[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2020-Ohio-80.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

JASERE JACKSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NOS. C-180159 

 C-180209 

TRIAL NO. B-1704100 

 O P I N I O N.

 

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause 

Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 15, 2020 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex Scott Havlin, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Roger W. Kirk, for Defendant-Appellant. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

2

MYERS, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jasere Jackson appeals his convictions for five 

counts of aggravated robbery. In four assignments of error, Jackson argues that it 

was error to transfer jurisdiction of his case from the Hamilton County Juvenile 

Court to the court of common pleas, that the trial court erred in the imposition of 

sentence, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial 

court erred by failing to award him the correct amount of jail-time credit. 

{¶2} The state concedes that the trial court did not correctly determine the 

amount of jail-time credit to which Jackson is entitled. We accordingly remand the 

case for the trial court to calculate and award Jackson the appropriate amount of jailtime credit, but otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶3} Between March 8, 2016, and January 31, 2017, various complaints 

were filed in the Hamilton County Juvenile Court alleging that Jackson had 

committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the offense 

of trafficking in marijuana, a felony of the fifth degree, and five separate offenses of 

aggravated robbery, all felonies of the first degree. Each complaint for aggravated 

robbery contained two firearm specifications. The aggravated-robbery offenses were 

subject to a mandatory bindover, while the trafficking-in-marijuana offense was 

subject to a discretionary bindover. 

{¶4} The state filed a motion for relinquishment of jurisdiction for all 

offenses. On April 26, 2017, the juvenile court issued an entry finding probable 

cause that Jackson had committed the aggravated-robbery offenses. The entry 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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acknowledged that Jackson had waived a hearing on probable cause, and that both 

the state and Jackson had stipulated to probable cause. 

{¶5} The juvenile court issued another entry pertaining to all offenses on 

July 12, 2017, finding probable cause that Jackson had committed the charged 

offenses of trafficking in marijuana and aggravated robbery. The entry stated that 

Jackson had waived both a hearing on probable cause and an amenability hearing, 

and that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. And although 

it was not necessary for the aggravated-robbery offenses (because they involved a 

mandatory bindover), the juvenile court weighed the statutory factors for and against 

a transfer of jurisdiction and found that Jackson was not amendable to rehabilitation 

within the juvenile system. The juvenile court ordered transfer of Jackson’s case to 

adult court for criminal prosecution. 

{¶6} Jackson was indicted in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

on five counts of aggravated robbery, each with two accompanying firearm 

specifications, five counts of robbery, and one count of trafficking in marijuana. He 

pled guilty to five counts of aggravated robbery, each with an accompanying firearm 

specification. All remaining counts and specifications were dismissed. 

{¶7} The state and Jackson asked the trial court to impose an agreed 

sentence of eight years in prison. The trial court accepted the agreed recommended 

sentence. It sentenced Jackson to six years in prison for each count of aggravated 

robbery, to be served concurrently. It further imposed a one year prison term for two 

of the firearm specifications. These specifications were to be served consecutively to 

each other and to the six years for the underlying offenses. All other specifications 

were merged for sentencing purposes, resulting in an aggregate sentence of eight 

years in prison. The trial court awarded Jackson 223 days of jail-time credit. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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Transfer of Jurisdiction 

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Jackson argues that the juvenile court 

erred by transferring jurisdiction of his case to the court of common pleas. 

{¶9} While the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints 

alleging that a juvenile is delinquent for committing offenses that would be crimes if 

committed by an adult, R.C. 2152.10 provides for the mandatory transfer of certain 

cases to adult court for criminal prosecution. State v. Cockrell, 2016-Ohio-5797, 70 

N.E.3d 1168, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). One circumstance in which the juvenile court must 

transfer jurisdiction of a case to adult court is where the juvenile has committed a 

category two offense, was 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense, and 

either of the following apply: 

(a) The child previously was adjudicated a delinquent child for 

committing an act that is a category one or a category two offense and 

was committed to the legal custody of the department of youth services 

on the basis of that adjudication[; or] 

(b) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the child’s 

person or under the child’s control while committing the act charged 

and to have displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated 

possession of the firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the 

commission of the act charged. 

R.C. 2152.10(A)(2). 

{¶10} The aggravated-robbery offenses that Jackson was convicted of were 

subject to mandatory transfer under this statute. Jackson was 17 years old at the 

time that the offenses were committed. The offense of aggravated robbery is a 

category two offense. Cockrell at ¶ 7; R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1). And the complaints filed 

in juvenile court alleged that Jackson had a firearm on or about his person or under 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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his control while committing the offenses, and that he displayed the firearm, 

brandished the firearm, indicated that he possessed the firearm, or used the firearm 

to facilitate the offense. 

{¶11} To transfer a case to adult court pursuant to this mandatory-transfer 

provision, the juvenile court must find probable cause that the juvenile has 

committed a qualifying offense. Cockrell at ¶ 8. In reviewing a juvenile court’s 

probable-cause determination, we employ a mixed standard of review. We must 

defer to the juvenile court’s findings regarding witness credibility, but we review de 

novo the court’s legal conclusion that the state presented sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate probable cause that the juvenile committed the charged offenses. Id. at 

¶ 9; In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 51. 

{¶12} Here, Jackson twice waived a probable-cause hearing and stipulated to 

the existence of probable cause that he had committed the charged offenses. With 

respect to the waiver and stipulation that occurred on July 12, 2017, the juvenile 

court specifically found that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently. Jackson does not argue otherwise. Under these circumstances, the 

juvenile court did not err in relinquishing jurisdiction and transferring the 

aggravated-robbery offenses to adult court for criminal prosecution. See State v. 

J.T.S., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-516, 2015-Ohio-1103, ¶ 33 (where the juvenile’s 

waiver of a probable-cause hearing and stipulation of probable cause was knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary, the juvenile court did not err in accepting the stipulation 

and transferring the case to adult court); State v. Talbott, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07 

MA 225, 2008-Ohio-6300, ¶ 27 (transfer from juvenile court to adult court was 

proper where the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive the probablecause hearing and stipulated to probable cause); State v. Pruitt, 11th Dist. Trumbull 

No. 2001-T-0121, 2002-Ohio-7164, ¶ 49 (the juvenile’s waiver of the preliminary 

bindover hearing was essentially a stipulation that there was probable cause). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶13} Jackson further argues under this assignment of error that Ohio’s 

mandatory-transfer scheme set forth in R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 violates his rights 

to procedural and substantive due process and that an amenability hearing should be 

required in every case before a transfer of jurisdiction to adult court. But as Jackson 

concedes, the Ohio Supreme Court recently considered and rejected these same 

arguments in State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883. 

{¶14} We hold that the juvenile court did not err in transferring jurisdiction 

of Jackson’s case to adult court, and we overrule the first assignment of error. 

Sentencing 

{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Jackson argues that the trial court 

erred as a matter of law by imposing an improper sentence. 

{¶16} As set forth above, the trial court imposed an agreed sentence of eight 

years in prison that had been jointly recommended by Jackson and the state. 

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not 

subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been 

recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is 

imposed by a sentencing judge.” We thus have no jurisdiction to review the sentence 

unless it was “not authorized by law.” 

{¶17} While acknowledging that the trial court imposed a jointlyrecommended sentence, Jackson argues that the trial court imposed consecutive 

sentences without making the necessary findings, and consequently that the 

aggregate sentence imposed was not authorized by law and is subject to appellate 

review under R.C. 2953.08. Jackson’s argument is without merit. 

{¶18} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) bars appeal of agreed sentences that include nonmandatory consecutive sentences, even if the trial court does not make findings 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Sergent, 148 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-2696, 69 

N.E.3d 627, ¶ 29. Such a sentence is “authorized by law.” Id. 

{¶19} The nonreviewable nature of the sentence is even stronger here where 

the agreed sentence included mandatory consecutive sentences for the firearm 

specifications. The consecutive portion of the agreed sentence is not only authorized 

by law, it is mandated. 

{¶20} Even if the agreed sentence is reviewable, the trial court was not 

required to make consecutive-sentencing findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C) in 

this case. The trial court was required to impose a sentence for at least two of the 

firearm specifications that Jackson was convicted of pursuant to R.C. 

2929.14(B)(1)(g), and it was required to make those sentences consecutive to each 

other and to the sentences imposed for aggravated robbery pursuant to R.C. 

2929.14(C)(1)(a). See State v. Pompey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150479, 2016-Ohio4610, ¶ 7. Where the imposition of consecutive sentences is mandatory, the trial 

court is not required to make consecutive-sentencing findings. See State v. James, 

2015-Ohio-4987, 53 N.E.3d 770, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.). 

