2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-20-2004 

# S a va ge v . DA P hi l a delphi a C t y P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-4445

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion
" S a va g e v . D A P hi l a de lp hi a C t y " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s . P ape r 204. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/204NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

__________ No. 03-4445

__________ CHRI STOP HER SAVA GE Ap pellan t,
v. THE DI STRI CT ATT ORNEY OF THE COUNT Y OF PHI LADELP HIA, LYNNE ABR AHAM; T HE ATTOR NEY GENER AL OF T HE STA TE OF PENNSYLVANIA, *GERALD J. PAPPERT; HARRY WILSON, SUPERI NTENDENT,

*(Amended Per the Cler k’s Order dated 6/24/04)

__________ On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt For th e Ea stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (Civ. A. No. 02-7854) Distric t Judg e: Ho nora ble S tewa rt Da lzell

__________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit L. A.R. 34.1( a)

September 28, 2004

___________ Be for e: R OT H, B AR RY , and GA RT H, Circu it Judges

(Fil ed: October

20, 2004)
OPI NIONGa rth, Circu it Judge :

Christ opher Savage brought this habeas corpus acti on under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, assert ing viol ations of his Si xth and Fourteenth Amendment right s to confr ontati on and compulsoryprocess. Applyi ng the defer entia l st andard of revi ew set fort h in the Anti-Terr orism and Effect ive Death Penal ty Act (“AEDPA ”), t he District Court

denied Sa va ge ’ s P eti t i on . We h av e j uri sd i cti on pu r su an t t o 2 8 U
. S. C. §§ 12 91 an d 2 25 3. We wil l a ffi rm. I. Because we write exclusivel y for the benefi t of the parti es who are well a cquaint ed with the facts and procedural posture of the present action, we will recount only those matte rs relev ant to th e issue s bef ore u s. On July 15, 1 998 , a jury in the P hilade lphia County Court

of Common Pleas found Savage guil ty of possess ion of a cont roll ed substanc e with intent to de liver . Savage had been arrested on the eveni ng of December 27, 1995 in t

he course of a narcoti cs survei llanc e operation by Philadelphia Housing Authority ( “PHA”) police offi cers Kevin Muldrow and Darri n DelViscio, with back-up assis tance fr om PHA officer s Michael Duross and Fred Pantal one. Duross di d not tes tify at tria l, bu t the C om mo nw ealth calle d M uld row , De lVi scio , and Pan talon e. According to t

heir testi mony, Muldrow and DelVisci o observed Savage for ten or fift een minutes as he walked back and for th between a t akeout shop and a housing proj ect
on o ppo site sides of the street. T he of ficers th en w itnesse d an u nkn ow n blac k m ale app roa ch S ava ge, a fter wh ich th e tw o co nve rsed and the m an h and ed S ava ge m one y.Upon taking the money, Savage retrieved a tinfoi l bundle of

what the offi cers as sumed was PCP from alongside t he wall of a hous e on the corner of the inter secti on. Savage th en cr os se d ba ckto th e o th ersi de of th e i nt er se ctio n, pa ss ed th e b und le to th e u nkn own
ma le, an d en tered the ta keo ut sh op. At this point, Muldrow radioed his backup officer s, Pant alone and Duross , who approached the scene i n a polic e car. When the officer s call ed to Savage as he exit ed the takeout shop, Savage fl ed, and the officer s gave chase. A few mom ents l ater, Pantalone apprehended Savage. The jury heard a diff erent v ersion of the even ts from Sav age, w ho to ok th e stand in his own defense. According to Sava ge, he had gone to the takeout shop t o purchase a sandwich duri ng a Christmas visi t with hi s young c hildren and thei r mother, who lived nearby . While t

he sandwich was being made, he stepped out side t he shop and saw Duross and Pantal one approach a man st anding on the corner. When the man fled, Du ross p ursue d the m an, an d Pa ntalon e rem ained behin d to q uestion Sav age. S avag e told Pantalone that he was waiting for his sandwic h and did not know the fleei ng man. Soon therea fter, Duross returned empty -handed and began t o inter rogate Sava ge. When Savage again stated th at he d id no t kno w th e ma n, D uross allege dly said, “Y ou w ill know him whe n I take you dow n to the station.” D uross then g rabbed S avage b y the shoulder, which caused Savage t o panic and run away. Givi ng chase, Duros s–not Pan talon e–u ltima tely ap pre hen ded him
. At tri al, the defens e maintai ned that Duross had arr ested Savage because he had1 Pa. R. Evid. 607(a), which took effect after Savage’s trial, abolished the common law

rule that prohibited a party from impeaching his own witness. See Commonwealth v. Kimbell , 759 A.2d 1273, 1276 n.3 (Pa. 2000).

2 Savage argued that the c ommon law impeachment rule was not applicable because he was not attempting to impeach Duross, but rather seeking to present substantive evidence through his testimony. We note that this appeal solely concerns the trial court’s exclusion of Duross’stestimony

as substantive evidence. bungled the arrest of the true c ulprit and that M uldrow , Pantalone, an d De lViscio w ere
cove ring fo r Du ross’s in ept an d cor rupt co ndu ct. To bolster this theo ry, Savag e sou ght to call Duross as a defens e witness , el icit his account

of the arrest , and then questi on him on his disc iplinary histo ry at the PH A, w hich in clude d three incide nts of misco ndu ct in former drug ca ses. First , in 1997, just six months prior

to Savage’s tri al, Duross tes tifi ed under a grant

of immunitybefore a feder al grand j ury that he fabric ated the detai ls of a narcotics arrest in A pril of 1997 . Second , Duross w as foun d guilty in a disciplinary hearing f or ly ing about t

he facts of a different narc otics arres t, resulting in a f ive-day suspensi on. Thir d, Duross was sued i n federalcourt, along with ot her PHA officers, for lying abo ut the re cove ry of nar cotics in a 199 3 arres t. In further support

of the conspiracytheory , Savage al so sought to cross- examine the three test

ify ing offi cers on their aware ness of Duross’ s disciplinar y r ecord. The Commonw ealth file d a motion i n limi ne to prec lude Savage fr om examining anyof the officer s on Duross’s record. Noting that there was no apparent conne ction be tween Duross’s mis conduct and the case at bar, t he tri al judge applie d Pennsyl vania’s common law im peac hm ent rule 1 and held that Savage was fre e to cal l Duross as a witness but
co ul d n ot th en im pe ac h h im w ith hi s d isc ip lin ar y hi sto ry. 2 The tri al judge deferred r ulingon whether Savag e could question Muldrow , Pantalone, and DelViscio on their awareness

of D uross ’s reco rd, bu t wh en the defe nse a ttemp ted to c ross-e xam ine M uldro w o n this issu e an d th e C om mo nw ealth obj ecte d, th e jud ge r uled in th e C om mo nw ealth ’s fa vor . Savage argued on di rect appeal and i n his habeas petit ion that the trial j udge improperl y l imit ed his cr oss-exami nation of three gove rnment witne sses and precluded him from present

ing subst antive evidence of t he arres ting off

icer’ s recor d of simil ar fabric ations , the reby deprivi ng him of his cons tit utionalright s under the Sixth and Fourteen th Am endm ents. The D istrict Court denied the petition, but granted S avage’s req ues t for a ce rtific ate o f ap pea labil ity. Th is ap pea l foll ow ed. II. At the ou tset, we mu st determine the approp riate standard of review, an inquiry wh ich tak es on particu lar imp ortanc e give n that th e D istrict Co urt con sidere d it to be all but o utcom e-dete rmina tive. U nder the A ED PA : An application for a wri t of habeas corpus on behal f of a person i n custody pursuant to the j udgment of a State court s hall not be grante d with res pect t o any clai m that was adj udicat ed on the meri ts i n State c ourt pr oceedings unl ess the adjudic ation of

the cl aim--( 1) resul ted in a decisi on that was cont

raryto, or involved an unreasonabl e appli cati on of, cl early establ ished Feder al la w, as dete rmin ed b y the S upr em e C our t of th e U nited Sta tes . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) . Thus, i nsofar as Savage’s cl aims were rej ected on the merit s by t he Superior Court, unde r the AEDPA he may be granted habe as rel ief onl y i f the deci sion was “contrary t o, or i nvolved an unre asonable application of, ” clearly establ ished fede ral3 As Savage has not attempted to argue that the Superior Court’s determination was “co nt rar y to” fed era l l aw, th is cas e on ly in vol ves th e “u nre aso nab le a ppl ica ti on” cla use . In Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 3 62 (2000) , the Supre me Court e

xplained that the “u

nreasonable application” clause refers to a state c ourt decision that “identifies the correct gove rning legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner ’s case .” 529 U.S . at 412-1 3. It i s not enoug h for a pe titioner t o show tha

t the state court’s application of federal law was incor rect; he must also show that it was unreasonable. Id. at 411. law as d etermined b y the Suprem e Cou rt. 28 U.S.C . § 2254(d )(1). 3 Sav age a rgue s, how ever, th at bec ause the P enns ylvania S uper ior C ourt cite d on ly Pennsyl vania l aw with no refere nce to feder al la w, this court nee d not apply the AE DP A’s d efere ntial stan dard of rev iew. In so arg uing , Sava ge relie s hea vily on this court’ s decis ion in Everett v. Beard , which hel d: The AED PA standard of r eview does not apply unless i t is clear from the face of the state court dec ision that the merits of th e petitioner’s constitutional claim s were examined in l ight of f

ederal law as est ablis hed by t he Supreme Court of t

he United States. 290 F.3d 500, 507- 08 (3d Cir. 2002). I n Eve rett , the state court di scussed onl y st ate cas es in rejec ting a f edera l cons titutional c laim. In this cas e, too, the Sup erior C ourt cite d on ly to state la w in adjud icating the co nstitution al claim s, wh ich, Sa vage conte nds, p laces th is case squar elywithin t

he holding of Eve rett , the reby compelli ng this court to applya de
novo st an da rd of

re vi ew. The d if fi cul tywith Sa vag e’ s po si ti on i s that sub se que ntopi ni ons of t he S upr eme Court “have made cl ear that as l ong as the reasoning of t he state court doe s not cont radict releva nt Supreme Court precedent, the AEDPA ’s gener al rul e of deference applie s.” Priester v. Vaughn , 382 F.3d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 2004) (ci ting Early v. Packer , 537 U.S . 3(200 2); Wo odfo rd v. V isciotti , 537 U.S. 19 ( 2002)). In Ear ly , f orin st anc e, th e Su pr eme Court held t

hat qual ific ation f

or AEDPA deference “doe s not re quire ci tati on of our
cases- -indeed, it does not even re quire awareness of our cases , so l ong as neit her the reasoni ng nor the r esult of the st ate court deci sion cont radict s them.” Ear ly , 537 U.S. at 8; see also Woodford , 537 U.S. at 23-24 ( holding t hat st ate court’s “ shorthand referenc e” to inef fecti ve assi stance of

counsel s tandard, though imprec ise, did not render deci sion
unw orthy of deferen ce); Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (apply ing defer entia l AE DP A sta ndar d of review wh ere state cour t had re lied on ly on its ow n pre cede nt to reject p etitioner ’s inef fectiv e assista nce o f cou nsel alle gation ); Rom pilla v. Horn , 355 F.3d 23 3, 250 (3d Cir. 2004 ) (applying AE DP A de ference to P ennsylvania cou rt’s determ ination of ine ffec tive ass istance of co unse l allegatio n des pite co urt’s fa ilure to expressl y ci te to Stri ckland stan dar d). The ques tion, the n, is no t wh ether th e Su perior Co urt cited to fed eral ca ses in adjudic ating Sava ge’s const itutional c laims. Rather, the question is whether the
reas oni ng o f the Su per ior C our t is co nsis tent w ith fe der al law
. See Priest er , 382 F.3d at 398. The Superi or Court determined that becaus e therewas “no connecti on between the prior a rrests an d the in stant ca se,” it co uld n ot say that th e “ev idenc e if ad mitted wo uld have resul ted in a

differe nt verdi ct. ” Comm onwealth v. Savage , No. 2358 Phil a. 1998, mem. op. (Pa. Super. Nov. 30, 1999) (citing Comm onwealth v. Robinson , 554 Pa. 293, 305 (199 9) (fin ding error w ill be de eme d har mless wh ere it co uld n ot hav e con tributed to
ver dict) ). In o ther wo rds, th e Su per ior C our t foc use d on the r elev anc y of th e ev iden ce, acrucia l ele ment in asc ertai ning a Confront ation or Compulsory Process Clause infr acti on, and appli ed a harmles s error standar d, which i s the same standard t hat governs violat

ions und er b oth clau ses. See Crane v. Kentuc ky , 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (harmless e rror applie s to C om pulso ry Proce ss claim ); De lawa re v. Van A rsda ll , 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (harmless e rror applies to Confrontation Clause clai m). As such, there i s no contra diction with Sup reme Co urt pre cede nt, and the A ED PA ’s stand ard o f def erenc e is applic able. III. We turn fir st t o Savage’s cl aim that the trial c ourt vi olate d his feder al constituti onal rights t o confrontation and due process by precluding any cr ossexam ination of the thre e testifying officers into their kno wledg e of D uross’s disciplinary histo ry. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the c riminaldefendant t he right “to be confronte d with the wit nesses aga inst

him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. At the core of the Confrontation Clause i s the right of e very defendant t o test the cre dibil ity

of witness es thro ugh cro ss-e xam inati on. See Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S . 308 , 315 -16 (19 74)
. But notwiths tanding t

he vita l rol e cross- examinati on can playin casting doubt on a witness’s cred ibility , not all conceivab le method s of und ermining c redibility are
co ns ti tu ti ona ll y guara nt ee d. As t he Sup re me Co ur t h as mad e c le ar , “ [i ]t doe s n otfo ll ow . . . t hat the Confrontation Clause of the Sixt h Amendment prevents a t rialjudge from imposing any

limi ts on defens e counsel’ s inqui ry into t he potential bi as of a pros ecuti onwitness. ” Van Arsd all , 475 U.S. at 679. On the contrary, a tri al court retai ns the discr etion to limi t the s cope of cross -examination. Id . This includes discretion to impose limits based on concerns about harassment, prejudi ce, confusion of the issues, witness saf ety, or in terro gatio n th at is re petit ive o r on ly mar gin ally rele van t. Id . In t his way , the Confrontation Clause “ guarante es an opportunity for effective cros s-examinat ion, not cross-examination that i s effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, t he defense might wish. ” Id. (quoti ng Delaware v. Fensterer , 474 U.S . 15, 2 0 (1 985 )). The analy sis here thus focus es on whether t he constr aints the trial c ourt i mposed on the scope of

Savage’s cr oss-exami nation f ell wit hin thos e “reasonable li mits” which a trial c our t, in d ue e xer cise of its disc retio n, ha s au tho rity to es tabli sh. See United St ates v. Chandler , 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). Governed by the fore going pri nciple s, and in li ght of the AED PA’s deferential review, we conclude that t he state court’ s li mitation of S ava ge’ s cro ss-e xam inati on p asse s co nstitu tion al sc rutin y. Sav age a rgue s that he had th e right to explo re the te stifying of ficers’ f amiliar ity with Du ross’s h istory of m isrepre sentatio ns an d fab rication s in na rcotics a rrests, w hich, in turn, could rai se a strong inference that theycraft ed thei r tes timonyso as to mi nimize and legit imiz e his role in S ava ge’ s arre st. W e are unc onv ince d fo r tw o pr incip al rea son s. First , the tri al judge did not preclude al l inqui ry into t he testify ing offi cers’ bias or
mo tives
. Co mp are V an A rsda ll , 475 U .S. at 67 9 (no ting tha t trial cou rt proh ibited a ll inquiry into possibility that prosecution witness w ould be b iased as a resu lt of State’s dism issal of his pe ndin g pu blic dru nken ness c harg e); Un ited Sta tes v. M cNe ill , 887 F.2d448, 453-54 ( 3d Cir. 1989) (“In r esolvi ng the te nsion between the admissibili ty of

evidence under

the bia s theory and t

he inadmiss ibil ity

of the same evi dence under the charact er theory, it i s signi ficant that t he court pe rmitted defendant to intr oduce evidence intended to im peach [ the witness] b y other means.”). T o the con trary, t he trial court affo rded Sav age th e opp ortun ity to exam ine the testifying o ffice rs abo ut their p ossible motive t o lie to protect

Duross and themsel ves. Moreover, defense counselargued to t he jury that the fou r offic ers co nspire d tog ether to fabric ate the arrest. Second, Savage’ s calculus ignore s the tension between the admissibili ty of evidence under a b ias theory and the inad missibility of the same ev idence un der a charact er theory. The power of courts to exclude evi dence thr ough the appl ication of evid entia ry rule s tha t serv e the inter ests o f fa irne ss an d re liabi lity is w ell se ttled
. See Chambers v. Missi ssippi , 410 U .S. 284, 302 (1973); Crane , 476 U.S. at 690 (“[W]e have never questioned the power of State s to excl ude evidence t hrough the appl ication of evidentiaryrules that t

hemselves s erve the interests of fairne ss and rel iabil ity --even i f the defendant would pr efer t o see that evidence admi tted. ”). The i nference t he jurywould be asked to dr aw in this case is that be cause Duross pr eviousl y gave fa lse testi mony about the facts of a narcotics poss ession arrest on p rior occasion(s), he f abricated Sa vage’s
arre st , t hus cr ea ti ng a

re as on o r mo ti ve fo r t

he te stif y in g of fi ce rs to fa ls if

y th ei r o wn testimony to protect

both Duross and t

hemselves. It i s clear

that bot h the st ate and feder al rules of evidence reflect a generalreluct ance to dr aw the infer ence that because a per son may have acted wrongfully on one occasi on, he al so acted wrongful ly on the occas ion at4 It is also of no consequence tha t Savage’s purported cross-examination of the testify ing officers involved impeachment, not substantive, evidence. That fa ct does not eliminate the evidentiary c oncerns underly ing the general prohibition of propensity evidence. Inasmuc

h as Savage sought to introduce Duross’s disciplinary history as substantive evidence –as proof that because Duross c ommitted mis conduct in other c ases, he did so in thiscase–hi s purport ed cross

examination of the te stify ing off icers a bout Duro ss’s disci

plinary history could be r

easonably viewed as a thinly- veiled attempt to introduce otherwise improper propensity evidence.
5 While Sava

ge also argue s that the t

rial cou rt’s ruling denied him due processof law, th

is court has previously pointed out that “ [t]here is apparently little, if any , difference in the analysis.” Government of Virg in Islands v. Mills , 956 F.2d 443, 445 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly , we review Savage’s cla im under the Compulsory Process Clause. issu e. See Pa . R. E vid. 404 (b); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The fact that Savage pr esents no evidence, apart f

rom his own test

imony, to support

his contention t

hat Duross had bungled the pursuit

of the true perpet

rator , fal selyarres ted Savage, and then i nveighed the oth er o ffic ers to cov er u p hi s m isde eds fur ther atten uate s the infe ren ce to be d raw n. Indeed, t his cas e would seem to pre sent a pr ototy pical example of the likel y confus ing, prejud icial a nd s pec ulati ve n atur e of pro pen sity evi den ce. Whether the t

rialcourt’ s determinati on is fr amed in terms of relevancy or the inadm issibility of pro pens ity eviden ce, it is clea r that the trial cou rt wa s acting we ll within its discr etion i n excludi ng such evidenc e. 4 Ac cord ingly, we hold that the Sup erior C ourt, in rej ecti ng Savage’s Confront ation Cl ause claim, di d not unreas onablyapplythe Su pre me Co urt’s Six th A me ndm ent ju rispr ude nce . IV. We next address Sava ge’s cl aim that the trial c ourt vi olate d his feder al consti tuti onal ri ght to compul soryprocess by precludi ng him from present ing subst antive
ev id en ce of D ur os s’s di sc ip lin ar y hi sto ry. 5The right to cal l witnes ses in order to present a meani ngful defense at a criminal trialis a fundamental constituti onal right secured by both the Compu lsoryProcess Clause of th e Si xth Am end me nt an d th e D ue P roc ess C laus e of the F our teen th A me ndm ent. See Tay lor v. Illino is , 484 U .S. 400 , 408- 09 (1 988 ); Cham bers , 410 U .S. at 29 4. “Fe w rig hts
are m ore fun dam enta l than that o f an acc use d to pre sen t wi tnes ses in his o wn def ens e.” Cham bers, 410 U.S . at 30 2 (c iting , inter alia , Webb v. Texas , 409 U.S. 95 ( 1972)). The right is not , of cours e, unl imit ed; the defendant “must comply wit

h establ ished rules of procedure a nd evidence des igned to a ssure bot h fairne ss and rel iabil ity .” Id. ; see also Taylor , 484 U.S. at 410 (“The acc used does not have an unfettered ri ght to off er testimony t

hat is incompetent , pri vilege d, or ot herwise i nadmissi ble under s tandard r ules of ev idenc e.”). O f partic ular im port h ere, the Sup reme Co urt has ackn ow ledge d its “tradi tionalreluct ance to i mpose consti tuti onal res trai nts on ordi nary evidentiaryruli ngs by st ate t rialcourts .” Crane , 476 U.S. at 689. That said, state evidentiaryrules cannot be infle xib ly app lied i n su ch a wa y as to v iolat e fu nda me ntal f airn ess. See Cham bers , 410 U.S . at 29 9-3 02. We have previousl y st ated that the Compulsory Process Clause “prot ects t he present ation of

the defendant ’s case from unwarrante d interference bythe government , be it i n the form of an unnece ssaryevidentiaryrule, a prosecut or’s mis conduct, or an arbit raryruli ng from the trialjudge. ” Go vern me nt of V irgin Isla nds v . Mills , 956 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir .1992). In M ills , we establ ished a t hree-pr ong test

for dete rmining whether a l imit ation on t he right to pres ent witne sses rises to the le vel of a cons tit utionalviolat

ion: First, that [ defe ndan t] wa s dep rived o f the o ppo rtunity to pre sent ev idenc e in his favo r; seco nd, tha t the ex clude d testim ony w ould have been mate rial and favo rable to his d efen se; and third, tha t the de privatio n w as arb itrary or disp ropo rtionate to any l egiti mate evident

iaryor procedur al purpos e. M ills , 956 F.2 d at 4 46. Applyi ng this test

to the present ca se, we rej ect Savage’ s argument bec ause the ruling of the trial court w as not “arbitrary or dispropo rtionate to any legitimate eviden tiary or p roc edu ral p urp ose .” Id. Althou gh the prec ise contours o f the trial court’s ruling are somewhat ambiguous, it i s clear that t he tri al court ’s excl usion of the evidence of Duross’s di scipl inaryhist ory , both for substant ive and i mpeachment purposes , constituted the typ e of ord inar y evid entia ry rulin g typic ally im mu ne f rom con stitutio nal e rror. The tri al court ’s evi dentiary ruli ng was based, at least in part , on a concern that t he evidence conc erned event s and arr ests unrelat ed to Savage’ s case, with allthe impli cati ons that

the admiss ion of such evi dence may have entai led. As explained above, the C onstitu tion giv es trial jud ges d iscretion to exc lude e viden ce tha t is “only m argina lly releva nt,” or that

poses an undue risk of “har assment, prejudi ce, or c onfusion of t he issues .” Van Arsd all , 475 U .S. at 67 9; see also Crane , 476 U.S. at 689. Here, the trial court found t

hat due t o, among other things , the lack of evi dence or “connect ion” bet ween the p rof fere d ev iden ce a nd S ava ge’ s pa rticu lar ca se, th e ev iden ce w as p rop erly ex clud ed. A7 2-73 . Wh ile the rele vanc y of the e viden ce m ight be subje ct to rea sona ble di sa gr ee men t, th at

is not en oug h t o s us ta in Sav ag e’ s b ur de n un de r t he AEDPA. In addition, notwithst anding the debatabl e rele vancy of t he proffere d evidence, theadmissi bili ty of such evide nce is al so highl y ques tionabl e for a di fferent , though relat ed,

reason, at le ast i nsofar as defense counselsought t o intr oduce the prior bad ac ts as subs tantive evide nce to corro bora te Sav age’s testimo ny. The rule ba rring p rope nsity evid enc e pr ovi des an a ddi tion al laye r oflegit ima cy to th e tria l cou rt’s e vid entia ry rulin g. See Pa . R. E vid. 404 (b) (“E viden ce of other c rimes , wro ngs, o r acts is n ot adm issible to prov e the c harac ter of a perso n in o rder to show action in con form ity therew ith.”); Fed. R. Ev id. 404(b) (s ame). Clearly , the n, the tri al court was not acti ng arbit

rari ly in barring the intro duc tion of D uro ss’s d iscip linar y histo ry for s ubs tanti ve p urp ose s. Savage, however, reli es on the Supr eme Court’s dec isi ons in Chambers v. Mississ ippi and Crane v. Kentuckyfor the pr oposition that the mechanic al appl ication of state ev identia ry rules tran sgress es the c onstitu tional lim its of jud icial disc retion in evidentiary matters. A rev iew of those cases, ho wev er, reveals that the Su preme C ourt was concerned about

the drac onian appl ication of st ate evi dentiary rules in contr aventi on of the basic c onstitu tional g uaran tees to p roced ural fa irness, so meth ing w hich is e ntirely abs ent f rom this c ase . See Cham bers , 410 U .S. at 302 (holdin g that trial court’s mechanical applic ation of the hear say rule to exclude t esti mony by defense witnesses abou t excu lpatory co nfes sions, “ coup led w ith the S tate’s ref usal to p ermit [ defe ndan t] to
cross- exam ine [w itness w ho h ad co nfes sed to the crim e cha rged ], denie d him a trial in
acco rd w ith tradition al and fun dam ental sta ndar ds of due p roces s”); Crane, 476 U.S. at 691-92 (hol ding that

a defendant must

be permitted to present evi dence in hi s defense,
even wh ere tha t evide nce p ertaine d to an issue th at wa s resolv ed ag ainst the defe ndan t ina pr e-tria l rulin g).

This case doe s not i nvolve the exclusi on of compelli ng exculpat ory evidence, nor does it involve t

he “blanket

exclusi on” of categories of evi dence based on an ar bitr ary or dispropor

tionate appli cati on of state evidentiaryrules . To be sure, the excl usion of a confession is far different t han the exclusion of prior bad acts of a non-testi fying witness, the r elev anc y of w hich is, at b est, su bjec t to re aso nab le dis agr eem ent. In addition, t

he ty pe of evidentiaryruli ng chall enged in this cas e–the re levancyof Du ross ’s dis cipli nar y histo ry–is a ffo rde d w ide la titud e by th e C ons titutio n. See Crane , 476 U.S. at 689 (noting the “traditi onal reluctance to i mpose constitutional constr aints” upo n suc h “or dinary ev identia ry rulings b y state trial cou rts” co ncern ing the adm issibility of evidence) . In Cham bers , moreover , the Court emphasiz ed that it was es tabli shing no new principl es of constitutional l aw and limited its holding to the fact s and circumstances of the cas e before i t. 410 U.S. at 302-03. Of partic ular relevance he re, t he Court st ated that “ Cham bers theref

ore does not

stand for

the propos iti on that t

he defendant i s denied a fair op portu nity to def end h imself wh enev er a state or fed eral rule exclu des f avor able evidence. ” Un ited S tates v. Sc heffe r, 523 U.S . 303 , 316 (19 98)
. V. App lyin g the AEDPA’ s d ef er en ti al st an da rd in re vi ewi ng S av ag e’ s p etit io n, we hold that the st ate court did not

err i n limi ting t

he scope of cros s-examinat ion and pre clud ing Sav age fro m p rese ntin g su bsta ntiv e ev iden ce o f D uro ss’s d iscip linar y histo ry. The Distri ct Court’ s denialof Savage’s habea s peti tion wil l therefore be affirmed.