Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

1 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

 

 

Authors’ Note 

Al‐Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records is the latest in a

series of reports from the Combating Terrorism Center drawing on newly

released information from captured al‐Qa’ida documents maintained in the

Defense Department’s Harmony Data Base. The report is a preliminary analysis

of records containing background information on foreign fighters entering Iraq

via Syria over the last year. The data used in this report was coded from English

translations of these records and undoubtedly contains some inaccuracies due to

imprecise translation as well as through errors in the transcription process.  The

CTC plans further studies based on the Sinjar Records and expects to hone and

improve the accuracy of our database as we do so.   

The authors thank James Phillips, CTC Harmony Project Manager, for significant

assistance coordinating and compiling the information and documents as well as

CTC Staff members Sherwet Witherington, Vahid Brown, and Warren Polensky

for their research and editorial support. We also thank Colonel Mike Meese and

Colonel Cindy Jebb‐Head and Deputy Head of the US Military Academy

Department of Social Sciences‐ for their continued support of the CTC’s

Harmony Project.  

The views expressed in this report are the authors’ and do not reflect the U.S.

Military Academy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.  

 

Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman

Combating Terrorism Center

Department of Social Sciences

US Military Academy  

West Point, New York

845‐938‐8495

Joseph.felter@usma.edu,Brian.fishman@usma.edu

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Introduction

On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al‐Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al‐Qa’ida’s

Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi,

containing only 200 foreign fighters.1  Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007,

Ayman al‐Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the ISI.  Both statements

are part of al‐Qa’ida’s ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent

the ISI’s foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law.   

In November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point received

nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006

and August 2007.  The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from

these personnel records, which was collected by al‐Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates, first

the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).  The

records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include

the fighter’s country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the

fighter’s recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq.  The records were

captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq’s

Syrian border.  Although there is some ambiguity in the data, it is likely that all

of the fighters listed in the Sinjar Records crossed into Iraq from Syria. The Sinjar

Records’ existence was first reported by The New York Times’ Richard Oppel,

who was provided a partial summary of the data.2   

The Combating Terrorism Center is pleased to make the Sinjar Records publicly

available for the first time. English translations of the Records can be accessed at

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FF‐Bios‐Trans.pdf and the records in their

original Arabic text at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios‐

Orig.pdf .3    The purpose of this initial assessment of the Sinjar Records is to

provide scholars access to this unique data, in the hope that their scholarship will

complement—and compete—with our own.  The CTC plans a more

comprehensive study on Iraq’s foreign fighters for release in early 2008.4  

 

1

 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, For the Scum Disappears Like Froth Cast Out, posted to www.muslm.net on 

December 4, 2007. 

2

 Richard Oppel, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of the U.S.,” The New York Times, November 

22, 2007, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/world/middleeast/22fighters.html 3 Information recorded from these documents and used to generate the summary statistics is available in 

spread sheet form on request. Please send request for this data to ctcharmony@usma.edu 4

 For access to all captured documents released to the CTC and the CTC’s previous reports incorporating 

this information see: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

The CTC has not altered the Sinjar Records except to format them in a more user‐

friendly manner for distribution.  The CTC cannot vouch for the authenticity or

accuracy of these records, except to confirm they were authorized for release by

the U.S government, which is why these records are presented in their entirety.  

The CTC does not redact or classify information.   

Readers should be aware that analyzing data captured on a battlefield is fraught

with risk.  Some of the personnel records were filled out incompletely or

improperly, some may have been lost by al‐Qa’ida’s personnel in Iraq, and some

may have been accidentally lost or destroyed by U.S. forces.  The Sinjar Records

are an astounding testimony to al‐Qa’ida’s importation of fighters to Iraq, but

they are an inherently imperfect record.  Readers and researchers should be wary

of conclusions drawn solely on the basis of these records.

Background

Al‐Qa’ida’s allies began moving into Iraq even before U.S. forces entered the

country in early 2003.  After fleeing Afghanistan and traversing Iran, Abu

Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi slipped into Northern Iraq some time in 2002.  At that time,

Zarqawi’s organization was called Tawhid wa’l Jihad (Monotheism and Struggle)

and was built around a backbone of Jordanians, Syrians, and Kurds that either

rushed to join him in Iraq or had been working with the Kurdistan‐based jihadi

group, Ansar al‐Islam.

Zarqawi did not join al‐Qa’ida until October 2004, when he swore allegiance to

Usama bin Ladin.  The new organization was called Tanzim Qa’idat al‐Jihad fi

Bilad al‐Rafidayn which was commonly known in the West as al‐Qa’ida in Iraq

(AQI).  The agreement between Zarqawi and his new masters belied important

disagreements that remained even after Zarqawi formally joined al‐Qa’ida.  

Zarqawi was sometimes critical of al‐Qa’ida’s willingness to cooperate with

“apostates” against other enemies and, unlike Bin Ladin, fervently argued that

al‐Qa’ida’s “Near Enemy”—apostates and the Shi’a—were more dangerous than

its “Far Enemy”—the United States and the West.5

Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq worked hard to recruit Iraqis and build cordial relationships

with nationalist and Ba’athist insurgents in Iraq, but its brutal tactics and

 

5

 For more on these and other disagreements within al-Qa’ida’s leadership see the CTC’s recent Harmony 

report, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms Within al-Qa’ida 1989-2006 at 

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

religious conservatism alienated more Iraqis than it attracted.  In January 2006,

after bloody battles with nationalist insurgent groups and Zarqawi’s ill‐fated

attack on three hotels in Amman, Jordan, AQI subsumed itself within an

umbrella group called Majlis Shura al‐Mujahidin (Mujahidin Shura Council—

MSC).  Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq still existed, but the MSC was a useful way to give AQI

a conciliatory—and Iraqi—face.  Zarqawi was a tremendously successful

propagandist, but his wanton violence was increasingly controversial among

Iraqis suffering the ravages of civil war. Meanwhile, the MSC was ostensibly led

by Abdullah Rashid al‐Baghdadi, a name that implies the man was Iraqi.

After Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, AQI quickly replaced him with Abu Hamzah

al‐Muhajir, a man the United States identified as an Egyptian named Abu Ayyub

al‐Masri.  The Sinjar Records begin shortly thereafter, and many are documented

on MSC letterhead.   

In October 2006, al‐Muhajir announced the formation of the Dawlat al‐ʹIraq al‐

Islamiyya (Islamic State of Iraq—ISI), and named Abu Umar al‐Baghdadi, another

purported Iraqi, its Emir.  Like the MSC, the ISI was designed to put an Iraqi face

on al‐Qa’ida’s efforts in the insurgency, but the new organization was intended

to be much more substantive than its predecessor.  Unlike the MSC, the ISI

totally supplanted its constituent organizations.  For its followers, al‐Qa’ida no

longer exists in Iraq, only the ISI.   

The ISI was meant to unify resistance to U.S. occupation, inspire support from al‐

Qa’ida’s global supporters by imposing Islamic law, and ensure that al‐Qa’ida

was prepared in case of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.  Today, the ISI

bolsters its religious authority by releasing religious instructions to followers and

has created a facade of governance by establishing a cabinet that even includes a

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.   

Despite these efforts, the ISI was poorly conceived and is largely failing.  As the

ISI tried to impose order, it alienated the Iraqi population and other Sunni

insurgents; meanwhile its weakness has left it unable to credibly provide security

for Iraqis or impose the religious strictures expected by al‐Qa’ida’s global

supporters.  The U.S. spokesman in Baghdad, General Kevin Bergner, even

claimed to have intelligence that Abu Umar al‐Baghdadi is a fictitious character

created to front the ISI while non‐Iraqis pulled the strings.6   

 

6

 Dean Yates, “Senior Qaeda Figure in Iraq a Myth: U.S. Military,” Reuters, July 18, 2007, online at 

http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1820065720070718?sp=true 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

The sheer magnitude of fighters listed in the Sinjar Records challenges Abu

Umar al‐Baghdadi’s reassurances that his organization is built on a local

foundation.  Although the records are not necessarily inconsistent with his claim

that there are only 200 foreign fighters left in Iraq, the scope of al‐Qa’ida’s

program to import fighters to Iraq belies his effort to convince Iraqis that the ISI

is an inherently Iraqi organization.  There is no doubt that al‐Qa’ida’s Iraqi

affiliates successfully recruited many Iraqis, but the leadership of both the MSC

and the ISI remain largely foreign.  Thus, the Sinjar Records exemplify al‐

Qa’ida’s fundamental strategic challenge in Iraq: melding the ideological

demands of its global constituency with the practical concerns of relatively

secular Iraqis.   

Most of Iraq’s militants do not suffer that strategic problem.  The vast majority of

militants in Iraq have nothing to do with al‐Qa’ida, and they are focused on Iraqi

problems: security, distribution of power and money, and sectarianism.  Those

insurgents are a mix of Sunni nationalists, Ba’thists, Shi’a militias, and Islamist

organizations.  Mistaking any of these groups for al‐Qa’ida is not simply wrong,

it is dangerous.  

The ISI’s political failure should not obscure the fact that Iraq has inspired

thousands of young men from around the world to join al‐Qa’ida’s cause. The

Sinjar Records are important not just for what they tell us about al‐Qa’ida’s

affiliates inside of Iraq, but also for what they reveal about its logistical and

recruiting capabilities outside.  This analysis will explore some of those

dynamics.  As stated above, the CTC will return to the subject in early 2008.  We

offer this data and preliminary analysis now in the hope that other researchers

will offer their own insights into the strengths and weaknesses of al‐Qa’ida.

Description of the Data

The CTC received a cache of more than 700 records from USSOCOM.  After

eliminating blanks and duplicates, the CTC examined 606 translated records of

fighters that, we believe, entered Iraq via the Syrian border. These records

contained varying amounts of detail on the fighters’ personal background, group

affiliation, travel to Syria, and intended role in Iraq. Some records had

considerably more detail than others.   

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Figure 1 and Figure 2 below are examples of a typical record in this sample in

both original Arabic and in English translation.  Readers may note spelling

mistakes in the original and translated versions, and varying transliterations.

Figure 1: Sample Record in Original Arabic               Figure 2: Translated Sample Record

Initial Findings 

Country of Origin

Saudi Arabia was by far the most common nationality of the fighters’ in this

sample; 41% (244) of the 595 records that included the fighter’s nationality

indicated they were of Saudi Arabian origin.7   

Libya was the next most common country of origin, with 18.8% (112) of the

fighters listing their nationality stating they hailed from Libya.  Syria, Yemen,

 

7 After recording and comparing the information contained in the translated records, the CTC determined 

that 34 records were likely duplicates of the same individual. These records were deleted from the sample 

studied. 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

and Algeria were the next most common origin countries with 8.2% (49), 8.1%

(48), and 7.2% (43), respectively. Moroccans accounted for 6.1% (36) of the

records and Jordanians 1.9% (11).8  

Figure 3: Foreign Fighters by Country of Origin

Based on 595 records stating country of origin

Foreign Fighters Country of Origin

Algeria

Egypt

Jordan

Libya

Morocco

Other

 Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

Yemen

100 150 200 250

Number of Records

0 50

The obvious discrepancy between previous studies of Iraqi foreign fighters and

the Sinjar Records is the percentage of Libyan fighters.  (See Appendix 1 for a

brief summary of previous foreign fighter studies.) No previous study has

indicated that more than 4 percent of fighters were Libyan.  Indeed, a June 2005

report by NBC quoted a U.S. government source indicating that Libya did not

make a top ten list of origin nationalities for foreign fighters in Iraq.9  As late as

July 15, 2007, the Los Angeles Times cited a U.S. Army source reporting that only

10 percent of all foreign fighters in Iraq hailed from North Africa.10  The Sinjar

Records suggest that number is much higher.  Almost 19 percent of the fighters

in the Sinjar Records came from Libya alone.  Furthermore, Libya contributed far

 

8

 The “Other” category included two fighters from France and one fighter each from Bosnia, Belgium, 

England, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Sudan and Sweden. 

9

 Lisa Meyers, “Who are the Foreign Fighters?” MSNBC, June 20, 2005, online at 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/

10 Ned Parker, “Saudis Role in Iraq Insurgency Outlined,” The Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2007, online at 

http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

more fighters per capita than any other nationality in the Sinjar Records,

including Saudi Arabia.

Figure 4: Foreign Fighters Per Capita

0 5 10 15 20

Number of Fighters per One Million Residents in Home Country

Yemen

Tunisia

Syria

Saudi Arabia

Morocco

Libya

Jordan

Egypt

Algeria

Foreign Fighters Per Capita

 

The previous reports may have collectively understated the Libyan contribution

to the fight in Iraq, but the relative synchronization of earlier analyses suggests

that the pattern of immigration to Iraq has simply shifted over time.  In an

admittedly small sample, 76.9% (30) of the 39 Libyans that listed their arrival

date in Iraq entered the country between May and July 2007, which may indicate

a spring “surge” of Libyan recruits to Iraq.  If the numbers cited by the Los

Angeles Times in July 2007 are any indication, even the U.S. Army may have

underestimated the Libyan contingent in Iraq.

The apparent surge in Libyan recruits traveling to Iraq may be linked the Libyan

Islamic Fighting Group’s (LIFG) increasingly cooperative relationship with al‐

Qa’ida, which culminated in the LIFG officially joining al‐Qa’ida on November 3,

2007. 11   

11 As-Sahab video released November 3, 2007, on the Al-Boraq Islamic Network; see OSC 

FEA20071104393586 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

In March 2007, the LIFG’s senior ideologue, Abu Yahya al‐Libi, weighed in on al‐

Qa’ida’s controversial declaration of an Islamic State of Iraq.  Although jihadis

globally were divided over the strategic wisdom and religious acceptability of

declaring the state, Abu Yahya called for unity in Iraq, and encouraged

“mujahidin” everywhere to support the ISI:

...our brothers are in need of the backing and aid of the Muslim peoples, with

their bodies and wealth, with shelter and prayer, and with incitement.... There is

no way to establish and preserve states other than Jihad in the Path of Allah and

Jihad alone....This is the path, and anything else is from the whispers of Satan.12

Whether there was a spring 2007 Libyan surge or not, the Libyan pipeline to Iraq

seems firmly established.  The vast majority (84.2%) of Libyans that recorded

their route to Iraq arrived via the same pathway running through Egypt and then

by air to Syria.  This recruiting and logistics network is likely tied to LIFG, which

has long ties (not all positive) with Egyptian and Algerian Islamist groups.   

The announcement that LIFG had officially sworn allegiance to al‐Qa’ida was

long‐expected by observers of the group.  Both the ideologue Abu Yahya al‐Libi

and the military leader Abu Layth al‐Libi have long histories with the LIFG, and

are increasingly prominent figures along the Afghanistan‐Pakistan border and in

al‐Qa’ida’s propaganda.  Abu Layth is now an operational commander in

Afghanistan; and in 2007, Abu Yahya is second only to Ayman al‐Zawahiri as the

most visible figure in al‐Qa’ida’s propaganda.13  The increasing prominence of

LIFG figures in al‐Qa’ida’s high command may be a function of the group’s

logistics capacity, including its now demonstrated ability to move people

effectively around the Middle East, including to Iraq.

City/Town of Origin

Of 591 records that included the country of origin of the fighters, 440 also

contained information on the home city/town the fighters hailed from. The most

common cities that the fighters called home were Darnah, Libya and Riyadh,

Saudi Arabia, with 52 and 51 fighters respectively. Darnah, with a population

just over 80,000 compared to Riaydh’s 4.3 million, has far and away the largest

per capita number of fighters in the Sinjar records.  The next most common

hometowns‐ in real terms‐ listed in the Sinjar records were Mecca (43), Beghazi

 

12 Abu Yahya al-Libi, Iraq Between Stages, Conspiratorial Intrigue, Al Firdaws Jihadist Forums on March 

22, 2007 

13 Al-Qaeda Messaging Statistics, IntelCenter, September 9, 2007, online at 

http://www.intelcenter.com/QMS-PUB-v3-3.pdf 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

(21), and Casablanca (17).  City/town of origin for Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco,

Algeria, and Syria are broken out in greater detail below.      

Saudi Hometowns

Two hundred and five of Saudi Arabians listed in the Sinjar Records noted their

hometown. Riyadh was the most common city of origin with 25.6% (51).  Mecca

contributed 22.1% (44), Jeddah 7.5% (15), Al‐Jawf 9.0% (18), Medina 6.5% (13),

Al‐Ta’if 5.5% (11), and Buraydah 4.5% (9).  The remaining 72 fighters hailed from

towns scattered across Saudi Arabia.  

Figure 5: Most Common Saudi Hometowns

25.6%

22.1%

9.0%

7.5%

6.5%

5.5%

4.5%

19.1%

Riyadh

Mecca

Al Jawf

Jeddah

Medina

Taif

Buraydah

Other

Based on 204/242 Saudi records with home town information

Saudi Arabia Fighters Home Town

Libyan Hometowns

The vast majority of Libyan fighters that included their hometown in the Sinjar

Records resided in the country’s Northeast, particularly the coastal cities of

Darnah 60.2% (53) and Benghazi 23.9% (21).   

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Figure 6: Most Common Libyan Hometowns

Libyan Fighters Home Town

Based on 88/112 Libyan fighters’ records with hometown information

Darnah

Benghazi

60.2%

23.9%

4.5%

3.4%

5.7%

2.3%

A Other

Misratah

Sirt jdabiyah

Both Darnah and Benghazi have long been associated with Islamic militancy in

Libya, in particular for an uprising by Islamist organizations in the mid‐1990s.  

The Libyan government blamed the uprising on “infiltrators from the Sudan and

Egypt” and one group—the Libyan Fighting Group (jamaʹah al‐libiyah al‐

muqatilah)—claimed to have Afghan veterans in its ranks.14   The Libyan

uprisings became extraordinarily violent.  Qadhafi used helicopter gunships in

Benghazi, cut telephone, electricity, and water supplies to Darnah and famously

claimed that the militants “deserve to die without trial, like dogs.”15

Abu Layth al‐Libi, LIFG’s Emir, reinforced Benghazi and Darnah’s importance to

Libyan jihadis in his announcement that LIFG had joined al‐Qa’ida, saying:

It is with the grace of God that we were hoisting the banner of jihad against this apostate

regime under the leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which sacrificed the

elite of its sons and commanders in combating this regime whose blood was spilled on

the mountains of Darnah, the streets of Benghazi, the outskirts of Tripoli, the desert of

Sabha, and the sands of the beach.16

 

14 Elie Austa, “Fundamentalist Unrest,” Agence France Presse, March 26, 1996. 15 “Libya Said to Seal Off Area Following Unrest,” Agence France Presse, March 25, 1996. 16 As-Sahab video released November 3, 2007, on the Al-Boraq Islamic Network; see OSC 

FEA20071104393586 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Like other governments in the region, Libya appears concerned about the

possibility of jihadi violence within its borders.  In May 2007, the Libyan

government arrested several Libyans on the grounds that they were planning a

car bomb attack similar to an April attack in Algeria.17  And in July 2007, a group

calling itself al‐Qa’ida in Eastern Libya announced a suicide attack in Darnah.18  

Libya’s leader Muammar Qadhafi has taken measures to mitigate the threat from

such groups, and has reportedly released over 80 Muslim Brotherhood activists

in the hope that they will moderate the views of more violent Islamist activists.19

If LIFG is funneling Libyans into Iraq, it may exacerbate rumored tensions

between LIFG elements over whether or not to concentrate on militant activity

within Libya’s borders.20  Such debates are common among national jihadi

movements shifting focus to global issues.  This sort of debate disrupted both

Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian Islamic Group in the 1990s.21  Reports

suggesting that LIFG’s decision to join al‐Qa’ida was controversial may be

exaggerated, but they probably reflect a contentious debate over LIFG’s future.22  

LIFG’s support for al‐Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliate has probably increased its stature in

al‐Qa’ida’s leadership, but complicated its internal dynamics.

Moroccan Hometowns

Twenty‐six of the 36 Moroccan fighters (72.2%) in the Sinjar Records listed their

hometown.  Of those, 65.4% (17) hailed from Casablanca while another 19.2% (5)

were from Tetouan.  The findings are somewhat surprising because terrorism

researchers have focused on Tetouan as a hotbed of recruitment for travel to Iraq.  

Anecdotal reports suggest this focus is appropriate, but the Sinjar Records are a

reminder of the larger picture of radicalization and mobilization in Morocco.   

 

17 Kamil al-Tawil, “The Americans Launch Rocket Attack Against Abu al-Layth al-Libi in Afghanistan; 

Libya: Arrest of Jihadists Amid Fears of Al-Qa’ida Attacks,” Al-Hayah, June 22, 2007. 18 Statement on the Free Libya website posted July 11, 2007, online at www.libya-alhora.com 

19 Gianandrea Gaiani, “The Leader in Tripoli’s Method’s to Isolate the Islamists,” Sole-24 Ore, March 4, 

2006. 

20 Husayn al-Harbi, “Bin Laden and Zawahiri Separated,” Al Ra’y al-Amm, September 6, 2007. 21 For more on the debate within LIFG, see Mahan Abedin’s interview with Noman Benotman, available at: 

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=101 22 Ibid.; see also Sami Yousafzi and Ron Moreau, “Al-Qa’ida’s Family Feud,” Newsweek, July 30, 2007, 

online at http://www.mywire.com/pubs/Newsweek/2007/07/30/4074018 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Figure 7: Most Common Moroccan Hometowns

Teroudant

3.8%

Tetouan

19.2%

Algerian Hometowns

Twenty‐two of 43 Algerians listed in the Sinjar Records noted their hometown.  

Of those, 36.4% (8) were from al‐Wad and 22.7% (5) were from Algiers.

Figure 8: Most Common Algerian

36.4%

22.7%

9.1%

9.1%

22.7% El Oued

Baraki Algiers

Constantine

Other

Based on 22 Algerian records that included hometown information

Algerian Fighters Home Town

65.4%

Casablanca

11.5%

Tangier

Based on 26 Moroccan records that included hometown information

Morrocan Fighters Home Town

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Syrian Hometowns

Thirty‐five of the 49 Syrians in the Sinjar Records listed their hometown.  Syrian

recruitment was widely dispersed except for Dayr al‐Zawr, which accounted for

34.3% (12) of the Syrians listed.  Dayr al‐Zawr is the capital city of a Syrian

regional state by the same name.  The state borders Iraq.   

Figure 9: Most Common Syrian Hometowns

Syrian Fighters Home Town

Based on 49/595 fighters from Syria in the SInjar sample

Other

Dar'a Al Tal

Latakia

Idlib

8.6%

34.3%

Dayr Al-Zawr

11.4%

5.7%

5.7%

Al Hasaka

8.6%

11.4%

Al Dayr

14.3%

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Age

The mean reported birth year of fighters listed in the Sinjar Records was 1982; the

median was 1984.  The date these fighters arrived in Syria on their way to Iraq

ranged from August 18, 2006 to August 22, 2007 which indicates that the average

age was 24‐25 years old and the median 22‐23 years old.

Figure 10: Birth Year of Foreign Fighters

0 20 40 60 80

Number of Records

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1967

1952

Based on 413 records stating year born

Birth Year of Foreign Fighters

 

The oldest fighter in the Sinjar Records was 54 when he crossed into Iraq.  Five

fighters were born in 1990 – at least one of which was still 16 when he entered

Iraq.23  Seven fighters were born in 1989 (16‐17 years old) and fifteen in 1990 –

many of whom had not yet turned 18 by the time they came to Syria.  The

youngest fighter in this group was Abdallah Abid Al Sulaymani from Al Ta’if,

Saudi Arabia, who was born June 14, 1991 and arrived in Syria on September 23,

2006 – just three months after turning 15 years old.24

The fighters’ overall youth suggests that most of these individuals are first‐time

volunteers rather than veterans of previous jihadi struggles.  If there was a major

23 Many records included birth year but not date of birth. 

24 Some records included actual date of birth, others year born, and others no data on age of the fighter. 

These figures are computed based on the estimated age in 2006. If fighters listed their year of birth in the 

Gregorian system, we counted it as January 1 of the record year. Similarly, when fighters listed their birth 

year as a Hijri year, we considered it the first day of the year for conversion purposes. 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

influx of veteran jihadis into Iraq, it may have come earlier in the war.  The

incitement of a new generation of jihadis to join the fight in Iraq, or plan

operations elsewhere, is one of the most worrisome aspects of the ongoing fight

in Iraq.  The United States should not confuse gains against al‐Qa’ida’s Iraqi

franchises as fundamental blows against the organization outside of Iraq.  So

long as al‐Qa’ida is able to attract hundreds of young men to join its ranks, it will

remain a serious threat to global security.  

Occupation

Most fighters in the Sinjar Records did not indicate their profession, but 157 of

the 606 did.  Of those that did, 42.6% (67) were students.  The remainder varied

widely.  Five teachers were recorded, as well as three doctors, and four

engineers.  The remaining responses varied widely, from the useful (military: 5)

to the bizarre (massage therapist: 1).

Figure 11: Occupation of Fighters25

0 20 40 60 80

Number of Records

TEACHER

STUDENT

SKILLED WORKER

SELF EMPLOYED

PROFESSIONAL

POLICE

OTHER

MILITARY

MEDICAL

LABORER

BUSINESS

ADMINISTRATIVE

Based on 156 records stating occupation

Foreign Fighters Occupation

 

25 “Student” includes high school and university, secondary school, and includes religious schools. 

“Teacher” includes high school, university, and religious schools. “Military” includes veterans. 

“Professional” includes businessman, NGO, lawyers, and engineers. “Administrative” includes clerks, 

judges assistants, and doctor’s assistant. “Business” includes business merchant and weapons merchant. 

“Other” includes free jobs, employee, artist, painter, fitness trainer, massage therapist, bombmaker, and 

farmer. “Skilled worker” includes carpenter, electrician, furniture maker, and welder. “Unskilled worker” 

includes guard and driver. “Laborer” includes work, work in a factory. 

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Work

Most of the fighters entering Iraq listed their “work” upon arrival, a category

that primarily distinguishes between fighters and suicide bombers.26  The

category seems to reflect the role fighters hoped to have upon their arrival in

Iraq, but it might indicate an assignment determined by local administrators.  

The translated versions of the Sinjar records convert the Arabic word istishhadi in

a variety of ways: as “martyr,” “martyrdom,” and “suicide bomber.”  The word

itself means “martyrdom seeker.”  We have coded all such individuals “suicide

bombers” in an effort to avoid confusion.  Although al‐Qa’ida’s ideology

embraces the concept of becoming a martyr during the course of traditional

military operations, the purpose of these personnel records was to enable

commanders to efficiently allocate individuals for specific tasks.  In such

circumstances, istishhadi likely refers to individuals intended for suicide attacks.   

Of the 389 fighters that designated their “work” in Iraq, 56.3% (217) were to be

suicide bombers.  Another 41.9% (166) were designated more traditional fighters.  

Several respondents listed more specialized tasks, including media operations

(2), doctor (3), and legal skills (1).  We have chosen to combine the suicide

bomber and martyr data categories.   

Figure 12: Work of All Fighters

   

Foreign Fighter Recruited Roles

Based on 389 fighters' records including information on intended “work”

Other

Fighter

Suicide Bomber

1.8%

41.9%

56.3%

 

26 Types of work are listed in various ways in the original Arabic and in translation. Listings such as 

“combatant,” and “fighters,” were counted as “fighter.” Listings such as “martyr,” “martyrdom,” “suicide,” 

and “suicide mission” are counted as “suicide bomber.” 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Numerous observers have concluded that Saudi Arabians are over‐represented

in the ranks of Iraqi suicide bombers.  One recent study analyzed 94 suicide

bombers in Iraq and determined that 44 were Saudi, 7 Kuwaiti, 7 European, six

Syrian and the remainder scattered across the Mideast and North Africa.27

  

The Sinjar Records support the conclusion that the plurality of suicide bombers

entering Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007 were Saudi.  However, they

challenge the notion that, once in Iraq, Saudi foreign fighters are more likely than

their comrades from other locations to become suicide bombers.  Libyan and

Moroccan fighters that listed their “work” in the Sinjar Records were much more

likely to register “suicide bomber” than fighters from other nations.

Figure 13: Intended Work of Fighters by Nationality

Country Suicide

Bombers

Fighters Other Total

Saudi Arabia 50.3% (76) 48.3% (73) 1.3% (2) 151

Libya 85.2% (52) 13.1% (8) 1.6% (1) 61

Morocco 91.7% (22) 8.3% (2) 0 24

Syria 65.6% (21) 31.2% (10) 3.1% (1) 32

Algeria 13.9%(5) 83.3%(30) 2.8% (1) 36

Yemen 46.1% (18) 53.9% (21) 0 39

Tunisia 41.7% (10) 58.3% (14) 0 24

Of the 244 Saudi fighters in the Sinjar Records, 61.8% (151) listed their “work.”  

Of that 151, 50.3% (76) planned to become suicide bombers.  Among the 238 non‐

Saudis who listed their “work” in the Sinjar Records, 59.2% (141) were denoted

as future suicide bombers.  Libyan and Moroccan jihadists were far more likely,

as a percentage of fighters who arrived in Iraq, to be listed as suicide bombers.  

Of the 112 Libyans in the Records, 54.4% (61) listed their “work.”  Fully 85.2%

(51) of these Libyan fighters listed “suicide bomber” as their work in Iraq.

Route to Iraq

Most of the fighters in the Sinjar Records do not explain the route they took to

Iraq.  Furthermore, the fighters that did enter information about their route were

very inconsistent in their methodology.  Some fighters included their home

country as a stop, others did not.  Some included “Iraq” as a stop on their way to

 

27 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data 

and Documentary Evidence,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:6 (2006) 616-19 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Iraq.  Some fighters listed Syria as a stop on their route to Iraq, while others

seemed to think it was assumed and did not mention Syria despite providing the

name of their coordinator in Syria.28  Meanwhile, it is not clear what fighters

considered a “stop.”  For some, that may have simply been a country transited

on the way to Iraq; for others, it may have required a more extensive layover.

Despite the data problem in assessing the route fighters took to Iraq, it is clear

that routes differed dramatically from country to country.  Of the 63 records of

Saudis that described their route to Iraq, 47.6% listed a direct route from Saudi

into Syria, while another 36.5% (23) noted that they traveled first to Jordan, then

to Syria.  Libyan fighters seemed to follow an established path to Syria.  Of the 52

Libyan fighters that listed their route to Iraq, 50 traveled first to Egypt, while 2

flew directly to Syria.  From Egypt, 84.2% (43) flew directly to Syria while 13.4%

(7) went to Jordan and then entered Syria.  The Sinjar Records also hint at an

established pathway from Morocco through Turkey into Syria.  Of the 12

Moroccan fighters that described their route to Syria, ten flew directly to Turkey

while the other two crossed first into Spain before traveling to Turkey.

Figure 14: Route to Iraq29

0 10 20 30 40

YEMEN-SYRIA

YEMEN-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

YEMEN-MALAYSIA-SYRIA

YEMEN-EGYPT-SYRIA

YEMEN-EGYPT-JORDAN-SYRIA

TUNISIA-TURKEY-SYRIA

TUNISIA-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

TUNISIA-GERMANY-TURKEY-SYRIA

SYRIA-LEBANON-SYRIA

SYRIA

SWEDEN-EGYPT-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-JORDAN-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-DUBAI-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-BAHRAIN-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-BAHRAIN-EGYPT-SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA-ALGERIA-JORDAN-SYRIA

MOROCCO-TURKEY-SYRIA

MOROCCO-SYRIA

MOROCCO-SPAIN-TURKEY-SYRIA

LIBYA-SYRIA

LIBYA-EGYPT-SYRIA

LIBYA-EGYPT-JORDAN-SYRIA

KUWAIT-SAUDI ARABIA-JORDAN-SYRIA

JORDAN-SYRIA

EGYPT-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

EGYPT-IRELAND-FRANCE-SYRIA

ALGERIA-TUNISIA-LIBYA-SYRIA

ALGERIA-SYRIA

ALGERIA-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA

Route Taken by Fighters from Country of Origin to Iraq via Syria

 

50

28 An example of this is Bader Shourie, record number 90. NMEC‐2007‐657770.

29 Figure 14, noting the routes fighters took to Iraq lists the country of origin, stopover nations, and Syria. 

The “Syria” category includes mostly Syrian fighters, but includes several others that only listed Syria 

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The Sinjar Records do not offer much information about the fighters’ travel once

in Syria.  One clue may be the disproportionate number of Syrian fighters that

listed Dayr al‐Zawr (34.3%) as their hometown.  There is anecdotal evidence that

Dayr al‐Zawr was an important transit point for jihadis hoping to infiltrate Iraq,

at least until 2006.  A December 2005 report in Al‐Hayah tracked a group of

Algerian and Saudi fighters trying to cross from Dayr al‐Zawr, through the

border town of Albu Kamal, and then into Iraq.30  Likewise, a young Saudi that

was captured in Iraq recounted how he arrived there after using the same

pathway from Dayr al‐Zawr, via minibus to Albu Kamal and by foot across the

border to al‐Qa’im.31  Abu Umar, a Palestinian fighter who crossed into Iraq to

train al‐Qa’ida troops also has described transiting Dayr al‐Zawr on his way to

al‐Qa’im in Iraq.32  Al‐Muhajir al‐Islami, a frequent poster on Syrian dissident

web forums explained that the Dayr al‐Zawr section of the border was

particularly easy to cross because of the links between tribes on either side of the

border.33

The Sinjar Records were captured far north of Albu Kamal in Syria and al‐Qa’im

in Iraq, which suggests that the smuggling route for fighters into Iraq has shifted

north.  Nonetheless, the city of Dayr al‐Zawr may still be an important logistics

hub for fighters hoping to enter Iraq.  Dayr al‐Zawr sits on the road north from

Damascus and East from Aleppo, which makes it a logical location for a logistics

base, whether heading further east to the Iraqi city of al‐Qa’im or north to Sinjar.

 

30 Muhammad Muqaddam, “Facts Disclosed by Fundamentalists,” Al-Hayah, December 8, 2005. 31 Malfi al-Harbi, “Al-Shayi, a Victim that was Lured to Iraq,” Al-Riyad, November 21, 2007. 32 Interview with Abu Umar, Al Arabiyah 1905, December 7, 2007 33 http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0805/roadtoiraq0805.pdf Global Terror Alert does not list the 

original website, but it was likely the Syrian Islamic Forum that was hosted at www.nnuu.org during 2005. 

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Entry Date

Two hundred and three of the 606 Sinjar Records provide the date the fighter

entered Iraq.  The most common month to arrive was November 2006, when 38

fighters were recorded.  The second busiest month was July 2007, with 32

recorded arrivals.  Interestingly, in December 2006 only one fighter was recorded

and it was someone named Hafid, who started his journey in Belgium.   

Figure 15: Date Entered Iraq by Month

0 10 20 30 40

Number of Records of 202 Containing Arrival Date

Aug-06Sep-06Oct-06Nov-06Dec-06Jan-07Feb-07Mar-07 Apr-07May-07Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07

Number of Foreign Fighters Arriving by Month

The Sinjar Records do not list any fighters entering Iraq in March or April 2007.  

This is a fascinating, but suspicious, statistic.  Only 3 fighters are recorded

entering in February 2007, which bolsters the notion that the ISI’s logistic

network was disrupted for some reason in early 2007, but it is also possible that

the records for that time period were lost.  

It is possible to estimate the entry date for fighters in the Sinjar Records by

tracking the watermarks and letterhead on the documents themselves.  The

Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was established in October 2006, which indicates that

fighters recorded on ISI stationary entered Iraq after that date.  Apparently, the

al‐Qa’ida’s affiliates did not exchange their stationary immediately after the ISI

was established.  Some of the fighters recorded on Mujahidin Shura Council

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

(MSC) stationary list fighters that arrived in November 2006—after the ISI had

replaced the MSC.  The first fighter listed on ISI stationary is Hafid, the Belgian

who arrived in December 2006.  Of the 606 total records, 56.1% (340) are clearly

listed as ISI recruits, while 16.8% (102) are listed on MSC stationary.

Traveling Partners

The Sinjar Records do not provide much information about how individual

fighters were recruited (or self‐selected) for the fight in Iraq.  There is interesting

evidence, however, that many of the fighters signed up in groups to travel to

Iraq, rather than on their own.  Of the 202 fighters that recorded their date of

arrival in Iraq, 46.5% (94) of them arrived on the same day as another individual

from their hometown.  Such evidence strongly suggests that the individuals

traveled together as a group and, in some cases, may have been recruited

simultaneously.  

One of the larger groups began their journey in Darnah, Libya and arrived in

Iraq on May 9, 2007.  Abu‐‘Abbas, Abu al‐Walid, Abu Bakar, Asad Allah, and

Abu‐‘Abd al‐Kabir all were istishhadi—martyrdom seekers.  The five men did not

sign up through the same local coordinator in Darnah.  Abu‐‘Abbas, who listed

his occupation as “Employee” signed up through a coordinator named Qamar,

Abu al‐Walid and Abu Bakar—a student and a traffic cop—received support

from someone named Saraj.  Asad Allah and Abu‐‘Abd al‐Kabir received help

from a coordinator named Bashar.  Asad Allah was a teacher.  None of the men

knew their coordinator before they decided to go to Iraq.   

It is not clear if the five men traveled together from Darnah or in separate

groups, but all five went to Egypt and then to Syria.  Once in Syria, the five

probably were together as a group.  All five listed a man named Abu ‘Abbas

(who they unanimously liked) as their Syrian coordinator.  When the five men

crossed into Iraq they each contributed several thousand Syrian Lira to the ISI,

but did not report any form of ID.   

Al‐Qa’ida’s Syria Problem

The authors of this report believe that all of the fighters in the Sinjar Records

entered Iraq from Syria.  Most of the Sinjar Records offer evidence of transit

through Syria, either because the country is listed as the final stop on the way to

Iraq or because the fighter named their “Syrian Coordinator.”  Furthermore,

Sinjar sits in Northwest Iraq approximately 10 miles from the Syrian border.  In a

location so close to Syria and so far from other borders, it would be surprising to

find records of individuals that did not cross into Iraq from Syria.   

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It is not clear, however, how complicit Syria’s government is in the movement of

personnel through its territory.  The Syrian government is led by a Ba’athist

regime dominated by members of the Alawite sect, which is a form of Shi’a Islam

that embraces elements similar to Christian theology.   

The history of the Syrian governmentʹs relationship with alien Islamist militants

is long and complicated, ranging from open support to brutal suppression of

jihadi activists operating within its borders.  Syrian policy toward such fighters is

likely driven by its perception of national interest, rather than ideological

kinship.  In the late 1970s, for instance, Syria sent thousands of troops into south

Lebanon in support of the PLOʹs guerrilla efforts there and provided logistical

support to foreign volunteers who wanted to join the ʺjihadʺ on that front, yet at

the same time it carried out an extremely violent campaign against the Syrian

Muslim Brotherhood’s uprising inside Syria, an insurgency that also included

significant numbers of foreign fighters.34   

Syria has an interest in keeping the U.S.‐backed regime in Iraq off balance, but it

must also fear a backlash from jihadi groups, many of which despise Alawite

“apostasy” as much or more than the United States.  Indeed, some of Abu

Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi’s most important early recruits were veterans of the Muslim

Brotherhood’s uprising against the Syrian government in the 1980s.35  For Syria,

supporting jihadi groups is at best a double‐edged sword.   

Anecdotal data from Syrian history hints at Syria’s strategy today.  Former jihadi

militant Abuʹl‐Walid Mustafa Hamid has described how he and a group of jihadi

volunteers traveled from Abu Dhabi to south Lebanon via Syria in the early

1980s; at the Lebanese‐Syrian border he and his entire group were photographed

and had their passports taken to be copied by the Syrian intelligence service.36  

Though this action was ostensibly part of the support that the Syrians were

providing to these volunteers as they made their way to Lebanon, Abuʹl‐Walid

learned a number of years later that he and several other of the men processed by

 

34 For an insider's account of the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency against the Syrian government from the 

Harmony Database, see Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, AFGP-2002-600080 and a case study developed using this 

and other Harmony documents at Chapter 3 of “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s 

Organizational Vulnerabilities” available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq_syria.asp 

35 Fu’ad Husayn, “Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qa’ida,” serialized in Al Quds al-Arabi, May 

14, 2005, p. 17. 

36 AFGP-2002-600087, p. 17; excerpts of this source were also published by Muhammad al-Shafi'i in alSharq al-Awsat on October 26, 2006, and subsequently translated by FBIS, GMP20061026866001. 

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Syrian intelligence at that time were subsequently placed on Syriaʹs terrorist

watch list.37

Syria would much rather be a transit point for jihadis than their final destination.  

Syria’s leaders may determine that an influx of fighters into Iraq supports its

national interests, but Syria is certainly tracking such fighters and likely hopes

that they do not survive to leave Iraq.

The Sinjar Records do offer clues about how al‐Qa’ida smuggles its volunteers

through Syria. Many of the fighters in the Sinjar Records listed a Syrian

coordinator or coordinators that presumably directed their travel upon arrival in

Syria.  Of the 606 total records, 41.9% (254) listed at least one contact in Syria.  

Many listed multiple contacts.  Given the multiple different translations and

transliterations of the Syrian coordinators as well as common names likely held

by more than one coordinator, it is difficult to accurately map the network of

Syrian coordinators and who they helped transit into Iraq after arrival in Syria.

Based on this initial assessment of the data, several named individuals are listed

more frequently as the fighters’ coordinator in Syria.      

The fighters listed in the Sinjar Records were asked to physically describe their

Syrian coordinator, divulge how much money the Syrian coordinator demanded,

and rate the fighter’s overall experience with the coordinator.  These questions

may indicate that al‐Qa’ida’s administrators in Iraq mistrust their Syrian

coordinators.  Such suspicion is common in al‐Qa’ida.  Numerous Harmony

documents reveal al‐Qa’ida’s rigorous efforts to ensure its agents are using funds

efficiently38.   

Al‐Qa’ida’s challenge in coordinating transportation in Syria likely runs much

deeper than minor graft.  Media reports suggests that many of the human

smugglers al‐Qa’ida uses in Syria are freelancers working for money rather than

al‐Qa’ida’s ideological allies, which would explain why the traveling fighters’

handlers in Iraq are so concerned about their fees.39 Some of these networks are

 

37 AFGP-2002-600087, p. 17. 

38 The tradeoff’s Al-Qa’ida must make when balancing security and financial efficiency are described by 

CTC Research Fellow Jacob Shapiro in Section I of “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s 

Organizational Vulnerabilities. See http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp for the CTC’s 

previous analyses of Harmony documents and a compilation of all documents released to the CTC by 

USSOCOM thus far. 

39 Hala Jaber and Ali Rafat “Suicide Bombers Head to Iraq from Damascus” The Sunday Times October 7, 

2007 

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

likely criminal, but others may be linked to Iraqi insurgent factions that were

operated from Syria after the U.S. invasion.40   

A sketch of Syrian Coordinator networks based on the limited data in this one

year sample is provided at Figure 16. The core network of Syrian handlers

appears to still be active with a certain Abu Umar and Abu Abbas playing key

roles in coordinating foreign fighter transit through Syria.  The activities of the

auxiliary handlers that can be measured using this data, however, appear to be

largely inactive now.

Figure 16: Active Syrian Coordinator Networks Over Time41

If al‐Qa’ida’s Syrian logistics networks are truly run by mercenaries, there are

many policy options available to co‐opt or manipulate them.  It is almost

inconceivable that Syrian intelligence has not already tried to penetrate these

networks, but that does not preclude American agencies from attempting the

same.  The United States’ ability to destroy networks inside of Syria is limited,

 

40 Mu’idd Fayyad, “Interview With Major General Muhammad Abdallah al-Shahwani, director of Iraq's 

National Intelligence Service,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 5, 2005. 41 Network analysis software was used to generate this initial sketch of the Syrian coordinator networks. 

The CTC’s follow on report due out early next year will incorporate greater amounts of data and more 

sophisticated use of this powerful analytical tool. 

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but it may be possible to bribe or otherwise coerce such coordinators to disrupt

their operations or reveal information about al‐Qa’ida’s organization in Iraq.

One of the persistent mysteries of the Iraq war is exactly how Islamist groups like

al‐Qa’ida were able to cooperate with Iraq’s secular Sunni insurgents early in the

insurgency period.  Since early 2007, relations between al‐Qa’ida’s ISI and its

secular counterparts have deteriorated dramatically, to the point where

shootouts and assassinations between groups are now commonplace.  It is

conceivable that deteriorating relations between the ISI and secular insurgents

have weakened the ISI’s logistical chain, particularly in Syria, where Iraqi

Ba’athists have strong ties.   

Conclusions

The Sinjar Records offer unrivaled insight into foreign fighters entering Iraq

between August 2006 and August 2007.  The data reveals several critical

findings:

• Saudis made up the largest contingent of foreign fighters entering Iraq.  

Libyans were second (first if measured in percapita terms) and Syrians a

distant third.  In terms of sheer numbers, Saudis constituted the largest

group of foreign fighters and contributed the most overall suicide

bombers, but the percentage of Saudi fighters listed as suicide bombers

was actually lower than non‐Saudis.

• Recent political developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the

prevalence of Libyan fighters in Iraq, and evidence of a well‐established

smuggling route for Libyans through Egypt, suggests that Libyan factions

(primarily the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group) are increasingly important

in al‐Qa’ida.  The Sinjar Records offer some evidence that Libyans began

surging into Iraq in larger numbers beginning in May 2007.  Most of the

Libyan recruits came from cities in North‐East Libya, an area long known

for jihadi‐linked militancy.  Libyan fighters were much more likely than

other nationalities to be listed as suicide bombers (85% for Libyans, 56%

for all others).   

• The Sinjar Records reinforce anecdotal accounts suggesting that al‐

Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates rely on smugglers and criminals—rather than their

own personnel—to funnel recruits into Iraq.

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

• Many of the foreign fighters entering Iraq arrived with a group from their

hometown, suggesting that al‐Qa’ida’s recruiters try to attract groups of

friends simultaneously.  

• The majority of fighters that listed their occupation before traveling to Iraq

were students.  Universities have become a critical recruiting field for al‐

Qa’ida.

The Sinjar Records reveal several weaknesses that the United States and other

governments can exploit:

• Al‐Qa’ida’s reliance on criminal and smuggling networks exposes it to the

greed of mercenaries.  In many cases, the United States should target work

to destroy these networks, but the U.S. must remain flexible enough to

recognize opportunities to co‐opt, rather than simply annihilate, such

systems.  The U.S. may be able to use financial incentives and creative

security guarantees to secure cooperation from some smugglers.42

• The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s unification with al‐Qa’ida and its

apparent decision to prioritize providing logistical support to the Islamic

State of Iraq is likely controversial within the organization.  It is likely that

some LIFG factions still want to prioritize the fight against the Libyan

regime, rather than the fight in Iraq. It may be possible to exacerbate

schisms within LIFG, and between LIFG’s leaders and al‐Qa’ida’s

traditional Egyptian and Saudi power‐base.

• The Islamic State of Iraq has failed politically because it has been unable to

balance the practical demands of its local Iraqi constituency and the

religious demands of its foreign supporters.  The ISI’s clumsy effort to

balance these demands has alienated it from other Sunni insurgents.  The

U.S. should not be content to exploit this failure only in Iraq.  The ISI’s

political failure exemplifies the fundamental bankruptcy of al‐Qa’ida’s

ideology.  The U.S., its allies, and moderates of all kinds, can discretely

use the ISI’s political failure to illustrate that larger ideological point.

 

42 See “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities” available at 

http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp 

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• The Syrian and Libyan governments share the United States’ concerns

about violent salafi‐jihadi ideology and the violence perpetrated by its

adherents.  These governments, like others in the Middle East, fear

violence inside their borders and would much rather radical elements go

to Iraq rather than cause unrest at home.  U.S. and Coalition efforts to

stem the flow of fighters into Iraq will be enhanced if they address the

entire logistical chain that supports the movement of these individuals—

beginning in their home countries – rather than just their Syrian entry

points.   

• The U.S. may be able to increase cooperation from governments to stem

the flow of fighters into Iraq by addressing their concerns about domestic

jihadi violence.  

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Appendix 1

The first study of foreign fighters in Iraq was authored in March 2005 by Israeli

researcher Reuven Paz.  Paz studied 154 fighters identified on jihadi web forums

as having been “martyred” in Iraq and used their memorial biographies to

identify their nationality.43  Paz’s data break down like this:   

Saudi Arabia: 94 (61%) Algeria: 2  

Syria: 16 (10.4%)   Morocco: 2 (one was living in Spain)  

Iraq: 13 (8.4%)   Yemen: 2  

Kuwait: 11 (7.1%)   Tunisia: 2  

Jordan: 4 Palestine: 1  

Lebanon: 3 (one was living in Denmark)   Dubai: 1  

Libya: 2   Sudan: 1 (living in Saudi Arabia)

In June 2005, an NBC News report cited a U.S. Army official who listed the top

ten countries of origin for foreign fighters in Iraq: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon,

the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.44  The

official would not provide the number of fighters from each country.

Several months after the Paz report was released, it was criticized by Anthony

Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid of the Center for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS) who argued that Paz overstated the Saudi presence in Iraq.45  

Cordesman and Obaid, whose data were provided by Saudi intelligence, claimed

that there were some 3000 foreign fighters operating in Iraq, but that only 12

percent were Saudi.  The Cordesman/Obaid estimates look like this:

Algeria: 600 (20%)

Syria: 550 (18%)

Yemen: 500 (17%)

Sudan: 450 (15%)

Egypt: 400 (13%)

Saudi Arabia: 350 (12%)

Other Countries: 150 (5%)

 

43 Reuven Paz, Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq: an Analysis, PRISM Series on Global Jihad, No. 1/3, March 

2005, online at http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf 44 Lisa Meyers, “Who are the Foreign Fighters?” MSNBC June 20, 2005, online at 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/ 45 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom’s Response,” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2005. 

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdf 

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31

 

In December 2005, another researcher used information gleaned from online

sources to assess the nationality of al‐Qa’ida‐linked fighters in Iraq.  Citing a list

of 429 slain Salafi‐jihadis posted on a jihadi‐linked web forum, Murad al‐

Shishani concluded that 53 percent were Saudi, 13 percent Syrian, 8 percent Iraqi,

5.8 percent Jordanian, 4 percent Kuwaiti and 3.8 percent Libyan.46

Citing statistics released by Multi‐National Forces—Iraq in late 2005, Alan

Krueger concluded that most fighters were Syrian, with Sudanese, Saudis, and

Egyptians also contributing a large number of fighters.  Of the 311 fighters whose

nationalities were released, only seven were Libyan.47

Two years later, the Los Angeles Times cited “official U.S. military figures”

stating that 45 percent of all foreign fighters in Iraq come from Saudi Arabia.48  

According to the article, 15 percent arrived from Lebanon and Syria and another

10 percent were from North Africa.  The Los Angeles Times article also cited

statistics indicating that 50 percent of all Saudis arrived in Iraq to become suicide

bombers.

46 Murad al-Shishani, “The Salafi-Jihadist Movement in Iraq: Recruitment Methods and Arab Volunteers,” 

Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 3:23, December 2, 2005. 

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369842 47 Krueger, Alan What Makes a Terrorist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) pp. 83 48 Ned Parker, “Saudis Role in Iraq Insurgency Outlined,” The Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2007, online at 

http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html