75442 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 238 / Wednesday, December 11, 2013 / Notices 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Highway Administration 

[Docket No. FHWA–2013–0050] 

Designation of the Primary Freight 

Network 

AGENCY: Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of extension of deadline 

and comment period. 

SUMMARY: The FHWA is extending the 

deadline and comment period for the 

Designation of the highway Primary 

Freight Network (PFN) notice, which 

was published on November 19, 2013, at 

78 FR 69520. The original comment 

period is set to close on December 19, 

2013. The extension is based on input 

received from DOT stakeholders that the 

December 19 closing date does not 

provide sufficient time for submission 

of comments to the docket. The FHWA 

agrees that the deadline and the 

comment period should be extended. 

Therefore, the closing date for 

submission of comments is extended to 

January 17, 2014, which will provide 

others interested in commenting 

additional time to submit comments to 

the docket. 

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before January 17, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: To ensure that you do not 

duplicate your docket submissions, 

please submit them by only one of the 

following means: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for submitting 

comments. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Ave. SE., W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Ave. SE., between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The telephone 

number is (202) 366–9329. 

• Instructions: You must include the 

agency name and docket number at the 

beginning of your comments. All 

comments received will be posted 

without change to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

questions about this program, contact 

Ed Strocko, FHWA Office of Freight 

Management and Operations, (202) 366– 

2997, or by email at Ed.Strocko@

dot.gov. For legal questions, please 

contact Michael Harkins, FHWA Office 

of the Chief Counsel, (202) 366–4928, or 

by email at Michael.Harkins@dot.gov. 

Business hours for the FHWA are from 

8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., e.t., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On November 19, 2013, at 78 FR 

69520, the FHWA published in the 

Federal Register a notice on the 

designation of the highway PFN. 

The purpose of the notice was to 

publish the draft initial designation of 

the highway PFN as required by 23 

U.S.C. 167(d), provide information 

regarding State designation of Critical 

Rural Freight Corridors (CRFCs) and the 

establishment of the complete National 

Freight Network (NFN), and to solicit 

comments on aspects of the NFN. The 

five areas for comment are: (1) Specific 

route deletions, additions, or 

modifications to the draft initial 

designation of the highway PFN 

contained in this notice; (2) the 

methodology for achieving a 27,000- 

mile final designation; (3) how the NFN 

and its components could be used by 

freight stakeholders in the future; (4) 

how the NFN may fit into a multimodal 

National Freight System; and (5) 

suggestions for an urban-area route 

designation process. 

The original comment period for the 

notice closes on December 19, 2013. 

However, DOT stakeholders have 

expressed concern that this closing date 

does not provide sufficient time for 

submission of comments to the docket. 

To allow time for interested parties to 

submit comments, the closing date is 

changed from December 19, 2013, to 

January 17, 2014. 

Authority: 23 U.S.C. 167; Section 1115 of 

Pub. L. 112–141. 

Issued on: December 5, 2013. 

Victor M. Mendez, 

FHWA Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2013–29520 Filed 12–10–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–22–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

[Emergency Order No. 29, Notice No. 1] 

Emergency Order Under 49 U.S.C. 

20104 Establishing Requirements for 

Controlling Passenger Train Speeds 

and Staffing Locomotive Cabs at 

Certain Locations on the Metro-North 

Commuter Railroad Company 

AGENCY: Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this emergency 

order (EO or Order) to require that the 

New York State Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority’s Metro-North 

Commuter Railroad Company (MetroNorth) take certain actions to control 

passenger train speed at any location on 

main track where there is a reduction of 

more than 20 miles per hour (mph) in 

the maximum authorized passenger 

train speed. Under the EO, Metro-North 

must create and comply with an FRAapproved action plan that institutes 

modifications to its existing Automatic 

Train Control System or other signal 

systems. Until Metro-North completes 

the necessary modifications, the EO 

requires that two qualified railroad 

employees be present in the control 

compartment of Metro-North’s 

passenger trains when those trains 

operate over locations on main track 

where there is a required reduction of 

more than 20-mph in the maximum 

authorized passenger train speed. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Thomas Herrmann, Acting Director, 

Office of Safety Assurance and 

Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety, 

FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 

493–6036; Joseph St. Peter, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 

493–6047, joseph.st.peter@dot.gov; or 

Stephen Gordon, Trial Attorney, Office 

of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

telephone (202) 493–6001, 

stephen.n.gordon@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Introduction 

FRA has determined that public safety 

compels issuance of this EO. This 

determination is made in light of the 

Metro-North train derailment that 

occurred in New York on December 1, 

2013, which killed four people and 

injured over 60 others. The preliminary 

investigation into this derailment 

indicates that the subject train was 

traveling approximately 82 mph as it 

entered a sharp curve where the 

maximum authorized passenger train 

speed was 30 mph. This is a serious 

overspeed event, and when considered 

in the context of three other accidents 

that occurred on Metro-North earlier 

this year, FRA has significant concerns 

with regard to the railroad’s compliance 

with Federal railroad safety regulations 

and the railroad’s own operating rules. 

These factors lead FRA to the 

conclusion that additional action is 

necessary in the form of this EO to 

eliminate an emergency situation 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 238 / Wednesday, December 11, 2013 / Notices 75443 

1The train was not scheduled to stop at the 

Spuyten Duyvil Station. 

2FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is 

unlawful to ‘‘[o]perate a train or locomotive at a 

speed which exceeds the maximum authorized 

limit by at least 10 miles per hour.’’ 49 CFR 

240.305(a)(2). 

3See NTSB Dockets DCA–13–MR–003 and 

DCA–13–MR–003; available online at http://

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/dms.html. 

4See NTSB Preliminary Report, Accident Number 

DCA–13–MR–003 (June 4, 2013); available online 

at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/

bridgeport_ct/Bridgeport_CT_10_day_Preliminary_

Report06042013.pdf. 

5See NTSB Accident Reconstruction Animation, 

Derailment and Collision of Metro-North Railroad 

Passenger Trains 1548 and 1581; available online at: 

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2013/bridgeport_

ct_hearing/animation.html. 

6See NTSB Recommendation R–13–17 (June 17, 

2013); available online at http://www.ntsb.gov/

doclib/recletters/2013/R-13-17.pdf. 

involving a hazard of death, personal 

injury, or significant harm to the 

environment. 

Authority 

Authority to enforce Federal railroad 

safety laws has been delegated by the 

Secretary of Transportation to the 

Administrator of FRA. 49 CFR 1.89. 

Railroads are subject to FRA’s safety 

jurisdiction under the Federal railroad 

safety laws. 49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103. 

FRA is authorized to issue emergency 

orders where an unsafe condition or 

practice ‘‘causes an emergency situation 

involving a hazard of death, personal 

injury, or significant harm to the 

environment.’’ 49 U.S.C. 20104. These 

orders may immediately impose 

‘‘restrictions and prohibitions . . . that 

may be necessary to abate the 

situation.’’ Id. 

Metro-North Spuyten Duyvil 

Derailment 

On Sunday, December 1, 2013, MetroNorth passenger train 8808 (Train 8808) 

was traveling south from Poughkeepsie, 

New York, to Grand Central Terminal in 

New York City. The train’s crew 

included a locomotive engineer, a 

conductor, and two assistant 

conductors. The exact number of 

passengers aboard the train is not 

presently known. At approximately 7:20 

a.m., the train derailed as it approached 

the Spuyten Duyvil Station in Spuyten 

Duyvil, Bronx, New York.1 The train 

consisted of seven passenger coach cars, 

including a control cab locomotive in 

the lead position, and a conventional 

locomotive at the rear of the train, 

operating in a push-pull configuration (a 

control cab locomotive is both a 

passenger car, in that it has seats for 

passengers, and a locomotive, in that it 

has a control cab from which the 

engineer can operate the train). All 

seven cars and the trailing locomotive 

derailed. As of December 6, the 

derailment has resulted in four fatalities 

and over 60 reported injuries. 

As is customary, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has 

taken the lead role in conducting the 

investigation of this accident pursuant 

to its legal authority. 49 U.S.C. 1101 et 

seq.; 49 CFR 800.3(a), 831.2(b). FRA is 

also investigating the accident. As Train 

8808 approached the Spuyten Duyvil 

Station from the north, it traveled over 

a straightaway with a maximum 

authorized passenger train speed of 70 

mph before reaching a sharp curve in 

the track where, by the railroad’s own 

rules, the maximum authorized speed 

was reduced to 30 mph. A preliminary 

review of the information on the 

locomotive event recorders by NTSB 

indicates that the train was traveling 

approximately 82 mph as it entered the 

curve’s 30-mph speed restriction, 

exceeding the maximum authorized 

speed on the straightaway by 12 mph, 

while also traveling nearly three times 

the railroad’s maximum authorized 

speed for the curve.2 Additionally, 

NTSB indicates that information 

obtained from the train’s event recorders 

reveals that approximately six seconds 

before the locomotive came to a stop, 

the locomotive throttle was placed in 

idle and an application of the train’s 

brake system was made. Prior to the 

derailment, Train 8808 received a pretrip brake inspection and made nine 

stops. The NTSB reviewed the brake 

inspection records for December 1 and, 

to date, has found no anomalies with 

the train’s brake system. Further, to 

date, no evidence has been discovered 

that any track-related or signal-related 

deficiencies contributed to the 

derailment. 

Safety Concerns Arising Out of 2013 

Metro-North Incidents 

In addition to the December 1, 2013, 

accident discussed above, three other 

notable accidents occurred on MetroNorth earlier this year. Two of the 

accidents occurred in May, and NTSB 

and FRA continue to investigate these 

accidents, and NTSB recently held a 

public hearing on both accidents in 

November 2013.3 A third accident that 

occurred in July 2013 is also under 

investigation by NTSB and FRA. 

May 17—Bridgeport, Connecticut 

Derailment 

The first accident occurred on May 

17, 2013, in Bridgeport, Connecticut, on 

Metro-North’s New Haven line.4 An 

eastbound Metro-North passenger train 

was traveling 74 mph on track number 

4 when it derailed near milepost 53.3 

and came to rest in the foul of an 

adjacent track. According to information 

obtained from locomotive event 

recorders, about 20 seconds later a 

westbound Metro-North passenger train 

on that adjacent track then struck the 

derailed train. As a result of the 

accident, over 50 people were 

transported to hospitals, and several 

million dollars in property damage 

occurred. 

At the accident scene, broken 

compromise joint bars were found. The 

location where the accident had 

occurred was last inspected on May 15, 

2013, two days prior to the accident. 

Metro-North’s record of that inspection 

noted that near milepost 53.3 on track 

number 4 an insulated rail joint had 

inadequate supporting ballast and 

displayed indications of vertical 

movement of the track system under 

load. In April 2013, the joint bars at this 

location were found to have been 

broken and were replaced by MetroNorth.5 This accident was one of two 

that was the subject of FRA’s Safety 

Advisory 2013–05, regarding joint 

failures on continuous welded rail track. 

78 FR 47486 (Aug. 5, 2013). Safety 

Advisory 2013–05 made several 

recommendations to railroads regarding 

the special attention and maintenance 

that rail joints in continuous welded rail 

require, including reminding railroads 

of applicable Federal Track Safety 

Standards for such joints at 49 CFR 

213.119, and the importance of proper 

maintenance practices to ensure that 

joints are adequately supported to 

support train loads. 

May 28—West Haven, Connecticut 

Employee Fatality 

A second accident occurred on May 

28, 2013, when a Metro-North passenger 

train in West Haven, Connecticut was 

traveling 70 mph when it struck and 

killed a Metro-North maintenance-ofway employee who was part of a 

roadway work group conducting a 

railroad maintenance and construction 

project. According to NTSB’s 

preliminary investigation, the roadway 

work group had established exclusive 

track occupancy working limits, in 

accordance with 49 CFR 214.321, on a 

controlled main track in order to 

conduct their work.6 A Metro-North rail 

traffic controller (RTC) trainee who was 

training under the mentorship of a 

qualified RTC placed blocking devices 

on the computer console for the signal 

system to prevent trains from entering 

the roadway work group’s exclusive 

track occupancy working limits. Later, 

the Metro-North RTC trainee apparently 


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7 Id. 

8The applicable FRA regulation governing train 

approach warning requires that warning must be 

given to enable an affected roadway worker to 

occupy a place of safety not less than 15 seconds 

before a train moving at maximum authorized speed 

can pass the roadway worker’s location. 49 CFR 

214.329(a). 

9NTSB Recommendation R–13–17 (June 17, 

2013); available online at http://www.ntsb.gov/

doclib/recletters/2013/R-13-17.pdf. 

removed the blocking devices without 

notifying the roadway work group.7

After the blocking devices were 

removed, a train then entered the 

exclusive track occupancy working 

limits at 70 mph and struck and killed 

the maintenance-of-way employee. 

Under FRA’s applicable regulations, 

train movements through exclusive 

track occupancy working limits may 

only be made under the direction of the 

roadway worker in charge of the 

working limits, and such movements are 

required to be made at restricted speed, 

unless a higher speed has been 

specifically authorized by the roadway 

worker in charge. 49 CFR 214.321(d). 

Further, FRA’s regulations prohibit the 

release of working limits until all 

affected roadway workers have been 

notified of such release, and until all 

affected roadway workers have either 

left the track or have been afforded ontrack safety through train approach 

warning.8 49 CFR 214.329(c). 

The NTSB has also stated that in an 

unrelated incident, approximately three 

weeks prior to the May 28 accident in 

West Haven, blocking devices that were 

protecting an occupied track were 

similarly removed in error by a MetroNorth RTC.9 In response, Metro-North 

adopted additional procedures to 

prevent blocking devices from being 

removed in error. Despite the adoption 

of these additional procedures, the 

accident occurred in West Haven on 

May 28. 

July 18—CSX Transportation, Inc., 

Freight Train Derailment 

A third accident occurred on July 18, 

2013, when a CSX Transportation, Inc. 

freight train derailed while traveling 

over Metro-North’s system. Ten of the 

train’s cars derailed near the Spuyten 

Duyvil station, and blocked tracks on 

Metro-North’s Hudson line. No persons 

were injured as a result of this accident, 

and the NTSB is investigating to 

determine the accident’s probable cause. 

The May 17 and May 28 accidents are 

still under investigation, and the NTSB 

has not established their probable 

causes, and the July 18 CSX accident 

also remains under investigation by 

FRA. However, together with the 

December 1, 2013, accident discussed 

above, these accidents lead FRA to 

believe that a potential lack of 

compliance with Federal railroad safety 

regulations and applicable Metro-North 

operating rules and procedures in recent 

months may have caused or contributed 

to these serious accidents, which have 

resulted in five deaths and well over 

100 injuries to Metro-North’s passengers 

and employees since May. While the 

specific causes of these recent accidents 

may vary, these events are extremely 

concerning, and require immediate 

corrective actions. 

Overspeed Protections 

Metro-North passenger trains are 

normally operated with only one 

crewmember, a locomotive engineer, 

located in the cab of the passenger 

train’s locomotive. In the case of pushpull operations, this crewmember 

occupies the control compartment of the 

passenger car (cab car) at the leading 

end of a train. Metro-North’s 

conventional controlling locomotives 

are typically equipped with an alerter in 

order to help ensure the attentiveness of 

the locomotive engineer operating the 

train, while the control cab of passenger 

cars are typically equipped with either 

an alerter or a ‘‘dead man pedal’’ for the 

same purpose. Metro-North’s 

locomotive controls and its signal 

systems also incorporate an Automatic 

Train Control System (ATC system), 

which is a train speed control system 

where trains may be automatically 

slowed or stopped if a locomotive 

engineer fails to comply with a signal 

indication. 

However, at locations where there are 

large reductions in the maximum 

authorized speed that a passenger train 

may travel (e.g., at locations such as the 

sharp curve in the track where the 

December 1 derailment occurred) and 

the signal system is not implicated, 

Metro-North’s ATC system is not 

currently coded to slow trains to comply 

with applicable speed limits. If a 

locomotive engineer fails to take action 

in accordance with applicable railroad 

rules to slow a train when approaching 

such a speed limit, Metro-North’s ATC 

system will not slow the train to comply 

with the speed reduction. As a result, 

extreme overspeed events like the 

December 1 derailment can occur if the 

lone crewmember controlling the train 

fails to comply with railroad rules, and, 

as demonstrated, these overspeed events 

can have catastrophic results. 

In light of the December 1 derailment 

that is the subject of this Order, and the 

other serious accidents that have 

occurred on Metro-North in 2013, and 

in an effort to immediately prevent 

similar incidents from occurring that 

could result in an emergency situation 

involving a hazard of death, personal 

injury, or significant harm to the 

environment, in this Order FRA is 

requiring that at main track locations 

where reductions in maximum 

authorized passenger train speed of 

greater than 20 mph occur, that MetroNorth must immediately have an 

additional qualified employee in each 

train’s control compartment when a 

train traverses each such location. A 

qualified employee is an individual who 

is qualified on the physical 

characteristics of the territory over 

which the train is operating, who is 

qualified on the signal systems on the 

territory, and who has been trained to 

apply the emergency brake if necessary 

to stop a train (e.g., a conductor, an 

additional locomotive engineer, or a 

Metro-North transportation supervisor). 

A qualified crewmember assigned to the 

train may serve as the additional 

qualified employee in a train’s control 

compartment when a train traverses 

such locations. On trains where the 

control cab locomotive configuration 

does not permit a second qualified 

person to occupy the control 

compartment, the additional qualified 

person shall occupy the space 

immediately adjacent to the control 

compartment and maintain constant 

communication with the train’s 

locomotive engineer. The additional 

qualified employee must be in (or 

adjacent to, where necessary) the 

control compartment well in advance of 

reaching the location where the speed 

reduction occurs in order to provide 

sufficient time to take action to control 

train speeds if necessary. 

FRA is requiring this action as the 

December 1 accident demonstrates that 

Metro-North’s existing ATC system and 

other existing overspeed protections are 

not sufficient to prevent dangerous 

overspeed events. The additional 

qualified employee located in the 

control compartment of Metro-North’s 

passenger trains can take immediate 

actions to slow or stop passenger trains 

where necessary when the train’s 

locomotive engineer or the existing ATC 

system fails to do so. 

Metro-North must comply with this 

provision of the EO until it has 

developed and complied with an action 

plan to make appropriate modifications 

to its existing ATC system or other 

signal systems to enable warning and 

enforcement of relevant passenger train 

speed restrictions. FRA notes that other 

railroads have coded their ATC systems 

to prevent overspeed events from 

occurring at locations where civil or 

other speed restrictions occur. FRA is 

ordering Metro-North to take similar 

steps to prevent accidents similar to the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 238 / Wednesday, December 11, 2013 / Notices 75445 

10Whether the cab of a conventional locomotive 

or control compartment of a control cab locomotive 

when the train is being operated in a push-pull 

configuration. 

December 1 accident from occurring in 

the future if a locomotive engineer fails 

to take actions to appropriately slow or 

stop a passenger train. 

Finding and Order 

FRA recognizes that passenger rail 

transportation is generally extremely 

safe. However, FRA finds that the recent 

December 1, 2013, accident on MetroNorth and the lack of overspeed 

protections in place on Metro-North’s 

system create an emergency situation 

involving a hazard of death, personal 

injury, or significant harm to the 

environment. Accordingly, pursuant to 

the authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104, 

delegated to the FRA Administrator by 

the Secretary of Transportation, 49 CFR 

1.89, it is hereby ordered: 

1. Metro-North shall survey its entire 

system and identify each main track 

location where there is a reduction of 

more than 20 mph from the maximum 

authorized operating speed for 

passenger trains (identified locations), 

and provide a list of each location to the 

FRA Associate Administrator for 

Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer 

(Associate Administrator) by December 

10, 2013. 

2. Metro-North shall develop an 

action plan that accomplishes each of 

the following: 

a. Identifies appropriate modifications 

to Metro-North’s existing ATC system or 

other signal systems to enable warning 

and enforcement of passenger train 

speeds at the identified locations. 

b. Contains milestones and target 

dates for implementing each identified 

modification to Metro-North’s existing 

ATC system or other signal systems to 

enable warning and enforcement of 

passenger train speeds at the identified 

locations. 

3. The action plan must be submitted 

to the Associate Administrator not later 

than December 31, 2013. FRA will 

review and approve, approve with 

conditions, or disapprove Metro-North’s 

action plan within 30 days of the plan’s 

submission to FRA. 

