PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JEROME A. WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JON OZMINT, Director SCDC et al.  No. 11-6940 Agency; OFFICER JOHNSON,

contraband et al.; WARDEN WILLIE

L. EAGLETON, Warden; L. T.

GRAHAM,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

G. Ross Anderson Jr., Senior District Judge.

(3:08-cv-04139-JRM)

Argued: March 19, 2013

Decided: May 15, 2013

Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by published opinion.

Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd concurred. Judge Davis wrote a separate opinion concurring in

the judgment.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Kirsten Elena Small, NEXSEN PRUET, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Andrew Lindemann,

DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: G. Murrell Smith, Jr., Steven

B. Johnson, LEE, ERTER, WILSON, HOLLER & SMITH,

LLC, Sumter, South Carolina, for Appellees.

OPINION

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

These claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raise the

issue whether certain actions taken by South Carolina prison

officials after an inmate’s suspected receipt of contraband,

including suspension of the inmate’s visitation privileges for

two years, violated his constitutional rights. We conclude that

the prison warden who imposed the challenged actions is

shielded by qualified immunity from the inmate’s claim for

monetary damages because, under the facts presented here,

the inmate did not have a clearly established constitutional

right to visitation. We also hold that because the inmate’s visitation privileges already have been restored, his request for

injunctive relief must be dismissed as moot. Accordingly, we

dismiss the appeal in part as moot, and we affirm the judgment of the district court in all other respects.

I.

Jerome Williams is an inmate serving a life sentence at

Evans Correctional Institution in South Carolina. The facts

underlying Williams’ claims occurred on March 31, 2007,

when Williams met with a visitor, Marilyn Massey, in the

prison visitation room.1

1With respect to the visitation claims in this appeal, we view the facts

in the light most favorable to Williams as the non-moving party. PBM

Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011).

2 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
Officer Johnson, who was assigned to the Contraband Unit

at the prison, monitored the visitation room on that date,

including the interaction between Williams and Massey. During Williams’ visit with Massey, Officer Johnson observed

Massey pass suspected marijuana to Williams. Johnson also

thought that he saw Williams place the suspected contraband

material in his pants before proceeding to walk toward the

restroom. 

Several officers, including Johnson, intercepted Williams.

The officers informed Williams that he was suspected of having received contraband from Massey, and they escorted Williams to a separate area to be "strip searched." Massey was

escorted from the premises. 

The officers did not find any contraband material on Williams’ person during the strip search. However, before the

strip search was conducted, Johnson saw Williams place

something in his mouth and swallow immediately. As a result,

the officers placed Williams in a "dry cell," a cell without running water, for a period of 72 hours. The officers searched

Williams’ excrement for evidence of the suspected marijuana,

but found none. 

Williams later was transferred to the "Special Management

Unit" where he was held in disciplinary confinement a little

over two months. Williams was not charged with a disciplinary offense, and he alleges that "no finding was ever made

that [he] possessed contraband (or violated any other prison

rule)." 

On April 4, 2007, Warden Willie Eagleton of Evans Correctional Institution (the warden) informed Williams that his

privileges to see visitors were suspended for two years.2 The

notice stated that Williams’ visitation was suspended "effec2The warden’s additional action suspending Massey’s visitation privileges for two years is not at issue in this case. 

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 3
tive March 31, 2007, through March 20, 2009," because he

"was observed receiving contraband from [his] visitor and

placing it in [his] pants." The notice also stated that, while

Williams was not found guilty of a crime or a disciplinary

offense as a result of his conduct, "agency policy provides

that action may be taken by the warden regarding rules violations in the visitation room." 

In December 2008, Williams filed a pro se complaint in a

South Carolina state court against Jon Ozmint, Director of the

South Carolina Department of Corrections, the warden, and

two prison guards, Johnson and Lieutenant Graham (collectively, the defendants). Williams alleged several constitutional

violations relating to the conditions of his confinement,

claimed excessive force by prison officials, and, as relevant

here, challenged the suspension of his visitation privileges in

the absence of being found with contraband or being charged

with a disciplinary offense. On the basis of these alleged violations, Williams sought: (1) monetary relief; (2) restoration

of "visitation" and "all privileges;" and (3) "any other relief

that seems just, and proper."3 The defendants timely removed

the action to federal district court.4

After discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment. Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation,

the district court denied the defendants’ request for summary

judgment on Williams’ claim of excessive force, but awarded

summary judgment to the defendants on all the remaining

claims. On the visitation privileges claim, the district court

awarded summary judgment on the ground that prisoners do

not have a constitutional right to visitation. 

3Williams also sought various forms of relief to which he plainly was

not entitled, such as being released on parole or having criminal charges

brought against the defendants. 

4The defendants removed this action on the basis of federal question

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

4 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
The district court appointed counsel for Williams on the

excessive force claim brought against Johnson. That claim

was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of

Johnson. The district court entered final judgment in favor of

all the defendants. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal.5

II.

We review a district court’s award of summary judgment

de novo. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)

(en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record

does not disclose a genuine issue of material fact, and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).

We liberally construe Williams’ pro se complaint, which

raises certain civil rights issues. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th

Cir. 2009). However, liberal construction does not require us

to attempt to "discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff,"

but only to determine the actual meaning of the words used

in the complaint. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th

Cir. 2006) (en banc).

A.

Williams argues that the two-year suspension of visitation

privileges, which was imposed without a hearing or a finding

that he actually possessed contraband, violated his First

Amendment right to association, his Fourteenth Amendment

right to procedural due process, and his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.6 Although

5Williams raised various issues on appeal in his pro se brief, including

challenges to the jury verdict and the district court’s award of summary

judgment. We appointed appellate counsel to Williams on the issue

whether prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to visitation. 

6The parties agree that the warden is the only proper defendant regarding Williams’ visitation claim. 

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 5
he concedes that the rights of prison inmates are subject to

substantial restrictions, Williams nevertheless argues that

incarceration does not extinguish a prisoner’s "qualified right

to visitation." 

Williams initially contends that a remand to the district

court is necessary for further discovery regarding the prison

policy underlying the suspension of his visitation privileges.

He asserts that until such facts are developed, adjudication of

his constitutional claims will be impossible because this Court

will be unable to determine whether the prison’s policy

advances legitimate penological objectives and is applied consistently. 

We find no merit in this argument. Discovery and remand

are not required for this purpose because Williams has not

sought declaratory relief or otherwise shown that such information is material to the resolution of his claims.

We therefore turn to consider the district court’s award of

summary judgment on Williams’ claim that the warden’s

action suspending Williams’ visitation privileges for two

years violated his constitutional rights. Under the doctrine of

qualified immunity, government officials are provided certain

protections from liability for civil damages. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty.,

Md., ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 388125, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 1,

2013). Qualified immunity extends to protect officials "who

commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly

established law, could reasonably believe that their actions

were lawful." Henry, 652 F.3d at 531. 

A qualified immunity inquiry involves two steps. A court

generally considers first, whether a constitutional violation

occurred, and second, when the court finds such a violation,

whether the right violated was "clearly established" at the

time of the official’s conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555

6 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
U.S. 223 (2009); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 (4th

Cir. 2012).

In performing this analysis, however, a court is not required

to consider the above two steps in any particular order. A

court may exercise its discretion to determine which of the

two steps of the qualified immunity analysis "should be

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular

case at hand." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. In the present case,

we exercise our discretion to determine first whether Williams

had a clearly established constitutional right to visitation at

the time of the warden’s decision.

Williams does not cite any case, or combination of cases,

from this Court, the Supreme Court, or the highest court in

South Carolina, that clearly establishes a constitutional right

to visitation in prison grounded in the First, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 639-40 (1987) (to overcome qualified immunity, the

asserted right must be defined with particularity). Having

failed to do so, Williams also necessarily has failed to identify

any authority establishing a right to such visitation that could

not be restricted by prison officials under the facts presented

here. The absence of controlling constitutional authority in

this regard thus forecloses Williams’ argument that, upon

application of an objective standard, the warden should have

been aware that his conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d

231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999) (ordinarily, courts need only look to

"the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of appeals,

and the highest court of the state in which the case arose," to

determine whether the asserted right was clearly established)

(citation omitted). 

This Court considered a restriction of prison visitation in

White v. Keller, in which we summarily affirmed a district

court decision rejecting a constitutional challenge to a 90-day

restriction on prisoner visitation imposed after some inmates

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 7
were found with certain contraband. 438 F. Supp. 110, 115

(D. Md. 1977), aff’d, 588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1978) (per

curiam). Like Williams in the present case, the plaintiffs in

White challenged the restrictions imposed on grounds including an alleged violation of their rights under the First Amendment. They also asserted that the prison policy violated their

procedural due process rights, including their alleged entitlement to written notice prior to the suspension of visitation and

the opportunity to contest the action. Id. at 113. 

The district court considered these issues in White and held,

in part, that "there is no constitutional right to prison visitation, either for prisoners or visitors."7

Id. at 115. The district

court rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges, and

also found no merit in the plaintiffs’ arguments that they were

denied "procedural guarantees" conferred by the state, and

that the prison did not follow its own regulations. Id. at 120-

21. In a published opinion, we affirmed the district court’s

decision without elaboration, stating that the decision was "correct."8

 588 F.2d at 914. 

We also observe that, although the Supreme Court has considered issues concerning the visitation rights of prisoners in

several cases, none of those cases materially advances Williams’ claims. The Supreme Court held in Block v. Rutherford

that "the Constitution does not require" pretrial detainees to

be allowed "contact visits," when administrators have exercised their sound discretion in determining that such visits

7We note that the district court in White did not rest its decision solely

on the basis that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to visitation

in prison. The court further stated that, "[i]n any event, whether visitation

is a right or not, it is at best a non-fundamental right, and hence may not

only be restricted, but may be restricted by other than the least drastic

means." 438 F. Supp. at 118. 

8On an issue related to visitation in prison, we also have held that an

inmate does not have a constitutional right to "physical contact" with his

family. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per

curiam). 

8 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
"will jeopardize the security of the facility." 468 U.S. 576,

589 (1984). And in Kentucky Department of Corrections v.

Thompson, the Court rejected the argument that any particular

visitor has a due process right to prison visitation. 490 U.S.

454, 461 (1989). 

More recently, in Overton v. Bazzetta, the Supreme Court

considered the issue whether certain prison regulations in

Michigan restricting visitation rights violated the First,

Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. 539 U.S. 126, 129-30

(2003). There, the prisoners challenged a regulation imposing

a two-year ban on visitation for prisoners who committed

multiple substance-abuse violations, which restriction could

be lifted only in the warden’s discretion. Id. at 130. 

The Court in Overton noted that "certain kinds of highly

personal relationships" are protected by the First Amendment,

but stated that "[t]his is not an appropriate case for further

elaboration of those matters." Id. at 131 (citation omitted).

The Court further explained that "[a]n inmate does not retain

rights inconsistent with proper incarceration," and "freedom of

association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration." Id. (emphasis added). The Court upheld the challenged regulations restricting visitation because they served "a

rational relation to legitimate penological interests," namely,

"deterring the use of drugs and alcohol within the prisons," as

well as "induc[ing] compliance with the rules of inmate

behavior." See id. at 132, 134. 

The Court also rejected for the same reasons the prisoners’

contention that the two-year restriction on visitation constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 136-37. However, the Court acknowledged that

its Eighth Amendment analysis might differ if visitation privileges were denied "permanent[ly]," or for a "much longer

period," or "in an arbitrary manner to a particular inmate." Id.

at 137. 

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 9
The length of the suspension imposed on Williams in the

present case is identical to the two-year period at issue in

Overton. And, significantly, the record before us does not

show that the warden suspended Williams’ visitation privileges arbitrarily, in the absence of any evidence that he

received contraband on this or any prior occasions.9

Like the Supreme Court in Overton, we need not determine

the issue whether, by virtue of their incarceration, prisoners

may be deprived of all associational rights in all instances, nor

need we define the boundaries of any such associational rights.10

Qualified immunity serves to protect officers from suit for

money damages in cases involving "gray areas" of constitutional rights or the violation of such asserted rights. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). Indeed, a

rejection of qualified immunity requires "that in the light of

pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of a defendant’s actions]

9Williams also has not shown that the warden violated a clearly established procedural due process right under Sandin v. Conner, which provides that liberty interests created by a State are protected by the Due

Process Clause if their denial is an "atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." See 515

U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Williams asserts, without any support, that "a twoyear suspension of visiting privileges in the absence of a disciplinary violation is atypical and significant," and that his visitation privileges were

suspended without cause. However, as we have explained, Williams’ privileges were not suspended arbitrarily or "without cause," but rather following a prison officer’s observation that Williams received contraband.

Moreover, the Court in Overton held that the two-year withdrawal of visitation was not a "dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions of confinement," id. at 137 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485), and

Williams does not cite, nor do we find, any controlling authority compelling a contrary conclusion on this record. 

10Williams correctly observes that the Court in Overton declined the

opportunity to declare that prison inmates have no associational rights

whatsoever. However, the Court explained that it was not required to

decide that "any right to intimate association is altogether terminated by

incarceration or is always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners." 539

U.S. at 131-32. Thus, the statement identified by Williams cannot be construed as affirmatively establishing that prisoners have such a right. 

10 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
must be apparent." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (emphasis

added). In view of controlling precedent, and upon application

of the above standards, we conclude that the warden’s action

suspending Williams’ visitation privileges for two years did

not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, we hold that the warden is entitled to qualified immunity on Williams’ claim for monetary damages arising from

the suspension of his visitation privileges.11

B.

The defense of qualified immunity has no bearing, however, on claims for prospective court action such as injunctive

relief. Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1331 (4th Cir.

1974); Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159, 177 (2d Cir.

2012). Accordingly, we proceed to address Williams’ claim

for injunctive relief. 

In asking that his "visitation" and "all privileges" be

restored, Williams seeks injunctive relief from the federal

courts. However, by its terms, the suspension of Williams’

visitation privileges expired on March 20, 2009. Indeed,

counsel acknowledged at oral argument in this appeal that

Williams’ visitation privileges have been restored. 

Williams argues, nonetheless, that his claims are not moot

because he remains incarcerated and, therefore, remains subject to a policy "that permits the warden . . . to deprive Williams of visitation rights without any evidence of

wrongdoing." According to Williams, his situation falls

within the exception to the mootness doctrine because his circumstance is capable of repetition yet evading review. We

disagree with Williams’ arguments. 

11In view of our conclusion that the warden did not violate clearly established law, we need not address the first step of the Saucier analysis,

namely, whether a constitutional violation occurred. See 533 U.S. at 201.

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 11
Mootness principles derive from the requirement in Article

III of the Constitution that federal courts may adjudicate only

disputes involving "a case or controversy." Warren v. Sessoms

& Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing

DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974)). The caseor-controversy requirement applies to all stages of a federal

case. See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-79

(1990). "[I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive

when [the] suit was filed," but the parties must continue to

have a "particularized, concrete stake" in the outcome of the

case through all stages of litigation. Id. This constitutional

requirement is of paramount importance, because the federal

courts have "no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules

of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case

before it." Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506

U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (citation omitted). 

A court is deprived of jurisdiction over a case when the

case becomes moot. Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464

U.S. 67, 70 (1983); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 316 (4th

Cir. 2013). Therefore, we address mootness, irrespective

whether the issue was raised by the parties, when our jurisdiction is "fairly in doubt." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671

(2009); Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th

Cir. 2002). 

A case becomes moot "when the issues presented are no

longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest

in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496

(1969). A change in factual circumstances can moot a case on

appeal, such as when the plaintiff receives the relief sought in

his or her claim, Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC,

634 F.3d 754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011), or when an event occurs

that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual

relief to the plaintiff, Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12.

We have explained that "[m]ootness questions often arise in

cases involving inmate challenges to prison policies or condi12 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
tions," because by the time such a suit is ready for adjudication, the challenged practice or policy may no longer affect

the prisoner. Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir.

2007). 

A claim may be mooted "when the claimant receives the

relief he or she sought to obtain through the claim," because

the court no longer "has [ ] effective relief to offer." Dunlap,

290 F.3d at 197 (citations omitted). This circumstance applies

in the present case, because Williams already has received the

restoration of his visitation privileges that he requested in his

complaint. Accordingly, his claim for injunctive relief is moot.12

See Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 2003)

(holding that inmate’s claim for injunctive relief to see a particular visitor was mooted when the warden reinstated her visitation privileges); White, 438 F. Supp. at 113 (holding that

"[t]he claims for injunctive relief of the named plaintiffs in

the visitor class are and have been moot since the restoration

of their visiting privileges").

Our conclusion is not altered by Williams’ contention that

this case falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine

of cases "capable of repetition yet evading review." In Williams’ view, because he remains incarcerated as an inmate of

the South Carolina prison system, he still is subject to a policy

that "permits the warden of an institution to deprive Williams

of visitation rights without any evidence of wrongdoing." We

are not persuaded by this argument.

Courts recognize an exception to the mootness doctrine

when "(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to

be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there

is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party

12Because Williams’ additional request raised in his pro se complaint

for restoration of "all privileges" is inherently vague, we do not consider

it here. See United States v. Fisher, 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 1994)

(courts are "not required to fashion" arguments for a pro se litigant). 

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 13
will be subject to the same action again." Lux v. Judd, 651

F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n

v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)). However, courts also have cautioned that this is a narrow exception, which is limited to the "exceptional situation[ ]." Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); see also Ringo v.

Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2012); Libertarian

Party of N.H. v. Gardner, 638 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, a party seeking to invoke this exception to the

mootness doctrine bears the burden of showing its application. Incumaa, 507 F.3d at 289 (citing Brooks v. Vassar, 462

F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2006)). 

Williams has not met his burden here. His argument fails

for two related reasons. First, Williams has not shown that he

would be subjected again to the alleged deprivation of rights

that occurred in this instance. See Lux, 651 F.3d at 401

(exception requires "a reasonable expectation that the same

complaining party will be subject to the same action again")

(emphasis added). There is no indication that the warden

deprived Williams of visitation privileges in the absence of

any evidence that Williams received contraband on this or any

prior occasion. 

Second, apart from vague and unsubstantiated allegations

that the defendants "targeted" him merely to harass him and

his family, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Williams’ visitation privileges will be suspended again in the

absence of culpable conduct on his part. Thus, Williams’

argument that his claim is capable of repetition rests either on

mere speculation, or on the possibility that he will violate

prison rules in the future. See Incumaa, 507 F.3d at 288-89

(declining to invoke exception to mootness doctrine when

prisoner was removed from maximum security ward, and only

way he would be subjected to challenged policies of that ward

were if he violated prison rules in the future); see also Cox v.

McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 804 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining

that "courts are in general still more reluctant to invoke the

14 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
capable-of-repetition doctrine when the possibility of recurrence for the plaintiff depends on his own wrongdoing") (citation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the narrow

exception to the mootness doctrine claimed by Williams is not

applicable in this case. 

C.

We also address the assertion of Williams’ counsel at oral

argument that Williams’ complaint, fairly construed, raised a

claim for declaratory relief. We disagree with this argument.

When we construe Williams’ pleadings liberally, as we

must, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, our review of his complaint

does not reveal that Williams sought relief in the form of a

declaratory judgment that the South Carolina Department of

Corrections’ visitation policy is unconstitutional. Instead,

Williams plainly sought monetary relief in the amount of

$250,000, and injunctive relief ordering that his "visitation"

and "all privileges" be "restored." And, as noted above, Williams also sought various forms of relief to which he clearly

was not entitled, namely, that he be granted parole or transferred to a minimum security institution, and that either criminal charges be instituted against the defendants or they be

removed from their positions at the prison. At the conclusion

of this list, Williams sought "any other relief that seems just

and proper." 

We long have recognized that, despite our expansive consideration of the pleadings of pro se litigants, district courts

"cannot be expected to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments," and appellate courts should not "permit

those same fleeting references to preserve questions on

appeal." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278

(4th Cir. 1985). Of necessity, our focus remains on discerning

the expressed intent of the litigant. See Laber, 438 F.3d at 413

n.3. Thus, although Williams need not have pleaded verbatim

that he sought "declaratory relief," he nevertheless was

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 15
required to express in his complaint a challenge to the validity

of the prison’s policy. Accordingly, his "catch-all" request for

"other relief" was insufficient to preserve a claim to declaratory relief. 

D.

Williams raises several additional arguments on appeal,

none of which has any merit. First, Williams challenges the

jury verdict in favor of Johnson on the excessive force claim.

However, Williams merely asserts in a conclusory manner

that Johnson used excessive force, and does not raise specific

allegations of error on the part of the district court. Thus, Williams has not met his burden of demonstrating a substantial

question warranting the production of a transcript at government expense. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); 28 U.S.C. § 753(f).

Accordingly, we decline to review the jury verdict. See Keller

v. Prince George’s Cnty., 827 F.2d 952, 954 n.1 (4th Cir.

1987). 

Second, we also reject Williams’ claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel assigned by the district court to represent Williams in his excessive force claim tried to a jury.

Counsel was not constitutionally mandated in this action

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13 See, e.g., Taylor v. Dickel,

293 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 2002); Stanciel v. Gramley, 267

F.3d 575, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2001); Nicholson v. Rushen, 767

F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 

III.

In conclusion, we dismiss as moot Williams’ claim for

injunctive relief regarding his asserted visitation rights, and

we affirm the district court’s judgment in all other respects.

13Even after affording Williams’ pro se brief liberal construction, we

conclude that Williams has failed to explain or develop his remaining

arguments. We therefore decline to address those issues. 

16 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
AFFIRMED IN PART AND

DISMISSED IN PART

DAVIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

We assigned appellate counsel in this case primarily to

present argument on the question of whether the district court

erred in rejecting Appellant’s assertion that the Warden’s

summary imposition of a two-year suspension of visitation

was consistent with one or more constitutional protections

retained by state inmates. As the majority opinion illustrates,

there is scant legal authority supporting the contention that the

Warden’s discretion in this area is so constrained. Still, one is

left uncomfortable with the outcome. I have never run a

prison. I have no idea, beyond untutored instinct and speculation, whether imposition of such a sanction on an inmate serving a life sentence, such as Appellant, is genuinely consistent

with legitimate and sensible penological "best practices" or

whether, instead, it worsens, rather than improves, the safety

and security of the prison environment, through the generation of simmering resentments and increased friction between

jailers and their charges. If the Warden can suspend Appellant’s visitation for two years merely on the say-so of a correctional officer, can he suspend it for three years? For four?

Forever? And if the answer to one of the latter queries is no,

then where is the line?

To my untrained mind, a prolonged separation of an inmate

from family, including perhaps children, or from whatever

supportive community he has left behind outside the walls

that wishes to maintain minimal contact while he pays his

debt to society, raises a real potential for serious infringement

on the residuum of constitutionally protected liberty one supposes inmates retain.1

 Surely, moreover, in the mine run of

1

Importantly, this case concerns the suspension of an inmate’s visitation, not the suspension of visitation for a particular visitor who violates

prison rules. 

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 17
cases, visitation furthers whatever is left in the American

criminal justice system that passes for attempts at rehabilitation. According to information provided on their website, the

officials who manage the South Carolina Department of Corrections appear to embrace this notion.2 But see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(a)("The court, in determining whether to impose a

term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be

imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall consider

the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they

are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.")(emphasis added).

That said, the reasoning of the majority appears unassailable on this record. To be sure, qualified immunity from a

damages remedy to one side, the majority could permissibly

interpret and construe Appellant’s hand-drawn, pro se complaint to have sought injunctive and declaratory relief (seeking, as it does, "such other and further relief" as may be

appropriate), and thereby avoid mooting the case. See Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c);3and see 10 Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2664, at 183 (3d ed. 1998).4 But there is no

2

See South Carolina Department of Corrections, http://www.doc.sc.gov/

family/visitation.jsp (last visited April 26, 2013)("Visitation is an important component of the rehabilitation process and is conducted in the least

restrictive manner possible while meeting requirements of safety, security,

classification, and space availability."). 

3 Demand for Judgment; Relief to Be Granted. A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is

demanded in the pleadings. Every other final judgment should

grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party

has not demanded that relief in its pleadings. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c)(emphasis added). 

4

"Rule 54(c) also has been utilized when the court awards a different

type of relief from that demanded in the complaint. For example, with the

merger of law and equity, specific or injunctive relief may be awarded

even though damages were prayed for and vice-versa. By the same token,

a party may be awarded declaratory relief, even though the party has not

demanded it . . . " (footnotes omitted). 

18 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT
requirement that the court do so. In any event, I agree that, for

now at least, decisions as to how best to act on suspicion of

contraband delivery to inmates during visitation (in contrast

to proof of such delivery) remain South Carolina’s call, unfettered by constitutional proscriptions, at least in the absence of

sanctions of a greater magnitude, litigated in a more timely

fashion, than has occurred here. Accordingly, I concur in the

judgment. 

WILLIAMS v. OZMINT 19