IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

WILLIAM R. WRIGHT, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-409 

 Judge Economus 

 Magistrate Judge King 

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 

COMPANY, 

 

Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

I. Background 

Plaintiffs William R. Wright and Jayde Wright (“plaintiffs”) seek 

compensatory and punitive damages in connection with the refusal by 

defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“defendant”) to 

replace plaintiffs’ roof following a windstorm that occurred on 

February 28, 2011. First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”), 

Doc. No. 32, ¶ 13, p. 5; Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty 

Insurance Co.’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint 

(“Answer”), Doc. No. 33, ¶ 9. 

By virtue of their ownership of a residence in Muirfield Village, 

plaintiffs are members of the Muirfield Homeowners Association 

(“MHA”). Amended Complaint, ¶ 3; Answer, ¶ 2. The MHA imposes certain 

restrictions on members through the Muirfield Design Control 

Committee, which promulgated the Muirfield Design Standards. Amended 

Complaint, ¶ 5. One of the Muirfield Design Standards requires that 

“[a]ny roof that needs repair must be re-roofed in entirety. Partial 

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or patch roofing is not permitted.” Id. The MHA’s deed restrictions 

are recorded on the deed records of the Franklin County Recorder, and 

apply to plaintiffs’ home. Id. 

Plaintiffs purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy from 

defendant, effective for the period December 3, 2010 through December 

3, 2011, through the Mike McClaskie Agency, Inc. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 

2, 6; Answer, ¶ 6. The policy covers, inter alia, “accidental direct 

physical loss to the dwelling used principally as a private 

residence.” Amended Complaint, ¶ 9. 

Plaintiffs filed a claim for roof damage with defendant the day 

after the February 29, 2011 windstorm. Amended Complaint, ¶ 13; 

Answer, ¶ 9. Defendant sent plaintiffs a check in the amount of 

$747.03 for the repair of the roof damage. Amended Complaint, at ¶ 15; 

Answer, ¶ 11. 

Plaintiffs sought a waiver from the MHA that would allow 

plaintiffs to repair, not replace, the roof. Amended Complaint, ¶ 17; 

Answer, ¶ 13. Referring to the Muirfield Design Standards, the MHA 

denied this request. Id. Plaintiffs thereafter requested that 

defendant pay the $47,055.09 cost of replacing the roof. Amended 

Complaint, ¶¶ 18, 20. Defendant refused that request and then declined 

to renew plaintiffs’ homeowner’s insurance policy on the policy’s 

December 3, 2011 renewal date. Id. at ¶ 18. 

Plaintiffs filed this action in the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas and the action was thereafter removed to this Court on 

the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, Doc No. 1, p. 

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1. The Amended Complaint asserts claims of breach of contract, 

misrepresentation and bad faith. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 21-25. 

This matter is now before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Order Compelling Defendant to Produce Requested Documents and For 

Sanctions (“Motion to Compel”), Doc. No. 37. By that motion, 

plaintiffs ask that defendant be required to further respond to 

certain interrogatories and requests for production of documents. 

 II. Standard 

Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 

“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter 

that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1). Relevance for discovery purposes is extremely broad. Miller 

v. Fed. Express, Corp., 186 F.R.D. 376, 383 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). “The 

scope of examination permitted under Rule 26(b) is broader than that 

permitted at trial. The test is whether the line of interrogation is 

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence.” Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 500-01 (6th 

Cir. 1970) (citations omitted). Determining the proper scope of 

discovery falls within the broad discretion of the trial court. Lewis 

v. ACD Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). 

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a 

motion to compel discovery when a party fails to answer 

interrogatories submitted under Rule 33 or to provide proper response 

to requests for production of documents under Rule 34. The proponent 

of a motion to compel bears the burden of proving that the information 

sought is relevant. Gruenbaum v. Werner Enters., Inc., No. 2:09-CVCase: 2:12-cv-00409-PCE-NMK Doc #: 50 Filed: 05/09/13 Page: 3 of 12 PAGEID #: <pageID>
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0141, 270 F.R.D. 298, 302 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2010). The rule 

expressly provides that “an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, 

or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or 

respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). 

The party moving to compel discovery must certify, however, that 

it “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person 

or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to 

obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). See also

S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.2. This prerequisite has been met in this case. 

