DEFENSE 

HEADQUARTERS

DOD Needs to 

Reassess Options for 

Permanent Location 

of U.S. Africa 

Command

Report to Congressional Committees

September 2013

GAO-13-646

United States Government Accountability Office
 

United States Government Accountability Office

 

Highlights of GAO-13-646, a report to 

congressional committees

September 2013

DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS

DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent 

Location of U.S. Africa Command

Why GAO Did This Study

A House Armed Services Committee 

report accompanying a bill for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to 

conduct an analysis of options for the 

permanent placement of AFRICOM 

headquarters. While GAO’s work was 

ongoing, DOD announced its decision 

to keep AFRICOM’s headquarters at 

its current location in Stuttgart, 

Germany. This report addresses the 

following questions: (1) What courses 

of action did DOD consider for the 

permanent placement of AFRICOM 

headquarters? and (2) To what extent 

was DOD’s decision to keep AFRICOM 

headquarters in Stuttgart based on a 

well-documented analysis of the costs 

and benefits of the options available to 

DOD? To meet these objectives, GAO 

analyzed documents provided by and 

interviewed officials from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense; the Joint 

Staff; and AFRICOM and other 

combatant commands.

What GAO Recommends

To meet operational needs at lower 

costs, GAO recommends that DOD 

conduct a more comprehensive and 

well-documented analysis of options 

for the permanent placement of the 

headquarters for AFRICOM, including 

documentation on whether the 

operational benefits of each option 

outweigh the costs. DOD partially 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation, stating that the 

decision was based primarily on 

military judgment but that it will perform 

additional analysis of the location of 

the headquarters if the Secretary 

deems it necessary. GAO continues to 

believe such analysis is needed. 

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has considered several courses of action for 

the placement of the headquarters for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) but 

decided in early 2013 to keep it in Germany. When AFRICOM was created in 

2007, DOD temporarily located its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, with the 

intent of selecting a permanent location at a later date. DOD’s initial goal was to 

locate the headquarters in Africa, but this was later abandoned in part because of 

significant projected costs and sensitivities on the part of African countries. 

Subsequently, in 2008, DOD conducted an analysis that found that several 

locations in Europe and the United States would be operationally feasible and 

less expensive than keeping the headquarters in Stuttgart. A final decision, 

however, was deferred until 2012, when the Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation office completed its analysis. Subsequent to this analysis, in January 

2013, the Secretary of Defense decided to keep AFRICOM’s headquarters in 

Stuttgart. In announcing the decision, the Secretary noted that keeping 

AFRICOM in Germany would cost more than moving it to the United States but 

the commander had judged it would be more operationally effective from its 

current location, given shared resources with the U.S. European Command.

GAO’s review of DOD’s decision to keep AFRICOM headquarters in Germany 

found that it was not supported by a comprehensive and well-documented 

analysis that balanced the operational and cost benefits of the options available 

to DOD. The 2012 study that accompanied the decision does not fully meet key 

principles for an economic analysis. For example, the study is not welldocumented and does not fully explain the decisions that were made. Although 

details supporting DOD’s cost estimates were not well-documented, the analysis 

indicated that moving the headquarters to the United States would accrue 

savings of $60 million to $70 million per year. The 2012 study also estimated that 

relocating the headquarters to the United States could create up to 4,300 

additional jobs, with an annual impact on the local economy ranging from $350 

million to $450 million, but it is not clear how this factored into DOD’s decision. 

Beyond costs and economic benefits, the study lists several factors to be 

considered when determining where to place a headquarters. It ranks two of 

these factors—access to the area of responsibility and to service components—

as critical. However, little support exists showing how the factors were weighted 

relative to each other. Moreover, the study describes how a small, forwarddeployed headquarters element such as the ones employed by other U.S.-based 

combatant commands might mitigate operational concerns, but the study is silent 

about why this mitigation plan was not deemed a satisfactory option. In 

discussions with GAO, officials from the Central and Southern Commands stated 

that they had successfully overcome negative effects of having a headquarters in 

the United States by maintaining a forward presence in their theaters. In sum, 

neither the analysis nor the letter announcing the decision to retain AFRICOM 

headquarters in Stuttgart explains why these operational factors outweighed the 

cost savings and economic benefits associated with moving the headquarters to 

the United States. Until the costs and benefits of maintaining AFRICOM in 

Germany are specified and weighed against the costs and benefits of relocating 

the command, the department may be missing an opportunity to accomplish its 

missions successfully at a lower cost.

View GAO-13-646. For more information, 

contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 

or pendletonj@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD Considered Several Possibilities for the Permanent 

Placement of AFRICOM before Deciding to Retain the Command 

in Its Current Location 5

DOD’s Decision to Keep AFRICOM Headquarters in Stuttgart Is 

Not Supported by an Analysis That Balances Operational Costs 

and Benefits for a Full Range of Options 11

Conclusions 19

Recommendation for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Appendix I Authorized Personnel at AFRICOM 24

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 25

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Figures

Figure 1: DOD’s Original Conception for Establishing Regional 

Offices in Africa 7

Figure 2: Timeline Showing the Courses of Action DOD Has 

Considered as Possible Locations for AFRICOM 

Headquarters 9

Figure 3: AFRICOM Travel Costs for Fiscal Year 2011 17

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

Abbreviations

AFRICOM Africa Command

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

DOD Department of Defense

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Page 1 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 9, 2013

Congressional Committees

The President has established, and the Department of Defense (DOD) 

operates, geographic combatant commands to perform military missions 

around the world. Each geographic combatant command is assigned an 

area of responsibility in which to conduct its missions and activities. On 

February 6, 2007, the President announced that he had directed the 

Secretary of Defense to establish the newest geographic combatant 

command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), consolidating responsibility 

for DOD activities in Africa that had formerly been shared by the U.S. 

Central Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. European 

Command. AFRICOM began initial operations on October 1, 2007, at 

Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, which was to be the command’s 

temporary home until an appropriate and permanent location for the 

headquarters could be found on the African continent.1 The department 

has invested at least $140 million to upgrade the facilities in Stuttgart, 

including major renovations of the office areas, family quarters, and an 

officers’ club, as well as construction of a child care center and shopping 

facility. Moreover, AFRICOM has grown since its creation and, as we 

reported in May 2013, contributed to a nearly 50 percent increase in the 

overall number of personnel assigned to all geographic combatant 

commands since 2001.2 An early planning document proposed assigning 

about 400 personnel, and DOD initially envisioned the command 

including large numbers of personnel from other civilian agencies, such 

as the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development. By fiscal year 2012, DOD had funding approved for 1,637 

positions for the command, of which 805 were to be filled by military 

personnel and 832 by DOD civilians (see appendix I for the total numbers 

 

1

Beginning in 1951, Kelley Barracks was the headquarters location for the U.S. Army VII 

Corps, which provided defense to southern Germany. In 1992, when the VII Corps was 

inactivated and vacated this space, Kelley Barracks became the headquarters of the 6th

Area Support Group (now known as U.S. Army Garrison, Stuttgart). Finally, when 

AFRICOM was stood up, it became the home of AFRICOM headquarters, and U.S. Army 

Garrison, Stuttgart, was relocated to Panzer Barracks, also in Stuttgart. 

2

GAO, Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve Visibility 

of Combatant Commands’ Resources, GAO-13-293 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2013).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

of authorized personnel for AFRICOM).3 According to AFRICOM officials, 

approximately 3,900 dependents also accompany the AFRICOM staff in 

Germany.

The House Armed Services Committee directed the Secretary of Defense 

to conduct an alternative basing review for the placement of AFRICOM 

headquarters and to report the conclusions to the congressional defense 

committees by April 1, 2012.4 DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) office led this study. CAPE did not meet the April 1 

deadline, and DOD was granted an extension through July 1, 2012, to 

present its analysis to the congressional defense committees.5 In January 

2013, DOD issued the directed report. Our report is in response to a 

mandate in the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a 

bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 to 

conduct an analysis of options for the permanent placement of AFRICOM 

headquarters.6 It addresses the following questions: (1) What courses of 

action did DOD consider for the permanent placement of the 

headquarters for AFRICOM? (2) To what extent was DOD’s decision to 

keep AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, based on a welldocumented analysis of the costs and benefits of the options available to 

DOD?

To determine the courses of action DOD considered for the permanent 

placement of AFRICOM headquarters, we interviewed officials from the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, the Joint Staff, 

the U.S. European Command, and AFRICOM. We also reviewed 

documents written at the time that AFRICOM was established and 

compared them with the latest statistics provided by AFRICOM to 

determine how the command’s mission, size, and cost have changed 

 

3

About 250 of the personnel assigned to AFRICOM headquarters are located in the 

United Kingdom at an intelligence center that supports both AFRICOM and U.S. European 

Command. For the purpose of this report, authorized positions refer to military and civilian 

positions that have been approved by DOD components for funding for a specific year. 

These numbers do not include contract personnel.

4

See H.R. Rep. No. 112-78, at 288 (2011).

5

See H.R. Rep. No. 112-479 at 256 (2012).

6

See id. Our work began in June 2012 in response to a committee mandate, but the 

CAPE report was not issued until January 2013.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

over time. We reviewed briefings and presentations prepared by various 

organizations throughout DOD since 2006. These organizations included 

CAPE’s predecessor, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, as 

well as the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Office of 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs; the U.S. 

European Command; and Transition Team Africa Command, a group that 

was established to assist in the standup of AFRICOM.

To determine the extent to which DOD’s decision to keep AFRICOM 

headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, was based on a well-documented 

analysis of the costs and benefits of the options available to DOD, we 

reviewed the CAPE study on this subject, discussed the study with CAPE 

officials, and requested and analyzed supporting documentation for the 

study’s findings. We also obtained documentation from and interviewed 

officials with AFRICOM, the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. European 

Command, and the U.S. Southern Command. To obtain an understanding 

of how other combatant commands have conducted cost benefit analyses 

to inform decisions on headquarters locations, we reviewed the studies 

prepared by the U.S. Southern Command before DOD decided where to 

locate its headquarters and discussed these studies with a Southern 

Command official involved in preparing them. We reviewed criteria for 

conducting economic analyses from key principles that we derived from a 

variety of cost estimating, economic analysis, and budgeting guidance 

documents and compared it with DOD’s efforts on the CAPE study. We 

also analyzed documents and interviewed officials from AFRICOM’s 

component commands: U.S. Army, Africa, in Vicenza, Italy; U.S. Air 

Force, Africa, in Ramstein Air Base, Germany; U.S. Naval Forces, Africa, 

in Naples, Italy; U.S. Marine Forces, Africa, in Stuttgart, Germany; U.S. 

Special Operations Command, Africa, in Stuttgart, Germany; and 

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Djibouti, Africa. As discussed 

later, DOD did not provide us with sufficient documentation to enable us 

to assess the reliability of the data used to produce the cost figures in the 

CAPE report, but these estimates were in line with costs prepared by 

DOD in earlier studies.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 through September

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

GAO has issued several reports on the establishment of AFRICOM and 

its components.7 In 2008, we testified that DOD had made progress in 

transferring activities, staffing the command, and establishing an interim 

headquarters for AFRICOM but had not yet fully estimated the additional 

costs of establishing and operating the command. We also reported in 

2008 that DOD had not reached an agreement with the Department of 

State (State) and potential host nations on the structure and location of 

the command’s presence in Africa, and that such uncertainty hindered 

DOD’s ability to estimate future funding requirements and raised 

questions about whether DOD’s concept for developing enduring 

relationships on the continent could be achieved. In 2009 we reported 

that the total future cost of establishing AFRICOM would be significant but 

remained unclear because decisions on the locations of AFRICOM’s 

permanent headquarters and its supporting offices in Africa had not been 

made. We also stated that it would be difficult to assess the merits of 

infrastructure investments in Germany for AFRICOM’s interim 

headquarters without knowing how long AFRICOM would use these 

facilities or how they would be used after a permanent location was 

established. To determine the long-term fiscal investment for AFRICOM’s 

infrastructure, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in 

consultation with the Secretary of State, as appropriate, conduct an 

assessment of possible locations for AFRICOM’s permanent 

headquarters and any supporting offices in Africa that would be based on 

transparent criteria, methodology, and assumptions; include the full cost 

and time-frames to construct and support proposed locations; evaluate 

how each location would contribute to AFRICOM’s mission consistent 

with the criteria of the study; and consider geopolitical and operational 

risks and barriers in implementing each alternative. We further 

recommended that DOD limit expenditures on temporary AFRICOM 

infrastructure until decisions were made on the long-term locations for the 

command. DOD partially agreed with the recommendations in our 2009 

 

7

GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges 

Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command, GAO-08-947T (Washington, DC: 

July 15, 2008); GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder 

Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with 

the U.S. Africa Command, GAO-09-181 (Washington, DC: Feb. 20, 2009); GAO, Defense 

Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force, 

GAO-10-504 (Washington, DC: Apr. 15, 2010); GAO, Defense Management: Improved 

Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in 

Africa, GAO-10-794 (Washington, DC: July 28, 2010); and GAO, Humanitarian and 

Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to 

Manage the Military’s Efforts, GAO-12-359 (Washington, DC: Feb. 8, 2012).

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

report, stating that in some cases, actions were already underway that 

would address the issues identified in our report.

In 2007, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a 

new geographic combatant command, consolidating the responsibility for 

DOD activities in Africa that had been shared by U.S. Central Command, 

U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command. AFRICOM was 

initially established as a subunified command within the European 

Command and was thus purposely staffed by European Command 

personnel. Because of this link to the European Command, DOD located 

AFRICOM’s headquarters at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, 

where the European Command headquarters was located, with the intent 

that this location would be temporary until a permanent location was 

selected. In 2008, AFRICOM became fully operational as a separate, 

independent geographic command. Since that time DOD has considered 

several courses of action for the permanent placement of the 

headquarters. Initially DOD’s goal was to locate AFRICOM headquarters 

in Africa, but that goal was later abandoned, in part because of what DOD 

described as significant projected costs and sensitivities on the part of 

African countries to having such a presence on the continent. 

Consequently, in 2008 DOD conducted an analysis of other locations in 

Europe and the United States, using cost and operational factors as 

criteria against which to evaluate the permanent placement of AFRICOM 

headquarters. Although this 2008 analysis contained no recommendation 

about where AFRICOM’s headquarters should be permanently located, it 

concluded that several locations in Europe and the United States would 

be operationally feasible as well as less expensive than Stuttgart. Finally, 

in January 2013, the Secretary of Defense decided to keep AFRICOM’s 

headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. This decision was made following 

the completion of an analysis directed by the House Armed Services 

Committee in 2011 and reiterated in 2012 and conducted by CAPE. The 

study, which presented the costs and benefits of maintaining AFRICOM’s 

headquarters in Stuttgart and of relocating it to the United States, stated 

that the AFRICOM commander had identified certain operational 

concerns as critical and that even though the operational risks could be 

mitigated, it was the AFRICOM commander’s professional judgment that 

the command would be less effective in the United States. In announcing 

the decision to keep AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, the Secretary 

of Defense noted that the commander had judged that the headquarters 

would be more operationally effective from its current location, given 

shared resources with the U.S. European Command.

DOD Considered 

Several Possibilities 

for the Permanent 

Placement of 

AFRICOM before 

Deciding to Retain the 

Command in Its 

Current Location
 

Page 6 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

The initial plan for AFRICOM was to have a central headquarters located 

on the African continent that would be complemented by several regional 

offices that would serve as hubs throughout AFRICOM’s area of 

responsibility (see figure 1). According to DOD officials, having a 

command presence in Africa would provide a better understanding of the 

regional environment and African needs; help build relationships with 

African partners, regional economic communities, and associated standby 

forces; and add a regional dimension to U.S. security assistance.8

However, after conducting extensive travel throughout Africa to identify 

appropriate locations and meet with key officials in prospective nations, 

DOD concluded that it was not feasible to locate AFRICOM’s 

headquarters in Africa, for several reasons. First, State officials who were 

involved in DOD’s early planning teams for AFRICOM voiced concerns 

over the command’s headquarters location and the means by which the 

AFRICOM commander and the Department of State would exercise their 

respective authorities. Specifically, DOD and State officials said that State 

was not comfortable with DOD’s concept of regional offices because 

those offices would not be operating under the Ambassador’s Chief of 

Mission authority.9 Second, African nations expressed concerns about the 

United States exerting greater influence on the continent, as well as the 

potential increase in U.S. military troops in the region. Third, since many 

of the African countries that were being considered for headquarters and 

regional office locations did not have existing infrastructure or the 

resources to support them, DOD officials concluded that locating 

AFRICOM headquarters in Africa would require extensive investments 

and military construction in order to provide appropriate levels of force 

protection and quality of life for assigned personnel. Officials were also 

concerned that if the headquarters were located in Africa, assigned 

 

8

Africa has five regional economic communities, which are the Arab Magreb Union in the 

north, the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of 

Central African States, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in the east, and 

the Southern African Development Community. The African Union, a continent-wide 

intergovernmental organization, established the African Standby Force, which has five 

regional brigades corresponding to each of the regional economic communities. The 

African Standby Force is intended to conduct peacekeeping operations.

9

A Chief of Mission is the principal officer, usually the Ambassador, in charge of a U.S. 

diplomatic mission abroad and has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and 

supervision of all U.S. government executive branch employees in that country, except for 

Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the 

command of a U.S. area military commander. See 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a)(1) and § 3902(3).

Original Plans for 

AFRICOM Called for a 

Headquarters on the 

Continent of Africa
 

Page 7 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

personnel would not be able to have dependents accompany them 

because of limited resources and quality-of-life issues.

Figure 1: DOD’s Original Conception for Establishing Regional Offices in Africa

In 2008, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Program 

Assessment and Evaluation conducted an analysis that considered other 

locations in Europe as well as in the United States for the permanent 

location of AFRICOM headquarters. It compared economic and 

operational factors associated with each of the locations and concluded 

that all of the locations considered were operationally feasible. It also 

concluded that relocating the headquarters to the United States would 

Subsequent DOD Analyses 

Considered Locations in 

Europe and the United 

States as Well as Merging 

Combatant Commands
 

Page 8 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

result in significant savings for DOD.10 However, DOD officials decided to 

defer a decision on the permanent location for AFRICOM headquarters 

until 2012 in order to provide the combatant command with sufficient time 

to stabilize.

In 2011, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the 

Joint Staff conducted a study that considered alternatives to the current 

geographic combatant command structure that could enable the 

department to realize a goal of $900 million in cost reductions between 

fiscal years 2014 and 2017. As part of DOD’s overall effort to reduce 

recurring overhead costs associated with maintaining multiple combatant 

commands, the study considered merging AFRICOM with either U.S. 

European Command (also located in Stuttgart, Germany) or U.S. 

Southern Command (located in Miami, Florida). The study concluded that 

these two options were neither “strategically prudent” nor “fiscally 

advantageous,” stating that combining combatant commands would likely 

result in a diluted effort on key mission sets, and that the costs incurred 

by creating a single merged headquarters would offset the available cost 

reductions. The study additionally found that altering the 

contemporaneous geographic combatant command structure would result 

in cost reductions well below the targeted $900 million. Subsequently, 

DOD determined that it would need to identify other ways to realize its 

goal of finding savings from combatant commands, and the department 

changed the timeframe to fiscal years 2014 through 2018. According to 

Joint Staff officials, DOD would seek to accomplish this goal by reducing 

funding in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2014 across all 

the geographic and functional combatant commands by approximately 

$881 million for fiscal years 2014 through 2018. To realize these savings, 

these officials stated that the department would reduce the number of 

civilian positions at the combatant commands and Joint Staff by 

approximately 400 through fiscal year 2018, but they provided few 

specifics. See figure 2 for a timeline of the courses of action DOD 

considered.

 

10The cost savings estimates from this study are classified, as is the list of cities 

considered as possible headquarters locations. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

Figure 2: Timeline Showing the Courses of Action DOD Has Considered as Possible 

Locations for AFRICOM Headquarters

In January 2013, the Secretary of Defense decided to keep AFRICOM’s 

headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. This decision was made following 

the completion of an analysis directed by the House Armed Services 

Committee in 2011 and conducted by the CAPE office. The purpose of 

the CAPE study was to present the strategic and operational impacts, as 

well as the costs and benefits, associated with moving AFRICOM 

headquarters from its current location to the United States. DOD 

considered two options for the basing of AFRICOM headquarters: (1) 

maintain AFRICOM’s current location in Stuttgart, Germany, or (2) 

relocate AFRICOM headquarters to the United States. However, the 

CAPE study also included a mitigation plan to address strategic and 

operational concerns identified by leadership as factors to consider in the 

In 2013 DOD Decided to 

Keep AFRICOM at Its 

Current Location
 

Page 10 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

event that AFRICOM were relocated to the United States. The main 

findings of the DOD study were as follows:

• The annual recurring cost of maintaining a U.S.-based headquarters 

would be $60 million to $70 million less than the cost of operating the 

headquarters in Stuttgart. The break-even point to recover one-time 

relocation costs to the United States would be reached between 2 and 

6 years after relocation, depending on the costs to establish facilities 

in the United States.

• Relocating AFRICOM to the continental United States could create up 

to 4,300 additional jobs, with an annual impact on the local economy 

ranging from $350 million to $450 million.

• The study stated that the AFRICOM commander had identified access 

to the area of responsibility and to the service component commands 

as critical operational concerns. The study also presented an option 

showing how operational concerns could be mitigated by basing some 

personnel forward in the region. However, it stated that the 

commander had judged that the command would be less effective if 

the headquarters were placed in the United States.

In January 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta wrote to 

congressional leaders notifying them of his decision to retain AFRICOM in 

Stuttgart. In the letter, the Secretary cited the judgment of the AFRICOM 

commander about operational effectiveness as a rationale for retaining 

the command in its current location.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

DOD’s decision to keep AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart was made 

following the issuance of CAPE’s 2012 study, although the extent to 

which DOD officials considered the study when making the decision is 

unclear. The decision, however, was not supported by a well-documented 

economic analysis that balances the operational and cost benefits for the 

options open to DOD. Specifically, the CAPE study does not conform with 

key principles GAO has derived from a variety of cost estimating, 

economic analysis, and budgeting guidance documents, in that (1) it is 

not well-documented, and (2) it does not fully explain why the operational 

benefits of keeping the headquarters in Stuttgart outweigh the benefit of 

potentially saving millions of dollars per year and bringing thousands of 

jobs to the United States.

According to key principles GAO has derived from cost estimating, 

economic analysis, and budgeting guidance, a high-quality and reliable 

cost estimate or economic analysis is, among other things, 

comprehensive and well-documented.11 Additionally, DOD Instruction 

7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decisionmaking, which CAPE officials 

acknowledged using to inform their analysis, states that an economic 

analysis is a systematic approach to the problem of choosing the best 

method of allocating scarce resources to achieve a given objective. The 

instruction further states that the results of the economic analysis, 

including all calculations and sources of data, must be documented down 

to the most basic inputs to provide an auditable and stand-alone 

document. The instruction also states that the costs and benefits 

associated with each alternative under consideration should be quantified 

whenever possible. When this is not possible, the analyst should still 

 

11We reviewed numerous federal guidance documents related to cost estimating, 

accounting standards, economic analysis, and budgeting, and we identified key principles 

that we believe can be applied to CAPE’s analysis of possible locations for AFRICOM 

headquarters. The guidance documents we reviewed include GAO Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009); Office of Management 

and Budget Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget

(Aug. 2011, superseded by an August 2012 issuance); Federal Accounting Standards 4 

(June 2011); Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for 

Decisionmaking (Nov. 7, 1995); and Department of Defense Financial Management 

Regulation 7000.14R, Volume 4, Chapter 22, Cost Finding (May 2010). We believe that 

these documents collectively contain broad themes that can be applied to evaluating cost 

analyses. 

DOD’s Decision to 

Keep AFRICOM 

Headquarters in 

Stuttgart Is Not 

Supported by an 

Analysis That 

Balances Operational 

Costs and Benefits for 

a Full Range of 

Options 

Analyses to Support Major 

Decisions Should Be WellDocumented and Fully 

Explain Rationale
 

Page 12 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

attempt to document significant qualitative costs and benefits and, at a 

minimum, discuss these costs and benefits in narrative format. CAPE 

officials agreed that DOD Instruction 7041.3 provides reasonable 

principles to apply in conducting a cost analysis, but officials stated that, 

as the independent analytic organization for the department, CAPE 

reserves the right to conduct analysis as it deems appropriate to inform 

specific decisions.

In April 2013, after the decision had been made to maintain AFRICOM 

headquarters in Stuttgart, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called on 

DOD to challenge all past assumptions in order to seek cost savings and 

efficiencies in “a time of unprecedented shifts in the world order, new 

global challenges, and deep global fiscal uncertainty,” to explore the full 

range of options for implementing U.S. national security strategy, and to 

“put everything on the table.”

12 In particular, the Secretary stated that the 

size and shape of the military forces should constantly be reassessed. He 

stated that this reassessment should include determining the most 

appropriate balance between forward-stationed, rotationally deployed, 

and home-based forces.

CAPE’s 2012 report describes strategic and operational factors that were 

considered when determining whether to place AFRICOM headquarters 

in the United States or keep it in its present location, and it includes 

estimates of annual recurring and one-time costs associated with each 

option. However, the analysis does not include enough narrative 

explanation to allow an independent third party to fully evaluate its 

methodology. Further, in our follow-up discussions, CAPE officials could 

not provide us with sufficient documentation for us to determine how they 

had developed their list of strategic and operational benefits or calculated 

cost savings and other economic benefits. CAPE officials told us that they 

did not have documentation to show how raw source data had been 

analyzed and compiled for the report.

The CAPE report, entitled “U.S. Africa Command Basing Alternatives,” 

dated October 2012, consists of 28 pages of briefing slides. It includes a 

discussion of the study’s assumptions and methodology, along with the 

 

12Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the National Defense University, Ft. McNair, 

Washington, D.C., Apr. 3, 2013.

CAPE’s Analysis Was Not 

Well-Documented
 

Page 13 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

one-time and recurring costs of each option. The report presents a table 

summarizing the strategic and operational factors that were considered 

when determining whether to retain AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart 

or move it to the United States. The table indicates that the most critical 

factors for a combatant command headquarters are for it to have access 

to its area of responsibility, partners, and organizations, as well as to 

have access to service components and forces. Working groups of DOD 

officials had compiled a list of factors considered important for a 

combatant command and had selected the factors they considered 

“critical.” The list included access to the Pentagon, interagency partners, 

analytic intelligence capabilities, and European partners, including the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); ability to recruit and retain 

civilian personnel, embed personnel from other agencies, and leverage 

U.S.-based non-governmental organizations; and ability to operate 

independently without the need for agreement from a host country.

However, the CAPE report contains limited explanation of how these 

factors were developed or why access to Africa and proximity to its 

service component commands were judged to be most critical. In followup discussions, CAPE officials told us that when they began their study 

they formed working groups to compile an authoritative list of strategic 

and operational factors critical to the operation of a combatant command 

headquarters, and that the groups independently developed similar 

factors, thereby verifying the comprehensiveness of the list and its 

relevance. However, CAPE officials provided no documentation of the 

meetings of these groups, the sources used to develop the factors, or the 

process used to arrive at a consensus in ranking the factors in terms of 

their criticality. According to CAPE officials, the reason they did not 

develop such documentation is that they viewed the study to be a 

straightforward analysis intended to be easily digestible for its policymaker audience. CAPE officials told us that if they had anticipated an 

outside review of the study and its analysis, they would have documented 

the study differently. We therefore could not evaluate the methodology 

used in developing or ranking the operational and strategic factors 

presented in the CAPE study. Such an explanation is important, however, 

since operational and strategic factors were judged to outweigh cost 

savings and other economic benefits. Also, while proximity to Africa and 

to service component commands were ranked as the most important 

criteria for determining where to place the headquarters, some of the 

service components that were created to support the establishment of 

AFRICOM were originally located in Europe so that they would be close 

to the command headquarters.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

For similar reasons, we were not able to determine the 

comprehensiveness, accuracy, or credibility of CAPE’s cost estimates.

The report itself does not provide sufficient explanation of how the costs 

were calculated or the effect of the various assumptions on the estimated 

costs for us to assess the estimates. Specifically, the report does not 

provide the sources of the cost estimates or the methodology used in 

calculating them. In follow-up discussions, CAPE officials explained that 

support for their calculations included e-mails and phone calls.

Finally, the study presented estimates of the economic benefits that could 

accrue to a local community if the command were relocated to the 

continental United States, but it is unclear how these estimates were 

factored into the Secretary of Defense’s decision. In discussing the costs 

of the alternatives, the CAPE study presents a summary of one-time 

costs, including construction and the transfer of personnel and materiel.

The study states that relocating AFRICOM to the continental United 

States may create up to 4,300 jobs (in addition to those of AFRICOM 

personnel), with a $350 million to $450 million a year impact on the local 

economy. However, the study does not explain how these possible 

savings were calculated, and CAPE officials could not explain how this 

analysis had been factored into the Secretary of Defense’s decision.

CAPE’s analysis estimated that the annual cost of providing AFRICOM 

personnel with overseas housing and cost-of-living pay was $81 million 

per year, as compared with the $19 million to $25 million these would cost 

if the personnel were located in the United States. These costs 

associated with stationing military and civilian personnel overseas 

comprise the bulk of the savings from CAPE’s analysis. Although CAPE 

officials did not provide us with documentation for us to assess the 

accuracy and completeness of their cost estimates, they are comparable 

with those developed in OSD’s 2008 analysis.13 Moreover, our analysis 

confirmed that savings would be likely for both military and civilian 

personnel if the headquarters were located in the United States. For 

example, our analysis indicates that, conservatively, DOD could save 

from $5 million to $15 million per year overall on reduced housing 

allowances for military personnel, depending on where in the United 

 

13The OSD 2008 analysis is classified; therefore, we cannot provide details. 

Housing and Cost-of-Living 

Allowances Are the Main 

Drivers of Additional Costs 

Associated with Overseas 

Headquarters
 

Page 15 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

States they were located.14 In addition, an AFRICOM document states 

that the command spent more than $30 million in fiscal year 2011 on 

overseas housing benefits for civilian personnel, which they would not 

receive if they were stationed in the United States.

In its 2012 study, DOD tasked CAPE with analyzing two options—keeping 

AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart or moving it to a generic location in 

one of the four U.S. time zones. CAPE analysts also considered 

establishing a forward operating headquarters so as to allay concerns 

about a diminished forward presence if AFRICOM headquarters were 

located in the United States. In CAPE’s scenario, the forward 

headquarters would be staffed with about 25 personnel but would be 

rapidly expandable. It would also place an additional 20 personnel in 

existing component command headquarters. CAPE officials estimate that 

the annual recurring costs for the forward-deployed element would be $13 

million, with a one-time cost of $8 million. CAPE added these estimates to 

its overall estimate of how much it would cost to move AFRICOM 

headquarters to the United States.

In CAPE’s summary of its findings, however, there is no discussion of 

how this factored into the commander’s conclusion when he stated his 

preference, or of how the CAPE study had factored into the Secretary of 

Defense’s final decision. Operating with a U.S. headquarters with forward 

locations is the way in which the U.S. Central Command and U.S. 

Southern Command operate from their respective headquarters in 

Tampa, Florida, and Miami, Florida. The Central Command, for example, 

has a forward operating location in Qatar, and the Southern Command 

has forward locations in Honduras and El Salvador. AFRICOM already 

has a command element at a forward location—Combined Joint Task 

Force - Horn of Africa. According to Task Force officials, there are about 

1,800 personnel temporarily assigned to this site at Camp Lemonnier, 

Djibouti. In 2012, the Navy submitted a master plan to Congress listing 

$1.4 billion in planned improvements to that site.

. 

 

14We did not assess the eligibility of personnel for housing allowances. Instead, for 

comparison purposes only, our calculations assume that all members would be eligible for 

housing allowances at both European and continental U.S. locations. 

DOD’s Decision Did Not 

Fully Explain Why Having 

a Forward Presence Could 

Not Mitigate the 

Disadvantages of Having a 

U.S. Headquarters
 

Page 16 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

When we asked AFRICOM staff about the specific operational benefits of 

having its headquarters located in Stuttgart, they cited the following: (1) it 

takes less time to travel to Africa from Stuttgart than it would from the 

United States; (2) it is easier to interact with partners in Africa from 

Stuttgart because they are in the same or similar time zones; and (3) it is 

easier to interact with AFRICOM’s service components because they all 

are in Europe, and because the U.S. European Command headquarters 

is also in Stuttgart. An AFRICOM briefing, however, indicated that the 

strategic risk of relocating the headquarters to the United States would be 

“minimal,” and also stated that establishing a forward headquarters could 

mitigate strategic and operational risks. CAPE officials also stated that 

maintaining AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart makes it easier for 

AFRICOM to share resources at the service component level with the 

U.S. European Command, and that AFRICOM’s sharing service 

components with the European Command makes it unique among the 

combatant commands. During our site visits, however, European 

Command officials told us that the two commands do not share 

personnel, even though two of the components are dual-hatted.

In its analysis, CAPE calculated the likely increase in hours that would be 

spent in traveling from the headquarters location to Africa if the 

headquarters were relocated to the United States. CAPE also estimated 

that if AFRICOM headquarters were relocated to the United States, the 

number of trips to Africa would likely remain the same. We believe that 

the number of trips to the United States would decrease. However, CAPE 

did not analyze travel patterns by individual AFRICOM staff. Our interview 

with AFRICOM officials and our review of travel patterns of AFRICOM 

staff indicate that being closer to Africa may offer few benefits for many 

personnel. For example, according to AFRICOM officials, 70 percent of 

AFRICOM staff travel infrequently. As a result, these staff could be 

relocated in the United States without negative effects. This is because 

the AFRICOM staff includes many support personnel–-accountants, 

personnel specialists, information technology experts, and planners, 

among other staff—who do their jobs primarily at the headquarters. 

(Appendix 1 shows a detailed breakdown of AFRICOM staff by mission 

area.) In addition, our independent analysis found that about 60 percent 

of AFRICOM headquarters staff’s travel in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 

was to locations in the United States or within Europe. In fiscal year 2011, 

for example, AFRICOM spent $4.8 million on travel to the United States 

and $3.9 million on travel to other locations in Europe, while it spent about 

$5.2 million on travel to Africa (see figure 3). AFRICOM officials told us 

that travel to other parts of Europe includes trips to Berlin to obtain visas 

and passports, as well as to planning meetings with its components and 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

other partners. If AFRICOM headquarters were to be relocated in the 

United States, the costs associated with travel to U.S. locations would 

likely be reduced. While some costs for official travel throughout Europe 

could increase, the travel that involves administrative tasks such as 

obtaining visas would be eliminated. In fiscal year 2011, this travel 

consumed almost one-third of all AFRICOM travel expenditures.

Figure 3: AFRICOM Travel Costs for Fiscal Year 2011

Moreover, the view that AFRICOM could perform its mission from the 

United States is supportable, in part, because other combatant 

commands have operated successfully with a U.S.-based headquarters.

During our review, we met with U.S Central Command and U.S. Southern 

Command officials to understand the extent to which their headquarters 

location in the United States affects them operationally. Officials 

expressed various opinions regarding the benefits of forward stationing 

personnel, and added that they are able to address time-zone and travel 

challenges. Central Command officials also explained that they manage 

partner relationships (including with NATO partners), overcome time-zone 

challenges, and travel to remote locations in their area of responsibility 

from their headquarters location in Tampa, Florida. They also stated that 

although they can quickly relocate personnel to a forward location in 

Qatar when needed, most of the headquarters staff does not need to be 

physically located in their area of responsibility in order to carry out their 

functions. A U.S. Southern Command official told us that they use video 

teleconferences with the components when they need to communicate 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

with them. He also told us that the command has a forward presence in 

Honduras and in El Salvador.

Neither the CAPE study nor the letter accompanying it when it was 

transmitted to Congress in January 2013 provides a complete explanation 

of why DOD decided that the operational benefits associated with 

remaining in Stuttgart outweigh the associated costs. Past studies 

conducted or commissioned by DOD, however, suggest that a more 

thorough approach to analyzing costs and benefits is possible. For 

example, unlike the 2012 analysis, DOD’s 2008 analysis of potential 

AFRICOM locations ranked each location according to how it fared 

against cost and operational factors. While the analysis made no 

recommendation and stated that Germany was superior to all of the 

considered U.S. locations based on factors other than cost, it concluded 

that any of the examined locations would be an operationally feasible 

choice, and that U.S. locations were routinely and significantly cheaper to 

maintain than overseas bases.

Moreover, a 1994 study was initiated by the U.S. Southern Command and 

validated by a committee appointed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

to review and refine the analysis. The committee included the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, the Principal 

Deputy Comptroller, and the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint 

Staff. The Committee’s final report quantified and prioritized operational 

benefits to determine where in the United States to place the U.S. 

Southern Command headquarters when it was required to move from 

Panama. Although this study did not consider overseas locations and 

assumed that remaining in Panama was not an option, it nevertheless 

stands as an example of a more transparent approach to weighing costs 

and operational concerns. This study examined 126 sites in the United 

States and then narrowed the possibilities based on criteria that 

addressed the mission and quality of life for assigned personnel. The 

names of the locations under consideration were “masked” to ensure that 

the criteria were applied objectively. As a result, six locations were 

chosen as most desirable: Tampa, Atlanta, New Orleans, Miami, Puerto 

Rico, and Washington, D.C. Visits were made to each of the locations 

and the final tallying of scores, including consideration of costs, showed 

that Miami was the preferred choice. The committee expanded the 

analysis through additional evaluation of Southern Command’s mission 

requirements and quality of life issues. Once its analysis was complete, 

the committee briefed the Deputy Secretary of Defense on its findings 

and conclusions based on three criteria: mission effectiveness, quality of 

Other DOD Studies 

Provide Examples of a 

More Transparent 

Approach for Comparing 

Cost and Operational 

Factors Associated with 

Basing Decisions
 

Page 19 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

life, and cost. In summary, the committee stated that if mission 

effectiveness was the most important of the three criteria, then Miami was 

clearly the superior location. If quality of life was the most important, then 

Washington was the leading candidate. If cost was the most important 

consideration, then New Orleans was the leading candidate. The 

committee’s recommendation was for the Secretary of Defense and the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense to select the final Southern Command 

relocation site from among those three candidate cities.

Finally, a 2013 RAND study conducted in response to a congressional 

requirement for DOD to commission an independent assessment of the 

overseas basing presence of U.S. forces provides several examples of 

principles that can be used to determine where to geographically place 

personnel so that they can most effectively be employed.15 For example, 

the study states that, because basing personnel in overseas locations is 

generally more expensive than basing them in the United States, DOD 

could consider configuring its forward-based forces overseas so that they 

can provide the initial response to a conflict, while placing in the United 

States the forces that will provide follow-up support. To inform the 

assessment of overseas forces, RAND examined how overseas posture 

translates to benefits, the risks that it poses, the cost of maintaining it, 

and how these costs would likely change if the U.S. overseas presence 

were to be modified in different ways—for example, by changing from a 

permanent to a rotational presence.

DOD’s letter describing the January 2013 decision to maintain the 

command in Stuttgart was based on operational benefits that are not 

clearly laid out, and it is unclear how cost savings and economic benefits 

were considered in the decision. DOD’s analysis stated that significant 

savings and economic benefits would result if the command were 

relocated to the United States, and our independent analyses confirmed 

that significant savings are possible. Moreover, the decision does not 

explain why using a small contingent of personnel stationed forward 

would not mitigate operational concerns. Our analysis of travel patterns 

and staff composition raises questions about why the AFRICOM staff 

 

15RAND Corporation, Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of 

Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits (Santa Monica: CA 90407), 2013. The 

requirement for DOD to commission the assessment appeared in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 347 (2011). 

Conclusions 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

needs to be located overseas, because not all staff would benefit from 

being closer to Africa—especially when other combatant commands 

operate with their headquarters in the United States. Key principles that 

GAO has derived for economic analysis and cost estimating, as well as a 

DOD instruction containing principles for certain types of economic 

analysis, suggest that the department’s rationale should be detailed and 

the study underpinning it should be comprehensive and well-documented.

Since making the decision to keep AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, 

the Department of Defense has sought to fundamentally rethink how the 

department does business in an era of increasingly constrained fiscal 

resources. Until the costs and benefits of maintaining AFRICOM in 

Germany are specified and weighed against the costs and economic 

benefits of moving the command, the department may be missing an 

opportunity to accomplish its missions successfully at a significantly lower 

cost. 

To enable the department to meet its Africa-related missions at the least 

cost, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense conduct a more 

comprehensive and well-documented analysis of options for the 

permanent placement of the headquarters for AFRICOM, including 

documentation as to whether the operational benefits of each option 

outweigh the costs. These options should include placing some 

AFRICOM headquarters personnel in forward locations, while moving 

others to the United States. In conducting this assessment, the Secretary 

should follow key principles GAO has derived for such studies, as well as 

principles found in DOD Instruction 7041.3, to help ensure that the results 

are comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. Should 

DOD determine that maintaining a location in Stuttgart is the best course 

of action, the Secretary of Defense should provide a detailed description 

of why the operational or other benefits outweigh the costs and benefits of 

relocating the command.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the 2012 

CAPE study met the requirements of the House Armed Services 

Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2012. DOD stated that the CAPE study was not intended 

to be a comprehensive analysis to determine the optimal location for 

AFRICOM’s headquarters. Rather, DOD believed that the study provided 

sufficient detail to support the specific questions posed in the National 

Defense Authorization Act. While the CAPE office did present the 

estimated costs of relocating AFRICOM’s headquarters, the National 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 21 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

Defense Authorization Act directing DOD to conduct this study specifically 

urged DOD to conduct this basing review “in an open and transparent 

manner consistent with the processes established for such a major 

review.” As we state in the body of our report, the CAPE study did not 

provide sufficient detail to support its methodology and cost estimates for 

a third party to validate the study’s findings. Moreover, DOD’s own 

guidance on conducting an economic analysis states that such an 

analysis should be transparent and serve as a stand-alone document.

DOD also stated that Secretary Panetta’s decision not to relocate the 

AFRICOM headquarters to the United States was based largely on the 

combatant commanders’ military judgment, which is not easily 

quantifiable. We recognize that military judgment is not easily 

quantifiable. However, we continue to believe that an accurate and 

reliable analysis should provide a more complete explanation of how 

operational benefits and costs were weighed, especially in light of the 

potential cost savings that DOD is deciding to forego.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD stated that to 

meet the requirements of the Budget Control Act, the Department of 

Defense will consider a wide range of options. If any of these options 

require additional analysis of the location of AFRICOM headquarters, 

DOD said that it will conduct a comprehensive and well-documented 

analysis. We continue to believe that such an analysis is needed. 

Because of the current tight fiscal climate and the Secretary of Defense’s 

continual urging that DOD identify additional opportunities for achieving 

efficiencies and cost savings, DOD should reassess the option of 

relocating AFRICOM’s headquarters to the United States. 

The department’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the 

Secretary of State. The report will also be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III.

John H. Pendleton

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 23 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Authorized Personnel at AFRICOM

Page 24 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

Note: Authorized military and civilian positions represent positions identified by DOD as approved, 

funded manpower requirements at the geographic command. Numbers in this table do not include 

numbers of foreign nationals employed by AFRICOM.

Appendix I: Authorized Personnel at 

AFRICOM 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 26 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO-13-646 Defense Headquarters

John Pendleton, Director, (202) 512-3489

In addition to the contact named above, Guy LoFaro, Assistant Director; 

Nicole Harris; Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; Beverly Schladt; Mike 

Shaughnessy; Amie Steele; Grant Sutton; and Cheryl Weissman made 

major contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(351748)
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