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Strategic Studies Institute

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U.S. Army War College Press

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

 ORGANIZATION AND LIBYA:

REVIEWING OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Florence Gaub

June 2013

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-579-8
iii

FOREWORD

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 

military action in Libya was a first in many ways—the Alliance’s first combat operation against an Arab country; 

the first time the United States “led from behind”; and 

the first time the concept of Responsibility to Protect was 

applied to support Libya’s civilian population against a 

murderous regime. The action is also considered, militarily speaking, a success, and has inspired confidence 

in those who were doubtful after the Alliance’s patchy 

Afghanistan experience.

In this monograph, Dr. Florence Gaub draws strategic lessons from the operation and points out how we 

can learn from NATO’s ways and improve its future 

ability and capacity to act in a similar situation. Her 

insights show that, while tactical lessons are learned 

easily, strategic ones are sometimes less obvious to draw.

Given the Middle East and North Africa’s current instability and uncertainty, Libya might not be the last time 

NATO is called to protect civilians; more importantly, 

the Libyan experience itself might not be over. In a time 

of strategic ambiguity and austerity measures, reviewing past actions is ever more important. Dr. Gaub makes 

clear in this monograph that while the Libya operation 

was a military success, its political outcome is yet to be 

determined. Where military planning is not followed by 

thorough post-conflict planning, the successes of the former might be easily supplanted by more challenges.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FLORENCE GAUB is a researcher in the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College’s Middle East Faculty. Her areas of interest include the Arab world, military sociology, post-conflict 

reconstruction, and intercultural communication. Previously, she has served as a research fellow in the German Parliament, focusing on issues of defense, internal 

security, and development. She has also held positions 

with the French Defense Ministry’s Research Centre 

in the Social Sciences of Defense (Centre d’études en 

sciences sociales de la defense), the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo, the Centre for Applied Policy 

Research in Munich, as well as with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research in New York, 

where she coordinated courses for diplomats posted 

at the United Nations. Gaub has conducted extensive 

field studies in Lebanon, Iraq, Nigeria, and BosniaHerzegovina. She has published several articles and 

two books on these topics, and has lectured widely 

with The NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany; 

Allied Joint Forces Command Naples; and several 

think tanks and universities in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. Dr. Gaub graduated from 

Sorbonne University in Paris, France, and the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, Germany. She 

holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science 

at Humboldt University of Berlin.

vii

SUMMARY

On March 17, 2011, 1 month after the beginning of 

the Libyan revolution and up to 2,000 civilians dead, 

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to back a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized 

“all necessary measures” to protect civilians. While 

France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, 

considerations to hand the mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days 

of the operation. On March 22, 2012, NATO agreed to 

enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, 

it announced it would take over all military aspects of 

UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. On March 31, 2012, 

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. For 

the first time in its history, NATO was at war with an 

Arab country.

OUP turned out to be one of NATO’s shorter, and 

seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated 

by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the 

regime of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, the 

mission had the aim to protect civilians from the air 

and sea. OUP has thus been described as a success—

a success NATO badly needed after its decade-long 

engagement in Afghanistan. However, the Libyan operation was not without its critics. Described as a “war 

of choice” rather than a “war of necessity,” it achieved 

its goals more by accident than by design, according 

to some commentators. Yet, the operation also exposed strategic shortcomings, which are analyzed in 

this monograph.

First, in the public appraisal of the operation, air 

power was seen as the crucial element in winning the 
conflict. This view is only partially correct; just as air 

power works best when integrated with land forces, 

NATO’s operation was, in part, decided by those forces engaged with the Libyan regime’s forces—although 

both forces were not truly integrated. Nevertheless, 

overestimating the impact of air power can mislead 

decisionmakers in future conflict.

Second, the operation exposed some flaws in 

NATO’s command structure, which was under reform when the conflict erupted. Joint Force Command 

Naples (JFC-Naples), in charge of the operation, was 

not properly equipped for an actual crisis of this dimension, but managed to improvise on a large scale. 

Third, the Alliance paid very little attention to 

Libya's cultural terrain. They had no cultural advisers on the staff of OUP—no one from Libya nor from 

any other Arab country. Also, there was no one who 

was familiar with the local conditions. The improvised advice OUP relied on turned out to be a failure; as officers involved in the campaign admitted, 

nobody predicted several of the turns the operation 

took. Given that the ground component was crucial to the mission’s success, cultural advice would 

have made an important contribution to the general 

understanding of the situation within Libya as the 

operation evolved.

Fourth, there was some disconnect between the legal and the political solution of the crisis. As the legal 

interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear, the operation did not seek to topple Qaddafi’s regime, let alone 

assassinate him. Its sole aim was the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and therefore 

it conformed to the norm of “Responsibility to Protect”; yet, against the backdrop of international political pressure, the Alliance’s neutrality and its agenda 

quickly became a point of discussion.

viii
ix

Fifth, the Libyan regime’s strategic communication proved to be a lot more resilient and creative than 

NATO’s strategic communication. It succeeded not 

only in recruiting a public relations firm for this purpose, but managed to escort BBC journalists into a 

hospital showing corpses of young children supposedly killed in NATO air strikes.

Last, but not least, the aftermath of NATO’s Libya 

operation was not planned at all, as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, even UN observers. As 

the regime’s security forces had virtually imploded, 

Libya’s security therefore fell into the hands of the 

multiple militias, which continued to proliferate after 

the conflict had ended. 

The euphoria over the end of a brutal regime, 

which lasted 4 decades in Libya, should not disguise the fact that the consequences of OUP are not 

yet fully visible. It would be a mistake to think that 

NATO’s Libya adventure ended with the drawdown 

of the military mission; whether the Alliance likes 

it or not, its reputation is at stake in Libya’s long 

reconstruction process.

1

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION AND LIBYA:

REVIEWING OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR

When demonstrators took to the streets of Tunis 

in January 2011, Libya’s de facto head of state Colonel Muammar Qaddafi appeared on state TV. He declared he was “in pain” about the removal of Tunisia 

President Ben Ali, and described the demonstrators as 

“led astray” by Wikileaks cables written “by Ambassadors to create chaos.”1

 His appearance expressed his 

concern, as that of many other dictators in the region, 

about a similar fate. Yet, it took another month and the 

toppling of Egypt’s President Mubarak for Libyans to 

engage in similar demonstrations, which began on 

February 16 in the Eastern city of Benghazi and quickly spread to other parts of the country.2

 Confronting 

police and armed forces, the civilian death toll rose 

dramatically within a few days.3 In a degree of violence surpassing that of its neighboring states by far, 

Libya’s security forces were accused of savagely attacking unarmed civilians. 