4. Once FRA approves its action plan, 

Metro-North must make all identified 

modifications to the existing ATC 

system or other signal systems in the 

timeframes and manner that comply 

with all conditions that FRA places on 

its approval of Metro-North’s action 

plan. 

5. As soon as possible, but not later 

than December 10, 2013, all passenger 

train movements at the identified 

locations shall be made with at least two 

qualified persons in the cab of the 

train’s controlling locomotive 10 until all 

modifications to Metro-North’s existing 

ATC system or other signal systems 

have been completed to enable warning 

and enforcement of passenger train 

speed. On trains where the control cab 

locomotive configuration does not 

permit a second qualified person to 

occupy the control compartment, the 

additional qualified person shall occupy 

the space immediately adjacent to the 

control compartment and maintain 

constant communication with the train’s 

locomotive engineer. The additional 

qualified employee must be present well 

in advance of reaching each identified 

location in order to take action to 

control train speed if necessary. For 

purposes of this requirement, 

‘‘qualified’’ means that that an employee 

is qualified on the physical 

characteristics of the territory, is 

qualified on the signal systems of the 

territory, and has been trained to apply 

the train’s emergency brake to stop or 

slow the train as necessary to comply 

with relevant railroad operating rules or 

applicable Federal railroad safety 

regulations. 

Nothing in this Order precludes FRA 

from using any of the other enforcement 

tools available to the agency under its 

regulatory authority to address noncompliance with the Federal railroad 

safety laws and regulations by MetroNorth. FRA is planning to conduct an 

extensive investigation of Metro-North’s 

safety compliance. If necessary, FRA 

may issue additional emergency orders 

or compliance orders, impose civil 

penalties against Metro-North 

(individuals may be liable for civil 

penalties for willful violations of the 

Federal railroad safety laws and 

regulations), or disqualify individuals 

from performing safety-sensitive 

functions. In addition, FRA 

reemphasizes the discussion in the 

agency’s December 3, 2013, letter to the 

New York Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority, directing Metro-North to 

update FRA on the progress of the 

pending safety stand-down that will be 

conducted by the railroad, and also to 

immediately implement a confidential 

close call reporting system. 

Relief 

Metro-North may petition for special 

approval to take actions not in 

accordance with this EO. Such petitions 

shall be submitted to the Associate 

Administrator, who shall be authorized 

to dispose of those requests without the 

necessity of amending this EO. In 

reviewing any petition for special 

review, the Associate Administrator 

shall grant petitions only in which 

Metro-North has clearly articulated an 

alternative action that will provide, in 

the Associate Administrator’s judgment, 

at least a level of safety equivalent to 

that provided by compliance with this 

EO. 

Penalties 

Any violation of this EO shall subject 

the person committing the violation to 

a civil penalty of up to $105,000. 49 

U.S.C. 21301. Any individual who 

willfully violates a prohibition stated in 

this order is subject to civil penalties 

under 49 U.S.C. 21301. In addition, 

such an individual whose violation of 

this order demonstrates the individual’s 

unfitness for safety-sensitive service 

may be removed from safety-sensitive 

service on the railroad under 49 U.S.C. 

20111. If appropriate, FRA may pursue 

criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C. 

522(a) and 49 U.S.C. 21311(a), as well 

as 18 U.S.C. 1001, for the knowing and 

willful falsification of a report required 

by this order. FRA may, through the 

Attorney General, also seek injunctive 

relief to enforce this order. 49 U.S.C. 

20112. 

Effective Date and Notice to Affected 

Persons 

This EO is effective upon receipt of an 

electronic copy of it by Metro-North, 

and Metro-North shall immediately 

initiate steps to implement this Order in 

order to comply with the Order’s 

deadlines. Metro-North must complete 

and submit its action plan to FRA no 

later than December 31, 2013. Notice of 

this EO will be given by providing 

Metro-North with a copy of the Order, 

and by publishing it in the Federal 

Register. 

Review 

Opportunity for formal review of this 

EO will be provided in accordance with 

49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and 5 U.S.C. 554. 

Administrative procedures governing 

such review are found at 49 CFR part 

211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 

211.75, and 211.77. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 6, 

2013. 

Joseph C. Szabo, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2013–29574 Filed 12–10–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 


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