U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

81–763 PDF 2013

BEYOND GSES: EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL 

HOUSING FINANCE MODELS WITHOUT 

EXPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 12, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 113–28 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

GARY G. MILLER, California, Vice Chairman 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

Emeritus 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

June 12, 2013 .................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

June 12, 2013 .................................................................................................... 57 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, 2013 

Jaffee, Dwight M., Willis Booth Professor of Banking, Finance, and Real 

Estate, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley .............. 8 

Lea, Michael J., Director, the Corky McMillin Center for Real Estate, San 

Diego State University ........................................................................................ 10 

Min, David K., Assistant Professor of Law, University of California Irvine 

School of Law ........................................................................................................ 15 

Pollock, Alex J., Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute ...................... 12 

White, Lawrence J., Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New 

York University .................................................................................................... 14 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Jaffee, Dwight M. ............................................................................................. 58 

Lea, Michael J. ................................................................................................. 64 

Min, David K. ................................................................................................... 77 

Pollock, Alex J. ................................................................................................. 98 

White, Lawrence J. ........................................................................................... 106 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Lea, Michael J.: 

Special Report entitled, ‘‘International Comparison of Mortgage Product 

Offerings’’ ....................................................................................................... 119 

‘‘Government Policy and the Fixed Rate Mortgage’’ ...................................... 200 

White, Lawrence J.: 

‘‘Reform of Housing Goals,’’ by Jonathan Brown ........................................... 213 

(1) 

BEYOND GSES: EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL 

HOUSING FINANCE MODELS WITHOUT 

EXPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 

Wednesday, June 12, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeb Hensarling [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Hensarling, Miller, Royce, 

Capito, Garrett, Neugebauer, McHenry, Pearce, Posey, Fitzpatrick, 

Westmoreland, Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, Duffy, Hurt, Stivers, 

Fincher, Stutzman, Mulvaney, Hultgren, Ross, Pittenger, Wagner, 

Barr, Cotton, Rothfus; Waters, Maloney, Velazquez, Watt, Sherman, Capuano, Hinojosa, Clay, Lynch, Scott, Green, Ellison, 

Himes, Peters, Carney, Sewell, Foster, Delaney, Sinema, Beatty, 

and Heck. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The committee will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the 

committee at any time. The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 

minutes for an opening statement. 

This is the 10th full or subcommittee hearing that we have had 

on the topic of forging a new sustainable housing policy for America. 

Clearly, all Americans want a healthier economy and they want 

a fair opportunity to buy a home that they can actually afford to 

keep. It is clearly time to displace a system of false hopes and broken dreams which have arisen from misdirected government policies and subsidies that regrettably have either incented, browbeat, 

or mandated financial institutions to loan money to people to buy 

homes they all too often could not afford. 

We know all too well the legacy of these policies: the shattered 

lives of millions of people who lost their meager savings rolling the 

dice on a home purchase that Washington encouraged them to 

make; almost $200 billion of taxpayer bailouts; and a wrecked economy from which this Nation has yet to recover. 

Regardless of its relative merits, the Dodd-Frank Act was silent 

on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: silent as to the existence of a government-sanctioned duopoly that was at the epicenter of the crisis; 

silent as to their cooked books; silent as to a system where Wall 

Street investors offloaded their risk onto Main Street taxpayers; 

and silent as to their bullying tactics. 

2 

Thus, the task of reforming Fannie and Freddie falls upon us. 

Notwithstanding the damage they have caused in their checkered 

past, many cannot conceive of a housing finance market without a 

government-guaranteed Fannie and Freddie. Thus, our hearing 

today will examine alternative models and will feature a panel of 

some of the most respected and knowledgeable experts on the subject. 

I believe this hearing will help establish a number of propositions: First, the United States is practically alone in the modern 

industrialized world in having GSEs directly guarantee mortgage 

securities. We are practically alone in the level of government subsidy and intervention into our housing market. 

We were also practically alone in the level of turmoil in our housing markets as measured by foreclosures and delinquencies. Clearly, there is a direct causal link. By almost any measure, Fannie 

and Freddie have not propelled the United States to housing finance nirvana. When compared to other modern industrialized nations, whether we look at rates of homeownership or spreads between mortgage interest rates and sovereign debt, the United 

States can usually be found either at the middle or the bottom of 

the pack. 

However, there is one category where the United States has 

clearly led. Regrettably, that category is foreclosure rates. In other 

words, only in America can you find a government that subsidizes 

housing more, so that we the people can get less. 

Next, I believe this hearing will help remind us that we don’t 

have to look overseas to see a well-functioning housing market 

without GSEs. Indeed, we don’t have to look any further than our 

own jumbo market that has operated without them. Prior to the 

housing bust, the jumbo market was approximately 20 percent of 

the total housing market. There was capital, liquidity, competition, 

the 30-year fixed mortgage, consumer choice, and innovation all 

right here in America. And all of this was delivered for about 25 

basis points or a quarter of 1 percent interest differential from the 

GSEs, a modest amount to avoid taxpayer bailouts, government 

control, and economic catastrophe. 

And I add parenthetically, as we have learned from previous 

hearings, whatever modest interest rate benefit the GSEs delivered 

to home buyers was offset by the cost of housing principal they artificially inflated for those very same home buyers. 

Furthermore, I believe that it will be established that although 

the 30-year fixed-rate with no pre-payment fees may be the ‘‘gold 

standard’’ mortgage for some, it is clearly the ‘‘rusty tin’’ standard 

for others. We, again, are practically alone in America having public policy assure its dominant role in the mortgage market. For 

home buyers facing rising interest rates or home buyers who keep 

their home for the market average of 7 years, it is almost assuredly 

not the best mortgage product. Successful alternative systems promote more consumer-friendly choices. 

Today, our government controls 90 percent of the housing finance 

market. Today, Washington elites decide who can qualify for a 

mortgage and who cannot. Today, taxpayers have bailed out Fannie 

and Freddie to the tune of $189 billion. Today, taxpayers are on 

the hook for $5 trillion in mortgage guarantees. 

3 

As lawmakers, it is time to open up our eyes and open up our 

minds to alternative models and a pathway forward. We shouldn’t 

preserve Fannie and Freddie’s Federal guarantee just because we 

have done so in the past. We shouldn’t preserve their Federal guarantee just because those who believe they profit from the status 

quo urge us to continue doing so. 

Americans deserve a better finance model, one that’s built to last 

and is sustainable—sustainable for homeowners, sustainable for 

taxpayers, and sustainable for our economy. 

At this time, I yield the ranking member 4 minutes for her opening statement. 

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing 

this morning on international approaches to housing finance. The 

hearing is entitled, ‘‘Beyond GSEs: Examples of Successful Housing 

Finance Models Without Explicit Government Guarantees.’’ However, if we are to be honest, it should be more properly entitled, 

‘‘Examples of Other Housing Finance Models with Other Forms of 

Government Guarantees,’’ because while the United States is 

among only a handful of countries that explicitly guarantee their 

mortgage-backed securities, we are not alone in terms of providing 

government support for housing finance. 

As our witnesses today will point out, covered bonds, which are 

utilized more robustly in Europe, enjoy a preferential status in 

terms of regulatory and capital treatment in ways that, in fact, 

mirror the Federal Home Loan Bank System. And as the actions 

of European governments and the European Central Bank in the 

wake of the 2008 crisis demonstrate, the covered bond market also 

enjoys implicit guarantees both in terms of the general market and 

for the issuers of those bonds. 

Of course, no one suggests that the United States model for 

housing finance is perfect, or that it is not in need of reform. Quite 

the contrary. That is why I continue to engage stakeholders on the 

future of the secondary mortgage market and why I call on the 

chairman to begin a discussion of the specific bipartisan reform 

proposals, of which there are now several. 

I am focused on pursuing reform proposals that preserve the beloved 30-year fixed-rate mortgage here in the United States. I 

think the recent crisis has demonstrated that this is a stable product which has actually outperformed the exotic mortgages that proliferated in the lead-up to the financial crisis. If we eliminated a 

government role in housing finance, these exotic products would 

likely again predominate. 

So while I think it is useful to consider international approaches 

to housing finance, I also believe it is disingenuous to suggest that 

foreign nations do not make significant government investments in 

housing. And I think we must acknowledge the important role that 

the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has played across the generations 

of American homeownership and the need to preserve this unique 

product. 

Finally, I think it is important to note that while other countries 

may invest fewer resources in homeownership than the United 

States, these foreign nations also make much more significant investments in public and assisted rental housing. This is something 

that the Majority on this committee is not interested in pursuing. 

4 

In fact, we already see that sequestration is pushing renters out of 

Section 8 housing operated by the Los Angeles City Housing Authority. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, as you engage us on your 

interpretation of the role that Fannie and Freddie have played in 

the housing market, and you blame the victims of a system that 

literally exploited would-be homeowners, I think this conversation 

needs to continue so that we can straighten out and get to the bottom of what really happened here in the subprime meltdown. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the committee, Mr. Miller, for 1 minute. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While a hybrid publicprivate model for Freddie and Fannie was fundamentally flawed, 

our focus should be a viable secondary mortgage market with 

sound underwriting principles. No matter the path forward, we 

must capture the important focus that the GSEs have performed 

in the market, including the securitization process and management of the to-be-determined futures market. 

As the committee contemplates changes to the U.S. finance system, it is useful to consider differences between the U.S. mortgage 

market and the housing finance system in other countries, which 

the witnesses are going to provide to us today. As we look at reform ideas from other countries, it is important to keep in mind 

that the size of the U.S. mortgage market is far greater than other 

countries’ mortgage markets combined. It exceeds the entire European mortgage market, if you added it all together. 

In addition, while 70 percent of residential mortgages in Europe 

are held by banks on their balance sheet, only about a quarter are 

held by our banks. So there is a significant difference between the 

two. We need to analyze the difference. While reform is absolutely 

necessary, we should not eliminate the extremely positive features 

that our system has had in the past. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Peters, for 1 minute. 

Mr. PETERS. Good morning. And thank you to our witnesses for 

being here today. While we are scheduled to examine housing finance models used by countries across the globe, we cannot lose 

sight of what makes America great: a strong middle class. Affordable, responsible homeownership is a cornerstone of the American 

middle class and vibrant communities across our great Nation. We 

need to put an end to the taxpayer-funded bailouts, but we must 

also ensure that responsible, hardworking families can still achieve 

the dream of homeownership. 

Eliminating the government backstop in the mortgage market 

would likely undermine the housing recovery and risk eliminating 

the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage which middle-class families rely on 

to build equity and responsibly purchase their piece of the American Dream. 

I believe our committee has a real window of opportunity in the 

coming months to meaningfully engage in GSE reform on a biparVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:05 Jan 24, 2014 Jkt 081763 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81763.TXT TERRI
5 

tisan basis, and I look forward to working with my colleagues on 

both sides of the aisle on this critical issue. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 

now recognizes the chairman of the Capital Markets Subcommittee, 

the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. I thank the chairman for holding this hearing 

today. 

When I began preparing for this hearing, I remembered reading 

an International Monetary Fund analysis on the U.S. housing market that compared it to other foreign housing markets. In comparing the level of subsidization of our housing market to other 

countries, one of the authors, John Kiff, notes, ‘‘Compared to other 

developed countries, only a couple come even close. Everything you 

could possibly name for supporting homeownership for everybody 

regardless of whether they can afford it is in place in the U.S.’’ 

The IMF report goes on to state, ‘‘Since the 1930s, the U.S. authorities have provided a wide range of support to facilities’ access 

to credit. While this has provided access to stable and affordable 

long-term mortgage financing, there is limited evidence that it has 

boosted homeownership or has made the system more efficient or 

provided buffers against economic stress. Meanwhile, it has exacerbated the boom-bust cycle.’’ The report went on to note, ‘‘During 

the pre-crisis boom period, government participation in housing finance tended to amplify the relationship between rising house 

prices and mortgage credit growth, particularly in advanced countries.’’ 

Also, countries with more government participation experienced 

deeper house price declines in the recent crisis. These findings suggest that government participation exacerbates house price swings 

for advanced economies. So while it is clear that the extraordinary 

and unprecedented level of subsidy that the United States provides 

its mortgage market directly benefits the mortgage market industry participants, there is much less evidence that all these subsidies actually provide much benefit to the borrower. In fact, based 

on the objective look of the IMF, no conservative think tank, mind 

you, and the terrible impact our country’s housing finance policy 

has had, I believe a strong case can be made that at least some 

of these policies, at the end of the day, have done more harm than 

good. I believe we should learn from some of our foreign counterparts who seem to have quite high levels of homeownership without the dozens of levels of subsidy that this country provides, which 

mostly benefit the wealthy and not the people who actually need 

the help. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the ranking 

member of the Capital Markets Subcommittee, the gentlelady from 

New York, Mrs. Maloney, for 21⁄2 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Chairman Hensarling and Ranking 

Member Waters, for holding this important hearing on alternative 

models of housing finance. And welcome, to our distinguished panel 

of witnesses today. One thing that we can all agree on is that the 

government should not back 100 percent, or 90 percent, or even 80 

percent of the mortgage market. Some of my colleagues say that 

6 

there should be no government involvement, but the market and 

most economists believe that that would be a disaster to our overall 

economy. 

So the real question before us today is, how much of the risk 

should the government bear and how much should private investors bear? When we compare our housing finance system to other 

countries, we need to look at the whole housing market, not just 

the mortgage-backed securities market. Other countries provide 

significantly more government support for rental housing than the 

United States Government does. And many of the largest European 

mortgage lenders have implicit government guarantees. So let’s remember, it was the GSEs that enabled the widespread availability 

of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, one of the great American innovations that my colleague, Mr. Peters, just spoke about. Do we 

really want to lose this 30-year mortgage that helps borrowers’ 

monthly payments remain low and predictable and provides a 

pathway, a road to homeownership? 

Housing represents 25 percent of our economy, according to Mark 

Zandi and other economists. So when we talk about reforming the 

GSEs, we need to remember that we are really talking about reforming 25 percent of our entire economy. And how do we reduce 

the government’s footprint without harming the overall mortgage 

market and homeownership availability? Would completely removing the government from the mortgage markets damage our economy as a whole? 

These are the kinds of questions that we need to answer as we 

move forward in deciding how to reform government GSEs. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Texas, the chairman of the Housing and Insurance Subcommittee, Mr. Neugebauer, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. A lot of people are probably wondering why we are having 

so many hearings on housing finance. The reason we are is that 

housing finance is important to housing. We talk about a lot of 

numbers that are the $200 billion that the taxpayers had to pony 

up because bad decisions were made, bad lending practices. 

But I think one of the things that we have to do is to put this 

in perspective of why it is important to have a sustainable housing 

finance system in this country. The reason is that it affects housing, not only the purchase of housing, but the homeownership. And 

what happened to a lot of hardworking Americans that we all are 

here trying to protect is that some of those folks were doing the 

right thing. They were making their payments. They had made a 

downpayment on their house. And what happened was, many of 

them suffered tremendous losses in the value of their house because of this poor market performance where market discipline was 

not in place. 

So, they got double-dipped. Their tax dollars had to bail out these 

entities and they lost equity in their house. That is a lose-lose situation for homeownership. If you want to have a positive impact on 

homeownership, you have to have a stable housing finance market. 

And there are those out there who think the status quo is the way 

to do that. I would remind you it is the status quo that got us here 

7 

today. And when people quit using proper underwriting standards 

and they were passing that risk along and weren’t paying attention, then we saw carelessness happen and poor lending practices 

initiated. 

What we have to do is to get—the government has nationalized 

the housing finance market in this country. It is not healthy for the 

government. Basically, that puts the government in the position of 

telling you whether or not you get to own a home. And that is not 

what America was founded on. 

Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate you holding this hearing 

today, and I look forward to hearing some of the other ideas that 

some of these witnesses will discuss as to what other countries are 

using to do their housing finance. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. First of all, I 

think our ranking member, Ms. Waters, really put her hand on the 

issue here. Yes, we have to make some moves. It is not as healthy 

as it should be to have 90 percent of the market with governmentbacked agencies. But what is important is that we get an answer 

to the question of whether or not the private market is willing to 

accept and fill this void and whether they are capable of doing so. 

We can look at nations all over the world, but there is no nation 

like the United States. We have a history of demographic issues. 

We have a history of exclusion. So, we look at this change. There 

is a reason why we have the GSEs. We have to make sure that the 

private market is capable and willing to fill the void. That is the 

fundamental issue and the balance that this committee has to deal 

with on this very, very important issue. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Illinois, Mr. Foster, for 30 seconds, and we all look forward 

to finding out how much he can pack into 30 seconds. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. I would like to start by thanking the 

chairman for having this hearing. I think it is past time that we 

show some humility in this country after the failure of our system 

and looking around the world at maybe other countries that got it 

right. In reading the testimony last night, I was struck by the generally positive comments about specifically the Danish mortgage 

origination system. It is one that provides a 30-year fixed-rate 

mortgage by pushing the prepayments and the interest rate risk 

out to the private markets, and it avoids the moral hazard and bad 

underwriting by insisting that mortgage originators retain the 

credit risk. It is also among the most efficient systems in the world. 

And I think we should give it a long hard look, and I think there 

is a bipartisan opportunity to really make an improvement by 

heading in that direction. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. We now welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses. 

Dr. Dwight Jaffee is the Willis Booth Professor of Banking, Finance and Real Estate at the University of California, Berkeley. 

Professor Jaffee teaches courses in asset-backed securitization. He 

is the co-chair of the Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics at UC Berkeley’s Haas School of Business. He earned his 

8 

Ph.D. in economics at MIT, and his B.A. in economics from Northwestern University. 

Dr. Michael Lea is the director of the Corky McMillin Center for 

Real Estate at San Diego State University. Dr. Lea has published 

numerous articles on housing and mortgage finance, including an 

influential 2009 World Bank publication on emerging market housing finance. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University 

of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

Mr. Alex Pollock is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise 

Institute, and is widely regarded as an expert in housing finance. 

He is a former president and CEO of the Federal Home Loan Bank 

of Chicago. He holds master’s degrees from Princeton University 

and the University of Chicago, and a bachelor’s degree from Williams College. 

Dr. Lawrence White is the Robert Kavesh Professor of Economics 

at Stern School of Business in New York City. Dr. White previously 

served on the board of the Federal Home Loan Bank and was one 

of the three board members of Freddie Mac. He has Ph.D. and 

bachelors degrees in economics from Harvard, and a master’s degree from the London School of Economics. 

Last but not least, Dr. David Min is an assistant professor of law 

at the University of California Irvine School of Law. Dr. Min previously served as a staff attorney at the SEC and as a staffer on 

the Senate Banking Committee. We welcome you back to the Hill, 

Professor Min. He earned his law degree from Harvard, and his 

bachelor’s degree from Wharton. 

Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Please bring the microphone very close 

to your mouth so all can hear the testimony. Without objection, 

each of your written statements will be made a part of the record. 

Again, the light is green. And when it turns yellow, you will have 

a minute to sum up. When it turns red, it is time for us to go to 

the next witness. And each member of the committee will have 5 

minutes in which to ask our panelists questions. Again, thank you 

for agreeing to testify. Welcome. 

Dr. Jaffee, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DWIGHT M. JAFFEE, WILLIS BOOTH PROFESSOR OF BANKING, FINANCE, AND REAL ESTATE, HAAS 

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 

BERKELEY 

Mr. JAFFEE. Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, 

and members of the committee, I very much welcome the opportunity to discuss with you today the future role of our government 

in the U.S. mortgage market. As the comments from the committee 

members have already indicated, we really are at the point of deciding how to reform the U.S. mortgage market and how to replace 

the Government-Sponsored Enterprises. 

There are basically two alternatives on the table. One is a private market system in which we basically let the private markets 

run the U.S. mortgage market. The alternative is to create some 

new form of a government guarantee for most U.S. mortgages that 

would replace the GSEs. In describing that second alternative, I 

want to say, at least for myself, that this is separable from the 

9 

question of FHA and VA programs. In other words, I do believe 

that the FHA and VA highly-directed mortgage programs for specific groups are a separable issue. My comments today are directed 

to government proposals, proposals to have the government take 

over a large part of the U.S. mortgage market. 

My research has come to the conclusion that the private markets 

are fully capable of carrying out all mortgage market functions in 

the United States, and that it is, by far, the best alternative. The 

issues with government guarantees, I will come to at the end of my 

comments. 

The reason for my confidence in the U.S. mortgage market as a 

private market really comes in two forms. The first is that the markets have already indicated a full capability to carry out this activity. If you go back, for example, and look at the period from 1950 

to 1990 in which we had primarily a private mortgage market, the 

homeownership rate in the United States rose from about 55 percent in 1950 to about 64 percent in 1990, a significant increase virtually all carried out by private market lending. If you look at the 

period from 1990 to the present, a period which has been clearly 

dominated by the GSEs, the homeownership rate rose from 64 percent to 65 percent. In other words, there is no evidence of the GSEs 

contributing anything significant to an increase in homeownership 

rates in the United States. 

A related statistic is to look at the part of the U.S. markets that 

is independent of the GSEs, the so-called jumbo mortgage market 

in which, by definition, the GSEs cannot operate. And the private 

markets, that market, the jumbo market, has often exceeded 20 

percent of the U.S. mortgage market, has reached as much as 25 

percent, and even today, under the current conditions, is coming 

back. In other words, the jumbo market is a really strong indicator 

that the private markets are fully capable of making a large 

amount of mortgages to most Americans. 

The role that is sometimes attributed to the GSEs concerns their 

role in the mortgage-backed security market where they have guaranteed mortgages. I would like to point out that the role that they 

have played there is predominantly due to the implicit subsidy. 

One has to remember that they have approximately a 50 basispoint benefit by convincing investors in all of their debt securities 

that the government would bail them out if worse came to worst, 

a fact that turned out to be true. Of those 50 basis points, 25 basis 

points were passed on to mortgage borrowers, and 25 basis points 

basically stayed in the pockets of the GSE shareholders. 

If you look at the jumbo market, at the same time, the jumbo 

mortgages were typically priced at about 25 basis points higher 

than conforming GSE mortgages. If you net out the 50 basis-point 

subsidy going to the GSEs, you actually come to the recognition 

that the jumbo market in some sense was pricing their mortgages 

25 basis points less than the GSEs once you net out the subsidy. 

So this is my confidence in the ability of the U.S. private markets 

to carry out the mortgage market activities. Comments are sometimes also raised for the GSEs, that they are responsible for the 

fixed-rate long-term mortgage. This is just plain wrong. First of all, 

the fixed-rate long-term mortgage was a creation actually of the 

10 

Homeowners Loan Corporation in the 1930s long before the GSEs 

existed. So, they certainly can’t claim credit for creating it. 

Second, if you look at their activities in mortgage-backed securities, all the GSEs did was pass all of the interest rate risks on to 

the investors. So it was the investors that were buying the fixedrate mortgages. The GSEs played almost no role in expediting that. 

So, there is just nothing to the fact that they created it. Furthermore, many of the jumbo mortgages that had nothing to do with 

the GSEs were also fixed-rate long-term mortgages. 

That is my basis on why the market works. The second point is 

the European markets which are the focus of a lot of the discussion 

here. My research on the— 

Chairman HENSARLING. Dr. Jaffee, if you could wrap it up, so we 

could go to the next witness. 

Mr. JAFFEE. Sure. So on the European markets, my research 

there has looked at a comparison of the databases with the behavior of the U.S. mortgage markets versus the European markets. 

And let me give one summary statistic which is that the homeownership rate of the United States is only the average of 16 European countries. So again, it reinforces the conclusion that the GSE 

activity here has not realized any benefits. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Jaffee can be found on page 58 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you, Dr. Jaffee. 

Dr. Lea, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. LEA, DIRECTOR, THE CORKY 

McMILLIN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE, SAN DIEGO STATE 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. LEA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Waters, and members 

of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. 

I have an extensive background in housing finance, including 

senior executive positions at major mortgage lenders and as Chief 

Economist at Freddie Mac. I have been actively involved in the 

study of international housing finance systems for more than 20 

years, having done consulting, business development, and research 

in 30 countries. I have recently published two international comparative studies of developed country mortgage markets and an article on the long-term fixed-rate mortgage. I would request that 

these studies be entered into the record, as they provide information supporting the points I make today. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. LEA. The points I would like to make in my opening remarks 

are as follows: The U.S. housing finance system is hardly the gold 

standard in the world. It has not performed better, and in many 

respects has performed worse, than those in other countries. The 

U.S. housing finance system is unusual in its dominance of GSEs, 

housing-specific guarantees, and securitization. These characteristics are, in large part, the policy decision to make the long-term 

fixed-rate mortgage the centerpiece of the system. No other developed country has a government-sponsored enterprise. Among the 

13 developed countries surveyed in my research, only Canada and 

Japan have government mortgage guarantee programs equivalent 

to Ginnie Mae. Only Canada and the Netherlands have governVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:05 Jan 24, 2014 Jkt 081763 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81763.TXT TERRI
11 

ment-owned insurance companies. And as mentioned before, only 

Denmark has a long-term fixed-rate mortgage that can be prepaid 

without penalty. And they finance it in a much safer and more 

transparent way. 

The extent of government support in other countries is less than 

that in the United States. A successful housing finance system is 

clearly not dependent on GSEs. It is important to note that all 

countries support housing finance indirectly through their banking 

systems. In most countries, commercial banks are the dominant 

lenders. They are supported through deposit insurance, liquidity 

backstops, and temporary guarantees in crisis. It is to support, to 

sustain and maintain a type of financial institution that is critical 

for the functioning of modern economies and that conducts a wide 

variety of business. Commercial banks pay for this support through 

deposit insurance and meaningful capital requirements. The GSEs 

have never paid user fees for their support and have operated with 

inadequate capital for most of their existence. 

To understand our housing finance system, one has to focus on 

the role of the long-term fixed-rate mortgage. As Dwight said, this 

is a creation of the government. It is not a naturally occurring instrument in modern financial systems, as it creates substantial financial and taxpayer risk. The instrument was born in the Depression as a solution for the refinancing problems of borrowers with 

nonamortizing mortgages. FHA insured these instruments and private lenders refused to make them. Due to concerns about their financial risks, Fannie Mae was created to purchase their fund with 

Treasury debt. The dominance of the instrument was entrenched 

when the savings and loans were required to make only these 

kinds of mortgages in the 1960s and 1970s. That dependence on 

fixed-rate mortgages bankrupted the savings and loans industry in 

the 1980s. 

The government continued to support the instrument through 

the activities of the GSEs. And today, we are in the unenviable position of having over 90 percent of our mortgage products be one 

instrument and entirely backed by government guarantees. Should 

this instrument be the bedrock of the housing finance system? It 

has undeniable consumer benefit. However, there are significant 

costs. The interest rate and prepayment risk of the fixed-rate mortgage are costly and difficult for investors to manage. A huge volume of derivative instruments is necessary for investors to manage 

these risks. The premium for both the long-term and prepayment 

option raise rates for all users of the mortgage. The fixed-rate 

mortgage can create negative equity in a falling house price environment, as we have seen. And taxpayers have had billions of dollars in losses, backing the credit risk guarantees provided by the 

GSEs in order to support the fixed-rate mortgage. 

If we move away from the housing finance system predicated on 

fixed-rate mortgages and GSEs, what would emerge? Pre-crisis experience shows that the private market can securitize fixed-rate 

mortgages as the jumbo experience indicates. Borrowers could 

lower mortgage rates by selecting shorter fixed-rate terms consistent with their mobility patterns. Few fixed-rate mortgages are 

held for the 15- to 30-year terms that exist in our current instruments. 

12 

In a non-GSE world, instruments like the rollover or hybrid adjustable rate mortgage provide rate and payment stability for up to 

10 years and protections through interest rate caps. Lenders can 

safely finance these through term deposits, covered bonds, or private label securitization. Taxpayer risk would be substantially reduced through the elimination of the GSEs and if lenders are holding meaningful capital. 

In conclusion, the experience of other countries is that affordable 

and stable housing finance can be provided without GSEs and 

nearly universal government guarantees. Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lea can be found on page 64 of 

the appendix.] 

Chairman HENSARLING. Mr. Pollock, you are now recognized for 

5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALEX J. POLLOCK, RESIDENT FELLOW, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. POLLOCK. Thank you. Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, Vice Chairman Miller, and members of the committee, 

the American housing finance system has collapsed twice in the 

last 3 decades. We certainly do need to see what we can learn from 

other countries. Viewing our housing finance sector in an international perspective, as Mike Lea just said, the one thing most unusual about it was and is the dominant and disproportionate role 

played by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The GSEs themselves 

used to claim that this made U.S. housing finance, as they said, 

‘‘the envy of the world.’’ This was, however, a view not shared by 

the world. 

Let us ask and answer five essential questions from an international perspective. 

Are GSEs, like Fannie and Freddie, necessary for effective housing finance? No. 

Do the GSEs get for the United States an internationally high 

homeownership rate? No. 

Do the GSEs get for the United States an above average homeownership rate? No. 

Are GSEs necessary to have long-term fixed-rate mortgages? No. 

And even with their disastrous actual outcome, are GSEs the 

best model in theory? No. 

It was often claimed without supporting data that the United 

States had the highest homeownership rate in the world. This 

seemed plausible to Americans but it was wrong. For example, 

England, with a different housing finance system and no GSEs, has 

a slightly higher homeownership rate than we do. In my written 

testimony there is a table of comparative homeownership rates 

which displays homeownership in 28 economically advanced countries. On this list, the United States ranks 20th, just behind England. The median homeownership rate among these countries is 68 

percent compared with our 65 percent. 

The GSEs, based on the free use of the U.S. Treasury’s credit, 

ran up the leverage of the housing finance sector, inflated house 

prices, and escalated systemic risk. Foreign investors helped pump 

13 

up the housing bubble through the GSEs while being fully protected from any risk. Of course, other countries also made housing 

finance mistakes. But nobody else made this particular giant mistake. 

When Fannie and Freddie were still riding high and Fannie, in 

particular, was a greatly feared bully boy both in Washington and 

on Wall Street, I presented the GSE-centric U.S. housing finance 

system to the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks in Copenhagen. 

One Danish CEO memorably summed things up at the end. He 

said, ‘‘In Denmark, we always say that we are the socialists and 

America is the land of free enterprise. Now I see that when it 

comes to mortgage finance, it is the opposite.’’ He was so right. 

But now, with Fannie and Freddie continuing to be guaranteed 

by the U.S. Treasury, being granted huge loopholes by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and being heavily subsidized 

by the Federal Reserve’s buying up of their MBS, they have a bigger market share and more monopoly power than before. The 

American housing finance sector is more socialized than ever. 

A senior British financial official said recently, ‘‘We don’t want 

a government guaranteed housing finance market like the United 

States has.’’ They don’t want what we have and we don’t want it 

either. 

Every housing finance system in the world, as we look around, 

must address two fundamental questions: The first is how to match 

the nature of a mortgage loan with an appropriate funding source. 

To this, there are multiple solutions. 

The second fundamental question is, who will bear the credit 

risk? In most countries, the lender retains the credit risk, which is 

undoubtedly the superior alignment of incentives. The GSE approach in America, and also that of private MBS, systematically 

separates credit risk from the lender. So you divest the credit risk 

of the loans you make to your own customers. This was and is a 

distinct outlier amongst countries and it has had disastrous results, needless to say. 

One impressive solution to the two fundamental questions of 

housing finance is the housing finance system of Denmark, as discussed in my written testimony and pointed out by Congressman 

Foster. My written testimony also discusses Germany, England, 

Malaysia and Canada. Like most of the world, Canada has no 

GSEs, although it does have excessive government bearing of mortgage credit risk. 

Overall, surveying the world emphasizes an essential conclusion. 

Fannie and Freddie should cease to be GSEs. Considering the 

international anomaly they represent and the disastrous government experiment they represent, we should all be able to agree on 

this. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollock can be found on page 98 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman HENSARLING. Professor White, you are now recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

14 

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. WHITE, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 

Mr. WHITE. Thank you. Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member 

Waters, and members of the committee, my name is Lawrence 

White. I am a professor of economics at the NYU Stern School of 

Business. As the chairman indicated, from 1986 to 1989, I was one 

of the board members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; and 

in that capacity, I was also one of the three board members of 

Freddie Mac. Now in the interest of full disclosure, I think it is important that I add, in 1997, 1998, Freddie Mac asked me to write 

an article for their publication, ‘‘Secondary Mortgage Markets on 

Bank Capital Requirements.’’ I did so. It was published. It is available. I am happy to send it to anyone. You can find it on my resume. You can look on my Web site and you can find the link. I 

was paid $5,000 for that article. 

In 2004, Fannie Mae asked me to come in to one of their advisory committee meetings and to talk about bank capital requirements. I was paid $2,000 plus transportation expenses. I flew both 

ways coach class on the shuttle. I used street-hailed taxi cabs to 

and from the airport. Full disclosure, Mr. Chairman. 

The U.S. housing system provides substantial subsidies for housing. Widespread. For homeowners, for home buyers, for home builders, for renters. Now, there is a central tenet of economics. I won’t 

call it a law. Only you men and women of the Congress deal with 

laws, and maybe Isaac Newton qualifies as a creator of laws, but 

it is a central tenet of economics: If you make something less expensive, if you make it lower in price, people will buy more of it. 

For example, through subsidy. And that has been true of housing. 

Housing has been reduced in price through all those subsidies, and 

people have bought more houses. 

And as a consequence, the U.S. economy has suffered. The housing stock is substantially larger than it otherwise would be—which 

has meant that investments in other useful productive capital, 

whether it is business capital plant and equipment, whether it is 

social capital, schools, roads, bridges, hospitals, whether it is 

human capital, education and training—has been smaller because 

the housing stock has sucked up otherwise usable investable funds. 

Further, ironically, a lot of the subsidy has gone to benefit highincome households. In essence, they have been subsidized to do 

what they would do otherwise, which is buy houses—only they 

bought more houses and they have engaged in excessive leveraging 

because a lot of the subsidy encourages borrowing. International 

comparisons, as you have just heard from the three gentlemen on 

my right, and some of which I reproduce in my testimony, shows 

that the U.S. housing system doesn’t look so good in international 

comparisons, despite the extensive amounts of subsidy. 

So what to do? First, let’s cut back on the subsidy. Second, let’s 

especially cut back on subsidized lending, whether through the income tax code or through special institutions like the GSEs. Third, 

contrary to a lot of what you are going to hear, maybe we ought 

to cut back on the sanctity of homeownership and recognize that 

renting is a perfectly good alternative for lots of households, especially when one realizes that housing prices do not always go up. 

15 

Fourth, let’s target subsidies where they really are needed: on lowand moderate-income households, first-time home buyers. Do it 

through FHA, VA. Do it on budget in a transparent way. 

In a largely private financial housing finance system, where will 

the financing come from? Partly through depositories. It is important to remember that as recently as 2007, depositories held 30 

percent of whole loan mortgages; and without competition from 

subsidized GSEs, that percentage would likely be higher. Probably 

also ‘‘covered bonds’’ might be able to help out a little bit. 

Securitization, simplified, with more information would take up the 

rest. Insurance companies, pension funds are natural buyers of 

these long-lived assets, since these institutions have long-lived liabilities. Having sensible prepayment fees would be important 

there. And in that context, the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage would 

continue to be available to borrowers. 

So in conclusion, a privately-oriented finance system for housing 

is desirable. It is feasible. And sooner would be better than later. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions from the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. White can be found on page 106 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes Professor Min 

for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID K. MIN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF 

LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. MIN. Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on the topic of alternative housing finance models. This is obviously a very complicated topic as we have seen from the other 

witnesses’ testimonies, but it is a critically important one. Before 

I get into the substance of my remarks, I want to emphasize a 

point that may seem obvious but is not always well taken, which 

is that it is extraordinarily difficult to try to compare different 

models of housing finance as these are intrinsically and intricately 

intertwined with the cultural political and economic systems with 

which they coexist. 

So for example, the low foreclosure rates in Europe can’t properly 

be understood in the absence of also understanding the strong social safety nets and a large availability of public rental housing 

there. With that important caveat in mind, there are four points 

I would like to make today in my spoken testimony. 

The first point is that contrary to claims of some, including all 

of my actual fellow witnesses, the United States is not unique in 

the level of government guarantees that it provides housing finance 

because such guarantees are universal throughout the developed 

world. The claim that the United States is unique in this respect 

is primarily based on observation, as the United States is one of 

only a handful of countries that provides government guarantees 

for mortgage-backed securitization. The problem with this analysis 

is that it focuses myopically on how the United States provides government guarantees for mortgage finance, and ignores how other 

countries might do so. 

16 

While securitization has dominated U.S. housing finance for the 

past several decades, it is not a major factor in most other countries. As such, in trying to determine whether other countries support their mortgage systems, it makes little sense to look at government guarantees for securitization. Rather, we should be looking to 

how other countries actually do fund mortgages and whether government guarantees exist on those forms of funding. 

Now, as Dr. Lea has noted, by far the largest source of financing 

for residential mortgages outside the United States is bank deposits, with covered bonds also providing a significant amount of housing finance in Europe. Therefore, in assessing how much government support exists in other mortgage systems, the right question 

to ask is this: Do other countries provide government guarantees 

on bank deposits and covered bonds? And the answer is unequivocally yes. Bank deposits, of course, enjoy explicit government guarantees across the world. 

And in Europe, covered bonds enjoy a myriad of government 

guarantees, which brings me to my second point. European covered 

bonds are really not very different from our own agency obligations 

in terms of the government support that they enjoy. There are a 

number of ways in which covered bonds benefit from such guarantees, which I describe in my written testimony, but I will focus on 

what I think is the most important of these, which is the implicit 

government guarantees that exist for covered bond issuers. Both 

because of European aversion to letting banks fail and because of 

the high prevalence of ‘‘too-big-to-fail,’’ European banks are seeing 

us enjoying implicit government guarantees behind all of their obligations. 

As one European Central Bank official said, ‘‘We don’t let banks 

fail. We don’t even let dry cleaners fail.’’ This statement is actually 

also borne by history as the last failure of a European covered bond 

issuer occurred in 1900. In addition to government guarantees, European covered bonds also enjoy a number of other governmental 

benefits, including preferential capital treatment and eligibility as 

collateral for ECB repo lending which are similar in many ways to 

the benefits that are enjoyed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

In short, in a number of ways European covered bonds look very 

similar to agency debt and may best be thought of as governmentsponsored obligations. This explains why sovereign risk is a central 

factor in the credit ratings of European covered bonds and why 

growing concerns about European sovereign risks have negatively 

impacted covered bond spreads. It is also why European governments and the European Central Bank responded to the financial 

crisis with a tsunami of bailouts targeted at protecting covered 

bonds, a partial list of which is listed in my written testimony. 

The third point I would like to make here today is that there is 

no perfect housing finance system, as each of the major housing finance housing models—bank deposits; mortgage-backed securities; 

and covered bonds—have their strengths and weaknesses. In the 

United States, we are well familiar with the weaknesses of deposits 

in MBS due to our previous experiences with the savings and loan 

debacle and the recent financial crisis. Covered bonds carry their 

own problems as well, which I will briefly describe to you. 

17 

First, because covered bonds require an overcollateralized cover 

pool of issuer’s best assets may necessarily increase risk to other 

creditors, particularly government deposit insurers who have worse 

and fewer assets to cover their claims in the event of a bank resolution. This, of course, raises the risk of a taxpayer loss. 

Second, because investors and covered bonds look primarily to 

the credit quality of the issuer, covered bonds tend to be a more 

suitable funding instrument for large complex banks with AAA ratings. And so any efforts to promote covered bonds in this country 

would disproportionately benefit ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ banks and exacerbate that problem. 

Moreover, covered bonds did not prove to be a panacea against 

housing finance instability. Both of the countries that primarily use 

covered bonds to fund their mortgage needs, Denmark and Spain, 

experienced housing bubbles that were worse than the one we experienced in the United States, and are currently facing serious 

housing market problems as a result. 

I make a number of other points in my written testimony, but 

I will conclude with the fourth and final point I will make here 

today, which is that given the political preferences of Americans, 

I think it makes more sense to try to fix our current system rather 

than implement radical changes or import European models. 

Deposit-backed lending is unlikely to provide broadly available 

30-year fixed-rate mortgages which are tremendously popular with 

Americans following in the aftermath of the savings and loans crisis. I uncovered bonds with the implicit guarantees they carry and 

their tendency to promote ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ seem inconsistent with 

the long-standing American populous diversion assertion that big 

banks, hidden subsidies, and bailouts. Sometimes the devil you 

know is better than the devil you don’t. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Professor Min can be found on page 

77 of the appendix.] 

Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you, Professor. And thank you to 

all of the panelists. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes to 

ask questions. 

Clearly, there is a lot to unpack in this testimony. Professor 

White, I was kind of intrigued by your use of the phrase, I think 

it was, ‘‘more home’’—which I believe was singular and not plural. 

Mr. WHITE. ‘‘More house.’’ 

Chairman HENSARLING. ‘‘More house.’’ So I believe what I have 

heard is that there are a number of countries that have FHA-like 

systems and structures to target government policy towards helping low- and moderate-income people; but otherwise, we are somewhat unique in having the government involved in a guarantee in 

the GSEs. 

Are the GSE phenomena mainly helping upper-income people get 

the granite countertops instead of the tile, get the fourth bedroom 

instead of the third? 

Professor White? 

Mr. WHITE. Certainly, that is the way I see the income tax deduction for mortgage interest and local property tax payments. 

Even the GSEs, if you look at the experience of the 1990s—I 

would urge you to take a look at a chapter written by Jonathan 

18 

Brown, look at the maps that Mr. Brown—I cite it in my testimony—look at the maps that Mr. Brown reproduces from the 1990s 

of where Fannie and Freddie were doing most of their lending relative to the available possibilities on conforming loans. And it was 

in the outer suburbs of the metropolitan areas of Chicago, Cleveland, and Dayton, not the inner areas. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Mr. Pollock— 

Mr. WHITE. And the expansion of the conforming loan limit in 2008 to $729,750 certainly expanded the opportunities again. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Mr. Pollock, you have done quite a bit of 

research here. So I think it is somewhat well-established that the 

GSEs may have helped buy down a consumer’s interest rate by 25 

basis points and may have lost it on inflating their principal. But what did the taxpayer get for his almost $200 billion of bailout? You say in your research we are only 20th in homeownership 

of the modern, industrialized world. What did we get? What did the 

taxpayer get for his money? 

Mr. POLLOCK. We certainly didn’t get a high level of homeownership, relative to other countries. Obviously, we got a lot of senior 

preferred stock in Fannie and Freddie. We got higher house prices, 

Mr. Chairman. When you push credit at any sector, especially in 

housing—but it also applies to colleges, let’s say—which is what 

Fannie and Freddie did, you cause prices to rise. So not only, as 

Professor White says, do you get more house, but you get higher 

house prices and you pump up bubbles. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Many posit that what the GSEs did deliver was a system that delivers the 30-year fixed with no prepayment penalties and makes that really the center of our housing finance system. 

So, number one, Mr. Pollock, do you believe this would exist? 

Would consumers, if they want a 30-year fixed with no prepayment 

fees, would that exist in the absence of the GSEs, in your opinion, 

and why? 

Mr. POLLOCK. Mr. Chairman, as my fellow panelists have said, 

we see the 30-year, fixed-rate alone existed in other markets which 

were not guaranteed by the GSEs like the jumbo market. As they 

have also said, the 30-year fixed-rate is primarily a question of 

whether there are investors in long-dated assets, which there are, 

not the question of the guarantee of the security by Fannie and 

Freddie. 

I think a robust housing finance system would have a lot of different instruments in it. It would have long-term fixed-rate mortgages. It would have— 

Chairman HENSARLING. Permit me to interrupt. My time is just 

about to run out. 

I am curious about the—and I don’t want to put words in your 

mouth, Professor Min, but I think you have shown a preference for 

having a system that is fixed on the 30-year fixed, but the data I 

see says that the average first-time home buyer owns their home 

for 4 years. And if that is true, I have done a little calculus here 

that if they would have gone with the 15-year instead of the 30- 

year, or, actually, over a 7-year time period, the difference in cumulative principal is the difference between roughly $14,000 versus 

$53,000. 

19 

So the average American sells their home every 7 years. If that 

is true, why is this necessarily pro-consumer? 

Mr. MIN. Sure. One thing I would note is that the span in which 

homeowners are living in their house is obviously much longer, 

given the crisis that we have experienced in the financial system 

and the economy. 

Basically, the safety and certainty of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage doesn’t really benefit people during good economies because 

they can resell their house during rising markets, et cetera. It is 

only when we have bad economies and difficulties in refinancing 

that the cost, certainly, of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage really 

shows its value to consumers. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you. 

I would note that the Chair is setting a poor example by asking 

a question and not giving the witness the time to answer. I hope 

the other Members don’t follow my example. 

Mr. MIN. Hopefully, that was succinct enough. 

Chairman HENSARLING. I now yield 5 minutes to the ranking 

member. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t know where to start here. Let me start with Mr. Lea, just 

quickly. 

What did you say caused the failure of the S&Ls? And what documentation do you have for that? 

Mr. LEA. The failure of the S&Ls was based on the mismatch 

that existed between their assets, 80 percent of which were longterm fixed-rate mortgages, and their liabilities, which were shortterm deposits. 

And when you look back in 1981, 1982, about 80 percent of the 

entire industry was bankrupt and insolvent because of that mismatch. They are paying out more in interest on their liabilities 

than they are earning interest on those fixed-rate mortgages. 

Ms. WATERS. May I ask, what role did the S&L involvement in 

the commercial markets and all those shopping centers that they 

invest in, what role did that play? 

Mr. LEA. That played a role in making the losses worse. Because 

what we allowed them to do is to try to grow out of their problems 

that were created by the fixed-rate mortgage— 

Ms. WATERS. Some of us believe that is the major cause. So I just 

wanted to make sure I understood what you were saying. 

Mr. LEA. That is the major cause. 

Ms. WATERS. Let me talk about some homeownership rates here. 

Professor Min, homeownership rates in Germany are around 40 

percent; in Denmark, around 51 percent during the 2000s, were 

much lower than the United States, which had homeownership 

rates between 65 and 70 percent. 

Granted, from the peak of the housing bubble until today, homeownership rates in the United States have fallen from a high of 

69.2 percent—that is, at the end of 2007—to 65 percent in the first 

quarter of 2013. 

As a Nation, do you believe that we are prepared to slide to the 

homeownership rates of 40 or 50 percent, similar to our international counterparts? 

20 

Mr. MIN. I think for that to happen without major macroeconomic and social collapse, we would need to really bring in a lot 

of the German and Danish social policies, including the strong social welfare systems they have, the large availability of publicly 

funded rental housing, among other things. 

There is just a lot less income volatility, a lot less division of 

wealth. You can’t really bring in the housing finance system of 

those countries and expect it to work the same way without bringing in all the other policies. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you. 

And, Mr. White, are you suggesting that we get rid of the income 

tax deduction for mortgage interest? 

Mr. WHITE. I would do it in a heartbeat. 

Ms. WATERS. Would you speak up a little bit louder so all of the 

middle-class constituents out there can hear you? 

Mr. WHITE. I would do it in a heartbeat because most of the middle-class people don’t get to take advantage of it because they do 

not itemize on their tax return. And, further, high-income households are going to buy more house, spend more money, get much 

greater benefit from the deduction. 

I would do it in a heartbeat. But if you are going to keep it, at 

least convert it from a tax deduction and into a tax credit so that 

lower-income households— 

Ms. WATERS. Okay, so I get it. 

Mr. WHITE. —could take advantage. 

Ms. WATERS. You are against the income tax deductions for 

mortgage interest. I get that. 

Let me just ask, if you know—I understand that the GSEs have paid back $130 billion of the $180 billion bailout that we afforded 

them. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. Pollock, are you aware of that? 

Mr. POLLOCK. Oh, I’m sorry, Ranking Member Waters. I didn’t 

realize—I didn’t hear my name. 

Yes. They haven’t actually paid it back. They have paid it in dividends. Of course, you don’t get credit when you pay interest or dividends on an investment for reducing the principal. If we did the 

math right, we would have to account— 

Ms. WATERS. But the fact of the matter is they have paid back $130 billion of the $180 billion; is that correct? 

Mr. POLLOCK. They have sent in that money, and it reflects their 

current monopoly— 

Ms. WATERS. And who has— 

Mr. POLLOCK. —power and monopoly pricing. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you. 

Who has documentation, as it has been represented, that the 

GSEs have more high-income owners than low-income owners? 

Who said that? 

Mr. WHITE. It was me, Ranking Member Waters. 

Ms. WATERS. Give me the numbers. Give me the information. 

What is the— 

Mr. WHITE. All right. I wish I had brought—I would love to—you 

look at these maps and you want to weep. 

Ms. WATERS. No, no, no. I just— 

Mr. WHITE. That is the only— 

21 

Ms. WATERS. —need the numbers. 

Mr. WHITE. I didn’t bring them with me. I cite the article in my 

testimony. I urge you and your staff to look at that article, look at 

those maps. 

Ms. WATERS. What I would like you to do is submit for the record 

your documentation—- 

Mr. WHITE. I will be very happy— 

Ms. WATERS. —your data, as it is being identified by my colleagues here, on what you represent. 

Mr. WHITE. I will be very happy to send it to you. 

Ms. WATERS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. I thank the Chair. 

So I guess I will start with—in light of Professor Min’s comment, 

since we are comparing the U.S. housing finance policy to many 

other countries in the world, I thought it would be helpful if we 

look at the various ways that the United States subsidizes the 

mortgage market and compare and contrast it with the amount of 

subsidies other countries have actually had. And other countries 

actually have a higher homeownership rate than the United States. 

And on the proverbial back-of-napkin count, the United States 

has over 20 various ways that we subsidize our Nation’s mortgage 

finance market. This panel may come up with some other ones for 

me. 

These range from the institutional—the FHA as a government 

mortgage insurer; Ginnie Mae as a government MBS guarantor; 

Fannie and Freddie as GSEs, MBS guarantors; Fannie and Freddie 

as GSEs, portfolio investors; the Federal Home Loan Bank as a 

GSE lender through their Advance program; and then you have the 

Federal Home Loan Bank as a GSE portfolio investor through their 

MPF programs. All right. 

Now, on top of that, you had the promotion of affordable housing 

through the FHA; Fannie and Freddie affordable housing goals; 

HUD’s National Home Ownership Strategy; the CRA, Community 

Reinvestment Act; HUD’s Best Practices Initiative; and the Federal 

Home Loan Affordable Housing Programs. 

And in addition to that, you have FHA’s Leadership in Low 

Down Payment Lending; HUD’s regulation of GSEs’ affordable 

housing mission; Fannie and Freddie’s leverage and preferred stock 

advantages; risk-based capital rules favorable to agency obligations. 

Then, you have favorable rules for second mortgage lending, both 

as to the capital and the inability of the first mortgage lender to 

prohibit it. And, of course, we all know the tax deductibility of interest. And then, finally, the overreliance by the Fed on lower rates 

as a weapon of choice. 

And then, of course, on top of that, you have other miscellaneous 

policies, such as limited use of prepayment penalties, the de jour 

and de facto limits on recourse deficiency judgments, liberal capital 

gains exemptions, and procyclical loan losses, reserving and FDSE 

premium policies. 

So that is what we have in this country. Does anyone else have 

anything close to that whole litany of programs on top of the GSEs? 

22 

Mr. MIN. First, let me just say, I would be in favor of streamlining some of the guarantees and other subsidies you talk about. 

Second, I guess I would just say it is difficult to tell with European countries because so many of these are implicit and opaque. 

So, for example, it was difficult to tell how Europe would react to 

the failure of their housing markets and their financial system in 

the 2008 crisis. What we saw was the deluge of bailouts that—it 

was very difficult to predict in advance. 

And I think that is one of the reasons I argue that ex ante sort 

of defined guarantees are better for the United States than a European-style system of after-the-fact— 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Pollock? 

Mr. MIN. —bailouts. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Congressman, I am not aware of anybody else who 

has the panoply which you so well articulated of different programs. It is, of course, difficult, when you do a whole lot of different things, it becomes difficult to track the aggregate impact of 

all of them. But we can say pretty clearly, the aggregate impact is 

an increase in house prices. 

As for the implicit versus explicit guarantees, of course, one of 

the problems with Fannie and Freddie was the denial that it really 

was a guarantee, when, of course, it really was. So we engaged in 

a kind of make-believe about how much risk we were taking, and 

that made the problem worse. 

Mr. GARRETT. Dr. Lea, do you have a comment before I go on to 

my next question? It looks like you did. 

Mr. LEA. Oh, I was just going to make a comment with regard 

to two aspects of subsidy. 

One is that, if you look on the lending side, no other country that 

I am aware of has housing goals that specifically require lenders 

to go down market and hit certain income deciles. And even in 

terms of supporting first-time buyers, we don’t really have that 

kind of focus. The insurance programs in Canada and the Netherlands, for example, are universal. They are not targeted to any particular group. 

Secondly, I think that we look at comparing or discussing guarantees. Ours were specifically for the purpose of lowering the cost 

of credit to the housing market, the kind of backstops— 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. 

Mr. LEA. —for issuers of covered bonds, which are commercial 

banks, are a result of governments not wanting failure of their 

large financial— 

Mr. GARRETT. Let me just cut you off. I only have 20 seconds 

here. 

On the credit risk aspect of this, one of the other arguments is 

that if you go to an explicit guarantee, one of the benefits is that 

you are able to attract foreign investors to our marketplace, whether it is implicit or explicit, but, as you say, we go to explicit. 

It was in a book back in the summer of last—a couple of years 

ago, Hank Paulson wrote the book, ‘‘On the Brink.’’ And he talks 

about in the summer of 2008 that the Russians—whoops. You will 

have to comment back on how they were going to kill our market, 

basically, by selling our credit risk here. And is that still a risk to 

us going forward if we make this an explicit guarantee? 

23 

But with the chairman’s— 

Chairman HENSARLING. The witness can respond in writing. 

Which witness were you directing that to, Mr. Garrett? 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Pollock. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. Please respond in writing, Mr. 

Pollock. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Yes, it is. The bad thing about having government 

guarantees— 

Chairman HENSARLING. That will do. 

Mr. POLLOCK. —is that it produces bubbles. 

[Mr. Pollock submitted the following response for the record: ‘‘Yes, 

it is. Government guarantees, whether implicit or explicit, create a 

group of creditors, such as bond or MBS buyers, who do not care 

or need to care about the soundness of the underlying assets being 

financed. They therefore promote excessive debt and leverage in 

the sector which is given the guarantee, and increase the chances 

of future bubbles and crises in that sector. Such guarantees tend 

to distort prices and cause misallocation of economic resources.’’] 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. 

Maloney, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. 

I would like to thank all the panelists, and particularly welcome 

Professor White, who is a professor in one of New York’s great educational institutions. Thank you for being here. 

I would like to ask Professor Min and Professor White, isn’t it 

true that the last time we had significant private sector involvement in the mortgage-backed securities market, the end result was 

a subprime mortgage bubble and a severe financial crisis? 

Professor Min? 

Mr. MIN. That is correct. In fact, the last time we had such a 

large level of private sector, nonguaranteed involvement was before 

the New Deal. Of course, the New Deal introduced guarantees 

through the form of deposit insurance. The thrifts became a major 

part of mortgage lending from the 1940s to the 1990s. What happened then was that the GSEs took over and really had the lion’s 

share of mortgage financing from the 1990s until about 2003, at 

which point private label securitization took over. 

And, of course, that is exactly contemporaneous with the housing 

bubble we enjoyed, which is why most experts who have looked 

closely at this issue blame the proliferation of private label 

securitization, which went from a 10 percent market share in 2002, 

rising to 40 percent of the market share in 2005 and 2006, as the 

proximate and most likely cause of the financial crisis. 

Mrs. MALONEY. So you are saying the private label was the cause 

of the financial crisis? 

Mr. MIN. I would agree with that statement, as I think most experts who have looked at this do, including the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and the three minority members who acknowledged that this was a possible cause but argue that there should 

be a multiplicity of causes looked at. 

Mrs. MALONEY. In light of the experiences that you just described, do you think it is safe for the government to leave the 

24 

mortgage-backed securities market entirely in the hands of the private sector, which, as you described, caused the financial crisis? 

Mr. MIN. I think that every time we have had such a high level 

of private, nonguaranteed involvement over 30, 40 percent in the 

United States, we have experienced a proliferation of crises, such 

as in the pre-New Deal era, where we had crises every 5 to 10 

years that really retarded economic growth and really stunted capital formation during that period. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Professor White, your comments on the two questions? 

Mr. WHITE. There is no question that the subprime expansion 

was a very unfortunate event. Why people came to believe that 

housing prices could only go up is something that is a mystery to 

me. That is not something we teach at the Stern School of Business 

at New York University. I doubt it is something that gets taught 

at the University of California or the University of San Diego or 

at the University of California-Irvine, but somehow people came to 

believe that. I know it isn’t taught at the American Enterprise Institute. Somehow, people came to believe it. 

If you believe it, then mortgages can never be a problem, because 

even if the mortgage borrower can’t repay out of his or her income, 

or gets hit by a truck or gets ill, he or she can still sell the house 

at a profit and repay the mortgage that way. And so, mortgage securities won’t be a problem. That is what happened. 

I like to think that people learn from these experiences and that 

going forward— 

Mrs. MALONEY. But do you agree with Professor Min that the 

cause of the financial crisis was the private label mortgage-backed 

securities, the private sector involvement? 

Mr. WHITE. Okay. It was a triggering event, but that alone would 

have just meant a recession for the United States economy. It was 

the spilling of those losses into a financial sector that had five large 

investment banks, a large insurance company holding company, a 

large bank holding company, and two large mortgage— 

Mrs. MALONEY. But you say it is the trigger. So why do we want 

to go— 

Mr. WHITE. —companies that were thinly capitalized and could 

not bear the losses. That is what really caused the crisis. 

Mrs. MALONEY. But, Professor— 

Mr. WHITE. Without those, we would have had a recession and 

not a crisis. 

Mrs. MALONEY. But, Professor, if the private sector involvement, 

as Professor Min pointed out, led to, he says, the crisis and you say 

the trigger to the crisis, why in the world do we want to go back 

to that particular model— 

Mr. WHITE. For sure— 

Mrs. MALONEY. —which led us to the worst depression, recession, 

whatever you want to call it, in my lifetime, one that we are still 

suffering from? 

Mr. WHITE. No, of course, we don’t want to go back to those particular circumstances. As I indicated, I think people learn— 

Mrs. MALONEY. I only have a few seconds. 

Mr. WHITE. —and will be a lot more cautious this time around. 

25 

Mrs. MALONEY. My time has expired. The chairman has his gavel 

ready. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WHITE. Thank you. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from California, Mr. Miller, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I enjoy these types of hearings because I think we need to look 

and say, what did we do wrong, and what do we do now? 

And I don’t think anybody is going to defend the concept of the 

structure of the GSEs to believe that the taxpayer should be put 

at risk, yet the private sector should make the profits. Now, they 

have historically been profitable; they are today. And the money 

today is going into the Treasury, where I believe it should always 

have gone. There should never have been a reason for the GSEs 

to ever go public. 

But the private label mortgage-backed securities were a disaster. 

Most of them were basically predatory loans. And there were trillions of dollars lost, and the investors were absolutely hammered. 

But GSEs don’t originate loans. They are a purchaser of loans as 

a conduit. And I believe they should have absolutely held the 

groups that made these loans accountable. The lenders who issued 

these loans and sold them off, they were not selling loans that met 

the underwriting standards to be conforming. They should have 

held them accountable. 

But I don’t want to, on the other side, tell somebody what type 

of house they need to buy or how they need to buy it. And I think, 

if we look at the Affordable Housing Initiative, the problems that 

caused by making loans maybe we shouldn’t have made. But the 

mission was a 2008 expansion of the limits. The reason they expanded the limits in 2008 is because everybody else left the marketplace. There would have been no liquidity in the marketplace in 

2008 had they not raised the limits to where they did. But the 

GSEs made huge, huge mistakes. 

The thing we need to look at that I think is very important is 

that the U.S. housing market is greater than any other country’s 

mortgage market. If we look at the European market, we are larger 

than theirs combined. 

And I look and say, how do we get government out? And if we 

are involved in any way, who should make the profits? I think the 

entire structure of the GSEs is wrong. They should never have 

gone public, and the profits should have always gone back to the 

Treasury. And had it done that, there would have been ample 

money to handle any losses that might have occurred in the future. 

But if you look at the U.K., they are dominated by five lenders, 

basically, and the government has already taken over some of 

those. If you look at Germany, they rely on depository institutions. 

The largest market share belongs to the savings banks that are 

owned by the government. So you have to look at all those and say, 

how do we make it work here today? 

We had some hearings last year, and what came out of those 

hearings was that U.S. markets have been predominantly through 

securitization. How do we change that in the future, I guess should 

be a debate. Are we going to argue that the private sector is going 

to put out mortgage-backed securities? I don’t think anybody will 

26 

buy them today or tomorrow because of the disaster that has occurred in the past. And the other thing that came out was a projection that we would lose $3 trillion to $4 trillion in funding for domestic and foreign investors if you didn’t have an agency mortgagebacked security. I don’t know if that is true or not. That was just 

the debate that occurred. 

But are there examples of other countries that we could use in 

our country to pattern ourselves after that can meet the demands 

and the size of the U.S. housing market? 

Anybody? I am willing to hear an answer from anybody. 

Yes, sir? 

Mr. LEA. You measure the depth of the housing finance system 

by virtue of relative to the size of the economy. And if you look at 

that for other developed countries, we are not exceptional in terms 

of the size of our system versus the economy. Many countries such 

as Denmark and the Netherlands, for example, actually have a 

higher percentage of their economy in the form of housing finance. 

So yes, they meet the needs of their system. Yes, we are larger. 

But if we had proper savings and we can tap that savings in a variety of different methods, then I think there is enough savings to 

go around. And, as Mr. Pollock said, it is really matching the kind 

of instruments we have with the— 

Mr. MILLER. But there is going to be some—even if you emulate 

what the U.K. does or Germany does, there is still a government 

backing through their banks. They are going to tend to be there. 

And we are looking at opportunities or options out there where the 

taxpayers are not put at risk. 

Professor, you had something you wanted to say, too? 

Mr. MIN. Yes. I think we can take some lessons from Canada 

without necessarily taking their model. Canada requires mortgage 

insurance on most mortgages, any mortgage that is over a certain 

loan-to-value ratio, and that insurance is then reinsured by their 

federal government. It is all paid for and capitalized against, so 

they have two buffers of protection against it. 

I think a number of independent think tanks and groups, such 

as the Bipartisan Policy Center, I think Senators Warner and 

Corker, have come up with a solution that looks a little like the Canadian model for mortgage-backed securities, which allows us to 

have 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. 

Mr. MILLER. Representative McCarthy—who is out right now 

with surgery—and I introduced the bill. And it basically says that 

the profits from the GSEs are a conduit, whatever you want to call 

it, go to the Treasury. And those funds build up as a backstop 

against any future losses. 

But if you are going to get the government out, you have to get 

the profits out of the private sector for the risk the government 

faces. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady 

from New York, Ms. Velazquez, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor Min, many of today’s panelists believe that the lower 

foreclosure rates in Europe offer a justification to eliminate government involvement in the U.S. mortgage market. However, Western 

27 

European governments provide a number of recourse options to underwater homeowners that are not available in the United States. 

I would like to hear from you what type of programs or mortgage 

provisions the European governments use to help prevent foreclosure. 

Mr. MIN. I am not familiar with all of them, and I don’t want 

to get the details wrong. 

I know that Spain is contemplating forbearance for many of its 

underwater homeowners. Of course, Spain is facing a very major 

housing crisis at the moment that, because of their heavy reliance 

on implicit guarantees, is translating into a sovereign debt crisis. 

Of course, many of these European countries have upfront social 

subsidies. Germany, for example, has a very, very large public 

housing program that accounts for a significant percentage of its 

GDP. This is publicly funded rental housing that competes with 

private sources of housing finance. They also have transfer payments. 

And, of course, many of these European governments are engaging in regulatory forbearance. Because many of the European 

banks offer adjustable-rate mortgages or short-term rollover mortgages, these are resetting, and the banks are being heavily encouraged to refinance these mortgages, even though they are actually 

heavily underwater. 

So these are the types of sort of ex-post, ad-hoc relief that European governments are providing, along with the ex-ante, upfront, 

social-welfare-type programs that they have in place. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you. 

Dr. Lea, would you be able to discuss with us some of the consumer protections and underwriting standards that were in place 

in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia, during the economic 

collapse of 2008? And do you believe that contributed to the lower 

number of foreclosures in those countries? 

Mr. LEA. I think there are a number of factors that contribute 

to lower foreclosures. One, of course, is recourse that provides incentives for borrowers to pay because they are subject to deficiencies. And that is pretty much widespread, though, as Professor 

Min said, both Spain and Ireland have moved back a bit from that 

by virtue of this distress. 

I think the other things that go into that is that, with our 

subprime debacle, if you will, it was characterized by what we call 

risk layering. So it wasn’t just that we made loans to people who 

had bad credit scores; we made high loan-to-value-ratio loans with 

limited documentation to people who had bad credit scores. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Okay. 

Mr. LEA. Yes, in the U.K, and to some extent the Netherlands, 

there was some move towards more of a subprime, but they never 

risk-layered. So if you had poor credit or if you wanted limited documentation, you still had to put 20 percent or more down. That is 

another factor in why we haven’t seen the significant default rates. 

The third is that, as mentioned earlier, you have adjustable-ratetype markets in many countries in Europe, with the extraordinary 

activities of central banks keeping short-term rates down. That also 

has contributed to lower foreclosure rates. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you. 

28 

Mr. Pollock’s written testimony included a chart listing homeownership data from a variety of international sources that ranked 

the United States 20th in homeownership rates. And, to me, it is 

kind of intriguing because the U.S. data was from 2013 and the 

international data ranged from 2004 to 2012, which was collected 

under very different economic circumstances. 

So I just would like to ask Mr. Jaffee, Mr. Lea, and Professor 

Min, as scholars, would you not agree that a single-year snapshot 

provides a more accurate comparison of international homeownership rates, rather than using data taken from several different 

years and different economic circumstances? 

Mr. POLLOCK. Is that question for me, Congresswoman? 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. I just would like to hear from the scholars who 

are here. 

Mr. LEA. I would just point out two things. One is that homeownership rates really, normally, don’t change that much over 

time. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. And the economic circumstances? 

Mr. LEA. We have had a big change in ours because of the very 

high rates of foreclosure and people losing their homes. That is 

internationally unusual; you don’t see very high foreclosure rates 

elsewhere. 

In that sense, I think it is okay to use homeownership rates over 

a period of time because, unless there is a shock of some kind, I 

don’t think they change that much. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Professor Min? 

Mr. MIN. Sorry, the question again was? Sorry about that. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. They— 

Mr. MIN. Oh, the 1-year snapshot, yes. Of course, circumstances 

were very different back then. I haven’t looked closely enough at 

the data to be able to judge whether that was a fair comparison 

or not. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired, 

so the witnesses can answer in writing. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Neugebauer, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back to—someone was saying that the private label 

was the cause of the housing crisis. 

But, in fact—Mr. Pollock, you can answer this question—Freddie 

and Fannie had these affordable housing goals, where they were 

going out and making zero-down-payment loans and housing policy. 

And, basically, they were encouraging the marketplace to bring 

more people into the housing market with, kind of looking the 

other direction. Is that correct? 

Mr. POLLOCK. That is correct, Congressman. As we know, you 

don’t do somebody a favor by making them a loan they can’t repay. 

And Fannie and Freddie made a lot of bad loans, under government direction. They were also major buyers of subprime loans. 

The crisis has a lot of culpable people. Certainly among the culpable in a big way were Fannie and Freddie. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. In fact, I remember—I can’t recall the source 

of it since it has been a while—that Fannie and Freddie said they 

were having trouble originating their own subprime lending or afVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:05 Jan 24, 2014 Jkt 081763 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81763.TXT TERRI
29 

fordable home lending and so they were, in fact, buying private 

label. 

In some cases, they were buying private label that they couldn’t 

actually legally themselves originate because of the quality of some 

of that paper; is that correct? 

Mr. POLLOCK. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So, let’s go back, then, to the private sector. 

And the private sector has a small market share right now, about 

10 percent, and that is what we call the jumbo space. 

And in the jumbo space right now, Dr. Lea, they are making 30- 

year mortgages. 

Mr. LEA. Yes, they do, 30-year, 15-year, and 10-year mortgages. 

All of those are part of what you see in private. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Fixed-rate, too? 

Mr. LEA. They make fixed-rates primarily. We only have about 

3 or 4 percent of loans right now that are adjustable. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So what we do know is the private sector will 

make a 30-year fixed-rate loan without Freddie and Fannie guaranteeing it? 

Mr. LEA. I think they will, and, as we said before, they do. Right 

now, they are crowded out, I would say. When you have the very 

high loan limits that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have, it is hard 

to get the volume and scale that is necessary to efficiently fund the 

instrument today in the private sector. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So if I am an investor and I am going to buy 

a 30-year mortgage or a mortgage-backed security and it goes 

through Freddie or Fannie, do I really care what the quality of the 

borrower is? 

Anybody? 

Mr. LEA. Absolutely. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. With the guarantee. 

Mr. LEA. Oh, with the guarantee? 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Yes, with the guarantee, do I really care 

whether that person can—what their FICA score is? Is that of any 

consequence to me? 

Mr. JAFFEE. Not at all. In that case, the government has taken 

all the risk, and so the investor is not looking to the credit quality 

whatsoever. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So where is the market discipline in that situation? 

Mr. JAFFEE. I would say there is none. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Yes. And what happens when there is no market discipline? 

Mr. JAFFEE. Bad loans get made. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Did that happen recently? 

Mr. JAFFEE. I think so. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So I think what we—it has been mentioned 

that America is a great country, and it is a great country. I have 

been in the housing business for over 30 years. And the housing 

business has existed in America for hundreds of years, and we built 

a lot of houses before the Federal Government started guaranteeing a substantial portion of them. 

And I think what my earlier comments were is that we have 

seen the destruction when the Federal Government starts trying to 

30 

manipulate the housing market or control the housing market. And 

when you let the government have 90 percent of the housing market, they are, in fact—or the housing finance market, they are, in 

fact, in control of the housing market in this country. 

So I guess the question with the panel is that, if we begin to create some space, more space here for the private market, is there 

any reason not to believe that if they are playing in the upper levels that they wouldn’t come down with the loan limits at Freddie 

and Fannie and fill that gap if the quality and the underwriting 

of those mortgages is done with some market discipline? 

Mr. WHITE. Congressman, let me just add, basically, you are 

right, but it would help if we could get some final regulations on 

the Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM). Without the certainty 

that the final regs on QRMs would bring, it is going to be hard to 

see a lot of securitization, because the securitizers, the investors 

don’t really know what those regulations look like. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Hinojosa. 

Mr. HINOJOSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

for having this important hearing today. It is something that is 

very important to me and to my State of Texas. 

My question is directed to Professor David Min. 

Over the last two sessions of Congress, there have been many 

suggestions by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle that 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac need to be abolished, but I have yet 

to see concrete suggestions for a replacement. Housing is the backbone of the recovery, and, without supporting it one way or another, the economy would never have turned a corner. 

My question to you is, the Financial Services Committee has now 

held several hearings this year on the status of housing finance but 

has failed to consider any legislation to reform the U.S. market. 

Nevertheless, there are several proposals that have recently been 

offered that aim at reforming the GSEs. 

For example, the Bipartisan Policy Center published a plan to 

created a public guarantor to approve issuers and provide a catastrophic government guarantee on qualifying mortgage-backed securities. There is also a plan to allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

to use earnings to recapitalize and repay the taxpayers. Additionally, the Center for American Progress proposes Congress create 

new private-chartered institutions that have the ability to guarantee payment of principal and interest on qualifying mortgagebacked securities. 

Professor Min, what are your views on each of these proposals? 

And please address the level of government support in each of 

these proposals. 

Mr. MIN. Sure, Congressman. 

I should state as a disclosure that I was formerly at the Center 

for American Progress, and I was deeply involved in the drafting 

of their particular proposal, which was actually a joint effort with 

a lot of other groups and individuals, which we called the Mortgage 

Finance Working Group. So, of course, I tend to favor that particular proposal, which in broad strokes shares a lot in common 

31 

with the Bipartisan Policy Center, their proposal, as well as the 

proposal in the works or soon to be released by Senators Warner 

and Corker over on the other side of Congress. 

So I agree that GSEs should be abolished. I think that they have 

a lot of moral-hazard issues, as has been suggested by a number 

of you today, as well as my fellow witnesses. That being said, given 

historical precedent, I think it is important to make sure that we 

don’t engage in radical reforms that might destroy some of the 

things we like about our housing finance system, or used to like 

about our housing finance system. 

And so that is why I support a limited guarantee at the mortgage-backed-security level that mirrors in some ways what Canada 

does at the mortgage level, which is have an insurance of that, effectively, that is reinsured by the Federal Government. You pay insurance premiums, and you require capital be held against that, 

and that provides some protection to taxpayers. Additionally, I 

think that adds an element of stability that was missing in the 

past decade, when private label securitization really took over. 

I think that particular proposal would be less government involvement than something where, like in 2008, we had the government step in and bail out all sorts of different markets that were 

tied to private label mortgage securitization. As I think Professor 

White said, this wasn’t just about private label mortgage 

securitization. Those securities were used and reused as collateral 

in different private banking arrangements, and that is why the 

Federal Government had to step in so hard. 

And so, I think we avoid that problem of ex-post, really undefined guarantees. As I describe in my written testimony, those 

guarantees tend to go too far. Because when you are in the middle 

of a crisis, you want to stop the bleeding, and you will do whatever 

it takes, even if that guarantees a bunch of people who don’t deserve that guarantee and are not necessary to stop that contagion. 

Mr. HINOJOSA. So, tell me this: Would the model that Germany 

is using, which does not have the GSEs, be practical for us? 

Mr. MIN. Germany has, as I think was mentioned by Congresswoman Waters, something like a 41 to 43 percent homeownership 

rate. They utilize primarily bank deposits, with a significant minority of covered bonds, which they call ‘‘pfandbrief’’ over there. 

And I think that that model, again, as I said at the outset, would 

be difficult to import without importing a lot of their other social 

policies, as well. It is difficult to imagine a 43 percent homeownership rate in this country. Given the lack of affordable rental housing, what would people do for housing, I think, is a real question. 

Something that has not really been addressed in this hearing is 

the need—rental housing also, like homes purchased by their owners, requires a lot of finance, and often those sources of finance 

come from the same entities. But we really do have to account for 

that. 

Mr. HINOJOSA. My time has run out, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. McHenry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

32 

Mr. Pollock, in your testimony you mention that we have had 

three cataclysmic housing events in the last 30 years. You had the 

S&L crisis that originated with housing, you had—or real estate. 

And then you had the government bailout at the end of that crisis. 

Then, in 2008, you had Fannie and Freddie that originated at the 

heart of this housing finance bubble that led to bailouts of a whole 

array of institutions and nationalization of the GSEs, right? 

So what are the housing policies that led to that? 

Mr. WHITE. It is important, Congressman, I think, to have that 

historical perspective. I would say—David Min said we have crises 

every 10 years before the New Deal and we have crises every 10 

years after the New Deal. We just have crises every 10 years. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Are they just more expensive? 

Mr. POLLOCK. In the S&L crisis, as Mike Lea points out in his 

testimony, the mismatch of lending long and borrowing short was 

directed by the government. This was a regulatory creation. And 

the S&Ls were broke by 1979 on interest rate mismatch directed 

by the Home Loan Bank Board, which was the cartel manager set 

up by the government for the savings and loan industry. 

Mr. WHITE. My predecessors. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Right. 

Mr. POLLOCK. This time, we have a different cartel, Fannie and 

Freddie, who took over and dominated the broad middle part of the 

mortgage market, the middle-class and upper-middle-class mortgage market, where perfectly sound loans can be made with no government guarantees. That is a market that would naturally have 

been a thoroughly private market, except that it was preempted by 

the government and by government direction through Fannie and 

Freddie. 

So you had a government market instead of a private market 

through preemption, with the resultant pushing of credit against 

the asset. This was a very important contributor to the bubble, 

which then collapsed, as we know. 

Mr. MCHENRY. So, Dr. Lea, one of the benefits—one of the potential benefits, I think you might agree, of the GSE system is standardization. Is that fairly accurate? 

Mr. LEA. I think in the early days of their existence that definitely was a benefit that they afforded the market, yes. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Is that still important to think about, the standardization, in order to access mortgages? 

Mr. LEA. I don’t believe it is important anymore, in that we have 

developed a lot of these standards, and there is a potential downside of excessive standardization, where you end up compartmentalizing housing finance with too narrow of a range of products and 

potentially too narrow of a range of underwriting standards. 

I do worry that some of the things being discussed in the QM 

and QRM world will eliminate, virtually, things that can be effectively used in certain circumstances. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. So overreliance on standardization could 

limit options for my constituents? 

Mr. LEA. Absolutely. 

Mr. MCHENRY. The question here is, if you have the interest rate 

risk and you have the credit risk—right? The interest rate risk for 

a 30-year fixed, you can hedge out. An institution, complex instituVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:05 Jan 24, 2014 Jkt 081763 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81763.TXT TERRI
33 

tions can hedge out interest rate risk, and that is done every day 

by moderate- and large-sized businesses. And so that is resolvable. 

The credit risk question, though, the benefit of standardization 

for securitization is that you can have a wider pool. And that can 

be effectively done without the government then purchasing that 

standardized product and being the securitizer, can it not? 

Mr. LEA. Absolutely. You can diversify across geographic areas, 

borrower types, and institutional originators. That diversification is 

a significant value in terms of reducing overall credit risk. 

Mr. MCHENRY. So I want to know this: If we end Fannie and 

Freddie, if we end GSEs, can my constituents still get a mortgage? 

Mr. LEA. Absolutely. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Is it one that they could reasonably afford? 

Mr. LEA. Absolutely. 

Mr. MCHENRY. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will happily yield back my remaining 15 seconds. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Capuano, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. 

It is kind of interesting, today we are looking around the world 

for different financial services issues that we can follow, which I 

think is a great idea. We should be checking every possibility we 

can. Yet, tomorrow, we are going to have a hearing that basically 

says we shouldn’t look around the world. 

I just find it kind of an interesting juxtaposition. We look when 

we want to find the right answer; we don’t look when we don’t 

want to find—not an issue for the panel, but I guess I will bring 

it up tomorrow, so you might want to be watching. 

I also find it interesting that—for me, this is very educational. 

I don’t know a lot of these things around these international matters, and I don’t know some of the history of it, and I am very interested in learning it. 

And, honestly, it is kind of interesting when you look at some of 

the covered bond things that the other bills do, that if we are going 

to adopt any other country’s system, we really have to adopt the 

whole system, we shouldn’t adopt it piecemeal, which means we 

would have to pick up the covered bonds, which, to me, sounds an 

awful like ‘‘too-big-to-fail.’’ 

And I don’t like ‘‘too-big-to-fail,’’ which is why, by the way, I just 

filed a bill yesterday, based on a paper written by Peter Wallison 

at AEI and a friend of mine, Con Hurley at BU, that kind of does 

an additional thing to suggest that ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ needs to be addressed again. Yet, today, I have implications that we should adopt 

‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ for mortgage bonds by private companies. That is 

a different hearing for a different day. 

So when I get all of these confused things, I tend to go to the 

simple matters, and for me, it is math. It is just numbers. So I 

don’t really know how to get a mortgage. I do the same thing everybody else does. I go online, I visit my local banker. So I did it 

again today. And in the United States right now, approximately, 

you can get a 30-year mortgage with 20 percent down, for 4 percent. That is a pretty typical mortgage today. 

34 

I have no idea what to do in other countries. So I picked one. I 

picked England, because I figured I didn’t have to translate the 

Web site. Maybe I could figure out what they were doing. 

So I pulled up the 10 top mortgages in the U.K. today, and I got 

one of these typical Web sites, money.co.uk, typical thing, and do 

the same thing here. And I looked at them, and I said, okay, that 

is all well and good. And I don’t know most of these companies, but 

I do know HSBC, one of the biggest banks in the world. So I went 

to their Web site to figure out what they actually do. 

And here is what HSBC offers today, as of this morning, on a 

typical mortgage. The rates are about the same, about 3.99 percent. 

Good stuff. But there is a minor little problem, actually two, because I know everybody here knows, but some people want to talk 

about rates as the only thing that matters. The other thing that 

matters is the term, and the other thing that matters is the downpayment. 

The downpayment, in this case, at HSBC, is 40 percent. A 40 percent downpayment on a $300,000 house is $120,000 down. Now, 

maybe a lot of people have $120,000 in cash sitting around that 

they can put down on a $300,000 home. I don’t. 

But let’s get past that. The next little issue is, the longest term 

I could find was a 10-year mortgage. They have 2-year mortgages, 

they have 7-year mortgages, they have 5-year mortgages. And the 

truth is I didn’t do the numbers on those, because, just on that, I 

know that is obscene. But you do the numbers on a 10-year mortgage versus the typical mortgage we just talked about, you get the 

exact same loan under the HSBC’s Web site as of this morning. 

And in the United States, the average person would have to pay $60,000 down and would pay roughly $13,752 a year in principal 

and interest. That same loan under these terms would require 

$120,000 down and $21,852 a year, which is $8,100 more than my 

average U.S. constituent, which means, for all intents and purposes, out of their own pocket they would have to pay for an extra 

7 months a year. I pay 12 months a year; they would have to pay 

19. 

Does anybody here think that is a good deal? Go right ahead. 

Anybody? 

Mr. LEA. That particular example would not be a good deal, Congressman. But I would say that that is not a representative loan 

in the U.K. today, looking at— 

Mr. CAPUANO. HSBC is not representative? 

Mr. LEA. Well— 

Mr. CAPUANO. Actually, it was the best rate on this page. This 

page shows me the highest rate is 5.79 percent, and that is for a 

2-year loan. 

Mr. LEA. When they talk about 2-year loans, Congressman, in 

the U.K., they are talking about the period of time the rate is fixed. 

So these loans are longer-term, typically— 

Mr. CAPUANO. I understand that. 

Mr. LEA. But you— 

Mr. CAPUANO. So there is no 30-year fixed-rate mortgage in England? 

Mr. LEA. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Ah, bingo. Here we go. 

35 

Mr. LEA. But the LTV that you are suggesting, 40 percent down, 

is not representative. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Now, on the private market that happened before 

the creation of GSEs—and, by the way, I want to be really clear. 

I absolutely agree that we need to do something with Fannie and 

Freddie, first of which is we should stop using them as a piggybank 

and allow them to pay down their debt, which is a different issue. 

But that is another argument for another day. 

But I absolutely agree. I actually particularly like the consolidation of regulations. I want to do that as much as anybody. I want 

to make it simple. All those issues are non-issues to me. 

The only question in the final analysis is whether the taxpayers, 

through some degree, either directly or indirectly, either explicitly 

or implicitly, are going to back mortgages for this country. And I 

haven’t heard anybody suggest anything other than they have to, 

with the sole exception of people who tell me the private market 

can do it alone. 

Mortgages will be available under the private market, just like 

they were in 1930, just like they were in 1920. There were private 

mortgages. But guess what the rates were? Just like England: 50 

percent down, 5-year repayment, 5 percent. Same problem. 

Will there be private mortgages? Of course, there will. Affordable? I don’t know where you live; they are not affordable in most 

of my district. It would be available to some of my constituents on 

Beacon Hill and maybe in Brattle Square in Cambridge. But my 

average constituent in Chelsea will never own a home. 

Do you think that is good for America? 

Mr. POLLOCK. And yet England has a higher homeownership rate 

than we do. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I fully understand that. And it is a good thing. I 

am going to be very interested to look at the historic thing. And, 

by the way, I would love to increase the homeownership rate. 

I guess my turn is over. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from, New Mexico, Mr. 

Pearce. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would yield a 

minute to the gentleman from New Jersey to complete a question 

that he had. 

Mr. GARRETT. Only 30 seconds. 

Can you just respond, Mr. Pollock, with regard to the question 

I was asking before? That was the question on what Hank Paulson 

was talking about, who we are actually selling our guarantees to, 

and does that put us in a more dangerous position going forward? 

You can be brief on that. 

Mr. POLLOCK. There is a wonderful couple of pages in Mr. 

Paulson’s memoirs of the crisis, which you cited, where he talks 

about how they have to make good on the guarantee because the 

Chinese and the Russians are calling them up and saying, how 

about it, do you want us to sell all these mortgages? This is a great 

example of the dangers of having a GSE. 

I think as Congressman Miller said, the key mistake was having 

a GSE. That is basically how you could summarize his remarks. I 

36 

think it is very important, that the worst of the cases is the GSE 

status. We need to end that. 

Mr. GARRETT. I yield back. 

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Min, the question about public- versus private 

sector involvement in the meltdown was brought up by one of my 

colleagues, and you, I think, discussed the role of the private institutions in that meltdown of 2008. 

Were there things that originated in public policy that also contributed to that? 

Mr. MIN. Absolutely, of course. 

Mr. PEARCE. Could you highlight those? And could you pull your 

microphone just a little bit closer to you? 

Mr. MIN. Sure. So I said, absolutely, yes. 

I think some of the things that were problematic, going back to 

the 1960s and 1970s, bank regulators started allowing banks to do 

more activities. You started developing universal banks in the 

United States. Our regulatory system was not well-suited for that. 

We allowed a lot of ‘‘shadow banking’’ to occur, financial intermediation or banking, as most people think of it, the use of short-term— 

Mr. PEARCE. What about the Affordable Housing Act? 

Mr. MIN. Sure. And so I think that— 

Mr. PEARCE. What about the Affordable Housing— 

Mr. MIN. I would make a distinction between affordable housing 

and subprime, because they were not always the same. Many 

subprime mortgages, for example— 

Mr. PEARCE. If I could reclaim my time— 

Mr. MIN. Sure. 

Mr. PEARCE. —when I read in Gretchen Morgenson’s book here, 

‘‘Reckless Endangerment,’’ before the affordable housing law was 

passed, 1 in 230 lenders had a downpayment of less than 3 percent. 

So we came in with something above 3 percent of a downpayment. 

And by 1992—the bill was passed in 1989—there was only one in 

three who had—one in three had less than 3 percent. So from 230 

lenders down to 3 lenders. 

And then, also, at that time, James Johnson with Fannie was 

fighting vicious warfare in this body, and he was paying off—he 

was giving contributions to people to vote for things which would 

push the affordable housing goals, which set into policies then that 

the bankers were required to perform, which then started all of 

these loans that were in the subprime category. 

Would you not consider that to be substantial in contribution to 

the 2008 collapse? 

Mr. MIN. If I could, first, I would say I have never taken any 

payments from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 

The second thing I would say is— 

Mr. PEARCE. No, I am talking about people in this body, that 

they were putting— 

Mr. MIN. No, no, as a disclosure. 

Mr. PEARCE. Yes. 

Mr. MIN. And how I would answer your question—I know you 

are running out of time—is that, in fact, there was zero connection 

between the affordable housing goals and the subprime crisis. 

There was almost no overlap, that most of these loans did not qualify because of various reasons. In fact, the Alt-A portfolio of Fannie 

37 

Mae and Freddie Mac was a much bigger cause of their losses. 

Hardly any of that qualified for their affordable housing goals. 

Similarly, CRA, which has been blamed for the crisis, almost 

none of the subprime mortgages were originated by CRA-regulated 

lenders— 

Mr. PEARCE. If I could reclaim my time, Mr. Chairman. During that period of time, before 1996, Fannie had a portfolio of $156 billion, and they doubled it. And then, it went up to what it is today. 

The five executives were sporting $44 million total in stock in 

Fannie and Freddie. 

Mr. MIN. Sure. 

Mr. PEARCE. During that time, Mr. Johnson was able to pay himself $100 million from this government-guaranteed program. His 

follower, Franklin Raines, took $29 million as his pay. 

And yet, I am to believe from you that all of these changes in 

the way that they were underwriting and the fact that they had 

to keep these things going or they couldn’t drive their balance 

sheet higher and they could not drive their pay higher, that had 

no effect downstream on the private market. Sir, that just defies 

imagination. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from California, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Professor White, thanks for pointing out how important it is that 

we get those QRM regulations published. Long-term reform may 

take us a while here in Congress, but the agency has had plenty 

of time to write those regulations. And that is one step we all can 

agree on. 

Mr. WHITE. I agree, Congressman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And, Professor Min, I think you are right to point 

out the important role private label subprime mortgage-backed securities played in this debacle. 

I just want to take a second to point out that the reason I think 

that happened was the credit rating agencies. Once they gave AAA 

to Alt-A, well, the lion’s share of capital in our system is in loans, 

bonds, publicly traded bonds, and any portfolio manager who 

turned down the opportunity to get somewhat higher yields with 

high-rated securities looked like a fool in 2006 and was fired before 

2007. 

So, as long as we have a system in which the issuer hires the 

bond rating agency, we are going to have bubbles here or there, 

just as, if you let me hire the umpire, I would have a bubble in 

my pitching record, 27 strikeouts per game. 

Now, we have been comparing ourselves to other countries. And 

one thing that is great in America still is that you can get a 30- 

year fixed-rate mortgage, often with a 10 percent downpayment if 

you have good credit. These other countries we have been talking 

about, can you get a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, and can you get 

it with a 10 percent downpayment if you have good credit? 

Dr. Lea? 

Mr. LEA. The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage is unusual. The only 

other country which has that long of a term is Denmark, and they 

have a 20 percent down requirement. 

38 

Mr. SHERMAN. So if we are going to let Americans buy homes the 

way they are used to when they have good credit, we are not going 

to be able to just adopt even the Danish system, let alone the systems we see in some other countries. 

Now, we are hearing about high homeownership levels in other 

countries. Often, in Europe, you meet people whose great-grandparents lived in the same house that they do. You can’t find that 

anywhere in California. We have the most adaptable workers in 

the world, or at least in the high-income world. Our people are willing to move across town or across the country for a better job. And 

so, we have a lot of people moving from here to there. 

Do these other countries, if you adjust for longtime family ownership, have the kind of homeownership rates we do? Or is there a 

way for you to adjust it to try to give me a picture of whether a 

young family who doesn’t inherit a home from great-grandparents 

can find a place to live and then find another place to live when 

they move to another city? 

Mr. POLLOCK. I will try that, Congressman, since that table is 

mine. Those numbers, of course, are fairly hard to get and have 

some estimates in them. The point of the table is it gives you a 

pretty good sense overall that we don’t have an outstanding homeownership ratio. 

We do have high labor mobility and lots of moving, as you correctly say, Congressman, which is just why, as I think the chairman said, you don’t really need 30-year loans if you are going to 

move every 4 or 5 years. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We need 30-year loans to keep payments lower 

than the 15-year loan, and— 

Mr. POLLOCK. Yes. One important thing about 30-year loans is, 

while they are good in an inflation, they are terrible in a houseprice deflation with falling interest rates. 

So if we look at other countries, we see that the crisis was helped 

by the fact that the house payments on a floating-rate loan automatically fall. You don’t have to refinance your mortgage. You don’t 

have to have a government program. Your payment automatically 

falls with the rates. 

One of the things, interestingly, and I think little understood, is 

what made the crisis in this country much worse was exactly the 

30-year fixed-rate mortgage. In a house-price deflation, it is a bad 

instrument. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I have met too many people who have suffered too 

much because their ARM adjusted upward. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Have any of you gentlemen ever purchased a home through 

FHA? Just raise your hand if you have. 

None of you have. Mostly everyone I know purchased their first 

home through FHA or VA. I surmise maybe a lot of people are just 

better off than the people that I know. And it is unfortunate. 

Have any of you ever processed a mortgage loan? Okay. Do any 

of you think it makes— 

39 

Mr. LEA. I have managed people who process mortgage loans, 

Congressman. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Do any of you think it makes any sense that as of 2 years ago, we have spent $166 million defending the top 3 

executives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Do any of you think 

that makes sense? Raise your hand if you think that makes a bit 

of sense. Raise your hand if you think any of the other countries 

in these charts that you gave us would ever think of doing something that stupendous. 

We had a crisis, and the crisis was caused by Congress; if we had 

to start locking people up, you would probably start with Congress. 

And then, you would go to the people who actually did the dirty 

deeds. And because there has been no accountability for that activity, that is why we have to fear it happening again. They haven’t 

pulled the same shams they did in S&L, did they? They didn’t have 

any S&Ls doing that stuff, did you? A thousand people went to 

prison. Now what do we do? Stipulated settlements and we buy off 

our prosecution with stock corporate’s money these days, it seems. 

I looked at the information that you provided us. I know you all 

don’t think we read your written testimony, but we do. And I compared the chart to Dr. Jaffee, Mr. Pollock, and Professor White. 

And you are not all on the same page. You are in the same neighborhood, but there are some differences in the data, the hard data 

that you have given us. Not to say that decisions to move in the 

direction Congress is going to move need to be made based just on 

those charts or comparisons with other countries. 

We know there is an awful lot of difference there. And the view 

we have of the international market that you provided us is really 

relatively slim. It came close compared to debt, but I would be interested in knowing the average cost of homes in other countries 

or the average value to their GDP or the total value to GDP. I am 

okay with moving away from GSEs. I am a REALTOR® by profession. I think it is just fine, just so long as someone has a detailed 

plan, not just a vision like we have passed on many national priorities recently, but a detailed plan of how we would replace it without upsetting an already very fragile—and I use that word as the 

nicest way of describing the current real estate market—as being 

very fragile. Without making that worse. 

Do any of you claim to have a detailed plan of how we get rid 

of the GSEs and replace the ability for funding and financing for 

future generations with the same opportunities that this generation had? And if you have a detailed plan of that, raise your hand, 

because I am going to hold you accountable for giving me a detailed 

plan. That is just wonderful. Okay. We don’t have time to hear 

your four detailed plans now. But I would appreciate it if you 

would give me those absolute four detailed plans and give us a 

chance to look them over, and hopefully the chairman will be kind 

enough to bring us back in here and we could discuss both sides 

of the solution. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. It wasn’t quite up, but we will take it 

nonetheless. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Green. Apparently, the gentleman from Texas is going to yield 

to the gentlelady from Ohio, Ms. Beatty, for 5 minutes. 

40 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Waters. And I thank all of our witnesses who are here today. 

As I have had a chance to listen briefly and read through your 

testimony, I find it very interesting and educational for me to be 

able to evaluate the international alternatives to our models of 

housing finance. Hearing in the last part of the testimony when we 

talk about eliminating some of the GSEs like we can still have 

homeownership at an affordable level if there is no FHA, Fannie 

Mae, Freddie Mac. 

Now I am from Ohio, where we have had a collapse in our housing market. We are trying to get through the recovery. I have also 

spent 20 years of my life working with public housing authorities 

to get people to be more self-reliant. So first-time homeowners who 

don’t have that 40 or 20 percent downpayment that we have talked 

about, who might have some challenges with their credit scores. 

So when I hear we can still have an affordable market, it puts 

me on pause because in Ohio, I have not had that experience. Let’s 

just assume that I have a different answer than your answer. My 

question then would be, if we don’t take steps to preserve access 

to housing for the working-class families, what risks do you foresee 

in the housing markets? 

Mr. WHITE. Congresswoman, I think most of us would agree that 

targeted programs through FHA are worthwhile—in fact, Professor 

Jaffee explicitly mentioned FHA. I mentioned FHA in my testimony as well. Target low- and moderate-income households, firsttime home buyers, absolutely. That is a worthwhile place to be focusing and targeting subsidies. On budget, transparent, and as far 

as I am concerned, we should expect this program to be a net cost 

in the budget. Because it is a subsidy program, we should expect 

it to be a subsidy. It is absolutely worthwhile. Absolutely worthwhile. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Congresswoman, in my testimony it says something like this—you can be a private company or you can be part 

of the government but you can’t ever be both at the same time, 

which is what the GSEs pretended and claimed to be with disastrous results. I think in a resulting real-world scenario, we will 

have some mix of private and government, but you will be one or 

the other. That which is government will be clearly government, on 

budget, approved and appropriated by the Congress. 

Then you can ask, what is the mix? Some of us think the right 

mix is 80 percent private, 20 percent government, which is a long 

way from where we are now in a much healthier way. We can debate about exactly what the mix should be. But we need to go in 

the more private less government direction. I think virtually everyone agrees with that. 

Mr. LEA. And Congresswoman, I would like to make two other 

quick observations. One is that if we put weak households—weak 

from a standpoint of income capacity, lack of savings, or past credit 

problems into a house—a house is a large financial obligation and 

it isn’t necessarily the best thing for all people. 

So I would agree, for example, with what Professor Min was talking about earlier in that we need to have a balance of policies for 

affordable rental as well as homeownership. We want to have a 

balance in that regard. 

41 

And the other thing to keep in mind is that while we have people 

we want to help from the standpoint of their homeownership and 

housing, other people provide savings and are bearing those risks. 

Mrs. BEATTY. You mentioned rental. Let me ask this very quickly: Do you think that the U.S. rental markets are significantly 

equipped to handle a larger rental population if we get into that? 

If people want a home, they can’t buy, they go to rent and all— 

Mr. LEA. We have seen a decline of almost 4 percentage points 

in the homeownership market. And the rental markets have been 

able to absorb a lot of that, yes. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER [presiding]. Thank you. The chairman had to 

step out for a little while, so I am in the chair. And it just so happens that I am up to ask questions, so you get a double dose of me 

here. 

I will be brief so that we can get to some other folks here before 

the time runs out. 

Dr. Jaffee, in your testimony, you talked about the period between 1950 and 1990 when homeownership rose to 64 percent. 

What was the percentage during that timeframe of GSE involvement in the housing market? 

Mr. JAFFEE. The GSE growth was steady over that period. If you 

start in 1950, it was minimal. It was maybe 1 or 2 or 5 percent 

of the mortgage market. Even by 1980, it was only maybe 10 percent of the market. So I would describe the period from 1950 to 

1990 to be a U.S. mortgage market that was dominated by private 

market bank participants. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. So by 1990, it was what, roughly? 

Mr. JAFFEE. All in, maybe 35 percent. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. 35 percent by then. And we had 64 percent 

homeownership numbers, is that right? 

Mr. JAFFEE. Exactly right. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. And now today, we have 90 percent GSE 

guarantee, according to your written testimony. 

Mr. JAFFEE. Yes. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. On page 3, I guess it is. And we have 65 percent homeownership, is that correct? 

Mr. JAFFEE. That is correct. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. So basically, we have almost tripled the 

amount of GSE involvement with basically no change in the 

amount of homeownership; is that basically correct? 

Mr. JAFFEE. That is correct. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. Mr. Pollock, you made, a minute ago, 

a comment with regards to 80/20 with regards to the ideal mix. 

Can you go back and explain just a little bit why you think that 

is a good number and why it would be not 50/50 or something like 

that? 

Mr. POLLOCK. We can remember how we used to think about the 

mortgage market. It was 15 or 20 percent what we call government 

loans, which is FHA/VA. I think realistically, politically, while the 

FHA has plenty of problems and lots of bad credit on its books, it 

will be reformed but not taken away. What is not government, in 

my view, should be private. That is how we get to 80/20. So it is 

42 

20 percent formally government, on budget, appropriated; 80 percent private; and zero percent GSEs, Congressman. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Part of the discussion earlier was with regards to 30-year fixed loans. As a former banker, I have made a 

lot of loans to individuals on homes before. And when you sit there 

and you look at their budgets and you look at the house they are 

trying to buy, and if it is something they can afford, and they have 

a proper downpayment, and you look at how they want to stretch 

it out to 30 years versus 20 years, if they just make an extra $50 

or $150 a month, they can go from 30 down to 20 and save literally 

thousands and thousands of dollars. And I don’t think we are doing 

them a favor by stretching it out to 30 years. I think we are doing 

them an injustice by putting them in a 30-year loan. 

Mr. Pollock, you made the comment a minute ago how this can 

be a detriment. I would like for you to expound on that just a little 

bit if you wouldn’t mind. 

Mr. POLLOCK. I am also a former banker, Mr. Chairman, and I 

fully agree with your point. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. You are recovering from that, are you? 

Mr. POLLOCK. I remember talking long ago to a guy who ran an 

old mutual. He still called it a ‘‘building and loan,’’ in downstate 

Illinois. His mortgage loans were for a maximum of 15 years. If you 

didn’t like the payments, you bought a less expensive house because, he said, ‘‘Look at the difference in the equity build-up between a 15-year and a 30-year loan.’’ And it is really quite remarkable. So there is a strong argument that the shorter loans, because 

of the much faster equity build for the borrower, can be more advantageous. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. This is one of the ways that individuals save, 

is it not, to get equity in their homes as they make payments into 

it? That is one of the best ways that the individual can save. It is 

also, as we go through this process, we have found that 7 years is 

the average length of a loan. And why do we need a 30-year mortgage whenever it endangers them, sometimes whenever the markets fluctuate? So I will stop right there and move on. I believe the 

gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, is next in the queue. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You look quite well in the 

chair. I thank the ranking member. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. You will get more time for that, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. I thank the ranking member for hosting this hearing 

as well. 

I thank all of the witnesses for appearing. Many of you indicated 

that you have detailed plans. I am not going to ask for your plans. 

But I do ask, do you have a statement from the builders who are 

in support of your detailed plan? If so, would you kindly extend a 

hand into the air from the builders, home builders who are in support, if you have a statement from them. Do you have a statement 

from the REALTORS® who are in support of your detailed plan? 

If you do, would you kindly extend a hand into the air? 

Let the record reflect that thus far, we have had no hands which 

connotes, as I understand it, with this en banc process, that we 

don’t have any statements from anyone. 

Do we have a statement from the bankers who are in support of 

the detailed plan? I take it from the absence of hands that the 

43 

plans, though they may be great plans, they haven’t been either 

vetted by the bankers, the REALTORS® and the builders, or that 

they are not in support of the plans. And I said that to give you 

a little bit of latitude so as not to imply that they have had an opportunity to see them and they are opposed to it. But let’s just say 

they haven’t been vetted. 

I do see Mr. Min. Mr. Min, do you have something that you 

would like to share with us? 

Mr. MIN. The National Association of REALTORS® (NAR), the 

Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), and the National Association 

of Home Builders (NAHB) have all looked at the plan that I was 

formerly associated with, which was released by the Mortgage Finance Working Group, and organized by the Center for American 

Progress. They indicated they were in broad support of it generally, 

but of course we didn’t have written statements from them for a 

number of different reasons. 

Mr. GREEN. Your plan has a 30-year rate associated with it? 

Mr. MIN. Yes, it does. 

Mr. GREEN. A 30-year fixed-rate? 

Mr. POLLOCK. And Congressman, the plan that my colleagues 

and I at AEI put together has also been given to all of those people. 

Mr. GREEN. Been given to, but not received a response from? 

Mr. POLLOCK. Home builders and REALTORS® in particular 

never saw a GSE they didn’t like, Congressman. 

Mr. GREEN. I understand. That may or may not be the case. I 

won’t speak for them in terms of your report. 

Let me go on. The 30-year fixed-rate does allow lower monthly 

payments, generally speaking. I think that is a fair statement. And 

I appreciate what you are saying about the ability to save money 

by having a 15-year mortgage or a 20-year mortgage. But let me 

ask this: Is there anything that precludes a 15-, 20-, or 25-year 

mortgage right now, notwithstanding the 30-year fixed-rate being 

offered? Nothing precludes that. A person can still get a 25-year, 

or a 15-year. You just have to either ask for that and negotiate that 

product, or you can simply make your payments such that you pay 

down your house in 15, 20, or 30 years. It is your option. And once 

you get the 30-year fixed-rate—let me do this, Mr. Min. And I will 

try to get back to you. 

Let’s talk about something else quickly. People not only need 

houses and homes, they also need transportation. If you get a 30- 

year fixed-rate mortgage, that $150 can go toward a vehicle for 

transportation. I have a good many constituents, my dear friends, 

who find $150 extra per month to be a rather handsome sum of 

money. And that can help them do other things. So if you change 

the 30-year fixed-rate such that this becomes a part of the culture—and it is a change in the culture that you are talking about— 

you will also impact other aspects of the economy. Perhaps the auto 

industry might have a little bit of concern with only 15- or 10-year 

rates because they may be impacted in terms of the products they 

produce and sell. There is an impact that goes beyond simply having that one mortgage. 

Finally this, with my last 29 seconds—and I apologize to you, 

Mr. Min. But we do have to ask ourselves, Mr. White—and I like 

your animation, by the way—why people thought that we would 

44 

have housing prices that go up forever. But let’s ask, why did they 

go up? You don’t have to know why people thought they would. But 

why did they, is the question? And when you have IRS regulations 

that cause flipping to be profitable, when you have other aspects 

of buying a home, not to own it, but to sell it, that is a part of it. 

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. The gentleman from Wisconsin, 

Mr. Duffy. 

Mr. DUFFY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is an important conversation we are having today. If you look at Americans, 

the largest investment they usually make in their lifetime is their 

home. And we are having a conversation about potentially changing the market in which Americans engage to make that largest 

purchase of their lifetime. We are also dealing with an issue where 

American taxpayers are forced to bail out the GSEs. And America 

hates that as well. So I think it is a great conversation. It is an 

important conversation to have. 

Mr. Jaffee, to you, I want to get you engaged here. I think you 

were commenting about the basis point difference in the GSE market as opposed to a non-GSE market. Is that correct? You would 

see a 25-point basis differential? 

Mr. JAFFEE. That was prior to the crisis, not in the current conditions. But over a long history, the jumbo mortgages would be 

priced at about 25 basis points above what was virtually an identical mortgage that was just under the conforming loan limits. 

Mr. DUFFY. I want to drill into that a little bit. If you look at 

the jumbo market, is it fair to say that those who were given a 

jumbo loan, a jumbo mortgage, are wealthier? They put more 

money down. In essence, they are probably a little better risk than 

the mid- to low-income individuals who may be getting mortgages 

as well. And to maybe use that as an example of the differential 

in basis points may not be an accurate representation of what we 

would see with middle-income Americans. 

Mr. JAFFEE. The 25 basis points difference that I was referring 

to was a computation which did try to control for the different borrower attributes on either side of the line. 

Mr. DUFFY. Including downpayment? Because on average, jumbo 

borrowers are putting 20 percent down, is that right? 

Mr. JAFFEE. Sure. 

Mr. DUFFY. And on average, we are seeing Americans put 5 or 

10 percent down. 

Mr. JAFFEE. For sure. So I am agreeing, the average jumbo borrower was different from the average conforming mortgage borrower which, in computing the 25 basis points, we just tried to control for that. 

Mr. DUFFY. Okay. So you think you have an accurate representation? 

Mr. JAFFEE. As good as can be. I think it is generally agreed that 

is a reasonable number. 

Mr. DUFFY. So looking at a world without our GSEs—which, listen, I am on this pathway, so don’t take my questions the wrong 

way. But what does the market look like? Do we have mortgages 

that are amortized for 30 years that will have a fixed rate for 10 

or 20 years? How does this look? How much are we putting down? 

45 

What can Americans expect? I know the four of you have plans. 

You have probably done this analysis. But Mr. Jaffee, if you want 

to go first, what does the market look like in a non-GSE world? 

Mr. JAFFEE. The way I look at it is, we once had, not 100 years 

ago, but 20 and 30 years ago, such a market. The U.S. mortgage 

market in the 1970s certainly, and I would say into the 1980s, was 

predominantly a private market-driven system. And what we had 

were mortgages. The standard U.S. mortgage was a 30-year, fixedrate, 20 percent downpayment mortgage. And I know of no reason 

to think that would not recur if we were not crowding out the private market today. 

Mr. DUFFY. But we have to agree that there is going to be a significant difference in Americans’ ability to purchase a home if you 

are saving 20 percent to put down as opposed to 5 or 10 percent. 

It is going to take far longer. It is going to have a significant impact on how the market works. And maybe that is a good thing. 

We are going to have less risk in the mortgage market. Is it fair 

to say a little longer in saving? 

Mr. JAFFEE. Except again, that I would say, remember now that 

the homeownership rate over this period from 1950 to 1990, when 

we did have this 20 percent downpayment mortgages, the standard 

did go up from 55 to 64 percent. So it is not clear to me, at least, 

that a 20 percent downpayment mortgage is not a feasible solution. 

Mr. DUFFY. So it is not a correlation is what you are saying in 

regard to downpayment and homeownership? 

I only have a limited amount of time left. 

Quickly. I come from rural Wisconsin. We have a lot of small 

community banks. They expressed concern about what kind of market would exist for them to still engage with homeownership. Are 

they going to see the big banks take over the mortgage business 

and leave them out? Because they are concerned about the market 

they will be able to sell into. 

Do you guys see a pathway for small community banks and credit unions to still engage in a mortgage market without our GSEs, 

Mr. Pollock? 

Mr. POLLOCK. Yes. It is a very important part of the system. Almost all of the 7,000 banks are small banks and we should make 

sure they have a vibrant, competitive role. There are various ways 

you can work on that. I would be happy to take it up with you in 

more detail, if you would like. 

Mr. LEA. One quick comment on that is that the GSE activities 

during the 1990s actually encouraged a lot of consolidation in the 

markets because the GSEs gave the big banks, the aggregators 

preferential pricing, and that led to the situation where the smaller 

community institutions were increasingly dependent on the ability 

to sell to a Wells Fargo or a Bank of America. And that was all 

due to GSE pricing policy. 

Mr. DUFFY. I yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. Mr. Delaney? 

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the witnesses for your testimony here today. 

Let’s assume for a second that the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, 

as it is structured, is a good deal for the borrower and not a good 

deal for the lender, which seems to me to be a reasonable assumpVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:05 Jan 24, 2014 Jkt 081763 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81763.TXT TERRI
46 

tion because no lender would ever make a 30-year fixed-rate 

prepayable mortgage unless they knew rates would stay high, or 

unless they had a way of hedging the interest rate risk and the 

prepayment risk, which they can do better now than they probably 

ever could. But still, it is a better economic proposition for the borrower and the lender. 

And let’s assume for a second the GSEs were poorly crafted and 

poorly designed institutions. I think Mr. Pollock, you said it quite 

well. You can be government, or you can be private, but you can’t 

be both. Because you get—from their perspective, it was a ‘‘heads 

they win, tails we lose’’ kind of business. 

And let’s assume for a second that the government is crowding 

out the private market, which I think to some extent they are. So 

let’s assume all these things for a second. 

I am curious. And first, Mr. Pollock and then Dr. Lea. Two questions. First, Mr. Pollock, have you done any analysis in your evaluation of the housing market to indicate the cost of the various 

subsidies and operating model that we have deployed across the 

last, call it 30 or 40 years, to the taxpayer, and compared that or 

contrasted that to the economic benefit that was created in the 

country broadly for this kind of housing finance system? Because 

it seems to me, we can’t look at what is wrong with our housing 

finance system in isolation without doing deep serious research 

into the economic benefits that were transferred to the economy to 

the tax base and to consumers broadly. 

And my second question for Dr. Lea is, as we think about new 

housing finance models, which we clearly have to do, and deciding 

what the role of government should be—I think there should be 

some role of government, but it needs to be very different than 

what it has been in the past. And we contrast it to international 

markets which have idiosyncratic aspects, as Professor Min indicated. But have you analyzed how those markets, which are materially smaller than the U.S. housing market, because I think the 

mortgage market in the United States is the second smallest fixed 

income market in the world and at different times, it was the largest fixed income market in the world. 

Have you thought about how those scale? Do they scale successfully into a much larger model? And have you done detailed research around that notion? So the first question for Mr. Pollock, 

which is contrasting the benefits, really, has this been a good investment for us economically? 

Mr. POLLOCK. Congressman, that is a great question. It would 

make a good project for an economist, of which I am not one. I am 

a banker. 

I would say this: We know that if you want to get efficient allocation of resources you have to have markets and market pricing. 

That is the way to do it. That is what we haven’t had. And that 

is what we need to move toward so that the prices of these instruments and the prices of the houses are not to be distorted. It is my 

view—and I think it is right—that all our subsidy efforts have had 

the effect of pushing up the price of houses, which is great if you 

happen to own one and your price is going up. It is very bad if you 

are trying to buy one as an entry level home buyer. 

47 

Mr. DELANEY. I am not an economist either; I am actually a 

banker by trade. But don’t you think it is somewhat intellectually 

dishonest to propose that the housing finance system we have deployed, which in my introductory comments I acknowledged, had 

deep structural flaws in it. But isn’t it somewhat intellectually dishonest to say that is not an appropriate system absent an analysis 

of what benefits it has created in the economy? So maybe we 

should have another time to talk about that. Maybe we will go to 

Dr. Lea. 

My question was, how do these other markets scale into the first 

or second largest fixed income market in the world? 

Mr. LEA. There are a couple of different ways of doing that. You 

obviously have a demand for credit on one side through the housing 

loan demand; and then you have a supply of savings that is going 

to meet that demand. That savings comes in a variety of forms. So 

as you mentioned before, commercial banks are the dominant lenders and the dominant funders not only in other countries, but if 

you look at what commercial banks buy, Fannie and Freddie securities, in fact, they are the dominant funding source here in the 

United States as well. And what they are doing is engaging in regulatory arbitrage where they are basically taking a 4 percent capitalized asset and turning it into a 1.6 percent capitalized asset because it could be guaranteed. 

Mr. DELANEY. So with 20 seconds left, do you think these other 

markets can scale their models, could scale into our sized market? 

Mr. LEA. Yes, because it has been a variety of instruments that 

are going to tap different sources of savings. So covered bonds as 

well as mortgage securities can tap longer term savings. And you 

want to have a mix of that. I think it is a savings and investment 

question. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Mulvaney. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for doing this. I want to chat for a little 

bit about a couple of different pieces of a credit facility you have 

heard discussed a little bit today, which is a 30-year fixed facility. 

I am a former home builder, so I am a little familiar with it. I also 

did mortgage closings for a long time, so I have been on all sides 

of these transactions. And one of the things that I have heard discussed back and forth a couple of times today is whether or not this 

particular facility would continue to exist. Dr. Pollock thinks that 

it would, that you don’t need a GSE to have a 30-year. And Mr. 

White probably agrees with him. And I agree with you, Doctor. You 

had mentioned that you thought that insurance companies were 

the proper funding source for those future loans because that 

would match up. 

Mr. WHITE. And pension funds, Congressman. 

Mr. MULVANEY. There you go. They are long-term. 

Mr. WHITE. They have long-term liabilities. They are natural 

buyers. 

Mr. MULVANEY. I recognize that Professor Min may disagree. But 

tell me, Mr. Pollock, we will start with you, why you think we 

would we still have a 30-year facility if we got rid of the GSEs? 

48 

Mr. POLLOCK. For starters, we have 30-year loans where there 

aren’t GSEs. So, they clearly happen already. We had 30-year loans 

when the GSEs were tiny and before one of them—namely Freddie 

Mac—existed. We will have whatever the market likes between demand and supply, just like always in markets. At some price we 

will have the balancing point between what the buyers demand 

and the suppliers will supply. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And I think that is important. We had 30-year 

fixed facilities before we had this dramatic participation in the 

market by these GSEs, correct? In fact, I think— 

Mr. POLLOCK. That is correct. 

Mr. MULVANEY. —Dr. Jaffee correctly pointed out, you go back 

to the 1960s and 1970s and my family was building houses. Yes, 

we had a 30-year facility. No, we didn’t really have the same type 

of GSE participation. But we did have 20 percent downpayment requirements. But we also had homeownership rates well above 60 

percent. So what we have seen over the course of the last generation is that the downpayment requirements have gone down, but 

homeownership has not gone up that dramatically. All that has 

gone down dramatically is the equity in homes, which I think exposes us to dramatic risk. 

I want to ask one last question dealing with a 30-year fix, which 

is that I can’t help but wonder—each of you I think has mentioned, 

I think accurately so, one of the root causes of the S&L crisis, a 

previous financial crisis that we faced in this particular industry 

which was caused by a mismatch of terms. We had short-term 

money funding, long-term types of durations on debt. Aren’t we encouraging the same type of risk now? Isn’t this GSE proclivity, isn’t 

the GSE the default preference for a 30-year fixed facility leading 

us down the exact same risk today? Are we simply encouraging 

short-term money to invest in long-term debt? 

Mr. POLLOCK. It is certainly true that the banking regulators are 

worried about the build-up of interest rate risk under the current 

low interest rate environment. And I think you and they are right. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Dr. Lea? 

Mr. LEA. Yes. I was just going to mention that it still exists. We 

haven’t gotten rid of that risk in our financial system. I mentioned 

before that banks buy mortgage securities and are funding them 

with a lot of short-term debt. 

Mr. MULVANEY. And to the extent there is a bias in favor of the 

30-year mortgage, the market by itself might not issue as much 30- 

year fixed debt as it is right now. I think that is fair to say. It 

would offer more options. You would have more 10-year; you would 

have more 5-year balloons; you would have more 20-year debt. 

Then, we have a 30-year fixed. That is the market because our 

rules push us toward this 30-year fixed. 

Professor Min, I am going to ask you the same question. Are we 

going down the same type of road today with this bias towards this 

30-year fixed facility through the GSE subsidy that you saw as 

being one of the root causes of the S&L crisis? 

Mr. MIN. I think it is important to recognize that asset mismatch 

still continues to be the case in every country in the world. I don’t 

think personally there is enough long-term demand for long-term 

elongated maturity securities. Even insurance companies and penVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:05 Jan 24, 2014 Jkt 081763 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81763.TXT TERRI
49 

sion funds want a lot of stuff that they can roll over. I think the 

fact that so many countries have that type of intermediation is important. So I think that it is important to recognize also that in the 

1960s and 1970s, the real issue was that we encouraged risk to 

lend to 30-year fixed. We gave them a benefit. It wasn’t a private 

system, as Dr. Jaffee has said. And it collapsed. 

So I think today the problem is that banks have shied away from 

interest rate risk. When you talk to bankers, they typically will tell 

you that they want more than 10 percent of their balance sheet 

being of these 30-year type— 

Mr. MULVANEY. Do you think that one of the reasons they are 

shying away from interest term risk is because we have had this 

zero interest rate policy in place for the last 4 years? 

Mr. MIN. This was pre-crisis as well when you talked to bankers. 

They didn’t want the interest rate—it was post S&L crisis that 

they shied away from that risk. So I think going back to the depository system doesn’t work as far as supplying the 30-year fixed 

mortgage. I think covered bonds would do it. But that comes with 

its own issues. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Dr. Jaffee, you look like you had something to 

add. 

Mr. JAFFEE. Yes. No one has commented that—we had some 

prior discussion suggesting a 15-year mortgage might be more reasonable, actually, given the high mobility of U.S. citizens. What no 

one has commented on is the 15-year mortgage has a lower interest 

rate than the 30-year. We have been deceived into thinking the 30- 

year is so wonderful because it is subsidized through the GSEs. If 

you take away those subsidies, actually the desirable mortgage for 

most U.S. homeowners would be the 15-year mortgage and they 

would actually get a rate benefit because the interest rate would 

be lower. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Foster. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. One of the things that makes it hard 

to compare mortgage systems across national boundaries is the 

very different loan-to-value limits that happen in different countries. And under normal market conditions, a 90 or even more than 

90 percent loan to value is actually a fairly safe thing. But when 

there is a bubble market going on, like in Las Vegas where the 

prices doubled in 2 years, even a 20 percent loan-to-value is a very 

unsafe mortgage. And I was wondering if any of you have comments on proposals to procyclically adjust the loan-to-value limits 

on mortgages and how that might be used to strengthen the system? We will start with Mr. Pollock. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Thank you very much, Congressman, for that 

question. Yes. Along with my colleagues, I do have such proposals 

and I think it would be a very positive thing in the American mortgage system if loan-to-value limits were countercyclically geared to 

the behavior of prices. I like to tell my banking friends, you think 

the collateral is the house but it is not the house. It is the price 

of the house. And as the price rises very high in a bubble, you need 

to be adjusting the loan-to-value ratio down. I think it is very realistic to think we could design such a system. Interestingly, our 

neighbors in Canada did make some countercyclical loan-to-value 

50 

adjustments like that. They did it by regulation. I think a systematic rule would be much better. Thank you. 

Mr. FOSTER. Are there any other comments? 

Mr. LEA. One very quick comment is that in Germany, they do 

the adjustments through the appraisal process. So instead of having an LTV regulation, they impose what is called a mortgageable 

value valuation which tries to take a more cycled view of what the 

true value of a house is. 

Mr. FOSTER. So in other words, they look at the long-term trend 

value of the house and treat rather skeptically the recently expanded value of a house— 

Mr. LEA. Absolutely yes. 

Mr. FOSTER. —in terms of underwriting the mortgage. 

Secondly, I was really, as I mentioned in my opening comments, 

surprised about the positive things said about the Danish system. 

And I was wondering if we could just go—anyone who wants to 

comment or maybe all of you about what would be the downside 

if we simply adopted the Danish system for both the covered bond 

and noncovered bond part of their market? 

Mr. MIN. I addressed this in my testimony. I think that the covered bond model could work in the United States. That being said, 

I don’t think it is a panacea against housing bubbles. Denmark actually had a worse housing bubble than we did, partly because of 

the proliferation of interest-only mortgages, which currently have 

a market share of about 56 percent there. They are facing a big 

fallout. It is a big policy problem right now. But covered bonds 

could work. And particularly, they have been providing the 30-year 

fixed-rate mortgage as they do in Denmark. The downsides from 

the U.S. perspective, I think, are that they tend to promote ‘‘toobig-to-fail,’’ because they are best suited to be issued by large 

issuers. 

In Europe, at least, where they have been successful, they really 

do benefit from these government guarantees I describe at length. 

So I am not sure they will achieve liquidity without all sorts of 

these types of regulatory and other mechanisms that really create 

guarantees for them if we transfer that to the United States. So 

that is sort of the cost we would have to deal with is implicit guarantees, ‘‘too-big-to-fail,’’ and all the stuff that comes with that. 

Mr. LEA. To point out one benefit of the system is that you have 

a match between the loan and the bond. And it becomes a very 

transparent system, a very efficient, much simpler than what we 

have today. Of course, it also achieves high credit quality by virtue 

of a maximum 80 percent loan-to-value ratio. The downside is that 

it does require a higher borrower downpayment. 

Mr. MIN. If I could respond to the maturity mismatch point, the 

fact is that covered bonds—much like many long-term obligations 

here where—collateralized and in the shadow banking system, it 

actually became short-term liquid liabilities, covered bonds serve 

the same purpose in Europe. They really are a core part of the 

shadow banking system, as I described in my written testimony. 

So in fact, a lot of what seems to be long-term demand for covered bonds is actually short-term demand for short-term liabilities, 

which is one of the reasons they bailed out covered bonds so heavily. 

51 

Mr. POLLOCK. Nothing, Congressman, saves financial systems 

from cycles. It is a part of human nature, and therefore part of financial systems. We could do very good things to moderate the cycles like the countercyclical loan-to-value ratios we were discussing. 

I think also the Danish-style covered bond would be a very good 

addition to the United States, as one instrument among others. 

The great advantage, as I see it, is that while the interest rate risk 

doesn’t go away, it is all taken by the bond buyer, while keeping 

all the credit risk with the maker of the loan, which aligns the incentives correctly. 

Mr. FOSTER. The interest rate risk and the prepayment risk, as 

I understand it. So you just simply could not have had, for example, a savings and loan crisis with the Danish system because it 

would have been agony in the bond market, which that is what the 

bond market is for, is dealing with that. All right. Thanks so much. 

I guess my time has expired. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. The next questioner is the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr. 

Mr. BARR. Professor Min, a question for you specifically pertaining to your testimony, assigning principal blame to private 

label securitization as the proximate cause for the financial crisis. 

Why would the private secondary mortgage market not securitize 

subprime when the GSEs, in order to promote their affordable 

housing goals, were the largest purchaser of subprime and Alt-A 

mortgages during the exact time period that your testimony referred to, the 2004–2007 time period? If the government is churning that, why would the private secondary mortgage market not be 

securitizing subprime? 

Mr. MIN. I believe that the GSEs actually started—became the 

majority purchaser, I think, starting in 2005 or so, when they convinced the regulator to do that. They also were the largest purchaser of Alt-A. That being said, the demand for AAA-rated private 

label securities has been described by a lot of sources—universally, 

as almost infinite, that the AAA demand, because it offered a higher coupon yield than agency debt or treasuries, and had that AAA 

rating that was seen as safe and because it was then 

recollateralized in different markets, like repos and derivatives and 

over-the-counter sort of transactions, there was almost infinite demand for it. So I don’t think the GSEs contributed materially to 

that. A lot of people have written about that particular issue. 

Mr. BARR. You acknowledge, though, Professor, that there was a 

massive growth in the GSE subprime portfolio during the time period that ran up to the financial crisis, correct? 

Mr. MIN. Sure. And I think a number of studies have looked at 

that purchase amount. First of all, it was all AAA, and determined 

that was not necessarily the driving cause of the demand. Really 

the limiting factor on private label securitization was the equity 

and mezzanine tranches. You had to sell those to somebody. So 

that was the limit basically. You could sell as much of the AAA 

stuff as you wanted. Somebody was going to buy it. Central banks, 

insurance companies, banks, et cetera. 

Mr. BARR. You talk about the devil you know versus the devil 

you don’t know. We know—a little editorial comment here—devil 

that we do know is a system with GSEs that operated at a leverage 

52 

ratio of over 200 to one—well over 200 to 1, primarily because of 

the hybrid models that allowed politics to drive it instead of market-based underwriting decisions. Where profits were privatized, 

losses were socialized, and where as a result, the taxpayers were 

exposed to up to $200 billion. So that is the devil we know. 

A question for Professor Lea. Alex Pollock has pointed out that 

the long-term fixed-rate mortgage, while it has been described as 

consumer friendly for obvious reasons, may not be so consumer 

friendly in practice. As he puts it, consumers do not benefit if rates 

go down, if they find that the values of their homes have fallen and 

they can’t refinance because the long-term mortgages have effectively trapped them in their homes. Isn’t there another problem 

though that comes about because the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage 

forces some borrowers to subsidize others because lenders can’t 

charge prepayment fees? I think you mentioned that the absence 

of prepayment fees raises the price of mortgages by 50 basis points. 

If this is true, doesn’t this force those who have no intention of refinancing or moving from their homes to subsidize those who want 

that option? 

Mr. LEA. Yes. In fact, the cost is socialized and spread through 

the mortgage interest rate to all buyers. And in fact, you do find 

that there are certain groups who are more likely to refinance and 

not surprisingly, it is better-off people who have equity and are 

going to refinance more often. So the contrast is to have a system 

where you pay for the option only when you exercise it. That is the 

European model, which applies prepayment penalties not for the 

30-year time period, but generally for the time the rate is fixed, 

which is oftentimes just 5 to 10 years. 

Mr. WHITE. Can we expunge from the discussion the phrase 

‘‘penalty?’’ It is a fee for exercising a valuable option. Don’t think 

of it as a penalty. Think of it as a fee for exercising a valuable option. Please. 

Mr. BARR. Let me just conclude. I have a little bit of time left. 

Let me just conclude by asking kind of a more general question for 

anyone who would like to chime in. I would like to inquire about 

the Federal Home Loan Bank model. We have been talking about, 

okay, beyond GSEs, what do we go to next? How do we have a vibrant private sector-driven secondary mortgage marketplace that 

gives us a range of products for consumers, including the 30-year 

fixed-rate mortgage? What are your views on the Federal Home 

Loan Bank model in terms of driving, I guess, that secondary mortgage marketplace as a substitute to the GSE model? Professor Min, 

I would like your thoughts on this too. 

Mr. MIN. I think it would create lots of liquidity. It has been a 

proven model. I am not sure it would lead to 30-year fixed-rate 

broad origination because of that interest rate risk that would be 

held by the depository institutions that receive the advances. 

Mr. POLLOCK. I am an interested party, Congressman, as you 

know, having run a Home Loan Bank and invented their mortgage 

business. I think we do need to consider how the Home Loan Bank, 

which is a GSE, but a much better kind of a GSE than Fannie and 

Freddie, could fit into this bigger picture. I would be glad to come 

talk to you about that if you would like. 

Mr. BARR. Okay. I yield back. 

53 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. Just as a housekeeping matter, 

we do have to clear the room here by 1:00, so we will have one 

more Member on each side speaking. First, Mr. Ellison, and then 

Mr. Royce will finish it up. And with that, Mr. Ellison from Minnesota. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank everyone on the panel. This is a very important discussion. Let me 

just lay a little groundwork for my question. The U.S. housing market is subsidized by tax incentives. And one of those tax incentives 

is mortgage interest deduction. I know Professor White, you and 

Representative Waters talked about that a little bit before. But it 

is also true that the Simpson-Bowles Deficit Commission and other 

bipartisan commissions have recommended converting the deduction into a tax credit. Others have recommended eliminating the 

deduction entirely to lower rates or to reduce the deficit. The benefits of the mortgage interest deduction are primarily to the top 

quintile of the income scale. And that is families with incomes 

above about $100,000 a year. Could you all talk about whether 

other countries use these kinds of tax incentives? To what extent 

do other countries provide generous tax benefits to homeowners or 

do they subsidize the interest on a mortgage property tax and capital gains while also exempting imputed rent? Go right ahead, Mr. 

Pollock? 

Mr. POLLOCK. Congressman, many other countries do not have 

the home interest deduction, such as Canada, for example, our 

neighbor. And yet, they have homeownership equal to or greater 

than ours. 

Mr. WHITE. The U.K., the United Kingdom, England used to 

have it. I think they changed from a mortgage interest deduction 

to none, I believe it was in the 1970s. And grass didn’t start growing in the streets. It is possible to make a transition to a less subsidized system. 

Mr. ELLISON. Professor Min? 

Mr. MIN. One additional comment. Germany has an interesting 

model where I believe they give tax subsidies to landlords and renters. So that might be something we are considering as well. 

Mr. ELLISON. Do you all think that we could reform the mortgage 

interest deduction so that it reaches more future homeowners and 

isn’t so highly concentrated in the top quintile? 

Mr. WHITE. If you want to keep it, Congressman, turn it into a 

refundable tax credit so that not just high-income households that 

are more likely to take deductions rather than use the standardized deduction. Sorry. Itemized versus the standard deduction. If 

you want to keep it, turn it into— 

Mr. MIN. You could cap it. That would be an easier fix but maybe 

not as effective. 

Mr. ELLISON. Dr. Lea? 

Mr. LEA. I will make a more general comment. If you look particularly at the housing market, but more broadly at trends in the 

U.S. economy, we have become addicted to debt generally. Not just 

mortgage—student, auto, everything else. And if you are going to 

talk about providing subsidies for particular activities such as 

home purchase, then doing it through the savings side makes sense 

54 

because we need to have more savings generally in this country 

and less emphasis on debt. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you for that. I will try to move quickly, because they only give us 5 minutes. 

Professor Min, you have mentioned I think in your testimony 

that other nations make a more significant investment in rental 

housing than the United States does. I would like to give you a 

chance to elaborate on that. One of the little factoids out there that 

I picked up on which is important to me is that in the United 

States, more than half of renters pay more than 30 percent of their 

income for housing; for the lowest-income families, more than 80 

percent pay more than half of their income for housing. And we already have a shortage of about 7 million homes affordable to families at the 30 percent area median income. In my own district, I 

can tell you, we have 10,000 people on the waiting list for public 

housing. Could you elaborate a little bit? 

Mr. MIN. I have not done an exhaustive analysis, but in looking 

at a few countries, I think generally what you see is two ways in 

which rental housing is subsidized: one is direct subsidies; and the 

other is sort of tax credits. And I guess there is a third which is 

transfer of payments so that people have a higher minimum level 

of income. I think all of those help support rental housing, particularly in European countries. 

Mr. ELLISON. With my very short time, does anybody care to 

comment on how other countries help people who are renters or 

particularly at the low-income level? 

Mr. LEA. Again, mainly through rental subsidies to help people 

afford rents beyond a certain percent of their income but to a much 

larger portion of the population than we do. 

Mr. ELLISON. Do other countries have this problem with low-income housing on the same scale we do? Is this a worldwide problem 

among industrialized economies? 

Mr. MIN. What do you mean by a problem? 

Mr. ELLISON. We need 7 million more homes which are affordable to families at the 30 percent. 

Mr. MIN. Affordability—I think that the United States is probably pretty unique among the advanced economies in that regard. 

Mr. POLLOCK. I know that in international discussions of housing 

finance, the problem of affordability and low income is often discussed by many countries. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you all. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. With that, the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Royce, will wind it up. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think at the end of the day, the question here with 90 percent 

of the market currently, the housing market, in the hands of the 

GSEs, is what are we going to do to reform the system to have private capital come back into the market, so as to return the stability 

to our housing finance system? And the element of this that concerns me is that the more distance there is from the last housing 

implosion, the memory loss that we are going to have over the factors that played into it, and the euphoria that we are going to feel 

over maybe the rise of Fannie and Freddie stock, or what have you, 

will take precedence over the actual impact this had on the average 

55 

homeowner, the type of individual who lost their home, the consequences of political interference in the market—and I know not 

everybody agrees with this. But I have always thought that replacing political poll by putting that in charge instead of market forces, 

that would always be the crux of a moral hazard problem, because 

good intentions have no limits in terms of Congressional interaction or from the Executive Branch. 

So if we go back to the good intentions with respect to zero downpayment loans, or the good intentions with respect to allowing the 

GSEs to overleverage 200 to 1, I understand what drove that, the 

idea to put everybody into a home. But I understand how injurious 

it was because at the end of the day, we had a lower homeownership rate. 

Traditionally, when private capital dominates, the ownership 

rate is pretty constant, and you do something to mitigate the boombust cycle. But here we had three factors of government intervention in play at one time. We had, from 2003 on, the decision by the 

Federal Reserve to run negative real interest rates for 4 years in 

a row—and I remember the economist opining on this, the London 

economist foresaw the asset bubble that this would create. But 

when I went back through the minutes, it was Mr. Bernanke who 

suggested this approach at the time. And I understand what they 

were trying to do. But central banks always overcompensate during 

growth periods and set those interest rates—traditionally, set them 

too low. And here we had the consequence of an asset bubble. But 

on top of that bubble, we were able to further leverage it because 

of some of the actions that Congress took. And in one case, action 

the SEC took. 

By allowing the investment banks the SEC decision on that, allowing the investment banks to leverage it 30 to 1, that was a profound error. But combining that with the GSEs, which by then 

were 60 percent of the market, who had imposed upon them this 

added mission with the housing goals of purchasing subprime and 

thus putting their—on those documents and holding those 

subprime in their portfolio up to 200-to-1 leverage, as I mentioned, 

that was $1.7 trillion. 

I had legislation in 2003 to try to allow the regulatory community to do what they wanted to do, which was to regulate this for 

systemic risk. And I remember how difficult it was during a housing boom to get anybody to focus on what the downside risk would 

be if the implosion came. But we had at the Fed at that time those 

who understood this problem and who told me this will start in 

housing and it will spread. And sure enough, when the GSEs collapsed and went down like dominos, the investment banks came 

out after them. By the way, AIG was overleveraged 170 to1. 

Your comments, Dr. Lea or Dr. Jaffee, on how we get action now 

before we lose the institutional memory of—there were other factors of course. But I am giving you some of the ones that were most 

immediately observable to me. Dr. Lea? 

Mr. LEA. I think we have to continue and accelerate the course 

we have started on with regard to reducing the footprint of the 

GSEs. One way is through reducing the loan limits. I don’t see a 

rationale for the high loan limits we have today. Also in terms of 

raising their guarantee fees because right now, they are crowding 

56 

out the private sector. We don’t have the option to see what the 

private sector can do because the GSEs are taking the bulk of the 

market. 

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Jaffee? 

Mr. JAFFEE. Yes, sir. I would agree. The two vehicles are to reduce the conforming loan limits, perhaps raise the guarantee fees 

that the GSEs are charging, and do that step by step. And it is actually a very safe way because you will see the results. You will 

see the jumbo markets coming back. If you don’t see them, of 

course, you will go more slowly. If it is working great, you go more 

quickly. I think it is a very feasible path. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Royce. And I would like to 

thank all the witnesses again for their testimony today. You guys 

have done a great job and we appreciate the opportunity to pick 

your brains and be able to get certain information for our further 

discussion and deliberation. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous 

materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

The Chair would also announce that we have another hearing in 

here starting at 1:00, so please take any conversations you have 

with your staff or anybody else to the back room or outside. And 

with that, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(57) 

A P P E N D I X 

June 12, 2013 

58 


81763.001

To the Committee on Financial Services 

of the U.S. House of Representatives 

June 12,2013 

For Hearings On: 

Reforming America's Housing Finance System 

Prepared June 10, 2013 

Written Testimony of 

Dr. Dwight M. Jaffee 

Booth Professor of Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 

Haas School of Business 

University of California, Berkeley 

Email: Jaffee@haas.berkeley.edu 

Phone: (510) 642-1273 
59 


81763.002

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to discuss with 

you today the future role of our government in the U.S. mortgage market. There is now a 

widespread consensus that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should no longer operate as government 

sponsored enterprises (GSEs). It is thus timely to consider the best means for replacing the two 

GSEs. 

Current discussions focus on two primary alternatives. The first would allow the private 

markets to replace the existing GSE functions. The second would create a government successor 

to the GSEs to continue to provide government guarantees against borrower default losses. 

My research leads me to a strong endorsement of the private markets as the preferred 

alternative for two reasons. First, there is strong evidence that the private markets would operate 

at a standard substantially higher than that actually experienced under the GSE regime. Second, 

experience indicates that a new government mortgage guarantee program would again leave 

taxpayers at high risk, while creating little or no sustainable increase in American horne 

ownership. I do believe, however, that there is a valid role for the FHA and VA programs, 

operating in their traditional manner with precisely defined programs, to provide benefits to 

lower income households and armed forces veterans. 

The evidence that private markets can and should replace the GSEs comes in two parts. The 

first is u.S. experience itself. Making new mortgages-mortgage origination-has always been 

100% a private market activity. Similarly, banks and other private investors have always owned 

the vast majority of U.S. mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). GSE portfolio 

holdings of mortgages and MBS rarely reached even 20% of the total. 

Guarantees of mortgage backed securities is the quantitatively most important GSE activity. 

But even here, only once (in 2003), did the totai of GSE portfolio holdings and guaranteed MBS 
60 


81763.003

reach 50% of total outstanding home mortgages. Prior to 1990 this total GSE share was always 

below 30% and prior to 1980 it was always a single-digit percentage. It is also worth 

remembering: 

1) The GSEs did not invent mortgage-backed securities-that honor goes to GNMA, an 

agency within HUD. 

2) All the innovations in asset-backed securitization, including prime jumbo MBS and 

commercial mortgage MBSs, were fully developed in the private sector. Indeed, during 

the 1990s, jumbo mortgage originations, which by definition exclude GSE participation, 

averaged over 20 percent of all mortgage originations. In 2000, jumbo mortgage 

originations reached 25 percent of all mortgage originations. 

The conclusion is clear: the private markets are fully capable of efficiently carrying out all of the 

GSE mortgage investment and securitization activities. 

This conclusion is reinforced by data that show the limited contribution the GSEs have made 

to expanding U.S. homeownership rates. Between 1950 and 1990, a period in which private 

markets dominated the U.S. mortgage markets, the U.S. homeownership rate rose from 55% to 

64%, a notable achievement. Since 1990, the 23 year period of the most extensive GSE 

operations, the homeownership rate has been basically flat-today it is 65%, one point higher 

than the 1990 value of 64%. 

Not to be deterred, the advocates for continuing government guarantees in the U.S. mortgage 

market often point to the 30-year, fixed-rate, mortgage as a major benefit of the GSEs. This is 

plain wrong for two reasons. First, the long-term, fixed-rate, mortgage was actually popularized 

in the U.S. by the Home Owners Loan Corporation during the Great Depression, long before the 

GSEs existed. Second, the GSEs have always pushed 100% of the interest rate risk embedded in 

2 
61 


81763.004

fixed-rate mortgages onto the private sector investors that purchase their MBS and bonds. The 

willingness of U.S. private sector investors to hold long-term, fixed-rate, mortgages and 

mortgage securities is thus independent of the GSEs. 

3 

Given the limited contribution ofthe GSEs to the U.S. mortgage market, it is reasonable to 

ask why they were often held in high esteem, at least until their collapse in 2008. The answer is 

simple: by promoting the concept of an implicit government guarantee, the GSEs garnered a 

subsidy of approximately one-half of 1 percent point on their funding costs, i.e. 50 basis points. 

The GSEs then passed approximately one-half of this subsidy, i.e. 25 basis points, to mortgage 

borrowers on their conforming mortgages. There was simply no way private markets could 

compete with such highly subsidized GSE mortgages. This is crowding out 10 I. The remarkable 

fact is that, nevertheless, the private markets efficiently served jumbo mortgage borrowers with a 

mortgage rate that was actually below the GSE mortgage rate after netting out the GSE subsidies. 

Turning to current conditions, the subsidies currently provided the GSEs are even more 

extreme: their securities are explicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve 

purchases their securities as part of its Quantitative Easing. The GSEs, together with the FHA 

and VA programs, now guarantee about 90% of all new U.S. mortgages. Again, this is no 

surprise-it is just crowding out on steroids. Nevertheless, the private markets continue to 

originate jumbo mortgages, and their volumes have been rapidly rising since Congress reduced 

the GSE conforming limits and the GSEs are now required to charge guarantee fees closer to 

market levels. Indeed, this approach-lower confirming loan limits and raising GSE guarantee 

fees--provides a transition path forward to a well-functioning, private, mortgage market for the 

U.S. My recent Op-Ed in the American Banker, with Mark Willis, provides further details. 
62 


81763.005

4 

My research has also identified a second set of evidence confirming that private markets will 

outperform the GSEs in providing mortgage finance for homeownership. This evidence comes 

from Western European countries. European Union rules prohibit member states from creating 

entities such as the U.S. GSEs, since the subsidies are considered an unfair trade advantage. A 

comparison of these EU countries with the U.S. thus provides another test of the GSE impact. 

The results show the European countries outperforming the U.S. on virtually every measure of 

housing and mortgage market performance. Perhaps the most stunning result is that the U.S. 

home ownership rate equals only the average of 15 major Western European countries. The 

European housing and mortgage markets have also been substantially more stable than those in 

the U.S. Of course, house prices have recently declined sharply in countries such as Greece, 

Ireland, and Spain, but this is a failure of their macroeconomic budget policies, not their 

mortgage markets. Indeed, even with their crisis conditions, the mortgage default rates in these 

countries remain far lower than the recent U.S. experience. I am attaching, as an appendix, a 

table from my research that provides more details. 

In closing, I tum brietly to my final reason for advocating private mortgage markets for the 

U.S., namely that, in my view, new government mortgage guarantee programs will inevitably fail 

because they will create the same taxpayer costs as the GSEs, just under a new name. To be 

clear, I recognize that many advocates of these programs ask for the government to provide only 

a catastrophe backstop, and they propose that the government charge appropriate fees for the 

guarantees it provides. This is acceptable in principle, and the current U.S. government terrorism 

insurance program-TRIA---could be seen as a prototype. However, in my view, the more 

realistic comparison is to the National Flood Insurance Program. This program also began with 

the best of intentions, with no intended subsidies, but in reality it provides large subsidies and 
63 


81763.006

5 

especially to the very homes that are at the greatest risk of flooding. The result has been both a 

financial catastrophe for U.S. taxpayers and a human tragedy for those households for whom the 

National Flood Insurance Program creates subsidizes to place themselves in harm's way. 

The bottom line is that no mechanism exists through which the U.S. government can 

effectively provide mortgage subsidies to most U.S. households. After all, almost all U.S. 

homeowners are also taxpayers. A subsidy then simply transfers money from a household's 

taxpayer pocket to its homeowner pocket. At best, this achieves nothing. While in reality it 

creates a misallocation in which funds that could create productive investments and job 

opportunities are diverted instead to the profit of third parties such as the GSEs. 

Appendix 

Table!: The Performance of European Mortgage Markets in Comparison with the US" 1998 to 2010 

(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) 

Rate of Owner Coefficient of Standard Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage To 

Occupancy CO\lariatjon Deviation of Interest Rate Interest Rate GOP Ratio 

Housing Starts (2) House Price Average Level Average 

Latest Year Inflation Spread (3) 2010 

Western Europe 

Austria 57.5% 7.2% 2.7% 4.83% 1.79% 28.0% 

Belgium 78.0% 15.2% 7.4% 5.61% 2.58% 46.3% 

Denmark 53.6% 56.1% 8.5% 5.80% 2.58% 101.4% 

Finland 59.0% 11.9% 3.8% 4.13% 1.09% 42.3% 

France 57.8% 17.4% 6.2% 4.83% 1.80% 41.2% 

Germany 43.2% 29.0% 1.7% 5.07% 2.05% 46.5% 

Ireland 74.5% 99.2% 14.2% 4,32% 1.15% 87.1% 

Italy 80.0% 25.7% 3.4% 4.70% 1.56% 22.7% 

luxembourg 70.4% 17.9% 4.7% 4.08% 1.05% 44.7% 

Netherlands 55.5% 14.5% 6,5% 5,08% 2.06% 107.1% 

Norway 85.0% 24,6% 5.0% 6.11% 1.44% 70.3% 

Portugal 74.6% 35.5% 2.9% 4.43% 1.35% 66.3% 

Spain 85.0% 93.0% 8.1% 4,16% 1.08% 64.0% 

Sweden 66.0% 45.5% 2.9% 3.75% 0.91% 81.8% 

United Kingdom 66.4% 25.0% 6,8% 5.12% 0.93% 85.0% 

EU Average 67.1% 34.5% 5.6% 4.80% 1.56% 62.3% 

US 66.9% 45.S% 7.3% 5.07% 2.26% 76.5% 

US Rank 8th 0116 3rd 0116 5th 0116 6th 0116 3rd 0116 6th 0116 

Source: Dwight M. Jaffee, "Reforming the U.S. Mortgage MarketThrough Private Market Incentives, published in 

House of Cards: Reforming America's Housing Finance System, Mercatus Center, March 2012 available at 

http://mercatu5.org/sites/default/files/House_of_Cards_ Ma rch_20 12.pdf 
64 


81763.007

Testimony of 

Dr. Michael J. Lea 

Director 

The Corky McMillin Center for Real Estate 

San Diego State University 

To the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services 

Hearing on Comparison of International Housing Finance Systems 

June 12,2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Waters and Members of the Committee thank you 

for the opportunity to be here today. I am Michael Lea, Director ofthe Corky 

McMillin Center for Real Estate and Professor of Finance at San Diego State 

University. I have an extensive background in housing finance induding senior 

executive positions at major mortgage lenders and as Chief Economist of Freddie 

Mac. I have been actively involved in the study of international housing finance 

systems for more than 20 years having done consulting, business development and 

research in 30 countries and serving as Director of Research for the International 

Union of Housing Finance. I authored a comparative study of mortgage products 

released by the Research Institute for Housing America in 2010, a comparative 

study of developed country mortgage markets published by the Brookings 

Institution in 2011 and an academic journal article on the long term fixed rate 

mortgage in 2011. I would requestthat these studies be entered in the record as 

they provide information supporting the points I will make today. 

In addressing the committee today you have asked me to address whether a 

sustainable housing finance system is possible without government guarantees and 

government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In answering this question I will draw 

on the experience of major developed housing finance systems with a focus on 

Canada, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. I will divide my remarks in 

three sections: First examining the incidence of guarantees and GSEs in major 

developed country housing finance systems; second summarizing the major features 

ofthe Canadian, Danish, German and British housing finance systems; and third 
65 


81763.008

Lea 

providing my thoughts as to what a system without government guarantees or GSEs 

would look like. 

1. Guarantees and Government-sponsored Enterprises in Housing Finance 

The U.S. is internationally unusual in the extent of government involvement to 

support owner-occupied mortgage finance. No other developed country has a 

government-sponsored enterprise similar to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Among 

13 developed countries surveyed in my research, only Canada and Japan have 

government mortgage security guarantee programs equivalent to Ginnie Mae. Only 

Canada and the Netherlands have government-owned mortgage insurance 

companies. Australia sold its government mortgage insurer to the private sector in 

1997. 

For countries with government mortgage market support the market share of 

government-supported entities is far less than the current U.S. situation in which 

over 90 percent of mortgage credit is corning from government-backed institutions. 

in Canada approximately 50 percent of mortgages have government-backed 

mortgage insurance which is required for all loans over 80 percent loan-to-value 

(LTV). Approximately 25 percent of mortgages have been securitized with 

guarantees from the Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation. A similar 

proportion of mortgages have been securitized in Japan with guarantees from the 

japan Housing Finance Agency. Governments do not directly support mortgage 

securitization in other countries. 

It is important to note that all countries support housing finance indirectly through 

their banking systems. In most countries commercial banks are the dominant 

lenders. They are supported through deposit insurance and in some cases 

government support in crisis. This type of support differs from that given to US 

GSEs. It is a support to sustain and maintain a type of financial institution that is 

critical for the functioning of modern economies and that conducts a wide variety of 

2 
66 


81763.009

Lea 

business. Commercial banks pay for this support through deposit insurance 

premiums and meaningful capital requirements. The GSEs have never paid user fees 

for their support and have operated with inadequate capital for most of their 

existence. 

2. Major Mortgage Markets: A Comparison 

Canada: The Canadian mortgage market is dominated by the top 5 commercial 

banks that have a 75 percent market share. The market is well developed with a 

mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio of 65 percent. 

The dominant product is the roll-over mortgage which is a short term frxed rate 

instrument amortized over a longer term - typically 30 years. Rates are "rolled" or 

renegotiated when the fixed rate period ends. The most common period of rate 

fixing is 5 years but the borrower has a choice of fixed rate terms ranging from 1-10 

years. During the time the rate is fixed (up to 5 years) the lender charges a penalty 

for prepayment. All loans over 80 percent loan-to-value are required to have 

mortgage insurance, which is provided by the government-backed National Housing 

Administration (NHA equivalent to the US FHA) or private mortgage insurance 

companies (which have a 90 percent backstop from the government). 

Approximately 50 percent of mortgages have mortgage insurance. There is no 

mortgage interest deduction in Canada. 

The banks fund a majority of their mortgages on balance sheet with deposits. 

Canada recently passed a mortgage "covered bond" law to broaden funding options. 

The Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation (CMHC) provides guarantees on 

pools of NHA insured loans that are securitized (similar to the Ginnie Mae program 

in the US CMHC also operates the NHA program). Approximately 25 percent of 

outstanding mortgages have been securitized through this program. CMHC is a 

crown corporation with an explicit guarantee from the Canadian government. The 

3 
67 


81763.010

Lea 

government caps its total insurance volume at C$600 billion and it recently reached 

this cap. 

The Canadian mortgage market performed well through the crisis. Despite a run up 

and subsequent fall in house prices default rates have remained quite low (less than 

0.5 percent). Canada had virtually no subprime market prior to the crisis. Canadian 

mortgages are full recourse to the borrower for deficiency judgments. The Ministry 

of Finance temporarily authorized CMHC to purchase mortgage securities during 

the crisis - an authority that has been terminated. 

Denmark: The Danish mortgage market is dominated by 5 specialized mortgage 

credit institutions (MCl) that fund loans up to an 80 percent loan to value ratio. 

Commercial banks supply a small amount of unsecured "top up" loans above the 80 

percent mortgage loan limit. Denmark has one of the highest mortgage debt-to-GDP 

ratios in the world at 101 percent. 

Danish borrowers have a variety of mortgage instruments from which to choose. 

The traditional mortgage design is a long term (20-30 year) fixed rate mortgage 

prepayable without penalty (the same loan that dominates the US housing finance 

system Denmark is the only other developed market that offers this types of 

mortgage). In addition, Danish borrowers can use an adjustable rate mortgage 

(ARM) in two forms: an indexed ARM using a Euribor index and a roll-over 

instrument that adjusts to the current market rate at the end of the fixed rate 

period. These loans are offered with and without a prepayment penalty. Mortgage 

interest is tax deductible in Denmark at a maximum 33 percent marginal tax rate. 

Danish Mel are funded entirely through issuance of covered bonds and equity. The 

covered bonds are issued in accordance with the "balance principle" in which the 

loan is funded with the simultaneous issuance of a bond that corresponds to the 

individual loan. In so doing the MCl has no interest rate risk. The Danish system is 

very transparent and efficient. The mortgage note rate equals the bond coupon rate 

4 
68 


81763.011

Lea 

and the Mel adds a 50 basis point fee for its administration. Another important 

feature is that fact that the mortgage bonds are corporate obligations of the issuer 

as such the credit risk remains with the originator thus aligning incentives. The 

Danish covered bond market is the largest in Europe with over £345 billion 

outstanding. 

As with US GSE mortgage-backed securities the bonds are pass-throughs of 

principal and interest. The individual bonds are part oflarger series that are 

purchased by investors on a pro rata basis. An important feature of the Danish 

system is the buy-back privilege of borrowers. In the event of a market rate increase 

the bond trades at a discount. The borrower can purchase the bond in the market 

(usually through their lender) and present it to the lender to pay off the mortgage. 

In this way the borrower can deleverage by lowering their loan amount at a time in 

which house prices are falling, thus reducing the likelihood of negative equity. In a 

falling market interest rate environment the borrower can refinance her mortgage 

without penalty as in the US. There is no securitization or GSE in Denmark. 

The Danish mortgage market performed exceptionally well during the crisis. The 

covered bond market remained open throughout the crisis ensuring a steady flow of 

funds without government guarantees. As in other developed countries, the Danish 

central bank did purchase mortgage bonds for a short time period in 2008 to ensure 

liquidity in the market. The Danish housing market experienced a greater boom and 

bust than most of the US yet Danish mortgage default rates remain very low (less 

than one percent). Danish mortgages are recourse obligations, which contribute to 

the low rates of default and foreclosure. Many borrowers took advantage of rising 

rates in 2007-8 to deleverage. Danish lenders have not offered sub-prime or limited 

documentation loans. 

Germany: Germany has a diverse mortgage market with several types of lenders 

taking significant market share. The largest market share belongs to the savings 

banks that are owned by state governments. The second largest lending group is 

5 
69 


81763.012

Lea 

cooperative banks that are mutually owned. Specialized mortgage banks and 

commercial banks are also significant originators. The market is stable and mature 

with a mortgage debt-to-GDP of 48 percent. 

The German mortgage market has a unique institution, the Bausparkassen that 

provides second mortgages linked to a savings account. Households take out a 

Bauspar contract that promises a loan in the amount equal to the sum saved for a 

downpayment over a period 4-5 years. The typical financing package in Germany is 

20 percent downpayment, a 20 percent Bauspar loan and a 60 percent first 

mortgage. The government provides small savings bonus upon completion of the 

Bauspar contract and most households have a contract. Mortgage interest is not 

deductible in Germany. The country is unique in that it has a (small) subsidy for 

savings rather than the more common mortgage debt subsidy. 

Most German mortgages are rollover contracts with a fixed rate for 1-15 years over 

a 25-30 year amortization. There is a yield maintenance prepayment penalty for 

refinance during the fixed rate period up to 10 years. Savings banks also offer short 

-term adjustable rate mortgages. 

German mortgages are funded with a mix of mortgage covered bonds and deposits. 

German covered bonds ("Pfandbrief') differ from those in Denmark in that they are 

issued against a portfolio of mortgage loans ('the cover") rather than a 1:1 loanbond correspondence. The bonds are bullet maturities with a term equal to the fixed 

rate period of the loans. The Pfandbrief covered bond market is the second largest 

in Europe with over €224 billion outstanding. There are no government guarantees 

or government sponsored enterprises in Germany; however the state-owned 

Landesbanken traditionally provided wholesale finance to the savings banks. The 

European Central Bank (ECB) supported the covered bond market during the crisis 

with purchases. Covered bonds throughout Europe are eligible collateral at the ECB 

discount window. 

6 
70 


81763.013

Lea 

The German mortgage market performed well during the crisis with very low 

default and foreclosure rates. Mortgage loans are full recourse in Germany. There 

were a numher of bank failures but none were related to residential real estate 

lending. The German government injected funds into selected institutions and 

guaranteed bank liabilities to ensure access to wholesale funds in 2008-2009. 

United Kingdom: The UK mortgage market is dominated by 5 large lenders: 4 

commercial banks and one mutually owned building society with a combined 

market share of 90 percent. Prior to the crisis UK-style mortgage companies called 

centralized lenders funded by loan sale and securitization accounted for 

approximately 10 percent of the market but they disappeared with the collapse of 

wholesale funding markets. The UK mortgage market is large relative to the size of 

the economy with a mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio of 75 percent. 

The dominant mortgage instrument in the UK is the short-term adjustable rate 

mortgage. There are two versions: a "tracker" loan indexed to Libor and a 

discretionary ARM ("standard variable rate") wherein the rate is set at the lender's 

discretion (typically following the Bank of England base rate). Initial fixed rate 

periods of 1-3 years with a modest discount are common. UK mortgage market 

exhibits significant churn as lenders aggressively compete for borrowers with the 

initial period fixed rates. A prepayment penalty during the fixed rate period and 

somewhat beyond is common. Mortgage interest is not deductible in the UK. 

UK lenders are funded primarily with deposits. Prior to the crisis approximately 15 

percent of lending was funded by securitization primarily by the centralized 

lenders. Large depository lenders have issued covered bonds and the UK has passed 

covered bond legislation. There are no government-sponsored enterprises and until 

recently no government mortgage guarantees. The UK government has proposed a 

guarantee program wherein the government will provide partial loss insurance for 

high LTV loans (over 80 percent) for a maximum of 7 years. An important difference 

7 
71 


81763.014

Lea 

from the FHA program is the requirement that lenders take a first loss position (5 

percent of loss over 80 percent LTV). 

Prior to the crisis the UK was one of the more aggressive markets with sub-prime 

and limited documentation (self certification) lending. Sub-prime lending 

accounted for approximately 8 percent of UK lending. Unlike the US, however, 

British lenders did not typically layer risk (e.g., granting high LTV loans to subprime borrowers). As in the US this type of lending disappeared in the crisis. 

The UK mortgage market has managed the stress of the financial crisis relatively 

well. Default and foreclosure rates are elevated but at 2.5 percent and 0.3 percent 

respectively they are well below US levels. UK non-conforming loans have high rates 

of delinquency but relatively low I-ates of foreclosure. The predominance of ARMs is 

an important factor - borrowers benefitted from sharply falling interest rates due to 

monetary policy easing. Unlike the US, negative equity is not a major problem and 

loans are full recourse (up to 6 years). Several large mortgage lenders including 

Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley were nationalized as a result of an 

excessive dependence on wholesale finance to fund non-conforming mortgages. 

3. A Vision of the Future 

The U.S. mortgage market is internationally unusual in several respects: the large 

role of government in directing credit to the housing market (even before the 

crisis); the presence of GSEs and extensive use of government guarantees to 

promote securitization; the dominance of securitization as a funding technique; and 

the high market share of a long-term, fixed rate mortgage (FRM). These 

characteristics are interrelated. The origins of the GSEs lie in an expanding role of 

the government in the Great Depression. Securitization through the GSEs rose to be 

a dominant funding technique because of the wide-spread failure of savings and 

loans due to a government prescribed mismatch in which they were required to 

offer only long term fixed rate mortgages. The advantages of the GSE charter 

8 
72 


81763.015

Lea 

allowed them to cement their role as the dominant funding source and in so doing 

enshrine the FRM as the major instrument. Today defenders of the GSE status quo 

point to the necessity of maintaining this instrument in its dominant position. 

Before turning to the benefits and costs of the FRM, it is instructive to review the 

history of the GSE. This brief review will show that GSEs are largely an unintended 

consequence of decisions made for reasons other than explicitly subsidizing housing 

finance. The GSE story begins in the Great Depression. The FHA was created in 1934 

as an independent, federally sponsored mutual mortgage insurance fund authorized 

to insure only the long term (up to 20 years) fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgage 

(FRM) with a maximum loan to value (LTV) ratio of 80 percent on new construction. 

The National Housing Act also gave FHA the authority to establish private national 

mortgage exchanges to "make a market" in these FHA-insured FRMs and thereby 

promote their use. However portfolio lenders refused to fund the FHA FRM because 

of its inherent funding risk. Thus the government created the National Mortgage 

Association of Washington (later changed to the Federal National Mortgage 

Association or "Fannie Mae") to purchase FHA loans funded with Treasury debt. 

The GSE charter was born in 1968 - not for the purpose of creating the secondary 

mortgage market but rather as political expediency to get the Association "off 

budget". The Government National Mortgage Association-"Ginnie Mae"-was 

established at the same time with the sole purpose being to "manage and liquidate" 

the Treasury-financed FHA (VA-insured Fannie Mae portfolio. Ginnie Mae created 

the mortgage-backed security using the grantor trust statute to facilitate a sale of 

assets without corporate double taxation (at the trust and investor level). A major 

rationale for creation of the Ginnie Mae security was to pre-empt state security law 

restrictions. This new instrument provided an efficient funding source for FHA and 

VA mortgages - a role that Fannie Mae had traditionally done. Fannie Mae's new 

owners, mortgage bankers, lobbied for and won the authority to invest in 

conventional, non-government insured mortgages. Fannie Mae funded its purchases 

with corporate debt through 1981. The savings and loans, seeing that the mortgage 

9 
73 


81763.016

Lea 

bankers now had a GSE funding source, lobbied for their own leading to the creation 

of Freddie Mac in 1970. Politics rather than policy lie behind its creation. 

While Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae slowly developed the secondary mortgage 

market in the 1970s, savings and loans continued to build up their exposure to fixed 

rate mortgages. Federally chartered S&Ls were prohibited from offering ARMs and 

state-chartered S&Ls offered only a limited amount. This changed in 1981 when 

regulators and Congress realized that the sharp rise in interest rates had effectively 

bankrupted the entire industry. The S&Ls were allowed to issue ARMs and given 

accounting and tax relief to encourage them to sell FRMs leading to strong GSE 

growth during the decade. Fannie Mae was insolvent at the same time for the same 

reason but like the S&Ls allowed to grow out of its problems. It began securitizing 

loans in 1981. 

GSE dominance grew as interest rates fell. Ever greater volumes of mortgages were 

refinanced as one of the main attributes of the FRM, the ability to prepay without 

penalty, became more apparent and borrowers refinanced their loans to lower 

payments and tap housing equity. Over time the interest rate sensitivity of 

borrowers grew and the mortgage industry became dependent on refinancing. The 

GSE MBS became a dominant trading instrument as investment banks and hedge 

funds speculated on prepayment risk. While the GSE securities stated they were not 

obligations of the US government, they were traded on investment bank "agency 

desks" and soon had the highest volume of trading in the fixed income market. The 

investment banks moved beyond market making to active investment, creating 

"proprietary trading desks" to structure and manage mortgage-backed security 

portfolios. In this way the entire mortgage securities market, not just the GSEs, 

became "too big to fail". 

Which brings us back to the GSEs and the FRM. Securitization (more accurately 

capital market funding) is necessary to fund the FRM due to its inherent cash flow 

risk. It also turns illiquid mortgage loans into liquid securities. However, as other 

10 
74 


81763.017

Lea 

panelists will attest, a government guarantee is not a necessary condition for 

securitization. A vibrant private label security market in jumbo FRMs existed before 

the crisis and will re-emerge if and when GSE loan limits return to normal levels. 

And the Danish market funds FRMs through non-guaranteed covered bonds. But the 

real question for policy makers is whether it is healthy to build a market around 

GSEs and the FRM. 

The FRM has undeniable benefit. In addition to penalty free prepayment it is a 

simple, easy to understand instrument. It provides protection against rising interest 

rates for a long time period. However there are significant costs to the FRM. The 

interest rate and prepayment risks in the FRM are costly and difficult for investors 

to manage. A huge volume of derivative instruments is necessary for investors to 

manage the risks increasing systemic risk in the financial system. There is a 

premium for both the long term and the prepayment option that are paid by all 

users of the mortgage. The FRM causes instability in the mortgage market through 

periodic refinancing waves. The FRM can create negative equity in an environment 

of falling house prices. And the taxpayers are on the hook for hundreds of billions of 

dollars in losses backing the credit risk guarantees provided by Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac to support securities backed by the FRM. 

If we move away from a housing finance system predicated on FRMs and GSEs what 

would emerge? As noted above, the FRM would continue to be offered but at a 

higher price reflecting non-subsidized financing. Borrowers would benefit through 

lower mortgage rates from moving down the yield curve selecting fixed rate temlS 

consistent with their mobility patterns. Very few FRMs are held to term so 

supporting an instrument that has a fixed rate for 15-30 years is not essential to the 

workings of the housing finance system. In a non-GSE world, shorter term fixed rate 

instruments like the roll-over and hybrid ARM would provide rate and payment 

stability for up to 10 years. Lenders could safely finance these instruments through 

term deposits, interest rate swaps and covered bonds or through private-label 

securitization. Loans could be offered with and without prepayment penalties 

11 
75 


81763.018

Lea 

providing borrowers with greater choice. And taxpayer risk would be substantially 

reduced through elimination of the GSEs. 

4. Conclusions 

There is no ideal housing finance system. Individual country arrangements reflect 

history, market structure and government policy. However, almost all developed 

country housing finance systems performed better during the crisis than that of the 

US. What can the U.s. learn from other countries? 

First no other country has as much government involvement in the mortgage 

market The combined effect of the various forms of government intervention 

undoubtedly contributed to the housing boom and bust in the U.S. Other countries 

have achieved comparable or higher rates of homeowners hip and well-developed, 

stable mortgage markets with much less government support 

Second, no developed country has a GSE. GSEs were created primarily for political 

not policy reasons. The GSEs rose to dominance as a result of economic policy 

(falling interest rates), consumer protection policy (requirements for S&Ls to offer 

FRMs) and their government backing. It is fair to say that policy makers never 

intended to create a duopoly providing over 75 percent of aJl mortgage credit in the 

US. 

Third, only one other country has the FRM as a major mortgage instrument. And 

that country, Denmark, has a safer and more efficient way to fund the FRM. The FRM 

has large costs to the consumer, lender and government. Continuation of its 

dominance should not be a public policy objective. A more balanced, market-driven 

system will provide a range of mortgage products and funding instruments 

addressing a wide variety of consumer and lender needs without exposing the 

taxpayer to undue risk. Average mortgage rates may be lower if borrowers switch to 

shorter term fixed rate and adjustable rate mortgages. 

12 
76 


81763.019

Lea 

Finally it is important to keep in mind that the pm-GSE housing finance system in 

the US generated comparable levels of homeowners hip without the distortions 

caused by government guarantees, institutions and programs. The experience of 

other countries is that private capital can fund the vast majority of demand for 

housing finance. A high rate of homeowners hip and a stable mortgage market 

meeting the needs of consumers and lenders can be achieved without the degree of 

government intervention that exists in the U.s. today. In that respect the U.S. clearly 

can learn much for international housing finance systems. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. 

13 
77 


81763.020

L \,jVER5ITY OF CALlI"(}R):lA.IRVI;-';E:- __ ~ ____________________ _ 

Written Testimony of 

DavidK. Min 

Assistant Professor of Law 

University of California Irvine School of Law 

Before the United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Financial Services 

"Beyond GSEs: Examples of Successful Housing Finance Models Without Explicit Government 

Guarantees" 

Wednesday, June 12,2013 

\0:00am 

2128 Rayburn House Office Building 
78 


81763.021

Chainnan Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, and members ofthe Committee, my 

name is David Min and I am an Assistant Professor at the University of California Irvine School 

of Law, where I teach and research in the area of banking law and financial regulation. Before 

coming into academia, I spent over a decade working in banking and capital markets regulation, 

both in private practice and in the federal government, including as a Senior Policy Advisor for 

the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, where I had the pleasure of working with several of 

you and your staff. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the topic of alternative 

housing finance models. In the aftennath of the 2007-08 financial crisis, which has generally 

been attributed to problems in the U.S. residential mortgage markets, it is critically important 

that leading policy makers such as yourselves thoughtfully consider how best to refonn a U.S. 

housing finance system that is widely seen as broken. 

Before I get into the substance of my remarks, I want to emphasize a point that may seem 

obvious, but is not always well understood. And that is that it is extraordinarily difficult to try to 

compare different models of housing finance, as these are intrinsically and intricately intertwined 

with the cultural, political, and economic systems with which they co-exist. For example, 

Gennany has recently enjoyed relative home price stability and low mortgage delinquency rates, 

while maintaining an abundance of affordable rental housing, and so it might be tempting to look 

to Gennany's housing finance system, which has a uniquely low homeownership rate and an 

abundance of affordable rental housing, as a model. But the experience of the Gennan housing 

and mortgage markets cannot be properly understood without also looking to other factors 

unique to Gennany, including the large rental subsidies offered by the government; I the large 

stock of quality affordable public housing;2 a tax code that favors landlords and tenants over 

homeowners;3 a strongly pro-tenant regulatory regime that limit rent increases and evictions;4 the 

provision of fenerous social welfare payments;5 the relatively flat income and wealth distribution 

in Gennany; and the macroeconomic policies of the Gennan government, which have led to 

high current account surpluses and low unemployment even during the global financial 

slowdown of the last several years.7 

With that important caveat in mind, there are seven points I would like to make today: 

1. Government Guarantees Are Universal: There are three types of funding instruments that 

collectively account for almost all of the residential mortgage financing in the developed 

world: bank deposits, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and covered bonds. Generally 

I See Michael Voigtlander, Why L, the Germany Homeownership Rate So Low?, 24 HOUSING STUDIES 355, 359-60 

(2009). 

'Id. 

J !d. at 365-67. 

4 See Axel Borsch-Supan, Housing Market Regulations and }{ousing Market Performance in the United States, 

Germany, and Japan, in SOCIAL PROTECTION VERSUS ECONOMIC FLEXIBILITY: Is THERE A TRADE-OFF? 132-36 

(Rebecca M. Blank, cd., 1994). 

, See Stefan Boeters, e! aI., Reforming Social Welfare in Germany-An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, 7 

GERM. ECON. REV. 363 (2006). 

6 See Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, Crisis Squeezes Income and Puts Pressure on 

Inequality and Poverty: New Resultsfrom the DECD Income Distribution Database (2013), available at 

http://www.oecd.orglels/soc/OECD2013-lnequality-and-Poverty-8p.pdf. 

7 See Anna Ivanova, Current Account Imbalances: Can Structural Policies Make a Difference? (In!'l Mon. Fund, 

Working Paper No. 12/61,2012). 
79 


81763.022

speaking, with only limited exceptions, investors in these instruments enjoy the benefits 

of either explicit or implicit government guarantces. While the Unitcd Statcs is relatively 

unique in its heavy reliance on government-guaranteed MBS, it is decidedly not unique in 

its dependence on government guarantees to fund residential mortgages. 

2. European Covered Bonds Are Best Thought of as Government-Sponsored Obligations: A 

corollary of the previous point is that covered bonds also enjoy government backing. 

Contrary to the elaims of some, European covered bonds are not purely private financial 

instruments, but rather enjoy a myriad of government guarantees, as well as preferential 

regulatory and capiiallreatlllents that mirror or surpass the benefits provided to Agency 

obligations in the United States. 

3. Government Guarantees Are Prevalent Because Thev Address Kev Alarket Failures in 

Housing Finance: Government guarantees are so ubiquitous because they address certain 

market failures that are inherent in financial intermediation-the use of short-term, 

illiquid liabilities to fillld long-term, illiquid loans-which is necessary to meet the 

enormous long-term capital requirements that housing entails. In particular, these 

guarantees ensure liquidity, stability, and affordability in housing finance. In the United 

States and Dcnmark, government guarantees also facilitate the wide and affordable 

availability of the 3D-year fixed-rate, fully self-amortizing mortgage, a product that is 

pro-consumer and helps to promote financial stability. 

4. There is No Pertect Housing Finance Model: In the aftermath of the problems with the 

U.S. housing finanee system, it is of course tempting to look at other models and assume 

the grass is greener on the other side. But each of the three major types of housing 

finance models-deposits, securitization, and covered bonds--experienced major failures 

in the recent credit crisis. And it is elear that each of these models has its advantages and 

disadvantages. While the weaknesses of securitization and deposits as funding vehicles 

are well recognized in the United States, it is important to recognize that covered bonds 

come with their own problems. Thc issuance of covcred bonds typically increases the risk 

to other creditors, including thc governmental dcposit insurer, and can thus create a moral 

hazard problem, insofar as covered bond investors have reduced incentives to engage in 

markct discipline. Perhaps most troubling, from a U.S. perspective, is that covered bonds 

are inherently best suited for very large financial institutions thought to enjoy a 

government backstop--so-called "Too Big To Fail" banks. 

5. The Common Thread in Global HQyslng12yQbl~LW(J.I1illg}JS2igl Deregulation: The 

United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom were perhaps the countries hardest-hit by 

housing market issues. All three of these countries underwent significant banking sector 

liberalization in the decades preceding their housing bubbles. At the same time, Canada, 

which did not have significant financial dercgulation but does have an outsized 

government role in housing finance, did not cxperience such housing problems. This 

suggests that financial deregulation is a primary factor in explaining international 

problems with housing finance. 

6. Explicit, Ex Ante Guarantees Are Preferahle to Implicit. Ex Post Guarantees: The choice 

facing policy makers is not whether to adopt a housing finance with explicit guarantees or 
80 


81763.023

no guarantees, as the title of this hearing might suggest. Rather, the choice is between 

explicit, well-defined, ex ante guarantees with buffers against taxpayer loss, or implicit, 

undefined, ex post guarantees that have no protections for taxpayers. For a numbcr of 

reasons, I bclieve that explicit guarantccs are preferable as a policy mattcr. 

7. Given u.s. Political Priorities. Improving the Status Quo Mav be Preferable to Importing 

Other Models: Housing finance reform efforts should consider the specific 

characteristics of our polity. Several are worth noting. First, the U.S. does not have a 

social safety nct as robust as thosc of most other advanced economies. As such, 

affordability in housing finance should be a much more important policy priority here 

than elsewhere. Second, the 3D-year fixed-rate mortgage is both politically popular, and 

has an extensive track record of proven success in our country. Third, the United States 

has a long and storied history of populist opposition to big banks, hidden subsidies, and 

bailouts that has translated into a strong opposition to "Too Big To Fail" banks and the 

implicit subsidies they enjoy. Collectively, these characteristics point to the conclusion 

that rather than trying to adopt radical wholesale changes or import European models of 

housing finance into our country, we should consider fixing thc problems with our 

current model of housing finance. This appears to be thc conclusion reached by a 

growing number of experts and policy leaders on both sides of the aisle, including, most 

recently, the Bipartisan Policy Center and Sens. Bob Corker and Mark Warner. 

The Global Ubiquity of Government Guarantees in Housing Finance 

Critics of the federal government's role in housing finance argue that the United States is 

unique among developed countries in providing significant levels of government backing for 

home mortgage financing. 8 This claim is primarily based on the observation that the United 

States funds the vast majority of its residential mortgages through the issuance of governmentbacked securities by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac, as well as the governmental agency Ginnie Mae, and that no other country provides so 

much governmental backing for mortgage-backcd securitization, or that no other country has 

GSEs.9 

The problem with this analysis is that it focuses myopically on how the United States 

provides government guarantees for mortgage finance, and ignores how other countries might do 

so. While securitization has dominated U.S. housing finance in the past several decades, it is not 

a major factor in most other countries. As such, in trying to determine the level of governmental 

involvement in other housing finance systems, it makes little sense to look to government 

8 See, e.g .• Michael Lea, International Comparison of Mortgage Product Offerings 12-14, Research Institute for 

Housing America, Sept. 20 I 0 (contending that the United States is "unusual" in its use of government guarantees 

and contending that the "market share of government-backed institutions'~ in other countries is far less than in the 

United States); Dwight Jaffee, Reforming the u.s. Mortgage Market Through Private Market Incentives 14-21, 

Paper Presented for Presentation at "Past, Present, and Future ofthe Government Sponsored Enterprises," Fed. Res. 

Bank ofS!. Louis, Nov. 17,2010 (claiming that Western European mortgages have "operated for decades with 

limited government intervention"). 

9 See Lea, id.; Jaffee, id. As Lea notes, Canada, Korea, and Japan are the only other countries that utilize 

government-backed MBS for their housing finance systems. 
81 


81763.024

guarantees on securitization. Rather, we should be looking to how they actually do fund 

mortgages, and whether government guarantees exist on those forms offunding. 

As Michael Lea has noted, by far the largest source of funding for residential mortgages 

outside the United States is bank deposits, with covered bonds also providing a significant 

amount of housing finance in some countries. IO Deposits and covered bonds are both bank 

liabilities, as compared to MBS, which in the United States are typically issued by off-balance 

sheet conduits that have no other assets other than those in the MBS pool. Therefore, in 

comparing the relative level of international governmental support in housing finance, the right 

question to ask is this: do other countries provide government guarantees on bank deposits and 

covered bonds? 

The answer to this question is unequivocally yes. Bank deposits of course enjoy explicit 

government guarantees across the world, as 29 ofthe 30 OECD countries have governmental 

deposit insurance programs in place, with New Zealand being the sole outlier. I I And in those 

countries where covered bonds are a major source of housing finance, these instruments enjoy a 

myriad of government guarantees, as I wi\l explain next. 

In fact, the claim that the United States has some extraordinarily high level of 

government backing for housing finance seems rooted in a misunderstanding of how other 

countries guarantee their housing finance systems. When government guarantees on instruments 

other than MBS are taken into account, it appears fairly clear that the United States is not 

particularly exceptional in the level of government support it provides to housing finance. 

Understanding "Government-Sponsored" Covered Bonds 

In the European countries where they account for a significant amount of housing 

finance, covered bonds benefit from a number of guarantees that are well recognized among 

investors. In order to understand how these implicit and explicit government guarantees work, it 

may be helpful to first briefly explain what covered bonds are. Covered bonds, like deposits, are 

uniquely bank obligations, and are perhaps best understood as a hybrid of general obligation 

bonds and MBS. Like other unsecured bank bonds, covered bond investors are paid out ofthe 

bank's general cash flows, and in the event of default, they have claims against the issuer's 

10 Lea, id. In Denmark, mortgages are primarily funded tbrough covered bonds. Canada has a slight wrinkle in its 

deposit-based system of housing finance, insofar as it requires mortgage insurance. which is mandatorily reinsured 

by the Canadian government, on most mortgages originated by Canadian banks. Canada also has a healthy dose of 

government-backed securitization, insofar as 25% of its mortgages are financed by MBS issued by the Canada 

Mortgage and Housing Corporation. See David Min, True North: The Facts Aboutlhe Canadian Mortgage Banking 

System, CTR. FORAMER. PROGRESS (2010). 

11 Prior to the financial crisis, Australia and New Zealand were the only OECD countries without explicit deposit 

insurance schemes in place. See The Treasury (Australia), Study of Financial System Guarantees ("Davis Report") 

(Commonwealth of Australia, 2004), Chapter 2. In response to the 2008 global financial crisis, both Australia and 

New Zealand implemented temporary deposit insurance programs. See The Treasury (Australia), Guarantee Scheme 

[or Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding, available at http://www.guaranteescheme.gov.au; The Treasury (New 

Zealand), Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme, available at http://www.treasury.govt.nzieconomy/guarantee/retaiI.In 

September 2011, Australia implemented a permanent guarantee program for bank deposits up to $250,000, which 

was formally implemented in February 2012. See The Treasury (Australia), Questions & Answers About the 

Guaranlee on Deposits, available at http://www.guaranteescheme.gov.au/qaldeposits.hlml. 
82 


81763.025

general assets on a pari passu, or equal footing, basis with senior unsecured creditors. 12 But as 

with MBS, investors in covered bonds also enjoy a first claim against a pool of high-quality 

assets (the "cover pool"), which is typically overcollateralized, in the event of default. Another 

defining characteristic of covered bonds is that cover pools are typically "dynamic," insofar as 

poor quality assets are typically replaced by good assets throughout the entire term ofthe 

covered bond.l3 As a number of commentators have noted, these features of covered bonds are 

shared with Federal Horne Loan Bank advances. 14 Because covered bonds have "dual recourse" 

to both the issuer and the assets of the cover pool, a risk analysis of covered bonds necessarily 

looks to both the characteristics ofthe issuer and the cover pool. 

In those countries where they have achieved significant liquidity, covered bonds have 

benefited from several types of government guarantees. First, and arguably most importantly, 

covered bonds benefit from the implicit government guarantees that exist for the issuing banks. 

European banks have historically enjoyed implicit guarantees on all oftheir debt obligations, in 

part because of the high prevalencc of "Too Big To Fail" in Europe. While TBTF is a relatively 

recent phenomenon in the United States, due to the longstanding restrictions on interstate 

banking and universal banking, this has decidedly not been the case in Europe, where national 

governments have long encouraged and facilitated the emergence of "national banking 

champions" with the size and scale to successfully compete with their neighbors. IS Because of 

these political and historical differences, European countries have much more concentrated 

banking sectors than the United States, and their largest banks account for a far higher level of 

systemic risk. 16 

Moreover, European governments are generally far less tolerant of bank failures than the 

U.S. federal government, perhaps because the last major European banking crisis in 1931 is seen 

as having played a major role in the rise of Adolf Hitler's National Socialists. 17 This antipathy 

towards bank failures is reflected in the remarks of an anonymous European Central Bank 

official, who purportedly stated, "Wc don't let banks fail. We don't even let dry cleaners fail.,,!8 

This statement is borne out by historical facts, as the last failure of a European issuer of covered 

bonds occurred 1900. 19 

Second, covered bonds as an asset class are thought to enjoy systemic importance 

independent of their issuers, particularly in those countries where these instruments account for a 

significant portion of the residential mortgage funding. As such, it is appropriate to recognize 

that covered bonds enjoy a TBTF guarantee, which explains why the European Central Bank felt 

compelled to announce a major covered bond bailout program in the midst of the 2008 financial 

12 See Covered Bonds: Potential Uses and Regulatory Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, 

and Urban Affairs, III 'h Congo 3-4 (2010) (statement of Michael H. Krimminger, Deputy Chairman, Fed. Deposit 

Insurance Corp.). 

1J See Steven L. Schwarz, The Conundrum a/Covered Bond" 66 BuS. LAWYER 561, 566-68 (2011). 

14 See, e.g., EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R4I322, COVERED BONDS: ISSUES TN THE 112'" 

CONGRESS 7-8 (2011). 

15 Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Veron, Too Big to Fail: The Transatlantic Debate 6-7, Bruegel Working Paper 

No. 2011/03 (201 I). 

16 Jd. at 13. 

17 Jd. at7. 

18 DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 22 (2009). 

19 See Frank Packer, et aI., The Covered Bond Market, BlS QUARTERLY REv. 45, 49 (Sept. 2007). 
83 


81763.026

crisis, as outlined below. Indeed, all three of the major credit rating agencies expressly recognize 

the "systemic importance of covered bond programs in thc issuer's jurisdiction" as a major factor 

in the ratings thcy providc to these instruments.2o 

Third, because covered bonds generally enjoy a first lien on the bcst assets of the issuer, 

and continue to replace weak: cover pool assets with good assets on a dynamic basis, they 

effectively benefit from the explicit guarantces bchind bank deposits, which help finance the 

purchascs of good bank assets that are then used to collatcralize covered bonds. In this way, 

covered bonds effcctively piggyback on governmental deposit insurancc.21 

All three ofthcse types of government guarantees-implicit guarantees behind the bank 

issuers of covered bonds, implicit guarantees of the covered bond markct gcnerally, and cxplicit 

guarantees of bank deposits which are used to fund assets that go into the cover pool-are 

important factors in the crcdit quality and liquidity cnjoyed by covered bonds in those countries 

whcre they have achieved scale. This is why sovereign risk-thc risk that the issuer's host 

country might default on its own government obligations-is a central factor in the credit ratings 

of European covered bonds.22 It is also why European governments and the European Central 

Bank responded with a tsunami of bailouts intended to maintain investor confidence in covered 

bonds, including a as illustrated by Figurc I, below, and why the continuing concerns about 

European sovereign risk have translated into concerns about covered bond risk. 23 It is fair to say 

that European covcred bonds enjoy the samc or even greater implicit guarantees as Agency 

obligations here. 

In addition to government guarantees, European covered bonds also enjoy from a number 

of othcr governmentally granted bcnefits. First, qualifying covered bonds enjoy beneficial capital 

treatment across the European Union, which is actually more preferential than the capital 

treatment accorded to Agency securitics24 here in the United States.25 Second, covered bonds are 

eligible as collateral for European Central Bank lending, just as Agcncy securities are cligible as 

20 See Yehudah Forster (Vice President, Moody's Investor Service), Helene M. Heberlein (Managing Director, Fitch 

Ratings), and Alia Sicatic (Senior Director, Fitch Ratings), Covered Bond Ratings, in COVERED BONDS HANDBOOK 

7-31 (James R. Tanenbaum and Anna T. Pinedo eds .• 2012). See also Karen E. Naylor et al.. Covered Bonds 

Counterparty and Supporting Obligations: Methodology and Assumptions, Standard & Poor's Global Credit Portal 

report, May 31, 2012, available at 

http://www.standardandpoors.comlspf/uploadiRatings_EMEAfCoveredBondCounterparty.pdf. 

21 This particular concern has been raised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on several occasions. See, 

e.g., Statement of Michael H. Krimminger 12-14, supra note 12. 

22 See, e.g., Sovereign Risk a Key Element in Covered Bond Credit Risk, Fitch Ratings, May 28, 2012, available at 

http://www.fitchratings.eomiweb/en/dynamic/arliclcs/Sovereign-Risk-a-Key-Element-in-Covered-Bond-CreditRisk.jsp. 

23 See, e.g., Moody's Investors Service, Spanish Mortgage Covered Bonds: High Credit Risks, Despite Tightening 

Spreads in Early 2013 (2013) (stating that sovereign risk has been the main driver in covered bond spread 

movements); Covered Bond Roundtable 2012, INT'L FINANCING REv. (2012) (quoting Jose Sarafana, a covered 

bond analyst, as observing that "the sovereign factor is extremely important for pricing covered bonds" and arguing 

that the high concerns about sovereign risk have made this the most important factor in covered bond spreads), 

available at http://www.ifre.com/covered-bond-roundtable-20 I 2-part-112 I 026480.article. 

24 The ternl "Agency securities" refers to MBS and debt obligations issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

25 Under the European Union's "Capital Requirements Direct," qualifYing covered bonds are risk-weighted at 10%. 

This compares to a risk-weighting of 20% for Agency debt and Agency MBS. 
84 


81763.027

collateral with the Fed26 Given that European covered bonds, like Agency debt, enjoy strong 

governmental guarantees and highly preferential capital and collateralization treatment, it may be 

most appropriate to describe these instruments as "government-sponsored" covered bonds. 

Figure 127 

European bank balloo!3l!urlll9 1'IIe 2008 flnilnclal criSIS 

S~IOClll$t of 1>0"<, "nd bank ''''''''' panages fo! J oomO<!r 01 ban., ,.,cued by t~eI' govommems 

-- _dtlli!1JI(\11ft!l~~go_ 

~.an"6b~nm. 

26 See Marketable Assets, European Central Bank Collateral, available a/ 

http://www.ecb.inUmopo/assets/standards/1l1arketablclht1l1l!index.en.ht1l11. European covered bonds are also used as 

collateral in repo transactions. See European Repo Market Survey No. 24, Inn Capital Market Assn. (Mar. 20(3). 

27 David Min~ The Global Importance of Government Guarantees in Mortgage Finance: An Analysis ofHolV 

Guarantees Work in Different Developed Nations 5 (Fig. 4), CrR. FORAMER. PROGRESS. May 2012. 
85 


81763.028

Government Guarantees Address Key Market Failures in Housing Finance 

Why are government guarantees so ubiquitous in global housing finance? I believe it's 

because they ensure certain outcomes in housing finance that are seen as socially and 

economically optimal, which do not occur in the absence of such guarantees. These are liquidity, 

stability, and affordability. I will address each of these points in turn. 

Because housing is necessary but costly, it requires an enormous investment of capital, 

greater than any other class of assets in the world. For example, the United States has some $13 

trillion2B and the European Union has roughly €6.5 trillion in residential mortgage debt 

outstanding.29 Moreover, because housing is a long-duration investment, with a typical 

depreciation schedule of several decades, residential mortgages are almost always long-dated, 

with amortization periods of between 25-40 years being the norm across the developed world.3o 

Given the high capital intensity of housing finance, ensuring that there is sufficient 

liquidity to meet these needs is a major concern. Government guarantees provide liquidity in 

three ways. 

First, government guarantees assuage investor concerns about credit risk, which allows 

mortgage liabilities to have access to a far deeper pool of capitaL Historically, the vast majority 

of investors in housing finance have sought "safe" assets-that is to say, assets that they believed 

did not bear credit risk, perhaps because it had a government guarantee, bore a AAA rating, 

and/or had structural safeguards against investor losses (such as the $1 net asset value that 

money market funds are required to maintain).3l This certainly has been true in the recent past. 

Even during the 2002-2007 housing bubble, when government-backed Agency debt lost 

significant market share to Wall Street's "private-label" mortgage securitization, some 90% of 

the private-label securities issued were AAA rated.32 

Long-dated mortgage debt carries with it enormous amounts ofliquidity and interest rate 

risk. Adding significant amounts of credit risk to these existing risks would certainly drive away 

most of these "safe" investors. Given the huge amount of interest rate risk that purchasers of 

long-dated mortgage debt already take on, there is no evidence to suggest that there would be 

significant demand for long-dated mortgage debt that carried significant credit risk on top of the 

28 See Federal Reserve, Table 1.54, Mortgage Debt Outstanding (Mar. 2013). 

29 European Mortgage Federation, Hypostat 2011: A Review of Europe's Mortgage and Housing Markets 89 (Table 

13) (2012). 

30 See Lea at 17-20. A number of countries utilize short-tenn fixed rate mortgages, such as the 5-year fixed-rate 

mortgage that dominates Canadian mortgage lending, but these generally amortize over a 25-40 year period. 

31 Gorton et al. (2012) layout the notion of "safe" assets, which they generally deseribe as sovereign debt and "the 

safe component of private financial debt." They argue that safe debt is so highly in demand because of the demand 

for money substitutes that are "informationally insensitive" and thus do not require due diligence despite the 

presence of steep infonnation asymmetries. See Gary B. Gorton et aI., The Safe Asset Share (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 

Research, Working Paper No. 17777, 2012). 

32 See Housing Finance Reform: Should There Be A Government Guarantee?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On 

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 2 (2011) (statement of Adam J. Levilin, Professor of Law, Georgetown 

University Law Center). 
86 


81763.029

huge amounts of interest rate and liquidity risk that already exist for such liabilities. That is why 

private-label securitization went to such great lengths in the past several decades to develop a 

structure that could produce securities that were seen as free of credit risk, including the creation 

of subordinated tranches and overcollateralized asset pools to absorb first losses, the hcavy use 

of credit enhancements (such as monoline insurancc and credit default swaps), and the heavy 

lobbying of credit rating agencies for investment-grade ratings. 

Of course, the financial crisis revealed significant flaws in private-label securitization, 

and shattered the perception that securities issued through this process carried no credit risk. As a 

result, it is unlikely that private mortgage-related liabilities without a government guarantec will 

be seen as safe anytime in the near future. One of the most prominent "safe" investors, PIMCO 

founder Bill Gross, has stated that in the absence of government guarantees, PIMCO would not 

purchase MBS without drastically more conservative underwriting standards, including at least a 

30 percent down payment, that harkcn back to the oncrous mortgage terms that existed in the 

pre-New Dcal era33 

Second, and relatedly, guarantees facilitate liquidity in the financial intermediation-the 

use of short-term liquid liabilities to fund investmcnt in long-term, illiquid loans-that is, and 

historically always has been, responsible for the vast majority of housing finance. As I will 

discuss shortly, financial intermediation is inherently fragile and quite vulnerable to runs and 

panics. Government guarantees provide an inoculation against the problem of bank runs and thus 

allow for deep liquidity. 

Third, guarantees help to ensure countercyclical liquidity in housing finance. As has bcen 

extensively described in the banking literature, thc financial system suffcrs from an inherent 

procyclicality--the tendency to provide too much risk during good times and to pull back too 

heavily on risk-taking during bad times-that has been attributed to the "financial accelcrator" 

described by Irving Fisher and elaborated by Bernanke/Gertlcr, as well the difficulties of 

measuring changes in risk over time and the existence of impropcr inccntives for market 

participants.34 In the aftermath ofthc financial crisis, a key focus of policy makers and regulators 

has been to rein in the pro cyclical tendencies of financial intermediaries to take on too much risk 

during financial booms. But another paramount concern must be in ensuring that countercyclical 

liquidity is available during financial busts, when private financial markets pull back excessively 

from the market. It is well documented that the lack of liquidity that follows financial crises can 

amplifY economic distress, as falling home prices, increasing delinquencics and decreasing 

availability of mortgagc finance all feed into a "vicious circle.,,35 

33 See David Lawder, PIMCO 's Gross: Government Mortgage Guarantee "Essential," REUTERS, AUG. 17,2010. 

" See, e.g., Claudio Borio, et aI., Procyclicality of the Financial System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy 

Options (Bureau of In!,1 Settlements, Working Paper No. 1,2001); Viral Acharya and Tanju Yorulmazer, A Theory 

of Pro cyclical Bank Herding (Aug. 15,2003) (unpublished paper) (available at 

http://www.fdic.govibankianalytical/CFRJAcharya.pdf). 

35 Irving Fisher 
87 


81763.030

Since the crisis, some 90 percent of housing finance has been provided by Fannie, 

Freddie and Ginnie% One can imagine how bad the housing downturn would have been in the 

absence of such government-backed mortgage finance. 37 

Government guarantees are also critical to ensuring stability in housing finance, 

particularly with respect to the financial intermediation that has always been the primary source 

of residential mortgage funding. As I discussed previously, the uniquely long durations of 

mortgage debt (even the short-term fixed rate mortgages that arc popular in Canada arc 

amortized over a 25 year period) present a challenge to housing finance, insofar as it is difficult 

to find sufficient patient capital (investors willing to buy and hold long-dated debt to term) to 

fund the massive needs of housing finance. This challenge has mostly been addressed through 

the heavy use of financial intermediation-the use of short-term liabilities such as bank deposits 

to fund and hold investments in long-term assets such as mortgages. 

Traditional deposit-backed bank lending was the primary source of U.S. mortgage 

financing since at least the late 19th eentury,38 up until the collapse of the savings and loan 

industry in the early 1990s.39 But in recent years, capital markets funding has grown to become 

an increasingly important factor in global housing finance. In the United States, MBS have come 

to dominate housing finance, displacing deposits as the major source of mortgage funding. While 

bank deposits still dominate Canadian mortgage finance, a significant and growing share of its 

housing finance system has been funded by government-backed securitization, which currently 

accounts for about 25% of outstanding home loans. Similarly, European housing finance also 

relies mainly on bank deposits, but has seen strong growth in covered bonds in recent years. 

MBS and covered bonds, at first glance, appear to be an alternative to traditional banking, 

insofar as they issue liabilities that are long-dated and tend to be closer in maturity to the 

mortgages they finance. 4o But a closer look reveals that these liabilities are also part of a process 

36 As Richard Green points Qut, the heavy reliance on Agency financing in the aftermath of a financial crisis is not 

new. Following the Long-Term Capital Management crisis, which was a smaller, more benign financial crisis, 

private sources ofliquidity dipped precipitously, as reflected in the spread between jumbo and conforming 

mortgages, which widened from 10 to 40 basis points in the aftennath of LTCM's problems. Housing Finance 

Refonn: Should There Be a Government Guarantee?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing. and 

Urban Affairs 6-7 (2011) (statement of Richard K. Green, Lusk Chair in Real Estate, Univ. of South em Cal.). 

37 Some have contended that Agency mortgage finance is crowding Qut private sector options. This seems 

inconsistent with the limited experience we have seen with private-label securitization since the financial crisis, 

which strongly suggests that investors have lost all confidence in PLS. Since the crisis, there have been but a handful 

of private-label securitization deals, with all of these that I am aware of having been sponsored by Redwood Trust, a 

Northern California investment firm. The investors in these relatively small deals have all been MBS specialists who 

have perfonned loan-level due diligence, even as the loan pools securing these deals had extraordinarily safe 

underwriting characteristics, such as a 40%+ average down payment and a 770 average FICO score). 

38 See generally Kenneth A. Snowden, The Anatomy of a Residential Mortgage Crisis: A Look Back to the 1930s 

(Na!'1 Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 16244, 2010). 

39 See David Min, How Government Guarantees in Housing Finance Promote Stability, 50 HARV. 1. ON LEG._ 

(forthcoming 2013). 

40 Agency MBS are pass-throughs, in which investors are effectively purchasing a share of the cash flows of a pool 

of mortgages. Thus the duration on Agency MBS is effectively the life of the pool of loans. Covered bonds are 

typically issued in 5-10 year or 2-3 year maturities, which tends to match the generally shorter duration of European 
88 


81763.031

of financial intennediation that has been described as "shadow banking," largely because it takes 

place outside the penumbra of traditional deposit-backed banking. MBS and covered bonds arc 

both utilized as collateral in a wide array of public and private sector lending markets, including 

central bank lending, public and private repo markets, securities lending transactions, and 

derivatives deals. The heavy demand for these securities as collateral has effectively given them 

a money-like quality, as they not only can be pledged to receive actual currency, but these assets 

themselves arc used and re-used as a liquid fonn of collateral. Thus, in the aggregate, MBS and 

covered bonds are a key part of the shadow banking system in the United States41 and Europc,42 

rcspectively, insofar as they are effectively used to transfonn long-tenn illiquid assets (home 

mortgages) into short-tenn liquid liabilities (repos, securities lending claims, etc.). 

As is well understood in banking economics, the maturity and liquidity transfonnation 

inherent to banking create an inherently fragile situation, as banks (and by extension, shadow 

banks) are highly vulnerable to the problems of bank runs and panics. The steep maturity and 

liquidity mismatches between their assets and liabilities means that banks do not have the ability 

to payoff more than a small number of withdrawal claims at any given time. Thus, if a large 

number of depositors simultaneously seek to withdraw their funds from the same bank, that bank 

must find new sources ofliquidity, and this may entail selling off its loans in a "fire sale" 

envi:onment. This ~ynamic can cause the insolven~l of even a healthy, well-managed bank, by 

forcmg the hqUldatlOn of profitable loans at a loss .. 

Moreover, bank runs can quickly lead to the problem of contagion, in which a run on one 

bank causes deteriorating confidence among depositors at other banks, leading to further bank 

runs. If these runs reach a critical mass, they can cause systemic dislocation and large economic 

losses, as banks across the system are forced to firesale illiquid assets at a loss in order to meet 

increasing redemptions by depositors. In other words, contagion can quickly turn runs on 

individual banks into system-wide banking panics. Such banking panics can lead to enonnous 

costs across the broader macroeconomy,44 as we have just witnessed.45 

mortgages. See Covered Bonds in the EU Financial System 18, Eur. Central Bank Report (2008). In Denmark, 

maturity matching is even more pronounced. as Danish covered bonds are required to adhere to the "balanccprinciple," which requires that covered bond cash flows exactly match those of the underlying cover assets on a 

loan-by-Ioan basis. See Jens Dick-Nielsen et aI., Liquidity in Government versus Covered Bond Markets 5 (Bank for 

lnt'! Settlements, Working Paper No. 392, Nov. 2012). 

" Pozsar et a1. (2012) have a good explanation of shadow banking in the United States. Zoltan Pozsar et aI., Shadow 

Banking (Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 458, Feb. 2012). 

42 Anand et at describe how covered bonds arc a core part of the European shadow banking system. Kartik Anand, 

et aI., Covered Bonds, Core Markets, and Financial Stability 2-3 (Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Discussion Paper 

No, 2012-065,2012). 

43 See DougJas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 

401 (1983). 

44 As Reinhart and Rogoff have observed in their comprehensive review of financial crises, banking panics lead to 

enonnous macroeconomic costs, resulting in sharp decreases in tax revenues that, on average, cause government 

debt to increase by 86% in the three years following such a panic. CARMEN M. REINHART AND KENNETH S. ROGOFF, 

THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 142 (2009). 

45 Following the recent financial crisis, U.S. households suffered an estimated $10 trillion decline in wealth. See 

Anthony J. Crescenzi, "Cyclical Tailwinds, Secular Headwinds and the Market of Bonds," Pimco (originally 

published on CNBC.com), Apr. 7, 2010. The median household experienced an 18% decline in its total net worth. 

See Jesse Bricker et aI., "Surveying the Aftermath of the Storm: Changes in Family Finances from 2007 to 2009," 

Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2011-17, Mar. 24, 2011. The OECD estimated 

the crisis would cause a 2.4% reduction in the long-run GDP of the United States. See ORGANISATlONOF ECONOMIC 
89 


81763.032

It is well recognized that government guarantees ameliorate and possibly solve the 

problems of bank runs and panics, by providing a credible backstop against credit risk, and thus 

removing any incentive for bank runs to happen. Indeed, it is notable that during the recent 

financial crisis, the various collateral calls and fund withdrawals that have been characterized as 

a run on the shadow banking system did not significantly impact government-backed liabilities 

and were instead primarily limited to purely private financial instruments. 

Government guarantees also may be important for systemic stability in another important 

way, and that is that they are critical in promoting the origination of affordably priced, 

consumer-friendly mortgages. More affordable mortgages are of course less likely to default, all 

else being equal, because their payment streams are less onerous. Similarly, mortgage 

characteristics that do not lay other risks (such as liquidity or interest rate risk) onto the borrower 

are similarly less likely to default. 

Affgrdability 

Given the extremely finite demand for long-dated assets,46 the simple laws of supply and 

demand dictate that mortgages would be much more expensive in the absence of government 

guarantees. Regardless of how one views these guarantees, it is clear that they make mortgage 

finance more affordable, simply by greatly expanding the pool of potential investors, as 

described above. For example, PIMCO head Bill Gross contends that in the absence of such a 

guarantee, mortgage rates would rise by as much as 4 percentage points. 4 7 This is consistent with 

the higher costs of mortgage finance in the pre-Depression era, or in commercial real estate 

today, where government guarantees do not exist. 

In the United States and Denmark, government guarantees arc also responsible for the 

wide and affordable availability ofthe 3D-year fixed-rate, fully self-amortizing mortgage, a 

product that is pro-consumer and has experienced extremely low delinquency rates when 

compared with alternative products. In the United States, of course, 3D-year fixed-rate mortgages 

(FRMs) have experienced delinquency rates that are exponentially lower than those for 

adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). For cxample, prime 30-year FRMs had a serious delinquency 

rate of 4.74% as ofQ2 2011, as compared to 11.76% for prime ARMs. Similarly, ARMs in 

Denmark look to be much more of a problem than 3D-year FRMs. The proliferation of option 

ARMs from 2003 to 2008 was seen as a major factor in the housing bubble experienced by 

Denmark, and a number of studies have warned that Denmark is on the verge of a major 

COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS: GOING FOR GROWfH 18-19 (Box 1.1) 

(OECD 2010), available at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdl53/48/44680877.pdf. The United States also suffered 

approximately 9.5 million job losses as a result of the financial crisis. See Philip 1. Swagel, "The Cost of the 

Financial Crisis: The Impact of the September 2008 Economic Collapse," Pew Financial Reform Group Briefing 

Paper No. 18, Apr. 28, 2010, p. 11, available at http://www.pewfr.orgiadmin/projectJeports/filcs/Cost-of-thcCrisis-fina1.pdf. 

40 It is difficullto know exactly how much of this long-dated demand exists, as discussed above, because most longdated debt, whether sovereign debt, Agency MBS, or eovered bonds, is not held to maturity, but instead is traded in 

liquid markets and used (and re-used) as collateral in various interbank transactions, such as repo and derivatives 

deals, and open market transactions. See Zoltan Pozsar, et aI., supra note 41; Kallik Anand, et aI., supra note 42. 

47 See Susanne Walker, Gross Says Mortgage Yields Would Soar Without Government Aid, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 24, 

2010. 
90 


81763.033

delinquency crisis, as 80 percent of homeowners under the age of 35 are underwater, and more 

than 100,000 mortgages appcar likely to default in the ncar future, in the absence of 

goverrunental intervention. 48 

The relative stability of the 30-year FRM should not be a surprise. It is a more 

systemically stable product for several reasons. First, it provides cost certainty to borrowers, 

which means they default less on those loans, particularly during periods of high interest rate 

volatility. Second, the 30-year FRM leaves interest rate risk with sophisticated market players 

(lenders and investors) who can plan for and hedge against interest rate fluctuations, rather than 

with unsophisticated households who have no such expertise or capacity to deal with this risk. 

Third, as the Miles Report, the landmark 2004 report on mortgage market reform authorized by 

thc United Kingdom, found, the 30-year FRM helps promote housing market stability, as it was 

generally less sensitive to short-term interest rate fluctuations and thus less likely to trigger high 

volatility in housing prices.49 

Comparing the Major Housing Finance Models 

As I mentioned at the outset, there are three major vehicles for funding housing around 

the world: bank deposits, MBS, and covered bonds (with most countries adopting more than one 

of these, and with many notable wrinkles, such as Canada's mortgage insurance requirement for 

bank-held loans and Denmark's matching principle for covered bonds). Tn the United States, we 

have had extensive experience with deposits and MBS as the primary means for funding 

residential mortgages, and so American academics are well familiar with the weaknesses of these 

instruments. 

Deposit-based mortgage finance, as we know from our own experience in the period of 

stagflation that occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s, leaves financial intermediaries vulnerable 

to large amounts of interest rate risk. Mortgage-backed securitization scems to solve the interest 

rate risk issue by leaving that risk with investors who are willing and interested in taking it on,IO 

but as we have learned, this too may be subject to problems, including numerous frictions 

(information asymmetries and conflicts of interest) that exist up and down the vertical 

securitization pipeline.ll 

Given the problems we have experienced with deposits and MBS, it is tempting to look at 

other models of housing finance, particularly ones centered upon covered bonds, as a panacea for 

our markets. After all, covered bonds are like MBS but with "skin in the game" to better align 

the interests of investors and issuers. But covercd bonds carry their own set of problems, which 

should not be ignored as we contemplate how to reform our housing finance system. 

48 See Frances Schwartzkopff, Denmark Races to Prevent Foreclosures as Home Prices Sink, BLOOMBERG NEWS 

(Mar. 19,2013). 

49 See David Miles, The UK Mortgage Market: Taking a Longer-Term View, Interim Report, Section 6. 

50 Investors in Agency MBS do carry prepayment risk, the risk that the loans in the MBS pool will all be refinanced 

or paid off before or after the investors' expected timeframe. 

51 For example, one such friction is the conllict between the originating lender and the MBS issuer, since the fomler 

has an incentive to sell its weakest loans to the latter, a classic lemons problem. See generally Adam B. Ashcraft and 

Til Schuermann, The Seven Deadly Frictions o[ Subprime Mortgage Credit Securitization, THE INVESTMENT 

PROFESSIONAL (Fall 2008). 
91 


81763.034

The first potential problem with covered bonds is their balance sheet intensity, which 

necessarily limits the amount of covercd bonds that can be issued, and requires covered bonds to 

piggyback off of other sources of funding. As I previously described, covered bonds are 

overcollateralized with good assets that are ring-fenced against other claims, and if any of these 

assets deteriorate in quality, they are replaced by more good assets from the issuer's balance 

sheet. Because of these structural characteristics, covered bonds are capped as a percentage of 

any issuer's balance sheet, and they must be augmented with other sources of finance. Covered 

bonds are in this way limited in the amount of funding they can provide, which is probably why 

they do not account for more than a minority of any country's housing finance, with the 

exceptions of Denmark and Spain. 

The second, and related, problem with covered bonds is that, by their very nature, they 

increase risk to other crcditors, with the largest class of creditors being depositors, who are 

themselves protected by govcrnmental deposit insurance. As such, the safety of covered bonds 

comes directly at the expense of taxpayers, who bear greater risks due to the loss of good 

collateral to cover pOOIS.52 

Third, because investors in covered bonds look either primarily to or equally to the 

creditworthiness of the issuer, covered bonds are much more suitable for large issuers with AAA 

credit ratings and thc perceived guarantee of their host government behind their obligations-in 

short, Too Big To Fail institutions. To the extent that covered bonds are cmphasized in U.S. 

legislation and regulations, this will disproportionately benefit the largest, most complex 

financial institutions. 

These problems with covered bonds might be justified, if these instruments brought 

significantly more systemic stability. But the fact is that covered bond regimes failed just as 

miserably as bank deposit regimes and MBS did in the recent crisis. As the minority dissent to 

the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report noted, the recent housing and financial crisis was a global 

phcnomenon, not confined to the United States.53 Indeed, the housing bubble that we 

experienced in the United States, where MBS was the dominant source of housing finance, was 

actually surpassed by the housing bubbles that took place in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 

where bank deposits were predominant, and Spain and Denmark, where covered bonds were the 

main source of housing finance, as Figure 2 below shows.54 

51 See, e.g., Kartik Anand, supra note 42. 

53 See Bill Thomas el aI., Dissenting Statement of Keith Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Bill Thomas, in THE 

FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REpORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 411,414-416 (2010). 

" Source: Ashok Bardban, et aJ., A Comparative Context for u.s. Housing Policy: Housing Markets and the 

Financial Crisis in Europe, Asia, and Beyond, Bipartisan Policy Centcr 16 (citing European Mortgage Federation). 
92 


81763.035

Selected European Markets 2005-2010 

180 

160 

140 

120 

100 

80 

60 

4{) 

20 

0 

r:P &' ;:," ",\$ 'l,\$ 

-""-Oenmark ---Germany Ireland Spain __ United Kingdom 

Despite the largcr peak-to-trough home price dcclincs that have taken place in most 

Europcan countries, some have argued that European housing finance systcms havc greatly 

outperformed the U.S. housing finance system, pointing to the relatively low delinquency rates 

and foreclosure rates in distressed European housing markets. But this analysis fails to 

contemplate the effects of European social welfare programs, which are much stronger than in 

the United States, on mortgage delinquencics.55 It is well established that ?reater income 

volatility significantly increases the likelihood of mortgage delinquency. 5 In the United States, 

income shocks (such as from a loss of job or dcath of a household member) are by far the largcst 

cause of mortgage delinquencics. 57 Of course, most European countries enjoy much stronger 

social safety ncts, which tend to mitigatc income volatility and reduce the likelihood of 

delinquencies and foreclosures. An underwater Spanish or Danish homeowner who lost her job 

would seem less likcly to default on her mortgage, duc to the social welfare supports in placc in 

those countries, than a similarly situated U.S. homeowner. 

Of course, the effects of sharply lower housing prices have severely and negatively 

affected the macroeconomic outlooks of many ofthcse European countries, and arguably havc 

had a larger effect on thc fiscal health of European countries with steep housing downturns, since 

55 EU countries provide nearly twice as much to income support and safety nets as the United States, as a percentage 

of GDP. See generally Alberto Alesina et aI., Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?, 

2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (2001). 

56 See generally Luis Diaz-Serrano, Income Volatility and Residential Mortgage Delinquency: Evidencefi-om 12 EU 

Countries (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit. Discussion Paper No. 1396, Nov. 2004). 

57 Frank E. Nathaft, What's Driving Mortgage Delinquencies?, Freddie Mac Executive Perspectives Blag, Mar. 22, 

2010, available 01 

http://www.freddiemac.cam/newsfblog/frank~nothaftl20l00322_what~drives~mortgagc._delinquencies.htm!. 
93 


81763.036

so many of the costs of housing downturns are bornc by the government rather than individual 

households in those countries. We are currently seeing this dynamic occurring in real time in 

Spain, and given the concerns about the Danish mortgage markets (Denmark has already 

suffered through a 20% home price decline, 56% of Danish mortgages are interest-only loans, 

and some 100,000 of these are underwater and due to reset soon),58 we may soon see similar 

macroeconomic and fiscal problems in Denmark as well. 

A Key Factor in International Housing Bubbles Was Laxly Regulated Mortgage Finance 

I have spent a good amount of time analyzing the different sources of funding in 

international housing finance, with the hopes of convincing you of the following two points: 1) 

all advanced economies heavily rely upon government guarantees to facilitate housing finance; 

and 2) the source of housing finance--<ieposits, MBS, or covered bonds-was not a particularly 

relevant factor in determining whether a country would experience a housing bubble. That being 

said, were there structural differences that actually did prove important in determining whether a 

country experienced a housing bubble or not? This is obviously a vcry complex question, which 

has been the topic of much analysis and debate. 

That bcing said, I believe one potential characteristic that has largely bcen 

underappreciated has been financial deregulation, as this appears to be a common thread in most, 

if not all, of the countries that experienced large housing bubbles in the past decade. Three of the 

more notable countries that experienced housing bubbles were Spain, the United Kingdom, and 

the United States. Each of these underwent some fairly dramatic financial deregulation in the 

past several decades. As the FCIC minority stated in their dissent: 

There were housing bubbles in thc United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, France and Ireland, 

some more pronounced than in the United States. Some nations with housing bubbles 

relied little on American-style mortgage securitization. A good explanation of the U.S. 

housing bubble should also take into account its parallels in other nations. This leads us 

to explanations broader than just U.S. housing policy, regulation, or supervision. It also 

tells us that while failures in U.S. securitization markcts may be an essential cause, we 

must look for other things that wcnt wrong as well. 59 

Of course, we are most familiar with the United Statcs. Beginning in the 1980s, 

geographic and activity-based restraints on banking werc gradually lifted, culminating in the 

Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, which eliminated restrictions on intcrstate banking, and the GrammLeach-Blilcy Act of 1999, which formally ended the activity restrictions put in place under the 

Glass-Steagall regime. These legislative actions were accompanied by a hands-off approach by 

financial regulators, who allowed investment banks to engage in activities that might be 

characterized as banking in previous times. The end result was the rapid rise of very large, 

universal banks that utilized capital markets to meet many of their financing needs. One of the 

primary ways in which this libcralization impacted residential mortgage markets in the United 

States was in the rise of private-label securitization (PLS), which typically utilized unregulatcd 

non-bank lenders to originate loans, and unregulated off-balance sheet conduits to pool and 

" See Schwartzkopff, supra note 48 

" See Bill Thomas, ot al. 415, supra note 53. 
94 


81763.037

securitize these loans. PLS rapidly grew from about 10 percent of the U.S. mortgagc markct in 

2002 to account for nearly 40 percent of mortgages in 2004 and 2005. Of course, PLS have 

subsequently experienced very high delinquency rates and are generally seen as a major factor in 

the problems experienced in the U.S. housing and mortgage markets. 

Spain went through banking deregulation that was parallel in many ways to the Unitcd 

States. Spanish "cajas,,60 for short, which bcgan as small local community-based savings 

associations-many wcrc startcd by local councils, associations, and religious orders-were 

gradually deregulated so that they could compete in broader markets61 Beginning in 1977, 

activity restrictions on cajas wcre lifted, allowing them to engage in universal banking. 

Geographic restrictions that limitcd cajas to opcrating in their homc rcgions wcre removed in 

1988. And legal barriers that prevented consolidation among cajas were eliminated in 2002. As 

with the somewhat parallel U.S. experience, Spain experienced rapid growth and consolidation 

in response to this deregulation of banking. Cajas' share of deposits grew from 33 percent in 

1976 to 52 percent in 2004, while its share of total lending grew 18 percent in 1976 to 45 pcrcent 

in 2004. Within the residential mortgage market, the cajas grew to command 60% of the market 

at its pcak. Pcrhaps not surprisingly, thc cajas are at thc cpicenter of the current Spanish banking 

crisis, and are holding an estimated €180 billion in troubled mortgages62 

The United Kingdom had a slightly different, but no less devastating, experience with 

financial deregulation. Beginning in the late 1990s, the UK's primary financial regulator, the 

Financial Services Authority (FSA), moved towards a more principles-based (often called "light 

touch") approach to bank oversight, which relied more heavily on banks' own internal risk 

management and governance. This in turn allowed British banks to hold less capital, and to 

engage in more aggressivc underwriting, which included the origination of mortgages ~ith very 

exotic features such as flexible mortgages, capped rates, discounted variable rates, and interestonly loans. Interest-only loans were prevalent in the 2000s and comprised about one-third of all 

mortgages for first-time home buyers. Low documentation was also fairly common (for example, 

this was a major cause of the downfall of Northern Rock), as were very high LTVs, up to 120%. 

Principles-based regulation has been widely blamed for the UK's financial crisiS.6l 

Denmark also presents an interesting case, insofar as it allowed a seemingly insignificant 

regulatory loosening of lending standards, which has seemingly led to large problems with its 

housing markets. In 2003, Denmark allowed interest-only products to be originated, and these 

subsequently experienced astronomical growth. By the end of 2005, interest-only mortgages 

accounted for 25.6 percent of outstanding mortgages. Currently, as aforementioned, they account 

for 56% of outstanding mortgages. These mortgages have been widely blamed for the problems 

in the Danish housing and mortgage markets. 

60 Cajas is short for "eajas de ahorros," which means saving banks in English. 

61 See generally Spain: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note-Regulation, Supervision, and 

Governance of the Spanish Cajas (Int'I Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 06/215, 2006). 

62 See David Bocking, Bankia Bailout: Spain Struggles to Control Escalating Bank Crisis 

63 See, e.g., Roger Alford, Some Help in Understanding Britain's Banking Crisis, 2007-09 (London School of 

Economics, Financial Markets Group Paper Series, Special Paper 193, Oct. 2010); Julia Black, The Rise, Fall and 

Fate of Principles Based Regulation (London School of Economics, Law Society and Economy Working PaperNo. 

17/20 I 0, 2010); United Kingdom: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision Detailed Assessment of 

Compliance (Int'I Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 11/233, July 201 I). 
95 


81763.038

Canada provides us with an important counterfactual. Unlike the Unitcd States, the 

United Kingdom, and Spain, Canada did not undergo any significant deregulation of the banking 

sector in the past several decades. On the other hand, Canada did have an outsized government 

role in housing finance that appears to be comparable to or larger than the role of the U.S. 

government, with 45 percent of Canadian mortgages receiving an explicit guarantee from 

Canadian mortgage insurance (which is required to be reinsured with the Canadian government), 

and an additional 29% of mortgages being securitized by the Canada Housing and Mortgage 

Corporation.64 If government guarantees were the problem in housing finance, one would expect 

to see Canada suffering through relatively large housing and mortgage market problems. 

Conversely, if banking deregulation were the problem in housing finance, one would expect to 

see Canada with a relatively stable housing and mortgage system. Indeed, as has been well 

documented, Canada's housing and mortgage markets have been relatively stable, and have not 

experienced distress on par with the United States, the UK, Spain, or Denmark.65 

Explicit, Ex Ante Guarantees Are Preferable to Implicit, Ex Post Guarantees 

As is clear from even a cursory analysis, there is no major economy that does not have 

high levels of government guarantees in its housing finance system. The choice, then, is not, as 

the title of this hearing might be understood, between housing finance models with explicit 

government guarantees and no government guarantees. Rather, the choice we are presented with 

is whether government guarantees should be explicit and defined up front, or implicit and 

defined in the midst of a crisis. As former Treasury Assistant Secretary Phillip Swagel has 

explained: 

[O]ne clear lesson from the economic meltdown of2008 [is that] [a]ny future U.S. 

administration will intervene directly and heavily if faced with a potentially devastating 

economic crisis. Market purists might not like it, but it is a fact I witnessed firsthand at 

the Treasury Department during the George W. Bush administration.66 

There are several reasons why I believe explicit guarantees are preferable to implicit 

ones. First, the parameters of implicit guarantees are typically defined in the midst of crises, 

when regulators are frantically trying to stop panics from spreading. As a result, these implicit, 

ex post (after the fact) guarantees may go too far in bailing out classes of creditors that are not 

systemically important, since the regulators' incentives are to bailout more creditors rather than 

fewer. This was the reason why Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson wanted a "bazooka" to 

address the growing problems in the financial markets in 2007 and 2008. 

Second, with explicit upfront guarantees, the government can require capital and 

insurance payments from the beneficiaries of these guarantees, just as it does with federally 

insured depository institutions. These are not only buffers against taxpayer loss, but can serve as 

64 If one considers Canadian deposit insurance, virtually all Canadian mortgages are financed with government 

~uarantees. 

, One other important factor may be that housing finance provided by private capital markets conduits was virtually 

non-existent in Canada, with private-label securitization accounting for less than 3% of all mortgage debt. See David 

Min, True North, supra note 10. 

66 Phillip L. Swagel, Will Free-Marketeers Save Fannie and Freddie?, BLOOMBERG VIEW, July 17,2011. 
96 


81763.039

a deterrent against excessive risk-taking. 

Third, implicit, ex post guarantees are more likely to accrue to larger, more systemically 

important financial institutions. If the failure of Lehman taught the banking community anything, 

it was that being big and interconnected was important to securing an implicit government 

guarantee. Therefore, in the absence of explicit upfront guarantees, we will be strongly 

incentivizing greater consolidation and asset growth in the financial services industry. 

Fixing the Current System, Rather than Importing New Models, is Preferable 

As leading policy makers such as yourselves contemplate how bcst to reform the U.S. 

housing finance system, it is important that you take into account the specific eharaetcristics of 

our polity. There are several that I think are particularly notable. First, we do not have a social 

safcty net equivalent to those that exist in most other advanced economies. As such, affordability 

in housing finance should be a more important policy priority for the United Statcs than it is in 

other countries. As such, we should seek solutions that facilitate lower costs to mortgage 

borrowers. All three of the major housing finance options used around the world-governmentbacked bank deposits, MBS, and covered bonds-provide low cost financing, so all three are 

suitable in this regard. 

Second, the 30-year, fixed-rate, fully self-amortizing mortgage is a critical part of U.S. 

housing finance, with a long record of proven success. Moreover, this product is politically quite 

popular, especially among prudent homeowners. However, it carries significant interest rate risk 

for intermediaries and investors. In the aftermath of the stagflation of the late 1970s and early 

1980s, traditional deposit-backed banks have proven unwilling to carry significant amounts of 

such risk to term. Government-backed MBS and covered bonds both distribute this interest rate 

risk to investors willing to carry it If we want to continue to emphasize the 30-year FRM in the 

United States, it seems to rule out bank deposits as the major source of U.S. housing finance. 

Third, the United States has a long record of populist opposition to big banks, hidden 

subsidies, and bailouts, dating back to the founding of this Republic and the political battles over 

the First and Second Banks of the United States. Given these strong political dynamics, covered 

bonds-with the implicit guarantees and hidden subsidies that they carry and their tendency to 

promote TBTF-seem more appropriate as a major source of funding for the socialist 

governments of Europe, but more problematic here in the United States. 

Collectively, these points lead me to the conclusion that we may be best served by 

enacting reforms of the current system, rather than trying to impose radical changes or importing 

European models of housing finance into our country. This appears to be the same conclusion 

that was reached by the Bipartisan Policy Center, Sens. Bob Corker and Mark Warner, and most 

other policy groups and academics that have thought about housing finance reform, as they have 

all proposed some variation of implementing substantial reforms on a government-backed MBS 

system of funding rcsidential mortgages67 

67 Among these are Donald Marron and Phillip Swagel; the Mortgage Finance Working Group; the Mortgage 

Bankers Association; Federal Reserve economists Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore; a leading group of 

economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and Moody's Chief Economist (and former Chief Economic 
97 


81763.040

I thank you again for your time, and for the opportunity to testify here today on this 

critically important topic. I look forward to your questions. 

Advisor to Sen. McCain in his 2008 presidential campaign) Mark Zandi. See David Min, How Government 

Guarantees in Housing Finance Promote Stability n. 21, supra note 39. 
98 


81763.041

A-" American Enterprise Institute 

~. for Public Policy Research 

Statement before the House Committee on Financial Services 

On Beyond GSEs: Examples of Successful Housing Finance Models without 

Explicit Government Guarantees 

We Don't Need GSEs 

Alex J. Pollock 

Resident Fellow 

American Enterprise Institute 

June 12,2013 

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author alone and do not necessari1:y represent those 

rifthe American Enterprise Institute. 
99 


81763.042

Testimony of 

Alex J. Pollock 

Resident Fellow 

American Enterprise Institute 

To the Committee on Financial Services 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing on learning from Mortgage Finance Systems of Other Countries 

June 12,2013 

We Don't Need GSEs 

2 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Waters, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to be here today. I am Alex Pollock, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and these are 

my personal views. Before joining AEI, I was the President and CEO of the Federal Home loan Bank of 

Chicago from 1991 to 2004. From 1999 to 2001, I also served as President of the International Union for 

Housing Finance (IUHF), a trade association devoted to the international exchange of housing finance 

ideas and information. In fact, I have just returned to the U.S. from an IUHF conference at which 

representatives of 42 countries met to share issues and experiences in this sector, which is economically 

and politically important to all countries. 

The American housing finance sector has collapsed twice in the last three decades, once as a 

government promoted savings and loan-based system, and once as a government promoted GSE-centric 

system. We should never assume that the particular, highly unusual, historical development of U.S. 

housing finance should define the limits of our considerations. There is no doubt that there is much to 

learn of much practical import from examining U.S. housing finance in international perspective, 

including how experts from other countries view our system from outside. 

Comparing our housing finance sector to other countries, the one thing most unusual about it was and is 

the dominant and disproportionate role played by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as governmentsponsored enterprises or GSEs. Fannie and Freddie's role and was and is unique among housing finance 

systems. The GSEs themselves used to claim that this made U.S. housing finance "the envy of the 

world," a view not shared by the world. When Fannie and Freddie were the darlings of Washington and 

the stars of Wall Street, they would come to IUHF meetings and boastfully promote their GSE model. 

But mortgage professionals from other countries were not convinced. 

let us begin by asking and answering five essential questions from an international perspective: 

1. Are GSEs like Fannie and Freddie necessary for effective housing finance? 
100 


81763.043

No. This is obvious from the many countries which achieve similar or higher home 

ownership than the u.s. without them. 

2. Did GSEs get for the u.s. an internationally high home ownership rate? 

No. 

3. Well, did GSEs get for the u.s. an above-average home ownership rate? 

No. 

4. Are GSEs necessary to have long-term, fixed rate mortgages? 

3 

No. 

5. Even if they had a disastrous actual outcome, are GSEs the best model in theory? 

No. 

Along with incorrectly saying that GSEs made u.s. housing finance "the envy of the world," it was often 

additionally claimed (without supporting data) that the U.S. had the highest home ownership rate in the 

world. This seemed plausible to Americans, but was wrong. Interestingly, people in England also 

claimed that they had the highest home ownership. In fact, England, with a completely different 

housing finance system and no GSEs, has been and is effectively tied with the U.S. in home ownership 

rate-both now at 65%, and both in the bottom half, as you will see in the ranking below. 

Based on the free use of the u.s. Treasury's credit, through the so-called "implicit" but very real (as 

events made clear) guaranty, massive amounts of Fannie and Freddie's debt securities were sold 

around the world. The GSEs ran up the leverage of the housing finance sector. As a market distortion 

which pushed credit at housing, they inflated house prices and escalated systemic risk. Foreign 

investors helped pump up the housing bubble through the GSEs while being fully protected from the 

risk, and then were bailed out by the taxes of ordinary Americans. Of course, other countries also made 

housing finance mistakes, but nobody else made this particular, giant mistake. 

The political interest in housing finance begins with what I think is a valid proposition: that in a 

democracy it is advantageous to have widespread property ownership among the citizens. The 

experiences of other countries make it obvious that high home ownership levels can be attained without 

GSEs-and moreover without tax deductions for mortgage interest; without our very unusual practice of 

making mortgage loans into non-recourse debt; without government orders to make "creative"-that is 

riskier-mortgage loans, which were part of being a GSE; and with prepayment fees. 

The following table, "Comparative Home Ownership Rates," is an update with the most recent available 

data of a comparison I presented to the Congress in 2010. It displays home ownership in 28 

economically advanced countries. The U.S. ranks 20th, just behind England. The median home 

ownership rate among these countries is 68%, compared to our 65%. 
101 


81763.044

4 

Comparative Home Ownership Rates 

Ownership 

Rank Country Rate Date Source 

1 Singapore 90.1% 2012 Statistics Singapore 

3 Spain 85.0% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

3 Norway 85.0% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

4 Poland 81.30% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

5 Italy 80.0% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

6 Belgium 78.0% 2010 European Mortgage Federation 

7 Iceland 77.0% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

8 Portugal 74.9% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

9 Ireland 74.5% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

10 Finland 74.1% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

11 Mexico 70.7% 2004 DECO 

13 Chile 69.0% 2006 Housing Finance Information Network 

13 Australia 69.0% 2010 Australian Bureau of Statistics 

14 Israel 68.8% 2008 Global Property Guide 

15 Luxembourg 68.1% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

16 Canada 67.0% 2011 Statistics Canada 

17 New Zealand 66.9% 2006 Statistics New Zealand 

18 Sweden 65.5% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

19 England 65.3% 2012 English Housing Survey 

20 UNITED STATES 65.0% 2013 Bloomberg 

21 Japan 61.1% 2010 Statistics Japan 

22 France 57.8% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

23 Austria 57.4% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

24 Netherlands 55.5% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

25 Denmark 53.5% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

26 Hong Kong 52.0% 2012 Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department 

27 Germany 43.2% 2011 European Mortgage Federation 

28 Switzerland 40.0% 2011 Swissinfo.ch 'estimate 
102 


81763.045

5 

Source: AEI research 

How do financial professionals in other countries view the u.S. housing finance sector? 

More than a decade ago, when Fannie and Freddie were still riding high, and Fannie in particular was a 

greatly feared bully boy whom both Washington politicians and Wall Street bankers were afraid to cross 

or offend, I presented the GSE-centric U.s. housing finance system to the Association of Danish 

Mortgage Banks in Copenhagen. When I was done, the CEO of one of their principal mortgage lenders 

memorably summed things up: 

"In Denmark we always say that we are the socialists and America is the land of free enterprise. 

Now I see that when it comes to mortgage finance, it is the opposite!" 

He was so right. But now, with Fannie and Freddie continuing to be guaranteed by the u.S. Treasury, 

able to run with zero capital and infinite leverage, being granted huge loopholes by the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau, and being heavily subsidized by the Federal Reserve's buying up their MBS, 

they have a bigger market share and more monopoly power than before. The American housing finance 

sector is more socialized than ever. 

Here's a view from Britain, where a senior financial official said recently: 

"We don't want a government guaranteed housing finance market like the United States have." 

They don't want what we have-and we don't want it either. How do we conceptualize the range of 

alternate possibilities? 

Every housing finance system in the world must address two fundamental questions. The first is how to 

match the nature ofthe mortgage loan with an appropriate funding source, so you are not lending long 

and borrowing short. Different approaches distribute the interest rate risk among the parties involvedlenders, investors, borrowers, governments, taxpayers--in various ways. 

Basic sustainable variations observed in different countries include variable rate mortgages funded with 

short-term deposits; medium term fixed-rate mortgages funded with medium-term fixed rate deposits 

or bonds; long-term fixed rate mortgages funded with long-term fixed rate bonds or covered bonds. In 

general, to soundly fund long-term fixed-rate mortgages, you have to have access to the bond market. 

In an advanced financial system, it does not require a GSE to do this. 

The classic example of not achieving the needed interest rate match was the collapse of the American 

savings and loan industry in the 1980s. What broke the savings and loans was the combination of their 

interest rate mismatch with the soaring interest rates of the great inflation created by the Federal 

Reserve in the 1970s. While the lenders were crushed, borrowers who had old 3D-year fixed rate 

mortgages in this period of rising interest rates and inflating house prices did very well. 

In contrast, the 3D-year fixed rate mortgage was terrible for great numbers of borrowers in the U.S. 

crisis of the 2000s. With the floating rate mortgage system of England, the rapid fall of interest rates in 

the housing crisis was automatically passed on to the borrowers in the form of lower payments, which 

helped contain the crisis. American borrowers faced with falling interest rates and house price 
103 


81763.046

6 

deflation, on the other hand, were often locked in to high payments and punished by their 30-year fixed 

rate mortgages, which thereby made the housing bust worse in this country. 

The second fundamental question of housing finance systems is who will bear the credit risk. In most 

countries, the lender retains the credit risk, which is undoubtedly the superior alignment of incentives. 

With covered bonds, which are used in many countries, you can simultaneously achieve fixed-rate 

funding while keeping the lender fully on the hook for the credit performance of the mortgage loans 

being funded. 

The American GSE approach (and also that of private MBS) systematically separates the credit risk from 

the lender-- so you divest the credit risk of the loans you make to your own customers. This was and is a 

distinct outlier among countries. It had disastrous results, needless to say. 

The most perfect conceptual solution to the two fundamental questions of housing finance, which 

functions very well in practice in its national setting, is the housing finance system of Denmark. This 

system has been justifiably admired by many observers. It operates in a small country, but represents 

big basic ideas. 

The Danish mortgage approach to interest rate risk in its funding market is explicitly governed by what it 

calis the "matching principle." This means that the interest rate and prepayment characteristics of the 

mortgage loans being funded are passed on entirely to the investor in Danish mortgage covered bonds. 

This allows long-term fixed rate mortgages, as well as variable rate mortgages. 

At the same time, the entire credit risk is retained by the mortgage bank lenders. They have 100% "skin 

in the game" for credit risk, in exchange for an annual fee, thus insuring alignment of incentives for 

credit performance. Deficiency judgments, if foreclosure on a house does not cover the mortgage debt, 

are actively pursued. In other words, mortgage loans are always made with recourse to the borrower's 

other income and assets. This is true in most countries. The U.S. state laws or practices of non-recourse 

mortgage lending are again a distinct outlier. 

The fundamentals of the Danish mortgage system go back over 200 years, to the 1790s. There are no 

GSEs. The Danish system can deliver long-term fixed rate loans of up to 30 years with a prepayment 

option. This is a private housing finance system build on quite robust prinCiples, which claims that no 

mortgage bond holder has suffered a credit loss in over two centuries. Denmark can and in the last 

decade did have a housing price bubble and bust, but the housing finance sector performed much better 

through it than did ours, and its covered bonds were sold throughout 2007-09. We should note that 

the Danish system generates a home ownership rate of 54%, on the low side. 

Another interesting case of the splitting of bond market funding and credit risk is that of Cagamas, or 

the National Mortgage Company of Malaysia. Cagamas buys mortgage loans from lenders, and then 

issues bonds to finance them, but the mortgage purchases are with full recourse to the lender, so the 

lender retains 100% of the credit risk and the alignment of incentives. 

Cagamas is 80% owned by the banks and 20% by the Malaysian central bank, so it is a GSE, but not a 

Fannie and Freddie-style GSE. Instead it functionally resembles the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). 

FHLBs provide bond market funding for mortgages through advances to banks, but the banks retain all 

the credit risk. FHLBs also buy mortgages, but only when the bank credit enhances the mortgages it has 
104 


81763.047

made. (It may be of interest that of all sizeable American GSEs, considering Fannie, Freddie and the 

Farm Credit Banks, the FHLBs are the only ones which have never gone broke.) 

A very stable, sound, and very conservative housing finance market is that of Germany. Some of its 

banks got into trouble in this cycle by buying U.S. mortgage securities, but their domestic mortgage 

market did not experience either a housing price boom-bust or a mortgage credit crisis. The problem is 

that the German system generates a very low home ownership rate, only 43%--as well as a relatively 

late age at which people are on average able to buy houses. I imagine that neither of these would be 

politically acceptable in the U.S. 

7 

Nevertheless, there are two German ideas worthy of study. One is the German version of mortgage 

covered bonds ("Pfandbriefe"). With a statutory basis more than one hundred years old (and, it is 

claimed, a history going back to Frederick the Great in the 1Sth centu ry), these covered bonds form and 

large and relatively stable source of bond-based mortgage funding with no GSE. The issuing bank retains 

all the credit risk of the mortgage loans. Mortgage loans funded with these covered bonds have a 

maximum LTV of 60%. 

Many people have proposed, and I agree, that the U.S. should introduce covered bonds without a 

government guaranty as a mortgage funding alternative, as part of escaping from the mortgage 

market's subservience to GSEs. 

A second German housing finance idea worth considering is their emphasizing the role of savings as an 

essential part of sound housing finance. The German building and savings banks ("Bausparkassen") 

continue to practice the savings contract, which was once also common in this country. By such a 

contract, the borrower commits to regular savings as part of qualifying for a mortgage loan. This is, in 

my opinion, a very old-fashioned, very good idea. 

Canada makes a pertinent comparison for the U.S., both countries being advanced, stable, financially 

sophisticated and North American. The Canadian housing finance system, like most in the world, has no 

GSEs. It is primarily funded on the balance sheets of banks, although Canadian banks are also becoming 

issuers of covered bonds under new legislation, and it came through the crisis of 2007-09 in much better 

shape than did we did. Mortgage lending is more conservative and creditor-friendly, and the Canadian 

system currently produces a higher home ownership rate of 67%. 

Although it has no GSEs, Canada does have a very important government body to promote housing 

finance, which plays a substantial role in the mortgage sector. This is the Canada Mortgage and Housing 

Corporation (CMHC). Its principal activity is insuring (i.e. guaranteeing) mortgage loans-and it 

guarantees approximately half of all Canadian mortgages. This is about the same proportion as the 

combined Fannie and Freddie have of outstanding the U.S. mortgage credit exposure. 

But in contrast to the game the U.S. played of pretending that Fannie and Freddie were "private," and 

that the government exposure was not really there (it was only "implicit"), CMHC's status is refreshingly 

clear and honest. It is a 100% government-owned and controlled corporation. It has an explicit 

guaranty from the government. It also provides housing subsidies which are on budget and must be 

appropriated by Parliament. So Canada, while having this large government intervention in the 

mortgage market, is definitely superiorto us in candor and clarity about it. 
105 


81763.048

8 

This exemplifies what I believe to be a core principle: You can be a private company. Or you can be part 

of the government. But you should never be allowed to pretend you are both. In other words, Fannie 

and Freddie should cease to be GSEs. Considering the international anomaly and the disastrous 

government experiment they represent, we should all be able to agree on this. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to share these views. 
106 


81763.049

TESTIMONY 

Lawrence J. White 

Professor of Economics 

Stern School of Business 

New York University 

Before the 

Committee on Financial Services 

United States House of Representatives 

Hearing on 

"Beyond GSEs: Examples of Successful Housing Finance Models 

without Explicit Government Guarantees" 

June 12,2013 

Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, and members of the Subcommittee: My 

name is Lawrence J. White. I am a Professor of Economics at the NYU Stern School of 

Business. During 1986-1989 I served as a Board Member of the Federal Home Loan Bank 

Board; in that capacity I was also one ofthe three Board Members of Freddie Mac. I have 

written extensively on the subject of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and on 

residential mortgage finance more generally; a chronological list of these writings is at the end of 

this statement, as is my short biographical summary and the "Truth in Testimony" disclosure 

form. I represent solely myself at this hearing. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this important topic. Housing, and 

housing finance, continues to occupy an important place in the American policy conversation. 

Housing costs are a significant fraction - approximately 20% of most families' budgets, and 

even more so for many lower-income households; and a family's residence is the environment in 

which the family members spend most of their hours in a week. It is therefore not surprising that 
107 


81763.050

public policy has shown a distinct bias toward subsidizing housing, often through subsidizing 

mortgage finance. I 

However, along with the benefits of subsidy come costs; rarely are there "free lunches". 

The housing boom and bust of the decade of the 2000s and the financial crisis of2008-2009, 

which was triggered by the housing bust, are fresh reminders of how costly such policies can be. 

In the remainder of this Testimony I will outline the wide extent of government policies 

that encourage/subsidize housing construction and consumption, summarize their consequences 

including an international comparison - and discuss a sensible way forward for housing policy 

and for residential mortgage finance in particular, which would involve reduced levels of subsidy 

for housing generally and less government involvement in housing finance. 

Government policies that encourage housing production and consumption. 

Government policies that encourage the construction and consumption of housing have 

been and continue to be widespread in the United States and occur at the federal, state, and local 

levels. Included (past and present) are: 

• Income tax deductions for residential mortgage interest and for local property taxes; 

• Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that are focused on housing finance -

primarily Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but also including the Federal Home Loan Bank System 

(FHLBS);2 

• The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and its mortgage insurance programs, as well 

as mortgage insurance that is provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the 

I Another factor that surely encourages subsidy is the employment of millions of people by the tens of thousands of 

enterprises that are in housing construction and its related businesses. 

2 The HILBS was created in 1932, primarily as a vehicle to provide low-cost wholesale funding to savings 

institutions, which in turn were expected to be housing lenders. After 1989, the FHLBS's mandate was broadened 

to community development, and its membership was broadened to encompass other categories of depository 

institutions, such as commercial banks and credit unions. For the remainder of this Testimony, unless otherwise 

indicated, my references to GSEs will mean Fannie Mae and/or Freddie Mac. 

2 
108 


81763.051

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Government National Mortgage Association 

(Ginnie Mae) to securitize these insured mortgages; 

A category of depository institutions (savings & loan associations) that were expected to 

specialize on residential mortgage finance; 

Subsidies for home builders; 

Subsidies for low-income renters; and 

Direct provision of rental housing ("public housing"). 

The consequences. 

a. Domestic consequences. A basic tenet of economics is that if something is reduced in 

price (e.g., through a subsidy), people generally will buy more of it. Housing is no exception. 

As housing has been reduced in price through many of the programs that were outlined above, 

households have often bought "more house"; They have bought larger and better appointed 

houses on larger lots. 3 

In tum, this "more house" (including more rental housing) has meant that more of the 

U.S. economy's resources have been devoted to housing and less to other investments that would 

have been more productive - such as business investments in plant, equipment, and inventories; 

government investments in schools, roads, bridges, hospitals, airports, etc.; and individuals' 

investments in more and better education and training. One set of studies from approximately 25 

years ago estimated that the U.S. housing stock was 30% larger than it would otherwise have 

been in the absence of the widespread subsidies and that U.S. GDP was 10% smaller than it 

3 In addition to this "price effect", there has also been an "income effect", since U.S. households have generally had 

progressively higher incomes through the period since the Second World War. 

3 
109 


81763.052

would otherwise have been4 More recent studies have generally been supportive ofthese earlier 

findings. 5 

Further, much of these subsidies - especially those that are connected with home 

ownership - have tended to benefit upper-income households. This has especially been true for 

the mortgage interest and local property tax deductions, since upper-income households are more 

likely to itemize on their income tax returns (which is the only way that a household can take 

advantage of the deduction) and to buy (and finance) more expensive houses (which would mean 

largcr deductions). The subsidies that are embedded in the GSEs' mortgage activities have 

tended to favor upper-income households as well, at least through the late 1990s.6 And, more 

recently, even FHA activities have been more focused on upper-income households, as the limit 

on mortgages that the FHA could insure has been raised (starting in 2008) to $729,750 in highhousing-cost areas. 

And, although increases in the rate of home ownership was an avowed goal of many 

presidential administrations, the subsidy programs tended to have, at best, only marginal effects 

on home ownership rates (and, of course, rental subsidy programs would tend to have the 

opposite effects). In essence, the subsidy programs tended to provide subsidies mostly for upperincome households who would likely buy anyway and thus who used the subsidy primarily to 

4 See Edwin S. Mills, "Has the United States Overinvested in Housing?" AREUEA Journal, 15 (Spring 1987); and 

Edwin S. Mills, "Dividing Up the Investment Pie: Have We Overinvested in Housing?" Business Review, Federal 

Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, (March-April 1987). 

5 A summary of some of these more recent studies can be found in Viral V. Acharya, Matthew Richardson, and Stijn 

Van Nieuweburgh, Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, Princeton 

University Press, 201 1. 

6 See, for example, Jonathan Brown, "Reform ofGSE Housing Goals," in Peter J. Wallison, ed., Serving Two 

Masters, Yct Out of Control: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2001. The increase in the 

GSEs' conforming loan limit in 2008 for high-housing-cost areas to $729,750 (from $417,000) certainly expanded 

the GSEs' reach into upper-income housing areas. The maximum allowable amount was lowered in 2011 to 

$625,500, where it stands today. 

4 
110 


81763.053

borrow more to leverage themselves more - than they otherwise would (since much of the 

subsidy came in the fonn lower-cost borrowing) and to buy "more house". 

Another consequence has been the necessity for the U.S. Government to put Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac into conservatorships in September 2008 and to decide to honor all of the debt 

obligations of these GSEs; thus far, the required capital contributions by the Treasury to the 

GSEs have been approximately $188 billion. 

b. International comparisons. Loose discussions of American housing policy have often 

claimed that these housing (and housing finance) policies have yielded superior outcomes, 

especially in comparison with the policies of other countries. The discussion above has shown 

some of the weaknesses in these claims with respect to superior outcomes. And the writings of 

Dwight Jaffee, Michael Lea, Alex Pollock, and others have shown that American housing 

outcomes have not been especially favorable in international comparisons. 

For example, Table I reproduces data that were compiled by Alex Pollock that show that 

the U.S. does not rank especially high in an international comparison of home ownership rates, 

despite all of the subsidies described above (and much less emphasis on subsidizing housing in 

other countries).7 Similarly, Table 2 reproduces data that have been compiled by Dwight Jaffee, 

which show that the U.S. ranks relatively unfavorably in an international comparison with 15 

European countries as to the differential between the average interest rates that mortgage 

borrowers have paid and the average interest rates on short-tenn Treasury Bills of their 

7 However, as will be discussed below, a de·emphasis of the home ownership rate as a goal of public policy would 

serve the U.S. economy better for the future. 

5 
111 


81763.054

respective countries; Jaffee has also shown that the U.S. does not rank favorably in a number of 

other comparative measures. 8 

The way forward. 

For overall housing policy, the most important policy measures would be cutbacks in the 

overall levels of subsidy for housing and for mortgage borrowing. A good place to start would 

be to phase out the income tax deduction for mortgage interest (and, along the way, convert it 

into a tax credit instead ofa tax deduction), which would also have the benefit of improving the 

budgetary position of the federal government. Phasing out the GSEs and replacing them with a 

housing system that is largely privately supported, as is discussed below, would also be 

important. 

Although there do appear to be modest societal benefits from the phenomenon of home 

ownership (which would justify a modest program to help low- and moderate-income first-time 

home buyers), the large-scale emphasis on the goal of expanding the rate of home ownership 

ought to become a relic of the past. Rental arrangements are appropriate for many households. 

After all, houses are large, risky assets that involve sizable transactions costs when buying and 

selling and that thereby impede geographic mobility; under most circumstances the financing of 

home ownership requires a steady income and budgetary discipline. Home ownership works for 

many households; but it is clearly not for everyone - especially when one remembers that 

housing prices do not always go up. 

With respect to mortgage finance, approximately 90% of newly originated residential 

mortgages involve a federal government guarantee (through the GSEs, FHA, VA, or USDA) 

with respect to the credit risk on those mortgages. This historically very high percentage is the 

8 See Dwight M. Jaffee, "Refonning the U.S. Mortgage Market through Private Market Incentives," in Satya 

Thallam, ed., House of Cards: Refonning America's Housing Finance System, Mercatus Center, George Mason 

University, 2012. 

6 
112 


81763.055

consequence of the implosion of the housing markets after 2006 and the concurrent collapse of 

"private label" securitization, and the expansion ofthe GSEs and FHA to fill the financing void. 

However, this absorption of 90% of the credit risk for residential mortgages by the 

federal government - and ultimately by taxpayers is not a sensible long-run position for the 

federal government in a markets-oriented economy. Instead, residential mortgage financing 

should be primarily a private-sector activity; federal guarantees (and the subsidy that they carry) 

should be better targeted and should be restricted to helping (suitably screened) low- and 

moderate-income first-time home buyers obtain housing finance, through the FHA in on-budget, 

transparent subsidy programs. 9 

There are a number of questions and issues that are repeatedly raised in the context of a 

mortgage finance system that is largely devoid of government guarantees. One of the most 

prominent is whether the 3D-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) would still be available to 

borrowers under a system of private finance. The answer to this question is a highly likely "yes". 

It is important to remember that 3D-year FRMs were offered to borrowers for "jumbo" loans (i.e., 

for mortgages that exceed the GSEs' conforming loan limit) prior to the financial crisis and have 

continued to be available in the years since the financial crisis; this availability oDD-year FRMs 

for all sizes of mortgages - should continue to be the case in a largely privatized mortgage 

market. 

Further, 3D-year FRMs pose interest-rate risks for investors, as compared with adjustablerate mortgages (ARMs); but the federal guarantees cover only credit risk. Consequently, for the 

issue of whether 30-year FRMs would continue to be available to borrowers (as compared with 

ARMs), the presence or absence offederal guarantees should be irrelevant. 

9 This was Option #1 of the Obama Administration's "Refonming America's Housing Finance Market: A Report to 

Congress," February 11,2011. In addition, over the longer run the subsidy programs should be transitioned from 

subsidies for borrowing (which encourage greater household leveraging) to down-payment assistance. 

7 
113 


81763.056

The interest-rate differential between jumbo loans and otherwise similar conforming 

loans prior to 2007 was approximately '/4 of a percentage point - a relatively modest amount. 

After the mortgage markets return to normalcy (see below), this differential could well represent 

the additional cost to borrowers from the absence of widespread government guarantees. Even if 

the differential were twice this size, the additional cost to borrowers would still be relatively 

modest. 

A second widespread question is where the funding for the largely privatized mortgage 

market would come from. Partly the funding would come from depository institutions. As late 

as 2007, despite the competition from the GSEs and all of the advantages that the latter enjoyed, 

depositories held (as "whole loans" - i.e., not as mortgage-backed securities) 30% of outstanding 

mortgages. In the absence ofthe GSEs and their advantages, the depositories' share would likely 

increase. If covered bonds bonds that represent a claim on a depository institution but that also 

have specific mortgages as collateral become more prevalent in the U.S., this would be a factor 

that would likely help depositories enlarge their share yet further. 

The remainder of mortgage financing would come through private-label securitization, 

which should revive if the advantages of the GSEs are curtailed and when the final rules with 

respect to "qualified residential mortgages" (QRMs) are promulgated. Given the failed 

experience ofthe 2000s, the securitization tranche structures would likely be simpler, with more 

information being provided to investors. lo 

Among the natural buyers of the senior, relatively safe tranches of the 30-year FRMs that 

would be securitized would be life insurance companies and pension funds - both of which have 

long-lived obligations that would be readily balanced by the long-lived assets of the 30-year 

FRMs. As of the first quarter of2013, however, these two categories of financial institution held 

lQ Also, bond insurers and/or the credit-default swap (CDS) market could help bond investors deal with the risks. 

8 
114 


81763.057

almost $16 trillion in assets but held only $764 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities 

(RMBS) - less than 5% of their assets. It appears that the heightened interest-rate risk that is 

embodied in the "free" prepayment option II that accompanies most 30-year FRMs has been a 

deterrent to these institutions' wider investment in RMBS. Consequently, suitable fees for the 

exercise of the pre-pay option are an important part of a largely private mortgage finance system. 

The higher-risk junior tranches would likely be bought by hedge funds and by high-risk bond 

mutual funds. 

Additional policy measures that would help provide a more robust privately oriented 

mortgage financing system would include making lender recourse the norm for mortgage 

borrowing (which would reduce strategic defaults and reduce over-leveraging), as is the norm in 

many other countries, and giving the primary lender the power to approve whether the borrower 

can take out a second lien (which is the norm in commercial lending generally). 

Conclusion. 

The reform of housing policy generally - to end widespread subsidies for the 

construction and consumption of housing and the reform of mortgage finance to allow a largely 

private-sector markets-oriented structure would be worthwhile policy actions for the U.S. 

economy. The sooner that such policy actions are taken, the sooner will the U.S. economy 

benefit. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing. I would be 

happy to answer any questions from the Committee. 

II However, although the exercise of the pre-payment option may be free to those choose to exercise it, the 

availability ofthis costly option adds about \" percentage point to the interest costs on 30·year FRMs; see Jaffee, op. 

cit. 

9 
115 


81763.058

Table 1: An International Comparison of Home Ownership Rates in the 2000s 

Rank Country Ownership rate 

1 Singapore 89% 

2 Spain 85% 

3 Iceland 83% 

4 Belgium 78% 

5 Norway 77% 

6 Portugal 76% 

7 Luxembourg 75% 

8 Ireland 75% 

9 Chile 73% 

10 Italy 72% 

11 Israel 71% 

12 Australia 70% 

13 England 68% 

14 Canada 68% 

15 Sweden 68% 

16 New Zealand 68% 

17 United States 67% 

18 Japan 61% 

19 Finland 59% 

20 Czech Republic 59% 

21 France 57% 

22 Netherlands 57% 

23 Austria 56% 

24 Denmark 54% 

25 Germany 46% 

Source: Alex J. Pollock, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Security and International Trade 

and Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, September 29, 

2010. 

10 
116 


81763.059

Table 2: An International Comparison of Average Interest-Rate Spreads between Mortgage 

Interest Rates and Three-Month Treasury Bills, 1998-20 10 

Rank Country Spread 

I Sweden 0.91% - 2 United Kingdom 0.93% 

3 Luxembourg 1.05% 

4 Spain 1.08% 

5 Finland 1.09% 

6 Ireland 1.15% 

7 Portugal 1.35% 

8 Norway 1.44% 

9 Italy 1.56% 

10 Austria 1.79% 

11 France 1.80% 

12 Germany 2.05% 

13 Netherlands 2.06% 

14 United States 2.26% 

15 Belgium 2.58% 

16 Denmark 2.58% 

Source: Dwight M. Jaffee, "Reforming the U.S. Mortgage Market through Private Market 

Incentives," in Satya Thallam, ed., House of Cards: Reforming America's Housing Finance 

System, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 2012. 

II 
117 


81763.060

Publications by Lawrence J. White on the GSEs and on Residential Mortgage Finance 

"Comments on 'The Privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,'" in U.S. Department of 

Housing and Urban Development, Studies on Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 1996. 

"What's It All About?" in P. Wallison, ed., Public Purposes and Private Interests: Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac, Vol. I: Government Subsidy and Conflicting Missions, AEI, 2000. 

"Focusing on Fannie and Freddie: The Dilemmas of Reforming Housing Finance," Journal of 

Financial Services Research, February 2003. 

"Regulating Housing GSEs: Thoughts on Institutional Structure and Authorities," Economic 

Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, First Quarter 2004 (with W.S. Frame). 

"Emerging Competition and Risk-Taking Incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," in Federal 

Reserve Bank of Chicago, How Do Banks Compete? Strategy, Regulation, and Technology, 40th 

Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, 2004 (with W.S. Frame). 

"The Trouble with Fannie and Freddie," SternBusiness, Fall 2004. 

"Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?" Regulation, Fall 2004 (with W.S. Frame). 

"Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing Finance: Why True Privatization is Good Public Policy," 

Policy Analysis, No. 528, Cato Institute, October 7, 2004. 

"Fussing and Fuming at Fannie and Freddie: How Much Smoke, How Much Fire?" Journal of 

Economic Perspectives, Spring 2005 (with W.S. Frame). 

"On Truly Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Why It's Important, and How to Do It," 

Housing Finance International, December 2005. 

"Charter Value, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Emerging Competition at Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February 2007 (with W.S. Frame). 

"Mortgage-Backed Securities: Another Way to Finance Housing," in K.N. Rao, ed., Financial 

System in US: Emerging Issues, Icfai University Press, 2007. 

"Fannie & Freddie: Part of the Solution, or Part ofthe Problem?" Milken Institute Review, Second 

Quarter 2008. 

"What to Do about the Government Sponsored Enterprises?" in V. Acharya and M. Richardson, 

eds., Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, Wiley, 2009 (with D. Jaffee, 

M. Richardson, S. Van Nieuwerburgh, and R. Wright). 

"Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing: Good Intentions Gone Awry," in R. Holcombe and B. 

Powell, eds., Housing America: Building out ofa Crisis, Transaction, 2009. 

12 
118 


81763.061

Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, Princeton 

University Press, 2011 (with V,V. Acharya, M. Richardson, and S. Van Nieuwerburgh). 

"Bursting the Bubble: Fixing What Ails Housing," Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 20 I O. 

"The Government-Sponsored Enterprises," in V.V. Acharya and M. Richardson, eds., Regulating 

Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance. Wiley, 2011 (with 

V.V. Acharya, T.S. Oncu, M. Richardson, and S. Van Nieuwerburgh). 

"Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Crisis in US Mortgage Finance," in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. 

Blume, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Online Edition. Palgrave Macmillan, 

2011. 

"Reforming the U.S. Housing Finance System," in The Financial Development Report 2011, World 

Economic Forum, 2011 (with V.V. Acharya, M. Richardson, and S. Van Nieuweburgh). 

"The Way Forward: U.S. Residential Mortgage Finance in a Post-GSE World," in S. Thallam, ed., 

House of Cards: Reforming America's Housing Finance System, Mercatus, 2012. 

"Digging Out: Finding Our Way out of the Housing Crisis," Milken Institute Review, Third Quarter 

2012. 

"The Industrial Organization of the U.S. Residential Mortgage Market," in S.l. Smith, ed., The 

International Encyclopedia of Housing and Home, Vol. 4, Elsevier, 2012 (with W.S. Frame). 

"The Devil's in the Tail: Residential Mortgage Finance and the U.S. Treasury," Journal of Applied 

Finance, forthcoming 2013 (with W.S. Frame and L. Wall). 

13 
119 


81763.062

~I MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION~ 

ir1Vcstmgl!1c0111l11unitics 
120 


81763.063

1009X 

International Comparison of 

Mortgage Product Offerings 

Dr. Michael Lea 

Director. Corky McMillin Center for Real Estate 

San Diego State University 

San Diego State University Research Foundation 

September 2010 

International Comparison of Mortgage Product Offerings 

t Re~~an;h lMtitute fMHou.~ll1g IImencaS('plembcr 2010, All rignt:< resc)"w',J, 
121 


81763.064

Research Institute for Housing America 

BOARD OF TnUSTEES 

Chair 

Teresa Bryce, Esq. 

Radian Group Inc. 

Michael W. Young 

CenEar FSB 

N ancee Mueller 

Wells Fargo 

Edward L. Hurley 

Avanath Capital Partners LLC 

Steve Graves 

Principal Real Estate Investors 

Dena Yocom 

IMortgage 

STAFF 

Jay Brinkmann, ph.D. 

SeniDr Vice President, Research and Business Dew:iopment 

Chief Economist 

Mortgage Bankers Association 

Michael Fratantoni, Ph.D. 

Vice President, Research and Economics 

Jvlortgage Bankers Association 

IntL!.rnatillnal C-ol'lq1arison ttfMortgage PrQdttet Offerings. 

,\ R<:~e;,\rd, lni>:in,m.' f,)l" Hm,,~;nl' Am~,,;cj !Wpremlwr 20Hl. ,\11 r1sn!$ ,'e~ef\'e,L 
122 


81763.065

Table of Contents 

lnterna.tion'll Cl1l'nparisolt of MortE,'age Product Offerings 

, RC.'e.orGh In'!;tu'~ fnrll"~;i,,s Am~,.i<:" q"pt~nl"cr lNO ~II "";;ht, 'c,elve-d. 
123 


81763.066

Executive Summary 

The recently passed Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill has significant implications for the provision of 

mortgage credit in the United States. The bill stipulates the characteristics of qualified mortgages, which 

are likely to become the standard instruments in the market going forward. The bill bans or restrict" the 

use of pre-payment penalties, balloon payments, interest-only payments and other features commonly 

offered in the mortgage choice set, A likely outcome of the bill is to perpetuate the use of the long-term 

fixed rate pre-payable mortgage (FRM) with implications for the future of the mortgage GSEs. 

This study examines the issue of mortgage product design from the viewpoint of international 

experience. What mortgage designs and characteristics exist in different markets and why? How 

have they performed prior to and during the cri.<;is? The study will focus on five important aspects 

of mortgage design: 

Interest rate determination: fixed versus adjustable-rate mortgages; 

Pre-payment penalties and restrictions; 

Loan-term and amortization limits; 

Mortgage default and foreclosure; and 

Consumer protection regulation 

This comparison of mortgage product offerings in developed countries has revealed significant 

differences in the dominant product offerings. Countries differ in terms of the market share of adjustable 

versus fixed~rate mortgages, the use of pre-payment penalties, maximum term and the offering of 

features such as interest-only payments and assumability, Our findings suggest that the United States 

is internationally unusual in several respects: 

The United States has an unusually high proportion oflong-term fixed-rate mortgages 

as well as use of securitization in the finance of housing. The dominance of the FRM and 

International Comparison of Mortgage Product Offerings 

, Re'""rch !n<t;lu!c r", H(""in;-: Am", 'L' 5ep\emk'f 2010 .\11 dgh!< "',~r"ed 
124 


81763.067

securitization is driven in part by the presence of government-backed secondary mortgage 

market institutions that lower the relative price of this type of mortgage. 

The United States js unusual in the banning or restriction of pre-payment penalties on fixedrate mortgages. Most countries in the survey allow such penalties to compensate lenders for 

loss associated with the financing of the instruments. As a result, mortgage rates do not include 

a significant pre-payment option premium and other financing techniques, such as covf'..red 

bonds, are more .common. 

The only other country that utilizes the FRM is Denmark. The Danish system offers 1:1 superior 

alternative in the form of the "Principal of Balance" that equates individual mortgages and 

bonds. This system allows borrowers to pre-pay their loans when rates faIl, as in the United 

States, and al10ws them to buy back their bond when rates rise. This feature allows the 

borrower to benefit from interest rate increases and decreases and facilitates de-leveraging 

when rates rise, reducing the incidence of negative equity. 

Features that are restricted in the Dodd-Frank Bill such as longer terms, interest-only periods 

and flexible payment designs are quite common in other countries and do not appear to have 

been associated with higher rates of default 

Mortgage default rates have been far lower in other countries than in the United States. 

despite the fact that several countries had greater house price volatility. The lack of subprime 

lending (outside of the United Kingdom) and less use of limited or no documentation lending 

were major factors. Mortgage products did not playa role in mortgage default - in fact the 

dominance of ARMs in several countries was noted as a reason for lower default rates. 

Mortgage foreclosure and repossession regimes are varied, with some more efficient and some 

less efficient than in the United States. However an other countries in the survey have recourse 

mortgages and lenders routinely pursue deficiencies. Research in Europe and the United States 

has found that recourse reduces the incidence of default. 

Consumer protection regulation has advanced in a number of countries. The focus has been 

on horrower qualification and suitabiHty standards and for the most part has not constrained 

mortgage product design. 

lnternationa1 Cml1parison ()fMortgllf,~ Pr.oduct Offerings 

( Ilt't~r(\1 l",tllme Ii), HnUH!)1'( i\r.,<t6t~ Se['t,,)\lb~r 20lCl. ,\H "l>h!~ n~~ened. 
125 


81763.068

Introduction 

In the aftermath of the U.S. mortgage-market crisis there have been numerous actions and 

proposals to restrict mortgage product design. The Federal Reserve Board created guidelines for 

high cost loans in 2008 that restrict or prohibit the use of certain features such as pre-payment 

penalties on high cost loans.l The trend continued with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Financial 

Reform Bill [2010] in July 2010, which contains a section entitled the "Mortgage Reform and 

Anti-Predatory Lending Act," that is likely to substantially change the mix of product offerings 

available in the U.S. market. 

The bm introduces the concept of a "qualified" mortgage that seriously constrains the characteristics 

of mortgages. The qualified mortgage is basically an instrument with low-risk characteristics 

such as fully amortizing payments and a term no longer than 30 years. Qualifying loans can 

be fixed rate or adjustable rate but qualification on the former has to be on a fully amortizing 

payment and on the latter is based on the highest possible rate in the first five years with full 

amortization. Pre-payment penalties on qualified fixed-rate mortgages are capped and not allowed 

on adjustable-rate mortgages. The law also allows regulators to prohibit or further restrict " ... the 

use of balloon payments, negative amortization, pre-payment penalties, interest-only payments, 

and other features that have been demonstrated to exhibit a higher risk of borrower default." 

(p.533). 

Although the Jaw allows lenders to make non-qualified mortgages, they too have constraints. For 

example pre-payment penalties are not allowed on non-qualified mortgages. More importantly, 

lenders that make qualified mortgages enjoy a safe harbor where they are not subject to certain 

restrictions - in particular, that they must retain at least five percent of the credit risk on the loans. 

If a mortgage is qualified the lender is not obliged to retain any of the risk of loss. Furthermore, 

lenders that make loans that are not qualified or are later found to have violated qualification 

provisions may find themselves subject to penalties and loss of the ability to pursue deficiency 

judgments in foreclosure. 

lnterniltional Comparison ofMortg-age Proo:1tlct Ofi"('Tinp 

, !{eH'"ch In,:-,,,,,, h" jjou';ng ,\m¢q~., Sel;t~m~~r JOW 
126 


81763.069

10 

The likely effect of these regulations will be to limit the offering of products that are not deemed to 

be qualified. Those that are offered will have a higher price, reflecting the required risk retention, 

greater risk of rules violations and greater cost of documenting affordabHity and compliance. 

In particular the law may result in a greater proportion of long~term FRMs that enjoy favored 

status as qualified mortgages. 

Is it a good idea to place restrictions on loan design? While many borrowers were offered inappropriate 

or highly risky products during the mortgage market boom, proposals to limit mortgage product 

offerings, either explicitly or implicitly. run the risk of ellminating valuable features from the 

mortgage marketplace and stifling mortgage product innovation. 2 For example, pre-payment 

penalties can be an efficient mechanism to lower mortgage rates and facilitate interest rate risk 

management for lenders and investors. Negative amortization can cushion the payment shock 

potential of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). Lower start rates due to discounts, interest-only 

periods or graduated payments can reduce affordability constraints for borrowers. Arguably 

the problem with loan design during the crisis was one of a mismatch between borrowers and 

particu lar loan designs - not the existence of the loan features themselves. Furthermore steering 

the market further towards FRMs has implications for the finance -of mortgages, market structure 

and stability. 

In this study we examine 12 major developed countries with distinctly different mortgage market 

and product configurations. The countries chosen have relatively large and wen developed mortgage 

markets with a variety of instruments and funding mechanisms. They a11 have relatively high 

homeownership rates and mortgage indebtedness. The purpose of the study is to inform U,S. 

market participants and policy makers about the range of product offerings available in other 

countries and identify potential features or products that could safely expand market offerings 

in the United States, 

International C(lmpadson orMortgllge Product Offerings 

~; Re<earch !Mtlfu~fur ll"u~ing Amerlc~ Sc·ptembcr 2mo .. \\1 rights rc~er\'e<i 
127 


81763.070

Country Background 

\Vith the exception or Germany and Switzerland, the countries in this study have similar rates of 

homeownership (Figure 1). Australia, Ireland, Spain and the UK. all have higher rates of home owners hip 

and Canada's rate is comp.'1rable to that of the United States. This is note"worthy as these countries 

provide rar less government support for homeowners hip than the United States does. Most \vestern 

European countries have lower rates of hom cow ncr ship, in part due to strong social rental systems. 

Germany provides incentives for rental investment but not for homeownership. SINitzerland has 

historically had a low homeownership rate, reflecting a high cost of housing and a large foreign~horn 

(often transient) popu lation. Southern European countries like Ttaly, Greece and Spain have higher 

rares of homeownership, reflecting cultural values, discriminatory policies towards private rental 

Figure 1 

Homeownership Rate 

100 

so 

60 

40 

20 

U-K u.s. 
128 


81763.071

12 

FIgure 2 

Mortgage Debt Outstanding-to-GOP. 2008 

SOl1rce-: Central B;)nks, World Bank 2008 except Jap<!n :2006. 

housing and weaker support of social rental housing. 

Mortgage indebtedness, as measured by mortgage debt outstanding relative to GDP, is also high in 

most countries - ranging from 3& percent in Japan to 100 percent in Switzerland (Figure 2). The 

ratios are low in Germany and Japan, reflecting more than a decade of stagnant house prices and 

mortgage lending. Many countries, including Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain had more 

rapid growth in mortgage indebtedness than the United States during the past decade. 

Although the United States had an unprecedented run-up of house prices during the decade, itwas 

not alone, as shmvn in Figure 3. Many OEeD countries had greater house price increases between 

2000 and 2006 than did the United States. Australia and the United States ,\vcrc the first of the 

hubble countries in which house prices fell (the Australian housing market has since recovered). The 

magnitude of the US. house price fall as measured by the S&P Case Shiller 20 MerroArea Index has 

been grea.ter than that of other countries. 

Mortgage interest rates in most countries declined during the decade except in Australia (Figure 4). 

The Reserve Bank of Australia increased interest rates in 2003, in part to he-ad off a housing price 

bubble. The rates are specific to the dominant instrument. Australia, Ireland, Spain and the U.K. are 

predominately short-term variable-rate markets. Their mortgage rates declined mOre sharply than 

those in otber countries during the crisis. 

There are significant differences among countries in the presence of government-owned or 

-sponsored mortgage institutions. Table 1 compares 5elect countries in this dimension. The United 
129 


81763.072

Figure 3 

House Price Change 

Source: (MHC. EMF, FHFA, s.,'l,.P. 

Fig~l'e 4 

Mortgage Interest Rates 

Source: CentrOti BaokS, EMF> MBA 

International C1Jmpari\o\on ofMottgnge Product Offcr-ixtgs 

£ lk~('Jrrl; In<\;{IHt ;(!r llNI'in.; Am~l ',',1 :'';-\'·\to)::-''', ~OIO 

_AustrBlJa 

~U.s,ARM 
130 


81763.073

j. 

States js unusual in its use of a11 three types of government-supported mortgage institutions 

or guarantee programs: mortgage insurance, mortgage guarantees and government~sponsored 

mortgage enterprises. Canada and Japan have government guarantee programs and Canada 

and the Netherlands have government-backed mortgage insurance programs. Korea has a GSE 

modeled after those in the United States. The market share of government-backed institutions in 

Canada, Japan and Korea is significantly less than that of the United States. 

Table 1 

Government Mortgage Market Support 

Denmark 

Germany 

Ireland 

Netherlands 

Spain 

UK 

Austr<llia 

Canad<l 

J<lpan 

No 

No 

No 

NHG 

No 

No 

NO 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No No _ ............. " .......................................... ,. ... -... . CMHC CMHC 

No JHF 

No 

No 

Int~r:nati ... nal Comparison of Mortgage Produd Offerings 

~,i'<:'-":l)nh !n~:ltute for llou~"'j; "-meTic~~el'temt>~' 2010 ,\11 ngl1\\" ... :~en·cd. 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Possible 
131 


81763.074

Mortgage Characteristics 

A mortgage is a complex mix of different features. 3 There are terms that dictate how the interest rate 

is determined, how the loan is amortized, its final maturity and the options for and requirements of 

the lender and borrower. 

What are the desirable features in amortgage instrument? The answer to this question is notstraightforward 

as it depends on whether viewed from the borrower or the lender /investor perspective. Features 

attractive to borrowers may be costly or impossible for lenders to provide. Features attractive to 

lenders may not be acceptable to borrowers. A borrower is interested in the affordability of the loan, 

both at inception and over its life. The lender is interested in getting an acceptable risk~adjusted rate 

of return over the life of the loan. This presents a conundrum - often an attempt to improve the 

attractiveness of the loan for one party creates a problem for the other. For example, an interest rate 

cap 00 an ARM reduces potential payment shock and default risk for borrowers but can reduce yield 

for lenders. 

There is no perfect mortgage - the dominant instrument in any country represents a balance between 

borrower and lender /iovestor needs. Regulation may have an important influence ifit bans or dictates 

certain features. History too may playa role - an instrument that has been dominant in a market 

for II long period of time is familiar to both borrowers and lenders and may be difficult to dislodge. 

In general there is no one ideal mortgage instrument for a market. A wjdevariety of mortgage instrument 

designs have been created to meet the varying needs of borrowers and lenders. A robust mortgage 

market will have a several different instruments that can be tailored to the varying needs of bar rowers 

and lenders with the mix determined by market forces rather than prescriptive regulation. 

International compllr-ison ofMortga~e Prodl1Ct Offerings 

" !~~<e"\'Lh ,n_mute ro>' !lou""g "r.l~) ku Sepl~m):lec .Wl() ·\1: r'~h{, re'Cl ved. 

15 
132 


81763.075

Interest Rate Determination: 

Fixed Versus Adjustable Rate 

Perhaps the most important parameter in mortgage instrument design is the determination ofthe 

periodic interest rate. There is a wide range of possibilities for setting interest rates. Table 2, adapted 

from a 2006 study by the European Mortgage Federation (EMF), defines the different types. 

Table 2 

Types of Interest Rates 

Type of interest rate 

Fixed interest rate 

DeKl'ipt!on 

Remamsunchanged 

through the entire duriltion 

of the loan 

lengthofinitjalperiodofflxation Definition 

lnitiat period fixed rate Starts with a period during 

which the interest rate is 

The initial fixed rate period · .... ··-·"··R~i;;;;;;R;;;;;;:;;;;;; 

is smalier than the toan matudty refers to a series of 

fixed. After the initlal period, 

the interest rate can either be 

fixed for another period or vary 

and can be broken into different fixed rate terms 

maturity categories: 

<1,,;:;5 years 

5",;10 years 

>10 years 

Variable or adjustable rate In a variable ratecontracl the ",lyei.lf 

interest rate can vary periodical!y 

(daily, weekly, monthly, Quarterly) 

or remain fixed up to 1 year, varying 

thereafter 

Convertlb!e Loan can haveinitialftxed or Can be variable, initial fixed rate 

variable rate with the borrower 

having <In option to change either 

ataparticulardateoratthe 

borrower's option 

Int~rnational Comparison of Mortgage PnJduct Olferings 

i' Ik,~~"h In't'tule r", llnu''''g '\m~;ka !"'l'tcm"ec .WHl 

Hybrtdrefersto 

toanswithaninitia! 

fixed rate period 

greatertnanlyear 

that revert to a 

variabte rate <Ifter 

the fixed term 

Reviewable-rate 

determined by the 

lender 

Indexed/ReferEnced 

-rate <Idjustment 

determined by 

indeJivalue 

Convertible 

17 
133 


81763.076

18 

Figure 5 

Mortgage Product Interest VariabiHty 

100 

80 

40 

20 

Source.' RBA, CHt,1C, KHfC EMF.GPG, MBA and SSP. 

Figure 5 shows market shares by interest rate variability for the subject countries as of2009. The data 

reported in Figure 5 refer to new loans made during different parts of 2009. 

There is (:onsiderable difference in interest determination across countries. Australia, Ireland, Korea, 

Spain and the United Kingdom CU.K.) are dominated byvariable~rate mortgages often with ashort~ 

term initia.l fixed f(lte. Designs vary - in Australia, Ireland and the U.K. the standard variable~rate 

mortgage has a rate set by the lender at its discretion (3 reviewable-rate 10an).4 Rates on these loans are 

changed for all borrowers at the same time. Spain I Korea and the United States have indexed ARMs 

with rate changes determined by changes in the underlying index.s Recently, "tracker" mortgages, 

which are indexed ARMs, have become common in the U.K Initial fixed-rate discounts are prevalent 

in Australia and the U.K. The magnitudes of the discounts are less than those in the US. ARMs were 

during the boom .,.- typically around 100 basts points, lasting one to two years. 

Short- to medium·term fixed-rate mortgages are the dominant instrument in a numher of countries, 

induding Canada, Denmark (recently), Germany, the Netherland!; and Sv.:itzerland. These instruments 

are rollover or renegotiable rate loans in which the rate is fixed typically for a period of one to five 

years \-vith a longer amortization period (25 to 35 years - briefly up to 40 years in Canada)." The rate is 

reset to the market rate at rollover. There is a substantial (as high as yield maintenance) pre-payment 

penalty during the fixcd~rate period (discussed below), 

The United States is unusual in the high proportion oflong-term fixed-rate mortgages. Long-term fixedrate pre-payable mortgages used to be the dominant product in Denmark, but low and falling short~ 
134 


81763.077

term rates have led Danish borrO\vers to shift to medium-term (one- to five-year) rollover mortgages 

in recent years.~ France i$ th~ only other countryv{ith a TIl'Jjority of fixed-rate mortgages, Unlike the 

penalty-frt~c pre-payable Danish and U.S, FRl\·1s, French fixed-rate loans have pre-payment penalties 

('maximum three rercent of outstanding balance or three months' interest) German mortgages can 

be fixed up to 1:; years with ~130-year amortization. The loans are-subje('t to a yield rnaintcnance prepayment penalty during the time the rate is fixed, up to 10 yeJrs, 

Box 1 

Foreign currency Loans 

Lo~ns denominated in a foreign currency have been quite popular in the transition countries of 

Centra! and Eastern Europe as weI! as Austria, The loans either require payments in the foreign 

currency or index amounts in domestic currency to the exchange rate. The most common indices 

have been the Euro and the Swiss franc, Use of these instruments typically arises as the result of 

domestic inflation, The appeal of the loans IS a lower initial rate that spreads the payment burden 

more evenly over the life of the loan. Such loans carry significant default risk, however, as the 

income of most borrowers is not in the same currency as the mortgage, Regulatory response as 

ranged from information campaigns (Latvia), to LTV restrictions (Hungary), debt service stress 

tests (Poland) and Outright product bans (Austria. Ukraine) [Dube! and Walley, 2010l 

The dominant mortgage product in a country can change over time. During 2004-2000 between 30 and 

35 percentofU.S. mortgages were hybrid AR Ms \vith short- to medium~tenn initial fixed rates reverting 

to variable rates after the end of the fixed-rate period. These loans were designed to improye affoni<lbility 

compared to the FR\tJ, The shift back to FRMs reflects their historically low rates (brought about in 

parr by Federal Reserve purchases of mortgage-backed securities), the poor experience of subprime 

ARMs and poss-ibly fears of future rate increases. In 2005, 50 percent of Danish mortgages \vere FRMs 

and ;:morher 20 percent were medium-term fixed-rate loans. The market shifted townrdsvariable~I'J.te 

and. short~term fixed-rate loans as interest rates declilwd, with 80 perCt~nt of Danish horrowers tnking 

such loans. in 2009 [Realkreditdidet 2010]. Spanish mortgages shifted from fixed. to variable after the 

government restricted the ability of lenders to charge pre-payment penalties ill the mid-1990s. A declining 

interest rate environment after Spain moved to the EUro also contributed to the shift. 

Indexed adjustnble-ratc loans in many countries have caps and floors (Appendix, Table A~l). The 

specific cap amounts are fixed by contract. In most cases loans will have both a cap and a floor. In 

Germany, borrowers can purchase interest rate risk insurance that will cup the loan rate at adjustment. 

Alternatively the borrower can execute a forward mortgage rate contract to lock in their rute up to 

three )-'ears prior to adjustment. In Switzerland lenders sell interest rate caps as separate contracts. 

Small (one percentage point or ies:;) initial rate discounts are common on AR.!\ils, taking the form 

of initial fixed rates that arc less than the fuUy indexed rate or standard vnriahlc r::ltes (SVR) on 

Int(!rnatitlnai COll1p::"Il'ison ofl\"longage- Product Offerings 

',.\"H' ,"1 ~'1",,",'hlr 2'''1) 

19 
135 


81763.078

20 

reviewable-rate ARMs. For reviewable-rate loans the rate may be fixed for a set period (one-three 

years) or variable when the SVR is changed. 

Adjustable-rate mortgages in other countries have a number of interesting features. About ha1f of 

Japanese loans are convertible (after the end of the fixed-rate term the borrower can select another 

fixed-rate period or switch to a variable rate) [Standard and Poors 2009]. Japanese floating-rate loans 

have fixed payments for five years with potential deferral and negative amortization. Conversion 

options (variable to fixed) are available in a number of countries. Several countries, indudingAustralia, 

Canada. the Netherlands and Spain allow loans that are part fixed rate (short- to medium-term) 

and part variable rate. Borrowers can also manage interest rate risk by taking out multiple loans 

with varying short- to medium-term fixed rates (Canada, Germany <ind Switzerland) or fixed- and 

variable-rate loans (Australia, U.K.) secured by the same property. Canada, France and Japan offer 

flexible-term loans in which the payment remains comtant but the term adjusts with interest rate 

changes. Flexible-term loans are subject to maximum term constraints (e.g., 35 years in Canada). 

International CmnplIrisan of Mortgage Pt'odu(>t. Offerings 

',' l<~"t~"cl> ln~H'll" f<1;JlnU,';"l: \"I,,;kuS"I"e,d'e,.lllH) 
136 


81763.079

Early Repayment 

Other than Denmark (FRM), Japan and the United States, fixed-rate mortgages are typically subject 

to an early repayment penalty.s Table 3 shows the treatment of early repayment in different countries. 

In a number of countries early repayment is restricted to certain conditions (e.g., in Germany if the 

borrower is moving or the lender refuses a request to increase the mortgage). In Australia, Canada, 

Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland the penalties are designed to compensate the 

lender for lost interest over the remaining term of the fixed rate (yield maintenance). The specific 

Table 3 

Prepayment Penalties 

Country Amount Applkability 

Denmark Yield maintenance ST fixed: loans with non-callable bonds 

Switzerland Yieldmaintenaoce Fixed rate 

Japan None Borrowers make semi-annual bonus payments 

Internationill Comparison orMortgage Product Olferings 

,- Ht'~''-'t'~ l~~:;n;,~ f" .. ll{)u,ing- "'m~nc,' S~rt~'nJ:,ec 2fllil 

Penalty Free Payment 

21 
137 


81763.080

penalty calculations differ and are typicalJy set by contract as opposed to regulation. Lenders may 

also charge borrovvcrs for the cost of processing the repayment (Denmark, Germany). Pre-payment 

penalties are capped by law in France and Spain (although the Spanish law was recently changed 

to allow lenders to charge yield maintenance penalties on fixed.-rate mortgages). In some countries 

borrowers must give advance notice of early repayment (two months in Denmark. six months in 

Germany). Partial pre-payment is quite common in Japan, in part reflecting the practice of paying 

employees semi-annual bonuses, 

Denmark has the most unique system with respect to early repayment. The Danish system is based 

on the Principle of Balance (POB) [Realkreditnldet 2009]. When the borrower obtains a mortgage 

loan, the mortgage credit institution (1\1CI) issues a bond into an existing bond series. Thus there 

is a 1:1 equivalence between the loan and the bond,9 The Danish mortgage is cancelabJe at the 

lower of the market price or par. As in the U.S., the borrower can refinance the loan at par if rates 

fall. But in the Danish system, if rates rise the borrower can buy her loan out of the mortgage bond 

at a discount and present to the Mel to repay the mortgage. Thi::; feature has several important 

benefits. For example, it aHows automatic de-leveraging as rates rise and reduces the probability of 

negative equity. Figure 6 from Boyce (2010) illustrates the difference between different mortgages 

as rates change. A non~callable mortgage (i.e., one with a pre-payment lock out or yield maintenance 

penalty) or a short-term ARM locks the borrower into the par (book) value of the loan when rates 

rise. This can create negative equity ifhouse prices fall with a rate increase. In the Danish system 

the borrower buys back the bond. at a discount and cancels the mortgage, allowing the mortgage 

balance to fall along with house prices. 

Figure 6 

Price/Yield Graph of Various Mortgage Risk Transfer Structures 

SourCf):8oyce.;1010. 
138 


81763.081

Danish lenders also offer mortgages with pre-payment penalties. Loans with fixed-interest periods 

of one and five years are funded by bullet bonds with corresponding maturity.J{I The loans may have 

terms up to 30 years and initial interest-only periods of up to 10 or 30 years. In the event of an early 

repayment the lender would charge a yield-maintenance penalty plus processing cost. 

Although the United States does not aUowpre-payment penalties on most FRMs, it has been pointed 

out that points paid by the borrower can have an effect similar to a pre-payment penalty [Colwell 

and Dehring1997]' Pre-payment penalties on FRMs are not allowed in a number of states. but Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac have historically not enforced such penalties. Points are unique to the United 

States, arising in the 1970s in response to interest rate regulation. As mortgages in other countries 

are typicaHy not subject to usury caps and lenders can charge early repayment penalties, there has 

been no apparent need to charge points.ll Kiff[2009] points out that the transactions cost of mortgage 

refinance is more expensive in the United States than in Canada, which substantjalIy offsets the cost 

of the pre-payment penalty.ll 

International CompnrisOti ofMortgag.e Produc:tOfferings 

t. R~"e,\!ch ;".<lnUl~ fot H()u~;nJ,': .~menca $,'ptelHh,;,,' 2ntO. All right> re~N\'~d. 

23 
139 


81763.082

Amortization and Term 

Mortgages in most countries are annuity loans with a level payment. Terms typically range between 20 

and 40 years. The European Central Bank (ECB) reports that in 2007 the typical maturity in the Euro 

area was between 20 and 30 years. Longer maturity products exist in several countries - up to 50 years 

in Spain and France and up to 60 years in Finland, although they have a very low market share. The 

maximum maturity granted is often linked to the retirement age. Japan and Switzerland have lOO-year 

(inter-generational) mortgages. Scanlon et. a!. [2009] note that the maximum maturity was shortened 

in several countries, induding France and Spain, during the crisis. 

Interest-only loans are common in a number of countries. Scanlon et. a1. [2008] reported that interestonly mortgages were available in at least 10 European countries as well as Australia and Korea. Table 4 

provides data on the incidence of interest-only mortgages in a number of countries in 2005 and 2009.13 

There are several factors in the rising importance of this feature. First are tax benefits. Mortgage interest 

is fully tax deductible in Denmark, Korea, the Netherlands and Switzerland}4 Even in countries like 

the Australia and the UK. where there is no deductibility of mortgage interest, there can be a tax angle 

associated with interest-only loans. If mortgage repayment comes from a tax~advantaged insurance 

or savings account it may be preferable to de-link the mortgage and repayment vehicle. For example, 

Table 4 

Interest~Only Mortgages 

C:ountry 

Australia 

Denmark 

Ireli'lnd 

Korea 

The Netherlands 

U.K 

2005-2006 

15% 

32% 

13% 

48% 

88% 

'4% 

International Cotn(lat'ison ofMortg:lg~~ product Offerings 

r lk'c;""h l~.':;n.lt<' 1m !lou,;ns .~r.ler;~a ,"pl~nlb€" 2(;]0 i\H ,;,;ht< r£"~)\'ed 

2009-2010 

27% 

50% 

10% 

43% 

79% 

43% 

2S 
140 


81763.083

26 

interest on a companion investment or savings account can accumulate free of tax during the term of 

the rnortgage. 

A second reason for interest-only mortgages is low interest rates, The repayment of principal accounts 

for a higher percentage of the monthly payment when interest rates are low. Thus, borrower ability to 

reduce mortgage payments through interest-only loans is greatest with low interest rates. 

Interest-only loans vary across countries,l5 In Denmark, the Netherlands and the U.K., the loan can be 

interest only to maturity (maximum 30 years).16 Switzerland has a unique instrument - the "infinite" 

mortgage, which does not have a maturity date and can be passed down through generations. The 

maximum LTV on an interest-only loan is 65 percent. This loan can be combined with an amortizing 

second loan of an additional IS percent. 

There are a number of different repayment options with interest-only ]oan5. According to Scanlon et. at 

[2008] in 2005, 20 percent ofU.K.loans and 44 percent of Dutch interest-only loans had no identified 

repayment vehicle, In these cases it is assumed that the borrower will refinance or payoff the mortgage 

through sale of the house, business or through an inheritance, More commonly there is a companion 

repayment vehicle. The dominant instrument in the UK. through the mid-1990s was the "endowment" 

mortgage. The borrower took out an interest-only mortgage to term and repaid with the proceeds of a 

life insurance policy on which she paid premiums throughout the life of the loan. Until 1984, endowment 

mortgages enjoyed a tax advantage through interest deductibility on the life insurance premiums.}7 In 

addition, mortgage interest was tax deductible until the late 1990s. Endowment mortgages remained 

popular until hit by scandals and charges of mis~semng in the late 19908. Many borrowers were lured 

into endowment mortgages by promises of high returns on invested premiums. When those high returns 

failed to materialize, borrowers reached the end of term with insufficient funds to repay the mortgage. 

Despite the problems with UK. endowment mortgages, interest-only loans with companion savings 

vehicles remain popular in the U.K., the Netherlands and Switzer1and. In the U.K., the individual 

savings account (ISA) mortgage is linked wlth an account inv~sted tax-free in equities. However, like 

the endowment mortgage, there is no guarantee that there will be sufficient funds to fully .repay the 

mortgage at term. Investment and pension-linked mortgages are significant in the Netherlands. According 

to the Netherlands Housing Survey (VROM 2009) approximately 3S percent of Dutch interest-only 

mortgages were Hnked to a savings or investment account. 

"Flexible" mortgages that aUow non-constant amortization are quite common outside the United States. 

Flexible mortgages allow borrowers to skip payments or take payment holidays. The flexible mortgage 

arose in Australia and the UK. in the 1990s as a measure to deal with payment fluctuations arising 

from short-term unemployment or variable income. In both countries it has become a common featurewhereby borrowers can underpaYI take payment holidays, overpay and borrow bftck without taking a 

second mortgage. The number of missed payments per year is restricted and unpaid interest is capitalized 

[nternatinnal comparison ofMoTQJagc product Offerings: 

',' !II""~l',h b,l',c,,¢ f,),' H(HJ.';ng ""';le;k~ ~e-\'teI11M- 20W. ·,U-righlS ,e~n'ed. 
141 


81763.084

into the loan balance.le: A survey of major lenders in the subject countries found flexible mortgage options 

available in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, as well as Australia and the u.K. 

Accordingto the Council of Mortgage Lenders in the u.K. most u.K. mortgages have a flexible option. 

A more recent and sophisticated variant of the flexible mortgage is the "offset" or <Icurrent account" 

mortgage (Australia, UK.), which allows the borrower to control mortgage borrowing through a current 

account. Salary is deposited into the current account, lowering the balance outstanding by the salary 

amount.. As debits come through on the current account, the balance rises. An attraction of this instrument 

is the interest savings that arise from paying down the debt, as interest is charged daily, An offset 

mortgage alJows the borrower to keep balances on mortgage, savings and current account in separate 

accounts but aU baJances are offset against each other, allowing the possibility of reducing'the interest 

paid and th€ mortgage being repaid early. Offset mortgage rates can be fixed or variable and there is a 

maximum LTY. 

Loans with pre~programmed negative amortization (e,g., graduated payment mortgages or pay-option 

ARMs) are not common outside the United States. Flexible mortgages have amaximum number of missed 

payments and LTV caps. Japanese loans have payments fixed for five years regardless of whether the 

interest rate changes. Unpaid interest is deferred and capitalized into the loan balance. At the end of 

five years the payment will change to amortize the balance over the remaining term. subject to a cap 

of12S percent of the current payment. 

Inte:rnationaJ COlnpariS£ln ofMorlgag(! Prodm:t Offll!rings 

·f' 'ilt~tJI\+ l."ti[ut~ im llm"in:;; '\",dt~Sept<'mber .WFl. ·\H ti\:ht~ r""",rycIL 

27 
142 


81763.085

Mortgage Default 

and Foreclosure 

Mortgage default rates are far lower outside the Unil'cd States (Figure 7) for bank loans. Of the countries 

in this survey only Spain and the U.K have seen a significant increase in mortgage default during the 

crisis. Despite greate-f house price volatility than the United States on average, the incidence of default 

and prevalence of negative equity in other nations remains far below that of the United States. 

Delinquencies on European securitized loans have increased during the crisis but remain well below those 

in the United States (Figure 8). Default rates on Australian securitized loans are less than 1.5 percent and 

in Canada less than 1 percent. These results reflect the factthatsubprime lendingwas rafe or non-existent 

outside of the United States. The only country with a significant subprime share was the UK. (a peak of 

eight percent of mortgages in 2006). Subprime accounted for five percent of mortgage..:.; in Canada, less than 

two percent in Australia and negligible proportions cJscv,'here. Subprime loans in Australia and Camlda 

were more similar to U.S. Alt-A (limited documentation) than true subprime loans. 

Figure 7 

Non~performing Housing Loans 

Source·Rp~crveBankcf Austraha2009 
143 


81763.086

30 

Figure B 

European Mortgage Arrears Rates, 30 or more days 

s()U~: Fitch Riltm9s 2010. 

The on]y compuruble performance experience to the United States is in U.K non-con forming mortgages. 

u..K.lenders provided loans to borrowers with both adverse credit and krw documentation. UK. nonconforming securitized loans have high delinquency rates (Figure 9) but their foreclosure rate i~ far 

Jess than in the u.s, \9 

In the Unit.ed States, mortgage product design has been linked to high rates of mortgage default .• 

though underwritingvariablE'.s appe~~rto be the dominant factor,30 To date, mortgage product design 

Figur,e 9 

Three Months or more in Arrears~ by Vintage 

3 Month-+- Arrears - by Vintage 

1(; 2f 2-D 31 31'. ..:Ii 46 51 5/, 61 (Xj. 71 76 8"1 36 91 

Months sif1ce lssue 

SDu{[trFitchRating52010. 
144 


81763.087

has not been implic.ated as a cause of mortgage default outside the United States. 21 In fact the usc of 

ARMs has been cited as a cause in lower than expected defaultratcs in Spain and the U.K. In the UK, 

borrowers have been helped by the high incidence of ARtvis linked to the U.K. base rate (equivalent 

to the Fed Funds rate in the United States), which have kept rates low [CML 2009b}. In Spain, the 

decline in rates and dorninance of variable-rate loans has reduced the proportion of income used to 

service a loan from 46 percent in 2006-2008 to 38.6 percent in 2009 [Hugh 2009]. Both sources note 

the vulnerability of borrowers to potential future rate increases and the systemic risk of an ARMdominated market. AustraHan interest fates have been higher than those in other countries and have 

impacted default rates (REA 2009]. The Reserve Bank of Australia notes: "Arrears rates are also likely 

to have been affected by movements in interest rates. The arrears rate on (securitised) variable-rate 

loans increased 35 basis points over the 12 months to December 2008, and h<ls since declined by 20 

basis points; this compares to an increase oflO has-is points for fixed-rate loan arrears over the same 

period, with no subsequent decline," 

An important fartor in lov,ler default rates in othercountdes is the foreclosure process and the possibility 

of deficiency judgments. The EeB [2009] reports that the duration of the foreclosure process in the 

Euro area has ::;ignificant variation ranging between two months in Finland to 132 months in Italy 

(Figure 10). The average time frame is close to two years. In the U.K. the average time is 8-12 months 

[EMF 2008J. The cost of the enforcement procedure also varies across countries, The average cost 

(not including the loss on the mortgage after sale of the property) in 2007 wa:> nine percent. In the 

U.K. the cost varied from 2.5 to 7 percent. 

The mortgage arrears and foredos-ure methods in Australia and Canada arc very efficient. Both 

countries have judicial foreclosure processes, which are procedural unless the horrower mounts a 

Figure 10 

Typical Duration of a Foreclosure Procedure 

Sou(c{':E(B. 

Int('t'MtiQnal Contpar-lson ofMot"tgage pt"(ldur:t Oif.:!rings 

, R~~c",d\ ln~tt(m(-' h)'"llN'H1>8 ''''''n'"~:w\'ter"1io~, ~,11f) ," ci,I""~',wd, 

31 
145 


81763.088

32 

defense. In both countries the lender or insurer can go after the borrower for a deficiency judgment. 

Per Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. (CMHC), the time frame between reporting of arrears 

(three months in Canada) to possession of collateral js seven to nine months. In Australia the process 

appears shorter (Hicksons 2010). Once a notice of default is filed there are 21 days to serve and 28 

days for the borrower to determine whether to mount a defense. If there is no defense. the court 

process for judgment takes two to four weeks with an additional two to four weeks to obtain a writ 

of possession. Eviction takes place seven to 30 days later. The typicaJ loss per default in Australia 

is 20 to 25 percent of the initial loan balance. In Canada~ CMHC claims appear to be somewhat 

lower -18 to 20 percent of initial balance.4Z 

An important difference between much of the United States and the subject countries is the possibility 

of recourse, or aUowing lenders to pursue deficiency judgments. Research in the United States has 

shown that recourse decreases the probability of default [Ghent and Kudylak 2009]. Research by 

Duygan-Bump and Grant [200S] find a similar result in Europe. MDrtgage loans in all the survey 

countries are recourse. The EMF study on the efficiency of mortgage collateral [EMF 2007] found 

that borrowers remain liable for deficiencies in Belgium, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, 

France, Ireland, Portugal and the U.K. The duration of debtor liability was without limit in Belgium, 

Germany, France and the Netherlands; 20 years in Greece; 15 years in Spain; and 12 years by law, six 

years in practice following voluntary industry agreement in the U.K. Loans are recourse in Australia, 

Canada, Japan and Korea as welL 

The Reserve Bank of Australia [2009] sums up the difference in delinquency experience between 

Australia and the United States as follows: 

Lending standards were not eased to the same extent as elsewhere. For example, riskier types 

of mortgages, such as non-conforming and negative amortisation loans, that became common 

in the United States, were not features of Australian banks' lending. 

The level of interest rates in Australia did not reach the very low levels that had made it 

temporarily possible for many borrowers with limited repayment ability to obtain loans, as in 

some other countries. 

AU Australian mortgages are "fun recourse" following a court reposse5.'5ion action, and 

households generally understand that they cannot just hand the keys to the lender to 

extinguish the debt. 

The legal environment in Australia places a stronger obligation on lenders to make responsible 

lending decisions than is the case in the United States. 

The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority CAPRA) has been relatively proactive in its 

approach to prudential supervision, conducting several stress tests of ADTs' housing loan 

portfolios and strengthening the capital requirements for higher-risk housing loans. 

Internllncrnal Comp:arisonofMortgage.l>roduet Offerings 

',,: R~w~rch !m:litute f<:>r llou$ing: J\mcrk~ S,,!,!~mb~r 2mo All dgh,' 1-.;,<..!.'"rl-'i,L 
146 


81763.089

What Determines Mortgage 

Instrument Design? 

The set of mortgage instruments offered in a country reflect demand and supply considerations as well 

as the legal and regulatory environment Borrower mortgage choice literature is based on a framework 

wherein a risk~adverse borrower decides which type of debt to hold against the collateral of her house 

based on the trade-off she makes between current and future consumption, given uncertainty about 

future income, interest rates and house prices [Campbell and Cocco, 2002; Miles 2004]. Miles develops 

asimple numerical model to simulate borrower choice under different assumptions about the trend and 

volatility of interest rates and house prices. He finds that borrowers wilJ prefer long-term fixed-rate 

mortgages when there is a significant positive correlation between inflation shocks and real interest rates 

and the borrower has a relatively high debt-to-income ratio. When the income risks are less extreme and 

inflation and real interest rates are not positively correlated, mortgages with a series ofshortfixed-rate 

periods are more favorable contracts. He also finds that households that are older, more indebted or with 

higher degree of unemployment certainty are more likely to prefer longer-term fixed-rate mortgages. 

Although his results apply only to the comparison between mortgages with rates fixed for two years 

versus those with rates fixed for the life of the contract, he infers that similar results would be obtained 

if comparing a variable-rate loan with a long-term fixed-rate loan. 

Svenstrup [2002] analyzes the choice between capped ARMs (short-term fixed-rate loans) and the FRM 

in Denmark. ARMs are popular because of their low start rate, but he suggests that it is dangerous to 

qualify borrowers for a 3D-year obligation based on the first-year payment, as is standard in short-term 

variable-rate mortgages. Conversely a long-term FRM has asubstantial inflation risk premium built into 

the rate, reducing initial affordability. Furthermore, the FRM requires payment of transactions costs 

and a pre-payment risk premium by the borrower to manage interest rate risk. With the shorter term 

(one- to five-year) fixed rate and an out-of"the~money interest rate cap, the borrower can get interest 

rate risk protection at a modest cost. Svenstrup also finds that the delivery option (ability to buy back 

the bonds at a discount and cancel the mortgage) in the Danish model is an efficient means to ensure 

a tighter match between assets and liabilities in a household portfolio and can increase the mobility of 

the labor force as a whole. 

International Comparison of Mortgage PI'oduct Offedngs 

i Ih'~~rd, In,t:tm~ r", ll()u"ng '!.medea S~l'tem~e' 2(l]() 

35 
147 


81763.090

36 

lfthe theoretical literature suggests that borrowers are better off with fixed~rate mortgages why do 

we see so many countries with ARMs as the dominant instrument and so few with long~term fixedrate mortgages? 

l\files puints to several reasons for the dominance of ARMs in the UK. These include relatively low 

debt-to~income ratios (at the time in 2003) for U.K borrowers, belief by borrmvcrs in their ability to 

manage interest rate and payment change and. most importantly, the greater attention borrowers pay 

to the initial mortgage payment than to any other factor in mortgage choice. The UK. also was in the 

mitist of an extended period of interest rate stability (since the early 1990s). 

The dominance of ARMs in many countries has supply-side explanations as well Banks (commercial, 

savings, cooperative) in most countries dominate mortgage iending. These institutions rely significantly 

on deposit funding (Figure 11). ARMs are a natural product for banks that hold loans on balance sheet 

funded with deposits, as they minimize interest rate risk Of the ARM countries in this survey, only Spain 

relies on the capital markets for a majority of funding (over 70 percent of funding comes from covered 

bonds and securitization). The high usc of tbe capital markets reflects the rapid growth in mortgage 

lending in Spain in the 2000 decade and the acceptance of AAA-rated security tranches and covered 

bonds as repo collateral at the ECn. 

Funding availability and characteristics are also major factors in the dominance of short- to mediumterm fixed-rate mortgages in many countries. In developed markets, such instruments are easy for 

banks to fund on balance sheet. The bank can swap its short-term deposits for medium maturity 

Figure 11 

Developed Country Mortgage Funding 

Source: ASS. CMHC, EMF, ESF, FRB, Merrill Lynch Europe, AU. CA, U.S. 2008, Japan 2006. 
148 


81763.091

fixed-rate liabilitie;.;. Or it can use corporate or covered bond markets to issue medium-term fixedrate debt (see Figure 12 on maturities of covered bond debt, which shows a significant proportion of 

issuance in three- to five··year maturity until early 2010 when issuers took advantage of low rates to 

extend maturities). This funding approach has implications for mortgage design as well. Outside the 

United States almost all corporate debt is non-callable. Thus, a lender using covered bond or noncallable corporate debt v .. riH incorporate a pre-payment penalty in order to maintain a relative match 

with its funding. The importance of pre-payment penalties has increased with the strengthening of 

asset-liability matching requirements in European cOYered bond legislation. Nearly aU such legislation 

requires strict matching with requirements t(l match balances, coupons and cash flows between the 

cover pool and honds. :!.lIn addition to matching-requirements, covered bond legislation also restricts 

I,TV ratios and lonll purpose for cover pool assets. 

l'vIortgage pricing has a major impact on the dominant instruments offered in various countries. 

Miles points to the relative expt:'l1se oflong-term finance a:;: a significant factor in the U,K preference 

for ARMs. He notes that the practice of offering initial period discounts on variable-rate mortgages 

offered to new borrowers. suhsidized by tbe (above market) rates paid by existing borrowers (the back 

book) for whom the discounts had expired, also contributes to the dominance of ARMs. Specifically: 

The two-year discounted deals are Hkely to be very attractive to borrowers focusing on the scale 

of their initial repayments 011 mortgages. The two~ye.ar discounted d-cals are probably only feasible 

because a substantial gap pxists behveen such rates and the Standard Variable Rate - a gap of over 

180 basis points for many lenders. The substantial number of borrowers paying Standard Variable 

Rates - a groupth:.1tmaycul'remly constitute more than a third of ali borrowers and a little over 20 

Figure 12 

Taking the Opportunity to Move Up Along the Curve 

100% 

80% 

40% 

SouTcc:Bal"lk of America Mernll 1 ynch [2010] 

2010111 

eli-year 

37 
149 


81763.092

38 

per cent of all mortgage 10a11s outstanding - allows pricing oftlus sort to be feasible ... This apparent 

cross-suhsidisation, which in itself is undesirable, has as a side effect that longer-term fixed-rate 

mortgages with flat repayment schedules - where sustainable margins over the marginal cost of 

funds are unlikeJy to be under 50 basis - appear expensive. Miles (p. 47.) 

Despite Mi1es' view of the unsustainability of such pricing, it remains a major factor in U.K. mortgage 

pdcingto this day. The prevalence ofinitiai period discounts on reviewable-rate mortgages in Australia 

also likely explains the dominance of this instrument there. 

The pricing and availability Df capital market funding is a significant factor in the dominance of FRMs 

in Denmark and the U.S. The deep and liquid Danish mortgage hond market provides efficient pricing 

and risk allocation for Danish lenders, allowing them to offer FRMs. The Danish POB has created a 

system where banks do not offer mortgages funded by deposits for competitive reasons. In the POB the 

mortgage rate is the same as the security coupon. The mortgage lender adds a small margin (50 basis 

points) to cover its administrative costs~ credit risk and profit. Thus, even for short-term fixed-rate or 

indexed variable-rate mortgages the bond~funded loan is cheaper than that offered by a commercial 

bank with deposit funding. 

Recent research in the United States points to the support ofFRMs by the GSEs as a significant fuctor in 

the predominance of the FRM. H Vickery [2007] analyzes the FRM / ARM market share as a function of 

the relative price of the instruments, controlling for the term structure of interest rates and other timeseries factors. He finds that a 20 basis-point increas.e in the retail FRM interest rate is estimated to cause a 

17percenta.ge-point decline in the FRM marker share. He compares the UK. and US. markets in terms of 

mortgage product. His estimates imply that if US. mortgages were priced by lenders at the same margins to 

the risk-free rate as in the UK, the average US. FRM share in the non-jumbo market would decline from 

76 percent to only 37 percent. In his view, differences in secondary market Hquidity are the most plausible 

explanation for these pricing differences. Although the GSEs purchase ARMs and have issued ARM 

securities) their pricing has not been attractive to depository institutions and the securities are not liquid. 

Krainer [20l!)) finds more recently that the Federal Reserve policy of buying agency MBS has lowered 

FRM rates and the FRM-ARM spread and contributed to thedediningshare of ARMs. Krainer's resear{'h 

finds that the FRM-ARM spread is the most important explanatory variable in an estimation of the 

ARM share. This spread is typically high1yrelated to the Treasury term spread (10 year to one year).lS 

This latter relationship broke down in 2009 due to heavy Federal Reserve purchasingofFRM-backed 

securities. The FRM-ARM spread declined to near zero in early 2009 and has remained depressed (50 

basis points or less) ever since. The dedine in spread reflects a widening ARM to one~year Treasury 

spread and a narrowing FRM to lO-year Treasury spread. 

Pre-crisis mortgage spreads in Europe appear lower than those in the United States Figure 13 shows 

spreads on variable and fixed-rate mortgages relative to an index or benchmark rate. Spreads declined 

in most countries between 2003 and 2007. Fixed-rate spreads are lower in Europe than in the United 

Inter-national Comparison ofMol'tgage Product Offerings 

( R\'5~Jr,h fllS!itu!e Ii.,.. H{)u~l",;Amen,~ St'!"temwr 2(llQ. All ri.;:nts n',~\ \-"".1 
150 


81763.093

Figure 13 

Spread of the Lending Rate for a Typical Housing Loan 

over the Opportunity Cost or Interest Indexation Rate 

,<';01lr[I;,\' feB and NeBs 

States due to the widespread use of pre"payment penalties. Thus the value of the- pre-payment option 

is not reflected in mortgage rates. 

As shown in TableA-l, U.S. ARM margins are higher than those jn most other countries. European indexed 

ARM mn.rgins are typically in tbe one-tv/{) percentage point range. u.s. ARJ\,1 margins have been constant 

at 275 basis points since 1990 [Freddie Mac 2010].1<> Spreads between reviewabie ARMs and lender cost 

of funds in Australia and the UK were in the lOO-L'iO basis point range pre-crisis. Recently u.K. tracker 

margins have risen r0300 basis points reflecting the hismricaHy low level of the hase rate (50 basis points). 

The UK Council of Mortgage Lenders [2009] analyzed margins in the summer of 2009. They note 

several reasons for the widening of margins. For example, lenders are under greater pressure from the 

Financial Services Authority (FSA) to have a better match between the duration of their sources; of 

funding and their mortgage assets. As more borrowers have taken short-term fixed-rare joans, lenders 

have had to respond to the regu latory requj fement by raising more medium-term fund ing - at greater 

expense (relative to deposits). 

Rising rates of arrears have added to the costs of mortgage lending. putting pressure on margins, The 

impact of the Basel 2 regime aJso means that the cost of capita} is greater for loans with bigher LTVs. 
151 


81763.094

Thus there has been both n tighteningoflendingcriteria and. higher hornnvingcosts. Investors providing 

equity for lenders now expect higher returns, which is exerting upward pres;:;ure on mQrtgage prking. 

A similar pricing -change has developed in Australia [2010]. The Reserve Bank of Au;:;tralia reports that 

mortgage rates have risen by 110 basis points relative to the cash rate. However margins in Australia 

have been squeezed ns funding costs have risen by 130 to 140 basis points. Part ofthe margin squeeze has 

been funded by cross-subsidization from the back book. similar to that in the u.K. Australian mortgage 

rates were declining through mostof2009 and borro\;vers shifted from short-term fixed to variahlE'-fate 

loans [Figure 14. Ge-nworth 2009]. Fixed-rate loans declined from 28 percent to 13 percent and mixed 

(part fixed, part variable) loans declined from 10 percent to one percent. 

l=lgure 14 

What Type of Interest Rate Did You Choose Originally? 

What type of interest rats did you choose originalfy? 

Source: Gef1 .... "O~h 2009. 
152 


81763.095

The Role of Regulation 

Both consumer protection and financial safety and soundness regulation can have an impact on 

mortgage design. The virtual absence of pre-payment penalties on FRMs in the United States is an 

example of such an impact. The borrower preference for FRMs in the United States also has its origins 

in the preclusion of ARMs for most lenders prior to 1981. 

The treatment of pre-payment penalties has been a contentious issue and a major influence on European 

mortgage design. The European Commission (EC) has been pushing for a market-wide Mortgage 

Directive for more than 15 years to harmonize mortgage product offerings and encourage more 

cross-border lending [Dlibel et, a11997]' One of the Commission's key objectives is to establish a right 

of early repayment for borrowers, with limits on pre-payment penalties. 27 To date such limits have 

been passed in several countries, notably France, Italy and Spain.2s French law caps the pre-payment 

penalty at [the greater of] six months' interest or 3 percent of the outstanding balance. The penalty 

cap does not appear to have deterred French lenders from offering long-term FRMs.29 Legislation 

in Spain has had a more significant effect on product offerings. Prior to Spain's adoption of the 

Euro, lenders offered long-term fixed-rate loans with refinance penalties and restrictions. In order to 

allow borrowers to henefit from falling interest rates prior to and after introduction of the Euro, the 

government allowed borrowers the right to refinance existing mortgages and capped the pre-payment 

penalties [specific reference]' More recently there has been concern about the high proportion of 

Spanish mortgages that are variable rate (in terms of the ability of borrowers to manage interest rate 

risk). The government has raised the cap on fixed-rate pre-payment penalties - first to 2.5 percent 

and now to yield maintenance - in an effort to stimulate the offering of such loans. Italy (as of2007) 

and Latvia are the only countries in Europe that ban pre-payment penalties on mortgages. 

A European Commission Staff White Paper [2007] has suggested the need to restrict certain product 

offerings. They recommended allowing early repayment in certain circumstances (mobility, hardship) 

and capping the penalty. Commission staff also recommended standardization of borrower qualification, 

requiring suitability standards or tests of borrower ability to repay. 

International Comparison of Mortgage Proouct Olfedngs 

, R"'e"",h Jl1Qi:,;re [Of 1-1"'''''':5 Am", ,e .. $q,!<'mbco lOW ,\tt right, lO"~ll·~d 

41 
153 


81763.096

European legislation and regulation also impacts adjustable-rate mortgage design. Several countries 

(Denmark, France, Spain, Switzerland) require ARMs to be indexed. Other countries (particularly 

those with reviewable-rate mortgages) have no such requirements. 

European consumer protection legislation has been b1amed for a lack of product competition in the 

EU {Dlibe12DDS]' For example, France rejects the German yield maintenance pre-payment indemnity 

protecting fixed-rate lenders against reinvestment loss upon pre-payment, Spain rejects British practices 

of reviewable-rate mortgages (standard variable rate) and Germany rejects indexed contracts dominant 

in the Spanish market. Dlibel states: 

National legal-regulatory regimes tend to be biased "in favour" oflenders providing national 

core products, which draw the greatest lobbyist pressure. Consider again the cases of Spain 

and Germany when dealing with early repayment, which is a focus of the Commission's White 

Paper. 

In Spain. adjustable~rate mortgages may fetch a 1 percent early repayment fee to stem the loss 

of servicing profit. Fees on adjustable-rate loans are strictly prohibited by German lawt a legal 

relic oftwo periods of hyperinflation in the 20th century. 

Tn striking contrast, under German law, a ConSumer willing to prepay a fixed-rate mortgage has 

to pay a yield maintenance indemnity that not only compensates the lender for reinvestment 

loss but also includes a considerable element of lost servicing profit. In Spain, until a very 

recent reform, pre-payment fees for fixed-rate loans were capped at 2.5 percent, which did not 

even cover reinvestment loss. 

As a result of the crisis,lenders are tighteningguideIines in many countries.30 Scanlon et. al. conducted 

a survey in early 2009 to assess the types of mortgage tightening taking place. As shown in Table S, 

mortgage product availability was lessened in a number of the countries surveyed. The maximum 

mortgage term was reduced in four countries (also Canada) and the availability of interest-only 

mortgages was reduced or constrained in five countries (including the United States). 

New or forthcoming consumer protection legislation may have a significant impact on mortgage 

product design in the future. Canada made several regulatory changes in response to the crisis in late 

2007 including reductions in the maximum amortization period (from 40 to 35 years), an increase 

in the minimum downpayment (with mortgage insurance) from zero to 5 percent. 1\.1ore recently 

(February 2010) the Ministry of Finance lowered the maximum LTV on refinance loans to 90 percent 

and on insured non-O\vner occupied loans to 20 percent [CMHC Observer 2010]. More significantly 

they now require borrowers taking out mortgages with variable rates or fixed-rate terms less than 

five years to be qualified at the average major lender-posted five-year rate. This change is likely to 

reduce demand for variable-rate mortgages reflecting both the use of a longer-term interest rate and 

the posted rate for qualification. 

InteTnanonnl COlnpllrisoll (JfMortgug(> Produc:t: Offerings 

.<,. !I~,e~l'~h ln~!i!m,"f,): J1"1J~lI:g "r.t~) i('J Sept<'mt-er 1(110 .. \\1 ri;hls !·e~~,·,'e't 
154 


81763.097

Table 5 

Change in Mortgage Product Characteristics, Late 2007-Late 2008 

lowerloan-toCountry Value Ratios 

Australia 

DenmQ.rk 

France 

Iceland 

Ireland 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Poland 

RussIa 

SDain 

Sweden 

U.K. 

U.S. 

Source: Scanlon et. aL 2009. 

loan-to100% Mortgages In(olllE' Criteria 

Less Avaiiable Tightened 

Maximum 

Mortgage Term 

S"ortened 

Reductlonlnlflterest 

Onlyl.oan 

Availability 

..................................................... Lower Maximum LIV 

IntroductiontlfNew 

loanTyPC!staOaal 

with the Crisis 

The FSA in the U.K. has gone the furthest in Europe in contemplating tightened mortgage regulation. 

Their Mortg-age Market Review of October 20091ays out a nu mber of proposals under consideration. In 

the area of product regulation, however, the FSA notes that LTV or debt-to-income (DTI) caps are not 

yet warranted by the evidence. They recommend restrictions on risk layering (prohibiting loans that 

are a mix of high-risk factors, for example, prohibiting high LTV 10ans to credit-impaired borrowers 

who have an unstable income or other similar ~Itoxic" mixes) and requiring income verification on 

all mortgages. Requirements to fully document borrower income will result in the disappearance of 

"self-certification" mortgages. Affordability must be based on a repayment mortgage. rather than an 

interest-only one, while it must take account of future interest rate rises and be based on a 25-year 

mortgage term, even if the loan is being taken out over a longer period [CML 2010). 

The FSA has promulgated suitability standards for mortgage lenders. Specifically, a product will be 

suitable if there are reasonable grounds to condude that: 

The client can afford it over the repayment term. 

It is appropriate to the client's needs and circumstances. 

It is the most suitable of those available within the scope of service provided to the client. 

The lender cannot recommend the "]east worst" product if it does not have access to a product 

that is appropriate to the client's needs and circumstances. 

International COlDparison of Mortgage Product Offerings 

',' lH'M~.llch In,.titurc-filrl1ma'!lg .\l1liHic~Scp!ell1N!t 2NU. AU ri1;h~" ,'e~'?I'\·ed 

43 
155 


81763.098

44 

Australia also has suitability standards. The new National Consumer Bill requires licensees to assess 

each consumer's capacity to repay credit to ensure that the credit contract is not unsuitable for the 

consumer's objectives, needs and financial circumstances [ASIC 2010). 

The EC [2009] is looking at additional mortgage regulation in response to the crisiS.'H,32 The Ee has 

suggested restricting the use of teaser rates to "induce" borrowers to move to "higher repayment 

levels or different foreign currency exposures." 

International Courpal'isou o(Mortgage Product Offerings 

.{ l~e""3F~h I~H'tu!"hF 11<l1IHil.!( 'm",6c'l ""I't<'(!lbnlOlO 
156 


81763.099

Conclusions 

This comparison of mortgage product offerings in developed countries has revealed significant differences 

in the dominant product offerings across countries. Countries differ in terms of the market share of 

adjustable versus fixed-rate mortgages, the use of pre-payment penalties, maximum term and the 

offering of features such as interest-only payments and assumability. Our findings suggest that the 

United States is internationally unusual in several respects: 

The United States has an unusually high proportion oflong-term fixed-rate mortgages as well 

as an usually high use of securitization in the financing ofhollsing. The dominance of the FRM 

and securitization is driven in part by the presence of government-backed secondary mortgage 

market institutions that lower the relative price of this type of mortgage. 

The United States is unusual in the banning or restriction of pre-payment penalties on fixedrate mortgages. Most countries in the survey allow such penalties to compensate lenders for 

loss associated with the financing of mortgages. As a result, mortgage rates do not include 

a significant pre-payment option premium and other financing techniques, such as covered 

bonds, are more common. 

The only other country that utilizes the FRM is Denmark. The Danish system offers a superior 

alternative in the form ofthe POB that equates individual mortgages and bonds. This system 

allows borrowers to prepay their loans when rates fan, as in the United States, and allows 

them to buy back their bond when rates rise. This feature allows the borrower to benefit from 

interest rate increases and decreases and facilitates de-leveraging when rates rise, reducing the 

incidence of negative equity. Features that are restricted in the Dodd-Frank Bm such as longer 

terms, interest-only periods and flexible payment designs are quite common in other countries 

and do not appear to have been associated with higher rates of default. 

Mortgage default rates have been far lower in other countries than in the United States, despite 

the fact that several countries had greater house price volatility. The lack of subprime lending 

Intf:'rnational ComparisOil ofMortJ!;aJ!;e PnuJlIct Offerings 

, !~e,"'r"h h'~;n!te f,,,· llr''''ing "r.l&'·'C~ ~el'W"'N'~ lOW Al~ m;nt< to'O' \'td 

4S 
157 


81763.100

46 

(outside ofthe U.K.) and less use of limited or no documentation lending were major factors. 

Mortgage products did not playa role in mortgage default - in fact the dominance of ARMs in 

several countries was noted as a reason for ]ower default rates. 

Mortgage foreclosure and repossession regimes are varied, with some more efficient and some 

less efficient than those in the United States. However all other countries in the survey have 

recourse mortgages, and lenders routinely pursue deficiencies. Research in Europe and the 

United States has found that recourse reduces the incidence of default. 

Consumer protection regulation has advanced in a number of countries. The focus has been 

on borrower qualification and suitability standards, and for the filost part has not constrained 

mortgage product design. 

What are the likely effects of Dodd-Frank on mortgage product design? Prior to the crisis the United 

States had one of the richest Sets of product offerings among the subject countries, offering a wide 

variety of ARMs, amortization choices and terms, along with long-term fixed-rate mortgages. As a 

result of the crisis the market has seen a decided shift to FRMs. driven in large part by historically 

low FRM rates. Rates are low in part because of low long-term Treasury rates, but their levels also 

reflect the impact of government policy in which almost all financing is from government-backed 

institutions, bolstered by unprecedented purchases of mortgage securities by the Federal Reserve. 

Dodd-Frank is likely to perpetuate this trend. The market is likely to gravitate towards vanilla, 

qualified mortgages. Limiting or banning pre-payment penalties constrains the ability of lenders to 

match fund medium-term fixed-rate mortgages like the Canadian rollover. This provision will reduce 

the effectiveness of covered bonds as a financing technique for lenders. Qualifying ARM borrowers 

at a fully amortizing payment at the highest possible rate over a five-year period is likely to reduce 

ARM qualification and volume. 

Is this state of the world sustainab1e or desirable? International experience suggests that comparable 

rates of homeowners hip and mortgage indebtedness can be achieved with different products and funding 

structures. While it is widely believed that the FRM is an ideal consumer mortgage instrument, its 

use does have significant drawbacks. In effect, the cost of the pre-payment option is socialized, with 

everyone paying a premium in the mortgage rate for the option. This contrasts with the European 

view that only borrowers who exercise the option for financial advantage should pay the cost (loss 

to the lender). As a result, European fixed-rate mortgages have lower spreads-to-benchmark rates. 

If the FRM is the instrument of choice, then the Danish option should be explored, as it provides 

benefits to borrowers throughout the interest rate cycle and reduces systemic risk that accompanies 

an interest rate increase. 

RefinandngofFRMs creates significant volatility in the mortgage market as evidenced by the dramatic 

expansion and subsequent contraction in origination volume accompallyingthe 2003 refinance boom. 

International COlnparison of Mortgage Product Olfering-B-

(. g"'~lrd:, ln~tlnlle for llnu.<lng ·\I:''''n~a S~f't~injwr uno .~ll risht~ '-"~~n'ed. 
158 


81763.101

Such volatility has implications for operational costs and profitability of lenders (e.g., in hedging 

mortgage servicing rights). The pre-payment option has spawned an industry oftraders in mortgagebacked securities (MBS). The turnover of MBS has little to do with the availability of housing or 

mortgage finance, but rather reflects speculation regarding the risky and uncertain embedded prepayment option. 

Transferring interest rate risk to borrowers through ARMs may not be good policy either. Excessive 

dependence on ARMs as in Australia, Spain and the u.K. runs the risk of significant credit deterioration 

when interest rates rise and may constrain monetary policy. Use of roHing short-term fixed-rate 

instruments, as in Canada and several countries in Europe, offers a trade off. Borrowers can adjust 

the fixed-rate term according to the level and expected direction of interest rates - shortening the 

term when rates :lre high and expected to fall. and lengthening when rates are low and expected to 

rise - allowing them to manage interest rate risk. 

Legislative and regulatory restrictions on features like interest-only payments. low start rates and 

negative amortization will reduce credit availabiHty for many households who need lower payments 

in the earlier years to afford a mortgage. The lack of such mortgages means there is less ability to 

offset the tilt effect of the FRM in which the real burden of the mortgage is higher in the earlyyears.:U 

Putting product restrictions and prohibitions into law win make it much more difficult to be flexible 

in underwriting borrowers in the future. 

IVlortgage products outside the United States do not appear to have had a role in the financial crisis. 

However, evidence suggests that it was the lack of underwriting and the mis-match between borrower 

ability to pay and loan characteristics that led to the mortgage meltdown, not the loan features in and 

of themselves. The predominance of ARMs in other countries may, in fact have reduced mortgage 

def.1Ult rates. However, borrowers in these countries have significant vulnerability to rate increases 

that may cause problems in the years to come. 

Finally, lower default rates in countries outside the United States, even in the presence ofmorevoIatile 

housing markets, may reflect stricter enforcement of lender rights. An countries in the survey have 

recourse lending, and anecdotal questioning by the author suggests it is enforced. Lenders with a 

greater certainty of recovering loan proceeds are more likely to extend credit and loan rates are likely 

to have lower credit risk premiums. 

Inte:rnationaJ C01\tparison ofMfJrtgagc Product Offe-rings 

c l1<;'-e~".h I:>>li!ut<' fur ll<ll,l.,!ng ,\r;Je:lca Scl'l€m,~r 2.01\1. 'Ill ri~hlS ;e$tn'~.'l 

47 
159 


81763.102

Appendix: 

Details of Variable-Rate 

Mortgages 

Adjustable-Rate Loan Characteristics: In most countries the dominant ARM is an indexed instrument 

(Table A-l). The index is typically a money market rate (LlnOR, eIBOR, EURIBOR). Canada and 

Japan use the prime rate and Korea uses either a CD or cost of funds index. The adjustment period 

is one year or less. Initial rate discounts are common but modest - typically no more than 1 percent. 

Table A-l 

Variable~Rate Loan Characteristics 

u.s. 

Korea 

Switzerland Optional caps separate 

frommortgilge 

Indexed; prime rate Payment CilP associated 

w~nflexterm 

6 months Flex term; 

conversion; 

mixed 

International COlnparison of Mortgage Pruduc:t Offerings 

, H~,e~r<'j, Jr"lmtte i",- )lm,,,ng O\.r:,",",eo S~rt(""h<.' 2[l)() ·~Il n;;-nt< re'er-eLl 

49 
160 


81763.103

End Notes 

t The final "HOEPA Rule." amending Truth in Lending Rules, Regulation Z was adopted by the Federal 

Reserve on July 14, 2008. HOEPA rules restrict product characteristics and underwriting on high-cost loans. 

2, See for example Bostic et aL, [2009] 

3. We will not address the legal aspects of the mortgage in this study. Rather Ollr focus is on the financial 

characteristics. 

4, Rates on reviewable mortgages are typically adjusted after a chimge in the central bank targ(>t rate (base 

rate in U.K., cash rate in Australia) 

5. See Table A-l in Appendix 2 for details on indices. 

6. Longer fixed rate periods are available in some countries (up to 10 years in Canada and the Netherlands 

and 15 years in Germany). Infinite life mortgages are common in Switzerland and are discussed below. 

7. These loans are referred to as adjustable-rate loans in Denmark. They differ from variable-rate loans which 

are indexed to the Copenhagen interbank lending rate. Realkreditradet [2010]. 

S. Mortgage contracts can contain a several options including aS$umability (the right of a new borrower 

to assume an existing mortgage on the same property) and portablHty (the right of a borrower to keep his 

mortgage when moving and have it secured by a new property). Mortgages in most European countries and 

Canada afe assumable subject to lender review. Countries that allow assumabillty also restrict or penalize 

early repayment. Allowing assumption (subject to qualification) enables the lender to maintain an asset 

liability match that is required for covered bond financing. Only Ireland and the U.K. do not allow assumption 

and the Netherlands restricts it. Although portable mortgages exist in several cQuntries (Australia, Canada, 

Germany, U.K.) there appears to be no data on their volume of use. 

9. Typically the borrower takes out a new mortgage for the lower balance - pocketing the gain. For a more 

detailed description of the buyback optlon see Svenstrup and WiHeman [2006). 

10. Bullet bonds pay period interest with the princip<;I! repaid at maturity. 

11. A number of European countries have theoretical usury limits but they are set much higher than recent 

historica! mortgage rates. See [EMF 2007]. 

12. U.S. origination costs are higher than in many other countries. An EMF survey found average mortgage 

origination costs of 1.1 percent in Europe (EMF 2010J. U.s. loan origination fees are higher in part because 

they are a function of the !o<1n amount. In many other countries. including Canada, origination charges are 

a flat typically low fee. Also most other countries do not have title insurance and the cost of title search is 

less than in the U.S. Some countnes, including Denmark and Spain, have taxes on mortgage registration that 

raise their total costs to 2-2.5 percent. 

International Comparison ofM.ortgage Pradnct offerings 

"C, R~,~or.:h ]",tit1.>tef", 11(l~"n.~A=n"aSr~':"mher:WW )ilr',;h!,,~>cn'eJ 

51 
161 


81763.104

52 

13. Scanlon et. al [2009] report that the use of interest~only mortgages has f.allen in several countries, 

including Ireland and the Netherlands, as both borrowers and lenders gravitate to less risky mortgages. 

2005-200-6 data fmm Scanlon et. al. 2009-2010 data from Scanlon 2009, Reserve Bank of Australia, 

Council of Mortgage Lenders, Korea Housing Finance Agency. 

14. Korea interest IS deductible if mortgage term is 10 years or more subject to maximum Income limit. 

15. In Germany, the lender can immediately cancel the loan jf the borrower goes into negative equity, even if 

the borrower's payments are up to date, although the facility is Htt!e used in practice. 

16. Interest-only mortgages in the Netherlands have a maximum 75 perc.ent LTV. Amortizing mortgages 

car) be as high as 100 perr;:ent LTV where value is defined as "foreclosure value," the likely proceeds from a 

foreclosure sale. 

17. Another quirk that favored endowments over repayment mortgages was the fact that U,K. lenders 

charged interest on ;;In annual basis. Thus the borrower with an amortizing loan did not get benefit of the 

principal reduction during the year, ralsing the effective interest rate. Life insurance premiums could be 

invested during the year, effectively lowering the amount af premiums necessary to repay the loan relative to 

the interest-only repayment loan. This practice was phased alit in the 19905. 

lB. For example on the Nationwide Building Society website a payment holiday of between three and twelve 

months can be taken if the mortgage for more than one year old and is less than 80% of the value of the 

home at the end of the payment holiday, The borrow back feature allows a drawdown of past overpayments 

subject to the LTV constraint 

19. The U.K. Homeowners Mortgage Support Program assists with mortgage payments for unemployed 

borrowers for up to two years, which may contribute to fower foreclosures. As in the U.S., lenders have been 

slow in repossessing hO/,Jses in part because house prices began rising at the end of 2009. 

20. Subprlme ARMS, balloons and interest-only mortgages have significantly higher default rates than prime 

fixed rates (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 200B]. However when controlling for other factors such 

as LTV, FICO score and geographic area, mortgage product variables appear less important. Demyanyk: and 

Van Hemert [2008) find that ARM and hybrid loan variables were insignificant in explaining the probability 

of default. Loan margin and a pr.e~payment penalty were significant but had small effect. 

21. There tends to less product variety in most countries as compared to the U.S. Thus there are no statistics 

relating product c.haracteristics to default. Rather the focus is on underwriting variables such as LTV, (3dverse 

credit and low documentation. 

22. Australian estimate from Genworth July 2010, Canadian estimate from CMHC and based on average loan 

size fram Canequity.com, 

23. Cov~red bonds are corporate obligations of the fender. Investors have priority rights to the pool of 

mortgages ("the cover" pledged to the bondholders). For de>tai! on covered bond requirements see ECSC 

[2009). 

24. Among the subject countries only Canada and Japan have government-supported secondary marKet 

institutions. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and Japan Housing Finance Agency playa 

similar role to Ginnie Mae in the U.S. See Lea [2010J for a more in-depth diScussion. 

25, KOlien et. at [2009] find that the long-term bond risk premium is a more powerful determinant of 

mortgage choice than the simple spread. 

26, Effective margins are less due to the widespread use af initial period discounts or "teaser rates." 

27. Most recently in the European Commission White Paper [2008]. The European Mortgage Federation 

response [2008) recommends keeping the right of early repayment as a contractual option. They note 

"As a general rule, individual consumers should bear the consequences of the choit;e they make, Le. 

borrowers not choosing an option to repay early should not pay for the CQsts of this option on an individual 

basis. The EMF considers that.il crQss~subsidisation/mutua1isation modei, under which all customers 

International Compari:;ou of Mortgage Product Offerings 

,. j<~~~J;ch 1",1i,llt"fM J l(ju,mg '\.rncn,'n Sepem!.>,.· JOW .. \!I r'~htPl"6~rved 
162 


81763.105

would have to foot the bill for the pre~payment option whether they opt for it or not, is not a proportlonat~ 

solution." 

28, For a survey of European national !egislation regarding early repayment see EMF [2007J 

29. French banks have a large pool of fong~term funds dedicated to real estate through the I'~pargne 

Logement system of contract savings, This source of funds effects the pricjng of mortgages (interest is tax 

exempt and thus lower than market rates on a pre-tax basis) as weI! as the ability to match fund longeHerm 

FRMs. See Diamond and Lea (1992]. 

30. Scan fan et,.al. (2009). Japan went the opposite direction by loosening underwriting in the crisis. The 

loan-to-cost ratio was allowed to increase to 100 percent from 90 percent Standard and Poars (2010). 

31. The EC is looking into suitability standards for EC fenders [EC 2009). They note: The requirement to 

assess the suitability of mortgage products to the personal circumstances of the consumer is set out in the 

national law of Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland. Malta and the Netherland5.. In the U.K. the requirement to 

assess the sult.ability of the product for the borrower is only relevant where advice is given. 

32. DG MARKT (EC financial markets committee) is conducting a research study on Interest rate restrictions 

in "consumer credit" - understood to include mortgage credit - in the EU. The study aims to identify 

the different types of interest rate restrictions, e.g. rate ceilings/ caps. limits on interest rate variability, 

restrictions on the use of compound interest rates etc, and identify the Member States applying these 

and their reasons for doing 50. The study also analyzes the economic. financial and social impacts of such 

restrictions on various stakeholders. 

33. The tilt effect is created when markets incorporate inflationary expectations into nominal interest rates. 

increasing their level reducing affordability. 

httt'rnatioltu} Comparison llfMnr~oagc Prodnct Offcrinp 

, j(~'~l"h )"";1("" f,'r l !"U~\Jlg An\>I:"iC~ ""1''''ll\h~.~ 2ilW Ail rip:hl3 ~"M'r\"td 

53 
163 


81763.106

References 

Australia Securities and Investment Commission, "Credit Licensing: Responsible LendingConduct", 

February 2010 

Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Structured Finance Research, "What's In a Mortgage? Simple 

Comparisons Across Select Countries", January 2010 

Bostic et. at, "Mortgage Product Substitution and State Anti~Predatory LendingLaws: Better Loans 

and Better Borrowers'?", U of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09·27 

Boyce, Alan "The Danish mortgage system offers some practical tools for the GSEs", presentation to 

the Center for Study of Responsive Law, January 2010 

Campbell and Cocco, 'Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage Choice', Quarterly Journal 

of Economics , 118, pp 1449-1494, November 2003 

Canada Mortgage Trends.com 

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Canadian Housing Observer, 2009 

Chomsisengphet, S. and A. Pennington~Cross, "A Look at Subprime Mortgage Originations 2000-

2007", presentation May 29,2008 

Chung, Chae~Sun, "Integrating Price Dynamics in the Prudential Norms: the Korean Example", 

presentation 4th Global Conference on Housing Finance in Emerging Markets, the World Bank, May 

2010 

Colwell, P. and C Dehring, "Points a.s the Price of the Pre-Payment Option", Illinois Real Estate Letter, 

Summer 1997 

Council of Mort gage Lenders, "So Why Are Mortgage Rates Rising", CML News and Views, July 2009 

Council of Mort gage Lenders, "Why is Possession So Much Higher In the US?", CIWL News and Views, 

International Comparison or Mortgage product Off"rings 

, !~";~'m:l, I~':"'-"~ f·" 11"",;n1' \,,,~;ico ~!'I~m1:>c' 1('j() ,,1\ ci~h" ,e'~, ".J S5 
164 


81763.107

56 

December 2009 

Debelle, G., "The State of the Mortgage Market", Address to l\{ortgage Innovation Conference Sydney 

Reserve Bank of Australia- 30 March 2010 

Demyanyk E. and O. Van Hemert. I<Understandingthe Subprime Mortgage Crisis'~, Review of Financial 

Studies, 2009 

Diibel A., M. Lea and R. Welter, "Mortgage Credit in the European Economic Area: Structure of 

the Market and Application of the Rules in Directives 87/102 and 90 iBSn, Report to the European 

Commission, September 1997 

Dilbel, A. «European Credit Research Institute Commentary". February 200S 

Diibel A. and S. Walley, Regulation of Foreign Currency Mortgage Loans, paper prepared for world 

Bank Global Housing Finance Conference, Washington DC May 2010 

Duygan-Bump. B. and C. Grant, IIHousehold Debt Repayment Behavior: What Role do Institutions 

Play", Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper QAU 08-3, 2008 

European Central Bank, Housing Finance in the Euro Area: Structural Issues Report, Brussels, 

March 2009 

European Commission, Public Consultation On Responsible Lending And Borrowing In The EU, 

June2009 

European Mortgage Federation, Study of Interest Variability in Europe) July 2006 

European Mortgage Federation, Quarterly Statistics, Q3 2009 

European Mortgage Federation, Protection of the Mortgage Borrower in the European Union, 

Brussels 2007 

European Mortgage Federation, Study on the Efficiency of Mortgage Collateral in the European 

Union, Brussels, 2008 

European Mortgage Federation, Study on the Cost of Housing in Europe, Brussels May 2010 

European Mortgage Federation, EMF Position on the European Commission's White Paper on the 

Integration of Mortgage Credit Markets in the ED, April 2008 

Financial Services Authority (U.K.), MOTtgagf! Market Review, October 2009 

Fitch Ratings,Amul1d the Houses: Quarterly European RMBS Review, March 2010 

Freddie Mac, Primary Mortgage Market Survey, June 2010 

International Comparison<>iMortgageProdtlctOfferlttgs 

{ j,b<:u(1" 1,\.'.J;;rUl<' r", J !ou'ln.!' ,\m.:-! ;~~ ~~l'\ltmhlt~ lOW . . \)1 r1g1,t~ l'C~N\'ed, 
165 


81763.108

Genworth Financial, Mortgage Trends Report, July 2009 

Ghent, A. and M. Kudylak, "Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from the US States", 

Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper 09-10, July 2010 

Hagerty, J., "What's So Great About the Fixed~Rate Mortgage'?", Wall StreetJoumal, 12/14j09 

Hicksons "Overview onegal elements of the mortgage enforcement process in NSW", undated but 

eu rrcntly used by Genworth Australia 

Hugh, e., "Twenty Percent of Span ish Mortgages Now Considered High Risk", www.fisfulofeuros.net. 

August 2009 

Kiff, John, "'Canadian Residential Mortgage Markets; Boring But Effective", IMF Working Paper, 

WP/09!130, June 2009 

Koijen, R., O. Van Hemert, and S, Van Nieuwerburgh. (~Mortgage Timing." Journal of Financial 

Economics 93(2), August 2009 

Krainer, J., "Mortgage Choice and the Pricing of Fixed Rate and Adjustable-Rate Mortgages", Federal 

Reserve Bank of San Francisco Newsletter, February 2010 

Lea, M. ~j1\lortgage Instruments" in HOllsing Finance in Emerging Markets, co~edited by M. Lea and 

L. Chiquier, The World Bank, June 2009 

Lea, M. l'Alternative Forms of Mortgage Finance: What Can We Learn From Other Countries? Paper 

prepared for Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies National Symposium Moving Forward: The 

Future of Consumer Credit and Mortgage Finance, February 2010 

Lea, M., "Housing Finance in Developed Countries: An International Comparison of Efficiency" (with 

Douglas B. Diamond), Journal of Housing Research, 3, 1.1992 

Miles, D., IjThe u.K. Mortgage Market: Taking a Longer Term View", Final Report and Recommendations, 

u.K. Treasury, March 2()04 

Mortgages.co.u.K. 

The Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, "Housing Funds", 

www.vrom.nl/pagina.htrnl?id=37432 

Nykredit, The Danish Covered Bond, Copenhagen 2009 

Realkreditrildet, The Traditional Danish Mortgage Model, Copenhagen, October 2009 [add url] 

Realkreditd.det, Annual Report, Copenhagen 2010 

Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial StabiHty Review, September 2009 

Internatiofial Compa.rison ofMQrtgagc product Offerings 

"' He~~~l'dlll\~~jtUfe I')l" llou~ml'/\t)l~rica S~rt~rnber 2010. An r\:hts l~~ned. 

57 
166 


81763.109

58 

Scanlon K, Lunde 1. and Whitehead c., 'Mortgage Product Innovation in Advanced Economies: More 

Choice, More Risk' European Journal of Housing Policy June 2008 

Scanlon, K" J. Lunde and C.M.E. Whitehead, "Mortgage Products And Government Policies To Heip 

Troubled Mortgagors: Responses To The Credit Crisis"~ paper presented at the ENHR International 

Conference 'Changing Housing Markets: Integration And Segmentation" Prague, June 2009 

Shimizu, T. and Y. Nakada, "Japan's Residential Mortgage Loan Characteristics And Trends, RMBS 

Outlook For 2009", Standard and Poors, July 2009 

Svenstrup, M. ,I Mortgage Choice - The Danish Case", Department of Finance, The Aarhus School of 

Business, 29 November 2002 workingpaper 

Svenstrup, 1\1:. and S. Wi11eman, "Reforming HotlsingFinance: Perspectives from Denmark", Journal 

of Real Estate Research, 26, 2, 2006 

Thaler, R. "Mortgages Made Simpler", New York Times~ Economic View, July 4, 2009 

Vickery, J.~ Interest Rates and Consumer Choice in the Residential Mortgage Market, FRB NY Working 

Paper, 9/07 

Woodward, S. "The Future of the Capital Markets: Connecting Primary Consumer and Mortgage 

Credit Markets to Global Capital", paper prepared forthe Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies 

National Symposium, The Future of Consumer Credit and Mortgage Finance, February 2010 

U.S. House of Representatives. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 

Conference Report, June 29, 2010 

Institutions Contacted 

Analistas Financeros Internrrcionales (Spain) 

Building Societies Association (U.K.) 

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (Canada) 

Council of Mortgage Lenders (U.K) 

European Mortgage Federation (Belgium) 

Korea Housing Finance Corporation (Korea) 

Realkreditradet (Denmark) 

Australia Prudential Regulation Authority (Australia) 

Int~rl1:1;tiotl"J cmnp~~d';li)l1 ()tM()rtgagt' Product Offerings 

" !~~H,~r<.:h ;~.,titutdorllm;,..i!lj( ;\m~rica Sq>t>"mMe JOIn .. ~n rit>"ll1f INen'ed. 
167 


81763.110

Dr. Michael Lea 

The Corky McMillin Center for Real Estate, College of Business Administration, San Diego State University 

Dr. Michael Lea is the Director of the Corky McMillin Center for Real Estate at San Diego State University. In 

that capacity he is responsible for improving real estate education, industry outreach and research. Dr. Lea is also 

a principal of Cardiff Economic Consulting, with a focus on the analysis of domestic and international mortgage 

markets and institutions. He has over 25 years of financial services industry experience, including more than 20 

years of international advisory work in 30 countries spanning six continents. He has provided advice on a wide 

variety of mortgage and securitization topics as a consultant to international development agencies, governmentsponsored enterprises, trade groups, regulatory agencies and major private and public sector financial institutions. 

From 2000 through 2004, Dr. Lea served as Executive Vice President for Global Market Development at Countrywide 

Financial Corporation. He was responsible for developing global strategy, analyzing market opporrunities and creating 

proposals and business plans for new international initiatives. Dr. Lea was also President of Countrywide International 

Consulting Services LLC, which conducted analysis of and provided technical assistance to primary and secondary 

mortgage market institutions worldwide. From 1991 through 1999, Dr. Lea was President of Cardiff Consulting Services, 

a firm specializing in the analysis of housing finance markets and institutions in the US and abroad. 

Dr. Lea has a unique combination of research experience, senior operational responsibility in major financial 

institutions and high-level participation in public policy formulation. He was Senior Vice President of Finance 

and Capital Markets at the Imperial Corporation of America from 1987 to 1991. In this capacity he was responsible 

for the corporate finance, portfolio management and strategic planning functions of a $12 billion diversified 

financial institution and managed a staff of 40 professionals. 

Dr. Lea was Chief Economist at the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) from 1983 to 1987 

with responsibiJities for primary and secondary mortgage market analysis and forecasting. He also served as a 

staff member for the President'S Commission on Housing and was a Brookings Institution economic policy fellow 

at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1980 and 1981. 

Dr. Lea is an internationally known authority on housing and mortgage finance. He has published over 75 articles 

and book chapters, organized several conferences and made numerous presentations to government agencies, 

legislative committees, multi-lateral institutions, corporate boards and management. trade groups and academic 

and professional organizations. He has taught at Cornell University, San Diego State University, the University of 

California, San Diego and the Wharton International Housing Finance Program atthe University of Pennsylvania. 

He received his ph.D. in economics from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 

~I MORTGAGE 

BANKERS 

ASSOCIATIONInvesting in communities 

1717 Rhode Is!and Ave .. NW, Suite 400 

Washmgton, DC 20036 

www,rnortgagebankers,org 
168 


81763.111

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

4 

Alternative Forms of Mortgage Finance: 

What Can We Learn from Other Countries? 

MICHAEL LEA 

The u.s. morrgage finance system has gone from the envy of the world to a 

case study of failure in twO short years. AI; recently as rhe 2003-05 period, 

the system generated an enormous volume of originations (nearly $4 trillion) that 

contribured to a record level of homeowners hip (69.3 percent). J Impressive gains 

were made in low-income and minority rates of homeowners hip. The system was 

characterized by low mortgage interest rates, robust competition, particularly trom 

nonbank lenders, buoyant house prices, and low default rates. While the government role was significant, the major government-supported institutions were losing market share. There were, however, ample warning signals that this rosy picture was about ro end. Affordability was falling, concerns about predatoty lending 

abounded, delinquencies in subprime lending were rising, and numerous commentators warned of unsustainable house prices. 

Fast forward to the 2007-10 time period. The homeownership rate has fallen 

to 67.4 percent, erasing all of the gains since 2000. House prices have been falling 

for three years and are off more than 30 percent nationwide. Mortgage originations are down significantly, and only prime borrowers can obtain loans. Conforming mortgage rates arc historically low, but the volume of refinancing is 

muted. And nonconforming rates are much higher. There is reduced competition, 

as most nonbank lenders have failed and the large bank, dominate the market. 

The country is experiencing record postwar default and foreclosure rates. The role 

I. Joint Center for Housing Srudies (2009). 

u8 
169 


81763.112

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Insmution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE Il9 

of government has expanded considerably; in fact, rhe government backs nearly 

all mortgage lending. There is considerable uncertainry about when the recovery 

in the housing and mortgage markers will begin. 

The economic recession that was sparked by the implosion of the U.S. subprime mortgage market has been global in dimension. As such, it has affecred rhe 

housing and mortgage markets of many countries. Most developed countries also 

experienced robust growth in their housing and mortgage markets during the first 

half of rhe decade. Many countries experienced record levels of house price inflation, increased competition, and relaxed mortgage underwriting. But no major 

developed market has experienced the severe decline in house prices, the high rate 

of mortgage default and foreclosute, and the change in the mortgage finance system as have been experienced by the United States. What have rhese other countries done differently? 

This chapter reviews the major characteristics and performance of various 

developed-country mortgage markets, comparing and contrasting rhe structure, 

principal features, and performance of the primary and secondary markets wirh 

those in the United States. The comparison includes the rypes onender and mortgage instruments in the primary market, institutions and instruments involved 

in the capital market, funding of mortgages, and management of major mortgage risks (default and prepayment). The chapter then compares and contrasts 

the role of government in mortgage market regulation, conSUmer protection, and 

rhe backing of institutions and instruments through guarantees and ownership 

in the primary and secondary markets. Finally, it seeks ro extract ideas about how 

the U,S. system can be reformed to improve performance and restore private capital market finance. 

International Comparisons 

This chapter focuses on the finance of owner-occupied housing. Figure 4-1 shows 

recent rates of homeowners hip among several Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The United States has a relatively 

high rate of homeownership, but it is not the highest among major developed 

markets, Australia, Ireland, Spain, and rhe United Kingdom all have higher rates 

of homeowners hip, and Canada's rate is comparable to that of the United States, 

This is noteworthy because these countries provide far less government support 

for homeownership than the United States. Most Western European countries 

have lower rates of homeownership in parr due to strong social rental systems. 

Southern European countries like Italy, Greece, and Spain have higher rates of 

homeownership, reflecting cultural values, discriminatory policies roward private 

rental housing, and relatively weak support of social rental housing. 

Homeownership rates in mOSt countries were stable in the 1999-2008 period. 

Canada had the largest increase in homeownersbip, growing from 64 to 68 percent. 
170 


81763.113

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

120 MICHAEL LEA 

Figure 4-1, Rates of Homeownership in Select Countries, 2008, except 2006 

for japan 

liome{)wnersbip rate (pcrc-em) 

100 

90 

80 

70 

GO 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

-;,. ... ~ 

s~'D' 

~" 

o'!- *' G~"ry; ~-§ <f 

'}.,,:-(:-b-

,-,< ." "",-\ "$' ." <- ,1- \,q <$'''t.o },.'"I!-"" s<:(,'I>'> y(:.""''::::-

c,'" 11;.,'-

G ~<'S' J--"<).' 

S 

Source Australian Bureau of Statistics, Can<lda Housing and Morrgage Corporation, Delft University, 

European Mortgage Federation, U.S. Bureau of the Census. 

Homeownership in Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States each grew 

2 to 3 percentage points. 

The housing boom was characterized by higher rates of housing construction 

in many countries. Several countries-notably Australia, Canada, Ireland, and 

Spain-had higher real residential investment to GDP in 2002-07." Ellis points 

out that a major difference between the United States and other countries is that 

the increase in dwellings in the United States was significantly greater than the 

increase in households or population, which created an excess supply ofhouses.3 

Figure 4-2 shows the growth in the ratio of residential mortgage debt outstanding to GDP between 1994-95 and 2008. The U.S. ratio grew from 44 to 

93 percent, an impressive performance. But several other countries had a similar performance. Australia, Ireland, and Spain had greater growth, and the 

Netherlands had a higher ratio. All countries except Germany and Japan had significant growth in their mortgage markets. 

Although the United States had an unprecedented run-up of house prices during the decade, it was not alone, as shown in table 4- 1. Many OECD countries 

had greater house price increases between 2000 and 2006 than did the United 

States. Australia and the United States were the first of the bubble countries in 

which house prices fell; the Australian housing market has since recovered. The 

magnintde of the fall in U.S. house prices, as measured by the Standard and Poor's 

2. IMF (2009). 

3. EHis (2008). 
171 


81763.114

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 

Figure 4-2. Ratio of Mortgage Debt to GDP in Select Countries, 1994-2008 

Ratio of !n1.mgage debt outstanding to GDP (percent) 

120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

121 

Source: Australlan Bureau of Statistics, C~nada Housing and Mortgage Corporation, European 

Mortgage Federation (various years), Federal Reserve BoarJ, and the World Bank. Data [or 1994-95 

nm available for SWitl.crland. 

Case Shiller 20 metro area index, has been greater than in other countries. 

Research by the International Monetary Fund suggests that the housing market 

is more elastic in the United States than in other countries, as evidenced by a 

higher share of real residential investment and real variation in house prices as a 

result of housing demand shocks. 

Morrgage interest rates in most countries declined during the decade, except 

in Australia (see table 4-2). The Reserve Bank of Australia raised interest rates in 

2003 in part to head off a house price bubble. The rates are specific to the dominant instrument. Australia, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom are predominately shorr-term variable-rare markers. Their mortgage rates declined more 

sharply than those in other countries during the crisis. 

Figure 4-3 compare.s dominant mortgage product offerings by country in terms 

of interest ratc variabiliry. There is considerable difference in the rypes of products offered. Australia, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom are dominated 

by variable-rate or short-term (rypically one- to three-year) fixed-rate mortgages. 

The design of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARlvls) varies. In Australia and the 

United Kingdom, the standard variable-rate mortgage has a rate set by the lender 

at its discretion. Rates are changed fur all borrowers at the Same time. Canada, 

Spain, and the United States have indexed ARMs. Recently tracker morrgages, 

which are indexed ARMs, have become dominant in the United Kingdom. Inirial fixed-tate discounts are prevalent in Australia and the United Kingdom. 

The magnitudes of the discounts are less than those in the United States during 

the boom---rypically around 100 basis points, lasting one to two years. 

The United States is unusual in the high proportion oElong-term fixed-rate 

mortgages (figure 4-3). The ARM and short-term fixed (hybrid) share in the 

United States grew during the boom-accounting for 30-35 percent of loans in 

81763.115

Table 4-1. House Prices in Select Countries, 2000-09 

Nominal ch.ange in house price 

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

U.S. Federal Housing 7.20 7.30 6.90 7.00 10.50 11.20 4.90 -O.G4 -4.30 -1.20 

Finance Agency 

Japan -3.7 -4.1 -4.6 -5.4 -6.1 -4.B -3.0 -l.0 -1.6 -3.2 

Germany 0.0 0.0 -2.B -l.0 -1.9 -2.0 0.9 -0.7 0.0 -0.7 

United Kingdom 14.9 8.1 16.1 15.7 11.9 5.5 6.3 10.9 -0.9 0.3 

Canada 3.7 4.6 9.9 9.4 9.4 9.9 11.3 10.8 -1.1 2.5 

Australia 8.3 11.2 18.8 IB.2 6.5 1.5 7.B 11.3 4.4 12.0 

Denmark 6.5 5.8 3.6 3.2 8.9 17.6 21.6 4.6 -4.5 -7.3 

Spain 7.5 9.5 16.9 20.0 IB.3 14.6 10.0 5.5 0.2 -6.3 

Ireland 16.5 8.2 10.7 15.B 11.6 1l.S 13.5 -1.0 -2.5 -IB.5 

Netherland, 18.2 11.1 6.5 3.6 4.3 3.B 4.6 4.2 -8.8 -5.0 

U.S. CS20' 11.6 7.2 12.0 11.0 15.3 14.5 0.4 -8.6 -16.7 -3.1 

France 8.B 7.9 B.3 11.7 15.2 15.3 12.1 6.6 1.3 -4.4 

Italy 8.3 8.2 9.6 10.3 9.9 7.5 6.4 5.2 1.7 

Source: Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation, European Mortgage Federation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Standard and Poor's. 

a. Standard and Poor's Case-ShaJer 20 metro area index. 

81763.116

Table 4-2. Mortgage Interest Rates in Select Countries, 2000---03 

Percent 

2004 2006 

2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 

Germany 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.2 4.6 5.0 4.8 4.39 

Denmark 7.2 6.4 5.7 5.5 5.0 4.4 5.2 5.9 6.6 4.18 

Spain 5.9 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.3 3.2 4.7 5.3 5.9 3.14 

UK 7.6 5.7 5.6 5.6 6.6 6.6 5.3 6.1 5.5 4.38 

Ireland 6.2 4.7 4.7 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.6 5.1 4.3 2.68 

Australia 8.1 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.1 7.3 7.5 8.0 6.3 6.05 

Canada 7.B 6.6 6.4 6.0 5.7 5.6 6.0 6.7 6.2 5.85 

Japan 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.3 2.4 3.0 2.7 2.75 

U.S. fixed rate mortgage 7.3 7.0 6.5 5.B 5.8 5.9 6.4 6.1 6.0 5.20 U.S. adjustable 7.0 5.8 4.6 3.B 3.9 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.2 4.70 

rate mortgage 

Switzerland 4.32 4.20 3.78 3.28 3.07 2.92 3.03 3.17 3.84 3.67 

Soutce: Central banks. European Mortgage Federation. Mortgage Bankers Association. 
174 


81763.117

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

124 

Figure 4-3. Mortgage Products in Select Countries, 200>9 

Share of all mortgages (percent) 

100 

90 

80 

70 

GO 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

~ 

b~ * c< 0'1; .s-'?7 .«,.:.1><;-' e <:;/' 

• • 

,,4. }.,'I>~b >'" <o",,'<.J~ }...~,.JY 0~':<"«~ "'c \>" ~ ';<.."\-",-,:, 

;:;.c' 

i 

&:.;;.<:> X§''b 

S .;.~r-~ 

0; 

MICHAEL LEA 

along-term fixed I:!!IMedium-term fixed rnShorr-terrn fixed DVariable r.are 

Source: Canadian Association of Accredited Mortgage Profcs.<;ionals., European Mortgage Federation 

{variotl.<;; years), Genworth, Mortgage Bankers Association, Standard and Poor's. 

the 2004--06 period-but the market has reverted to fixed-rate mortgages in the 

crisis4 Long-term fixed-rate mortgages used to be the dominant product in Denmark, but relatively low and falling shorr-term rates have led Danish borrowers to 

shift to mediwn-term (one- to five-year) fixed-rate loans in recent years. Rollover 

mortgages are the dominant product in Canada, Germany, and rhe Netherlands. 

These loans have a fLxed rate for up to five yeats (ten years in Getmany), with a 

twenty-five- to thirty-year amortization period (thirty-five years in Canada). At 

the end of the fixed-rate period, the rate adjusts to the new market rate. There is 

a substantial (as high as yield maintenance) prepayment penalty during the fixedrate period. Canadian borrowers have responded to low short-term interest rates 

with a larger proportion of variable-rate loans. A high proportion of Dutch Joans 

are interest only to maximize tax benefits. About half ofJapanese loans are convertible (after the end of the fixed-rate term the borrower can select another fixedrate period or switch to a variable rate).' Japanese floating-rate loans have fixed 

payments for five years with potential deferral and negative amortization. Some 

Spanish loans are part fixed and part variable rate. 

4. Despite the fact that a one-year AR.\1 is 120 basis points lower than a thirty-year fixed rate 

mortg:age, and a 3/1 AR.\f is 81 basis points tower, as of September 10, 2010, according to the Virlall 

Street]liUrnaL See "Ivlarket Data," WallStreet}ournaL September 10, 2010. 

5. FO! more derail on Japanese mortgages, sec Standard and Poor's (2009). 
175 


81763.118

Copyright 2011. The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 

Figure 4-4. Mortgage Funding in Select Countries, 2008 

Source of mortgage funding (percent) 

100 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

~ - r-

-

III 

C1Deposits Dlnstitutional investors aMBS IIMortgage bonds OOther 

125 

;-

Source: Central banks, Canadian Association of Accredited Mortgage Professionals, European 

Mortgage federation, Federal Reserve Board, Merrill Lynch. 

Mortgage funding comparisons reveal interesting differences. As shown in figure 4-4, deposit funding dominates in most countries. The United States is unique 

with regard to the importance of securitization. More than 60 percent of U.S. residential mortgages have been securitized; the next closest countries arc Canada, 

Spain, and the United Kingdom, with 24-28 percent securitized. Covered bonds 

are a more common funding mechanism in Europe: 94 percent of Danish Iltnding and 47 percent of Spanish funding come from this source. We comment later 

on the role of covered bonds and the reason for their dominance in Denmark and 

significance in Europe. 

Mortgage lending tends IO be dominated by banks and highly concentrated in 

most countries. The top five lenders have more than a 50 percent market share in 

Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The top 

five are commercial banks, except in Denmark where they are specialist mortgage 

companies (which are owned by or own commerdal banks).6 Banks are the largest 

class of lender in Germany and Spain, but the market share of individual institutions is much smaller. Savings banks (owned by the state governments) are the 

largest lenders in these countries, followed by commercial banks in Spain and 

mortgage banks in Germany. In Europe all mortgage lenders must have a bank 

6. The Nationwide Building Society is a top five lender in the United Kingdom. 
176 


81763.119

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

126 

Figure 4-5, Bl'Oker Share ofOriginatiol1S in Select Countries, 2008 

Share of originations (percent) 

"0 80 l 

60 

50 

Cil20()8 share 

MICHAEL LEA 

Source: Canadian Association of Accredited Mongage Prof,cs.siona1s, Europe Economics, Inside 

Mortgage Fin.ance, National Australia Bank 

charter (which can be commercial, savings} cooperative, and mortgage, among 

others), The market in Japan is rather fragmented, but large city banks have the 

largest market share. As a result of the crisis, the U.S. mortgage market is beginning to look more like those in the other countries, with origination dominated 

by large commercial banks. 

Mortgage brokers playa significant distriburion role in many countries. As figure 4-5 shows, the broker share of originations varies widely across countries, from 

as high as 60-70 percent in Ireland and the United Kingdom to as low as J-5 percent in Denmark and Japan. The U.S. number does nor reflect correspondent 

lending, which accounted for 31 percent of 2008 originations. Australia and the 

United Kingdom have a small amount of correspondent lending as well. The broker share has fallen in the United States as a result of the crisis. 

The recession has taken its roll on all mortgage markets, but more so in the 

United States than anywhere else. Figure 4-6 shows comparative mortgage default 

rates for bank portfolios in several countries. Mortgage default rates have risen but 

remain low in other countries'? The performance of bank mortgage portfolios in 

the United Stares is worse than in other countries. 

Mortgage perfotmance has been worse for securitized mortgages in those 

countries with significant securitization. In large part this is due to the fact that 

subprime or nonconforming mortgages were the collateral for these securities. 

Figure 4-7 shows the performance of private-label securitized loans in the U nired 

7. Danish arrears (not shown) were less than 2 percent and foreclosures were 0.4 percent in 2008 

(Boyce 2010). German and Japanese default rates are also quite low. Serious default rates on loans 

held or guaranteed by Fannie 1\1ae and Freddie Mac were over 5.5 percent in t~arly 2010. 
177 


81763.120

Copyright 2011. The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 127 

Figure 4-6. NonpClfimning Loans as a Share of Housing Loam in Select Countries, 

1993-2009 

Share of housing loans that arc nonperforming (percent)~ 

10.000 

9.000 

8.000 

7.000 

6.000 

5.000 

4.000 

3.000 

2.000 

Spain 

" ...... - .. , " ......... UK;-'. 

, . ... ; .... ~ ... Australiab 

0.000 +-+-.,~t...,..-~~-~-~-~=-';""'-r:"~--~~--"-~-··~:"'~~-·:;"T--·"-_-~··-;:"_--··"'r·~~·-_···-_·_""T"_·""~·~·""_··T··:-_·"r·_-~t",A''M;;"-\;d,,,;_~ 

LOOO 

-NNNNmmmm.~~~~mmm~~~~GGGGOOOOOOOO~~~~o 

oooooooocoooooooooooooooooooooooo~ 

~~!~~~!~~~!!~~!!~~!!~~!!~~!!~~!!~~ 

Somees: Bank ofSpaln; Canadian Bankers' Association; Council of Mongage Lenders; FDIC; Reserve 

Bank of Ausualia; Australia Prudential Regulatory Authority. 

a. Percent of loans: by value. Includes impaired loans unless otherwise stated. For AuscraJia, only 

inciud('s ninety Of more days in arrears prior to September 2003. 

b. Banks only. 

c. Percent of loans by number that arc ninety or more da~ in arrears. 

States. Subprime loans have extraordinarily high default rates, reflecting the decline 

in underwriting standards and risk layering. The recent increase in prime defaults 

fellects rising unemployment and falling house prices. 

Figure 4-8 shows the performance of prime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) in Europe. Delinquencies on European securitized loans have 

increased during the crisis but remain well below those in the United States. 

Default rates on securitized loans are less than 1.5 percent in Australia and less 

than 1 percent in Canada. These results reflect the faCt that subprime lending was 

rare or nonexistent outside of the United States. The only country with a significant share of subprime lending was the United Kingdom (a peak of 8 percent of 

mortgages in 2006). Subprime loans accounted for 5 percent of mortgages in 

Canada, less than 2 percent in Australia, and negligible proportions elsewhere. 

Subprime loans in Australia and Canada were more similar to U.S. A1t-A loans 

than to true subprime loans. 
178 


81763.121

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

128 MICHAEL LEA 

Figure 4-7. Peiformance if Private-Label Securitized Mortgage Loans in the 

United States, 1998-2009' 

Share of housing loans mat are delinquent or in foreclosure (percent) 

50.00 

45.00 

40.00 

35.00 

30.00 i 

25.00 

20.00 

15.00 

10.00 

-Prime 

_SubprimeARM. 

-,~~~Subprime FRM 

-FHA VA 

5.00 'L.. _____ -

0.00 :::-:~~~====-==_=_==_~~==::_:=~ _______ .~. __ _ 

Source; Amherst Securities (2009). 

3. In the third quarter of 2009. the share of loans that were delinquent or in foteclosure is the foilowin~ 

subprime adjustable~rate mortgages, 45.7 percent; subprime fixed-rate mortgages. 22.4 percent; Federal 

Housing Administration and Veterans Benefits Administration loans, 9.1 percent; and prime mortgages, 

5.9 percent. 

The only performance comparable to that of the United States is in U.K. nonconforming mortgages. U.K. lenders provided loans to borrowers who had both 

adverse credit and low documentation. Nonconforming securitized loans have 

high delinquency rates in the United Kingdom (see figure 4-9), but foreclosure 

rates are far lower than in the United States.' 

Role of Government 

Govemmen t is involved in all of the surveyed mortgage markets to varying degrees. 

Government involvement includes tax incentives, guarantees, government~ 

sponsored enterprises, and regulation. 

8. The U.K. Homeowners Mortgage Support Program assists unemployed borrowers with mort .. 

gage payments for up to two years, which may contribute to lower foreclosures. As in the United 

States, lenders have been slow to repossess houses, in part because house prices began rising at the 

end of2009. 
179 


81763.122

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 

Figure 4-8, Pe1formance of RMBS in Select European Countries, 2000----fJ9 

Share of residential mortgage-backed securities thirty or more days in arrears (percent) 

3.00·, 

2.50·1 J 

j 

1.001 

1... .. , , . - - -- O.5oj I --- 0.00 L __ .,._"_""_"", .. ".~",~._ ... ~.-,~ ... "_._ .. ~_,".,._~,~--"_,_~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oo~~oooo~~~~~~~ 

0000000000000000000000000000000 

~~~1~8~~~1!8~~~118~~~1!8~~~118~ 

Source: Fitch Ratings. 

Figure 4·9, Performance of Nonconforming Securitized Loam in the 

United Kingdom at the End of2009, by Year of Origination 

Share of nonconforming securities loans at least three months in arrears (percent) 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

o 

--Germany 

- - -Ireland 

·"'·,Italy 

- -Netherlands 

ll'?,\tQ'1:~" Portugal 

--Spain 

- - -UKPrirne 

Index 

11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 

Months since issue 

Source: Firch Ratin~. 
180 


81763.123

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

130 MICHAEL LEA 

Tax Treatment of Homeownership 

Government can provide incentives for owner-occupied housing in many ways. 

Perhaps rhe best known is favorable tax treatment, Table 4-3 compares the tax 

treatment of owner-occupied housing for select OECD countries, 

The tax treatment of mortgage interest is varied. Most OECD countries do 

not allow a deduction, and several that do cap it at low marginal tax rates. Denmark and the Netherlands have full or nearly full deductibility, although both 

countries tax imputed rent {albeit at low rates}. Only the United States allows 

nearly full deductibilitywithour taxing imputed rent. In recent years those countries with deductibility have exhibited faster mortgage growth. Ireland, the 

Netherlands, and the United States had the highest rates of growth in mortgage 

Table 4-3. Tax Treatment of Owner-Occupied Housing in Select Countries 

Country Mortgage interest Capital gain> Other 

Denmark Deductible at 33 per- Exempt if primary 

cent maximum tax residence of less than 

rate 1.400 square meters 

Germany Nondeductible Exempt if held more than 

tcn years 

Ireland Deductible for seven Exempt 

years at 25 percent 

of the maximum 

tax rarc, falling to 

20 percent 

Netherlands Fully deductible Exempt Imputed income 

taxed 

Spain At €9,O 15, capped Exempt if reinvested or 

at 15 percent rate sold after age sixty-five 

United Kingdom Nondeductible Exempt 

Australia Nondeductible Taxable with indexed coSt First~rime 

base homebuyer 

tax credit 

Canada Nondeductible Exempt 

Japan Nondeductible Taxed at 30 percent if five Deduction of 

years or less; 15 percent 1 percent of 

if more than five years principal 

per year for 

ten years 

United Stares Deductible limit Exemption of $250,0001 Temporaty tax 

$1 million $500,000 for a principal credit in 

residence in two out of 2009-10 

[he last five years 

Source: CMHC, European Mortgage Federation, Global Property Guide. 
181 


81763.124

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 131 

Table 4-4. Government-Backed Mortgage Institutiom in Select Countries 

Government Government Gove171ment~ 

mqrtgage security sponsored 

Country insurrr guarantees enterprise 

Denmark No No No 

Germany No No No 

Ireland No No No 

Netherlands NHG No No 

Spain No No No 

United Kingdom No No No 

Ausrralia No No No 

Canada CMHC CMHC No 

Japan No JHF Possible 

United States Federal Housing Ginnie Mae Fannie Mae) 

Administration Freddie Mac, Federal 

Home Loan Banks 

Source: Author. 

debt outstanding over the past fifteen years, and the Netherlands and the United 

States have the highest levels of indebtedness today. Countries that do not allow 

deductibility (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom) or cap it (Ireland, Spain) 

have equivalent or higher rates of homeowners hip than the United States. Most 

countries exempt or limit the tax on capital gains on owner-occupied housing. 

Ellis points out that interest deductibility combined with a lack of prepayment 

penalties in the United States may have contributed to the growth in household 

leverage and mortgage indebtedness through cash-out refinance and second 

mortgages. 9 

Mortgage Guarantees and Imtitutiom 

The differences among countries in the presence of government-owned or 

-sponsored mortgage institutions are more striking. Table 4-4 compares select 

countries in this dimension. The United States is unusual in its use of all three 

types of government-supported mortgage institutions or guarantee programs: 

mortgage insurance, morrgage guarantees, and government-sponsored mortgage 

enterprises. Canada and Japan have government guarantee programs, and Canada 

and the Netherlands have government-backed mortgage insurance programs.'O 

9. Second-mortgage home equity lines of credit exist in other counrries (for exampje~ Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom), but in far less volume, perhaps reflecting the lack of interest deductibility. The Netherlands hac; a relatively high incidence of second mortgages (l3 percent 

of borrowers in 2002), reflecting full deductibility and high marginal tax rates. 

10. Australia had a government~owned mortgage insurer from 1965 to 1997, when it was sold to 

Genworrh. For an analysis, sec Lea (2009). 
182 


81763.125

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

132 MICHAEL LEA 

The market share of government-backed institurions is smaller in Canada and 

Japan than in the United States.ll 

The role of governmem in Canada is more similar to its role in the United 

States than in any other coumry. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) is 100 percem owned by the government and enjoys an explicit 

guarantee of the Canadian governmem. I2 It provides 100 percent mortgage 

default insurance through its National Housing Act Program (similar to the Federal Housing Administration in the United States).'3 The CMHC also provides 

timely payment guarantees on securities backed by National Housing Act loans 

(similar to Ginnie Mae in the United States). The CMHC administers the Canada 

Mortgage Bond purchase program, which is a trust set up to purchase CMHCguaranteed mortgage securities funded by the issuance of mortgage bonds. The 

program eliminates the cash flow uncertainty caused by mortgage amortization 

and prepayment through cash flow swaps executed with investment banks. The 

CMHC does not lend to primary mortgage institutions or invest in mortgages. 

The Japan Housing Finance Agency GHF) is a government-incorporated 

administrative agency." It operates in a manner similar to the guarantee functions 

of Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac, purchasing mortgages and issuing mortgagebacked securities with its timely payment guarantee. It does not purchase loans 

for portfolio, although it could do so within its charter. The JHF replaced the former Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC) in 2007, which mainly 

provided loans to the public with funding from the Ministry of Finance and also 

securitized some of these loans. The JHF was created after the GHLC ran into 

asset-liability mismatch problems. 

The Netherlands has a government-owned mortgage insurer, the Homeownership Guarantee Fund (rhe Nationale Hypotheek Garantie, NHG).15 The 

NHG provides 100 percent mortgage default insurance and a temporary mortgage payment facility. The fund is a private institution with fallback agreements with the national and municipal governments. These agreements form 

the basis for interest-free loans to the fund from the national and municipal 

governments at times when its assets are no longer sufficient to meet claims. 

This means that the fund is able to comply with its payment obligations at all 

times. As a result, the Netherlands Central Bank (Dutch De Nederlandsche Bank) 

considers the NHG as a government guarantee. 

11. About 25 percr~nt of Canadian mortgages are securitized through Canada Mortgage and 

Housing Corporat:ion guarantees. The CMHC insures about half of mortgages through the National 

Housing Act program. Japan Homing Finance Agency guarantees approximately 25 percent ofjapanese mortgages. Its charter allows it to purchase mortgages. but to date it has focused on guarantees. 

12. See www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca!en. 

13. The Canadian government also provides a 90 percent backstop guarantee for two private 

mortgage insurers: Genworth and United Guaranty. 

14. See www.jhEgo.jplengiishlabout/pdflmain_l.pdf. 

15. Netherlands, Ministry of Housing. Spatial Planning. and the Environment (n.d.). 
183 


81763.126

Copyright 2011. The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE '33 

Unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, none of the international, governmentbacked institutions has experienced exceptional loss or required government capital injections. None of these institutions has a formal affordable housing poliey 

mandate. Also none of these institutions takes on much interest rate risk, as they 

have limited or no portfolio accumulation. 

Regulation 

Government is heavily involved in regulating the mortgage market through both 

consumer protection and safety and soundness regulations in all countries. A major 

difference between the United States and other countries is that the United States 

is the only country with specialized housing finance safety and soundness regulators. 

Hisrorically, building societies in Australia, Ireland, and the Unired Kingdom 

operated in a similar fashion ro savings and loans in the United States. These 

institutions had a specialist regulator. Regulatory reform led to the creation of a 

single financial regulator: the Australia Prudential Regulatory Authority (J 999), 

the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom (2001), and the 

Financial Regulator in Ireland (2003). The building societies are regulated the 

same as banks in these countries. The mortgage credit institutions dominate housing finance in Denmark, regulated by the Danish Financial Services Authority. 

Mortgage banks are significant residential mortgage lenders in Germany. They 

too are regulated by the single financial regulatory ageney, the Bundesanstalt fUr 

Finanzdiensdeistungsaufsicht. Commercial banks dominate mortgage finance in 

the other countries in this survey. Thus mortgage lending is not subject to specialist regulation. 16 The United States is unique in having a fragmented regulatory 

structure with numerous specialized regulatory agencies. 

The specialist mortgage guarantee and insurance institutions in this survey do 

not have specialist regulators. The Ministry of Finance in their respective countries regulates the CMHC and the JHE The Netherlands Ministry of Housing 

and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities supervise the NHG. An 

advantage to having a single financial sector regulator is the lower likelihood of 

regulatory capture or regulatory arbitrage. but a disadvantage may be the lack of 

sector-specific expertise. 

Consumer protection regulation is less clear-cut and in /lux. There was significant product innovation and loosening of underwriting in most subject countries during the housing boom. Moderate versions of subprime lending appeared 

in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom during the 2000s. Documentation requirements were relaxed in those countries, creating a version of the AIr-A 

market. However, the extent of product innovation and underwriting relaxation 

16. The mortgage managers and centralized lenders are wholesale lenders funded by sec.uritiza~ 

don in Australia and the United Kingdom, respecthrely. They are not subject to bank safery and 

soundness regulation but are subject to consumer protection and business conduct regulation. Their 

market share has dropped significantly during the crisis. 
184 


81763.127

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

134 MICHAEL LEA 

Table 4-5. Change in Mortgage Underwriting in Select Countries, 2007--08 

100 

Lower percent Tighter Shorter Introduction 

Ioan~to- mortgages wan-to- maximum J nterest-on/y of new wan 

value less income mortgage foamles, types to deal 

ratin! available criteria term available with crisis 

Australia X X X 

Denmark X 

France X X X 

Iceland 

Ireland X X X X X 

Netherlands X X X 

Norway X 

Poland X 

PortUgal X X X 

Russia X X X X 

Spain X X X 

Sweden X X Lower 

maximum 

LTV 

United X X X X 

Kingdom 

United States X X X X 

Source: Lunde, Scanlon. and Whitehead (2009). 

did not approach the extent prevalent in the United States. A study by the Australian Treasury Department in 2008 note.s, "The lax lending behaviour which 

gave rise to the sub-prime problem in the United States did not occur in Australia in part because the regulatory environment encourages a more cautious 

lending culture."" 

In the current market environment, both lenders and regularors are tightening 

guidelines, contributing to a fall in new lending of 40--50 percent in many countries. IS Lunde, Scanlon, and Whitehead conducted a survey in early 2009 to assess 

[he types of mortgage tightening taking place. As shown in table 4-5, underwriting criteria have tightened in thirteen of the fourteen countries surveyed. 

In light of falling house prices in most countries, lenders are requiring larger 

down payments, and 100 percent loan-ro-value (LTV) loans, common in various 

countries before the crisis, have disappeared. Swedish maximum LTVs have 

declined from 95 percent to 85-90 percent, and the average LTV in the United 

Kingdom has fallen from 80 to 75 percent. Lender surveys also reveal [ightening: 

the Netherlands reported 80 percent oflenders tightening in early 2009, and the 

17. Australian Treasury Department (2008, p. 19). 

18. Lunde, Scanlon, and Whitehead (2009). 
185 


81763.128

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 135 

United States reported 65 percent. Affordability criteria have been tightened, and 

all loans are now fully documented. 

Most of these changes appear to be at the volition of the lenders. According 

to the European Mortgage Federation, regulators in several countries are mooting restrictions on products and maximum L TVs. '9 However, no new regulations 

have been promulgated. There is no Europe-wide mortgage regulation. The merits of a mortgage directive that would create minimum standards for all countries 

have been debated for several years. However, the industty has steadfastly 

opposed this approach and developed an industry-wide code of conduct to police 

transactions.20 

The FSA in the United Kingdom has gone the furthest in Europe in contemplating tighter mortgage regulation. Its Mortgage Market Review of October 2009 

lays out various proposals under consideration, including higher capital requirements for lenders, new quantitative liquidity standards, increased regulation of 

nonbank ("high-risk") lenders, and product regulation.2 ' The FSA notes, however, that LTV or debt-to-income (DTI) caps are not yet warranted, pointing out 

that LTV or DTI caps are "a blunt approach to achieving the olltcomes we want." 

The FSA does recommend placing restrictions on risk layering (prohibiting loans 

that are a mix of high-risk factors, for example, prohibiting high LTV loans to 

credit-impaired borrowers who have an unstable income or other similar "toxic" 

mixes) and requiring income verification on all mortgages. It should be noted that 

mortgage brokers (intermediaries) are subject to FSA regulation. 

The FSA has promulgated suitability standards for mortgage lenders. Specifically, a product is considered suitable if there are reasonable grounds to conclude 

the following: 

-The client can afford it over the repayment term. 

-It is appropriate to the client's needs and circumstances. 

-It is the most suirable of those available within the scope of service provided 

to the client. 

Moreover, the lender cannot recommend the "least worst" product if it does 

not have access to a product that is appropriate to the client's needs and circumstances22 The FSA stresses that it expects a "commonsense" approach. The lender 

or broket is expected to document thoroughly the research on and advice given to 

the client. 

The FSA is considering changing consumer disclosure requirements as well. 

Notably its October discussion paper states, "Our policy approach to date has 

been underpinned by a view that mortgage consumers will act rationally to protect 

their own interests. We believe that we need to change that approach, recognise 

19. Conversation with European Monetary Fund officials earlier this year. 

20. See www.hypo.org/Contenddefault.asp?PagelD=449. 

21. Financial Services Authoriry (2009). 

22. See www.fsa.govollk. 
186 


81763.129

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

MICHAEL LEA 

the behavioural biases of consumers, and be mote interventionist to help protect 

consumers from themselves .... Overall, we think that our regulatOl:Y strategy 

needs to change to one that rdies less on disclosure as a regulatory tool and looks 

to influence consumer behaviour in a more sophisticated way." The FSA is signaling that consumer protection can be improved, "for example, through banning 

products or prohibiting sales to those consumers exhibiting multiple high-risk 

characteristics or limiting the amount of equity that can be withdrawn." 

The FSA is not alone in contemplating fundamental consumer protection 

reform. Australia is also in the process of strengthening its consumer protections.23 

The Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been in existence since the 

mid-1990s at the state level. The code empowers the courts to set aside mortgage 

agreements where the lender could reasonably have known that the borrower 

would not be able to repay the loan without causing substantial hardship. N umerous cases highlight the circumstances in which the courts have taken action to protect the interests of the borrower. 

The National Consumer Protection Bill of 2009 was promulgated ro create 

unifonn nationwide legislation to replace existing (but varied) state legislation. 

The Australian Securities and Investment Commission was tapped to be the sole 

regulator of the new national credit framework and given enhanced enforcement 

powers. The code requires all providers of consumer credit and credit-related brokering services and advice to obtain a license from the commission. It extends the 

scope of credit products covered by the code to regulate the provision of consumer 

mortgages over residential investment properties. The bill requires licensees to 

assess each consumer's capacity to repay credit ro ensure that the credit contract 

is nor unsuitable for the consumer's objectives, needs, and financial circumstances. 

A second phase planned for 20 I 0 will reform existing disclosures. 

The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada is an independent regulatory body 

working to protect and inform consumers of financial services. 24 It was established 

in 2001 by the federal government to strengthen oversight of consumer issues and 

expand consumer education in the financial sector. As a federal regulatory agency, 

the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada is responsible for the following: 

-Ensuring that federally regulated financial institutions comply with federal 

consumer protection laws and regulations 

-Moniroring financial institutions' compliance with voluntary codes of conduct and their own public commitments 

-Informing consumers about their rights and responsibilities when dealing 

with financial institutions 

-Providing timely and objective infurmation and tools to help consumers to 

understand and shop arowld for a variety of financial products and services. 

23. See 'WVv"W,treasury.gov.au/consumercredit/contenrlpublicacions.asp. 

24. See www.fcac-acfc.gc.cafenglaboutldefault.asp. 
187 


81763.130

Copyright 2011. The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 137 

The recently passed Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation in the United States 

imposes significant restrictions on mortgage product design that are not present in 

other countries.25 The bill bans or restricts the use of prepayment penalties, balloon 

payments, interest-only payments, and other features commonly offered in other 

countries. The bill stipulates the characteristics of qualified mortgages, which is 

likely to result in a greater predominance oflong-term fixed-rate mortgages. 

What Can the United States Learn from Other Countries? 

This brief survey has shown that mortgage finance systems differ significantly 

across countries in structure, funding, role of government, and performance. The 

United States is unique, however, in several respects. It has the highest level of 

government involvement, the greatest use of securitization, and a product mix 

dominated by the long-term fixed-rate mortgage. These attributes are related. The 

long-term fixed-rate mortgage has been the dominant instrument in the United 

States since the Great Depression. Its dominance reflects consumer preferences, 

the ease of prepayment, past restrictions on ARMs, and emergence of the secondary 

mortgage market. However, it results in the federal government absorbing most 

or all of the mortgage credit risk, allowing investors to focus on managing and 

pricing the prepayment risk. 

Despite the high level of government support, the mortgage finance system in 

the United States has perfurmed much worse than those in other countries during the crisis. Furthermore, it does not produce higher rates of homeowners hip or 

levels of mortgage indebtedness than many other countries. It is fair to ask whether 

this unique system is sustainable and whether the U.S. market would be more srable and effective in meeting the needs of borrowers and lenders with a different 

configuration. 

Four interrelated factors should be considered in evaluating a housing finance 

system: the product, the underwriting, the funding, and the role of government. 

These characteristics are so intertwined that it is difficult to evaluate them in isolation. Thus we assess the merits of four different systems: the Danish principle 

of balance model, the European covered bond model, the Canadian and Japanese 

guarantee model, and the Australian and U.K. depository model. Each of these 

systems has strengths and weaknesses and relevance for the United States. 

The Danish Model 

Denmark is the only country in the world other than the United States in which 

the dominant product is the long-term fixed-rate mortgage that can be prepaid 

without penalty. Like the United States, most of Denmark's mortgage market is 

funded through the capital markets. The Danish system adds several important 

attributes that are relevant for the United States. 

25. Lea (2010). 
188 


81763.131

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

MICHAEL LEA 

Figure 4-10. Ratio of Price to Yield for Various Structures of Mortgage 

Risk Transfer 

House price 

Loan value 

Source: Diibel (2005) as presented in Boyce (2010). 

Non-(.-allable (Denmark) 

S'I LOCK·IN 

EFFECT 

rate 

The Danish system is based on the principle of balance. When the borrower 

obtains a mortgage loan, the mortgage credit institution issues a bond into an 

existing bond series. Thus there is a one-to·one equivalence between the loan and 

the bond. The Danish mortgage can be canceled at the lower of the market price 

or par. Like borrowers in the United States, the borrower can refinance the loan 

at par if rates fall. But in the Danish system if rates rise, the borrower can buy the 

mortgage bond funding her loan at a discount and present it to the mortgage 

credit institution to repay the mortgage. This feature has several important bene· 

fits, It allows automatic deleveraging as rates rise and reduces the probability of 

negative equity. Figute 4·1 0 demonstrates the difference between different mortgages as rates change, 

In the United States, most mortgage loans can be called at par, However, loans 

may not be redeemed at the market price when trading at a discount, This allows 

for equity release in the event oflower rates but subjecrs the borrower to a lockin effect when rates rise, The Danish mortgage loan can be prepaid at par or 

redeemed by purchasing the bond at the market price, thus eliminating the lock· 

in effecr. For example, if the borrower has an outsranding balance of $200,000 

and rates rise, the value of the bond may fall to $180,000.26 The borrower can go 

to the bond market (through the mortgage credit institution) and buy back the 

bond and cancel the loan, Thus the borrower saves $20,000 relative to the U.S, 

caseY Danish borrowers exercised this option in significant numbers in 2006 and 

26, Svcnstrup and Willeman (2006). 

27. In most C3S1.".5 the borrower will finance the purchase "'lith a new loan at a higher rate. if rates 

fall, the borrower can refinance at a lower rate, as in the United States. 
189 


81763.132

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 139 

2007 when interest rates were rising, which may have reduced the likelihood of 

negative equity when house prices fen in 2008 and 2009. 

The underwriting of mortgages is more strict in Denmark than in the United 

States. The maximum ratio of loan to value is 80 percent, and the borrower's 

income is fully documented. Danish loans are recourse: in the event of a deficiency, the lender has recourse to the borrower's income and other assets. Danish 

borrowers have in the past been able to obtain loans over 80 percent LTV through 

a top-up loan system, whereby commercial banks provide unsecured loans for the 

amount over the mortgage. 

Mortgage credit institutions in Denmark specialize in residential, commercial, 

and agricultural mortgage lending. The market is highly concentrated, with four 

institutions providing more than 80 percent of the market. There is no explicit 

government backing of the institutions or the bonds they issue. The mortgage 

credit institutions bear all of the credit risk of the mortgages they originate. However, they bear no imerest rate risk due to their unique funding structure. They 

are required to maintain a minimum, risk-weighted capital-to-assets ratio of8 percent. The combination of a low-risk structure and Danish Financial Services 

Agency and covered bond regulation results in low-risk institutions. 28 

Danish mortgages are funded through the issuance of covered bonds. Individualloans are funded by selling the loan into a larger bond series. The bond market is deep, liquid, and vety efficient. The direct link established berween the 

borrower and the bond market facilitates redemption of the bond in the future. 

The mortgage credit institution acts as a liability adviser, helping the borrower to 

obtain the lowest-cost financing. Incentives are aligned in this system in that the 

borrower and lender have "skin in the game" and the lender serves the needs of 

the borrower. Prepayments are less cyclical, as borrowers can exercise the option 

when rates rise or full. 

The Danish system has performed well throughout the crisis. Despite having 

a larger house price bubble (table 4-I), the Danish system has had far fewer 

defaults and foreclosures (see figure 4-11). This can be attributed to less negative 

equity, absence of subprime lending, borrower recourse, and strong regulation. 

The International Monetaty Fund notes that the Danish banking system, including the mortgage credit institutions, has fared well despite a housing boom. They 

attribute this to conservative investments and sound regulation-in particular, 

tight standards of credit risk management and limited market risk.'· 

The Danish mortgage bond market has performed well. There has never been 

a mortgage bond default in its more than 200-year history, and the market 

remained open without government assistance during the liquidity crisis of October 2008. The strengths of the Danish system are incentive compatibility, efficient 

28. Realkredirradet (2009). 

29. IMF (2008b). 
190 


81763.133

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

MICHAEL LEA 

Figure 4-11. Mortgage Delinquency and Forec!oJum in Denmark and the 

United States, 1993-2009 

Mong.lge ddinquem:y 

Percent of total loans 

5.00 

4.50 

4.00 

3.50 

3.00 

2.50 

2.00 

1.50 

l.00 

0.50 

United States, seasonally adjusted 

-Denmark 

~~~~~~~~~~OOOO~~OO __ MN~~~~~~~~~~OO~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oooooooooooooooocooo 

______________ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oooooooooooooooooooo NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

Foreclosures and repossessions 

Percent of loans in foreclosure Number of repossessions 

1.60 4,500 

1.40 

1.20 

1.00 

0.80 

0.60 

0.40 

0.20 

United States; mortgage foredosmes, seasonally adjusted 

-Denmark: repossessions 4,000 

3.500 

3.000 

2.500 

2,000 

1.500 

1.000 

500 

0.00 L ___ -___ ~-:::::::=====::::::::::::::;=:::;:::= ___ ~::::J 0 

~~~~~~~~~~OOOO~~OO __ NNmm9~~~~~~~OOOO~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oooooooooooooooooooo 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oooooooooooooooooooo ____ ~~~ ____ ~~_NMNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 

~~~~&~&~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

Sources; Danish A~sociatiQn of Mortgage Bankers; U.S. Mortgage Bankers Association. 
191 


81763.134

Copyright 2011. The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 

risk allocation without government guarantees, and the potential for autOmatic 

deleveraging. The weaknesses are the need for scale to ensure efficient execution: 

multiple-lender issuers can create scale for smaller lenders.'" 

The European Covered Bond Model 

Covered bonds in other European countries differ from those in the traditional 

Danish model. Mortgage covered bonds are full-recourse debt obligations of the 

issuing financial institution, secured by a pool of performing eligible morrgage 

assets (the cover pool) that remain on the balance sheet of the issuer.31 Covered 

bonds are dual-recoutse instruments. Investors have a priority claim on the cover 

pool assets in the event of an issuer default as well as a general claim on the assets 

of the institution. Thus the lender bears the credit risk of the mortgage. The main 

difference is the collateral. In the Danish model there is a one-to-one correspondence between the loan and the bond, whereas in the Eutopean model a dynamic 

portfolio of mortgage loans backs the bonds. 

Underwriting requirements are strict in the covered bond modeL The maximum LTV varies by country bur does not exceed 80 percent. There are no legislative documentation requirements or deht service restrictions. As noted earlier, 

in most covered bond issuance countries, default rates have been low and mortgage loans are reCOurse obligations. 

In the European covered bond model, bortowers bear potentially significant 

interest rate risk. Covered bonds can be backed by variable-rate mortgages (Spain, 

the United Kingdom) or rollover mortgages (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden). European rollover mortgages have prepayment penalties during the fixedrate period. For example, a common form of rollover mortgage has a twenty-fiveto thirty-year amortization with a five--year fixed-rate period. During the fixed-rate 

period, there is a hefty penalty (typically yield maintenance) for substantial or toral 

prepayment. Thus the borrower cannot release equity if rates fall and is locked in 

if rates rise (the German example in figure 4-10). 

Most countries allow a partial prepayment (for example, 20 percent) without 

penalty. At the end of the fixed-rate period, the loan rate adjusts to the cutrent 

market rate (negotiated with the lender). The borrower can manage the interest 

rate risk to a degree by adjusting the term of the new fixed-rate period (for example, switching from a five-year to a one-year period if rates are expected to fall). 

Lenders are also exposed to portfolio interest rate risk in the European model, 

as outside Denmark there is not a one-to-one match. Covered bond legislation 

stipulates asset-liability matching requirements such as nominal balance, yield, or 

net present value matching. Most European covered bonds also require some over30. A weakness in non~U.S. models is the absence of forward-rate locks and a matket for to-beannounced trades that allows efficient management of pipeline risk. 

31. See European Covered Bond Council (2009) for a detailed explanarion of general and coumryspecific frameworks. 
192 


81763.135

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

MICHAEL LEA 

collateralization. However, these requirements have not stopped lender failure due 

to asset-liabiliry mismatch. Realkreditradet notes that the Irish, German, and Belgian governments had to step in and rescue covered bond issuers that suffered 

losses due to an interest rate mismatch between their mortgage loans and bonds. 

By legislation, covered bond issuers must be regulated banks---commercial, 

savings, cooperative, or mortgage. There has been a decline in specialist mortgage 

banks, and in most countries covered bond issuers are lenders with a diversified 

mix of funding. 

The European covered bond markets were stressed during the crisis. Issuance 

of jumbo covered bonds (minimum €l billion) dropped to near zero in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy. It was only restarted in the first quarter of2009, 

aftet the European Central Bank announced a purchase program of up to €65 

billion. One reason for the decline in issuance has been the widespread government guarantees of bank debt that have crowded out covered bonds in most countries during the crisis.'2 Unlike the U.S. Federal Reserve purchase program, which 

purchased more than the net new supply of agency mortgage-backed securities 

(MBSs) in 2009, the European Central Bank program has been limited, and private investors have returned to the market. 

Secondary spreads widened dramatically during the crisis and are still well 

above recent historical averages (sec figure 4-12). Investors differentiate among 

covered bond countries. Spreads arc much wider in countries with weaker legislation and greater housing market turmoil (Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom). 

The strengths of the covered bond model are incentive alignment (for borrowers and lenders) and achievement of capital market access without government 

guarantees. The weakness is in the allocation of interest rate risk. Borrowers have 

substantial interest rate risk as they face unlimited interest rate change at rollover 

and are locked in during the fixed-rate term. The longest term is rypically ten 

years, although there are fifteen-year fixed-rate periods in France and Germany. 

Lenders have suffered losses from interest rate risk, and legislative and regulatory 

asset-liability matching requirements have been tightened. 

The Australian and U.K Depository Mode! 

The dominant Australian and U.K. mortgage lenders are large diversified banks 

that fund with deposits and MBS issuance. In recent years U.K. lenders have also 

used covered bonds. The dominant mortgage products in these countries are discretionary ARMs, typically with a one- ro two-year initial discounted fixed-rate 

period. This product is ideal for depository lenders, allowing them to match assets 

and liabilities effectively. In the past discretionary ARMs performed in a manner 

32. The RMBS market has been dosed to new issuance, with new Issues retained by lenders and 

repo'd with central banks. Secondary spreads have declined but remaIn historically high-much 

higher than on covered bonds. 
193 


81763.136

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 

Figure 4-12. Covered Bond Spreads in Select Countries, 2008--10 

hp 

350 

'43 

Source: BorA MerrilJ Lynch Global Re_~em:h; our ~pre~d calculations aft: b;lscd on Reuters' The 

spreads are generic spreads of 5-year Tumbos from the respective jurisciinions. Our for 

Germany tolkes into account mortgage and public covered bonds, 

similar to U.S. cost-of-funds-indexed loans, as lenders price mortgages at a margin over their average cost of funds. Basing interest rate changes on lenders' costs 

of funds docs shield the borrower from some interest rate risk (relative to AIU.1s 

indexed to short-term government or money market ratcs), as the COSt of funds is 

nOt as volatile as these rates. In rccem years rate changes have followed central 

hank policy rare changes. lenders in the United Kingdom have heen moving to 

indexed or tracker AIUv!s, in part due to consumer complaims about the differential treatment of new versus existing borrowers. Both countries are notable in 

the absence of medium- to long-term fixed-rate mortgages." 

Alrhough borrowers bear inrerest risk in this model, the use of ARMs has 

cushioned the downturn. Both ,he British Building Society Association and the 

Council of Mortgage Lenders attribure low rates of mortgage default to the 

exceptionally low mortgage interest rates. The question is how borrowers will 

respond to the inevitable rightening of credit and rise in interest rates. Australia 

has some experience, as it was the first major country TO begin raising rates coming out of the crisis. House prices have been rising in Australia, and default rares 

remain low. 

Mortgage loans predominately remain on the balance sheet of lenders in this 

model. Although there is no government guarantee or insurance in this model, 

33, See Miles (2004), 
194 


81763.137

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

144 MICHAEL LEA 

pre-crisis securirization accounted fOr as much as 25 percent of mortgage debt outstanding. In Australia about one-third of mortgages have 100 percent default 

insurance from private mortgage insurers. Almost all Australian securitization 

transactions have credit enhancement (loan or pool) from a mortgage insurer. Ptivate mortgage insurance is available, but not widely used in the United Kingdom, 

and credit enhancement comes primarily from structuring. 

Underwriting of mortgages was more liberal in Australia and the United Kingdom than in continental Europe, but more strict than in the United States. Nonconforming loans in Australia were low-documentation or high LTV loans-very 

few true sub prime loans were granted. The U.K. lenders provided loans to borrowers with adverse credit as well as low documentation and high ratios ofloan to 

value. As noted earlier, default rates on nonconforming products were much 

higher than on bank-originated conforming loans. 

The regulatory performance in these two countries has been mixed. The Australia Prudential Regulatory Authoriry and the Reserve Bank of Australia have 

been credited with cooling a house price boom in the mid-2000s. The U.K. FSA 

has been criticized for its oversight and resolution of mortgage lenders such as 

Northern Rock and Halifax Bank of Scotland." 

Both governments supported the market during the crisis with mortgage securiry purchase programs. In September 2008 the Australian government announced 

that it would invest A$4 billion, which was then increased to A$8 billion in 

October via its asser management arm-the Ausrralian Office of Financial 

Management-to purchase AAA-rated RMBSs to shore up investor confidence in 

the sector and revive competition in the mortgage market." The securirization 

market reopened in September 2009, and more than A$6 billion in securities have 

been purchased by privare investors since thar time. The U.K. government has 

broadened the eligibility guidelines for central bank repurchases to include most 

AAA mortgage securiries, Four RMBSs were issued in late 2009 and early 20 1 0 with 

wider margins, significantly greater credit enhancement, and purs to the issuer.36 

Although mortgage markets have performed better in Australia and the United 

Kingdom than in the United States during the crisis, it is unlikely that U.S. mortgage borrowers are going to accept adjustable-rate mortgages in high proportions. 

But the U.S. market may move in this direction as large banks have increasing 

market share. A strength of this model during the crisis was the reduction in borrower repayment burdens as interesr rates fell, but a weakness is the risk of higher 

defaults when and if interest rates rise. 

34. House of Common, (2008). 

35. Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2009b). 

36. Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2010). 
195 


81763.138

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE '45 

The Canadian and Japanese Guarantee Model 

The Canadian and Japanese mortgage markets have had less dislocation than the 

markets in mosr other developed countries. They have avoided the high rates of 

default, lender failures, and large house price dedines evident in other countries. 

Commentators attribute this performance to more conservative lending practices, 

tighter regulation, and government guarantees.37 Of course, Japan has never truly 

recovered from the property boom and bust of the late 19805 and has had anemic 

economic performance since. 

. The Canadian model mixes attributes of the European and U.S, models. The 

dominant instrument is the rollover mortgage, similar to that found in continental Europe. The maximum interest rate fixed period is five years, although a few 

ten-year fixed rerms were offered prior to the crisis, As in Europe there are significant penalties for early repayment. Thus most interest rare risk is borne by borrowers. Japanese borrowers have somewhat greater abiliry to manage interest rate 

risk through the use of convertible and flexible-term mortgages. 

Canadian borrowers have responded to falling and low short-term interest rates 

by switching to variable-rate mortgages. More than 45 percent of new mortgages 

taken out in the first three quarters of2008 were variable rate, increasing the stock 

of such loans ro 25 percent of the totaVB The abiliry to switch between variablerate and medium-term fixed-rate loans affords Canadian borrowers some abiliry 

to manage interest rate risk. The Canadian government did offer interest rate 

insurance from 1984 ro 1997, but it had a very low take-up. 

Lenders and the government hold credit risk in Canada. The government 

supports mortgage lending and funding through mortgage insurance and securiry guarantees, similar to the Federal Housing Authority and Ginnie Mae in 

the United States. Canada is unique in requiring mortgage insurance on all bankoriginated mortgages with LTV greater than 80 percent. Approximately 50 percent of all bank-owned mortgages are insured, and almost all securitized loans are 

insured." Requiring mortgage insurance has two benefits: it provides an outside 

review of lender practices and ensures risk capital in the origination process. 

CMHC guarantees have kept rhe MBS market functioning during the crisis. The 

CMHC has no quantitative affordable housing goals comparable to those of the 

government-sponsored entities (GSEs) in the United St:ltes. The Japan Housing 

Finance Agency retains credit risk on loans it purchases and securirizes (approximately 25 percent of the market). 

Canadian lenders and insurers are relatively conservative in underwriting. Payment affordabiliry criteria are similar to those in the U.S, prime market. A small 

37. See Kilf (2009) JOr a Canadian di,ellssion. 

38. CMHC (2009). 

39. There are private mortgage insurers in Canada The government provides a 90 percent backstop on their liabilities. 
196 


81763.139

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Insmution 

MICHAEL LEA 

A1t-A market is aimed at self-employed borrowers with difficulty documenting 

income. The maximum LTV is 95 percent, and all bank-owned loans with LTV 

greater than 80 percent ate required to have mortgage insurance. Mortgages are 

recourse obligations. Kiff notes the differences in the relative treatment of prepayment in Canada and the United States.40 Although Canadian lenders impose 

prepayment penalties, the origination (transaction) cost to the borrower is lower. 

His calculations suggest that the cost to refinance (penalty plus transaction cost) 

is comparable between the two countries. Prepayment penalties are not common 

in Japan, and borrowers frequently make partial prepayments. 

The Canadian financial regulatory structure is widely credited with enhancing 

the stabiliry of the system. The International Monetary Fund has commended the 

Canadians for their highly effective and nearly unified regulatory and supervisory 

framework.4' Freeland notes that conservative mortgage market regulation, including the requiremem thar all loans over 80 percent LTV have mortgage insurance, 

has contribured to Canada's stable mortgage market.42 

The government acted to support the MBS market during the crisis by committing to purchase C$125 billion of CMHC-guaranteed securities in October 

2008. Issuance of CMHC-guaranteed MBSs and Canada bonds rose sharply in 

2008 and 2009, reHecting the value of the guarantee and the Bank of Canada purchase program. 

Conclusion 

There is no ideal housing finance system. Arrangements in an individual country 

reHect the country's history, market structure, and government policy. However, 

the housing finance systems in almost all countries performed better during the 

crisis than the system in the United States. In examining the different systems, we 

can make several observations abour what worked and whether it is applicable to 

the United States. 

The Danish system offers the prospect of real improvement for the U.S. system. It retains the core long-term fixed-rate mortgage product but makes it more 

consumer and invesror friendly by adding the option to repay the loan through 

the bond mark" if rates rise. This feature would have reduced some of the negative equity built up in the U.S. system during the crisis and the significant extension risk faced by mortgage securiry investors today. As discussed by Boyce, the 

Danish system could be implemented in the United States through the GSE cash 

purchase programs, which were significant during the 19805 before being largely 

phased out in favor of swaps and bulk purchases from individual lenders. 

40, Kiff (2009). 

41. IMF (2008.). 

42. Freel.nd (2010). 
197 


81763.140

Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 147 

The Danish model is also better at aligning incentives, as the credit risk remains 

on the balance sheet of the lender, with substanrial capital requiremenrs. In theory a Danish-style covered bond model could replace the GSE funding model. 

Although dropping government guarantees at the currenr time would be unwise 

and infeasible, as the crisis dissipates, the United States could move to a hybrid 

model in which Danish-sryle mortgage bonds have a backup government guarantee (for example, a Ginnie Mae wrap).43 A model in which a private guarantor 

or issuer holds significant capital, combined with private mortgage insurance, 

would come close to achieving a similar allocation of credit risk as in the Danish 

system. Restricting the government role to guarantees without portfolio accumulation of mortgages would reduce the systemic risk of the U.S. housing finance 

system in line with the more targeted and stable Canadian system. 

If the United States wanrS to reduce the role of government in the funding of 

mortgages, it could move toward a European-style covered bond model. Although 

less desirable than the Danish model from the perspective of interest rate risk allocation, it does align incentives and creates a liquid, simple, and low-risk security 

with which to fund housing. As noted, there is some flexibility for borrowers to 

manage interest rate risk, and insurance products could be offered to reduce the 

exposure of borrowers to interest rate risk even further. The rollover mortgage is 

a much simpler instrument than the U.S. ARM with the prospect for improved 

consumer disclosure and less short-term interest rate and payment volatility than 

a traditional U.S. ARM. 

Recourse is an important feature of most developed-country housing finance 

systems that would reduce credit risk for lenders, investors. and the governmenr. 

Research in Europe has found that the propensiry to default in the face of an 

adverse income shock is closely related to the punishmenr incurred by doing so, 

which depends on the legal framework.44 Recenr U.S. research suggests that 

recourse decreases the probability of default when a borrower has negative home 

equity.41 

Governmenr policy supporting homeownership could be adjusted to focus less 

on mortgage debt and leverage. Many developed countries achieve similar or 

higher rates of homeowners hip than the United States without a mortgage inrerest deduction or government subsidies for mortgage debt (GSE support). The 

U.S. tax system has contributed to excessive borrower leverage and a high degree 

of negative equity. The First Time Homeownership Tax Credit Program of 2009 

could be expanded to replace the mortgage interest deduction (which could be 

phased out over rime through lowered maximum tax rates or deduction amounrs, 

as was the case in the United Kingdom during the 1990s). 

43. Jallee (2010). 

44. Duygan .nd Grant (2008). 

45. Ghent and Kudlyak (2009). 
198 


81763.141

Copyright 2011. The Brookings Institution 

MICHAEL LEA 

The decline in underwriting standards inherent in subprime lending clearly was 

responsible for extending and accentuating the housing boom in the Unired Stares, 

worsening the housing bust, and creating the spark thar rriggered the financial crisis. No other country experienced a similar decline in standards. Several countries 

started down this road, but none created a market with as poor-quality loans as 

the United States. Several facrors appear to be responsible. First no other COUntry 

had a shadow banking system as significant as that of the United States. In all 

other countries there was greater regulatoty oversight of mortgage lending, which 

may have slowed the move to lower standards. Having one financial regulator with 

responsibility for nonbank as well as bank lenders is an important attribute of regularion. Second, mortgage lending in most markets is dominated by large commercial banks. There is some evidence (for example, in Australia) that large lenders 

avoided the excesses of nonconforming lending due to concerns about reputation 

risk. Third, governments in other countries placed less policy emphasis on homeownership, an emphasis thar many commentators suggested was responsible for 

parr of the subprime problem in the United Stares. Finally, reqwring lenders 

explicitly to consider borrower affordability, as is the case in many other countries, would have reduced rhe prevalence of stated-income loans and reaser ARlvIs. 

Unlike most developed countries, the United States is still mired in a housing 

and mortgage crisis. Continued and expanded government support of the mOrtgage market is essential to irs current survival. Bur when the recovery begins, U.S. 

policymakers should ask themselves whether it is desirable that most, if not all, of 

the U.S. mortgage market is guaranteed by the taxpayer, whether ir is necessaty 

thar a majority of U.S. mortgages are securitized, and whether homeownership 

should receive as much emphasis and policy support as ir did before rhe crisis. 

Examination of the finance of housing from orher developed countries suggesrs 

that alternative arrangements with far less support from the government can 

achieve outcomes rhat are more robust than the arrangements in the United States. 

References 

Amherst Securities. 2009. "The Mortgage Market! Outlook and Opportunities." December. 

Australian Treasury Deparrment. 2008. l'Financial Services and Credit RefOrm: Improving. 

Simplifying, and Standardising Financial Services and Credit Regulation." Green Paper. 

Canberra aune), 

Bank of America Merrill Lynch. 2009a. "Ausrralian R..'VfBS Performance Update." London 

(October). 

---. 2009b. "European Structured Finance Markers 2009-2010." London (November). 

---.2010. "The: Securitisation Market: Open for Business." London (March), 

Boyce, Alan. 2010. "The Danish Mortgage System Offers Some Practical Tools furthe GSEs." 

Presentation to the Center for Study of Responsive Lawt Washington, January. 

CMHC (Canada Mortgage and HousingCorporation). 2009. 2009 Canadian HouJingObsen'<r. 

Ottawa. 

Dubd, A. 2005. '(European Mortgage Markets-Conjectures on Macro Implications of 

Structural Idiosyncrasy." Presentation given at the DG ECFIN conference. Brussels, 

November 21. 
199 


81763.142

Copyright 2011, The Brookings instttution 

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MORTGAGE FlNANCE '49 

Duygan, Burell. and Charles Gram. 2008. "Household Debt Repayment Behavior: \Xlhat Role 

Do InstitUtions Play?" Working Paper 08-3. Federal Re.~erve Board ofBasmo, Quantitative 

An:dysis Unit (March). 

Ellis, Lucy. 2008. "The Housing Meltdown: Why Did It Happen in the United States?" BIS 

Working Paper 259. Basel: Bank for Internation:d Settlements (September). 

European Covered Bond Council. 2009. Factbook 2009. Brussels. 

European Mongage Federation. 2009a. Hypostat. Brussels. 

---. 2009b. Quarterly Review Second Quarter 2009. Brussels. 

Financi:d Services Authority. 2009. Mortgage Market Review. London (October). 

Financial Times. 2010. "Nex[ up for Europe: Covered Bond Catastrophe?" Financial Times, 

February 5. 

Freeland. Chrystia. 2010. "\Xlhat Toronto Can Teach New York and London." Financial 

Times, January 29. 

Ghent. Andra, and Marianna Kudlyak. 2009. «Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: 

Thcotyand Evidence from the United States." Working Paper 09-10. Richmond, Va.: Federal 

Reserve Bank of Richmond Guly). 

Gkbal Property Guide. n.d. Manila. www.globalpropcrtyguide.com. 

House of Commons. 2008. Run on the Rock. Fifrh Repon of Session 2007-08. London: 

Treasury Committee Oanuary). 

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2ooBa. "Canada Financi:d Stability Assessment Update." 

Washington (February). 

---. 200gb. "Denmark: 2008 Article IV Consultation; Update." Washington (December). 

-'--. 2009. "The Changing Housing Cycle and ImpHcarions for Monetary Policy." In 

World Economic Outkok, ch. 3. Washingron, October. 

Jaffee, Dwight. 2010. "The Future Role of Fanoie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. Mortgage 

Market .... Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association and 

the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, Atlanta, Ga.~ January 3. 

Joint Center for HousingStudies. 2009. Stak oftheNatiuns HOUfing2009. Harvard Universiry. 

Kiff, John. 2009. "Canadian Residenti:d Mortgage Markets: Boring but Effective." IMF Working Paper "WP/09/130. Washington: International Monetary Fund Onne}. 

Lea, Michael. 2009. "The Political Economy of Mortgage Insurance: The Australian Experience." Paper presented at the Joint 2009 international conference of the A .. ian Real Estate 

Sodery and the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, Los Angeles. July. 

2010. "International Comparison of Mongage Profit Offerings." Research Insotute 

for Housing America, Washington, D.C., September. 

Lunde. Jens, Karhleen Scanlon. and Christine 'Whitehead. 2009. "Mortgage Products and 

Government Policies to Help Troubled Mortgagors: Responses co the Credit Crisis." Paper 

presenred at the international conference "Changing Housing Markets: Integration and 

Segmentation." European Network for Housing Research. Prague, June. 

Miles, David. 2004. "The U.K. Mortgage Market: Taking a Longer View; Fin:d Report and 

Recommendations.» London: Her Majesty's Treasury (.t\.-1arch). 

Netherlands., Ministry of Housing. Spatial Planning, and the Environmenr. n.d. "Housing 

Funds." The Hague. www.vrom.nl/pagina.htmI1id=37432. 

Re:dkreditradet. 2009. The Traditional Danish Mortgage Model Copenhagen 

Reserve Bank of Ausu:dia. 2009. Financial Stability Review. Canberra (September). 

Standard and Poor's. 2009.japan s ResidmtialMortgage Loan Characteristics and Trends: RMBS 

Outlookfor 2009. New York Guly). 

Svensuup, Mikkel. and Soren Willeman. 2006. "Reforming Housing Finance: Perspectives 

from Denmark." Journal of Real Estate R,;earch 28, no. 2: 105-30. 

Winkler, Sabine, and Nexander Batchvarov. 2009. Gkbal Covered Bond Markets 2009-2010. 

Bank of America Merrill Lynch, November 2009. 
200 


81763.143

Government Policy and 

the Fixed Rate Mortgage 

Michael Lea 1 and Anthony B. Sanders2 
201 


81763.144

INTRODUCTION 

A central argument in the ongoing discussion about the fates of Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac is the importance of the 30~ycar, fixed-rate., prcpayable mortgage (hereafter referred 

to as the FRM). David Min (2010) of the Center for American Progress asserts that the 

FRM is an essential part of the U.S. housing-finance system. Susan Woodard (2010, p. 6) 

emphasizes the special role of the FRM, stating, "Americans now seem to regard the 

availability of long-term fixed-rate mortgages as part of their civil rights." Adam Levitin 

and Susan Wachter assert that the FRM is critical for sustainable homeownership {Levitin 

& Wachter 2010). All four analysts advocate continued government support of Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac to preserve the FRM. 

The FRM occupies a central role in the U.S. housing-finance system. The dominant 

instrument since the Great Depression, the FR11 currently accounts for more than 90% of 

mortgage originations. One reason why it enjoys enduring popularity is that the FRM is a 

consumer~friendly instrument. Not only does the FRM offer payment stability, but also the 

instrument provides a one-sided bet in the borrower's favor. If rates rise, the borrower 

benefits from a helow-market interest rate. If rates fall, the borrower can benefit from 

exercising the prepayment option in the FRM to lower their mortgage interest rate. 

But these consumer benefits have costs. It is cosdy to provide a fixed nominal interest 

rate for as long as 30 years. And the prepayment option creates significant costs. If rates 

rise, the lender has a below-market rate asset on its books, If rates faU, the lender again 

loses as the mortgage is replaced hy another with a lower interest rate. To compensate for 

this risk, lenders incorporate a premium in mortgage rates that all borrowers pay regardless of whether they benefit from refinance. Exercise of the prepayment option in the 

contract also has significant transa.ctions costs for the borrower and imposes additional 

operating costs on the mortgage industry. 

Another major reason for the FRM's dominance is government support and regulatory 

favoritism. The FRM is subsidized through the securitization activities of Fannie Mae, 

Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. Their securities benefit from a government guarantee that 

lowers the relative cost of the instrument, which is their core product. These guarantees 

have a significant cost, as the government backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has 

exposed taxpayers to Jarge losses. 

Are the FRM's benefits worth its costs? Would the FRM disappear if Fannie and 

Freddie stopped financing it? Are there mortgage alternatives that balance the needs of 

consumers and investors without exposing the taxpayer to inordinate risk? This review 

seeks to answer these questions. starting with a brief history of the l'''RM and emphasizing the government's ongoing role in enhancing its presence. The review then discusses 

the FRM's benefits and costs to consumers, investors, taxpayers. and the economy and 

ends with a depiction of a world in which Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac no longer 

support the FRM. 

THE FIXED-RATE, PREPAYABLE MORTGAGE: A BRIEF HISTORY 

The FRM has been the dominant instrument throughout the post-Depression period. Prior 

to the Depression, the standard mortgage instrument was a five- to IO-year, fixedMrate, 

non-amortizing loan that required borrowers to refinance or repay the loan at the end of its 

term. Then, in 1934, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA} effectively created the 

13.2 Lea· Sanders 
202 


81763.145

FRM with the National Housing Act, which authorized the FHA as a mutual insurance 

company providing mortgage insurance on specific mortgage types. I The original FHA 

mortgage had the following features: 

• It was fully amortizing with a fixed, annual-contract interest rate of 5.5%. 

• It required a minimum down payment of 20% of the property's appraised value. 

• Its maximum term was 20 years. 

• Its maximum loan amount was $16,000. 

• It was freely assumable . 

.. It had no prepayment penalty. 2 

Over time the maximum term and loan amounts have increased, and FRMs have become 

due on sale. 

Government policy supported the FRM from its inception. Fannie Mae (initially the 

Federal National Mortgage Association) was created as a government agency in 1938 to 

purchase FHA morrgages. FHA- and later Veteran Affairs-insured mortgages were the 

dominant instruments until the 196Ds. The government insurers set rates administratively that made lt difficult for noninsured loans to compete with government-insured 

instruments. (See Bodfish & Theobald 1940 for savings and loan complaiuts about FHA 

pricing.) Federally insured savings and loan institutions (S&Ls) were restricted to offering 

only fixed~rate mortgages until 1981.J 

Ginnie Mae, also a government agency, was created in 1968 to liquidate the subsidized 

portfolio held by Fannie Mae, which was privatiud in that year. Ginnie Mae developed 

the mortgage-backed security to facilitate liquidation. Ginnie Mae began guaranteeing 

securitized pools of FHA- and Veteran Mfairs-insured loans in 1970, providing a full faith 

and credit~ timely payment guarantee facilitating their sale. 

The government created Freddie Mac in 197-0 to assist S&Ls in managing the intercst~ 

rate and liquidity risk inherent to the FRM. Accounting and tax policies in the 19805 that 

made it easier for S&Ls to sell undenvater FRMs without immediately recognizing a Joss 

stimulated the development and growth of the secondary mortgage market.4 Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac introduced the concept of the swap in the 19805 that anowed lenders to 

exchange their portfolios of FRMs for securities with lower capital requirements reducing 

the cost of holding the loans. The large~scale sale of FRMs increased liquidity in fixed-rate 

mortgage securities, leading to improved pricing. The timely payment guarantees on mortgage securities provided by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac lowered the relative 

lSavings and loans offered amortizing mortgages thr(Jugh sinking fund and level payment at!'3ngements. In 1930. 

such instrument5 accounted for approximately half of loans outstanding. Their average term was 11 years. See 

Bodfish & Theobold (1940). 

2Howevcr, a 1935 amendment to the National Ho-using Act authorized a prepayment pMalty equal to the lesser of 

1 % of the original mongage amount or the amount of premium payments tlle borrower would have been required tv 

pay if the FHA,iusured mongagc had remained in force throltgh its maturity date (Herwg 2009). 

'~Savings and loans originated nongovernment-insured loans but w.ere sltbject to regulatiou that required fixed-rate 

lending (ostensibly for con$Umc( protection reasons). Thel! lending was to harrower..: who could not qualify for FHA 

loaus (either due to underwriting or loan size restrictions). 

4The sellers incurred an economic loss as investors PlJrl;:hased the loans at market prices. For regulatory accounting 

purposes the ~eller could remgni:re the loss over the remaining term of the loan. Deferred loss. accouuting proved to 

be a poisoned chalice for many savings and loans. Not only did the policies !ead them to sell their FRMs at the wrong 

time-when rates were high but falling-·but also, the 1989 Ftnanc.ial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act !eg!slation e!imittated it for regulatory capital purposes, rendering many institutions insolvent. 

www,annualreviews.org • Government Policy and the Fixed RAte Mortgage 13.3 
203 


81763.146

price of securities backed by conforming fixed-rate loans, increasing the instrument's 

market share. 5 

The prepayment feature is a key factor in the FRM's dominance. FRMs contain an 

embedded option for borrowers to prepay their Joans without penalty. Government policy 

promotes this feature: Many states ban prepayment penalties on fRMs, and Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac will not enforce a prepayment penalty on FRMs they purchase. 6 

Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) were introduced by state-chartered S&Ls in the 

19605 and allowed by reguLHion for federalty chartered institutions in 1981. Since then) 

the FRM's marht share has fluctuated based on the level and direction of interest rates. 

AR1I,.ts have achieved a market share as high as 35% for some short periods (when the 

FRM-ARM spread is wide or rising), but for the most part have had a market share of 20% 

or less (Krainer 2010). Although Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA have introduced 

ARM products, these agencies have directed most of their efforts toward developing and 

enhancing their fixed-rate offerings.. Today, more than 90% of mortgage originations are 

FRMs, reflecting Federal Reserve efforts to keep rates low through monetary policy and 

quantitative easing, and because Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae are the only 

funding sources for mortgage loans. 

The 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform bill enshrined the FRM's dominance through 

the qualified mortgage.' Lenders will get safe harbor from risk-retention requirements 

for qualified residential mortgages (QRMs), as well as other regulatory benefits. Lenders 

will likely make QRMs their loans of choice~ relegating non-QRMs to the nonbanking, 

non~govemments sponsored enterprise (GSE, a limited purpose government chartered 

corporation) realms of private-market securitizations through private-equity funds~ real 

estate investment trusts, and other vehicles. 

Benefits of Fixed-Rate, Prepayable Mortgages 

A long history of government support is not the onfy reason for the FRM's dominance. The 

instrument offers consumers several advantages. First and foremost, it provides nominal 

payment stability, which helps consumers budget and reduces the likelihood of default. 

The monthly payment on an fR1v[ is the same throughout the life of the loan. whereas 

borrowers with AR..'M:s can experience payment shock in a volatile inrerest~rate environment, making them more likely to default.ll The FRM is also a simple instrument for 

borrowers to understand, which has led to proposals that lenders be required to offer the 

instrument to consumers applying for a mortgage (Thaler 2009). 

~James VICkery (2007) analyzes the FRM/ARM market share as a function of the instruments' rdative ptil::e, 

comrolling for the rcnn structure of imerest rlltes and other rime·seties factors. He t"in.ds that a 20 basis-point 

im;:rease in the retail FRM interest rate is e&fim~ted to callSe a 17 pe{centllge PQinr decline in the FRM market share. 

~[nterestingly, many ARMs hav<, prepayment penalties, and Fannie and Freddie wit! enforce them. 

7 A plain-vanilla mortgage amortizes In 30 years or less, is fully documented, and has reasonable rates and fues. The 

FRM is a qualified mortgage, as is a vani!l~ ARM. Howc"ITr, the requirement that bonowers be <jualified at the 

highest possible rate dllTing the first five years of the term suggestS that mOst quahfied mortgages will be FRMs. Most 

AR1vIs. interest--{)nly mottgagl:"S, and high-coS! loans will Ix nonqualified. QRlvl.s will be exempt from the {e.qUlrement that loao sellers remin at least 5% of the risk. Risk reteI:tion will raise the cost of nOflqualified mortgages, 

reducing their market share. See Lea (2010). 

BARMs ha~e had a much worse default .experience during the recession. In part, this reflects the predominance of 

AR,\fs in the subp(ime market. Jt also rdlects a selection bias whereby riskier and more speculative borrowers went 

into ARMs. For an aM!ysis of the latter. see Barlevy & FIsher (2010). 

I3.4 Lea· Sanders 
204 


81763.147

The option to prepay an FRM without penalty is another consumer advantage,9 This 

feature effectively converts the FRM into a downwardly adjustable instrument. When 

market interest rates fal1~ the borrower can refinance into a new loan at a lower rate. When 

rates rise, the fixed-rate feature protects the borrower against rising mortgage payments. 

Thus, the FRM (as opposed to a short-term ARM, for example) shields borrowers 

from most interest-rate risk. But the risk does not disappear-the lower the risk for the 

borrower, the greater it is for the lender/investor. 

Costs afFixed-Rate, ['repayable Mortgages 

The instrument's supporters point out that it is easier for investors than consumers to 

manage interest-rate risk. It is true rhat lenders and investors have more tools at rheir 

disposal to manage interest-rate risk. But managing prepayment risk is costly and difficult 

and many institutions have suffered significant losses as a result (e.g., savings and loans in 

the 1980s; hedge funds and mortgage companies in the 1990s and 2000S).1O Furthermore, 

borrowers rarely stay in the same home or keep the same mortgage for 15 to 30 years,11 so 

one can reasonably ask why rates should be fixed for such long periods (increasing the 

loan's cost and risk). Also, the taxpayer ultimately bears a significant portion of the risk 

through support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

Min (2010) argues that the FRM promotes financial- and housing-market stahility. 

A system dominated by ARMs or short-term fixed-rate mortgages is more sensitive to 

interest-rate fluctuations than one dominated by tbe FRM and can contribute to boombust cycles in housing. Housing demand is more rapidly influenced by monetary poJicy 

with ARJI"is rdative to FRMs. But FRMs hardly eliminate housing cycles. The United 

States has experienc~d pronounced housing cycles in most decades since World War H. 

including a massive housing boom and bust in the last decade. Min attributes the most 

recent cycle to the rapid growth in short-duration mortgages. In large part, the shortening 

average life of mortgages reflects the widespread exercise of the FRM prepayment option. 

The FRM has a uniquely one-sided design that protects the borrower at the expense of 

the lender/investor. But such protection comes at a cost. LongeHerm fixed-rate loans have 

higher rates than shorter-term fixed-rate loans in most interest-rate environments {Table 1}. 

Having a range of fixed-rate tcrms allows the borrower to tradc off monthly payment 

stability with overall mortgage afford ability. For example, a mortgage whose interest rate 

is fixed for 30 years will usually have the highest interest rate, whereas a 3:1 ARM, whose 

interest rate is only fixed for the first three years, will usually have the lowest interest rate. 

Also, prepayable mortgages have higher rates than non-prepayable mortgages. In e[fect~ 

an U.S. mortgage borrowers pay for the option to refinance, regardless of whether they 

9Prepayment is not costless, however. There au significant trani>action cost~ a!>Sociated with refinancing, John Kiff 

(2009) compar~ Canadian and U.S. mortgage origination COS1;5. and finds that the U.S. COSts are three to five times 

higher for pIlIchase loans and comparable for refinance loans (Canadian prepayment penalties are similar to the 

transactions coots of a U.S. transaction), Also. frequent refinancing often results. in equity stripping, incn,asing the 

probahility ot future default. 

lIThe uncertainty about prepayment leads to considerablespl"(:ulation on the future direct1()n or mortgage rates that 

has lint\': social benefit. Hedging also increases systemic risk rhrough counterpany t'xpOSllte. The huge hedge 

positions of Fannie and Freddie were one reason why the government pbced theln in consen'atorship in 200S. 

110ver the past 50 years the average life of a 30'year mortgage has neVEr bt:en higher than 12 years jduring periods 

oJ high interest rates) and otten no more than fiye y~.ars {during {X'riods of lower interest rat-es) (Dennis & Pinkowish 

2004). 

WU!tu.otlnffiJlret'iew$.org" Covermnellt Policy and the Fi;r;edRate Mortgage r3.5 
205 


81763.148

Table 1 Mongag:e pricing.~,b 

exercise it. This system differs from the Canadian and European systems. In those systems, 

the borrower receives a short- to medium-term fixed-rate loan without a free prepayment 

oplion. If the borrower wants to prepay for financial reasons (as opposed to moving), they 

must pay 0 penalty equivalent to the investor's or lendct's cost to reinvest {he proceeds 

at the new, Iowa market rate. The option's cost is thus individu,diz,cd-borne hy the 

individual exercising the option. In the United States, the option's cost is socialized, with 

all borrowers poying a premium in their mortgage rates (on average, approximately SO 

basis points, or 0.5%) (Lea 2010, Supra note 12). In effect, the prepayment option is a tax 

on all borrowers. 

Be('anse all borrowers pay for the prepayment option, horrowers who do not exercise 

the option effectively suhsidize tbose who do. Most often, unsophisticated borrowers who 

arc intimidated by the refinance process or who arc credit impaired pay the subsidy. The 

latter group is most likely to benefit;.1t the margin (i.e., hy lowering the risk of default) but 

least able to refinance. 

Alex Pollock (2011) points out another significant problem with the FRM. When 

interest rates and house prices are rising, borrowers benefit from constant nominal and 

falling real mortgage payments and get to keL'p the inflation premium in the house price. 

But if interest Tates are low and hous(~ prices are falling, a dark side emerges. Borrowers 

often cannot refinance because of the fall in hOllse prices, and they are stuck with high 

nominal and real mortgage payments and potential negative equity. As a result, they are 

unable to take advantage of historically low interest rates. Many horrowers find themselves in this situarion today. 

The potential for negative equity with ,) slowly amortizing mortgage product is daunrjog. For example, Figure 1 shows what would happen with a 30-ycar, fixed-rate mortgage 

paydown when house prices arc dedining by 2.5% per month. In this example, the 

borrower is in negative-equity territory by month 11, given that house prices are {aUing 

faster than the loan is being paid down. The difference between the loan-balance line 

and the house~price line illustrates how severe the negative~eqllity problem Can get with a 

3D-year, fixed-rate mortgage and declining house prices. 

The FRM can create negative equity ior borrowers in a rising interesHate cnvironmmt 

as weIl (Dubel200S). When interest rates rise, a house's value may fall. And the economlc 

value of the mortgage falls. However, the borrower is still responsible for repaying the !oan 

at par value (the nominal outstanding balance). The combin~tion of falling house price and 

13.6 Lea· Sanders 
206 


81763.149

$250,000 

5200JJOO 

S10D.Oro +-.. ~.------.. ~----.-

SSQ,Do,'} f------------.---.--.. ----"''''''''_-2'e.----

1 1427405366 79 921051181311441571701831962092222352.i8Z61274287300313326339352 

Month 

r.~yment With --112% 

Vobrile interest rates o:.:ause problems for both borro\\'l'rs -lmllenders. Long-term fixeJto interest-rate changes than shorter-term instrtl~ 
207 


81763.150

associated with managing such volatility. For example. origination volume rose from 

less than $3 trillion in 2002 to nearly $4 trillion in 2003 and fell to less than $3 trillion in 

2004. Thus, the industry had to increase capacity by 33% in one year and reduce it by 25% 

the following year. FRM refinancing was the main reason for this volatHity (see Figure 2). 

For mortgage borrowers, the cost of refinancing lies in the thousands of dollars they must 

pay in transactions costs simply to lower their mortgage rates. 13 

The FRM has also created significant costs for taxpayers. Until 1981, federaUy insured 

depositories were prohibited from offering ARMs. Predictably, when inflation and interest 

rates rose in the 1970s and eady 19805, reliance on this instrument effectively killed off 

the S&L industry. In 1982, approximately 80% of the S&L industry was bankrupt and 

insolvent due to the mismatch between FRM assets and the short-term deposits that 

funded them. A similar mismatch rendered Fannie Mae insolvent. When numerous thrifts 

eventually failed, the taxpayer picked up a significant tab to restructure the industry.14 

Learning from the experience, banks and thrifts continued to originate 30-ycar FRMs., 

but only if the loans could be sold to Fannie Mac~ Freddie Mac, or guaranteed by Ginnie 

Mae. In other words. banks and thdhs did not retain the interest-rate risk that rhey 

created by originating the FRMs. Instead) investors absorbed the risk. As the ultimate risk 

bearen;, private investors attempted to price and manage the risk (with varying degrees of 

success). The GSEs hold a significant portion of the FRM inventory,15 so when interest 

rates rise, they may suffer large losses that will be borne by taxpayers. 

The FRM's popularity and its government backing produce another significant risk 

for the government. To finance the FRM and allocate the intcrest~rate risk to investors, 

the government-through FHA insurance and FannielFreddie guarantees-absorbs the 

mortgages' credit risk. IronicaHy, it was credit risk that led to the failures of Fannie and 

Freddie in the financial crisis. Although part of their losses can be attributed to speculative 

investments in subprime- and Alt A-backed securities (mostly non-fIxed-rate mortgages), 

a significant portion of their losses have come from FRM dcfaults. 16 The FHFA now 

projects GSE losses to be $220 to $360 billion. A portion of these losses can be attributed 

to the policy goal of ensuring the FRM's availability through the government's absorption 

of the credit risk. 

The Myth of the Fixed-Rate, Prepayable Mortgages as a Gold Standard 

David Min has written that "'the 30·year fixed-rate: mortgage remains the gold standard for 

mortgages throughout the world, offering superior stability for both homeowners and 

financial systems" (Min 2010, p. 11). If this statement is true, why is the United States 

one of only rwo countries with this instrument? And why is the United States the conn try 

URefinancing transao::tions cost5 could be eliminated witb use of II ratchet mortgage, in which the rate is automatically lowered without transaction cmts. See Ely (2010). 

H Although the popular press tended to focus on excessively risky nonresidential mortgage investmen'bi as the cause 

of the S&Ls' failure, the f>'Ict was that they were bankrupted by the asset-liability mismatch and tried to grow out of 

their earnings and capital problems through investment in high-risk asset.>-

HThe GSEs hold whole loans in their portfolios... They :Usa repurchase securities they guarllnte~in efie{;t investing 

in the cash-flow risk associated with funding callable mortgages with it blend of callable and noncallable debts of 

dlfterentmaturities. 

16Federa! Housing Finance Agency (I-BFA) projections of GSE losses foulld that most of the Josses are due to their 

purchased loans rather than securities. Sec FBFA (2010, attachment). 

T3.8 Le4· S{1nders 
208 


81763.151

most afflicted by a housing bust? Given me catastrophic conditions of Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Ma<; it is dear that the 30-year, flxed-rate mortgage is outright dangerous-not a 

gold standard. Perhaps his musing should be rewritten to say, "The 30-year fixed-rate 

mortgage remains the fool's gold standard for mortgages throughout the United States, 

offering superior stability for some homeowners and potential catastrophe for U.S. and 

global financial systems.'" 

The FRM is a unique instrument by international standards. Only one other country, 

Denmark, has a long-term, fixed-rate. prepayable (without penalty) mortgage. 17 Several 

other countries have long-term fixed rare products (e.g.~ France, Japan, and Germany), hut 

the typical terms arc shorter and prepayment is subject to penalty. Shorter amortization 

periods benefit both borrowers and lenders because borrowers accumulate equity faster. 

A more common fixed-rate instrument is the rollover mortgage, which is the dominant 

instrument in Canada and several European countries. Its interest rate is typically fixed for 

up to five years and rolls into a new fixed rate at the end of the teon. The new rate is 

negotiated with the lender and is based on prevailing market rates. These loans also have 

prepayment penalries during the fixed·rate term but allow total repayment without penalty 

at the end of the term. 

Adjustable-rate loans arc the dominant instrument in several countries~ including 

Australia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Table 2 shows the types of mortgages available 

in different countries and how common each product is. 

Many countries have had housing booms and busts during the last decade (e.g., Austra~ 

lia, Denmark, Ireland, Spain). Yet only Ireland has had as severe of a downturn as the 

United States (Table 3). Min (2010) attributes the U.S. housing cyde to a shortening of the 

duration of mortgages over the past two decades, which caused house prices to become 

more sensitive to interest rates. Low interest rates and ample credit clearly contributed to 

the boom-however throughout the boom period a majority of loans were in fact fixed 

rates. Most of the reduction in average mortgage maturity was due to borrowers exercising 

the prepayment option in their FRM contracts, And much of the shortening was for cashout refinances to facilitate consumption at the expense of wealth accumulation. The 

inability of households to refinance FRMs to reduce negative equity has exacerbated the 

current crisis as noted above. 

Min (20IO) assumes the prepayment option to be free, but it is far from freet as 

discussed earlier. Although only some borrowers will actually utilize the prepayment 

option, everyone has to pay for it. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will only purchase 

prcpayabJe mortgages, even though non-prepayable mortgages may be in many borrowers' 

best interests. 

CONCLUSION 

The fundamental question remains: Are the benefits of the FRM worth tbe costs? All 

borrowers pay a substantial tax-50 basis points or more-for this instrument. Further~ 

more, taxpayers have absorbed substantial losses to support this instrument, first through 

the S&ls and now through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Should the government subject 

t7The Danes add.a unique twist to the instrurm'nt in that the loan is backed by an individual mortgage bond. If rates 

rise, the houowcr can buy the bond at a discount and caned the loan with the lender. This h:aturc facilitates 

automatic deleverage and reduces the likelihood Qfnegatlvc equity. See Lea (20W.) 

www.anffualreviews.org • Govr!rnment P-o!icyand the Fixed Rate MDrlgoge I3.9 
209 


81763.152

Table 1 International mortgage products Im<lfkct share of imtrumem by fi>.ed-rate period)·'·b 

+----f-----+---------- 55%, 10% 

67% 

1T"I" 38% 

9% 

20'% 

IS% 

R% 

Table ':\ Troubled mortgages: \VcsteTn Europe and the United Statc~",l' 

.'.. ','.' •. : -i.' :;';3 

Belgium 0.46"1" - - 2009 

Denmark O.53'X, - 2009 

France 0.93% 

_'''_b_n_d ___ 4-_3.3_2% ______ ~------~-----~~2~''~09-

~ ______ -__________ +3_.0_"_'1,, _____ + __ - ______ +_20_"_8 __ ._ 

Ponug •• ! 1.J7'~;" -

---'Sp_"_·n ___ -1 _______ ~-3.04'y" 

$v,;cden 

UK 2.44'% 

--+- U.S.(aJ]) 9.47'/'" 

U.5.(prime) 

u.s. (sllbpnme) 25.26'% 

'Sourc(':!af{e.e(20101 

h:r-;oemry me~[]> negligible rJte. 

13.10 tell' Sa1lders 

.. 

1009 

2009 

2009 

0,19% 2009 

4.58% ____ +2_(_'0_9 __ _ 

3.31% 200.9 

2009 
210 


81763.153

taxpayers to the risk of another catastrophic meltdown to preserve the FRM? Are there 

alternatives that maintain some of the FRM"s hencfits while greatly reducing the .costs? 

If the government abolished Fannie Mae and Freddie Mact the FRM would not cease to 

exist. Private~labei securitization in the United States and covered bonds in Denmark have 

funded rrus instrument in the past and are fully capable of funding it in the future. Investors 

are sophisticated enough to price hath credit risk and interest~rate risk. Conventional 

wisdom suggests that U.S. iovesmrs will not accept both credit risk and interest-rate risk 

for large volumes of mortgages and the reaSOn is dear: Private investors can get the 

government to absorh the credit risk at a lower cost than would be charged by the private 

market. The loss experiences of Fannie and Freddie suggest that they were funding mortgages at bclow~market (risk-adjusted} rates. Without Fannie and Freddie, the FRM would 

still be offered by lenders, but not at a subsidized rate. The FRM would have a smaller 

market share, but it would nOl disappear, as Min (2010) asserts. Nor would the only 

alternative be a short-tenn ARM, as international experience suggests. 

What would emerge as the standard U.S. mortgage instrument without government 

support of the FRM? A rollover mortgage similar to that offered in Canada and several 

European countries is the likely candidare.1s This instrument offers borrowers short- to 

medium-term payment stability, and borrowers can manage interest-rate risk hy adjusting 

the fixed-rate term upon renewaL Modern inte.rnational experience does not bear out 

Min's (2010) a.o;:sertion that borrowers would be unable to refinance. Borrowers .could 

hedge the interest-rate risk by locking in a forward rate in advance of renewal. German 

lenders offer forward rates up to five years--certainly U.S. lenders could do the same, given 

the deep derivative market. Alternatively, borrowers can adjust the degree of risk by 

varying the length of the fjxed~rate period. 

A complete and robust housing-finance system should offer borrowers a menu of 

mortgage options, ranging from short-term ARMs for borrowers who can handle payment 

change to long-term FRMs for borrowers who value payment stability. To asscrt that the 

.FRM is the preferred alternative (or most borrowers is naIve. Many horrowers have 

shorter-term time horizons and can handle some interest-rate risk. The reason borrowers 

select a longer-term fixed rate is that government guarantees subsidizes the rate. International experience does not support Min's (2010) assertion that the switch to shorterduration instruments would lead to massive defaults if and when interest rates increase. 

The prohibition of prepayment penalties on fixed-rate mortgages is also misguided. 

Borrowers should be given a choice-Iong~term versus sbort*tcrm fixed rates, with and 

without prepayment penalties. The market will price the differences, giving price breaks to 

those borrowers wiUing and able to handle interes.t-rate risk. Following Canadian and 

European tradition, the imposition of a prepayment penalty should be limited. It should 

not apply co borrowers moving and it should be limited in term. (f'or example, the maximum term over which the penalty applies is five years in Canada and the Netherlands and 

10 years in Germany.) 

The most important result of a shift away from the FRM wouJd be a reduction in 

taxpayer liability for mortgage risk. There is nothing so special ahout housing finance that 

\SCanada supports Its mortgage market thcough default insurance and cash-flow guarantees comparable to FHA 

insurance and Ginnie Mae guarantees In the United Statts. The market share of government-backed mortgages is 

considerably less, however., with approximately 50% of mongages backed by government insurance and 25% of 

m()rtgagl!S b<1cked by guar>lntees. European countries (with the ~xception of the Netherlands) do not suppOrt their 

mortgage marketS through insurance or guaraOt~s. 

www.annualrevif?ws.org·GovernmentPolicyandtheFixedRateMortgageI3·1r 
211 


81763.154

the government should absorb the credit risk of the vast majority of the mortgage market 

Of underwrite the interest-rate risk of that market. Two episodes of massive taxpayer losses 

should convince us of that fact. 

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 

The authors are not aware of auy affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings 

that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review. 

LITERATURE CITED 

Barlevy G, Fisher J. Mortgage r:hoices and housing speculation. Work. Pap. 2()1 O· 12, Fed. Reserve 

Bank Chic. 

Bodfish M, Theobald A. 1940. Savi11gs and Loan Pritlciples. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger 

Dennis M, Pinkowish T. 2004. Residential Mortgage Lending: Principles and Practices. Austin, 

TX: South-Western. 5th ed. 

Diibel A. 2005. European mortgage. markets: (conjectures on) macro implications of $tructural idiosynaasy. Presented at DG ECFIN Conf., 21st, Brussels. http://cc.curopa.eu/1,!conomr-finance/ 

events/20OStbxlworkshop2111/contributionsiduebcl_cn,pdf 

Ely B. 2010. Why mortgage originators should offer ratchet mortgages. Presented at Fed. Hous. 

Finance Agency, Washington, D.C. 

Fed. Hous. Finance Agency iFHFA}. 2010. Projections showing range of potential draws for Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac. FHFA, Oct., pp. 1-12 

Herzog T. 2009. History of mortgage finalla with an emphasis on mortgage insurance (Society 

of Actuaries). http://www.soa.orgllibrary/monographslfinance!housing-wcalthl2009/septembcr/ 

mono-2009--mfi09-herzog-history.pdf 

Jaffee D. 2010. Reforming the US mortgage market through private inceTltives. Presented at Past, 

Pft!sent, and Future Gov. Sponsored Ent. Conf. Fed. Reserve Bank, St. Louis 

Kitf J. 2009. Canadian residential mortgage markets: boring hut effective. lMF Work. Pap., 

WP/09/BO 

Krainer J. 2010. Mortgage choice and the pricing of fixed rare and adjustable (ate mortgages. FRBSF 

Economic Letter, Feb. pp. 1-5 

Lea M. 2010. International comparison of mortgage product offering.'i. Res. 1nst. Hous. Am. Rep.> 

Washington, D.C. 

Levitin A~ Wachrer S. 2010. Exp!3.ining the housing bubble, Res_ Pap.lO·IS Inst. Law £Can. Res, Unlv. 

PennJl0~60 Georget. Public Law11O·16 (':.-eorget. Bus., Econ. Regulatory Law. http://ssm.£Om/ 

abstra~1669401 

Min D. 2010. Future of housing finance reform: why the 30-year fixed-rare mortgage is an essential 

part of our housing finance system. Center for AmeriC<1ll Progress, Nov. 19, pp. 1-13. http:// 

www.amcricanprogress.orglissucsI2010/11lhousinK-refonn.html 

Pollock A. 2011. The dark side of the 30-year fixed-rate mortgagc. A.merican. Mar. 8 

Thaler R. 2009. Mortgages made simpler. New York Times (Economic View), July 4, p. BU4 

Vickery J. 2007. Interest rates and consumer choice in the residential mortgage market. Work Pap., 

Fed. Reserve Bank N. Y. 

Woodward S. 2010. The furnre of the capital markets: cmmecting primary consumer and mortgage 

credit markets to global c;apita~. Presenred at Harva(d Joint Cent. Hous. Stud. Nat. Symp. Gonf. 

Moy, Forw. Future Consumer Credit Mortg. Finance. Boston, http://www.jchs.harvard.edul 

publicarionsiMFlO-4.pdf 

r.:I.1'l. Lea· Stmders 
212 


81763.155

10,000 

8,000 

6,()OO 

4,OUO 

2,000 

o 

- fl.lBA R('fi !nd{"x -rl't'ddie 30-year FRN 

~~~_'_2 ________________________________ _ 

10,00 

6.()O 

6.00 

·ton 

2,00 

0.00 

IFRM). 

~()Ilrce: 
213 


81763.156

9 

Reform of GSE Housing Goals 

Jonathan Brown 

HVD's proposed rules for housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac and the many public announcements of Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac on their housing commitments have fostered the general impression that the goals have been a success, although some adjustments are needed to strengthen the goals. A perspective of local 

community reinvestment and civil rights, however, reveals major 

problems in the design and implementation of the GSE housing goals. 

The problems stem in large part from serious flaws in the structure 

of the goals. An extensive review of GSE performance in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) across the nation indicates that in many 

MSAs in 1998 the GSE market share of one- to four-family mortgage 

loans in low- and moderate income and minority neighborhoods 

was roughly half the GSE market share of such loans in upscale, 

nonminority neighborhoods. 

My analysis measured GSE market share as the ratio between 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's combined purchases of one- to fourfamily mortgages and the total number of conventional one- to 

four-family mortgage loan originations reported under the Home 

Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) with loan amounts less than 

$227,000, the 1998 GSE ceiling for mortgages on one-unit homes. 

GSE purchases are based on the Census Tract File in the GSE Public 

Use Database. Because the file does not distinguish between home 

purchase loans and refinancing loans, I consolidated these two types 

of mortgage loans in computing GSE market shares. 

Implicit in the GSE concept of housing goals is the idea that the 

GSEs should at minimum support the mortgage market in low- and 

moderate-income and minority neighborhoods to the same extent 

that they support the mortgage market in affluent, nonminority 

neighborhoods. Clearly the minimum standard of support is not 

153 
214 


81763.157

154 REFORM OF HOUSING GOALS 

being met where the GSE market share of mortgage loans in lowand moderate-income or minority neighborhoods is much less than 

the GSE market share in affiuent or nonrninority neighborhoods. 

Similarly the GSEs fall short of the minimum standard when the 

GSE market share of mortgage loans to low- or moderate-income or 

minority borrowers is well below the GSE market share of loans to 

more affiuent or nonminority borrowers. 

Figures 9-1 through 9--4 provide stark examples of how the 

GSE market share tends to decline sharply in inner-city neighborhoods. (The 1998 Chicago, Cleveland, and Akron maps were submitted to the Department of Housing and Urban Development 

according to the pending rulemaking on GSE housing goals by illinois Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now and 

the Metropolitan Strategy Group of Ohio. The 1996 Chicago map 

was presented by Essential Information at a 1998 conference on the 

role of the GSEs.) The map's diagonal overlay identifies minority 

census tracts. The Chicago map overlay identifies census tracts in 

which nonwhite and non-Asian persons are 70 percent or more of 

the census tract population. The Cleveland and Akron diagonal overlays indicate census tracts in which minority persons are 40 percent 

or more of the census tract population. The maps strongly correlate 

the racial composition of census tracts and the GSE market share. 

Also comparison of the 1996 and 1998 Chicago maps shows that the 

overall pattern of GSE market share disparity did not change much 

during this two-year period. 

To provide further insight into the nature of GSE housing goal 

performance in the Chicago MSA, I prepared a set of statistical tables 

on 1998 GSE market shares by census tract race and census tract 

income categories and by borrower race and income categories. I 

based the tables on GSE loan purchase data and HMDA loan origination data for the nine-county Chicago primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA). 

Table 9-1 cites GSE market share data by census tract racial category. The table shows a decline in GSE market share from 75.10 

percent in predominantly nonrninority census tracts to only 33.28 

percent in census tracts in which minorities constitute 75 percent or 

more of the population. In the Chicago PMSA these two census tract 

categories account for almost 60 percent of the 1,776 census tracts. 

Table 9-2 reports GSE market share data by census tract income 

category and shows a decline in GSE market share from 77.54 percent in upper-income census tracts to only 39.01 percent in low-income 
215 


81763.158

JONATHAN BROWN 155 

FIGURE 9-1 

FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC SUPPORT FOR CONVENTIONAL HOME 

MORTGAGE LOAN MARKET, CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA, 1996 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac market share of 

("onn~ntinnalloans 1996, by cens!.Js Ifact 

DiagonaJ owrlay for mim>rity nt'ishborhc'>ods 

SOURCES: HUD, 1996 GSE Single-Family Public Usc Data; FFIEC, 1998 HMDA data; 

and 1990 U.S. Census data. 
216 


81763.159

1% REFORM OF HOUS1N(~ COALS 

FJGURE9-2 

FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC SUPPORT FOR CONVENTIONAL HOME 

MORTGAGE LOAN MARKET, CHICAGO lvIETROPOLlTAN AREA, 1998 

SOcReFS: HUD, 1996 GSE Single-Family Public Use Data; FflEC, 1998 HMDA data; 

and 1990 U5. Census dal'a. 
217 


81763.160

JONATHAN BROWN 157 

FlGURE9-3 

FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC SUPPORT FOR CONVENTIONAL 

LOAN MARKET, CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN AREA, 1998 

SOURCES: 1998 GSE Single-Family Public Use Data; 1998 HMDA data; and U.s, 

Census Bureau 1990. Prepared by Metropolitan Strategy Group. 

census tracts, The census tract income-related decline in GSE market share in table 9-2 is similar to the census tract race-related decline in table 9-1 except that not as many census tracts have the 

lowest market share interval in the former, Generally one can obtain 

a sharper focus on GSE market share disparities by looking at census tract race rather than census tract income, 

Table 9,-3 compares the GSE market share in minority census 

tracts and nonminority census tracts for separate census tract income intervals, While the GSE market share in nonminority census 

tracts ranges from 61.27 percent to 69,62 percent for a census tract 

within various moderate- and middle-income intervals, it never rises 
218 


81763.161

158 REFORM OF HOUSING GOALS 

FlGURE9-4 

FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC SUPPORT FOR CONVEt1TIONAL 

LOAN MARKET, AKRON, OHIO, 1998 

V,;;. MlnQ!!ty popuilltion:;, 40% 

SOURCES; 1998 GSE Single-Family Public Usc Data; 1998 HMDA data; and US. 

Census Bureau, 1990. Prepared by Metropolitan Strategy Group. 

above 42.61 percent for minority census tracts in comparable census 

tract income intervals. Although such tract-based analysis does not 

by itself establish disparate treatment or disparate impact in violation of the federal discrimination laws, it does indicate major disparities between neighborhoods along racial lines in accessing the 

GSE-operated secondary mortgage market. The disparity needs to 

be addressed directly in implementing the GSE housing goals. 
219 


81763.162

JONATHAN BROWN 159 

TABLE 9-1 

GSE MARKET SHARE, BY CENSUS TRACf RACIAL CATEGORY, 

CHICAGO PMSA, 

GSE 

Census Tract Minority Census Loan GSE Market 

Population (%) Tracts Originations Purchases Share 

75 or more 472 23,616 7,860 33.28 

50-75 141 12,546 6,846 5457 

30-SO 182 20,194 12,825 63.51 

20-30 146 24,887 16,971 68.19 

10-20 267 66,815 47,842 71.60 

Less than 10 550 167,043 125,446 75.10 

Tracts with no population data 18 

Total tracts 1,776 

Table 9-4 provides GSE market share data by borrower income 

category. The table indicates that borrower income-related disparities in GSE market shares are not as great as neighborhood-related 

disparities. Further, the GSE market share disparity is substantial 

only for low-income borrowers but is not much of a factor for borrowers with incomes exceeding 80 percent of MSA median family 

income. 

Table 9-5 proVides GSE market share data by borrower racial 

category and shows that the GSE market share is dramatically lower 

for African-American borrowers and moderately lower for Hispanic 

borrowers. 

The failure of the GSE housing goals to provide residents of 

many minority neighborhoods and low- and moderate-income 

neighborhoods and, more generally, minority borrowers and lowand moderate-income borrowers with the same access to the secondary mortgage market enjoyed by most Americans is rooted in 

several major structural flaws in 1992 GSE housing goal legislation. 

First, the legislation used unduly broad definitions to determine the 

focus of the GSE housing goals, with the result that they are not 

properly targeted on underserved sectors of the mortgage market. 

Much of this inadequate targeting or dilution is associated with 

misapplication of terms commonly used in the Community Redevelopment Agency (eRA) and community development activities. 
220 


81763.163

160 REFORM OF HOUSING GOALS 

TABLE 9-2 

GSE MARKET SHARE, BY CENSUS TRACT INCOME CATEGORY, 

CHICAGO PMSA, 

GSE 

Census Tract MFI as a Census Loan GSE Market 

Percentage of MSA MFI Tracts Originations Purchases Share 

Less than 50 280 8,631 3,367 39.01 

50-80 374 29,541 14,717 49.82 

80-90 168 22,722 12,919 56.86 

90-100 209 36,401 23,260 63.90 

100-110 167 39,927 27,440 68.73 

110-120 141 43,729 31,931 73.02 

More than 120 409 133,944 103,858 77.54 

Tracts with no income data 28 

Total tracts 1,776 

For purposes of the low- and moderate-income housing goal, lowand moderate-income borrowers are defined to include not only borrowers with incomes less than 80 percent of MSA median family 

income (as they are for CRA purposes) but also borrowers with incomes between 80 percent and 100 percent of MSA median family 

income. Yet table 9-4 shows that in the Chicago PMSA borrowers 

with incomes in the 80--100 percent range of MSAMFI (Iower-middleincome borrowers) have a GSE market share (69.03 percent) almost 

the same as the average GSE market share for the Chicago PMSA as 

a whole (68.92 percent). Why are GSE housing goals needed to encourage GSE purchases from this middle subsector of the mortgage 

market? Moreover, if the GSE housing goals are successful in encouraging the GSEs to change underwriting and other policies to 

stimulate more GSE purchases of loans to low- and moderate-income 

borrowers, wouldn't borrowers in the 80--100 percent range of MSA 

MFI also benefit from such changes? 

Similarly, for purposes of the special affordable housing goal, 

the GSE legislation defines low-income borrowers to mean borrowers 

with incomes less than 80 percent of MSA median family income 

rather than the 50 percent of MSA median family income standard 

used for CRA purposes. Yet, as table 9-4 shows, borrowers with incomes less than 50 percent of MSA mean family income have the 
221 


81763.164

JONATHAN BROWN 161 

TABLE 9-3 

GSE MARKET SHARE, MINORITY AND NONMINORITY 

CENSUS TRACTS, CHICAGO PMSA, 1998 

280 tracts with MFI less than 

50% of MSA MFI: 

272 minority tracts 

374 tracts with MFI of 50-80% 

ofMSAMFI 

253 minority tracts 

121 nonminority tracts 

168 tracts with MFI of 80-90% 

ofMSAMFI 

32 minority tracts 

136 nonminority tracts 

209 tracts with MFI of 90--100% 

ofMSAMFI 

33 minority tracts 

176 nonminority tracts 

167 tracts with MFI of 100--110% 

ofMSAMFI 

8 minority tracts 

159 nonminority tracts 

Loan 

18,484 

1I,057 

3,367 

19,355 

3,422 

32,979 

1,137 

38,790 

GSE 

GSE 

Market 

Purchases Share 

7,845 42.44 

6,872 62.15 

1,061 31.51 

1I,858 61.27 

1,458 42.61 

21,802 66.1I 

435 38.26 

27,005 69.62 

NOTE: Minority tract: minority population percentage of 50% or more. Nonminority 

tract: minority population percentage less than 50%. 

most difficulty in accessing the GSE secondary market and clearly 

the most need for a "special affordable housing goal." 

In addition the GSE legislation established a geographic GSE 

housing goal that included all central cities, rural areas, and other 

underserved areas as defined by HUD. Clearly this was an excessively broad definition of geographic areas with restricted access to 

the GSE-operated secondary market, although HUD has to some 

extent narrowed its scope by means of its regulatory authority to 

define underserved geographies. 

Second, the GSE legislation prohibits HUD from establishing 

enforceable subgoals for the low- and moderate-income housing goal 

and the geographic area goal. Sub goals are a logical tool to ensure 
222 


81763.165

162 REFORM OF HOUSING GOALS 

TABLE 9-4 

GSE MARKET SHARE, BY BORROWER INCOME CATEGORY, 

CHICAGO PMSA, 1998 

Loan GSE GSEMarket 

Purchases Share 

Low 20,851 10,631 50.99 

Moderate 64,537 40,351 62.52 

Lower-middle 51,595 35,614 69.03 

Upper-middle 46,936 34,438 73.37 

Upper 119,538 92,206 77.14 

No borrower income 12,568 4,552 36.22 

MSAtotal 316,025 217,792 68.92 

NOTE: Low income: borrower income less than 50% of MSA MFL Moderate income: 

borrower income greater than 50% but less than 80% of MSA MFI. Lower-middle 

income: borrower income greater than 80% but less than 100% of MSA MFI. Uppermiddle income: borrower income greater than 100% but less than 120% of MSAMFI. 

Upper income: borrower income greater than 120% of MSA MFI. 

that the GSEs adequately consider the most underserved sectors of 

the mortgage market. For example, census tracts with minoritypopulation percentages exceeding 50 percent, or even 75 percent, would 

be good candidates for an enforceable subgoaL 

Third, and perhaps most important of all, the GSE legislation 

failed to establish separate GSE housing goals (or sets of housing 

goals) for one- to four-family mortgage loans and multifamily 

mortgage loans. As a result, in implementing all three statutory housing goals, HUD has devised an accounting system that measures 

the number of housing units financed by GSE loan purchases and 

combines one- to four-family units and multifamily units. This consolidation of one- to four-family and multifamily units has significantly diluted the impact of the special affordable housing goal, the 

one statutory GSE housing goal that made some effort to achieve 

proper targeting. 

Because a high percentage of multifamily housing loans qualify 

for the special affordable housing goal, the GSEs can significantly 

reduce their obligation to purchase one- to four-family housing loans 

under the special affordable housing goal by increasing their pur-
223 


81763.166

JONATHAN BROWN 163 

TABLE 9-5 

GSE MARKET SHARE, BY BORROWER RACIAL CATEGORY, 

CHICAGO PMSA, 1998 

Loan GSE GSEMarket 

Borrower Racial Category Originations Purchases Share 

White 227,212 165,569 72.87 

African-American 24,521 8,556 34.89 

Hispanic 21,312 13,016 61.07 

Asian 12,448 9,562 76.82 

Targeted minority 49,809 23,696 47.57 

No race 26,556 18,965 71.42 

MSAtotal 316,025 217,792 68.92 

NOTE: Targeted minority: excludes white and Asian borrowers. 

chases of multifamily mortgage loans. According to HUD roughly 

50 percent of the multifamily mortgage loan purchases of the GSEs 

qualify for the special affordable housing goa\. In 1997, multifamily 

loans accounted for 44 percent of Fannie Mae's special affordable 

housing goal units and 31 percent of Freddie Mac's. In short the 

commingling of one- to fouI'-family housing loans and multifamily 

housing loans within the same special basket enables the GSEs to 

trade off performance on the one- to four-family side against performance on the multifamily side. 

Reinforcing these statutory weaknesses, HUD set the special 

affordable housing goal too low in the 1995 GSE rulemaking. Although HUD estimated that such units were 2~23 percent of the 

market, it set the goal for 1997-1998 at only 14 percent of GSE loan 

purchases measured on a housing unit basis. 

Improving the working of the GSE housing goals requires several basic reforms. First, in the one- to four-family side of the mortgage market, GSE market shares should define underserved sectors. 

Such market share analysis should be efficiently employed to identify underserved census tract categories, borrower income categories, and borrower racial categories. Such GSE market share data 

were not available to Congress in 1992 when it enacted the GSE housing goal legislation. Now that the data are available, Congress should 
224 


81763.167

164 REFORM OF HOUSING GOALS 

examine the information closely and restructure the statutory GSE 

housing goals to provide for better targeting. 

In implementing the GSE housing goal legislation, HUD has 

generally relied on loan origination and loan denial rates derived 

from HMDA data to identify underserved segments of the mortgage market. While the approach has some value, GSE market share 

data provide a much sharper lens for identifying market segments 

that have restricted access to the GSE-sponsored secondary mortgage market. HUD should use this approach in its current rulemaking 

to bring as much targeting to the GSE housing goal rules as possible 

within the statutory framework. 

Second, the legislation on GSE housing goals needs to be restructured to provide separate housing goals or sets of housing 

goals for one- to four-family housing and multifamily housing. The 

reform is needed to prevent the GSEs from trading off improved 

housing goal performance on the multifamily side for reduced 

housing goal obligation on the one- to four-family side. Most of 

this trade-off takes place within the category of the special affordable housing goal. 

Multifamily housing loans and one- to four-family housing 

loans targeted toward underserved sectors are the most important 

elements of any strategy to address affordable housing needs. GSE 

housing goals should be structured to encourage the GSEs to take 

affirmative measures on both fronts. 

Third, better targeted GSE housing goals for one- to four-family 

housing loans are needed to encourage the GSEs to purchase more 

eRA-type mortgage loans originated by banks and savings associations. One of the main reasons why the GSE market share is so low 

in most minority and low- and moderate-income census tracts is 

that many mortgage loans originated in such tracts are eRA-type 

loans that are often not sold to the GSEs. In some cases those loans 

have below-market rate features, and the GSEs will not purchase 

such loans without discounting them to market rates. Given the large 

indirect subsidies received by the GSEs and their substantial resources including strong earnings streams, the GSE should share 

more equally with banks the costs of effective eRA implementation. 

For example, with eRA-type loans with below-market rates, the GSEs 

should absorb some cost of marking these loans to market. Such 

action would make banks more willing to sell eRA-type loans to the 

GSEs and would in tum significantly expand the capacity of banks 

to originate eRA-type loans. 
225 


81763.168

JONATHAN BROWN 165 

Fourth, HUD should establish a process for administrative review of GSE performance at the local level when GSE market share 

data indicate that the GSEs have significantly underserved minority census tracts or low- and moderate-income census tracts within 

a particular MSA or rural area. Local government officials, community groups, and lenders should be encouraged to participate in this 

administrative review. The administrative process should encourage the GSEs to make commitments to improve their housing goal 

performance in the local community. 

Review of GSE performance within individual MSAs or rural 

areas is important because the GSEs can substantially underserve 

individual MSAs and still meet national targets if they are evaluated only in terms of national targets. Setting uniform targeting standards appropriate for all MSAs or rural areas in the nation is difficult. 

In particular the relationship between the minority percentage of 

census tract population and the GSE market share varies dramatically in different parts of the nation. In Brooklyn, New York, neighborhood access to the GSE-operated secondary market may not be 

greatly restricted until the minority percentage rises well above 50 

percent. By contrast in Iowa such restricted access may be seen in 

census tracts with a minority percentage of only 15 percent. 

Fifth, separate and enforceable subgoals for one- to four-family 

mortgage loans should be established for home purchase loans and 

refinancing loans. The GSE housing goals could be implemented 

much more effectively if the horne purchase loan market were separated from the volatile and increasingly controversial refinancing 

loan market for evaluation purposes. 

Finally, should the GSEs be given housing goal credit for the 

purchase of subprime loans? In many minority neighborhoods of 

the nation's larger cities, mortgage lenders classified by HUD as 

subprime lenders originated more than 40 percent or even 50 percent of the refinancing loans in 1998. GSE purchase of a substantial 

share of these loans, with housing goal credit awarded for such purchases, would significantly increase GSE housing goal performance 

in these neighborhoods. However, the primary mission of the GSEs 

should be to bring as many borrowers as possible into the mainstream of prime mortgage credit financing, or at least to provide a 

strong secondary market for legitimate eRA-type lending. At this 

point it would be counterproductive to the underlying GSE mission 

to encourage the GSEs to purchase subprime loans by giving them 

housing goal credit for such purchases. 

o