Qaddafi himself appeared on TV, calling on his 

supporters to hunt the “greasy rats” on drugs, “the 

dirt,” as he described the demonstrators.4

 Within days, 

Libya’s diplomatic staff at the United Nations (UN), 

the League of Arab States, as well as numerous other 

missions, resigned out of protest against the regime’s 

actions against civilians. Two weeks into the events, 

U.S. President Barack Obama called for Qaddafi’s resignation, while the International Criminal Court announced investigations into crimes against humanity 

committed by Qaddafi and his inner circle. While first 

calls for a no-fly zone emerged following the regime’s 

use of its air force against the protesters, France’s foreign minister Alain Juppe rejected such a move as: 
2

France, for its part, does not think that in the current 

circumstances military intervention, NATO forces, 

would be welcomed in the south of the Mediterranean 

and could be counterproductive.5

As the regime continued to crumble among highlevel defections, the self-proclaimed body representing the Libyan rebels, the National Transitional 

Council, called for the implementation of a no-fly 

zone as the clashes between government and rebel 

forces reached new and violent dimensions.6 The 

League of Arab States, which had already suspended 

Libyan membership 3 weeks earlier, supported this 

call.7 While regime forces marched onto the rebel city 

of Benghazi, Qaddafi declared that his forces would 

“show no mercy, and no pity” to the rebels.8 The next 

day, March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of 

the Libyan revolution and up to 2,000 civilians dead, 

the UN Security Council (UNSC) decided to back a 

no-fly zone over Libya and authorized “all necessary 

measures” to protect civilians.9 While France, Great 

Britain, and the United States took immediate military 

action using air and missile strikes, considerations 

to hand over to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. 

On March 22, 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms 

embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced 

it would take over all military aspects of the UNSC 

1973.10 On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. For the first time in its history, 

NATO was at war with an Arab country.

OUP turned out to be one of NATO’s shorter, and 

seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated 

by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the 
3

regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on 

peacefully demonstrating citizens, OUP had an aim to 

protect civilians from the air and sea. As the operation came to an end after 204 days and 26,323 sorties 

(including 9,658 strike sorties),11 3,124 vessels in the 

Mediterranean had been captured, Colonel Qaddafi’s 

regime had been toppled, and many civilian lives had 

probably been saved. OUP has thus been described as 

a success—a success NATO badly needed after its decade-long engagement in Afghanistan. However, the 

Libyan operation was not without its critics. Described 

as a “war of choice” rather than a “war of necessity,” 

OUP achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some commentators.12 The operation quickly highlighted tactical shortcomings, such 

as the lack of targets in a mission conducted solely 

from the air and sea, and made the need for improved 

intelligence sharing within the Alliance apparent. Yet, 

the operation also exposed strategic shortcomings that 

will be analyzed here. 

Overall, a balanced assessment of OUP’s impact 

will have to take into account Libya’s still uncertain 

future development and the impact of the crisis on 

regional security. As NATO has ceased all involvement in Libya as of October 31, 2011, it has not taken 

any role in the country’s post-conflict stabilization efforts. At the time of this writing, Libya was stable, yet 

showed increasing signs of instability, particularly in 

the security sector. Should Libya implode, this would 

have repercussions not only for future operations and 

post-conflict planning, but in particular for NATO’s 

potential involvement in out-of-area crises.

There are, by and large, six lessons the Alliance 

can draw from its Libya operation. These regard air 

power, its command structure, the understanding of 
4

culture, the interpretation of UNSC Resolution 1973, 

strategic communication, and NATO’s relations with 

the region in general.

Lesson 1: Do Not Draw the Wrong Conclusions 

Regarding Air Power.

OUP gave the impression to some commentators 

of being a “clean” conflict conducted solely from the 

air and sea, as specified by UNSC Resolution 1973 in 

the requirement that there be no “foreign occupation 

force of any form.”13 The implementation of the resolution’s three military elements—namely, the weapons embargo, the no-fly zone, as well as the “protection of civilians”—was therefore limited to air and 

naval power. Since the latter was largely used for the 

implementation of the maritime embargo, the decisive 

force used by NATO during the operation therefore 

was from the air. Two dimensions of the resolution 

were to be implemented from the air: the no-fly zone, 

of course, but also the protection of civilians—which 

was more vague than the other two military elements 

of the resolution and therefore offered more room for 

interpretation. This protection of civilians aspect was 

to become a point of contention later on.

Another point of discussion leading up to the operation was the question of kinetic action. For some 

Allies, such as Germany, military action in any form 

in Libya was simply not politically acceptable. For 

others, such as the United States, the extent of this action had legal implications. Since the U.S. President 

requires congressional approval to engage American 

forces in military action for longer than 60 days without a declaration of war according to the War Powers 

Resolution of 1973, the White House argued that the 

Libyan operation was not a war. 
5

U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of 

‘hostilities’ contemplated by the Resolution’s 60-day 

termination provision. U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition. . . . U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor 

do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, 

U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by those forces.14

Regardless of the interpretation of OUP’s military 

action, a point of contention before the operation was 

the Libyan air defense system. As its destruction was 

considered decidedly kinetic, initial debates at the 

political level sought the implementation of a no-fly 

zone without any such action. The idea, however, was 

quickly abandoned, as it became clear that the Libyan 

regime would not only not respect such a no-fly zone 

(as Iraq had done more or less from 1991 to 2003), but 

respond in full force. As then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said:

Let’s just call a spade a spade, a no-fly zone begins 

with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses. 

That’s the way you do a no-fly zone. And then you can 

fly planes around the country and not worry about our 

guys being shot down. But that’s the way it starts.15

In addition to the general political concern over the 

extent of the no-fly zone, there were also practical considerations, such as the large Libyan air space— which 

would be difficult to control—and the fact that Libyan 

helicopters would still be able to fly, since their use 

of low altitudes would make them more difficult to 

detect. This view was disputed by Air Force officers, 
6

who claimed not only that, given the limited number 

of helicopter staging areas in Libya, these would be 

easy to destroy, but also that Aim-9X Sidewinders, an 

air-to-air missile, could shoot them down easily.16 As 

the political pressure mounted, the operational plan 

for OUP finally included the neutralization of the air 

defense system, a task largely taken on by the United 

States, particularly before the handover to NATO.

Before the conflict, the Libyan air defense system 

was considered one of the most robust air defense networks in Africa, second only to Egypt’s. It included 

31 long-range surface-to-air missile sites and 17 radar 

sites along the country’s Mediterranean coast line, and 

was suspected to have been kept in shape after the 

U.S. attack in 1986—as a retaliation to Libyan support 

of international terrorism. At that time, Libyan antiaircraft fire set in only after the planes had entered 

Libyan airspace, but was heavy throughout the attack. 

One of 66 planes involved in the operation was lost.17

Prior to the 2011 conflict, the location of the air defense system was identifiable, but “the condition and 

effectiveness of the communications, command and 

control network linking those sites has proven more 

difficult to determine.”18 Although it was assumed 

that Libya relied on outdated Soviet equipment and 

that its system would ultimately be less sophisticated than the Iraqi one, this remained a question mark 

before the actual conflict began. Ultimately, the destruction of the Libyan air defense system, mostly by 

the United States in the early days of the operation, 

was less difficult than General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, had anticipated.19

Within days, Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander 

of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe, declared, “Gadhafi’s 

long-range air defenses and his air force 

largely ineffective.”20
7

Once the air defense system was largely neutralized, air power came to concentrate mostly on the 

government’s command-and-control system. The protection of civilians—particularly in Benghazi, which 

was under immediate threat when the UN resolution 

was adopted—became paramount, but as the mission 

moved on it also became more complex. The intricacies of an internal conflict came to be particularly 

difficult as defecting soldiers of the Libyan military 

took ground vehicles with them, making it impossible 

to distinguish them from the air from actual regime 

forces. Several air strikes were reported in which rebel 

convoys were mistakenly hit by NATO, especially in 

the beginning of the operation.21

After the handover from Operation ODYSSEY 

DAWN (during which the United States was significantly involved) to OUP, about two-thirds of the strike 

sorties were shouldered by France and Great Britain, 

the rest by Italy, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden 

(which is not a member of NATO), and Belgium.22 The 

United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Jordan, while 

participating with aircraft in the operation, remained 

in a supportive role.

NATO’s air campaign over Libya has been largely 

described as a success—having achieved its objectives 

without any casualties. However, the understandably 

widespread, yet mistaken, conclusion was that this offered an effective demonstration of how warfare will 

be in the future, finally making it possible to circumvent the “zero tolerance” that Western societies profess for casualties. Yet, this reasoning revives the air 

power debate, exemplified by these two quotes:
8

Once the command of the air is obtained by one of the 

contended armies, the war must become a conflict between a seeing host and one that is blind.

 H. G. Wells, Anticipations of the Reaction 

	 	 of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon

 Human Life, 1902.

No aircraft ever took and held ground.

 U.S. Marine Corps Manual

While the air power element in OUP was crucial, 

the war was not won from the air. Although NATO 

did not have boots on the ground, there were, indeed, 

ground troops: the Libyan rebel forces. Just as air 

power works best when integrated with land forces, 

NATO’s operation was, in part, decided by those forces engaged with the Libyan regime’s forces—although 

both forces were not truly integrated.23

Most analyses ignore the ground element of OUP, 

because it was not under NATO’s operational control. 

Nevertheless, the armed elements more or less under 

orders of the Libyan National Transitional Council 

(NTC) indeed formed. These elements combined with 

those external actors who interpreted UNSC Resolution 1973 loosely, ground troops that not only fought 

the decisive battles but also encountered the highest 

battle losses. It is difficult to estimate the number of 

actual Libyan rebels—250,000 registered with the 

Warrior Affairs Commission, an organization seeking their reintegration into civil society—although the 

commission itself admits that the number is very likely to be inflated by possibly 50 percent.24 The same is 

true for casualties, which amount to 30,000, according 

to the Libyan health ministry, but do not differentiate 

between civilians, Qaddafi forces, or rebel fighters.25
9

The greater number of these fighters were, however, hardly militarily trained. Although basic military 

training was part of Libya’s school curriculum, it did 

not constitute significant preparation for a situation 

of internal, and mostly urban, combat. As the average 

Libyan fighter was male, possessed an educational 

level at high school (27 percent) or elementary (35 percent), and was between 18 and 38 years old, there was 

in theory manpower available. In practice, however, 

there was virtually no command-and-control system, and basic military structures such as hierarchy, 

communication technology, and standard operating 

procedures were nonexistent.26 As a result, concerns 

about these forces’ capacity to gain and hold territory 

rose in the early days of the operation.

Since UNSC Resolution 1973 not only excluded a 

“foreign occupation force of any form” and also called 

on member states to “inform the Secretary General 

immediately of the measures they take” in order to 

protect civilians, there was room for maneuvering 

regarding foreign ground troops, but transparency 

was essential for the second.27 The Panel of Experts 

established by the UN pursuant to UNSC Resolution 

1973 thereby clearly indicated that “foreign military 

support, including deliveries of military materiel, had 

been crucial.” In compliance with the transparency 

clause of the resolution, only four Member States—

France, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States—immediately notified the Committee of the 

intention to deliver the actual supply of military-related materiel or personnel to Libya. 

This covered small teams of military advisors sent 

to Libya in order to support and advise on ways to 

organize (the NTC’s) internal structure, manage its resources, and improve its communications.28
10

Although the exact size of these teams is classified, 

it is very likely to be limited to up to 20 personnel per 

country mentioned. Nevertheless, the sole presence of 

Western military personnel on Libyan ground was interpreted by a number of media outlets as a breach of 

UNSC Resolution 1973.29 Rather than infringing on the 

issue of a foreign presence on the ground, however, 

these measures are questionable in terms of how they 

contribute to civilian protection.

In spite of the clause of the resolution pertaining 

to transparency, two states in particular did not notify 

the UN in time or adequately, namely, Qatar and the 

UAE. Upon inquiry by the panel regarding the transfer 

of weapons, military technology, and military personnel, the UAE replied that “NATO would be in a better 

position to answer those questions.”30 Similarly, Qatar 

originally did not inform the UN, but finally admitted 

to having sent a limited number of military personnel 

to provide military consultations to the revolutionaries, defend Libyan civilians, and protect air convoys, 

and that it had supplied those Qatari military personnel with limited arms and ammunitions for the purpose of self-defense.31 Qatar also denied having provided the rebels with arms and ammunition.

This contradicts a statement by Qatar’s Chief of 

Staff, Major General Hamad bin Ali al-Atiya, who 

declared “that the numbers of Qataris on the ground 

were hundreds in every region.”32 NTC chairman 

Mustafa Abdel-Jalil supported this by stating that the 

battles that ultimately led to victory were planned 

by Qatari officers, since the rebels were incapable of 

organizing professional forces. The presence of particularly Qatari military personnel on the ground 

highlights the blurred lines that existed during OUP. 
11

Although in theory this was an operation to be conducted purely from the air and sea to protect civilians, 

in practice the difference between regime change and 

civilian protection, and between advice and military planning, became more unclear the longer the 

operation lasted.

In sum, the Libyan war indeed did possess a 

land component—one that was, however, not under 

NATO’s command. Direct contact between the Alliance and the rebels was not possible, as it was not part 

of the mandate. 

Coordinating with a crucial component that was 

only partly trained, unavailable for direct contact, and 

outside the command structure proved to be a challenge for JFC-Naples, which was in charge of the operation. Visualization of the situation on the ground 

was therefore improvised with all necessary means, 

including intelligence, media reports, and even a hotline established for Libyan civilians to call. Contradicting the official narrative, Qatar’s Chief of Staff Major 

General Hamad bin Ali al-Atiya declared that it was 

the country’s liaison officers in Naples who provided 

a link between NATO and the rebel forces. 33

Lesson 2: Rethinking the JFC-Naples Structure.

OUP was run from JFC-Naples, which was at the 

time one of NATO’s three operational commands (in 

addition to Joint Force Command Lisbon and Joint 

Force Command Brunssum). As OUP took the headquarters as much by surprise as by political leadership, the management of the operation allowed for a 

number of insights useful in the context of NATO’s 

ongoing command structure reform. Overall, NATO’s 

command structure has been downsized significantly 
12

since the end of the Cold War: in five revisions overall, 

it has shrunk from over five million active military and 

78 headquarters to 3.8 million active military and 11 

headquarters.34 The ongoing reform of the command 

structure will reduce this number further.

The Alliance’s integrated military command structure is not only unique (the Warsaw Pact, for instance, 

did not possess one), but is also considered one of 

its greatest assets. As a standing military structure 

that comprises personnel from all Allied nations, the 

structure allows for joint exercises, the establishment 

of interoperability, rules of procedures, and a quick 

response to crises. Created after the outbreak of the 

Korean War in 1950, the command structure was built 

along regional lines. Three regions (North, Center, 

and South) were headed by a Commander-in-Chief 

(CINC) who had control over regional air, land, and 

sea components. 

In case of the Southern region, these were grouped 

under Allied Forces Southern Region (AFSOUTH), 

headed by CINC South, and initially all located in 

Italy—the Southern region originally did not include 

Greece and Turkey as they were not NATO members 

yet. AFSOUTH, whose headquarters was located in 

Naples, was to be responsible for “the integrated defence of the Southern European area (as well as) the 

Mediterranean.”35 This initial structure underwent 

a number of changes due to political disagreements 

as well as other changes: the accession of Turkey and 

Greece, later Spain, expanded the Mediterranean dimension, whereas the departure of France from the 

integrated military demanded restructuring.

AFSOUTH, the predecessor of JFC-Naples, was 

initially responsible for only the part of the Mediterranean that ranges from the West to a line in the 

Adriatic from Trieste to the Tunisian waters. The full 
13

Mediterranean became its area of responsibility only 

with the admission of Turkey and Greece in 1952. Yet, 

AFSOUTH was a stepchild in the command structure: 

For the large majority of the Allies, the likeliest battleground was to be located in Germany, and consequently, they believed that this is where NATO should 

concentrate its efforts. This “Central Front Bias” has 

permeated the Alliance in spite of a strategic reality repeatedly uttered by policymakers and military 

strategists alike which highlighted the importance of 

the Mediterranean not only from an economic point of 

view, but even from a Cold War perspective. 

Should we be forced into a conflict, I believe the Soviets would place the following at the top of their wartime objectives in the Southern region: countering the 

strike capability of the carrier battle groups; seizing 

control of the Turkish Straits to permit their Black Sea 

Fleet unrestricted access to the Mediterranean—which 

would permit free flow of the economic support they 

need in the flank, and to prevent the entry of NATO 

ships into the Black Sea—and interdicting NATO reinforcements and resupply of the southern front.36

Continuously neglected by planners, the Southern region was outnumbered toward the end of the 

Cold War by the Warsaw Pact both in land and air 

forces. In the Southern region, the Soviet Union and 

its Allies matched NATO’s 41 divisions with 71, and 

offered 2,450 aircraft against NATO’s 1,000. Although 

the Alliance did have naval superiority, a conflict in 

this part of the world between the Warsaw Pact and 

NATO would have given the former a significant advantage—particularly because the Southern region is 

separated from the rest of the Alliance by the Alps, 

and reinforcements, therefore, would have taken 

significant time.37
14

JFC-Naples inherited this partial neglect to some 

extent. Although in charge of NATO’s Operation in 

Kosovo (KFOR)—its former training mission in Iraq 

ended in 2011—and the Mediterranean anti-terrorism 

mission Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, JFC-Naples rivaled for strategic attention in particular with 

JFC-Brunssum which conducted NATO’s engagement 

in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF). It was, therefore, not entirely surprising 

that the headquarters was not as well equipped for the 

Libya operation as it was supposed to be.

JFC-Naples’ mission was to prepare for, plan, and 

conduct military operations in order to preserve the 

peace, security, and territorial integrity of Alliance 

member states and freedom of the seas and economic 

lifelines throughout SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) and beyond. But it also was to contribute 

to crisis management and deterrence by ensuring that 

assigned headquarters and forces were at the designated state of readiness for the conduct and support of 

operations, and to conduct prudent operational level 

military analysis and planning, which includes the 

identification of required forces.38

In contrast to its predecessor AFSOUTH, JFCNaples did not have an assigned geographic area, 

but was focusing on a range of operations including peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Since 

the headquarters was already quite busy with three 

operations when the Libyan crisis erupted, the capacity to take over OUP could hardly be taken for 

granted; it required kinetic action rather than peace 

enforcement, and the region concerned demanded 

specialist expertise.

The speed with which the mission was taken on 

meant that staff had to be drafted in from other posi-
15

tions within JFC-Naples while the operational headquarters were hastily set up in a ballroom. Although 

in theory NATO’s Force Command in Madrid could 

be relied on to draft the necessary personnel, the 

speed of the mission, as well as the specific skill requirements, effectively precluded this possibility. As 

the Alliance’s bureaucracy seemed at times to rule out 

the urgency of military action (partner officers were 

told computers would not be available in less than 3 

months), JFC-Naples was not properly equipped for 

an actual crisis of this dimension, but managed to improvise on a large scale.

As NATO remodels its command structure, these 

shortcomings are being partly addressed, and JFC-Naples will grow into a headquarters capable of deploying up to a major joint operation in theater. However, 

since the uncertainty brought on by the Arab Spring 

makes instability and violence a likely scenario, the 

Mediterranean remains an area of concern, where 

NATO might need capacities for operations ranging 

from Responsibility to Protect39 missions to peacekeeping. Manning and equipping the headquarters 

appropriately would be the logical consequence of 

this consideration, as would the allocation of a specific 

area of responsibility.

Lesson 3: Do Not Ignore Culture.

NATO’s Libya operation was the Alliance’s first 

combat action against an Arab country; although the 

Alliance already had an operation in another country in the region, Iraq, this was extremely small (150 

troops) and limited to training only. Arguably, individual member states had gathered experience during 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which, although not a 
16

NATO operation, had included 19 of the then 26 Allies. But, as a collective and in its joint headquarters, 

NATO engaged for the first time within an Arab strategic environment. In spite of this, the Alliance paid 

rather limited attention to Libya’s cultural terrain and 

had no cultural advisers on the staff of OUP—not from 

Libya, nor another Arab country, and not anyone familiar with local conditions. Although there, indeed, 

were people with limited local knowledge involved 

in the planning of the campaign, the headquarters 

in charge of it, JFC-Naples, did not employ cultural 

advisers. Instead, it occasionally improvised cultural 

advice from liaison officers from Jordan, Qatar, and 

the UAE, or NATO officers who had worked in Tripoli 

as defense attachés for less than a year. This could not 

make up for the fact that there, indeed, was no understanding of Libya—either its regime or its population. 

In other words, there was no structured approach to 

a nation that has been visited and studied all too little 

for the past 4 decades—although no less than General 

Sun Tzu had postulated that knowing your enemy is 

crucial in conflict.

This lack of an approach is partly the result of a 

general lack of research on Libya. Research activities 

within the country had been difficult for decades, because the regime not only focused all in-country political research on its ideology laid out in the Green 

Book, but made life difficult for foreigners attempting 

to shed light on local conditions. Furthermore, international intelligence activities died down in Libya 

after 2003, when the regime decided to abandon its 

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons program 

and ceased the support of international terrorism. 

