UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

KERN, MORAN, and ALDYKIEWICZ 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private First Class SHELTON A. HUNT 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20111081 

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division (Rear) (Provisional) (convened) 

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division (action) 

Karin G. Tackaberry, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Cucuzzella, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Major Jaired D. Stallard, JA; Captain Brian J. Sullivan, JA (on brief) 

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA; 

Major Robert A. Rodrigues, JA; Captain Daniel H. Karna, JA (on brief) 

25 June 2014 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

--------------------------------- 

Per Curiam: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of violating a lawful general regulation, in violation of Article 

92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. 

Contrary to appellant’s pleas, the military judge convicted appellant of attempted 

larceny, attempted robbery, four specifications of conspiracy, willfully disobeying a 

lawful command of his superior commissioned officer, violating a lawful general 

regulation, assault in which grievous bodily harm is intentionally inflicted, two 

specifications of assault with a dangerous weapon, housebreaking, and drunk and 

disorderly conduct, in violation of Articles 80, 81, 90, 92, 128, 130, and 134, UCMJ. 

The military judge sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 

twelve years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 
HUNT–ARMY 20111081 

2 

The convening authority approved 9 years and 11 months confinement and the 

remainder of the sentence.1

We now review appellant’s case under Article 66, UCMJ. Two of appellant’s 

three assignments of error warrant discussion and relief. First, appellant argues that 

his conviction for attempted larceny (Specification 2 of Additional Charge I) is 

multiplicious with his conviction for attempted robbery (Specification 1 of 

Additional Charge I). Second, appellant argues that his convictions for conspiracy 

to commit larceny, conspiracy to commit robbery, and conspiracy to commit 

housebreaking (Specification 1, 2, and 3 of Additional Charge II, respectively) 

constitute a single conspiracy. The government concedes both claims. The 

remaining assignment of error and the matters raised personally by appellant 

pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982) do not warrant 

relief. 

BACKGROUND 

 On or about 30 January 2011, appellant and his co-conspirators broke into a 

house that they suspected contained illegal drugs and money. They dressed in dark 

clothing and one conspirator carried a pistol. Appellant personally kicked down the 

house’s back door. Before breaking into the house, appellant and his coconspirators smoked a “blunt” of spice. All of the co-conspirators knew that they 

were armed, and the purpose of the housebreaking was to steal drugs and money, by 

force if necessary. Ultimately, appellant and his co-conspirators did not find any 

drugs or money in the house. 

 Later that night, appellant and others became aware of a possible fight at a 

nightclub called the Speak Easy. Appellant learned that another person, Specialist 

(SPC) H, had been “disrespecting” Private First Class (PFC) Jackson, whom 

appellant knew. Private First Class Jackson wanted a gun brought to him. Appellant 

brought the pistol used in the housebreaking to the Speak Easy and gave it to PFC 

Jackson, who was visibly angry. Private First Class Jackson said that he would 

handle the situation. Eventually appellant, PFC Jackson, and others followed SPC H 

and his vehicle onto the Fort Bragg installation. Private First Class Jackson fired 

the pistol thirteen times into SPC H’s vehicle. A passenger in that vehicle, SPC G, 

was shot in the arm. 

 

1

 The convening authority credited appellant with 151 days of credit against the 

sentence to confinement. 
HUNT–ARMY 20111081 

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LAW AND DISCUSSION 

A. Multiplicity 

Appellant stands convicted of both attempted robbery and attempted larceny 

as a result of his actions before and during the housebreaking.2 “Robbery is a 

compound offense consisting of assault and larceny.” United States v. Cunningham, 

6 U.S.C.M.A. 106, 107, 19 C.M.R. 232, 233 (C.M.A. 1955). “Offenses are 

multiplicious if one is a lesser-included offense of the other.” United States v. 

Palagar, 56 M.J. 294, 296 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Lesser-included offenses are 

“necessarily included” within the greater offense. See UCMJ art. 79; cf. United 

States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F. 2010). As a matter of logic, appellant’s 

attempt to commit robbery necessarily includes an attempt to commit larceny. The 

lesser offense of attempted larceny is thus multiplicious with the greater offense of 

attempted robbery. 

B. Conspiracy 

Appellant was found guilty of, inter alia, three separate specifications of 

conspiracy: conspiracy to commit larceny, conspiracy to commit robbery, and 

conspiracy to commit housebreaking. The object crimes of these specifications 

involved the earlier housebreaking into the house containing suspected drugs and 

money. Appellant argues that he should only be convicted of a single conspiracy. 

As we explained in an earlier decision: 

“[C]onspiracy is a partnership in crime.” Pinkerton v. United States, 

328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946). The essence of a conspiracy is in the 

“agreement or confederation to commit a crime, and that is what is 

punishable as a conspiracy, if any overt act is taken in pursuit of it.” 

United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947); see Braverman v. 

United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942). As such, it is ordinarily the 

agreement that forms the unit of prosecution for conspiracy, “even if it 

contemplates the commission of several offenses.” Rollin M. Perkins 

& Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 683 (3rd ed. 1982) (citing 

Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53); see United States v. Pereira, 53 M.J. 183, 

184 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (finding single conspiracy to commit murder, 

robbery, and kidnapping); cf. United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit 

Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 & n.3 (1952) (introducing concept of “unit of 

prosecution”). 

United States v. Finlayson, 58 M.J. 824, 826 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2003). Among 

the factors we use to determine the number of conspiracies include “(1) the 

 

2

 He also stands convicted of housebreaking under Article 130. 
HUNT–ARMY 20111081 

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objectives and (2) nature of the scheme in each alleged conspiracy; (3) the nature of 

the charge and (4) the overt acts alleged in each; (5) the time and (6) location of 

each of the alleged conspiracies; (7) the conspiratorial participants in each; and (8) 

the degree of interdependence between the alleged conspiracies.” Id. at 827. 

 After weighing these factors, we conclude that appellant and his coconspirators engaged in a single conspiracy here. These acts occurred at the same 

time, had the same participants, and were wholly interdependent. The housebreaking 

was a means to achieve the objective of stealing drugs and money. Given this 

record, we conclude that appellant and his co-conspirators had a single agreement to 

commit multiple crimes. 

The government urges us to consolidate Specifications 1, 2, and 3 of 

Additional Charge II. See Finlayson, 58 M.J. at 829. However, for the same reasons 

we found attempted larceny to be multiplicious with attempted robbery, we find 

conspiracy to commit larceny to be multiplicious with conspiracy to commit 

robbery. We will set aside the finding of guilt of Specification 1 of Additional 

Charge II and dismiss that specification. We will then consolidate Specifications 2 

and 3 of Additional Charge II into the Specification of Additional Charge II. 

C. Reassessment 

 Given the errors noted above, we are confident, considering the remaining 

specifications, that we can reassess appellant’s sentence at our level. United States 

v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11 (C.A.A.F. 2013); United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 

307 n.3 (C.M.A. 1986). We note that the military judge treated the three conspiracy 

specifications at issue as one specification for sentencing purposes. The military 

judge also treated the attempted robbery, attempted larceny, and housebreaking 

specifications as one for sentencing. Appellant also remains convicted of numerous 

other offenses, including several assault convictions arising from the shooting on 

Fort Bragg. Thus, neither the penalty landscape nor the admissible aggravation 

evidence has changed. 

Appellant also elected trial by judge alone, and we “are more likely to be 

certain of what a military judge would have done as opposed to members.” 

Wincklemann, 73 M.J. at 16. Finally, we have extensive experience with the 

remaining convictions, and we are confident that we can reliably assess what 

sentence a military judge would have imposed on the remaining findings of guilt. 

Id. We are confident that the military judge would have adjudged the same sentence 

absent the errors noted. However, because the convening authority approved two 

years and one month less confinement than the military judge adjudged, we affirm 

that lesser sentence. See UCMJ art. 66(c) (“[A] Court of Criminal Appeals may act 

only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening 

authority.”). 
HUNT–ARMY 20111081 

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CONCLUSION 

After consideration of the entire record of trial, appellant’s assignments of 

error, and the matters personally raised by appellant pursuant to Grostefon, the 

findings of guilty of Specification 2 of Additional Charge I and Specification 1 of 

Additional Charge II are set aside and those specifications are dismissed. 

Specifications 2 and 3 of Additional Charge II are consolidated into the 

Specification of Additional Charge II, to read as follows: 

In that Private First Class Shelton A. Hunt, U.S. Army, did at or near 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina on or about 30 January 2011, conspire with 

Private (E-1) Cordic L. Coleman, Private First Class Kamarques K. 

Dyess, Private (E-1) Bryan C.N. Alston, and Private First Class Cerion 

R. Allen to commit offenses under the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, to wit: robbery and housebreaking, and in order to effect the 

object of the conspiracy the said Private First Class Shelton A. Hunt 

did dress in black, acquire a firearm, travel to the dwelling house of 

another, conceal his face, and kick in the back door of said dwelling 

house to gain entrance. 

The remaining findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. The sentence as approved by the 

convening authority is AFFIRMED. All rights, privileges, and property, of which 

appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of the findings set aside by this 

decision, are hereby ordered restored. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: