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SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at 

(703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Summary of Report: SIGIR 10-007 

Why SIGIR Did this Study 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) has a legislative 

requirement to prepare a final forensic audit 

report on amounts made available for Iraq 

reconstruction. To fulfill this requirement, 

SIGIR has undertaken audits examining major 

Iraq reconstruction contracts. The objective of 

these audits is to review the key requirements 

and provisions of the contracts to determine 

contract costs, outcomes, and oversight, 

emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to 

fraud, waste, and abuse. 

This audit focused on three contracts awarded 

to Wamar International, Inc. (Wamar); one 

indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract 

to purchase and deliver armored vehicles for 

U.S. and Iraqi forces, and two firm-fixed-price 

contracts to inspect and repair turbine 

generators at power plants near Baghdad. The 

contracts were funded mostly from the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Economic 

Support Fund (ESF), and the Iraq Security 

Forces Fund. According to SIGIR’s October 

30, 2008 Quarterly Report, Wamar was in the 

top 10 of contractors receiving ESF funds: the 

total funds obligated were about $70 million. 

The Joint Contracting Command, 

Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) administered the 

contracts, and the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), 

provided contract performance oversight. 

What SIGIR Recommends 

Previous SIGIR reports have included 

recommendations and/or lessons learned to 

address issues related to cost increases and 

schedule changes on Iraq reconstruction 

projects. The major issues identified in this 

report—changes in contract cost and 

schedules, and contract administration and 

project management—have been addressed. 

Accordingly, SIGIR includes no 

recommendations in this report. 

Management Comments and Audit 

Response 

SIGIR provided a draft of this report to 

responsible agencies for comment. Both the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and JCC-I/A 

concurred with the report. 

January 28, 2010 

WAMAR INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED CONTRACTS,

BUT UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS AFFECTED COSTS AND SCHEDULES

What SIGIR Found 

SIGIR found that Wamar successfully completed the three contracts and that 

JCC-I/A and GRD actively carried out their management and oversight 

responsibilities, though some management and contract problems affected 

costs and schedules. 

The 2004 contract, competitively awarded to Wamar to purchase and deliver 

armored vehicles (W914NS-04-D-0121), was mostly successful although 

eight vehicles were stolen and other vehicles were delivered late. Wamar 

replaced the stolen vehicles at no cost to the government. At completion of 

the 2 1⁄2-year contract in December 2006, Wamar had successfully delivered 

245 armored vehicles to U.S. and Iraqi forces at a cost of $32.96 million. 

The cost of some vehicles increased because of changes in U.S. government 

requirements, including adding special features to the basic vehicle. Further, 

after the theft of the vehicles, the U.S. government decided to fly the 

vehicles into Baghdad to prevent further thefts at a cost of about $10,000 per 

vehicle. This added about $2.0 million to total contract costs. 

The two contracts awarded to Wamar to inspect and repair six turbine 

generators (W9GXY-06-C-0050 and W9GXY-07-0014) were generally 

successful even though the work cost more and took longer to complete than 

planned. Contract documents revealed that the two inspection contracts 

were competitively awarded and that Wamar’s proposals represented the 

best overall value to the U.S. government and to the Iraq Ministry of 

Electricity (MoE). However, costs under the first contract, awarded in 2006, 

increased from $24.01 million to $34.82 million, and the performance period 

for the inspections was extended from fall 2006 to September 2008. Costs 

under the second contract, awarded in 2007, increased from $14.92 million 

to $25.42 million, and the performance period for the inspections was 

extended from fall 2007 to September 2008. Cost and schedule changes 

were due mainly to unanticipated repairs identified during the inspections 

and a fire at one of the generators. Additionally, the MoE delayed contractor 

access for some inspections which increased costs. These problems were out 

of the control of Wamar. 

JCC-I/A and GRD actively and effectively carried out their management and 

oversight responsibilities on the inspection contracts, and resolved the few 

contract performance and personnel problems that occurred. SIGIR 

identified some administrative and management problems, including GRDprepared independent government estimates which were overstated, and 

numerous JCC-I/A narrative and math errors on the first contract. At the 

time of this report, JCC-I/A had not financially closed out the contracts, nor 

had it located the contract files from which to conduct this closeout. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

January 28, 2010 

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

SUBJECT: Wamar International Successfully Completed Contracts, but Unanticipated 

Problems Affected Costs and Schedules (SIGIR 10-007) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. The report discusses 

reconstruction work done under three contracts awarded to Wamar International, Inc.: one 

contract in 2004 to purchase and deliver armored vehicles to U.S. and Iraqi forces, and two 

contracts in 2006 and 2007 to inspect, test, refurbish, and repair turbine generators at the Qudas 

and Baghdad South power plants. We performed this audit in accordance with our statutory 

responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties 

and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. This law 

provides for independent and objective audits of programs and operations funded with amounts 

appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq and for recommendations 

on related policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and to prevent 

and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR project 9007. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Joint Contracting Command provided technical 

comments on a draft of this report that we included as appropriate. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the draft 

report, please contact David Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, (703) 604-0982/ 

david.warren@sigir.mil or Glenn Furbish, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector General for 

Audits, (703) 604-1388 / glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 
Table of Contents 

Introduction 1

Background 2

Objectives 3

Wamar’s Purchase and Delivery of Armored Vehicles Was Mostly 

Successful, but Contract Management Information Was Incomplete 4

Armored Vehicle Purchase and Delivery – Cost and Outcome 4

U.S. Government Data on Contract Management and Oversight Was Incomplete 7

Wamar’s Turbine Generator Inspections Were Generally Successful and 

Contract Oversight Was Extensive 8

2006 Turbine Generator Inspections - Cost and Outcome 8

2007 Turbine Generator Inspections - Cost and Outcome 14

Contract Management and Oversight Was Sound, and Some Problems Were Resolved 18

Conclusions 23

Management Comments and Audit Response 24

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 25

Appendix B—Funds Provided on Wamar Contracts 28

Appendix C—Description of Inspections 29

Appendix D—Acronyms 31

Appendix E—Audit Team Members 32

Appendix F—Management Comments 33

Appendix G—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 34
1 

Wamar International Successfully Completed Contracts, 

but Unanticipated Problems Affected Costs and Schedules 

SIGIR 10-007 January 28, 2010

Introduction 

Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) prepare a final forensic audit report on “all amounts appropriated or 

otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq.” To help fulfill this requirement, SIGIR 

has undertaken a series of audits to examine major Iraq reconstruction contracts. The objective 

of these audits is to examine contract cost, outcome, and U.S. government oversight, 

emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Wamar International, Inc. (Wamar) was one of the top 10 contractors receiving Economic 

Support Funds (ESF). In total, it had ESF obligations of about $70 million.1

 From all funding 

accounts combined, Wamar was awarded 29 contracts between 2004 and 2009 with obligations 

of $150.17 million (see Appendix B). This report discusses the three largest completed contracts 

awarded to Wamar with obligations of $93.20 million, including: 

• One indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (W914NS-04-D-0121) awarded in 

2004, to purchase and deliver up to 250 armored vehicles to U.S. and Iraqi forces in Iraq, 

initially estimated to cost about $30.90 million, and 

• Two firm-fixed-price contracts, the first one awarded in 2006 (W91GXY-06-C-0050), 

and the second in 2007 (W91GXY-07-C-0014), to inspect, test, refurbish, and repair 

turbine generators at the Qudas and Baghdad South power plants, initially estimated to 

cost about $38.93 million. 

When contract W914NS-04-D-0121 for the delivery of armored vehicles was awarded in 2004, 

the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) provided contract and overall management for the 

project. With the issuance of Task Order 6 on this contract in April 2005, until the end of the 

contract, the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) replaced the PCO. At that 

time JCC-I/A assumed responsibility for contract management, including providing quality 

assurance. This contract was funded through the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI); when 

completed, 245 vehicles were purchased and delivered for $32.96 million. The additional costs 

resulted from changing transporting methods, and modifications to the armoring design of the 

vehicles. 

JCC-I/A was the contracting office for both turbine generator inspection and repair contracts. 

When the first contract was issued to Wamar in March 2006, the PCO was responsible for 

 

1

 SIGIR’s October 30, 2008 Quarterly Report to the Congress. 
2 

program management, including defining the scope of work. In October 2006, the PCO was 

replaced by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD) which assumed 

responsibility for developing program requirements and providing technical expertise, 

technical/construction management, and quality assurance. The Iraq Ministry of Electricity 

(MoE), in addition to operating and maintaining the turbine generators, undertook site work at 

the units, including providing new water and fuel connections, major tank and piping 

refurbishments, and major electrical connections. The first inspection project (in 2006) was 

IRRF-funded while the second inspection project (in 2007) was ESF-funded. When completed, 

the total cost of these two inspection projects was just over $60.24 million. 

Background 

Purchase and Delivery of Armored Vehicles for U.S. and Iraqi Forces: In early February 

2004, U.S. forces decided that Iraqi personal security details did not have adequate armored 

vehicles that could operate safely in a variety of urban and remote off-road settings. As a result 

the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) decided that the Government of Iraq needed more 

than 100 such vehicles to transport Iraqi senior officials and that more were needed to support 

U.S. forces. To address these requirements, the CPA solicited proposals from U.S. companies 

for the immediate purchase and delivery of armored vehicles. 

In April 2004, Wamar was awarded an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract (W914NS04-D-0121) to purchase and deliver a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 250 armored vehicles. 

The contract and subsequent task orders called for Wamar to deliver armored Toyota Land 

Cruisers and 4 Runners, Nissan Peace Keepers, Chevrolet Tahoes and Suburbans, or equivalent 

vehicles. These vehicles were to have an automatic transmission, a gas engine, 4-wheel drive, 

and sufficient factory-installed armor to provide protection against high-powered ammunition. 

Some vehicles included special features such as an upgraded suspension system, heat-treated 

hardened ballistic steel floors and roofs, heavy-duty steel wheels, gun ports, roof escape slides, 

run flat tires, fire suppression systems, and special seats. 

Inspections of Turbine Generators at Qudas and Baghdad South Power Plants: At the 

beginning of the war, Iraq had approximately 29 power plants, all of which required regular 

inspection and overhaul to keep them running. The power plants at Qudas, including four 

General Electric (GE) Frame 9E turbine generator units, and at Baghdad South, including two 

similar GE units, have been the major providers of electricity for the area around Baghdad. 

According to GRD, the Qudas plant is a strategic site for which $150 million of U.S. 

reconstruction funds had already been invested. Each of the GE turbine generators is capable of 

producing approximately 90 to 123 megawatts, depending on the type of fuel used to power the 

turbines. The turbine generators at each of the units require regular maintenance and overhaul at 

manufacturer-recommended intervals based on a number of factors, including the type of fuel 

used, the accumulated number of starts and shutdowns, and the number of operating hours. The 

optimum fuel to use in operating the turbine generators is natural gas, but the turbine generators 

can operate using crude oil. However, when turbine generators are run using crude oil, the times 

between required inspections decrease and maintenance requirements increase. 

According to a senior Iraq Transition Assistance Office official, at the time of the inspections, 

the MoE maintained control of the power plants throughout Iraq, including the plants at Qudas 
3 

and Baghdad South. A U.S. Agency for International Development information bulletin noted 

that at that time many Iraqi power plants were in great disrepair and that Iraqi engineers had been 

pressured to keep the facilities running at any cost, often foregoing required maintenance and 

safety procedures. A GRD document also noted that “for many years, Iraqi power plants were 

run to failure without the required regular maintenance, and GRD cautioned that by not doing 

these inspections and overhauls, the risk of catastrophic failure increases and the only alternative 

may be to shut down the units.” 

When JCC-I/A awarded the work for the first inspection, it noted that it lacked the basic 

technical information necessary to gauge the type and cost of the work that needed to be done at 

these power plants, though the agency recognized that even “minor inspections had not been 

regularly performed.” As such, JCC-I/A stated that the inspection and maintenance cost 

estimates for the contract were based on the limited information available, and that the true costs 

of the inspections and repairs could not be determined until the inspections were actually made. 

Further adding to the difficulty of estimating requirements and schedules, GRD noted that 

because of the pressure to keep the power plants running and to maintain electrical power to the 

city, the MoE would give GRD only one unit at a time to work on. Because the overhaul work 

had to coincide with lower power usage times in Iraq, the specific start times for the work could 

be determined only at the time the contract was awarded. Overall, the contract required the 

contractor to closely coordinate with the PCO and with the MoE. 

In March 2006, after an open competition, Wamar was awarded a firm-fixed-price service 

contract (W91GXY-06-C-0050) to conduct either a hot gas path inspection or a combustion 

inspection on each of the turbine generators at the Qudas and Baghdad South power plants. (A 

general description of the work required on these types of inspections is included in Appendix 

C.) In March 2007, Wamar was awarded a second contract (W91GXY-07-C-0014) to continue 

the scheduled inspections for another cycle of inspections. Both contracts’ Statement of Work 

required Wamar to inspect and service all auxiliary systems and to procure and transport all 

parts. The contracts also included funding for mobilization and demobilization, life support, and 

security. 

Objectives 

SIGIR’s reporting objectives for the three contracts are to identify (1) project costs and outcomes 

and (2) contract and project management oversight and controls, emphasizing vulnerabilities to 

fraud, waste, and abuse. For a discussion of our audit scope and methodology and a summary of 

prior coverage, see Appendix A. For a summary of funds provided on Wamar’s contracts, see 

Appendix B. For a description of the types of turbine generator inspections, see Appendix C. 

For acronyms used, see Appendix D. For audit team members, see Appendix E. For 

Management Comments, see Appendix F. For the SIGIR Mission and Contact Information, see 

Appendix G. 

 
4 

Wamar’s Purchase and Delivery of Armored Vehicles 

Was Mostly Successful, but Contract Management 

Information Was Incomplete 

The contract awarded to Wamar (W914NS-04-D-0121) and subsequent task orders to purchase 

and deliver armored sports utility and other vehicles was successfully completed although eight 

vehicles were stolen and other vehicles were delivered late because of problems outside of 

Wamar’s control. Wamar replaced the stolen vehicles at no cost to the U.S. government. During 

the 2 1⁄2-year contract period, Wamar delivered the required 245 vehicles and was paid $32.96 

million. The cost of some vehicles increased because of changing U.S. government 

requirements, including the addition of special features to the basic vehicle, and a decision to fly, 

rather than ground transport, the vehicles into Baghdad following the theft of the eight vehicles. 

This decision added about $10,000 to the cost of each vehicle, and about $2.0 million to total 

contract costs. Although some of the vehicles Wamar delivered to their final destination—the 

Abu Ghrayib warehouse—arrived late, Wamar officials said that all of the vehicles were 

delivered to Baghdad International Airport on time and that any onward delays, including those 

caused by customs problems, airport closures, and lack of personnel to inspect and accept the 

vehicles, were beyond its control. 

SIGIR could not fully evaluate U.S. government management and oversight of this armored 

vehicle contract because information in the contract files regarding JCC-I/A oversight of the 

contract was incomplete. Moreover, SIGIR was unable to contact officers with detailed 

knowledge on the management of the 2004 contract. Thus, it was not possible to assess whether 

the problems with vehicle theft and delay could have been mitigated by improved contract 

oversight. 

Armored Vehicle Purchase and Delivery – Cost and Outcome 

The initial indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for an immediate purchase of 8, and a 

maximum of 250 armored vehicles was solicited in February 2004 and competitively awarded to 

Wamar on April 27, 2004, for $988,800. Under this 30-month contract, 16 separate task 

orders—one was canceled—were issued for Wamar to deliver armored vehicles. 

At completion of the contract in December 2006, Wamar had successfully delivered 245 armored 

vehicles to U.S. and Iraqi forces at a cost of $32.96 million. Most of the vehicles (198) were 

funded through ISFF and IRRF, but 47 were funded through DFI for use by the Government of 

Iraq. The average price of the vehicles was approximately $134,000: individual vehicle costs 

ranged from $123,600 to $199,754; the final price depended on the special features added to the 

basic vehicle. Table 1 lists the 16 task orders and selected information associated with the task 

orders, including the number of vehicles to be delivered, the type of funds used, and the invoice 

amounts. 
5 

Table 1—Armored Vehicles Purchased Under Contract W914NS-04-D-0121 

Task 

Order 

Award 

Date 

Vehicles 

Delivered 

ISFF & 

IRRF Funds DFI Funds

Invoice

 Amounta

1 4/19/2004 8 - $ 988,800 $ 988,800

2 5/20/2004 4 - 494,400 494,400

3 5/21/2004 5 $ 618,000 - 618,000

4 5/19/2004 4 494,400 - 494,400

5 6/28/2004 35 - 4,326,000 4,326,000

6 4/24/2005 6 785,003 - 785,003

7 5/28/2005 8 1,044,000 - 1,044,000

8 6/10/2005 22 3,190,000 - 3,190,000

9 6/13/2005 7 952,000 - 952,000

10 6/19/2005 3 599,262 - 599,262

11 3/05/2006 8 1,164,800 - 1,164,800

12 5/04/2006 15 2,140,500 - 2,140,500

13 6/20/2006 93 12,424,800 - 12,424,800

14 7/22/2006 10 1,386,000 - 1,386,000

15 Cancelled - - - -

16 10/15/2006 17 2,356,200 - 2,356,200

Total 245 $27,154,965 $5,809,200 $32,964,165

Note 

a Beginning with Task Order 6, delivery of the next 189 armored vehicles into Baghdad was changed from land to air, resulting in 

additional costs to the government of between $10,000 and $11,000 per vehicle, totaling about $2 million.

Source: SIGIR developed information for this table based on copies of Task Orders and Wamar invoices. 

Eight Armored Vehicles Stolen 

In the early stages of the contract, eight armored vehicles in route to Baghdad were stolen along 

the Jordan-Iraq border, along with the trucks that were transporting them, and were never 

recovered. Figure 1 shows armored vehicles and delivery trucks in Baghdad similar to those that 

were stolen. The initial contract and subsequent task orders stated that the armored vehicles 

were to be delivered to the Abu Ghrayib warehouse near Baghdad International Airport but did 

not specify how they were to be transported to the warehouse. Wamar officials told us they had 

decided to transport the vehicles via freighter from the United States to Jordan and then to have 

the vehicles transferred overland, alongside military-protected convoys traveling from Jordan to 

Baghdad. However, the convoys had no set schedules, no guarantee that they would operate, and 

no assurance that they could include the shipment of armored vehicles. As such, the vehicles and 

four delivery trucks were left in Jordan in an unsecured area waiting for a convoy escort when 

they were stolen. According to Wamar officials, because the PCO did not receive these vehicles 

as required, Wamar was not reimbursed for the nearly $1 million it cost to replace the stolen 
6 

vehicles. Wamar later delivered replacement vehicles. As such, the theft of the vehicles did not 

result in additional costs to the government. 

Figure 1—Armored Vehicles Being Delivered Overland in Iraq 

Source: Wamar International 

As a result of this theft, the Department of State Regional Security Office in Baghdad decided 

that all future vehicles would be delivered in the most secure manner possible. Beginning with 

Task Order 6, Wamar changed its method of transporting the final 189 vehicles from sea/ground 

to sea/air directly into Baghdad International Airport. Some of the vehicles were shipped to 

Dubai and then flown to Baghdad rather than through Jordan. According to Wamar officials, the 

additional cost to fly each vehicle was $10,000 to $11,000, for which Wamar was reimbursed by 

the U.S. government. 

Armored Vehicles Not Always Received in a Timely Manner 

Contract documents show that some of the armored vehicles were not received as timely as 

required, but information was insufficient to determine whether JCC-I/A or Wamar could have 

taken actions to expedite their delivery. The original announcement stated that the successful 

bidder was required to provide armored vehicles within 30 days after contract award. However, 

the solicitation and award document included nothing regarding delivery dates. Beginning in 

May 2005, Task Order 7 and all subsequent task orders included specific “No Later Than” dates 

for delivery of the armored vehicles. Our review of receiving documents for the vehicles at the 

Abu Ghrayib warehouse showed that the vehicles were received an average of 26 days after the 

required date. In Task Order 10, three required armored vehicles were received 93 days late. 

The files, however, contain no information to indicate whether JCC-I/A or Wamar took action to 

speed up the vehicles’ delivery or whether the delays had any adverse impact on operations. 
7 

Wamar officials stated that they were never late in delivering the armored vehicles to Baghdad 

International Airport but that logistical and other factors beyond its control caused the delays 

from the airport to the warehouse. They also stated that after the vehicles arrived at the airport, 

they were transferred to Skylink, a U.S. government logistics contractor that was responsible for 

clearing the vehicles through customs; this process could take up to 20 days. Once through 

customs, Skylink would transfer the vehicles by ground transport to the Abu Ghrayib warehouse. 

Once at Abu Ghrayib, the vehicles might sit for several weeks before the Quality 

Assurance/Quality Control personnel would be available to inspect and receive the vehicles. 

Additionally, Wamar officials noted that ever-changing Iraqi customs regulations, closures at the 

airport due to security issues, and weather-related problems such as sandstorms also delayed 

final delivery to the airport. Therefore, they stated, it could take 40 or more days from the time 

the vehicles arrived at Baghdad International Airport until the receiving report was signed. 

U.S. Government Data on Contract Management and Oversight 

Was Incomplete 

Information in contract files regarding JCC-I/A’s management and oversight of the armored 

vehicle contract was incomplete. The electronic contract files contained most invoices, receiving 

documents, and some correspondence regarding contract management. However, we found 

virtually no pre-award information, including contractor proposals and their evaluations, or 

decisions on the selection process. Moreover, information was limited regarding the extent and 

type of JCC-I/A oversight of vehicle deliveries. SIGIR was unable to locate officials with the 

historical knowledge of the contract that was executed between 2004 and 2006. 

 
8 

Wamar’s Turbine Generator Inspections Were 

Generally Successful and Contract Oversight Was 

Extensive 

The two contracts awarded to Wamar to inspect and repair turbine generators at the Qudas and 

Baghdad South power plants were generally successful even though the work cost more and took 

longer to complete than anticipated. Moreover, JCC-I/A and GRD exercised extensive oversight 

of Wamar’s activities. Costs under the 2006 contract increased by $10.8 million, and the 

performance period was extended by about two years. Similarly, costs under the 2007 contract 

increased by $10.5 million, and the performance period was extended by almost one year. Cost 

and schedule changes were due mainly to unanticipated repair problems identified during the 

inspections and MoE delays in granting the contractor access to some of the power plants. The 

need for these repairs could not have been detected until the inspections were conducted. 

Another cost increase was caused by a fire at one inspection site that was caused by MoE 

activity. While some contract administrative issues arose (mainly on the first contract), overall 

JCC-I/A and GRD actively carried out their management and oversight responsibilities under 

these two contracts. 

Contract documents revealed that the two turbine generator inspection contracts were 

competitively awarded and that Wamar’s proposals represented the best overall value to the U.S. 

government and to the MoE. However, SIGIR identified some problems in the government’s 

contract administration and project management, including overstated independent government 

estimates2

 and repeatedly incorrect requirements and costs on the first contract that resulted in 

numerous modifications to the contract. Moreover, although GRD determined in November 

2007 that Wamar had successfully completed the 2006 inspections, and in September 2008 that 

the 2007 inspections had been completed, as of November 2009, JCC-I/A had not closed out 

either contract to ensure that all financial transactions were accurate and up-to-date, and JCC-I/A 

could not locate its contract files. Nevertheless, GRD oversight of the contractor was extensive 

throughout the two contracts’ periods of performance, and the projects resulted in the required 

inspections and repairs of the turbine generators at the Qudas and Baghdad South power plants. 

When the inspections were completed, the turbine generators were operating as required. 

2006 Turbine Generator Inspections - Cost and Outcome 

The first contract (W91GXY-06-C-0050), estimated to cost $24,010,000 and funded through 

IRRF, was solicited on January 5, 2006, and awarded on March 20, 2006. The contract called 

for Wamar to conduct hot gas path inspections and combustion inspections of the turbine 

generators and to service all auxiliary systems at the Qudas and Baghdad South power plants as 

 

2

 An independent government estimate is the U.S. government’s estimated cost/price of a proposed acquisition. Its purpose is to

serve as a basis for reserving funds for the contract, comparing costs/prices offered by contractors, and determining the 

reasonableness of contractor proposals. 
9 

listed in the price schedule, which defined project requirements by Unit.3 This section of the 

contract called for the following inspections:4

• Combustion inspection on Qudas Unit 1 to begin in spring 2006 

• Hot gas path inspection on Qudas Unit 3 to begin in spring 2006 

• Hot gas path inspection on Qudas Units 2 and 4 to begin in fall 2006 

• Combustion inspection on Baghdad South Units 1 and 2 to begin in fall 2006 

The contract called for the inspection and start-up of the units to be completed within 50 days 

after Wamar received permission to start work, but no later than sometime in fall 2006; the 

performance period was to be staggered by unit and by the work to be done. The work was to 

include the servicing of all auxiliary systems and the procuring, refurbishing, and/or repairing 

and transporting of all parts as required under the contract. Figures 2 and 3 show turbine 

generators during repairs. 

Figure 2—Turbine Generator Being Lifted during Repair 

Source: Wamar International Files. 

 

3

 The “Units” listed in the contract refer to the power plant “islands,” including the individual turbine generators and their 

accessories and associated equipment. 

4

 The initial contract and early modifications incorrectly identified some of the Qudas Power Plant Units that were to receive a

combustion inspection or a hot gas path inspection. Over the next several months, numerous modifications and administrative 

changes were made, and cost estimates changed to correctly identify inspection requirements. The inspections listed above were

taken from Modification A00001 issued September 27, 2006. 
10 

Figure 3—Turbine Generator under Repair 

Source: Wamar International Files. 

Cost and Schedule Changes 

Unanticipated repair work required to keep the units operational, including higher-than-expected 

parts replacement and refurbishment costs, resulted in increased inspection costs and schedule 

delays. These repairs were identified during Wamar’s inspections and the need for these repairs 

could not have been identified in advance. By the time of the 11th and final contract 

modification in October 2008, project costs had increased by $10,808,500 (45%), from 

$24,010,000 to $34,818,500, and the performance period had been extended from fall 2006 to 

September 30, 2008, about 2 years longer than planned. All funds appropriated for the contract 

have been disbursed. 

According to GRD, Wamar was unable to refurbish or repair a large number of parts because of 

their advanced state of deterioration stemming from a lack of preventive maintenance and severe 

wear and tear. This unanticipated additional work at Qudas Units 1 and 4 accounted for most of 

the cost increases (see Table 2, which shows cost increases by unit). As one JCC-I/A official 

noted, the units were in worse condition than originally believed during the solicitation phase. 

During the inspections, Wamar inspectors determined, and JCC-I/A agreed, that the rotors in the 

turbine generators in Units 1 and 4 required complete refurbishing, repair, and testing. 

Moreover, due to a major shutdown and failure of the generator, Unit 4 required a major 

overhaul. In addition to the cost of additional repairs that were difficult to detect until the 

inspections were started, the delays caused by these unanticipated problems also resulted in 

increased security and life support costs. 
11 

Table 2—Planned and Final Costs for Contract W91GXY-06-C-0050 

Power Plant Planned Cost Final Cost Cost Increase 

 

Qudas 

 

 Inspections Service, Parts and Repairs 

 Unit 1 $ 3,022,000 $ 5,848,000 $ 2,826,000

 Unit 2 3,022,000 3,485,000 463,000

 Unit 3 4,642,000 4,642,000 -

 Unit 4 4,642,000 7,112,000 2,470,000

 Qudas - Inspections $ 15,328,000 $ 21,087,000 $ 5,759,000

 

 Other Costs 

 Mobilization/Demobilization $ 250,000 $ 250,000 $ -

 Security 992,000 1,878,000 886,000

 Life Support 390,000 585,000 195,000

 Additional Repairs/Critical Maintenance - 1,775,000 1,775,000

 Equitable Adjustment - 1,912,500 1,912,500

 Qudas - Other Costs $ 1,632,000 $ 6,400,500 $ 4,768,500

 

 Qudas Total $ 16,960,000 $ 27,487,500 $ 10,527,500 

Baghdad South 

 

 Inspections Service 

 Unit 1 $ 2,427,000 $ 2,427,000 $ -

 Unit 2 2,427,000 2,708,000 281,000

 Baghdad South - Inspections $ 4,854,000 $ 5,135,000 $ 281,000

 

 Other Costs 

 Mobilization/Demobilization $ 125,000 $ 125,000 $ -

 New & Refurbished Parts / Units 1 & 2 1,380,000 1,380,000 -

 Security 496,000 496,000 -

 Life Support 195,000 195,000 -

 Baghdad South - Other Costs $ 2,196,000 $ 2,196,000 $ - 

 

 Baghdad South Total $ 7,050,000 $ 7,331,000 $ 281,000

 

 Contract Total $ 24,010,000 $ 34,818,500 $ 10,808,500 

Source: GRD Contract Files. 

Following are summaries of the costs and schedules for the individual inspections, including 

parts, security, life support and other costs at the four units at Qudas and the two units at 

Baghdad South under this contract. 
12 

Qudas – Unit 1: Wamar was to conduct a combustion inspection on this turbine generator in 

spring 2006 at an estimated cost of approximately $3.02 million—$811,000 to service the 

inspection and $2.21 million for parts and other repair expenses (excluding mobilization, 

security, or life support). According to Wamar officials, Wamar began the inspection in May 

2006 and completed the work in 10 days, and GRD determined in June 2006 that the required 

work on the turbine had been completed.5

At that time, however, JCC-I/A approved an additional $133,000 for Wamar to inspect and 

repair couplings on the generator. According to Wamar documents, Wamar began this 

additional work in October 2006; in January 2007, GRD determined that the unit’s generator 

rotor required complete refurbishing—including the rotor’s repair, transport, installation, testing, 

and start-up. That winter, the contract was modified to cover additional costs incurred in 

refurbishing and overhauling the generator rotor, to include transporting the rotor to a 

refurbishing and high-speed balancing facility in the Netherlands. According to Wamar, because 

the rotor was extremely large, it required special handling, special equipment, and one-of-a-kind 

transport aircraft (see Figure 4). When all of the work was completed on the unit—including 

inspecting the unit and conducting the required rotor repairs—total costs had increased to $5.85 

million. GRD determined in November 2007 that the required rotor repairs were completed. 

 

5

 Dates on Wamar completion of inspections, and GRD physical completions and approvals, and closeouts were 

provided by Wamar. 
13 

Figure 4—Transport of Turbine Generator Rotor for Repair 

Source: Wamar International Files. 

Qudas – Unit 2: Wamar was required to do a hot gas path inspection on this turbine generator 

in fall 2006 at a cost of about $3.02 million—$811,000 for the inspection and $2.21 million in 

parts. This requirement was modified to a combustion inspection. Even though Wamar officials 

had begun mobilizing to conduct the inspection in October 2006, the MoE did not release the 

unit as planned, causing Wamar to spend additional time on site. GRD recognized that the delay 

in conducting the inspection “increased the risk of component failure, and significantly reduced 

the reliability of the unit.” Wamar completed the inspection in late December 2006 at a cost of 

$3.49 million. GRD determined in February 2007 that the required work on the unit had been 

completed. 

Qudas – Unit 3: This turbine generator was scheduled for a hot gas path inspection in spring 

2006 at an estimated cost of $4.64 million—$811,000 for the inspection plus an additional $3.83 

million in parts and other refurbishing expenses. Wamar began the inspection in April 2006 and 

completed the work in 1 month; the required work came in on budget. GRD determined in 

October 2006 that the required work had been completed. 

Qudas – Unit 4: This turbine generator was scheduled for a hot gas path inspection in fall 2006 

at an estimated cost of $4.64 million—$811,000 for the inspection plus an additional $3.83 

million in parts and other refurbishing expenses. Wamar mobilized to start the work in late 

December 2006. However, when the unit was ready for inspection, it failed. Wamar reported 

that the unit experienced unexpected high vibration and had to be shut down. As a result, GRD 

was forced to change the scope of work from a hot gas path inspection to a major overhaul. 
14 

However, by the time the work was completed in July 2007, total costs, including parts and other 

expenses, had increased by $2.47 million to $7.11 million. Wamar documents show that in 

November 2007 the required work on the unit had been completed. 

Qudas - Parts, Security, Life Support, and Other Costs: In addition to the cost of the 

individual inspections and overhauls and the required rotor repairs at the Qudas plant, GRD 

budgeted $1.63 million for mobilization and demobilization services, security, and life support 

costs. However, actual costs for these requirements increased to $6.40 million. Life support 

costs increased from $390,000 to $585,000 and security costs almost doubled, from $992,000 to 

approximately $1.88 million. In addition, Wamar was awarded an equitable adjustment payment 

of $1.91 million to cover other inspection costs, and another $1.78 million was paid for “critical 

maintenance” necessary to complete the inspections. 

Baghdad South – Unit 1: The planned combustion inspection on this turbine generator was 

estimated to cost $2.43 million, including parts. The inspection was started in March 2007 and 

completed in a week for the estimated amount. GRD determined in July 2007 that the required 

work on the unit had been completed. 

Baghdad South – Unit 2: The planned combustion inspection for this turbine generator was 

estimated to cost $2.43 million. The inspection was started in January 2007 and completed in 

four weeks; costs increased by $281,000 (from $2.43 million to $2.71 million) when the 

inspection was changed from a combustion inspection to a hot gas path inspection. GRD 

determined in July 2007 that the required work on the unit had been completed. 

In addition to the inspections and required parts, the cost of refurbishing parts for both turbine 

generators was $1.38 million, while the combined cost for security was $496,000; both of these 

costs did not change during the contract period. 

2007 Turbine Generator Inspections - Cost and Outcome 

The second contract (W91GXY-07-C-0014) was solicited on January 2, 2007, and awarded on 

March 20, 2007, for $14,916,000 in ESF funds. This contract required the following inspections 

in 2007: 

• Combustion inspections on Qudas Units 1 and 4 

• Hot gas path inspections on Qudas Units 2 and 3 

• Hot gas path inspection on Baghdad South Unit 1 

• Combustion inspection on Baghdad South Unit 2 

The project required the successful inspection and start-up of all six units, including refurbishing 

and restoring all auxiliary systems and equipment to achieve fully operational systems. The 

performance period for this work—between March and November 2007—was to begin 10 days 

after contract award. Under this contract, JCC-I/A expected that each of the hot gas path 

inspections would take 45 days to complete and that each combustion inspection would take 20 

days to complete. JCC-I/A noted that the actual timing for each unit would be “dependent upon 

the MoE’s release of the units.” 
15 

Cost and Schedule Changes 

As with the 2006 contract, unanticipated repairs (including fire damage to one unit) increased the 

costs of the inspection projects. To compensate for the additional work, some inspection work 

that had originally been planned was eliminated. By the time of the eighth and final contract 

modification, contract costs had increased by $10,505,000 (70%), from $14,916,000 to 

$25,421,000 (as shown in Table 3), and the performance period had been extended from 

November 2007 to September 2008. Cost increases were due almost entirely to repair fire 

damage to Qudas Unit 2, which eventually required a major overhaul. On the other hand, the 

planned combustion inspection at Qudas Unit 4 was not started after it was determined that the 

unit had too much damage for it to be repaired; funds scheduled for this work were used to 

complete repairs to Unit 2. At the completion of the contract, hot gas path inspections had been 

completed on three units, as required, and combustion inspections had been done on two others. 
16 

Table 3—Planned and Final Costs for Contract W91GXY-07-C-0014 

Power Plant Planned Cost Final Cost Cost Increase

 

Qudas

 

 Inspections Service, Parts & Repairs 

 Unit 1 $ 2,080,000 $ 1,830,000 $ (250,000)

 Unit 2 2,550,000 13,518,460 10,968,460

 Unit 3 2,550,000 2,550,000 -

 Unit 4 1,900,000 - (1,900,000)

 Qudas -Inspections $ 9,080,000 $ 17,898,460 $ 8,818,460

 

 Other Costs

 

 Security & Life Support $ 700,000 $ 700,000 $ -

 Mobilization/Demobilization 100,000 100,000 -

 Qudas - Other Costs $ 800,000 $ 800,000 $ -

 

 Qudas Total $ 9,880,000 $ 18,698,460 $ 8,818,460

 

Baghdad South

 

 Inspections Service, Parts, & Repairs 

 Unit 1 $ 2,450,000 $ 4,073,540 $ 1,623,540

 Unit 2 2,250,000 2,056,000 (194,000)

 Baghdad South - Inspections $ 4,700,000 $ 6,129,540 $ 1,429,540

 

 Other Costs

 

 Security & Life Support (Units 1 & 2) $ 250,000 $ 507,000 $ 257,000

 Mobilization/Demobilization 86,000 86,000 -

 Baghdad South - Other Costs $ 336,000 $ 593,000 $ 257,000

 

 Baghdad South Total $ 5,036,000 $ 6,722,540 $ 1,686,540

 Contract Total $14,916,000 $25,421,000 $10,505,000 

Source: GRD Contract Files. 

The following are summaries of costs and schedules for the inspections and other work done 

under this contract at the four units at Qudas and the two units at Baghdad South. 

Qudas – Unit 1: According to the contract, Wamar was to conduct a combustion inspection on 

this turbine generator at an estimated cost of $2.08 million—$1.68 million to service the 

inspection plus an additional $400,000 for parts and other repair expenses. The inspection was 

started in December 2007 and completed in one month for $1.83 million after funding for the 
17 

required parts, valued at $250,000, was cut. GRD determined in September 2008 that the 

required work on the unit had been completed. 

Qudas – Unit 2: The original plan for Wamar to conduct a hot gas path inspection on this 

turbine generator at a cost of about $2.55 million was changed significantly. Wamar started the 

inspection in October 2007, but in December 2007, the contract was modified and $140,000 was 

added to pay for costs incurred by Wamar as a result of a fire to the unit. According to JCC-I/A 

documents, the fire was caused by “MoE actions.” 

Over the next 4 months, the contract was modified three more times to make needed repairs 

caused by the fire. The modification in February 2008 added $1.73 million. The March 2008 

modification added $6.24 million for fire-related work and subtracted $550,000 budgeted for 

replacement parts. It also noted that additional funds were needed to cover Wamar’s increased 

operating expenses resulting from the MoE’s failure to release the unit for work in a timely 

manner. The May 2008 modification added $2.12 million when it was determined that the unit 

required a major overhaul and $1.33 million for an equitable adjustment payment to Wamar. 

When Wamar completed the work in August 2008, the cost to repair the unit totaled $13.52 

million, including $3.73 million for the inspection, $6.34 million to repair fire damages, $2.12 

million for the major overhaul, and an additional $1.33 million for the equitable adjustment. 

GRD determined in September 2008 that the required work on the unit had been completed. 

Qudas – Unit 3: This turbine generator was scheduled for a hot gas path inspection at an 

estimated cost of $2.55 million—$1.85 million for the inspection plus an additional $700,000 for 

parts and other refurbishing expenses. Wamar began this inspection in October 2007 and 

completed it two months later and on budget. GRD determined in March 2008 that the required 

work on the unit had been completed. 

Qudas – Unit 4: The $1.90 million combustion inspection planned for this turbine generator 

was cancelled, and no work was done on the unit. Funds allocated for this inspection were used 

to settle Wamar’s “Request for Equitable Adjustment due to Government caused delays” and to 

pay for other parts and consumables and for other work required to repair the fire-related 

equipment on Unit 2. 

Qudas – Mobilization, Security, and Life Support Costs Unchanged: The estimated 

$700,000 for security and life support and the $100,000 for mobilization/demobilization costs 

did not change during the contract’s performance period. 

Baghdad South – Unit 1: In March 2008, Wamar began a hot gas path inspection of this 

turbine generator that was to cost $2.45 million, including parts and other consumables. GRD 

determined that additional work was needed on the unit and, in May 2008, modified the contract, 

adding $1.99 million to conduct an “extended” hot gas path inspection and $257,000 for more 

security and life support. In October 2008 an additional $182,000 was added to the contract to 

pay for shipping of required parts. However, the contract called for Wamar to repair, refurbish, 

and return to the site those parts that had been removed from the unit to be used as spares at a 

later date. In October 2008, this requirement was eliminated, and the $550,000 originally 

planned to refurbish these parts was transferred to pay for some of the costs associated with the 

major generator overhaul at Qudas Unit 2. When completed, the cost of the work done on the 
18 

unit was $4.07 million, $1.62 million more than planned. Wamar completed the work in June 

2008, and GRD determined in September 2008 that the required work on the unit had been 

completed. 

Baghdad South – Unit 2: Wamar began a combustion inspection for this turbine generator in 

February 2008 at a cost of $2.25 million. Wamar completed the inspection in 3 weeks, and all 

but $194,000 that was planned for the refurbishing of parts was spent. These funds were used to 

pay for some of the costs associated with the major overhaul of Qudas Unit 2. GRD determined 

in June 2008 that the required work on the unit had been completed. 

Contract Management and Oversight Was Sound, and Some 

Problems Were Resolved 

The two contracts for the inspection and repair of the turbine generators at the Qudas and 

Baghdad South power plants were generally successful even though both cost more and took 

longer than planned, and some administrative problems hindered management of the contract. 

Both contracts were competitively awarded, and Wamar won both contracts on the basis of high 

technical ability, management approach, and low price. GRD’s oversight of the projects was 

generally sound, and JCC-I/A effectively addressed some contractor performance issues. 

However, JCC-I/A experienced some administrative problems on the 2006 contract, including 

inaccurate statements of requirements and costs, and the agency has yet to financially close out 

the contracts or account for missing contract files. 

Contracts Were Competitively Awarded and Wamar Proposals Received High Ratings 

JCC-I/A awarded both the 2006 and the 2007 contracts to Wamar after open competitions and 

assessments that Wamar’s proposals represented the best value for the U.S. government. On the 

2005 contract (W91GXY-06-C-0050), JCC-I/A issued its request for proposals on January 5, 

2006, and received proposals from six contractors. The Source Selection Evaluation Board 

evaluated the proposals using three factors: (1) technical ability to succeed, (2) management 

approach, and (3) price. Four of the six proposals were considered “nonresponsive” mainly 

because they were not completed correctly. Of the remaining two proposals, Wamar’s received 

the highest overall rating of “High Confidence”6

 for both its technical ability and management 

approach. In recommending Wamar, the Board noted that Wamar had completed five projects in 

Iraq and had a history of working with the PCO, the MoE, and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization. Wamar’s use of local and bilingual Iraqi personnel was cited positively in the 

evaluation. The Board also reported that Wamar’s financial statements and references were 

“impressive” and that the contractor’s record of payment history was “impeccable.” 

In addition to its high ratings, Wamar’s cost proposal was the lower of the two proposals 

considered; Wamar’s price of $24,010,000 also was less than one-third of GRD’s independent 

government estimate of $76,747,820. The Board’s price evaluation team concluded that overall, 

Wamar had consistent and balanced pricing and that its proposal was competitively-priced. The 

Board noted that Wamar’s costs were significantly lower than the government’s estimate for 

purchasing and refurbishing parts and in providing security, life support, and mobilization, 

 

6

 High Confidence means that based on the contractor’s capability, experience, and resources, the government has virtually no 

doubt that it can successfully perform the required work. 
19 

mainly because of its use and support of local labor. Overall, JCC-I/A made the best value 

source selection in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

On the 2007 contract (W91GXY-07-C-0014), contract documents also demonstrate that JCC-I/A 

followed proper procedures in soliciting the contract, evaluating proposals, and making an 

award. According to the Source Selection Evaluation Board, the contract was subject to full and 

open competition and was publicized in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 

requirements. According to GRD, the source selection evaluation criteria was supposed to 

emphasize the Iraqi First Initiative, which encouraged awarding contracts to local companies to 

promote socioeconomic development in the country. The government received six proposals of 

which four were eventually considered acceptable: including one from a U.S.-Iraqi Joint Venture 

company, one from an Iraqi-owned company, and one from Wamar, which included a workforce 

that was 96% Iraqi. The Board’s evaluation of each proposal focused on technical, 

socioeconomic, past performance, and price merits. Even though the Joint Venture company 

was considered more technically capable, Wamar’s proposed price was significantly lower, and 

its proposal was considered to be the best overall value to the government when price and other 

factors were considered. 

GRD Had Problems Developing Its Independent Government Estimates 

An independent government estimate—the U.S. government’s estimated cost/price of a proposed 

acquisition—is to be completed prior to soliciting bids on a contract. These estimates are used 

by U.S. government agencies to gauge the merits of contractor proposals it receives. GRD 

conducted the initial cost estimates of the work to be done under both inspection contracts. 

GRD’s estimates were much higher than the final costs and appear to SIGIR to have been of 

little value in evaluating contractor proposals. 

GRD estimated the required work under the 2006 contract would cost approximately $74 

million.7

 This estimate was about three times greater than the prices quoted by each of the two 

final contractors and two times greater than the final cost of the inspections, including all the cost 

increases for additional repairs. The Source Selection Evaluation Board realized that this 

estimate was significantly “disproportionate” in pricing compared to prevailing competitive 

pricing. Virtually all of the components of the estimate were greatly overstated. For example, 

GRD estimated the cost of conducting a hot gas path inspection and a combustion inspection at 

$3.10 million, while Wamar’s proposals were $811,000 and $720,000, respectively. GRD also 

estimated the six-month cost of security at $2.24 million, while Wamar’s proposal was for 

$496,000; moreover, GRD’s estimates for life support and mobilization were five times greater 

than the price offered by Wamar. 

On the 2007 contract, the independent government estimate was again “disproportionate” even 

though GRD had just completed the same work on the 2006 contract. For example, GRD’s 

estimate for the entire contract was $48.93 million, more than three times Wamar’s proposed 

cost of $14.92 million. GRD estimated the total cost of providing, refurbishing, or replacing 

 

7 GRD recognized that estimating costs would be difficult because of the unknown damages to the gas turbines due to lack of 

required maintenance by the MOE and because GRD’s firm-fixed-price estimates had to include additional funds for any 

unanticipated costs discovered during the teardown and inspection phases. 
20 

parts at $16.75 million, while Wamar’s proposal was $2.40 million. Similarly, GRD’s estimate 

for security was $5.30 million compared with Wamar’s proposal of less than $1.0 million. 

JCC-I/A Management of 2006 Contract Experienced Administrative Problems 

Our review of contract files shows that contract administrative problems—such as inaccurate 

identification of requirements, price estimates and performance periods, and math errors—

hindered management of the 2006 contract throughout the first year. Almost all of the problems 

were associated with the planned work at the Qudas Power Plant. According to JCC-I/A and 

Wamar officials, many of these problems may have resulted from constant turnover of 

contracting officers on the project. Contract management improved throughout 2007 and 2008, 

and from April 2007 until the work was completed in February 2008, JCC-I/A made only minor 

changes to the contract. 

Contract documents show that JCC-I/A officials were well aware of its problems in 

administering the 2006 contract. Over the first ten months, four contract modifications were 

issued, mostly to correct government narrative or math errors. According to contract files, some 

line items were incorrectly priced and some invoices and receiving documents were improperly 

completed. The original contract section that outlined the price schedule and identified the types 

of inspections to be done, their price, and schedule and performance periods had to be 

completely modified within two days after it was issued because it was filled with math errors 

and required other corrections. This modification, however, also contained inaccurate 

information, and, in September 2006, JCC-I/A again modified the contract to cancel the price 

schedule section in its entirety and to add $3.62 million to the contract to pay for additional 

work. In total, four modifications were issued specifically to correct math and narrative errors in 

the contract. In addition, because of the changing work requirements, the contract performance 

period had to be extended four times during the second year. 

JCC-I/A Addresses Contractor Performance Issues 

Overall, JCC-I/A exercised good oversight of Wamar contract activities, and Wamar positively 

addressed the few problems that arose. Nevertheless, some issues and concerns were raised 

during the inspections, including concerns about the contractor’s parts management. In a May 

31, 2007 letter to Wamar, JCC-I/A questioned the state of Wamar’s control system on Units 1 

and 4, noting that on Unit 4, a number of items were “bypassed, forced, or not working.” 

Wamar officials responded that they were making the required improvements in the areas of 

control systems, housekeeping, fuel leaks, equipment inspections, and calibration records. 

According to JCC-I/A officials, because no additional letters were in the files on this issue, they 

could only presume that Wamar’s response satisfied the assigned contracting officer. In a 

response to SIGIR questions about Wamar’s overall performance on the contracts, JCC-I/A 

officials responded that in the absence of further letters of concern or other correspondence in the 

files regarding performance, cost/price, reliability, and compliance with the contracts’ statements 

of work, they believed that Wamar’s performance was positive. In a memo for the record during 

the 2006 inspection, JCC-I/A noted that Wamar had several other contracts with the government, 

including “a strong past performance history.” A senior Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

official involved with the turbine generator inspections stated that Wamar “had the best record” 

of the companies performing these types of inspections. 
21 

Wamar also complied with a JCC-I/A request to resolve a serious staffing problem. In 

September 2006, the contracting officer informed Wamar in a letter that one of Wamar’s senior 

officials had been a member on the Source Selection Team that made the recommendation to 

award the 2006 contract to Wamar. This conflict of interest problem could have affected the 

contractual relationship between the government and the contractor. JCC-I/A notified Wamar 

that this employee was in violation of the Nondisclosure Agreement and Conflict of Interest 

Certification and that, as such, his employment with Wamar raised serious questions regarding 

the validity and impartiality of the overall contract award. In the letter, the contracting officer 

indicated that JCC-I/A would “continue to investigate this matter” and requested that Wamar 

remove the employee from any future involvement in matters associated with the contract. 

According to Wamar officials, after receipt of the letter, the company terminated the employee’s 

contract. As a result of Wamar’s response, JCC-I/A conducted no further investigations and took 

no further actions against the contractor or the employee. 

GRD Oversight Generally Sound, but JCC-I/A Has Not Closed Out Contracts, and Contract 

Files Are Missing 

Our review of contract documents showed that GRD provided constant and detailed reviews and 

oversight of Wamar inspection and repair activities throughout the performance periods of both 

contracts. SIGIR reviewed copies of Wamar’s required Accident Prevention and Safety Plans, 

Quality Assurance and Quality Control Plans, and warranty documents and reports along with 

the MoE’s Environmental Plans. SIGIR also reviewed records of GRD daily, weekly, and 

monthly meetings in addition to numerous e-mails, letters, and other correspondence between the 

U.S. government and Wamar officials regarding the inspections. SIGIR found that GRD files 

included a detailed record of the status of inspections, including electrical checks and tests, 

ultrasonic inspections of the turbines, independent international certificates of conformity and 

quality, and established procedures for storing and handling parts, materials, and equipment 

required during the inspections. Our review of the documents also showed that GRD had 

consistently reviewed Wamar’s cost proposals and schedule changes and monitored ongoing 

inspection problems. 

However, JCC-I/A has not taken timely action to financially close out the two contracts and 

could not locate the official files from which to complete these closeout procedures. The Federal 

Acquisition Regulation states that firm-fixed-price contracts should be closed out within six 

months of evidence of completion. Once a contractor has physically completed a contract, 

contracting officers are to begin the administrative and financial components of closeout. JCCI/A’s Contract Closeout Task Force Office, located in San Antonio, Texas, is responsible for the 

financial closeout and storage of all firm-fixed-price contracts such as those awarded to Wamar. 

While no major issues appear to be outstanding with the Wamar contracts, as of December 2009, 

the contracts had not been closed out, and the location of the official contract files from which to 

conduct the final financial closeouts was unknown. Neither JCC-I/A nor its Contract Closeout 

Task Force Office could tell us the status or location of the files. 

On the 2006 contract, Wamar had completed all of the inspections by July 2007, and GRD 

determined by August 2007 that the inspections had been physically completed as specified. On 

the 2007 contract, by August 2008, GRD had determined that Wamar had completed the 

inspections as specified. Financial closeout—determining whether a contract audit has been 
22 

completed, a final contractor’s invoice has been submitted, and excess funds have been 

deobligated—is considered to be the most critical phase of the closeout process. However, 

according to Wamar and JCC-I/A officials, as of December 2009, neither contract had been 

financially closed out. While financial closeout procedures were not done, it appears that no 

major financial issues are outstanding with either contract. According to Wamar documents, the 

inspections were completed, all invoices were submitted and paid, and virtually no funds remain 

to be deobligated. 
23 

Conclusions 

The three Wamar contracts were generally successful and JCC-I/A and GRD exercised sound 

management and oversight over the work. Wamar, JCC-I/A, and GRD faced multiple challenges 

on all three contracts but took prudent measures to control costs and complete the required work. 

Wamar’s armored vehicle contract, though not free of problems, was mostly successful. The 

most significant problem, the theft of eight vehicles that were in route to Baghdad, eventually 

resulted in a U.S. government decision to change the way Wamar was to deliver the remaining 

vehicles to prevent further thefts. This change added about $2.0 million to total contract costs. 

Wamar also began the first turbine generator inspections at a time when the real conditions of the 

power plants were unknown. For many years the power plants across the country had been run 

to failure because the Iraqi government had forgone the required maintenance and safety 

procedures on the generators. As a result, U.S government pre-award planning and defining 

project requirements, especially in a difficult security environment, created very real challenges 

for both Wamar and the government. Even though the inspections and repairs cost more and 

took longer to complete than planned, these cost increases were due mostly to unanticipated 

repairs that could not be seen until the inspections were started. 

Overall, SIGIR believes that both JCC-I/A and GRD actively and effectively carried out their 

management and oversight responsibilities under these three contracts. While both agencies 

encountered problems throughout the contracts’ performance periods, most of these problems 

were recognized, addressed and mostly resolved. However, JCC-I/A has yet to financially close 

out the contracts or account for missing contract files. 

Previous SIGIR reports have included recommendations and/or lessons learned to address issues 

related to Iraq reconstruction project contract management and oversight. The major issues 

identified in this report—contract cost and schedule changes after contract awards, and contract 

administration, project management, and oversight—have been addressed in these prior reports. 

Accordingly, SIGIR includes no recommendations or lessons learned in this report. 

 
24 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

SIGIR provided a draft of this report to the responsible agencies for comment. The U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers generally agreed with the facts in the report. JCC-I/A also concurred with 

the report. 

JCC-I/A provided an update on the location of contract files and of their closeout of the 

contracts. It noted the files of contracts W914NS-04-D-0121 and W91GXY-06-C-0050 had 

been identified and an inventory of these files showed that they were 90% complete. Closeout of 

these contracts is in process. Files for contract W91GXY-07-C-0014, however, have not been 

located. 

 
25 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

In June 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) began its work on 

Project 9007 to audit three contracts awarded to Wamar International, Inc. (Wamar) to complete 

Iraq reconstruction projects. SIGIR’s objectives for this report were to examine contract 

outcomes, cost, and oversight, emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and 

abuse. This audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work from June through October 2009 in various locations in 

the United States and in Baghdad, Iraq. 

To accomplish our audit objectives, we visited or held discussions with officials and/or reviewed 

data from the following organizations: 

• Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/Gulf Region Division (GRD) 

• Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

• Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 

• Wamar International 

We obtained and reviewed relevant contract, financial, and other information from these 

organizations relating to the pre-award, award, oversight, and performance of Wamar on Iraq 

reconstruction contracts W914NS-04-D-0121, W91GXY-06-C-0050, and W91GXY-07-C-0014. 

We reviewed the contracts, task orders, delivery orders, associated modifications, and other 

related documentation from the contract files maintained by JCC-I/A and GRD. 

To determine the overall cost and funding of the contracts and individual task orders, we used 

data in the contract files and financial data obtained from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 

Financial Management System. To determine the outcome and oversight of the selected task 

orders and delivery orders, we used data in the JCC-I/A and GRD contract and project files, 

including the basic contracts, task orders, contract modifications, and scope of work changes; 

invoices that Wamar submitted for work under the task orders; daily, weekly and monthly 

progress reports on the work performed, and photographs of project sites. 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

To perform this audit, SIGIR had direct access to data in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Financial Management System and used this access to identify obligations, expenditures, and 

unliquidated obligations for the task orders. This automated financial management system is 

intended to provide timely, accurate, and comprehensive financial information for all levels of 
26 

management, especially at the program and project management level, through interface with 

other information system programs. We used computer-processed data contained in this system 

to identify, verify, and crosscheck financial information on task orders contained in GRD and 

Wamar’s contract files. This process showed that the computer-processed data we used was 

reliable. 

Internal Controls 

We did not examine Wamar’s internal management and financial control systems. Rather, we 

relied on Wamar’s invoices and accounting and purchasing contract files to identify indications 

of fraud, waste, and abuse. Since the work was largely complete at the time of our audit, we 

could not monitor construction progress. Further, we were unable to observe the condition of the 

turbine generator inspection projects at the time of or after their completion. Thus, we relied on 

available reports, site photographs, transfer documents, and discussions with government and 

Wamar officials for insight on the completed facilities. 

We did not review the U.S. government or JCC-I/A’s contract management system as a whole 

but did review controls and oversight of the specific inspections under the two contracts. We 

reviewed the controls used in awarding, managing, and administering these inspections. 

Specifically, we reviewed the management controls related to contract award, contract 

administration and management, oversight of the inspections, and completion of the inspections 

and repairs. 

Audit Limitations 

Because of the administrative and math errors in the 2006 inspection contract (W91GXY-06-C0050), this document was not useful in establishing a baseline that would allow SIGIR to track 

requirements and costs. SIGIR determined that the most accurate and realistic estimates of 

requirements (though still incorrect and not without additional problems) were those in the price 

schedule of Modification P0001 issued on March 22, 2006. SIGIR based this determination on 

the relatively few changes that were made to the contract after that modification. 

Prior Coverage 

The following reports are related to this assignment: 

Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts, SIGIR 08-

020, 7/27/2008. 

Agency Management of the Closeout Process for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracts,

SIGIR 07-010, 10/24/2007. 

Other Reports in the Series of Focused Contract Audits 

Iraq Security Forces Facilities: Environmental Chemical Corporation Projects Achieved 

Results, but with Significant Cost Increases and Schedule Delays, SIGIR 10-001, 10/22/2009.
27 

Developing a Depot Maintenance Capability at Taji Hampered by Numerous Problems, SIGIR 

09-027, 7/29/2009. 

Tikrit Location Command Project Achieving Contract Goals by Using Sound Management 

Practices, SIGIR 09-024, 7/29/2009. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Hotel Construction Completed, but Project 

Management Issues Remain, SIGIR 09-026, 7/24/2009. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Muhalla 312 Electrical Distribution Project 

Largely Successful, SIGIR 09-025, 7/24/2009. 

Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight 

Problems, SIGIR 09-014, 4/26/2009. 

Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraq Oil Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown & Root 

Services, Inc., SIGIR 09-008, 1/13/2009. 

Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Local Governance Program Contracts with Research Triangle, 

SIGIR 09-003, 10/21/2008. 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,

SIGIR 08-019, 7/28/2008. 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with FluorAMEC, LLC, 

SIGIR 08-018, 7/15/2008. 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with Perini 

Corporation, SIGIR 08-011, 4/29/2008. 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction Contract W914NS-04-D-006 SIGIR 08-

010, 1/28/2008. 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Reconstruction of Taji Military Base and Baghdad Recruiting 

Center, SIGIR 08-004, 1/15/2008. 

Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police 

Training Program, SIGIR 07-016, 10/23/2007. 

Review of Bechtel’s Spending Under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction Contract, SIGIR 07-009, 

7/24/2007. 

 
28 

Appendix B—Funds Provided on Wamar Contracts 

Table 4—Wamar Contracts as of September 17, 2009 

 Contract Number Contract Description Obligations Disbursements Balance 

Economic Support Fund (ESF) 

1 W91GDW-09-C-4038 Gas Turbine Inspection, Testing & Repair $ 2,380,258 - $2,380,258 

2 W91GXY-07-C-0009 Gas Turbine Inspection, Testing & Repair 37,919,754 $37,919,754 - 

3 W91GXY-07-C-0014 Gas Turbine Inspection, Testing & Repair 25,421,000 25,379,000 42,000 

4 W91BXY-07-M-0020 Gas Recirculation Fan 278,000 278,000 - 

5 W91GDW-07-M-0086 Spare Parts 45,660 45,660 - 

6 W91GDW-08-M-0064 Electronic Cards 687,000 687,000 - 

7 W91GXY-07-C-0003 Service for Combustion Inspection 3,980,000 3,980,000 - 

8 W91GDW-07-C-4001 Management Workshops / Other Expenses 1,049,445 1,049,445 - 

9 W91GDW-07-D-4042 GIS Capacity Development for Ministry of 

the Environment 451,896 451,896 - 

Total ESF $72,213,013 $69,790,755 $2,422,258 

Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) 

10 W56HZV-09-C-0466 Purchase/Deliver Armored Vehicles $ 1,154,870 - $1,154,870 

11 W91GY0-09-P-0380 DC to DC Converter + Shipping & Handling 557,000 $ 557,000 

12 W914NS-04-D-0121 Purchase/Deliver Armored Vehicles 16,921,500 16,921,500 - 

13 W19GY0-07-M-0314 Purchase/Deliver Armored Vehicles for MoE 133,600 133,600 - 

14 W91GY0-07-M-0355 Purchase/Deliver Armored Vehicles for NP 133,600 133,600 - 

15 W91GY0-08-M-0447 Auto Trans/Power Steering Fluid Exchanger 19,748 19,748 - 

Total ISFF $18,920,318 $17,208,448 $1,711,870 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) 

W914NS-04-D-0121 Purchase/Deliver Armored Vehicles $ 9,448,462 $ 9,448,462 - 

16 W914NS-05-M-0013 Purchase/Deliver Tactical Rescue 

Equipment 122,769 122,769 - 

17 W914NS-05-M-1254 Purchase/Deliver Armored Vehicles + 

Extras 1,495,354 1,495,354 - 

18 W914NS-05-M-2060 Liquid Fuel Nozzle Test Stand 128,625 128,625 - 

19 W91GXX-06-M-0024 Equipment and Training 4,522 4,522 - 

20 W91GXY-06-C-0050 Gas Turbine Inspection, Testing & Repair 34,670,500 34,670,500 - 

21 W91GXY-06-C-0059 Emergency Repair of Khor Al Zubair Unit #5 4,285,400 4,285,400 - 

22 W91GXU-06-C-0098 Emergency Spare Parts for Power Plants 1,044,205 1,044,205 - 

23 W91GXY-06-C-0103 Nassiriyah Gas Skid Installation 1,693,660 1,693,660 - 

24 W91GXY-06-M-0036 Liquid Fuel Nozzle Test Stand 643,500 643,500 - 

25 W91GXY-06-M-0089 Emergency Spare Parts for Power Plants 20,722 20,722 - 

26 W91GXY-06-M-0101 Emergency Spare Parts for Power Plants 829,325 829,325 - 

27 W91GXY-06-M-0115 Emergency Spare Parts for Power Plants 4,991 4,991 - 

28 W91GY1-06-M-0007 Mosul Dam Equipment Purchase, Phase 1 7,738 7,738 - 

Total IRRF $54,399,773 $54,399,773 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

29 W91GDW-07-C-2014 Mussayab Gas Tank Farm $ 4,630,000 $ 4,630,000 - 

Total CERP $ 4,630,000 $ 4,630,000 

GRAND TOTAL $150,163,104 $146,585,976 $3,577,128 
29 

Appendix C—Description of Inspections 

According to manufacturer documents and accepted industry language, an “inspection” is a 

maintenance term that includes both the inspection and repair of turbine generators. The types of 

inspections required under these two contracts are referred to as “shutdown” inspections because 

the units require disassembly of the turbines in varying degrees. 

Combustion Inspection 

According to GE turbine maintenance documents, a combustion inspection is a relatively short 

disassembly shutdown inspection of fuel nozzles, liners, transition pieces, tubes and retainers, 

spark plug assemblies, flame detectors, and other pieces of the turbines that are recognized as 

being the first to require replacement and repair in a good maintenance program. For each 

combustion inspection, Wamar was required to (1) disassemble the combustion components, (2) 

remove the turbine outer casing upper part, (3) remove the turbine stationary blade carrier upper 

part, (4) roll out the turbine stationary carrier lower part, and (5) replace the turbine blades and 

vanes if necessary. According to Wamar officials, this type of inspection should be performed at 

least every 4,000 hours of operating time or about every six months if the generators are run on 

natural gas or more frequently if crude oil is used. The initial cost of each combustion 

inspection, including service on all auxiliary systems, was approximately $740,000; the cost of 

providing and refurbishing needed parts for this type of inspection was estimated at around $3 

million. 

Hot Gas Path Inspection 

According to GE documents, a hot path gas inspection is a more detailed inspection than a 

combustion inspection. The purpose of this inspection is to examine those parts exposed to high 

temperatures from the hot gases during the turbine’s combustion process. These inspections 

require the removal of all combustion transition pieces and the first-stage turbine nozzle 

assemblies. Removal of the second- and third-stage turbine nozzle segment assemblies is 

optional, depending upon the results of visual observations and measurements. As in 

combustion inspections, the contractor was required to (1) disassemble the combustion 

components, (2) remove the turbine outer casing upper part, (3) remove the turbine stationary 

blade carrier upper part, (4) roll out the turbine stationary carrier lower part, and (5) replace the 

turbine blades and vanes. According to Wamar officials, this type of inspection should be 

performed at least every 10,000 hours of operating time or about once a year if the turbine is run 

on natural gas. Again, if crude oil is used, the inspection interval should be reduced. The initial 

contracted cost of performing a hot gas path inspection, including service on all plant auxiliary 

systems was $820,000, with an additional $3.8 million to cover the cost of providing and/or 

refurbishing needed parts. 
30 

Major Overhauls 

According to Wamar officials, this type of inspection should be performed at least every 30,000 

hours of operating time, or about every three years, depending on the type of fuel used. Neither 

of the projects initially required a major overhaul of any of the units. 
31 

Appendix D—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 

DFI Development Fund for Iraq 

ESF Economic Support Fund 

GE General Electric Company 

GRD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/Gulf Region Division 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

MoE Iraq Ministry of Electricity 

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

 
32 

Appendix E—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Ziad Buhaissi 

George Salvatierra 

Robert Whitely 

Michael Welsh 

 
33 

Appendix F—Management Comments 

We provided a draft of this report to responsible agencies for comment; however, SIGIR has no 

recommendations in the report, and neither USACE nor JCC-I/A suggested changes to the 

report. USACE generally agreed with the facts as prevented in the report and found it 

unnecessary to provide additional comments. JCC-I/A concurred with the conclusions of the 

report and provided an update on the status of the contracts’ closeout and location of contract 

files. The Contract Closeout Task Force Office has identified two of the three contracts 

(W914NS-04-D-0121) and (W91GXY-06-C-0050). The inventory of all the contract files is 

90% complete and the contracts’ closeouts are in process. However, files for contract 

W91GXY-07-C-0014 have not been located. 

 
34 

Appendix G—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Danny Kopp 

Office of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil