OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at 

(703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Summary of Report: SIGIR 11-004 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted this review 

to assess the United States Forces-Iraq’s (USFI) management of its program to develop the 

Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF). This is 

the Iraqi force primarily responsible for 

conducting counterinsurgency operations 

against insurgent and extremist networks, and 

denying safe haven to terrorists. The program 

was carried out by the Joint Forces Special 

Operations Component Command–Iraq assigned 

to USF-I and its predecessor organizations. In 

this report we refer to these organizations 

collectively as U.S. Special Operations Forces 

(USSOF). 

In March 2010, SIGIR issued an interim report 

(SIGIR 10-009) on contracts awarded to provide 

the ISOF with a counterterrorism 

communications network and intelligence 

database. SIGIR made several 

recommendations in the report to improve 

contract management. 

SIGIR’s objectives in this report were to assess 

the extent to which the ISOF training program 

goals and outcomes were met; identify program 

costs; and assess the status of ISOF transition to 

the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the GOI’s 

sustainment of the force. 

Recommendations 

This report contains no recommendations. 

Lessons Learned 

SIGIR identifies two lessons learned that can be 

applied to training programs in other 

contingencies. In particular, USSOF’s ability to 

provide continuous oversight and continuity of 

trainers were critical elements in the success of 

the ISOF program. 

Management Comments and Audit 

Response 

Because this report did not contain any 

recommendations, the responsible agencies were 

not required to, and did not, submit comments. 

October 25, 2010 

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE PROGRAM IS 

ACHIEVING GOALS, BUT IRAQI SUPPORT REMAINS CRITICAL TO 

SUCCESS

What SIGIR Found 

The ISOF’s demonstrated ability to independently conduct operations and 

missions and to sustain its equipment and facilities are indicators of the 

program's success. In developing the ISOF, the USSOF used established U.S. 

military processes such as U.S. Army Special Forces training doctrine and a 

Modified Table of Organization and Equipment for a U.S. Army Special Forces 

unit. The training doctrine and the modified table of organization and 

equipment provided a sound basis for developing the ISOF. This, coupled with 

the USSOF’s continuing adjustments, reassessments, and re-planning, provided 

a solid basis for developing the force. USSOF personnel also accompanied 

ISOF personnel on missions, documented the results, and provided feedback. 

These assessments document the progressive improvement and maturity of the 

ISOF’s tactical and technical skills. Working together with its Iraqi 

counterparts, the USSOF assisted in training and equipping over 4,100 ISOF 

soldiers as of March 10, 2010. These soldiers are deployed throughout Iraq 

providing essential counterterrorism capabilities. 

USF-I did not separately account for the funds used in developing the ISOF, 

and the total cost of the program is unknown. At least $237 million from the 

Iraqi Security Forces Fund was used to equip and sustain the ISOF. In addition, 

an unknown amount from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was used for 

procuring new equipment in support of all Iraqi security forces. However, the 

purchases were not identified to the Iraqi force receiving the equipment. 

The long-term success of the ISOF lies in the hands of the GOI. Two issues 

point out the challenges in post conflict stabilization operations. First, the 

extra-constitutional movement of the ISOF from the Ministry of Defense to the 

Office of the Prime Minister raises concerns about how the force will be used in 

the future. Second, uncertain GOI support as evidenced by the lack of a 

dedicated budget, poor logistical and recruiting support, and the irregular 

payment of specialty pay create concerns about the GOI’s commitment to 

sustain the force. USF-I has been consulting with its GOI/Ministry of Defense 

counterparts about these concerns and states that it will continue to consult on 

these issues. SIGIR supports this continuing engagement. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

October 25, 2010 

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES FORCES-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT FORCES SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces: Special Operations Force Program Is Achieving Goals, but 

Iraqi Support Remains Critical to Success (SIGIR 11-004) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. The report discusses the 

U.S. Forces-Iraq’s oversight of its program to train, equip, and develop the Iraqi Special 

Operations Force (ISOF). We performed this audit in accordance with our statutory 

responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties 

and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. This law 

provides for independent and objective audits of programs and operations funded with amounts 

appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq, and for 

recommendations on related policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR Project 

9023b. This report does not contain recommendations; accordingly, the addressees were not 

required to provide comments and elected not to do so. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Glenn D. Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, 

DC), (703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil or Jason Venner, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 607-1346/ jason.venner@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Commanding General, U.S. Central Command 
1 

Table of Contents 

Table of Contents 1

Introduction 1

Background 1

Objectives 2

Program Goals Are Being Achieved 4

U.S. Has Trained ISOF to U.S. Special Operations Forces Standards 4

USSOF Monitors and Assesses ISOF Performance 5

ISOF Minimum Essential Capabilities Have Also Been Assessed and Found Good 6

Accounting for Program Costs Was Imprecise 7

Iraq Security Forces Fund 7

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds Were Spent but Amount Is Unknown 14

Continuing Issues in Transitioning and Sustaining the ISOF 15

ISOF Moved Under Control of the Prime Minister 15

GOI Budgeting for the ISOF Has Been Inconsistent 15

Conclusions and Lessons Learned 18

Conclusion 18

Recommendations 18

Lessons Learned 18

Management Comments 19

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix B—Contracts 23

Appendix C—Acronyms 29

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 30

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 31
1 

Iraqi Security Forces: Special Operations Force Program 

Is Achieving Goals, but Iraqi Support Remains 

Critical to Success 

SIGIR 11-004 October 25, 2010

Introduction 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted this review to assess 

the United States Forces-Iraq’s (USF-I) management of its program to develop the Iraqi Special 

Operations Force (ISOF). This is the Iraqi force primarily responsible for conducting 

counterinsurgency operations against insurgents and extremist networks, and denying safe haven 

to terrorists. The program was carried out by the Joint Forces Special Operations Component 

Command-Iraq, a subordinate command of USF-I, and its predecessor organizations. In this 

report we refer to these organizations collectively as U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF). 

In March 2010, SIGIR issued an interim report1

 on contracts awarded to provide ISOF with a 

counterterrorism communications network and intelligence database. SIGIR made several 

recommendations in the report to improve contract management. This audit focuses on the 

development and operational capabilities of the ISOF. 

Background 

In 2003, as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the 

Commander, United States Central Command directed the formation of an Iraqi counterterrorism 

capability. USSOF was assigned the responsibility to develop this force because training foreign 

militaries is an integral part of their mission. The U.S. Army Special Forces, for example, has 

been training foreign militaries as part of its Foreign Internal Defense mission for many years. 

U.S. Army Rangers and U.S. Navy SEALS also participate in training and developing the ISOF. 

The current ISOF organization was formed from two distinct forces—the Iraq Civil Defense 

Corps and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force. These organizations operated independently until 

May 2004, when they were merged to form the ISOF. USSOF directly controlled the training 

and equipping of the ISOF until 2006, when operational control of all Iraqi forces, including 

ISOF, was transferred to the Government of Iraq (GOI). Since that time, USSOF forces have 

mentored and advised the ISOF. 

Within the GOI, ISOF falls under the Counterterrorism Command (CTC), which executes the 

National Counterterrorism Strategy. The CTC is under the direction of the Counterterrorism 

Service (CTS), a quasi-ministerial agency established by Prime Minister Decree rather than Iraqi 

 

1 Interim Report on Projects To Develop the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, SIGIR 10-009, 3/25/2010. 
2 

law. CTC responds to target priorities and mission execution orders conveyed by the Prime 

Minister through the CTS. The CTC is also responsible for integrating intelligence and 

providing command and control of ISOF counterterrorism operations nationwide. Figure 1 

shows the current ISOF organizational structure. 

Figure 1—ISOF Organizational Structure 

Notes: 

RCC—Regional Coordinating Center 

GSU—Garrison Support Unit 

CDO—Commando Battalion 

ICTF—Iraqi Counterterrorism Force 

SPT—Support Battalion 

Recce—Reconnaissance Company 

ISWCS—Iraqi Special Warfare Center and School 

Source: Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq. 

Objectives 

SIGIR’s objectives in this report were to assess the extent to which the ISOF training program 

goals and outcomes were met; identify program costs; and assess the status of ISOF transition to 

the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the GOI’s sustainment of the force. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For a list of ISOF contracts, see Appendix B. For a list of acronyms used, see 
3 

Appendix C. For the audit team members, see Appendix D. For the SIGIR mission and contact 

information, see Appendix E. 

 
4 

Program Goals Are Being Achieved 

To date, the USSOF has successfully trained more than 4,100 Iraqi Special Operations Force 

soldiers to U.S. special operations standards, and developed an internal ISOF command structure 

and planning mechanism that mirrors U.S. special operations forces requirements. USSOF is 

actively monitoring and evaluating ISOF performance in conducting counterterrorism operations, 

and its assessments show that the ISOF is performing at an acceptable level. USSOF documents 

show that ISOF troops are deployed in various provinces of Iraq and are providing essential 

counterterrorism capabilities that enable the GOI to maintain pressure on insurgent/extremist 

networks and deny safe haven to terrorists. 

U.S. Has Trained ISOF to U.S. Special Operations Forces Standards 

U.S. Army Special Forces standard training doctrine was the basis for the ISOF training effort. 

USSOF modified this doctrine to develop specific courses that meet the needs and conditions in 

Iraq. The U.S. training program evolved as the Iraqi trainers’ capabilities increased and 

consisted of three phases: 

 Direct U.S. Training of Iraqis—November 2003 through June 2006 

 Training Iraqi Trainers—June 2006 through June 2008 

 Monitoring ISOF—June 2008 through current phase 

Direct U.S. Training 

According to a senior USSOF Advisor, they initially ran two training programs; one for the Iraqi 

Civil Defense Corps, and one for the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 

training began in response to a Multi-National Force-Iraq effort to persuade various political and 

secular entities in Iraq to disband their militias. According to a senior USSOF advisor, the 

Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander asked each of the militia leaders to provide a few men for 

a civil defense force, and most did. This force became the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and one 

battalion received direct U.S. training in offensive operations. This battalion became operational 

in December 2004. 

Direct U.S. training for the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force started in January 2004. USSOF 

conducted an assessment and selection process for the Force, and once the students were vetted 

and cleared they were given initial training, and then transported to Jordan for a more advanced 

98-day course taught by U.S. and Jordanian Special Forces. Altogether six training cycles were 

conducted in Jordan, each attended by approximately 100 students. A seventh training cycle was 

conducted in Iraq. 

The U.S. has also sent a small number of ISOF soldiers to advanced training in the United States. 

Beginning in 2006, USSOF began sending select ISOF soldiers to the U.S. Army Ranger School; 

one ISOF soldier is attending the Green Beret Qualification Course, and a CTS officer recently 

graduated from the National Defense University. The senior USSOF advisor stated that they 

would like to send more ISOF soldiers to this type of training, but the lack of English language 

skills has been a barrier to expanding stateside training. However, a Joint Forces Special 
5 

Operations Component Command-Iraq (JFSOCC-I) official stated that currently an instructor is 

teaching English to ISOF soldiers at Area IV. 

Training Iraqi Trainers 

A goal of the U.S. training effort was to develop Iraqi instructors so that they could assume 

responsibility for training future ISOF soldiers. With the exception of the Instructor Refresher 

Courses, Iraqi instructors currently conduct all of the training. Training is conducted at the Iraqi 

Special Warfare Center and School and consists of three courses: 

 Assessment and Selection Course—a 21-day course that provides the recruits with basic 

military training. The attrition rate for candidates in this screening course is greater than 

50%. 

 Commando Course—a 47-day course that teaches candidates advanced combat skills to 

include tactical combat movements, offensive operations, cordon and blocking 

procedures, mounted operations, air assault techniques, and direct action operations. 

 Operator Training Course—a 52-day course that teaches candidates many of the same 

advanced combat skills as the Commando Course, with additional instruction on close 

quarters battle, crew-served weapons employment, and advanced marksmanship. 

USSOF is currently attempting to encourage the school leadership to initiate a program to rotate 

instructors between the school house and the Battalions. This would help the instructors 

maintain their skill sets and give other ISOF soldiers experience as trainers. 

Embedded in the training is a logistics and supply element intended to acquaint ISOF soldiers 

with how to identify their requirements for ammunition, repair parts, and various supplies. The 

training is not formal logistics training but more cursory in nature. Although the ISOF soldiers 

are exposed to requirements planning, the CTC and the CTS do not receive the training, which 

limits their ability to budget and plan for future ISOF requirements. A senior USSOF advisor 

indicated that there is concern about the ability of the CTC or the CTS and the ministerial level 

to adequately sustain the ISOF once the U.S. military draws down. 

USSOF Monitors and Assesses ISOF Performance 

With few exceptions USSOF advisors have always gone on missions with the ISOF. Following 

each mission the senior mission advisor completes a post operations assessment. The USSOF 

assessments are classified, however; SIGIR reviewed 13 of the most recent post-operations 

assessments to gain an understanding of ISOF performance. These assessments were prepared 

between May and July 2010. 

The assessments we reviewed contained a detailed chronology of the mission to include a 

description of the targets and locations, methods for insertion and extraction, and a summary of 

the events that took place during the operation. They also contained a critique of the tactical and 

technical skills and performance demonstrated by the ISOF soldiers and leaders for that specific 

mission. If the advisor noted any weakness in the tactical or technical skills or performance 

during the mission by any of the soldiers or leaders, it was identified in the assessment so it 
6 

could be addressed in future training. Conversely, if the advisor noted good performance, it was 

also recorded so that improvements in tactical and technical skills were documented. 

The SIGIR review of assessments found that, overall, USSOF advisors documented a 

progressive improvement in the ISOF’s tactical and technical skills. For example, several 

assessments noted the patience demonstrated by the ISOF awaiting the right conditions in which 

to carry out the operations. Additionally, other assessments discussed how the ISOF had 

successfully taken the lead in planning, developing, and coordinating the mission. Finally, one 

USSOF advisor remarked in his assessment that the ISOF leaders had placed the noncommissioned officers in charge of planning and executing the mission. The advisor stated that 

the ISOF leader’s intent was to improve non-commissioned officer leadership development. 

ISOF Minimum Essential Capabilities Have Also Been Assessed and 

Found Good 

Another evaluative tool being used by USSOF is the Minimum Essential Capability assessment 

which was initiated in 2009 by JFSOCC-I. This assessment evaluates critical functions such as 

force management, training, equipping, and sustainment. JFSOCC-I conducts monthly meetings 

to assess ISOF progress toward achieving objectives. The Minimum Essential Capability 

contains color-coded ratings for each capability/function showing the current and predicted 

future capability. If and when a capability gap is assessed, resources are applied in an attempt to 

increase ISOF’s capability in that particular area. In some instances this may take the form of 

additional training/mentorship, in other instances a material solution may be necessary in order 

to increase a particular capability. 

These monthly meetings serve two complimentary purposes. They enable the objective 

allocation of resources to those areas in need of improvement. They also serve to measure the 

effectiveness of the allocation, and enable USSOF to determine what additional action (if any) is 

needed in order to achieve minimum essential capability in one of the functional areas. 

SIGIR reviewed the Minimum Essential Capability assessment and attended one of the monthly 

meetings discussing the assessment. The assessments are classified and as such, cannot be 

discussed in this report. However, in general they show that the ISOF is becoming a selfsustaining, national counterterrorism command that can independently and successfully plan, 

prepare, and execute operations in a synchronized and coordinated manner. 
7 

Accounting for Program Costs Was Imprecise 

USF-I did not fully account for the funds used in developing the ISOF, and the total cost of the 

program is unknown. At least $237 million from the ISFF was used to equip and sustain the 

ISOF. In addition, an unknown amount from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was also 

used for procuring new equipment. However, this equipment was purchased in support of all 

Iraqi Security Forces, and the amount allocated to the ISOF is unknown. 

Iraq Security Forces Fund 

Since 2005, the Congress has appropriated more than $19 billion in ISFF to support the 

development of the Iraqi Security Forces. Of this total, about $237 million has been used to train 

and equip the ISOF. The majority of this money was used for improving/renovating facilities 

and procuring new equipment. 

Each ISFF appropriation is divided into three budget activities. Defense Forces is one of the 

three and is shared by several USF-I directorates that fund requirements to train and equip Iraqi 

Security Forces. Defense Forces funds support requirements for the Iraqi Army, Air Force, 

Navy, Special Operations Forces, Logistics, and Communications. Each directorate does not 

have its own separate budget but shares the Defense Forces funds. USF-I Resource Management 

tracks the directorate and funding amount for each requirement. However, there is the potential 

for a requirement such as ammunition or infrastructure to be shared between the directorates 

making it difficult to determine how much has been spent on developing the ISOF. 

SIGIR identified 103 ISFF-funded contracts used to equip and sustain the ISOF. The largest 

category of spending, approximately $125 million, went to support infrastructure, in particular 

the construction/rehabilitation of facilities necessary to support ISOF operations. Sustainment 

represented approximately 25%, or nearly $59 million, and is discussed in more detail in the 

Transition and Sustainment section of this report. Training and Operations accounted for 

$2 million, or less than 1% of total ISFF spending. This funding was not used to train ISOF 

soldiers but rather to provide advisors to the Counterterrorism Command. 

 
8 

Table 1—ISFF Funds Spent in Developing the ISOF (FY 2005–FY 2009) 

Fiscal Years 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2004-2009 2004-2009

Sustainment $10,721,492 $2,921,970 $43,327,614 $2,000,000 $58,971,076 24.8%

Infrastructure $8,179,175 $17,662,443 $73,401,735 $25,312,623 $124,555,975 52.4%

Equipment & 

Transportation $14,000 $14,533,709 $28,166,844 $9,278,936 $51,993,489 21.9%

Training & 

Operations $0 $491,218 $1,518,614 $14,700 $2,024,532 0.9%

ISOF TOTAL $18,914,667 $35,609,340 $146,414,807 $36,606,259 $237,545,073 100.0%

Source: SIGIR Analysis of USF-I documents.

Infrastructure 

Improving and renovating facilities, in particular the construction/rehabilitation of facilities 

necessary to support ISOF operations, was the largest category of ISFF spending, accounting for 

approximately $125 million. SIGIR visited two ISOF sites during the review and toured many 

buildings either constructed or rehabilitated with ISFF money. The sites visited were Area IV 

(Headquarters for the 1st and 2nd ISOF Brigades) located at the Victory Base Complex and one of 

the Regional Coordinating Centers. Both sites are located in Baghdad, Iraq. 

Area IV Infrastructure 

The visit to Area IV was an unannounced visit conducted by SIGIR and JFSOCC-I personnel on 

April 20, 2010. Infrastructure at Area IV included 12 barracks, a company headquarters, 

warehouse and maintenance facilities, training facilities and ranges, barracks, operational 

planning spaces, equipment storage areas, and administrative facilities. The U.S. provided 

approximately $32 million for this project. Additional construction improved the existing base 

infrastructure, to include generators and power distribution systems, and wastewater treatment 

facilities. 

During the tour at Area IV, the SIGIR audit team observed that the installation was well 

maintained. All of the facilities visited were being used by the ISOF and were in good to 

excellent condition. The Area IV barracks are shown in Figure 1. 

 
9 

Figure 1—Area IV Barracks 

Source: SIGIR Photographs, April 2010. 

The dining facility was modern, and in an excellent state of repair. The kitchen was large, well 

ordered and clean with two large walk-in freezer/refrigerators: one for meat, and one for 

vegetables. Although electricity to the camp is still somewhat intermittent, the freezers had their 

own generators and constant power. Figure 2 shows the Area IV Dining Facility. 

Figure 2—Area IV Dining Facility 

Source: SIGIR Photograph, April 2010. 
10 

The medical facility is staffed with both Medical Doctors and Dentists and has rooms for 

diagnosis, routine examinations, physical therapy, x-rays, emergent/trauma care, a laboratory, 

and pharmacy. It can also keep patients overnight in a six-bed ward. The dental facility is 

located in the same building and contains modern equipment for most dental procedures. These 

facilities are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 

Figure 3—Area IV Medical Examination Room and Ward 

Source: SIGIR Photographs, April 2010. 

Figure 4—Area IV Dental Facility 

Source: SIGIR Photograph, April 2010. 
11 

The Shoot House is an indoor firing range built at a cost of $2.5 million that allows the ISOF to 

train in a variety of scenarios. It can be used for live-fire and building-clearing exercises to 

include the actual “breaching” or entering of the building using explosives, and to allow ISOF 

soldiers to practice clearing a building using live ammunition. The configuration of the rooms 

can be modified by closing off some rooms and opening others using special sliding doors. It 

also permits ISOF soldiers to practice negotiating hallways and stairways; traditionally 

considered to be danger areas. The Shoot House in shown in Figure 5. 

Figure 5—Shoot House Overhead View and Interior Room 

Source: SIGIR Photographs, April 2010. 

Regional Coordination Center Infrastructure 

SIGIR also visited the Baghdad Regional Coordinating Center on April 28, 2010. The project 

consisted of one building under construction (about 45% complete) and a second building being 

refurbished (about 90% complete). The project manager and project engineer said that the new 

building would be used for conferences, officer and enlisted quarters, and dining. The 

refurbished building would be used for administration. A USF-I official said that the project is 

scheduled for completion in November 2010. 

Equipping the ISOF 

The USSOF is equipping the ISOF with U.S. equipment to enhance interoperability with 

USSOF, improve sustainability, and establish a basis for a long-term bilateral working 

relationship. Approximately $52 million of the $237 million in ISFF funding has been used for 

equipment. 

During our tour of Area IV, we inspected the arms rooms, communications, and the night 

observation devices storage and repair facilities and found that the equipment was wellmaintained and accounted for. We also assessed weapons accountability based on concerns 

identified in an earlier SIGIR report that identified a material management weakness in 

accounting for weapons procured by the U.S. Department of Defense for the Iraqi Security 

Forces.2 These concerns were also identified in a July 2008, Department of Defense Inspector 

 

2 Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund, SIGIR 06-033, 10/28/2006. 
12 

General report.3 These storage rooms for night vision devices and weapons are shown in 

Figure 6. 

Figure 6—Night Vision Device Storage Room and Arms Room 

Source: SIGIR Photographs, April 2010. 

On July 14, 2010, we conducted an inventory of U.S.-purchased weapons currently in ISOF’s 

control. We randomly selected 51 weapons located at ISOF Headquarters Battalion armories and 

traced the weapon nomenclature and serial number to the USF-I J4 Forward (Logistics) ISOF 

Weapons Serial Numbers Database that identifies all weapons turned over to the GOI and Iraqi 

Security Forces. We also checked to see if there was a corresponding receipt for the weapon 

signed by an official from the GOI. All 51 weapons selected were in the USF-I J4 database and 

had a receipt signed by a GOI official. 

To accommodate the rapid deployment of the ISOF units, the USSOF modified a number of 

rebuilt U.S. manufactured M1114 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles, at a cost of 

$3.8 million, to fit the ISOF mission profile. The vehicles serve as the primary combat insertion 

and extraction vehicle for ISOF. The U.S. supplied approximately 450 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles to ISOF. Many of these vehicles were customized to incorporate an 

“open-back” modification, enabling the vehicles to carry up to 14 personnel. Additional 

elements of the modification include the addition of ballistic steel around the outer seating area, 

installation of two swing-arm mounts for M240B machine guns, the installation of side running 

boards, and the installation of a rear step. In addition to the High Mobility Multi-purpose 

Wheeled Vehicles and the associated modifications, ISFF funds enabled the procurement of 

repair parts and contractor maintenance and maintenance training. These were critical factors in 

establishing and maintaining the operational readiness of ISOF’s tactical vehicle fleet. These 

vehicles are shown in Figure 7. 

 

3

Report on the Assessment of Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq, 

DoD/IG SPO-2008-001, 7/3/2008 (Classified). 
13 

Figure 7—Modified HMMWVs 

Source: SIGIR Photograph, July 2010. 

In addition to the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles, ISOF operates an extensive 

fleet of civilian vehicles that are used for intelligence gathering and target reconnaissance. The 

vehicles have a limited operational lifespan since using them repeatedly risks establishing a 

pattern that would allow ISOF adversaries to identify and target them. Current ISOF Modified 

Table of Organization and Equipment authorizes 160 civilian vehicles for reconnaissance 

purposes. 

Beyond close target reconnaissance, ISOF reconnaissance elements use cell phones to maintain 

contact with their source networks. The majority of ISOF targets were developed using human 

intelligence sources. ISFF funding was used to support the purchase of local Iraqi cell phone 

cards. In early 2008, the U.S. began purchasing radios for ISOF to provide a tactical 

communications capability to the operational forces and headquarters. 
14 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds Were Spent but Amount Is 

Unknown 

Between 2004 and 2006, Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds were also used to support the 

development of the Iraqi Security Forces. Equipment and weapons purchased were delivered to 

the Iraqi Ministry of Defense who, in turn, allocated it to the various Security Forces. Some of 

the equipment and weapons were provided to the ISOF, but the amounts cannot be specifically 

identified. 

There are several issues that impact accountability of the funds. First, multiple USF-I 

directorates often combine purchases, such as ammunition purchases, and it is not possible to 

determine what each directorate received. Second, some weapons purchases were combined 

with captured and seized weapons making it difficult to specifically identify the IRRF-funded 

purchases. For example, in a 2006 report, SIGIR reported that about $133 million in IRRF funds 

had been spent to purchase 370,251 weapons for the Ministries of Defense and Interior.4 

However, a total of 485,677 weapons were issued: 192,752 to the Ministry of Defense and 

292,925 to the Ministry of Interior. According to the report, it could reasonably be assumed that 

the difference between the amounts purchased and issued were weapons that had been donated, 

captured, or purchased with other than IRRF funds. However, without more information we 

could not determine what percent of the weapons provided to the individual Ministries were 

IRRF-funded. 

 

 

4 Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund, SIGIR-06-033, 10/28/ 2006. 
15 

Continuing Issues in Transitioning and Sustaining the 

ISOF 

The long-term success of the ISOF lies in the hands of the GOI. During the course of this audit we 

noted a number of issues that raise questions about the future use of ISOF forces and their longterm sustainment. These include the extra-constitutional placement of ISOF under the Office of 

the Prime Minister, insufficient and inconsistent funding from the GOI/Ministry of Defense to 

sustain the force, and problems with recruiting ISOF soldiers. USF-I has been in discussions 

with its GOI/Ministry of Defense counterparts about these concerns and states that it will 

continue to consult on these issues. 

ISOF Moved Under Control of the Prime Minister 

Recent GOI decisions create concerns about whether the ISOF is appropriately positioned within 

the GOI to ensure its independence and legitimacy. 

Through 2006 the ISOF was part of the Ministry of Defense. This was the structure that the 

USSOF had recommended to keep the ISOF within the Iraqi military chain of command and 

protected from political influence. However, starting in late 2006 the Prime Minister issued 

three Executive Orders that significantly changed the structure from the one that the U.S. 

advisors had envisioned and recommended. 

 Executive Order 38, dated December 6, 2006, placed ISOF forces directly under the 

Prime Minister for Operations. 

 Executive Order 14, dated January 24, 2007, placed CTC directly under the Prime 

Minister for Operations. 

 Executive Order 61, dated April 5, 2007, placed CTS under the Prime Minister and in the 

chain of command for CTC. 

Consequently, by early 2007 the CTS had become a “ministerial level” headquarters reporting 

directly to the Prime Minister with operational control of CTC. This organization was not 

formally authorized by the Iraqi Council of Representatives. To address this issue, in September 

2007, the Prime Minister’s office drafted a proposed counterterrorism law and submitted it to the 

legislature for review and approval. However, while the Council of Ministers has approved the 

law, it still has not been approved by the Council of Representatives. 

GOI Budgeting for the ISOF Has Been Inconsistent 

Funding for the ISOF has been inconsistent, partly because of its uncertain status as a Ministry of 

Defense agency or a Prime Minister agency. 

During the initial years of USF-I’s program, ISOF received very limited logistical support from 

the Ministry of Defense and consequently relied upon U.S. funding for a full range of necessary 

supplies. The USSOF provided ISOF with such items as uniforms, body armor, printer 
16 

cartridges, and furniture. When ISOF was split off from the Ministry of Defense by the Iraqi 

Prime Minister in December 2007 and established as a separate service under the CTS, the 

Ministry and the CTS Director signed a Memorandum of Agreement in 2008 in which the 

Ministry agreed to fund the following: 

 the salaries of all CTS personnel, emergency expenses for operations, payments for ISOF 

soldiers injured or killed in combat, and to provide personnel to fill shortages in the ISOF 

ranks, coordinate promotions, and other personnel actions 

 ammunition and weapons, billets at Ministry of Defense schools, transportation 

assistance using Ministry of Defense vehicles, tractor trailers and aircraft, and medical 

support for CTS personnel 

 various items such as life support, water purification and treatment, special vehicles, 

generators, and use of Ministry of Defense maintenance facilities on a reimbursable basis 

to CTS 

The Memorandum was to serve as a support mechanism until CTS received a dedicated budget. 

It stipulated that it was to be effective for one year, and it was not subsequently renewed. 

USSOF advisors said that through 2008 and into 2009, while awaiting passage of the Counter 

Terrorism law (and the associated budget authority), CTS was funded with Prime Minister 

discretionary funds. Since the Counter Terrorism law was not passed, the expected funding did 

not materialize. 

In early 2010, USSOF advisors said that Ministry of Defense support to ISOF had moderately 

improved. In the first quarter of CY 2010, the Ministry of Defense began to provide ISOF with 

predictable salary payments, needed repair parts, and a 40% increase in monthly fuel allocations. 

The 2010 Government of Iraq budget passed by the Council of Representative in January 2010 

included a funding line of approximately $170 million for the CTS as part of the overall Ministry 

of Defense budget. USSOF officials were informed by CTS that the actual operational 

requirement for ISOF was $350 million for this period. Consequently, the ISOF still continues 

having difficulty obtaining fuel, ammunition, and other logistical support due to limited funding. 

Recruiting Support Has Been Poor 

ISOF is also having problems with recruiting and maintaining troop strength. By the close of 

2008, ISOF was manned at 98%, and it expected all battalions to be fully manned by July 2009. 

Two factors changed this assessment. In May of 2008, the CTS decided to double its authorized 

strength to more than 8,500 operators, staff, and support personnel. As a “ministerial level” 

official, the CTS Director had the authority to approve such changes, although since the CTS 

relied on the Ministry of Defense for logistical support, this change should have been 

coordinated. However, it is unclear if it were. In September 2008, the GOI froze hiring for all 

government ministries. The Iraqi Army stopped recruiting, and the Ministry of Defense was no 

longer providing soldiers to ISOF. Nonetheless, in early 2009, CTS changed its Table of 

Organization and Equipment to show the increase. As a result, the manning levels (as a 

percentage) became lower than those reported in early 2009. 
17 

In order to grow the Brigade to the desired level, ISOF ran an assessment and selection course 

that graduated 824 personnel in May 2008. These personnel had been recruited “off the street” 

and not from the ranks of the Iraqi Army, a common practice during the early days of ISOF. 

However, this time the hiring freeze prevented them from being inducted into the Iraqi Army, a 

necessary step in order to bring them into ISOF. By March of 2009, the ISOF Brigade manning 

percentage was at 67%. 

In June 2009, after the move of the ISOF from the Ministry of Defense to the Office of the Prime 

Minister, the Prime Minister directed the Ministry of Defense to provide 1,400 soldiers to ISOF, 

in order to bring ISOF to full strength. The Ministry ordered the 14 Iraqi Army Division 

Commanders to provide 100 soldiers each to ISOF. However, it later revised the order to 

provide only 50 personnel per division, and soon thereafter revoked the order altogether. As a 

result 2009 closed with no additional soldiers added to the ISOF rolls. Natural attrition 

compounded this manning problem, and the overall manning numbers began to go down. In 

April 2009, budget constraints caused the CTS to suspend the payment of a monthly $800 

specialty pay for ISOF soldiers. Staffing shortfalls remained the primary barrier preventing the 

Regional Commando Battalions in Baqubah and Al Asad from reaching full operational 

capability. 

 
18 

Conclusions and Lessons Learned 

Conclusion 

The ISOF’s demonstrated ability to independently conduct operations and missions and to 

sustain its equipment and facilities are indicators of the program's success. The training doctrine 

and the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment provided a sound basis for developing 

the ISOF, and coupled with the USSOF’s continuing adjustments, reassessments and re-planning 

provided solid groundwork for developing the force. Accompanying ISOF personnel on 

missions, documenting the results, and providing feedback also demonstrates a solid process of 

analysis and accountability not often seen in Iraq relief and reconstruction activities. These 

assessments document the progressive improvement and maturity of the ISOF’s tactical and 

technical skills. 

As with all Iraq relief and reconstruction activities, the long-term success of the ISOF lies in the 

hands of the Government of Iraq. Two issues point out the challenges in post-conflict 

stabilization operations. First, the extra-constitutional movement of the ISOF from the Ministry 

of Defense to the Office of the Prime Minister raises concerns about how the force will be used 

in the future. Second, poor GOI support as evidenced by the lack of a dedicated budget, poor 

logistical and recruiting support, and the irregular payment of specialty pay creates concerns 

about the GOI’s commitment to sustain the force. USF-I has been consulting with its GOI 

counterparts about these issues and states that it will continue to consult on these issues. SIGIR 

supports this continuing engagement. 

Recommendations 

This report contains no recommendations. 

Lessons Learned 

USSOF’s ability to provide continuous oversight and continuity of trainers is one of the critical 

elements in helping to assure the success of ISOF. USSOF has had the responsibility for 

training, equipping, and developing the ISOF since its inception. Many USSOF trainers have 

made multiple deployments to Iraq as trainers for ISOF. This continuity and the use of standard 

U.S. Army Special Forces training doctrine provided a solid base of support, instruction, and 

mentorship that has contributed to the ISOF becoming a self-sustaining, national counterterrorist 

command that can independently and successfully plan, prepare, and execute counterterrorist 

operations. 

SIGIR has previously noted that continuity in relief and reconstruction program management is a 

major component of successful programs. An effective monitoring and oversight plan also 

allows for early and direct feedback on program outcomes and allows for timely adjustments to 

operating practices and policies. 

 
19 

Management Comments 

Management comments were not required because SIGIR did not make recommendations. 

Neither USF-I nor USSOF provided comments on a draft of this report. 
20 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

In June 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

9023 to review the contracts supporting the equipping and training of Iraqi Special Operations 

Force (ISOF). SIGIR issued an interim report in March 25, 2010, on two contracts awarded with 

ISFF monies to procure a counterterrorism communications network and intelligence database 

for ISOF.5

 To complete the original planned objectives for this review, SIGIR continued the 

audit under the same project number (9023) in March 2010. SIGIR’s objectives in this report 

were to assess the extent to which the ISOF training program goals and outcomes were met; 

identify program costs; and assess the status of ISOF transition to the Government of Iraq (GOI) 

and the GOI’s sustainment of the force. 

This audit was performed by SIGIR under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, 

which requires SIGIR to prepare a final forensic audit report on amounts appropriated or 

otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq. The 2008 Defense Authorization Act 

extended this requirement to other funds, including the Iraq Security Forces Fund. SIGIR 

conducted its work during March through August 2010 in Baghdad, Iraq. 

To accomplish our objectives, we visited or held discussions with officials, and reviewed 

documents and data from U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) Resource Management (J8 Forward–Forward 

Operating Base Union III) and USF-I’s major subordinate command, the Joint Forces Special 

Operations Component Command-Iraq (JFSOCC-I), and the Iraqi Military (ISOF). Officials at 

these organizations included senior U.S. and Iraqi military officials and other personnel involved 

in the management and oversight of the ISOF. The following areas were visited in Baghdad, 

Iraq during the course of this audit: (1) JFSOCC-I at Victory Base Complex (multiple times), 

(2) ISOF Regional Coordinating Center Baghdad on April 28, 2010, (3) ISOF 1st & 2nd 

battalion HQ’s at Area IV on Victory Base Complex (multiple times), (4) USF-I Resource 

Management/J8 Forward at FOB Union III on June 1, 2010, (5) Counterterrorism 

Command/Counterterrorism Service Military Training Team office located at FOB Union III, 

Bldg 5 on May 8, 2010, and (6) Special Operations Task Force-Central on June 8, 2010. In 

addition, numerous meetings were held at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. 

To identify program plans and goals, outcomes, and transition and sustainment efforts, we 

conducted interviews with the U.S. and Iraqi military (JFSOCC-I and ISOF), collected 

information via questionnaires, and obtained and analyzed relevant programmatic documents and 

other information. To determine costs, we obtained and analyzed relevant contract, financial, 

and other information from USF-I Resource Management (J8 Forward). 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

 

5 Interim Report on Projects To Develop the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, SIGIR 10-009, 4/23/2010.
21 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Reliability of Data from Computer-Based Systems 

We used data from the USF-I Resource Management databases to identify expenditures for 

training and equipping the ISOF. We did not verify the data, but we conducted limited testing to 

determine that data was reliable for the purposes of the audit. 

Internal Controls 

In conducting the audit, we assessed certain internal controls pertinent to the audit objectives 

regarding the laws and procedures for the control and accountability of designated sensitive 

items related to small arms. Specifically, we assessed JSOCC-I’s procedures relating to the 

accountability controls for the designated sensitive items prior to and during distribution to the 

ISOF and the assistance given to the ISOF related to their accountability control of the items. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following reports for this audit:

SIGIR 

Interim Report on Projects To Develop the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, SIGIR 10-009, 

3/25/2010. 

Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight 

Problems, SIGIR 09-014, 4/26/2009. 

The U.S. Has Reduced Its Funding for the Iraqi Security Forces, but Continued Support Will 

Likely Be Necessary, SIGIR 09-012, 1/26/2009. 

Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue, SIGIR 09-

002, 10/21/2008. 

Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund, SIGIR 06-033, 10/28/2006. 

Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, SIGIR 06-032, 

10/28/2006. 

DOD/Inspector General 

Assessment of the Accountability of Night Vision Devices Provided to the Security Forces of 

Iraq, SPO-2009-003, 3/17/2009. 
22 

Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; 

Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces, SPO-2009-002, 

12/19/2008. 

Report on the Assessment of Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security 

Forces of Iraq, SPO-2008-001, 7/3/2008 (Classified). 
23 

Appendix B—Contracts 

Project Description Obligation Paid Unliquidated

11000 TEMPORARY DUTY FOR IRAQI 

ISOF FOR CEREMONY $879.71 $879.71 $0.00

11000 ISOF BRIGADE HIGH MOBILITY 

MULTI-PURPOSE WHEELED 

VEHICLE M1114/1151 VEHICLE 

MODIFICATION $920.00 $920.00 $0.00

11000 IRAQNA PHONE CARDS $5,612.00 $5,612.00 $0.00

11000 CONSUMABLE SUPPLIES FOR 

ISOF: CHEMICAL LIGHTS AND 

BATTERIES $18,482.65 $18,458.25 $24.40

11000 PRINTER CARTRIDGES FOR ISOF 

XEROX PRINTERS $22,390.00 $22,390.00 $0.00

11000 REMINGTON 870 SHOTGUNS 

(X25) & SHIPPING $33,304.25 $33,304.25 $0.00

11000 IRAQ SPECIAL WARFARE 

CENTER & SCHOOL TRAINING 

EQUIPMENT $35,459.08 $35,459.08 $0.00

11000 NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRRORISM 

COMMUNICATIONS 

CONNECTIVITY $48,242.63 $48,242.63 $0.00

11000 HARRIS FIELD SERVICE 

ENGINEER & REPAIR PARTS $48,417.93 $48,417.93 $0.00

11000 UNIVERSAL GUN MOUNTS 91 MK 

HARDWARE $48,865.00 $48,865.00 $0.00

11000 LIFE SUPPORT $90,300.00 $90,300.00 $0.00

11000 ISOF L3 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT $95,819.00 $86,344.00 $9,475.00

11000 FIBER LINK FOR CTC $97,616.72 $97,616.72 $0.00

11000 LIFE SUPPORT $191,193.00 $0.00 $191,193.00

11000 UNIVERSAL GUN MOUNTS 91 MK 

93 MODIFICATION 1 $223,810.35 $223,810.35 $0.00

11000 COUNTERTERRORISM NETWORK 

– HARDWARE $521,000.00 $521,000.00 $0.00

11000 COUNTERTERRORISM NETWORK 

– BANDWITH $696,000.00 $696,000.00 $0.00

11000 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 

NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 

ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING $825,291.00 $825,291.00 $0.00

11000 COUNTERTERRRORISM 

COMMUNICATIONS 

CONNECTIVITY COST INCREASE $903,274.98 $903,274.98 $0.00
24 

Project Description Obligation Paid Unliquidated

11000 ISOF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CELL $916,284.00 $915,107.00 $1,177.00

11000 EXPANSION OF 

COUNTERTERRRORISM 

NETWORK TO REMOTE SITES $1,000,000.00 $934,369.65 $65,630.35

11000 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT 

AREA IV $1,032,044.09 $1,032,044.09 $0.00

11000 COMMUNICATION: CRIMINAL 

INTELLIGENCE NETWORK 

ARCHITECTURE, 

ADMINISTRATION & TRAINING $1,143,114.00 $1,134,467.00 $8,647.00

11000 HARRIS FIELD SERVICE 

ENGINEER & REPAIR PARTS $1,274,156.00 $1,274,156.00 $0.00

11000 COUNTERTERRRORISM 

NETWORK SUSTAINMENT $1,767,614.60 $1,767,614.60 $0.00

11000 WEAPONS/HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE 

SPARE PARTS $2,000,000.00 $2,000,000.00 $0.00

11000 IRAQI COUNTERTERRORIST 

FORCE - ARMORED VEHICLE (15) $2,140,500.00 $2,140,500.00 $0.00

11000 NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRRORISM 

COMMUNICATIONS 

CONNECTIVITY $2,616,475.01 $2,616,475.01 $0.00

11000 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 

NETWORK ARCHITECTURE, 

ADMINISTRATION, & TRAINING $4,825,902.90 $4,825,902.90 $0.00

11000 FIBER LINK FOR CTC $4,899,937.62 $4,899,937.62 $0.00

11000 INITIAL LIFE SUPPORT FOR CTC 

& COUNTERTERRRORISM 

BUREAU FOR ONE YEAR $5,732,850.88 $5,732,850.88 $0.00

11000 AMMUNITION FOR BAGHDAD 

SECURITY PLAN/ISOF USE 

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES $6,647,630.00 $6,647,630.00 $0.00

11000 ISOF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT $7,300,000.00 $7,300,000.00 $0.00

11000 COUNTERTERRORISM NETWORK $11,767,689.00 $11,129,937.00 $637,752.00

12000 RANGE CONSTRUCTION $379,401.00 $377,167.00 $2,234.00

12000 EXPAND & REPAIR SHOOTHOUSE $642,332.00 $642,332.00 $0.00

12000 BAGHDAD REGIONAL 

COORDINATING CENTER $1,407,176.75 $0.00 $1,407,176.75

12000 CONSTRUCT SHOOTHOUSE $2,564,887.00 $2,564,887.00 $0.00

12000 CONSTRUCT REGIONAL 

COMMANDO BASE AT BASRAH $3,306,195.64 $3,209,752.38 $96,443.26

12000 CONSTRUCT DIVISION AT 

BELIEVERS PALACE & 

COUNTERTERRORISM BUREAU $4,237,879.29 $3,900,736.04 $337,143.25
25 

Project Description Obligation Paid Unliquidated

12000 CONSTRUCT BRIGADE CAMP $4,971,955.60 $4,893,654.43 $78,301.17

12000 CONSTRUCT REGIONAL 

COMMANDO BASE AT DIYALA $9,712,045.61 $7,104,395.87 $2,607,649.74

12000 CONSTRUCT REGIONAL 

COMMANDO BASE AT BASRAH $9,823,200.00 $9,823,200.00 $0.00

12000 CONSTRUCT REGIONAL 

COMMANDO BASE AT BASRAH $10,776,050.40 $0.00 $10,776,050.40

12000 CONSTRUCT BASE AT AREA IV $13,045,162.31 $13,018,247.39 $26,914.92

12000 CONSTRUCT REGIONAL 

COMMANDO COMPANY AT 

MOSUL $13,939,400.00 $13,398,205.70 $541,194.30

12000 CONSTRUCT REGIONAL 

COMMANDO COMPANY AT 

AL ASAD $17,869,400.46 $17,061,960.70 $807,439.76

12000 CONSTRUCT AREA IV $31,880,889.36 $31,779,424.05 $101,465.31

13000 BAGHDAD REGIONAL 

COORDINATING CENTER: 

