2016 IL App (3d) 140604

Order filed October 19, 2016 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2016 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

LOREN SWIFT, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 13th Judicial Circuit, 

La Salle County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-14-0604 

Circuit No. 12-CF-608 

Honorable 

Cynthia M. Raccuglia, 

Judge, Presiding. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Loren Swift, appeals from his conviction for aggravated driving under the 

influence (DUI). He argues first that the trial court should have dismissed the case where the 

indictment was deficient. Further, defendant contends that the State failed to prove the element 

of proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
2 

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On January 2, 2013, the State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated DUI (625 

ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(C) (West 2012)). The State would later drop one of those charges.

The indictment on the remaining count read as follows: 

 “On or about, August 17, 2012, in LaSalle County, Illinois, *** 

defendant[ ] committed the offense of: aggravated driving under the influence of 

alcohol (Class 4 felony) 

In that the said defendant drove a Chevy Trailblazer north on County 

Highway 15 at a time when there was any amount of drug, substance or 

compound in the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine resulting from the unlawful 

use or consumption of cannabis, and in committing the violation the defendant 

was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm to 

Robert Miller.” 

¶ 4 The trial court arraigned defendant on February 1, 2013. On that date, the State tendered

the then two-count indictment to the defense. Defense counsel stated: “We’ll acknowledge 

receipt of the two count indictment, waive reading of that and recitation of penalties and enter a 

plea of not guilty and demand trial by jury, please.” 

¶ 5 Over the ensuing months, defendant filed a number of pretrial motions. In one of those 

motions, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that the statute 

under which he was charged had been amended to carve out an exception for the lawful medical 

use of cannabis. Defendant argued that his equal protection and due process rights would be 

violated if the new standard did not apply to him. At a hearing on the matter, defense counsel 

declared that he had “read the whole act five times.” The trial court denied the motion. 
3 

¶ 6 Defendant’s jury trial commenced on March 10, 2014. The State’s first witness was Dr. 

Richard Anderson, a trauma surgeon at St. Francis Hospital in Peoria. Anderson testified that 

defendant was brought to the hospital on August 17, 2012, and a urinalysis was conducted as a 

standard part of trauma procedures. He testified that the urinalysis toxicology showed the 

presence of cannabinoids in defendant’s system. He explained that cannabinoids are derivatives 

of marijuana and that their presence in a urine sample is indicative of prior marijuana use. 

¶ 7 After Anderson was dismissed, defense counsel moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing 

that it was defective on its face. Counsel argued that while the statute referenced a statutory 

subsection that required proximate cause, the actual indictment did not contain that element.

Counsel characterized that as a fatal flaw, arguing that the case should be dismissed. The State 

argued that the phrase “resulted in great bodily harm,” as used in the indictment, had the same 

meaning as proximate cause. The State also referenced a discussion the parties had held 

regarding jury instructions that took place the previous day in the court’s chambers. Citing that 

discussion, the State suggested defense counsel’s argument was not made in good faith. 

¶ 8 The trial court denied defendant’s motion and directed the State to amend the indictment. 

The court commented: “[I]t’s just a matter of words because resulted in does, indeed, mean the 

cause.” Accordingly, the court found that amending the indictment to include the proximate 

cause element was technical rather than substantive and thus did not require the State to go back 

to the grand jury. The court also found that amending the indictment to include the proximate 

cause element would cause no surprise to defendant. 

¶ 9 The State’s next witness was Miller, the victim in the case. Miller testified that on the 

date in question he was driving his pickup truck with a trailer attached. After loading farm 

equipment onto his trailer, Miller proceeded north on County Highway 15 toward the town of 
4 

Kernan. Miller described that stretch of Highway 15 as “gently rolling, [with a] roller coastertype effect.” Miller testified that Highway 15 is a two-lane road with a three-foot shoulder. 

¶ 10 As Miller turned onto Highway 15, he noticed in his mirror that a piece of the equipment 

on his trailer had come loose. Concerned that the equipment might fall off the trailer when the 

truck crossed railroad tracks, Miller decided to pull over. Citing his experience as a truck driver, 

Miller testified that he knew the best place to pull over would be the top of a hill. He explained 

that the top of a hill is ideal both to increase the visibility of his truck and to “get a truck moving 

again” upon restarting. Miller testified that he found an appropriate spot “on top of a little rise,” 

and that he “pulled off the road as far as I safely could.” Miller explained that to the right of the 

three-foot shoulder was a ditch with a steep drop-off. He testified that the wheels on his truck 

and trailer were as close to that drop-off as possible and were then “about halfway off the 

pavement.” 