III. Discussion 

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel contends, first, that defendant’s 

response to Interrogatory No. 2 is inadequate. That interrogatory 

asks, “Did State Farm have knowledge of Muirfield’s deed restrictions 

on or before it issued” the policy? Id. at p. 2. In response, 

defendant, inter alia, referred to the deposition testimony of its 

claim team manager, Mike Seebauer, who conceded knowledge of 

Muirfield’s design standards prior to issuance of the policy. 

Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s Memorandum in 

Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order Compelling Defendant to 

Produce Requested Documents and for Sanctions and Defendant’s Request 

for Oral Hearing (“Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition”), Doc No. 40, 

Exhibit A, p. 2. 

Plaintiffs characterize this answer as evasive because it does 

not specify whether Seebauer’s knowledge of Muirfield’s design 

standards is imputable to State Farm. Motion to Compel, at pp. 2-3. 

Plaintiffs ask that this Court require defendant to answer “yes” or 

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“no” to the interrogatory. Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to 

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel (“Plaintiffs’ Reply”), Doc. No. 44, p. 4. 

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that it has provided truthful 

and complete factual information in response to the interrogatory; 

the legal significance of that information, defendant contends, is for 

plaintiffs to determine for themselves. Defendant’s Memorandum in 

Opposition, p. 3. 

Under Ohio law, an agent’s knowledge is imputed to the principal 

when the agent “is acting within the scope of his authority and in 

reference to a matter over which his authority extends . . . .” Fay 

v. Swicker, 154 Ohio St. 341, syllabus 1 (1950). See also Ford Motor 

Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 1982). Here, 

defendant’s admitted agent, Seebauer, testified that he had knowledge 

of Muirfield’s design restrictions. Defendant’s Memorandum in 

Opposition, Exhibit A, p. 2. However, Seebauer’s deposition testimony 

does not make clear in what capacity he obtained this knowledge and, 

considering the specificity and clarity of Interrogatory No. 2, 

plaintiffs are entitled to a specific and clear response to that 

interrogatory. As it relates to Interrogatory No. 2, the Motion to 

Compel is meritorious. 

Plaintiffs also characterize defendant’s response to 

Interrogatory No. 3 as inadequate. That interrogatory asks, “Did 

State Farm have knowledge as a result of any other claim against it 

since 2001 of roof damage in which a homeowner deed restriction 

required a roof to be replaced and not repaired?” Motion to Compel, p. 

4. Defendant answered, “While State Farm has paid for a number of wood 

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roof repairs in the Muirfield area, it has not paid to replace a roof 

when only a repair could have been made.” Defendant’s Memorandum in 

Opposition, Exhibit A. Plaintiffs contend that further response to 

Interrogatory No. 2 will require further response to Interrogatory No. 

3. Motion to Compel, p. 4. This Court disagrees. Interrogatory Nos. 2 

and 3 pose different queries. Because defendant’s answer to 

Interrogatory No. 3 is neither evasive nor incomplete, defendant need 

not further respond to that interrogatory. 

Document Request No. 2 of plaintiffs’ First Request for 

Production of Documents seeks production of “any and all documents by 

and between Agent Mike McClaskie, Insurance Agency Inc. and Defendant 

regarding homeowner insurance for Plaintiff.” Id., at 4. In response, 

defendant indicated that it possessed no such documents. Id., Exhibit 

A. Plaintiffs insist that there must be some documentation between 

McClaskie and defendant, considering that plaintiffs provided 

information to McClaskie and that defendant thereafter issued the 

insurance policy. Id. at p. 5. Plaintiffs also point to a piece of 

correspondence between defendant and plaintiffs which indicates that a 

copy was provided to the McClaskie Insurance Agency, Inc. Id.

In response, defendant clarifies that it is in possession of no 

documents between it and the Mike McClaskie Agency, Inc., that are not 

already in plaintiffs’ possession. Defendant’s Memorandum in 

Opposition, p. 5. In this regard, defendant notes that it has produced 

plaintiffs’ claims files as well as the underwriting file for 

plaintiffs’ policy, see id., at 2, and the record suggests that 

plaintiffs are in possession of correspondence between defendant and 

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plaintiffs, upon which the insurance agency was copied, as well as a 

copy of the application of insurance submitted by the Mike McClaskie 

Insurance Agency, Inc., to defendant. See Homeowners Application, 

attached to plaintiffs’ Memorandum Contra Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 45. 

Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the 

production of documents in the “possession, custody or control” of a 

party, assuming of course that the requested documents fall within the 

ambit of discoverable information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). The 

documents sought by Document Request No. 2 are indisputably 

discoverable and defendant neither alleges nor establishes that its 

production of such documents would be unreasonably burdensome. 

Although defendant has apparently determined that plaintiffs already 

possess these relevant documents, that determination is for plaintiffs 

to make. As it relates to Request No. 2 of plaintiffs’ First Request 

for Production of Documents, then, the Motion to Compel is 

meritorious. 

Plaintiffs’ Request No. 6 of plaintiffs’ First Request for 

Production of Documents seeks “[a]ny and all documents regarding 

underwriting of homeowner insurance for Plaintiff.” Motion to Compel, 

p. 6. In response, defendant produced computer screen print-outs 

characterized by defendants as plaintiffs’ entire underwriting file. 

Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition, p. 5. Plaintiffs insist that, 

in addition, they are entitled to the production of “the guidelines 

for underwriting homeowner insurance particularly as to procedures in 

accepting a new homeowner, pricing the policy, and other 

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considerations.” Id. at pp. 6-7. Assuming that such documents are 

possessed by defendant, this Court agrees that those documents are 

both relevant to the issues in the case and within the scope the 

document request. As it relates to Request No. 6 of plaintiffs’ First 

Request for Production of Documents, the Motion to Compel is 

meritorious. 

Request Nos. 8-10 of plaintiffs’ First Request for Production of 

Documents seek all documents regarding “homeowner policies issued to 

homeowners in Muirfield Village since 2000,” “homeowner claims of 

homeowners in Muirfield Village since 2000,” and “cancellation of 

homeowner policies of homeowners in Muirfield Village since 2000.” 

Motion to Compel, p. 7. Request No. 7 of plaintiffs’ Second Request 

for Production of Documents seeks all documents “regarding State Farm 

homeowner policies issued to homeowners in Muirfield Village that 

relate to homeowner claims for roof damage since 2000.” Plaintiffs’ 

Reply, p. 7. Plaintiffs argue that the requested documents are 

relevant to their bad faith claim against defendant: 

It appears possible that time after time, Defendant has 

taken advantage of other homeowners similarly situated to 

Plaintiffs’, [sic] and will continue to do so until someone 

like Plaintiffs’ [sic] challenges the practice. It appears 

that such documents might lead to further discoverable 

evidence. It also appears possible that Defendant has 

replaced roofs in some situations, but not others, and has 

done so in an arbitrary fashion. It is also possible that 

a class-action may be discovered. 

Motion to Compel, p. 7. Defendant maintains that these requests are 

not relevant to the issues in the case, are not reasonably calculated 

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and are overly 

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burdensome, overly broad and unlimited in scope. Defendant’s 

Memorandum in Opposition, p. 6. 

 As an initial matter, discovery relating to a possible class 

action and defendant’s alleged “tak[ing] advantage of other homeowners 

similarly situated to Plaintiffs[]”is simply not relevant to the 

claims presently asserted in this action. Second, the conclusory 

statement that the requested documents “might lead to further 

discoverable evidence” is simply not sufficient to establish that this 

document request falls within the ambit of discoverable information. 

However, plaintiffs’ suggestion that “Defendant has replaced roofs in 

some situations, but not others, and has done so in an arbitrary 

fashion,” see Motion to Compel, p. 7, is relevant to plaintiffs’ bad 

faith claim. 

 “[A]n insurer has the duty to act in good faith in the handling 

and payment of the claims of its insured.” Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. 

Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 276 (1983). “An insurer's lack of good faith 

in the processing of a claim is frequently referred to as ‘bad faith.’ 

Such conduct gives rise to a cause of action in tort against the 

insurer.” Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 91 Ohio St. 3d 209, 210 n.1 

(2001) (citing Hoskins, at syllabus). A bad faith claim does not, 

however, require allegation or proof of bad intent or malice. Zoppo v. 

Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St. 3d 552, 554-55 (1994). Rather, “[a]n 

insurer fails to exercise good faith in the processing of a claim of 

its insured where its refusal to pay the claim is not predicated upon 

circumstances that furnish reasonable justification therefor.” Id. 

“̔A lack of reasonable justification exists where an insurer refuses 

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to pay a claim in an arbitrary or capricious manner.’” Jenkins v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 11AP-1074, 2013 WL 1200246, at *8 

(Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. Mar. 26, 2013) (quoting Brown v. Nationwide 

Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 174 Ohio App. 3d 694 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 

2008)). 

 In arguing that documents related to all Muirfield Village 

homeowner insurance policies and claims are relevant, plaintiffs cite 

to Martin v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 143 Ohio App. 3d 332 (Ohio Ct. App. 

11th Dist. 2001), for the proposition that “[r]easonable justification 

can be considered in light of past practices.” Plaintiffs’ Reply, p. 

7. Martin does not, however, support plaintiffs’ argument because, 

among other reasons, the plaintiffs in Martin did not assert a claim 

of bad faith. See id., at 335. Plaintiffs have not cited any other 

authority for the proposition that defendant’s handling of other 

homeowner claims is relevant to whether defendant had “reasonable 

justification” to repair plaintiffs’ roof rather than replace it, and 

this Court has found no such authority.1

 Plaintiffs, who allege that 

defendant failed to renew their policy, see Amended Complaint, ¶ 19, 

have also not demonstrated how the “cancellation” of other homeowner 

policies is relevant to their bad faith claim. Accordingly, as it 

relates to Request Nos. 8-10 of plaintiffs’ First Request for 

																																																								

1 Notably, plaintiffs’ Memorandum Contra Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Doc. No. 45, argues that plaintiffs’ bad faith claim is premised 

only on defendant’s non-renewal of plaintiffs’ policy. See id. at pp. 11-14. 

Plaintiffs expressly preclude the possibility that their bad faith claim is 

premised on defendant’s refusal or delay in paying a claim. See id. at pp. 

13-14 (“In response to Defendant’s anticipated response that bad faith claims 

are limited to cases involving refusal to or delay in paying claims, 

Plaintiff’s [sic] submit that Ohio Courts have refused to limit insurers and 

consumers so narrowly.”).

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Production of Documents Request No. 7 of plaintiffs’ Second Request 

for Production of Documents, the Motion to Compel is without merit. 

 Finally, Request No. 6 of plaintiffs’ Second Request for 

Production of Documents seeks “̔[t]he complete files (both claims and 

trial) of Peter M. Klein, Plaintiff in the case of A Peter M. Klein v. 

State Farm Case No. 06-4155’ filed in the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, excluding 

objectionable privileged communications.” Motion to Compel, p. 8. 

Plaintiffs again argue that the requested documents are relevant to 

their bad faith claim. See id. (“Plaintiffs’ purpose in seeking the 

files is consistent with their reasons as stated above.”). As 

discussed supra, plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving 

that documents relating to other homeowner claims in Muirfield Village 

are relevant to plaintiffs’ bad faith claim. As it relates to Request 

No. 6 of plaintiffs’ Second Request for Production of Documents, the 

Motion to Compel is without merit. 

 Plaintiffs have also asked that they be awarded sanctions, 

including their attorney’s fees, in connection with the Motion to 

Compel. Defendant opposes plaintiffs’ request in this regard but does 

not seek affirmative relief on its own behalf. A court must 

ordinarily award a movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in filing a 

motion to compel, including attorney’s fees, if the motion to compel 

is granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Where, as here, the motion 

is granted in part and denied in part, a court is authorized to 

“apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

(a)(5)(C). A court has wide discretion in determining an appropriate 

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sanction under Rule 37. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey 

Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976); Regional Refuse Systems v. Inland 

Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1988). Considering that 

the parties prevailed in approximate equal degree, the Court concludes 

that an award of sanctions to either side would be inappropriate. 

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, 

Doc. No. 37, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant is 

ORDERED to supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 2 and to 

Document Request Nos. 2 and 6 of plaintiffs’ First Request for 

Production of Documents within seven (7) days of the date of this 

Opinion and Order. 

 Plaintiffs’ request for an award of sanctions is DENIED. 

May 9, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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