U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

85–640PDF 2014

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE ARABIAN PENINSULA:

YEMEN AND BAHRAIN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 19, 2013

Serial No. 113–84

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Ms. Barbara Leaf, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Arabian Peninsula, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 4

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Barbara Leaf: Prepared statement ................................................................. 7

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 28

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 29

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE ARABIAN 

PENINSULA: YEMEN AND BAHRAIN 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Congressman Ted Deutch, the ranking member is on his way, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 

1 minute each. We will then hear from our witness, and without 

objection, the prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and 

questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the 

rules. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. With so much 

focus being given to the conflict in Syria, the ever-changing political landscape in Egypt and, of course, Iran’s march toward full nuclear breakout capability, it is vitally important that we not lose 

sight of the big picture and remain engaged throughout the region. 

The U.S. must look ahead and try to anticipate problems before 

they arise, by being proactive rather than reactive as all too often 

we are. 

Today, we take a look at two of those countries, Yemen and Bahrain, that may not get much media attention, but whose recent developments are a cause for concern for U.S. national security interests and may have regional implications as well. 

After more than 33 years in power in Yemen, the President of 

Yemen was forced to resign from office in early 2012 as a result 

of a rising tide of pro-democracy movements in Yemen. Since that 

time, Yemen has been in a period of political transition as the 

Yemeni people attempted to draft a new Constitution, implement 

new electoral laws, and move toward a more inclusive governing 

body by implementing a national dialogue process. 

The U.S. and the international community must support the national dialogue in its effort to get a consensus on how to move the 

country forward toward a path for democracy. But in order for the 

political process to stand a chance, the economy and the security 

situation must all improve in Yemen. There has been a serious and 

2

a worrisome rise in extremism, and civil unrest has not simmered 

down. 

Contrary to what some in the administration believe, al-Qaeda 

has not been decimated. It is not on the run. It is resurgent 

throughout the region, and Yemen is no different. The fragile socioeconomic and political situations in Yemen has fostered an environment that allows al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, to gain a safe 

haven from which to operate, posing a serious threat to Yemen’s 

stability and to our U.S. national security. 

But just as Yemen has seen its fair share of uprisings as a result 

of the Arab Spring, so has Bahrain. Bahrain has served as the 

long-term headquarters of the United States Navy Fifth Fleet, so 

it is in the vital interest of our national security to see a stable, 

unified, and democratic Bahrain. In 2002, it appeared that the 

Government of Bahrain had set itself out on a path toward democracy. A national action charter was adopted by the people that led 

the way to Bahrain’s first parliamentary elections in nearly three 

decades and the first municipal election in almost 50 years. Suffrage was extended to women. Political parties were finally legalized, and I introduced a resolution praising these efforts in July 

2004. That resolution reaffirmed the friendship between the United 

States and Bahrain and offered to assist them in the future should 

any challenge arise on its road to democracy, and that offer still 

stands. 

Fast forward to 2011, it became clear that Bahrain did not reach 

the end of the path toward democracy. The political dialogue that 

began in 2011 had failed to bring about any of the reforms required 

with several prominent members of the moderate reform party as 

being targeted by the regime for arrest and prosecution. The administration has largely remained silent throughout most of the 

process, but it needs to be more vocal and supportive of the nonviolent moderate reformists in Bahrain and it must stress to the 

government the importance of a political solution that can only be 

achieved by the people of Bahrain themselves. 

It must also call attention to the growing number of reports on 

human rights abuses in the country and the increasing numbers of 

political prisoners. All sides must come together in Bahrain to find 

a political solution and the administration must work with the government and the opposition to come together to solve their disputes, address human rights abuses and fully implement the recommendations of the Bahrain Commission of Inquiry. 

As we convene this hearing today, I look forward to hearing the 

administration’s strategic goals and objectives in both Yemen and 

Bahrain and what concrete steps we are taking to ensure regional 

stability as well as furthering U.S. national security interests. 

Thank you. And with that, I am pleased to turn to our ranking 

member, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, ma’am. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I am pleased today that we 

will have the opportunity to focus on a region of vital importance 

to the interest of the United States. 

And I thank you, Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf for joining us. 

I know you recently returned from the region. We look forward to 

hearing how things are progressing both in Yemen, and in Bahrain. 

3

You know, 3 years ago, inspired by events in Tunisia, the people 

of Yemen courageously took to the streets to add their voices to the 

growing discontent with stagnant economic conditions, repression 

of freedoms and government corruption that seemed to be sweeping 

the Middle East and North Africa. Within months, the Gulf Cooperation Council presented President Saleh with a plan to cede 

his 30-year grip of power to then Vice President Hadi. It has now 

been 21 months since Hadi took over as interim President. The 

GCC-backed agreement called for national dialogue that would 

eventually give way to a new Constitution, followed by local and 

national elections. 

By comparison of many of its neighbors, Yemen’s political transition seemed to be progressing positively. The national dialogue included 565 representatives from across the political spectrum with 

a mandate that one-third of the participants be women, while 

youth accounted for one-fifth of the participants. A secular woman 

was even appointed chair of one of the committees. However, meetings have stalled since September, and I am concerned that there 

will be a lack of progress now that difficult questions about Yemen’s future are pending. 

We must continue to urge national dialogue to move forward 

with real solutions and mechanisms for implementing its recommendations. We have got to continue to feed momentum toward 

the drafting of an a new Constitution and eventually new elections. 

The United States can play an extremely important role in providing technical support for free and fair elections, working with 

civil society to support an inclusive democratic process and instituting needed economic reforms. But I am increasingly concerned 

that our efforts to assist the political transition and aid in economic 

development are often overshadowed by an overwhelming focus on 

our security relationship with Yemen. Al-Qaeda and the Arabian 

Peninsula activities in Yemen has proven to be a breeding ground 

for some of the organization’s most influential leaders. As Yemeni 

security forces struggle to root out terrorists, it raises questions 

about what kind of training and support the United States is providing on the ground. How has our reliance on drone strikes to 

reach these high-level targets hindered our relations with the Yemeni people, and what exactly is our long-term strategy for Yemen? 

Yemen is widely believed to be on the front line in our fight 

against terror, but I am concerned that whether our level of security assistance reflects the need. U.S. assistance to Yemen totaled 

$256 million for Fiscal Year 2013, but these funds come from 17 

different accounts, all with very different objectives. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf, I hope that you will address 

any ongoing discussions to reevaluate our assistance and provide a 

long-term strategy for ensuring a stable and inclusive Yemen. 

Turning to Bahrain, the United States, and Bahrain have enjoyed, long enjoyed a close partnership by Bahrain housing the U.S. 

Navy’s Fifth Fleet, having hosted it now for over 60 years. This relationship plays an integral part of security in the Persian Gulf. 

The King has remained a steadfast partner of the GCC and our regional efforts to address mutual security concerns. Since the 2011 

demonstrations, the government has undertaken a process to institute various reforms for a more inclusive government. The comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111913\85640 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

mencement of a national dialogue led by the Crown Prince was 

promising, but the continuing violence and recent boycotts by the 

opposition threatened to unravel progress. The U.S. response to the 

uprisings in Bahrain has been somewhat puzzling. 

And I hope that today, Secretary Leaf, you will be able to provide 

some clarity as to how the United States plans to balance our security and interests in our close partnership with Bahrain with our 

expectations for human rights. How do we balance those two? 

Our Gulf allies are playing an increasingly critical role in regional geopolitics. How are Yemen and Bahrain affected by U.S. relationships with other regional powers, with Saudi Arabia, with 

Qatar? And as we work together to counter the Iranian influence 

in Syria and across the Gulf and prevent a nuclear armed Iran, 

communication and cooperation is essential. 

How do we work on parallel tracks to support democratic values, 

strengthen economic factors, and stabilize the security of our regional partners? So Secretary Leaf, I recognize that there is no onesize-fits-all policy toward our friends in the Arabian Peninsula, but 

I appreciate you being here today to shed light on our long-term 

strategy, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

I am pleased to yield for a 1-minute opening statement to Mr. 

Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. I am ready to go. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am ready. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ready to go. 

Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am not going to break the trend. Thank you, 

Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much and now our committee, the subcommittee, is very pleased to welcome Ms. Barbara 

Leaf, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Arabian Peninsula 

at the State Department. Prior to this position, Ms. Leaf was the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and previously served as the 

first director of the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs. 

She is also a member of the Senior Foreign Service. 

Welcome, Ms. Leaf, and we look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

STATEMENT OF MS. BARBARA LEAF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Ms. LEAF. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here 

today to discuss two quite important countries for the U.S. in the 

Middle East, Yemen and Bahrain. 

I have just returned from a trip to this region, and I welcome the 

chance to discuss them with you and ask that my full testimony 

be submitted for the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Ms. LEAF. On Yemen, the U.S. enjoys a strong and comprehensive relationship with the government of President Abd Rabbuh 

5

Mansour Hadi and the Yemeni people. I visited Sana’a last week 

for 5 days to underscore our support for Yemen’s historic transition 

and continued bilateral security cooperation. Yemen continues to 

make significant strides forward in its political transition, even 

while it faces unprecedented challenges. Since the new November 

2011 signing of the GCC brokered transition initiative, Yemen has 

taken several big steps forward, including the launch of a national 

dialogue conference this march, a gathering of 565 delegates from 

across the political spectrum, indeed across the country, brought together for the most inclusive discussion of its kind in Yemen’s history. The dialogue has accomplished what many thought impossible 

as Yemen stood on the brink of civil war a little more than 2 years 

ago. Political elites, travel elders, women, youth, civil society activists, and representatives of minority communities have gathered to 

share ideas and develop meaningful recommendations and proposals for Yemen’s future. Despite these positive achievements, disagreement over the future state structure has delayed the dialogue 

well beyond its scheduled September 18 conclusion. We are actively 

engaging with President Hadi and other Yemeni political leaders to 

encourage a consensus agreement on principles of the state structure to allow the dialogue to conclude and subsequent transition 

steps, including constitutional reform, constitutional referendum 

and national elections, to proceed. 

However, there also remains spoilers’ intent on disrupting or derailing the transition process, from members of the former Saleh 

regime to political opportunists bent on bolstering their own support at any cost. While we do not believe these detractors will succeed in their attempts, we continue to make clear that we will not 

tolerate any attempts to subvert the process. We are in close coordination with the international community in Sana’a as well as 

the U.N. and other international partners to encourage transition 

progress. The GCC in particular has played and will continue to 

play a critical role supporting Yemen throughout its transition. 

Economic reform and development will also be a key underpinning 

of the transition success. 

Yemen’s economy is showing some signs of recovery since the 

events of 2011. In tandem with international partners, we have 

made clear to Yemen that undertaking specific achievable economic 

reforms today, is essential to building the foundation necessary to 

address the needs of all Yemenis. As Yemen tackles these issues 

of reform, it continues to cope with serious economic and social 

challenges affecting the everyday lives of Yemenis. Investment in 

the economic and social wellbeing of the Yemeni people as well as 

immediate relief for urgent humanitarian needs is necessary to 

help realize the transition’s full potential. 

Finally, the Yemeni Government has made some gains in extending the security in the country, both through military operations 

against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and through a challenging reorganization of security institutions. However, as President Obama said in his May speech at the National Defense University, AQAP is the most active organization plotting against our 

homeland. We have encouraged the Yemeni Government to continue progress on restructuring of the military and security services, which will strengthen Yemeni capacity to secure the country 

6

against internal and external threats. We view continued use of 

U.S. support for the Yemeni security sector as critical as the country continues to battle an AQAP presence within its borders. 

Turning to Bahrain. Bahrain is a major non-NATO ally and a 

steadfast partner in regional security, host to the Fifth Fleet and 

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Bahrain is home to our main 

naval operating base in the Middle East. Our relationship with 

Bahrain allows us to address threats to national security interests, 

ensure open sea lanes for international commerce, and counter piracy. The U.S. is committed to this relationship. 

During my visit to Bahrain this past September, I met with a 

wide range of Bahraini interlocutors, from government officials to 

political society leaders, civil society members. I saw firsthand the 

importance of this relationship to Bahrainis in general. The complex challenges Bahrain is facing and the ways in which the U.S. 

can support Bahrain’s transition beyond this challenging period in 

its history, a more stable secure and prosperous Bahrain will enable us to continue to build our strong security partnership, meet 

our national security goals across the region, and promote reform, 

human rights, and dialogue. 

November 23rd marks the 2-year anniversary of the landmark 

Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report. King Hamad 

demonstrated strong leadership in convening the body and taking 

on board the recommendations in the report and committing to implement them in full. Two years later, the government has made 

some progress, but much remains to be done, particularly in the 

areas of accountability for police abuse, freedom of expression, and 

media incitement. 

The First Deputy Prime Minister’s Office has laid out an additional set of measures aimed at addressing both BICI report recommendations, as well as other initiatives that go beyond the scope 

of the report. These include projects to rebuild mosques and religious structures demolished during the 2011 unrest and construction of new housing tracts. They are positive steps that can help 

rebuild trust. 

As you noted, the Bahraini Government announced a national 

dialogue in early 2013. Regrettably those talks have broken down, 

and the opposition societies maintain a boycott of the dialogue that 

they initiated in September as a result of a deteriorating political 

environment. An end to the dialogue would leave both Bahrain’s 

political societies and its government with no formal mechanism to 

negotiate a path forward. We have consistently urged the opposition to return to the table and demonstrate political courage in denouncing unequivocally all violent acts. At the same time, we have 

consistently pressed the Bahraini Government to take concrete 

steps that would improve the environment for dialogue. We are 

deeply committed to working with all parties in Bahrain to move 

beyond this period of crisis, which, by the way, is a term that 

every, literally, every Bahraini used with me, whether inside government or outside. 

In the end, however, we do agree that Bahrainis themselves 

must find the solution. It must be a Bahraini-driven solution. But 

strong leadership is needed from all sides in order to move Bahrain 

beyond its current situation of impasse. Thank you for the opporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111913\85640 HFA PsN: SHIRL
7

tunity to testify, and I look forward to answering any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Leaf follows:]


85640a-1.eps

HFAC Testimony on Yemen and Bahrain 

November 19,2013 

Chaimlan Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, Members ofthe Subconmlittee, 

thank you for inviting me here today to discuss Yemen and Bahrain. I have just 

retumed from a trip to the region and I can assure you that this is an issue of 

critical importance to the Obama Administration. I welcome the chance to discuss 

Yemen and Bahrain with you and ask that my full testimony be submitted for the 

record. 

The United States el~oys a strong and comprehensive relationship with the 

govemment of President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the Yemeni people. 

visited Sana'a last week to underscore U.S. support for Yemen's historic political 

transition and continued bilateral security cooperation. A democratic, uniiied, and 

stable Yemen will be best able to meet the needs of its citizens and participate fully 

as a partner in supporting regional security. 

Yemen continues to make significant strides forward in its political transition, even 

while it faces lllprecedented challenges. Our policy focuses on supporting 

President Hadi and the people of Yemen as they seek to achieve an inclusive, 

representative, and unified political system through this ongoing transition process. 

We are also partnering with the Yemeni govemment to meet the critical, near-tenn 

needs of its citizens. In particular, our engagement centers on four key areas: I) 

the political transition process; 2) economic reform and development; 3) 

humanitarian relief; and, 4) security and cOlmterterrorism cooperation. 

Since the November 2011 signing ofthe Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-

brokered transition initiative, Yemen has taken several significant steps toward 

meaningful reioml. These include: the December 2011 ionnation of a National 

Consensus Govemment, consisting offomler ruling party and opposition leaders; 

the Febmary 2012 election of President Hadi as the COllltry'S first new president in 

over three decades; and, the launch of a National Dialogue Conference this March 

- a gathering of 565 delegates from across the political spectmm, brought together 

for the most inclusive discussion of its kind in Yemen's history. During my recent 

trip to Sana' a, I saw firsthand how the Yemeni people have come together to 

support this process. 
8


85640a-2.eps

The dialogue has accomplished what many thought impossible, as Yemen stood on 

the brink of civil war a little more than two years ago. Political elites, tribal elders, 

women, youth, civil society activists, and representatives of minority communities 

have gathered to share ideas and develop meaningful reconunendations and 

proposals for Yemen's future. Nine working groups have discussed an expansive 

range oftopics, including govemance, state-building, deep-seated regional 

grievances, human rights and security. Women represent nearly a third -- and 

youth a fifth -- ofthe dialogue's delegates. Participation was also divided equally 

between the COlilltry'S north and south, fostering a measme of goodwill among 

many southemers previously marginalized from political, military, and economic 

opportunities by the former regime. 

Despite these positive achievements, disagreement over the future state structure 

has delayed the dialogue well beyond its scheduled September 18 conclusion. This 

stalemate has allowed regional, sectarian, and political disputes to intensify. We 

are actively engaging with President Hadi and other Yemeni political leaders to 

encomage a consensus agreement on the principles of the state's structme, so that 

the dialogue can conclude and subsequent transition steps -- including 

constitutional refoml, a constitutional referendum, and national elections -- may 

proceed, while the details of state structure are deliberated concurrently. Peaceful 

deliberation and disagreement are essential features of healthy democratic debates. 

Indeed, as several prominent Yemenis told me dming my recent visit to Sana' a, 

individuals from all sides are optimistic that there is a way forward and that all of 

the outstanding political issues can and should be agreed upon, so that the next 

steps ofthe transition may proceed. 

However, there also remain "spoilers" intent on disrupting or derailing the 

transition process - from members of the fonner regime to political opportunists 

bent on bolstering their own support at any cost. Given the desire of Yemenis to 

achieve real change, we do not believe these detractors will succeed in their 

attempts. Nonetheless, we continue to make clear that we will not tolerate any 

attempts to subvert the process. 

We are in close coordination with the intemational conulllUlity in Sana'a, as well 

as the United Nations and other intemational partners, to encourage transition 

progress. The GCC, in particular, has played and will continue to playa critical 

role supporting Yemen throughout its transition. We maintain regular engagement 

with our Gulf partners to harmonize efforts. To date, we have provided nearly $39 

million to support the political transition process, including training National 

Dialogue delegates, mentoring female and minority delegates, and strengthening 

2 
9


85640a-3.eps

civic engagement. We also plan to assist Yemen as it moves forward to 

constitutional refonn and, ultimately, national elections. 

Economic reforn1 and development will also be a key underpilming ofthe 

transition's success. Yemen's economy has shown some signs of recovery. 

Following a 15 percent GDP contraction during the turnlOil 01'2011 that paralyzed 

govemment institutions and shut down many private enterprises, and minimal 

growth in 2012, the lMF predicts there will be around 4.5 percent GDP growth in 

2013. However, Yemen is expected to have a budget deficit of more than $3 

billion. Overall unemployment is estimated at 40 percent and youth 

unemployment exceeds 60 percent. Meanwhile, frequent attacks on energy 

infrastmcture have reduced oil and gas exports that are the principal source of 

revenue to support Yemen's large and inetlicient public sector. 

To address these endemic issues we are committed to supporting Yemen's 

economic refonn and development. In tandem with the World Bank, IMF, and 

other international partners, we have made clear to Yemen that undertaking 

specific, achievable reforms today - such as reducing crippling fuel subsidies, 

eliminating ghost government employees, increasing transparency in the budget 

process, strengthening the private sector, and reinvigorating the govemment's anticormption efforts - is essential to building the foundation necessary to address the 

needs of all Yemenis. I emphasized while in Sana'a last week that the Yemeni 

govemment must take steps toward economic reform to ensure the success of the 

broader political transition and create the foundation for a prosperous Yemen. We 

will continue to work with intemational partners to provide the incentives and 

support Yemen requires to carry out its reform agenda. 

As Yemen tackles issues of fundamental political reform, it continues to cope with 

serious economic and social challenges affecting the everyday lives of Yemenis. 

Over 306,000 Yemenis remain internally displaced, an estimated 10.5 million of 

Yemen's 24 million people are food insecure, one million Yemenis sutTer from 

acute malnutrition, and as many as 13.1 million people lack access to safe drinking 

water and basic sanitation services, according to the United Nations. Investment in 

the economic and social well-being of the Yemeni people, as well as immediate 

relief for their urgent humanitarian needs, is necessary to help realize the 

transition's full potential. The United States has provided more than $221mi11ion 

in humanitarian assistance over the past two fiscal years to help address the needs 

ofthe most vulnerable populations in Yemen, in coordination with the United 

Nations and other humanitarian organizations. This includes food and nutrition 

3 
10


85640a-4.eps

assistance, access to water and shelter, and provision of health care, including 

immunizations and disease prevention, among other types of assistance. 

Ultimately, progress on security will be a key underpilming to the success of 

Yemen's political transition. The Yemeni government has made some gains in 

extending security in the country, both through military operations against alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and through a challenging reorganization 

of security institutions. President Hadi has taken important steps toward 

restructuring Yemen's military and security services, including issuing decrees in 

January and April 2013 that outlined a new brigade structure, and undertaking 

other initiatives to enhance the professionalism and capacity of Yemen's arnled 

forces. We have encouraged the Yemeni government to continue progress on this 

important aspect of the transition agreement, which will strengthen Yemeni 

capacity to secure the country against internal and external threats. r underscored 

this point during my recent visit to Sana'a. We also have concerns that external 

actors, including Iran, continue etlorts to undermine Yemen's transition in order to 

destabilize the region. 

We are encouraged by the counterterrorism efforts President Hadi and the Yemeni 

government have taken, and remain committed to continued close coordination in 

the fight against terrorism. Through the steadfast support of the United States and 

the etlorts of President Hadi, Yemen has reclaimed territory in the south previously 

under AQAP control and has taken steps to strengthen border security. Despite 

this, AQAP continues to pose an inunediate security threat to Yemen, the region, 

and to the United States. As President Obama said in his May speech at the 

National Defense University, AQAP is the most active organization plotting 

against our homeland. The Yemeni government has the will to counter AQAP, but 

does not have the capacity at this time to extend security throughout all parts of the 

country. 

Continued U.S. support for the Yemeni security sector is thus critical as the 

country continues to battle an AQAP presence within its borders. Our security 

assistance to Yemen focuses on increasing Yemeni capacity to secure the cOlmtry 

against AQAP and other threats through a comprehensive strategy that addresses 

the country's critical security challenges. Our assistance seeks to develop the 

capacity of Yemen's security forces to conduct counterterrori sm operations and to 

secure maritime and land borders and territorial waters. We also support programs 

to counter violent extremism in Yemen and build law enforcement capacity. 

4 
11


85640a-5.eps

To sustain Yemen's ongoing security sector refoml and counterterrorism efforts 

throughout the transition period, the United States provided roughly $87 million in 

Department of State-flmded security assistance to Yemen over the past two fiscal 

years, as well as nearly $161 million in Department of De tense-funded programs to 

train and equip the Yemeni security forces to conduct cOlmterterrorism operations. 

Bahrain 

If you will permit, I will now turn to Ballrain. Strategically situated between Saudi 

Arabia and Iran, Ballrain is a major non-NATO ally and a steadfast partner in 

regional security. As host of our Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central 

Command (NA VCENT), Bahrain is home to our main naval operating base in the 

Middle East. Our relationship with Ballfain allows us to work cooperatively to 

address threats to our common security interests, ensure open sea-lanes for 

intemational commerce, and cOlmter piracy. The United States is committed to 

this important relationship. 

During my first visit to Bahrain as Deputy Assistant Secretary this past September, 

I met with a wide range of Bahraini interlocutors, ranging from govemment 

officials to political society leaders to civil society members. [saw first-hand the 

importance of this relationship, the complex challenges Ballrain is facing, and the 

ways in which the United States can support Bahrain's transition beyond this 

challenging period in its history. 

A more stable, secure, and prosperous Bahrain will enable us to continue to build 

our strong security partnership and promote ref 01111, human rights, and dialogue. 

Beginning in Febmary 2011, the country experienced a sustained period of unrest, 

with mass protests calling for political refoml. At the urging of intemational 

partners, including the U.S., and in response to this unrest, which was marked by 

mass arrests and deaths of a number of protesters as well as security personnel, the 

Bahraini govenunent launched a political reform process in the sununer of 2011. 

This process has made some important strides, but it has not yet gained sufficient 

momentllll to move Ballrain definitively beyond this unrest. 

Bahrain continues to suffer from low-level street violence, including the use of 

crude improvised explosive devices that have resulted in numerous security force 

casualties. A small but violent set of groups seeking the overthrow ofthe Bahraini 

govemment are engaging in increasingly provocative actions against security 

forces which have led to injuries and a number of deaths. Overall, the number and 

tempo of violent incidents has decreased in recent months. While none ofthese 

5 
12


85640a-6.eps

incidents have been directed at U. S. mission or military persOlmel, we continue to 

closely monitor these trends and provide regular updates to American citizens 

residing in Bahrain. 

November 23 marks the two year anniversary ofthe landmark Bahrain 

Independent Commission ofInquiry (BICI) report, promulgated by an independent 

body of experts convened by King Hamad to study and provide recommendations 

to address the government's response to the 2011 protest movement. King Hamad 

demonstrated strong leadership in convening the body, accepting the 

recommendations in the report, and conmritting to implement them in full - a 

uniq ue undertaking in response to some ofthe unrest we have witnessed across the 

region during the last years. Two years later, the Bahraini government has made 

some progress in implementing these reconm1endations but much remains to be 

done, particularly in the areas of accountability for police abuse, freedom of 

expression protections, and media incitement. 

The First Deputy Prime Minister's office, led by Crown Prince Salman al Khalifa, 

has laid out an ambitious set of measures aimed at addressing a number ofthe BICI 

report reconunendations as well as other initiatives that go beyond the scope ofthe 

report. Among many efforts, these include projects to rebuild mosques and 

religious structures demolished during the 2011 unrest as well as the construction 

of new housing tracts for a diverse group of Bahrainis. These are positive steps 

that can help rebuild trust. 

The Bahraini government recognized the need for a dialogue process to address the 

range of concerns from the political societies. In early 2013, the Bahraini 

government annOlllced a National Dialogue, an initiative that brought together 27 

Bahraini ministers, Parliamentarians, and members of opposition societies and 

loyalist societies. This could be an important mechanism to promote engagement 

and reconciliation, and we have strongly supported this effort since its inception. 

Regrettably, however, talks have broken down and the opposition societies 

continue to maintain the temporary boycott of the dialoh'1le they initiated in 

September as a result of a deteriorating political enviromnent. Certain measures by 

the govermnent -the Ministry of Justice's order regulating meetings between 

political societies and international diplomats, and the charges against senior 

opposition members including Wifaq leaders Khalil Marzooq and Ali Salmanhave had a chilling effect on the dialogue and have restricted the space for 

opposition activity. At the same time, opposition societies continue to boycott 

mechanisms that do not produce immediate results, an approach that we believe, 

6 
13


85640a-7.eps

m1fortunately, undennines reconciliation efforts. An end to the dialogue would 

leave both Bahrain's political societies and its government with no forn1a1 

mechanism to negotiate a path forward. We have consistently urged the opposition 

to retum to the table and demonstrate political courage in denom1cing 

unequivocally all acts of violence as well as those committing such acts; at the 

same time, we have consistently pressed the Bal1raini government to take concrete 

steps that would improve the environment for dialogue. We are pressing all sides 

to demonstrate courageous leadership to build a positive environment and move 

forward constmctively in this important fomm. 

We are deeply committed to working with all parties in Bahrain to move beyond 

this period of crisis - a term used by literally every Bahraini I spoke with in 

September, whether inside or outside government - and continue to build on our 

strong bilateral relationship. We believe this vision is best realized by pursuing a 

political dialoh'1le, implementing promised reforms, and ensuring the protection of 

hmnan rights, all eftorts the Bahraini govemment has initiated. There is a strong 

need in Bahrain to cultivate voices of moderation, to drown out those who 

otherwise incite and feed the kind of polarization that is surely not in keeping with 

Bahrain's historical traditions of a hamlOnious multi-etlmic society. We are 

engaging intensively with the Bahraini government, political societies, civil society 

members, and Bahrain's neighbors to realize this vision. In the end, however, we 

agree with Bal1rainis that the solution must be Bahraini-driven. We calion 

responsible persons from all parts of Bahraini society to demonstrate leadership in 

the quest for reconciliation and real dialogue. Strong leadership is greatly needed 

from all sides in order to move Bahrain beyond its current period impasse. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. 

7 
14

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you for that 

testimony, and thank you for the written testimony as well. 

Ms. Leaf, in May 2012, President Obama issued Executive Order 

13611, blocking property of persons threatening the peace, security, 

or stability of Yemen. This gave the Treasury Department authority to freeze U.S.-based assets of anyone deemed to be obstructing 

the political transition in Yemen or who is engaged in activity that 

threatens Yemen security or political stability, yet I believe that no 

individual or entity has yet been sanctioned under Executive Order 

13611. And will sanctions now be considered as we see some obstruction taking place once again in Yemen? 

How effective has this tool been if we have not yet used it, and 

do you believe that it could be effective in helping to create a stable 

environment for the political transition to proceed? And I will continue, and then I will let you answer if you could. 

It is clear that the economic situation in Yemen is rapidly deteriorating. Yemen relies heavily on foreign assistance from neighboring countries in the Gulf, most notably, its neighbor to the 

north, Saudi Arabia, but also the United States. However, late last 

month, Saudi Arabia said that it would halt its aid to Yemen, and 

to make matters worse, it has been deporting Yemeni workers from 

Saudi Arabia by the tens of thousands. 

You testified that we will continue to work with our international 

partners to provide the incentives and support Yemen in carrying 

out what we hope will be its reform agenda. What incentives are 

we providing? Have we been using our leverage with the GCC to 

get them to provide much more of the needed development assistance for Yemen? And in Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, Yemen received about $27 million in economic support funds. In Fiscal Year 

2013, State requested $38 million, and now, in Fiscal Year 2014, 

you have requested $45 million. What is the justification for this 

increase in ESF funds, and what kinds of programs do we want to 

implement or augment with that additional money? What kind of 

return on investment are we seeing with all of our assistance to 

Yemen? 

Thank you very much, Madam. 

Ms. LEAF. Thank you for that set of questions. First, to the issue 

of sanctions, whether they be bilateral sanctions or U.N.-based 

sanctions. I would say that at this point, we are closely evaluating 

the situation and whether there is a need to go forward with anything specific at this time. We are in very close and constant touch 

with the government, with President Hadi himself. I met with him 

a week ago during my visit, and we went over the proximate set 

of obstacles to concluding this phase of the transition, which means 

wrapping up the dialogue. 

I think we are going to evaluate carefully before we move. We 

have a number of tools, obviously, available, and we have been in 

discussion with what we call the Group of 10 Ambassadors, missions in Sana’a, as well as partner countries. 

I stopped in Riyadh on the way home from Sana’a to discuss 

these issues. We want to allow President Hadi and those who are 

directing, who are running the national dialogue to take the steps 

that they want to do, not get out in front of them, but be ready 

to act as needed. So we are in the process of evaluating exactly this 

15

right now. I would say it is—while there is a degree of obstructionism by former regime elements, there are also genuine political 

issues at play right now that are—that have to be resolved. They 

mostly relate to the north-south divide and the issues as to how a 

future state set of structures will be elaborated. 

So there are legitimate political issues that need to be finessed. 

And then there is also elements of what I would call possible obstructionism. Now, whether they are enough to block the conclusion 

of this phase is yet to be determined. But we will be ready to assist 

President Hadi all along the way in this because it is a critical first 

step, and you—and this step will then take us to the next, or take 

Yemen to the next. 

On the issue of economic assistance, of course, Saudi Arabia is 

by far the largest donor of the group of donor countries. The GCC 

as a block have pledged something on the order of $4.4 billion, and 

of that, Saudi funds are $3.25 billion. There have been ongoing discussions among donors and with Yemeni Government, both on a bilateral basis and in other groups, such as the Friends of Yemen, 

about how the Yemeni Government can best leverage those funds. 

To put it politely, there is endemic corruption and a certain large 

dysfunctionality in Yemeni Governments that goes back three decades. Donors naturally want a fair degree of accountability so that 

their funding goes against the areas of need. We have, as donors 

set up and the World Bank helped to craft this approach, what we 

call a mutual accountability framework, an executive board that is 

going to be the liaison between Yemeni Government and donors to 

ensure that the funding can flow and the funding can flow directly 

to the needs defined. So that was one of the issues that I discussed 

both with the government as well as with the donor community in 

Sana’a. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me just interrupt you a second because 

I had another question. With the Bahrain Independent Commission 

of Inquiry they had made 26 recommendations. Has the government implemented those? And that is dealing with the investigation and reporting of a pro-democracy protest that took place between February and March 2011. What can you tell us about that? 

Ms. LEAF. We issued a report, a sort of a report card, if you will, 

in August on this sort of the state of play on BICI recommendations, and I would say it is a mixed bag. The main shortcomings 

are in accountability. Accountability for abuses, excesses committed 

by security forces during the unrest. Obviously, there are some 

structural reforms that need to be tackled, and I think it is fair to 

say the government is beginning those—is putting those steps in 

place. But accountability, they have certainly fallen short and that 

is something that we have raised regularly with the government. 

I met with the new ombudsman this summer. He has started work 

pretty energetically, he and his team. This is a piece of structural 

reform that I think will essentially help in the accountability piece. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, I appreciate it. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf, I am concerned that there has 

been so much focus on completing the national dialogue in Yemen, 

16

that other really important, critically important factors have been 

overlooked. It is my understanding that none of the committees in 

the national dialogue have focused on any large-scale economic 

issues, which was a key driver of the 2011 unrest. What are we 

doing? What is the United States doing to assist with the economic 

development issues or the kinds of economic reforms that ultimately will be necessary to secure any sort of IMF loan? 

Ms. LEAF. You know, the thing that struck me when I was in 

Sana’a is that basically all eyes are focused now on this end game 

of the first phase of the transition timeline. All eyes are focused on 

that, even in places like the Ministry of Defense, there is sort of 

a waiting to see how this finishes out. The working groups, there 

are nine of them, as you may know, have tackled a range of issues 

that will go into drafting a new Constitution. But the issues that 

have really seized the dialogue and that have sort of gripped them 

at this point relate to the north-south cleavage, which is a critical 

piece of future stability to get past. 

We are putting—we and other donors, the donor community, are 

putting money against efforts to improve in the immediate term, 

because the government of President Hadi of course, is a transition—transitional government, and hereto, frankly, I would say 

even the government ministers who were in charge of these areas, 

the foreign minister himself, have regretted that there is not 

enough energy and push by the government to tackle these structural reforms. I would say, frankly, that there is a sense of reluctance to do things that are politically risky right now. The more so 

because of this stalemate right now that has developed over this 

end game piece of the national dialogue. 

But we are putting money toward a variety of sectors, and they 

would help the government improve social services delivery, which 

is a critical issue, and was a—has been long been a flash point of 

instability, especially in the south, which has felt substantially 

shortchanged, and to promote sustainable policy reforms. But I 

would say that we have—what we are trying to do is help the Yemenis, the dialogue, participants, and President Hadi, get over this 

political hump even as we are beginning to bear in on some of the 

structural economic issues, and the Yemenis are in a prolonged 

conversation with the IMF about a loan program. But they are, 

shall we say, reluctant to tackle some of the reforms right now that 

they need to do. 

Mr. DEUTCH. But what are we doing to help with that? I understand the focus on helping to deliver what services and the rest, 

but on the requirements that the IMF would demand, any sort of 

reforms that would help address those fundamental issues, what 

are we doing? 

Ms. LEAF. They are—we are pushing them. We are pushing 

them. All of the donor community is pushing, you know, with the 

force of a large community to get them to do things on essentially 

ghost workers, cleaning out the rolls of the government, pension 

rolls, and tackling fuel subsidies. We are looking at some 

incentivations to help them over this hump. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And the Friends of Yemen Group, which was initially organized, the United States, Britain, and 24 other countries, 

has pledged nearly $8 billion. Only $2.2 billion, it is my underVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111913\85640 HFA PsN: SHIRL
17

standing, only $2.2 billion has been delivered. You spoke about corruption. You spoke about efforts that are underway to try to address that to make sure the dollars get where—the money gets 

where it is supposed to. Is that enough to convince our friends to 

fulfill their pledges? What do they need to see for their commitments to be upheld? 

Ms. LEAF. I think so. They have just appointed the executive 

board. I met with the interim director of the board. I do think it 

will be enough to start moving things forward. So yes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And if I may, Madam Chairman, just for one 

last——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. Thing on Bahrain. The Crown Prince 

has taken a lead in Bahrain in negotiations with the opposition, instituting reforms. How much leeway does the Crown Prince really 

have? How much space does he really have to accomplish the reforms? 

Ms. LEAF. You know, Congressman, as the King appointed him 

as First Deputy Prime Minister last spring. I, you know, it is early 

days to see how far he is going to get in some of the things that 

he has laid out, but what we have seen is he has got a pretty ambitious plan that combines, as I said, elements of BICI implementation, which the King himself has committed fully to implement. So 

that is already—that is sort of already part of the record or the 

government’s public commitment. 

He has a slate of other activities and programs that he would 

like to take forward. We don’t really, I would say, peg everything 

on the Crown Prince or the First Deputy Prime Minister. We are 

looking at this as a whole of government requirement, and we work 

with all of the ministers, the King, the Prime Minister. The government owns this whole set of problems, not just the First Deputy 

Prime Minister. So we don’t personalize it to say that all of our efforts hang on him. He is an important figure in the government, 

but there are line ministries which have responsibility in both accountability as well as the larger reform effort. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Deutch, thank you. 

Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Madam Chair, why don’t you pass me up right now 

and get back to me. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Sure. All right. Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I don’t have any questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Yoho? 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, for holding this 

very important hearing. 

Ms. Leaf, thank you for lending your considerable expertise into 

the hearing on the very important issues of the United States policy toward Yemen and Bahrain. The escalating political uncertainty in both countries should give us all pause, so as we can 

evaluate our strategy in the region and make sure it is the most 

effective it can be at securing our national interests while promoting peaceful democratic reforms. I look forward—unfortunately, 

I missed your opening lines, but I look forward to this hearing to 

18

find out how we can better utilize the aid we give, not just in 

money and food but the military, how we can utilize that better to 

get a more favorable outcome. Because what I see is a repeat of so 

many of the policies we have done in the Middle East. In your experience, you know, we promote democracy, but yet we do that in 

a country that doesn’t believe the same way we do. How can we 

better approach that to get the results that we both want, you 

know? I know there is something on their side that they want, and 

there is something on our side that we want. What would you recommend to do different than we have maybe done in the past? 

Ms. LEAF. You know, the interesting thing about Yemen, is that 

even while we, the country, the government is grappling with this 

huge, really seismic political transition, our own mission is working 

in pretty difficult circumstances in terms of the security environment, and yet we get out and we engage across the board in all 

of the critical sectors where action by the Yemeni Government and 

by us and other donors is really key to them being successful in 

this. 

So that is in military restructuring where our advice to the military and security services is quite critical and is highly valued. It 

is in counterterrorism assistance and essentially trying to help 

stimulate and grow their capacity to tackle the internal fight to secure their borders, maritime and to take the fight to al-Qaeda. But 

on the political and economic, our small and hardy but very talented and committed staff, both USAID and State, works up and 

down the spectrum of political activists and civil society members 

and is really engaging through both with the national dialogue but 

also the elements of society that have become newly active in a 

way that really Yemen has never seen before. 

Mr. YOHO. All right, let me ask you something else. Do they have 

a workable Constitution? 

Ms. LEAF. Constitution drafting is the next step. 

Mr. YOHO. All right, is there—I mean, the thing that made our 

country so great, it was from the ground up, and what we have 

learned is, you know, life, liberty, pursuit of happiness for all, and 

you can’t have personal freedom without economic freedom. 

Ms. LEAF. Okay. 

Mr. YOHO. Are they going to have things in there like property 

rights and human rights and things like that that they would agree 

on, that, again, is more of a Western value that we don’t see so 

much, like the freedom of religion, the freedom of free speech, the 

freedom to organize. Do you see that on the horizon as something 

that will happen over there, and is that something—I guess the big 

thing that helped us here in the early years in the 1700s and the 

1800s was the knowledge that the base, the population had and the 

understanding of those rights. Is that feasible in that country or in 

Bahrain? 

Ms. LEAF. Sir, they are very, very different cases, but to take 

Yemen, which on any given day, you know, has pretty daunting 

challenges, I mean, across the board. I mean, you know, you have 

a population of 24 million; 40 percent unemployment; you know, 1 

million cases of what is termed acute malnutrition; and almost 50 

percent of the population has what we call food insecurity; and a 

significant portion of the population struggles to get access to clean 

19

water and sanitization services. So, on the one hand, you have got 

this daunting economic picture; on the other hand, you have got a 

pretty daunting security picture. 

Mr. YOHO. So, at this point right now, they are more concerned 

about survival than a Constitution and property rights, and all 

that. 

Ms. LEAF. Well, not so, not so entirely. Yes, there are people who 

are just struggling to survive every day, but the thing about this 

dialogue, which is so extraordinary, is it is tapped into people 

across the country that have really never had a voice. And I tell 

you, I spent——

Mr. YOHO. I am going to have to cut you off because my time has 

expired. 

Ms. LEAF. Okay. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will let her finish. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, thank you, Miss Chairman. 

Ms. LEAF. I spent a whole afternoon with about three or four 

dozen extraordinarily outspoken and feisty Yemeni women, many 

of whom were participants in the national dialogue, others who 

were simply active in various civil society domains. And having 

wrestled through this process, as sort of a minimal floor of participation, they are determined to hang on to it, come what may. And 

they are determined to hang on to it through the next steps of the 

constitutional drafting. But all of these people who are new voices 

in the national dialogue are going back to their communities and 

taking back that experience. So it is really, I have to say, it is quite 

extraordinary. We won’t see a Constitution that looks like ours. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Ms. LEAF. It will be a Yemeni-style Constitution, but I think it 

will respond to some things. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, ma’am. 

Thank you, Ms. Leaf. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for 

calling this hearing. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Leaf, thank you for being here, as 

you said, addressing the issues in two very important countries. 

Starting first with Yemen, and just to put it in maybe a frame, 

in your words, this is a historic seismic transition in the context 

of unprecedented challenges, including spoilers inside the country, 

as well as urgent humanitarian needs. You kind of touched, Yemen 

is the poorest of the Arab countries. It has food insecurity widespread. It has a lack of water, a shrinking supply of water. And 

yet, at the same time, for all of those challenges, we are dealing 

with the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an external threat, but a threat that is not just to Yemen but to the entire 

region. Both the historic transition and the challenge to al-Qaeda 

requires, again, a word you used a few times, capacity building. 

What are the most critical issues from our standpoint as we are 

looking at American policy, vis-a`-vis Yemen that we need to focus 

on to make sure that there is capacity to address the humanitarian 

needs internally, but also to ensure that AQAP is a threat we can 

work to eliminate rather than see expand? 

20

Ms. LEAF. Thank you, Congressman. 

You know, we are, and I saw this myself in meeting with the 

Group of 10 Missions, who meet on a weekly basis in Sana’a and 

basically compare notes, compare approaches, and coordinate tightly as the international community, and that includes the U.N.’s 

Special Representative for Yemen’s Transition and economic assistance agencies. 

We coordinate tightly, but we are doing—essentially what you 

said is the Yemenis bitten off a lot. Have they bitten off too much? 

I think they have no choice—they view themselves as having no 

choice but to do it all. They are tackling assiduously the political 

challenges. They are coming forward slowly to tackle the economic 

challenges, but I think it is there that the donor community has 

to continue to provide technical expertise to make up for the lack 

of capacity that is evident in many of the ministries. And on the 

security front, we are evaluating on just a constant basis how best 

we can calibrate our security assistance and training to help the 

security forces, the military, continue to stand up in terms of their 

capacity to secure their borders but also to take the fight to alQaeda. It is a lot to do. They view themselves as having no choice 

but to do all at the same time, and we are helping on all of those 

fronts, in addition to helping with aid that we push through the 

U.N. principally to help them get their most urgent humanitarian 

needs met. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And unfortunately, I have limited time, but let 

me shift gears a little bit. These are two very different countries 

with very different challenges, but a common thread for both of 

them is the fingerprints, if you will, of Iran and Iran trying to influence what is happening. Can you touch a bit on how Iran is trying to affect events in Yemen, and in particular, more so in Bahrain, and efforts of Bahrain to counter that influence? 

Ms. LEAF. As you are probably aware, there was—the Yemenis 

seized the dhow of Iranian origin with arms last January that was 

clearly en route to support elements of the Houthis community. I 

don’t want to tar the whole Houthis population in Yemen to suggest that they are sort of a backdoor in any sense for Iran. The 

Houthis have representation in the national dialogue. There are 

elements, however, who were fighting the central government, and 

indeed, there were five or six such wars with Saleh’s regime over 

the past years. There is evidence of Iranian meddling. I think it 

would, as in—and I will speak to it in a minute in Bahrain, but 

I think it would be best to do this in a restricted session if you 

want more granularity on it. 

On Bahrain, let me say two things. The events of 2011 were Bahraini driven, are Bahraini originated. And at the same time, there 

has been evidence or concern, certainly expressed by the Bahrainis, 

and we have seen some evidence that Iran is fostering some of the 

sectarian sort of conflict, especially by media incitement. Again, I 

think I would rather do this in a restricted session, if you want to 

do more. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would welcome that.

Ms. LEAF. Okay. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I mean, there is obviously concern about Iranian 

intentions, and they continue to put pressure on Iran and their inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111913\85640 HFA PsN: SHIRL
21

fluence in the region, so I would welcome that opportunity. And 

with that, I have extended my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I thank you for being here, by the way, today. We appreciate 

your willingness to be here. I just want to touch on a couple of brief 

issues. I have seen recent reports that the administration is considering or maybe trying to reengage in the idea of closing Guantanamo and transferring the prisoners to Yemen. I want to ask you 

first off if you are aware of any effort to do that? Is that in fact 

true, or is that not true, or——

Ms. LEAF. Thank you, Congressman. Well, the President moved 

earlier this year to release, essentially, the embargo on returning 

Yemeni nationals from Guantanamo. But there is a—but there is 

a case-by-case review of all such cases that has to be done. And it 

will necessarily hinge on a number of issues, including security 

issues and the capacity of the Yemeni Government to take back 

and secure anyone who was transferred. So there is not an immediate——

Mr. KINZINGER. But there is discussion, then? 

Ms. LEAF. Yes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And does that discussion include a rehabilitation 

program like was implemented in Saudi Arabia? 

Ms. LEAF. So, there is a U.N. body uniquely which has the resident expertise on these issues, and it has established as steering 

group. We are part of it, and a number of other countries are part 

of that effort to look at providing technical assistance to the Yemeni Government, about how to stand up such a program in its early 

stages. But Cliff Sloan, whom I think you may know is our envoy 

on Guantanamo closure. He is engaged in those discussions. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, I just think it is important to point out, 

in 2009, the GAO report the chairwoman actually commissioned, 

showed that there was a 20 percent recidivism rate among those, 

and when you look at a place as unstable as Yemen and you look 

at, frankly, the challenges they have, I think that is definitely of 

concern and I think something that ought to be put on the record. 

You touched on it briefly, but let’s say something like this actually moves forward, and what can we do, how can we ensure that 

the Yemeni Government has—by the way, I was in Yemen last 

year and just for a brief period. It was like a 24 hours, but how 

can we help ensure that they, you know, run the program correctly, 

they have the resources, and that these guys aren’t either taken 

out of prison or released prematurely? 

Ms. LEAF. Congressman, those are all issues that we are looking 

at in detail. We are—we would be quite concerned to see that any 

such program is sustainable and is sound. And that is why we, the 

Yemenis will rely principally on UNICRI to lead this effort. There 

will undoubtedly be funding needs, but it will be, to say the least, 

it would be a very methodical effort and one that we will carefully 

evaluate before moving ahead. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, and then just briefly to touch on Bahrain, 

what are the benefits, and I am supportive of it. I just want to hear 

22

it from your end. What are the benefits of having the Fifth Fleet 

headquartered in Bahrain? 

Ms. LEAF. Well, the Fifth Fleet has been there for decades, as 

you know, and the Bahrainis have provided a level of support and 

access to necessary facilities that is really unparalleled. They have 

also been ready and able participants in both exercises for our fleet 

as well as partners in security operations going back to Desert 

Storm, and most recently in Afghanistan, where they provided security forces to guard our forces in the Helmand Province. It is a 

longstanding relationship. It is, as I say, they have been unstinting 

in their support for our needs there, that spanned, you know, the 

spectrum of the CENTCOM AOR. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, great. 

I yield back, thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Now I am pleased to yield to Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Just a couple of questions. I was also in Yemen about a year ago, 

I guess, and we actually went to another country prior to that and 

in the air we learned that over 100 troops had been killed on parade grounds and an explosion, and I don’t know if we were still 

going to come. We did. But the concern I guess a lot of us have at 

this point, is how is the vetting now amongst those types of things 

compared to back then? I mean, these were actually, to my recollection they were a number of people that were either troops, or 

dressed up as troops. I think they were troops that had actually 

been responsible for the explosion. And my recollection is it was 

like 100-plus killed and 200-plus wounded. I don’t remember if it 

was a graduation ceremony, but it was something, you know, somewhat festive occasion, so it hit the country extremely hard, and so 

anything you would like to comment on that, or anything following 

that, I would be interested. 

Ms. LEAF. It indeed was a shocking incidence of AQAP’s ability 

to reach in and strike, and indeed, over these past months, what 

we have seen is after a period last year when the government essentially pushed AQAP out of pieces of the south that it was essentially holding territory, what you have got now is a more dispersed 

AQAP that focuses on sort of guerilla tactics and asymmetrical attacks against Yemeni forces. 

You know, I wish there were a silver-bullet approach to this. 

There isn’t. We know it. The Yemenis know it. It requires a very 

methodical kind of capacity building across both conventional 

forces as well as more elite units, and that is something that we 

are engaged in as well as the range of traditional professional military education tools and so forth. But it is something we really 

have bitten into and that we are very committed to. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you, and my second question relative 

to Yemen is, you just touched on it, and that is that at the time, 

there were pretty significant portions of the southern part of the 

country that were under AQAP’s control, and they have had some 

success there, but success also sometimes breeds other difficulties, 

and that is the dispersal in other areas. Could you discuss the 

greater challenges that faces and what we are doing to assist the 

23

Yemenis in battling AQAP in its current form rather than when it 

was in a certain area? 

Ms. LEAF. I think if you would allow me, I would like to default 

to a restricted setting on that. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right, that is fine. That is fine. Thank you. Let 

me shift over to Bahrain just for a moment then. And they are obviously in relatively close proximity to Iran, as the other Gulf 

states are, and they are very wary of Iran, and in the recent things 

which almost occurred in Geneva, I am just wondering what the 

administration is hearing from some of those countries that are 

very close relative to possible loosening of the sanctions on nuclear 

weapons with respect to Iran in return for at least concessions on 

paper on moving in the other direction on the nuclear program? 

Are we hearing concerns from those countries, especially Bahrain? I would assume that we are. 

Ms. LEAF. Thank you, Congressman. 

We are engaged in sort of a constant rolling conversation with 

the Gulf countries, including Bahrain, on these issues. And in September, on the margins of the U.N., we had the third session of the 

US–GCC strategic cooperation forum, and that was a forum in 

which we talked in detail about their anxiety levels, which are 

longstanding. This is not new. Bahrain, as you say, has some more 

acute concerns, especially given sort of the historically irredentist 

tendencies of Iran vis-a`-vis Bahrain and the tendency to direct 

problematic broadcasting in Bahrain. 

But we have used not only that form but very high level conversations on a very ongoing basis, including Secretary Kerry’s 

most recent trip through the Gulf, to reaffirm the depth of our commitment to their security, one and all, including Bahrain. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Gosh, I am thinking all my answers are going to be 

in a classified setting. 

Do you believe, Ms. Leaf, that al-Qaeda in that area has been 

decimated? 

Ms. LEAF. I can only refer—I can only repeat exactly what the 

President said in May. It is the most active affiliate targeting and 

plotting against the homeland. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you hazard—well, let me put it this way. You 

are getting help—we are getting help from the FBI and the CIA 

actively engaged I am assuming. 

Ms. LEAF. Uh-huh. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, would you hazard a guess as to how many alQaeda fighters there are in both of those countries? 

Ms. LEAF. I wouldn’t in this setting, you are absolutely right. But 

I would be happy to look for that and get it to you in a——

Mr. WEBER. Okay, a lot of workers, Yemeni workers kicked out. 

Of course, the Saudis announced they were halting aid and kicking 

out workers. There is a strain between us and the Saudis over 

what is going on in the peace process. 

Do you think, is that a good, is that a fair and accurate assessment? Do you think that is why it is happening? 

24

Ms. LEAF. Actually, I would like to correct a misapprehension 

here. The Saudis are not halting aid. In fact, I discussed a range 

of assistance issues with them when I was there this past week, 

and they are actually acceding to some additional bilateral requests 

that the Yemeni Government made recently. 

The worker issue is a separate one, and it is part of a larger 

push to essentially legalize all workers in the country. Obviously, 

and the Yemenis raised this with me, the Yemeni Government 

raised their concerns about the economic effect of these workers 

coming back. 

What I heard back from the Saudis was they were in no way targeting the Yemenis. They do want everybody to regularize, and 

they said it obviously behooves them and the Yemeni Government 

to have a more structured discussion of that. So I think that would 

be—that is something we will encourage. 

Mr. WEBER. So, in your discussion, you are not hearing any mention of the peace process going on between John Kerry about the 

sanctions with Iran? 

Ms. LEAF. Oh, you mean with the Saudis? 

Mr. WEBER. Uh-huh. 

Ms. LEAF. No. No. No that was, I mean the——

Mr. WEBER. I am talking about you personally. 

Ms. LEAF. Of course. I mean, I didn’t discuss the peace process. 

I discussed the range of regional issues with the Saudis when I was 

there last week. 

Mr. WEBER. And they tied it to the peace process, which you 

didn’t discuss? 

Ms. LEAF. No. No. They did not. 

Mr. WEBER. They did not tie it to the peace process? 

Ms. LEAF. No. 

Mr. WEBER. So they didn’t raise that concern about our apparent 

path to easing the sanctions on Iran? They have not raised that 

with you. 

Ms. LEAF. No. They had a full, full discussion of that between the 

king and Secretary Kerry as well as other cabinet ministers, yes. 

Mr. WEBER. And US aid to Yemen has spread across a number 

of different program areas. Two questions. Is all of our aid getting 

marked? When we send aid into a country, USA, there has been 

some discussion about taking off our stamp so that some of the insurgents won’t go right at it or the people receiving it. Are we experiencing that in those countries? 

Ms. LEAF. Let me get back to you. I don’t believe so, but let me 

get back to you on that, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, then a follow-up question is, you may or may 

not know the answer is, of those programs, which one is yielding 

us the best bang for the buck? 

Ms. LEAF. In Yemen, I would say without question the support 

that we have provided to the national dialogue; technical expertise, 

mentoring of delegates, you know, legal and other expertise provided to help them shape their discussions. 

Mr. WEBER. And you may have answered this question earlier, 

and that is we are seeing, I am hoping or I am guessing we are 

seeing heightened awareness of security concerns in that area? In 

25

other words, we don’t want to repeat a Benghazi, obviously. So 

what is being done to prevent that? 

Ms. LEAF. In terms of our mission in Sana’a, yes. No, we have 

an extraordinarily robust set of security arrangements there for our 

mission and for the facility where our people are housed. And I 

would obviously not want to go into those in detail here. We are 

doing enhancements that build on others of the last couple of years, 

but security is front and center for us there. 

Mr. WEBER. Madam Chair, I yield to the classified setting. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And we do look forward to maybe 

having a session with you in a classified setting in order to answer 

Mr. Weber’s——

Ms. LEAF. Absolutely. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Concerns and others. 

I just have one last question, and I will have Mr. Deutsch ask 

one last question as well. 

As we speak, Senator Kelly Ayotte is presenting an amendment 

to the NDAA bill prohibiting the U.S. from any transfers of GTMO 

detainees to Yemen or to the United States. 

Do you care to comment on that amendment? 

Ms. LEAF. Well, I can only affirm—reaffirm the President’s policy 

on this which is to see a closure, an eventual closure of the facility. 

As to the issue of returning Yemeni nationals, detainees to Yemen, 

obviously, that is part of the closure of the facility. We have, as I 

indicated, a very thorough understanding of the challenges that relate to doing so, and we would only do so in a very careful, methodical fashion that would be in our national security interests. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you ma’am, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you. 

The remaining questions I have I would also like to ask in a classified setting. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So we look forward to doing that. 

And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

Thank you to our Capitol Police officers. 

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(27)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

28

f


85640n.eps

SlJBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

November 12, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

AfIairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, to be held in Room 

2172 of the Rayburn House Otnce Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

}y}'!Yv.foreignaffairs.house gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Tuesday, November 19, 2013 

2:30 p.m. 

US Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula: Yemen and Bahrain 

Ms. Barbara Leaf 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Arabian Peninsula 

US Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 
29


85640m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMlTTEE ON JIEARJNG 

Day' __ ~T,-"",Ie",s",da"'!L' __ Date ___ -'-I"'JI'-'I-"9'-''/J'''3'----_~Roorn ___ _''2_'_1"'72''__ __ _ 

Starting Time ~...llL-Endillg Time 3:33 p.111. 

Recesses __ L-to---.J ~to __ ) ~«) ---.J ~I() __ ) ~to __ ) ~io __ ) 

Presiding Member(,) 

Chaimtan Ros-Lehtfnl?-n (FL) 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session IZl Executive (closed) Session D Televised [Z] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recorded (taped) IZl 

Stenographic Record [Z] 

U.S. Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula: Yemen and Bahrain 

SunCO\1MlTTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

(See attached) 

NOI'\-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark IFitn an * ((,hey are nol members offilll committee,) 

HEAIHNG \VITNll:SSfl:S: Same as met'ting noti(.·t~ attached? Yes W No 0 

(If "no ", please list belmv' und inciw1e fitle, ogeney, depamnent, ar organization) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Li,,' wrY,IIC/leme"'I' submitled!or the record) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIl'>IE ADJOtffiNED 3:33p.m. 
30

Æ


85640m-2.eps

Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Titk U.S. Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula: Yemen and Bahrain 

Date: 111 19113 

NOllcommittee Members 

Member Present Member 

Ros-Lehtinen, Tleana (FL) X Deutch, Ted (FL) 

Chabot, Steve (OH) X Connolly, Gerald (VA) 

Wilson, Joe (SC) Higgins, Brian (N Y) 

Kinzinger, Adam (IL) X Cicilline, David (RJ) 

Cotton, Tom (AR) X 

Grayson, Alan (F L) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) 

Weber, Randy (TX) X 

Schneider, Bradley (IL) 

Desanti s, Ron (FL) Kennedy, Joseph (MA) 

Radel, Trey (FL) Meng, Grace (NY) 

Collins, Doug (GA) Frankel, Lois (FL) 

Meadows, Mark (NC) 

Yoho, Ted (FL) X 

Messer, Luke (TN) 

Present 

X 

X 

X 

X