Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1609-CR-2032 | June 19, 2017 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kristin A. Mulholland

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gentry Hervie Jackson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 19, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1609-CR-2032

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G01-1508-MR-4

Barnes, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Gentry Jackson appeals his conviction for murder. We affirm.
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Issues

[2] The issues before us are:

I. whether the trial court properly allowed the State to

present evidence of an alleged threat made to one of its key 

witnesses by Jackson’s wife;

II. whether there is sufficient evidence of the necessary mens 

rea for a murder conviction; and

III. whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

rejection of his self-defense claim.

Facts

[3] Jackson is married to Michelle Jackson. Previously, Michelle was married to 

Alec McCloud for eight to nine years and had five children with him. Two of 

those children were Justin McCloud and Alexis McCloud Rogers; Justin was 

twenty-two at the time of trial, and Alexis was nineteen. Michelle asserted that 

Alec had been abusive towards her during their marriage, and Alec and Jackson 

had a very antagonistic relationship. Alec was not welcome at Jackson’s 

residence.

[4] On August 3, 2015, Alexis was living with Jackson and Michelle in Gary. 

Justin also was at the house that day. At some point on that day, before the sun 

went down, Alexis returned to the house from an outing and had to knock on 

the door because she did not have a key. As she was knocking, she saw Alec

drive up to the house in his mother’s car. Alexis had not spoken to Alec for 
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months and was surprised to see him. Justin opened the door for Alexis and 

also saw Alec parked outside; he had spoken to Alec earlier and was aware he 

was in town.

[5] Alexis got into an argument with Michelle after going into the house and 

mentioning to Justin that their father was outside. Justin went outside while 

Alexis and Michelle continued arguing. When Michelle noticed that Alec was 

outside, she yelled at Alexis, “why did [you] bring him over here.” Tr. Vol. I p. 

136. Alexis noticed Jackson go into his bedroom, come back out carrying a 

gun, and go outside. As Jackson walked past Michelle, she said, “make sure 

that’s him.” Id. at 141. Justin could see that Alec was on his phone, sitting in 

the car, when Jackson approached the car and said, “I got you now.” Id. at 79. 

Justin did not see anything else in Alec’s hands besides his cell phone. Jackson 

then began shooting at the car and eventually fired a total of eight shots. Alec

began driving away as Jackson opened fire. 

[6] Alec drove for a short distance before wrecking the car. Justin and a friend of 

his arrived on the scene shortly thereafter. Justin and his friend saw Alec’s 

phone in his lap and nothing else, such as a gun. Police never recovered a gun 

from Alec or the car. There were five bullet holes in the driver’s side front door 

and one in the rear door. Alec suffered gunshot wounds to his back, abdomen, 

and buttocks. After undergoing emergency surgery, Alec died.

[7] After the shooting, Jackson took the chamber out of the gun, called 911, 

reported the shooting, and waited for police to arrive. While waiting, Michelle 
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told Alexis, “Look what you made my husband do. My husband better not go 

to jail.” Id. at 157. When police arrived, Jackson told them he had shot Alec

because he had seen Alec point a gun at him. 

[8] In Alexis’s first statement to police immediately after the shooting, she said that 

Alec had called Jackson to the car and that she saw Alec holding a gun. She 

also said Alec may have shot first. Alexis also made similar statements to 

defense counsel. However, at the end of December 2015, Alexis went to the 

police station with Alec’s mother and said she had lied in her earlier statements, 

and that in fact from where she was standing she could not see if Alec was 

holding anything in his hands. Alexis explained that she felt pressured to lie 

because of Michelle’s perceived threat to her that Jackson “better not go to jail.” 

Id. 

