UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4503

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEREK LEON HINTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00434-WO-1)

Submitted: October 6, 2016 Decided: November 14, 2016

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Blake Norman, THE LAW OFFICE OF J. BLAKE NORMAN, Durham, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States 

Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial, Derek Leon Hinton was convicted on 

three counts of distribution of cocaine base (“crack”), in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012). On 

appeal, Hinton contends that the district court improperly 

permitted the Government to introduce evidence pursuant to Fed. 

R. Evid. 404(b) of Defendant’s two recent convictions for

distribution of crack. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

“To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be (1) 

relevant to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and 

(3) reliable.” United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 317 (4th 

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence 

also must satisfy the mandate of Fed. R. Evid. 403 that “the 

probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 

outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Byers, 

649 F.3d 197, 206 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We review the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for 

abuse of discretion and “will not vacate a conviction

unless . . . the district court judge acted arbitrarily or 

irrationally.” United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 

755 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Generally, evidence of a crime or other bad act is 

inadmissible “to prove a person’s character in order to show 

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
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with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such 

evidence may be admissible for other purposes, “such as proving 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 404(b)(2). As “a rule of inclusion,” Rule 404(b) allows 

admission of “all evidence of other crimes or acts except that 

which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United States

v. Briley, 770 F.3d 267, 275 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1844 (2015).

“In drug cases, evidence of a defendant’s prior, similar 

drug transactions is generally admissible under Rule 404(b) as 

evidence of the defendant’s knowledge and intent.” CabreraBeltran, 660 F.3d at 755. However, to be admissible, the prior 

narcotics activity must have a sufficient nexus to the charged

offenses, i.e., the acts should be “related in time, manner, 

place, or pattern of conduct.” United States v. Johnson, 617 

F.3d 286, 297 (4th Cir. 2010). Here, Hinton had been convicted 

of selling crack in hand-to-hand sales in Burlington, North 

Carolina, on two occasions only a matter of months before the 

charged offenses. We therefore conclude that the evidence of 

Hinton’s prior drug distribution was admissible to demonstrate 

knowledge and intent. 

Hinton contends that knowledge and intent were not issues 

in this case because he did not claim that he unknowingly sold 
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crack to the confidential human source, but rather denied 

selling anything to the source. By pleading not guilty to the 

charges of distributing crack, however, Hinton necessarily put 

his knowledge and intent--elements of the prosecution’s case--

directly at issue. See United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444, 

448 (4th Cir. 1991). “[T]he government, which has the burden 

of proving every element of the crime charged, must have the 

freedom to decide how to discharge that burden.” United States 

v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding the

defendant’s intent at issue, notwithstanding defendant’s

conditional offer to stipulate to intent). 

Thus, we conclude that the evidence was relevant and 

necessary. See Byers, 649 F.3d at 208 (noting that evidence is 

relevant as long as it has “any tendency to make the existence 

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 

action more probable or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United 

States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 398 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding 

that evidence is necessary when it “is an essential part of the 

crimes on trial” or “furnishes part of the context of the 

crime” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We further conclude that any prejudicial effect did not 

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence, 

especially in light of the district court’s limiting 
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instructions to the jury explaining that the jury was to 

consider the acts only as evidence of intent or knowledge, and 

not as evidence of bad character or propensity. See United 

States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ny risk 

of such prejudice was mitigated by a limiting instruction from 

the district court clarifying the issues for which the jury 

could properly consider [the Rule 404(b)] evidence.”). 

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Hinton’s 

previous crack sales. Accordingly, we affirm Hinton’s 

convictions.*

AFFIRMED

 

* We dispensed with oral argument because the facts and 

legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional 

process.