UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHIKO STEHRENBERGER,

Plaintiff,

 Civil Action 2:12-cv-874

v. Judge James L. Graham 

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants.

ORDER and INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Michiko Stehrenberger, a Washington resident who is proceeding without the

assistance of counsel, brings this action against Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank (“Chase”),

seeking a declaration that Chase does not own any Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”) assets

and enjoining Chase from collecting loan payments. This matter is before the Court for

consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The

Motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judicial officers who render services

in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. This matter is also before the Court for

the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable

claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having

performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

the Court DISMISS this action for failure to assert any claim with an arguable basis in law over

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which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. 

I.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff obtained a loan or line of credit from WaMu. In

September 2008, the United States Office of Thrift Supervision seized WaMu and placed it into

the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). The FDIC then sold

certain WaMu assets, including all loans and loan commitments, to Chase pursuant to a written

Purchase and Assumption Agreement (the “PAA”).1

 

It appears that Plaintiff seeks to have the Court declare the PAA invalid because it

contains “no listing of any individually-identifiable loans, lines of credit, credit card accounts,

trust business, mortgage servicing rights, or other assets being purchased.” (Compl. ¶ III-25,

ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff further asks the Court to enjoin Chase from “enforcing payment [or]

collecting debts” arising from the WaMu loans that it acquired pursuant to the PAA and to order

Chase “to refund all monies [it] received” from the WaMu loans. (Id. at ¶¶ IV-3.) 

II.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). 

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

1

Like many other courts, this Court takes judicial notice of the PAA, which is available

through the FDIC’s website, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See Fed. R. Evid.

201(b)(2) (judicial notice proper where information “can be accurately and readily determined

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); Roberts v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A., Nos. 09-cv-07855 and 09-cv-07879, 2011 WL 4479455, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11,

2011) (taking judicial notice of the PAA and collecting cases in which other courts also took

judicial notice of the PAA and its provisions); Yetiv v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. 4:11-cv01250, 2012 WL 112597, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2012) (same). 

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filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)2 as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- 

***

(B) the action or appeal--

 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630

F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards

to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Although this pleading standard

does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is insufficient. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

2

Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

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of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility

is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In addition, the

Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th

Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The Court is not

required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. 

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III.

 The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Chase are frivolous. A claim is

frivolous if it lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989). The former occurs when “indisputably meritless” legal theories underlie the

complaint, and the latter when it relies on “fantastic or delusional” allegations. Id. at 327–28. 

Here, Plaintiff’s premises his claims against Chase on “indisputably meritless” legal theories. 

Plaintiff indicates that he obtained a loan from WaMu. He concedes that the FDIC sold all of

WaMu’s loans and loan commitments to Chase pursuant to the PAA. Plaintiff’s claim for relief

is premised upon his legal theory that the PAA is invalid and unenforceable against him because

the PAA does not specifically identify and list his loan as an asset Chase acquired. 

Plaintiff’s unsupported legal theory indisputably lacks merit. The Federal Deposit

Insurance Act authorized the FDIC, as the receiver of WaMu, to “transfer any asset or liability”

of WaMu “without any approval, assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer.” See 12

U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II). Consistent with this statutory provision, the FDIC transferred all

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of WaMu’s loans and loan commitments to Chase pursuant to the September 2008 PAA. Courts

have, therefore, consistently held that Chase became the owner of WaMu’s loans and loan

commitments by operation of law and have rejected any arguments that Chase is not entitled to

enforce the acquired WaMu loans. See, e.g., Sherman v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:12-

cv-05357, 2012 WL 3071246, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2012) (characterizing the plaintiff’s

assertion that Chase was not entitled to enforce the WaMu notes it obtained pursuant to the PAA

because “there is no evidence of ownership” as “simply untrue” and dismissing the action for

failure to state a claim); Lomely v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 5:12-cv-01194, 2012 WL

4123403, at *3–4, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that Chase

failed to acquire an interest in his WaMu loan through the PAA and dismissing the plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim). 

Because the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to advance any claims with

any arguable basis in law, it is RECOMMENDED that Court dismiss this action as frivolous

pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

IV.

 In summary, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is GRANTED. 

(ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judicial officers who render services in this

action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. In addition, for the reasons set forth above, it

is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s action for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l

Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the

magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the

district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding

that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely

object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation

omitted))

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: September 26, 2012 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

 United States Magistrate Judge

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