As Major General Margaret Woodward, the com-
17

mander of the joint force air component for operation 

ODYSSEY DAWN, OUP’s predecessor, noted: 

There was little ‘intelligence preparation’ of the area of 

conflict. . . . The U.S. Intelligence Community hadn’t 

viewed Libya as a potential adversary ‘for years’.40

The same was true for most other NATO Allies.

This lack of knowledge was not helped by the fact 

that JFC-Naples did not have a geographical area of 

focus, and regional expertise therefore did not exist 

in the headquarters. Although the salary of an analyst 

represents only a fraction of other operational costs, 

nations seem to consider analysis of a strategic environment too costly. Yet, understanding of conditions 

on the ground was of particular relevance in the case 

of OUP, where situational awareness was restricted 

by the absence of a land component and limitations of 

intelligence gathered on the ground. 

Although the widespread lack of expertise on Libya was an aspect NATO had to make do with, the way 

it attempted to fill the gap was not ideal. Relying on 

the advice of officers from the Gulf states or Jordan, 

the Alliance replaced a distinctly Libyan culture with 

a generic Arab one, which watered its specifics distinctly down. As JFC-Naples later recognized, Libya 

differs vastly in culture from that of the Gulf states; 

as JFC-Naples sought experts on Libya, it all too often 

relied on researchers and officers from NATO countries with outdated or limited knowledge. JFC-Naples 

ultimately attempted to reach out to Libyan researchers located in Libya, but was not able to do so because 

of the Alliance’s rules of engagement, which clearly 

interdicted direct contact with locals. This aspect was 

sidestepped when OUP commander General Charles 
18

Bouchard met with president of the rebel body NTC 

Mustafa Abdel Jalil in his Canadian, not NATO, capacity. Yet, as it turned out, even people on the ground in 

Libya had a very incomplete picture of the situation 

that was confused by lack of communication, disinformation, and the fluidity as well as complexity of 

internal conflict.

The improvised advice OUP relied on turned out 

to be a failure, as officers involved in the campaign 

admitted, nobody predicted several of the turns the 

operation took. Qaddafi’s holding on to power, the 

comparable weakness but surprising resilience and 

adaptability of the armed forces, and apparent passivity shown by the population of Tripoli, whose uprising was expected, were all features of a terrain widely 

misunderstood. Given that the ground component 

was crucial to the mission’s success, cultural advice 

would have made an important contribution to the 

general understanding of the situation within Libya 

as the operation evolved.

While NATO continues to deal with nations and 

cultures very different from those of Europe or North 

America, it is rather slow in acknowledging the importance of having an accurate grasp of local conditions 

outside the purely military field. The success eventually achieved by OUP should not lead to the conclusion that cultural advisers are unnecessary. What 

must really be asked is whether success could have 

come earlier with a thorough understanding of local 

circumstances—e.g., in anticipating rebel and civilian 

population behavior, be it in Tripoli or Misrata, on the 

basis of sound judgment rather than speculation.
19

Lesson 4: Close the Politico-Military Gap.

In many ways, OUP was “the war that wasn’t.” 

As the legal interpretations of UNSC Resolution 1973 

made clear, the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Qaddafi’s regime, let alone assassinate him. Its 

declared aim was solely the protection of civilians in 

a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of “Responsibility to Protect.” Yet, 

against the backdrop of international political pressure, 

the Alliance’s neutrality and agenda quickly became a 

point of discussion. As military personnel bemoaned, 

the resolution did not lend itself to military planning: 

the protection of civilians does not indicate an end 

state to be achieved, nor does it identify an enemy. 

For a mission to be planned and executed properly, its 

outline needs to be more precise. As the translation of 

the resolution’s wording into military action required 

more specification, concrete indications needed to be 

found that would point to effectively protected civilians. After consultation, it was agreed that the mission 

would have achieved its objective when: a) all attacks 

and threats of attack against civilians and civilianpopulated areas have ended; b) the regime has verifiably withdrawn to bases all military forces, including 

snipers, mercenaries, and other paramilitary forces, 

including from all populated areas they have forcibly 

entered, occupied, or besieged throughout all of Libya; and, c) the regime has permitted immediate, full, 

safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to all the 

people in Libya in need of assistance.41

Yet, the disconnect between military planning 

and political reasoning continued throughout the operation. As the military rules of engagement of NATO 
20

very clearly excluded any regime change as a mission 

objective, political pressure mounted to remove Colonel Qaddafi from power. The Contact Group, a merger 

of representatives from 21 countries and representatives from the UN, the Arab League, NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf 

States, took a firm stance at its meeting in early-April 

2011, declaring that “Qaddafi and his regime had lost 

all legitimacy and he must leave power . . . Qaddafi’s 

continued presence would threaten any resolution of 

the crisis.”42 At the Berlin meeting of NATO’s Foreign 

Ministers with those nations participating in OUP in 

April 2011, not even 2 weeks into the operation, the 

group “strongly” endorsed the Contact Group’s call 

for Qaddafi to leave power.43 The impression that NATO’s operation was really about changing the Libyan 

regime hence solidified, regardless of the fact that JFCNaples continued to interpret UNSC Resolution 1973 

strictly in terms of providing civilian protection. In a 

joint article, U.S. President Obama, France’s President 

Nicholas Sarkozy, and Great Britain’s Prime Minister 

David Cameron explained that: 

[O]ur duty and our mandate under U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we 

are doing that. It is not to remove Gadhafi by force. 

But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with 

Gadhafi in power. . . . It is unthinkable that someone 

who has tried to massacre his own people can play a 

part in their future government . . . so long as Gadhafi is in power, NATO and its coalition partners must 

maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds.44
21

The call for regime change was reiterated at the 

Libya Contact Group’s second meeting in May, further supported by a declaration by NATO’s Secretary 

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, which echoed the 

regime’s loss of legitimacy: 

I am confident that combination of strong military 

pressure and increased political pressure and support 

for the opposition will eventually lead to the collapse 

of the regime.45

Yet, this stood in stark contrast to the military interpretations of UNSC Resolution 1973. As pressure 

mounted throughout the summer of 2011, OUP commander General Charles Bouchard had to explain that 

his orders were “not regime change or to kill a head 

of state.”46

But the clear discrepancy between the political and 

the military level, the legitimacy of UNSC Resolution 

1973, and the political ambition, as well as between 

NATO as a collective and its individual member 

states, confused the public in Allied and non-Allied 

countries. The same was true of the legal distinction 

between Allied and national caveats. As General 

Bouchard was not allowed to have direct contacts with 

the rebels, he encountered the head of the NTC in his 

Canadian capacity, and Qatar sent ground forces into 

Libya outside of OUP. 47 Yet, in the public perception, 

this legal distinction is not necessarily clear and contributes to confusion between NATO as a collective 

and its individual members or partner nations.

The unclear distinction between NATO’s military 

action solely for the purpose of civilian protection 

and political declarations on the member-state level 

calling for regime change particularly upset Russia 
22

and China. They had acquiesced to UNSC Resolution 

1973 only because it was precisely not about regime 

change—thereby reviving the international debate opposing national sovereignty to the protection of human rights. Political capital was thus squandered by 

the inconsistency between the political and military 

levels. In practice, this meant that the political problem was passed on to the military level, where it did 

not belong.

Lesson 5: Improve Strategic Communication.

Although strategic communication is not an entirely new idea, the Alliance recognized the necessity 

for an overall concept during the NATO-led operation 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, when rallying the Afghan people’s support 

for the mission’s objectives turned out to be more difficult than anticipated. In 2009, only 2 years before the 

crisis in Libya erupted, NATO issued its first strategic 

communications concept, which aimed at supporting 

an operation’s objectives by ensuring that audiences 

receive clear, fair, and opportune information regarding actions and that the interpretation of the Alliance’s 

messages are not left solely to NATO’s adversaries or 

other audiences.48

Actors of strategic communication are psychological operations (PYSOPS) departments, public diplomacy, and media relations units—essentially, any 

unit involved in the operation that reaches out and 

communicates with a broader audience crucial to the 

mission’s success. Target audiences can be primary 

as well as collateral; messaging can shift, depending 

on events and perceptions, and therefore needs to be 

highly adaptable. In particular, the strategic commu-
23

nication efforts of antagonists need to be taken into 

account.

In the case of OUP, NATO’s first strategic communication efforts targeted the Libyan population, which 

can be clustered roughly in two separate groups: on 

the one hand, the civilian population; on the other, 

members of the regime’s forces. The civilian population needed to be favorable to NATO’s efforts; avoiding civilian casualties was therefore not only a moral 

imperative but also a strategic one, as civilian support 

would most certainly wane with increasing numbers 

of casualties. Leaflets dropped by the Alliance warned 

civilians hours before the air strikes: “Warning: Step 

away from military activities.” In addition, NATO 

dropped leaflets informing Libyans about a hot line 

Libyans could call to pass on information they deemed 

useful and a radio station designed to warn civilians 

in time. As the UN noted, NATO “conducted a highly 

precise campaign with a demonstrable determination 

to avoid civilian casualties.”49

Nevertheless, criticism on the Alliance’s methods 

emerged shortly after the mission’s inception. The 

League of Arab States’ Secretary General bemoaned 

the amplitude of the campaign: 

What is happening in Libya differs from the aim 

of imposing a no-fly zone. And what we want is the 

protection of civilians and not the shelling of more 

civilians.50

Although successive investigations by different 

bodies after the end of the campaign showed that 40-

70 civilians died as a result of NATO air strikes,51 the 

fact that the Alliance did not confirm any responsibility for these casualties has only fueled speculations—
24

reports in the Arab as well as the Russian media spoke 

of 700-1,000 civilians killed by NATO air strikes.52 Although the Alliance’s reasoning for not investigating 

in Libya proper is sound and its cooperation with the 

investigating UN body was extensive, it has backfired 

in strategic communication terms, since it was still interpreted as NATO avoiding its responsibilities.

NATO’s strategic communication efforts also targeted another part of Libyan society, namely, the regime’s forces. Encouraging desertion of both Libyan 

fighters and mercenaries, the leaflets dropped in Arabic contained messages such as: 

Officers, soldiers and regime fighters of great Libya: 

Many Senior officers have already defected and followed their conscience. Stop being part of the fighting. Return to your family and serve your country by 

laying down your weapons, leaving your post and 

respecting the right of all Libyans to live in peace.

Others used a more threatening tone: 

You are no match for NATO’s superior weapons systems and air power. Continuing to man your posts 

and equipment will result in your death.

Another set appealed to the professionalism of the 

soldiers: “Professional soldiers don’t attack civilians. 

Do not bring dishonor to yourselves and to your families.” Lastly, a number of leaflets sought to criminalize 

Qaddafi and erode support for him: 

Gadhafi has been indicted by the International Criminal Court. Will you share a prison cell with him? Who 

will support your family? Make a choice before it is 

too late.
25

The pictures used on these leaflets showed Libyan 

resistance fighter Omar Mokhtar, juxtaposing him to 

a speech balloon asking Qaddafi, “Why do you allow 

our Libyan brothers to fight and kill each other?” To 

what extent these leaflets encouraged the disintegration and desertion of the Libyan forces is difficult to 

measure; although the Libyan forces suffered significant desertion, the direct correlation with NATO leaflets is hard to establish.

In addition, the general public in Allied and Arab 

countries as well as in Russia developed collaborative 

strategic communication audiences. This was particularly the case, as the media began to question the 

true motive behind the mandate for regime change, 

accused France and the UK of exceeding the mandate, 

and created in summer 2011 the “stalemate narrative”—the notion that the Alliance was not achieving 

its goals. The pan-Arab daily Al-Quds al-Arabi wrote 

in June 2011: 

It is obvious that, by targeting residential buildings, 

NATO seeks to assassinate and physically liquidate 

the Libyan leader. . . . UN Security Council Resolution 1973 does not provide for the assassination of the 

Libyan leader or the overthrow of the ruling regime.53

Another pan-Arab daily, Al-Hayat, noted that: 

NATO is looking for political and legal pretexts to 

prolong the war in order to be able to get an explicit 

UN resolution to allow the occupation of Libya in the 

same way as that of Iraq.54

NATO attempted to turn this around by relentlessly 

repeating the content of UNSC Resolution 1973 and 

the military interpretations of it as well as the com-
26

plexity of the Libyan crisis on the ground, both in 

press conferences and an especially set-up YouTube 

Channel in Arabic.

Nevertheless, the Libyan regime’s strategic communication proved to be comparatively resilient and 

creative. It not only succeeded in recruiting a public 

relations firm for this purpose, but managed to escort 

BBC journalists into a hospital, showing corpses of 

young children supposedly killed in NATO air strikes. 

Tapping into traditional Arab grievances, Qaddafi

used words such as “colonialism” and “imperialism,” 

called the rebels “NATO agents,” and promised to exterminate them like rats.

Although there was Arab support for the NATO 

operation, news coverage remained neutral to negative, depending on the region, and proved volatile 

throughout the conflict. Al-Jazeera, a channel the Alliance has quarreled with in the past over Afghanistan, defended the operation prominently and helped 

strengthen Arab support, but others remained critical 

of the number of civilian deaths. As a result, NATO’s 

traditionally rather negative image in the region has 

not yet changed; the long-term impact of OUP in this 

respect will depend to a large extent on internal Libyan 

developments. Although the Alliance’s contribution 

very likely saved a large number of civilian lives, the 

role it played in this respect might well be obscured 

by other, negative, developments. 

Overall, the strategic communication of the regime 

forces (and of the NTC as well) was better attuned to 

the local sentiment of target audiences and thus to the 

most relevant media profile. The extremely rapid creation of rebel TV station Libya Ahrar (“Free Libya”) 

reflects a constantly growing agility and adaptability 

in strategic communication. NATO has to adapt to 

this sooner rather than later.
27

Lesson 6: The Aftermath of Intervention.

NATO’s Libya operation aimed at protecting civilians in a situation of internal strife. In a conflict opposing the regime and rebel forces, the Alliance nominally 

never took sides—although its action de facto tipped 

the balance, which had been in favor of the regime. 

Once the regime of Colonel Qaddafi had been toppled 

and Libya’s “liberation” proclaimed on October 23, 

2011, the Alliance brought OUP to an end a week later 

despite calls from the Libyan NTC to maintain NATO 

air patrolling: 

We hope (NATO) will continue its campaign until at 

least the end of this year to serve us and neighboring 

countries, ensuring that no arms are infiltrated into 

those countries and to ensure the security of Libyans 

from some remnants of Qaddafi’s forces who have 

fled to nearby countries.55

Yet, in the immediate aftermath of the regime’s 

fall, the transitional council sent mixed messages 

on the acceptability of international support in 

security terms.

Although calling on NATO and hinting at possible 

requests from Arab states to assist Libya in the immediate aftermath of the end of the conflict, the NTC also 

firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, 

even UN observers.56 As the regime’s security forces 

had virtually imploded, Libya’s security therefore fell 

into the hands of the multiple militias, which continued to proliferate after the conflict ended. In a situation of effective lawlessness, Libyans protested several times against the militia rule and asked for their 

disbandment. However, militia leaders refused disbandment as long as no military or police force could 

take over.57
28

While the country prepared its first elections in 

half a century, vetted candidates, and sought to bring 

its oil industry back on track, security sector reconstruction advanced rather slowly. Throughout the 

first half of 2012, attacks on the Red Cross’s offices in 

Tripoli and Benghazi, the Tunisian Consulate, and the 

convoy of the British ambassador, and a brief occupation of Tripoli Airport as a result of intermilitia fights 

indicated a progressive implosion of Libya’s security, 

which culminated in an attack on the U.S. Consulate 

in Benghazi—resulting in the death of four embassy 

staff, including the ambassador.58 Without a doubt, 

Libya’s ongoing security challenge will influence 

the way future interventions in internal strife will be 

conducted. If the government is unable to take back 

control of the security sector, Libya might very well 

be headed to a failed-state scenario—which, of course, 

would cast a shadow on NATO’s operation as well.

CONCLUSION

Albeit hailed by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, as a “model 

intervention,”59 the Alliance can still learn a number of 

strategic lessons from its Libyan adventure. These include, of course, technical elements such as air power 

and command structure, but extends to aspects such 

as culture, strategic communication, and the general 

political backdrop against which OUP was conducted. 

Most importantly, OUP will relaunch the Alliance’s 

debate on its collective stance on the Middle East. After all, it proved to be a moment of division for NATO 

as well as Germany, which abstained from the vote on 

UNSC Resolution 1973; only six NATO Allies actively 

participated in the operation.
29

In spite of their two partnership programs, the 

Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Allies have so far held very different visions of how to deal with the region. This is, 

in part, a leftover from the Alliance’s first 4 decades, 

when the Mediterranean and its Southern rim hardly 

featured outside the Cold War context, and, in part, 

an outcome of different analysis over which regions 

should matter to the Alliance beyond the Soviet threat. 

Depending on geographical location, the Allies 

would emphasize the Central, the Northern, or the 

Southern Front. 

Mostly, however, this lack of vision reflects a 

strong preference of individual Allies for bi- or trilateralism when dealing with this part of the world. 

As a region of international importance, not only because of large petrol resources but also the existence of 

maritime choke points and one of the most important 

world trade routes, it attracts those Allies with strategic interests that might threaten NATO consensus. 

Yet, if the Alliance wants to continue to reach out into 

its Southern neighbor area, a common vision will be 

necessary to achieve that goal.

The euphoria over the end of a brutal regime that 

lasted 4 decades in Libya should not disguise the fact 

that the consequences of OUP are not yet fully visible. 

Indeed, a number of lessons to be learned will possibly emerge only several years after the end of OUP. 

It would be a mistake to think that NATO’s Libya adventure ended with the drawdown of the military mission; whether the Alliance likes it or not, its reputation 

is at stake in Libya’s long reconstruction process.
30

ENDNOTES

1. “Muammar Gaddafi Condemns Tunisia Uprising,” The 

Guardian, January 16, 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising.

2. “Libyan Protestors Clash with Police in Benghazi,” The 

Guardian, February 16, 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2011/feb/16/libyan-protesters-clash-with-police.

3. “Libya on Brink as Protests Hit Tripoli,” The Guardian,

 February 21, 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/

feb/20/libya-defiant-protesters-feared-dead.

4. “Raging Gaddafi Orders Forces to ‘Capture the Rats,’ ” ABC 

News, February 23, 2011, available from www.abc.net.au/news/

2011-02-23/raging-gaddafi-orders-forces-to-capture-the-rats/1953788.

5. “Libyan Leader Should Stand Down as He Has ‘Lost Legitimately,’ “Obama,” The Guardian, March 3, 2011, available from 

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/03/libyan-leader-stand-downobama.

6. “Rebel Leader Calls for ‘Immediate Action’ on No-fly 

Zone,” CNN, March 10, 2011, available from edition.cnn.com/2011/

WORLD/africa/03/09/libya.civil.war/index.html.

7. “Arab League Backs Libya No-fly Zone,” BBC News, March 

12, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12723554.

8. “Gaddafi Tells Rebel City, Benghazi, ‘We Will Show No 

Mercy’,” The Huffington Post, March 17, 2011, available from www.

huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/17/gaddafi-benghazi-libyanews_n_837245.html.

9. “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote 

of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” United Nations, March 17, 

2011, available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.

doc.htm.
31

10. “NATO Secretary General’s Statement on Libya No-fly 

Zone,” NATO, March 24, 2011, available from www.nato.int/cps/

en/natolive/news_71763.htm.

11. Sorties in general are military deployments with a specific mission; strike sorties are intended to identify and engage 

appropriate targets, but need not always involve deployment of 

ammunition.

12. “Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation,” London, UK: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), September 2011, available from www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RUSIInterimLibyaReport.pdf.

13. UNSC Resolution 1973, March 17, 2011, available from 

www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm.

14. “United States Activities in Libya,” Washington, DC: The 

White House, June 15, 2011, p. 25, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/united-states-activities-libya.html. 

15. “Gates Warns of Risks of a No-fly Zone,” The New York 

Times, March 2, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/

world/africa/03military.html?pagewanted=all.

16. “Libyan Air Defenses Would Fade Fast,” Aviation Week, 

March 8, 2011, available from www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.

aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plck

Controller=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=2

7ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%253A27ec

4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%253Ab5d2af1a-9b89-40d6-

acb6-ee7a623098a0&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest.

17. “1986: US Launches Air Strikes on Libya,” BBC News, 

April 15, 1986, available from news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/3975455.stm.

18. Jeremiah Gertler, “Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): 

Background and Issues for Congress,” March 30, 2011, p. 10, 

available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41725.pdf.
32

19. “Libya No-Fly Zone Would Require NATO Military 

Action, General Says,” ABC News, March 1, 2011, available from 

abcnews.go.com/Politics/libya-fly-zone-require-nato-military-force/

story?id=13031952#.UEeAE7VcAcs. 

20. Department of Defense (DoD) News Briefing with Admiral Locklear via Telephone from USS Mount Whitney, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 22, 2011, available 

from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4793.

21. “Libyan Rebels near Ajdabiya ‘Killed in NATO Air Strike’,” 

BBC News, April 7, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-12997181; “Libyan Opposition Says NATO Strike Hit 

Rebel Fighters; 13 Killed,” CNN, March 3, 2011, available from 

edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/02/libya.war/index.html; 

“NATO says its aircraft hit Libyan rebel column,” Reuters, June 

18, 2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/18/uslibya-nato-rebel-idUSTRE75H22120110618. 

22. “Libye: point de situation no50—bilan de l’operation 

Unified Protector’ (“Libya: Update Number 50: Balance of Operation Unified Protector”), November 8, 2011, Ministere de la 

Defense Francais, available from www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/

autres-operations/operation-harmattan-libye/actualites/libye-pointde-situation-n-50-bilan-de-l-operation-unified-protector; “NATO Operations in Libya: Data Journalism Breaks Down Which Country 

Does What,” The Guardian, October 31, 2011, available from www.

guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country#.

23. See also Grant T. Hammond, “Myths of the Air War over 

Serbia: Some ‘Lessons’ Not to Learn,” Aerospace Power Journal, 

Winter 2000, available from www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/

apj/apj00/win00/hammond.htm.

24. Author interview with representative of the Warrior 

Affairs Commission, Tripoli, Lebanon, June 2012.

25. “At Least 30,000 Killed, 50,000 Wounded in Libyan Conflict,” The Tripoli Post, September 8, 2011, available from www.

tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=6862&archive=1.
33

26. “Distribution of Warriors According to Age Group and 

Educational Level,” Tripoli, Lebanon: Warrior Affairs Commission, June 2012.

27. UNSC Resolution 1973.

28. Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant 

to Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) Concerning Libya, UN 

Security Council, March 20, 2012, pp. 20-22, available from www.

un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/163.

29. “Al-Jazeera Footage Captures ‘Western Troops on the 

Ground’ in Libya,” The Guardian, May 30, 2011, available from 

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/30/western-troops-on-groundlibya; “Foreign Forces in Libya Helping Rebel Forces Advance,” 

CNN, August 24, 2011, available from articles.cnn.com/2011-08-24/

world/libya.foreign.forces_1_rebel-forces-special-forces-rebel-units?_

s=PM:WORLD.

30. Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) Concerning 

Libya, p. 23.

31. Ibid., p. 25.

32. “Qatar Admits Sending Hundreds of Troops to Support 

Libya Rebels,” The Guardian, October 26, 2011, available from 

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/26/qatar-troops-libya-rebelssupport.

33. “Qatar Admits It Had Boots on the Ground in Libya, NTC 

Seeks further NATO Help,” Al-Arabiya, October 26, 2011, available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/26/173833.html.

34. W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry, “NATO 

Command Structure: Considerations for the Future,” Washington, 

DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National 

Defense University, September 2010, p. 8, available from 

www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2075%20NATO%20

Command%20Structure.pdf.
34

35. Letter from General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Admiral 

Robert Carney, first CINCSOUTH, quoted in AFSOUTH Public 

Information, AFSOUTH at 50: Defending Peace, Fostering Stability,

Naples, Italy: Alfredo Guida Editore, 2001, p. 26.

36. James Busey, “The Lion’s Share: The Challenge for Allied 

Forces Southern Europe,” NATO’s Sixteen Nations, July/August 

1988, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 19.

37. Ibid., pp. 18-25.

38. “JFC Naples Mission,” Allied Joint Force Command 

Naples, available from www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page87211118.aspx.

39. Responsibility to Protect: a United Nations concept 

designed to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against 

humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

40. John A. Tirpak, “Lessons From Libya,” Air Force Magazine, 

December 2011, p. 36.

41. NATO: Statement on Libya, April 14, 2011, available from 

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_72544.htm.

42. “Libya Contact Group: Chair’s Statement,” London, UK: 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, April 13, 2011, available from 

www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?id=583592582&view=News.

43. NATO: Statement on Libya, April 14, 2011, available from 

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_72544.htm.

44. “Libya Letter by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy,” The 

Daily Star (Lebanon), April 15, 2011, available from www.dailystar.

com.lb/News/Middle-East/Apr/15/Libya-letter-by-Obama-Cameronand-Sarkozy-Full-text.ashx#axzz27P0aaGZE.

45. “NATO: Gaddafi Forces ‘Significantly Degraded,’” Al 

Jazeera, May 20, 2011, available from www.aljazeera.com/news/

africa/2011/05/201151914159509484.html.

46. “Libya Conflict: NATO's Man against Gaddafi,” BBC 

News, June 26, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-13919380.
35

47. “Qatar Admits It Had Boots on the Ground in Libya; 

NTC Seeks Further NATO Help,” Al-Arabiya, October 26, 2011, 

available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/26/173833.html.

48. Anaïs Reding et al., NATO’s Strategic Communications 

Concept and its Relevance for France, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation: 2010, p. 4, available from www.rand.org/content/dam/

rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR855.2.pdf.

49. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 

Libya, New York: UN Human Rights Council, March 2, 2012, p. 2.

50. “Arab League Condemns Broad Western Bombing Campaigns in Libya,” The Washington Post, March 20, 2011, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-league-condemns-broadbombing-campaign-in-libya/2011/03/20/AB1pSg1_story.html.

51. “HRW Urges NATO to Probe Libyan Civilians’ Deaths, 

but Libya Says No Need to Investigate,” Al Arabiya News,

December 16, 2011, available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/16/182835.html; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, p. 17; “Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Air Strikes,” Amnesty

International, March 2012, available from www.

amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/003/2012/en/8982a094-60ff4783-8aa8-8c80a4fd0b14/mde190032012en.pdf; “In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll,” The New York Times, 

December 17, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/

world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-war-in-libya.

html?ref=opinion.

52. “Civilian Cost of NATO victory in Libya,” Russia Today, 

October 20, 2011, available from rt.com/news/libya-nato-civiliandeaths-323/; “Libya Says NATO Strikes Kill(?) 19 Civilians,” AlJazeera, June 21, 2011, available from www.aljazeera.com/news/

africa/2011/06/2011620214646273991.html.

53. BBC Monitoring, “Pan-Arab Daily Criticizes NATO for 

Targeting 'Residential Buildings' in Libya,” June 21, 2011.
36

54. BBC Monitoring, “Writer Criticizes NATO's Role in Libya; 

Calls for Redrafting UN Resolution,” April 21, 2011.

55. “Qatar Admits It Had Boots on the Ground in Libya.”

56. “Libya’s Interim Leaders Reject UN Military Personnel,” 

BBC News, August 31, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-14726292.

57. “Can Libya’s Armed Groups be Disbanded?” Al-Jazeera, 

January 8, 2012, available from www.aljazeera.com/programmes/

insidestory/2012/01/2012156215196506.html.

58. “Chris Stevens, US Ambassador to Libya, killed in Benghazi Attack,” The Guardian, September 12, 2012, available from 

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/12/chris-stevens-us-ambassadorlibya-killed.

59. Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention,” Foreign 

Affairs, March/April 2012, p. 2, available from aco.nato.int/

resources/site631/saceur/documents/Daalder_Stavridis_final.pdf.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Florence Gaub

Editor for Production

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Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil