# Official Journal C 167/11 M

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 167 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6611 May 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 167

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6611 May 2023

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | |
| | EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2022-2023 SESSIONSittings of 21 to 24 November 2022TEXTS ADOPTED | 1 |

Contents

page

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2022-2023 SESSIONSittings of 21 to 24 November 2022TEXTS ADOPTED

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1

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| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| --- | --- |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 22 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/01 | European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the borrowing strategy to finance NextGenerationEU, the Union’s recovery instrument (2021/2076(INI)) | 2 |
| 2023/C 167/02 | European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the European Innovation Council (2022/2063(INI)) | 8 |
| | Wednesday 23 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/03 | European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (2022/2896(RSP)) | 18 |
| 2023/C 167/04 | European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on promoting regional stability and security in the broader Middle East region (2020/2113(INI)) | 25 |
| 2023/C 167/05 | European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on prevention, management and better care of diabetes in the EU on the occasion of World Diabetes Day (2022/2901(RSP)) | 36 |
| | Thursday 24 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/06 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, especially the deterioration of women’s rights and attacks against educational institutions (2022/2955(RSP)) | 43 |
| 2023/C 167/07 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the continuing repression of the democratic opposition and civil society in Belarus (2022/2956(RSP)) | 48 |
| 2023/C 167/08 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the forced displacement of people as a result of the escalating conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2022/2957(RSP)) | 54 |
| 2023/C 167/09 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the future European Financial Architecture for Development (2021/2252(INI)) | 57 |
| 2023/C 167/10 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the outcome of the modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty (2022/2934(RSP)) | 68 |
| 2023/C 167/11 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP (2022/2935(RSP)) | 74 |
| 2023/C 167/12 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the protection of livestock farming and large carnivores in Europe (2022/2952(RSP)) | 77 |
| 2023/C 167/13 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the European Year of Youth 2022 legacy (2022/2953(RSP)) | 83 |
| 2023/C 167/14 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on improving EU regulations on wild and exotic animals to be kept as pets in the European Union through an EU positive list (2022/2809(RSP)) | 89 |
| 2023/C 167/15 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the human rights situation in Egypt (2022/2962(RSP)) | 94 |
| 2023/C 167/16 | European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (2022/2948(RSP)) | 99 |
| | RECOMMENDATIONS |
| | European Parliament |
| | Wednesday 23 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/17 | European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (2022/2064(INI)) | 105 |
| 2023/C 167/18 | European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Libya (2021/2064(INI)) | 116 |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 22 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/19 | European Parliament decision of 22 November 2022 on the closure of the accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2020 (2022/2903(RSP)) | 126 |

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 22 November 2022

2023/C 167/01

European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the borrowing strategy to finance NextGenerationEU, the Union’s recovery instrument (2021/2076(INI))

2

2023/C 167/02

European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the European Innovation Council (2022/2063(INI))

8

Wednesday 23 November 2022

2023/C 167/03

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (2022/2896(RSP))

18

2023/C 167/04

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on promoting regional stability and security in the broader Middle East region (2020/2113(INI))

25

2023/C 167/05

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on prevention, management and better care of diabetes in the EU on the occasion of World Diabetes Day (2022/2901(RSP))

36

Thursday 24 November 2022

2023/C 167/06

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, especially the deterioration of women’s rights and attacks against educational institutions (2022/2955(RSP))

43

2023/C 167/07

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the continuing repression of the democratic opposition and civil society in Belarus (2022/2956(RSP))

48

2023/C 167/08

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the forced displacement of people as a result of the escalating conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2022/2957(RSP))

54

2023/C 167/09

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the future European Financial Architecture for Development (2021/2252(INI))

57

2023/C 167/10

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the outcome of the modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty (2022/2934(RSP))

68

2023/C 167/11

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP (2022/2935(RSP))

74

2023/C 167/12

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the protection of livestock farming and large carnivores in Europe (2022/2952(RSP))

77

2023/C 167/13

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the European Year of Youth 2022 legacy (2022/2953(RSP))

83

2023/C 167/14

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on improving EU regulations on wild and exotic animals to be kept as pets in the European Union through an EU positive list (2022/2809(RSP))

89

2023/C 167/15

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the human rights situation in Egypt (2022/2962(RSP))

94

2023/C 167/16

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (2022/2948(RSP))

99

RECOMMENDATIONS

European Parliament

Wednesday 23 November 2022

2023/C 167/17

European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (2022/2064(INI))

105

2023/C 167/18

European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Libya (2021/2064(INI))

116

OPINIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 22 November 2022

2023/C 167/19

European Parliament decision of 22 November 2022 on the closure of the accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2020 (2022/2903(RSP))

126

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 22 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/20 | European Parliament decision of 22 November 2022 on the nomination of Keit Pentus-Rosimannus as a Member of the Court of Auditors (C9-0316/2022 — 2022/0808(NLE)) | 128 |
| 2023/C 167/21 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the general principles for its participation in Union programmes (12669/2019 — C9-0115/2021 — 2019/0164(NLE)) | 129 |
| 2023/C 167/22 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies and related measures (10521/1/2022 — C9-0354/2022 — 2012/0299(COD)) | 130 |
| 2023/C 167/23 | P9_TA(2022)0394Resilience of critical entitiesEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities (COM(2020)0829 — C9-0421/2020 — 2020/0365(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0365Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC | 131 |
| 2023/C 167/24 | P9_TA(2022)0395Common fisheries policy (CFP): restrictions to the access to Union watersEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013, as regards restrictions to the access to Union waters (COM(2021)0356 — C9-0254/2021 — 2021/0176(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0176Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 as regards restrictions to the access to Union waters | 132 |
| 2023/C 167/25 | P9_TA(2022)0396Decisions of European standardisation organisationsEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards the decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables (COM(2022)0032 — C9-0033/2022 — 2022/0021(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0021Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables | 134 |
| 2023/C 167/26 | P9_TA(2022)0397Drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers: initial qualification and periodic training (codification)European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers (codification) (COM(2021)0034 — C9-0008/2021 — 2021/0018(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0018Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers (codification) | 135 |
| 2023/C 167/27 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and New Zealand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (07910/2022 — C9-0296/2022 — 2022/0098(NLE)) | 136 |
| 2023/C 167/28 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision amending Decision (EU) 2015/2169 on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part (12600/2022 — C9-0343/2022 — 2022/0257(NLE)) | 137 |
| | Wednesday 23 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/29 | European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 5/2022 of the European Union for the financial year 2022 — Additional measures to address the consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine, Union Civil Protection Mechanism reinforcement, Reduction in payment appropriations and update of revenues, Other adjustments and technical updates (14832/2022 — C9-0388/2022 — 2022/0318(BUD)) | 138 |
| 2023/C 167/30 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 November 2022 on the joint text on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023 approved by the Conciliation Committee under the budgetary procedure (14783/2022 — C9-0389/2022 — 2022/0212(BUD)) | 141 |
| 2023/C 167/31 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 November 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570 — C9-0034/2022 — 2021/0430(CNS)) | 162 |
| | Thursday 24 November 2022 |
| 2023/C 167/32 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (14471/2022 — C9-0386/2022 — 2022/0369(APP)) | 167 |
| 2023/C 167/33 | P9_TA(2022)0411Amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing methodEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method (COM(2022)0596 — C9-0374/2022 — 2022/0370(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0370Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method | 168 |
| 2023/C 167/34 | P9_TA(2022)0412Macro-Financial Assistance+ instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (COM(2022)0597 — C9-0373/2022 — 2022/0371(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0371Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) | 169 |
| 2023/C 167/35 | P9_TA(2022)0413Non-acceptance of travel documents of the Russian Federation issued in Ukraine and GeorgiaEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-recognition of Russian travel documents issued in occupied foreign regions (COM(2022)0662 — C9-0302/2022 — 2022/0274(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0274Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-acceptance of travel documents of the Russian Federation issued in Ukraine and Georgia | 170 |
| 2023/C 167/36 | P9_TA(2022)0414Establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 2030 Policy Programme Path to the Digital Decade (COM(2021)0574 — C9-0359/2021 — 2021/0293(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0293Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 | 171 |
| 2023/C 167/37 | European Parliament decision of 24 November 2022 to raise no objections to the Commission delegated regulation of 21 October 2022 amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 as regards temporary emergency measures on collateral requirements (C(2022)7536 — 2022/2908(DEA)) | 172 |
| 2023/C 167/38 | European Parliament decision of 24 November 2022 to raise no objections to the Commission delegated regulation of 18 October 2022 amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 as regards the value of the clearing threshold for positions held in OTC commodity derivative contracts and other OTC derivative contracts (C(2022)7413 — 2022/2899(DEA)) | 174 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Tuesday 22 November 2022

2023/C 167/20

European Parliament decision of 22 November 2022 on the nomination of Keit Pentus-Rosimannus as a Member of the Court of Auditors (C9-0316/2022 — 2022/0808(NLE))

128

2023/C 167/21

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the general principles for its participation in Union programmes (12669/2019 — C9-0115/2021 — 2019/0164(NLE))

129

2023/C 167/22

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies and related measures (10521/1/2022 — C9-0354/2022 — 2012/0299(COD))

130

2023/C 167/23

P9_TA(2022)0394Resilience of critical entitiesEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities (COM(2020)0829 — C9-0421/2020 — 2020/0365(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0365Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC

131

2023/C 167/24

P9_TA(2022)0395Common fisheries policy (CFP): restrictions to the access to Union watersEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013, as regards restrictions to the access to Union waters (COM(2021)0356 — C9-0254/2021 — 2021/0176(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0176Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 as regards restrictions to the access to Union waters

132

2023/C 167/25

P9_TA(2022)0396Decisions of European standardisation organisationsEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards the decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables (COM(2022)0032 — C9-0033/2022 — 2022/0021(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0021Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables

134

2023/C 167/26

P9_TA(2022)0397Drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers: initial qualification and periodic training (codification)European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers (codification) (COM(2021)0034 — C9-0008/2021 — 2021/0018(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0018Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers (codification)

135

2023/C 167/27

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and New Zealand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (07910/2022 — C9-0296/2022 — 2022/0098(NLE))

136

2023/C 167/28

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision amending Decision (EU) 2015/2169 on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part (12600/2022 — C9-0343/2022 — 2022/0257(NLE))

137

Wednesday 23 November 2022

2023/C 167/29

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 5/2022 of the European Union for the financial year 2022 — Additional measures to address the consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine, Union Civil Protection Mechanism reinforcement, Reduction in payment appropriations and update of revenues, Other adjustments and technical updates (14832/2022 — C9-0388/2022 — 2022/0318(BUD))

138

2023/C 167/30

European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 November 2022 on the joint text on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023 approved by the Conciliation Committee under the budgetary procedure (14783/2022 — C9-0389/2022 — 2022/0212(BUD))

141

2023/C 167/31

European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 November 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570 — C9-0034/2022 — 2021/0430(CNS))

162

Thursday 24 November 2022

2023/C 167/32

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (14471/2022 — C9-0386/2022 — 2022/0369(APP))

167

2023/C 167/33

P9_TA(2022)0411Amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing methodEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method (COM(2022)0596 — C9-0374/2022 — 2022/0370(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0370Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method

168

2023/C 167/34

P9_TA(2022)0412Macro-Financial Assistance+ instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (COM(2022)0597 — C9-0373/2022 — 2022/0371(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0371Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +)

169

2023/C 167/35

P9_TA(2022)0413Non-acceptance of travel documents of the Russian Federation issued in Ukraine and GeorgiaEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-recognition of Russian travel documents issued in occupied foreign regions (COM(2022)0662 — C9-0302/2022 — 2022/0274(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0274Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-acceptance of travel documents of the Russian Federation issued in Ukraine and Georgia

170

2023/C 167/36

P9_TA(2022)0414Establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 2030 Policy Programme Path to the Digital Decade (COM(2021)0574 — C9-0359/2021 — 2021/0293(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0293Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030

171

2023/C 167/37

European Parliament decision of 24 November 2022 to raise no objections to the Commission delegated regulation of 21 October 2022 amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 as regards temporary emergency measures on collateral requirements (C(2022)7536 — 2022/2908(DEA))

172

2023/C 167/38

European Parliament decision of 24 November 2022 to raise no objections to the Commission delegated regulation of 18 October 2022 amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 as regards the value of the clearing threshold for positions held in OTC commodity derivative contracts and other OTC derivative contracts (C(2022)7413 — 2022/2899(DEA))

174

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11.5.2023

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/1 |
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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/1

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2022-2023 SESSION

Sittings of 21 to 24 November 2022

TEXTS ADOPTED

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 22 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/2 |
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11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/2

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P9_TA(2022)0400

Borrowing strategy to finance NextGenerationEU

European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the borrowing strategy to finance NextGenerationEU, the Union’s recovery instrument (2021/2076(INI))

(2023/C 167/01)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 5(3) of Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union (1) (Own Resources Decision), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 5(3) of Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union (1) (Own Resources Decision),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 of 14 December 2020 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 of 14 December 2020 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis (2),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (4), including the joint and unilateral declarations agreed as part of the multiannual financial framework (MFF), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (4), including the joint and unilateral declarations agreed as part of the multiannual financial framework (MFF),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on a new funding strategy to finance NextGenerationEU (COM(2021)0250), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on a new funding strategy to finance NextGenerationEU (COM(2021)0250),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council decision amending the Own Resources Decision (COM(2021)0570), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council decision amending the Own Resources Decision (COM(2021)0570),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 thereon (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 thereon (5),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0250/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0250/2022),

| A. | whereas the Own Resources Decision empowers the Commission to borrow funds of up to EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices between 2021 and 2026 on the capital markets on behalf of the Union for the sole purpose of addressing the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis through NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the EU’s recovery instrument; whereas EUR 360 billion in 2018 prices may be used to provide loans to Member States and EUR 390 billion may be used directly for EU expenditure; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Own Resources Decision empowers the Commission to borrow funds of up to EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices between 2021 and 2026 on the capital markets on behalf of the Union for the sole purpose of addressing the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis through NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the EU’s recovery instrument; whereas EUR 360 billion in 2018 prices may be used to provide loans to Member States and EUR 390 billion may be used directly for EU expenditure;

| B. | whereas the repayment of the funds borrowed and the related interest is to be borne by the Union budget and scheduled so as to ensure the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities until 31 December 2058 at the latest; whereas the own resources ceilings have been increased by 0,6 % in order to cover all Union liabilities resulting from NGEU borrowing; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the repayment of the funds borrowed and the related interest is to be borne by the Union budget and scheduled so as to ensure the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities until 31 December 2058 at the latest; whereas the own resources ceilings have been increased by 0,6 % in order to cover all Union liabilities resulting from NGEU borrowing;

| C. | whereas Parliament, the Council and the Commission adopted a legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources with a view to generating sufficient funds to cover expected expenditure related to the repayment of NGEU, thereby not reducing funding for Union programmes and policies; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Parliament, the Council and the Commission adopted a legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources with a view to generating sufficient funds to cover expected expenditure related to the repayment of NGEU, thereby not reducing funding for Union programmes and policies;

| D. | whereas under the Own Resources Decision, the Commission must comprehensively inform Parliament and the Council on a regular basis about all aspects of its debt management strategy, including an issuance calendar with expected issuance dates and volumes for the forthcoming year, and a plan setting out the expected principal and interest payments; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas under the Own Resources Decision, the Commission must comprehensively inform Parliament and the Council on a regular basis about all aspects of its debt management strategy, including an issuance calendar with expected issuance dates and volumes for the forthcoming year, and a plan setting out the expected principal and interest payments;

| E. | whereas the total amount programmed for NGEU and the payment of the periodic coupon and redemption at maturity (EURI repayment costs) has been set at EUR 14,7 billion for the 2021-2027 period; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the total amount programmed for NGEU and the payment of the periodic coupon and redemption at maturity (EURI repayment costs) has been set at EUR 14,7 billion for the 2021-2027 period;

Rationale of the borrowing for NextGenerationEU

| 1. | Stresses that NGEU is the largest EU common borrowing programme and the first that not only grants loans to Member States, but also provides direct Union budget expenditure embedded in genuine EU programmes and policies; underlines that common Union debt managed by the Commission boosts the size, impact and added value of the Union budget, thereby supporting the post-COVID-19 recovery and delivering on long-term EU priorities, in particular the green and digital transitions; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Points out that with average annual borrowing volumes of EUR 150 billion until 2026, the NGEU borrowing programme makes the Union a key player on the financial markets, puts it on a par with other major European sovereign issuers, and makes it the largest supranational issuer and the largest green bond issuer; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underlines that the success of the borrowing strategy will be judged by its ability to raise the funds necessary for the implementation of NGEU on the capital markets in a timely and relatively low-cost manner, and to repay the debt by 2058 on the basis of a profile that is both smooth and predictable, without crowding out established programme expenditure under the MFF ceilings and endangering future EU action; stresses that the Union’s issuance should not upset borrowing conditions for other European issuers and should even play a positive role on capital markets, notably by meeting investors’ demands for euro-denominated assets and for new products such as green bonds; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Description and assessment of the NextGenerationEU borrowing strategy to date

| 4. | Notes that the Commission has developed and put in place a new and large funding programme and built up its debt management capacities swiftly and efficiently; welcomes the fact that issuances have taken place at a steady pace since the first issuance in 2021 and have all been heavily oversubscribed, revealing strong investor interest and enabling the Commission to meet its funding targets; notes with satisfaction that, as is consistent with the Union’s AAA-rating, EU products have been traded at attractive interest rates that are on a par with other large European and supranational issuers; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Acknowledges that the funding strategy adopted by the Commission is diversified and offers a wide range of products (bonds and bills) and maturities (from three months to 30 years) through various issuance methods (syndicated transactions and auctions) on a regular schedule; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Notes the Commission’s decision to rely on a large Primary Dealer Network, which constitute important partners in ensuring well-functioning primary and secondary markets and reporting to the Commission on market conditions; reminds the Commission of the importance of ensuring that banks meet their legal requirements and of seeking a better geographical balance both in terms of membership within the Primary Dealer Network and the leading role of syndicated transactions; calls on the Commission to ensure that members of the Primary Dealer Network have sufficient incentives and obligations in order to play their role; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Takes note of the annual borrowing decisions and funding plans published by the Commission thus far; underlines that transparency regarding the Commission’s borrowing strategy and operations is key to achieving successful coordination with other market players and ensuring accountability, notably for Parliament, as well as awareness and ownership among decision-makers and the general public; calls on the Commission, in this context, to swiftly and systematically inform Parliament by providing disaggregated data on all charges incurred in issuing EU debt, including the Commission’s charges to EURI as administrative costs as well as the costs incurred by Member States when taking on loans under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Observes that in line with the annual borrowing decision and the semi-annual funding plans, the Commission had raised more than EUR 113 billion on the financial markets as of June 2021, including EUR 23 billion in the form of green bonds and bonds with short-, medium- and long-term maturities; takes good note of the information provided with regard to the distribution of investor type and geographical distribution; calls for continued transparent communications about the progress of the bond auctions and syndications; |
| --- | --- |

8.

Potential positive


  effects and challenges of NextGenerationEU borrowing

| 9. | Believes that by making the Union one of largest bond issuers in Europe, NGEU can have a positive impact on the stability and liquidity of EU capital markets, improve the EU’s economic outlook, complement the macroeconomic architecture of the euro area and strengthen the international role of the euro; notes that NGEU is legally limited in size and in time, and could play an even more influential role as a source of safe assets and help to integrate EU financial markets and bolster the Union’s resilience, provided that lessons are properly heeded; notes, in addition, that both the temporality and the volume of the NGEU borrowing programme limits the potential of EU bonds to become genuine safe assets, to serve the proper functioning of the financial markets and to improve the stability of the economic and monetary union; calls on the Commission to reflect on potential ways to maintain the outstanding volume of NGEU bonds beyond 2027 in order to prevent liquidity decline shortly after the peak is reached at the end of the NGEU spending phase; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Notes the high demand for and smooth integration of the EU’s debt on capital markets; calls on the Commission to consolidate the standing of EU debt by diversifying the investor profile, stimulating secondary markets and removing technical obstacles; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Highlights, in particular, that the Union could set benchmarks for sustainable investment as the largest global issuer of green bonds, as well as by diversifying its investor base and securing lower borrowing costs; stresses the important role of green bonds in financing the assets needed for the low-carbon transition; welcomes the fact that the Commission’s green bond framework employs high sustainability standards; urges the Commission to prevent any kind of greenwashing and to ensure high-quality reporting on the use of proceeds so as not to put the green premium at risk; notes that the do-no-significant-harm principle serves as a standard for expenditure financed under NGEU; stresses that by issuing part of the NGEU debt as green bonds, Member States and the Commission have a responsibility to do their utmost to ensure that the commitments made towards investors on climate spending are fulfilled, and expects the Commission to fully live up to its commitment to exclude problematic projects from being financed by green bonds as soon as any duly substantiated concerns of greenwashing are raised; welcomes the NGEU Green Bond Dashboard, an interactive webpage with reporting information on investments financed from the green bonds (6); |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Is of the opinion that the Commission should deploy robust auditing measures to ensure the proper implementation of the RRF, in particular in order to reduce the risk of any kind of greenwashing, and in view of the unique configuration of NGEU, whereby the Commission raises funds in capital markets and is responsible vis-à-vis investors, but the Member States actually spend the money; calls on the Member States, therefore, to stick to the commitments they made in their recovery and resilience plans, implement those commitments properly and in full, and provide thorough reporting to the Commission on the implementation of the milestones and targets; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Notes that despite its scale, NGEU has so far successfully mitigated the risk of demand for other European sovereign bonds being crowded out; emphasises that by making the sovereign market of the euro area more attractive, especially to non-EU investors, NGEU issuance may have a positive impact on the demand for securities issued by other European market players; invites the Commission to continue to coordinate closely with the debt agencies of the Member States and with the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank and the European Stability Mechanism; reiterates the importance of spreading the trading of EU debt through other EU stock exchanges in line with the principles of the capital markets union; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Argues, furthermore, that NGEU is having a positive impact on the attractiveness and sustainability of Member State debts by offering AAA-rated borrowing conditions to all Member States through RRF loans, helping to significantly lower sovereign yields and discounting grants from the calculation of national debt, as well as conveying a strong message to financial markets about the resilience and cohesion of the euro area and the EU; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Believes that NGEU shows the merits of a more ambitious, collective and democratic crisis response at EU level; considers that an opportunity for EU citizens to buy EU bonds directly could increase their sense of belonging to the EU; asks the Commission to develop a simple and transparent mechanism in this regard; notes that this practice already exists in several Member States; believes that the economic benefits would be significant and would outweigh the costs of implementation; notes that the substantial crisis support funded by joint debt issuance has strengthened the confidence in the resilience of the EU and its Member States and that financial market participants widely acknowledge that the European financial architecture is more robust; underlines that the successful implementation of NGEU demonstrates that the EU has provided an adequate response to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis; calls on all EU institutions, therefore, to ensure that the EU delivers on its promises, including offering a long-term political vision; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Notes with concern the new challenges posed by the lack of security in the global environment as a result of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine and the sharp rises in inflation and interest rates, which affect sovereign issuers; warns that the costs of funding have increased significantly due to the challenging market conditions and that massive uncertainties are expected in the long-term interest landscape; anticipates that this will affect the EURI repayment line in the EU budget; observes with concern that higher than programmed refinancing costs are already having an impact on availabilities in Heading 2b and are even eating into the limited availabilities of the special instruments in the course of the annual budget procedure; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the situation and regularly inform the budgetary authority; acknowledges that the Commission is having to operate in a very uncertain market beyond the 99 % confidence interval; recalls that all payments of financial contributions to Member States should be made by 31 December 2026, as established under the EURI and RRF Regulations, but that changes to this deadline could be made; underlines that such changes will require both the EURI and RRF Regulations to be amended; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Considers that the full potential of NGEU can only be unlocked if all national recovery and resilience plans are implemented effectively and in a timely manner; is concerned by several Member States’ lack of financial absorption capacity; regrets the dynamic that has occurred in some Member States whereby the implementation of traditional EU funds has been delayed in order to absorb RRF funds more quickly; encourages the Member States to make full and consistent use of the loans provided under NGEU; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Underlines that further investments in EU policies will be necessary to strengthen the EU’s competitiveness, resilience and strategic autonomy, particularly with regard to industry and climate action; considers that permanent redeployments are not a viable long-term solution for financing EU priorities and underlines the need for additional resources; recalls that climate change as well as the ongoing war in Ukraine highlight the urgent need to end the Union’s dependence on third countries in essential sectors of its economy, such as energy, raw materials, industry and agriculture; considers, in this connection, that the announcement made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the creation of a European Sovereignty Fund is in line with Parliament’s resolution of 19 May 2022 (7) and the Conference of Presidents’ statement of 30 June 2022 on the 2023 Commission Work Programme; calls on the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to give further consideration, in line with the recommendations of the Conference on the Future of Europe, to common borrowing at EU level with a view to creating more favourable borrowing conditions, while maintaining responsible fiscal policies at Member State level; regrets the systematic creation and use of instruments, funds and common borrowing programmes, including NGEU, outside the scope of the EU budget and with no scrutiny or control from the budgetary authority; calls, therefore, for the budgetisation of borrowing and lending operations and of all future EU programmes or instruments; requests that Parliament be fully involved in all cases through co-decision; |
| --- | --- |

18.

Union budget and new own resources

| 19. | Points out that the features of NGEU borrowing will have direct consequences on repayments from the Union budget for decades; insists, therefore, on optimising the debt service and ensuring a smooth debt profile in order to spread out the future burden evenly; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Underlines that the EU’s borrowing and lending capacity has increased considerably with NGEU; insists on the need to involve the budgetary authority at all stages of the lending and borrowing process; recalls that under the Own Resources Decision, the Commission is required to publish a regularly updated plan of expected principal and interest payments, to be discussed with Parliament and the Council at regular interinstitutional meetings on NGEU; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Reiterates its firm demand that the budgetary appropriations for the EURI repayment costs should be entered in the EU budget over and above the MFF ceilings in order to safeguard the margins and flexibility mechanisms for their intended purposes; calls for the relevant modifications to be made to the MFF Regulation during the MFF mid-term revision; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Firmly believes that the ultimate success of NGEU, and in particular the credibility and sustainability of its financing, will also be assessed against the Union’s ability to repay the common debt with new own resources in the environmental and corporate sector, rather than with increased gross national income-based contributions from the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Highlights that new own resources are a key enabler for the Union to implement its policy priorities, due partly to the need for increased investment to address energy independence and help mitigate the social impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and in order to speed up the green energy transition; stresses that the introduction of new own resources would avoid cuts having to be made to Union programmes in the future, which would undermine the very purpose and long-term benefits of the recovery plan; believes that introducing new own resources, as agreed in the legally binding Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020, would achieve lasting benefits, not only in delivering EU policies but also ensuring the Union’s standing as a credible and smart debt issuer; calls on the Member States, therefore, to move as swiftly as possible and speed up the negotiations on the first basket of the so-called new generation of EU own resources based on the EU Emissions Trading System, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and Pillar I of the OECD international agreement on the minimum taxation of multinationals, as outlined by the Commission on 22 December 2021; urges the Council to approve the first basket of own resources before the end of 2022; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Notes, however, that the estimated proceeds from these three own resources would not suffice to cover NGEU borrowing debt; reiterates its demand, therefore, that the Commission put forward a proposal for the second basket of new own resources before December 2023, including a proposal for a financial transaction tax, in order to ensure sufficient resources for NGEU debt repayments; underlines the legally binding roadmap established under the Interinstitutional Agreement; asks the Commission, in view of the recent economic challenges however, to be even more ambitious and not to exclude the possibility of adding own resources that are innovative, new and — preferably — genuine; |
| --- | --- |

24.

o

o o

| 25. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

25.

---

(1)  OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 23.

(3)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

(4)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(5)  OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2.

(6)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/nextgenerationeu-green-bonds/dashboard_en

(7)  European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2022 on the social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine — reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0219).

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/8

---

P9_TA(2022)0401

Implementation report on the European Innovation Council

European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the European Innovation Council (2022/2063(INI))

(2023/C 167/02)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Title XIX thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Title XIX thereof,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination (1),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 establishing the Specific Programme implementing Horizon Europe — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 establishing the Specific Programme implementing Horizon Europe — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (3),

| — | having regard to the European Innovation Council (EIC) work programmes for 2021 and 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Innovation Council (EIC) work programmes for 2021 and 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIC impact report 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EIC impact report 2021,

| — | having regards to the Commission communication of 11 January 2018 entitled ‘Horizon 2020 interim evaluation: maximising the impact of EU research and innovation’ (COM(2018)0002), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regards to the Commission communication of 11 January 2018 entitled ‘Horizon 2020 interim evaluation: maximising the impact of EU research and innovation’ (COM(2018)0002),

| — | having regard to the impact assessment of 7 June 2018 accompanying the Commission’s proposal for Horizon Europe (SWD(2018)0307), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the impact assessment of 7 June 2018 accompanying the Commission’s proposal for Horizon Europe (SWD(2018)0307),

| — | having regard to the statement from the EIC Board of 16 August 2022 for the discussion in Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy on EIC implementation (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement from the EIC Board of 16 August 2022 for the discussion in Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy on EIC implementation (4),

| — | having regard to the statement by the EIC Board of 9 February 2022 on the EIC work programme for 2022 and future of the EIC Fund (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the EIC Board of 9 February 2022 on the EIC work programme for 2022 and future of the EIC Fund (5),

| — | having regard to the Commission press release of 5 August 2022 entitled ‘EIC Accelerator implementation update’ (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission press release of 5 August 2022 entitled ‘EIC Accelerator implementation update’ (6),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0268/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0268/2022),

General objectives and structure of the EIC under Horizon Europe

| A. | whereas the EIC is the EU’s flagship innovation programme to identify, develop and scale up breakthrough, and in particular deep-tech, innovations; whereas the EIC will facilitate and enhance networking and cooperation and create synergies between different innovation communities in the EU and with the EIT in particular, ensuring broad geographical coverage; whereas it was set up to foster Europe’s technological strategic autonomy as well as to improve the functioning of the European venture capital market; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the EIC is the EU’s flagship innovation programme to identify, develop and scale up breakthrough, and in particular deep-tech, innovations; whereas the EIC will facilitate and enhance networking and cooperation and create synergies between different innovation communities in the EU and with the EIT in particular, ensuring broad geographical coverage; whereas it was set up to foster Europe’s technological strategic autonomy as well as to improve the functioning of the European venture capital market;

| B. | whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/695 identifies the EIC as ‘a centrally managed one-stop shop’ which ‘shall focus mainly on breakthrough and disruptive innovation, targeting especially market-creating innovation, while also supporting all types of innovation, including incremental’; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/695 identifies the EIC as ‘a centrally managed one-stop shop’ which ‘shall focus mainly on breakthrough and disruptive innovation, targeting especially market-creating innovation, while also supporting all types of innovation, including incremental’;

| C. | whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/695 stipulates that the EIC must operate in accordance with clear Union added value, autonomy, ability to take risk, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/695 stipulates that the EIC must operate in accordance with clear Union added value, autonomy, ability to take risk, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability;

| D. | whereas Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 stipulates that the EIC has two objectives: firstly, to identify, develop and deploy high-risk innovations of all kinds, including incremental; and secondly, to support the rapid scale-up of innovative companies at Union and international levels along the pathway from ideas to market; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 stipulates that the EIC has two objectives: firstly, to identify, develop and deploy high-risk innovations of all kinds, including incremental; and secondly, to support the rapid scale-up of innovative companies at Union and international levels along the pathway from ideas to market;

| E. | whereas the EIC is implemented through three main pillars: the EIC Pathfinder; the EIC Transition; and the EIC Accelerator; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the EIC is implemented through three main pillars: the EIC Pathfinder; the EIC Transition; and the EIC Accelerator;

| F. | whereas the Pathfinder provides grants to high-risk cutting-edge projects that explore new and deep-tech areas with the aim of developing potentially radical innovative technologies of the future and new market opportunities; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the Pathfinder provides grants to high-risk cutting-edge projects that explore new and deep-tech areas with the aim of developing potentially radical innovative technologies of the future and new market opportunities;

| G. | whereas the Accelerator mainly supports small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with the ambition of developing breakthrough, deep-tech innovations which are key to Europe’s future growth and open strategic autonomy; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the Accelerator mainly supports small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with the ambition of developing breakthrough, deep-tech innovations which are key to Europe’s future growth and open strategic autonomy;

| H. | whereas the Accelerator is implemented mainly by using EIC blended finance awarded through a single, clear and transparent process and with a single decision, providing the supported innovator with a single global commitment to financial resources covering the various stages of innovation until market deployment, including pre-mass commercialisation; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the Accelerator is implemented mainly by using EIC blended finance awarded through a single, clear and transparent process and with a single decision, providing the supported innovator with a single global commitment to financial resources covering the various stages of innovation until market deployment, including pre-mass commercialisation;

| I. | whereas the Horizon Europe legislation allows for the Union to bear the initial risk of the selected innovation alone; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the Horizon Europe legislation allows for the Union to bear the initial risk of the selected innovation alone;

| J. | whereas Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 requires the Commission to establish a special purpose vehicle for the implementation of EIC blended finance and to manage all operational elements of Accelerator projects; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 requires the Commission to establish a special purpose vehicle for the implementation of EIC blended finance and to manage all operational elements of Accelerator projects;

Results of Pilot

| K. | whereas the EIC Pilot and EIC Enhanced Pilot successfully demonstrated the feasibility of the EIC as a fully-fledged programme as outlined in the general conclusions of the 2022 evaluation study published by the Commission (7), despite some initial issues including unclear communication with beneficiaries about the investment conditions for companies; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the EIC Pilot and EIC Enhanced Pilot successfully demonstrated the feasibility of the EIC as a fully-fledged programme as outlined in the general conclusions of the 2022 evaluation study published by the Commission (7), despite some initial issues including unclear communication with beneficiaries about the investment conditions for companies;

| L. | whereas the effectiveness of the EIC Pilot was under pressure due to low success rates; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the effectiveness of the EIC Pilot was under pressure due to low success rates;

| M. | whereas between 2018 and 2020, the EIC Pilot funded 330 Pathfinder projects under calls with high numbers of submissions; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas between 2018 and 2020, the EIC Pilot funded 330 Pathfinder projects under calls with high numbers of submissions;

| N. | whereas the geographical spread of participation and, in particular, coordination of the Pathfinder Pilot was concentrated in the EU-15 and Associated Countries; whereas a country’s position in the European innovation scoreboard seemed to be reflected in the number of applications as well as in the success of its innovators in the Pathfinder Pilot: the innovation leaders had the highest success rates and emerging innovators had the lowest success rates; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the geographical spread of participation and, in particular, coordination of the Pathfinder Pilot was concentrated in the EU-15 and Associated Countries; whereas a country’s position in the European innovation scoreboard seemed to be reflected in the number of applications as well as in the success of its innovators in the Pathfinder Pilot: the innovation leaders had the highest success rates and emerging innovators had the lowest success rates;

| O. | whereas the EIC Fund under its original structure, as put in place in 2020 under the EIC Pilot and which was accepted by the Commission at the time, was functioning appropriately; whereas 140 equity investment decisions were taken, despite the recurrent delays and issues in signing the blended finance instrument; whereas these decisions had a leverage ratio of 2,7, showing that the EIC Fund in its original structure was capable of establishing significant co-investment; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the EIC Fund under its original structure, as put in place in 2020 under the EIC Pilot and which was accepted by the Commission at the time, was functioning appropriately; whereas 140 equity investment decisions were taken, despite the recurrent delays and issues in signing the blended finance instrument; whereas these decisions had a leverage ratio of 2,7, showing that the EIC Fund in its original structure was capable of establishing significant co-investment;

| P. | whereas the evaluation study concludes that ‘the EIC Fund is underpinned by well-justified public policy goals and market needs’ and that ‘a contentious point on the Fund structure pivots around the interpretation of two eligibility rules: non-bankability and co-investment’; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the evaluation study concludes that ‘the EIC Fund is underpinned by well-justified public policy goals and market needs’ and that ‘a contentious point on the Fund structure pivots around the interpretation of two eligibility rules: non-bankability and co-investment’;

| Q. | whereas the due diligence procedure as established under the EIC Pilot has been particularly successful because it has delivered high quality due diligence assessments as confirmed by the fact that several of these assessments were used to attract external investors, indicating that investors base their investment decisions on due diligence of sufficient quality; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the due diligence procedure as established under the EIC Pilot has been particularly successful because it has delivered high quality due diligence assessments as confirmed by the fact that several of these assessments were used to attract external investors, indicating that investors base their investment decisions on due diligence of sufficient quality;

| R. | whereas the structured professional investment advice delivered by the Investment Committee and the European Investment Bank (EIB) team embedded in the EIC and SMEs Executive Agency (EISMEA) was able to deliver the high quality due diligence thanks to the unique cooperation between EISMEA and the EIB in combination with investment expertise brought in by external experts, including serial investors and venture capitalists, on the Investment Committee; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the structured professional investment advice delivered by the Investment Committee and the European Investment Bank (EIB) team embedded in the EIC and SMEs Executive Agency (EISMEA) was able to deliver the high quality due diligence thanks to the unique cooperation between EISMEA and the EIB in combination with investment expertise brought in by external experts, including serial investors and venture capitalists, on the Investment Committee;

State of implementation of the EIC under Horizon Europe

| S. | whereas the annotated model grant agreement for Horizon Europe was published extremely late, which created significant uncertainty among applicants, including potential applicants under the EIC; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the annotated model grant agreement for Horizon Europe was published extremely late, which created significant uncertainty among applicants, including potential applicants under the EIC;

| T. | whereas the introduction of programme managers has the potential to increase the effectiveness of the EIC; whereas a further nine programme managers have been appointed; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the introduction of programme managers has the potential to increase the effectiveness of the EIC; whereas a further nine programme managers have been appointed;

| U. | whereas the work of the programme managers still lacks visibility and is seen as lacking transparency by stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the work of the programme managers still lacks visibility and is seen as lacking transparency by stakeholders;

| V. | whereas the EIC is a new type of programme which carries more financial risk than traditional Union spending and which requires a dedicated auditing strategy; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas the EIC is a new type of programme which carries more financial risk than traditional Union spending and which requires a dedicated auditing strategy;

| W. | whereas under the 2021 and 2022 work programmes, EUR 1,55 billion and EUR 1,71 billion respectively was made available for the EIC; whereas in both of those years, roughly EUR 430 million stemmed from the NextGenerationEU budget, all of which was made available for grant components of the EIC; whereas about 52 % of the available budget was allocated to open, bottom-up calls under the open calls; whereas 65 % of the available funding was allocated to the grant components of the EIC, while 35 % was allocated to the investment components; whereas nearly 70 % of the available funding was allocated to the Accelerator calls, with 20 % going to the Pathfinder calls; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas under the 2021 and 2022 work programmes, EUR 1,55 billion and EUR 1,71 billion respectively was made available for the EIC; whereas in both of those years, roughly EUR 430 million stemmed from the NextGenerationEU budget, all of which was made available for grant components of the EIC; whereas about 52 % of the available budget was allocated to open, bottom-up calls under the open calls; whereas 65 % of the available funding was allocated to the grant components of the EIC, while 35 % was allocated to the investment components; whereas nearly 70 % of the available funding was allocated to the Accelerator calls, with 20 % going to the Pathfinder calls;

| X. | whereas the Pathfinder Open call had a success rate of 6,45 % and 7 % in 2021 and 2022 respectively; whereas under the Pathfinder Challenges call of 2021, 403 proposals were submitted and 39 proposals were awarded, which is a success rate of 9,7 %; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas the Pathfinder Open call had a success rate of 6,45 % and 7 % in 2021 and 2022 respectively; whereas under the Pathfinder Challenges call of 2021, 403 proposals were submitted and 39 proposals were awarded, which is a success rate of 9,7 %;

| Y. | whereas for the Accelerator call there were two cut-off dates in 2021 and 2022 respectively; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas for the Accelerator call there were two cut-off dates in 2021 and 2022 respectively;

| Z. | whereas, until September 2022, the only funding transferred to Accelerator beneficiaries was grant pre-payments for which the time-to-grant was 12 months, no funds were transferred as part of (quasi-) equity support and only one investment decision was taken, leading to a time-to-investment of well over a year; whereas the Commission only started signing term sheets in the summer of 2022 for beneficiaries selected in 2021 and most of them will be signed after the summer (8); |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas, until September 2022, the only funding transferred to Accelerator beneficiaries was grant pre-payments for which the time-to-grant was 12 months, no funds were transferred as part of (quasi-) equity support and only one investment decision was taken, leading to a time-to-investment of well over a year; whereas the Commission only started signing term sheets in the summer of 2022 for beneficiaries selected in 2021 and most of them will be signed after the summer (8);

Fundamental implementation issues

EIC Fund management and considerations on restructuring the Fund

| 1. | Is deeply concerned about the announcement in early 2022 of changes to the structure of the Fund compared to the situation under the EIC Pilot, when companies from the first two cut-offs in 2021 had already been selected for funding; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Recalls that the EIC Fund is set up to support startups and SMEs developing deep-tech innovations; highlights the fact that cash flows are crucial for startups and SMEs, and that long delays in receiving expected funding can bankrupt these kinds of companies; emphasises, therefore, the importance of the EIC Fund in being able to invest within market-compatible timeframes; deplores the cases where the EIC Fund failed to achieve this objective and where the original investment decision of the EIC Fund was rendered irrelevant, due to the long time lag and the company’s development during that time; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Is concerned by the delays in the implementation of the blended finance actions under the Accelerator; emphasises that the delays were exclusively the result of divergent perspectives on the implementation of the EIC stemming from conflicting interpretations of the relevant legal texts by different departments of the Commission about the management of the EIC Fund; notes that conflicts only concerned the equity part of the project and should therefore not have affected the grant agreements; deplores the fact that these internal Commission conflicts put at risk 96 European deep-tech companies; is deeply concerned that, except for one exceptional investment decision, no decisions for actual investments have been taken by the EIC Fund; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Recalls that EIC blended finance should be awarded through a single process and through a single decision covering both the grant and the financial instrument components; points out that the Commission should manage all of the operational elements of Accelerator projects; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Recognises that the Commission expressed concerns about the management of the EIC Fund in terms of staffing implications as well as the Commission’s potential reputational liability for the investments; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Acknowledges the staffing concerns raised by the Commission regarding the management of the EIC Fund investment portfolio; appreciates that staffing at the EIC Fund needs to be appropriate and that this means that a significant number of staff with significant experience are required; considers, however, that directly employing these persons is not the only solution; points out that the original Investment Committee together with the EIB had developed an alternative plan to resolve the staffing issue; concludes, therefore, that the staffing challenge is not a reason for restructuring the Fund; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Takes note of the Commission’s reasoning that Article 11(3) of Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 requires the Commission to explore indirect management and that this prompts changes to the structure of the EIC Fund; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Recalls that the text of Article 11(3) was included in the Commission proposal for Horizon Europe and was never challenged during the legislative procedure; highlights the fact that this means that the Commission should have been fully aware of this text when it set up the EIC Fund in 2020; stresses that the Commission decision to set up the EIC Fund, which included the original structure, was adopted by the College of Commissioners and had the support of the entire Commission; emphasises that the same is true for the 2021 EIC work programme, which made no mention of the need to restructure the EIC Fund; concludes that the issue of compliance with Article 11(3) was raised internally in the Commission in the summer of 2021 after the programme had already started; considers that raising such a fundamental issue during a programme in operation after having missed several opportunities to raise the issue in the three years preceding the start of the programme is at the very least a case of mismanagement and a sign of reluctance to accept a new way of working as envisaged by the co-legislators; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Highlights that Article 11(3) is only a single sentence that needs to be read in the context of the full Council Decision; stresses in this regard also that the Annex to the above-mentioned Council Decision mandates that the Commission ‘establish a special purpose vehicle’, without laying down any other conditions; stresses, furthermore, that EIC blended finance as referred to in Article 11(3) and defined in point 1.1.2 of Annex I to the Council Decision includes both grants and support for investment in the form of equity or other repayable forms; concludes, therefore, that the requirement of indirect management cannot be read as applying only to the investment part of blended finance and that this article cannot be interpreted in such a way that the two components are separated in implementation; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Notes the importance of the professional preparation of an investment decision; highlights, therefore, the role of the EIC Fund Investment Committee appointed by the Commission as well as the valuable support for due diligence provided by the EIB embedded in EISMEA; regrets, however, that further decisions of the EIC Fund, such as joining an investment round after the initial investment decision or establishing a rationale for an investment, seem to take too long, in part due to the time it takes the EIB to provide its input; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Notes that both the EIC Investment Committee and the EIC Fund Board, under the original set-up of the EIC Fund, included representatives of the Commission as well as external experts, ensuring a proper balance between policy coherence and professional investment decisions; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Notes that by October 2022 the Commission had adopted and implemented a ‘transition arrangement’ under which the EIC Fund remains in the ownership of the Commission while an external fund manager will take the Fund’s investment decisions; highlights that the external fund manager will also recruit staff to the Investment Committee and that this means that no more independent experts providing invaluable expertise will be on the Committee and no Commission representatives will be ensuring policy coherence; takes note of the description of this arrangement in the 2022 EIC work programme; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Notes with concern that until the transitional arrangement for the investments announced in the EIC 2022 work programme was in place, all single award decisions and all substantial investment decisions needed to be approved by the College of Commissioners and were therefore accompanied by another level of scrutiny; regards this as an unacceptable situation because it makes the decision-making process even longer, more complex and with more uncertainty for the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Notes with deep concern that just setting up the transitional arrangement for the EIC Fund took over a year due to continuous internal discussions between the different Commission departments; notes that in June 2022 the Commission started processing the grant components of the Accelerator projects selected in June 2021, indicating that sufficient progress had been made in setting up the transitional arrangement to be able to start implementing blended finance projects; notes that most of the grant agreements for grantees selected under the June 2021 cut-off were signed in the summer of 2022, resulting in it taking more than a year to receive the grant; notes that in May 2022 the Commission communicated that the grant components for the EIC blended finance grantees from the October 2021 cut-off date would be finalised by the end of May or early June (9); notes that the Commission had to inform these grantees over the summer of 2022 that the grants would not be ready by July and that they would probably have to wait until October 2022; concludes that for this cut-off date the time-to-grant will also be at least one year; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Highlights that Article 216(1) of the Financial Regulation expressly empowers the Commission to directly manage investments (Article 216(1b)) or to implement them through ‘a dedicated investment vehicle’ (Article 216(1a)); stresses that this form of implementation allows for more flexibility and more strategic consideration in the investment decisions and portfolio management than indirect management; rejects the notion that transferring the management of the Fund to the EIB and an external fund manager will allow for the flexibility and strategic consideration required to make the EIC a success; expresses the concern that the EIC Fund will simply become another EIB-backed venture capital fund; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Underscores that the EIC Board’s strategic advice needs to be more thoroughly implemented in the work of the EIC, including its recommendations to increase diversity and the inclusion of participants from a broad range of countries to realise the potential of innovators across Europe and to foster practical collaborations with the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT); |
| --- | --- |

16.

EIC Fund as sole investor

| 17. | Is deeply concerned about the apparent policy for the EIC Fund never to be the lead investor in an equity round, in particular in combination with the requirement for companies to bring in matching co-investment from external investors; believes this goes against the strategic objectives of and main logic behind the EIC; highlights the fact that this was not the policy at the beginning of the EIC Pilot and that this policy change was applied with retroactive effect to applications submitted before the policy change; is deeply concerned about the fact that this created cash-flow problems for many applicants and that only a third of the committed equity investments have actually been turned into payments to companies; emphasises that co-investment should not be an upfront requirement for projects but rather an objective of the EIC Fund during the lifetime of the grant project; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Recalls that the EIC can be the sole investor, taking on all the risk of an investment, in line with Regulation (EU) 2021/695; notes that this role seems to be implemented only by providing convertible loans alongside the requirement of matching co-investment for any equity investments; notes that more than 50 % of all investments under the equity component have so far been in the form of convertible loans; highlights that one of the reasons for establishing the EIC was that Europe lacks risk capital investors and, in particular, risk capital investors with expertise in deep-tech markets; notes in that regard that a dysfunctional market cannot be fully relied on as an effective mechanism to steer EIC investment and exit decisions; warns, in this regard, that requiring qualified co-investment could exacerbate the market failure which the EIC was set up to address; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Notes that the practice of requiring co-investment makes the EIC a follower investor, which puts it at risk of either:






  (a) | offering free and partly exclusive access for private investors to excellent investment opportunities, creating a risk of distorting the European venture capital market while at the same time reinforcing the relatively risk-averse nature of the European market; |
| --- | --- | --- |

19.

(a)

offering free and partly exclusive access for private investors to excellent investment opportunities, creating a risk of distorting the European venture capital market while at the same time reinforcing the relatively risk-averse nature of the European market;

| (b) | or becoming redundant because the lead investor sets the pace and standard for investment rounds, which raises the question of whether startups would need the EIC at all; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

or becoming redundant because the lead investor sets the pace and standard for investment rounds, which raises the question of whether startups would need the EIC at all;

| 20. | Is alarmed by the practice of converting convertible loans to equity for companies that did not manage to attract additional investment, based on a valuation established at the time of granting the loan rather than on a valuation at the time of converting the loan; points out, in this regard, that the EIC was set up to facilitate the development and scaling-up of startups exactly in the phase where valuations can increase quickly because the risks surrounding a technology fall rapidly and market entry is closer; concludes, therefore, that relying on an old valuation goes against the objectives of the EIC; points out, furthermore, that the EIC Fund is supposed to take risks, but by using convertible loans, most of the risk is essentially passed on to the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Recognises that an external lead investor brings added value because this lead investor may have highly specialised knowledge of the market segment relevant for a specific investment, and that the EIC Fund, owing to its size and general nature, may not be able to match this specialised knowledge; notes, therefore, that the specialised lead investor may be of more added value to the company’s development than the EIC Fund; recognises, furthermore, that having an external lead investor would guarantee that the valuation and other terms of investment are set by the market; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Firmly rejects the notion that the EIC Fund cannot be the sole investor or the lead investor; emphasises that the ability to invest even when the market is not ready to do so is one of the key justifications for the existence of the EIC; concludes that the investment policy of the EIC Fund should explicitly allow for:






  (a) | the EIC Fund to be the sole investor through convertible loans or, in specific cases, through equity investments; |
| --- | --- | --- |

22.

(a)

the EIC Fund to be the sole investor through convertible loans or, in specific cases, through equity investments;

| (b) | the EIC Fund to be able to lead an investment round; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the EIC Fund to be able to lead an investment round;

| (c) | the EIC Fund to be the biggest investor while not being the lead investor; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the EIC Fund to be the biggest investor while not being the lead investor;

| 23. | Notes that point 1.2.3 of Annex I to Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 requires the EIC Fund to define and implement an exit strategy for its investments; observes that no such strategy seems to be in place; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Implementation flaws

Application procedure

| 24. | Emphasises the importance of an accessible and effective application procedure for a programme that aims to attract the most ambitious innovators; notes that the procedure can still be improved along the following lines:






  (a) | both single- and multi-beneficiary proposals should be facilitated in the application procedure, requiring a dedicated proposal template for both types of application; |
| --- | --- | --- |

24.

(a)

both single- and multi-beneficiary proposals should be facilitated in the application procedure, requiring a dedicated proposal template for both types of application;

| (b) | all information required for a successful application should be made available in a coherent manner; currently, the information is spread across several documents which makes preparing the application unnecessarily cumbersome; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

all information required for a successful application should be made available in a coherent manner; currently, the information is spread across several documents which makes preparing the application unnecessarily cumbersome;

| 25. | Notes with concern that evaluators are giving mixed signals to stakeholders regarding the appropriate risk and bankability of EIC Accelerator proposals, especially affecting the participation of under-represented regions and female-led companies; recalls that one of the core principles of the EIC is the ability to take risks; recalls further that point 1.1.2 of Annex I to Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 identifies providing funding to non-bankable projects as a core objective of the EIC Accelerator; is deeply convinced that the EIC Accelerator can only be successful if there is a clear policy and communication on the appropriate risk for and bankability of EIC Accelerator projects; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Is concerned about the apparent lack of transparency in the management of the programme as reported by stakeholders; highlights the two main concerns of stakeholders:






  (a) | the lack of transparency in how the topics for Pathfinder Challenges are selected; |
| --- | --- | --- |

26.

(a)

the lack of transparency in how the topics for Pathfinder Challenges are selected;

| (b) | and the lack of transparency in how the programme managers manage the portfolios, in particular in the proposal selection phase; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

and the lack of transparency in how the programme managers manage the portfolios, in particular in the proposal selection phase;

| 27. | Stresses the importance of a reliable time-to-grant promise; highlights, in this regard, that the evaluation of the 2021 Pathfinder Open call took more than five months, while Article 31 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695 requires that applicants are informed within five months about the outcome of the evaluation process; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Expresses concern regarding the EIC Accelerator submission process, which has become longer and more complex through its several steps and own EIC platform, outside the official funding and tender opportunities portal; believes that the submission and evaluation process for an innovator-centric EIC Accelerator should be easy to understand for entrepreneurs as well as scientists, minimal in terms of the time investment needed, fair and transparent, and in line with industry standards; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Is deeply concerned about the way in which the AI Platform functions; notes in this regard that both applicants and evaluators have voiced concerns about the Platform; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Highlights that the online form is time-consuming, has no flexibility in terms of presenting information (no formatting or images possible) and uses jargon needlessly; notes that the resulting ‘Business Plan’ does not seem to meet industry standards and is not in a format which is user friendly for evaluators or project managers; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Draws particular attention to the increased number of pages (120-200 pages) compared to the EIC Pilot (50 pages), while pointing out that evaluators have 36 minutes to evaluate a full (second stage) proposal; notes that this is one of the reasons why stakeholders are dissatisfied with the quality of evaluation; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Notes with concern that a single ‘No-Go’ opinion in the second stage of the evaluation process is sufficient for an application to fail; believes this is disproportionate considering that there are three evaluators assessing the proposal and that they all give a ‘Go’/‘No-Go’ opinion on three separate evaluation criteria; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Appreciates, together with most stakeholders, the introduction of the rebuttal procedure. as it potentially contributes to improving the evaluation procedure; notes, however, that improvements are needed as many stakeholders report that it is unclear what happens with rebuttal remarks provided by applicants and that applicants have very little time to prepare their rebuttal; stresses that the introduction of the rebuttal procedure has been reported as one of the reasons for the longer period of time before receiving a grant; calls on the Commission to improve the rebuttal procedure and make it more meaningful by allowing it to be completed in a shorter timeframe in order to meet the deadline for providing the grant while allowing sufficient time to prepare the rebuttal; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Is concerned about the increasing need for applicants to hire consultants to manage the application procedure owing to its complexity; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Recognises that in order to facilitate the quick pace of EIC decision-making and deep-tech startup development, individuals employed by research organisations should be able to use the results of research projects to create startups; welcomes in this regard the introduction of the concept of ‘EIC Inventor’ in the model grant agreement and 2022 work programme; regrets that this introduction is accompanied by uncertainty about the legal consequences of this concept for research organisations; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Other individual issues raised

| 36. | Emphasises that the concept of ‘EIC Inventors’ should lead to the effective use of research results to develop economic activities; concludes therefore that it should not undermine the use of the results by other experts within the research organisation or by the research organisation itself to develop economic activities; believes that broad access rights for EIC Inventors, without any time limitation, are justified only in cases where the research organisations do not provide the support needed for individual researchers to use the results to develop economic activity; believes, therefore, that these access rights should be granted to EIC Inventors on a case-by-case basis when it is evident that the Inventor lacks the support needed within the research organisation; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Regrets that the low success rates of the programme (6-10 %) leads to too many high-quality proposals not being funded; highlights that low success rates constitute a loss in terms of potentially deeply transformative innovations not being developed further as well as in lost time and money invested in the preparation of proposals; calls for the use, in this regard, where appropriate, of two-step applications in order to limit losses in time and money invested in preparing proposals; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Emphasises that Europe’s innovative capacity, economic growth and resilience are undermined because of the low participation of women on the startup and venture capital scene; welcomes, in this regard, the efforts made by the EIC to promote female leadership and participation in startups and venture capital; regrets that this has not yet resulted in sufficient change; points, in this regard, to the fact that only 1,8 % of investments in European startups in 2021 were raised by startups founded exclusively by women and a mere 9,3 % were raised by mixed-gender founding teams (10); |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Points to the importance of the EIC Board as the principle advisor to the Commission regarding the implementation of the EIC as well as the development of broader innovation policy, particular as regards improving the innovation ecosystem in Europe and identifying strategically relevant technologies; stresses that the EIC Board should be fully informed in a timely manner, both by the EISMEA and other Commission departments involved, on all developments in the implementation of the EIC, and be provided with all information which it requests regarding the EIC; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Notes that the EIC Transition is formally part of the EIC Pathfinder, although it is implemented as a separate programme part; considers that the Transition calls represent less than 10 % of the EIC budgets under the 2021 and 2022 work programmes; points out that the Transition calls are the only calls to which the fast track to research and innovation procedure is applied; endorses the use of this procedure for the Transition call; calls on the Commission to widen the application of this procedure to more Pathfinder calls; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Highlights that the 2022 work programme refers to the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle both as an evaluation criterion for the EIC Accelerator and as an eligibility criterion for the EIC in general; is alarmed by this requirement to comply with the DNSH principle as enshrined in Regulation (EU) 2020/852, known as the Taxonomy Regulation, since it is applied to all calls regardless of content or maturity; recognises the usefulness of the principle to guide the selection of projects under calls whose content directly relates to the environmental objectives of the Union and which are close to market deployment; emphasises that there is no legal basis for a blanket application of this additional eligibility criterion to all calls; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Welcomes the efforts within the EIC to develop a suitable framework for the evaluation of the EIC’s performance; highlights that the unique nature of the EIC requires a tailor-made approach to monitoring performance and using the outcome of that monitoring to ensure that the EIC is a top performer in the market; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Recommendations

| 43. | Calls on the Commission to re-assess its implementation of the EIC Fund in the frame of the Horizon Europe programme and to find a new fit-for-purpose management mode that reflects the ambitious and transformative nature of the EIC as the investor of reference for breakthrough innovation in Europe; urges the Commission to include in this new approach the following principles:






  (a) | ensuring that the implementation of both the equity and grant components are under the full control of the Commission, which should also ensure that there is a direct coordinating line between the implementation of the two components, and safeguarding the ability of the Commission to intervene at any stage of the investment cycle to ensure that investments of strategic importance are made; |
| --- | --- | --- |

43.

(a)

ensuring that the implementation of both the equity and grant components are under the full control of the Commission, which should also ensure that there is a direct coordinating line between the implementation of the two components, and safeguarding the ability of the Commission to intervene at any stage of the investment cycle to ensure that investments of strategic importance are made;

| (b) | ensuring a role for the EIC Fund Board and independent expert evaluation by the Investment Committee in order to closely monitor the fulfilment of the EIC Fund investment guidelines, while relying on the EIB team and the external fund managers for the day-to-day management of operations; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

ensuring a role for the EIC Fund Board and independent expert evaluation by the Investment Committee in order to closely monitor the fulfilment of the EIC Fund investment guidelines, while relying on the EIB team and the external fund managers for the day-to-day management of operations;

| (c) | making full use of the added value of co-investment by external investors, while maintaining the possibility for the EIC Fund to:






  (i) | be the sole investor, including through taking equity without co-investment from external investors being required; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(c)

making full use of the added value of co-investment by external investors, while maintaining the possibility for the EIC Fund to:

(i)

be the sole investor, including through taking equity without co-investment from external investors being required;

| (ii) | be the major investor without leading the investment round; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

be the major investor without leading the investment round;

| (iii) | lead an investment round; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

lead an investment round;

| (d) | developing an investment strategy for equity investments based on milestones reflecting the merits of the innovation as well as the strategic objectives of the Union rather than solely the willingness of other investors to join the investment round, which would encourage the EIC Fund to take risks as the sole investor, in particular to boost the successful participation of under-represented regions and female-led companies, which face even more difficulties in financing their startups; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

developing an investment strategy for equity investments based on milestones reflecting the merits of the innovation as well as the strategic objectives of the Union rather than solely the willingness of other investors to join the investment round, which would encourage the EIC Fund to take risks as the sole investor, in particular to boost the successful participation of under-represented regions and female-led companies, which face even more difficulties in financing their startups;

| (e) | establishing an exit strategy for equity investments of the EIC Fund which takes into consideration the strategic objectives of the Union; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

establishing an exit strategy for equity investments of the EIC Fund which takes into consideration the strategic objectives of the Union;

| (f) | maintaining the construction that allows the EIB team to be embedded in the EISMEA European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency to deliver high-quality due diligence; requests the Commission to build on this successful collaboration and agree on an arrangement with the EIB to have the embedded EIB team representing the EIC Fund in investees’ board meetings; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

maintaining the construction that allows the EIB team to be embedded in the EISMEA European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency to deliver high-quality due diligence; requests the Commission to build on this successful collaboration and agree on an arrangement with the EIB to have the embedded EIB team representing the EIC Fund in investees’ board meetings;

| (g) | ensuring efficient collaboration with national contact points as well as regional authorities if applicable; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

ensuring efficient collaboration with national contact points as well as regional authorities if applicable;

| 44. | Urges the Commission to enter into an open dialogue with Parliament, the relevant programme committee and the EIC Board in order to develop an alternative long-term solution for the structure of the EIC Fund which fully respects the relevant Union legislation and the above-mentioned principles; recommends that a thorough assessment be made of ways to improve the EIC’s implementation, considering as an option the establishment of an independent Union body under Article 187 TFEU as the main entity responsible for implementing the EIC; underlines the need to ensure that applicants are always treated equally, and that implementation safeguards transparency, accountability and prevention of conflicts of interest; recommends that if the thorough assessment finds that such a body would be the best institutional setting to implement the Accelerator along the lines set out above, it should be set up as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to the promotion of women across the innovation sector while striving for gender parity in all relevant positions, as well as geographical balance of EIC beneficiaries across the Union’s regions; requests, in particular, that the Commission include in the EIC work programmes specific measures to address both issues within the EIC; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Recommends that an InvestEU compartment be explored outside of the EIC Fund for companies which simply need to match funding to complete their upscaling rounds; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Calls on the Commission to clarify the rules and procedures regarding the interpretation of non-bankability and co-investment criteria, enhancing communication and better involving National Contact Points; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Calls on the Commission to apply the DNSH principle for calls whose content directly relates to the environmental objectives of the Union and which are close to market deployment, and refrain from using the DNSH principle as an additional horizontal eligibility criterion for all EIC projects; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Calls on the Commission to adapt the Model Grant Agreement to include a clear definition of ‘EIC Inventor’ and to stipulate a clear policy on access rights for EIC Inventors providing them broad access rights only when a research organisation does not have an active policy and structure in place to support the use of research results for economic activities; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Calls on the Commission to introduce a system of continuous and quick evaluation of the performance of the EIC and, in particular, of the Accelerator; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Calls on the Commission to include a rigorous and continuous assessment of the evaluation procedure, taking seriously into account complaints raised by applicants indicating clear inconsistencies in the evaluation of their proposals; invites the Commission to inform Parliament on how it handles individual complaints demonstrating a clear failure by the evaluators; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Calls on the relevant Union bodies, including the European Court of Auditors and the EIC Board, to develop a dedicated auditing strategy for the EIC which reflects the particular nature of the EIC; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Calls on the Commission to include measures to improve the participation of SMEs and to make the EIC Accelerator accessible and attractive for innovative SMEs, by simplifying the application process in order to remove barriers for SMEs; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Calls on the Commission to ensure that the instrument supports a wide range of projects in terms of their scale, so that small companies developing and scaling up high-impact innovations can have equal access to it; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Calls on the Commission to revise the EIC Accelerator’s current submission process and its time-to-grant period, aligning the EIC platform with the evaluation criteria of the EIC Accelerator; believes that such a revision should aim for a fast and simple instrument fit for the needs of European deep-tech startups, reaching a targeted time-to-grant of four to five months; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Calls on the Commission to improve synergies and collaboration with the EIT; calls on the EIT and EIC to set up reciprocal and systematic exchanges of information, as well as to have a common member in each of their governing boards, with the aim of avoiding silos and the duplication of efforts and strategies; |
| --- | --- |

56.

o

o o

| 57. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

57.

---

(1)  OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 167 I, 12.05.2021, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

(4)  https://eic.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-eic-board-discussion-european-parliament-itre-committee-eic-implementation-2022-08-16_en

(5)  https://eic.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/Statement%20by%20the%20EIC%20Board%20on%20the%20EIC%20Work%20Programme%20for%202022%20and%20future%20of%20the%20EIC%20Fund.pdf

(6)  https://eic.ec.europa.eu/news/eic-accelerator-implementation-update-2022-08-05_en

(7)  European Commission, Evaluation study on the European Innovation Council (EIC) Pilot, 2022.

(8)  https://eic.ec.europa.eu/news/eic-accelerator-implementation-update-2022-08-05_en

(9)  https://sciencebusiness.net/news/commission-says-european-innovation-council-grant-logjam-end-june

(10)  https://europeanwomeninvc.idcinteractive.net/

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Wednesday 23 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/18 |
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11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/18

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P9_TA(2022)0405

Recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (2022/2896(RSP))

(2023/C 167/03)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, including its resolutions of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine (1), of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (2), and of 25 November 2021 on the human rights violations by private military and security companies, particularly the Wagner Group (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, including its resolutions of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine (1), of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (2), and of 25 November 2021 on the human rights violations by private military and security companies, particularly the Wagner Group (3),

| — | having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, |
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—

having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

| — | having regard to the international legal framework for preventing and fighting terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 2341 on protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist acts, adopted on 13 February 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the international legal framework for preventing and fighting terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 2341 on protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist acts, adopted on 13 February 2017,

| — | having regard to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1977, and the international conventions that followed, |
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—

having regard to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1977, and the international conventions that followed,

| — | having regard to the EU legal framework against terrorism, including Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (4) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU legal framework against terrorism, including Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (4) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (5),

| — | having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

| — | having regard to Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2463 of 13 October 2022 on the further escalation of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, |
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—

having regard to Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2463 of 13 October 2022 on the further escalation of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the statement of 10 October 2022 by European Council President Charles Michel on Russia’s violent attacks against Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of 10 October 2022 by European Council President Charles Michel on Russia’s violent attacks against Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 22 September 2022 on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 22 September 2022 on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 14 November 2022 recommending the creation of a register to document damages caused by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 14 November 2022 recommending the creation of a register to document damages caused by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas since 2014, and in particular after 24 February 2022, when Russia relaunched the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, its forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, have killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and carried out acts of terror throughout the country targeting various elements of civilian infrastructure such as residential areas, schools, hospitals, railway stations, theatres, and water and electricity networks; whereas these brutal and inhumane acts are causing death, suffering, destruction and displacement; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas since 2014, and in particular after 24 February 2022, when Russia relaunched the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, its forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, have killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and carried out acts of terror throughout the country targeting various elements of civilian infrastructure such as residential areas, schools, hospitals, railway stations, theatres, and water and electricity networks; whereas these brutal and inhumane acts are causing death, suffering, destruction and displacement;

| B. | whereas the Russian armed forces and their proxies have committed summary executions, abductions, sexual violence, torture and other atrocities in newly and previously occupied territories of Ukraine, including the massacres of civilians in cities and towns such as Bucha, Irpin, Izium and Lyman, the deliberate attack on a theatre in Mariupol, which killed hundreds of people, and the attack against the Kramatorsk railway station, which killed 60 civilians; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the Russian armed forces and their proxies have committed summary executions, abductions, sexual violence, torture and other atrocities in newly and previously occupied territories of Ukraine, including the massacres of civilians in cities and towns such as Bucha, Irpin, Izium and Lyman, the deliberate attack on a theatre in Mariupol, which killed hundreds of people, and the attack against the Kramatorsk railway station, which killed 60 civilians;

| C. | whereas many thousands of civilians have been murdered in Ukraine, including hundreds of children, and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced or disappeared by the Russian armed forces and their proxies; whereas human rights groups and international observer missions have thoroughly documented the numerous atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces and their proxies against Ukrainian civilians, such as summary executions, torture, rape and mass detention of civilians in so-called filtration centres, as well as forced adoptions of Ukrainian children and forced deportations; whereas the number of documented war crimes in Ukraine is nearing 40 000 and is expected to increase after war crimes are documented in the recently liberated parts of Kherson oblast; whereas according to monitoring data gathered by Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information, the Russian Federation has committed 457 crimes against journalists and media in Ukraine and the Russian occupiers have killed more than 40 Ukrainian and foreign journalists since the start of the war of aggression; whereas the same methods have been used by the Russian Federation and its proxies in the occupied territories since 2014, with the most infamous example being that of the ‘Izolyatsia prison’ in Donetsk; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas many thousands of civilians have been murdered in Ukraine, including hundreds of children, and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced or disappeared by the Russian armed forces and their proxies; whereas human rights groups and international observer missions have thoroughly documented the numerous atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces and their proxies against Ukrainian civilians, such as summary executions, torture, rape and mass detention of civilians in so-called filtration centres, as well as forced adoptions of Ukrainian children and forced deportations; whereas the number of documented war crimes in Ukraine is nearing 40 000 and is expected to increase after war crimes are documented in the recently liberated parts of Kherson oblast; whereas according to monitoring data gathered by Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information, the Russian Federation has committed 457 crimes against journalists and media in Ukraine and the Russian occupiers have killed more than 40 Ukrainian and foreign journalists since the start of the war of aggression; whereas the same methods have been used by the Russian Federation and its proxies in the occupied territories since 2014, with the most infamous example being that of the ‘Izolyatsia prison’ in Donetsk;

| D. | whereas the Russian Federation continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its acts of aggression against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, inter alia by deliberately targeting civilian objects that should not be the object of attack according to Article 52(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; whereas these crimes reflect a grotesque indifference to the rules and laws of war that constrain the exercise of military power, as seen for instance in the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, the widespread use of torture against and the summary executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well the denial of access to international humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the Russian Federation continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its acts of aggression against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, inter alia by deliberately targeting civilian objects that should not be the object of attack according to Article 52(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; whereas these crimes reflect a grotesque indifference to the rules and laws of war that constrain the exercise of military power, as seen for instance in the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, the widespread use of torture against and the summary executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well the denial of access to international humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross;

| E. | whereas the Russian Federation has already launched more than 4 000 missiles against Ukraine and shelled the country more than 24 000 times, including from the territory of Belarus; whereas Russia’s missile, drone and artillery strikes have damaged or destroyed 60 982 civilian infrastructure facilities across Ukraine to date, including 42 818 residential buildings and houses, 1 960 educational institutions and 396 medical institutions, 392 cultural and 87 religious buildings, and 5 315 water and electricity facilities; whereas deliberate missile and drone attacks launched by the Russian Federation, including with Iranian-supplied drones, have damaged or destroyed around 40 % of the critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the Russian Federation has already launched more than 4 000 missiles against Ukraine and shelled the country more than 24 000 times, including from the territory of Belarus; whereas Russia’s missile, drone and artillery strikes have damaged or destroyed 60 982 civilian infrastructure facilities across Ukraine to date, including 42 818 residential buildings and houses, 1 960 educational institutions and 396 medical institutions, 392 cultural and 87 religious buildings, and 5 315 water and electricity facilities; whereas deliberate missile and drone attacks launched by the Russian Federation, including with Iranian-supplied drones, have damaged or destroyed around 40 % of the critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine;

| F. | whereas during the siege of Mariupol, the authorities of the Russian Federation created a large-scale humanitarian crisis, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians and destroyed 95 % of the city; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas during the siege of Mariupol, the authorities of the Russian Federation created a large-scale humanitarian crisis, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians and destroyed 95 % of the city;

| G. | whereas since October 2022, Russia has been deliberately targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure all over the country in order to terrorise the population and cut its access to gas, electricity, water, the internet and other basic goods and services, which is particularly devastating with winter on its way; whereas the purpose of these attacks is to terrorise the population of Ukraine, to suppress their resistance and resolve to continue defending their country, and to force them to accept the occupying power and agree to the illegal attempt to annex several parts of Ukraine; whereas Polish territory has been hit during these attacks, killing two Polish citizens; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas since October 2022, Russia has been deliberately targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure all over the country in order to terrorise the population and cut its access to gas, electricity, water, the internet and other basic goods and services, which is particularly devastating with winter on its way; whereas the purpose of these attacks is to terrorise the population of Ukraine, to suppress their resistance and resolve to continue defending their country, and to force them to accept the occupying power and agree to the illegal attempt to annex several parts of Ukraine; whereas Polish territory has been hit during these attacks, killing two Polish citizens;

| H. | whereas Russia is responsible for the global food security crisis as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine and its blockade of Ukrainian seaports; whereas Russia has been weaponising food and hunger since the beginning of the war; whereas Russia’s deliberate actions, including destroying stocks, disrupting production and imposing quotas on its own exports of foodstuffs and fertilisers, have exacerbated the global food security crisis; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas Russia is responsible for the global food security crisis as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine and its blockade of Ukrainian seaports; whereas Russia has been weaponising food and hunger since the beginning of the war; whereas Russia’s deliberate actions, including destroying stocks, disrupting production and imposing quotas on its own exports of foodstuffs and fertilisers, have exacerbated the global food security crisis;

| I. | whereas Russia has illegally annexed the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts of Ukraine; whereas Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) is a serious threat to the plant’s safety and security; whereas Russia has kidnapped the workers of the NPP and forced them to work, has stored military equipment on the site and has opened fire on targets in its immediate vicinity; whereas Russia has also jeopardised the safety and security of the Chernobyl NPP; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas Russia has illegally annexed the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts of Ukraine; whereas Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) is a serious threat to the plant’s safety and security; whereas Russia has kidnapped the workers of the NPP and forced them to work, has stored military equipment on the site and has opened fire on targets in its immediate vicinity; whereas Russia has also jeopardised the safety and security of the Chernobyl NPP;

| J. | whereas Russia poses a risk to the safety and security of the whole European continent and the rules-based international order through its efforts to undermine the security and safety of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and its threats of using nuclear weapons; whereas Russian officials have threatened European countries on several occasions, including with ‘military-technical measures’, due to their support for Ukraine and/or their aspirations to join NATO; whereas Russia’s attempt to leverage energy exports as a tool of geopolitical coercion amounts to using energy supplies as a weapon; whereas the damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines on 26 September 2022 resulted in major gas leaks in the Baltic Sea, which also constitutes an environmental attack on the EU; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas Russia poses a risk to the safety and security of the whole European continent and the rules-based international order through its efforts to undermine the security and safety of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and its threats of using nuclear weapons; whereas Russian officials have threatened European countries on several occasions, including with ‘military-technical measures’, due to their support for Ukraine and/or their aspirations to join NATO; whereas Russia’s attempt to leverage energy exports as a tool of geopolitical coercion amounts to using energy supplies as a weapon; whereas the damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines on 26 September 2022 resulted in major gas leaks in the Baltic Sea, which also constitutes an environmental attack on the EU;

| K. | whereas the Russian armed forces and Russian state-controlled groups and proxies such as the Wagner Group have repeatedly targeted civilians in several other locations, including during the Second Chechen War, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the Syrian Civil War, as well as in Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali; whereas the Wagner Group receives significant political, economic and logistical support from the Russian state, in particular the Russian Ministry of Defence; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Russian armed forces and Russian state-controlled groups and proxies such as the Wagner Group have repeatedly targeted civilians in several other locations, including during the Second Chechen War, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the Syrian Civil War, as well as in Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali; whereas the Wagner Group receives significant political, economic and logistical support from the Russian state, in particular the Russian Ministry of Defence;

| L. | whereas for many years Russia has supported and financed terrorist regimes and organisations, notably the Assad regime in Syria, to which Russia has supplied arms and in whose defence it has carried out deliberate attacks on the Syrian civilian population, cities and civilian infrastructure; whereas Russia has carried out attacks in other sovereign countries and on its own territory, including killing or attempting to assassinate many of the opponents of Putin’s dictatorship, among them journalists, politicians, activists and foreign leaders — most notably Anna Politkovskaya, Viktor Yushchenko, Boris Nemtsov, Stanislav Markelov, Anastasia Baburova, Sergei Protazanov, Natalya Estemirova, Sergey Magnitsky, Sergei Yushenkov, Yuri Shchekochikhin, Boris Berezovsky, Dzhokhar Dudayev and Zelimkhan Khangoshvili — as well as poisoning with nerve agents the Skripal family in the United Kingdom, poisoning Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei Navalny and others, and bombing ammunition depots in the Czech Republic in 2014; whereas the current Russian regime’s systematic repression of its own people has taken on a totalitarian nature and whereas it has a long history of using violence against its political opponents; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas for many years Russia has supported and financed terrorist regimes and organisations, notably the Assad regime in Syria, to which Russia has supplied arms and in whose defence it has carried out deliberate attacks on the Syrian civilian population, cities and civilian infrastructure; whereas Russia has carried out attacks in other sovereign countries and on its own territory, including killing or attempting to assassinate many of the opponents of Putin’s dictatorship, among them journalists, politicians, activists and foreign leaders — most notably Anna Politkovskaya, Viktor Yushchenko, Boris Nemtsov, Stanislav Markelov, Anastasia Baburova, Sergei Protazanov, Natalya Estemirova, Sergey Magnitsky, Sergei Yushenkov, Yuri Shchekochikhin, Boris Berezovsky, Dzhokhar Dudayev and Zelimkhan Khangoshvili — as well as poisoning with nerve agents the Skripal family in the United Kingdom, poisoning Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei Navalny and others, and bombing ammunition depots in the Czech Republic in 2014; whereas the current Russian regime’s systematic repression of its own people has taken on a totalitarian nature and whereas it has a long history of using violence against its political opponents;

| M. | whereas the Russian Federation actively supports and enables Alexandr Lukashenka in his oppression of the people of Belarus through an enormous wave of mass repressive measures, including torture; whereas, according to investigations, senior Belarusian officials conspired to use a false bomb threat to unlawfully divert a Ryanair passenger flight in order to arrest a Belarusian dissident, in a joint special operation of the Belarusian and Russian secret services; whereas hijacking a civilian plane constitutes an act of state terrorism; whereas Lukashenka should be treated as an accomplice in the war of aggression against Ukraine for his role in enabling attacks from the territory of Belarus and openly supporting the Russian aggressors; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the Russian Federation actively supports and enables Alexandr Lukashenka in his oppression of the people of Belarus through an enormous wave of mass repressive measures, including torture; whereas, according to investigations, senior Belarusian officials conspired to use a false bomb threat to unlawfully divert a Ryanair passenger flight in order to arrest a Belarusian dissident, in a joint special operation of the Belarusian and Russian secret services; whereas hijacking a civilian plane constitutes an act of state terrorism; whereas Lukashenka should be treated as an accomplice in the war of aggression against Ukraine for his role in enabling attacks from the territory of Belarus and openly supporting the Russian aggressors;

| N. | whereas on 15 November 2022, a Dutch court convicted two Russians and a pro-Moscow Ukrainian separatist in absentia of the murders of 298 people for the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight 17; whereas the Russian state continues to deny its responsibility for shooting down Malaysia Airlines flight 17, and refuses to collaborate with international justice bodies; whereas, likewise, the Russian Federation continues to refuse to return the wreckage and black boxes of the TU-154 Polish Government aircraft which crashed near Smolensk in the Russian Federation in April 2010; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas on 15 November 2022, a Dutch court convicted two Russians and a pro-Moscow Ukrainian separatist in absentia of the murders of 298 people for the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight 17; whereas the Russian state continues to deny its responsibility for shooting down Malaysia Airlines flight 17, and refuses to collaborate with international justice bodies; whereas, likewise, the Russian Federation continues to refuse to return the wreckage and black boxes of the TU-154 Polish Government aircraft which crashed near Smolensk in the Russian Federation in April 2010;

| O. | whereas Russia is also waging an active information war, spreading disinformation about Ukraine, Europe and liberal democratic values, and conducting special operations to destabilise society in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine’s relations with its international partners; |
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O.

whereas Russia is also waging an active information war, spreading disinformation about Ukraine, Europe and liberal democratic values, and conducting special operations to destabilise society in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine’s relations with its international partners;

| P. | whereas the EU maintains a list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts which are subject to sanctions but the current legal framework, unlike those of countries such as the United States and Canada, does not provide for the designation of a state as a sponsor of terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the EU maintains a list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts which are subject to sanctions but the current legal framework, unlike those of countries such as the United States and Canada, does not provide for the designation of a state as a sponsor of terrorism;

| Q. | whereas the actions undertaken by Russian and proxy forces fit the definition of terrorism accepted by the EU, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004, UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994 and Council Common Positions 2001/931/CFSP and 2009/468/CFSP (6); |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the actions undertaken by Russian and proxy forces fit the definition of terrorism accepted by the EU, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004, UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994 and Council Common Positions 2001/931/CFSP and 2009/468/CFSP (6);

| R. | whereas over recent months, the parliaments or chambers of the parliaments in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Czechia, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) have adopted resolutions declaring Russia as a terrorist state or a state sponsor of terrorism, or designating the current Russian regime as a terrorist one; whereas the US Senate Resolution of 27 July 2022 and the US House of Representatives Resolution of 12 May 2022 called upon the US Department of State to designate the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas over recent months, the parliaments or chambers of the parliaments in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Czechia, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) have adopted resolutions declaring Russia as a terrorist state or a state sponsor of terrorism, or designating the current Russian regime as a terrorist one; whereas the US Senate Resolution of 27 July 2022 and the US House of Representatives Resolution of 12 May 2022 called upon the US Department of State to designate the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism;

| S. | whereas the President of the European Council Charles Michel stated in his remarks at Parliament’s extraordinary debate of 1 March 2022 on Russian aggression against Ukraine that Russia’s aggression constitutes ‘geopolitical terrorism, pure and simple’; whereas President Michel stated on 23 September 2022, in his speech to the 77th UN General Assembly on the Russian Federation, that ‘when a permanent member of the Security Council starts an unprovoked, unjustified war which has been condemned by the General Assembly, its suspension from the Security Council should be automatic’; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the President of the European Council Charles Michel stated in his remarks at Parliament’s extraordinary debate of 1 March 2022 on Russian aggression against Ukraine that Russia’s aggression constitutes ‘geopolitical terrorism, pure and simple’; whereas President Michel stated on 23 September 2022, in his speech to the 77th UN General Assembly on the Russian Federation, that ‘when a permanent member of the Security Council starts an unprovoked, unjustified war which has been condemned by the General Assembly, its suspension from the Security Council should be automatic’;

| T. | whereas in his statement of 14 March 2022, Zbigniew Rau, the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), qualified the attacks by the Government of the Russian Federation against innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine as ‘state terrorism’; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas in his statement of 14 March 2022, Zbigniew Rau, the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), qualified the attacks by the Government of the Russian Federation against innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine as ‘state terrorism’;

| 1. | Reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military actions, in particular the attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, and that Russia withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, end the forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians and the forced adoptions of Ukrainian children, release all the persons it has detained in Ukraine and permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Underlines that the deliberate attacks and atrocities carried out by the Russian Federation against the civilian population of Ukraine, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law amount to acts of terror against the Ukrainian population and constitute war crimes; expresses its unreserved outrage at and condemnation of these attacks and atrocities and the other acts that Russia has committed in pursuit of its destructive political aims in Ukraine and on the territory of other countries; in the light of the above, recognises Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state which uses means of terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who continue to show remarkable courage and resilience under unrelenting threats and attacks since 24 February 2022 and over the last nine years of Russian aggression, as well as with other victims of Russia’s aggression across the world; expresses its solidarity with the families of the victims of the 15 November 2022 missile incident in Poland and its support for Poland; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to develop an EU legal framework for the designation of states as sponsors of terrorism and states which use means of terrorism, which would trigger a number of significant restrictive measure against those countries and would have profound restrictive implications for EU relations with those countries; calls on the Council to subsequently consider adding the Russian Federation to such an EU list of state sponsors of terrorism; calls on the EU’s partners to adopt similar measures; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to take action to initiate a comprehensive international isolation of the Russian Federation, including with regard to Russia’s membership of international organisations and bodies such as the United Nations Security Council, and to refrain from holding any formal events on the territory of the Russian Federation; calls for diplomatic relations with Russia to be reduced further and for contacts with its official representatives at all levels to be kept to the absolute minimum necessary; calls on EU Member States to close and ban Russian state-affiliated institutions, such as the Russian Centres for Science and Culture and Russian diaspora organisations and associations, which operate under the auspices and leadership of Russian diplomatic missions and promote Russian state propaganda around the world; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on the Council to include the Wagner Group and the 141st Special Motorized Regiment, also known as the Kadyrovites, as well as other Russian-funded armed groups, militias and proxies such as those active in the occupied territories of Ukraine, on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts (EU terrorist list); welcomes the EU’s decision of 13 December 2021 to sanction the Wagner Group itself, as well as eight individuals and three entities connected to it, under four different EU sanctions regimes; urges all countries to terminate their relationships with companies affiliated with the Wagner Group and to comply with their obligations under international law by holding to account all perpetrators of grave violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed on their territory; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Council to take into account the Russian Federation’s escalating acts of terror against the population of Ukraine and therefore to swiftly complete its work on a ninth sanctions package; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure swift implementation and strict enforcement of all sanctions; calls on the Member States to actively prevent, investigate and prosecute any circumvention of the sanctions; calls on all Member States to remain united in their response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and on all EU candidate countries and potential candidates to align with the EU’s sanctions policy; asks the Commission and the Member States to consider possible measures against countries that try to help Russia to circumvent the sanctions imposed; urges the Commission to ensure that national penalties for breaching EU sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Strongly condemns Russia’s support of other dictatorships that use terror to suppress the democratic aspirations of their societies, in particular the regimes of Lukashenka and Assad, but also the regimes in Iran, Cuba and elsewhere; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Council to expand the list of individuals targeted by the sanctions to include those involved in forced deportations, forced adoptions of Ukrainian children, the illegal ‘referendums’ in the Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, and the illegal ‘elections’ in Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as all members of State Duma parties who hold offices in elected parliaments at all levels, including at regional and municipal levels; calls for a ban on the direct or indirect import, purchase or transfer of diamonds, whether in raw or processed form, originating from the Russian Federation; calls for Russia and Belarus to be put on the EU’s high-risk third country list on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism; urges the Member States to address loopholes in the implementation of sanctions, such as in regard to cryptoassets and non-compliance with anti-money laundering rules by professional enablers, and to suspend all automatic exchange of tax information and double tax agreements with both Russia and Belarus; calls for an immediate and full embargo on EU imports of Russian fossil fuels and uranium, and for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines to be completely abandoned, in order to stop financing Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the EU and its Member States to prohibit intentional public condoning or denial of Russia’s military aggression and war crimes in any form; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the Commission to come forward with a legislative proposal to amend the current EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) by extending its scope to include acts of corruption, to swiftly adopt targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for high-level corruption in Russia and Belarus, as well as their EU-based enablers and beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Reiterates its firm demand that all persons responsible for committing, assisting or organising human rights violations, atrocities or war crimes in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine must be identified as swiftly as possible, prosecuted and held to account; calls for renewed support for the ongoing independent investigations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Russia, which should ensure that those involved in planning, organising, committing or facilitating these crimes are individually held to account; calls on the EU and its Member States to provide the appropriate support for the establishment of a special tribunal dealing with the crime of aggression by Russia against Ukraine; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to include the crime of aggression in their national law; fully supports the investigation launched by the ICC Prosecutor into the situation in Ukraine, the work of the Commission of Inquiry under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the efforts of independent civil society organisations working to collect and preserve evidence of war crimes; encourages EU Member States to make even wider use of the principle of universal jurisdiction and to step up their support for international efforts to investigate and prosecute all the perpetrators of, and persons responsible for, war crimes in Ukraine; stresses the need for the EU to ensure the inclusion of a gender perspective in these investigations, including the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence against women, which can also constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards the establishment of a comprehensive international compensation mechanism, including an international register of damage, and actively cooperate with the Ukrainian authorities on this matter; calls on the Commission and the co-legislators to complete the legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian assets frozen by the EU and for their use to address the various consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including the reconstruction of Ukraine and compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the Council and the Member States to urgently and significantly increase their political, economic, financial, military, technical and humanitarian support for Ukraine in order to help Ukraine defend itself against the Russian war of aggression and against Russian attempts to destabilise Ukrainian state institutions, undermine the country’s macroeconomic stability, and destroy critical infrastructure in the areas of energy, communications, water and transport, and civilian infrastructure in the areas of education, health and culture; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of 9 November 2022 for an unprecedented EUR 18 billion support package for Ukraine in 2023 to ensure its macroeconomic stability, restore critical infrastructure and maintain essential public services, and affirms its support for the swift adoption of the proposal; emphasises the importance of swift implementation of commitments to provide financial and technical assistance, in particular with a view to the approaching winter where a significant number of Ukrainian citizens risk having no access to basic services such as water, heating and electricity; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Denounces the Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia power plant aimed at terrorising the Ukrainian population and condemns Russia for making power plants military targets; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Appeals to all Russian people not only to refuse to be dragged into this war, but also to protest against the atrocious war crimes against the people of Ukraine, committed by the Russian Federation in the name of the Russian people; expresses its support for Russian citizens protesting and fighting the current regime from within or outside of Russia or supporting refugees from Ukraine; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to increase support for and cooperation with civil society and free media from Russia and to continue to provide protection and temporary shelter to those Russians who are being persecuted due to their opposition to the regime; commends the work of Ukrainian and international journalists who tell the world the truth about the war in Ukraine, often risking their own lives to do so; calls for the investigation of Russian crimes against journalists in Ukraine and of the activities of those involved in criminal disinformation campaigns forming an integral part of the full-scale war against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Emphasises that Russia’s current war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the need for a thorough historical and legal evaluation of and a transparent public debate about the crimes of the Soviet regime, most importantly in Russia itself, because a lack of accountability and justice only leads to the repetition of similar crimes; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Criminal Court, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, and the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

18.

---

(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0353.

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0218.

(3)  OJ C 224, 8.6.2022, p. 104.

(4)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93.

(5)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70.

(6)  Council Common Position 2009/468/CFSP of 15 June 2009 updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2009/67/CFSP (OJ L 151, 16.6.2009, p. 45).

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/25

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P9_TA(2022)0408

Promoting regional stability and security in the broader Middle East region

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on promoting regional stability and security in the broader Middle East region (2020/2113(INI))

(2023/C 167/04)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 8 and 21 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 8 and 21 thereof,

| — | having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021’ (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021’ (2),

| — | having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 June 2021 entitled ‘CFSP Report — Our priorities in 2021’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 June 2021 entitled ‘CFSP Report — Our priorities in 2021’,

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration between the European Union and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) of 17 November 2021 on European Union support to UNRWA (2021-2024), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint Declaration between the European Union and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) of 17 November 2021 on European Union support to UNRWA (2021-2024),

| — | having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 18 May 2022 on a strategic partnership with the Gulf (JOIN(2022)0013), and to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2022 thereon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 18 May 2022 on a strategic partnership with the Gulf (JOIN(2022)0013), and to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2022 thereon,

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 of 10 September 2012 entitled ‘Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 of 10 September 2012 entitled ‘Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome’,

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 on women and peace and security, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 on women and peace and security,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,

| — | having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on gender equality in EU’s foreign and security policy (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on gender equality in EU’s foreign and security policy (3),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0256/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0256/2022),

| A. | whereas the countries in the broader Middle East region referred to in this report, which encompasses the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, are very diverse; whereas this region is strategic for the EU given its geographical position and common ties and requires a long-term approach and coordinated policy, considering the objectives of the Union to promote the values of peace, security and the protection of human rights in strict compliance with international law; whereas the stability and security of Europe and the broader Middle East region are interdependent, and whereas the security situation in the region is currently characterised by ongoing conflicts with strong regional and extra-regional dimensions, and is both fragile and very concerning; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the countries in the broader Middle East region referred to in this report, which encompasses the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, are very diverse; whereas this region is strategic for the EU given its geographical position and common ties and requires a long-term approach and coordinated policy, considering the objectives of the Union to promote the values of peace, security and the protection of human rights in strict compliance with international law; whereas the stability and security of Europe and the broader Middle East region are interdependent, and whereas the security situation in the region is currently characterised by ongoing conflicts with strong regional and extra-regional dimensions, and is both fragile and very concerning;

| B. | whereas the Middle East region has been plagued by outbreaks of instability, resulting from both structural geopolitical tensions and persistent internal factors, such as socioeconomic development challenges, weak governance and religious radicalism; whereas numerous countries in the broader Middle East have faced war, instability and social and financial crises; whereas terrorist organisations have exploited the instability and security situation and have caused many civilian deaths; whereas in this troubled context, and in view of historical and neighbourly relations, the EU has a key role to play in helping the region to achieve stability; whereas the EU, as a global player, must be able to assert itself as a constructive partner, drawing on its mediation capabilities to help Middle Eastern countries achieve stability and prosperity; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the Middle East region has been plagued by outbreaks of instability, resulting from both structural geopolitical tensions and persistent internal factors, such as socioeconomic development challenges, weak governance and religious radicalism; whereas numerous countries in the broader Middle East have faced war, instability and social and financial crises; whereas terrorist organisations have exploited the instability and security situation and have caused many civilian deaths; whereas in this troubled context, and in view of historical and neighbourly relations, the EU has a key role to play in helping the region to achieve stability; whereas the EU, as a global player, must be able to assert itself as a constructive partner, drawing on its mediation capabilities to help Middle Eastern countries achieve stability and prosperity;

| C. | whereas the influence and role of different EU Member States in the region is very unequal, owing to their specific historic, cultural and socioeconomic ties; whereas all EU Member States share the common objectives of security and stability, as well as promoting human rights and democracy; whereas these differences can sometimes give rise to contradictory or conflicting views in the region’s countries and rival strategies that are deeply detrimental to the EU achieving a more coherent and effective approach; whereas EU policy has been increasingly focused on the issues of migration and asylum, as well as counterterrorism; whereas it is also necessary to focus on the underlying causes of instability in order to provide long-term strategies and solutions for shared challenges; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the influence and role of different EU Member States in the region is very unequal, owing to their specific historic, cultural and socioeconomic ties; whereas all EU Member States share the common objectives of security and stability, as well as promoting human rights and democracy; whereas these differences can sometimes give rise to contradictory or conflicting views in the region’s countries and rival strategies that are deeply detrimental to the EU achieving a more coherent and effective approach; whereas EU policy has been increasingly focused on the issues of migration and asylum, as well as counterterrorism; whereas it is also necessary to focus on the underlying causes of instability in order to provide long-term strategies and solutions for shared challenges;

| D. | whereas there are many heated state, ethnic and religious rivalries in the Persian Gulf that will likely not only perpetuate current crises, such as the one in Yemen, but also spread instability across the entire region; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas there are many heated state, ethnic and religious rivalries in the Persian Gulf that will likely not only perpetuate current crises, such as the one in Yemen, but also spread instability across the entire region;

| E. | whereas the unresolved conflicts in Libya and Syria are a reason for major concern, and hamper the stability of the whole region; whereas third actors, such as Iran, Russia, and Türkiye in Syria, are present in these countries and military and paramilitary groups are involved in these conflicts, such as Russia’s Wagner Group; whereas Yemen is in the midst of a protracted political and humanitarian crisis, which has been exacerbated by the war, and there has been a constant flow of arms into the country; whereas 80 % of the population, 24,1 million people, are in need of humanitarian aid and protection; whereas the war in Yemen is now the largest humanitarian crisis in the world; whereas there are ongoing social and political conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon in which different regional powers are attempting to influence the local population in order to expand their control; whereas these conflicts have the potential to further develop; whereas the ongoing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories continues to be a source of instability; whereas conflicts in the region has affected the lives of millions of refugees forced to leave their countries, including around 14 million Palestinians (4), 7 million Syrians (5), 2 million Iraqis (6) and 1,7 million Yemenis (7); |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the unresolved conflicts in Libya and Syria are a reason for major concern, and hamper the stability of the whole region; whereas third actors, such as Iran, Russia, and Türkiye in Syria, are present in these countries and military and paramilitary groups are involved in these conflicts, such as Russia’s Wagner Group; whereas Yemen is in the midst of a protracted political and humanitarian crisis, which has been exacerbated by the war, and there has been a constant flow of arms into the country; whereas 80 % of the population, 24,1 million people, are in need of humanitarian aid and protection; whereas the war in Yemen is now the largest humanitarian crisis in the world; whereas there are ongoing social and political conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon in which different regional powers are attempting to influence the local population in order to expand their control; whereas these conflicts have the potential to further develop; whereas the ongoing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories continues to be a source of instability; whereas conflicts in the region has affected the lives of millions of refugees forced to leave their countries, including around 14 million Palestinians (4), 7 million Syrians (5), 2 million Iraqis (6) and 1,7 million Yemenis (7);

| F. | whereas the UNRWA continues to contribute to regional stability and peace; whereas its funding is not adequate for it to fulfil its mandate, which is key for the human development of and humanitarian support for some of the world’s most vulnerable refugees, and therefore the EU’s continued support for the UNRWA is a key element in the EU strategy of contributing to the promotion of security, stability and development in the region; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the UNRWA continues to contribute to regional stability and peace; whereas its funding is not adequate for it to fulfil its mandate, which is key for the human development of and humanitarian support for some of the world’s most vulnerable refugees, and therefore the EU’s continued support for the UNRWA is a key element in the EU strategy of contributing to the promotion of security, stability and development in the region;

| G. | whereas the US, despite giving lower priority to the region, continues to play a relevant role, including through a direct military and security presence, which has been shrinking, but still plays a decisive role in many countries; whereas Russia has emerged as a military actor in the region following its 2015 intervention to support Syria’s regime; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the US, despite giving lower priority to the region, continues to play a relevant role, including through a direct military and security presence, which has been shrinking, but still plays a decisive role in many countries; whereas Russia has emerged as a military actor in the region following its 2015 intervention to support Syria’s regime;

| H. | whereas on 15 September 2020, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain agreed to normalise their diplomatic relations with Israel by signing the so-called Abraham Accords; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas on 15 September 2020, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain agreed to normalise their diplomatic relations with Israel by signing the so-called Abraham Accords;

| I. | whereas the summit of 27 and 28 March 2022 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco aiming to create a new regional approach on security and increase their cooperation, which was also attended by the US Secretary of State, paved the way for a new regional approach to security; whereas since 2011, Iran has significantly expanded its influence in the region; whereas at the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula in 2021, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain ended their boycott of Qatar after nearly four years; whereas in 2021, talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran and high-level dialogues between Iran and the United Arab Emirates contributed to de-escalation in the region; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the summit of 27 and 28 March 2022 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco aiming to create a new regional approach on security and increase their cooperation, which was also attended by the US Secretary of State, paved the way for a new regional approach to security; whereas since 2011, Iran has significantly expanded its influence in the region; whereas at the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula in 2021, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain ended their boycott of Qatar after nearly four years; whereas in 2021, talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran and high-level dialogues between Iran and the United Arab Emirates contributed to de-escalation in the region;

| J. | whereas both Ukraine and Russia are leading exporters of grain and fertilisers for agricultural products for numerous countries in the region that are highly dependent and vulnerable; whereas Russia's war in Ukraine and its blockade of Ukraine’s grain is causing shortages of wheat and cereal, and could push up to 49 million people into famine-like conditions; whereas disruptions related to the war are exacerbating already-rising food prices and deepening poverty; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas both Ukraine and Russia are leading exporters of grain and fertilisers for agricultural products for numerous countries in the region that are highly dependent and vulnerable; whereas Russia's war in Ukraine and its blockade of Ukraine’s grain is causing shortages of wheat and cereal, and could push up to 49 million people into famine-like conditions; whereas disruptions related to the war are exacerbating already-rising food prices and deepening poverty;

| K. | whereas EU Member States continue to export arms to countries in the region; whereas the EU has established a common position that sets out common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (8); |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas EU Member States continue to export arms to countries in the region; whereas the EU has established a common position that sets out common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (8);

| L. | whereas countries in the region are key trading partners for the EU and there are important economic ties between the two sides; whereas the ongoing global energy crisis, which has been exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine, has led to increased contacts with the GCC and other countries in the region on the import of energy resources into the EU; whereas there is potential for stronger cooperation in other areas, such as the green transition, climate change mitigation and adaption, tourism, better governance, education, culture and human rights; whereas the joint communication on a strategic partnership with the Gulf outlined multiple areas of common interest between the EU, the GCC and other Gulf countries; whereas the Arab Gulf countries have increased their international humanitarian and development aid; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas countries in the region are key trading partners for the EU and there are important economic ties between the two sides; whereas the ongoing global energy crisis, which has been exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine, has led to increased contacts with the GCC and other countries in the region on the import of energy resources into the EU; whereas there is potential for stronger cooperation in other areas, such as the green transition, climate change mitigation and adaption, tourism, better governance, education, culture and human rights; whereas the joint communication on a strategic partnership with the Gulf outlined multiple areas of common interest between the EU, the GCC and other Gulf countries; whereas the Arab Gulf countries have increased their international humanitarian and development aid;

| M. | whereas the broader Middle East is among the most affected by climate change worldwide, with temperatures rising twice as fast as the global average; whereas the region’s countries face a multitude of environmental challenges, such as desertification, biodiversity loss, pollution in marine and coastal areas, air pollution and water scarcity and quality issues, which will be exacerbated by climate change; whereas the frequency and intensity of sand storms is steadily increasing in the region; whereas climate-induced water shortages, desertification and food insecurity threaten human security and may aggravate existing or trigger new conflicts in the region; whereas increased contact with partners in the region is needed against the backdrop of the ongoing global energy crisis and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas there is potential for stronger cooperation in other areas such as the green transition, better governance and human rights; whereas the European Green Deal can create channels for constructive cooperation between the EU and countries in the region; whereas the EU will have to import renewable energy to meet its climate targets; whereas in the context of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and divest from fossil fuels, the countries of the broader Middle East need to diversify their economies, which strongly rely on the extraction and trade of hydrocarbons; whereas in October 2021, the United Arab Emirates pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, Saudi Arabia pledged to achieve net-zero emissions domestically by 2060 and Qatar pledged to achieve a 25 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the broader Middle East is among the most affected by climate change worldwide, with temperatures rising twice as fast as the global average; whereas the region’s countries face a multitude of environmental challenges, such as desertification, biodiversity loss, pollution in marine and coastal areas, air pollution and water scarcity and quality issues, which will be exacerbated by climate change; whereas the frequency and intensity of sand storms is steadily increasing in the region; whereas climate-induced water shortages, desertification and food insecurity threaten human security and may aggravate existing or trigger new conflicts in the region; whereas increased contact with partners in the region is needed against the backdrop of the ongoing global energy crisis and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas there is potential for stronger cooperation in other areas such as the green transition, better governance and human rights; whereas the European Green Deal can create channels for constructive cooperation between the EU and countries in the region; whereas the EU will have to import renewable energy to meet its climate targets; whereas in the context of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and divest from fossil fuels, the countries of the broader Middle East need to diversify their economies, which strongly rely on the extraction and trade of hydrocarbons; whereas in October 2021, the United Arab Emirates pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, Saudi Arabia pledged to achieve net-zero emissions domestically by 2060 and Qatar pledged to achieve a 25 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030;

| N. | whereas problems associated with non-inclusive governance and breaches of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as terrorism, corruption and foreign interference in the region, are worrying and are significant sources of instability and insecurity; whereas the imprisonment or torture of peaceful political opposition figures, human rights defenders and social activists in several countries across the region has increased in response to legitimate democratic aspirations and is paving the way for further conflict; whereas according to reports, 520 executions were recorded in seven countries in 2021 — Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen — constituting a 19 % increase in comparison to 2020; whereas deeply rooted corruption adversely impacts employment, growth and development and compromise states’ abilities to fulfil their obligation to promote, respect and protect the human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions; whereas the world’s highest levels of youth unemployment and the imprisonment or torture of political opposition figures and social activists across the region fuel tension and conflict; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas problems associated with non-inclusive governance and breaches of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as terrorism, corruption and foreign interference in the region, are worrying and are significant sources of instability and insecurity; whereas the imprisonment or torture of peaceful political opposition figures, human rights defenders and social activists in several countries across the region has increased in response to legitimate democratic aspirations and is paving the way for further conflict; whereas according to reports, 520 executions were recorded in seven countries in 2021 — Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen — constituting a 19 % increase in comparison to 2020; whereas deeply rooted corruption adversely impacts employment, growth and development and compromise states’ abilities to fulfil their obligation to promote, respect and protect the human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions; whereas the world’s highest levels of youth unemployment and the imprisonment or torture of political opposition figures and social activists across the region fuel tension and conflict;

| O. | whereas the definitions of stability and security are positively related to democratic development and to respect for the rule of law; whereas recent research (9) on political economy confirms that ‘there is an economically and statistically significant positive effect of democracy on future GDP per capita’, and implies that ‘long-run GDP increases by about 20-25 % in the 25 years following a democratization’ process; whereas the clampdown on media pluralism and freedom of the press has further destabilised the region, by increasing the promotion of violence and demonising all opposition voices; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the definitions of stability and security are positively related to democratic development and to respect for the rule of law; whereas recent research (9) on political economy confirms that ‘there is an economically and statistically significant positive effect of democracy on future GDP per capita’, and implies that ‘long-run GDP increases by about 20-25 % in the 25 years following a democratization’ process; whereas the clampdown on media pluralism and freedom of the press has further destabilised the region, by increasing the promotion of violence and demonising all opposition voices;

| P. | whereas according to UNICEF, children and young people (aged 0-24 years) in the Middle East and North Africa currently account for nearly half of the region’s population; whereas according to the 2021 Arab Youth Survey, the rising cost of living and other ‘kitchen table’ issues are seen as top obstacles facing the region, as over one third of young Arabs struggle to make ends meet; whereas hundreds of European children have been held for more than four years in the Al-Hol and Al-Roj detention camps; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas according to UNICEF, children and young people (aged 0-24 years) in the Middle East and North Africa currently account for nearly half of the region’s population; whereas according to the 2021 Arab Youth Survey, the rising cost of living and other ‘kitchen table’ issues are seen as top obstacles facing the region, as over one third of young Arabs struggle to make ends meet; whereas hundreds of European children have been held for more than four years in the Al-Hol and Al-Roj detention camps;

| Q. | whereas the EU Human Rights guidelines, including EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality, should be strengthened and centred at the core of the EU’s strategy for the region; whereas women’s human rights are being systematically violated and women’s rights activists continue to be harassed, intimidated, detained and imprisoned in the region or barred from travelling; whereas honour killings remain prevalent in many countries in the broader Middle East, and many women continue to live in marital captivity; whereas fully including women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts has proven to be beneficial in promoting security and stability globally; whereas across the GCC, in recent years there has been a significant focus on increasing women’s representation in the workforce, as well as in municipalities and parliaments; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the EU Human Rights guidelines, including EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality, should be strengthened and centred at the core of the EU’s strategy for the region; whereas women’s human rights are being systematically violated and women’s rights activists continue to be harassed, intimidated, detained and imprisoned in the region or barred from travelling; whereas honour killings remain prevalent in many countries in the broader Middle East, and many women continue to live in marital captivity; whereas fully including women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts has proven to be beneficial in promoting security and stability globally; whereas across the GCC, in recent years there has been a significant focus on increasing women’s representation in the workforce, as well as in municipalities and parliaments;

| R. | whereas LGBTI people continue to be victims of repression and violence throughout the region and the death penalty still exists in many countries in the region; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas LGBTI people continue to be victims of repression and violence throughout the region and the death penalty still exists in many countries in the region;

| S. | whereas religious and ethnic minorities, including Christians, continue to be persecuted in many Middle Eastern countries, and whereas the full enjoyment of their rights and freedoms should be guaranteed; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas religious and ethnic minorities, including Christians, continue to be persecuted in many Middle Eastern countries, and whereas the full enjoyment of their rights and freedoms should be guaranteed;

| T. | whereas the recent events in Iran have caused the pre-existing human rights crisis to deteriorate further; whereas following the death of Mahsa Amini, mass protests have erupted throughout the country and the Iranian authorities have reacted with unacceptable repressive measures, in particular aimed at women protesting against abuses and systemic discrimination; |
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T.

whereas the recent events in Iran have caused the pre-existing human rights crisis to deteriorate further; whereas following the death of Mahsa Amini, mass protests have erupted throughout the country and the Iranian authorities have reacted with unacceptable repressive measures, in particular aimed at women protesting against abuses and systemic discrimination;

Current state of play

| 1. | Highlights that the current situation in the broader Middle East region is characterised by the persistence of ongoing conflicts, including crippling proxy ones with a regional dimension and crises with multiple sources, which makes the development of a global European strategy particularly complex, as any contribution has to be multidimensional and adapted to the specificities of each situation, while maintaining a coherent regional and international dimension; stresses that any involvement of the EU Member States or other external parties, in particular Russia, must be aimed at resolving the conflicts and increasing security and stability; notes that besides ongoing conflicts, there are latent ones that the EU must take into consideration when establishing its long-term strategy to tackle the underlying causes of instability in the region; |
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1.

| 2. | Welcomes the EU’s efforts to promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights, economic development and fundamental freedoms in the Middle East region and calls for the EU to further encourage each country to carry out political and economic reforms; |
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2.

| 3. | Stresses that the EU promotes a peace and stability agenda and is ready to cooperate closely and share conflict prevention, mediation and counterterrorism methods, experiences and best practices, both at a bilateral and regional level; |
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3.

| 4. | Underlines that the EU has its own interests in the Middle East as an area of major attention that affects the security of the EU and its citizens, namely promoting peace, stability and the de-escalation of tensions in the broader region, fighting climate change, cooperating on the production of clean energy, promoting and implementing multilateralism, promoting respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance, increasing prosperity, meeting growing global development and humanitarian needs and promoting global health, stresses that EU security is interdependent with security in the Middle East and that EU funding instruments, such as the European Peace Facility and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, and humanitarian aid and operations directed at the region should make an important contribution to the stability and prosperity of the region; stresses the responsibility of the relevant EU authorities in continuing to ensure financial accountability and transparency based on existing methodology for performance management and reporting system and that no EU funding can be diverted to terrorist organisation or activities; |
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4.

| 5. | Stresses that global and regional actors, who do not all make their aid conditional on the principles of good governance promoted by the EU, are increasingly stepping up their efforts, especially in the area of military affairs with African countries, and are undermining the multilateral mechanisms that are essential for peacekeeping; |
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5.

| 6. | Notes that the region has undergone historical changes since the Arab Spring in 2011; stresses however that the instability that has followed has been caused, inter alia, by the decision of certain authoritarian regimes to use violence against peaceful protests and criticism; considers the increased polarisation counterproductive for the EU’s goals in the area of stability and security; calls for the EU to foster multilateralism and regional integration in the broader Middle East through the EU-GCC institutional partnership and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, including strong inter-parliamentary relations; encourages the EU in parallel to enhance its bilateral discussions and partnerships with all stakeholders seriously committed to bringing peace and stability to the region; |
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6.

| 7. | Highlights the important role the EU could play in cooperating closely with partners in the region, including civil society, peaceful opposition voices, unions and the business community, at bilateral, regional and international level to help form a collective response to achieve stabilisation and development, which is key to fostering stability; commends, in this sense, the efforts of regional actors, such as Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, to promote constructive intra-regional diplomatic engagement, including through such initiatives as the 2021 Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership and normalisation talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia facilitated by Iraq; calls for the EU to support these diplomatic efforts wherever possible and to encourage regional ownership and responsibility for de-escalating tensions; calls, therefore, for cooperation with regional organisations, such as the GCC and the Arab League, to be enhanced; |
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7.

| 8. | Welcomes the joint communication on a strategic partnership with the Gulf to promote wide-ranging cooperation with the GCC countries in different areas; considers the communication an important step in acknowledging the Arab Gulf countries' role in the region and putting inter-regional relations between the EU and the Gulf on a new footing; believes the communication would have benefited from developing policies aimed at overcoming the existing lack of trust between different stakeholders in the Gulf, including the GCC, Iraq and Iran; considers that the EU should support issue-oriented cooperation between regional actors on common challenges, such as climate change, natural disasters, trade and the Sustainable Development Goals, as a means of confidence-building in the region; commends the central role of cooperation in the green transition, however, regrets a lack of more critical engagement vis-à-vis the poor human rights record and problematic foreign and security policy of the countries concerned; invites the EU and its Member States to stress that a closer partnership with Gulf countries should be linked to clear human rights benchmarks for progress, including on accountability for war crimes in Yemen, women’s rights, freedom of expression and association, the release of human rights defenders, a moratorium on the death penalty, the rights of migrant workers and alignment in international forums; welcomes the proposal in the joint communication to step up the EU's engagement with the Gulf countries on funding international humanitarian and development aid; calls on the Commission to encourage Gulf donors to channel more of their humanitarian and development aid through multilateral institutions (10), as their aid is mainly bilateral and only 1-6 % of aid goes to multilateral institutions; recommends that the Commission offer the respective countries assistance in reconsidering their aid objectives, as well as enhancing cooperation and coordination both among them and between them and the EU; |
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8.

| 9. | Condemns the ongoing violent attacks on the people of Yemen since 2015, which are responsible for thousands of deaths, the destruction of key civilian infrastructure and widespread famine; recalls that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Yemen and that the crisis can only be resolved sustainably through an inclusive Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned negotiation process involving all parts of Yemeni society and all parties to the conflict; calls on the EU Member States to suspend the export of arms that are used in the war in Yemen, given the serious risk of violations of international humanitarian law or humanitarian law; condemns the supply of significant volumes of weapons and components by Iranian individuals and entities to the Houthi movement; welcomes the UN-brokered truce announcement of April 2022 in Yemen between the Saudi Arabia–led coalition and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, and its renewal of June 2022; insists that the truce should be the first step to prepare the ground for credible peace talks between the Yemeni parties, which should lead to an end to the war and one of the world’s greatest humanitarian disasters; stresses that the conflict cannot be truly solved without accountability for alleged war crimes; calls on all parties to respect the truce and to engage in good faith negotiations to achieve viable political and security arrangements, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015), the joint implementation mechanisms of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement and the global ceasefire, as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 2532 (2020); calls attention to the humanitarian disaster caused by the war in Yemen, which has been ongoing since 2016; calls on all parties to abide by international humanitarian law and fully engage in the UN-led peace talks; |
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9.

| 10. | Expresses deep concern about the escalation of tensions in Iraq, including foreign interference, which are posing a threat to the work of crucial state institutions in the country; calls on all parties to exercise the utmost restraint and to remain calm, as it is critical for all actors to avoid any actions that could lead to further violence; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for Iraq’s security, stability and sovereignty; expresses concern about the situation in Iraq and underlines the deep popular frustration with persistent corruption in the country; encourages the EU and its Member States to contribute to stability in Iraq by supporting post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, as well as accountable institution-building, in order to shield the country from geopolitical rivalries and to bridge widening social divisions; underlines that the destruction of cultural heritage and the looting of works of art and other cultural goods during armed conflicts needs to be addressed in terms of both reconstruction and restitution in order to protect and ensure the integrity of the cultural heritage and identity of societies, communities, groups and individuals; notes the relevance of the EU Advisory Mission in Iraq; underlines, however, that it must reform itself in order to increase its impact on the ground, in cooperation with Iraqi authorities; |
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10.

| 11. | Recalls that the conflict in Lebanon is a consequence of the political actors’ clientelism, coupled with endemic corruption, and that any financial help from the EU must be conditional on a democratic and inclusive government that adopts a clear stance against corruption; is highly concerned about the protraction of the political, economic, financial and social crisis in Lebanon, which continues to cause population-wide suffering; welcomes the parliamentary elections in Lebanon that were held on 15 May 2022 and calls for a swift and inclusive formation of a new government that is mission-driven, credible and accountable and that is free from foreign influence; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States to continue to firmly pressure Lebanon’s political representatives towards reform, including by conditioning large-scale structural support on the implementation of real change; calls, in parallel, for the EU and its Member States to increase humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, coupled with support for core public services, grassroots organisations and civil society; |
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11.

| 12. | Stresses the particular responsibility of the Syrian regime; underlines the particular responsibility of Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, in vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aiming to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis 18 times since 2011; welcomes the April 2021 decision by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to suspend Syria’s members from the organisation; recalls that the Syrian civil war is one of the region’s most deadly conflict in decades, having caused the deaths of half a million people and having forcibly displaced 14 million Syrians; recalls the human tragedy caused by the displacement of over half of Syria’s population internally and as refugees across the region and Europe; stresses the need to end the ongoing occupation of different parts of Syria by regional actors; highlights the need for a resolution to the ongoing conflict in Syria based on democracy and the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; underlines that this resolution much be reached through dialogue; welcomes all efforts by the EU, its Member States and civil society to document and prosecute crimes against humanity and calls for the EU to intensify efforts to end impunity; notes that since the start of the conflict, none of its main drivers have been resolved, while regional tensions have increased and Syria’s economic crisis has further deteriorated, causing terrible civilian suffering; welcomes the EU’s financial support to Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan for hosting Syrian refugees; recalls that Syria is not a safe country of return for the 7 million refugees who have fled repression and conflict since 2011; stresses that ensuring the defeat of Daesh/ISIS remains a top priority for the Global Coalition to defeat Daesh/ISIS, as despite significant setbacks suffered by its leadership in the recent past, Daesh/ISIS continues to conduct attacks and represents an ongoing regional and global threat; |
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12.

| 13. | Calls on the EU Member States to fulfil their obligation to immediately repatriate their nationals, both the minors and their mothers, who have been detained for more than four years in the Al-Hol and Al-Roj detention camps in the Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria; considers that, in the event that the mothers or fathers bear any criminal responsibility, they should be held accountable upon their return to the Member State; |
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13.

| 14. | Underlines that a stable, secure, united, and prosperous Libya is a priority for the EU; recommends, in this regard, that the EU remain neutral in the ongoing power struggles in the country, especially after the recent fighting; stresses that the EU should support projects to increase job creation, especially in the Fezzan region, which would play an important role in stabilising the country; |
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14.

| 15. | Stresses that the EU’s long-standing commitment to the relevant UN resolutions and Parliament’s previous resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy as the EU’s position on the Israel-Palestinian conflict and its long-standing commitment for a just and comprehensive solution based on two states; highlights furthermore that, in accordance with international law, illegal settlements impede the establishment of the two-state solution as established policy of the European Union; recalls that peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on a definitive settlement of the conflict based on a solution enabling both countries to live side-by-side in peace and security, based on the 1967 lines, is a perquisite for stability, among others; expresses again its deep concern over the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and calls for the lifting of all restrictive measures on the movement of people and goods imposed by Israel on the territory, but which are having a devastating impact on the population; calls on the Commission and the Council to discourage all activities from both sides undermining the two-state solution, such as the expansion of settlements; strongly deplores the continuing violence, acts of terrorism and incitements to violence, which are fundamentally incompatible with advancing a peaceful two-state solution; emphasises the importance of holding Palestinian elections; calls for the EU to pay special attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to its exceptional length and to current perspectives that do not allow for a realistic path towards stability across the Middle East; |
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15.

| 16. | Acknowledges the normalisation of relations between the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan on the one hand and Israel on the other hand; encourages regional cooperation and supports the normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab states, promoting the full inclusion of the Palestinian National Authority, in line with EU and US efforts to achieve peace, security and stability in the region and in accordance with the UN framework, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Oslo Accords; calls for this momentum to be used to advance dialogue and cooperation in the region to support the Middle East peace process and the two-state solution, as well as respect for international law; notes that the Abraham Accords are a factor in the reorganisation of inter-state relations in the region and must be taken into account in a European strategy aimed at helping the region to achieve stability; calls on the Commission and the Council to explore, with the respective Arab countries, how their normalisation agreements with Israel can be conducive to the two-state solution; |
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16.

| 17. | Reaffirms the UNRWA’s essential contribution to stability and security in a difficult context of growing humanitarian and development needs, and appeals to the EU and the wider international community to ensure adequate support for the agency, both politically and financially, to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate and in view of the renewal of its mandate by the UN General Assembly in 2022; underlines that EU funding must not be suspended without evidence of misuse; |
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17.

| 18. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to tackle the consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on global food supply and prices for the stability of the region; calls on the Commission to address, as a matter of priority, the impact of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on certain countries in the broader Middle East in terms of food security, prioritising those countries most vulnerable because of high import dependency and lack of social security and ensuring that financial support directly benefits the most vulnerable groups; stresses that the conflict in Ukraine could build up inflationary pressures already triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and thus aggravate the food and humanitarian crisis in the most dependent countries of the Middle East; |
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18.

Stability and security options

| 19. | Highlights that any form of cooperation must be based on a human security approach and respect for international law, a rules-based world order and the shared objectives of promoting human rights and democracy; |
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19.

| 20. | Calls on all EU Member States to avoid being dragged into regional rivalries; stresses that, in view of ongoing conflicts and reports of internal repression, arms exports to certain countries in the Middle East region may be in contravention of the EU’s position as set out in Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP; calls for monitoring of arms exports to the region to be ensured through a consultation mechanism among Member States; |
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20.

| 21. | Deplores the fact that neighbouring countries interfere too often in each other’s internal crises and that such interference — whether political or even military in nature — is harmful, causes long-term damage to inter-state relations in the region and prevents conflicts from being resolved; calls on the third countries in the region to refrain from exporting arms to countries affected by internal conflicts or combatants and from intervening militarily in other countries in conflict through regular or paramilitary groups, as such interventions contribute to regional destabilisation, undermine state structures and sponsor a pool of fighters with different ideological orientations; condemns, in this regard, Türkiye’s ongoing violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq; also condemns Iran’s recent use of ballistic missiles and drone attacks against the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as an unjustified violation of Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity; firmly opposes the use of drones in extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings and calls for a commitment to work in the relevant international forums on a global ban; highlights, in particular, the dangers associated with the use of autonomous and remotely operated systems for such operations; |
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21.

| 22. | Calls for the EU to make full use of its new forms of cooperation and financial support, such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe and the European Peace Facility, acting in line with the guiding principles already set out and in a way that promotes stability and human development; |
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22.

| 23. | Welcomes the EU’s commitment to establishing a weapons of mass destruction–free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and welcomes the EU’s promotion of confidence-building measures in support of this process in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; expresses deep concern about potential nuclear proliferation in the region and calls for the EU and its Member States to activate and step up all diplomatic efforts to avoid it and to put an end to this phenomenon; notes that Israel, as a non-party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has long maintained ambiguity regarding its nuclear status; calls on Israel to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; |
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23.

| 24. | Condemns, in the strongest terms, Iran’s all-out repression against peaceful protesters following the murder, by Iranian authorities, of 21-year-old Mahsa Amini for not abiding by the regime’s compulsory dress code; expresses its utmost admiration, respect and support for the women and men who have been peacefully protesting for basic rights and freedoms, such as the right for a woman to not wear a headscarf; welcomes the Council’s additional targeted sanctions against top officials in the Iranian regime involved in the crackdown, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the morality police and, in the light of increased online censorship, the Minister of Information; asserts that Parliament should cease holding official meetings with Iranian officials as long as six of its Members are under Iran’s targeted sanctions; reiterates its support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while calling for a more comprehensive agreement on Iran’s missile programme; deeply deplores Iran’s ongoing support for the repressive regime in Syria and for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its export of military drones and missiles to Russia, despite its war of aggression against Ukraine; |
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24.

| 25. | Notes the strategic dimension of energy cooperation with the Middle East region; underlines the need to diversify the EU’s sources of energy and calls on the EEAS and the Commission to conduct an assessment of the implications in the field of security of any agreement to import oil, gas or hydrogen into the EU; underlines that regional stability and prosperity is a key objective of the EU given the region’s importance in diversifying EU energy sources; calls for the EU not to merely substitute its gas and oil imports from Russia with hydrocarbon supply from the broader Middle East, but to seize the opportunity of cutting reliance on Russian gas by two thirds before 2022 in order to decrease the EU's overall reliance on fossil fuels and boost investment in energy generation from renewable sources, as well as electricity interconnection; calls for the EU to increase its engagement with the countries of the broader Middle East on the European Green Deal; calls for the EU to encourage and support the region's countries in achieving their climate targets, especially by capitalising on their large renewable energy capacity; considers the region's reliance on the extraction and trade of hydrocarbon a threat to its future stability; calls for the EU to stress the mutual benefits of cooperation in the green transition, notably the advantages of sustainable growth, vis-à-vis their interlocutors in the region; invites the EU to consider setting up a renewable energy partnership with the countries of the broader Middle East; |
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25.

| 26. | Highlights the need to combat the funding of terrorist organisations and activities; stresses that the EU must help to stop money laundering and stem illicit financial flows by adopting a clear strategy to address the shortcomings in controlling these kind of funds by several states in the region; deplores that the United Arab Emirates has provided a safe haven for Russian oligarchs avoiding EU sanctions on Russia; underlines that the advanced and historical security partnership with the region requires a joint approach towards Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and fundamental European interests; equally deplores that EU sanctions on the Syrian regime have been circumvented via Lebanon, Iran and Russia since 2011; |
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26.

| 27. | Strongly condemns the terrorist attacks by terror groups in the region; calls therefore for the EU and its Member States to make a firm commitment to legitimate governments fighting against jihadist networks; applauds the efforts being made by the Commission and the EEAS to set up a network of experts in the field of counterterrorism among the EU delegations in several countries in the region and to provide tailored support as requested by several governments; calls for more systematic cooperation in preventing and combating radicalisation and terrorism through targeted, tailor-made and regularly assessed civilian programmes; applauds the efforts being made by the Commission, and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments in particular, to set up programmes to develop partnerships with several countries in the region to combat radicalisation and terrorism; considers that such tailor-made programmes, supported by material and financial resources suited to the specific needs of the recipient countries, can be an effective instrument for security cooperation; calls, however, for an in-depth assessment to be made of the effectiveness of these projects and for it to be ensured that service providers, often from Member State agencies, provide training that is appropriate and adapted to the needs indicated by the host countries and based on genuine professional expertise; |
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27.

| 28. | Welcomes the Council’s adoption of the Magnitsky Act as an important EU instrument to sanction violators of human rights; calls for the preparation of restrictive measures against Iranian officials involved in the grave human rights violations against Iranian human rights defenders, prisoners of conscience and those peacefully protesting in the country; |
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28.

Citizens and human rights

| 29. | Highlights that people-to-people contacts and cooperation in fields such as trade education, science and culture play an important role in the region and can make a key contribution to regional stability and the bridging of divides both with the EU and among the different states; welcomes, in this context, the proposal presented by the Commission for visa exemptions for citizens of Kuwait and Qatar; calls on the Commission to swiftly engage in technical discussions to ensure the fulfilment of relevant criteria in view of ultimately achieving visa exemptions for citizens of Kuwait and Qatar; calls on the Commission to facilitate access to the Erasmus+ programme for students from the region; |
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29.

| 30. | Underlines the importance of a constant and growing EU political and diplomatic presence in the region in promoting strategic political dialogue and fostering exchanges between countries in the region in order to promote stability; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase diplomatic and political relations for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as demanded by peaceful popular movements across the Middle East and North Africa region; |
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30.

| 31. | Notes that the EU and its Member States are currently involved in various military operations and cooperation in the region: EU Naval Force Somalia Operation ATALANTA to protect World Food Programme vessels and other vulnerable shipping and deter, prevent and repress piracy and armed robbery at sea, EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI, US Operation Inherent Resolve to support partnered forces until they can independently defeat Daesh/ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria, NATO Operation Sea Guardian for maritime security capacity building, support of maritime situational awareness and maritime anti-terrorism, and the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz surveillance mission; believes that with these commitments, which respond to collective threats recognised by international law, the EU is making a significant contribution to security in the region; notes, however, that certain Member States’ individual involvement in local crises or conflicts is not part of efforts more closely coordinated at European level, for example in Syria or Libya; highlights the need to monitor and evaluate EU presence from a human rights perspective and take into consideration human security criteria; |
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31.

| 32. | Deplores that leaders in the region have responded with authoritarian restoration to wide spread street protests calling for democratic reforms in numerous Arab countries in 2010, 2011 and later, by further restricting freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of press for citizens and residents; stresses that rule of law and human rights, good governance and anti-corruption bring benefits to people and foster stability in the region; stresses that the prospect of being arbitrarily detained and tortured constitutes an unacceptable form of insecurity for all the citizens of the region and causes more social unrest, mistrust and resentment towards national institutions; |
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32.

| 33. | Condemns that, throughout the region, human rights defenders, activists, journalists and perceived critics continue to suffer severe and pervasive state repression; calls for EU and Member State delegations on the ground to prioritise human rights issues in their interactions with local authorities and ensure full and scrupulous implementation of all EU guidelines, including the Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, and the action plan on human rights and democracy; calls for the EU to promote tolerance and freedom of religion in the region; calls on the Commission to ensure that the democratic clause in our Association Agreements with third countries is effectively applied whenever there are clear human rights violations; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all multilateral forums at their disposal, including the UN, to renew or establish independent international investigative and reporting mechanisms to address the most serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Middle East, notably torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings; calls, to this end, for the re-establishment of the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen, the establishment of a UN monitoring and reporting mechanism on human rights violations in Egypt and the renewal of the mandate of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission in Libya; |
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33.

| 34. | Expresses deep concern regarding the human rights impact of selling, exporting, updating and maintaining mass surveillance technology in the region, given their dismal track record of misusing technology for domestic repression; condemns the region’s abusive use of spyware technology, such as the Pegasus spyware from Israel’s NSO Group; underlines that any misuse of surveillance software targeting political leaders, journalists, activists or civil society constitutes a serious violation of fundamental rights and freedoms; stresses the specific threat that new digital technologies pose for human rights defenders, opposition figures, journalists and others in controlling, restricting and undermining their activities; calls for the EU to take initiative to promote an immediate, global moratorium on the sale, transfer and use of spyware technology until the adoption of a robust regulatory framework in this field; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure full due human rights diligence and proper vetting of any future exports of European surveillance technology and related technical assistance; calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with third country governments to end repressive cybersecurity and counterterrorism legislation practices and legislation; calls on the relevant authorities to release all prisoners of conscience, including journalists and citizen journalists, and to allow a free, independent and diverse media landscape to develop, which will be in the long-term interest of their own stability and security; underlines the importance of tackling disinformation and the spread of fake news in the region and calls for the EU to take appropriate action, in particular by supporting independent media and educational civic initiatives; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Calls for the EU to further promote the development of a strong and independent civil society in the region, particularly through engagement with trade unions, women’s organisations and environmental organisations; notes that the EU has an interest in engaging with local civil society organisations to better inform, evaluate and diversify its policies towards the countries in the region; highlights that the shrinking space for civil society in several countries poses a threat to regional stability; deeply deplores the sharp deterioration of freedom of association and attacks against civil society organisations, whether through legal or de facto repression and intimidation, in a number of countries in the past decade; strongly reaffirms that defending basic civil and political rights and freedoms is a legitimate field of work for civil society organisations, including in the Middle East; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Highlights the gravity of violence against women in the region, particularly in situations of conflict; asks the EU and its Member States to call on their interlocutors in the region to increase the participation of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian responses and post-conflict reconstruction; asks the EU in this regard to lead by example and ensure fair representation of women in its own EU delegations and missions; calls for the EU and its Member States to incorporate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in its conflict resolution efforts in the broader Middle East; reiterates its calls for the EU’s Gender Action Plan III to be fully implemented and prioritised in every aspect of EU external action; calls for the EU and its Member States to urge all parties to conflict in the region to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict; stresses the importance of supporting local women’s organisations as a means of empowerment; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Calls on the authorities in the region to uphold the ban on torture under all circumstances, as enshrined in particular in the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which most of the countries in the region have signed and ratified; calls for the abolition of the death penalty throughout the region; regrets that the joint communication on a strategic partnership with the Gulf failed to introduce any human rights safeguards for counterterrorist cooperation with the Gulf States and insists that any cooperation in this field with the Gulf and Middle East countries be subject to the strict application of such safeguards; notes with deep concern the persistent pattern in the countries of the region of adopting vaguely drafted ‘anti-terrorism’ laws, the implementation of which in practice leads to the criminalisation of legitimate, peaceful dissent; welcomes the holding of bilateral human rights dialogues with Arab Gulf countries, as well as Israel, Jordan and Lebanon; stresses, however, that such dialogues should not be box-ticking exercises and should instead aim to secure concrete commitments and deliverables for specific human rights progress in partner countries; further emphasises that yearly human rights dialogues should not be the only opportunity for human rights talks with the respective countries; calls for the EU and leaders of the Member States to echo concerns and formulate recommendations expressed in the dialogues during all high-level interactions with their counterparts in GCC member states; is deeply concerned about the steady deterioration of the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia, which is reflected in the rise of executions in 2022 and the sentencing of Saudi citizens, such as Salma al-Shehab, to 45 years of prisons for using social media; is deeply concerned about the lack of meaningful accountability for the murder of the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Highlights the importance of the Sustainable Development Goals set out in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as key promoters of regional stability; stresses the need to further enhance cooperation between the EU and countries in the region in order to fulfil all of the goals, particularly the ones concerning challenges that require global cooperation, such as climate change, by setting out clear strategies, timeframes and goals in these areas; stresses that the best way for the EU to promote security and stability in the region is through tackling underlying causes; |
| --- | --- |

38.

o

o o

| 39. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the governments and parliaments of their member countries. |
| --- | --- |

39.

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(1)  OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99.

(2)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 167.

(3)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 202.

(4)  Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, Achim Steiner, ‘Message from the United Nations humanitarian, refugee, and development chiefs on the situation in Syria and the region’, 10 May 2022.

(5)  UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Syria emergency’, updated 15 March 2021.

(6)  UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Iraq Refugee Crisis Explained’, 7 November 2019.

(7)  UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Yemen Crisis Explained’, 14 July 2022.

(8)  Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

(9)  Acemoglu, D. et al., ‘Democracy Does Cause Growth’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 127, No 1, 2019, pp. 47-100.

(10)  AlMezaini, K., ‘Humanitarian Foreign Aid of Gulf States — Background and Orientations’, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Policy Report No 20, January 2021.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/36 |
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11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/36

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P9_TA(2022)0409

Prevention, management and better care of diabetes in the EU on the occasion of World Diabetes Day

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on prevention, management and better care of diabetes in the EU on the occasion of World Diabetes Day (2022/2901(RSP))

(2023/C 167/05)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 168 thereof, |
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having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 168 thereof,

| — | having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 target 4, to reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being, and SDG 3 target 8, to achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all (1), |
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having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 target 4, to reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being, and SDG 3 target 8, to achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all (1),

| — | having regard to the Global Monitoring Framework for the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), in particular the priority to halt the rise in diabetes and obesity (2), |
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having regard to the Global Monitoring Framework for the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), in particular the priority to halt the rise in diabetes and obesity (2),

| — | having regard to the outcome report from the World Health Organization (WHO) European high-level conference on non-communicable diseases held in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on 9-10 April 2019, entitled ‘Time to Deliver in Europe: meeting non-communicable disease targets to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals’ (3), |
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having regard to the outcome report from the World Health Organization (WHO) European high-level conference on non-communicable diseases held in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on 9-10 April 2019, entitled ‘Time to Deliver in Europe: meeting non-communicable disease targets to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals’ (3),

| — | having regard to the WHO Global Diabetes Compact (4), |
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having regard to the WHO Global Diabetes Compact (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2012 on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic (5), |
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having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2012 on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic (5),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 thereon (6), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 thereon (6),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 on a Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system (COM(2020)0381) and Parliament’s resolution of 20 October 2021 thereon (7), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 on a Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system (COM(2020)0381) and Parliament’s resolution of 20 October 2021 thereon (7),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 25 November 2020 on a Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe (COM(2020)0761) and Parliament’s resolution of 24 November 2021 thereon (8), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 25 November 2020 on a Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe (COM(2020)0761) and Parliament’s resolution of 24 November 2021 thereon (8),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 3 February 2021 on Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan (COM(2021)0044), and Parliament’s resolution of 16 February 2022 on strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer — towards a comprehensive and coordinated strategy (9), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 3 February 2021 on Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan (COM(2021)0044), and Parliament’s resolution of 16 February 2022 on strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer — towards a comprehensive and coordinated strategy (9),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/522 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing a Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health (‘EU4Health Programme’) for the period 2021-2027 (10), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/522 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing a Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health (‘EU4Health Programme’) for the period 2021-2027 (10),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the European health data space (COM(2022)0197), |
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having regard to the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the European health data space (COM(2022)0197),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2282 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on health technology assessment (11), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2282 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on health technology assessment (11),

| — | having regard the Commission’s Healthier Together EU Non-Communicable Diseases Initiative of 20 June 2022 (12), |
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having regard the Commission’s Healthier Together EU Non-Communicable Diseases Initiative of 20 June 2022 (12),

| — | having regard to the World Health Assembly resolution of 28 May 2019 on improving the transparency of markets for medicines, vaccines, and other health products, |
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having regard to the World Health Assembly resolution of 28 May 2019 on improving the transparency of markets for medicines, vaccines, and other health products,

| — | having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (13), |
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having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (13),

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas diabetes is one of the most common non-communicable diseases; whereas there are more than 33 million people in the EU living with diabetes; whereas the number of people living with diabetes in the EU is predicted to rise to 38 million in 2030 (14); |
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A.

whereas diabetes is one of the most common non-communicable diseases; whereas there are more than 33 million people in the EU living with diabetes; whereas the number of people living with diabetes in the EU is predicted to rise to 38 million in 2030 (14);

| B. | whereas approximately half of people living with diabetes are not achieving or maintaining optimal blood glucose targets (15), leading to an increased risk of diabetes-related complications resulting in deterioration of well-being and other consequences including productivity loss and costs for society; whereas Europe is the region with the highest number of children and youths living with type 1 diabetes in the world (16); |
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B.

whereas approximately half of people living with diabetes are not achieving or maintaining optimal blood glucose targets (15), leading to an increased risk of diabetes-related complications resulting in deterioration of well-being and other consequences including productivity loss and costs for society; whereas Europe is the region with the highest number of children and youths living with type 1 diabetes in the world (16);

| C. | whereas more than 95 % of people with diabetes have type 2 diabetes, with risk factors including weight above a healthy range, tobacco use, lack of exercise and unhealthy diet; whereas type 2 diabetes is becoming increasingly prevalent among children and young adults (17); |
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C.

whereas more than 95 % of people with diabetes have type 2 diabetes, with risk factors including weight above a healthy range, tobacco use, lack of exercise and unhealthy diet; whereas type 2 diabetes is becoming increasingly prevalent among children and young adults (17);

| D. | whereas type 1 and type 2 diabetes have been shown to have negative impacts on life expectancy (18); whereas diabetes has been estimated to be the fourth leading cause of death in Europe (19); |
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D.

whereas type 1 and type 2 diabetes have been shown to have negative impacts on life expectancy (18); whereas diabetes has been estimated to be the fourth leading cause of death in Europe (19);

| E. | whereas no cures are currently available for diabetes; |
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E.

whereas no cures are currently available for diabetes;

| F. | whereas people of all ages and walks of life can be afflicted by diabetes; |
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F.

whereas people of all ages and walks of life can be afflicted by diabetes;

| G. | whereas diabetes affects different socio-economic groups unequally, and socio-economic factors determine its implications for people’s lives; |
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G.

whereas diabetes affects different socio-economic groups unequally, and socio-economic factors determine its implications for people’s lives;

| H. | whereas all patients have the right to optimal treatment, regardless of their financial means, gender, age or nationality, whereas there is an urgent need to ensure equal access to safe, effective and affordable treatments within the EU; |
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H.

whereas all patients have the right to optimal treatment, regardless of their financial means, gender, age or nationality, whereas there is an urgent need to ensure equal access to safe, effective and affordable treatments within the EU;

| I. | whereas EU citizens are still facing inequities in terms of prevention, and are unequally protected against risk factors, unequally educated in terms of healthy behaviours and unequally equipped against misinformation; whereas EU citizens are unequal in terms of timely access to affordable and high quality treatment and care from Member State to Member State and from region to region in any given country; |
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I.

whereas EU citizens are still facing inequities in terms of prevention, and are unequally protected against risk factors, unequally educated in terms of healthy behaviours and unequally equipped against misinformation; whereas EU citizens are unequal in terms of timely access to affordable and high quality treatment and care from Member State to Member State and from region to region in any given country;

| J. | whereas diabetes is a cause of many health complications, with one third of people living with diabetes developing diabetic retinopathy (20) and one third developing cardio-vascular diseases (CVDs) (21); whereas four fifths of end-stage renal diseases occur in people living with type 2 diabetes and/or hypertension (22); whereas diabetes is a cause of early mortality and disability (blindness, amputations, heart failure); |
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J.

whereas diabetes is a cause of many health complications, with one third of people living with diabetes developing diabetic retinopathy (20) and one third developing cardio-vascular diseases (CVDs) (21); whereas four fifths of end-stage renal diseases occur in people living with type 2 diabetes and/or hypertension (22); whereas diabetes is a cause of early mortality and disability (blindness, amputations, heart failure);

| K. | whereas some forms of type 2 diabetes, diabetes in pregnancy, diabetes-related complications and other consequences of diabetes may be prevented through policies addressing the condition’s modifiable risk factors, such as promoting active and tobacco-free living and access to healthy foods as well as policies tackling the environmental, cultural and socio-economic determinants of health and the promotion of early diagnosis and action; whereas, however, diabetes is frequently diagnosed too late, and up to one third of all people living with diabetes in the EU are currently unaware of their condition (23); |
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K.

whereas some forms of type 2 diabetes, diabetes in pregnancy, diabetes-related complications and other consequences of diabetes may be prevented through policies addressing the condition’s modifiable risk factors, such as promoting active and tobacco-free living and access to healthy foods as well as policies tackling the environmental, cultural and socio-economic determinants of health and the promotion of early diagnosis and action; whereas, however, diabetes is frequently diagnosed too late, and up to one third of all people living with diabetes in the EU are currently unaware of their condition (23);

| L. | whereas front-of-pack nutritional labelling supports citizens in making healthier food choices and thereby preventing unhealthy consumption of food high in salt, fat and sugar and preventing obesity which is one of the major determining risk factors for developing type 2 diabetes; |
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L.

whereas front-of-pack nutritional labelling supports citizens in making healthier food choices and thereby preventing unhealthy consumption of food high in salt, fat and sugar and preventing obesity which is one of the major determining risk factors for developing type 2 diabetes;

| M. | whereas people living with diabetes are among the most severely affected by COVID-19, not only relating to their risk of developing severe forms of the disease but also relating to their risk of later-life complications resulting from the disruption of care during the pandemic (24); |
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M.

whereas people living with diabetes are among the most severely affected by COVID-19, not only relating to their risk of developing severe forms of the disease but also relating to their risk of later-life complications resulting from the disruption of care during the pandemic (24);

| N. | whereas diabetes is a complex and multifactorial disease owing to its interplay with other conditions and with all levels of care; whereas prevention, treatment and management of the disease can be indicative of a health system’s quality, effectiveness, performance and resilience; whereas effective diabetes management and care also leads to better outcomes for other NCDs and other diseases; |
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N.

whereas diabetes is a complex and multifactorial disease owing to its interplay with other conditions and with all levels of care; whereas prevention, treatment and management of the disease can be indicative of a health system’s quality, effectiveness, performance and resilience; whereas effective diabetes management and care also leads to better outcomes for other NCDs and other diseases;

| O. | whereas 100 years after the breakthrough discovery of insulin, many inequalities still exist globally and among and within Member States regarding access to care, education, autonomy, medicines, tools to monitor blood sugar levels, supplies and technologies and health outcomes (25); whereas research is still needed to clearly identify personalised risk factors for type 1 diabetes, to help determine how best to enable earlier diagnosis of type 1 diabetes and to identify patients that are candidates for an immunological treatment approach in the future; whereas further research, including behavioural research, is also required to improve and further determine the most impactful interventions for the prevention and management of type 2 diabetes; |
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O.

whereas 100 years after the breakthrough discovery of insulin, many inequalities still exist globally and among and within Member States regarding access to care, education, autonomy, medicines, tools to monitor blood sugar levels, supplies and technologies and health outcomes (25); whereas research is still needed to clearly identify personalised risk factors for type 1 diabetes, to help determine how best to enable earlier diagnosis of type 1 diabetes and to identify patients that are candidates for an immunological treatment approach in the future; whereas further research, including behavioural research, is also required to improve and further determine the most impactful interventions for the prevention and management of type 2 diabetes;

| P. | whereas across all Member States, diabetes is responsible for about 9 % of healthcare expenditure (26), and whereas up to 75 % of those costs could be related to potentially preventable complications (27); whereas prevention is more effective than any cure in reducing the incidence, prevalence and complications of some types of diabetes, as well as being the most cost-effective long-term diabetes control strategy; |
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P.

whereas across all Member States, diabetes is responsible for about 9 % of healthcare expenditure (26), and whereas up to 75 % of those costs could be related to potentially preventable complications (27); whereas prevention is more effective than any cure in reducing the incidence, prevalence and complications of some types of diabetes, as well as being the most cost-effective long-term diabetes control strategy;

| Q. | whereas people living with diabetes must self-manage their conditions, with sporadic input or support from their healthcare professionals, a few times a year; whereas the burden of diabetes on individuals and their families is not only financial, but also involves huge psycho-social issues and reduced quality of life; whereas innovations in the field of self-measurement of blood sugar levels facilitate the easier and better regulation of blood sugar levels; whereas supporting the swift availability for diabetes patients of such innovations is beneficial, as they improve successful diabetes management, thereby preventing health complications and subsequent health costs; |
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Q.

whereas people living with diabetes must self-manage their conditions, with sporadic input or support from their healthcare professionals, a few times a year; whereas the burden of diabetes on individuals and their families is not only financial, but also involves huge psycho-social issues and reduced quality of life; whereas innovations in the field of self-measurement of blood sugar levels facilitate the easier and better regulation of blood sugar levels; whereas supporting the swift availability for diabetes patients of such innovations is beneficial, as they improve successful diabetes management, thereby preventing health complications and subsequent health costs;

| R. | whereas there is no EU legal framework against discrimination towards people living with diabetes or other chronic diseases, and prejudice against those people living with the condition is still widespread in schools, job recruitment, work places, insurance policies and assessment for driving licenses throughout the EU; whereas developments in knowledge of diabetes as well as in treatment and technology in recent years mean that people living with diabetes can be in much more precise and continuous control of their blood sugar, enabling them to overcome previously perceived risks in daily activities; |
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R.

whereas there is no EU legal framework against discrimination towards people living with diabetes or other chronic diseases, and prejudice against those people living with the condition is still widespread in schools, job recruitment, work places, insurance policies and assessment for driving licenses throughout the EU; whereas developments in knowledge of diabetes as well as in treatment and technology in recent years mean that people living with diabetes can be in much more precise and continuous control of their blood sugar, enabling them to overcome previously perceived risks in daily activities;

| S. | whereas people living with diabetes and other NCDs have been shown to be at great risk of discontinuing care and of developing more serious symptoms and complications during humanitarian emergencies; |
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S.

whereas people living with diabetes and other NCDs have been shown to be at great risk of discontinuing care and of developing more serious symptoms and complications during humanitarian emergencies;

| T. | whereas several EU actions have addressed diabetes, including the 2006 Council conclusions on the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention of diabetes, and Parliament’s resolution of 14 March 2012 on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic; whereas there is a strong rationale for increasing these efforts in response to the increasing burden of diabetes and the urgent need for Member States to take strong action, particularly in the light of the added value of concerted efforts at EU level; whereas the Healthier Together — EU Non-Communicable Diseases Initiative addresses some of the Member States’ needs and requests raised in Parliament’s 2012 resolution, but lacks a clear framework for action in the Member States and does not have concrete objectives and targets which would allow for the setting of goals and the measuring of progress; |
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T.

whereas several EU actions have addressed diabetes, including the 2006 Council conclusions on the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention of diabetes, and Parliament’s resolution of 14 March 2012 on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic; whereas there is a strong rationale for increasing these efforts in response to the increasing burden of diabetes and the urgent need for Member States to take strong action, particularly in the light of the added value of concerted efforts at EU level; whereas the Healthier Together — EU Non-Communicable Diseases Initiative addresses some of the Member States’ needs and requests raised in Parliament’s 2012 resolution, but lacks a clear framework for action in the Member States and does not have concrete objectives and targets which would allow for the setting of goals and the measuring of progress;

| 1. | Deeply regrets the fact that a growing number of people are living with diabetes and expresses solidarity with the patients of this disruptive disease and their families; |
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1.

| 2. | Recalls the global coverage targets for 2030 for diabetes adopted at the 75th World Health Assembly, including the targets of 80 % of people living with diabetes being diagnosed; 80 % having good control of glycaemia; 80 % of people with diagnosed diabetes having good control of blood pressure; 60 % of people with diabetes aged 40 years or older receiving statins; and 100 % of people with type 1 diabetes having access to affordable quality-assured insulin and blood glucose self-monitoring; stresses that the EU coverage targets for 2030 should be even more ambitious; |
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2.

| 3. | Welcomes the joint statement issued by the Commission and the WHO Regional Office for Europe at the 70th session of the WHO Regional Committee for Europe in 2020, in which they promised to boost their already strong partnership and adapt it to new health priorities including a comprehensive response to non-communicable diseases (28); |
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3.

| 4. | Welcomes the development of the Healthier Together — EU Non-Communicable Disease Initiative and calls on the Member States to avail themselves of the best practices outlined in the document and of the funding made available through various EU programmes; |
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4.

| 5. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to demonstrate political commitment and set ambitious targets for reversing the rising trend in numbers of Europeans with diabetes, to reduce inequalities between EU citizens and improve the care and quality of life of people living with diabetes; |
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5.

| 6. | Underlines in this regard that the Commission should follow through with the Healthier Together — EU Non-Communicable Disease Initiative, inter alia by collaborating with Member States in developing and implementing common, standardised criteria and methods for data collection on diabetes, and in collecting, registering, monitoring and managing comprehensive epidemiological data on diabetes, as well as economic data on the cost of diabetes prevention and management in the EU, including patient preferences and patient-generated data; stresses that fostering and leveraging best practices and supporting research into the effectiveness of clinical interventions and prevention programmes will lead to better outcomes not just for diabetes but also for all other complications and co-morbidities of diabetes; |
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6.

| 7. | Calls on the Member States to develop, implement and monitor national diabetes plans and strategies with comparable milestones and targets, including a risk-reduction and screening/early action component to target, among other things, the socio-economic determinants of health, the promotion of health-enabling environments and health and digital literacy, education and awareness rising aimed at both the population at large and high-risk groups in particular (such as people with prediabetes), and which is designed to reduce inequalities and optimise healthcare resources; |
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7.

| 8. | Calls on the Commission to ensure that all EU actions and documents across all work areas reflect the most up-to-date evidence, especially with regard to modifiable risk factors and risk reduction measures, and present an accurate picture of diabetes to combat stigma and discrimination; |
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8.

| 9. | Underlines that more attention should be paid to the prevention of all non-communicable diseases, and asks the Commission and the Member States to reinforce, implement and evaluate properly funded prevention plans; |
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9.

| 10. | Deplores the significant health inequalities in the EU, including in NCD prevention; insists on the need to identify and pay special attention to vulnerable, marginalised, socially excluded populations and people living in remote areas (such as in rural, isolated or outermost regions far from medical centres), in order to ensure they have access to prevention services; considers in this regard that prevention also needs to be framed in the context of social justice, entailing the need for systemic changes through population-wide public policies beyond changes in individual behaviour; |
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10.

| 11. | Calls on the Member States to ensure continued patient access to primary and secondary care, and diabetes treatments and technologies, including e-health technologies such as continuous glucose monitoring systems and new insulin delivery systems, and to support patients in obtaining and sustaining the skills and understanding needed to enable competent life-long self-management; |
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11.

| 12. | Stresses the importance of viewing NCDs from a position that acknowledges that human, animal and environmental health are intrinsically linked and that therefore all actions to combat NCDs should be firmly rooted in the One Health approach; |
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12.

| 13. | Emphasises the importance of EU health legislation and actions, including the Directive on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (29), the revised mandates for EU public health agencies, the proposed serious cross-border health threats regulation (COM(2020)0727), the Tobacco Products Directive (30), the EU4Health programme, and the pharmaceutical strategy, in preventing chronic diseases and addressing health risks; |
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13.

| 14. | Underscores the essential role of a healthy food environment in preventing NCDs and asks the Member States and the Commission to step up their actions to ensure that the most healthy and sustainable food is also the most affordable; |
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14.

| 15. | Underlines the need to address the modifiable risk factors of NCDs with policies that promote active and tobacco-free living, access to healthy foods and physical activity, and which tackle the environmental, cultural and socio-economic determinants of poor health; |
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15.

| 16. | Acknowledges that obesity is considered a primary risk factor for type 2 diabetes; emphasises the role of a healthy diet in preventing and managing type 2 diabetes; stresses that individual diabetes risk can be reduced by increasing consumption of sustainably-produced plants and plant-based foods, such as fresh fruits and vegetables, whole grains and legumes (31); emphasises, furthermore, the need to address the overconsumption of meat and ultra-processed products, and products high in sugars, salt and fats; welcomes the revision of the EU school fruit, vegetables and milk scheme and of the EU’s policy on the promotion of agricultural products; |
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16.

| 17. | Asks the Commission and the Member States to encourage and help consumers to make informed, healthy and sustainable choices about food products by means of the adoption of a mandatory and harmonised EU front-of-pack nutritional label that is developed based on robust and independent scientific evidence; welcomes the focus on healthy nutrition in the EU Child Guarantee and calls for a new EU action plan on childhood obesity; supports fiscal measures to make fresh foods (such as fruits and vegetables, pulses, legumes and wholegrains) more affordable and accessible at national level, especially for people on low incomes; encourages Member States to use pricing policies such as value added tax differentiation, and marketing controls to influence demand for, access to, and the affordability of food and drinks that are low in saturated fats, trans-fats, salt and sugar; supports the Member States in revising the relevant provisions for restricting the advertising of sweetened beverages and processed food products high in fats, salt and sugar, including advertising on social media, and eagerly awaits the announced legislative proposals in this regard under the farm to fork strategy; |
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17.

| 18. | Underlines that tobacco, harmful alcohol consumption and environmental pollution are risk factors common to other chronic diseases; reiterates its call for an integrated chronic disease prevention programme, to be developed in close cooperation with the Steering Group on Health Promotion, Disease Prevention and Management of Non-Communicable Diseases; |
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18.

| 19. | Reiterates the importance of the European Green Deal as a significant contributing factor to disease prevention in Europe, by means of reducing air, food, water and soil pollution and chemical exposure and ensuring access to and information on healthy foods; calls for an evaluation of the impact of policies on NCD incidence to be integrated into the farm to fork strategy, the chemicals strategy for sustainability, the zero pollution and the non-toxic environment strategies; |
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19.

| 20. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support the digitalisation of national health services and the adoption of new tools and technologies, allowing for more effective data collection, monitoring and action to improve self-management, reduce the risk of diabetes-related complications and other consequences of diabetes and improve quality of life; stresses that any digital transition in healthcare should go hand in hand with enhanced digital health literacy, be user-friendly and patient-centred, and promote trust by ensuring high standards on data privacy and cybersecurity; stresses in this regard the potential of the European Health Data Space for NCDs including diabetes; |
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20.

| 21. | Calls on the Commission to engage with patient organisations and people living with diabetes and other chronic diseases in a structured way and encourage the development of a common set of outcome measures that matter most to people living with diabetes, to be used for regulatory assessment and decision-making on pricing and reimbursement, as well as throughout the development and implementation of relevant policies, including national diabetes plans and awareness programmes; |
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21.

| 22. | Calls on the Commission to continue providing financial support, in a transparent manner, to key non-governmental organisations, including those that advocate for and represent patients, consumers and healthcare professionals; |
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22.

| 23. | Calls on the Member States to review and as appropriate advance their national models of care with a focus on deploying person-centred and fully integrated care across the entire care pathway, particularly including disease prevention, prevention of diabetes complications and mental health support; |
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23.

| 24. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to map out and address barriers to both human and analogue insulin, and to ensure affordability for both users and national health systems; |
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24.

| 25. | Calls on the Commission to provide concrete guidance to Member States for ensuring the uninterrupted treatment of people living with diabetes during humanitarian emergencies and highlights the need to provide diabetes care within humanitarian responses; |
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25.

| 26. | Calls on the Commission to support the upskilling of primary and proximity care across the Member States, ensuring integration and continuity of care with a focus on collaboration between professionals within multi-disciplinary care teams; |
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26.

| 27. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to improve the coordination of European and inter-Member State diabetes research; |
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27.

| 28. | Calls on the Commission and Member States to support research into unmet clinical needs for diabetes and its many co-morbidities and complications, taking into account the need to improve the quality of life of people living with diabetes and other chronic diseases; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support production capacities for quality-assured affordable insulin, injection devices and glucose monitoring tools to improve competition, national supply and patient access; |
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28.

| 29. | Stresses the importance of excellence in medical research and innovation in the Union and calls on the Commission to build on the work of Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan in this regard; reiterates its call in its resolution of 24 November 2021 to support additional research in underrepresented populations, such as the elderly, children, women and patients with comorbidities, including obesity as a primary morbidity as well as where it exists as a gateway chronic disease to other non-communicable diseases such as diabetes; |
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29.

| 30. | Is concerned that the accessibility and affordability of medicines remain a challenge for national health systems, and that innovative medicines are expensive or in certain Member States are not even brought to market for commercial reasons; |
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30.

| 31. | Reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure that EU funding for biomedical research and development is made conditional on the full transparency and traceability of investments, on ensuring supply in all Member States and on facilitating the best outcomes for patients, including in terms of the accessibility and affordability of manufactured medicines; |
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31.

| 32. | Calls on the Commission to periodically evaluate and review the incentive system, increase price transparency and highlight the factors limiting affordability and patient access to medicinal products; further calls on the Commission to address the root causes of shortages of pharmaceuticals and propose sustainable solutions that also promote on- and off-patent competition and the timely entry into the market of generic and biosimilar medicines; |
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32.

| 33. | Reiterates its call to guarantee that research priorities are driven by patient and public health needs and that public funds are invested in a transparent manner, ensuring the availability and affordability of products resulting from these partnerships and public funds; |
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33.

| 34. | Calls on the Commission to review the relevant occupational health and safety legal framework and road safety legislation to avoid further discrimination against people living with diabetes; |
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34.

| 35. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure continued support for diabetes funding under the current and future EU framework programmes for research, including research on integrated care models, effective interventions in diabetes prevention and management, and the impact of digital technologies on diabetes self-management and behavioural changes; |
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35.

| 36. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
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36.

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(1)  https://sdgs.un.org/goals

(2)  NCD Global Monitoring Framework (World Health Organization)

(3)  https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/347381

(4)  https://www.who.int/initiatives/the-who-global-diabetes-compact

(5)  OJ C 251 E, 31.8.2013, p. 47.

(6)  OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2.

(7)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 2.

(8)  OJ C 224, 8.6.2022, p. 47.

(9)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 109.

(10)  OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 1.

(11)  OJ L 458, 22.12.2021, p. 1.

(12)  https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/eu-non-communicable-diseases-ncds-initiative-guidance-document_en

(13)  https://op.europa.eu/webpub/empl/european-pillar-of-social-rights/en/

(14)  https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/research-area/health/diabetes_en

(15)  https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1479164116679775

(16)  https://diabetesatlas.org/atlas/tenth-edition/

(17)  https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/diabetes

(18)  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7673790/

(19)  https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/327971/9789289041904-eng.pdf

(20)  https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26605370/

(21)  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5994068/

(22)  https://idf.org/our-activities/care-prevention/diabetes-and-the-kidney.html

(23)  https://diabetesatlas.org/atlas/tenth-edition/

(24)  https://idf.org/our-network/regions-members/europe/covid-19.html

(25)  https://www.mepinterestgroupdiabetes.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/MMD-BLUEPRINT-FOR-ACTION-ON-DIABETES.pdf

(26)  https://www.idf.org/our-network/regions-members/europe/europe-news/487:idf-europe-statement-on-the-eu-ncd-initiative-%E2%80%93-healthier-together%C2%A0.html

(27)  https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17853332/

(28)  https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-11/2020_who_euro_cooperation_en_0.pdf

(29)  Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 45).

(30)  OJ L 127, 29.4.2014, p. 1.

(31)  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5466941

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Thursday 24 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/43

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P9_TA(2022)0417

The Human rights situation in Afghanistan especially the deterioration of women's rights and attacks against educational institutions

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, especially the deterioration of women’s rights and attacks against educational institutions (2022/2955(RSP))

(2023/C 167/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Afghanistan, in particular those of 16 September 2021 (1) and of 7 April 2022 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Afghanistan, in particular those of 16 September 2021 (1) and of 7 April 2022 (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy (3),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2022 on women, peace and security, and of 15 September 2021 on Afghanistan, which outlined five benchmarks for EU engagement with the Taliban-led de facto authorities, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2022 on women, peace and security, and of 15 September 2021 on Afghanistan, which outlined five benchmarks for EU engagement with the Taliban-led de facto authorities,

| — | having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Afghanistan, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Afghanistan,

| — | having regard to the UN Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan, including Resolutions 2626 (2022), 2596 (2021), 2543 (2020) and 2513 (2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan, including Resolutions 2626 (2022), 2596 (2021), 2543 (2020) and 2513 (2020),

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 10 November 2022 on the situation in Afghanistan, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 10 November 2022 on the situation in Afghanistan,

| — | having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 8 July 2022 on the situation of human rights of women and girls in Afghanistan, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 8 July 2022 on the situation of human rights of women and girls in Afghanistan,

| — | having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan of 9 September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan of 9 September 2022,

| — | having regard to the report of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) of 20 July 2022 outlining the human rights situation in Afghanistan over the 10 months since the Taliban takeover, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) of 20 July 2022 outlining the human rights situation in Afghanistan over the 10 months since the Taliban takeover,

| — | having regard to the Taliban’s announcement of the creation of the caretaker government of Afghanistan of 7 September 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Taliban’s announcement of the creation of the caretaker government of Afghanistan of 7 September 2021,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both ratified by Afghanistan, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both ratified by Afghanistan,

| — | having regard to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the 1967 Protocol thereto, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

| — | having regard to the Cooperation Agreement of 18 February 2017 on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Cooperation Agreement of 18 February 2017 on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part,

| — | having regard to the EU thematic guidelines on human rights defenders, on the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, and on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU thematic guidelines on human rights defenders, on the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, and on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021 following the withdrawal of NATO and Allied troops; whereas it re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and appointed an all-male interim government, including members from the 1996-2001 Taliban regime, some of whom are wanted on terrorism charges; whereas the EU maintains a solid position of non-recognition of the de facto Taliban government; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021 following the withdrawal of NATO and Allied troops; whereas it re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and appointed an all-male interim government, including members from the 1996-2001 Taliban regime, some of whom are wanted on terrorism charges; whereas the EU maintains a solid position of non-recognition of the de facto Taliban government;

| B. | whereas the Taliban are rolling back the progress made in the past 20 years; whereas they have re-established the former Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, and closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and other local structures providing support to women and girls, abolished previously enforced laws protecting women and imposed harsh restrictions on women’s rights; whereas the Taliban have excluded women from the administration and have not included women in their new unrecognised government; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the Taliban are rolling back the progress made in the past 20 years; whereas they have re-established the former Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, and closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and other local structures providing support to women and girls, abolished previously enforced laws protecting women and imposed harsh restrictions on women’s rights; whereas the Taliban have excluded women from the administration and have not included women in their new unrecognised government;

| C. | whereas women and girls have faced growing restrictions to their fundamental rights since the Taliban takeover, in particular in access to education and employment, and freedom of movement; whereas women have been virtually erased from all areas of public life; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas women and girls have faced growing restrictions to their fundamental rights since the Taliban takeover, in particular in access to education and employment, and freedom of movement; whereas women have been virtually erased from all areas of public life;

| D. | whereas girls over 12 years old are denied an education in Afghanistan; whereas the de facto authorities of Afghanistan pledged on 15 January 2022 to allow girls to return to school at all levels after the start of the new school year in the second half of March 2022; whereas female students are banned from attending seventh grade and above; whereas this is a violation of the fundamental right to education for all children as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; whereas Afghan girls and women have bravely held peaceful protests in the country, demanding that their right to education be respected; whereas child marriage has sharply increased; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas girls over 12 years old are denied an education in Afghanistan; whereas the de facto authorities of Afghanistan pledged on 15 January 2022 to allow girls to return to school at all levels after the start of the new school year in the second half of March 2022; whereas female students are banned from attending seventh grade and above; whereas this is a violation of the fundamental right to education for all children as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; whereas Afghan girls and women have bravely held peaceful protests in the country, demanding that their right to education be respected; whereas child marriage has sharply increased;

| E. | whereas the Taliban recently stepped up their systemic repression of women and girls through a wave of arrests of human rights defenders; whereas Alia Azizi, the director of Herat women’s prison, has been missing since October 2021; whereas human rights organisations suspect she has been forcibly disappeared; whereas, on 3 November 2022, the Taliban disrupted a press conference announcing the formation of the Afghan Women Movement for Equality, arresting one woman, Zarifa Yaqobi, and four of her male colleagues; whereas, on 11 November 2022, the Taliban arrested prominent activist Farhat Popalzai, one of the founders of the Spontaneous Movement of Afghan Women; whereas, on 13 November 2022, another women’s rights defender, Humaira Yusuf, was taken into custody by the Taliban; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the Taliban recently stepped up their systemic repression of women and girls through a wave of arrests of human rights defenders; whereas Alia Azizi, the director of Herat women’s prison, has been missing since October 2021; whereas human rights organisations suspect she has been forcibly disappeared; whereas, on 3 November 2022, the Taliban disrupted a press conference announcing the formation of the Afghan Women Movement for Equality, arresting one woman, Zarifa Yaqobi, and four of her male colleagues; whereas, on 11 November 2022, the Taliban arrested prominent activist Farhat Popalzai, one of the founders of the Spontaneous Movement of Afghan Women; whereas, on 13 November 2022, another women’s rights defender, Humaira Yusuf, was taken into custody by the Taliban;

| F. | whereas human rights violations are being reported daily, including arrests, detention, abduction, torture, threats, extortion, killings and attacks on human rights defenders and their family members; whereas there continues to be a complete lack of accountability for such violations; whereas the Taliban recently ordered judges to fully implement the Taliban interpretation of Sharia law, potentially leading to cruel and inhuman punishments and raising fears of further human rights violations; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas human rights violations are being reported daily, including arrests, detention, abduction, torture, threats, extortion, killings and attacks on human rights defenders and their family members; whereas there continues to be a complete lack of accountability for such violations; whereas the Taliban recently ordered judges to fully implement the Taliban interpretation of Sharia law, potentially leading to cruel and inhuman punishments and raising fears of further human rights violations;

| G. | whereas the Taliban takeover has led to increasing attacks against minority groups, in particular Hazaras, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians; whereas, since the Taliban takeover, a large number of attacks have been carried out against the Hazara community, a predominantly Shiite minority, by the Islamic State Khorasan Province and other actors; whereas these attacks and the historical persecution of Hazaras could amount to crimes against humanity; whereas since August 2021, their places of worship and educational and medical centres have been systematically attacked and their members have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, summarily executed, evicted, marginalised and, in some cases, forced to flee the country; whereas in 2021 and 2022, several educational centres were attacked in the predominantly Hazara district of Dasht-e Barchi, Kabul, in particular Sayed ul Shuhada, Abdul Rahman Shahid, Mumtaz and the Kaaj Educational Centre; whereas the attacks left hundreds dead and wounded; whereas Taliban forces reportedly opened fire and used physical violence to break up demonstrations against the attacks; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the Taliban takeover has led to increasing attacks against minority groups, in particular Hazaras, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians; whereas, since the Taliban takeover, a large number of attacks have been carried out against the Hazara community, a predominantly Shiite minority, by the Islamic State Khorasan Province and other actors; whereas these attacks and the historical persecution of Hazaras could amount to crimes against humanity; whereas since August 2021, their places of worship and educational and medical centres have been systematically attacked and their members have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, summarily executed, evicted, marginalised and, in some cases, forced to flee the country; whereas in 2021 and 2022, several educational centres were attacked in the predominantly Hazara district of Dasht-e Barchi, Kabul, in particular Sayed ul Shuhada, Abdul Rahman Shahid, Mumtaz and the Kaaj Educational Centre; whereas the attacks left hundreds dead and wounded; whereas Taliban forces reportedly opened fire and used physical violence to break up demonstrations against the attacks;

| H. | whereas the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is rapidly deteriorating and is disproportionately affecting women and girls; whereas the new policies introduced by the Taliban government have critically diminished the ability of women to work, including as aid workers, which has also negatively impacted women’s ability to access humanitarian aid; whereas restricting women from participating in the work force has pushed women further into poverty and placed an estimated 850 000 girls at risk of economic and sexual exploitation, as well as child marriage; whereas fewer than one out of four women human rights defenders who remain in Afghanistan have reported they have access to any type of humanitarian aid or financial and legal assistance; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is rapidly deteriorating and is disproportionately affecting women and girls; whereas the new policies introduced by the Taliban government have critically diminished the ability of women to work, including as aid workers, which has also negatively impacted women’s ability to access humanitarian aid; whereas restricting women from participating in the work force has pushed women further into poverty and placed an estimated 850 000 girls at risk of economic and sexual exploitation, as well as child marriage; whereas fewer than one out of four women human rights defenders who remain in Afghanistan have reported they have access to any type of humanitarian aid or financial and legal assistance;

| I. | whereas the UNAMA estimates that 59 % of the population was in need of humanitarian assistance as of July 2022, an increase of 6 million people compared with the beginning of 2021; whereas, in 2023, 28 million people are expected to require humanitarian assistance, out of which 13 million are children; whereas the Word Food Programme estimates that 18,9 million Afghans are facing acute levels of food insecurity; whereas 4,3 million Afghans are internally displaced and 5,6 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries; whereas Iran and Pakistan host a large share of Afghan refugees, together accounting for 2,2 million registered Afghan refugees; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the UNAMA estimates that 59 % of the population was in need of humanitarian assistance as of July 2022, an increase of 6 million people compared with the beginning of 2021; whereas, in 2023, 28 million people are expected to require humanitarian assistance, out of which 13 million are children; whereas the Word Food Programme estimates that 18,9 million Afghans are facing acute levels of food insecurity; whereas 4,3 million Afghans are internally displaced and 5,6 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries; whereas Iran and Pakistan host a large share of Afghan refugees, together accounting for 2,2 million registered Afghan refugees;

| J. | whereas a devastating earthquake struck Eastern Afghanistan in June 2022, killing more than 1 000 and injuring over 6 000 people; whereas in August 2022, heavy rains fell in several parts of Afghanistan, causing floods, flash floods and landslides killing more than 180 and injuring over 250 people according to media reports; whereas earthquakes, floods, droughts, as well as the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic and rising commodity prices as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas a devastating earthquake struck Eastern Afghanistan in June 2022, killing more than 1 000 and injuring over 6 000 people; whereas in August 2022, heavy rains fell in several parts of Afghanistan, causing floods, flash floods and landslides killing more than 180 and injuring over 250 people according to media reports; whereas earthquakes, floods, droughts, as well as the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic and rising commodity prices as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation;

| K. | whereas the EU launched a EUR 1 billion humanitarian aid package for Afghanistan in October 2021 to support vulnerable Afghans who live in the country and the region; whereas as part of its new humanitarian aid package of EUR 210 million in food assistance for the most vulnerable worldwide, the G20 is planning to disburse EUR 75 million for Afghanistan to address the dramatic food security situation in the country; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the EU launched a EUR 1 billion humanitarian aid package for Afghanistan in October 2021 to support vulnerable Afghans who live in the country and the region; whereas as part of its new humanitarian aid package of EUR 210 million in food assistance for the most vulnerable worldwide, the G20 is planning to disburse EUR 75 million for Afghanistan to address the dramatic food security situation in the country;

| L. | whereas the space for independent media and civil society has drastically shrunk under the Taliban; whereas regulations decreed by various Taliban bodies have massively restricted journalistic activity and led to an increase in arbitrary arrests of journalists; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the space for independent media and civil society has drastically shrunk under the Taliban; whereas regulations decreed by various Taliban bodies have massively restricted journalistic activity and led to an increase in arbitrary arrests of journalists;

| 1. | Deeply deplores the continuing deterioration of the political, economic, humanitarian, human rights and security situation in Afghanistan, especially for women and girls, since the Taliban takeover of August 2021; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with and commitment to the people of Afghanistan; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Condemns the staggering regression in women and girls’ exercise of their rights under the Taliban, a situation that currently qualifies as a gender apartheid; condemns the additional restrictions imposed by the Taliban on women’s freedom of movement; calls on the de facto authorities of Afghanistan to ensure that all gender-based restrictions on women are lifted and that they can again actively participate in public life in Afghanistan; stresses that this must be a key condition for any engagement of the international community with the Taliban; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Denounces the egregious ban on secondary education for girls, in direct violation of their universal right to education; recalls the Taliban’s promises that women’s access to education would be restored; demands, therefore, that the Taliban now honour its own commitments, lift the ban and resume classes without delay and ensure achievement of UNESCO’s educational goals; urges the EU to step up its support to Afghan groups working to defend the rights of women and girls, including alternative education options for girls, and to fund specific assistance and protection programmes, including by funding scholarships and ensuring expedited issuance of visas to Afghan students and academics who are awarded EU scholarships; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Denounces the relentless targeting of human rights defenders, journalists and other civil society actors, LGBTIQ+ people, dissidents and judges, as well as the brutal repression of peaceful protest and expressions of dissent throughout the country; condemns the arrest of women’s and human rights defenders, including Zarifa Yaqobi and her colleagues, Farhat Popalzai, and Humaira Yusuf; and demands their immediate and unconditional release; urges the EU to step up its political and financial support for Afghan women’s and human rights defenders and to guarantee their safety, as well as for women in exile, by providing quality educational and employment opportunities; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Is appalled by the increasing attacks on and marginalisation of minority groups, including the recent attack inside the Kaaj Educational Centre in Kabul; expresses its condolences to the families of the victims and its solidarity with the survivors; calls on the de facto authorities to bring to justice those responsible for these attacks and for them to be held accountable; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Expresses deep concern about the situation of the Hazara, Hindu, Sikh, Christian and other minorities since the Taliban takeover, and about the systematic attacks and broader discrimination against them, including arbitrary arrests, torture and other ill-treatment, summary executions and enforced disappearances; recalls the responsibility of the de facto authorities to prohibit and prevent discrimination against all ethnic and religious communities and to safeguard their places of worship and educational and medical centres; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Deeply regrets that, since the Taliban takeover, access to information has become increasingly difficult, journalistic independence has been significantly curtailed, and civil society organisations have been subjected to increasing pressure by the de facto authorities; urges the Taliban to provide an enabling environment for journalists, the media and civil society organisations to carry out their activities without hindrance and fear of reprisals; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Reiterates its extreme concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation; urges countries to step up and coordinate their humanitarian assistance with UN agencies and non-governmental organisations; calls on the de facto authorities to remove any restrictions and obstacles to the provision of humanitarian assistance and emphasises the need to allow proper access for organisations providing this; urges the EU and its Member States to address the economic factors behind the ongoing humanitarian crisis by making every effort to scale up humanitarian assistance, which should include a gender perspective; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Expresses its alarm at the devastating impact of climate change and environmental degradation in Afghanistan, which is ranked by the UN as the sixth country in the world most affected by climate-related threats; calls for urgent action by the international community to help Afghans address this dramatic situation, which disproportionately affects vulnerable groups such as women and girls; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes and supports the work of the UN Mission and the UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, as it is essential to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country; calls on the EU and the international community to boost political and financial support for their work; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Welcomes the resumption of the investigation by the International Criminal Court into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Afghanistan; calls on the EU to step up its support for information-sharing, research, monitoring and oversight for enhanced accountability; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Recalls that the EU has a solid position on any political engagement with the Taliban, guided by five thematic benchmarks for engagement based on the principles of adherence to human rights for all and the rule of law; highlights that, since 15 August 2021, there has only been a clear deterioration in all these benchmarks, which means that any legitimisation of the Taliban authorities cannot be justified; points out that the current benchmarks need to be updated with a view to establishing an EU long-term strategy on Afghanistan in light of the current situation and the failure of the Taliban to deliver on any of their initial promises; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the EU to seek the expansion of the list of targeted measures against the Taliban leadership responsible for the continued deterioration of the human rights situation; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the de facto authorities to take the necessary measures to combat violence against women and girls, including forced marriage and intimate partner violence, and to hold perpetrators accountable without delay; calls on the de facto authorities to reopen the nationwide support system for victims; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Delegations and Member State embassies to increase their support for Afghan human rights defenders and independent journalists, in the country and outside it, including by streamlining the resettlement of human rights defenders in line with the EU Guidelines on this matter; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls for the establishment of a representative and elected government that involves women and minorities in the decision-making process at all levels; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls for the UN Human Rights Council to establish a complementary ongoing accountability mechanism to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of human rights law amounting to crimes under international law, in particular, violence against women and girls; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Notes that further international efforts are needed to support women-led intra-Afghan dialogues and Afghan women’s networks both inside and outside the country; calls on the EEAS to further involve Parliament and the other EU institutions in the Afghan Women Leaders Forum; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to take action to ensure participation of Afghan women in policy dialogues on Afghanistan; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EU Special Envoy to Afghanistan. |
| --- | --- |

19.

---

(1)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 133.

(2)  OJ C 434, 15.11.2022, p. 86.

(3)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 70.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/48

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P9_TA(2022)0418

The continuing repression of the democratic opposition and civil society in Belarus

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the continuing repression of the democratic opposition and civil society in Belarus (2022/2956(RSP))

(2023/C 167/07)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all human rights conventions to which Belarus is a party, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all human rights conventions to which Belarus is a party,

| — | having regard to the Council Conclusions of 12 October 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council Conclusions of 12 October 2020,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 October 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 October 2021,

| — | having regard to the reports drawn up by international and independent Belarusian human rights organisations, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reports drawn up by international and independent Belarusian human rights organisations,

| — | having regard to the reports of 4 May 2021 and 20 July 2022 of Anaïs Marin, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, for the UN Human Rights Council and the call by UN experts on 10 October 2022 for the immediate release of a jailed Nobel prize winner and other rights defenders in Belarus, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reports of 4 May 2021 and 20 July 2022 of Anaïs Marin, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, for the UN Human Rights Council and the call by UN experts on 10 October 2022 for the immediate release of a jailed Nobel prize winner and other rights defenders in Belarus,

| — | having regard to the report of 4 March 2022 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of 4 March 2022 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,

| — | having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement on Belarus of 4 November 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement on Belarus of 4 November 2022,

| — | having regard to the statement by the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) dated 13 July 2022 on the persistent imprisonment of journalists and media workers in Belarus, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) dated 13 July 2022 on the persistent imprisonment of journalists and media workers in Belarus,

| — | having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) of 7 October 2022 on a court ruling against independent media representatives, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) of 7 October 2022 on a court ruling against independent media representatives,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the Belarusian regime’s systematic repression against civil society and human rights defenders aims to silence all remaining independent voices in Belarus; whereas more than 10 000 Belarusians are estimated to have been detained at some point for protesting against the regime; whereas human rights defenders, opposition politicians, civil society representatives, artists, independent journalists, trade union leaders and members, and other activists are being systematically subjected to violent repression and forced to flee; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Belarusian regime’s systematic repression against civil society and human rights defenders aims to silence all remaining independent voices in Belarus; whereas more than 10 000 Belarusians are estimated to have been detained at some point for protesting against the regime; whereas human rights defenders, opposition politicians, civil society representatives, artists, independent journalists, trade union leaders and members, and other activists are being systematically subjected to violent repression and forced to flee;

| B. | whereas the human rights violations in Belarus have escalated since August 2020, with more than 1 400 political prisoners as of November 2022, including the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski; whereas the list of prisoners includes minors, persons with disabilities, pensioners and severely ill persons; whereas trials of political prisoners have continued, with sentences handed down on a previously unseen scale; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the human rights violations in Belarus have escalated since August 2020, with more than 1 400 political prisoners as of November 2022, including the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski; whereas the list of prisoners includes minors, persons with disabilities, pensioners and severely ill persons; whereas trials of political prisoners have continued, with sentences handed down on a previously unseen scale;

| C. | whereas an ever-increasing number of crackdowns on Belarus’ widely supported pro-democratic opposition movement have been taking place; whereas in October 2022, Hrodna Regional Court handed down a 25-year sentence to political activist Mikalai Autukhovich on entirely fabricated charges that included high treason; whereas this is the longest ever prison sentence imposed on an opponent of the Lukashenka regime; whereas Mr Autukhovich, who went on a hunger strike over the summer, has been beaten and tortured since the start of his imprisonment; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas an ever-increasing number of crackdowns on Belarus’ widely supported pro-democratic opposition movement have been taking place; whereas in October 2022, Hrodna Regional Court handed down a 25-year sentence to political activist Mikalai Autukhovich on entirely fabricated charges that included high treason; whereas this is the longest ever prison sentence imposed on an opponent of the Lukashenka regime; whereas Mr Autukhovich, who went on a hunger strike over the summer, has been beaten and tortured since the start of his imprisonment;

| D. | whereas 11 other defendants in the case, together with Mr Autukhovich, are referred to as the ‘Autukhovich twelve’, and were sentenced to a combined 169,5 years in prison, namely Paval Sava, Halina Dzerbysh, Volha Mayorava, Viktar Snehur, Uladzimer Hundar, Syarhey Razanovich, Paval Razanovich, Lyobov Razanovich, Iryna Melkher, Anton Melkher and Iryna Harachkina; whereas some of the detained individuals were repeatedly placed in solitary confinement after their families had reported violent treatment and even torture of the prisoners by the prison guards; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas 11 other defendants in the case, together with Mr Autukhovich, are referred to as the ‘Autukhovich twelve’, and were sentenced to a combined 169,5 years in prison, namely Paval Sava, Halina Dzerbysh, Volha Mayorava, Viktar Snehur, Uladzimer Hundar, Syarhey Razanovich, Paval Razanovich, Lyobov Razanovich, Iryna Melkher, Anton Melkher and Iryna Harachkina; whereas some of the detained individuals were repeatedly placed in solitary confinement after their families had reported violent treatment and even torture of the prisoners by the prison guards;

| E. | whereas Belarusian courts have delivered many hundreds of unfair and arbitrary verdicts in politically motivated trials in the ‘round dance’ case, with hearings often held behind closed doors, without due process of law and with no access for EU diplomats to observe proceedings; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas Belarusian courts have delivered many hundreds of unfair and arbitrary verdicts in politically motivated trials in the ‘round dance’ case, with hearings often held behind closed doors, without due process of law and with no access for EU diplomats to observe proceedings;

| F. | whereas special in absentia proceedings have been initiated by the Investigative Committee of Belarus against leaders of the democratic Belarusian opposition and members of the Coordination Council, namely Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Pavel Latushka, Volha Kavalkova, Maria Maroz, Siarhei Dyleuski, Dmitry Navosha, Valeria Zanemonskaya, Daniil Bogdanovich, Yanina Sazanovich, Volha Vysotskaya, Aleksandra Gerasimova, Aliaksandr Opeikin, and Dmitry Soloviev, among others; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas special in absentia proceedings have been initiated by the Investigative Committee of Belarus against leaders of the democratic Belarusian opposition and members of the Coordination Council, namely Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Pavel Latushka, Volha Kavalkova, Maria Maroz, Siarhei Dyleuski, Dmitry Navosha, Valeria Zanemonskaya, Daniil Bogdanovich, Yanina Sazanovich, Volha Vysotskaya, Aleksandra Gerasimova, Aliaksandr Opeikin, and Dmitry Soloviev, among others;

| G. | whereas leaders and representatives of the democratic opposition parties, including Pavel Seviarynets, Mikalai Kazlou, Antanina Kavaleva, Aksana Alyakseeva, Tatsiana and Dzmitry Kaneuski, Ihar Salavei, Pavel Spiryn, Uladzimir Niapomniashchykh, Aliaksandr Agraitsovich, Pavel Belavus, Andrei Kudzik, Mikolai Siarhienka, Ramuald Ulan, Aliaksandr Nahela, Andrei Kabanau, Artur Smaliakou, Andrei Asmalouski, Dziana Charnushyna, Mikola Statkevich, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maryia Kalesnikava, Maksim Znak, Ihar Losik, Sergey Sparish, continue to be imprisoned in inhumane conditions; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas leaders and representatives of the democratic opposition parties, including Pavel Seviarynets, Mikalai Kazlou, Antanina Kavaleva, Aksana Alyakseeva, Tatsiana and Dzmitry Kaneuski, Ihar Salavei, Pavel Spiryn, Uladzimir Niapomniashchykh, Aliaksandr Agraitsovich, Pavel Belavus, Andrei Kudzik, Mikolai Siarhienka, Ramuald Ulan, Aliaksandr Nahela, Andrei Kabanau, Artur Smaliakou, Andrei Asmalouski, Dziana Charnushyna, Mikola Statkevich, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maryia Kalesnikava, Maksim Znak, Ihar Losik, Sergey Sparish, continue to be imprisoned in inhumane conditions;

| H. | whereas the Belarusian regime is not investigating the thousands of reports of police brutality; whereas it is instead promoting and rewarding those responsible for these acts; whereas the widespread impunity of human rights violations perpetuates the desperate situation of the Belarusian people; whereas the absence of the rule of law impedes their right to a fair trial; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the Belarusian regime is not investigating the thousands of reports of police brutality; whereas it is instead promoting and rewarding those responsible for these acts; whereas the widespread impunity of human rights violations perpetuates the desperate situation of the Belarusian people; whereas the absence of the rule of law impedes their right to a fair trial;

| I. | whereas Belarus is the only country in Europe to use capital punishment, with announcements made recently that executions of political opponents of the regime would be carried out; whereas in January 2022, the Criminal Code of Belarus was amended and signed into law by Lukashenka in May 2022 to extend capital punishment to ‘attempted terrorist acts’, with the eventual aim of targeting political dissidents and introducing trials in absentia on ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ grounds; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas Belarus is the only country in Europe to use capital punishment, with announcements made recently that executions of political opponents of the regime would be carried out; whereas in January 2022, the Criminal Code of Belarus was amended and signed into law by Lukashenka in May 2022 to extend capital punishment to ‘attempted terrorist acts’, with the eventual aim of targeting political dissidents and introducing trials in absentia on ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ grounds;

| J. | whereas torture is still used by the Lukashenka regime and political prisoners continue to report deteriorating health conditions, humiliation, and inhuman and cruel treatment; whereas Lukashenka has expanded his campaign against human rights activists and journalists, having imprisoned Andrzej Poczobut, a prominent journalist and activist of the Polish minority in Belarus, who was added to its ‘terrorist list’; whereas the unacceptable persecution of the Polish and other minorities has intensified, including recent decisions of the Belarusian authorities aimed at eliminating education in the Polish and Lithuanian languages, carrying out searches in houses of Polish leaders and the destruction of Polish cemeteries and the graves of poets, writers, insurgents and soldiers of the Home Army; whereas the authorities terminated the contract allowing the free use of the Red Catholic Church by the Roman Catholic Parish of St Simon and St Helen, which then had to remove its property from the church; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas torture is still used by the Lukashenka regime and political prisoners continue to report deteriorating health conditions, humiliation, and inhuman and cruel treatment; whereas Lukashenka has expanded his campaign against human rights activists and journalists, having imprisoned Andrzej Poczobut, a prominent journalist and activist of the Polish minority in Belarus, who was added to its ‘terrorist list’; whereas the unacceptable persecution of the Polish and other minorities has intensified, including recent decisions of the Belarusian authorities aimed at eliminating education in the Polish and Lithuanian languages, carrying out searches in houses of Polish leaders and the destruction of Polish cemeteries and the graves of poets, writers, insurgents and soldiers of the Home Army; whereas the authorities terminated the contract allowing the free use of the Red Catholic Church by the Roman Catholic Parish of St Simon and St Helen, which then had to remove its property from the church;

| K. | whereas, according to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, university students face arbitrary detention, wrongful dismissal and expulsion from studies, clearly threatening their academic freedom; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas, according to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, university students face arbitrary detention, wrongful dismissal and expulsion from studies, clearly threatening their academic freedom;

| L. | whereas Belarus has withdrawn from the Aarhus Convention, which had had considerable success in strengthening access rights, sustainable development and environmental democracy; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas Belarus has withdrawn from the Aarhus Convention, which had had considerable success in strengthening access rights, sustainable development and environmental democracy;

| M. | whereas the authorities often resort to surveillance, online censorship and disinformation, deploying technologies to control the population; whereas this repressive practice represents another step towards digital authoritarianism and suppression of the digital rights of people in Belarus, resulting in the escalating intimidation of citizens and the shrinking of civic space; whereas, as a result, freedom of speech does not exist anymore; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the authorities often resort to surveillance, online censorship and disinformation, deploying technologies to control the population; whereas this repressive practice represents another step towards digital authoritarianism and suppression of the digital rights of people in Belarus, resulting in the escalating intimidation of citizens and the shrinking of civic space; whereas, as a result, freedom of speech does not exist anymore;

| N. | whereas on 14 November 2022, independent media reported on the criminal prosecution of Irena Valius and Renata Dzemanchuk, leaders of the Union of Poles in Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas on 14 November 2022, independent media reported on the criminal prosecution of Irena Valius and Renata Dzemanchuk, leaders of the Union of Poles in Belarus;

| O. | whereas the Lukashenka regime in Belarus continues to enable Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, by allowing Russia to use Belarusian territory for military attacks against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the Lukashenka regime in Belarus continues to enable Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, by allowing Russia to use Belarusian territory for military attacks against Ukraine;

| P. | whereas the Belarusians who joined the anti-war movement are being targeted by repressive measures, placed under administrative arrest or charged with criminal offences, including lawyer Alexander Danilevich who is facing criminal charges in connection with his signature of a public petition against the war in Ukraine and three Belarusian citizens, Dzianis Dzikun, Dzmitry Ravich and Aleh Malchanau, who are facing terrorism charges for sabotaging railway infrastructure to prevent the transportation of Russian military equipment; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the Belarusians who joined the anti-war movement are being targeted by repressive measures, placed under administrative arrest or charged with criminal offences, including lawyer Alexander Danilevich who is facing criminal charges in connection with his signature of a public petition against the war in Ukraine and three Belarusian citizens, Dzianis Dzikun, Dzmitry Ravich and Aleh Malchanau, who are facing terrorism charges for sabotaging railway infrastructure to prevent the transportation of Russian military equipment;

| Q. | whereas the Viasna Human Rights Centre is facing a series of criminal investigations and charges have been brought against, among others, Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Uladzimir Labkovich, Marfa Rabkova, Leanid Sudalenka, Tatsiana Lasitsa and Andrei Chapiuk; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the Viasna Human Rights Centre is facing a series of criminal investigations and charges have been brought against, among others, Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Uladzimir Labkovich, Marfa Rabkova, Leanid Sudalenka, Tatsiana Lasitsa and Andrei Chapiuk;

| R. | whereas more than 600 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been liquidated or are being liquidated, including virtually all human rights groups working in the country; whereas the persecution of independent trade unions is still ongoing, and their leaders and activists, including Aliaksandr Yarashuk, Henadz Fiadynich, Siarhei Antusevich, Mikhail Hromau, Iryna Bud-Husaim, Yanina Malash, Vasil Berasnieu, Zinaida Mikhniuk, Aliaksandr Mishuk, Ihar Povarau, Yauhen Hovar, Artsiom Zhernak and Daniil Cheunakou, remain in prison; whereas in July, the Supreme Court of Belarus liquidated the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, which is an umbrella organisation for independent trade unions, to close, thereby effectively banning all independent trade unions; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas more than 600 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been liquidated or are being liquidated, including virtually all human rights groups working in the country; whereas the persecution of independent trade unions is still ongoing, and their leaders and activists, including Aliaksandr Yarashuk, Henadz Fiadynich, Siarhei Antusevich, Mikhail Hromau, Iryna Bud-Husaim, Yanina Malash, Vasil Berasnieu, Zinaida Mikhniuk, Aliaksandr Mishuk, Ihar Povarau, Yauhen Hovar, Artsiom Zhernak and Daniil Cheunakou, remain in prison; whereas in July, the Supreme Court of Belarus liquidated the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, which is an umbrella organisation for independent trade unions, to close, thereby effectively banning all independent trade unions;

| S. | whereas journalists remain one of the most targeted groups by the regime, including Katsiaryna Andreyeva, Iryna Slaunikava, Siarhei Satsuk, Ihar Losik, Ksenia Lutskina and Andrei Kuznechyk; whereas on 6 October 2022, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced three journalists from the banned independent media outlet BelaPAN, namely Iryna Leushyna, editor in chief, Dzmitry Navazhylau, Director, Andrei Aliaksandrau, Deputy Director, as well as an independent journalist, Iryna Zlobina, to terms of imprisonment ranging from 4 to 14 years; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas journalists remain one of the most targeted groups by the regime, including Katsiaryna Andreyeva, Iryna Slaunikava, Siarhei Satsuk, Ihar Losik, Ksenia Lutskina and Andrei Kuznechyk; whereas on 6 October 2022, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced three journalists from the banned independent media outlet BelaPAN, namely Iryna Leushyna, editor in chief, Dzmitry Navazhylau, Director, Andrei Aliaksandrau, Deputy Director, as well as an independent journalist, Iryna Zlobina, to terms of imprisonment ranging from 4 to 14 years;

| T. | whereas freedom of peaceful assembly is being continuously violated; whereas no opposition street protests have been authorised since the fraudulent presidential elections of August 2020; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas freedom of peaceful assembly is being continuously violated; whereas no opposition street protests have been authorised since the fraudulent presidential elections of August 2020;

| U. | whereas Lukashenka is continuing with his policy of russifying Belarus, pushing towards the marginalisation and destruction of manifestations of the national identity of Belarusians, including in terms of language, education and culture, through arbitrary arrests, detention and, in particular, the brutal treatment of cultural figures; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas Lukashenka is continuing with his policy of russifying Belarus, pushing towards the marginalisation and destruction of manifestations of the national identity of Belarusians, including in terms of language, education and culture, through arbitrary arrests, detention and, in particular, the brutal treatment of cultural figures;

| 1. | Continues to stand firmly in solidarity with the people of Belarus as well as with the members of the democratic opposition and civil society, who continue to make a stand for a free, sovereign and democratic Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Recalls that the EU and its Member States did not recognise the results of the 2020 presidential election owing to their massive falsification and fabrication and do not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as president of Belarus; calls for continued support for the Belarusian democratic opposition and independent civil society, including members of the European political families; welcomes the formation of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, which follows the establishment of the Coordination Council and the National Anti-Crisis Management; calls on democratic opposition forces to maintain and promote unity based on the objective of a free, democratic and independent Belarus; notes that many Belarusians consider Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to be the winner of the 2020 presidential election; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Reiterates its unwavering support to the Belarusian democratic opposition and civil society and calls on them to continue to act in the interests of the Belarusian people and to elaborate a plan to reform the country; notes that Ukraine’s victory will accelerate democratic changes in Belarus; reiterates that, in line with the OSCE’s principles, the legitimate demands of the people of Belarus for democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms, prosperity, sovereignty and security must be met; reiterates its previous calls for new free and fair elections under international observation by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Strongly condemns the unjustified and politically motivated sentences handed down to members of the ‘Autukhovich twelve’, as well as to the more than 1 400 political prisoners being held; demands an immediate end to the violence and repression, as well as the unconditional release of all political prisoners and all persons arbitrarily detained, arrested or sentenced on politically motivated grounds, and for all charges against them to be dropped; demands also their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damages incurred as a result of their illegitimate detention; underlines, in the meantime, the need for information to be provided on their whereabouts and conditions of detention, as well as for them to have access to lawyers of their choice and medical support, and to ensure their communication with family members; demands that the Lukashenka regime make it possible to observe and monitor the trials of all political prisoners, including pro-democracy activists, members of the democratic opposition, human rights defenders, journalists and trade unionists; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Strongly condemns Belarus’ involvement in Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the new deployment of Russian armed forces in Belarus; condemns the belligerent and threat-based rhetoric of Belarusian officials against Ukraine; notes that Lukashenka and those associated with him are equally responsible for the war crimes in Ukraine and should be held accountable before the international tribunal and the International Criminal Court; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the EEAS to cooperate with international partners, such as the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism and the UN Human Rights Council, as well as human rights defenders and civil society on the ground to ensure the monitoring, documentation and reporting of human rights violations and subsequent accountability and justice for victims; welcomes and supports the establishment of the International Accountability Platform for Belarus; reiterates the importance of continuing the diplomatic isolation of Belarus, reducing the diplomatic presence of the EU and its Member States in the country and continuing the isolation of Belarus in international organisations; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Urges the Belarusian authorities to cease all repression, persecution, torture and ill-treatment of its people, including violence against women and vulnerable groups and enforced disappearances; continues to condemn the inhumane conditions of detention and the incessant humiliation and deteriorating health conditions of the political prisoners; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Expresses concern over the alleged use of the forced labour of inmates in Belarusian penal colonies by suppliers to major EU-based companies; calls on all EU-based companies to exercise particular diligence and terminate their relations with any Belarusian suppliers which use forced labour in their supply chains, suppress the civil and political rights of their employees or openly support the violent regime; calls on the Council to impose sanctions on any Belarusian or international companies operating in Belarus which use forced labour in their supply chains, suppress the civil and political rights of their employees or openly support the violent regime; urges the Lukashenka regime to end its practice of imposing forced labour in penal colonies; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Condemns Lukashenka’s efforts to undermine Belarusian culture, including minority cultures, and russify the nation; calls on the EU to support Belarusian independent cultural organisations such as theatres, choirs, schools, folk groups and artists; deplores the decision of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs to label the country’s patriotic motto ‘Zhyve Belarus!’ (‘Long live Belarus!’) a Nazi motto; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Firmly condemns the Russian military’s use of Belarusian territory for its aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the action taken by Belarusian society in opposing the use of the territory of Belarus for facilitating the Russian invasion of Ukraine; expresses support for the Kastuś Kalinoüski and Pahonia Regiment, which is supporting Ukraine in its defence against the Russian war of aggression; endorses the position of the Belarusian democratic opposition and civil society that Belarus should be recognised as an occupied or de facto occupied territory, and joins them in calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus and Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Reiterates its call on the Council and the Commission to prevent sanctions evasion and calls for a strict mirroring of the sanctions issued against Russia for Belarus and their appropriate application in any future rounds of sanctions; calls on the Commission, the co-legislators and the Member States to complete the legal regime allowing for the confiscation of assets frozen by the EU, which would also make it possible to confiscate the assets of Lukashenka, his family and the inner circle enabling the regime, including judges, prosecutors, propagandists, members of the militia, KGB and security operatives involved in repression, sentencing, unlawful detention and torture, and to channel these resources to support its victims and the Belarusian democratic opposition; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Welcomes the awarding of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize to the human rights advocate, founder of the Viasna Human Rights Centre and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski; denounces the ongoing imprisonment of Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovic and Uladzimir Labkhovich on politically motivated charges of smuggling and financing of collective actions violating public order, which carry a sentence of up to 12 years in prison, and calls for their immediate and unconditional release; echoes the call of the chairperson of the Norwegian Nobel Committee for the Lukashenka regime to ensure Ales Bialiatski’s release ahead of the 10 December 2022 Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the establishment of a Contact Group in the Council of Europe in cooperation with the Belarusian democratic forces and civil society; encourages the EU institutions and Member States and international organisations to enhance systemic cooperation with democratic representatives of Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Welcomes the provision by the EU and Member States, in particular Poland and Lithuania, of support and protection to Belarusians forced to flee the country; calls on the Member States to maintain their solidarity with people fleeing Belarus and calls on the Commission to further back these efforts; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Welcomes the Commission’s comprehensive plan of economic support for a democratic Belarus, but demands that these funds be made immediately accessible in order to support the crucial work of civil society, independent media, trade unions and the Belarusian opposition in exile, as well as those fleeing the oppressive regime; calls on the European political parties and foundations to provide direct support to their Belarusian party members and to the wider opposition; calls on the Commission to further support independent news outlets, especially new media such as Nexta, which has not received any EU financial support despite having a broad audience in Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to continue assisting the democratic opposition, civil society and human rights defenders, trade union representatives and independent media in Belarus and abroad in order to prepare for the country’s future democratic transition; commends the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) for his regular invitations to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, including to the roundtable of 14 November 2022; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of the Mission for Democratic Belarus in Brussels; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to prepare rules and procedures to deal with cases where human rights defenders and other civil society activists are stripped of their citizenship in Belarus, as well as to provide support to those Belarusians residing in the EU whose identity documents are about to expire and who have no means of renewing them, since they cannot return to Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to explore further measures, beyond sanctions, and to develop a coherent and comprehensive long-term approach towards Belarus, closely coordinated with like-minded countries and international organisations; calls for the EEAS to take the lead in coordinating a coherent policy with the Member States and other EU institutions; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Denounces the decision by Belarus to withdraw from the Aarhus Convention, in particular in the context of the launch of the Astravyets nuclear power plant (NPP) without fully implementing the stress test recommendations, and deplores further negligence concerning compliance with the highest nuclear safety regulations at the Astravyets NPP site; condemns the Belarusian regime’s brutal persecution of environmental and human rights defenders and NGOs raising nuclear safety concerns; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the authorities of the Republic of Belarus and of the Russian Federation, and to the representatives of the Belarusian democratic opposition. |
| --- | --- |

20.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/54 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/54

---

P9_TA(2022)0419

Forced displacement of people as a result of escalating conflict in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the forced displacement of people as a result of the escalating conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2022/2957(RSP))

(2023/C 167/08)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

| — | having regard to the report of the Secretary-General of the UN of 10 October 2022 on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Secretary-General of the UN of 10 October 2022 on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

| — | having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 18 December 1979 (CEDAW), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 18 December 1979 (CEDAW),

| — | having regard to the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 and its additional protocols of 1977 and 2005, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 and its additional protocols of 1977 and 2005,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) of 20 November 1989, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) of 20 November 1989,

| — | having regard to the OHCHR-MONUSCO report of July 2020 entitled ‘Report on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Allied Democratic Forces armed group and by members of the defence and security forces in Beni territory, North Kivu province and Irumu and Mambasa territories, Ituri province, between 1 January 2019 and 31 January 2020’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the OHCHR-MONUSCO report of July 2020 entitled ‘Report on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Allied Democratic Forces armed group and by members of the defence and security forces in Beni territory, North Kivu province and Irumu and Mambasa territories, Ituri province, between 1 January 2019 and 31 January 2020’,

| — | having regard to the declaration of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, of 4 July 2022 on the situation of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declaration of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, of 4 July 2022 on the situation of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (1),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (2),

| — | having regard to the Cotonou Agreement, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate, particularly in the north-eastern part of the country, due to armed foreign and domestic groups, including the M23 with links to Rwanda; whereas some rebel groups have links with Uganda and Burundi as well as reported allegiance to ISIS and have been implicated in numerous massacres, causing the displacement of thousands of civilians, and there are reports that armed groups have been recruiting children and perpetrating widespread sexual and gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate, particularly in the north-eastern part of the country, due to armed foreign and domestic groups, including the M23 with links to Rwanda; whereas some rebel groups have links with Uganda and Burundi as well as reported allegiance to ISIS and have been implicated in numerous massacres, causing the displacement of thousands of civilians, and there are reports that armed groups have been recruiting children and perpetrating widespread sexual and gender-based violence;

| B. | whereas since 20 October 2022, advances by the M23 have led to the displacement of thousands of people from Rutshuru to Kanyaruchinya and Kibati, north of the city of Goma, and to Lubero territory, adding to the six million persons already internally displaced; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas since 20 October 2022, advances by the M23 have led to the displacement of thousands of people from Rutshuru to Kanyaruchinya and Kibati, north of the city of Goma, and to Lubero territory, adding to the six million persons already internally displaced;

| C. | whereas since 20 October 2022 an estimated 183 000 people, mostly women and children, have been displaced, bringing the total to more than 232 000 civilians in the eastern part of the country; whereas 2,4 million Congolese children under the age of five are suffering from global acute malnutrition; whereas many children have been separated from their parents and guardians as people flee rebel attacks; whereas an estimated 7,5 million people currently need assistance and have no access to water and sanitation facilities; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas since 20 October 2022 an estimated 183 000 people, mostly women and children, have been displaced, bringing the total to more than 232 000 civilians in the eastern part of the country; whereas 2,4 million Congolese children under the age of five are suffering from global acute malnutrition; whereas many children have been separated from their parents and guardians as people flee rebel attacks; whereas an estimated 7,5 million people currently need assistance and have no access to water and sanitation facilities;

| D. | whereas the DRC’s eastern provinces of Ituri and Kivu have suffered two decades of cyclical conflict characterised by massacres of civilians and violence by armed groups, while government authorities have failed to hold non-state groups accountable for past crimes; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the DRC’s eastern provinces of Ituri and Kivu have suffered two decades of cyclical conflict characterised by massacres of civilians and violence by armed groups, while government authorities have failed to hold non-state groups accountable for past crimes;

| E. | whereas in October 2022 it was reported that in the recent conflict with M23 rebel forces Congolese army units and their allies were responsible for massive human rights violations; whereas serious abuses such as child labour have also been reported; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas in October 2022 it was reported that in the recent conflict with M23 rebel forces Congolese army units and their allies were responsible for massive human rights violations; whereas serious abuses such as child labour have also been reported;

| F. | whereas journalists covering the conflict face increasing harassment, threats and arrests; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas journalists covering the conflict face increasing harassment, threats and arrests;

| G. | whereas the Luanda process facilitated by Angola aims to mediate between DRC and Rwanda regarding the conflict in eastern DRC; whereas the East African Community (EAC), of which the DRC became a member in March 2022, has initiated a two-track process aimed at ending instability in Eastern Congo: political discussions with rebel groups that have expressed a willingness to stop fighting and disarm, coupled with the deployment of an East African military force; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the Luanda process facilitated by Angola aims to mediate between DRC and Rwanda regarding the conflict in eastern DRC; whereas the East African Community (EAC), of which the DRC became a member in March 2022, has initiated a two-track process aimed at ending instability in Eastern Congo: political discussions with rebel groups that have expressed a willingness to stop fighting and disarm, coupled with the deployment of an East African military force;

| 1. | Expresses its deep concern about the escalation of violence and the alarming and deteriorating humanitarian situation in the DRC, caused in particular by the armed conflicts in the eastern provinces; deplores the loss of life and expresses its sympathy with the people of the DRC; deplores that the conflict has left an estimated 27 million Congolese in need of humanitarian assistance and the number of internally displaced persons in the DRC is rising, with up to six million estimated to have been displaced to date, including 515 000 refugees; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls for the EU and other international partners to provide humanitarian aid to the region; insists that EU-funded humanitarian aid should be targeted on helping vulnerable people, such as survivors of sexual violence and improving social determinants of health; calls for the EU to continue increasing its development and humanitarian funding for the DRC for the programming period 2021-2027; urges all sides to allow and facilitate humanitarian access to all those in need and make the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons possible; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Strongly condemns the ongoing brutal aggression by armed groups; calls for the M23 armed group to withdraw from its positions, disarm, and for all armed groups in the region to re-join the Inter-Congolese dialogue (Nairobi process) in preparation for disarmament, demobilisation, and community reintegration; calls on all state actors in the region to cease all cooperation with M23 and other armed groups in the region; urges all governments concerned to ensure that any political settlement does not include an amnesty for those responsible for grave international crimes and that M23 commanders who have committed abuses are not allowed to integrate into DR Congo’s armed forces; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Urges Rwanda not to support the M23 rebels; calls for the EU and its Member States to impose sanctions against perpetrators of human rights violations in eastern DRC through the Global Human Rights Sanction Mechanism; calls for sanctions against senior M23 commanders to be maintained and expanded to include those newly found responsible for serious abuses, as well as senior officials from across the region complicit in the armed group’s abuses; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Expresses its deep concern at the full range of threats and human-rights violations and abuses experienced by women and girls in armed conflict, and recognises that women and girls are particularly at risk as they are often specifically targeted and at an increased risk of violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, which prevents their participation in peace processes; urges the international community to accelerate its efforts to eradicate the scourge of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflicts in eastern DRC, to protect victims, to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators, and to guarantee access to justice, reparations and redress for survivors; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Urges the international community to take concrete steps to stop the ongoing violence, especially by encouraging the promotion of dialogue and non-violent solutions, and by supporting the regional mediation process, the Luanda process, initiated by the President of Angola João Lourenço; emphasises that all State Parties of the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) must uphold the principles agreed through the East African Heads of State Conclave and the Luanda mediation process; firmly underlines the need for cross-border cooperation in the African Great Lakes region; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls for the creation of a formal vetting mechanism as part of broader security sector reform efforts, to investigate candidates for removal and to ensure that security forces act in a manner consistent with international human rights and the standards of humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Urges the Commission and the EU Members States to ensure that the upcoming EU strategy for the African Great Lakes adequately reflects the numerous and serious human rights and humanitarian challenges at both country and regional level, in particular in the DRC; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on countries neighbouring the DRC to step up efforts to combat smuggling of conflict minerals through their countries and the illicit trade in natural resources that is fuelling the conflict; stresses the importance of making further efforts to cut off financing for armed groups involved in the illicit trade in natural resources, including gold and wildlife products; calls on the Commission to assess the impacts and efficiency of Regulation (EU) 2017/821 in its review of the functioning and effectiveness of this regulation; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the African Union, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as of other countries of the East African Community. |
| --- | --- |

10.

---

(1)  OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/57 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/57

---

P9_TA(2022)0420

The future European Financial Architecture for Development

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the future European Financial Architecture for Development (2021/2252(INI))

(2023/C 167/09)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission of 30 January 2008 entitled ‘The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’ (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission of 30 January 2008 entitled ‘The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’ (1),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 April 2014 entitled ‘Tool-box — A rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation’ (SWD(2014)0152), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 April 2014 entitled ‘Tool-box — A rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation’ (SWD(2014)0152),

| — | having regard to the UN resolution of 21 October 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York, and to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN resolution of 21 October 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York, and to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

| — | having regard to the Third International Conference on Financing for Development held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 16 July 2015, and to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Third International Conference on Financing for Development held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 16 July 2015, and to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda,

| — | having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

| — | having regard to the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission of 30 June 2017 entitled ‘The New European Consensus on Development — Our world, our dignity, our future’ (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission of 30 June 2017 entitled ‘The New European Consensus on Development — Our world, our dignity, our future’ (2),

| — | having regard to the report by the High-Level Group of Wise Persons on the European financial architecture for development of October 2019 entitled ‘Europe in the World — The future of the European Architecture for Development’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report by the High-Level Group of Wise Persons on the European financial architecture for development of October 2019 entitled ‘Europe in the World — The future of the European Architecture for Development’,

| — | having regard to the Council Feasibility Study of 14 April 2021 on Options for Strengthening the Future European Financial Architecture for Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council Feasibility Study of 14 April 2021 on Options for Strengthening the Future European Financial Architecture for Development,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 June 2021 on enhancing the European financial architecture for development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 June 2021 on enhancing the European financial architecture for development,

| — | having regard to the Commission’s roadmap of 24 March 2022 for an improved European financial architecture for development and 2021 progress report (COM(2022)0139), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s roadmap of 24 March 2022 for an improved European financial architecture for development and 2021 progress report (COM(2022)0139),

| — | having regard to the EIB-EBRD Joint Report of 25 November 2021 on actions undertaken in the context of the European financial architecture for development (EFAD) Council Conclusions, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EIB-EBRD Joint Report of 25 November 2021 on actions undertaken in the context of the European financial architecture for development (EFAD) Council Conclusions,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Court of Auditors No 7/2020 of 11 September 2020 accompanying the Commission’s report on the implementation of the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Court of Auditors No 7/2020 of 11 September 2020 accompanying the Commission’s report on the implementation of the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 entitled ‘A new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development’ (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 entitled ‘A new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development’ (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the implementation report on the EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the implementation report on the EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (4),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (5),

| — | having regard to the 6th European Union — African Union Summit of 17-18 February 2022 and related final statement entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 6th European Union — African Union Summit of 17-18 February 2022 and related final statement entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,

| — | having regard to Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is annexed to the Treaties and stipulates that the EIB is the financing institution of the European Union, is exclusively owned by all 27 Member States of the EU and has the task of contributing to the implementation of EU development policy, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is annexed to the Treaties and stipulates that the EIB is the financing institution of the European Union, is exclusively owned by all 27 Member States of the EU and has the task of contributing to the implementation of EU development policy,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A9-0270/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A9-0270/2022),

| A. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has deepened the already significant SDG financing gap and caused an overall decline in resources of USD 700 billion, and, at the same time, an increase in needs of USD 1 trillion, causing a scissor effect, so that the pre-pandemic SDG annual funding gap in developing countries of USD 2,5 trillion is expected to increase by 70 % post-COVID-19, to USD 4,2 trillion (EUR 3,7 trillion) (6); |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has deepened the already significant SDG financing gap and caused an overall decline in resources of USD 700 billion, and, at the same time, an increase in needs of USD 1 trillion, causing a scissor effect, so that the pre-pandemic SDG annual funding gap in developing countries of USD 2,5 trillion is expected to increase by 70 % post-COVID-19, to USD 4,2 trillion (EUR 3,7 trillion) (6);

| B. | whereas there is an annual financing gap of USD 148 billion in low- and lower-middle-income countries in relation to achieving SDG 4 between now and 2030; whereas additional costs resulting from COVID-19-related school closures risk increasing this financing gap by up to one third; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas there is an annual financing gap of USD 148 billion in low- and lower-middle-income countries in relation to achieving SDG 4 between now and 2030; whereas additional costs resulting from COVID-19-related school closures risk increasing this financing gap by up to one third;

| C. | whereas Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine has drastically exacerbated the situation of SDGs in Ukraine and its neighbouring countries; whereas the current Russian military aggression in Ukraine will impact the worldwide implementation of the SDGs, particularly in relation to the fight against poverty and hunger, which heighten the risks of growing civil unrest, conflicts and irregular migration; whereas the destructive consequences caused by the criminal act of Putin’s war have significantly diverted the already scarce resources of development aid; whereas the long-term consequences of this war are as yet unknown; whereas the major shortfall in SDG financing and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been devastating across the developing world, demands an extraordinary sustained response from all EU actors and a system-wide review of the EFAD; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine has drastically exacerbated the situation of SDGs in Ukraine and its neighbouring countries; whereas the current Russian military aggression in Ukraine will impact the worldwide implementation of the SDGs, particularly in relation to the fight against poverty and hunger, which heighten the risks of growing civil unrest, conflicts and irregular migration; whereas the destructive consequences caused by the criminal act of Putin’s war have significantly diverted the already scarce resources of development aid; whereas the long-term consequences of this war are as yet unknown; whereas the major shortfall in SDG financing and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been devastating across the developing world, demands an extraordinary sustained response from all EU actors and a system-wide review of the EFAD;

| D. | whereas the current political and financial leadership of and efforts by the EU are not sufficient for achieving the SDGs and the goals of the Paris Agreement and addressing other acute global challenges, in particular worsening climate change, the dramatically increased debt burden of partner countries, the consequences of COVID-19 and violent conflicts, and therefore joint engagement at international level is required to ensure that EFAD is able to respond to these emerging challenges; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the current political and financial leadership of and efforts by the EU are not sufficient for achieving the SDGs and the goals of the Paris Agreement and addressing other acute global challenges, in particular worsening climate change, the dramatically increased debt burden of partner countries, the consequences of COVID-19 and violent conflicts, and therefore joint engagement at international level is required to ensure that EFAD is able to respond to these emerging challenges;

| E. | whereas in order to actually achieve the SDGs and to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, policy coherence and close cooperation between all official development finance institutions, their government shareholders, EU institutions and all existing partners is urgently needed to ensure that scarce public money is used in the most effective and efficient way; whereas the successful mobilisation of further capital, both private and public, in addition to official development assistance (ODA) and other existing forms of development finance, is critical and needs to be aligned with development policy objectives, particularly with a view to reducing inequalities and poverty as the first goal of Agenda 2030; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas in order to actually achieve the SDGs and to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, policy coherence and close cooperation between all official development finance institutions, their government shareholders, EU institutions and all existing partners is urgently needed to ensure that scarce public money is used in the most effective and efficient way; whereas the successful mobilisation of further capital, both private and public, in addition to official development assistance (ODA) and other existing forms of development finance, is critical and needs to be aligned with development policy objectives, particularly with a view to reducing inequalities and poverty as the first goal of Agenda 2030;

| F. | whereas, also with a view to the sustainable development of the Global South, it is of prime importance that world energy flows are reorganised in the future and that the African continent plays an important role; whereas strengthening its role with regard to sustainable energy production, use and exports will provide the chance for future-oriented and sustainable economic development and could improve the living conditions of the broad majority of the population; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas, also with a view to the sustainable development of the Global South, it is of prime importance that world energy flows are reorganised in the future and that the African continent plays an important role; whereas strengthening its role with regard to sustainable energy production, use and exports will provide the chance for future-oriented and sustainable economic development and could improve the living conditions of the broad majority of the population;

| G. | whereas food insecurity is a significant barrier to achieving the SDGs, particularly in Africa, where 2 in 10 people are undernourished; whereas this challenge will only become more acute as a result of population growth; whereas EU cooperation with partner countries needs to tackle this challenge effectively, in a sustainable manner; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas food insecurity is a significant barrier to achieving the SDGs, particularly in Africa, where 2 in 10 people are undernourished; whereas this challenge will only become more acute as a result of population growth; whereas EU cooperation with partner countries needs to tackle this challenge effectively, in a sustainable manner;

| H. | whereas the EU institutions and the 27 EU Member States together constitute the largest donor for developing countries, responsible for approximately 46 % of the total ODA provided by all OECD ODA members to developing countries; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the EU institutions and the 27 EU Member States together constitute the largest donor for developing countries, responsible for approximately 46 % of the total ODA provided by all OECD ODA members to developing countries;

| I. | whereas the creation of the Team Europe approach as the global EU response to COVID-19 could help to establish a single strategic coordination framework for the EU’s external response to the pandemic and other major challenges, such as the consequences of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, in support of partner countries; whereas this approach is a promising process in enabling further cooperation between the EU institutions, the Member States and European bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions, the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), continuously increasing the EU’s collective effectiveness and visibility; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the creation of the Team Europe approach as the global EU response to COVID-19 could help to establish a single strategic coordination framework for the EU’s external response to the pandemic and other major challenges, such as the consequences of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, in support of partner countries; whereas this approach is a promising process in enabling further cooperation between the EU institutions, the Member States and European bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions, the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), continuously increasing the EU’s collective effectiveness and visibility;

| J. | whereas the entry into force of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI — Global Europe), with an overall budget of EUR 79,5 billion, constitutes an historic change in the EU’s external and development policies, leading to the rationalisation and consolidation of EU development spending, and giving new impetus to greater cooperation between European development actors; whereas NDICI — Global Europe significantly modifies the external investment framework, bringing together blended finance and guarantees under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) — External Action Guarantee (EAG); whereas the EFSD+ considerably expands the geographical scope and financial envelope of its predecessor, the EFSD, and will be able to guarantee operations up to EUR 53,4 billion through the EAG; whereas the ‘policy first’ principle at the core of NDICI — Global Europe represents a shift towards cooperation driven by policy objectives and ensures that the use of EU budgetary guarantees is covered by the programming process; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the entry into force of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI — Global Europe), with an overall budget of EUR 79,5 billion, constitutes an historic change in the EU’s external and development policies, leading to the rationalisation and consolidation of EU development spending, and giving new impetus to greater cooperation between European development actors; whereas NDICI — Global Europe significantly modifies the external investment framework, bringing together blended finance and guarantees under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) — External Action Guarantee (EAG); whereas the EFSD+ considerably expands the geographical scope and financial envelope of its predecessor, the EFSD, and will be able to guarantee operations up to EUR 53,4 billion through the EAG; whereas the ‘policy first’ principle at the core of NDICI — Global Europe represents a shift towards cooperation driven by policy objectives and ensures that the use of EU budgetary guarantees is covered by the programming process;

| K. | whereas the EFSD+, established under the NDICI — Global Europe instrument, provides funding for blending and budgetary guarantee operations, which are to be implemented by eligible partners in an open and collaborative approach; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the EFSD+, established under the NDICI — Global Europe instrument, provides funding for blending and budgetary guarantee operations, which are to be implemented by eligible partners in an open and collaborative approach;

| L. | whereas Article 36 of the NDICI — Global Europe Regulation sets out the specific role of the EIB under that instrument; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas Article 36 of the NDICI — Global Europe Regulation sets out the specific role of the EIB under that instrument;

| M. | whereas EU companies and financing institutions operating in developing countries during the last decade have increasingly faced unfair competition from global players that operate outside the multilateral development finance system, which provides for an international set of rules and regulations, such as specific requirements for ODA, officially supported credits, sustainable lending and debt sustainability, prohibited export subsidies and international standards to combat bribery and corruption; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas EU companies and financing institutions operating in developing countries during the last decade have increasingly faced unfair competition from global players that operate outside the multilateral development finance system, which provides for an international set of rules and regulations, such as specific requirements for ODA, officially supported credits, sustainable lending and debt sustainability, prohibited export subsidies and international standards to combat bribery and corruption;

| N. | whereas properly functioning Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and support for Domestic Resource Mobilisation (DRM) is an integral part of sound financial management and is aimed at increasing aid effectiveness through concrete initiatives, such as supporting the fight against corruption, the development of progressive tax systems and tackling tax avoidance and evasion; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas properly functioning Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and support for Domestic Resource Mobilisation (DRM) is an integral part of sound financial management and is aimed at increasing aid effectiveness through concrete initiatives, such as supporting the fight against corruption, the development of progressive tax systems and tackling tax avoidance and evasion;

| O. | whereas the report of the High-Level Group of Wise Persons released in October 2019 included among its recommendations the setting up of a European Climate and Sustainable Development Bank (ECSDB), an option immediately dismissed by the Member States as being too costly and taking too long to implement within the new budgetary period; whereas, instead, the Council opted for an alternative option to those suggested by the High-Level Group of Wise Persons, called Status Quo +, which does not fundamentally change the existing structures but calls for their improvement; whereas the Status Quo+ option envisages the following improvements at no additional cost for the Member States: improving the presence of the EIB on the ground and changing its business model towards a more development bank-oriented one, gradually expanding the EBRD’s scope of action into sub-Saharan Africa and increasing the capacity of the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU delegations; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the report of the High-Level Group of Wise Persons released in October 2019 included among its recommendations the setting up of a European Climate and Sustainable Development Bank (ECSDB), an option immediately dismissed by the Member States as being too costly and taking too long to implement within the new budgetary period; whereas, instead, the Council opted for an alternative option to those suggested by the High-Level Group of Wise Persons, called Status Quo +, which does not fundamentally change the existing structures but calls for their improvement; whereas the Status Quo+ option envisages the following improvements at no additional cost for the Member States: improving the presence of the EIB on the ground and changing its business model towards a more development bank-oriented one, gradually expanding the EBRD’s scope of action into sub-Saharan Africa and increasing the capacity of the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU delegations;

| P. | whereas Member States have called on European development banks and financial institutions to increase their collaboration and coordination, both among themselves and with other multilateral and international financial institutions, building on the strengths and expertise of each institution, thereby enhancing the efficiency, visibility and impact of EFAD, and encouraging further mobilisation of the private sector while continuing to complement and support public sector engagement; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas Member States have called on European development banks and financial institutions to increase their collaboration and coordination, both among themselves and with other multilateral and international financial institutions, building on the strengths and expertise of each institution, thereby enhancing the efficiency, visibility and impact of EFAD, and encouraging further mobilisation of the private sector while continuing to complement and support public sector engagement;

Principles and objectives of the European financial architecture for development

| 1. | Takes note of the Council’s conclusions on enhancing EFAD and of the Commission’s roadmap for an improved European financial architecture and the 2021 progress report of 24 March 2022 (COM(2022)0139); underlines the key role of NDICI Global Europe, the EFSD+ and the EAG in providing a strategic framework for blended finance, de-risking investments and guarantees, and mobilising resources from the private sector with the support of the EU budget, especially in the light of increasing geopolitical and economic competition; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Emphasises that EFAD should provide for an efficient, effective, coherent and inclusive architecture, underpinned by the ‘policy first’ principle as the backbone of EFAD’s structure, and in line with the strategic interests and values of the EU; insists that all implementing partners who are part of EFAD and access EU budget funds under the EFSD+ apply the full range of EU social, human rights, procurement, transparency and environment and rule of law standards, policies and procedures; calls on the Commission to assess, monitor and report back on the adherence to these EU rules; stresses that the policy-first-driven EFAD should be guided by the principles and objectives set out in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and should contribute to the achievement of the SDGs; reiterates that projects involving EFAD actors must be subject to climate, environmental and social sustainability-proofing with a view to minimising any possible detrimental impact and maximising the benefits in the climate, environment and social dimensions, in line with the commitments of the EU and its Member States under Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement; strongly insists that operations under the new EFAD contribute to mitigation and adaptation to climate change; further insists, in this context, that operations involving EFAD actors do not finance sectors that bolster the climate crisis but contribute instead to the transition to sustainable energy production; recalls that the EU’s political engagement should be embodied in its multiannual financial framework and fully reflected in its European financial architecture for development; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Strongly insists that EFAD must strengthen the strategic partnerships between the European Union and its global development partners; reiterates that such partnerships should always be based on mutual respect and dignity, shared interests and values, in particular human rights, gender equality, environmental, social and climate responsibility, health and security, aimed at reducing inequalities and poverty; repeats that these partnerships should always be established in line with, and in an effort to, achieve the SDGs; points, in this regard, to the multidimensional influence of and support to Putin’s regime by the African continent and calls for the EU and its Member States to reach out to these African partner countries and to establish reliable partnerships; calls on the Commission to involve civil society organisations and NGOs, including local organisations, in the establishment and implementation of such partnerships; underlines that a prerequisite for the partnership projects financed through EFAD is to ensure development and financial additionality, as well as country ownership and development effectiveness; advocates EU policies and initiatives supporting coordination and cooperation between Member States in the field of development policy, and the EU’s actions complementing and supporting the initiatives of Member States; stresses that the eradication of poverty (SDG 1), fostering good health and well-being (SDG 3), ensuring access to quality education for all (SDG 4, reducing inequalities (SDG 10) and promoting climate action (SDG 13), with a particular focus on the most marginalised groups and leaving no one behind, are especially acute challenges in today’s world; further insists that more action should be taken to meet investment needs for sustainable ocean industries, since SDG 14 on ‘life below water’ remains one of the most underfunded of all the SDGs; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Underlines the interconnection between humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace; highlights the role that development plays in preventing conflicts, ensuring durable exits from conflicts and bolstering crisis management; insists on the importance of further developing a well-tailored triple nexus focused on a people-centred, structural, and sustainable long-term recovery, in order to address the complexities of protracted and predictable crises and violent situations; recalls that, without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible, while without development and poverty eradication, sustainable peace, human or state security cannot be established; further notes that a lack of security exacerbates the already existing vulnerabilities in developing countries and increases the funding gap for achieving the SDGs; takes note of the fact that security, the rule of law and resilient institutions are essential for investments and for sustainable development; notes the activities of local stakeholders, including local government bodies, civil society organisations, social partners and faith-based organisations in conflict resolution and management, contributing to peace and security; recalls that ODA should always be used in line with internationally agreed development objectives and NDICI — Global Europe; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Emphasises the role of a collective, coherent EU approach, supported and endorsed by all EU Member States, which is politically savvy and tailored to the specificities of the partner country, and which could be effective in fostering the expansion of social protection systems that are in line with the relevant ILO conventions, and of essential public services in developing countries; points out that such an EU approach would help make social protection one of the foundations of the social contract, paving the way to enhanced resilience; considers blended finance to be an option from the development finance toolbox that could complement public investment in a constrained budgetary context; calls for blending operations to be limited to areas where they can add value to the local economy and calls, in this context, for a careful assessment, in particular when targeting least-developed countries, with a view to limiting debt burdens, safeguarding essential public services such as health, education and social protection, and not widening existing inequalities; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Underlines that consistency across all EU policies, strategies, initiatives and financing instruments, notably the new NDICI — Global Europe instrument, the Team Europe initiative and the new Global Gateway strategy, as well as close alignment with the EU’s strategy for PCD and Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) is crucial in order to maximise the EU’s global response for sustainable growth, development and peace; believes that EFAD should improve the EU’s visibility and the impact of its development finance in the world, in order to ensure that the EU’s perceived role in the world matches the magnitude of its support; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Is alarmed at how the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the long-standing structural drivers of health inequalities; believes that EFAD should contribute to investments in resilient public health systems, healthcare and healthcare services, and in research and development of new health technologies, as well as of vaccines, treatments and focusing on diseases that are recurrent in developing countries; calls for the possibility of creating a platform for sharing innovation, education and training, knowledge and expertise to be explored, which would support multi-stakeholder partnerships, foster public-private dialogue and explore innovative business solutions to accelerate sustainable development; underlines the role of public and private investments and public-private partnerships, as well as the importance of domestic resource mobilisation in partner countries and more efficient utilisation of EU funding in closing the USD 2,5 trillion funding gap identified for meeting the SDGs by 2030, while strengthening good governance and combating corruption; |
| --- | --- |

7.

Challenges to be addressed

| 8. | Underlines that developing and developed countries have a shared responsibility to achieve the SDGs; emphasises that the EU’s financial contribution to sustainable development in partner countries should enable partner countries to contribute to their own economic and social development and to achieve the SDGs; underlines the paramount importance of domestic ownership in this context; stresses that EFAD and the long-awaited EU SDG strategy must reflect and facilitate a coordinated and coherent set of internal and external EU policies and commitments, including through the set of existing development policy tools; underlines that public and private financing must be aligned with the goals of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement; regrets, in that context, that the Commission has not yet developed an integrated and holistic SDG implementation strategy, which presents a significant challenge in terms of the ambition to achieve policy coherence, owing to the lack of clear, measurable and time-bound EU-wide targets for all SDGs as a reporting benchmark; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Believes that EFAD should be based on the expertise and existing networks of all its different actors (i.e. the EIB, the EBRD, the European Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and others); recognises the progress and improvements made in relation to the future EFAD since the Council’s conclusions, but notes that the current status quo is still characterised by a lack of policy steer and coordination, as well as by fragmentation, duplication and unhelpful competition between the aforementioned actors; calls for further efforts for better coordination and cooperation to make the current system more effective, collaborative and focused on ensuring an optimal use of resources that leverages key partners’ relevant geographical, sectoral and financial expertise to achieve a better return on EU taxpayers’ money and a stronger development impact; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Recognises the need to enhance and improve the EU institutional set-up, and address its ‘development effectiveness deficit’, to reduce heavy bureaucratic coordination and strengthen institutional flexibility with a view to maximising EFAD’s potential and increasing its development impact; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Commission to work on effective governance of the Global Gateway strategy, which has to be promoted under the overall steer of the President of the Commission, and to coordinate closely in this regard with the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS, the Council and Parliament; underlines that the strategy should be consistent with EFAD and that a recourse to the NDICI — Global Europe’s emerging challenges and priorities cushion for financing is not appropriate; urges the Commission to provide additional information on its calculation of the leverage ratio for investment operations of the recently announced EU Global Gateway; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Is concerned that the key features of the PCSD principle are systematically missing from regulatory initiatives of the EU; stresses that more efforts are needed to fully comply with PCSD principles, in order to achieve aid effectiveness objectives; insists that mechanisms for ensuring PCSD must be enshrined in EFAD; calls for more ex ante impact assessments and the establishment of an early warning system for policy incoherencies at EU delegations; recommends that PCSD should be used more systematically and efficiently by all relevant EU institutions and Member States, including at the highest political level, and should be mainstreamed in the design and implementation of every variety of EU policy in order to ensure that they do not negatively affect the attainment of the SDGs; recalls that PCSD mechanisms should be also implemented by the EIB, EBRD, DFIs and their intermediaries; emphasises that PCSD needs to be mainstreamed in particular in EU external policies and addressed in order to achieve the SDGs; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts in better regulation with the aim of creating long-term sustainable investments which promote health and the well-being of both people and the planet, and which protect human rights; demands that EFAD be consistent with the future EU due diligence and corporate responsibility legislation, ensuring corporate compliance with human rights standards and regulatory developments, mandatory due diligence and adherence to the international commitments on business and human rights; underlines that EFAD must meet the highest standards of transparency and accountability; calls on EFAD members to strengthen the due diligence of their operations, ensure meaningful consultation of the local population throughout the implementation of the projects, further develop their development expertise and dedicated capacity and human resources on the ground, implement gender mainstreaming and protect human rights in all operations, be equipped with solid accountability mechanisms for impacted communities and closely monitor, and report on, the shortcomings of their involvement and the role of their intermediaries in projects which have negatively impacted local populations in developing countries; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Reaffirms that all implementing partners and financial intermediaries involved in projects linked to EU guarantees or financed from the EU budget must fully comply with EU social, environmental, tax, transparency, anti-fraud and anti-corruption standards, policies, rules and procedures; calls on the European Court of Auditors to fully scrutinise and regularly report on operations backed by guarantees from the EU budget, addressing any shortcomings in its working methods that are currently preventing it from doing so; underlines the importance of carrying out an independent evaluation of the EFSD+ and the Team Europe approach in due course in order to assess their effectiveness, performance and development impact; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Notes that the Team Europe approach emerged as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic; believes that the Team Europe approach should play a key role in further improving strategic cooperation and global coordination and the coherence and effectiveness of development efforts, especially at partner-country level, as well as at EU and Member State level, including at regional government level; expects stronger policy direction and focus, and stronger mechanisms for communication and visibility when it comes to the EFSD+/NDICI — Global Europe instrument; further insists on the appropriate implementation of the European Parliament scrutiny mechanism in order to allow for the democratic legitimacy of Team Europe activities; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the Commission to put forward a powerful EU policy direction for development policies and to coordinate EFAD in a way that would allow further alignment of the EU development financial institutions’ activities within the new open, collaborative, transparent and inclusive architecture in order to achieve EU development policy objectives, strengthen close partnerships with regions and contribute to their development; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Emphasises that the NDICI — Global Europe programming process provides the opportunity to enhance the use of EU budgetary guarantees, notably the EFSD +; underlines that the future financial architecture should enable all interested development finance actors to participate, including small and medium-sized actors and non-EU development banks and stakeholders; calls, in this context, for a solid level playing field in terms of the governance of the EFSD+ and access to EU resources; stresses the importance of an adequate risk management framework and of the effective management and oversight of the implementation of development finance instruments; calls on the Commission to use its existing banking expertise resources and its financial and technical capacities more effectively; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Welcomes the publication of the Commission’s first roadmap for an improved European financial architecture for development and 2021 progress report; recalls that NDICI — Global Europe requires that the Commission disclose to the Council and Parliament the composition, terms of reference and rules of procedure of the technical assessment group and that it ensure the impartiality and absence of conflicts of interest of its members; urges the Commission to put in place similar measures to ensure the transparency and impartiality of the High-Level expert group which will provide the Commission with recommendations on further accelerating the flow of private capital to low- and middle-income countries; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls on the Commission to ensure that EFAD pursues the goal of restoring the multilateral development finance system in order to help put an end to the unsustainable lending practices of some countries operating outside that system, which not only threaten the level playing field for the EU and other compliant countries, but also dramatically increase the already high external debt of many developing countries which were made even more vulnerable as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic; highlights against this backdrop that Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is further worsening the debt burden in many developing countries; highlights that least developed countries are unable to implement the SDGs without financial support and therefore strongly calls for debt relief measures in line with sustainability commitments; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Considers that the EU taxonomy should contribute to the reorientation of capital flows towards sustainable investments and introduce sustainability among the criteria to be taken into account for risk management; calls on the Commission to further develop the EU taxonomy and encourage development finance institutions both at EU and Member State level, as well as private actors active in development, to align their activities, in particular those in developing countries, with SDG objectives and the objectives of the Paris agreement; |
| --- | --- |

20.

European and national financial institutions

| 21. | Reaffirms the EIB’s specific role within the EU and globally — as set out in Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in Article 36 of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe; highlights the important role of the EIB in delivering EU investments and partnering with the Commission in implementing the Global Gateway strategy; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Recognises the EIB’s flagship role in the European Green Deal and sustainable blue economy, and its substantial contribution to the EU’s economic response to the COVID-19 pandemic; calls for the EU to further maximise the potential of the EIB as a tool to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy and promote its external policy interests and priorities in its relations with non-EU countries; calls on the EIB to improve its policies and practices and its transparency, in particular by implementing the recommendations formulated by the European Ombudsman to ‘take several transparency steps to enable the public to more easily see the potential environmental impact of the projects it finances’, as set out in cases 1065/2020/PB, 1251/2020/PB and 1252/2020/PB; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Welcomes the setting up of EIB Global, defined by the EIB as a dedicated development branch within the EIB Group, which has been operational since 1 January 2022; calls on the EIB to strengthen its presence in the field, while exploiting possible synergies with the EEAS, EU delegations, the EBRD and other European DIFs; points out that the lack of information on how EIB Global is funded jeopardises its mandate from the outset, also in view of the commitments of this new entity in terms of development objectives; calls, therefore, for a concrete and strong development mandate for the new EIB Global; expects this new structure and its advisory board, its goals and budgetary provisions, organisational functioning and specific goals of the branch, as well as its coordination mechanisms with other financial development institutions, to be fully transparent, including by proactively publishing documents, by ensuring meaningful representation of recipient countries and by regular exchanges with the European Parliament and open dialogue with stakeholders, in particular civil society organisations and local actors; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Encourages the EIB to continue to actively engage in developing planning, monitoring and evaluation at country level, hand in hand with the EU delegations and through co-financing with development finance institutions; calls for stronger coordination between the Commission and the EEAS and EU delegations to facilitate discussions and cooperation with relevant actors on the ground in order to identify projects which best meet development effectiveness objectives; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Encourages the EIB and the EBRD to further reinforce their complementarity and their business models through greater mutual reliance initiatives, as the needs are greater than their joint resources; calls on the EIB and the EBRD to coordinate their work along different trajectories and clarify their division of labour in order to help each bank to focus on its respective core competencies, thereby avoiding duplication and undercutting; notes that there is a need to adapt the working methods and tools of the EIB and the EBRD to the investment needs in Africa, particularly in order to facilitate large-scale investments, while maintaining EU support for smaller scale local projects; points out that it is crucial for European investments to be accompanied by a visible presence of the EU and continuous political dialogue; notes that EFAD needs to maximise the advantages of the different structural backgrounds and working methods of the existing European development banks and financial institutions in order to increase the efficiency of the EU’s contribution to sustainable development; expects the EIB, EBRD and other European DFIs to ensure and provide evidence in the form of ex ante impact assessments that every project, and in particular blended finance projects, contribute to the EU’s development goals, including those concerning least developed countries, and meet international human rights standards; calls on the Commission, the EIB, the EBRD and European DFIs to ensure that their advisory and technical assistance teams are equipped to further gender equality and inclusive development; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Calls on the Commission, the Member States, the EIB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the other European development banks and financial institutions, including smaller DFIs, to strengthen their cooperation, notably in the framework of NDICI — Global Europe and its objectives, as well as in globally achieving the goals of Agenda 2030, and to encourage them to pool resources and financing, and to enhance coordination and communication in common projects, by drawing on their respective financial expertise; calls on the Commission to play a stronger role in providing technical assistance for projects and assisting DFIs and other development actors in coordinating; calls for an inclusive approach towards the smaller DFIs of Member States in accessing funding under the European development finance architecture; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Underlines the importance of more efficiently utilising synergies and better harmonising the financing initiatives of the EBRD, the EIB and other DFIs that are targeting European neighbourhood countries, with particular importance given to EU candidate countries; recalls, against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine, that European financing in neighbourhood and candidate countries is an indispensable component of the reforms required to fulfil the accession criteria, in line with the EU’s foreign policy interests; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Calls on the EIB to work more closely with the African Development Bank and to assess the advantages of establishing a joint subsidiary following the implementation of the ongoing EIB-African Development Bank partnership action plan; invites the EIB to report to Parliament about the next steps taken; underlines the need to finance long-term investments that foster sustainable development and to build on cooperation to date, in order to develop further sustainable development opportunities for the African continent; encourages the creation of project and advisory hubs, jointly operated by the EIB and the African Development Bank, to create effective contact points for advice and project initiation for local actors and to better match the development needs on the ground, as well as improve local ownership for common development projects; calls, in this regard, for support to local private sector development in Africa, in particular thanks to the provision of more funds to African micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Stresses, in this context, that in general, local ownership and a collaborative and inclusive approach are needed and should be underpinned by a strong framework for systematic local consultations of stakeholders and beneficiaries in order to achieve a lasting development impact; asks the Commission to assess how the framework for systematic local consultations of stakeholders and beneficiaries could be further improved; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Calls on Member States’ development finance institutions to further expand financial inclusion to support access to sustainable finance to those most in need, including women, as it contributes to their economic empowerment; calls, in this context, for EFAD to contribute to the full implementation of the EU’s third gender action plan; recalls the target for at least 85 % of actions to have gender equality as a principal or significant objective, of which at least 5 % should have gender equality and women’s and girls’ rights and empowerment as a principal objective; calls for an obligation for all EFAD operations to collect gender-disaggregated data and include ex ante as well as ex post gender impact evaluations; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Encourages all development banks and institutions to make sustainable commitments and bold investments in line with development policy objectives, in particular the reduction of inequalities and the eradication of poverty, rather than in terms of return on investment; recognises, therefore, the importance of encouraging riskier investments in more challenging development settings, such as fragile or conflict-affected countries, and underserved sectors such as the climate, biodiversity and the education and health sectors; underlines, at the same time, the need to minimise any associated risks to the EU budget, such as increased demands on the EU budgetary guarantees, and to preserve the high credit rating of the EIB; encourages DFIs to take more risk in their investment programmes through the EFSD+, so as to also reach the most fragile economies; calls on the Commission, in this respect, to play a greater role in ensuring measurable and additional development impacts without distorting the local market or unfairly competing with local economic actors, and in helping to develop the supply side of projects by providing support for project preparation and helping DFIs to coordinate, while ensuring the integration of smaller DFIs; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Recognises the importance and potential of Member State development banks within the EFAD structure; is concerned, however, about the role of intermediaries partnering with DFIs, in particular regarding reported violations of human rights; stresses the important role that local private sector development in sub-Saharan Africa can play in empowering partner countries to set themselves on a path to sustainable development; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Calls on the Commission to report annually on Team Europe initiatives (TEIs) based on quantitative and qualitative indicators within the framework of NDICI — Global Europe, while evaluating the resources mobilised, development planning and impact, harmonisation and application of EU standards, the EU integration perspective and Member States’ involvement; insists that such reporting be shared with Parliament and made public; stresses that Parliament has a key role to play in scrutinising the political objectives and expected results of TEIs, both at general and project levels, ensuring that TEIs work alongside existing mechanisms and complement rather than supplement the multiannual indicative programmes; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Reiterates that institutional control and scrutiny of EU funding fosters democratic debate and helps to boost the credibility and transparency of the EU; highlights Parliament’s important role and its scrutiny role under NDICI — Global Europe in that regard; calls for obligations ensuring appropriate visibility of the implementation of EFAD; calls on the Commission to take action in an appropriate and timely manner where those obligations are not met; calls on the European Court of Auditors to draw up regular reports on the implementation of EFAD, which will be made public and lead to policy recommendations, including on actions to be taken for improvements; regrets the lack of information provided to the general public on the EU’s role in offering support to local communities and encourages better communication with the public; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Calls on the Commission and EFAD institutions to promote transparency in their procurement procedures; recalls that EU businesses should be able to compete on equal terms with businesses based in non-EU countries; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Underlines that obtaining relevant, consistent and comparable information in a timely manner is essential for measuring progress and actual results, and for identifying whether EU development finance has been effective and additional to other finance; regrets the absence of a unified reporting and results measurement framework with comparable indicators for the EFSD+; encourages the Commission to develop such a framework to make it possible to harmonise results management; invites the Commission to update Parliament on the content and implementation of this framework; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Looks forward to the European Court of Auditors special report on programming development aid, which will assess whether EU development aid for 2021-2027 has been allocated according to a well-defined strategy; stresses the importance of assessing the additionality of blended finance in order to determine the effectiveness of these instruments in achieving development results and policy objectives based on EU values; invites the European Court of Auditors to consider performing such an assessment; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Financing for development

| 38. | Insists that the Member States honour their commitment to spend 0,7 % of their gross national income (GNI) on ODA; is alarmed that in 2020, ODA from advanced economies was on average just 0,32 % of their GNI — less than half of the 0,7 % commitment, one which has only been attained by four Member States; highlights that the impact of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine on government spending around the globe will put further pressure on aid budgets which are already low; notes that the Member States which joined the EU after 2002 committed to striving to increase their ODA/GNI to 0,33 %; welcomes the efforts which these and other Member States have made so far to gradually scale up their ODA spending; encourages them to continue on this track; underlines the important role of ODA as a catalyst for change and a lever for the mobilisation of other resources; considers that the EU should strive to maintain its position as a world leader in ODA; recalls that at least 93 % of the expenditure under NDICI — Global Europe must fulfil the criteria for ODA; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Stresses the importance of the EU’s commitment to mobilise resources for climate action and the EIB’s and other EFAD members’ role in making progress in this area; notes the Council’s commitments to steer EFAD towards achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the SDGs and the Paris Agreement in order to limit global warming to 1,5 oC; recalls the NDICI — Global Europe 30 % global climate spending target and the target to spend 7,5 % of GDP on biodiversity by 2024 outlined in the multiannual financial framework; regrets the fact that the Commission has not made more specific commitments to climate policy goals in its roadmap and expects this to be remedied in an upcoming programming document; calls for all operations financing sectors that contribute to the climate crisis, mainly the fossil fuel industry, to be banned; recognises that EFAD should be inclusive for all regions and partner countries, while acknowledging that a considerable share of investment is being channelled to the Western Balkans and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Recognises the role of local micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, cooperatives, inclusive business models and research institutes as engines of growth, employment and local innovation, which will in turn contribute to the achievement of the SDGs; underlines the need to simplify access to financing, strengthen inclusiveness and support smaller actors, including by improving accessibility to relevant publicly available data; underlines that local SMEs therefore need to have easy access to financial services in the EFAD framework; notes that EU policies need to encourage the cooperation of companies and enterprises, particularly SMEs, to play an active role in initiatives contributing to sustainable development in developing countries; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Calls on the Commission to establish a link between possible de-risking activities and financial support for access to education and vocational training, particularly for the purpose of establishing proper infrastructure and training for teachers, under the NDICI) — Global Europe, in order to facilitate achieving SDG 4; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Notes the particular importance of EU investments in the field of sustainable agriculture, including agro-ecological practices, where private and public investments are lacking; emphasises that local farmers, smallholders and family farms need to have access to financial services, and, in particular, to micro-financing; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Notes that the lack of market access owing to connectivity issues is one of the main barriers to food security in many regions in Africa; considers that EU investments in this field could have a strong impact; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Takes note of the two-pillar solution for addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation and globalisation of the economy, as agreed by the members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that the agreed global minimum corporate tax rate of 15 % for multinational enterprises is effectively applied; underlines that according to estimates, this minimum tax is expected to generate around USD 150 billion in additional global tax revenues annually; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Calls on the Commission to promote international cooperation in tax matters to fight against tax evasion, illicit financial flows and corruption in order to foster purposeful and sustainable development financing that contributes to reducing inequalities and poverty; |
| --- | --- |

45.

o

o o

| 46. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations. |
| --- | --- |

46.

---

(1)  OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, p. 1.

(2)  OJ C 210, 30.6.2017, p. 1.

(3)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 80.

(4)  OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 88.

(5)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

(6)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/68 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/68

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P9_TA(2022)0421

Outcome of the modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the outcome of the modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty (2022/2934(RSP))

(2023/C 167/10)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) signed in 1994 and which entered into force in 1998, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) signed in 1994 and which entered into force in 1998,

| — | having regard to the modernisation process of the Energy Charter Treaty, which was initiated in 2017, and to the EU’s proposal thereon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the modernisation process of the Energy Charter Treaty, which was initiated in 2017, and to the EU’s proposal thereon,

| — | having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (1),

| — | having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1749 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Energy Efficiency First: from principles to practice’ (2) and the guidelines annexed thereto, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1749 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Energy Efficiency First: from principles to practice’ (2) and the guidelines annexed thereto,

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Renewable Energy Directive) (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Renewable Energy Directive) (3),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (4),

| — | having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, notably its opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017 on the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Singapore (5), its judgment of 6 March 2018 in Case C-284/16 (preliminary ruling on Slovak Republic v Achmea BV) (6), its opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019 on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU and its Member States (7), its judgment of 2. September 2021 in Case C-741/19 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC) (8), and its judgment of 26 October 2021 in Case C-109/20 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Poland v PL Holdings Sàrl) (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, notably its opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017 on the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Singapore (5), its judgment of 6 March 2018 in Case C-284/16 (preliminary ruling on Slovak Republic v Achmea BV) (6), its opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019 on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU and its Member States (7), its judgment of 2. September 2021 in Case C-741/19 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC) (8), and its judgment of 26 October 2021 in Case C-109/20 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Poland v PL Holdings Sàrl) (9),

| — | having regard to the mandate given to Working Group III of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2017 to work on a reform of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the mandate given to Working Group III of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2017 to work on a reform of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS),

| — | having regard to Italy’s decision to withdraw from the ECT from 1 January 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Italy’s decision to withdraw from the ECT from 1 January 2016,

| — | having regard to the draft law on the termination of the ECT adopted by the Polish Government on 10 August 2022 and referred to the Polish Parliament on 25 August 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft law on the termination of the ECT adopted by the Polish Government on 10 August 2022 and referred to the Polish Parliament on 25 August 2022,

| — | having regard to the announcements by the Spanish Government of 12 October 2022, by the Dutch Government of 19 October 2022, by the French Government of 21 October 2022, by the Slovenian Government of 10 November 2022, by the German Government of 11 November 2022, and by the Luxembourgish Government of 18 November 2022 of their intention to withdraw from the ECT, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the announcements by the Spanish Government of 12 October 2022, by the Dutch Government of 19 October 2022, by the French Government of 21 October 2022, by the Slovenian Government of 10 November 2022, by the German Government of 11 November 2022, and by the Luxembourgish Government of 18 November 2022 of their intention to withdraw from the ECT,

| — | having regard to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union, signed on 5 May 2020 (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union, signed on 5 May 2020 (10),

| — | having regard to its most recent resolutions, notably those of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy (11), and of 20 October 2022 on the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27) (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its most recent resolutions, notably those of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy (11), and of 20 October 2022 on the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27) (12),

| — | having regard to the failure to reach a qualified majority in the Council in favour of the modernisation of the ECT as a basis for the position of the EU at the 33rd meeting of the Energy Charter Conference, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the failure to reach a qualified majority in the Council in favour of the modernisation of the ECT as a basis for the position of the EU at the 33rd meeting of the Energy Charter Conference,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 5 October 2022 on an agreement between the Member States, the European Union, and the European Atomic Energy Community on the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty (COM(2022)0523), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 5 October 2022 on an agreement between the Member States, the European Union, and the European Atomic Energy Community on the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty (COM(2022)0523),

| — | having regard to Rule 132 (2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132 (2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the ECT is an international agreement; whereas the treaty was signed in December 1994 and came into effect in April 1998; whereas there are 53 signatories and contracting parties to the ECT, including the European Union, and Euratom and all its member states except for Italy, which withdrew in 2016; whereas the EU and its Member States represent over half of the voting membership of the ECT; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the ECT is an international agreement; whereas the treaty was signed in December 1994 and came into effect in April 1998; whereas there are 53 signatories and contracting parties to the ECT, including the European Union, and Euratom and all its member states except for Italy, which withdrew in 2016; whereas the EU and its Member States represent over half of the voting membership of the ECT;

| B. | whereas the initial aim of the ECT was to create a forum for East-West policy cooperation in the fields of energy, investment protection, trade and transit; whereas the Treaty’s investment protection provisions have not been updated since the 1990s and are outdated in comparison to the new standards established by the EU’s reformed approach on investment policy; whereas there was no attempt to integrate the urgency of mitigating climate change and phasing out fossil fuel investments until 2018; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the initial aim of the ECT was to create a forum for East-West policy cooperation in the fields of energy, investment protection, trade and transit; whereas the Treaty’s investment protection provisions have not been updated since the 1990s and are outdated in comparison to the new standards established by the EU’s reformed approach on investment policy; whereas there was no attempt to integrate the urgency of mitigating climate change and phasing out fossil fuel investments until 2018;

| C. | whereas Member States have around 1 500 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), ratified before the Treaty of Lisbon, which still protect fossil fuel investments, include the old model of ISDS and contain outdated provisions and mechanisms that are incompatible with the EU’s values and principles of law; whereas none of the new international investment agreements following a modern approach negotiated by the EU since the Treaty of Lisbon have entered into force; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Member States have around 1 500 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), ratified before the Treaty of Lisbon, which still protect fossil fuel investments, include the old model of ISDS and contain outdated provisions and mechanisms that are incompatible with the EU’s values and principles of law; whereas none of the new international investment agreements following a modern approach negotiated by the EU since the Treaty of Lisbon have entered into force;

| D. | whereas averting severe climate crises and protecting our energy security will require accelerating the process of phasing out fossil fuels and a rapid transition to renewable energy; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas averting severe climate crises and protecting our energy security will require accelerating the process of phasing out fossil fuels and a rapid transition to renewable energy;

| E. | whereas the European Green Deal aims to respond to the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation; whereas all EU policies need to contribute to this goal, including investment policy; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the European Green Deal aims to respond to the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation; whereas all EU policies need to contribute to this goal, including investment policy;

| F. | whereas the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change described the ECT as ‘a serious obstacle to climate change mitigation’ in its 2022 report on the mitigation of climate change, issued in April 2022; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change described the ECT as ‘a serious obstacle to climate change mitigation’ in its 2022 report on the mitigation of climate change, issued in April 2022;

| G. | whereas the energy transition requires an acceleration of global investment in clean energy and incentives for European energy companies to invest in renewable energy; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the energy transition requires an acceleration of global investment in clean energy and incentives for European energy companies to invest in renewable energy;

| H. | whereas, in the light of the growing legal and political concerns about the ECT, a modernisation process driven by the EU and its Member States was initiated in November 2018, focused on investment protection standards, as well as on the limitation of the protection granted to fossil fuels and on fostering sustainable development; whereas on 27 November 2018, the Energy Charter Conference approved the list of topics for modernisation; whereas the Council gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate a modernisation of the ECT in July 2019; whereas in May 2020, the EU submitted a proposal for the modernisation of the ECT; whereas on 15 February 2021, the EU submitted to the Energy Charter Secretariat a supplementary proposal to address the issue of the definition of economic activity in the energy sector, also known as the fossil fuel carve out; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas, in the light of the growing legal and political concerns about the ECT, a modernisation process driven by the EU and its Member States was initiated in November 2018, focused on investment protection standards, as well as on the limitation of the protection granted to fossil fuels and on fostering sustainable development; whereas on 27 November 2018, the Energy Charter Conference approved the list of topics for modernisation; whereas the Council gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate a modernisation of the ECT in July 2019; whereas in May 2020, the EU submitted a proposal for the modernisation of the ECT; whereas on 15 February 2021, the EU submitted to the Energy Charter Secretariat a supplementary proposal to address the issue of the definition of economic activity in the energy sector, also known as the fossil fuel carve out;

| I. | whereas the contracting parties reached an agreement in principle on 24 June 2022 on the modernisation of the ECT; whereas amendments to the Treaty include changes to the ECT’s investment protection standards and a reference to the right of countries to take regulatory action for reasons such as environmental protection or climate action; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the contracting parties reached an agreement in principle on 24 June 2022 on the modernisation of the ECT; whereas amendments to the Treaty include changes to the ECT’s investment protection standards and a reference to the right of countries to take regulatory action for reasons such as environmental protection or climate action;

| J. | whereas the legal text of the final agreement has not yet been formally published, which does not meet the level of transparency of other EU trade and investment agreements; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the legal text of the final agreement has not yet been formally published, which does not meet the level of transparency of other EU trade and investment agreements;

| K. | whereas since the conclusion of negotiations, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Luxembourg, who combined represent more than 70 % of the EU’s population, announced their intention to withdraw from the ECT; whereas Italy left the ECT in 2016; whereas other Member States are still considering the option of leaving the ECT; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas since the conclusion of negotiations, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Luxembourg, who combined represent more than 70 % of the EU’s population, announced their intention to withdraw from the ECT; whereas Italy left the ECT in 2016; whereas other Member States are still considering the option of leaving the ECT;

| L. | whereas the Council has failed to reach a qualified majority in favour of the modernisation of the ECT, as a basis for the adoption of the modernisation at the Energy Charter Conference of November 2022; whereas, as a result, the modernisation was taken off the agenda of the Energy Charter Conference; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the Council has failed to reach a qualified majority in favour of the modernisation of the ECT, as a basis for the adoption of the modernisation at the Energy Charter Conference of November 2022; whereas, as a result, the modernisation was taken off the agenda of the Energy Charter Conference;

| M. | whereas the EU has a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States that are contracting parties to the ECT; whereas only if the EU does not exercise its right to vote may its Member States exercise theirs; whereas ratification by those EU Member States which are parties to the ECT would have to be carried out in accordance with their national ratification rules and with the division of competences between the EU and the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the EU has a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States that are contracting parties to the ECT; whereas only if the EU does not exercise its right to vote may its Member States exercise theirs; whereas ratification by those EU Member States which are parties to the ECT would have to be carried out in accordance with their national ratification rules and with the division of competences between the EU and the Member States;

| N. | whereas Parliament would have to give its consent to the ECT modernisation before the EU could start provisionally applying the modernised treaty, in accordance with Commission’s political guidelines; whereas Parliament would have to consent to the EU exiting the ECT; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas Parliament would have to give its consent to the ECT modernisation before the EU could start provisionally applying the modernised treaty, in accordance with Commission’s political guidelines; whereas Parliament would have to consent to the EU exiting the ECT;

| O. | whereas an alarming number of investment claims target environmental measures; whereas various countries, including the Member States, are being sued in relation to policies on climate or the just transition; whereas the ECT is the most litigated of all investment protection agreements; whereas more than 40 intra-EU investment arbitration cases are currently ongoing; whereas, as of 1 June 2022, according to the Energy Charter Secretariat, at least 150 investment arbitration cases have been instituted under the ECT, one third of which relate to fossil fuel investments and 70 % of which are intra-EU ECT-based investment arbitration cases; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas an alarming number of investment claims target environmental measures; whereas various countries, including the Member States, are being sued in relation to policies on climate or the just transition; whereas the ECT is the most litigated of all investment protection agreements; whereas more than 40 intra-EU investment arbitration cases are currently ongoing; whereas, as of 1 June 2022, according to the Energy Charter Secretariat, at least 150 investment arbitration cases have been instituted under the ECT, one third of which relate to fossil fuel investments and 70 % of which are intra-EU ECT-based investment arbitration cases;

| P. | whereas the ECT is currently incompatible with the EU Treaties, as it enables investment tribunals to interpret and apply EU law without introducing the necessary safeguards that preserve the EU’s regulatory autonomy, and as it adversely affects the operation of the EU institutions in accordance with the EU’s constitutional framework; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the ECT is currently incompatible with the EU Treaties, as it enables investment tribunals to interpret and apply EU law without introducing the necessary safeguards that preserve the EU’s regulatory autonomy, and as it adversely affects the operation of the EU institutions in accordance with the EU’s constitutional framework;

| Q. | whereas in its judgment of 6 March 2018 in case C-284/16 (preliminary ruling on Slovak Republic v Achmea BV), the CJEU held that investor-state arbitration clauses in international agreements concluded between the EU Member States are contrary to the EU Treaties and, as a result, cannot be applied after the date on which the last of the parties to an intra-EU BIT became an EU Member State; whereas, while applying the same principles, in its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C-741/19 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC), the CJEU held that Article 26(2)(c) of the ECT must be interpreted as not being applicable to disputes between an EU Member State and an investor of another EU Member State concerning an investment made by the latter in the former; whereas it is well established that judgments of the CJEU apply ex tunc; whereas arbitrators have ignored those CJEU rulings in their deliberations; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas in its judgment of 6 March 2018 in case C-284/16 (preliminary ruling on Slovak Republic v Achmea BV), the CJEU held that investor-state arbitration clauses in international agreements concluded between the EU Member States are contrary to the EU Treaties and, as a result, cannot be applied after the date on which the last of the parties to an intra-EU BIT became an EU Member State; whereas, while applying the same principles, in its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C-741/19 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC), the CJEU held that Article 26(2)(c) of the ECT must be interpreted as not being applicable to disputes between an EU Member State and an investor of another EU Member State concerning an investment made by the latter in the former; whereas it is well established that judgments of the CJEU apply ex tunc; whereas arbitrators have ignored those CJEU rulings in their deliberations;

| R. | whereas the EU has taken leadership in investment policy reform; whereas since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, at the insistence and with the support of Parliament, the EU adopted a reformed investment protection model and decided to replace ISDS with the investment court system, launched negotiations for a multilateral investment court (MIC), adopted legislation to regulate foreign subsidies that distort the internal market, and adopted legislation for the screening of inward foreign direct investment; whereas these developments are significant steps in the right direction for a modernised and sustainable investment policy; whereas much more remains to be done to advance this reform agenda; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the EU has taken leadership in investment policy reform; whereas since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, at the insistence and with the support of Parliament, the EU adopted a reformed investment protection model and decided to replace ISDS with the investment court system, launched negotiations for a multilateral investment court (MIC), adopted legislation to regulate foreign subsidies that distort the internal market, and adopted legislation for the screening of inward foreign direct investment; whereas these developments are significant steps in the right direction for a modernised and sustainable investment policy; whereas much more remains to be done to advance this reform agenda;

| S. | whereas the EU supports the ongoing negotiations in UNCITRAL Working Group III, and the establishment of the MIC; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the EU supports the ongoing negotiations in UNCITRAL Working Group III, and the establishment of the MIC;

| 1. | Recognises that the ECT has come under heavy criticism as an obstacle to the transition to renewable energy and to the protection of energy security in the EU and its Member States; considers the current ECT an outdated instrument which no longer serves the interest of the European Union, especially with regard to the objective to become climate neutral by 2050; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Welcomes the efforts by the EU and its Member States to drive the modernisation process of the ECT; commends the Commission’s negotiation efforts to achieve the alignment of the ECT with the mandate it received from the Council to preserve the EU’s ability to develop public policy measures consistent with the Paris Agreement, the objectives of the European Green Deal and the priorities of the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Recognises that the modernised ECT was negotiated in response to strong demand from EU Member States since November 2018; underlines that amending the ECT requires unanimity of all contracting parties voting at the annual ECT conference; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Reiterates its concerns that many contracting parties, including high-income industrialised countries, seem not to share the EU’s ambitions in modernising the ECT, mitigating climate change, fostering sustainable development and supporting the energy transition, despite the fact that all of them are also signatories of the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Underlines that the final text of the modernised ECT integrates elements of the negotiating mandate given to the Commission, is not aligned with the Paris Agreement, the EU Climate Law or the objectives of the European Green Deal, is not in line with the objectives laid down by Parliament in its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy, including, most notably, the immediate prohibition of fossil fuel investors from suing contracting parties for pursuing policies to phase out fossil fuels, in line with their international commitments, the significant shortening of the time frame for phasing out the protection of existing investments in fossil fuels, and the removal of the ISDS mechanism; stresses that Parliament has expressed the position that the EU and its Member States should not sign or ratify investment protection treaties that include the ISDS mechanism; reiterates that if established, the MIC could directly apply to all ongoing bilateral and multilateral investment agreements — including the ECT — of countries subscribing to it; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Welcomes the EU’s and the UK’s intention to carve out fossil fuel investments from ECT protection; welcomes the fact that for the EU and its Member States, most new investments in fossil fuels are due to lose protection as of 15 August 2023; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Notes that the modernised ECT proposal maintains protection for existing fossil fuel investments for at least 10 years; notes that the 10-year countdown would start from the entry into force of the modernised ECT, a period that would begin on 15 August 2023 if the EU, its Member States and the other contracting parties were to agree to provisionally apply the agreement, and that it would otherwise only start after ratification by three quarters of contracting parties, extending protection for fossil fuel investment for a period close to the 20 years provided for in the ECT sunset clause; notes that the modernised ECT sets a cut-off date of 2040, by which all investments in fossil fuels will no longer be protected in the case of contracting parties opting in to the carve-out; expresses great concern that this time line is at odds with current knowledge on the speed of fossil fuel phase-out needed to limit global warming to 1,5 oC above pre-industrial levels and that it will undermine the EU’s climate objectives; recalls the fact that Parliament had taken the position that the ECT should ‘immediately prohibit fossil fuel investors from suing contracting parties for pursuing policies to phase out fossil fuels in line with their commitments under the Paris Agreement’; notes that the definition of existing investments covers projects in the exploration phase and their potential future exploitation; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Regrets the fact that, under the modernised ECT, most contracting parties have decided to maintain the protection of fossil fuel investors indefinitely; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Stresses that the modernised ECT can only be used as the basis of new claims after its full entry into force, or if the investor’s host state and the respondent states both provisionally apply the modernised ECT; deeply regrets the lack of clarity this situation creates, as it generates a piecemeal implementation and delays and risks prolonging the application of the non-reformed ECT; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes the inclusion in the modernised ECT of new provisions guiding the treaty’s interpretation, especially provisions on the right to regulate in the interest of legitimate public policy objectives, the urgent need to effectively combat climate change, the rights and obligations of the contracting parties under multilateral environmental and labour agreements including the Paris Agreement, their commitment to promoting energy investment in a manner that would contribute to sustainable development, and responsible business conduct; notes the inclusion of a conciliation-based mechanism to resolve disputes relating to sustainable development; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Recalls its position that the EU and its Member States should not sign or ratify investment protection treaties that include the ISDS mechanism; regrets the fact that the modernised ECT maintained this outdated dispute settlement mechanism and stresses the considerable evidence of investment arbitrators disregarding state’s intent to protect their public policy objectives, especially when it comes to phasing out fossil fuels or the protection of the environment; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Supports the ongoing negotiations in UNCITRAL Working Group III, in which the EU and its Member States are pursuing the establishment of the MIC, which could become its competent adjudicatory body to resolve international investment disputes; points out that if established, the MIC would directly apply to all ongoing bilateral and multilateral investment agreements — including the ECT — of countries subscribing to it; recalls that as per Article 30(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the MIC system would therefore take precedence over ISDS mechanisms for countries subscribing to it; calls on the Commission to successfully conclude the UNCITRAL Working Group III negotiations as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the Commission to expressly support including within the UNCITRAL process and outputs a mechanism by which states can efficiently withdraw consent for ISDS from their treaties, or terminate their treaties; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Worries that the 20-year sunset clause in case of exit remains unchanged in the modernised text and regrets that this was not part of the EU’s negotiating mandate, thus continuing to deprive countries that remain parties to the ECT of the possibility to easily leave the treaty should arbitrators continue to undermine states’ ability to regulate; stresses that withdrawing from the ECT would subject departing contracting parties to the ECT’s 20-year sunset clause, whereby all existing investments not covered by an inter se agreement would continue to be protected, under the rules contained in the non-modernised ECT; welcomes, however, the fact that protection would immediately end after withdrawal for all new investments; notes that under a modernised ECT, most new investments in fossil fuels would no longer be protected as of 15 August 2023; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Regrets that the modernised ECT fails to address the critical issue of valuation techniques, enabling awards of compensation that vastly outweigh the amounts invested; observes that proposed changes to provisions on damages awards would have little impact, as arbitrators tend to interpret the concept of ‘loss’ very broadly, including expected future profits; notes that these methods are highly controversial owing to their very wide margin of discretion and reliance on highly complex and inherently speculative assumptions; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Welcomes the Court of Justice’s clarification that ISDS provisions in the ECT are not applicable in the case of intra-EU disputes, as well as the inclusion in the modernised ECT of the principle that ISDS provisions do not apply among members of the same regional economic integration organisation; expresses concern, however, about the possibility that arbitrators may still decide to hear intra-EU disputes and that cases under the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes still be enforced in the courts of other countries; notes with concern that the Achmea ruling did not deter arbitrators from continuing to repeatedly ignore the ruling and hear intra-EU disputes; welcomes the Commission’s draft of an inter se agreement clarifying that the ECT and its sunset clause do not, and never did, apply in an intra-EU context; urges all Member States to ratify such agreements as soon as possible; calls on the Commission to reach out to partner countries and propose a second agreement allowing non-EU ECT contracting parties willing to withdraw to neutralise the sunset clause on a reciprocal basis; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Takes note of the absence of a qualified majority of EU Member States willing to support the ECT modernisation which has led to the collapse of the modernisation efforts; is of the opinion that neither the EU nor its Member States can stay party to the current ECT because of its incompatibility with EU law and EU policy; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Reiterates that Parliament has called on the Commission and the Member States to start preparing a coordinated exit from the ECT and an agreement excluding the application of the sunset clause between willing contracting parties; recalls that the EU can only ratify the modernised ECT with the final consent of Parliament, and that Parliament will consider its previous positions and the shortcomings of the modernisation if requested to consent to it; takes the position that Parliament will support the EU’s exit from the ECT when requested to consent to it; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Welcomes the announcement by the Polish, Spanish, Dutch, French, Slovenian, German and Luxembourgish governments of their intention to withdraw from the ECT, and notes that in most cases the decision has been taken on the basis of the outcome of the modernisation process; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Underlines the need to act in a coordinated manner in order to be stronger in the withdrawal negotiations and to limit the negative effects of the sunset clause and to effectively prevent intra-EU disputes; urges the Commission to initiate immediately the process towards a coordinated exit of the EU from the ECT and calls on the Council to support such a proposal; believes this to be the best option for the EU to achieve legal certainty, and prevent the ECT from putting the EU’s climate and energy security ambitions in further jeopardy; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Stresses that the Commission has not adequately prepared this coordinated withdrawal nor shared any information about it, despite Parliament’s several demands since the beginning of the modernisation negotiations, as an alternative in case of unsatisfactory results or the failure of the modernisation process; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Draws attention to the lack of consistency between some Member State’s positions on the ECT and their BITs which still protect fossil fuel investments and outdated provisions contrary to EU objectives and values; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretariat of the Energy Charter Treaty and the governments of the member countries of the Energy Charter Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

23.

---

(1)  OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 350, 4.10.2021, p. 9.

(3)  OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82.

(4)  OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 210.

(5)  Opinion of 16 May 2017, EU:C:2017:376.

(6)  Judgment of 6 March 2018, Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158.

(7)  Opinion of 30 April 2019, EU:C:2019:341.

(8)  Judgment of 2 September 2021, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC, C-741/19, EU:C:2021:655.

(9)  Judgment of 26 October 2021, Republic of Poland v PL Holdings Sàrl, C-109/20, EU:C:2021:875.

(10)  OJ L 169, 29.5.2020, p. 1.

(11)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0268.

(12)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0373.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/74 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/74

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P9_TA(2022)0422

Assessment of Hungary's compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP (2022/2935(RSP))

(2023/C 167/11)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’),

| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 4(3) and 7(1) thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 4(3) and 7(1) thereof,

| — | having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the protocols thereto, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the protocols thereto,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

| — | having regard to the international human rights treaties of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the international human rights treaties of the United Nations and the Council of Europe,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (1) (Conditionality Regulation), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (1) (Conditionality Regulation),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (3),

| — | having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 3 June 2021 in case C-650/18 dismissing Hungary’s action against the Parliament’s resolution of 12 September 2018 triggering the procedure for determining the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State, of the values on which the European Union is founded (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 3 June 2021 in case C-650/18 dismissing Hungary’s action against the Parliament’s resolution of 12 September 2018 triggering the procedure for determining the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State, of the values on which the European Union is founded (4),

| — | having regard to the country chapters on Hungary in the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Reports, in particular that of 2021 and 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the country chapters on Hungary in the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Reports, in particular that of 2021 and 2022,

| — | having regard to the case-law of the CJEU, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the case-law of the CJEU,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions, notably those of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (5), of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF) (6), of 5 May 2022 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary (7), of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling (8), of 8 July 2021 on breaches of EU law and of the rights of LGBTIQ citizens in Hungary as a result of the legal changes adopted by the Hungarian Parliament (9), and of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions, notably those of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (5), of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF) (6), of 5 May 2022 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary (7), of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling (8), of 8 July 2021 on breaches of EU law and of the rights of LGBTIQ citizens in Hungary as a result of the legal changes adopted by the Hungarian Parliament (9), and of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 (10),

| — | having regard to the written notification sent by the Commission to the Hungarian Government on 27 April 2022 in line with article 6(1) of the Conditionality Regulation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the written notification sent by the Commission to the Hungarian Government on 27 April 2022 in line with article 6(1) of the Conditionality Regulation,

| — | having regard to the remedial measures submitted by the Hungarian Government to the Commission by letter dated 22 August 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the remedial measures submitted by the Hungarian Government to the Commission by letter dated 22 August 2022,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 September 2022 for a Council implementing decision on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary (COM(2022)0485), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 September 2022 for a Council implementing decision on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary (COM(2022)0485),

| — | having regard to Hungary’s ranking in World Justice Project 2022 Rule of Law Index (73rd out of 140 countries and last in the EU, European Free Trade Association and North America region), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Hungary’s ranking in World Justice Project 2022 Rule of Law Index (73rd out of 140 countries and last in the EU, European Free Trade Association and North America region),

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU, and as reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas those values, which are common to the Member States and to which all Member States have freely subscribed, constitute the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the Union; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU, and as reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas those values, which are common to the Member States and to which all Member States have freely subscribed, constitute the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the Union;

| B. | whereas the measures under the Conditionality Regulation can be implemented by the Commission when breaches of the rule of law principles directly affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the measures under the Conditionality Regulation can be implemented by the Commission when breaches of the rule of law principles directly affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union;

| C. | whereas on the 18 September 2022 the Commission put forward budget protection measures under the Conditionality Regulation through a proposal for a Council implementing decision ensuring the protection of the EU’s financial interests against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, with the suspension of 65 % of the commitments for three programmes under the cohesion policy or, if applicable, the approval of the three programmes, as well as a prohibition to enter into legal commitments with the public interest trusts for programmes implemented in direct and indirect management; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas on the 18 September 2022 the Commission put forward budget protection measures under the Conditionality Regulation through a proposal for a Council implementing decision ensuring the protection of the EU’s financial interests against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, with the suspension of 65 % of the commitments for three programmes under the cohesion policy or, if applicable, the approval of the three programmes, as well as a prohibition to enter into legal commitments with the public interest trusts for programmes implemented in direct and indirect management;

| D. | whereas the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government are not sufficient to prove that breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary no longer affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union nor are they adequate to remedy the limited set of deficiencies that the Commission chose to address in the draft Council implementing decision, and whereas even their full implementation seems unlikely to be adequate to remedy breaches of the rule of law affecting or seriously risking to affect the sound financial management of the EU budget in Hungary; whereas these remedial measures would not remedy other breaches of the principle of the rule of law in Hungary, beyond the scope of the regulation; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government are not sufficient to prove that breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary no longer affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union nor are they adequate to remedy the limited set of deficiencies that the Commission chose to address in the draft Council implementing decision, and whereas even their full implementation seems unlikely to be adequate to remedy breaches of the rule of law affecting or seriously risking to affect the sound financial management of the EU budget in Hungary; whereas these remedial measures would not remedy other breaches of the principle of the rule of law in Hungary, beyond the scope of the regulation;

| E. | whereas Hungary has decided not to participate in enhanced cooperation for the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas Hungary has decided not to participate in enhanced cooperation for the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office;

| 1. | Welcomes the decision to trigger the Conditionality Regulation in the case of Hungary, albeit after a long delay and with a too limited a scope; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Is of the opinion that the 17 measures negotiated by the Commission and the Hungarian Government are not sufficient to address the existing systemic risk to the EU’s financial interests; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the Commission to point in its assessment to the continuing risk and to maintain the need for remedial measures in order to provide for grounds for the Council to approve by qualified majority the Commission proposal of 18 September 2022 for a Council implementing decision on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls on the Council to adopt the measures under the Conditionality Regulation, as proposed by the Commission on 18 September 2022, and to lift the adopted measures only after seeing evidence that the conditions for the adoption of the measures are no longer fulfilled, namely that the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government have had a sustainable effect in practice and in particular that no regression has been registered on already adopted measures; stresses that if these measures are reversed in the future, the Union should proceed to financial correction; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Calls on the Commission to take immediate action under the Conditionality Regulation as regards other breaches of the rule of law, particularly those relating to the independence of the judiciary and other grounds addressed in the letter sent by the Commission to Hungary on 19 November 2021; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Regrets the continued abuse by the Hungarian authorities of the EU’s unanimity rule to block crucial decisions with the objective of pressuring the Commission and Council to release EU funds, thereby delaying the EUR 18 billion Ukrainian aid package and the global minimum corporate tax rate; calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that this does not have any impact on its decisions in relation to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and rule of law conditionality; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure that the final recipients or beneficiaries of EU funds are not deprived of these funds in the event that measures are applied under the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism, as set out in Article 5(4) and (5), of the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to find ways to distribute EU funds via local governments and NGOs if the government concerned does not cooperate regarding deficiencies in the rule of law; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Recalls that the purpose of the RRF is to boost recovery and resilience in the EU and its Members States, including Hungary; deplores the fact that, because of the Hungarian Government’s actions, RRF funding has not reached yet the people and regions of Hungary nor local governments or civil society organisations, while the 26 other RRF plans have been approved; notes that there is a the risk of misuse of funds under the RRF and reiterates its call for the Commission to refrain from giving a positive assessment of the Hungary’s plan until it has fully complied with all recommendations in the field of the rule of law and until it has implemented all of the relevant judgments of the CJEU and European Court of Human Rights; expects the Commission to exclude any risks of programmes under cohesion policy contributing to the misuse of EU funds or to breaches of the rule of law before approving the partnership agreements and cohesion policy programmes; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Regrets the lack of information made available to Parliament regarding the negotiations between the Commission and the Hungarian authorities; expects the Commission to inform Parliament swiftly and regularly on any relevant developments; notes the importance of transparency also for European citizens, including Hungarian citizens for whom the stakes are incredibly high; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

10.

---

(1)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.

(3)  OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159.

(4)  Judgment of 3 June 2021, Hungary v Parliament, C-650/18, ECLI:EU:C:2021:426.

(5)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0324.

(6)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0240.

(7)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0204.

(8)  OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.

(9)  OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 218.

(10)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/77 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/77

---

P9_TA(2022)0423

Protection of livestock farming and large carnivores in Europe

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the protection of livestock farming and large carnivores in Europe (2022/2952(RSP))

(2023/C 167/12)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 November 2017 on an Action Plan for nature, people and the economy (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 November 2017 on an Action Plan for nature, people and the economy (2),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (the Habitats Directive) (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (the Habitats Directive) (3),

| — | having regard to the Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats (the Bern Convention) (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats (the Bern Convention) (4),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT),

| — | having regard to Commission notice of 12 October 2021 entitled ‘Guidance document on the strict protection of animal species of Community interest under the Habitats Directive’ (C(2021)7301), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Commission notice of 12 October 2021 entitled ‘Guidance document on the strict protection of animal species of Community interest under the Habitats Directive’ (C(2021)7301),

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas in many parts of Europe an expansion of range or recolonisation by certain large predators including especially wolves and bears that have been absent from those territories for quite some time, which brings them into conflict with human activities, especially extensive grazing of sheep and cattle; whereas there are significant costs to pastoralists caused by depredation of their herds and the great disparity between Member States and regions in terms of measures, and in some cases a lack thereof, to support their farmers and public funds they make available for compensation and adaptation; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas in many parts of Europe an expansion of range or recolonisation by certain large predators including especially wolves and bears that have been absent from those territories for quite some time, which brings them into conflict with human activities, especially extensive grazing of sheep and cattle; whereas there are significant costs to pastoralists caused by depredation of their herds and the great disparity between Member States and regions in terms of measures, and in some cases a lack thereof, to support their farmers and public funds they make available for compensation and adaptation;

| B. | whereas legislative action, such as the Habitats Directive and international treaties such as the Bern Convention, have contributed to the recovery of large carnivores including the grey wolf, the brown bear, the Eurasian lynx and the wolverine; whereas the number of large carnivores in continental Europe present in 2012 amounted to 9 000 Eurasian lynxes, 17 000 brown bears, 1 250 wolverines and 12 000 wolves; whereas the numbers for wolves have increased significantly in the last 10 years to 17 000, according to an assessment carried out in 2018 (5), while the numbers for other species remain similar; whereas furthermore, based on best available data, in 2022, the total number of wolves in the EU-27 is likely to be in the order of 19 000 and is likely to exceed 21 500 in geographical Europe (6); whereas in the last 10 years, an increase of over 25 % in wolf range has been reported in Europe according to a 2022 assessment of the conservation status of the wolf (Canis lupus) in Europe (7); whereas the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has classified 3 out of 9 wolf populations, 3 out of 10 Brown bear populations and 3 out of 11 Eurasian lynx populations in Europe as least concern; whereas both wolverine populations in Europe remain threatened and the Iberian lynx is still endangered; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas legislative action, such as the Habitats Directive and international treaties such as the Bern Convention, have contributed to the recovery of large carnivores including the grey wolf, the brown bear, the Eurasian lynx and the wolverine; whereas the number of large carnivores in continental Europe present in 2012 amounted to 9 000 Eurasian lynxes, 17 000 brown bears, 1 250 wolverines and 12 000 wolves; whereas the numbers for wolves have increased significantly in the last 10 years to 17 000, according to an assessment carried out in 2018 (5), while the numbers for other species remain similar; whereas furthermore, based on best available data, in 2022, the total number of wolves in the EU-27 is likely to be in the order of 19 000 and is likely to exceed 21 500 in geographical Europe (6); whereas in the last 10 years, an increase of over 25 % in wolf range has been reported in Europe according to a 2022 assessment of the conservation status of the wolf (Canis lupus) in Europe (7); whereas the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has classified 3 out of 9 wolf populations, 3 out of 10 Brown bear populations and 3 out of 11 Eurasian lynx populations in Europe as least concern; whereas both wolverine populations in Europe remain threatened and the Iberian lynx is still endangered;

| C. | whereas the wolf population has the potential to exponentially increase by approximately 30 % annually; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the wolf population has the potential to exponentially increase by approximately 30 % annually;

| D. | whereas the negative impact of attacks on livestock by the growing wolf population is increasing; whereas wolves are coming into very close proximity to humans increasingly frequently, in particular in densely populated areas; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the negative impact of attacks on livestock by the growing wolf population is increasing; whereas wolves are coming into very close proximity to humans increasingly frequently, in particular in densely populated areas;

| E. | whereas in Austria alone, the number of livestock killed by wolves increased by 230 % to 680 in 2021; whereas a similar development in wolf attacks can also be observed in other Member States, where in 2020 the number of livestock killed amounted to 11 849 in France, 3 959 in Germany, 616 in Czechia, 139 in Belgium and 98 in the South Tyrol region of Italy; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas in Austria alone, the number of livestock killed by wolves increased by 230 % to 680 in 2021; whereas a similar development in wolf attacks can also be observed in other Member States, where in 2020 the number of livestock killed amounted to 11 849 in France, 3 959 in Germany, 616 in Czechia, 139 in Belgium and 98 in the South Tyrol region of Italy;

| F. | whereas the rapid increase in the wolf population and in attacks on livestock makes it hard for national administrators to act effectively and decisively with the tools currently available to them; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the rapid increase in the wolf population and in attacks on livestock makes it hard for national administrators to act effectively and decisively with the tools currently available to them;

| G. | whereas faced with large carnivore attacks themselves, farmers are feeling desperate, misunderstood and powerless; whereas the attacks by large carnivores have already included human victims; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas faced with large carnivore attacks themselves, farmers are feeling desperate, misunderstood and powerless; whereas the attacks by large carnivores have already included human victims;

| H. | whereas most populations of large carnivores in Europe are transboundary; whereas individual populations can cover large geographical ranges across different countries, within and outside of the EU, leading to situations where the same population in one region can be considered as being under favourable conservation status, while in a neighbouring region it can be classified as in need of strict protection; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas most populations of large carnivores in Europe are transboundary; whereas individual populations can cover large geographical ranges across different countries, within and outside of the EU, leading to situations where the same population in one region can be considered as being under favourable conservation status, while in a neighbouring region it can be classified as in need of strict protection;

| I. | whereas monitoring approaches vary greatly, leading to inconsistent quality and quantity of data on large carnivore population levels; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas monitoring approaches vary greatly, leading to inconsistent quality and quantity of data on large carnivore population levels;

| J. | whereas the LIFE programme has already funded numerous projects to mitigate wildlife conflicts and promote long-term coexistence with large predators; whereas EUR 3,6 million per year on average were spent between 1992 and 2019 on projects focusing on large carnivore damage mitigation measures through the LIFE programme and a further EUR 36 million were granted for ongoing projects providing context-specific guidance on the effectiveness of mitigation measures such as electric fences, active shepherding and the use of livestock guarding dogs in many different regions of the EU; whereas there is a need for additional projects in regions and on large carnivore species that have not yet been addressed; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the LIFE programme has already funded numerous projects to mitigate wildlife conflicts and promote long-term coexistence with large predators; whereas EUR 3,6 million per year on average were spent between 1992 and 2019 on projects focusing on large carnivore damage mitigation measures through the LIFE programme and a further EUR 36 million were granted for ongoing projects providing context-specific guidance on the effectiveness of mitigation measures such as electric fences, active shepherding and the use of livestock guarding dogs in many different regions of the EU; whereas there is a need for additional projects in regions and on large carnivore species that have not yet been addressed;

| K. | whereas domesticated animals, particularly in pasture and open grazing systems, are put at higher risk of depredation (depending on the measures put in place and their effectiveness) by the growing presence of large carnivores; whereas this is especially true in mountainous and sparsely populated regions in which grazing is necessary to conserve these priority habitat; whereas in some densely populated areas with few of the natural prey species for large carnivores, there could also be a greater risk for domesticated animals; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas domesticated animals, particularly in pasture and open grazing systems, are put at higher risk of depredation (depending on the measures put in place and their effectiveness) by the growing presence of large carnivores; whereas this is especially true in mountainous and sparsely populated regions in which grazing is necessary to conserve these priority habitat; whereas in some densely populated areas with few of the natural prey species for large carnivores, there could also be a greater risk for domesticated animals;

| L. | whereas public attitudes to large carnivores vary widely across different countries and among various interest groups, in particular in regions where large carnivores have been absent for longer time spans; whereas the fear of attacks and lack of sufficient support from the authorities for avoiding damage might lead to the illegal killing of protected species; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas public attitudes to large carnivores vary widely across different countries and among various interest groups, in particular in regions where large carnivores have been absent for longer time spans; whereas the fear of attacks and lack of sufficient support from the authorities for avoiding damage might lead to the illegal killing of protected species;

| M. | whereas the sheep and goat sectors, which are the most vulnerable to predator attacks from large carnivores, have already been under economic strain owing to wider socio-economic reasons for several decades; whereas this fragile sector can provide environmental added value through extensive grazing, by contributing to the maintenance of biodiversity in open landscapes in many areas with natural constraints or low fertility, such as alpine pastures, and by helping to combat phenomena such as erosion and forest fires; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the sheep and goat sectors, which are the most vulnerable to predator attacks from large carnivores, have already been under economic strain owing to wider socio-economic reasons for several decades; whereas this fragile sector can provide environmental added value through extensive grazing, by contributing to the maintenance of biodiversity in open landscapes in many areas with natural constraints or low fertility, such as alpine pastures, and by helping to combat phenomena such as erosion and forest fires;

| N. | whereas traditional alpine pastures and meadow grazing systems are increasingly being abandoned as a result of environmental, agricultural and socio-economic challenges; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas traditional alpine pastures and meadow grazing systems are increasingly being abandoned as a result of environmental, agricultural and socio-economic challenges;

| O. | whereas prevention measures to avoid conflicts of coexistence have been reported by LIFE projects in some EU regions as successful methods for reducing damage by large carnivores; whereas the effectiveness of these measures could, however, be affected by geographical circumstances and local conditions; whereas these measures may lead to increased labour and costs for farmers, especially in regions where large carnivores are returning or expanding their territory; whereas preventive measures to avoid conflicts of coexistence can be combined to increase effectiveness; whereas compensation payments, which are regulated at national level, differ within the EU and do not always achieve full compensation of the damage suffered; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas prevention measures to avoid conflicts of coexistence have been reported by LIFE projects in some EU regions as successful methods for reducing damage by large carnivores; whereas the effectiveness of these measures could, however, be affected by geographical circumstances and local conditions; whereas these measures may lead to increased labour and costs for farmers, especially in regions where large carnivores are returning or expanding their territory; whereas preventive measures to avoid conflicts of coexistence can be combined to increase effectiveness; whereas compensation payments, which are regulated at national level, differ within the EU and do not always achieve full compensation of the damage suffered;

| P. | whereas the loss of, and injuries to, domesticated animals due to large carnivore attacks not only cause economic damage to farmers and breeders, but also have considerable emotional consequences for their owners; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the loss of, and injuries to, domesticated animals due to large carnivore attacks not only cause economic damage to farmers and breeders, but also have considerable emotional consequences for their owners;

| Q. | whereas traditional livestock farming practices with high protection of livestock against predators such as the use of shepherds, livestock guarding dogs and night-time recovery to ensure the direct and continuous surveillance of grazing livestock have been used for centuries in Europe but have been gradually abandoned due to far fewer predator attacks; whereas it may prove difficult to return fully to these old practices on a large scale in some regions due to the land use change with a more multifunctional approach in agricultural areas, the increased importance of tourism and the current socio-economic pressure that farming is facing in the EU, with significant decreases in the numbers of farmers and below average wages; whereas innovative solutions will need to be found to accustom modern farming to the presence of wolves; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas traditional livestock farming practices with high protection of livestock against predators such as the use of shepherds, livestock guarding dogs and night-time recovery to ensure the direct and continuous surveillance of grazing livestock have been used for centuries in Europe but have been gradually abandoned due to far fewer predator attacks; whereas it may prove difficult to return fully to these old practices on a large scale in some regions due to the land use change with a more multifunctional approach in agricultural areas, the increased importance of tourism and the current socio-economic pressure that farming is facing in the EU, with significant decreases in the numbers of farmers and below average wages; whereas innovative solutions will need to be found to accustom modern farming to the presence of wolves;

| R. | whereas constructive coexistence between large carnivores and livestock farming is needed, whereby on the one hand, the conservation status of large carnivores could continue to develop favourably, while farmers would be given the tools and sufficient financing to address and prevent attacks on farm animals; whereas all management decisions should be based on science and sound data and should take into account ecological, social and economic perspectives; whereas further discussions will be needed between stakeholders and farmers in areas where large carnivores have been absent for decades, and further efforts will be needed in terms of the sharing of best practices to support the uptake of preventive measures and obtain access to financing; whereas the increased presence of large carnivores can have positive effects on ecosystem functioning and resilience, the conservation of biodiversity and ecological processes, contributing, inter alia, to regulating populations of wild ungulates; highlights also that, especially in national parks, the presence of large carnivores contributes to forests’ recreational value and ever-increasing nature-based tourism; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas constructive coexistence between large carnivores and livestock farming is needed, whereby on the one hand, the conservation status of large carnivores could continue to develop favourably, while farmers would be given the tools and sufficient financing to address and prevent attacks on farm animals; whereas all management decisions should be based on science and sound data and should take into account ecological, social and economic perspectives; whereas further discussions will be needed between stakeholders and farmers in areas where large carnivores have been absent for decades, and further efforts will be needed in terms of the sharing of best practices to support the uptake of preventive measures and obtain access to financing; whereas the increased presence of large carnivores can have positive effects on ecosystem functioning and resilience, the conservation of biodiversity and ecological processes, contributing, inter alia, to regulating populations of wild ungulates; highlights also that, especially in national parks, the presence of large carnivores contributes to forests’ recreational value and ever-increasing nature-based tourism;

| S. | whereas in October 2021, the Commission issued new guidance on the strict protection of animal species under the Habitats Directive, including wolves, aimed at helping EU Member States to improve the implementation of the Habitats Directive on the ground, and especially to ensure the full, clear and precise transposition of Article 16 thereof; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas in October 2021, the Commission issued new guidance on the strict protection of animal species under the Habitats Directive, including wolves, aimed at helping EU Member States to improve the implementation of the Habitats Directive on the ground, and especially to ensure the full, clear and precise transposition of Article 16 thereof;

| 1. | Notes the positive results of biodiversity policies with regard to the restoration of large carnivore species in the EU and notes their effects on ecosystem functioning and resilience, conservation of biodiversity and ecological processes, as well as livestock farming; stresses the importance of ensuring a balanced coexistence between humans, livestock and large carnivores, in particular in rural areas, and highlights the need to recognise that changes in population levels of certain species can lead to a number of environmental, agricultural and socio-economic challenges; recognises that Article 2(3) of the Habitats Directive already contains the flexibility to effectively address and manage these synergies and trade-offs and is considered fit for purpose; notes that these flexibilities should be explored further; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Deplores the impact that attacks by large carnivores have on animal welfare, including injuries, abortion, reduced fertility, loss of animals or entire herds, and the deaths of guard dogs, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to do their utmost to prevent suffering and damage to livestock animals; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the Commission to continue to assess progress in achieving the favourable conservation status for species on the basis of scientific evidence, in order to properly assess and monitor the population range and sizes of large carnivores, including their effects on nature and biodiversity; stresses the need to take into account the high cross-border mobility of species, as the conservation status of different populations of the same species can vary across regions; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to further intensify cross-border collaboration and stresses that monitoring should be coordinated through a harmonised methodology, taking into account transnational populations and (bio-)geographical regions, where applicable; calls on the Commission to earmark funds for biodiversity studies, for example under Horizon Europe, aimed at updating the distribution and density maps of large carnivores; calls on the Commission to ensure that Member States use appropriate monitoring methods for each of the different large carnivore species that allow for the compilation of high-quality, comparable and standardised data for an effective assessment of population levels; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Welcomes the fact that the item ‘Proposal for amendment: Downlisting of the wolf (Canis lupus) from Appendix II to Appendix III of the Convention’ has been included on the agenda of the 42nd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention; emphasises that the conservation status of the wolf at pan-European level justifies a mitigation of the protection status and consequently the adoption of the proposed amendment; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Recognises that large carnivore attacks are increasing across Europe, and have already claimed human victims and generated negative effects for livestock breeders; stresses the importance for Member States to also collect information and report on the damages resulting from large carnivore attacks; stresses that good monitoring of trends in damage occurrence for livestock breeders is a basic prerequisite for successful policies, yet the Member States use different surveying and monitoring methods; underscores the importance of standardised reporting formats, and underlines that this should apply equally to monitoring of the effectiveness of the damage mitigation programmes, including compensation and prevention; calls for the results of the monitoring and the methodology used to be made available to the public in a timely and transparent manner; highlights that the Commission should coordinate the data collection and perform the analyses; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Stresses the importance of improving wildlife health surveillance, in particular on dog-wolf hybridisation which should be proactively detected at an early stage; calls for a standardised policy for identifying hybrids and a transparent approach, including a generalised cross-border exchange of wolf DNA samples between research institutions; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to assist regions facing coexistence conflicts to clarify how to make appropriate and responsible use of the flexibility that already exists under Article 16(1) of the Habitats Directive; takes note of the Commission’s updated guidance document on the strict protection of animal species of Community interest under the Habitats Directive published on 12 October 2021 (8); stresses that it is the responsibility of the Commission to clarify the existing guidelines and to keep its guidance up to date, where appropriate, including on the interpretation of Articles 12 and 16, and encourages the Member States to better use the existing guidelines and act in an effective way to prevent, mitigate and compensate the damages caused by large carnivores, considering transboundary populations, and to set an effective legal and institutional framework to support farmers and breeders to make this coexistence possible; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls on the Commission to carry out regular assessments of the scientific data to enable the protection status of species to be adapted as soon as the desired conservation status has been reached, in accordance with Article 19 of the Habitats Directive; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to organise opportunities for different stakeholders, including rural actors, to discuss the impacts of large carnivores; urges them to provide information on practical solutions and financing possibilities for preventive measures against attacks on livestock, and to conduct a clear awareness campaign; underlines the importance of developing stakeholder platforms on coexistence with large predators at EU, national and local level, such as the EU Platform on Coexistence between People and Large Carnivores, and of promoting dialogue, exchanging experience and cooperating to address conflicts between people and protected species; calls on the Commission to support the development of coordinated approaches across the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the Commission to report on the impact of the presence of large carnivores in Europe on the viability of livestock farming, biodiversity, rural communities and rural tourism, including generational renewal in agriculture, within the context of the socio-economic factors impacting the viability of livestock farming; calls on the Commission and the Member States to evaluate the impact that attacks by large carnivores have on animal welfare, as well as on farmers’ well-being, incomes and higher labour and material costs, also taking into account whether or not preventive measures were implemented and how effective they were; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a solid and comprehensive assessment of all relevant threats and pressures on each species of large carnivores and their habitats at European level and in each Member State, either by natural causes or human induced factors; calls on the Member States and the Commission to also map priority connectivity areas for large carnivore populations and to identify the most important ecological corridors, dispersal barriers, high-mortality road sections and other important landscape features pertaining to the fragmented nature of large carnivore distribution in order to avoid habitat fragmentation; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Stresses that livestock farms in mountainous areas, including notably the Alpine region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing damages from large predators; points out that holdings in these regions are often small and face high additional costs and should be protected and encouraged as they can help to preserve mountain landscapes and safeguard biodiversity in inhospitable regions; points out that areas such as species-rich Nardus grasslands, on silicious substrates in mountain areas and alpine and subalpine calcareous grasslands are particularly worthy of conservation under the Habitats Directive; notes that these habitats have been created in the presence of wild predators and points out that a key factor for the conservation of those areas is extensive grazing, for example by bovines and horses or by shepherd-supervised flocks; calls on the Commission to protect and preserve traditional agricultural practices, such as pastoralism, the model of supervised grazing, the practice of transhumance recognised by UNESCO and the way of life of pastoral farmers, through concrete solutions; recognises that of these practices, certain ones can be covered by the proposed list of potential agriculture practices funded by eco-schemes; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to recognise that the currently available preventive measures, including fences and guard dogs, which are successful in some EU regions, may present additional financial and labour burdens for farmers, are not always supported by EU or national funding and have a varying degree of efficiency and effectiveness depending on the local conditions (9) (10); stresses, in this regard, that financial support for preventive measures should be accompanied by advisory support to ensure their comprehensive and timely implementation; highlights that the nature of the terrain, the geographical circumstances, the history of coexistence with large carnivores and other prevailing factors, such as tourism, which is often essential for the areas concerned, need to be taken into account when implementing preventive measures and when considering derogations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to recognise, in cases where populations of large carnivores are expanding, the importance of developing and implementing mitigation strategies proactively in line with the Habitats Directive, based on scientific evidence; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the Commission to regularly assess progress in achieving the conservation status for species at the level of biogeographical regions and/or EU-wide populations, and insists that the Commission develop an assessment procedure without delay to enable the protection status of populations in particular regions to be amended as soon as the desired conservation status has been reached, in accordance with Article 19 of the Habitats Directive; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to scientifically identify and support the best feasible preventive measures to reduce attacks and the damage of the predation of livestock by large carnivores, taking into account the regional and local characteristics of the Member States, and to support farmers to apply for those preventive measures to multiply and scale up successful approaches; calls also for their effective inclusion in advisory and extension services; calls for an increase of LIFE funding for projects aimed at the achievement of coexistence with large carnivores while upholding funding for the protection of species; calls for the prioritising of small-scale projects, aimed at sharing and developing best practices on coexistence with large predators, and calls on the Commission to define appropriate requirements for measuring and reporting the effectiveness of damage mitigation measures investigated in projects funded by the EU, such as through the LIFE programme, giving priority to objective and quantitative assessment methods; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the Member States to draw up and implement comprehensive species action plans or conservation and/or management plans, where none are already in place, taking into account human densities, landscape structures, livestock herding, conservation status, other relevant human activities and wild ungulate populations; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Highlights the need for a regular monitoring of large carnivore populations in order to strategically plan conservation actions, to apply preventive schemes to reduce conflicts and to evaluate the results of all the actions; remarks that monitoring should be based on a robust methodology, should promote and facilitate the participation of different stakeholders and that its results should be regularly communicated to society and the main stakeholder groups; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify adequate and long-term funding opportunities for appropriate preventive measures and adequate compensation for farmers not only for any losses suffered and costs incurred as a result of large carnivore attacks, but also for the mitigation measures implemented, in order to ensure the coexistence of large carnivores and sustainable livestock farming practices; stresses that compensation schemes, designed in such a way that livestock farming and the presence of large carnivores does not mean a profit loss for farmers, should cover direct and indirect costs associated with predator attacks, and should be integrated with preventive measures for greatest efficiency; highlights the importance of fairly and comprehensively compensating for any losses of farm animals caused by large carnivores, including hybrid species; calls on the Member States and regions to improve access to financial compensation; calls on the Commission to recognise that the rising number of attacks by large carnivores means that the resources devoted to protecting domesticated animals and paying out compensation are also increasing; regrets that the compensation paid to livestock breeders after an attack varies from Member State to Member State; calls on the Commission to consider amending its agricultural guidelines to facilitate compensation for damage by large predators as State aid; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council. |
| --- | --- |

19.

---

(1)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(2)  OJ C 356, 4.10.2018, p. 38.

(3)  OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7.

(4)  OJ L 38, 10.2.1982, p. 3.

(5)  IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, ‘Canis lupus (Grey Wolf)’, accessed 23 November 2022.

(6)  Large Carnivore Initiative for Europe — Specialist Group of the IUCN Species Survival Commission for the Standing Committee of the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, ‘Assessment of the conservation status of the Wolf (Canis lupus) in Europe’, 2 September 2022.

(7)  https://rm.coe.int/inf45e-2022-wolf-assessment-bern-convention-2791-5979-4182-1-2/1680a7fa47 Idem, p. 2.

(8)  Commission notice of 12 October 2021 entitled ‘Guidance document on the strict protection of animal species of Community interest under the Habitats Directive’ (C(2021)7301).

(9)  Cortés, Y. et al., ‘A decade of use of damage prevention measures in Spain and Portugal’, Carnivore Damage Prevention News, 2020.

(10)  Oliveira, T. et al., ‘The contribution of the LIFE program to mitigating damages caused by large carnivores in Europe’, Global Ecology and Conservation, Vol. 31, 2021.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/83 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/83

---

P9_TA(2022)0424

The European Year of Youth 2022 Legacy

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the European Year of Youth 2022 legacy (2022/2953(RSP))

(2023/C 167/13)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 165(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 165(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1),

| — | having regard to Articles 165(4) and 166(4) TFEU, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 165(4) and 166(4) TFEU,

| — | having regard to Decision (EU) 2021/2316 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 December 2021 on a European Year of Youth (2022) (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Decision (EU) 2021/2316 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 December 2021 on a European Year of Youth (2022) (2),

| — | having regard to the Bratislava Roadmap of 16 September 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Bratislava Roadmap of 16 September 2016,

| — | having regard to the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017,

| — | having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan of 4 March 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan of 4 March 2021,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe’s recommendation CM/Rec(2017)4 on youth work of 31 May 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe’s recommendation CM/Rec(2017)4 on youth work of 31 May 2017,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe’s youth sector strategy 2030 of 23 January 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe’s youth sector strategy 2030 of 23 January 2020,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life, |
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—

having regard to the Council of Europe Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe’s recommendation CM/Rec(2019)4 on supporting young refugees in transition to adulthood, |
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—

having regard to the Council of Europe’s recommendation CM/Rec(2019)4 on supporting young refugees in transition to adulthood,

| — | having regard to the resolution of the Council of the European Union and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on a framework for European cooperation in the youth field: The European Union Youth Strategy 2019-2027 (3), |
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—

having regard to the resolution of the Council of the European Union and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on a framework for European cooperation in the youth field: The European Union Youth Strategy 2019-2027 (3),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s European Education Area action plan of 30 September 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s European Education Area action plan of 30 September 2020,

| — | having regard to the Commission’s Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027),

| — | having regard to its resolution on shaping digital education policy of 25 March 2021 (4), |
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—

having regard to its resolution on shaping digital education policy of 25 March 2021 (4),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on smart youth work of 7 December 2017 (5), |
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—

having regard to the Council conclusions on smart youth work of 7 December 2017 (5),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on young people and the future of work of 5 June 2019 (6), |
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—

having regard to the Council conclusions on young people and the future of work of 5 June 2019 (6),

| — | having regard to the Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on Digital Youth Work of 3 October 2019 (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on Digital Youth Work of 3 October 2019 (7),

| — | having regard to the Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on the Framework for establishing a European Youth Work Agenda (8) and its implementation through the so-called ‘Bonn Process’, |
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—

having regard to the Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on the Framework for establishing a European Youth Work Agenda (8) and its implementation through the so-called ‘Bonn Process’,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 on the Youth Guarantee (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 on the Youth Guarantee (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on a strong social Europe for Just Transitions (10), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on a strong social Europe for Just Transitions (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the impact of COVID-19 on youth and on sport (11), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the impact of COVID-19 on youth and on sport (11),

| — | having regard to the Commission President’s State of the Union address of 15 September 2021, |
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—

having regard to the Commission President’s State of the Union address of 15 September 2021,

| — | having regard to its position of 18 October 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (12), |
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—

having regard to its position of 18 October 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (12),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the EU Youth Test, |
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—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the EU Youth Test,

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe as regards education and youth, |
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—

having regard to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe as regards education and youth,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the European Year of Youth (‘the Year’) was announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech on 15 September 2021, emphasising the importance of young Europeans in building a better future — greener, more inclusive, sustainable and digital — and giving them more and better opportunities, by ensuring that their voices are heard and by putting them in the spotlight after the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the European Year of Youth (‘the Year’) was announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech on 15 September 2021, emphasising the importance of young Europeans in building a better future — greener, more inclusive, sustainable and digital — and giving them more and better opportunities, by ensuring that their voices are heard and by putting them in the spotlight after the COVID-19 pandemic;

| B. | whereas the Year was conceived to achieve the four general objectives, namely to renew the positive perspectives for young people and help them overcome the effects of the pandemic on their lives; to support and empower young people to become active and engaged citizens; to better inform young generations about opportunities available to them from public policies at EU, national, regional and local levels; and to mainstream youth policy across all relevant Union policy fields; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the Year was conceived to achieve the four general objectives, namely to renew the positive perspectives for young people and help them overcome the effects of the pandemic on their lives; to support and empower young people to become active and engaged citizens; to better inform young generations about opportunities available to them from public policies at EU, national, regional and local levels; and to mainstream youth policy across all relevant Union policy fields;

| C. | whereas these objectives build on a number of EU policy initiatives already in place, from the European Youth Guarantee to the European Youth Strategy and its EU Youth Dialogue, the European Youth Work Agenda and prospects for a European Education Area, among others; whereas these policies have identified much needed and urgent objectives to effectively improve living, learning and working conditions for all young people, yet their implementation remains largely fragmented and incomplete; whereas, therefore, the Year is expected to serve as an accelerator to implement in full these policies, through a coordinated approach, a solid methodology and process, and give young people more and better participation opportunities as change-makers in society; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas these objectives build on a number of EU policy initiatives already in place, from the European Youth Guarantee to the European Youth Strategy and its EU Youth Dialogue, the European Youth Work Agenda and prospects for a European Education Area, among others; whereas these policies have identified much needed and urgent objectives to effectively improve living, learning and working conditions for all young people, yet their implementation remains largely fragmented and incomplete; whereas, therefore, the Year is expected to serve as an accelerator to implement in full these policies, through a coordinated approach, a solid methodology and process, and give young people more and better participation opportunities as change-makers in society;

| D. | whereas young people’s most common expectation for the Year as regards democracy is for decision-makers to listen more to their demands and act on them (72 %) and to support their personal, social and professional development (71 %) (13); |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas young people’s most common expectation for the Year as regards democracy is for decision-makers to listen more to their demands and act on them (72 %) and to support their personal, social and professional development (71 %) (13);

| E. | whereas youth organisations are among the main vehicles for the participation of young people in public life and for access to development possibilities through mobility and non-formal and informal learning opportunities; whereas the civic space for many youth organisations is shrinking in several EU Member States (14); |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas youth organisations are among the main vehicles for the participation of young people in public life and for access to development possibilities through mobility and non-formal and informal learning opportunities; whereas the civic space for many youth organisations is shrinking in several EU Member States (14);

| F. | whereas disparities persist between and within Member States, often negatively impacting young people with fewer opportunities from rural or remote areas and those from all types of minorities with regard to opportunities for education, skills acquisition and work; whereas too many young people in Europe find themselves in precarious living conditions and are faced with major financial risks in order to pursue their studies and acquire the skills and experiences they need to have a quality start to their working life; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas disparities persist between and within Member States, often negatively impacting young people with fewer opportunities from rural or remote areas and those from all types of minorities with regard to opportunities for education, skills acquisition and work; whereas too many young people in Europe find themselves in precarious living conditions and are faced with major financial risks in order to pursue their studies and acquire the skills and experiences they need to have a quality start to their working life;

| G. | whereas young people are among the most affected by the economic, psychological and social side effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic and political tensions caused by the war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine, including rising bills as a consequence of the devastating energy crisis and the gloomy prospects in view of rising environmental degradation, putting at risk their physical and mental wellbeing; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas young people are among the most affected by the economic, psychological and social side effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic and political tensions caused by the war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine, including rising bills as a consequence of the devastating energy crisis and the gloomy prospects in view of rising environmental degradation, putting at risk their physical and mental wellbeing;

| H. | whereas the existing tools and resources for young people and their inclusion in policy-making are often not made available and visible for all, and as a result many young people and youth-led organisations are not aware of them, or they are not sufficiently consulted or involved by decision-makers in policy-making processes; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the existing tools and resources for young people and their inclusion in policy-making are often not made available and visible for all, and as a result many young people and youth-led organisations are not aware of them, or they are not sufficiently consulted or involved by decision-makers in policy-making processes;

| I. | whereas, in this respect, the success of the Year should not only be measured against the backdrop of the number of events organised or their attendance, but also on the mechanisms and policies set in motion or advanced to positively impact the position and role of young people in society; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas, in this respect, the success of the Year should not only be measured against the backdrop of the number of events organised or their attendance, but also on the mechanisms and policies set in motion or advanced to positively impact the position and role of young people in society;

| J. | whereas the extremely rushed adoption of the decision has proven very challenging for the EU institutions and the stakeholders to prepare the Year adequately and with the aim of achieving the objectives set; whereas this is all the more regrettable given the pressing needs for improving young people’s lives in Europe; whereas in these circumstances, the available time was not sufficient to implement a meaningful and impactful Year; whereas lessons should be learnt from this experience for future European Years; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the extremely rushed adoption of the decision has proven very challenging for the EU institutions and the stakeholders to prepare the Year adequately and with the aim of achieving the objectives set; whereas this is all the more regrettable given the pressing needs for improving young people’s lives in Europe; whereas in these circumstances, the available time was not sufficient to implement a meaningful and impactful Year; whereas lessons should be learnt from this experience for future European Years;

| K. | whereas the Year is already drawing to a close and preparations are under way to ensure its lasting impact; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Year is already drawing to a close and preparations are under way to ensure its lasting impact;

Conditions for establishing and deploying European Years

| 1. | Welcomes the European Year of Youth 2022 as the EU’s strong commitment to young and future generations; stresses that during the COVID-19 pandemic, young people were most impacted by the sanitary measures, which affected their access to a social and cultural life and damaged their access to education; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Deeply regrets the condition of the launch of the Year, especially the hasty timespan for adopting the regulation, which delayed the implementation and the financing of many projects; regrets, furthermore, that it impacted communication on the Year in Member States and to youth organisations and the young people themselves; calls, in this context, on the Commission to extend the Year until the next Europe Day on 9 May 2023 without prejudice to the start of the European Year of Skills; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Deplores the fact that decisions on future European Years may still be subject to late announcements and calls on the Commission to have the relevant institutions and the civil society concerned fully involved well ahead of the starting date of any future European Year, so as to maximise their impact; highlights that announcing Years only a few months prior to their planned commencement cannot become a new norm, as this jeopardises the strength of the whole project; calls on the Commission in the future to ensure that European Years can be prepared in due time for all stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Welcomes the interinstitutional final conference on the Year entitled ‘Claim the future’ on 6 December 2022; welcomes also the fact that the content was proposed and co-organised by young people; acknowledges that the chosen topics focused on an inclusive Europe through education, a digital Europe through education, European wellbeing through mainstreaming mental healthcare, and European wellbeing through accessible mental healthcare; calls on the Commission in this respect to include and reflect these topics and conclusions in the legacy of the Year; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Calls on the Commission to propose a communication setting out the follow-up to the Year with a view to achieving its four objectives, providing support to new initiatives and allowing them to grow, achieving the full mainstreaming of EU youth policies across all policy fields and launching an assessment and reporting back to Parliament regarding the Year’s concrete contribution to the implementation of the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027 and the EU Youth Work Agenda; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Highlights that a tangible and concrete legacy should consist on the one hand of the implementation of a methodology on how to involve and listen to young people in the entire EU and on the other hand of the implementation of new European and national policies directly deriving from the Year’s outcome; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Welcomes the financial contribution and initiatives made by the Commissions’ various directorates-general; notes, however, that some of the described activities would have taken place in any case, or have little to do with the objectives of the Year; calls on the Commission to clarify which projects are newly created in the framework of the Year and which already existed and have been relabelled for the purpose of the Year; insists on having a clear picture of the exact financing of the Year by the Commission and the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

7.

Ensuring meaningful youth engagement and involvement in policy and decision-making

| 8. | Highlights that one third of the Conference on the Future of Europe’s citizens panel participants were young people aged between 16 and 25; supports the proposals made by the plenary of the Conference on the Future of Europe on 9 May 2022, particularly the ones that directly or indirectly called for the fostering of policies focusing on youth; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission to adopt a fully-fledged ‘EU Youth Test’ to ensure the meaningful engagement, participation and commitment of young people in the preparation of all EU policies, establish a systematic impact assessment on its proposals to ensure that they promote and reflect the needs of young people and to take mitigation measures if they have a negative impact; believes that such a process is essential in order to take into account young people’s opinions, improve the positive impact of EU policies on them and make those clearly visible to them, as the next generation is directly concerned by policies being shaped today; stresses that the EU Youth Test must not merely become a bureaucratic check-list but it should engage people in a holistic way in order to achieve its aim; considers that the Test’s outcomes should inform and be connected to already existing processes such as the EU Youth Dialogue; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Proposes to follow up on the Year with regular structured dialogue with young people in its Committee on Culture and Education, with the idea of proposing a democratic platform for the open and inclusive participation of young people in the policy-making process at EU level; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Reiterates its request to the Commission and the Member States to develop and deploy global and EU citizenship modules in national curricula and learning mobility experiences to contribute to a more active and participatory citizenship, a more youth-inclusive political system and to combat racism in all its forms, discrimination and gender-based violence, with the aim of debunking prejudices and building inclusive societies free of structural racism that promote tolerance, diversity and gender-equality; calls on the Commission to provide the necessary tools and opportunities for teachers to actively engage in creating an EU common framework on citizenship education, for example through Erasmus+ teaching academies or Jean Monnet Teacher Training; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Sees high potential in having decentralised events to bring the EU closer to young people and proposes to set up a yearly EU festival of culture and ideas fostering local debates and cultural activities on all topical issues of young people’s choosing around the symbolic date of 9 May; |
| --- | --- |

12.

Stepping up measures catering for young people’s wellbeing

| 13. | Underlines the link between young people’s wellbeing and the learning and working opportunities and capacities, as well as standard of living, available for them in their country of residence; notes with concern that young people are experiencing increasing anxiety and mental distress caused by, among other things, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the increased cost of living and energy poverty and the climate emergency; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Reiterates its call for the Commission and Member States to draft a European Plan for mental health protection in education and training, including informal and non-formal learning, in order to care for our younger generation’s wellbeing in all its forms; insists on the importance of providing regular psychological support for learners, teachers and educators as part of the education system; encourages the intensification of links between educational institutions and cultural, youth and sport organisations as well as networks of psychological counsellors to provide extra-curricular activities in order to increase youth social commitment; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Is concerned by the severe impact of inflation, surging housing and utility prices and the scarcity of accommodation in some destination countries on youth mobility, impeding especially those with fewer opportunities; highlights the importance of ensuring that EU programmes provide sufficient financial support to young people and youth-led organisations to undertake mobility experiences, be they for learning, training or solidarity purposes; in this regard, calls on the Commission and the Member States to diligently adapt the level of financial support provided to young people for mobility experiences to ensure the socially inclusive dimension of EU programmes; |
| --- | --- |

15.

Combating precariousness among young people and providing a quality start to working life

| 16. | Reiterates its calls on Member States to implement the Child Guarantee to ensure that every child in need has access to free and effective early childhood education and care, quality education including school-based activities, healthcare, and effective access to healthy nutrition and decent housing; calls, furthermore, on Member States to implement the reinforced Youth Guarantee ensuring that every young person receives a good quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeships and traineeships according to their needs; welcomes the Commission’s actions to facilitate the exchange of good practices and the coordination of national action plans in this respect, and encourages it to keep up efforts until the objectives are fully achieved; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Insists on the essential role of youth work to address the challenges young people face, in particular when it comes to its contribution to personal development, wellbeing and self-realisation; calls on the Member States to better recognise the value of youth work and to sustainably reconstruct and strengthen the structures of youth work wherever needed; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls on the Commission and Member States to propose a common legal framework to ensure fair remuneration for traineeships and apprenticeships; insists that decent working conditions and fair remuneration should be guaranteed to all trainees in order to avoid exploitative practices; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Stresses that school-to-work transition depends very much on the recognition of young people’s degrees, qualifications or learning periods acquired abroad; regrets that hurdles persist in this area and urges the Commission and the Member States to render such recognition automatic, leveraging in particular the possibilities offered by digitalisation; encourages the Member States to also validate and recognise the competences and skills acquired through non-formal and informal learning experiences and youth work alongside formal education throughout the Union and outside the EU; reiterates that this should not undermine the right to high-quality higher education; |
| --- | --- |

19.

Investing in the next generation through education

| 20. | Highlights that investing in youth learning opportunities has a direct impact not only on young people’s future lives as individuals, but also on the economic health and cohesion of society as a whole; emphasises the need to address the challenges young people who are discriminated against or have fewer opportunities are facing in accessing different levels of formal, informal and non-formal educational frameworks, among others young women, young members of the LGBTIQ+ communities, young migrants, young asylum seekers and refugees and learners with disabilities and impairments; calls, therefore, on the Member States to significantly increase public spending on education, including digital education, vocational and educational training, upskilling and reskilling; calls on the Commission to foster common indicators in order to assess the impact of investment, including NextGenerationEU, and reforms in advancing dedicated youth and education policies; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Reiterates its call on the Member States to fully implement the European Education Area by 2025; welcomes, therefore, the progress that had been already achieved in certain Member States; calls on the Member States to take the adequate measures needed to reinforce their digital infrastructure, connectivity and educational curricula and to adequately train teachers and educators and to provide guidelines to foster digital literacy in order to enhance new teaching methods and equip young people to effectively access information, debunk disinformation and address online violence such as incitement to hatred, racism, online child sexual abuse, gender-based violence, cyberbullying and ghosting; recalls the existing educational gender gap in science, technology, engineering, the arts and mathematics (STEAM) and the need for corrective measures to fill this gap; looks forward to the Commission’s mid-term review of the Digital Education Action Plan (2012-2027); |
| --- | --- |

21.

o

o o

| 22. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

22.

---

(1)  OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 47.

(2)  OJ L 462, 28.12.2021, p. 1.

(3)  OJ C 456, 18.12.2018, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 2.

(5)  OJ C 418, 7.12.2017, p. 2.

(6)  OJ C 189, 5.6.2019, p. 28.

(7)  OJ C 414, 10.12.2019, p. 2.

(8)  OJ C 415, 1.12.2020, p. 1.

(9)  OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 101.

(10)  OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 75.

(11)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 82.

(12)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0359.

(13)  2022 Youth and Democracy in the European Year of Youth Eurobarometer published 6 May 2022.

(14)  Shrinking space for civil society: its impact on young people and their organisations

Resolution on Combating shrinking space with expanding opportunities for youth organisations, national youth councils and international non-governmental youth organisations

Voicify: Part of Europe

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/89 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/89

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P9_TA(2022)0425

Improving EU regulations on wild and exotic animals to be kept as pets in the European Union through an EU positive list

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on improving EU regulations on wild and exotic animals to be kept as pets in the European Union through an EU positive list (2022/2809(RSP))

(2023/C 167/14)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Petitions Nos 0697/2020, 0744/2020 and 0786/2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Petitions Nos 0697/2020, 0744/2020 and 0786/2020,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 114, 191 and 192 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 114, 191 and 192 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),

| — | having regard to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, founded as the OIE) Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Health Codes, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, founded as the OIE) Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Health Codes,

| — | having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals and to the Council of Europe Resolution on the keeping of wild animals as pets, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals and to the Council of Europe Resolution on the keeping of wild animals as pets,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 on protecting the EU’s internal market and consumer rights against the negative implications of the illegal trade in companion animals (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 on protecting the EU’s internal market and consumer rights against the negative implications of the illegal trade in companion animals (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2016 on the EU strategic objectives for the 17th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held in Johannesburg (South Africa) from 24 September to 5 October 2016 (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2016 on the EU strategic objectives for the 17th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held in Johannesburg (South Africa) from 24 September to 5 October 2016 (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2016 on EU action plan against wildlife trafficking (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2016 on EU action plan against wildlife trafficking (4),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2016 entitled ‘EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking’ (COM(2016)0087) and to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2016 on the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2016 entitled ‘EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking’ (COM(2016)0087) and to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2016 on the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (5) and to Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (5) and to Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (6),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (7),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species (8) (Invasive Species Regulation), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species (8) (Invasive Species Regulation),

| — | having regard to the Regulation (EU) No 576/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the non-commercial movement of pet animals and repealing Regulation (EC) No 998/2003 (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Regulation (EU) No 576/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the non-commercial movement of pet animals and repealing Regulation (EC) No 998/2003 (9),

| — | having regard to Rule 227(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 227(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the Committee on Petitions has received petitions Nos 0697/2020, 0744/2020 and 0786/2020, which raise concerns over the welfare and health risks related to the trade in wild and exotic animals in the EU and call for the adoption of an EU-wide positive list defining the animals that can be kept as pets; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Committee on Petitions has received petitions Nos 0697/2020, 0744/2020 and 0786/2020, which raise concerns over the welfare and health risks related to the trade in wild and exotic animals in the EU and call for the adoption of an EU-wide positive list defining the animals that can be kept as pets;

| B. | whereas biodiversity is an integral part of the world’s heritage; whereas the ‘One Health’ principle reflects the fact that human health, animals and the environment are interconnected; whereas the current information has shown that the COVID-19 pandemic may have emerged from an animal source (10), which shows that the trade in exotic animals requires greater attention, as it relates to major health risks for the whole population; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas biodiversity is an integral part of the world’s heritage; whereas the ‘One Health’ principle reflects the fact that human health, animals and the environment are interconnected; whereas the current information has shown that the COVID-19 pandemic may have emerged from an animal source (10), which shows that the trade in exotic animals requires greater attention, as it relates to major health risks for the whole population;

| C. | whereas 70 % of the pathogens that cause diseases in humans are of animal origin and these diseases, known as zoonoses, can be transmitted by domestic or wild animals (11); whereas the trade in wildlife increases contacts between humans and wildlife and is a key factor in the potential emergence of spillover effects, thereby leading to the spreading of viral diseases, including new ones, to humans; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas 70 % of the pathogens that cause diseases in humans are of animal origin and these diseases, known as zoonoses, can be transmitted by domestic or wild animals (11); whereas the trade in wildlife increases contacts between humans and wildlife and is a key factor in the potential emergence of spillover effects, thereby leading to the spreading of viral diseases, including new ones, to humans;

| D. | whereas according to estimates, more than 100 million animals are kept in Europe as pets, including small mammals, birds, reptiles, fish and amphibians (12); whereas many of these species were captured in the wild, depleting natural populations; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas according to estimates, more than 100 million animals are kept in Europe as pets, including small mammals, birds, reptiles, fish and amphibians (12); whereas many of these species were captured in the wild, depleting natural populations;

| E. | whereas wild species have specific needs and suffer greatly when captured, transported and placed in captivity; whereas according to recent data, a substantial number of wild and exotic animals die within the first year of becoming a pet, with the vast majority succumbing to suffocation, disease, starvation and dehydration during transit, as also reported by the United Nations Environment Programme; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas wild species have specific needs and suffer greatly when captured, transported and placed in captivity; whereas according to recent data, a substantial number of wild and exotic animals die within the first year of becoming a pet, with the vast majority succumbing to suffocation, disease, starvation and dehydration during transit, as also reported by the United Nations Environment Programme;

| F. | whereas there is an urgent need to raise public awareness about the welfare of wild and exotic animals to be kept as pets, including the worrying levels of health, behavioural and veterinary problems encountered; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas there is an urgent need to raise public awareness about the welfare of wild and exotic animals to be kept as pets, including the worrying levels of health, behavioural and veterinary problems encountered;

| G. | whereas according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), one in four mammal species and one in eight species of birds face a high risk of extinction, while one in three amphibians is threatened; whereas well-documented evidence confirms that the exotic pet trade is one of the main threats to the survival of these species; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), one in four mammal species and one in eight species of birds face a high risk of extinction, while one in three amphibians is threatened; whereas well-documented evidence confirms that the exotic pet trade is one of the main threats to the survival of these species;

| H. | whereas invasive alien species are one of the five major causes of biodiversity loss both in Europe and worldwide; whereas the Commission has estimated that the cost of controlling and managing the damage caused by invasive species in the EU amounts to EUR 12 billion annually; whereas a number of Member States, in breach of EU law, have still failed to establish a fully functioning surveillance and control system to monitor invasive alien species of Union concern, which has led the Commission to launch infringement procedures against them; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas invasive alien species are one of the five major causes of biodiversity loss both in Europe and worldwide; whereas the Commission has estimated that the cost of controlling and managing the damage caused by invasive species in the EU amounts to EUR 12 billion annually; whereas a number of Member States, in breach of EU law, have still failed to establish a fully functioning surveillance and control system to monitor invasive alien species of Union concern, which has led the Commission to launch infringement procedures against them;

| I. | whereas many wild and exotic animals that are kept as pets represent a serious threat to people’s safety as a result of their natural behaviour, exhibiting aggressive or predatory traits, worsened by the stress they undergo in captivity; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas many wild and exotic animals that are kept as pets represent a serious threat to people’s safety as a result of their natural behaviour, exhibiting aggressive or predatory traits, worsened by the stress they undergo in captivity;

| J. | whereas national rules imposing restrictions on keeping exotic pets vary widely across the Member States and are, in some cases, contradictory, which makes it extremely difficult for Member States to pursue a coherent policy on this matter at European level and, in addition, there are gaps in the current national laws related to exotic pets (13); whereas legal provisions may either ban the keeping of some species of animals (a negative list or blacklist) or only allow some species to be kept (a positive or whitelist), with the negative list being the most commonly used system to regulate the keeping of exotic pets; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas national rules imposing restrictions on keeping exotic pets vary widely across the Member States and are, in some cases, contradictory, which makes it extremely difficult for Member States to pursue a coherent policy on this matter at European level and, in addition, there are gaps in the current national laws related to exotic pets (13); whereas legal provisions may either ban the keeping of some species of animals (a negative list or blacklist) or only allow some species to be kept (a positive or whitelist), with the negative list being the most commonly used system to regulate the keeping of exotic pets;

| K. | whereas the current situation perpetuates existing barriers, fragments the Union’s single market and creates serious differences between those Member States which have a positive list in their legislation and those which do not; whereas furthermore, even positive lists differ between some Member States and others, including on matters such as the listing of species, the different levels of protection or the differences in the way in which the risk assessment has been carried out; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the current situation perpetuates existing barriers, fragments the Union’s single market and creates serious differences between those Member States which have a positive list in their legislation and those which do not; whereas furthermore, even positive lists differ between some Member States and others, including on matters such as the listing of species, the different levels of protection or the differences in the way in which the risk assessment has been carried out;

| L. | whereas the negative list approach is by nature reactive and the least precautionary, as any animal not on a negative list is allowed to be kept by default, requiring the list to be quite long; whereas the species being traded in are ever changing based on current trends, so that any negative list needs regular updating; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the negative list approach is by nature reactive and the least precautionary, as any animal not on a negative list is allowed to be kept by default, requiring the list to be quite long; whereas the species being traded in are ever changing based on current trends, so that any negative list needs regular updating;

| M. | whereas scientists have highlighted with concern the inadequacy of the EU list of prohibited invasive alien species, as included in the Invasive Species Regulation, to face the level of threat that invasive alien species pose to EU biodiversity; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas scientists have highlighted with concern the inadequacy of the EU list of prohibited invasive alien species, as included in the Invasive Species Regulation, to face the level of threat that invasive alien species pose to EU biodiversity;

| N. | whereas the lack of an EU-wide positive list of animals to be kept as pets undermines the welfare and health of both humans and animals, and poses a threat to biodiversity; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the lack of an EU-wide positive list of animals to be kept as pets undermines the welfare and health of both humans and animals, and poses a threat to biodiversity;

| O. | whereas an adequate level of awareness of responsible pet keeping would be necessary in order to improve the effectiveness of a positive list and enhance the welfare of both the pet and the owner; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas an adequate level of awareness of responsible pet keeping would be necessary in order to improve the effectiveness of a positive list and enhance the welfare of both the pet and the owner;

| P. | whereas 19 Member States have supported the position paper on a new EU legislative framework for an EU Positive List for the keeping of companion animals on behalf of Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta, as presented at the Agriculture and Fisheries Council meeting of 24 May 2022; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas 19 Member States have supported the position paper on a new EU legislative framework for an EU Positive List for the keeping of companion animals on behalf of Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta, as presented at the Agriculture and Fisheries Council meeting of 24 May 2022;

| 1. | Reiterates that the highest priority should be given to prevention as the most cost-effective, humane and environmentally desirable measure; points out that the EU must seize the opportunity to incorporate the lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic into its policies; underlines the important role of the Commission in coordinating and supporting the ‘One Health’ approach in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Stresses that the trade in exotic animals can pose a danger not only to animal welfare, but also to human health owing to the possibility of zoonoses and that, therefore, the EU must enact cohesive legislation that prevents these types of potential diseases which can lead to public health problems; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Recalls that the trade in exotic wildlife has already demonstrated that it can lead to biodiversity decline, both in the habitat from which the species originates and in the ecosystems of the Union; stresses that European trade policy needs to ensure that practices in the pet trade do not compromise the welfare of wild and exotic animals or contribute to biodiversity loss, and that the keeping of such animals as pets does not jeopardise the welfare of the animal or of the owner; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Expresses its concern about the fact that the current regulations in the Member States on the trade in and keeping of wild and exotic animals are fragmented and not consistent, often failing to encompass the animal kingdom by mainly addressing mammals, while ignoring the large groups of birds, reptiles, amphibians, insects and ornamental fish, which are currently widely represented in the pet trade, and about the fact that they can pose a danger to native species and ecosystems if they are released; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Stresses that inconsistent legislation makes the collection of accurate data difficult; underlines that the EU databases designed to track animal trade into and between Member States do not record the sources of animals and CITES only concerns itself with the relatively small proportion of animal species listed in its appendices; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Highlights that several European countries have already implemented positive lists, based on several criteria such as animal welfare, the environment, human health, husbandry and housing requirements, and the precautionary principle; also welcomes the fact that several others are developing positive lists or conducting research on positive lists; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Notes with regret that the provisions of EU law are currently insufficient to tackle animal welfare, public health and safety, and the invasiveness risks associated with the trade in and keeping of wild and exotic animals as pets; stresses that the EU Animal Health Law was not designed to deal with the exotic pet trade and none of the EU legislative acts relating to animal welfare govern the welfare of animals kept and traded in as pets within the EU’s single market; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Highlights that a positive list tends to be a shorter, distinct list that is precautionary in nature and provides clarity about which species are allowed to be kept in a country; points out that a positive list is also much easier to update than a negative list, as all species not on the list are a priori prohibited from being kept, thereby contributing to the simplification of legislation at European level and reducing administrative costs; stresses that the research into the positive list approach proves its effectiveness in reducing the trade in wild and exotic animals and in better public awareness (14); |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Weighs up the advantages of a European positive list that would regulate the trade in wild and exotic animals and restrict their being kept as pets, as argued in the petitions received by the Committee on Petitions; takes note of the call by some Member States to establish an EU-wide positive list under appropriate welfare conditions; calls, in this context, on the Commission to carry out an impact assessment of the added value and feasibility of establishing such a list, using a science-based set of criteria to determine which species are suitable as pets and including a careful analysis of various criteria already used in national positive lists in order to establish the most effective ones which could possibly be adopted in an EU-wide positive list based on the Member States’ best practices, existing experiences and lessons learnt; calls on the Commission to launch a study to analyse this issue in the context of the strict and timely implementation of the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Underlines the paramount importance for the protection of human health and the environment of all Member States establishing and implementing, without further delay, effective action plans to address the most invasive alien species of Union concern, ensuring the setting up of fully functioning structures in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014, in order to carry out adequate controls aimed at preventing the unintentional and intentional introduction and spreading into the Union of invasive alien species; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Takes note that the keeping of pets is not regulated at EU, but at national level and that some Member States have established positive lists for animal species; stresses that the international wildlife trade and the corresponding legislation to regulate it should be based on scientific evidence; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Believes that the revision of the EU action plan on preventing illegal trade in wildlife should result in raising awareness about illegal trade and in a positive impact on animal welfare and on the welfare of exotic and wild animals that may be kept as pets in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Stresses that the animals included in a positive list must not represent a particular danger for human health, must be easy to handle and must be kept in conditions that respect their essential physiological, ethological and ecological needs; underlines that no exotic and wild species of animals should be listed where there are clear indications that, should they escape or be released into the wild, they would be able to survive and consequently represent a risk to native ecosystems, thereby altering the subsistence of the native species themselves by becoming invasive species, once released into the natural environment; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

14.

---

(1)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(2)  OJ C 294, 23.7.2021, p. 40.

(3)  OJ C 204, 13.6.2018, p. 136.

(4)  OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 117.

(5)  OJ L 61, 3.3.1997, p. 1.

(6)  OJ L 166, 19.6.2006, p. 1.

(7)  OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, p. 1.

(8)  OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 35.

(9)  OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, p. 1.

(10)  Briefing, ‘Coronavirus and the trade in wildlife’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, 4 May 2020.

(11)  WOAH, ‘The “One Health” Concept’, 14 January 2013.

(12)  Council of the EU, ‘Position paper on a new EU legislative framework for an EU Positive List for the keeping of companion animals on behalf of Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta’, 16 May 2022.

(13)  As demonstrated in the study entitled ‘Analysis of national legislation related to the keeping and sale of exotic pets in Europe’, published in June 2020 by Eurogroup For Animals.

(14)  World Animal Protection, ‘Think positive — An overview of national and international Positive Lists’, September 2020.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/94 |
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11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/94

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P9_TA(2022)0426

Human rights situation in Egypt

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the human rights situation in Egypt (2022/2962(RSP))

(2023/C 167/15)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Egypt, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Egypt,

| — | having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Egypt, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Egypt,

| — | having regard to the EU Neighbourhood Policy and to the joint communication of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ (JOIN(2021)0002), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Neighbourhood Policy and to the joint communication of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ (JOIN(2021)0002),

| — | having regard to the 13th Inter-parliamentary meeting EU-Egypt held on 29 September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 13th Inter-parliamentary meeting EU-Egypt held on 29 September 2022,

| — | having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the EU, Egypt and Israel on cooperation related to trade, transport and export of natural gas to the European Union, signed in Cairo on 15 June 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the EU, Egypt and Israel on cooperation related to trade, transport and export of natural gas to the European Union, signed in Cairo on 15 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the latest statement by the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Egypt, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the latest statement by the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Egypt,

| — | having regard to the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of Egypt for 2019-2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of Egypt for 2019-2020,

| — | having regard to the statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 8 November 2022 calling for the immediate release of Alaa Abdel Fattah, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 8 November 2022 calling for the immediate release of Alaa Abdel Fattah,

| — | having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, on torture, on freedom of expression, on human rights defenders, on violence against women and girls and on the rights of LGBTI persons, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, on torture, on freedom of expression, on human rights defenders, on violence against women and girls and on the rights of LGBTI persons,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, all of which have been ratified by Egypt, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, all of which have been ratified by Egypt,

| — | having regard to the Constitution of Egypt, notably its Article 52 on the prohibition of all forms of torture, Article 73 on freedom of assembly and Article 93 on the binding character of international human rights law, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Constitution of Egypt, notably its Article 52 on the prohibition of all forms of torture, Article 73 on freedom of assembly and Article 93 on the binding character of international human rights law,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas Egypt hosted the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) in Sharm El -Sheikh; whereas this international event put the spotlight on Egypt’s domestic repression against peaceful and legitimate voices of civil society; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Egypt hosted the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) in Sharm El -Sheikh; whereas this international event put the spotlight on Egypt’s domestic repression against peaceful and legitimate voices of civil society;

| B. | whereas in 2021 Egypt launched its national human rights strategy and its national dialogue, which officially aimed to improve its human rights record and establish a more inclusive political environment; whereas in April 2022, the Egyptian Presidential Pardon Committee was launched, which is tasked with conducting civil society organisation investigations into cases of prisoners whose situation does not comply with international human rights standards; whereas the committee has overlooked grave past and ongoing human rights violations and there have been no substantial changes one year after the launch of the national human rights strategy and Egypt’s national dialogue; whereas the Subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy — International and Regional Issues, emanating from the Association Agreement between Egypt and the European Union, serves as a framework for discussing human rights issues between the two parties; whereas the next meeting of this subcommittee is scheduled for 8 December 2022 in Cairo; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas in 2021 Egypt launched its national human rights strategy and its national dialogue, which officially aimed to improve its human rights record and establish a more inclusive political environment; whereas in April 2022, the Egyptian Presidential Pardon Committee was launched, which is tasked with conducting civil society organisation investigations into cases of prisoners whose situation does not comply with international human rights standards; whereas the committee has overlooked grave past and ongoing human rights violations and there have been no substantial changes one year after the launch of the national human rights strategy and Egypt’s national dialogue; whereas the Subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy — International and Regional Issues, emanating from the Association Agreement between Egypt and the European Union, serves as a framework for discussing human rights issues between the two parties; whereas the next meeting of this subcommittee is scheduled for 8 December 2022 in Cairo;

| C. | whereas Egypt did not amend any relevant piece of legislation ahead of its hosting of COP27, including as regards the right to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association and media freedom, even though providing space to civil society is a joint commitment enshrined in the EU-Egypt partnership priorities and stipulated in the Egyptian Constitution; whereas the state of emergency, in force since 2017, has not been lifted; whereas mass trials and mass detention continue, with military and state security emergency courts trying tens of thousands of civilians; whereas on 8 July 2021 the UN’s Special Rapporteurs on the rights to freedom of assembly and association, on human rights defenders and on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism jointly expressed their concerns over Egypt’s 2019 Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Law, its 2018 Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law, the 2015 Terrorist Entities Law and the 2013 Law on Public Meetings and Peaceful Demonstrations; whereas according to the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, the Egyptian Government detained nearly 734 individuals across 18 governorates between 1 October and 14 November 2022; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Egypt did not amend any relevant piece of legislation ahead of its hosting of COP27, including as regards the right to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association and media freedom, even though providing space to civil society is a joint commitment enshrined in the EU-Egypt partnership priorities and stipulated in the Egyptian Constitution; whereas the state of emergency, in force since 2017, has not been lifted; whereas mass trials and mass detention continue, with military and state security emergency courts trying tens of thousands of civilians; whereas on 8 July 2021 the UN’s Special Rapporteurs on the rights to freedom of assembly and association, on human rights defenders and on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism jointly expressed their concerns over Egypt’s 2019 Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Law, its 2018 Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law, the 2015 Terrorist Entities Law and the 2013 Law on Public Meetings and Peaceful Demonstrations; whereas according to the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, the Egyptian Government detained nearly 734 individuals across 18 governorates between 1 October and 14 November 2022;

| D. | whereas in November 2022 human rights defender Alaa Abdel Fattah, who has been arbitrarily detained for most of the past decade on unsubstantiated charges, interrupted his hunger strike, which he had started in April 2022, after being force-fed following a near-death experience in his prison cell; whereas since the beginning of COP27 he had also stopped drinking water; whereas Alaa still has had no consular access to UK officials and whereas his lawyer was denied a visit; whereas Alaa’s family has been sporadically allowed to visit him in the past following international pressure; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas in November 2022 human rights defender Alaa Abdel Fattah, who has been arbitrarily detained for most of the past decade on unsubstantiated charges, interrupted his hunger strike, which he had started in April 2022, after being force-fed following a near-death experience in his prison cell; whereas since the beginning of COP27 he had also stopped drinking water; whereas Alaa still has had no consular access to UK officials and whereas his lawyer was denied a visit; whereas Alaa’s family has been sporadically allowed to visit him in the past following international pressure;

| E. | whereas the Egyptian Government has excluded independent human rights groups from participating at COP27 through a covert government-controlled registration process that filtered out groups critical of the Egyptian Government, undue restrictions to freedom of peaceful assembly outside the COP27 venue and unjustified delays in the issuing of visas to those travelling from abroad; whereas only some independent human rights groups and rights defender Sanaa Seif were able to participate thanks to the assistance of international organisations; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the Egyptian Government has excluded independent human rights groups from participating at COP27 through a covert government-controlled registration process that filtered out groups critical of the Egyptian Government, undue restrictions to freedom of peaceful assembly outside the COP27 venue and unjustified delays in the issuing of visas to those travelling from abroad; whereas only some independent human rights groups and rights defender Sanaa Seif were able to participate thanks to the assistance of international organisations;

| F. | whereas women rights defenders, LGBTIQ+ people and Coptic rights defenders are still being harassed, intimidated, arrested and detained, such as in the case of Patrick George Zaki, who is still under a travel ban and is still facing trial before a state emergency court after criticising his government’s policy towards Coptic Christians, and in that of women social media influencers Haneen Hossam and Mawada Al Adham, who were sentenced to three and two years in prison on trumped up morality charges in 2020 after casually dancing in TikTok videos; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas women rights defenders, LGBTIQ+ people and Coptic rights defenders are still being harassed, intimidated, arrested and detained, such as in the case of Patrick George Zaki, who is still under a travel ban and is still facing trial before a state emergency court after criticising his government’s policy towards Coptic Christians, and in that of women social media influencers Haneen Hossam and Mawada Al Adham, who were sentenced to three and two years in prison on trumped up morality charges in 2020 after casually dancing in TikTok videos;

| G. | whereas the ninth meeting of the Association Council of the EU and Egypt held on 20 June 2022 and the 2021-2027 partnership priorities adopted on 19 June 2022 reiterated the commitment of both parties to promote democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, gender equality and equal opportunities; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the ninth meeting of the Association Council of the EU and Egypt held on 20 June 2022 and the 2021-2027 partnership priorities adopted on 19 June 2022 reiterated the commitment of both parties to promote democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, gender equality and equal opportunities;

| H. | whereas Egypt is a long-standing strategic partner of the EU, with shared goals of building stability, peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions and whereas it plays an important role for stability in the region; whereas the EU is Egypt’s largest economic partner and its main source of foreign investment; whereas in June 2022, the EU and Egypt adopted partnership priorities in many areas, including security, counter-terrorism and judiciary reform; whereas Egypt supported the UN resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian regions and continues to support EU and international efforts to end the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Egypt has signed a memorandum of understanding between it, the EU and Israel to reduce gas imports from Russia following its aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Commission has allocated 100 EUR million to Egypt from the Food and Resilience Facility to help it deal with food shortages resulting from the war of aggression against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas Egypt is a long-standing strategic partner of the EU, with shared goals of building stability, peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions and whereas it plays an important role for stability in the region; whereas the EU is Egypt’s largest economic partner and its main source of foreign investment; whereas in June 2022, the EU and Egypt adopted partnership priorities in many areas, including security, counter-terrorism and judiciary reform; whereas Egypt supported the UN resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian regions and continues to support EU and international efforts to end the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Egypt has signed a memorandum of understanding between it, the EU and Israel to reduce gas imports from Russia following its aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Commission has allocated 100 EUR million to Egypt from the Food and Resilience Facility to help it deal with food shortages resulting from the war of aggression against Ukraine;

| 1. | Deeply deplores the continued lack of basic political rights and freedoms in Egypt, including in the context of the holding of COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh; regrets that COP27 did not lead to an improvement in the human rights situation; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Condemns in the strongest terms the Egyptian authorities’ censorship, harassment and intimidation of representatives of Egypt’s civil society, which has taken place even on international UN premises, as well as the new wave of arrests and detentions in the context of COP27; conveys its support to the Government of Germany, which lodged a complaint on 13 November 2022 against the Egyptian authorities over the excessive security surveillance of participants in the German pavilion of COP27; deplores that independent Egyptian NGOs were refused a one-time registration to COP27 and that only a handful managed to attend, and only thanks to the fact that international organisations gave them their own badges; deplores the selection by the Egyptian authorities of civil society organisations that do not criticise the authorities; underlines that, as legitimate stakeholders, local communities and NGOs from Sinai should have been allowed to take part in COP27, as it was taking place in Sinai; deplores Egypt’s secret process using undisclosed selection criteria to exclude critical human rights NGOs; urges the Egyptian authorities not to take any retaliatory measures against those Egyptian human rights defenders and activists who publicly voiced concerns over Egypt’s human rights violations during COP27; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Firmly condemns the continued arbitrary and pre-trial detention of tens of thousands of prisoners of conscience in Egypt, many of whom are detained in inhuman conditions without access to a fair trial or basic rights, as evidenced in Egypt’s political prisons at Wadi Natroun and Badr; notes that a limited fraction of Egypt’s political prisoners were released or pardoned by the Presidential Pardon Committee in April 2022, with the release of between 800 and 1 000 prisoners from arbitrary pre-trial detention; highlights that at least 1 953 Egyptians have been arbitrarily arrested and detained since then, according to Egyptian NGOs and Amnesty International; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Urges the Egyptian authorities to immediately release Mohamed ‘Oxygen’ Ibrahim, Mohamed Adel, Alaa Abdel Fattah and the three lawyers that are the 2020 recipients of the human rights award of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Ibrahim Metwally Hegazy, Mohamed El Baqer and Hoda Abdelmoniem, as well as Ezzat Ghoneim, Ahmed Amasha, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Mohamed El Kassas, Ziad Abu El Fadl, Aisha El Shater, Mohamed Abo Houraira, Manal Agrama, Marwa Arafa, Hala Fahmy, Safaa El Korbagy, Tawfik Ghanim, Seif Thabit, Safwan Thabit, Sherif al Rouby, Anas El-Beltagy, Ahmed Douma, Mohamed Adel Fahmy, Nermin Hussein, Haneen Hossam, Mawadda el-Adham, Ismail Iskandarani, Seif Fateen, Hisham Genena, Omar Mohammed Ali, Aymen Moussa, Omar el Hout, Ahmed Moussa Abd El Khaleq and Ahmed Fayez, among many others unjustly detained; stresses that those women and men are Egyptian human rights defenders, journalists, peaceful activists, politicians, women social media influencers or businessmen who refused to sell their assets to the military; calls on the Egyptian authorities to lift the travel bans on Patrick George Zaki and Mahinour Al Masry; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Urges the Egyptian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release British-Egyptian human rights defender and peaceful activist Alaa Abdel Fattah, Deutsche Welle and Reporters Without Borders award recipient, who has been arbitrarily detained for most of the past decade on unsubstantiated charges, for his peaceful and legitimate calls for more rights and freedoms and who is far from being an isolated case, and to allow him to promptly depart for the UK; highlights that both Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz and France’s President Emmanuel Macron have called for his release; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Reiterates its utmost condemnation of the widespread use of torture by Egypt’s security apparatus; recalls that Egypt’s 25 January 2011 revolution started as a public outcry against police impunity following the torture and killing of blogger Khaled Said, among others; urges Egypt to fully cooperate with the Italian authorities’ investigation into the murder of Italian PhD student Giulio Regeni, who was tortured to death by security officials in 2016; reiterates, in particular, its call to notify General Tariq Sabir, Colonel Athar Kamel Mohamed Ibrahim, Colonel Uhsam Helmi and Major Magdi Ibrahim Abdelal Sharif of the judicial proceeding against them in Italy; condemns in the strongest terms the torture to death of economist Ayman Hadhoud, who died on 5 March 2022 after being forcibly disappeared and detained by security officials following his criticism of economic policies, and deeply deplores the lack of any independent autopsy and a credible investigation by Egypt’s Public Prosecution; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Urges Egypt to release all 21 journalists who are currently in prison for doing their job, as documented by Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists; underlines the right of all Egyptians to access information without their government’s censorship; notes the decision, taken under pressure at the start of the COP27 conference, to allow access to some websites of human rights NGOs and independent newspapers such as Medium, Mada Masr or Human Rights Watch; stresses, however, that such websites should always remain accessible to Egyptians even after the conference; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Urges the Egyptian authorities therefore to release all journalists who were detained as of November 2022: Khaled Abdelwahab Radwan, Ahmed Fayez, Alaa Abdelfattah, Ismail Alexandrani, Mohamed Ibrahim (aka Mohamed Oxygen), Ahmed Allaam, Hamdi al-Zaeem, Tawfik Ghanem, Rabie al-Sheikh, Adallah Shusha, Khaled Sahloob, Bahaa al-Din Ibrahim Nemat Allah, Hisham Abdel Aziz, Mohamed Said Fahmy, Badr Mohamed Badr, Raouf Ebeid, Mostafa Saad, Mohamed Mostafa Moussa, Mahmoud Saad Diab and Amr Shnin; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Egyptian authorities to put a stop to discrimination and guarantee effective equality for all Egyptians before the law and in practice, as stipulated in the constitution, regardless of their faith or belief; points to the long-standing discrimination against minorities, such as the Coptic minority and the people of the Bahá'í faith; calls on Egypt to review its blasphemy laws to ensure protection of freedom of conscience and the rights of religious minorities; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Urges Egypt to respect basic international standards on freedom of association and to repeal its repressive NGO Law 149/2019, which subordinates all activities to government control; shares the concerns expressed by UN human rights experts on Egypt’s legal arsenal to curtail freedom of association, of expression, of the press and the right to peaceful assembly under the pretext of fighting terrorism; urges Egypt to also amend or repeal its 2018 Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law, its 2015 Terrorist Entities Law and the 2013 Law on Public Meetings and Peaceful Demonstrations; calls on the Egyptian authorities once again to close case 173/2011, known as ‘the Foreign funding case’, and lift all travel bans and assets freezes against 31 employees of human rights NGOs; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Egyptian Parliament to accelerate its adoption of a comprehensive law on violence against women, particularly honour killings; calls on the Egyptian authorities to reiterate their opposition to female genital mutilation and effectively prosecute those who continue to practice it; recommends that the Egyptian authorities reinforce their cooperation with the EU in finding new ways to further protect women against sexual abuse and gender-based violence; condemns in the strongest possible terms gender-based murders; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the Egyptian authorities to end arrests and prosecutions for adult consensual sexual relations, including same-sex relations or relations based on gender expression, and to immediately release LGBTIQ+ people who remain arbitrarily detained, often in inhuman conditions; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the recent legal changes that Egypt has made on child labour and child marriage; calls, however, on the Egyptian authorities to further strengthen the implementation of the law on child marriage and to reinforce school systems, and public child protection services preventing and responding to child abuse to further protect children against it; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Urges Egypt to abolish the death penalty, and declare an immediate moratorium on its application; deplores Egypt’s rise over the past decade as one of the world’s worst offenders on capital punishment, including for juvenile offenders; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Reiterates its call to all EU Member States and the EU delegation to attend the trials of Egyptian and foreign human rights defenders, journalists and trade unionists and to visit them in detention; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Urges the EU Member States to support a monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave human rights violations in Egypt at the UN Human Rights Council; recalls that the EU should mainstream human rights concerns in all its high-level exchanges with Egyptian officials, including the EU-Egypt Association Council; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to stress the interconnectedness between democratic development and growth; calls on the UN to establish criteria for host countries on access for civil society and freedom of expression at future COP meetings and similar UN conferences; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Reiterates its call for a profound and comprehensive review of the EU’s relations with Egypt in light of the very limited progress on Egypt’s human rights record and of its crackdown on dissent, despite continuing support from European partners; urges the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to take a firm public position on the need for Egypt to release political prisoners, make concrete human rights progress, end and investigate torture and abandon the massive use of abusive pre-trial detention and travel bans to clamp down on real or perceived dissent as necessary conditions to improve the EU’s relations and cooperation with Egypt; reiterates its call on the EU Member States to consider adopting targeted sanctions against those most responsible for the brutal repression in the country; calls for more transparency on all forms of financial support or training provided to Egypt by the EU, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Urges all EU Member States to fully abide by the EU Council conclusions of 21 August 2013 announcing the suspension of export licences for any equipment used for internal repression, including surveillance technology used to track down dissenting voices; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt. |
| --- | --- |

19.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/99 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/99

---

P9_TA(2022)0427

Situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA world cup in Qatar

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (2022/2948(RSP))

(2023/C 167/16)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2022 on a strategic partnership with the Gulf region, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2022 on a strategic partnership with the Gulf region,

| — | having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘A strategic partnership with the Gulf’ (JOIN(2022)0013), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘A strategic partnership with the Gulf’ (JOIN(2022)0013),

| — | having regard to the fourth EU-Qatar human rights dialogue held in Brussels on 12 September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the fourth EU-Qatar human rights dialogue held in Brussels on 12 September 2022,

| — | having regard to the EU-Qatar Cooperation Arrangement of 7 March 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU-Qatar Cooperation Arrangement of 7 March 2018,

| — | having regard to the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 18 December 1990, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 18 December 1990,

| — | having regard to the announcement by the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) of 2 December 2010 regarding the selection of Qatar as the venue for the 2022 Football World Cup, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the announcement by the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) of 2 December 2010 regarding the selection of Qatar as the venue for the 2022 Football World Cup,

| — | having regard to Laws Nos 17, 18 and 19 adopted by the Government of Qatar in 2020 on the freedom of movement and on a minimum wage for migrant workers, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Laws Nos 17, 18 and 19 adopted by the Government of Qatar in 2020 on the freedom of movement and on a minimum wage for migrant workers,

| — | having regard to the Human Rights Watch report of 24 October 2022 entitled ‘Qatar: Security Forces Arrest, Abuse LGBT People’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Human Rights Watch report of 24 October 2022 entitled ‘Qatar: Security Forces Arrest, Abuse LGBT People’,

| — | having regard to Article 285 of Qatar’s Criminal Code and to Law No 17 of 2002 on Protection of Community, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 285 of Qatar’s Criminal Code and to Law No 17 of 2002 on Protection of Community,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,

| — | having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty,

| — | having regard to the progress report on the technical cooperation programme between the Government of Qatar and the International Labour Organization (ILO) of 31 October 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the progress report on the technical cooperation programme between the Government of Qatar and the International Labour Organization (ILO) of 31 October 2022,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Qatar ratified on 21 May 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Qatar ratified on 21 May 2018,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Qatar, in particular that of 21 November 2013 entitled ‘Qatar: situation of migrant workers’ (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Qatar, in particular that of 21 November 2013 entitled ‘Qatar: situation of migrant workers’ (1),

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas Qatar is the first country in the region that is hosting the FIFA World Cup; whereas in 2010, FIFA awarded Qatar the World Cup without conducting human rights or environmental due diligence or laying down conditions for the protection of migrant workers; whereas Qatar won the FIFA World Cup bidding process amid credible allegations of bribery and corruption that led to judicial investigations; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Qatar is the first country in the region that is hosting the FIFA World Cup; whereas in 2010, FIFA awarded Qatar the World Cup without conducting human rights or environmental due diligence or laying down conditions for the protection of migrant workers; whereas Qatar won the FIFA World Cup bidding process amid credible allegations of bribery and corruption that led to judicial investigations;

| B. | whereas in Qatar, there is estimated to be more than 2 million foreign nationals, who make up some 94 % of the workforce; whereas migrants are employed mainly in construction, services and domestic work; whereas it has been reported that worker’s rights have been violated in these sectors; whereas because of this number, Qatar has the highest ratio of migrant workers to domestic population in the world; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas in Qatar, there is estimated to be more than 2 million foreign nationals, who make up some 94 % of the workforce; whereas migrants are employed mainly in construction, services and domestic work; whereas it has been reported that worker’s rights have been violated in these sectors; whereas because of this number, Qatar has the highest ratio of migrant workers to domestic population in the world;

| C. | whereas to work in Qatar, many workers were forced into debt by recruitment companies that illegally charged them fees, and many of them suffered wage theft and were subject to gruelling working conditions in extreme heat that exposed them to the risk of illness, injury and death; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas to work in Qatar, many workers were forced into debt by recruitment companies that illegally charged them fees, and many of them suffered wage theft and were subject to gruelling working conditions in extreme heat that exposed them to the risk of illness, injury and death;

| D. | whereas thousands of migrant workers reportedly died and many more were injured during construction works related to the World Cup in Qatar; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas thousands of migrant workers reportedly died and many more were injured during construction works related to the World Cup in Qatar;

| E. | whereas according to the ILO, some European companies have refused to engage in the Joint Committees, whose aim is to bring together management and worker representatives to discuss, prevent and resolve workplace conflicts; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas according to the ILO, some European companies have refused to engage in the Joint Committees, whose aim is to bring together management and worker representatives to discuss, prevent and resolve workplace conflicts;

| F. | whereas prior to reforms enacted in Qatar, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) lodged a complaint against Qatar with the ILO in 2014, regarding its non-observance of the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the Labour Inspection Convention of 1947; whereas according to the ITUC, laws in Qatar have been changed and the country is continuing to make progress on implementing these changes; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas prior to reforms enacted in Qatar, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) lodged a complaint against Qatar with the ILO in 2014, regarding its non-observance of the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the Labour Inspection Convention of 1947; whereas according to the ITUC, laws in Qatar have been changed and the country is continuing to make progress on implementing these changes;

| G. | whereas Qatar is the first country in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to have opened an ILO project office; whereas Qatar has signed a number of partnerships with the ILO, UN organisations and EU Member States, such as a memorandum of understanding with Sweden in January 2020 and with France in March 2022, to improve workers’ rights; whereas the ILO has noted tangible progress in the five years leading up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, notably in the areas of labour migration governance, the enforcement of labour law and access to justice, and strengthening the voice of workers and social dialogue; whereas according to the ILO, it is still not legal for migrant workers to join and form unions; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas Qatar is the first country in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to have opened an ILO project office; whereas Qatar has signed a number of partnerships with the ILO, UN organisations and EU Member States, such as a memorandum of understanding with Sweden in January 2020 and with France in March 2022, to improve workers’ rights; whereas the ILO has noted tangible progress in the five years leading up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, notably in the areas of labour migration governance, the enforcement of labour law and access to justice, and strengthening the voice of workers and social dialogue; whereas according to the ILO, it is still not legal for migrant workers to join and form unions;

| H. | whereas workers in Qatar previously required permission from their employers to change jobs or to leave the country; whereas these requirements constituted the most problematic features of the kafala sponsorship system, as they made workers overly dependent on their employers and thus created opportunities for exploitation and forced labour; whereas as a result of these changes, the Ministry of Labour has approved around 420 000 applications by migrant workers to change jobs in the two years since these reforms were introduced; whereas, however, many workers still face obstacles to leaving their jobs and moving to new ones, such as retaliation from their employers; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas workers in Qatar previously required permission from their employers to change jobs or to leave the country; whereas these requirements constituted the most problematic features of the kafala sponsorship system, as they made workers overly dependent on their employers and thus created opportunities for exploitation and forced labour; whereas as a result of these changes, the Ministry of Labour has approved around 420 000 applications by migrant workers to change jobs in the two years since these reforms were introduced; whereas, however, many workers still face obstacles to leaving their jobs and moving to new ones, such as retaliation from their employers;

| I. | whereas in March 2021, Qatar became the first country in the Gulf region to adopt a non-discriminatory minimum wage that applies to all workers, of all nationalities, in all sectors, including domestic work; whereas according to the ILO, a total of 13 % of the workforce — 280 000 people — have seen their wages rise to the new minimum threshold since the new legislation was introduced; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas in March 2021, Qatar became the first country in the Gulf region to adopt a non-discriminatory minimum wage that applies to all workers, of all nationalities, in all sectors, including domestic work; whereas according to the ILO, a total of 13 % of the workforce — 280 000 people — have seen their wages rise to the new minimum threshold since the new legislation was introduced;

| J. | whereas the new legislation provides workers in Qatar with greater protection from heat stress; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the new legislation provides workers in Qatar with greater protection from heat stress;

| K. | whereas Qatar has taken steps to improve workers’ access to justice by establishing a new online platform for workers to submit complaints and by creating new labour tribunals to settle disputes; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas Qatar has taken steps to improve workers’ access to justice by establishing a new online platform for workers to submit complaints and by creating new labour tribunals to settle disputes;

| L. | whereas reportedly, however, some of the discriminatory practices related to foreign workers remain in place in Qatar and other GCC countries, such as arbitrary deductions from and non-payment of wages and the withholding of travel documents; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas reportedly, however, some of the discriminatory practices related to foreign workers remain in place in Qatar and other GCC countries, such as arbitrary deductions from and non-payment of wages and the withholding of travel documents;

| M. | whereas Article 285 of Qatar’s Penal Code punishes extramarital sex, including same-sex relations, with up to seven years in prison; whereas arbitrary arrests of LGBTQ+ people have reportedly been based on Law No 17 of 2002 on Protection of Community, which according to Human Rights Watch, allows for provisional detention without charge or trial for up to six months if ‘there exist well-founded reasons to believe that the defendant may have committed a crime’, including ‘violating public morality’, which leads to frequent abuse of LGBTQ+ persons; whereas a Qatar FIFA World Cup ambassador shared a publicly homophobic statement; whereas seven football federations, including in Europe, have decided that their players can wear a rainbow-coloured ‘OneLove’ armband; whereas nevertheless, FIFA decided that players can be given a yellow card or expelled for displaying that armband, as it is as an alleged political statement; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas Article 285 of Qatar’s Penal Code punishes extramarital sex, including same-sex relations, with up to seven years in prison; whereas arbitrary arrests of LGBTQ+ people have reportedly been based on Law No 17 of 2002 on Protection of Community, which according to Human Rights Watch, allows for provisional detention without charge or trial for up to six months if ‘there exist well-founded reasons to believe that the defendant may have committed a crime’, including ‘violating public morality’, which leads to frequent abuse of LGBTQ+ persons; whereas a Qatar FIFA World Cup ambassador shared a publicly homophobic statement; whereas seven football federations, including in Europe, have decided that their players can wear a rainbow-coloured ‘OneLove’ armband; whereas nevertheless, FIFA decided that players can be given a yellow card or expelled for displaying that armband, as it is as an alleged political statement;

| N. | whereas in 2016, FIFA signed up to the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, which compel FIFA to refrain from interfering in human rights and to remedy the negative effects of its activities in the field of human rights; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas in 2016, FIFA signed up to the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, which compel FIFA to refrain from interfering in human rights and to remedy the negative effects of its activities in the field of human rights;

| O. | whereas at a time of insecurity and significant challenges to the rules-based international order both in Europe and in the Gulf region, and as the world faces the consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the urgent imperative of the green and digital transitions, the EU stands much to gain from a stronger and more strategic partnership with the GCC and its member states, including Qatar; whereas in 2021, diplomatic relations were restored between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas at a time of insecurity and significant challenges to the rules-based international order both in Europe and in the Gulf region, and as the world faces the consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the urgent imperative of the green and digital transitions, the EU stands much to gain from a stronger and more strategic partnership with the GCC and its member states, including Qatar; whereas in 2021, diplomatic relations were restored between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt;

| P. | whereas the EU-Qatar Cooperation Arrangement signed in 2018 provides a framework for political and sectoral consultations on areas of mutual interest; whereas Qatar is an important partner of the EU and their relations cover a multitude of important areas; whereas Qatar has a key role to play in implementing the European energy security strategy; whereas engagement between the EU and Qatar has intensified significantly, leading to the opening of an EU delegation in Doha in 2022; whereas Qatar was a co-sponsor of a UN General Assembly resolution in February 2022 calling for Russia to withdraw from Ukraine, and voted in favour of resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the EU-Qatar Cooperation Arrangement signed in 2018 provides a framework for political and sectoral consultations on areas of mutual interest; whereas Qatar is an important partner of the EU and their relations cover a multitude of important areas; whereas Qatar has a key role to play in implementing the European energy security strategy; whereas engagement between the EU and Qatar has intensified significantly, leading to the opening of an EU delegation in Doha in 2022; whereas Qatar was a co-sponsor of a UN General Assembly resolution in February 2022 calling for Russia to withdraw from Ukraine, and voted in favour of resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine;

| Q. | whereas the fourth EU-Qatar Human Rights Dialogue was held on 12 September 2022; whereas the Human Rights Dialogue represents a crucial moment of engagement to advance human rights; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the fourth EU-Qatar Human Rights Dialogue was held on 12 September 2022; whereas the Human Rights Dialogue represents a crucial moment of engagement to advance human rights;

| 1. | Deplores the deaths of thousands of migrant workers and the injuries sustained by workers during the preparations for the World Cup; expresses its condolences to the families of these workers and demands accountability; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Urges Qatar to fully implement its new legislation protecting workers’ rights and to dismantle the remaining components of the kafala sponsorship system, such as absconding penalties for workers; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Stresses that the EU is committed to supporting human rights in its relations with Qatar, including issues raised in the context of the FIFA World Cup; is concerned about reports that hundreds of thousands of migrant workers still face discriminatory laws and practices in Qatar; deplores the lack of transparency and the clear lack of a responsible risk assessment that characterised the awarding of the FIFA World Cup to Qatar in 2010; recalls its long-held view that corruption within FIFA is rampant, systemic and deep-rooted, and continues to believe the organisation has seriously damaged the image and integrity of global football, despite attempts to reform it, such as the introduction of human rights requirements; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Urges public authorities, sports federations and organisations to uphold the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law when awarding host status for major sporting events, as well as when choosing sponsors; asks for clear criteria and a charter with strong values to be set in this regard; calls for particular attention to be paid, ahead of hosting such major sports events, to the protection of workers’ rights, equality and non-discrimination, and for the establishment of independent and credible environmental impact assessments; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Calls on the EU Member States, particularly those with large national football leagues, such as Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, to exert pressure on UEFA and FIFA for the latter to engage in fundamental reform, including the introduction of democratic and transparent procedures in the awarding of football World Cups and the strict implementation of human rights and sustainability criteria for hosting countries; urgently calls for violations of fundamental rights and human rights, especially evident systematic gender-based violence, to be made into binding exclusion criterion for the awarding of international sporting events in order to protect athletes and fans and to put an end to sportswashing; calls for the investigations into, and prosecutions for, the awarding of World Cups tainted with corruption to be continued; calls on EU Member States to authorise access to archived information on the attribution of the 2022 World Cup; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Acknowledges the important contribution of migrant workers to Qatar’s economy and the FIFA World Cup 2022; urges the Qatari authorities to conduct a full investigation into the deaths of the migrant workers, certify the death of migrant workers and provide reparations to families in cases where workers died as a result of their working conditions; supports Qatar’s efforts to improve their working conditions and respect for their rights, which the international community has raised; calls for the full implementation of the reforms that have been adopted; welcomes Qatar’s cooperation with the ILO; calls on Qatar to continue to engage with the ILO on reforms; underlines that corporate responsibility, including for European companies, necessitates respecting workers’ rights and the same standard of due diligence required in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Acknowledges, nevertheless, that the ILO and the ITUC consider the reforms undertaken in Qatar to be an example for the Gulf region; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Stresses that victims of human rights violations have legal avenues to seek justice and hold EU-based companies accountable under existing due diligence laws in some Member States; notes the ongoing EU-level work on the directive on corporate sustainability due diligence that will further expand such legal avenues; considers that the relevant companies have failed to fully respect their obligations under Directive 2014/95/EU (2) and those arising from internationally recognised human rights conventions; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Strongly condemns the participation of European companies in any migrant workers’ rights violations that they have caused, contributed to or benefited from, in particular in the construction and finance sectors, during the preparation of the 2022 FIFA World Cup; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes the fact that, according to the ILO, the Qatari Government has reimbursed USD 320 million to wage abuse victims through the Workers’ Support and Insurance Fund; regrets, however, that the fund only became operational in 2018, which resulted in millions of workers and their families remaining excluded from its application; urges Qatar to carry out a thorough review of its data collection and inquiry standards for cases of work-related injuries or death; calls for the fund to be expanded in order to include all victims since the beginning of the works related to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, including all deaths and other abuses of workers’ human rights associated with preparations for the World Cup, such as wage theft, injuries and all uninvestigated and uncompensated deaths; calls on FIFA to contribute to a comprehensive remediation programme for workers’ families, as compensation for the working conditions from which they suffered; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Welcomes the reforms the Qatari authorities have enacted in consultation with the ILO to address the governance of labour migration, to enforce labour law and enable access to justice, and to strengthen the voice of workers and social dialogue; notes that these changes have already improved the working and living conditions of hundreds of thousands of workers; regrets however, that many workers still do not benefit from these reforms, facing obstacles to accessing these improvements and retaliation from their employers; notes its concern about documented and repeated allegations that migrant domestic workers are subjected to abuse and exploitation; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on Qatar to abolish any legislation allowing companies to impose recruitment fees on foreign workers; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes Qatar’s new legislation against heat on construction sites; calls on all countries of the GCC to adopt similar legislation and to fully implement it; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Reiterates its call on Qatar to ratify the UN’s International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Urges Qatar, in cooperation with the ILO, to ensure that all workers and employers can benefit from the kafala reforms on labour mobility, to streamline access to justice and the recovery of wages due, and to fully implement the law regarding domestic workers’ rights; welcomes, in this regard, the fact that more than 420 000 workers have changed job across Qatar and more than 300 000 have benefited from the introduction of the minimum wage; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Points out that the right of association and to self-organisation should be recognised for all workers, including migrants; calls on the Qatari Government to ensure that workers have the right to associate freely without retaliation and enjoy safe and secure access to justice, including by joining and forming national unions; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Welcomes the EU’s continued engagement on human rights with Qatar, including through the EU-Qatar Human Rights Dialogue, which should be intensified, and through strengthening the institutional set-up for cooperation between the EU and Qatar; stresses that the Qatari National Human Rights Committee has established regular interaction with EU institutions and Qatar has invited the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to visit the country; underlines that migrant workers’ rights, labour reforms, women’s rights and freedom of expression are recurrent topics; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls on the Member States and the EU Delegation to Qatar to closely monitor Qatar’s social reforms, with special attention to the concrete implementation of its legislation, including by European companies in Qatar, and calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to regularly inform Parliament about the progress of these reforms; welcomes, in this respect, Qatari Minister of Labour Ali Bin Samikh Al Marri’s engagement with Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights on the ongoing reforms and remaining gaps to be closed, and notes his commitment to compensate any workers or their families who have not received what is due to them; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls on the Qatari authorities to continue their efforts to ensure that the National Human Rights Committee fully complies with the principles on the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights and that the committee is able to carry out its mandate fully, effectively and independently, including by promoting the pluralism and diversity of its members and staff; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls on the Qatari authorities to fully enforce existing legislation forbidding torture and mistreatment; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Recalls its commitment to the universal abolition of the death penalty and calls on the Qatari authorities to adopt a moratorium on this issue; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Urges the Qatari authorities to strengthen measures to ensure gender equality, including by abolishing the remnants of women’s guardianship, while stepping up their efforts to achieve the equitable representation of women in the formal labour market, and in the public and political spheres, including the Shura Council and executive bodies, particularly in decision-making positions, and to treat women and men equally as heads of households; calls on the Qatari authorities to amend the Nationality Act to ensure that Qatari women and men have equal rights to pass on their nationality to their children and their foreign spouses; encourages Qatar to ensure that data on violence against women is collected and that all cases of violence against women, including domestic violence, are thoroughly investigated, and that perpetrators are prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Notes the global trend towards decriminalising consensual same-sex relations; calls on Qatar to repeal Article 285 of its criminal code and all other related laws used to criminalise consensual same-sex sexual relations, and to introduce legislation against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity or expression; deplores the reports of abuses to the LGBTQ+ community by the Preventive Security Department forces of Qatar and their use of Law No 17 of 2002 on Protection of Community, which allows for provisional detention without charge or trial for up to six months; is appalled, in this context, by FIFA’s decision regarding the ‘OneLove’ armbands; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Calls on the Qatari authorities to ensure respect for the human rights of all persons attending the 2022 World Cup, including international guests and those living in the country, including for their freedom of religion and belief; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Notes and welcomes Qatar’s deep concern expressed following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes Qatar’s important decisions to vote in favour of all relevant UN resolutions on the issue, in contrast to various GCC members; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Welcomes the cooperation and dialogue between the EU and Qatar, as well as with other Gulf states, which is essential to achieve key objectives of the EU, notably: peaceful and prosperous Gulf and Middle East regions; a strong economic recovery; sustainable, affordable and secure energy supplies; strong collaboration on the green transition; and a strong response to global humanitarian and development needs; welcomes, in this regard, the normalisation of relations between Qatar and its neighbours; praises Qatar’s role in assisting the evacuation of tens of thousands of people from Afghanistan following its violent takeover by the Taliban in September 2021; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of the State of Qatar, the International Federation of Association Football, the Union of European Football Associations, the International Labour Organization and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. |
| --- | --- |

27.

---

(1)  OJ C 436, 24.11.2016, p. 42.

(2)  Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1).

---

RECOMMENDATIONS

European Parliament

Wednesday 23 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/105 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/105

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P9_TA(2022)0406

New EU strategy for enlargement

European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (2022/2064(INI))

(2023/C 167/17)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

| — | having regard to the presidency conclusions of the European Council meeting held in Copenhagen on 21 and 22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the presidency conclusions of the European Council meeting held in Copenhagen on 21 and 22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29 and 30 April 1997 on the application of conditionality with a view to developing a coherent EU strategy for relations with the countries in the Western Balkan region, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29 and 30 April 1997 on the application of conditionality with a view to developing a coherent EU strategy for relations with the countries in the Western Balkan region,

| — | having regard to the declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003, concerning the prospect of the Western Balkan countries joining the EU, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003, concerning the prospect of the Western Balkan countries joining the EU,

| — | having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on the matter, in particular that of 24 October 2019 on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania (1), its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit (2), its resolutions on the 2021 Commission reports on the enlargement countries, and its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the candidate status of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the matter, in particular that of 24 October 2019 on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania (1), its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit (2), its resolutions on the 2021 Commission reports on the enlargement countries, and its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the candidate status of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia (3),

| — | having regard to the EU Global Strategy of 2016, which specifies that a credible enlargement policy represents a strategic investment in Europe’s security and prosperity, and has already contributed greatly to peace in formerly war-torn areas, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Global Strategy of 2016, which specifies that a credible enlargement policy represents a strategic investment in Europe’s security and prosperity, and has already contributed greatly to peace in formerly war-torn areas,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2018 entitled ‘A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ (COM(2018)0065), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2018 entitled ‘A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ (COM(2018)0065),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process — A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process — A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

| — | having regard to the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Sofia and Zagreb on 17 May 2018 and 6 May 2020, and to their respective declarations, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Sofia and Zagreb on 17 May 2018 and 6 May 2020, and to their respective declarations,

| — | having regard to the Brdo Declaration, adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 October 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Brdo Declaration, adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 October 2021,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 30 May 2022 on Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 30 May 2022 on Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia,

| — | having regard to the applications for EU membership submitted by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and the related favourable Commission opinions and European Council conclusions, namely those of 23 and 24 June 2022 on wider Europe, Ukraine, the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, the Western Balkans, economic issues, the Conference on the Future of Europe and external relations, which granted candidate country status to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova and expressed a readiness to do the same for Georgia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the applications for EU membership submitted by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and the related favourable Commission opinions and European Council conclusions, namely those of 23 and 24 June 2022 on wider Europe, Ukraine, the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, the Western Balkans, economic issues, the Conference on the Future of Europe and external relations, which granted candidate country status to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova and expressed a readiness to do the same for Georgia,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 June 2018, 18 June 2019, 25 March 2020 and 14 December 2021 on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process, to the Council conclusions of 15 July 2019 and 14 October 2019 on Türkiye’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, to the European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019, 1 and 2 October 2020 and 15 and 16 October 2020, to the statement of the EU foreign ministers of 15 May 2020 and the main results of their videoconference of 14 August 2020 on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to the outcome of the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Gymnich of 27 and 28 August 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 June 2018, 18 June 2019, 25 March 2020 and 14 December 2021 on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process, to the Council conclusions of 15 July 2019 and 14 October 2019 on Türkiye’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, to the European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019, 1 and 2 October 2020 and 15 and 16 October 2020, to the statement of the EU foreign ministers of 15 May 2020 and the main results of their videoconference of 14 August 2020 on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to the outcome of the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Gymnich of 27 and 28 August 2020,

| — | having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (4), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which entered into force on 1 September 2017, and to the related Association Agenda, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (4), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which entered into force on 1 September 2017, and to the related Association Agenda,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III) (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III) (5),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’, |
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—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 09/2021 of 3 June 2021 entitled ‘Disinformation affecting the EU: tackled but not tamed’, |
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—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 09/2021 of 3 June 2021 entitled ‘Disinformation affecting the EU: tackled but not tamed’,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 19 October 2021 entitled ‘2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2021)0644), |
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—

having regard to the Commission communication of 19 October 2021 entitled ‘2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2021)0644),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 July 2020 entitled ‘Promoting values and rules-based pan-European cooperation and supporting a reinvigorated Council of Europe’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 July 2020 entitled ‘Promoting values and rules-based pan-European cooperation and supporting a reinvigorated Council of Europe’,

| — | having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, as formally approved by the Council on 21 March 2022, |
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—

having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, as formally approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the political agreement of 12 June 2022 on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path, |
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—

having regard to the political agreement of 12 June 2022 on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021 (6), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021 (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties (7), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties (7),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (8), |
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—

having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (8),

| — | having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0251/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0251/2022),

| A. | whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and one of the Union’s most successful policies, and it remains a strategic, future-oriented geopolitical investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity on the European continent; whereas in the light of the growing Russian threat to European peace and stability, an enhanced enlargement policy remains the strongest geopolitical tool at the EU’s disposal; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and one of the Union’s most successful policies, and it remains a strategic, future-oriented geopolitical investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity on the European continent; whereas in the light of the growing Russian threat to European peace and stability, an enhanced enlargement policy remains the strongest geopolitical tool at the EU’s disposal;

| B. | whereas enlargement is a win-win process and has been a very effective and successful instrument for boosting the necessary reforms both within the EU and in applicant countries, helping to encourage democratic transformation; whereas its effectiveness has been considerably diminished over the years due to the EU’s failure to live up to its own promises; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas enlargement is a win-win process and has been a very effective and successful instrument for boosting the necessary reforms both within the EU and in applicant countries, helping to encourage democratic transformation; whereas its effectiveness has been considerably diminished over the years due to the EU’s failure to live up to its own promises;

| C. | whereas enlargement policy should not be seen as a purely political, administrative or technocratic process, but should become more dynamic and outreach-oriented, since accession negotiations entail the progressive transfer and reinforcement of EU values and policies in candidate countries; |
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C.

whereas enlargement policy should not be seen as a purely political, administrative or technocratic process, but should become more dynamic and outreach-oriented, since accession negotiations entail the progressive transfer and reinforcement of EU values and policies in candidate countries;

| D. | whereas the EU is committed to supporting candidate and potential EU candidate countries that share the EU’s common values; whereas the EU continues to be their biggest trading partner and largest provider of investment and financial assistance through the IPA III, the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) — Global Europe, and macro-financial assistance; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the EU is committed to supporting candidate and potential EU candidate countries that share the EU’s common values; whereas the EU continues to be their biggest trading partner and largest provider of investment and financial assistance through the IPA III, the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) — Global Europe, and macro-financial assistance;

| E. | whereas the EU should undertake a comprehensive reflection on the credibility and effectiveness of its enlargement policy, while reforming and strengthening itself, notably the functioning of its institutions, policies and voting procedures; |
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E.

whereas the EU should undertake a comprehensive reflection on the credibility and effectiveness of its enlargement policy, while reforming and strengthening itself, notably the functioning of its institutions, policies and voting procedures;

| F. | whereas a new, clearly defined and strategically, politically and geopolitically focused impetus, political commitment and vision is urgently needed to overcome the status quo, address the EU’s lack of political will over the last decade and re-energise the enlargement process within the EU and in the candidate countries in particular, while ensuring its continuity, consistency, credibility and impact, delivering tangible results in the countries that are part of the enlargement process by implementing concrete reforms and achieving the benchmarks of the new enlargement methodology; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas a new, clearly defined and strategically, politically and geopolitically focused impetus, political commitment and vision is urgently needed to overcome the status quo, address the EU’s lack of political will over the last decade and re-energise the enlargement process within the EU and in the candidate countries in particular, while ensuring its continuity, consistency, credibility and impact, delivering tangible results in the countries that are part of the enlargement process by implementing concrete reforms and achieving the benchmarks of the new enlargement methodology;

| G. | whereas the European Parliament remains a reliable partner for accession countries and an advocate of the enlargement process, enabling institutional and socio-economic reforms for the benefit of citizens; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the European Parliament remains a reliable partner for accession countries and an advocate of the enlargement process, enabling institutional and socio-economic reforms for the benefit of citizens;

| H. | whereas due to internal blockages in the past few years, the Council has failed the enlargement countries by blocking the accession process and not delivering on the EU’s long-outstanding promises, leading to delays in the start of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, as well as visa liberalisation for Kosovo, despite their having fulfilled the required benchmarks, as the Commission itself had confirmed; whereas the EU’s lack of engagement and credibility over the past few years has created a vacuum, thereby opening up space for Russia, China and other malign third actors; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas due to internal blockages in the past few years, the Council has failed the enlargement countries by blocking the accession process and not delivering on the EU’s long-outstanding promises, leading to delays in the start of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, as well as visa liberalisation for Kosovo, despite their having fulfilled the required benchmarks, as the Commission itself had confirmed; whereas the EU’s lack of engagement and credibility over the past few years has created a vacuum, thereby opening up space for Russia, China and other malign third actors;

| I. | whereas limited progress is also due to a lack of genuine political will on the part of some of the political leaders in the enlargement countries to advance fundamental reforms, as the declarations that they have made have not always been commensurate with the level of reforms in the accession process of the respective countries; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas limited progress is also due to a lack of genuine political will on the part of some of the political leaders in the enlargement countries to advance fundamental reforms, as the declarations that they have made have not always been commensurate with the level of reforms in the accession process of the respective countries;

| J. | whereas enlargement policy must be updated to become more flexible, dynamic and rewarding, by taking into consideration both the political realities and the new geopolitical context created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while maintaining the merit-based accession process; whereas in order to become more effective, the EU’s enlargement policy needs to combine a strong focus on the fundamental issues — the rule of law, democratic standards, economic reforms, fundamental rights and freedoms — with the gradual phasing-in of the candidate countries into various sectors of EU integration, moving visibly and constantly towards full membership to sustain the momentum for reform in candidate and potential candidate countries; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas enlargement policy must be updated to become more flexible, dynamic and rewarding, by taking into consideration both the political realities and the new geopolitical context created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while maintaining the merit-based accession process; whereas in order to become more effective, the EU’s enlargement policy needs to combine a strong focus on the fundamental issues — the rule of law, democratic standards, economic reforms, fundamental rights and freedoms — with the gradual phasing-in of the candidate countries into various sectors of EU integration, moving visibly and constantly towards full membership to sustain the momentum for reform in candidate and potential candidate countries;

| K. | whereas the new EU enlargement strategy should be strictly based on upholding the principle of each country being able to freely choose its own path, taking into account the lessons learnt in the ongoing process with the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries; whereas third parties should not be allowed to blackmail or threaten the EU by claiming that EU enlargement is targeted against them; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the new EU enlargement strategy should be strictly based on upholding the principle of each country being able to freely choose its own path, taking into account the lessons learnt in the ongoing process with the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries; whereas third parties should not be allowed to blackmail or threaten the EU by claiming that EU enlargement is targeted against them;

| L. | whereas EU accession countries are facing challenges stemming from malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; whereas past developments have shown that non-enlargement has a serious strategic cost and can undermine security and stability on our continent; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas EU accession countries are facing challenges stemming from malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; whereas past developments have shown that non-enlargement has a serious strategic cost and can undermine security and stability on our continent;

| M. | whereas the transatlantic partnership has been a reliable and constant platform for supporting EU enlargement; whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has once again confirmed the significance of this partnership; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the transatlantic partnership has been a reliable and constant platform for supporting EU enlargement; whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has once again confirmed the significance of this partnership;

| N. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has prompted three countries with EU Association Agreements — Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova — to submit membership applications, expressing their peoples’ wish to live in free and democratic countries firmly anchored in the European family; whereas on 17 June 2022, the Commission published its opinions on the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, recommending to the Council that all three countries should be given the perspective to become a member of the European Union, as well as recommending, in particular, that candidate status be granted to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and to Georgia once the country has fulfilled certain criteria; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has prompted three countries with EU Association Agreements — Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova — to submit membership applications, expressing their peoples’ wish to live in free and democratic countries firmly anchored in the European family; whereas on 17 June 2022, the Commission published its opinions on the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, recommending to the Council that all three countries should be given the perspective to become a member of the European Union, as well as recommending, in particular, that candidate status be granted to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and to Georgia once the country has fulfilled certain criteria;

| O. | whereas on 23 June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, while recognising the European perspective of Georgia; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas on 23 June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, while recognising the European perspective of Georgia;

| P. | whereas the Western Balkans are an area of strategic and geopolitical competition and some of its countries are prone to destabilisation, threatening the security and stability of our continent; whereas third countries are exploiting these vulnerabilities, including through strategic investments and disinformation campaigns; whereas the stability, security and democratic resilience of the accession countries are inextricably linked to the EU’s own security, stability and democratic resilience; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the Western Balkans are an area of strategic and geopolitical competition and some of its countries are prone to destabilisation, threatening the security and stability of our continent; whereas third countries are exploiting these vulnerabilities, including through strategic investments and disinformation campaigns; whereas the stability, security and democratic resilience of the accession countries are inextricably linked to the EU’s own security, stability and democratic resilience;

| Q. | whereas in its conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022, the European Council expressed its full and unequivocal commitment to the Western Balkans’ EU perspective and called for the acceleration of the accession process; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas in its conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022, the European Council expressed its full and unequivocal commitment to the Western Balkans’ EU perspective and called for the acceleration of the accession process;

| R. | whereas in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the Council emphasised that the Western Balkan countries need to continue to make tangible progress on the rule of law and reforms based on European values, rules and standards in order to advance on their European path; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the Council emphasised that the Western Balkan countries need to continue to make tangible progress on the rule of law and reforms based on European values, rules and standards in order to advance on their European path;

| S. | whereas the Council’s decision should be backed up with a concrete action plan that not only includes expected deliverables from the candidate countries, but also ensures that the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have all the necessary support to become EU Member States; whereas the plan should also provide Georgia with a clear roadmap with the tangible requirements it needs to fulfil in order to be granted candidate status and the perspective for joining the EU; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the Council’s decision should be backed up with a concrete action plan that not only includes expected deliverables from the candidate countries, but also ensures that the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have all the necessary support to become EU Member States; whereas the plan should also provide Georgia with a clear roadmap with the tangible requirements it needs to fulfil in order to be granted candidate status and the perspective for joining the EU;

| T. | whereas Russia’s energy war and destruction of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure has exacerbated candidate countries’ dependency and vulnerabilities, highlighting the opportunity and urgent need for substantial and immediate EU financial support, as well as for investments in long-term sustainable energy interconnectivity with the EU, energy diversification and strategic autonomy; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas Russia’s energy war and destruction of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure has exacerbated candidate countries’ dependency and vulnerabilities, highlighting the opportunity and urgent need for substantial and immediate EU financial support, as well as for investments in long-term sustainable energy interconnectivity with the EU, energy diversification and strategic autonomy;

| U. | whereas Türkiye is a candidate country for EU accession; whereas Türkiye remains vastly distant from the EU’s values and normative framework, a gap that is widening in fundamental areas, such as the respect for international law, the rule of law, human rights, individual liberties, civil rights and freedom of expression, as well as good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas Türkiye is a candidate country for EU accession; whereas Türkiye remains vastly distant from the EU’s values and normative framework, a gap that is widening in fundamental areas, such as the respect for international law, the rule of law, human rights, individual liberties, civil rights and freedom of expression, as well as good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation;

| V. | whereas each enlargement country should be judged on its own merits and advancement on the EU path should depend on sustained and irreversible progress made through necessary EU-related reforms, particularly in the area of the rule of law; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas each enlargement country should be judged on its own merits and advancement on the EU path should depend on sustained and irreversible progress made through necessary EU-related reforms, particularly in the area of the rule of law;

| W. | whereas accession to the EU must take place in accordance with Article 49 TEU, based on respect for the relevant procedures and subject to the fulfilment of the established criteria; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas accession to the EU must take place in accordance with Article 49 TEU, based on respect for the relevant procedures and subject to the fulfilment of the established criteria;

| X. | whereas the EU must defend its principles and values by showing solidarity with those who stand up for shared ideals; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas the EU must defend its principles and values by showing solidarity with those who stand up for shared ideals;

| Y. | whereas there is no place in the EU or in countries aspiring to become its Member States for inflammatory rhetoric, genocide denial or the glorification of war criminals from any side; whereas coming to terms with the past is the only way to achieve genuine reconciliation, which is crucial for prosperous societies and successful integration; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas there is no place in the EU or in countries aspiring to become its Member States for inflammatory rhetoric, genocide denial or the glorification of war criminals from any side; whereas coming to terms with the past is the only way to achieve genuine reconciliation, which is crucial for prosperous societies and successful integration;

| 1. | Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: |
| --- | --- |

1.

The geopolitical context and the future and cohesion of the European Union

| (a) | recognise that the EU’s prosperity and security rests on its ability to defend and advance peace, democracy, the rule of law, human rights including minority rights, fundamental freedoms and values, and the rules-based multilateral order, including in its immediate neighbourhood; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

recognise that the EU’s prosperity and security rests on its ability to defend and advance peace, democracy, the rule of law, human rights including minority rights, fundamental freedoms and values, and the rules-based multilateral order, including in its immediate neighbourhood;

| (b) | advance the EU’s enlargement policy as the single most effective EU instrument for securing peace, prosperity and fundamental values on the European continent; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

advance the EU’s enlargement policy as the single most effective EU instrument for securing peace, prosperity and fundamental values on the European continent;

| (c) | retain the geostrategic and geopolitical relevance and credibility of the EU by enhancing the integration of the Member States and cooperation with like-minded partners, especially candidate and potential candidate countries, in the areas of common foreign, security and defence policies, and by streamlining its decision-making processes with a view to becoming a more credible and efficient global player, while enhancing the functioning and transparency of its internal policies, making them easy for candidate countries to adopt; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

retain the geostrategic and geopolitical relevance and credibility of the EU by enhancing the integration of the Member States and cooperation with like-minded partners, especially candidate and potential candidate countries, in the areas of common foreign, security and defence policies, and by streamlining its decision-making processes with a view to becoming a more credible and efficient global player, while enhancing the functioning and transparency of its internal policies, making them easy for candidate countries to adopt;

| (d) | enhance the EU’s capacity to act by reforming decision-making, including through the introduction of qualified majority voting in areas relevant to the accession process, and ensuring the effective functioning of an enlarged union as a whole; abolish, in particular, the requirement for unanimity when deciding on the start of the negotiation process as well as the opening and closing of individual negotiating clusters and chapters; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

enhance the EU’s capacity to act by reforming decision-making, including through the introduction of qualified majority voting in areas relevant to the accession process, and ensuring the effective functioning of an enlarged union as a whole; abolish, in particular, the requirement for unanimity when deciding on the start of the negotiation process as well as the opening and closing of individual negotiating clusters and chapters;

| (e) | recognise the EU’s transformative power throughout the integration process and previous successful rounds of EU enlargement; deliver positive results both for the Western Balkan applicant countries under the stabilisation and association process and the Eastern Partnership applicant countries under the association process; |
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(e)

recognise the EU’s transformative power throughout the integration process and previous successful rounds of EU enlargement; deliver positive results both for the Western Balkan applicant countries under the stabilisation and association process and the Eastern Partnership applicant countries under the association process;

| (f) | acknowledge the need for the EU to enhance the effectiveness of its enlargement policy, upgrade its enlargement strategy and undertake a thorough critical assessment and revision of the EU’s enlargement capacity and perspectives, and enhance it through the new EU strategy for enlargement, including by defining clear and transparent policy objectives and implementing the necessary and timely institutional reforms, while confirming that full accession to the EU is irreplaceable and that the enlargement process will encourage much-awaited EU reforms; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

acknowledge the need for the EU to enhance the effectiveness of its enlargement policy, upgrade its enlargement strategy and undertake a thorough critical assessment and revision of the EU’s enlargement capacity and perspectives, and enhance it through the new EU strategy for enlargement, including by defining clear and transparent policy objectives and implementing the necessary and timely institutional reforms, while confirming that full accession to the EU is irreplaceable and that the enlargement process will encourage much-awaited EU reforms;

| (g) | reconfirm the validity of the Copenhagen criteria and the relevance of the EU’s integration capacity; involve the candidate countries in discussions on EU reforms; continue regular summits with the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries in order to strengthen political ownership and better direct the enlargement process; deliver on the Commission’s intention to begin the necessary preparations for the launch of a European convention and recognise the importance of its success for effectively achieving EU enlargement; |
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(g)

reconfirm the validity of the Copenhagen criteria and the relevance of the EU’s integration capacity; involve the candidate countries in discussions on EU reforms; continue regular summits with the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries in order to strengthen political ownership and better direct the enlargement process; deliver on the Commission’s intention to begin the necessary preparations for the launch of a European convention and recognise the importance of its success for effectively achieving EU enlargement;

| (h) | ensure that the EU remains an evolving community of European states open to the accession of like-minded democracies, which shares and fully protects common values, principles and interests and respects the EU Treaties; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

ensure that the EU remains an evolving community of European states open to the accession of like-minded democracies, which shares and fully protects common values, principles and interests and respects the EU Treaties;

| (i) | strengthen the Member States’ commitment to enlargement by delivering on the EU’s commitment towards the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries; carry out EU enlargement as a merit-based political process; reaffirm their untrammelled political will to proceed further with the accession process for the Eastern Partnership countries and maintain their long-standing commitment to the Western Balkan countries, which dates back to the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit and 1993 Copenhagen summit; ensure that there will be no alternatives to substitute enlargement; |
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(i)

strengthen the Member States’ commitment to enlargement by delivering on the EU’s commitment towards the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries; carry out EU enlargement as a merit-based political process; reaffirm their untrammelled political will to proceed further with the accession process for the Eastern Partnership countries and maintain their long-standing commitment to the Western Balkan countries, which dates back to the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit and 1993 Copenhagen summit; ensure that there will be no alternatives to substitute enlargement;

| (j) | encourage the Member States’ active engagement in the enlargement process to ensure that its objectives are met through its new methodology, combining conditionality and instruments of technical and financial support for the candidate countries; step up the involvement of civil society and the local and regional authorities of both EU Member States and candidate countries in the accession process; |
| --- | --- |

(j)

encourage the Member States’ active engagement in the enlargement process to ensure that its objectives are met through its new methodology, combining conditionality and instruments of technical and financial support for the candidate countries; step up the involvement of civil society and the local and regional authorities of both EU Member States and candidate countries in the accession process;

| (k) | avoid using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes and adopt an official mechanism for the resolution and arbitration of these disputes to support their resolution separately from the accession to the EU, as they can hinder the implementation of European policies and weaken the EU’s regional and global influence; |
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(k)

avoid using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes and adopt an official mechanism for the resolution and arbitration of these disputes to support their resolution separately from the accession to the EU, as they can hinder the implementation of European policies and weaken the EU’s regional and global influence;

| (l) | acknowledge that the Member States’ use of bilateral issues for their own benefit is contrary to the spirit of the EU Treaties; work to achieve regional cooperation and the promotion of European values; |
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(l)

acknowledge that the Member States’ use of bilateral issues for their own benefit is contrary to the spirit of the EU Treaties; work to achieve regional cooperation and the promotion of European values;

| (m) | strengthen strategic communication and provide relevant information on the mutual benefits and opportunities of enlargement both in the accession countries and in the Member States in order to further increase support and improve understanding of the accession process, especially beyond the major cities, with a particular focus on democracy, the rule of law and the welfare of citizens; improve the visibility of EU funding and the tangible results of it in the enlargement countries; |
| --- | --- |

(m)

strengthen strategic communication and provide relevant information on the mutual benefits and opportunities of enlargement both in the accession countries and in the Member States in order to further increase support and improve understanding of the accession process, especially beyond the major cities, with a particular focus on democracy, the rule of law and the welfare of citizens; improve the visibility of EU funding and the tangible results of it in the enlargement countries;

| (n) | work strategically and proactively to counter hybrid threats and to prevent third-party interference in the political, electoral and other democratic processes of the accession countries, in particular malicious acts aimed at manipulating public opinion and undermining European integration; increase resilience against disinformation and disruptive campaigns designed to undermine democratic processes and create divisions, and encourage candidate and potential candidate countries to take decisive steps to tackle manipulative disinformation, malign propaganda and other hybrid threats; |
| --- | --- |

(n)

work strategically and proactively to counter hybrid threats and to prevent third-party interference in the political, electoral and other democratic processes of the accession countries, in particular malicious acts aimed at manipulating public opinion and undermining European integration; increase resilience against disinformation and disruptive campaigns designed to undermine democratic processes and create divisions, and encourage candidate and potential candidate countries to take decisive steps to tackle manipulative disinformation, malign propaganda and other hybrid threats;

Accession process

| (o) | overcome the enlargement gridlock by revamping the accession process to clearly define political and socio-economic aims, making full use of the new enlargement methodology to increase its credibility, predictability and dynamism; consider appointing EU chief negotiators to carry out negotiations under a broad negotiating mandate, who would also be accountable to the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

(o)

overcome the enlargement gridlock by revamping the accession process to clearly define political and socio-economic aims, making full use of the new enlargement methodology to increase its credibility, predictability and dynamism; consider appointing EU chief negotiators to carry out negotiations under a broad negotiating mandate, who would also be accountable to the European Parliament;

| (p) | accelerate the integration of countries that demonstrate strategic orientation and unwavering commitment to EU-related reforms, democratic consolidation, fundamental values and foreign policy alignment, including sanctions; |
| --- | --- |

(p)

accelerate the integration of countries that demonstrate strategic orientation and unwavering commitment to EU-related reforms, democratic consolidation, fundamental values and foreign policy alignment, including sanctions;

| (q) | ensure that each country’s progress on the path to accession is assessed on its own merits and the extent to which it has adopted and implemented fundamental reforms and the EU acquis; refocus the accession process on citizens; |
| --- | --- |

(q)

ensure that each country’s progress on the path to accession is assessed on its own merits and the extent to which it has adopted and implemented fundamental reforms and the EU acquis; refocus the accession process on citizens;

| (r) | offer membership-oriented roadmaps for each individual accession country with tangible and concrete steps as well as regular feedback on the results achieved by further enhancing the enlargement methodology; anchor the Commission’s new methodology as a long-term policy adjustment; |
| --- | --- |

(r)

offer membership-oriented roadmaps for each individual accession country with tangible and concrete steps as well as regular feedback on the results achieved by further enhancing the enlargement methodology; anchor the Commission’s new methodology as a long-term policy adjustment;

| (s) | apply clear, transparent and consistent performance benchmarks including timelines, improve the measuring of progress and ensure consistent and continued political and technical support throughout the accession process based on individual performance; improve the quality, readability and accessibility of the Commission’s reports, especially on the rule of law; provide regular reporting on the lack of progress or backtracking in a systematic and transparent manner, including clear conditions for assessment and indicators to measure any serious or prolonged stagnation or backsliding; establish clear deadlines for concluding negotiations with the accession countries by the end of the current decade at the latest; |
| --- | --- |

(s)

apply clear, transparent and consistent performance benchmarks including timelines, improve the measuring of progress and ensure consistent and continued political and technical support throughout the accession process based on individual performance; improve the quality, readability and accessibility of the Commission’s reports, especially on the rule of law; provide regular reporting on the lack of progress or backtracking in a systematic and transparent manner, including clear conditions for assessment and indicators to measure any serious or prolonged stagnation or backsliding; establish clear deadlines for concluding negotiations with the accession countries by the end of the current decade at the latest;

| (t) | step up political, economic and technical incentives for accession countries, ensuring that intermediate integration steps do not substitute but facilitate the final goal of EU membership; |
| --- | --- |

(t)

step up political, economic and technical incentives for accession countries, ensuring that intermediate integration steps do not substitute but facilitate the final goal of EU membership;

| (u) | reward sustainable progress with a wider phasing-in of candidate countries into respective EU policies, initiatives and the single market, including access to EU funds in the respective areas, enabling citizens to reap the benefits of accession throughout the process and not only upon its completion; work to reduce the development gaps between the Member States and EU candidate countries; |
| --- | --- |

(u)

reward sustainable progress with a wider phasing-in of candidate countries into respective EU policies, initiatives and the single market, including access to EU funds in the respective areas, enabling citizens to reap the benefits of accession throughout the process and not only upon its completion; work to reduce the development gaps between the Member States and EU candidate countries;

| (v) | ensure that integration within the EU single market and other areas is based on strict conditionality and tangible progress on reforms, while sanctioning in real time any backtracking or unjustified delays in the reform process, especially in the fields of democracy, media freedom, the fight against corruption, human rights and the rule of law; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

ensure that integration within the EU single market and other areas is based on strict conditionality and tangible progress on reforms, while sanctioning in real time any backtracking or unjustified delays in the reform process, especially in the fields of democracy, media freedom, the fight against corruption, human rights and the rule of law;

| (w) | extend the opportunities for candidate countries to participate in and observe the work of the EU institutions; |
| --- | --- |

(w)

extend the opportunities for candidate countries to participate in and observe the work of the EU institutions;

| (x) | establish enhanced structured political dialogue with associated, candidate and potential candidate countries, including leaders’ meetings on the margins of the European Council; open sectoral cooperation with accession countries and ramp up exchanges on best practices in order to advance further economic integration and legislative harmonisation and facilitate gradual integration; |
| --- | --- |

(x)

establish enhanced structured political dialogue with associated, candidate and potential candidate countries, including leaders’ meetings on the margins of the European Council; open sectoral cooperation with accession countries and ramp up exchanges on best practices in order to advance further economic integration and legislative harmonisation and facilitate gradual integration;

| (y) | recognise the role of existing intergovernmental bodies and forums such as the Adriatic Ionian Initiative, the Central European Initiative and the Berlin Process, and promote synergies between them in order to increase the multilateral ties between the Western Balkan and the Member States as a means of advancing integration; |
| --- | --- |

(y)

recognise the role of existing intergovernmental bodies and forums such as the Adriatic Ionian Initiative, the Central European Initiative and the Berlin Process, and promote synergies between them in order to increase the multilateral ties between the Western Balkan and the Member States as a means of advancing integration;

| (z) | welcome the start of the long overdue accession talks at the first intergovernmental conferences with the Republics of Albania and North Macedonia held on 19 July 2022; recognise Western Balkan countries’ achievements in a timely manner, including by granting visa liberalisation to Kosovo without delay; |
| --- | --- |

(z)

welcome the start of the long overdue accession talks at the first intergovernmental conferences with the Republics of Albania and North Macedonia held on 19 July 2022; recognise Western Balkan countries’ achievements in a timely manner, including by granting visa liberalisation to Kosovo without delay;

| (aa) | encourage and support Bosnia and Herzegovina in improving its legislative and institutional framework to ensure meaningful progress in addressing the 14 key priorities, as reiterated in the European Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022; in this context, the European Parliament welcomes the Commission’s recommendation with conditions for granting candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a clear message of support and unequivocal commitment to its European perspective as well as a step towards the stabilisation of the country and the region, and calls on the European Council to follow up on the recommendation as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

(aa)

encourage and support Bosnia and Herzegovina in improving its legislative and institutional framework to ensure meaningful progress in addressing the 14 key priorities, as reiterated in the European Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022; in this context, the European Parliament welcomes the Commission’s recommendation with conditions for granting candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a clear message of support and unequivocal commitment to its European perspective as well as a step towards the stabilisation of the country and the region, and calls on the European Council to follow up on the recommendation as soon as possible;

| (ab) | underline the need for clear progress in the implementation of key reforms with a view to granting the status of candidate country; |
| --- | --- |

(ab)

underline the need for clear progress in the implementation of key reforms with a view to granting the status of candidate country;

| (ac) | continue to encourage and support the acceleration of Montenegro’s accession, as the frontrunner in the EU accession process; assist the country in fulfilling all the necessary conditions, including by setting the closing benchmarks for negotiating chapters; call for the country’s multi-ethnic identity to be respected; in this context, the European Parliament expresses concern about the persistent political crisis in Montenegro, which has already had and continues to have negative consequences for the country’s EU accession path; recalls that all legislative actions must be aligned with the country’s constitution, as the rule of law is one of the fundamental European values and principles; |
| --- | --- |

(ac)

continue to encourage and support the acceleration of Montenegro’s accession, as the frontrunner in the EU accession process; assist the country in fulfilling all the necessary conditions, including by setting the closing benchmarks for negotiating chapters; call for the country’s multi-ethnic identity to be respected; in this context, the European Parliament expresses concern about the persistent political crisis in Montenegro, which has already had and continues to have negative consequences for the country’s EU accession path; recalls that all legislative actions must be aligned with the country’s constitution, as the rule of law is one of the fundamental European values and principles;

| (ad) | welcome the European Council’s exceptionally swift decision on the EU membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia and continue to provide them with political and technical support in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; invite the authorities of the three countries to unambiguously demonstrate their political determination to realise the European aspirations of their people by making significant progress on substantial reforms, in particular the priorities outlined in the Commission’s opinions of 17 June 2022, in order to effectively fulfil the criteria for EU membership as soon as possible; launch a reflection on how to enhance the effectiveness of accession-related financial and technical assistance in line with the stated reform priorities; |
| --- | --- |

(ad)

welcome the European Council’s exceptionally swift decision on the EU membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia and continue to provide them with political and technical support in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; invite the authorities of the three countries to unambiguously demonstrate their political determination to realise the European aspirations of their people by making significant progress on substantial reforms, in particular the priorities outlined in the Commission’s opinions of 17 June 2022, in order to effectively fulfil the criteria for EU membership as soon as possible; launch a reflection on how to enhance the effectiveness of accession-related financial and technical assistance in line with the stated reform priorities;

| (ae) | encourage continuous and effective implementation of the Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia; review the EU’s Eastern Partnership strategy and enhance regional cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

(ae)

encourage continuous and effective implementation of the Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia; review the EU’s Eastern Partnership strategy and enhance regional cooperation;

| (af) | assist Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to help them meet the conditions set by the Commission for further steps towards EU membership, and assist Georgia to help it complete the necessary steps to obtain candidate status; focus in particular on the independence of the judiciary, the fight against corruption, democratic oversight, human rights and de-oligarchisation; facilitate these countries’ transitions from the Eastern Partnership to the enlargement framework, including the switchover from the NDICI — Global Europe instrument to the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA); sufficiently increase the overall budget of IPA III in order to retain funding for current IPA III beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

(af)

assist Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to help them meet the conditions set by the Commission for further steps towards EU membership, and assist Georgia to help it complete the necessary steps to obtain candidate status; focus in particular on the independence of the judiciary, the fight against corruption, democratic oversight, human rights and de-oligarchisation; facilitate these countries’ transitions from the Eastern Partnership to the enlargement framework, including the switchover from the NDICI — Global Europe instrument to the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA); sufficiently increase the overall budget of IPA III in order to retain funding for current IPA III beneficiaries;

| (ag) | step up the EU’s constructive engagement with the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement based on mutual recognition between the two in the framework of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is crucial for both countries to advance on their respective European paths and will contribute to regional stability, prosperity and the normalisation of relations; reiterate the crucial importance of addressing all outstanding issues through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue swiftly, transparently and in good faith; |
| --- | --- |

(ag)

step up the EU’s constructive engagement with the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement based on mutual recognition between the two in the framework of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is crucial for both countries to advance on their respective European paths and will contribute to regional stability, prosperity and the normalisation of relations; reiterate the crucial importance of addressing all outstanding issues through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue swiftly, transparently and in good faith;

| (ah) | prioritise the alignment of accession countries with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and advance accession negotiations with Serbia only if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on the EU-related reforms; call on Serbia to systematically align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia, demonstrate progress in democracy and the rule of law and embrace EU values and priorities; reconsider any bilateral and EU funds for Serbia that would benefit the Serbian authorities, in particular any pertaining to projects financed under the Western Balkan Economic and Investment Plan, in order to ensure that all EU expenditure is fully in line with the EU’s strategic goals and interests; |
| --- | --- |

(ah)

prioritise the alignment of accession countries with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and advance accession negotiations with Serbia only if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on the EU-related reforms; call on Serbia to systematically align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia, demonstrate progress in democracy and the rule of law and embrace EU values and priorities; reconsider any bilateral and EU funds for Serbia that would benefit the Serbian authorities, in particular any pertaining to projects financed under the Western Balkan Economic and Investment Plan, in order to ensure that all EU expenditure is fully in line with the EU’s strategic goals and interests;

| (ai) | keep the process of accession negotiations with Türkiye frozen, in accordance with the negotiating framework, until the country genuinely engages with the EU and demonstrates clear and significant progress in the field of fundamental freedoms, civil and human rights and the rule of law, as well as other EU-related reforms, and fully respects the territorial integrity of the Member States, while continuing a partnership in essential areas of joint interest and maintaining economic and cultural cooperation, especially with civil society; |
| --- | --- |

(ai)

keep the process of accession negotiations with Türkiye frozen, in accordance with the negotiating framework, until the country genuinely engages with the EU and demonstrates clear and significant progress in the field of fundamental freedoms, civil and human rights and the rule of law, as well as other EU-related reforms, and fully respects the territorial integrity of the Member States, while continuing a partnership in essential areas of joint interest and maintaining economic and cultural cooperation, especially with civil society;

| (aj) | recognise and support the pro-European aspirations of the Belarusian people, who seek to live in a free and democratic society, and formally engage with the democratic opposition of Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

(aj)

recognise and support the pro-European aspirations of the Belarusian people, who seek to live in a free and democratic society, and formally engage with the democratic opposition of Belarus;

Conditionality

| (ak) | confirm that the democratic transformation and the rule of law have a central role in the EU accession process, in line with the new methodology; prioritise judicial independence, regional and judicial cooperation, good governance, the fight against corruption, trafficking, disinformation, money laundering and organised crime, eradicating the improper influence of oligarchs on authorities, the media and the economy, and advancing human rights, including minority rights, gender equality, fundamental freedoms and media freedom, as crucial, non-negotiable preconditions for progress on the EU path; |
| --- | --- |

(ak)

confirm that the democratic transformation and the rule of law have a central role in the EU accession process, in line with the new methodology; prioritise judicial independence, regional and judicial cooperation, good governance, the fight against corruption, trafficking, disinformation, money laundering and organised crime, eradicating the improper influence of oligarchs on authorities, the media and the economy, and advancing human rights, including minority rights, gender equality, fundamental freedoms and media freedom, as crucial, non-negotiable preconditions for progress on the EU path;

| (al) | strengthen the involvement of civil society, non-governmental organisations and experts in monitoring the accession process; acknowledge and embed within its enlargement strategy the fact that the rule of law, strong independent democratic institutions, media freedom and a vibrant civil society are inextricably linked to democratic resilience; |
| --- | --- |

(al)

strengthen the involvement of civil society, non-governmental organisations and experts in monitoring the accession process; acknowledge and embed within its enlargement strategy the fact that the rule of law, strong independent democratic institutions, media freedom and a vibrant civil society are inextricably linked to democratic resilience;

| (am) | implement the EU human rights sanctions regime (the European Magnitsky Act), and extend it to include sanctions for corruption crimes, covering accession countries; |
| --- | --- |

(am)

implement the EU human rights sanctions regime (the European Magnitsky Act), and extend it to include sanctions for corruption crimes, covering accession countries;

| (an) | ensure that democratic and legal standards are not undermined or downplayed from within the EU institutions or by the Member States; remind European Commissioners of their obligation to act with integrity, discretion and independence in accordance with their code of conduct; |
| --- | --- |

(an)

ensure that democratic and legal standards are not undermined or downplayed from within the EU institutions or by the Member States; remind European Commissioners of their obligation to act with integrity, discretion and independence in accordance with their code of conduct;

| (ao) | improve the consistency, efficiency, visibility and transparency of pre-accession assistance, clearly reflecting the priorities in the fundamental areas in the allocation of IPA III funding; take the necessary corrective measures and develop guidelines on the application of IPA III provisions on conditionality in line with the findings of the European Court of Auditors in its special report of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans; |
| --- | --- |

(ao)

improve the consistency, efficiency, visibility and transparency of pre-accession assistance, clearly reflecting the priorities in the fundamental areas in the allocation of IPA III funding; take the necessary corrective measures and develop guidelines on the application of IPA III provisions on conditionality in line with the findings of the European Court of Auditors in its special report of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans;

| (ap) | provide the European Parliament with a full and in-depth evaluation of the use of all pre-accession funds, including funds and projects in individual countries in the region from 2015 onwards; |
| --- | --- |

(ap)

provide the European Parliament with a full and in-depth evaluation of the use of all pre-accession funds, including funds and projects in individual countries in the region from 2015 onwards;

| (aq) | strategically apply targeted conditionality based on clear progress benchmarks, rewarding reforms and sanctioning regression or a persistent lack of progress; |
| --- | --- |

(aq)

strategically apply targeted conditionality based on clear progress benchmarks, rewarding reforms and sanctioning regression or a persistent lack of progress;

| (ar) | strengthen rule of law reporting for all accession countries by fully implementing and enhancing the enlargement methodology and the annual reporting process, and by establishing monitoring, dialogue and warning mechanisms for rectifying major rule of law deficiencies, offering positive conditionality in the form of access to EU policies or triggering negative conditionality in the form of the suspension of accession negotiations and pre-accession funding, in particular by making the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 on IPA III swiftly and fully operational, and enabling the reopening of the negotiation chapters under reversibility clauses, as well as by closely involving civil society in the process; |
| --- | --- |

(ar)

strengthen rule of law reporting for all accession countries by fully implementing and enhancing the enlargement methodology and the annual reporting process, and by establishing monitoring, dialogue and warning mechanisms for rectifying major rule of law deficiencies, offering positive conditionality in the form of access to EU policies or triggering negative conditionality in the form of the suspension of accession negotiations and pre-accession funding, in particular by making the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 on IPA III swiftly and fully operational, and enabling the reopening of the negotiation chapters under reversibility clauses, as well as by closely involving civil society in the process;

| (as) | establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries; encourage candidates and potential candidates for EU accession to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; |
| --- | --- |

(as)

establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries; encourage candidates and potential candidates for EU accession to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO;

| (at) | formally assess accession countries under the EU’s rule of law mechanism and report, and the EU Justice Scoreboard, using the same indicators that apply to the Member States with the aim of providing an objective and clear picture of the state of play in order to prevent a persistent lack of progress, serious deficiencies and regression; |
| --- | --- |

(at)

formally assess accession countries under the EU’s rule of law mechanism and report, and the EU Justice Scoreboard, using the same indicators that apply to the Member States with the aim of providing an objective and clear picture of the state of play in order to prevent a persistent lack of progress, serious deficiencies and regression;

| (au) | set up a dedicated rule of law task force, to be entrusted with developing more substantial and effective support to candidate and potential candidate countries, with the active involvement of judges and prosecutors from the Member States; ensure that compliance with the EU’s common values is enforced by applying and strengthening internal procedures to decisively tackle problems with the rule of law; |
| --- | --- |

(au)

set up a dedicated rule of law task force, to be entrusted with developing more substantial and effective support to candidate and potential candidate countries, with the active involvement of judges and prosecutors from the Member States; ensure that compliance with the EU’s common values is enforced by applying and strengthening internal procedures to decisively tackle problems with the rule of law;

Democratic and socio-economic transformation in candidate countries

| (av) | actively engage in fostering a culture of political pluralism and inclusion, as well as constructive political dialogue and parliamentary functions with regard to legislation, scrutiny and oversight; |
| --- | --- |

(av)

actively engage in fostering a culture of political pluralism and inclusion, as well as constructive political dialogue and parliamentary functions with regard to legislation, scrutiny and oversight;

| (aw) | foster electoral reforms with the aim of ensuring undisputed free, fair and democratic election processes in all candidate and aspiring countries and strengthening the electoral process with respect to OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Venice Commission and other international commitments, obligations and standards, democratic pluralism, intra-party democracy, and the adoption of internal frameworks for integrity and fighting corruption within political parties, the transparency of party and media funding, and judicial and media independence and freedom, by setting these benchmarks as preconditions for financial support and any further progress in the accession process; |
| --- | --- |

(aw)

foster electoral reforms with the aim of ensuring undisputed free, fair and democratic election processes in all candidate and aspiring countries and strengthening the electoral process with respect to OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Venice Commission and other international commitments, obligations and standards, democratic pluralism, intra-party democracy, and the adoption of internal frameworks for integrity and fighting corruption within political parties, the transparency of party and media funding, and judicial and media independence and freedom, by setting these benchmarks as preconditions for financial support and any further progress in the accession process;

| (ax) | conduct regular enhanced rule of law expert and electoral observation missions to accession countries; |
| --- | --- |

(ax)

conduct regular enhanced rule of law expert and electoral observation missions to accession countries;

| (ay) | take action against hate speech, smear campaigns, threats and intimidation against journalists and media outlets and insist on the investigation and prosecution of such offences, enabling a safe environment for journalists, while tackling the issues of media concentration, political and economic pressure and the lack of transparency of media ownership; continue its cooperation with the Council of Europe to support accession countries in carrying out essential reforms and training; |
| --- | --- |

(ay)

take action against hate speech, smear campaigns, threats and intimidation against journalists and media outlets and insist on the investigation and prosecution of such offences, enabling a safe environment for journalists, while tackling the issues of media concentration, political and economic pressure and the lack of transparency of media ownership; continue its cooperation with the Council of Europe to support accession countries in carrying out essential reforms and training;

| (az) | uphold democratic accountability, increase transparency and inclusiveness and enhance the parliamentary dimension, especially parliamentary oversight, of the accession process; support parliamentary work in candidate and potential candidate countries and facilitate the accession-related scrutiny and democracy support activities of the European Parliament and democracy support tools, such as the Jean Monnet dialogue and inter-party dialogue; support a new generation of political leaders in the accession countries; |
| --- | --- |

(az)

uphold democratic accountability, increase transparency and inclusiveness and enhance the parliamentary dimension, especially parliamentary oversight, of the accession process; support parliamentary work in candidate and potential candidate countries and facilitate the accession-related scrutiny and democracy support activities of the European Parliament and democracy support tools, such as the Jean Monnet dialogue and inter-party dialogue; support a new generation of political leaders in the accession countries;

| (ba) | ensure that oversight institutions and other independent democratic bodies are able to effectively carry out their role in the political processes of candidate countries, as provided for by their constitutions; |
| --- | --- |

(ba)

ensure that oversight institutions and other independent democratic bodies are able to effectively carry out their role in the political processes of candidate countries, as provided for by their constitutions;

| (bb) | encourage bilateral parliamentary meetings between the parliaments of both the Member States and the accession countries and consider ways to bring forward the period when observers from candidate countries can take up their seats in the European Parliament, as well as closing negotiations on specific clusters; |
| --- | --- |

(bb)

encourage bilateral parliamentary meetings between the parliaments of both the Member States and the accession countries and consider ways to bring forward the period when observers from candidate countries can take up their seats in the European Parliament, as well as closing negotiations on specific clusters;

| (bc) | ensure that the enlargement process delivers on the goals of democratic consolidation, institutional integrity, long-term growth and socio-economic cohesion, while underlining the direct link between the rule of law and fighting corruption and sustainable and equitable economic development; focus on mitigating the negative social repercussions of the necessary transformation processes in candidate countries, adding information on approximation to the EU’s social acquis in the annual reports; work to prevent and reverse the brain drain from candidate countries; |
| --- | --- |

(bc)

ensure that the enlargement process delivers on the goals of democratic consolidation, institutional integrity, long-term growth and socio-economic cohesion, while underlining the direct link between the rule of law and fighting corruption and sustainable and equitable economic development; focus on mitigating the negative social repercussions of the necessary transformation processes in candidate countries, adding information on approximation to the EU’s social acquis in the annual reports; work to prevent and reverse the brain drain from candidate countries;

| (bd) | considerably reinforce efforts towards settling conflicts, promoting confidence, achieving sustainable reconciliation covering the effective and impartial prosecution of war crimes, and ensuring access to truth, justice and effective and non-selective reparations, including for the victims of sexual violence; facilitate the full implementation of domestic and international court rulings and compliance with international obligations on war crimes and missing persons, addressing the glorification of war criminals and historical revisionism; |
| --- | --- |

(bd)

considerably reinforce efforts towards settling conflicts, promoting confidence, achieving sustainable reconciliation covering the effective and impartial prosecution of war crimes, and ensuring access to truth, justice and effective and non-selective reparations, including for the victims of sexual violence; facilitate the full implementation of domestic and international court rulings and compliance with international obligations on war crimes and missing persons, addressing the glorification of war criminals and historical revisionism;

| (be) | step up efforts towards good neighbourly relations, inclusive and effective socio-economic cooperation at a regional level and solidarity in EU accession countries as well as regional cross-border cooperation between EU Member States and partner countries along the EU’s external borders; enhance economic competitiveness and social cohesion in the Western Balkans through structural reforms and by establishing regional economic cooperation that is acceptable to all six countries, pursuing further alignment with EU standards and acquis and contributing to the EU integration process; in this context, the European Parliament welcomes the recent agreements at the Berlin Process Summit, in particular the conclusion of regional mobility agreements on the freedom of travel with ID cards and the recognition of academic diplomas and vocational certificates; express strong reservations about any regional economic cooperation initiative that does not encompass all six Western Balkan countries and is not based on EU rules, such as the Open Balkan initiative; |
| --- | --- |

(be)

step up efforts towards good neighbourly relations, inclusive and effective socio-economic cooperation at a regional level and solidarity in EU accession countries as well as regional cross-border cooperation between EU Member States and partner countries along the EU’s external borders; enhance economic competitiveness and social cohesion in the Western Balkans through structural reforms and by establishing regional economic cooperation that is acceptable to all six countries, pursuing further alignment with EU standards and acquis and contributing to the EU integration process; in this context, the European Parliament welcomes the recent agreements at the Berlin Process Summit, in particular the conclusion of regional mobility agreements on the freedom of travel with ID cards and the recognition of academic diplomas and vocational certificates; express strong reservations about any regional economic cooperation initiative that does not encompass all six Western Balkan countries and is not based on EU rules, such as the Open Balkan initiative;

| (bf) | insist on the need to build an inclusive society free from discrimination, racism, violent nationalism and extremism; focus on the protection of minorities, including Roma, LGBTIQ+ persons, ethnic and religious communities, and persons with disabilities as well as on the preservation of cultural and linguistic diversity; mainstream gender equality and the rights of women and girls, empower and invest in women and young people, and step up the fight against gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

(bf)

insist on the need to build an inclusive society free from discrimination, racism, violent nationalism and extremism; focus on the protection of minorities, including Roma, LGBTIQ+ persons, ethnic and religious communities, and persons with disabilities as well as on the preservation of cultural and linguistic diversity; mainstream gender equality and the rights of women and girls, empower and invest in women and young people, and step up the fight against gender-based violence;

| (bg) | deplore human rights violations and the inhumane treatment of asylum seekers and migrants; work to ensure that the conditions for detainees and prisoners are dignified and in line with international standards; condemn torture and impunity for serious abuses by law enforcement agencies; |
| --- | --- |

(bg)

deplore human rights violations and the inhumane treatment of asylum seekers and migrants; work to ensure that the conditions for detainees and prisoners are dignified and in line with international standards; condemn torture and impunity for serious abuses by law enforcement agencies;

| (bh) | step up citizen participation and the involvement of civil society in the enlargement process by increasing cooperation with, support for and the funding allocated to civil society; ensure that civil society organisations continue to receive adequate financial support following EU accession; |
| --- | --- |

(bh)

step up citizen participation and the involvement of civil society in the enlargement process by increasing cooperation with, support for and the funding allocated to civil society; ensure that civil society organisations continue to receive adequate financial support following EU accession;

| (bi) | invest in youth and intraregional mobility and connectivity, including by offering broad access to Erasmus+, and increasing its budget, as well as to other mobility programmes for young academics, specialists and researchers from candidate countries; foster, in addition, the further integration of partner countries into EU programmes, such as Erasmus+, Horizon Europe and Creative Europe, and improve cooperation in the framework of current and future programmes; work to tackle youth unemployment; |
| --- | --- |

(bi)

invest in youth and intraregional mobility and connectivity, including by offering broad access to Erasmus+, and increasing its budget, as well as to other mobility programmes for young academics, specialists and researchers from candidate countries; foster, in addition, the further integration of partner countries into EU programmes, such as Erasmus+, Horizon Europe and Creative Europe, and improve cooperation in the framework of current and future programmes; work to tackle youth unemployment;

| (bj) | promote people-to-people contacts between EU Member States and candidate countries and bolster youth exchange programmes; acknowledge the importance of cross-border mobility in strengthening these contacts, and encourage the development of border infrastructure to this end; reinforce and, where possible, increase the EU’s and Western Balkan countries’ common efforts on people-to-people contacts and exchanges in order to build mutually positive images among the population; |
| --- | --- |

(bj)

promote people-to-people contacts between EU Member States and candidate countries and bolster youth exchange programmes; acknowledge the importance of cross-border mobility in strengthening these contacts, and encourage the development of border infrastructure to this end; reinforce and, where possible, increase the EU’s and Western Balkan countries’ common efforts on people-to-people contacts and exchanges in order to build mutually positive images among the population;

| (bk) | increase support for economic development, the market economy, transport connectivity, competitiveness and green transition; |
| --- | --- |

(bk)

increase support for economic development, the market economy, transport connectivity, competitiveness and green transition;

| (bl) | strengthen partnerships between candidate countries and the EU through principal infrastructure projects within the framework of the Trans-European Energy (TEN-E) and Transport (TEN-T) Networks, while increasing financial assistance to candidate countries in order to alleviate cross-border bottlenecks and develop transport links for passengers and freight transport; |
| --- | --- |

(bl)

strengthen partnerships between candidate countries and the EU through principal infrastructure projects within the framework of the Trans-European Energy (TEN-E) and Transport (TEN-T) Networks, while increasing financial assistance to candidate countries in order to alleviate cross-border bottlenecks and develop transport links for passengers and freight transport;

| (bm) | advance energy efficiency, connectivity and the clean energy transition, increasing the diversification and security of energy supply, as well as sustainable development; ensure that the energy transition is conducted fairly and in a socially sustainable manner, with vulnerable groups adequately supported by the EU and its Member States; take immediate steps to achieve long-term and sustainable connection of candidate countries to the European energy transmission network; mobilise significant investments to support the development of local renewable solutions; include the candidate countries in the EU’s energy policy strategies, with a special focus on those which are heavily dependent on Russian gas and are severely impacted due to their European choice; |
| --- | --- |

(bm)

advance energy efficiency, connectivity and the clean energy transition, increasing the diversification and security of energy supply, as well as sustainable development; ensure that the energy transition is conducted fairly and in a socially sustainable manner, with vulnerable groups adequately supported by the EU and its Member States; take immediate steps to achieve long-term and sustainable connection of candidate countries to the European energy transmission network; mobilise significant investments to support the development of local renewable solutions; include the candidate countries in the EU’s energy policy strategies, with a special focus on those which are heavily dependent on Russian gas and are severely impacted due to their European choice;

| (bn) | implement a roadmap for phasing out roaming fees between the EU and accession countries; |
| --- | --- |

(bn)

implement a roadmap for phasing out roaming fees between the EU and accession countries;

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and, for information, to the governments and parliaments of the accession countries. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 86.

(2)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 129.

(3)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0249.

(4)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(5)  OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1.

(6)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 148.

(7)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0244.

(8)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0235.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/116 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/116

---

P9_TA(2022)0407

Situation in Libya

European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Libya (2021/2064(INI))

(2023/C 167/18)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 25 June 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 25 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019,

| — | having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 24 December 2021 on the postponement of the elections, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 24 December 2021 on the postponement of the elections,

| — | having regard to the declaration by the VP/HR of 11 March 2021 on behalf of the European Union on the approval of the new Government of National Unity, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declaration by the VP/HR of 11 March 2021 on behalf of the European Union on the approval of the new Government of National Unity,

| — | having regard to the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the status of refugees, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the status of refugees,

| — | having regard to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF),

| — | having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’(JOIN(2021)0002), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’(JOIN(2021)0002),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

| — | having regard to the UN resolution entitled ‘Transforming our World — the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York (the UN 2030 Agenda), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN resolution entitled ‘Transforming our World — the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York (the UN 2030 Agenda),

| — | having regard to the Paris Agreement, adopted by decision 1/CP.21, to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and to the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11), held in Paris, France from 30 November to 11 December 2015, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Paris Agreement, adopted by decision 1/CP.21, to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and to the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11), held in Paris, France from 30 November to 11 December 2015,

| — | having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 18 September 1997, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 18 September 1997,

| — | having regard to the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008,

| — | having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 31 October 2000 on women and peace and security, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 31 October 2000 on women and peace and security,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,

| — | having regard to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 1 July 1990, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 1 July 1990,

| — | having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 26 February 2011 and all subsequent resolutions on the arms embargo in Libya, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 26 February 2011 and all subsequent resolutions on the arms embargo in Libya,

| — | having regard to the UN Security Council resolutions of 29 April 2022, 28 July 2022 and 28 October 2022 on Libya, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Security Council resolutions of 29 April 2022, 28 July 2022 and 28 October 2022 on Libya,

| — | having regard to the report of the Secretary-General of 20 May 2022 on the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Secretary-General of 20 May 2022 on the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),

| — | having regard to the 23rd Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council of 28 April 2022 pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 23rd Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council of 28 April 2022 pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011),

| — | having regard to the UN’s 2020 Roadmap ‘For the Preparatory Phase of a Comprehensive Solution’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN’s 2020 Roadmap ‘For the Preparatory Phase of a Comprehensive Solution’,

| — | having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 22 June 2020 establishing a fact-finding mission to Libya and that of 8 July 2022 extending its mandate for nine months, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 22 June 2020 establishing a fact-finding mission to Libya and that of 8 July 2022 extending its mandate for nine months,

| — | having regard to the reports of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya to the UN Human Rights Council of 29 November 2021, 23 March 2022, 27 June 2022 and 1 July 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reports of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya to the UN Human Rights Council of 29 November 2021, 23 March 2022, 27 June 2022 and 1 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy (1),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 30 May 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its recommendation of 30 May 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya (2),

| — | having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0252/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0252/2022),

| A. | whereas over the past decade, deep divisions and confrontations between major Libyan stakeholders, further exacerbated by interference from foreign actors, has led to continuous power struggles and significantly hindered the national reconciliation process; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas over the past decade, deep divisions and confrontations between major Libyan stakeholders, further exacerbated by interference from foreign actors, has led to continuous power struggles and significantly hindered the national reconciliation process;

| B. | whereas in November 2020, UNSMIL facilitated the first round of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which consisted in 75 Libyan participants representing the full social and political spectrum of Libyan society; whereas the LPDF agreed on a roadmap on credible, inclusive and democratic national elections, to be held on 24 December 2021; whereas in February 2021 the LPDF elected Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh to head the interim Government of National Unity; whereas the approval of the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) by the Libyan House of Representatives based in Tobruk in March 2021 temporarily addressed the political deadlock and the situation of contested legitimacy in the country; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas in November 2020, UNSMIL facilitated the first round of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which consisted in 75 Libyan participants representing the full social and political spectrum of Libyan society; whereas the LPDF agreed on a roadmap on credible, inclusive and democratic national elections, to be held on 24 December 2021; whereas in February 2021 the LPDF elected Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh to head the interim Government of National Unity; whereas the approval of the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) by the Libyan House of Representatives based in Tobruk in March 2021 temporarily addressed the political deadlock and the situation of contested legitimacy in the country;

| C. | whereas in January 2022 the House of Representatives declared that the legal term for the mandate of the GNU had expired in December 2021; whereas the House of Representatives consequently designated the former minister of interior, Fathi Bashagha, as Prime Minister in February 2022; whereas GNU leaders rejected Bashagha’s appointment and the subsequent formation of a new government, and did not resign; whereas the GNU is still the only government recognised by the international community; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas in January 2022 the House of Representatives declared that the legal term for the mandate of the GNU had expired in December 2021; whereas the House of Representatives consequently designated the former minister of interior, Fathi Bashagha, as Prime Minister in February 2022; whereas GNU leaders rejected Bashagha’s appointment and the subsequent formation of a new government, and did not resign; whereas the GNU is still the only government recognised by the international community;

| D. | whereas the situation in Libya has further deteriorated since the indefinite postponement of the elections at the end of 2021, notably due to a lack of prior agreement on the legal basis for elections and on vetting criteria for candidates as well as the failure to prioritise the building of essential guarantees for credible and transparent elections, deepening the political deadlock and national fragmentation; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the situation in Libya has further deteriorated since the indefinite postponement of the elections at the end of 2021, notably due to a lack of prior agreement on the legal basis for elections and on vetting criteria for candidates as well as the failure to prioritise the building of essential guarantees for credible and transparent elections, deepening the political deadlock and national fragmentation;

| E. | whereas the postponement of the elections profoundly disappointed the more than 2,8 million Libyan citizens who had registered to vote, and in particular the young electorate, and risks contributing to further diminishing trust in public institutions; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the postponement of the elections profoundly disappointed the more than 2,8 million Libyan citizens who had registered to vote, and in particular the young electorate, and risks contributing to further diminishing trust in public institutions;

| F. | whereas, despite the fact that the UN-facilitated talks between the Libyan House of Representative and High State Council legislative bodies in Cairo and Geneva in June 2022 led to an unprecedented level of consensus on several long-standing issues, including on the distribution of seats for the two legislative chambers, the distribution of power among different executive authorities and the delineation of provinces, they were unable to lead to an agreement on a broadly supported constitution or a legal framework for elections; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas, despite the fact that the UN-facilitated talks between the Libyan House of Representative and High State Council legislative bodies in Cairo and Geneva in June 2022 led to an unprecedented level of consensus on several long-standing issues, including on the distribution of seats for the two legislative chambers, the distribution of power among different executive authorities and the delineation of provinces, they were unable to lead to an agreement on a broadly supported constitution or a legal framework for elections;

| G. | whereas elections cannot be an end in themselves but should be accompanied by significant political, economic and institutional reforms; whereas the involvement of women, civil society organisations, municipalities and local stakeholders is key to building a functioning state and ensuring proper governance in Libya; whereas all Libyan parties should engage in a genuine dialogue to address the ongoing political impasse and not use force to resolve their differences; whereas the lack of commitment from Libyan stakeholders to build a new shared roadmap towards elections appears to indicate a shared lack of interest in building functional and representative political institutions; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas elections cannot be an end in themselves but should be accompanied by significant political, economic and institutional reforms; whereas the involvement of women, civil society organisations, municipalities and local stakeholders is key to building a functioning state and ensuring proper governance in Libya; whereas all Libyan parties should engage in a genuine dialogue to address the ongoing political impasse and not use force to resolve their differences; whereas the lack of commitment from Libyan stakeholders to build a new shared roadmap towards elections appears to indicate a shared lack of interest in building functional and representative political institutions;

| H. | whereas in July 2022, mass protests against the mismanagement of political institutions and the deterioration of living conditions were held across the country, including in Tripoli, Tobruk, Benghazi and Misrata; whereas protesters called for elections to be held without delay; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas in July 2022, mass protests against the mismanagement of political institutions and the deterioration of living conditions were held across the country, including in Tripoli, Tobruk, Benghazi and Misrata; whereas protesters called for elections to be held without delay;

| I. | whereas following the protests, the Presidential Council proposed an action plan to move forward and preserve the unity of the country, including parliamentary and presidential elections within a specific timeframe to overcome the deadlock; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas following the protests, the Presidential Council proposed an action plan to move forward and preserve the unity of the country, including parliamentary and presidential elections within a specific timeframe to overcome the deadlock;

| J. | whereas clashes in Tripoli between militias loyal to Dbeibeh and militias loyal to Bashagha caused several deaths, including among the civilian population, and underlined once more the fragile situation in the country; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas clashes in Tripoli between militias loyal to Dbeibeh and militias loyal to Bashagha caused several deaths, including among the civilian population, and underlined once more the fragile situation in the country;

| K. | whereas security and stability in Libya are closely correlated with the prospect of a real democratic transition that has the potential to deliver for all people in Libya; whereas the long-term instability and systemic impunity has been a significant factor in the resurgence of military confrontations as well as mass demonstrations across the country; whereas respect for the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations are essential to ensure political stability and sustainable peace in Libya and the entire region; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas security and stability in Libya are closely correlated with the prospect of a real democratic transition that has the potential to deliver for all people in Libya; whereas the long-term instability and systemic impunity has been a significant factor in the resurgence of military confrontations as well as mass demonstrations across the country; whereas respect for the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations are essential to ensure political stability and sustainable peace in Libya and the entire region;

| L. | whereas it is of the utmost importance that the Member States coordinate their actions and speak with one voice, strengthening the EU’s mediation efforts and underlining the central role of the UN; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas it is of the utmost importance that the Member States coordinate their actions and speak with one voice, strengthening the EU’s mediation efforts and underlining the central role of the UN;

| M. | whereas for months Russia has significantly undermined the UN’s capacity for action by refusing to join consensus on proposals for a longer mandate of UNSMIL and for the nomination of a new UN Special Representative for Libya; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas for months Russia has significantly undermined the UN’s capacity for action by refusing to join consensus on proposals for a longer mandate of UNSMIL and for the nomination of a new UN Special Representative for Libya;

| N. | whereas, after nine months of political deadlock within the UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced on 2 September 2022 the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal as his Special Representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL; whereas on 28 October 2022 the UN Security Council voted unanimously in favour of extending UNSMIL’s mandate until 31 October 2023; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas, after nine months of political deadlock within the UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced on 2 September 2022 the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal as his Special Representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL; whereas on 28 October 2022 the UN Security Council voted unanimously in favour of extending UNSMIL’s mandate until 31 October 2023;

| O. | whereas in November 2019, Libya signed with Türkiye a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea; whereas this agreement infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states and does not comply with the Law of the Sea, and therefore cannot produce any legal consequences for third states, as stated by the European Council; whereas on 3 October 2022 Libya and Türkiye signed an agreement on hydrocarbons based on the 2019 Türkiye-Libya MoU; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas in November 2019, Libya signed with Türkiye a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea; whereas this agreement infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states and does not comply with the Law of the Sea, and therefore cannot produce any legal consequences for third states, as stated by the European Council; whereas on 3 October 2022 Libya and Türkiye signed an agreement on hydrocarbons based on the 2019 Türkiye-Libya MoU;

| P. | whereas the ongoing involvement in the conflict of local and foreign armed groups, such as Russia’s Wagner group, as well as foreign forces, poses a threat to the stability and security of Libya and the entire region; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the ongoing involvement in the conflict of local and foreign armed groups, such as Russia’s Wagner group, as well as foreign forces, poses a threat to the stability and security of Libya and the entire region;

| Q. | whereas all countries that participated in the Berlin Conferences on Libya and in the Paris International Conference for Libya, including Russia and Türkiye who have a military presence in Libya, committed themselves not to interfere in Libyan affairs and backed the implementation of an action plan for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces from Libyan territory without delay; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas all countries that participated in the Berlin Conferences on Libya and in the Paris International Conference for Libya, including Russia and Türkiye who have a military presence in Libya, committed themselves not to interfere in Libyan affairs and backed the implementation of an action plan for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces from Libyan territory without delay;

| R. | whereas recently there have been attempts by senior Libyan military figures to re-establish a unified Libyan army; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas recently there have been attempts by senior Libyan military figures to re-establish a unified Libyan army;

| S. | whereas comprehensive security sector reform is critical to establish unified, inclusive and accountable Libyan national security, police and military forces under central, civilian authority, thus contributing to the prevention of future human rights violations, strengthening the rule of law, ending impunity and guaranteeing political stability in the country and the region; whereas developments on the ground in late August unfortunately point in the other direction, with increased fighting leading to the brink of military escalation; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas comprehensive security sector reform is critical to establish unified, inclusive and accountable Libyan national security, police and military forces under central, civilian authority, thus contributing to the prevention of future human rights violations, strengthening the rule of law, ending impunity and guaranteeing political stability in the country and the region; whereas developments on the ground in late August unfortunately point in the other direction, with increased fighting leading to the brink of military escalation;

| T. | whereas the significant presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance, in addition to resulting in the loss of human life, represents a serious obstacle to the economic and social recovery of the country; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the significant presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance, in addition to resulting in the loss of human life, represents a serious obstacle to the economic and social recovery of the country;

| U. | whereas the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and abandoned ammunition stockpiles increases instability as they are often diverted both within Libya and across its borders, significantly affecting regional and local security as local armed groups gain access to these weapons, especially in the Sahel region; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and abandoned ammunition stockpiles increases instability as they are often diverted both within Libya and across its borders, significantly affecting regional and local security as local armed groups gain access to these weapons, especially in the Sahel region;

| V. | whereas the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations are essential to ensuring political stability and sustainable peace; whereas the absence of a robust judicial system, the systemic violation of the rule of law, the consequent widespread corruption and the repeated violations of human rights contribute to creating a climate of impunity in the country which is a significant obstacle to peaceful coexistence and to the safe return of internally displaced persons; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations are essential to ensuring political stability and sustainable peace; whereas the absence of a robust judicial system, the systemic violation of the rule of law, the consequent widespread corruption and the repeated violations of human rights contribute to creating a climate of impunity in the country which is a significant obstacle to peaceful coexistence and to the safe return of internally displaced persons;

| W. | whereas Libya is the country with the largest oil reserves in Africa, a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and one of the main oil suppliers to world markets; whereas the Libyan economy relies heavily on the oil sector; whereas oil production has been often instrumentalised by different actors who have repeatedly shut down oil facilities for political purposes; whereas the practice of pillaging and the illicit export of crude oil and refined petroleum products poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of Libya and must therefore be overcome; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas Libya is the country with the largest oil reserves in Africa, a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and one of the main oil suppliers to world markets; whereas the Libyan economy relies heavily on the oil sector; whereas oil production has been often instrumentalised by different actors who have repeatedly shut down oil facilities for political purposes; whereas the practice of pillaging and the illicit export of crude oil and refined petroleum products poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of Libya and must therefore be overcome;

| X. | whereas the months’ long partial shutdown of Libya’s oil facilities by the forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which started in April 2022, has significantly cut the country’s production, causing a decrease in revenues to the state budget, and has had significant repercussions beyond Libya’s borders, including further increasing energy prices which were already high due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; whereas in July 2022, an agreement was reached between western and eastern Libyan stakeholders to resume oil production and exports in all of Libya’s blockaded oilfields and ports; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas the months’ long partial shutdown of Libya’s oil facilities by the forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which started in April 2022, has significantly cut the country’s production, causing a decrease in revenues to the state budget, and has had significant repercussions beyond Libya’s borders, including further increasing energy prices which were already high due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; whereas in July 2022, an agreement was reached between western and eastern Libyan stakeholders to resume oil production and exports in all of Libya’s blockaded oilfields and ports;

| Y. | whereas climate change poses an existential threat to Libya, a country that has been increasingly suffering severe droughts and water shortages; whereas in his speech at the UN Climate Summit COP27 in Egypt, the Head of the Libyan Presidential Council Mohammed Menfi stated that ‘climate change undermines the opportunities of development and investment and curbs economic growth’; whereas, as recalled by former UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Libya Stephanie Williams, Libya’s climate fragility is also exacerbated by the country’s sole reliance on fossil fuels and by its damaged electrical and water infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas climate change poses an existential threat to Libya, a country that has been increasingly suffering severe droughts and water shortages; whereas in his speech at the UN Climate Summit COP27 in Egypt, the Head of the Libyan Presidential Council Mohammed Menfi stated that ‘climate change undermines the opportunities of development and investment and curbs economic growth’; whereas, as recalled by former UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Libya Stephanie Williams, Libya’s climate fragility is also exacerbated by the country’s sole reliance on fossil fuels and by its damaged electrical and water infrastructure;

| Z. | whereas the Economic Working Group of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya (EWG), which is co-chaired by the EU, Egypt, the USA and UNSMIL, is working with the Libyan authorities on delivering core basic services to the Libyan people, strengthening economic institutions, revitalising the private sector and improving the budget process; whereas the EWG has already made significant progress in assisting with the reunification of the Libyan Central Bank; whereas, however, the consultations on the matter have recently been suspended; |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas the Economic Working Group of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya (EWG), which is co-chaired by the EU, Egypt, the USA and UNSMIL, is working with the Libyan authorities on delivering core basic services to the Libyan people, strengthening economic institutions, revitalising the private sector and improving the budget process; whereas the EWG has already made significant progress in assisting with the reunification of the Libyan Central Bank; whereas, however, the consultations on the matter have recently been suspended;

| AA. | whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) has since 2013 supported the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security in Libya; whereas EUBAM Libya has been extended until 30 June 2023; |
| --- | --- |

AA.

whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) has since 2013 supported the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security in Libya; whereas EUBAM Libya has been extended until 30 June 2023;

| AB. | whereas EUBAM Libya, in cooperation with the EU Special Representative for the Sahel, the Regional Advising and Coordination Cell and the counter-terrorism programme (CT-JUST), organised a regional conference in Tunis on 22 and 23 November 2022 on cross-border cooperation between Libya and the Sahel countries with the goal of supporting regional security and stability by enhancing cross-border cooperation on the fight against cross-border crime, including terrorism and organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

AB.

whereas EUBAM Libya, in cooperation with the EU Special Representative for the Sahel, the Regional Advising and Coordination Cell and the counter-terrorism programme (CT-JUST), organised a regional conference in Tunis on 22 and 23 November 2022 on cross-border cooperation between Libya and the Sahel countries with the goal of supporting regional security and stability by enhancing cross-border cooperation on the fight against cross-border crime, including terrorism and organised crime;

| AC. | whereas, the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini (EUNAVFOR MED Irini) was launched on 31 March 2020 and extended to 31 March 2023; whereas its core task is the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya established by UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011); whereas the UN arms embargo has faced multiple and continued breaches by a number of actors; |
| --- | --- |

AC.

whereas, the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini (EUNAVFOR MED Irini) was launched on 31 March 2020 and extended to 31 March 2023; whereas its core task is the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya established by UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011); whereas the UN arms embargo has faced multiple and continued breaches by a number of actors;

| AD. | whereas on 15 January 2021, Irini and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) signed a working arrangement whereby they will, inter alia, exchange information on cross-border crime such as arms trafficking and human smuggling; whereas Frontex exchanges information on actual or potential situations of distress at sea in the Libyan search and rescue (SAR) region with the relevant authorities and coordination centres, including the Italian, Maltese and Tunisian marine rescue coordination centres (MRCCs), as well as the Libyan MRCC and joint rescue coordination centre, financed by the EU through the EUTF and operated by the Libyan coastguard and navy; |
| --- | --- |

AD.

whereas on 15 January 2021, Irini and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) signed a working arrangement whereby they will, inter alia, exchange information on cross-border crime such as arms trafficking and human smuggling; whereas Frontex exchanges information on actual or potential situations of distress at sea in the Libyan search and rescue (SAR) region with the relevant authorities and coordination centres, including the Italian, Maltese and Tunisian marine rescue coordination centres (MRCCs), as well as the Libyan MRCC and joint rescue coordination centre, financed by the EU through the EUTF and operated by the Libyan coastguard and navy;

| AE. | whereas the stability and security of Libya are essential to those of the broader Mediterranean region; |
| --- | --- |

AE.

whereas the stability and security of Libya are essential to those of the broader Mediterranean region;

| AF. | whereas the EU has adopted a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood that focuses on human development, good governance and the rule of law, resilience, prosperity and the digital transition, peace and security, migration and mobility, as well as the green transition, climate resilience, energy and the environment; |
| --- | --- |

AF.

whereas the EU has adopted a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood that focuses on human development, good governance and the rule of law, resilience, prosperity and the digital transition, peace and security, migration and mobility, as well as the green transition, climate resilience, energy and the environment;

| AG. | whereas the EU is allocating an average of EUR 37 million per year between 2021 and 2024 to state-building efforts, human development needs and basic health services in Libya; |
| --- | --- |

AG.

whereas the EU is allocating an average of EUR 37 million per year between 2021 and 2024 to state-building efforts, human development needs and basic health services in Libya;

| AH. | whereas Libya’s civil society must play a key role in determining its country’s future; whereas in recent months, there has been a worrying shrinking of civic space characterised by increasingly draconian laws and regulations; whereas many political activists, human rights defenders, humanitarian personnel, journalists, magistrates and lawyers have been threatened, abducted, arbitrarily detained, tortured and killed; whereas the lack of an autonomous and independent justice system does not allow victims of human rights violations to pursue legal remedies; |
| --- | --- |

AH.

whereas Libya’s civil society must play a key role in determining its country’s future; whereas in recent months, there has been a worrying shrinking of civic space characterised by increasingly draconian laws and regulations; whereas many political activists, human rights defenders, humanitarian personnel, journalists, magistrates and lawyers have been threatened, abducted, arbitrarily detained, tortured and killed; whereas the lack of an autonomous and independent justice system does not allow victims of human rights violations to pursue legal remedies;

| AI. | whereas migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are victims of widespread and systematic human rights violations such as human trafficking, arbitrary arrest, detention, extortion, rape, enslavement, and kidnapping for blackmail and exploitation, by both state authorities and armed groups; |
| --- | --- |

AI.

whereas migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are victims of widespread and systematic human rights violations such as human trafficking, arbitrary arrest, detention, extortion, rape, enslavement, and kidnapping for blackmail and exploitation, by both state authorities and armed groups;

| AJ. | whereas Libya is a key point of transit and departure for migrants attempting to reach Europe, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa; whereas thousands of people have lost their lives attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe; |
| --- | --- |

AJ.

whereas Libya is a key point of transit and departure for migrants attempting to reach Europe, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa; whereas thousands of people have lost their lives attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe;

| AK. | whereas one of the objectives of the EU’s support for border management in Libya is to prevent the loss of life in the Mediterranean; whereas NGOs have often played a praiseworthy role in saving lives in the Mediterranean; whereas the sharp decrease in the number of SAR vessels has had deadly consequences for people seeking safety; whereas human-smuggling networks exploit the SAR principle to illegally profit from people escaping atrocities in Libya, thus perpetuating human misery and becoming responsible of grave violations of human rights; whereas the European Council reiterated that all vessels operating in the Mediterranean must respect international and EU law; whereas both UN bodies and prominent NGOs have documented violations of human rights against people attempting to escape Libya by sea; whereas people intercepted by the Libyan coast guard and disembarked after rescue at sea are often placed in immigration detention and subjected to human rights violations; whereas the EU expects Libyan authorities, including the Libyan coast guard with which it cooperates, to ensure respect for the human rights and dignity of migrants, to investigate incidents of violence and to ensure appropriate follow-up actions against those responsible; whereas, however, these violations continue to persist, especially owing to ineffective monitoring and accountability mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

AK.

whereas one of the objectives of the EU’s support for border management in Libya is to prevent the loss of life in the Mediterranean; whereas NGOs have often played a praiseworthy role in saving lives in the Mediterranean; whereas the sharp decrease in the number of SAR vessels has had deadly consequences for people seeking safety; whereas human-smuggling networks exploit the SAR principle to illegally profit from people escaping atrocities in Libya, thus perpetuating human misery and becoming responsible of grave violations of human rights; whereas the European Council reiterated that all vessels operating in the Mediterranean must respect international and EU law; whereas both UN bodies and prominent NGOs have documented violations of human rights against people attempting to escape Libya by sea; whereas people intercepted by the Libyan coast guard and disembarked after rescue at sea are often placed in immigration detention and subjected to human rights violations; whereas the EU expects Libyan authorities, including the Libyan coast guard with which it cooperates, to ensure respect for the human rights and dignity of migrants, to investigate incidents of violence and to ensure appropriate follow-up actions against those responsible; whereas, however, these violations continue to persist, especially owing to ineffective monitoring and accountability mechanisms;

| AL. | whereas around 160 000 internally displaced people in Libya still lack sufficient protection and assistance; |
| --- | --- |

AL.

whereas around 160 000 internally displaced people in Libya still lack sufficient protection and assistance;

| AM. | whereas women and children are at higher risk of exploitation, trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, forced prostitution and unlawful detention; |
| --- | --- |

AM.

whereas women and children are at higher risk of exploitation, trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, forced prostitution and unlawful detention;

| AN. | whereas sexual and gender-based violence is widespread and fuelled by impunity; whereas survivors of sexual violence are often marginalised and stigmatised by their families and communities; whereas the domestic legal framework does not properly provide for the protection of survivors of sexual violence; |
| --- | --- |

AN.

whereas sexual and gender-based violence is widespread and fuelled by impunity; whereas survivors of sexual violence are often marginalised and stigmatised by their families and communities; whereas the domestic legal framework does not properly provide for the protection of survivors of sexual violence;

| AO. | whereas the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya has concluded in its reports that it has reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been and are still being committed in Libya; whereas on 8 July 2022 the UN Human Rights Council renewed the mandate of the mission for a final, non-extendable period of nine months to present its concluding recommendations; |
| --- | --- |

AO.

whereas the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya has concluded in its reports that it has reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been and are still being committed in Libya; whereas on 8 July 2022 the UN Human Rights Council renewed the mandate of the mission for a final, non-extendable period of nine months to present its concluding recommendations;

| 1. | Recommends that, in implementing the EU policy on Libya, the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:






  (a) | ensure that a UN-facilitated, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned inclusive national reconciliation process is given the strongest support possible in order to deliver longer-term stability and security and lay the foundations for a peaceful and democratic transition that involves all Libyan stakeholders, including women, civil society organisations and local authorities, in order for the peace process to be representative of the entire Libyan population; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

ensure that a UN-facilitated, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned inclusive national reconciliation process is given the strongest support possible in order to deliver longer-term stability and security and lay the foundations for a peaceful and democratic transition that involves all Libyan stakeholders, including women, civil society organisations and local authorities, in order for the peace process to be representative of the entire Libyan population;

| (b) | continue to cooperate closely with UNSMIL and actively support a further prolongation of its mandate beyond 31 October 2023 if necessary in order to effectively contribute to the constitutional process and the organisation of the elections, implement the ceasefire, monitor human rights issues and offer technical assistance to the Libyan institutions; stress that, given the current political impasse, the continuation of UN-backed negotiations on a roadmap for free, fair, credible and transparent elections remains vital, and urge all Libyan stakeholders to avoid mistakes made in the past, such as the absence of vetting criteria for candidates, to respect the electoral results and to guarantee a peaceful transition of power; deploy an EU electoral observation mission to monitor the electoral process; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

continue to cooperate closely with UNSMIL and actively support a further prolongation of its mandate beyond 31 October 2023 if necessary in order to effectively contribute to the constitutional process and the organisation of the elections, implement the ceasefire, monitor human rights issues and offer technical assistance to the Libyan institutions; stress that, given the current political impasse, the continuation of UN-backed negotiations on a roadmap for free, fair, credible and transparent elections remains vital, and urge all Libyan stakeholders to avoid mistakes made in the past, such as the absence of vetting criteria for candidates, to respect the electoral results and to guarantee a peaceful transition of power; deploy an EU electoral observation mission to monitor the electoral process;

| (c) | reinforce diplomatic channels with international actors and increase efforts to mediate and reach a unified international strategy towards a peaceful, stable and unified Libya; consider hosting another Libya conference, and foster so-called ‘Track 2’ diplomatic efforts; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

reinforce diplomatic channels with international actors and increase efforts to mediate and reach a unified international strategy towards a peaceful, stable and unified Libya; consider hosting another Libya conference, and foster so-called ‘Track 2’ diplomatic efforts;

| (d) | step up EU diplomatic efforts to restore peace and security in the country, and ensure that the Member States speak with one voice, act in a more unified manner and support nation-wide, inclusive and collaborative efforts to achieve the desired political transition accompanied by the necessary reforms; to this end, nominate, as a matter of priority, an EU special representative for Libya; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

step up EU diplomatic efforts to restore peace and security in the country, and ensure that the Member States speak with one voice, act in a more unified manner and support nation-wide, inclusive and collaborative efforts to achieve the desired political transition accompanied by the necessary reforms; to this end, nominate, as a matter of priority, an EU special representative for Libya;

| (e) | ensure that the EU Delegation to Libya plays a more active role and, as soon as security conditions allow, that it facilitates more missions of EU institutions to Libya, including of the European Parliament, in order to further increase dialogue between the EU and Libya; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

ensure that the EU Delegation to Libya plays a more active role and, as soon as security conditions allow, that it facilitates more missions of EU institutions to Libya, including of the European Parliament, in order to further increase dialogue between the EU and Libya;

| (f) | ensure that all agreements or cooperation measures between Libya and the EU or its Member States are consistent with international and EU law; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

ensure that all agreements or cooperation measures between Libya and the EU or its Member States are consistent with international and EU law;

| (g) | urge the Libyan authorities to proceed with the cancelation of the 2019 Türkiye-Libya MoU on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea, and not to implement any clause included in the subsequent agreement on hydrocarbons signed on 3 October 2022, which provides for illegal drilling activities in third countries’ exclusive economic zones, including those of Cyprus and Greece; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

urge the Libyan authorities to proceed with the cancelation of the 2019 Türkiye-Libya MoU on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea, and not to implement any clause included in the subsequent agreement on hydrocarbons signed on 3 October 2022, which provides for illegal drilling activities in third countries’ exclusive economic zones, including those of Cyprus and Greece;

| (h) | reinforce the call made during the Berlin and Paris conferences on Libya for all mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces to withdraw from Libyan territory; urge all international actors involved, including Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye, not to interfere in Libya and to comply with that call, to refrain from fuelling tensions and fights through direct or sponsored military intervention and to immediately withdraw any mercenaries which, like Russia’s Wagner group, are still present in the country and which represent a threat to the stability of Libya and the entire region; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

reinforce the call made during the Berlin and Paris conferences on Libya for all mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces to withdraw from Libyan territory; urge all international actors involved, including Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye, not to interfere in Libya and to comply with that call, to refrain from fuelling tensions and fights through direct or sponsored military intervention and to immediately withdraw any mercenaries which, like Russia’s Wagner group, are still present in the country and which represent a threat to the stability of Libya and the entire region;

| (i) | increase support to the Libyan authorities for the implementation of a comprehensive security sector reform and for policies in the area of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups, based on a census of armed groups’ personnel and with professional vetting, assisted by the UN; work towards guaranteeing that such policies have the final aims of establishing unified, inclusive and accountable Libyan national security, police and military forces under a civilian authority and allowing former combatants to lay down their weapons and be reintegrated in their communities, thus building a more sustainable peace; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

increase support to the Libyan authorities for the implementation of a comprehensive security sector reform and for policies in the area of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups, based on a census of armed groups’ personnel and with professional vetting, assisted by the UN; work towards guaranteeing that such policies have the final aims of establishing unified, inclusive and accountable Libyan national security, police and military forces under a civilian authority and allowing former combatants to lay down their weapons and be reintegrated in their communities, thus building a more sustainable peace;

| (j) | urge Libyan authorities to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction and the Convention on Cluster Munitions; allocate adequate EU funds to projects aimed at removing landmines and other unexploded ordnances, at providing mine risk education and at supporting mine victims, including by guaranteeing them access to healthcare, rehabilitation, psychological and psychosocial support, in order to prevent future accidents and enable sustainable economic and social development; |
| --- | --- |

(j)

urge Libyan authorities to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction and the Convention on Cluster Munitions; allocate adequate EU funds to projects aimed at removing landmines and other unexploded ordnances, at providing mine risk education and at supporting mine victims, including by guaranteeing them access to healthcare, rehabilitation, psychological and psychosocial support, in order to prevent future accidents and enable sustainable economic and social development;

| (k) | address the impact on human security and regional stability of the diversion of small arms, light weapons and ammunition to the illicit market, including by supporting weapon and ammunition management and security sector reform at national and regional levels; |
| --- | --- |

(k)

address the impact on human security and regional stability of the diversion of small arms, light weapons and ammunition to the illicit market, including by supporting weapon and ammunition management and security sector reform at national and regional levels;

| (l) | provide the Libyan authorities with the technical assistance they need to enact a comprehensive reform of the judiciary sector with the aim also of dismantling the structural impunity that prevails in the country and paving the way for sustainable reconciliation and peace; |
| --- | --- |

(l)

provide the Libyan authorities with the technical assistance they need to enact a comprehensive reform of the judiciary sector with the aim also of dismantling the structural impunity that prevails in the country and paving the way for sustainable reconciliation and peace;

| (m) | consider the imposition of additional targeted restrictive measures, including through the use of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, on persons and entities whose actions cause serious violations of human rights and freedoms and threaten the rule of law; |
| --- | --- |

(m)

consider the imposition of additional targeted restrictive measures, including through the use of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, on persons and entities whose actions cause serious violations of human rights and freedoms and threaten the rule of law;

| (n) | call on all actors to refrain from using oil as an instrument of political confrontation and keep all wells and oil terminals open; step up efforts within the EWG to call on the Libyan authorities to ensure fair, transparent, inclusive and sustainable redistribution of oil revenues by pursuing a vision of shared economic prosperity for all people in the country; |
| --- | --- |

(n)

call on all actors to refrain from using oil as an instrument of political confrontation and keep all wells and oil terminals open; step up efforts within the EWG to call on the Libyan authorities to ensure fair, transparent, inclusive and sustainable redistribution of oil revenues by pursuing a vision of shared economic prosperity for all people in the country;

| (o) | support Libya’s economic institutions, reinforce the country’s economic governance and promote economic diversification; |
| --- | --- |

(o)

support Libya’s economic institutions, reinforce the country’s economic governance and promote economic diversification;

| (p) | work towards a more stable energy partnership with Libya which would help to increase Libya’s capabilities in the sector and diversify the EU’s energy sources; provide, in this regard, Libyan authorities with the necessary technical assistance to support the country in its transition to a sustainable and climate-neutral economy in order to limit the risks posed by climate change which are severely affecting the country, in line with the external dimension of the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

(p)

work towards a more stable energy partnership with Libya which would help to increase Libya’s capabilities in the sector and diversify the EU’s energy sources; provide, in this regard, Libyan authorities with the necessary technical assistance to support the country in its transition to a sustainable and climate-neutral economy in order to limit the risks posed by climate change which are severely affecting the country, in line with the external dimension of the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement;

| (q) | support the valuable work of EUBAM Libya and the EUNAVFOR MED Irini, two common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, in contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability; continue, in particular, to support Irini’s core task of implementing the arms embargo on Libya imposed by the UN; ensure that the two missions live up to their true potential, which so far has not been the case; equip Irini with the necessary technical capabilities to prevent arms entering Libya via land, sea, or air and step up EUBAM’s efforts at Libya’s southern border; |
| --- | --- |

(q)

support the valuable work of EUBAM Libya and the EUNAVFOR MED Irini, two common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, in contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability; continue, in particular, to support Irini’s core task of implementing the arms embargo on Libya imposed by the UN; ensure that the two missions live up to their true potential, which so far has not been the case; equip Irini with the necessary technical capabilities to prevent arms entering Libya via land, sea, or air and step up EUBAM’s efforts at Libya’s southern border;

| (r) | renew, if deemed necessary, the mandate of these two CSDP missions in order to contribute to improving the security conditions on the ground, including by preventing terrorists, human traffickers and armed groups from carrying out cross-border activities, such as the illicit trafficking of weapons; guarantee that all activities carried out or facilitated by these two missions respect human rights and are in line with international and EU law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, and provide accountability for possible violations; enhance the monitoring of the work of EUBAM to prevent any mismanagement with regard to its activities in carrying out the mission; conduct and provide Parliament with regular human rights impact assessments and evaluations of all their activities; guarantee that any support to the Libyan border or security apparatus is conditional to the respect of international and EU law; |
| --- | --- |

(r)

renew, if deemed necessary, the mandate of these two CSDP missions in order to contribute to improving the security conditions on the ground, including by preventing terrorists, human traffickers and armed groups from carrying out cross-border activities, such as the illicit trafficking of weapons; guarantee that all activities carried out or facilitated by these two missions respect human rights and are in line with international and EU law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, and provide accountability for possible violations; enhance the monitoring of the work of EUBAM to prevent any mismanagement with regard to its activities in carrying out the mission; conduct and provide Parliament with regular human rights impact assessments and evaluations of all their activities; guarantee that any support to the Libyan border or security apparatus is conditional to the respect of international and EU law;

| (s) | ensure adequate resources for SAR activities along the central Mediterranean Sea route, including proactive maritime and aerial patrolling by the EU and its Member States, in order to guarantee the full protection of people’s life and dignity; ensure that private vessels conducting SAR activities comply with relevant international and EU law, and cooperate with the competent authorities of Member States and Frontex in order to safeguard the safety of people in distress at sea; ensure that migrants rescued at sea are disembarked in places of safety, and that southern Member States are not left alone to carry the responsibility of disembarkation and reception; |
| --- | --- |

(s)

ensure adequate resources for SAR activities along the central Mediterranean Sea route, including proactive maritime and aerial patrolling by the EU and its Member States, in order to guarantee the full protection of people’s life and dignity; ensure that private vessels conducting SAR activities comply with relevant international and EU law, and cooperate with the competent authorities of Member States and Frontex in order to safeguard the safety of people in distress at sea; ensure that migrants rescued at sea are disembarked in places of safety, and that southern Member States are not left alone to carry the responsibility of disembarkation and reception;

| (t) | mobilise adequate EU funds based on reviews of previous programmes in the country under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) — Global Europe to support Libyan democratisation efforts and projects aimed at strengthening the rule of law and good governance, improving Libya’s public service delivery capacities, supporting decentralisation efforts, fostering stabilisation in the country, supporting civil society organisations, strengthening social inclusion and fighting inequalities, promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women and young people, strengthening Libya’s health system, fighting climate change and promoting the concept of human security and inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth; provide technical assistance to these projects and ensure their implementation by international institutions and non-governmental organisations with experience operating in Libya; ensure that these projects are in line with the priorities of the New Agenda for the Mediterranean and the UN 2030 Agenda and are compliant with the criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; guarantee that all EU funds under the NDICI — Global Europe are conditional on the respect for human rights and international law, and that Parliament has adequate power to scrutinise their use and ensure accountability; |
| --- | --- |

(t)

mobilise adequate EU funds based on reviews of previous programmes in the country under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) — Global Europe to support Libyan democratisation efforts and projects aimed at strengthening the rule of law and good governance, improving Libya’s public service delivery capacities, supporting decentralisation efforts, fostering stabilisation in the country, supporting civil society organisations, strengthening social inclusion and fighting inequalities, promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women and young people, strengthening Libya’s health system, fighting climate change and promoting the concept of human security and inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth; provide technical assistance to these projects and ensure their implementation by international institutions and non-governmental organisations with experience operating in Libya; ensure that these projects are in line with the priorities of the New Agenda for the Mediterranean and the UN 2030 Agenda and are compliant with the criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; guarantee that all EU funds under the NDICI — Global Europe are conditional on the respect for human rights and international law, and that Parliament has adequate power to scrutinise their use and ensure accountability;

| (u) | continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Libya, with a special focus on the most vulnerable groups; |
| --- | --- |

(u)

continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Libya, with a special focus on the most vulnerable groups;

| (v) | continue to support and actively cooperate with Libyan civil society; urge the Libyan authorities to stop the violent repression of civil society organisations via arrests, detentions, enforced disappearances and torture, and to lift restrictions on civil society organisations that continue to put up serious obstacles to the freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, as guaranteed also by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Libya has ratified; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

continue to support and actively cooperate with Libyan civil society; urge the Libyan authorities to stop the violent repression of civil society organisations via arrests, detentions, enforced disappearances and torture, and to lift restrictions on civil society organisations that continue to put up serious obstacles to the freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, as guaranteed also by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Libya has ratified;

| (w) | urge the Libyan authorities to lift visa restrictions for members of the foreign and local press and to guarantee journalists’ safety; |
| --- | --- |

(w)

urge the Libyan authorities to lift visa restrictions for members of the foreign and local press and to guarantee journalists’ safety;

| (x) | urge the Libyan authorities to repeal Law No. 19 of 2001 and Presidential Council Decree No. 286 of 2019, which restrict the ability of civil society actors to carry out their activities, and Law No.76 of 1972 on publications, which restricts the freedom of expression; urge the Libyan authorities to stop criminalising fundamental freedoms using vaguely-worded articles of the Libyan Penal Code such as Articles 206 and 207, which provide for the death penalty; urge the Libyan authorities to immediately release all people unjustly detained under these charges; |
| --- | --- |

(x)

urge the Libyan authorities to repeal Law No. 19 of 2001 and Presidential Council Decree No. 286 of 2019, which restrict the ability of civil society actors to carry out their activities, and Law No.76 of 1972 on publications, which restricts the freedom of expression; urge the Libyan authorities to stop criminalising fundamental freedoms using vaguely-worded articles of the Libyan Penal Code such as Articles 206 and 207, which provide for the death penalty; urge the Libyan authorities to immediately release all people unjustly detained under these charges;

| (y) | call on the Libyan authorities to introduce a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, with the objective of ultimately abolishing it; |
| --- | --- |

(y)

call on the Libyan authorities to introduce a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, with the objective of ultimately abolishing it;

| (z) | call on the Libyan authorities to enhance the full representation and participation of women and protect them from all forms of violence; support initiatives aimed at developing a national action plan on women, peace and security, in line with the UN Security Council resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000; |
| --- | --- |

(z)

call on the Libyan authorities to enhance the full representation and participation of women and protect them from all forms of violence; support initiatives aimed at developing a national action plan on women, peace and security, in line with the UN Security Council resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000;

| (aa) | urge the Libyan authorities to develop and adopt measures to end and prevent violations against children and to comply with Libya’s obligations to promote and protect the rights of children, with particular regard to the obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; |
| --- | --- |

(aa)

urge the Libyan authorities to develop and adopt measures to end and prevent violations against children and to comply with Libya’s obligations to promote and protect the rights of children, with particular regard to the obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;

| (ab) | urge the Libyan authorities to eliminate discriminatory laws and practices against members of religious and ethnic minorities; |
| --- | --- |

(ab)

urge the Libyan authorities to eliminate discriminatory laws and practices against members of religious and ethnic minorities;

| (ac) | assist the Libyan authorities in ensuring the voluntary, safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons to their homes and support all the relevant stakeholders providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons and returnees, including access to basic healthcare, education and protection services; |
| --- | --- |

(ac)

assist the Libyan authorities in ensuring the voluntary, safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons to their homes and support all the relevant stakeholders providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons and returnees, including access to basic healthcare, education and protection services;

| (ad) | urge Libyan authorities to respect cultural, linguistic and historical regional diversity and lift restrictions and obstacles to peaceful expression of local communities’ aspirations for fair and equal rights and responsibilities within the framework of a united Libya; continue to provide assistance and funds to local communities, in particular marginalised communities, in order to foster sustainable economic development, social cohesion and human security; further develop partnerships with Libyan municipalities and support them to strengthen their systems of local governance and provide essential services, including but not limited to education and healthcare; |
| --- | --- |

(ad)

urge Libyan authorities to respect cultural, linguistic and historical regional diversity and lift restrictions and obstacles to peaceful expression of local communities’ aspirations for fair and equal rights and responsibilities within the framework of a united Libya; continue to provide assistance and funds to local communities, in particular marginalised communities, in order to foster sustainable economic development, social cohesion and human security; further develop partnerships with Libyan municipalities and support them to strengthen their systems of local governance and provide essential services, including but not limited to education and healthcare;

| (ae) | urge the Libyan authorities to ensure migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are protected, and guarantee full, safe and unhindered access to disembarkation points and to all rooms of detention centres for humanitarian organisations providing assistance to these vulnerable categories of people; encourage the Libyan authorities to lift visa restrictions for all international humanitarian personnel regardless of nationality; provide these humanitarian actors with adequate financial resources to ensure an effective humanitarian response within the detention centres and in urban areas; |
| --- | --- |

(ae)

urge the Libyan authorities to ensure migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are protected, and guarantee full, safe and unhindered access to disembarkation points and to all rooms of detention centres for humanitarian organisations providing assistance to these vulnerable categories of people; encourage the Libyan authorities to lift visa restrictions for all international humanitarian personnel regardless of nationality; provide these humanitarian actors with adequate financial resources to ensure an effective humanitarian response within the detention centres and in urban areas;

| (af) | urge the Libyan authorities to sign and ratify the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951, and offer support for the implementation of its accompanying measures; |
| --- | --- |

(af)

urge the Libyan authorities to sign and ratify the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951, and offer support for the implementation of its accompanying measures;

| (ag) | urge the Libyan authorities to end arbitrary immigration detention and introduce human rights-based alternatives to detention, inter alia by closing immigration detention centres and opening reception centres, developing screening and referral mechanisms and offering community housing options; to this end, actively support and fund initiatives to amend the Libyan legislative framework on migration and asylum to align it with international law and internationally recognised standards and principles; |
| --- | --- |

(ag)

urge the Libyan authorities to end arbitrary immigration detention and introduce human rights-based alternatives to detention, inter alia by closing immigration detention centres and opening reception centres, developing screening and referral mechanisms and offering community housing options; to this end, actively support and fund initiatives to amend the Libyan legislative framework on migration and asylum to align it with international law and internationally recognised standards and principles;

| (ah) | urge the Libyan authorities to ensure that women detainees are held in facilities with adequately trained women guards, and children separately from unrelated adults; |
| --- | --- |

(ah)

urge the Libyan authorities to ensure that women detainees are held in facilities with adequately trained women guards, and children separately from unrelated adults;

| (ai) | continue encouraging the Libyan authorities to enhance cooperation with neighbourhood countries regarding the creation of safe and legal pathways for migration; |
| --- | --- |

(ai)

continue encouraging the Libyan authorities to enhance cooperation with neighbourhood countries regarding the creation of safe and legal pathways for migration;

| (aj) | encourage the Libyan authorities to enhance cooperation with other countries and the International Organisation for Migration regarding the voluntary, safe and dignified return to countries of origin of migrants stranded in Libya and their reintegration into the societies and communities that receive them; |
| --- | --- |

(aj)

encourage the Libyan authorities to enhance cooperation with other countries and the International Organisation for Migration regarding the voluntary, safe and dignified return to countries of origin of migrants stranded in Libya and their reintegration into the societies and communities that receive them;

| (ak) | encourage negotiations by EU Member States on the development of a more ambitious EU migration and asylum policy in order not to indirectly facilitate illegal pullbacks by the Libyan border or security apparatus and the returning of people to inhumane camps in Libya, and not to fund and cooperate with Libyan stakeholders against which there are credible allegations of grave violations and involvement in human trafficking; reinforce safe and legal pathways for migration to the EU, including by replicating existing good practices and increasing the capacities of the Emergency Transit Mechanisms and the Member States’ resettlement pledges; |
| --- | --- |

(ak)

encourage negotiations by EU Member States on the development of a more ambitious EU migration and asylum policy in order not to indirectly facilitate illegal pullbacks by the Libyan border or security apparatus and the returning of people to inhumane camps in Libya, and not to fund and cooperate with Libyan stakeholders against which there are credible allegations of grave violations and involvement in human trafficking; reinforce safe and legal pathways for migration to the EU, including by replicating existing good practices and increasing the capacities of the Emergency Transit Mechanisms and the Member States’ resettlement pledges;

| (al) | actively support, if deemed necessary, an additional renewal of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya and the implementation of the recommendations included in its reports; ensure that the mission has sufficient resources to fulfil its mandate and urge Libyan authorities to cooperate fully with the mission and to grant its members full access to carry out their investigations without delay; |
| --- | --- |

(al)

actively support, if deemed necessary, an additional renewal of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya and the implementation of the recommendations included in its reports; ensure that the mission has sufficient resources to fulfil its mandate and urge Libyan authorities to cooperate fully with the mission and to grant its members full access to carry out their investigations without delay;

| (am) | continue to support the International Criminal Court’s mandate and its efforts to bring to justice all perpetrators of atrocity crimes, including violations of international humanitarian law, the recruitment and direct participation of children in hostilities, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and other forms of violence against vulnerable populations; |
| --- | --- |

(am)

continue to support the International Criminal Court’s mandate and its efforts to bring to justice all perpetrators of atrocity crimes, including violations of international humanitarian law, the recruitment and direct participation of children in hostilities, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and other forms of violence against vulnerable populations;

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Committee of the Regions. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 70.

(2)  OJ C 76, 9.3.2020, p. 206.

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OPINIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 22 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/126 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/126

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P9_TA(2022)0391

Closure of the accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2020

European Parliament decision of 22 November 2022 on the closure of the accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2020 (2022/2903(RSP))

(2023/C 167/19)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2020,

| — | having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2020, together with the agencies’ replies (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2020, together with the agencies’ replies (1),

| — | having regard to the statement of assurance (2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2020, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of assurance (2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2020, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 28 February 2022 on discharge to be given to the Agency in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2020 (06003/2022 — C9-0101/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 28 February 2022 on discharge to be given to the Agency in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2020 (06003/2022 — C9-0101/2022),

| — | having regard to its decision of 4 May 2022 (3) postponing the discharge decision for the financial year 2020, and the replies from the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its decision of 4 May 2022 (3) postponing the discharge decision for the financial year 2020, and the replies from the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency,

| — | having regard to its decision of 18 October 2022 (4) refusing to grant the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency discharge for the financial year 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its decision of 18 October 2022 (4) refusing to grant the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency discharge for the financial year 2020,

| — | having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (5), and in particular Article 70 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (5), and in particular Article 70 thereof,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (6), and in particular Article 116 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (6), and in particular Article 116 thereof,

| — | having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), and in particular Article 105 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), and in particular Article 105 thereof,

| — | having regard to Rule 100 of, and Annex V to, its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 100 of, and Annex V to, its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2020; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series). |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ C 439, 29.10.2021, p. 3.

(2)  OJ C 439, 29.10.2021, p. 3.

(3)  OJ L 258, 5.10.2022, p. 406.

(4)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0362.

(5)  OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

(6)  OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1.

(7)  OJ L 122, 10.5.2019, p. 1.

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III Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Tuesday 22 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/128 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/128

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P9_TA(2022)0390

Nomination of a member of the Court of Auditors — Keit Pentus-Rosimannus

European Parliament decision of 22 November 2022 on the nomination of Keit Pentus-Rosimannus as a Member of the Court of Auditors (C9-0316/2022 — 2022/0808(NLE))

(Consultation)

(2023/C 167/20)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 286(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0316/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 286(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0316/2022),

| — | having regard to Rule 129 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 129 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0272/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0272/2022),

| A. | whereas, by letter of 20 September 2022, the Council consulted Parliament on the nomination of Keit Pentus-Rosimannus as a Member of the Court of Auditors; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas, by letter of 20 September 2022, the Council consulted Parliament on the nomination of Keit Pentus-Rosimannus as a Member of the Court of Auditors;

| B. | whereas Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control then proceeded to evaluate Keit Pentus-Rosimannus’s credentials, in particular in view of the requirements laid down in Article 286(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; whereas in carrying out that evaluation, the committee received a curriculum vitae from Keit Pentus-Rosimannus, as well as the replies to the written questionnaire that she had been sent; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control then proceeded to evaluate Keit Pentus-Rosimannus’s credentials, in particular in view of the requirements laid down in Article 286(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; whereas in carrying out that evaluation, the committee received a curriculum vitae from Keit Pentus-Rosimannus, as well as the replies to the written questionnaire that she had been sent;

| C. | whereas the committee subsequently held a hearing with Keit Pentus-Rosimannus on 8 November 2022, at which she made an opening statement and then answered questions put by the members of the committee; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the committee subsequently held a hearing with Keit Pentus-Rosimannus on 8 November 2022, at which she made an opening statement and then answered questions put by the members of the committee;

| 1. | Delivers a favourable opinion on the Council’s nomination of Keit Pentus-Rosimannus as a Member of the Court of Auditors; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and, for information, the Court of Auditors, the other institutions of the European Union and the audit institutions of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/129 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/129

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P9_TA(2022)0392

Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement: participation of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in Union programmes

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the general principles for its participation in Union programmes (12669/2019 — C9-0115/2021 — 2019/0164(NLE))

(Consent)

(2023/C 167/21)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (12669/2019), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (12669/2019),

| — | having regard to the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the general principles for its participation in Union programmes (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the general principles for its participation in Union programmes (1),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 209 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0115/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 209 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0115/2021),

| — | having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0253/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0253/2022),

| 1. | Gives its consent to the conclusion of the Protocol; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of Palestine. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ L 121, 8.4.2021, p. 3.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/130 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/130

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P9_TA(2022)0393

Gender balance among directors of listed companies

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies and related measures (10521/1/2022 — C9-0354/2022 — 2012/0299(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading)

(2023/C 167/22)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Council position at first reading (10521/1/2022 — C9-0354/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council position at first reading (10521/1/2022 — C9-0354/2022),

| — | having regard to its position at first reading (1) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2012)0614), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its position at first reading (1) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2012)0614),

| — | having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committees responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committees responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0275/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0275/2022),

| 1. | Approves the Council position at first reading; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

5.

---

(1)  OJ C 436, 24.11.2016, p. 225.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/131 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/131

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P9_TA(2022)0394

Resilience of critical entities

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities (COM(2020)0829 — C9-0421/2020 — 2020/0365(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/23)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0829), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0829),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0421/2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0421/2020),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 1 July 2021 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 1 July 2021 (2),

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 21 September 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 21 September 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Transport and Tourism, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0289/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0289/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 170.

(2)  OJ C 440, 29.10.2021, p. 99.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2020)0365

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2022/2557.)

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/132 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/132

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P9_TA(2022)0395

Common fisheries policy (CFP): restrictions to the access to Union waters

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013, as regards restrictions to the access to Union waters (COM(2021)0356 — C9-0254/2021 — 2021/0176(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/24)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0356), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0356),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0254/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0254/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 September 2021 (1) |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 September 2021 (1)

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 12 October 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 12 October 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Regional Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Regional Development,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0206/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0206/2022),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Approves the joint statement by Parliament and the Commission annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Takes note of the statement by the Commission annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

5.

---

(1)  OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 123.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0176

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 as regards restrictions to the access to Union waters

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2495.)

---

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Statement by the European Parliament and the Commission on fisheries in the Channel

The European Parliament and the Commission take note of the situation of fisheries in the Channel and the concerns raised by local and regional fisheries stakeholders, including fishers, regarding the use of demersal seines by numerous vessels.

The European Parliament and the Commission encourage close cooperation between those stakeholders and initiatives from them and invite Member States to follow up, where relevant, with the submission of joint recommendations. The Commission will follow up with measures, where appropriate, including technical measures, based on consultations of stakeholders and an assessment by the relevant scientific bodies including an assessment of socio-economic impacts. In that regard, the Commission will ensure that funding is available for scientific research and advice.

Statement by the Commission on review of the CFP Regulation

In the event that it considers a review of the CFP Regulation, the Commission will conduct an impact assessment, along the lines of the Better Regulation principles. The Commission will make available to the co-legislators the impact assessment at the moment it publishes such proposal.

Alternatively, it will consider reporting on the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy at the latest by 2032.

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/134 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/134

---

P9_TA(2022)0396

Decisions of European standardisation organisations

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards the decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables (COM(2022)0032 — C9-0033/2022 — 2022/0021(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/25)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0032), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0032),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0033/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0033/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 26 August 2022 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 26 August 2022 (1),

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 19 October 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 19 October 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0205/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0205/2022),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 43.

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P9_TC1-COD(2022)0021

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2480.)

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/135 |
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11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/135

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P9_TA(2022)0397

Drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers: initial qualification and periodic training (codification)

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers (codification) (COM(2021)0034 — C9-0008/2021 — 2021/0018(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure — codification)

(2023/C 167/26)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0034), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0034),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 91 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0008/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 91 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0008/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 24 February 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 24 February 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 December 1994 — Accelerated working method for official codification of legislative texts (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 December 1994 — Accelerated working method for official codification of legislative texts (2),

| — | having regard to Rules 109 and 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 109 and 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A9-0267/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A9-0267/2022),

| A. | whereas, according to the Consultative Working Party of the legal services of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, the proposal in question contains a straightforward codification of the existing texts without any change in their substance; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas, according to the Consultative Working Party of the legal services of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, the proposal in question contains a straightforward codification of the existing texts without any change in their substance;

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 78.

(2)  OJ C 102, 4.4.1996, p. 2.

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P9_TC1-COD(2021)0018

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 22 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers (codification)

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2022/2561.)

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/136 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/136

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P9_TA(2022)0398

EU/New Zealand Agreement: modification of concessions on all the tariff rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and New Zealand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (07910/2022 — C9-0296/2022 — 2022/0098(NLE))

(Consent)

(2023/C 167/27)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (07910/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (07910/2022),

| — | having regard to the draft agreement between the European Union and New Zealand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (07911/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft agreement between the European Union and New Zealand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (07911/2022),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 207(4), first subparagraph, and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0296/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 207(4), first subparagraph, and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0296/2022),

| — | having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0273/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0273/2022),

| 1. | Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of New Zealand. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/137 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/137

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P9_TA(2022)0399

Amending Decision (EU) 2015/2169 on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea

European Parliament legislative resolution of 22 November 2022 on the draft Council decision amending Decision (EU) 2015/2169 on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part (12600/2022 — C9-0343/2022 — 2022/0257(NLE))

(Consent)

(2023/C 167/28)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (12600/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (12600/2022),

| — | having regard to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part,

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 91, Article 100(2), Article 167(3), Article 207 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) (v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0343/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 91, Article 100(2), Article 167(3), Article 207 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) (v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0343/2022),

| — | having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0277/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0277/2022),

| 1. | Gives its consent to the draft Council decision; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of Republic of Korea. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

Wednesday 23 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/138 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/138

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P9_TA(2022)0402

Draft amending budget No 5/2022: Additional measures to address the consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine — Union Civil Protection Mechanism reinforcement — Reduction in payment appropriations and update of revenues — Other adjustments and technical updates

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 5/2022 of the European Union for the financial year 2022 — Additional measures to address the consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine, Union Civil Protection Mechanism reinforcement, Reduction in payment appropriations and update of revenues, Other adjustments and technical updates (14832/2022 — C9-0388/2022 — 2022/0318(BUD))

(2023/C 167/29)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (1), and in particular Article 44 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (1), and in particular Article 44 thereof,

| — | having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2022, as definitively adopted on 24 November 2021 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2022, as definitively adopted on 24 November 2021 (2),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (3) (‘MFF Regulation’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (3) (‘MFF Regulation’),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (4),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (5),

| — | having regard to Draft amending budget No 5/2022, which the Commission adopted on 5 October 2022 (COM(2022)0351), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Draft amending budget No 5/2022, which the Commission adopted on 5 October 2022 (COM(2022)0351),

| — | having regard to the joint text agreed by the Conciliation Committee on 14 November 2022 on the general budget for the financial year 2023, which includes also the adoption of Draft amending budget No 5/2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint text agreed by the Conciliation Committee on 14 November 2022 on the general budget for the financial year 2023, which includes also the adoption of Draft amending budget No 5/2022,

| — | having regard to the position on Draft amending budget No 5/2022 which the Council adopted on 21 November 2022 and forwarded to Parliament on the same day (14832/2022 — C9-0388/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the position on Draft amending budget No 5/2022 which the Council adopted on 21 November 2022 and forwarded to Parliament on the same day (14832/2022 — C9-0388/2022),

| — | having regard to Rules 94 and 96 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 94 and 96 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0280/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0280/2022),

| A. | whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 covers updates on both the expenditure and revenue sides, and includes changes for Section III (Commission) and other sections; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 covers updates on both the expenditure and revenue sides, and includes changes for Section III (Commission) and other sections;

| B. | whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 includes, but is not limited to, adjustments to address the consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 includes, but is not limited to, adjustments to address the consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine;

| C. | whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 is linked to the financing of the new European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), reinforcing the emergency measures under the Food Chain strand of the Single Market Programme, frontloading and reinforcing the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), reinforcing the EU contribution to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, reinforcing administrative expenditure and pensions because of high inflation, returning the amount from the reserve of the new ‘ReFuelEU Aviation’ to the transport line of the Connecting Europe Facility given its delayed adoption; whereas the full remaining margins in Headings 2b and 5 are fully exhausted; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 is linked to the financing of the new European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), reinforcing the emergency measures under the Food Chain strand of the Single Market Programme, frontloading and reinforcing the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), reinforcing the EU contribution to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, reinforcing administrative expenditure and pensions because of high inflation, returning the amount from the reserve of the new ‘ReFuelEU Aviation’ to the transport line of the Connecting Europe Facility given its delayed adoption; whereas the full remaining margins in Headings 2b and 5 are fully exhausted;

| D. | whereas Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations aim at keeping the evolution of the purchasing power of EU civil servants in line with those of national civil servants; whereas the forecasted salary update rate to be applied retroactively as from 1 July 2022 was 2,5 % in the adopted 2022 budget (6 months impact), while the rate reflected in Draft amending budget No 5/2022 amounts to 6,9 %; whereas the final rate is set to 7,0 % in the Eurostat report on the salary update for 2022 of 24 October 2022 (6); |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations aim at keeping the evolution of the purchasing power of EU civil servants in line with those of national civil servants; whereas the forecasted salary update rate to be applied retroactively as from 1 July 2022 was 2,5 % in the adopted 2022 budget (6 months impact), while the rate reflected in Draft amending budget No 5/2022 amounts to 6,9 %; whereas the final rate is set to 7,0 % in the Eurostat report on the salary update for 2022 of 24 October 2022 (6);

| E. | whereas the level of payment appropriations for the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and EU4Health are decreased by respectively EUR 775 million and EUR 129,2 million; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the level of payment appropriations for the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and EU4Health are decreased by respectively EUR 775 million and EUR 129,2 million;

| F. | whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 also includes two adjustments on the revenue side, namely an update of the estimates for Traditional Own Resources (TOR) and the estimated impact of exchange rate differences; whereas the revenue surplus is estimated at EUR 3,0 billion; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas Draft amending budget No 5/2022 also includes two adjustments on the revenue side, namely an update of the estimates for Traditional Own Resources (TOR) and the estimated impact of exchange rate differences; whereas the revenue surplus is estimated at EUR 3,0 billion;

| G. | whereas the net impact of Draft amending budget No 5/2022 on expenditure amounts to an increase of EUR 447,5 million in commitment appropriations, and a decrease of EUR 741,1 million in payment appropriations; whereas the overall impact on the revenue side (comprised of the revenue surplus and decrease in payments) is a net decrease in the GNI contributions of EUR 3 779 million; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the net impact of Draft amending budget No 5/2022 on expenditure amounts to an increase of EUR 447,5 million in commitment appropriations, and a decrease of EUR 741,1 million in payment appropriations; whereas the overall impact on the revenue side (comprised of the revenue surplus and decrease in payments) is a net decrease in the GNI contributions of EUR 3 779 million;

| H. | whereas Parliament has repeatedly considered that a draft amending budget should have one purpose only; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas Parliament has repeatedly considered that a draft amending budget should have one purpose only;

| 1. | Takes note of Draft amending budget No 5/2022 as submitted by the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Recalls that, due to the late adoption of the legal base for the EDIRPA, the Conciliation Committee on the general budget for the financial year 2023 agreed not to place any amount in commitment appropriations in the reserve for that purpose and not to create a corresponding budget line for the financial year 2022; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Highlights that the UCPM has required significant reinforcements since the start of its implementation, especially as the consequences of severe weather conditions which cause floods, fires and droughts are growing in Europe, and in order to set up a permanent firefighting fleet to combat Europe-wide forest fires; indicates, therefore, that the proposed frontloading/backloading of UCPM will have to be reassessed based on needs, notably in the context of the upcoming MFF revision; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Warns about the risk of an increasingly high payments backlog due to the worrying delays in programme implementation and the need to address this risk in the context of the MFF revision; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Stresses that there is an overall decrease of EUR 3,8 billion in Member States’ GNI contribution and that some Member States are benefitting from big top-ups given that their lump sum rebates are annually adjusted by the real GDP price deflator — and not on the basis of the automatic 2 % deflator set out in the MFF; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Reiterates that, to better respect the prerogative of the budgetary authority, the Commission should present a draft amending budget for one purpose only and refrain from combining several purposes in one draft amending budget; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Approves the Council position on Draft amending budget No 5/2022; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Instructs its President to declare that Amending budget No 5/2022 has been definitively adopted and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

9.

---

(1)  OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 45, 24.2.2022, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(4)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

(5)  OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1.

(6)  Commission Staff Working Paper ‘Eurostat Report on the 2022 annual update of remuneration and pensions of EU officials’, published on 24.10.2022.

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/141 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/141

---

P9_TA(2022)0403

2023 budgetary procedure: joint text

European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 November 2022 on the joint text on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023 approved by the Conciliation Committee under the budgetary procedure (14783/2022 — C9-0389/2022 — 2022/0212(BUD))

(2023/C 167/30)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee and the relevant Parliament, Council and Commission statements (14783/2022 — C9-0389/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee and the relevant Parliament, Council and Commission statements (14783/2022 — C9-0389/2022),

| — | having regard to the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, which the Commission adopted on 1 July 2022 (COM(2022)0400), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, which the Commission adopted on 1 July 2022 (COM(2022)0400),

| — | having regard to the position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, which the Council adopted on 6 September 2022 and forwarded to Parliament on 9 September 2022 (12108/2022 — C9-0306/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, which the Council adopted on 6 September 2022 and forwarded to Parliament on 9 September 2022 (12108/2022 — C9-0306/2022),

| — | having regard to Letter of amendment No 1/2023 to the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, which the Commission presented on 5 October 2022 (COM(2022)0670), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Letter of amendment No 1/2023 to the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, which the Commission presented on 5 October 2022 (COM(2022)0670),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2022 on the Council position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023 (1) and to the budget amendments contained therein, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2022 on the Council position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023 (1) and to the budget amendments contained therein,

| — | having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 EU of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 EU of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (3),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (4),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (5),

| — | having regard to Rule 95 and Rule 96 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 95 and Rule 96 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of its delegation to the Conciliation Committee (A9-0278/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of its delegation to the Conciliation Committee (A9-0278/2022),

| 1. | Approves the joint text; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Confirms the joint statements annexed to this resolution; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Takes note of the Commission statement annexed to this resolution; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Instructs its President to declare that the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023 has been definitively adopted and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward this legislative resolution to the Council, the Commission, the other institutions and bodies concerned and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

5.

---

(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0366.

(2)  OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(5)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

---

ANNEX

FINAL

Budget 2023 — Elements for joint conclusions

These joint conclusions cover the following sections:

| 1. | Budget 2023 |
| --- | --- |

1.

Budget 2023

| 2. | Budget 2022 — Draft Amending Budget No 5/2022 |
| --- | --- |

2.

Budget 2022 — Draft Amending Budget No 5/2022

| 3. | Statements |
| --- | --- |

3.

Statements

—   Summary overview

A.   Budget 2023

According to the elements for joint conclusions:

| — | The overall level of commitment appropriations in the 2023 budget is set at EUR 186 616,7 million. Overall, this leaves a margin below the MFF ceilings for 2023 of EUR 421,2 million in commitment appropriations. |
| --- | --- |

—

The overall level of commitment appropriations in the 2023 budget is set at EUR 186 616,7 million. Overall, this leaves a margin below the MFF ceilings for 2023 of EUR 421,2 million in commitment appropriations.

| — | The overall level of payment appropriations in the 2023 budget is set at EUR 168 648,7 million. Overall, this leaves a margin below the MFF ceiling for 2023 of EUR 3 554,2 million in payment appropriations. |
| --- | --- |

—

The overall level of payment appropriations in the 2023 budget is set at EUR 168 648,7 million. Overall, this leaves a margin below the MFF ceiling for 2023 of EUR 3 554,2 million in payment appropriations.

| — | The Flexibility Instrument for 2023 is mobilised in commitment appropriations for an amount of EUR 1 235,7 million, of which EUR 182,2 million for sub-heading 2b Resilience and Values, EUR 170,6 million for heading 5 Security and Defence and EUR 882,9 million for heading 6 Neighbourhood and the World. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Flexibility Instrument for 2023 is mobilised in commitment appropriations for an amount of EUR 1 235,7 million, of which EUR 182,2 million for sub-heading 2b Resilience and Values, EUR 170,6 million for heading 5 Security and Defence and EUR 882,9 million for heading 6 Neighbourhood and the World.

The 2023 payment appropriations related to the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument in the years 2019 to 2023 are estimated by the Commission at EUR 948,1 million. The estimated payment schedule of the related outstanding amounts for these years is detailed in the following table:

| Flexibility Instrument — payment profile (in EUR million) |
| --- |
| Mobilisation year | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Total |
| 2019 | 82,2 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 223,2 |
| 2020 | 39,9 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 106,1 |
| 2021 | 10,3 | 7,6 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 58,9 |
| 2022 | 62,7 | 49,8 | 36,7 | 0,0 | 368,4 |
| 2023 | 752,9 | 279,0 | 120,6 | 83,2 | 1 235,7 |
| Total | 948,1 | 336,4 | 157,4 | 83,2 | 1 992,3 |

Flexibility Instrument — payment profile (in EUR million)

Mobilisation year

2023

2024

2025

2026

Total

2019

82,2

0,0

0,0

0,0

223,2

2020

39,9

0,0

0,0

0,0

106,1

2021

10,3

7,6

0,0

0,0

58,9

2022

62,7

49,8

36,7

0,0

368,4

2023

752,9

279,0

120,6

83,2

1 235,7

Total

948,1

336,4

157,4

83,2

1 992,3

| — | In accordance with Article 11(1) a of the MFF Regulation, the Single Margin Instrument is mobilised in commitment appropriations for an amount of EUR 280 million in sub-heading 2b Resilience and Values. |
| --- | --- |

—

In accordance with Article 11(1) a of the MFF Regulation, the Single Margin Instrument is mobilised in commitment appropriations for an amount of EUR 280 million in sub-heading 2b Resilience and Values.

B.   Budget 2022

Draft Amending Budget (DAB) No 5/2022 is approved, with one amendment compared to the Commission proposal: due to the late adoption of the legal base for the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the amount of EUR 82 972 301 in commitment appropriations placed in the reserve for this purpose is not accepted, and the corresponding budget line 13 06 01 is not created for the financial year 2022.

—1.   Budget 2023

1.1.   ‘Closed’ lines

Unless stated otherwise below in these conclusions, all budget lines are confirmed as proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget for 2023 as amended in Amending Letter No 1/2023.

For the other budget lines, the Conciliation Committee has agreed on the conclusions included in sections 1.2 to 1.7 below.

1.2.   Horizontal issues

Decentralised agencies

The EU contribution (in commitment and payment appropriations) and the number of establishment plan posts for all decentralised agencies are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget for 2023 as amended in Amending Letter No 1/2023, with the following exceptions:

| — | Under sub-heading 2b: |
| --- | --- |

—

Under sub-heading 2b:

| — | The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO, budget article 07 10 08), for which the 2023 budget includes an increase of EUR 2,5 million and the transformation of twenty contract agent positions into temporary agents posts in the establishment plan, assuming recruitment on average mid-year. |
| --- | --- |

—

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO, budget article 07 10 08), for which the 2023 budget includes an increase of EUR 2,5 million and the transformation of twenty contract agent positions into temporary agents posts in the establishment plan, assuming recruitment on average mid-year.

| — | Under heading 4: |
| --- | --- |

—

Under heading 4:

| — | The European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA, budget article 11 10 02), for which six posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations is increased by EUR 0,5 million, assuming recruitment on average mid-year. |
| --- | --- |

—

The European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA, budget article 11 10 02), for which six posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations is increased by EUR 0,5 million, assuming recruitment on average mid-year.

| — | The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA, budget article 10 10 01) for which the level of commitment and payment appropriations is increased by EUR 3 million. |
| --- | --- |

—

The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA, budget article 10 10 01) for which the level of commitment and payment appropriations is increased by EUR 3 million.

| — | The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex, budget article 11 10 01), for which the level of commitment and payment appropriations is reduced by EUR 50 million as proposed by the Council and agreed by the European Parliament in their readings. |
| --- | --- |

—

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex, budget article 11 10 01), for which the level of commitment and payment appropriations is reduced by EUR 50 million as proposed by the Council and agreed by the European Parliament in their readings.

Executive agencies

The EU contribution (in commitment and payment appropriations) and the number of establishment plan posts for executive agencies are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget.

Pilot Projects/Preparatory Actions

A comprehensive package of 39 pilot projects/preparatory actions (PP/PA), of which 29 new, for a total amount of EUR 80,1 million in commitment appropriations is agreed as proposed by the Parliament.

The level of appropriations for the continuation of the pilot project implemented by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Pilot Project — Towards the creation of a European Diplomatic Academy, budget item 2 2 5 0) is set at the level requested by the EEAS and proposed by the Commission in the 2023 Draft Budget.

This package respects the ceilings for pilot projects and preparatory actions set out in the Financial Regulation.

1.3.   Expenditure headings of the financial framework — commitment appropriations

After taking into account the above conclusions on agencies and pilot projects and preparatory actions, the Conciliation Committee has agreed on the following:

Heading 1 — Single Market, Innovation and Digital

Commitment appropriations are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023 but with the following adjustments, agreed by the Conciliation Committee, set out in the table below:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 1.0.11 | Horizon Europe | 12 342 890 425 | 12 352 890 425 | 10 000 000 |
| 01 02 01 02 | Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions | 864 130 546 | 874 130 546 | 10 000 000 |
| 1.0.13 | International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) | 1 019 848 352 | 839 848 352 | - 180 000 000 |
| 01 04 01 | Construction, operation and exploitation of the ITER facilities — European Joint Undertaking for ITER — and the Development of Fusion Energy | 1 012 128 572 | 832 128 572 | - 180 000 000 |
| 1.0.221 | CEF Transport | 1 792 540 197 | 1 852 540 197 | 60 000 000 |
| 02 03 01 | Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Transport | 1 782 813 707 | 1 842 813 707 | 60 000 000 |
| 1.0.222 | CEF Energy | 815 673 939 | 859 173 939 | 43 500 000 |
| 02 03 02 | Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Energy | 810 644 269 | 854 144 269 | 43 500 000 |
| 1.0.31 | Single Market Programme (incl. SMEs) | 592 820 090 | 602 820 090 | 10 000 000 |
| 03 02 02 | Improving the competitiveness of enterprises, particularly SMEs, and supporting their access to markets | 126 384 000 | 136 384 000 | 10 000 000 |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 37 325 000 |
| | Total | | | -19 175 000 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

1.0.11

Horizon Europe

12 342 890 425

12 352 890 425

10 000 000

01 02 01 02

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions

864 130 546

874 130 546

10 000 000

1.0.13

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)

1 019 848 352

839 848 352

- 180 000 000

01 04 01

Construction, operation and exploitation of the ITER facilities — European Joint Undertaking for ITER — and the Development of Fusion Energy

1 012 128 572

832 128 572

- 180 000 000

1.0.221

CEF Transport

1 792 540 197

1 852 540 197

60 000 000

02 03 01

Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Transport

1 782 813 707

1 842 813 707

60 000 000

1.0.222

CEF Energy

815 673 939

859 173 939

43 500 000

02 03 02

Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Energy

810 644 269

854 144 269

43 500 000

1.0.31

Single Market Programme (incl. SMEs)

592 820 090

602 820 090

10 000 000

03 02 02

Improving the competitiveness of enterprises, particularly SMEs, and supporting their access to markets

126 384 000

136 384 000

10 000 000

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

37 325 000

Total

-19 175 000

As a consequence, the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 21 548,4 million, leaving a margin of EUR 178,6 million under the expenditure ceiling of heading 1.

In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation (1), the Conciliation Committee agrees to make commitment appropriations available again on the research budget lines for a total amount of EUR 148,8 million in commitment appropriations. These appropriations are part of the overall amount of up to EUR 0,5 billion (in 2018 prices) for the 2021-2027 period as agreed upon in the framework of the MFF agreement. This leaves up to EUR 238,0 million in 2018 prices available for the 2024-2027 period. A possible further activation of Article 15.3 will be discussed in the framework of the legislative procedure on the European Chips Act and its financing.

The following budget line is reinforced and its budget remarks revised accordingly:

| (in EUR) |
| --- |
| Budget line | Name | Commitment appropriations |
| 01 02 02 20 | Cluster ‘Culture, Creativity and Inclusive Society’ | 29 762 369 |
| 01 02 02 40 | Cluster ‘Digital, Industry and Space’ | 89 287 105 |
| 01 02 02 50 | Cluster ‘Climate, Energy and Mobility’ | 29 762 369 |
| Total | | 148 811 843 |

(in EUR)

Budget line

Name

Commitment appropriations

01 02 02 20

Cluster ‘Culture, Creativity and Inclusive Society’

29 762 369

01 02 02 40

Cluster ‘Digital, Industry and Space’

89 287 105

01 02 02 50

Cluster ‘Climate, Energy and Mobility’

29 762 369

Total

148 811 843

Sub-heading 2a — Economic, social and territorial Cohesion

Commitment appropriations are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget but with the following adjustments, agreed by the Conciliation Committee, set out in the table below:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 3 500 000 |
| | Total | | | 3 500 000 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

3 500 000

Total

3 500 000

As a consequence, the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 62 926,5 million, leaving a margin of EUR 12,5 million under the expenditure ceiling of sub-heading 2a.

Sub-heading 2b — Resilience and Values

Commitment appropriations are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023 but with the following adjustments, agreed by the Conciliation Committee, set out in the table below:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 2.2.23 | Financing cost of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) | 1 485 775 000 | 1 315 775 000 | - 170 000 000 |
| 06 04 01 | European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) — Payment of periodic coupon and redemption at maturity | 1 479 775 000 | 1 309 775 000 | - 170 000 000 |
| 2.2.25 | EU4Health | 731 750 309 | 739 250 309 | 7 500 000 |
| 06 06 01 | EU4Health Programme | 707 621 072 | 715 121 072 | 7 500 000 |
| 2.2.32 | Erasmus+ | 3 648 525 437 | 3 668 525 437 | 20 000 000 |
| 07 03 01 01 | Promoting learning mobility of individuals, as well as cooperation, inclusion, excellence, creativity and innovation at the level of organisations and policies in the field of education and training — Indirect management | 2 382 120 171 | 2 400 120 171 | 18 000 000 |
| 07 03 03 | Promoting learning mobility of sport coaches and staff, as well as cooperation, inclusion, creativity and innovation at the level of sport organisations and sport policies | 67 664 711 | 69 664 711 | 2 000 000 |
| 2.2.33 | European Solidarity Corps (ESC) | 141 196 320 | 144 196 320 | 3 000 000 |
| 07 04 01 | European Solidarity Corps | 134 298 196 | 137 298 196 | 3 000 000 |
| 2.2.34 | Creative Europe | 325 290 321 | 332 790 321 | 7 500 000 |
| 07 05 01 | Culture | 100 040 879 | 102 540 879 | 2 500 000 |
| 07 05 02 | Media | 175 661 827 | 180 661 827 | 5 000 000 |
| 2.2.352 | Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values | 212 282 092 | 215 282 092 | 3 000 000 |
| 07 06 02 | Promote citizens engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union | 32 154 085 | 33 154 085 | 1 000 000 |
| 07 06 03 | Daphne | 25 257 735 | 26 757 735 | 1 500 000 |
| 07 06 04 | Protection and promotion of Union values | 108 683 873 | 109 183 873 | 500 000 |
| 2.2.3DAG | Decentralised Agencies | 268 478 848 | 270 978 848 | 2 500 000 |
| 07 10 08 | European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) | 62 101 095 | 64 601 095 | 2 500 000 |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 31 590 500 |
| | Total | | | -94 909 500 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

2.2.23

Financing cost of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI)

1 485 775 000

1 315 775 000

- 170 000 000

06 04 01

European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) — Payment of periodic coupon and redemption at maturity

1 479 775 000

1 309 775 000

- 170 000 000

2.2.25

EU4Health

731 750 309

739 250 309

7 500 000

06 06 01

EU4Health Programme

707 621 072

715 121 072

7 500 000

2.2.32

Erasmus+

3 648 525 437

3 668 525 437

20 000 000

07 03 01 01

Promoting learning mobility of individuals, as well as cooperation, inclusion, excellence, creativity and innovation at the level of organisations and policies in the field of education and training — Indirect management

2 382 120 171

2 400 120 171

18 000 000

07 03 03

Promoting learning mobility of sport coaches and staff, as well as cooperation, inclusion, creativity and innovation at the level of sport organisations and sport policies

67 664 711

69 664 711

2 000 000

2.2.33

European Solidarity Corps (ESC)

141 196 320

144 196 320

3 000 000

07 04 01

European Solidarity Corps

134 298 196

137 298 196

3 000 000

2.2.34

Creative Europe

325 290 321

332 790 321

7 500 000

07 05 01

Culture

100 040 879

102 540 879

2 500 000

07 05 02

Media

175 661 827

180 661 827

5 000 000

2.2.352

Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values

212 282 092

215 282 092

3 000 000

07 06 02

Promote citizens engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union

32 154 085

33 154 085

1 000 000

07 06 03

Daphne

25 257 735

26 757 735

1 500 000

07 06 04

Protection and promotion of Union values

108 683 873

109 183 873

500 000

2.2.3DAG

Decentralised Agencies

268 478 848

270 978 848

2 500 000

07 10 08

European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)

62 101 095

64 601 095

2 500 000

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

31 590 500

Total

-94 909 500

In the light of the interest rates and the volume of the NGEU financing operations until the end of 2022, the appropriations for budget line 06 04 01 can be reduced by EUR 170,0 million, while fully preserving the capacity to finance the non-repayable component of NGEU in 2023.

For Erasmus+, the reinforcement for budget Article 07 03 03 Promoting learning mobility of sport coaches and staff, as well as cooperation, inclusion, creativity and innovation at the level of sport organisations and sport policies would allow a contribution to the financing of actions related to the next special Olympics.

As a consequence, the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 7 660,2 million, with no margin left under the expenditure ceiling of sub-heading 2b and the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for an amount of EUR 182,2 million in accordance with Article 12 of the MFF Regulation as well as the mobilisation of the Single Margin Instrument for an amount of EUR 280,0 million in accordance with Article 11(1)(a) of the MFF Regulation.

Heading 3 — Natural Resources and Environment

Commitment appropriations are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023 but with the following adjustments, agreed by the Conciliation Committee, set out in the table below:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 3.2.21 | Programme for Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) | 725 521 280 | 755 521 280 | 30 000 000 |
| 09 02 01 | Nature and biodiversity | 272 761 676 | 279 011 676 | 6 250 000 |
| 09 02 02 | Circular economy and quality of life | 173 862 556 | 179 112 556 | 5 250 000 |
| 09 02 03 | Climate change mitigation and adaptation | 122 358 139 | 128 608 139 | 6 250 000 |
| 09 02 04 | Clean energy transition | 130 752 568 | 143 002 568 | 12 250 000 |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 6 700 000 |
| | Total | | | 36 700 000 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

3.2.21

Programme for Environment and Climate Action (LIFE)

725 521 280

755 521 280

30 000 000

09 02 01

Nature and biodiversity

272 761 676

279 011 676

6 250 000

09 02 02

Circular economy and quality of life

173 862 556

179 112 556

5 250 000

09 02 03

Climate change mitigation and adaptation

122 358 139

128 608 139

6 250 000

09 02 04

Clean energy transition

130 752 568

143 002 568

12 250 000

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

6 700 000

Total

36 700 000

As a consequence, the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 57 259,3 million, leaving a margin of EUR 35,7 million under the expenditure ceiling of heading 3.

Heading 4 — Migration and Border Management

Commitment appropriations are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget but with the following adjustments, agreed by the Conciliation Committee, set out in the table below:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 4.0.11 | Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund | 1 418 121 253 | 1 454 621 253 | 36 500 000 |
| 10 02 01 | Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund | 1 414 824 860 | 1 451 324 860 | 36 500 000 |
| 4.0.1DAG | Decentralised Agencies | 169 169 287 | 172 169 287 | 3 000 000 |
| 10 10 01 | European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) | 169 169 287 | 172 169 287 | 3 000 000 |
| 4.0.211 | Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) — Instrument for border management and visa (BMVI) | 946 798 303 | 956 798 303 | 10 000 000 |
| 11 02 01 | Instrument for financial support for border management and visa | 944 798 303 | 954 798 303 | 10 000 000 |
| 4.0.2DAG | Decentralised Agencies | 1 052 269 675 | 1 002 769 675 | -49 500 000 |
| 11 10 01 | European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) | 793 614 137 | 743 614 137 | -50 000 000 |
| 11 10 02 | European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (‘eu-LISA’) | 258 655 538 | 259 155 538 | 500 000 |
| | Total | | | 0 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

4.0.11

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

1 418 121 253

1 454 621 253

36 500 000

10 02 01

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

1 414 824 860

1 451 324 860

36 500 000

4.0.1DAG

Decentralised Agencies

169 169 287

172 169 287

3 000 000

10 10 01

European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)

169 169 287

172 169 287

3 000 000

4.0.211

Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) — Instrument for border management and visa (BMVI)

946 798 303

956 798 303

10 000 000

11 02 01

Instrument for financial support for border management and visa

944 798 303

954 798 303

10 000 000

4.0.2DAG

Decentralised Agencies

1 052 269 675

1 002 769 675

-49 500 000

11 10 01

European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)

793 614 137

743 614 137

-50 000 000

11 10 02

European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (‘eu-LISA’)

258 655 538

259 155 538

500 000

Total

0

As a consequence, the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 3 727,3 million, leaving a margin of EUR 86,7 million under the expenditure ceiling of heading 4.

Heading 5 — Security and Defence

Commitment appropriations are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget but with the following adjustments, agreed by the Conciliation Committee, set out in the table below:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 5.0.22 | Military Mobility | 236 685 681 | 295 185 681 | 58 500 000 |
| 13 04 01 | Military mobility | 234 970 661 | 293 470 661 | 58 500 000 |
| | Total | | | 58 500 000 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

5.0.22

Military Mobility

236 685 681

295 185 681

58 500 000

13 04 01

Military mobility

234 970 661

293 470 661

58 500 000

Total

58 500 000

Additionally, pending the agreement on the Space secure connectivity programme, the amounts proposed in the Draft Budget for this purpose will be put in reserve, to be be released or amended in line with the financing solution finally agreed by the European Parliament and the Council. The details are set out in section 1.5 below.

As a consequence, the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 2 116,6 million, with no margin left under the expenditure ceiling of heading 5 and the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for an amount of EUR 170,6 million.

Heading 6 — Neighbourhood and the World

Commitment appropriations are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023 but with the following adjustments, agreed by the Conciliation Committee, set out in the table below:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 6.0.111 | Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI — Global Europe) | 11 970 770 313 | 12 250 770 313 | 280 000 000 |
| 14 02 01 10 | Southern neighbourhood | 1 657 209 546 | 1 727 209 546 | 70 000 000 |
| 14 02 01 11 | Eastern neighbourhood | 618 890 238 | 828 890 238 | 210 000 000 |
| | Total | | | 280 000 000 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

6.0.111

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI — Global Europe)

11 970 770 313

12 250 770 313

280 000 000

14 02 01 10

Southern neighbourhood

1 657 209 546

1 727 209 546

70 000 000

14 02 01 11

Eastern neighbourhood

618 890 238

828 890 238

210 000 000

Total

280 000 000

For the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, the increase of EUR 210 million in commitment appropriations for the Eastern neighbourhood (budget item 14 02 01 11) will be dedicated to measures in Ukraine and Moldova in response to the Russian aggression. The increase of EUR 70 million in commitment appropriations for the Southern neighbourhood (budget item 14 02 01 10) is intended to finance migration-related actions, in particular actions supporting the management and governance of migration and forced displacement and UNRWA.

As a consequence, the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 17 211,9 million, with no margin left under the expenditure ceiling of heading 6 and the mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for an amount of EUR 882,9 million.

Heading 7 — European Public Administration

The number of posts in the establishment plans of the institutions and the appropriations proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023 are agreed by the Conciliation Committee with the following exceptions:

| — | The section of the Court of Justice of the European Union for which four posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 634 903 considering recruitment on average mid-year; |
| --- | --- |

—

The section of the Court of Justice of the European Union for which four posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 634 903 considering recruitment on average mid-year;

| — | The section of the European Court of Auditors for which nine posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 1 005 422 considering recruitment on average mid-year. The corresponding posts are temporary allowed, until 2027; |
| --- | --- |

—

The section of the European Court of Auditors for which nine posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 1 005 422 considering recruitment on average mid-year. The corresponding posts are temporary allowed, until 2027;

| — | The section of the European Economic and Social Committee for which two posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 115 497 considering recruitment on average mid-year; |
| --- | --- |

—

The section of the European Economic and Social Committee for which two posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 115 497 considering recruitment on average mid-year;

| — | The section of the European Ombudsman for which two posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 101 388 considering recruitment on average mid-year; |
| --- | --- |

—

The section of the European Ombudsman for which two posts are added to the establishment plan and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 101 388 considering recruitment on average mid-year;

| — | The section of the European Data Protection Supervisor for which five posts are added of which three posts to the establishment plan of the European Data Protection Supervisor and two posts to the establishment plan of the European Data Protection Board. The level of commitment and payment appropriations is therefore increased by EUR 388 202 considering recruitment on average mid-year; |
| --- | --- |

—

The section of the European Data Protection Supervisor for which five posts are added of which three posts to the establishment plan of the European Data Protection Supervisor and two posts to the establishment plan of the European Data Protection Board. The level of commitment and payment appropriations is therefore increased by EUR 388 202 considering recruitment on average mid-year;

| — | The section of the European External Action Service (EEAS) for which staff resources are increased by 11 Contract Agents and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 420 239 considering recruitment on average mid-year. |
| --- | --- |

—

The section of the European External Action Service (EEAS) for which staff resources are increased by 11 Contract Agents and the level of commitment and payment appropriations increased by EUR 420 239 considering recruitment on average mid-year.

The adjustments, resulting in an increase of EUR 2,7 million of heading 7, are detailed in the following tables:

Section 4 — Court of Justice

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 1 2 0 0 | Remuneration and allowances | 304 868 000 | 305 502 903 | 634 903 |
| | Total | | | 634 903 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

1 2 0 0

Remuneration and allowances

304 868 000

305 502 903

634 903

Total

634 903

Section 5 — European Court of Auditors

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 1 2 0 0 | Remunerations and allowances | 129 600 000 | 130 605 422 | 1 005 422 |
| | Total | | | 1 005 422 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

1 2 0 0

Remunerations and allowances

129 600 000

130 605 422

1 005 422

Total

1 005 422

Section 6 — European Econcomic and Social Committee

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 1 2 0 0 | Remunerations and allowances | 82 849 505 | 82 965 001 | 115 496 |
| | Total | | | 115 496 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

1 2 0 0

Remunerations and allowances

82 849 505

82 965 001

115 496

Total

115 496

Section 8 — European Ombudsman

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 1 2 0 0 | Remuneration and allowances | 9 002 978 | 9 104 366 | 101 388 |
| | Total | | | 101 388 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

1 2 0 0

Remuneration and allowances

9 002 978

9 104 366

101 388

Total

101 388

Section 9 — European data-protection Supervisor

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 1 1 0 0 | Remuneration and allowances | 7 491 500 | 7 724 420 | 232 920 |
| 3 0 1 0 | Remuneration and allowances | 2 123 500 | 2 278 782 | 155 282 |
| | Total | | | 388 202 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

1 1 0 0

Remuneration and allowances

7 491 500

7 724 420

232 920

3 0 1 0

Remuneration and allowances

2 123 500

2 278 782

155 282

Total

388 202

Section 10 — European External Action Service

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| 1 2 0 0 | Contract staff | 20 967 900 | 21 388 139 | 420 239 |
| | Total | | | 420 239 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in commitment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

1 2 0 0

Contract staff

20 967 900

21 388 139

420 239

Total

420 239

As a consequence the agreed level of commitment appropriations is set at EUR 11 311,3 million, leaving a margin of EUR 107,7 million under the expenditure ceiling of heading 7, of which EUR 28,2 million under the sub-margin for ‘Administrative expenditure of the institutions’.

Thematic special instruments: EGF, SEAR and BAR

Commitment appropriations for the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF), the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR) are set at the level proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget.

1.4.   Payment appropriations

The overall level of payment appropriations in the 2023 budget is set at the level of the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023 with the following adjustments agreed by the Conciliation Committee:

| 1. | The agreed level of commitment appropriations for non-differentiated expenditure (headings 1 to 6), for which the level of payment appropriations is equal to the level of commitment appropriations, is taken into account. This applies also to the reduction of the financing cost of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) by EUR 170,0 million. Taking into account also the adjustment to the Union contribution to decentralised agencies, the combined effect is a decrease of EUR 214,0 million; |
| --- | --- |

1.

The agreed level of commitment appropriations for non-differentiated expenditure (headings 1 to 6), for which the level of payment appropriations is equal to the level of commitment appropriations, is taken into account. This applies also to the reduction of the financing cost of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) by EUR 170,0 million. Taking into account also the adjustment to the Union contribution to decentralised agencies, the combined effect is a decrease of EUR 214,0 million;

| 2. | The adjustment under heading 7 resulting in an increase of EUR 2,7 million; |
| --- | --- |

2.

The adjustment under heading 7 resulting in an increase of EUR 2,7 million;

| 3. | The payment appropriations for all new pilot projects and preparatory actions proposed by the Parliament are set at 25 % of the corresponding commitment appropriations, or at the level proposed by Parliament, if lower. In the case of extension of existing pilot projects and preparatory actions, the level of payment appropriations is the level defined in the Draft Budget as amended by the Amending Letter No 1/2023 plus 25 % of the corresponding new commitment appropriations, or at the level proposed by Parliament, if lower. The combined effect is an increase of EUR 19,8 million; |
| --- | --- |

3.

The payment appropriations for all new pilot projects and preparatory actions proposed by the Parliament are set at 25 % of the corresponding commitment appropriations, or at the level proposed by Parliament, if lower. In the case of extension of existing pilot projects and preparatory actions, the level of payment appropriations is the level defined in the Draft Budget as amended by the Amending Letter No 1/2023 plus 25 % of the corresponding new commitment appropriations, or at the level proposed by Parliament, if lower. The combined effect is an increase of EUR 19,8 million;

| 4. | The adjustments to differentiated expenditure budget lines, for which the combined effect is an increase of EUR 177,0 million. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The adjustments to differentiated expenditure budget lines, for which the combined effect is an increase of EUR 177,0 million.

The adjustments, resulting in an overall decrease of EUR 14,5 million, are set out in the following table:

| Budget line / Programme | Name | Variation in payment appropriations (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB 2023 (incl. AL1) | Budget 2023 | Difference |
| Heading 1 |
| 1.0.11 | Horizon Europe | 11 903 569 694 | 11 908 569 694 | 5 000 000 |
| 01 02 01 02 | Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions | 602 437 939 | 607 437 939 | 5 000 000 |
| 1.0.13 | International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) | 721 228 782 | 671 228 782 | -50 000 000 |
| 01 04 01 | Construction, operation and exploitation of the ITER facilities — European Joint Undertaking for ITER — and the Development of Fusion Energy | 563 509 002 | 513 509 002 | -50 000 000 |
| 1.0.221 | CEF Transport | 1 922 486 490 | 1 943 486 490 | 21 000 000 |
| 02 03 01 | Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Transport | 973 760 000 | 994 760 000 | 21 000 000 |
| 1.0.222 | CEF Energy | 713 629 670 | 723 629 670 | 10 000 000 |
| 02 03 02 | Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Energy | 246 000 000 | 256 000 000 | 10 000 000 |
| 1.0.31 | Single Market Programme (incl. SMEs) | 610 260 036 | 615 260 036 | 5 000 000 |
| 03 02 02 | Improving the competitiveness of enterprises, particularly SMEs, and supporting their access to markets | 132 069 500 | 137 069 500 | 5 000 000 |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 9 331 250 |
| | Total Heading 1 | | | 331 250 |
| Sub-heading 2a |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 875 000 |
| | Total Sub-heading 2a | | | 875 000 |
| Sub-heading 2b |
| 2.2.23 | Financing cost of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) | 1 485 775 000 | 1 315 775 000 | - 170 000 000 |
| 06 04 01 | European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) — Payment of periodic coupon and redemption at maturity | 1 479 775 000 | 1 309 775 000 | - 170 000 000 |
| 2.2.25 | EU4Health | 619 341 615 | 626 841 615 | 7 500 000 |
| 06 06 01 | EU4Health Programme | 570 712 378 | 578 212 378 | 7 500 000 |
| 2.2.32 | Erasmus+ | 3 274 197 196 | 3 291 597 196 | 17 400 000 |
| 07 03 01 01 | Promoting learning mobility of individuals, as well as cooperation, inclusion, excellence, creativity and innovation at the level of organisations and policies in the field of education and training — Indirect management | 2 280 250 000 | 2 296 250 000 | 16 000 000 |
| 07 03 03 | Promoting learning mobility of sport coaches and staff, as well as cooperation, inclusion, creativity and innovation at the level of sport organisations and sport policies | 55 000 000 | 56 400 000 | 1 400 000 |
| 2.2.33 | European Solidarity Corps (ESC) | 122 118 124 | 124 118 124 | 2 000 000 |
| 07 04 01 | European Solidarity Corps | 104 000 000 | 106 000 000 | 2 000 000 |
| 2.2.34 | Creative Europe | 306 962 192 | 312 462 192 | 5 500 000 |
| 07 05 01 | Culture | 89 452 597 | 91 452 597 | 2 000 000 |
| 07 05 02 | Media | 137 922 353 | 141 422 353 | 3 500 000 |
| 2.2.352 | Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values | 155 069 755 | 156 569 755 | 1 500 000 |
| 07 06 02 | Promote citizens engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union | 18 510 511 | 19 010 511 | 500 000 |
| 07 06 03 | Daphne | 26 078 886 | 26 828 886 | 750 000 |
| 07 06 04 | Protection and promotion of Union values | 54 381 753 | 54 631 753 | 250 000 |
| 2.2.3DAG | Decentralised Agencies | 263 290 848 | 265 790 848 | 2 500 000 |
| 07 10 08 | European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) | 62 101 095 | 64 601 095 | 2 500 000 |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 7 897 625 |
| | Total sub-heading 2b | | | - 125 702 375 |
| Heading 3 |
| 3.2.21 | Programme for Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) | 513 989 167 | 522 689 167 | 8 700 000 |
| 09 02 01 | Nature and biodiversity | 97 698 396 | 99 323 396 | 1 625 000 |
| 09 02 02 | Circular economy and quality of life | 69 504 430 | 71 129 430 | 1 625 000 |
| 09 02 03 | Climate change mitigation and adaptation | 47 000 000 | 48 625 000 | 1 625 000 |
| 09 02 04 | Clean energy transition | 53 000 000 | 56 825 000 | 3 825 000 |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 1 675 000 |
| | Total Heading 3 | | | 10 375 000 |
| Heading 4 |
| 4.0.11 | Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund | 1 314 919 500 | 1 329 919 500 | 15 000 000 |
| 10 02 01 | Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund | 710 919 500 | 725 919 500 | 15 000 000 |
| 4.0.1DAG | Decentralised Agencies | 169 169 287 | 172 169 287 | 3 000 000 |
| 10 10 01 | European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) | 169 169 287 | 172 169 287 | 3 000 000 |
| 4.0.211 | Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) — Instrument for border management and visa (BMVI) | 394 492 752 | 396 992 752 | 2 500 000 |
| 11 02 01 | Instrument for financial support for border management and visa | 276 492 752 | 278 992 752 | 2 500 000 |
| 4.0.2DAG | Decentralised Agencies | 1 117 019 143 | 1 067 519 143 | -49 500 000 |
| 11 10 01 | European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) | 793 614 137 | 743 614 137 | -50 000 000 |
| 11 10 02 | European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (‘eu-LISA’) | 323 405 006 | 323 905 006 | 500 000 |
| PPPA | Pilot projects and preparatory actions | | | 0 |
| | Total Heading 4 | | | -29 000 000 |
| Heading 5 |
| 5.0.22 | Military Mobility | 106 715 020 | 131 715 020 | 25 000 000 |
| 13 04 01 | Military mobility | 105 000 000 | 130 000 000 | 25 000 000 |
| | Total Heading 5 | | | 25 000 000 |
| Heading 6 |
| 6.0.111 | Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI — Global Europe) | 8 842 716 018 | 8 943 716 018 | 101 000 000 |
| 14 02 01 10 | Southern neighbourhood | 423 893 255 | 444 893 255 | 21 000 000 |
| 14 02 01 11 | Eastern neighbourhood | 185 608 958 | 265 608 958 | 80 000 000 |
| | Total Heading 6 | | | 101 000 000 |
| Heading 7 |
| 7.1.24 | Court of Justice of the European Union | 485 342 893 | 485 977 796 | 634 903 |
| 7.1.25 | European Court of Auditors | 174 054 500 | 175 059 922 | 1 005 422 |
| 7.1.26 | European Economic and Social Committee | 158 652 474 | 158 767 970 | 115 496 |
| 7.1.28 | European Ombudsman | 12 943 383 | 13 044 771 | 101 388 |
| 7.1.29 | European Data Protection Supervisor | 21 941 500 | 22 329 702 | 388 202 |
| 7.1.2X | European External Action Service | 819 647 241 | 820 067 480 | 420 239 |
| | Total Heading 7 | 2 665 650 |
| TOTAL | -14 455 475 |

Budget line / Programme

Name

Variation in payment appropriations (in EUR)

DB 2023 (incl. AL1)

Budget 2023

Difference

Heading 1

1.0.11

Horizon Europe

11 903 569 694

11 908 569 694

5 000 000

01 02 01 02

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions

602 437 939

607 437 939

5 000 000

1.0.13

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)

721 228 782

671 228 782

-50 000 000

01 04 01

Construction, operation and exploitation of the ITER facilities — European Joint Undertaking for ITER — and the Development of Fusion Energy

563 509 002

513 509 002

-50 000 000

1.0.221

CEF Transport

1 922 486 490

1 943 486 490

21 000 000

02 03 01

Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Transport

973 760 000

994 760 000

21 000 000

1.0.222

CEF Energy

713 629 670

723 629 670

10 000 000

02 03 02

Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Energy

246 000 000

256 000 000

10 000 000

1.0.31

Single Market Programme (incl. SMEs)

610 260 036

615 260 036

5 000 000

03 02 02

Improving the competitiveness of enterprises, particularly SMEs, and supporting their access to markets

132 069 500

137 069 500

5 000 000

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

9 331 250

Total Heading 1

331 250

Sub-heading 2a

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

875 000

Total Sub-heading 2a

875 000

Sub-heading 2b

2.2.23

Financing cost of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI)

1 485 775 000

1 315 775 000

- 170 000 000

06 04 01

European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) — Payment of periodic coupon and redemption at maturity

1 479 775 000

1 309 775 000

- 170 000 000

2.2.25

EU4Health

619 341 615

626 841 615

7 500 000

06 06 01

EU4Health Programme

570 712 378

578 212 378

7 500 000

2.2.32

Erasmus+

3 274 197 196

3 291 597 196

17 400 000

07 03 01 01

Promoting learning mobility of individuals, as well as cooperation, inclusion, excellence, creativity and innovation at the level of organisations and policies in the field of education and training — Indirect management

2 280 250 000

2 296 250 000

16 000 000

07 03 03

Promoting learning mobility of sport coaches and staff, as well as cooperation, inclusion, creativity and innovation at the level of sport organisations and sport policies

55 000 000

56 400 000

1 400 000

2.2.33

European Solidarity Corps (ESC)

122 118 124

124 118 124

2 000 000

07 04 01

European Solidarity Corps

104 000 000

106 000 000

2 000 000

2.2.34

Creative Europe

306 962 192

312 462 192

5 500 000

07 05 01

Culture

89 452 597

91 452 597

2 000 000

07 05 02

Media

137 922 353

141 422 353

3 500 000

2.2.352

Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values

155 069 755

156 569 755

1 500 000

07 06 02

Promote citizens engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union

18 510 511

19 010 511

500 000

07 06 03

Daphne

26 078 886

26 828 886

750 000

07 06 04

Protection and promotion of Union values

54 381 753

54 631 753

250 000

2.2.3DAG

Decentralised Agencies

263 290 848

265 790 848

2 500 000

07 10 08

European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)

62 101 095

64 601 095

2 500 000

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

7 897 625

Total sub-heading 2b

- 125 702 375

Heading 3

3.2.21

Programme for Environment and Climate Action (LIFE)

513 989 167

522 689 167

8 700 000

09 02 01

Nature and biodiversity

97 698 396

99 323 396

1 625 000

09 02 02

Circular economy and quality of life

69 504 430

71 129 430

1 625 000

09 02 03

Climate change mitigation and adaptation

47 000 000

48 625 000

1 625 000

09 02 04

Clean energy transition

53 000 000

56 825 000

3 825 000

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

1 675 000

Total Heading 3

10 375 000

Heading 4

4.0.11

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

1 314 919 500

1 329 919 500

15 000 000

10 02 01

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

710 919 500

725 919 500

15 000 000

4.0.1DAG

Decentralised Agencies

169 169 287

172 169 287

3 000 000

10 10 01

European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)

169 169 287

172 169 287

3 000 000

4.0.211

Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) — Instrument for border management and visa (BMVI)

394 492 752

396 992 752

2 500 000

11 02 01

Instrument for financial support for border management and visa

276 492 752

278 992 752

2 500 000

4.0.2DAG

Decentralised Agencies

1 117 019 143

1 067 519 143

-49 500 000

11 10 01

European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)

793 614 137

743 614 137

-50 000 000

11 10 02

European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (‘eu-LISA’)

323 405 006

323 905 006

500 000

PPPA

Pilot projects and preparatory actions

0

Total Heading 4

-29 000 000

Heading 5

5.0.22

Military Mobility

106 715 020

131 715 020

25 000 000

13 04 01

Military mobility

105 000 000

130 000 000

25 000 000

Total Heading 5

25 000 000

Heading 6

6.0.111

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI — Global Europe)

8 842 716 018

8 943 716 018

101 000 000

14 02 01 10

Southern neighbourhood

423 893 255

444 893 255

21 000 000

14 02 01 11

Eastern neighbourhood

185 608 958

265 608 958

80 000 000

Total Heading 6

101 000 000

Heading 7

7.1.24

Court of Justice of the European Union

485 342 893

485 977 796

634 903

7.1.25

European Court of Auditors

174 054 500

175 059 922

1 005 422

7.1.26

European Economic and Social Committee

158 652 474

158 767 970

115 496

7.1.28

European Ombudsman

12 943 383

13 044 771

101 388

7.1.29

European Data Protection Supervisor

21 941 500

22 329 702

388 202

7.1.2X

European External Action Service

819 647 241

820 067 480

420 239

Total Heading 7

2 665 650

TOTAL

-14 455 475

Overall, this results in a level of payment appropriations of EUR 168 648,7 million, which represents a decrease of EUR 14,5 million in comparison with the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023.

1.5.   Reserves

There are no reserves in addition to those of the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023.

1.6.   Budget remarks

The text of budget remarks corresponds to the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023 with the following adjustments proposed in the letter of executability and agreed by the Conciliation Committee:

| — | Budget lines for which amendments have been introduced by the European Parliament to its own section are approved without modifications. This includes the following amendment: |
| --- | --- |

—

Budget lines for which amendments have been introduced by the European Parliament to its own section are approved without modifications. This includes the following amendment:

| — | Item 1 2 0 0 — Remuneration and allowances |
| --- | --- |

—

Item 1 2 0 0 — Remuneration and allowances

Add text as follows:

98 additional establishment plan posts for the year 2023. These posts are intended for one budget year and will be removed from the establishment plan in the 2024 draft budget. These posts are intended to facilitate the continuity of employment of temporary staff in the light of the application of article 29(4) of the Staff Regulation. No additional appropriations are necessary.

| — | The Conciliation Committee also agrees that the number of establishment plan posts of the ‘Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations and the Committee of Independent Eminent Persons’ should be clearly marked within the European Parliament's establishment plan by introducing a new line below the grand total of the European Parliament, showing ‘of which for the Authority’. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Conciliation Committee also agrees that the number of establishment plan posts of the ‘Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations and the Committee of Independent Eminent Persons’ should be clearly marked within the European Parliament's establishment plan by introducing a new line below the grand total of the European Parliament, showing ‘of which for the Authority’.

| — | Budget lines for which the amendments introduced by the European Parliament are approved without modifications: |
| --- | --- |

—

Budget lines for which the amendments introduced by the European Parliament are approved without modifications:

| — | Article 14 04 02 — European Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions (Eurofound) |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 14 04 02 — European Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions (Eurofound)

Amend text as follows:

This appropriation covers expenditure on the salaries of EUSRs and on setting up their teams and/or support structures, including
  travel costs and
  staff costs other than those relating to staff seconded by Member States or Union institutions. It also covers the costs of any projects implemented under the direct responsibility of an EUSR.

| — | Budget lines for which the respective budget remark as proposed in the Draft Budget as amended by the Amending Letter, are approved with the following modifications: |
| --- | --- |

—

Budget lines for which the respective budget remark as proposed in the Draft Budget as amended by the Amending Letter, are approved with the following modifications:

| — | Item 13 03 01 — Defence research |
| --- | --- |

—

Item 13 03 01 — Defence research

Amend the paragraph as follows:

studies, such as feasibility studies to explore the feasibility of new or improved technologies, products, processes, services and solutions, including in the field of cyber defence and cyber security,

| — | New budget lines following the adoption of the Commission proposal for a Regulation establishing an Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) on 9 November 2022 for which the respective budget remark are approved with the text as follows: |
| --- | --- |

—

New budget lines following the adoption of the Commission proposal for a Regulation establishing an Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) on 9 November 2022 for which the respective budget remark are approved with the text as follows:

| — | Article 14 01 06 — Support expenditure for Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus (MFA+) |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 14 01 06 — Support expenditure for Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus (MFA+)

Add text as follows:

Besides the expenditure described in this chapter, this appropriation is also and more specifically intended to cover support expenditure for the implementation of the Instrument and for the achievement of its objectives, including administrative support associated with the achievement of its objectives, including administrative support associated with the preparation, follow-up, monitoring, control, audit and evaluation activities necessary for such implementation, as well as expenditure at headquarters and Union delegations for the administrative and coordination support needed for the Instrument, and to manage operations financed under the Instrument, including information and communication actions, and corporate information technology systems.

| — | Chapter 14 07 — Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus (MFA+) |
| --- | --- |

—

Chapter 14 07 — Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus (MFA+)

Add text as follows:

Appropriations under this chapter are intended to cover operational expenditure related to actions carried out under the Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +). The general objective of the Instrument is to provide short term financial relief in a predictable, continuous, orderly and timely manner, financing of rehabilitation and initial support towards post-war reconstruction, where appropriate, with a view to supporting Ukraine on its path towards European integration.

To reach the general objective, the main specific objectives shall in particular be to support:

| — | macro-financial stability, and to ease the Country’s external and internal financing constraints; |
| --- | --- |

—

macro-financial stability, and to ease the Country’s external and internal financing constraints;

| — | a reform agenda gearing towards the early preparatory phase of the pre-accession process, as appropriate, including strengthening Ukraine’s institutions, reforming and reinforcing the effectiveness of public administration as well as transparency, structural reforms and good governance at all levels; |
| --- | --- |

—

a reform agenda gearing towards the early preparatory phase of the pre-accession process, as appropriate, including strengthening Ukraine’s institutions, reforming and reinforcing the effectiveness of public administration as well as transparency, structural reforms and good governance at all levels;

| — | rehabilitation of critical functions and infrastructure and relief for people in need. |
| --- | --- |

—

rehabilitation of critical functions and infrastructure and relief for people in need.

In accordance with Articles 21, 22 and 24 of the Financial Regulation, contributions received from third countries (EFTA States pursuant to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, candidate countries and, if applicable, the Western Balkan potential candidates, or other third countries) for participating in Union programmes and any other assigned revenue entered in the statement of revenue give rise to the provision of corresponding appropriations and to implementation under this chapter.

The related estimated amounts as well as the corresponding article or item of the statement of revenue are indicated, wherever possible, in the relevant budget lines.

| — | Article 14 07 01 — Ukraine MFA+ interest rate subsidy |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 14 07 01 — Ukraine MFA+ interest rate subsidy

Add text as follows:

This appropriation is intended to cover activities aiming at granting an interest rate subsidy related to the borrowing and lending, with the exception of costs related to early repayment of the loan, in respect of the loans under this Regulation.

These contributions shall constitute external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(2), point (d) and (e) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

| — | Article 14 07 02 — Ukraine MFA+ non-repayable support |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 14 07 02 — Ukraine MFA+ non-repayable support

Add text as follows:

This appropriation is intended to cover additional amounts made available by Member States and interested third countries and parties, implemented as non-repayable support where provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding to be concluded under Article 7 of the proposed Regulation, or in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947 and Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 to finance measures achieving the objectives referred to in Article 2(2)(b) to(c) of the proposed Regulation.

This appropriation shall in particular relate to

| — | a reform agenda gearing towards the early preparatory phase of the pre-accession process, as appropriate, including strengthening Ukraine’s institutions, reforming and reinforcing the effectiveness of public administration as well as transparency, structural reforms and good governance at all levels; |
| --- | --- |

—

a reform agenda gearing towards the early preparatory phase of the pre-accession process, as appropriate, including strengthening Ukraine’s institutions, reforming and reinforcing the effectiveness of public administration as well as transparency, structural reforms and good governance at all levels;

| — | rehabilitation of critical functions and infrastructure and relief for people in need. |
| --- | --- |

—

rehabilitation of critical functions and infrastructure and relief for people in need.

These contributions shall constitute external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(2), point (d) and (e) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

| — | The Conciliation Committee agrees to include the following footnote in the establishment plan of the European Court of Auditors. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Conciliation Committee agrees to include the following footnote in the establishment plan of the European Court of Auditors.

Add text as follows:

‘Additional posts (2023) (29 auditors, linked to NGEU and granted until 2027)’.

| — | In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, the Conciliation Committee agrees to make commitment appropriations available again on the budget line 01 02 02 20. Budget remarks will be adjusted accordingly: |
| --- | --- |

—

In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, the Conciliation Committee agrees to make commitment appropriations available again on the budget line 01 02 02 20. Budget remarks will be adjusted accordingly:

| Budget line | Name |
| --- | --- |
| 01 02 02 20 | Add following text:



  In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, an amount of EUR 29 762 369 in commitment appropriations is available for this budget item further to decommitments made in 2020 as a result of total or partial non-implementation of research projects. |

Budget line

Name

01 02 02 20

Add following text:

In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, an amount of EUR 29 762 369 in commitment appropriations is available for this budget item further to decommitments made in 2020 as a result of total or partial non-implementation of research projects.

| — | In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, the Conciliation Committee agrees to make commitment appropriations available again on the budget line 01 02 02 40. Budget remarks will be adjusted accordingly: |
| --- | --- |

—

In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, the Conciliation Committee agrees to make commitment appropriations available again on the budget line 01 02 02 40. Budget remarks will be adjusted accordingly:

| Budget line | Name |
| --- | --- |
| 01 02 02 40 | Add following text:



  In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, an amount of EUR 89 287 105 in commitment appropriations is available for this budget item further to decommitments made in 2020 as a result of total or partial non-implementation of research projects. |

Budget line

Name

01 02 02 40

Add following text:

In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, an amount of EUR 89 287 105 in commitment appropriations is available for this budget item further to decommitments made in 2020 as a result of total or partial non-implementation of research projects.

| — | In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, the Conciliation Committee agrees to make commitment appropriations available again on the budget line 01 02 02 50. Budget remarks will be adjusted accordingly: |
| --- | --- |

—

In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, the Conciliation Committee agrees to make commitment appropriations available again on the budget line 01 02 02 50. Budget remarks will be adjusted accordingly:

| Budget line | Name |
| --- | --- |
| 01 02 02 50 | Add following text:



  In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, an amount of EUR 29 762 369 in commitment appropriations is available for this budget item further to decommitments made in 2020 as a result of total or partial non-implementation of research projects. |

Budget line

Name

01 02 02 50

Add following text:

In accordance with Article 15.3 of the Financial Regulation, an amount of EUR 29 762 369 in commitment appropriations is available for this budget item further to decommitments made in 2020 as a result of total or partial non-implementation of research projects.

This is with the understanding that amendments introduced by the European Parliament or the Council cannot modify or extend the scope of an existing basic act, or impinge on the administrative autonomy of the institutions, and that the action can be covered by available resources.

1.7.   Budget nomenclature

The budget nomenclature proposed by the Commission in the Draft Budget, as amended by Amending Letter No 1/2023, is agreed, with the inclusion of the new pilot projects and preparatory actions. The Conciliation Committee also agrees on the creation of one new budget line in the section of the European Parliament (Article 5 0 2 — Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations — Remunerations and allowances). Finally, in line with the Legislative Financial Statement accompanying the Commission proposal for a Regulation establishing an Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) adopted on 9 November 2022, the Conciliation Committee agrees on the creation of three new budget lines in the section of the European Commission as follows:

| — | Article 14 01 06 Support expenditure for Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus (MFA+) |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 14 01 06 Support expenditure for Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus (MFA+)

| — | Article 14 07 01 Ukraine MFA+ interest rate subsidy |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 14 07 01 Ukraine MFA+ interest rate subsidy

| — | Article 14 07 02 Ukraine MFA+ non-repayable support |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 14 07 02 Ukraine MFA+ non-repayable support

—2.   Budget 2022

Draft Amending Budget (DAB) No 5/2022 is approved, with one amendment compared to the Commission proposal: due to the late adoption of the legal base for the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the amount of EUR 82 972 301 in commitment appropriations placed in the reserve for this purpose is not accepted, and the corresponding budget line 13 06 01 is not created for the financial year 2022.

—3.   Statements

3.1.   Joint statement by the European Parliament and the Council on payment appropriations

The European Parliament and the Council call on the Commission to continue closely and actively monitoring during the year 2023 the implementation of the programmes of the current and previous MFFs (particularly in sub-heading 2a and Rural Development). To that end, the European Parliament and the Council invite the Commission to present, in a timely manner, updated figures concerning the state of affairs and estimates regarding 2023 payment appropriations (taking into account the improved forecasts accuracy of the Member States where applicable). If the figures show that the appropriations entered in the 2023 budget are insufficient to cover the needs, the European Parliament and the Council invite the Commission to present as soon as possible an appropriate solution, inter alia a draft amending budget, with a view to allowing the European Parliament and the Council to take any necessary decisions as soon as possible without undue delay for justified needs. Where applicable, the European Parliament and the Council will take into account the urgency of the matter, shortening the eight-week period for a decision if deemed necessary. The same applies mutatis mutandis if the figures show that the appropriations entered in the 2023 budget are higher than needed.

3.2.   Joint statement by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the financing of the European Chips Act and the Secure space connectivity programme

The three institutions acknowledge that the financing of the European Chips Act and the Secure space connectivity programme will depend on the final outcome of the ongoing legislative negotiations. In view of the final text of the approved Regulations and the accompanying Legislative Financial Statements, the European Parliament and the Council invite the Commission to submit to the budgetary authority the necessary transfers or a draft amending budget without delay, in order to ensure that an adequate amount of appropriations is made available for use in the financial year 2023.

Should agreement on the financing of the European Chips Act be reached between the European Parliament and the Council including the use of appropriations to be made available again based on Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation for Horizon Europe, such a modification will be included in a Draft Amending Budget.

3.3.   Joint statement by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on cybersecurity

Robust and coordinated cybersecurity is of critical importance to the business continuity of the EU institutions and bodies, particularly in the run up to the European Parliament elections in 2024. The three institutions recognise the necessity of a central capacity to address cybersecurity threats and incidents. A co-ordinated approach is the most cost effective and can offer a high level of protection to all, including the most vulnerable.

The three institutions acknowledge the need for adequate cybersecurity resources, within each institution and, particularly, in the interinstitutional Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU).

The Commission, in close cooperation with CERT-EU and the other institutions, is asked to draw up an assessment, by mid-2023, of the needs for cybersecurity posts within CERT-EU and across all the institutions as well as of the mandate of CERT-EU.

The budgetary authority invites the EU Institutions to collaborate to strengthen cybersecurity across all EU institutions. Following the Commission’s assessment, the resources for cybersecurity foreseen in the 2023 budget for all EU institutions should be made available in a co-ordinated manner to maximise the protection of the Institutions, notably but not exclusively through a reinforcement of the central cybersecurity capacity.

This is without prejudice to any use of human and budgetary resources by CERT-EU from the participating institutions resulting from the agreement on the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM(2022)0122).

3.4.   Statement by the European Commission on the Review of the Multiannual Financial Framework

The Commission will assess the sustainability of the expenditure ceilings and sub-ceilings of all headings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 in the context of the midterm review of the MFF Regulation, which it plans to carry out by mid-2023, as set out in the Commission work programme for 2023.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/162 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/162

---

P9_TA(2022)0404

System of own resources of the European Union

European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 November 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570 — C9-0034/2022 — 2021/0430(CNS))

(Special legislative procedure — consultation)

(2023/C 167/31)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0570), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0570),

| — | having regard to the Commission Communication on The next generation of own resources for the EU Budget (COM(2021)0566), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission Communication on The next generation of own resources for the EU Budget (COM(2021)0566),

| — | having regard to Article 311 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0034/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 311 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0034/2022),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission of 16 December 2020 on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission of 16 December 2020 on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources (1),

| — | having regard to its legislative resolution of 16 September 2020 on the draft Council decision on the system of own resources of the European Union (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 16 September 2020 on the draft Council decision on the system of own resources of the European Union (2),

| — | having regard to its amendments adopted on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a directive revising the EU Emissions Trading System (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its amendments adopted on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a directive revising the EU Emissions Trading System (3),

| — | having regard to its amendments adopted on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its amendments adopted on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (4),

| — | having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the position in the form of amendments of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the position in the form of amendments of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs,

| — | having regard to the letters from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letters from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0266/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0266/2022),

| 1. | Approves the Commission proposal as amended; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the Commission proposal; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (1a) | This Decision constitutes an important step, in accordance with the legally binding Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020, for the implementation of a roadmap of new own resources; it is to be followed up by additional and complementary initiatives, which will make sure that the new proceeds are at least sufficient for the payment of the interest and the principal of NGEU debts and that the distributive financial implications of the basket are acceptable to all Member States. An adequate amount of new own resources has to ensure sustainable financing of the Union budget on a long-term basis including for new Union priorities and repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument in order to avoid cuts to existing EU programmes and policies. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1a)

This Decision constitutes an important step, in accordance with the legally binding Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020, for the implementation of a roadmap of new own resources; it is to be followed up by additional and complementary initiatives, which will make sure that the new proceeds are at least sufficient for the payment of the interest and the principal of NGEU debts and that the distributive financial implications of the basket are acceptable to all Member States. An adequate amount of new own resources has to ensure sustainable financing of the Union budget on a long-term basis including for new Union priorities and repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument in order to avoid cuts to existing EU programmes and policies.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (2a) | There is a need to increase the level of income through new own resources to cater for NGEU repayment costs and the Social Climate Fund which is to be integrated into the MFF as well as to contribute to the long term achievement of the Union’s policy goals. However, legally and technically, the three new own resources will constitute general income in full compliance with the principle of universality of revenue. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2a)

There is a need to increase the level of income through new own resources to cater for NGEU repayment costs and the Social Climate Fund which is to be integrated into the MFF as well as to contribute to the long term achievement of the Union’s policy goals. However, legally and technically, the three new own resources will constitute general income in full compliance with the principle of universality of revenue.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (2b) | The Commission needs to take further timely actions if the proposed new own resources are not adopted or do not generate the anticipated level of revenue for the Union budget. In line with the legally binding Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020, the Commission is expected to present a proposal for a second basket of new own resources by the end of 2023, which could include a financial transaction tax and an own resource linked to the corporate sector. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2b)

The Commission needs to take further timely actions if the proposed new own resources are not adopted or do not generate the anticipated level of revenue for the Union budget. In line with the legally binding Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020, the Commission is expected to present a proposal for a second basket of new own resources by the end of 2023, which could include a financial transaction tax and an own resource linked to the corporate sector.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a decision

Recital 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (5) | To avoid an excessively regressive impact on contributions from the emissions trading, a maximum contribution should be established for eligible Member States. For the period from 2023 to 2027, Member States are eligible if the gross national income per capita, measured in purchasing power standard and calculated on the basis of Union figures for 2020 is below 90 % of the EU average. For the period from 2028 to 2030, the gross national income per capita in 2025 should be used. The maximum contribution should be established by comparing Member States’ shares in the total emission trading based own resource with the shares of those Member States in the Union gross national income. A minimum contribution should be established for all Member States if their share of the total amount of ETS-based own resources is lower than 75 % of their share in the Union gross national income. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5)

To avoid an excessively regressive impact on contributions from the emissions trading, a maximum contribution should be established for eligible Member States. For the period from 2023 to 2027, Member States are eligible if the gross national income per capita, measured in purchasing power standard and calculated on the basis of Union figures for 2020 is below 90 % of the EU average. For the period from 2028 to 2030, the gross national income per capita in 2025 should be used. The maximum contribution should be established by comparing Member States’ shares in the total emission trading based own resource with the shares of those Member States in the Union gross national income. A minimum contribution should be established for all Member States if their share of the total amount of ETS-based own resources is lower than 75 % of their share in the Union gross national income.

| (5) | To avoid an excessively regressive impact on contributions from the emissions trading, a maximum contribution should be established for eligible Member States
  until 2030
  . For the period from 2023 to 2027, Member States are eligible if the gross national income per capita, measured in purchasing power standard and calculated on the basis of Union figures for 2020 is below 90 % of the EU average. For the period from 2028 to 2030, the gross national income per capita in 2025 should be used. The maximum contribution should be established by comparing Member States’ shares in the total emission trading based own resource with the shares of those Member States in the Union gross national income. A minimum contribution should be established for all Member States if their share of the total amount of ETS-based own resources is lower than 75 % of their share in the Union gross national income. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

To avoid an excessively regressive impact on contributions from the emissions trading, a maximum contribution should be established for eligible Member States
  until 2030
  . For the period from 2023 to 2027, Member States are eligible if the gross national income per capita, measured in purchasing power standard and calculated on the basis of Union figures for 2020 is below 90 % of the EU average. For the period from 2028 to 2030, the gross national income per capita in 2025 should be used. The maximum contribution should be established by comparing Member States’ shares in the total emission trading based own resource with the shares of those Member States in the Union gross national income. A minimum contribution should be established for all Member States if their share of the total amount of ETS-based own resources is lower than 75 % of their share in the Union gross national income.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (7) | In October 2021, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting reached an agreement on the allocation to participating market jurisdictions of 25 % of residual profits of large multinational enterprises above the profitability threshold of 10 % (‘OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement’). The own resource should consist in applying a uniform call rate to the share of residual profits of the multinational enterprises, reallocated to Member States [pursuant to the Directive on implementation of the global agreement on re-allocation of taxing rights.] |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7)

In October 2021, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting reached an agreement on the allocation to participating market jurisdictions of 25 % of residual profits of large multinational enterprises above the profitability threshold of 10 % (‘OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement’). The own resource should consist in applying a uniform call rate to the share of residual profits of the multinational enterprises, reallocated to Member States [pursuant to the Directive on implementation of the global agreement on re-allocation of taxing rights.]

| (7) | In October 2021, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting reached an agreement on the allocation to participating market jurisdictions of 25 % of residual profits of large multinational enterprises above the profitability threshold of 10 % (‘OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement’). The own resource should consist in applying a uniform call rate to the share of residual profits of the multinational enterprises, re-allocated to Member States [pursuant to the Directive on implementation of the global agreement on re-allocation of taxing rights
  , as soon as adopted
  ]. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In October 2021, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting reached an agreement on the allocation to participating market jurisdictions of 25 % of residual profits of large multinational enterprises above the profitability threshold of 10 % (‘OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement’). The own resource should consist in applying a uniform call rate to the share of residual profits of the multinational enterprises, re-allocated to Member States [pursuant to the Directive on implementation of the global agreement on re-allocation of taxing rights
  , as soon as adopted
  ].

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (7a) | The OECD aims for the Multilateral Convention implementing the OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement to enter into force in 2024. However, as the successful implementation of the OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement at international level by certain key third countries is not yet guaranteed, it is necessary for the Commission and the Member States to regularly reassess the situation. In the event of clear lack of progress by end of 2023, the Commission should submit a legislative proposal for a digital levy or a similar measure. Such a digital levy or proceeds resulting from a similar measure should then be considered an own resource of the Union in order to generate revenues by 2026. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7a)

The OECD aims for the Multilateral Convention implementing the OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement to enter into force in 2024. However, as the successful implementation of the OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement at international level by certain key third countries is not yet guaranteed, it is necessary for the Commission and the Member States to regularly reassess the situation. In the event of clear lack of progress by end of 2023, the Commission should submit a legislative proposal for a digital levy or a similar measure. Such a digital levy or proceeds resulting from a similar measure should then be considered an own resource of the Union in order to generate revenues by 2026.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (8a) | Revenue for the Union budget on the basis of the Commission's proposals for the implementation of the OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement is expected to be between EUR 2,5 billion and EUR 4 billion per year. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8a)

Revenue for the Union budget on the basis of the Commission's proposals for the implementation of the OECD/G20 IF Pillar 1 Agreement is expected to be between EUR 2,5 billion and EUR 4 billion per year.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (8b) | Following consultation of the European Parliament, the adoption of this Decision requires unanimity in the Council. This Decision should enter into force following the completion by the Member States of the procedures for its approval in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8b)

Following consultation of the European Parliament, the adoption of this Decision requires unanimity in the Council. This Decision should enter into force following the completion by the Member States of the procedures for its approval in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a decision

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 1 — point b

Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | the application of a uniform call rate equal to
  75 %
  of the revenues from the sale of certificates of the carbon border adjustment mechanism established by Regulation (EU) [XXX] of the European Parliament and of the Council (18) . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(f)

the application of a uniform call rate equal to
  75 %
  of the revenues from the sale of certificates of the carbon border adjustment mechanism established by Regulation (EU) [XXX] of the European Parliament and of the Council (18) .

| (f) | the application of a uniform call rate equal to
  100 %
  of the revenues from the sale of certificates of the carbon border adjustment mechanism established by Regulation (EU) [XXX] of the European Parliament and of the Council (18) . |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the application of a uniform call rate equal to
  100 %
  of the revenues from the sale of certificates of the carbon border adjustment mechanism established by Regulation (EU) [XXX] of the European Parliament and of the Council (18) .

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 2a




  Review




  If by the end of 2023 the process of ratification of the OECD/G20 (IF) Pillar 1 Agreement has not started in a critical mass of countries as defined by the Multilateral Convention, the Commission shall propose a new own resource in connection with the single market, such as a digital levy or a similar measure, in order to generate revenues by 2026. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 2a

Review

If by the end of 2023 the process of ratification of the OECD/G20 (IF) Pillar 1 Agreement has not started in a critical mass of countries as defined by the Multilateral Convention, the Commission shall propose a new own resource in connection with the single market, such as a digital levy or a similar measure, in order to generate revenues by 2026.

---

(1)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

1

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0220.

2

(3)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0246.

3

(4)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0248.

4

(18)  Regulation (EU) [XXX] of the European Parliament and of the Council on the carbon border adjustment mechanism.

18

(18)  Regulation (EU) [XXX] of the European Parliament and of the Council on the carbon border adjustment mechanism.

18

---

Thursday 24 November 2022

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/167 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/167

---

P9_TA(2022)0410

Amending Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (14471/2022 — C9-0386/2022 — 2022/0369(APP))

(Special legislative procedure — consent)

(2023/C 167/32)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council regulation (14471/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council regulation (14471/2022),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (C9-0386/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (C9-0386/2022),

| — | having regard to Rule 92, Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 92, Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Gives its consent to the draft Council regulation; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/168 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/168

---

P9_TA(2022)0411

Amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method (COM(2022)0596 — C9-0374/2022 — 2022/0370(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/33)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0596), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0596),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 322(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0374/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 322(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0374/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Court of Auditors of 22 November 2022 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Court of Auditors of 22 November 2022 (1),

| — | having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  Not yet published in the Official Journal.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2022)0370

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2434.)

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/169 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/169

---

P9_TA(2022)0412

‘Macro-Financial Assistance+’ instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (COM(2022)0597 — C9-0373/2022 — 2022/0371(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/34)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0597), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0597),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0373/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0373/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2022)0371

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +)

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2463.)

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/170 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/170

---

P9_TA(2022)0413

Non-acceptance of travel documents of the Russian Federation issued in Ukraine and Georgia

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-recognition of Russian travel documents issued in occupied foreign regions (COM(2022)0662 — C9-0302/2022 — 2022/0274(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/35)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0662), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0662),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 77(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0302/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 77(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0302/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out (1); |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  This position replaces the amendments adopted on 20 October 2022 (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0370).

---

P9_TC1-COD(2022)0274

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-acceptance of travel documents of the Russian Federation issued in Ukraine and Georgia

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Decision (EU) 2022/2512.)

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/171 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/171

---

P9_TA(2022)0414

Establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 2030 Policy Programme ‘Path to the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0574 — C9-0359/2021 — 2021/0293(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/36)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0574), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0574),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0359/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0359/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 January 2022 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 January 2022 (1),

| — | after consulting the Committee of the Regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 22 July 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 22 July 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the Committee on Culture and Education, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the Committee on Culture and Education,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0159/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0159/2022),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 87.

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P9_TC1-COD(2021)0293

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Decision (EU) 2022/2481.)

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| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/172 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/172

---

P9_TA(2022)0415

Non-objection to a delegated act: temporary emergency measures on collateral requirements

European Parliament decision of 24 November 2022 to raise no objections to the Commission delegated regulation of 21 October 2022 amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 as regards temporary emergency measures on collateral requirements (C(2022)7536 — 2022/2908(DEA))

(2023/C 167/37)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2022)7536), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2022)7536),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s letter of 25 October 2022 asking Parliament to declare that it will raise no objections to the delegated regulation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s letter of 25 October 2022 asking Parliament to declare that it will raise no objections to the delegated regulation,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to the Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs of 17 November 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to the Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs of 17 November 2022,

| — | having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (1), and in particular Article 46(3) thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (1), and in particular Article 46(3) thereof,

| — | having regard to the draft set of regulatory technical standards submitted by European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on 14 October 2022 pursuant to Article 46(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft set of regulatory technical standards submitted by European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on 14 October 2022 pursuant to Article 46(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012,

| — | having regard to Rule 111(6) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 111(6) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation for a decision of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation for a decision of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs,

| A. | whereas the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 (2) specifies, inter alia, the minimum levels of initial margins and the list of eligible collateral, as provided for in Article 46(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 (2) specifies, inter alia, the minimum levels of initial margins and the list of eligible collateral, as provided for in Article 46(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012;

| B. | whereas recent political and market developments have led to significant increases in price levels and volatility on energy markets, triggering calls for substantial margin calls by central counterparties to cover the related exposures; whereas those margin calls have created liquidity strains for non-financial counterparties, such as energy firms, which typically have less liquid assets to meet margin requirements, forcing them to either reduce their positions or leaving them improperly hedged and exposing them to further price variations; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas recent political and market developments have led to significant increases in price levels and volatility on energy markets, triggering calls for substantial margin calls by central counterparties to cover the related exposures; whereas those margin calls have created liquidity strains for non-financial counterparties, such as energy firms, which typically have less liquid assets to meet margin requirements, forcing them to either reduce their positions or leaving them improperly hedged and exposing them to further price variations;

| C. | whereas the Commission asked the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on 13 September 2022 (by letter Ares(2022)6980063) whether the applicable provisions of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 should be temporarily adapted to alleviate some of the burden faced by energy companies as non-financial counterparties in hedging their commercial activity on financial markets while maintaining the overarching aim of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of preserving financial stability; whereas ESMA replied on 22 September 2022 (by letter ESMA24-436-1414) indicating that only uncollateralised commercial bank guarantees should be considered for temporary and limited amendments under certain conditions; whereas in its final report ESMA proposed draft regulatory technical standards (ESMA91-372-2466) including amendments to temporarily expand the pool of eligible collateral to uncollateralised bank guarantees for non-financial counterparties acting as clearing members and to public guarantees for all types of counterparties; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the Commission asked the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on 13 September 2022 (by letter Ares(2022)6980063) whether the applicable provisions of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 should be temporarily adapted to alleviate some of the burden faced by energy companies as non-financial counterparties in hedging their commercial activity on financial markets while maintaining the overarching aim of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of preserving financial stability; whereas ESMA replied on 22 September 2022 (by letter ESMA24-436-1414) indicating that only uncollateralised commercial bank guarantees should be considered for temporary and limited amendments under certain conditions; whereas in its final report ESMA proposed draft regulatory technical standards (ESMA91-372-2466) including amendments to temporarily expand the pool of eligible collateral to uncollateralised bank guarantees for non-financial counterparties acting as clearing members and to public guarantees for all types of counterparties;

| D. | whereas the Commission has therfore adopted the delegated regulation which temporarily modifies the list of eligible collateral that can be posted at Union central counterparties (CCPs) to uncollateralised bank guarantees as well as to public guarantees for a period of 12 months; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the Commission has therfore adopted the delegated regulation which temporarily modifies the list of eligible collateral that can be posted at Union central counterparties (CCPs) to uncollateralised bank guarantees as well as to public guarantees for a period of 12 months;

| E. | whereas the delegated regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency in order to ease the increased liquidity pressure on non-financial counterparties trading on gas and electricity regulated markets and clearing via Union-based CCPs; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the delegated regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency in order to ease the increased liquidity pressure on non-financial counterparties trading on gas and electricity regulated markets and clearing via Union-based CCPs;

| 1. | Declares that it has no objections to the delegated regulation; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements for central counterparties (OJ L 52, 23.2.2013, p. 41).

---

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/174 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/174

---

P9_TA(2022)0416

Non-objection to a delegated act: value of the clearing threshold for positions held in OTC commodity derivative contracts and other OTC derivative contracts

European Parliament decision of 24 November 2022 to raise no objections to the Commission delegated regulation of 18 October 2022 amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 as regards the value of the clearing threshold for positions held in OTC commodity derivative contracts and other OTC derivative contracts (C(2022)7413 — 2022/2899(DEA))

(2023/C 167/38)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2022)7413), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2022)7413),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s letter of 25 October 2022 asking Parliament to declare that it will raise no objections to the delegated regulation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s letter of 25 October 2022 asking Parliament to declare that it will raise no objections to the delegated regulation,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to the Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs of 17 November 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to the Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs of 17 November 2022,

| — | having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (1), and in particular Article 10(4), third subparagraph, thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (1), and in particular Article 10(4), third subparagraph, thereof,

| — | having regard to the draft set of regulatory technical standards submitted by European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on 3 June 2022 pursuant to Article 10(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft set of regulatory technical standards submitted by European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on 3 June 2022 pursuant to Article 10(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012,

| — | having regard to Rule 111(6) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 111(6) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation for a decision of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation for a decision of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs,

| A. | whereas Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 (2) specifies, inter alia, the values of the clearing thresholds for the purpose of the clearing obligation; whereas according to Article 10(4), fourth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) reviews periodically the values of those clearing thresholds and proposes regulatory technical standards to amend them; whereas for some third-country jurisdictions, no equivalence decision has been adopted yet, therefore contracts executed on markets in those third-country jurisdictions are considered OTC and, although being cleared by recognised central counterparties (CCPs), count towards the clearing thresholds; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 (2) specifies, inter alia, the values of the clearing thresholds for the purpose of the clearing obligation; whereas according to Article 10(4), fourth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) reviews periodically the values of those clearing thresholds and proposes regulatory technical standards to amend them; whereas for some third-country jurisdictions, no equivalence decision has been adopted yet, therefore contracts executed on markets in those third-country jurisdictions are considered OTC and, although being cleared by recognised central counterparties (CCPs), count towards the clearing thresholds;

| B. | whereas commodity prices have increased recently, significantly exacerbated by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas rising prices and extreme volatility on energy derivative markets have recently led to higher margin calls by CCPs for energy companies to cover the related exposures; whereas this situation has created liquidity strains for non-financial counterparties, such as energy companies, as collateral posted to Union CCPs is usually provided in cash; whereas energy companies which have often less liquid assets to meet margin requirements may be forced to either reduce their positions or leave them improperly hedged, thus exposing them to further price variations; whereas energy companies should maintain the financial ability and liquidity to secure supplies and purchases of energy commodities in the medium term — while preserving financial stability — in order to benefit Union households and businesses; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas commodity prices have increased recently, significantly exacerbated by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas rising prices and extreme volatility on energy derivative markets have recently led to higher margin calls by CCPs for energy companies to cover the related exposures; whereas this situation has created liquidity strains for non-financial counterparties, such as energy companies, as collateral posted to Union CCPs is usually provided in cash; whereas energy companies which have often less liquid assets to meet margin requirements may be forced to either reduce their positions or leave them improperly hedged, thus exposing them to further price variations; whereas energy companies should maintain the financial ability and liquidity to secure supplies and purchases of energy commodities in the medium term — while preserving financial stability — in order to benefit Union households and businesses;

| C. | whereas the Commission asked ESMA on 13 September 2022 (by letter Ares(2022)6980063) to consider whether Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 should be temporarily amended to alleviate some of these burdens; whereas ESMA replied on 22 September 2022 (by letter ESMA24-436-1414) indicating that it submitted its draft regulatory technical standards (ESMA70-451-114) on commodity clearing thresholds on 3 June 2022 to the Commission that proposed to increase the commodity clearing threshold by EUR 1 billion, bringing it to EUR 4 billion; whereas ESMA confirmed the appropriateness of the proposed increase and invited the Commission to adopt that measure as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the Commission asked ESMA on 13 September 2022 (by letter Ares(2022)6980063) to consider whether Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 should be temporarily amended to alleviate some of these burdens; whereas ESMA replied on 22 September 2022 (by letter ESMA24-436-1414) indicating that it submitted its draft regulatory technical standards (ESMA70-451-114) on commodity clearing thresholds on 3 June 2022 to the Commission that proposed to increase the commodity clearing threshold by EUR 1 billion, bringing it to EUR 4 billion; whereas ESMA confirmed the appropriateness of the proposed increase and invited the Commission to adopt that measure as soon as possible;

| D. | whereas the Commission has therefore adopted the delegated regulation which increases the clearing threshold value for positions held in OTC commodity derivatives stipulated in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 from EUR 3 billion to EUR 4 billion; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the Commission has therefore adopted the delegated regulation which increases the clearing threshold value for positions held in OTC commodity derivatives stipulated in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 from EUR 3 billion to EUR 4 billion;

| E. | whereas the delegated regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency in order to ease the increased liquidity pressure on energy companies; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the delegated regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency in order to ease the increased liquidity pressure on energy companies;

| 1. | Declares that it has no objections to the delegated regulation; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on indirect clearing arrangements, the clearing obligation, the public register, access to a trading venue, non-financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a CCP (OJ L 52, 23.2.2013, p. 11).

---