{¶21} Jackson further argues that the trial court failed to inform him of the 

following at sentencing: that he would be required to submit to DNA testing as a 

result of his felony convictions; that he had the right to earn jail-time credit; and 

that, pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f), he would be required to submit to random 

drug testing while incarcerated and should not ingest or be injected with a drug of 

abuse. But as Jackson concedes, we have previously considered and rejected these 

arguments. See State v. Taylor, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150488, 2016-Ohio-4548. 

{¶22} The jointly-recommended agreed sentence imposed by the trial court 

was authorized by law and is not subject to appellate review. We accordingly 

overrule Jackson’s second assignment of error. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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Ineffective Assistance 

{¶23} In his third assignment of error, Jackson argues that he received 

ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. He specifically argues that counsel was 

ineffective for stipulating to probable cause and waiving the probable-cause and 

amenability hearings during the bindover process. He argues that counsel’s 

deficiencies prevented a proper record from being made for this court to determine 

whether a transfer of jurisdiction to adult court was proper. 

{¶24} We only consider Jackson’s arguments concerning counsel’s 

stipulation to probable cause and waiver of the probable-cause hearing, as Jackson 

was convicted of offenses that were subject to a mandatory transfer of jurisdiction 

and the juvenile court was not required to conduct an amenability hearing. 

{¶25} Counsel will not be considered ineffective unless her or his 

performance was deficient and caused actual prejudice to the defendant. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. 

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Counsel’s performance 

will only be deemed deficient if it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Strickland at 688; Bradley at 142. A defendant is only prejudiced by counsel’s 

performance if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding 

would have been different but for the deficient performance. Strickland at 

694; Bradley at 142. A reviewing court must indulge a presumption that counsel’s 

behavior fell within the acceptable range of reasonable professional assistance. 

Strickland at 689; Bradley at 142. 

{¶26} Even if counsel could be considered deficient for stipulating to 

probable cause and waiving the probable-cause hearing, Jackson suffered no 

resulting prejudice because the record contains no indication that the state lacked 

sufficient evidence to prove his guilt or that the juvenile court would not have found 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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probable cause that Jackson had committed the charged offenses. After his case was 

transferred to adult court, Jackson was indicted on five counts of aggravated robbery 

with accompanying weapon specifications, to which he ultimately pled guilty. In 

J.T.S, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-516, 2015-Ohio-1103, at ¶ 52, the Tenth District 

considered a similar argument and found that counsel was not ineffective for 

allowing the defendant to stipulate to probable cause in a bindover proceeding. The 

court held that “given the operative facts of the case as recited by the prosecutor, 

there is nothing in the record to suggest that a hearing would have yielded a different 

result.” Id.; see Pruitt, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2001-T-0121, 2002-Ohio-7164, at ¶ 

60 (“Even if defense counsel had not waived the preliminary bindover hearing and 

the state was required to produce evidence of probable cause, there is no indication 

that the state’s evidence would fall short concerning appellant’s alleged role in the 

crime.”). 

{¶27} Jackson suffered no prejudice from counsel’s stipulation to probable 

cause and waiver of the probable-cause hearing. We hold that counsel did not render 

ineffective assistance, and overrule the third assignment of error. 

Jail-Time Credit 

{¶28} In his fourth assignment of error, Jackson argues that the trial court 

erred in failing to award him the correct amount of jail-time credit. He contends that 

the trial court failed to give him credit for time spent in a juvenile detention facility 

awaiting transfer to adult court. 

{¶29} Relying on R.C. 2967.191(A), which provides, as relevant to this 

appeal, that the prison term of an offender shall be reduced by the total number of 

days the offender was confined in a juvenile facility, the state concedes the error. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶30} The trial court was required to calculate and include in the sentencing 

entry the appropriate amount of jail-time credit. State v. Bowden, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-140462, 2015-Ohio-3740, ¶ 17; former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g).1 It committed 

plain error by failing to award Jackson credit for time spent in a juvenile facility prior 

to his criminal indictment. See Bowden at ¶ 18. The fourth assignment of error is 

sustained. 

Conclusion 

{¶31} We reverse the trial court’s award of jail-time credit and remand this 

case for the trial court to calculate and award Jackson the appropriate amount of jailtime credit. The judgment of the trial court is otherwise affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 

MOCK, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion. 

 

1 We apply the version of the statute in effect at the time that Jackson committed his offenses.