# Official Journal L 12/2022

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 12 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6519 January 2022 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 12

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6519 January 2022

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| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/68 of 27 October 2021 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards authorised oenological practices | 1 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/69 of 12 January 2022 approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (Heumilch/Haymilk/Latte fieno/Lait de foin/Leche de heno (TSG)) | 30 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/70 of 12 January 2022 approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (Schaf-Heumilch/Sheep’s Haymilk/Latte fieno di pecora/Lait de foin de brebis/Leche de heno de oveja (TSG)) | 31 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/71 of 12 January 2022 approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (Ziegen-Heumilch/Goat’s Haymilk/Latte fieno di capra/Lait de foin de chèvre/Leche de heno de cabra (TSG)) | 33 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/72 of 18 January 2022 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China | 34 |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | * | Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/73 of 18 January 2022 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 as regards authorisation to Hungary to apply for a further period the special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax | 148 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/74 of 17 January 2022 setting out the list of Interreg programmes and indicating the global amount of the total support from the European Regional Development Fund and from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme and the list of the amounts transferred between strands under the European territorial cooperation goal for the period 2021 to 2027
  (notified under document C(2022) 131) | 151 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/75 of 17 January 2022 setting out the list of Interreg programme areas to receive support from the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments of the Union, broken down by strand and Interreg programme under the European territorial cooperation goal
  (notifed under document C(2022)109) | 164 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/68 of 27 October 2021 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards authorised oenological practices

1

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/69 of 12 January 2022 approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (Heumilch/Haymilk/Latte fieno/Lait de foin/Leche de heno (TSG))

30

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/70 of 12 January 2022 approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (Schaf-Heumilch/Sheep’s Haymilk/Latte fieno di pecora/Lait de foin de brebis/Leche de heno de oveja (TSG))

31

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/71 of 12 January 2022 approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (Ziegen-Heumilch/Goat’s Haymilk/Latte fieno di capra/Lait de foin de chèvre/Leche de heno de cabra (TSG))

33

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/72 of 18 January 2022 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China

34

DECISIONS

*

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/73 of 18 January 2022 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 as regards authorisation to Hungary to apply for a further period the special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax

148

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/74 of 17 January 2022 setting out the list of Interreg programmes and indicating the global amount of the total support from the European Regional Development Fund and from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme and the list of the amounts transferred between strands under the European territorial cooperation goal for the period 2021 to 2027
  (notified under document C(2022) 131)

(notified under document C(2022) 131)

151

*

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/75 of 17 January 2022 setting out the list of Interreg programme areas to receive support from the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments of the Union, broken down by strand and Interreg programme under the European territorial cooperation goal
  (notifed under document C(2022)109)

(notifed under document C(2022)109)

164

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
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EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

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II Non-legislative acts

REGULATIONS

| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/1 |
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19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/1

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COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2022/68

of 27 October 2021

amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards authorised oenological practices

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1), and in particular Articles 75(2) and 80(4) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 (2) lays down rules supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 concerning wine-growing areas where the alcoholic strength may be increased, authorised oenological practices and restrictions applicable to the production and conservation of grapevine products, the minimum percentage of alcohol for by-products and their disposal, and publication of the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) files. |
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(1)

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 (2) lays down rules supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 concerning wine-growing areas where the alcoholic strength may be increased, authorised oenological practices and restrictions applicable to the production and conservation of grapevine products, the minimum percentage of alcohol for by-products and their disposal, and publication of the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) files.

| (2) | Article 2 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 defines the wine-growing areas where wines may have a maximum total alcoholic strength of 20 % vol. The wines ‘Vin de pays de Franche-Comté’ and ‘Vin de pays du Val de Loire’ referred to in that Article have changed names. That Article should be amended accordingly. |
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(2)

Article 2 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 defines the wine-growing areas where wines may have a maximum total alcoholic strength of 20 % vol. The wines ‘Vin de pays de Franche-Comté’ and ‘Vin de pays du Val de Loire’ referred to in that Article have changed names. That Article should be amended accordingly.

| (3) | Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 sets out the list of authorised oenological practices and restrictions applicable to the production and conservation of grapevine products falling within the scope of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, as referred to in Article 80(1) of that Regulation. Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 lays down the authorised oenological processes and the conditions and limits of their use. Table 2 of that Part lays down the authorised oenological compounds and the conditions and limits of their use. Tables 1 and 2 should be supplemented to take account of technical progress, in particular in relation to resolutions adopted by the OIV in 2019, 2020 and 2021. In addition, some of the information provided in those Tables should be further clarified and its coherence should be improved. |
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(3)

Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 sets out the list of authorised oenological practices and restrictions applicable to the production and conservation of grapevine products falling within the scope of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, as referred to in Article 80(1) of that Regulation. Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 lays down the authorised oenological processes and the conditions and limits of their use. Table 2 of that Part lays down the authorised oenological compounds and the conditions and limits of their use. Tables 1 and 2 should be supplemented to take account of technical progress, in particular in relation to resolutions adopted by the OIV in 2019, 2020 and 2021. In addition, some of the information provided in those Tables should be further clarified and its coherence should be improved.

| (4) | To improve clarity and better inform the producers of grapevine products using authorised oenological processes, an additional column should be added in Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. That column should list the categories of wine products in the production of which an oenological process may be used. |
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(4)

To improve clarity and better inform the producers of grapevine products using authorised oenological processes, an additional column should be added in Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. That column should list the categories of wine products in the production of which an oenological process may be used.

| (5) | The conditions and limits of use of the aeration or oxygenation oenological process in line item 1 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 currently authorised are too restrictive as they only allow the use of gaseous oxygen. They should refer instead to the relevant OIV files 2.1.1 and 3.5.5 which allow the use of both oxygen and air. |
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(5)

The conditions and limits of use of the aeration or oxygenation oenological process in line item 1 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 currently authorised are too restrictive as they only allow the use of gaseous oxygen. They should refer instead to the relevant OIV files 2.1.1 and 3.5.5 which allow the use of both oxygen and air.

| (6) | For the sake of completeness, the conditions and limits of use of the heat treatments oenological process in line item 2 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should refer to additional OIV files which relate to heat treatments, namely files 2.3.6, 2.3.9, 3.5.4 and 3.5.10. |
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(6)

For the sake of completeness, the conditions and limits of use of the heat treatments oenological process in line item 2 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should refer to additional OIV files which relate to heat treatments, namely files 2.3.6, 2.3.9, 3.5.4 and 3.5.10.

| (7) | Although accepted by the OIV, cold treatments are currently not included in Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. Given their importance in winemaking, it is appropriate to authorise their use, subject to certain conditions, and add a new line item in that Table. |
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(7)

Although accepted by the OIV, cold treatments are currently not included in Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. Given their importance in winemaking, it is appropriate to authorise their use, subject to certain conditions, and add a new line item in that Table.

| (8) | To improve clarity, it is appropriate to specify which inert filtering agents are authorised in line item 3 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 by referring to the relevant OIV files, namely files 2.1.11, 2.1.11.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.2.1. |
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(8)

To improve clarity, it is appropriate to specify which inert filtering agents are authorised in line item 3 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 by referring to the relevant OIV files, namely files 2.1.11, 2.1.11.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.2.1.

| (9) | In line item 5 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, for the sake of consistency, the information on the categories of wine products in the production of which elimination of sulphur dioxide by physical processes may be used should be deleted from column 2 and introduced into a new column 3 of that Table. |
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(9)

In line item 5 of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, for the sake of consistency, the information on the categories of wine products in the production of which elimination of sulphur dioxide by physical processes may be used should be deleted from column 2 and introduced into a new column 3 of that Table.

| (10) | Article 29 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/273 (3) provides that a number of treatments is to be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. That requirement is mentioned in some, but not all, relevant line items of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 as well as in some Appendices to Annex I to that Regulation. To improve consistency within Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, this requirement should be referred to in all relevant line items of Table 1 by adding it where it is missing and by transferring it, where appropriate, from the Appendices to Annex I. This concerns column 2 of line items 6, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 18 of Table 1 and Appendices 5, 7, 8 and 10 to Annex I. |
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(10)

Article 29 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/273 (3) provides that a number of treatments is to be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. That requirement is mentioned in some, but not all, relevant line items of Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 as well as in some Appendices to Annex I to that Regulation. To improve consistency within Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, this requirement should be referred to in all relevant line items of Table 1 by adding it where it is missing and by transferring it, where appropriate, from the Appendices to Annex I. This concerns column 2 of line items 6, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 18 of Table 1 and Appendices 5, 7, 8 and 10 to Annex I.

| (11) | Points 1(b) and (c) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 refer to the possibility to increase by partial concentration the natural alcoholic strength of respectively grape must and wine. This oenological process is currently not included in Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. It is therefore appropriate to authorise it and add a new line item in that Table. |
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(11)

Points 1(b) and (c) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 refer to the possibility to increase by partial concentration the natural alcoholic strength of respectively grape must and wine. This oenological process is currently not included in Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. It is therefore appropriate to authorise it and add a new line item in that Table.

| (12) | Resolution OIV-OENO 594A-2019 established a new oenological practice, namely the reduction of indigenous microorganisms in grapes and musts by discontinuous high pressure process. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
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(12)

Resolution OIV-OENO 594A-2019 established a new oenological practice, namely the reduction of indigenous microorganisms in grapes and musts by discontinuous high pressure process. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (13) | Resolution OIV-OENO 594B-2020 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of musts by continuous high pressure processes to eliminate wild micro-organisms. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
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(13)

Resolution OIV-OENO 594B-2020 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of musts by continuous high pressure processes to eliminate wild micro-organisms. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (14) | Resolution OIV-OENO 616-2019 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of crushed grapes with ultrasound to promote the extraction of their compounds. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
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(14)

Resolution OIV-OENO 616-2019 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of crushed grapes with ultrasound to promote the extraction of their compounds. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (15) | Resolution OIV-OENO 634-2020 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of grapes by pulsed electric fields to facilitate and increase the extraction of valuable substances. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
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(15)

Resolution OIV-OENO 634-2020 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of grapes by pulsed electric fields to facilitate and increase the extraction of valuable substances. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (16) | Resolutions OIV-OENO 614A-2020 and 614B-2020 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of respectively musts and wines using adsorbent styrene-divinylbenzene beads to reduce or eliminate organoleptic deviations characterised as ‘earthy-musty’. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
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(16)

Resolutions OIV-OENO 614A-2020 and 614B-2020 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment of respectively musts and wines using adsorbent styrene-divinylbenzene beads to reduce or eliminate organoleptic deviations characterised as ‘earthy-musty’. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (17) | Calcium tartrate has been included by error in the Section on acidity regulators in line item 1.7 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. The OIV file 3.3.12 only refers to its property as stabilising agent. It is therefore appropriate to delete that line item from that Table. |
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(17)

Calcium tartrate has been included by error in the Section on acidity regulators in line item 1.7 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. The OIV file 3.3.12 only refers to its property as stabilising agent. It is therefore appropriate to delete that line item from that Table.

| (18) | Citric acid has been included in the Section on stabilising agents in line item 6.3 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. Yeasts for wine production and lactic acid bacteria have been included in the Section on fermentation agents respectively in line items 9.1 and 9.2 of that Table. In addition to their respective stabilising and fermentation properties, those oenological compounds can also modify wine acidity and taste, as specified in the relevant files of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. It is therefore appropriate to add to the Section on acidity regulators in that Table new line items for respectively citric acid, yeasts for wine production and lactic acid bacteria. |
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(18)

Citric acid has been included in the Section on stabilising agents in line item 6.3 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. Yeasts for wine production and lactic acid bacteria have been included in the Section on fermentation agents respectively in line items 9.1 and 9.2 of that Table. In addition to their respective stabilising and fermentation properties, those oenological compounds can also modify wine acidity and taste, as specified in the relevant files of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. It is therefore appropriate to add to the Section on acidity regulators in that Table new line items for respectively citric acid, yeasts for wine production and lactic acid bacteria.

| (19) | Experience has shown that a number of categories of wine products mentioned in column 8 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 were missing or incorrect for some oenological compounds. This concerns line items 2.1 to 2.4, 4.1 to 4.6, 5.9, 5.11, 5.12, 5.16, 6.4, 6.11, 7.2 to 7.8 and 9.2. Column 8 of those line items should therefore be amended accordingly. |
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(19)

Experience has shown that a number of categories of wine products mentioned in column 8 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 were missing or incorrect for some oenological compounds. This concerns line items 2.1 to 2.4, 4.1 to 4.6, 5.9, 5.11, 5.12, 5.16, 6.4, 6.11, 7.2 to 7.8 and 9.2. Column 8 of those line items should therefore be amended accordingly.

| (20) | Sulphur dioxide, potassium bisulphite and potassium metabisulphite set out respectively in line items 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 are similar compounds covered by the same OIV files. It is therefore appropriate to mention the same OIV files in column 3 of that Table and the same categories of wine products in column 8 of that Table for those three compounds. |
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(20)

Sulphur dioxide, potassium bisulphite and potassium metabisulphite set out respectively in line items 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 are similar compounds covered by the same OIV files. It is therefore appropriate to mention the same OIV files in column 3 of that Table and the same categories of wine products in column 8 of that Table for those three compounds.

| (21) | Charcoal for oenological use as referred to in line item 3.1 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 and selective vegetal fibres as referred to in line item 3.2 of that Table are used rather for their adsorption than for their sequestration properties. Therefore, for clarification purposes, the name of Section 3 in that Table to which these compounds belong should be changed from ‘Sequestrants’ to ‘Adsorbents’. |
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(21)

Charcoal for oenological use as referred to in line item 3.1 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 and selective vegetal fibres as referred to in line item 3.2 of that Table are used rather for their adsorption than for their sequestration properties. Therefore, for clarification purposes, the name of Section 3 in that Table to which these compounds belong should be changed from ‘Sequestrants’ to ‘Adsorbents’.

| (22) | Resolution OIV-OENO 633-2019 amended the objectives and prescriptions of OIV file 2.3.2 concerning fermentation activators. Column 3 of line items 4.1, 4.6 and 4.8 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly. |
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(22)

Resolution OIV-OENO 633-2019 amended the objectives and prescriptions of OIV file 2.3.2 concerning fermentation activators. Column 3 of line items 4.1, 4.6 and 4.8 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly.

| (23) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 606/2009 (4) laid down the conditions of use of thiamine hydrochloride by specifying that no more than 0,6 mg/l (expressed in thiamine) may be used per treatment. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, which repealed Regulation (EC) No 606/2009, maintained this requirement. However, the explicit reference to the quantitative limitation to the use of thiamine was removed since it was considered that OIV files 2.3.3 and 4.1.7 mentioned in column 3 of line item 4.5 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 provide already this information. During the first year of implementation of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, it became nevertheless clear that the combined reading of the two OIV files may lead to confusion as regards the maximum allowed quantity of thiamine. It appears possible that, in the absence of an explicit numerical reference, the separate references in file 2.3.3 (considering 0,6 mg/l as a sufficient dose for musts) and in file 4.1.7 (allowing maximum 0,6 mg/l for sparkling wines) may be understood as providing for the combined maximum limit of 1,2 mg/l. To avoid possible misinterpretation regarding the conditions of use of thiamine, it is appropriate to specify in column 7 of line item 4.5 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 the maximum quantity of 0,6 mg/l as it was the case in Regulation (EC) No 606/2009 for that compound. |
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(23)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 606/2009 (4) laid down the conditions of use of thiamine hydrochloride by specifying that no more than 0,6 mg/l (expressed in thiamine) may be used per treatment. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, which repealed Regulation (EC) No 606/2009, maintained this requirement. However, the explicit reference to the quantitative limitation to the use of thiamine was removed since it was considered that OIV files 2.3.3 and 4.1.7 mentioned in column 3 of line item 4.5 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 provide already this information. During the first year of implementation of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, it became nevertheless clear that the combined reading of the two OIV files may lead to confusion as regards the maximum allowed quantity of thiamine. It appears possible that, in the absence of an explicit numerical reference, the separate references in file 2.3.3 (considering 0,6 mg/l as a sufficient dose for musts) and in file 4.1.7 (allowing maximum 0,6 mg/l for sparkling wines) may be understood as providing for the combined maximum limit of 1,2 mg/l. To avoid possible misinterpretation regarding the conditions of use of thiamine, it is appropriate to specify in column 7 of line item 4.5 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 the maximum quantity of 0,6 mg/l as it was the case in Regulation (EC) No 606/2009 for that compound.

| (24) | Since 1 June 2013, bentonite is no longer authorised as food additive under Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). It is therefore appropriate to delete its E number in column 2 of line item 5.9 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
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(24)

Since 1 June 2013, bentonite is no longer authorised as food additive under Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). It is therefore appropriate to delete its E number in column 2 of line item 5.9 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (25) | Resolution OIV-OENO 612-2019 replaced OIV file 2.1.7 concerning tannin addition to musts. Column 3 of line items 5.12 and 6.4 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly. |
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(25)

Resolution OIV-OENO 612-2019 replaced OIV file 2.1.7 concerning tannin addition to musts. Column 3 of line items 5.12 and 6.4 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly.

| (26) | Resolution OIV-OENO 613-2019 replaced OIV file 3.2.6 concerning tannin addition to wines. Column 3 of line items 5.12 and 6.4 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly. |
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(26)

Resolution OIV-OENO 613-2019 replaced OIV file 3.2.6 concerning tannin addition to wines. Column 3 of line items 5.12 and 6.4 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly.

| (27) | Regulation (EC) No 606/2009 restricted the use of chitosan in wine production to compounds derived only from Aspergillus niger. This restriction has been retained in line items 5.13 and 10.3 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. However, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470 (6) authorises in the Union list of novel foods set out in the Annex thereto the chitosan extract from fungi derived from either Agaricus bisporus or Aspergillus niger. Therefore, it is appropriate to align the references in line items 5.13 and 10.3 of that Table to the corresponding provision in Table 1 of the Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470. Thus, column 1 of those line items should specify that chitosan may also derive from Agaricus bisporus. |
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(27)

Regulation (EC) No 606/2009 restricted the use of chitosan in wine production to compounds derived only from Aspergillus niger. This restriction has been retained in line items 5.13 and 10.3 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. However, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470 (6) authorises in the Union list of novel foods set out in the Annex thereto the chitosan extract from fungi derived from either Agaricus bisporus or Aspergillus niger. Therefore, it is appropriate to align the references in line items 5.13 and 10.3 of that Table to the corresponding provision in Table 1 of the Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470. Thus, column 1 of those line items should specify that chitosan may also derive from Agaricus bisporus.

| (28) | The tetra-hydrate form of calcium tartrate as referred to in line item 6.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 is used as processing aid by the Union wine sector. However, calcium tartrate exists also in a di-hydrate form, which even if rarely used in food is authorised as food additive E 354 under Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 and represents a substance distinct from the tetra-hydrate form. For the sake of completeness, a reference to E 354 is also currently included in line item 6.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. However, during the first year of implementation of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, it became clear that the di-hydrate form of calcium tartrate is not used in winemaking. In addition, Member States and the industry report that in practice the only form of calcium tartrate available on the market is the tetra-hydrate form. To clarify the use and avoid any confusion between the two forms of calcium tartrate, the reference to the food additive E 354 in column 2 of line item 6.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should therefore be deleted. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The tetra-hydrate form of calcium tartrate as referred to in line item 6.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 is used as processing aid by the Union wine sector. However, calcium tartrate exists also in a di-hydrate form, which even if rarely used in food is authorised as food additive E 354 under Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 and represents a substance distinct from the tetra-hydrate form. For the sake of completeness, a reference to E 354 is also currently included in line item 6.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. However, during the first year of implementation of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, it became clear that the di-hydrate form of calcium tartrate is not used in winemaking. In addition, Member States and the industry report that in practice the only form of calcium tartrate available on the market is the tetra-hydrate form. To clarify the use and avoid any confusion between the two forms of calcium tartrate, the reference to the food additive E 354 in column 2 of line item 6.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should therefore be deleted.

| (29) | OIV file 3.3.10 concerns the treatment of wines with potassium ferrocyanide. This file is not mentioned in column 3 of line item 6.5 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 although particularly relevant thereto. It is therefore appropriate to add a reference to this file therein. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

OIV file 3.3.10 concerns the treatment of wines with potassium ferrocyanide. This file is not mentioned in column 3 of line item 6.5 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 although particularly relevant thereto. It is therefore appropriate to add a reference to this file therein.

| (30) | Resolutions OIV-OENO 586-2019 and OIV-OENO 659-2020 amended the prescriptions of OIV file 3.3.14 concerning the treatment with cellulose gums (carboxymethylcellulose). Columns 3 and 8 of line item 6.11 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Resolutions OIV-OENO 586-2019 and OIV-OENO 659-2020 amended the prescriptions of OIV file 3.3.14 concerning the treatment with cellulose gums (carboxymethylcellulose). Columns 3 and 8 of line item 6.11 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should be amended accordingly.

| (31) | The reference to the file COEI-1-POTASP of the International Oenological Codex of the OIV in column 4 of line item 6.13 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 is not correct. It should be replaced by a reference to the file COEI-1-POTPOL. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The reference to the file COEI-1-POTASP of the International Oenological Codex of the OIV in column 4 of line item 6.13 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 is not correct. It should be replaced by a reference to the file COEI-1-POTPOL.

| (32) | Resolution OIV-OENO 581A-2021 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment with fumaric acid in wine to inhibit malolactic fermentation. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Resolution OIV-OENO 581A-2021 established a new oenological practice, namely the treatment with fumaric acid in wine to inhibit malolactic fermentation. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (33) | As indicated in file COEI-1-PRENZY of the International Oenological Codex of the OIV, enzymatic preparations contain many enzymatic activities, and, other than the main enzymatic activities, secondary activities are only tolerated if they are set within the technological constraint limits for manufacturing of enzymatic preparations. This distinction between main and secondary activities is currently not specified in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. It is therefore appropriate to include it in Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to that Delegated Regulation and refer to the file COEI-1-PRENZY in column 4 of line items 7.1 to 7.11. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

As indicated in file COEI-1-PRENZY of the International Oenological Codex of the OIV, enzymatic preparations contain many enzymatic activities, and, other than the main enzymatic activities, secondary activities are only tolerated if they are set within the technological constraint limits for manufacturing of enzymatic preparations. This distinction between main and secondary activities is currently not specified in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. It is therefore appropriate to include it in Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to that Delegated Regulation and refer to the file COEI-1-PRENZY in column 4 of line items 7.1 to 7.11.

| (34) | Resolution OIV-OENO 682-2021 updated the files 1.13, 2.1.4, 2.1.18, 3.2.8 and 3.2.11 of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The reference year for these files as referred to in column 3 of Section 7 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should therefore be amended. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Resolution OIV-OENO 682-2021 updated the files 1.13, 2.1.4, 2.1.18, 3.2.8 and 3.2.11 of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The reference year for these files as referred to in column 3 of Section 7 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should therefore be amended.

| (35) | The OIV Code of Oenological Practices lists a number of different enzymes. Not all of those are included in Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. In order to offer wine producers the widest possible range of enzymes to improve their wines, it is appropriate to harmonise the list of authorised enzymes in that Table with the list of accepted enzymes in the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. New line items for the enzymes arabinanase, beta-glucanase (β1-3, β1-6) and glucosidase should therefore be added in Section 7 ‘Enzymes’ of that Table. In addition, the file COEI-1-GLYCOS of the International Oenological Codex of the OIV should be deleted from column 4 of line item 7.8 of that Table and moved to column 4 of new line item 7.11 as it refers to the enzyme numbered EC 3.2.1.21. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The OIV Code of Oenological Practices lists a number of different enzymes. Not all of those are included in Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. In order to offer wine producers the widest possible range of enzymes to improve their wines, it is appropriate to harmonise the list of authorised enzymes in that Table with the list of accepted enzymes in the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. New line items for the enzymes arabinanase, beta-glucanase (β1-3, β1-6) and glucosidase should therefore be added in Section 7 ‘Enzymes’ of that Table. In addition, the file COEI-1-GLYCOS of the International Oenological Codex of the OIV should be deleted from column 4 of line item 7.8 of that Table and moved to column 4 of new line item 7.11 as it refers to the enzyme numbered EC 3.2.1.21.

| (36) | Resolutions OIV-OENO 541A-2021 and 541B-2021 established a new oenological practice, namely the use of Aspergillopepsin I to remove haze-forming proteins respectively in grape must and wine. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Resolutions OIV-OENO 541A-2021 and 541B-2021 established a new oenological practice, namely the use of Aspergillopepsin I to remove haze-forming proteins respectively in grape must and wine. A new line item should therefore be added to Table 1 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (37) | The file COEI-1-LESEAC in the OIV International Oenological Codex has been replaced by the files COEI-1-SACCHA and COEI-1-NOSACC. It is therefore appropriate to delete the reference to the file COEI-1-LESEAC in column 4 of line item 9.1 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 and replace it by a reference to the files COEI-1-SACCHA and COEI-1-NOSACC. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The file COEI-1-LESEAC in the OIV International Oenological Codex has been replaced by the files COEI-1-SACCHA and COEI-1-NOSACC. It is therefore appropriate to delete the reference to the file COEI-1-LESEAC in column 4 of line item 9.1 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 and replace it by a reference to the files COEI-1-SACCHA and COEI-1-NOSACC.

| (38) | Resolution OIV-OENO 611-2019 completed OIV file 2.1.3.2.3.2 concerning de-acidification by lactic acid bacteria. This file is relevant to line item 9.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 and should therefore be added to column 3 thereof. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Resolution OIV-OENO 611-2019 completed OIV file 2.1.3.2.3.2 concerning de-acidification by lactic acid bacteria. This file is relevant to line item 9.2 of Table 2 of Part A of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 and should therefore be added to column 3 thereof.

| (39) | According to paragraph 1 of Appendix 1 to Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, the use of tartaric acid for deacidification is currently only permitted for products originating from the ‘Elbling’ and ‘Weißer Riesling’ vine varieties and obtained from grapes harvested in the following wine-growing areas of the northern part of wine-growing zone A: Ahr, Rheingau, Mittelrhein, Mosel, Nahe, Rheinhessen, Pfalz and Moselle luxembourgeoise. Germany informed the Commission that the cultivation of the vine varieties ‘Elbling’ and ‘Weißer Riesling’ is now authorised in Germany in other wine-growing areas of wine-growing zone A. The list of regions referred to in that paragraph should therefore be amended to cover all areas of wine-growing zone A in Germany. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

According to paragraph 1 of Appendix 1 to Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934, the use of tartaric acid for deacidification is currently only permitted for products originating from the ‘Elbling’ and ‘Weißer Riesling’ vine varieties and obtained from grapes harvested in the following wine-growing areas of the northern part of wine-growing zone A: Ahr, Rheingau, Mittelrhein, Mosel, Nahe, Rheinhessen, Pfalz and Moselle luxembourgeoise. Germany informed the Commission that the cultivation of the vine varieties ‘Elbling’ and ‘Weißer Riesling’ is now authorised in Germany in other wine-growing areas of wine-growing zone A. The list of regions referred to in that paragraph should therefore be amended to cover all areas of wine-growing zone A in Germany.

| (40) | Part B of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 defines the maximum sulphur dioxide content of wines. The names of the wines ‘Côteaux de l’Ardèche’, ‘Lot’, ‘Corrèze’, ‘Oc’, ‘Thau’ and ‘Allobrogie’ referred to in the fourteenth indent of point A(2)(c) of that Part have been changed. In addition, Slovenia has requested to add the wine ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – slamno vino (vino iz sušenega grozdja)’ among the list of wines for which the maximum sulphur dioxide content may be raised up to 400 mg/l. This wine has a very high content in residual sugars, therefore requiring higher levels of sulphur dioxide to ensure its preservation. Part B of Annex I should be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Part B of Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 defines the maximum sulphur dioxide content of wines. The names of the wines ‘Côteaux de l’Ardèche’, ‘Lot’, ‘Corrèze’, ‘Oc’, ‘Thau’ and ‘Allobrogie’ referred to in the fourteenth indent of point A(2)(c) of that Part have been changed. In addition, Slovenia has requested to add the wine ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – slamno vino (vino iz sušenega grozdja)’ among the list of wines for which the maximum sulphur dioxide content may be raised up to 400 mg/l. This wine has a very high content in residual sugars, therefore requiring higher levels of sulphur dioxide to ensure its preservation. Part B of Annex I should be amended accordingly.

| (41) | Spain has requested amendments to provisions relating to Spanish liqueur wines laid down in Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 to ensure consistency with the definition of liqueur wines as referred to in point (3) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and with the specifications of the wines bearing the protected designations of origin Condado de Huelva and Lebrija. Upon request of its wine producers, Spain has also asked to add the varieties Garnacha roja and Mazuela to the list of varieties as referred to in Appendix 3 to Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. It is therefore appropriate to amend the relevant Sections and Appendices to Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Spain has requested amendments to provisions relating to Spanish liqueur wines laid down in Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 to ensure consistency with the definition of liqueur wines as referred to in point (3) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and with the specifications of the wines bearing the protected designations of origin Condado de Huelva and Lebrija. Upon request of its wine producers, Spain has also asked to add the varieties Garnacha roja and Mazuela to the list of varieties as referred to in Appendix 3 to Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934. It is therefore appropriate to amend the relevant Sections and Appendices to Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934.

| (42) | Part B of Appendix 1 to Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 lists the liqueur wines bearing a protected designation of origin the production of which involves the addition of the products referred to in point (3)(f) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Following amendments to the specifications of the wine bearing the protected designation of origin ‘Κουμανδαρία (Commandaria)’, Cyprus has requested to add that wine to points 5 and 6 of Part B of Appendix 1 to Annex III to that Delegated Regulation. These points should be amended accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Part B of Appendix 1 to Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 lists the liqueur wines bearing a protected designation of origin the production of which involves the addition of the products referred to in point (3)(f) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Following amendments to the specifications of the wine bearing the protected designation of origin ‘Κουμανδαρία (Commandaria)’, Cyprus has requested to add that wine to points 5 and 6 of Part B of Appendix 1 to Annex III to that Delegated Regulation. These points should be amended accordingly.

| (43) | Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 is amended as follows:

| (1) | Article 2 is replaced by the following:

  ‘Article 2
  Wine-growing areas where wines may have a maximum total alcoholic strength of 20 % vol.
  The wine-growing areas referred to in the first indent of point (c) of the second paragraph of point (1) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 shall be zones C I, C II and C III referred to in Appendix 1 to that Annex and the areas of zone B in which white wines with the following protected geographical indications may be produced: ‘Franche-Comté’ and ‘Val de Loire’.’; |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 2

Wine-growing areas where wines may have a maximum total alcoholic strength of 20 % vol.

The wine-growing areas referred to in the first indent of point (c) of the second paragraph of point (1) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 shall be zones C I, C II and C III referred to in Appendix 1 to that Annex and the areas of zone B in which white wines with the following protected geographical indications may be produced: ‘Franche-Comté’ and ‘Val de Loire’.’;

| (2) | Annex I is amended in accordance with Annex I to this Regulation; |
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(2)

Annex I is amended in accordance with Annex I to this Regulation;

| (3) | Annex III is amended in accordance with Annex II to this Regulation. |
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(3)

Annex III is amended in accordance with Annex II to this Regulation.

Article 2

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 October 2021.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

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(1)  
  OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 of 12 March 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards wine-growing areas where the alcoholic strength may be increased, authorised oenological practices and restrictions applicable to the production and conservation of grapevine products, the minimum percentage of alcohol for by-products and their disposal, and publication of OIV files (OJ L 149, 7.6.2019, p. 1).

2

(3)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/273 of 11 December 2017 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the scheme of authorisations for vine plantings, the vineyard register, accompanying documents and certification, the inward and outward register, compulsory declarations, notifications and publication of notified information, and supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the relevant checks and penalties, amending Commission Regulations (EC) No 555/2008, (EC) No 606/2009 and (EC) No 607/2009 and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 436/2009 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/560 (OJ L 58, 28.2.2018, p. 1).

3

(4)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 606/2009 of 10 July 2009 laying down certain detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 as regards the categories of grapevine products, oenological practices and the applicable restrictions (OJ L 193, 24.7.2009, p. 1).

4

(5)  Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on food additives (OJ L 354, 31.12.2008, p. 16).

5

(6)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470 of 20 December 2017 establishing the Union list of novel foods in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council on novel foods (OJ L 351, 30.12.2017, p. 72).

6

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ANNEX I

Annex I to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 is amended as follows:

| (1) | Part A is amended as follows:






  (a) | Tables 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:
  ‘Table 1

  Authorised oenological processes as referred to in Article 3(1) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Oenological processes | Conditions and limits of use (1) | Categories of wine products  (4) |
| 1 | Aeration or oxygenation | Subject to the conditions set out in files 2.1.1 (2016) and 3.5.5 (2016) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2 | Heat treatments | Subject to the conditions set out in files 1.8 (1970), 2.2.4 (1988), 2.3.6 (1988), 2.3.9 (2005), 3.4.3 (1988), 3.4.3.1 (1990), 3.5.4 (1997) and 3.5.10 (1982) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2a | Cold treatments | Subject to the conditions set out in point 1(c) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and in files 1.14 (2005), 1.15 (2005), 2.1.12.4 (1998), 2.3.6 (1988), 3.1.2 (1979), 3.1.2.1 (1979), 3.3.4 (2004) and 3.5.11.1 (2001) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 3 | Centrifugation and filtration with or without an inert filtering agent | Inert filtering agents are those referred to in files 2.1.11 (1970), 2.1.11.1 (1990), 3.2.2 (1989) and 3.2.2.1 (1990) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. Their use must not leave undesirable residues in the treated product. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 4 | Create an inert atmosphere | Only for the purpose to handle the product shielded from the air. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5 | Elimination of sulphur dioxide by physical processes | | Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14) |
| 6 | Ion exchange resins | Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 3 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | Grape must intended for the manufacture of rectified concentrated grape must |
| 7 | Bubbling | Only when using argon or nitrogen. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 8 | Flotation | Only when using nitrogen or carbon dioxide or by aerating. Subject to the conditions set out in file 2.1.14 (1999). | (10), (11) and (12) |
| 9 | Discs of pure paraffin impregnated with allyl isothiocyanate | Only for the purpose to create a sterile atmosphere. In Italy permitted solely as long as it is in conformity with that country’s legislation and only in containers holding more than 20 litres. The use of allyl isothiocyanate is subject to the conditions and limits in Table 2 on authorised oenological compounds. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 10 | Electrodialysis treatment | Only for the purpose to ensure the tartaric stabilisation of the wine. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 5 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 11 | Pieces of oak wood | In winemaking and ageing, including in the fermentation of fresh grapes and grape must. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 7 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 12 | Correction of the alcohol content of wine | Correction only carried out with wine. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 8 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 13 | Cation exchangers for tartaric stabilisation | Subject to the conditions laid down in file 3.3.3 (2011) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. It must also comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 14 | Electro-membranary treatment | Only for acidification or deacidification. Subject to the conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. It must comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 and with Commission Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 (3) and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. Subject to the conditions set out in files 2.1.3.1.3 (2010), 2.1.3.2.4 (2012), 3.1.1.4 (2010), 3.1.2.4 (2012) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 15 | Cation exchangers for acidification | Subject to the conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. It must comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. Subject to the conditions set out in files 2.1.3.1.4 (2012) and 3.1.1.5 (2012) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 16 | Membrane coupling | Only for the reduction in sugar content of musts. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 9 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (10) |
| 17 | Membrane contactors | Only for the purpose to manage the dissolved gas in wine. The addition of carbon dioxide for the products defined in points (4), (5), (6) and (8) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 is prohibited. It must comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 and with Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. Subject to the conditions set out in file 3.5.17 (2013) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 18 | Membrane technology coupled with activated carbon | Only for the purpose to reduce excess 4-ethylphenol and 4-ethylguaiacol in wines. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 10 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 19 | Filter plates containing zeolite y-faujasite | Only for the purpose to adsorb haloanisoles. Subject to the conditions laid down in file 3.2.15 (2016) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 20 | Partial concentration | For grape must: subject to the conditions laid down in point 1(b) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and in files 2.1.12 (1998), 2.1.12.1 (1993), 2.1.12.2 (2001), 2.1.12.3 (1998) and 2.1.12.4 (1998) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.
  For wine: subject to the conditions laid down in point 1(c) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and in files 3.5.11 (2001) and 3.5.11.1 (2001) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.
  The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (15) and (16) |
| 21 | Treatment by discontinuous high pressure processes | Subject to the conditions laid down in files 1.18 (2019) and 2.1.26 (2019) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | Fresh grapes, (10), (11) and (12) |
| 22 | Treatment by continuous high pressure processes | Subject to the conditions laid down in file 2.2.10 (2020) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | (10), (11) and (12) |
| 23 | Treatment of crushed grapes with ultrasound to promote the extraction of their compounds | Subject to the conditions laid down in file 1.17 (2019) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | Fresh grapes |
| 24 | Treatment of grapes by pulsed electric fields | Subject to the conditions laid down in file 2.1.27 (2020) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | Fresh grapes |
| 25 | Treatment of musts and wines using adsorbent styrene-divinylbenzene beads | Subject to the conditions laid down in files 2.2.11 (2020) and 3.4.22 (2020) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |

(1)

Part A is amended as follows:

(a)

Tables 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

‘Table 1

Authorised oenological processes as referred to in Article 3(1)

1

2

3

Oenological processes

Conditions and limits of use (1)

Categories of wine products  (4)

1

Aeration or oxygenation

Subject to the conditions set out in files 2.1.1 (2016) and 3.5.5 (2016) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2

Heat treatments

Subject to the conditions set out in files 1.8 (1970), 2.2.4 (1988), 2.3.6 (1988), 2.3.9 (2005), 3.4.3 (1988), 3.4.3.1 (1990), 3.5.4 (1997) and 3.5.10 (1982) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2a

Cold treatments

Subject to the conditions set out in point 1(c) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and in files 1.14 (2005), 1.15 (2005), 2.1.12.4 (1998), 2.3.6 (1988), 3.1.2 (1979), 3.1.2.1 (1979), 3.3.4 (2004) and 3.5.11.1 (2001) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

3

Centrifugation and filtration with or without an inert filtering agent

Inert filtering agents are those referred to in files 2.1.11 (1970), 2.1.11.1 (1990), 3.2.2 (1989) and 3.2.2.1 (1990) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. Their use must not leave undesirable residues in the treated product.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

4

Create an inert atmosphere

Only for the purpose to handle the product shielded from the air.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5

Elimination of sulphur dioxide by physical processes

Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14)

6

Ion exchange resins

Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 3 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Grape must intended for the manufacture of rectified concentrated grape must

7

Bubbling

Only when using argon or nitrogen.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

8

Flotation

Only when using nitrogen or carbon dioxide or by aerating. Subject to the conditions set out in file 2.1.14 (1999).

(10), (11) and (12)

9

Discs of pure paraffin impregnated with allyl isothiocyanate

Only for the purpose to create a sterile atmosphere. In Italy permitted solely as long as it is in conformity with that country’s legislation and only in containers holding more than 20 litres. The use of allyl isothiocyanate is subject to the conditions and limits in Table 2 on authorised oenological compounds.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

10

Electrodialysis treatment

Only for the purpose to ensure the tartaric stabilisation of the wine. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 5 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

11

Pieces of oak wood

In winemaking and ageing, including in the fermentation of fresh grapes and grape must. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 7 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

12

Correction of the alcohol content of wine

Correction only carried out with wine. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 8 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

13

Cation exchangers for tartaric stabilisation

Subject to the conditions laid down in file 3.3.3 (2011) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. It must also comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

14

Electro-membranary treatment

Only for acidification or deacidification. Subject to the conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. It must comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 and with Commission Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 (3) and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. Subject to the conditions set out in files 2.1.3.1.3 (2010), 2.1.3.2.4 (2012), 3.1.1.4 (2010), 3.1.2.4 (2012) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

15

Cation exchangers for acidification

Subject to the conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. It must comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. Subject to the conditions set out in files 2.1.3.1.4 (2012) and 3.1.1.5 (2012) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

16

Membrane coupling

Only for the reduction in sugar content of musts. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 9 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(10)

17

Membrane contactors

Only for the purpose to manage the dissolved gas in wine. The addition of carbon dioxide for the products defined in points (4), (5), (6) and (8) of Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 is prohibited. It must comply with Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 and with Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and with the national provisions adopted for the implementation thereof. Subject to the conditions set out in file 3.5.17 (2013) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

18

Membrane technology coupled with activated carbon

Only for the purpose to reduce excess 4-ethylphenol and 4-ethylguaiacol in wines. Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 10 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

19

Filter plates containing zeolite y-faujasite

Only for the purpose to adsorb haloanisoles. Subject to the conditions laid down in file 3.2.15 (2016) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

20

Partial concentration

For grape must: subject to the conditions laid down in point 1(b) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and in files 2.1.12 (1998), 2.1.12.1 (1993), 2.1.12.2 (2001), 2.1.12.3 (1998) and 2.1.12.4 (1998) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

For wine: subject to the conditions laid down in point 1(c) of Section B of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and in files 3.5.11 (2001) and 3.5.11.1 (2001) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (15) and (16)

21

Treatment by discontinuous high pressure processes

Subject to the conditions laid down in files 1.18 (2019) and 2.1.26 (2019) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

Fresh grapes, (10), (11) and (12)

22

Treatment by continuous high pressure processes

Subject to the conditions laid down in file 2.2.10 (2020) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

(10), (11) and (12)

23

Treatment of crushed grapes with ultrasound to promote the extraction of their compounds

Subject to the conditions laid down in file 1.17 (2019) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

Fresh grapes

24

Treatment of grapes by pulsed electric fields

Subject to the conditions laid down in file 2.1.27 (2020) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

Fresh grapes

25

Treatment of musts and wines using adsorbent styrene-divinylbenzene beads

Subject to the conditions laid down in files 2.2.11 (2020) and 3.4.22 (2020) of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

Table 2

Authorised oenological compounds as referred to in Article 3(1)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Substances/Activities | E number
  and/or
  CAS number | OIV Code of Oenological Practices (5) | OIV Codex file reference as referred to in Article 9(1) | Additive | Processing aid/substance used as processing aid (6) | Conditions and limits of use (7) | Categories of wine products (8) |
| 1 | Acidity regulators |
| 1.1 | Tartaric acid (L(+)-) | E 334/CAS 87-69-4 | Files 2.1.3.1.1 (2001),
  3.1.1.1 (2001) | COEI-1-LTARAC | x | | Conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Specifications for tartaric acid (L(+)-) laid down in point 2 of Appendix 1 to this Annex. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 1.2 | Malic acid (D,L-; L-) | E 296/- | Files 2.1.3.1.1 (2001),
  3.1.1.1 (2001) | COEI-1-ACIMAL | x | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 1.3 | Lactic acid | E 270/- | Files 2.1.3.1.1 (2001),
  3.1.1.1 (2001) | COEI-1-ACILAC | x | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 1.4 | Potassium L(+)-tartrate | E 336(ii)/CAS 921-53-9 | Files 2.1.3.2.2 (1979),
  3.1.2.2 (1979) | COEI-1-POTTAR | | x | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 1.5 | Potassium bicarbonate | E 501(ii)/CAS 298-14-6 | Files 2.1.3.2.2 (1979),
  3.1.2.2 (1979) | COEI-1-POTBIC | | x | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 1.6 | Calcium carbonate | E 170/CAS 471-34-1 | Files 2.1.3.2.2 (1979),
  3.1.2.2 (1979) | COEI-1-CALCAR | | x | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| | | | | | | | | |
| 1.8 | Calcium sulphate | E 516/- | File 2.1.3.1.1.1 (2017) | | x | | Conditions and limits laid down in point 2(b) of Section A of Annex III. Maximum use level: 2 g/l. | (3) |
| 1.9 | Potassium carbonate | E 501(i) | Files 2.1.3.2.5 (2017), 3.1.2.2 (1979) | | | x | Conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
  Citric acid: Only objective a) of OIV files 3.1.1 (1979) and 3.1.1.1 (2001) applies. Maximum content in wine thus treated and placed on the market: 1 g/l. | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 1.10 | Citric acid | E 330 | Files 3.1.1 (1979), 3.1.1.1 (2001) | COEI-1-CITACI | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 1.11 | Yeasts for wine production | -/- | Files 2.1.3.2.3 (2019), 2.1.3.2.3.1 (2019), 2.3.1 (2016) | COEI-1-SACCHA
  COEI-1-NOSACC | | x (6) | (10), (11) and (12) |
| 1.12 | Lactic acid bacteria | -/- | Files 2.1.3.2.3 (2019), 2.1.3.2.3.2 (2019), 3.1.2 (1979), 3.1.2.3 (1980) | COEI-1-BALACT | | x (6) | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2 | Preservatives and antioxidants |
| 2.1 | Sulphur dioxide | E 220/CAS 7446-09-5 | Files 1.12 (2004), 2.1.2 (1987),
  3.4.4 (2003) | COEI-1-SOUDIO | x | | Limits (i.e. maximum quantity in the product placed on the market) as laid down in Part B of Annex I. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2.2 | Potassium bisulphite | E 228/CAS 7773-03-7 | Files 1.12 (2004), 2.1.2 (1987), 3.4.4 (2003) | COEI-1-POTBIS | x | | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2.3 | Potassium metabisulphite | E 224/CAS 16731-55-8 | Files 1.12 (2004), 2.1.2 (1987), 3.4.4 (2003) | COEI-1-POTANH | x | | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2.4 | Potassium sorbate | E 202 | File 3.4.5 (1988) | COEI-1-POTSOR | x | | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 2.5 | Lysozyme | E 1105 | Files 2.2.6 (1997), 3.4.12 (1997) | COEI-1-LYSOZY | x | x | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2.6 | L ascorbic acid | E 300 | Files 1.11 (2001), 2.2.7 (2001), 3.4.7 (2001) | COEI-1-ASCACI | x | | Maximum content in wine thus treated and placed on the market: 250 mg/l. Maximum 250 mg/l for each treatment. | Fresh grapes, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 2.7 | Dimethyldicarbonate (DMDC) | E242/CAS 4525-33-1 | File 3.4.13 (2001) | COEI-1-DICDIM | x | | The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 3 | Adsorbents |
| 3.1 | Charcoal for oenological use | | Files 2.1.9 (2002), 3.5.9 (1970) | COEI-1-CHARBO | | x | The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | White wines, (2), (10), and (14) |
| 3.2 | Selective vegetal fibres | | File 3.4.20 (2017) | COEI-1-FIBVEG | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 4 | Activators for alcoholic and malolactic fermentation |
| 4.1 | Microcrystalline cellulose | E 460(i)/CAS 9004-34-6 | Files 2.3.2 (2019), 3.4.21 (2015) | COEI-1-CELMIC | | x | It must comply with the specifications laid down in the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 231/2012. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 4.2 | Diammonium hydrogen phosphate | E 342/CAS 7783-28-0 | File 4.1.7 (1995) | COEI-1-PHODIA | | x | Only for alcoholic fermentation. No more than 1 g/l (expressed in salts) (9) or 0,3 g/l for the second fermentation of sparkling wines. | Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), second alcoholic fermentation of (4), (5), (6) and (7) |
| 4.3 | Ammonium sulphate | E 517/CAS 7783-20-2 | File 4.1.7 (1995) | COEI-1AMMSUL | | x |
| 4.4 | Ammonium bisulphite | -/CAS 10192-30-0 | | COEI-1-AMMHYD | | x | Only for alcoholic fermentation. No more than 0,2 g/l (expressed in salts) and up to the limits set in points 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. | Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11) and (12) |
| 4.5 | Thiamine hydrochloride | -/CAS 67-03-8 | Files 2.3.3 (1976), 4.1.7 (1995) | COEI-1-THIAMIN | | x | Only for alcoholic fermentation.
  No more than 0,6 mg/l (expressed in thiamin) for each treatment. | Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), second alcoholic fermentation of (4), (5), (6) and (7) |
| 4.6 | Yeast autolysates | -/- | Files 2.3.2 (2019), 3.4.21 (2015) | COEI-1-AUTLYS | | x (6) | | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 4.7 | Yeast cell walls | -/- | Files 2.3.4 (1988), 3.4.21 (2015) | COEI-1-YEHULL | | x (6) | | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 4.8 | Inactivated yeasts | -/- | Files 2.3.2 (2019), 3.4.21 (2015) | COEI-1-INAYEA | | x (6) | | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 4.9 | Inactivated yeasts with guaranteed glutathione levels | -/- | File 2.2.9 (2017) | COEI-1-LEVGLU | | x (6) | Only for alcoholic fermentation. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5 | Clarifying agents |
| 5.1 | Edible gelatine | -/CAS 9000-70-8 | Files 2.1.6 (1997), 3.2.1 (2011) | COEI-1-GELATI | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.2 | Wheat protein | | Files 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.7 (2004) | COEI-1-PROVEG | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.3 | Peas protein | | Files 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.7 (2004) | COEI-1-PROVEG | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.4 | Potatoes protein | | Files 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.7 (2004) | COEI-1-PROVEG | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.5 | Isinglass | | File 3.2.1 (2011) | COEI-1-COLPOI | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 5.6 | Casein | -/CAS 9005-43-0 | File 2.1.16 (2004) | COEI-1-CASEIN | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.7 | Potassium caseinates | -/CAS 68131-54-4 | Files 2.1.15 (2004), 3.2.1 (2011) | COEI-1-POTCAS | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.8 | Egg albumin | -/CAS 9006-59-1 | File 3.2.1 (2011) | COEI-1-OEUALB | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 5.9 | Bentonite | -/- | Files 2.1.8 (1970), 3.3.5 (1970) | COEI-1-BENTON | | x | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.10 | Silicon dioxide (gel or colloidal solution) | E 551/- | Files 2.1.10 (1991), 3.2.1 (2011), 3.2.4 (1991) | COEI-1-DIOSIL | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.11 | Kaolin | -/CAS 1332-58-7 | File 3.2.1 (2011) | COEI-1-KAOLIN | | x | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 5.12 | Tannins | | Files 2.1.7 (2019), 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.6 (2019), 3.2.7 (2004), 4.1.8 (1981), 4.3.2 (1981) | COEI-1-TANINS | | x | | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.13 | Chitosan derived from Aspergillus niger or Agaricus bisporus | -/CAS 9012-76-4 | Files 2.1.22 (2009), 3.2.1 (2011), 3.2.12 (2009) | COEI-1-CHITOS | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.14 | Chitin-glucan derived from Aspergillus niger | Chitin: CAS 1398-61-4; Glucan: CAS 9041-22-9. | Files 2.1.23 (2009),3.2.1 (2011), 3.2.13 (2009) | COEI-1-CHITGL | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.15 | Yeast protein extracts | -/- | Files 2.1.24 (2011), 3.2.14 (2011), 3.2.1 (2011) | COEI-1-EPLEV | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.16 | Polyvinylpolypyrrolidone | E 1202/CAS 25249-54-1 | File 3.4.9 (1987) | COEI-1-PVPP | | x | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 5.17 | Calcium alginate | E 404/CAS 9005-35-0 | File 4.1.8 (1981) | COEI-1-ALGIAC | | x | Only in the production of all categories of sparkling and semi-sparkling wines obtained by fermentation in bottle and with the lees separated by disgorging. | (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) |
| 5.18 | Potassium alginate | E 402/CAS 9005-36-1 | File 4.1.8 (1981) | COEI-1-POTALG | | x | Only in the production of all categories of sparkling and semi-sparkling wines obtained by fermentation in bottle and with the lees separated by disgorging. | (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) |
| 6 | Stabilising agents |
| 6.1 | Potassium hydrogen tartrate | E336(i)/CAS 868-14-4 | File 3.3.4 (2004) | COEI-1-POTBIT | | x | Only to assist the precipitation of tartaric salts. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.2 | Calcium tartrate | -/- | File 3.3.12 (1997) | COEI-1-CALTAR | | x | | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.3 | Citric acid | E 330 | Files 3.3.1 (1970), 3.3.8 (1970) | COEI-1-CITACI | x | | Maximum content in wine thus treated and placed on the market: 1 g/l. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.4 | Tannins | -/- | Files 2.1.7 (2019), 3.2.6 (2019), 3.3.1 (1970) | COEI-1-TANINS | | | | Fresh grapes, partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 6.5 | Potassium ferrocyanide | E 536/- | Files 3.3.1 (1970), 3.3.10 (1970) | COEI-1-POTFER | | x | Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 4 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.6 | Calcium phytate | -/CAS 3615-82-5 | File 3.3.1 (1970) | COEI-1-CALPHY | | x | Only for red wines and no more than 8 g/hl.
  Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 4 to this Annex. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.7 | Metatartaric acid | E 353/- | File 3.3.7 (1970) | COEI-1-METACI | x | | | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.8 | Gum arabic | E 414/CAS 9000-01-5 | File 3.3.6 (1972) | COEI-1-GOMARA | x | | Quantum satis. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such,(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.9 | Tartaric acid D, L- or its neutral salt of potassium | -/CAS 133-37-9 | Files 2.1.21 (2008), 3.4.15 (2008) | COEI-1-DLTART | | x | Only for precipitating excess calcium.
  Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 4 to this Annex. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.10 | Yeast mannoproteins | -/- | File 3.3.13 (2005) | COEI-1-MANPRO | x | | | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.11 | Carboxymethylcellulose | E466/- | File 3.3.14 (2020) | COEI-1-CMC | x | | Only to ensure tartaric stabilisation. | White and rosé wines, (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) |
| 6.12 | Polyvinylimidazole-polyvinylpyrrolidone copolymers (PVI/PVP) | -/CAS 87865-40-5 | Files 2.1.20 (2014), 3.4.14 (2014) | COEI-1-PVIPVP | | x | The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 6.13 | Potassium polyaspartate | E 456/CAS 64723-18-8 | File 3.3.15 (2016) | COEI-1-POTPOL | x | | Only to contribute to the tartaric stabilization. | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 6.14 | Fumaric acid | E 297/CAS 110-17-8 | Files 3.4.2 (2021), 3.4.23 (2021) | | x | | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 7 | Enzymes (10) |
| 7.1 | Urease | EC 3.5.1.5 | File 3.4.11 (1995) | COEI-1-UREASE
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only to reduce the level of urea in the wine.
  Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 6 to this Annex. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 7.2 | Pectin lyases | EC 4.2.2.10 | Files 1.13 (2021); 2.1.4 (2021); 2.1.18 (2021); 3.2.8 (2021); 3.2.11 (2021) | COEI-1-ACTPLY
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.3 | Pectin methylesterase | EC 3.1.1.11 | Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021) | COEI-1-ACTPME
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.4 | Polygalacturonase | EC 3.2.1.15 | Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021) | COEI-1-ACTPGA
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.5 | Hemicellulase | EC 3.2.1.78 | Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021) | COEI-1-ACTGHE
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.6 | Cellulase | EC 3.2.1.4 | Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021) | COEI-1-ACTCEL
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.7 | Betaglucanase | EC 3.2.1.58 | File 3.2.10 (2004) | COEI-1-BGLUCA
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9),, (15) and (16) |
| 7.8 | Glycosidase | EC 3.2.1.20 | Files 2.1.19 (2013), 3.2.9 (2013) | COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.9 | Arabinanase | EC 3.2.1.99 | Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021) | COEI-1-ACTARA
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.10 | Beta-glucanase (β1-3, β1-6) | EC 3.2.1.6 | File 3.5.7 (2013) | COEI-1-ACTGLU
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 7.11 | Glucosidase | EC 3.2.1.21 | Files 2.1.19 (2013), 3.2.9 (2013) | COEI-1-GLYCOS
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes. | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 7.12 | Aspergillopepsin I | EC 3.4.23.18 | Files 2.2.12 (2021), 3.3.16 (2021) | COEI-1-PROTEA
  COEI-1-PRENZY | | x | Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 8 | Gases and packaging gases (11) |
| 8.1 | Argon | E 938/CAS 7440-37-1 | Files 2.2.5 (1970), 3.2.3 (2002) | COEI-1-ARGON | x (11) | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 8.2 | Nitrogen | E 941/CAS 7727-37-9 | Files 2.1.14 (1999), 2.2.5 (1970), 3.2.3 (2002) | COEI-1-AZOTE | x (11) | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 8.3 | Carbon dioxide | E 290/CAS 124-38-9 | Files 1.7 (1970), 2.1.14 (1999), 2.2.3 (1970), 2.2.5 (1970), 2.3.9 (2005), 4.1.10 (2002) | COEI-1-DIOCAR | x (11) | x | In the case of still wines the maximum carbon dioxide content in the wine so treated and placed on the market is 3 g/l, while the excess pressure caused by the carbon dioxide must be less than 1 bar at a temperature of 20 °C. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 8.4 | Gaseous oxygen | E 948/CAS 17778-80-2 | Files 2.1.1 (2016), 3.5.5 (2016) | COEI-1-OXYGEN | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 9 | Fermentation agents |
| 9.1 | Yeasts for wine production | -/- | Files 2.1.3.2.3.1. (2019), 2.3.1 (2016), 4.1.8 (1981) | COEI-1-SACCHA
  COEI-1-NOSACC | | x (6) | | Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), (13), second alcoholic fermentation of (4), (5), (6) and (7) |
| 9.2 | Lactic acid bacteria | -/- | Files 2.1.3.2.3.2 (2019), 3.1.2 (1979), 3.1.2.3 (1980) | COEI-1-BALACT | | x (6) | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 10 | Correction of defects |
| 10.1 | Copper sulphate, pentahydrate | -/CAS 7758-99-8 | File 3.5.8 (1989) | COEI-1-CUISUL | | x | No more than 1 g/hl, provided that the copper content of the product so treated does not exceed 1 mg/l, with the exception of liqueur wines prepared from fresh unfermented or slightly fermented grape must, for which the copper content may not exceed 2 mg/l. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 10.2 | Copper citrate | -/CAS 866-82-0 | File 3.5.14 (2008) | COEI-1-CUICIT | | x | No more than 1 g/hl, provided that the copper content of the product so treated does not exceed 1 mg/l, with the exception of liqueur wines prepared from fresh unfermented or slightly fermented grape must, for which the copper content may not exceed 2 mg/l. | Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 10.3 | Chitosan derived from Aspergillus niger or Agaricus bisporus | -/CAS 9012-76-4 | File 3.4.16 (2009) | COEI-1-CHITOS | | x | | (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 10.4 | Chitin-glucan derived from Aspergillus niger | Chitin: CAS 1398-61-4; Glucan: CAS 9041-22-9. | File 3.4.17 (2009) | COEI-1-CHITGL | | x | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 10.5 | Inactivated yeasts | -/- | | COEI-1-INAYEA | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |
| 11 | Other practices |
| 11.1 | Aleppo pine resin | -/- | | | x | | Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 2 to this Annex. | (2), (10) and (11) |
| 11.2 | Fresh lees | -/- | | | | x (6) | Only in dry wines. Fresh lees are sound and undiluted and contain yeasts resulting from the recent vinification of dry wine. Quantities not exceeding 5 % of the volume of product treated. | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16) |
| 11.3 | Caramel | E 150 a-d/- | File 4.3 (2007) | COEI-1-CARAMEL | x | | To reinforce the colour as defined in point 2 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008. | (3) |
| 11.4 | Allyl isothiocyanate | -/57-06-7 | | | | x | Only to impregnate discs of pure paraffin. See Table 1.
  No trace of allyl isothiocyanate must be present in the wine. | Only for partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, and wine. |
| 11.5 | Inactivated yeasts | -/- | | COEI-1-INAYEA | | x (6) | | (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16) |

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Substances/Activities

E number

and/or

CAS number

OIV Code of Oenological Practices (5)

OIV Codex file reference as referred to in Article 9(1)

Additive

Processing aid/substance used as processing aid (6)

Conditions and limits of use (7)

Categories of wine products (8)

1

Acidity regulators

1.1

Tartaric acid (L(+)-)

E 334/CAS 87-69-4

Files 2.1.3.1.1 (2001),

3.1.1.1 (2001)

COEI-1-LTARAC

x

Conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Specifications for tartaric acid (L(+)-) laid down in point 2 of Appendix 1 to this Annex.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

1.2

Malic acid (D,L-; L-)

E 296/-

Files 2.1.3.1.1 (2001),

3.1.1.1 (2001)

COEI-1-ACIMAL

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

1.3

Lactic acid

E 270/-

Files 2.1.3.1.1 (2001),

3.1.1.1 (2001)

COEI-1-ACILAC

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

1.4

Potassium L(+)-tartrate

E 336(ii)/CAS 921-53-9

Files 2.1.3.2.2 (1979),

3.1.2.2 (1979)

COEI-1-POTTAR

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

1.5

Potassium bicarbonate

E 501(ii)/CAS 298-14-6

Files 2.1.3.2.2 (1979),

3.1.2.2 (1979)

COEI-1-POTBIC

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

1.6

Calcium carbonate

E 170/CAS 471-34-1

Files 2.1.3.2.2 (1979),

3.1.2.2 (1979)

COEI-1-CALCAR

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

1.8

Calcium sulphate

E 516/-

File 2.1.3.1.1.1 (2017)

x

Conditions and limits laid down in point 2(b) of Section A of Annex III. Maximum use level: 2 g/l.

(3)

1.9

Potassium carbonate

E 501(i)

Files 2.1.3.2.5 (2017), 3.1.2.2 (1979)

x

Conditions and limits laid down in Sections C and D of Part I of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Article 11 of this Regulation. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Citric acid: Only objective a) of OIV files 3.1.1 (1979) and 3.1.1.1 (2001) applies. Maximum content in wine thus treated and placed on the market: 1 g/l.

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

1.10

Citric acid

E 330

Files 3.1.1 (1979), 3.1.1.1 (2001)

COEI-1-CITACI

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

1.11

Yeasts for wine production

-/-

Files 2.1.3.2.3 (2019), 2.1.3.2.3.1 (2019), 2.3.1 (2016)

COEI-1-SACCHA

COEI-1-NOSACC

x (6)

(10), (11) and (12)

1.12

Lactic acid bacteria

-/-

Files 2.1.3.2.3 (2019), 2.1.3.2.3.2 (2019), 3.1.2 (1979), 3.1.2.3 (1980)

COEI-1-BALACT

x (6)

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2

Preservatives and antioxidants

2.1

Sulphur dioxide

E 220/CAS 7446-09-5

Files 1.12 (2004), 2.1.2 (1987),

3.4.4 (2003)

COEI-1-SOUDIO

x

Limits (i.e. maximum quantity in the product placed on the market) as laid down in Part B of Annex I.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2.2

Potassium bisulphite

E 228/CAS 7773-03-7

Files 1.12 (2004), 2.1.2 (1987), 3.4.4 (2003)

COEI-1-POTBIS

x

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2.3

Potassium metabisulphite

E 224/CAS 16731-55-8

Files 1.12 (2004), 2.1.2 (1987), 3.4.4 (2003)

COEI-1-POTANH

x

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2.4

Potassium sorbate

E 202

File 3.4.5 (1988)

COEI-1-POTSOR

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

2.5

Lysozyme

E 1105

Files 2.2.6 (1997), 3.4.12 (1997)

COEI-1-LYSOZY

x

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2.6

L ascorbic acid

E 300

Files 1.11 (2001), 2.2.7 (2001), 3.4.7 (2001)

COEI-1-ASCACI

x

Maximum content in wine thus treated and placed on the market: 250 mg/l. Maximum 250 mg/l for each treatment.

Fresh grapes, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

2.7

Dimethyldicarbonate (DMDC)

E242/CAS 4525-33-1

File 3.4.13 (2001)

COEI-1-DICDIM

x

The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

3

Adsorbents

3.1

Charcoal for oenological use

Files 2.1.9 (2002), 3.5.9 (1970)

COEI-1-CHARBO

x

The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

White wines, (2), (10), and (14)

3.2

Selective vegetal fibres

File 3.4.20 (2017)

COEI-1-FIBVEG

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

4

Activators for alcoholic and malolactic fermentation

4.1

Microcrystalline cellulose

E 460(i)/CAS 9004-34-6

Files 2.3.2 (2019), 3.4.21 (2015)

COEI-1-CELMIC

x

It must comply with the specifications laid down in the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 231/2012.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

4.2

Diammonium hydrogen phosphate

E 342/CAS 7783-28-0

File 4.1.7 (1995)

COEI-1-PHODIA

x

Only for alcoholic fermentation. No more than 1 g/l (expressed in salts) (9) or 0,3 g/l for the second fermentation of sparkling wines.

Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), second alcoholic fermentation of (4), (5), (6) and (7)

4.3

Ammonium sulphate

E 517/CAS 7783-20-2

File 4.1.7 (1995)

COEI-1AMMSUL

x

4.4

Ammonium bisulphite

-/CAS 10192-30-0

COEI-1-AMMHYD

x

Only for alcoholic fermentation. No more than 0,2 g/l (expressed in salts) and up to the limits set in points 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.

Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11) and (12)

4.5

Thiamine hydrochloride

-/CAS 67-03-8

Files 2.3.3 (1976), 4.1.7 (1995)

COEI-1-THIAMIN

x

Only for alcoholic fermentation.

No more than 0,6 mg/l (expressed in thiamin) for each treatment.

Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), second alcoholic fermentation of (4), (5), (6) and (7)

4.6

Yeast autolysates

-/-

Files 2.3.2 (2019), 3.4.21 (2015)

COEI-1-AUTLYS

x (6)

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

4.7

Yeast cell walls

-/-

Files 2.3.4 (1988), 3.4.21 (2015)

COEI-1-YEHULL

x (6)

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

4.8

Inactivated yeasts

-/-

Files 2.3.2 (2019), 3.4.21 (2015)

COEI-1-INAYEA

x (6)

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

4.9

Inactivated yeasts with guaranteed glutathione levels

-/-

File 2.2.9 (2017)

COEI-1-LEVGLU

x (6)

Only for alcoholic fermentation.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5

Clarifying agents

5.1

Edible gelatine

-/CAS 9000-70-8

Files 2.1.6 (1997), 3.2.1 (2011)

COEI-1-GELATI

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.2

Wheat protein

Files 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.7 (2004)

COEI-1-PROVEG

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.3

Peas protein

Files 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.7 (2004)

COEI-1-PROVEG

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.4

Potatoes protein

Files 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.7 (2004)

COEI-1-PROVEG

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.5

Isinglass

File 3.2.1 (2011)

COEI-1-COLPOI

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

5.6

Casein

-/CAS 9005-43-0

File 2.1.16 (2004)

COEI-1-CASEIN

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.7

Potassium caseinates

-/CAS 68131-54-4

Files 2.1.15 (2004), 3.2.1 (2011)

COEI-1-POTCAS

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.8

Egg albumin

-/CAS 9006-59-1

File 3.2.1 (2011)

COEI-1-OEUALB

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

5.9

Bentonite

-/-

Files 2.1.8 (1970), 3.3.5 (1970)

COEI-1-BENTON

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.10

Silicon dioxide (gel or colloidal solution)

E 551/-

Files 2.1.10 (1991), 3.2.1 (2011), 3.2.4 (1991)

COEI-1-DIOSIL

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.11

Kaolin

-/CAS 1332-58-7

File 3.2.1 (2011)

COEI-1-KAOLIN

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

5.12

Tannins

Files 2.1.7 (2019), 2.1.17 (2004), 3.2.6 (2019), 3.2.7 (2004), 4.1.8 (1981), 4.3.2 (1981)

COEI-1-TANINS

x

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.13

Chitosan derived from Aspergillus niger or Agaricus bisporus

-/CAS 9012-76-4

Files 2.1.22 (2009), 3.2.1 (2011), 3.2.12 (2009)

COEI-1-CHITOS

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.14

Chitin-glucan derived from Aspergillus niger

Chitin: CAS 1398-61-4; Glucan: CAS 9041-22-9.

Files 2.1.23 (2009),3.2.1 (2011), 3.2.13 (2009)

COEI-1-CHITGL

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.15

Yeast protein extracts

-/-

Files 2.1.24 (2011), 3.2.14 (2011), 3.2.1 (2011)

COEI-1-EPLEV

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.16

Polyvinylpolypyrrolidone

E 1202/CAS 25249-54-1

File 3.4.9 (1987)

COEI-1-PVPP

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

5.17

Calcium alginate

E 404/CAS 9005-35-0

File 4.1.8 (1981)

COEI-1-ALGIAC

x

Only in the production of all categories of sparkling and semi-sparkling wines obtained by fermentation in bottle and with the lees separated by disgorging.

(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9)

5.18

Potassium alginate

E 402/CAS 9005-36-1

File 4.1.8 (1981)

COEI-1-POTALG

x

Only in the production of all categories of sparkling and semi-sparkling wines obtained by fermentation in bottle and with the lees separated by disgorging.

(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9)

6

Stabilising agents

6.1

Potassium hydrogen tartrate

E336(i)/CAS 868-14-4

File 3.3.4 (2004)

COEI-1-POTBIT

x

Only to assist the precipitation of tartaric salts.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.2

Calcium tartrate

-/-

File 3.3.12 (1997)

COEI-1-CALTAR

x

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.3

Citric acid

E 330

Files 3.3.1 (1970), 3.3.8 (1970)

COEI-1-CITACI

x

Maximum content in wine thus treated and placed on the market: 1 g/l.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.4

Tannins

-/-

Files 2.1.7 (2019), 3.2.6 (2019), 3.3.1 (1970)

COEI-1-TANINS

Fresh grapes, partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

6.5

Potassium ferrocyanide

E 536/-

Files 3.3.1 (1970), 3.3.10 (1970)

COEI-1-POTFER

x

Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 4 to this Annex. The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.6

Calcium phytate

-/CAS 3615-82-5

File 3.3.1 (1970)

COEI-1-CALPHY

x

Only for red wines and no more than 8 g/hl.

Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 4 to this Annex.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.7

Metatartaric acid

E 353/-

File 3.3.7 (1970)

COEI-1-METACI

x

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.8

Gum arabic

E 414/CAS 9000-01-5

File 3.3.6 (1972)

COEI-1-GOMARA

x

Quantum satis.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such,(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.9

Tartaric acid D, L- or its neutral salt of potassium

-/CAS 133-37-9

Files 2.1.21 (2008), 3.4.15 (2008)

COEI-1-DLTART

x

Only for precipitating excess calcium.

Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 4 to this Annex.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.10

Yeast mannoproteins

-/-

File 3.3.13 (2005)

COEI-1-MANPRO

x

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.11

Carboxymethylcellulose

E466/-

File 3.3.14 (2020)

COEI-1-CMC

x

Only to ensure tartaric stabilisation.

White and rosé wines, (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9)

6.12

Polyvinylimidazole-polyvinylpyrrolidone copolymers (PVI/PVP)

-/CAS 87865-40-5

Files 2.1.20 (2014), 3.4.14 (2014)

COEI-1-PVIPVP

x

The treatment shall be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

6.13

Potassium polyaspartate

E 456/CAS 64723-18-8

File 3.3.15 (2016)

COEI-1-POTPOL

x

Only to contribute to the tartaric stabilization.

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

6.14

Fumaric acid

E 297/CAS 110-17-8

Files 3.4.2 (2021), 3.4.23 (2021)

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

7

Enzymes (10)

7.1

Urease

EC 3.5.1.5

File 3.4.11 (1995)

COEI-1-UREASE

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only to reduce the level of urea in the wine.

Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 6 to this Annex.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

7.2

Pectin lyases

EC 4.2.2.10

Files 1.13 (2021); 2.1.4 (2021); 2.1.18 (2021); 3.2.8 (2021); 3.2.11 (2021)

COEI-1-ACTPLY

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.3

Pectin methylesterase

EC 3.1.1.11

Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021)

COEI-1-ACTPME

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.4

Polygalacturonase

EC 3.2.1.15

Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021)

COEI-1-ACTPGA

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.5

Hemicellulase

EC 3.2.1.78

Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021)

COEI-1-ACTGHE

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.6

Cellulase

EC 3.2.1.4

Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021)

COEI-1-ACTCEL

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.7

Betaglucanase

EC 3.2.1.58

File 3.2.10 (2004)

COEI-1-BGLUCA

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9),, (15) and (16)

7.8

Glycosidase

EC 3.2.1.20

Files 2.1.19 (2013), 3.2.9 (2013)

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.9

Arabinanase

EC 3.2.1.99

Files 1.13 (2021), 2.1.4 (2021), 2.1.18 (2021), 3.2.8 (2021), 3.2.11 (2021)

COEI-1-ACTARA

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

Fresh grapes, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.10

Beta-glucanase (β1-3, β1-6)

EC 3.2.1.6

File 3.5.7 (2013)

COEI-1-ACTGLU

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

7.11

Glucosidase

EC 3.2.1.21

Files 2.1.19 (2013), 3.2.9 (2013)

COEI-1-GLYCOS

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes.

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

7.12

Aspergillopepsin I

EC 3.4.23.18

Files 2.2.12 (2021), 3.3.16 (2021)

COEI-1-PROTEA

COEI-1-PRENZY

x

Only for oenological purposes in maceration, clarification, stabilisation, filtration and to reveal the aromatic precursors of grapes

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

8

Gases and packaging gases (11)

8.1

Argon

E 938/CAS 7440-37-1

Files 2.2.5 (1970), 3.2.3 (2002)

COEI-1-ARGON

x (11)

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

8.2

Nitrogen

E 941/CAS 7727-37-9

Files 2.1.14 (1999), 2.2.5 (1970), 3.2.3 (2002)

COEI-1-AZOTE

x (11)

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

8.3

Carbon dioxide

E 290/CAS 124-38-9

Files 1.7 (1970), 2.1.14 (1999), 2.2.3 (1970), 2.2.5 (1970), 2.3.9 (2005), 4.1.10 (2002)

COEI-1-DIOCAR

x (11)

x

In the case of still wines the maximum carbon dioxide content in the wine so treated and placed on the market is 3 g/l, while the excess pressure caused by the carbon dioxide must be less than 1 bar at a temperature of 20 °C.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

8.4

Gaseous oxygen

E 948/CAS 17778-80-2

Files 2.1.1 (2016), 3.5.5 (2016)

COEI-1-OXYGEN

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

9

Fermentation agents

9.1

Yeasts for wine production

-/-

Files 2.1.3.2.3.1. (2019), 2.3.1 (2016), 4.1.8 (1981)

COEI-1-SACCHA

COEI-1-NOSACC

x (6)

Fresh grapes, (2), (10), (11), (12), (13), second alcoholic fermentation of (4), (5), (6) and (7)

9.2

Lactic acid bacteria

-/-

Files 2.1.3.2.3.2 (2019), 3.1.2 (1979), 3.1.2.3 (1980)

COEI-1-BALACT

x (6)

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

10

Correction of defects

10.1

Copper sulphate, pentahydrate

-/CAS 7758-99-8

File 3.5.8 (1989)

COEI-1-CUISUL

x

No more than 1 g/hl, provided that the copper content of the product so treated does not exceed 1 mg/l, with the exception of liqueur wines prepared from fresh unfermented or slightly fermented grape must, for which the copper content may not exceed 2 mg/l.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

10.2

Copper citrate

-/CAS 866-82-0

File 3.5.14 (2008)

COEI-1-CUICIT

x

No more than 1 g/hl, provided that the copper content of the product so treated does not exceed 1 mg/l, with the exception of liqueur wines prepared from fresh unfermented or slightly fermented grape must, for which the copper content may not exceed 2 mg/l.

Partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

10.3

Chitosan derived from Aspergillus niger or Agaricus bisporus

-/CAS 9012-76-4

File 3.4.16 (2009)

COEI-1-CHITOS

x

(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

10.4

Chitin-glucan derived from Aspergillus niger

Chitin: CAS 1398-61-4; Glucan: CAS 9041-22-9.

File 3.4.17 (2009)

COEI-1-CHITGL

x

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

10.5

Inactivated yeasts

-/-

COEI-1-INAYEA

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

11

Other practices

11.1

Aleppo pine resin

-/-

x

Subject to the conditions laid down in Appendix 2 to this Annex.

(2), (10) and (11)

11.2

Fresh lees

-/-

x (6)

Only in dry wines. Fresh lees are sound and undiluted and contain yeasts resulting from the recent vinification of dry wine. Quantities not exceeding 5 % of the volume of product treated.

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (15) and (16)

11.3

Caramel

E 150 a-d/-

File 4.3 (2007)

COEI-1-CARAMEL

x

To reinforce the colour as defined in point 2 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008.

(3)

11.4

Allyl isothiocyanate

-/57-06-7

x

Only to impregnate discs of pure paraffin. See Table 1.

No trace of allyl isothiocyanate must be present in the wine.

Only for partially fermented must for direct human consumption as such, and wine.

11.5

Inactivated yeasts

-/-

COEI-1-INAYEA

x (6)

(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (15) and (16)

| (b) | in Appendix 1, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:






  ‘1. | Tartaric acid, the use of which for deacidification purposes is provided for in line item 1.1 of Table 2 of this Annex, may be used only for products that: | are from the Elbling and Riesling vine varieties; and |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(b)

in Appendix 1, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.

are from the Elbling and Riesling vine varieties; and

| | are obtained from grapes harvested in Germany in wine-growing zone A.’; |
| --- | --- |

are obtained from grapes harvested in Germany in wine-growing zone A.’;

| (c) | in Appendix 5, the sentence “The treatment is to be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

in Appendix 5, the sentence “The treatment is to be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted;

| (d) | in Appendix 7, the sentence “The treatment is to be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

in Appendix 7, the sentence “The treatment is to be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted;

| (e) | in Appendix 8, the sentence “The treatment must be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

in Appendix 8, the sentence “The treatment must be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted;

| (f) | in Appendix 10, the sentence “The treatment must be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

in Appendix 10, the sentence “The treatment must be recorded in the register referred to in Article 147(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013” is deleted;

| (2) | Part B, Section A, point 2 is amended as follows:






  (a) | in point (c), the fourteenth indent is replaced by the following:






  ‘— | white wines with the following protected geographical indications, with a total alcoholic strength by volume of more than 15 % vol. and a sugar content of more than 45 g/l:






  — | Franche-Comté, |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

(2)

Part B, Section A, point 2 is amended as follows:

(a)

in point (c), the fourteenth indent is replaced by the following:

‘—

white wines with the following protected geographical indications, with a total alcoholic strength by volume of more than 15 % vol. and a sugar content of more than 45 g/l:

—

Franche-Comté,

| — | Coteaux de l’Auxois, |
| --- | --- |

—

Coteaux de l’Auxois,

| — | Saône-et-Loire, |
| --- | --- |

—

Saône-et-Loire,

| — | Ardèche, |
| --- | --- |

—

Ardèche,

| — | Collines rhodaniennes, |
| --- | --- |

—

Collines rhodaniennes,

| — | Comté Tolosan, |
| --- | --- |

—

Comté Tolosan,

| — | Côtes de Gascogne, |
| --- | --- |

—

Côtes de Gascogne,

| — | Gers, |
| --- | --- |

—

Gers,

| — | Côtes du Lot, |
| --- | --- |

—

Côtes du Lot,

| — | Côtes du Tarn, |
| --- | --- |

—

Côtes du Tarn,

| — | Vins de la Corrèze, |
| --- | --- |

—

Vins de la Corrèze,

| — | Ile de Beauté, |
| --- | --- |

—

Ile de Beauté,

| — | Pays d’Oc, |
| --- | --- |

—

Pays d’Oc,

| — | Côtes de Thau, |
| --- | --- |

—

Côtes de Thau,

| — | Val de Loire, |
| --- | --- |

—

Val de Loire,

| — | Méditerranée, |
| --- | --- |

—

Méditerranée,

| — | Comtés rhodaniens, |
| --- | --- |

—

Comtés rhodaniens,

| — | Côtes de Thongue, |
| --- | --- |

—

Côtes de Thongue,

| — | Côte Vermeille, |
| --- | --- |

—

Côte Vermeille,

| — | Agenais, |
| --- | --- |

—

Agenais,

| — | Landes, |
| --- | --- |

—

Landes,

| — | Vins des Allobroges, |
| --- | --- |

—

Vins des Allobroges,

| — | Var,’; |
| --- | --- |

—

Var,’;

| (b) | in point (e), the tenth indent is replaced by the following:






  ‘— | wines from Slovenia entitled to a protected designation of origin and described by the terms ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – jagodni izbor’, ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – ledeno vino’, ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – suhi jagodni izbor’ or ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – slamno vino (vino iz sušenega grozdja)’,’. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

in point (e), the tenth indent is replaced by the following:

‘—

wines from Slovenia entitled to a protected designation of origin and described by the terms ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – jagodni izbor’, ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – ledeno vino’, ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – suhi jagodni izbor’ or ‘vrhunsko vino ZGP – slamno vino (vino iz sušenega grozdja)’,’.

---

(1)  The year in brackets following references to a file of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices indicates the version of the file authorised by the Union as authorised oenological practices, subject to the conditions and limits of use set out in this table.

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p 4).

(3)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 of 14 January 2011 on plastic materials and articles intended to come into contact with food (OJ L 12, 15.1.2011, p. 1).

(4)  If not applicable to all categories of wine products laid down in Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(5)  The year in brackets following references to a file of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices indicates the version of the file authorised by the Union as authorised oenological practices, subject to the conditions and limits of use set out in this table.

(6)  Substances used as processing aids as referred to in Article 20(d) of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 (OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 18).

(7)  The authorised oenological compounds are to be used in line with the provisions contained in the files of the OIV Code of Oenological Practices referred to in column 3 unless any further conditions and limits of use as laid down in this column apply.

(8)  If not applicable to all categories of wine products laid down in Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(9)  The ammonium salts referred to in line 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 may also be used in combination, up to the overall limit of 1g/l or 0,3 g/l for the second fermentation of sparkling wine. However, the ammonium salt referred to in line 4.4 may not exceed the limit referred to in line 4.4.

(10)  See also Article 9(2) of this Regulation.

(11)  When they are used as additives a referred to in point 20 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on food additives (OJ L 354, 31.12.2008, p. 16).’

---

ANNEX II

Annex III to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/934 is amended as follows:

| (1) | in Section A, point 4(a), the second indent is replaced by the following:






  ‘— | concentrated grape must, concentrated grape must obtained by the action of direct heat, complying, with the exception of this operation, with the definition of concentrated grape must, rectified concentrated grape must or must from raisined grapes to which neutral alcohol of vine origin has been added to prevent fermentation, for Spanish wine described by the traditional expression ‘vino generoso de licor’ and provided that the increase in the total alcoholic strength by volume of the wine in question is not greater than 8 % vol.,’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

in Section A, point 4(a), the second indent is replaced by the following:

‘—

concentrated grape must, concentrated grape must obtained by the action of direct heat, complying, with the exception of this operation, with the definition of concentrated grape must, rectified concentrated grape must or must from raisined grapes to which neutral alcohol of vine origin has been added to prevent fermentation, for Spanish wine described by the traditional expression ‘vino generoso de licor’ and provided that the increase in the total alcoholic strength by volume of the wine in question is not greater than 8 % vol.,’;

| (2) | in Section B, point 3, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

  ‘However, as concerns liqueur wines bearing the protected designation of origin ‘Condado de Huelva’, ‘Málaga’ and ‘Jerez-Xérès-Sherry’, the must of raisined grapes to which neutral alcohol of vine origin has been added to prevent fermentation, obtained from the Pedro Ximénez vine variety, may come from the ‘Montilla-Moriles’ region.’; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

in Section B, point 3, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘However, as concerns liqueur wines bearing the protected designation of origin ‘Condado de Huelva’, ‘Málaga’ and ‘Jerez-Xérès-Sherry’, the must of raisined grapes to which neutral alcohol of vine origin has been added to prevent fermentation, obtained from the Pedro Ximénez vine variety, may come from the ‘Montilla-Moriles’ region.’;

| (3) | Appendix 1 is amended as follows:






  (a) | in Section A, the table referring to ‘SPAIN’ is replaced by the following:






  ‘Liqueur wines bearing a protected designation of origin | Description of product as established by Union rules or national legislation |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Alicante | Moscatel de Alicante |
| | Vino dulce |
| Cariñena | Vino dulce |
| Condado de Huelva | Pedro Ximénez |
| | Moscatel |
| | Mistela |
| | Vino dulce |
| Empordà | Mistela |
| | Moscatel |
| Jerez-Xérès-Sherry | Pedro Ximénez |
| | Moscatel |
| Lebrija | |
| Málaga | Vino dulce |
| Montilla-Moriles | Pedro Ximénez |
| | Moscatel |
| Priorato | Vino dulce |
| Tarragona | Vino dulce |
| Valencia | Moscatel de Valencia |
| | Vino dulce’; |

(3)

Appendix 1 is amended as follows:

(a)

in Section A, the table referring to ‘SPAIN’ is replaced by the following:

‘Liqueur wines bearing a protected designation of origin

Description of product as established by Union rules or national legislation

Alicante

Moscatel de Alicante

Vino dulce

Cariñena

Vino dulce

Condado de Huelva

Pedro Ximénez

Moscatel

Mistela

Vino dulce

Empordà

Mistela

Moscatel

Jerez-Xérès-Sherry

Pedro Ximénez

Moscatel

Lebrija

Málaga

Vino dulce

Montilla-Moriles

Pedro Ximénez

Moscatel

Priorato

Vino dulce

Tarragona

Vino dulce

Valencia

Moscatel de Valencia

Vino dulce’;

| (b) | Section B is amended as follows:






  (i) | in point 4, the table referring to ‘SPAIN’ is replaced by the following:






  ‘Liqueur wines bearing a protected designation of origin | Description of product as established by Union rules or national legislation |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Condado de Huelva | |
| Jerez-Xérès-Sherry | Vino generoso de licor |
| Málaga | Vino dulce |
| Montilla-Moriles | Vino generoso de licor’; |

(b)

Section B is amended as follows:

(i)

in point 4, the table referring to ‘SPAIN’ is replaced by the following:

‘Liqueur wines bearing a protected designation of origin

Description of product as established by Union rules or national legislation

Condado de Huelva

Jerez-Xérès-Sherry

Vino generoso de licor

Málaga

Vino dulce

Montilla-Moriles

Vino generoso de licor’;

| (ii) | in point 5, the following words are added after ‘ITALY Marsala’:

  ‘CYPRUS
  Κουμανδαρία (Commandaria).’; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

in point 5, the following words are added after ‘ITALY Marsala’:

‘CYPRUS

Κουμανδαρία (Commandaria).’;

| (iii) | in point 6, the following words are added after ‘ITALY Oltrepó Pavese Moscato, Marsala, Moscato di Trani’:

  ‘CYPRUS
  Κουμανδαρία (Commandaria).’. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

in point 6, the following words are added after ‘ITALY Oltrepó Pavese Moscato, Marsala, Moscato di Trani’:

‘CYPRUS

Κουμανδαρία (Commandaria).’.

| (4) | In Appendix 3, the list of varieties is replaced by the following:

  ‘Muscats – Grenache – Garnacha Blanca – Garnacha Peluda – Listán Blanco – Listán Negro-Negramoll – Maccabéo – Malvoisies – Mavrodaphne – Assirtiko – Liatiko – Garnacha tintorera – Monastrell – Palomino – Pedro Ximénez – Albarola – Aleatico – Bosco – Cannonau – Corinto nero – Giró – Monica – Nasco – Primitivo – Vermentino – Zibibbo – Moscateles – Garnacha – Garnacha roja – Mazuela.’ |
| --- | --- |

(4)

In Appendix 3, the list of varieties is replaced by the following:

‘Muscats – Grenache – Garnacha Blanca – Garnacha Peluda – Listán Blanco – Listán Negro-Negramoll – Maccabéo – Malvoisies – Mavrodaphne – Assirtiko – Liatiko – Garnacha tintorera – Monastrell – Palomino – Pedro Ximénez – Albarola – Aleatico – Bosco – Cannonau – Corinto nero – Giró – Monica – Nasco – Primitivo – Vermentino – Zibibbo – Moscateles – Garnacha – Garnacha roja – Mazuela.’

---

| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/30

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/69

of 12 January 2022

approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’ (TSG))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Austria’s application for the approval of an amendment to the product specification for the traditional speciality guaranteed ‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’, registered under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/304 (2). The amendment changes the name ‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’ to ‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’/‘Seneno mleko’. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Austria’s application for the approval of an amendment to the product specification for the traditional speciality guaranteed ‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’, registered under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/304 (2). The amendment changes the name ‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’ to ‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’/‘Seneno mleko’.

| (2) | Since the amendment in question is not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(b) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since the amendment in question is not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(b) of that Regulation.

| (3) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendment to the specification should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendment to the specification should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The amendment to the product specification published in the Official Journal of the European Union regarding the name ‘Heumilch’/‘Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno’/‘Lait de foin’/‘Leche de heno’ (TSG) is hereby approved.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 January 2022.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/304 of 2 March 2016 entering a name in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (Heumilch/Haymilk/Latte fieno/Lait de foin/Leche de heno (TSG)) (OJ L 58, 4.3.2016, p. 28).

2

(3)  
  OJ C 392, 28.9.2021, p. 8.

3

---

| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/31

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/70

of 12 January 2022

approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’ (TSG))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Austria’s application for the approval of an amendment to the product specification for the traditional speciality guaranteed ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’, registered under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/486 (2). The amendment includes changing the name ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’ to ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’/‘Ovčje seneno mleko’. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Austria’s application for the approval of an amendment to the product specification for the traditional speciality guaranteed ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’, registered under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/486 (2). The amendment includes changing the name ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’ to ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’/‘Ovčje seneno mleko’.

| (2) | Since the amendment in question is not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(b) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since the amendment in question is not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(b) of that Regulation.

| (3) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendment to the specification should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendment to the specification should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The amendment to the product specification published in the Official Journal of the European Union regarding the name ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’ (TSG) is hereby approved.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 January 2022.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/486 of 19 March 2019 entering the name ‘Schaf-Heumilch’/‘Sheep’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di pecora’/‘Lait de foin de brebis’/‘Leche de heno de oveja’ (TSG) in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (OJ L 84, 26.3.2019, p. 1).

2

(3)  
  OJ C 392, 28.9.2021, p. 13.

3

---

| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/33

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/71

of 12 January 2022

approving a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a name entered in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’ (TSG))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Austria’s application for the approval of an amendment to the product specification for the traditional speciality guaranteed ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’, registered under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/487 (2). The amendment includes changing the name ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’ to ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’/‘Kozje seneno mleko’. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Austria’s application for the approval of an amendment to the product specification for the traditional speciality guaranteed ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’, registered under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/487 (2). The amendment includes changing the name ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’ to ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’/‘Kozje seneno mleko’.

| (2) | Since the amendment in question is not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(b) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since the amendment in question is not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (3) as required by Article 50(2)(b) of that Regulation.

| (3) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendment to the specification should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendment to the specification should be approved,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The amendment to the product specification published in the Official Journal of the European Union regarding the name ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’ (TSG) is hereby approved.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 January 2022.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/487 of 19 March 2019 entering the name ‘Ziegen-Heumilch’/‘Goat’s Haymilk’/‘Latte fieno di capra’/‘Lait de foin de chèvre’/‘Leche de heno de cabra’ (TSG) in the register of traditional specialities guaranteed (OJ L 84, 26.3.2019, p. 3).

2

(3)  
  OJ C 396, 30.9.2021, p. 22.

3

---

| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/34

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/72

of 18 January 2022

imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 15 and Article 24(1) thereof,

Whereas:

1.   PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE

1.1.   Initiation

Initiation

| (1) | On 21 December 2020, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-subsidy proceeding with regard to imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’, ‘PRC’ or ‘the country concerned’) on the basis of Article 10 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (‘the Notice of Initiation’) (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 21 December 2020, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-subsidy proceeding with regard to imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’, ‘PRC’ or ‘the country concerned’) on the basis of Article 10 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (‘the Notice of Initiation’) (2).

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| (2) | The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged by Europacable (‘the complainant’) on behalf of Union producers. The complainant represented more than 25 % of the total Union production of optical fibre cables (‘OFC’). The complaint contained evidence of subsidisation and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation. |
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(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged by Europacable (‘the complainant’) on behalf of Union producers. The complainant represented more than 25 % of the total Union production of optical fibre cables (‘OFC’). The complaint contained evidence of subsidisation and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

| (3) | Prior to the initiation of the anti-subsidy investigation, the Commission notified the Government of China (‘GOC’) (3) that it had received a properly documented complaint, and invited the GOC for consultations in accordance with Article 10(7) of the basic Regulation. Consultations were held on 16 December 2020 with the GOC. However, no mutually agreed solution could be reached. |
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(3)

Prior to the initiation of the anti-subsidy investigation, the Commission notified the Government of China (‘GOC’) (3) that it had received a properly documented complaint, and invited the GOC for consultations in accordance with Article 10(7) of the basic Regulation. Consultations were held on 16 December 2020 with the GOC. However, no mutually agreed solution could be reached.

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| (4) | On 24 September 2020, the European Commission initiated a separate anti-dumping investigation with regard to the same product originating in the People’s Republic of China (4) (‘the separate anti-dumping investigation’). The injury, causation and Union interest analyses performed in the present anti-subsidy investigation and the separate anti-dumping investigation are mutatis mutandis identical, since the definition of the Union industry, the sampled Union producers, the period considered and the investigation period are the same in both investigations. |
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(4)

On 24 September 2020, the European Commission initiated a separate anti-dumping investigation with regard to the same product originating in the People’s Republic of China (4) (‘the separate anti-dumping investigation’). The injury, causation and Union interest analyses performed in the present anti-subsidy investigation and the separate anti-dumping investigation are mutatis mutandis identical, since the definition of the Union industry, the sampled Union producers, the period considered and the investigation period are the same in both investigations.

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mutatis mutandis

1.2.   Comments concerning initiation

Comments concerning initiation

| (5) | The Commission received comments on initiation from the GOC, the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (‘CCCME’), one importer (Connect Com), and the complainant. |
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(5)

The Commission received comments on initiation from the GOC, the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (‘CCCME’), one importer (Connect Com), and the complainant.

| (6) | The GOC claimed that the investigation should not be initiated because the complaint did not satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Articles 11(2) and 11(3) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM Agreement’) and of Article 10(2) of the Basic Regulation. According to the GOC, there was insufficient evidence of countervailable subsidies, injury and a causal link between the subsidised imports and the injury. In response to this claim of the GOC, the complainant argued that the complaint contained information that was reasonably available to and that the complaint provided for more than ample evidence demonstrating the existence of subsidisation, injury and a causal link between the two. The GOC reiterated that the complaint did not contain sufficient evidence to meet the evidentiary standard and regardless of what information might be reasonably available to the complainant, there always needs to be sufficient evidence regarding the existence and nature of a subsidy, material injury and a causal link. |
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(6)

The GOC claimed that the investigation should not be initiated because the complaint did not satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Articles 11(2) and 11(3) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM Agreement’) and of Article 10(2) of the Basic Regulation. According to the GOC, there was insufficient evidence of countervailable subsidies, injury and a causal link between the subsidised imports and the injury. In response to this claim of the GOC, the complainant argued that the complaint contained information that was reasonably available to and that the complaint provided for more than ample evidence demonstrating the existence of subsidisation, injury and a causal link between the two. The GOC reiterated that the complaint did not contain sufficient evidence to meet the evidentiary standard and regardless of what information might be reasonably available to the complainant, there always needs to be sufficient evidence regarding the existence and nature of a subsidy, material injury and a causal link.

| (7) | The Commission rejected the claim of the GOC. Indeed, the evidence submitted in the complaint constituted the information reasonably available to the complainant at that stage. As shown in the memorandum on sufficiency of evidence, which contains the Commission’s assessment on all the evidence at the disposal of the Commission concerning the PRC, and on the basis of which the Commission initiated the investigation, there was sufficient evidence at initiation stage that the alleged subsidies were countervailable in terms of their existence, amount and nature. The complaint also contained sufficient evidence of the existence of injury to the Union industry, which was caused by the subsidised imports. |
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(7)

The Commission rejected the claim of the GOC. Indeed, the evidence submitted in the complaint constituted the information reasonably available to the complainant at that stage. As shown in the memorandum on sufficiency of evidence, which contains the Commission’s assessment on all the evidence at the disposal of the Commission concerning the PRC, and on the basis of which the Commission initiated the investigation, there was sufficient evidence at initiation stage that the alleged subsidies were countervailable in terms of their existence, amount and nature. The complaint also contained sufficient evidence of the existence of injury to the Union industry, which was caused by the subsidised imports.

| (8) | Following final disclosure, the GOC argued that the Commission could not have used facts available to remedy the lack of evidence provided in the complaint. The Commission noted that the GOC misunderstood what the Commission did at initiation stage. As set out in recital (7), the complaint contained sufficient evidence pursuant to Article 10(2) of the basic Regulation to justify the initiation of an investigation. Logically, the complaint could not have included all the necessary information requested from the GOC, as this was part of the detailed assessment done by the Commission during the investigation. Moreover, the Commission examined the complaint in light of all the available information to the Commission as regards the alleged subsidisation, including its past practice. This does not mean that the Commission applies facts available but rather that the Commission uses all the information available to confirm the allegations made in the complaint. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
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(8)

Following final disclosure, the GOC argued that the Commission could not have used facts available to remedy the lack of evidence provided in the complaint. The Commission noted that the GOC misunderstood what the Commission did at initiation stage. As set out in recital (7), the complaint contained sufficient evidence pursuant to Article 10(2) of the basic Regulation to justify the initiation of an investigation. Logically, the complaint could not have included all the necessary information requested from the GOC, as this was part of the detailed assessment done by the Commission during the investigation. Moreover, the Commission examined the complaint in light of all the available information to the Commission as regards the alleged subsidisation, including its past practice. This does not mean that the Commission applies facts available but rather that the Commission uses all the information available to confirm the allegations made in the complaint. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (9) | During the pre-initiation consultations and in its submission following initiation, the GOC alleged more specifically that the complainant used Chinese laws selectively and misinterpreted their connection with respect to the OFC industry and stated that policy documents, such as China’s High-tech Product Catalogue, Broadband China Strategy, the 13th Five-Year Plan, or Made in China 2025, are just guidance documents that are not binding. The China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (‘CCCME’) repeated this claim. The GOC also stated that the document ‘Made in China 2025’ does not specifically refer to OFC. The complainant argued that the Commission already established in previous investigations that China’s Five-Year Plans are of a binding nature. |
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(9)

During the pre-initiation consultations and in its submission following initiation, the GOC alleged more specifically that the complainant used Chinese laws selectively and misinterpreted their connection with respect to the OFC industry and stated that policy documents, such as China’s High-tech Product Catalogue, Broadband China Strategy, the 13th Five-Year Plan, or Made in China 2025, are just guidance documents that are not binding. The China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (‘CCCME’) repeated this claim. The GOC also stated that the document ‘Made in China 2025’ does not specifically refer to OFC. The complainant argued that the Commission already established in previous investigations that China’s Five-Year Plans are of a binding nature.

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| (10) | The Commission noted that the GOC does not dispute the existence of such plans, programmes, or recommendations but only the extent to which they are binding for the OFC industry. The Commission further observed that the complainant provided evidence indicating that ‘optical fibre’ is mentioned in several government documents, while ‘fiber optic network’ is mentioned in the Made in China 2025 Strategy. The GOC failed to produce any evidence showing that those statements would not be applicable to the product concerned. |
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(10)

The Commission noted that the GOC does not dispute the existence of such plans, programmes, or recommendations but only the extent to which they are binding for the OFC industry. The Commission further observed that the complainant provided evidence indicating that ‘optical fibre’ is mentioned in several government documents, while ‘fiber optic network’ is mentioned in the Made in China 2025 Strategy. The GOC failed to produce any evidence showing that those statements would not be applicable to the product concerned.

| (11) | The GOC also stated that State-owned enterprises (SOEs), State-owned banks or the Chinese Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (‘Sinosure’) cannot be qualified as public bodies and that the complainant unjustifiably relied on previous Commission’s findings for entirely unrelated industries. The CCCME repeated the claim that State-owned banks cannot be qualified as public bodies. The complainant argued that the Commission has recognised State-owned banks and Sinosure as public bodies in previous investigations. The GOC claimed that past findings of the Commission for unrelated industries could not constitute sufficient evidence in the complaint that State-owned banks and Sinosure acted as public bodies in the current investigation. |
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(11)

The GOC also stated that State-owned enterprises (SOEs), State-owned banks or the Chinese Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (‘Sinosure’) cannot be qualified as public bodies and that the complainant unjustifiably relied on previous Commission’s findings for entirely unrelated industries. The CCCME repeated the claim that State-owned banks cannot be qualified as public bodies. The complainant argued that the Commission has recognised State-owned banks and Sinosure as public bodies in previous investigations. The GOC claimed that past findings of the Commission for unrelated industries could not constitute sufficient evidence in the complaint that State-owned banks and Sinosure acted as public bodies in the current investigation.

| (12) | The Commission noted that this claim of the GOC is connected to the claim already evoked above, and that the complaint among others mentioned the Bank Law in China, which the GOC does not dispute to belong to the Chinese legislation. The Commission also highlighted that recent EU anti-subsidy investigations had concluded differently on this matter (5). The fact that these investigations covered industries unrelated to the OFC industry does not cast aside the qualification of the above institutions as public bodies. Moreover, evidence of government ownership may be considered to amount to evidence ‘tending to prove or indicating’ that an entity is a public body capable of conferring a financial contribution (6). |
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(12)

The Commission noted that this claim of the GOC is connected to the claim already evoked above, and that the complaint among others mentioned the Bank Law in China, which the GOC does not dispute to belong to the Chinese legislation. The Commission also highlighted that recent EU anti-subsidy investigations had concluded differently on this matter (5). The fact that these investigations covered industries unrelated to the OFC industry does not cast aside the qualification of the above institutions as public bodies. Moreover, evidence of government ownership may be considered to amount to evidence ‘tending to prove or indicating’ that an entity is a public body capable of conferring a financial contribution (6).

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| (13) | Following initiation, the GOC further argued that the complainant did not establish the conditions for applying an out-of-country benchmark for loans and for land use rights. The Commission found, however, that the allegations contained in the complaint are supported by recent EU anti-subsidy investigations concluding on those matters the need for external benchmarks adjusted to the prevailing conditions in the PRC (7). |
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(13)

Following initiation, the GOC further argued that the complainant did not establish the conditions for applying an out-of-country benchmark for loans and for land use rights. The Commission found, however, that the allegations contained in the complaint are supported by recent EU anti-subsidy investigations concluding on those matters the need for external benchmarks adjusted to the prevailing conditions in the PRC (7).

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| (14) | Furthermore, the GOC claimed that various subsidy schemes alleged by the complainant could not be considered a subsidy as the complaint did not provide for detailed evidence concerning the existence, amount and nature of these subsidies, or the direct relationship between the subsidy and the product concerned. |
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(14)

Furthermore, the GOC claimed that various subsidy schemes alleged by the complainant could not be considered a subsidy as the complaint did not provide for detailed evidence concerning the existence, amount and nature of these subsidies, or the direct relationship between the subsidy and the product concerned.

| (15) | The complainant argued that the complaint provided examples of specific direct transfers of funds and specifically referred to annual reports of numerous Chinese exporting producers of OFC which clearly indicated direct transfers of funds received in the form of grants. In addition, the complainant provided a document published by one of the exporting producers identifying the financial support it received from the GOC. |
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(15)

The complainant argued that the complaint provided examples of specific direct transfers of funds and specifically referred to annual reports of numerous Chinese exporting producers of OFC which clearly indicated direct transfers of funds received in the form of grants. In addition, the complainant provided a document published by one of the exporting producers identifying the financial support it received from the GOC.

| (16) | The GOC further claimed, in relation to various subsidies, that the complainant failed to provide evidence of benefit and specificity. The Commission is of the view that the complainant provided sufficient evidence of benefit and specificity as was reasonably available to it. In any event, the Commission examined the evidence in the complaint and provided its own assessment of all relevant elements in the memorandum of sufficiency of evidence, which was put on the open file upon initiation. The GOC reiterated its comments following initiation, but did not provide any further evidence. |
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(16)

The GOC further claimed, in relation to various subsidies, that the complainant failed to provide evidence of benefit and specificity. The Commission is of the view that the complainant provided sufficient evidence of benefit and specificity as was reasonably available to it. In any event, the Commission examined the evidence in the complaint and provided its own assessment of all relevant elements in the memorandum of sufficiency of evidence, which was put on the open file upon initiation. The GOC reiterated its comments following initiation, but did not provide any further evidence.

| (17) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that there was sufficient evidence provided in the complaint tending to show the existence of the alleged subsidisation by the GOC. |
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(17)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that there was sufficient evidence provided in the complaint tending to show the existence of the alleged subsidisation by the GOC.

| (18) | Following initiation, the GOC and the CCCME argued that the complainant incorrectly set aside the fact that the OFC industry in the Union were granted subsidies very similar to those in the PRC and that the Commission should not apply double standards. The complainant argued that these allegations are irrelevant in the investigation at hand. The GOC disagreed and claimed that the Commission, by investigating alleged subsidies in China, it distorts the market to the detriment of non-Union competitors. Such approach would lead to protectionist measures, ultimately obstructing international trade and development. |
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(18)

Following initiation, the GOC and the CCCME argued that the complainant incorrectly set aside the fact that the OFC industry in the Union were granted subsidies very similar to those in the PRC and that the Commission should not apply double standards. The complainant argued that these allegations are irrelevant in the investigation at hand. The GOC disagreed and claimed that the Commission, by investigating alleged subsidies in China, it distorts the market to the detriment of non-Union competitors. Such approach would lead to protectionist measures, ultimately obstructing international trade and development.

| (19) | This claim concerning subsidies in the EU had no weight on the Commission’s assessment underlying the initiation of this case, as they do not fall within the factors considered for this purpose. |
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(19)

This claim concerning subsidies in the EU had no weight on the Commission’s assessment underlying the initiation of this case, as they do not fall within the factors considered for this purpose.

| (20) | Finally, in its comments following initiation, the GOC claimed that no actual sales information was provided in the undercutting/underselling calculation and that the questionnaire responses of the sampled Union producers did not provide a meaningful summary of sensitive information. The GOC asserted that this had prevented it from properly rebutting the injury claims made by the complainant, and that these questionnaire responses seemed to contradict the complaint with regard to the alleged injury. |
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(20)

Finally, in its comments following initiation, the GOC claimed that no actual sales information was provided in the undercutting/underselling calculation and that the questionnaire responses of the sampled Union producers did not provide a meaningful summary of sensitive information. The GOC asserted that this had prevented it from properly rebutting the injury claims made by the complainant, and that these questionnaire responses seemed to contradict the complaint with regard to the alleged injury.

| (21) | The Commission considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint and the questionnaire replies contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data granted confidential treatment in order for interested parties to exercise their rights of defence throughout the proceeding. It is recalled that Article 29 of the basic Regulation allows for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person has acquired the information. The claims of the GOC in this regard were therefore rejected. |
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(21)

The Commission considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint and the questionnaire replies contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data granted confidential treatment in order for interested parties to exercise their rights of defence throughout the proceeding. It is recalled that Article 29 of the basic Regulation allows for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person has acquired the information. The claims of the GOC in this regard were therefore rejected.

| (22) | On the substantive requirements for the initiation of the investigation, the GOC and CCCME argued that the complainant failed to provide any comparable data on sales prices and profitability. The GOC and CCCME also claimed that the target profit indicated by the complainants was not justified and that the injury suffered by the complainants could have been caused by other elements including over stocking by one Union producer. |
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(22)

On the substantive requirements for the initiation of the investigation, the GOC and CCCME argued that the complainant failed to provide any comparable data on sales prices and profitability. The GOC and CCCME also claimed that the target profit indicated by the complainants was not justified and that the injury suffered by the complainants could have been caused by other elements including over stocking by one Union producer.

| (23) | Connect Com supported the arguments of the GOC on initiation. In particular, Connect Com claimed that an anti-dumping and a parallel anti-subsidy investigations would possibly result in a double remedy for the EU industry and could lead to an abuse of countervailing measures. Connect Com argued that the allegations in the complaint on the existence of a subsidy, on injury and on a causal link between the subsidy and injury were not supported by sufficient evidence. Concerning the lack of evidence on a causal link, Connect Com claimed that there were number of alternative reasons for a decrease in the EU industry’s market share such as the increase of imports from other third countries during the period considered and that there was an overcapacity in the EU. In addition, Connect Com claimed that the complaint was a mere copy of the complaint of the anti-dumping investigation and that the complainant should have differentiated the alleged injury due to dumping from the alleged injury due to subsidy. |
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(23)

Connect Com supported the arguments of the GOC on initiation. In particular, Connect Com claimed that an anti-dumping and a parallel anti-subsidy investigations would possibly result in a double remedy for the EU industry and could lead to an abuse of countervailing measures. Connect Com argued that the allegations in the complaint on the existence of a subsidy, on injury and on a causal link between the subsidy and injury were not supported by sufficient evidence. Concerning the lack of evidence on a causal link, Connect Com claimed that there were number of alternative reasons for a decrease in the EU industry’s market share such as the increase of imports from other third countries during the period considered and that there was an overcapacity in the EU. In addition, Connect Com claimed that the complaint was a mere copy of the complaint of the anti-dumping investigation and that the complainant should have differentiated the alleged injury due to dumping from the alleged injury due to subsidy.

| (24) | Moreover, the GOC and the CCCME claimed that there was no injury shown in the complaint, since the Union industry increased its production and the slight decrease in production capacity deriving from the inability of the Union Industry of supplying all newly developed consumption in Europe was not in itself an indicator of material injury. Sales volumes increased as well, while the Union industry retained a market share of almost 80 % and the profitability trend was unclear and did not show injury. In this respect, the complainant submitted that the increase in the Union consumption benefitted Chinese imports, the remaining market share did not bear relevance for the assessment of the injury, and the effects of tenders won by Chinese producers would materialise after a certain time lag. The CCCME responded that consumption, production and production capacity data showed that the Union industry was able to supply most of the increase in EU consumption, while expanding its business. |
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(24)

Moreover, the GOC and the CCCME claimed that there was no injury shown in the complaint, since the Union industry increased its production and the slight decrease in production capacity deriving from the inability of the Union Industry of supplying all newly developed consumption in Europe was not in itself an indicator of material injury. Sales volumes increased as well, while the Union industry retained a market share of almost 80 % and the profitability trend was unclear and did not show injury. In this respect, the complainant submitted that the increase in the Union consumption benefitted Chinese imports, the remaining market share did not bear relevance for the assessment of the injury, and the effects of tenders won by Chinese producers would materialise after a certain time lag. The CCCME responded that consumption, production and production capacity data showed that the Union industry was able to supply most of the increase in EU consumption, while expanding its business.

| (25) | In addition, the GOC and the CCCME claimed that the complaint contained no evidence of a causal link between subsidized imports and injury. Firstly, the GOC and the CCCME argued that there was no correlation between imports from China and the development of the Union industry. By way of example, they submitted that amidst the strongest increase in import volume from China in 2017-2018, the Union industry had the most significant increase in profitability. Secondly, third-country imports increased between 2018 and 2019, contrary to imports from China, and their effect could not therefore be attributable to China, and, if there is injury, this was a self-inflicted injury due to the Union industry’s slow reaction to market movements. |
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(25)

In addition, the GOC and the CCCME claimed that the complaint contained no evidence of a causal link between subsidized imports and injury. Firstly, the GOC and the CCCME argued that there was no correlation between imports from China and the development of the Union industry. By way of example, they submitted that amidst the strongest increase in import volume from China in 2017-2018, the Union industry had the most significant increase in profitability. Secondly, third-country imports increased between 2018 and 2019, contrary to imports from China, and their effect could not therefore be attributable to China, and, if there is injury, this was a self-inflicted injury due to the Union industry’s slow reaction to market movements.

| (26) | The complainant reacted to this claim, stating that a causal link could be established, since the injury happened at the same time as the increase in imports from China, and that third-country imports could not be considered as a cause of injury because they were either de minimis or showed no evidence of injurious pricing. |
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(26)

The complainant reacted to this claim, stating that a causal link could be established, since the injury happened at the same time as the increase in imports from China, and that third-country imports could not be considered as a cause of injury because they were either de minimis or showed no evidence of injurious pricing.

de minimis

| (27) | The CCCME responded recalling that, amidst the strongest increase in import volume from China in 2017-2018, the Union industry had the most significant increase in profitability and that there was no correlation between the increase of imports from China and the decreasing sales volumes of the Union industry. Instead, as regards third-country imports, the CCCME noted that in total third-country imports increased, while imports from China decreased between 2018 and 2019. Finally, the CCCME observed that the complainant did not challenge the arguments that virtually all injury indicators in the complaint displayed positive trends and that the alleged injury was at least to a certain degree self-inflicted. Moreover, the CCCME claimed that the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and allegations on the existence of a power-cable cartel should also be taken into account in evaluating the impact of subsidized imports on the situation of the Union industry. Furthermore, the GOC and the CCCME stated that import data presented by the complainant were not reliable because they were outdated and based on assumptions in terms of weight of the product concerned and its proportion in the CN code 8544 70 00. In addition, according to the GOC and the CCCME, undercutting calculations in the complaint were flawed because they referred only to one exporter in one specific tender. |
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(27)

The CCCME responded recalling that, amidst the strongest increase in import volume from China in 2017-2018, the Union industry had the most significant increase in profitability and that there was no correlation between the increase of imports from China and the decreasing sales volumes of the Union industry. Instead, as regards third-country imports, the CCCME noted that in total third-country imports increased, while imports from China decreased between 2018 and 2019. Finally, the CCCME observed that the complainant did not challenge the arguments that virtually all injury indicators in the complaint displayed positive trends and that the alleged injury was at least to a certain degree self-inflicted. Moreover, the CCCME claimed that the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and allegations on the existence of a power-cable cartel should also be taken into account in evaluating the impact of subsidized imports on the situation of the Union industry. Furthermore, the GOC and the CCCME stated that import data presented by the complainant were not reliable because they were outdated and based on assumptions in terms of weight of the product concerned and its proportion in the CN code 8544 70 00. In addition, according to the GOC and the CCCME, undercutting calculations in the complaint were flawed because they referred only to one exporter in one specific tender.

| (28) | The complainant referred to its reply in the parallel anti-dumping investigation, that a longer period should be considered to see the increase in volume of imports, not denied by the CCCME and confirmed by third-party data from market intelligence (CRU), and that calculations were not flawed because the complainant was bound to provide only reasonably available information, which included information from several producers in the Union and in China. |
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(28)

The complainant referred to its reply in the parallel anti-dumping investigation, that a longer period should be considered to see the increase in volume of imports, not denied by the CCCME and confirmed by third-party data from market intelligence (CRU), and that calculations were not flawed because the complainant was bound to provide only reasonably available information, which included information from several producers in the Union and in China.

| (29) | The CCCME responded that it was the duty of the complainant to substantiate its claims and provide proof in respect of import data and that market intelligence (CRU) data referred to optical fibres and not to optical fibre cables. As regards undercutting and underselling calculations, the CCCME reiterated that they did not meet the standard to constitute sufficient evidence and that for significant calculations the complainant referred only to the prices of one Chinese producer (e.g., the free circulation export price used for the calculation of the injury margin for H1 2019 and the export price used for the costs of production for the underselling margin for H2 2019). |
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(29)

The CCCME responded that it was the duty of the complainant to substantiate its claims and provide proof in respect of import data and that market intelligence (CRU) data referred to optical fibres and not to optical fibre cables. As regards undercutting and underselling calculations, the CCCME reiterated that they did not meet the standard to constitute sufficient evidence and that for significant calculations the complainant referred only to the prices of one Chinese producer (e.g., the free circulation export price used for the calculation of the injury margin for H1 2019 and the export price used for the costs of production for the underselling margin for H2 2019).

| (30) | The Commission considered that none of the allegations on initiation disproved the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence for the initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding. Indeed, the complaint contained sufficient evidence that subsidized imports had materially injured the Union industry. The specific injury analysis of the complaint showed increased penetration of the EU market (both in absolute and relative terms) by imports from China made at prices which substantially undercut the Union industry’s prices. This suggested that the alleged subsidised imports had materially injured the Union industry, shown for example by decreases in sales and market share or by a deterioration of financial results. |
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(30)

The Commission considered that none of the allegations on initiation disproved the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence for the initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding. Indeed, the complaint contained sufficient evidence that subsidized imports had materially injured the Union industry. The specific injury analysis of the complaint showed increased penetration of the EU market (both in absolute and relative terms) by imports from China made at prices which substantially undercut the Union industry’s prices. This suggested that the alleged subsidised imports had materially injured the Union industry, shown for example by decreases in sales and market share or by a deterioration of financial results.

| (31) | The evidence provided in the complaint contained separate undercutting and underselling calculations for each representative product type. The Commission was satisfied with the level of evidence of undercutting and underselling brought forward by the complainant and considered that the complaint met the sufficient evidence standard required for the initiation of the investigation. |
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(31)

The evidence provided in the complaint contained separate undercutting and underselling calculations for each representative product type. The Commission was satisfied with the level of evidence of undercutting and underselling brought forward by the complainant and considered that the complaint met the sufficient evidence standard required for the initiation of the investigation.

| (32) | In reply to the claim that the complainant failed to provide reliable/comparable data on sales prices, the Commission considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data provided under confidential cover in order for interested parties to exercise their right of defence throughout the proceeding. |
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(32)

In reply to the claim that the complainant failed to provide reliable/comparable data on sales prices, the Commission considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data provided under confidential cover in order for interested parties to exercise their right of defence throughout the proceeding.

| (33) | Article 29 of the basic Regulation (as well as Article 12(4) of the SCM Agreement) allow for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person has acquired the information. |
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(33)

Article 29 of the basic Regulation (as well as Article 12(4) of the SCM Agreement) allow for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person has acquired the information.

| (34) | In relation to sufficient evidence of a causal link, the following should be noted. Firstly, the complaint showed that the situation of the Union industry deteriorated at the same time as the increase in subsidized imports at prices which significantly undercut those of the Union industry. This already tended to show the existence of a causal link. Secondly, concerning other factors such as third-country imports and other elements mentioned by the GOC and the CCCME , their impact was not as such as to cause deterioration of the Union industry, whereas, the analysis did not reveal self-inflicted injury. Moreover, concerning the allegation that the subsidy investigation would result in a double imposition, the Commission, as reported at recital (765), made sure that the imposition of a cumulated duty reflecting the level of subsidisation and the full level of dumping would not result in offsetting the effects of subsidisation twice. Finally, concerning import volumes, the complainant provided data based on reasonable assumptions such as the weight of the product concerned produced and sold by the Union industry, and used market intelligence to complete the analysis where public information was not available. Concerning the time period of the measuring of imports in the complaint, the alleged injury has been caused by both dumping and subsidies practices, and therefore a different investigation period would have been unreasonably burden on the complaining industry. |
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(34)

In relation to sufficient evidence of a causal link, the following should be noted. Firstly, the complaint showed that the situation of the Union industry deteriorated at the same time as the increase in subsidized imports at prices which significantly undercut those of the Union industry. This already tended to show the existence of a causal link. Secondly, concerning other factors such as third-country imports and other elements mentioned by the GOC and the CCCME , their impact was not as such as to cause deterioration of the Union industry, whereas, the analysis did not reveal self-inflicted injury. Moreover, concerning the allegation that the subsidy investigation would result in a double imposition, the Commission, as reported at recital (765), made sure that the imposition of a cumulated duty reflecting the level of subsidisation and the full level of dumping would not result in offsetting the effects of subsidisation twice. Finally, concerning import volumes, the complainant provided data based on reasonable assumptions such as the weight of the product concerned produced and sold by the Union industry, and used market intelligence to complete the analysis where public information was not available. Concerning the time period of the measuring of imports in the complaint, the alleged injury has been caused by both dumping and subsidies practices, and therefore a different investigation period would have been unreasonably burden on the complaining industry.

1.3.   Registration of imports

Registration of imports

| (35) | On 24 August 2021, in accordance with Article 29a(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed the interested parties of its intention not to impose provisional countervailing measures and to continue the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

On 24 August 2021, in accordance with Article 29a(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed the interested parties of its intention not to impose provisional countervailing measures and to continue the investigation.

| (36) | Since no provisional countervailing measures were imposed, no registration of imports was performed. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Since no provisional countervailing measures were imposed, no registration of imports was performed.

1.4.   Investigation period and period considered

Investigation period and period considered

| (37) | The investigation of subsidisation and injury covered the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The investigation of subsidisation and injury covered the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

| (38) | Both the current anti-subsidy investigation and the separate anti-dumping investigation mentioned in recital (4) have the same investigation period and the same period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Both the current anti-subsidy investigation and the separate anti-dumping investigation mentioned in recital (4) have the same investigation period and the same period considered.

1.5.   Interested parties

Interested parties

| (39) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, the GOC, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers, known importers and users about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, the GOC, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers, known importers and users about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

| (40) | Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No one requested an intervention. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No one requested an intervention.

1.6.   Sampling

Sampling

1.6.1.   Sampling of Union producers

Sampling of Union producers

| (41) | In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of the volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union during the investigation period. This sample consisted of three Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 52 % of Union production in the investigation period and was considered representative of the Union industry. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received and therefore the sample was confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of the volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union during the investigation period. This sample consisted of three Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 52 % of Union production in the investigation period and was considered representative of the Union industry. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received and therefore the sample was confirmed.

1.6.2   Sampling of importers

Sampling of importers

| (42) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

| (43) | Five unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. After analysing the sampling information supplied by the importers, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary and asked all cooperating importers to submit their replies to the questionnaire. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Five unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. After analysing the sampling information supplied by the importers, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary and asked all cooperating importers to submit their replies to the questionnaire.

1.6.3.   Sampling of exporting producers in China

Sampling of exporting producers in China

| (44) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in China to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in China to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

| (45) | Twenty five exporting producers in the country concerned provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two groups of exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. The sampled groups of exporting producers represented more than 40 % of the exports reported by cooperating exporting producers of optical fibre cables from China to the Union during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Twenty five exporting producers in the country concerned provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two groups of exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. The sampled groups of exporting producers represented more than 40 % of the exports reported by cooperating exporting producers of optical fibre cables from China to the Union during the investigation period.

| (46) | In accordance with Article 27(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned, and the authorities of the country concerned, were consulted on the selection of the sample. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In accordance with Article 27(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned, and the authorities of the country concerned, were consulted on the selection of the sample.

| (47) | Comments on the selection of the sample were received from one non-sampled exporting producer, Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable Joint Stock Limited Company (‘YOFC’), which wanted to be included in the sample. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Comments on the selection of the sample were received from one non-sampled exporting producer, Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable Joint Stock Limited Company (‘YOFC’), which wanted to be included in the sample.

| (48) | YOFC argued that considering the large number of cooperating exporting producers, the two sampled companies accounted for a relatively low proportion of export volume to the Union that was not representative for the Chinese exporters and that the Commission’s practice in previous anti-dumping investigations was to sampled at least three companies. Furthermore, YOFC claimed that a sample of three companies could better avoid the situation that, due to changes to the sampled companies, the sample could be reduced to one company. Finally, YOFC argued that certain subsidy programmes are regional, so to have a more comprehensive overview of the subsidy schemes in the China the geographical spread should be considered when selecting a sample. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

YOFC argued that considering the large number of cooperating exporting producers, the two sampled companies accounted for a relatively low proportion of export volume to the Union that was not representative for the Chinese exporters and that the Commission’s practice in previous anti-dumping investigations was to sampled at least three companies. Furthermore, YOFC claimed that a sample of three companies could better avoid the situation that, due to changes to the sampled companies, the sample could be reduced to one company. Finally, YOFC argued that certain subsidy programmes are regional, so to have a more comprehensive overview of the subsidy schemes in the China the geographical spread should be considered when selecting a sample.

| (49) | Pursuant Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation the selection of the sample should be based on the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports which can reasonably be investigated within the time available. As stated in recital (45), the sampled groups of exporting producers accounted for more than 40 % of the reported exports from China to the Union during the investigation period, a representative level. The Commission considered that the sample as selected contained the largest quantity of imports that could be reasonably investigated within the time available. In this context, the two sampled exporting producer groups contain a large number of entities (four exporting producers, seven sales entities, and more than 20 related companies providing inputs or financing). Furthermore, whether a sampled company will indeed cooperate or not after being sampled is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an exporting producer to be considered for the selection of a sample under Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation. The Commission also considered the geographical spread of the companies selected in the sampled, covering two provinces in China with the two exporting producer groups and many more provinces with all the related companies providing inputs or financing. As all requirements in Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation were hence met there was no obligation to sample a third company. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Pursuant Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation the selection of the sample should be based on the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports which can reasonably be investigated within the time available. As stated in recital (45), the sampled groups of exporting producers accounted for more than 40 % of the reported exports from China to the Union during the investigation period, a representative level. The Commission considered that the sample as selected contained the largest quantity of imports that could be reasonably investigated within the time available. In this context, the two sampled exporting producer groups contain a large number of entities (four exporting producers, seven sales entities, and more than 20 related companies providing inputs or financing). Furthermore, whether a sampled company will indeed cooperate or not after being sampled is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an exporting producer to be considered for the selection of a sample under Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation. The Commission also considered the geographical spread of the companies selected in the sampled, covering two provinces in China with the two exporting producer groups and many more provinces with all the related companies providing inputs or financing. As all requirements in Article 27(1) of the basic Regulation were hence met there was no obligation to sample a third company.

| (50) | YOFC also claimed that it should be included in the sample as it is an experienced producer that exports high quality optical fibre cables to the Union, and its manufacturing process is different from other Chinese producers (it is vertically integrated, uses European technology to produce optical fibre cables, has advanced technologies, is the sole National Intelligent Manufacturing Demonstration Unit in China, and has achieved high automatization in the production of optical fibres). It further claimed that its export volume to the Union during the investigation period was relatively large. Moreover, YOFC submitted that one of the sampled Union producers indirectly holds shares of YOFC and two of the related companies concerned of YOFC and, therefore, including YOFC in the sample would enable the Commission to have a more comprehensive knowledge of the structure of the industry. YOFC also claimed that there are five exporting producers in the group, which are located in Hubei Province, Guangdong Province, Sichuan Province, Jiangsu Province and Shanghai City, so by including YOFC in the sample, the Commission would obtain information on subsidy programmes in more provinces. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

YOFC also claimed that it should be included in the sample as it is an experienced producer that exports high quality optical fibre cables to the Union, and its manufacturing process is different from other Chinese producers (it is vertically integrated, uses European technology to produce optical fibre cables, has advanced technologies, is the sole National Intelligent Manufacturing Demonstration Unit in China, and has achieved high automatization in the production of optical fibres). It further claimed that its export volume to the Union during the investigation period was relatively large. Moreover, YOFC submitted that one of the sampled Union producers indirectly holds shares of YOFC and two of the related companies concerned of YOFC and, therefore, including YOFC in the sample would enable the Commission to have a more comprehensive knowledge of the structure of the industry. YOFC also claimed that there are five exporting producers in the group, which are located in Hubei Province, Guangdong Province, Sichuan Province, Jiangsu Province and Shanghai City, so by including YOFC in the sample, the Commission would obtain information on subsidy programmes in more provinces.

| (51) | As explained above, the sample of exporting producers was selected on the basis of the largest percentage of the volume of exports from the country in question which could reasonably be investigated within the time available, having a good geographical spread within China. YOFC was not among the largest exporting producers and therefore was not sampled. At any rate, the two sampled groups of exporting producers are large experienced groups of companies as well that manufacture and sell high quality optical fibre cables to the Union, including also vertically integrated entities. Furthermore, there is no information in the file indicating that the technology used by the sampled exporting producers would be less advanced than other Chinese exporting producers. YOFC has not presented any evidence that would contradict this fact. Moreover, the fact that one sampled Union producer holds shares in an exporting producer is not relevant for the selection of the sample of the exporting producers. Therefore, these claims were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

As explained above, the sample of exporting producers was selected on the basis of the largest percentage of the volume of exports from the country in question which could reasonably be investigated within the time available, having a good geographical spread within China. YOFC was not among the largest exporting producers and therefore was not sampled. At any rate, the two sampled groups of exporting producers are large experienced groups of companies as well that manufacture and sell high quality optical fibre cables to the Union, including also vertically integrated entities. Furthermore, there is no information in the file indicating that the technology used by the sampled exporting producers would be less advanced than other Chinese exporting producers. YOFC has not presented any evidence that would contradict this fact. Moreover, the fact that one sampled Union producer holds shares in an exporting producer is not relevant for the selection of the sample of the exporting producers. Therefore, these claims were rejected.

1.7.   Individual examination

Individual examination

| (52) | Six of the non-sampled Chinese exporting producers that returned the sampling form informed the Commission of their intention to request individual examination under Article 27(3) of the basic Regulation. The Commission made the questionnaire available online on the day of initiation. Moreover, the Commission informed the non-sampled exporting producers that they were required to provide a questionnaire reply if they wished to be examined individually. Two companies provided a questionnaire reply. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Six of the non-sampled Chinese exporting producers that returned the sampling form informed the Commission of their intention to request individual examination under Article 27(3) of the basic Regulation. The Commission made the questionnaire available online on the day of initiation. Moreover, the Commission informed the non-sampled exporting producers that they were required to provide a questionnaire reply if they wished to be examined individually. Two companies provided a questionnaire reply.

| (53) | One of the companies who provided a questionnaire reply, requested to be individually examined for the same reasons as in its request to be included in the sample, as set out in recitals (48) and (50) above. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

One of the companies who provided a questionnaire reply, requested to be individually examined for the same reasons as in its request to be included in the sample, as set out in recitals (48) and (50) above.

| (54) | The other company who provided a questionnaire reply, requested to be individually examined because it was related to a Union importer and it claimed to not have received any of the alleged subsidies. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The other company who provided a questionnaire reply, requested to be individually examined because it was related to a Union importer and it claimed to not have received any of the alleged subsidies.

| (55) | Due to the complexity of the investigation and the complex structure of the sampled exporting producers, the Commission decided not to grant individual examination as it would have been unduly burdensome and could have impeded the Commission to complete the investigation within the statutory deadlines. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Due to the complexity of the investigation and the complex structure of the sampled exporting producers, the Commission decided not to grant individual examination as it would have been unduly burdensome and could have impeded the Commission to complete the investigation within the statutory deadlines.

1.8.   Questionnaire replies and verification visits

Questionnaire replies and verification visits

| (56) | The Commission sent a questionnaire to the complainant and the questionnaires for the Union producers, importers, users, and exporting producers in China were made available online on the day of initiation (8). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The Commission sent a questionnaire to the complainant and the questionnaires for the Union producers, importers, users, and exporting producers in China were made available online on the day of initiation (8).

8

| (57) | The Commission also sent a questionnaire to the GOC, which included specific questionnaires for Sinosure, the banks and other financial institutions that provided financing or export credits to the sampled exporting producers, and the top 10 producers and distributors of the input materials used by the sampled exporting producers. The GOC was also asked for administrative convenience to gather any responses provided by these financial institutions and to send them directly to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Commission also sent a questionnaire to the GOC, which included specific questionnaires for Sinosure, the banks and other financial institutions that provided financing or export credits to the sampled exporting producers, and the top 10 producers and distributors of the input materials used by the sampled exporting producers. The GOC was also asked for administrative convenience to gather any responses provided by these financial institutions and to send them directly to the Commission.

| (58) | The Commission received a questionnaire reply from the GOC, which included a questionnaire reply from the Export-Import Bank of China (‘EXIM bank’). However, no reply was received from Sinosure, any of the other banks or financial institutions, or from the main producers and distributors of the input materials. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Commission received a questionnaire reply from the GOC, which included a questionnaire reply from the Export-Import Bank of China (‘EXIM bank’). However, no reply was received from Sinosure, any of the other banks or financial institutions, or from the main producers and distributors of the input materials.

| (59) | Without prejudice to the application of Article 28 of the basic Regulation, the Commission sought and crosschecked all the information deemed necessary for the determination of subsidy, resulting injury and Union interest. Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent measures taken to deal with the outbreak (‘the COVID-19 Notice’) (9), the Commission was unable to carry out verification visits at the premises of the GOC, the sampled companies and the cooperating importers and users. Instead, the Commission performed a remote crosscheck (‘RCC’) of the information provided by the GOC, during which officials from the relevant ministries and other government authorities participated. The Commission furthermore carried out RCCs of the following companies via videoconference: | Union producers:






  — | Acome S. A. (France), |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(59)

Without prejudice to the application of Article 28 of the basic Regulation, the Commission sought and crosschecked all the information deemed necessary for the determination of subsidy, resulting injury and Union interest. Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent measures taken to deal with the outbreak (‘the COVID-19 Notice’) (9), the Commission was unable to carry out verification visits at the premises of the GOC, the sampled companies and the cooperating importers and users. Instead, the Commission performed a remote crosscheck (‘RCC’) of the information provided by the GOC, during which officials from the relevant ministries and other government authorities participated. The Commission furthermore carried out RCCs of the following companies via videoconference:

9

Union producers:

—

Acome S. A. (France),

| — | Corning Optical Communications Sp. z o.o., and its related companies (Poland, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain), |
| --- | --- |

—

Corning Optical Communications Sp. z o.o., and its related companies (Poland, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain),

| — | Prysmian S.p.A., and its related companies (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden) |
| --- | --- |

—

Prysmian S.p.A., and its related companies (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden)

| | Importers:






  — | Cable 77 Danmark ApS (Denmark), |
| --- | --- | --- |

Importers:

—

Cable 77 Danmark ApS (Denmark),

| — | Connect Com GmbH (Germany), |
| --- | --- |

—

Connect Com GmbH (Germany),

| — | Eku Kabel GmbH (Germany), |
| --- | --- |

—

Eku Kabel GmbH (Germany),

| — | Har&Ca S.r.l. (Italy), |
| --- | --- |

—

Har&Ca S.r.l. (Italy),

| — | Infraconcepts B.V. (Netherlands) |
| --- | --- |

—

Infraconcepts B.V. (Netherlands)

| | Users:






  — | Deutsche Telekom GmbH (Germany) |
| --- | --- | --- |

Users:

—

Deutsche Telekom GmbH (Germany)

| | Exporting producers in China: | FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd, Wuhan, |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Exporting producers in China:

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd, Wuhan,

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd, Nanjing, |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd, Nanjing,

| — | Fiberhome Technologies Group Co., Ltd, Wuhan, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fiberhome Technologies Group Co., Ltd, Wuhan,

| — | China Information Communication Technologies Group Corporation, Wuhan, |
| --- | --- |

—

China Information Communication Technologies Group Corporation, Wuhan,

| — | Jiangsu Telecom Industrial Co., Ltd, Nanjing |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Telecom Industrial Co., Ltd, Nanjing

| | ZTT Group:






  — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd, Nantong, |
| --- | --- | --- |

ZTT Group:

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd, Nantong,

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd, Nantong. |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd, Nantong.

1.9.   Non-imposition of provisional measures and subsequent procedure

Non-imposition of provisional measures and subsequent procedure

| (60) | On 10 May 2021, the Commission sent an additional request for information to the cooperating non-sampled exporting producers, to the sampled exporting producers and to the sampled Union producers including but not limited to sales data on the basis of groups of product control numbers (‘PCNs’), investments and tenders. The replies were checked by the Commission during the RCCs. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

On 10 May 2021, the Commission sent an additional request for information to the cooperating non-sampled exporting producers, to the sampled exporting producers and to the sampled Union producers including but not limited to sales data on the basis of groups of product control numbers (‘PCNs’), investments and tenders. The replies were checked by the Commission during the RCCs.

| (61) | On 24 August 2021, pursuant to Article 29a(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties that it intended not to impose provisional measures and to continue with the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

On 24 August 2021, pursuant to Article 29a(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties that it intended not to impose provisional measures and to continue with the investigation.

| (62) | The Commission continued seeking and checking all information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Commission continued seeking and checking all information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings.

1.10.   Final disclosure

Final disclosure

| (63) | On 14 September 2021, the Commission informed all parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-subsidy duty on imports of the product concerned (‘final disclosure’). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On 14 September 2021, the Commission informed all parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-subsidy duty on imports of the product concerned (‘final disclosure’).

| (64) | All parties were granted a 20 days period within which they could make comments on the definitive disclosure. Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

All parties were granted a 20 days period within which they could make comments on the definitive disclosure. Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

| (65) | Comments were received from the complainant, the GOC, the CCCME, the two sampled exporting producers, and one unrelated importer, namely Connect Com GmbH (‘Connect Com’). Two cooperating non-sampled exporting producers provided clarifications on clerical errors made by the Commission on their cooperating status and exact name, which were corrected accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Comments were received from the complainant, the GOC, the CCCME, the two sampled exporting producers, and one unrelated importer, namely Connect Com GmbH (‘Connect Com’). Two cooperating non-sampled exporting producers provided clarifications on clerical errors made by the Commission on their cooperating status and exact name, which were corrected accordingly.

| (66) | Following final disclosure, interested parties were granted an opportunity to be heard according to the provisions stipulated under point 5.7 of the Notice of initiation. A hearing took place with CCCME. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Following final disclosure, interested parties were granted an opportunity to be heard according to the provisions stipulated under point 5.7 of the Notice of initiation. A hearing took place with CCCME.

| (67) | The Commission addressed in this regulation comments submitted during the anti-subsidy procedure. Comments submitted in the context of the separate anti-dumping investigation were not addressed in this regulation unless the parties explicitly indicated that the comments submitted covered both procedures. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Commission addressed in this regulation comments submitted during the anti-subsidy procedure. Comments submitted in the context of the separate anti-dumping investigation were not addressed in this regulation unless the parties explicitly indicated that the comments submitted covered both procedures.

2.   PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product concerned

Product concerned

| (68) | The product concerned is single mode optical fibre cables, made up of one or more individually sheathed fibres, with protective casing, whether or not containing electric conductors, originating in China, currently falling under CN code ex 8544 70 00 (TARIC code 8544700010) (‘the product concerned’). |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The product concerned is single mode optical fibre cables, made up of one or more individually sheathed fibres, with protective casing, whether or not containing electric conductors, originating in China, currently falling under CN code ex 8544 70 00 (TARIC code 8544700010) (‘the product concerned’).

| (69) | The following products are excluded:






  (i) | cables in which all the optical fibres are individually fitted with operational connectors at one or both extremities; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(69)

The following products are excluded:

(i)

cables in which all the optical fibres are individually fitted with operational connectors at one or both extremities; and

| (ii) | cables for submarine use. Cables for submarine use are plastic insulated optical fibre cables, containing a copper or aluminium conductor, in which fibres are contained in metal module(s). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

cables for submarine use. Cables for submarine use are plastic insulated optical fibre cables, containing a copper or aluminium conductor, in which fibres are contained in metal module(s).

| (70) | The optical fibre cables (‘OFC’) are used as an optical transmission medium in telecommunication networks in long haul, metro and access networks. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The optical fibre cables (‘OFC’) are used as an optical transmission medium in telecommunication networks in long haul, metro and access networks.

2.2.   Like product

Like product

| (71) | The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:






  — | the product concerned; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

—

the product concerned;

| — | the product produced and sold on the domestic market of the country concerned; and |
| --- | --- |

—

the product produced and sold on the domestic market of the country concerned; and

| — | the product produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

—

the product produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

| (72) | The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the basic Regulation.

2.3.   Claims regarding product scope

Claims regarding product scope

| (73) | The ZTT Group requested the exclusion from the investigation of optical ground wire (‘OPGW’) and optical phase conductor (‘OPPC’) cables. It argued that although these cables fell under the product definition, they had different physical characteristics and use (i.e. power transmission), were subject to different technical standards, were manufactured using different raw materials and according to different production processes, and were sold in separate markets. Furthermore, it was claimed that OPGW and OPPC cables represented only a small portion of sales to Union. The ZTT Group also requested that in case the Commission considered that OPGW and OPPC cables fell within the product scope of the investigation, the specific features, end-use or market segment factors of these products be taken into account in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The ZTT Group requested the exclusion from the investigation of optical ground wire (‘OPGW’) and optical phase conductor (‘OPPC’) cables. It argued that although these cables fell under the product definition, they had different physical characteristics and use (i.e. power transmission), were subject to different technical standards, were manufactured using different raw materials and according to different production processes, and were sold in separate markets. Furthermore, it was claimed that OPGW and OPPC cables represented only a small portion of sales to Union. The ZTT Group also requested that in case the Commission considered that OPGW and OPPC cables fell within the product scope of the investigation, the specific features, end-use or market segment factors of these products be taken into account in the investigation.

| (74) | OPGW and OPPC cables are used for data transmission and share the basic characteristics of other OFC, including: (i) they include optical fibres; (ii) the coated optical fibre diameter is the same range; (iii) the number of fibres is also in the same range; (iv) the number of fibres per module is equally the same; and (v) the construction of the cable core is the same. The fact that OPGW and OPPC cables have an additional use (power transmission) and certain features (such as electrical features, no flame resistance requirement, high tensile strength requirement, etc.) does not detract from this fact. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

OPGW and OPPC cables are used for data transmission and share the basic characteristics of other OFC, including: (i) they include optical fibres; (ii) the coated optical fibre diameter is the same range; (iii) the number of fibres is also in the same range; (iv) the number of fibres per module is equally the same; and (v) the construction of the cable core is the same. The fact that OPGW and OPPC cables have an additional use (power transmission) and certain features (such as electrical features, no flame resistance requirement, high tensile strength requirement, etc.) does not detract from this fact.

| (75) | Furthermore, all cable types are subject to a certain extent to different technical specifications and standards. Regarding the raw materials, the fact that one material used for one component of the OFC may differ from one type of cable to another is irrelevant: all types of OFC are manufactured using optical fibres. Regarding the manufacturing processes, the investigation revealed that certain specially protected designs of standard optical cables had a layer of steel wire around their jacket, and these cables were made on the same machines as OPGW machines. Furthermore, the manufacturing of the armouring of OPGW and OPPC cables only applied to one stage of the construction of these cables, and this did not justify their exclusion from the product scope of the investigation. Furthermore, the fact that the sales of OPGW and OPPC cables represented a smaller portion of sales to the Union during the investigation period is irrelevant for the assessment of the claim. Finally, the Union industry is producing OPGW and OPPC cables as well and therefore is in direct competition with the Chinese exporters for these cables as well. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore, all cable types are subject to a certain extent to different technical specifications and standards. Regarding the raw materials, the fact that one material used for one component of the OFC may differ from one type of cable to another is irrelevant: all types of OFC are manufactured using optical fibres. Regarding the manufacturing processes, the investigation revealed that certain specially protected designs of standard optical cables had a layer of steel wire around their jacket, and these cables were made on the same machines as OPGW machines. Furthermore, the manufacturing of the armouring of OPGW and OPPC cables only applied to one stage of the construction of these cables, and this did not justify their exclusion from the product scope of the investigation. Furthermore, the fact that the sales of OPGW and OPPC cables represented a smaller portion of sales to the Union during the investigation period is irrelevant for the assessment of the claim. Finally, the Union industry is producing OPGW and OPPC cables as well and therefore is in direct competition with the Chinese exporters for these cables as well.

| (76) | Based on the foregoing, the Commission concluded that OPGW and OPPC are OFC that have the same basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics as the other OFC that are covered by the definition of the product concerned and therefore no separate analysis for these products was needed. In fact, the product control numbers used by the Commission for the calculation of dumping and injury margins properly identifies OPGW and OPPC cables and adequately enables the Commission to conduct a fair price comparison between Union and Chinese producers. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Based on the foregoing, the Commission concluded that OPGW and OPPC are OFC that have the same basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics as the other OFC that are covered by the definition of the product concerned and therefore no separate analysis for these products was needed. In fact, the product control numbers used by the Commission for the calculation of dumping and injury margins properly identifies OPGW and OPPC cables and adequately enables the Commission to conduct a fair price comparison between Union and Chinese producers. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (77) | The ZTT Group also suggested four methods to address and avoid any possible issues of circumvention in the event that OPGW and OPPC cables were excluded from the product scope of the investigation such as (i) visual inspection and documentary check by customs officials, (ii) system of certification, (iii) end-use control customs procedure and (iv) system of monitoring. As it was concluded that OPGW and OPPC are covered by the investigation, it was not needed to address the suggested methods for preventing circumvention. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The ZTT Group also suggested four methods to address and avoid any possible issues of circumvention in the event that OPGW and OPPC cables were excluded from the product scope of the investigation such as (i) visual inspection and documentary check by customs officials, (ii) system of certification, (iii) end-use control customs procedure and (iv) system of monitoring. As it was concluded that OPGW and OPPC are covered by the investigation, it was not needed to address the suggested methods for preventing circumvention.

3.   SUBSIDISATION

SUBSIDISATION

3.1.   Introduction: Government plans, projects and other documents

Introduction: Government plans, projects and other documents

| (78) | Before analysing the alleged subsidisation in the form of subsidies or subsidy programmes, the Commission assessed government plans, projects, and other documents, which were relevant for the sector of the product concerned and/or its inputs and hence represented integral context for the substantive findings. It found that all subsidies or subsidy programmes under assessment form part of the implementation of the GOC’s central planning to encourage the OFC industry for the following reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Before analysing the alleged subsidisation in the form of subsidies or subsidy programmes, the Commission assessed government plans, projects, and other documents, which were relevant for the sector of the product concerned and/or its inputs and hence represented integral context for the substantive findings. It found that all subsidies or subsidy programmes under assessment form part of the implementation of the GOC’s central planning to encourage the OFC industry for the following reasons.

| (79) | The direction of the Chinese economy is to a significant degree determined by an elaborate system of planning which sets out priorities and prescribes the goals the central and local governments must focus on. Relevant plans exist at all levels of government and cover all economic sectors. The objectives set by the planning instruments are of binding nature and the authorities at each administrative level monitor the implementation of the plans by the corresponding lower level of government. Overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being allocated to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the government, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (10). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The direction of the Chinese economy is to a significant degree determined by an elaborate system of planning which sets out priorities and prescribes the goals the central and local governments must focus on. Relevant plans exist at all levels of government and cover all economic sectors. The objectives set by the planning instruments are of binding nature and the authorities at each administrative level monitor the implementation of the plans by the corresponding lower level of government. Overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being allocated to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the government, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (10).

10

| (80) | The OFC equipment is regarded as a key product by the GOC, as found in public policy documents and lists (11). Such categorisation is of significant importance as it qualifies given sectors for coverage by a variety of specific policies and support measures designed to spur development in each sector (12). OFC being a key component of internet networks infrastructure, it plays a paramount role in the roll-out of optical fibre networks and broadband internet. The development of the latter in the PRC is guided and managed by numerous plans, directives and other documents, which are issued at national, regional and municipal level, and are mutually interlinked. Examples of such key policy documents include the following plans, projects and other documents. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The OFC equipment is regarded as a key product by the GOC, as found in public policy documents and lists (11). Such categorisation is of significant importance as it qualifies given sectors for coverage by a variety of specific policies and support measures designed to spur development in each sector (12). OFC being a key component of internet networks infrastructure, it plays a paramount role in the roll-out of optical fibre networks and broadband internet. The development of the latter in the PRC is guided and managed by numerous plans, directives and other documents, which are issued at national, regional and municipal level, and are mutually interlinked. Examples of such key policy documents include the following plans, projects and other documents.

11

12

| (81) | The 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the PRC (‘the 13th Five-Year Plan’), which covers the period 2016-2020, highlights the strategic vision of the GOC for improvement and promotion of key industries. The 13th Five-Year Plan emphasised the GOC’s intention to strengthen the development of strategic high technologies, among which information technology is included in Chapter 6. Chapter 23 further stipulated that information networks, under which OFC fall, are considered a
  ‘strategic emerging industry’. In this respect, the 13th Five-Year Plan states that the GOC will ‘help ensure rapid development of the production and innovation chains of emerging industries to accelerate industry clustering according to their specific characteristics’ and ‘encourage Chinese enterprises to allocate innovation resources globally’. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the PRC (‘the 13th Five-Year Plan’), which covers the period 2016-2020, highlights the strategic vision of the GOC for improvement and promotion of key industries. The 13th Five-Year Plan emphasised the GOC’s intention to strengthen the development of strategic high technologies, among which information technology is included in Chapter 6. Chapter 23 further stipulated that information networks, under which OFC fall, are considered a
  ‘strategic emerging industry’. In this respect, the 13th Five-Year Plan states that the GOC will ‘help ensure rapid development of the production and innovation chains of emerging industries to accelerate industry clustering according to their specific characteristics’ and ‘encourage Chinese enterprises to allocate innovation resources globally’.

th

th

th

‘strategic emerging industry’.

th

help ensure rapid development of the production and innovation chains of emerging industries to accelerate industry clustering according to their specific characteristics

encourage Chinese enterprises to allocate innovation resources globally

| (82) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that there is no reference to OFC in the 13th Five-Year Plan and that the Commission simply assumed that OFC falls under the categorisation of
  ‘information networks’. According to the GOC, Chapter 6 of the 13th Five-Year Plan clearly mentions that its focus will be
  ‘general-purpose’
  technologies and Chapter 23 makes no mention of the OFC industry and the term
  ‘information network’
  in Chapter 23 makes it clear that it does not concern OFC or specific products but rather general infrastructure. Likewise, Chapter 25 speaks of
  ‘optic networks’
  and not about specific products, such as OFC. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that there is no reference to OFC in the 13th Five-Year Plan and that the Commission simply assumed that OFC falls under the categorisation of
  ‘information networks’. According to the GOC, Chapter 6 of the 13th Five-Year Plan clearly mentions that its focus will be
  ‘general-purpose’
  technologies and Chapter 23 makes no mention of the OFC industry and the term
  ‘information network’
  in Chapter 23 makes it clear that it does not concern OFC or specific products but rather general infrastructure. Likewise, Chapter 25 speaks of
  ‘optic networks’
  and not about specific products, such as OFC.

th

‘information networks’.

th

‘general-purpose’

‘information network’

‘optic networks’

| (83) | Chapter 4 ‘The Development Philosophy’ of the 13th Five-Year Plan lists
  ‘information technology adoption’
  among the development priorities. This Chapter defines the focus and priorities in order to achieve the objectives of the 13th Five-Year Plan and the items listed therein are of a strategic importance. Therefore,
  ‘information technology’
  is considered as a key component of the country’s development for the period covered by the 13th Five-Year Plan. Furthermore, the 13th Five-Year Plan refers to
  ‘information technology’
  in numerous Chapters concerning diverse sectors of the economy and society. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Chapter 4 ‘The Development Philosophy’ of the 13th Five-Year Plan lists
  ‘information technology adoption’
  among the development priorities. This Chapter defines the focus and priorities in order to achieve the objectives of the 13th Five-Year Plan and the items listed therein are of a strategic importance. Therefore,
  ‘information technology’
  is considered as a key component of the country’s development for the period covered by the 13th Five-Year Plan. Furthermore, the 13th Five-Year Plan refers to
  ‘information technology’
  in numerous Chapters concerning diverse sectors of the economy and society.

th

‘information technology adoption’

th

‘information technology’

th

th

‘information technology’

| (84) | Section 2 ‘Strategic Industries’ of Chapter 23 ‘Develop Strategic Emerging Industries’ in the 13th Five-Year Plan provides that ‘we will foster strategic industries in the fields of aerospace, oceanography, information networks, the life sciences, and nuclear technology’ Furthermore, Chapter 25 ‘Build Ubiquitous, Efficient Information Network’ provides that
  ‘We will accelerate the construction of high-speed, mobile, secure, and ubiquitous next generation information infrastructure and spread the use of information network technology’
  which includes
  ‘new generation high-speed fibre-optic networks’
  ,
  ‘an advanced and ubiquitous wireless broadband network’
  , and
  ‘new information network technology’. In addition, Box 9 provides a list of information technology projects among which is the National Broadband Agenda with a focus to
  ‘establish a high-speed, high-capacity optical telecommunications system’. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Section 2 ‘Strategic Industries’ of Chapter 23 ‘Develop Strategic Emerging Industries’ in the 13th Five-Year Plan provides that ‘we will foster strategic industries in the fields of aerospace, oceanography, information networks, the life sciences, and nuclear technology’ Furthermore, Chapter 25 ‘Build Ubiquitous, Efficient Information Network’ provides that
  ‘We will accelerate the construction of high-speed, mobile, secure, and ubiquitous next generation information infrastructure and spread the use of information network technology’
  which includes
  ‘new generation high-speed fibre-optic networks’
  ,
  ‘an advanced and ubiquitous wireless broadband network’
  , and
  ‘new information network technology’. In addition, Box 9 provides a list of information technology projects among which is the National Broadband Agenda with a focus to
  ‘establish a high-speed, high-capacity optical telecommunications system’.

th

we will foster strategic industries in the fields of aerospace, oceanography, information networks, the life sciences, and nuclear technology

‘We will accelerate the construction of high-speed, mobile, secure, and ubiquitous next generation information infrastructure and spread the use of information network technology’

‘new generation high-speed fibre-optic networks’

‘an advanced and ubiquitous wireless broadband network’

‘new information network technology’.

‘establish a high-speed, high-capacity optical telecommunications system’.

| (85) | The 13th Five-Year Plan is the key policy document which sets the priorities for national economic and social development of the PRC and as such it underlines the focus areas without necessarily providing all the details for the concrete achievement of the priorities. Therefore, the fact that OFC as such is not mentioned in the 13th Five-Year Plan does not mean that it is not concerned as a key and indispensable component for the achievement of the more general strategic goal of development of information technology and information network infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The 13th Five-Year Plan is the key policy document which sets the priorities for national economic and social development of the PRC and as such it underlines the focus areas without necessarily providing all the details for the concrete achievement of the priorities. Therefore, the fact that OFC as such is not mentioned in the 13th Five-Year Plan does not mean that it is not concerned as a key and indispensable component for the achievement of the more general strategic goal of development of information technology and information network infrastructure.

th

th

| (86) | The ‘new generation of information technology industry’, which includes OFC as information and communication device, is also an encouraged industry under the Made in China 2025 initiative (13). In this initiative, the promoted ‘information communication equipment’ is also defined as
  ‘super high speed and large capacity intelligent optical transmission technology’
  and further under ‘Strategic Tasks and Priorities’, priority is given to acceleration of the deployment and construction of
  ‘fiber optic network’. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The ‘new generation of information technology industry’, which includes OFC as information and communication device, is also an encouraged industry under the Made in China 2025 initiative (13). In this initiative, the promoted ‘information communication equipment’ is also defined as
  ‘super high speed and large capacity intelligent optical transmission technology’
  and further under ‘Strategic Tasks and Priorities’, priority is given to acceleration of the deployment and construction of
  ‘fiber optic network’.

13

‘super high speed and large capacity intelligent optical transmission technology’

‘fiber optic network’.

| (87) | By being an encouraged industry in the Made in China 2025 strategy, the OFC industry is eligible to benefit from considerable State funding. A number of funds had been created to support the Made in China 2025 initiative (14) and hence indirectly the OFC industry, such as the National Integrated Circuit fund (15), the Advanced Manufacturing Fund (16) and the Emerging Industries Investment Fund (17). |
| --- | --- |

(87)

By being an encouraged industry in the Made in China 2025 strategy, the OFC industry is eligible to benefit from considerable State funding. A number of funds had been created to support the Made in China 2025 initiative (14) and hence indirectly the OFC industry, such as the National Integrated Circuit fund (15), the Advanced Manufacturing Fund (16) and the Emerging Industries Investment Fund (17).

14

15

16

17

| (88) | By including the construction of fibre optic network as one objective in the Made in China 2025 strategy, or in any other strategic planning document, products which are essential to achieve the enhanced and improved expansion of the construction of those networks, such as the optical fibre cables used for transmission, fall under the scope of those strategic plans and are thus beneficiary of the corresponding preferential measures. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

By including the construction of fibre optic network as one objective in the Made in China 2025 strategy, or in any other strategic planning document, products which are essential to achieve the enhanced and improved expansion of the construction of those networks, such as the optical fibre cables used for transmission, fall under the scope of those strategic plans and are thus beneficiary of the corresponding preferential measures.

| (89) | Furthermore, OFC is often included under the umbrella of ‘New generation of Information Technology Industry’ and in particular as ‘Information and communication equipment’. The Made in China 2025 Roadmap (18) gives 10 strategic sectors, which are the key industries for the GOC. It describes in Sector 1 ‘New generation of information technology industry’/ 1.2 Information and communication equipment the product categories
  ‘high-speed and large-capacity optical transmission equipment (400G/1Tbps)’
  and
  ‘high-speed optical access equipment (10G/100Gbps)’
  as products that fall under the development priorities of this sector. The new generation of information technology thus benefits from the advantages stemming from the support mechanisms listed in the document, including, among others, financial support policies, fiscal and taxation policy, and State council oversight and support (19). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

Furthermore, OFC is often included under the umbrella of ‘New generation of Information Technology Industry’ and in particular as ‘Information and communication equipment’. The Made in China 2025 Roadmap (18) gives 10 strategic sectors, which are the key industries for the GOC. It describes in Sector 1 ‘New generation of information technology industry’/ 1.2 Information and communication equipment the product categories
  ‘high-speed and large-capacity optical transmission equipment (400G/1Tbps)’
  and
  ‘high-speed optical access equipment (10G/100Gbps)’
  as products that fall under the development priorities of this sector. The new generation of information technology thus benefits from the advantages stemming from the support mechanisms listed in the document, including, among others, financial support policies, fiscal and taxation policy, and State council oversight and support (19).

18

‘high-speed and large-capacity optical transmission equipment (400G/1Tbps)’

‘high-speed optical access equipment (10G/100Gbps)’

19

| (90) | Furthermore, OFC is related to the category ‘new materials’. In the Made in China 2025 Roadmap in Section 9 ‘new materials’ and its subcategories, including key strategic materials (point 9.2), high performance fibres and composite materials are listed. As can be seen in the Catalogue of High and New Technology Products (2006) in No 6020004 and 6020005, optical fibre products, especially those linked to optical fibre preform, which is a main input material for the production of OFC, are considered to constitute ‘new materials’. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Furthermore, OFC is related to the category ‘new materials’. In the Made in China 2025 Roadmap in Section 9 ‘new materials’ and its subcategories, including key strategic materials (point 9.2), high performance fibres and composite materials are listed. As can be seen in the Catalogue of High and New Technology Products (2006) in No 6020004 and 6020005, optical fibre products, especially those linked to optical fibre preform, which is a main input material for the production of OFC, are considered to constitute ‘new materials’.

| (91) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission did not explain on what basis it considered OFC as ‘new materials’. It stressed that Section 9.2.3 of the roadmap document only refers to
  ‘high-performance fibres and composite materials’
  and that only the main input material for the production of OFC is considered to constitute ‘new materials’ and not OFC as such. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission did not explain on what basis it considered OFC as ‘new materials’. It stressed that Section 9.2.3 of the roadmap document only refers to
  ‘high-performance fibres and composite materials’
  and that only the main input material for the production of OFC is considered to constitute ‘new materials’ and not OFC as such.

‘high-performance fibres and composite materials’

| (92) | In this respect, the Commission reiterated that in the Catalogue of High and New Technology Products (2006) optical fibre products, including notably optical fibre preform, are considered to constitute ‘new materials’. Optical fibre preform is a key input material with high added value for the production of OFC, representing a substantial part of the cost of production. Therefore, the Commission concluded that since optical fibre preform, which is a semi-finished product of OFC is listed as ‘new material’, there is a direct link between OFC and the category of ‘new materials’. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

In this respect, the Commission reiterated that in the Catalogue of High and New Technology Products (2006) optical fibre products, including notably optical fibre preform, are considered to constitute ‘new materials’. Optical fibre preform is a key input material with high added value for the production of OFC, representing a substantial part of the cost of production. Therefore, the Commission concluded that since optical fibre preform, which is a semi-finished product of OFC is listed as ‘new material’, there is a direct link between OFC and the category of ‘new materials’.

| (93) | Additionally, further to the Made in China 2025 Roadmap, in November 2016, the list of 10 strategic sectors was refined into a Catalogue of Four Essentials (20) published by the National Manufacturing Strategy Advisory Committee (NMSAC), an advisory group to the National Leading Small Group on Building a National Manufacturing Power. This group was established by the GOC to develop plans, policies, projects, and work arrangements to promote the development of the manufacturing industry and to coordinate matters across regions and departments (21). In this catalogue, each of the 10 strategic sectors is split into four chapters: (i) core essential spare parts, (ii) key essential materials, (iii) advanced essential processes/technologies and (iv) industry technology platforms. Optical fibre cables can be found under sector 1: new generation information technology, point (i) core basic spare parts, sub-point 38 Ultra-low-loss optical fibre based on 400G bandwidth (mains network) and under point (ii) key basic materials, sub-point 22 New-generation fibre optic materials. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

Additionally, further to the Made in China 2025 Roadmap, in November 2016, the list of 10 strategic sectors was refined into a Catalogue of Four Essentials (20) published by the National Manufacturing Strategy Advisory Committee (NMSAC), an advisory group to the National Leading Small Group on Building a National Manufacturing Power. This group was established by the GOC to develop plans, policies, projects, and work arrangements to promote the development of the manufacturing industry and to coordinate matters across regions and departments (21). In this catalogue, each of the 10 strategic sectors is split into four chapters: (i) core essential spare parts, (ii) key essential materials, (iii) advanced essential processes/technologies and (iv) industry technology platforms. Optical fibre cables can be found under sector 1: new generation information technology, point (i) core basic spare parts, sub-point 38 Ultra-low-loss optical fibre based on 400G bandwidth (mains network) and under point (ii) key basic materials, sub-point 22 New-generation fibre optic materials.

20

21

| (94) | Following final disclosure, the GOC reiterated its position that the 13th Five-Year Plan and the Made in China 2025 initiative are not mandatory or legally binding documents. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

Following final disclosure, the GOC reiterated its position that the 13th Five-Year Plan and the Made in China 2025 initiative are not mandatory or legally binding documents.

th

| (95) | In this respect, the Commission pointed out that rather than making only general statements of encouragement, the 13th Five-Year plan uses language which points to its binding nature. In any case, as stated in recital (85), the 13th Five-Year Plan is the key policy document which sets the priorities for national economic and social development and is the basis for various binding legal acts that the authorities need to take into account and implement when adopting new rules or when distributing public resources. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

In this respect, the Commission pointed out that rather than making only general statements of encouragement, the 13th Five-Year plan uses language which points to its binding nature. In any case, as stated in recital (85), the 13th Five-Year Plan is the key policy document which sets the priorities for national economic and social development and is the basis for various binding legal acts that the authorities need to take into account and implement when adopting new rules or when distributing public resources.

th

th

| (96) | Regarding the Made in China 2025 initiative, it needs to be read in conjunction with the Made in China 2025 Roadmap and considering the funds that had been created to support the Made in China 2025 initiative. Although the Made in China 2025 initiative mainly sets general principles to be followed, its implementation through the disbursement of State funding to certain encouraged industries is binding and makes it specifically targeting such encouraged industries and not generally applicable. In addition, the Made in China 2025 strategy uses wording that implies objectives and targets to be met such as ‘we will speed up the deployment and construction of fiber optic networks’
  and
  ‘we will vigorously promote breakthrough development in key areas’
  when referring to
  ‘a new generation of information technology industry’
  including
  ‘information and communication devices’. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Regarding the Made in China 2025 initiative, it needs to be read in conjunction with the Made in China 2025 Roadmap and considering the funds that had been created to support the Made in China 2025 initiative. Although the Made in China 2025 initiative mainly sets general principles to be followed, its implementation through the disbursement of State funding to certain encouraged industries is binding and makes it specifically targeting such encouraged industries and not generally applicable. In addition, the Made in China 2025 strategy uses wording that implies objectives and targets to be met such as ‘we will speed up the deployment and construction of fiber optic networks’
  and
  ‘we will vigorously promote breakthrough development in key areas’
  when referring to
  ‘a new generation of information technology industry’
  including
  ‘information and communication devices’.

we will speed up the deployment and construction of fiber optic networks’

‘we will vigorously promote breakthrough development in key areas’

‘a new generation of information technology industry’

‘information and communication devices’.

| (97) | Therefore, the Commission rejected the claims of the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Therefore, the Commission rejected the claims of the GOC.

| (98) | The OFC industry is also covered by the Intelligent Manufacturing Development Plan (2016-2020) published by the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (‘MIIT’) (22), which aims at implementing the 13th Five-Year Plan and has set up 10 key tasks that aim at shortening the product development cycle, improving production efficiency, product quality, reducing operating cost, resources and energy consumption, and accelerating the development of intelligent manufacturing. In 2018, the State Council announced China’s plans to expand its programme for smart manufacturing by adding about 100 pilot projects that same year and according to publicly available information, two companies related to sampled exporting producers, Zhongtian technology precision materials Ltd and Fiberhome Communication Technology, were included on the List of Smart Manufacturing Pilot Demonstration Projects by the MIIT, the first in 2017 (23) and the latter in 2018 (24). Furthermore, one of the cooperating exporting producers, Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable, was listed as ‘National First Batch Smart Manufacturing Pilot Enterprise’ (25). |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The OFC industry is also covered by the Intelligent Manufacturing Development Plan (2016-2020) published by the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (‘MIIT’) (22), which aims at implementing the 13th Five-Year Plan and has set up 10 key tasks that aim at shortening the product development cycle, improving production efficiency, product quality, reducing operating cost, resources and energy consumption, and accelerating the development of intelligent manufacturing. In 2018, the State Council announced China’s plans to expand its programme for smart manufacturing by adding about 100 pilot projects that same year and according to publicly available information, two companies related to sampled exporting producers, Zhongtian technology precision materials Ltd and Fiberhome Communication Technology, were included on the List of Smart Manufacturing Pilot Demonstration Projects by the MIIT, the first in 2017 (23) and the latter in 2018 (24). Furthermore, one of the cooperating exporting producers, Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable, was listed as ‘National First Batch Smart Manufacturing Pilot Enterprise’ (25).

22

th

23

24

25

| (99) | There are clear indications that being mentioned on one of these lists, which are related to the Made in China 2025 strategy, is not only a laudatory remark, but that there are financial benefits associated with it. In the document called ‘MOF Notice concerning the transferred amounts for 2017 local industry transformation and upgrade programmes’, there is a corresponding entry in line 151 stating that Fiberhome Communication Technology under the programme ‘New Manufacturing mode of 5G communication network core equipment’ received a subsidy in the amount of 12 million RMB. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

There are clear indications that being mentioned on one of these lists, which are related to the Made in China 2025 strategy, is not only a laudatory remark, but that there are financial benefits associated with it. In the document called ‘MOF Notice concerning the transferred amounts for 2017 local industry transformation and upgrade programmes’, there is a corresponding entry in line 151 stating that Fiberhome Communication Technology under the programme ‘New Manufacturing mode of 5G communication network core equipment’ received a subsidy in the amount of 12 million RMB.

| (100) | Numerous additional documents support the finding that the GOC has created a broad framework of support of internet technology infrastructure and broadband networks that cover inter alia the OFC industry. Already in 2009 in the Plan for the Adjustment and Revitalization of the Electronic Information Industry (26), the GOC explicitly expressed its objective to
  ‘guide and promote the construction of [...] the broadband fiber-optic access network’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(100)

Numerous additional documents support the finding that the GOC has created a broad framework of support of internet technology infrastructure and broadband networks that cover inter alia the OFC industry. Already in 2009 in the Plan for the Adjustment and Revitalization of the Electronic Information Industry (26), the GOC explicitly expressed its objective to
  ‘guide and promote the construction of [...] the broadband fiber-optic access network’
  .

inter alia

26

‘guide and promote the construction of [...] the broadband fiber-optic access network’

| (101) | In the Broadband China Strategy of 2013 (27) the GOC formulated the aim to promote
  ‘access networks [...] in accordance with the ideas of high-speed access’
  and that
  ‘in urban areas, access network construction and renovation will be carried out using technical methods such as fibre-to-the-home and fibre-to-the-building’
  . Also, according to this strategy, the
  ‘extension of optical fibre to the user side’
  shall be promoted and
  ‘a fixed broadband access network with optical fibre as the main source’
  shall be gradually build. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

In the Broadband China Strategy of 2013 (27) the GOC formulated the aim to promote
  ‘access networks [...] in accordance with the ideas of high-speed access’
  and that
  ‘in urban areas, access network construction and renovation will be carried out using technical methods such as fibre-to-the-home and fibre-to-the-building’
  . Also, according to this strategy, the
  ‘extension of optical fibre to the user side’
  shall be promoted and
  ‘a fixed broadband access network with optical fibre as the main source’
  shall be gradually build.

27

‘access networks [...] in accordance with the ideas of high-speed access’

‘in urban areas, access network construction and renovation will be carried out using technical methods such as fibre-to-the-home and fibre-to-the-building’

‘extension of optical fibre to the user side’

‘a fixed broadband access network with optical fibre as the main source’

| (102) | In the chapter in the Broadband China Strategy addressing the policy instruments, the GOC describes the instruments that are used to achieve the goals of this strategy, i.e. making
  ‘full use of various special funds from the central government to guide relevant local funds to invest in broadband network research and development and industrialization’
  and of providing
  ‘subsidised interest support for loans to eligible broadband construction projects in national development zones in the western region’
  and finally of strengthening
  ‘tax concession support’
  and of
  ‘support [for] the construction of broadband networks’. As set out in recital (80), the Commission considered OFC to be a key component of internet networks infrastructure and indispensable for the set-up of broadband systems. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

In the chapter in the Broadband China Strategy addressing the policy instruments, the GOC describes the instruments that are used to achieve the goals of this strategy, i.e. making
  ‘full use of various special funds from the central government to guide relevant local funds to invest in broadband network research and development and industrialization’
  and of providing
  ‘subsidised interest support for loans to eligible broadband construction projects in national development zones in the western region’
  and finally of strengthening
  ‘tax concession support’
  and of
  ‘support [for] the construction of broadband networks’. As set out in recital (80), the Commission considered OFC to be a key component of internet networks infrastructure and indispensable for the set-up of broadband systems.

‘full use of various special funds from the central government to guide relevant local funds to invest in broadband network research and development and industrialization’

‘subsidised interest support for loans to eligible broadband construction projects in national development zones in the western region’

‘tax concession support’

‘support [for] the construction of broadband networks’.

| (103) | The Broadband China Strategy does not merely state non-binding objectives with regard to the development of the internet infrastructure. When viewed together with other documents it is clear that financial contributions from the GOC are an essential element used to achieve the objectives of this strategy. In the Opinions on Promoting the Construction of Fiber Optic Broadband Networks (28), it is stated that
  ‘local governments at all levels are encouraged to provide financial subsidies for the use of fiber-optic broadband in public service institutions’
  and that
  ‘investment and policy support in research and development of core chips, devices, system equipment and applications for fiber-optic broadband communications’
  shall be increased and
  ‘technological innovation in fiber-optic communications’
  shall be encouraged. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Broadband China Strategy does not merely state non-binding objectives with regard to the development of the internet infrastructure. When viewed together with other documents it is clear that financial contributions from the GOC are an essential element used to achieve the objectives of this strategy. In the Opinions on Promoting the Construction of Fiber Optic Broadband Networks (28), it is stated that
  ‘local governments at all levels are encouraged to provide financial subsidies for the use of fiber-optic broadband in public service institutions’
  and that
  ‘investment and policy support in research and development of core chips, devices, system equipment and applications for fiber-optic broadband communications’
  shall be increased and
  ‘technological innovation in fiber-optic communications’
  shall be encouraged.

28

‘local governments at all levels are encouraged to provide financial subsidies for the use of fiber-optic broadband in public service institutions’

‘investment and policy support in research and development of core chips, devices, system equipment and applications for fiber-optic broadband communications’

‘technological innovation in fiber-optic communications’

| (104) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Broadband China Strategy is only a guidance document concerning broadband infrastructure. In this regard, the GOC noted that the Panel in ‘China – GOES’ found that
  ‘general information about governmental policy, with no direct connection to [a] program at issue, in not “sufficient evidence” of specificity’. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Broadband China Strategy is only a guidance document concerning broadband infrastructure. In this regard, the GOC noted that the Panel in ‘China – GOES’ found that
  ‘general information about governmental policy, with no direct connection to [a] program at issue, in not “sufficient evidence” of specificity’.

‘general information about governmental policy, with no direct connection to [a] program at issue, in not “sufficient evidence” of specificity’.

| (105) | In this respect, the Commission recalled that as stated in recital (102), in the chapter in the Broadband China Strategy addressing the policy instruments, the GOC describes the instruments that are used to achieve the goals of this strategy such as the use of various special funds, subsidised interest support, tax concession support etc. Therefore, the Commission considered in recital (103) that when viewed together with other documents, it is clear that financial contributions from the GOC are an essential element used to achieve the objectives of this strategy. Therefore, even though Broadband China Strategy is claimed to be of a guidance nature, its implementation through the disbursement of State funding to certain encouraged industries only makes it binding and specifically targeting such encouraged industries and not generally applicable. In any event, the reference to the Panel Report in ‘China – GOES’ is not decisive as concerns specificity, because in this case the numerous plans and policy documents issued by GOC covered in this section provide specific guidance and support for the product concerned. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

In this respect, the Commission recalled that as stated in recital (102), in the chapter in the Broadband China Strategy addressing the policy instruments, the GOC describes the instruments that are used to achieve the goals of this strategy such as the use of various special funds, subsidised interest support, tax concession support etc. Therefore, the Commission considered in recital (103) that when viewed together with other documents, it is clear that financial contributions from the GOC are an essential element used to achieve the objectives of this strategy. Therefore, even though Broadband China Strategy is claimed to be of a guidance nature, its implementation through the disbursement of State funding to certain encouraged industries only makes it binding and specifically targeting such encouraged industries and not generally applicable. In any event, the reference to the Panel Report in ‘China – GOES’ is not decisive as concerns specificity, because in this case the numerous plans and policy documents issued by GOC covered in this section provide specific guidance and support for the product concerned. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (106) | In the Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Actively Promoting the ‘Internet Plus’ (29) from 2015, a clear objective is formulated by stating that this document shall help to
  ‘accelerate the implementation of the “Broadband China” strategy, organize and implement the national new generation information infrastructure construction project [and] promote the transformation of fiber optic broadband network.’
  And the way to achieve this goal is described under ‘(6) Strengthen guidance and support’ where it is elaborated that fiscal and taxation support shall be increased and tasks are specified such as
  ‘actively invest in the research and development and application demonstration of qualified “Internet +” integrated innovation key technologies. Coordinate the use of existing financial special funds to support the construction of “Internet +” related platforms and application demonstrations.’ |
| --- | --- |

(106)

In the Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Actively Promoting the ‘Internet Plus’ (29) from 2015, a clear objective is formulated by stating that this document shall help to
  ‘accelerate the implementation of the “Broadband China” strategy, organize and implement the national new generation information infrastructure construction project [and] promote the transformation of fiber optic broadband network.’
  And the way to achieve this goal is described under ‘(6) Strengthen guidance and support’ where it is elaborated that fiscal and taxation support shall be increased and tasks are specified such as
  ‘actively invest in the research and development and application demonstration of qualified “Internet +” integrated innovation key technologies. Coordinate the use of existing financial special funds to support the construction of “Internet +” related platforms and application demonstrations.’

29

‘accelerate the implementation of the “Broadband China” strategy, organize and implement the national new generation information infrastructure construction project [and] promote the transformation of fiber optic broadband network.’

‘actively invest in the research and development and application demonstration of qualified “Internet +” integrated innovation key technologies. Coordinate the use of existing financial special funds to support the construction of “Internet +” related platforms and application demonstrations.’

| (107) | In 2015, the GOC furthermore outlined the plan for financial investments foreseen to
  ‘speed up infrastructure construction’
  in the ‘Guidance from the General Office of the State Council on Speeding up the Construction of High-Speed Broadband Networks and Promoting the Speed Reduction of Network Speed-up Fees’ (30). In this document it is stated that the GOC, in order to achieve this objective
  ‘will accelerate the construction of all-fiber network cities and fourth-generation mobile communications (4G) networks, with more than 430 bil yuan invested in network construction in 2015 and no less than 700 bil yuan in 2016-2017’
  and
  ‘promote the fiber-to-the-home process, complete the fiber-optic transformation of 45 000 copper cable access zones in 2015, and [to] build more than 80 million new fiber-to-the-home households.’ |
| --- | --- |

(107)

In 2015, the GOC furthermore outlined the plan for financial investments foreseen to
  ‘speed up infrastructure construction’
  in the ‘Guidance from the General Office of the State Council on Speeding up the Construction of High-Speed Broadband Networks and Promoting the Speed Reduction of Network Speed-up Fees’ (30). In this document it is stated that the GOC, in order to achieve this objective
  ‘will accelerate the construction of all-fiber network cities and fourth-generation mobile communications (4G) networks, with more than 430 bil yuan invested in network construction in 2015 and no less than 700 bil yuan in 2016-2017’
  and
  ‘promote the fiber-to-the-home process, complete the fiber-optic transformation of 45 000 copper cable access zones in 2015, and [to] build more than 80 million new fiber-to-the-home households.’

‘speed up infrastructure construction’

30

‘will accelerate the construction of all-fiber network cities and fourth-generation mobile communications (4G) networks, with more than 430 bil yuan invested in network construction in 2015 and no less than 700 bil yuan in 2016-2017’

‘promote the fiber-to-the-home process, complete the fiber-optic transformation of 45 000 copper cable access zones in 2015, and [to] build more than 80 million new fiber-to-the-home households.’

| (108) | The approach of the GOC to define encouraged industries and products in catalogues in order to allocate resources accordingly, based on their strategic or political importance as attributed by the GOC, and to implement and supervise the plans at each administrative level can be further observed by examining the Catalogue of Strategic and Emerging Products and Services of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) from 2016 (31). Again, the establishment of a new generation of IT industry is envisaged, including a new generation of information network industry. To achieve this objective, certain products are included in the catalogue of strategic and emerging products. OFC clearly is one of the products as the reference to ‘Optical communication equipment. Including fiber’
  is unequivocal. The enumeration of technological specificities of the equipment concerned, such as
  ‘G.657 fiber for FTTx, large effective area G.655 fiber, G.656 fiber, low-loss and ultra-low-loss light that meets G.652 standards Fiber, [...] Optical transmission equipment, single channel line rate 10Gbit/s, 40Gbit/s, 100Gbit/s, 200Gbit/s, 400Gbit/s’
  show not only that OFC is considered a strategic and emerging product by the GOC but also the degree of detailed planning by the GOC that extends to the level of certain technological products. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

The approach of the GOC to define encouraged industries and products in catalogues in order to allocate resources accordingly, based on their strategic or political importance as attributed by the GOC, and to implement and supervise the plans at each administrative level can be further observed by examining the Catalogue of Strategic and Emerging Products and Services of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) from 2016 (31). Again, the establishment of a new generation of IT industry is envisaged, including a new generation of information network industry. To achieve this objective, certain products are included in the catalogue of strategic and emerging products. OFC clearly is one of the products as the reference to ‘Optical communication equipment. Including fiber’
  is unequivocal. The enumeration of technological specificities of the equipment concerned, such as
  ‘G.657 fiber for FTTx, large effective area G.655 fiber, G.656 fiber, low-loss and ultra-low-loss light that meets G.652 standards Fiber, [...] Optical transmission equipment, single channel line rate 10Gbit/s, 40Gbit/s, 100Gbit/s, 200Gbit/s, 400Gbit/s’
  show not only that OFC is considered a strategic and emerging product by the GOC but also the degree of detailed planning by the GOC that extends to the level of certain technological products.

31

Optical communication equipment. Including fiber’

‘G.657 fiber for FTTx, large effective area G.655 fiber, G.656 fiber, low-loss and ultra-low-loss light that meets G.652 standards Fiber, [...] Optical transmission equipment, single channel line rate 10Gbit/s, 40Gbit/s, 100Gbit/s, 200Gbit/s, 400Gbit/s’

| (109) | The same approach – to define objectives in plans and further implementing them by defining technical details in catalogues – is used in the Catalogue of High and new Technology Products (32), where OFC are covered as communication product in No 1020011, which includes
  ‘SDH optical fiber transmission system with single-mode fiber transmission medium, high-speed data transmission channel, the transmission rate of 10Gbit / s and 40Gbit / s, for communication lines and metro backbone network’
  . Already in 2003, OFC was listed in the Catalogue of Encouraged Hi-Tech Products for Foreign investment in the category Communication Equipment and Products (33) under number 42 as
  ‘10Gb/s and above SDH fiber communication equipment’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The same approach – to define objectives in plans and further implementing them by defining technical details in catalogues – is used in the Catalogue of High and new Technology Products (32), where OFC are covered as communication product in No 1020011, which includes
  ‘SDH optical fiber transmission system with single-mode fiber transmission medium, high-speed data transmission channel, the transmission rate of 10Gbit / s and 40Gbit / s, for communication lines and metro backbone network’
  . Already in 2003, OFC was listed in the Catalogue of Encouraged Hi-Tech Products for Foreign investment in the category Communication Equipment and Products (33) under number 42 as
  ‘10Gb/s and above SDH fiber communication equipment’
  .

32

‘SDH optical fiber transmission system with single-mode fiber transmission medium, high-speed data transmission channel, the transmission rate of 10Gbit / s and 40Gbit / s, for communication lines and metro backbone network’

33

‘10Gb/s and above SDH fiber communication equipment’

| (110) | Following final disclosure, the GOC and Connect Com claimed that the Commission did not demonstrate that the various documents mentioned in Section 3.1
  ‘specifically’
  support or encourage the OFC industry although Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to demonstrate that a GOC document
  ‘explicitly limits access’
  to certain enterprises and that such a requirement under Article 2.1(a) of the SCM Agreement entails the demonstration of a limitation that is
  ‘express...unambiguous and clear’
   (34). Connect Com further referred to Article 4(5) of the basic Regulation which requires that specificity must be clearly justified on the basis of positive evidence and claimed that the Commission did not meet this requirement. The GOC further argued that the Commission bases itself on the incorrect assumption that if network infrastructure is supposedly encouraged, everything that makes up that network is encouraged. The GOC stated that numerous documents mentioned by the Commission, such as the 13th Five-Year plan, the Made in China 2025 initiative, the Intelligent Manufacturing Development plan (2016-2020), the 2009 Plan for Adjustment and Revitalization of the Electronic Information industry and the Broadband China Strategy of 2013, do not concern the product OFC or the OFC industry but rather downstream networks or the deployment of broadband, i.e. general infrastructure. According to the GOC, given that building networks requires many inputs and products, the Commission should clearly explain exactly which products and services making the infrastructure it considers to be encouraged. Additionally, the GOC claimed that the
  ‘roll-out’
  of the network or broadband is not related to goods but rather to infrastructure development and services, since such roll-out concerns the improvement of general telecommunication services. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Following final disclosure, the GOC and Connect Com claimed that the Commission did not demonstrate that the various documents mentioned in Section 3.1
  ‘specifically’
  support or encourage the OFC industry although Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to demonstrate that a GOC document
  ‘explicitly limits access’
  to certain enterprises and that such a requirement under Article 2.1(a) of the SCM Agreement entails the demonstration of a limitation that is
  ‘express...unambiguous and clear’
   (34). Connect Com further referred to Article 4(5) of the basic Regulation which requires that specificity must be clearly justified on the basis of positive evidence and claimed that the Commission did not meet this requirement. The GOC further argued that the Commission bases itself on the incorrect assumption that if network infrastructure is supposedly encouraged, everything that makes up that network is encouraged. The GOC stated that numerous documents mentioned by the Commission, such as the 13th Five-Year plan, the Made in China 2025 initiative, the Intelligent Manufacturing Development plan (2016-2020), the 2009 Plan for Adjustment and Revitalization of the Electronic Information industry and the Broadband China Strategy of 2013, do not concern the product OFC or the OFC industry but rather downstream networks or the deployment of broadband, i.e. general infrastructure. According to the GOC, given that building networks requires many inputs and products, the Commission should clearly explain exactly which products and services making the infrastructure it considers to be encouraged. Additionally, the GOC claimed that the
  ‘roll-out’
  of the network or broadband is not related to goods but rather to infrastructure development and services, since such roll-out concerns the improvement of general telecommunication services.

‘specifically’

‘explicitly limits access’

‘express...unambiguous and clear’

34

th

‘roll-out’

| (111) | The Commission disagreed. As explained in recital (80), OFC is a key component of internet networks infrastructure and it plays a paramount role in the roll-out of optical fibre networks and broadband internet. The broadband infrastructure refers to networks of deployed telecommunications equipment and technologies necessary to provide high-speed internet access and other advanced telecommunication services (35) and OFC is a main part of the transmission equipment. Therefore, the building of the broadband infrastructure and networks requires the use of products necessary to the transmission of data and does not consists mainly in the provision of services as the GOC seems to imply. Actually, the provision of services would be the result of the existence of such infrastructure once built. Therefore, if the building of the broadband infrastructure is encouraged by the GOC, key products which are indispensable for the building of such infrastructure and which form an integral part of it are also encouraged by the GOC. The Commission is of the opinion that the normative framework resulting from the implementation of the various documents mentioned in Section 3.1
  ‘explicitly limits access’
  to a preferential treatment to certain enterprises in encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry which is part of the information technology and broadband networks. Consequently, the various documents that were mentioned in Section 3.1 constituted sufficient positive evidence to conclude the specificity of the support and encouragement of the OFC industry by the GOC. Therefore, the claims of the GOC and Connect Com were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

The Commission disagreed. As explained in recital (80), OFC is a key component of internet networks infrastructure and it plays a paramount role in the roll-out of optical fibre networks and broadband internet. The broadband infrastructure refers to networks of deployed telecommunications equipment and technologies necessary to provide high-speed internet access and other advanced telecommunication services (35) and OFC is a main part of the transmission equipment. Therefore, the building of the broadband infrastructure and networks requires the use of products necessary to the transmission of data and does not consists mainly in the provision of services as the GOC seems to imply. Actually, the provision of services would be the result of the existence of such infrastructure once built. Therefore, if the building of the broadband infrastructure is encouraged by the GOC, key products which are indispensable for the building of such infrastructure and which form an integral part of it are also encouraged by the GOC. The Commission is of the opinion that the normative framework resulting from the implementation of the various documents mentioned in Section 3.1
  ‘explicitly limits access’
  to a preferential treatment to certain enterprises in encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry which is part of the information technology and broadband networks. Consequently, the various documents that were mentioned in Section 3.1 constituted sufficient positive evidence to conclude the specificity of the support and encouragement of the OFC industry by the GOC. Therefore, the claims of the GOC and Connect Com were rejected.

35

‘explicitly limits access’

| (112) | Furthermore, according to the GOC, internet access networks and broadband infrastructure are general infrastructure. The GOC made reference to the interpretation of
  ‘general infrastructure’
  by the Panel in ‘EC and certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft’as ‘infrastructure that is not provided to or for the advantage of only a single entity or limited group of entities, but rather is available to all or nearly all entities’. The GOC further argued that the Appellate Body in ‘US – Softwood Lumber IV’ confirmed that
  ‘only explicit exception to the general principle that the provision of “goods” by a government will result in a financial contribution is when those goods are provided in the form of “general infrastructure.”
  ‘ |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Furthermore, according to the GOC, internet access networks and broadband infrastructure are general infrastructure. The GOC made reference to the interpretation of
  ‘general infrastructure’
  by the Panel in ‘EC and certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft’as ‘infrastructure that is not provided to or for the advantage of only a single entity or limited group of entities, but rather is available to all or nearly all entities’. The GOC further argued that the Appellate Body in ‘US – Softwood Lumber IV’ confirmed that
  ‘only explicit exception to the general principle that the provision of “goods” by a government will result in a financial contribution is when those goods are provided in the form of “general infrastructure.”
  ‘

‘general infrastructure’

as ‘infrastructure that is not provided to or for the advantage of only a single entity or limited group of entities, but rather is available to all or nearly all entities’.

‘only explicit exception to the general principle that the provision of “goods” by a government will result in a financial contribution is when those goods are provided in the form of “general infrastructure.”
  ‘

| (113) | In this respect, the Commission pointed out that the interpretation of
  ‘general infrastructure’
  to which the GOC referred relates to the definition of provision of goods by a government in the form of general infrastructure. This interpretation does not relate to the specificity analysis of a subsidy programme. Moreover, the object of this investigation is not the provision of optical fiber cable by a government, which GOC claimed to be
  ‘general infrastructure’, but rather all the countervailing subsidies granted to the exporting producers of OFC, which in turn export this OFC to telecom operators in the Union. Therefore, the Commission considered the claim as unfounded and irrelevant for the assessment of the encouragement of the OFC industry by the GOC and therefore rejected it. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

In this respect, the Commission pointed out that the interpretation of
  ‘general infrastructure’
  to which the GOC referred relates to the definition of provision of goods by a government in the form of general infrastructure. This interpretation does not relate to the specificity analysis of a subsidy programme. Moreover, the object of this investigation is not the provision of optical fiber cable by a government, which GOC claimed to be
  ‘general infrastructure’, but rather all the countervailing subsidies granted to the exporting producers of OFC, which in turn export this OFC to telecom operators in the Union. Therefore, the Commission considered the claim as unfounded and irrelevant for the assessment of the encouragement of the OFC industry by the GOC and therefore rejected it.

‘general infrastructure’

‘general infrastructure’,

| (114) | Following final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that the general funding for the expansion of the fibre optical network does not represent a specific subsidy for OFC and referred to recital (749) below according to which, OFC do not make up more than 5 % of the total volume of optical fibre network. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

Following final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that the general funding for the expansion of the fibre optical network does not represent a specific subsidy for OFC and referred to recital (749) below according to which, OFC do not make up more than 5 % of the total volume of optical fibre network.

| (115) | In this respect, the Commission stressed that recital (749) reads as follows:
  ‘the investigation established that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks projects - in the case of 5G being much less than 5 %’. First, this statement refers to the cost of production and not to the volume. Second, the fact that OFC might represent a minor share of the total rollout of the network does not invalidate the fact that OFC is a key and indispensable product for the deployment of such network. As explained at recitals (80) and (111), OFC is an integral component of the last-generation high-speed broadband networks based on this technology, which therefore would not be able to function without it. Subsidies to this key component are thus by definition specific and instrumental for the successful functioning of the whole optical fibre network. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

In this respect, the Commission stressed that recital (749) reads as follows:
  ‘the investigation established that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks projects - in the case of 5G being much less than 5 %’. First, this statement refers to the cost of production and not to the volume. Second, the fact that OFC might represent a minor share of the total rollout of the network does not invalidate the fact that OFC is a key and indispensable product for the deployment of such network. As explained at recitals (80) and (111), OFC is an integral component of the last-generation high-speed broadband networks based on this technology, which therefore would not be able to function without it. Subsidies to this key component are thus by definition specific and instrumental for the successful functioning of the whole optical fibre network. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

‘the investigation established that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks projects - in the case of 5G being much less than 5 %’.

| (116) | Furthermore, the Temporary Provisions on Promoting Industrial Structure Adjustment (Decision No 40 from 2005 of the State Council) (‘Decision No 40’), Chapter III refers to ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ which is composed of three kinds of contents, namely encouraged project contents, limited projects content and eliminated projects content. According to Article XVII of the Decision, if
  ‘the investment project belongs to the encouragement content it shall be examined and approved and put on records according to the relevant national regulations on investment; all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles; the self-using equipment imported in the total amount of investment, with the exception of commodities in the Non-exempt Imported Commodities Content of Domestic Invested Projects (amended in 2000) issued by the Ministry of Finance, can be exempt from import duty and import links value-added tax, unless there are new regulations on the non-exempt investment projects content. Other favorite policies on the encouraged industrial projects shall be implemented according to relevant national Regulations’. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

Furthermore, the Temporary Provisions on Promoting Industrial Structure Adjustment (Decision No 40 from 2005 of the State Council) (‘Decision No 40’), Chapter III refers to ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ which is composed of three kinds of contents, namely encouraged project contents, limited projects content and eliminated projects content. According to Article XVII of the Decision, if
  ‘the investment project belongs to the encouragement content it shall be examined and approved and put on records according to the relevant national regulations on investment; all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles; the self-using equipment imported in the total amount of investment, with the exception of commodities in the Non-exempt Imported Commodities Content of Domestic Invested Projects (amended in 2000) issued by the Ministry of Finance, can be exempt from import duty and import links value-added tax, unless there are new regulations on the non-exempt investment projects content. Other favorite policies on the encouraged industrial projects shall be implemented according to relevant national Regulations’.

‘the investment project belongs to the encouragement content it shall be examined and approved and put on records according to the relevant national regulations on investment; all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles; the self-using equipment imported in the total amount of investment, with the exception of commodities in the Non-exempt Imported Commodities Content of Domestic Invested Projects (amended in 2000) issued by the Ministry of Finance, can be exempt from import duty and import links value-added tax, unless there are new regulations on the non-exempt investment projects content. Other favorite policies on the encouraged industrial projects shall be implemented according to relevant national Regulations’.

| (117) | Consequently, Decision No 40 read together with the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring provides for specific treatment of certain projects within certain encouraged industries. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

Consequently, Decision No 40 read together with the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring provides for specific treatment of certain projects within certain encouraged industries.

| (118) | The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring (2011 Version)(2013 Amendment) (36) and the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring (2019 Version) (37) approved by Decree of the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China No 29 of 27 August 2019, which entered into force on 1 January 2020, list under ‘Category I Encouragement’:
  ‘XXVIII.   Information Industry


  [...]









  13. | Equipment manufacture of wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) optical fiber transmission systems with a speed of 32 waves or more; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(118)

The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring (2011 Version)(2013 Amendment) (36) and the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring (2019 Version) (37) approved by Decree of the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China No 29 of 27 August 2019, which entered into force on 1 January 2020, list under ‘Category I Encouragement’:

36

37

‘XXVIII.   Information Industry

Information Industry

[...]

[...]

13.

Equipment manufacture of wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) optical fiber transmission systems with a speed of 32 waves or more;

| 14. | Equipment manufacture of digital synchronization series optical fiber communication systems with a speed of 10GB/S or more; |
| --- | --- |

14.

Equipment manufacture of digital synchronization series optical fiber communication systems with a speed of 10GB/S or more;

[...]

[...]

| 28. | Manufacture of new (non-dispersive) single-mode fiber and optical fiber preforms’ |
| --- | --- |

28.

Manufacture of new (non-dispersive) single-mode fiber and optical fiber preforms

| (119) | Therefore, the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring includes under ‘information industry’ specific projects related to the OFC industry as encouraged. |
| --- | --- |

(119)

Therefore, the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring includes under ‘information industry’ specific projects related to the OFC industry as encouraged.

| (120) | The GOC claimed that Decision No 40 is not mandatory or legally binding, but instead is merely a guidance document. In addition, according to the GOC, Article V of Decision No 40, which refers to
  ‘[s]trengthen the construction of information infrastructure including broadband communication’
  , clearly concerns only the improvement of infrastructure and does not mention OFC. Thus, the GOC argued that this document could not have provided support or encouragement to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

The GOC claimed that Decision No 40 is not mandatory or legally binding, but instead is merely a guidance document. In addition, according to the GOC, Article V of Decision No 40, which refers to
  ‘[s]trengthen the construction of information infrastructure including broadband communication’
  , clearly concerns only the improvement of infrastructure and does not mention OFC. Thus, the GOC argued that this document could not have provided support or encouragement to the OFC industry.

‘[s]trengthen the construction of information infrastructure including broadband communication’

| (121) | First, the Commission disagreed that Decision No 40 has no mandatory effect. Indeed, Decision No 40 lays down the temporary regulations promoting the industrial restructuring and it refers to ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’, which defines three kinds of content: encouraged projects content, limited projects content and eliminated projects content. Article XVII of Decision No 40 establishes the treatment of investment projects belonging to the encouraged content in a mandatory manner, e.g.
  ‘all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles’
  and
  ‘other favourite policies on the encouraged industrial projects shall be implemented according to relevant national Regulations’
  . Furthermore, Article XXI sets that
  ‘the relevant preferential policies implemented according to The Content of Industries, Products and Technologies Currently Especially Encouraged by the State (amended in 2000) shall be adjusted to be implemented according to the encouragement content of The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’
  . Therefore, Decision No 40 has a mandatory effect in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(121)

First, the Commission disagreed that Decision No 40 has no mandatory effect. Indeed, Decision No 40 lays down the temporary regulations promoting the industrial restructuring and it refers to ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’, which defines three kinds of content: encouraged projects content, limited projects content and eliminated projects content. Article XVII of Decision No 40 establishes the treatment of investment projects belonging to the encouraged content in a mandatory manner, e.g.
  ‘all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles’
  and
  ‘other favourite policies on the encouraged industrial projects shall be implemented according to relevant national Regulations’
  . Furthermore, Article XXI sets that
  ‘the relevant preferential policies implemented according to The Content of Industries, Products and Technologies Currently Especially Encouraged by the State (amended in 2000) shall be adjusted to be implemented according to the encouragement content of The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’
  . Therefore, Decision No 40 has a mandatory effect in this respect.

‘all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles’

‘other favourite policies on the encouraged industrial projects shall be implemented according to relevant national Regulations’

‘the relevant preferential policies implemented according to The Content of Industries, Products and Technologies Currently Especially Encouraged by the State (amended in 2000) shall be adjusted to be implemented according to the encouragement content of The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’

| (122) | Second, Article V of Decision No 40, which belongs to Chapter II ‘Orientation and Priorities of Industrial Restructuring’, sets as priority to strengthen the
  ‘construction of information infrastructure including broadband communication’
  and as demonstrated in recital (80) and further explained in recital (111), OFC is a key and indispensable component of such infrastructure. As concluded by the Commission in recital (111), if the building of the broadband infrastructure is encouraged by the GOC, key products which are indispensable for the building of such infrastructure and form an integral part of it are also considered encouraged by the GOC. Furthermore, Article XIV of Decision No 40, which belongs to Chapter III ‘The Guiding Catalogue of the Industrial Restructuring’, states that:
  ‘the encouragement content mainly includes the key technologies, equipment and products that may promote the social and economic development, that are beneficial for saving the resources, protecting the environment and optimizing and upgrading the industrial structure and that need to be encouraged and supported by relevant policies and measures’
  . As already pointed out in recital (118), information industry and in particular key input materials for the production of OFC such as single-mode fibre and optical fibre preforms as well as upstream products such as optical fibre transmission systems and optical fibre communication systems are listed as encouraged content. Furthermore, OFC is key equipment for the deployment of
  ‘information infrastructure including broadband communication’, which is encouraged by the GOC. Therefore, the combined reading of the above provisions shows that OFC is an encouraged product, on the one side because it is an indispensable component of an encouraged infrastructure and on the other side, because its core input materials, which determine the added value of OFC, are also encouraged by the GOC. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

Second, Article V of Decision No 40, which belongs to Chapter II ‘Orientation and Priorities of Industrial Restructuring’, sets as priority to strengthen the
  ‘construction of information infrastructure including broadband communication’
  and as demonstrated in recital (80) and further explained in recital (111), OFC is a key and indispensable component of such infrastructure. As concluded by the Commission in recital (111), if the building of the broadband infrastructure is encouraged by the GOC, key products which are indispensable for the building of such infrastructure and form an integral part of it are also considered encouraged by the GOC. Furthermore, Article XIV of Decision No 40, which belongs to Chapter III ‘The Guiding Catalogue of the Industrial Restructuring’, states that:
  ‘the encouragement content mainly includes the key technologies, equipment and products that may promote the social and economic development, that are beneficial for saving the resources, protecting the environment and optimizing and upgrading the industrial structure and that need to be encouraged and supported by relevant policies and measures’
  . As already pointed out in recital (118), information industry and in particular key input materials for the production of OFC such as single-mode fibre and optical fibre preforms as well as upstream products such as optical fibre transmission systems and optical fibre communication systems are listed as encouraged content. Furthermore, OFC is key equipment for the deployment of
  ‘information infrastructure including broadband communication’, which is encouraged by the GOC. Therefore, the combined reading of the above provisions shows that OFC is an encouraged product, on the one side because it is an indispensable component of an encouraged infrastructure and on the other side, because its core input materials, which determine the added value of OFC, are also encouraged by the GOC. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

‘construction of information infrastructure including broadband communication’

‘the encouragement content mainly includes the key technologies, equipment and products that may promote the social and economic development, that are beneficial for saving the resources, protecting the environment and optimizing and upgrading the industrial structure and that need to be encouraged and supported by relevant policies and measures’

‘information infrastructure including broadband communication’,

| (123) | Not only plans and strategies on national level target at supporting the OFC industry. On provincial level so called National High Tech Industry Development Zones were established. One of them is the East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone. Those zones are intended to, as set out in Section I.2 of the 13th Five Year Plan on National High Tech Industry Development Zones, provide a regional platform in order to implement in-depth national strategies such as ‘Internet +’ and ‘Made in China 2025’ (38). Companies and enterprises that are located in one of those zones and qualify as an entity conducting business that falls under the scope of the respective strategies enjoy beneficial treatments. As can be seen in the document concerning ‘Preferential policies of the National High-tech Industrial Development Zone’ (39), a general exemption for income tax is awarded within two years from the date of establishment and also afterwards preferential treatments continue with granting a reduced corporate income tax rate, an exemption from export tariffs and other tax benefits. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

Not only plans and strategies on national level target at supporting the OFC industry. On provincial level so called National High Tech Industry Development Zones were established. One of them is the East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone. Those zones are intended to, as set out in Section I.2 of the 13th Five Year Plan on National High Tech Industry Development Zones, provide a regional platform in order to implement in-depth national strategies such as ‘Internet +’ and ‘Made in China 2025’ (38). Companies and enterprises that are located in one of those zones and qualify as an entity conducting business that falls under the scope of the respective strategies enjoy beneficial treatments. As can be seen in the document concerning ‘Preferential policies of the National High-tech Industrial Development Zone’ (39), a general exemption for income tax is awarded within two years from the date of establishment and also afterwards preferential treatments continue with granting a reduced corporate income tax rate, an exemption from export tariffs and other tax benefits.

th

38

39

| (124) | The benefits granted for companies operating in high-tech industry located in the National High-tech Industrial Development Zone are not limited to tax benefits but also include direct financial support. As can be seen in the cited document that sets out the preferential policies of the National High-tech Industrial Development Zones it is up to the State to
  ‘arrange[...] a certain amount of capital construction loans and investment scale each year, and can issue a certain amount of long-term bonds to raise funds from the society’
   (40). A more precise description is provided in this document when it states that
  ‘[t]he financial support of the Chinese government for the high-tech industrial development zone is mainly to give certain start-up funds to the national-level development zones, and to implement some national-level planned projects to enterprises in the development zones. In most development zones in China, the local government mainly supports the development zone by renting land at low prices’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(124)

The benefits granted for companies operating in high-tech industry located in the National High-tech Industrial Development Zone are not limited to tax benefits but also include direct financial support. As can be seen in the cited document that sets out the preferential policies of the National High-tech Industrial Development Zones it is up to the State to
  ‘arrange[...] a certain amount of capital construction loans and investment scale each year, and can issue a certain amount of long-term bonds to raise funds from the society’
   (40). A more precise description is provided in this document when it states that
  ‘[t]he financial support of the Chinese government for the high-tech industrial development zone is mainly to give certain start-up funds to the national-level development zones, and to implement some national-level planned projects to enterprises in the development zones. In most development zones in China, the local government mainly supports the development zone by renting land at low prices’
  .

‘arrange[...] a certain amount of capital construction loans and investment scale each year, and can issue a certain amount of long-term bonds to raise funds from the society’

40

‘[t]he financial support of the Chinese government for the high-tech industrial development zone is mainly to give certain start-up funds to the national-level development zones, and to implement some national-level planned projects to enterprises in the development zones. In most development zones in China, the local government mainly supports the development zone by renting land at low prices’

| (125) | Furthermore, the ‘Preferential policies for the national development zones’ refer to the Catalogue of Key High Tech Fields Supported by the State from 2016 that lists the supported key high technology fields. This catalogue clearly mentions under ‘I. Electronic Information’, point 4. ‘Communication technology’
  ‘optical transmission network’
  and
  ‘optical transmission system technology’, which cover optical fibre cables, as high technology fields supported by the State. One of the sampled exporting producers of OFC is located in Wuhan Province and most of the companies in the group are located in the East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone. Therefore, these companies qualify for beneficial treatments that are granted under the scheme of National High Tech Industry Development Zones. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Furthermore, the ‘Preferential policies for the national development zones’ refer to the Catalogue of Key High Tech Fields Supported by the State from 2016 that lists the supported key high technology fields. This catalogue clearly mentions under ‘I. Electronic Information’, point 4. ‘Communication technology’
  ‘optical transmission network’
  and
  ‘optical transmission system technology’, which cover optical fibre cables, as high technology fields supported by the State. One of the sampled exporting producers of OFC is located in Wuhan Province and most of the companies in the group are located in the East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone. Therefore, these companies qualify for beneficial treatments that are granted under the scheme of National High Tech Industry Development Zones.

‘optical transmission network’

‘optical transmission system technology’,

| (126) | This GOC-backed special industry development zone in Wuhan - the East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone - served as a major production base for OFC. As one of the State Council-approved ‘National High-tech Industry Development Zones’ and a ‘National Indigenous Innovation Demonstration Zone’, it became the PRC’s first optoelectronics industry base (also called ‘China Optics Valley’). OFC producers active in the zone have been benefitting from various forms of incentives and State support. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

This GOC-backed special industry development zone in Wuhan - the East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone - served as a major production base for OFC. As one of the State Council-approved ‘National High-tech Industry Development Zones’ and a ‘National Indigenous Innovation Demonstration Zone’, it became the PRC’s first optoelectronics industry base (also called ‘China Optics Valley’). OFC producers active in the zone have been benefitting from various forms of incentives and State support.

| (127) | With regard to inputs used in the production of OFC, the Commission found that aramid, a chemically obtained synthetic fibre and input in the production of OFC, is categorised as a key product by the GOC in the Guiding Catalogue of key products and services in strategic emerging industries (41). This qualification has put the latter raw material in focus of various GOC policies. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

With regard to inputs used in the production of OFC, the Commission found that aramid, a chemically obtained synthetic fibre and input in the production of OFC, is categorised as a key product by the GOC in the Guiding Catalogue of key products and services in strategic emerging industries (41). This qualification has put the latter raw material in focus of various GOC policies.

Guiding Catalogue of key products and services in strategic emerging industries

41

| (128) | More broadly, chemical fibres are subject to State regulation and market-management policies not only centrally but also under sub-central planning documents, such as the Zhejiang Province’s Action Plan for Comprehensive Transformation and Upgrade of Traditional Manufacturing industries - where chemical fibres feature as one of the 10 key industries subject to specific policy management (42), or the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Chemical Industry in Jiangsu Province (2016 – 2020). In the provisions of the latter concerning new chemical materials, the focus is placed notably on supporting the development and industrialisation of high-value added downstream applications such as ‘high performance fibres’, which encompasses fibres used in the production of OFC. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

More broadly, chemical fibres are subject to State regulation and market-management policies not only centrally but also under sub-central planning documents, such as the Zhejiang Province’s Action Plan for Comprehensive Transformation and Upgrade of Traditional Manufacturing industries - where chemical fibres feature as one of the 10 key industries subject to specific policy management (42), or the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Chemical Industry in Jiangsu Province (2016 – 2020). In the provisions of the latter concerning new chemical materials, the focus is placed notably on supporting the development and industrialisation of high-value added downstream applications such as ‘high performance fibres’, which encompasses fibres used in the production of OFC.

42

th

| (129) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that various documents cited by the Commission such as the ‘Catalogue of Four Essentials’, the ‘Catalogue of Strategic and Emerging Products and Services of the National Development and Reform Commission 2016’ and the ‘Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ do not mention OFC as such but rather refer to input materials. The GOC further stated that the Commission did not carry out a pass-through or pass-back analysis to demonstrate that alleged subsided received by upstream or downstream industries have been passed to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that various documents cited by the Commission such as the ‘Catalogue of Four Essentials’, the ‘Catalogue of Strategic and Emerging Products and Services of the National Development and Reform Commission 2016’ and the ‘Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ do not mention OFC as such but rather refer to input materials. The GOC further stated that the Commission did not carry out a pass-through or pass-back analysis to demonstrate that alleged subsided received by upstream or downstream industries have been passed to the OFC industry.

| (130) | With regard to upstream industries, the Commission noted that the sampled exporting producers were vertically integrated and therefore subsidies received by their related suppliers were considered to be passed-through to the exporting producers of OFC. Furthermore, the documents mentioned by the GOC as covering the input materials of OFC, even assuming that they do not also cover at least indirectly or implicitly OFC, quod non, are in any event relevant in together with all other preferential policies and documents by the GOC covered in this section. All the documents in this section cover either optical fibre networks in which OFC is a key component, or its main inputs, hence showing how the OFC sector as a whole is encouraged starting from the upstream production until the downstream output of the product concerned. These documents are also relevant to show specificity of the various subsidy programmes. A pass-through analysis is needed only for subsidies actually granted to raw materials supplied at less than adequate remuneration and used by the exporting producers for the production of the product concerned, and only if the seller and the buyer of these input materials are unrelated. As explained below in Section 3.8.2, raw materials sourced by unrelated suppliers at less than adequate remuneration have not been countervailed in this investigation. Furthermore, as stated above in this recital, the cooperating exporting producers are mainly integrated. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

With regard to upstream industries, the Commission noted that the sampled exporting producers were vertically integrated and therefore subsidies received by their related suppliers were considered to be passed-through to the exporting producers of OFC. Furthermore, the documents mentioned by the GOC as covering the input materials of OFC, even assuming that they do not also cover at least indirectly or implicitly OFC, quod non, are in any event relevant in together with all other preferential policies and documents by the GOC covered in this section. All the documents in this section cover either optical fibre networks in which OFC is a key component, or its main inputs, hence showing how the OFC sector as a whole is encouraged starting from the upstream production until the downstream output of the product concerned. These documents are also relevant to show specificity of the various subsidy programmes. A pass-through analysis is needed only for subsidies actually granted to raw materials supplied at less than adequate remuneration and used by the exporting producers for the production of the product concerned, and only if the seller and the buyer of these input materials are unrelated. As explained below in Section 3.8.2, raw materials sourced by unrelated suppliers at less than adequate remuneration have not been countervailed in this investigation. Furthermore, as stated above in this recital, the cooperating exporting producers are mainly integrated.

quod non,

| (131) | Considering the above-mentioned plans and programmes, the OFC industry is thus regarded as a key/strategic industry, whose development is actively pursued by the GOC as a policy objective. OFC stands out as a product of paramount importance for the GOC in the building of networks and infrastructure serving entire strata of key connectivity and digital policy areas developed and overseen by the State. On the basis of the policy documents referred to in this section, the Commission concluded that the GOC intervenes in the OFC industry to implement the related policies and interferes with the free play of market forces in the OFC sector, notably by promoting and supporting the sector through various means. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Considering the above-mentioned plans and programmes, the OFC industry is thus regarded as a key/strategic industry, whose development is actively pursued by the GOC as a policy objective. OFC stands out as a product of paramount importance for the GOC in the building of networks and infrastructure serving entire strata of key connectivity and digital policy areas developed and overseen by the State. On the basis of the policy documents referred to in this section, the Commission concluded that the GOC intervenes in the OFC industry to implement the related policies and interferes with the free play of market forces in the OFC sector, notably by promoting and supporting the sector through various means.

3.2.   Partial non-cooperation and use of facts available

Partial non-cooperation and use of facts available

| (132) | Following final disclosure, the GOC made some general remarks concerning the Commission’s decision to apply the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation with regard to preferential lending, export credit insurance, and input materials. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

Following final disclosure, the GOC made some general remarks concerning the Commission’s decision to apply the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation with regard to preferential lending, export credit insurance, and input materials.

| (133) | The GOC claimed that all of the Commission’s requests for information to which the GOC could not provide responses, were unreasonable, since these requests assumed the existence of legal powers which the GOC did not possess. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The GOC claimed that all of the Commission’s requests for information to which the GOC could not provide responses, were unreasonable, since these requests assumed the existence of legal powers which the GOC did not possess.

| (134) | Furthermore, the GOC argued that the Commission did not properly evaluate the facts before it and did not provide a proper explanation of why the facts available reasonably replaced any necessary information that was missing. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

Furthermore, the GOC argued that the Commission did not properly evaluate the facts before it and did not provide a proper explanation of why the facts available reasonably replaced any necessary information that was missing.

| (135) | As set out below in recitals (146), (160) and (168), the Commission was of the opinion that the GOC did have the legal power to obtain the requested information, as shareholder or responsible authority of the entities for which the Commission requested the information. The Commission did set out in its communication to the GOC, repeated in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 below, why it had to rely on facts available. The Commission considered publicly available information to be a reasonable replacement for the information that was not provided by the GOC. The Commission therefore rejected the claims of the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

As set out below in recitals (146), (160) and (168), the Commission was of the opinion that the GOC did have the legal power to obtain the requested information, as shareholder or responsible authority of the entities for which the Commission requested the information. The Commission did set out in its communication to the GOC, repeated in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 below, why it had to rely on facts available. The Commission considered publicly available information to be a reasonable replacement for the information that was not provided by the GOC. The Commission therefore rejected the claims of the GOC.

3.2.1.   The application of the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation in relation to preferential lending

The application of the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation in relation to preferential lending

| (136) | For administrative convenience, the Commission requested the GOC to forward specific questionnaires to any financial institution that provided loans or export credits to the sampled companies. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

For administrative convenience, the Commission requested the GOC to forward specific questionnaires to any financial institution that provided loans or export credits to the sampled companies.

| (137) | At first, only a reply from EXIM bank was received. The GOC did not respond to the Commission’s request to provide questionnaire replies of all financial institutions that provided loans or export credits to the sampled companies. In the deficiency letter, the Commission therefore repeated its request with regard to the financial institutions with a view to maximising the possibilities to engage them in the investigation by providing the necessary information for the Commission to make findings on the existence and extent of the alleged subsidisation. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

At first, only a reply from EXIM bank was received. The GOC did not respond to the Commission’s request to provide questionnaire replies of all financial institutions that provided loans or export credits to the sampled companies. In the deficiency letter, the Commission therefore repeated its request with regard to the financial institutions with a view to maximising the possibilities to engage them in the investigation by providing the necessary information for the Commission to make findings on the existence and extent of the alleged subsidisation.

| (138) | Following the deficiency letter, the GOC indicated that questionnaire responses from the financial institutions that provided loans were not relevant to the investigation, since none of the loans and export credits were granted in accordance with the government plans and projects as alleged in the complaint and set out in the questionnaire. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Following the deficiency letter, the GOC indicated that questionnaire responses from the financial institutions that provided loans were not relevant to the investigation, since none of the loans and export credits were granted in accordance with the government plans and projects as alleged in the complaint and set out in the questionnaire.

| (139) | The Commission disagreed with this view. First, it is the Commission’s understanding that the information requested from State-owned entities is available to the GOC for all entities where the GOC is the main or major shareholder. In addition, the GOC also has the necessary authority to interact with the financial institutions even when they are not State-owned, since they all fall under the jurisdiction of the Chinese banking regulatory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

The Commission disagreed with this view. First, it is the Commission’s understanding that the information requested from State-owned entities is available to the GOC for all entities where the GOC is the main or major shareholder. In addition, the GOC also has the necessary authority to interact with the financial institutions even when they are not State-owned, since they all fall under the jurisdiction of the Chinese banking regulatory authority.

| (140) | In the end, the Commission only received information on corporate structure, governance and ownership from one State-owned bank but not from any of the other financial institutions which had provided loans to the sampled companies. Moreover, the Commission did not receive any verifiable company-specific information from the banks, other than the EXIM Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

In the end, the Commission only received information on corporate structure, governance and ownership from one State-owned bank but not from any of the other financial institutions which had provided loans to the sampled companies. Moreover, the Commission did not receive any verifiable company-specific information from the banks, other than the EXIM Bank.

| (141) | Furthermore, although EXIM Bank provided some general explanations on the functioning of their loan approval and risk management systems, it did not provide specific information concerning the assessment of the loans provided to the sampled companies. It argued that it was not in a position to disclose these documents, as they were considered internal and business confidential. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, although EXIM Bank provided some general explanations on the functioning of their loan approval and risk management systems, it did not provide specific information concerning the assessment of the loans provided to the sampled companies. It argued that it was not in a position to disclose these documents, as they were considered internal and business confidential.

| (142) | Therefore, the Commission asked the sampled groups of exporting producers to grant access to company-specific information held by all banks, State-owned and private, from which they received loans. Although the sampled companies gave their agreement to provide access to the bank data pertaining to them, the partially cooperating bank refused to provide the required detailed information. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Therefore, the Commission asked the sampled groups of exporting producers to grant access to company-specific information held by all banks, State-owned and private, from which they received loans. Although the sampled companies gave their agreement to provide access to the bank data pertaining to them, the partially cooperating bank refused to provide the required detailed information.

| (143) | Since it has received no information in relation to most of the banks that provided loans to the sampled companies, the Commission considered that it has not received crucial information relevant to this aspect of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Since it has received no information in relation to most of the banks that provided loans to the sampled companies, the Commission considered that it has not received crucial information relevant to this aspect of the investigation.

| (144) | Therefore, the Commission informed the GOC that it might have to resort to the use of facts available under Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation when examining the existence and the extent of the alleged subsidisation granted through preferential lending. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

Therefore, the Commission informed the GOC that it might have to resort to the use of facts available under Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation when examining the existence and the extent of the alleged subsidisation granted through preferential lending.

| (145) | In the reply to the Commission’s letter, the GOC objected to the application of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. It argued that the GOC is not obliged to provide the requested information and that the requested information does not constitute necessary information. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

In the reply to the Commission’s letter, the GOC objected to the application of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. It argued that the GOC is not obliged to provide the requested information and that the requested information does not constitute necessary information.

| (146) | The Commission maintained its position that as the regulatory body, the GOC is the authority to provide answers to the specific questions asked to the financial institutions that provided financing to the sampled exporting producers. As set out in the Commission’s letter, the information requested from State-owned entities is available to the GOC for all entities where the GOC is the main or major shareholder and the GOC has the necessary authority to interact with the financial institutions even when they are not State-owned, since they all fall under the jurisdiction of the Chinese banking regulatory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

The Commission maintained its position that as the regulatory body, the GOC is the authority to provide answers to the specific questions asked to the financial institutions that provided financing to the sampled exporting producers. As set out in the Commission’s letter, the information requested from State-owned entities is available to the GOC for all entities where the GOC is the main or major shareholder and the GOC has the necessary authority to interact with the financial institutions even when they are not State-owned, since they all fall under the jurisdiction of the Chinese banking regulatory authority.

| (147) | Furthermore, the Commission considered the requested information to be crucial to assess the control of the GOC over the conduct of the financial institutions with respect to its lending policies and assessment of risk, where they provided loans to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Furthermore, the Commission considered the requested information to be crucial to assess the control of the GOC over the conduct of the financial institutions with respect to its lending policies and assessment of risk, where they provided loans to the OFC industry.

| (148) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the information by the Commission with regard to information from financial institutions providing loans or export credits to the sampled companies was not necessary, or even relevant, for the Commission to complete its analysis, since none of the loans at issue were granted pursuant to government plans or other GOC documents. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the information by the Commission with regard to information from financial institutions providing loans or export credits to the sampled companies was not necessary, or even relevant, for the Commission to complete its analysis, since none of the loans at issue were granted pursuant to government plans or other GOC documents.

| (149) | The missing information concerned two aspects. First, the information on the ownership and governance structure of the non-cooperating banks was necessary for the Commission to determine whether these banks are public bodies or not. Second, company-specific information from the partially cooperating bank, EXIM Bank, such as the loan approval process and the creditworthiness assessment by the bank for the loans provided to the sampled exporting producers, were necessary in order to determine whether loans were provided at preferential rates to these producers. Such internal documents could only have been provided by the banks and the GOC, since the sampled exporting producers would not have access to them. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The missing information concerned two aspects. First, the information on the ownership and governance structure of the non-cooperating banks was necessary for the Commission to determine whether these banks are public bodies or not. Second, company-specific information from the partially cooperating bank, EXIM Bank, such as the loan approval process and the creditworthiness assessment by the bank for the loans provided to the sampled exporting producers, were necessary in order to determine whether loans were provided at preferential rates to these producers. Such internal documents could only have been provided by the banks and the GOC, since the sampled exporting producers would not have access to them.

| (150) | The GOC also argued that the requested information was not available to it. The GOC asserted that it was legally impossible to obtain the requested information, because there is no basis in Chinese law for the GOC to compel financial institutions to divulge such confidential information. By requesting this information, the Commission placed an unreasonable burden on the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

The GOC also argued that the requested information was not available to it. The GOC asserted that it was legally impossible to obtain the requested information, because there is no basis in Chinese law for the GOC to compel financial institutions to divulge such confidential information. By requesting this information, the Commission placed an unreasonable burden on the GOC.

| (151) | The Commission noted that consent was requested separately from each company for the loan transactions of each specific bank. The Commission considered that such a specific consent should be sufficient as such to grant access to the records related to the sampled companies. In addition, the partially cooperating bank actually provided an overview of their outstanding loans with the companies, thus showing that they were not restricted in providing information as such on specific transactions. However, none of the banks provided any information related to their own internal assessment of the transactions that had been disclosed. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

The Commission noted that consent was requested separately from each company for the loan transactions of each specific bank. The Commission considered that such a specific consent should be sufficient as such to grant access to the records related to the sampled companies. In addition, the partially cooperating bank actually provided an overview of their outstanding loans with the companies, thus showing that they were not restricted in providing information as such on specific transactions. However, none of the banks provided any information related to their own internal assessment of the transactions that had been disclosed.

| (152) | Finally, the Commission did not consider that it had imposed an unreasonable burden on the GOC by asking the information on preferential lending. From the start, the Commission had limited its investigation to those financial institutions that had provided loans to the sampled companies. The Commission did identify these financial institutions and the request to forward the questionnaires was provided to the GOC together with the questionnaire to be filled in by the GOC at an early stage of the investigation. This provided ample time for the GOC to comply with the request of the Commission. Therefore, the Commission considered that it had done its utmost best to facilitate its request to the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Finally, the Commission did not consider that it had imposed an unreasonable burden on the GOC by asking the information on preferential lending. From the start, the Commission had limited its investigation to those financial institutions that had provided loans to the sampled companies. The Commission did identify these financial institutions and the request to forward the questionnaires was provided to the GOC together with the questionnaire to be filled in by the GOC at an early stage of the investigation. This provided ample time for the GOC to comply with the request of the Commission. Therefore, the Commission considered that it had done its utmost best to facilitate its request to the GOC.

| (153) | The Commission thus maintained that it had to rely partially on facts available when examining the existence and the extent of the alleged subsidisation granted through preferential lending. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

The Commission thus maintained that it had to rely partially on facts available when examining the existence and the extent of the alleged subsidisation granted through preferential lending.

| (154) | Following final disclosure, the complainant argued that the Commission did not receive crucial information from the GOC in relation to preferential lending, which has resulted in subsidy margins that likely under-represent the true benefit from preferential loans conferred on the exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

Following final disclosure, the complainant argued that the Commission did not receive crucial information from the GOC in relation to preferential lending, which has resulted in subsidy margins that likely under-represent the true benefit from preferential loans conferred on the exporting producers.

| (155) | The sampled exporting producers did cooperate in the investigation and provided detailed information on the loans they received from the banks. Since the benefit was calculated on the basis of the difference between this information and a benchmark interest rate, the subsidy margin was considered to represent the true benefit conferred on the sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the claim had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The sampled exporting producers did cooperate in the investigation and provided detailed information on the loans they received from the banks. Since the benefit was calculated on the basis of the difference between this information and a benchmark interest rate, the subsidy margin was considered to represent the true benefit conferred on the sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the claim had to be rejected.

3.2.2.   The application of the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation in relation to export credit insurance

The application of the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation in relation to export credit insurance

| (156) | For administrative convenience, the Commission requested the GOC to forward a specific questionnaire to Sinosure. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

For administrative convenience, the Commission requested the GOC to forward a specific questionnaire to Sinosure.

| (157) | In its initial questionnaire reply, the GOC claimed that Sinosure did not provide subsidies to the OFC industry and it considered that the specific questionnaire intended for Sinosure was not relevant. The GOC only provided the annual report of Sinosure. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

In its initial questionnaire reply, the GOC claimed that Sinosure did not provide subsidies to the OFC industry and it considered that the specific questionnaire intended for Sinosure was not relevant. The GOC only provided the annual report of Sinosure.

| (158) | Following the deficiency letter, the GOC reiterated its view that Sinosure did not provide subsidies specific to the sampled exporting producers or the OFC industry, although it provided a partial reply to the specific questionnaire. However, neither the GOC nor Sinosure gave any of the supporting documentation requested concerning Sinosure’s corporate governance, such as its Articles of Association, and provided a complete and correct list of the export credits provided to the sampled exporting producers. Furthermore, no specific information about the export credit insurance provided to the OFC industry, the level of its premiums or detailed figures relating to the profitability of its export credit insurance business were received from the GOC or Sinosure. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Following the deficiency letter, the GOC reiterated its view that Sinosure did not provide subsidies specific to the sampled exporting producers or the OFC industry, although it provided a partial reply to the specific questionnaire. However, neither the GOC nor Sinosure gave any of the supporting documentation requested concerning Sinosure’s corporate governance, such as its Articles of Association, and provided a complete and correct list of the export credits provided to the sampled exporting producers. Furthermore, no specific information about the export credit insurance provided to the OFC industry, the level of its premiums or detailed figures relating to the profitability of its export credit insurance business were received from the GOC or Sinosure.

| (159) | In the absence of such information, the Commission considered that it had not received crucial information relevant to this aspect of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

In the absence of such information, the Commission considered that it had not received crucial information relevant to this aspect of the investigation.

| (160) | It is the Commission’s understanding that the information requested from State-owned entities (be it companies or public/financial institutions) is available to the GOC for all entities where the GOC is the main or major shareholder. This is also the case for Sinosure, which is a fully State-owned entity. Therefore, the Commission informed the GOC that it might have to resort to the use of facts available under Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation when examining the existence and the extent of the alleged subsidisation granted through export credit insurance. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

It is the Commission’s understanding that the information requested from State-owned entities (be it companies or public/financial institutions) is available to the GOC for all entities where the GOC is the main or major shareholder. This is also the case for Sinosure, which is a fully State-owned entity. Therefore, the Commission informed the GOC that it might have to resort to the use of facts available under Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation when examining the existence and the extent of the alleged subsidisation granted through export credit insurance.

| (161) | In the reply to the Commission’s letter, the GOC maintained its position that Sinosure did not provide subsidies specific to the OFC industry and that it follows the market-oriented principle to carry out relevant insurance business and has no specific preferential treatment concerning the OFC industry as requested by any policy documents. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

In the reply to the Commission’s letter, the GOC maintained its position that Sinosure did not provide subsidies specific to the OFC industry and that it follows the market-oriented principle to carry out relevant insurance business and has no specific preferential treatment concerning the OFC industry as requested by any policy documents.

| (162) | The information that the GOC provided with regard to Sinosure was incomplete and did not allow the Commission to draw conclusions on crucial parts of the investigation regarding export credit insurance, specifically whether Sinosure is a public body and whether the premiums charged to the sampled companies were market conform. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

The information that the GOC provided with regard to Sinosure was incomplete and did not allow the Commission to draw conclusions on crucial parts of the investigation regarding export credit insurance, specifically whether Sinosure is a public body and whether the premiums charged to the sampled companies were market conform.

| (163) | Following final disclosure, the GOC argued that all necessary information was submitted to the Commission and, since Sinosure did not provide subsidies that are specific to the OFC industry, the information requested was not relevant in the current investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

Following final disclosure, the GOC argued that all necessary information was submitted to the Commission and, since Sinosure did not provide subsidies that are specific to the OFC industry, the information requested was not relevant in the current investigation.

| (164) | As set out in recital (162), the Commission did not receive information from Sinosure to assess the correctness of the claim by the GOC that Sinosure was not a public body and whether the premiums charged by Sinosure were market conform. This information was considered necessary to allow the Commission to draw a conclusion whether the export credit insurance provided by Sinosure established a countervailable subsidy that conferred a benefit to the sampled exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

As set out in recital (162), the Commission did not receive information from Sinosure to assess the correctness of the claim by the GOC that Sinosure was not a public body and whether the premiums charged by Sinosure were market conform. This information was considered necessary to allow the Commission to draw a conclusion whether the export credit insurance provided by Sinosure established a countervailable subsidy that conferred a benefit to the sampled exporting producers.

| (165) | The Commission thus concluded that it had to rely partially on facts available for its findings concerning export credit insurance. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

The Commission thus concluded that it had to rely partially on facts available for its findings concerning export credit insurance.

| (166) | Following final disclosure, the complainant argued that the Commission did receive incomplete information from the GOC in relation to Sinosure, not allowing to draw conclusions on crucial parts of the investigation regarding export credit insurance. As a result, the subsidy rate calculated for each sampled exporting producer could very likely under-represent the true benefit from export credit insurance conferred on the exporting producers. The complainant considered that the Commission should apply the highest rate found for one exporting producer automatically to the other exporting producer. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

Following final disclosure, the complainant argued that the Commission did receive incomplete information from the GOC in relation to Sinosure, not allowing to draw conclusions on crucial parts of the investigation regarding export credit insurance. As a result, the subsidy rate calculated for each sampled exporting producer could very likely under-represent the true benefit from export credit insurance conferred on the exporting producers. The complainant considered that the Commission should apply the highest rate found for one exporting producer automatically to the other exporting producer.

| (167) | The sampled exporting producers did cooperate in the investigation and provided detailed information on the export credit insurance they received from Sinosure. Since the benefit was calculated on the basis of the difference between this information and an appropriate external benchmark, the subsidy amount was considered to represent the actual benefit conferred on the sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the claim had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

The sampled exporting producers did cooperate in the investigation and provided detailed information on the export credit insurance they received from Sinosure. Since the benefit was calculated on the basis of the difference between this information and an appropriate external benchmark, the subsidy amount was considered to represent the actual benefit conferred on the sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the claim had to be rejected.

3.2.3.   Use of facts available in relation to input materials

Use of facts available in relation to input materials

| (168) | The Commission requested the GOC to forward a specific questionnaire to the top 10 producers and distributors of the input materials used in the production of OFC, as well as to any other suppliers of the materials in question, which have provided inputs to the sampled companies. In its reply to the questionnaire, the GOC claimed that it does not have control over the input materials suppliers to request that they provide the confidential information requested in the questionnaire and that it would be an unreasonable burden for the GOC to coordinate with a very significant number of input materials suppliers of the sampled companies. The Commission found on the basis of publicly available data, however, that the main germanium producers are (partially) State-owned, as set out in Section 3.8.2. Thus, the GOC was in a position to provide the requested information. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Commission requested the GOC to forward a specific questionnaire to the top 10 producers and distributors of the input materials used in the production of OFC, as well as to any other suppliers of the materials in question, which have provided inputs to the sampled companies. In its reply to the questionnaire, the GOC claimed that it does not have control over the input materials suppliers to request that they provide the confidential information requested in the questionnaire and that it would be an unreasonable burden for the GOC to coordinate with a very significant number of input materials suppliers of the sampled companies. The Commission found on the basis of publicly available data, however, that the main germanium producers are (partially) State-owned, as set out in Section 3.8.2. Thus, the GOC was in a position to provide the requested information.

| (169) | Upon request by the Commission, the GOC provided government plans and notices issued by the Yunnan Province Government affecting the germanium industry. Yet, the GOC refused to comply with the Commission’s request to forward the questionnaire to input suppliers in order to get more detailed information on the ownership structure of the enterprises manufacturing and supplying the input materials in question. Therefore, because of the only partial cooperation of the GOC in respect to input materials used in the production of OFC, the Commission did not obtain the necessary information about the input suppliers. |
| --- | --- |

(169)

Upon request by the Commission, the GOC provided government plans and notices issued by the Yunnan Province Government affecting the germanium industry. Yet, the GOC refused to comply with the Commission’s request to forward the questionnaire to input suppliers in order to get more detailed information on the ownership structure of the enterprises manufacturing and supplying the input materials in question. Therefore, because of the only partial cooperation of the GOC in respect to input materials used in the production of OFC, the Commission did not obtain the necessary information about the input suppliers.

| (170) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission illegally used facts available with respect to information from input material producers and distributors, arguing that it is unreasonable to expect the GOC to coordinate with uncountable input producers. |
| --- | --- |

(170)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission illegally used facts available with respect to information from input material producers and distributors, arguing that it is unreasonable to expect the GOC to coordinate with uncountable input producers.

| (171) | The Commission exceptionally only asked further questions in its deficiency letter to the GOC on one of the main input materials, germanium, for the reasons explained in Section 3.8.2 below. However, the necessary information related to this input material was not fully provided by the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(171)

The Commission exceptionally only asked further questions in its deficiency letter to the GOC on one of the main input materials, germanium, for the reasons explained in Section 3.8.2 below. However, the necessary information related to this input material was not fully provided by the GOC.

| (172) | This missing information mainly concerned two aspects: first, information on the ownership and governance structure of the non-cooperating producers of input materials. Without such information the Commission could not determine whether these producers are public bodies or not. Second, company-specific information from the non-cooperating producers of input materials, such as e.g. information on the price setting of the inputs provided to the sampled companies. Such information is necessary in the sense of Article 28 of the Basic Regulation in order to determine whether inputs had been provided at less than adequate remuneration to the sampled companies. Furthermore, such information could only be provided by the producers, and could thus not be supplied through the questionnaire replies of the sampled companies. |
| --- | --- |

(172)

This missing information mainly concerned two aspects: first, information on the ownership and governance structure of the non-cooperating producers of input materials. Without such information the Commission could not determine whether these producers are public bodies or not. Second, company-specific information from the non-cooperating producers of input materials, such as e.g. information on the price setting of the inputs provided to the sampled companies. Such information is necessary in the sense of Article 28 of the Basic Regulation in order to determine whether inputs had been provided at less than adequate remuneration to the sampled companies. Furthermore, such information could only be provided by the producers, and could thus not be supplied through the questionnaire replies of the sampled companies.

| (173) | Therefore, the Commission thus concluded that it had to rely partially on facts available for its findings concerning the provision of input materials at less than adequate remuneration in accordance with Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(173)

Therefore, the Commission thus concluded that it had to rely partially on facts available for its findings concerning the provision of input materials at less than adequate remuneration in accordance with Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation.

3.3.   Subsidies and subsidy programmes within the scope of the current investigation

Subsidies and subsidy programmes within the scope of the current investigation

| (174) | On the basis of the information contained in the complaint, the Notice of Initiation and the replies to the Commission’s questionnaires, the alleged subsidisation through the following subsidies by the GOC were investigated:






  (i) | Grant Programmes






  — | Technology, innovation and development grants and funds; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(174)

On the basis of the information contained in the complaint, the Notice of Initiation and the replies to the Commission’s questionnaires, the alleged subsidisation through the following subsidies by the GOC were investigated:

(i)

Grant Programmes

—

Technology, innovation and development grants and funds;

| — | Industrial transformation and upgrading funds; |
| --- | --- |

—

Industrial transformation and upgrading funds;

| — | Project-based grants; |
| --- | --- |

—

Project-based grants;

| — | Asset-related grants; |
| --- | --- |

—

Asset-related grants;

| — | Equipment and construction services grants; |
| --- | --- |

—

Equipment and construction services grants;

| — | Research and development funding; |
| --- | --- |

—

Research and development funding;

| — | Subsidies related to raw materials; |
| --- | --- |

—

Subsidies related to raw materials;

| — | Other grants. |
| --- | --- |

—

Other grants.

| (ii) | Provision of preferential financing, directed credits and funding through equity, quasi-equity and other capital instruments (e.g. policy loans, credit lines, bank acceptance drafts, export financing). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Provision of preferential financing, directed credits and funding through equity, quasi-equity and other capital instruments (e.g. policy loans, credit lines, bank acceptance drafts, export financing).

| (iii) | Preferential Export credit and export credit insurance and guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

Preferential Export credit and export credit insurance and guarantee.

| (iv) | Revenue foregone through Tax Exemption and Reduction programmes






  — | Enterprise Income Tax (‘EIT’) reduction for High and New Technology Enterprises; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(iv)

Revenue foregone through Tax Exemption and Reduction programmes

—

Enterprise Income Tax (‘EIT’) reduction for High and New Technology Enterprises;

| — | Preferential pre-tax deduction of research and development expenses; |
| --- | --- |

—

Preferential pre-tax deduction of research and development expenses;

| — | Accelerated depreciation of instruments and equipment used by High-Tech enterprises for High-Tech development and production; |
| --- | --- |

—

Accelerated depreciation of instruments and equipment used by High-Tech enterprises for High-Tech development and production;

| — | Dividend exemption between qualified resident enterprises; |
| --- | --- |

—

Dividend exemption between qualified resident enterprises;

| — | Exemption or waiving of real estate and land use taxes; |
| --- | --- |

—

Exemption or waiving of real estate and land use taxes;

| — | Provision of power at reduced rate. |
| --- | --- |

—

Provision of power at reduced rate.

| (v) | Government provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration (‘LTAR’)






  — | Government provision of land use rights for less than adequate remuneration; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(v)

Government provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration (‘LTAR’)

—

Government provision of land use rights for less than adequate remuneration;

| — | Government provision of input materials for less than adequate remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

—

Government provision of input materials for less than adequate remuneration.

3.4.   Grant programmes

Grant programmes

| (175) | The Commission found that the sampled groups of companies benefitted from a variety of grants programmes such as grants related to technology, innovation and development, asset-related grants, interest discounts on loans, grants supporting exports, grants targeting the development of smart and medium size enterprises, and special grants related to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Grants related to technology, innovation and development constituted a significant part of the grants reported by the sampled groups of companies. Therefore, the Commission grouped the grants in two categories: (i) grants related to technology, innovation and development and (ii) other grants. |
| --- | --- |

(175)

The Commission found that the sampled groups of companies benefitted from a variety of grants programmes such as grants related to technology, innovation and development, asset-related grants, interest discounts on loans, grants supporting exports, grants targeting the development of smart and medium size enterprises, and special grants related to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Grants related to technology, innovation and development constituted a significant part of the grants reported by the sampled groups of companies. Therefore, the Commission grouped the grants in two categories: (i) grants related to technology, innovation and development and (ii) other grants.

3.4.1.   Grants related to technology, innovation and development

Grants related to technology, innovation and development

| (176) | Both sampled groups received grants related to research and development (‘R&D’) and industrialisation, technological upgrading and innovation during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

Both sampled groups received grants related to research and development (‘R&D’) and industrialisation, technological upgrading and innovation during the investigation period.

(a)   Legal basis

| — | The 13th Five-year Plan on Technological Innovation; |
| --- | --- |

—

The 13th Five-year Plan on Technological Innovation;

th

| — | Notice on the Establishment of the 2018 Annual Projects of the Key Special Projects of Optoelectronics and Microelectronics Devices and Integration, Ministry of Science and Technology, Guo Ke Gao Fa Ji Zi (2019) No 49; |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice on the Establishment of the 2018 Annual Projects of the Key Special Projects of Optoelectronics and Microelectronics Devices and Integration, Ministry of Science and Technology, Guo Ke Gao Fa Ji Zi (2019) No 49;

| — | Notice on Issuing the Establishment of the Broadband Communications and New Network Key Special Projects of National Key R&D Program in 2019, Ministry of Science and Technology, Guo Ke Gao Fa Ji Zi (2020) No 6; |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice on Issuing the Establishment of the Broadband Communications and New Network Key Special Projects of National Key R&D Program in 2019, Ministry of Science and Technology, Guo Ke Gao Fa Ji Zi (2020) No 6;

| — | Industry support funds and special funds for R&D and industrialization, Dong Ban Fa (2018) No 62; |
| --- | --- |

—

Industry support funds and special funds for R&D and industrialization, Dong Ban Fa (2018) No 62;

| — | National High-Tech Research and Development Program (863) Management Measures; |
| --- | --- |

—

National High-Tech Research and Development Program (863) Management Measures;

| — | Development and Industrialization of Convergent Optical Transmission Equipment-13 Hubei Science and Technology Development [2014] No 10 Notice from the Provincial Department of Science and Technology on the release of the 2014 Hubei Province Science and Technology Plan Projects (the first batch); |
| --- | --- |

—

Development and Industrialization of Convergent Optical Transmission Equipment-13 Hubei Science and Technology Development [2014] No 10 Notice from the Provincial Department of Science and Technology on the release of the 2014 Hubei Province Science and Technology Plan Projects (the first batch);

| — | Project Funds for Double Innovation Service Platform; |
| --- | --- |

—

Project Funds for Double Innovation Service Platform;

| — | Notice on Issuing the First Batch of Provincial Industrial and Information Industry Transformation and Upgrading Special Fund Indicators in 2019; |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice on Issuing the First Batch of Provincial Industrial and Information Industry Transformation and Upgrading Special Fund Indicators in 2019;

| — | The Third Research Institute of the Ministry of Public Security Project Research Appropriation Direct funding; |
| --- | --- |

—

The Third Research Institute of the Ministry of Public Security Project Research Appropriation Direct funding;

| — | Notices on allocating special funds for technical renovation, special funds for industrial revitalization, special funds for technical transformation, and special funds for industrial development; |
| --- | --- |

—

Notices on allocating special funds for technical renovation, special funds for industrial revitalization, special funds for technical transformation, and special funds for industrial development;

| — | The local programmes Wuhan Municipal Market Supervision Administration allocated high-value cultivation projects; and |
| --- | --- |

—

The local programmes Wuhan Municipal Market Supervision Administration allocated high-value cultivation projects; and

| — | Document of Nanjing Economic and Technological Development Zone Management Committee, 2018 No 149. |
| --- | --- |

—

Document of Nanjing Economic and Technological Development Zone Management Committee, 2018 No 149.

(b)   Findings

| (177) | The Commission found that the majority of the grants related to technological upgrading, renovation or transformation received by the sampled companies explicitly related to research and development. Few grants related to the transformation and innovation of the companies or their manufacturing process and hence indirectly relate to research and development. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

The Commission found that the majority of the grants related to technological upgrading, renovation or transformation received by the sampled companies explicitly related to research and development. Few grants related to the transformation and innovation of the companies or their manufacturing process and hence indirectly relate to research and development.

| (178) | One exporting producer in one of the sampled groups reported 113 grants for the investigation period from which, in value, over 80 % were related to R&D projects. The value of R&D grants of the second exporting producer in the same group represented more than 70 % of the total grants it reported for the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

One exporting producer in one of the sampled groups reported 113 grants for the investigation period from which, in value, over 80 % were related to R&D projects. The value of R&D grants of the second exporting producer in the same group represented more than 70 % of the total grants it reported for the investigation period.

| (179) | Regarding this group of companies, the Commission further established that the GOC provided grants for R&D industrialisation at various levels in the group. In particular, the GOC awarded special purpose funds to the parent companies, one of which is directly managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (‘SASAC’), which have been further allocated to subsidiaries, including one of the exporting producers, for R&D projects. |
| --- | --- |

(179)

Regarding this group of companies, the Commission further established that the GOC provided grants for R&D industrialisation at various levels in the group. In particular, the GOC awarded special purpose funds to the parent companies, one of which is directly managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (‘SASAC’), which have been further allocated to subsidiaries, including one of the exporting producers, for R&D projects.

| (180) | One of the exporting producers in the group received a certain amount of funds from its parent companies in the framework of contracts for entrusted R&D services provided to the parent companies. The grants were awarded by the GOC to the parent companies. However, during the RCC, the Commission found that the grants awarded by the GOC were ultimately paid in the form of fees for R&D services to the exporting producer. Moreover, the provisions of the contracts indicated that the R&D results, including all IP rights resulting from these services, belong to both parties and that the right for application remained with the company executing the R&D project, i.e. the exporting producer. The Commission established that the R&D services in question also covered the product concerned. Therefore, on this basis, the Commission considered the funds provided in the form of R&D fees as a grant fully awarded by the GOC to the exporting producer. Related suppliers in the group also received significant grants for R&D projects. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

One of the exporting producers in the group received a certain amount of funds from its parent companies in the framework of contracts for entrusted R&D services provided to the parent companies. The grants were awarded by the GOC to the parent companies. However, during the RCC, the Commission found that the grants awarded by the GOC were ultimately paid in the form of fees for R&D services to the exporting producer. Moreover, the provisions of the contracts indicated that the R&D results, including all IP rights resulting from these services, belong to both parties and that the right for application remained with the company executing the R&D project, i.e. the exporting producer. The Commission established that the R&D services in question also covered the product concerned. Therefore, on this basis, the Commission considered the funds provided in the form of R&D fees as a grant fully awarded by the GOC to the exporting producer. Related suppliers in the group also received significant grants for R&D projects.

| (181) | A large proportion of the companies in this sampled group are located in the Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development Zone and have received R&D funds because they are situated in this zone. This high-tech zone is often referred to as the ‘Optics Valley’ (43) due to the focus on optoelectronics production, including OFC. As described in recitals (123) to (125) above, the Wuhan East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone served as a major production base for OFC and OFC producers active in the zone have been benefitting from various forms of incentives and State support, including grants. (44) |
| --- | --- |

(181)

A large proportion of the companies in this sampled group are located in the Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development Zone and have received R&D funds because they are situated in this zone. This high-tech zone is often referred to as the ‘Optics Valley’ (43) due to the focus on optoelectronics production, including OFC. As described in recitals (123) to (125) above, the Wuhan East Lake New Technology Industry Development Zone served as a major production base for OFC and OFC producers active in the zone have been benefitting from various forms of incentives and State support, including grants. (44)

43

44

| (182) | Regarding the second sampled group, the Commission established that the value of grants that support R&D or serve transformation or innovation purposes represented around 90 % of the grants received during the investigation period for one of the exporting companies and more than 40 % for the other exporting company. |
| --- | --- |

(182)

Regarding the second sampled group, the Commission established that the value of grants that support R&D or serve transformation or innovation purposes represented around 90 % of the grants received during the investigation period for one of the exporting companies and more than 40 % for the other exporting company.

| (183) | The implementation of the plans and programmes described above in recitals (81) to (126) translated into concrete monetary payments. Indeed, among the instruments through which the GOC steers the development of the OFC sector, there are direct State subsidies. The publicly available 2019 Annual report of the exporting producer FTT confirms that the company had RMB 393,8 million of deferred income in governmental subsidies and RMB 45,8 million of governmental subsidies as ‘other income’ at the end of 2019 (45). The publicly available 2019 annual report of the exporting producer ZTT confirms that the company had RMB 150,3 million of deferred income in governmental subsidies and had received RMB 361,1 million of governmental subsidies related to daily company activities at the end of 2019 (46). |
| --- | --- |

(183)

The implementation of the plans and programmes described above in recitals (81) to (126) translated into concrete monetary payments. Indeed, among the instruments through which the GOC steers the development of the OFC sector, there are direct State subsidies. The publicly available 2019 Annual report of the exporting producer FTT confirms that the company had RMB 393,8 million of deferred income in governmental subsidies and RMB 45,8 million of governmental subsidies as ‘other income’ at the end of 2019 (45). The publicly available 2019 annual report of the exporting producer ZTT confirms that the company had RMB 150,3 million of deferred income in governmental subsidies and had received RMB 361,1 million of governmental subsidies related to daily company activities at the end of 2019 (46).

45

46

| (184) | The grant programmes from which the sampled groups of companies benefitted are to a large extent similar in their design. Depending on the purpose, criteria are set upon which enterprises can apply and if the criteria are complied with, the financial support is granted. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

The grant programmes from which the sampled groups of companies benefitted are to a large extent similar in their design. Depending on the purpose, criteria are set upon which enterprises can apply and if the criteria are complied with, the financial support is granted.

| (185) | Some of the grants that are provided to the sampled companies have their legal basis in the ‘National High-Tech Research and Development Program’, the so-called ‘863 Management Measures’. These Management Measures once more illustrate the functioning of State planning in the PRC as described above in recital (79). Article 2 states that
  ‘The National High-Tech Research and Development Plan (863) is a science and technology program with clear national objectives, which is supported by central financial allocations.’
  Article 29 of the same document establishes the procedure for the approval of projects that are eligible. It reflects the mechanism described above: after an application, the acceptance and evaluation of it, an expert group will put forward the proposals of the project and the project funding estimates and eventually a joint office will approve and sign the grant. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

Some of the grants that are provided to the sampled companies have their legal basis in the ‘National High-Tech Research and Development Program’, the so-called ‘863 Management Measures’. These Management Measures once more illustrate the functioning of State planning in the PRC as described above in recital (79). Article 2 states that
  ‘The National High-Tech Research and Development Plan (863) is a science and technology program with clear national objectives, which is supported by central financial allocations.’
  Article 29 of the same document establishes the procedure for the approval of projects that are eligible. It reflects the mechanism described above: after an application, the acceptance and evaluation of it, an expert group will put forward the proposals of the project and the project funding estimates and eventually a joint office will approve and sign the grant.

‘The National High-Tech Research and Development Plan (863) is a science and technology program with clear national objectives, which is supported by central financial allocations.’

| (186) | There are further legal provisions which form the basis for subsidy programmes in which OFC manufacturers participate. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

There are further legal provisions which form the basis for subsidy programmes in which OFC manufacturers participate.

| (187) | One of those legal documents is the ‘Notice on the Establishment of the 2018 Annual Projects of the Key Special Projects of Optoelectronics and Microelectronics Devices and Integration’. This notice states that the responsibility for the coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the projects lies with so-called Lead Units of the projects, which are selected companies benefitting from the respective programme and supervising the other beneficiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(187)

One of those legal documents is the ‘Notice on the Establishment of the 2018 Annual Projects of the Key Special Projects of Optoelectronics and Microelectronics Devices and Integration’. This notice states that the responsibility for the coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the projects lies with so-called Lead Units of the projects, which are selected companies benefitting from the respective programme and supervising the other beneficiaries.

| (188) | The specific content of the grants that are awarded on the basis of this scheme is specified in its enclosures. For instance, one of the programmes applicable during the IP is described as ‘25G/100G Hybrid Photonic Integrated Chip and Module in Passive Optical Network (PON)’ and amounts to 50.54 million RMB. One of the sampled exporting producers was awarded a grant under this programme. The aim of the GOC to encourage R&D with this grant is evident from its ‘Project Objectives’ that are inter alia described as
  ‘Research on high-power 25G laser chip technology for passive optical network (PON)’
  . Passive optical network is a fibre-optic telecommunications technology for delivering broadband network access to end-customers. |
| --- | --- |

(188)

The specific content of the grants that are awarded on the basis of this scheme is specified in its enclosures. For instance, one of the programmes applicable during the IP is described as ‘25G/100G Hybrid Photonic Integrated Chip and Module in Passive Optical Network (PON)’ and amounts to 50.54 million RMB. One of the sampled exporting producers was awarded a grant under this programme. The aim of the GOC to encourage R&D with this grant is evident from its ‘Project Objectives’ that are inter alia described as
  ‘Research on high-power 25G laser chip technology for passive optical network (PON)’
  . Passive optical network is a fibre-optic telecommunications technology for delivering broadband network access to end-customers.

inter alia

‘Research on high-power 25G laser chip technology for passive optical network (PON)’

| (189) | Based on the same legal document, approval is given to a project named ‘25G/50G/100G PON Silicon-based Optoelectronic Chip and Subsystem Project for Optical Access’ with a total project funding of 64.17 million RMB. The objective of the grant leaves no doubt that the grants are supposed to benefit research on optical modulators, optical detectors, photodetectors, and on silicon based multi-channel 100Gb/s PON technology which are all used for optical fibre networks. |
| --- | --- |

(189)

Based on the same legal document, approval is given to a project named ‘25G/50G/100G PON Silicon-based Optoelectronic Chip and Subsystem Project for Optical Access’ with a total project funding of 64.17 million RMB. The objective of the grant leaves no doubt that the grants are supposed to benefit research on optical modulators, optical detectors, photodetectors, and on silicon based multi-channel 100Gb/s PON technology which are all used for optical fibre networks.

| (190) | Another project set by this Notice is named ‘Optical Emission and Control Integrated Chip Technology Project in Coherent Optical Communication System’, with a funding of 41.77 million RMB, that is foreseen to be implemented during the period from August 2019 to July 2022. By defining research objectives concerning lasers, laser chips and modulators this grant supports manufacturers in the optical network industry in general and more specifically OFC manufacturers. One of the sampled exporting producers is among the beneficiaries of this programme. |
| --- | --- |

(190)

Another project set by this Notice is named ‘Optical Emission and Control Integrated Chip Technology Project in Coherent Optical Communication System’, with a funding of 41.77 million RMB, that is foreseen to be implemented during the period from August 2019 to July 2022. By defining research objectives concerning lasers, laser chips and modulators this grant supports manufacturers in the optical network industry in general and more specifically OFC manufacturers. One of the sampled exporting producers is among the beneficiaries of this programme.

| (191) | An additional scheme supporting the internet industry, and in particular OFC manufactures, is stemming from the ‘Notice on Issuing the Establishment of the Broadband Communications and New Network Key Special Projects of National Key R&D Program in 2019’. Based on this Notice, a project called ‘Low Power Consumption, High Integration and High Performance 100G Optical Transmission System Research and Application Demonstration’ was approved and a funding amounting 95.47 million RMB was established. In the description of the project objectives it is expressed that this grant shall help becoming independent from the supply from foreign devices needed for 100G high-speed optical transmission technology and in order to do so it is requested to research and realize high-speed optoelectronic devices and modules and 100G optical transmission platform equipment based on independent chip devices. One of the sampled exporting producers received a R&D grant based on this programme worth 8 360 000 Yuan. |
| --- | --- |

(191)

An additional scheme supporting the internet industry, and in particular OFC manufactures, is stemming from the ‘Notice on Issuing the Establishment of the Broadband Communications and New Network Key Special Projects of National Key R&D Program in 2019’. Based on this Notice, a project called ‘Low Power Consumption, High Integration and High Performance 100G Optical Transmission System Research and Application Demonstration’ was approved and a funding amounting 95.47 million RMB was established. In the description of the project objectives it is expressed that this grant shall help becoming independent from the supply from foreign devices needed for 100G high-speed optical transmission technology and in order to do so it is requested to research and realize high-speed optoelectronic devices and modules and 100G optical transmission platform equipment based on independent chip devices. One of the sampled exporting producers received a R&D grant based on this programme worth 8 360 000 Yuan.

(c)   Conclusion

| (192) | The grants related to technology, innovation and development, including the grants for R&D projects described in recitals (184) to (191), confer subsidies within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(i) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation, i.e. a transfer of funds from the GOC to the producers of the product concerned in the form of grants. As mentioned in recital (183) above, most of these funds are booked as government subsidies in the accounts of the sampled exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(192)

The grants related to technology, innovation and development, including the grants for R&D projects described in recitals (184) to (191), confer subsidies within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(i) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation, i.e. a transfer of funds from the GOC to the producers of the product concerned in the form of grants. As mentioned in recital (183) above, most of these funds are booked as government subsidies in the accounts of the sampled exporting producers.

| (193) | These subsidies are specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation because only companies operating in key areas or technologies, as listed in the guidelines, administrative measures and catalogues that are published on a regular basis, are eligible to receive them and OFC is among the eligible sectors. |
| --- | --- |

(193)

These subsidies are specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation because only companies operating in key areas or technologies, as listed in the guidelines, administrative measures and catalogues that are published on a regular basis, are eligible to receive them and OFC is among the eligible sectors.

| (194) | Following final disclosure, the GOC and Connect Com claimed that none of the R&D grants are geared towards the OFC industry and that the Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development Zone does not provide support to companies producing OFC as any alleged support stemming from this Zone relates to upstream or downstream industries of OFC. The GOC further argued that the Commission did not demonstrate that the grants at issue are specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation and failed to meet the requirement set out by the Panel in
  ‘EC – Aircraft’
  , according to which, specificity requires the establishment of an explicit limitation of the alleged subsidy and that a limitation must
  ‘distinctly express all that is meant, leaving nothing merely implied or suggested.’
  The GOC further claimed that the Commission’s conclusion that these grants are explicitly limited to the OFC industry was manifestly incorrect, referring to the Appellate Body Report in the
  ‘US-Large Civil Aircraft’
  case according to which, the inquiry of whether a subsidy is explicitly limited focuses on
  ‘not only whether the subsidy was provided to particular recipients identified in the complaint, but focuses also on all enterprises or industries eligible to receive that same subsidy’. |
| --- | --- |

(194)

Following final disclosure, the GOC and Connect Com claimed that none of the R&D grants are geared towards the OFC industry and that the Wuhan East Lake New Technology Development Zone does not provide support to companies producing OFC as any alleged support stemming from this Zone relates to upstream or downstream industries of OFC. The GOC further argued that the Commission did not demonstrate that the grants at issue are specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation and failed to meet the requirement set out by the Panel in
  ‘EC – Aircraft’
  , according to which, specificity requires the establishment of an explicit limitation of the alleged subsidy and that a limitation must
  ‘distinctly express all that is meant, leaving nothing merely implied or suggested.’
  The GOC further claimed that the Commission’s conclusion that these grants are explicitly limited to the OFC industry was manifestly incorrect, referring to the Appellate Body Report in the
  ‘US-Large Civil Aircraft’
  case according to which, the inquiry of whether a subsidy is explicitly limited focuses on
  ‘not only whether the subsidy was provided to particular recipients identified in the complaint, but focuses also on all enterprises or industries eligible to receive that same subsidy’.

‘EC – Aircraft’

‘distinctly express all that is meant, leaving nothing merely implied or suggested.’

‘US-Large Civil Aircraft’

‘not only whether the subsidy was provided to particular recipients identified in the complaint, but focuses also on all enterprises or industries eligible to receive that same subsidy’.

| (195) | The Commission has already demonstrated the specificity of grants in recital (193) above. Indeed, only companies operating in key areas or technologies as listed in the guidelines, administrative measures and catalogues are eligible. Furthermore, the cooperating exporting producers provided grants-related documents, such as legal documents and granting notices, which demonstrated that the grants were provided to companies belonging to certain specified industries or sectors and/or involved in specific industrial projects encouraged by the State. Therefore, the Commission reiterated its conclusion that these grants are only available to a clearly specified sub-set of certain enterprises and/or sectors of the economy, certainly a much narrower and specifically defined as the ones at stake in the ‘EC-Aircraft’
  dispute. In addition, the Commission found that the eligibility conditions of these grants were not clear and objective and they did not apply automatically; consequently, they did not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(195)

The Commission has already demonstrated the specificity of grants in recital (193) above. Indeed, only companies operating in key areas or technologies as listed in the guidelines, administrative measures and catalogues are eligible. Furthermore, the cooperating exporting producers provided grants-related documents, such as legal documents and granting notices, which demonstrated that the grants were provided to companies belonging to certain specified industries or sectors and/or involved in specific industrial projects encouraged by the State. Therefore, the Commission reiterated its conclusion that these grants are only available to a clearly specified sub-set of certain enterprises and/or sectors of the economy, certainly a much narrower and specifically defined as the ones at stake in the ‘EC-Aircraft’
  dispute. In addition, the Commission found that the eligibility conditions of these grants were not clear and objective and they did not apply automatically; consequently, they did not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation.

EC-Aircraft’

| (196) | The Commission disagreed with the statement of the GOC that the Wuhan East Lake New Technology development Zone did not provide support to companies producing OFC and that any alleged support stemming from this Zone relates to upstream or downstream industries of OFC. First, the Commission found that one of the exporting producers benefitted from R&D funds granted by the authorities of the Wuhan East Lake New Technology development Zone to its parent company. Second, even if the GOC’s allegation that any alleged support stemming from this Zone relates only to upstream or downstream industries of OFC was true, it does not demonstrate that the related OFC producers did not benefit from such grants. Indeed, the Commission investigated all related companies that supplied input materials to the exporting producers and allocated part of their subsidies, including grants, to the product concerned. Therefore, this claim was considered unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

(196)

The Commission disagreed with the statement of the GOC that the Wuhan East Lake New Technology development Zone did not provide support to companies producing OFC and that any alleged support stemming from this Zone relates to upstream or downstream industries of OFC. First, the Commission found that one of the exporting producers benefitted from R&D funds granted by the authorities of the Wuhan East Lake New Technology development Zone to its parent company. Second, even if the GOC’s allegation that any alleged support stemming from this Zone relates only to upstream or downstream industries of OFC was true, it does not demonstrate that the related OFC producers did not benefit from such grants. Indeed, the Commission investigated all related companies that supplied input materials to the exporting producers and allocated part of their subsidies, including grants, to the product concerned. Therefore, this claim was considered unfounded.

(d)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (197) | In order to establish the benefit during the investigation period, the Commission considered grants received during the investigation period as well as grants received before the investigation period but for which the depreciation period continued during the investigation period. Regarding grants which are not depreciated, the benefit was considered to be the amount received during the investigation period. Concerning project-related grants and asset-related grants, the benefit was considered to be the portion of the total grant amount that was depreciated during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(197)

In order to establish the benefit during the investigation period, the Commission considered grants received during the investigation period as well as grants received before the investigation period but for which the depreciation period continued during the investigation period. Regarding grants which are not depreciated, the benefit was considered to be the amount received during the investigation period. Concerning project-related grants and asset-related grants, the benefit was considered to be the portion of the total grant amount that was depreciated during the investigation period.

| (198) | Regarding the grants received as a remuneration of R&D services described in recital (180), the Commission considered the amounts received as R&D fees during the investigation period and allocated them to the product concerned based on the proportion that the turnover of the product concerned has in the total exporting producer’s turnover. |
| --- | --- |

(198)

Regarding the grants received as a remuneration of R&D services described in recital (180), the Commission considered the amounts received as R&D fees during the investigation period and allocated them to the product concerned based on the proportion that the turnover of the product concerned has in the total exporting producer’s turnover.

| (199) | Following final disclosure, Connect Com requested the Commission to disclose the amount of the share of grants specifically granted for the production of OFC and allocated to the production of the product concerned for the cooperating exporting producers, claiming it could not exercise effectively its rights of defence. |
| --- | --- |

(199)

Following final disclosure, Connect Com requested the Commission to disclose the amount of the share of grants specifically granted for the production of OFC and allocated to the production of the product concerned for the cooperating exporting producers, claiming it could not exercise effectively its rights of defence.

| (200) | The Commission was not able to share such information as it is considered sensitive business information. The company also failed to explain how knowing such an amount would be vital to defend its rights. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(200)

The Commission was not able to share such information as it is considered sensitive business information. The company also failed to explain how knowing such an amount would be vital to defend its rights. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (201) | The Commission considered whether to apply an additional annual commercial interest rate in accordance with section F.a) of the Commission’s Guidelines for the calculation of the amount of subsidy (47). However, such an approach would have involved a variety of complex hypothetical factors for which there was no accurate information available. Therefore, the Commission found it more appropriate to allocate amounts to the investigation period according to the depreciation rates of the R&D projects and assets, in line with the calculation methodology used in previous cases (48). |
| --- | --- |

(201)

The Commission considered whether to apply an additional annual commercial interest rate in accordance with section F.a) of the Commission’s Guidelines for the calculation of the amount of subsidy (47). However, such an approach would have involved a variety of complex hypothetical factors for which there was no accurate information available. Therefore, the Commission found it more appropriate to allocate amounts to the investigation period according to the depreciation rates of the R&D projects and assets, in line with the calculation methodology used in previous cases (48).

47

48

3.4.2.   Other grants

Other grants

| (202) | As mentioned in recital (175), the Commission found that the two sampled groups of companies also received other grants, such as asset-related grants, interest discounts on loans, grants supporting exports, and grants targeting the development of small and medium size enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

(202)

As mentioned in recital (175), the Commission found that the two sampled groups of companies also received other grants, such as asset-related grants, interest discounts on loans, grants supporting exports, and grants targeting the development of small and medium size enterprises.

(a)   Legal Basis

| (203) | These grants were awarded to the companies by national, provincial, city, county or district government authorities and all appeared to be specific to the sampled companies, or specific in terms of geographical location or type of industry. The information regarding the legal basis, under which these grants were awarded, was not disclosed by all sampled companies. However, the Commission received from some companies a copy of documents issued by a government authority, which awarded the funds, referred to as ‘the notice’. |
| --- | --- |

(203)

These grants were awarded to the companies by national, provincial, city, county or district government authorities and all appeared to be specific to the sampled companies, or specific in terms of geographical location or type of industry. The information regarding the legal basis, under which these grants were awarded, was not disclosed by all sampled companies. However, the Commission received from some companies a copy of documents issued by a government authority, which awarded the funds, referred to as ‘the notice’.

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (204) | Examples of such other grants are asset-related grants, patent funds, science and technology funds and awards, business development funds, export promotion funds, grants for industry quality increase and efficiency enhancement, municipal commerce support funds, foreign economic and trade development funds and production safety awards. |
| --- | --- |

(204)

Examples of such other grants are asset-related grants, patent funds, science and technology funds and awards, business development funds, export promotion funds, grants for industry quality increase and efficiency enhancement, municipal commerce support funds, foreign economic and trade development funds and production safety awards.

| (205) | Given the large amount of grants that the Commission found in the books of the sampled groups of companies, only a summary of the key findings is presented in this Regulation. Evidence of the existence of numerous grants and the fact that they had been granted by various levels of the GOC was initially provided by the two sampled groups. Detailed findings on these grants were provided to the individual companies in their specific disclosure documents. |
| --- | --- |

(205)

Given the large amount of grants that the Commission found in the books of the sampled groups of companies, only a summary of the key findings is presented in this Regulation. Evidence of the existence of numerous grants and the fact that they had been granted by various levels of the GOC was initially provided by the two sampled groups. Detailed findings on these grants were provided to the individual companies in their specific disclosure documents.

(c)   Conclusion

| (206) | These other grants constitute subsidies within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(i) and (2) of the basic Regulation as a transfer of funds from the GOC in the form of grants to the sampled groups of companies took place and a benefit was thereby conferred. |
| --- | --- |

(206)

These other grants constitute subsidies within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(i) and (2) of the basic Regulation as a transfer of funds from the GOC in the form of grants to the sampled groups of companies took place and a benefit was thereby conferred.

| (207) | The sampled groups of companies provided information as to the amount of the grants and the authority that awarded and paid each grant. The companies concerned also mostly booked this income under the heading ‘subsidy income’ in their accounts and had these accounts independently audited. The information on these grants has been taken by the Commission as positive evidence of a subsidy that conferred a benefit. |
| --- | --- |

(207)

The sampled groups of companies provided information as to the amount of the grants and the authority that awarded and paid each grant. The companies concerned also mostly booked this income under the heading ‘subsidy income’ in their accounts and had these accounts independently audited. The information on these grants has been taken by the Commission as positive evidence of a subsidy that conferred a benefit.

| (208) | These grants are also specific within the meaning of Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(3) of the basic Regulation given that, from the documents provided by the cooperating exporting producers, they appear to be limited to certain companies, certain industries, such as the OFC industry, or specific projects in specific regions. In addition, some of the grants are contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 4(4)(a). |
| --- | --- |

(208)

These grants are also specific within the meaning of Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(3) of the basic Regulation given that, from the documents provided by the cooperating exporting producers, they appear to be limited to certain companies, certain industries, such as the OFC industry, or specific projects in specific regions. In addition, some of the grants are contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 4(4)(a).

| (209) | Furthermore, these grants do not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation, given that the eligibility conditions and the actual selection criteria for enterprises to be eligible are not transparent, not objective and do not apply automatically. |
| --- | --- |

(209)

Furthermore, these grants do not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation, given that the eligibility conditions and the actual selection criteria for enterprises to be eligible are not transparent, not objective and do not apply automatically.

| (210) | Following final disclosure, the GOC argued that to the extent that any of the alleged grants are provided by local and/or regional government, they cannot be considered as regionally specific subsidies. The GOC pointed out that a regional subsidy under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement cannot be considered to be specific if it is granted by the region itself (i.e. by the regional or local government) (49) and that the Commission needed to show that there is a limitation on access to the grants on the basis of geographical location alone (50). |
| --- | --- |

(210)

Following final disclosure, the GOC argued that to the extent that any of the alleged grants are provided by local and/or regional government, they cannot be considered as regionally specific subsidies. The GOC pointed out that a regional subsidy under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement cannot be considered to be specific if it is granted by the region itself (i.e. by the regional or local government) (49) and that the Commission needed to show that there is a limitation on access to the grants on the basis of geographical location alone (50).

49

50

| (211) | In this respect, the Commission pointed out that in recital (208) it concluded that the grants other than grants related to technology, innovation and development, are specific within the meaning of Articles 4(2)(a), 4(3) and 4(4)(a) of the basic Regulation. Most of these grants appeared to be limited to certain companies operating in certain industries, such as the OFC industry. Only certain grants appeared to relate to specific projects in specific regions. The fact that these grants were awarded to the companies by national, provincial, city, county or district government authorities does not mean that these grants do not have their legal basis at national level and did not concern specific projects in specific regions. The GOC did not provide any concrete evidence that these grants are not specific (for instance, that the grants were provided to all companies within the jurisdiction of the local entity, acting as the granting authority). Consequently, the Commission reiterated that on the basis of the evidence at its disposal it concluded that these grants do not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation and are specific under Articles 4(2)(a), 4(3) and 4(4)(a) of the basic Regulation and therefore it rejected the claim of the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(211)

In this respect, the Commission pointed out that in recital (208) it concluded that the grants other than grants related to technology, innovation and development, are specific within the meaning of Articles 4(2)(a), 4(3) and 4(4)(a) of the basic Regulation. Most of these grants appeared to be limited to certain companies operating in certain industries, such as the OFC industry. Only certain grants appeared to relate to specific projects in specific regions. The fact that these grants were awarded to the companies by national, provincial, city, county or district government authorities does not mean that these grants do not have their legal basis at national level and did not concern specific projects in specific regions. The GOC did not provide any concrete evidence that these grants are not specific (for instance, that the grants were provided to all companies within the jurisdiction of the local entity, acting as the granting authority). Consequently, the Commission reiterated that on the basis of the evidence at its disposal it concluded that these grants do not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation and are specific under Articles 4(2)(a), 4(3) and 4(4)(a) of the basic Regulation and therefore it rejected the claim of the GOC.

| (212) | Following final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that a subsidy is only specific if it related directly to the OFC industry and not if it concerns a number of industries,
  ‘such’
  as OFC production as stated by the Commission in recital (208). |
| --- | --- |

(212)

Following final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that a subsidy is only specific if it related directly to the OFC industry and not if it concerns a number of industries,
  ‘such’
  as OFC production as stated by the Commission in recital (208).

‘such’

| (213) | In this respect, the Commission clarified that Article 4(2) of the basic Regulation provides that
  ‘in order to determine whether a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (‘certain enterprises’) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following shall apply (...)’. It results from the wording of this provision that specificity can refer also to a
  ‘group of enterprises or industries’
  . Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(213)

In this respect, the Commission clarified that Article 4(2) of the basic Regulation provides that
  ‘in order to determine whether a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (‘certain enterprises’) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following shall apply (...)’. It results from the wording of this provision that specificity can refer also to a
  ‘group of enterprises or industries’
  . Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

‘in order to determine whether a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (‘certain enterprises’) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following shall apply (...)’.

‘group of enterprises or industries’

| (214) | Connect Com also claimed that the Commission ignored Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation, according to which specificity shall not exist where the granting authority establishes objective criteria governing the eligibility for and the amount of a subsidy. |
| --- | --- |

(214)

Connect Com also claimed that the Commission ignored Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation, according to which specificity shall not exist where the granting authority establishes objective criteria governing the eligibility for and the amount of a subsidy.

| (215) | With this regard, the Commission explained that, as pointed out in recitals (195) and (209), these grants do not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation, given that the eligibility conditions and the actual selection criteria for enterprises to be eligible are not transparent, not objective and do not apply automatically. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(215)

With this regard, the Commission explained that, as pointed out in recitals (195) and (209), these grants do not meet the non-specificity requirements of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation, given that the eligibility conditions and the actual selection criteria for enterprises to be eligible are not transparent, not objective and do not apply automatically. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(d)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (216) | The Commission calculated the benefit in accordance with the methodology described in recital (197) above. |
| --- | --- |

(216)

The Commission calculated the benefit in accordance with the methodology described in recital (197) above.

3.4.3.   Conclusion on grants programmes

Conclusion on grants programmes

| (217) | The subsidy rates established with regard to all grants during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers were as follows:

  Grants







  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(217)

The subsidy rates established with regard to all grants during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers were as follows:

Grants

Grants

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

1,79 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

0,33 %

3.5.   Preferential financing

Preferential financing

3.5.1.   Financial institutions providing preferential financing

Financial institutions providing preferential financing

| (218) | According to the information provided by the two sampled groups of exporting producers, 32 financial institutions located within the PRC had provided financing to them. Of these 32 financial institutions, 25 were State-owned. The remaining financial institutions were either privately owned or the Commission was not able to determine whether they were State-owned or privately owned. However, only one State-owned bank filled in the specific questionnaire, despite a request to the GOC that covered all financial institutions which had provided loans to the sampled companies. |
| --- | --- |

(218)

According to the information provided by the two sampled groups of exporting producers, 32 financial institutions located within the PRC had provided financing to them. Of these 32 financial institutions, 25 were State-owned. The remaining financial institutions were either privately owned or the Commission was not able to determine whether they were State-owned or privately owned. However, only one State-owned bank filled in the specific questionnaire, despite a request to the GOC that covered all financial institutions which had provided loans to the sampled companies.

3.5.1.1.   State-owned financial institutions acting as public bodies

| (219) | The Commission ascertained whether the State-owned banks were acting as public bodies within the meaning of Articles 3 and 2(b) of the basic Regulation. Interpreting the basic Regulation in line with the EU’s WTO obligations, the applicable test to establish that a State-owned undertaking is a public body is as follows (51): ‘What matters is whether an entity is vested with authority to exercise governmental functions, rather than how that is achieved. There are many different ways in which government in the narrow sense could provide entities with authority. Accordingly, different types of evidence may be relevant to showing that such authority has been bestowed on a particular entity. Evidence that an entity is, in fact, exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence that it possesses or has been vested with governmental authority, particularly where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice. It follows, in our view, that evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the performance of governmental functions. We stress, however, that, apart from an express delegation of authority in a legal instrument, the existence of mere formal links between an entity and government in the narrow sense is unlikely to suffice to establish the necessary possession of governmental authority. Thus, for example, the mere fact that a government is the majority shareholder of an entity does not demonstrate that the government exercises meaningful control over the conduct of that entity, much less that the government has bestowed it with governmental authority. In some instances, however, where the evidence shows that the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is exercising governmental authority.’ |
| --- | --- |

(219)

The Commission ascertained whether the State-owned banks were acting as public bodies within the meaning of Articles 3 and 2(b) of the basic Regulation. Interpreting the basic Regulation in line with the EU’s WTO obligations, the applicable test to establish that a State-owned undertaking is a public body is as follows (51): ‘What matters is whether an entity is vested with authority to exercise governmental functions, rather than how that is achieved. There are many different ways in which government in the narrow sense could provide entities with authority. Accordingly, different types of evidence may be relevant to showing that such authority has been bestowed on a particular entity. Evidence that an entity is, in fact, exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence that it possesses or has been vested with governmental authority, particularly where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice. It follows, in our view, that evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the performance of governmental functions. We stress, however, that, apart from an express delegation of authority in a legal instrument, the existence of mere formal links between an entity and government in the narrow sense is unlikely to suffice to establish the necessary possession of governmental authority. Thus, for example, the mere fact that a government is the majority shareholder of an entity does not demonstrate that the government exercises meaningful control over the conduct of that entity, much less that the government has bestowed it with governmental authority. In some instances, however, where the evidence shows that the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is exercising governmental authority.’

51

What matters is whether an entity is vested with authority to exercise governmental functions, rather than how that is achieved. There are many different ways in which government in the narrow sense could provide entities with authority. Accordingly, different types of evidence may be relevant to showing that such authority has been bestowed on a particular entity. Evidence that an entity is, in fact, exercising governmental functions may serve as evidence that it possesses or has been vested with governmental authority, particularly where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice. It follows, in our view, that evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the performance of governmental functions. We stress, however, that, apart from an express delegation of authority in a legal instrument, the existence of mere formal links between an entity and government in the narrow sense is unlikely to suffice to establish the necessary possession of governmental authority. Thus, for example, the mere fact that a government is the majority shareholder of an entity does not demonstrate that the government exercises meaningful control over the conduct of that entity, much less that the government has bestowed it with governmental authority. In some instances, however, where the evidence shows that the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is exercising governmental authority

| (220) | The Commission sought information about State ownership as well as formal indicia of government control in the State-owned banks. It also analysed whether control had been exercised in a meaningful way. For this purpose, the Commission had to partially rely on facts available due to the refusal of the GOC and the State-owned banks to provide evidence on the decision making process that had led to the preferential lending, as set out in recitals (136) to (153) above. |
| --- | --- |

(220)

The Commission sought information about State ownership as well as formal indicia of government control in the State-owned banks. It also analysed whether control had been exercised in a meaningful way. For this purpose, the Commission had to partially rely on facts available due to the refusal of the GOC and the State-owned banks to provide evidence on the decision making process that had led to the preferential lending, as set out in recitals (136) to (153) above.

| (221) | In order to carry out this analysis, the Commission first examined information from the State-owned bank that had filled in the specific questionnaire. |
| --- | --- |

(221)

In order to carry out this analysis, the Commission first examined information from the State-owned bank that had filled in the specific questionnaire.

(1)   
  Partially cooperating State-owned financial institutions

Partially cooperating State-owned financial institutions

| (222) | Only one State-owned bank, namely EXIM, provided a questionnaire reply. |
| --- | --- |

(222)

Only one State-owned bank, namely EXIM, provided a questionnaire reply.

(a)   Ownership and formal indicia of control by the GOC

| (223) | Based on the information received in the questionnaire reply, the Commission established that the GOC held, either directly or indirectly, more than 50 % of the shares in this financial institution. |
| --- | --- |

(223)

Based on the information received in the questionnaire reply, the Commission established that the GOC held, either directly or indirectly, more than 50 % of the shares in this financial institution.

| (224) | Concerning the formal indicia of government control of the cooperating State-owned bank, the Commission qualified it as a ‘key State-owned financial institution’. In particular, the notice ‘Interim Regulations on the Board of Supervisors in Key State-owned Financial Institutions’ (52) states that:
  ‘The key State-owned financial institutions mentioned in these Regulations refer to State-owned policy banks, commercial banks, financial assets management companies, securities companies, insurance companies, etc. (hereinafter referred to as State-owned financial institutions), to which the State Council dispatches boards of supervisors’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(224)

Concerning the formal indicia of government control of the cooperating State-owned bank, the Commission qualified it as a ‘key State-owned financial institution’. In particular, the notice ‘Interim Regulations on the Board of Supervisors in Key State-owned Financial Institutions’ (52) states that:
  ‘The key State-owned financial institutions mentioned in these Regulations refer to State-owned policy banks, commercial banks, financial assets management companies, securities companies, insurance companies, etc. (hereinafter referred to as State-owned financial institutions), to which the State Council dispatches boards of supervisors’
  .

52

‘The key State-owned financial institutions mentioned in these Regulations refer to State-owned policy banks, commercial banks, financial assets management companies, securities companies, insurance companies, etc. (hereinafter referred to as State-owned financial institutions), to which the State Council dispatches boards of supervisors’

| (225) | The Board of Supervisors of the key State-owned financial institutions is appointed according to the ‘Interim Regulations of Board of Supervisors of Key State-owned Financial Institutions’. Based on Articles 3 and 5 of these Interim Regulations, the Commission established that Members of the Board of Supervisors are dispatched by and accountable to the State Council, thus illustrating the institutional control of the State on the cooperating State-owned bank’s business activities. |
| --- | --- |

(225)

The Board of Supervisors of the key State-owned financial institutions is appointed according to the ‘Interim Regulations of Board of Supervisors of Key State-owned Financial Institutions’. Based on Articles 3 and 5 of these Interim Regulations, the Commission established that Members of the Board of Supervisors are dispatched by and accountable to the State Council, thus illustrating the institutional control of the State on the cooperating State-owned bank’s business activities.

| (226) | In addition to these generally applicable indicia, the Commission found the following with respect to EXIM. EXIM was formed and operates in accordance with ‘The Notice of Establishing Export-Import Bank of China’ issued by the State Council, as well as the Articles of Association of EXIM. According to its Articles of Association, the State directly nominates the management of EXIM. The Board of Supervisors is appointed by the State Council in accordance with the ‘Interim Regulations on the Boards of Supervisors in Key State-owned Financial Institutions’ and other laws and regulations, and it is responsible to the State Council. |
| --- | --- |

(226)

In addition to these generally applicable indicia, the Commission found the following with respect to EXIM. EXIM was formed and operates in accordance with ‘The Notice of Establishing Export-Import Bank of China’ issued by the State Council, as well as the Articles of Association of EXIM. According to its Articles of Association, the State directly nominates the management of EXIM. The Board of Supervisors is appointed by the State Council in accordance with the ‘Interim Regulations on the Boards of Supervisors in Key State-owned Financial Institutions’ and other laws and regulations, and it is responsible to the State Council.

| (227) | The Articles of Association also mention that the Party Committee of EXIM plays a leading and political core role to ensure that policies and major deployment of the Party and the State are implemented by EXIM. The Party’s leadership is integrated into all aspects of corporate governance. |
| --- | --- |

(227)

The Articles of Association also mention that the Party Committee of EXIM plays a leading and political core role to ensure that policies and major deployment of the Party and the State are implemented by EXIM. The Party’s leadership is integrated into all aspects of corporate governance.

| (228) | The Articles of Association also state that EXIM is dedicated to supporting the development of foreign trade and economic cooperation, cross-border investment, the One Belt One Road Initiative, cooperation in international capacity and equipment manufacturing. Its scope of business includes short-term, medium-term and long-term loans as approved and in line with the State’s foreign trade and ‘going out’ policies, such as export credit, import credit, foreign contracted engineering loans, overseas investment loans, Chinese government foreign aid loans and export buyer loans. |
| --- | --- |

(228)

The Articles of Association also state that EXIM is dedicated to supporting the development of foreign trade and economic cooperation, cross-border investment, the One Belt One Road Initiative, cooperation in international capacity and equipment manufacturing. Its scope of business includes short-term, medium-term and long-term loans as approved and in line with the State’s foreign trade and ‘going out’ policies, such as export credit, import credit, foreign contracted engineering loans, overseas investment loans, Chinese government foreign aid loans and export buyer loans.

| (229) | Furthermore, in its annual report of 2019, EXIM Bank stated that over that it fully implemented all major policies and decisions made by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. |
| --- | --- |

(229)

Furthermore, in its annual report of 2019, EXIM Bank stated that over that it fully implemented all major policies and decisions made by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council.

| (230) | The Commission also found that State-owned financial institutions have changed their Articles of Associations in 2017 to increase the role of the China Communist Party (‘CCP’) at the highest decision-making level of the banks (53). |
| --- | --- |

(230)

The Commission also found that State-owned financial institutions have changed their Articles of Associations in 2017 to increase the role of the China Communist Party (‘CCP’) at the highest decision-making level of the banks (53).

53

| (231) | These new Articles of Association stipulate that:






  — | the Chairman of the Board of Directors shall be the same person as the Secretary of the Party Committee; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(231)

These new Articles of Association stipulate that:

—

the Chairman of the Board of Directors shall be the same person as the Secretary of the Party Committee;

| — | the CCP’s role is to ensure and supervise the Bank’s implementation of policies and guidelines of the CCP and the State; as well as to play a leadership and gate keeping role in the appointment of personnel (including senior management); and |
| --- | --- |

—

the CCP’s role is to ensure and supervise the Bank’s implementation of policies and guidelines of the CCP and the State; as well as to play a leadership and gate keeping role in the appointment of personnel (including senior management); and

| — | the opinions of the Party Committee shall be heard by the Board of Directors for any major decisions to be taken. |
| --- | --- |

—

the opinions of the Party Committee shall be heard by the Board of Directors for any major decisions to be taken.

(b)   Meaningful control by the GOC

| (232) | The Commission further sought information about whether the GOC exercised meaningful control over the conduct of EXIM bank with respect to its lending policies and assessment of risk, where they provided loans to the OFC industry. The following regulatory documents have been taken into account in this respect:






  — | Article 34 of the Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks (‘Bank law’); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(232)

The Commission further sought information about whether the GOC exercised meaningful control over the conduct of EXIM bank with respect to its lending policies and assessment of risk, where they provided loans to the OFC industry. The following regulatory documents have been taken into account in this respect:

—

Article 34 of the Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks (‘Bank law’);

| — | Article 15 of the General Rules on Loans (implemented by the People’s Bank of China) |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 15 of the General Rules on Loans (implemented by the People’s Bank of China)

| — | Decision No 40; |
| --- | --- |

—

Decision No 40;

| — | Implementing Measures of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (‘CBIRC’) for Administrative Licensing Matters for Chinese-funded Commercial Banks (Order of the CBIRC [2017] No 1) |
| --- | --- |

—

Implementing Measures of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (‘CBIRC’) for Administrative Licensing Matters for Chinese-funded Commercial Banks (Order of the CBIRC [2017] No 1)

| — | Implementing Measures of the CBIRC for Administrative Licensing Matters relating to Foreign-funded Banks (Order of the CBIRC [2015] No 4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Implementing Measures of the CBIRC for Administrative Licensing Matters relating to Foreign-funded Banks (Order of the CBIRC [2015] No 4)

| — | Administrative Measures for the Qualifications of Directors and Senior Officers of Financial Institutions in the Banking Sector (CBIRC [2013] No 3). |
| --- | --- |

—

Administrative Measures for the Qualifications of Directors and Senior Officers of Financial Institutions in the Banking Sector (CBIRC [2013] No 3).

| (233) | Reviewing these regulatory documents, the Commission found that financial institutions in the PRC are operating in a general legal environment that directs them to align themselves with the GOC’s industrial policy objectives when taking financial decisions, for the following reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(233)

Reviewing these regulatory documents, the Commission found that financial institutions in the PRC are operating in a general legal environment that directs them to align themselves with the GOC’s industrial policy objectives when taking financial decisions, for the following reasons.

| (234) | With respect to EXIM Bank, its public policy mandate is established in the notice of establishing EXIM Bank as well as in its Articles of Association. |
| --- | --- |

(234)

With respect to EXIM Bank, its public policy mandate is established in the notice of establishing EXIM Bank as well as in its Articles of Association.

| (235) | At the general level, Article 34 of the Bank law, which applies to all financial institutions operating in China, provides that
  ‘commercial banks shall conduct their business of lending in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State’
  . Although Article 4 of the Bank Law states that,
  ‘commercial banks shall, pursuant to law, conduct business operations without interference from any unit or individual. Commercial banks shall independently assume civil liability with their entire legal person property’
  , the investigation showed that Article 4 of the Bank law is applied subject to Article 34 of the Bank law, i.e. where the State establishes a public policy the banks implement it and follow State instructions. |
| --- | --- |

(235)

At the general level, Article 34 of the Bank law, which applies to all financial institutions operating in China, provides that
  ‘commercial banks shall conduct their business of lending in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State’
  . Although Article 4 of the Bank Law states that,
  ‘commercial banks shall, pursuant to law, conduct business operations without interference from any unit or individual. Commercial banks shall independently assume civil liability with their entire legal person property’
  , the investigation showed that Article 4 of the Bank law is applied subject to Article 34 of the Bank law, i.e. where the State establishes a public policy the banks implement it and follow State instructions.

‘commercial banks shall conduct their business of lending in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State’

‘commercial banks shall, pursuant to law, conduct business operations without interference from any unit or individual. Commercial banks shall independently assume civil liability with their entire legal person property’

| (236) | In addition, Article 15 of the General Rules on Loans provides that
  ‘In accordance with the State’s policy, relevant departments may subsidize interests on loans, with a view to promoting the growth of certain industries and economic development in some areas’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(236)

In addition, Article 15 of the General Rules on Loans provides that
  ‘In accordance with the State’s policy, relevant departments may subsidize interests on loans, with a view to promoting the growth of certain industries and economic development in some areas’
  .

‘In accordance with the State’s policy, relevant departments may subsidize interests on loans, with a view to promoting the growth of certain industries and economic development in some areas’

| (237) | Similarly, Decision No 40 instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support specifically to ‘encouraged’ projects. As already explained in Section 3.1 and more specifically in recitals (81) and (86), projects of the OFC industry belong to the ‘encouraged’ category. Decision No 40 hence confirms the previous finding with respect to the Bank law that banks exercise governmental authority in the form of preferential credit operations. The Commission also found that the CBIRC has far-reaching approval authority over all aspects of the management of all financial institutions established in the PRC (including privately owned and foreign owned financial institutions), such as (54):






  — | approval of the appointment of all managers of the financial institutions, both at the level of headquarters and at the level of local branches. Approval of the CBIRC is required for the recruitment of all levels of management, from the most senior positions down to branch managers, and even includes managers appointed in overseas branches as well as managers responsible for support functions (e.g. the IT managers); and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(237)

Similarly, Decision No 40 instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support specifically to ‘encouraged’ projects. As already explained in Section 3.1 and more specifically in recitals (81) and (86), projects of the OFC industry belong to the ‘encouraged’ category. Decision No 40 hence confirms the previous finding with respect to the Bank law that banks exercise governmental authority in the form of preferential credit operations. The Commission also found that the CBIRC has far-reaching approval authority over all aspects of the management of all financial institutions established in the PRC (including privately owned and foreign owned financial institutions), such as (54):

54

—

approval of the appointment of all managers of the financial institutions, both at the level of headquarters and at the level of local branches. Approval of the CBIRC is required for the recruitment of all levels of management, from the most senior positions down to branch managers, and even includes managers appointed in overseas branches as well as managers responsible for support functions (e.g. the IT managers); and

| — | a very long list of administrative approvals, including approvals for setting up branches, for starting new business lines or selling new products, for changing the Articles of Association of the bank, for selling more than 5 % of their shares, for capital increases, for changes of domicile, for changes of organisational form, etc. |
| --- | --- |

—

a very long list of administrative approvals, including approvals for setting up branches, for starting new business lines or selling new products, for changing the Articles of Association of the bank, for selling more than 5 % of their shares, for capital increases, for changes of domicile, for changes of organisational form, etc.

| (238) | The Bank law is legally binding. The mandatory nature of the Five-Year Plans and of Decision No 40 has been established above in Section 3.1. The mandatory nature of the CBIRC regulatory documents derives from its powers as the banking regulatory authority. The mandatory nature of other documents is demonstrated by the supervision and evaluation clauses, which they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(238)

The Bank law is legally binding. The mandatory nature of the Five-Year Plans and of Decision No 40 has been established above in Section 3.1. The mandatory nature of the CBIRC regulatory documents derives from its powers as the banking regulatory authority. The mandatory nature of other documents is demonstrated by the supervision and evaluation clauses, which they contain.

| (239) | Decision No 40 of the State Council instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support only to encouraged projects and promises the implementation of
  ‘other preferential policies on the encouraged projects’
  . On this basis, banks are required to provide credit support to the OFC industry as an encouraged industry. |
| --- | --- |

(239)

Decision No 40 of the State Council instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support only to encouraged projects and promises the implementation of
  ‘other preferential policies on the encouraged projects’
  . On this basis, banks are required to provide credit support to the OFC industry as an encouraged industry.

‘other preferential policies on the encouraged projects’

| (240) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that the GOC has created a normative framework that had to be adhered to by the managers and supervisors of the cooperating State-owned bank, who are appointed by the GOC and accountable to the GOC. Therefore, the GOC relied on this normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the conduct of the cooperating State-owned bank whenever it was providing loans to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(240)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that the GOC has created a normative framework that had to be adhered to by the managers and supervisors of the cooperating State-owned bank, who are appointed by the GOC and accountable to the GOC. Therefore, the GOC relied on this normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the conduct of the cooperating State-owned bank whenever it was providing loans to the OFC industry.

| (241) | The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete loans provided to the sampled exporting producers. In its questionnaire reply, the partially cooperating State-owned bank explained that it uses sophisticated credit risk assessment policies and models when granting the loans at issue. EXIM bank further explained that there is no policy difference regarding the industry in which the borrower operates, the credit situation and capital status, etc.; nevertheless, such factors impact the credit rating assessment and the cost of the risk of the borrower. It may refer to relevant plans and policies in providing loans; however, in determining individual loan projects it applies a market-based assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(241)

The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete loans provided to the sampled exporting producers. In its questionnaire reply, the partially cooperating State-owned bank explained that it uses sophisticated credit risk assessment policies and models when granting the loans at issue. EXIM bank further explained that there is no policy difference regarding the industry in which the borrower operates, the credit situation and capital status, etc.; nevertheless, such factors impact the credit rating assessment and the cost of the risk of the borrower. It may refer to relevant plans and policies in providing loans; however, in determining individual loan projects it applies a market-based assessment.

| (242) | As already indicated in recital (141) above, the partially cooperating State-owned bank refused to provide concrete examples of its credit risk assessment relating to the sampled companies on the ground that the information requested is internal of the bank and contains business confidential information that is not permitted to be disclosed even though the Commission had a written consent from the sampled companies waiving their confidentiality rights. |
| --- | --- |

(242)

As already indicated in recital (141) above, the partially cooperating State-owned bank refused to provide concrete examples of its credit risk assessment relating to the sampled companies on the ground that the information requested is internal of the bank and contains business confidential information that is not permitted to be disclosed even though the Commission had a written consent from the sampled companies waiving their confidentiality rights.

| (243) | In the absence of concrete evidence of creditworthiness assessments, the Commission therefore examined the overall legal environment as set out above in recitals (232) to (239), in combination with the behaviour of the cooperating State-owned bank regarding loans provided to the sampled companies. This behaviour contrasted with its official stance as in practice it was not acting based on thorough market-based risk assessments. |
| --- | --- |

(243)

In the absence of concrete evidence of creditworthiness assessments, the Commission therefore examined the overall legal environment as set out above in recitals (232) to (239), in combination with the behaviour of the cooperating State-owned bank regarding loans provided to the sampled companies. This behaviour contrasted with its official stance as in practice it was not acting based on thorough market-based risk assessments.

| (244) | In the course of the investigation, the Commission found that loans were provided to the two sampled groups of exporting producers at interest rates below or close to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) Loan Benchmark Rate and below the Loan Prime Rate as announced by the National Interbank Funding Center (NIFC) that was introduced on 20 August 2019 (55), regardless of the companies’ financial and credit risk situation. Hence, the loans were provided below market rates when compared to the rate corresponding to the risk profile of the sampled exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(244)

In the course of the investigation, the Commission found that loans were provided to the two sampled groups of exporting producers at interest rates below or close to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) Loan Benchmark Rate and below the Loan Prime Rate as announced by the National Interbank Funding Center (NIFC) that was introduced on 20 August 2019 (55), regardless of the companies’ financial and credit risk situation. Hence, the loans were provided below market rates when compared to the rate corresponding to the risk profile of the sampled exporting producers.

55

| (245) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission did not demonstrate that the cooperating State-owned bank, namely EXIM bank, is a public body and that the GOC exercised meaningful control over EXIM bank. The GOC stressed that the
  ‘ownership and formal indicia of control’
  are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a public body and that the Commission did not demonstrate the lack of independence of the management of EXIM bank by arguing that the GOC exercises control over EXIM bank only in supervising the appointment of the management of the bank and its board. |
| --- | --- |

(245)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission did not demonstrate that the cooperating State-owned bank, namely EXIM bank, is a public body and that the GOC exercised meaningful control over EXIM bank. The GOC stressed that the
  ‘ownership and formal indicia of control’
  are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a public body and that the Commission did not demonstrate the lack of independence of the management of EXIM bank by arguing that the GOC exercises control over EXIM bank only in supervising the appointment of the management of the bank and its board.

‘ownership and formal indicia of control’

| (246) | The GOC further claimed that the financial institutions in question are not performing any function that could be considered governmental in nature and the GOC has not exercised meaningful control over EXIM bank. Although Article 34 of the Chinese Bank Law requires that commercial banks act ‘under the guidance of the industrial policies’
  of the GOC, nowhere in the provision there is a stipulation that requires the banks to act in a certain manner and according to the GOC this provision should be considered a guiding principle for Chinese banks. The GOC also stated that the Chinese Bank Law explicitly prohibits the GOC from exercising any form of control over the decisions of commercial banks. In this respect, the GOC invoked Articles 4 and 5 of the Chinese Bank Law, which respectively provide that commercial banks shall
  ‘make their own decisions’
  and operate
  ‘without interference from any unit or individual’
  . The GOC further stressed that Article 41 of the Chinese Bank Law provides that
  ‘no entity or individual may coerce a commercial bank into granting loans or providing a guarantee’. Furthermore, the GOC claimed that Article 15 of the General Rules on loans as well as Decision No 40 are not mandatory but only of a guidance nature. Finally, the GOC disagreed with the assertion that EXIM bank provided loans at below market rates as it follows internationally accepted standards for risk assessment and loan disbursement and it operates independently from the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(246)

The GOC further claimed that the financial institutions in question are not performing any function that could be considered governmental in nature and the GOC has not exercised meaningful control over EXIM bank. Although Article 34 of the Chinese Bank Law requires that commercial banks act ‘under the guidance of the industrial policies’
  of the GOC, nowhere in the provision there is a stipulation that requires the banks to act in a certain manner and according to the GOC this provision should be considered a guiding principle for Chinese banks. The GOC also stated that the Chinese Bank Law explicitly prohibits the GOC from exercising any form of control over the decisions of commercial banks. In this respect, the GOC invoked Articles 4 and 5 of the Chinese Bank Law, which respectively provide that commercial banks shall
  ‘make their own decisions’
  and operate
  ‘without interference from any unit or individual’
  . The GOC further stressed that Article 41 of the Chinese Bank Law provides that
  ‘no entity or individual may coerce a commercial bank into granting loans or providing a guarantee’. Furthermore, the GOC claimed that Article 15 of the General Rules on loans as well as Decision No 40 are not mandatory but only of a guidance nature. Finally, the GOC disagreed with the assertion that EXIM bank provided loans at below market rates as it follows internationally accepted standards for risk assessment and loan disbursement and it operates independently from the GOC.

under the guidance of the industrial policies’

‘make their own decisions’

‘without interference from any unit or individual’

‘no entity or individual may coerce a commercial bank into granting loans or providing a guarantee’.

| (247) | The Commission disagreed with the allegations of the GOC. The Commission did not reply only on
  ‘ownership and formal indicia of control’
  in order to qualify the cooperating State-owned EXIM bank as a public body but also demonstrated that the GOC exercised meaningful control over the bank for the following reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(247)

The Commission disagreed with the allegations of the GOC. The Commission did not reply only on
  ‘ownership and formal indicia of control’
  in order to qualify the cooperating State-owned EXIM bank as a public body but also demonstrated that the GOC exercised meaningful control over the bank for the following reasons.

‘ownership and formal indicia of control’

| (248) | As explained in recital (238) above, the Commission considered that the Chinese Bank law and Decision No 40 are of a mandatory nature. Furthermore, the findings of this investigation as well as the Commission’s findings in previous investigations concerning the same subsidy programme (56) did not support the claim that banks do not take government policy and plans into account when making lending decisions. For example, the Commission found that the exporting producers benefited from preferential lending at below-market interest rates. One of the exporting producers befitted from preferential lending by the China Development Bank Fund, which as described in recital (285) below is a policy-oriented investment organisation mainly supporting
  ‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(248)

As explained in recital (238) above, the Commission considered that the Chinese Bank law and Decision No 40 are of a mandatory nature. Furthermore, the findings of this investigation as well as the Commission’s findings in previous investigations concerning the same subsidy programme (56) did not support the claim that banks do not take government policy and plans into account when making lending decisions. For example, the Commission found that the exporting producers benefited from preferential lending at below-market interest rates. One of the exporting producers befitted from preferential lending by the China Development Bank Fund, which as described in recital (285) below is a policy-oriented investment organisation mainly supporting
  ‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’
  .

56

‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’

| (249) | The investigation showed that Article 15 of the General Rules on Loans was actually applied in practice, and that Articles 4, 5 and 41 of the Bank law were applicable subject to Article 34 of the Bank Law, i.e. where the State establishes a public policy the banks implement it and follow State instructions. In fact, while Articles 4 and 5 of the Bank Law are part of Chapter I, which sets the general provisions, Article 34 is part of Chapter IV, which establishes the basic rules governing loans. The wording of Article 34:
  ‘commercial banks carry out their loan business upon the needs of national economy and the social development and under the guidance of the State industrial policies’, demonstrates that this provision is not of a guiding nature but has rather a mandatory character and provides a clear instruction to banks to take into account the State industrial policies when carrying out their loan business. The Commission also noted that the Decision No 40 of the State Council instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support only to encouraged projects and promises the implementation of
  ‘other preferential policies on the encouraged projects’
  . While Article 17 of the same Decision requires banks to respect credit principles, the Commission could not establish during the investigation that this was done in practice. To the contrary, loans were provided to the exporting producers irrespective of their financial situation and creditworthiness. |
| --- | --- |

(249)

The investigation showed that Article 15 of the General Rules on Loans was actually applied in practice, and that Articles 4, 5 and 41 of the Bank law were applicable subject to Article 34 of the Bank Law, i.e. where the State establishes a public policy the banks implement it and follow State instructions. In fact, while Articles 4 and 5 of the Bank Law are part of Chapter I, which sets the general provisions, Article 34 is part of Chapter IV, which establishes the basic rules governing loans. The wording of Article 34:
  ‘commercial banks carry out their loan business upon the needs of national economy and the social development and under the guidance of the State industrial policies’, demonstrates that this provision is not of a guiding nature but has rather a mandatory character and provides a clear instruction to banks to take into account the State industrial policies when carrying out their loan business. The Commission also noted that the Decision No 40 of the State Council instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support only to encouraged projects and promises the implementation of
  ‘other preferential policies on the encouraged projects’
  . While Article 17 of the same Decision requires banks to respect credit principles, the Commission could not establish during the investigation that this was done in practice. To the contrary, loans were provided to the exporting producers irrespective of their financial situation and creditworthiness.

‘commercial banks carry out their loan business upon the needs of national economy and the social development and under the guidance of the State industrial policies’,

‘other preferential policies on the encouraged projects’

| (250) | Moreover, as concerns specifically EXIM Bank, it is undisputable that this is a policy bank directly pursuing government policies by its own admission. As explained on its website, (57) EXIM is a State-funded and State-owned policy bank directly under the leadership of the State Council and dedicated to supporting inter alia China’s foreign trade and implementing the ‘going global’ strategy. |
| --- | --- |

(250)

Moreover, as concerns specifically EXIM Bank, it is undisputable that this is a policy bank directly pursuing government policies by its own admission. As explained on its website, (57) EXIM is a State-funded and State-owned policy bank directly under the leadership of the State Council and dedicated to supporting inter alia China’s foreign trade and implementing the ‘going global’ strategy.

57

inter alia

| (251) | On that basis, the Commission concluded that the GOC has created a normative framework with respect to lending to encouraged industries that had to be adhered to by the managers and supervisors of the bank, which are appointed by the GOC and accountable to the GOC. This normative framework did not leave any margin of manoeuvre to the managers and supervisors of the bank as to whether to follow this framework or not with respect to the sampled exporting producers, thus putting the management of that bank in a position of dependence. Therefore, the GOC relied on the normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the conduct of the cooperating State-owned bank whenever it was providing loans to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(251)

On that basis, the Commission concluded that the GOC has created a normative framework with respect to lending to encouraged industries that had to be adhered to by the managers and supervisors of the bank, which are appointed by the GOC and accountable to the GOC. This normative framework did not leave any margin of manoeuvre to the managers and supervisors of the bank as to whether to follow this framework or not with respect to the sampled exporting producers, thus putting the management of that bank in a position of dependence. Therefore, the GOC relied on the normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the conduct of the cooperating State-owned bank whenever it was providing loans to the OFC industry.

| (252) | As explained in recital (241), the Commission sought proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete loans. However, the cooperating State-owned bank did not provide certain necessary information, including its specific credit risk assessment related to the sampled companies. In the absence of concrete evidence of such credit risk assessments, the Commission examined the overall legal environment applicable to lending to encouraged industries such as the OFC industry in combination with the behaviour of the cooperating State-owned bank and established that the bank was not acting based on thorough market-based credit risk assessments. Furthermore, as explained in recital (244), loans were provided to the two sampled groups of exporting producers at interest rates below or close to the risk-free PBOC Benchmark Interest Rates and the Loan Prime Rate regardless of their financial and credit risk situation. Therefore, considering the risk profile of the sampled exporting producers described in Section 3.5.3.3 below and that, according to the risk analysis performed by the Commission, the exporting producers should have received a BB credit rating and should thus have paid interest rates significantly above the risk-free rate, the Commission concluded that the loans at issue were provided below market rates. |
| --- | --- |

(252)

As explained in recital (241), the Commission sought proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete loans. However, the cooperating State-owned bank did not provide certain necessary information, including its specific credit risk assessment related to the sampled companies. In the absence of concrete evidence of such credit risk assessments, the Commission examined the overall legal environment applicable to lending to encouraged industries such as the OFC industry in combination with the behaviour of the cooperating State-owned bank and established that the bank was not acting based on thorough market-based credit risk assessments. Furthermore, as explained in recital (244), loans were provided to the two sampled groups of exporting producers at interest rates below or close to the risk-free PBOC Benchmark Interest Rates and the Loan Prime Rate regardless of their financial and credit risk situation. Therefore, considering the risk profile of the sampled exporting producers described in Section 3.5.3.3 below and that, according to the risk analysis performed by the Commission, the exporting producers should have received a BB credit rating and should thus have paid interest rates significantly above the risk-free rate, the Commission concluded that the loans at issue were provided below market rates.

| (253) | The Commission therefore concluded that the GOC has exercised meaningful control over the conduct of the cooperating State-owned bank with respect to its lending policies and assessment of risk concerning the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(253)

The Commission therefore concluded that the GOC has exercised meaningful control over the conduct of the cooperating State-owned bank with respect to its lending policies and assessment of risk concerning the OFC industry.

(c)   Conclusion on State-owned banks

| (254) | The Commission established that the partially cooperating State-owned bank implemented the legal framework set out above in the exercise of governmental functions with respect to the OFC sector. Therefore, it was acting as public body in the sense of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and in accordance with the relevant WTO case-law. |
| --- | --- |

(254)

The Commission established that the partially cooperating State-owned bank implemented the legal framework set out above in the exercise of governmental functions with respect to the OFC sector. Therefore, it was acting as public body in the sense of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and in accordance with the relevant WTO case-law.

(2)   
  Non-cooperating State-owned financial institutions

Non-cooperating State-owned financial institutions

| (255) | As set out in recital (218) above, none of the other State-owned financial institutions, which provided loans to the sampled companies, replied to the specific questionnaire. The GOC provided solely some information on the ownership of a number of banks, but not on their governance structure, risk assessment or examples relating to specific loans to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(255)

As set out in recital (218) above, none of the other State-owned financial institutions, which provided loans to the sampled companies, replied to the specific questionnaire. The GOC provided solely some information on the ownership of a number of banks, but not on their governance structure, risk assessment or examples relating to specific loans to the OFC industry.

| (256) | Therefore, in line with the conclusions reached in Section 3.2.1, the Commission decided to use facts available to determine whether those State-owned financial institutions qualify as public bodies. |
| --- | --- |

(256)

Therefore, in line with the conclusions reached in Section 3.2.1, the Commission decided to use facts available to determine whether those State-owned financial institutions qualify as public bodies.

| (257) | The GOC provided that the following banks, which had provided loans to the sampled groups of exporting producers in the investigation at hand, were partially or fully owned by the State itself or by State-held legal persons: Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Bank of Jiangsu, Bank of Kunlun, Bank of Nanjing, Bank of Ningbo, China CITIC Bank China Development Bank, China Construction Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Guangfa Bank, China Merchants Bank, China Minsheng Bank, Hankou Bank, Industrial Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Ping An Bank, Postal Savings Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and Zheshang Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(257)

The GOC provided that the following banks, which had provided loans to the sampled groups of exporting producers in the investigation at hand, were partially or fully owned by the State itself or by State-held legal persons: Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Bank of Jiangsu, Bank of Kunlun, Bank of Nanjing, Bank of Ningbo, China CITIC Bank China Development Bank, China Construction Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Guangfa Bank, China Merchants Bank, China Minsheng Bank, Hankou Bank, Industrial Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Ping An Bank, Postal Savings Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and Zheshang Bank.

| (258) | Using publicly available information, such as the website, annual reports, information available in bank directories or on the Internet, the Commission found that the following financial institutions that had provided loans to the two sampled groups of exporting producers were partially or fully owned by the State itself or by State-held legal persons:






  Name | Information on ownership structure |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Bank of Beijing | At least 21 % of the shares held by the local and national government and SOEs |
| Sinomach Finance Ltd | Belongs to China National Machinery Industry Corporation Ltd (Sinomach), which is a state-owned enterprise |

(258)

Using publicly available information, such as the website, annual reports, information available in bank directories or on the Internet, the Commission found that the following financial institutions that had provided loans to the two sampled groups of exporting producers were partially or fully owned by the State itself or by State-held legal persons:

Name

Information on ownership structure

Bank of Beijing

At least 21 % of the shares held by the local and national government and SOEs

Sinomach Finance Ltd

Belongs to China National Machinery Industry Corporation Ltd (Sinomach), which is a state-owned enterprise

| (259) | The Commission further established, in the absence of specific information from the financial institutions at issue indicating otherwise, the GOC’s ownership and control based on formal indicia for the same reasons as set out above in point (1). In particular, based on facts available, managers and supervisors in the non-cooperating State-owned financial institutions appear to be appointed by the GOC and be accountable to the GOC in the same manner as in the cooperating State-owned bank. |
| --- | --- |

(259)

The Commission further established, in the absence of specific information from the financial institutions at issue indicating otherwise, the GOC’s ownership and control based on formal indicia for the same reasons as set out above in point (1). In particular, based on facts available, managers and supervisors in the non-cooperating State-owned financial institutions appear to be appointed by the GOC and be accountable to the GOC in the same manner as in the cooperating State-owned bank.

| (260) | With regard to the exercise of control in a meaningful manner, the Commission considered that the findings concerning the cooperating State-owned financial institution could be considered representative also for the non-cooperating State-owned financial institutions. The normative framework analysed in point (1) above applies to them in an identical manner. Absent any indication to the contrary, based on facts available, (58) the lack of concrete evidence of creditworthiness assessments is valid for them in the same manner as for the cooperating State-owned bank. |
| --- | --- |

(260)

With regard to the exercise of control in a meaningful manner, the Commission considered that the findings concerning the cooperating State-owned financial institution could be considered representative also for the non-cooperating State-owned financial institutions. The normative framework analysed in point (1) above applies to them in an identical manner. Absent any indication to the contrary, based on facts available, (58) the lack of concrete evidence of creditworthiness assessments is valid for them in the same manner as for the cooperating State-owned bank.

58

| (261) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed the insufficiency of the Commission’s arguments concluding that all State-owned financial institutions other than EXIM bank also constituted public bodies. The GOC argued that the Commission relied on previous anti-subsidy cases and its own conclusions with respect to the cooperating State-owned financial institutions and lacked to perform a case-by-case analysis giving particular relevance to the specific circumstances of each case and with respect to each of the non-cooperating financial institutions. The GOC further argued that the Commission did not provide sufficient proof to determine the existence of meaningful control over the State-owned financial institutions, as its managers and supervisors appear to be appointed by the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(261)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed the insufficiency of the Commission’s arguments concluding that all State-owned financial institutions other than EXIM bank also constituted public bodies. The GOC argued that the Commission relied on previous anti-subsidy cases and its own conclusions with respect to the cooperating State-owned financial institutions and lacked to perform a case-by-case analysis giving particular relevance to the specific circumstances of each case and with respect to each of the non-cooperating financial institutions. The GOC further argued that the Commission did not provide sufficient proof to determine the existence of meaningful control over the State-owned financial institutions, as its managers and supervisors appear to be appointed by the GOC.

| (262) | In this respect, the Commission recalled that in the absence of cooperation from the other State-owned banks, the Commission had to rely on facts available. The Commission concluded that the information from previous investigations, combined with formal indicia of control and the findings of the investigation itself regarding EXIM bank and regarding the actual conduct of the banks towards the exporting producers constituted the best facts available in this case. In any event, the GOC failed to put forward any evidence or argument to rebut the Commission’s findings concerning the fact that the other State-owned banks which provided loans to the sampled companies are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation. The Commission thus maintained its position. |
| --- | --- |

(262)

In this respect, the Commission recalled that in the absence of cooperation from the other State-owned banks, the Commission had to rely on facts available. The Commission concluded that the information from previous investigations, combined with formal indicia of control and the findings of the investigation itself regarding EXIM bank and regarding the actual conduct of the banks towards the exporting producers constituted the best facts available in this case. In any event, the GOC failed to put forward any evidence or argument to rebut the Commission’s findings concerning the fact that the other State-owned banks which provided loans to the sampled companies are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation. The Commission thus maintained its position.

(3)   
  Conclusion on State-owned financial institutions

Conclusion on State-owned financial institutions

| (263) | In light of the above considerations, the Commission established that all State-owned Chinese financial institutions that provided financing to the two sampled groups of cooperating exporting producers are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(263)

In light of the above considerations, the Commission established that all State-owned Chinese financial institutions that provided financing to the two sampled groups of cooperating exporting producers are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation.

| (264) | In addition, even if the State-owned financial institutions were not to be considered as public bodies, the Commission established on the basis of the same information that they would be considered entrusted or directed by the GOC to carry out functions normally vested in the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation for the same reasons, as set out in Section 3.5.1.2 below. Thus, their conduct would be attributed to the GOC in any event. |
| --- | --- |

(264)

In addition, even if the State-owned financial institutions were not to be considered as public bodies, the Commission established on the basis of the same information that they would be considered entrusted or directed by the GOC to carry out functions normally vested in the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation for the same reasons, as set out in Section 3.5.1.2 below. Thus, their conduct would be attributed to the GOC in any event.

3.5.1.2.   Private financial institutions entrusted or directed by the State

| (265) | The following financial institutions were considered to be privately owned, based on the findings established in previous anti-subsidy investigations (59) and complemented by publicly available information: HSBC, CITI Bank China, Zijin Rural Commercial Bank, Mizuho Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking (China), MUFG Bank, Bohai international Trust Co., Ltd, and Hubei Rural Credit Cooperative. The Commission analysed whether these financial institutions had been entrusted or directed by the GOC to grant subsidies to the OFC sector within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(265)

The following financial institutions were considered to be privately owned, based on the findings established in previous anti-subsidy investigations (59) and complemented by publicly available information: HSBC, CITI Bank China, Zijin Rural Commercial Bank, Mizuho Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking (China), MUFG Bank, Bohai international Trust Co., Ltd, and Hubei Rural Credit Cooperative. The Commission analysed whether these financial institutions had been entrusted or directed by the GOC to grant subsidies to the OFC sector within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.

59

| (266) | According to the WTO Appellate Body, ‘entrustment’ occurs where a government gives responsibility to a private body and ‘direction’ refers to situations where the government exercises its authority over a private body (60). In both cases, the government uses a private body as a proxy to make the financial contribution, and
  ‘in most cases, one would expect entrustment or direction of a private body to involve some form of threat or inducement’
   (61). At the same time, Article 3(1)(a)(iv) does not allow Members to impose countervailing measures to products
  ‘whenever the government is merely exercising its general regulatory powers’
   (62) or where government intervention
  ‘may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market’
   (63). Rather, entrustment or direction implies
  ‘a more active role of the government than mere acts of encouragement’
   (64). |
| --- | --- |

(266)

According to the WTO Appellate Body, ‘entrustment’ occurs where a government gives responsibility to a private body and ‘direction’ refers to situations where the government exercises its authority over a private body (60). In both cases, the government uses a private body as a proxy to make the financial contribution, and
  ‘in most cases, one would expect entrustment or direction of a private body to involve some form of threat or inducement’
   (61). At the same time, Article 3(1)(a)(iv) does not allow Members to impose countervailing measures to products
  ‘whenever the government is merely exercising its general regulatory powers’
   (62) or where government intervention
  ‘may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market’
   (63). Rather, entrustment or direction implies
  ‘a more active role of the government than mere acts of encouragement’
   (64).

60

‘in most cases, one would expect entrustment or direction of a private body to involve some form of threat or inducement’

61

‘whenever the government is merely exercising its general regulatory powers’

62

‘may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market’

63

‘a more active role of the government than mere acts of encouragement’

64

| (267) | The Commission noted that the normative framework concerning the industry mentioned above in recitals (232) to (238) applies to all financial institutions in the PRC, including privately owned financial institutions. To illustrate this, the Bank Law and the various orders of the CBIRC cover all Chinese-funded and foreign-invested banks under the management of the CBIRC. |
| --- | --- |

(267)

The Commission noted that the normative framework concerning the industry mentioned above in recitals (232) to (238) applies to all financial institutions in the PRC, including privately owned financial institutions. To illustrate this, the Bank Law and the various orders of the CBIRC cover all Chinese-funded and foreign-invested banks under the management of the CBIRC.

| (268) | Furthermore, the majority of loan contracts with private financial institutions had similar conditions as the contracts with State-owned banks, and the lending rates provided by the private financial institutions were similar to the rates provided by the State-owned financial institutions. |
| --- | --- |

(268)

Furthermore, the majority of loan contracts with private financial institutions had similar conditions as the contracts with State-owned banks, and the lending rates provided by the private financial institutions were similar to the rates provided by the State-owned financial institutions.

| (269) | In the absence of any divergent information received from the private financial institutions, the Commission concluded that, in so far as the OFC industry is concerned, all financial institutions (including private financial institutions) operating in China under the supervision of the CBIRC have been entrusted or directed by the State in the sense of Article 3(1)(a)(iv), first indent of the basic Regulation to pursue governmental policies and provide loans at preferential rates to the OFC industry. (65) |
| --- | --- |

(269)

In the absence of any divergent information received from the private financial institutions, the Commission concluded that, in so far as the OFC industry is concerned, all financial institutions (including private financial institutions) operating in China under the supervision of the CBIRC have been entrusted or directed by the State in the sense of Article 3(1)(a)(iv), first indent of the basic Regulation to pursue governmental policies and provide loans at preferential rates to the OFC industry. (65)

65

| (270) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission failed to demonstrate entrustment or direction by the GOC, in particular a link between the government and the specific conduct of all financial institutions. The GOC argues that exercising its general regulatory powers by giving a mere guidance or encouragement are not sufficient to show entrustment and direction; there needs to be some form of threat or inducement. According to the GOC, the Bank Law explicitly prohibits the interference by the GOC and the General Rules of Loan and Decision No 40 only provide guidance and are not mandatory or legally binding. In addition, the GOC claimed that the Commission failed to its duty to conduct such an analysis for each entity. |
| --- | --- |

(270)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the Commission failed to demonstrate entrustment or direction by the GOC, in particular a link between the government and the specific conduct of all financial institutions. The GOC argues that exercising its general regulatory powers by giving a mere guidance or encouragement are not sufficient to show entrustment and direction; there needs to be some form of threat or inducement. According to the GOC, the Bank Law explicitly prohibits the interference by the GOC and the General Rules of Loan and Decision No 40 only provide guidance and are not mandatory or legally binding. In addition, the GOC claimed that the Commission failed to its duty to conduct such an analysis for each entity.

entrustment or direction by the GOC,

link between the government and the specific conduct

threat or inducement.

| (271) | The Commission disagreed with this view. Since the normative framework explained in recitals (232) to (239), which applies to all banks in China, is legally binding as further confirmed in recitals (248) and (249), it does not amount to a mere encouragement or guidance by the government. The Commission already established in recital (239) above that Decision No 40 instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support only to encouraged projects even though Article 17 of the same Decision also asks the bank to respect credit principles. Furthermore, the Commission established in recital (251) that the GOC relied on this normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the financial institutions not leaving them any margin of manoeuvre as to whether to implement it or not. Therefore, there is a clear link between the GOC and the specific conduct of the private banks, which demonstrates entrustment and direction by the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(271)

The Commission disagreed with this view. Since the normative framework explained in recitals (232) to (239), which applies to all banks in China, is legally binding as further confirmed in recitals (248) and (249), it does not amount to a mere encouragement or guidance by the government. The Commission already established in recital (239) above that Decision No 40 instructs all financial institutions to provide credit support only to encouraged projects even though Article 17 of the same Decision also asks the bank to respect credit principles. Furthermore, the Commission established in recital (251) that the GOC relied on this normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the financial institutions not leaving them any margin of manoeuvre as to whether to implement it or not. Therefore, there is a clear link between the GOC and the specific conduct of the private banks, which demonstrates entrustment and direction by the GOC.

| (272) | In addition, the Commission recalled that in the absence of cooperation from the private banks, it had to rely on facts available. Since there was partial cooperation from only one State-owned bank, the Commission used the information available for this bank, which was proven to be a public body, and compared it with the lending conditions offered by the non-cooperating private banks. Moreover, the RCCs with the sampled companies did not reveal any significant differences between loan conditions or rates provided by the private financial institutions and those provided by State-owned financial institutions. The fact that there was an overlap in rates shows that the private banks also provided loans below market terms in compliance with the normative framework referred to above. Therefore, the GOC’s claim that the Commission failed to its duty to conduct such an analysis for each entity is unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

(272)

In addition, the Commission recalled that in the absence of cooperation from the private banks, it had to rely on facts available. Since there was partial cooperation from only one State-owned bank, the Commission used the information available for this bank, which was proven to be a public body, and compared it with the lending conditions offered by the non-cooperating private banks. Moreover, the RCCs with the sampled companies did not reveal any significant differences between loan conditions or rates provided by the private financial institutions and those provided by State-owned financial institutions. The fact that there was an overlap in rates shows that the private banks also provided loans below market terms in compliance with the normative framework referred to above. Therefore, the GOC’s claim that the Commission failed to its duty to conduct such an analysis for each entity is unfounded.

| (273) | Consequently, the Commission confirmed its conclusion that, in so far as the OFC industry is concerned, all financial institutions, including private financial institutions, operating in China have been entrusted or directed by the State in the sense of Article 3(1)(a)(iv), first indent of the basic Regulation to pursue governmental policies and provide loans at preferential rates to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(273)

Consequently, the Commission confirmed its conclusion that, in so far as the OFC industry is concerned, all financial institutions, including private financial institutions, operating in China have been entrusted or directed by the State in the sense of Article 3(1)(a)(iv), first indent of the basic Regulation to pursue governmental policies and provide loans at preferential rates to the OFC industry.

3.5.2.   Credit ratings

Credit ratings

| (274) | In previous anti-subsidy investigations, the Commission already determined that domestic credit ratings awarded to Chinese companies were not reliable, based on a study published by the International Monetary Fund (66), showing a discrepancy between international and Chinese credit ratings, combined with the findings of the investigation concerning the sampled companies. Indeed, according to the IMF, over 90 % of Chinese bonds are rated from AA to AAA by local rating agencies. This is not comparable to other markets, such as the Union or the United States of America (‘US’). For example, less than 2 % of firms enjoy such top-notch ratings in the US market. Chinese credit rating agencies are thus heavily skewed towards the highest end of the rating scale. They have very broad rating scales and tend to pool bonds with significantly different default risks into one broad rating category (67). According to the China bond market insight 2021 by Bloomberg (68), five Chinese local rating agencies dominate the bond market: China Chengxin, Dagong, Lianhe, Shanghai Brilliance, and Golden credit rating, and around 90 % of the bonds are rated AAA by local rating agencies. However, many of the issuers have received a lower S&P global issuer rating of A and BBB (69). |
| --- | --- |

(274)

In previous anti-subsidy investigations, the Commission already determined that domestic credit ratings awarded to Chinese companies were not reliable, based on a study published by the International Monetary Fund (66), showing a discrepancy between international and Chinese credit ratings, combined with the findings of the investigation concerning the sampled companies. Indeed, according to the IMF, over 90 % of Chinese bonds are rated from AA to AAA by local rating agencies. This is not comparable to other markets, such as the Union or the United States of America (‘US’). For example, less than 2 % of firms enjoy such top-notch ratings in the US market. Chinese credit rating agencies are thus heavily skewed towards the highest end of the rating scale. They have very broad rating scales and tend to pool bonds with significantly different default risks into one broad rating category (67). According to the China bond market insight 2021 by Bloomberg (68), five Chinese local rating agencies dominate the bond market: China Chengxin, Dagong, Lianhe, Shanghai Brilliance, and Golden credit rating, and around 90 % of the bonds are rated AAA by local rating agencies. However, many of the issuers have received a lower S&P global issuer rating of A and BBB (69).

66

67

68

69

| (275) | In addition, foreign rating agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, typically apply an uplift over the issuer’s baseline credit rating based on an estimate of the firm’s strategic importance to the Chinese Government and the strength of any implicit guarantee when they rate Chinese bonds issued overseas (70). |
| --- | --- |

(275)

In addition, foreign rating agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, typically apply an uplift over the issuer’s baseline credit rating based on an estimate of the firm’s strategic importance to the Chinese Government and the strength of any implicit guarantee when they rate Chinese bonds issued overseas (70).

70

| (276) | The Commission also found further information to complement this analysis. First, the Commission determined that the State can exercise a certain influence over the credit rating market. |
| --- | --- |

(276)

The Commission also found further information to complement this analysis. First, the Commission determined that the State can exercise a certain influence over the credit rating market.

| (277) | According to the information provided by the GOC, during the investigation period, there were 14 credit rating agencies active on China’s bond market, including 12 domestic rating agencies. |
| --- | --- |

(277)

According to the information provided by the GOC, during the investigation period, there were 14 credit rating agencies active on China’s bond market, including 12 domestic rating agencies.

| (278) | Second, there is no free entrance on the Chinese credit rating market. It is essentially a closed market, since rating agencies need to be approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (‘CSRC’) or the PBOC before they can start operations (71). The PBOC announced mid-2017 that overseas credit rating agencies would be allowed to carry out credit ratings on part of the domestic bond market, under certain conditions. During the investigation period, there were two foreign-owned and two Sino-foreign joint venture credit rating agencies operating on the Chinese market. However, these credit rating agencies follow Chinese rating scales and are thus not exactly comparable with international ratings, as explained in recital (275). |
| --- | --- |

(278)

Second, there is no free entrance on the Chinese credit rating market. It is essentially a closed market, since rating agencies need to be approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (‘CSRC’) or the PBOC before they can start operations (71). The PBOC announced mid-2017 that overseas credit rating agencies would be allowed to carry out credit ratings on part of the domestic bond market, under certain conditions. During the investigation period, there were two foreign-owned and two Sino-foreign joint venture credit rating agencies operating on the Chinese market. However, these credit rating agencies follow Chinese rating scales and are thus not exactly comparable with international ratings, as explained in recital (275).

71

| (279) | Finally, a 2017 study performed by the PBOC itself confirms the Commission’s findings, stating in its conclusions that
  ‘if the investment level of foreign bonds is set to international rating BBB-and above, then the domestic bond investment grade may be rated at AA-level and above, taking into account the difference between the average domestic rating and the international rating of 6 or more notches’
   (72). |
| --- | --- |

(279)

Finally, a 2017 study performed by the PBOC itself confirms the Commission’s findings, stating in its conclusions that
  ‘if the investment level of foreign bonds is set to international rating BBB-and above, then the domestic bond investment grade may be rated at AA-level and above, taking into account the difference between the average domestic rating and the international rating of 6 or more notches’
   (72).

‘if the investment level of foreign bonds is set to international rating BBB-and above, then the domestic bond investment grade may be rated at AA-level and above, taking into account the difference between the average domestic rating and the international rating of 6 or more notches’

72

| (280) | In view of the situation described in recitals (274) to (279) above, the Commission concluded that Chinese credit ratings do not provide a reliable estimation of the credit risk of the underlying asset. Those ratings were also distorted by the policy objectives to encourage key strategic industries, such as the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(280)

In view of the situation described in recitals (274) to (279) above, the Commission concluded that Chinese credit ratings do not provide a reliable estimation of the credit risk of the underlying asset. Those ratings were also distorted by the policy objectives to encourage key strategic industries, such as the OFC industry.

3.5.3.   Preferential financing: loans

Preferential financing: loans

3.5.3.1.   Types of loans

(1)   
  Short-term and long-term loans

Short-term and long-term loans

| (281) | The Commission established that companies in both sampled groups used various short-term and long-term loans to finance their activities. These loans were mainly used for daily operations, working capital needs, for special projects, investments or to replace other loans. Both groups also used short-term and long-term export credits. |
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(281)

The Commission established that companies in both sampled groups used various short-term and long-term loans to finance their activities. These loans were mainly used for daily operations, working capital needs, for special projects, investments or to replace other loans. Both groups also used short-term and long-term export credits.

(2)   
  Loans with the specific purpose to replace other loans

Loans with the specific purpose to replace other loans

| (282) | In the course of the investigation, the Commission found that certain sampled companies contracted loans with the specific purpose to replace loans from other banks. With this practice, companies could rearrange their liabilities and obtain funds in order to repay their previous obligations, which points to problems to repay debt, absent any other reason for it. |
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(282)

In the course of the investigation, the Commission found that certain sampled companies contracted loans with the specific purpose to replace loans from other banks. With this practice, companies could rearrange their liabilities and obtain funds in order to repay their previous obligations, which points to problems to repay debt, absent any other reason for it.

| (283) | The use of loans with the sole purpose of repaying other ongoing loans is considered as an indication that the company is not capable of honouring its current loan liabilities and thus presents an additional risk related to its short and long-term financing. |
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(283)

The use of loans with the sole purpose of repaying other ongoing loans is considered as an indication that the company is not capable of honouring its current loan liabilities and thus presents an additional risk related to its short and long-term financing.

(3)   
  Shareholder loan

Shareholder loan

| (284) | The Commission found that one of the sampled exporting producers received a bank loan from China Development Bank through its parent company. The parent company contracted the loan with the bank within a so-called ‘shareholder loan’ or ‘entrusted loan’ for an R&D project executed by the exporting producer, and channelled the proceeds of the loan to the exporting producer under the same contractual conditions as it was signed with the bank. During the RCC, the company concerned explained that China Development Bank has special funds for projects that can be provided in the form of loans only to centrally owned entities, which are directly under SASAC’s control. However, the loan was directly negotiated between the exporting producer and the bank. In addition, the loan contract specifies that the bank commissions the parent company to grant the
  ‘entrusted loan’
  to the exporting producer for project capital input. |
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(284)

The Commission found that one of the sampled exporting producers received a bank loan from China Development Bank through its parent company. The parent company contracted the loan with the bank within a so-called ‘shareholder loan’ or ‘entrusted loan’ for an R&D project executed by the exporting producer, and channelled the proceeds of the loan to the exporting producer under the same contractual conditions as it was signed with the bank. During the RCC, the company concerned explained that China Development Bank has special funds for projects that can be provided in the form of loans only to centrally owned entities, which are directly under SASAC’s control. However, the loan was directly negotiated between the exporting producer and the bank. In addition, the loan contract specifies that the bank commissions the parent company to grant the
  ‘entrusted loan’
  to the exporting producer for project capital input.

‘entrusted loan’

| (285) | The Commission further established that the China Development Bank Fund is a policy-oriented investment organisation, which mainly supports
  ‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’
  through
  ‘project capital investment, entity investment, shareholders loans and investments in local investment and financing company funds, to fill the gaps in key projects’
   (73). |
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(285)

The Commission further established that the China Development Bank Fund is a policy-oriented investment organisation, which mainly supports
  ‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’
  through
  ‘project capital investment, entity investment, shareholders loans and investments in local investment and financing company funds, to fill the gaps in key projects’
   (73).

‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’

‘project capital investment, entity investment, shareholders loans and investments in local investment and financing company funds, to fill the gaps in key projects’

73

| (286) | Taking into account that the proceeds of the loan were used by the sampled exporting producer for its own projects, that the loan was negotiated directly between the sampled exporting producer and the bank, and that the exporting producer had a loan contract with its parent company mirroring the shareholder contract between the parent company and the bank, the Commission considered that the parent company had only the role of an intermediary and agreed with China Development Bank to provide the loan to the exporting producer. Therefore, the Commission included the loan at issue as financing provided by the bank to the exporting producer in question. |
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(286)

Taking into account that the proceeds of the loan were used by the sampled exporting producer for its own projects, that the loan was negotiated directly between the sampled exporting producer and the bank, and that the exporting producer had a loan contract with its parent company mirroring the shareholder contract between the parent company and the bank, the Commission considered that the parent company had only the role of an intermediary and agreed with China Development Bank to provide the loan to the exporting producer. Therefore, the Commission included the loan at issue as financing provided by the bank to the exporting producer in question.

3.5.3.2.   Specificity

| (287) | As demonstrated in recitals (232) to (238), several legal documents, which specifically target companies in the sector, direct the financial institutions to provide loans at preferential rates to the OFC industry. These documents demonstrate that the financial institutions only provide preferential financing to a limited number of industries/companies, which comply with the relevant policies of the GOC. The Commission considered that the reference to the OFC industry is sufficiently clear as this industry is identified either by its name or by a reference to the product that it manufactures or the industry group that it belongs to. Furthermore, as explained in recital (286), one of the sampled exporting producers benefitted from loan provided by the China Development Bank Fund, which supports
  ‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’
  . Therefore, the fact that the GOC supports a limited group of encouraged industries, which includes the OFC industry, makes this subsidy specific. |
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(287)

As demonstrated in recitals (232) to (238), several legal documents, which specifically target companies in the sector, direct the financial institutions to provide loans at preferential rates to the OFC industry. These documents demonstrate that the financial institutions only provide preferential financing to a limited number of industries/companies, which comply with the relevant policies of the GOC. The Commission considered that the reference to the OFC industry is sufficiently clear as this industry is identified either by its name or by a reference to the product that it manufactures or the industry group that it belongs to. Furthermore, as explained in recital (286), one of the sampled exporting producers benefitted from loan provided by the China Development Bank Fund, which supports
  ‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’
  . Therefore, the fact that the GOC supports a limited group of encouraged industries, which includes the OFC industry, makes this subsidy specific.

‘projects in key sectors recognised by the State’

| (288) | Following final disclosure, the GOC and the ZTT Group claimed that the loans at issue are not specific. According to the GOC, the Commission did not demonstrate that the legislation under which the financial support is given expressly limits access to the support and none of the documents referred to by the Commission are geared towards the OFC industry, which according to the GOC is not an encouraged industry in the PRC. |
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(288)

Following final disclosure, the GOC and the ZTT Group claimed that the loans at issue are not specific. According to the GOC, the Commission did not demonstrate that the legislation under which the financial support is given expressly limits access to the support and none of the documents referred to by the Commission are geared towards the OFC industry, which according to the GOC is not an encouraged industry in the PRC.

expressly limits

| (289) | In this respect, the Commission noted that, even though the documents listed in recital (232) and in particular, Decision No 40, the Bank Law and the General Rules on Loans, do not specify encouraged industries to a granular level to include the OFC industry as such, they do refer to the GOC’s industrial policies to support encouraged industries. As concluded in Section 3.1, the OFC industry is an encouraged industry. The combined reading of the documents concerned demonstrated that the GOC instructed financial institutions to take into account the industrial policies of the GOC in their lending business operations and that according to these industrial policies of the GOC, financial institutions are obliged to provide credit support to encouraged projects. Therefore, it results that the GOC expressly supports a limited group of encouraged industries, including the OFC industry. Therefore, this subsidy is specific. The Commission thus maintained its conclusions. |
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(289)

In this respect, the Commission noted that, even though the documents listed in recital (232) and in particular, Decision No 40, the Bank Law and the General Rules on Loans, do not specify encouraged industries to a granular level to include the OFC industry as such, they do refer to the GOC’s industrial policies to support encouraged industries. As concluded in Section 3.1, the OFC industry is an encouraged industry. The combined reading of the documents concerned demonstrated that the GOC instructed financial institutions to take into account the industrial policies of the GOC in their lending business operations and that according to these industrial policies of the GOC, financial institutions are obliged to provide credit support to encouraged projects. Therefore, it results that the GOC expressly supports a limited group of encouraged industries, including the OFC industry. Therefore, this subsidy is specific. The Commission thus maintained its conclusions.

| (290) | The Commission therefore concluded that subsidies in the form of preferential lending are not generally available to all industries but are specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation. |
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(290)

The Commission therefore concluded that subsidies in the form of preferential lending are not generally available to all industries but are specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation.

3.5.3.3.   Benefit and calculation of the subsidy amount

| (291) | The Commission calculated the amount of the countervailable subsidy based on the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. According to Article 6(b) of the basic Regulation, the benefit conferred on the recipients is the difference between the amount of interest that the company has paid on the preferential loan and the amount that the company would have paid for a comparable commercial loan which the company could have obtained on the market. |
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(291)

The Commission calculated the amount of the countervailable subsidy based on the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. According to Article 6(b) of the basic Regulation, the benefit conferred on the recipients is the difference between the amount of interest that the company has paid on the preferential loan and the amount that the company would have paid for a comparable commercial loan which the company could have obtained on the market.

| (292) | As explained in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 above, the loans provided by Chinese financial institutions reflect substantial government intervention and do not reflect rates that would normally be found in a functioning market. |
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(292)

As explained in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 above, the loans provided by Chinese financial institutions reflect substantial government intervention and do not reflect rates that would normally be found in a functioning market.

| (293) | The sampled groups of companies differed in terms of their general financial situation. Each of them benefitted from different types of loans during the investigation period with variances in respect of maturity, collateral, guarantees and other conditions. For those two reasons, each company had an average interest rate based on its own set of loans received. |
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(293)

The sampled groups of companies differed in terms of their general financial situation. Each of them benefitted from different types of loans during the investigation period with variances in respect of maturity, collateral, guarantees and other conditions. For those two reasons, each company had an average interest rate based on its own set of loans received.

| (294) | The Commission assessed individually the financial situation of each sampled group of exporting producers in order to reflect these particularities. In this respect, the Commission followed the calculation methodology for preferential financing through loans established in the anti-subsidy investigation on hot-rolled flat steel products originating in the PRC, as well as in the anti-subsidy investigations on tyres originating in the PRC and certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the PRC (74) and explained in the recitals below. As a result, the Commission calculated the benefit from the preferential financing through loans practices for each sampled group of exporting producers on an individual basis, and allocated such benefit to the product concerned. |
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(294)

The Commission assessed individually the financial situation of each sampled group of exporting producers in order to reflect these particularities. In this respect, the Commission followed the calculation methodology for preferential financing through loans established in the anti-subsidy investigation on hot-rolled flat steel products originating in the PRC, as well as in the anti-subsidy investigations on tyres originating in the PRC and certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the PRC (74) and explained in the recitals below. As a result, the Commission calculated the benefit from the preferential financing through loans practices for each sampled group of exporting producers on an individual basis, and allocated such benefit to the product concerned.

74

(1)   
  FTT Group

FTT Group

| (295) | The Commission noted that the exporting producers in the FTT Group were awarded an AAA credit rating by Chinese credit rating agencies, while the credit rating of their related companies ranged between B and AAA. In light of the overall distortions of Chinese credit ratings mentioned in Section 3.5.2, the Commission concluded that these ratings are not reliable. |
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(295)

The Commission noted that the exporting producers in the FTT Group were awarded an AAA credit rating by Chinese credit rating agencies, while the credit rating of their related companies ranged between B and AAA. In light of the overall distortions of Chinese credit ratings mentioned in Section 3.5.2, the Commission concluded that these ratings are not reliable.

| (296) | As mentioned in recitals (243) to (253) above, the Chinese lending financial institutions did not provide any creditworthiness assessment in this investigation. Therefore, in order to establish the benefit, the Commission had to assess whether the interest rates for the loans accorded to the FTT Group were at market level. |
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(296)

As mentioned in recitals (243) to (253) above, the Chinese lending financial institutions did not provide any creditworthiness assessment in this investigation. Therefore, in order to establish the benefit, the Commission had to assess whether the interest rates for the loans accorded to the FTT Group were at market level.

| (297) | The exporting producers of the FTT Group presented themselves in a generally profitable financial situation with profit margins ranging between 1 % and 3 % according to their own financial accounts although the profit margins were much below the profit margin generally expected in the OFC industry, which was set at 12,4 % in the separate anti-dumping investigation. |
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(297)

The exporting producers of the FTT Group presented themselves in a generally profitable financial situation with profit margins ranging between 1 % and 3 % according to their own financial accounts although the profit margins were much below the profit margin generally expected in the OFC industry, which was set at 12,4 % in the separate anti-dumping investigation.

| (298) | One of the exporting producers in the FTT Group used short-term and long-term debt to finance its operations. The Commission assessed the short-term liquidity and the long-term solvency situation of the company. |
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(298)

One of the exporting producers in the FTT Group used short-term and long-term debt to finance its operations. The Commission assessed the short-term liquidity and the long-term solvency situation of the company.

| (299) | Regarding short-term liquidity, the Commission used liquidity ratios such as current ratio, quick ratio, cash ratio and cash flow ratio. These ratios measure the company’s ability to pay short-term obligations, including short-term debt. The company presented an average current ratio of 1,1 during the IP. Although the current ratio is slightly above 1, the company’s current assets are just enough to pay the short-term obligations, which is not sufficient to justify a high credit rating, for which a company should present a ratio of at least 2. The quick ratio of the company was 0,8 in 2019 and 0,6 in 2020, while a quick ratio of at least 1 is considered as a reference. In fact, a company that has a quick ratio below 1 may not be able to pay off its current liabilities in the short-term. The cash ratio of the company was on average 0,1 in the IP; therefore, the company had insufficient cash at hand to pay its short-term debt. The company also showed a negative cash flow from operating activities (‘CFO’) in 2019 and 2020. The CFO ratio was - 0,07 in 2019 and - 0,00007 in 2020. A CFO ratio lower than 1 means that the company has not generated enough cash to cover its current liabilities. |
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(299)

Regarding short-term liquidity, the Commission used liquidity ratios such as current ratio, quick ratio, cash ratio and cash flow ratio. These ratios measure the company’s ability to pay short-term obligations, including short-term debt. The company presented an average current ratio of 1,1 during the IP. Although the current ratio is slightly above 1, the company’s current assets are just enough to pay the short-term obligations, which is not sufficient to justify a high credit rating, for which a company should present a ratio of at least 2. The quick ratio of the company was 0,8 in 2019 and 0,6 in 2020, while a quick ratio of at least 1 is considered as a reference. In fact, a company that has a quick ratio below 1 may not be able to pay off its current liabilities in the short-term. The cash ratio of the company was on average 0,1 in the IP; therefore, the company had insufficient cash at hand to pay its short-term debt. The company also showed a negative cash flow from operating activities (‘CFO’) in 2019 and 2020. The CFO ratio was - 0,07 in 2019 and - 0,00007 in 2020. A CFO ratio lower than 1 means that the company has not generated enough cash to cover its current liabilities.

| (300) | Considering the liquidity indicators described in recital (299), the Commission concluded that the company at issue presented short-term liquidity problems which results in having a high risk debtor profile. |
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(300)

Considering the liquidity indicators described in recital (299), the Commission concluded that the company at issue presented short-term liquidity problems which results in having a high risk debtor profile.

| (301) | The Commission based the long-term solvency risk assessment on various solvency rations such as debt ratios and coverage ratios. The solvency ratios measure the company’s ability to meet its long-term debt obligations. They are used by lenders and bond investors when assessing the company’s creditworthiness. |
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(301)

The Commission based the long-term solvency risk assessment on various solvency rations such as debt ratios and coverage ratios. The solvency ratios measure the company’s ability to meet its long-term debt obligations. They are used by lenders and bond investors when assessing the company’s creditworthiness.

| (302) | Debt ratios measure the amount of liabilities, in particular long-term debt. The company had a high Debt-to-Assets ratio of 0,67, which means that 67 % of the assets of the company are financed by debt. The Debt-to-Equity ratio was 1,9 in 2019 and 2,8 in 2020, which points to the fact the company is financing its activity mainly through debt. The higher the Debt-to-Assets and the Debt-to-Equity ratios are, the higher the financial risk of the company is. |
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(302)

Debt ratios measure the amount of liabilities, in particular long-term debt. The company had a high Debt-to-Assets ratio of 0,67, which means that 67 % of the assets of the company are financed by debt. The Debt-to-Equity ratio was 1,9 in 2019 and 2,8 in 2020, which points to the fact the company is financing its activity mainly through debt. The higher the Debt-to-Assets and the Debt-to-Equity ratios are, the higher the financial risk of the company is.

| (303) | The coverage ratios measure the company’s ability to serve its debt and meet its financial obligations. The company based its assessment on the interest coverage ratio and the CFO-to-Debt ratio. The interest coverage ratio shows the ability of the company to finance interest costs. This ratio was 1,4 in 2019 and 0,6 in 2020. In financial analysis terms, an interest coverage ratio of less than 1,5 indicates that the company has difficulties meeting its interest expenses. The CFO-to-Debt ratio shows the ability of the company to repay its debt with cash generated from operating activities. The average CFO-to-Debt ratio of the company in the IP was – 6 % in 2019 and – 0,006 % in 2020. This means that the company would need 16 years according to the 2019 ratio to repay its total debt with the operating cash flow it generates. The data from 2020 shows an even worse situation. Therefore, there is indication of serious problems of the company to generate enough cash in order to repay is debt. |
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(303)

The coverage ratios measure the company’s ability to serve its debt and meet its financial obligations. The company based its assessment on the interest coverage ratio and the CFO-to-Debt ratio. The interest coverage ratio shows the ability of the company to finance interest costs. This ratio was 1,4 in 2019 and 0,6 in 2020. In financial analysis terms, an interest coverage ratio of less than 1,5 indicates that the company has difficulties meeting its interest expenses. The CFO-to-Debt ratio shows the ability of the company to repay its debt with cash generated from operating activities. The average CFO-to-Debt ratio of the company in the IP was – 6 % in 2019 and – 0,006 % in 2020. This means that the company would need 16 years according to the 2019 ratio to repay its total debt with the operating cash flow it generates. The data from 2020 shows an even worse situation. Therefore, there is indication of serious problems of the company to generate enough cash in order to repay is debt.

| (304) | Moreover, this company has contracted loans with the sole purpose to repay loans from other banks. As described in recitals (282) and (283), this type of loans is considered as an indication that the company is not capable of honouring its current loan liabilities and thus presents an additional risk related to its short and long-term financing. |
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(304)

Moreover, this company has contracted loans with the sole purpose to repay loans from other banks. As described in recitals (282) and (283), this type of loans is considered as an indication that the company is not capable of honouring its current loan liabilities and thus presents an additional risk related to its short and long-term financing.

| (305) | Therefore, considering the liquidity and solvency issues described in recitals (299) to (304), the Commission considered that the company presented a fragile financial situation and a high risk profile for potential lenders and investors. |
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(305)

Therefore, considering the liquidity and solvency issues described in recitals (299) to (304), the Commission considered that the company presented a fragile financial situation and a high risk profile for potential lenders and investors.

| (306) | The second exporting producer in the group did not have any loans. However, the Commission noted that it financed 35 % of its purchases by bank acceptance drafts, which are, as established in Section 3.5.4.2 below, a preferential short-term financial instrument. The debt of this producer represented on average 61 % of the total assets the IP with a Debt-to-Assets ratio of 0,6 while the average Debt-to-Equity ratio in the IP was 1,6. This means that the company mainly financed its operations through debt, which is a factor of risk. |
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(306)

The second exporting producer in the group did not have any loans. However, the Commission noted that it financed 35 % of its purchases by bank acceptance drafts, which are, as established in Section 3.5.4.2 below, a preferential short-term financial instrument. The debt of this producer represented on average 61 % of the total assets the IP with a Debt-to-Assets ratio of 0,6 while the average Debt-to-Equity ratio in the IP was 1,6. This means that the company mainly financed its operations through debt, which is a factor of risk.

| (307) | Since this company financed its activities mainly through short-term financing, the Commission focused its analysis on the liquidity situation of the company. The company presented, on average in the IP, a current ratio of 0,9, a quick ratio of 0,7, a cash ratio of 0,1 and a CFO ratio of 0,1. These ratios point to liquidity problems as the total current liabilities exceed the total current assets and the company is in a situation where it cannot pay its current liabilities with cash generated by its current assets and operating activities. In terms of financial analysis, it is generally accepted that liquidity ratios below 1 are an indication of liquidity problems, which is considered as a risk by lending institutions. |
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(307)

Since this company financed its activities mainly through short-term financing, the Commission focused its analysis on the liquidity situation of the company. The company presented, on average in the IP, a current ratio of 0,9, a quick ratio of 0,7, a cash ratio of 0,1 and a CFO ratio of 0,1. These ratios point to liquidity problems as the total current liabilities exceed the total current assets and the company is in a situation where it cannot pay its current liabilities with cash generated by its current assets and operating activities. In terms of financial analysis, it is generally accepted that liquidity ratios below 1 are an indication of liquidity problems, which is considered as a risk by lending institutions.

| (308) | Taking into account the serious liquidity and solvency problems that the financial analysis of the two exporting producers in the FTT Group, as described in recitals (298) to (307), pointed out, the Commission considered that the overall financial situation of the FTT Group corresponds to a BB rating, which is the highest rating that does no longer qualify as ‘investment grade’. ‘Investment grade’ means that bonds issued by the company are judged by the rating agency as likely enough to meet payment obligations that banks are allowed to invest in them. |
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(308)

Taking into account the serious liquidity and solvency problems that the financial analysis of the two exporting producers in the FTT Group, as described in recitals (298) to (307), pointed out, the Commission considered that the overall financial situation of the FTT Group corresponds to a BB rating, which is the highest rating that does no longer qualify as ‘investment grade’. ‘Investment grade’ means that bonds issued by the company are judged by the rating agency as likely enough to meet payment obligations that banks are allowed to invest in them.

| (309) | Based on publicly available data on Bloomberg, the Commission used as a benchmark the premium expected on bonds issued by firms with a BB rating, which was applied to the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, or after 20 August 2019 to the Loan Prime Rate as announced by the NIFC (75) in order to determine the market rate. |
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(309)

Based on publicly available data on Bloomberg, the Commission used as a benchmark the premium expected on bonds issued by firms with a BB rating, which was applied to the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, or after 20 August 2019 to the Loan Prime Rate as announced by the NIFC (75) in order to determine the market rate.

75

| (310) | That mark-up was determined by calculating the relative spread between the indices of US AA rated corporate bonds to US BB rated corporate bonds based on Bloomberg data for industrial segments. The relative spread thus calculated was then added to the Loan Benchmark Rate published by the PBOC or, after 20 August 2019, to the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC, at the date when the loan was granted (76) and for the same duration as the loan in question. This was done individually for each loan provided to the company group. |
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(310)

That mark-up was determined by calculating the relative spread between the indices of US AA rated corporate bonds to US BB rated corporate bonds based on Bloomberg data for industrial segments. The relative spread thus calculated was then added to the Loan Benchmark Rate published by the PBOC or, after 20 August 2019, to the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC, at the date when the loan was granted (76) and for the same duration as the loan in question. This was done individually for each loan provided to the company group.

76

| (311) | As for loans denominated in foreign currencies, the same situation in respect of market distortions and the absence of valid credit ratings applies, because these loans are granted by the same Chinese financial institutions. Therefore, as found before, BB rated corporate bonds in relevant denominations issued during the investigation period were used to determine an appropriate benchmark. |
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(311)

As for loans denominated in foreign currencies, the same situation in respect of market distortions and the absence of valid credit ratings applies, because these loans are granted by the same Chinese financial institutions. Therefore, as found before, BB rated corporate bonds in relevant denominations issued during the investigation period were used to determine an appropriate benchmark.

| (312) | The benefit was established by applying the benchmark described in recital (310) to the period of loan financing during the investigation period. |
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(312)

The benefit was established by applying the benchmark described in recital (310) to the period of loan financing during the investigation period.

(2)   
  ZTT Group

ZTT Group

| (313) | The Commission noted that the ZTT Group was awarded an AA+ rating by a Chinese credit rating agency in 2018. In view of the overall distortions of Chinese credit ratings, mentioned in Section 3.5.2, the Commission concluded that the AA+ credit rating awarded to the ZTT Group is not reliable. |
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(313)

The Commission noted that the ZTT Group was awarded an AA+ rating by a Chinese credit rating agency in 2018. In view of the overall distortions of Chinese credit ratings, mentioned in Section 3.5.2, the Commission concluded that the AA+ credit rating awarded to the ZTT Group is not reliable.

| (314) | As mentioned in recitals (243) to (253) above, the lending Chinese financial institutions did not provide any creditworthiness assessment. Hence, in order to establish the benefit, the Commission had to assess whether the interest rates for the loans accorded to the ZTT Group were at market level. |
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(314)

As mentioned in recitals (243) to (253) above, the lending Chinese financial institutions did not provide any creditworthiness assessment. Hence, in order to establish the benefit, the Commission had to assess whether the interest rates for the loans accorded to the ZTT Group were at market level.

| (315) | The exporting producers of the ZTT Group presented themselves in a generally profitable financial situation according to their own financial accounts. |
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(315)

The exporting producers of the ZTT Group presented themselves in a generally profitable financial situation according to their own financial accounts.

| (316) | However, the analysis of one of the exporting producers in the group showed a decrease in the turnover combined with a significant increase in its liabilities since 2018. The Commission noted that the company is altering its financial leverage, expressed as the debt equity ratio (77), increasing its dependency on external financing and limiting the share of wholly owned funds to finance its growth. Furthermore, while the company is in a profitable situation, it should be noted that the profit margin, as well as the return on equity (78), decreased since 2018. Similarly, the Commission established the general use of short-term loans with the purpose to finance working capital for the day-to-day operations, by the two exporting producers as well as by other related companies in the group. |
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(316)

However, the analysis of one of the exporting producers in the group showed a decrease in the turnover combined with a significant increase in its liabilities since 2018. The Commission noted that the company is altering its financial leverage, expressed as the debt equity ratio (77), increasing its dependency on external financing and limiting the share of wholly owned funds to finance its growth. Furthermore, while the company is in a profitable situation, it should be noted that the profit margin, as well as the return on equity (78), decreased since 2018. Similarly, the Commission established the general use of short-term loans with the purpose to finance working capital for the day-to-day operations, by the two exporting producers as well as by other related companies in the group.

77

78

| (317) | Analysing ZTT Group from a consolidated approach, the Commission noted that the group issued bonds with the intention to, in addition to other projects, supplement the company’s working capital. By this action, the group recognises its necessity of replenishing working capital to provide sufficient liquidity to the undergoing expansion of the business. Furthermore, during the period 2015 to 2018, ZTT Group’s gross profit rate showed a downward trend and was also below the average of comparable optical fibres producers companies (79). The investigation also established that Zhongtian Technology Group Co., Ltd, the parent company of the exporting producers, issued short term bonds with the purpose of debt repayment. A debt to equity swap was similarly established (80). |
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(317)

Analysing ZTT Group from a consolidated approach, the Commission noted that the group issued bonds with the intention to, in addition to other projects, supplement the company’s working capital. By this action, the group recognises its necessity of replenishing working capital to provide sufficient liquidity to the undergoing expansion of the business. Furthermore, during the period 2015 to 2018, ZTT Group’s gross profit rate showed a downward trend and was also below the average of comparable optical fibres producers companies (79). The investigation also established that Zhongtian Technology Group Co., Ltd, the parent company of the exporting producers, issued short term bonds with the purpose of debt repayment. A debt to equity swap was similarly established (80).

79

80

| (318) | In view of the above, the Commission considered that the overall financial situation of the group corresponds to a BB rating, which is the highest rating that does no longer qualify as ‘investment grade’. ‘Investment grade’ means that bonds issued by the company are judged by the rating agency as likely enough to meet payment obligations that banks are allowed to invest in them. |
| --- | --- |

(318)

In view of the above, the Commission considered that the overall financial situation of the group corresponds to a BB rating, which is the highest rating that does no longer qualify as ‘investment grade’. ‘Investment grade’ means that bonds issued by the company are judged by the rating agency as likely enough to meet payment obligations that banks are allowed to invest in them.

| (319) | The premium expected on bonds issued by firms with this BB rating was then applied to the standard lending rate of the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, or after 20 August 2019 to the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC, in order to determine the market rate. |
| --- | --- |

(319)

The premium expected on bonds issued by firms with this BB rating was then applied to the standard lending rate of the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, or after 20 August 2019 to the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC, in order to determine the market rate.

| (320) | That mark-up was determined by calculating the relative spread between the indices of US AA rated corporate bonds to US BB rated corporate bonds based on Bloomberg data for industrial segments. The relative spread thus calculated was then added to the Loan Benchmark Rate or by the Loan Prime Rate, at the date when the loan was granted and for the same duration as the loan in question. This was done individually for each loan provided to the company group. |
| --- | --- |

(320)

That mark-up was determined by calculating the relative spread between the indices of US AA rated corporate bonds to US BB rated corporate bonds based on Bloomberg data for industrial segments. The relative spread thus calculated was then added to the Loan Benchmark Rate or by the Loan Prime Rate, at the date when the loan was granted and for the same duration as the loan in question. This was done individually for each loan provided to the company group.

| (321) | As for loans denominated in foreign currencies, the same situation in respect of market distortions and the absence of valid credit ratings applies, because these loans are granted by the same Chinese financial institutions. Therefore, as found before, BB rated corporate bonds in relevant denominations issued during the investigation period were used to determine an appropriate benchmark. |
| --- | --- |

(321)

As for loans denominated in foreign currencies, the same situation in respect of market distortions and the absence of valid credit ratings applies, because these loans are granted by the same Chinese financial institutions. Therefore, as found before, BB rated corporate bonds in relevant denominations issued during the investigation period were used to determine an appropriate benchmark.

| (322) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the loans at issue did not confer a benefit within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basis Regulation and Article 1(1)(b) of the SCM Agreement. The GOC considered that the Commission illegally disregarded the credit rating of the cooperating exporting producers and disagreed with the methodology used by the Commission to establish a benchmark, which is based on a lack of consideration of the credit ratings of the exporting producers. The GOC noted that while the Commission’s findings regarding loans is based, to a significant extent, on its assessment of the supposedly poor financial situation of the companies at issue, the Commission’s assessment in this regard is incorrect, especially with regard to the companies’ revolving loans. |
| --- | --- |

(322)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the loans at issue did not confer a benefit within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basis Regulation and Article 1(1)(b) of the SCM Agreement. The GOC considered that the Commission illegally disregarded the credit rating of the cooperating exporting producers and disagreed with the methodology used by the Commission to establish a benchmark, which is based on a lack of consideration of the credit ratings of the exporting producers. The GOC noted that while the Commission’s findings regarding loans is based, to a significant extent, on its assessment of the supposedly poor financial situation of the companies at issue, the Commission’s assessment in this regard is incorrect, especially with regard to the companies’ revolving loans.

| (323) | In this respect, the Commission referred to its findings and conclusions in Section 3.5.2 where it demonstrated that the Chinese credit ratings do not provide a reliable estimation of the credit risk and that these credit ratings are distorted by the policy objectives of the GOC to encourage key strategic industries. Therefore, the claim of the GOC regarding the credit ratings of the cooperating exporting producers is unfounded. In order to establish a credit rating corresponding to the risk profile of the cooperating exporting producers, the Commission performed a financial analysis of the companies concerned in points (1) and (2) above, which pointed to a financial situation of the corresponding to a BB rating. Therefore, the claim of the GOC was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(323)

In this respect, the Commission referred to its findings and conclusions in Section 3.5.2 where it demonstrated that the Chinese credit ratings do not provide a reliable estimation of the credit risk and that these credit ratings are distorted by the policy objectives of the GOC to encourage key strategic industries. Therefore, the claim of the GOC regarding the credit ratings of the cooperating exporting producers is unfounded. In order to establish a credit rating corresponding to the risk profile of the cooperating exporting producers, the Commission performed a financial analysis of the companies concerned in points (1) and (2) above, which pointed to a financial situation of the corresponding to a BB rating. Therefore, the claim of the GOC was rejected.

| (324) | The GOC also claimed that the Commission failed to justify why it did not use a comparable loan on the Chinese market and failed to demonstrate on the basis of positive evidence that the market for loans in the PCR is distorted by government intervention. The GOC also claimed that even when resorting to external benchmarks for benefit establishment, the Commission did not make the required adjustments to its proxy benchmark and did not adequately explained how such a proxy approximates a comparable commercial loan available on the market. According to the GOC, the Commission should have taken into account differences that existed in inter alia the size of the loans, the terms of repayment, and considerations regarding whether or not the loans were actually granted and which have an effect on the lending rates. |
| --- | --- |

(324)

The GOC also claimed that the Commission failed to justify why it did not use a comparable loan on the Chinese market and failed to demonstrate on the basis of positive evidence that the market for loans in the PCR is distorted by government intervention. The GOC also claimed that even when resorting to external benchmarks for benefit establishment, the Commission did not make the required adjustments to its proxy benchmark and did not adequately explained how such a proxy approximates a comparable commercial loan available on the market. According to the GOC, the Commission should have taken into account differences that existed in inter alia the size of the loans, the terms of repayment, and considerations regarding whether or not the loans were actually granted and which have an effect on the lending rates.

approximates

inter alia

| (325) | In this respect, as explained above, domestic credit ratings awarded to Chinese companies were considered distorted by the policy objectives of the GOC to encourage key strategic industries and therefore unreliable. As a result, the Commission had to look for a benchmark based on undistorted credit ratings. The Commission disagreed with the view of the GOC that it did not make the required adjustments to its proxy benchmark. First, the Commission used the Chinese PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate and the Loan Prime Rate as a starting point for the calculation. Second, the use of the relative spread captures changes in the underlying country-specific market conditions, which are not expressed when following the logic of an absolute spread. The Commission observed that it is not possible to include all factors of the individual risk assessment of a bank into the proxy. However, the Commission’s calculation methodology takes into account parameters of individual loans, such as the start date and the duration of the loan, as well as the variability of the interest rate. The GOC’s claims were thus rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(325)

In this respect, as explained above, domestic credit ratings awarded to Chinese companies were considered distorted by the policy objectives of the GOC to encourage key strategic industries and therefore unreliable. As a result, the Commission had to look for a benchmark based on undistorted credit ratings. The Commission disagreed with the view of the GOC that it did not make the required adjustments to its proxy benchmark. First, the Commission used the Chinese PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate and the Loan Prime Rate as a starting point for the calculation. Second, the use of the relative spread captures changes in the underlying country-specific market conditions, which are not expressed when following the logic of an absolute spread. The Commission observed that it is not possible to include all factors of the individual risk assessment of a bank into the proxy. However, the Commission’s calculation methodology takes into account parameters of individual loans, such as the start date and the duration of the loan, as well as the variability of the interest rate. The GOC’s claims were thus rejected.

| (326) | The GOC objected to the use of the relative spread between AA and BB rated bonds as the mark-up and its addition to the PBOC rates. According to the GOC, the use of a relative spread further distorts the calculation of the benchmark interest rate at which Chinese companies with a BB rating could have obtained a
  ‘comparable commercial loan on the market’
  as the PBOC reference rates in the PRC during the relevant years were much higher than the reference rate in the US. In addition, the GOC stated that publicly available information shows that EU OFC producers with BB rating are issuing bonds at significantly lower rates than those used for Chinese producers. |
| --- | --- |

(326)

The GOC objected to the use of the relative spread between AA and BB rated bonds as the mark-up and its addition to the PBOC rates. According to the GOC, the use of a relative spread further distorts the calculation of the benchmark interest rate at which Chinese companies with a BB rating could have obtained a
  ‘comparable commercial loan on the market’
  as the PBOC reference rates in the PRC during the relevant years were much higher than the reference rate in the US. In addition, the GOC stated that publicly available information shows that EU OFC producers with BB rating are issuing bonds at significantly lower rates than those used for Chinese producers.

‘comparable commercial loan on the market’

| (327) | The ZTT Group commented that the Commission should have applied the absolute spread between the US AA rate corporate bonds and the US BB rated corporate bonds to the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, which would sufficiently factor in the risk exposure between the corporate bonds of different credit ratings. According to this party, the Commission did not explain why it used the relative spread and why it considered that the Benchmark Interest Rate published by the PBOC or the Loan Prime Rate published by NIFC equals to an AA rating interest rate. |
| --- | --- |

(327)

The ZTT Group commented that the Commission should have applied the absolute spread between the US AA rate corporate bonds and the US BB rated corporate bonds to the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, which would sufficiently factor in the risk exposure between the corporate bonds of different credit ratings. According to this party, the Commission did not explain why it used the relative spread and why it considered that the Benchmark Interest Rate published by the PBOC or the Loan Prime Rate published by NIFC equals to an AA rating interest rate.

| (328) | Regarding the comment on the use of the Benchmark Interest Rate published by the PBOC or the Loan Prime Rate published by NIFC as a starting point in the calculation of the benchmark, the Commission pointed out that these rates are considered to be risk-free rates which, in a conservative approach, would be applied to companies having an AA rating. |
| --- | --- |

(328)

Regarding the comment on the use of the Benchmark Interest Rate published by the PBOC or the Loan Prime Rate published by NIFC as a starting point in the calculation of the benchmark, the Commission pointed out that these rates are considered to be risk-free rates which, in a conservative approach, would be applied to companies having an AA rating.

| (329) | The issue of the use of the relative spread instead of the absolute spread was already explained in previous investigations (81). |
| --- | --- |

(329)

The issue of the use of the relative spread instead of the absolute spread was already explained in previous investigations (81).

81

| (330) | First, while the Commission recognised that commercial banks usually use a mark-up expressed in absolute terms, it observed that this practice seems mainly based on practical considerations because the interest rate is ultimately an absolute number. The absolute number is however the translation of a risk assessment that is based on a relative evaluation. The relative evaluation means that the risk of default of a BB-rated company is X % more likely than the risk of default of the government or a risk-free company. |
| --- | --- |

(330)

First, while the Commission recognised that commercial banks usually use a mark-up expressed in absolute terms, it observed that this practice seems mainly based on practical considerations because the interest rate is ultimately an absolute number. The absolute number is however the translation of a risk assessment that is based on a relative evaluation. The relative evaluation means that the risk of default of a BB-rated company is X % more likely than the risk of default of the government or a risk-free company.

| (331) | Second, interest rates reflect not only company-specific risk profiles, but also country- and currency-specific risks. The relative spread thus captures changes in the underlying market conditions, which are not expressed when following the logic of an absolute spread. Often, as in the present case, the country- and currency-specific risk varies over time, and the variations are different for different countries. As a result, the risk-free rates vary significantly over time, and are sometimes lower in the US, sometimes in China. These differences relate to factors such as observed and expected GDP growth, economic sentiment, and inflation levels. Because the risk-free rate varies over time, the same nominal absolute spread can signify a very different assessment of the risk. For example, where the bank estimates the company-specific risk of default at 10 % higher than the risk-free rate (relative estimation), the resulting absolute spread can be between 0,1 % (at a risk-free rate of 1 %) and 1 % (at a risk-free rate of 10 %). From an investor perspective, the relative spread is hence a better measure as it reflects the magnitude of the yield spread and the way it is affected by the base interest-rate level. |
| --- | --- |

(331)

Second, interest rates reflect not only company-specific risk profiles, but also country- and currency-specific risks. The relative spread thus captures changes in the underlying market conditions, which are not expressed when following the logic of an absolute spread. Often, as in the present case, the country- and currency-specific risk varies over time, and the variations are different for different countries. As a result, the risk-free rates vary significantly over time, and are sometimes lower in the US, sometimes in China. These differences relate to factors such as observed and expected GDP growth, economic sentiment, and inflation levels. Because the risk-free rate varies over time, the same nominal absolute spread can signify a very different assessment of the risk. For example, where the bank estimates the company-specific risk of default at 10 % higher than the risk-free rate (relative estimation), the resulting absolute spread can be between 0,1 % (at a risk-free rate of 1 %) and 1 % (at a risk-free rate of 10 %). From an investor perspective, the relative spread is hence a better measure as it reflects the magnitude of the yield spread and the way it is affected by the base interest-rate level.

| (332) | Third, the relative spread is also country-neutral. For instance, where the risk-free rate in the US is lower than the risk-free rate in China, the method will lead to higher absolute mark-ups. On the other hand, where the risk-free rate in China is lower than in the US the method will lead to lower absolute mark-ups. |
| --- | --- |

(332)

Third, the relative spread is also country-neutral. For instance, where the risk-free rate in the US is lower than the risk-free rate in China, the method will lead to higher absolute mark-ups. On the other hand, where the risk-free rate in China is lower than in the US the method will lead to lower absolute mark-ups.

| (333) | The Commission considered the comments of the GOC referring to interest rates applicable to BB-rated companies in the European Union as unfounded since the risk-free rate in the European Union is not the same as the risk-free rate in the PRC and thus it is not possible to compare interest rates in absolute terms. |
| --- | --- |

(333)

The Commission considered the comments of the GOC referring to interest rates applicable to BB-rated companies in the European Union as unfounded since the risk-free rate in the European Union is not the same as the risk-free rate in the PRC and thus it is not possible to compare interest rates in absolute terms.

| (334) | The ZTT Group further claimed that even if the relative spread is applicable, it shall be applied to the basis points part in the variable interest rates (usually expressed in a structure of reference rate plus basis points) and that this is the case for loans denominated in foreign currencies, where interest rates are expressed in the form of LIBOR plus basis points. Therefore, the risk exposure of borrowing is duly reflected by the basis points added to LIBOR and by applying the relative spread to LIBOR, the commission calculated a benchmark rate completely disconnected to the company’s credit rating. As regards loans denominated in CNY, the same spread adjustment shall be made only to basis points where the variable rates are expressed in LRP plus basis points. |
| --- | --- |

(334)

The ZTT Group further claimed that even if the relative spread is applicable, it shall be applied to the basis points part in the variable interest rates (usually expressed in a structure of reference rate plus basis points) and that this is the case for loans denominated in foreign currencies, where interest rates are expressed in the form of LIBOR plus basis points. Therefore, the risk exposure of borrowing is duly reflected by the basis points added to LIBOR and by applying the relative spread to LIBOR, the commission calculated a benchmark rate completely disconnected to the company’s credit rating. As regards loans denominated in CNY, the same spread adjustment shall be made only to basis points where the variable rates are expressed in LRP plus basis points.

| (335) | In this respect, the Commission considered for loans denominated in foreign currencies a conservative approach by using the LIBOR as risk-free reference interest rate. The basis points added to LIBOR indicate the specific risks of a company. First, only for some loans of sampled exporting producers such differentiation between reference interest rate and basis points was given. Second, these basis points were also considered to be market distorted. Therefore, the Commission considered the risk-free rate increased by the relative spread an appropriate proxy to reflect the additional risk of a BB-rated company, such as the sampled exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(335)

In this respect, the Commission considered for loans denominated in foreign currencies a conservative approach by using the LIBOR as risk-free reference interest rate. The basis points added to LIBOR indicate the specific risks of a company. First, only for some loans of sampled exporting producers such differentiation between reference interest rate and basis points was given. Second, these basis points were also considered to be market distorted. Therefore, the Commission considered the risk-free rate increased by the relative spread an appropriate proxy to reflect the additional risk of a BB-rated company, such as the sampled exporting producers.

| (336) | The GOC also argued that the benchmark for loans, which is based on the relative spread between corporate bonds, needs to be adjusted downwards in view of the difference between the two financial instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(336)

The GOC also argued that the benchmark for loans, which is based on the relative spread between corporate bonds, needs to be adjusted downwards in view of the difference between the two financial instruments.

| (337) | In this respect, the Commission pointed out that loans and corporate bonds are similar financial debt instruments. In fact, a corporate bond is a kind of a loan used by large entities to raise capital. Both loans and corporate bonds are contracted/issued for a certain period of time and bear an interest/coupon rate. The fact that the financing through a loan is provided by a financial institution and that the financing through a corporate bond is provided by investors, which in most cases are also financial institutions, is irrelevant for the determination of the core characteristics of both instruments. Indeed, both instruments serve to finance business operations, bear the same kind of remuneration and have similar repayment term and conditions. Furthermore, during the investigation, the Commission found out that the corporate bond issued by one of the cooperating exporting producers had a coupon rate and purpose which was very similar to the interest rates and purpose of loans with similar duration, and thus they could be considered interchangeable from the producer’s perspective. On this basis, the Commission rejected the claim of the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(337)

In this respect, the Commission pointed out that loans and corporate bonds are similar financial debt instruments. In fact, a corporate bond is a kind of a loan used by large entities to raise capital. Both loans and corporate bonds are contracted/issued for a certain period of time and bear an interest/coupon rate. The fact that the financing through a loan is provided by a financial institution and that the financing through a corporate bond is provided by investors, which in most cases are also financial institutions, is irrelevant for the determination of the core characteristics of both instruments. Indeed, both instruments serve to finance business operations, bear the same kind of remuneration and have similar repayment term and conditions. Furthermore, during the investigation, the Commission found out that the corporate bond issued by one of the cooperating exporting producers had a coupon rate and purpose which was very similar to the interest rates and purpose of loans with similar duration, and thus they could be considered interchangeable from the producer’s perspective. On this basis, the Commission rejected the claim of the GOC.

3.5.3.4.   Conclusion on preferential financing: loans

| (338) | The Commission established that both sampled groups of exporting producers benefited from preferential financing through loans during the investigation period. In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, the Commission considered preferential financing through loans a countervailable subsidy. |
| --- | --- |

(338)

The Commission established that both sampled groups of exporting producers benefited from preferential financing through loans during the investigation period. In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, the Commission considered preferential financing through loans a countervailable subsidy.

| (339) | The subsidy rates established with regard to the preferential financing through loans during the investigation period for the sampled groups of companies amounted to:

  Preferential financing: loans







  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(339)

The subsidy rates established with regard to the preferential financing through loans during the investigation period for the sampled groups of companies amounted to:

Preferential financing: loans

Preferential financing: loans

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

0,90 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

0,38 %

3.5.4.   Preferential financing: other types of financing

Preferential financing: other types of financing

3.5.4.1   Credit lines

(a)   General

| (340) | The purpose of a credit line is to establish a borrowing limit that the company can use at any time to finance its current operations thus making working capital financing flexible and immediately available when needed. Therefore, the Commission considered that in principle, all short-term financing of the sampled companies, such as short-term loans, bank acceptance drafts etc., should be covered by a credit line instrument. |
| --- | --- |

(340)

The purpose of a credit line is to establish a borrowing limit that the company can use at any time to finance its current operations thus making working capital financing flexible and immediately available when needed. Therefore, the Commission considered that in principle, all short-term financing of the sampled companies, such as short-term loans, bank acceptance drafts etc., should be covered by a credit line instrument.

(b)   Findings

| (341) | The Commission established that Chinese financial institutions provided credit lines to both sampled groups in connection with the provision of financing. These consisted of framework agreements, under which the bank allows the sampled companies to use various debt instruments, such as working capital loans, bank acceptance drafts, other forms of trade financing, etc., within a certain maximum amount. |
| --- | --- |

(341)

The Commission established that Chinese financial institutions provided credit lines to both sampled groups in connection with the provision of financing. These consisted of framework agreements, under which the bank allows the sampled companies to use various debt instruments, such as working capital loans, bank acceptance drafts, other forms of trade financing, etc., within a certain maximum amount.

| (342) | As mentioned in recital (340) above, all short-term financing should be covered by a credit line. Therefore, the Commission compared the amount of the credit lines available to the cooperating companies during the investigation period with the amount of short-term financing used by these companies during the same period to establish whether all short-term financing was covered by a credit line. In the case where the amount of the short-term financing exceeded the credit line limit, the Commission increased the amount of the existing credit line by the amount actually used by the exporting producers beyond that credit line limit. |
| --- | --- |

(342)

As mentioned in recital (340) above, all short-term financing should be covered by a credit line. Therefore, the Commission compared the amount of the credit lines available to the cooperating companies during the investigation period with the amount of short-term financing used by these companies during the same period to establish whether all short-term financing was covered by a credit line. In the case where the amount of the short-term financing exceeded the credit line limit, the Commission increased the amount of the existing credit line by the amount actually used by the exporting producers beyond that credit line limit.

| (343) | Under normal market circumstances, credit lines would be subject to a so-called ‘arrangement’ or ‘commitment’ fee to compensate for the bank’s costs and risks at the opening of a credit line, as well as to a ‘renewal fee’ charged on a yearly basis for renewing the validity of the credit lines. However, the Commission found that both sampled groups of companies benefited from credit lines provided free of charge. Therefore, a benefit was conferred to both groups of companies within the meaning of Article 6(d) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(343)

Under normal market circumstances, credit lines would be subject to a so-called ‘arrangement’ or ‘commitment’ fee to compensate for the bank’s costs and risks at the opening of a credit line, as well as to a ‘renewal fee’ charged on a yearly basis for renewing the validity of the credit lines. However, the Commission found that both sampled groups of companies benefited from credit lines provided free of charge. Therefore, a benefit was conferred to both groups of companies within the meaning of Article 6(d) of the basic Regulation.

(c)   Specificity

| (344) | As mentioned in recital (116), according to Decision No 40, financial institutions shall provide credit support to encouraged industries. |
| --- | --- |

(344)

As mentioned in recital (116), according to Decision No 40, financial institutions shall provide credit support to encouraged industries.

| (345) | The Commission considered that credit lines are a form of a preferential financial support by financial institutions to encouraged industries such as the OFC sector. As specified in Section 3.1 above, the OFC sector is among the encouraged industries and is therefore eligible for all possible financial support. |
| --- | --- |

(345)

The Commission considered that credit lines are a form of a preferential financial support by financial institutions to encouraged industries such as the OFC sector. As specified in Section 3.1 above, the OFC sector is among the encouraged industries and is therefore eligible for all possible financial support.

| (346) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the credit lines allegedly being provided to the OFC industry are not specific and that the Commission failed to demonstrate how the access to the credit lines was explicitly limited to the OFC industry. The GOC stressed that all enterprises in the PRC, regardless of industry type, are equally eligible for obtaining credit lines. This claim was reiterated by the FTT Group. |
| --- | --- |

(346)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the credit lines allegedly being provided to the OFC industry are not specific and that the Commission failed to demonstrate how the access to the credit lines was explicitly limited to the OFC industry. The GOC stressed that all enterprises in the PRC, regardless of industry type, are equally eligible for obtaining credit lines. This claim was reiterated by the FTT Group.

explicitly limited

| (347) | In this respect, the Commission noted that the GOC’s assertion that all enterprises in the PRC can benefit from credit lines is inapposite. The GOC failed to demonstrate that companies in the PRC can equally benefit from the preferential conditions observed as regards the OFC industry. Moreover, as credit lines are intrinsically linked to other types of preferential lending such as loans and as they are part of the credit support specifically provided to encouraged industries as explained in recital (239), the specificity analysis as developed in Section 3.5.3.2 above for loans is also applicable to credit lines. As a result, these claims were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(347)

In this respect, the Commission noted that the GOC’s assertion that all enterprises in the PRC can benefit from credit lines is inapposite. The GOC failed to demonstrate that companies in the PRC can equally benefit from the preferential conditions observed as regards the OFC industry. Moreover, as credit lines are intrinsically linked to other types of preferential lending such as loans and as they are part of the credit support specifically provided to encouraged industries as explained in recital (239), the specificity analysis as developed in Section 3.5.3.2 above for loans is also applicable to credit lines. As a result, these claims were rejected.

(d)   Calculation of the benefit

| (348) | In accordance with Article 6(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, the Commission considered the benefit conferred on the recipients to be the difference between the amount that the company has paid as a fee for the opening or the renewal of the credit lines by Chinese financial institutions and the amount that the company would pay for a comparable commercial credit line obtained on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(348)

In accordance with Article 6(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, the Commission considered the benefit conferred on the recipients to be the difference between the amount that the company has paid as a fee for the opening or the renewal of the credit lines by Chinese financial institutions and the amount that the company would pay for a comparable commercial credit line obtained on the market.

| (349) | The appropriate benchmarks for the arrangement fee and for the renewal fee were established at 1,5 % and 1,25 % respectively by reference to publicly available data (82) and benchmarks used in previous investigations (83). |
| --- | --- |

(349)

The appropriate benchmarks for the arrangement fee and for the renewal fee were established at 1,5 % and 1,25 % respectively by reference to publicly available data (82) and benchmarks used in previous investigations (83).

82

83

| (350) | In principle, the arrangement fee and the renewal fee are payable on a lump sum basis at the time of the opening of a new credit line or the renewal of an existing credit line respectively. However, for calculation purposes, the Commission took into account credit lines which have been opened or renewed before the investigation period but which were available to the sampled groups during the investigation period and the credit lines that were opened or renewed during the investigation period. Then, the Commission calculated the benefit based on the period within the investigation period during which the credit line was available. |
| --- | --- |

(350)

In principle, the arrangement fee and the renewal fee are payable on a lump sum basis at the time of the opening of a new credit line or the renewal of an existing credit line respectively. However, for calculation purposes, the Commission took into account credit lines which have been opened or renewed before the investigation period but which were available to the sampled groups during the investigation period and the credit lines that were opened or renewed during the investigation period. Then, the Commission calculated the benefit based on the period within the investigation period during which the credit line was available.

| (351) | Following final disclosure, the GOC commented that the Commission failed to demonstrate that a benefit was provided through credit lines. The GOC claimed that the Commission has not demonstrated that the financial assistance at issue makes the recipient better off than it would have been, absent that contribution. |
| --- | --- |

(351)

Following final disclosure, the GOC commented that the Commission failed to demonstrate that a benefit was provided through credit lines. The GOC claimed that the Commission has not demonstrated that the financial assistance at issue makes the recipient better off than it would have been, absent that contribution.

better off

| (352) | In this respect, as pointed out in recital (343), under normal market circumstances, credit lines are subject to an ‘arrangement’ or ‘commitment’ fee as well as to a ‘renewal fee’ charged on a yearly basis for renewing the validity of the credit lines. Taking into account the fact that the cooperating exporting producers befitted from credit lines free of charge, the benefit consisted in the amount of arrangement and renewal fees that the companies should have paid. The fees savings from which the companies benefitted made them better off from a financial point of view. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(352)

In this respect, as pointed out in recital (343), under normal market circumstances, credit lines are subject to an ‘arrangement’ or ‘commitment’ fee as well as to a ‘renewal fee’ charged on a yearly basis for renewing the validity of the credit lines. Taking into account the fact that the cooperating exporting producers befitted from credit lines free of charge, the benefit consisted in the amount of arrangement and renewal fees that the companies should have paid. The fees savings from which the companies benefitted made them better off from a financial point of view. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

better off

| (353) | The FTT Group claimed that the opening of a credit line is not a financial contribution. It stated that credit lines establish only a borrowing limit that a company can use to obtain working capital or financial instruments and that there are no world-wide accepted standards regarding how to arrange the opening credit lines and that there is no evidence that fees are commonly and compulsorily applied by all banks in the world and that the Commission based its assessment and benchmark fee on only one bank, namely HSBC. In addition, the FTT Group argued that the applicable fees are merely bank handling expenses, which are not associated with the risk of opening or renewing a credit line. The GOC also claimed that the Commission erred in its determination of a proper benchmark. |
| --- | --- |

(353)

The FTT Group claimed that the opening of a credit line is not a financial contribution. It stated that credit lines establish only a borrowing limit that a company can use to obtain working capital or financial instruments and that there are no world-wide accepted standards regarding how to arrange the opening credit lines and that there is no evidence that fees are commonly and compulsorily applied by all banks in the world and that the Commission based its assessment and benchmark fee on only one bank, namely HSBC. In addition, the FTT Group argued that the applicable fees are merely bank handling expenses, which are not associated with the risk of opening or renewing a credit line. The GOC also claimed that the Commission erred in its determination of a proper benchmark.

| (354) | In this respect, the Commission clarified that it has based its conclusion regarding the application of arrangement and renewal fees as well as regarding the appropriate benchmark on publicly available data. In recital (349), the Commission made reference to findings in previous anti-subsidy cases as well as to the practice of two large internationally operating banks, i.e. HSBC and Barclays Bank (84), in order to establish an appropriate benchmark. Considering the available information, the Commission estimated that the application of an arrangement fee benchmark of 1,5 % and a renewal benchmark fee of 1,25 % was reasonable. The Commission disagreed with the claim of the FTT Group that the applicable fees are merely bank handling expense, which are not associated with the risk of opening or renewing a credit line. According to business practice, a commitment fee is charged by a lender to a borrower to compensate the lender for keeping a credit line open and financial resources available; the fee also secures a lender’s promise to provide the credit line on the agreed terms and compensates the lender for the risks associated with an open credit line (85). Actually, a business credit line operates in the same ways as a personal credit card for which banks always charge fees associated with the use of the credit card and the availability of the given amount of money. Therefore, the claims were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(354)

In this respect, the Commission clarified that it has based its conclusion regarding the application of arrangement and renewal fees as well as regarding the appropriate benchmark on publicly available data. In recital (349), the Commission made reference to findings in previous anti-subsidy cases as well as to the practice of two large internationally operating banks, i.e. HSBC and Barclays Bank (84), in order to establish an appropriate benchmark. Considering the available information, the Commission estimated that the application of an arrangement fee benchmark of 1,5 % and a renewal benchmark fee of 1,25 % was reasonable. The Commission disagreed with the claim of the FTT Group that the applicable fees are merely bank handling expense, which are not associated with the risk of opening or renewing a credit line. According to business practice, a commitment fee is charged by a lender to a borrower to compensate the lender for keeping a credit line open and financial resources available; the fee also secures a lender’s promise to provide the credit line on the agreed terms and compensates the lender for the risks associated with an open credit line (85). Actually, a business credit line operates in the same ways as a personal credit card for which banks always charge fees associated with the use of the credit card and the availability of the given amount of money. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

84

85

| (355) | The ZTT Group disagreed with the Commission’s statement that having a credit line agreement with a bank is a pre-requisite for obtaining financing from the latter and provided examples of bank in the world that do not require credit lines in order to provide ad-hoc borrowings. According to the ZTT Group, credit lines are framework agreements, under which the bank allows a company to use various debt instruments within a certain maximum credit amount without re-negotiation; however, it does not exclude any stand-alone loans to a company which is assessed and granted on a case-by-case basis without a prior credit line. The ZTT Group also disagreed that all credit lines, especially the ones agreed with large and sophisticated clients, are subject to arrangement or renewal fees. The ZTT Group claimed that the benchmark fees used by the Commission are too high and provided examples of fees charged by Lloyds (up to 1,5 % for arrangement and 1 % for renewal) and HSBC where the exact fee seems to be determined bilaterally/contractually. |
| --- | --- |

(355)

The ZTT Group disagreed with the Commission’s statement that having a credit line agreement with a bank is a pre-requisite for obtaining financing from the latter and provided examples of bank in the world that do not require credit lines in order to provide ad-hoc borrowings. According to the ZTT Group, credit lines are framework agreements, under which the bank allows a company to use various debt instruments within a certain maximum credit amount without re-negotiation; however, it does not exclude any stand-alone loans to a company which is assessed and granted on a case-by-case basis without a prior credit line. The ZTT Group also disagreed that all credit lines, especially the ones agreed with large and sophisticated clients, are subject to arrangement or renewal fees. The ZTT Group claimed that the benchmark fees used by the Commission are too high and provided examples of fees charged by Lloyds (up to 1,5 % for arrangement and 1 % for renewal) and HSBC where the exact fee seems to be determined bilaterally/contractually.

| (356) | First, as explained in recital (340), the purpose of a credit line is to establish a borrowing limit that the company can use at any time to finance its current operations thus making working capital financing flexible and immediately available when needed. Taking into account the short-term financing practices of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in the form of bank acceptance drafts and working capital short-term loans, for which financial resources needed to be immediately available, as well as the fact that most of the time the companies only had oral credit line arrangements without any written evidence, the Commission considered that all short-term financing of the sampled companies were to be covered by a credit line instrument. This conclusion is applicable only to short-term financing and does not concern long-term financing, which is subject to a case-by-case negotiation. Second, regarding the claim that all credit lines, especially the ones agreed with large and sophisticated clients, are subject to arrangement or renewal fees, the Commission observed that the ZTT Group failed to provide evidence of credit line facilities without a commission attached to them. Third, regarding the benchmark fees used by the Commission, as stated in recital (354), the Commission used findings in previous anti-subsidy cases and publicly available data to conclude that the application of an arrangement fee benchmark of 1,5 % and a renewal benchmark fee of 1,25 % was reasonable. In this respect, the Commission pointed out that for instance Barclays Bank charges a set-up fee of 1,5 % of the arranged overdraft limit, and a renewal fee of 1,5 % for overdrafts over £ 15 000. In this case the renewal fee benchmark used by the Commission is lower. A further search showed that Barkley charges business overdraft fees from 1,6 % up to 2,5 % of the limits for the business bands £ 15 001 - £ 20 000 and £ 20 001 – £ 25 000 (86). Therefore, the Commission reiterated its conclusion that the benchmark fees it has used are reasonable and based on available market data and thus rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(356)

First, as explained in recital (340), the purpose of a credit line is to establish a borrowing limit that the company can use at any time to finance its current operations thus making working capital financing flexible and immediately available when needed. Taking into account the short-term financing practices of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in the form of bank acceptance drafts and working capital short-term loans, for which financial resources needed to be immediately available, as well as the fact that most of the time the companies only had oral credit line arrangements without any written evidence, the Commission considered that all short-term financing of the sampled companies were to be covered by a credit line instrument. This conclusion is applicable only to short-term financing and does not concern long-term financing, which is subject to a case-by-case negotiation. Second, regarding the claim that all credit lines, especially the ones agreed with large and sophisticated clients, are subject to arrangement or renewal fees, the Commission observed that the ZTT Group failed to provide evidence of credit line facilities without a commission attached to them. Third, regarding the benchmark fees used by the Commission, as stated in recital (354), the Commission used findings in previous anti-subsidy cases and publicly available data to conclude that the application of an arrangement fee benchmark of 1,5 % and a renewal benchmark fee of 1,25 % was reasonable. In this respect, the Commission pointed out that for instance Barclays Bank charges a set-up fee of 1,5 % of the arranged overdraft limit, and a renewal fee of 1,5 % for overdrafts over £ 15 000. In this case the renewal fee benchmark used by the Commission is lower. A further search showed that Barkley charges business overdraft fees from 1,6 % up to 2,5 % of the limits for the business bands £ 15 001 - £ 20 000 and £ 20 001 – £ 25 000 (86). Therefore, the Commission reiterated its conclusion that the benchmark fees it has used are reasonable and based on available market data and thus rejected the claim.

86

3.5.4.2.   Bank acceptance drafts

(a)   General

| (357) | Bank acceptance drafts are a financial product aimed at developing a more active domestic money market by broadening credit facilities. It is a form of short-term financing that might
  ‘reduce fund cost and enhance capital efficiency’
  of the drawer (87). In addition, as stated by the People’s Bank of China on its website,
  ‘the bank acceptance draft can guarantee the establishment and performance of the contract between the buyer and the seller, as well as promote the capital turnover via the intervention of Bank of China’s credit’
   (88). In addition, on its website DBS Bank advertises bank acceptance drafts as a means to
  ‘improve working capital by deferring payments’
   (89). |
| --- | --- |

(357)

Bank acceptance drafts are a financial product aimed at developing a more active domestic money market by broadening credit facilities. It is a form of short-term financing that might
  ‘reduce fund cost and enhance capital efficiency’
  of the drawer (87). In addition, as stated by the People’s Bank of China on its website,
  ‘the bank acceptance draft can guarantee the establishment and performance of the contract between the buyer and the seller, as well as promote the capital turnover via the intervention of Bank of China’s credit’
   (88). In addition, on its website DBS Bank advertises bank acceptance drafts as a means to
  ‘improve working capital by deferring payments’
   (89).

‘reduce fund cost and enhance capital efficiency’

87

‘the bank acceptance draft can guarantee the establishment and performance of the contract between the buyer and the seller, as well as promote the capital turnover via the intervention of Bank of China’s credit’

88

‘improve working capital by deferring payments’

89

| (358) | Bank acceptance drafts can only be used to settle genuine trade transactions and the drawer must produce sufficient evidence in that respect, e.g. through a purchase/sales agreement, invoice and delivery order etc. Bank acceptance drafts may be used as a standard means of payment in purchase agreements together with other means such as remittance or money order. |
| --- | --- |

(358)

Bank acceptance drafts can only be used to settle genuine trade transactions and the drawer must produce sufficient evidence in that respect, e.g. through a purchase/sales agreement, invoice and delivery order etc. Bank acceptance drafts may be used as a standard means of payment in purchase agreements together with other means such as remittance or money order.

| (359) | The bank acceptance draft is drawn by the applicant (the drawer, which is also the buyer in the underlying commercial transaction) and accepted by a bank. By accepting the draft, the bank accepts to make an unconditional payment of the amount of money specified in the draft to the payee/bearer on the designated date (the maturity date). |
| --- | --- |

(359)

The bank acceptance draft is drawn by the applicant (the drawer, which is also the buyer in the underlying commercial transaction) and accepted by a bank. By accepting the draft, the bank accepts to make an unconditional payment of the amount of money specified in the draft to the payee/bearer on the designated date (the maturity date).

| (360) | In general, the bank acceptance contracts contain the list of the transactions covered by the amount of the draft with indication of the payment due date with the supplier and the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft. |
| --- | --- |

(360)

In general, the bank acceptance contracts contain the list of the transactions covered by the amount of the draft with indication of the payment due date with the supplier and the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft.

| (361) | Usually, bank acceptance drafts are issued within the framework of a bank acceptance draft agreement specifying the identity of the bank, suppliers and buyer, the obligations of the bank and the buyer and detailing the value per supplier, the payment due date agreed with the supplier and the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft. |
| --- | --- |

(361)

Usually, bank acceptance drafts are issued within the framework of a bank acceptance draft agreement specifying the identity of the bank, suppliers and buyer, the obligations of the bank and the buyer and detailing the value per supplier, the payment due date agreed with the supplier and the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft.

| (362) | The Commission established that credit line agreements generally list bank acceptance drafts as possible use of the finance limit along with other short-term financial instruments such as working capital loans. |
| --- | --- |

(362)

The Commission established that credit line agreements generally list bank acceptance drafts as possible use of the finance limit along with other short-term financial instruments such as working capital loans.

| (363) | Depending on the conditions established by each bank, the drawer might be required to make a small deposit in a dedicated account, make a pledge and pay acceptance commission. In any event, the drawer is obliged to transfer the full amount of the bank acceptance draft to the dedicated account at the latest at the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft. |
| --- | --- |

(363)

Depending on the conditions established by each bank, the drawer might be required to make a small deposit in a dedicated account, make a pledge and pay acceptance commission. In any event, the drawer is obliged to transfer the full amount of the bank acceptance draft to the dedicated account at the latest at the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft.

| (364) | Once accepted by the bank, the drawer endorses the bank acceptance draft and transfers it to the payee, who is also the supplier in the underlying commercial transaction, as a payment of the invoice. Consequently, the payment obligation of the buyer (drawer) towards the supplier (payee) is cancelled. A new payment obligation of the buyer is created towards the accepting bank for the same amount (the drawer has the obligation to pay the bank in cash before the maturity of the bank acceptance draft). Therefore, the issuance of a bank acceptance drafts has the effect to replace the obligation of the drawer towards its supplier by an obligation towards the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(364)

Once accepted by the bank, the drawer endorses the bank acceptance draft and transfers it to the payee, who is also the supplier in the underlying commercial transaction, as a payment of the invoice. Consequently, the payment obligation of the buyer (drawer) towards the supplier (payee) is cancelled. A new payment obligation of the buyer is created towards the accepting bank for the same amount (the drawer has the obligation to pay the bank in cash before the maturity of the bank acceptance draft). Therefore, the issuance of a bank acceptance drafts has the effect to replace the obligation of the drawer towards its supplier by an obligation towards the bank.

| (365) | The maturity of bank acceptance drafts varies depending on the conditions set by each bank and can go up to 1 year. |
| --- | --- |

(365)

The maturity of bank acceptance drafts varies depending on the conditions set by each bank and can go up to 1 year.

| (366) | The payee (or bearer) of the bank acceptance draft has three options before the maturity:






  — | wait until maturity to be paid in cash the full amount of the face value of the draft by the accepting bank; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(366)

The payee (or bearer) of the bank acceptance draft has three options before the maturity:

—

wait until maturity to be paid in cash the full amount of the face value of the draft by the accepting bank;

| — | endorse the bank acceptance draft, i.e. use it as a means of payment for its liabilities towards other parties; or |
| --- | --- |

—

endorse the bank acceptance draft, i.e. use it as a means of payment for its liabilities towards other parties; or

| — | discount the bank acceptance draft with the accepting bank or another bank and obtain the cash proceeds against the payment of a discounting rate. |
| --- | --- |

—

discount the bank acceptance draft with the accepting bank or another bank and obtain the cash proceeds against the payment of a discounting rate.

| (367) | The issuance date of the bank acceptance draft generally corresponds to the payment due date agreed with the supplier. The Commission found that, as far as the sampled companies are concerned, the issuance date was generally on or before the due date of the payment with the supplier and in some cases even few days after the payment due date. The Commission established that the maturity date of the bank acceptance drafts of the sampled companies is from 3 months up to 12 months after the payment due date of the invoice. |
| --- | --- |

(367)

The issuance date of the bank acceptance draft generally corresponds to the payment due date agreed with the supplier. The Commission found that, as far as the sampled companies are concerned, the issuance date was generally on or before the due date of the payment with the supplier and in some cases even few days after the payment due date. The Commission established that the maturity date of the bank acceptance drafts of the sampled companies is from 3 months up to 12 months after the payment due date of the invoice.

| (368) | Regarding the accounting treatment of bank acceptance drafts, they are recognized as liabilities to the bank in the accounts of the drawers, i.e. the sampled exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(368)

Regarding the accounting treatment of bank acceptance drafts, they are recognized as liabilities to the bank in the accounts of the drawers, i.e. the sampled exporting producers.

| (369) | The Credit Reference Center of the People’s Bank of China (‘CRCP’) recognises bank acceptance drafts as ‘unsettled credit’ provided by banks at the same level as loans, letters of credit or trade financing. It should also be noted that the CRCP is fed by the financial institutions, which grant various types of loans, and that such financial institutions have thus recognised bank acceptance drafts as liabilities to them. Furthermore, the bank acceptance agreements collected during the investigation provide that, should the buyer not make the full payment on the expiry date of the bank acceptance drafts, the bank would treat the amount unpaid as an overdue loan to the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(369)

The Credit Reference Center of the People’s Bank of China (‘CRCP’) recognises bank acceptance drafts as ‘unsettled credit’ provided by banks at the same level as loans, letters of credit or trade financing. It should also be noted that the CRCP is fed by the financial institutions, which grant various types of loans, and that such financial institutions have thus recognised bank acceptance drafts as liabilities to them. Furthermore, the bank acceptance agreements collected during the investigation provide that, should the buyer not make the full payment on the expiry date of the bank acceptance drafts, the bank would treat the amount unpaid as an overdue loan to the bank.

| (370) | The Commission established that bank acceptance drafts are largely used as a means of payment in commercial transactions as a substitute to a money order thus facilitating the cash turnover and the working capital of the drawer. From a cash point of view, the instrument de facto grants the drawer a deferred due date of payment up to 1 year because the actual cash payment of the transaction amount occurs at the maturity of the bank acceptance draft and not at the moment when the drawer had to pay its supplier. In the absence of such a financial instrument, the drawer would either use its own working capital, which has a cost, or contract a short-term working capital loan with a bank in order to pay its suppliers, which also has a cost. In fact, by paying with bank acceptance draft, the drawer uses the supplied goods or services for a period of 3 months to 1 year without advancing any cash and without bearing any cost. |
| --- | --- |

(370)

The Commission established that bank acceptance drafts are largely used as a means of payment in commercial transactions as a substitute to a money order thus facilitating the cash turnover and the working capital of the drawer. From a cash point of view, the instrument de facto grants the drawer a deferred due date of payment up to 1 year because the actual cash payment of the transaction amount occurs at the maturity of the bank acceptance draft and not at the moment when the drawer had to pay its supplier. In the absence of such a financial instrument, the drawer would either use its own working capital, which has a cost, or contract a short-term working capital loan with a bank in order to pay its suppliers, which also has a cost. In fact, by paying with bank acceptance draft, the drawer uses the supplied goods or services for a period of 3 months to 1 year without advancing any cash and without bearing any cost.

de facto

| (371) | Under normal market circumstances, as a financial instrument, bank acceptance drafts would imply a cost of financing for the drawer. The investigation showed that all the sampled companies that used bank acceptance drafts during the investigation period only paid a commission for the acceptance service provided by the bank, which was in general 0,05 % of the face value of the draft. However, none of the sampled companies bore a cost for the financing via bank acceptance drafts by deferring the cash payment of the supply of goods and services. Therefore, the Commission considered that the investigated companies benefitted from financing in the form of bank acceptance drafts for which they did not bear any cost. |
| --- | --- |

(371)

Under normal market circumstances, as a financial instrument, bank acceptance drafts would imply a cost of financing for the drawer. The investigation showed that all the sampled companies that used bank acceptance drafts during the investigation period only paid a commission for the acceptance service provided by the bank, which was in general 0,05 % of the face value of the draft. However, none of the sampled companies bore a cost for the financing via bank acceptance drafts by deferring the cash payment of the supply of goods and services. Therefore, the Commission considered that the investigated companies benefitted from financing in the form of bank acceptance drafts for which they did not bear any cost.

| (372) | Considering the above, the Commission concluded that the bank acceptance system put in place in the PRC provided all exporting producers a free financing of their current operations, which conferred a countervailable benefit as described in recitals (384) to (388) below, in accordance with Article 3(1)(a)(i) and 3(2) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(372)

Considering the above, the Commission concluded that the bank acceptance system put in place in the PRC provided all exporting producers a free financing of their current operations, which conferred a countervailable benefit as described in recitals (384) to (388) below, in accordance with Article 3(1)(a)(i) and 3(2) of the basic Regulation.

| (373) | The Commission established in a previous investigation (90) that bank acceptance drafts effectively have the same purpose and effects as short-term working capital loans, as they are used by companies to finance their current operations instead of using short-term working capital loans, and that consequently, they should bear a cost equivalent to a short-term working capital loan financing. |
| --- | --- |

(373)

The Commission established in a previous investigation (90) that bank acceptance drafts effectively have the same purpose and effects as short-term working capital loans, as they are used by companies to finance their current operations instead of using short-term working capital loans, and that consequently, they should bear a cost equivalent to a short-term working capital loan financing.

90

| (374) | Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group disagreed with the Commission that bank acceptance drafts are a form of short-term financing and that they act rather as a bank guarantee. According to this party, a bank acceptance draft is an instrument by which the bank takes the obligation to pay a party rather than the original debtor, who still remains liable to pay the bank. The purpose of such instrument is not to act as short-term financing but as to facilitate the sale of goods. The ZTT Group argued that by agreeing to the payment via bank acceptance drafts, the parties to the transactions consented to the payment term of settling the debt between them, amounting to the seller to agree to a credit term until the draft maturity against a bank guaranteed payment and the buyer undertaking the obligation to make the same value available to the bank at the maturity date at the latest. |
| --- | --- |

(374)

Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group disagreed with the Commission that bank acceptance drafts are a form of short-term financing and that they act rather as a bank guarantee. According to this party, a bank acceptance draft is an instrument by which the bank takes the obligation to pay a party rather than the original debtor, who still remains liable to pay the bank. The purpose of such instrument is not to act as short-term financing but as to facilitate the sale of goods. The ZTT Group argued that by agreeing to the payment via bank acceptance drafts, the parties to the transactions consented to the payment term of settling the debt between them, amounting to the seller to agree to a credit term until the draft maturity against a bank guaranteed payment and the buyer undertaking the obligation to make the same value available to the bank at the maturity date at the latest.

| (375) | The Commission disagreed that bank acceptance drafts act merely as a bank guarantee for a payment at maturity date. The Commission observed that in the case of the sampled exporting producers, the bank acceptance draft is an actual means of payment acknowledged in the sales contract, and the payment obligation of the drawer towards the supplier is cancelled by the payment with a bank acceptance draft. The payment of the supplier by the drawer happens at the moment of the endorsement of the bank acceptance draft, while at maturity, the drawer honours its payment obligation towards the bank. Therefore, the bank acceptance draft cannot be classified merely as an additional guarantee of a future payment and this claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(375)

The Commission disagreed that bank acceptance drafts act merely as a bank guarantee for a payment at maturity date. The Commission observed that in the case of the sampled exporting producers, the bank acceptance draft is an actual means of payment acknowledged in the sales contract, and the payment obligation of the drawer towards the supplier is cancelled by the payment with a bank acceptance draft. The payment of the supplier by the drawer happens at the moment of the endorsement of the bank acceptance draft, while at maturity, the drawer honours its payment obligation towards the bank. Therefore, the bank acceptance draft cannot be classified merely as an additional guarantee of a future payment and this claim was rejected.

| (376) | Consequently, the Commission reiterated its conclusion that in terms of their effects bank acceptance drafts are a form of a short-term financing allowing the exporting producers to finance their purchases. The benefit provided to the cooperating exporting producers is the financing cost savings due to the fact that the use of financing through bank acceptance drafts was not remunerated. |
| --- | --- |

(376)

Consequently, the Commission reiterated its conclusion that in terms of their effects bank acceptance drafts are a form of a short-term financing allowing the exporting producers to finance their purchases. The benefit provided to the cooperating exporting producers is the financing cost savings due to the fact that the use of financing through bank acceptance drafts was not remunerated.

(b)   Specificity

| (377) | Concerning specificity, as mentioned in recital (116), according to Decision No 40, financial institutions shall provide credit support to encouraged industries. |
| --- | --- |

(377)

Concerning specificity, as mentioned in recital (116), according to Decision No 40, financial institutions shall provide credit support to encouraged industries.

| (378) | The Commission considered that bank acceptance drafts are another form of preferential financial support by financial institutions to encouraged industries such as the OFC sector. Indeed, as specified in Section 3.1 above, the OFC sector is among the encouraged industries and is therefore eligible for all possible financial support. Bank acceptance drafts, as a form of financing, are part of the preferential financial support system by financial institutions to encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(378)

The Commission considered that bank acceptance drafts are another form of preferential financial support by financial institutions to encouraged industries such as the OFC sector. Indeed, as specified in Section 3.1 above, the OFC sector is among the encouraged industries and is therefore eligible for all possible financial support. Bank acceptance drafts, as a form of financing, are part of the preferential financial support system by financial institutions to encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry.

| (379) | No evidence was provided that any undertaking in the PRC (other than within encouraged industries) can benefit from bank acceptance drafts under the same preferential terms and conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(379)

No evidence was provided that any undertaking in the PRC (other than within encouraged industries) can benefit from bank acceptance drafts under the same preferential terms and conditions.

| (380) | Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that bank acceptance drafts are not specific since they are widely used by almost all business operators in the PRC and thus are not limited to the OFC sector or to ZTT Group. |
| --- | --- |

(380)

Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that bank acceptance drafts are not specific since they are widely used by almost all business operators in the PRC and thus are not limited to the OFC sector or to ZTT Group.

| (381) | In this respect, the Commission referred to recital (116) where it presented evidence that according to Decision No 40, financial institutions are required to provide credit support to encouraged industries. |
| --- | --- |

(381)

In this respect, the Commission referred to recital (116) where it presented evidence that according to Decision No 40, financial institutions are required to provide credit support to encouraged industries.

| (382) | The Commission based its assessment regarding the specificity of the subsidy scheme on available governmental documents, such as plans and regulations, on encouraged industries. The GOC clearly defined which industries are encouraged limiting the specific preferential financing benefits only to those ones. Therefore, even if a number of other industries specifically defined as encouraged also enjoyed the same or similar preferential conditions as the OFC industry, this does not render preferential financing and in particular bank acceptance drafts generally available to all industries. |
| --- | --- |

(382)

The Commission based its assessment regarding the specificity of the subsidy scheme on available governmental documents, such as plans and regulations, on encouraged industries. The GOC clearly defined which industries are encouraged limiting the specific preferential financing benefits only to those ones. Therefore, even if a number of other industries specifically defined as encouraged also enjoyed the same or similar preferential conditions as the OFC industry, this does not render preferential financing and in particular bank acceptance drafts generally available to all industries.

| (383) | Furthermore, even if a form of financing could be in principle available to companies in other industries, the concrete conditions, under which such financing is offered to companies from a certain industry, such as the financing remuneration and the volume of financing, might make it specific. There was no evidence submitted by any of the interested parties demonstrating that the preferential financing through bank acceptance drafts of companies in the OFC industry is based on objective criteria or conditions in the sense of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(383)

Furthermore, even if a form of financing could be in principle available to companies in other industries, the concrete conditions, under which such financing is offered to companies from a certain industry, such as the financing remuneration and the volume of financing, might make it specific. There was no evidence submitted by any of the interested parties demonstrating that the preferential financing through bank acceptance drafts of companies in the OFC industry is based on objective criteria or conditions in the sense of Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(c)   Calculation of the benefit

| (384) | For the calculation of the amount of the countervailable subsidy, the Commission assessed the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(384)

For the calculation of the amount of the countervailable subsidy, the Commission assessed the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period.

| (385) | As already mentioned in recitals (357) and (370), bank acceptance drafts are a form of short-term financing that enhance the capital efficiency of the drawer by facilitating its working capital and meeting its cash needs as they are largely used as a means of payment in commercial transactions instead of cash. The Commission found that the sampled exporting producers used bank acceptance drafts to address their needs for short-term financing without paying a remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(385)

As already mentioned in recitals (357) and (370), bank acceptance drafts are a form of short-term financing that enhance the capital efficiency of the drawer by facilitating its working capital and meeting its cash needs as they are largely used as a means of payment in commercial transactions instead of cash. The Commission found that the sampled exporting producers used bank acceptance drafts to address their needs for short-term financing without paying a remuneration.

| (386) | The Commission thus concluded that bank acceptance drawers should pay a remuneration for the period of financing. The Commission considered that the period of financing started on the date of the issuance of the bank acceptance draft and ended on the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft. Regarding bank acceptance drafts issued before the investigation period and banks acceptance drafts with a maturity date after the end of the investigation period, the Commission calculated the benefit only for the period of financing covered by the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(386)

The Commission thus concluded that bank acceptance drawers should pay a remuneration for the period of financing. The Commission considered that the period of financing started on the date of the issuance of the bank acceptance draft and ended on the maturity date of the bank acceptance draft. Regarding bank acceptance drafts issued before the investigation period and banks acceptance drafts with a maturity date after the end of the investigation period, the Commission calculated the benefit only for the period of financing covered by the investigation period.

| (387) | In accordance with Article 6(b) of the basic Regulation, the Commission considered that the benefit thus conferred on the recipients is the difference between the amount that the company had actually paid as remuneration of the financing by bank acceptance drafts and the amount that it should pay by applying a short-term financing interest rate. |
| --- | --- |

(387)

In accordance with Article 6(b) of the basic Regulation, the Commission considered that the benefit thus conferred on the recipients is the difference between the amount that the company had actually paid as remuneration of the financing by bank acceptance drafts and the amount that it should pay by applying a short-term financing interest rate.

| (388) | The Commission determined the benefit resulting from the non-payment of a short-term financing cost. Considering that bank acceptance drafts are a form of short-term financing and that they effectively have the same purpose as short-term working capital loans, the Commission considered, as established in previous investigations (91), that bank acceptance drafts should bear a cost equivalent to a short-term loan financing. Therefore, the Commission applied the same methodology as to short-term loans financing denominated in RMB, described in Section 3.5.3.1 above. |
| --- | --- |

(388)

The Commission determined the benefit resulting from the non-payment of a short-term financing cost. Considering that bank acceptance drafts are a form of short-term financing and that they effectively have the same purpose as short-term working capital loans, the Commission considered, as established in previous investigations (91), that bank acceptance drafts should bear a cost equivalent to a short-term loan financing. Therefore, the Commission applied the same methodology as to short-term loans financing denominated in RMB, described in Section 3.5.3.1 above.

91

| (389) | Following final disclosure, the FTT Group submitted that the Commission should consider the fees paid by the group in the calculation of the benefit. |
| --- | --- |

(389)

Following final disclosure, the FTT Group submitted that the Commission should consider the fees paid by the group in the calculation of the benefit.

| (390) | The Commission already noted in recital (371) that the sampled companies that used bank acceptance drafts during the investigation period only paid a commission for the acceptance service provided by the bank, which was in general 0,05 % of the face value of the draft. In fact, this commission paid for the processing of the bank acceptance draft by the bank, is a distinct element from the financing granted by the bank, for which the cooperating exporting producers did not bear any cost. This fee is paid in order to cover the bank’s administrative costs of processing the bank acceptance drafts. The Commission countervailed only the financing part of the bank acceptance drafts (namely, the part equivalent to short-term financing); it did not analyse whether the acceptance commission also involved a countervailable subsidy. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(390)

The Commission already noted in recital (371) that the sampled companies that used bank acceptance drafts during the investigation period only paid a commission for the acceptance service provided by the bank, which was in general 0,05 % of the face value of the draft. In fact, this commission paid for the processing of the bank acceptance draft by the bank, is a distinct element from the financing granted by the bank, for which the cooperating exporting producers did not bear any cost. This fee is paid in order to cover the bank’s administrative costs of processing the bank acceptance drafts. The Commission countervailed only the financing part of the bank acceptance drafts (namely, the part equivalent to short-term financing); it did not analyse whether the acceptance commission also involved a countervailable subsidy. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (391) | The ZTT Group disagreed with the use of the benchmark for short-term loans as it considered bank acceptance drafts being a guarantee for which a commission should be charged. In this respect, the ZTT Group referred to the New York Federal Reserve which makes it clear that bank acceptance drafts operate more like a guarantee than a loan. |
| --- | --- |

(391)

The ZTT Group disagreed with the use of the benchmark for short-term loans as it considered bank acceptance drafts being a guarantee for which a commission should be charged. In this respect, the ZTT Group referred to the New York Federal Reserve which makes it clear that bank acceptance drafts operate more like a guarantee than a loan.

| (392) | The Commission disagreed with the stance of the ZTT Group. According to publicly available data concerning bank acceptance drafts in the US, in practice the bank typically buys the bank acceptance draft from the drawer by applying a discount rate, which is similar to an interest rate, and therefore, the acceptance serves as a medium for the bank to advance credit (92). Furthermore, in other jurisdictions such as Canada and Malaysia, when the bank accepts the draft it advances the funds after deducting the applicable discount rate (93). Indeed, the Bank of Canada Discussion Paper: A Primer on the Canadian Bankers’ Acceptance Market provides that
  ‘the drafts are purchased by the lenders at a discount to their face amount and the borrower receives the discounted proceeds as a loan. The discount rate at which the lenders purchase the drafts is often based on the CDOR rate’. According to Article 14(4) of the Malaysian Guideline son Bankers acceptances (2004), ‘the drawer of the BA shall be required to discount the [banker acceptance] with the accepting bank if the purchase has yet to be paid, in which case, the accepting bank is required to pay the discounted proceeds to the supplier of the goods’. Therefore, the bank acceptance drafts primarily operate as a type of financing and not as a guarantee. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(392)

The Commission disagreed with the stance of the ZTT Group. According to publicly available data concerning bank acceptance drafts in the US, in practice the bank typically buys the bank acceptance draft from the drawer by applying a discount rate, which is similar to an interest rate, and therefore, the acceptance serves as a medium for the bank to advance credit (92). Furthermore, in other jurisdictions such as Canada and Malaysia, when the bank accepts the draft it advances the funds after deducting the applicable discount rate (93). Indeed, the Bank of Canada Discussion Paper: A Primer on the Canadian Bankers’ Acceptance Market provides that
  ‘the drafts are purchased by the lenders at a discount to their face amount and the borrower receives the discounted proceeds as a loan. The discount rate at which the lenders purchase the drafts is often based on the CDOR rate’. According to Article 14(4) of the Malaysian Guideline son Bankers acceptances (2004), ‘the drawer of the BA shall be required to discount the [banker acceptance] with the accepting bank if the purchase has yet to be paid, in which case, the accepting bank is required to pay the discounted proceeds to the supplier of the goods’. Therefore, the bank acceptance drafts primarily operate as a type of financing and not as a guarantee. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

92

93

‘the drafts are purchased by the lenders at a discount to their face amount and the borrower receives the discounted proceeds as a loan. The discount rate at which the lenders purchase the drafts is often based on the CDOR rate’.

the drawer of the BA shall be required to discount the [banker acceptance] with the accepting bank if the purchase has yet to be paid, in which case, the accepting bank is required to pay the discounted proceeds to the supplier of the goods’.

3.5.4.3.   Convertible corporate bonds

| (393) | Companies from the two sampled groups have issued convertible corporate bonds during the investigation period. Both convertible bonds have a progressive interest rate structure with very low interest rates, ranging between 0,2 % and 2 %, which is much below the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate and below the Loan Prime Rate of the NIFC (94). |
| --- | --- |

(393)

Companies from the two sampled groups have issued convertible corporate bonds during the investigation period. Both convertible bonds have a progressive interest rate structure with very low interest rates, ranging between 0,2 % and 2 %, which is much below the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate and below the Loan Prime Rate of the NIFC (94).

94

| (394) | The Commission established that both sampled companies benefited from preferential financing in the form of convertible bonds.






  — | Legal basis (95) |
| --- | --- | --- |

(394)

The Commission established that both sampled companies benefited from preferential financing in the form of convertible bonds.

—

Legal basis (95)

95

| — | Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities (version 2014) (‘Securities Law’) (96); |
| --- | --- |

—

Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities (version 2014) (‘Securities Law’) (96);

96

| — | Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies (version 2008) (97); |
| --- | --- |

—

Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies (version 2008) (97);

97

| — | Administrative Measures on Sponsorship for Securities Issuance and Listing (version 2008) (98); |
| --- | --- |

—

Administrative Measures on Sponsorship for Securities Issuance and Listing (version 2008) (98);

98

| — | Administrative Measures on Issue and Underwriting of Securities (version 2018); |
| --- | --- |

—

Administrative Measures on Issue and Underwriting of Securities (version 2018);

| — | Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, issued by the State Council on 18 January 2011; |
| --- | --- |

—

Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, issued by the State Council on 18 January 2011;

| — | Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds, Order of the China Securities Regulatory Commission No 113, 15 January 2015; |
| --- | --- |

—

Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds, Order of the China Securities Regulatory Commission No 113, 15 January 2015;

| — | Measures of the Administration of Debt Financing Instruments of Non-financial Enterprises on the Inter-bank Bond Market Issued by the People’s Bank of China, Order of the People’s Bank of China [2008] No 12, 9 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

—

Measures of the Administration of Debt Financing Instruments of Non-financial Enterprises on the Inter-bank Bond Market Issued by the People’s Bank of China, Order of the People’s Bank of China [2008] No 12, 9 April 2008.

| — | Regulatory framework governing convertible bonds |
| --- | --- |

—

Regulatory framework governing convertible bonds

| (395) | The Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds and the Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds set the general legal framework applicable to corporate bonds. However, there is a set of specific legislation applicable to convertible corporate bonds, namely the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies, the Administrative Measures on Issue and Underwriting of Securities and the Administrative Measures on Sponsorship for Securities Issuance and Listing. |
| --- | --- |

(395)

The Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds and the Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds set the general legal framework applicable to corporate bonds. However, there is a set of specific legislation applicable to convertible corporate bonds, namely the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies, the Administrative Measures on Issue and Underwriting of Securities and the Administrative Measures on Sponsorship for Securities Issuance and Listing.

| (396) | Article 14 of the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies defines ‘convertible corporate bonds’ as
  ‘corporate bonds which are issued by an issuing company pursuant to law and which may be converted to shares during a certain period and under stipulated conditions’. |
| --- | --- |

(396)

Article 14 of the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies defines ‘convertible corporate bonds’ as
  ‘corporate bonds which are issued by an issuing company pursuant to law and which may be converted to shares during a certain period and under stipulated conditions’.

‘corporate bonds which are issued by an issuing company pursuant to law and which may be converted to shares during a certain period and under stipulated conditions’.

| (397) | Pursuant to Article 11 of the Securities Law (version 2014), which was applicable at the time of the issuance of the convertible bonds by the sampled companies, Article 45 of the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies and Article 2 of the Administrative Measures on Sponsorship for Securities Issuance and Listing, companies that want to issue convertible corporate bonds need to solicit the services of a securities sponsor, which acts as an underwriter. The sponsor organizes the issuance of the bonds, recommends the issuer, submits the application file to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (‘CSRC’) for approval, negotiates the interest rates at which the bond will be presented to investors and is responsible for finding investors which would accept the agreed terms of issuance of the bond, including the interest rate. |
| --- | --- |

(397)

Pursuant to Article 11 of the Securities Law (version 2014), which was applicable at the time of the issuance of the convertible bonds by the sampled companies, Article 45 of the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies and Article 2 of the Administrative Measures on Sponsorship for Securities Issuance and Listing, companies that want to issue convertible corporate bonds need to solicit the services of a securities sponsor, which acts as an underwriter. The sponsor organizes the issuance of the bonds, recommends the issuer, submits the application file to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (‘CSRC’) for approval, negotiates the interest rates at which the bond will be presented to investors and is responsible for finding investors which would accept the agreed terms of issuance of the bond, including the interest rate.

| (398) | In line with the regulatory framework, convertible bonds cannot be issued and traded freely in China. The issuance of each bond must be approved by the CSRC. Article 16 of the Securities Law (version 2014) stipulates that
  ‘listed companies issuing convertible corporate bonds shall [...] satisfy the requirements stipulated in this Law for public offering of shares; and shall obtain the approval of the securities regulatory authorities of the State Council’. According to Article 3 of the Administrative Measures on Issue and Underwriting of Securities, which applies to convertible bonds,
  ‘the CSRC shall supervise and administer the offering and underwriting of securities to the law’. Furthermore, according to Article 10 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, there are annual quotas for the issuance of corporate bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(398)

In line with the regulatory framework, convertible bonds cannot be issued and traded freely in China. The issuance of each bond must be approved by the CSRC. Article 16 of the Securities Law (version 2014) stipulates that
  ‘listed companies issuing convertible corporate bonds shall [...] satisfy the requirements stipulated in this Law for public offering of shares; and shall obtain the approval of the securities regulatory authorities of the State Council’. According to Article 3 of the Administrative Measures on Issue and Underwriting of Securities, which applies to convertible bonds,
  ‘the CSRC shall supervise and administer the offering and underwriting of securities to the law’. Furthermore, according to Article 10 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, there are annual quotas for the issuance of corporate bonds.

‘listed companies issuing convertible corporate bonds shall [...] satisfy the requirements stipulated in this Law for public offering of shares; and shall obtain the approval of the securities regulatory authorities of the State Council’.

‘the CSRC shall supervise and administer the offering and underwriting of securities to the law’.

| (399) | According to Article 16 of the Securities Law (version 2014), the public issuance of bonds should satisfy the following requirements:
  ‘the usage purpose of the proceeds shall comply with State industrial policies’ and ‘the proceeds from a public offering of corporate bonds shall be used for approved purpose(s) only’. Article 12 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds reiterates that the purpose of the raised funds must comply with the industrial policies of the State. Furthermore, Article 10(2) of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies, which is a lex specialis applicable to convertible bonds, stipulates that
  ‘the purposes of use of the fund raised are in line with the industrial policies of the State’. |
| --- | --- |

(399)

According to Article 16 of the Securities Law (version 2014), the public issuance of bonds should satisfy the following requirements:
  ‘the usage purpose of the proceeds shall comply with State industrial policies’ and ‘the proceeds from a public offering of corporate bonds shall be used for approved purpose(s) only’. Article 12 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds reiterates that the purpose of the raised funds must comply with the industrial policies of the State. Furthermore, Article 10(2) of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies, which is a lex specialis applicable to convertible bonds, stipulates that
  ‘the purposes of use of the fund raised are in line with the industrial policies of the State’.

‘the usage purpose of the proceeds shall comply with State industrial policies’ and ‘the proceeds from a public offering of corporate bonds shall be used for approved purpose(s) only’.

lex specialis

‘the purposes of use of the fund raised are in line with the industrial policies of the State’.

| (400) | During the RCC, the GOC explained that this sentence means that the funds raised must not be for projects falling under the ‘limited’ industries in the ‘Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’. This catalogue consists of three categories of projects, i.e. ‘encouraged’, ‘limited’, and ‘eliminated’. In the ‘limited’ category, new projects are prohibited and ongoing production is directed to innovate and upgrade, while in the ‘eliminated’ category, existing projects are banned from seeking investment. Therefore, it can be concluded that
  ‘in line with the industrial policies of the State’
  could only mean that the investment project falls under the ‘encouraged’ content, which is entitled to receive credit support from financial institutions. |
| --- | --- |

(400)

During the RCC, the GOC explained that this sentence means that the funds raised must not be for projects falling under the ‘limited’ industries in the ‘Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’. This catalogue consists of three categories of projects, i.e. ‘encouraged’, ‘limited’, and ‘eliminated’. In the ‘limited’ category, new projects are prohibited and ongoing production is directed to innovate and upgrade, while in the ‘eliminated’ category, existing projects are banned from seeking investment. Therefore, it can be concluded that
  ‘in line with the industrial policies of the State’
  could only mean that the investment project falls under the ‘encouraged’ content, which is entitled to receive credit support from financial institutions.

‘in line with the industrial policies of the State’

| (401) | As explained in recital (116), Decision No 40 refers to ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ and provides that if
  ‘the investment project belongs to the encouragement content it shall be examined and approved and put on records according to the relevant national regulations on investment; all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles’. It follows that the issuance of convertible corporate bonds, which, as shown, necessarily target an encouraged industry, corresponds with the practice of financial institutions to support those industries. |
| --- | --- |

(401)

As explained in recital (116), Decision No 40 refers to ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ and provides that if
  ‘the investment project belongs to the encouragement content it shall be examined and approved and put on records according to the relevant national regulations on investment; all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles’. It follows that the issuance of convertible corporate bonds, which, as shown, necessarily target an encouraged industry, corresponds with the practice of financial institutions to support those industries.

‘the investment project belongs to the encouragement content it shall be examined and approved and put on records according to the relevant national regulations on investment; all financial institutions shall provide credit support according to the credit principles’.

| (402) | The interest rates on corporate bonds are also strictly regulated. Article 16 of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies provides that ‘the interest rate of a convertible corporate bond shall be determined by the issuing company and the leading underwriter through negotiations, but it shall satisfy the relevant provisions of the State’. According to Article 16(5) of the Securities Law (version 2014),
  ‘the coupon rate of the corporate bonds shall not exceed the coupon rate stipulated by the State Council’. In addition, Article 18 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, which is generally applicable to all bonds, provides further details by stating that,
  ‘the interest rate offered for any corporate bonds shall not be higher than 40 % of the prevailing interest rate paid by banks to individuals for fixed-term savings deposits of the same maturity’. |
| --- | --- |

(402)

The interest rates on corporate bonds are also strictly regulated. Article 16 of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies provides that ‘the interest rate of a convertible corporate bond shall be determined by the issuing company and the leading underwriter through negotiations, but it shall satisfy the relevant provisions of the State’. According to Article 16(5) of the Securities Law (version 2014),
  ‘the coupon rate of the corporate bonds shall not exceed the coupon rate stipulated by the State Council’. In addition, Article 18 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, which is generally applicable to all bonds, provides further details by stating that,
  ‘the interest rate offered for any corporate bonds shall not be higher than 40 % of the prevailing interest rate paid by banks to individuals for fixed-term savings deposits of the same maturity’.

the interest rate of a convertible corporate bond shall be determined by the issuing company and the leading underwriter through negotiations, but it shall satisfy the relevant provisions of the State’.

‘the coupon rate of the corporate bonds shall not exceed the coupon rate stipulated by the State Council’.

‘the interest rate offered for any corporate bonds shall not be higher than 40 % of the prevailing interest rate paid by banks to individuals for fixed-term savings deposits of the same maturity’.

| (403) | According to Article 17 of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies,
  ‘to publicly issue convertible corporate bonds, a company shall entrust a qualified credit rating agency to make credit ratings and follow-up ratings’
  . In addition, Article 18 of the generally applicable Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds stipulates that only certain bonds complying with strict quality criteria, such as an AAA credit rating, may be issued in a public manner to public investors or be issued in a public manner to qualified investors only at the sole discretion of the issuer. The corporate bonds that fail to meet these standards can be issued in a public manner only to qualified investors. |
| --- | --- |

(403)

According to Article 17 of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies,
  ‘to publicly issue convertible corporate bonds, a company shall entrust a qualified credit rating agency to make credit ratings and follow-up ratings’
  . In addition, Article 18 of the generally applicable Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds stipulates that only certain bonds complying with strict quality criteria, such as an AAA credit rating, may be issued in a public manner to public investors or be issued in a public manner to qualified investors only at the sole discretion of the issuer. The corporate bonds that fail to meet these standards can be issued in a public manner only to qualified investors.

‘to publicly issue convertible corporate bonds, a company shall entrust a qualified credit rating agency to make credit ratings and follow-up ratings’

(a)   Financial institutions acting as public bodies

| (404) | According to the China bond market insight 2021 by Bloomberg, most of the investors are institutional investors, including financial institutions. In particular, commercial banks represent 57 % of the investors and policy banks represent 3 % (99). Furthermore, the Commission found that 85 % of the investors of the convertible bond issued by one of the sampled companies are institutional investors, a category of investors that includes financial institutions. |
| --- | --- |

(404)

According to the China bond market insight 2021 by Bloomberg, most of the investors are institutional investors, including financial institutions. In particular, commercial banks represent 57 % of the investors and policy banks represent 3 % (99). Furthermore, the Commission found that 85 % of the investors of the convertible bond issued by one of the sampled companies are institutional investors, a category of investors that includes financial institutions.

99

| (405) | Furthermore, as an encouraged industry under the ‘Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’, the OFC industry is entitled to credit support by financial institutions based on Decision No 40. The fact that convertible bonds, such as the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies, bear a low interest rate is a strong indication that financial institutions are the major investor in these bonds. They are obliged to provide
  ‘credit support’
  to these companies and would take into account other considerations than the interest remuneration when taking the investment/financing decision, such as policy objectives. Indeed, an investor operating in market conditions would be more sensitive to the financial return on his investment and would most probably not invest in convertible bonds bearing very low interest rate. Moreover, the conclusions reached by the Commission about the financial situation of both groups of exporting producers in Section 3.5.3.3 above in terms of their liquidity and solvency profiles further indicate that investors operating in market conditions would not invest in financial instruments such as convertible bonds, offering low financial return, while the issuer presents high liquidity and solvency risks. Therefore, in the Commission’s view only investors having motivations other than a financial return on investment, such as complying with the legal obligation to provide financing to companies in encouraged industries, would make such an investment. |
| --- | --- |

(405)

Furthermore, as an encouraged industry under the ‘Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’, the OFC industry is entitled to credit support by financial institutions based on Decision No 40. The fact that convertible bonds, such as the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies, bear a low interest rate is a strong indication that financial institutions are the major investor in these bonds. They are obliged to provide
  ‘credit support’
  to these companies and would take into account other considerations than the interest remuneration when taking the investment/financing decision, such as policy objectives. Indeed, an investor operating in market conditions would be more sensitive to the financial return on his investment and would most probably not invest in convertible bonds bearing very low interest rate. Moreover, the conclusions reached by the Commission about the financial situation of both groups of exporting producers in Section 3.5.3.3 above in terms of their liquidity and solvency profiles further indicate that investors operating in market conditions would not invest in financial instruments such as convertible bonds, offering low financial return, while the issuer presents high liquidity and solvency risks. Therefore, in the Commission’s view only investors having motivations other than a financial return on investment, such as complying with the legal obligation to provide financing to companies in encouraged industries, would make such an investment.

‘credit support’

| (406) | Consequently, taking into account the facts exposed in recitals (404) and (405), the Commission considered that there is a body of corroborating evidence, according to which a major proportion of the investors in the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies is constituted by financial institutions which have a legal obligation to provide credit support to OFC producers. |
| --- | --- |

(406)

Consequently, taking into account the facts exposed in recitals (404) and (405), the Commission considered that there is a body of corroborating evidence, according to which a major proportion of the investors in the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies is constituted by financial institutions which have a legal obligation to provide credit support to OFC producers.

| (407) | Further, as described in Section 3.5.1 above, the financial institutions are characterized by a strong State presence, and the GOC has the possibility to exercise a meaningful influence on them. The general legal framework, in which these financial institutions operate is also applicable to convertible bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(407)

Further, as described in Section 3.5.1 above, the financial institutions are characterized by a strong State presence, and the GOC has the possibility to exercise a meaningful influence on them. The general legal framework, in which these financial institutions operate is also applicable to convertible bonds.

| (408) | In Section (1) and (2) above, the Commission concluded that State-owned financial institutions are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and that they are in any event considered entrusted or directed by the GOC to carry out functions normally vested in the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation. In Section 3.5.1.2 above, the Commission concluded that private financial institutions are also entrusted and directed by the government. |
| --- | --- |

(408)

In Section (1) and (2) above, the Commission concluded that State-owned financial institutions are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and that they are in any event considered entrusted or directed by the GOC to carry out functions normally vested in the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation. In Section 3.5.1.2 above, the Commission concluded that private financial institutions are also entrusted and directed by the government.

| (409) | The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete issuances of convertible bonds. It therefore examined the overall legal environment as set out above in recitals (395) to (403), in combination with the concrete findings of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(409)

The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete issuances of convertible bonds. It therefore examined the overall legal environment as set out above in recitals (395) to (403), in combination with the concrete findings of the investigation.

| (410) | The Commission found that the convertible bonds were issued by the two groups of sampled exporting producers at very low and similar interest rates, regardless of the companies’ financial and credit risk situation. |
| --- | --- |

(410)

The Commission found that the convertible bonds were issued by the two groups of sampled exporting producers at very low and similar interest rates, regardless of the companies’ financial and credit risk situation.

| (411) | In practice, interest rates on convertible bonds are influenced by the credit rating of the company, similar to loans. However, the Commission concluded in recital (280) that the local credit rating market is distorted and credit ratings are unreliable. As stated in recital (274), five Chinese local rating agencies dominate the bond market and around 90 % of the bonds are rated AAA by local crating agencies, while many of the issuers have received a lower S&P global issuer rating of A and BBB. |
| --- | --- |

(411)

In practice, interest rates on convertible bonds are influenced by the credit rating of the company, similar to loans. However, the Commission concluded in recital (280) that the local credit rating market is distorted and credit ratings are unreliable. As stated in recital (274), five Chinese local rating agencies dominate the bond market and around 90 % of the bonds are rated AAA by local crating agencies, while many of the issuers have received a lower S&P global issuer rating of A and BBB.

| (412) | This was illustrated by the fact that the credit rating reports for the bonds issued by the sampled companies did not correspond to their actual financial situation. |
| --- | --- |

(412)

This was illustrated by the fact that the credit rating reports for the bonds issued by the sampled companies did not correspond to their actual financial situation.

| (413) | In light of the above considerations, the Commission concluded that the Chinese financial institutions, which are the major investor in the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies, followed the policy orientations laid down in Decision No 40 by providing preferential financing at a very low interest rate to companies pertaining to an encouraged industry and thus acted either as public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation or as bodies which are entrusted or directed by the government within the meaning of Articles 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(413)

In light of the above considerations, the Commission concluded that the Chinese financial institutions, which are the major investor in the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies, followed the policy orientations laid down in Decision No 40 by providing preferential financing at a very low interest rate to companies pertaining to an encouraged industry and thus acted either as public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation or as bodies which are entrusted or directed by the government within the meaning of Articles 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.

| (414) | By accepting to invest in convertible bonds with a very low rate of return irrespective of the risk profile of the issuer, the financial institutions provided a benefit to the sampled exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(414)

By accepting to invest in convertible bonds with a very low rate of return irrespective of the risk profile of the issuer, the financial institutions provided a benefit to the sampled exporting producers.

| (415) | Following final disclosure, the GOC contested the conclusion of the Commission that the financial institutions, which purchased a major part of the convertible corporate bonds at issue, have acted as public bodies. The GOC claimed that the purchase of corporate bonds and convertible corporate bonds is a regular commercial practice that occurs in all major jurisdictions, including the Union and the US. According to the GOC, the function performed by financial institutions when they buy bonds or when they provide loans is completely different and thus the Commission was under the obligation to conduct a specific assessment if financial institutions could be considered public bodies for the function of buying bonds and to conduct a case-by-case assessment of each financial institution. The GOC also submitted that the Commission did not analyse whether there existed purchasers of corporate bonds and convertible bonds other than the Chinese banks and financial institutions and if there were private purchasers. Furthermore, the GOC submitted that the purpose of the Chinese financial supervision system with respect to corporate bonds and convertible bonds is to ensure safety of the system and to protect the right and interests of the investors and that this system as such does not demonstrate interference from the government. |
| --- | --- |

(415)

Following final disclosure, the GOC contested the conclusion of the Commission that the financial institutions, which purchased a major part of the convertible corporate bonds at issue, have acted as public bodies. The GOC claimed that the purchase of corporate bonds and convertible corporate bonds is a regular commercial practice that occurs in all major jurisdictions, including the Union and the US. According to the GOC, the function performed by financial institutions when they buy bonds or when they provide loans is completely different and thus the Commission was under the obligation to conduct a specific assessment if financial institutions could be considered public bodies for the function of buying bonds and to conduct a case-by-case assessment of each financial institution. The GOC also submitted that the Commission did not analyse whether there existed purchasers of corporate bonds and convertible bonds other than the Chinese banks and financial institutions and if there were private purchasers. Furthermore, the GOC submitted that the purpose of the Chinese financial supervision system with respect to corporate bonds and convertible bonds is to ensure safety of the system and to protect the right and interests of the investors and that this system as such does not demonstrate interference from the government.

| (416) | The Commission disagreed with the statement of the GOC that it did not carry out a specific assessment of the conduct of financial institutions as public bodies for the function of buying bonds. In addition to the conclusions reached by the Commission in Section 3.5.1 above, the Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on the concrete issuances of convertible bonds and carried out a specific assessment in recitals (409) to (413). While the Commission agreed with the GOC that the purchase of corporate bonds and convertible bonds may be in principle a regular commercial practice that occurs in all major jurisdictions, it pointed out that the purchase of corporate bonds by Chinese financial institutions is characterised by a State interference as demonstrated in recital (413). The Commission also disagreed with the allegation of the GOC that it did not analyse the existence of purchasers of corporate bonds and convertible bonds other than the Chinese banks and financial institutions. In fact, the Commission pointed out in recitals (404) and (406) that 85 % of the investors of the convertible bond issued by one of the sampled companies were institutional investors, including financial institutions, and that there is a body of corroborating evidence, according to which a major proportion of the investors in the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies is constituted by financial institutions which have a legal obligation to provide credit support to OFC producers. Considering the high proportion of institutional investors, including financial institutions, the Commission was of the opinion that they have determined the characteristics of the convertible corporate bonds at issue, in particular the low coupon rate, and that other investors, such as private investors only adhered to such conditions. Finally, the Commission considered that the Chinese financial supervision system with respect to corporate bonds and convertible bonds is only an element, which together with the normative framework governing financing by financial institutions described in recitals (405) and (407) as well as with the concrete behaviour of the financial institutions pointed to the interference from the GOC. Therefore, the claims of the GOC were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(416)

The Commission disagreed with the statement of the GOC that it did not carry out a specific assessment of the conduct of financial institutions as public bodies for the function of buying bonds. In addition to the conclusions reached by the Commission in Section 3.5.1 above, the Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on the concrete issuances of convertible bonds and carried out a specific assessment in recitals (409) to (413). While the Commission agreed with the GOC that the purchase of corporate bonds and convertible bonds may be in principle a regular commercial practice that occurs in all major jurisdictions, it pointed out that the purchase of corporate bonds by Chinese financial institutions is characterised by a State interference as demonstrated in recital (413). The Commission also disagreed with the allegation of the GOC that it did not analyse the existence of purchasers of corporate bonds and convertible bonds other than the Chinese banks and financial institutions. In fact, the Commission pointed out in recitals (404) and (406) that 85 % of the investors of the convertible bond issued by one of the sampled companies were institutional investors, including financial institutions, and that there is a body of corroborating evidence, according to which a major proportion of the investors in the convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies is constituted by financial institutions which have a legal obligation to provide credit support to OFC producers. Considering the high proportion of institutional investors, including financial institutions, the Commission was of the opinion that they have determined the characteristics of the convertible corporate bonds at issue, in particular the low coupon rate, and that other investors, such as private investors only adhered to such conditions. Finally, the Commission considered that the Chinese financial supervision system with respect to corporate bonds and convertible bonds is only an element, which together with the normative framework governing financing by financial institutions described in recitals (405) and (407) as well as with the concrete behaviour of the financial institutions pointed to the interference from the GOC. Therefore, the claims of the GOC were rejected.

(b)   Specificity

| (417) | The Commission considered that the preferential financing through convertible bonds is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation. In fact, convertible bonds cannot be issued without the approval of the CSRC, which checks if all the regulatory conditions for the issuance of the convertible bonds are met. As explained in recital (399), according to the Securities Law of the PRC (version 2014) and the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies specifically applicable to convertible bonds, the issuance of convertible bonds must be in line with the State’s industrial policies. The Commission considered in recital (400) that
  ‘in line with the industrial policies of the State’
  means that the investment project falls under the ‘encouraged’ content in the Guiding Catalogue of Industry Restructuring to which the OFC industry belongs. |
| --- | --- |

(417)

The Commission considered that the preferential financing through convertible bonds is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation. In fact, convertible bonds cannot be issued without the approval of the CSRC, which checks if all the regulatory conditions for the issuance of the convertible bonds are met. As explained in recital (399), according to the Securities Law of the PRC (version 2014) and the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies specifically applicable to convertible bonds, the issuance of convertible bonds must be in line with the State’s industrial policies. The Commission considered in recital (400) that
  ‘in line with the industrial policies of the State’
  means that the investment project falls under the ‘encouraged’ content in the Guiding Catalogue of Industry Restructuring to which the OFC industry belongs.

‘in line with the industrial policies of the State’

| (418) | Following final disclosure, the GOC submitted that bonds markets are regulated in every country as this is a question of economic stability. The criteria that must be met by a company in order to issue bonds are financial in nature and are not policy-oriented. The GOC disagreed with the stance that the issuance of convertible bonds must be in line with the State’s industrial policies and repeated that the OFC industry is not an encouraged industry. The GOC further claimed that the Commission has not demonstrated that the sale of bonds is explicitly limited to certain companies. |
| --- | --- |

(418)

Following final disclosure, the GOC submitted that bonds markets are regulated in every country as this is a question of economic stability. The criteria that must be met by a company in order to issue bonds are financial in nature and are not policy-oriented. The GOC disagreed with the stance that the issuance of convertible bonds must be in line with the State’s industrial policies and repeated that the OFC industry is not an encouraged industry. The GOC further claimed that the Commission has not demonstrated that the sale of bonds is explicitly limited to certain companies.

must be in line with the State’s industrial policies

explicitly limited

| (419) | In this respect, although the Commission agreed that bonds markets are regulated in every country and that most of the criteria that must be met by a company in order to issue bonds are financial in nature, it disagreed with the claim of the GOC that the issuance of convertible bonds is not policy-oriented in China. First, the Commission reiterated its stance that the OFC sector is an encouraged industry. Second, the Commission considered that the wording of the Securities Law of the PRC (version 2014) and the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies specifically applicable to convertible bonds, according to which the issuance of convertible bonds must be in line with the State’s industrial policies is clear enough. Finally, the Commission established in recital (414) that by accepting to invest in convertible bonds with a very low rate of return irrespective of the risk profile of the issuer, the financial institutions provided a benefit to the sampled exporting producers. In fact, the financial advantage provided through the purchase of convertible corporate bonds with such a low coupon rate is
  ‘explicitly limited’
  to encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry, by the normative framework designed by the GOC. Therefore, the claims of the GOC were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(419)

In this respect, although the Commission agreed that bonds markets are regulated in every country and that most of the criteria that must be met by a company in order to issue bonds are financial in nature, it disagreed with the claim of the GOC that the issuance of convertible bonds is not policy-oriented in China. First, the Commission reiterated its stance that the OFC sector is an encouraged industry. Second, the Commission considered that the wording of the Securities Law of the PRC (version 2014) and the Administrative Measures on Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies specifically applicable to convertible bonds, according to which the issuance of convertible bonds must be in line with the State’s industrial policies is clear enough. Finally, the Commission established in recital (414) that by accepting to invest in convertible bonds with a very low rate of return irrespective of the risk profile of the issuer, the financial institutions provided a benefit to the sampled exporting producers. In fact, the financial advantage provided through the purchase of convertible corporate bonds with such a low coupon rate is
  ‘explicitly limited’
  to encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry, by the normative framework designed by the GOC. Therefore, the claims of the GOC were rejected.

‘explicitly limited’

(c)   Calculation of the benefit

| (420) | Convertible bonds are a hybrid debt instrument which have features of a bond such as interest payments while also providing the opportunity to convert the invested amount into shares under certain conditions. The Commission found that only a negligible part of the convertible bonds of both sampled companies has been converted into shares. Therefore, during the investigation period, the convertible bonds of the two sampled companies operated only as a bond, providing investors a return in the form of an interest similarly to loans. Since the calculation methodology for loans described in recital (310) is based on bonds, the Commission decided to follow the same methodology given these specific circumstances of this case (100). This means that the relative spread between US AA corporate bonds and US BB corporate bonds with the same duration is applied to the Loan Benchmark Rates published by the PBOC or, after 20 August 2019, the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC (101), to establish a market-based interest rate for bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(420)

Convertible bonds are a hybrid debt instrument which have features of a bond such as interest payments while also providing the opportunity to convert the invested amount into shares under certain conditions. The Commission found that only a negligible part of the convertible bonds of both sampled companies has been converted into shares. Therefore, during the investigation period, the convertible bonds of the two sampled companies operated only as a bond, providing investors a return in the form of an interest similarly to loans. Since the calculation methodology for loans described in recital (310) is based on bonds, the Commission decided to follow the same methodology given these specific circumstances of this case (100). This means that the relative spread between US AA corporate bonds and US BB corporate bonds with the same duration is applied to the Loan Benchmark Rates published by the PBOC or, after 20 August 2019, the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC (101), to establish a market-based interest rate for bonds.

100

101

| (421) | Following final disclosure, the GOC, the ZTT Group and the FTT Group objected the use of the same benchmark for bonds and convertible bonds as the one applied to loans since bonds, in particular convertible bonds, and loans are different financial instruments and that the bonds market works differently from the private lending market. The GOC claimed that there is no basis for the Commission to use the PBOC benchmark as a starting point and then add a mark-up. According to the GOC, the Commission should directly use the interest rate for bonds issued by BB rated companies and gave examples that European OFC and steel producers with BB rating issued bonds for a similar maturity period at significantly lower rates than the calculated benchmark rate during the same period. The ZTT Group argued that the main advantage of issuing bonds compared to raising loans from banks is that the interest rate (i.e. coupon rate) companies have to pay to the bond investors is often less that the interest rate that they would have to pay on a bank loan. According to the ZTT Group, issuing convertible bonds is even more attractive because they typically bear a lower coupon rate because they enable investors to convert the bonds into equity and thus receive investment returns via equity dividends. The FTT Group also stated that the benefit of convertible bonds is not the interest income but the conversion right. Both the FTT Group and the ZTT Group suggested using the coupon rate of US BB rated corporate bonds as a benchmark for the calculation of the benefit for bonds and convertible bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(421)

Following final disclosure, the GOC, the ZTT Group and the FTT Group objected the use of the same benchmark for bonds and convertible bonds as the one applied to loans since bonds, in particular convertible bonds, and loans are different financial instruments and that the bonds market works differently from the private lending market. The GOC claimed that there is no basis for the Commission to use the PBOC benchmark as a starting point and then add a mark-up. According to the GOC, the Commission should directly use the interest rate for bonds issued by BB rated companies and gave examples that European OFC and steel producers with BB rating issued bonds for a similar maturity period at significantly lower rates than the calculated benchmark rate during the same period. The ZTT Group argued that the main advantage of issuing bonds compared to raising loans from banks is that the interest rate (i.e. coupon rate) companies have to pay to the bond investors is often less that the interest rate that they would have to pay on a bank loan. According to the ZTT Group, issuing convertible bonds is even more attractive because they typically bear a lower coupon rate because they enable investors to convert the bonds into equity and thus receive investment returns via equity dividends. The FTT Group also stated that the benefit of convertible bonds is not the interest income but the conversion right. Both the FTT Group and the ZTT Group suggested using the coupon rate of US BB rated corporate bonds as a benchmark for the calculation of the benefit for bonds and convertible bonds.

| (422) | In recital (337), the Commission explained why it considered that loans and corporate bonds are similar financial debt instruments, which justified the application of the same benchmark for both instruments in the specific circumstances of this case. In recitals (325) to (333), the Commission explained why it judged that the benchmark for loans and corporate bonds is appropriate, why it cannot use the coupon rate of US BB rated corporate bonds as a benchmark and why the comparison with EU interest rates/coupon rates is irrelevant. The Commission agreed that convertible corporate bonds are a hybrid debt instrument which also provides the opportunity to convert the invested amount into shares under certain conditions and are as such in principle different from corporate bonds. The Commission did look into the possibility to quantify this convertibility element as well as the use of the US BB rated corporate bonds as suggested by the GOC, the FTT Group, and the ZTT Group. However, the benchmark proposed by these parties did not take into consideration such convertibility and it was a benchmark for corporate bonds de-linked from the Chinese markets as it concerned bonds issued in a different currency (i.e. USD and not CNY), and with a substantially different risk-free interest rate. No other possible benchmarks were submitted, and no further public information was available to provide for a more accurate benchmark for convertible bonds (e.g. indices for the premium on US AA rated convertible bonds and US BB rated convertible bonds) or for the convertibility aspect of these bonds. The companies’ own data also lacked the possibility for any proper comparison on the difference in coupon rate between bonds and convertible bonds, as one of the sampled companies did not have any bonds outstanding and the bonds of the other sampled company did have a different maturity and financing purpose from its convertible bond. Furthermore, the Commission concluded in recital (420) that only a negligible part of the convertible bonds of both sampled companies has been converted into shares, and that in practice the exporting producers used this financing instrument interchangeably with the other financing instruments, that is loans and corporate bonds. Therefore, since during the investigation period these convertible bonds operated only as a bond, providing investors a return in the form of an interest similarly to loans, and since the use of the benchmark at a free-risk rate as published by the PBOC or the NIFC was estimated to be conservative, the Commission confirmed its decision to apply the benchmark for loans as stated in recital (420). |
| --- | --- |

(422)

In recital (337), the Commission explained why it considered that loans and corporate bonds are similar financial debt instruments, which justified the application of the same benchmark for both instruments in the specific circumstances of this case. In recitals (325) to (333), the Commission explained why it judged that the benchmark for loans and corporate bonds is appropriate, why it cannot use the coupon rate of US BB rated corporate bonds as a benchmark and why the comparison with EU interest rates/coupon rates is irrelevant. The Commission agreed that convertible corporate bonds are a hybrid debt instrument which also provides the opportunity to convert the invested amount into shares under certain conditions and are as such in principle different from corporate bonds. The Commission did look into the possibility to quantify this convertibility element as well as the use of the US BB rated corporate bonds as suggested by the GOC, the FTT Group, and the ZTT Group. However, the benchmark proposed by these parties did not take into consideration such convertibility and it was a benchmark for corporate bonds de-linked from the Chinese markets as it concerned bonds issued in a different currency (i.e. USD and not CNY), and with a substantially different risk-free interest rate. No other possible benchmarks were submitted, and no further public information was available to provide for a more accurate benchmark for convertible bonds (e.g. indices for the premium on US AA rated convertible bonds and US BB rated convertible bonds) or for the convertibility aspect of these bonds. The companies’ own data also lacked the possibility for any proper comparison on the difference in coupon rate between bonds and convertible bonds, as one of the sampled companies did not have any bonds outstanding and the bonds of the other sampled company did have a different maturity and financing purpose from its convertible bond. Furthermore, the Commission concluded in recital (420) that only a negligible part of the convertible bonds of both sampled companies has been converted into shares, and that in practice the exporting producers used this financing instrument interchangeably with the other financing instruments, that is loans and corporate bonds. Therefore, since during the investigation period these convertible bonds operated only as a bond, providing investors a return in the form of an interest similarly to loans, and since the use of the benchmark at a free-risk rate as published by the PBOC or the NIFC was estimated to be conservative, the Commission confirmed its decision to apply the benchmark for loans as stated in recital (420).

| (423) | The benefit is the difference between the interest amount that the company should have paid by applying the market-based interest rate referred to in recital (420) and the actual interest paid by the company. |
| --- | --- |

(423)

The benefit is the difference between the interest amount that the company should have paid by applying the market-based interest rate referred to in recital (420) and the actual interest paid by the company.

3.5.4.4   Corporate bonds

| (424) | One of the sampled groups benefited from preferential financing in the form of corporate bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(424)

One of the sampled groups benefited from preferential financing in the form of corporate bonds.

(a)   Legal basis

| — | Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities (version 2014) (‘Securities Law’) (102); |
| --- | --- |

—

Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities (version 2014) (‘Securities Law’) (102);

102

| — | Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds, Order of the China Securities Regulatory Commission No 113, 15 January 2015; |
| --- | --- |

—

Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds, Order of the China Securities Regulatory Commission No 113, 15 January 2015;

| — | Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, issued by the State Council on 18 January 2011 |
| --- | --- |

—

Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, issued by the State Council on 18 January 2011

| — | Measures of the Administration of Debt Financing Instruments of Non-financial Enterprises on the Inter-bank Bond Market Issued by the People’s Bank of China, Order of the People’s Bank of China [2008] No 12, 9 April 2008; |
| --- | --- |

—

Measures of the Administration of Debt Financing Instruments of Non-financial Enterprises on the Inter-bank Bond Market Issued by the People’s Bank of China, Order of the People’s Bank of China [2008] No 12, 9 April 2008;

(b)   Regulatory framework governing corporate bonds

| (425) | In line with the regulatory framework, bonds cannot be issued or traded freely in China. The issuance of each bond must be approved by various governmental authorities, such as the PBOC, the NDRC or the CSRC, depending on the type of bond and the type of issuer. In addition, according to the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, there are annual quotas for the issuance of corporate bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(425)

In line with the regulatory framework, bonds cannot be issued or traded freely in China. The issuance of each bond must be approved by various governmental authorities, such as the PBOC, the NDRC or the CSRC, depending on the type of bond and the type of issuer. In addition, according to the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds, there are annual quotas for the issuance of corporate bonds.

| (426) | Furthermore, according to Article 16 of the Securities Law applicable during the IP, a public offering of corporate bonds should satisfy the following requirements: ‘the usage purpose of the proceeds shall comply with State industrial policies [...]’ and ‘the proceeds from a public offering of corporate bonds shall be used for approved purpose(s) only’. Article 12 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds reiterates that the purpose of the raised funds must comply with the industrial policies of the State. As explained in recitals (400) and (401), the issuance of corporate bonds under such conditions targets an encouraged industry such as the OFC industry and corresponds with the practice of financial institutions to support those industries. |
| --- | --- |

(426)

Furthermore, according to Article 16 of the Securities Law applicable during the IP, a public offering of corporate bonds should satisfy the following requirements: ‘the usage purpose of the proceeds shall comply with State industrial policies [...]’ and ‘the proceeds from a public offering of corporate bonds shall be used for approved purpose(s) only’. Article 12 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds reiterates that the purpose of the raised funds must comply with the industrial policies of the State. As explained in recitals (400) and (401), the issuance of corporate bonds under such conditions targets an encouraged industry such as the OFC industry and corresponds with the practice of financial institutions to support those industries.

the usage purpose of the proceeds shall comply with State industrial policies [...]’ and ‘the proceeds from a public offering of corporate bonds shall be used for approved purpose(s) only

| (427) | According to Article 16(5) of the Securities Law (version 2014),
  ‘the coupon rate of the corporate bonds shall not exceed the coupon rate stipulated by the State Council’. In addition, Article 18 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds provides further details by stating that, ‘the interest rate offered for any corporate bonds shall not be higher than 40 % of the prevailing interest rate paid by banks to individuals for fixed-term savings deposits of the same maturity’. |
| --- | --- |

(427)

According to Article 16(5) of the Securities Law (version 2014),
  ‘the coupon rate of the corporate bonds shall not exceed the coupon rate stipulated by the State Council’. In addition, Article 18 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds provides further details by stating that, ‘the interest rate offered for any corporate bonds shall not be higher than 40 % of the prevailing interest rate paid by banks to individuals for fixed-term savings deposits of the same maturity’.

‘the coupon rate of the corporate bonds shall not exceed the coupon rate stipulated by the State Council’.

the interest rate offered for any corporate bonds shall not be higher than 40 % of the prevailing interest rate paid by banks to individuals for fixed-term savings deposits of the same maturity

| (428) | Furthermore, Article 18 of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds stipulates that only certain bonds complying with strict quality criteria, such as an AAA credit rating, may be issued in a public manner to public investors or be issued in a public manner to qualified investors only at the sole discretion of the issuer. The corporate bonds that fail to meet these standards can be issued in a public manner only to qualified investors. Therefore, it results that most corporate bonds are issued to qualified investors which have been approved by the CSRC and which are Chinese institutional investors. |
| --- | --- |

(428)

Furthermore, Article 18 of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance and Trading of Corporate Bonds stipulates that only certain bonds complying with strict quality criteria, such as an AAA credit rating, may be issued in a public manner to public investors or be issued in a public manner to qualified investors only at the sole discretion of the issuer. The corporate bonds that fail to meet these standards can be issued in a public manner only to qualified investors. Therefore, it results that most corporate bonds are issued to qualified investors which have been approved by the CSRC and which are Chinese institutional investors.

(c)   Financial institutions acting as public bodies

| (429) | In China, companies that want to issue corporate bonds need to solicit the services of a financial institution acting as an underwriter. Underwriters organize the issuance of bonds and negotiate the interest rate at which the bond will be presented to investors. The Commission established that the underwriter of the corporate bond issued by one of the sampled groups was among the financial institutions that also provided preferential financing, which was explained in Section 3.5.1 above. |
| --- | --- |

(429)

In China, companies that want to issue corporate bonds need to solicit the services of a financial institution acting as an underwriter. Underwriters organize the issuance of bonds and negotiate the interest rate at which the bond will be presented to investors. The Commission established that the underwriter of the corporate bond issued by one of the sampled groups was among the financial institutions that also provided preferential financing, which was explained in Section 3.5.1 above.

| (430) | Furthermore, according to the China bond market insight 2021 by Bloomberg, the bonds listed in the interbank bond market account for 88 % of the total trading volume of bonds. According to the same study, most of the investors are institutional investors, including financial institutions. In particular, commercial banks represent 57 % of the investors and policy banks represent 3 % (103). Therefore, investors buying corporate bonds are mainly Chinese banks, including State-owned banks. |
| --- | --- |

(430)

Furthermore, according to the China bond market insight 2021 by Bloomberg, the bonds listed in the interbank bond market account for 88 % of the total trading volume of bonds. According to the same study, most of the investors are institutional investors, including financial institutions. In particular, commercial banks represent 57 % of the investors and policy banks represent 3 % (103). Therefore, investors buying corporate bonds are mainly Chinese banks, including State-owned banks.

103

| (431) | As explained in recitals (405) and (406) above, the Commission considered that there is a body of corroborating evidence, according to which a major proportion of the investors in convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies is constituted by financial institutions which have a legal obligation to provide credit support to OFC producers. The same reasoning and conclusion also applies to corporate bonds as the conditions of issuance are very similar, in particular the condition to comply with the requirements of national laws, regulations and policy, and with the industrial policy of the State. |
| --- | --- |

(431)

As explained in recitals (405) and (406) above, the Commission considered that there is a body of corroborating evidence, according to which a major proportion of the investors in convertible bonds issued by the sampled companies is constituted by financial institutions which have a legal obligation to provide credit support to OFC producers. The same reasoning and conclusion also applies to corporate bonds as the conditions of issuance are very similar, in particular the condition to comply with the requirements of national laws, regulations and policy, and with the industrial policy of the State.

| (432) | As described in recital (426), Article 16 of the Securities Law (version 2014) and Article 12 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds require that a public offering of corporate bonds complies with the industrial policies of the State. This has the effect that corporate bonds can only be issued for purposes that are in line with the targets of the planning of the GOC regarding encouraged industries as explained in recitals (393) and (394). The institutional investors, which are, as shown in recitals (397) and (430), to a large extent commercial banks and policy banks, have to follow the policy orientations laid down in Decision No 40. |
| --- | --- |

(432)

As described in recital (426), Article 16 of the Securities Law (version 2014) and Article 12 of the Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds require that a public offering of corporate bonds complies with the industrial policies of the State. This has the effect that corporate bonds can only be issued for purposes that are in line with the targets of the planning of the GOC regarding encouraged industries as explained in recitals (393) and (394). The institutional investors, which are, as shown in recitals (397) and (430), to a large extent commercial banks and policy banks, have to follow the policy orientations laid down in Decision No 40.

| (433) | Thus, the mechanism as described in recitals (116), (401) and (413) above applies to corporate bonds as well, i.e. Decision No 40 read together with the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring provides for specific treatment of certain projects within certain encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry. The beneficial treatment that was applied in favour of one of the sampled groups aggregated in the decision to invest in corporate bonds issued with an interest rate that does not reflect market based criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(433)

Thus, the mechanism as described in recitals (116), (401) and (413) above applies to corporate bonds as well, i.e. Decision No 40 read together with the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring provides for specific treatment of certain projects within certain encouraged industries, such as the OFC industry. The beneficial treatment that was applied in favour of one of the sampled groups aggregated in the decision to invest in corporate bonds issued with an interest rate that does not reflect market based criteria.

| (434) | As described in Section 3.5.1 above, the financial institutions are characterized by a strong State presence, and the GOC has the possibility to exercise a meaningful influence on them. The general legal framework, in which these financial institutions operate is also applicable to corporate bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(434)

As described in Section 3.5.1 above, the financial institutions are characterized by a strong State presence, and the GOC has the possibility to exercise a meaningful influence on them. The general legal framework, in which these financial institutions operate is also applicable to corporate bonds.

| (435) | In Section (1) and (2) above, the Commission concluded that State-owned financial institutions are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and that they are in any event considered entrusted or directed by the GOC to carry out functions normally vested in the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation. In Section 3.5.1.2 above, the Commission concluded that private financial institutions are also entrusted and directed by the government. |
| --- | --- |

(435)

In Section (1) and (2) above, the Commission concluded that State-owned financial institutions are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and that they are in any event considered entrusted or directed by the GOC to carry out functions normally vested in the government within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation. In Section 3.5.1.2 above, the Commission concluded that private financial institutions are also entrusted and directed by the government.

| (436) | The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete issuances of corporate bonds. It therefore examined the overall legal environment as set out above in recitals (425) to (428), in combination with the concrete findings of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(436)

The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete issuances of corporate bonds. It therefore examined the overall legal environment as set out above in recitals (425) to (428), in combination with the concrete findings of the investigation.

| (437) | The Commission found that the corporate bond was issued with an interest rate below the level that should have been expected in the companies’ financial and credit risk situation. |
| --- | --- |

(437)

The Commission found that the corporate bond was issued with an interest rate below the level that should have been expected in the companies’ financial and credit risk situation.

| (438) | In practice, interest rates on corporate bonds are influenced by the credit rating of the company, similar to loans. However, the Commission concluded in recital (280) that the local credit rating market is distorted and credit ratings are unreliable. As stated in recital (274), five Chinese local rating agencies dominate the bond market and around 90 % of the bonds are rated AAA by local crating agencies, while many of the issuers have received a lower S&P global issuer rating of A and BBB. |
| --- | --- |

(438)

In practice, interest rates on corporate bonds are influenced by the credit rating of the company, similar to loans. However, the Commission concluded in recital (280) that the local credit rating market is distorted and credit ratings are unreliable. As stated in recital (274), five Chinese local rating agencies dominate the bond market and around 90 % of the bonds are rated AAA by local crating agencies, while many of the issuers have received a lower S&P global issuer rating of A and BBB.

| (439) | This was illustrated by the fact that the credit rating reports for the corporate bond issued by the sampled company did not correspond to its actual financial situation. |
| --- | --- |

(439)

This was illustrated by the fact that the credit rating reports for the corporate bond issued by the sampled company did not correspond to its actual financial situation.

| (440) | In light of the above considerations, the Commission concluded that the Chinese financial institutions, which acted as underwriters in the issuance of the corporate bond by the sampled company and which are the major investors in the corporate bond, followed the policy orientations laid down in Decision No 40 by providing preferential financing to companies pertaining to an encouraged industry and thus acted either as public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation or as bodies which are entrusted or directed by the government within the meaning of Articles 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(440)

In light of the above considerations, the Commission concluded that the Chinese financial institutions, which acted as underwriters in the issuance of the corporate bond by the sampled company and which are the major investors in the corporate bond, followed the policy orientations laid down in Decision No 40 by providing preferential financing to companies pertaining to an encouraged industry and thus acted either as public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation or as bodies which are entrusted or directed by the government within the meaning of Articles 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.

| (441) | By organising the issuance of a corporate bonds with the interest rate below the market rate corresponding to the actual risk profile of the issuer and by accepting to invest in such corporate bond, the financial institutions provided a benefit to the sampled exporting producer. |
| --- | --- |

(441)

By organising the issuance of a corporate bonds with the interest rate below the market rate corresponding to the actual risk profile of the issuer and by accepting to invest in such corporate bond, the financial institutions provided a benefit to the sampled exporting producer.

(d)   Specificity

| (442) | As described in recital (417) above, the Commission considered that the preferential financing through bonds is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the bonds cannot be issued without approval from government authorities, and the Securities Law of the PRC (version 2014) states that the issuance of bonds must comply with the State’s industrial policies. As already mentioned in recital (131), the OFC industry is regarded as encouraged industry in the Guiding Catalogue of Industry Restructuring. |
| --- | --- |

(442)

As described in recital (417) above, the Commission considered that the preferential financing through bonds is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the bonds cannot be issued without approval from government authorities, and the Securities Law of the PRC (version 2014) states that the issuance of bonds must comply with the State’s industrial policies. As already mentioned in recital (131), the OFC industry is regarded as encouraged industry in the Guiding Catalogue of Industry Restructuring.

(e)   Calculation of the benefit

| (443) | Since bonds are in essence just another type of debt instrument, similar to loans, and since the calculation methodology for loans is already based on a basket of bonds, the Commission decided to follow the calculation methodology for loans as described above in Section 3.5.3.3. This means that the relative spread between US AA corporate bonds and US BB corporate bonds with the same duration is applied to the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, or after 20 August 2019 to the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC, to establish a market-based interest rate for bonds, which is then compared with the actual interest rate paid by the company in order to determine the benefit. |
| --- | --- |

(443)

Since bonds are in essence just another type of debt instrument, similar to loans, and since the calculation methodology for loans is already based on a basket of bonds, the Commission decided to follow the calculation methodology for loans as described above in Section 3.5.3.3. This means that the relative spread between US AA corporate bonds and US BB corporate bonds with the same duration is applied to the PBOC Loan Benchmark Rate, or after 20 August 2019 to the Loan Prime Rate published by the NIFC, to establish a market-based interest rate for bonds, which is then compared with the actual interest rate paid by the company in order to determine the benefit.

3.5.4.5.   Conclusion on preferential financing: other types of financing

| (444) | The Commission established that both sampled groups of exporting producers benefited from preferential financing in the form of credit lines, bank acceptance drafts and convertible bonds. In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, the Commission considered these types of preferential financing a countervailable subsidy. |
| --- | --- |

(444)

The Commission established that both sampled groups of exporting producers benefited from preferential financing in the form of credit lines, bank acceptance drafts and convertible bonds. In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, the Commission considered these types of preferential financing a countervailable subsidy.

| (445) | The subsidy rate established with regard to the preferential financing described above during the investigation period for the sampled groups of companies amounted to:

  Preferential financing: other types of financing







  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(445)

The subsidy rate established with regard to the preferential financing described above during the investigation period for the sampled groups of companies amounted to:

Preferential financing: other types of financing

Preferential financing: other types of financing

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

3,51 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

2,62 %

3.6.   Preferential insurance: export credit insurance

Preferential insurance: export credit insurance

| (446) | The complainant alleged that Sinosure provides short-, medium- and long-term export credit insurance, investment insurance and bond guarantees, among other services, on a concessional basis to encouraged industries. On its general website, Sinosure states that it promotes Chinese exports of goods, especially the exporting of high-tech products. According to a study undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), the Chinese high-tech industry, of which the OFC industry is part, received 21 % of the total export credit insurance provided by Sinosure (104). Furthermore, Sinosure has taken an active role in fulfilling the ‘Made in China 2025’ Initiative, guiding enterprises to use national credit resources, carrying out scientific and technological innovation and technological upgrading, and helping ‘going out’ enterprises become more competitive in the global market (105). |
| --- | --- |

(446)

The complainant alleged that Sinosure provides short-, medium- and long-term export credit insurance, investment insurance and bond guarantees, among other services, on a concessional basis to encouraged industries. On its general website, Sinosure states that it promotes Chinese exports of goods, especially the exporting of high-tech products. According to a study undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), the Chinese high-tech industry, of which the OFC industry is part, received 21 % of the total export credit insurance provided by Sinosure (104). Furthermore, Sinosure has taken an active role in fulfilling the ‘Made in China 2025’ Initiative, guiding enterprises to use national credit resources, carrying out scientific and technological innovation and technological upgrading, and helping ‘going out’ enterprises become more competitive in the global market (105).

104

105

(a)   Legal basis

| (a) | Notice on the Implementation of the Strategy of Promoting Trade through Science and Technology by Utilising Export Credit Insurance (Shang Ji Fa [2004] No 368), issued jointly by MOFCOM and Sinosure; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Notice on the Implementation of the Strategy of Promoting Trade through Science and Technology by Utilising Export Credit Insurance (Shang Ji Fa [2004] No 368), issued jointly by MOFCOM and Sinosure;

| (b) | 840 plan included in the Notice by the State Council of 27 May 2009; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

840 plan included in the Notice by the State Council of 27 May 2009;

| (c) | Notice on Cultivation and Development of the State Council on Accelerating Emerging Industries of Strategic Decision (GuoFa [2010] No 32 of 18 October 2010), issued by the State Council and its Implementing Guidelines (GuoFa [2011] No 310 of 21 October 2011) |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Notice on Cultivation and Development of the State Council on Accelerating Emerging Industries of Strategic Decision (GuoFa [2010] No 32 of 18 October 2010), issued by the State Council and its Implementing Guidelines (GuoFa [2011] No 310 of 21 October 2011)

| (d) | Notice on the issuance of the 2006 edition of China’s High-tech Products Export Catalogue No 16 of the National Science and Technology Department (2006). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Notice on the issuance of the 2006 edition of China’s High-tech Products Export Catalogue No 16 of the National Science and Technology Department (2006).

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (447) | The two sampled groups of companies had outstanding export insurance agreements with Sinosure during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(447)

The two sampled groups of companies had outstanding export insurance agreements with Sinosure during the investigation period.

| (448) | As mentioned in recital (158) above, Sinosure failed to provide the supporting documentation requested concerning its corporate governance such as Articles of Association. In addition, Sinosure did not provide more specific information about the export credit insurance provided to the OFC industry, the level of its premiums or detailed figures relating to the profitability of its export credit insurance business. |
| --- | --- |

(448)

As mentioned in recital (158) above, Sinosure failed to provide the supporting documentation requested concerning its corporate governance such as Articles of Association. In addition, Sinosure did not provide more specific information about the export credit insurance provided to the OFC industry, the level of its premiums or detailed figures relating to the profitability of its export credit insurance business.

| (449) | Therefore, the Commission had to complement the information provided by facts available. |
| --- | --- |

(449)

Therefore, the Commission had to complement the information provided by facts available.

| (450) | According to information provided in previous anti-subsidy investigations (106) and according to Sinosure’s website (107), Sinosure is a State-owned policy-oriented insurance company established and supported by the State to support the PRC’s foreign economic and trade development and cooperation. The company is 100 % owned by the State. It has a board of directors and a board of supervisors. The Government has the power to appoint and dismiss the company’s senior managers. Based on this information, the Commission concluded that there is formal indicia of government control with respect to Sinosure. |
| --- | --- |

(450)

According to information provided in previous anti-subsidy investigations (106) and according to Sinosure’s website (107), Sinosure is a State-owned policy-oriented insurance company established and supported by the State to support the PRC’s foreign economic and trade development and cooperation. The company is 100 % owned by the State. It has a board of directors and a board of supervisors. The Government has the power to appoint and dismiss the company’s senior managers. Based on this information, the Commission concluded that there is formal indicia of government control with respect to Sinosure.

106

107

| (451) | The Commission further sought information about whether the GOC exercised meaningful control over the conduct of Sinosure with respect to the OFC industry. |
| --- | --- |

(451)

The Commission further sought information about whether the GOC exercised meaningful control over the conduct of Sinosure with respect to the OFC industry.

| (452) | According to the Notice on the issuance of the 2006 edition of China’s High-tech Products Export Catalogue No 16,
  ‘products included in the 2006 edition of the Export Catalogue may enjoy preferential policies granted by the State for the export of high-tech products’. The Export Catalogue of High-Tech Products specifically lists optical fibres, optical fiber communication transmission equipment and optical fibre cables. (108) |
| --- | --- |

(452)

According to the Notice on the issuance of the 2006 edition of China’s High-tech Products Export Catalogue No 16,
  ‘products included in the 2006 edition of the Export Catalogue may enjoy preferential policies granted by the State for the export of high-tech products’. The Export Catalogue of High-Tech Products specifically lists optical fibres, optical fiber communication transmission equipment and optical fibre cables. (108)

‘products included in the 2006 edition of the Export Catalogue may enjoy preferential policies granted by the State for the export of high-tech products’.

108

| (453) | Furthermore, according to the Notice on the Implementation of the Strategy of Promoting Trade through Science and Technology by Utilising Export Credit Insurance (109), Sinosure should increase its support for key industries and products by strengthening its overall support for the export of high and new technology products, including ‘information and communications’ products. It should treat high and new technology industries, such as the OFC industry, listed in the China’s High-tech Products Export Catalogue, as its business focus and provide comprehensive support in terms of underwriting procedures, approval with limits, claims processing speed and rate flexibility. With regard to rate flexibility, it should give products the maximum premium rate discount within the floating range provided by the credit insurance company. As mentioned in recitals (86) and (118), the OFC industry is included in the more general category of ‘Information Industry’. Furthermore, the Annual Report of Sinosure for 2019 states that Sinosure has
  ‘supported steady development of key Industries’
  and
  ‘accelerated growth of strategic emerging Industries’
   (110). |
| --- | --- |

(453)

Furthermore, according to the Notice on the Implementation of the Strategy of Promoting Trade through Science and Technology by Utilising Export Credit Insurance (109), Sinosure should increase its support for key industries and products by strengthening its overall support for the export of high and new technology products, including ‘information and communications’ products. It should treat high and new technology industries, such as the OFC industry, listed in the China’s High-tech Products Export Catalogue, as its business focus and provide comprehensive support in terms of underwriting procedures, approval with limits, claims processing speed and rate flexibility. With regard to rate flexibility, it should give products the maximum premium rate discount within the floating range provided by the credit insurance company. As mentioned in recitals (86) and (118), the OFC industry is included in the more general category of ‘Information Industry’. Furthermore, the Annual Report of Sinosure for 2019 states that Sinosure has
  ‘supported steady development of key Industries’
  and
  ‘accelerated growth of strategic emerging Industries’
   (110).

109

‘supported steady development of key Industries’

‘accelerated growth of strategic emerging Industries’

110

| (454) | On this basis, the Commission concluded that the GOC has created a normative framework that had to be adhered to by the managers and supervisors appointed by the GOC and accountable to the GOC. Therefore, the GOC relied on such normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the conduct of Sinosure. |
| --- | --- |

(454)

On this basis, the Commission concluded that the GOC has created a normative framework that had to be adhered to by the managers and supervisors appointed by the GOC and accountable to the GOC. Therefore, the GOC relied on such normative framework in order to exercise control in a meaningful way over the conduct of Sinosure.

| (455) | The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete insurance agreements. During the RCC, the GOC maintained that in practice Sinosure’s premiums were market-oriented and based on risk assessment principles. However, no specific examples with respect to the OFC industry or the sampled companies were provided. |
| --- | --- |

(455)

The Commission also sought concrete proof of the exercise of control in a meaningful way based on concrete insurance agreements. During the RCC, the GOC maintained that in practice Sinosure’s premiums were market-oriented and based on risk assessment principles. However, no specific examples with respect to the OFC industry or the sampled companies were provided.

| (456) | In the absence of concrete evidence, the Commission therefore examined the concrete behaviour of Sinosure with regard to the insurance provided to the sampled companies. This behaviour contrasted with their official stance, as they were not acting based on market principles. |
| --- | --- |

(456)

In the absence of concrete evidence, the Commission therefore examined the concrete behaviour of Sinosure with regard to the insurance provided to the sampled companies. This behaviour contrasted with their official stance, as they were not acting based on market principles.

| (457) | After comparing the total claims paid with the total insured amounts, based on the data in the Sinosure’s Annual Report for 2019 (111), the Commission concluded that on average Sinosure would need to charge 0,22 % of the insured amount as a premium to cover the cost of the claims (without even taking into account overhead expenses). However, in practice, the premiums paid by the sampled companies were much lower than the minimum fee needed to cover operational costs. |
| --- | --- |

(457)

After comparing the total claims paid with the total insured amounts, based on the data in the Sinosure’s Annual Report for 2019 (111), the Commission concluded that on average Sinosure would need to charge 0,22 % of the insured amount as a premium to cover the cost of the claims (without even taking into account overhead expenses). However, in practice, the premiums paid by the sampled companies were much lower than the minimum fee needed to cover operational costs.

111

| (458) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that the legal framework set out above is being implemented by Sinosure in the exercise of governmental functions with respect to the OFC sector. Sinosure acted as a public body in the sense of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and in accordance with the relevant WTO case-law. Furthermore, the sampled exporting producers received a benefit, since the insurance was provided at rates below the minimum fee needed for Sinosure to cover its operational costs. |
| --- | --- |

(458)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that the legal framework set out above is being implemented by Sinosure in the exercise of governmental functions with respect to the OFC sector. Sinosure acted as a public body in the sense of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation read in conjunction with Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation and in accordance with the relevant WTO case-law. Furthermore, the sampled exporting producers received a benefit, since the insurance was provided at rates below the minimum fee needed for Sinosure to cover its operational costs.

| (459) | The Commission also determined that the subsidies provided under the export insurance programme are specific, because they could not be obtained without exporting and are thus export contingent within the meaning of Article 4(4)(a) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(459)

The Commission also determined that the subsidies provided under the export insurance programme are specific, because they could not be obtained without exporting and are thus export contingent within the meaning of Article 4(4)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(c)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (460) | As Sinosure held a predominant market position during the investigation period, the Commission could not find a market-based domestic insurance premium. Therefore, in line with previous anti-subsidy investigations, the Commission thus used the most appropriate external benchmark, for which information was readily available, i.e. the premium rates applied by the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America to non-financial institutions for exports to OECD countries. |
| --- | --- |

(460)

As Sinosure held a predominant market position during the investigation period, the Commission could not find a market-based domestic insurance premium. Therefore, in line with previous anti-subsidy investigations, the Commission thus used the most appropriate external benchmark, for which information was readily available, i.e. the premium rates applied by the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America to non-financial institutions for exports to OECD countries.

| (461) | The Commission considered that the benefit conferred on the recipients is the difference between the amount that the company had actually paid as insurance premium and the amount that it should have paid by applying the external benchmark premium rate mentioned in recital (460). |
| --- | --- |

(461)

The Commission considered that the benefit conferred on the recipients is the difference between the amount that the company had actually paid as insurance premium and the amount that it should have paid by applying the external benchmark premium rate mentioned in recital (460).

| (462) | The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the investigation period for FTT Group and for ZTT Group amounted to:

  Preferential financing and insurance: export credit insurance







  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(462)

The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the investigation period for FTT Group and for ZTT Group amounted to:

Preferential financing and insurance: export credit insurance

Preferential financing and insurance: export credit insurance

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

0,08 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

0,54 %

3.7.   Revenue foregone through tax exemptions and reduction programmes

Revenue foregone through tax exemptions and reduction programmes

3.7.1.   Tax exemptions and reductions

Tax exemptions and reductions

3.7.1.1.   EIT privileges for High and New Technology Enterprises

| (463) | According to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax (‘EIT Law’) (112), high and new technology enterprises to which the State needs to give key support benefit from a reduced enterprise income tax rate of 15 % rather than the standard tax rate of 25 %. |
| --- | --- |

(463)

According to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax (‘EIT Law’) (112), high and new technology enterprises to which the State needs to give key support benefit from a reduced enterprise income tax rate of 15 % rather than the standard tax rate of 25 %.

112

(a)   Legal basis

| (464) | The legal basis of this programme is Article 28 of the EIT Law and Article 93 of the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC (113), as well as:






  — | Circular of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on revising and issuing Administrative Measures for the Recognition of High-Tech Enterprises, G.K.F.H. [2016] No 32; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(464)

The legal basis of this programme is Article 28 of the EIT Law and Article 93 of the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC (113), as well as:

113

—

Circular of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on revising and issuing Administrative Measures for the Recognition of High-Tech Enterprises, G.K.F.H. [2016] No 32;

| — | Circular of the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on Revising and Issuing the Guidelines for the Administration of Accreditation of High-tech Enterprises, Guo Ke Fa Huo [2016] No 195; |
| --- | --- |

—

Circular of the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on Revising and Issuing the Guidelines for the Administration of Accreditation of High-tech Enterprises, Guo Ke Fa Huo [2016] No 195;

| — | Announcement [2017] No 24 of the State Administration of Taxation on the Application of Preferential Income Tax Policies to High-tech Enterprises; |
| --- | --- |

—

Announcement [2017] No 24 of the State Administration of Taxation on the Application of Preferential Income Tax Policies to High-tech Enterprises;

| — | The 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State (114); and |
| --- | --- |

—

The 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State (114); and

114

| — | Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation Announcement [2019] No 68. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation Announcement [2019] No 68.

| (465) | Chapter IV of the EIT Law contains provisions regarding ‘Preferential Tax Treatment’. Article 25 of the EIT Law, which stands as a chapeau for Chapter IV, provides that
  ‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’
  . Article 28 of the EIT law provides that
  ‘the rate of enterprise income tax on high and new technological enterprises needing special support of the State shall be reduced to 15 %’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(465)

Chapter IV of the EIT Law contains provisions regarding ‘Preferential Tax Treatment’. Article 25 of the EIT Law, which stands as a chapeau for Chapter IV, provides that
  ‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’
  . Article 28 of the EIT law provides that
  ‘the rate of enterprise income tax on high and new technological enterprises needing special support of the State shall be reduced to 15 %’
  .

‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’

‘the rate of enterprise income tax on high and new technological enterprises needing special support of the State shall be reduced to 15 %’

| (466) | Article 93 of the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law clarifies that:

  ‘

  “The important high and new technology enterprises to be supported by the state” as referred to in Clause 2 of Article 28 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law refer to the enterprises which own key intellectual property rights and satisfy the following conditions:







  1. | Complying with the scope of the Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(466)

Article 93 of the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law clarifies that:

‘

  “The important high and new technology enterprises to be supported by the state” as referred to in Clause 2 of Article 28 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law refer to the enterprises which own key intellectual property rights and satisfy the following conditions:

“The important high and new technology enterprises to be supported by the state” as referred to in Clause 2 of Article 28 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law refer to the enterprises which own key intellectual property rights and satisfy the following conditions:

1.

Complying with the scope of the Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas;

Complying with the scope of the Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas;

| 2. | The proportion of the research and development expense in the sales revenue shall be no less than the prescribed proportion; |
| --- | --- |

2.

The proportion of the research and development expense in the sales revenue shall be no less than the prescribed proportion;

The proportion of the research and development expense in the sales revenue shall be no less than the prescribed proportion;

| 3. | The proportion of the income from high-tech technology/product/service in the enterprise’s total revenue shall be no less than the prescribed proportion; |
| --- | --- |

3.

The proportion of the income from high-tech technology/product/service in the enterprise’s total revenue shall be no less than the prescribed proportion;

The proportion of the income from high-tech technology/product/service in the enterprise’s total revenue shall be no less than the prescribed proportion;

| 4. | The proportion of the technical personnel in the enterprise’s total employees shall be no less than the prescribed proportion; |
| --- | --- |

4.

The proportion of the technical personnel in the enterprise’s total employees shall be no less than the prescribed proportion;

The proportion of the technical personnel in the enterprise’s total employees shall be no less than the prescribed proportion;

| 5. | Other conditions prescribed in the Measures for the Administration of High-Tech Enterprise Identification. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Other conditions prescribed in the Measures for the Administration of High-Tech Enterprise Identification.

Other conditions prescribed in the Measures for the Administration of High-Tech Enterprise Identification.

Measures for the Administration of High-Tech Enterprise Identification and Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas shall be jointly formulated by the technology, finance and taxation departments under the State Council and come into effect after approved by State Council
  ’.

Measures for the Administration of High-Tech Enterprise Identification and Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas shall be jointly formulated by the technology, finance and taxation departments under the State Council and come into effect after approved by State Council

| (467) | The above-mentioned provisions clearly specify that the reduced enterprise income tax rate is reserved to
  ‘important high and new technology enterprises to be supported by the State’
  which own key intellectual property rights and satisfy certain conditions such as
  ‘complying with the scope of the Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas’. |
| --- | --- |

(467)

The above-mentioned provisions clearly specify that the reduced enterprise income tax rate is reserved to
  ‘important high and new technology enterprises to be supported by the State’
  which own key intellectual property rights and satisfy certain conditions such as
  ‘complying with the scope of the Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas’.

‘important high and new technology enterprises to be supported by the State’

‘complying with the scope of the Key State Supported High and New Technology Areas’.

| (468) | According to Article 11 of the Administrative Measures for the Recognition of High-Tech Enterprises (G.K.F.H. [2016] No 32), to be recognized as high-tech an enterprise must simultaneously meet certain conditions among which:
  ‘it has obtained the ownership of intellectual property rights, which plays a central role in technically supporting its main products (services), through independent research, transfer, grant, mergers and acquisitions, etc.’
  and
  ‘the technology that plays a central role in technically supporting its main products (services) is within the range predetermined in the “high-tech fields supported by the state”
  ‘
  . |
| --- | --- |

(468)

According to Article 11 of the Administrative Measures for the Recognition of High-Tech Enterprises (G.K.F.H. [2016] No 32), to be recognized as high-tech an enterprise must simultaneously meet certain conditions among which:
  ‘it has obtained the ownership of intellectual property rights, which plays a central role in technically supporting its main products (services), through independent research, transfer, grant, mergers and acquisitions, etc.’
  and
  ‘the technology that plays a central role in technically supporting its main products (services) is within the range predetermined in the “high-tech fields supported by the state”
  ‘
  .

‘it has obtained the ownership of intellectual property rights, which plays a central role in technically supporting its main products (services), through independent research, transfer, grant, mergers and acquisitions, etc.’

‘the technology that plays a central role in technically supporting its main products (services) is within the range predetermined in the “high-tech fields supported by the state”
  ‘

| (469) | The key high technology fields supported by the State are listed in the 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State. This catalogue clearly mentions under ‘I. Electronic Information’, point 4. ‘Communication technology’
  ‘optical transmission network’
  and
  ‘optical transmission system technology’, which cover optical fibre cables, as high technology fields supported by the State. |
| --- | --- |

(469)

The key high technology fields supported by the State are listed in the 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State. This catalogue clearly mentions under ‘I. Electronic Information’, point 4. ‘Communication technology’
  ‘optical transmission network’
  and
  ‘optical transmission system technology’, which cover optical fibre cables, as high technology fields supported by the State.

‘optical transmission network’

‘optical transmission system technology’,

| (470) | Companies benefiting from this measure have to file their income tax return and the relevant annexes. The actual amount of the benefit is included in the tax return. |
| --- | --- |

(470)

Companies benefiting from this measure have to file their income tax return and the relevant annexes. The actual amount of the benefit is included in the tax return.

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (471) | The Commission found that companies within the sampled exporting producer groups qualified as high-tech companies during the investigation period and thus enjoyed a reduced EIT rates of 15 % or 12,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

(471)

The Commission found that companies within the sampled exporting producer groups qualified as high-tech companies during the investigation period and thus enjoyed a reduced EIT rates of 15 % or 12,5 %.

| (472) | The Commission considered that the tax offset at issue is a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the tax saving. |
| --- | --- |

(472)

The Commission considered that the tax offset at issue is a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the tax saving.

| (473) | This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this scheme only to enterprises that are operating in certain high technology priority areas determined by the State as demonstrated in recital (466) to (468). As pointed out in recital (469), the OFC industry is such a high technology priority. |
| --- | --- |

(473)

This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this scheme only to enterprises that are operating in certain high technology priority areas determined by the State as demonstrated in recital (466) to (468). As pointed out in recital (469), the OFC industry is such a high technology priority.

| (474) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the tax exemption and deduction programs countervailed by the Commission do not constitute countervailable subsidies. According to the GOC, the alleged tax exemptions and deductions operate as a result of a system that establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for accessing financial support, in which eligibility is automatic and the criteria and conditions laid down in the programmes are strictly adhered to, not favouring certain enterprises over others and purely economic and horizontal in nature. Therefore, the GOC claimed they are not specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of the basis Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(474)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that the tax exemption and deduction programs countervailed by the Commission do not constitute countervailable subsidies. According to the GOC, the alleged tax exemptions and deductions operate as a result of a system that establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for accessing financial support, in which eligibility is automatic and the criteria and conditions laid down in the programmes are strictly adhered to, not favouring certain enterprises over others and purely economic and horizontal in nature. Therefore, the GOC claimed they are not specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of the basis Regulation.

establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility

| (475) | The Commission disagreed with this claim as it considered the tax schemes described in Sections 3.7.1.1 to 3.7.1.3 specific under Article 4(2)(a) of the basis Regulation, which provides that
  ‘where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific’. Indeed, the subsidy schemes at issue have their legal basis in Chapter IV ‘Tax Preferences’ of the EIT. By its name and content, this chapter explicitly provides for specific preferential treatment which
  ‘explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises’
  . Consequently, the subsidies provided under these tax schemes are specific under Article 4(2)(a) of the basis Regulation. The Claim was therefore rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(475)

The Commission disagreed with this claim as it considered the tax schemes described in Sections 3.7.1.1 to 3.7.1.3 specific under Article 4(2)(a) of the basis Regulation, which provides that
  ‘where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific’. Indeed, the subsidy schemes at issue have their legal basis in Chapter IV ‘Tax Preferences’ of the EIT. By its name and content, this chapter explicitly provides for specific preferential treatment which
  ‘explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises’
  . Consequently, the subsidies provided under these tax schemes are specific under Article 4(2)(a) of the basis Regulation. The Claim was therefore rejected.

‘where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific’.

‘explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises’

(c)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (476) | The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was calculated as the difference between the total tax payable according to the normal tax rate and the total tax payable under the reduced tax rate. |
| --- | --- |

(476)

The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was calculated as the difference between the total tax payable according to the normal tax rate and the total tax payable under the reduced tax rate.

| (477) | The subsidy rate established for this specific scheme was 0,10 % for the FTT Group and 0,48 % for the ZTT Group. |
| --- | --- |

(477)

The subsidy rate established for this specific scheme was 0,10 % for the FTT Group and 0,48 % for the ZTT Group.

3.7.1.2.   EIT offset for research and development expenses

| (478) | The tax offset for research and development entitles companies to preferential tax treatment for their R&D activities in certain high technology priority areas determined by the State and when certain thresholds for R&D spending are met. |
| --- | --- |

(478)

The tax offset for research and development entitles companies to preferential tax treatment for their R&D activities in certain high technology priority areas determined by the State and when certain thresholds for R&D spending are met.

| (479) | More specifically, R&D expenditures incurred to develop new technologies, new products and new techniques, which do not form intangible assets and are accounted into the current term profit and loss, are subject to an additional 75 % deduction after being deducted in full in light of the actual situation. Where the above-mentioned R&D expenditures form intangible assets, they are subject to amortization based on 175 % of the intangible asset costs. Since January 2021, the additional pre-tax deduction for R&D expenses was increased to 100 % (115). |
| --- | --- |

(479)

More specifically, R&D expenditures incurred to develop new technologies, new products and new techniques, which do not form intangible assets and are accounted into the current term profit and loss, are subject to an additional 75 % deduction after being deducted in full in light of the actual situation. Where the above-mentioned R&D expenditures form intangible assets, they are subject to amortization based on 175 % of the intangible asset costs. Since January 2021, the additional pre-tax deduction for R&D expenses was increased to 100 % (115).

115

(a)   Legal basis

| (480) | The legal basis for the programme is Article 30(1) of the EIT Law, along with the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC as well as the following notices:






  — | Notice of the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation and the Ministry of Science and Technology on Improving the Policy of Pre-tax Deduction of R&D Expenses (Cai Shui [2015] No 119); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(480)

The legal basis for the programme is Article 30(1) of the EIT Law, along with the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC as well as the following notices:

—

Notice of the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation and the Ministry of Science and Technology on Improving the Policy of Pre-tax Deduction of R&D Expenses (Cai Shui [2015] No 119);

| — | Circular on Raising the Proportion of Pre-tax Super Deduction of Research and Development Expenses (Cai Shui [2018] No 99) |
| --- | --- |

—

Circular on Raising the Proportion of Pre-tax Super Deduction of Research and Development Expenses (Cai Shui [2018] No 99)

| — | Announcement [2015] No 97 of the State Administration of Taxation on Relevant Issues concerning Policies of Additional Pre-tax Deduction of Research and Development Expenses of Enterprises; |
| --- | --- |

—

Announcement [2015] No 97 of the State Administration of Taxation on Relevant Issues concerning Policies of Additional Pre-tax Deduction of Research and Development Expenses of Enterprises;

| — | Announcement 2017 No 40 of the State Administration of Taxation on Issues Concerning the Eligible Scope of Calculation of Additional Pre-tax Deduction of Research and Development Expenses; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Announcement 2017 No 40 of the State Administration of Taxation on Issues Concerning the Eligible Scope of Calculation of Additional Pre-tax Deduction of Research and Development Expenses; and

| — | The 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State. |
| --- | --- |

—

The 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State.

| (481) | In previous investigations (116), the Commission established that the
  ‘new technologies, new products and new crafts’
  , which can benefit from the tax deduction, are part of certain high technology fields supported by the State. As mentioned in recital (469), the key high technology fields supported by the State are listed in the 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State. |
| --- | --- |

(481)

In previous investigations (116), the Commission established that the
  ‘new technologies, new products and new crafts’
  , which can benefit from the tax deduction, are part of certain high technology fields supported by the State. As mentioned in recital (469), the key high technology fields supported by the State are listed in the 2016 Catalogue of High-tech Fields Supported by the State.

116

‘new technologies, new products and new crafts’

| (482) | As set out in recital (468), Chapter IV of the EIT Law contains provisions regarding ‘Preferential Tax Treatment’, in particular Article 25. Article 30(1) of the EIT Law, which is also part of this Chapter, provides that
  ‘research and development expenses incurred by enterprises in the development of new technologies, new products and new techniques’
  may be additionally deducted at the time of calculating taxable income. Article 95 of the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law clarifies the meaning of
  ‘R&D expenditures incurred for the purpose to develop new technologies, new products and new crafts’
  laid down in Article 30(1) of the EIT Law. |
| --- | --- |

(482)

As set out in recital (468), Chapter IV of the EIT Law contains provisions regarding ‘Preferential Tax Treatment’, in particular Article 25. Article 30(1) of the EIT Law, which is also part of this Chapter, provides that
  ‘research and development expenses incurred by enterprises in the development of new technologies, new products and new techniques’
  may be additionally deducted at the time of calculating taxable income. Article 95 of the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law clarifies the meaning of
  ‘R&D expenditures incurred for the purpose to develop new technologies, new products and new crafts’
  laid down in Article 30(1) of the EIT Law.

‘research and development expenses incurred by enterprises in the development of new technologies, new products and new techniques’

‘R&D expenditures incurred for the purpose to develop new technologies, new products and new crafts’

| (483) | According to the Circular on Raising the Proportion of Pre-tax Super Deduction of Research and Development Expenses (Cai Shui [2018] No 99),
  ‘with respect to research and development (R&D) expenses actually incurred by an enterprise from its R&D activities, an extra 75 % of the actual amount of expenses is deductible before tax, in addition to other actual deductions, during the period from January 1, 2018 till December 31, 2020, provided that the said expenses are not converted into the intangible asset and balanced into this enterprise’s current gains and losses; however, if the said expenses have been converted into the intangible asset, such expenses may be amortized at a rate of 175 % of the intangible asset’s costs before tax during the above-said period’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(483)

According to the Circular on Raising the Proportion of Pre-tax Super Deduction of Research and Development Expenses (Cai Shui [2018] No 99),
  ‘with respect to research and development (R&D) expenses actually incurred by an enterprise from its R&D activities, an extra 75 % of the actual amount of expenses is deductible before tax, in addition to other actual deductions, during the period from January 1, 2018 till December 31, 2020, provided that the said expenses are not converted into the intangible asset and balanced into this enterprise’s current gains and losses; however, if the said expenses have been converted into the intangible asset, such expenses may be amortized at a rate of 175 % of the intangible asset’s costs before tax during the above-said period’
  .

‘with respect to research and development (R&D) expenses actually incurred by an enterprise from its R&D activities, an extra 75 % of the actual amount of expenses is deductible before tax, in addition to other actual deductions, during the period from January 1, 2018 till December 31, 2020, provided that the said expenses are not converted into the intangible asset and balanced into this enterprise’s current gains and losses; however, if the said expenses have been converted into the intangible asset, such expenses may be amortized at a rate of 175 % of the intangible asset’s costs before tax during the above-said period’

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (484) | The Commission found out that companies within the sampled groups enjoyed
  ‘additional deduction on research and development expenses incurred from the research and development of new technologies, new products and new techniques’. |
| --- | --- |

(484)

The Commission found out that companies within the sampled groups enjoyed
  ‘additional deduction on research and development expenses incurred from the research and development of new technologies, new products and new techniques’.

‘additional deduction on research and development expenses incurred from the research and development of new technologies, new products and new techniques’.

| (485) | The Commission considered that the tax offset at issue is a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the tax saving. |
| --- | --- |

(485)

The Commission considered that the tax offset at issue is a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the tax saving.

| (486) | This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this measure only to enterprises that incur R&D expenses in certain high technology priority areas determined by the State, such as the OFC sector. |
| --- | --- |

(486)

This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this measure only to enterprises that incur R&D expenses in certain high technology priority areas determined by the State, such as the OFC sector.

(c)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (487) | The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was calculated as the difference between the total tax payable according to the normal tax rate and the total tax payable after the additional 75 % deduction of the actual expenses on R&D. |
| --- | --- |

(487)

The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was calculated as the difference between the total tax payable according to the normal tax rate and the total tax payable after the additional 75 % deduction of the actual expenses on R&D.

| (488) | The subsidy rate established for this specific scheme was 1,28 % for the FTT Group and 0,13 % for the ZTT Group. |
| --- | --- |

(488)

The subsidy rate established for this specific scheme was 1,28 % for the FTT Group and 0,13 % for the ZTT Group.

3.7.1.3.   Dividends exemption between qualified resident enterprises

| (489) | The EIT Law offers income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specifically supported and encouraged by the State and in particular, exempt from tax the income from equity investment, such as dividends and bonuses, between eligible resident enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

(489)

The EIT Law offers income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specifically supported and encouraged by the State and in particular, exempt from tax the income from equity investment, such as dividends and bonuses, between eligible resident enterprises.

(a)   Legal basis

| (490) | The legal basis for the programme is Article 26(2) of the EIT Law, along with the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC. |
| --- | --- |

(490)

The legal basis for the programme is Article 26(2) of the EIT Law, along with the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC.

| (491) | Article 25 of the EIT, which stands as a chapeau for Chapter IV ‘Preferential Tax Policies’, provides that
  ‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’
  . Furthermore, Article 26(2) specifies that the tax exemption is applicable to income from equity investments between
  ‘eligible resident enterprises’, which appears to limit its scope of application to only certain resident enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

(491)

Article 25 of the EIT, which stands as a chapeau for Chapter IV ‘Preferential Tax Policies’, provides that
  ‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’
  . Furthermore, Article 26(2) specifies that the tax exemption is applicable to income from equity investments between
  ‘eligible resident enterprises’, which appears to limit its scope of application to only certain resident enterprises.

‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’

‘eligible resident enterprises’,

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (492) | The Commission found that some companies in the sampled groups received an exemption from tax of dividend income between qualified resident enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

(492)

The Commission found that some companies in the sampled groups received an exemption from tax of dividend income between qualified resident enterprises.

| (493) | The Commission considered that this scheme is a subsidy under Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the tax saving. |
| --- | --- |

(493)

The Commission considered that this scheme is a subsidy under Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the tax saving.

| (494) | This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this exemption only to qualified resident enterprises which have the major support of, and the development of which is encouraged by the State. |
| --- | --- |

(494)

This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this exemption only to qualified resident enterprises which have the major support of, and the development of which is encouraged by the State.

| (495) | Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that the exemption of dividends is destined to eliminate double taxation of the same income at both parent and subsidiary companies, which is an internationally accepted tax practice. |
| --- | --- |

(495)

Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that the exemption of dividends is destined to eliminate double taxation of the same income at both parent and subsidiary companies, which is an internationally accepted tax practice.

| (496) | In this respect, although the Commission agreed that the elimination of double taxation is an internationally recognised tax practice, Article 26(2) of the EIT is part of Chapter IV ‘Tax Preferences’, which provides for a number of preferential tax treatments that are exemptions to the general taxation rules. Furthermore, as explained in recital (491), Article 25 of the EIT, which stands as a chapeau for Chapter IV ‘Preferential Tax Policies’, provides that
  ‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’. In addition, Article 26(2) specifies that the tax exemption is applicable to income from equity investments between
  ‘eligible resident enterprises’, which appears to limit its scope of application to only certain resident enterprises. Therefore, the Commission considered that such preferential tax policy is limited to certain industries, which are specifically supported and encouraged by the State, such as the OFC industry, and is therefore specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, the Commission confirmed its conclusion described in recitals (493) and (494) that this scheme is a countervailable subsidy. |
| --- | --- |

(496)

In this respect, although the Commission agreed that the elimination of double taxation is an internationally recognised tax practice, Article 26(2) of the EIT is part of Chapter IV ‘Tax Preferences’, which provides for a number of preferential tax treatments that are exemptions to the general taxation rules. Furthermore, as explained in recital (491), Article 25 of the EIT, which stands as a chapeau for Chapter IV ‘Preferential Tax Policies’, provides that
  ‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’. In addition, Article 26(2) specifies that the tax exemption is applicable to income from equity investments between
  ‘eligible resident enterprises’, which appears to limit its scope of application to only certain resident enterprises. Therefore, the Commission considered that such preferential tax policy is limited to certain industries, which are specifically supported and encouraged by the State, such as the OFC industry, and is therefore specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, the Commission confirmed its conclusion described in recitals (493) and (494) that this scheme is a countervailable subsidy.

‘The State will offer income tax preferences to Enterprises engaged in industries or projects the development of which is specially supported and encouraged by the State’.

‘eligible resident enterprises’,

(c)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (497) | The Commission has calculated the amount of the subsidy by applying the normal tax rate to the dividend income that has been deducted from taxable income. |
| --- | --- |

(497)

The Commission has calculated the amount of the subsidy by applying the normal tax rate to the dividend income that has been deducted from taxable income.

| (498) | Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that the Commission should distinguish two different tax treatments in the income tax return, i.e. dividend income and the tax adjustment amount for investment, the latter not being a dividend income concerned by the provisions of Article 26(2) of the EIT. The Commission agreed with this claim and corrected the benefit calculations accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(498)

Following final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that the Commission should distinguish two different tax treatments in the income tax return, i.e. dividend income and the tax adjustment amount for investment, the latter not being a dividend income concerned by the provisions of Article 26(2) of the EIT. The Commission agreed with this claim and corrected the benefit calculations accordingly.

| (499) | The subsidy rate established for this specific scheme was 1,05 % for the FTT Group and 0,21 % for the ZTT Group. |
| --- | --- |

(499)

The subsidy rate established for this specific scheme was 1,05 % for the FTT Group and 0,21 % for the ZTT Group.

3.7.1.4.   Accelerated depreciation of equipment used by High-Tech enterprises

| (500) | According to Article 32 of the EIT law,
  ‘where accelerated depreciation of fixed assets of an enterprise is really necessary due to technological advancement or other reasons, the number of years for the depreciation may be lessened or the accelerated depreciation method may be adopted’. |
| --- | --- |

(500)

According to Article 32 of the EIT law,
  ‘where accelerated depreciation of fixed assets of an enterprise is really necessary due to technological advancement or other reasons, the number of years for the depreciation may be lessened or the accelerated depreciation method may be adopted’.

‘where accelerated depreciation of fixed assets of an enterprise is really necessary due to technological advancement or other reasons, the number of years for the depreciation may be lessened or the accelerated depreciation method may be adopted’.

(a)   Legal basis

| (501) | The legal basis for the programme is Article 32 of the EIT Law, along with the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC as well as the following notices:






  — | Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on the Policies of Deduction of Equipment and Appliances for Enterprise Income Tax Purposes (Cai Shui [2018] No 54); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(501)

The legal basis for the programme is Article 32 of the EIT Law, along with the Implementation Rules for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC as well as the following notices:

—

Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on the Policies of Deduction of Equipment and Appliances for Enterprise Income Tax Purposes (Cai Shui [2018] No 54);

| — | Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2014] No 75); and |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2014] No 75); and

| — | Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on Further Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2015] No 106). |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on Further Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2015] No 106).

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (502) | According to the Notice on the Policies of Deduction of Equipment and Appliances for Enterprise Income Tax Purposes (Cai Shui [2018] No 54),
  ‘where the unit value of a piece of equipment or appliance newly purchased by an enterprise during the period from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2020 does not exceed RMB five million, the enterprise is allowed to include such value in the cost and expenses of the current period on a lump-sum basis for deduction upon calculation of its taxable income, and is no longer required to calculate depreciation on an annual basis’. This legislation is not industry-specific. |
| --- | --- |

(502)

According to the Notice on the Policies of Deduction of Equipment and Appliances for Enterprise Income Tax Purposes (Cai Shui [2018] No 54),
  ‘where the unit value of a piece of equipment or appliance newly purchased by an enterprise during the period from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2020 does not exceed RMB five million, the enterprise is allowed to include such value in the cost and expenses of the current period on a lump-sum basis for deduction upon calculation of its taxable income, and is no longer required to calculate depreciation on an annual basis’. This legislation is not industry-specific.

‘where the unit value of a piece of equipment or appliance newly purchased by an enterprise during the period from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2020 does not exceed RMB five million, the enterprise is allowed to include such value in the cost and expenses of the current period on a lump-sum basis for deduction upon calculation of its taxable income, and is no longer required to calculate depreciation on an annual basis’.

| (503) | As regards assets with unit value above 5 million RMB, the Notice on Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2014] No 75) and the Notice on Further Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2015] No 106) continue to apply. According to theses notices, fixed assets purchased by companies in 10 key industries may opt for the accelerated depreciation method. |
| --- | --- |

(503)

As regards assets with unit value above 5 million RMB, the Notice on Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2014] No 75) and the Notice on Further Fine-tuning the Enterprise Income Tax Policies Applicable to Accelerated Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Cai Shui [2015] No 106) continue to apply. According to theses notices, fixed assets purchased by companies in 10 key industries may opt for the accelerated depreciation method.

| (504) | The Commission established that, during the investigation period, the sampled companies have not applied accelerated depreciation for assets with unit value that exceeds 5 million RMB. Therefore, since those assets did not fall under Notice Cai Shui [2014] No 75 and Notice Cai Shui [2015] No 106, the Commission found that the exporting producers did not benefit from countervailable subsidies. |
| --- | --- |

(504)

The Commission established that, during the investigation period, the sampled companies have not applied accelerated depreciation for assets with unit value that exceeds 5 million RMB. Therefore, since those assets did not fall under Notice Cai Shui [2014] No 75 and Notice Cai Shui [2015] No 106, the Commission found that the exporting producers did not benefit from countervailable subsidies.

| (505) | Following final disclosure, the complainant argued that the sampled exporting producers could have benefitted from accelerated depreciation of houses and buildings, which are excluded from the scope of the 5 million RMB threshold according to Article 2 of the Notice on the Policies of Deduction of Equipment and Appliances for Enterprise Income Tax Purposes (Cai Shui [2018] No 54). In this respect, the Commission confirmed that the sampled companies did not benefit from accelerated depreciation of houses and buildings during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(505)

Following final disclosure, the complainant argued that the sampled exporting producers could have benefitted from accelerated depreciation of houses and buildings, which are excluded from the scope of the 5 million RMB threshold according to Article 2 of the Notice on the Policies of Deduction of Equipment and Appliances for Enterprise Income Tax Purposes (Cai Shui [2018] No 54). In this respect, the Commission confirmed that the sampled companies did not benefit from accelerated depreciation of houses and buildings during the investigation period.

(c)   Conclusion

| (506) | The Commission considered that the exporting producers did not benefit from countervailable subsidies under this programme during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(506)

The Commission considered that the exporting producers did not benefit from countervailable subsidies under this programme during the IP.

3.7.1.5.   Land use tax exemption

| (507) | An organisation or individual using land in cities, county towns and administrative towns and industrial and mining districts shall normally pay urban land use tax. Land use tax is collected by the local tax authorities where the land is used. However, certain categories of land, such as land reclaimed from the sea, land for the use of government institutions, people’s organisations and military units for their own use, land for use by institutions financed by government allocations from the Ministry of Finance, land used by religious temples, public parks and public historical and scenic sites, streets, roads, public squares, lawns and other urban public land are exempted from the land use tax. |
| --- | --- |

(507)

An organisation or individual using land in cities, county towns and administrative towns and industrial and mining districts shall normally pay urban land use tax. Land use tax is collected by the local tax authorities where the land is used. However, certain categories of land, such as land reclaimed from the sea, land for the use of government institutions, people’s organisations and military units for their own use, land for use by institutions financed by government allocations from the Ministry of Finance, land used by religious temples, public parks and public historical and scenic sites, streets, roads, public squares, lawns and other urban public land are exempted from the land use tax.

(a)   Legal basis

| (508) | The legal basis for this programme is:






  — | Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Real Estate Tax (Guo Fa [1986] No 90, as amended in 2011); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(508)

The legal basis for this programme is:

—

Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Real Estate Tax (Guo Fa [1986] No 90, as amended in 2011);

| — | Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Urban Land Use Tax (Revised in 2019), Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China No 709; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Urban Land Use Tax (Revised in 2019), Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China No 709; and

| — | Several Opinions on Vigorously Supporting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Private Economy’ (EFa [2018] No 33). |
| --- | --- |

—

Several Opinions on Vigorously Supporting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Private Economy’ (EFa [2018] No 33).

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (509) | One company in one of the sampled groups benefited from a reduction in the land use tax amount of 60 % based on special policy applicable to the high-tech companies in 2019 and 2020 pursuant to Article 2(1) of ‘Several Opinions on Vigorously Supporting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Private Economy’ (EFa [2018] No 33)’. |
| --- | --- |

(509)

One company in one of the sampled groups benefited from a reduction in the land use tax amount of 60 % based on special policy applicable to the high-tech companies in 2019 and 2020 pursuant to Article 2(1) of ‘Several Opinions on Vigorously Supporting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Private Economy’ (EFa [2018] No 33)’.

| (510) | The company at issue did not fall under any of the exempted categories set by Article 6 of the Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Urban Land Use Tax (Revised in 2019). |
| --- | --- |

(510)

The company at issue did not fall under any of the exempted categories set by Article 6 of the Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Urban Land Use Tax (Revised in 2019).

| (511) | Furthermore, the same company was totally exempted from the payment of the land use tax in the first quarter of 2020 based on ‘Notice of General Office of Hubei Provincial People’s Government on Printing and Distributing the Relevant Policies and Measures for Coping with COVID-19 Situation and Supporting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises to Tide Over the Difficulties’ (EZhengBanFa (2020) No 5) and ‘Notice of Hubei Provincial People’s Government on Printing and Distributing the Relevant Policies and Measures for Speeding up Development of Economy and Society in Hubei Province’ (EZhengBanFa (2020) No 6). |
| --- | --- |

(511)

Furthermore, the same company was totally exempted from the payment of the land use tax in the first quarter of 2020 based on ‘Notice of General Office of Hubei Provincial People’s Government on Printing and Distributing the Relevant Policies and Measures for Coping with COVID-19 Situation and Supporting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises to Tide Over the Difficulties’ (EZhengBanFa (2020) No 5) and ‘Notice of Hubei Provincial People’s Government on Printing and Distributing the Relevant Policies and Measures for Speeding up Development of Economy and Society in Hubei Province’ (EZhengBanFa (2020) No 6).

(c)   Conclusion

| (512) | The Commission considered that the land use tax reduction for high-tech companies described above is a subsidy within the meaning of either Article 3(1)(a)(i) or Article 3(1)(a)(ii), and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of either direct transfer of funds (refund of the tax paid) or revenue foregone by the GOC (the non-paid tax) that confers a benefit to the company concerned. The subsidy is specific as it targets only high-tech companies. |
| --- | --- |

(512)

The Commission considered that the land use tax reduction for high-tech companies described above is a subsidy within the meaning of either Article 3(1)(a)(i) or Article 3(1)(a)(ii), and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of either direct transfer of funds (refund of the tax paid) or revenue foregone by the GOC (the non-paid tax) that confers a benefit to the company concerned. The subsidy is specific as it targets only high-tech companies.

| (513) | The benefit for the recipients is equal to the amount refunded/tax saving. This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the company received a tax reduction although it did not fit into any of the objective criteria mentioned in recital (507). |
| --- | --- |

(513)

The benefit for the recipients is equal to the amount refunded/tax saving. This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the company received a tax reduction although it did not fit into any of the objective criteria mentioned in recital (507).

| (514) | As regards the land use tax exemption in the first quarter of 2020, the Commission considered that the measure is not specific in the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as, in view of the COVID-pandemic, this tax exemption was not limited to a specific enterprise or industry or group, of enterprises or industries, but was applied to all industries. |
| --- | --- |

(514)

As regards the land use tax exemption in the first quarter of 2020, the Commission considered that the measure is not specific in the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as, in view of the COVID-pandemic, this tax exemption was not limited to a specific enterprise or industry or group, of enterprises or industries, but was applied to all industries.

(d)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (515) | The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was considered to be the refunded amount during the investigation period. The amount of subsidy established for this specific scheme was negligible for the FTT Group. |
| --- | --- |

(515)

The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was considered to be the refunded amount during the investigation period. The amount of subsidy established for this specific scheme was negligible for the FTT Group.

3.7.1.6.   Total for all tax exemption schemes and reduction programmes

| (516) | The total subsidy rate established with regard to all tax schemes during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers was as follows:

  Tax exemptions and reductions







  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(516)

The total subsidy rate established with regard to all tax schemes during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers was as follows:

Tax exemptions and reductions

Tax exemptions and reductions

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

2,43 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

0,82 %

3.7.2.   Provision of electricity at reduced rate

Provision of electricity at reduced rate

(a)   Legal basis

| — | Circular of the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration on Actively Promoting the Market-oriented Power Transactions and Further Improving the Trading Mechanism, Fa Gua Yun Xing [2018] No 1027, issued on 16 July 2018; |
| --- | --- |

—

Circular of the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration on Actively Promoting the Market-oriented Power Transactions and Further Improving the Trading Mechanism, Fa Gua Yun Xing [2018] No 1027, issued on 16 July 2018;

| — | Several Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Power System (Zhong Fa [2015] No 9); |
| --- | --- |

—

Several Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Power System (Zhong Fa [2015] No 9);

| — | Notice on Fully Liberalizing the Electricity Generation and Consumption Plan for Commercially Operational Users (National Development and Reform Commission [2019] No 1105); |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice on Fully Liberalizing the Electricity Generation and Consumption Plan for Commercially Operational Users (National Development and Reform Commission [2019] No 1105);

| — | Rules for Electricity Trading for Medium and Long-term Transactions Implementation Rules (Interim) in Hubei Province of 29 November 2019; |
| --- | --- |

—

Rules for Electricity Trading for Medium and Long-term Transactions Implementation Rules (Interim) in Hubei Province of 29 November 2019;

| — | Rules for Electricity Trading for Medium and Long Term Transactions in Jiangsu Province; |
| --- | --- |

—

Rules for Electricity Trading for Medium and Long Term Transactions in Jiangsu Province;

| — | Notice of the Price Bureau of Jiangsu Province about Reasonable Adjustment of the Electricity Price Structure, Su Jia Gong [2017] No 124; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice of the Price Bureau of Jiangsu Province about Reasonable Adjustment of the Electricity Price Structure, Su Jia Gong [2017] No 124; and

| — | Circular of the National Development and Reform Commission on Reducing Electricity Cost of Enterprises to Supporting Restoration of Work and Production Development and Reform Price [2020] No 258. |
| --- | --- |

—

Circular of the National Development and Reform Commission on Reducing Electricity Cost of Enterprises to Supporting Restoration of Work and Production Development and Reform Price [2020] No 258.

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (517) | All sampled companies purchased their electricity. |
| --- | --- |

(517)

All sampled companies purchased their electricity.

| (518) | Regarding some companies within the sampled groups, the purchase prices of electricity followed the official prices for large industrial users established at provincial level. As found in previous investigations (117), the provision of electricity at officially established prices does not confer a specific advantage. |
| --- | --- |

(518)

Regarding some companies within the sampled groups, the purchase prices of electricity followed the official prices for large industrial users established at provincial level. As found in previous investigations (117), the provision of electricity at officially established prices does not confer a specific advantage.

117

| (519) | However, the Commission established that investigated companies within the two sampled groups benefitted from reductions or refunds/adjustments of part of their electricity cost. |
| --- | --- |

(519)

However, the Commission established that investigated companies within the two sampled groups benefitted from reductions or refunds/adjustments of part of their electricity cost.

| (520) | The Commission found that companies within one of the sampled groups benefitted from specific refunds/adjustments of their electricity cost because these companies were allowed to participate in a pilot programme for ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’. These companies did not have a contract with a power generator for direct electricity supply. The refunds/adjustments were received because the companies concerned communicated in advance their power demand to the power plants. |
| --- | --- |

(520)

The Commission found that companies within one of the sampled groups benefitted from specific refunds/adjustments of their electricity cost because these companies were allowed to participate in a pilot programme for ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’. These companies did not have a contract with a power generator for direct electricity supply. The refunds/adjustments were received because the companies concerned communicated in advance their power demand to the power plants.

| (521) | The Commission further found that, like in previous investigations, (118) certain investigated companies are allowed to purchase electricity directly from power generators by signing direct purchasing agreements. Such contracts provide for a certain quantity of electricity at a certain price, which is lower than the official prices set at provincial level for large industrial users. |
| --- | --- |

(521)

The Commission further found that, like in previous investigations, (118) certain investigated companies are allowed to purchase electricity directly from power generators by signing direct purchasing agreements. Such contracts provide for a certain quantity of electricity at a certain price, which is lower than the official prices set at provincial level for large industrial users.

118

| (522) | The possibility to enter into direct electricity supply contracts or to benefit from refunds/adjustments of the electricity cost by participating in
  ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’
  is currently not open to all large industrial users. At national level, the Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Power System specifies for example that ‘enterprises that do not conform to the national industrial policy and whose products and processes are eliminated should not participate in direct transactions’
   (119). The same Opinions also stipulate that
  ‘after the access standards are determined, we should also upgrade the catalogues of local power generation enterprises and electricity retailers that meet the standards that are annually publicized by governments and implement dynamic regulation of the user catalogue. The power generation enterprises, electricity retailers and users included in the catalogue can voluntarily register with the trading institutions to become market players’. Therefore, in order to participate in the direct trading system, a company should meet certain standards and be included in the
  ‘user catalogue’. |
| --- | --- |

(522)

The possibility to enter into direct electricity supply contracts or to benefit from refunds/adjustments of the electricity cost by participating in
  ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’
  is currently not open to all large industrial users. At national level, the Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Power System specifies for example that ‘enterprises that do not conform to the national industrial policy and whose products and processes are eliminated should not participate in direct transactions’
   (119). The same Opinions also stipulate that
  ‘after the access standards are determined, we should also upgrade the catalogues of local power generation enterprises and electricity retailers that meet the standards that are annually publicized by governments and implement dynamic regulation of the user catalogue. The power generation enterprises, electricity retailers and users included in the catalogue can voluntarily register with the trading institutions to become market players’. Therefore, in order to participate in the direct trading system, a company should meet certain standards and be included in the
  ‘user catalogue’.

‘market-oriented electricity transactions’

enterprises that do not conform to the national industrial policy and whose products and processes are eliminated should not participate in direct transactions’

119

‘after the access standards are determined, we should also upgrade the catalogues of local power generation enterprises and electricity retailers that meet the standards that are annually publicized by governments and implement dynamic regulation of the user catalogue. The power generation enterprises, electricity retailers and users included in the catalogue can voluntarily register with the trading institutions to become market players’.

‘user catalogue’.

| (523) | In practice, direct electricity trading is executed by the provinces. Companies have to apply to provincial authorities for approval to participate in the direct electricity pilot scheme, and they have to fulfil certain criteria. For certain companies, there is no actual market-based negotiation or bidding process, since the quantities purchased under direct contracts are not based on the real supply and demand. Indeed, power generators and power users are not free to sell or purchase all of their electricity directly. They are restricted by quantitative quotas, which are allocated to them by the local government. Furthermore, although prices are supposed to be negotiated directly between the power generators and the power user or through intermediary service companies, the invoices to the companies are actually issued by the State Grid Company. Finally, all signed direct purchase contracts need to be submitted to the local government for the record. |
| --- | --- |

(523)

In practice, direct electricity trading is executed by the provinces. Companies have to apply to provincial authorities for approval to participate in the direct electricity pilot scheme, and they have to fulfil certain criteria. For certain companies, there is no actual market-based negotiation or bidding process, since the quantities purchased under direct contracts are not based on the real supply and demand. Indeed, power generators and power users are not free to sell or purchase all of their electricity directly. They are restricted by quantitative quotas, which are allocated to them by the local government. Furthermore, although prices are supposed to be negotiated directly between the power generators and the power user or through intermediary service companies, the invoices to the companies are actually issued by the State Grid Company. Finally, all signed direct purchase contracts need to be submitted to the local government for the record.

| (524) | In 2018, the GOC issued the Circular of the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration on Actively Promoting the Market-oriented Power Transactions and Further Improving the Trading Mechanism (Fa Gai Yun Xing [2018] No 1027). Although the Circular aims to increase the number of direct transactions on the electricity market, it specifically mentions certain industries, including high-tech industries such as the OFC industry, as supported and benefitting from liberalisation of the electricity market. In particular, Section III. ‘Opening up to allow entry of user fulfilling requirements’, point (2) provides that
  ‘supporting emerging industries with high added value, such as high-tech, internet, big data and high-end manufacturing industries, as well as enterprises with distinct advantages and characteristics and high technology content, to participate in transactions, free from voltage levels and power consumption restrictions’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(524)

In 2018, the GOC issued the Circular of the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration on Actively Promoting the Market-oriented Power Transactions and Further Improving the Trading Mechanism (Fa Gai Yun Xing [2018] No 1027). Although the Circular aims to increase the number of direct transactions on the electricity market, it specifically mentions certain industries, including high-tech industries such as the OFC industry, as supported and benefitting from liberalisation of the electricity market. In particular, Section III. ‘Opening up to allow entry of user fulfilling requirements’, point (2) provides that
  ‘supporting emerging industries with high added value, such as high-tech, internet, big data and high-end manufacturing industries, as well as enterprises with distinct advantages and characteristics and high technology content, to participate in transactions, free from voltage levels and power consumption restrictions’
  .

‘supporting emerging industries with high added value, such as high-tech, internet, big data and high-end manufacturing industries, as well as enterprises with distinct advantages and characteristics and high technology content, to participate in transactions, free from voltage levels and power consumption restrictions’

| (525) | Furthermore, the Notice on Fully Liberalizing the Electricity Generation and Consumption Plan for Commercially Operational Users [2019] No 1105, which aims for further liberalise the electricity market, provides that
  ‘among the commercial electricity users, those who do not comply with the national industry policies shall provisionally not participate in market-oriented transactions, and the electricity users whose products and processes belong to the eliminated and limited categories of the “Guidance Catalogue for the Industry’s Structural Adjustment” shall strictly implement the current differential prices policy for electricity.’ |
| --- | --- |

(525)

Furthermore, the Notice on Fully Liberalizing the Electricity Generation and Consumption Plan for Commercially Operational Users [2019] No 1105, which aims for further liberalise the electricity market, provides that
  ‘among the commercial electricity users, those who do not comply with the national industry policies shall provisionally not participate in market-oriented transactions, and the electricity users whose products and processes belong to the eliminated and limited categories of the “Guidance Catalogue for the Industry’s Structural Adjustment” shall strictly implement the current differential prices policy for electricity.’

‘among the commercial electricity users, those who do not comply with the national industry policies shall provisionally not participate in market-oriented transactions, and the electricity users whose products and processes belong to the eliminated and limited categories of the “Guidance Catalogue for the Industry’s Structural Adjustment” shall strictly implement the current differential prices policy for electricity.’

| (526) | Therefore, the legislation provides for a selective application of ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’ on the electricity market limited to certain industries such as the industries which comply with the national industry policies, with a particular focus on high-tech industries. As a result, these industries pay lower prices for electricity. |
| --- | --- |

(526)

Therefore, the legislation provides for a selective application of ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’ on the electricity market limited to certain industries such as the industries which comply with the national industry policies, with a particular focus on high-tech industries. As a result, these industries pay lower prices for electricity.

| (527) | The Commission also found that certain investigated companies benefitted from refunds/adjustments of their electricity cost during the period March - June 2020 based on a nation-wide policy (120) aiming to relieve the burden on companies due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission considered that this measure is not specific. |
| --- | --- |

(527)

The Commission also found that certain investigated companies benefitted from refunds/adjustments of their electricity cost during the period March - June 2020 based on a nation-wide policy (120) aiming to relieve the burden on companies due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission considered that this measure is not specific.

120

(c)   Conclusion

| (528) | The Commission considered that the reduced electricity rate and the refunds/adjustments resulting from the participation in
  ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’
  , by means of a direct electricity supply contract or not, received by the sampled companies at issue constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC (i.e. the operator of the grid) that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the electricity cost saving, either through reduced electricity prices negotiated in the framework of direct electricity supply contracts or through refunds/adjustments because of the participation in a pilot programme for
  ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’
  , since the electricity was provided at a price below the normal grid price paid by other large industrial users that are not allowed by the State to participate in
  ‘market-oriented transactions’
  for the supply of electricity. |
| --- | --- |

(528)

The Commission considered that the reduced electricity rate and the refunds/adjustments resulting from the participation in
  ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’
  , by means of a direct electricity supply contract or not, received by the sampled companies at issue constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation because there is a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the GOC (i.e. the operator of the grid) that confers a benefit to the companies concerned. The benefit for the recipients is equal to the electricity cost saving, either through reduced electricity prices negotiated in the framework of direct electricity supply contracts or through refunds/adjustments because of the participation in a pilot programme for
  ‘market-oriented electricity transactions’
  , since the electricity was provided at a price below the normal grid price paid by other large industrial users that are not allowed by the State to participate in
  ‘market-oriented transactions’
  for the supply of electricity.

‘market-oriented electricity transactions’

‘market-oriented electricity transactions’

‘market-oriented transactions’

| (529) | This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this scheme only to enterprises that conform with certain industrial policy objectives determined by the State and whose products or process have not been eliminated as not eligible. |
| --- | --- |

(529)

This subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation as the legislation itself limits the application of this scheme only to enterprises that conform with certain industrial policy objectives determined by the State and whose products or process have not been eliminated as not eligible.

| (530) | Thus, the Commission concluded that the subsidy scheme was in place during the investigation period and that it is specific within the meaning of Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(3) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(530)

Thus, the Commission concluded that the subsidy scheme was in place during the investigation period and that it is specific within the meaning of Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(3) of the basic Regulation.

(d)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (531) | The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was calculated as the difference between the total electricity price payable according to the official electricity price and the total electricity price paid by the sampled groups of companies under the reduced rate and/or by deducting various forms of refunds/adjustments. |
| --- | --- |

(531)

The amount of countervailable subsidy was calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipients during the investigation period. This benefit was calculated as the difference between the total electricity price payable according to the official electricity price and the total electricity price paid by the sampled groups of companies under the reduced rate and/or by deducting various forms of refunds/adjustments.

| (532) | The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers amounts to:

  Provision of electricity at reduced rate







  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(532)

The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers amounts to:

Provision of electricity at reduced rate

Provision of electricity at reduced rate

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

0,18 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

0,06 %

3.8.   Provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration

Provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration

3.8.1.   Provision of land for less than adequate remuneration

Provision of land for less than adequate remuneration

| (533) | All land in the PRC is owned either by the State or by a collective, constituted of either villages or townships, before the land’s legal or equitable title may be patented or granted to corporate or individual owners. All parcels of land in urbanized areas are owned by the State and all parcels of land in rural areas are owned by the villages or townships therein. |
| --- | --- |

(533)

All land in the PRC is owned either by the State or by a collective, constituted of either villages or townships, before the land’s legal or equitable title may be patented or granted to corporate or individual owners. All parcels of land in urbanized areas are owned by the State and all parcels of land in rural areas are owned by the villages or townships therein.

| (534) | Pursuant to the constitutional law of the PRC and the Land Law, companies and individuals may however purchase ‘land use rights’. For industrial land, the leasehold is normally 50 years, renewable for a further 50 years. |
| --- | --- |

(534)

Pursuant to the constitutional law of the PRC and the Land Law, companies and individuals may however purchase ‘land use rights’. For industrial land, the leasehold is normally 50 years, renewable for a further 50 years.

| (535) | According to the GOC, Article 137 of the Property Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that ‘the land used for purposes of industry, business, entertainment or commercial dwelling houses, etc. or the land for which there are two or more intended users shall be transferred by means of auction, bid invitation or any other public bidding method.’ Furthermore, the GOC refers to Article 3 of the Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in Urban Areas. This Article provides that ‘any company, enterprise, other organization and individual within or outside the People’s Republic of China may, unless otherwise provided by law, obtain the right to the use of the land and engage in land development, utilization and management in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations.’ |
| --- | --- |

(535)

According to the GOC, Article 137 of the Property Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that ‘the land used for purposes of industry, business, entertainment or commercial dwelling houses, etc. or the land for which there are two or more intended users shall be transferred by means of auction, bid invitation or any other public bidding method.’ Furthermore, the GOC refers to Article 3 of the Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in Urban Areas. This Article provides that ‘any company, enterprise, other organization and individual within or outside the People’s Republic of China may, unless otherwise provided by law, obtain the right to the use of the land and engage in land development, utilization and management in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations.’

the land used for purposes of industry, business, entertainment or commercial dwelling houses, etc. or the land for which there are two or more intended users shall be transferred by means of auction, bid invitation or any other public bidding method.

any company, enterprise, other organization and individual within or outside the People’s Republic of China may, unless otherwise provided by law, obtain the right to the use of the land and engage in land development, utilization and management in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations.

(a)   Legal basis

| (536) | The land-use right provision in China falls under Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China. In addition, the following documents also are part of the legal basis:






  — | Property Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No 62); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(536)

The land-use right provision in China falls under Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China. In addition, the following documents also are part of the legal basis:

—

Property Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No 62);

| — | Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No 28); |
| --- | --- |

—

Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No 28);

| — | Law of the People’s Republic of China on Urban Real Estate Administration (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No 18); |
| --- | --- |

—

Law of the People’s Republic of China on Urban Real Estate Administration (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No 18);

| — | Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas (Decree No 55 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China); |
| --- | --- |

—

Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas (Decree No 55 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China);

| — | Regulation on the Implementation of the Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China [2014] No 653); |
| --- | --- |

—

Regulation on the Implementation of the Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China [2014] No 653);

| — | Provision on Assignment of State-owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid Invitation, Auction and Quotation (Announcement No 39 of the CSRC); and |
| --- | --- |

—

Provision on Assignment of State-owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid Invitation, Auction and Quotation (Announcement No 39 of the CSRC); and

| — | Notice of the State Council on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Strengthening of Land Control (Guo Fa (2006) No 31). |
| --- | --- |

—

Notice of the State Council on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Strengthening of Land Control (Guo Fa (2006) No 31).

(b)   Findings of the investigation

| (537) | According to Article 10 of the ‘Provision on Assignment of State-owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid Invitation, Auction and Quotation’, local authorities set land prices according to the urban land evaluation system, which is only updated every three years, and the government’s industrial policy. |
| --- | --- |

(537)

According to Article 10 of the ‘Provision on Assignment of State-owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid Invitation, Auction and Quotation’, local authorities set land prices according to the urban land evaluation system, which is only updated every three years, and the government’s industrial policy.

| (538) | In previous investigations, the Commission found that prices paid for land use rights (‘LUR’) in the PRC were not representative of a market price determined by free market supply and demand, since the auctioning system was found to be unclear, non-transparent and not functioning in practice, and prices were found to be arbitrarily set by the authorities. (121) As mentioned in the previous recital, the authorities set the prices according to the Urban Land Evaluation System, which instructs them among other criteria to consider also industrial policy when setting the price of industrial land. |
| --- | --- |

(538)

In previous investigations, the Commission found that prices paid for land use rights (‘LUR’) in the PRC were not representative of a market price determined by free market supply and demand, since the auctioning system was found to be unclear, non-transparent and not functioning in practice, and prices were found to be arbitrarily set by the authorities. (121) As mentioned in the previous recital, the authorities set the prices according to the Urban Land Evaluation System, which instructs them among other criteria to consider also industrial policy when setting the price of industrial land.

121

| (539) | The current investigation did not show any noticeable changes in this respect. For instance, the Commission found that most of the sampled companies obtained their LUR through allocation by local authorities and not through a bidding procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(539)

The current investigation did not show any noticeable changes in this respect. For instance, the Commission found that most of the sampled companies obtained their LUR through allocation by local authorities and not through a bidding procedure.

| (540) | The above evidence contradicts the claims of the GOC that the prices paid for LUR in the PRC are representative of a market price, which is determined by free market supply and demand. |
| --- | --- |

(540)

The above evidence contradicts the claims of the GOC that the prices paid for LUR in the PRC are representative of a market price, which is determined by free market supply and demand.

(c)   Conclusion

| (541) | The findings of this investigation show that the situation concerning acquisition of LUR in the PRC is non-transparent and the prices were arbitrarily set by the authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(541)

The findings of this investigation show that the situation concerning acquisition of LUR in the PRC is non-transparent and the prices were arbitrarily set by the authorities.

| (542) | Therefore, the provision of land-use rights by the GOC should be considered a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation in the form of provision of goods, which confers a benefit upon the recipient companies. As explained in recitals (537) to (540) above, there is no functioning market for land in the PRC and the use of an external benchmark (see recitals (549) to (551) below) demonstrates that the amount paid for land-use rights by the sampled exporting producers is well below the normal market rate. |
| --- | --- |

(542)

Therefore, the provision of land-use rights by the GOC should be considered a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation in the form of provision of goods, which confers a benefit upon the recipient companies. As explained in recitals (537) to (540) above, there is no functioning market for land in the PRC and the use of an external benchmark (see recitals (549) to (551) below) demonstrates that the amount paid for land-use rights by the sampled exporting producers is well below the normal market rate.

| (543) | In the context of preferential access to industrial land for companies belonging to certain industries, the Commission noted that the price set by local authorities has to take into account the government’s industrial policy, as mentioned above in recital (538). Within this industrial policy, the OFC industry is listed as an encouraged industry (122). In addition, according to Decision No 40 of the State Council, public authorities take into account ‘The Guiding Catalogue of the Industrial Restructuring’ and the industrial policies when providing land. Article XVIII of Decision No 40 makes clear that industries that are ‘restricted’ will not have access to land use rights. It follows that the subsidy is specific under Article 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(c) of the basic Regulation because the preferential provision of land is limited to companies belonging to certain industries, in this case the OFC industry, and government practices in this area are unclear and non-transparent. |
| --- | --- |

(543)

In the context of preferential access to industrial land for companies belonging to certain industries, the Commission noted that the price set by local authorities has to take into account the government’s industrial policy, as mentioned above in recital (538). Within this industrial policy, the OFC industry is listed as an encouraged industry (122). In addition, according to Decision No 40 of the State Council, public authorities take into account ‘The Guiding Catalogue of the Industrial Restructuring’ and the industrial policies when providing land. Article XVIII of Decision No 40 makes clear that industries that are ‘restricted’ will not have access to land use rights. It follows that the subsidy is specific under Article 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(c) of the basic Regulation because the preferential provision of land is limited to companies belonging to certain industries, in this case the OFC industry, and government practices in this area are unclear and non-transparent.

122

| (544) | Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that no benefit has been conferred to the sampled companies through the provision of land use rights because there is a free market for land in the PRC. In this respect, the GOC referred to Article 347 of the Civil Code of the PRC, according to which,
  ‘where land is used for industrial, commercial, tourist or entertaining purposes, as commodity residence, or for other profit-making purposes, or there are two or more persons who are willing to use the same piece of land, the right to the use of land for construction shall be assigned through bid invitation, auction or other open bidding. The price of the land is established through market competition’. |
| --- | --- |

(544)

Following final disclosure, the GOC claimed that no benefit has been conferred to the sampled companies through the provision of land use rights because there is a free market for land in the PRC. In this respect, the GOC referred to Article 347 of the Civil Code of the PRC, according to which,
  ‘where land is used for industrial, commercial, tourist or entertaining purposes, as commodity residence, or for other profit-making purposes, or there are two or more persons who are willing to use the same piece of land, the right to the use of land for construction shall be assigned through bid invitation, auction or other open bidding. The price of the land is established through market competition’.

‘where land is used for industrial, commercial, tourist or entertaining purposes, as commodity residence, or for other profit-making purposes, or there are two or more persons who are willing to use the same piece of land, the right to the use of land for construction shall be assigned through bid invitation, auction or other open bidding. The price of the land is established through market competition’.

| (545) | The Commission found that, although there are legal provisions that aim at allocating land use rights in a transparent manner and at market prices, for instance by introducing bidding procedures, these provisions are regularly not respected, with certain buyers obtaining their land for free or below market rates (123). Moreover, authorities often pursue specific political goals including the implementation of the economic plans when allocating land (124). |
| --- | --- |

(545)

The Commission found that, although there are legal provisions that aim at allocating land use rights in a transparent manner and at market prices, for instance by introducing bidding procedures, these provisions are regularly not respected, with certain buyers obtaining their land for free or below market rates (123). Moreover, authorities often pursue specific political goals including the implementation of the economic plans when allocating land (124).

123

124

| (546) | Furthermore, the GOC disagreed with the Commission that the measures are specific because the PRC does not have a special land policy for any industry. It further stated that Decision No 40 does not require that public authorities ensure that land is provided to encouraged industries. |
| --- | --- |

(546)

Furthermore, the GOC disagreed with the Commission that the measures are specific because the PRC does not have a special land policy for any industry. It further stated that Decision No 40 does not require that public authorities ensure that land is provided to encouraged industries.

| (547) | In this respect, Decision No 40 of the State Council does mention in Article XII that ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ is an important reference for guiding the investment, government’s management of investment projects and the formulation and implementation of policies of tax, credits, land (emphasis added) and import and export. Furthermore, the introduction of Decision No 40 states that ‘All departments concerned shall accelerate the steps in formulating and amending the relevant policies in tax, credit, land (emphasis added) and import and export, etc., and strengthen the coordination with industrial policies so as to further perfect the policy system of promoting the industrial restructuring’. Therefore, it is clear that public authorities have to take into account ‘The Guiding Catalogue of the Industrial Restructuring’ and the industrial policies when providing land to companies. Article XVIII of Decision No 40 states that for industries that are restricted,
  ‘The departments governing investment shall not examine, approve or put on record, no financial institution may grant any loan, no other departments governing land management, city planning and construction, environmental protection, quality inspection, firefighting, customs, industry and commerce, etc., may go through relevant procedures’
  (emphasis added). Therefore, departments governing land management are prohibited to provide land to restricted industries. The above-mentioned provisions of Decision No 40 read in the light of the spirit of ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ point to a clear link between the industrial policies for encouraged industries and the policy for the provision of land. The GOC’s claim was therefore rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(547)

In this respect, Decision No 40 of the State Council does mention in Article XII that ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ is an important reference for guiding the investment, government’s management of investment projects and the formulation and implementation of policies of tax, credits, land (emphasis added) and import and export. Furthermore, the introduction of Decision No 40 states that ‘All departments concerned shall accelerate the steps in formulating and amending the relevant policies in tax, credit, land (emphasis added) and import and export, etc., and strengthen the coordination with industrial policies so as to further perfect the policy system of promoting the industrial restructuring’. Therefore, it is clear that public authorities have to take into account ‘The Guiding Catalogue of the Industrial Restructuring’ and the industrial policies when providing land to companies. Article XVIII of Decision No 40 states that for industries that are restricted,
  ‘The departments governing investment shall not examine, approve or put on record, no financial institution may grant any loan, no other departments governing land management, city planning and construction, environmental protection, quality inspection, firefighting, customs, industry and commerce, etc., may go through relevant procedures’
  (emphasis added). Therefore, departments governing land management are prohibited to provide land to restricted industries. The above-mentioned provisions of Decision No 40 read in the light of the spirit of ‘The Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring’ point to a clear link between the industrial policies for encouraged industries and the policy for the provision of land. The GOC’s claim was therefore rejected.

emphasis added

All departments concerned shall accelerate the steps in formulating and amending the relevant policies in tax, credit, land (emphasis added) and import and export, etc., and strengthen the coordination with industrial policies so as to further perfect the policy system of promoting the industrial restructuring’.

‘The departments governing investment shall not examine, approve or put on record, no financial institution may grant any loan, no other departments governing land management, city planning and construction, environmental protection, quality inspection, firefighting, customs, industry and commerce, etc., may go through relevant procedures’

| (548) | Consequently, the Commission considered this subsidy countervailable. |
| --- | --- |

(548)

Consequently, the Commission considered this subsidy countervailable.

(d)   Calculation of the subsidy amount

| (549) | As in previous investigations (125) and in accordance with Article 6(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, land prices from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (‘Chinese Taipei’) were used as an external benchmark (126). The benefit conferred on the recipients is calculated by taking into consideration the difference between the amount actually paid by each of the sampled exporting producers (i.e., the actual price paid as stated in the contract and, when applicable, the price stated in the contract reduced by the amount of local government refunds/grants) for land use rights and the amount that should normally have been paid on the basis of the Chinese Taipei benchmark. |
| --- | --- |

(549)

As in previous investigations (125) and in accordance with Article 6(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, land prices from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (‘Chinese Taipei’) were used as an external benchmark (126). The benefit conferred on the recipients is calculated by taking into consideration the difference between the amount actually paid by each of the sampled exporting producers (i.e., the actual price paid as stated in the contract and, when applicable, the price stated in the contract reduced by the amount of local government refunds/grants) for land use rights and the amount that should normally have been paid on the basis of the Chinese Taipei benchmark.

125

126

| (550) | The Commission considers Chinese Taipei as a suitable external benchmark for the following reasons:






  — | the comparable level of economic development, GDP and economic structure in Chinese Taipei and a majority of the provinces and cities in the PRC where the sampled exporting producers are based; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(550)

The Commission considers Chinese Taipei as a suitable external benchmark for the following reasons:

—

the comparable level of economic development, GDP and economic structure in Chinese Taipei and a majority of the provinces and cities in the PRC where the sampled exporting producers are based;

| — | the physical proximity of the PRC and Chinese Taipei; |
| --- | --- |

—

the physical proximity of the PRC and Chinese Taipei;

| — | the high degree of industrial infrastructure in both Chinese Taipei and many provinces of the PRC; |
| --- | --- |

—

the high degree of industrial infrastructure in both Chinese Taipei and many provinces of the PRC;

| — | the strong economic ties and cross border trade between Chinese Taipei and the PRC; |
| --- | --- |

—

the strong economic ties and cross border trade between Chinese Taipei and the PRC;

| — | the high density of population in many of the provinces of the PRC and in Chinese Taipei; |
| --- | --- |

—

the high density of population in many of the provinces of the PRC and in Chinese Taipei;

| — | the similarity between the type of land and transactions used for constructing the relevant benchmark in Chinese Taipei with those in the PRC; and |
| --- | --- |

—

the similarity between the type of land and transactions used for constructing the relevant benchmark in Chinese Taipei with those in the PRC; and

| — | the common demographic, linguistic and cultural characteristics between Chinese Taipei and the PRC. |
| --- | --- |

—

the common demographic, linguistic and cultural characteristics between Chinese Taipei and the PRC.

| (551) | Following the methodology applied in previous investigations (127), and absent any more appropriate information in this respect, the Commission used the average land price per square meter established in the six districts in Chinese Taipei where most Taiwanese industrial parks are located (i.e. Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, Taoyuan, Hsinchu) corrected for inflation and GDP evolution as from the dates of the respective land use right contracts. Since all the sampled exporting producers are located in industrial zones in the PRC, the Commission considered it appropriate to set a benchmark on transactions that also took place in an industrial zone. The information concerning industrial land prices as of 2013 was retrieved from the website of the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan (128). For the previous years, the prices were corrected using the inflation rates and evolution of GDP per capita at current prices in USD for Taiwan as published by the IMF. |
| --- | --- |

(551)

Following the methodology applied in previous investigations (127), and absent any more appropriate information in this respect, the Commission used the average land price per square meter established in the six districts in Chinese Taipei where most Taiwanese industrial parks are located (i.e. Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, Taoyuan, Hsinchu) corrected for inflation and GDP evolution as from the dates of the respective land use right contracts. Since all the sampled exporting producers are located in industrial zones in the PRC, the Commission considered it appropriate to set a benchmark on transactions that also took place in an industrial zone. The information concerning industrial land prices as of 2013 was retrieved from the website of the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan (128). For the previous years, the prices were corrected using the inflation rates and evolution of GDP per capita at current prices in USD for Taiwan as published by the IMF.

127

128

| (552) | Following final disclosure, the GOC disagreed with the use of a benchmark outside mainland China, which resulted in a benefit calculation that is inconsistent with Article 6(d) of the basic Regulation and Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. The GOC claimed that undistorted benchmarks exist in mainland China because land use rights are transferred by public bidding quotation or auction according to the Land Administration Law and that since private companies owning land use rights can rent or sell them to unrelated buyers, the Commission should have used prices in mainland China as a benchmark. The GOC further claimed that the fact that prices are determined through competitive bidding and negotiation ensures that they are not distorted but reflect an adequate market price. |
| --- | --- |

(552)

Following final disclosure, the GOC disagreed with the use of a benchmark outside mainland China, which resulted in a benefit calculation that is inconsistent with Article 6(d) of the basic Regulation and Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. The GOC claimed that undistorted benchmarks exist in mainland China because land use rights are transferred by public bidding quotation or auction according to the Land Administration Law and that since private companies owning land use rights can rent or sell them to unrelated buyers, the Commission should have used prices in mainland China as a benchmark. The GOC further claimed that the fact that prices are determined through competitive bidding and negotiation ensures that they are not distorted but reflect an adequate market price.

| (553) | However, the GOC failed to provide any statistics or data to allow the Commission to examine the proposal to use prices at which private companies rent or resell land use rights. The Commission could not find any publicly available data on the subject either. In addition, even if such information were to be received, it would only concern a secondary market of transfers, since there is only one player on the primary market (i.e. the original allocation of land use rights is always performed by the GOC). Indeed, the primary market of original allocation for 50 years is different from the rent on the secondary market, which normally should be for a much shorter period, or at least with different clauses for revaluation, termination, etc. Therefore, the Commission continued to rely on the information available for the primary market, which is the market under investigation in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(553)

However, the GOC failed to provide any statistics or data to allow the Commission to examine the proposal to use prices at which private companies rent or resell land use rights. The Commission could not find any publicly available data on the subject either. In addition, even if such information were to be received, it would only concern a secondary market of transfers, since there is only one player on the primary market (i.e. the original allocation of land use rights is always performed by the GOC). Indeed, the primary market of original allocation for 50 years is different from the rent on the secondary market, which normally should be for a much shorter period, or at least with different clauses for revaluation, termination, etc. Therefore, the Commission continued to rely on the information available for the primary market, which is the market under investigation in this case.

| (554) | Furthermore, the GOC claimed that if a benchmark outside mainland China were to be used, the method of comparison used by the Commission as well as the selection of Chinese Taipei was incorrect. First, the Commission incorrectly compared certain attributes of Chinese Taipei, such as economic development, state of industrial infrastructure, etc., with the attributes of provinces and cities of mainland China because both markets are not similar. Second, the GOC argued that the prices of land in Chinese Taipei are neither related nor connected with the prevailing market conditions in mainland China as required by Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement since in Chinese Taipei land has to be purchased while in mainland China land is leased for a period of 50 years. Furthermore, the population density, size and GDP of mainland China and Chinese Taipei are very different and thus both markets are not comparable. For example, in 2020, China’s population density was 149 people per square kilometre of land, while for Chinese Taipei the density was 650 people per square kilometre of land. Furthermore, the size of Chinese Taipei is about 36 197 km2 which is much smaller than the provinces at issue like Hubei (185 900 km2) and Jiangsu (102 600 km2). Therefore, the GOC claimed that an adjustment needs to be made to reflect these factors. The GOC further claimed that no adjustment was made for inflation and requested a detailed disclosure of the data underlying the benchmark calculation, notably regarding the benchmark of Chinese Taipei prices used and the data used for the adjustment of previous years. |
| --- | --- |

(554)

Furthermore, the GOC claimed that if a benchmark outside mainland China were to be used, the method of comparison used by the Commission as well as the selection of Chinese Taipei was incorrect. First, the Commission incorrectly compared certain attributes of Chinese Taipei, such as economic development, state of industrial infrastructure, etc., with the attributes of provinces and cities of mainland China because both markets are not similar. Second, the GOC argued that the prices of land in Chinese Taipei are neither related nor connected with the prevailing market conditions in mainland China as required by Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement since in Chinese Taipei land has to be purchased while in mainland China land is leased for a period of 50 years. Furthermore, the population density, size and GDP of mainland China and Chinese Taipei are very different and thus both markets are not comparable. For example, in 2020, China’s population density was 149 people per square kilometre of land, while for Chinese Taipei the density was 650 people per square kilometre of land. Furthermore, the size of Chinese Taipei is about 36 197 km2 which is much smaller than the provinces at issue like Hubei (185 900 km2) and Jiangsu (102 600 km2). Therefore, the GOC claimed that an adjustment needs to be made to reflect these factors. The GOC further claimed that no adjustment was made for inflation and requested a detailed disclosure of the data underlying the benchmark calculation, notably regarding the benchmark of Chinese Taipei prices used and the data used for the adjustment of previous years.

2

2

2

| (555) | The ZTT Group also claimed that the benchmark used by the Commission is manifestly inappropriate. First, the state of development of the Chinese provinces at the time of the acquisition of the land use right should be considered and compared with that of Chinese Taipei and not during the investigation period. Second, the Chinese Taipei’s GDP was more than three times that of mainland China in the past three years and more than 50 % higher than that in Jiangsu Province in 2020. Third, the correction indexes to be applied should be those of the Chinese provinces where the sampled producers are based and not of Chinese Taipei. Finally, this party requested the Commission to provide meaningful statistics and the details for the calculation of the benchmark or the complete set of data used for such calculation. |
| --- | --- |

(555)

The ZTT Group also claimed that the benchmark used by the Commission is manifestly inappropriate. First, the state of development of the Chinese provinces at the time of the acquisition of the land use right should be considered and compared with that of Chinese Taipei and not during the investigation period. Second, the Chinese Taipei’s GDP was more than three times that of mainland China in the past three years and more than 50 % higher than that in Jiangsu Province in 2020. Third, the correction indexes to be applied should be those of the Chinese provinces where the sampled producers are based and not of Chinese Taipei. Finally, this party requested the Commission to provide meaningful statistics and the details for the calculation of the benchmark or the complete set of data used for such calculation.

| (556) | In this respect, the Commission noted that the selection of Chinese Taipei as a benchmark was based on the examination of several factors listed in recital (550). Although there are certain differences in the market conditions between land use rights in mainland China and sale of land in Chinese Taipei, these are not of such nature to invalidate the choice of Chinese Taipei as a valid benchmark. Moreover, the GOC compared population density figures at the level of the entire country. Looking closer at population density of the actual locations of the exporting producers, it appears that on average the population density figures are similar. For example, the population density of Hubei was 308 people per km2 in 2020; however, the density of Wuhan city where most of the companies are located was 1 145 people per km2 (129). The population density of Jiangsu was 830 people per km2 (130). Therefore, the Commission considered that no adjustment was warranted. |
| --- | --- |

(556)

In this respect, the Commission noted that the selection of Chinese Taipei as a benchmark was based on the examination of several factors listed in recital (550). Although there are certain differences in the market conditions between land use rights in mainland China and sale of land in Chinese Taipei, these are not of such nature to invalidate the choice of Chinese Taipei as a valid benchmark. Moreover, the GOC compared population density figures at the level of the entire country. Looking closer at population density of the actual locations of the exporting producers, it appears that on average the population density figures are similar. For example, the population density of Hubei was 308 people per km2 in 2020; however, the density of Wuhan city where most of the companies are located was 1 145 people per km2 (129). The population density of Jiangsu was 830 people per km2 (130). Therefore, the Commission considered that no adjustment was warranted.

2

2

129

2

130

| (557) | The subsidy rate established with regard to this subsidy during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers amounts to:

  Provision of land for less than adequate remuneration







  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(557)

The subsidy rate established with regard to this subsidy during the investigation period for the sampled exporting producers amounts to:

Provision of land for less than adequate remuneration

Provision of land for less than adequate remuneration

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

0,84 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

0,40 %

3.8.2.   Provision of raw materials for less than adequate remuneration

Provision of raw materials for less than adequate remuneration

| (558) | In its complaint, the complainant provided evidence that Chinese OFC producers operate in an encouraged industry and that it is reasonable to conclude that the subsidies provided to producers of raw materials used in the production of OFC ultimately benefit OFC producers. This benefit would be accrued by OFC manufacturers directly, to the extent that they are vertically integrated, and indirectly, to the extent those subsidies result in lower prices for inputs on the Chinese domestic market than would otherwise be the case. |
| --- | --- |

(558)

In its complaint, the complainant provided evidence that Chinese OFC producers operate in an encouraged industry and that it is reasonable to conclude that the subsidies provided to producers of raw materials used in the production of OFC ultimately benefit OFC producers. This benefit would be accrued by OFC manufacturers directly, to the extent that they are vertically integrated, and indirectly, to the extent those subsidies result in lower prices for inputs on the Chinese domestic market than would otherwise be the case.

| (559) | While the GOC has, as set out in recitals (168) and (169) above, during the RCC provided documents regarding relevant provincial State policies in Yunnan, it has not been supportive in assisting the Commission to obtain information from private or State-owned enterprises and therefore was considered to be only partially cooperating with the Commission’s requests to receive information on the provision of raw materials and the respective market. |
| --- | --- |

(559)

While the GOC has, as set out in recitals (168) and (169) above, during the RCC provided documents regarding relevant provincial State policies in Yunnan, it has not been supportive in assisting the Commission to obtain information from private or State-owned enterprises and therefore was considered to be only partially cooperating with the Commission’s requests to receive information on the provision of raw materials and the respective market.

| (560) | This finding was not altered by the argument of the GOC that the Commission had asked for information concerning an irrelevant market, since not germanium but germanium tetra-chloride was the raw material used in the production of OFC. Because germanium is the source material for germanium tetra-chloride, regulations on germanium and the respective market have an impact on the specific derivate germanium tetra-chloride. |
| --- | --- |

(560)

This finding was not altered by the argument of the GOC that the Commission had asked for information concerning an irrelevant market, since not germanium but germanium tetra-chloride was the raw material used in the production of OFC. Because germanium is the source material for germanium tetra-chloride, regulations on germanium and the respective market have an impact on the specific derivate germanium tetra-chloride.

| (561) | Since the investigated groups of companies were vertically integrated, the raw materials provided by related suppliers of the OFC producing entities have in principle been included in the investigation. Therefore, to the extent that certain investigated countervailable subsidies were received at the level of these related suppliers, they have been integrated into the calculations for each subsidy scheme analysed above. |
| --- | --- |

(561)

Since the investigated groups of companies were vertically integrated, the raw materials provided by related suppliers of the OFC producing entities have in principle been included in the investigation. Therefore, to the extent that certain investigated countervailable subsidies were received at the level of these related suppliers, they have been integrated into the calculations for each subsidy scheme analysed above.

| (562) | The Commission also investigated whether unrelated suppliers of basic raw materials provided inputs for less than adequate remuneration to the sampled exporting producers. The Commission focused in particular on the basic raw materials for the production of OFC that the sampled companies purchased to a large extent from unrelated suppliers, that is germanium tetrachloride and silicone chloride. |
| --- | --- |

(562)

The Commission also investigated whether unrelated suppliers of basic raw materials provided inputs for less than adequate remuneration to the sampled exporting producers. The Commission focused in particular on the basic raw materials for the production of OFC that the sampled companies purchased to a large extent from unrelated suppliers, that is germanium tetrachloride and silicone chloride.

| (563) | The original input material of germanium tetrachloride is germanium, which is indispensable for many high-tech products. It is an important input material used in the production OFC in order to increase its refractive index and help minimizing signal loss over long distances (131). Because of the geological conditions, the Yunnan region has a rich supply of germanium. |
| --- | --- |

(563)

The original input material of germanium tetrachloride is germanium, which is indispensable for many high-tech products. It is an important input material used in the production OFC in order to increase its refractive index and help minimizing signal loss over long distances (131). Because of the geological conditions, the Yunnan region has a rich supply of germanium.

131

| (564) | In view of the partial cooperation by the GOC, the Commission analysed the limited set of documents submitted by GOC and supplemented them by researching the government plans and policies concerning these inputs based on the information available, as well as the actors in the market of these inputs. The Commission found that the GOC has implemented plans and strategies to support the germanium industry in Yunnan. Plans addressing the production of this raw material include the ‘13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of Yunnan Province’ (132), the ‘Yunnan Province Government’s Notice on Developing Yunnan’s Industry 2016-2020’ (133) and the ‘Yunnan Province Government Notice on Several Measures to Support the Development of the Real Economy’ (134). |
| --- | --- |

(564)

In view of the partial cooperation by the GOC, the Commission analysed the limited set of documents submitted by GOC and supplemented them by researching the government plans and policies concerning these inputs based on the information available, as well as the actors in the market of these inputs. The Commission found that the GOC has implemented plans and strategies to support the germanium industry in Yunnan. Plans addressing the production of this raw material include the ‘13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of Yunnan Province’ (132), the ‘Yunnan Province Government’s Notice on Developing Yunnan’s Industry 2016-2020’ (133) and the ‘Yunnan Province Government Notice on Several Measures to Support the Development of the Real Economy’ (134).

132

133

134

| (565) | The ‘13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of Yunnan Province’ refers explicitly to germanium when it formulates the aim to
  ‘actively develop new solar cell materials such as germanium and thin film,’
  and to
  ‘support the development of new generation information technology industry, accelerate the development of new electronic information and semiconductor functional materials based on platinum group, germanium, indium and other rare and precious metals’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(565)

The ‘13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of Yunnan Province’ refers explicitly to germanium when it formulates the aim to
  ‘actively develop new solar cell materials such as germanium and thin film,’
  and to
  ‘support the development of new generation information technology industry, accelerate the development of new electronic information and semiconductor functional materials based on platinum group, germanium, indium and other rare and precious metals’
  .

th

‘actively develop new solar cell materials such as germanium and thin film,’

‘support the development of new generation information technology industry, accelerate the development of new electronic information and semiconductor functional materials based on platinum group, germanium, indium and other rare and precious metals’

| (566) | The objectives of the Five-Year Plan are reflected and developed in further government notices and implementing measures. As set out in recital (79), the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being allocated to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC. |
| --- | --- |

(566)

The objectives of the Five-Year Plan are reflected and developed in further government notices and implementing measures. As set out in recital (79), the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being allocated to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC.

| (567) | In the ‘Yunnan Province Government’s Notice on Developing Yunnan’s Industry 2016-2020’ the government of the province explicitly sets as strategic tasks to
  ‘vigorously promote Yunnan precious metal new material industrial park, [...] national germanium industrial base Construction of new optoelectronic materials and devices’
  and to
  ‘break down foreign technical barriers and accelerate the cultivation of new rare metal materials such as [...] germanium and germanium-based new materials’
  and
  ‘proactively deploy the research and development of cutting-edge new materials such as [...] germanium’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(567)

In the ‘Yunnan Province Government’s Notice on Developing Yunnan’s Industry 2016-2020’ the government of the province explicitly sets as strategic tasks to
  ‘vigorously promote Yunnan precious metal new material industrial park, [...] national germanium industrial base Construction of new optoelectronic materials and devices’
  and to
  ‘break down foreign technical barriers and accelerate the cultivation of new rare metal materials such as [...] germanium and germanium-based new materials’
  and
  ‘proactively deploy the research and development of cutting-edge new materials such as [...] germanium’
  .

‘vigorously promote Yunnan precious metal new material industrial park, [...] national germanium industrial base Construction of new optoelectronic materials and devices’

‘break down foreign technical barriers and accelerate the cultivation of new rare metal materials such as [...] germanium and germanium-based new materials’

‘proactively deploy the research and development of cutting-edge new materials such as [...] germanium’

| (568) | In the third document that sets out the mechanism to promote the germanium industry in Yunnan province a direct financial support is described:
  ‘In accordance with the principle of “enterprise purchase and storage, bank loans, financial subsidies, market operation, self-financing”, we have carried out commercial purchase and storage of [...] germanium, [...] and other key non-ferrous metal products in the whole province. The total amount of purchase and storage is about 800 000 tons, and the collection and storage time is one year. The funds needed for collection and storage shall be lent by the enterprise to the bank in the form of product pledge. A special fund of 1 billion yuan was allocated by the provincial government to subsidize the bank loans to enterprises. Among them, 80 % discount subsidy will be given to enterprises that purchase and store tin, germanium and indium.’ |
| --- | --- |

(568)

In the third document that sets out the mechanism to promote the germanium industry in Yunnan province a direct financial support is described:
  ‘In accordance with the principle of “enterprise purchase and storage, bank loans, financial subsidies, market operation, self-financing”, we have carried out commercial purchase and storage of [...] germanium, [...] and other key non-ferrous metal products in the whole province. The total amount of purchase and storage is about 800 000 tons, and the collection and storage time is one year. The funds needed for collection and storage shall be lent by the enterprise to the bank in the form of product pledge. A special fund of 1 billion yuan was allocated by the provincial government to subsidize the bank loans to enterprises. Among them, 80 % discount subsidy will be given to enterprises that purchase and store tin, germanium and indium.’

‘In accordance with the principle of “enterprise purchase and storage, bank loans, financial subsidies, market operation, self-financing”, we have carried out commercial purchase and storage of [...] germanium, [...] and other key non-ferrous metal products in the whole province. The total amount of purchase and storage is about 800 000 tons, and the collection and storage time is one year. The funds needed for collection and storage shall be lent by the enterprise to the bank in the form of product pledge. A special fund of 1 billion yuan was allocated by the provincial government to subsidize the bank loans to enterprises. Among them, 80 % discount subsidy will be given to enterprises that purchase and store tin, germanium and indium.’

| (569) | On the basis of publicly available information, the Commission found that companies operating in the germanium industry, including producers of germanium tetrachloride, located in the Yunnan Province have received subsidies from the State. For instance, the partially State-owned company YUNNAN Lincang Xinyuan Germanium and its subsidiaries, received multiple payments by the GOC. In its annual report from 2020 the company reports an amount of 21 847 627 RMB as income from subsidy payments for the year 2019. In 2020 the grants received from the GOC reached an amount of 55 361 284 RMB (135). The grants provided by the GOC to the germanium industry are not limited to one company. In its annual report for 2019 the State-owned company Yunnan Chihong Zinc and Germanium also stated that it received subsidies amounting to 43 771 439 RMB in that year (136). |
| --- | --- |

(569)

On the basis of publicly available information, the Commission found that companies operating in the germanium industry, including producers of germanium tetrachloride, located in the Yunnan Province have received subsidies from the State. For instance, the partially State-owned company YUNNAN Lincang Xinyuan Germanium and its subsidiaries, received multiple payments by the GOC. In its annual report from 2020 the company reports an amount of 21 847 627 RMB as income from subsidy payments for the year 2019. In 2020 the grants received from the GOC reached an amount of 55 361 284 RMB (135). The grants provided by the GOC to the germanium industry are not limited to one company. In its annual report for 2019 the State-owned company Yunnan Chihong Zinc and Germanium also stated that it received subsidies amounting to 43 771 439 RMB in that year (136).

135

136

| (570) | Therefore, it is evident that the GOC is involved across the entire OFC value chain, which is likely to have an effect on prices so that they do not reflect market forces. Through the means described above, sectors producing raw materials used to manufacture OFC, in particular germanium and germanium tetrachloride, are subject to governmental intervention. |
| --- | --- |

(570)

Therefore, it is evident that the GOC is involved across the entire OFC value chain, which is likely to have an effect on prices so that they do not reflect market forces. Through the means described above, sectors producing raw materials used to manufacture OFC, in particular germanium and germanium tetrachloride, are subject to governmental intervention.

| (571) | That being said, in view of the fact that the anti-dumping duty may be set at the level of the dumping margin, as explained in recital (769), and the potential relevance of the circumstances set out at recital (765), the Commission decided not to continue the investigation on this alleged subsidy and reserved its right to come back to this issue if necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(571)

That being said, in view of the fact that the anti-dumping duty may be set at the level of the dumping margin, as explained in recital (769), and the potential relevance of the circumstances set out at recital (765), the Commission decided not to continue the investigation on this alleged subsidy and reserved its right to come back to this issue if necessary.

3.9.   Conclusion on subsidisation

Conclusion on subsidisation

| (572) | Based on the information available, the Commission calculated the amount of countervailable subsidies for the sampled companies in accordance with the provisions of the basic Regulation by examining each subsidy or subsidy programme, and added these figures together to calculate a total amount of subsidisation for each exporting producer for the investigation period. To calculate the overall subsidisation below, the Commission first calculated the percentage subsidisation, being the subsidy amount as a percentage of the company’s total turnover. This percentage was then used to calculate the subsidy allocated to exports of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. The subsidy amount per tonne of product concerned exported to the Union during the investigation period was then calculated, and the margins below calculated as a percentage of the Costs, Insurance and Freight (‘CIF’) value of the same exports per tonne. |
| --- | --- |

(572)

Based on the information available, the Commission calculated the amount of countervailable subsidies for the sampled companies in accordance with the provisions of the basic Regulation by examining each subsidy or subsidy programme, and added these figures together to calculate a total amount of subsidisation for each exporting producer for the investigation period. To calculate the overall subsidisation below, the Commission first calculated the percentage subsidisation, being the subsidy amount as a percentage of the company’s total turnover. This percentage was then used to calculate the subsidy allocated to exports of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. The subsidy amount per tonne of product concerned exported to the Union during the investigation period was then calculated, and the margins below calculated as a percentage of the Costs, Insurance and Freight (‘CIF’) value of the same exports per tonne.

| (573) | In accordance with Article 15(3) of the basic Regulation, the total subsidy amount for the cooperating companies not included in the sample was calculated on the basis of the total weighted average amount of countervailing subsidies established for the cooperating exporting producers in the sample with the exclusion of negligible amounts as well as the amount of subsidies established for items which are subject to the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. However, the Commission did not disregard findings partially based on facts available to determine those amounts. Indeed, the Commission considers that the facts available used in those cases did not affect substantially the information needed to determine the amount of subsidisation in a fair manner, so that exporters who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation will not be prejudiced by using this approach (137). |
| --- | --- |

(573)

In accordance with Article 15(3) of the basic Regulation, the total subsidy amount for the cooperating companies not included in the sample was calculated on the basis of the total weighted average amount of countervailing subsidies established for the cooperating exporting producers in the sample with the exclusion of negligible amounts as well as the amount of subsidies established for items which are subject to the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. However, the Commission did not disregard findings partially based on facts available to determine those amounts. Indeed, the Commission considers that the facts available used in those cases did not affect substantially the information needed to determine the amount of subsidisation in a fair manner, so that exporters who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation will not be prejudiced by using this approach (137).

137

| (574) | Given the high rate of cooperation of Chinese exporting producers and the representativeness of the sample also in terms of subsidy eligibility, the Commission considered it appropriate to set the amount for ‘all other companies’ at the level of the highest amount established for the sampled companies. The ‘all other companies’ amount was applied to those companies which did not cooperate in the investigation.






  Company name | Subsidy rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(574)

Given the high rate of cooperation of Chinese exporting producers and the representativeness of the sample also in terms of subsidy eligibility, the Commission considered it appropriate to set the amount for ‘all other companies’ at the level of the highest amount established for the sampled companies. The ‘all other companies’ amount was applied to those companies which did not cooperate in the investigation.

Company name

Subsidy rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

10,33 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

5,1 %

Other cooperating companies

7,8 %

All other companies

10,33 %

4.   INJURY

INJURY

4.1.   Unit of measurement

Unit of measurement

| (575) | Although official import statistics are reported in kilograms, the Commission considered, in line with comments by exporting producers and Union industry, that this unit of measurement is not suitable for a proper measurement of the volumes concerned. The investigation shows that the industry commonly does not use weight but length as a main volume indicator. This could either measure the length of the cable (cable-km), or the total length of the fibres contained therein (fibre-km). Given that the current investigation concerns cables, cable-km is considered the most appropriate unit of measurement, which will be used in the injury determination below. |
| --- | --- |

(575)

Although official import statistics are reported in kilograms, the Commission considered, in line with comments by exporting producers and Union industry, that this unit of measurement is not suitable for a proper measurement of the volumes concerned. The investigation shows that the industry commonly does not use weight but length as a main volume indicator. This could either measure the length of the cable (cable-km), or the total length of the fibres contained therein (fibre-km). Given that the current investigation concerns cables, cable-km is considered the most appropriate unit of measurement, which will be used in the injury determination below.

| (576) | In its comments on final disclosure, the CCCME claimed that import volumes should have been calculated on the basis of fibre kilometres instead of cable kilometres as fibre kilometre was the accepted industry standard and the only unit of measurement that reflected the immense differences in fibre numbers per cable. |
| --- | --- |

(576)

In its comments on final disclosure, the CCCME claimed that import volumes should have been calculated on the basis of fibre kilometres instead of cable kilometres as fibre kilometre was the accepted industry standard and the only unit of measurement that reflected the immense differences in fibre numbers per cable.

| (577) | The Commission maintained that cable kilometre is the appropriate unit of measurement as the products subject to the investigation are cables and the number of fibres in a cable is a specific feature of the cable which is reflected in the PCN. Therefore this claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(577)

The Commission maintained that cable kilometre is the appropriate unit of measurement as the products subject to the investigation are cables and the number of fibres in a cable is a specific feature of the cable which is reflected in the PCN. Therefore this claim was rejected.

4.2.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

Definition of the Union industry and Union production

| (578) | The like product was manufactured by 29 producers in the Union during the investigation period. With the exception of the two companies mentioned in the next section, they constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation. Following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the injury determination is based on data of 27 Member States (EU27) for the whole period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(578)

The like product was manufactured by 29 producers in the Union during the investigation period. With the exception of the two companies mentioned in the next section, they constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation. Following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the injury determination is based on data of 27 Member States (EU27) for the whole period considered.

| (579) | The total Union production during the investigation period was established at 1.2 million cable-km. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as direct information from the 9 parties - 6 complainants, 3 companies supporting the complaint - and market intelligence for the remaining producers. As indicated in recital (41), three Union producers were selected in the sample representing 52 % of the total Union production of the like product. |
| --- | --- |

(579)

The total Union production during the investigation period was established at 1.2 million cable-km. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as direct information from the 9 parties - 6 complainants, 3 companies supporting the complaint - and market intelligence for the remaining producers. As indicated in recital (41), three Union producers were selected in the sample representing 52 % of the total Union production of the like product.

4.3.   Exclusion of two producers from the Union industry

Exclusion of two producers from the Union industry

| (580) | According to Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation, producers who are related to Chinese exporters or importers and/or are themselves importers of the allegedly subsidised product may be excluded from the Union industry. Article 9(2) defines when producers are to be considered related to exporters or importers. |
| --- | --- |

(580)

According to Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation, producers who are related to Chinese exporters or importers and/or are themselves importers of the allegedly subsidised product may be excluded from the Union industry. Article 9(2) defines when producers are to be considered related to exporters or importers.

| (581) | The Commission investigated the existing relationships of the Union industry with exporters or importers of the product concerned. The investigation showed that one sampled Union producer imported a marginal volume of optical fibre cables from China, and another one holds a minority shareholding in a non-sampled exporting producer. In light of the negligible volumes imported by the first producer and of the fact that the second one demonstrated that it does not control nor is controlled by this exporting producer and that the effect of this relationship did not cause it to behave differently from the non-related producers, the Commission concluded there was no reason to exclude either of these companies from the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(581)

The Commission investigated the existing relationships of the Union industry with exporters or importers of the product concerned. The investigation showed that one sampled Union producer imported a marginal volume of optical fibre cables from China, and another one holds a minority shareholding in a non-sampled exporting producer. In light of the negligible volumes imported by the first producer and of the fact that the second one demonstrated that it does not control nor is controlled by this exporting producer and that the effect of this relationship did not cause it to behave differently from the non-related producers, the Commission concluded there was no reason to exclude either of these companies from the Union industry.

| (582) | Concerning a third non-sampled producer the Commission considered, in view of its relationship with a Chinese exporting producer (which is controlled by the same entity) and the significant quantities of imports from China, that it was appropriate to exclude such a producer from the definition of the Union industry, despite the significant production of this company within the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(582)

Concerning a third non-sampled producer the Commission considered, in view of its relationship with a Chinese exporting producer (which is controlled by the same entity) and the significant quantities of imports from China, that it was appropriate to exclude such a producer from the definition of the Union industry, despite the significant production of this company within the Union.

| (583) | Similarly, concerning a non-cooperating producer in the Union, who declared significant amount of imports from China, the Commission decided that, taking into account the relationship with a Chinese exporting producer and the significant amounts of imports, it should be equally excluded from the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(583)

Similarly, concerning a non-cooperating producer in the Union, who declared significant amount of imports from China, the Commission decided that, taking into account the relationship with a Chinese exporting producer and the significant amounts of imports, it should be equally excluded from the Union industry.

| (584) | As the investigation did not show that any other producer was either related to Chinese exporters or imported from China, no further exclusions from the definition of the Union industry were necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(584)

As the investigation did not show that any other producer was either related to Chinese exporters or imported from China, no further exclusions from the definition of the Union industry were necessary.

| (585) | CCCME argued that a number of Union producers had links to Chinese OFC producers and requested the Commission to conduct a segmented injury analysis by separately analysing this import stream. |
| --- | --- |

(585)

CCCME argued that a number of Union producers had links to Chinese OFC producers and requested the Commission to conduct a segmented injury analysis by separately analysing this import stream.

| (586) | In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME reiterated this claim that the imports of the Union producers should be segregated and assessed separately from the imports of other parties. CCCME also considered that the Commission should disclose the volume and percentage of the Union producers’ imports from related and unrelated Chinese producers during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(586)

In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME reiterated this claim that the imports of the Union producers should be segregated and assessed separately from the imports of other parties. CCCME also considered that the Commission should disclose the volume and percentage of the Union producers’ imports from related and unrelated Chinese producers during the IP.

| (587) | As set out above, the Commission has duly taken into account in its analysis the links of Union producers with Chinese companies by excluding producers with significant imports from China and also had regard to their relationship with Chinese exporters. The sampled Union producers imported marginal quantities (less than 1 % of their production) of the product concerned from related companies in China. Other companies producing in the Union importing significant quantities were not considered Union industry within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation as set out in recitals (582) to (584). Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(587)

As set out above, the Commission has duly taken into account in its analysis the links of Union producers with Chinese companies by excluding producers with significant imports from China and also had regard to their relationship with Chinese exporters. The sampled Union producers imported marginal quantities (less than 1 % of their production) of the product concerned from related companies in China. Other companies producing in the Union importing significant quantities were not considered Union industry within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation as set out in recitals (582) to (584). Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (588) | Connect Com submitted a list of other Union producers of optical fibre cables which were not taken into consideration in the complaint. The Commission noted that these companies did not cooperate with the investigation and that estimations for non-cooperating Union producers were provided on the basis of reliable market intelligence (138). |
| --- | --- |

(588)

Connect Com submitted a list of other Union producers of optical fibre cables which were not taken into consideration in the complaint. The Commission noted that these companies did not cooperate with the investigation and that estimations for non-cooperating Union producers were provided on the basis of reliable market intelligence (138).

138

4.4.   Determination of the relevant Union market

Determination of the relevant Union market

| (589) | To establish whether the Union industry suffered injury and to determine consumption and the various economic indicators related to the situation of the Union industry, the Commission examined whether and to what extent the subsequent use of the Union industry’s production of the like product had to be taken into account in the analysis. |
| --- | --- |

(589)

To establish whether the Union industry suffered injury and to determine consumption and the various economic indicators related to the situation of the Union industry, the Commission examined whether and to what extent the subsequent use of the Union industry’s production of the like product had to be taken into account in the analysis.

4.5.   Captive use

Captive use

| (590) | The Commission found that between 5,8 % and 4,4 % of the Union producers’ production was destined for captive use during the period considered. The cables were in that case delivered within the same company or groups of companies for further downstream processing, in particular for the production of cables fitted with connectors. |
| --- | --- |

(590)

The Commission found that between 5,8 % and 4,4 % of the Union producers’ production was destined for captive use during the period considered. The cables were in that case delivered within the same company or groups of companies for further downstream processing, in particular for the production of cables fitted with connectors.

| (591) | The distinction between captive and free market is relevant for the injury analysis because products destined for captive use are not exposed to direct competition from imports. By contrast, production destined for free market sale is in direct competition with imports of the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(591)

The distinction between captive and free market is relevant for the injury analysis because products destined for captive use are not exposed to direct competition from imports. By contrast, production destined for free market sale is in direct competition with imports of the product concerned.

| (592) | To provide a picture of the Union industry that was as complete as possible, the Commission obtained data for the entire optical fibre activity and determined whether the production was destined for captive use or for the free market. |
| --- | --- |

(592)

To provide a picture of the Union industry that was as complete as possible, the Commission obtained data for the entire optical fibre activity and determined whether the production was destined for captive use or for the free market.

| (593) | The Commission examined certain economic indicators relating to the Union industry on the basis of data for the free market. These indicators are: sales volume and sales prices on the Union market; market share; growth; export volume and prices; profitability; return on investment; and cash flow. Where possible and justified, the findings of the examination were compared with the data for the captive market in order to provide a complete picture of the situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(593)

The Commission examined certain economic indicators relating to the Union industry on the basis of data for the free market. These indicators are: sales volume and sales prices on the Union market; market share; growth; export volume and prices; profitability; return on investment; and cash flow. Where possible and justified, the findings of the examination were compared with the data for the captive market in order to provide a complete picture of the situation of the Union industry.

| (594) | However, other economic indicators could meaningfully be examined only by referring to the whole activity, including the captive use of the Union industry (139). These are: production; capacity, capacity utilisation; investments; stocks; employment; productivity; wages; and ability to raise capital. |
| --- | --- |

(594)

However, other economic indicators could meaningfully be examined only by referring to the whole activity, including the captive use of the Union industry (139). These are: production; capacity, capacity utilisation; investments; stocks; employment; productivity; wages; and ability to raise capital.

139

| (595) | In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME claimed that the captive market should not be disregarded when analysing the overall market position of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(595)

In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME claimed that the captive market should not be disregarded when analysing the overall market position of the Union industry.

| (596) | In this respect, as described below, the Commission did not disregard the captive market, but rather identified it and assessed its evolution over time. This provided a complete picture of the situation of Union industry. The small and decreasing size of such market underscores that it does not have any meaningful impact on the situation of the Union industry. The Commission further recalls that cables with connectors are not product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(596)

In this respect, as described below, the Commission did not disregard the captive market, but rather identified it and assessed its evolution over time. This provided a complete picture of the situation of Union industry. The small and decreasing size of such market underscores that it does not have any meaningful impact on the situation of the Union industry. The Commission further recalls that cables with connectors are not product concerned.

4.6.   Union consumption

Union consumption

| (597) | The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of data on sales as determined by the complainant plus import data established in line with the methodology described in recital (600) to (607). |
| --- | --- |

(597)

The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of data on sales as determined by the complainant plus import data established in line with the methodology described in recital (600) to (607).

| (598) | Union consumption developed as follows:

  Table 1


  Union consumption (cable-km) | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total free market Union consumption | 1 276 902 | 1 537 999 | 1 655 737 | 1 760 092 |
| Index | 100 | 120 | 130 | 138 |
| Captive market | 61 505 | 59 802 | 62 710 | 54 205 |
| Index | 100 | 97 | 102 | 88 |
| Source: | Cooperating exporting producers, EU customs authorities, Eurostat, complainants |

(598)

Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Table 1

Union consumption (cable-km)

Union consumption (cable-km)

2017

2018

2019

IP

Total free market Union consumption

1 276 902

1 537 999

1 655 737

1 760 092

Index

Index

100

100

120

120

130

130

138

138

Captive market

61 505

59 802

62 710

54 205

Index

Index

100

100

97

97

102

102

88

88

Source:

Source:

Cooperating exporting producers, EU customs authorities, Eurostat, complainants

| (599) | The free market consumption in the Union increased by 38 % during the period considered. Indeed, linked to the wide digital expansion in the EU, this is a market whose growth is strong and is slated to continue at a brisk pace (140). The consumption kept growing until the IP, despite the fact that the second part of the period (i.e. the first half of 2020) coincided with the first months of the disruptions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. The investigation’s findings show that the pandemic which started in the last months of the IP and the related prevention measures did slow down the growth, but did not prevent consumption of the product concerned from increasing in the Union during the investigation period as a whole. The captive market is constituted by the use of optical fibre cables in connectivity solutions offered by the companies, including cables fitted with connectors; its volumes, very limited in proportion to the overall market, showed a decrease of 12 % throughout the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(599)

The free market consumption in the Union increased by 38 % during the period considered. Indeed, linked to the wide digital expansion in the EU, this is a market whose growth is strong and is slated to continue at a brisk pace (140). The consumption kept growing until the IP, despite the fact that the second part of the period (i.e. the first half of 2020) coincided with the first months of the disruptions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. The investigation’s findings show that the pandemic which started in the last months of the IP and the related prevention measures did slow down the growth, but did not prevent consumption of the product concerned from increasing in the Union during the investigation period as a whole. The captive market is constituted by the use of optical fibre cables in connectivity solutions offered by the companies, including cables fitted with connectors; its volumes, very limited in proportion to the overall market, showed a decrease of 12 % throughout the period considered.

140

4.7.   Imports from the country concerned

Imports from the country concerned

4.7.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned

Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned

| (600) | Official import statistics for CN code 8544 70 00 are reported in kilograms, and the same code contains products other than the product concerned. To obtain a more precise picture of imports, the Commission scrutinised detailed information from national customs authorities on the full set of single import transactions over the 2017-IP period, as reported by importers in their customs declarations and processed by the aforementioned authorities. The information pertained to imports into 9 Member States (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain) and was considered representative, as it covered 79 % of imports in the period considered. Granular analysis on this basis led to the conclusions presented below. |
| --- | --- |

(600)

Official import statistics for CN code 8544 70 00 are reported in kilograms, and the same code contains products other than the product concerned. To obtain a more precise picture of imports, the Commission scrutinised detailed information from national customs authorities on the full set of single import transactions over the 2017-IP period, as reported by importers in their customs declarations and processed by the aforementioned authorities. The information pertained to imports into 9 Member States (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain) and was considered representative, as it covered 79 % of imports in the period considered. Granular analysis on this basis led to the conclusions presented below.

| (601) | In its comments on final disclosure, Connect com argued that imports were only examined in nine Member States and that this was not representative as large Member States such as Italy, Poland, Austria etc., were not included in this analysis. In this respect, the Commission notes that the information received from national customs authorities was an additional analysis to identify more precisely the product concerned within the full CN code 8544 70 00. The Commission used the information from all national authorities which replied in time to its request for information and it considered that 79 % of total imports gives a representative picture of the share of the product concerned among all imports under the CN code. Therefore the Commission considered this argument to be unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

(601)

In its comments on final disclosure, Connect com argued that imports were only examined in nine Member States and that this was not representative as large Member States such as Italy, Poland, Austria etc., were not included in this analysis. In this respect, the Commission notes that the information received from national customs authorities was an additional analysis to identify more precisely the product concerned within the full CN code 8544 70 00. The Commission used the information from all national authorities which replied in time to its request for information and it considered that 79 % of total imports gives a representative picture of the share of the product concerned among all imports under the CN code. Therefore the Commission considered this argument to be unfounded.

| (602) | Concerning the volume of imports from China, it was established on the same basis as for the separate anti-dumping investigation, that is, on the basis of the information provided by Chinese exporting producers in the sampling exercise. |
| --- | --- |

(602)

Concerning the volume of imports from China, it was established on the same basis as for the separate anti-dumping investigation, that is, on the basis of the information provided by Chinese exporting producers in the sampling exercise.

| (603) | Imports from other third countries were established on the basis of the detailed exercise mentioned in recital (600), which identified imports of the product concerned in kg, and were converted into cable-km using the precise conversion factors declared by Chinese exporting producers in their replies to the additional request for information mentioned in recital (60). |
| --- | --- |

(603)

Imports from other third countries were established on the basis of the detailed exercise mentioned in recital (600), which identified imports of the product concerned in kg, and were converted into cable-km using the precise conversion factors declared by Chinese exporting producers in their replies to the additional request for information mentioned in recital (60).

| (604) | The market share of the imports was established on the basis of the import volume as compared to the volume of free market consumption shown in Table 1. |
| --- | --- |

(604)

The market share of the imports was established on the basis of the import volume as compared to the volume of free market consumption shown in Table 1.

| (605) | Imports from the country concerned developed as follows:

  Table 2


  Import volume and market share | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Volume of imports from the country concerned (cable-km) | 189 479 | 354 167 | 434 754 | 498 335 |
| Index | 100 | 187 | 229 | 263 |
| Market share (%) | 14,8 | 23,0 | 26,3 | 28,3 |
| Index | 100 | 155 | 177 | 191 |
| Source: | Cooperating exporting producers, Eurostat, EU customs authorities |

(605)

Imports from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 2

Table 2

Import volume and market share

Import volume and market share

2017

2018

2019

IP

Volume of imports from the country concerned (cable-km)

189 479

354 167

434 754

498 335

Index

Index

100

100

187

187

229

229

263

263

Market share (%)

14,8

23,0

26,3

28,3

Index

Index

100

100

155

155

177

177

191

191

Source:

Source:

Cooperating exporting producers, Eurostat, EU customs authorities

| (606) | Against a backdrop of significant Chinese excess capacity (estimated to amount to more than twice the entire EU market, on the basis of market analysis provided by the complainants (141)), imports from the country concerned increased from around 190 000 cable-km to around 500 000 cable-km over the period considered, a very rapid increase of more than two and a half times. This 163 % increase is more than four times higher than the increase in consumption, underscoring the depth and thrust of Chinese penetration of this market. |
| --- | --- |

(606)

Against a backdrop of significant Chinese excess capacity (estimated to amount to more than twice the entire EU market, on the basis of market analysis provided by the complainants (141)), imports from the country concerned increased from around 190 000 cable-km to around 500 000 cable-km over the period considered, a very rapid increase of more than two and a half times. This 163 % increase is more than four times higher than the increase in consumption, underscoring the depth and thrust of Chinese penetration of this market.

141

| (607) | As a result, the market share of those imports increased from 14,8 % to 28,3 % over the period considered, a massive increase of 91 %. It should be noted that the volumes of Chinese imports showed an increase in every year of the period considered, an element which highlights the rapidity and magnitude of the market penetration. |
| --- | --- |

(607)

As a result, the market share of those imports increased from 14,8 % to 28,3 % over the period considered, a massive increase of 91 %. It should be noted that the volumes of Chinese imports showed an increase in every year of the period considered, an element which highlights the rapidity and magnitude of the market penetration.

| (608) | In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME argued that the market share of the Union industry was understated and the market share of the Chinese imports was inflated. In this regard, CCCME further claimed that the market data should be based on fibre kilometres instead of cable kilometres which would result in a lower market share of Chinese imports. |
| --- | --- |

(608)

In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME argued that the market share of the Union industry was understated and the market share of the Chinese imports was inflated. In this regard, CCCME further claimed that the market data should be based on fibre kilometres instead of cable kilometres which would result in a lower market share of Chinese imports.

| (609) | The investigation revealed that cable-kilometre was the most appropriate unit of measurement for the product concerned as explained in recital (575). Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(609)

The investigation revealed that cable-kilometre was the most appropriate unit of measurement for the product concerned as explained in recital (575). Therefore, the claim was rejected.

4.7.2.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned, price undercutting, price depression

Prices of the imports from the country concerned, price undercutting, price depression

| (610) | The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of the replies provided by cooperating exporters in response to a request for information. |
| --- | --- |

(610)

The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of the replies provided by cooperating exporters in response to a request for information.

| (611) | The average price of imports from the country concerned developed as follows:

  Table 3


  Import prices (EUR/cable-km) | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| China | 452,9 | 401,9 | 468,5 | 349,1 |
| Index | 100 | 89 | 103 | 77 |
| Source: | Cooperating exporting producers |

(611)

The average price of imports from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Table 3

Import prices (EUR/cable-km)

Import prices (EUR/cable-km)

2017

2018

2019

IP

China

452,9

401,9

468,5

349,1

Index

Index

100

100

89

89

103

103

77

77

Source:

Source:

Cooperating exporting producers

| (612) | Import prices from China decreased from 452 to 349 EUR/cable-km over the period considered, a fall of 23 %. This development should be seen in the light of the increased aggressiveness of Chinese exporting producers, which is connected to the excess capacity in that country (see recital (606)). This indicator should further be seen against the backdrop of significant price variations for a given length between different product types as well as large differences in the product mix from year to year. The variation in product stemmed both from the variability and therefore price in the types of cables sold, and also from the fact that not all types of products were tendered or sold each year. |
| --- | --- |

(612)

Import prices from China decreased from 452 to 349 EUR/cable-km over the period considered, a fall of 23 %. This development should be seen in the light of the increased aggressiveness of Chinese exporting producers, which is connected to the excess capacity in that country (see recital (606)). This indicator should further be seen against the backdrop of significant price variations for a given length between different product types as well as large differences in the product mix from year to year. The variation in product stemmed both from the variability and therefore price in the types of cables sold, and also from the fact that not all types of products were tendered or sold each year.

| (613) | To avoid the variations in product mix inherent to the price series over the period considered, and to obtain more accurate and representative data, the Commission also analysed the comprehensive information from sampled Chinese exporters and Union producers based on more aggregated groups of directly comparable products. This led to the identification of 35 identical (matching) groups which are sold by both Chinese exporters and the Union industry, and for which there were sales in each of the years examined. In other words, the Commission obtained a complete time series with price per product type for each year in the period under consideration. These prices can be seen as representative of overall Chinese exports over the period, covering 62 % of exports of the sampled companies during the IP. The resulting representative time series developed as follows, on a weighted aggregated basis:

  Table 3-bis


  Chinese imports (EUR/cable-km) | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average price | 854 | 720 | 593 | 320 |
| Index | 100 | 84 | 69 | 38 |
| Representativeness (%) | 94 | 35 | 59 | 62 |

(613)

To avoid the variations in product mix inherent to the price series over the period considered, and to obtain more accurate and representative data, the Commission also analysed the comprehensive information from sampled Chinese exporters and Union producers based on more aggregated groups of directly comparable products. This led to the identification of 35 identical (matching) groups which are sold by both Chinese exporters and the Union industry, and for which there were sales in each of the years examined. In other words, the Commission obtained a complete time series with price per product type for each year in the period under consideration. These prices can be seen as representative of overall Chinese exports over the period, covering 62 % of exports of the sampled companies during the IP. The resulting representative time series developed as follows, on a weighted aggregated basis:

Table 3-bis

Table 3-bis

Chinese imports (EUR/cable-km)

Chinese imports (EUR/cable-km)

2017

2018

2019

IP

Average price

854

720

593

320

Index

Index

100

100

84

84

69

69

38

38

Representativeness (%)

94

35

59

62

| (614) | This shows a significant, continuous price drop by Chinese exports. In other words, when sales of the same product types are compared on a year by year basis, there is a clear and discernible price drop of Chinese import prices in each year, which were well below the prices of the Union producers during the period 2018-IP (Table 7-bis). |
| --- | --- |

(614)

This shows a significant, continuous price drop by Chinese exports. In other words, when sales of the same product types are compared on a year by year basis, there is a clear and discernible price drop of Chinese import prices in each year, which were well below the prices of the Union producers during the period 2018-IP (Table 7-bis).

| (615) | Against this backdrop, the Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:






  — | the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers in the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(615)

Against this backdrop, the Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:

—

the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers in the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and

| — | the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled Chinese producers to the first independent customer in the Union market, established on a Cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for post-importation costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled Chinese producers to the first independent customer in the Union market, established on a Cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for post-importation costs.

| (616) | The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin for the two sampled exporting producers were 30,0 % and 33,2 %, giving an overall undercutting margin of 31,5 %. As described in recital (673) , the analysis of tenders confirms the existence of price undercutting at the level of tenders. |
| --- | --- |

(616)

The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin for the two sampled exporting producers were 30,0 % and 33,2 %, giving an overall undercutting margin of 31,5 %. As described in recital (673) , the analysis of tenders confirms the existence of price undercutting at the level of tenders.

| (617) | This is in line with the prices identified in recitals (613) and (614). |
| --- | --- |

(617)

This is in line with the prices identified in recitals (613) and (614).

| (618) | In its comments on final disclosure, the ZTT Group also argued that the Commission gave no explanation on the aggregated PCN groups which were therefore arbitrary. CCCME claimed that the use of these groups implied there was a problem of matching and comparability of Union industry and Chinese prices. CCCME referred to the Panel report in China – X-Ray Equipment (142) which held that an investigation authority was under an obligation to ensure that the products that it was comparing in its price undercutting and suppression analysis were actually comparable and argued that the Commission failed to ensure such price comparability. |
| --- | --- |

(618)

In its comments on final disclosure, the ZTT Group also argued that the Commission gave no explanation on the aggregated PCN groups which were therefore arbitrary. CCCME claimed that the use of these groups implied there was a problem of matching and comparability of Union industry and Chinese prices. CCCME referred to the Panel report in China – X-Ray Equipment (142) which held that an investigation authority was under an obligation to ensure that the products that it was comparing in its price undercutting and suppression analysis were actually comparable and argued that the Commission failed to ensure such price comparability.

142

| (619) | The Commission disagreed with this claim for two reasons. First, these groups were not used for the purpose of undercutting and underselling calculations. Second, they were used to make a price comparison on a type-by-type basis set out in recital (613) precisely to ensure that price trends over time were not polluted by significant changes in product mix over the period, thus enhancing the accuracy of comparability over time, based on groups which as explained above were representative of the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(619)

The Commission disagreed with this claim for two reasons. First, these groups were not used for the purpose of undercutting and underselling calculations. Second, they were used to make a price comparison on a type-by-type basis set out in recital (613) precisely to ensure that price trends over time were not polluted by significant changes in product mix over the period, thus enhancing the accuracy of comparability over time, based on groups which as explained above were representative of the product concerned.

| (620) | The Commission noted that when assessing undercutting and underselling margins, the models exported to the Union from the country concerned constituted the reference for comparison. It lies in the nature of comparing export sales of exporting producers with sales of the Union industry that not all models exported were sold by the Union industry. In the current case, the matching rate was around 70 % for the sampled Chinese exporting producers, which the Commission considered amply sufficient to ensure a broad and fair comparison of the exported models and those sold by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(620)

The Commission noted that when assessing undercutting and underselling margins, the models exported to the Union from the country concerned constituted the reference for comparison. It lies in the nature of comparing export sales of exporting producers with sales of the Union industry that not all models exported were sold by the Union industry. In the current case, the matching rate was around 70 % for the sampled Chinese exporting producers, which the Commission considered amply sufficient to ensure a broad and fair comparison of the exported models and those sold by the Union industry.

4.8.   Economic situation of the Union industry

Economic situation of the Union industry

4.8.1.   General remarks

General remarks

| (621) | In accordance with Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the subsidised imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(621)

In accordance with Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the subsidised imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

| (622) | The Commission have received several comments from parties concerning injury. The GOC claimed that imports from China did not cause injury or threat of injury, because the indicators showed that the situation of the Union industry was good and that the Union industry still occupied a dominant position with its market share. Connect Com noted that the decrease in market share of the Union industry was very limited and happened in the context of a possibly oligopolistic market. |
| --- | --- |

(622)

The Commission have received several comments from parties concerning injury. The GOC claimed that imports from China did not cause injury or threat of injury, because the indicators showed that the situation of the Union industry was good and that the Union industry still occupied a dominant position with its market share. Connect Com noted that the decrease in market share of the Union industry was very limited and happened in the context of a possibly oligopolistic market.

| (623) | Connect Com submitted that injury, even if it existed, was insignificant if profits were made up to a minimum profit margin of 5 % and it recalled in this regard Commission Decision of 23 December 1988 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain cellular mobile radiotelephones originating in Canada, Hong Kong and Japan (143), and the judgment of 17 December 1997, EFMA v Council (144). However, it should be recalled that the Decision on radiotelephones considered the profit margin in the light of other improving indicators and that the mentioned Court case concerned a claim which the General Court rejected that the target profit established by the Commission during the investigation should have been higher. Therefore, these precedents do not support the view that injury would be insignificant when profit margins are above 5 %. Injury is established on a holistic assessment of all the factors mentioned in Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation, analysed in the context of the specific market and industry concerned. Furthermore, the profit achieved by the industry was below the target profit established taking into consideration all the elements relating to the industry concerned, as required under Article 12(1a) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(623)

Connect Com submitted that injury, even if it existed, was insignificant if profits were made up to a minimum profit margin of 5 % and it recalled in this regard Commission Decision of 23 December 1988 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain cellular mobile radiotelephones originating in Canada, Hong Kong and Japan (143), and the judgment of 17 December 1997, EFMA v Council (144). However, it should be recalled that the Decision on radiotelephones considered the profit margin in the light of other improving indicators and that the mentioned Court case concerned a claim which the General Court rejected that the target profit established by the Commission during the investigation should have been higher. Therefore, these precedents do not support the view that injury would be insignificant when profit margins are above 5 %. Injury is established on a holistic assessment of all the factors mentioned in Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation, analysed in the context of the specific market and industry concerned. Furthermore, the profit achieved by the industry was below the target profit established taking into consideration all the elements relating to the industry concerned, as required under Article 12(1a) of the basic Regulation.

143

EFMA v Council

144

| (624) | For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the response to the questionnaire submitted by the complainant covering data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. |
| --- | --- |

(624)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the response to the questionnaire submitted by the complainant covering data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers.

| (625) | The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the subsidy margin, and recovery from past subsidisation. |
| --- | --- |

(625)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the subsidy margin, and recovery from past subsidisation.

| (626) | The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital. |
| --- | --- |

(626)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

4.8.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

Macroeconomic indicators

4.8.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

| (627) | The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 4


  Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Production volume (cable-km) | 1 062 482 | 1 195 017 | 1 250 881 | 1 229 252 |
| Index | 100 | 112 | 118 | 116 |
| Production capacity (cable-km) | 1 585 738 | 1 748 667 | 2 019 526 | 2 084 082 |
| Index | 100 | 110 | 127 | 131 |
| Capacity utilisation (%) | 67 | 68 | 62 | 59 |
| Index | 100 | 102 | 92 | 88 |

(627)

The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 4

Table 4

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

2017

2018

2019

IP

Production volume (cable-km)

1 062 482

1 195 017

1 250 881

1 229 252

Index

Index

100

100

112

112

118

118

116

116

Production capacity (cable-km)

1 585 738

1 748 667

2 019 526

2 084 082

Index

Index

100

100

110

110

127

127

131

131

Capacity utilisation (%)

67

68

62

59

Index

Index

100

100

102

102

92

92

88

88

| (628) | Throughout the period considered, the production volume of the Union industry increased by 16 %. A detailed analysis shows that from 2017 to 2019 Union production increased by 18 %, while in the investigation period Union production fell slightly by 2 percentage points. |
| --- | --- |

(628)

Throughout the period considered, the production volume of the Union industry increased by 16 %. A detailed analysis shows that from 2017 to 2019 Union production increased by 18 %, while in the investigation period Union production fell slightly by 2 percentage points.

| (629) | The overall increase over the period considered was due to the growth in demand described in Table 1. However, the Union industry only managed to increase their production by 16 % during the period considered, in a market growing by 38 %. The Union industry was therefore unable to fully benefit from the market growth. |
| --- | --- |

(629)

The overall increase over the period considered was due to the growth in demand described in Table 1. However, the Union industry only managed to increase their production by 16 % during the period considered, in a market growing by 38 %. The Union industry was therefore unable to fully benefit from the market growth.

| (630) | During the period considered, Union production capacity increased by 31 %. This reflects the investments made by some Union producers’ to follow market growth. This attempt was frustrated by the increased penetration of Chinese products, which, relying on unfair pricing strategies, increasingly absorbed market shares from the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(630)

During the period considered, Union production capacity increased by 31 %. This reflects the investments made by some Union producers’ to follow market growth. This attempt was frustrated by the increased penetration of Chinese products, which, relying on unfair pricing strategies, increasingly absorbed market shares from the Union industry.

| (631) | As a result, capacity utilization fell by 12 %, reaching a level below 60 % in the IP: Union producers were prevented from increasing production in line with market growth. |
| --- | --- |

(631)

As a result, capacity utilization fell by 12 %, reaching a level below 60 % in the IP: Union producers were prevented from increasing production in line with market growth.

4.8.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

| (632) | The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 5


  Sales volume and market share | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sales volume on the Union market (cable-km) | 882 772 | 945 842 | 1 009 439 | 995 703 |
| Index | 100 | 107 | 114 | 113 |
| Captive market | 61 505 | 59 802 | 62 710 | 54 205 |
| Index | 100 | 97 | 102 | 88 |
| Captive market as a % of Union sales | 7,0 | 6,3 | 6,2 | 5,4 |
| Index | 100 | 91 | 89 | 78 |
| Free market sales | 821 268 | 886 040 | 946 729 | 941 498 |
| Index | 100 | 108 | 115 | 115 |
| Market share of free market sales (%) | 64,3 | 57,6 | 57,2 | 53,5 |
| Index | 100 | 90 | 89 | 83 |
| Source: | Union industry |

(632)

The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Table 5

Sales volume and market share

Sales volume and market share

2017

2018

2019

IP

Sales volume on the Union market (cable-km)

882 772

945 842

1 009 439

995 703

Index

Index

100

100

107

107

114

114

113

113

Captive market

61 505

59 802

62 710

54 205

Index

Index

100

100

97

97

102

102

88

88

Captive market as a % of Union sales

7,0

6,3

6,2

5,4

Index

Index

100

100

91

91

89

89

78

78

Free market sales

821 268

886 040

946 729

941 498

Index

Index

100

100

108

108

115

115

115

115

Market share of free market sales (%)

64,3

57,6

57,2

53,5

Index

Index

100

100

90

90

89

89

83

83

Source:

Source:

Union industry

| (633) | Throughout the period considered, the total Union sales volume of the Union industry increased by 13 %. Yet, because of the increase in consumption, the market share in the free market decreased during the period considered from 64,3 % to 53,5 %, a drop of more than 10 percentage points (-17 %). |
| --- | --- |

(633)

Throughout the period considered, the total Union sales volume of the Union industry increased by 13 %. Yet, because of the increase in consumption, the market share in the free market decreased during the period considered from 64,3 % to 53,5 %, a drop of more than 10 percentage points (-17 %).

| (634) | Union sales volume on the free market also increased by 15 % over the period considered. Union sales followed the trend of Union production very closely because the industry largely operates a production to order system. |
| --- | --- |

(634)

Union sales volume on the free market also increased by 15 % over the period considered. Union sales followed the trend of Union production very closely because the industry largely operates a production to order system.

| (635) | The Union’s industry captive market (expressed as a percentage over total sales in the Union) was at very low levels throughout the period considered, with a decreasing trend which saw the percentage decrease from 7 % in 2017 to 5,4 % in the IP. This had a marginal impact due to the limited size of this market. |
| --- | --- |

(635)

The Union’s industry captive market (expressed as a percentage over total sales in the Union) was at very low levels throughout the period considered, with a decreasing trend which saw the percentage decrease from 7 % in 2017 to 5,4 % in the IP. This had a marginal impact due to the limited size of this market.

4.8.2.3.   Growth

| (636) | It results from the fall in market share of Union sales volumes that the Union industry was not able to benefit from the growth on the Union market over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(636)

It results from the fall in market share of Union sales volumes that the Union industry was not able to benefit from the growth on the Union market over the period considered.

4.8.2.4.   Employment and productivity

| (637) | Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 6


  Employment and productivity | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of employees (FTE (145)) | 4 088 | 4 589 | 4 815 | 4 659 |
| Index | 100 | 112 | 118 | 114 |
| Productivity (cable-km/FTE) | 260 | 260 | 260 | 264 |
| Index | 100 | 100 | 100 | 102 |
| Source: | Union industry |

(637)

Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Table 6

Employment and productivity

Employment and productivity

2017

2018

2019

IP

Number of employees (FTE (145))

145

4 088

4 589

4 815

4 659

Index

Index

100

100

112

112

118

118

114

114

Productivity (cable-km/FTE)

260

260

260

264

Index

Index

100

100

100

100

100

100

102

102

Source:

Source:

Union industry

| (638) | The Union industry employment rose by 18 % from 2017 to 2019 on an FTE basis. This rise was followed by a fall of 4 percentage points in the investigation period. This development largely follows the trend in production volume shown in Table 3. |
| --- | --- |

(638)

The Union industry employment rose by 18 % from 2017 to 2019 on an FTE basis. This rise was followed by a fall of 4 percentage points in the investigation period. This development largely follows the trend in production volume shown in Table 3.

| (639) | As the figures for production and employment mirrored each other closely, productivity in terms of cable-km per employee remained largely stable. |
| --- | --- |

(639)

As the figures for production and employment mirrored each other closely, productivity in terms of cable-km per employee remained largely stable.

4.8.2.5.   Magnitude of the subsidy margin and recovery from past subsidisation

| (640) | All subsidy margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of subsidy on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(640)

All subsidy margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of subsidy on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.

de minimis

| (641) | This is the first anti-subsidy investigation regarding the product concerned. Therefore, no data were available to assess the effects of possible past subsidisation. |
| --- | --- |

(641)

This is the first anti-subsidy investigation regarding the product concerned. Therefore, no data were available to assess the effects of possible past subsidisation.

4.8.3.   Microeconomic indicators

Microeconomic indicators

4.8.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

| (642) | The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 7


  Sales prices in the Union | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average unit sales price in the Union (EUR/ cable-km) | 816 | 861 | 944 | 821 |
| Index | 100 | 105 | 116 | 101 |
| Unit cost of production (EUR/ cable-km) | 756 | 785 | 860 | 758 |
| Index | 100 | 104 | 114 | 100 |
| Source: | Sampled Union producers |

(642)

The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Table 7

Sales prices in the Union

Sales prices in the Union

2017

2018

2019

IP

Average unit sales price in the Union (EUR/ cable-km)

816

861

944

821

Index

Index

100

100

105

105

116

116

101

101

Unit cost of production (EUR/ cable-km)

756

785

860

758

Index

Index

100

100

104

104

114

114

100

100

Source:

Source:

Sampled Union producers

| (643) | Sales prices on the Union market to unrelated parties (the free market) increased in the period 2017-2019 by 16 %, and then in the IP decreased, reaching a similar level as the one recorded in 2017 (+1 %). However, the level of prices is largely dependent on the complexity of the products sold, given that the price can vary greatly based on the characteristic of the cable (including the number of fibres, the number and type of coating, etc.). |
| --- | --- |

(643)

Sales prices on the Union market to unrelated parties (the free market) increased in the period 2017-2019 by 16 %, and then in the IP decreased, reaching a similar level as the one recorded in 2017 (+1 %). However, the level of prices is largely dependent on the complexity of the products sold, given that the price can vary greatly based on the characteristic of the cable (including the number of fibres, the number and type of coating, etc.).

| (644) | This is evident when comparing the evolution of the prices with the evolution of the cost of production, given that more complex cables, which can be sold at higher prices, also entail higher cost of production. |
| --- | --- |

(644)

This is evident when comparing the evolution of the prices with the evolution of the cost of production, given that more complex cables, which can be sold at higher prices, also entail higher cost of production.

| (645) | The unit cost of production increased in the period 2017-2019 by 14 %, roughly in line with average prices in the free Union market (16 %). Subsequently, it dropped by 14 %, also, in line with the drop of prices in the same period 2019-IP (15 %). |
| --- | --- |

(645)

The unit cost of production increased in the period 2017-2019 by 14 %, roughly in line with average prices in the free Union market (16 %). Subsequently, it dropped by 14 %, also, in line with the drop of prices in the same period 2019-IP (15 %).

| (646) | As mentioned in recital (613), to avoid the variations in product mix inherent to the price series over the period considered, the Commission analysed the comprehensive information from sampled Chinese exporters and Union producers based on more aggregated groups of directly comparable products. This led to the identification of 35 identical (matching) groups which are sold by both Chinese exporters and the Union industry, and for which there is a complete time series over each year in the period under consideration. |
| --- | --- |

(646)

As mentioned in recital (613), to avoid the variations in product mix inherent to the price series over the period considered, the Commission analysed the comprehensive information from sampled Chinese exporters and Union producers based on more aggregated groups of directly comparable products. This led to the identification of 35 identical (matching) groups which are sold by both Chinese exporters and the Union industry, and for which there is a complete time series over each year in the period under consideration.

| (647) | These are representative of EU industry sales over the period, with more than 34 % of sales of such matching products in the investigation period. The resulting representative time series is as follows:

  Table 7-bis


  Union industry (EUR/cable-km) | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average price | 817 | 780 | 792 | 719 |
| Index | 100 | 95 | 97 | 88 |
| Representativeness (%) | 42 | 38 | 35 | 34 |

(647)

These are representative of EU industry sales over the period, with more than 34 % of sales of such matching products in the investigation period. The resulting representative time series is as follows:

Table 7-bis

Table 7-bis

Union industry (EUR/cable-km)

Union industry (EUR/cable-km)

2017

2018

2019

IP

Average price

817

780

792

719

Index

Index

100

100

95

95

97

97

88

88

Representativeness (%)

42

38

35

34

| (648) | This shows a significant drop of Union industry prices, similar to the price drop observed for Chinese exports mentioned in recital (613). |
| --- | --- |

(648)

This shows a significant drop of Union industry prices, similar to the price drop observed for Chinese exports mentioned in recital (613).

| (649) | Moreover, given that customers often ask for made-to-measure OFC types tailored to their specific needs, and that certain Member States also define specific technical requirements, comparing prices over time for the same customer and Member State generates an even more precise picture of price developments. The Union industry provided additional detailed information in this regard. The price trends for the most important twenty such product group-customer-Member State combinations developed as follows (146):

  Table 7-ter


  Union industry (EUR/cable-km, index)









  2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 100 | 73 | 56 | 59 |

(649)

Moreover, given that customers often ask for made-to-measure OFC types tailored to their specific needs, and that certain Member States also define specific technical requirements, comparing prices over time for the same customer and Member State generates an even more precise picture of price developments. The Union industry provided additional detailed information in this regard. The price trends for the most important twenty such product group-customer-Member State combinations developed as follows (146):

146

Table 7-ter

Table 7-ter

Union industry (EUR/cable-km, index)

Union industry (EUR/cable-km, index)

2017

2018

2019

IP

100

100

73

73

56

56

59

59

| (650) | This shows again a clear drop in Union industry prices over the period, following the price drops by Chinese exports mentioned in recitals (610) to (614). |
| --- | --- |

(650)

This shows again a clear drop in Union industry prices over the period, following the price drops by Chinese exports mentioned in recitals (610) to (614).

4.8.3.2.   Labour costs

| (651) | The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 8


  Average labour costs per employee | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average labour costs per employee (EUR/FTE) | 39 511 | 35 826 | 39 157 | 38 966 |
| Index | 100 | 91 | 99 | 99 |
| Source: | Sampled Union producers |

(651)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Table 8

Average labour costs per employee

Average labour costs per employee

2017

2018

2019

IP

Average labour costs per employee (EUR/FTE)

39 511

35 826

39 157

38 966

Index

Index

100

100

91

91

99

99

99

99

Source:

Source:

Sampled Union producers

| (652) | The average labour cost per employee remained relatively stable in the period 2017-IP. The slight decrease in the year 2018 corresponds with the increase of 13 % in the number of FTE, and reflects the cost of this additional workforce. |
| --- | --- |

(652)

The average labour cost per employee remained relatively stable in the period 2017-IP. The slight decrease in the year 2018 corresponds with the increase of 13 % in the number of FTE, and reflects the cost of this additional workforce.

4.8.3.3.   Inventories

| (653) | Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 9


  Inventories | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Closing stocks (cable-km) | 134 925 | 161 561 | 161 878 | 171 058 |
| Index | 100 | 120 | 120 | 127 |
| Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%) | 12,7 | 13,5 | 12,9 | 13,9 |
| Index | 100 | 106 | 102 | 110 |
| Source: | Sampled Union producers |

(653)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Table 9

Inventories

Inventories

2017

2018

2019

IP

Closing stocks (cable-km)

134 925

161 561

161 878

171 058

Index

Index

100

100

120

120

120

120

127

127

Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%)

12,7

13,5

12,9

13,9

Index

Index

100

100

106

106

102

102

110

110

Source:

Source:

Sampled Union producers

| (654) | The stocks of the sampled Union producers increased by 27 % over the period considered. While, the increase in stocks signifies a slower turnover of the sale of certain recurring items and could be linked to the increasing difficulty of the Union industry in selling its products because of very aggressive price competition from Chinese exporting producers, the increase in the period 2019-IP can also be connected to a seasonal effect. In any case, given that the majority of the production takes place based on orders and customers specifications, inventories do not constitute a main indicator of injury. |
| --- | --- |

(654)

The stocks of the sampled Union producers increased by 27 % over the period considered. While, the increase in stocks signifies a slower turnover of the sale of certain recurring items and could be linked to the increasing difficulty of the Union industry in selling its products because of very aggressive price competition from Chinese exporting producers, the increase in the period 2019-IP can also be connected to a seasonal effect. In any case, given that the majority of the production takes place based on orders and customers specifications, inventories do not constitute a main indicator of injury.

4.8.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

| (655) | Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 10


  Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) | 8,1 | 8,4 | 8,5 | 7,9 |
| Index | 100 | 104 | 104 | 97 |
| Cash flow (EUR) | 33 254 746 | 48 644 480 | 41 707 715 | 39 805 852 |
| Index | 100 | 146 | 125 | 120 |
| Investments (EUR) | 60 405 839 | 67 794 023 | 82 761 718 | 59 886 812 |
| Index | 100 | 112 | 137 | 99 |
| Return on investments (%) | 34 | 36 | 24 | 20 |
| Index | 100 | 105 | 70 | 58 |
| Source: | Sampled Union producers |

(655)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Table 10

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2017

2018

2019

IP

Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)

8,1

8,4

8,5

7,9

Index

Index

100

100

104

104

104

104

97

97

Cash flow (EUR)

33 254 746

48 644 480

41 707 715

39 805 852

Index

Index

100

100

146

146

125

125

120

120

Investments (EUR)

60 405 839

67 794 023

82 761 718

59 886 812

Index

Index

100

100

112

112

137

137

99

99

Return on investments (%)

34

36

24

20

Index

Index

100

100

105

105

70

70

58

58

Source:

Source:

Sampled Union producers

| (656) | The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. |
| --- | --- |

(656)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

| (657) | The profitability of the sampled producers was positive but abnormally low throughout the period considered and declined from 8,1 % in 2017 to 7,9 % in the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(657)

The profitability of the sampled producers was positive but abnormally low throughout the period considered and declined from 8,1 % in 2017 to 7,9 % in the investigation period.

| (658) | In its comments on final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that, through a reverse engineering analysis, the Union industry made very high profits by excessively pricing in the Union market which casted serious doubt about the injurious status of the Union industry and that the price undercutting was due to unreasonable pricing of the Union industry and not to the low-priced imports from China. |
| --- | --- |

(658)

In its comments on final disclosure, the ZTT Group claimed that, through a reverse engineering analysis, the Union industry made very high profits by excessively pricing in the Union market which casted serious doubt about the injurious status of the Union industry and that the price undercutting was due to unreasonable pricing of the Union industry and not to the low-priced imports from China.

| (659) | The Commission disagreed with this claim. The reverse engineering analysis presented by the ZTT Group was partial and not based on a full assessment of costs and prices. The Commission verified the profit margins on the basis of comprehensive information and this analysis showed them to be as just described in recitals (655) to (657). Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(659)

The Commission disagreed with this claim. The reverse engineering analysis presented by the ZTT Group was partial and not based on a full assessment of costs and prices. The Commission verified the profit margins on the basis of comprehensive information and this analysis showed them to be as just described in recitals (655) to (657). Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (660) | The complainants claimed that the need for investments and research in the sector would require a profit margin of 15 %. The investigation showed that level of already planned investments that would have taken place under normal circumstances to keep up with market developments would need to be sustained by profits of 13,4 % on average on the basis of the period considered. These investments covered the following issues: retooling and maintenance costs to ensure efficiency of existing capacity, adapting capacity to changing product mix; expansion of capacity; research and development expenses (product and process innovation). |
| --- | --- |

(660)

The complainants claimed that the need for investments and research in the sector would require a profit margin of 15 %. The investigation showed that level of already planned investments that would have taken place under normal circumstances to keep up with market developments would need to be sustained by profits of 13,4 % on average on the basis of the period considered. These investments covered the following issues: retooling and maintenance costs to ensure efficiency of existing capacity, adapting capacity to changing product mix; expansion of capacity; research and development expenses (product and process innovation).

| (661) | The Commission found that the aforementioned order of magnitude is in line with historical profits in the absence of Chinese subsidised imports, which as underlined in the analysis made in Table 10-bis is in the range of 12 %. |
| --- | --- |

(661)

The Commission found that the aforementioned order of magnitude is in line with historical profits in the absence of Chinese subsidised imports, which as underlined in the analysis made in Table 10-bis is in the range of 12 %.

bis

| (662) | This underscores that the profit level in the range of 8 % over the period considered is insufficient to sustain activity in an expanding high-tech market and are thus an expression of injury to the Union industry.

  Table 10-bis


  Union industry pre-2017 profitability | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Profit margin (in %) | 10,4 | 12,6 | 12,4 |

(662)

This underscores that the profit level in the range of 8 % over the period considered is insufficient to sustain activity in an expanding high-tech market and are thus an expression of injury to the Union industry.

Table 10-bis

Table 10-bis

Union industry pre-2017 profitability

Union industry pre-2017 profitability

2014

2015

2016

Profit margin (in %)

10,4

12,6

12,4

| (663) | However, this was not observed in the present case. Indeed profitability dropped as compared to 2014-2016. The lower level of profits throughout the period considered reflects significant price injury throughout the period considered. Because of the downward pressure caused by imports from China (both in terms of increased volumes and of low prices), the Union industry was unable to raise prices, to minimise costs and as a result reach the normal profit levels achieved before the brunt of the expansion let alone any increase. |
| --- | --- |

(663)

However, this was not observed in the present case. Indeed profitability dropped as compared to 2014-2016. The lower level of profits throughout the period considered reflects significant price injury throughout the period considered. Because of the downward pressure caused by imports from China (both in terms of increased volumes and of low prices), the Union industry was unable to raise prices, to minimise costs and as a result reach the normal profit levels achieved before the brunt of the expansion let alone any increase.

| (664) | After an increase in 2018, the cash flow decreased towards the second half of the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(664)

After an increase in 2018, the cash flow decreased towards the second half of the period considered.

| (665) | As a direct result of the pressure from imported goods, Union industry had to postpone investments, including some which were already planned and approved. These investments, which were aimed at expanding existing Union production capacity, were put to a halt (even when the execution had already started) in the course of the period considered as a direct effect to the changed market circumstances caused by the aggressive pricing of Chinese imports. This led the investments to fall sharply towards the end of the period considered, in contrast to the previous years’ trend and overall growth of the market. |
| --- | --- |

(665)

As a direct result of the pressure from imported goods, Union industry had to postpone investments, including some which were already planned and approved. These investments, which were aimed at expanding existing Union production capacity, were put to a halt (even when the execution had already started) in the course of the period considered as a direct effect to the changed market circumstances caused by the aggressive pricing of Chinese imports. This led the investments to fall sharply towards the end of the period considered, in contrast to the previous years’ trend and overall growth of the market.

| (666) | The return on investments undertaken developed negatively over the period considered and in fact fell by 42 %. This negative development shows that, although investments continued to be made, in order to maintain and improve efficiency and competitiveness, the returns on those investments have fallen substantially over the period considered due to the impossibility for the Union industry to improve the profitability rate. |
| --- | --- |

(666)

The return on investments undertaken developed negatively over the period considered and in fact fell by 42 %. This negative development shows that, although investments continued to be made, in order to maintain and improve efficiency and competitiveness, the returns on those investments have fallen substantially over the period considered due to the impossibility for the Union industry to improve the profitability rate.

| (667) | With returns on investments falling so quickly, the sampled producing entities ability to raise capital in the future is clearly in jeopardy should the situation fail to improve. |
| --- | --- |

(667)

With returns on investments falling so quickly, the sampled producing entities ability to raise capital in the future is clearly in jeopardy should the situation fail to improve.

4.9.   Analysis of sales based on tenders

Analysis of sales based on tenders

| (668) | A vast majority of OFC is sold through tender procedures. In order to obtain the necessary insight into this important aspect of the market and to complement the rest of its injury analysis, the Commission requested detailed information on tenders from the sampled Chinese exporting producers, sampled Union producers, importers and users. Questions were asked on the nature, process, timing, and other relevant characteristics, covering both concluded and ongoing tenders. From the tendering entities’ side the Commission had very little cooperation. No public tendering entity participated in the investigation and among the large telecom operators only Deutsche Telekom provided detailed information on tenders. |
| --- | --- |

(668)

A vast majority of OFC is sold through tender procedures. In order to obtain the necessary insight into this important aspect of the market and to complement the rest of its injury analysis, the Commission requested detailed information on tenders from the sampled Chinese exporting producers, sampled Union producers, importers and users. Questions were asked on the nature, process, timing, and other relevant characteristics, covering both concluded and ongoing tenders. From the tendering entities’ side the Commission had very little cooperation. No public tendering entity participated in the investigation and among the large telecom operators only Deutsche Telekom provided detailed information on tenders.

| (669) | After the non-imposition of provisional measures, the Commission requested from the sampled Union producers additional, detailed information on all tenders in which they participated during the period considered including information on bids, prices and competitors where available. |
| --- | --- |

(669)

After the non-imposition of provisional measures, the Commission requested from the sampled Union producers additional, detailed information on all tenders in which they participated during the period considered including information on bids, prices and competitors where available.

| (670) | The information submitted showed a highly heterogeneous and fragmented picture with a very large number of tenders organised every year in different Member States, a wide variety of tendering entities and bidders and different durations and terms. On the tendering entity’s side, tenders can be either public, organised by municipalities or other public entities, or private, organised by large telecom or network operators. There are also many other smaller types of bids, quotations, e-auctions and smaller amounts can also be sourced through direct customer contact. Each tender process is highly specific to the tendering entity, which may use a variety of processes depending on the specific tender at hand and market developments. There is also a wide variety of players bidding in the tenders. Chinese exporting producers participate directly (also through their subsidiaries) and indirectly by partnering with local companies in the different Member States. Importers, traders and distributors also compete with Union producers. There are also sometimes installers involved and sales by the winning suppliers to the telecom operators are made through these installers. |
| --- | --- |

(670)

The information submitted showed a highly heterogeneous and fragmented picture with a very large number of tenders organised every year in different Member States, a wide variety of tendering entities and bidders and different durations and terms. On the tendering entity’s side, tenders can be either public, organised by municipalities or other public entities, or private, organised by large telecom or network operators. There are also many other smaller types of bids, quotations, e-auctions and smaller amounts can also be sourced through direct customer contact. Each tender process is highly specific to the tendering entity, which may use a variety of processes depending on the specific tender at hand and market developments. There is also a wide variety of players bidding in the tenders. Chinese exporting producers participate directly (also through their subsidiaries) and indirectly by partnering with local companies in the different Member States. Importers, traders and distributors also compete with Union producers. There are also sometimes installers involved and sales by the winning suppliers to the telecom operators are made through these installers.

| (671) | The investigation has also shown that the number of tenders organised in the Union is very high. The three sampled Union producers reported a total of more than 500 tenders in which they participated directly during the investigation period. One of the cooperating unrelated importers participates in 150-200 tenders per year focusing on the German market alone. |
| --- | --- |

(671)

The investigation has also shown that the number of tenders organised in the Union is very high. The three sampled Union producers reported a total of more than 500 tenders in which they participated directly during the investigation period. One of the cooperating unrelated importers participates in 150-200 tenders per year focusing on the German market alone.

| (672) | The duration of the tenders is highly variable, from immediate delivery to three years. In longer tenders, while prices are agreed, volumes are not fixed and therefore tendering entities can issue further tenders that replace existing ones when prices drop. Thus, while tenders provide a kind of general ‘ceiling’ to price conditions, prices can and do change dynamically throughout the lifetime of the tender. As a result, they tend to adjust and to largely reflect the current market conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(672)

The duration of the tenders is highly variable, from immediate delivery to three years. In longer tenders, while prices are agreed, volumes are not fixed and therefore tendering entities can issue further tenders that replace existing ones when prices drop. Thus, while tenders provide a kind of general ‘ceiling’ to price conditions, prices can and do change dynamically throughout the lifetime of the tender. As a result, they tend to adjust and to largely reflect the current market conditions.

| (673) | The Commission has analysed the detailed information on tenders reported by the sampled Union producers in response to its request. Of the reported tenders in which the Union producers presented a bid during the period considered, the Commission analysed those for which there was concrete evidence of Chinese participation. There were 55 such tenders during the period considered. The analysed tenders amount to 45 % of sampled Union producer sales, and for 14 % of total EU consumption during the investigation period. For these tenders, a granular analysis of price and volume injury per tender has been made, showing significant losses of sales (between 25 % and 100 %), and/or price depression (between 5 % and 55 %), and/or price undercutting (between 8 % and 39 %). This tender-specific analysis further confirmed the price depression and undercutting already established above throughout the period. |
| --- | --- |

(673)

The Commission has analysed the detailed information on tenders reported by the sampled Union producers in response to its request. Of the reported tenders in which the Union producers presented a bid during the period considered, the Commission analysed those for which there was concrete evidence of Chinese participation. There were 55 such tenders during the period considered. The analysed tenders amount to 45 % of sampled Union producer sales, and for 14 % of total EU consumption during the investigation period. For these tenders, a granular analysis of price and volume injury per tender has been made, showing significant losses of sales (between 25 % and 100 %), and/or price depression (between 5 % and 55 %), and/or price undercutting (between 8 % and 39 %). This tender-specific analysis further confirmed the price depression and undercutting already established above throughout the period.

| (674) | Connect Com submitted comments in relation to tender procedures and pointed out that Union producers represented by the complainant did not lose a large number of tenders in general, but only one or a few large private tenders. It underlined that the complainant referred to a single invitation to a private tender and the pricing behaviour of a single Chinese producer as evidence of the price undercutting. Connect Com submitted a notice of the contracts awarded in a German district, where prices of the winning bidder were explicitly stated. It submitted that the complainant had omitted the entire market segment of public tenders from its presentation. According to Connect Com, the Union producers represented by the complainant were not successful in these tenders because they did not meet the requested criteria (e.g. warehouses, stock, wide range of products, logistics concept). In particular, Connect Com underlined the low storage capacity of Prysmian and Corning. Connect Com claimed that rejecting the existence of a market segment of public tenders would be wrong, because the prices on the public and the private tender markets correspond to a large extent or are mutually interdependent. According to Connect Com, it would not be right to impose duties in an entire market which is segmented in public and private tenders. Reference was made to recital 42 of Commission Decision 98/230/EC (147). On the basis of that decision, Connect Com argued that in the case of segmented markets, there is no overall injury to the Union industry if, although there is a certain decline in sales in one market segment (here private tenders), the Union industry has sales opportunities in another market segment (here public tenders) which compensate for the decline in sales volume. |
| --- | --- |

(674)

Connect Com submitted comments in relation to tender procedures and pointed out that Union producers represented by the complainant did not lose a large number of tenders in general, but only one or a few large private tenders. It underlined that the complainant referred to a single invitation to a private tender and the pricing behaviour of a single Chinese producer as evidence of the price undercutting. Connect Com submitted a notice of the contracts awarded in a German district, where prices of the winning bidder were explicitly stated. It submitted that the complainant had omitted the entire market segment of public tenders from its presentation. According to Connect Com, the Union producers represented by the complainant were not successful in these tenders because they did not meet the requested criteria (e.g. warehouses, stock, wide range of products, logistics concept). In particular, Connect Com underlined the low storage capacity of Prysmian and Corning. Connect Com claimed that rejecting the existence of a market segment of public tenders would be wrong, because the prices on the public and the private tender markets correspond to a large extent or are mutually interdependent. According to Connect Com, it would not be right to impose duties in an entire market which is segmented in public and private tenders. Reference was made to recital 42 of Commission Decision 98/230/EC (147). On the basis of that decision, Connect Com argued that in the case of segmented markets, there is no overall injury to the Union industry if, although there is a certain decline in sales in one market segment (here private tenders), the Union industry has sales opportunities in another market segment (here public tenders) which compensate for the decline in sales volume.

147

| (675) | The arguments and analysis in recital (673) contradict those claims. Despite significant efforts from the Union industry to maintain price competitiveness, large shares of the markets were taken over by Chinese exporters, whose offers could not be matched by the Union industry in terms of prices. As concerns the 1998 Commission Decision concerning imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid, the Commission found in that case that the decrease in market share of the Union industry on the open market should be seen in the light of Union industry’s tendency to use an increasing proportion of its production of the product concerned to produce downstream products. The underlying factual situation concerning these two different market segments of the Union industry (open market and captive use) is different from the competitive situation in this case where the size of the captive market is slightly decreasing throughout the period considered and represents a very small part of the production of the product concerned. Therefore those claims were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(675)

The arguments and analysis in recital (673) contradict those claims. Despite significant efforts from the Union industry to maintain price competitiveness, large shares of the markets were taken over by Chinese exporters, whose offers could not be matched by the Union industry in terms of prices. As concerns the 1998 Commission Decision concerning imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid, the Commission found in that case that the decrease in market share of the Union industry on the open market should be seen in the light of Union industry’s tendency to use an increasing proportion of its production of the product concerned to produce downstream products. The underlying factual situation concerning these two different market segments of the Union industry (open market and captive use) is different from the competitive situation in this case where the size of the captive market is slightly decreasing throughout the period considered and represents a very small part of the production of the product concerned. Therefore those claims were rejected.

| (676) | In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that the Commission did not disclose how many of the tenders were won by a Chinese producer and for what reason, and reiterated its argument that price was never the only decisive criterion but rather quality and logistics. Also, Connect Com requested the disclosure of the results of the analysis in recital (673). |
| --- | --- |

(676)

In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that the Commission did not disclose how many of the tenders were won by a Chinese producer and for what reason, and reiterated its argument that price was never the only decisive criterion but rather quality and logistics. Also, Connect Com requested the disclosure of the results of the analysis in recital (673).

| (677) | In this respect, the Commission collected detailed information on tenders during the period considered. The Commission verified and analysed this information which is highly confidential and therefore cannot be disclosed to interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(677)

In this respect, the Commission collected detailed information on tenders during the period considered. The Commission verified and analysed this information which is highly confidential and therefore cannot be disclosed to interested parties.

| (678) | The analysis on tenders points to a process of accelerated replacement of Union industry products by Chinese products, which is confirmed by tenders at the end of the investigation period. This revealed price erosion and further significant losses of volumes for the Union industry which are in line and confirm the overall injury picture. |
| --- | --- |

(678)

The analysis on tenders points to a process of accelerated replacement of Union industry products by Chinese products, which is confirmed by tenders at the end of the investigation period. This revealed price erosion and further significant losses of volumes for the Union industry which are in line and confirm the overall injury picture.

4.10.   Conclusion on injury

Conclusion on injury

| (679) | Several indicators showed a positive trend such as production, capacity, sales volume on the Union market and employment. However, the development of these indicators did not match the increase in consumption and, in fact, such indicators should have increased more strongly, if the Union industry had been able to fully benefit from the growing market. Indeed, despite the increase in sales volume, the Union industry lost 10,8 percentage points of market share (from 64,3 % to 53,5 %) in a growing market. This is linked to the price pressure generated by Chinese exports, with significant undercutting and, in any event, price depression throughout the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(679)

Several indicators showed a positive trend such as production, capacity, sales volume on the Union market and employment. However, the development of these indicators did not match the increase in consumption and, in fact, such indicators should have increased more strongly, if the Union industry had been able to fully benefit from the growing market. Indeed, despite the increase in sales volume, the Union industry lost 10,8 percentage points of market share (from 64,3 % to 53,5 %) in a growing market. This is linked to the price pressure generated by Chinese exports, with significant undercutting and, in any event, price depression throughout the period considered.

| (680) | The foregoing led to financial injury in the form of lower profits and a drop in investments and on the return thereon. |
| --- | --- |

(680)

The foregoing led to financial injury in the form of lower profits and a drop in investments and on the return thereon.

| (681) | In addition to that, as explained above in recital (673), the analysis of sales through tenders indicates that the market share and price erosion is accelerating and will continue to do so due to the extremely aggressive behaviour from Chinese exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(681)

In addition to that, as explained above in recital (673), the analysis of sales through tenders indicates that the market share and price erosion is accelerating and will continue to do so due to the extremely aggressive behaviour from Chinese exporting producers.

| (682) | In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME claimed that several key indicators did not show that the Union industry suffered injury as its productivity remained stable and even increased during the IP, its production volume and employment remained stable, its capacity increased, its sales prices remained stable with a slight decrease and its profitability and investments remained at high levels. Also, CCCME argued that the Panel in Thailand – H-Beams (148) stated that ‘such positive movements in a number of factors would require a compelling explanation of why and how, in light of such apparent positive trends, the domestic industry was, or remained, injured within the meaning of the Agreement’. CCCME claimed that the Commission had not provided such a compelling explanation. CCCME also claimed that in Tartaric Acid (149)
  , the Commission concluded that there was no injury to the industry concerned since the profitability, cash flow, investments and employment increased during the period considered, despite the industry’s declining trends as regards production, sales volume and market share. |
| --- | --- |

(682)

In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME claimed that several key indicators did not show that the Union industry suffered injury as its productivity remained stable and even increased during the IP, its production volume and employment remained stable, its capacity increased, its sales prices remained stable with a slight decrease and its profitability and investments remained at high levels. Also, CCCME argued that the Panel in Thailand – H-Beams (148) stated that ‘such positive movements in a number of factors would require a compelling explanation of why and how, in light of such apparent positive trends, the domestic industry was, or remained, injured within the meaning of the Agreement’. CCCME claimed that the Commission had not provided such a compelling explanation. CCCME also claimed that in Tartaric Acid (149)
  , the Commission concluded that there was no injury to the industry concerned since the profitability, cash flow, investments and employment increased during the period considered, despite the industry’s declining trends as regards production, sales volume and market share.

Thailand – H-Beams

148

Tartaric Acid

149

,

| (683) | As stated in recital (679), these indicators have to be assessed against the increased consumption on a growing market and this analysis showed that the Union industry could not adequately benefit from an expanding market, underscoring actual negative effects on Union industry growth. Furthermore, the detailed tender analysis showed very clear undercutting and mounting sales losses of the Union industry. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(683)

As stated in recital (679), these indicators have to be assessed against the increased consumption on a growing market and this analysis showed that the Union industry could not adequately benefit from an expanding market, underscoring actual negative effects on Union industry growth. Furthermore, the detailed tender analysis showed very clear undercutting and mounting sales losses of the Union industry. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

| (684) | The Commission recalls that the weighing of injury factors vary in each case, depending on the industry and factual situation. Nevertheless, neither of the cases cited by CCCME is factually comparable with the present case. For example, in Tartaric Acid, the Union industry’s profitability showed a steady positive trend during the period considered and even exceeded the target profit during the investigation period, which is not the case here. Similarly, the factual situation in the investigation subject to the Panel in Thailand – H-Beams was fundamentally different. Most importantly, the Panel took issue with the fact that the Thai investigating authority had not explained how the positive trends (in particular profitability) would support their affirmative injury determination. Again, the facts in this case are not similar to H-Beams. Apart from the fact that in this case several injury indicators showed a negative trend, the Commission has fully explained its analysis and conclusions of the injury factors. Therefore, the Commission found that the conclusion of the cases cited by CCCME above were not applicable in the present investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(684)

The Commission recalls that the weighing of injury factors vary in each case, depending on the industry and factual situation. Nevertheless, neither of the cases cited by CCCME is factually comparable with the present case. For example, in Tartaric Acid, the Union industry’s profitability showed a steady positive trend during the period considered and even exceeded the target profit during the investigation period, which is not the case here. Similarly, the factual situation in the investigation subject to the Panel in Thailand – H-Beams was fundamentally different. Most importantly, the Panel took issue with the fact that the Thai investigating authority had not explained how the positive trends (in particular profitability) would support their affirmative injury determination. Again, the facts in this case are not similar to H-Beams. Apart from the fact that in this case several injury indicators showed a negative trend, the Commission has fully explained its analysis and conclusions of the injury factors. Therefore, the Commission found that the conclusion of the cases cited by CCCME above were not applicable in the present investigation.

Tartaric Acid,

Thailand – H-Beams

| (685) | CCCME also argued that the market share criteria alone could not be the basis of findings of material injury in accordance with the Panel in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft (150) and, as demand increased, all market participants gained sales which was indicative of an open and competitive market. Moreover, CCCME claimed that the future deterioration of the Union industry’s situation and the excess capacity of the exporters could not be the basis of material injury as this investigation did not assess the threat of injury and did not meet the evidentiary standard required for such a case in line with case T-528/09 - Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council (151) where the General Court regarded the assessment of the excess capacity of the exporters as a part of the
  ‘threat of injury’
  test. |
| --- | --- |

(685)

CCCME also argued that the market share criteria alone could not be the basis of findings of material injury in accordance with the Panel in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft (150) and, as demand increased, all market participants gained sales which was indicative of an open and competitive market. Moreover, CCCME claimed that the future deterioration of the Union industry’s situation and the excess capacity of the exporters could not be the basis of material injury as this investigation did not assess the threat of injury and did not meet the evidentiary standard required for such a case in line with case T-528/09 - Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council (151) where the General Court regarded the assessment of the excess capacity of the exporters as a part of the
  ‘threat of injury’
  test.

EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft

150

Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council

151

‘threat of injury’

| (686) | In this respect the Commission recalls that the finding of material injury is not based on market shares alone, but on the totality of several economic indicators assessed in recitals (599), (606), (612), and (661), which included inter alia actual negative impacts on growth, price depression, price undercutting, price underselling, and depressed profits, which show material injury. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(686)

In this respect the Commission recalls that the finding of material injury is not based on market shares alone, but on the totality of several economic indicators assessed in recitals (599), (606), (612), and (661), which included inter alia actual negative impacts on growth, price depression, price undercutting, price underselling, and depressed profits, which show material injury. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

inter alia

| (687) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(687)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation.

5.   CAUSATION

CAUSATION

| (688) | In accordance with Article 8(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the subsidised imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 8(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the subsidised imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the subsidised imports. These factors are: imports from third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, captive sales, and raw material prices. |
| --- | --- |

(688)

In accordance with Article 8(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the subsidised imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 8(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the subsidised imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the subsidised imports. These factors are: imports from third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, captive sales, and raw material prices.

5.1.   Effects of the subsidised imports

Effects of the subsidised imports

| (689) | The deterioration in the Union industry market share throughout the period considered was simultaneous and directly connected with significant penetration of the Union market by substantial volumes of imports from China, which significantly undercut the Union industry’s prices and, in any event, exercised significant price depression on Union sales. |
| --- | --- |

(689)

The deterioration in the Union industry market share throughout the period considered was simultaneous and directly connected with significant penetration of the Union market by substantial volumes of imports from China, which significantly undercut the Union industry’s prices and, in any event, exercised significant price depression on Union sales.

| (690) | The volume of imports from China increased (as shown in Table 2) from around 189 000 cable-km in 2017 to around 498 000 cable-km in the investigation period, a double and a half increase (+163 %). In terms of market share the increase over the same period was from 14,8 % to 28,3 %, an almost double increase (+91 %). Over the same period (as shown in Table 5), the Union industry sales on the free market increased by only 14 % and its market share fell from 64,3 % to 53,5 %, a fall of 10,8 percentage points (or -17 %). The sales on the smaller captive market showed a moderate decrease (-12 %). The subsidised imports have increased in both absolute and relative terms. As shown by Table 1, consumption on the Union market has increased by 38 % over the period considered, and it is evident that it has been mainly imports from China that took advantage of this growth. |
| --- | --- |

(690)

The volume of imports from China increased (as shown in Table 2) from around 189 000 cable-km in 2017 to around 498 000 cable-km in the investigation period, a double and a half increase (+163 %). In terms of market share the increase over the same period was from 14,8 % to 28,3 %, an almost double increase (+91 %). Over the same period (as shown in Table 5), the Union industry sales on the free market increased by only 14 % and its market share fell from 64,3 % to 53,5 %, a fall of 10,8 percentage points (or -17 %). The sales on the smaller captive market showed a moderate decrease (-12 %). The subsidised imports have increased in both absolute and relative terms. As shown by Table 1, consumption on the Union market has increased by 38 % over the period considered, and it is evident that it has been mainly imports from China that took advantage of this growth.

| (691) | The prices of the subsidised imports decreased significantly over the period considered, for example by 62 % according to Table 3-bis. Comparable sales prices of the Union industry on the Union market to unrelated parties (the free market) dropped overall by 12 % over the period on the basis of the analysis in Table 7-bis and by 41 % with the more refined analysis in Table 7-ter. The level of prices is largely dependent on the complexity of the product types sold, and a type by type comparison of domestically produced and imported products from the country concerned (on the basis of the sampled companies) is the most accurate tool to examine price trends. During the investigation period, this shows weighted average undercutting margins for the two sampled exporting producers above 30 %. |
| --- | --- |

(691)

The prices of the subsidised imports decreased significantly over the period considered, for example by 62 % according to Table 3-bis. Comparable sales prices of the Union industry on the Union market to unrelated parties (the free market) dropped overall by 12 % over the period on the basis of the analysis in Table 7-bis and by 41 % with the more refined analysis in Table 7-ter. The level of prices is largely dependent on the complexity of the product types sold, and a type by type comparison of domestically produced and imported products from the country concerned (on the basis of the sampled companies) is the most accurate tool to examine price trends. During the investigation period, this shows weighted average undercutting margins for the two sampled exporting producers above 30 %.

| (692) | This aggressive behaviour started eroding the Union industry market share since the beginning of the period considered, and during the IP the availability on the market of Chinese products at extremely low prices (well below the Union industry’s cost of production) has continued. This occurred inter alia via the mechanisms described above in the section on tenders in recitals (670) to (673) and has generated price depression, losses in sales, decreasing market share, and financial injury both in terms of depressed profitability and waning investments jeopardising the existence of Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(692)

This aggressive behaviour started eroding the Union industry market share since the beginning of the period considered, and during the IP the availability on the market of Chinese products at extremely low prices (well below the Union industry’s cost of production) has continued. This occurred inter alia via the mechanisms described above in the section on tenders in recitals (670) to (673) and has generated price depression, losses in sales, decreasing market share, and financial injury both in terms of depressed profitability and waning investments jeopardising the existence of Union industry.

inter alia

| (693) | As described in recital (665) above, there was also evidence that certain planned investments and expansion projects of the Union industry had been cancelled or suspended due to the increase in aggressively priced Chinese imports and consequent loss in Union industry market share. |
| --- | --- |

(693)

As described in recital (665) above, there was also evidence that certain planned investments and expansion projects of the Union industry had been cancelled or suspended due to the increase in aggressively priced Chinese imports and consequent loss in Union industry market share.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

Imports from third countries

| (694) | Imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows.

  Table 11


  Imports from third countries











  Country | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Korea | Volume (cable-km) | 20 450 | 51 339 | 44 405 | 45 908 |
| | Index | 100 | 251 | 217 | 224 |
| | Market share (%) | 1,6 | 3,3 | 2,7 | 2,6 |
| | Average price (EUR/ cable-km) | 796 | 873 | 1 627 | 1 073 |
| | Index | 100 | 110 | 204 | 135 |
| Turkey | Volume (cable-km) | 26 732 | 32 932 | 22 922 | 37 008 |
| | Index | 100 | 123 | 86 | 138 |
| | Market share (%) | 2,1 | 2,1 | 1,4 | 2,1 |
| | Average price (EUR/ cable-km) | 428 | 501 | 776 | 594 |
| | Index | 100 | 117 | 181 | 139 |
| Norway | Volume (cable-km) | 12 143 | 11 622 | 22 728 | 26 471 |
| | Index | 100 | 96 | 187 | 218 |
| | Market share (%) | 1,0 | 0,8 | 1,4 | 1,5 |
| | Average price (EUR/ cable-km) | 330 | 271 | 279 | 261 |
| | Index | 100 | 82 | 85 | 79 |
| Other third countries | Volume (cable-km) | 126 307 | 114 520 | 77 787 | 107 334 |
| | Index | 100 | 91 | 62 | 85 |
| | Market share (%) | 9,9 | 7,4 | 4,7 | 6,1 |
| | Average price (EUR/ cable-km) | 1 631 | 1 728 | 2 447 | 1 218 |
| | Index | 100 | 106 | 150 | 75 |
| Total of all third countries except the country concerned | Volume (cable-km) | 185 633 | 210 414 | 167 842 | 216 721 |
| | Index | 100 | 113 | 90 | 117 |
| | Market share (%) | 14,5 | 13,7 | 10,1 | 12,3 |
| | Average price (EUR/ cable-km) | 1 280 | 1 247 | 1 708 | 964 |
| | Index | 100 | 97 | 133 | 75 |
| Source: | Data from EU Customs Authorities, Comext (Eurostat) |

(694)

Imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows.

Table 11

Table 11

Imports from third countries

Imports from third countries

Country

2017

2018

2019

IP

Korea

Volume (cable-km)

20 450

51 339

44 405

45 908

Index

Index

100

100

251

251

217

217

224

224

Market share (%)

1,6

3,3

2,7

2,6

Average price (EUR/ cable-km)

796

873

1 627

1 073

Index

Index

100

100

110

110

204

204

135

135

Turkey

Volume (cable-km)

26 732

32 932

22 922

37 008

Index

Index

100

100

123

123

86

86

138

138

Market share (%)

2,1

2,1

1,4

2,1

Average price (EUR/ cable-km)

428

501

776

594

Index

Index

100

100

117

117

181

181

139

139

Norway

Volume (cable-km)

12 143

11 622

22 728

26 471

Index

Index

100

100

96

96

187

187

218

218

Market share (%)

1,0

0,8

1,4

1,5

Average price (EUR/ cable-km)

330

271

279

261

Index

Index

100

100

82

82

85

85

79

79

Other third countries

Volume (cable-km)

126 307

114 520

77 787

107 334

Index

Index

100

100

91

91

62

62

85

85

Market share (%)

9,9

7,4

4,7

6,1

Average price (EUR/ cable-km)

1 631

1 728

2 447

1 218

Index

Index

100

100

106

106

150

150

75

75

Total of all third countries except the country concerned

Volume (cable-km)

185 633

210 414

167 842

216 721

Index

Index

100

100

113

113

90

90

117

117

Market share (%)

14,5

13,7

10,1

12,3

Average price (EUR/ cable-km)

1 280

1 247

1 708

964

Index

Index

100

100

97

97

133

133

75

75

Source:

Source:

Data from EU Customs Authorities, Comext (Eurostat)

| (695) | Imports from Korea increased over the period considered from around 20 000 cable-km in 2017 to around 45 000 in the investigation period. The market share of these imports increased from 1,6 % in 2017 to 2,6 % in the investigation period. Average prices from Korea appear significantly higher than both the ones from the Union industry and the exporting producers. Therefore, given the high prices and the limited volumes, imports from Korea did not appear to play a role in the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(695)

Imports from Korea increased over the period considered from around 20 000 cable-km in 2017 to around 45 000 in the investigation period. The market share of these imports increased from 1,6 % in 2017 to 2,6 % in the investigation period. Average prices from Korea appear significantly higher than both the ones from the Union industry and the exporting producers. Therefore, given the high prices and the limited volumes, imports from Korea did not appear to play a role in the injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (696) | Imports from Turkey appear to have been sold at a low price, although higher than the Chinese imports in the period 2018-IP and gradually increasing. The market share of Turkish exporters was basically stable in the period considered at just over 2 %. These trends are based on statistics which include many product types and therefore, given the overall limited volumes, the Commission cannot precisely estimate the impact of these imports on the situation of the Union industry. While it cannot be excluded that Turkish imports might have contributed to injury suffered by the Union industry, given their relative volume in relation to the imports of the product concerned and stable market share throughout the period, the Commission concluded that, even if these imports had a limited impact on the situation of the industry, they did not attenuate the causal link between subsidised Chinese imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry |
| --- | --- |

(696)

Imports from Turkey appear to have been sold at a low price, although higher than the Chinese imports in the period 2018-IP and gradually increasing. The market share of Turkish exporters was basically stable in the period considered at just over 2 %. These trends are based on statistics which include many product types and therefore, given the overall limited volumes, the Commission cannot precisely estimate the impact of these imports on the situation of the Union industry. While it cannot be excluded that Turkish imports might have contributed to injury suffered by the Union industry, given their relative volume in relation to the imports of the product concerned and stable market share throughout the period, the Commission concluded that, even if these imports had a limited impact on the situation of the industry, they did not attenuate the causal link between subsidised Chinese imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry

| (697) | Finally, imports from Norway also increased in the period considered. Norwegian prices, which were already low in 2017, kept decreasing in the period considered (-21 % in the period 2017-IP), at a price level well below both the one of the Union industry and the one of the Chinese exporters. The market share of Norwegian exporters increased in the same period from 1 % to 1,5 %. These trends are based on statistics which include many product types and therefore, given the overall limited volumes, the Commission cannot precisely estimate the impact of these imports on the situation of the Union industry. While it cannot be excluded that Norwegian imports might have contributed to injury suffered by the Union industry, given their relative volume in relation to the imports of the product concerned, the Commission concluded that, even if these imports had a limited impact on the situation of the industry, they did not attenuate the causal link between subsidised Chinese imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(697)

Finally, imports from Norway also increased in the period considered. Norwegian prices, which were already low in 2017, kept decreasing in the period considered (-21 % in the period 2017-IP), at a price level well below both the one of the Union industry and the one of the Chinese exporters. The market share of Norwegian exporters increased in the same period from 1 % to 1,5 %. These trends are based on statistics which include many product types and therefore, given the overall limited volumes, the Commission cannot precisely estimate the impact of these imports on the situation of the Union industry. While it cannot be excluded that Norwegian imports might have contributed to injury suffered by the Union industry, given their relative volume in relation to the imports of the product concerned, the Commission concluded that, even if these imports had a limited impact on the situation of the industry, they did not attenuate the causal link between subsidised Chinese imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (698) | Imports from other third countries decreased slightly in the period considered in absolute terms, and lost significant market share in the process. Average prices were high and therefore there are no indications that they caused material injury to the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(698)

Imports from other third countries decreased slightly in the period considered in absolute terms, and lost significant market share in the process. Average prices were high and therefore there are no indications that they caused material injury to the Union industry.

| (699) | CCCME claimed that there was a complete absence of correlation between imports from China and the development of the Union industry. In particular, CCCME argued that amidst the strongest increase in import volume from China between 2017 and 2018, the Union industry increased its profitability. CCCME also claimed that during the period 2018 to 2019 when Chinese imports increased and prices decreased, the Union producers increased their sales prices without losing market share. |
| --- | --- |

(699)

CCCME claimed that there was a complete absence of correlation between imports from China and the development of the Union industry. In particular, CCCME argued that amidst the strongest increase in import volume from China between 2017 and 2018, the Union industry increased its profitability. CCCME also claimed that during the period 2018 to 2019 when Chinese imports increased and prices decreased, the Union producers increased their sales prices without losing market share.

| (700) | In this respect the Commission recalls that the vast majority of the market is based on long term supply contracts as explained in recitals (668) to (678). Moreover, the profitability of the Union industry was below the target profit throughout the period considered, which shows that the Union industry was already injured in 2018 and 2019 when, as observed by CCCME, dumped imports from China strongly increased. Therefore, the Commission considers that the above arguments of CCCME do not point to the absence of a causal link between dumping and injury. Indeed it only confirmed that there was a certain time gap between the rise of imports of the product concerned from China and the negative trend of some of the injury indicators. |
| --- | --- |

(700)

In this respect the Commission recalls that the vast majority of the market is based on long term supply contracts as explained in recitals (668) to (678). Moreover, the profitability of the Union industry was below the target profit throughout the period considered, which shows that the Union industry was already injured in 2018 and 2019 when, as observed by CCCME, dumped imports from China strongly increased. Therefore, the Commission considers that the above arguments of CCCME do not point to the absence of a causal link between dumping and injury. Indeed it only confirmed that there was a certain time gap between the rise of imports of the product concerned from China and the negative trend of some of the injury indicators.

| (701) | In view of the above, imports from countries other than China could not have caused the observed deterioration in the Union industry’s performance, and at any rate do not attenuate the causal link between the latter and Chinse import penetration. |
| --- | --- |

(701)

In view of the above, imports from countries other than China could not have caused the observed deterioration in the Union industry’s performance, and at any rate do not attenuate the causal link between the latter and Chinse import penetration.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

Export performance of the Union industry

| (702) | The volume of exports of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 12


  Export performance of the Union producers | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Export volume (cable-km) | 85 676 | 99 295 | 95 397 | 108 672 |
| Index | 100 | 116 | 111 | 127 |
| Average price (EUR/cable-km) | 1 329 | 1 111 | 1 282 | 949 |
| Index | 100 | 84 | 96 | 71 |
| Source: | Union industry |

(702)

The volume of exports of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Table 12

Export performance of the Union producers

Export performance of the Union producers

2017

2018

2019

IP

Export volume (cable-km)

85 676

99 295

95 397

108 672

Index

Index

100

100

116

116

111

111

127

127

Average price (EUR/cable-km)

1 329

1 111

1 282

949

Index

Index

100

100

84

84

96

96

71

71

Source:

Source:

Union industry

| (703) | Exports of the Union industry increased by 27 % over the period considered from around 85 000 cable-km in 2017 to around 108 000 cable-km in the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(703)

Exports of the Union industry increased by 27 % over the period considered from around 85 000 cable-km in 2017 to around 108 000 cable-km in the investigation period.

| (704) | The average price of the exports of the sampled Union producers decreased by 29 % over the period considered from 1 329 EUR/cable-km in 2017 to 949 EUR/cable-km in the investigation period. Price levels were above those in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(704)

The average price of the exports of the sampled Union producers decreased by 29 % over the period considered from 1 329 EUR/cable-km in 2017 to 949 EUR/cable-km in the investigation period. Price levels were above those in the Union.

| (705) | Against a backdrop of increasing exports and relatively high price levels, it is clear that these exports would not have caused injury to the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(705)

Against a backdrop of increasing exports and relatively high price levels, it is clear that these exports would not have caused injury to the Union industry.

5.2.3.   Captive volumes

Captive volumes

| (706) | As shown at Table 4, during the period considered the Union industry’s captive use decreased by 12 %. |
| --- | --- |

(706)

As shown at Table 4, during the period considered the Union industry’s captive use decreased by 12 %.

| (707) | Bearing in mind the limited size of the market (estimated at less than 5 % of the Union production in the IP), the Commission found that the slight decrease in captive use did not cause material injury to the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(707)

Bearing in mind the limited size of the market (estimated at less than 5 % of the Union production in the IP), the Commission found that the slight decrease in captive use did not cause material injury to the Union industry.

5.2.4.   Price of raw materials

Price of raw materials

| (708) | The main raw material used by the Union industry is optical fibres, either produced in the Union or imported. Several importers have argued that the sampled Union producers buy optical fibre from their related companies outside the Union at transfer prices which do not correspond to the market price of this raw material. In fact, importers suspected that this transfer price was too high and therefore resulted in a lower profit rate for the sampled EU producers. |
| --- | --- |

(708)

The main raw material used by the Union industry is optical fibres, either produced in the Union or imported. Several importers have argued that the sampled Union producers buy optical fibre from their related companies outside the Union at transfer prices which do not correspond to the market price of this raw material. In fact, importers suspected that this transfer price was too high and therefore resulted in a lower profit rate for the sampled EU producers.

| (709) | In particular, Connect Com raised concerns on internal transfer prices for intercompany transactions taking place within the Prysmian and Corning groups. |
| --- | --- |

(709)

In particular, Connect Com raised concerns on internal transfer prices for intercompany transactions taking place within the Prysmian and Corning groups.

| (710) | In order to investigate this claim, the Commission requested additional information from the sampled Union producers of their purchases of optical fibre used for the production of optical fibre cables in the IP. The Commission also requested information on the optical fibre produced by related companies of the sampled Union producers and on the sales of these fibres (volume and quantity) to both related and unrelated customers inside and outside the Union. By comparing sales of the same product types of fibre to related and unrelated parties, the Commission could establish that prices were in the same order of magnitude and therefore the sales of fibre to related companies were performed at arms’ length. Data on this activity is company-specific and confidential, it can thus not be disclosed. |
| --- | --- |

(710)

In order to investigate this claim, the Commission requested additional information from the sampled Union producers of their purchases of optical fibre used for the production of optical fibre cables in the IP. The Commission also requested information on the optical fibre produced by related companies of the sampled Union producers and on the sales of these fibres (volume and quantity) to both related and unrelated customers inside and outside the Union. By comparing sales of the same product types of fibre to related and unrelated parties, the Commission could establish that prices were in the same order of magnitude and therefore the sales of fibre to related companies were performed at arms’ length. Data on this activity is company-specific and confidential, it can thus not be disclosed.

| (711) | The Commission concluded therefore that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was not caused by the impact of transfer prices on the profitability of the sampled Union producers. |
| --- | --- |

(711)

The Commission concluded therefore that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was not caused by the impact of transfer prices on the profitability of the sampled Union producers.

5.2.5.   Effect of COVID-19 pandemic

Effect of COVID-19 pandemic

| (712) | In its submission on initiation mentioned at recital (5), CCCME claimed that there is a clear correlation between the downturn in sales for the EU (and global) OFC industry and the beginning of the pandemic and that this situation should not be exploited to impose unjustified trade defence measures. In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that it was not clear which part of the IP data related to 2019 and which part of it related to 2020 and therefore, the expected effect of the COVID-19 pandemic could not be assessed and requested a breakdown of the IP data. With regards to this claim, the Commission notes that it requested all IP data provided by the parties broken down to quarters in order to assess any potential effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the IP. The investigation revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic only had a very limited and temporary impact on the industry (as described in recitals (599) and (729)), and did not prevent the significant increase of consumption in the Union during the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(712)

In its submission on initiation mentioned at recital (5), CCCME claimed that there is a clear correlation between the downturn in sales for the EU (and global) OFC industry and the beginning of the pandemic and that this situation should not be exploited to impose unjustified trade defence measures. In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that it was not clear which part of the IP data related to 2019 and which part of it related to 2020 and therefore, the expected effect of the COVID-19 pandemic could not be assessed and requested a breakdown of the IP data. With regards to this claim, the Commission notes that it requested all IP data provided by the parties broken down to quarters in order to assess any potential effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the IP. The investigation revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic only had a very limited and temporary impact on the industry (as described in recitals (599) and (729)), and did not prevent the significant increase of consumption in the Union during the period considered.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

Conclusion on causation

| (713) | The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the subsidised imports. None of the other factors explained the Union industry’s negative developments in terms of loss of market share, price depression and low profitability, decreasing investments and return on investments. |
| --- | --- |

(713)

The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the subsidised imports. None of the other factors explained the Union industry’s negative developments in terms of loss of market share, price depression and low profitability, decreasing investments and return on investments.

| (714) | The adverse impact on profitability caused by the subsidised imports and continuous price pressure did not allow the Union industry to undertake the necessary investments for the long term survival of the industry. This is supported by the decreasing trend as described in recital (657) and the cancelling of planned investments discussed in recital (665). |
| --- | --- |

(714)

The adverse impact on profitability caused by the subsidised imports and continuous price pressure did not allow the Union industry to undertake the necessary investments for the long term survival of the industry. This is supported by the decreasing trend as described in recital (657) and the cancelling of planned investments discussed in recital (665).

| (715) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the subsidised imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. The other known factors, individually or collectively, were not capable of attenuating the causal link between the subsidised imports and the material injury. |
| --- | --- |

(715)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the subsidised imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. The other known factors, individually or collectively, were not capable of attenuating the causal link between the subsidised imports and the material injury.

6.   UNION INTEREST

UNION INTEREST

| (716) | In accordance with Article 31 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious subsidies. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users and other relevant economic operators. |
| --- | --- |

(716)

In accordance with Article 31 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious subsidies. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users and other relevant economic operators.

| (717) | Several comments were submitted concerning the Union interest. In particular, the GOC claimed that imports from China effectively promote the development of technology in the industry and foster competition in the Union market. According to the GOC, if over protected, the optical fibre cables industry in the Union will only lose ground in comparison with third countries, therefore there is no Union interest in pursuing an investigation in the sector, which could damage the bilateral cooperation between China and the Union in the digital field. |
| --- | --- |

(717)

Several comments were submitted concerning the Union interest. In particular, the GOC claimed that imports from China effectively promote the development of technology in the industry and foster competition in the Union market. According to the GOC, if over protected, the optical fibre cables industry in the Union will only lose ground in comparison with third countries, therefore there is no Union interest in pursuing an investigation in the sector, which could damage the bilateral cooperation between China and the Union in the digital field.

| (718) | Also Connect Com claimed that the imposition of measures would be detrimental to the industry because importers from China could no longer submit attractive offers to tenders. As a consequence, price level in tender procedures would rise with a negative outcome for public budgets. |
| --- | --- |

(718)

Also Connect Com claimed that the imposition of measures would be detrimental to the industry because importers from China could no longer submit attractive offers to tenders. As a consequence, price level in tender procedures would rise with a negative outcome for public budgets.

| (719) | CCCME noted that the EU’s digitalization agenda and the 5G transition would be best served by not further restricting high-quality optical fibre cables supplies from China. |
| --- | --- |

(719)

CCCME noted that the EU’s digitalization agenda and the 5G transition would be best served by not further restricting high-quality optical fibre cables supplies from China.

| (720) | Cable 77, instead, underlined that the imposition of duties on optical fibre cables would influence also other industries and that, if duties were to be imposed on cables, they should also be imposed on fibres because Union producers employ also fibres produced outside the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(720)

Cable 77, instead, underlined that the imposition of duties on optical fibre cables would influence also other industries and that, if duties were to be imposed on cables, they should also be imposed on fibres because Union producers employ also fibres produced outside the Union.

| (721) | However, as detailed in the following recitals, the Commission found no compelling reasons to conclude it is not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of optical fibre cables originating in China. |
| --- | --- |

(721)

However, as detailed in the following recitals, the Commission found no compelling reasons to conclude it is not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of optical fibre cables originating in China.

6.1.   Interest of the Union industry

Interest of the Union industry

| (722) | There are 29 companies producing OFC in the Union, having around 4 700 employees (FTE). The producers are widely spread throughout the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(722)

There are 29 companies producing OFC in the Union, having around 4 700 employees (FTE). The producers are widely spread throughout the Union.

| (723) | The imposition of measures would allow the Union industry to maintain a competitive position on the market and recover lost market share, while improving their profitability towards sustainable levels. |
| --- | --- |

(723)

The imposition of measures would allow the Union industry to maintain a competitive position on the market and recover lost market share, while improving their profitability towards sustainable levels.

| (724) | The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price depression and lower sales and production, with further financial deterioration in terms of profitability and investments, jeopardising its future. |
| --- | --- |

(724)

The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price depression and lower sales and production, with further financial deterioration in terms of profitability and investments, jeopardising its future.

6.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

Interest of unrelated importers

| (725) | Relatively low cooperation was received from the importing sector. Five unrelated importers submitted a sampling form within the deadline. Out of these five importers, four submitted a questionnaire reply. A new importer came forward after the initiation of the anti-subsidy investigation into optical fibre cables from China and requested to cooperate also in the present investigation. The Commission granted interested party status to this importer for the present investigation as from the day in which it came forward, and to consider the information submitted for this investigation without prejudice to the procedural steps already lapsed. |
| --- | --- |

(725)

Relatively low cooperation was received from the importing sector. Five unrelated importers submitted a sampling form within the deadline. Out of these five importers, four submitted a questionnaire reply. A new importer came forward after the initiation of the anti-subsidy investigation into optical fibre cables from China and requested to cooperate also in the present investigation. The Commission granted interested party status to this importer for the present investigation as from the day in which it came forward, and to consider the information submitted for this investigation without prejudice to the procedural steps already lapsed.

| (726) | The five cooperating importers represent around 12 % of Chinese imports. Two importers provided complete information in their questionnaire reply, while three others were not in a position to provide accurate profit data for the product concerned for the IP. All cooperating importers opposed the measures. |
| --- | --- |

(726)

The five cooperating importers represent around 12 % of Chinese imports. Two importers provided complete information in their questionnaire reply, while three others were not in a position to provide accurate profit data for the product concerned for the IP. All cooperating importers opposed the measures.

| (727) | The cooperating importers are located in four different Member States and they mainly focus their activity there. They import 70-90 % of their OFC purchases from China and they source the remaining part from Union producers and from producers in other third countries. They underlined the importance of having different sources of supply. Imports of OFC from third countries are not subject to customs duty in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(727)

The cooperating importers are located in four different Member States and they mainly focus their activity there. They import 70-90 % of their OFC purchases from China and they source the remaining part from Union producers and from producers in other third countries. They underlined the importance of having different sources of supply. Imports of OFC from third countries are not subject to customs duty in the Union.

| (728) | An important part of cooperating importers’ activity is to bid for smaller projects. Beyond these bids, they also offer additional products (e.g. ducts, connectors and cabinets) and complex services to customers (e.g. design and installation of network). On average, the product concerned accounts for around one third of their total turnover. |
| --- | --- |

(728)

An important part of cooperating importers’ activity is to bid for smaller projects. Beyond these bids, they also offer additional products (e.g. ducts, connectors and cabinets) and complex services to customers (e.g. design and installation of network). On average, the product concerned accounts for around one third of their total turnover.

| (729) | None of the importers claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic would have had a major impact on their business activity. One importer stated that there was a certain slowdown in March 2020 due to the lockdown but stressed that the importance of fibre to the home (‘FTTH’) projects was amplified by this crisis. |
| --- | --- |

(729)

None of the importers claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic would have had a major impact on their business activity. One importer stated that there was a certain slowdown in March 2020 due to the lockdown but stressed that the importance of fibre to the home (‘FTTH’) projects was amplified by this crisis.

| (730) | Importers consider that their competitive advantage over the Union producers lies in their efficient sales structure and logistics. They shorten their delivery times by keeping a high amount of stock in their warehouse and aim to respond in a swift and flexible way to their customers’ needs. |
| --- | --- |

(730)

Importers consider that their competitive advantage over the Union producers lies in their efficient sales structure and logistics. They shorten their delivery times by keeping a high amount of stock in their warehouse and aim to respond in a swift and flexible way to their customers’ needs.

| (731) | The importers claimed that they cannot source all their OFC from the Union industry because the industry cannot supply the required quantities under the required deadlines. They alleged there was a shortage of OFC and of its main raw material, optical fibre on the market in 2017-18 when the Union industry could not cover their demand and therefore they had to find other suppliers. Some importers stressed that with the rollout of fibre optic and 5G networks, the demand for OFC has been rising and is expected to rise further. They argued that this increased demand, in combination with potential trade defence measures, could lead to a new shortage on the market and to delays in the expansion of the fibre optic and 5G network. |
| --- | --- |

(731)

The importers claimed that they cannot source all their OFC from the Union industry because the industry cannot supply the required quantities under the required deadlines. They alleged there was a shortage of OFC and of its main raw material, optical fibre on the market in 2017-18 when the Union industry could not cover their demand and therefore they had to find other suppliers. Some importers stressed that with the rollout of fibre optic and 5G networks, the demand for OFC has been rising and is expected to rise further. They argued that this increased demand, in combination with potential trade defence measures, could lead to a new shortage on the market and to delays in the expansion of the fibre optic and 5G network.

| (732) | The Union industry rebutted the claim of supply issues stating that the Union industry has ample spare capacity. Indeed, the investigation found that the capacity utilisation of the Union industry was 59 % during the IP and the production capacity of optical fibre cables is over 2 million cable-km, well above the estimated Union consumption of OFC for the coming years. The Union industry provided evidence that the Union producers have capacity to produce more OFC if needed. Furthermore, alternative sources of supply exist in third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(732)

The Union industry rebutted the claim of supply issues stating that the Union industry has ample spare capacity. Indeed, the investigation found that the capacity utilisation of the Union industry was 59 % during the IP and the production capacity of optical fibre cables is over 2 million cable-km, well above the estimated Union consumption of OFC for the coming years. The Union industry provided evidence that the Union producers have capacity to produce more OFC if needed. Furthermore, alternative sources of supply exist in third countries.

| (733) | Importers have also claimed that they have long term supply contracts with their customers in which fixed prices are agreed for the total term of 2-4 years and there is no price adjustment clause for unforeseen increases in their purchase prices. Therefore it would not be possible to pass on the increased costs to their customers. Moreover, importers have argued that they are not able to bid in tenders which are announced during the present investigation as they do not know what price they will pay for OFC in case measures are imposed. |
| --- | --- |

(733)

Importers have also claimed that they have long term supply contracts with their customers in which fixed prices are agreed for the total term of 2-4 years and there is no price adjustment clause for unforeseen increases in their purchase prices. Therefore it would not be possible to pass on the increased costs to their customers. Moreover, importers have argued that they are not able to bid in tenders which are announced during the present investigation as they do not know what price they will pay for OFC in case measures are imposed.

| (734) | Importers also argued that it would not be possible to shift the source of supply to other third countries in the case of current contracts as the cables have undergone complex approval processes, and therefore there would be the risk of serious time delays and considerable difficulties in the blowing process, which must be adapted to the rigidity of the cable which varies from supplier to supplier even for products of the same technical specification. |
| --- | --- |

(734)

Importers also argued that it would not be possible to shift the source of supply to other third countries in the case of current contracts as the cables have undergone complex approval processes, and therefore there would be the risk of serious time delays and considerable difficulties in the blowing process, which must be adapted to the rigidity of the cable which varies from supplier to supplier even for products of the same technical specification.

| (735) | In addition, some importers have also claimed that Chinese cables are of higher quality than the cables produced by the Union industry. Although the technical specifications are the same, they claim that Chinese OFC is produced on newer production lines and the finishing, the rolling up and the technical characteristics are of higher standard. These importers also argue that the difference in quality does not only concern the product, but Chinese producers serve their clients’ individual needs in a more flexible and timely manner and they provide better after sales services. Also, one importer claims that the price difference between Union and Chinese optical fibre cables is lower than stated in the complaint. This importer also claims that Union producers supply other products (ducts, handholes, closures) and considers that measures would allow Union producers to tie these other products to OFC and sell them part of a project. It also considers that measures would create a disincentive for Union producers to innovate as they would protect them from competition. In its view, this would lead to a slowdown of the deployment of networks. |
| --- | --- |

(735)

In addition, some importers have also claimed that Chinese cables are of higher quality than the cables produced by the Union industry. Although the technical specifications are the same, they claim that Chinese OFC is produced on newer production lines and the finishing, the rolling up and the technical characteristics are of higher standard. These importers also argue that the difference in quality does not only concern the product, but Chinese producers serve their clients’ individual needs in a more flexible and timely manner and they provide better after sales services. Also, one importer claims that the price difference between Union and Chinese optical fibre cables is lower than stated in the complaint. This importer also claims that Union producers supply other products (ducts, handholes, closures) and considers that measures would allow Union producers to tie these other products to OFC and sell them part of a project. It also considers that measures would create a disincentive for Union producers to innovate as they would protect them from competition. In its view, this would lead to a slowdown of the deployment of networks.

| (736) | In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that the proposed level of duties significantly exceeded their profit margins. This situation would cause substantial losses as they would not be able to pass on the duties to their customers, with whom they have existing long term contracts with fixed prices. Moreover, Connect Com argued that its profit margin for public contracts was usually significantly lower than 20 % and that the anti-subsidy measures combined with the anti-dumping duties would not allow the fulfilment of their current contracts. Therefore the duties could eventually lead to their bankruptcy. They also maintained that Union producers were not able or willing to supply the OFC corresponding to their requirements on time and that there would be a shortage of OFC and a considerable delay in lead times and in the rollout of networks if measures were introduced. In addition, Connect Com argued that it was not correct to give EU producers an increase in their profit margin from 8 % to 12 % while reducing the profit margin of the importers to zero or even to losses. |
| --- | --- |

(736)

In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com claimed that the proposed level of duties significantly exceeded their profit margins. This situation would cause substantial losses as they would not be able to pass on the duties to their customers, with whom they have existing long term contracts with fixed prices. Moreover, Connect Com argued that its profit margin for public contracts was usually significantly lower than 20 % and that the anti-subsidy measures combined with the anti-dumping duties would not allow the fulfilment of their current contracts. Therefore the duties could eventually lead to their bankruptcy. They also maintained that Union producers were not able or willing to supply the OFC corresponding to their requirements on time and that there would be a shortage of OFC and a considerable delay in lead times and in the rollout of networks if measures were introduced. In addition, Connect Com argued that it was not correct to give EU producers an increase in their profit margin from 8 % to 12 % while reducing the profit margin of the importers to zero or even to losses.

| (737) | The Commission has found that while the cooperating importers have stable business ties with their suppliers of OFC in China, they do not have long-term contracts with these suppliers fixing volumes or purchase prices. In fact, the importers place regular orders for larger volumes of OFC and they receive a price offer for each order from the Chinese producers. Although the importers claim that it would be costly and time consuming to switch suppliers, they all buy from other sources too (i.e. in the Union, United States, India, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine) and they had successfully found new suppliers during the alleged 2017-18 shortage. This indicates that, while the importers would indeed need to pay a higher price for the orders already placed but not yet received before the imposition of measures, it would not be excessively difficult for them to switch to new suppliers in a relatively short time. |
| --- | --- |

(737)

The Commission has found that while the cooperating importers have stable business ties with their suppliers of OFC in China, they do not have long-term contracts with these suppliers fixing volumes or purchase prices. In fact, the importers place regular orders for larger volumes of OFC and they receive a price offer for each order from the Chinese producers. Although the importers claim that it would be costly and time consuming to switch suppliers, they all buy from other sources too (i.e. in the Union, United States, India, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine) and they had successfully found new suppliers during the alleged 2017-18 shortage. This indicates that, while the importers would indeed need to pay a higher price for the orders already placed but not yet received before the imposition of measures, it would not be excessively difficult for them to switch to new suppliers in a relatively short time.

| (738) | While the countervailing measures are likely to have a certain negative impact on importers and may reduce their profitability, the importers will be able to absorb and/or pass on some of the cost increase caused by the duty to their customers given their significant profit margins of over 20 %. They also have the possibility to find alternative sources of supply, including from other third countries and the Union industry. Therefore, the combination of other sources of supply for the product concerned and the ability to absorb and/or at least partially pass on the effect of the duties to their customers would mean that the unrelated importers are not disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures. |
| --- | --- |

(738)

While the countervailing measures are likely to have a certain negative impact on importers and may reduce their profitability, the importers will be able to absorb and/or pass on some of the cost increase caused by the duty to their customers given their significant profit margins of over 20 %. They also have the possibility to find alternative sources of supply, including from other third countries and the Union industry. Therefore, the combination of other sources of supply for the product concerned and the ability to absorb and/or at least partially pass on the effect of the duties to their customers would mean that the unrelated importers are not disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures.

| (739) | In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME argued that the imposition of countervailing measures would be detrimental the EU’s digitalization agenda and connectivity targets as they will result in critical shortages of this crucial product for 5G networks and will lead to a price increase, without providing evidence in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(739)

In its comments on final disclosure, CCCME argued that the imposition of countervailing measures would be detrimental the EU’s digitalization agenda and connectivity targets as they will result in critical shortages of this crucial product for 5G networks and will lead to a price increase, without providing evidence in this respect.

| (740) | The allegations regarding quality differences, shortage of supply, inability or unwillingness of the Union industry to supply the market, price differences, profitability of importers, risks of monopoly or oligopoly, incentives to innovate and deployment times for telecom networks were unsubstantiated and could not thus be accepted. |
| --- | --- |

(740)

The allegations regarding quality differences, shortage of supply, inability or unwillingness of the Union industry to supply the market, price differences, profitability of importers, risks of monopoly or oligopoly, incentives to innovate and deployment times for telecom networks were unsubstantiated and could not thus be accepted.

| (741) | In any event, the investigation has shown that one of the important facets of injury in this case is precisely the fact that, due to Chinese dumped imports, Union industry could not achieve the level of profits that would enable it to continue to invest inter alia in further capacity to meet the growing demand on the expanding Union market. The expected impact of measures is precisely to restore a level playing field and allow for such profits, investment and expansion of capacity to take place. |
| --- | --- |

(741)

In any event, the investigation has shown that one of the important facets of injury in this case is precisely the fact that, due to Chinese dumped imports, Union industry could not achieve the level of profits that would enable it to continue to invest inter alia in further capacity to meet the growing demand on the expanding Union market. The expected impact of measures is precisely to restore a level playing field and allow for such profits, investment and expansion of capacity to take place.

inter alia

| (742) | In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com argued that raw material costs were rising significantly across all sectors and that the production of broadband cables was also affected. In this regard, Connect Com gave examples of price increase of an undisclosed Chinese supplier from the second quarter of 2020 to the second quarter of 2021. In this respect, Connect Com argued that there was an urgent need to expand broadband cable networks in Europe but the demand could not be met by the Union producers in the short term at competitive and acceptable prices and therefore duties should not be imposed or should at least be suspended. |
| --- | --- |

(742)

In its comments on final disclosure, Connect Com argued that raw material costs were rising significantly across all sectors and that the production of broadband cables was also affected. In this regard, Connect Com gave examples of price increase of an undisclosed Chinese supplier from the second quarter of 2020 to the second quarter of 2021. In this respect, Connect Com argued that there was an urgent need to expand broadband cable networks in Europe but the demand could not be met by the Union producers in the short term at competitive and acceptable prices and therefore duties should not be imposed or should at least be suspended.

| (743) | Neither the representativeness nor the effect of this price increase on users and importers was substantiated. Therefore, the claim was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(743)

Neither the representativeness nor the effect of this price increase on users and importers was substantiated. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

6.3.   Interest of users and distributors

Interest of users and distributors

| (744) | The product concerned is sourced by several industries, mainly large telecom operators, public bodies (such as municipalities) responsible for expanding the broadband network, installers and operators, and distributors. |
| --- | --- |

(744)

The product concerned is sourced by several industries, mainly large telecom operators, public bodies (such as municipalities) responsible for expanding the broadband network, installers and operators, and distributors.

| (745) | A modest number of users cooperated in the investigation: two large telecom operators (Deutsche Telekom in Germany and Proximus in Belgium), five network installers and operators, one distributor and a small user. Together the cooperating users account for under 12 % of the total volume of imports of OFC from China and for under 9 % of the total volume of consumption of OFC in the EU during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(745)

A modest number of users cooperated in the investigation: two large telecom operators (Deutsche Telekom in Germany and Proximus in Belgium), five network installers and operators, one distributor and a small user. Together the cooperating users account for under 12 % of the total volume of imports of OFC from China and for under 9 % of the total volume of consumption of OFC in the EU during the IP.

| (746) | Many of the users’ replies to the questionnaire were very deficient and did not contain any arguments or information on Union interest. None of the public bodies which procure OFC cooperated in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(746)

Many of the users’ replies to the questionnaire were very deficient and did not contain any arguments or information on Union interest. None of the public bodies which procure OFC cooperated in the investigation.

| (747) | BYCN Axione and another user who buy OFC mainly from Union producers did not express opposition to measures. Deutsche Telekom and Spanish distributor Comercial Electro Industrial S.A. (‘Comel’) would oppose imposition of measures. |
| --- | --- |

(747)

BYCN Axione and another user who buy OFC mainly from Union producers did not express opposition to measures. Deutsche Telekom and Spanish distributor Comercial Electro Industrial S.A. (‘Comel’) would oppose imposition of measures.

| (748) | Deutsche Telekom expects an increase in demand for OFC due to the massive 5G rollout and maintains that OFC is a worldwide market with standardized technology, global deployment and suppliers. It argues that duties on OFC from China can lead to significant issues to secure Union cable demands and risk hindering or delaying network rollouts and would lead to a significant cost increase for EU customers. It also claims that prices have decreased due to existing overcapacities and all players have invested in increasing capacity during the alleged shortage of supply a few years ago. |
| --- | --- |

(748)

Deutsche Telekom expects an increase in demand for OFC due to the massive 5G rollout and maintains that OFC is a worldwide market with standardized technology, global deployment and suppliers. It argues that duties on OFC from China can lead to significant issues to secure Union cable demands and risk hindering or delaying network rollouts and would lead to a significant cost increase for EU customers. It also claims that prices have decreased due to existing overcapacities and all players have invested in increasing capacity during the alleged shortage of supply a few years ago.

| (749) | The Commission concluded that it was inevitable that countervailing duties would have cost implications for users who purchase their OFC from China, but that this was due to the unfair export behaviour of Chinese exporters. Furthermore, the investigation established that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks projects - in the case of 5G being much less than 5 %. The purchases of the product concerned by the cooperating telecom operators represent a marginal percentage of company turnover, and the firm purchase a significant part of its OFC from other sources. With regard to the claim of the other user that it is difficult to switch suppliers, as explained at recital (737) other importers have also found to buy from different sources in third countries. Likewise, users also have the possibility to find alternative sources of supply, including suppliers from other third countries. As demand for OFC is expected to expand in the coming years, users and distributors will compete on a larger market than previously. This is an opportunity for them to keep and develop their business even if their prices increase due to the countervailing duties. |
| --- | --- |

(749)

The Commission concluded that it was inevitable that countervailing duties would have cost implications for users who purchase their OFC from China, but that this was due to the unfair export behaviour of Chinese exporters. Furthermore, the investigation established that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks projects - in the case of 5G being much less than 5 %. The purchases of the product concerned by the cooperating telecom operators represent a marginal percentage of company turnover, and the firm purchase a significant part of its OFC from other sources. With regard to the claim of the other user that it is difficult to switch suppliers, as explained at recital (737) other importers have also found to buy from different sources in third countries. Likewise, users also have the possibility to find alternative sources of supply, including suppliers from other third countries. As demand for OFC is expected to expand in the coming years, users and distributors will compete on a larger market than previously. This is an opportunity for them to keep and develop their business even if their prices increase due to the countervailing duties.

| (750) | It is further underlined that the existence of overcapacity driven by China does not justify unfair trade practices whose injury to the Union industry jeopardises its future, as well as diversity of supply and thus competition in the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(750)

It is further underlined that the existence of overcapacity driven by China does not justify unfair trade practices whose injury to the Union industry jeopardises its future, as well as diversity of supply and thus competition in the Union market.

| (751) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that users and distributors are not disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures. |
| --- | --- |

(751)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that users and distributors are not disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures.

6.4.   Other factors

Other factors

| (752) | Optical fibre cables are needed to build fast broadband networks and are therefore of high importance for citizens, businesses and public entities across the EU who depend on these networks for home working, home learning, for running a business or providing services. The investment through the NextGenerationEU program (152) is one of the main priorities of the European Union which also aims to deploy high technology broadband infrastructure reaching every corner of the EU. Optical fibre cables are thus key for the EU’s Digital Decade (153) and also for its digital sovereignty. |
| --- | --- |

(752)

Optical fibre cables are needed to build fast broadband networks and are therefore of high importance for citizens, businesses and public entities across the EU who depend on these networks for home working, home learning, for running a business or providing services. The investment through the NextGenerationEU program (152) is one of the main priorities of the European Union which also aims to deploy high technology broadband infrastructure reaching every corner of the EU. Optical fibre cables are thus key for the EU’s Digital Decade (153) and also for its digital sovereignty.

152

153

| (753) | Given the importance of the product concerned in light of the above public objectives, the Commission has carefully analysed the impact of potential measures on the rollout of broadband network projects. |
| --- | --- |

(753)

Given the importance of the product concerned in light of the above public objectives, the Commission has carefully analysed the impact of potential measures on the rollout of broadband network projects.

| (754) | Several parties argued that consumers and public budgets in the Union would be harmed in case measures were imposed as the price of OFC and thus the total price of network projects would rise. |
| --- | --- |

(754)

Several parties argued that consumers and public budgets in the Union would be harmed in case measures were imposed as the price of OFC and thus the total price of network projects would rise.

| (755) | The Commission has therefore analysed the cost of OFC in the total cost of the network projects. The investigation has shown that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks. In fact, the construction works (i.e. digging the ground in order to place the cables) is the most significant cost item in these projects accounting to around 80 % of the costs. The remaining 20 % is constituted by material costs which include also other products such as ducts, cabinets and connectors. The Commission has found that OFC represents a minor proportion of total network project costs in the case of 5G being less than 5 % according to one of the large users. EU producers and the cooperating importers have also claimed that OFC represents around 5-10 % of the total costs of network projects. |
| --- | --- |

(755)

The Commission has therefore analysed the cost of OFC in the total cost of the network projects. The investigation has shown that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks. In fact, the construction works (i.e. digging the ground in order to place the cables) is the most significant cost item in these projects accounting to around 80 % of the costs. The remaining 20 % is constituted by material costs which include also other products such as ducts, cabinets and connectors. The Commission has found that OFC represents a minor proportion of total network project costs in the case of 5G being less than 5 % according to one of the large users. EU producers and the cooperating importers have also claimed that OFC represents around 5-10 % of the total costs of network projects.

| (756) | The modest level of cooperation of the major EU network operators and public bodies responsible for the large network projects also suggests that possible measures on OFC would not have a substantial impact on the cost and the timing of these projects. |
| --- | --- |

(756)

The modest level of cooperation of the major EU network operators and public bodies responsible for the large network projects also suggests that possible measures on OFC would not have a substantial impact on the cost and the timing of these projects.

6.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

Conclusion on Union interest

| (757) | The investigation found that there is sufficient capacity in the Union and in other third countries to replace imports originating in China. Furthermore, the imposition of countervailing measures would enable the Union industry to invest in their Union production sites and new technologies to the benefit the user industry. At the same time, measures would not prevent imports from third countries (including China) from competing fairly on the Union market. Even if the demand for OFC increases in the coming years as expected by market players, importers and users of the product concerned would not run any noticeable risks of shortage of supply and the rollout of the optical fibre broadband network to homes and businesses would thus not be delayed. |
| --- | --- |

(757)

The investigation found that there is sufficient capacity in the Union and in other third countries to replace imports originating in China. Furthermore, the imposition of countervailing measures would enable the Union industry to invest in their Union production sites and new technologies to the benefit the user industry. At the same time, measures would not prevent imports from third countries (including China) from competing fairly on the Union market. Even if the demand for OFC increases in the coming years as expected by market players, importers and users of the product concerned would not run any noticeable risks of shortage of supply and the rollout of the optical fibre broadband network to homes and businesses would thus not be delayed.

| (758) | Overall, while in the absence of measures users, importers, final customers and public budgets may benefit from cheaper products in the short term, the subsidised imports from China would inevitably drive the Union producers out of the Union market, resulting in the loss for the users industry of valuable sources of supply and potentially in increase of import prices in the absence of competition from the Union producers. Finally, survival of the Union producers is key for the EU’s digital sovereignty. |
| --- | --- |

(758)

Overall, while in the absence of measures users, importers, final customers and public budgets may benefit from cheaper products in the short term, the subsidised imports from China would inevitably drive the Union producers out of the Union market, resulting in the loss for the users industry of valuable sources of supply and potentially in increase of import prices in the absence of competition from the Union producers. Finally, survival of the Union producers is key for the EU’s digital sovereignty.

| (759) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of OFC originating in the People’s Republic of China at this stage of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(759)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of OFC originating in the People’s Republic of China at this stage of the investigation.

7.   DEFINITIVE COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

DEFINITIVE COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

| (760) | In view of the conclusions reached with regard to subsidisation, injury, causation, and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 15 of the basic Regulation, a definitive countervailing duty should be imposed. |
| --- | --- |

(760)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to subsidisation, injury, causation, and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 15 of the basic Regulation, a definitive countervailing duty should be imposed.

7.1.   Level of the definitive countervailing measures

Level of the definitive countervailing measures

| (761) | Article 15(1), third subparagraph of the basic Regulation provides that the amount of the definitive countervailing duty shall not exceed the amount of countervailable subsidies established. |
| --- | --- |

(761)

Article 15(1), third subparagraph of the basic Regulation provides that the amount of the definitive countervailing duty shall not exceed the amount of countervailable subsidies established.

| (762) | Article 15(1), fourth subparagraph states that ‘where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Union’s interest to determine the amount of measures in accordance with the third subparagraph, the amount of the countervailing duty shall be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry’. |
| --- | --- |

(762)

Article 15(1), fourth subparagraph states that ‘where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Union’s interest to determine the amount of measures in accordance with the third subparagraph, the amount of the countervailing duty shall be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry’.

where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Union’s interest to determine the amount of measures in accordance with the third subparagraph, the amount of the countervailing duty shall be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry

| (763) | No such information has been submitted to the Commission, and therefore the level of the countervailing measures will be set with reference to Article 15(1), third subparagraph. |
| --- | --- |

(763)

No such information has been submitted to the Commission, and therefore the level of the countervailing measures will be set with reference to Article 15(1), third subparagraph.

| (764) | On the basis of the above, the definitive countervailing duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:






  Company | Countervailing duty rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(764)

On the basis of the above, the definitive countervailing duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Company

Countervailing duty rate

FTT group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

10,3 %

ZTT group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

5,1 %

Other companies cooperating in both anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigation listed in Annex I

7,8 %

Other companies cooperating in the anti-dumping investigation but not in the anti-subsidy investigation listed in Annex II

10,3 %

All other companies

10,3 %

| (765) | The anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with a separate anti-dumping investigation concerning the same product concerned originating from the PRC, in which the Commission imposed anti-dumping measures at the level of the dumping margin. The Commission made sure that the imposition of a cumulated duty reflecting the level of subsidisation and the full level of dumping would not result in offsetting the effects of subsidisation twice (‘double-counting’) in accordance with Article 24(1) and Article 15(2) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(765)

The anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with a separate anti-dumping investigation concerning the same product concerned originating from the PRC, in which the Commission imposed anti-dumping measures at the level of the dumping margin. The Commission made sure that the imposition of a cumulated duty reflecting the level of subsidisation and the full level of dumping would not result in offsetting the effects of subsidisation twice (‘double-counting’) in accordance with Article 24(1) and Article 15(2) of the basic Regulation.

| (766) | The normal value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(6a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (154) with reference to undistorted costs and profits in an appropriate external representative country. Consequently, in accordance with Article 15(2) of the basic Regulation and in order to avoid double counting, the Commission first imposed the definitive countervailing duty at the level of the established definitive amount of subsidisation and then imposed the remaining definitive anti-dumping duty, which corresponds to the relevant dumping margin reduced by the amount of the countervailing duty and up to the relevant injury elimination level established in the separate anti-dumping investigation. Since the Commission reduced the dumping margin found with the entire amount of subsidisation established in the PRC, there was no double counting issue within the meaning of Article 24(1) of the basic Regulation |
| --- | --- |

(766)

The normal value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(6a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (154) with reference to undistorted costs and profits in an appropriate external representative country. Consequently, in accordance with Article 15(2) of the basic Regulation and in order to avoid double counting, the Commission first imposed the definitive countervailing duty at the level of the established definitive amount of subsidisation and then imposed the remaining definitive anti-dumping duty, which corresponds to the relevant dumping margin reduced by the amount of the countervailing duty and up to the relevant injury elimination level established in the separate anti-dumping investigation. Since the Commission reduced the dumping margin found with the entire amount of subsidisation established in the PRC, there was no double counting issue within the meaning of Article 24(1) of the basic Regulation

154

| (767) | Given the high rate of cooperation of Chinese exporting producers, the Commission found that the level of the highest duty imposed on the sampled companies would be representative as the ‘all other companies’. The ‘all other companies’ duty will be applied to those companies, which did not cooperate in this investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(767)

Given the high rate of cooperation of Chinese exporting producers, the Commission found that the level of the highest duty imposed on the sampled companies would be representative as the ‘all other companies’. The ‘all other companies’ duty will be applied to those companies, which did not cooperate in this investigation.

| (768) | In accordance with Article 15(3) of the basic Regulation, the total subsidy amount for the cooperating exporting producers not included in the sample was calculated on the basis of the total weighted average amount of countervailing subsidies established for the cooperating exporting producers in the sample with the exclusion of negligible amounts as well as the amount of subsidies established for items, which are subject to the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. However, the Commission did not disregard findings based partially on facts available to determine those amounts. Indeed, the Commission considered that the facts available and used in those cases did not affect substantially the information needed to determine the amount of subsidisation in a fair manner, so that exporters who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation will not be prejudiced by using this approach. |
| --- | --- |

(768)

In accordance with Article 15(3) of the basic Regulation, the total subsidy amount for the cooperating exporting producers not included in the sample was calculated on the basis of the total weighted average amount of countervailing subsidies established for the cooperating exporting producers in the sample with the exclusion of negligible amounts as well as the amount of subsidies established for items, which are subject to the provisions of Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. However, the Commission did not disregard findings based partially on facts available to determine those amounts. Indeed, the Commission considered that the facts available and used in those cases did not affect substantially the information needed to determine the amount of subsidisation in a fair manner, so that exporters who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation will not be prejudiced by using this approach.

| (769) | On the basis of the above, the rates at which such duties will be imposed are set as follows:










  Company | Dumping margin | Subsidy rate | Injury elimination level | Countervailing duty rate | Anti-dumping duty rate |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(769)

On the basis of the above, the rates at which such duties will be imposed are set as follows:

Company

Dumping margin

Subsidy rate

Injury elimination level

Countervailing duty rate

Anti-dumping duty rate

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

44,0 %

10,3 %

61,3 %

10,3 %

33,7 %

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

19,7 %

5,1 %

42,0 %

5,1 %

14,6 %

Other companies cooperating in both anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigation listed in Annex I

31,2 %

7,8 %

52,7 %

7,8 %

23,4 %

Other companies cooperating in the anti-dumping investigation but not in the anti-subsidy investigation listed in Annex II

31,2 %

10,3 %

52,8 %

10,3 %

20,9 %

All other companies

44,0 %

10,3 %

61,3 %

10,3 %

33,7 %

| (770) | The individual company countervailing duty rate specified in this Regulation was established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, it reflects the situation found during the investigation with respect to the company concerned. This duty rate (as opposed to the countrywide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) is thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in the country concerned and produced by the company mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. |
| --- | --- |

(770)

The individual company countervailing duty rate specified in this Regulation was established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, it reflects the situation found during the investigation with respect to the company concerned. This duty rate (as opposed to the countrywide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) is thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in the country concerned and produced by the company mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.

| (771) | A company may request the application of these individual duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate, which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate, which applies to it, a regulation informing about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(771)

A company may request the application of these individual duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate, which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate, which applies to it, a regulation informing about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

7.2.   Special monitoring clause

Special monitoring clause

| (772) | To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual countervailing duties. The companies with individual countervailing duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the countervailing duty applicable to ‘all other companies’. |
| --- | --- |

(772)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual countervailing duties. The companies with individual countervailing duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the countervailing duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

| (773) | While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of countervailing duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and should, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law. |
| --- | --- |

(773)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of countervailing duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and should, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

| (774) | Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a countrywide duty. |
| --- | --- |

(774)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a countrywide duty.

| (775) | In order to ensure a proper enforcement of the countervailing duty, the duty level for all other companies should not only apply to the non-cooperating exporting producers, but also to those producers, which did not have any exports to the Union during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(775)

In order to ensure a proper enforcement of the countervailing duty, the duty level for all other companies should not only apply to the non-cooperating exporting producers, but also to those producers, which did not have any exports to the Union during the investigation period.

8.   DISCLOSURE

DISCLOSURE

| (776) | Interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive countervailing duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the PRC. Interested parties were given the opportunity to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them. |
| --- | --- |

(776)

Interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive countervailing duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the PRC. Interested parties were given the opportunity to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

9.   FINAL PROVISIONS

FINAL PROVISIONS

| (777) | In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (155), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month. |
| --- | --- |

(777)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (155), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

155

| (778) | As explained in recitals (765) and (769) above, the Commission deducted from the dumping margin part of the subsidy amount in order to avoid double counting. Thus, should any modification or removal of the definitive countervailing duties occur, the level of anti-dumping duties should be automatically increased by the same proportion in order to reflect the actual extent of double counting as a result of this modification or removal. This change of the anti-dumping duties should take place as from the entry into force of this regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(778)

As explained in recitals (765) and (769) above, the Commission deducted from the dumping margin part of the subsidy amount in order to avoid double counting. Thus, should any modification or removal of the definitive countervailing duties occur, the level of anti-dumping duties should be automatically increased by the same proportion in order to reflect the actual extent of double counting as a result of this modification or removal. This change of the anti-dumping duties should take place as from the entry into force of this regulation.

| (779) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (156), |
| --- | --- |

(779)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (156),

156

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   A definitive countervailing duty is imposed on imports of single mode optical fibre cables, made up of one or more individually sheathed fibres, with protective casing, whether or not containing electric conductors currently falling under CN code ex 8544 70 00 (TARIC code 8544700010) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

The following products are excluded:

| (i) | cables in which all the optical fibres are individually fitted with operational connectors at one or both extremities; and |
| --- | --- |

(i)

cables in which all the optical fibres are individually fitted with operational connectors at one or both extremities; and

| (ii) | cables for submarine use. Cables for submarine use are plastic insulated optical fibre cables, containing a copper or aluminium conductor, in which fibres are contained in metal module(s). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

cables for submarine use. Cables for submarine use are plastic insulated optical fibre cables, containing a copper or aluminium conductor, in which fibres are contained in metal module(s).

2.   The definitive countervailing duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

| Company | Definitive countervailing duty | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  1. | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

Company

Definitive countervailing duty

TARIC additional code

FTT Group:

1.

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| 2. | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

2.

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| 3. | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

3.

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

10,3 %

C696

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

5,1 %

C697

Other companies cooperating in both anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigation listed in Annex I

7,8 %

Other companies cooperating in the anti-dumping investigation but not in the anti-subsidy investigation listed in Annex II

10,3 %

All other companies

10,3 %

C999

3.   The application of the individual countervailing duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

4.   Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

5.   The customs declaration shall indicate the length in kilometres of the product described in Article 1(1), provided this indication is compatible with Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 (157).

6.   In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty for certain exporting producers, refund requests under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 shall also trigger the assessment of the dumping margin for that exporting producer prevailing during the refund investigation period.

Article 2

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2011 (158) is amended as follows:

| (1) | Article 1(2) is replaced by the following:

  ‘2.   The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:







  Company | Definitive anti-dumping duty | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FTT Group:






  — | FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd |

(1)

Article 1(2) is replaced by the following:

‘2.   The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

Company

Definitive anti-dumping duty

TARIC additional code

FTT Group:

—

FiberHome Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd

| — | Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Nanjing Wasin Fujikura Optical Communication Ltd

| — | Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Hubei Fiberhome Boxin Electronic Co., Ltd

33,7 %

C696

ZTT Group:

| — | Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd

| — | Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Zhongtian Power Optical Cable Co., Ltd

14,6 %

C697

Other companies cooperating in both anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigation listed in Annex I

23,4 %

Other companies cooperating in the anti-dumping investigation but not in the anti-subsidy investigation listed in Annex II

20,9 %

All other companies

33,7 %

C699’

| (2) | a new Article 1(7) is inserted:

  ‘7.   Should the definitive countervailing duties imposed by Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/72 (*1) be modified or removed, the duties specified in paragraph 2 or in Annexes I or II shall be increased by the same proportion limited to the actual dumping margin found or the injury margin found as appropriate per company and from the entry into force of this Regulation.


  (*1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/72 of 18 January 2022 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 12, 19.1.2022, p. 34)’;" |
| --- | --- |

(2)

a new Article 1(7) is inserted:

‘7.   Should the definitive countervailing duties imposed by Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/72 (*1) be modified or removed, the duties specified in paragraph 2 or in Annexes I or II shall be increased by the same proportion limited to the actual dumping margin found or the injury margin found as appropriate per company and from the entry into force of this Regulation.

(*1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/72 of 18 January 2022 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 12, 19.1.2022, p. 34)’;"

*1

| (3) | a new Article 1(8) is inserted:

  ‘8.   In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty for certain exporting producers, refund requests under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 shall also trigger the assessment of the dumping margin for that exporting producer prevailing during the refund investigation period.’; |
| --- | --- |

(3)

a new Article 1(8) is inserted:

‘8.   In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty for certain exporting producers, refund requests under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 shall also trigger the assessment of the dumping margin for that exporting producer prevailing during the refund investigation period.’;

| (4) | Annex I is replaced by Annexes I and II to this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Annex I is replaced by Annexes I and II to this Regulation.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 January 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 55.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 442, 21.12.2020, p. 18.

2

(3)  The term ‘GOC’ is used in this Regulation in a broad sense, including the State Council, as well as all Ministries, Departments, Agencies, and Administrations at central, regional or local level.

3

(4)  Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 316, 24.9.2020, p. 10).

4

(5)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17) (‘HRF case’), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1690 of 9 November 2018 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries and with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1579 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163 (OJ L 283, 12.11.2018, p. 1) (‘Tyres case’) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 of 17 January 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 16, 18.1.2019, p. 5) (‘E-bikes case’), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt (OJ L 189, 15.6.2020, p. 33) (‘GFF case’).

5

(6)  See Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/R, adopted 16 January 2015, para. 7.152.

6

United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China

(7)  See the cases cited in footnote 5 before.

7

(8)  Available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2508.

8

(9)  Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (2020/C 86/06) (OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6).

9

(10)  Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2 (the ‘Report’) – Chapter 4, p. 41-42, 83.

10

(11)  See the Guiding Catalogue of key products and services in strategic emerging industries. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-09/22/5324533/files/dcf470fe4eac413cabb686a51d080eec.pdf and the Made in China 2025 Catalogue of “Four Essentials”. http://www.cm2025.org/show-14-126-1.html and http://www.cm2025.org/uploadfile/2016/1122/20161122053929266.pdf, all last accessed on 18. August 2021.

11

(12)  Report – Chapter 2, p. 17

12

(13)  Notice of the State Council on the Issue of Made in China 2025 (Guofa (2015) No 28) - Government Information Disclosure Column (www.gov.cn), last accessed on 28 June 2021.

13

(14)  See US-China Economic and Security Review Commission: The 13th Five-Year Plan, page 12.

14

(15)  http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-10/14/content_2764849.htm, last accessed on 6 August 2021.

15

(16)  http://www.forestry.gov.cn/lczb/5/20210429/101204144404645.html, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

16

(17)  https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzggw/jgsj/gjss/sjdt/201806/t20180612_1154987.html?code=&state=123, last accessed on 6 August 2021.

17

(18)  https://www.cae.cn/cae/html/files/2015-10/29/20151029105822561730637.pdf, last accessed on 28 June 2021.

18

(19)  See Made in China 2025, Chapter 4: Strategic Support and Supply.

19

(20)  http://www.cm2025.org/show-14-126-1.html, last accessed on 6 August 2021.

20

(21)  http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-06/24/content_9972.htm, last accessed on 6 August 2021.

21

(22)  http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-12/08/content_5145162.htm, last accessed on 6 August 2021.

22

(23)  http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n4509627/c5862297/part/5862506.doc, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

23

(24)  https://www.miit.gov.cn/ztzl/rdzt/znzzxggz/wjfb/art/2020/art_4430cca546bd4f4c9dd7c96b31bc7c11. html, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

24

(25)  https://www.directindustry.com/soc/yangtze-optical-fibre-cable-joint-stock-limited-company-212621.html, last accessed on 6 August 2021.

25

(26)  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-04/15/content_1282430.htm, last accessed on 2 August 2021.

26

(27)  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-08/17/content_2468348.htm, last accessed on 2 August 2021.

27

(28)  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-04/08/content_1576039.htm, last accessed on 2 August 2021.

28

(29)  http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-07/04/content_10002.htm, last accessed on 2 August 2021.

29

(30)  http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/20/content_9789.htm, last accessed on 5 August 2021.

30

(31)  https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/gg/201702/t20170204_961174.html?code=&state=123, last accessed on 3 August 2021.

31

(32)  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-12/21/content_474651.htm, last accessed on 7 August 2021.

32

(33)  http://www.most.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/200312/t20031214_10451.html, last accessed on 7 August 2021.

33

(34)  Appellate Body Report, ‘European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft’

34

(35)  https://itlaw.wikia.org/wiki/Broadband_infrastructure, last accesses on 26 October 2021.

35

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/broadband.asp, last accessed on 26 October 2021.

(36)  Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) (2013 Amendment) (Issued by Order No 9 of the National Development and Reform Commission on March 27, 2011, and amended in accordance with the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) issued by Order No 21 of the National Development and Reform Commission on February 16, 2013).

36

(37)  http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-11/06/5449193/files/26c9d25f713f4ed5b8dc51ae40ef37af.pdf, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

37

(38)  13th Five Year Plan on National High Tech Industry Development Zones (2017), p. 9, http://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2017/201705/t20170510_132712.html, last accessed on 10 August 2021.

38

th

(39)  Preferential policies of the National High-Tech Industrial Development Zones, page 1.

39

(40)  Preferential policies of the National High-Tech Industrial Development Zones, page 1.

40

(41)  See section 3.3.1 of the Catalogue.

41

http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-09/22/5324533/files/dcf470fe4eac413cabb686a51d080eec.pdf, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

(42)  See the Notice of the People’s Government of Zhejiang Province on Issuing ‘The Zhejiang Province’s Action Plan for Comprehensive Transformation and Upgrade of Traditional Manufacturing Industries (2017-2020)’. http://jxt.zj.gov.cn/art/2017/6/4/art_1657971_35695741.html, last accessed on 11 August 2021.

42

(43)  https://asiatimes.com/tag/donghu-high-tech-zone/, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

43

(44)  See article Wuhan East Lake: a National High Tech Zone mixing investment and tax benefit policies, Pedata website, 27 February 2013, https://free.pedata.cn/755314.html, last accessed on 10 August 2021. See excerpt: ‘
  Ten companies have been listed on the "New Third Board" and received the corresponding government subsidies; [...] As regards attracting equity investment institutions to settle in the park or to invest in enterprises located in the park, the relevant departments of Hubei Province, Wuhan Municipality, and the East Lake High-tech Zone have respectively established venture capital guidance funds. Compared with high-tech zones in coastal areas, although the equity investment industry in the inland East Lake High-tech Zone started later, its attractiveness for VC/PE institutions is relatively significant due to its low business registration barrier, strong incentive policy support, and large number of government guidance funds.’

44

Wuhan East Lake: a National High Tech Zone mixing investment and tax benefit policies

Ten companies have been listed on the "New Third Board" and received the corresponding government subsidies; [...] As regards attracting equity investment institutions to settle in the park or to invest in enterprises located in the park, the relevant departments of Hubei Province, Wuhan Municipality, and the East Lake High-tech Zone have respectively established venture capital guidance funds. Compared with high-tech zones in coastal areas, although the equity investment industry in the inland East Lake High-tech Zone started later, its attractiveness for VC/PE institutions is relatively significant due to its low business registration barrier, strong incentive policy support, and large number of government guidance funds

(45)  https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN202004291379049397_1.pdf, p. 133, 138-139, last accessed on 11 August 2021.

45

(46)  https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN202004291379029468_1.pdf, p. 205, 215, last accessed on 11 August 2021.

46

(47)  
  OJ C 394, 17.12.1998, p. 6.

47

(48)  Such as e.g. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 452/2011 (OJ L 128, 14.5.2011, p. 18) (Coated fine paper), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 215/2013 (OJ L 73, 11.3.2013, p. 16) (Organic coated steel), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/366 (OJ L 56, 3.3.2017, p. 1) (Solar panels), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1379/2014 (OJ L 367, 23.12.2014, p. 22) (Filament glass fibre), Commission Implementing Decision 2014/918 (OJ L 360, 17.12.2014 p. 65) (Polyester Staple Fibers).

48

(Coated fine paper

Organic coated steel

Solar panels

Filament glass fibre

Polyester Staple Fibers

(49)  Panel Report, EC – Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 7.1230 – 7.1231; Panel Report, US – AD/CVD (China), paras. 9.138 – 9.139.

49

(50)  Panel Report, United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R, paras. 9.140 – 9.144, 9.157.

50

(51)  WT/DS379/AB/R (US – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China), Appellate Body Report of 11 March 2011, DS 379, paragraph 318. See also WT/DS436/AB/R (US — Carbon Steel (India)), Appellate Body Report of 8 December 2014, paragraphs 4.9 - 4.10, 4.17 - 4.20 and WT/DS437/AB/R (United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China) Appellate Body Report of 18 December 2014, paragraph 4.92.

51

(52)  Decree of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (No 283).

52

(53)  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-banks-party-idUSKBN1JN0XN, last accessed on 13 August 2021.

53

(54)  According to the Implementing Measures of the CBIRC for Administrative Licensing Matters for Chinese-funded Commercial Banks (Order of the CBIRC [2017] No 1), the Implementing Measures of the CBIRC for Administrative Licensing Matters relating to Foreign-funded Banks (Order of the CBIRC [2015] No 4) and the Administrative Measures for the Qualifications of Directors and Senior Officers of Financial Institutions in the Banking Sector (CBIRC [2013] No 3)

54

(55)  http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125440/3876551/de24575c/index2.html, last accessed on 3 August 2021.

55

(56)  See for example the HRF, Tyres and E-bikes cases cited in footnote 5, respectively in Section 3.4.1.1.b, Section 3.4.1.1.b and Section 3.5.1.1.

56

(57)  See http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/Profile/AboutTB/Introduction/ last accessed on 28.10.2021.

57

(58)  See GFF and Tyres cases mentioned in footnote 5.

58

(59)  See GFF and Tyres cases mentioned in footnote 5.

59

(60)  WT/DS/296 (DS296 United States – Countervailing duty investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAMS) from Korea), Appellate Body Report of 21 February 2005, para. 116.

60

(61)  Appellate Body Report, DS 296, para. 116.

61

(62)  Appellate Body Report, DS 296, para. 115.

62

(63)  Appellate Body Report, DS 296, para. 114 agreeing with the Panel Report, DS 194, para. 8.31. on that account.

63

(64)  Appellate Body Report, DS 296, para. 115.

64

(65)  See GFF and Tyres cases mentioned in footnote 5.

65

(66)  IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan, October 2016, WP/16/203.

66

(67)  Livingston, M. Poon, W.P.H. and Zhou, L. (2017). Are Chinese Credit Ratings Relevant? A Study of the Chinese Bond Market and Credit Rating Industry, in: Journal of Banking & Finance, p. 24.

67

(68)  China bond market insight 2021, https://assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/10/China-bond-market-booklet.pdf, last accessed on 8 August 2021.

68

(69)  China bond market insight 2021, Footnote 59, p. 31.

69

(70)  Price, A.H., Brightbill T.C., DeFrancesco R.E., Claeys, S.J., Teslik, A. and Neelakantan, U. (2017). China’s broken promises: why it is not a market-economy, Wiley Rein LLP, p. 68.

70

(71)  See Tentative Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Business Regarding the Securities Market Promulgated by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, Order of the China Securities Regulatory Commission [2007] No 50, 24 August 2007; Notice of the People’s Bank of China on Qualifications of China Cheng Xin Securities Rating Co., Ltd and other Institutions Engaged in Corporate Bond Credit Rating Business, Yinfa [1997] No 547, 16 December 1997, and Announcement No 14 [2018] of the People’s Bank of China and the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Issues Concerning the Provision of Bond Rating Services by Credit Rating Agencies on the Interbank Bond Market and the Stock Exchange Bond Market.

71

(72)  PBOC Working Paper No 2017/5, May 25, 2017, p. 28.

72

(73)  See China Development Bank Fund’s website: http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/ywgl/zhjryw/gkfzjj/, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

73

(74)  See HRF case (recitals 152 to 244), Tyres case (recital 236) and GFF case (recital 300) cited in footnote 5.

74

(75)  See recital (189) above.

75

(76)  In case of fixed interest loans. For variable interest rate loans, the PBOC benchmark rate or after 20 August 2019 to the Loan Prime Rate was taken.

76

(77)  The debt equity ratio is a ratio used to evaluate a company’s financial leverage. The debt equity ratio is expressed as the comparison of a company’s total liabilities to its shareholders equity.

77

(78)  Return on equity measures a corporation’s profitability in relation to stockholders’ equity. Return on equity is calculated by dividing profit before tax by shareholders’ equity.

78

(79)  Source Capital IQ, 2018 contained in the Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Bond Prospectus.

79

(80)  Under such a deal, the company could convert part of its debt into shares, and thus reduce the liabilities on its balance sheet.

80

(81)  HRF and Tyres cases cited in footnote 5 , recitals (175) to (187) in the HRF case, and from recital (256) in the Tyres case

81

(82)  See https://www.barclays.co.uk/current-accounts/bank-account/overdrafts/overdraft-charges/, last accessed on 18 August 2021, fees for executive overdrafts -
  “overdrafts over £15 000 have a set-up fee of 1.5% of the arranged overdraft limit, and a renewal fee of 1.5%”
  .

82

“overdrafts over £15 000 have a set-up fee of 1.5% of the arranged overdraft limit, and a renewal fee of 1.5%”

(83)  See GFF case cited in footnote 5 (recitals 354 and 355)

83

(84)  See footnote 79

84

(85)  https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/commitment-fee/

85

(86)  https://www.barclays.co.uk/business-banking/borrow/overdrafts/

86

(87)  See website of the People’s Bank of China:

87

https://www.boc.cn/en/cbservice/cncb6/cb61/200811/t20081112_1324239.html, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

(88)  Ibid.

88

(89)  See website of DBS Bank: https://www.dbs.com.cn/corporate/financing/working-capital/bank-acceptance-draft-bad-issuance, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

89

(90)  See GFF case mentioned in footnote 5, recital 385.

90

(91)  See GFF case mentioned in footnote 5, recital 399.

91

(92)  
  "Quarterly Review, Summer 1981"

92

(93)  See Bank of Canada Discussion Paper: A Primer on the Canadian Bankers’ Acceptance Market and https://fast.bnm.gov.my/fastweb/public/files/BA_Apr2004_Updated.pdf

93

(94)  See recital (189) above.

94

(95)  Legislation applicable at the time of the issuance of the convertible bonds.

95

(96)  Lastly amended on 28 December 2019 by Presidential Decree No 37 with effect from 1 March 2020.

96

(97)  Lastly amended on 14 February 2020 pursuant to the Decision on Revision of the "Administrative Measures on Securities Issuance by Listed Companies" of the China Securities Regulatory Commission with effect from 14 February 2020.

97

(98)  Replaced by Administrative Measures on the Sponsor Service for Securities Issuances and Listings, Decree No 170 of the China Securities Regulatory Commission of 12 June 2020 with effect from 12 June 2020.

98

(99)  See China bond market insight 2021, Footnote 59, p. 33.

99

(100)  As there were no data specific to convertible corporate bonds publicly available, the Commission used the data available for corporate bonds, which should also include convertible corporate bonds.

100

(101)  See recital (189) above.

101

(102)  Lastly amended on 28 December 2019 by Presidential Decree No 37 with effect from 1 March 2020.

102

(103)  See China bond market insight 2021, Footnote 59, p. 33.

103

(104)  OECD Study on Chinese export credit policies and programmes, page 7, para 32, available at https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/ECG(2015)3&doclanguage=en, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

104

(105)  See Sinosure website, Company profile, Supporting ‘Made in China’, https://www.sinosure.com.cn/en/Resbonsiblity/smic/index.shtml, last accessed on 17 August 2021.

105

(106)  See Tyres case cited in footnote 5, recital 429.

106

(107)  https://www.sinosure.com.cn/en/Sinosure/Profile/index.shtml, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

107

(108)  China’s High-tech Products Export Catalogue, e.g. No 775, 780, 781, 1035, 1098, 1100, 1104, 1107 and 1109.

108

(109)  http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/g/200411/20041100300040.html, last accessed on 12 August 2021.

109

(110)  Sinosure Annual Report 2019, p. 11, https://www.sinosure.com.cn/images/xwzx/ndbd/2020/08/27/38BBA5826A689D7D5B1DAE8BB66FACF8.pdf , last accessed on 18 August 2019.

110

(111)  Ibid, p. 28 and 29.

111

(112)  Order No 23 of the President of the People’s Republic of China.

112

(113)  Implementing Regulations of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China (Revised in 2019) - Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China No 714.

113

(114)  http://kj.quanzhou.gov.cn/wsbs/xgxz/201703/t20170322_431820.htm, last accessed on 17 August 2021.

114

(115)  Announcement [2021] No 13 of the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration on Further Improvements to the Policy of Weighted Pre-tax Deduction for Research and Development Expenses.

115

(116)  See HRF, Tyres and GFF cases cited in footnote 5, recitals 330, 521 and 560 respectively.

116

(117)  Recital 182 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 215/2013 of 11 March 2013 imposing a countervailing duty on imports of certain organic coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 73, 15.3.2013, p. 16).

117

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 451/2011 of 6 May 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 128, 14.5.2011, p. 1).

(118)  See GFF case, recital (531).

118

(119)  Several Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Power System (Zhong Fa [2015] No 9), Section III (4).

119

(120)  Circular of the National Development and Reform Commission on Reducing Electricity Cost of Enterprises to Supporting Restoration of Work and Production Development and Reform Price [2020] No 258.

120

(121)  See GFF, OCS, and Solar panels cases.

121

(122)  See section 3.1 above.

122

(123)  Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2 – Chapter 9, p. 213-215.

123

(124)  Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2 – Chapter 9, p. 209-211.

124

(125)  See footnote 105.

125

(126)  Upheld by the General Court in Case T-444/11 Gold East Paper and Gold Huacheng Paper versus Council, Judgment of the General Court of 11 September 2014 ECLI:EU:T:2014:773.

126

(127)  See GFF, OCS, and Solar panels cases.

127

(128)  https://idbpark.moeaidb.gov.tw/, last accessed on 18 August 2021.

128

(129)  Hubei - Wikipedia

129

(130)  Jiangsu - Wikipedia

130

(131)  https://www.earthmagazine.org/article/mineral-resource-month-germanium/, last accessed on 17 August 2021.

131

(132)  https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/201603/P020191104614882474091.pdf, last accessed on 4 August 2021.

132

(133)  http://www.yn.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/zxwj/201701/t20170106_143075.html, last accessed on 4 August 2021.

133

(134)  http://www.yn.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/zxwj/202004/t20200426_203069.html, last accessed on 4 August 2021.

134

(135)  https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN202104221487092732_1.pdf?1619123432000.pdf, p. 171, last accessed on 5 August 2021.

135

(136)  https://chxz.chinalco.com.cn/tzzgx/dqbg/202103/P020210325553668267186.pdf, p. 221, last accessed on 6 August 2021.

136

(137)  See also, mutatis mutandis, WT/DS294/AB/RW, US — Zeroing (Article 21.5 DSU), Appellate Body Report of 14 May 2009, para 453.

137

mutatis mutandis

(138)  CRU Cable Market Outlook (August 2020), complemented by complainants’ market intelligence.

138

(139)  These indicators were based on direct data collected by the complainant on the 8 complaining or supporting Union producers (excluding one company for the reasons explained at recital (574) representing almost 80% of the Union production in the IP, plus an estimate for the remaining Union producers based on market research and intelligence.

139

(140)  CRU Cable Market Outlook (August 2020), p. 29, and CRU Worldwide Cable Market Summary by Application and Region, February 2021.

140

(141)  Estimations based on public sources (CRU Article of 10 January 2020
  ‘Further instability on the horizon as tumultuous year ends’ and slides from CRU Wire Cable Conference, June 2019), provided as Annex 6.1 and 6.5 to the complaint and further elaborated on in the complaint.

141

(142)  Panel Report, China – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from the European Union, WT/DS425/R, para. 7.67.

142

(143)  
  OJ L 362, 30.12.1988, p. 59, recital 7.

143

(144)  Judgment of 17 December 1997, EFMA v Council, T-121/95, EU:T:1997:198, paras. 105 et seq.

144

EFMA v Council

(145)  Full time equivalent.

145

(146)  These are representative, covering 36 % of EU industry sales in the IP.

146

(147)  Commission Decision 98/230/EC of 20 March 1998 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 87, 21.3.1998, p. 24).

147

(148)  Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/R, paras. 7.245-7.256

148

(149)  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/176 of 9 February 2016 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of tartaric acid originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by Hangzhou Bioking Biochemical Engineering Co. Ltd (OJ L 33, 10.2.2016, p. 14), recital (140)

149

(150)  Panel Report, European Communities and Certain member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316, para. 7.2083.

150

(151)  Judgment of the General Court, 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union, T-528/09, EU:T:2014:35, paras. 79-80.

151

(152)  In her 2020 State of the Union address, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated:
  “The investment boost through NextGenerationEU is a unique chance to drive expansion to every village. This is why we want to focus our investments on secure connectivity, on the expansion of 5G, 6G and fibre. NextGenerationEU is also a unique opportunity to develop a more coherent European approach to connectivity and digital infrastructure deployment.”

152

“The investment boost through NextGenerationEU is a unique chance to drive expansion to every village. This is why we want to focus our investments on secure connectivity, on the expansion of 5G, 6G and fibre. NextGenerationEU is also a unique opportunity to develop a more coherent European approach to connectivity and digital infrastructure deployment.”

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655.

(153)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic And Social Committee and the Committee of The Regions: 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade, Brussels, 9.3.2021 COM(2021) 118 final.

153

(154)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21).

154

(155)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

155

(156)  As last amended by Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ L 143, 7.6.2018, p. 1).

156

(157)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1), Annex I ‘Combined Nomenclature’.

157

(158)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2011 of 17 November 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 410, 18.11.2021, p. 51).

158

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ANNEX I

Other companies cooperating in both anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigation

| Name of the company | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- |
| Dongjie Optical Technology (Suzhou) Co., Ltd | C700 |
| Fasten Group: | Jiangsu Fasten Optical Communication Technology Co., Ltd |

Name of the company

TARIC additional code

Dongjie Optical Technology (Suzhou) Co., Ltd

C700

Fasten Group:

Jiangsu Fasten Optical Communication Technology Co., Ltd

| | Jiangsu Fasten Optical Cable Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

Jiangsu Fasten Optical Cable Co., Ltd

C701

Hangzhou Futong Communication Technology Co., Ltd

C702

Hangzhou Tuolima Network Technologies Co., Ltd

C703

Jiangsu Etern Co., Ltd

C704

Jiangsu Hengtong Group:

| | Hengtong Optic-Electric Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

Hengtong Optic-Electric Co., Ltd

| | Guangdong Hengtong Optic-electronical Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

Guangdong Hengtong Optic-electronical Technology Co., Ltd

| | Jiangsu Hengtong Smart Grids Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

Jiangsu Hengtong Smart Grids Co., Ltd

| | Zhejiang Dongtong Optical Network and IOT Technology Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

Zhejiang Dongtong Optical Network and IOT Technology Co., Ltd

C705

Jiangsu Tongguang Optical Fiber Cable Co., Ltd

C706

LEONI Cable (China) Co., Ltd

C707

Nanjing Huamai Technology Co., Ltd

C708

Ningbo Geyida Cable Technology Co., Ltd

C709

SDG group:

| — | Shenzhen SDG Information Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Shenzhen SDG Information Co., Ltd

| — | Shenzhen SDGI Optical Network Technologies co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Shenzhen SDGI Optical Network Technologies co., Ltd

C725

Shanghai Qishen International Trade Co., Ltd

C712

Shenzhen Wanbao Optical Fiber Communication Co., Ltd

C713

Sichuan Huiyuan Optical Communications Co., Ltd

C714

Suzhou Furukawa Power Optic Cable Co., Ltd

C715

Suzhou Torres Optic-electric Technology Co., Ltd

C716

Twentsche (Nanjing) Fibre Optics Ltd

C717

XDK Communication Equipment (Huizhou) Ltd

C718

Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable group:

| — | Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable Joint Stock Limited Company |
| --- | --- |

—

Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable Joint Stock Limited Company

| — | Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable (Shanghai) Company Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable (Shanghai) Company Ltd

| — | Yangtze Zhongli Optical Fibre and Cable (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

—

Yangtze Zhongli Optical Fibre and Cable (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd

| — | Sichuan Lefei Optoelectronic Technology Company Limited |
| --- | --- |

—

Sichuan Lefei Optoelectronic Technology Company Limited

| — | Everpro Technology Company Limited |
| --- | --- |

—

Everpro Technology Company Limited

C719

---

ANNEX II

Other companies cooperating in anti-dumping investigation but not in anti-subsidy investigation

| Name of the company | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- |
| Anhui Tianji Information Technology Co., Ltd | C698 |
| Prysmian Wuxi Cable Co., Ltd | C710 |

Name of the company

TARIC additional code

Anhui Tianji Information Technology Co., Ltd

C698

Prysmian Wuxi Cable Co., Ltd

C710

---

DECISIONS

| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/148 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/148

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/73

of 18 January 2022

amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 as regards authorisation to Hungary to apply for a further period the special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1), and in particular Article 395(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 287, point (12), of Directive 2006/112/EC, Hungary may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 287, point (12), of Directive 2006/112/EC, Hungary may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.

| (2) | By Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 (2), Hungary was authorised to introduce a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 48 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession to the Union, either until 31 December 2021 or until the entry into force of a directive amending the provisions of Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is earlier (‘the special measure’). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 (2), Hungary was authorised to introduce a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 48 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession to the Union, either until 31 December 2021 or until the entry into force of a directive amending the provisions of Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is earlier (‘the special measure’).

| (3) | By letter of 19 April 2021, Hungary submitted a request to the Commission for an authorisation to continue to apply the special measure until 31 December 2024, the date by which Member States are to transpose Council Directive (EU) 2020/285 (3) which lays down simpler VAT rules for small enterprises. That Directive also allows Member States to exempt taxable persons whose Member State annual turnover does not exceed a threshold of EUR 85 000 or the equivalent in national currency. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter of 19 April 2021, Hungary submitted a request to the Commission for an authorisation to continue to apply the special measure until 31 December 2024, the date by which Member States are to transpose Council Directive (EU) 2020/285 (3) which lays down simpler VAT rules for small enterprises. That Directive also allows Member States to exempt taxable persons whose Member State annual turnover does not exceed a threshold of EUR 85 000 or the equivalent in national currency.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 395(2), second subparagraph, of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission transmitted the request made by Hungary to the other Member States by letter dated 28 June 2021. By letter dated 29 June 2021, the Commission notified Hungary that it had all the information necessary for the appraisal of the request. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 395(2), second subparagraph, of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission transmitted the request made by Hungary to the other Member States by letter dated 28 June 2021. By letter dated 29 June 2021, the Commission notified Hungary that it had all the information necessary for the appraisal of the request.

| (5) | The special measure is in line with Directive (EU) 2020/285, which seeks to reduce VAT compliance costs for small enterprises, distortions of competition at both national and Union level, and the negative impact of transition from exemption to taxation (the threshold effect). It also seeks to facilitate compliance by small enterprises as well as monitoring by tax authorities. The threshold of EUR 48 000 is consistent with the new threshold for exemption as laid down by Directive (EU) 2020/285. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The special measure is in line with Directive (EU) 2020/285, which seeks to reduce VAT compliance costs for small enterprises, distortions of competition at both national and Union level, and the negative impact of transition from exemption to taxation (the threshold effect). It also seeks to facilitate compliance by small enterprises as well as monitoring by tax authorities. The threshold of EUR 48 000 is consistent with the new threshold for exemption as laid down by Directive (EU) 2020/285.

| (6) | The special measure will remain optional for taxable persons. Taxable persons may still opt for the normal VAT arrangements pursuant to Article 290 of Directive 2006/112/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The special measure will remain optional for taxable persons. Taxable persons may still opt for the normal VAT arrangements pursuant to Article 290 of Directive 2006/112/EC.

| (7) | According to information provided by Hungary, the special measure will have only a negligible effect on the overall amount of the tax revenue Hungary collects at the stage of final consumption. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

According to information provided by Hungary, the special measure will have only a negligible effect on the overall amount of the tax revenue Hungary collects at the stage of final consumption.

| (8) | Following the entry into force of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/769 (4), there will be no compensation calculation carried out by Hungary with regard to the VAT own resource statement for the financial year 2021 onwards. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Following the entry into force of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/769 (4), there will be no compensation calculation carried out by Hungary with regard to the VAT own resource statement for the financial year 2021 onwards.

| (9) | Given the positive impact of the special measure in simplifying VAT-related obligations by reducing the administrative burden and compliance costs for small enterprises and for the tax authorities, and the lack of any major impact on the total VAT revenue generated, Hungary should be authorised to apply the special measure for a further period. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Given the positive impact of the special measure in simplifying VAT-related obligations by reducing the administrative burden and compliance costs for small enterprises and for the tax authorities, and the lack of any major impact on the total VAT revenue generated, Hungary should be authorised to apply the special measure for a further period.

| (10) | The authorisation to apply the special measure should be limited in time. The time limit should be sufficient to allow for evaluating the effectiveness and appropriateness of the threshold. Moreover, pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive (EU) 2020/285, Member States are to adopt and publish, by 31 December 2024, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Article 1 of that Directive, and are to apply those provisions from 1 January 2025. It is therefore appropriate to authorise Hungary to apply the special measure until 31 December 2024. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The authorisation to apply the special measure should be limited in time. The time limit should be sufficient to allow for evaluating the effectiveness and appropriateness of the threshold. Moreover, pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive (EU) 2020/285, Member States are to adopt and publish, by 31 December 2024, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Article 1 of that Directive, and are to apply those provisions from 1 January 2025. It is therefore appropriate to authorise Hungary to apply the special measure until 31 December 2024.

| (11) | In order to avoid disruptive effects, Hungary should be allowed to apply the special measure without interruption. The authorisation requested should therefore be granted with effect from 1 January 2022, in order to follow seamlessly on from the prior arrangements under Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In order to avoid disruptive effects, Hungary should be allowed to apply the special measure without interruption. The authorisation requested should therefore be granted with effect from 1 January 2022, in order to follow seamlessly on from the prior arrangements under Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490.

| (12) | Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Article 2 of Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 2

This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2019 until 31 December 2024.’.

Article 2

This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to Hungary.

Done at Brussels, 18 January 2022.

For the Council

The President

B. LE MAIRE

---

(1)  
  OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1.

1

(2)  Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1490 of 2 October 2018 authorising Hungary to introduce a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 252, 8.10.2018, p. 38).

2

(3)  Council Directive (EU) 2020/285 of 18 February 2020 amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for small enterprises and Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the administrative cooperation and exchange of information for the purpose of monitoring the correct application of the special scheme for small enterprises (OJ L 62, 2.3.2020, p. 13).

3

(4)  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/769 of 30 April 2021 amending Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89 on the definitive uniform arrangements for the collection of own resources accruing from value added tax (OJ L 165, 11.5.2021, p. 9).

4

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| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/151 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/151

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/74

of 17 January 2022

setting out the list of Interreg programmes and indicating the global amount of the total support from the European Regional Development Fund and from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme and the list of the amounts transferred between strands under the European territorial cooperation goal for the period 2021 to 2027

(notified under document C(2022) 131)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments (1), and in particular Article 11(1) thereof,

After consulting the committee established by Article 115(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (2),

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 sets out the global resources available under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) and their allocation to cross-border cooperation, transnational cooperation, interregional cooperation and outermost regions’ cooperation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 sets out the global resources available under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) and their allocation to cross-border cooperation, transnational cooperation, interregional cooperation and outermost regions’ cooperation.

| (2) | In accordance with Article 9(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the Commission communicated to each Member State its share of the global amounts for cross-border cooperation, transnational cooperation and outermost regions’ cooperation, broken down by year in accordance with the methodology set out in point 8 of Annex XXVI to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In accordance with Article 9(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the Commission communicated to each Member State its share of the global amounts for cross-border cooperation, transnational cooperation and outermost regions’ cooperation, broken down by year in accordance with the methodology set out in point 8 of Annex XXVI to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060.

| (3) | Pursuant to Article 9(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, based on the amounts communicated by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, each Member State informed the Commission whether and how it has used the transfer option provided for in paragraph 4 of that Article, and on the resulting distribution of its share among the Interreg programmes in which the Member State participates. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Pursuant to Article 9(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, based on the amounts communicated by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, each Member State informed the Commission whether and how it has used the transfer option provided for in paragraph 4 of that Article, and on the resulting distribution of its share among the Interreg programmes in which the Member State participates.

| (4) | In accordance with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the Commission and the Member States concerned establish the contribution from the ERDF to external cross-border Interreg programmes to be also supported from the financial envelope allocated under the Instrument for Pre-Accession III to cross-border cooperation (IPA III-CBC) or from the financial envelope allocated under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe to cross-border cooperation for the Neighbourhood geographic area (NDICI CBC). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

In accordance with Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the Commission and the Member States concerned establish the contribution from the ERDF to external cross-border Interreg programmes to be also supported from the financial envelope allocated under the Instrument for Pre-Accession III to cross-border cooperation (IPA III-CBC) or from the financial envelope allocated under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe to cross-border cooperation for the Neighbourhood geographic area (NDICI CBC).

| (5) | In accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the Commission also establishes a list of the amounts transferred pursuant to Article 9(4) of that Regulation, broken down by Member State. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

In accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the Commission also establishes a list of the amounts transferred pursuant to Article 9(4) of that Regulation, broken down by Member State.

| (6) | It is therefore necessary to set up the list of Interreg programmes and to indicate the global amount of the total support from the ERDF and, where applicable, the total support from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme as well as the list of the amounts transferred pursuant to Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, broken down by Member State, |
| --- | --- |

(6)

It is therefore necessary to set up the list of Interreg programmes and to indicate the global amount of the total support from the ERDF and, where applicable, the total support from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme as well as the list of the amounts transferred pursuant to Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, broken down by Member State,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The list of cross-border cooperation programmes, the global amount of the total support from the ERDF and, where applicable, the total support from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme, is set out in Annex I.

Article 2

The list of transnational cooperation programmes, the global amount of the total support from the ERDF and, where applicable, the total support from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme, is set out in Annex II.

Article 3

The list of interregional cooperation programmes, the global amount of the total support from the ERDF and, where applicable, the total support from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme, is set out in Annex III.

Article 4

The list of outermost regions’ cooperation programmes, the global amount of the total support from the ERDF and, where applicable, the total support from each external financing instrument of the Union for each programme, is set out in Annex IV.

Article 5

The amounts transferred pursuant to Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, broken down by Member State, are set out in Annex V.

Article 6

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 17 January 2022.

For the Commission

Elisa FERREIRA

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 94.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159.

2

---

ANNEX I

List of cross-border cooperation programmes with indication of the global amount of the total support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA III) and the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) for each cross-border cooperation programme

| N° | CCI | Name of the programme | Member States | Non-Member States | Global ERDF contribution | IPA II Icontribution | NDICI contribution | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2021TC16RFCB001 | (Interreg VI-A) Maas-Rijn/Meuse-Rhin/Maas-Rhein (NL-BE-DE) | NL BE DE | | 125 677 095 | | | 125 677 095 |
| 2 | 2021TC16RFCB002 | (Interreg VI-A) Austria-Czechia | AT CZ | | 86 821 148 | | | 86 821 148 |
| 3 | 2021TC16RFCB003 | (Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Austria | SK AT | | 55 500 000 | | | 55 500 000 |
| 4 | 2021TC16RFCB004 | (Interreg VI-A) Austria-Germany/Bavaria | AT DE | | 61 547 037 | | | 61 547 037 |
| 5 | 2021TC16RFCB005 | (Interreg VI-A) Spain-Portugal (POCTEP) | ES PT | | 320 622 726 | | | 320 622 726 |
| 6 | 2021TC16RFCB006 | (Interreg VI-A) Spain-France-Andorra (POCTEFA) | ES FR | AD | 243 079 964 | | | 243 079 964 |
| 7 | 2021TC16RFCB007 | (Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Croatia | HU HR | | 70 034 030 | | | 70 034 030 |
| 8 | 2021TC16RFCB008 | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Bavaria-Czechia | DE CZ | | 99 064 772 | | | 99 064 772 |
| 9 | 2021TC16RFCB009 | (Interreg VI-A) Austria-Hungary | AT HU | | 49 561 200 | | | 49 561 200 |
| 10 | 2021TC16RFCB010 | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Brandenburg-Poland | DE PL | | 88 300 000 | | | 88 300 000 |
| 11 | 2021TC16RFCB011 | (Interreg VI-A) Poland-Slovakia | PL SK | | 129 286 462 | | | 129 286 462 |
| 12 | 2021TC16RFCB012 | (Interreg VI-A) Poland-Denmark-Germany-Lithuania-Sweden (South Baltic) | PL DK DE LT SE | | 83 802 411 | | | 83 802 411 |
| 13 | 2021TC16RFCB013 | (Interreg VI-A) Finland-Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (Central Baltic) | FI EE LV SE | | 126 788 865 | | | 126 788 865 |
| 14 | 2021TC16RFCB014 | (Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Slovakia | HU SK | | 129 000 000 | | | 129 000 000 |
| 15 | 2021TC16RFCB015 | (Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Norway | SE | NO | 47 200 000 | | | 47 200 000 |
| 16 | 2021TC16RFCB016 | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Saxony-Czechia | DE CZ | | 152 364 968 | | | 152 364 968 |
| 17 | 2021TC16RFCB017 | (Interreg VI-A) Poland-Germany/Saxony | PL DE | | 60 275 000 | | | 60 275 000 |
| 18 | 2021TC16RFCB018 | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Mecklenburg Western Pomerania/Brandenburg-Poland | DE PL | | 124 580 000 | | | 124 580 000 |
| 19 | 2021TC16RFCB019 | (Interreg VI-A) Greece-Italy | EL IT | | 79 582 928 | | | 79 582 928 |
| 20 | 2021TC16RFCB020 | (Interreg VI-A) Romania-Bulgaria | RO BG | | 163 497 401 | | | 163 497 401 |
| 21 | 2021TC16RFCB021 | (Interreg VI-A) Greece-Bulgaria | EL BG | | 67 162 945 | | | 67 162 945 |
| 22 | 2021TC16RFCB022 | (Interreg VI-A) Germany-The Netherlands | DE NL | | 240 775 132 | | | 240 775 132 |
| 23 | 2021TC16RFCB023 | (Interreg VI-A) Germany-Austria-Switzerland-Liechtenstein
  (Alpenrhein-Bodensee-Hochrhein) | DE AT | CH LI | 47 569 062 | | | 47 569 062 |
| 24 | 2021TC16RFCB024 | (Interreg VI-A) Czechia-Poland | CZ PL | | 178 870 508 | | | 178 870 508 |
| 25 | 2021TC16RFCB025 | (Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Denmark-Norway (Öresund-Kattegat-
  Skagerrak) | SE DK | NO | 141 300 000 | | | 141 300 000 |
| 26 | 2021TC16RFCB026 | (Interreg VI-A) Latvia-Lithuania | LV LT | | 31 752 230 | | | 31 752 230 |
| 27 | 2021TC16RFCB027 | (Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Finland-Norway (AURORA) | SE FI | NO | 93 809 500 | | | 93 809 500 |
| 28 | 2021TC16RFCB028 | (Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Croatia | SI HR | | 39 344 493 | | | 39 344 493 |
| 29 | 2021TC16RFCB029 | (Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Czechia | SK CZ | | 85 323 597 | | | 85 323 597 |
| 30 | 2021TC16RFCB030 | (Interreg VI-A) Lithuania-Poland | LT PL | | 45 706 836 | | | 45 706 836 |
| 31 | 2021TC16RFCB031 | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-France (Maritime) | IT FR | | 154 636 861 | | | 154 636 861 |
| 32 | 2021TC16RFCB032 | (Interreg VI-A) France-Italy (ALCOTRA) | FR IT | | 182 330 487 | | | 182 330 487 |
| 33 | 2021TC16RFCB033 | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Switzerland | IT | CH | 82 346 673 | | | 82 346 673 |
| 34 | 2021TC16RFCB034 | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Slovenia | IT SI | | 70 898 662 | | | 70 898 662 |
| 35 | 2021TC16RFCB035 | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Malta | IT MT | | 46 083 225 | | | 46 083 225 |
| 36 | 2021TC16RFCB036 | (Interreg VI-A) France-Germany-Switzerland (Upper Rhine) | FR DE | CH | 125 117 615 | | | 125 117 615 |
| 37 | 2021TC16RFCB037 | (Interreg VI-A) France-Switzerland | FR | CH | 69 766 796 | | | 69 766 796 |
| 38 | 2021TC16RFCB038 | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Croatia | IT HR | | 172 986 266 | | | 172 986 266 |
| 39 | 2021TC16RFCB039 | (Interreg VI-A) Belgium-France (Wallonie-Vlaanderen-France) | BE FR | | 286 882 570 | | | 286 882 570 |
| 40 | 2021TC16RFCB040 | (Interreg VI-A) France-Belgium-Germany-Luxembourg (Grande Région/Großregion) | FR BE DE LU | | 181 942 401 | | | 181 942 401 |
| 41 | 2021TC16RFCB041 | (Interreg VI-A) Belgium-The Netherlands (Vlaanderen-Nederland) | BE NL | | 205 405 605 | | | 205 405 605 |
| 42 | 2021TC16RFCB042 | (Interreg VI-A) Romania-Hungary | RO HU | | 140 752 020 | | | 140 752 020 |
| 43 | 2021TC16RFCB043 | (Interreg VI-A) Estonia-Latvia | EE LV | | 26 004 949 | | | 26 004 949 |
| 44 | 2021TC16RFCB044 | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Austria | IT AT | | 73 071 805 | | | 73 071 805 |
| 45 | 2021TC16RFCB045 | (Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Hungary | SI HU | | 14 109 017 | | | 14 109 017 |
| 46 | 2021TC16RFCB046 | (Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Austria | SI AT | | 45 846 198 | | | 45 846 198 |
| 47 | 2021TC16RFCB047 | (Interreg VI-A) Greece-Cyprus | EL CY | | 45 991 214 | | | 45 991 214 |
| 48 | 2021TC16RFCB048 | (Interreg VI-A) Germany Denmark | DE DK | | 93 771 505 | | | 93 771 505 |
| 49 | 2014TC16RFPC001 | PEACE PLUS Ireland-Northern Ireland/United Kingdom | IE | UK | 234 474 919 | | | 234 474 919 |
| 50 | 2021TC16IPCB006 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria North Macedonia | BG | MK | 12 916 849 | 13 562 691 | | 26 479 540 |
| 51 | 2021TC16IPCB007 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Serbia | BG | RS | 15 804 360 | 16 594 578 | | 32 398 938 |
| 52 | 2021TC16IPCB005 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Turkey | BG | TR | 14 269 738 | 14 983 225 | | 29 252 963 |
| 53 | 2021TC16IPCB003 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia Serbia | HR | RS | 18 673 977 | 19 607 676 | | 38 281 653 |
| 54 | 2021TC16IPCB004 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Montenegro | HR | BA ME | 57 407 658 | 60 278 041 | | 117 685 699 |
| 55 | 2021TC16IPCB010 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece Albania | EL | AL | 13 000 000 | 13 650 000 | | 26 650 000 |
| 56 | 2021TC16IPCB009 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece North Macedonia | EL | MK | 13 000 000 | 13 650 000 | | 26 650 000 |
| 57 | 2021TC16IPCB001 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Hungary Serbia | HU | RS | 31 000 000 | 32 550 000 | | 63 550 000 |
| 58 | 2021TC16IPCB008 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Italy Albania Montenegro (South Adriatic) | IT | AL ME | 32 695 846 | 34 330 638 | | 67 026 484 |
| 59 | 2021TC16IPCB002 | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Romania Serbia | RO | RS | 36 374 062 | 38 192 765 | | 74 566 827 |
| 60 | 2021TC16NXCB004 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Estonia Russia | EE | RU | 10 906 623 | | 11 124 755 | 22 031 378 |
| 61 | 2021TC16NXCB010 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Hungary Slovakia Romania Ukraine | HU SK RO | UA | 30 998 055 | | 31 618 016 | 62 616 071 |
| 62 | 2021TC16NXCB013 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Italy Tunisia | IT | TN | 16 010 314 | | 16 330 520 | 32 340 834 |
| 63 | 2021TC16NXCB002 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Karelia | FI | RU | 14 003 500 | | 14 283 570 | 28 287 070 |
| 64 | 2021TC16NXCB001 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Kolarctic | FI SE | RU NO | 17 501 359 | | 17 851 386 | 35 352 745 |
| 65 | 2021TC16NXCB005 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Russia | LV | RU | 7 000 000 | | 7 140 000 | 14 140 000 |
| 66 | 2021TC16NXCB006 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Russia | LT | RU | 11 952 500 | | 12 191 550 | 24 144 050 |
| 67 | 2021TC16NXCB009 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Belarus Ukraine | PL | BY UA | 87 900 000 | | 89 658 000 | 177 558 000 |
| 68 | 2021TC16NXCB007 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Russia | PL | RU | 43 240 000 | | 44 104 800 | 87 344 800 |
| 69 | 2021TC16NXCB011 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Rep.Moldova | RO | MD | 36 250 000 | | 36 975 000 | 73 225 000 |
| 70 | 2021TC16NXCB012 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Ukraine | RO | UA | 25 350 000 | | 25 857 000 | 51 207 000 |
| 71 | 2021TC16NXCB003 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT South East Finland Russia | FI | RU | 24 003 500 | | 24 483 570 | 48 487 070 |
| 72 | 2021TC16NXCB008 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Belarus | LV | BY | 5 860 134 | | 5 977 337 | 11 837 471 |
| 73 | 2021TC16NXCB014 | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Belarus | LT | BY | 16 000 000 | | 16 320 000 | 32 320 000 |
| | | | | Total: | 6 115 505 509 | 257 399 614 | 353 915 504 | 6 726 820 627 |

N°

CCI

Name of the programme

Member States

Non-Member States

Global ERDF contribution

IPA II Icontribution

NDICI contribution

Total

1

2021TC16RFCB001

(Interreg VI-A) Maas-Rijn/Meuse-Rhin/Maas-Rhein (NL-BE-DE)

NL BE DE

125 677 095

125 677 095

2

2021TC16RFCB002

(Interreg VI-A) Austria-Czechia

AT CZ

86 821 148

86 821 148

3

2021TC16RFCB003

(Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Austria

SK AT

55 500 000

55 500 000

4

2021TC16RFCB004

(Interreg VI-A) Austria-Germany/Bavaria

AT DE

61 547 037

61 547 037

5

2021TC16RFCB005

(Interreg VI-A) Spain-Portugal (POCTEP)

ES PT

320 622 726

320 622 726

6

2021TC16RFCB006

(Interreg VI-A) Spain-France-Andorra (POCTEFA)

ES FR

AD

243 079 964

243 079 964

7

2021TC16RFCB007

(Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Croatia

HU HR

70 034 030

70 034 030

8

2021TC16RFCB008

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Bavaria-Czechia

DE CZ

99 064 772

99 064 772

9

2021TC16RFCB009

(Interreg VI-A) Austria-Hungary

AT HU

49 561 200

49 561 200

10

2021TC16RFCB010

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Brandenburg-Poland

DE PL

88 300 000

88 300 000

11

2021TC16RFCB011

(Interreg VI-A) Poland-Slovakia

PL SK

129 286 462

129 286 462

12

2021TC16RFCB012

(Interreg VI-A) Poland-Denmark-Germany-Lithuania-Sweden (South Baltic)

PL DK DE LT SE

83 802 411

83 802 411

13

2021TC16RFCB013

(Interreg VI-A) Finland-Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (Central Baltic)

FI EE LV SE

126 788 865

126 788 865

14

2021TC16RFCB014

(Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Slovakia

HU SK

129 000 000

129 000 000

15

2021TC16RFCB015

(Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Norway

SE

NO

47 200 000

47 200 000

16

2021TC16RFCB016

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Saxony-Czechia

DE CZ

152 364 968

152 364 968

17

2021TC16RFCB017

(Interreg VI-A) Poland-Germany/Saxony

PL DE

60 275 000

60 275 000

18

2021TC16RFCB018

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Mecklenburg Western Pomerania/Brandenburg-Poland

DE PL

124 580 000

124 580 000

19

2021TC16RFCB019

(Interreg VI-A) Greece-Italy

EL IT

79 582 928

79 582 928

20

2021TC16RFCB020

(Interreg VI-A) Romania-Bulgaria

RO BG

163 497 401

163 497 401

21

2021TC16RFCB021

(Interreg VI-A) Greece-Bulgaria

EL BG

67 162 945

67 162 945

22

2021TC16RFCB022

(Interreg VI-A) Germany-The Netherlands

DE NL

240 775 132

240 775 132

23

2021TC16RFCB023

(Interreg VI-A) Germany-Austria-Switzerland-Liechtenstein

(Alpenrhein-Bodensee-Hochrhein)

DE AT

CH LI

47 569 062

47 569 062

24

2021TC16RFCB024

(Interreg VI-A) Czechia-Poland

CZ PL

178 870 508

178 870 508

25

2021TC16RFCB025

(Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Denmark-Norway (Öresund-Kattegat-

Skagerrak)

SE DK

NO

141 300 000

141 300 000

26

2021TC16RFCB026

(Interreg VI-A) Latvia-Lithuania

LV LT

31 752 230

31 752 230

27

2021TC16RFCB027

(Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Finland-Norway (AURORA)

SE FI

NO

93 809 500

93 809 500

28

2021TC16RFCB028

(Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Croatia

SI HR

39 344 493

39 344 493

29

2021TC16RFCB029

(Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Czechia

SK CZ

85 323 597

85 323 597

30

2021TC16RFCB030

(Interreg VI-A) Lithuania-Poland

LT PL

45 706 836

45 706 836

31

2021TC16RFCB031

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-France (Maritime)

IT FR

154 636 861

154 636 861

32

2021TC16RFCB032

(Interreg VI-A) France-Italy (ALCOTRA)

FR IT

182 330 487

182 330 487

33

2021TC16RFCB033

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Switzerland

IT

CH

82 346 673

82 346 673

34

2021TC16RFCB034

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Slovenia

IT SI

70 898 662

70 898 662

35

2021TC16RFCB035

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Malta

IT MT

46 083 225

46 083 225

36

2021TC16RFCB036

(Interreg VI-A) France-Germany-Switzerland (Upper Rhine)

FR DE

CH

125 117 615

125 117 615

37

2021TC16RFCB037

(Interreg VI-A) France-Switzerland

FR

CH

69 766 796

69 766 796

38

2021TC16RFCB038

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Croatia

IT HR

172 986 266

172 986 266

39

2021TC16RFCB039

(Interreg VI-A) Belgium-France (Wallonie-Vlaanderen-France)

BE FR

286 882 570

286 882 570

40

2021TC16RFCB040

(Interreg VI-A) France-Belgium-Germany-Luxembourg (Grande Région/Großregion)

FR BE DE LU

181 942 401

181 942 401

41

2021TC16RFCB041

(Interreg VI-A) Belgium-The Netherlands (Vlaanderen-Nederland)

BE NL

205 405 605

205 405 605

42

2021TC16RFCB042

(Interreg VI-A) Romania-Hungary

RO HU

140 752 020

140 752 020

43

2021TC16RFCB043

(Interreg VI-A) Estonia-Latvia

EE LV

26 004 949

26 004 949

44

2021TC16RFCB044

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Austria

IT AT

73 071 805

73 071 805

45

2021TC16RFCB045

(Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Hungary

SI HU

14 109 017

14 109 017

46

2021TC16RFCB046

(Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Austria

SI AT

45 846 198

45 846 198

47

2021TC16RFCB047

(Interreg VI-A) Greece-Cyprus

EL CY

45 991 214

45 991 214

48

2021TC16RFCB048

(Interreg VI-A) Germany Denmark

DE DK

93 771 505

93 771 505

49

2014TC16RFPC001

PEACE PLUS Ireland-Northern Ireland/United Kingdom

IE

UK

234 474 919

234 474 919

50

2021TC16IPCB006

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria North Macedonia

BG

MK

12 916 849

13 562 691

26 479 540

51

2021TC16IPCB007

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Serbia

BG

RS

15 804 360

16 594 578

32 398 938

52

2021TC16IPCB005

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Turkey

BG

TR

14 269 738

14 983 225

29 252 963

53

2021TC16IPCB003

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia Serbia

HR

RS

18 673 977

19 607 676

38 281 653

54

2021TC16IPCB004

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Montenegro

HR

BA ME

57 407 658

60 278 041

117 685 699

55

2021TC16IPCB010

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece Albania

EL

AL

13 000 000

13 650 000

26 650 000

56

2021TC16IPCB009

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece North Macedonia

EL

MK

13 000 000

13 650 000

26 650 000

57

2021TC16IPCB001

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Hungary Serbia

HU

RS

31 000 000

32 550 000

63 550 000

58

2021TC16IPCB008

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Italy Albania Montenegro (South Adriatic)

IT

AL ME

32 695 846

34 330 638

67 026 484

59

2021TC16IPCB002

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Romania Serbia

RO

RS

36 374 062

38 192 765

74 566 827

60

2021TC16NXCB004

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Estonia Russia

EE

RU

10 906 623

11 124 755

22 031 378

61

2021TC16NXCB010

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Hungary Slovakia Romania Ukraine

HU SK RO

UA

30 998 055

31 618 016

62 616 071

62

2021TC16NXCB013

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Italy Tunisia

IT

TN

16 010 314

16 330 520

32 340 834

63

2021TC16NXCB002

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Karelia

FI

RU

14 003 500

14 283 570

28 287 070

64

2021TC16NXCB001

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Kolarctic

FI SE

RU NO

17 501 359

17 851 386

35 352 745

65

2021TC16NXCB005

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Russia

LV

RU

7 000 000

7 140 000

14 140 000

66

2021TC16NXCB006

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Russia

LT

RU

11 952 500

12 191 550

24 144 050

67

2021TC16NXCB009

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Belarus Ukraine

PL

BY UA

87 900 000

89 658 000

177 558 000

68

2021TC16NXCB007

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Russia

PL

RU

43 240 000

44 104 800

87 344 800

69

2021TC16NXCB011

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Rep.Moldova

RO

MD

36 250 000

36 975 000

73 225 000

70

2021TC16NXCB012

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Ukraine

RO

UA

25 350 000

25 857 000

51 207 000

71

2021TC16NXCB003

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT South East Finland Russia

FI

RU

24 003 500

24 483 570

48 487 070

72

2021TC16NXCB008

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Belarus

LV

BY

5 860 134

5 977 337

11 837 471

73

2021TC16NXCB014

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Belarus

LT

BY

16 000 000

16 320 000

32 320 000

Total:

6 115 505 509

257 399 614

353 915 504

6 726 820 627

---

ANNEX II

List of transnational cooperation programmes with indication of the global amount of the total support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA III) and the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) for each cross-border cooperation programme

| N° | CCI | Name of the programme | Member States | Non-Member States | Global ERDF contribution | IPA III contribution | NDICI contribution | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2021TC16IPTN001 | (Interreg VI-B) IPA Adriatic-Ionian | EL HR IT SI | AL BA ME RS SM | 65 848 129 | 70 840 386 | | 136 688 515 |
| 2 | 2021TC16RFTN001 | (Interreg VI-B) Alpine Space | DE FR IT AT SI | CH LI | 107 051 188 | | | 107 051 188 |
| 3 | 2021TC16RFTN002 | (Interreg VI-B) Atlantic Area | ES FR PT | | 113 075 964 | | | 113 075 964 |
| 4 | 2021TC16FFTN003 | (Interreg VI-B) Baltic Sea Region | DE DK EE LV LT PL FI SE | BY NO RU | 250 984 823 | | 8 800 000 | 259 784 823 |
| 5 | 2021TC16RFTN003 | (Interreg VI-B) Central Europe | CZ DE IT HR HU AT PL SI SK | | 224 623 802 | | | 224 623 802 |
| 6 | 2021TC16FFTN004 | (Interreg VI-B) Danube | AT BG CZ DE HR HU RO SI SK | BA ME RS MD UA | 165 424 228 | 30 000 000 | 17 679 725 | 213 103 953 |
| 7 | 2021TC16FFTN001 | (Interreg VI-B) Euro Mediterranean (EURO MED) | BG EL ES FR HR IT CY MT PT SI | ME MK AL BA | 216 559 226 | 18 340 000 | | 234 899 226 |
| 8 | 2021TC16FFTN005 | (Interreg VI-B) Northern Periphery and Arctic | IE FI SE | FO GL IS NO | 43 716 415 | | | 43 716 415 |
| 9 | 2021TC16RFTN004 | (Interreg VI-B) North Sea | BE DK DE FR NL SE | NO | 171 154 311 | | | 171 154 311 |
| 10 | 2021TC16RFTN005 | (Interreg VI-B) North West Europe | BE DE FR IE NL LU | CH | 310 480 455 | | | 310 480 455 |
| 11 | 2021TC16RFTN006 | (Interreg VI-B) South West Europe (SUDOE) | ES FR PT | AD | 106 260 516 | | | 106 260 516 |
| 12 | 2021TC16NXTN001 | (Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mediterranean Sea Basin (NEXT MED) | EL ES FR IT MT CY PT | TR DZ EG IL JO LB PS TN | 96 199 962 | 9 500 000 | 138 713 588 | 244 413 550 |
| 13 | 2021TC16NXTN003 | (Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mid-Atlantic | ES PT | MA | 55 100 000 | | 55 100 000 | 110 200 000 |
| 14 | 2021TC16NXTN002 | (Interreg VI-B) NEXT Black Sea Basin | BG EL RO | TR UA AM GE MD RU | 14 552 489 | 9 500 000 | 36 934 183 | 60 986 672 |
| Total: | 1 941 031 508 | 138 180 386 | 257 227 496 | 2 336 439 390 |

N°

CCI

Name of the programme

Member States

Non-Member States

Global ERDF contribution

IPA III contribution

NDICI contribution

Total

1

2021TC16IPTN001

(Interreg VI-B) IPA Adriatic-Ionian

EL HR IT SI

AL BA ME RS SM

65 848 129

70 840 386

136 688 515

2

2021TC16RFTN001

(Interreg VI-B) Alpine Space

DE FR IT AT SI

CH LI

107 051 188

107 051 188

3

2021TC16RFTN002

(Interreg VI-B) Atlantic Area

ES FR PT

113 075 964

113 075 964

4

2021TC16FFTN003

(Interreg VI-B) Baltic Sea Region

DE DK EE LV LT PL FI SE

BY NO RU

250 984 823

8 800 000

259 784 823

5

2021TC16RFTN003

(Interreg VI-B) Central Europe

CZ DE IT HR HU AT PL SI SK

224 623 802

224 623 802

6

2021TC16FFTN004

(Interreg VI-B) Danube

AT BG CZ DE HR HU RO SI SK

BA ME RS MD UA

165 424 228

30 000 000

17 679 725

213 103 953

7

2021TC16FFTN001

(Interreg VI-B) Euro Mediterranean (EURO MED)

BG EL ES FR HR IT CY MT PT SI

ME MK AL BA

216 559 226

18 340 000

234 899 226

8

2021TC16FFTN005

(Interreg VI-B) Northern Periphery and Arctic

IE FI SE

FO GL IS NO

43 716 415

43 716 415

9

2021TC16RFTN004

(Interreg VI-B) North Sea

BE DK DE FR NL SE

NO

171 154 311

171 154 311

10

2021TC16RFTN005

(Interreg VI-B) North West Europe

BE DE FR IE NL LU

CH

310 480 455

310 480 455

11

2021TC16RFTN006

(Interreg VI-B) South West Europe (SUDOE)

ES FR PT

AD

106 260 516

106 260 516

12

2021TC16NXTN001

(Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mediterranean Sea Basin (NEXT MED)

EL ES FR IT MT CY PT

TR DZ EG IL JO LB PS TN

96 199 962

9 500 000

138 713 588

244 413 550

13

2021TC16NXTN003

(Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mid-Atlantic

ES PT

MA

55 100 000

55 100 000

110 200 000

14

2021TC16NXTN002

(Interreg VI-B) NEXT Black Sea Basin

BG EL RO

TR UA AM GE MD RU

14 552 489

9 500 000

36 934 183

60 986 672

Total:

1 941 031 508

138 180 386

257 227 496

2 336 439 390

---

ANNEX III

List of interregional cooperation programmes with indication of the global amount of the total support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA III) for each cross-border cooperation programme

| N° | CCI | Name of the programme | Member States | Non-Member States | Global ERDF contribution | IPA III contribution | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2021TC16RFIR001 | (Interreg VI-C) lnterreg Europe | All MS | NO CH | 379 482 670 | | 379 482 670 |
| 2 | 2021TC16FFIR001 | (Interreg VI-C) Urbact IV | All MS | NO CH AL BA ME MK RS | 79 769 799 | 5 000 000 | 84 769 799 |
| 3 | 2021TC16RFIR004 | (Interreg VI-C) ESPON 2030 Cooperation Programme | All MS | NO CH IS LI | 48 000 000 | | 48 000 000 |
| 4 | 2021TC16RFIR002 | (Interreg VI-C) Interact | All MS | NO CH | 45 000 000 | | 45 000 000 |
| Total: | 552 252 469 | 5 000 000 | 557 252 469 |

N°

CCI

Name of the programme

Member States

Non-Member States

Global ERDF contribution

IPA III contribution

Total

1

2021TC16RFIR001

(Interreg VI-C) lnterreg Europe

All MS

NO CH

379 482 670

379 482 670

2

2021TC16FFIR001

(Interreg VI-C) Urbact IV

All MS

NO CH AL BA ME MK RS

79 769 799

5 000 000

84 769 799

3

2021TC16RFIR004

(Interreg VI-C) ESPON 2030 Cooperation Programme

All MS

NO CH IS LI

48 000 000

48 000 000

4

2021TC16RFIR002

(Interreg VI-C) Interact

All MS

NO CH

45 000 000

45 000 000

Total:

552 252 469

5 000 000

557 252 469

---

ANNEX IV

List of outermost regions cooperation programmes with indication of the global amount of the total support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for each cross-border cooperation programme

| N° | CCI | Name of the programme | Member States | Non-Member States | Global ERDF contribution |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2021TC16FFOR004 | (Interreg VI-D) Indian Ocean | FR | Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | 62 252 459 |
| 2 | 2021TC16FFOR003 | (Interreg VI-D) Caribbean | FR | Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | 67 895 832 |
| 3 | 2021TC16FFOR005 | (Interreg VI-D) Amazonia | FR | Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | 18 899 049 |
| 4 | 2021TC16FFOR001 | (Interreg VI-D) Madeira-Azores-Canary Islands (MAC) | ES PT | Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | 169 898 663 |
| 5 | 2021TC16FFOR002 | (Interreg VI-D) Mozambique Channel | FR | Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | 10 228 777 |
| Total: | 329 174 780 |

N°

CCI

Name of the programme

Member States

Non-Member States

Global ERDF contribution

1

2021TC16FFOR004

(Interreg VI-D) Indian Ocean

FR

Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

62 252 459

2

2021TC16FFOR003

(Interreg VI-D) Caribbean

FR

Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

67 895 832

3

2021TC16FFOR005

(Interreg VI-D) Amazonia

FR

Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

18 899 049

4

2021TC16FFOR001

(Interreg VI-D) Madeira-Azores-Canary Islands (MAC)

ES PT

Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

169 898 663

5

2021TC16FFOR002

(Interreg VI-D) Mozambique Channel

FR

Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

10 228 777

Total:

329 174 780

---

ANNEX V

Transfers proposed by Member States between strands

| ID | COUNTRY | STRAND | TOTAL ALLOCATION | MS INPUT | TRANSFER | % |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| BE | Belgium | | 374 383 720 | | | |
| BE | cross-border | 332 648 155 | 301 477 183 | -31 170 972 | -9,37  % |
| BE | transnational | 41 735 565 | 72 906 537 | 31 170 972 | |
| BG | Bulgaria | | 135 521 264 | | | |
| BG | cross-border | 109 183 390 | 113 134 071 | 3 950 681 | |
| BG | transnational | 26 337 874 | 22 387 193 | -3 950 681 | -15,00  % |
| CZ | Czechia | | 310 867 301 | | | |
| CZ | cross-border | 271 822 272 | 277 679 027 | 5 856 755 | |
| CZ | transnational | 39 045 029 | 33 188 274 | -5 856 755 | -15,00  % |
| DK | Denmark | | 152 000 000 | | | |
| DK | cross-border | 130 840 407 | 115 300 000 | -15 540 407 | -11,88  % |
| DK | transnational | 21 159 593 | 36 700 000 | 15 540 407 | |
| DE | Germany | | 1 017 882 396 | | | |
| DE | cross-border | 714 007 944 | 699 742 467 | -14 265 477 | -2,00  % |
| DE | transnational | 303 874 452 | 318 139 929 | 14 265 477 | |
| EE | Estonia | | 58 059 611 | | | |
| EE | cross-border | 53 200 437 | 53 200 437 | 0 | 0,00  % |
| EE | transnational | 4 859 174 | 4 859 174 | 0 | |
| IE | Ireland | | 293 402 230 | | | |
| IE | cross-border | 275 852 846 | 234 474 919 | -41 377 927 | -15,00  % |
| IE | transnational | 17 549 384 | 58 927 311 | 41 377 927 | |
| EL | Greece | | 128 236 156 | | | |
| EL | cross-border | 88 385 657 | 94 363 232 | 5 977 575 | |
| EL | transnational | 39 850 499 | 33 872 924 | -5 977 575 | -15,00  % |
| ES | Spain | | 694 796 132 | | | |
| ES | cross-border | 382 709 233 | 358 561 065 | -24 148 168 | -6,31  % |
| ES | transnational | 171 704 452 | 199 155 881 | 27 451 429 | |
| ES | outermost regions | 140 382 447 | 137 079 186 | -3 303 261 | -2,35  % |
| FR | France | | 1 107 421 089 | | | |
| FR | cross-border | 718 304 673 | 639 687 357 | -78 617 316 | -10,94  % |
| FR | transnational | 246 523 404 | 308 457 615 | 61 934 211 | |
| FR | outermost regions | 142 593 012 | 159 276 117 | 16 683 105 | |
| HR | Croatia | | 186 871 939 | | | |
| HR | cross-border | 171 461 871 | 171 461 871 | 0 | 0,00  % |
| HR | transnational | 15 410 068 | 15 410 068 | 0 | |
| IT | Italy | | 947 705 559 | | | |
| IT | cross-border | 723 649 055 | 682 037 150 | -41 611 905 | -5,75  % |
| IT | transnational | 224 056 504 | 265 668 409 | 41 611 905 | |
| CY | Cyprus | | 37 259 150 | | | |
| CY | cross-border | 34 107 311 | 28 991 214 | -5 116 097 | -15,00  % |
| CY | transnational | 3 151 839 | 8 267 936 | 5 116 097 | |
| LV | Latvia | | 49 764 070 | | | |
| LV | cross-border | 42 523 827 | 43 609 864 | 1 086 037 | |
| LV | transnational | 7 240 243 | 6 154 206 | -1 086 037 | -15,00  % |
| LT | Lithuania | | 83 055 466 | | | |
| LT | cross-border | 72 459 911 | 72 459 911 | 0 | 0,00  % |
| LT | transnational | 10 595 555 | 10 595 555 | 0 | |
| LU | Luxembourg | | 29 026 447 | | | |
| LU | cross-border | 26 870 192 | 23 026 447 | -3 843 745 | -14,30  % |
| LU | transnational | 2 156 255 | 6 000 000 | 3 843 745 | |
| HU | Hungary | | 258 768 190 | | | |
| HU | cross-border | 222 498 055 | 222 498 055 | 0 | 0,00  % |
| HU | transnational | 36 270 135 | 36 270 135 | 0 | |
| MT | Malta | | 23 116 871 | | | |
| MT | cross-border | 21 429 922 | 20 416 871 | -1 013 051 | -4,73  % |
| MT | transnational | 1 686 949 | 2 700 000 | 1 013 051 | |
| NL | Netherlands | | 378 695 652 | | | |
| NL | cross-border | 315 751 099 | 274 554 348 | -41 196 751 | -13,05  % |
| NL | transnational | 62 944 553 | 104 141 304 | 41 196 751 | |
| AT | Austria | | 219 711 720 | | | |
| AT | cross-border | 187 482 629 | 186 882 629 | - 600 000 | -0,32  % |
| AT | transnational | 32 229 091 | 32 829 091 | 600 000 | |
| PL | Poland | | 567 530 160 | | | |
| PL | cross-border | 425 499 779 | 446 804 336 | 21 304 557 | |
| PL | transnational | 142 030 381 | 120 725 824 | -21 304 557 | -15,00  % |
| PT | Portugal | | 138 751 654 | | | |
| PT | cross-border | 67 766 585 | 73 491 424 | 5 724 839 | |
| PT | transnational | 38 165 592 | 32 440 753 | -5 724 839 | -15,00  % |
| PT | outermost regions | 32 819 477 | 32 819 477 | 0 | |
| RO | Romania | | 372 637 625 | | | |
| RO | cross-border | 299 820 777 | 310 743 304 | 10 922 527 | |
| RO | transnational | 72 816 848 | 61 894 321 | -10 922 527 | -15,00  % |
| SI | Slovenia | | 75 065 477 | | | |
| SI | cross-border | 67 436 070 | 67 436 070 | 0 | 0,00  % |
| SI | transnational | 7 629 407 | 7 629 407 | 0 | |
| SK | Slovakia | | 223 354 237 | | | |
| SK | cross-border | 203 286 462 | 203 286 462 | 0 | 0,00  % |
| SK | transnational | 20 067 775 | 20 067 775 | 0 | |
| FI | Finland | | 162 721 339 | | | |
| FI | cross-border | 142 416 484 | 122 514 000 | -19 902 484 | -13,97  % |
| FI | transnational | 20 304 855 | 40 207 339 | 19 902 484 | |
| SE | Sweden | | 356 338 406 | | | |
| SE | cross-border | 319 655 650 | 274 903 859 | -44 751 791 | -14,00  % |
| SE | transnational | 36 682 756 | 81 434 547 | 44 751 791 | |

ID

COUNTRY

STRAND

TOTAL ALLOCATION

MS INPUT

TRANSFER

%

BE

Belgium

374 383 720

BE

cross-border

332 648 155

301 477 183

-31 170 972

-9,37  %

BE

transnational

41 735 565

72 906 537

31 170 972

BG

Bulgaria

135 521 264

BG

cross-border

109 183 390

113 134 071

3 950 681

BG

transnational

26 337 874

22 387 193

-3 950 681

-15,00  %

CZ

Czechia

310 867 301

CZ

cross-border

271 822 272

277 679 027

5 856 755

CZ

transnational

39 045 029

33 188 274

-5 856 755

-15,00  %

DK

Denmark

152 000 000

DK

cross-border

130 840 407

115 300 000

-15 540 407

-11,88  %

DK

transnational

21 159 593

36 700 000

15 540 407

DE

Germany

1 017 882 396

DE

cross-border

714 007 944

699 742 467

-14 265 477

-2,00  %

DE

transnational

303 874 452

318 139 929

14 265 477

EE

Estonia

58 059 611

EE

cross-border

53 200 437

53 200 437

0

0,00  %

EE

transnational

4 859 174

4 859 174

0

IE

Ireland

293 402 230

IE

cross-border

275 852 846

234 474 919

-41 377 927

-15,00  %

IE

transnational

17 549 384

58 927 311

41 377 927

EL

Greece

128 236 156

EL

cross-border

88 385 657

94 363 232

5 977 575

EL

transnational

39 850 499

33 872 924

-5 977 575

-15,00  %

ES

Spain

694 796 132

ES

cross-border

382 709 233

358 561 065

-24 148 168

-6,31  %

ES

transnational

171 704 452

199 155 881

27 451 429

ES

outermost regions

140 382 447

137 079 186

-3 303 261

-2,35  %

FR

France

1 107 421 089

FR

cross-border

718 304 673

639 687 357

-78 617 316

-10,94  %

FR

transnational

246 523 404

308 457 615

61 934 211

FR

outermost regions

142 593 012

159 276 117

16 683 105

HR

Croatia

186 871 939

HR

cross-border

171 461 871

171 461 871

0

0,00  %

HR

transnational

15 410 068

15 410 068

0

IT

Italy

947 705 559

IT

cross-border

723 649 055

682 037 150

-41 611 905

-5,75  %

IT

transnational

224 056 504

265 668 409

41 611 905

CY

Cyprus

37 259 150

CY

cross-border

34 107 311

28 991 214

-5 116 097

-15,00  %

CY

transnational

3 151 839

8 267 936

5 116 097

LV

Latvia

49 764 070

LV

cross-border

42 523 827

43 609 864

1 086 037

LV

transnational

7 240 243

6 154 206

-1 086 037

-15,00  %

LT

Lithuania

83 055 466

LT

cross-border

72 459 911

72 459 911

0

0,00  %

LT

transnational

10 595 555

10 595 555

0

LU

Luxembourg

29 026 447

LU

cross-border

26 870 192

23 026 447

-3 843 745

-14,30  %

LU

transnational

2 156 255

6 000 000

3 843 745

HU

Hungary

258 768 190

HU

cross-border

222 498 055

222 498 055

0

0,00  %

HU

transnational

36 270 135

36 270 135

0

MT

Malta

23 116 871

MT

cross-border

21 429 922

20 416 871

-1 013 051

-4,73  %

MT

transnational

1 686 949

2 700 000

1 013 051

NL

Netherlands

378 695 652

NL

cross-border

315 751 099

274 554 348

-41 196 751

-13,05  %

NL

transnational

62 944 553

104 141 304

41 196 751

AT

Austria

219 711 720

AT

cross-border

187 482 629

186 882 629

- 600 000

-0,32  %

AT

transnational

32 229 091

32 829 091

600 000

PL

Poland

567 530 160

PL

cross-border

425 499 779

446 804 336

21 304 557

PL

transnational

142 030 381

120 725 824

-21 304 557

-15,00  %

PT

Portugal

138 751 654

PT

cross-border

67 766 585

73 491 424

5 724 839

PT

transnational

38 165 592

32 440 753

-5 724 839

-15,00  %

PT

outermost regions

32 819 477

32 819 477

0

RO

Romania

372 637 625

RO

cross-border

299 820 777

310 743 304

10 922 527

RO

transnational

72 816 848

61 894 321

-10 922 527

-15,00  %

SI

Slovenia

75 065 477

SI

cross-border

67 436 070

67 436 070

0

0,00  %

SI

transnational

7 629 407

7 629 407

0

SK

Slovakia

223 354 237

SK

cross-border

203 286 462

203 286 462

0

0,00  %

SK

transnational

20 067 775

20 067 775

0

FI

Finland

162 721 339

FI

cross-border

142 416 484

122 514 000

-19 902 484

-13,97  %

FI

transnational

20 304 855

40 207 339

19 902 484

SE

Sweden

356 338 406

SE

cross-border

319 655 650

274 903 859

-44 751 791

-14,00  %

SE

transnational

36 682 756

81 434 547

44 751 791

---

| 19.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 12/164 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 12/164

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/75

of 17 January 2022

setting out the list of Interreg programme areas to receive support from the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments of the Union, broken down by strand and Interreg programme under the European territorial cooperation goal

(notifed under document C(2022)109)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments (1), and in particular Article 8(1) thereof,

After consulting the committee established by Article 115(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (2),

Whereas:

| (1) | The European Regional Development Fund (‘ERDF’) supports the European territorial cooperation goal in certain regions corresponding to level 3 of the common classification of territorial units for statistics (‘NUTS level 3 regions’) for cross-border cooperation, and in all regions corresponding to level 2 of the common classification of territorial units for statistics (‘NUTS level 2 regions’) for transnational cooperation, as established by Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3). Those regions therefore need to be listed. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The European Regional Development Fund (‘ERDF’) supports the European territorial cooperation goal in certain regions corresponding to level 3 of the common classification of territorial units for statistics (‘NUTS level 3 regions’) for cross-border cooperation, and in all regions corresponding to level 2 of the common classification of territorial units for statistics (‘NUTS level 2 regions’) for transnational cooperation, as established by Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3). Those regions therefore need to be listed.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 8(1), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, external cross-border Interreg programmes are to be listed as ‘Interreg A IPA III CBC programmes’ (IPA III-CBC) or ‘Interreg A NEXT programmes’ (NDICI-CBC). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 8(1), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, external cross-border Interreg programmes are to be listed as ‘Interreg A IPA III CBC programmes’ (IPA III-CBC) or ‘Interreg A NEXT programmes’ (NDICI-CBC).

| (3) | Pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, regions of third or partner countries or territories outside the Union, which do not receive support from the ERDF or from an external financing instrument of the Union, or which contribute to the budget of the Union by external assigned revenue, are also to be mentioned in the list of Interreg programme areas. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, regions of third or partner countries or territories outside the Union, which do not receive support from the ERDF or from an external financing instrument of the Union, or which contribute to the budget of the Union by external assigned revenue, are also to be mentioned in the list of Interreg programme areas.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, for transnational cooperation, the regions to be supported by the ERDF are to be NUTS level 2 regions of the Union or, in the absence of a NUTS classification, equivalent areas. They may include outermost regions covering larger transnational territories and taking into account, where applicable, macro-regional strategies or sea basin strategies. Transnational cooperation may also cover regions which are to be NUTS level 2 regions or, in the absence of a NUTS classification, equivalent areas in Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom as well as Andorra, the Faroe Islands, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino, overseas territories or countries (OCTs) and regions of partner countries under the Instrument for Pre-Accession III (‘IPA III’) or the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI’). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, for transnational cooperation, the regions to be supported by the ERDF are to be NUTS level 2 regions of the Union or, in the absence of a NUTS classification, equivalent areas. They may include outermost regions covering larger transnational territories and taking into account, where applicable, macro-regional strategies or sea basin strategies. Transnational cooperation may also cover regions which are to be NUTS level 2 regions or, in the absence of a NUTS classification, equivalent areas in Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom as well as Andorra, the Faroe Islands, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino, overseas territories or countries (OCTs) and regions of partner countries under the Instrument for Pre-Accession III (‘IPA III’) or the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI’).

| (5) | Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, for interregional cooperation, the entire territory of the Union, including the outermost regions, is to be supported by the ERDF. Interregional cooperation programmes may also cover the whole territory of third countries, partner countries under IPA III or NDICI and other territories, or a part thereof, or OCTs, whether or not they are supported by the Union’s external financing instruments. It is therefore not necessary to set out the programme area for interregional cooperation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, for interregional cooperation, the entire territory of the Union, including the outermost regions, is to be supported by the ERDF. Interregional cooperation programmes may also cover the whole territory of third countries, partner countries under IPA III or NDICI and other territories, or a part thereof, or OCTs, whether or not they are supported by the Union’s external financing instruments. It is therefore not necessary to set out the programme area for interregional cooperation.

| (6) | Pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, for outermost regions cooperation, all regions listed in the first paragraph of Article 349 TFEU are to be supported by the ERDF. The outermost regions’ Interreg programmes may also cover partner countries or parts thereof supported by the NDICI or OCTs supported by the Overseas Countries and Territories Programme (OCTP), or both. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, for outermost regions cooperation, all regions listed in the first paragraph of Article 349 TFEU are to be supported by the ERDF. The outermost regions’ Interreg programmes may also cover partner countries or parts thereof supported by the NDICI or OCTs supported by the Overseas Countries and Territories Programme (OCTP), or both.

| (7) | Pursuant to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the list of regions for cross-border cooperation should also specify those NUTS level 3 regions of the Union taken into account for the ERDF allocation for cross-border cooperation at all internal borders and those external borders covered by the Union’s external financing instruments. The NUTS level 3 regions for the programme areas of cross-border cooperation programmes should be listed based on Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/1755 (4). However, for the purpose of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the NUTS level 3 regions taken into account for the ERDF allocation are based on Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/2066 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Pursuant to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the list of regions for cross-border cooperation should also specify those NUTS level 3 regions of the Union taken into account for the ERDF allocation for cross-border cooperation at all internal borders and those external borders covered by the Union’s external financing instruments. The NUTS level 3 regions for the programme areas of cross-border cooperation programmes should be listed based on Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/1755 (4). However, for the purpose of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1059, the NUTS level 3 regions taken into account for the ERDF allocation are based on Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/2066 (5).

| (8) | It is therefore necessary to establish the lists of Interreg programme areas to receive support, broken down by strand and Interreg programme, |
| --- | --- |

(8)

It is therefore necessary to establish the lists of Interreg programme areas to receive support, broken down by strand and Interreg programme,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The list of programme areas to receive support from the ERDF under the cross-border cooperation strand of the European territorial cooperation goal, including under external cross-border cooperation also supported by IPA III and NDICI, and including regions of third or partner countries or territories outside the Union which do not receive support from the ERDF or from an external financing instrument of the Union, or which contribute to the Union budget by external assigned revenue, is set out in Annex I.

Article 2

The list of programme areas to receive support from the ERDF and the external financing instruments of the Union under the transnational cooperation strand of the European territorial cooperation goal, including regions of third or partner countries or territories outside the Union which do not receive support from the ERDF or from an external financing instrument of the Union, or which contribute to the Union budget by external assigned revenue, is set out in Annex II.

Article 3

The list of programme areas, including partner countries or parts thereof supported by the NDICI or OCTs supported by the OCTP or both, to receive support from the ERDF under the outermost regions’ strand of the European territorial cooperation goal, is set out in Annex III.

Article 4

The list of NUTS level 3 regions of the Union taken into account for the ERDF allocation for cross-border cooperation at all internal borders and those external borders covered by the Union’s external financing instruments, is set out in Annex IV.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 17 January 2022.

For the Commission

Elisa FERREIRA

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 94.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159.

2

(3)  Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 154, 21.6.2003, p. 1).

3

(4)  Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/1755 of 8 August 2019 amending the Annexes to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 270, 24.10.2019, p. 1).

4

(5)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/2066 of 21 November 2016 amending the annexes to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 322, 29.11.2016, p. 1).

5

---

ANNEX I

List of Interreg programme areas to receive support under strand A

| Interreg Internal Cross-Border Programmes |
| --- |
| CCI | | NUTS 3 level regions (in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/1755) |
| 2021TC16RFCB001 | BE DE NL | (Interreg VI-A) Maas-Rijn/Meuse-Rhin/Maas-Rhein (NL-BE-DE) |
| | | BE223 Arr. Tongeren |
| | | BE224 Arr. Hasselt |
| | | BE225 Arr. Maaseik |
| | | BE332 Arr. Liège |
| | | BE335 Arr. Verviers – communes francophones |
| | | BE336 Bezirk Verviers-Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft |
| | | DEA26 Düren |
| | | DEA28 Euskirchen |
| | | DEA29 Heinsberg |
| | | DEA2D Städteregion Aachen |
| | | DEB23 Eifelkreis Bitburg-Prüm |
| | | DEB24 Vulkaneifel |
| | | NL422 Midden-Limburg |
| | | NL423 Zuid-Limburg |
| 2021TC16RFCB002 | AT CZ | (Interreg VI-A) Austria-Czechia |
| | | AT121 Mostviertel-Eisenwurzen |
| | | AT123 Sankt Pölten |
| | | AT124 Waldviertel |
| | | AT125 Weinviertel |
| | | AT126 Wiener Umland/Nordteil |
| | | AT130 Wien |
| | | AT311 Innviertel |
| | | AT312 Linz-Wels |
| | | AT313 Mühlviertel |
| | | AT314 Steyr-Kirchdorf |
| | | CZ031 Jihočeský kraj |
| | | CZ063 Kraj Vysočina |
| | | CZ064 Jihomoravský kraj |
| 2021TC16RFCB003 | AT SK | (Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Austria |
| | | SK010 Bratislavský kraj |
| | | SK021 Trnavský kraj |
| | | AT112 Nordburgenland |
| | | AT122 Niederösterreich-Süd |
| | | AT123 Sankt Pölten |
| | | AT124 Waldviertel |
| | | AT125 Weinviertel |
| | | AT126 Wiener Umland/Nordteil |
| | | AT127 Wiener Umland/Südteil |
| | | AT130 Wien |
| 2021TC16RFCB004 | AT DE | (Interreg VI-A) Austria-Germany/Bavaria |
| | | AT311 Innviertel |
| | | AT312 Linz-Wels |
| | | AT313 Mühlviertel |
| | | AT315 Traunviertel |
| | | AT321 Lungau |
| | | AT322 Pinzgau-Pongau |
| | | AT323 Salzburg und Umgebung |
| | | AT331 Außerfern |
| | | AT332 Innsbruck |
| | | AT333 Osttirol |
| | | AT334 Tiroler Oberland |
| | | AT335 Tiroler Unterland |
| | | AT341 Bludenz-Bregenzer Wald |
| | | AT342 Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet |
| | | DE213 Rosenheim, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE214 Altötting |
| | | DE215 Berchtesgadener Land |
| | | DE216 Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen |
| | | DE21D Garmisch-Partenkirchen |
| | | DE21F Miesbach |
| | | DE21G Mühldorf a. Inn |
| | | DE21K Rosenheim, Landkreis |
| | | DE21M Traunstein |
| | | DE21N Weilheim-Schongau |
| | | DE221 Landshut, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE222 Passau, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE224 Deggendorf |
| | | DE225 Freyung-Grafenau |
| | | DE227 Landshut, Landkreis |
| | | DE228 Passau, Landkreis |
| | | DE229 Regen |
| | | DE22A Rottal-Inn |
| | | DE22C Dingolfing-Landau |
| | | DE272 Kaufbeuren, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE273 Kempten (Allgäu), Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE274 Memmingen, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE27A Lindau (Bodensee) |
| | | DE27B Ostallgäu |
| | | DE27C Unterallgäu |
| | | DE27E Oberallgäu |
| 2021TC16RFCB005 | ES PT | (Interreg VI-A) Spain-Portugal (POCTEP) |
| | | ES111 A Coruña |
| | | ES112 Lugo |
| | | ES113 Ourense |
| | | ES114 Pontevedra |
| | | ES148 Valladolid |
| | | ES411 Ávila |
| | | ES413 León |
| | | ES415 Salamanca |
| | | ES419 Zamora |
| | | ES431 Badajoz |
| | | ES432 Cáceres |
| | | ES612 Cádiz |
| | | ES613 Córdoba |
| | | ES615 Huelva |
| | | ES618 Sevilla |
| | | PT111 Alto Minho |
| | | PT112 Cávado |
| | | PT119 Ave |
| | | PT11A Area Metropolitana do Porto |
| | | PT11B Alto Tâmega |
| | | PT11C Tamega e Sousa |
| | | PT11D Douro |
| | | PT11E Terras de Trás-os-Montes |
| | | PT150 Algarve |
| | | PT16B Oeste |
| | | PT16D Região de Aveiro |
| | | PT16E Região de Coimbra |
| | | PT16F Região de Leiria |
| | | PT16G Viseu Dão Lafões |
| | | PT16H Beira Baixa |
| | | PT 16I Médio Tejo |
| | | PT16J Beiras e Serra da Estrela |
| | | PT181 Alentejo litoral |
| | | PT184 Baixo Alentejo |
| | | PT186 Alto Alentejo |
| | | PT187 Alentejo Central |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFCB006 | ES FR AD | (Interreg VI-A) Spain-France-Andorra (POCTEFA) |
| | | ES211 Araba/Alava Álava |
| | | ES212 GuipùzcoaGipuzkoa |
| | | ES213 Vizcaya/Bizkaia |
| | | ES220 Navarra |
| | | ES230 La Rioja |
| | | ES241 Huesca |
| | | ES243 Zaragoza |
| | | ES511 Barcelona |
| | | ES512 Girona |
| | | ES513 Lleida |
| | | FRI15 Pyrénées-Atlantiques |
| | | FRJ21 Ariège |
| | | FRJ23 Haute -Garonne |
| | | FRJ15 Pyrénées -Orientales |
| | | FRJ26 Hautes-Pyrénées |
| | | AD Andorra (third country) |
| 2021TC16RFCB007 | HU HR | (Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Croatia |
| | | HR021 Bjelovarsko-bilogorska županija |
| | | HR022 Virovitičko-podravska županija |
| | | HR023 Požeško-slavonska županija |
| | | HR025 Osječko-baranjska županija |
| | | HR026 Vukovarsko-srijemska županija |
| | | HR061 Međimurska županija |
| | | HR062 Varaždinska županija |
| | | HR063 Koprivničko-križevačka županija |
| | | HU223 Zala |
| | | HU231 Baranya |
| | | HU232 Somogy |
| 2021TC16RFCB008 | DE CZ | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Bavaria- Czechia |
| | | CZ031 Jihoceský kraj |
| | | CZ032 Plzeňský kraj |
| | | CZ041 Karlovarský kraj |
| | | DE222 Passau, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE223 Straubing, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE224 Deggendorf |
| | | DE225 Freyung-Grafenau |
| | | DE228 Passau, Landkreis |
| | | DE229 Regen |
| | | DE22B Straubing-Bogen |
| | | DE231 Amberg, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE232 Regensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE233 Weiden i. d. Opf, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE234 Amberg-Sulzbach |
| | | DE235 Cham |
| | | DE237 Neustadt a. d. Waldnaab |
| | | DE238 Regensburg, Landkreis |
| | | DE239 Schwandorf |
| | | DE23A Tirschenreuth |
| | | DE242 Bayreuth, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE244 Hof, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE246 Bayreuth, Landkreis |
| | | DE249 Hof, Landkreis |
| | | DE24A Kronach |
| | | DE24B Kulmbach |
| | | DE24D Wunsiedel i. Fichtelgebirge |
| 2021TC16RFCB009 | AT HU | (Interreg VI-A) Austria-Hungary |
| | | AT111 Mittelburgenland |
| | | AT112 Nordburgenland |
| | | AT113 Südburgenland |
| | | AT122 Niederösterreich-Süd |
| | | AT127 Wiener Umland/Südteil |
| | | AT130 Wien |
| | | AT221 Graz |
| | | AT224 Oststeiermark |
| | | HU221 Győr-Moson-Sopron |
| | | HU222 Vas |
| | | HU223 Zala |
| 2021TC16RFCB010 | DE PL | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Brandenburg-Poland |
| | | DE402 Cottbus, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE403 Frankfurt (Oder), Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE409 Märkisch-Oderland |
| | | DE40C Oder-Spree |
| | | DE40G Spree-Neiße |
| | | PL431 Gorzowski |
| | | PL432 Zielonogórski |
| 2021TC16RFCB011 | PL SK | (Interreg VI-A) Poland-Slovakia |
| | | PL214 Krakowski |
| | | PL218 Nowosądecki |
| | | PL219 Nowotarski |
| | | PL21A Oświęcimski |
| | | PL225 Bielski |
| | | PL22C Tyski |
| | | PL821 Krośnieński |
| | | PL822 Przemyski |
| | | PL823 Rzeszowski |
| | | SK031 Žilinský kraj |
| | | SK041 Prešovský kraj |
| | | SK042 Košický kraj |
| 2021TC16RFCB012 | DE DK LT PL SE | (Interreg VI-A) Poland-Denmark-Germany-Lithuania-Sweden (South Baltic) |
| | | DE80N Vorpommern-Greifswald |
| | | DE803 Rostock, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE80M Nordwestmecklenburg |
| | | DE80L Vorpommern-Rügen |
| | | DE80K Landkreis Rostock |
| | | DK014 Bornholm |
| | | DK021 Østsjælland |
| | | DK022 Vest- og Sydsjælland |
| | | LT023 Klaipėdos apskritis |
| | | LT027 Tauragės apskritis |
| | | LT028 Telšių apskritis |
| | | PL424 Miasto Szczecin |
| | | PL426 Koszaliński |
| | | PL427 Szczecinecko-pyrzycki |
| | | PL428 Szczeciński |
| | | PL636 Słupski |
| | | PL637 Chojnicki |
| | | PL638 Starogardzki |
| | | PL633 Trójmiejski |
| | | PL634 Gdański |
| | | PL621 Elbląski |
| | | SE212 Kronobergs län |
| | | SE213 Kalmar län |
| | | SE221 Blekinge län |
| | | SE224 Skåne län |
| 2021TC16RFCB013 | EE FI LV SE | (Interreg VI-A) Finland-Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (Central Baltic) |
| | | EE001 Põhja-Eesti |
| | | EE004 Lääne-Eesti |
| | | EE008 Lõuna-Eesti |
| | | EE009 Kesk-Eesti |
| | | EE00A Kirde-Eesti |
| | | FI1B1 Helsinki-Uusimaa |
| | | FI1C1 Varsinais-Suomi |
| | | FI1C2 Kanta-Häme |
| | | FI1C3 Päijät-Häme |
| | | FI1C4 Kymenlaakso |
| | | FI1C5 Etelä-Karjala |
| | | FI196 Satakunta |
| | | FI197 Pirkanmaa |
| | | FI200 Åland |
| | | LV003 Kurzeme |
| | | LV006 Rīga |
| | | LV007 Pierīga |
| | | LV008 Vidzeme |
| | | LV009 Zemgale |
| | | SE110 Stockholms län |
| | | SE121 Uppsala län |
| | | SE122 Södermanlands län |
| | | SE123 Östergötlands län |
| | | SE124 Örebro län |
| | | SE125 Västmanlands län |
| | | SE214 Gotlands län |
| | | SE313 Gävleborgs län |
| 2021TC16RFCB014 | HU SK | (Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Slovakia |
| | | HU110 Budapest |
| | | HU120 Pest |
| | | HU212 Komárom-Esztergom |
| | | HU221 Győr-Moson-Sopron |
| | | HU311 Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén |
| | | HU312 Heves |
| | | HU313 Nógrád |
| | | HU323 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg |
| | | SK010 Bratislavský kraj |
| | | SK021 Trnavský kraj |
| | | SK023 Nitriansky kraj |
| | | SK032 Banskobystrický kraj |
| | | SK042 Košický kraj |
| 2021TC16RFCB015 | SE NO | (Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Norway |
| | | SE311 Värmlands län |
| | | SE312 Dalarnas län |
| | | SE232 Västra Götalands län |
| | | SE321 Västernorrlands län |
| | | SE322 Jämtlands län |
| | | NO020 Innlandet |
| | | NO060 Trøndelag |
| | | NO082 Viken |
| 2021TC16RFCB016 | CZ DE | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Saxony- Czechia |
| | | CZ041 Karlovarský kraj |
| | | CZ042 Ústecký kraj |
| | | CZ051 Liberecký kraj |
| | | DED21 Dresden, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DED2C Bautzen |
| | | DED2D Görlitz |
| | | DED2F Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge |
| | | DED41 Chemnitz, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DED42 Erzgebirgskreis |
| | | DED43 Mittelsachsen |
| | | DED44 Vogtlandkreis |
| | | DED45 Zwickau |
| 2021TC16RFCB017 | DE PL | (Interreg VI-A) Poland-Germany/Saxony |
| | | DED2C Bautzen |
| | | DED2D Görlitz |
| | | PL432 Zielonogórski |
| | | PL515 Jeleniogórski |
| 2021TC16RFCB018 | DE PL | (Interreg VI-A) Germany/Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania/Brandenburg-Poland |
| | | DE405 Barnim |
| | | DE409 Märkisch-Oderland |
| | | DE40I Uckermark |
| | | DE80J Mecklenburgische Seenplatte |
| | | DE80L Vorpommern-Rügen |
| | | DE80N Vorpommern-Greifswald |
| | | PL424 Miasto Szczecin |
| | | PL426 Koszalinski |
| | | PL427 Szczecinecko-pyrzycki |
| | | PL428 Szczeciński |
| 2021TC16RFCB019 | EL IT | (Interreg VI-A) Greece-Italy |
| | | EL541 Άρτα, Πρέβεζα (Arta/Arta, Preveza) |
| | | EL542 Θεσπρωτία (Thesprotia) |
| | | EL543 Ιωάννινα (Ioannina) |
| | | EL621 Ζάκυνθος (Zakynthos) |
| | | EL622 Κέρκυρα (Kerkyra) |
| | | EL623 Ιθάκη, Κεφαλονιά (Ithaki Kefallinia, Kefallοnia) |
| | | EL624 Λευκάδα (Lefkada) |
| | | EL631 Αιτωλοακαρνανία (Aitoloakarnania) |
| | | EL632 Αχαΐα (Achaia) |
| | | EL633 Ηλεία (Ileia) |
| | | ITF43 Taranto |
| | | ITF44 Brindisi |
| | | ITF45 Lecce |
| | | ITF46 Foggia |
| | | ITF47 Bari |
| | | ITF48 Barletta-Andria-Trani |
| | | ITF52 Matera |
| | | ITF61 Cosenza |
| | | ITF62 Crotone |
| | | ITF63 Catanzaro |
| | | ITF65 Reggio di Calabria |
| 2021TC16RFCB020 | BG RO | (Interreg VI-A) Romania-Bulgaria |
| | | BG311 Видин (Vidin) |
| | | BG312 Монтана (Montana) |
| | | BG313 Враца (Vratsa) |
| | | BG314 Плевен (Pleven) |
| | | BG321 Велико Търново (Veliko Tarnovo) |
| | | BG323 Русе (Ruse) |
| | | BG325 Силистра (Silistra) |
| | | BG332 Добрич (Dobrich) |
| | | RO223 Constanţa |
| | | RO312 Călăraşi |
| | | RO314 Giurgiu |
| | | RO317 Teleorman |
| | | RO411 Dolj |
| | | RO413 Mehedinţi |
| | | RO414 Olt |
| 2021TC16RFCB021 | BG EL | (Interreg VI-A) Greece-Bulgaria |
| | | BG413 Благоевград (Blagoevgrad) |
| | | BG422 Хасково (Haskovo) |
| | | BG424 Смолян (Smolyan) |
| | | BG425 Кърджали (Kardzhali) |
| | | EL511 Έβρος (Evros) |
| | | EL512 Ξάνθη (Xanthi) |
| | | EL513 Ροδόπη (Rodopi) |
| | | EL514 Δράμα (Drama) |
| | | EL515 Καβάλα (Kavala) |
| | | EL522 Θεσσαλονίκη (Thessaloniki) |
| | | EL526 Σέρρες (Serres) |
| 2021TC16RFCB022 | DE NL | (Interreg VI-A) Germany-The Netherlands |
| | | DE941 Delmenhorst, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE942 Emden, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE943 Oldenburg, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE944 Osnabrück, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE945 Wilhelmshaven, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE946 Ammerland |
| | | DE947 Aurich |
| | | DE948 Cloppenburg |
| | | DE949 Emsland |
| | | DE94A Friesland (DE) |
| | | DE94B Grafschaft Bentheim |
| | | DE94C Leer |
| | | DE94D Oldenburg, Landkreis |
| | | DE94E Osnabrück, Landkreis |
| | | DE94F Vechta |
| | | DE94G Wesermarsch |
| | | DE94H Wittmund |
| | | DEA11 Düsseldorf, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEA12 Duisburg, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEA14 Krefeld, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEA15 Mönchengladbach, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEA1B Kleve |
| | | DEA1D Rhein-Kreis Neuss |
| | | DEA1E Viersen |
| | | DEA1F Wesel |
| | | DEA33 Münster, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEA34 Borken |
| | | DEA35 Coesfeld |
| | | DEA37 Steinfurt |
| | | DEA38 Warendorf |
| | | NL111 Oost-Groningen |
| | | NL112 Delfzijl en omgeving |
| | | NL113 Overig Groningen |
| | | NL124 Noord-Friesland |
| | | NL125 Zuidwest-Friesland |
| | | NL126 Zuidoost-Friesland |
| | | NL131 Noord-Drenthe |
| | | NL132 Zuidoost-Drenthe |
| | | NL133 Zuidwest-Drenthe |
| | | NL211 Noord-Overijssel |
| | | NL212 Zuidwest-Overijssel |
| | | NL213 Twente |
| | | NL221 Veluwe |
| | | NL224 Zuidwest-Gelderland |
| | | NL225 Achterhoek |
| | | NL226 Arnhem/Nijmegen |
| | | NL230 Flevoland |
| | | NL413 Noordoost-Noord-Brabant |
| | | NL414 Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant |
| | | NL421 Noord-Limburg |
| | | NL422 Midden-Limburg |
| 2021TC16RFCB023 | AT DE CH LI | (Interreg VI-A) Germany-Austria-Switzerland-Liechtenstein (Alpenrhein-Bodensee-Hochrhein) |
| | | AT341 Bludenz-Bregenzer Wald |
| | | AT342 Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet |
| | | DE136 Schwarzwald-Baar-Kreis |
| | | DE137 Tuttlingen |
| | | DE138 Konstanz |
| | | DE139 Lörrach |
| | | DE13A Waldshut |
| | | DE147 Bodenseekreis |
| | | DE148 Ravensburg |
| | | DE149 Sigmaringen |
| | | DE272 Kaufbeuren, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE273 Kempten (Allgäu), Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE274 Memmingen, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DE27A Lindau (Bodensee) |
| | | DE27B Landkreis Ostallgäu |
| | | DE27C Unterallgäu |
| | | DE27E Oberallgäu |
| | | CH033 Aargau |
| | | CH040 Zürich |
| | | CH051 Glarus |
| | | CH052 Schaffhausen |
| | | CH053 Appenzell Ausserrhoden |
| | | CH054 Appenzell Innerrhoden |
| | | CH055 St. Gallen |
| | | CH056 Graubünden |
| | | CH057 Thurgau |
| | | LI000 Liechtenstein |
| 2021TC16RFCB024 | CZ PL | (Interreg VI-A) Czechia -Poland |
| | | CZ051 Liberecký kraj |
| | | CZ052 Královéhradecký kraj |
| | | CZ053 Pardubický kraj |
| | | CZ071 Olomoucký kraj |
| | | CZ080 Moravskoslezský kraj |
| | | PL22C Tyski |
| | | PL225 Bielski |
| | | PL227 Rybnicki |
| | | PL515 Jeleniogórski |
| | | PL517 Wałbrzyski |
| | | PL518 Wrocławski |
| | | PL523 Nyski |
| | | PL524 Opolski |
| 2021TC16RFCB025 | SE NO DK | (Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Denmark-Norway (Öresund-Kattegat-Skagerrak) |
| | | SE224 Skåne län |
| | | SE231 Hallands län |
| | | SE232 Västra Götalandsregionen |
| | | NO081 Oslo |
| | | NO082 Viken |
| | | NO091 Vestfold og Telemark |
| | | NO092 Agder |
| | | DK011 Byen København |
| | | DK012 Københavns omegn |
| | | DK013 Nordsjælland |
| | | DK014 Bornholm |
| | | DK021 Østsjælland |
| | | DK022 Vest- og Sydsjælland |
| | | DK041 Vestjylland |
| | | DK042 Østjylland |
| | | DK050 Nordjylland |
| 2021TC16RFCB026 | LT LV | (Interreg VI-A) Latvia-Lithuania |
| | | LT023 Klaipėdos apskritis |
| | | LT025 Panevėžio apskritis |
| | | LT026 Šiaulių apskritis |
| | | LT028 Telšių apskritis |
| | | LT029 Utenos apskritis |
| | | LV003 Kurzeme |
| | | LV005 Latgale |
| | | LV009 Zemgale |
| 2021TC16RFCB027 | FI SE NO | (Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Finland-Norway (AURORA) |
| | | FI1D5 Keski-Pohjanmaa |
| | | FI1D9 Pohjois-Pohjanmaa |
| | | FI1D7 Lappi |
| | | FI194 Etelä-Pohjanmaa |
| | | FI195 Pohjanmaa |
| | | SE312 Dalarnas län |
| | | SE321 Västernorrlands län |
| | | SE322 Jämtlands län |
| | | SE331 Västerbottens län |
| | | SE332 Norrbottens län |
| | | NO020 Innlandet |
| | | NO060 Trøndelag |
| | | NO071 Nordland |
| | | NO074 Troms og Finnmark |
| 2021TC16RFCB028 | SI HR | (Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Croatia |
| | | HR027 Karlovačka županija |
| | | HR031 Primorsko-goranska županija |
| | | HR036 Istarska županija |
| | | HR050 Grad Zagreb |
| | | HR061 Međimurska županija |
| | | HR062 Varaždinska županija |
| | | HR064 Krapinsko-zagorska županija |
| | | HR065 Zagrebačka županija |
| | | SI031 Pomurska |
| | | SI032 Podravska |
| | | SI034 Savinjska |
| | | SI035 Zasavska |
| | | SI036 Posakvska (formerly Spodnjeposavska) |
| | | SI037 Jugovzhodna Slovenija |
| | | SI038 Primorsko-notranjska (formerly Notranjsko-kraška) |
| | | SI041 Osrednjeslovenska |
| | | SI044 Obalno-kraška |
| 2021TC16RFCB029 | SK CZ | (Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Czechia |
| | | CZ064 Jihomoravsky kraj |
| | | CZ072 Zlinsky kraj |
| | | CZ080 Moravskoslezský kraj |
| | | SK021 Trnavský kraj |
| | | SK022 Trenčiansky kraj |
| | | SK031 Žilinský kraj |
| 2021TC16RFCB030 | LT PL | (Interreg VI-A) Lithuania-Poland |
| | | LT011 Vilniaus apskritis |
| | | LT021 Alytaus apskritis |
| | | LT022 Kauno apskritis |
| | | LT024 Marijampolės apskritis |
| | | LT027 Tauragės apskritis |
| | | PL623 Ełcki |
| | | PL841 Białostocki |
| | | PL843 Suwalski |
| 2021TC16RFCB031 | IT FR | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-France (Maritime) |
| | | ITC31 Imperia |
| | | ITC32 Savona |
| | | ITC33 Genova |
| | | ITC34 La Spezia |
| | | ITG2D Sassari |
| | | ITG2E Nuoro |
| | | ITG2F Cagliari |
| | | ITG2G Oristano |
| | | ITG2H Sud Sardegna |
| | | ITI11 Massa-Carrara |
| | | ITI12 Lucca |
| | | ITI16 Livorno |
| | | ITI17 Pisa |
| | | ITI1A Grosseto |
| | | FRL03 Alpes-Maritimes |
| | | FRL05 Var |
| | | FRM02 Haute-Corse |
| | | FRM01 Corse-du-Sud |
| 2021TC16RFCB032 | FR IT | (Interreg VI-A) France-Italy (ALCOTRA) |
| | | FRK27 Savoie |
| | | FRK28 Haute-Savoie |
| | | FRL01 Alpes -de -Haute -Provence |
| | | FRL02 Hautes -Alpes |
| | | FRL03 Alpes -Maritimes |
| | | ITC11 Torino |
| | | ITC16 Cuneo |
| | | ITC20 Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste |
| | | ITC31 Imperia |
| 2021TC16RFCB033 | IT CH | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Switzerland |
| | | ITC12 Vercelli |
| | | ITC13 Biella |
| | | ITC14 Verbano-Cusio-Ossola |
| | | ITC15 Novara |
| | | ITC20 Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste |
| | | ITC41 Varese |
| | | ITC42 Como |
| | | ITC43 Lecco |
| | | ITC44 Sondrio |
| | | ITH10 Bolzano-Bozen |
| | | CH012 Valais |
| | | CH056 Graubünden |
| | | CH070 Ticino |
| 2021TC16RFCB034 | IT SI | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Slovenia |
| | | SI038 Notranjsko-kraška/Primorsko Notranska-notranjska |
| | | SI042 Gorenjska |
| | | SI043 GoriskaGoriška |
| | | SI044 Obalno-kraška |
| | | SI041 Osrednjeslovenska |
| | | ITH35 Venezia |
| | | ITH41 Pordenone |
| | | ITH42 Udine |
| | | ITH43 Gorizia |
| | | ITH44 Trieste |
| 2021TC16RFCB035 | IT MT | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Malta |
| | | ITG11 Trapani |
| | | ITG12 Palermo |
| | | ITG13 Messina |
| | | ITG14 Agrigento |
| | | ITG15 Caltanissetta |
| | | ITG16 Enna |
| | | ITG17 Catania |
| | | ITG18 Ragusa |
| | | ITG19 Siracusa |
| | | MT001 Malta |
| | | MT002 Gozo& and Comino/Ghawdex u Kemmuna |
| 2021TC16RFCB036 | DE FR CH | (Interreg VI-A) France-Germany-Switzerland (Upper Rhine) |
| | | DEB37 Pirmasens, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEB3K Südwestpfalz |
| | | DE121 Baden-Baden, Stadtkreis |
| | | DE122 Karlsruhe, Stadtkreis |
| | | DE123 Karlsruhe, Landkreis |
| | | DE124 Rastatt |
| | | DE131 Freiburg im Breisgau, Stadtkreis |
| | | DE132 Breisgau-Hochschwarzwald |
| | | DE133 Emmendingen |
| | | DE134 Ortenaukreis |
| | | DE139 Lörrach |
| | | DE13A Waldshut |
| | | DEB33 Landau in der Pfalz, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEB3E Germersheim |
| | | DEB3H Südliche Weinstrasse |
| | | FRF11 Bas -Rhin |
| | | FRF12 Haut -Rhin |
| | | CH023 Solothurn |
| | | CH025 Jura |
| | | CH031 Basel-Stadt |
| | | CH032 Basel-Landschaft |
| | | CH033 Aargau |
| 2021TC16RFCB037 | FR CH | (Interreg VI-A) France-Switzerland |
| | | FRC21 Doubs |
| | | FRC22 Jura |
| | | FRC24 Territoire de Belfort |
| | | FRK21 Ain |
| | | FRK28 Haute-Savoie |
| | | CH011 Vaud |
| | | CH012 Valais |
| | | CH013 Genève |
| | | CH021 Bern |
| | | CH022 Fribourg |
| | | CH024 Neuchâtel |
| | | CH025 Jura |
| 2021TC16RFCB038 | IT HR | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Croatia |
| | | HR027 Karlovačka županija |
| | | HR031 Primorsko-goranska županija |
| | | HR032 Ličko-senjska županija |
| | | HR033 Zadarska županija |
| | | HR034 Šibensko-kninska županija |
| | | HR035 Splitsko-dalmatinska županija |
| | | HR036 Istarska županija |
| | | HR037 Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija |
| | | ITF12 Teramo |
| | | ITF13 Pescara |
| | | ITF14 Chieti |
| | | ITF22 Campobasso |
| | | ITF44 Brindisi |
| | | ITF45 Lecce |
| | | ITF46 Foggia |
| | | ITF47 Bari |
| | | ITF48 Barletta-Andria-Trani |
| | | ITH35 Venezia |
| | | ITH36 Padova |
| | | ITH37 Rovigo |
| | | ITH41 Pordenone |
| | | ITH42 Udine |
| | | ITH43 Gorizia |
| | | ITH44 Trieste |
| | | ITH56 Ferrara |
| | | ITH57 Ravenna |
| | | ITH58 Forlì-Cesena |
| | | ITH59 Rimini |
| | | ITI31 Pesaro e Urbino |
| | | ITI32 Ancona |
| | | ITI33 Macerata |
| | | ITI34 Ascoli Piceno |
| | | ITI35 Fermo |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFCB039 | BE FR | (Interreg VI-A) Belgium-France (Wallonie-Vlaanderen-France) |
| | | BE234 Arr. Gent |
| | | BE235 Arr. Oudenaarde |
| | | BE251 Arr. Brugge |
| | | BE252 Arr. Diksmuide |
| | | BE253 Arr. Ieper |
| | | BE254 Arr. Kortrijk |
| | | BE255 Arr. Oostende |
| | | BE256 Arr. Roeselare |
| | | BE257 Arr. Tielt |
| | | BE258 Arr. Veurne |
| | | BE32A Arr. Ath |
| | | BE32B Arr. Charleroi |
| | | BE323 Arr. Mons |
| | | BE328 Arr. Mouscron |
| | | BE329 Arr. La Louvière |
| | | BE32C Arr. Soignies |
| | | BE32D Arr. Thuin |
| | | BE328 Arr. Tournai |
| | | BE341 Arr. Arlon |
| | | BE342 Arr. Bastogne |
| | | BE343 Arr. Marche-en-Famenne |
| | | BE344 Arr. Neufchâteau |
| | | BE345 Arr. Virton |
| | | BE351 Arr. Dinant |
| | | BE352 Arr. Namur |
| | | BE353 Arr. Philippeville |
| | | FRE11 Nord |
| | | FRE12 Pas-de-Calais |
| | | FRE21 Aisne |
| | | FRE22 Oise |
| | | FRE23 Somme |
| | | FRF21 Ardennes |
| | | FRF23 Marne |
| 2021TC16RFCB040 | BE DE FR LU | (Interreg VI-A) France-Belgium-Germany-Luxembourg (Grande Région/Großregion) |
| | | BE331 Arr. Huy |
| | | BE332 Arr. Liège |
| | | BE334 Arr. Waremme |
| | | BE335 Arr. Verviers – communes francophones |
| | | BE336 Bezirk Verviers – Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft |
| | | BE341 Arr. Arlon |
| | | BE342 Arr. Bastogne |
| | | BE343 Arr. Marche-en-Famenne |
| | | BE344 Arr. Neufchâteau |
| | | BE345 Arr. Virton |
| | | DEB21 Trier, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEB23 Eifelkreis Bitburg-Prüm |
| | | DEB25 Trier-Saarburg |
| | | DEB37 Pirmasens, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEB3A Zweibrücken, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEB3K Südwestpfalz |
| | | DEC01 Regionalverband Saarbrücken |
| | | DEC02 Merzig-Wadern |
| | | DEC04 Saarlouis |
| | | DEC05 Saarpfalz-Kreis |
| | | DEB15 Birkenfeld |
| | | DEB22 Bernkastel-Wittlich |
| | | DEB24 Vulkaneifel |
| | | DEB32 Kaiserslautern, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEB33 Landau in der Pfalz, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEB3E Germersheim |
| | | DEB3F Kaiserslautern, Landkreis |
| | | DEB3G Kusel |
| | | DEB3H Südliche Weinstraße |
| | | DEC03 Neunkirchen |
| | | DEC06 St. Wendel |
| | | FRF31 Meurthe-et-Moselle |
| | | FRF32 Meuse |
| | | FRF33 Moselle |
| | | LU000 Luxembourg |
| 2021TC16RFCB041 | BE NL | (Interreg VI-A) Belgium-The Netherlands (Vlaanderen-Nederland) |
| | | BE211 Arr. Antwerpen |
| | | BE212 Arr. Mechelen |
| | | BE213 Arr. Turnhout |
| | | BE224 Arr. Hasselt |
| | | BE225 Arr. Maaseik |
| | | BE223 Arr. Tongeren |
| | | BE231 Arr. Aalst |
| | | BE232 Arr. Dendermonde |
| | | BE233 Arr. Eeklo |
| | | BE234 Arr. Gent |
| | | BE235 Arr. Oudenaarde |
| | | BE236 Arr. Sint-Niklaas |
| | | BE242 Arr. Leuven |
| | | BE251 Arr. Brugge |
| | | BE252 Arr. Diksmuide |
| | | BE254 Arr. Kortrijk |
| | | BE255 Arr. Oostende |
| | | BE256 Arr. Roeselare |
| | | BE257 Arr. Tielt |
| | | NL341 Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen |
| | | NL342 Overig Zeeland |
| | | NL411 West-Noord-Brabant |
| | | NL412 Midden-Noord-Brabant |
| | | NL413 Noordoost-Noord-Brabant |
| | | NL414 Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant |
| | | NL421 Noord-Limburg |
| | | NL422 Midden-Limburg |
| | | NL423 Zuid-Limburg |
| 2021TC16RFCB042 | RO HU | (Interreg VI-A) Romania-Hungary |
| | | HU321 Hajdú-Bihar |
| | | HU323 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg |
| | | HU332 Békés |
| | | HU333 Csongrád |
| | | RO111 Bihor |
| | | RO115 Satu Mare |
| | | RO421 Arad |
| | | RO424 Timiş |
| 2021TC16RFCB043 | EE LV | (Interreg VI-A) Estonia-Latvia |
| | | EE004 Lääne-Eesti |
| | | EE008 Lõuna-Eesti |
| | | LV003 Kurzeme |
| | | LV006 Rīga |
| | | LV007 Pierīga |
| | | LV008 Vidzeme |
| 2021TC16RFCB044 | IT AT | (Interreg VI-A) Italy-Austria |
| | | AT211 Klagenfurt-Villach |
| | | AT212 Oberkärnten |
| | | AT213: Unterkärnten |
| | | AT321: Lungau |
| | | AT322 Pinzgau-Pongau |
| | | AT323: Salzburg und Umgebung |
| | | AT331: Außerfern |
| | | AT332 Innsbruck |
| | | AT333 Osttirol |
| | | AT334 Tiroler Oberland |
| | | AT335 Tiroler Unterland |
| | | ITH10 Bolzano-Bozen |
| | | ITH32: Vicenza |
| | | ITH33 Belluno |
| | | ITH34: Treviso |
| | | ITH41 Pordenone |
| | | ITH42 Udine |
| | | ITH43: Gorizia |
| | | ITH44: Trieste |
| 2021TC16RFCB045 | SI HU | (Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Hungary |
| | | HU222 Vas |
| | | HU223 Zala |
| | | SI031 Pomurska |
| | | SI032 Podravska |
| 2021TC16RFCB046 | SI AT | (Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Austria |
| | | AT113 Südburgenland |
| | | AT211 Klagenfurt-Villach |
| | | AT212 Oberkärnten |
| | | AT213 Unterkärnten |
| | | AT221 Graz |
| | | AT223 Östliche Obersteiermark |
| | | AT224 Oststeiermark |
| | | AT225 West- und Südsteiermark |
| | | SI031 Pomurska |
| | | SI032 Podravska |
| | | SI033 Koroška |
| | | SI034 Savinjska |
| | | SI035 Zasavska |
| | | SI041 Osrednjeslovenska |
| | | SI042 Gorenjska |
| | | SI043 Goriška |
| 2021TC16RFCB047 | EL CY | (Interreg VI-A) Greece-Cyprus |
| | | CY000 Κύπρος (Cyprus) |
| | | EL411 Λέσβος, Λήμνος (Lesvos, Limnos) |
| | | EL412 Ικαρία, Σάμος (Ikaria, Samos) |
| | | EL413 Χίος (Chios) |
| | | EL421 Κάλυμνος, Κάρπαθος, Κάσος, Κως, Ρόδος (Kalymnos, Karpathos, Kasos, Kos, Rodos) |
| | | EL422 Άνδρος, Θήρα, Κέα, Μηλος, Μύκονος, Νάξος, Πάρος, Σύρος, Σύρος, Τήνος(Andros, Thira, Kea, Milos, Mykonos, Naxos, Paros, Syros, Tinos) |
| | | EL431 Ηράκλειο (Irakleio) |
| | | EL432 Λασίθι (Lasithi) |
| | | EL433 RethimniΡέθυμνο (Rethimnο) |
| | | EL434 Χανιά (Chania) |
| 2021TC16RFCB048 | DE DK | (Interreg VI-A) Germany-Denmark |
| | | DEF01 Flensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEF02 Kiel, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEF03 Lübeck, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEF04 Neumünster, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| | | DEF07 Nordfriesland |
| | | DEF08 Ostholstein |
| | | DEF0A Plön |
| | | DEF0B Rendsburg-Eckernförde |
| | | DEF0C Schleswig-Flensburg |
| | | DK021 Østsjælland |
| | | DK022 Vest- og Sydsjælland |
| | | DK031 Fyn |
| | | DK032 Sydjylland |
| | | |
| 2014TC16RFPC001 | IE UK | (Interreg VI-A) PEACE PLUS Ireland-Northern Ireland/United Kingdom |
| | | IE041 Border |
| | | IE062 Mid-East |
| | | UKN06 Belfast |
| | | UKN07 Armagh City, Banbridge and Craigavon |
| | | UKN08 Newry, Mourne and Down |
| | | UKN09 Ards and North Down |
| | | UKN0A Derry City and Strabane |
| | | UKN0B Mid Ulster |
| | | UKN0C Causeway Coast and Glens |
| | | UKN0D Antrim and Newtownabbey |
| | | UKN0E Lisburn and Castlereagh |
| | | UKN0F Mid and East Antrim |
| | | UKN0G Fermanagh and Omagh |

Interreg Internal Cross-Border Programmes

CCI

NUTS 3 level regions (in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/1755)

2021TC16RFCB001

BE DE NL

(Interreg VI-A) Maas-Rijn/Meuse-Rhin/Maas-Rhein (NL-BE-DE)

BE223 Arr. Tongeren

BE224 Arr. Hasselt

BE225 Arr. Maaseik

BE332 Arr. Liège

BE335 Arr. Verviers – communes francophones

BE336 Bezirk Verviers-Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft

DEA26 Düren

DEA28 Euskirchen

DEA29 Heinsberg

DEA2D Städteregion Aachen

DEB23 Eifelkreis Bitburg-Prüm

DEB24 Vulkaneifel

NL422 Midden-Limburg

NL423 Zuid-Limburg

2021TC16RFCB002

AT CZ

(Interreg VI-A) Austria-Czechia

AT121 Mostviertel-Eisenwurzen

AT123 Sankt Pölten

AT124 Waldviertel

AT125 Weinviertel

AT126 Wiener Umland/Nordteil

AT130 Wien

AT311 Innviertel

AT312 Linz-Wels

AT313 Mühlviertel

AT314 Steyr-Kirchdorf

CZ031 Jihočeský kraj

CZ063 Kraj Vysočina

CZ064 Jihomoravský kraj

2021TC16RFCB003

AT SK

(Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Austria

SK010 Bratislavský kraj

SK021 Trnavský kraj

AT112 Nordburgenland

AT122 Niederösterreich-Süd

AT123 Sankt Pölten

AT124 Waldviertel

AT125 Weinviertel

AT126 Wiener Umland/Nordteil

AT127 Wiener Umland/Südteil

AT130 Wien

2021TC16RFCB004

AT DE

(Interreg VI-A) Austria-Germany/Bavaria

AT311 Innviertel

AT312 Linz-Wels

AT313 Mühlviertel

AT315 Traunviertel

AT321 Lungau

AT322 Pinzgau-Pongau

AT323 Salzburg und Umgebung

AT331 Außerfern

AT332 Innsbruck

AT333 Osttirol

AT334 Tiroler Oberland

AT335 Tiroler Unterland

AT341 Bludenz-Bregenzer Wald

AT342 Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet

DE213 Rosenheim, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE214 Altötting

DE215 Berchtesgadener Land

DE216 Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen

DE21D Garmisch-Partenkirchen

DE21F Miesbach

DE21G Mühldorf a. Inn

DE21K Rosenheim, Landkreis

DE21M Traunstein

DE21N Weilheim-Schongau

DE221 Landshut, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE222 Passau, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE224 Deggendorf

DE225 Freyung-Grafenau

DE227 Landshut, Landkreis

DE228 Passau, Landkreis

DE229 Regen

DE22A Rottal-Inn

DE22C Dingolfing-Landau

DE272 Kaufbeuren, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE273 Kempten (Allgäu), Kreisfreie Stadt

DE274 Memmingen, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE27A Lindau (Bodensee)

DE27B Ostallgäu

DE27C Unterallgäu

DE27E Oberallgäu

2021TC16RFCB005

ES PT

(Interreg VI-A) Spain-Portugal (POCTEP)

ES111 A Coruña

ES112 Lugo

ES113 Ourense

ES114 Pontevedra

ES148 Valladolid

ES411 Ávila

ES413 León

ES415 Salamanca

ES419 Zamora

ES431 Badajoz

ES432 Cáceres

ES612 Cádiz

ES613 Córdoba

ES615 Huelva

ES618 Sevilla

PT111 Alto Minho

PT112 Cávado

PT119 Ave

PT11A Area Metropolitana do Porto

PT11B Alto Tâmega

PT11C Tamega e Sousa

PT11D Douro

PT11E Terras de Trás-os-Montes

PT150 Algarve

PT16B Oeste

PT16D Região de Aveiro

PT16E Região de Coimbra

PT16F Região de Leiria

PT16G Viseu Dão Lafões

PT16H Beira Baixa

PT 16I Médio Tejo

PT16J Beiras e Serra da Estrela

PT181 Alentejo litoral

PT184 Baixo Alentejo

PT186 Alto Alentejo

PT187 Alentejo Central

2021TC16RFCB006

ES FR AD

(Interreg VI-A) Spain-France-Andorra (POCTEFA)

ES211 Araba/Alava Álava

ES212 GuipùzcoaGipuzkoa

ES213 Vizcaya/Bizkaia

ES220 Navarra

ES230 La Rioja

ES241 Huesca

ES243 Zaragoza

ES511 Barcelona

ES512 Girona

ES513 Lleida

FRI15 Pyrénées-Atlantiques

FRJ21 Ariège

FRJ23 Haute -Garonne

FRJ15 Pyrénées -Orientales

FRJ26 Hautes-Pyrénées

AD Andorra (third country)

2021TC16RFCB007

HU HR

(Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Croatia

HR021 Bjelovarsko-bilogorska županija

HR022 Virovitičko-podravska županija

HR023 Požeško-slavonska županija

HR025 Osječko-baranjska županija

HR026 Vukovarsko-srijemska županija

HR061 Međimurska županija

HR062 Varaždinska županija

HR063 Koprivničko-križevačka županija

HU223 Zala

HU231 Baranya

HU232 Somogy

2021TC16RFCB008

DE CZ

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Bavaria- Czechia

CZ031 Jihoceský kraj

CZ032 Plzeňský kraj

CZ041 Karlovarský kraj

DE222 Passau, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE223 Straubing, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE224 Deggendorf

DE225 Freyung-Grafenau

DE228 Passau, Landkreis

DE229 Regen

DE22B Straubing-Bogen

DE231 Amberg, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE232 Regensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE233 Weiden i. d. Opf, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE234 Amberg-Sulzbach

DE235 Cham

DE237 Neustadt a. d. Waldnaab

DE238 Regensburg, Landkreis

DE239 Schwandorf

DE23A Tirschenreuth

DE242 Bayreuth, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE244 Hof, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE246 Bayreuth, Landkreis

DE249 Hof, Landkreis

DE24A Kronach

DE24B Kulmbach

DE24D Wunsiedel i. Fichtelgebirge

2021TC16RFCB009

AT HU

(Interreg VI-A) Austria-Hungary

AT111 Mittelburgenland

AT112 Nordburgenland

AT113 Südburgenland

AT122 Niederösterreich-Süd

AT127 Wiener Umland/Südteil

AT130 Wien

AT221 Graz

AT224 Oststeiermark

HU221 Győr-Moson-Sopron

HU222 Vas

HU223 Zala

2021TC16RFCB010

DE PL

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Brandenburg-Poland

DE402 Cottbus, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE403 Frankfurt (Oder), Kreisfreie Stadt

DE409 Märkisch-Oderland

DE40C Oder-Spree

DE40G Spree-Neiße

PL431 Gorzowski

PL432 Zielonogórski

2021TC16RFCB011

PL SK

(Interreg VI-A) Poland-Slovakia

PL214 Krakowski

PL218 Nowosądecki

PL219 Nowotarski

PL21A Oświęcimski

PL225 Bielski

PL22C Tyski

PL821 Krośnieński

PL822 Przemyski

PL823 Rzeszowski

SK031 Žilinský kraj

SK041 Prešovský kraj

SK042 Košický kraj

2021TC16RFCB012

DE DK LT PL SE

(Interreg VI-A) Poland-Denmark-Germany-Lithuania-Sweden (South Baltic)

DE80N Vorpommern-Greifswald

DE803 Rostock, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE80M Nordwestmecklenburg

DE80L Vorpommern-Rügen

DE80K Landkreis Rostock

DK014 Bornholm

DK021 Østsjælland

DK022 Vest- og Sydsjælland

LT023 Klaipėdos apskritis

LT027 Tauragės apskritis

LT028 Telšių apskritis

PL424 Miasto Szczecin

PL426 Koszaliński

PL427 Szczecinecko-pyrzycki

PL428 Szczeciński

PL636 Słupski

PL637 Chojnicki

PL638 Starogardzki

PL633 Trójmiejski

PL634 Gdański

PL621 Elbląski

SE212 Kronobergs län

SE213 Kalmar län

SE221 Blekinge län

SE224 Skåne län

2021TC16RFCB013

EE FI LV SE

(Interreg VI-A) Finland-Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (Central Baltic)

EE001 Põhja-Eesti

EE004 Lääne-Eesti

EE008 Lõuna-Eesti

EE009 Kesk-Eesti

EE00A Kirde-Eesti

FI1B1 Helsinki-Uusimaa

FI1C1 Varsinais-Suomi

FI1C2 Kanta-Häme

FI1C3 Päijät-Häme

FI1C4 Kymenlaakso

FI1C5 Etelä-Karjala

FI196 Satakunta

FI197 Pirkanmaa

FI200 Åland

LV003 Kurzeme

LV006 Rīga

LV007 Pierīga

LV008 Vidzeme

LV009 Zemgale

SE110 Stockholms län

SE121 Uppsala län

SE122 Södermanlands län

SE123 Östergötlands län

SE124 Örebro län

SE125 Västmanlands län

SE214 Gotlands län

SE313 Gävleborgs län

2021TC16RFCB014

HU SK

(Interreg VI-A) Hungary-Slovakia

HU110 Budapest

HU120 Pest

HU212 Komárom-Esztergom

HU221 Győr-Moson-Sopron

HU311 Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén

HU312 Heves

HU313 Nógrád

HU323 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg

SK010 Bratislavský kraj

SK021 Trnavský kraj

SK023 Nitriansky kraj

SK032 Banskobystrický kraj

SK042 Košický kraj

2021TC16RFCB015

SE NO

(Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Norway

SE311 Värmlands län

SE312 Dalarnas län

SE232 Västra Götalands län

SE321 Västernorrlands län

SE322 Jämtlands län

NO020 Innlandet

NO060 Trøndelag

NO082 Viken

2021TC16RFCB016

CZ DE

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Saxony- Czechia

CZ041 Karlovarský kraj

CZ042 Ústecký kraj

CZ051 Liberecký kraj

DED21 Dresden, Kreisfreie Stadt

DED2C Bautzen

DED2D Görlitz

DED2F Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge

DED41 Chemnitz, Kreisfreie Stadt

DED42 Erzgebirgskreis

DED43 Mittelsachsen

DED44 Vogtlandkreis

DED45 Zwickau

2021TC16RFCB017

DE PL

(Interreg VI-A) Poland-Germany/Saxony

DED2C Bautzen

DED2D Görlitz

PL432 Zielonogórski

PL515 Jeleniogórski

2021TC16RFCB018

DE PL

(Interreg VI-A) Germany/Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania/Brandenburg-Poland

DE405 Barnim

DE409 Märkisch-Oderland

DE40I Uckermark

DE80J Mecklenburgische Seenplatte

DE80L Vorpommern-Rügen

DE80N Vorpommern-Greifswald

PL424 Miasto Szczecin

PL426 Koszalinski

PL427 Szczecinecko-pyrzycki

PL428 Szczeciński

2021TC16RFCB019

EL IT

(Interreg VI-A) Greece-Italy

EL541 Άρτα, Πρέβεζα (Arta/Arta, Preveza)

EL542 Θεσπρωτία (Thesprotia)

EL543 Ιωάννινα (Ioannina)

EL621 Ζάκυνθος (Zakynthos)

EL622 Κέρκυρα (Kerkyra)

EL623 Ιθάκη, Κεφαλονιά (Ithaki Kefallinia, Kefallοnia)

EL624 Λευκάδα (Lefkada)

EL631 Αιτωλοακαρνανία (Aitoloakarnania)

EL632 Αχαΐα (Achaia)

EL633 Ηλεία (Ileia)

ITF43 Taranto

ITF44 Brindisi

ITF45 Lecce

ITF46 Foggia

ITF47 Bari

ITF48 Barletta-Andria-Trani

ITF52 Matera

ITF61 Cosenza

ITF62 Crotone

ITF63 Catanzaro

ITF65 Reggio di Calabria

2021TC16RFCB020

BG RO

(Interreg VI-A) Romania-Bulgaria

BG311 Видин (Vidin)

BG312 Монтана (Montana)

BG313 Враца (Vratsa)

BG314 Плевен (Pleven)

BG321 Велико Търново (Veliko Tarnovo)

BG323 Русе (Ruse)

BG325 Силистра (Silistra)

BG332 Добрич (Dobrich)

RO223 Constanţa

RO312 Călăraşi

RO314 Giurgiu

RO317 Teleorman

RO411 Dolj

RO413 Mehedinţi

RO414 Olt

2021TC16RFCB021

BG EL

(Interreg VI-A) Greece-Bulgaria

BG413 Благоевград (Blagoevgrad)

BG422 Хасково (Haskovo)

BG424 Смолян (Smolyan)

BG425 Кърджали (Kardzhali)

EL511 Έβρος (Evros)

EL512 Ξάνθη (Xanthi)

EL513 Ροδόπη (Rodopi)

EL514 Δράμα (Drama)

EL515 Καβάλα (Kavala)

EL522 Θεσσαλονίκη (Thessaloniki)

EL526 Σέρρες (Serres)

2021TC16RFCB022

DE NL

(Interreg VI-A) Germany-The Netherlands

DE941 Delmenhorst, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE942 Emden, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE943 Oldenburg, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE944 Osnabrück, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE945 Wilhelmshaven, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE946 Ammerland

DE947 Aurich

DE948 Cloppenburg

DE949 Emsland

DE94A Friesland (DE)

DE94B Grafschaft Bentheim

DE94C Leer

DE94D Oldenburg, Landkreis

DE94E Osnabrück, Landkreis

DE94F Vechta

DE94G Wesermarsch

DE94H Wittmund

DEA11 Düsseldorf, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEA12 Duisburg, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEA14 Krefeld, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEA15 Mönchengladbach, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEA1B Kleve

DEA1D Rhein-Kreis Neuss

DEA1E Viersen

DEA1F Wesel

DEA33 Münster, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEA34 Borken

DEA35 Coesfeld

DEA37 Steinfurt

DEA38 Warendorf

NL111 Oost-Groningen

NL112 Delfzijl en omgeving

NL113 Overig Groningen

NL124 Noord-Friesland

NL125 Zuidwest-Friesland

NL126 Zuidoost-Friesland

NL131 Noord-Drenthe

NL132 Zuidoost-Drenthe

NL133 Zuidwest-Drenthe

NL211 Noord-Overijssel

NL212 Zuidwest-Overijssel

NL213 Twente

NL221 Veluwe

NL224 Zuidwest-Gelderland

NL225 Achterhoek

NL226 Arnhem/Nijmegen

NL230 Flevoland

NL413 Noordoost-Noord-Brabant

NL414 Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant

NL421 Noord-Limburg

NL422 Midden-Limburg

2021TC16RFCB023

AT DE CH LI

(Interreg VI-A) Germany-Austria-Switzerland-Liechtenstein (Alpenrhein-Bodensee-Hochrhein)

AT341 Bludenz-Bregenzer Wald

AT342 Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet

DE136 Schwarzwald-Baar-Kreis

DE137 Tuttlingen

DE138 Konstanz

DE139 Lörrach

DE13A Waldshut

DE147 Bodenseekreis

DE148 Ravensburg

DE149 Sigmaringen

DE272 Kaufbeuren, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE273 Kempten (Allgäu), Kreisfreie Stadt

DE274 Memmingen, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE27A Lindau (Bodensee)

DE27B Landkreis Ostallgäu

DE27C Unterallgäu

DE27E Oberallgäu

CH033 Aargau

CH040 Zürich

CH051 Glarus

CH052 Schaffhausen

CH053 Appenzell Ausserrhoden

CH054 Appenzell Innerrhoden

CH055 St. Gallen

CH056 Graubünden

CH057 Thurgau

LI000 Liechtenstein

2021TC16RFCB024

CZ PL

(Interreg VI-A) Czechia -Poland

CZ051 Liberecký kraj

CZ052 Královéhradecký kraj

CZ053 Pardubický kraj

CZ071 Olomoucký kraj

CZ080 Moravskoslezský kraj

PL22C Tyski

PL225 Bielski

PL227 Rybnicki

PL515 Jeleniogórski

PL517 Wałbrzyski

PL518 Wrocławski

PL523 Nyski

PL524 Opolski

2021TC16RFCB025

SE NO DK

(Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Denmark-Norway (Öresund-Kattegat-Skagerrak)

SE224 Skåne län

SE231 Hallands län

SE232 Västra Götalandsregionen

NO081 Oslo

NO082 Viken

NO091 Vestfold og Telemark

NO092 Agder

DK011 Byen København

DK012 Københavns omegn

DK013 Nordsjælland

DK014 Bornholm

DK021 Østsjælland

DK022 Vest- og Sydsjælland

DK041 Vestjylland

DK042 Østjylland

DK050 Nordjylland

2021TC16RFCB026

LT LV

(Interreg VI-A) Latvia-Lithuania

LT023 Klaipėdos apskritis

LT025 Panevėžio apskritis

LT026 Šiaulių apskritis

LT028 Telšių apskritis

LT029 Utenos apskritis

LV003 Kurzeme

LV005 Latgale

LV009 Zemgale

2021TC16RFCB027

FI SE NO

(Interreg VI-A) Sweden-Finland-Norway (AURORA)

FI1D5 Keski-Pohjanmaa

FI1D9 Pohjois-Pohjanmaa

FI1D7 Lappi

FI194 Etelä-Pohjanmaa

FI195 Pohjanmaa

SE312 Dalarnas län

SE321 Västernorrlands län

SE322 Jämtlands län

SE331 Västerbottens län

SE332 Norrbottens län

NO020 Innlandet

NO060 Trøndelag

NO071 Nordland

NO074 Troms og Finnmark

2021TC16RFCB028

SI HR

(Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Croatia

HR027 Karlovačka županija

HR031 Primorsko-goranska županija

HR036 Istarska županija

HR050 Grad Zagreb

HR061 Međimurska županija

HR062 Varaždinska županija

HR064 Krapinsko-zagorska županija

HR065 Zagrebačka županija

SI031 Pomurska

SI032 Podravska

SI034 Savinjska

SI035 Zasavska

SI036 Posakvska (formerly Spodnjeposavska)

SI037 Jugovzhodna Slovenija

SI038 Primorsko-notranjska (formerly Notranjsko-kraška)

SI041 Osrednjeslovenska

SI044 Obalno-kraška

2021TC16RFCB029

SK CZ

(Interreg VI-A) Slovakia-Czechia

CZ064 Jihomoravsky kraj

CZ072 Zlinsky kraj

CZ080 Moravskoslezský kraj

SK021 Trnavský kraj

SK022 Trenčiansky kraj

SK031 Žilinský kraj

2021TC16RFCB030

LT PL

(Interreg VI-A) Lithuania-Poland

LT011 Vilniaus apskritis

LT021 Alytaus apskritis

LT022 Kauno apskritis

LT024 Marijampolės apskritis

LT027 Tauragės apskritis

PL623 Ełcki

PL841 Białostocki

PL843 Suwalski

2021TC16RFCB031

IT FR

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-France (Maritime)

ITC31 Imperia

ITC32 Savona

ITC33 Genova

ITC34 La Spezia

ITG2D Sassari

ITG2E Nuoro

ITG2F Cagliari

ITG2G Oristano

ITG2H Sud Sardegna

ITI11 Massa-Carrara

ITI12 Lucca

ITI16 Livorno

ITI17 Pisa

ITI1A Grosseto

FRL03 Alpes-Maritimes

FRL05 Var

FRM02 Haute-Corse

FRM01 Corse-du-Sud

2021TC16RFCB032

FR IT

(Interreg VI-A) France-Italy (ALCOTRA)

FRK27 Savoie

FRK28 Haute-Savoie

FRL01 Alpes -de -Haute -Provence

FRL02 Hautes -Alpes

FRL03 Alpes -Maritimes

ITC11 Torino

ITC16 Cuneo

ITC20 Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste

ITC31 Imperia

2021TC16RFCB033

IT CH

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Switzerland

ITC12 Vercelli

ITC13 Biella

ITC14 Verbano-Cusio-Ossola

ITC15 Novara

ITC20 Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste

ITC41 Varese

ITC42 Como

ITC43 Lecco

ITC44 Sondrio

ITH10 Bolzano-Bozen

CH012 Valais

CH056 Graubünden

CH070 Ticino

2021TC16RFCB034

IT SI

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Slovenia

SI038 Notranjsko-kraška/Primorsko Notranska-notranjska

SI042 Gorenjska

SI043 GoriskaGoriška

SI044 Obalno-kraška

SI041 Osrednjeslovenska

ITH35 Venezia

ITH41 Pordenone

ITH42 Udine

ITH43 Gorizia

ITH44 Trieste

2021TC16RFCB035

IT MT

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Malta

ITG11 Trapani

ITG12 Palermo

ITG13 Messina

ITG14 Agrigento

ITG15 Caltanissetta

ITG16 Enna

ITG17 Catania

ITG18 Ragusa

ITG19 Siracusa

MT001 Malta

MT002 Gozo& and Comino/Ghawdex u Kemmuna

2021TC16RFCB036

DE FR CH

(Interreg VI-A) France-Germany-Switzerland (Upper Rhine)

DEB37 Pirmasens, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB3K Südwestpfalz

DE121 Baden-Baden, Stadtkreis

DE122 Karlsruhe, Stadtkreis

DE123 Karlsruhe, Landkreis

DE124 Rastatt

DE131 Freiburg im Breisgau, Stadtkreis

DE132 Breisgau-Hochschwarzwald

DE133 Emmendingen

DE134 Ortenaukreis

DE139 Lörrach

DE13A Waldshut

DEB33 Landau in der Pfalz, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB3E Germersheim

DEB3H Südliche Weinstrasse

FRF11 Bas -Rhin

FRF12 Haut -Rhin

CH023 Solothurn

CH025 Jura

CH031 Basel-Stadt

CH032 Basel-Landschaft

CH033 Aargau

2021TC16RFCB037

FR CH

(Interreg VI-A) France-Switzerland

FRC21 Doubs

FRC22 Jura

FRC24 Territoire de Belfort

FRK21 Ain

FRK28 Haute-Savoie

CH011 Vaud

CH012 Valais

CH013 Genève

CH021 Bern

CH022 Fribourg

CH024 Neuchâtel

CH025 Jura

2021TC16RFCB038

IT HR

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Croatia

HR027 Karlovačka županija

HR031 Primorsko-goranska županija

HR032 Ličko-senjska županija

HR033 Zadarska županija

HR034 Šibensko-kninska županija

HR035 Splitsko-dalmatinska županija

HR036 Istarska županija

HR037 Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija

ITF12 Teramo

ITF13 Pescara

ITF14 Chieti

ITF22 Campobasso

ITF44 Brindisi

ITF45 Lecce

ITF46 Foggia

ITF47 Bari

ITF48 Barletta-Andria-Trani

ITH35 Venezia

ITH36 Padova

ITH37 Rovigo

ITH41 Pordenone

ITH42 Udine

ITH43 Gorizia

ITH44 Trieste

ITH56 Ferrara

ITH57 Ravenna

ITH58 Forlì-Cesena

ITH59 Rimini

ITI31 Pesaro e Urbino

ITI32 Ancona

ITI33 Macerata

ITI34 Ascoli Piceno

ITI35 Fermo

2021TC16RFCB039

BE FR

(Interreg VI-A) Belgium-France (Wallonie-Vlaanderen-France)

BE234 Arr. Gent

BE235 Arr. Oudenaarde

BE251 Arr. Brugge

BE252 Arr. Diksmuide

BE253 Arr. Ieper

BE254 Arr. Kortrijk

BE255 Arr. Oostende

BE256 Arr. Roeselare

BE257 Arr. Tielt

BE258 Arr. Veurne

BE32A Arr. Ath

BE32B Arr. Charleroi

BE323 Arr. Mons

BE328 Arr. Mouscron

BE329 Arr. La Louvière

BE32C Arr. Soignies

BE32D Arr. Thuin

BE328 Arr. Tournai

BE341 Arr. Arlon

BE342 Arr. Bastogne

BE343 Arr. Marche-en-Famenne

BE344 Arr. Neufchâteau

BE345 Arr. Virton

BE351 Arr. Dinant

BE352 Arr. Namur

BE353 Arr. Philippeville

FRE11 Nord

FRE12 Pas-de-Calais

FRE21 Aisne

FRE22 Oise

FRE23 Somme

FRF21 Ardennes

FRF23 Marne

2021TC16RFCB040

BE DE FR LU

(Interreg VI-A) France-Belgium-Germany-Luxembourg (Grande Région/Großregion)

BE331 Arr. Huy

BE332 Arr. Liège

BE334 Arr. Waremme

BE335 Arr. Verviers – communes francophones

BE336 Bezirk Verviers – Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft

BE341 Arr. Arlon

BE342 Arr. Bastogne

BE343 Arr. Marche-en-Famenne

BE344 Arr. Neufchâteau

BE345 Arr. Virton

DEB21 Trier, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB23 Eifelkreis Bitburg-Prüm

DEB25 Trier-Saarburg

DEB37 Pirmasens, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB3A Zweibrücken, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB3K Südwestpfalz

DEC01 Regionalverband Saarbrücken

DEC02 Merzig-Wadern

DEC04 Saarlouis

DEC05 Saarpfalz-Kreis

DEB15 Birkenfeld

DEB22 Bernkastel-Wittlich

DEB24 Vulkaneifel

DEB32 Kaiserslautern, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB33 Landau in der Pfalz, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB3E Germersheim

DEB3F Kaiserslautern, Landkreis

DEB3G Kusel

DEB3H Südliche Weinstraße

DEC03 Neunkirchen

DEC06 St. Wendel

FRF31 Meurthe-et-Moselle

FRF32 Meuse

FRF33 Moselle

LU000 Luxembourg

2021TC16RFCB041

BE NL

(Interreg VI-A) Belgium-The Netherlands (Vlaanderen-Nederland)

BE211 Arr. Antwerpen

BE212 Arr. Mechelen

BE213 Arr. Turnhout

BE224 Arr. Hasselt

BE225 Arr. Maaseik

BE223 Arr. Tongeren

BE231 Arr. Aalst

BE232 Arr. Dendermonde

BE233 Arr. Eeklo

BE234 Arr. Gent

BE235 Arr. Oudenaarde

BE236 Arr. Sint-Niklaas

BE242 Arr. Leuven

BE251 Arr. Brugge

BE252 Arr. Diksmuide

BE254 Arr. Kortrijk

BE255 Arr. Oostende

BE256 Arr. Roeselare

BE257 Arr. Tielt

NL341 Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen

NL342 Overig Zeeland

NL411 West-Noord-Brabant

NL412 Midden-Noord-Brabant

NL413 Noordoost-Noord-Brabant

NL414 Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant

NL421 Noord-Limburg

NL422 Midden-Limburg

NL423 Zuid-Limburg

2021TC16RFCB042

RO HU

(Interreg VI-A) Romania-Hungary

HU321 Hajdú-Bihar

HU323 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg

HU332 Békés

HU333 Csongrád

RO111 Bihor

RO115 Satu Mare

RO421 Arad

RO424 Timiş

2021TC16RFCB043

EE LV

(Interreg VI-A) Estonia-Latvia

EE004 Lääne-Eesti

EE008 Lõuna-Eesti

LV003 Kurzeme

LV006 Rīga

LV007 Pierīga

LV008 Vidzeme

2021TC16RFCB044

IT AT

(Interreg VI-A) Italy-Austria

AT211 Klagenfurt-Villach

AT212 Oberkärnten

AT213: Unterkärnten

AT321: Lungau

AT322 Pinzgau-Pongau

AT323: Salzburg und Umgebung

AT331: Außerfern

AT332 Innsbruck

AT333 Osttirol

AT334 Tiroler Oberland

AT335 Tiroler Unterland

ITH10 Bolzano-Bozen

ITH32: Vicenza

ITH33 Belluno

ITH34: Treviso

ITH41 Pordenone

ITH42 Udine

ITH43: Gorizia

ITH44: Trieste

2021TC16RFCB045

SI HU

(Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Hungary

HU222 Vas

HU223 Zala

SI031 Pomurska

SI032 Podravska

2021TC16RFCB046

SI AT

(Interreg VI-A) Slovenia-Austria

AT113 Südburgenland

AT211 Klagenfurt-Villach

AT212 Oberkärnten

AT213 Unterkärnten

AT221 Graz

AT223 Östliche Obersteiermark

AT224 Oststeiermark

AT225 West- und Südsteiermark

SI031 Pomurska

SI032 Podravska

SI033 Koroška

SI034 Savinjska

SI035 Zasavska

SI041 Osrednjeslovenska

SI042 Gorenjska

SI043 Goriška

2021TC16RFCB047

EL CY

(Interreg VI-A) Greece-Cyprus

CY000 Κύπρος (Cyprus)

EL411 Λέσβος, Λήμνος (Lesvos, Limnos)

EL412 Ικαρία, Σάμος (Ikaria, Samos)

EL413 Χίος (Chios)

EL421 Κάλυμνος, Κάρπαθος, Κάσος, Κως, Ρόδος (Kalymnos, Karpathos, Kasos, Kos, Rodos)

EL422 Άνδρος, Θήρα, Κέα, Μηλος, Μύκονος, Νάξος, Πάρος, Σύρος, Σύρος, Τήνος(Andros, Thira, Kea, Milos, Mykonos, Naxos, Paros, Syros, Tinos)

EL431 Ηράκλειο (Irakleio)

EL432 Λασίθι (Lasithi)

EL433 RethimniΡέθυμνο (Rethimnο)

EL434 Χανιά (Chania)

2021TC16RFCB048

DE DK

(Interreg VI-A) Germany-Denmark

DEF01 Flensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEF02 Kiel, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEF03 Lübeck, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEF04 Neumünster, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEF07 Nordfriesland

DEF08 Ostholstein

DEF0A Plön

DEF0B Rendsburg-Eckernförde

DEF0C Schleswig-Flensburg

DK021 Østsjælland

DK022 Vest- og Sydsjælland

DK031 Fyn

DK032 Sydjylland

2014TC16RFPC001

IE UK

(Interreg VI-A) PEACE PLUS Ireland-Northern Ireland/United Kingdom

IE041 Border

IE062 Mid-East

UKN06 Belfast

UKN07 Armagh City, Banbridge and Craigavon

UKN08 Newry, Mourne and Down

UKN09 Ards and North Down

UKN0A Derry City and Strabane

UKN0B Mid Ulster

UKN0C Causeway Coast and Glens

UKN0D Antrim and Newtownabbey

UKN0E Lisburn and Castlereagh

UKN0F Mid and East Antrim

UKN0G Fermanagh and Omagh

| Interreg A IPA III CBC programmes (IPA III CBC) |
| --- |
| CCI | | NUTS 3 level regions (in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/1755) |
| 2021TC16IPCB001 | HU RS | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Hungary Serbia |
| | HU331 | Bács-Kiskun |
| | HU333 | Csongrád |
| | RS121 | West Bačka District |
| | RS122 | South Banat District |
| | RS123 | South Bačka District |
| | RS124 | North Banat District |
| | RS125 | North Bačka District |
| | RS126 | Central Banat District |
| | RS127 | Srem District |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB002 | RO RS | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Romania Serbia |
| | RO413 | Mehedinți |
| | RO422 | Caraș-Severin |
| | RO424 | Timiș |
| | RS122 | South Banat District |
| | RS124 | North Banat District |
| | RS126 | Central Banat District |
| | RS221 | Bor District |
| | RS222 | Braničevski District |
| | RS227 | Podunavski District |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB003 | HR RS | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia Serbia |
| | HR023 | Požeško-slavonska županija |
| | HR024 | Brodsko-posavska županija |
| | HR025 | Osječko-baranjska županija |
| | HR026 | Vukovarsko-srijemska županija |
| | RS121 | West Bačka District |
| | RS123 | South Bačka District |
| | RS125 | North Bačka District |
| | RS127 | Srem District |
| | RS213 | Mačva District |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB004 | HR BA ME | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro |
| | HR021 | Bjelovarsko-bilogorska županija |
| | HR023 | Požeško-slavonska županija |
| | HR024 | Brodsko-posavska županija |
| | HR026 | Vukovarsko-srijemska županija |
| | HR027 | Karlovačka županija |
| | HR028 | Sisačko-moslavačka županija |
| | HR032 | Ličko-senjska županija |
| | HR033 | Zadarska županija |
| | HR034 | Šibensko-kninska županija |
| | HR035 | Splitsko-dalmatinska županija |
| | HR037 | Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija |
| | HR065 | Zagrebačka županija |
| | ME | Montenegro |
| | BA | Brčko District |
| | BA | Republika Srpska |
| | BA | Una Sana Canton |
| | BA | Posavina Canton |
| | BA | Tuzla Canton |
| | BA | Zenica-Doboj Canton |
| | BA | Central Bosnia Canton |
| | BA | West Herzegovina Canton |
| | BA | Herzegovina-Neretva Canton |
| | BA | Canton 10 |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB005 | BG TR | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Turkey |
| | BG341 | Бургас/Burgas |
| | BG343 | Ямбол/Yambol |
| | BG422 | Хасково/Haskovo |
| | TR212 | Edirne |
| | TR213 | Kırklareli |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB006 | BG MK | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria North Macedonia |
| | BG413 | Благоевград/Blagoevgrad |
| | BG415 | Кюстендил/Kyustendil |
| | MK002 | East region |
| | MK004 | Southeast |
| | MK007 | Northeast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB007 | BG RS | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Serbia |
| | BG311 | Видин/Vidin |
| | BG312 | Монтана/Montana |
| | BG313 | Враца/Vratsa |
| | BG412 | София/Sofia |
| | BG414 | Перник/Pernik |
| | BG415 | Кюстендил/Kyustendil |
| | RS221 | Bor District |
| | RS223 | Zaječar District |
| | RS224 | Jablanica District |
| | RS225 | Nišava District |
| | RS226 | Pirot District |
| | RS228 | Pčinja District |
| | RS229 | Toplica District |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB008 | IT AL ME | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Italy Albania Montenegro (South Adriatic) |
| | ITF21 | Isernia |
| | ITF22 | Campobasso |
| | ITF43 | Taranto |
| | ITF44 | Brindisi |
| | ITF45 | Lecce |
| | ITF46 | Foggia |
| | ITF47 | Bari |
| | ITF48 | Barletta-Andria-Trani |
| | ME | Montenegro |
| | AL | Albania |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB009 | EL MK | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece North Macedonia |
| | EL522 | Θεσσαλονίκη/Thessaloniki |
| | EL523 | Κιλκίς/Kilkis |
| | EL524 | Πέλλα/Pella |
| | EL526 | Σέρρες/Serres |
| | EL531 | Γρεβενά, Κοζάνη/Grevena, Kozani |
| | EL533 | Φλώρινα/Florina |
| | MK001 | Vardar |
| | MK003 | Southwest |
| | MK004 | Southeast |
| | MK005 | Pelagonia |
| | | |
| 2021TC16IPCB010 | EL AL | (Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece Albania |
| | EL531 | Γρεβενά, Κοζάνη/Grevena, Kozani |
| | EL532 | Καστοριά/Kastoria |
| | EL533 | Φλώρινα/Florina |
| | EL541 | Άρτα, Πρέβεζα/Arta, Preveza |
| | EL542 | Θεσπρωτία/Thesprotia |
| | EL543 | Ιωάννινα/Ioannina |
| | EL621 | Ζάκυνθος/Zakynthos |
| | EL622 | Κέρκυρα/Kerkyra |
| | EL623 | Ιθάκη, Κεφαλληνία/Ithaki, Kefallinia |
| | EL624 | Λευκάδα/Lefkada |
| | AL031 | Berat |
| | AL032 | Fier |
| | AL033 | Gjirokastër |
| | AL034 | Korçë |
| | AL035 | Vlorë |

Interreg A IPA III CBC programmes (IPA III CBC)

CCI

NUTS 3 level regions (in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/1755)

2021TC16IPCB001

HU RS

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Hungary Serbia

HU331

Bács-Kiskun

HU333

Csongrád

RS121

West Bačka District

RS122

South Banat District

RS123

South Bačka District

RS124

North Banat District

RS125

North Bačka District

RS126

Central Banat District

RS127

Srem District

2021TC16IPCB002

RO RS

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Romania Serbia

RO413

Mehedinți

RO422

Caraș-Severin

RO424

Timiș

RS122

South Banat District

RS124

North Banat District

RS126

Central Banat District

RS221

Bor District

RS222

Braničevski District

RS227

Podunavski District

2021TC16IPCB003

HR RS

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia Serbia

HR023

Požeško-slavonska županija

HR024

Brodsko-posavska županija

HR025

Osječko-baranjska županija

HR026

Vukovarsko-srijemska županija

RS121

West Bačka District

RS123

South Bačka District

RS125

North Bačka District

RS127

Srem District

RS213

Mačva District

2021TC16IPCB004

HR BA ME

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro

HR021

Bjelovarsko-bilogorska županija

HR023

Požeško-slavonska županija

HR024

Brodsko-posavska županija

HR026

Vukovarsko-srijemska županija

HR027

Karlovačka županija

HR028

Sisačko-moslavačka županija

HR032

Ličko-senjska županija

HR033

Zadarska županija

HR034

Šibensko-kninska županija

HR035

Splitsko-dalmatinska županija

HR037

Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija

HR065

Zagrebačka županija

ME

Montenegro

BA

Brčko District

BA

Republika Srpska

BA

Una Sana Canton

BA

Posavina Canton

BA

Tuzla Canton

BA

Zenica-Doboj Canton

BA

Central Bosnia Canton

BA

West Herzegovina Canton

BA

Herzegovina-Neretva Canton

BA

Canton 10

2021TC16IPCB005

BG TR

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Turkey

BG341

Бургас/Burgas

BG343

Ямбол/Yambol

BG422

Хасково/Haskovo

TR212

Edirne

TR213

Kırklareli

2021TC16IPCB006

BG MK

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria North Macedonia

BG413

Благоевград/Blagoevgrad

BG415

Кюстендил/Kyustendil

MK002

East region

MK004

Southeast

MK007

Northeast

2021TC16IPCB007

BG RS

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Bulgaria Serbia

BG311

Видин/Vidin

BG312

Монтана/Montana

BG313

Враца/Vratsa

BG412

София/Sofia

BG414

Перник/Pernik

BG415

Кюстендил/Kyustendil

RS221

Bor District

RS223

Zaječar District

RS224

Jablanica District

RS225

Nišava District

RS226

Pirot District

RS228

Pčinja District

RS229

Toplica District

2021TC16IPCB008

IT AL ME

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Italy Albania Montenegro (South Adriatic)

ITF21

Isernia

ITF22

Campobasso

ITF43

Taranto

ITF44

Brindisi

ITF45

Lecce

ITF46

Foggia

ITF47

Bari

ITF48

Barletta-Andria-Trani

ME

Montenegro

AL

Albania

2021TC16IPCB009

EL MK

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece North Macedonia

EL522

Θεσσαλονίκη/Thessaloniki

EL523

Κιλκίς/Kilkis

EL524

Πέλλα/Pella

EL526

Σέρρες/Serres

EL531

Γρεβενά, Κοζάνη/Grevena, Kozani

EL533

Φλώρινα/Florina

MK001

Vardar

MK003

Southwest

MK004

Southeast

MK005

Pelagonia

2021TC16IPCB010

EL AL

(Interreg VI-A) IPA Greece Albania

EL531

Γρεβενά, Κοζάνη/Grevena, Kozani

EL532

Καστοριά/Kastoria

EL533

Φλώρινα/Florina

EL541

Άρτα, Πρέβεζα/Arta, Preveza

EL542

Θεσπρωτία/Thesprotia

EL543

Ιωάννινα/Ioannina

EL621

Ζάκυνθος/Zakynthos

EL622

Κέρκυρα/Kerkyra

EL623

Ιθάκη, Κεφαλληνία/Ithaki, Kefallinia

EL624

Λευκάδα/Lefkada

AL031

Berat

AL032

Fier

AL033

Gjirokastër

AL034

Korçë

AL035

Vlorë

| Interreg A NEXT programmes (NDICI-CBC) |
| --- |
| CCI | | NUTS 3 level regions (in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/1755) |
| 2021TC16NXCB001 | FI NO RU SE | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Kolarctic |
| | FI1D7 | Lappi |
| | NO071 | Nordland |
| | NO074 | Troms og Finnmark |
| | RU | Arkhangelskaya oblast |
| | RU | Murmanskaya oblast |
| | RU | Nenetskiy Avtonomniy okrug |
| | SE332 | Norrbottens län |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB002 | FI RU | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Karelia |
| | FI1D3 | Pohjois-Karjala |
| | FI1D8 | Kainuu |
| | FI1D9 | Pohjois-Pohjanmaa |
| | RU | Respublika Kareliya |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB003 | FI RU | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT South East Finland Russia |
| | FI1C4 | Kymenlaakso |
| | FI1C5 | Etelä-Karjala |
| | FI1D1 | Etelä-Savo |
| | RU | Sankt-Peterburg |
| | RU | Leningradskaya oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB004 | EE RU | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Estonia Russia |
| | EE001 | Põhja-Eesti |
| | EE008 | Lõuna-Eesti |
| | EE009 | Kesk-Eesti |
| | EE00A | Kirde-Eesti |
| | RU | Sankt-Peterburg |
| | RU | Pskovskaya oblast |
| | RU | Leningradskaya oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB005 | LV RU | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Russia |
| | LV005 | Latgale |
| | LV008 | Vidzeme |
| | LV006 | Rīga |
| | LV007 | Pierīga |
| | LV009 | Zemgale |
| | RU | Pskovskaya oblast |
| | RU | Leningradskaya oblast |
| | RU | Sankt-Peterburg |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB006 | LT RU | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Russia |
| | LT021 | Alytaus apskritis |
| | LT022 | Kauno apskritis |
| | LT026 | Šiaulių apskritis |
| | LT028 | Telšių apskritis |
| | LT023 | Klaipėdos apskritis |
| | LT024 | Marijampolės apskritis |
| | LT027 | Tauragės apskritis |
| | RU | Kaliningradskaya oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB007 | PL RU | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Russia |
| | PL841 | Białostocki |
| | PL636 | Słupski |
| | PL843 | Suwalski |
| | PL621 | Elbląski |
| | PL622 | Olsztyński |
| | PL623 | Ełcki |
| | PL633 | Trójmiejski |
| | PL634 | Gdański |
| | PL637 | Chojnicki |
| | PL638 | Starogardzki |
| | RU | Kaliningradskaya oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB008 | LV BY | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Belarus |
| | LV005 | Latgale |
| | LV009 | Zemgale |
| | BY | Vitebsk oblast |
| | BY | Minskaya oblast |
| | BY | Mogilevskaya oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB009 | PL BU UA | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Belarus Ukraine
   (1) |
| | PL811 | Bialski |
| | PL812 | Chełmsko-zamojski |
| | PL814 | Lubelski |
| | PL815 | Puławski |
| | PL821 | Krośnieński |
| | PL822 | Przemyski |
| | PL823 | Rzeszowski |
| | PL824 | Tarnobrzeski |
| | PL841 | Białostocki |
| | PL842 | Łomżyński |
| | PL843 | Suwalski |
| | PL924 | Ostrołęcki |
| | PL925 | Siedlecki |
| | BY | Gomelskaya oblast |
| | BY | Minskaya oblast |
| | BY | Brestskaya oblast |
| | BY | Grodnenskaya oblast |
| | UA | Ivano-Frankivsk oblast |
| | UA | Rivne oblast |
| | UA | Ternopil oblast |
| | UA | Lviv oblast |
| | UA | Volyn oblast |
| | UA | Zakarpatska oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB010 | HU SK RO UA | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Hungary Slovakia Romania Ukraine
   (1) |
| | HU311 | Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén |
| | HU323 | Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg |
| | RO215 | Suceava |
| | RO114 | Maramureş |
| | RO115 | Satu Mare |
| | SK041 | Prešovský kraj |
| | SK042 | Košický kraj |
| | UA | Chernivtsi oblast |
| | UA | Ivano-Frankivsk oblast |
| | UA | Zakarpattiaa oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB011 | RO MD | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Rep.Moldova |
| | RO212 | Botoşani |
| | RO213 | Iaşi |
| | RO216 | Vaslui |
| | RO224 | Galaţi |
| | MD | Rep.Moldova |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB012 | RO UA | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Ukraine
   (1) |
| | RO114 | Maramureş |
| | RO115 | Satu Mare |
| | RO212 | Botoşani |
| | RO215 | Suceava |
| | RO225 | Tulcea |
| | UA | Chernivtsi oblast |
| | UA | Ivano-Frankivsk oblast |
| | UA | Zakarpattia oblast |
| | UA | Odessa oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB013 | IT TN | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Italy Tunisia |
| | ITG12 | Palermo |
| | ITG16 | Enna |
| | ITG17 | Catania |
| | ITG11 | Trapani |
| | ITG14 | Agrigento |
| | ITG15 | Caltanissetta |
| | ITG18 | Ragusa |
| | ITG19 | Siracusa |
| | ITG13 | Messina |
| | TN | Beja |
| | TN | Zaghouan |
| | TN | Kairouan |
| | TN | Sidi Bouz |
| | TN | Gabes |
| | TN | Manouba |
| | TN | Bizerte |
| | TN | Ariana |
| | TN | Tunis |
| | TN | Ben Arous |
| | TN | Nabeul |
| | TN | Sousse |
| | TN | Monastir |
| | TN | Mahdia |
| | TN | Sfax |
| | TN | Medenine |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXCB014 | LT BY | (Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Belarus |
| | LT021 | Alytaus apskritis |
| | LT029 | Utenos apskritis |
| | LT011 | Vilniaus apskritis |
| | LT022 | Kauno apskritis |
| | LT025 | Panevėžio apskritis |
| | BY | Grodnenskaya oblast |
| | BY | Minskaya oblast |
| | BY | Mogilevskaya oblast |
| | BY | Vitebsk oblast |

Interreg A NEXT programmes (NDICI-CBC)

CCI

NUTS 3 level regions (in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1059/2003, as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/1755)

2021TC16NXCB001

FI NO RU SE

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Kolarctic

FI1D7

Lappi

NO071

Nordland

NO074

Troms og Finnmark

RU

Arkhangelskaya oblast

RU

Murmanskaya oblast

RU

Nenetskiy Avtonomniy okrug

SE332

Norrbottens län

2021TC16NXCB002

FI RU

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Karelia

FI1D3

Pohjois-Karjala

FI1D8

Kainuu

FI1D9

Pohjois-Pohjanmaa

RU

Respublika Kareliya

2021TC16NXCB003

FI RU

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT South East Finland Russia

FI1C4

Kymenlaakso

FI1C5

Etelä-Karjala

FI1D1

Etelä-Savo

RU

Sankt-Peterburg

RU

Leningradskaya oblast

2021TC16NXCB004

EE RU

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Estonia Russia

EE001

Põhja-Eesti

EE008

Lõuna-Eesti

EE009

Kesk-Eesti

EE00A

Kirde-Eesti

RU

Sankt-Peterburg

RU

Pskovskaya oblast

RU

Leningradskaya oblast

2021TC16NXCB005

LV RU

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Russia

LV005

Latgale

LV008

Vidzeme

LV006

Rīga

LV007

Pierīga

LV009

Zemgale

RU

Pskovskaya oblast

RU

Leningradskaya oblast

RU

Sankt-Peterburg

2021TC16NXCB006

LT RU

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Russia

LT021

Alytaus apskritis

LT022

Kauno apskritis

LT026

Šiaulių apskritis

LT028

Telšių apskritis

LT023

Klaipėdos apskritis

LT024

Marijampolės apskritis

LT027

Tauragės apskritis

RU

Kaliningradskaya oblast

2021TC16NXCB007

PL RU

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Russia

PL841

Białostocki

PL636

Słupski

PL843

Suwalski

PL621

Elbląski

PL622

Olsztyński

PL623

Ełcki

PL633

Trójmiejski

PL634

Gdański

PL637

Chojnicki

PL638

Starogardzki

RU

Kaliningradskaya oblast

2021TC16NXCB008

LV BY

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Latvia Belarus

LV005

Latgale

LV009

Zemgale

BY

Vitebsk oblast

BY

Minskaya oblast

BY

Mogilevskaya oblast

2021TC16NXCB009

PL BU UA

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Poland Belarus Ukraine
   (1)

PL811

Bialski

PL812

Chełmsko-zamojski

PL814

Lubelski

PL815

Puławski

PL821

Krośnieński

PL822

Przemyski

PL823

Rzeszowski

PL824

Tarnobrzeski

PL841

Białostocki

PL842

Łomżyński

PL843

Suwalski

PL924

Ostrołęcki

PL925

Siedlecki

BY

Gomelskaya oblast

BY

Minskaya oblast

BY

Brestskaya oblast

BY

Grodnenskaya oblast

UA

Ivano-Frankivsk oblast

UA

Rivne oblast

UA

Ternopil oblast

UA

Lviv oblast

UA

Volyn oblast

UA

Zakarpatska oblast

2021TC16NXCB010

HU SK RO UA

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Hungary Slovakia Romania Ukraine
   (1)

HU311

Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén

HU323

Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg

RO215

Suceava

RO114

Maramureş

RO115

Satu Mare

SK041

Prešovský kraj

SK042

Košický kraj

UA

Chernivtsi oblast

UA

Ivano-Frankivsk oblast

UA

Zakarpattiaa oblast

2021TC16NXCB011

RO MD

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Rep.Moldova

RO212

Botoşani

RO213

Iaşi

RO216

Vaslui

RO224

Galaţi

MD

Rep.Moldova

2021TC16NXCB012

RO UA

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Romania Ukraine
   (1)

RO114

Maramureş

RO115

Satu Mare

RO212

Botoşani

RO215

Suceava

RO225

Tulcea

UA

Chernivtsi oblast

UA

Ivano-Frankivsk oblast

UA

Zakarpattia oblast

UA

Odessa oblast

2021TC16NXCB013

IT TN

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Italy Tunisia

ITG12

Palermo

ITG16

Enna

ITG17

Catania

ITG11

Trapani

ITG14

Agrigento

ITG15

Caltanissetta

ITG18

Ragusa

ITG19

Siracusa

ITG13

Messina

TN

Beja

TN

Zaghouan

TN

Kairouan

TN

Sidi Bouz

TN

Gabes

TN

Manouba

TN

Bizerte

TN

Ariana

TN

Tunis

TN

Ben Arous

TN

Nabeul

TN

Sousse

TN

Monastir

TN

Mahdia

TN

Sfax

TN

Medenine

2021TC16NXCB014

LT BY

(Interreg VI-A) NEXT Lithuania Belarus

LT021

Alytaus apskritis

LT029

Utenos apskritis

LT011

Vilniaus apskritis

LT022

Kauno apskritis

LT025

Panevėžio apskritis

BY

Grodnenskaya oblast

BY

Minskaya oblast

BY

Mogilevskaya oblast

BY

Vitebsk oblast

---

(1)  UA: The general EU restrictions on cooperation in regions that are illegally annexed by Russia are also applicable to Interreg NEXT.

---

ANNEX II

List of Interreg programme areas to receive support under strand B

| CCI | | Names |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2021TC16IPTN001 | IT EL HR SI AL BA ME MK RS SM | (Interreg VI-B) IPA Adriatic-Ionian |
| | EL30 | Αττική/Attiki |
| | EL41 | Βόρειο Αιγαίο/Voreio Aigaio |
| | EL42 | Νότιο Αιγαίο/Notio Aigaio |
| | EL43 | Κρήτη/Kriti |
| | EL51 | Ανατολική Μακεδονία, Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki |
| | EL52 | Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia |
| | EL53 | Δυτική Μακεδονία/Dytiki Makedonia |
| | EL54 | Ήπειρος/Ipeiros |
| | EL61 | Θεσσαλία/Thessalia |
| | EL62 | Ιόνια Νησιά/Ionia Nisia |
| | EL63 | Δυτική Ελλάδα/Dytiki Elláda |
| | EL64 | Στερεά Ελλάδα/Sterea Elláda |
| | EL65 | Πελοπόννησος/Peloponnisos |
| | HR02 | Panonska Hrvatska |
| | HR03 | Jadranska Hrvatska |
| | HR05 | Grad Zagreb |
| | HR06 | Sjeverna Hrvatska |
| | ITC4 | Lombardia |
| | ITF1 | Abruzzo |
| | ITF2 | Molise |
| | ITF4 | Puglia |
| | ITF5 | Basilicata |
| | ITF6 | Calabria |
| | ITG1 | Sicilia |
| | ITH1 | Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen |
| | ITH2 | Provincia Autonoma di Trento |
| | ITH3 | Veneto |
| | ITH4 | Friuli-Venezia Giulia |
| | ITH5 | Emilia-Romagna |
| | ITI2 | Umbria |
| | ITI3 | Marche |
| | SI03 | Vzhodna Slovenija |
| | SI04 | Zahodna Slovenija |
| | AL | Albania |
| | BA | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| | ME | Montenegro |
| | RS | Serbia |
| | MK | North Macedonia |
| | SM | San Marino |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFTN001 | AT DE FR IT SI CH LI | (Interreg VI-B) Alpine Space |
| | DE11 | Stuttgart |
| | DE12 | Karlsruhe |
| | DE13 | Freiburg |
| | DE14 | Tübingen |
| | DE21 | Oberbayern |
| | DE22 | Niederbayern |
| | DE23 | Oberpfalz |
| | DE24 | Oberfranken |
| | DE25 | Mittelfranken |
| | DE26 | Unterfranken |
| | DE27 | Schwaben |
| | FRC2 | Franche-Comté |
| | FRF1 | Alsace |
| | FRK2 | Rhône-Alpes |
| | FRL0 | Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur |
| | ITC1 | Piemonte |
| | ITC2 | Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste |
| | ITC3 | Liguria |
| | ITC4 | Lombardia |
| | ITH1 | Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen |
| | ITH2 | Provincia Autonoma di Trento |
| | ITH3 | Veneto |
| | ITH4 | Friuli-Venezia Giulia |
| | AT11 | Burgenland |
| | AT12 | Niederösterreich |
| | AT13 | Wien |
| | AT21 | Kärnten |
| | AT22 | Steiermark |
| | AT31 | Oberösterreich |
| | AT32 | Salzburg |
| | AT33 | Tirol |
| | AT34 | Vorarlberg |
| | SI03 | Vzhodna Slovenija |
| | SI04 | Zahodna Slovenija |
| | CH | Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera |
| | LI | Liechtenstein |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFTN002 | PT ES FR IE | (Interreg VI-B) Atlantic Area |
| | ES11 | Galicia |
| | ES12 | Principado de Asturias |
| | ES13 | Cantabria |
| | ES21 | País Vasco |
| | ES22 | Comunidad Foral de Navarra |
| | ES23 | La Rioja |
| | ES61 | Andalucía |
| | ES70 | Canarias |
| | FRD1 | Basse-Normandie |
| | FRD2 | Haute-Normandie |
| | FRG0 | Pays de la Loire |
| | FRH0 | Bretagne |
| | FRI1 | Aquitaine |
| | FRI2 | Limousin |
| | FRI3 | Poitou-Charentes |
| | IE04 | Northern and Western |
| | IE05 | Southern |
| | IE06 | Eastern and Midland |
| | PT11 | Norte |
| | PT15 | Algarve |
| | PT16 | Centro (PT) |
| | PT17 | Área Metropolitana de Lisboa |
| | PT18 | Alentejo |
| | PT20 | Região Autónoma dos Açores |
| | PT30 | Região Autónoma da Madeira |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFTN003 | DE DK EE LV LT PL FI SE BY NO RU | (Interreg VI-B) Baltic Sea Region |
| | DK01 | Hovedstaden |
| | DK02 | Sjælland |
| | DK03 | Syddanmark |
| | DK04 | Midtjylland |
| | DK05 | Nordjylland |
| | DE30 | Berlin |
| | DE40 | Brandenburg |
| | DE50 | Bremen |
| | DE60 | Hamburg |
| | DE80 | Mecklenburg-Vorpommern |
| | DE93 | Lüneburg |
| | DEF0 | Schleswig-Holstein |
| | EE00 | Eesti |
| | LV00 | Latvija |
| | LT01 | Sostinės regionas |
| | LT02 | Vidurio ir vakarų Lietuvos regionas |
| | PL21 | Małopolskie |
| | PL22 | Śląskie |
| | PL41 | Wielkopolskie |
| | PL42 | Zachodniopomorskie |
| | PL43 | Lubuskie |
| | PL51 | Dolnośląskie |
| | PL52 | Opolskie |
| | PL61 | Kujawsko-pomorskie |
| | PL62 | Warmińsko-mazurskie |
| | PL63 | Pomorskie |
| | PL71 | Łódzkie |
| | PL72 | Świętokrzyskie |
| | PL81 | Lubelskie |
| | PL82 | Podkarpackie |
| | PL84 | Podlaskie |
| | PL91 | Warszawski stołeczny |
| | PL92 | Mazowiecki regionalny |
| | FI19 | Länsi-Suomi |
| | FI1B | Helsinki-Uusimaa |
| | FI1C | Etelä-Suomi |
| | FI1D | Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi |
| | FI20 | Åland |
| | SE11 | Stockholm |
| | | |
| | SE12 | Östra Mellansverige |
| | SE21 | Småland med öarna |
| | SE22 | Sydsverige |
| | SE23 | Västsverige |
| | SE31 | Norra Mellansverige |
| | SE32 | Mellersta Norrland |
| | SE33 | Övre Norrland |
| | BY | Belarus |
| | NO02 | Innlandet |
| | NO06 | Trøndelag |
| | NO08 | Oslo og Viken |
| | NO09 | Agder og Sør-Østlandet |
| | NO0A | Vestlandet |
| | RU | Arkhangelskaya oblast |
| | RU | Kaliningradskaya oblast |
| | RU | Karelya Republik |
| | RU | Komi Republik |
| | RU | Leningradskaya oblast |
| | RU | Murmanskaya oblast |
| | RU | Nenetskiy Avtonomniy okrug |
| | RU | Novgorodskaya oblast |
| | RU | Pskovskaya oblast |
| | RU | Sankt-Peterburg |
| | RU | Vologda oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFTN003 | AT CZ DE IT HR HU PL SI SK | (Interreg VI-B) Central Europe |
| | CZ01 | Praha |
| | CZ02 | Střední Čechy |
| | CZ03 | Jihozápad |
| | CZ04 | Severozápad |
| | CZ05 | Severovýchod |
| | CZ06 | Jihovýchod |
| | CZ07 | Střední Morava |
| | CZ08 | Moravskoslezsko |
| | DE11 | Stuttgart |
| | DE12 | Karlsruhe |
| | DE13 | Freiburg |
| | DE14 | Tübingen |
| | DE21 | Oberbayern |
| | DE22 | Niederbayern |
| | DE23 | Oberpfalz |
| | DE24 | Oberfranken |
| | DE25 | Mittelfranken |
| | DE26 | Unterfranken |
| | DE27 | Schwaben |
| | DE30 | Berlin |
| | DE40 | Brandenburg |
| | DE80 | Mecklenburg-Vorpommern |
| | DE91 | Braunschweig |
| | DED2 | Dresden |
| | DED4 | Chemnitz |
| | DED5 | Leipzig |
| | DEE0 | Sachsen-Anhalt |
| | DEG0 | Thüringen |
| | ITC1 | Piemonte |
| | ITC2 | Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste |
| | ITC3 | Liguria |
| | ITC4 | Lombardia |
| | ITH1 | Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen |
| | ITH2 | Provincia Autonoma di Trento |
| | ITH3 | Veneto |
| | ITH4 | Friuli-Venezia Giulia |
| | ITH5 | Emilia-Romagna |
| | HR02 | Panonska Hrvatska |
| | HR03 | Jadranska Hrvatska |
| | HR05 | Grad Zagreb |
| | HR06 | Sjeverna Hrvatska |
| | HU11 | Budapest |
| | HU12 | Pest |
| | HU21 | Közép-Dunántúl |
| | HU22 | Nyugat-Dunántúl |
| | HU23 | Dél-Dunántúl |
| | HU31 | Észak-Magyarország |
| | HU32 | Észak-Alföld |
| | HU33 | Dél-Alföld |
| | AT11 | Burgenland |
| | AT12 | Niederösterreich |
| | AT13 | Wien |
| | AT21 | Kärnten |
| | AT22 | Steiermark |
| | AT31 | Oberösterreich |
| | AT32 | Salzburg |
| | AT33 | Tirol |
| | AT34 | Vorarlberg |
| | PL21 | Małopolskie |
| | PL22 | Śląskie |
| | PL41 | Wielkopolskie |
| | PL42 | Zachodniopomorskie |
| | PL43 | Lubuskie |
| | PL51 | Dolnośląskie |
| | PL52 | Opolskie |
| | PL61 | Kujawsko-pomorskie |
| | PL62 | Warmińsko-mazurskie |
| | PL63 | Pomorskie |
| | PL71 | Łódzkie |
| | PL72 | Świętokrzyskie |
| | PL81 | Lubelskie |
| | PL82 | Podkarpackie |
| | PL84 | Podlaskie |
| | PL91 | Warszawski stołeczny |
| | PL92 | Mazowiecki regionalny |
| | SI03 | Vzhodna Slovenija |
| | SI04 | Zahodna Slovenija |
| | SK01 | Bratislavský kraj |
| | SK02 | Západné Slovensko |
| | SK03 | Stredné Slovensko |
| | SK04 | Východné Slovensko |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFTN004 | HU AT BG CZ DE HR RO SI SK BA ME RS MD UA | (Interreg VI-B) Danube
   (1) |
| | AT11 | Burgenland |
| | AT12 | Niederösterreich |
| | AT13 | Wien |
| | AT21 | Kärnten |
| | AT22 | Steiermark |
| | AT31 | Oberösterreich |
| | AT32 | Salzburg |
| | AT33 | Tirol |
| | AT34 | Vorarlberg |
| | BG31 | Северозападен/Severozapaden |
| | BG32 | Северен централен/Severen tsentralen |
| | BG33 | Североизточен/Severoiztochen |
| | BG34 | Югоизточен/Yugoiztochen |
| | BG41 | Югозападен/Yugozapaden |
| | BG42 | Южен централен/Yuzhen tsentralen |
| | CZ01 | Praha |
| | CZ02 | Střední Čechy |
| | CZ03 | Jihozápad |
| | CZ04 | Severozápad |
| | CZ05 | Severovýchod |
| | CZ06 | Jihovýchod |
| | CZ07 | Střední Morava |
| | CZ08 | Moravskoslezsko |
| | DE11 | Stuttgart |
| | DE12 | Karlsruhe |
| | DE13 | Freiburg |
| | DE14 | Tübingen |
| | DE21 | Oberbayern |
| | DE22 | Niederbayern |
| | DE23 | Oberpfalz |
| | DE24 | Oberfranken |
| | DE25 | Mittelfranken |
| | DE26 | Unterfranken |
| | DE27 | Schwaben |
| | HR02 | Panonska Hrvatska |
| | HR03 | Jadranska Hrvatska |
| | HR05 | Grad Zagreb |
| | HR06 | Sjeverna Hrvatska |
| | HU11 | Budapest |
| | HU12 | Pest |
| | HU21 | Közép-Dunántúl |
| | HU22 | Nyugat-Dunántúl |
| | HU23 | Dél-Dunántúl |
| | HU31 | Észak-Magyarország |
| | HU32 | Észak-Alföld |
| | HU33 | Dél-Alföld |
| | RO11 | Nord-Vest |
| | RO12 | Centru |
| | RO21 | Nord-Est |
| | RO22 | Sud-Est |
| | RO31 | Sud-Muntenia |
| | RO32 | Bucureşti-Ilfov |
| | RO41 | Sud-Vest Oltenia |
| | RO42 | Vest |
| | SI03 | Vzhodna Slovenija |
| | SI04 | Zahodna Slovenija |
| | SK01 | Bratislavský kraj |
| | SK02 | Západné Slovensko |
| | SK03 | Stredné Slovensko |
| | SK04 | Východné Slovensko |
| | BA | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| | ME | Montenegro |
| | RS1 | Serbia – sever |
| | RS11 | City of Belgrade |
| | RS12 | Autonomous Province of Vojvodina |
| | RS21 | Region Šumadije i Zapadne Srbije |
| | RS22 | Region Južne i Istočne Srbije |
| | MD | Moldova |
| | UA | Chernivtsi oblast |
| | UA | Ivano-Frankivsk oblast |
| | UA | Zakarpattia oblast |
| | UA | Odessa oblast |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFTN001 | FR BG EL ES HR IT CY MT PT SI AL BA ME MK | (Interreg VI-B) EURO MEDITERRANEAN (EURO MED) |
| | BG31 | Северозападен/Severozapaden |
| | BG32 | Северен централен/Severen tsentralen |
| | BG33 | Североизточен/Severoiztochen |
| | BG34 | Югоизточен/Yugoiztochen |
| | BG41 | Югозападен/Yugozapaden |
| | BG42 | Южен централен/Yuzhen tsentralen |
| | EL30 | Αττική/Attiki |
| | EL41 | Βόρειο Αιγαίο/Voreio Aigaio |
| | EL42 | Νότιο Αιγαίο/Notio Aigaio |
| | EL43 | Κρήτη/Kriti |
| | EL51 | Ανατολική Μακεδονία, Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki |
| | EL52 | Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia |
| | EL53 | Δυτική Μακεδονία/Dytiki Makedonia |
| | EL54 | Ήπειρος/Ipeiros |
| | EL61 | Θεσσαλία/Thessalia |
| | EL62 | Ιόνια Νησιά/Ionia Nisia |
| | EL63 | Δυτική Ελλάδα/Dytiki Elláda |
| | EL64 | Στερεά Ελλάδα/Sterea Elláda |
| | EL65 | Πελοπόννησος/Peloponnisos |
| | ES24 | Aragón |
| | ES30 | Comunidad de Madrid |
| | ES42 | Castilla-La Mancha |
| | ES43 | Extremadura |
| | ES51 | Cataluña |
| | ES52 | Comunitat Valenciana |
| | ES53 | Illes Balears |
| | ES61 | Andalucía |
| | ES62 | Región de Murcia |
| | ES63 | Ciudad de Ceuta |
| | ES64 | Ciudad de Melilla |
| | FRJ1 | Languedoc-Roussillon |
| | FRJ2 | Midi-Pyrénées |
| | FRK2 | Rhône-Alpes |
| | FRL0 | Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur |
| | FRM0 | Corse |
| | HR02 | Panonska Hrvatska |
| | HR03 | Jadranska Hrvatska |
| | HR05 | Grad Zagreb |
| | HR06 | Sjeverna Hrvatska |
| | ITC1 | Piemonte |
| | ITC2 | Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste |
| | ITC3 | Liguria |
| | ITC4 | Lombardia |
| | ITF1 | Abruzzo |
| | ITF2 | Molise |
| | ITF3 | Campania |
| | ITF4 | Puglia |
| | ITF5 | Basilicata |
| | ITF6 | Calabria |
| | ITG1 | Sicilia |
| | ITG2 | Sardegna |
| | ITH3 | Veneto |
| | ITH4 | Friuli-Venezia Giulia |
| | ITH5 | Emilia-Romagna |
| | ITI1 | Toscana |
| | ITI2 | Umbria |
| | ITI3 | Marche |
| | ITI4 | Lazio |
| | CY | Κύπρος/Kýpros |
| | MT | Malta |
| | PT15 | Algarve |
| | PT17 | Área Metropolitana de Lisboa |
| | PT18 | Alentejo |
| | SI03 | Vzhodna Slovenija |
| | SI04 | Zahodna Slovenija |
| | ME | Montenegro |
| | MK | North Macedonia |
| | AL | Albania |
| | BA | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFTN005 | SE IE FI FO GL IS NO | (Interreg VI-B) Northern Periphery and Arctic |
| | IE04 | Northern and Western |
| | IE05 | Southern |
| | FI19 | Länsi-Suomi |
| | FI1D | Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi |
| | SE32 | Mellersta Norrland |
| | SE33 | Övre Norrland |
| | FO | Faroe |
| | GL | Greenland (OCTs) |
| | IS | Ísland |
| | NO06 | Trøndelag |
| | NO07 | Nord-Norge |
| | NO0B | Svalbard og Jan Mayen |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFTN004 | DK BE DE FR NL SE NO | (Interreg VI-B) North Sea |
| | BE21 | Prov. Antwerpen |
| | BE22 | Prov. Limburg (BE) |
| | BE23 | Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen |
| | BE24 | Prov. Vlaams-Brabant |
| | BE25 | Prov. West-Vlaanderen |
| | DK01 | Hovedstaden |
| | DK02 | Sjælland |
| | DK03 | Syddanmark |
| | DK04 | Midtjylland |
| | DK05 | Nordjylland |
| | DE50 | Bremen |
| | DE60 | Hamburg |
| | DE91 | Braunschweig |
| | DE92 | Hannover |
| | DE93 | Lüneburg |
| | DE94 | Weser-Ems |
| | DEF0 | Schleswig-Holstein |
| | FRD1 | Basse-Normandie |
| | FRD2 | Haute-Normandie |
| | FRE1 | Nord-Pas de Calais |
| | FRE2 | Picardie |
| | FRH0 | Bretagne |
| | NL11 | Groningen |
| | NL12 | Friesland (NL) |
| | NL13 | Drenthe |
| | NL21 | Overijssel |
| | NL22 | Gelderland |
| | NL23 | Flevoland |
| | NL31 | Utrecht |
| | NL32 | Noord-Holland |
| | NL33 | Zuid-Holland |
| | NL34 | Zeeland |
| | NL41 | Noord-Brabant |
| | NL42 | Limburg (NL) |
| | SE21 | Småland med öarna |
| | SE22 | Sydsverige |
| | SE23 | Västsverige |
| | SE31 | Norra Mellansverige |
| | NO02 | Innlandet |
| | NO06 | Trøndelag |
| | NO08 | Oslo og Viken |
| | NO09 | Agder og Sør-Østlandet |
| | NO0A | Vestlandet |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFTN005 | FR BE DE IE NL LU CH | (Interreg VI-B) North West Europe |
| | BE10 | Prov. Antwerpen |
| | BE21 | Prov. Antwerpen |
| | BE22 | Prov. Limburg (BE) |
| | BE23 | Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen |
| | BE24 | Prov. Vlaams-Brabant |
| | BE25 | Prov. West-Vlaanderen |
| | BE31 | Prov. Brabant Wallon |
| | BE32 | Prov. Hainaut |
| | BE33 | Prov. Liège |
| | BE34 | Prov. Luxembourg (BE) |
| | BE35 | Prov. Namur |
| | DE11 | Stuttgart |
| | DE12 | Karlsruhe |
| | DE13 | Freiburg |
| | DE14 | Tübingen |
| | DE24 | Oberfranken |
| | DE25 | Mittelfranken |
| | DE26 | Unterfranken |
| | DE27 | Schwaben |
| | DE50 | Bremen |
| | DE71 | Darmstadt |
| | DE72 | Gießen |
| | DE73 | Kassel |
| | DE92 | Hannover |
| | DE94 | Weser -Ems |
| | DEA1 | Düsseldorf |
| | DEA2 | Köln |
| | DEA3 | Münster |
| | DEA4 | Detmold |
| | DEA5 | Arnsberg |
| | DEB1 | Koblenz |
| | DEB2 | Trier |
| | DEB3 | Rheinhessen -Pfalz |
| | DEC0 | Saarland |
| | FR10 | Ile -de -France |
| | FRB0 | Centre – Val de Loire |
| | FRC1 | Bourgogne |
| | FRC2 | Franche -Comté |
| | FRD1 | Basse -Normandie |
| | FRD2 | Haute -Normandie |
| | FRE1 | Nord -Pas de Calais |
| | FRE2 | Picardie |
| | FRF1 | Alsace |
| | FRF2 | Champagne -Ardenne |
| | FRF3 | Lorraine |
| | FRG0 | Pays de la Loire |
| | FRH0 | Bretagne |
| | IE04 | Northern and Western |
| | IE05 | Southern |
| | IE06 | Eastern and Midland |
| | LU | Luxembourg |
| | NL11 | Groningen |
| | NL12 | Friesland (NL) |
| | NL13 | Drenthe |
| | NL21 | Overijssel |
| | NL22 | Gelderland |
| | NL23 | Flevoland |
| | NL31 | Utrecht |
| | NL32 | Noord-Holland |
| | NL33 | Zuid-Holland |
| | NL34 | Zeeland |
| | NL41 | Noord-Brabant |
| | NL42 | Limburg (NL) |
| | CH | Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera |
| | | |
| 2021TC16RFTN006 | ES FR PT AD | (Interreg VI-B) South West Europe (SUDOE) |
| | ES11 | Galicia |
| | ES12 | Principado de Asturias |
| | ES13 | Cantabria |
| | ES21 | País Vasco |
| | ES22 | Comunidad Foral de Navarra |
| | ES23 | La Rioja |
| | ES24 | Aragón |
| | ES30 | Comunidad de Madrid |
| | ES41 | Castilla y León |
| | ES42 | Castilla-La Mancha |
| | ES43 | Extremadura |
| | ES51 | Cataluña |
| | ES52 | Comunitat Valenciana |
| | ES53 | Illes Balears |
| | ES61 | Andalucía |
| | ES62 | Región de Murcia |
| | ES63 | Ciudad de Ceuta |
| | ES64 | Ciudad de Melilla |
| | FRI3 | Poitou-Charentes |
| | FRI1 | Aquitaine |
| | FRJ2 | Midi-Pyrénées |
| | FRI2 | Limousin |
| | FRK1 | Auvergne |
| | FRJ1 | Languedoc-Roussillon |
| | PT11 | Norte |
| | PT15 | Algarve |
| | PT16 | Centro (PT) |
| | PT17 | Área Metropolitana de Lisboa |
| | PT18 | Alentejo |
| | AD | Andorra |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXTN001 | IT EL ES FR CY MT PT TR DZ EG IL JO LB PS TN | (Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mediterranean Sea Basin (NEXT MED) |
| | EL30 | Αττική/Attiki |
| | EL41 | Βόρειο Αιγαίο/Voreio Aigaio |
| | EL42 | Νότιο Αιγαίο/Notio Aigaio |
| | EL43 | Κρήτη/Kriti |
| | EL51 | Ανατολική Μακεδονία, EN - Cleaned document 13/16 Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki |
| | EL52 | Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia |
| | EL53 | Δυτική Μακεδονία/Dytiki Makedonia |
| | EL54 | Ήπειρος/Ipeiros |
| | EL61 | Θεσσαλία/Thessalia |
| | EL62 | Ιόνια Νησιά/Ionia Nisia |
| | EL63 | Δυτική Ελλάδα/Dytiki Elláda |
| | EL64 | Στερεά Ελλάδα/Sterea Elláda |
| | EL65 | Πελοπόννησος/Peloponnisos |
| | ES51 | Cataluña |
| | ES52 | Comunitat Valenciana |
| | ES53 | Illes Balears |
| | ES61 | Andalucía |
| | ES62 | Región de Murcia |
| | ES63 | Ciudad de Ceuta |
| | ES64 | Ciudad de Melilla |
| | FRJ1 | Languedoc-Roussillon |
| | FRJ2 | Midi-Pyrénées |
| | FRL0 | Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur |
| | FRM0 | Corse |
| | ITC3 | Liguria |
| | ITF3 | Campania |
| | ITF4 | Puglia |
| | ITF5 | Basilicata |
| | ITF6 | Calabria |
| | ITG1 | Sicilia |
| | ITG2 | Sardegna |
| | ITI1 | Toscana |
| | ITI4 | Lazio |
| | CY | Κύπρος/Cyprus |
| | MT | Malta |
| | PT15 | Algarve |
| | TR21 | Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli |
| | TR22 | Balıkesir, Çanakkale |
| | TR31 | İzmir |
| | TR32 | Aydın, Denizli, Muğla |
| | TR33 | Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak |
| | TR61 | Antalya, Isparta, Burdur |
| | TR62 | Adana, Mersin |
| | TR63 | Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye |
| | DZ | Tlemcen |
| | DZ | Ain-Temouchent |
| | DZ | Oran |
| | DZ | Mostaganem |
| | DZ | Chlef |
| | DZ | Tipaza |
| | DZ | Boumerdes |
| | DZ | Tizi Ouzou |
| | DZ | Bejaia |
| | DZ | Jijel |
| | DZ | Skikda |
| | DZ | Annaba |
| | DZ | El-Tarf |
| | DZ | Alger |
| | EG | Matruh |
| | EG | Al Iskandariyah (alex.) |
| | EG | Al Buhayrah (behera) |
| | EG | Kafr-el-sheikh |
| | EG | Ash Sharqiyah (sharkia) |
| | EG | Al Daqahliyah (dakahlia) |
| | EG | Dumyat (damietta) |
| | EG | As Ismailiyah (ismailia) |
| | EG | Bur Said (port Said) |
| | EG | Governorate of Cairo |
| | IL | Israel (2) |
| | JO | Jordan |
| | LB | Lebanon |
| | PS | Palestine (3) |
| | TN | Zaghouan |
| | TN | Kairouan |
| | TN | Sidi Bouz |
| | TN | Manouba |
| | TN | Siliana |
| | TN | Le Kef |
| | TN | Gafsa |
| | TN | Kebili |
| | TN | Tataouine |
| | TN | Jendouba |
| | TN | Beja |
| | TN | Bizerte |
| | TN | Ariana |
| | TN | Tunis |
| | TN | Ben Arous |
| | TN | Nabeul |
| | TN | Sousse |
| | TN | Monastir |
| | TN | Mahdia |
| | TN | Sfax |
| | TN | Gabes |
| | TN | Medenine |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXTN003 | ES PT MA | (Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mid-Atlantic
   (4) |
| | ES61 | Andalucía |
| | ES70 | Canarias |
| | PT15 | Algarve |
| | PT18 | Alentejo |
| | PT30 | Região Autónoma da Madeira |
| | MA | Morocco |
| | | |
| 2021TC16NXTN002 | BG EL RO TR AM GE MD UA RU | (Interreg VI-B) NEXT Black Sea Basin
   (5) |
| | BG33 | Североизточен/Severoiztochen |
| | BG34 | Югоизточен/Yugoiztochen |
| | EL51 | Ανατολική Μακεδονία, Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki |
| | EL52 | Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia |
| | RO22 | Sud-Est |
| | TR10 | İstanbul |
| | TR21 | Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli |
| | TR42 | Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova |
| | TR81 | Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın |
| | TR82 | Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop |
| | TR83 | Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya |
| | TR90 | Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane |
| | AM | Armenia |
| | GE | Georgia |
| | MD | Rep.Moldova |
| | UA | Donetsk oblast (6) (Bakhmut District, Kramatorsk District, Volnovakha District, Mariupol District, Pokrovsk District) |
| | UA | Kherson oblast |
| | UA | Mykolayiv oblast |
| | UA | Odessa oblast |
| | UA | Zaporizhzhia oblast |
| | RU | Adygea Republic |
| | RU | Krasnodar Krai |
| | RU | Rostov oblast |

CCI

Names

2021TC16IPTN001

IT EL HR SI AL BA ME MK RS SM

(Interreg VI-B) IPA Adriatic-Ionian

EL30

Αττική/Attiki

EL41

Βόρειο Αιγαίο/Voreio Aigaio

EL42

Νότιο Αιγαίο/Notio Aigaio

EL43

Κρήτη/Kriti

EL51

Ανατολική Μακεδονία, Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki

EL52

Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia

EL53

Δυτική Μακεδονία/Dytiki Makedonia

EL54

Ήπειρος/Ipeiros

EL61

Θεσσαλία/Thessalia

EL62

Ιόνια Νησιά/Ionia Nisia

EL63

Δυτική Ελλάδα/Dytiki Elláda

EL64

Στερεά Ελλάδα/Sterea Elláda

EL65

Πελοπόννησος/Peloponnisos

HR02

Panonska Hrvatska

HR03

Jadranska Hrvatska

HR05

Grad Zagreb

HR06

Sjeverna Hrvatska

ITC4

Lombardia

ITF1

Abruzzo

ITF2

Molise

ITF4

Puglia

ITF5

Basilicata

ITF6

Calabria

ITG1

Sicilia

ITH1

Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen

ITH2

Provincia Autonoma di Trento

ITH3

Veneto

ITH4

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

ITH5

Emilia-Romagna

ITI2

Umbria

ITI3

Marche

SI03

Vzhodna Slovenija

SI04

Zahodna Slovenija

AL

Albania

BA

Bosnia and Herzegovina

ME

Montenegro

RS

Serbia

MK

North Macedonia

SM

San Marino

2021TC16RFTN001

AT DE FR IT SI CH LI

(Interreg VI-B) Alpine Space

DE11

Stuttgart

DE12

Karlsruhe

DE13

Freiburg

DE14

Tübingen

DE21

Oberbayern

DE22

Niederbayern

DE23

Oberpfalz

DE24

Oberfranken

DE25

Mittelfranken

DE26

Unterfranken

DE27

Schwaben

FRC2

Franche-Comté

FRF1

Alsace

FRK2

Rhône-Alpes

FRL0

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

ITC1

Piemonte

ITC2

Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste

ITC3

Liguria

ITC4

Lombardia

ITH1

Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen

ITH2

Provincia Autonoma di Trento

ITH3

Veneto

ITH4

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

AT11

Burgenland

AT12

Niederösterreich

AT13

Wien

AT21

Kärnten

AT22

Steiermark

AT31

Oberösterreich

AT32

Salzburg

AT33

Tirol

AT34

Vorarlberg

SI03

Vzhodna Slovenija

SI04

Zahodna Slovenija

CH

Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera

LI

Liechtenstein

2021TC16RFTN002

PT ES FR IE

(Interreg VI-B) Atlantic Area

ES11

Galicia

ES12

Principado de Asturias

ES13

Cantabria

ES21

País Vasco

ES22

Comunidad Foral de Navarra

ES23

La Rioja

ES61

Andalucía

ES70

Canarias

FRD1

Basse-Normandie

FRD2

Haute-Normandie

FRG0

Pays de la Loire

FRH0

Bretagne

FRI1

Aquitaine

FRI2

Limousin

FRI3

Poitou-Charentes

IE04

Northern and Western

IE05

Southern

IE06

Eastern and Midland

PT11

Norte

PT15

Algarve

PT16

Centro (PT)

PT17

Área Metropolitana de Lisboa

PT18

Alentejo

PT20

Região Autónoma dos Açores

PT30

Região Autónoma da Madeira

2021TC16FFTN003

DE DK EE LV LT PL FI SE BY NO RU

(Interreg VI-B) Baltic Sea Region

DK01

Hovedstaden

DK02

Sjælland

DK03

Syddanmark

DK04

Midtjylland

DK05

Nordjylland

DE30

Berlin

DE40

Brandenburg

DE50

Bremen

DE60

Hamburg

DE80

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

DE93

Lüneburg

DEF0

Schleswig-Holstein

EE00

Eesti

LV00

Latvija

LT01

Sostinės regionas

LT02

Vidurio ir vakarų Lietuvos regionas

PL21

Małopolskie

PL22

Śląskie

PL41

Wielkopolskie

PL42

Zachodniopomorskie

PL43

Lubuskie

PL51

Dolnośląskie

PL52

Opolskie

PL61

Kujawsko-pomorskie

PL62

Warmińsko-mazurskie

PL63

Pomorskie

PL71

Łódzkie

PL72

Świętokrzyskie

PL81

Lubelskie

PL82

Podkarpackie

PL84

Podlaskie

PL91

Warszawski stołeczny

PL92

Mazowiecki regionalny

FI19

Länsi-Suomi

FI1B

Helsinki-Uusimaa

FI1C

Etelä-Suomi

FI1D

Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi

FI20

Åland

SE11

Stockholm

SE12

Östra Mellansverige

SE21

Småland med öarna

SE22

Sydsverige

SE23

Västsverige

SE31

Norra Mellansverige

SE32

Mellersta Norrland

SE33

Övre Norrland

BY

Belarus

NO02

Innlandet

NO06

Trøndelag

NO08

Oslo og Viken

NO09

Agder og Sør-Østlandet

NO0A

Vestlandet

RU

Arkhangelskaya oblast

RU

Kaliningradskaya oblast

RU

Karelya Republik

RU

Komi Republik

RU

Leningradskaya oblast

RU

Murmanskaya oblast

RU

Nenetskiy Avtonomniy okrug

RU

Novgorodskaya oblast

RU

Pskovskaya oblast

RU

Sankt-Peterburg

RU

Vologda oblast

2021TC16RFTN003

AT CZ DE IT HR HU PL SI SK

(Interreg VI-B) Central Europe

CZ01

Praha

CZ02

Střední Čechy

CZ03

Jihozápad

CZ04

Severozápad

CZ05

Severovýchod

CZ06

Jihovýchod

CZ07

Střední Morava

CZ08

Moravskoslezsko

DE11

Stuttgart

DE12

Karlsruhe

DE13

Freiburg

DE14

Tübingen

DE21

Oberbayern

DE22

Niederbayern

DE23

Oberpfalz

DE24

Oberfranken

DE25

Mittelfranken

DE26

Unterfranken

DE27

Schwaben

DE30

Berlin

DE40

Brandenburg

DE80

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

DE91

Braunschweig

DED2

Dresden

DED4

Chemnitz

DED5

Leipzig

DEE0

Sachsen-Anhalt

DEG0

Thüringen

ITC1

Piemonte

ITC2

Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste

ITC3

Liguria

ITC4

Lombardia

ITH1

Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen

ITH2

Provincia Autonoma di Trento

ITH3

Veneto

ITH4

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

ITH5

Emilia-Romagna

HR02

Panonska Hrvatska

HR03

Jadranska Hrvatska

HR05

Grad Zagreb

HR06

Sjeverna Hrvatska

HU11

Budapest

HU12

Pest

HU21

Közép-Dunántúl

HU22

Nyugat-Dunántúl

HU23

Dél-Dunántúl

HU31

Észak-Magyarország

HU32

Észak-Alföld

HU33

Dél-Alföld

AT11

Burgenland

AT12

Niederösterreich

AT13

Wien

AT21

Kärnten

AT22

Steiermark

AT31

Oberösterreich

AT32

Salzburg

AT33

Tirol

AT34

Vorarlberg

PL21

Małopolskie

PL22

Śląskie

PL41

Wielkopolskie

PL42

Zachodniopomorskie

PL43

Lubuskie

PL51

Dolnośląskie

PL52

Opolskie

PL61

Kujawsko-pomorskie

PL62

Warmińsko-mazurskie

PL63

Pomorskie

PL71

Łódzkie

PL72

Świętokrzyskie

PL81

Lubelskie

PL82

Podkarpackie

PL84

Podlaskie

PL91

Warszawski stołeczny

PL92

Mazowiecki regionalny

SI03

Vzhodna Slovenija

SI04

Zahodna Slovenija

SK01

Bratislavský kraj

SK02

Západné Slovensko

SK03

Stredné Slovensko

SK04

Východné Slovensko

2021TC16FFTN004

HU AT BG CZ DE HR RO SI SK BA ME RS MD UA

(Interreg VI-B) Danube
   (1)

AT11

Burgenland

AT12

Niederösterreich

AT13

Wien

AT21

Kärnten

AT22

Steiermark

AT31

Oberösterreich

AT32

Salzburg

AT33

Tirol

AT34

Vorarlberg

BG31

Северозападен/Severozapaden

BG32

Северен централен/Severen tsentralen

BG33

Североизточен/Severoiztochen

BG34

Югоизточен/Yugoiztochen

BG41

Югозападен/Yugozapaden

BG42

Южен централен/Yuzhen tsentralen

CZ01

Praha

CZ02

Střední Čechy

CZ03

Jihozápad

CZ04

Severozápad

CZ05

Severovýchod

CZ06

Jihovýchod

CZ07

Střední Morava

CZ08

Moravskoslezsko

DE11

Stuttgart

DE12

Karlsruhe

DE13

Freiburg

DE14

Tübingen

DE21

Oberbayern

DE22

Niederbayern

DE23

Oberpfalz

DE24

Oberfranken

DE25

Mittelfranken

DE26

Unterfranken

DE27

Schwaben

HR02

Panonska Hrvatska

HR03

Jadranska Hrvatska

HR05

Grad Zagreb

HR06

Sjeverna Hrvatska

HU11

Budapest

HU12

Pest

HU21

Közép-Dunántúl

HU22

Nyugat-Dunántúl

HU23

Dél-Dunántúl

HU31

Észak-Magyarország

HU32

Észak-Alföld

HU33

Dél-Alföld

RO11

Nord-Vest

RO12

Centru

RO21

Nord-Est

RO22

Sud-Est

RO31

Sud-Muntenia

RO32

Bucureşti-Ilfov

RO41

Sud-Vest Oltenia

RO42

Vest

SI03

Vzhodna Slovenija

SI04

Zahodna Slovenija

SK01

Bratislavský kraj

SK02

Západné Slovensko

SK03

Stredné Slovensko

SK04

Východné Slovensko

BA

Bosnia and Herzegovina

ME

Montenegro

RS1

Serbia – sever

RS11

City of Belgrade

RS12

Autonomous Province of Vojvodina

RS21

Region Šumadije i Zapadne Srbije

RS22

Region Južne i Istočne Srbije

MD

Moldova

UA

Chernivtsi oblast

UA

Ivano-Frankivsk oblast

UA

Zakarpattia oblast

UA

Odessa oblast

2021TC16FFTN001

FR BG EL ES HR IT CY MT PT SI AL BA ME MK

(Interreg VI-B) EURO MEDITERRANEAN (EURO MED)

BG31

Северозападен/Severozapaden

BG32

Северен централен/Severen tsentralen

BG33

Североизточен/Severoiztochen

BG34

Югоизточен/Yugoiztochen

BG41

Югозападен/Yugozapaden

BG42

Южен централен/Yuzhen tsentralen

EL30

Αττική/Attiki

EL41

Βόρειο Αιγαίο/Voreio Aigaio

EL42

Νότιο Αιγαίο/Notio Aigaio

EL43

Κρήτη/Kriti

EL51

Ανατολική Μακεδονία, Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki

EL52

Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia

EL53

Δυτική Μακεδονία/Dytiki Makedonia

EL54

Ήπειρος/Ipeiros

EL61

Θεσσαλία/Thessalia

EL62

Ιόνια Νησιά/Ionia Nisia

EL63

Δυτική Ελλάδα/Dytiki Elláda

EL64

Στερεά Ελλάδα/Sterea Elláda

EL65

Πελοπόννησος/Peloponnisos

ES24

Aragón

ES30

Comunidad de Madrid

ES42

Castilla-La Mancha

ES43

Extremadura

ES51

Cataluña

ES52

Comunitat Valenciana

ES53

Illes Balears

ES61

Andalucía

ES62

Región de Murcia

ES63

Ciudad de Ceuta

ES64

Ciudad de Melilla

FRJ1

Languedoc-Roussillon

FRJ2

Midi-Pyrénées

FRK2

Rhône-Alpes

FRL0

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

FRM0

Corse

HR02

Panonska Hrvatska

HR03

Jadranska Hrvatska

HR05

Grad Zagreb

HR06

Sjeverna Hrvatska

ITC1

Piemonte

ITC2

Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste

ITC3

Liguria

ITC4

Lombardia

ITF1

Abruzzo

ITF2

Molise

ITF3

Campania

ITF4

Puglia

ITF5

Basilicata

ITF6

Calabria

ITG1

Sicilia

ITG2

Sardegna

ITH3

Veneto

ITH4

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

ITH5

Emilia-Romagna

ITI1

Toscana

ITI2

Umbria

ITI3

Marche

ITI4

Lazio

CY

Κύπρος/Kýpros

MT

Malta

PT15

Algarve

PT17

Área Metropolitana de Lisboa

PT18

Alentejo

SI03

Vzhodna Slovenija

SI04

Zahodna Slovenija

ME

Montenegro

MK

North Macedonia

AL

Albania

BA

Bosnia and Herzegovina

2021TC16FFTN005

SE IE FI FO GL IS NO

(Interreg VI-B) Northern Periphery and Arctic

IE04

Northern and Western

IE05

Southern

FI19

Länsi-Suomi

FI1D

Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi

SE32

Mellersta Norrland

SE33

Övre Norrland

FO

Faroe

GL

Greenland (OCTs)

IS

Ísland

NO06

Trøndelag

NO07

Nord-Norge

NO0B

Svalbard og Jan Mayen

2021TC16RFTN004

DK BE DE FR NL SE NO

(Interreg VI-B) North Sea

BE21

Prov. Antwerpen

BE22

Prov. Limburg (BE)

BE23

Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen

BE24

Prov. Vlaams-Brabant

BE25

Prov. West-Vlaanderen

DK01

Hovedstaden

DK02

Sjælland

DK03

Syddanmark

DK04

Midtjylland

DK05

Nordjylland

DE50

Bremen

DE60

Hamburg

DE91

Braunschweig

DE92

Hannover

DE93

Lüneburg

DE94

Weser-Ems

DEF0

Schleswig-Holstein

FRD1

Basse-Normandie

FRD2

Haute-Normandie

FRE1

Nord-Pas de Calais

FRE2

Picardie

FRH0

Bretagne

NL11

Groningen

NL12

Friesland (NL)

NL13

Drenthe

NL21

Overijssel

NL22

Gelderland

NL23

Flevoland

NL31

Utrecht

NL32

Noord-Holland

NL33

Zuid-Holland

NL34

Zeeland

NL41

Noord-Brabant

NL42

Limburg (NL)

SE21

Småland med öarna

SE22

Sydsverige

SE23

Västsverige

SE31

Norra Mellansverige

NO02

Innlandet

NO06

Trøndelag

NO08

Oslo og Viken

NO09

Agder og Sør-Østlandet

NO0A

Vestlandet

2021TC16RFTN005

FR BE DE IE NL LU CH

(Interreg VI-B) North West Europe

BE10

Prov. Antwerpen

BE21

Prov. Antwerpen

BE22

Prov. Limburg (BE)

BE23

Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen

BE24

Prov. Vlaams-Brabant

BE25

Prov. West-Vlaanderen

BE31

Prov. Brabant Wallon

BE32

Prov. Hainaut

BE33

Prov. Liège

BE34

Prov. Luxembourg (BE)

BE35

Prov. Namur

DE11

Stuttgart

DE12

Karlsruhe

DE13

Freiburg

DE14

Tübingen

DE24

Oberfranken

DE25

Mittelfranken

DE26

Unterfranken

DE27

Schwaben

DE50

Bremen

DE71

Darmstadt

DE72

Gießen

DE73

Kassel

DE92

Hannover

DE94

Weser -Ems

DEA1

Düsseldorf

DEA2

Köln

DEA3

Münster

DEA4

Detmold

DEA5

Arnsberg

DEB1

Koblenz

DEB2

Trier

DEB3

Rheinhessen -Pfalz

DEC0

Saarland

FR10

Ile -de -France

FRB0

Centre – Val de Loire

FRC1

Bourgogne

FRC2

Franche -Comté

FRD1

Basse -Normandie

FRD2

Haute -Normandie

FRE1

Nord -Pas de Calais

FRE2

Picardie

FRF1

Alsace

FRF2

Champagne -Ardenne

FRF3

Lorraine

FRG0

Pays de la Loire

FRH0

Bretagne

IE04

Northern and Western

IE05

Southern

IE06

Eastern and Midland

LU

Luxembourg

NL11

Groningen

NL12

Friesland (NL)

NL13

Drenthe

NL21

Overijssel

NL22

Gelderland

NL23

Flevoland

NL31

Utrecht

NL32

Noord-Holland

NL33

Zuid-Holland

NL34

Zeeland

NL41

Noord-Brabant

NL42

Limburg (NL)

CH

Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera

2021TC16RFTN006

ES FR PT AD

(Interreg VI-B) South West Europe (SUDOE)

ES11

Galicia

ES12

Principado de Asturias

ES13

Cantabria

ES21

País Vasco

ES22

Comunidad Foral de Navarra

ES23

La Rioja

ES24

Aragón

ES30

Comunidad de Madrid

ES41

Castilla y León

ES42

Castilla-La Mancha

ES43

Extremadura

ES51

Cataluña

ES52

Comunitat Valenciana

ES53

Illes Balears

ES61

Andalucía

ES62

Región de Murcia

ES63

Ciudad de Ceuta

ES64

Ciudad de Melilla

FRI3

Poitou-Charentes

FRI1

Aquitaine

FRJ2

Midi-Pyrénées

FRI2

Limousin

FRK1

Auvergne

FRJ1

Languedoc-Roussillon

PT11

Norte

PT15

Algarve

PT16

Centro (PT)

PT17

Área Metropolitana de Lisboa

PT18

Alentejo

AD

Andorra

2021TC16NXTN001

IT EL ES FR CY MT PT TR DZ EG IL JO LB PS TN

(Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mediterranean Sea Basin (NEXT MED)

EL30

Αττική/Attiki

EL41

Βόρειο Αιγαίο/Voreio Aigaio

EL42

Νότιο Αιγαίο/Notio Aigaio

EL43

Κρήτη/Kriti

EL51

Ανατολική Μακεδονία, EN - Cleaned document 13/16 Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki

EL52

Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia

EL53

Δυτική Μακεδονία/Dytiki Makedonia

EL54

Ήπειρος/Ipeiros

EL61

Θεσσαλία/Thessalia

EL62

Ιόνια Νησιά/Ionia Nisia

EL63

Δυτική Ελλάδα/Dytiki Elláda

EL64

Στερεά Ελλάδα/Sterea Elláda

EL65

Πελοπόννησος/Peloponnisos

ES51

Cataluña

ES52

Comunitat Valenciana

ES53

Illes Balears

ES61

Andalucía

ES62

Región de Murcia

ES63

Ciudad de Ceuta

ES64

Ciudad de Melilla

FRJ1

Languedoc-Roussillon

FRJ2

Midi-Pyrénées

FRL0

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

FRM0

Corse

ITC3

Liguria

ITF3

Campania

ITF4

Puglia

ITF5

Basilicata

ITF6

Calabria

ITG1

Sicilia

ITG2

Sardegna

ITI1

Toscana

ITI4

Lazio

CY

Κύπρος/Cyprus

MT

Malta

PT15

Algarve

TR21

Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli

TR22

Balıkesir, Çanakkale

TR31

İzmir

TR32

Aydın, Denizli, Muğla

TR33

Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Uşak

TR61

Antalya, Isparta, Burdur

TR62

Adana, Mersin

TR63

Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye

DZ

Tlemcen

DZ

Ain-Temouchent

DZ

Oran

DZ

Mostaganem

DZ

Chlef

DZ

Tipaza

DZ

Boumerdes

DZ

Tizi Ouzou

DZ

Bejaia

DZ

Jijel

DZ

Skikda

DZ

Annaba

DZ

El-Tarf

DZ

Alger

EG

Matruh

EG

Al Iskandariyah (alex.)

EG

Al Buhayrah (behera)

EG

Kafr-el-sheikh

EG

Ash Sharqiyah (sharkia)

EG

Al Daqahliyah (dakahlia)

EG

Dumyat (damietta)

EG

As Ismailiyah (ismailia)

EG

Bur Said (port Said)

EG

Governorate of Cairo

IL

Israel (2)

JO

Jordan

LB

Lebanon

PS

Palestine (3)

TN

Zaghouan

TN

Kairouan

TN

Sidi Bouz

TN

Manouba

TN

Siliana

TN

Le Kef

TN

Gafsa

TN

Kebili

TN

Tataouine

TN

Jendouba

TN

Beja

TN

Bizerte

TN

Ariana

TN

Tunis

TN

Ben Arous

TN

Nabeul

TN

Sousse

TN

Monastir

TN

Mahdia

TN

Sfax

TN

Gabes

TN

Medenine

2021TC16NXTN003

ES PT MA

(Interreg VI-B) NEXT Mid-Atlantic
   (4)

ES61

Andalucía

ES70

Canarias

PT15

Algarve

PT18

Alentejo

PT30

Região Autónoma da Madeira

MA

Morocco

2021TC16NXTN002

BG EL RO TR AM GE MD UA RU

(Interreg VI-B) NEXT Black Sea Basin
   (5)

BG33

Североизточен/Severoiztochen

BG34

Югоизточен/Yugoiztochen

EL51

Ανατολική Μακεδονία, Θράκη/Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki

EL52

Κεντρική Μακεδονία/Kentriki Makedonia

RO22

Sud-Est

TR10

İstanbul

TR21

Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli

TR42

Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova

TR81

Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın

TR82

Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop

TR83

Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya

TR90

Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane

AM

Armenia

GE

Georgia

MD

Rep.Moldova

UA

Donetsk oblast (6) (Bakhmut District, Kramatorsk District, Volnovakha District, Mariupol District, Pokrovsk District)

UA

Kherson oblast

UA

Mykolayiv oblast

UA

Odessa oblast

UA

Zaporizhzhia oblast

RU

Adygea Republic

RU

Krasnodar Krai

RU

Rostov oblast

---

(1)  UA: The general EU restrictions on cooperation in regions that are illegally annexed by Russia are also applicable to the Interreg programmes.

(2)  In accordance with the EU policy, the CBC programme does not apply to the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. Thus, in accordance with the Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funder by the EU from 2014 onwards (OJ C 205/9 of 19.7.2013) only Israeli entities having their place of establishment within Israel’s pre-1967 borders are considered eligible for EU funding. In addition, activities of Israeli entities funded by the EU must not be carried out in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967.

(3)  This designation shall not be construed as a recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the MS on this issue.

(4)  The definition of the geographical coverage outside the EU is ongoing.

(5)  UA: The general EU restrictions on cooperation in regions that are illegally annexed by Russia are also applicable to Interreg NEXT.

(6)  Only regions under the full control of the Government of Ukraine are eligible for the Donetsk oblast.

---

ANNEX III

List of Interreg programme areas to receive support under strand D

| 2021TC16FFOR001 | ES PT Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | (Interreg VI-D) Madeira-Azores-Canary Islands (MAC) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | ES70 | Canarias |
| | PT20 | Região Autónoma dos Açores |
| | PT30 | Região Autónoma da Madeira |
| | CV | Cap vert |
| | CI | Ivory Coast |
| | GM | Gambia |
| | GH | Ghana |
| | MR | Mauritania |
| | SN | Senegal |
| | ST | Sao Tome and Principe |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFOR002 | FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | (Interreg VI-D) Mozambique Channel |
| | FRY5 | Mayotte |
| | FRY4 | La Réunion |
| | KM | Union of Comoros |
| | MG | Madagascar |
| | MZ | Mozambique |
| | SC | Seychelles |
| | TZ | Tanzania |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFOR003 | FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | (Interreg VI-D) Caribbean |
| | FRY1 | Guadeloupe |
| | FRY1 | Saint-Martin |
| | FRY2 | Martinique |
| | FRY3 | Guyane |
| | AG | Antigua and Barbuda |
| | AW | Aruba (OCTs) |
| | BS | Bahamas |
| | BB | Barbados |
| | BL | Saint Barthélémy (OCTs) |
| | BZ | Belize |
| | BQ | Bonaire (OCTs) |
| | BQ | Sint Eustatius (OCTs) |
| | BQ | Saba (OCTs) |
| | BR | Brazil (only the States of Amapa, Para, Amazonas and Roraima) |
| | CO | Colombia |
| | CR | Costa Rica |
| | CU | Cuba |
| | CW | Curaçao (OCTs |
| | DM | Dominica |
| | DO | Dominican Republic |
| | SV | El Salvador |
| | GD | Grenada |
| | GT | Guatemala |
| | GY | Guyana |
| | HT | Haiti |
| | HN | HN |
| | JM | Jamaica |
| | MX | Mexico |
| | NI | Nicaragua |
| | PA | Panama |
| | PR | Puerto Rico |
| | KN | Saint Kitts and Nevis |
| | LC | Saint Lucia |
| | VC | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines |
| | SX | Sint Maarten (OCTs) |
| | SR | Suriname |
| | TT | Trinidad and Tobago |
| | VE | Venezuela |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFOR004 | FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | (Interreg VI-D) Indian Ocean |
| | FRY4 | La Réunion |
| | FRY5 | Mayotte |
| | TF | French Southern and Antarctic Lands (OCTs) |
| | AU | Australia |
| | KM | Comoros |
| | IN | India |
| | KE | Kenya |
| | MG | Madagascar |
| | MV | Maldives |
| | MU | Mauritius |
| | MZ | Mozambique |
| | SC | Seychelles |
| | ZA | South Africa |
| | LK | Sri Lanka |
| | TZ | Tanzania |
| | | |
| 2021TC16FFOR005 | FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories | (Interreg VI-D) Amazonia |
| | FRY3 | Guyane |
| | BR | Brazil (Only the States of Amapa, Para and Amazonas) |
| | SR | Suriname |
| | GY | Guyana |

2021TC16FFOR001

ES PT Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

(Interreg VI-D) Madeira-Azores-Canary Islands (MAC)

ES70

Canarias

PT20

Região Autónoma dos Açores

PT30

Região Autónoma da Madeira

CV

Cap vert

CI

Ivory Coast

GM

Gambia

GH

Ghana

MR

Mauritania

SN

Senegal

ST

Sao Tome and Principe

2021TC16FFOR002

FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

(Interreg VI-D) Mozambique Channel

FRY5

Mayotte

FRY4

La Réunion

KM

Union of Comoros

MG

Madagascar

MZ

Mozambique

SC

Seychelles

TZ

Tanzania

2021TC16FFOR003

FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

(Interreg VI-D) Caribbean

FRY1

Guadeloupe

FRY1

Saint-Martin

FRY2

Martinique

FRY3

Guyane

AG

Antigua and Barbuda

AW

Aruba (OCTs)

BS

Bahamas

BB

Barbados

BL

Saint Barthélémy (OCTs)

BZ

Belize

BQ

Bonaire (OCTs)

BQ

Sint Eustatius (OCTs)

BQ

Saba (OCTs)

BR

Brazil (only the States of Amapa, Para, Amazonas and Roraima)

CO

Colombia

CR

Costa Rica

CU

Cuba

CW

Curaçao (OCTs

DM

Dominica

DO

Dominican Republic

SV

El Salvador

GD

Grenada

GT

Guatemala

GY

Guyana

HT

Haiti

HN

HN

JM

Jamaica

MX

Mexico

NI

Nicaragua

PA

Panama

PR

Puerto Rico

KN

Saint Kitts and Nevis

LC

Saint Lucia

VC

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

SX

Sint Maarten (OCTs)

SR

Suriname

TT

Trinidad and Tobago

VE

Venezuela

2021TC16FFOR004

FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

(Interreg VI-D) Indian Ocean

FRY4

La Réunion

FRY5

Mayotte

TF

French Southern and Antarctic Lands (OCTs)

AU

Australia

KM

Comoros

IN

India

KE

Kenya

MG

Madagascar

MV

Maldives

MU

Mauritius

MZ

Mozambique

SC

Seychelles

ZA

South Africa

LK

Sri Lanka

TZ

Tanzania

2021TC16FFOR005

FR Several third countries and overseas countries or territories

(Interreg VI-D) Amazonia

FRY3

Guyane

BR

Brazil (Only the States of Amapa, Para and Amazonas)

SR

Suriname

GY

Guyana

---

ANNEX IV

NUTS level 3 regions of the Union taken into account for the ERDF allocation for cross-border cooperation at all internal borders and those external borders covered by the external financing instruments of the Union

| BE211 | Arr. Antwerpen |
| --- | --- |
| BE213 | Arr. Turnhout |
| BE221 | Arr. Hasselt |
| BE222 | Arr. Maaseik |
| BE223 | Arr. Tongeren |
| BE232 | Arr. Dendermonde |
| BE233 | Arr. Eeklo |
| BE234 | Arr. Gent |
| BE236 | Arr. Sint-Niklaas |
| BE251 | Arr. Brugge |
| BE252 | Arr. Diksmuide |
| BE253 | Arr. Ieper |
| BE254 | Arr. Kortrijk |
| BE255 | Arr. Oostende |
| BE256 | Arr. Roeselare |
| BE257 | Arr. Tielt |
| BE258 | Arr. Veurne |
| BE321 | Arr. Ath |
| BE322 | Arr. Charleroi |
| BE323 | Arr. Mons |
| BE324 | Arr. Mouscron |
| BE325 | Arr. Soignies |
| BE326 | Arr. Thuin |
| BE327 | Arr. Tournai |
| BE332 | Arr. Liège |
| BE335 | Arr. Verviers – communes francophones |
| BE336 | Bezirk Verviers – Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft |
| BE341 | Arr. Arlon |
| BE342 | Arr. Bastogne |
| BE344 | Arr. Neufchâteau |
| BE345 | Arr. Virton |
| BE351 | Arr. Dinant |
| BE353 | Arr. Philippeville |
| BG311 | Видин (Vidin) |
| BG312 | Монтана (Montana) |
| BG313 | Враца (Vratsa) |
| BG314 | Плевен (Pleven) |
| BG321 | Велико Търново (Veliko Tarnovo) |
| BG323 | Русе (Ruse) |
| BG325 | Силистра (Silistra) |
| BG332 | Добрич (Dobrich) |
| BG341 | Бургас (Burgas) |
| BG343 | Ямбол (Yambol) |
| BG412 | София (Sofia) |
| BG413 | Благоевград (Blagoevgrad) |
| BG414 | Перник (Pernik) |
| BG415 | Кюстендил (Kyustendil) |
| BG422 | Хасково (Haskovo) |
| BG424 | Смолян (Smolyan) |
| BG425 | Кърджали (Kardzhali) |
| CZ031 | Jihočeský kra |
| CZ032 | Plzeňský kraj |
| CZ041 | Karlovarský kraj |
| CZ042 | Ústecký kraj |
| CZ051 | Liberecký kraj |
| CZ052 | Královéhradecký kraj |
| CZ053 | Pardubický kraj |
| CZ064 | Jihomoravský kraj |
| CZ071 | Olomoucký kraj |
| CZ072 | Zlínský kraj |
| CZ080 | Moravskoslezský kraj |
| DK011 | Byen København |
| DK012 | Københavns omegn |
| DK013 | Nordsjælland |
| DK014 | Bornholm |
| DK021 | Østsjælland |
| DK022 | Vest- og Sydsjælland |
| DK031 | Fyn |
| DK032 | Sydjylland |
| DK042 | Østjylland |
| DK050 | Nordjylland |
| DE121 | Baden-Baden, Stadtkreis |
| DE122 | Karlsruhe, Stadtkreis |
| DE124 | Rastatt |
| DE131 | Freiburg im Breisgau, Stadtkreis |
| DE132 | Breisgau-Hochschwarzwald |
| DE133 | Emmendingen |
| DE134 | Ortenaukreis |
| DE136 | Schwarzwald-Baar-Kreis |
| DE138 | Konstanz |
| DE139 | Lörrach |
| DE13A | Waldshut |
| DE147 | Bodenseekreis |
| DE213 | Rosenheim, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE214 | Altötting |
| DE215 | Berchtesgadener Land |
| DE216 | Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen |
| DE21D | Garmisch-Partenkirchen |
| DE21F | Miesbach |
| DE21K | Rosenheim, Landkreis |
| DE21M | Traunstein |
| DE222 | Passau, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE225 | Freyung-Grafenau |
| DE228 | Passau, Landkreis |
| DE229 | Regen |
| DE22A | Rottal-Inn |
| DE233 | Weiden i. d. Opf, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE235 | Cham |
| DE237 | Neustadt a. d. Waldnaab |
| DE239 | Schwandorf |
| DE23A | Tirschenreuth |
| DE244 | Hof, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE249 | Hof, Landkreis |
| DE24D | Wunsiedel i. Fichtelgebirge |
| DE273 | Kempten (Allgäu), Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE27A | Lindau (Bodensee) |
| DE27B | Ostallgäu |
| DE27E | Oberallgäu |
| DE402 | Cottbus, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE403 | Frankfurt (Oder), Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE405 | Barnim |
| DE409 | Märkisch-Oderland |
| DE40C | Oder-Spree |
| DE40G | Spree-Neiße |
| DE40I | Uckermark |
| DE803 | Rostock, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE80K | Landkreis Rostock |
| DE80L | Vorpommern-Rügen |
| DE80M | Nordwestmecklenburg |
| DE80N | Vorpommern-Greifswald |
| DE942 | Emden, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DE949 | Emsland |
| DE94B | Grafschaft Bentheim |
| DE94C | Leer |
| DEA15 | Mönchengladbach, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEA1B | Kleve |
| DEA1E | Viersen |
| DEA26 | Düren |
| DEA28 | Euskirchen |
| DEA29 | Heinsberg |
| DEA2D | Städteregion Aachen |
| DEA34 | Borken |
| DEB21 | Trier, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEB23 | Eifelkreis Bitburg-Prüm |
| DEB25 | Trier-Saarburg |
| DEB33 | Landau in der Pfalz, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEB37 | Pirmasens, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEB3A | Zweibrücken, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEB3E | Germersheim |
| DEB3H | Südliche Weinstraße |
| DEB3K | Südwestpfalz |
| DEC01 | Regionalverband Saarbrücken |
| DEC02 | Merzig-Wadern |
| DEC03 | Neunkirchen |
| DEC04 | Saarlouis |
| DEC05 | Saarpfalz-Kreis |
| DED2C | Bautzen |
| DED2D | Görlitz |
| DED2F | Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirg |
| DED42 | Erzgebirgskreis |
| DED43 | Mittelsachsen |
| DED44 | Vogtlandkreis |
| DEF01 | Flensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEF02 | Kiel, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEF03 | Lübeck, Kreisfreie Stadt |
| DEF07 | Nordfriesland |
| DEF08 | Ostholstein |
| DEF0A | Plön |
| DEF0B | Rendsburg-Eckernförde |
| DEF0C | Schleswig-Flensburg |
| EE001 | Põhja-Eesti |
| EE004 | Lääne-Eesti |
| EE006 | Kesk-Eesti |
| EE007 | Kirde-Eesti |
| EE008 | Lõuna-Eesti |
| IE041 | Border |
| IE052 | South-East |
| IE053 | South-West |
| IE061 | Dublin |
| IE062 | Mid-East |
| EL411 | Λέσβος, Λήμνος (Lesvos, Limnos) |
| EL412 | Ικαρία, Σάμος (Ikaria, Samos) |
| EL413 | Χίος (Chios) |
| EL421 | Κάλυμνος, Κάρπαθος, Κως, Ρόδος (Kalymnos, Karpathos, Kos, Rodos) |
| EL422 | Άνδρος, Θήρα, Κέα, Μήλος, Μύκονος, Νάξος, Πάρος, Σύρος, Τήνος (Andros, Thira, Kea, Milos, Mykonos, Naxos, Paros, Syros, Tinos) |
| EL511 | Έβρος (Evros) |
| EL512 | Ξάνθη (Xanthi) |
| EL513 | Ροδόπη (Rodopi) |
| EL514 | Δράμα (Drama) |
| EL515 | Θάσος, Καβάλα (Thasos, Kavala) |
| EL523 | Κιλκίς (Kilkis) |
| EL524 | Πέλλα (Pella) |
| EL526 | Σέρρες (Serres) |
| EL532 | Καστοριά (Kastoria) |
| EL533 | Φλώρινα (Florina) |
| EL541 | Άρτα, Πρέβεζα (Arta, Preveza) |
| EL542 | Θεσπρωτία (Thesprotia) |
| EL543 | Ιωάννινα (Ioannina) |
| EL613 | Μαγνησία, Σποράδες (Magnisia, Sporades) |
| EL622 | Κέρκυρα (Kerkyra) |
| EL642 | Εύβοια (Evvoia) |
| ES113 | Ourense |
| ES114 | Pontevedra |
| ES212 | Gipuzkoa |
| ES220 | Navarra |
| ES241 | Huesca |
| ES415 | Salamanca |
| ES419 | Zamora |
| ES431 | Badajoz |
| ES432 | Cáceres |
| ES512 | Girona |
| ES513 | Lleida |
| ES611 | Almería |
| ES612 | Cádiz |
| ES614 | Granada |
| ES615 | Huelva |
| ES617 | Málaga |
| ES630 | Ceuta |
| ES640 | Melilla |
| FRC21 | Doubs |
| FRC22 | Jura |
| FRC24 | Territoire de Belfort |
| FRD11 | Calvados |
| FRD12 | Manche |
| FRD21 | Eure |
| FRD22 | Seine-Maritime |
| FRE11 | Nord |
| FRE12 | Pas-de-Calais |
| FRE21 | Aisne |
| FRE23 | Somme |
| FRF11 | Bas-Rhin |
| FRF12 | Haut-Rhin |
| FRF21 | Ardennes |
| FRF31 | Meurthe-et-Moselle |
| FRF32 | Meuse |
| FRF33 | Moselle |
| FRI15 | Pyrénées-Atlantiques |
| FRJ15 | Pyrénées-Orientales |
| FRJ21 | Ariège |
| FRJ23 | Haute-Garonne |
| FRJ26 | Hautes-Pyrénées |
| FRK21 | Ain |
| FRK27 | Savoie |
| FRK28 | Haute-Savoie |
| FRL01 | Alpes-de-Haute-Provence |
| FRL02 | Hautes-Alpes |
| FRL03 | Alpes-Maritimes |
| FRM01 | Corse-du-Sud |
| FRM02 | Haute-Corse |
| HR031 | Primorsko-goranska županija |
| HR032 | Ličko-senjska županija |
| HR033 | Zadarska županija |
| HR034 | Šibensko-kninska županija |
| HR035 | Splitsko-dalmatinska županija |
| HR036 | Istarska županija |
| HR037 | Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija |
| HR041 | Grad Zagreb |
| HR042 | Zagrebačka županija |
| HR043 | Krapinsko-zagorska županija |
| HR044 | Varaždinska županija |
| HR045 | Koprivničko-križevačka županija |
| HR046 | Međimurska županija |
| HR048 | Virovitičko-podravska županija |
| HR049 | Požeško-slavonska županija |
| HR04A | Brodsko-posavska županija |
| HR04B | Osječko-baranjska županija |
| HR04C | Vukovarsko-srijemska županija |
| HR04D | Karlovačka županija |
| HR04E | Sisačko-moslavačka županija |
| ITC11 | Torino |
| ITC12 | Vercelli |
| ITC14 | Verbano-Cusio-Ossola |
| ITC16 | Cuneo |
| ITC20 | Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste |
| ITC31 | Imperia |
| ITC32 | Savona |
| ITC33 | Genova |
| ITC34 | La Spezia |
| ITC41 | Varese |
| ITC42 | Como |
| ITC44 | Sondrio |
| ITF44 | Brindisi |
| ITF45 | Lecce |
| ITF46 | Foggia |
| ITF47 | Bari |
| ITG11 | Trapani |
| ITG14 | Agrigento |
| ITG15 | Caltanissetta |
| ITG18 | Ragusa |
| ITG19 | Siracusa |
| ITG25 | Sassari |
| ITG26 | Nuoro |
| ITG29 | Olbia -Tempio |
| ITG2A | Ogliastra |
| ITH10 | Bolzano -Bozen |
| ITH33 | Belluno |
| ITH42 | Udine |
| ITH43 | Gorizia |
| ITH44 | Trieste |
| ITH56 | Ferrara |
| ITH57 | Ravenna |
| ITH58 | Forlì -Cesena |
| ITH59 | Rimini |
| ITI11 | Massa -Carrara |
| ITI12 | Lucca |
| ITI16 | Livorno |
| ITI17 | Pisa |
| ITI1A | Grosseto |
| ITI31 | Pesaro e Urbino |
| ITI32 | Ancona |
| ITI33 | Macerata |
| ITI35 | Fermo |
| ITI41 | Viterbo |
| CY000 | Κύπρος (Kýpros) |
| LV003 | Kurzeme |
| LV005 | Latgale |
| LV007 | Pierīga |
| LV008 | Vidzeme |
| LV009 | Zemgale |
| LT011 | Vilniaus apskritis |
| LT021 | Alytaus apskritis |
| LT023 | Klaipėdos apskritis |
| LT024 | Marijampolės apskritis |
| LT025 | Panevėžio apskritis |
| LT026 | Šiaulių apskritis |
| LT027 | Tauragės apskritis |
| LT028 | Telšių apskritis |
| LT029 | Utenos apskritis |
| LU000 | Luxembourg |
| HU120 | Pest |
| HU212 | Komárom-Esztergom |
| HU221 | Győr-Moson-Sopron |
| HU222 | Vas |
| HU223 | Zala |
| HU231 | Baranya |
| HU232 | Somogy |
| HU311 | Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén |
| HU313 | Nógrád |
| HU321 | Hajdú-Bihar |
| HU323 | Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg |
| HU331 | Bács-Kiskun |
| HU332 | Békés |
| HU333 | Csongrád |
| MT001 | Malta |
| MT002 | Gozo and Comino/Għawdex u Kemmuna |
| NL111 | Oost-Groningen |
| NL112 | Delfzijl en omgeving |
| NL132 | Zuidoost-Drenthe |
| NL133 | Zuidwest-Drenthe |
| NL211 | Noord-Overijssel |
| NL213 | Twente |
| NL225 | Achterhoek |
| NL226 | Arnhem/Nijmegen |
| NL33C | Groot-Rijnmond |
| NL341 | Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen |
| NL342 | Overig Zeeland |
| NL411 | West-Noord-Brabant |
| NL412 | Midden-Noord-Brabant |
| NL414 | Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant |
| NL421 | Noord-Limburg |
| NL422 | Midden-Limburg |
| NL423 | Zuid-Limburg |
| AT111 | Mittelburgenland |
| AT112 | Nordburgenland |
| AT113 | Südburgenland |
| AT124 | Waldviertel |
| AT125 | Weinviertel |
| AT126 | Wiener Umland/Nordteil |
| AT127 | Wiener Umland/Südteil |
| AT211 | Klagenfurt-Villach |
| AT212 | Oberkärnten |
| AT213 | Unterkärnten |
| AT224 | Oststeiermark |
| AT225 | West - und Südsteiermark |
| AT311 | Innviertel |
| AT313 | Mühlviertel |
| AT322 | Pinzgau -Pongau |
| AT323 | Salzburg und Umgebung |
| AT331 | Außerfern |
| AT332 | Innsbruck |
| AT333 | Osttirol |
| AT334 | Tiroler Oberland |
| AT335 | Tiroler Unterland |
| AT341 | Bludenz -Bregenzer Wald |
| AT342 | Rheintal -Bodenseegebiet |
| PL218 | Nowosądecki |
| PL219 | Nowotarski |
| PL225 | Bielski |
| PL227 | Rybnicki |
| PL424 | Miasto Szczecin |
| PL426 | Koszaliński |
| PL427 | Szczecinecko -pyrzycki |
| PL428 | Szczeciński |
| PL431 | Gorzowsk |
| PL432 | Zielonogórski |
| PL515 | Jeleniogórski |
| PL517 | Wałbrzyski |
| PL523 | Nyski |
| PL621 | Elbląski |
| PL622 | Olsztyński |
| PL623 | Ełcki |
| PL634 | Gdański |
| PL636 | Słupski |
| PL811 | Bialski |
| PL812 | Chełmsko -zamojski |
| PL821 | Krośnieński |
| PL822 | Przemyski |
| PL841 | Białostocki |
| PL842 | Łomżyński |
| PL843 | Suwalski |
| PT111 | Alto Minho |
| PT112 | Cávado |
| PT11B | Alto Tâmega |
| PT11D | Douro |
| PT11E | Terras de Trás -os -Montes |
| PT150 | Algarve |
| PT16H | Beira Baixa |
| PT16J | Beiras e Serra da Estrel |
| PT184 | Baixo Alentejo |
| PT186 | Alto Alentejo |
| PT187 | Alentejo Central |
| RO111 | Bihor |
| RO114 | Maramureş |
| RO115 | Satu Mare |
| RO212 | Botoşani |
| RO213 | Iaşi |
| RO215 | Suceava |
| RO216 | Vaslui |
| RO223 | Constanţa |
| RO224 | Galaţi |
| RO225 | Tulcea |
| RO312 | Călăraşi |
| RO314 | Giurgiu |
| RO317 | Teleorman |
| RO411 | Dolj |
| RO413 | Mehedinţi |
| RO414 | Olt |
| RO421 | Arad |
| RO422 | Caraş -Severin |
| RO424 | Timiş |
| SI031 | Pomurska |
| SI032 | Podravska |
| SI033 | Koroška |
| SI034 | Savinjska |
| SI036 | Posavska |
| SI037 | Jugovzhodna Slovenija |
| SI038 | Primorsko -notranjska |
| SI042 | Gorenjska |
| SI043 | Goriška |
| SI044 | Obalno -kraška |
| SK010 | Bratislavský kraj |
| SK021 | Trnavský kraj |
| SK022 | Trenčiansky kraj |
| SK023 | Nitriansky kraj |
| SK031 | Žilinský kraj |
| SK032 | Banskobystrický kraj |
| SK041 | Prešovský kraj |
| SK042 | Košický kraj |
| FI195 | Pohjanmaa |
| FI1B1 | Helsinki -Uusimaa |
| FI1C1 | Varsinais -Suomi |
| FI1C4 | Kymenlaakso |
| FI1C5 | Etelä-Karjala |
| FI1D3 | Pohjois-Karjala |
| FI1D5 | Keski-Pohjanmaa |
| FI1D7 | Lappi |
| FI1D8 | Kainuu |
| FI1D9 | Pohjois-Pohjanmaa |
| FI200 | Åland |
| SE110 | Stockholms län |
| SE121 | Uppsala län |
| SE213 | Kalmar län |
| SE214 | Gotlands län |
| SE221 | Blekinge län |
| SE224 | Skåne län |
| SE231 | Hallands län |
| SE232 | Västra Götalands län |
| SE311 | Värmlands län |
| SE312 | Dalarnas län |
| SE313 | Gävleborgs län |
| SE321 | Västernorrlands län |
| SE322 | Jämtlands län |
| SE331 | Västerbottens län |
| SE332 | Norrbottens län |

BE211

Arr. Antwerpen

BE213

Arr. Turnhout

BE221

Arr. Hasselt

BE222

Arr. Maaseik

BE223

Arr. Tongeren

BE232

Arr. Dendermonde

BE233

Arr. Eeklo

BE234

Arr. Gent

BE236

Arr. Sint-Niklaas

BE251

Arr. Brugge

BE252

Arr. Diksmuide

BE253

Arr. Ieper

BE254

Arr. Kortrijk

BE255

Arr. Oostende

BE256

Arr. Roeselare

BE257

Arr. Tielt

BE258

Arr. Veurne

BE321

Arr. Ath

BE322

Arr. Charleroi

BE323

Arr. Mons

BE324

Arr. Mouscron

BE325

Arr. Soignies

BE326

Arr. Thuin

BE327

Arr. Tournai

BE332

Arr. Liège

BE335

Arr. Verviers – communes francophones

BE336

Bezirk Verviers – Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft

BE341

Arr. Arlon

BE342

Arr. Bastogne

BE344

Arr. Neufchâteau

BE345

Arr. Virton

BE351

Arr. Dinant

BE353

Arr. Philippeville

BG311

Видин (Vidin)

BG312

Монтана (Montana)

BG313

Враца (Vratsa)

BG314

Плевен (Pleven)

BG321

Велико Търново (Veliko Tarnovo)

BG323

Русе (Ruse)

BG325

Силистра (Silistra)

BG332

Добрич (Dobrich)

BG341

Бургас (Burgas)

BG343

Ямбол (Yambol)

BG412

София (Sofia)

BG413

Благоевград (Blagoevgrad)

BG414

Перник (Pernik)

BG415

Кюстендил (Kyustendil)

BG422

Хасково (Haskovo)

BG424

Смолян (Smolyan)

BG425

Кърджали (Kardzhali)

CZ031

Jihočeský kra

CZ032

Plzeňský kraj

CZ041

Karlovarský kraj

CZ042

Ústecký kraj

CZ051

Liberecký kraj

CZ052

Královéhradecký kraj

CZ053

Pardubický kraj

CZ064

Jihomoravský kraj

CZ071

Olomoucký kraj

CZ072

Zlínský kraj

CZ080

Moravskoslezský kraj

DK011

Byen København

DK012

Københavns omegn

DK013

Nordsjælland

DK014

Bornholm

DK021

Østsjælland

DK022

Vest- og Sydsjælland

DK031

Fyn

DK032

Sydjylland

DK042

Østjylland

DK050

Nordjylland

DE121

Baden-Baden, Stadtkreis

DE122

Karlsruhe, Stadtkreis

DE124

Rastatt

DE131

Freiburg im Breisgau, Stadtkreis

DE132

Breisgau-Hochschwarzwald

DE133

Emmendingen

DE134

Ortenaukreis

DE136

Schwarzwald-Baar-Kreis

DE138

Konstanz

DE139

Lörrach

DE13A

Waldshut

DE147

Bodenseekreis

DE213

Rosenheim, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE214

Altötting

DE215

Berchtesgadener Land

DE216

Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen

DE21D

Garmisch-Partenkirchen

DE21F

Miesbach

DE21K

Rosenheim, Landkreis

DE21M

Traunstein

DE222

Passau, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE225

Freyung-Grafenau

DE228

Passau, Landkreis

DE229

Regen

DE22A

Rottal-Inn

DE233

Weiden i. d. Opf, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE235

Cham

DE237

Neustadt a. d. Waldnaab

DE239

Schwandorf

DE23A

Tirschenreuth

DE244

Hof, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE249

Hof, Landkreis

DE24D

Wunsiedel i. Fichtelgebirge

DE273

Kempten (Allgäu), Kreisfreie Stadt

DE27A

Lindau (Bodensee)

DE27B

Ostallgäu

DE27E

Oberallgäu

DE402

Cottbus, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE403

Frankfurt (Oder), Kreisfreie Stadt

DE405

Barnim

DE409

Märkisch-Oderland

DE40C

Oder-Spree

DE40G

Spree-Neiße

DE40I

Uckermark

DE803

Rostock, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE80K

Landkreis Rostock

DE80L

Vorpommern-Rügen

DE80M

Nordwestmecklenburg

DE80N

Vorpommern-Greifswald

DE942

Emden, Kreisfreie Stadt

DE949

Emsland

DE94B

Grafschaft Bentheim

DE94C

Leer

DEA15

Mönchengladbach, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEA1B

Kleve

DEA1E

Viersen

DEA26

Düren

DEA28

Euskirchen

DEA29

Heinsberg

DEA2D

Städteregion Aachen

DEA34

Borken

DEB21

Trier, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB23

Eifelkreis Bitburg-Prüm

DEB25

Trier-Saarburg

DEB33

Landau in der Pfalz, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB37

Pirmasens, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB3A

Zweibrücken, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEB3E

Germersheim

DEB3H

Südliche Weinstraße

DEB3K

Südwestpfalz

DEC01

Regionalverband Saarbrücken

DEC02

Merzig-Wadern

DEC03

Neunkirchen

DEC04

Saarlouis

DEC05

Saarpfalz-Kreis

DED2C

Bautzen

DED2D

Görlitz

DED2F

Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirg

DED42

Erzgebirgskreis

DED43

Mittelsachsen

DED44

Vogtlandkreis

DEF01

Flensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEF02

Kiel, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEF03

Lübeck, Kreisfreie Stadt

DEF07

Nordfriesland

DEF08

Ostholstein

DEF0A

Plön

DEF0B

Rendsburg-Eckernförde

DEF0C

Schleswig-Flensburg

EE001

Põhja-Eesti

EE004

Lääne-Eesti

EE006

Kesk-Eesti

EE007

Kirde-Eesti

EE008

Lõuna-Eesti

IE041

Border

IE052

South-East

IE053

South-West

IE061

Dublin

IE062

Mid-East

EL411

Λέσβος, Λήμνος (Lesvos, Limnos)

EL412

Ικαρία, Σάμος (Ikaria, Samos)

EL413

Χίος (Chios)

EL421

Κάλυμνος, Κάρπαθος, Κως, Ρόδος (Kalymnos, Karpathos, Kos, Rodos)

EL422

Άνδρος, Θήρα, Κέα, Μήλος, Μύκονος, Νάξος, Πάρος, Σύρος, Τήνος (Andros, Thira, Kea, Milos, Mykonos, Naxos, Paros, Syros, Tinos)

EL511

Έβρος (Evros)

EL512

Ξάνθη (Xanthi)

EL513

Ροδόπη (Rodopi)

EL514

Δράμα (Drama)

EL515

Θάσος, Καβάλα (Thasos, Kavala)

EL523

Κιλκίς (Kilkis)

EL524

Πέλλα (Pella)

EL526

Σέρρες (Serres)

EL532

Καστοριά (Kastoria)

EL533

Φλώρινα (Florina)

EL541

Άρτα, Πρέβεζα (Arta, Preveza)

EL542

Θεσπρωτία (Thesprotia)

EL543

Ιωάννινα (Ioannina)

EL613

Μαγνησία, Σποράδες (Magnisia, Sporades)

EL622

Κέρκυρα (Kerkyra)

EL642

Εύβοια (Evvoia)

ES113

Ourense

ES114

Pontevedra

ES212

Gipuzkoa

ES220

Navarra

ES241

Huesca

ES415

Salamanca

ES419

Zamora

ES431

Badajoz

ES432

Cáceres

ES512

Girona

ES513

Lleida

ES611

Almería

ES612

Cádiz

ES614

Granada

ES615

Huelva

ES617

Málaga

ES630

Ceuta

ES640

Melilla

FRC21

Doubs

FRC22

Jura

FRC24

Territoire de Belfort

FRD11

Calvados

FRD12

Manche

FRD21

Eure

FRD22

Seine-Maritime

FRE11

Nord

FRE12

Pas-de-Calais

FRE21

Aisne

FRE23

Somme

FRF11

Bas-Rhin

FRF12

Haut-Rhin

FRF21

Ardennes

FRF31

Meurthe-et-Moselle

FRF32

Meuse

FRF33

Moselle

FRI15

Pyrénées-Atlantiques

FRJ15

Pyrénées-Orientales

FRJ21

Ariège

FRJ23

Haute-Garonne

FRJ26

Hautes-Pyrénées

FRK21

Ain

FRK27

Savoie

FRK28

Haute-Savoie

FRL01

Alpes-de-Haute-Provence

FRL02

Hautes-Alpes

FRL03

Alpes-Maritimes

FRM01

Corse-du-Sud

FRM02

Haute-Corse

HR031

Primorsko-goranska županija

HR032

Ličko-senjska županija

HR033

Zadarska županija

HR034

Šibensko-kninska županija

HR035

Splitsko-dalmatinska županija

HR036

Istarska županija

HR037

Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija

HR041

Grad Zagreb

HR042

Zagrebačka županija

HR043

Krapinsko-zagorska županija

HR044

Varaždinska županija

HR045

Koprivničko-križevačka županija

HR046

Međimurska županija

HR048

Virovitičko-podravska županija

HR049

Požeško-slavonska županija

HR04A

Brodsko-posavska županija

HR04B

Osječko-baranjska županija

HR04C

Vukovarsko-srijemska županija

HR04D

Karlovačka županija

HR04E

Sisačko-moslavačka županija

ITC11

Torino

ITC12

Vercelli

ITC14

Verbano-Cusio-Ossola

ITC16

Cuneo

ITC20

Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste

ITC31

Imperia

ITC32

Savona

ITC33

Genova

ITC34

La Spezia

ITC41

Varese

ITC42

Como

ITC44

Sondrio

ITF44

Brindisi

ITF45

Lecce

ITF46

Foggia

ITF47

Bari

ITG11

Trapani

ITG14

Agrigento

ITG15

Caltanissetta

ITG18

Ragusa

ITG19

Siracusa

ITG25

Sassari

ITG26

Nuoro

ITG29

Olbia -Tempio

ITG2A

Ogliastra

ITH10

Bolzano -Bozen

ITH33

Belluno

ITH42

Udine

ITH43

Gorizia

ITH44

Trieste

ITH56

Ferrara

ITH57

Ravenna

ITH58

Forlì -Cesena

ITH59

Rimini

ITI11

Massa -Carrara

ITI12

Lucca

ITI16

Livorno

ITI17

Pisa

ITI1A

Grosseto

ITI31

Pesaro e Urbino

ITI32

Ancona

ITI33

Macerata

ITI35

Fermo

ITI41

Viterbo

CY000

Κύπρος (Kýpros)

LV003

Kurzeme

LV005

Latgale

LV007

Pierīga

LV008

Vidzeme

LV009

Zemgale

LT011

Vilniaus apskritis

LT021

Alytaus apskritis

LT023

Klaipėdos apskritis

LT024

Marijampolės apskritis

LT025

Panevėžio apskritis

LT026

Šiaulių apskritis

LT027

Tauragės apskritis

LT028

Telšių apskritis

LT029

Utenos apskritis

LU000

Luxembourg

HU120

Pest

HU212

Komárom-Esztergom

HU221

Győr-Moson-Sopron

HU222

Vas

HU223

Zala

HU231

Baranya

HU232

Somogy

HU311

Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén

HU313

Nógrád

HU321

Hajdú-Bihar

HU323

Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg

HU331

Bács-Kiskun

HU332

Békés

HU333

Csongrád

MT001

Malta

MT002

Gozo and Comino/Għawdex u Kemmuna

NL111

Oost-Groningen

NL112

Delfzijl en omgeving

NL132

Zuidoost-Drenthe

NL133

Zuidwest-Drenthe

NL211

Noord-Overijssel

NL213

Twente

NL225

Achterhoek

NL226

Arnhem/Nijmegen

NL33C

Groot-Rijnmond

NL341

Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen

NL342

Overig Zeeland

NL411

West-Noord-Brabant

NL412

Midden-Noord-Brabant

NL414

Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant

NL421

Noord-Limburg

NL422

Midden-Limburg

NL423

Zuid-Limburg

AT111

Mittelburgenland

AT112

Nordburgenland

AT113

Südburgenland

AT124

Waldviertel

AT125

Weinviertel

AT126

Wiener Umland/Nordteil

AT127

Wiener Umland/Südteil

AT211

Klagenfurt-Villach

AT212

Oberkärnten

AT213

Unterkärnten

AT224

Oststeiermark

AT225

West - und Südsteiermark

AT311

Innviertel

AT313

Mühlviertel

AT322

Pinzgau -Pongau

AT323

Salzburg und Umgebung

AT331

Außerfern

AT332

Innsbruck

AT333

Osttirol

AT334

Tiroler Oberland

AT335

Tiroler Unterland

AT341

Bludenz -Bregenzer Wald

AT342

Rheintal -Bodenseegebiet

PL218

Nowosądecki

PL219

Nowotarski

PL225

Bielski

PL227

Rybnicki

PL424

Miasto Szczecin

PL426

Koszaliński

PL427

Szczecinecko -pyrzycki

PL428

Szczeciński

PL431

Gorzowsk

PL432

Zielonogórski

PL515

Jeleniogórski

PL517

Wałbrzyski

PL523

Nyski

PL621

Elbląski

PL622

Olsztyński

PL623

Ełcki

PL634

Gdański

PL636

Słupski

PL811

Bialski

PL812

Chełmsko -zamojski

PL821

Krośnieński

PL822

Przemyski

PL841

Białostocki

PL842

Łomżyński

PL843

Suwalski

PT111

Alto Minho

PT112

Cávado

PT11B

Alto Tâmega

PT11D

Douro

PT11E

Terras de Trás -os -Montes

PT150

Algarve

PT16H

Beira Baixa

PT16J

Beiras e Serra da Estrel

PT184

Baixo Alentejo

PT186

Alto Alentejo

PT187

Alentejo Central

RO111

Bihor

RO114

Maramureş

RO115

Satu Mare

RO212

Botoşani

RO213

Iaşi

RO215

Suceava

RO216

Vaslui

RO223

Constanţa

RO224

Galaţi

RO225

Tulcea

RO312

Călăraşi

RO314

Giurgiu

RO317

Teleorman

RO411

Dolj

RO413

Mehedinţi

RO414

Olt

RO421

Arad

RO422

Caraş -Severin

RO424

Timiş

SI031

Pomurska

SI032

Podravska

SI033

Koroška

SI034

Savinjska

SI036

Posavska

SI037

Jugovzhodna Slovenija

SI038

Primorsko -notranjska

SI042

Gorenjska

SI043

Goriška

SI044

Obalno -kraška

SK010

Bratislavský kraj

SK021

Trnavský kraj

SK022

Trenčiansky kraj

SK023

Nitriansky kraj

SK031

Žilinský kraj

SK032

Banskobystrický kraj

SK041

Prešovský kraj

SK042

Košický kraj

FI195

Pohjanmaa

FI1B1

Helsinki -Uusimaa

FI1C1

Varsinais -Suomi

FI1C4

Kymenlaakso

FI1C5

Etelä-Karjala

FI1D3

Pohjois-Karjala

FI1D5

Keski-Pohjanmaa

FI1D7

Lappi

FI1D8

Kainuu

FI1D9

Pohjois-Pohjanmaa

FI200

Åland

SE110

Stockholms län

SE121

Uppsala län

SE213

Kalmar län

SE214

Gotlands län

SE221

Blekinge län

SE224

Skåne län

SE231

Hallands län

SE232

Västra Götalands län

SE311

Värmlands län

SE312

Dalarnas län

SE313

Gävleborgs län

SE321

Västernorrlands län

SE322

Jämtlands län

SE331

Västerbottens län

SE332

Norrbottens län

---