DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE

Army Brigade Combat 

Team Inactivations

Informed by Analyses, 

but Actions Needed to 

Improve Stationing 

Process

Report to the Subcommittee on Airland, 

Committee on Armed Services, United 

States Senate

December 2013

GAO-14-76

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-76, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on 

Armed Services, United States Senate

December 2013

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

Army Brigade Combat Team Inactivations Informed 

by Analyses, but Actions Needed to Improve

Stationing Process

Why GAO Did This Study

As part of its plan to reduce its active 

duty force by 80,000 personnel by 

2017, the Army will be inactivating 10 

BCTs currently stationed in the United 

States and reorganizing the remaining 

BCTs. The Army conducted analyses 

of different stationing options, which 

included the use of its military value 

analysis model to compare installations

based on their ability to support BCTs. 

GAO was asked to review the decision 

making process the Army used for its 

BCT stationing decision, including its 

military value analysis model. This 

report (1) describes the analyses the 

Army conducted to make its BCT 

decision and (2) evaluates the extent 

to which the Army has established 

guidance and processes related to the 

use of the military value analysis model 

as a part of its stationing decisions.

GAO reviewed the Army’s stationing 

guidance, current and previous 

versions of the military value analysis

model, documents on the BCT 

decision, and spoke with cognizant 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the Army develop 

and implement guidance related to 

when community input should be 

obtained for stationing decisions, and

related to the use of its military value 

analysis model, such as when it should 

be used, the level of approval required 

for changes to the model, and how 

certain training areas should be 

considered, as well as processes for 

updating and reviewing the model. The 

Army concurred with GAO’s

recommendations and explained how 

they will be implemented.

What GAO Found

To make decisions regarding the installations at which to inactivate 10 Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) and reorganize others, the Army conducted quantitative 

and qualitative analyses and obtained community input. Specifically, in 2012 the 

Army established a BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team to assess 

factors such as strategic considerations, military construction costs, and 

environmental and socioeconomic impacts, among others, and develop 

stationing options for decision makers. The Army also considered other factors, 

or attributes—such as training ranges, geographic distribution, and proximity to 

embarkation points—in its military value analysis model. In addition, the Army 

conducted community input sessions at installations with 5,000 or more military 

and civilian personnel, including the 15 under consideration for inactivation of a 

BCT. Several Army officials said that the sessions were valuable and could serve 

as a tool for future stationing decisions. However, the Army’s stationing 

regulation does not include guidance on obtaining community input beyond what 

may be required in the context of environmental analysis. An Army official said 

that he is developing proposed guidelines for when such input should be 

considered, but was uncertain how they will be incorporated into formal 

guidance. Effective stakeholder involvement includes actively soliciting ongoing 

stakeholder input and fostering communication between stakeholders and 

decision makers. Incorporating this type of communication with external 

stakeholders into its stationing guidance for future decisions could lead to 

potentially greater buy-in from local communities for Army stationing decisions.

The Army expects to continue using its military value analysis model for major 

stationing decisions and has taken steps to validate the model, but has not 

established guidance and consistent formal processes related to its use, 

including when the model should be used or how it should be reviewed, updated, 

and approved. Standards for internal control state that control activities, such as 

established and consistent processes or policies, can help to ensure actions to 

mitigate risks are carried out. Army officials said that the model has generally 

been used for large-impact stationing decisions and may not be appropriate for 

minor decisions. However, the Army’s stationing regulation does not discuss the 

model or provide guidance on the circumstances when the model should be 

used. Also, the Army has not established consistent processes for reviewing and 

updating attributes and attribute definitions within the model or for collecting and 

validating data, nor has it established guidance related to the level of input or 

approval required for changes to the model or how geographically distant training 

areas should be treated in the model. For instance, subject matter experts noted

that the definitions of a couple of attributes should be updated or reviewed, but 

GAO found that there is no consistent process in place for addressing such 

issues. Army officials told GAO that the attributes and weighting of the attributes 

within the model may also change depending on the type of stationing decision, 

but there is no guidance on when revisions should be approved by Army leaders.

Without consistent formal processes for updating and reviewing the model and 

data used, and guidance related to the level of approval required for changes to 

the model, the Army risks potential decline in the rigor and consistency of the 

model over time.

View GAO-14-76. For more information, 

contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov
Page i GAO-14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Letter 1

Background 4

The Army’s BCT Stationing Decision Was Informed by Quantitative 

and Qualitative Analyses and Included an Effort to Obtain 

Community Input, Which May Provide Benefits for Future 

Stationing Decisions 7

The Army Expects the Military Value Analysis Model Will Be an 

Enduring Tool but Has Not Established Guidance or Consistent 

Processes Related to the Use of the Model within Its Stationing 

Process 18

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 32

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 36

Appendix II Brigade Combat Team Inactivations and Projected 

Installation Population Changes 39

Appendix III Army’s Military Value Analysis Model Attributes 40

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of the Army 41

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45

Related GAO Products 46

Tables

Table 1: Stationing Factors Identified for Consideration Outside of 

the Military Value Analysis Model as Part of the Brigade 

Combat Team (BCT) Inactivation Decision 9

Contents
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Table 2: Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Inactivations by U.S.

Army Installation 39

Table 3: Definitions for Attributes within the Army’s Military 

Value Analysis Model 40

Figure

Figure 1: The Army’s BCT Inactivation Decision Process 15

Abbreviations 

BCT Brigade Combat Team

DOD Department of Defense

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Page 1 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 11, 2013

The Honorable Joe Manchin III

Chairman

The Honorable Roger F. Wicker

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Airland

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Army’s active component is set to decline from a peak of 

approximately 570,000 soldiers in 2012 to 490,000 by 2017, in 

accordance with anticipated reductions in defense spending and with 

strategic guidance released in January 2012.1 The Army plans to reduce 

its forces through a number of different actions, including eliminating 

temporary personnel allowances related to operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and reducing the number of military personnel at installations 

around the United States and in Europe. Specifically, the Army will be 

making reductions of approximately 17,700 personnel from the 15 U.S. 

installations where at least one brigade combat team (BCT) is stationed.2

As part of this reduction, the Army announced on June 25, 2013 that it 

would reduce the number of active duty BCTs from 45 to 33 by 

inactivating 12 BCTs—2 currently stationed in Europe and 10 currently 

stationed at installations in the United States.3

 1 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 

Defense (Jan. 3, 2012).

The Army also announced 

that it would reorganize the remaining BCTs into larger organizations 

2 A BCT is a modular organization that provides the division, land component commander, 

or joint task force commander with close combat capabilities. BCTs are the Army’s combat 

power building blocks for maneuver, and the smallest combined arms units that can be 

committed independently. BCTs can be one of three types—infantry, armor, and Stryker.

3 According to the Army, it will also likely be announcing the inactivation of an additional 

BCT in the future, which will bring the number of active component BCTs to 32. See 

appendix II for the installations where BCT inactivations will be taking place. 
Page 2 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

through the addition of more engineering capabilities and a third 

maneuver battalion to most BCTs.4

According to the Army, the magnitude of its force structure reductions 

necessitated that the reductions be distributed broadly both in terms of 

the number of installations that would be affected and the types of units 

that would be inactivated. Decisions by the military services—the Army in 

this instance—regarding where to base their force structure in the United 

States can have significant strategic, socioeconomic, and cost 

implications for both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 

communities surrounding the bases. For example, stationing decisions 

can often result in changes to the numbers of personnel, military families, 

and defense-related contractors working or living at DOD installations and 

can have an effect on the off-base infrastructure, community services, 

businesses, and environmental considerations of local communities.5

You asked us to conduct a review of the Army’s analysis and decision 

making processes that were used to support the decisions on BCT force 

structure and stationing changes, including reviewing the Army’s military 

value analysis methodology. Specifically, our objectives were to: (1) 

describe the analyses that the Army conducted to make determinations 

regarding which BCTs would be inactivated or reorganized, and at which 

installations; and (2) evaluate the extent to which the Army has 

established guidance and processes related to the use of the military 

value analysis model as a part of its stationing decisions.

To 

aid decision making for its current force reductions, the Army conducted a 

number of different analyses, including the use of a military value analysis 

model the Army has used to support previous major stationing decisions.

 4 BCTs stationed outside of the continental U.S. in Hawaii, Alaska, and Italy will not 

receive a third maneuver battalion. Also, Stryker BCTs already have a third maneuver 

battalion and will not receive an additional battalion.

5 The purpose of Army Regulation 5-10, Stationing, is to assign responsibilities for and 

prescribe policies and procedures governing the Army stationing process. According to 

the Regulation, stationing is the process of combining force structure and installation 

structure at a specific location to satisfy a specific mission requirement. It includes all 

forms of realignment or relocation and includes actions that determine the authorized 

population (military and civilian) at a particular installation. Activation and inactivation of 

force structure components are among the ways to accomplish stationing. See Army 

Regulation 5-10, Stationing at 31 (Aug. 20, 2010) (hereinafter cited as AR 5-10 (Aug. 20, 

2010)).
Page 3 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

To address the first objective, we reviewed the Army’s stationing 

regulation, reports, and guidance, examined briefings and documents 

outlining the key components of the current decision process, such as 

briefings related to the development and assessment of possible 

stationing options, and interviewed knowledgeable Army officials about 

the Army’s decision process and the key factors that were considered. 

Additionally, we reviewed documents related to the Army’s environmental 

analysis, such as environmental regulations and the Army’s programmatic 

environmental assessment of 21 installations,6

To address the second objective, we examined the Army’s stationing 

regulation, 2011 stationing report to Congress, and other applicable 

reports and guidance to determine the extent to which the Army’s military 

value analysis model is established in guidance. We examined 

documentation related to prior versions of the model and the current 

model used for the recent BCT decision to determine how the model has 

changed over time. We also reviewed key elements of the version of the 

model used to support the BCT inactivation decision, such as the 

attributes and weighting of the attributes, and interviewed knowledgeable 

officials such as Center for Army Analysis personnel to discuss the 

development of the model and how the key aspects of the model are 

reviewed and updated for each use of the model. Additionally, we 

examined documentation related to and interviewed subject matter 

experts about the processes used by the Army to collect and validate the 

data used in the model, but we did not review the completeness of the 

data or validate the data itself.

and examined briefings 

and an order related to the listening sessions held at Army installations to 

obtain community input. Further, we examined documentation related to 

the Army’s military value analysis model and methodology, such as 

briefings and reports, to identify key elements of the model and determine 

how the attributes within the model are defined and weighted to arrive at 

the results. We also interviewed knowledgeable Army officials to 

determine how the model’s results were considered as part of the broader 

BCT decision process. The scope of our work was limited to inactivations 

occurring at installations located within the United States.

