F-35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER

Slower Than Expected 

Progress in Software 

Testing May Limit Initial 

Warfighting Capabilities

Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical 

Air and Land Forces, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 12:30 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, March 26, 2014

GAO-14-468T

United States Government Accountability Office
 

Page 1 GAO-14-468T 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F-35 Lightning II, 

also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). With estimated acquisition 

costs approaching $400 billion, the F-35 is the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) most costly and ambitious acquisition program. The program is 

developing and fielding a family of next generation fighter aircraft, 

incorporating low observable (stealth) technologies as well as advanced 

sensors and computer networking capabilities for the United States Air 

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as well as eight international partners.1

As we have reported in the past, DOD began the F-35 acquisition 

program in October 2001 without adequate knowledge about the aircraft’s 

critical technologies or its design.

The F-35 family is comprised of three aircraft variants: (1) a conventional 

takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant, (2) a short takeoff and vertical landing 

(STOVL) variant, and (3) a carrier-suitable variant (CV). The F-35 is 

integral to U.S. and partner plans to replace existing fighter aircraft and 

support future combat operations. According to current plans, the U.S. 

portion of the program will require annual acquisition funding of more than 

$12 billion on average through 2037 to complete development and 

procure a total of 2,457 aircraft. In addition, the F-35 fleet is estimated to 

cost around $1 trillion to operate and support over its lifetime. In a time of 

austere federal budgets, cost projections of this magnitude pose 

significant fiscal challenges.

2

 

1 The international partners are the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, 

Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. These nations contributed funds for system 

development and signed agreements to procure aircraft. In addition, Israel and Japan 

have signed on as foreign military sales customers.

In addition, the program’s acquisition 

strategy called for high levels of concurrency between development, 

testing, and production. As a result, the program encountered significant 

cost and schedule growth as well as performance shortfalls and was 

restructured three times: first in December 2003, then again in March 

2007, and most recently in March 2012. The most recent restructuring 

2

GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and 

Address Affordability Risks, GAO-12-437 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012); Joint Strike 

Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordability Is a Major Concern,

GAO-13-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2013); and Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring 

Places Program on Firmer Footing, but Progress Still Lags, GAO-11-325 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 7, 2011). 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-468T 

was initiated in early 2010, when the program’s unit cost estimates 

exceeded critical thresholds established by statute—a condition known as 

a Nunn-McCurdy breach. DOD subsequently certified to the Congress in 

June 2010 that the program was essential to national security and 

needed to continue.

3

At the time the new F-35 acquisition program baseline was finalized, it did 

not identify new initial operational capability (IOC) dates for the three 

military services.

DOD then began efforts to significantly restructure 

the program and establish a new acquisition program baseline. These 

restructuring efforts continued through 2011 and into 2012, during which 

the department increased the program’s cost estimates, extended its 

testing and delivery schedules, and reduced near-term aircraft 

procurement quantities by deferring the procurement of 410 aircraft into 

the future. The new F-35 acquisition program baseline was finalized in 

March 2012, and since that time, costs have remained relatively stable.

4

 

3 Section 2433 of title 10 of the United States Code, commonly referred to as NunnMcCurdy, requires DOD to notify Congress whenever a major defense acquisition 

program’s unit cost experiences cost growth that exceeds certain thresholds. This is 

commonly referred to as a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Significant breaches occur when the 

program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost increases by at least 15 percent 

over the current baseline estimate or at least 30 percent over the original estimate. For 

critical breaches, when these unit costs increase at least 25 percent over the current 

baseline estimate or at least 50 percent over the original, DOD is required to take 

additional steps, including conducting an in-depth review of the program. Programs with 

critical breaches must be terminated unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to certain 

facts related to the program and takes other actions, including restructuring the program. 

10 U.S.C. § 2433a.

The following year DOD issued a memorandum noting 

that Marine Corps and Air Force were planning to field initial operational

capabilities in July 2015 and August 2016, respectively, and that the Navy 

planned to field its initial capability in August 2018. The memorandum 

emphasized that the Marine Corps and Air Force initial operational

capabilities would be achieved with aircraft that possess initial combat 

capabilities, and noted that those aircraft would need additional lethality 

and survivability enhancements to meet the full spectrum of warfighter 

requirements in the future. These new parameters represented a delay of 

5 to 6 years from the program’s initial 2001 baseline and a reduction in 

the capabilities expected at IOC.

4 Initial operational capability is obtained when organizations or units have received a 

specified number of systems and have the ability to employ and maintain those systems.
 

Page 3 GAO-14-468T 

We have reported on F-35 issues for a number of years.5 This testimony 

is based on and summarizes the results of our March 2014 report, which 

addresses the progress the F-35 program has made and the risks it still 

faces in the areas of development, testing, affordability, and 

manufacturing.6

For our March 2014 report, we reviewed and analyzed program briefings, 

management reports, program test results, and internal DOD program 

analyses. We discussed key aspects of F-35 performance with both 

military and private contractor test pilots. We interviewed F-35 program 

and aircraft prime contractor officials to discuss developmental testing. 

We also collected developmental test plans, and data on test 

achievements to assess program progress through December 2013. We 

obtained current program acquisition and life-cycle sustainment cost 

estimates, reviewed the supporting documentation and discussed the 

development of those estimates with DOD and prime contractor officials 

instrumental in producing them. We toured F-35 manufacturing and test 

facilities and obtained and analyzed production and supply chain data as 

of December 2013. We assessed the reliability of DOD and contractor 

data by reviewing existing information about the data, and interviewing 

agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also 

discussed ongoing manufacturing process improvements with prime 

contractor and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) officials.

Further details about the scope and methodology can be found in our 

March 2014 report. 

 

We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards required that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In summary, delays in developmental flight testing of the F-35’s critical

software may hinder delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the 

 

5 See related GAO products at the end of this statement.

6 GAO- F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Problems Completing Software Testing May Hinder 

Delivery of Expected Capabilities, GAO-14-322 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2014). 
 

Page 4 GAO-14-468T 

military services. F-35 developmental flight testing comprises two key 

areas: mission systems and flight sciences. Mission systems testing 

verifies that the software-intensive systems that provide critical 

warfighting capabilities function properly and meet requirements, while 

flight sciences testing verifies the aircraft’s basic flying capabilities. 

Challenges in development and testing of mission systems software 

continued through 2013, due largely to delays in software delivery, limited 

capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems 

and retest multiple software versions. The Director of Operational Test 

and Evaluation predicts delivery of warfighting capabilities could be 

delayed by as much as 13 months. Delays of this magnitude will likely 

limit the warfighting capabilities that are delivered to support the military 

services’ initial operational capabilities—the first of which is scheduled for 

July 2015—and at this time it is not clear what those specific capabilities 

will be because testing is still ongoing. In addition, delays could increase 

the already significant concurrency between testing and aircraft 

procurement and result in additional cost growth. Without a clear 

understanding of the specific capabilities that will initially be delivered, 

Congress and the military services may not be able to make fully 

informed resource allocation decisions.7

To execute the program as planned, the DOD will have to increase funds 

steeply over the next 5 years and sustain an average of $12.6 billion per 

year through 2037; for several years, funding requirements will peak at 

around $15 billion (see figure 1). 

Flight sciences testing has seen 

better progress, as the F-35 program has been able to accomplish nearly 

all of its planned test flights and test points. Testing of the aircraft’s 

operational capabilities in a realistic threat environment is scheduled to 

begin in 2015. The program has continued to make progress in

addressing some key technical risks.

 

7 We made a recommendation in our March 2014 report to address this issue which is 

discussed later in this statement.
 

Page 5 GAO-14-468T 

Figure 1: Budgeted Development and Procurement Costs by Service, 2014-2037

Annual funding of this magnitude clearly poses long-term affordability 

risks given the current fiscal environment. The program has been directed 

to reduce unit costs to meet established affordability targets before fullrate production begins in 2019, but meeting those targets will be 

challenging as significant cost reductions are needed. Additionally, the 

most recent cost estimate for operating and supporting the F-35 fleet is 

more than $1 trillion, which DOD officials have deemed unaffordable. This 

estimate reflects assumptions about key cost drivers the program can 

control, like aircraft reliability, and those it cannot control, including fuel 

costs, labor costs, and inflation rates. Reliability is lower than expected for 

two variants, and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation reports 

that the F-35 program has limited additional opportunities to improve 

reliability.

Aircraft manufacturing continued to improve in 2013, and management of 

the supply chain is evolving. As the number of aircraft in production has 

increased, critical learning has taken place and manufacturing efficiency 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-468T 

has improved. For example, the prime contractor has seen reductions in 

overall labor hours needed to manufacture the aircraft, as expected. In 

2013, the contractor delivered 35 aircraft to the government, 5 more than 

it delivered in 2012 and 26 more than it delivered in 2011. The prime 

contractor has put in place a supplier management system to oversee key 

supplier performance.

In conclusion, DOD has made a number of difficult decisions to put the 

F-35 on a more sound footing. More such decisions may lie ahead. For 

example, if software testing continues to be delayed, if funding falls short 

of expectations, or if unit cost targets cannot be met, DOD may have to 

make decisions about whether to proceed with production as planned 

with less capable aircraft or to alter the production rate. Also, if reliability 

falls short of goals, DOD may have to make decisions about other ways 

to reduce sustainment costs, such as reduced flying hours. Eventually, 

DOD will be faced with making contingency plans for these and other 

issues. At this point, we believe the most pressing issue is the effect 

software testing delays are likely to have on the capabilities of the initial 

operational aircraft that each military service will receive. In order to make 

informed decisions about weapon system investments and future force 

structure, it is important that Congress and the services have a clear 

understanding of the capabilities that the initial operational F-35 aircraft 

will possess. Thus, in our March 2014 report we recommended that DOD 

assess the specific capabilities that realistically can be delivered and 

those that will not likely be delivered to each of the military services by 

their established initial operational capability dates, and share the results 

of that assessment with the Congress and military services as soon as 

possible but no later than July 2015. DOD agreed with our 

recommendation and noted that it would conduct an assessment and 

share the results with Congress and military services in a timely manner. 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and members of the House 

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land 

Forces this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions you may have. We look forward to continuing to 

work with the Congress as we continue to monitor and report on the 

progress of the F-35 program.
 

Page 7 GAO-14-468T 

For further information on this statement, please contact Michael Sullivan 

at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

are Travis Masters, Pete Anderson, Marvin Bonner, Megan Porter, and 

Abby Volk.

GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 8 GAO-14-468T 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Problems Completing Software Testing May 

Hinder Delivery of Expected Warfighting Capabilities. GAO-14-322. 

Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2014.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term 

Affordability Is a Major Concern. GAO-13-309. Washington, D.C.: March 

11, 2013.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance 

Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks. GAO-12-437. Washington, 

D.C.: June 14, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, 

but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern. GAO-12-525T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 20, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Is Still Lagging. GAO-11-677T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 

2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Still Lags. GAO-11-325. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but 

Progress Is Still Lagging Overall. GAO-11-450T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing 

Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk. GAO-09-303. 

Washington D.C.: March 12, 2009.

Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks.

GAO-08-388. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. 

GAO-07-360. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing 

Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2006.

Related GAO Products

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