COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

ANTHONY FRANKLIN MOODY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1519-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 DECEMBER 22, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY 

William Shore Robertson, Judge 

 Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Director 

Capital/Appellate Services (Laura A. Cook, 

Assistant Public Defender; Public Defender 

Commission, on briefs), for appellant. 

 Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 In this appeal, Anthony Franklin Moody (appellant) 

challenges his conviction for attempted malicious wounding, 

arguing that the evidence was insufficient to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he acted with the intent to maim, 

disfigure, disable, or kill as required by Code § 18.2-51. 

Appellant contends the Commonwealth's evidence presents two 

reasonable hypotheses, one consistent with his innocence and the 

other with his guilt, and that the evidence fails to discount the 

hypothesis of innocence. Corbett v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 304, 

307, 171 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1969); Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. 

App. 562, 567, 458 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1995). We disagree and 

affirm. 

 Whether a criminal conviction is supported by sufficient 
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evidence is not a question of fact, but one of law. Bridgeman v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). 

On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, the party prevailing below, and grant to it all 

reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence 

therefrom. Clifton v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 178, 180, 468 

S.E.2d 155, 156 (1996). We will not reverse the trial court's 

judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. Code § 8.01-680. The relevant facts, stated in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, follow. 

 On May 9, 1996, David van de Graaff, a teacher at 

Rappahannock County High School, heard the sound of breaking 

glass from a nearby parking lot on the school's property. 

Responding to this noise, van de Graaff arrived in the parking 

lot moments later and witnessed appellant driving an Isuzu 

Trooper toward the lot's only exit, which lay down a narrow lane 

with cars parked on both sides. 

 While appellant's vehicle was still approximately thirty to 

fifty feet away, van de Graaff stepped into its exit path and 

motioned for appellant to stop. Rather than slowing or stopping, 

appellant accelerated towards van de Graaff, motioning for him to 

move out of the way. After ordering the appellant to stop for a 

second time, van de Graaff was forced to jump out of the car's 

path as it accelerated out of the parking lot and fish-tailed 

around a turn on the gravel surface. At the moment van de Graaff 
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jumped out of its way, appellant's vehicle was within ten to 

fifteen feet of striking van de Graaff and was travelling at 

approximately fifteen to twenty-five miles-per-hour in a five 

mile-per-hour zone. No evidence was presented that appellant 

decelerated or swerved to miss van de Graaff as he dove out of 

the vehicle's path. Appellant continued to drive his vehicle 

until apprehended by police later that day. 

 On May 10, 1996, when questioned by Deputy Richard MacWelch 

regarding these events, appellant confessed to breaking into 

several vehicles, including a car in the parking lot of the high 

school. In response to a question regarding whether he had seen 

anyone in the school parking lot attempting to stop his vehicle, 

appellant replied, "Yes, I did. I waved him out of the way 

because I was going out of there." 

 Code § 18.2-51 states that "[i]f any person maliciously 

shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or by any means cause him 

bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or 

kill, he shall . . . be guilty of a Class 3 felony." An attempt 

to commit this crime consists of (1) the specific intent to maim, 

disfigure, disable or kill, and (2) an ineffectual act done 

towards the crime's completion. Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 

653, 657, 180 S.E. 395, 397 (1935); Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. 

App. 530, 533, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991). 

 The requisite specific intent "may, like any other fact, be 

shown by circumstances. Intent is a state of mind which can be 
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evidenced only by the words or conduct of the person who is 

claimed to have entertained it." Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 

Va. 210, 216, 83 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1954), quoted in Bell, 11 Va. 

App. at 533, 399 S.E.2d at 452. When facts are equally 

susceptible to more than one interpretation, one which is 

consistent with the innocence of the accused, the trier of fact 

cannot arbitrarily adopt an inculpatory interpretation. Corbett, 

210 Va. at 307, 171 S.E.2d at 253. The fact finder, however, is 

entitled to draw inferences from proved facts, so long as the 

inferences are reasonable and justified. Webb v. Commonwealth, 

204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963); Bell, 11 Va. App. at 

533, 399 S.E.2d at 452. Furthermore, the fact finder may infer 

that a person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary 

consequences of his voluntary acts. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 

U.S. 510, 522-23 (1979); Stokes v. Warden, 226 Va. 111, 117, 306 

S.E.2d 882, 885 (1983). Thus, when the fact finder draws such 

inferences reasonably, not arbitrarily, they will be upheld. 

 In the present case, the evidence shows that appellant, who 

saw van de Graaff blocking the only avenue of his escape, 

deliberately chose to accelerate his car toward the pedestrian, 

never decelerating, braking, or swerving to avoid him, even when 

van de Graaff was only five to ten feet away from being struck. 

Van de Graaff was spared certain injury only by jumping out of 

the vehicle's path at the last moment. Although appellant warned 

van de Graaff to move out of his way with a wave, this act does 
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not negate the trial court's reasonable inference that appellant 

had formed the specific intent to run over van de Graaff should 

the pedestrian not move out of his way. Thus, the evidence was 

sufficient for the trial court to reasonably infer that appellant 

had the requisite specific intent to sustain a conviction of 

attempted malicious wounding. 

 In support of his argument that the evidence of intent was 

insufficient to find the necessary intent, appellant inoppositely 

relies on Haywood, 20 Va. App. 562, 458 S.E.2d 606. In that 

case, Haywood, who had been drinking heavily, fled the scene of a 

public altercation in his truck. On two separate occasions, a 

police officer positioned his vehicle in the road so as to block 

Haywood's path. On each of these occasions, however, Haywood 

failed to slow down or change his course and, but for the 

officers' last-minute evasive actions, would have struck the 

police vehicles. Id. at 564-65, 458 S.E.2d at 607. 

 On Haywood's appeal from two convictions of attempted 

capital murder of a police officer, we addressed the question of 

"whether Haywood, while driving his truck, formed the specific 

intent to use his vehicle as a weapon for the unequivocal purpose 

of murdering the police officers." Id. at 566, 458 S.E.2d at 

608. We reversed the convictions because the Commonwealth 

presented no direct evidence that Haywood, by running the road 

blocks, intended to kill the police officers and because the 

circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis 
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of innocence that Haywood only intended to avoid police 

apprehension by driving through their vehicular roadblocks. Id.

at 567-68, 458 S.E.2d at 609. 

 The instant case, however, can be distinguished from 

Haywood. Although we recognize that appellant plainly sought to 

flee the parking lot, the evidence sufficiently proves his 

further intent to run down van de Graaff in the process of doing 

so. Unlike Haywood, appellant was not attempting to run through 

an inanimate object; rather, the obstacle in his path consisted 

exclusively of a pedestrian. Thus, it is not unreasonable to 

infer that the direct consequences of appellant's actions would 

have been the injury or death of van de Graaff had he not jumped 

clear of the oncoming vehicle. 

 Based on the foregoing, we find that the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.