IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER KNECHT,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-124

Judge Graham

Magistrate Judge King

JOHN KASICH,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This action against the Governor of the State of Ohio was originally

filed by plaintiff, who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel,

in the Western Division of this Court. The matter was thereafter

transferred to this division pursuant to S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 82.1, Order,

Doc. No. 2,1 and randomly assigned to a District Judge and to the

undersigned in accordance with Eastern Division Order 91-3(I)(A). The

undersigned thereafter granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis, Doc. No. 1, and granted defendant forty-five (45) days

after service of process to respond to the Complaint. Order, Doc. No.

3. This matter is now before the Court on plaintiff’s motion to recuse

the undersigned. Plaintiff’s Objection to Automatic Appearance of

Magistrate Judge Norah King; Objection to Assignment of Magistrate Juge;

Objection to Magistrate Judge Norah King’s Order Granting Leave to

Proceed in Forma Pauperis; Plaintiff’s Motion for

Recusal/Disqualificaiton of Magistrate Judge Norah King, Doc. No. 14

1

Plaintiff has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the

transfer of the action to this division. Doc. No. 8.

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[“Motion to Recuse”].2

Plaintiff bases his request for the recusal of the undersigned on

decisions made and/or the recommendation issued in a previous case filed

by plaintiff, Knecht v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 2:97-cv-736 (S.D.

Ohio). Judgment entered in that case by the District Judge,3 Doc. No. 44,

was affirmed in part and reversed in part on appeal, Knecht v. Ohio Adult

Parole Authority, 215 F.3d 1326, 2000 WL 659030 (6th Cir. May 10,

2000)(unpublished). 

Federal law requires a federal judge to “disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28

U.S.C. §455(a). The bias or prejudice that mandates recusal, however,

must be wrongful or inappropriate, i.e., either relying on knowledge

acquired outside the proceedings or displaying deep-seated and

unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. 

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). In this regard, judicial

rulings alone almost never constitute a basis for recusal. Id.; United

States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). In basing his motion

on actions taken in prior litigation, plaintiff has not articulated a

valid basis for the recusal of the undersigned.

Plaintiff also complains that “he will spend a good portion of his

time regularly submitting objections to various proceedings carried out

by” the undersigned, “which doesn’t promote the judicial efficiency of

the Court much less the time the parties would spend on subjective

2

An identical filing appears at Doc. No. 13. To the extent that

plaintiff’s filings seek reconsideration of the assignment of the case to the

undersigned and reconsideration of the order issued by the undersigned, the

motions will be left for consideration by the District Judge.

3

Plaintiff erroneously asserts that the earlier case was assigned to the

same District Judge to which this case has been assigned.

2

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issues.” Motion to Recuse, p. 7. However, plaintiff’s speculation about

the future course of these proceedings is simply not a basis for recusal

of a judge.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse, Doc. No. 14, is DENIED.

 s/ Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King

 United States Magistrate Judge

February 23, 2012

3

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