Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, e-mail 

corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

MATTHEW RICHTER, 

Appellant, 

v. 

SHELLEY RICHTER, 

Appellee. 

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) Supreme Court No. S-15088 

Superior Court No. 3PA-11-02920 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 6931 - August 1, 2014 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Palmer, Vanessa White, Judge. 

Appearances: Richard W. Postma, Jr. and Mitchell K. Wyatt, 

Law Offices of Mitchell K. Wyatt, Anchorage, for Appellant. 

Elizabeth-Ann Neufeld Smith, Law Offices of Kenneth 

Goldman, PC, Palmer, for Appellee. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

MAASSEN, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The superior court granted a divorce to Shelley and Matthew Richter and 

equitably divided their marital property. Matthew appeals, challenging the court’s 

jurisdiction and its finding that a loan from Matthew’s mother was marital debt. We 

affirm. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Shelley Richter (now Sailer) and Matthew Richter married in California in 

January 2010. They separated in October 2011, and Shelley filed for divorce. At the 

three-day divorce trial in December 2012, Matthew argued that the superior court lacked 

jurisdiction over him because he is a resident of Idaho. He contended that he had not 

resided in Alaska for at least six consecutive months while in a marital relationship with 

Shelley, as is required by Alaska law before the court can acquire personal jurisdiction 

over the parties in a divorce action.1 

Matthew and Shelley are both helicopter pilots, and their work requires 

frequent travel. According to Matthew, he moved to Alaska five or six years before trial 

but “was only there seasonally” until he and Shelley got married, when he began living 

in Alaska year-round. At trial he identified Idaho as his residence, but he also testified 

that he had had an Alaska driver’s license for about three years, that he applied twice for 

an Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend but never qualified, and that he used an Alaska 

address for his 2010 federal income tax return. He testified that because he and Shelley 

both traveled frequently, there was no continuous six-month period of time when they 

lived together in Alaska during their marriage. 

Shelley testified that Matthew rented out his house in Idaho and brought 

most of his belongings to Alaska shortly after they got married, and that they bought a 

condo together in Anchorage in April 2010. She testified that Matthew told her in March 

2011 that he wanted to move back to Idaho, but he did not actually leave until October 

2011, when they agreed to separate. 

See AS 09.05.015(a)(12). 

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1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After hearing this testimony, the superior court concluded that it had 

personal jurisdiction over Matthew because “[h]e was a resident [of Alaska] from 

January of 2010 until at least September of 2011 in a marital relationship and he resided 

in this state consecutively during that time.” 

Other issues at trial involved the parties’ marital property and debts. Their 

main disagreement concerned a $100,000 loan from Matthew’s mother, Patricia Richter. 

Shelley entered the marriage with over $100,000 in debt for student loans, bearing a 

variable interest rate that could go as high as 16 percent. According to Matthew, his 

mother offered to help Shelley with refinancing the student loan debt and co-signing a 

new loan at a lower interest rate; he testified that he had no involvement in that 

transaction. Shelley testified, on the other hand, that Matthew’s mother “made $100,000 

available to [her and Matthew] to use as investment,” which they first considered 

investing in commercial properties in Girdwood. Shelley testified that “[t]hose 

properties didn’t work out[,] and as we sat there empty handed, not sure what our next 

move was, we started analyzing our finances and looking at where our liabilities were.” 

Concluding that reducing Shelley’s student loan debt was their wisest financial move, 

they jointly decided to use the $100,000 from Matthew’s mother to pay off that debt. 

Whatever the impetus, Patricia Richter took out a loan from a family trust at about 2.25% 

interest and wired the money to Matthew and Shelley’s joint bank account, from which 

Shelley paid off her student loans. Repayments to Patricia Richter for the loan were also 

made from the couple’s joint account. 

Despite testimony by both Matthew and his mother that the loan was a nonmarital transaction solely between Patricia Richter and Shelley, the court credited 

Shelley’s testimony that the parties had incurred the loan as a couple to improve their 

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overall financial situation and were jointly liable for its repayment. Finding it to be 

marital debt, the court divided it equally between Shelley and Matthew. 

Matthew timely2

 appealed the superior court’s rulings on jurisdiction and 

the marital nature of the $100,000 debt. He also contends that he was denied due process 

because he went to trial without knowing that it might result in an equitable property 

division. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

We review de novo issues of law, including whether the superior court has 

subject matter jurisdiction3

 and whether it has personal jurisdiction.4 

“There are three basic steps in the equitable division of marital assets: (1) 

deciding what specific property is available for distribution, (2) finding the value of the 

2 Shelley argues in her brief that Matthew’s appeal is not timely as to the 

jurisdiction issue because the appeal was not filed within 30 days of the court’s 

judgment. The final decree and written findings were distributed on January 16, 2013. 

Matthew had filed motions for reconsideration and for a new trial a day earlier, based on 

the court’s oral decision made on the record on January 2. Matthew’s motions 

terminated the running of the time for appeal. See Alaska R. App. P. 204(a)(3). Shelley 

argues that the motions did not affect the time for appealing the jurisdiction issue because 

they did not address it. But Rule 204(a)(3) does not extend the time for appealing only 

those issues that are addressed in post-trial motions; such a rule would needlessly foster 

piecemeal appeals. Matthew’s post-trial motions were denied on February 26, and he 

timely filed this appeal on March 13. 

3 Hawkins v. Attatayuk, 322 P.3d 891, 894 (Alaska 2014). 

4 Vanvelzor v. Vanvelzor, 219 P.3d 184, 187 (Alaska 2009) (citing S.B. v. 

State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 61 P.3d 6, 10 

(Alaska 2002)). 

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property, and (3) dividing the property equitably.” 5 This appeal concerns only the first 

step. 

“In the first step, ‘[t]he characterization of property as separate or marital 

may involve both legal and factual questions.’ ”6 We review the “[u]nderlying factual 

findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate” for clear 

error.7

 “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, upon review of the entire record, we are 

left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.”8

 “[W]hether the 

trial court applied the correct legal rule in exercising its discretion is a question of law 

that we review de novo using our independent judgment.”9 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. The Superior Court Had Jurisdiction Over This Divorce Case. 

1. The superior court had subject matter jurisdiction. 

Matthew claims that the superior court did not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over the “personal claims in the divorce.” He is incorrect. “Subject matter 

jurisdiction is ‘the legal authority of a court to hear and decide a particular type of 

case.’ ”10 “[W]here the legislature has authorized a court to enter judgment in a 

5 Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 458 (Alaska 2013). 

6 Id. at 459 (quoting Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 330 (Alaska 2006)) 

(alteration in original). 

7 Id.
 

8 Stanhope v. Stanhope, 306 P.3d 1282, 1287 (Alaska 2013).
 

9
 Id. at 1286 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

10 Nw. Med. Imaging, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 151 P.3d 434, 438
 

(Alaska 2006) (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 257 (3d ed.
 

(continued...)
 

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particular class of cases, the court properly has subject matter jurisdiction.”11 Alaska 

Statute 25.24.050 sets out the grounds for divorce, and AS 25.24.160(a) describes what 

the superior court may include in its judgment in an action for divorce. These statutes 

clearly grant the superior court the authority to enter judgment in a divorce action, 

thereby giving the court subject matter jurisdiction.12 

2. The superior court had personal jurisdiction. 

Alaska Statute 09.05.015(a)(12) grants a court personal jurisdiction over 

a nonresident party for the personal claims in a divorce action if: 

(A) the parties resided in this state in a marital relationship 

for not less than six consecutive months within the six years 

preceding the commencement of the action; (B) the party 

asserting the personal claim has continued to reside in this 

state; and (C) the nonresident party receives notice as 

required by law. 

Here, in response to the court’s questioning, Matthew confirmed that he lived in Alaska 

“more or less continuously” for the first eight months of his marriage to Shelley. He 

moved most of his belongings to Anchorage, obtained an Alaska driver’s license, 

identified his residence as Alaska for federal tax purposes, and applied for the Permanent 

Fund Dividend. He and Shelley together bought an Anchorage condo, which Shelley 

testified was their “home base.” Although Matthew still owned his house in Idaho, he 

rented it out during the marriage. Considering all this evidence, the court did not clearly 

10(...continued) 

1999)). 

11 Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d 1007, 1011 (Alaska 1995)). 

12 Cf. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d at 1011. 

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err in finding that Matthew resided in Alaska for more than six consecutive months of 

the marital relationship. 

Matthew reads the statutory phrase “in a marital relationship for not less 

than six consecutive months” as requiring a couple to have lived under the same roof for 

that amount of time, a requirement he fails to meet because of his and Shelley’s constant 

travel. But his reading of the statute is unreasonable. If it were accepted, an Alaska 

court would lack jurisdiction over long-time Alaska couples simply because one spouse 

travels regularly to Juneau or the North Slope, or because their employment requires that 

they maintain separate residences and see each other on weekends. The statute simply 

requires six consecutive months of Alaska residency while in a marital relationship; it 

does not require that the married couple share a home, let alone that they spend every day 

together for the required six months. Here, once the superior court found that Matthew 

had resided in Alaska for six consecutive months during his marital relationship with 

Shelley, it properly exercised jurisdiction under AS 09.05.015(a)(12). 

B. The Superior Court Properly Classified The Loan As Marital Debt. 

Matthew argues that the $100,000 debt owed to his mother was Shelley’s 

separate obligation and that the court erred by classifying it as marital and allocating it 

between them.13 

In a judgment for divorce, the court may provide “for the division between 

the parties of their property, . . . whether joint or separate, acquired only during marriage, 

13 Matthew cites to AS 25.15.050, which provides that “neither spouse is 

liable for the . . . separate debts of the other,” and to AS 25.15.100, which allows a 

married person to make contracts and incur liabilities which can then be enforced “to the 

same extent and in the same manner as if the person were unmarried.” Neither of these 

statutes is relevant unless the loan is Shelley’s separate debt; they do not help determine 

whether the debt is separate or marital in the first instance. 

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in a just manner.”14 Debt incurred during marriage is presumptively marital; the party 

claiming otherwise must show that the parties intended it to be separate.15 “Separate 

property includes property acquired by one spouse before marriage, property acquired 

by gift, and property acquired by inheritance.” 16 “Whether an initially nonmarital debt 

transmutes into a marital liability is a question of intent and acceptance.”17 

Neither party disputes that Shelley’s student loan debt was separate debt that 

she brought to the marriage. But it is also undisputed that this debt was paid off during 

the marriage: Matthew testified that he paid $13,500, expecting Shelley to make up for 

it by making future mortgage payments and paying other household expenses; and the 

remaining $100,000 was paid off with the loan from Matthew’s mother, Patricia Richter. 

14 AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 

15 Stanhope v. Stanhope, 306 P.3d 1282, 1290 (Alaska 2013); Beals v. Beals, 

303 P.3d 453, 460 (Alaska 2013) (“Generally, ‘all assets acquired by the parties during 

their marriage are marital property’ except for gifts and inheritances.”)(quoting Johns v. 

Johns, 945 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Alaska 1997)). 

16 Bilbao v. Bilbao, 205 P.3d 311, 313-14 (Alaska 2009) (citing Schmitz v. 

Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1127 (Alaska 2004)). 

17 Ginn-Williams v. Williams, 143 P.3d 949, 956 (Alaska 2006). Matthew 

claims that Ginn-Williams requires this court to conclude that the $100,000 debt was 

separate. Ginn-Williams held that where property transmuted to marital property, the 

debt associated with that property must also transmute. This holding does not apply here 

because no property transmuted. The loan from Patricia Richter was incurred during the 

marriage and was therefore presumptively marital debt. 

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The loan from Patricia was acquired during the parties’ marriage and therefore became 

18 19 presumptively marital debt. It is Matthew’s burden to prove it is separate. 

The evidence on this issue at trial was conflicting. Matthew denied any 

involvement with Shelley’s student loans “other than paying down the $13,500.” He 

testified that he had no authority to “negotiate or compromise this debt between Shelley 

and [his] mother.” Patricia supported her son’s view of the transaction, testifying that she 

“sent $100,000 to [Shelley’s] bank account in the name of Shelley Richter in June 2011,” 

that Matthew did not sign anything related to the loan, and that Matthew was not 

responsible for the loan in any way — the loan “was only intended to help Shelley.” 

But the superior court did not find the testimony of Matthew and Patricia 

credible on this issue. The court credited instead Shelley’s testimony that Patricia had 

offered the couple $100,000 to invest and that after considering and rejecting the idea of 

buying commercial real estate, they together decided it would make better financial sense 

to pay off Shelley’s high-interest student loan debt. Shelley maintained that she would 

not have asked Patricia for help but that Matthew wanted to use the money in this way. 

The money loaned by Patricia was transferred to the couple’s joint bank account, and 

repayments to Patricia on the loan were made from the same joint account. Shelley 

testified that the amount of the loan would be subtracted from Matthew’s inheritance if 

Patricia died before it was paid off, indicating that she saw the loan as benefitting her son; 

Patricia testified that she never would have loaned Shelley the money if she had known 

about the couple’s marital difficulties, again indicating that benefit to Matthew was part 

of Patricia’s calculus. The evidence also showed that Patricia only attempted to document 

18 Stanhope, 306 P.3d at 1290; Beals, 303 P.3d at 460 (quoting Johns, 945 

P.2d at 1225). 

19 Id. See also Brandal v. Shangin, 36 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Alaska 2001). 

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the transaction — drawing up a promissory note between herself and Shelley alone — 

after she learned that the couple had decided to separate; Shelley refused to sign the note. 

Given the evidence on both sides of the issue and the great deference we give to a trial 

court’s factual findings when they require “weighing the credibility of witnesses and 

conflicting oral testimony,”20 we cannot say the superior court clearly erred when it found 

that the parties intended the debt to be marital.21 

Matthew also argues the debt is nonmarital because Shelley incurred it 

during a period of separation that led to divorce. As a general rule, “property acquired 

after separation is properly excluded from the category of marital property.”22 Separation 

occurs when a married couple ceases to function as a single economic unit, which requires 

a fact-specific inquiry. 23 Here, Patricia Richter loaned Shelley and Matthew the money 

in June 2011. Matthew is correct that this transaction occurred after he proposed that the 

parties separate, but the evidence showed that they did not actually do so until October 

2011. The debt remains presumptively marital. 

Matthew makes a few other arguments challenging the superior court’s 

findings, none of them meritorious. He argues first that the superior court improperly 

20 Stanhope, 306 P.3d at 1287 (quoting Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 

P.3d 168, 178 (Alaska 2009)). 

21 Matthew separately argues that he was not a party to Shelley’s agreement 

with Patricia and that “a third-party cannot be held liable on a debt for merely helping 

a debtor make a payment.” But these arguments simply restate his central tenet — that 

the debt to his mother was not incurred by the marital unit — an argument the superior 

court rejected as a factual matter. 

22 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) (citing Schanck v. 

Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986)). 

23 Hatten v. Hatten, 917 P.2d 667, 671 (Alaska 1996). 

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relied on an unadmitted exhibit, Exhibit 23, in making its oral findings. But after 

Matthew’s attorney pointed this out, the court acknowledged its mistake and stated, 

“[T]he fact that [Exhibit] 23 is not part of the record doesn’t change my ruling. . . . I 

found [Shelley’s] testimony to be highly credible on this point. I did not find Mr. 

Richter’s testimony to be credible. I did not find his mother’s testimony to be credible 

on this point.” The testimony on which the court relied was sufficient to support its 

findings of fact. 

Finally, Matthew argues that the debt to his mother is unenforceable because 

there was no consideration given for it except possibly a promise to Patricia that the 

couple would have grandchildren, a promise Matthew contends was illusory. But 

Matthew did not raise this issue before the superior court, and it is therefore waived.24 

C. The Superior Court Did Not Violate Matthew’s Due Process Rights. 

Matthew claims that his due process rights were violated because he went 

to trial believing that Shelley did not intend to ask the court for anything other than a 

rescission of their relatively short marriage, and he was surprised when she sought an 

equitable distribution of their marital property. He argues that “because (a) Shelley 

alleged Matthew was a resident of Idaho and not Alaska [in her complaint]; (b) Matthew 

agreed that he was an Idaho resident [in his answer]; and (c) Shelley never alleged any 

set of facts that would invoke the long-arm statute for divorce, Matthew did not have 

sufficient notice that Shelley would contradict her own pleadings and seek anything more 

than a Rose v. Rose-type rescission of the marriage.”25 Matthew claims that with proper 

24 Alaska State Emps. Ass’n/AFSCME Local 52, AFL-CIO v. State, 74 P.3d 

881, 886 (Alaska 2003). 

25 See Rose v. Rose, 755 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1988). Whether to apply a Rose­

(continued...) 

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notice that a property division was contemplated, he would have presented additional 

evidence proving that the $100,000 loan from his mother was Shelley’s separate debt. 

Matthew’s argument fails for a number of reasons. Most obviously, it is 

unreasonable to read the complaint’s allegation that Matthew was then “a resident of 

Victor, Idaho,” as an affirmative assertion that the superior court therefore lacked 

jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce, particularly given that the complaint was captioned 

“Complaint for Divorce” and asked the court to adjudicate “[c]ertain property rights and 

obligations [that] have been acquired and certain debts and obligations [that have been] 

incurred by the parties during the course of the marriage.” And Matthew was clearly on 

notice that the $100,000 debt would be an issue at trial; he specifically addressed it both 

in his answer (asserting that he would not agree to a divorce until Shelley had refinanced 

the loan, which “is her loan, it has nothing to do with my mother and I”) and in his trial 

brief (asserting that the student loans had been refinanced with the help of his mother but 

that “Matthew did not co-sign the refinance”). Shelley’s trial brief listed the loan as a 

joint obligation of the parties and asked on her property spreadsheet that it be split 50/50. 

Matthew testified about the loan at trial, cross-examined Shelley on the subject, and 

presented the supporting testimony of his mother. There is no basis in these facts to 

conclude that Matthew lacked fair notice that responsibility for the loan was at issue or 

that he lacked a fair opportunity to litigate it. His claim that he was denied due process 

is without merit. 

25(...continued) 

type rescission remedy rather than make an equitable distribution is left to the court’s 

discretion. Id. at 1125 (“stating that the trial court may, without abusing its discretion” 

treat the divorce as a rescission); see also Nicholson v. Wolfe, 974 P.2d 417, 421 (Alaska 

1999) (“Since Rose, we never have held that it would be clearly unjust to adopt equitable 

rather than rescission principles.”). 

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V. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court. 

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