### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary11, 200 6 S es sio n MIDW ESTE RN GAS TRANSMI SSI ON COMPANY v. MI CHAEL RI PPY ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Su m ner County No. 26448-C C . L. Rogers, Judge

No. M2005- 00828-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Fe bruary 24, 2006
This appea l is one of twenty -seve n simi l ar ap p ea l s arising from a dispute betwee n a natur al g as company that has the power of eminent domain and the owner s of twenty -seve n properties who are re sis tin g thec omp a ny ’s e ff orts t o c on str

uc t an e xten sio n of an e xistin g pip e lin e . Af te r the se pr op e rty ow ne r s r e f

u s e d t o p e r m i t th e c o mp a n y t o c o n d u c t p r e l i m i n ary e xam i n a t i o n s a n d s u r v e y s on the ir pr op e rtie s, thec omp a ny

fi le d s e pa

rate c omp laint s a g a ins t th e own ers of e a c h tr a c t intheCir c uit Court for Sumner County seeking order s authorizing it to conduct the pr eliminary examinations and survey s nece ssary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 ( 2000). The trial court c onducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an or der dismissing the c ompany ’s complaints. The company appealed, and weconsolidated the c ases f o r o ra l arg ument. We have conclude d that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-121 is not pree mpted by the Natural G as Ac t and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it soug ht. Acc ording ly , we have dete rmined that th e tria l c ou rt

e rr e d b y dis mis sin g thec omp a ny ’s c omp laint s. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of the Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R . , P

. J

. , M.S., delivered the opinion of thecourt, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined. L ela M. Hollabaug h and Micha el S. Miz ell, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Midwestern Gas T r a n s m i s s i o n C o mp a n y. Fr ank M. F ly , Murfre esboro, Te nnessee , and Gary Allen Davis, Hot Springs, North Carolina, for the ap p e l l e e s , M i c h a e l R i p p y a n dT h e r e s a R i p p y. 

### OPIN ION I. Th e Mid we ste rnGa s Tr a ns mis sio n Company (M idw e ste rn ) plans to c on str uc t a ndop e rate a natura l g as pipeline approximately thirty miles long beg inning at its Portland Station in SumnerSee M i dwe s t er n G as T r an s mi s s i on Compan y ; N ot i ce of In t en t t o P r epa r e an Env i r on men t al As s es s men t for 1 the P ro p o se d M G T E a ste rn E x te n sio n P ro je c t, R e q u e st fo r C o m m e n ts o n E n v iro n m e n ta l I ssu e s, a n d N o tice o f P u b lic S c o p ing , 7 0 F e d . R e g . 4 8 3 7 -0 2 (J a n . 2 1 , 2 0 0 5 ).

M i dwes t er n f

i l ed s i mi l ar comp l ai nt s i n t he C i r cui t Co ur t for T r ous dal e Co un t y ag ai ns t t he owner s of proper t i es 2
a lo n g the p ro p o se d ro u te in T ro u sd a le C o u n ty. A fter the tria l c o u rt d ism isse d the c o m p la ints filed in S u m n e r C o u n ty, M id w e ste rn vo lun ta rily d ism isse d it s T ro u sd a le C o u n ty co m p la ints p e n d ing the o u tc o m e o f t h is a p p e a l.

M i d west ern’ s d esi re f

o r an exped i t ed heari ng s t em m ed f rom i t s aggress i ve t i m et ab l e fo r com p l et i ng t he 3 pi pel i n e pr oj ec t
. I n pr el i mi n ar y f i l i n g s w i t h FE RC , M i dwe s t er n s t at ed t h at i t i n t en ded t o f i l e a for mal a ppl i ca t i on for a cert i f i cat e o f p ub l i c co nveni ence and necess i t y i n M ay 2 0 0 5 , t hat i t de si red t o be gi n co nst ruct i o n of t he p i p el i ne i n June 2006, a n d t h at i t i n t en ded t o c ompl et e t h e pr oj ec t i n N ov embe r 2006. -2- Countyand running southeast to proposed inter connec ts in Trousdale County with pipelines owned a n do p e r a t e d b y C o l u mb i a G u l f T r a n s m i s s i o n C o mp a n y a n d E a s tT e n n e s s e e N a tu r a l G a s C o mp a n y. 1 Be forecommencing construction, Midwestern must de termine the prec ise location of the pipe line, acquir e the ne cessa

ry ease ments, and obtain a c ertificate of public c onvenienc e and nec essity from the Fe deral Energ y

Reg ulatory

Commi ssion (FERC). I n order to make a f

inal decision re g arding the p i p el ine’s location, Midwestern beg an contac ting the ow ners of

the potentially

aff ecte d properties to o b t ain their pe rmission to conduct pr e lim ina ry e xami natio ns a ndsurve y s. Whil e many of thea ff e c te d p ro pe rty

ow ne rs g a ve the ir pe rm iss ion , o the rs did no t. A c c or din g ly , o n Jan ua ry 7, 20 05 , M idw e ste rnfi le d tw e nty -n inese pa rate complaints in the Circuit Court fo r S u m n er Countyag ainst the owner s of twenty -nine prope rties located along the path of theproposed pipeline. Midwestern alleg ed in these c omplaints that itwas 2 entitled to conduct pre liminary examinations and survey s under Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-16- 121 (2 00 0) a ndthat it

ha d atte mpt e d u ns uc c e ssf ull y to o btain t e mpo ra

ry ri ghts of

e ntry onthe se pr op e rtie s. Ac c or din g ly , M idw e ste rnre qu e ste d th e tria l c ou rt to e nte r o rd e rs g ranti ng it a c c e ss t o the prope rties to conduct the pr eliminary examinations and survey s authorized by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121. On J anuary 25, 2005, Midwestern r equeste d the trial court to gr ant an e x pedited hea ring on its request for

order s g ranting it acce ss to the properties unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121. 3 Mid we ste rne xpla ine d inthe se motion s th a t th e pr op os e d p ipe lin e pr oje c t w ou ld c ro ss 1 57 se pa rate trac ts of property

in Sumner and Trousdale Counties and that the proj ec t co uld not move forwa rd until preliminary

examinations and survey s of all the prope rties along the proposed route c ould be obtained. Midwestern acknow ledg ed that once the route of the pipeline wa s finalized, it would be re qu ir e d to ob ta in ea se me nts a c ro ss thea ff e c te d p ro pe rtie s e ith e r b y

e nte ri ng int o a g re e me nts wi th the prope rty

owner s or, if nec essary , by filing condemnation pr ocee dings a g ainst the properties and pay ing thepr op e rty

ow ne rs jus t c omp e ns a tio n f or thee a se me nts
. Midwestern’ s motions also stated that if the pre liminary examinations and survey s indicated that a particular property was not suitable for inclusion in the project, it would reroute thepipeline a ndwo uldha ve no ne e d to com me nc e c on de mnatio n pro c e e din g s ag a ins t the un su ita blepr op e rtie s. Midwestern pointed out that if it could not obtain a rig ht of temporary entry to the properties along thepr op os e d r ou te to c on du c t th e re qu isi te e xami natio ns a ndsu rv e y s, it wo ul d be re qu ir e d to fi leT h e twe n ty-t w o c a se s in w h ic h a n sw e rs w e re fi le d a d m itt ing the fac tua l alle g a tio n s o f M id w e stern’ s co m p la ints 4
are s t y l ed as fo l l o ws: ( 1 ) M i d w estern G a s T ra n sm i ssi o n C o . v. C a m i l l a Je a n P a l m er R e v o ca b l e L i vin g T ru st , N o. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 7 8 9

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (2) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v . L a rry L a w e t a l. , N o. M 2005- 00790- CO A- R3- C V ; (3) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. H a ro ld B . K n ig h t et a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 7 9 1

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (4) M i d w estern G as Tr an s m i s s i on C o. v. R uth W

. B ri l ey , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 7 9 2

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (5) M i dw es t er n G as Tr an s m i s s i on Co

. v. M a rt h a Jo L a w F en i m o re , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 7 9 3

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (6) M i dwes t er n G as Tr ans m i s s i on Co. v. Cal vi n Ki r kham e t a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 7 9 5

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (7) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v . D a v id S m ith e t a l. , N o. M 2005- 00799- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (8) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. W ill ia m S h e rro n e t a l. , N o. M 2005- 00800- CO A- R3- CV ; ( 9) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. F ra n k A . B a ss e t a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 0 1

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (10 ) M i dwes t er n G as T ra n sm issio n C o . v . T

. D a v id B a rk e r, S r. e t a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 0 2

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (11 ) M i dwes t er n G as Tr ans m i s s i on Co. v . D env erL. Pr

yor , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 0 3

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (12 ) M i dwes t er n G as Tr ans m i s s i on Co. v. Lor r i e M ar cum , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 0 4

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (13 ) M i dw es t er n G as Tr an s m i s s i on C o. v. Li nd a Scot tW ebs t er , N o. M 2005- 00818- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (14 ) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. N ik k i Wa lla c e e t a l. , N o. M 2005- 00819- CO A- R3- CV ; ( 15) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. B e rto n G re g o ry e t a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 2 0

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (16 ) M i dwes t er n G as T ra n sm issio n C o . v . F re d Th o m a s M c K e e e t a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 2 3

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (17 ) M i dwes t er n G as Tr ans m i s s i on C o . v. C h a rle s C a rte r e t a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 2 5

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (1 8 ) M i d we s t e r n Ga s T r a n s mi s s i o n Co

. v . J a me s R. S tep h e n so n e t a l. , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 2 6

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (19 ) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. M ic h a e l R ip p y e t a l. , N o. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 2 8

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (20 ) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. J a m e s L a ssite r e t a l. , No. M 20 05

- 00 82 9- COAR 3

- C V ; (21 ) M i d w ester n G as Tr an s m i s s i on Co

. v. R ebecca W arr en , N o. M 2005- 00830- CO A- R3- CV ; a n d ( 22) M i d w estern G a s T ra n sm i ssi o n C o . v. C h a rl es A

. D esh l er & M a rt h a A

. D esh l er J o i n tC a ri n g T ru st , N o. M 2005- 00831- C OA

- R 3

- C V.

T hi s ca s e w a s a pp e a l e d a l on g w i t h t h e ot h e r s , bu t t h e c a s e w a s r e ma n de d t o t h e t r i a l c ou r t a f t e r t h e pa r t i es 5
a g re e d to d ism iss the a p p e a l in a c c o rd a n c e w ith T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 5 fo r re a so n s u n iq u e to the c a se . M i dwes t er n G as T ra n sm issio n C o . v. R o b e rt T. M c F a d d e n e t a l. , N o. M 20 05

- 00 82 1- C O A

- R 3- C V ( St i pul at i on of V ol un t ar y D i s mi s s al f i l ed M ay 9, 200 5). T he t r i al cour t s ubs equen t l y en t er ed a f i nal order appl i cabl e t o t hat ca s e a l one, an d M i dwes t er n h as a g a in ap p e a le d the tria l c o u rt’s d e c isio n . M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v . R o b e rt T. M c F a d d e n e t a l. , N o. M 2005- 0 2 8 3 1 -C O A -R 3 -C V

. -3- c on de mnatio n p ro c e e di n g s a g a ins t a ll p ote nti a lly a ff e c te d p ro pe rtie s w ith ou t kn ow ing wh e the r the se properties wereeven suitable for the c onstruction and maintenance of a natur al g as pipeline. Acc ording to Midwestern, this option would result in takings of private prop er t y t h at might ultimate ly

pr ov e un ne c e ssa

ry fo r the fi na l pr oje c t. The owner s of twenty -two of the parc els retained the same law firm and, on Fe bru ar y9, 2005, filed answe rs admitting the f actual alleg ations in Midwestern’s c omplaints but denying that Midwestern w as entitled to conduc t preliminary examinations and survey s on their prope rty without their co n s ent. These pr operty owner s also reque sted the trial court to dism iss Midwestern’s 4 complaints or, in the alternative to inc lude lang uag e in theorder s authorizing the pr eliminary entries that would limitMidwestern’ s activities on the prope rties to the following: (1 ) walking on the pro perty ; ( 2) c utting br

us h o r w e e ds to allo w a

lin e of sig ht w ithc omp e ns a tio n f or a ny dama g e s; (3) driving stake s to identify the proposed r oute; (4) walking throug h the property and taking shallow s o i l s am p l es fo r en v i ro n m en t al , b i o l o gi ca l , an d ar ch ae o l o gi ca l re v i ew s ; an d(5 ) t ak i n g s o i l co ri n gs near major water c rossing s and at propose d meter sites. The owne rs of an o t h erparc el re tained anothe r lawy er w ho filed sepa rate pleading s. The 5 ow ne rs of thesix r e ma ini ng pa

rc e ls d id not re tain co un se l. In fiv e of the se six c a se s, thepr op e rtyT he f i ve cases i n whi ch answers were no t f i l ed are s t y l ed as fo l l o ws: ( 1 ) M i dwes t er n G as Tr ans m i s s i on Co. 6
v. P at r i ci a G

. G r een , N o . M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 7 9 6

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (2) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v . R u fu s R e e se e t a l. , N o. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 0 5

- C O A

- R 3

- C V ; (3) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v . F re d P . W a lter e t a l. , No. M 20 05

- 00 82 2- COAR 3

- C V ; (4) M i d w est ern G a s Tra n sm i ss i o n C o . v. R o b ert G

. Ing rum et a l. , N o . M 2 0 05- 00827- CO A- R3- CV ; a n d ( 5) M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. K y le D o rris e t a l. , N o. 26450- C. T h e l as t of t h es e ca s es w as n ot a ppea l ed.
M id w e ste rn G a s T ra n sm issio n C o . v. R o n a ld R . D u n n e t a l. , No

. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 2 4

- C OA

- R 3

- C V. 7

E v e n tho u g h M id w e ste rn o rig ina lly file d t w e n ty-n ine c a se s in S u m n e r C o u n ty, the se a p p e a ls inv o lve o n ly 8 tw e n ty-sev e n c a se s. F o llo w ing th e e n try o f th e tr ia l co u rt’s M a rc h 3 , 2 0 0 5 o rd e r, M id w e ste rn re a c h e d a n a g re e m e n t with the o w n e rs o f o n e o f t h e p a rc e ls, an d tha t ca se w a s n o t ap p e a le d

. M i dw es t er n G as Trans m i s s i on C o. v. K yl e D orr i s et a l. , N o . 2 6 4 5 0 -C . T h e o the r c a se is t h e su b je c t o f a se p a ra te a p p e a l. M i dwes t er n G as Tr ans m i s s i on Co. v . Rober tT. M c F a d d e n e t a l. , No

. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 2 8 3 1

- C OA

- R 3

- C V.

A f t er t he ent r y of

t he M ar ch 3, 2 00 5 order , t he owner s of one of t he propert i es wh o had not r et ai ned c ouns el 9
o r p a rtic ip a te d in the p ro c e e d ing s in th e trial c o u rt re ta ine d th e a tto rn e y w h o h a d b e e n r e p re se n ting th e o w n e rs o f t w e n tytw o o f the p ro p e rtie s in th e trial c o u rt to re p re se n t t h e m o n a p p e a l as w e ll. M i dwes t er n G as Tr ans m i s s i on Co. v . Ruf us R e e se e t a l. , No

. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 8 0 5

- C OA

- R 3

- C V. -4- owner s did not file answer s to Midwe stern’s complaints. In the remaining c ase, theproperty owner s 6 fi le d a pr o s e a ns we r that ne ith e r a dmi tte d n or den ied thefa c tual a lle g a tio ns c on taine d in Mid we ste rn ’s c omp la int

. 7 On Fe bruary

22, 2005, the trial court held an expedited joint hearing in all the pending Sumner County

case s. No proof w as pre sented, and at the conc lusion of the hearing, thetrial court announce d that it would deny M i d we s t er n ’s motions. On March 3, 2005, the trial court filed an order applicableto all the pending Sumner County case s in w hich it concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 doe s not authorize companies like Midweste rn to enter private pr o p ertywithout the owner ’s conse nt to conduct pre liminary examinations and survey s prior t o t h e fi ling of a condemnation complaint ag ainst the property

. The court further conclude d that even if Tenn. Code An n . § 2 9 -16-121 authorized a rig ht of preliminary entry prior to the initiation of condemnation proce eding s, Midwestern ha d prese nted no proof that it satisfied the fac tual prerequisites for exercisin g t h i s authority . Acc ording ly , the trial court denied Midwestern’s motions. W ithout explanation, the tr

ia l c o u rt took the furthe r step of dismissing Midwe stern’s c omplaints. Midwestern appealed. 8 OnMay 13 , 2 00 5, the pr op e rty ow ne rs fi le d a Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 16 (b ) m oti onto c on so lid a te theap p e a ls

. M id w e s te r n r e s p o n d e do n M a y 2 0 , 2 0 0 5 th a t i t d idn o t o p p o s e c o n s o li d a ti o n a s lo ng as the a ppeals were consolidated i nto three g roups based on whether the def endant pr operty

owner s had filed an answe r admitting the fac tual alleg ations of the complaints, had filed an answe r neither admitting nor de ny ing thealleg ations, or had f il ed no answe r to the complaint at a ll. On May 25, 2005, this court enter ed an order consolidating the appeals for the purposeof oral arg ument only and a llo wi ng thepa

rtie s to fi le c onso li dat ed bri efs if the y wi sh e d to do so . T hepr op e rty ow ne rs in tw e nty -thr e e c a se s f

ile d a c on so lid a te d b ri e f t o w hic h M idw e ste rn re pli e d. Th e pr op e rty ow ne rs in 9 the other f

our appe als d id not file briefs or otherwise pa

rticipate in the January

11, 2006 oral arg ume nt b e fo rethi s c ou rt
.-5- II. T HE R IGH T O F P RE L I M I NARY E NT RY U NDE R S TATE L AW The parties’ disag ree ment cente rs around the proper interpre tation of th e s tatutory condemnation procedur es codified at Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 29-16-101 to -127 ( 2000 & Supp. 2005) and Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-16- 121 in particular . Midwestern c laims that the plain lang uag e of Te nn. Cod e An n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 auth orize s it to e nte r the a ff

e c te d pr op e rtie s wi tho ut the ow ne rs ’ c on se nt t o conduct the pr eliminary

examinations and survey s nece ssary to determine whether the prope rties ar e suitable for inc lusion in i ts proposed pi peline ex tension projec t. The property owner s contend that Te nn . Cod e An n. § 29 -1 6- 12 1 do e s no t c on ve y a ri g ht of pr e lim ina ry e ntry a t a ll, a ndthat e ve n if it does, the rig ht of entry

arises o n l y af

t er condemnation complaints have bee n filed ag ainst the properties. Acc ording ly , we must e x amine the statutory condemnation pr ocedur es codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-16- 101 to -127. A. The re sponsibili ty

for de termining what a statute means re sts with the courts. Roseman v

. Roseman , 8 90 S.W. 2d

27 , 2 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; Realty Shop, Inc. v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 601 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). We must ascertain and then g ive the fullest possible ef fec t to the Gene ral Asse mbly ’s purpose in e nacting t h e s tatute as re flec ted in the statute’s lang uag e. Ste wart v . S tate , 3 3 S.W.3 d 785 , 790 -9 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Lavin v. Jordon , 16 S.W .3d 362, 365 (Tenn. 2000). In doing so, w e must avoid construc tions that u n d u l y ex pand or r estrict the statute’ s application. W

att v. L u mbermens Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. , 62 S.W .3d 123, 127-28 (Te nn. 2001); Patterson v. Tenn. Dep’ t of Labor & W orkforce D ev. , 6 0 S. W.3 d 6 0, 64 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Limbaugh v. Cof fe e Me d. Ctr

. , 59 S.W .3d 73, 83 (Tenn. 2001) . Our go al i s t o co n s true a statute in a way

that avoids conflict and fac ilitates the harmonious operation of the law. Fr az ie r v . Ea st T

enn . B ap ti st Hosp., Inc. , 5 5 S. W.3 d 9 25 , 9 28 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Le ns Cra fte rs, In c . v . S un dq uis t , 33 S.W .3d 772, 777 (Tenn. 2000)

. Ou r co ns truc tio n of a statut e is mor e lik e ly to co nf orm with the Ge ne ral A sse mbl y ’s pu rp os e if we a pproac h the statute pre suming that the G eneral As s embly chose its words pur

posely and deliberately , Tidw ell v. Serv omation-W illoughby Co. , 48 3 S.W. 2d 98 , 10 0 (T e nn . 1 97 2) ; Merrimac k Mu t. Fire In s. Co. v . B att s , 59 S.W .3d 142, 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), and that the wor ds chosen b y t h e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y c o n v e y th e m e a n i n g th e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y i n t e n d e dth e mt o c o n v e y, Lim ba ug h v . Cof

fe e Me d. Ctr

. , 5 9 S. W.3 d at 83 ; BellSouth Telecomm s., Inc. v . Gree r , 972 S.W .2d 6 6 3 , 6 7 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). T hus, we must construe statutes as we f ind them, J

a c k s o n v. Jack son , 1 86 Te nn . 3 37 , 3 42 , 2 10 S.W. 2d33 2, 33 4 ( 19 48 ); Pa c ifi c Ea ste rn Cor p. v . Gul f Lif e Holding Co. , 9 02 S.W.2d 94 6, 95 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) , andou r s e arc h f or a statut e ’s pu rp os e must beg in with the words of the statute itself, Bl an ke ns hi p v. Es tate of B ain , 5 S.W .3d 647, 651 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; Sta te ex

re l. Com m’ r o

f Tra ns p. v . Me dic ine Bi rd

Bl ac k Be ar W hite Ea gle , 63 S.W .3d 734, 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).LeTel l i erv. LeTel l i er , 4 0 S .W .3 d 4 9 0 , 4 9 8 (T e n n . 2 0 0 1 ); B r yant v. H C

A H eal t h Serv s . of

N. Tenn. , I

nc. , 15 10 S.W

. 3 d 80 4 , 80 9 (T enn. 20 0 0 ). -6- We mu s t g i v e a s t a tu t e ’ s w o r d s th e i r n a tu r a l a n d o r d i n ary m e a n i n g u n l e s s th e c on te xt in which they are used re quires otherwise. Frazier v. East Tenn. Baptist Hosp., Inc. , 55 S.W .3d at 928; Mooneyv. Snee d , 30 S.W. 3d 30 4, 30 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Sta te v . Fitz , 19 S.W .3d 213, 216 (Tenn. 2000)

. Be causewords ar e known by the company

they keep, State ex re l. Comm’r of Transp. v. Medicine Bi rd Bl ac k Be ar W hite Ea gle , 63 S.W .3d at 754, we should c o n s t ru e the wor ds in a statute in the context of the entire st at u t e and in l ight of the statute’s g ener al purpose, State v. Flem ming , 19 S.W. 3d 19 5, 19 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Lyons v. Rasar , 8 72 S.W. 2d89 5, 89 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; W achovia Bank of N.C., N .A. v. J ohnson , 26 S.W .3d 621, 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). When the meaning of statutory lang uag e is c lear , we must interpre t it as written, Kradel v. Piper Indus., Inc. , 60 S.W .3d 744, 749 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; ATS Southeast, Inc. v. Carrier Corp. , 18 S.W .3d 626, 629-30 (Tenn. 2000), rather than using the tools of construction to givethe statute anothe r meaning, Lim ba ug h v. Cof fe e Me d. Ctr

. , 59 S.W. 3da t 83 ; Gleave s v. Checker Cab Transit Corp. , 15 S.W .3d 799, 803 (Tenn. 2000)

. Statute s , h o we v er, are not alway s fre e fr om ambiguity . When we enc ounter ambiguous statut ory la ng ua g e – la ng ua g e that c a n re a so na bly have mor e than on e me a nin g – wemus t lo ok to 10 thee nti restatut e , th e e nti re statut ory sc he me in wh ic h the statut e app e ars , a nde lse wh e reto a sc e rt a in the Gene ral Asse mbly ’s intent and purpose

. Sta te v . W alls , 62 S.W.3 d 119 , 121 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Sta te v. Mc Knight , 51 S.W .3d 559, 566 (Tenn. 2001). One of the source s that we fr equently look to for g uidance is the statute’s leg islative history

. Bowden v. Mem phis Bd. of Educ. , 29 S.W .3d 462, 465 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Hathaway v. First Family Fin. Serv s., Inc. , 1 S.W. 3d 63 4, 64 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; Re e v e sSain Med., Inc . v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn. , 4 0 S. W. 3 d5 0 3 , 5 0 7 ( T e n n . Ct

. A p p . 2 0 0 0 )

. We must be cautious about consult i n g leg islative history

. BellSouth Telecomm s., Inc. v . Gree r , 972 S.W .2d at 673. A statute’s meaning must be g rounded in its text . Thus, comments made during the Gene ral Asse mbly ’s debates cannot provide a ba sis for a c onst ru ct i o n that is not rooted in the statute’s text. D. Can ale & Co. v . Ce lau ro , 7 65 S.W. 2d 73 6, 73 8 ( Te nn . 1 98 9) ; Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. , 5 0 S. W.3 d 4 46 , 4 53 n. 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) . Wh e n a statut e ’s te xt an d th e c omm e nts made during a leg islative debate diverg e, the textcontrols. BellSouth Telecomm s., Inc. v . Gree r , 972 S.W .2d at 674. The tasks of statutory

construction and a

pply ing a statute to a particula r set of f acts involve qu e sti on s of la w rathe r than que sti on s of f a c t. Patterson v. Tenn. De p’t of Labor & W

orkforce D ev. , 60 S.W. 3d a t 62 ; State v. Mc Knight , 5 1 S. W.3 d at 56 2; Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W .2d 920, 92 4 (T e nn . 19 98 ). Ac c or din g ly , app e llate c ou rt s mus t re vie w a tria l c ou rt ’s c on str uc tio n o f a

statut e or app lic a tio n o f a statut e to a pa rtic ula r se t of fa c ts de no vo wi tho ut a pr e su mptionof

c or re c tne ss. Sta te v . W

alls , 6 2 S. W.3 d at 12 1; Hi ll v . Ci ty of Ge rm an tow n , 31 S.W .3d 234, 237 (Tenn. 2000) ; Mooneyv. Snee d , 30 S.W .3d at 306.T h e Code of T en n es s ee ( Ret u r n J. M ei g s & W i l l i am F. Cooper , eds

. , E. G

. Eas t man & Co. 1858) ( Code of 11 1 8 5 8 ); see a l so A c t o f M a r. 2 0 , 1 8 5 8 , ch . 1 7 7 , § 1 , 1 8 5 7 -5 8 T e n n . P riv . A c ts 4 1 1

.

T h i s c h apt er of

t h e Code of

1858 wa s ca r r i ed for wa r d, wi t h ci t i n g re fer en ce s , i n Sha n n on ’ s C ode of 1896. 12 Sh an n on ’ s Code, t i t
. 8, c h

. 9, §§ 1844- 1867 ( ci t i n g I owa C ode of 1851 §§ 759- 60, 763, 768, 771- 72, 775, 778; Act of Fe b

. 2 2 , 1 8 5 6 , c h. 1 3 2 , § § 1 0

- 1 1 , 1 8 5 5

- 5 6 T enn. P ub

. A ct s 1 9 0 , 1 9 2 ; A ct o f J an. 1 0 , 1 8 5 4 , c h. 90 , § 1 4 , 18 5 3

- 5 4 T enn. Pub. Act s 164, 167; Act of Fe b. 7, 1850, ch

. 72, §§ 5, 9, 1849- 50 T en n . Pub. Act s 229, 230- 32; Act of D ec . 11, 1845, c h . 1 , § 2 4 , 1 8 4 5 -4 6 T e n n . P u b . A c ts 1 7 , 2 3 -2 4 ); see a l so A c t o f Ja n . 2 2 , 1 8 5 2 , ch . 7 4 , § 2 3 , 1 8 5 1 -5 2 T e n n . P u b . A c ts 8 2 , 87

- 8 9 ; A ct of Jan. 7 , 18 3 0 , c h. 7 0 , § 1 , 1 8 2 9

- 3 0 T enn. P ub

. A ct s 9 8 , 9 8

- 9 9 ; A ct o f O ct
. 31 , 18 2 5 , ch. 17 , 18 2 5 T enn. Pub. Act s 13, 13- 14; Act of Au g . 4, 1804, c h

. 1, § 19, 2 E DWA R D S CO TT , L AW S O F THE S TA TE O F T ENN ESS EE 823 ( 1821) (S CO TT ); A c t o f A p r. 2 0 , 1 7 9 6 , ch . 2 2 , § 4 , 2 S CO TT , a t 568- 69.

T he ad d ed pro vi si o ns t hat rem ai n in effect a re T enn. C o d e A nn. §§ 29

- 1 6

- 1 0 2 t o - 1 0 3 , - 1 1 3 (b), - 1 1 4 (b)- (d), 13

- 1 1 8 (b)- (c), - 1 2 3 (b), and - 1 2 5 t o - 1 2 7 as well as every t hi ng a f t er t he f i rs t s ent ence i n T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 9

- 1 6

- 1 1 4 (a).
T en n . Code An n . § 29- 16- 126, w h i ch w as no t p art o f t h e or i g i n al s t at u t or y s ch eme , c on fer s t h e powe r of 14
em i ne nt d o m ain o n c ertain t yp es o f ho sp i t als t o co nd em n a dja ce nt, co nti gu o us p ro p erti es.

-7- B. The c ondemnation proc edure s codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-16-101 to -127 orig inated as part of the Code of 1858. Code of 1858 §§ 1325-1348. They appea red tog ether

in the chapte r 11 of the 1858 Code entitled, “Of [T] aking [P ]rivate Property for Works of Int er n al I m p ro vement.” Code of 1858 §§ 1325-1348. I n compiling this chapte r, the Ge neral Assembly relied primarily

on I owa’ s statutory

condemnation procedur es an d s e v eral e arly

Tenne ssee statutes c onfer ring the power of eminent domain on pa

rticular c ompanies or g roups of individuals for the construc tion of works of interna l improvement such as railroa ds and paved roads. There have been few chang es to the 12 statutory scheme since its orig inal enac tment in 1858. Thus, aside fr om the addition of a handful of new pr ovisions over the past 148 y ear s and some inconse quential chang es i n wo rdi ng , the 13 proce dural fr am ew o rk for c ondemnation proc eeding s enac ted by the Gene ral Asse mbly

in 1858 r e m a i n s i n e f

f e c tt o d a y. The statutory

condemnation scheme is primarily proce dural in nature. Wit h one exception, it does not purport to confe r the powe r of e minent domain on any one. It merely presc ribes 14 pr oc e du re s f

or thee xer c iseof

thi s p ow e r b y

e nti tie s o n w ho m th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y ha s o the rw ise confe rre d it. The first fe w sec tions ex plain the re ach of the leg islative scheme. T enn. Code Ann. §§ 29-16-101, - 1 0 2 ( a ) , - 1 0 3

. T h e n e xt f e w s e c ti o n s s p e c if

y th e c o n te n ts o f

a c o n d e mn a ti on complaint, the court in which a conde mnation proce eding must be filed, and the manner in whic h no tic e of thepr oc e e din g s mu st b e pr ov ide d to int e re ste d p artie s. Te nn . Co deAn n. §§ 29 -1 6- 10 4 to -106. The bulk of

the statutory

scheme relates to the procedure s for empaneling juries t o decidethe amount of compe nsation due and how the amount of c ompensation is to be calc ulated. Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 29-16-107 to - 120. Th e re ma ini ng se c tio ns re late to the ri g ht o f c omp a nie s w iththepo we r o f e min e nt d omain to e nte r p ri vate pr op e rty

to c on du c t pr e limin arye xami natio ns a ndsu rv e y s, a pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t actually occupyi n g property

without first paying thecompensation set by the jury , the rig ht of property owner s to file complaints for i n v er s e condemnation wher e their pr operty has bee n takenT en n . Code An n . §§ 29- 16- 121 ( pr el i mi n ar y e n t r y for e x ami n at i on s a n d s u r v ey s ) , - 122 ( ac t u al oc cu pat i on 15 of pr oper t y pr oh i bi t ed pr i or t o pa y men t of compe n s at i on ) , - 123 ( i n v er s e con demn at i on pr oce edi n g s ) , - 124 ( s t at u t e of lim itatio n s in in v e rs e c o n d e m n a tio n p ro c e e d ing s) , - 1 2 5 (c o m p e n sa tio n o f ju ro rs ), -1 2 6 (p o w e r o f ce rta in h o sp itals to co nd em n ad

jacent , co nt i guo us p ro p ert i es) , - 1 2 7 (adm i ss i b i l i t y of p rop ert y ass ess o r app rai sal s i n cal cul at i ng co m p ensat i o n).

Acc or di n g t o Sh an n on ’ s Code of 1896, t h i s pr ov i s i on w as c opi ed f r om I owa Code of

1851 § 778. 16 -8- without the filing of a

condemnation procee ding, and miscellaneous other matters. The provision 15 onwh ic h M idw e ste rnba se d it s c omp laint s r e a ds a s f oll ow s: A per son or company

actually intending to makeapplication for the privileg es her ein contemplate d, and entering upon the l and of another f or the purposeof making the re quisite ex aminations and surve y s, and d o i n g n o u n n ec es s ar y

i n j u ry , i s l i ab l e o n l y

fo r t h e a ct u al d am age d o ne, and, if

sued in such ca se, the plaintiff shall recove r only as muc h c os ts a s d a ma g e s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-121. 16 The only portion of the statutory

textthat is at all opa que is the phra se “to makeapplication for the privilege s here in contemplated.” Howeve r, i n the contex t of t he st atutory scheme as a w hole, it is clear that the word “privilege s” i n Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 r efe rs bac k to Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 9- 16 -1 01 ’s dis c us sio n o f the “ privi le g e ” of “ tak[in g ] there a l e state of ind ivi du a ls” that th e state h a s “ c o n c e d e d ” t o c e rt a i n e n t i t i e s f o r th e c o n s tru c t i o n o f

w o rk s o f i n t e rn a l i mp r o v e m e n t
. S i m i l ar l y, th e p h ra s e “ t o m ak e ap p l i ca t i o n fo r” i n T en n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -1 6 -1 2 1 i s a r ef er en ce t o th e l an gu age in T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 16 -1 04 a llo wi ng “ [t]he pe rs onse e king to appro priate su c h land[to] f ile a p e t i t i o n i n th e c i r c u i tc o u rto f th e c o u n t y i n w h i c h th e l a n d ” i s l o c a t e dt o c o n d e m n th e p r o p e rt y. The prope rty

owner s in this case havesug g ested no a lternative inter pretation for this statutory lang uag e. Oncethe phra se “to makeapplication for the privileg es her ein contemplate d” is understood, theme a nin g of

Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 sn aps int o foc us . To pa ra ph ra se , this se c tio n g rants companies w ith the pow er of eminent domain that ar e ac tually intending to c ondemn prope rty for the construc tion of a work of internal improveme nt a rig ht of temporary entry to private prope rty for thepu rp os e of

c on du cti ng thepr e lim ina ry e xami natio ns a ndsu rv e y s n e c e ssa ry to s itethepr oje c t. I n exercising this right of e ntry , the co m p any is not allowed to do any unnece ssary

injury to the property , and it must compensate the pr operty owner s for any

actual d am age . A prope rty owner cannot de feat the rig ht of entry by filing a lawsuit ag ainst the company , beca use in any such suit, the relief availableto the property owner is ex pressly

limit ed to re covering thecost of re pairing any a c tu a l d a m a g e c au s e db y th e c o mp a n y. The prope rty

owner s in the se ca ses offe r two ar g uments in oppositi on to this i nterpre tation. First, they rely on the canon of statutory

construction that leg islation granting the pow er of eminent domain is to be strictly

construed a g ainst the conde mning authority and liberally

construed in favorA s one l eadi ng t r eat i s e on s t at ut ory cons t r uct i o n o b serv es , a “ nar r ow, s t r ai ned i nt er pret at i on of s t at ut es 17 g r an t i n g e mi n en t doma i n pow er i s n ev er j u s t i f i ed. ” 3 S UT HE R L A ND § 64: 6, a t 354- 55.
T enn. C o d e A nn. §§ 42

- 3

- 1 0 1 t o - 2 0 5 (20 0 0 ). 18

A c t o f M a r. 2 2 , 1 9 5 7 , ch . 3 7 6 , § 8 , 1 9 5 7 T e n n . P u b . A c ts 1 3 2 6 , 1 3 3 7 -3 8

. 19 -9- of the pa rty resisting condemnation becausethe power of eminent domain ope rate s in derog ation of property rig hts. Ci ty of Cha tta no og a v . S tate , 151 Tenn. 691, 698, 272 S.W. 432, 434 (1925); Draper v. W

ebb , 57 Tenn. App. 394, 396, 418 S.W.2d 7 7 5 , 7 7 6 (1 9 67); 3 N OR MAN J. S I NGER , S U TH E R L A ND ON S T A TUTES AND S TATUTOR Y C ONS TR UC TI ON § 64:6, at 345-57 (6th ed. 2001) (S U THER L AND ). Whil e thi s c a no n o f s tatut ory c on str uc tio n is c e rt a inl y

re le vant, wedo no t f

indit dispositi ve. Acc ording to the property owner s, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 does not authorize a rig ht of entry to conduct pr eliminary examinations and survey s. Rather, it simplylimit s the damag es that a prope rty owner may rec over from a trespasse r who e nters onto prope rty illegally . So interpreted, Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 wo ul d be no th ing le ss than an in vit a tio n to la wl e ssn e ss b e c aus e it would encour ag e tre spasses on private prope rty by limit ing the damag es that trespa ssers would be require d to pay . We decline to asc ribe such a meaning to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-121. More over, if the statute does not c onvey a tempora

ry ri g ht of entry

to companies with the powe r of e minent domain, then it does nothing at all. We de cline the property owner s’ invitation to read Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 out of

exis tenceunder theg uise of “statutory interpre tation.” 17 The property owner s also arg ue that this c ourt should not rea d Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 a s c on ve y ing a

te mpo ra ry ri g ht o f e ntry

onc omp a nie s wi th the po we r of e min e nt d omain b e c aus e i n o th e r s t a tu t e s , th e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y h a s e x p r e s s e di t s i n t e n tt o c o n v e y s u c h a ri g h tm o r e c l e ar l y. As thei r p ri m e example, they point to a simi lar provision of the A irport Authorities Act which 18 state s a s f oll ow s: I n th e a cq u i s i t i o n o f p ro p er ty b y em i n en td o m ai n p ro ce ed i n gs authorized by

this chapter, an autho ri ty shall proce ed in the manne r p r o v i d e db y t i t l e 2 9 , c h ap t e r 1 6

. F o r th e p u rp o s e o f

m aki n g s u r v e ys and examinations relative to eminent domain proc eeding s, it is l awful for th e au th o r ity

to e n te r u p o n th e lan d , d o in g n o u n n e c e s sary damag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 42- 3-109 (e mphasis added) . We find this arg ument unpersua sive. Th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y

e na c te d the p rov isionc od if ie d at T e nn . Co deAn n. § 4 2- 3- 10 9 in 1957, almost one hundred y ear s afte r it enacte d the text of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16- 121. Modes 19 of expression chang e over time, and we f

ind it unremarka

ble that the wor ding c hosen by the Gene ral Assembly to e x press an idea in 1957 would sound somewhat clear er to modern ear s than the wording chosen by the Gene ral Asse mbly

to express the same idea

in 1858. More importantly , we a re a war e of no la w, a ndthepr op e rty ow ne rs ha ve no t poin te d us to one , that re qu ir e s the Ge ne ral A sse mbl yT he C our t of Ap peal s may af

f i r m a j udgment on di f

fer ent gr ounds t han t hos e r el i ed on b y t he t r i al cour t wh en 20 the tria l co u rt re a c h e d the c o rr e c t re su lt. C o n tin e n ta l C a s. C o . v. S m ith , 7 2 0 S .W .2 d 4 8 , 5 0 (T e n n . 1 9 8 6 ); A rn o ld v . C ity o f Ch a t t anooga , 1 9 S .W .3 d 7 7 9 , 7 8 9 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ); A l l en v. N a t ’l B a n k o f N ew p o rt , 839 S. W

. 2d 763, 765 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 2 ); C l a rk v. M et ro. G o v’t , 82 7 S.W

. 2 d 31 2 , 31 7 (T enn. C t
. A p p . 19 9 1 ).

U

. S. Cons t
. a r t
. V I , c l

. 2 pr ov i des : “ T h i s Cons t i t u t i on , an d t h e La ws of t h e U n i t ed St at es w h i ch s h al l be ma de 21 i n Pur s u an ce t h er eof ; a n d a l l T r ea t i es ma de, or w h i ch s h al l be ma de, u n der t h e Aut h or i t y of t h e U n i t ed St at es , s h al l be t he s upr eme Law of

t he l and; an d t he Judge s of ev er y St at e s hal l be bound t her eby , an y T hi ng i n t he C ons t i t ut i on or l aws o f an y sta te to the C o n tra ry n o tw ithsta n d ing .” -10- to u se thesame wo rd ing to e xpre ss a part icu lar i de a in e ve ry le g isl a tiv e e na c tme nt. Th e En g lis h la ng ua g e is i nc re dib ly

fl e xible , andwesh ou ld n ot e xpe c t th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y to l e g isl a te in cookie- cutter f

ashion eve n in contemporaneous st atutes. W e cannot ignor e the Ge neral Assembly ’s intent as expressed in Tenn. Code A nn. § 29-16-121 s i mply beca use a statute e nacte d almost one hu ndre d y e ars late r e xpre sse s th e same c on c e pt i n a sli g htl y mor e str a ig htf

or wa rdmann e r. Onits fac e, T en n . C o de Ann. § 29- 16-121 conve y s a rig ht of entry to conduct pre liminary

examinations and surve y s o n p ri vate pr operty without the property

owner ’s conse nt to companies that havethe power o f em i n ent domain, as long as the c ompany is “ac tually

intending” to file conde mnation complaints to obtain the property rig hts nece ssary

to construct the f

inal projec t. III . P R EE M PTION O F T E NN . C OD E A NN . § 29-16-121 BY TH E N A TUR A L G A S A CT The prope rty

owner s also insist t hat Mi d w e s ternc annot re ly on Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-121 be c aus e thestate c on de mnatio n p ro c e du re s h a vebe e n pr e e mpt e d by the Natur a l Ga s Ac t [15 U .S. C. §§ 717 -717w (2000) ]. The trial court did not rely on fede ral p ree mption when it dism issed Mid we ste rn ’s c omp la int s. Nev erthe le ss, wemus t a ddre ss this arg ume nt b e c aus e if thepr op e rty ow ne rs arec or

re c t, i t w ou ld p ro vid e a n in de pe nd e nt b a sis fo r d ism iss ing Mid we ste rn ’s c omp la int s, and wewould be re quired to af firm the dismissals on this alternative g round. 20

A. Our fe deral sy stem of g overnme nt r ecog nizes the dual sovere ignty of the fe deral gove rnment and the va rious state g overnme nts. Printz v. United States , 521 U.S. 898, 918, 117 S. Ct . 2365, 2376 (1 99 7) ; Gre go ryv . A sh c ro ft , 5 01 U. S. 4 52 , 4 57 , 111 S. Ct. 239 5, 23 99 (1 99 1) . T hestate s p os se ss so ve re ig nty wi thi n the ir pa rtic ula r sp he re s c on c ur

re nt wi th the fe de ral g ov e rn me nt s ub je c t on ly to the po we r of the Con g re ss un de r the Sup re ma c y Claus e of the Un ite d State s Con sti tution to 21 p r e e mp t s tate la w. T

af fl in v. Lev itt , 4 93 U. S. 4 55 , 4 58 , 1 10 S. Ct . 7 92 , 7 95 (1 99 0) ; Be llS ou th Telecomm s., Inc. v . Gree r , 972 S.W .2d at 670. The cou rts , h o w e v e r , ar e r e lu c tan t t o p r e s u meth a t p r e e mp ti o n o f s tatela w h a s o c c urre d. Building & Constr. T

rades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./ R.I., Inc

. , 507 U. S. 218 , 224 , 113 S. Ct. 1 19 0, 11 94 (1 99 3) ; BellSouth Telecomm s., Inc. v . Gree r , 972 S.W .2d at 67 0. Ac c or din g ly , th e c ou rt s wo rk fr om thea ssu mptionthat th e his toric po we rs of thestate s w ith re g ard to m a tte rs tr a dition a lly

su bje c t to state re g ulatio n a reno t disp la c e d by

a fe de ral st a tut e un le ssT hi s t y p e o f i m p l i ed preem p t i o n i s co m m o nl y ref erred t o as “f

i el d ” p reem p t i o n. 22

T hi s t y p e o f

i m p l i ed preem p t i o n i s co m m o nl y ref erred t o as “confl i ct ” p reem p t i o n. 23

T h e U n ited S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt h a s e x p la ine d tha t c o n fli c t p re e m p tio n o c c u rs o n ly wh e n it is i m p o ssib le 24 fo r a pri vat e p art y t o co m p l y wi t h bo t h s t at e and f ed eral l aw o r when, und er t he ci rcum st ances of a p art i cul ar case, t he st ate law st an d s as an o b st ac l e t o the a cc o m p l i shm en t a nd e xe cu t i o n o f the full p urp o ses an d o b je cti ve s o f t he C o ng ress. C ro sb y v . N a t’l F o re ig n T ra d e C o u n c il , 5 3 0 U .S . at 3 7 2 -7 3 , 1 2 0 S . C t. a t 2 2 9 4 ; see a l so W at s on v . Cl ev el and Chai r Co. , 7 8 9 S.W

. 2 d 53 8 , 54 2 (T enn. 19 8 9 ). -11- that is the clea

r and manifest intent of Cong ress. Lor ill ar d To ba c c o Co . v . R e ill

y , 533 U.S. 525, 540- 41 , 12 1 S. Ct. 24 04 , 2 41 4- 15 (2 00 1) ; Eg e lho ff v. Eg e lho

ff , 532 U.S. 141, 151, 121 S. C t. 1322, 1330 (2 00 1) ; Calif

ornia Div. of Labor Standards Enforceme nt v. Dill ingham Const., N .A. , 519 U.S. 316, 32 5, 11 7 S. Ct. 83 2, 83 8 ( 19 97 ); Gr ac e Thr u F

ait h v . Ca ldw e ll , 9 44 S .W .2 d 6 07 , 6 09 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1996). Congr essional purpose is the “ ultimate touchstone” of thepree mption inqui ry . Cipoll one v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 50 5 U. S. 50 4, 51 6, 11 2 S. Ct. 26 08 , 2 61 7 ( 19 92 ); Riggs v. Burson , 941 S.W .2d 44 , 4 8 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . Co ng re ss’ s p re e mptiveint e nt m a y be e ith e r e xpre ss o r i mpl ie d. Expr e ss pr e e mptio n oc c ur s w he n th e Con g re ss i nc lud e s e xplic it p re e mptivelang ua g e in f e de ral st a tut e s. I mplied pree mption occurs wh en the f eder al statutes occ upy

the entireleg islative field leaving no room for state reg ulation, and, even wher e Congr ess has not oc cupied the entire field, to the extent 22 of any outrig ht or actual conflict between f eder al and state law. Lor ill ar d To ba c c o Co . v . R e ill

y , 23 53 3 U. S. a t 54 0, 12 1 S. Ct . at 24 14 ; Gade v . Nat’l Solid W astes Mgmt. Ass’n , 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S. Ct. 2 37 4, 23 83 (1 99 2) ; LeTellier v. LeTellier , 4 0 S. W.3 d at 49 7; Pr ofi ll D e v ., In c . v . D ills , 960 S.W. 2d17 , 2 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) . T hec a te g orie s o f i mpl ied pree mptio n a reno t “ ri g idl y distinct.” English v. Gen. Ele c. Co. , 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5, 110 S. C t. 2270, 2275 n.5 (1990). A n y p r e e mp t i o n i n q u i ry

m u s tb e g i n w i t h th e l a n g u a g e o f th e f e d e r a l s t a tu t e s i n v o l v e d

. In case s of express pree mption, the tex t of the fe deral statute defines the domain that Congr ess intended to pree mpt. Medtronic, I nc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 484, 116 S. C t. 2240, 2250 (1996). Howe ver, in both express and im plied pree mption case s, the fe deral statutory lang uag e is not considere d in a vacuum. Thecourts must also consider thestructureand purposeof the e ntire fe deral statutory scheme

. Cro sb

y v . Na t’ l F

ore ign Tra de Cou nc il , 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S. Ct . 2288, 2294 (2000); B a r n e tt B a n k o

f M a r io n Co u n ty, N. A . v. Nelson , 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S. C t. 1103, 1108 (1996); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. M

cClendon , 498 U.S. 133, 138, 111 S. C t. 478, 482 (1990). 24 State law is displac ed only to the extent that it is expressly or impliedly pree mpted. Dalton v . Li ttl e Ro c k

Fa mi ly Pl an nin g S e rv s. , 5 16 U. S. 4 74 , 4 76 , 1 16 S. Ct . 1 06 3, 10 64 (1 99 6) ; Be llS ou th Te le c o m m s . , Inc. v . Gree r , 9 72 S.W. 2dat 67 1. Ac c or din g ly , th e pr op e r a pp ro a c h is to atte mpt

to rec oncile the f

eder al and state laws at issue, Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 43 5 U. S. 15 1, 18 2- 83 , 9 8 S. Ct. 98 8, 10 07 (1 97 8) ; Me rri ll Lyn c h, Pi e rc e , F e nn e r &Sm ith , I

nc . v . W are , 414 U.S. 117, 127, 94 S. Ct . 383, 389-90 (1973) , rathe r than to seek out c onflict wher e none c learly exis ts. The exist ence a nde xten t of

pr e e mptionare qu e sti on s of la w wh ic h thi s c ou rt re vie ws deno vo . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); Sta te v . S c ott , 678 S.W .2d 50, 51-52 (Te nn. 1984).A t ora l ar gu ment before t hi s cour t , t he propert y owner s i n t wen t y - t hr ee of t he appeal s ex pres s l y di s cl ai med 25
an y r el i an ce on a “ con f l i ct ” pr ee mpt i on t h eor y . T h e r ema i ni n g pr oper t y ow n er s di d n ot f i l e br i ef s on a ppea l or p a rtic ip a te in o ra l ar g u m e n t. -12- B. The prope rty

owner s insistthat Congr ess intended to “occ upy the field” of conde mnation for the c on str uc tio n a nd ma int e nanc e of natur a l g a s p ipe lin e s w he n it e na c te d th e Natur a l G a s A c t. T his arg ument rests on two provisions of the Ac t
. T h e fi rst provision require s natural g as companies e ng a g e d intheint e rs tate or int e rn a tio na l tr a ns po rt a tio n o r s a le of natur a l g a s to ob tain a

c e rtif ic a te of public conve nienceand nec essity from F ERC before“undertak[ing] the construction or e x tension of any fac iliti es.” 15 U .S.C. § 717f(c)( 1)(A)

. The second confe rs eminent domain power on natura l g a s c omp a nie s th a t have be e n is su e d a c e rtif ic ate of pu bli c c on ve nie nc e a ndne c e ssi ty by F ERC to “construc t, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines f

or the transportation of natural g as.” 15 U. S.C. § 7 17 f( h) . The pr op e rty ow ne rs do no t claim that the se pr ov isi on s expr e ssl y pr e e mpt state c on de mnatio n p ro c e du re s, no r d o th e y a sse rt th at th ereis any

a c tual c on fl ic t be tw e e n th e se pr ov isi on s andTe nn e sse e ’s c on de mnatio n s tatut e s. Th us , th e ir pr e e mptiona

rg ume nt i s b a se d s ole ly o n a n i mp l i e d“ f

i e l d ” p r e e mp t i o n th e o ry. 25 The prope rty

owner s’ field pre e mp ti o nth e o r y f o u n d ers on the lang uag e of the very provisions onwh ic h th e y

re ly . T he se c on d p ro vis ionthe y re ly up onbe g ins a s f

oll ow s: Whe n any ho lde r o f a

c e rtif ic a te of pu bli c c on ve nie nc e a ndne c e ssi ty cannot a cquire by

contra ct, or is unable to a g ree wi t h t h e owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the ne cessa ry rig ht-ofway to construct, oper ate, an d maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation o f natural ga s, . . . it may acquir e the same by

the exercise of

the rig ht of eminent domain in the distri ct court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in t he Sta te cou rts . The pra ctice and proce dure in any action or proce eding for that purpose in the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with the pr

ac tic e an d proc e du re in simila r a c ti o n o r

p ro c e e d in g in th e c o u r ts o f t h e S ta te wh e re the property is situated : Pr ov ide d, Th a t th e Un ite d St a te s d ist ri c t c ou rt s shall only have jurisdiction of case s when the amount claimed by the owner of the prope rty

to be conde mned exceeds $3,000. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (e mphasis added)

. By its plain lang uag e, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) does sever al things. First, it deleg ates the f eder al po we r o f e min e nt d omain t o n a tur a l g a s c omp a nie s th a t havebe e n is su e d a c e rtif ic a te of pu blic convenie nce and nece ssityby FERC. Second, it authorizes n at u ra l g as companies to exercise the fe de ral e min e nt d omain pow e r in both s tate a ndfe de ral c ou rt s. Th ir d, it r e qu ir e s f e de ral c ou rt s to fo llo w s tate c on de mnatio n p ro c e du re s a s c los e ly a s p os sib le wh e n n a tural gas co mpanie s se e k toC f. O akl and C l ub v. S. C. P ub. Ser v. Aut h. , 110 F. 2d 84, 85- 87 ( 4t h Ci r . 1940) ( con s t r u i n g s i mi l ar pr ov i s i on 26
o f t h e F e d e ra l P o w e r A c t [1 6 U .S .C . § § 7 9 1 a -8 2 5 r (2 0 0 0 )] a s n o t p re e m p ting S o u th C a ro lina e m ine n t d o m a in la w ).

See W al ke r v. G at eway P i pel i ne Co. , 60 1 So. 2d 97 0, 97 4- 76 ( A l a. 199 2) ( hol di ng t hat N at ur al G as Act does 27 not r equi r e i ssu anc e of FE R C ce r t i f

i cat e of publ i c c onven i enc e a nd ne ces s i t y as a pr er equi s i t e t o t he exe r ci s e of pre co nd em nat i o n ri ght of ent ry fo r prel i m i nary exam i nat i o ns and s urvey s co nferred b y s t at e l aw). -13- exercise the fe deral condemnation powe r in fede ral c ourts. Finally , the statute limits t he fe deral courts’ jurisdiction over case s in which a natural g as company seeks to exerc ise the fe deral eminent domain power

to case s involving prope rty claimed to be worth more than $3,000. Thestatute makes no mention of the states’ e minent domain power. It applies ex clusively to the ex erc ise of t he fe deral eminent domain power

that Congr ess has c hosen to confe r on natura l ga s companies that ha ve re c e ive d a

c e rtif ic a te of pu bli c c on ve nie nc e a ndne c e ssi ty fr om FERC

. The United St ates S upreme Court has addressed feder al preemption of st ate law under the Natural Gas Act many times since the Act’s ena ctment in 1938. In many of these c ases, the Court has expressly

considere d whether state laws or reg ulations are impliedly pree mpted under a

“fie ld” pree mption theory

. See, e .g. , Northw est Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansas , 489 U. S. 4 93 , 5 06 -1 4, 10 9 S. Ct. 12 62 , 1 27 2- 76 (1 98 9) ; Northern Natural Gas C o . v. S t a t e C orp. Comm’n of Kansas , 3 72 U. S. 8 4, 89 -9 8, 83 S. Ct

. 64 6, 64 9- 65 4 ( 19 63 ); Public Utils. Comm’n of Ohio v. United Fue l Gas Co. , 31 7 U. S. 45 6, 46 7- 70 , 63 S. Ct. 36 9, 37 5- 77 (1 94 3)

. No neof the se de c isi on s c on ta ins e ve n th e sli g ht est in dic a tio n th a t Co ng re ss i nte nd e d th e Natur a l G a s A c t to displace the states’ tra ditional authority to deleg ate their

own inhere nt power of

eminent domain for thec on str uc tio n o f w or

ks of int e rn a l impr ov e me nt. Th e pr op e rty ow ne rs ha ve po int e d us to no ca se ho ldi ng that the state s’ auth ority to d e le g a te their own powe r of e minent domain to companies eng ag ed in the business of construc ting wor ks of int e rn a l impr ov e me nt h a s b e e n p re e mpt e d b y theNatur a l G a s A c t. Cou rt s that ha vec on sid e re d th is q u e s ti o n h a v e r e a c h e d p r e c is e ly th e o p p o s it e c o n c lu s ion. Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Ac res of Land , 563 F .2 d 1 17 8, 11 85 n. 19 (5 th C ir . 1 97 7) ; Robinson v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. , 421 F .2 d 1 39 7 ( 5thCir . 197 0) ; se e als o Harmon v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 555 F. Supp. 447, 450 n.5 (D .C. Mo nt. 19 82 ) (h old ing that Natur a l Ga s Ac t do e s n ot r e qu ir e F ERC ’s iss uanc e of a c e rtif ic a te of pu bli c c on ve nie nc e and ne c e ssi ty a s a c on ditionpre c e de nt t o th e app lic a tio n o f s tate c on de mnatio n s tatut e s) ; Southern Natural Gas C o. v. Poland , 384 So. 2d 528, 530-31 (L a. Ct. App. 19 80 ) ( same ). Ac c or din g ly , w e re je c t th e de fe nd a nt p ro pe rty ow ne rs ’ a

rg ume nt that th e se 26 pr oc e e din g s a

repr e e mpt e d b y

thepr ov isi on s o f theNatur a l G a s A c t. 27

IV. T HE P ROP E RT Y O W NE RS ’ M OT I ONS T O D IS M IS S Th e tria l c ou rt ’s Ma

rc h 3 , 20 05 or de r d id n ot s pe c if y thepr oc e du ral ba sis fo r i ts d e c isi onto dismiss Midwestern’ s complaints. Howeve r, Midwestern and the pr o p er t yowner s ag reethat the or de r c a n b e c on str

ue d a s d ism iss ing thec omp laint s pur su a nt to T e nn . R. Civ . P. 12 .0 2( 6) be c aus e they fail to state a c laim upon which re lief can be g rante d. The prope rty owner s also insist t hat the Marc h 3, 2005 order

can beconstrued a s dismis sin g t h e complaints for lack of subject matterT enn. C o d e A nn. §§ 29

- 1 4

- 1 0 1 t o - 1 1 3 (20 0 0 ). 28 -14- jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 12.02(1). Thedistinction between a dismiss al under

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) and a

dismiss al under

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) is significant. Accor dingly we w i l l a d d r e s s e a c h g r o u n ds e p ar a t e l y. A.

The Motion to Dism iss f or Lack of S ubject M atte r Jurisdiction Th e pr op e rty

ow ne rs arg ue that th e tria l c ou rt la c ke d s ub

je c t matte r j urisd ic tio n to a dju dic a te Midwestern’ s claims beca use Mid we s t er n has not y et filed c ondemnation complaints ag ainst the properties under Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-16-104. They note that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-121 wa s o ri gi n al l y en ac t ed as p ar to f t h e c h ap t eres t ab l i s h i n g th e p ro ce d u re s fo r c o n d em n at i o n p ro ce ed i n gs and cla im th a t n o s tatu te o u ts id e th is c h ap te r p r o v id e s p r o c e d u r e s f o r th e a s s e rti o n o f th e rig ht of preliminary

entry convey ed by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-121. Ac cording ly , they ar gu e t h at there is no leg al basis for thetrial court’s exercise of jurisdiction ove r these c ases. This ar g ument ignor es the pl ain lang ua g e of

thec on de mnatio n s tatut e s, no t to me nti ontheTe nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du rea ndthestatut e s g ov e rn ing de c laratory jud g me nts
. 28 1. The c oncept of

subject matter jurisdiction im plicates a court’s pow er to a djudicate a particula r ty pe of c ase or

controve rsy . Toms v . Toms , 9 8 S. W.3 d 1 40 , 1 43 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; First Am. Trust C o. v. Franklin-M

urray Dev . Co. , 59 S.W .3d 135, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). A court derives its subject matter jurisdiction, either expli citly or by nece ssary

implication, from the Constitut ion of Tenne ssee o r fr om leg islative acts. Meighan v . U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. , 924 S.W .2d 632, 639 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; Di sh mo n v . She lbySta te Cm ty . Co ll. , 15 S.W .3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). The parties c annot confer subject matter jurisdi ction on a trial or an appellate court by appea ranc e, plea , consent, sil ence , or waiver. State ex re l. Dep’t of Soc. Se rvs. v. W right , 7 3 6 S. W. 2 d8 4 , 8 5 n.2 (T e nn . 1 98 7) ; Team Design v . Gottlieb , 104 S.W .3d 512, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). The e x istence of

subject matter jurisdiction depends on thenatureof the c ause of action and the re lief soug ht. Landers v. Jone s , 872 S.W .2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994) . Thus, when a court’s subjec t matter jurisdiction is questioned, it must first ascertain the nature or g ravamen of the c ase. Newsome v . W hite , No. M2001-03014-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 22994288, at * 2 (T enn. Ct. App. Dec . 22, 20 03 ) ( No Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 11 app lic a tio n f ile d) ; Le v y v . B d. of Z

on ing Ap pe als , No. M1999-00126- COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL

1141351, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 2 7 , 2001) (No T enn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) . The c ourt m u s t t h en determine whether the Constitut ion of Tenne ssee, the Gen e r a l A s s e mb ly , o r

th e c o mm o n la w h a v e c o n f e rr e do n it

th e p o w e r

to a d ju d ic a tec a s e s o f

that sort. Ne wso me v . W

hite , 2 00 3 W L22 99 42 88 , at *2 ; Le v y v . B d. of Z

on ing Ap pe als , 2 0 0 1 WL 1141351, at *3. B oth determinations pre sent q u es t i o n s o f law which this court review s de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness. Northlan d Ins . Co. v . S tate , 33 S.W .3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000) ; Southwest W

illiamson C ounty Cmty. Ass’n v . Saltsman , 66 S.W .3d 872, 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 12 i s subst ant i al l y identi cal to Fe d

. R

. C i v. P

. 12 , m aki ng f ed eral co urt prece d ent s p ers uasi ve 29
a u tho rity in c o n stru ing o u r ru le

. B y rd v . H a ll , 8 4 7 S .W .2 d 2 0 8 , 2 1 1 n.2 (T e n n . 1 9 9 3 ); B ayberr y Ass ocs . v. Jones , 783 S .W .2 d 5 5 3 , 5 5 7 (T e n n . 1 9 9 0 ); Paci f i c Eas t er n Cor

p. v . G ul f Li f e H ol di ng Co. , 902 S. W

. 2d a t 952 n

. 7.
T h er e i s n o a n al og ou s “ f ac t u al ” ch al l en g e t o a c ompl ai n t for fai l u r e t o s t at e a cl ai m u pon wh i ch re l i ef c an be 30 g ra n te d un d e r T e n n . R

. C iv. P

. 1 2 .0 2 (6 ). If e ithe r o r b o th p a rtie s su b m it e v id e n tiar y m a te ria ls o u tsid e the p le a d ing s in sup p o rt o f

o r i n o p p o si t i o n to a T en n. R

. C i v. P

. 1 2 .02 (6 ) m o t i o n a nd the t rial co urt d ec i d es to co nsid er these m aterials, the trial c o u rt m u st c o n v e rt the m o tio n to d ism iss to a m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t, P a c ifi c E a ste rn C o rp . v. G u lf L ife H ol di ng Co. , 9 0 2 S .W .2 d a t 9 5 2 , a n d n o tif y the p a rtie s tha t it h a s m a d e the c o n v e rs io n , T ea st er v . T en n . D ep ’t o f C o rr. , N o. 01A01

- 9 6 08- CH

- 00358, 1998 W L 195963, a t * 3- 4 ( T en n . Ct

. App. Apr

. 24, 1998) ( N o T en n . R. App. P. 11 ap p l i ca t i o n fi l ed ). O nc e a m o t i o n t o d i sm i ss has b ee n c o nv erted t o a m o t i o n for su m m ary jud gm en t , t he t rial co urt m ust d e n y th e m o tio n if th e re e x ists a n y g e n u ine d isp u te a b o u t th e m a te ria l fa c ts o f t h e c a se . B y rd v . H a ll , 847 S. W

. 2d a t 211; Pat e v. Se r v. M er ch. Co. , 95 9 S.W

. 2 d 56 9 , 57 3 (T enn. C t
. A p p . 19 9 6 ). -15- Likea motionfo r f

ailu reto s tate a

c laim u po n w hic h r e lie f c an be grant ed, a motionto dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may rest on the contents of the c omplaint alone. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. Howeve r, this is not alway s the casebeca use a c ourt’s subject matter jurisdiction may be questioned in two way s – “fa cial” c halleng es or “ fac tual” challeng es. Tho ma s v . M ay fie ld , No. M2000-02533-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 904080, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. N ov. 15, 2004); 2A J A M ES W. M O O RE , M O O RE ’ S F ED ER A L P RACT I CE ¶ 12.07[2.- 1], at 12 -5 0 to 12 -5 5 ( 2de d. 19 96 ). Th e me tho d a c ou rt us e s to e va luate a

fa c ia l atta c k is qu ite simil ar to the me thod of dec iding motions to dismiss f or failure to state a c laim upon which re lief can beg rante d. Jetform Cor p. v. Unisys Corp. , 11 F

. Sup p. 2d 78 8, 78 9 ( E. D. Va . 1 99 8) ; Ave llino v. He rron , 991 F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1997)

. A “ fa c ia l” c ha lle ng e make s w ar o n th e c omp laint its e lf . It a sse rt s that the c omp la int , considere d from top to bottom, fails t o al l ege f acts that show that the c ourt has powe r to hea r the case . See, e .g. , C ra wford v. United States Dep’t of Justice , 123 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1013-14 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (makin g a fac ial challeng e to jurisdiction). In deciding a fa cial challeng e, the c ourt 29 considers the impugne d pleading and nothing else. Laird v. Ramirez , 884 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (N.D. I ow a 19 95 ); Ensign-Bickford Co. v . ICI Explosive s USA, Inc

. , 817 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (D. Conn. 19 93 ). I f a

c omp la int

a tta c ke d o n it s f

a c e c omp e te ntl y

a lle g e s any

fa cts whi ch, if

true , w ou ld establish g rounds for subject m atter jurisdiction, the court must uncritica lly acc ept t hose facts, end its inqui ry , and deny

the dismissal mot ion. Gre at Lake s E du c . Co ns ult

an ts v . F e d. Em e rg e nc

y Mg mt
. Agenc y , 582 F. Supp. 193, 194 (W.D. Mich. 1984). “F actua l” challeng es to sub j ect matter jurisdiction require a diffe rent a pproac h both in the trial court and on appeal. A “fa ctual” c halleng e d en i es t h at the court actually has subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of fac t e ven thoug h the complaint alleg es fa cts tending to show jurisdiction. It controverts the complaint’s fac tual alleg ations reg arding jurisdiction, Cedars-Sinai Med. Ct r. v. W atkins , 11 F.3d 1573, 1583- 84 (F ed. Cir. 1993), and puts at issue the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to prove fa cts that would bring the ca se within the court’ s subje ct matter jurisdiction, EnsignBickford Co. v

. ICI Explosive s USA, Inc

. , 817 F. Supp. at 1023. “F actua l” cha lleng es to jurisdiction c re a te “ g e nu ineiss ue s a s to mate ri a l f a c t,” bu t the y do no t re qu ir e c ou rt s to c on ve rt themotionint o one for summary

judgme nt. Chenault v. W alker , 36 S.W .3d 45, 55-56 (Te nn. 2001). Instead, the 30 courts must resolve the se fa ctual issues, at lea st pr el i m i n ar ily

. Edick v . Poznanski , 6 F. Supp. 2dT he p rop ert y ow ners represent i ng t hem sel ves pro se s o ught t o t est i f y at t he very b egi nni ng of t he heari ng, but 31 t he t r i al cour t r ebuf

fed t hei r r eques t becau s e t he i s s ue un der cons i dera t i on at t hat t i me was admi ni s t r at i ve i n n at ur e. -16- 66 6, 66 8 (W.D . M ic h. 19 98 ); Malkin v. U nited States , 3 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497 (D. N .J . 1998). The court must “dete rmine whether the evidenc e in f avor of finding jurisdiction is sufficient to allow the caseto proce ed.” Chenault v. W alker , 36 S.W .3d at 56. I n assessing “fa ctual” c halleng es to subject matter jurisdiction at the m otion to dismi ss stag e, courts must keep in mind that the pl aintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving fac ts establishing the courts’ jurisdiction over

the ca se. Chenault v. W

alker , 3 6 S. W.3 d a t 56 ; W ilson v. Sentenc e Info. Se rv s. , No. M1998-00939-COA- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 1 WL 422966, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2001) (N o Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) . I f a de fendan t h as fi led af fidavits or other c ompetent e vid e nti ary

mate ri a ls c ha lle ng ing theplaintif f’ s ju ri sd ic tio na l a lle g a tio ns , th e plaintif f m a y no t r e ly onthea lle g a tio ns of

thec omp la int

a lon e , b ut i ns te a d must pr e se nt ev ide nc e by a ff idavit or oth e rw ise that makes out a prima fac ie showing of fa cts establishing jurisdiction

. T en n . R. Civ. P . 43.02; Chenault v. W

alker , 36 S.W .3d at 56. The tria l cour t wi ll “take a s true the alleg ations of the nonmoving party and resolve all fac tual disputes in its favor . . . [wit hout c reditin g] co n cl u s ory alleg ations or dra w[ing] farf etche d infere nces.” Ch e n a u lt v . W a lker , 36 S.W .3d at 56 (c itations omi tte d) ; ac c or

d W ils on v . S e nte nc e In

fo. Se rv s. , 2001 WL 4 2 2 966, at *5. Howe ver, thecourt’s initial resolution of t h e fa ct ual issues relating to jurisdiction is not final and conc lusive. As the Tenne ssee Supre me Court has explained, the court does “not makeany finding as to whethe r [the plaintif f’ s] ve rs ionof

e ve nts is, in f

a c t, c or re c t. Th a t will be fo r a jury to de c ideif thec a se g oe s to trial.” Chenault v. W

alker , 36 S.W .3d at 56. Midwestern’ s complaints werenot verified, and Midwestern did not file aff idavits or other competent e videncein support of its motions. The prope rty owner s likewise filed no a ffidavits or other e videncein oppositi on to Midwestern’s c omplaints and m otions. At the Febr uary 22, 2005 hearing, thetrial court r ep eate dly offe red both sides the opportunityto present testimony or other evidenc e, but they

declined thetrial court’ s invitation t o do so. Thus, the Marc h 3 , 2 0 05 order 31 denying Midwe stern’s motions and dismissing its complaints did not rest on any evidenc e contained in the re c or d. I f the tria l c ou rt dis mis se d th e c omp laint s f or la c k o f sub

je c t matt e r jurisd ic tio n, it d id so based o n a

“ f a c ial” r a th e r

th a n a “ f a c tu a l” c h a ll e n g e to it s s u b je c t m a tt e r

ju ris d ic ti o n. Acc ording ly , we must assume the truth of t he allegations contained in Midwestern’s c omplaints and decidewhether

the alleg ed fa cts provide a basis for the trial court’s e x erc ise of s u b j ec t matter jurisd ic tio n o ve r the se c a se s. 2. The Ge neral Assembly ’s intent reg arding the re lative timi ng of the e ntry for pr eliminary e xa mi n a ti o n s a n ds u r v e y s u n d e r T e n n . Co d e A n n . § 2 9

- 1 6

- 1 2 1 a n dth e f il in g o f a c o n demnation complaint under Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-16- 104 is clear from the statutory

text . Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 auth orize s the pr e lim ina ry ri g ht o f e ntry

wh e n a c omp a ny is “ a c tually

int e nd ing ” to f

ile initiate condemnation proc eeding s, not after a conde mnation complaint has alre ady been f iled.I n t he 14 8 y ear s s i nce t he G ene r al Ass emb l y f i r s t adop t ed t he s t at ut ory s che me, the l ang uag e of t hes e t wo 32
s ec t i on s h as r ema i n ed v i r t u al l y un ch an g ed. T h e ph r as e “ as prov i ded i n § 29- 16- 120” i n T en n . Code An n . § 29- 16- 122 or i g i n al l y r ea d “ as be for e pr ov i ded. ” Code of 1858 § 1346. -17- I f therewer e any

doubt reg arding the seque nce of events e nvision ed b y

the Gene ral Assembly , it is decisively resolved by

rea ding T enn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-121 in the conte x t of the provision immediately

following it both in the original 1858 Code and in the cur rent e dition of the Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d. Re a d inor de r, the se tw o s e c tio ns pr ov idea s f oll ow s: A p e r s o n o r

c o mp a n y actually intending to make application for the privilege s here in contemplated, and entering upon theland of another for the pur

pose of making t h e requisite examinations and survey s, and doing no unnece ssary injury , is liable only

for the a ctual dama g e do ne , an d, if su e d insu c h c a se , th e plaintif f s ha ll r e c ov e r o nly a s mu c h c os ts a s d a ma g e s. No per son or company shall, howeve r, enter upon such land for the pur

pose of actually occ upying the rig ht-of-w ay , until the damag es asse ssed by t h e juryof inquest and the c osts have bee n actually paid; or if an a

ppeal ha s been ta

ken, until the bond has bee n g iven to abide by

the final judg ment as provided in § 29- 16-120. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29- 16-12 1 t o -122 (originally codified at Code of 1858 §§ 1345-1346) (empha sis added). 32 Th e se se c tio ns c le arl y dis tin g uis h be tw e e n “ e nte ri ng up on the land of a no the r f or thepu rp os e of makin g there qu isi te e xami natio ns a ndsu rv e y s” a nd“ e nte r[i ng ] upo n s uc h land fo r thepu rp os e of a c tually oc c up y ing theri g ht- of

-w a y .” Te nn . Cod e An n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 auth orize s c omp a nie s w ith the power of eminent domain to ente r privateproper ty to conduct “the requisite ex aminations and survey s” as long as t he company does no unnec essary

injury and pay s the property

owner for any actual damag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-122 warns, however, that this temporary , limit ed rig ht of preliminary

entry must not be confused w ith the rig ht to enter private p ro p er t y fo r the purposeof “ac tually occupying” it, which the statutory schemeauthoriz es o n l y afte r the filing of a condemnation complaint, d et er mination by a jury of the amount due to the property owner , and pay me nt o f c omp e ns a tio n to thepr op e rty ow ne r fo r the takin g or thepo sti ng of a bo ndsu ff

ic ie nt t o cover this sum as well as the court costs pending appeal. Thus, under theplain lang uag e of the statute, the rig ht of entry

for pr eliminary

examinations and survey s arises prior to the filing of a c on de mnatio n c omp la int

. The statutory

condemnation procedur es re prese nt the Gene ral Asse mbly ’s consider ed policy judgme nt reg ard i n g how best to balanc e the rights of private prope rty owner s ag ainst the public’s interest in the construc tion of infrastruc ture proje cts that servethe common g ood. The Ge ner al Assembly has dele g ated the a wesome pow er o f eminent domain to companies involved in theE. g. , T enn. C o d e A nn. §§ 65

- 6

- 1 0 9 (2 0 0 4 ) (rai l road c o m p ani es) , 6 5

- 2 1

- 1 0 1 (2 0 0 4 ) ( t el egrap h and t el ep ho ne 33
com pani es ) , 65- 22

- 10 1 (2004 ) ( po wer co mp ani es ) , 6 5- 27

- 10 1 ( 20 04 ) (wat er co mp ani es ) , 65- 28

- 10 1 (2004 ) ( nat ur al ga s c o m p a n ie s)

.

A s t he T enn es s ee Supre me C our t l ong a go obser ved i n c onnec t i on wi t h t he s i t i ng of a r ai l r oad l i ne: 34

N ecessar i l y t he l o cat i o n m ust be co nt roll ed , t o a l arge ext ent , by t he t o p o graphy of t he co unt ry , and t he na t ura l ad va ntag es a nd o b st ac l es to b e m et o n t he d i f fere nt ro utes; an d the d eterm i na t i o n o f t he se q uest i o ns res t s l argel y i n t he [com p any’ s] engi neer, and upo n hi s [or her] judgm ent and dis cret i o n t he l oca t i on mu s t l ar g el y de pen d.
T e n n . C e n t. R . C o . v. C a m p b e ll , 73 S.W

. 11 2 , 11 6 (T enn. 19 0 3 ).

A s o ne co m m ent at o r has o b ser ved , t he “po wer o f em i nent do m ai n has b een, and remains , a necess ary el em ent 35 t o a cc ompl i s h g r ea t pu bl i c en t er pr i s es . ” 3 S UT HE R L A ND § 64: 6, a t 355. -18- c on str uc tio n andop e ratio n of ce rt a in wo rk s of inte rn a l impr ov e me nt. Th e se pr oje c ts a reg e ne rally 33 lin e ar i n n a tur e , andthe y c a nn ot b e c on str

uc te d u nle ss thec omp a ny con st ruct in g t he m is ableto obtain property rig hts along a continuous path from the starting point to the e nd of the proje ct. The completion of such projects often require s the ex penditure of substantial resour ces, and the Gene ral As se mbl y c ou ld r e a so na

bly c on c lud e that c omp a nie s w ou ld b e un wi lli ng , o r at lea st he sit a nt, to undertake such c ostly projec ts if they could not determine early in the proce ss whether

a propose d route wa s phy sically

possible, much less economically fea sible. Thus, with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 34 1 6 -1 21 , th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y so ug ht t o e nc ou ra g e thec on str uc tio n o f c ri tic a l in fr a str

uc tur e pr oje c ts by confe rring on companies that h av e the power of e minent domain the additional ability to enter private pr operty

on a tempora

ry , limit ed basis to cond u ct t h e examinations and survey s nece ssary fo r the siting of

su c h p ro je c ts. 35 Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 9 -16-121 is not , as the prope rty owner s claim, some kind of outrig ht assault on the rig ht of property owner s to control acc ess t o their prope rties. As noted a bove, the Ge ne ral A sse mbl y

ha s o nly c on fe rr e d the po we r o f e min e nt d omain o n a small c a te g ory

of private compan ie s e n g a g e d

in the construction of vital infr astructur e proje cts. Moreove r, the de cision befor e theGe ne ral A sse mbl y

wa s n ot a simple c ho ic e be tw e e n pro te c tin g or c urtaili ng tr a dition a l pr op e rty rig hts. A policy that rig idly enfor ced an absolute rig ht to exclude others fr om one’s prope rty at the property owner ’s whim could well havethe pra ctical e ffe ct o f u ndermining the prope rty rig hts of others. I f companies with the power of eminent domain cannot temporarily acc ess prope rties along th e p r o p o s e dr o u t e o f al i n e ar c o n s tru c t i o n p r o

j e c tt o p e r f

o rmth e e x a m i n a t i o n s a n ds u r v e ys nece ssary to site the project, they

will likelybe for ced to f

ile condemnation complaints much earlier in the proce ss and ag ainst a much gre ater number of properties. Such a process would cr eateclouds onthetit le s o f l arg e nu mbe rs of pr op e rtie s f

or lon g pe ri od s o f timebe fo re thec omp a ny , th e c ou rt s, a ndthe app ro priate g ov e rn me ntal re g ulatory a g e nc ie s h a vee ve n d e te rm ine d w hic h p ro pe rtie s w ill ultimate ly

be ne e de d f

or thec on str

uc tio n o f thefi na l pr oje c t.A t o ra l ar g u m e n t b e fo re th is c o u rt, M id w e ste rn s ta te d u n e q u ivo c a lly tha t i t ha s n o t an d w o u ld no t atte m p t t o 36
e x e rc ise the rig h t o f e n try c o n v e ye d b y T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -1 6 -1 2 1 w itho u t f irst e ithe r o b ta inin g the p ro p e rty o w n e r’s p erm i ss i o n t o ent er t he p rop ert y o r f i l i ng sui t a gai nst the p rop ert y o wner a nd o b t ai ni ng a c o urt ord er confi rming i t s ri ght o f p re lim ina ry en try. W e fully e x p e c t M id w e ste rn to c o m p ly w ith its re p re se n ta tio n s to this c o u rt. A l l i an ce f or N at i ve A m . In d ia n R ig h ts in Te n n ., In c . v. N ic e ly , __ _ S.W

. 3 d

__ _ , __ _ (T enn. C t
. A p p . 20 0 5 ).

S e e Te n n . E le c . P o w e r C o . v. H o lt , 3 T enn. A p p . 37 2 , 37 3

- 7 4 (19 2 6 ) ( i nvo l vi ng a pro p ert y o w ner who 37 d yn a m ited c o n c re te b a se fo r a stee l to w e r t h a t a p o w e r co m p a n y h a d c o n stru c te d o n p ro p e rty h e c la im e d to o w n ); s ee a l so M o d el E m i nent D o m ai n C o d e § 30 1 (a)( 3 ) ( 1 9 7 4 ), 13 U

. L.A. 30 (20 0 2 ) ( aut ho ri zi ng pre- co nd em nat i o n ri ght of ent ry for e x ami n at i on s a n d s u r v ey s fol l owi n g r ea s on abl e ef for t s t o n ot i f

y t h e pr oper t y own er an d pa y men t of c ompen s at i on fo r any res ul t i ng da m ages as l o ng as t he ent ry i s “accom p l i shed p eacea b l y and wi t ho ut i nf l i ct i ng s ub st ant i al i njury ”). -19- 3. We ha ve a lr e a dy no te d that Te nn . Co deAn n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 is n ot an in vit a tio n to la wl e ssn e ss. Be fo re ex erc ising its rig hts under the statute, a company must either re ach an ag ree ment with the aff ecte d property

o wn er s o r m ust obtain an order confirming its right to conduc t preliminary examinations and survey s. Disputes betwee n the prope rty owner s and the company reg arding the 36 need f or or e x tent of particular e x aminations and surve y s can beresolved by the court asked to ente r theor de r g ranti ng thete mpo ra ry ri g ht of e ntry . Th e se pr oc e du ral pr ote c tio ns arene c e ssa ry no t on ly to p ro te c t th e du e pr oc e ss rig hts of thepr op e rty

ow ne rs bu t al so to avo id v olatil e a ndpo te nti a lly vio le nt c on fr on tatio ns be tw e e n th e c omp a ny a ndthepr op e rty

ow ne rs . 37 Contrary to t h e p ro p er ty

owner s’ claim, the Te nnesseeRules of Civil P roce dure and the statutes g overning decla

ratory judgme nts establish procedur es for the assertion and enfor ceme nt of the rig ht of entry

confe rre d by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 71 provides that the “proc edurefor the c ondemnation of both re al and pe rsonal prope rt y under the power of eminent domain shall be in ac cordance w ith the statutes of this state,” and that “to the extent that they arenot in conflict with or do not contra dict or contravene the provisi ons of said statutes, these Rules, whe re applicable , shall be followed.” Thus, the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Proceduresup p l ement the statutory condemnation scheme. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 14-103 provides that “ [a] ny person . . . whose rig hts, status, or othe r leg al re lat i o n s areaff

ecte d by a statute . . . may

have de termined any

question of construc tion or validi t y ar i s i n g u n d er the . . . statute . . . and obtain a de clar ation of rig hts, status, or other leg al relations thereunder .” Further, T enn. Code Ann. § 29-14-110 empower s courts to g rant “ [f] urther relief based on a

decla ratory judgme nt or d ec re e” w heneve r such f urther r elief is “ne cessa

ry or proper ,” and that “application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief.” The stated purpose of these statutes is “to settle and to aff ord re li ef fr o m u n certainty and insecurity with r espec t to rig hts, status, and other leg al relations,” and it is “to be liberally construed and administere d” to ac hieve this reme dial purpose. Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 113. Although Midwe st ern’s complaints werenot sty led as “ Complaints for Decla ratory J udg ments,” it is well established that the courts of thi s state look to the substancerathe r than the form of pleading s in determining their nature and eff ect. Morgan v. Layne , 165 Tenn. 513, 518, 56 S.W. 2d16 1, 16 2 ( 19 33 ); Rawlings v. John Hancoc k Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 78 S.W .3d 291, 300 (Tenn.T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -1 4 -1 0 2 (a ) (“C o u rts o f re c o rd w ithin th e ir re sp e c tive j u risd ic tio n s h a v e th e p o w e r to 38 dec l ar e r i g h t s , s t at u s , or ot h er l eg al r el at i on s w h et h er or n ot f u r t h er r el i ef i s or cou l d be c l ai med. ”) ; T en n . R. Ci v . P. 57 ( “ T h e e x i s t e n c e of

a n ot h e r a de qu a t e r e me dy do e s n ot n e c e s s a r i l y pr e c l u de a j u dg me n t for de c l a r a t or y r e l i e f i n ca s es w h e re it is ap p ro p ria te .” ); C ity o f C h a tta n o o g a v . S ta te , 151 T en n . a t 698, 272 S. W

. a t 434 ( “ O f c ou r s e t h e powe r of em i nent do m ai n i s t o be s t ri ct l y co nst rued, and the p roce d ure p res cri b ed b y the st at ut e m ust be fo l l o wed

. T here i s no re a so n , ho w e v e r, w h y the L e g islatu re m a y no t p re sc rib e two m e tho d s o f p ro c e d u re , an d this i s fre q u e n tly d o n e a s w ill ap p ear f rom an exam i nat i o n of t he aut ho ri t i es r eferred t o i n 20 C

. J. 81

. ”). -20- Ct. App

. 2 001). Midwestern filed its complaints ag ainst the property owner s rather

than the proper ti e s . T h e r e li e f

s o u g h t i n th e c o mp lain ts –i. e . , a d e c la r a ti o n o f it s rig h ts u n d e r

T e n n . Co de An n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 a nd a n ord e r en fo rc ing the se ri g hts – is c la ssi c de c laratory jud g me nt r e lie f. Th us , we have no diffic ulty

concluding that Midwestern’ s complaints ag ainst the property owner s were , in essence , complaints for de clar atory judgme nt. Midwestern wa s not require d to file conde mnation c omp la int s a g a ins t th e pr op e rtie s as a pr e re qu isi te to as se rting a ndse e kin g c ou rt e nf or c e me nt o f i ts rig hts unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121. Acc ording ly , we r ejec t the property owner s’ ar g ument 38 that th e tria l c ou rt

la c ke d s ub

je c t matte r j urisd ic tio n o ve r the se c a se s.

B. The M otion to Di sm iss forF ail ur e to St at e a C lai m The prope rty

owner s als o i nsist that the trial court prope rly dismiss ed Midwestern’s complaints because they

fail to state a c laim u p o n wh i ch re lief can be g rante d. We have alrea dy addre sse d th ep r o p e r

ty o w n e r s ’ a r g u me n ts b a s e d

on their interpr etation of Te nnessee ’s conde mnation laws and the Natural Gas Ac t. I n light of our interpre tation of the re levant state and fede ral law , we have de termined that Midweste rn’s c omplaints state a claim upon which r elief c an be g rante d. 1. A motion to dis miss a complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be gr anted tests the leg al suffic iency

of the plaintiff’ s pleading

. Gi v e ns v . M ull ik in , 75 S.W .3d 383, 406 (Tenn. 20 02 ); Trau-Med of Am., I nc. v. A llstat e Ins. Co. , 7 1 S. W. 3 d6 9 1 , 6 9 6 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 2 )

. T h e motion require s the court to review the complaint alone, Mi tc he ll v . Ca mp be ll , 88 S.W .3d 561, 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), and to look to the complaint’s substance rathe r t han it s form, Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W .2d 728, 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Dismiss al under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) is warranted only when the alleg ed facts wil l not entitle the pl aintiff to relief, Crews v. Buck man Labs. Int’l, Inc. , 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 5 2 , 8 5 7 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 2 ) , o r w h e n th e c o mp l a i n t i s t o t a l l y l a c ki n g i n c l ari t y a n ds p e c i f i c i t y, Dobbs v. Gue nther , 846 S.W .2d 270, 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). A Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion admits t he truth of all the relevant and material fac tual all ega t i o n s in the complaint but asserts that no cause of a ction arises f rom these f

acts. Davis v. Tennessean , 83 S .W. 3d12 5, 12 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Pe ndle ton v . Mills , 73 S.W .3d 115, 120 (Tenn. C t
. App. 2001). Ac cording ly , in review ing a trial court’ s dismis sal of a c omplaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), we must c onstrue the complaint liberally in favor of

the plaintiff by

taking all fac tual alleg ations in the comp laint as true, Stein v. Dav idson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997) , and by g iving the plaintiff the bene fit of all infer ence s that can r easona bly be dra wn-21-

from the plea ded fa cts, R OB E R T B A N KS , J R . & J UNE F. E NTMAN , T ENNES S EE C I V I L P ROCE DURE § 5- 6(g ), at 5-110 ( 2d ed. 2004). We re view the tria l court’s leg al conc lusions reg arding the ade quacy of the c omplaint de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness. Sn

y de r ex re l. Be ll v . I

c ar d, Me rri ll, Culli s, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A. , 98 6 S.W. 2d 55 0, 55 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; Stein v. Dav idson Hotel Co., 945 S.W .2d at 716. 2. Ea c h o f the c omp la int s Mids we ste rn fi le d in th e se c a se s c on taine d th e fo llo wi ng a lle g a tio ns : (1) that Midwestern ow ned and ope rate d an interstateg as pipeline; (2) that Midwestern ha s the power of eminent domain under state law; (3) that Midwestern intends to construct an extension of an exis ting pipeline in Sumner and Trousdale Counties; (4) that Midwestern desires t o co n duct preliminary ex am i n at i o ns and surve y s pursuant to Tenn. Code A nn. § 29-16-121; and ( 5) that Midwestern intends to exerc ise its power of e minent domain if it is forced to conde mnation actions to o btain the e a se me nts ne e de d to con str uc t the pip e lin e . F or

thepu rp os e of

thepr op e rty

ow ne rs ’ motion to di smiss, we must take eac h of these alleg ations as true. We h a ve a lr e a dy

de te rm ine d th a t T e nn . Co deAn n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 g iv es e nti tie s w ith cond em n at i o n p o we r t h e r i gh tt o co n d u ctp re l i m i n ar y ex am i n at i o n s an ds u rv ey s o n p ro p er ty that they may be re quired to conde mn in order to construc t a public improvement. Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-16- 121 is n o t p r e e mp te d b y th e f e d e r a l N a tu r a l G a s A c t, a n d e n ti ti e s s e e kin g th e rig h t to conduct preliminary

ex aminations and surve y s need not fir st file a conde mnation proce eding or obtain a certificate of

public convenie nce and nece ssityfrom F ERC. Further , state courts have subjec t matter jurisdiction to hear and decidelawsuits filed by entities seeking to confirm their rights unde r Tenn. Cod e An n. § 2 9- 16 -1 21 or by pr opert y own ers se e kin g dama g e s f or un ne c e ssa

ry inj ury to the ir pr op e rty re su lti ng fr om the pr e lim ina ry e xami natio ns or

su rvey s. B a se d o n th e se c on c lus ion s, Midwestern’ s complaints clearly state a c laim upon whi ch re lief can be g rante d, and thus the trial court e rre d by

dismiss ing the m pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). V. We r e ve rs e theMa

rc h 3 , 2 00 5 o rd e r d ism iss ing Mid we stern ’s pe titiona nd re mand thec a se to the trial court f

or further proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion. We tax thecosts of this appea l to Michael Rippy

and The resa

Rippyfor whic h execution, if nece ssary , may issue.

___________________________________ WILLIAM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.