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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

October 13, 2016 

v No. 327187 

Chippewa Circuit Court 

CHRISTOPHER LEHMAN TADGERSON, LC No. 14-001581-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MURPHY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals by right his conviction, following a jury trial, of resisting and 

obstructing a law enforcement officer causing injury, MCL 750.81d(2). According to the 

judgment of sentence, defendant was sentenced as a fourth-habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 4 

to 15 years’ imprisonment for the conviction. We affirm defendant’s conviction but remand for 

the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence relative to the payment of a probation 

supervision fee and defendant’s minimum sentence. 

 Defendant’s conviction arose out of a physical altercation that he had with another inmate 

named Hammonds at the Chippewa County Correctional Facility. The prosecution offered 

testimony and video footage establishing that when defendant and Hammonds did not heed 

commands by corrections officers to stop fighting, Chippewa County Sheriff’s Department 

Deputy Officer Thomas Lawlor and Correctional Supervisor Corporal Ashely Reid pulled 

defendant and Hammonds apart. The video shows that defendant continuously resisted Lawlor 

as he was being escorted out of the cell. Defendant testified that he was being “choked out” 

during the fight and that he was unable to hear Lawlor’s commands. There was no video footage 

of what occurred at the cell door, but Lawlor testified that defendant “made a big lunge at, to get 

out of my grasp,” and that when defendant did so, Lawlor felt a “pop, pull type feeling” in his 

back. Defendant maintained that he thought another inmate had grabbed him. Defendant 

claimed that he stopped resisting once he realized he was being held by Lawlor. Lawlor testified 

that he sustained a ruptured disc in his lower back for which he continues to see a specialist. 

 Defendant argues that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant 

admits that he resisted Lawlor and does not dispute that Lawlor suffered a bodily injury requiring 

medical attention as a result. He argues, however, that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he knew or had reason to know that the person he was resisting was an 
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officer. We review de novo the issue regarding whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 

a conviction. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). In reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence – whether direct or circumstantial 

– in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could 

find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v 

Reese, 491 Mich 127, 139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012); People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 

NW2d 158 (2002). A jury, and not an appellate court, observes the witnesses and listens to their 

testimony; therefore, an appellate court must not interfere with the jury’s role in assessing the 

weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-

515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise 

from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. People v 

Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The prosecution need not negate every 

reasonable theory of innocence, but need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of 

whatever contradictory evidence is provided by the defendant. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 

400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution. 

People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). 

 A defendant is guilty of resisting and obstructing an officer causing injury if he or she 

“assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual 

knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties causing a bodily injury requiring 

medical attention or medical care . . . .” MCL 750.81d(2). As used in the statute, “person” 

includes “[a] sheriff or deputy sheriff.” MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(v). 

 The phrase “has reason to know” “is established with something less than actual 

knowledge,” and “requires the fact-finder to engage in an analysis to determine whether the facts 

and circumstances of the case indicate that when resisting, defendant had reasonable cause to 

believe the person he was assaulting was performing his or her duties.” People v Nichols, 262 

Mich App 408, 414; 686 NW2d 502 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that, under the 

facts and circumstances, defendant had reasonable cause to believe that he was resisting an 

officer. Lawlor and Reid testified to Lawlor commanding defendant and Hammonds to stop 

fighting. In the video shown to the jury, it appears that as defendant was pulled away from the 

altercation, he would have seen Reid, wearing a black uniform, holding Hammonds. Even if 

defendant did not know who Reid was, it is reasonable to conclude that a prison inmate would 

have identified the uniform as one worn by a corrections officer. The video also shows 

defendant grabbing a pillar and turning his body into Lawlor in an apparent attempt to return to 

Hammonds. The jury was free to infer that defendant would have seen Lawlor’s black uniform 

at that time. See People v Kosik, 303 Mich App 146, 150-151; 841 NW2d 906 (2013) (“It is for 

the trier of fact, rather than this Court, to determine what inferences can be fairly drawn from the 

evidence and to determine the weight to be afforded to the inferences.”). Moreover, testimony 

established that there was a third corrections officer stationed at the open cell door when 

defendant made his final lunge that caused Lawlor’s injury. And because actual knowledge is 

not required under MCL 750.81d(2), Nichols, 262 Mich App at 414, the jury did not necessarily 

have to find defendant’s testimony, that he believed he was being grabbed by another inmate, not 

credible in order to convict him. In sum, defendant’s conviction is supported by the evidence 

presented at trial. 
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 Next, defendant contends, and the prosecutor concedes, that he was improperly ordered 

to pay a probation supervision fee. MCL 771.3(1)(d) provides that a defendant “shall pay a 

probation supervision fee” as a condition of a sentence of probation when sentenced in circuit 

court. Because defendant was not sentenced to probation, the trial court lacked the statutory 

authority to impose a probation supervision fee. Accordingly, we remand for the ministerial task 

of correcting the judgment of sentence so as to delete the provision ordering defendant to pay a 

probation supervision fee. 

 Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a fee for his courtappointed attorney without first assessing his ability to pay. Under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv), if a 

defendant is found guilty after trial, the court may impose “[t]he expenses of providing legal 

assistance to the defendant.” MCL 769.1l provides the procedure for collecting court-imposed 

costs from prisoners and states in relevant part as follows: 

 If a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections has 

been ordered to pay any sum of money as described in section 1k and the 

department of corrections receives an order from the court on a form prescribed 

by the state court administrative office, the department of corrections shall deduct 

50% of the funds received by the prisoner in a month over $50.00 and promptly 

forward a payment to the court as provided in the order when the amount exceeds 

$100.00 . . . . 

 In People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271, 290; 769 NW2d 630 (2009), the Michigan Supreme 

Court held that defendants do not have a constitutional right to an ability-to-pay assessment 

when the trial court imposes a fee for a court-appointed attorney. However, “whenever a trial 

court attempts to enforce its imposition of a fee for a court-appointed attorney under MCL 

769.1k, the defendant must be advised of this enforcement action and be given an opportunity to 

contest the enforcement on the basis of his indigency.” Id. at 292 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the 

Court concluded that “trial courts should not entertain defendants’ ability-to-pay-based 

challenges to the imposition of fees until enforcement of that imposition has begun.” Id. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing an attorney fee on defendant in the judgment 

of sentence without first determining his ability to pay. 

 However, the lower court record contains a remittance order directing the Department of 

Corrections to collect from defendant all of the fees and costs imposed by the trial court, which 

totaled $1,048, including the assessment of attorney fees, under the formula set forth in MCL 

769.1l, as quoted above. And the Jackson Court observed that perfunctory entry of a remittance 

order under MCL 769.1l “is an enforcement of the fee without an ability-to-pay assessment.” 

Jackson, 483 Mich at 294 (emphasis added). But our Supreme Court additionally ruled as 

follows with respect to a remittance order entered pursuant to MCL 769.1l: 

 [W]e decline to hold that this enforcement procedure is unconstitutional, 

because the statute's monetary calculations necessarily conduct a preliminary, 

general ability-to-pay assessment before the prisoner's funds are taken. 

 The ability-to-pay analysis should not be confused with the underlying 

constitutional tenet; it is merely a procedure used to ensure compliance with the 
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constitutional precept that no indigent defendant must be forced to pay. In other 

words, as long as it does not require indigent defendants to pay a fee, a procedure 

that enforces the fee is not unconstitutional simply because it does not require an 

ability-to-pay analysis. Indeed, the true issue is always indigency, no matter what 

test is used to evaluate the issue. And application of § 1l's calculative procedure 

necessarily only applies to prisoners who have an apparent ability to pay. 

 MCL 769.1l inherently calculates a prisoner's general ability to pay and, in 

effect, creates a statutory presumption of nonindigency. The provision only allows 

the garnishment of a prisoner's account if the balance exceeds $50. Although this 

amount would be insufficient to sustain a defendant living among the general 

populace, it is uncontested that a prisoner's “living expenses” are nil, as the 

prisoner is clothed, sheltered, fed, and has all his medical needs provided by the 

state. The funds left to the prisoner on a monthly basis are more than adequate to 

cover the prisoner's other minimal expenses and obligations without causing 

manifest hardship. Thus, we conclude that § 1l's application makes a legitimate 

presumption that the prisoner is not indigent. 

 We acknowledge that one's indigency is an individualized assessment and 

that § 1l's presumption does not result from a full individualized analysis of a 

prisoner's indigency. Accordingly, if a prisoner believes that his unique individual 

financial circumstances rebut § 1l's presumption of nonindigency, he may petition 

the court to reduce or eliminate the amount that the remittance order requires 

him to pay. However, because we adjudge a prisoner's indigency at the time of 

enforcement on the basis of manifest hardship and because a prisoner is being 

provided all significant life necessities by the state, we caution that the 

imprisoned defendant bears a heavy burden of establishing his extraordinary 

financial circumstances. . . . [W]hen reviewing a prisoner's claim, lower courts 

must receive the prisoner's petition and any proofs of his unique and extraordinary 

financial circumstances. Further, the lower courts should only hold that a 

prisoner's individual circumstances warrant amending or reducing the remittance 

order when, in its discretion, it determines that enforcement would work a 

manifest hardship on the prisoner or his immediate family. The trial courts are 

under no obligation to hold any formal proceedings. They are only required to 

amend the remittance order when § 1l's presumption of nonindigency is rebutted 

with evidence that enforcement would impose a manifest hardship on the prisoner 

or his immediate family. . . . 

* * * 

 In this case, the trial court did not err by imposing the fee for his courtappointed attorney without conducting an ability-to-pay analysis. Further, it did 

not err by issuing the remittance order under MCL 769.1l because defendant is 

presumed to be nonindigent if his prisoner account is only reduced by 50 percent 

of the amount over $50. However, if he contests his ability to pay that amount, he 

may ask the trial court to amend or revoke the remittance order, at which point the 

trial court must decide whether defendant's claim of extraordinary financial 
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circumstances rebuts the statutory presumption of his nonindigency. [Jackson, 

483 Mich at 294-299 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).] 

 Accordingly, the trial court here did not err by issuing the remittance order under MCL 

769.1l, given that defendant is presumed to be nonindigent, and defendant never petitioned the 

trial court to reduce or eliminate the amount that the remittance order requires him to pay. In 

light of defendant’s failure to contest the remittance order, we have no ruling to review. 

 As a final matter, we note that at defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a 

minimum prison sentence of four years and ten months, which was the recommended minimum 

sentence set forth in the PSIR, but the judgment of sentence provides that defendant was 

sentenced to a minimum of four years’ imprisonment. In their briefs, both parties refer to 

defendant being sentenced to a minimum prison term of four years and ten months. On remand, 

the judgment of sentence is to be corrected to show that defendant’s minimum prison sentence is 

four years and ten months. 

 Affirmed and remanded for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence so 

as to delete the provision ordering defendant to pay a probation supervision fee and to change 

defendant’s minimum term of imprisonment to four years and ten months. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause