In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-3306

KAREN KODL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION SCHOOL

DISTRICT 45, VILLA PARK,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 3837—Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 5, 2007—DECIDED JUNE 4, 2007

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

WOOD, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. In 1987, the Board of Education

School District 45, Villa Park (the “School District”), hired

Karen Kodl as a physical education teacher at Jackson

Middle School. In 2004, the School District transferred her

to Schafer Elementary School, where she is currently

employed. Following her transfer, Kodl, then forty-seven

years of age, sued the School District alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and age discrimina-
2 No. 06-3306

tion and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. We affirm.

I. Background

Kodl’s allegations revolve around the following incidents:

When the P.E. Team Leader at Jackson Middle School

retired in 2002, Anthony Palmisano, the principal, divided

the P.E. Team Leader position into two separate positions:

“Team Leader” and “Athletic Director.” Kodl applied for

both positions, and other P.E. teachers applied for each

position. Kodl was awarded the position of Team Leader,

but she rejected the offer. She then filed a grievance based

on her belief that the division of the Team Leader position

violated the collective bargaining agreement between the

School District and the union. The following year, Kodl did

not apply for either position. The positions were consolidated and awarded to a male under forty years of age.

Around December 10, 2003, Linda Rajca, another P.E.

teacher, submitted a written complaint about Eric Willis,

a male under the age of forty, who was a mathematics

teacher and also taught P.E. classes. Rajca’s complaint

described three examples of Willis’s conduct: (1) he and

another P.E. teacher wanted to use the gym for boys

basketball teams during girls volleyball intramurals; (2) he

had students relay “snotty” messages to Kodl; and (3) he

was “very unprofessional and very demeaning” at a

meeting he requested with Rajca and Kodl. Palmisano and

Carol Hogsfelt, the Assistant Superintendent of Human

Resources for the School District, immediately investigated

the claims, interviewing every witness, including Kodl.

They concluded that Rajca’s complaints did not constitute

sexual harassment or general harassment, and at worst,
No. 06-3306 3

involved petty misunderstandings. The School District

asserts, and Kodl disputes, that it issued Willis a verbal

warning against engaging in inappropriate conduct.

Kodl claims that Willis harassed her during volleyball

matches and that she reported such conduct to Palmisano

at the end of February 2004. Palmisano denies that Kodl

reported any purported harassment to him at that time. 

In March 2004, Rajca and Kodl accused Tisha Alvarez,

an under forty years of age P.E. teacher, of stealing petty

cash from the girls’ locker room. Alvarez denied stealing

the money. Following an investigation, Palmisano was

unable to reach a conclusion as to whether money was

missing from the girls’ P.E. department and whether

Alvarez had stolen any money. Palmisano told Kodl and

Rajca that there was no proof of any missing money.

Kodl says that at a March 2004 meeting, Palmisano told

her that she was the problem in the P.E. department and

that she had “better change or watch out.” Palmisano

denied making such statements but admitted raising the

issue that other teachers and staff members had expressed

concerns about Kodl. 

Around April 6, 2004, Willis notified Palmisano that

Kodl and Rajca had attempted to secretly tape record him.

Interview notes from a recorded meeting between Kodl and

Palmisano indicated that Kodl admitted that she had tried

unsuccessfully to tape record Willis. As a result of this

incident, Kodl received a written reprimand for her

behavior, and Rajca received a written reprimand for

failing to report the incident. Kodl claims, while the School

District denies, that Alvarez was involved in the taperecording incident. Alvarez did not receive a written

reprimand. 

At a meeting in April 2004, six teachers complained to

Palmisano and other administrators about the behavior of
4 No. 06-3306

Kodl and Rajca and unanimously requested that they be

“split up.”

 On April 30, 2004, Palmisano gave Kodl an overall rating

of “satisfactory” in her performance evaluation. He wrote

“[t]he area of most concern is that of professionalism. You

have not conducted yourself in a professional manner in

several instances.” He listed examples of Kodl’s unprofessional conduct: (1) interacting with secretaries and other

staff members in a manner that made them uncomfortable;

(2) attempting to tape-record a co-worker; and (3) crying

while on the phone with Palmisano after not being invited

to play in a volleyball game.

After these events, the School District decided to transfer Kodl from Jackson Middle School to Schafer Elementary School. The transfer memorandum stated that “[t]his

transfer is the result of your demonstrated failure to relate

in a positive manner with other teachers at Jackson

Middle School.” After receiving the notification, Kodl

filed five grievances, including one asserting age and sex

discrimination. Union representatives concluded that her

grievances were without merit and refused to pursue them.

When a position opened up in the P.E. department at

Jackson Middle School in October 2004, Kodl requested a

transfer back to the school. The School District denied her

request and hired a woman under forty to fill the position.

 After Kodl filed her suit, the School District moved for

summary judgment, which the district court granted. The

district court held that even if Kodl could establish a

prima facie claim of discrimination, she could not show

that the School District’s reasons for transferring her were

a pretext for discrimination. The district court also found

that Kodl could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she had not engaged in protected activity, and

even if she had engaged in protected activity, she failed to

establish causation and pretext. Kodl filed this timely

appeal. 
No. 06-3306 5

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary

judgment de novo. Cengr v. Fusibound Piping Sys., 135

F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is

proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

A. Age and Gender Discrimination

Kodl first challenges the district court’s determination

that she could not show that the School District’s reasons

for transferring her were a pretext for discrimination. To

prevail on her claims of age and gender discrimination,

Kodl is required to show that the School District’s reasons

for transferring her were a pretext. McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.

2d 668 (1973). “A pretext . . . is a deliberate false-hood.”

Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th

Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “[T]o show pretext, [plaintiff]

must show more than [defendant’s] decision was mistaken,

ill considered or foolish, [and] as long as [the employer]

honestly believes those reasons, pretext has not been

shown.” Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 823

(7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). “The only

concern in reviewing an employer’s reasons for termination

is the honesty of the employer’s beliefs.” Forrester, 453

F.3d at 419 (quoting Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine

Division, 328 F.3d 309, 323 (7th Cir. 2003)). 

The School District asserts that it transferred Kodl

because she was not getting along with her co-workers at

Jackson. On appeal, Kodl argues that this reason is a

pretext for discrimination because of the vastly more
6 No. 06-3306

favorable treatment Willis and Alvarez received as compared to Kodl. Specifically, Kodl claims that both Willis

and Alvarez engaged in misconduct without discipline. As

the district court recognized, however, there is no evidence

that Willis and Alvarez engaged in misconduct. Willis

denies he engaged in the conduct of which he was accused.

And, the School District’s investigations confirmed that

position and further found that Alvarez had not participated in the tape recording incident. Moreover, Kodl

admitted that she engaged in unprofessional conduct in

attempting to tape record a co-worker. Kodl has not shown

pretext, and the district court did not err in granting

summary judgment on Kodl’s sex and age discrimination

claims. 

B. Retaliation

Kodl next claims that the district court erred by entering

summary judgment on her retaliation claims. A prima

facie case of retaliation may be made directly or indirectly.

Under the direct method, a plaintiff must show (1) she

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered

an adverse employment action taken by the employer; and

(3) a causal connection between the two. Moser v. Ind.

Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2005). Under the

indirect method, plaintiff must show that she (1) engaged

in statutorily protected expression, (2) met the employer’s

legitimate expectations, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than

similarly situated employees who did not engage in

statutorily protected expression. Tomanovich v. City of

Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The district court found that Kodl could not establish a

prima facie case of retaliation under either a direct or an

indirect method because she did not engage in protected

expression, and even if she had, she failed to establish

pretext. We agree.
No. 06-3306 7

To constitute protected expression, “the complaint must

indicate the discrimination occurred because of sex, race,

national origin, or some other protected class. Merely

complaining in general terms of . . . harassment, without

indicating a connection to a protected class or providing

facts sufficient to create that inference, is insufficient.”

Tomanovich, 457 F.3d at 663 (citations omitted). Neither

Kodl’s grievance regarding the Team Leader position nor

her participation in Rajca’s written complaint constitute

protected expression. During her deposition, Kodl stated

that her grievance regarding the Team Leader position had

nothing to do with age or gender discrimination. Further,

Rajca’s written complaint did not assert claims of age or

sex discrimination but only harassment in general. In

conjunction with Rajca’s complaint, Kodl claims that she

made an informal complaint about inappropriate comments made by Willis that she later charactered as “silly.”

“Silly” comments are not the stuff (generally speaking)

that violate Title VII or the ADEA.

Additionally, the district court held that Kodl could not

establish a causal link in support of her retaliation claim.

“[S]uspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to create a

triable issue.” Moser, 406 F.3d at 905. A temporal proximity between Kodl’s claimed protected activities and her

transfer, standing alone, does not establish the requisite

causal connection. Kodl presents no evidence of causation

other than a chronology of the events leading up to her

transfer. The district court did not err. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.
8 No. 06-3306

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—6-4-07