ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Jacquelyn Thompson          

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

INDIANAPOLIS NEWSPAPERS, INC.

Jan M. Carroll     

Mark J. Dinsmore           

Indianapolis, Indiana

A.H.M. GRAVES COMPANY, INC.

Karen I. Brogan      

Indianapolis, Indiana  

JACQUELINE D. BAKER

Brian J. Zaiger       

Noblesville, Indiana

	IN THE

	SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

STATE OF INDIANA,  	 		)

INDIANA CIVIL RIGHTS       		)

COMMISSION, in its own right and on	)

behalf of JOSEPH C. BELZER and	)

THERESA WRIGHT,			)

   						)

	Appellants (Plaintiffs Below),	)	

						)	Indiana Supreme Court      

	      v.					)	Cause No. 49S04-9907-CV-371

 						)	 

INDIANAPOLIS NEWSPAPERS, INC.,	)	

UNKNOWN DIRECTORS OF		)	Indiana Court of Appeals  

INDIANAPOLIS NEWSPAPERS, INC.,	)	Cause No. 49A04-9703-CV-95

A.H.M. GRAVES COMPANY, INC.,	)

UNKNOWN DIRECTORS OF A.H.M.	)

GRAVES COMPANY, INC., SHERRY	)

HOYT, SHIRLEY MORPHEY and	)

JACQUELINE D. BAKER,		)

						)

	Appellees (Defendants Below).	)

	APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

	The Honorable Anthony J. Metz, III, Judge 

	Cause No. 49D01-9607-CP-0913

	ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

September 30, 1999

BOEHM, Justice.

	The Indiana Civil Rights Law provides that the Commission “shall” file its petition

in civil court within thirty days after a proper election by a party to have the claim decided

in a civil action.  We hold that a petition filed by the Commission after that time must be

dismissed.

Factual and Procedural Background 

	Jacqueline Baker owned a rental house in the Broad Ripple area of Indianapolis.  She hired A.H.M. Graves Company to manage the rental property and instructed Graves to rent

to tenants with no children.  Graves prepared an advertisement which ran in the Indianapolis

Star from January to March of 1994 and specified the desire for no children.

	On January 31, 1994, Joseph Belzer responded to the ad and was told that the house

would not be rented to anyone with children.  At that time Belzer was living with Theresa

Wright and her eleven-year-old daughter, Krystal.  A week later, Belzer filed an

administrative complaint alleging discrimination based on familial status with the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  In due course this complaint, which named

Baker, Graves, and Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. (“INI”), owner of the Indianapolis Star,1 was referred to the Indiana Civil Rights Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(1). 

	On April 12, 1996, the Commission issued its notice of findings stating that there was

evidence to support the charge of discrimination based on familial status in violation of

Indiana Code § 22-9.5-5-1.  On April 19, Baker filed a notice of election to have the issue

decided in a civil action pursuant to Indiana Code § 22-9.5-6-12.2  Seventy days later, on June 28, 1996, the Commission filed a complaint in Marion County Superior Court on behalf

of Belzer, Wright, and itself against Baker, Graves, and INI, adding as defendants several

individuals associated with both Graves and INI.3

	The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The Court of Appeals

affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that (1) the statutory time limit for filing in a

court was not mandatory, (2) Belzer had standing to sue, and (3) the Commission had failed to amend its complaint correctly, requiring the dismissal of Wright as a claimant.  See Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 702 N.E.2d 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  

	INI sought transfer, challenging two aspects of the Court of Appeal’s decision.  First,

INI contends that Belzer has no standing to contest the discriminatory practices in this case

and therefore the Commission has no claim on his behalf.  Second, INI contends that the

complaint must be dismissed because of the Commission’s failure to comply with the thirty

day filing provision contained in Indiana Code § 22-9.5-6-13.  Although we agree with the

Commission that Belzer has standing under the Civil Rights Law, we affirm the trial court’s

dismissal of the complaint for failure to meet the thirty day filing requirement.

Standard of Review

	The trial court granted INI’s motion to dismiss.  In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the

appellate court looks at the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, with every

inference drawn in their favor, to determine if there is any set of allegations under which the

plaintiffs could be granted relief.  See Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ind. 1998); Cram v. Howell, 680 N.E.2d 1096, 1096 (Ind. 1997).

I. Belzer’s Standing to Bring Suit

	INI first claims that Belzer does not have standing because Belzer was merely living

with Wright and her minor child and that relationship does not constitute familial status

under Indiana Code § 22-9.5-1-2.  The Court of Appeals held that Belzer had standing

because he was an “aggrieved person” as defined by the Indiana Civil Rights Law.  See Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 702 N.E.2d at 379-80.  Standing is defined as having “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that

controversy.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1405 (6th ed. 1990).  In order to have standing, “the party challenging the law must show adequate injury or the immediate danger of

sustaining some injury.”  Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995).  

	Discrimination due to familial status is defined in Indiana Code § 22-9.5-1-2.  Under

that section, a person is a “subject” of a discriminatory act due to familial status if that

person is discriminated against because the person is pregnant, or living with a person under

eighteen whom the person is a parent of, has custody of, or permission to reside with, or if

the person is trying to obtain custody of someone under eighteen.  Belzer does not meet any

of these criteria, but he contends that he was nonetheless aggrieved by the discrimination

against Wright because she lived with a person under eighteen.  

	Indiana Code § 22-9.5-6-1(c) states that any “aggrieved person” may file a complaint

with the Commission for the alleged discrimination.  An “aggrieved person” is defined in

Indiana Code § 22-9.5-2-2 as “any person who:  (1) claims to have been injured by a

discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that the person will be injured by a

discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.”  Indiana Code § 22-9.5-6-12 allows

a “complainant, a respondent, or an aggrieved person” to elect to proceed in civil court.  A

complainant is defined in Indiana Code § 22-9-1-3(n)(1) as “any individual . . . personally

aggrieved by a discriminatory practice . . . .”  

	The issue of standing as an aggrieved person was addressed earlier this year in Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. Alder.  See 714 N.E.2d 632 (Ind. 1999).  In that case, Larry Stovall, an African-American, occasionally stayed at the mobile home of Jodie Jackson. 

Jackson’s landlord attempted to evict her, and eventually caused her to move, because the

landlord did not want Stovall or people “of that kind” in his mobile home park.  The landlord

argued that Stovall had no standing to bring suit himself because he was not denied housing. 

This Court held that Stovall had standing as an individual who was “personally aggrieved”

under the Civil Rights Law even though he was not denied housing.  Id. at 636-37. 

	The Civil Rights Law is to be construed broadly to serve its purpose and explicitly

provides for relief to anyone who is “personally aggrieved” by a discriminatory practice,

whether or not that person is the direct object of the practice.  Just as Stovall was aggrieved

by the discriminatory practices in Alder, Belzer was “personally aggrieved” when his girlfriend and her child were denied housing based on their familial status.  Although Belzer

is not a “subject” of familial discrimination as defined by the Indiana Code, he has standing

as an aggrieved person under the Indiana Civil Rights Law.

II. Statute of Limitations

	INI also contends that the Commission’s complaint was barred by Indiana Code §  22- 9.5-6-13.  After a complaint is filed with the Commission, it must determine whether there

is reasonable cause to support the charge of discrimination.  See Ind. Code § 22-9.5-6-8 (1998).  If the Commission makes that finding, any complainant, respondent or aggrieved

party may elect to have the claim determined in a civil action pursuant to Indiana Code § 22-

9.5-6-12 by filing an election within twenty days of receipt of service of the finding on the

electing person.  If the election is made, Indiana Code § 22-9.5-6-13 states “the commission shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the election is made, file a civil action on behalf of

the aggrieved person seeking relief under this section in a circuit or superior court . . . .”

	A.  Thirty Day Time Limitation

	It is undisputed that the Commission filed the complaint on June 28, 1996, seventy

days after Baker made the election to resolve the claim in a civil action.  The Court of

Appeals determined that the thirty day language was directory, not mandatory, and allowed

the complaint to stand because it did not prejudice any substantial rights of the parties.  See Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 702 N.E.2d at 378-79.  We conclude that this result is inconsistent with the language and purpose of the Civil Rights Law and that the thirty day

requirement is mandatory.

	“The first and often the only step in resolving an issue of statutory interpretation is

the language of the statute.”  Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 972 (Ind. 1998).  “‘[N]othing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the

legislature’ as ascertained from ‘the plain and obvious meaning’ of the words of the statute.” 

Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Indiana Util. Regulatory Comm’n, 715 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ind. 1994)).  Indiana Code § 22-9.5-6-13 states “the commission shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the election is made, file a civil action.” (emphasis added).  This language

certainly suggests that the thirty day requirement is mandatory, not directory.  “Shall” is

defined as “will have to . . . used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is

mandatory.”  Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1075-76 (10th ed. 1993); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (“As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory.”).

	The construction of the time limit as mandatory is also supported by Indiana case law

that presumptively treats “shall” as mandatory.  “When the word ‘shall’ appears in a statute,

it is construed as mandatory rather than directory unless it appears clear from the context or

the purpose of the statute that the legislature intended a different meaning.”  United Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 549 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind. 1990); see also Clark v. Kenley, 646 N.E.2d 76, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Sherrard v. Board of Comm’rs of County of Fulton, 151 Ind. App. 127, 130, 278 N.E.2d 307, 309 (1972).  Finally, this interpretation is further supported by United Rural Electric, 549 N.E.2d at 1022, which found statutory time deadlines presumptively mandatory.

	The Court of Appeals held that the time limitation was directory using the factors

identified in May v. Department of Natural Resources, 565 N.E.2d 367, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), i.e., the statute failed to specify adverse consequences for noncompliance, the time

limit provision did not go to the essence of the statutory purpose, and a mandatory

construction would thwart the legislative purpose of the statute.  May dealt with a statutory provision that each state agency employing registered engineers “shall” adopt regulations

authorized by another section of the statute.  Id.  That section in turn provided that each of these agencies was authorized to adopt “such rules . . . as it may deem proper” to deal with

engineer employment issues.  Id.  May held that a demoted engineer’s challenge to his demotion on the ground that the Department of Natural Resources failed to have any such regulation “rests on quicksand.”  Id.  So it did, given that the range of regulation was clearly left to the agency’s discretion by the “as it may deem proper” language.  But INI’s claim here

rests on firmer ground.  

	The structure of the Civil Rights Law fortifies the conclusion that “shall” means what

it says.  Statutes of limitations and their value are widely understood.  If this language does

not require the Commission to file within thirty days or forever hold its peace, it has no

function whatsoever.  Equally important, there is no other provision creating a final time for

bringing an action.  If the thirty day provision is not mandatory, all parties would be left

dangling in the uncertainty of laches, waiver, tolling, and related doctrines.  This does not

further the enforcement purposes of the Civil Rights Law.  To the contrary, the enforcement

goal is furthered by giving the affected private parties a bright line date by which they must

take up the cudgel if the Commission fails to act.  Moreover if thirty days is merely

directory, an aggrieved party may assume, as did Belzer here, that the Commission is

protecting the party’s interests, fail to file an individual action, and run afoul of the one year

statute of limitations.  See   Ind. Code § 22-9.5-7-1 (1998). .  Finally, this requirement obviously reflects a legislative policy to move these matters along.  An open-ended time

frame for filing by the Commission would frustrate that goal.

	B.  Equitable Defenses to the Time Limitation

	The Commission argues that even if the thirty day time limit is mandatory the

requirement of prompt filing is subject to equitable doctrines, including waiver, estoppel, and

equitable tolling.  Specifically, the Commission claims that the period for filing did not expire because it was subject to equitable tolling until May 22, 1996, when conciliation

conferences were scheduled to be conducted.  When statutes of limitations are running, a

party may either file its claim or obtain a waiver of the limitation period to keep negotiations

going.  Doing nothing does not do the job.  We are directed to no facts supporting fraudulent

concealment or other traditional means of tolling the statute. .   In the absence of any such

showing, filing within the thirty day period is required.

Conclusion

	Because the Commission failed to file its complaint within the thirty day time limit

imposed by Indiana Code § 22-9.5-6-13, the dismissal by the trial court is affirmed.  Due to

the resolution of the this issue, the other issues addressed by the Court of Appeals are now moot

and not addressed in this opinion. 

	SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and SELBY, JJ., concur.