¶ 11 Upon stopping, Miller checked his driver’s side mirror and saw the running lights of a 

vehicle cresting a hill behind him. He activated his emergency flashers and checked his mirror 

once again. This time, Miller saw nothing behind him. He alighted from his truck and walked 

back to the trailer. He grabbed the loose piece of iron, then noticed that another piece of iron had 

come loose as well. Miller took the first piece of iron to the bed of his truck and turned back 

toward the trailer to retrieve the second loose piece. As he returned to the trailer, he noticed a 

vehicle traveling toward him. Miller testified: “I noticed a vehicle coming from the south at a 

rate of speed that I thought was faster than should have been traveling knowing that *** I was 

there. Knowing that I was *** partially obstructing the road.” Miller testified that the vehicle he 

saw was a TrailBlazer.
5 

¶ 12 Miller saw the TrailBlazer hit his trailer. He testified that he did not hear the squealing of 

tires indicative of braking before the impact. Miller recalled spinning, as well as seeing a vehicle

in the air. His next recollection was of lying in the middle of the road. His shoulder was on the 

center line with his head facing south. Miller testified that he was just under the TrailBlazer’s 

driver’s door. Miller spoke to the driver of the TrailBlazer as they waited for help to arrive.

Miller identified defendant as the driver.

¶ 13 Miller was taken by ambulance to a hospital in Streator, then later via helicopter to St. 

Francis Hospital in Peoria. Miller testified that he sustained a number of injuries, including a 

broken femur, a broken disc in his lumbar spine, and three breaks in his pelvis. His injuries 

required eight or nine surgeries, including, in Miller’s words, “five serious surgeries.” 

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Miller testified that he was aware of a large parking lot off 

Highway 15, approximately 25 to 50 yards north of where the accident took place. That parking 

lot was adjacent to Harv’s Auto Body Repair. He explained that he chose not to pull in there 

because backing out onto Highway 15 with his trailer would have been difficult and unsafe. It 

was for this same reason that Miller chose not to pull off onto a smaller street.

¶ 15 Lawrence Majerus of the La Salle County sheriff’s office testified that he responded to 

the scene of the accident. Majerus briefly spoke to defendant on the scene and again later at the 

hospital. Defendant told Majerus that he had been glancing at a cornfield, and when he brought 

his eyes back to the road he saw the truck and trailer, and was unable to stop or swerve. Majerus 

described the relevant stretch of Highway 15 as follows: “There are dips in the road but they’re 

not to the point where you come up over a rise and you’re on top of somebody.” Majerus 

confirmed that the accident occurred at the top of one of those rises. Majerus agreed that there 
6 

were multiple places further down the road that Miller could have pulled into, including the 

parking lot by Harv’s Auto Body Repair. 

¶ 16 David Guinnee, also of the La Salle County sheriff’s office, testified that he spoke to 

defendant on October 19, 2012, approximately two months after the accident. Defendant told 

Guinnee that on the morning of the accident he had purchased two sandwiches and placed them 

on the front passenger’s seat of his vehicle. Defendant told Guinnee that at one point the 

sandwiches fell off the seat onto the floorboard. Defendant bent down to retrieve the sandwiches, 

at which point the accident occurred. Defendant also told Guinnee that he had smoked marijuana 

approximately one month prior to the accident. 

¶ 17 The defense’s first witness was Paul Surrock, who lived in Kernan and had come upon 

the accident after it occurred. He testified that a vehicle could safely pull off Highway 15 at 

Harv’s Auto Body Repair, which was 200 to 300 yards from where the accident occurred.

Further, Surrock testified that approximately 50 yards beyond Harv’s, traveling north, was a 

large gravel parking lot big enough that one could “turn a train around” in it. Surrock described 

the shoulder at the scene of the accident as being 16 inches of gravel, 4 inches of grass, and then 

a significant drop-off. Surrock testified that he noticed marks indicating that the trailer’s tires had 

been “right at the edge of the grass,” just before the immediate drop-off. Surrock testified that he 

observed scratch marks in the roadway indicating that “part of the trailer hit was right almost in 

the center of the road. Like one foot off the center of the road of the yellow lines.” 

¶ 18 Defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that as he drove up a rise on Highway 

15 on the day of the accident, he could not see Miller’s vehicle. At one point, defendant reached 

down to pick up sandwiches that had fallen off of the passenger’s seat. Defendant described what 

happened next: “Bam. I did not—I didn’t even have time to put my brakes on. I didn’t have time 
7 

to step on my brakes.” Defendant admitted that he had smoked marijuana a month prior to the 

accident and had taken a marijuana capsule for pain relief two weeks prior to the accident.

¶ 19 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he had been driving within the speed limit

and had not slowed down as he approached the crest of the rise. He admitted that he “glanced” 

over a cornfield at some point to observe a parked train. He agreed that he had not mentioned the 

sandwiches until speaking to Guinnee over two months after the accident. 

¶ 20 Following closing arguments, the trial court delivered instructions to the jury. In doing 

so, the court listed five propositions that the State was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt to sustain a conviction for aggravated DUI. The court read the fifth proposition as follows: 

“That the defendant’s act of driving a vehicle while there was any amount of a drug, substance or 

compound in his blood or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis was 

the proximate cause of the great bodily harm.” The court continued: 

 “The term ‘proximate cause’ means any cause which in the natural or 

probable sequence produced the great bodily harm. It need not be the only cause 

nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it occurs with some other cause, 

which in combination with it causes the great bodily harm.” 

¶ 21 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated DUI. Following a sentencing hearing held 

on June 13, 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of two years’ imprisonment.

¶ 22 ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, defendant argues first that his conviction should be reversed because the 

State’s indictment was deficient. Alternatively, defendant argues that the State failed to prove 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
8 

¶ 24 I. Indictment

¶ 25 Defendant argues that the indictment failed to strictly comply with the charging 

requirements set forth in section 111-3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code). See 

725 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 2012). Specifically, defendant points out that the indictment failed to 

allege that his conduct was the proximate cause of Miller’s injuries and that proximate cause is a 

necessary element of the offense. Because the State’s omission was substantive rather than 

formal, defendant maintains that the proper remedy is reversal of his conviction and dismissal of 

the charges. 

¶ 26 Section 111-3(a) of the Code provides a list of five items that the State must include in 

any criminal charging instrument. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (West 2012). This includes the 

requirement that the instrument “[set] forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” 725 

ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2012). Section 111-5 of the Code, however, provides that the charging 

instrument should not be dismissed based on formal defects—that is, minor, technical defects, as 

opposed to substantive defects. See 725 ILCS 5/111-5(a-f) (West 2012). That section further sets 

out a list of formal defects which will not form the basis of a dismissal:

 “(a) Any miswriting, misspelling or grammatical error;

 (b) Any misjoinder of the parties defendant; 

 (c) Any misjoinder of the offense charged; 

(d) The presence of any unnecessary allegation; 

(e) The failure to negative any exception, any excuse or proviso contained 

in the statute defining the offense; or 

(f) The use of alternative or disjunctive allegations as to the acts, means, 

intents or results charged.” Id. 
9 

Section 111-5 provides that a charging instrument that contains such a defect should be remedied 

via amendment, on motion of the State or defendant. Id. 

¶ 27 Defendant argues that the State’s failure to include the element of proximate cause in the 

indictment constitutes a substantive defect. Defendant also maintains that absent strict 

compliance with section 111-3(a), an indictment must be dismissed. Our analysis requires three 

distinct inquiries: (1) was the indictment in the present case defective; (2) was any defect formal 

or substantive in nature; and (3) is defendant required to show prejudice flowing from the 

deficiency, and if so, has he shown such prejudice. 

¶ 28 A. Defect

¶ 29 Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code is entitled “Driving while under the influence 

of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination 

thereof” (DUI statute). 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2012). Subsection (a) of the DUI statute sets 

forth the scenarios in which misdemeanor DUI may be committed. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 

2012). In turn, subsection (d)(1) provides a list of circumstances in which misdemeanor DUI

may be elevated to felony aggravated DUI. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1) (West 2012). Subsection 

(d)(1)(C), the subsection under which defendant was charged, provides that a person commits 

aggravated DUI where “the person in committing a violation of subsection (a) was involved in a 

motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability or 

disfigurement to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” 625 ILCS 

5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2012).

¶ 30 Proximate cause is plainly an element of aggravated DUI as charged under subsection 

(d)(1)(C). Here, the court’s instruction to the jury stated that proximate cause was one of the 

propositions the State was obligated to prove in order to sustain a conviction. The State was 
10 

required to include that element in the charging instrument. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 

2012). Since proximate cause was not explicitly stated in the indictment, the indictment was 

defective in that it failed to strictly comply with the Code.

¶ 31 B. Formal or Substantive Defect

¶ 32 A defect in a charging instrument is formal in nature where that defect “is not material or 

does not alter the nature and elements of the offense charged.” People v. Flores, 250 Ill. App. 3d 

399, 401 (1993). A defect is considered substantive where it materially alters the charge in such a 

way that it cannot be determined whether the grand jury intended such an alteration. People v. 

Milton, 309 Ill. App. 3d 863, 866 (1999). In other words, “once an indictment has been returned 

by the grand jury, it may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself.” 

People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 254 (1996). 

¶ 33 The State’s failure to include proximate cause in the indictment in the present case does 

not fall under any of the formal defects contemplated by section 111-5 of the Code. See supra

¶ 26. The failure to include an essential element of the charge would seem to be a clear 

substantive defect, which requires a broadening of the indictment to include that element.

However, the trial court reasoned that the phrase “resulted in great bodily harm” meant the same 

thing as proximate cause. Under the trial court’s analysis, the defect in the indictment was 

merely formal, because although the indictment did not contain the precise phrase “proximate 

cause,” it nevertheless sufficiently described proximate cause. See People v. Viar, 131 Ill. App. 

2d 983, 985 (1971) (“It is one thing to hold that there is a total omission of a necessary allegation 

and quite another to hold that a necessary allegation is imprecisely stated.”).

¶ 34 The trial court erred in finding that “resulted in” holds the same functional meaning as 

“proximate cause.” “Cause” and “result” are separate concepts. As written, the State’s indictment 
11 

only required that the end result of the motor vehicle accident was bodily harm to Miller. The 

DUI statute, however, requires that defendant’s driving a motor vehicle caused that bodily harm. 

625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2012). Proximate cause, as defined in the jury’s instructions, 

means “any cause which in the natural or probable sequence produced the great bodily harm.” 

Supra ¶ 20; see also infra ¶¶ 51-52. Indeed, Miller could have been injured in an accident with 

defendant, where defendant did not proximately cause those injuries. Thus, it is not apparent 

from the face of the indictment whether the grand jury considered whether defendant’s driving 

was the proximate cause of Miller’s injuries. The amendment to include proximate cause in the 

indictment, then, was necessarily a broadening of that charging instrument. Accordingly, the 

defect in the indictment was substantive in nature. 

¶ 35 C. Prejudice

¶ 36 Whether a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by a substantively defective 

charging instrument turns on the timing of his challenge to that instrument. It is well-settled that 

where a charging instrument is challenged in a pretrial motion, the charging instrument will be 

dismissed if it does not strictly comply with the requirements of section 111-3 of the Code. E.g., 

People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 93 (2008). It is equally well-settled that where an indictment is 

challenged for the first time on appeal, a defendant must show prejudice in the preparation of his 

defense. People v. Davis, 217 Ill. 2d 472, 479 (2005). In that context, an indictment will be 

deemed “sufficient if it apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient 

specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future 

prosecution arising out of the same conduct.” People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 (1976). 

¶ 37 Where a defendant challenged the State’s indictment during his trial is less well-settled.

However, our supreme court has addressed such a situation on two occasions. In Benitez, 169 Ill. 
12 

2d at 246-47, the grand jury returned an indictment that named only one codefendant, and did not 

contain Gavino Benitez’s name. The State nevertheless informed Benitez that he had been 

indicted. Id. at 247. At Benitez’s arraignment, the State filed a new indictment, which named 

Benitez. Id. The State had not reconvened the grand jury, nor had it filed any motion to amend 

the original indictment. Id. Thirteen months later, on the second day of trial, defense counsel 

alerted the court that “it ha[d] just come to [his] attention that the indictment in this case *** 

does not contain the name of Gavino Benitez.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 247-48. 

The trial court found the second indictment sufficient, and Benitez was found guilty. 

¶ 38 The supreme court reversed, relying heavily on the fact that the State had failed to utilize

either prescribed method for altering an indictment, i.e., returning to the grand jury or filing a 

motion for amendment. Id. at 255. The court explained: 

“[T]he State arrogated for itself the power to amend the indictment as it saw fit.

Secretaries in the State’s Attorney’s office prepared the second indictment to 

replace the first indictment. The second indictment added two new defendants and 

changed the name of a victim. We cannot sanction such a practice. Assistant 

State’s Attorneys and their staff do not have the authority to amend grand jury 

indictments at will. Accordingly, we find that the second indictment was not valid 

as to the present defendant. Because the initial indictment failed to name 

defendant and the second indictment was not valid, defendant was never properly 

charged with any offense.” Id. 

¶ 39 Further, the court rejected the State’s argument that the conviction should nevertheless 

stand because Benitez could not show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of being 

arraigned under the second indictment. Id. at 257. The court stated: “We hold that, under the 
13 

unique circumstances of this case, defendant is not required to show that he sustained prejudice 

to warrant reversal of his convictions.” Id. at 259. 

¶ 40 Our supreme court considered a challenge to a charging instrument nine years later in 

People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d 79 (2005). In Cuadrado, the court held that its prior decision in

Benitez had been based primarily on the prosecution’s malfeasance in substituting one indictment 

for another. Id. at 87. Thus, the court held that, as a general rule, a defendant challenging a 

charging instrument during trial must show prejudice and that the misconduct in Benitez

represented an exception to that rule. Id. 

“Our holding in Benitez clearly relied in large part upon the prosecution’s 

misconduct. Due to that misconduct, the defendant was denied an opportunity to 

object to the deficiencies in the indictment before trial because he was only 

apprised of the State’s improprieties after the trial had begun. 

In marked contrast, defendant in this case had ample opportunity before 

trial to object to the indictment. The indictment properly cited the charged offense 

[citation]. Its only deficiency was the substitution of the word “solicited” for the 

word “procured” used in the statutory section defining solicitation of murder for 

hire [citation]. We disagree with the State that the substitution is irrelevant and 

that the two terms are interchangeable. We do agree with the State, however, that 

defendant was not prejudiced by the substitution. Prior to filing her motion to 

dismiss the indictment, defendant filed and argued a motion for a directed finding, 

alleging the State’s case in chief failed to prove that she “procured” Jimenez to 

murder her husband. This motion establishes that defendant was aware of the 

State’s need to prove procurement. We cannot say the error in the indictment 
14 

inhibited defendant in the preparation of her defense. Accordingly, we cannot 

conclude that defendant suffered any prejudice.” Id. at 87-88. 

¶ 41 We recognize that defendant here challenged the indictment after only one witness

testified, whereas the defendant in Cuadrado did so after the State had completed its case-inchief and after making a motion for directed finding. However, given the “general requirement of 

prejudice when an indictment is challenged after the commencement of trial” (id. at 87), we find 

this to be a distinction without a difference. Indeed, the State only amended the indictment after 

the trial court ordered it to do so. The defendant is obligated to show that he was prejudiced by 

the defective indictment in order to obtain relief in the form of dismissal.

¶ 42 Defendant, however, has put the full force of his argument on appeal behind the legal 

theory that he is not obligated to show prejudice in the preparation of his defense. He makes no 

alternative argument that he actually did suffer prejudice. In any event, the record would 

contradict any such argument.

¶ 43 The record shows that defendant was aware of the proximate cause element, despite the 

State’s failure to include it in the charging instrument and suffered no prejudice in the 

preparation of his defense. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the 

indictment.

¶ 44 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 45 Defendant next contends that the State failed to introduce evidence sufficient to prove 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, defendant once again takes issue with the 

proximate cause requirement. Specifically, defendant maintains that the State failed to prove that 

his conduct was the proximate cause of Miller’s injuries where evidence showed that Miller’s 

own actions were an intervening cause of those injuries. 
15 

¶ 46 When a challenge is made to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we review to 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 31; People v. Collins, 106 

Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). In making this determination, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 31. All reasonable inferences from 

the record in favor of the prosecution will be allowed. People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 327 

(2005). 

¶ 47 It is not the purpose of a reviewing court to retry a defendant. People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 

150, 178 (2004). Great deference is given to the trier of fact. See, e.g., People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. 

App. 3d 409, 416-17 (2007). “The weight to be given to witnesses’ testimony, the witnesses’ 

credibility, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, are all the responsibility 

of the fact finder.” Milka, 211 Ill. 2d at 178. The trier of fact is not required to accept or 

otherwise seek out any explanations of the evidence that are consistent with a defendant’s 

innocence; nor is the trier of fact required to disregard any inferences that do flow from the 

evidence. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 380 (1992). 

¶ 48 “[A]ggravated DUI is simply misdemeanor DUI with an aggravating factor, which turns 

the offense into a felony.” People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 24. In order to prove the 

underlying misdemeanor DUI in the present case, the State needed only to show that defendant 

was in actual physical control of a vehicle while “there [was] any amount of a drug, substance, or 

compound in [defendant’s] breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or 
16 

consumption of cannabis” or other controlled substances. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) 

(West 2012).1 Defendant concedes that the State proved that he committed this misdemeanor.

¶ 49 To prove that defendant committed aggravated DUI, the State had the burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, “in committing a violation of subsection (a)[,] was 

involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability or 

disfigurement to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” 625 ILCS 

5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2012). Our supreme court has clarified that the proximate cause 

element refers not to the presence of drugs referenced in subsection (a)(6), but only to a 

defendant’s driving. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26. In other words, the State must prove only a 

causal link between defendant’s driving and a person’s injuries. Id. 

¶ 50 The concept of proximate cause encompasses two separate requirements, cause in fact 

and legal cause. People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 401 (2006). “Cause in fact exists where there 

is a reasonable certainty that a defendant’s acts caused the injury or damage.” First Springfield 

Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999). 

“Legal cause ‘is essentially a question of foreseeability’; the relevant inquiry is 

‘whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely 

result of his or her conduct.’ [Citation.] Foreseeability is added to the cause-in-

 1

Though subsection (a)(6) appears in the statute entitled “Driving while under the influence ***,” 

no actual “influence” or impairment is necessary to sustain a conviction under that subsection. It has thus 

been characterized as a strict liability violation. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2012). E.g., People v. 

Merrick, 2012 IL App (3d) 100551, ¶ 27. Perhaps reflective of changing public perceptions, our 

legislature has begun to phase out that strict liability for drivers found with cannabis or its derivatives in 

their systems. Effective in 2014, the statute now contains an exception for those lawfully consuming 

cannabis pursuant to Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act (410 ILCS 130/1 et seq. 

(West 2014)). 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2014). Effective July 29, 2016, cannabis has been removed 

from subsection (a)(6) altogether. Pub. Act 99-697 (eff. July 29, 2016) (amending 625 ILCS 5/11-501 

(West 2014)). Now, the presence of cannabis in a driver’s system may only serve as the basis for a DUI 

conviction when it reaches a certain level in the body, similar to a DUI conviction based on alcohol. Pub. 

Act 99-697 (eff. July 29, 2016) (amending 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2 (West 2014)). 
17 

fact requirement because ‘even when cause in fact is established, it must be 

determined that any variation between the result intended *** and the result 

actually achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the 

defendant responsible for the actual result.’ ” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 (quoting 

Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258, and 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 

§ 6.4, at 464 (2d ed. 2003)). 

¶ 51 A defendant may escape liability by showing that an intervening event was the actual 

proximate cause of an accident. See Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 52, 57 (1996) 

(citing Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 64 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (1976)). An intervening event does not 

break the chain of legal causation, however, where that intervening event is foreseeable. Id. 

(citing Felty v. New Berlin Transit, Inc., 71 Ill. 2d 126, 131 (1978)). In fact, there may be more 

than one proximate cause to an injury. E.g., Seef v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d 

7, 20 (1999). “Furthermore, the precise nature of the intervening cause need not be foreseen 

[citation], and where varying inferences are possible, foreseeability is a question for the jury

[citation].” Mack, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 57. 

¶ 52 A rational juror could reasonably have found that defendant’s driving proximately caused 

Miller’s injuries. Such a juror could surely conclude that it is foreseeable that a vehicle may be 

pulled over onto the shoulder of a road. Moreover, a rational juror could certainly find it 

foreseeable that when the shoulder of a road is narrow, such a stopped vehicle may partially 

obstruct the roadway. Finally, a rational juror could also conclude that when a driver takes his 

eyes off the road, whether to stare into a cornfield, or to pick up sandwiches, it is foreseeable that 

a traffic accident might occur. 
18 

¶ 53 Defendant maintains that Miller’s conduct was an unforeseeable intervening cause of 

Miller’s injuries, defeating the conclusion that defendant’s own driving was the proximate cause 

of those injuries. He asserts that he “could not have foreseen that a trailer would be obstructing 

the only northbound lane of a road with rolling hills which already made it difficult to anticipate 

conditions ahead.” 

¶ 54 However, as discussed above, a rational jury could find that a motorist pulled over onto 

the narrow shoulder should have been foreseeable to defendant. While the defense did present 

evidence probative of the unreasonableness of Miller’s actions, the jury was under no obligation 

to accept its evidence. When looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we 

find that a rational juror could have found defendant’s conduct to be the proximate cause of 

Miller’s injuries beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 55 CONCLUSION

¶ 56 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed. 

¶ 57 Affirmed.