2019 WI 62 

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2017AP1269 

COMPLETE TITLE: John Teske, Julie A. Teske, Katherine Teske and 

Elle Teske, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

United HealthCare Insurance Company, 

 Subrogated Party-Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, 

 Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 832,917 N.W.2d 233 

 (2018 – unpublished) 

OPINION FILED: June 4, 2019 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: March 18, 2019 

SOURCE OF APPEAL: 

 COURT: Circuit 

 COUNTY: Fond du Lac 

 JUDGE: Peter L. Grimm 

 

JUSTICES: 

 CONCURRED: 

 DISSENTED: 

 NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate. 

 

ATTORNEYS: 

For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 

filed by Corrado Cirillo and Olsen, Kloet, Gunderson & Conway, 

Sheboygan. There was an oral argument by Corrado Cirillo. 

For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 

Keith E. Trower and Warshafsky, Rotter, Tarnoff & Bloch, S.C., 

Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Keith E. Trower. 
2019 WI 62

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2017AP1269 

(L.C. No. 2016CV500) 

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT 

John Teske, Julie A. Teske, Katherine Teske and 

Elle Teske, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

United HealthCare Insurance Company, 

 Subrogated Party-Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, 

 Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 

FILED 

JUN 4, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed in 

part, reversed in part.

¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, Wilson Mutual 

Insurance Company (Wilson), seeks review of an unpublished 

decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's 

order that determined the Teskes' claims were barred by the 
No. 2017AP1269 

2 

doctrine of claim preclusion.1 Wilson contends that the circuit 

court correctly dismissed the Teskes' claims because the claims 

could have been brought in a prior action between the same 

parties. 

¶2 Specifically, Wilson asserts that claim preclusion 

applies to bar all of the plaintiffs' claims because all three 

elements of claim preclusion are established. It contends that 

the parties to the first and second actions were the same, or 

were in privity. Wilson argues next that identity of causes of 

action is present because the claims in this lawsuit and the 

previous lawsuit arose from the same common nucleus of operative 

facts. Finally, it advances that there was a final judgment on 

the merits in the first action. 

¶3 We conclude that claim preclusion bars the claims 

brought by Julie, Katherine, and Elle Teske in this second 

action. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the decision of 

the court of appeals that allowed their claims to proceed. 

However, we are evenly divided as to whether claim preclusion 

bars the claims brought by John Teske. As a result, we affirm 

 

1 Teske v. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2017AP1269, unpublished 

slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 9, 2018) (reversing order of the 

circuit court for Fond du Lac County, Peter L. Grimm, Judge). 
No. 2017AP1269 

3 

the court of appeals' decision that allowed John's claims to 

proceed.2

I 

¶4 This case arises from a car accident in Fond du Lac 

County on November 24, 2013. The underlying facts of the 

accident are undisputed. 

¶5 Emily Teske was driving a vehicle in which her mother, 

Julie, and two sisters, Katherine and Elle, were passengers. 

John Teske, Julie's husband and Emily, Katherine and Elle's 

father, was not in the car. Julie, Emily, Katherine, and Elle 

were all seriously injured after their vehicle was rear-ended by 

a car driven by Sabrina Srock. The force of the collision 

propelled the Teskes' car into the oncoming lane, where it 

struck a vehicle driven by Patrice Rog, who was also injured. 

¶6 Srock carried an automobile insurance policy with 

State Farm that provided a policy limit of $100,000 per person 

and $300,000 per accident. The Teskes carried a policy with 

Wilson, which as relevant here contained underinsured motorist 

(UIM) coverage with a policy limit of $500,000 per person, per 

accident. Importantly, the Wilson policy also incorporated a 

"reducing clause" which "permits a setoff from the insured's UIM 

 

2 See Wingra Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Burial Sites Preservation 

Bd., 2018 WI 54, ¶1, 381 Wis. 2d 601, 912 N.W.2d 392 ("The 

decision of the court of appeals is affirmed by an equally 

divided court."); Gruhl Sash & Door Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. 

Ry. Co., 173 Wis. 215, 180 N.W. 845 (1921) (explaining that when 

the court is equally divided, the order appealed from is 

affirmed). 
No. 2017AP1269 

4 

coverage [in] the amount paid to the insured by the underinsured 

tortfeasor."3

¶7 The accident resulted in two separate lawsuits. In 

the first action, Julie Teske brought a negligence claim against 

Srock and her insurer, State Farm, in Milwaukee County circuit 

court.4 Katherine and Elle were also named as plaintiffs, 

although as minors they were represented by a guardian ad litem. 

¶8 Pursuant to a minor settlement agreement,5 the parties 

settled the lawsuit and agreed how the money from the various 

insurers would be split. State Farm tendered its $300,000 

policy limit, but the amount was insufficient to cover the full 

medical expenses incurred by Rog and the Teskes. The amount was 

ultimately split between the Teskes and Rog, with the Teskes 

receiving $255,000 and Rog receiving $45,000. 

¶9 Applying the policy's reducing clause, Wilson agreed 

to pay the Teskes $245,000. It arrived at this amount by 

 

3 Dowhower ex rel. Rosenberg v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 

2000 WI 73, ¶1, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557. 

4 The Honorable David Hansher presided. 

5 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.10(1) (2013-14), 

A compromise or settlement of an action or proceeding 

to which a minor or individual adjudicated incompetent 

is a party may be made by the guardian, if the 

guardian is represented by an attorney, or the 

guardian ad litem with the approval of the court in 

which such action or proceeding is pending. 

All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 

2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2017AP1269 

5 

beginning with its $500,000 UIM policy limit and subtracting the 

$255,000 the Teskes received from State Farm. 

¶10 Each member of the Teske family received proceeds from 

the insurance settlement as set forth in the minor settlement 

agreement. Specifically, Julie received $264,000, Katherine 

received $40,000, Elle and Emily received $35,000 each, and John 

received $20,000. 

¶11 Also incorporated into the minor settlement agreement 

was a "Pierringer Release."6 Pursuant to the Pierringer Release, 

the Teskes released all of their claims against Srock and State 

Farm. The Teskes partially released Wilson to the extent of the 

$245,000 it paid. However, they explicitly "reserved the right 

to pursue further claims for UIM benefits against [Wilson] and 

[Wilson] has not waived any defenses to such future claims." 

The minor settlement agreement was signed by each member of the 

Teske family,7 as well as a representative of Wilson, and 

approved by the circuit court. 

 

6 "A Pierringer release operates as a satisfaction of that 

portion of the plaintiff's cause of action for which the 

settling joint tortfeasor is responsible, while at the same time 

reserving the balance of the plaintiff's cause of action against 

a nonsettling joint tortfeasor." Imark Indus., Inc. v. Arthur 

Young & Co., 148 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989); see 

Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 184-85, 124 N.W.2d 106 

(1963). It provides that the plaintiff "will assume or satisfy 

that portion of the liability that is determined to be the 

responsibility of the settling joint tortfeasor." Imark Indus., 

148 Wis. 2d at 621. 

7 Although they were not named parties in the lawsuit, Emily 

and John each signed the minor settlement agreement, under which 

each received the stated proceeds. See supra, ¶10. 
No. 2017AP1269 

6 

¶12 After releasing Srock and State Farm, Julie, 

Katherine, and Elle amended their complaint and added Wilson as 

a defendant. At issue in this amended declaratory action was 

whether the reducing clause in the Wilson policy was properly 

applied. Venue was transferred to Sheboygan County, and the 

Sheboygan County circuit court8 determined that the reducing 

clause was unambiguous, valid, and applicable. Julie, 

Katherine, and Elle appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. 

Teske ex rel. Harding v. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. (Teske I), No. 

2015AP208, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2015). 

The same three Teskes petitioned for review, which this court 

denied, thus ending the first action. 

¶13 Following the resolution of the first action, John, 

Julie, Katherine, and Elle brought this second lawsuit. They 

alleged that Emily, as the driver at the time of the accident, 

was negligent in the operation of the Teske vehicle. However, 

they sued Wilson directly as Emily's insurer pursuant to 

Wisconsin's direct action statute.9

 

8 The Honorable Angela W. Sutkiewicz presided. 

9 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.24, the "direct action" statute, 

"provides that any liability policy covering negligence makes 

the insurance company liable to the person entitled to recover 

against the insured up to policy limits. Under the direct 

action statute, the complaining party may allege the insured's 

conduct, and the insurer's liability therefor, directly against 

the insurer." Estate of Otto v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 

Inc., 2008 WI 78, ¶32, 311 Wis. 2d 84, 751 N.W.2d 805. The 

statute provides: 

Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to 

others for negligence makes the insurer liable, up to 

(continued) 
No. 2017AP1269 

7 

¶14 Moving for summary judgment, Wilson argued that the 

Teskes' negligence action was barred by the doctrine of claim 

preclusion. Focusing on the first two elements of claim 

preclusion, identity of parties and identity of causes of 

action, it asserted that there was identity between the parties 

in both lawsuits. It based this argument on the observation 

that Wilson, Julie, Katherine and Elle were all named plaintiffs 

in the first action. Wilson also observed that although John 

was not formally named a party in the first action, he 

participated and received proceeds from the minor settlement 

agreement. 

¶15 Wilson also contended that there was identity between 

the causes of action in both lawsuits. Specifically, it argued 

that the actions arose from a single event——the November 24, 

2013 accident.10

 

the amounts stated in the bond or policy, to the 

persons entitled to recover against the insured for 

the death of any person or for injury to persons or 

property, irrespective of whether the liability is 

presently established or is contingent and to become 

fixed or certain by final judgment against the 

insured. 

§ 632.24. 

10 Wilson did not make a specific argument regarding the 

third element of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the 

merits, other than to assert that "[t]here is no dispute that 

the Sheboygan County Circuit Court entered a final judgment on 

the merits dismissing the Teskes' prior lawsuit." 
No. 2017AP1269 

8 

¶16 The circuit court agreed with Wilson and granted the 

motion for summary judgment. It determined that "there is no 

dispute as to the technical identity between the parties given 

the captions and pleadings of the suits and the involvement of 

the parties in the litigation and the minor settlement and 

executing documents and such." 

¶17 Additionally, the circuit court concluded that there 

was an identity of the causes of action in the first and second 

lawsuits, explaining: "The methodology or the phraseology 

refers to a concept of a transaction which has a natural 

grouping of a common nucleus of operative facts, and here the 

facts are all consistent about the horrific accident on November 

24th, 2013, on Highway 23 near Mount Calvary." Finally, it 

determined that a final judgment on the merits had been reached. 

Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that claim preclusion 

barred the second action. 

¶18 The Teskes appealed, and the court of appeals 

reversed. Teske v. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. (Teske II), No. 

2017AP1269, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 9, 2018). 

Contrary to the circuit court, the court of appeals determined 

that claim preclusion did not bar the second action. It 

reasoned that "[t]he current tort action involves litigation of 

different facts and legal theories, specifically the facts of 

the accident versus the interpretation of whether the reducing 

clause in Wilson's policy applied." Id., ¶9. As opposed to the 

first action, which "was a contract action . . . requir[ing] the 

court to interpret Wilson's UIM policy provisions[,]" the second 
No. 2017AP1269 

9 

action "will examine Emily's alleged negligence and, if any, 

whether her negligence was a cause of the Teskes' injuries." 

Id. 

¶19 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that 

"[t]he two actions involve neither a common 'nucleus of facts' 

nor legal question." Id. Thus in the court of appeals' view, 

"there is no requirement in law or equity requiring these 

distinctly separate claims to be litigated together." Id. 

II 

¶20 We are asked to review the court of appeals' decision 

concluding that claim preclusion does not bar the Teskes' second 

action. Whether claim preclusion applies under a given factual 

scenario is a question of law we review independently of the 

determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 

appeals. Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Thompson, 2018 WI 57, 

¶28, 381 Wis. 2d 609, 912 N.W.2d 364. 

¶21 This question arises in the context of a motion for 

summary judgment. We similarly review a summary judgment 

determination independently, without deference to the circuit 

court or court of appeals. Shugarts v. Mohr, 2018 WI 27, ¶17, 

380 Wis. 2d 512, 909 N.W.2d 402. Summary judgment is 

appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Id. 
No. 2017AP1269 

10 

III 

¶22 To determine whether claim preclusion bars this second 

action, we address each of the three elements of claim 

preclusion with respect to the facts of this case. 

¶23 "The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that a 

final judgment on the merits in one action bars parties from 

relitigating any claim that arises out of the same relevant 

facts, transactions or occurrences." Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 

2005 WI 43, ¶19, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879 (citations 

omitted). Pursuant to claim preclusion, "a final judgment is 

conclusive in all subsequent actions between the same parties as 

to all matters which were litigated or which might have been 

litigated in the former proceedings." Lindas v. Cady, 183 

Wis. 2d 547, 558, 515 N.W.2d 458 (1994) (quoting DePratt v. West 

Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306, 310, 334 N.W.2d 883 

(1983)). 

¶24 Claim preclusion is "designed to draw a line between 

the meritorious claim on the one hand and the vexatious, 

repetitious and needless claim on the other hand." N. States 

Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995) 

(quoting Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 689-90 (3d Cir. 

1985)). The doctrine "provides an effective and useful means to 

establish and fix the rights of individuals, to relieve parties 

of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, to conserve 

judicial resources, to prevent inconsistent decisions, and to 

encourage reliance on adjudication." Kruckenberg, 279 

Wis. 2d 520, ¶20 (citations omitted). It further recognizes 
No. 2017AP1269 

11 

that "endless litigation leads to chaos; that certainty in legal 

relations must be maintained; that after a party has had his day 

in court, justice, expediency, and the preservation of the 

public tranquility requires that the matter be at an end." Id. 

(citations omitted). 

¶25 Three elements are required to establish the 

application of claim preclusion to bar an action: (1) an 

identity between the parties or their privies in the prior and 

present lawsuits; (2) an identity of the causes of action in the 

two lawsuits; and (3) a final judgment on the merits in a court 

of competent jurisdiction. N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 

551. We address each in turn. 

A 

¶26 We begin our claim preclusion analysis by addressing 

the first element, identity between the parties or their privies 

in the prior and present lawsuits. Id. 

¶27 This court has previously stated that there is an 

identity of parties when the parties are "for the most part, 

identical." Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen, 2007 WI 82, ¶28, 302 

Wis. 2d 41, 734 N.W.2d 855 (citing Sopha v. Owens-Corning 

Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, ¶48 n.28, 601 N.W.2d 627 

(1999)). For example, case law provides that this element is 

met when the two actions involve a closely-held corporation in 

one case and its principal shareholder in the other. 

Wickenhauser, 302 Wis. 2d 41, ¶29 n.12 (citing Manu-Tronics, 

Inc. v. Effective Mgnt. Sys., Inc., 163 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 471 

N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1991)). Similarly, an owner of property 
No. 2017AP1269 

12 

and a successor in interest to that property are in privity for 

purposes of claim preclusion. Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 

¶23. 

¶28 With regard to the claims made by Julie, Katherine, 

and Elle, we need not reach a privity analysis because identity 

of parties is distinctly present. Julie, Katherine, and Elle 

were named parties in both the first action and the present 

action. Likewise, Wilson was a named party in both actions. 

Thus, because Julie, Katherine, Elle, and Wilson were all named 

parties in the two actions, identity of parties exists with 

respect to those named parties. 

¶29 However, we are equally divided as to whether the 

identity of parties element is met with regard to John. Thus, 

we affirm the court of appeals' decision that allowed John's 

claims to proceed. 

B 

¶30 We turn next to address the second element of claim 

preclusion, identity of the causes of action in the two 

lawsuits. See N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 551. Because 

we are equally divided as to whether the first element of claim 

preclusion is met with regard to John, we need only address the 

second element with respect to the claims made by Julie, 

Katherine, and Elle. 

¶31 For purposes of determining whether there is an 

identity of causes of action in two lawsuits, Wisconsin has 
No. 2017AP1269 

13 

adopted the "transactional approach" set forth in the 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982).11 Menard, Inc. v. 

Liteway Lighting Prods., 2005 WI 98, ¶30, 282 Wis. 2d 582, 698 

N.W.2d 738. The transactional approach "reflects the 

expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present 

their entire controversies shall in fact do so." Kruckenberg, 

279 Wis. 2d 520, ¶27 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Pursuant to this analysis, "all claims arising out of one 

transaction or factual situation are treated as being part of a 

single cause of action and they are required to be litigated 

together." A.B.C.G. Enters., Inc. v. First Bank Se., N.A., 184 

Wis. 2d 465, 480-81, 515 N.W.2d 904 (1994) (quoting Parks v. 

City of Madison, 171 Wis. 2d 730, 735, 492 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 

1992)). 

 

11 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) provides: 

(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an 

action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to 

the rules of merger or bar (see §§ 18, 19), the claim 

extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to 

remedies against the defendant with respect to all or 

any part of the transaction, or series of connected 

transactions, out of which the action arose. 

(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", 

and what groupings constitute a "series", are to be 

determined pragmatically, giving weight to such 

considerations as whether the facts are related in 

time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form 

a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment 

as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or 

business understanding or usage. 
No. 2017AP1269 

14 

¶32 The concept of a "transaction" connotes a natural 

grouping or common nucleus of operative facts. Menard, Inc., 

282 Wis. 2d 582, ¶30 (citations omitted). "In determining if 

the claims of an action arise from a single transaction, we may 

consider whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, 

or motivation." Id. 

¶33 Relying on this second element of the claim preclusion 

analysis, the court of appeals determined that claim preclusion 

does not bar the Teskes' second lawsuit. It concluded that 

despite the fact that the claims in both lawsuits arose from the 

November 24, 2013 car accident, the requirement of identity of 

causes of action was not fulfilled. 

¶34 The court of appeals' reasoned that "[t]he current 

tort action involves litigation of different facts and legal 

theories, specifically the facts of the accident versus the 

interpretation of whether the reducing clause in Wilson's policy 

applied." Teske II, No. 2017AP1269, unpublished slip op., ¶9. 

"The current action will examine Emily's alleged negligence and, 

if any, whether her negligence was a cause of the Teskes' 

injuries." Id. In contrast, "[t]he prior action was a contract 

action, which required the court to interpret Wilson's UIM 

policy provisions." Id. 

¶35 We disagree with the court of appeals. Contrary to 

the court of appeals' conclusion, we determine that the causes 

of action in both lawsuits arise from a common nucleus of 

operative facts——namely, the November 24, 2013 car accident. 
No. 2017AP1269 

15 

¶36 The court of appeals' error originates in its approach 

of examining the legal theories presented in the two actions 

rather than the underlying facts. Following a transactional 

analysis, "it is irrelevant that 'the legal theories, remedies 

sought, and evidence used may be different between the first and 

second actions.'" Menard, Inc., 282 Wis. 2d 582, ¶32 (quoting 

Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, ¶26). Rather, "[t]he goal in the 

transactional approach is to see a claim in factual terms and to 

make a claim coterminous with the transaction, regardless of the 

claimant's substantive theories or forms of relief, regardless 

of the primary rights invaded, and regardless of the evidence 

needed to support the theories or rights." Kruckenberg, 279 

Wis. 2d 520, ¶26. 

¶37 With our lens properly focused on the facts instead of 

the legal theories, it is apparent that the claims made in both 

the first and second actions arise from the same factual 

circumstances surrounding the November 24, 2013 car accident. 

Although the court of appeals viewed the UIM issue in the first 

action as separate and distinct from the tort claim in the 

second action, without an underlying tort there can be no UIM 

claim. 

¶38 This court's decision in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co. v. Gillette, 2002 WI 31, ¶31, 251 Wis. 2d 561, 641 

N.W.2d 662, sheds light on the connection between a UIM claim 

based on contract and the tort claim that necessarily underlies 

a UIM claim. It explained: "A claim against the insurance 

company for underinsured motorist coverage is 'an action on the 
No. 2017AP1269 

16 

policy and sounds in contract,' although an underlying tortious 

injury is also involved." Id., ¶25 (citing Sahloff v. W. Cas. & 

Sur. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 70, 171 Wis. 2d 914 (1969)). 

¶39 As the Gillette court highlighted, "[w]hen an insured 

sues an insurance company for underinsured motorist coverage, 

contract law and tort law converge. Contract law applies to 

interpret the insurance policy, but an insured's right to 

underinsured motorist benefits hinges on the existence of a tort 

cause of action against the underinsured motorist." Id., ¶31. 

¶40 Although the tort cause of action here is against 

Emily Teske, and the tort underlying the UIM case was that 

committed by Srock, the two alleged torts arose as part of the 

same car accident, i.e. the same common nucleus of operative 

facts. Thus, the negligence claim against Emily could have been 

litigated in the first action. See Menard, 282 Wis. 2d 582, 

¶55. We therefore conclude that the second element of claim 

preclusion, identity of causes of action, is fulfilled. 

C 

¶41 Finally, we address the third element of claim 

preclusion, a final judgment on the merits in a court of 

competent jurisdiction. See N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 

551. 

¶42 The parties exhaustively litigated the issue of 

whether the reducing clause in the Wilson policy applies. 

Initially, the Sheboygan County circuit court made a 

determination that the clause applies. This conclusion was 
No. 2017AP1269 

17 

affirmed by the court of appeals. After Julie, Katherine, and 

Elle petitioned for review, this court denied the petition. 

¶43 A final judgment was accordingly reached on the issue 

of whether the reducing clause in the Wilson policy applies. 

Such a final judgment has preclusive effect on all matters 

"which were litigated or which might have been litigated in the 

former proceedings." Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, ¶19. We 

thus conclude that the third element of claim preclusion is 

fulfilled. 

¶44 In sum, all three elements of claim preclusion are met 

with regard to Julie, Katherine, and Elle's claims against 

Wilson. We therefore conclude that claim preclusion bars the 

claims brought by Julie, Katherine, and Elle in this second 

action. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the decision of 

the court of appeals that allowed their claims to proceed. 

¶45 However, we are evenly divided as to whether claim 

preclusion bars the claims brought by John. As a result, we 

affirm the court of appeals' decision that allowed John's claims 

to proceed. 

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from 

participation. 
No. 2017AP1269 

1