place, according to Defense officials. By 

focusing research on dangerous pathogens or key technologies relevant to 

biological weapons, these projects would be the most likely to 

inadvertently advance Russian biological weapons capabilities. To mitigate 

this risk, in addition to routine safeguard measures, the U.S. scientists 

would work in the laboratory side-by-side with their Russian counterparts 

to advance U.S. confidence about the research and to ensure that the 

United States receives the same research results. For example, if the 

smallpox projects are approved, the executive branch plans to place a U.S. 

scientist at Vector. Similarly, the Departments of Defense and Agriculture 

plan to seek on-site collaboration for their most sensitive projects. 

Department of Defense officials told us that they will seek on-site 

collaboration for projects that either involve research on live animals or 

that develop new antiviral drugs against known biological weapons. They 

estimate the cost of an individual collaborator to be about $250,000 per 

year. They note this could eventually constitute as much as half of the 

Department’s overall collaborative research budget. At this point, however, 

the United States and Russia have not yet reached an agreement that would 
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allow U.S. scientists to live and work at Russian institutes. Without such an 

agreement, Department of Defense officials said they would not fund these 

sensitive research projects.

U.S. officials said these on-site collaboration arrangements would offer the 

United States significant oversight; however, they acknowledge that even 

on-site collaboration does not eliminate all potential risks. In fact, they 

acknowledge that none of the above safeguards would address the risk that 

Russian scientists could later transfer their skills and research outputs to 

offensive activities at facilities that remain closed to the United States. This 

risk is exacerbated by the fact that safeguards at the national level do not 

exist and that the United States does not have access to Russian military 

facilities. Officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy all 

acknowledge the risks involved in funding former Soviet biological 

weapons institutes. However, they believe that failing to engage these 

institutes in collaborative activities represents an even greater risk to U.S. 

national security by leaving them vulnerable to proliferation. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

The Departments of State, Defense, and Energy provided consolidated 

comments on a draft of this report. The agencies concurred with our 

report’s findings and acknowledge the risks involved in engaging these 

former Soviet biological weapons institutes, but said that the benefits 

outweigh the risks. They further stated that it is critical that the United 

States continue its effort to redirect these institutes and scientists toward 

peaceful endeavors. Although discussed in our report, the agencies 

reiterated that (1) access gained as a result of U.S. assistance programs has 

significantly increased U.S. confidence that the participating institutes are 

not conducting offensive biological weapons research and (2) the 

expanded program was not based on an abrupt change in policy or 

approach, but rather reflects program progressions based on increasing 

levels of confidence. Joint comments from the agencies are presented in 

appendix I. The agencies also provided technical comments that were 

incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Scope and 

Methodology

To assess the potential risks that the former Soviet biological weapons 

institutes could pose to the United States, we met with senior executive 

branch officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy and 

with senior staff at the National Security Council. We met with 

nongovernmental experts on biological weapons and nonproliferation 
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issues at organizations, including the Henry L. Stimson Center and the 

Monterey Institute of International Studies in Washington, D.C. We 

collected and analyzed both classified and unclassified reports and related 

threat information from the federal government, nongovernmental 

organizations, the media, and other sources. To discuss the history of the 

Soviet biological weapons program and the threats that it continues to 

pose, we met with the former Deputy Chief of Biopreparat, who now works 

in Alexandria, Virginia. 

We visited six leading former Soviet biological weapons institutes in Russia 

where officials informed us that they employ 4,500 staff and about 

500 senior scientists with biological weapons backgrounds. State and 

Defense Department officials identified the six institutes we visited as 

being representative of the former Soviet biological weapons program. The 

institutes included the (1) State Research Center for Virology and 

Biotechnology (Vector) in Koltsovo, (2) State Research Center for Applied 

Microbiology in Obolensk, (3) State Research Center for Ultra Pure 

Biopreparations in St. Petersburg, (4) State Research Center for Toxicology 

and Hygienic Regulation of Biopreparations in Serpukhov, (5) State 

Research Center for Molecular Diagnostics and Therapy in Moscow, and 

(6) the Puschino branch of the Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of 

Bioorganic Chemistry. At these institutes, we met with directors and 

scientists to discuss proliferation risks, and we toured the facilities.

To develop information about the U.S. assistance efforts to address these 

threats, we met with policy and program officials from the three primary 

departments funding engagement activities as well as other U.S. agencies 

also involved in these programs. At the State Department, we met with 

senior officials in the Bureau of Nonproliferation and in the Office of the 

Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States. At the 

Defense Department, we met with officials in the Office of Threat 

Reduction Policy, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency. At the Energy Department, we met 

with Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention senior program officials and 

also with representatives from the U.S. national laboratories, including the 

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and the Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory. We also met with senior program officials 

from the Department of Agriculture’s Agriculture Research Service and the 

Department of Health and Human Service’s Biotechnology Engagement 

Program to discuss their planned activities as Science Center partner 

organizations. In addition, we met with officials at the National Academy of 
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Sciences and the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation to 

discuss collaborative research projects they have funded. 

In Russia, we met with officials and staff at the International Science and 

Technology Center in Moscow to discuss project management and 

oversight issues. At the six Russian institutes we visited, we met with 

institute directors and scientists receiving U.S. assistance. To determine 

program benefits, we examined program data from 1994 through 1999 that 

identified performance measures such as the level of funding provided and 

the number of scientists and institutes engaged. Although we reviewed 

classified information provided by the Departments of State and Defense 

regarding the programs’ benefits, we did not include this information in our 

report. To determine the percentage of scientists that are senior biological 

weapons experts, we analyzed Science Center database and project plans 

to calculate the numbers receiving U.S. assistance from 1994 through 1999. 

To address the risks associated with the U.S. efforts and the steps the 

executive branch is taking to mitigate them, we met with officials from 

many agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy as 

well as the former Deputy Chief of Biopreparat. However, we did not 

evaluate the sufficiency and effectiveness of these safeguards. We 

discussed the risks involved in funding biological weapons research and 

how the United States plans to address these risks. We met with officials 

from the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious 

Diseases to discuss scientific collaboration issues. We also met with 

officials who participate in the interagency review process to discuss the 

criteria used to review project proposals. We reviewed U.S. Defense 

Contracts Auditing Agency audit reports on biotechnology projects.

We performed our work from August 1999 through March 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 

distribution of this report until 7 days from its issue date. At that time, we 

will send copies of this report to other congressional committees; the 

Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable 

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; and the Honorable Bill Richardson, 

Secretary of Energy. Copies will also be made available to other interested 

parties upon request. 
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If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

me at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

identified in appendix II. 

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues
Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-138 Biological Weapons

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State ApApenednxidexiIs
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-138 Biological Weapons
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-138 Biological Weapons
Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-138 Biological Weapons

Appendix II

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Boris L. Kachura, (202) 512-3161

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Andrew D. Crawford, Valérie L. Nowak, 

Jodi M. Prosser, and Pierre R. Toureille made key contributions to this 

report.

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