WIRELESS ETHERNET $6,821.71 $6,821.71 $0.00

13000 COMMAND & CONTROL 

RECONNAISSANCE & 

SURVEILLANCE TEAM - USED 

VANS (X 2) $14,000.00 $14,000.00 $0.00

13000 REGIONAL COMMANDO BASING - 

COMMUNICATIONS - COMPUTER 

EQUIPMENT $15,205.00 $10,315.00 $4,890.00

13000 TOOL KITS & EQUIPMENT 

MODIFIED TABLE OF 

ORGANIZATON & EQUIPMENT 

GENERAL MECHANICS TOOL 

KITS FOR ISOF COMMANDO & 

IRAQI COUNTERTERRORISM 

FORCE $16,422.00 $16,422.00 $0.00

13000 VIDEO TELECONFRENCE FOR 

2ND ISOF $18,039.27 $7,102.27 $10,937.00

13000 2ND BRIGADE: EXTENDED VERY 

SMALL APERTURE TERMINAL

BANDWIDTH FOR 2ND ISOF 

COMMAND $19,500.00 $0.00 $19,500.00

13000 NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRRORISM 

COMMUNICATIONS 

CONNECTIVITY $20,579.48 $20,579.48 $0.00

13000 MODIFIED TABLE OF 

ORGANIZATON & EQUIPMENT 

ITEMS FOR ISOF GARRISON 

SUPPORT UNIT $22,323.24 $22,323.24 $0.00
26 

Project Description Obligation Paid Unliquidated

13000 2ND BRIGADE: ENHANCED 

SECURITY FOR ISOF - METAL 

DETECTORS $24,400.00 $0.00 $24,400.00

13000 BAGHDAD 

REGIONALCOORDINATING 

CENTER BAGHDAD COMPUTER 

EQUIPMENT $25,290.00 $25,290.00 $0.00

13000 REGIONAL BASE EXPANSION - 

COMMUNICATIONS $49,651.90 $49,651.90 $0.00

13000 2ND BRIGADE COMMUNICATIONS

EQUIPMENT FOR 2ND ISOF 

COMMAND $76,475.63 $76,475.63 $0.00

13000 STURDY MOBILE-CORE TOOL 

LOAD FOR ISOF GARRISON 

SUPPORT UNIT $81,852.00 $81,852.00 $0.00

13000 REGIONAL BASE EXPANSION - 

COMMUNICATIONS $112,416.89 $35,769.50 $76,647.39

13000 FLASHBANGS (STUN GRENADES) 

FOR ISOF $137,900.00 $137,900.00 $0.00

13000 NIGHT VISION DEVICE HELMET 

MOUNTS $150,054.98 $150,054.98 $0.00

13000 FURNITURE FOR REGIONAL 

COMMANDO BASES AT MOSUL, 

BASRAH, AL ASAD & DIYALA $157,000.00 $157,000.00 $0.00

13000 TOOL KITS & EQUIPMENT 

MODIFIED TABLE OF 

ORGANIZATON & EQUIPMENT 

TWO EACH STURDY MOBILE 

TOOL SET $163,704.00 $163,704.00 $0.00

13000 IRAQI TWO- & FOUR-DRAWER 

SAFES $170,000.00 $170,000.00 $0.00

13000 FURNITURE FOR NEW IRAQI 

MILITARY COMMAND FACILITY $177,010.80 $177,010.80 $0.00

13000 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

OPERATIONS CENTER COUNTER 

INTELLIGENCE SCREENING $205,194.00 $205,194.00 $0.00

13000 FURNITURE FOR ISOF GARRISON 

SUPPORT UNIT $207,124.00 $207,124.00 $0.00

13000 FURNITURE FOR REGIONAL 

COMMANDO BASES AT MOSUL, 

BASRAH, AL ASAD & DIYALA $238,780.00 $238,780.00 $0.00

13000 DINING FACILITY EQUIPMENT 

FOR REGIONAL COMMANDO 

BASES AT MOSUL, BASRAH, 

AL ASAD & DIYALA $247,137.00 $247,137.00 $0.00
27 

Project Description Obligation Paid Unliquidated

13000 DINING FACILITY EQUIPMENT 

FOR REGIONAL COMMANDO 

BASES AT MOSUL, BASRAH, 

AL ASAD & DIYALA $254,163.00 $254,163.00 $0.00

13000 RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES - 

LOCAL CARS (X 25) $257,500.00 $257,500.00 $0.00

13000 FURNITURE FOR 

COUNTERTERRORISM BUREAU $277,771.40 $277,771.40 $0.00

13000 ISOF & IRAQI 

COUNTERTERRORISM COMMAND

UNIFORMS $471,261.66 $471,261.66 $0.00

13000 GARRISON SUPPORT UNIT 

MODIFIED TABLE OF 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 

(MEDICAL EQUIPMENT) $523,361.00 $312,328.60 $211,032.40

13000 CLASS 7 (VEHICLES) FOR ISOF 

GARRISON SUPPORT UNIT $566,601.18 $566,601.18 $0.00

13000 BATTALION FLYAWAY KITS - 

GENERATOR & MISCELLANEOUS 

EQUIPMENT $573,140.00 $573,140.00 $0.00

13000 ISOF IRAQI 

COUNTERTERRORISM COMMAND

MODIFIED TABLE OF 

ORGANIZATION & EQUIPMENT $608,852.50 $608,852.50 $0.00

13000 HARRIS RADIOS FOR 1ST 

BRIGADE $668,378.01 $668,028.73 $349.28

13000 ISOF PARACLETE BODY ARMOR $781,940.40 $781,940.40 $0.00

13000 WEAPONS & ACCESSORIES 

MODIFIED TABLE OF 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 

ITEMS $879,120.80 $879,120.80 $0.00

13000 BATTALION FLYAWAY KITS, AIR 

RAPID RESPONSE KIT, PORTION 

OF THE FLYAWAY KITS $882,007.64 $407,442.17 $474,565.47

13000 ISOF WEAPONS-SNIPER RIFLES, 

MACHINE GUNS $906,052.00 $906,052.00 $0.00

13000 M1114 VEHICLE MOD, SWING 

MOUNTS $1,069,489.13 $1,069,489.13 $0.00

13000 RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES - 

USED LOCAL VANS (X 90) $1,080,000.00 $1,080,000.00 $0.00

13000 RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES - 

LOCAL VANS (X 87) $1,161,450.00 $1,161,450.00 $0.00

13000 HIGH MOBILITY MULTI-PURPOSE 

WHEELED VEHICLE M1114/1151 

VEHICLE MODIFICATION 

EXERCISE CONTRACT OPTION 

ON W91GY0-09-C-0013 $1,232,322.00 $1,232,322.00 $0.00
28 

Project Description Obligation Paid Unliquidated

13000 M4A1 CARBINE (X 1,219), 

ADAPTER RAIL SYSTEM (X 1,320), 

TACTICAL LIGHT (X 780) & 

FREIGHT $1,305,211.00 $1,305,211.00 $0.00

13000 ISOF COMMANDO MODIFIED 

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION & 

EQUIPMENT: AN/PEQ2 

INFRARED ILLUMINATORS & 

XM68 AIM POINT SCOPES $1,368,327.00 $1,368,327.00 $0.00

13000 M1114 VEHICLE MODIFICATIONIRAQI NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERROR FORCE, ISOF $1,548,020.86 $1,548,020.86 $0.00

13000 LIVING TRAILERS FOR IRAQI 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

COMMAND OFFICERS $1,824,750.00 $1,824,750.00 $0.00

13000 HARRIS RADIOS $1,854,899.81 $1,854,899.81 $0.00

13000 CLASS 7 VEHICLES FOR ISOF 

GARRISON SUPPORT UNIT $2,224,308.90 $1,178,883.70 $1,045,425.20

13000 RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES - 

UP ARMORED VEHICLES (X 17) $2,356,200.00 $2,356,200.00 $0.00

13000 RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES - 

LOCAL CARS (X 359) $2,522,800.00 $2,522,800.00 $0.00

13000 1,612 SETS OF BODY ARMOR 

AND 2,424 LEVEL IV PLATES FOR 

ISOF & COUNTERTERRORISM 

FORCES $4,849,784.08 $4,849,784.08 $0.00

13000 HARRIS RADIOS FOR 1ST 

BRIGADE $17,588,895.00 $17,588,895.00 $0.00

14000 JORDAN & CONTINENTAL U.S. 

TRIP FOR IRAQI NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM FORCE 

COMMANDERS $14,700.00 $6,888.01 $7,811.99

14000 MPRI TRAINERS FOR 

COUNTERTERRORISM BUREAU $491,218.36 $491,218.36 $0.00

14000 MPRI TRAINERS FOR CTC $567,093.86 $567,093.86 $0.00

14000 MPRI SUPPORT FOR THE IRAQI 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

BUREAU $951,519.78 $951,519.78 $0.00

TOTAL $237,545,073.09 $217,973,602.75 $19,571,470.34

Source: USF-I as of June 2010. 
29 

Appendix C—Acronyms

Acronym Definition 

CTC Counterterrorism Command 

CTS Counterterrorism Service 

GOI Government of Iraq 

ISFF Iraqi Security Forces Fund 

ISOF Iraqi Special Operations Force 

JFSOCC-I Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USF-I U.S. Forces-Iraq 

USSOF U.S. Special Operations Forces 

 
30 

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Randy Gentry 

Wilson D. Haigler 

Nancee Needham 

 
31 

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Deborah Horan 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil