In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 31, 2023

S23Y0579. IN THE MATTER OF BRIAN WALTON WHITESIDE.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and 

recommendation of special master Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, who 

recommends that the Court accept the amended petition for voluntary 

discipline filed by respondent Brian Walton Whiteside (State Bar No. 

756040) after the filing of a formal complaint, see Bar Rule 4-227 (c), 

and impose a three-month suspension as discipline for his violation of 

various Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), see Bar Rule 

4-102 (d), in two separate matters undertaken for the same client. 

Neither the State Bar nor Whiteside has filed exceptions to the special 

master’s report, and we agree that the imposition of a three-month 

suspension is appropriate under the specific facts of this case. 

According to the report and recommendation, Whiteside had a 

career in law enforcement prior to becoming a member of the Bar in 
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1996, at which point he engaged in private practice, primarily 

representing defendants charged in criminal cases. In 2018, he was 

elected as the Solicitor General for Gwinnett County—a position he 

held through January 1, 2023. Prior to his election, in January 2015, 

Whiteside agreed to represent a friend who was in law enforcement in 

a medical malpractice case that arose from the client’s December 2014 

visit to the emergency room at Piedmont Newnan Hospital. In 

February 2015, Whiteside sent a one-paragraph letter with the 

salutation: “Piedmont Legal Staff,” demanding, on the client’s behalf, 

five million dollars for “Grave Damage, Physical Harm, Mental Harm, 

Sexual Dysfunction,” but including no date of medical treatment, no 

information about the diagnosis or treatment, no names of the treating 

professionals, and no explanation of how the client’s treatment at the 

hospital caused the various general harms described. As noted, the 

letter was not directed to any individual, and, although it stated that 

it had been delivered by electronic mail “and/or” hand delivery, it bore 

no email address or physical address to which it was purportedly sent. 

Whiteside did not charge the client for this work. After sending the 

letter, Whiteside told the client that he had met with the hospital’s 
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lawyers over multiple days regarding the client’s claims, but he later 

admitted to the client that the statement was untrue. Over the ensuing 

months and years, the client made numerous requests for information 

about his legal matter but his requests went unanswered, and, finally, 

in late 2018, he checked the court’s electronic docket and discovered 

that no case had been filed on his behalf. He contacted Whiteside, who 

responded by attempting to file a medical malpractice complaint in 

Fulton County in December 2018, but Whiteside named the defendant 

incorrectly and failed to include the expert affidavit required by OCGA 

§ 9-11-9.1 (a). And, more importantly, the statute of limitations 

already had expired on the client’s claims. Ultimately, the case was 

dismissed in February 2019, but Whiteside did not advise the client of 

the dismissal. Instead, the client only learned that his case had been 

dismissed when he contacted the court and made an inquiry. The 

special master noted Whiteside’s claim that he sent the names of 

potential experts to the client so that he could hire one for the case, 

but noted that there was no correspondence from Whiteside to the 

client notifying him about the date that the statute of limitations 

would expire or clearly advising him that his malpractice case 
4

depended upon his obtaining an expert who could make the averments 

required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). These failures, the special master 

concluded, were the result of Whiteside not having an adequate 

understanding of how to prosecute a medical malpractice claim.

In June 2015, Whiteside agreed to file and litigate a divorce 

action on behalf of the same client for $450. Although Whiteside filed 

the action in February 2016, he failed to serve the wife or to take any 

other action with respect to the case. The client made multiple 

requests for information about his divorce case, but Whiteside failed to 

respond to any of those inquiries. In February 2019, the client texted 

Whiteside once again asking about the status of the case and 

Whiteside responded that he had been elected to be the Solicitor 

General and that he was looking for an attorney to handle the divorce 

case, but Whiteside never found a new attorney and never withdrew 

from the representation. Eventually, the client was forced to hire 

substitute counsel to represent him in the divorce case. 

Noting that Whiteside admitted all of the above facts and 

acknowledged that he should have declined to represent the client, 

particularly in the medical malpractice case, since he did not possess 
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the requisite skills or experience to handle the case, the special master 

accepted Whiteside’s admission that, during the course of his 

representation of the client in both the medical malpractice case and 

in the divorce case, he violated Rules 1.1 (“lawyer shall provide 

competent representation to a client” and “shall not handle a matter 

which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer’s level 

of competence without associating another lawyer who the original 

lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in 

question”), 1.3 (“lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 

promptness in representing a client”), 1.4 (lawyer shall “reasonably 

consult with the client”; “keep the client reasonably informed about the 

status of [his] matter”; and “promptly comply with reasonable requests 

for information”), 1.16 (d) (upon termination of representation, lawyer 

shall take steps “to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a 

client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, and 

allowing time for employment of other counsel”), 3.2 (“lawyer shall 

make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 

interests of the client”), and 8.4 (a) (4) (lawyer shall not “engage in 

professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
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misrepresentation”) of the GRPC. The special master noted that the 

maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is 

disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.4, 

1.16 (d), and 3.2 is a public reprimand.

In evaluating the appropriate discipline, the special master first 

acknowledged that this Court looks to the ABA Standards for Imposing 

Lawyer Discipline (“ABA Standards”) for guidance in determining the 

appropriate sanction to impose on a lawyer for his or her violations of 

the GRPC, see In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) 

(1996), and noted that under ABA Standard § 3.0, the factors to 

consider in determining a sanction include the duty violated, the 

lawyer’s mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the 

lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating and/or

mitigating factors. The special master concluded that most of 

Whiteside’s violations implicate the duties that lawyers owe to their 

clients: diligence, competence, and candor. See ABA Standards, §§ 4.4, 

4.5, and 4.6. She noted that, with respect to Whiteside’s violations of 

Rule 1.1, a suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages 

in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he is not competent 
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and causes injury to the client. ABA Standard, § 4.52. The special 

master considered Whiteside’s admissions that he had no experience 

in medical malpractice cases and that he should have at least 

consulted an attorney with the requisite experience before accepting 

the client’s medical malpractice case. She also considered the fact that 

Whiteside’s numerous mistakes in prosecuting the case ultimately led 

to the dismissal of the client’s lawsuit and to the loss of his right to 

pursue legal relief for any damages he suffered. 

With regard to Whiteside’s violations of Rules 1.3 and 3.2, the 

special master recited ABA Standard § 4.42, which provides that 

suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to 

perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a 

client, or a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect that causes injury or 

potential injury. She recited that, here, Whiteside failed to file the 

medical malpractice action within the statute of limitations and failed 

to serve the defendant in the divorce case.1 The special master pointed

 

1 The special master recited Whiteside’s assertions that he met with the 

client’s wife in December 2016, but she would not acknowledge the complaint; 

that his attempts to have her served failed; that the client reported that he 
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out that, regardless of whether Whiteside knowingly abandoned the 

divorce case or negligently failed to give it due attention, he knowingly 

did not perform the services he had agreed to undertake, and held that 

his failures in these cases constituted both a knowing failure to 

perform necessary services for a client and a pattern of neglect of the 

client’s legal matters. 

Relating to the violations of Rule 1.4, the special master recited 

ABA Standard § 4.63, which provides that a reprimand is generally 

appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to provide a client with 

accurate or complete information and causes injury or potential injury 

to the client. She then recounted that Whiteside failed to respond to 

the client’s inquires as to either of his cases; failed to explain the 

statute of limitations applicable in the medical malpractice action; and 

failed to inform the client that his malpractice action had been 

dismissed. The special master determined that, giving Whiteside the 

benefit of the doubt, these failures could be seen as negligent rather 

 

received an occasional text or call from his estranged wife, who was periodically 

homeless; and that, although the wife stated that she would file something on 

her own with the court, she never did so.
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than knowing or intentional, but that the violations were still serious 

since confidence in the legal system is hurt when a client has to find 

out on his own that his case had been dismissed and because the client

was injured as the result of Whiteside’s actions. With regard to the 

violation of Rule 1.16 (d), the special master found that the duty 

violated was one owed to the legal profession and that suspension was 

the presumptive sanction when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct 

that is a violation of that duty and thereby causes injury or potential 

injury to a client, the public, or the legal profession. See ABA Standard 

§ 7.2. She recited that, here, Whiteside failed to give his client notice 

of his withdrawal from the divorce case, or to formally withdraw from 

that representation. With regard to Whiteside’s violation of Rule 8.4 

(a) (4) by falsely telling his client that he had met with the hospital’s 

lawyers, the special master found that Whiteside violated his duty to 

his client to refrain from engaging in deceit or misrepresentation and 

that a suspension is the presumptive sanction when a lawyer 

knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to 

the client. See ABA Standard § 4.62.
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The special master then considered whether the presumptive 

discipline should be enhanced (or reduced) by virtue of the existence of 

aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In aggravation, the special 

master found that, by his actions in these cases, Whiteside engaged in 

multiple offenses and in a pattern of misconduct, and that he has 

substantial experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard § 9.22 

(c), (d), (i). In mitigation, the special master noted that Whiteside had 

no prior disciplinary history; that, although he took some steps in an 

attempt to cover up his mistakes, he lacked a dishonest or selfish 

motive (having agreed to represent the client as a favor to a fellow law 

enforcement officer, charging him nothing for the medical malpractice 

case and a flat fee of $450 for the divorce case); that he was 

experiencing personal and emotional problems as a result of his 

responsibility for caring for his dying mother out of state; that 

Whiteside fully cooperated in the disciplinary process and admitted his 

violations; that Whiteside had demonstrated that he possesses good 

character and reputation as demonstrated by his history of serving the 

public through various law enforcement positions and by the various 

letters from people in the community attesting to his good character 
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and reputation;2 and that Whiteside has demonstrated remorse for his 

misconduct. ABA Standard § 9.32 (a), (b), (c), (e), (g) and (l).

The special master then noted that for similar violations, this 

Court has imposed sanctions that run the gamut from public 

reprimand to suspension to disbarment,

3 suggesting that the 

appropriate sanction for such behavior is highly fact-dependent. 

 

2 Specifically, the special master referenced letters Whiteside attached 

to his amended petition from seven members of the public, two of whom were 

attorneys, and all of whom attested to his honesty, good character, and 

commitment to his community. 

3 See In the Matter of Bell, 313 Ga. 615 (872 SE2d 290) (2022) 

(disbarment, e.g., for lawyer’s failure to act diligently and adequately 

communicate with client; lawyer made numerous misrepresentations to client, 

exhibited a dishonest or selfish motive, and had two instances of prior 

discipline and failed to respond to the Bar’s motion for summary judgment); In 

Matter of Golub, 313 Ga. 686 (872 SE2d 699) (2022) (one-year suspension for 

lawyer who failed to complete legal work and failed to adequately communicate 

with client; one instance of prior discipline); In the Matter of Van Johnson, 313 

Ga. 151 (868 SE2d 794) (2022) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and 

imposing six-month suspension for lawyer with no prior disciplinary history

who misappropriated, but repaid, client funds and who failed to perform 

diligently or to adequately communicate with two clients); In the Matter of 

Kirby, 312 Ga. 341 (862 SE2d 550) (2021) (accepting fourth petition for 

voluntary discipline and imposing six-month suspension for lawyer, with one 

prior instance of discipline, who neglected and mishandled multiple client 

matters over several years); In the Matter of Gantt, 302 Ga. 3 (804 SE2d 336) 

(2017) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing public 

reprimand for lawyer with no prior disciplinary history, who failed to notify a 

client of the dismissal of a lawsuit and failed to timely file a renewal action).
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Noting that Whiteside had requested a public reprimand, but had 

agreed to accept up to a three-month suspension from the practice of 

law as discipline for his misconduct, the special master indicated that 

a reprimand might have been appropriate if Whiteside’s misconduct 

was solely the result of negligence, but that, here, Whiteside accepted 

the malpractice case knowing that he had no relevant experience; his 

false statement was knowing, if not intentional; his failure to inform 

his client about the statute of limitations was knowing; his filing of the 

malpractice complaint without the required affidavit and after the 

statute of limitations had expired suggested that Whiteside acted 

knowingly and intentionally to cover up his mistakes; and his failure 

to advise his client that his malpractice action had been dismissed was 

done knowingly and as part of a pattern of behavior intended to hide 

his misconduct. The special master concluded that, while the knowing 

and intentional nature of Whiteside’s actions rendered a reprimand an 

inadequate sanction, the mitigating factors suggested that a short 

suspension would be appropriate discipline. For those reasons, the 

special master recommended that this Court grant Whiteside’s 
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amended petition for voluntary discipline and impose a three-month 

suspension as discipline for his misconduct.

Having reviewed the record in this case, this Court agrees that a 

three-month suspension is appropriate in this matter, given 

Whiteside’s lack of any prior discipline, his full cooperation in these 

disciplinary proceedings, and the other mitigating factors identified by 

the special master. See In the Matter of Powell, 289 Ga. 215 (710 SE2d 

145) (2011) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing 

three-month suspension for attorney’s violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 

3.2; no prior disciplinary history). Because there are no conditions on

Whiteside’s reinstatement other than the passage of time, there is no 

need for him to take any action either through the State Bar or through 

this Court to effectuate his return to the practice of law. Instead, the 

suspension based on this opinion will take effect as of the date this 

opinion is issued and will expire by its own terms three months later. 

Whiteside is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Three-month 

suspension. All the Justices concur.