[9] The State charged Jackson with murder. Before his jury trial, Jackson filed a 

motion in limine to prevent the State from presenting evidence of Michelle’s 

threatening statement to Alexis. Initially, the trial court granted this motion but 

later reversed itself. The State presented evidence of Michelle’s statement

during its direct examination of Alexis to explain why some of her pretrial 

statements differed from later statements and her trial testimony that she did 

not see Alec holding a gun. Before Alexis’s testimony on this point, the trial 

court instructed the jury:

We are about to go into a line of questioning where the witness 

will be allowed to testify to certain statements attributed to her 

mother, Michelle. Now, typically these are hearsay statements. 
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It would not be admissible, but in this instance, in hearings 

conducted outside your presence, they are now deemed to be 

proper and admissible to show the witnesses, this witness’ state of 

mind and her beliefs at the time that she’s receiving these 

statements from Michelle. They are not intended to prove that 

the statements are actually made. If the intent is to show what 

this witness’ state of mind was at the time of receiving the 

statements were Michelle. I also inform you that these 

statements attributed to her mother, Michelle, are not attributed 

to the defendant.

Id. at 151-52. Defense counsel also questioned Alexis about her inconsistent 

pretrial statements during cross-examination.

[10] Jackson testified on his own behalf at trial. He claimed that Alec asked him to 

approach the car, and as he did so, Alec raised a gun and pointed it at him. 

Jackson said he then pulled his gun out the waistband of his pants and began 

firing it at the car, not really aiming, as he ran backwards and attempted to take 

shelter behind his own car. The jury found Jackson guilty as charged, and the 

trial court sentenced him accordingly. Jackson now appeals.

Analysis

I. Admission of “Threat” Evidence

[11] The first issue is whether the trial court properly allowed Alexis to testify that 

she felt threatened by statements Michelle made immediately after the shooting, 

which caused her to initially make false statements about the shooting to police

and defense counsel. “We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion 

resulting in prejudicial error.” Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. 2015). 
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An abuse of discretion occurs if a ruling “is either clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or when the court 

misinterprets the law.” Id. We may affirm a decision regarding the admission 

of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Johnson v. State, 6 

N.E.3d 491, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Also, we will disregard any error in the 

admission of evidence unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. Id. In 

determining the prejudicial effect of an evidentiary ruling on a party’s 

substantial rights, we consider the probable impact of the improperly-admitted 

evidence on the fact finder. Id. “Any error caused by the admission of evidence 

is harmless if the evidence was cumulative of other, appropriately admitted, 

evidence.” Id.

[12] Before the trial court, Jackson lodged two specific objections against Alexis 

relating what Michelle had told her: (1) it was inadmissible hearsay, and (2) its 

unfair prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value under Indiana Evidence 

Rule 403.1 On appeal, Jackson does not attempt to argue that Alexis’s 

testimony regarding Michelle’s statements was inadmissible hearsay. See Fox v. 

State, 497 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Ind. 1986) (holding testimony that witness had 

made prior inconsistent statements because of threats against his family was 

admissible under “state of mind” exception to hearsay rule). Jackson argues 

only that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403. He is correct 

 

1 Evidence Rule 403 states: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 

the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
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that Fox did not address the probative value of such evidence versus its 

prejudicial effect, nor does it appear the trial court addressed the Evidence Rule 

403 issue. Still, we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on any basis supported by 

the record. See Johnson, 6 N.E.3d at 499.

[13] When analyzing a claim of evidence being inadmissible under Evidence Rule 

403 for being too unfairly prejudicial, the inquiry is whether the probative value 

of the proffered evidence is outweighed by the likely unfair prejudicial impact of 

that evidence. Myers v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1077, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. 

denied. “‘When determining the likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will 

look for the dangers that the jury will (1) substantially overestimate the value of 

the evidence or (2) that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or 

sympathies of the jury.’” Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (quoting Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied. 

The general admissibility of evidence of threats against a witness has been 

addressed in several cases. Most of these cases predate the adoption of the 

Indiana Rules of Evidence and Rule 403 specifically; still, they are helpful in 

evaluating the issue of the unfair prejudicial effect of such evidence versus its 

probative value. 

[14] Our supreme court has stated, “evidence pertaining to bribery, threats and other 

influences which reflect upon the credibility of a witness should be given to the 

jury. . . . Moreover, such evidence should not be viewed as being collateral in 

nature.” Hardin v. State, 275 Ind. 63, 65–66, 414 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1981). 

Shortly after Hardin, this court held, “[s]ince threats tend to show guilty 
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knowledge or an admission of guilt on the part of the defendant, a proper 

foundation must be laid showing the threats were made either by the defendant 

or with his or her knowledge or authorization.” Cox v. State, 422 N.E.2d 357, 

361–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). “Thus, evidence of threats made by unidentified 

third persons usually lacks a sufficient connection to the defendant to render 

them admissible. Barring such a showing, the highly prejudicial nature of such 

testimony requires its exclusion.” Id. at 362. The main concern in Cox

appeared to be that the State was implying certain threats made against a 

witness while incarcerated were instigated by the defendant, without any 

evidence to that effect. See Adams v. State, 890 N.E.2d 770, 776-77 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008) (distinguishing Cox in part because there was no evidence defendant 

knew of or was connected to threats against victim and State did not prompt 

witness to relate threats on stand), trans. denied.

[15] Kimble v. State, 451 N.E.2d 302 (Ind. 1983), addressed a situation in which the 

trial court allowed the State to question a witness on re-direct examination 

about threats made to him in prison by friends of the defendant, without the Cox

foundation of proof that the defendant knew of or authorized the threats. Our 

supreme court affirmed, holding defense counsel had opened the door on crossexamination to such evidence by leaving a false or misleading impression about 

why the witness wanted to avoid going to certain prisons as part of a plea deal 

with the State. Kimble, 451 N.E.2d at 306. We also note that Indiana Evidence 

Rule 613(b) now provides, “Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent 

statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or 
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deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the 

witness about it, or if justice so requires.” This rule does not require the 

presentation of evidence in any particular order regarding the prior inconsistent 

statement and explanations or denials of the statement. See Griffith v. State, 31 

N.E.3d 965, 970-71 (Ind. 2015). 

[16] After considering the caselaw surrounding this issue, as well as Evidence Rules 

403 and 613(b), we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in permitting 

Alexis to relate the perceived threat Michelle made against her. Clearly, it 

related to explanation of prior inconsistent statements Alexis made regarding 

whether she saw Alec holding a gun before Jackson began shooting. Without 

the testimony about the threat, the jury would have had an incomplete and 

misleading picture about Alexis’s pretrial statements. The testimony about the 

threat had probative value as an explanation of Alexis’s prior inconsistent 

statements. Moreover, the trial court expressly instructed the jury that 

Michelle’s threat was hers and hers alone and was not attributable to Jackson. 

Thus, the apparent concern of cases such as Cox—that the State may attempt to 

sneak in an evidentiary harpoon of implied uncharged misconduct by the 

defendant or an admission of guilt—is absent here. Although the testimony 

about the threat may have been prejudicial to Jackson’s case, we cannot say 

that it was so unfairly prejudicial or encouraged the jury to consider improper 

factors in considering Jackson’s guilt or innocence such that it was 

inadmissible.
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[17] Additionally, under our current evidence rules, it was not error for the State to 

bring up Michelle’s threat during Alexis’s direct examination, rather than 

waiting for the defense to question her about prior inconsistent statements 

during cross-examination and then to question her about the threats during redirect examination or rebuttal. As noted, Evidence Rule 613(b) does not 

require any particular order in the presentation of evidence.2 The Seventh 

Circuit, in addressing the Federal Rules of Evidence, has addressed a situation 

similar to this, and held it is proper for the government to anticipate that the 

defense will attempt to introduce evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent 

statements and to “front” such cross-examination by admitting evidence during 

direct examination that the witness had been threatened by the defendant to 

make false pretrial statements. United States v. Holly, 167 F.3d 393, 394-95 (7th

Cir. 1999). Although not binding upon us, a federal court’s interpretation of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally are similar to the Indiana Rules of 

Evidence, is useful. Griffith, 31 N.E.3d at 969. In sum, Holly and the way the 

trial court proceeded here are consistent with our rules of evidence. The trial 

court did not err in allowing the State to question Alexis about Michelle’s threat 

to her.

 

2 A party cannot call a witness for the sole purpose of impeaching them and presenting otherwise 

inadmissible evidence. Griffith, 31 N.E.3d at 973. The State did not call Alexis for the sole purpose of 

impeaching her, but primarily to elicit her testimony that she did not see Alec holding a gun and for other 

evidence related to the shooting.
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II. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Mens Rea

[18] Next, we address whether there is sufficient evidence Jackson acted with the 

mens rea required to support a conviction for murder; Jackson contends that, at 

the most, he acted recklessly in shooting Alec. When analyzing a claim of 

insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Sallee v. 

State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016). “It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of 

appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to 

determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id. The evidence 

does not have to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and it is 

sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn to support the verdict. Id.

[19] To convict Jackson as charged, the State was required to prove that he 

knowingly or intentionally killed Alec. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). The 

requisite intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the attack and the 

circumstances surrounding the crime. Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind. 

2002). Also, intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a 

manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Id.

[20] Jackson’s argument is largely dependent upon the version of events described in 

his testimony, namely that he fired wildly at Alec’s car after he saw Alec

holding a gun and while Jackson attempted to take cover behind his own car. 

This testimony conflicts in large measure with other evidence, including 

Justin’s testimony. Justin testified clearly that Jackson ran up to Alec’s car, said 

“I got you now,” and began firing at the car. Tr. Vol. I p. 79. Justin saw Alec
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holding a cell phone and nothing else; no gun ever was found on Alec’s person 

or in his car. Jackson continued firing at Alec’s car as he drove away and did 

not stop until Alec turned a corner. All in all, Jackson fired eight shots, and at 

least six of them struck the car. This evidence is indicative of a deliberate intent 

to kill Alec and is sufficient to sustain his conviction for murder. See Allen v. 

State, 575 N.E.2d 615, 616 (Ind. 1991) (holding that firing multiple shots at 

moving car, at least two of which struck car, was sufficient evidence of intent to 

kill); Ware v. State, 859 N.E.2d 708, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding there was 

sufficient evidence of intent to kill where defendant fired gun at group of fleeing 

boys and said he was “going to get” them), trans. denied. Jackson’s argument is 

an invitation to reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we 

must reject.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Self-Defense

[21] Finally, we address Jackson’s claim that he was acting in self-defense in 

shooting Alec. We review such claims as we do any other sufficiency claim: 

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Cole v. State, 28 

N.E.3d 1126, 1136-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A person is justified in using 

deadly force against another person “if the person reasonably believes that the 

force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person 

or the commission of a forcible felony.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). The State has the 

burden of negating a claim of self-defense once it is raised and has support in 

the record. Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1137. “The State may meet this burden by 

rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not 
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act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in 

chief.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). Whether the defense 

has been rebutted is a question for the trier of fact. Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1137.

[22] As with his mens rea argument, Jackson’s self-defense claim is dependent upon 

acceptance of his trial testimony that he only began shooting at Alec when he 

saw Alec point a gun at him. This is in direct contravention of Justin’s 

testimony that he only saw Alec holding a cell phone, and the failure to find a 

gun on Alec’s person or in his car. Justin’s testimony that Jackson said “I got 

you now” before opening fire also supports the conclusion that Jackson began 

firing not out of fear of Alec, but as some sort of revenge for years of conflict 

between them and between Alec and Michelle. Tr. Vol. I p. 79. Finally, even if 

Jackson had some initial fear of Alec, there is evidence that Alec himself did 

not have a gun, let alone that he ever fired it at Jackson, yet Jackson fired eight 

shots, at least six of which struck Alec’s car, and continued firing at Alec even 

after he began to drive away. In other words, Jackson continued firing long 

after any threat posed by Alec disappeared. There is sufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s rejection of Jackson’s self-defense claim.

Conclusion

[23] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to elicit 

testimony from Alexis that Michelle had threatened her, thus causing Alexis to 

make false pretrial statements. There is sufficient evidence Jackson had the 

requisite mens rea to commit murder and was not acting in self-defense when 

he shot Alec. We affirm.
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[24] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.