 6 The 21 installations included the 15 locations where BCTs are stationed and 6 non-BCT 

installations that support major training schools or Combat Training Centers with the 

potential to lose or gain 1,000 or more military members.
Page 4 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 through December 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains 

additional information about our scope and methodology.

In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense announced that the Army’s 

end strength would be reduced by 27,000 active duty military personnel 

beginning in 2015. According to Army officials, initial discussions 

regarding how these reductions should be made began as part of the 

2014-2018 Total Army Analysis, but no decisions on BCT inactivations in 

the United States were made in 2011.7 As part of the early 2012 decision 

to further reduce its active component end-strength to 490,000, the Army 

determined that it would inactivate at least 8 of its 45 active component 

BCTs. According to the Army, it began more extensive analysis of its BCT 

organizational design, which included a series of vignettes addressing the 

full range of Army missions, simulated combat that examined multiple 

organizational options, and a strategic analysis focused on the ability of 

the Army to support force demands in plausible future campaigns. As a 

result of this analysis, the Army determined that it would inactivate 12 

BCTs and reorganize the remaining BCTs by adding a third maneuver 

battalion to armor and infantry brigades located in the continental United 

States, among other additional capabilities.8

 7 The Army describes Total Army Analysis as a process that determines the force 

structure that is both balanced and affordable to meet guidance issued from the President, 

Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, or Army leadership. 

Under the current 

organization design, the Army has 45 active component BCTs with 98 

maneuver battalions.

8 The Army is inactivating two BCTs in Europe in addition to inactivating the 10 BCTs in 

the United States.

Background

Army Reorganization of 

BCTs
Page 5 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Under the new design, the Army will reduce the number of BCTs to 33, 

but will still maintain 95 maneuver battalions by focusing reductions on 

headquarters organizations. According to Army officials, this 

reorganization will allow the Army to maximize its combat power within its 

reduced end-strength. The Army will conduct these BCT reorganizations 

concurrently with BCT inactivations and has cited some benefits of doing 

so, such as cost efficiencies that can be achieved by using inactivating 

BCTs to provide personnel, equipment, and infrastructure to BCTs that 

are reorganizing at the same installations. These BCT inactivations and 

reorganizations will take place within the Army’s stationing process.

Stationing includes realignment or relocation, and those actions that 

determine the population at a particular installation. As such, it may 

involve activation or establishment, or inactivation or discontinuance, of 

force structure components at one or more military installations in support 

of operational requirements. The Army’s stationing process incorporates 

both a force structure component and an installation component. Army 

Regulation 5-10 on Stationing establishes the policy, procedures, and 

responsibilities for Army stationing actions that occur outside of the Base 

Realignment and Closure process.9

 9 The procedures outlined in Army Regulation 5-10 are not applicable to specified 

situations. The list of exclusions includes stationing actions specifically mandated by law, 

such as base realignment and closure-directed stationing actions, although base 

realignment and closure-discretionary actions are covered. See AR 5-10, paras. 1-5.e, 6-3 

(Aug. 20, 2010).

Under the regulation, the Army 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans serves as the Army Staff 

principal proponent for directing and monitoring stationing activities, but a 

range of other Army staff directorates and organizations also have 

responsibilities within the process. In addition to providing instruction on 

administrative procedures for obtaining approval of stationing actions, 

Army Regulation 5-10 provides a framework for planning stationing 

actions, to include studying and analyzing feasible stationing options. This 

framework allows for some flexibility in regard to the factors that should 

be considered as part of stationing decisions. For example, the regulation 

identifies 28 stationing planning factors, such as operational 

considerations, for planners to consider as they identify, analyze, and 

evaluate stationing options, but recognizes that some planning factors 

may have little relevance for certain stationing actions. In addition, 

environmental analysis is generally a necessary element of the Army’s 

Army Regulation 5-10 

Establishes Framework for 

Stationing Decisions
Page 6 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

stationing process and Army Regulation 5-10 directs that stationing 

proposals are to be evaluated for compliance with the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969.10

The Army’s military value analysis model is a possible input to the Army’s 

stationing process and has been a consideration in a number of prior 

stationing decisions, including the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 

round.11 Based on tools used to analyze the military value of installations 

as part of the Base Realignment and Closure process, the Army 

developed a military value analysis model to support stationing decisions 

for six new BCTs that were established as part of the 2007 Grow the 

Army initiative, and has adapted that model for use in a number of other 

brigade stationing decisions since that time.12

 10 Pub. L. No. 91-190 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347). 

The Army’s military value 

analysis model was developed by the Center for Army Analysis, which 

reports to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, and is a decision 

analysis tool that is designed to rank-order installations based on 

attributes that the Army has identified as being operationally important to 

the type of unit in question for each stationing decision.

11 The legislation governing the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round required the 

Secretary of Defense to give priority consideration to specific criteria, identified as military 

value criteria, in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military 

installations. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 

107-107, § 3002 (2001) (amending the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 

1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX (1990)), amended by Ronald Wilson Reagan 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 2832 

(2004) (appended as a note below 10 U.S.C. § 2687).

12 The Grow the Army initiative increased the size of the active and reserve components 

of the Army by 74,000, including six new infantry BCTs.

Military Value Analysis
Page 7 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

The Army’s BCT stationing decision regarding the installations at which to 

inactivate BCTs was informed by a number of quantitative and qualitative 

analyses, including a military value analysis of installations, an 

environmental assessment, and a qualitative analysis of different 

stationing options. The Army also obtained community input through 

listening sessions held at installations around the country, a practice that 

is not currently required by Army guidance, but which may provide some 

benefits for future stationing decisions.

In May 2012, the Army established a BCT Reorganization Operational 

Planning Team for the purpose of conducting, facilitating, and overseeing 

planning and analysis to determine how to best achieve the targeted BCT 

reductions. This team was led by the Force Management directorate 

within the Army Staff and included stakeholders from across the Army 

Staff and other Army organizations, such as the Office of the Assistant 

Chief of Staff for Installation Management and Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment, among 

others. Guidance from the Secretary of the Army and Director of Army 

Force Management identifying a number of specific stationing factors to 

be considered when assessing stationing options as part of the BCT 

inactivation decision process was provided to the BCT Reorganization 

Operational Planning Team.13

 13 For the purposes of this report, we use the term “stationing options” to refer to the 

different scenarios that the Army developed and assessed regarding the 15 U.S. 

installations where the 10 BCTs could potentially be inactivated. We use the term 

“stationing factors” to refer to the guidance that planners received regarding the elements 

that they should consider when assessing the merits of the stationing options.

These key stationing factors for the 

inactivation decision were initially established in an information paper 

approved by the Secretary of the Army in November 2011 when the Army 

was planning for the reduction of at least 8 BCTs and then further defined 

and modified to account for potential BCT reorganizations in 2013. The 

The Army’s BCT 

Stationing Decision 

Was Informed by 

Quantitative and 

Qualitative Analyses 

and Included an 

Effort to Obtain 

Community Input, 

Which May Provide 

Benefits for Future 

Stationing Decisions

Army’s BCT Stationing 

Decision Was Informed by 

Qualitative and 

Quantitative Analyses of 

Identified Stationing 

Factors
Page 8 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

stationing factors included some factors to be considered as part of the 

analysis conducted using the Army’s military value analysis model and 

other stationing factors to be considered as part of analyses occurring 

outside of the military value analysis model.

To inform its BCT inactivation decision, the Army used its military value 

analysis model to measure the relative value of installations based on the 

requirements of BCTs. Stationing factors considered under the model’s 

analysis are specific to an installation’s ability to support a BCT, such as 

maneuver land availability or housing. These factors, also known as 

model attributes, were quantified as part of the military value analysis 

model in order to rank order the installations under consideration 

according to their military value. The 2013 version of the model used to 

support the recent BCT inactivation decision scored the 15 installations 

with BCTs based on 16 attributes identified by the Army as being 

operationally important to a BCT. Each attribute within the model has a 

formula or categorical definition that measures a certain characteristic 

(see appendix III for a full list of the attributes used within the current 

model and their definitions). The results of the formulas and categorical 

ratings for each attribute are converted to 0-10 scores for each 

installation. The attributes are weighted within the model based on their 

operational importance and ease of change relative to each other. For 

example, maneuver land is an attribute within the model and is 

considered to be of high operational importance, but additional maneuver 

land is not easily attainable, so that attribute is weighted more heavily 

than an attribute such as quality of life facilities, which can be improved 

through Army investment. Installations receive a score for each attribute 

based on collected data and then individual attribute scores are weighted 

and summed to produce the installations’ overall military value scores. 

For the recent decision, the 15 installations were then rank-ordered, with 

higher rankings indicating greater military value for stationing BCTs. Army 

officials emphasized that the results of the model were used only as a 

starting point for further analysis and were useful in comparing 

installations, but that the model cannot account for all of the factors that 

need to be considered in a complex decision, such as strategic 

considerations.

The Army also identified other stationing factors, which were to be 

considered outside of the military value analysis model as part of a 

qualitative assessment of stationing options. These factors address 

issues beyond a particular installation’s capabilities and infrastructure that 

are not accounted for within the model, such as strategic considerations 

or immediate impacts on readiness. Table 1 shows the key factors 

The Army Considered Some 

Stationing Factors Through the 

Use of Its Military Value 

Analysis Model

The Army Identified Stationing

Factors for Consideration 

Outside of the Military Value 

Analysis Model
Page 9 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

identified for consideration outside of the military value analysis model as 

part of the Army decision.

Table 1: Stationing Factors Identified for Consideration Outside of the Military Value 

Analysis Model as Part of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Inactivation Decision

Strategic 

considerations

Stationing options that enhanced the Army’s ability to meet 

the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance and to 

rebalance efforts to the Asia-Pacific region were to be 

considered preferable to those that did not.

Proximity of 

subordinate units to 

parent headquarters

Stationing options that resulted in subordinate units being 

collocated with, or in very close proximity, to their respective 

parent headquarters were to be considered preferable to 

those that did not.

Military construction 

costs

Stationing options that minimized unprogrammed military 

construction costs were to be considered preferable to those 

that did not.

Investment and 

regeneration

Stationing options that created space for regeneration of force 

structure in case the Army is required to grow in the future to 

meet a national emergency were to be considered preferable 

to those that did not.

Statutory requirements

Stationing options were to be checked for compliance with the 

provisions of sections 993 and 2687 of Title 10, U.S. Code;

section 8018 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2013; and Department of Defense 

Instruction 1400.25, volume 351 (Jan. 19, 2011).14

Immediate readiness 

impacts

Stationing options that minimized organizational, equipment, 

and personnel readiness impacts due to the reorganization of 

BCTs were to be considered preferable to those that did not.

Environmental and 

socioeconomic 

impacts

Stationing options that minimized environmental and 

socioeconomic impacts, as identified through the 

programmatic environmental assessment and community 

listening sessions, were to be considered preferable to those 

that did not.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

While some of the additional factors, such as strategic considerations, 

were addressed primarily through the qualitative assessment of stationing 

options, other factors required additional analysis, such as environmental 

analysis. To comply with environmental regulations and to address one of 

the stationing factors identified for consideration, the Army conducted a

 14 These statutes and the regulation contain provisions requiring notification or certification 

prior to taking certain relocation, realignment, installation closure, and personnel reduction 

actions.
Page 10 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

programmatic environmental assessment of the 21 installations and their 

associated maneuver training areas with the potential to gain or lose 

1,000 or more military and civilian personnel due to the planned force 

reductions and force structure changes—the 15 installations where BCTs 

are currently stationed and 6 other installations that support major training 

schools or Combat Training Centers—to identify potential environmental 

and socioeconomic impacts of planned force reductions. The Army found 

that no significant environmental impacts were expected as the result of 

its proposed actions and, as a result, does not anticipate preparing a

more detailed programmatic environmental impact statement related to its 

decisions.15

Army officials said that additional site-specific environmental analysis may 

be necessary once the force structure changes at affected installations 

have been finalized, particularly in instances where installations may 

experience some growth or where the types of units stationed at an 

installation may change, but this has not yet been determined. In 

particular, the Army did not assess the environmental impacts at Fort 

Benning of restructuring under the alternative that could lead to some 

degree of force growth as part of the programmatic environmental 

assessment because, as the assessment stated, there would not be a 

situation where Fort Benning would see a net increase in soldiers overall 

due to its lack of sufficient unrestricted maneuver land at that time to 

support the training needs of additional maneuver units. The Army has 

since announced that it will be retaining the BCT at Fort Benning, and 

reorganizing it by adding an additional maneuver battalion and other 

capabilities. An Army official said that Fort Benning had taken steps to 

acquire additional maneuver land to mitigate the installation’s training 

land limitations and in response to a Jeopardy Biological Opinion from 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services prior to the BCT inactivation decision 

process and related programmatic environmental assessment, but the 

acquisition was put on hold pending Army force structure and budgetary 

decisions. Army officials said that the Army still has some decisions to 

make in regard to the BCT stationed at Fort Benning and the extent that 

 15 The Army documented the results of the assessment in a document referred to as a 

Finding of No Significant Impact. See Finding of No Significant Impact and Final 

Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment, 78 

Fed. Reg. 21,919 (Apr. 12, 2013); see also Department of the Army, U.S. Army 

Environmental Command, Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force 

Structure Realignment: Finding of No Significant Impact (Apr. 2013).
Page 11 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

additional environmental analysis or other actions will be required at the 

installation to mitigate challenges related to the lack of maneuver land.

The programmatic environmental assessment found that potentially 

significant socioeconomic impacts could result at some installations due 

to the proposed force reductions. In estimating these impacts, the 

programmatic environmental assessment looked at the socioeconomic 

impacts of the maximum possible reductions that could occur at the 

installations, with an estimated loss of up to 8,000 military and civilian 

personnel at some installations. However, because the Army will be using 

units and personnel from inactivating BCTs to reorganize the remaining 

BCTs at installations where possible, the Army projects that the 

population losses at the installations that are losing BCTs, and thus the 

projected socioeconomic impacts, will not be as large as the estimates 

analyzed by the programmatic environmental assessment.

Prior to finalizing its analysis related to the environment, the Army 

provided opportunity for public comment on the draft Finding of No 

Significant Impact and the programmatic environmental assessment.16 A

30-day comment period is required by Army regulation,17 but the Army 

then voluntarily extended it for an additional 30 days18

Incorporating the results of the aforementioned programmatic 

environmental assessment and the military value analysis, as well as 

other stationing factors considered outside of the military value analysis 

as described above, the BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team 

at the request of 

some communities in order to encourage maximum stakeholder 

participation.

 16 See Availability of the Draft Finding of No Significant Impact and Final Programmatic 

Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment, 78 Fed. Reg. 

4134 (Jan. 18, 2013).

17 See 32 C.F.R. § 651.14(b)(2)(i).

18 See Notice of Availability for the Draft Finding of No Significant Impact and Final 

Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment, 78 

Fed. Reg. 11,632 (Feb. 19, 2013).

The Army Assessed Potential 

BCT Stationing Options against 

Identified Stationing Factors
Page 12 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

developed and assessed 10 potential stationing options.19 Each option 

was developed to focus on a particular consideration, some of which were 

identified as key stationing factors, some related to other considerations 

such as impacts on training, and some options were directly related to the 

outcomes of the programmatic environmental analysis and the military 

value analysis.20

Other options the planning team considered placed primary emphasis on 

different stationing factors and then incorporated the results of the military 

value analysis model as a secondary consideration. For example, one 

option selected installations for BCT inactivation that would result in the 

lowest overall military construction costs and then, once costs no longer 

distinguished between the remaining installations, inactivated BCTs at 

installations based on their military value analysis training rankings. 

Another option was based on retaining BCTs at installations that would 

best support the strategic realignment of forces to the Pacific and then, 

once those strategic considerations were addressed, inactivated BCTs at 

installations based on their military value analysis rankings.

For example, two of the potential stationing options the 

Army assessed in its qualitative analysis of options were developed to 

identify those installations where BCT inactivation would result in minimal 

environmental and socioeconomic impacts, respectively, as identified 

through the programmatic environmental assessment. In addition, one of 

the potential stationing options the Army assessed considered 

inactivating BCTs solely according to the rank order of installations where 

they are currently stationed based on the results of the military value 

analysis (i.e., the BCTs would be identified for inactivation at the ten 

installations with the lowest military value scores under this option) prior 

to the consideration of other stationing factors.

Once the BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team developed the 

10 different options, the team analyzed each option and identified 

 19 According to Army officials, when they developed the stationing option based on 

minimizing the environmental impacts of BCT inactivations and reorganizations, and the 

stationing option that inactivated BCTs based on installation military value analysis model 

scores, the two options resulted in BCTs being inactivated at the same 10 installations 

(i.e., installations with lower military value scores also faced potentially adverse 

environmental impacts from inactivations and reorganizations). 

20 One assumption throughout the development and assessment of these stationing 

options was that the options could include adjustments of BCT types (e.g., infantry, armor, 

or Stryker) at installations; according to the Army, the final BCT mix at each of the 

installations is still being determined.
Page 13 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

advantages and disadvantages based on the Army’s stationing factors 

and other considerations, such as impacts to training.21 For instance, the 

team found that the stationing option that inactivated BCTs at installations 

based on the results of the military value analysis would incur an 

estimated $684 million in military construction costs22

 21 The stationing factor related to investment and regeneration (see table 1) is not clearly 

considered as part of the Army’s summarized stationing options. Army Force Management 

officials said that the factor was considered based on the concept that by maintaining as 

many installations as possible that still have a BCT, the Army retains maneuver land and 

allows for the possibility for future expansion at those locations. Additionally, the officials 

said that inactivating at installations where there are already several BCTs reduces 

crowding and allows room for the potential for future growth at those installations.

and did not appear 

to support the Defense Strategic Guidance regarding a realignment of 

forces toward the Pacific because it would inactivate one BCT each at 

installations in Hawaii, Alaska, and Washington. In general, the analysis 

of the advantages and disadvantages of the various stationing options 

found that reorganizing BCTs (i.e., adding additional units and personnel) 

at installations with multiple BCTs without first inactivating a BCT resulted 

in higher military construction costs because each BCT on the installation 

would experience growth with no loss of population to offset that growth. 

For example, according to the Army’s analysis, Fort Hood currently has 

five BCTs and increasing the size of those BCTs without first inactivating 

a BCT would have resulted in approximately $243 million in military 

construction costs, whereas inactivating BCTs at installations with 

multiple BCTs creates excess facilities capacity to allow for the 

reorganization of the remaining units on the installation while incurring 

lower estimated military construction costs. Further, according to the 

Army, using inactivating BCTs at these locations as the initial source of 

equipment and personnel for the remaining BCTs where possible is 

expected to reduce costs related to transportation of equipment and to 

mitigate some equipment and personnel readiness impacts. Additionally, 

an official from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Installations, Energy, and Environment said that inactivating BCTs at 

single-BCT installations is less efficient because it creates excess 

capacity without a readily available reutilization or disposal strategy for 

those facilities.

22 We did not review the Army’s military construction cost estimates or other cost 

analyses.
Page 14 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Army officials involved in developing and assessing the stationing options 

said that minimizing military construction costs became a major emphasis 

of the analysis because it would be difficult to justify significant increases 

in military construction costs while reducing the size of the force. The 

Army’s military construction estimates were developed based primarily on 

data available from the Real Property Planning and Analysis System, 

which is an Army database that provides information on excess capacity 

at installations by aggregated gross square footage and facility type. An 

Army official said that these estimates are only rough order of magnitude 

estimates. Other Army officials involved in developing the estimates said 

that more accurate military construction cost estimates along with 

estimates of other potential base support costs, such as those relating to 

information technology or facilities sustainment, could have been 

provided had they been able to gather data directly from the installations, 

but non-disclosure agreements limited them to using data from the Real 

Property Planning and Analysis System.23

Military construction costs were the only costs specifically estimated for 

each stationing option, although the stationing options did include 

measures related to socioeconomic factors and basic allowance for 

housing.24 Officials said that some other costs, such as those related to 

equipment transportation for unit reorganization and for the training of 

certain units, were considered during the development and assessment of 

stationing options. According to Army officials, the Army is now 

developing detailed cost estimates for its selected stationing option as it 

completes the stationing documentation required under Army Regulation 

5-10.25

 23 According to Army officials, those closely involved in the BCT inactivation and 

reorganization decision were required to sign non-disclosure agreements that prohibited 

them from coordinating with those not covered by similar agreements due to the sensitivity 

of the stationing decisions. 

24 Basic allowance for housing is a U.S. based allowance prescribed by geographic duty 

location, pay grade, and dependency status. It provides uniformed Service members 

equitable housing compensation based on housing costs in local civilian housing markets 

within the United States when government quarters are not provided.

25 According to an Army official, this stationing documentation is preferably completed 

prior to information on stationing actions being released to Congress and the general 

public. However, this official said that Army Regulation 5-10 allows for announcement 

earlier in the planning process for politically sensitive stationing actions. 
Page 15 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

The BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team, which transitioned 

to a Council of Colonels,

26

Figure 1: The Army’s BCT Inactivation Decision Process 

developed summaries of each of the stationing 

options with the identified advantages and disadvantages based on the 

stationing factors, military value analysis results, military construction cost 

estimates, and projected socioeconomic impacts. The stationing options 

were then briefed to a 1-and 2-star general officer steering committee, 

which voted on and screened out five of the stationing options. The 

remaining five stationing options were then briefed to a 3-star general 

officer steering committee, which screened out two more stationing 

options. According to Army officials, the three recommended stationing 

options that emerged from the general officer steering committees were 

then submitted to Army senior leaders for a final determination. According 

to Army officials, all of the stationing options that were considered by the 

general officer steering committees were presented to senior leaders in 

case they wanted to revisit a stationing option that was previously 

screened out and senior leaders also had the ability to adjust the 

recommended stationing options based on their judgment. Figure 1 

shows the key elements of the Army’s BCT inactivation decision process.

 26 A Council of Colonels is a group of officers or civilian equivalents that is formed when a 

study or issue involves multiple Army organizations or staffs. Army officials said that the 

BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team transitioned into the Council of Colonels 

and the same individuals were part of both groups.
Page 16 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Officials characterized the final decision by the Secretary of the Army as a 

hybrid of a couple of the stationing options and the Army stated that 

principal considerations in the inactivations were the Army’s ability to 

meet the requirements of the defense strategy, including a rebalancing of 

forces to the Pacific, minimizing military construction costs, and 

minimizing immediate readiness impacts. The military value of 

installations also played a role in the Army’s decision. While the various 

analyses conducted by the Army played an important role in informing 

decision makers about the implications of stationing options, according to 

Army officials, decision makers also utilized military judgment in making 

the final determination about where to inactivate BCTs.

The Army’s BCT stationing decision regarding the installations at which to 

inactivate BCTs included steps to obtain community input, a practice that 

may provide benefits for future stationing decisions. The Army conducted 

listening sessions at installations that had more than 5,000 civilian and 

military personnel—the 15 installations considered as part of the BCT 

inactivation decision and 15 non-BCT installations—to give communities 

an opportunity to provide input to the Army’s force structure reduction 

decisions. These sessions had a range of attendees, such as local, state, 

and federal elected officials and civic and business leaders from across 

the individual communities. The primary focus of the listening sessions 

was to capture community input for Army leaders to consider as part of 

the Army’s overall analysis before any decisions were made, as well as to 

explain the process that the Army would be using to make its decisions.

Army Force Management officials described holding community listening 

sessions as an atypical part of the stationing process. They added that 

the number and scope of public comments received as part of the 

programmatic environmental assessment indicated the depth and breadth 

of the public’s interest in the decision. Additionally, many installation 

communities specifically requested a public forum to discuss their 

concerns. An official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment said that local 

communities might see the stationing decision as a potential loss of force 

structure similar to what could occur during the Base Realignment and 

Closure process and that it was important for the communities to have a 

public forum. This Army official stated that the listening sessions provided 

the communities with an opportunity to express their concerns about the 

projected socioeconomic impacts of the potential stationing decisions and 

inform the Army about local community investments made to support the 

installation and its military personnel. Input from the listening sessions 

The Army’s Efforts to 

Obtain Community Input 

Related to Force Structure 

Reductions May Provide 

Benefits for Future 

Stationing Decisions
Page 17 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

was provided to the general officer steering committees and Army senior 

leaders as part of their consideration of potential stationing options during 

the BCT inactivation determination. For instance, Army officials said that 

officials participating in the general officer steering committees were 

briefed at a high level on the communities’ primary concerns and given indepth reports and data the communities provided as the officials

assessed the options to help them make informed decisions. In addition, 

senior leaders were provided with daily and weekly summaries of the

listening sessions as they were taking place. These reports included 

information on the community concerns, media coverage, and key 

individuals attending each listening session, such as elected officials.

Additionally, an Army official involved in developing a stationing option 

related to minimizing the socioeconomic impacts at installations said that 

he considered the input from the listening sessions as he developed the 

stationing option.

Several Army officials told us that they believed that the listening sessions 

were a valuable tool to support the Army’s overall BCT inactivation 

decision process and could serve as good precedent for future stationing 

decisions. The stationing decision framework presented in Army 

Regulation 5-10 includes local community impact as one of the stationing 

factors that should be considered and requires a community impact 

analysis for stationing proposals with a strength change of 200 or more 

personnel unless a substantially similar analysis was already completed 

in the context of analyses under the National Environmental Policy Act.27

 27 See AR 5-10, paras. 2-3.b(14), 5-2.b(16) (Aug. 20, 2010).

Analysis conducted under the National Environmental Policy Act and 

implementing regulations often includes opportunity for public comment. 

The community impact analysis required under Army Regulation 5-10 

addresses the impacts of changes in population, personal income, tax 

base, and employment, and may include an examination of the effects on 

local businesses, schools, housing, and other public services and 

economic factors. It is based on analysis generated from an economic 

forecasting model. However, Army Regulation 5-10 does not provide 

guidance for or discuss obtaining community input in the stationing 

context as part of developing community impact analyses, such as when 

community listening sessions or similar efforts to obtain community input 

that are beyond the scope of environmental analyses should be 

considered as part of a particular stationing decision. An Army Force 
Page 18 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Management official said that he is currently developing proposed 

guidelines for when community listening sessions should be proposed for 

consideration by Army senior leaders in making stationing decisions, but 

was uncertain how such guidelines would be incorporated into the 

stationing process and related guidance. Principles for effective 

stakeholder participation have shown that effective stakeholder 

involvement includes actively soliciting stakeholder input from those 

potentially affected by a decision, involving stakeholders early and 

throughout the decision-making process, and fostering responsive, 

interactive communication between stakeholders and decision makers.28

The Army has used its military value analysis model to inform several 

recent stationing decisions and Army officials expect that the model will 

be an enduring tool in stationing decisions. While the Army has taken 

steps to validate the model, it has not yet formalized the use of the 

military value analysis model within its stationing process by establishing 

guidance related to the use of the model, including guidance related to 

when the model should be used for stationing decisions or the processes 

through which key aspects of the model are reviewed, updated, and 

approved for each use of the model, and data collected and validated. 

Internal control standards state that appropriate policies and procedures 

are needed for an agency’s activities, and that relevant objectives and 

associated risks for each activity should be identified along with the 

control activities needed to address those risks.

Incorporating this type of communication with external stakeholders into 

its stationing process could help to ensure that the Army takes into 

account the views of external stakeholders and lead to potentially greater 

buy-in from local communities for Army stationing decisions. 

29 Key practices for 

successful transformations state that stakeholders in public sector 

transformations are concerned not only with the decisions made but also 

the process used to make those decisions.30

 28 GAO, Fisheries Management: Core Principles and a Strategic Approach Would 

Enhance Stakeholder Participation in Developing Quota-Based Programs, GAO-06-289

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).

29 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999); GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation 

Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

30 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).

The Army Expects the 

Military Value 

Analysis Model Will 

Be an Enduring Tool 

but Has Not 

Established Guidance 

or Consistent 

Processes Related to 

the Use of the Model 

within Its Stationing 

Process
Page 19 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

The military value analysis model has been used to inform several 

stationing decisions since 2005, such as the stationing of additional BCTs 

related to the Grow the Army initiative in 2007 and the stationing of an 

aviation brigade in 2009. However, Army officials said that the Army has 

not formally established in guidance the circumstances under which the 

model would be used or how the model should be considered as a factor 

within the stationing process. Army Force Management officials said that 

the Army generally has used the model in stationing decisions with a 

large impact, potentially greater risk, and requirement for more rigorous 

analytical underpinning, such as in stationing decisions involving brigade 

combat teams. One official added that the Army will likely continue to 

utilize the model in future stationing decisions of a similar nature. 

Conversely, Army officials said that for stationing decisions related to 

smaller units, using the military value analysis model may be too labor 

intensive and thus may not be an appropriate use of resources. In 2010, 

as part of a prior review GAO conducted of the military services’

stationing processes, Army Force Management officials told GAO that the 

Army would incorporate military value analysis into Army Regulation 5-10. 

However, as of our current review, it has not yet done so. The Army has 

documented its use of the military value analysis model in reports and 

briefings, but has not incorporated in its stationing regulation or other 

guidance any discussions of when the use of the model would be 

warranted and how the model should be used in stationing decisions.

According to Army Force Management officials, the Army plans to include 

a discussion of the military value analysis model in a pamphlet it has 

been developing to supplement Army Regulation 5-10. Officials said that 

the pamphlet may include when a military value analysis versus other 

types of analyses should be conducted within the stationing process, but 

they have not yet determined what other information related to the model 

will be included.31

 31 The two basic types of Army pamphlets are standard and informational. Standard 

pamphlets are used to publish information (such as how-to procedures) needed to carry 

out policies and mandated procedures prescribed in Army Regulations. Informational

pamphlets are used to publish information or guidance on subjects in support of Army 

missions. See Army Regulation 25-30, The Army Publishing Program (Mar. 27, 2006).

Army officials noted that the stationing pamphlet will be used to document day to day 

actions for how to accomplish the policies laid out in Army Regulation 5-10. 

Further, the pamphlet has been in draft form for more 

than two years, and the timeframe for its approval and release has not yet 

been determined. Without formalizing the model within the Army’s 

stationing process, such as documenting in guidance the circumstances 

The Army Has Not 

Established Guidance 

Related to When and How 

the Model Should Be Used 

within Its Stationing 

Process
Page 20 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

under which the model would be used to support stationing decisions and 

how the results of the model are considered as part of the broader 

stationing process, the model’s role within the stationing process may not 

be transparent and it may not be clearly known how the results of the 

model are used to inform decisions.

The Army has taken steps to ensure the validity of the military value 

analysis model and its results, but has not established consistent formal 

processes to guide how (a) the attributes of the model should be 

reviewed and selected for use in the model, (b) attribute definitions should 

be reviewed to determine if they are still relevant for a particular decision 

and updated, and (c) data should be collected and validated. The Army 

also lacks guidance related to the level of input or approval that is 

necessary for changes to key elements of the model, and how noncontiguous training areas should be treated within the model. Internal 

control standards state that control activities, such as consistent 

processes or policies, can help to ensure that actions to mitigate risks are 

carried out. In addition, control activities are essential for achieving 

effective and efficient program results, and include the clear assignment 

of stakeholder responsibilities.32

The Army has taken steps to validate the military value analysis model 

and its results, such as involving key stakeholders and reviewing the

relevancy of key elements of the model for specific stationing decisions. 

According to Center for Army Analysis officials, the military value analysis 

models used in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round and the 

2007 Grow the Army initiative stationing decisions were thoroughly vetted 

within the Army and reviewed and approved by senior leaders. In 

addition, Center for Army Analysis officials said that the model used for 

the 2007 Grow the Army decisions was validated by the Naval Post 

Graduate School, and that each version of the model is briefed to an 

analytical review board within the Center for Army Analysis. In general, 

each use of the military value analysis model begins with an examination 

of the most recently used model. For example, for 2007 Grow the Army 

initiative stationing decisions, the Army began by reviewing the attributes 

used in the model that supported the 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure round and selected and developed attributes that were specific to 

the requirements of stationing a BCT. The military value analysis models 

 32 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 ; GAO-01-1008G. 

The Army Has Taken Steps 

to Validate the Model, but 

Has Not Established 

Consistent Formal 

Processes and Guidance 

Related to How the Model 

Is Reviewed, Updated, and 

Approved for Each Use

The Army Has Taken Steps to 

Validate the Model
Page 21 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

used in several BCT stationing decisions in recent years have been 

adapted from the model used for the 2007 Grow the Army initiative 

stationing decisions.

In addition, each time the model has been used, the Center for Army 

Analysis has conducted a sensitivity analysis to determine the extent to 

which the weighting of the attributes changes the resulting military value 

rankings of the installations. According to Center for Army Analysis 

officials, this allows them to test the impact that any one attribute has on 

the results of the model and thus be able to identify how any potential 

flaws in the attribute definitions or data could affect the model and look for 

opportunities to mitigate them. In the most recent version of the model, 

the sensitivity analysis did not affect the 6 top-ranked installations or the 

bottom-ranked installation, which, according to Center for Army Analysis 

officials, indicates that the ranking of those installations within the model 

were not affected by any one attribute. Center for Army Analysis officials 

explained that rankings did change for certain installations during the 

sensitivity analysis because there was little deviation in the model’s 

scores for those installations. For example, 7 installations scored within 

.11 points of one another on a 10-point scale. Overall, for the 2013 

version of the model used to support the BCT inactivation decision, only 

1.27 points separated the top-ranked installation from the bottom-ranked 

installation, which, according to Army officials, indicates that all of the 

installations considered within the model have fairly comparable military 

value for supporting a BCT.

Several factors affect the need to review the model each time it is used. 

According to Center for Army Analysis officials, a new stationing decision 

may require different attributes to be included in the model because it 

may involve different types of units and installations or seek to address a 

different stationing scenario. The weighting of the attributes within the 

model may require review because the relative importance of specific 

attributes may change depending on those attributes’ importance to the 

new stationing decision. The definitions for existing attributes can also 

change over time depending on a number of factors, such as updates to 

Army policy, availability of data, technological advances, or the question 

the model seeks to address. While the model utilizes quantitative

comparison, some aspects of the model are subjective. For example, 

decisions about which attributes to include within the model and the 

weight of those attributes are determined by stakeholders who utilize 

military judgment in deciding what attributes are important for the specific 

decision and their relative importance within the model. Additionally, the 

attribute definitions, including associated formulas and categorical ratings, 

Different Factors Affect the 

Need to Review the Model for 

Each Use
Page 22 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

are developed based upon subject matter expertise. Because of the 

subjectivity of some aspects of the model, its continued validity is largely 

dependent on the involvement of key stakeholders, such as subject 

matter experts and Army leaders.33

The Army has not established consistent formal processes for (a) 

reviewing the attributes to determine which attributes should be used in 

the model, (b) reviewing and updating attribute definitions to determine if 

they are still relevant for a particular decision, and (c) collecting and 

validating the data for use in the model. We found that the Army took 

steps to review the relevancy of the attributes in developing the version of 

the model used to support the BCT inactivation decision, but we identified 

a couple of instances where further review and updates to the attribute 

definitions could have been beneficial. Also, although Army Force 

Management issued direction related to data collection and validation for 

the version of the model used to support the BCT inactivations, we found 

some instances of inconsistency related to how data were updated that 

indicate that a consistent process formalized through established 

guidance could better ensure that expectations for stakeholders involved 

in data collection are clear and that the data is current.

Additionally, due to the potential for 

changing uses of the model, Center for Army Analysis officials said that 

the model is reviewed by subject matter experts at the beginning of each 

use to determine if the attributes are still relevant for the stationing 

decision and if any aspects of the model should be changed, such as how 

the attributes are defined.

When force reductions were first announced in 2011, Army Force 

Management officials met with subject matter experts to identify attributes 

to be used in a new version of the military value analysis model to support 

stationing decisions related to these force reductions. The working group 

used the 14 attributes used in the 2010 version of the model as a 

baseline and began an initial effort to review the 40 attributes used in the 

2005 Base Realignment and Closure round for additions.34

 33 We use the term “subject matter expert” in this report to refer to Army officials with 

knowledge of relevant subject areas who provide input to the model, such as in relation to 

how attributes are defined or collecting data for attributes.

According to 

Army Force Management officials, some of the additional attributes that 

34 Some of the 14 attributes used in the 2010 version were among the 40 attributes used 

in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round.

The Army Does Not Have 

Consistent Formal Processes 

for Reviewing and Updating the 

Attributes and Attribute 

Definitions, and Collecting 

Data for Use in the Model
Page 23 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

were considered for the model were rejected because the characteristics 

were accounted for in other analyses or existing attributes, the data was 

not readily available, or did not clearly distinguish between the 

installations. Additionally, the 14 attributes used in the 2010 version of the 

model already represented attributes that were important to a BCT. While 

the Army considered alternatives, Army Force Management officials said 

that time constraints and a desire to maintain consistency with the 

attributes used in prior BCT stationing models diffused enthusiasm for 

including new attributes or removing attributes from the model. Ultimately, 

for the 2011 model, Army Force Management decided to include the 14 

attributes used in the 2010 model and added one attribute previously 

used as a screening measure within the model.35

According to an Army Force Management official, with the public release 

of the programmatic environmental assessment in January 2013, a 

decision on BCT reorganization and inactivation appeared imminent and 

the Army focused on updating and validating the data used in the 2011 

model. Army officials viewed the 2013 model as a continuation of the 

2011 model with the assumption that the attributes in the 2011 model 

were still valid. Army officials said that they added one attribute, 

geographic distribution, to the 2013 model based on guidance from the 

Secretary of the Army to include it in the Army’s decision making process. 

While some Army officials raised concerns about the applicability of the 

buildable acres attribute in a force reduction scenario, an Army Force 

Management official told us that the attribute was kept in order to 

preserve potential for growth regeneration in the Army. The official 

additionally said that there was potential for growth at certain installations 

resulting from the BCT inactivation and subsequent reorganization.

The Army collected data 

for these 15 attributes and the preliminary results of the 2011 model were 

briefed to senior leaders. However, the Army did not make any decisions 

on force reductions or BCT inactivations in 2011.

Further, Army officials said that the Army does not have a formal process 

for reviewing and updating the attribute definitions in coordination with 

subject matter experts to determine if they are still the best way to 

measure a particular attribute and we found a couple of instances where 

further review of and updates to the definitions could have been 

 35 A screening measure is a binary (yes or no) measure that establishes a threshold to 

determine whether an installation should be included within the model. 
Page 24 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

beneficial. For the 2013 model, an Army Force Management official said 

that the Army did not deliberately engage subject matter experts in 

discussions regarding the attribute definitions. The Army focused on 

updating and validating the data collected in 2011 for use for the 2013 

model, which Army officials viewed as a continuation of the 2011 model. 

Further, these officials told us that they generally rely on subject matter 

experts to suggest proposed changes or updates to the attribute 

definitions when necessary and noted that some subject matter experts 

are more assertive in this regard than others. Officials at the Center for 

Army Analysis and Army Force Management said that suggestions from 

subject matter experts are addressed if they are compelling. For instance, 

the attribute definition for the connectivity attribute was updated for the 

2010 model that supported the stationing of a heavy BCT based on a 

suggestion made by the subject matter expert.36

Additionally, the subject matter expert for the family housing attribute 

noted that it may be a good idea to revisit the definition for the attribute for 

future uses of the model for a couple of reasons, including the attribute’s 

data source. As the attribute is currently defined, it utilizes data from a 

housing study that is conducted in various years for individual installations 

and, as a result, it is possible that the data may not reflect the current 

housing situation at some installations. For example, housing data used 

in the model came from housing studies that were published between 

2009 and 2012. Further, we found that the formula for the family housing 

attribute was calibrated to prior force growth scenarios at installations in 

Subject matter experts 

for many of the attributes we spoke with said that they were comfortable 

with the attribute definitions related to their areas of expertise. However, 

we did find a couple instances where subject matter experts identified the 

need to update or review attribute definitions. For example, the subject 

matter expert for the connectivity attribute said that technological 

advances in cellular coverage had rendered one of the three sub-factors 

within the attribute’s definition moot as all installations would receive the 

same score for that sub-factor. This subject matter expert said that he 

informed Army Force Management that the attribute definition needed to 

be examined for future uses of the model as there was no time to 

effectively address the issue for the current model.

 36 Heavy BCTs—now referred to as armor BCTs by the Army—are balanced combined 

arms units that utilize battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, and fighting vehicle-mounted 

Infantry to provide striking power. The military value analysis model was used to support 

the stationing of a heavy BCT in 2010.
Page 25 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

that it included the specific addition of a heavy BCT as part of the 

calculation of the availability of housing and was not updated for the 

current version of the model. Center for Army Analysis officials told us 

that they were unclear as to why the attribute definition would include the 

addition of a BCT for this particular scenario, but said that they did not 

believe this would affect the relative scores of the installations because 

the same factor was added for all installations.

It is unclear whether reviews and updates to the attribute definitions in 

these instances would have affected the relative scores of the 

installations or whether, after review, the Center for Army Analysis and 

subject matter experts would have determined that changes were indeed 

necessary. However, these examples indicate that it may be beneficial to 

have an established process in place to review attribute definitions to 

determine whether adjustments are needed.

Moreover, the Army has not established a consistent formal process for 

collecting and validating the data used in the model each time the model 

is used. In lieu of such a process, to update the data for the model used 

to support the BCT inactivation decision, Army Force Management 

instructed the subject matter experts for each of the attributes to update 

and validate the data that was used in the 2011 version of the model and 

directed them to, among other things, coordinate at the installation level 

to ensure accuracy with the installation-level data. An Army Force 

Management official said that the 2011 data sheets for the attributes were 

also sent to the installations through the senior maneuver commander at 

the installation, but the official said that the process for distributing the 

data sheets may have varied by installation. In communications to both 

the organizations providing data and the installation commanders, Army 

Force Management officials emphasized the importance of ensuring that 

the data used in the model was consistent with that at the installation 

level. Despite this direction, we found some inconsistencies in the 

process that was used to update and validate the data for the 2013 

model.

We found that the subject matter experts responsible for updating and 

validating the data underlying each attribute in the model that we spoke 

with were generally confident with the accuracy of the data that they

provided, but subject matter experts differed in the extent to which they 

coordinated with installations to update and validate the data. While 

subject matter experts for a few of the attributes said that they 

coordinated directly with the installations to validate data, some subject 

matter experts said that they did not coordinate with the installations 
Page 26 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

because they had other sources for obtaining data, such as Army 

databases, program records, or the use of mapping tools that they 

believed to be sufficient. Given how some of these attributes are 

formulated and the data sources used, these data sources may have 

been the best sources for providing the most consistent and reliable data 

across installations. Subject matter experts who utilized Army databases 

for one of the attributes said that different factors may affect the quality of 

some of the data in the systems at a given time, but noted that these 

systems have annual validation processes in place that are meant to

keep the data accurate and up-to-date. The subject matter expert for 

another attribute said that he obtained data from studies and a database 

that are kept up to date with information, gathered from the installations, 

that he believes to be fair and objective. He additionally said that he did 

not coordinate directly with the installations to collect data in prior 

stationing decisions but did so for this stationing decision in response to 

instruction from Army Force Management. In doing so, he said that he 

had to exercise judgment in determining which inputs to accept from 

installations because installations may not always be objective given their 

interest in receiving the best rating possible.

Additionally, the subject matter expert for three of the attributes said that 

he expected the installations to contact him in response to the data 

sheets from 2011 that Army Force Management had sent to the 

installations if the data needed to be updated. While some installations 

did respond and the subject matter expert said he updated data for those 

installations and validated it using other data sources to ensure 

consistency, he said that he did not review or update the data for these 

attributes using available data systems for, or coordinate directly with, 

other installations that did not respond. This official noted that the data for 

one of these attributes is fairly static and, in general, most changes in the 

data set for the model made by the installations are related to actions that 

his office would be aware of and thus are not surprising. An Army Force 

Management official said that some installations could have been 

proactive and provided data updates in certain instances, but that it was 

incumbent upon the subject matter experts to update and validate the 

data in coordination with the installations. Ultimately, this official said that 

the data’s accuracy and the decision about whether coordination with the 

installations was needed on the individual attributes were decided by the 

subject matter experts.

Data collection may be more challenging in some instances because the 

Army does not routinely collect and maintain the data used for certain 

attributes, such as buildable acres or indirect fire. For example, the
Page 27 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

subject matter expert for one attribute said that he was not able to update 

or validate the data for the attribute because the level of analysis that 

would have had to be conducted in coordination with the installations 

could not be completed within the timeframes of the request. Thus, he 

informed Army Force Management that the existing data was the best 

data available within the timeframes identified to update the data. 

However, the subject matter expert told us that the data may not be 

reflective of the current status at the installations because of Army 

facilities planning policy changes and military construction that may have 

occurred at the installations since the data was last updated.

It is unclear whether data obtained based on additional coordination with 

the installations in these instances would have been significantly different 

than the data that was obtained under the current approach. While Army 

Force Management did issue direction related to the data collection effort 

for the 2013 model in the absence of an existing process, an Army Force 

Management official said that the model would benefit from a consistent 

process for updating data so that guidance and expectations are clear for 

all of the stakeholders involved in the process. A process would also help 

to ensure that data is reviewed and updated for each use of the model. 

For example, one subject matter expert who updated data for an attribute 

for the 2013 model said that the data for this attribute had not been 

updated since 2004 when it was used to support the Base Realignment 

and Closure decisions, even though the attribute has been used in more 

recent stationing decisions. This subject matter expert said that the data 

does not change much from year to year, although his data collection 

effort did result in changes to the prior data.

An Army Force Management official who oversaw the use of the model in 

the BCT inactivation decision said that it would be valuable for the Army 

to have formal processes that allow for time to review and update the 

attributes within the model when the model is used, including a more 

deliberative analysis of the attributes in terms of how they are defined and 

measured and a process for updating data. The official also noted that the 

lack of a process for periodic review and updates to the model puts 

subject matter experts in the difficult position of raising issues when the 

pressure to update data is at its greatest. A couple of the subject matter 

experts we spoke with noted that potential upcoming changes in their 

areas of responsibility would likely result in the need to make changes to 

the attributes in the future. Without deliberate processes that allow for 

time to review attributes and attribute definitions in coordination with 

subject matter experts and consider necessary updates to the model, 

potential issues could remain unaddressed throughout each use of the 
Page 28 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

model, and necessary changes to the model might not be made, leading 

to a reduced relevance of the model to the current environment and in 

future uses. Further, without a consistent formal process for collecting 

and validating data each time the model is used that ensures consistency 

with data at the installation level and allows for time to update the data, 

the Army risks not having the most current and accurate data for use in 

the military value analysis model.

One of the model’s assumptions is that the attributes and weighting within 

the model reflect current senior Army leader priorities. However, the Army 

has not established clear guidance for when review of the key elements 

of the model or changes to the model require higher-level input or 

approval. Center for Army Analysis officials said that, in general, 

removing or adding model attributes should be approved by higher level 

officials, such as a general officer steering committee, because they 

provide a broader perspective on the Army’s priorities. For example, in 

discussions with a subject matter expert about whether an attribute 

should be removed, an official from the Center for Army Analysis 

suggested that a general officer steering committee should be convened 

in order to drop the attribute from the model. Also, for the recent BCT 

inactivation decision, the Army held a three-star general officer steering 

committee specifically to review and update the weighting of the attributes 

within the model, which the Secretary of the Army then approved.37

 37 The Center for Army Analysis provided the general officer steering committee with a 

value matrix to evaluate the attributes along two scales: operational importance and how 

easily the attributes could be changed. The matrix assigns basis points to the attributes 

depending on their positioning along these two scales. The basis points are then 

calculated into percentage weights by the Center for Army Analysis for each attribute. 

Center for Army Analysis officials said that this basis point matrix is important in 

preventing the arbitrary assignment of weights to attributes.

However, Center for Army Analysis officials said that, while prior versions 

of the model were approved by various chains of command, there is no 

specific threshold for holding a general officer steering committee and 

holding one may not always be feasible if the model is being used under 

constrained timeframes. Further, Army officials indicated that whether a 

general officer steering committee is needed is based on the risks and 

potential impacts related to the decision. For example, Center for Army 

Analysis officials said that they recommended using a general officer 

steering committee for the 2013 use of the model because of the 

sensitivity of the BCT inactivation decision and because the model was 

being used in a reduction scenario, in contrast to a growth scenario as in 

The Army Has Not Established 

Clear Guidance Identifying the 

Level of Review Required for 

Changes to the Model
Page 29 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

previous models. By contrast, the same officials said that a general officer 

steering committee may not be needed for smaller scale decisions.

During our review, an Army Force Management official expressed 

concern about making any significant changes to the model, such as 

removing any of the attributes within the model, without a compelling 

reason. The official explained that because the Army had only recently 

described the attributes used within the model to Congress in its March 

2011 Report to Congress, Army Stationing Decisions, they believed that 

external stakeholders might perceive any changes to the model so close 

to a significant stationing decision as being arbitrary or as if the Army was 

attempting to manipulate the results of the model to influence a desired 

outcome. Key practices for successful transformations state that the 

demand for transparency and accountability needs to be accepted in any 

public sector transformation and stakeholders are concerned not only with 

the decisions made but also the process used to make those decisions.38

The Army’s approach to the treatment of non-contiguous training areas 

(i.e., training areas that are geographically distant from the installation) 

within the model lacks clarity and, in some cases, appears to be

inconsistent because the Army has not issued clear guidance establishing 

how these areas should be considered, particularly for attributes related 

to training.

Caution related to making changes to the key elements of the model for 

such a sensitive decision is understandable, but without establishing 

transparent and consistent policies and guidance around the model, Army 

concerns about how changes to the model may appear to external 

stakeholders are likely to continue. Further, without consistent formal 

processes through which key aspects of the model are reviewed and 

updated, and guidance that establishes the circumstances under which 

changes to the model require input or approval from Army leaders, the 

Army risks potential decline in the rigor and consistency of the model over 

time.

39

 38

Several of the installations examined within the model utilize 

non-contiguous training areas for their units, also referred to as subinstallations. Army training officials told us that whether certain noncontiguous areas should be considered separately or together with their 

GAO-03-669.

39 There are five attributes related to training within the military value analysis model—

airspace, maneuver land, range sustainability, training facilities, and indirect fire.

The Army’s Approach to the 

Treatment of Non-Contiguous 

Training Areas within the 

Military Value Analysis Model 

Lacks Clarity
Page 30 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

associated installations depends on the stationing decision. For example, 

in the model used to support the 2007 Grow the Army initiative stationing 

decisions, the Army identified Yakima Training Center, located in 

Washington state, as a stand-alone installation because it was 

considering stationing a BCT at Yakima. In contrast, in the 2013 version 

of the model supporting the BCT inactivation decisions, Army training 

officials told us that Yakima should be considered as part of Joint Base 

Lewis McChord because Yakima’s primary purpose is to support the 

training of units assigned to the installation.

Despite the potential for different treatment of these non-contiguous areas 

in different stationing decisions, the Army has not established a clear and 

consistent policy in this regard. Army training officials said that subject 

matter experts that provide data for the installations do not have a holistic 

view of the model and their individual views on whether to include noncontiguous areas may differ depending on their area of expertise. 

Additionally, communication between Army officials indicated that subject 

matter experts raised questions about whether certain non-contiguous 

training areas should be combined with the installation for some of the 

attributes, such as indirect fire, within the 2013 model. Without a 

consistent policy, the Army has wavered in how to deal with this issue. 

For example, there has been a lack of clarity regarding the extent to 

which Joint Base Lewis McChord and Yakima should be aggregated and 

for what attributes within the military value analysis model. In a 2010 

version of the model used to determine where to station a heavy BCT and 

a fires brigade, as well as the 2011 interim model, the two locations were 

aggregated for the airspace attribute. However, a 2012 interim version of 

the model that was prepared for senior Army leaders did not aggregate 

Yakima with Joint Base Lewis McChord for this attribute. As a result, Joint 

Base Lewis McChord received a lower military value score relative to 

other installations in this 2012 interim version of the model than it had in 

prior versions of the model. After reviewing the results of the interim 

model, an Army Force Management official said that the goal was to 

maintain consistency with how non-contiguous training areas were 

treated in the past and to treat all installations with non-contiguous 

training land the same. However, a lack of clarity still remained for the 

airspace attribute leading up to the BCT inactivation decision and the 

Center for Army Analysis ran two different versions of the model, one that 

aggregated airspace data for the two locations and one that excluded 

airspace data for Yakima. The two versions of the model produced 

different military value scores and rankings for Joint Base Lewis 

McChord. Ultimately, the version of the model used to support the BCT 
Page 31 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

inactivation stationing decision did not aggregate the two locations for the 

airspace attribute.

Army training officials said that the Army has long struggled with how to 

treat non-contiguous training areas in models to best simulate reality. 

These officials said that clear guidance prior to data collection is needed 

to ensure that non-contiguous training areas are treated consistently 

within the military value analysis model. Without establishing a clear 

policy and communicating it to subject matter experts regarding how noncontiguous training areas should be treated in the model for specific 

attributes, the Army risks inconsistent consideration of these noncontiguous training areas across installations and attributes, which could 

influence the results of the model.

The Army recognizes that its decision to meet part of its planned active 

component force reductions through the inactivation of 10 BCTs currently 

stationed in the United States, coupled with the reorganization of the 

remaining BCTs in the continental United States, will have strategic, 

operational, and cost implications. The decision will also alter existing 

demands on the infrastructure, services, businesses and other aspects of 

communities surrounding the affected installations. Thus, the Army 

carried out a variety of analyses in order to inform its decision, 

emphasizing key considerations such as supporting the strategic focus on 

the Pacific, minimizing additional military construction costs, and 

minimizing immediate readiness impacts. In addition, concerns about the 

implications for local communities led to the Army obtaining input through 

open meetings with communities around installations being considered 

for stationing changes, which could provide useful lessons for obtaining 

stakeholder support in future stationing decisions. The Army has 

indicated it may use such meetings prior to future force structure 

changes, but without assessing and establishing in guidance when it is 

appropriate to obtain community input and how such efforts should be 

conducted, the Army may miss opportunities to obtain input from 

communities, and the installations themselves and their surrounding 

communities may lack insight into the Army’s decisions on force structure 

and stationing. Similarly, the Army’s use of its military value analysis 

model is consistent with its use of the model for making previous major 

stationing decisions. However, other actions the Army could take would 

improve the model’s analytical rigor, credibility, and transparency, and 

mitigate risk. For instance, without formalizing the military value analysis 

model in its stationing process guidance or as part of other guidance, 

including when it should be used and how it should be considered within 

Conclusions
Page 32 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

the stationing process, the transparency of the model’s role in stationing 

decisions may be limited. Further, without established processes through 

which key aspects of the model are reviewed and updated, and data 

collected and validated, as well as guidance related to the level of 

approval required for changes to the key elements of the model and how 

non-contiguous training areas should be considered within the model, the 

Army and external stakeholders may lack certainty as to the model’s 

analytic rigor and stakeholder buy-in could be limited. Taking action now 

could help the Army balance the need to ensure a methodologically 

sound and rigorous process while considering both resources and risk to 

ensure that stakeholders, including affected communities and 

installations, can provide input into and understand the basis for its 

stationing decisions.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following five 

actions to improve the stationing process:

To obtain input from communities and installations affected by significant 

stationing decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans to develop and 

implement guidance related to when community listening sessions or 

other similar efforts to obtain community input should be conducted and 

incorporated as part of the Army’s process for making future stationing 

decisions.

To better ensure the Army military value analysis model’s analytical rigor 

and credibility, minimize risk, and further enhance the transparency of the 

process used to make stationing decisions, we recommend that the 

Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 

Plans, in coordination with the Center for Army Analysis, to take the 

following four actions to formalize the model as part of its stationing 

process:

• Develop and implement guidance that establishes the circumstances 

under which

• the model should be used in stationing decisions and update 

stationing regulations or related documents accordingly;

• key elements of the model or changes to the model require input 

or approval from Army leaders, such as through the use of a 

general officer steering committee; and,

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 33 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

• non-contiguous training areas should be considered within the 

model that are specific to the stationing decision under 

consideration and communicate those policies to subject matter 

experts.

• Establish and implement through guidance consistent formal 

processes through which attributes and attribute definitions will be 

deliberately reviewed and updated for use in the model, in 

coordination with subject matter experts, and data will be collected 

and validated for these attributes.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review 

and comment. The Department of the Army provided written comments.

The Army concurred with all five of our recommendations and cited plans

to issue guidance through Army Pamphlet 5-10, which is currently being 

developed to supplement Army Regulation 5-10, to address our 

recommendations. The Army’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in 

appendix IV. In addition, the Army provided technical comments, which 

we have incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

The Army concurred with our recommendation to develop and implement 

guidance related to when community listening sessions or other similar 

efforts to obtain community input should be conducted as part of the 

Army’s process for making future stationing decisions. The Army stated 

that it values community input into important decisions that impact 

soldiers, civilians, families and local communities, and is planning to issue 

guidance directing that stationing actions that meet a specific threshold 

will include a staff recommendation for the Secretary of the Army on the 

use of community meetings as a means to gather public input. We believe 

that this is a positive step that will position the Army to take advantage of 

opportunities to obtain community input for relevant future stationing 

decisions. 

The Army also concurred with our recommendations related to the 

military value analysis model. Specifically, the Army concurred with our 

recommendation to develop and implement guidance that establishes the 

circumstances under which the model should be used in stationing 

decisions. It noted that the military value analysis model is an important 

decision support tool that it has used to inform all significant stationing 

actions since the Base Realignment and Closure round in 2005. The 

Army stated that it will issue guidance directing that the model will be 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 34 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

used to inform stationing decisions involving the activation, inactivation, or 

relocation of a brigade size unit or other units that meet a certain 

threshold. The Army additionally concurred with our recommendation to 

develop and implement guidance that establishes the circumstances 

under which key elements of the model or changes to the model require 

input or approval from Army leaders, stating that it would issue guidance 

directing that significant changes to the military value analysis model will 

be reviewed by a general officer steering committee, chaired by the 

Director of Force Management, prior to approval. We believe these 

actions will enhance the transparency of the model’s role within the 

stationing process and, to the extent that the guidance defines what 

constitutes significant changes to the model, the process used to make 

changes to the model, as well as better ensure the model’s rigor and 

mitigate risk related to key decisions. 

Further, the Army concurred with our recommendation to develop and 

implement guidance that establishes the circumstances under which noncontiguous training areas should be considered within the model that are 

specific to the stationing decision under consideration and communicate 

those policies to subject matter experts. The Army stated that the quality 

and quantity of training resources are important considerations in 

stationing decisions, although not all training areas are equally 

accessible, and that when non-contiguous training areas are included in 

the military value analysis model, the assigned attribute score should 

reflect all relevant aspects of the training area. In this regard, the Army 

stated that it will issue guidance directing that the military value analysis 

model attribute scores for installations with non-contiguous training areas 

include a statement explaining the manner in which the non-contiguous 

nature of the training area was given due consideration in the applicable 

attribute scores. This planned action will provide greater transparency 

with regard to how non-contiguous training areas are considered for 

specific attributes.

Additionally, the Army concurred with our recommendation to establish 

and implement through guidance consistent formal processes through 

which attributes and attribute definitions will be deliberately reviewed and 

updated for use in the model, in coordination with subject matter experts, 

and data will be collected and validated for these attributes. The Army 

noted that technology, tactics, and business practices are constantly 

changing and improving and that, therefore, the military value analysis 

model attributes should be regularly reviewed and, when appropriate, 

updated. Along these lines, the Army stated that it will issue guidance 

directing a regular review and update of the military value analysis model 
Page 35 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

attribute definitions and data, with reviews and updates occurring a 

minimum of every two years. We believe that the Army’s plan to establish 

regular reviews will better ensure that the model attribute definitions and 

data used in the military value analysis model remain relevant and up-todate for a changing environment while balancing the Army’s concerns 

about time constraints surrounding certain stationing decisions.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 

days from the report date. At that time, we will distribute this report to the 

Secretaries of Defense and the Army; the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. The report also 

will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix V.

Brian J. Lepore, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 36 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

To describe the analyses that the Army conducted to make 

determinations regarding which brigade combat teams (BCTs) would be 

inactivated or reorganized and at which U.S. installations, we identified 

and examined regulations, briefings and other relevant documents 

outlining the Army’s decision process and interviewed knowledgeable 

Army officials about the Army’s decision process and the key factors that 

were considered. Specifically, we reviewed the Army stationing 

regulation, Army Regulation 5-10 on Stationing—the document that 

establishes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for Army stationing 

actions. We also examined documents related to the Army’s 

environmental analysis, such as environmental regulations and the 

Army’s programmatic environmental assessment of 21 installations, and 

discussed this analysis with Army officials. Further, we examined 

documentation related to the Army’s military value analysis model, such 

as briefings and reports on the model, and interviewed Army officials to 

determine how the model was used to inform the recent stationing 

decision. In addition, we reviewed documents and briefings related to the 

development and assessment of the stationing options the Army 

considered as part of its decision process and interviewed Army officials 

to discuss how the stationing options were analyzed in light of the 

identified stationing factors and the process used to screen the stationing 

options prior to the final Army decision. We also met Army officials to 

discuss the methodology used to develop the military construction cost 

estimates that were considered as part of the stationing options and how 

other costs were considered as part of the Army’s analysis, but did not 

review these cost estimates or analyses as they did not materially affect 

our findings, recommendations, or conclusions. Further, we examined 

briefings, orders, and other documentation related to the listening 

sessions held at Army installations, such as summaries from the 

meetings and information provided by installations, to obtain information 

on community input used to inform these decisions and spoke with Army 

officials regarding the extent to which they considered such information 

as part of the stationing decision.

To evaluate the extent to which the Army has established guidance and 

processes related to the use of the military value analysis model as a part 

of its stationing decisions, including the recent BCT decision, we 

examined the Army’s stationing guidance, stationing report to Congress, 

and reports and briefings that documented previous uses of the model. 

We examined and compared prior versions of the model and the current 

model used for the recent BCT decision to determine if and how the 

process for conducting the model, including the key elements of the 

model, such as the attributes used within the model, and the review and 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 37 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

approval process for key elements of the model, has changed over time. 

We reviewed documentation related to key elements of the current model, 

such as the attributes that were included, weighting of the attributes, and 

scoring of the attributes for each installation. We interviewed 

knowledgeable officials at the Center for Army Analysis and Army Force 

Management to discuss the development of the model, including how 

attributes were identified, the factors that determine if an attribute would 

be included in the model, and how weights for the attributes were 

determined. Additionally, we interviewed knowledgeable officials about 

how the key aspects of the model are reviewed, updated and if relevant, 

approved, for each use of the model. We obtained and reviewed the 

spreadsheet-based military value analysis model to examine the technical 

components of the tool and how the tool is used to calculate the scores. 

This included some general checks for basic internal consistency and 

coherence of key elements in the tool as well as a general check of the 

consistency of the tool with key documents, such as briefings and reports 

related to the model. We also examined documents related to collecting 

and validating the data used in the model, and interviewed subject matter 

experts from various Army organizations who provided the data about 

their role in developing the attributes’ definition and their methods and 

processes used to collect and validate the data, but we did not validate 

the data itself.

During the course of our review, we interviewed officials from the 

following Army organizations:

• Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel G-1

• Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations G-3/5/7 (Force Management, 

Training Support)

• Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics G-4 (Strategic Mobility Division and 

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation 

Engineering Agency)

• Chief Information Officer G-6 (Installation Infrastructure Division)

• Deputy Chief of Staff for Financial Management G-8 (Program 

Analysis and Evaluation)

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, 

and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 38 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

• Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management

• U.S. Army Installation Management Command

• U.S. Army Environmental Command

• Center for Army Analysis

• Office of the Surgeon General/U.S. Army Medical Command

• U.S. Army Aeronautical Services Agency

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 through December 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Brigade Combat Team 

Inactivations and Projected Installation 

Population Changes

Page 39 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

On June 25, 2013, the Army announced that it will be inactivating one 

brigade combat team (BCT) from each of 10 different U.S. installations. 

An additional 5 installations were considered as part of the Army’s 

decision process, but these installations will not have a BCT inactivated at 

this time. Table 2 shows the BCT inactivations by installation as well as 

changes to the number of BCTs and projected population as a result of 

these inactivations and other force structure changes.

Table 2: Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Inactivations by U.S. Army Installation

BCT Installations

Number of 

BCTs prior to 

inactivations

Number of 

BCTs after 

inactivations 

2012 Army 

active 

component 

installation 

end strength 

Projected 

2017 Army 

active 

component 

installation 

end strength 

Projected 2012 -

2017 Army active 

component 

installation 

population 

change by 

percentage

Installations with a BCT inactivation

Fort Bliss, TX 4 3 27,479 26,729 - 2.73%

Fort Bragg, NC 4 3 42,735 40,186 - 5.96 %

Fort Campbell, KY 4 3 29,222 28,902 - 1.10%

Fort Carson, CO 4 3 22,667 24,484 + 8.02%

Fort Drum, NY 3 2 16,643 15,060 - 9.51%

Fort Hood, TX 5 4 40,899 37,959 - 7.19%

Fort Knox, KY 1 0 7,667 4,354 - 43.21%

Fort Riley, KS 3 2 17,226 15,497 - 10.04%

Fort Stewart, GA 3 2 21,157 19,785 - 6.48%

Joint Base Lewis McChord, WA 3 2 31,029 26,488 - 14.63%

Installations without a BCT inactivation

Fort Benning, GA 1 1 13,029 13,105 + 0.58%

Fort Polk, LA 1 1 9,327 9,084 - 2.61%

Fort Wainwright, AK 1 1 6,254 6,806 + 8.83%

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK 1 1 5,659 4,765 - 15.80%

Schofield Barracks, HI 2 2 15,730 15,840 + 0.70%

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Note: Modifications to non-BCT formations are also being made and the changes in installation 

population are reflective of all planned Army force structure adjustments to date, not just BCT 

inactivations and reorganizations. For example, while Fort Carson, CO is losing a BCT, the Army 

plans to station a Combat Aviation Brigade at the installation, resulting in an increase to the projected 

installation population.

We did not assess the reliability of these data as they are included for informational purposes only 

and do not affect our findings, recommendations, or conclusions.

Appendix II: Brigade Combat Team 

Inactivations and Projected Installation 

Population Changes
Appendix III: Army’s Military Value Analysis 

Model Attributes

Page 40 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Table 3 identifies the 16 attributes used in the Army’s military value 

analysis model that supported the Army’s brigade combat team (BCT) 

inactivation decision and the definitions of each attribute.

Table 3: Definitions for Attributes within the Army’s Military Value Analysis Model

Attribute Definition

Maneuver land Formula calculates the ratio of available land and required 

maneuver land.

Range sustainability Formula calculates the ratio of land with future restricted use to 

required land.

Training facilities Formula weights and sums categorical ratings for ranges, battle

command centers, and training support centers.

Airspace Categorical rating based on the largest single restricted area and 

total of all restricted areas.

Indirect fire Categorical rating based on largest indirect fire weapons fired 

and distance from firing point to impact area.

Deployment 

infrastructure

Categorical rating based on rail cars per day, railhead on or off 

post, and aircraft parking, among other factors.

Seaport of 

embarkation

Categorical rating based on proximity to seaport.

Aerial port of 

embarkation

Categorical rating based on proximity to airport.

Access to medical 

care

Formula weights and sums categorical ratings for the capacity of 

medical facilities on and off the installation.

Quality of life 

facilities

Sum of scores for presence and capacity of chapels, fitness 

centers, Army community services, child development centers, 

and youth services.

Family housing Formula weights and sums the projected housing deficit or 

surplus both on and off the installation.

Brigade complex Formula averages categorical ratings for condition and quantity 

of brigade combat team facilities.

Buildable acres Sum of all the buildable acreage on the installation not counting 

training land.

Urban sprawl Formula calculates the expected density of people in 10-mile 

zone outside the installation.

Connectivity Formula weights and sums categorical ratings of network 

infrastructure and commercial cell phone coverage on and off the 

installation.

Geographic 

distribution

Formula calculates the average distance between installations.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Appendix III: Army’s Military Value Analysis 

Model Attributes
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of the Army

Page 41 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of the Army
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of the Army

Page 42 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department

of the Army

Page 43 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of the Army

Page 44 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 45 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Assistant 

Director; Bonita P. Anderson; David Dornisch; Kasea Hamar; Michael 

Shaughnessy; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Weifei Zheng made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact:

Staff 

Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products

Page 46 GAO 14-76 Defense Infrastructure

Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent 

Location of U.S. Africa Command, GAO-13-646. (Washington, D.C.: 

September 9, 2013).

Military Bases: DOD Has Processes to Comply with Statutory 

Requirements for Closing or Realigning Installations, GAO-13-645. 

(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013).

Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and 

Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure 

or Growth, GAO-13-436. (Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2013).

Defense Infrastructure: Improved Guidance Needed for Estimating 

Alternatively Financed Project Liabilities. GAO-13-337. (Washington, 

D.C.: April 18, 2013).

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings 

Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2012).

Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy’s Basing 

Decision Process and DOD Oversight, GAO-10-482. (Washington, D.C.: 

May 10, 2010).

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. (Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007).

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

Related GAO Products

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