Section 3.11 Safety and Security

California High-Speed Rail Authority November 2017 

Fresno to Bakersfield Section Page | 3.11-1 

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3.11 Safety and Security

This section of the Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative (F-B LGA) Draft 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement (EIR/EIS) analyzes 

potential safety issues related to construction and operation of the F-B LGA, including the 

measures and regulations currently in place or that would be implemented to keep employees, 

passengers, pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists safe from high-speed rail (HSR) related 

activities. This section analyzes potential security issues that could result from criminal acts that 

could affect HSR operation and the ability of emergency responders to respond to incidents.

Where appropriate, information from Section 3.11 of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section California 

High-Speed Train Final Project EIR/EIS (California High-Speed Rail Authority [Authority] and 

Federal Railroad Administration [FRA] 2014) for the May 2014 Project is incorporated by 

reference.

Safety concerns associated with resource areas are described and evaluated elsewhere in this

Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS, as follows:

• Section 3.3, Air Quality and Global Climate Change, covers safety hazards from air

emissions such as air toxics.

• Section 3.9, Geology, Soils, Seismicity, and Paleontological Resources, addresses seismic,

and geotechnical hazards.

• Section 3.10, Hazardous Materials and Waste, addresses safety issues related to hazardous

materials and waste from use or exposure to soil and groundwater contamination.

Conventional passenger rail service is extremely safe when compared with other modes of 

transportation, especially the automobile, the most heavily used and dangerous transportation 

mode. Sophisticated train control, communications, and signaling systems, and protected grade 

crossings, for example, have made conventional passenger rail service in the U.S. a safe way to 

travel. Figure 3.11-1 and Figure 3.11-2 present a fatality comparison among modes.1

0.094

0.534

0.771

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Air Rail Highway

Figure 3.11-1 Fatalities (per 100 million passenger miles) in 2008

1 The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration monitors heavy truck safety in 

terms of fatalities per 100 million miles traveled. In 2008, the heavy truck fatality rate was 0.143 fatality per 100 million

miles traveled. Passenger rail fatalities were skewed in 2008 as a result of a Metrolink commuter rail accident in 

Chatsworth, California. There were zero passenger rail fatalities in 2007 and 2009.
Section 3.11 Safety and Security

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3 24

31,235

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

Air Rail Highway

Source: Federal Railroad Administration 2010a

Figure 3.11-2 Total Passenger Fatalities in 2008

International experience operating HSR Systems has surpassed the passenger rail safety record 

achieved in the U.S. The Japanese (the Shinkansen) and French (Train à Grande Vitesse) HSR 

Systems have maintained a record of no HSR-related passenger fatalities. The German HSR 

(Intercity-Express), which differs from the Japanese, French, and proposed California HSR 

Systems in that it does not use an entirely dedicated track system, has had very few accidents as 

well. The Chinese and Spanish (Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles) HSR lines have 

experienced fatal accidents caused by signaling equipment failure and distraction, respectively. 

Please see the Safety and Security Section of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS for 

more information on HSR operating experience in other countries (Authority and FRA 2014: 

Section 3.11.1, pages 3.11-2 and 3.11-3).

The California HSR System will incorporate a positive train control system to protect against overspeed derailment, as required by the Railway Safety Improvement Act of 2008 through 

regulations enforced by the FRA. The system will enforce speed restrictions, including slower 

speed restrictions for curves. If the engineer does not voluntarily slow the train, the system will 

slow or stop the train as appropriate. This and other project features will increase the safety of the 

HSR System. Maintaining a safe and secure traveling environment is important for passenger 

confidence in using these rail systems.

3.11.1 Regulatory Setting

This section identifies the federal, state, regional, and local regulations, laws, and orders that 

apply to safety and security. Local plans and polices relating to safety and security have been 

considered in the preparation of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS. 

3.11.1.1 Federal

Please see pages 3.11-3 and 3.11-4 in Section 3.11.2 of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final 

EIR/EIS (Authority and FRA 2014) for additional discussion of the following applicable federal

regulations:1

 

• Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-432);

• FRA (Code of Federal Regulations [C.F.R.] Title 49, Volume 4, Chapter 2, Part 200 to 299);

1 On December 6, 2016, FRA published an NPRM proposing to amend its regulations on passenger equipment safety 

standards. See 81 Fed. Reg. 88006. The NPRM addresses three major subject areas: (1) Tier III trainset safety 

standards; (2) alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger 

equipment; and (3) the maximum authorized speed for Tier III passenger equipment. These standards will not become 

effective unless FRA issues a final rule.
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• U.S. Code on Railroad Safety (49 U.S.C 20101 et seq.);

• Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration (49 C.F.R. 1580);

• Transportation Security Administration – Security Directives for Passenger Rail; and the

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (42 U.S.C 116);

• Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (42 U.S.C 116); and,

• National Fire Protection Association Codes and Standards.

3.11.1.2 State

Please see pages 3.11-3 and 3.11-4 in Section 3.11.2 of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final 

EIR/EIS for additional discussion of the following applicable state regulations: 

• California Public Utilities Code (Sections 309, 315, 765, 768, 7710 to 7727, 7661, and 7665

et seq.);

• California Emergency Services Act (Sections 8550 to 8692); and,

• California Public Resources Code (Section 21096).

New state regulations implemented since the certification of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section 

Final EIR/EIS that would apply to both the May 2014 Project and the F-B LGA include:

• California Government Code Section 65302: California Government Code Section 65302

requires cities and counties to include in their general plan a statement of development

policies setting forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals for seven policy

areas, including safety. The safety element is to provide for the protection of the community

from any unreasonable risks associated with seismic and geologic hazards, flooding, and

wildland and urban fires. The element must also address evacuation routes, peak load water

supply requirements, and minimum road widths and clearances around structures, as those

items relate to identified fire and geologic hazards.

• California Public Resources Code Section 21098: California Public Resources Code

Section 21098 specifies notification procedures if a proposed project is located within a “lowlevel flight path” for aircraft that fly lower than 1,500 feet above the ground or a “military

impact zone” within 2 miles of a military installation under the jurisdiction of the U.S.

Department of Defense.

• Gas Monitoring and Control at Active and Closed Disposal Sites (27 Cal. Code Regs.

20917 et seq.): The regulations within Article 6 set forth the performance standards and the

minimum substantive requirements for landfill gas monitoring and control as it relates to

active solid waste disposal sites and to proper closure, post-closure maintenance, and

ultimate reuse of solid waste disposal sites to ensure that public health and safety and the

environment are protected from pollution to the disposal of solid waste (it should be noted

that the F-B LGA is not located near any landfills; therefore, direct impacts associated with

this regulation would not occur).

• California Code of Regulations Title 8 (Cal-OSHA): Developing and enforcing workplace

safety regulations within California is the primary responsibility of the California Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (Cal-OSHA) through Title 8 of the California Code of

Regulations (Cal. Code Regs.). Title 8 regulates the use of hazardous materials in the

workplace and includes requirements for safety training, availability of safety equipment,

accident and illness prevention programs, hazardous substance exposure warnings, and

preparation of emergency action and fire prevention plans.
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3.11.1.3 Regional and Local

Please see pages 3.11-5 and 3.11-6 in Section 3.15.1.3 of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section 

Final EIR/EIS (Authority and FRA 2014) for additional discussion of the following applicable local 

regulations and plans: 

• Kern County General Plan;

• Kern County Emergency Operations Plan;

• Kern County Municipal Code, Chapter 2.66.050: Emergency Organization;

• Kern County Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan;

• Meadows Field Airport Master Plan 2006

• Metropolitan Bakersfield General Plan

• Bakersfield Municipal Code, Chapter 2.40.070: Emergency Organization - Constitution

3.11.2 Methods for Evaluating Impacts

This section considers the exposure of HSR System passengers and employees, structures, or

the general public to significant risk of loss, injury, or death during construction and operation of 

the project. Since this is a supplemental analysis, the methods for evaluating impacts are 

consistent with the methods used in the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS (Authority

and FRA 2014). Because no HSR System currently operates in the U.S., the evaluation of safety

and security impacts is based on: (1) international HSR operating experience, and (2) existing 

conditions compared with the design and operational features of the HSR alternatives. For safety, 

issues addressed include future rail system operations, such as the following: 

• Train travel

• Vehicle, bicycle, and pedestrian access

• Emergency response by fire, law enforcement, and emergency services to fire, seismic

events, or other emergency situations

For security, the analysis evaluates impacts associated with the incidence of crime against 

people and property, including acts of terrorism.

3.11.2.1 Methods for Evaluating Effects under National Environmental Policy 

Act

In the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS, analysts applied specified thresholds for each 

resource topic to assess whether the intensity of each impact is negligible, moderate, or 

substantial for the Build Alternatives, and provided a conclusion of whether the impact was 

“significant”. Since the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS does not evaluate the May 

2014 Project as a discrete subsection of the Fresno to Bakersfield Project (as it did for example 

for the Allensworth Bypass), it does not provide conclusions using intensity thresholds for the May 

2014 Project. Therefore, intensity thresholds are not used for the F-B LGA. Instead, the 

evaluation of impacts under National Environmental Policy Act in this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS 

focuses on a comprehensive discussion of the project’s potential impacts in terms of context, 

intensity, and duration and provides agency decision makers and the public with an apples-toapples comparison between the May 2014 Project and the F-B LGA.

3.11.2.2 CEQA Significance Criteria 

The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires the analysis of impacts to determine 

whether significant impacts would occur as a result of the F-B LGA and the identification of 

specific mitigation for significant impacts. A significant safety and security impact would occur if 

the F-B LGA were to do one or more of the following:

• Conflict with adopted policies, plans, or programs regarding public transit, bicycle, or

pedestrian facilities, or otherwise decrease the safety of such facilities

• Substantially increase hazards due to a design feature (e.g., sharp curves or dangerous

intersections) or incompatible uses
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• Result in a safety hazard for people residing or working in the project vicinity (for a project

located within an area where there is an airport land use plan or, where such a plan has not

been adopted, within 2 miles of a public airport or public use airport and/or within the vicinity

of a private airstrip)

• Result in substantial adverse physical impacts associated with the provision of and need for

new or physically altered governmental facilities, the construction of which could cause

significant environmental impacts in order to maintain acceptable service ratios, response

times, or other performance objectives for any of the public services, including fire protection,

police protection, and emergency services

• Result in inadequate emergency access

• Impair implementation of or physically interfere with an adopted emergency response plan or

emergency evacuation plan

3.11.2.3 Study Area

For the evaluation of direct safety and security effects, the F-B LGA study area includes the HSR

right-of-way, areas adjacent to the construction footprint, and the area within a 0.5-mile radius of 

the proposed F-B LGA centerline. The indirect effects study area is made up of parcels in the 

cities of Shafter and Bakersfield, as well as parcels in Kern County between these cities. Since 

certain service providers’ service boundaries fall within the direct impacts study area, indirect 

effects from the proposed F-B LGA could influence an area larger than the direct impacts study 

area.

The safety and security evaluation also includes certain services (e.g., fire departments, police 

departments, hospitals) that are not located within the study area but have service boundaries 

within the study area, as well as airports and high-risk facilities (such as refineries and chemical 

plants) within 2 miles of the F-B LGA centerline. 

3.11.3 Affected Environment

3.11.3.1 Summary of the May 2014 Project Affected Environment

This section provides a summary of those effects of the May 2014 Project using information from 

the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS. The May 2014 Project is the comparable portion 

of the Preferred Alternative used to compare impacts to the F-B LGA. The May 2014 Project 

direct safety and security impact study area includes the May 2014 Project right-of-way, areas 

adjacent to the construction footprint, and the area within a 0.5-mile radius of the Truxtun Avenue 

Station. The indirect safety and security impact study area for the May 2014 Project includes the 

cities of Shafter and Bakersfield and County of Kern. The safety and security evaluation for the 

May 2014 Project also includes certain services (e.g., fire departments, police departments, and 

hospitals) that are not located within the study area but have service boundaries or would provide 

service within the study area, as well as airports and high-risk facilities within 2 miles of the May 

2014 Project study area. 

Safety and Security issues associated with the May 2014 Project that were analyzed in the study 

area include locations and levels of service for fire departments, law enforcement, hospitals, 

airports and heliports, schools, and locations of high-risk facilities and fall hazards. Vehicular, rail 

and airports, and pedestrian and bicycle safety were also analyzed for the May 2014 Project. Two 

fire departments serve the region where the May 2014 Project is located and three police 

departments provide law enforcement in the same area. Seven hospitals provide emergency 

medical services to the May 2014 Project study area. No airports are located within 2 miles of the 

May 2014 Project; however, there are three heliports located a hospitals within 2 miles of the May 

2014 Project. There are a total of 22 schools within 0.25 mile of the May 2014 Project; four highrisk facilities within the May 2014 Project study area and three tall structures that pose a fall 

hazard along the May 2014 Project. Finally, there are thirty-six at grade crossings within the May 

2014 Project study area where 22 accidents have occurred at these crossings since January 

2004, resulting in 3 fatalities and 21 injuries. 
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3.11.3.2 Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

This section discusses the affected environment related to safety and security in the study area of 

the F-B LGA. Other than the general plans and related safety documents referenced in Section 

3.11.2, no additional regional plans or policies pertaining to safety and security are applicable 

within the F-B LGA study area.

Emergency Services

Fire

Table 3.11-1 summarizes the fire departments and types of equipment operated within the F-B 

LGA vicinity. Fire stations in the vicinity of the F-B LGA are shown on Figure 3.11-3. The City of 

Shafter contracts fire protection through the Kern County Fire Department. The Bakersfield Fire 

Department consists of paid employees, while the Kern County Fire Department consists of both 

paid employees and volunteers. The Bakersfield Fire Department is certified as a Type 1 Heavy 

Rescue and Regional Response Force. The fire department has specialized rescue equipment 

and contracts access to additional equipment, such as industrial cranes, as needed. The city fire 

departments have mutual-aid agreements with Kern County fire protection services (and in some 

cases with one another) to provide concurrent, cooperative response and assistance during 

emergencies. 

Table 3.11-1 Fire Departments and Equipment in the F-B LGA Study Area

Fire Department Service Area Equipment

Kern County Fire

Department

Unincorporated Kern County and the cities of 

Arvin, Delano, Maricopa, McFarland, Ridgecrest, 

Shafter, Taft, Tehachapi, and Wasco

3 ladder trucks

51 engines

Hazmat truck

3 crash rescue vehicles

Air van

Bakersfield Fire

Department

City of Bakersfield 3 ladder trucks (100 feet tall)

13 engines

4 Type II engines for vegetation fires

Light/air truck

Hazmat truck

USAR truck

Technical rescue trailer

Emergency medical service trailer

Decontamination trailer 

Sources: Hall, 2010; Maletta 2010

F-B LGA = Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

USAR = urban search and rescue

Response times for fire departments vary in the study area. The Kern County Fire Department’s 

goal is to respond to calls in Shafter within seven minutes and in the rural areas of Kern County in 

15 minutes (Hartley 2016). The Bakersfield Fire Department is a multidimensional public safety

organization and includes an “all-risk” approach in its emergency service delivery system. The fire 

department’s response standard is to arrive at the scene of an emergency within seven minutes 

90 percent of the time with the first fire unit. This response standard takes into consideration 

alarm processing time, turnout time, and apparatus travel time, as indicated within the National 

Fire Protection Association 1710 standard (Bakersfield Fire Department 2016). 
Section 3.11 Safety and Security

California High-Speed Rail Environmental Document 

Figure 3.11-3 Shafter Area: Safety and Security Existing Conditions

(Sheet 1 of 2)

November 2017 

Fresno to Bakersfield Section Page | 3.11-7 

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Section 3.11 Safety and Security

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Figure 3.11-3 Bakersfield Area: Safety and Security Existing Conditions

(Sheet 2 of 2)
Section 3.11 Safety and Security

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Fresno to Bakersfield Section Page | 3.11-9 

Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS

At-grade railroad crossings hinder emergency response times when trains block the road 

crossings. In such instances, emergency response teams must use out-of-direction routes in 

order to bypass the train and reach emergencies on the other side of the tracks. This situation is 

problematic particularly in rural areas where crossings are farther apart. The F-B LGA would not 

have at-grade crossings. Additionally, the F-B LGA alignment would have emergency access 

points every 2.5 miles along the right-of-way to facilitate emergency response access to the F-B 

LGA. Emergency access points located every 2.5 miles along the right-of-way would be 

consistent with the design described and evaluated in the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final 

EIR/EIS. 

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has prepared the Strategic 

Fire Plan for California, the state’s “road map” for reducing the risk of wildfire (CAL FIRE [1996] 

2010). The plan identifies and assesses community assets at risk of wildfire damage. CAL FIRE 

has generated a list of California communities at risk for wildfire and created Fire Hazard Severity 

Zones (CAL FIRE 2007). The study area is not in any of the Fire Hazard Severity Zones, is not 

considered to pose a significant risk for wildland fires.

Law Enforcement 

Law enforcement services in the area of the F-B LGA study area is provided by the Kern County 

Sheriff’s Department in unincorporated county areas, the Shafter Police Department in the City of 

Shafter, and the Bakersfield Police Department in the City of Bakersfield. The California Highway 

Patrol provides traffic enforcement on major roads, state highways, and freeways within the area 

of the F-B LGA study area. 

Crime rates in Bakersfield, where the F-B LGA F Street Station would be located, were compared 

to crime rates in the state. The violent crime rate in Bakersfield (5.4 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants) 

is slightly lower than the state average (5.7 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants). Property crime in 

Bakersfield (50 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants) is higher than the state average (29 crimes per 

1,000 inhabitants) (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2012a).

Analysis of crime on board passenger trains used statistics gathered from the Los Angeles 

County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LA Metro) and San Francisco Bay Area Rapid 

Transit. The reported crimes include those committed on board trains and at transit facilities such 

as stations and parking lots. Compared to crime rates in the general population, crime rates on 

light rail systems in California are extremely low. Less than 1 crime occurs for every 1,000 riders 

on LA Metro. For every 1,000 riders on Bay Area Rapid Transit lines, less than one violent crime 

and one property crime is committed (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2012b).

Emergency Medical Services

Emergency medical services are provided by the local fire departments, emergency medical 

service agencies, and independent ambulance services. Seven hospitals provide emergency 

medical services to the F-B LGA study area: 

• Bakersfield Memorial Hospital

• Bakersfield Heart Hospital

• Healthsouth Bakersfield Rehabilitation Hospital

• Kern Medical Center

• Mercy Hospital

• Mercy Southwest Hospital

• San Joaquin Community Hospital

Two air ambulance services operate in the F-B LGA study area: 

• San Joaquin Community Hospital

• Kern Medical Center
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Emergency Response Plans

In addition to emergency operations requirements set forth in the county and city general plans, 

Kern County and the cities of Shafter and Bakersfield operate under the guidance of emergency 

operations plans. These plans outline procedures for operations during emergencies such as 

earthquakes, floods, fires, and other natural disasters; hazardous materials spills; transportation

emergencies; civil disturbance; and terrorism. The plans also identify the location of critical 

emergency response facilities, such as emergency dispatch and operations centers, government 

structures, and hospitals or other major medical facilities. Figure 3.11-3 of this Draft Supplemental 

EIR/EIS and Appendix 3.11-A, Safety and Security Data, of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section 

Final EIR/EIS (Authority and FRA 2014) identify these facilities. Vital facilities that provide water, 

electricity, and gas are discussed in Section 3.6, Public Utilities and Energy, of this Draft 

Supplemental EIR/EIS. No federal or state buildings or emergency centers are located in the F-B 

LGA study area.

Regionally significant roads (illustrated on Figure 3.2-5 in Section 3.2, Transportation, of the 

Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS) are typically identified as emergency evacuation 

routes in county and city general plans and emergency response plans (Authority and FRA 2014). 

Under existing conditions, regionally significant roads cross the BNSF Railway (BNSF) tracks at

grade in the area where the F-B LGA would be located. These roads include Fresno Avenue, 

Shafter Avenue, Central Avenue, and E Lerdo Highway in the City of Shafter and Olive Drive in 

the City of Bakersfield. Implementation of the F-B LGA would eliminate the existing at-grade 

crossings in Shafter. BNSF and HSR bridges would be constructed at the road locations identified 

above and in-between the underpasses. The BNSF and HSR alignments would be built on 

retained fill.

Community Safety

Vehicular Safety

The automobile is the most heavily used and hazardous transportation mode. In 2012, the 

California Highway Patrol reported approximately 3,000 fatalities and approximately 226,000 

nonfatal injuries on California’s highways (California Highway Patrol 2012). The following factors 

influence automobile and highway safety: 

• Operator age, experience, ability, and other factors

• Vehicle reliability, maintenance, and crashworthiness

• Environmental considerations, including roadway conditions, weather, and lighting conditions

(e.g., wind, rain, fog, darkness, and sun glare)

• Driver distractions and interferences

Vehicular safety issues associated with the two railroads in the F-B LGA study area (BNSF and 

Union Pacific Railroad [UPRR]) are centered on the conflict between motor vehicles and trains at 

at-grade crossings. In 2009, California ranked second for most highway/rail grade crossing 

collisions in the U.S. and first for highway/rail grade crossing fatalities (Operation Lifesaver, Inc. 

2009). In 2009, a total of five highway/rail crossing collisions occurred in Kern County, with two of 

these collisions resulting in fatalities (FRA 2010). The City of Shafter has eight at-grade crossings 

that are within the study area of the F-B LGA. FRA records indicate that historically, for these 

eight at-grade crossings, there have been 29 at-grade roadway crossing accidents, resulting in 10 

injuries and 10 fatalities (the remainder of the 29 at-grade roadway crossing accidents did not 

record injuries or fatalities) (FRA 2016).

Additional details regarding existing vehicular traffic conditions, including congestion and accident

patterns, within the study area for the F-B LGA are included in Section 3.2, Transportation, and in 

the Fresno to Bakersfield Section: Supplemental EIR/EIS – Transportation Analysis Technical 

Report (Authority and FRA 2017). 
Section 3.11 Safety and Security 

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Rail and Airports

Under existing conditions, except for a few grade separations in Bakersfield, all road crossings of 

the BNSF and UPRR within the F-B LGA study area are at grade. Nine at-grade crossings of the 

BNSF tracks and eight at-grade crossings of the UPRR tracks are located in the F-B LGA study 

area. The State Route (SR) 43 and SR 99, BNSF, and UPRR rights-of-way are not fenced in this 

region, and no barriers are located between the highway and the railway. In many places, the 

BNSF and UPRR tracks are on embankments up to approximately eight feet above SR 43 and 

SR 99, respectively. Stormwater drainage ditches also provide a topographic separation between 

rail operations and vehicular traffic.

A train accident is defined as any collision, derailment, fire, explosion, act of God, or other event 

involving operation of railroad on-track equipment (standing or moving) that results in damages 

greater than the current reporting threshold to railroad on-track equipment, signals, track, track 

structures, and roadbed. A train incident is defined as any event involving the movement of ontrack equipment that results in a reportable casualty but does not cause reportable damage 

above the current threshold established for train accidents (49 C.F.R. Part 225.5). According to 

FRA accident/incident reports, 108 train accidents/incidents occurred in the Kern County portion 

of the study area between January 2004 and December 2009, resulting in 5 fatalities and 22 

injuries. According to records, 89 train accidents/incidents at highway/rail grade crossings 

occurred in the study area between January 2004 and December 2009, resulting in 12 fatalities 

and 11 injuries (FRA 2010b). 

Appendix 3.11-A, Safety and Security Data, of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS

(Authority and FRA 2014) provides detailed information related to these train accidents/incidents

including those that occur at highway/rail grade crossings. 

One public-service airport and three heliports are located within 2 miles of the F-B LGA (Table 

3.11-2; Figure 3.11-3). No private-service airports are located within 2 miles of the F-B LGA. 

Meadows Field Airport does not contain an international terminal. Airport master plans and land 

use compatibility plans from the Kern County Airport Land Use Commission regulate land use 

within airport safety zones to minimize airport hazards and risk of accidents. The F-B LGA is 

within Zone C (referred to as Common Traffic Pattern per the Kern County Airport Land Use 

Compatibility Plan) of the Meadows Field Airport Land Use Plan (Kern County, 2011). 

Table 3.11-2 Airports, Airstrips, and Heliports within 2 Miles of the F-B LGA Centerline

Facility Distance from Centerline (miles)1

San Joaquin Community Hospital Heliport 0.3

Kern Medical Center Heliport 0.8

Memorial Hospital Heliport 0.5

Meadows Field Airport 0.5

Source: United States Geologic Survey, 2012 1 Distance is given in approximate miles from the centerline of the F-B LGA. 

F-B LGA = Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety

Between January 2004 and December 2009, one pedestrian/train accident occurred within the 

F-B LGA study area on the UPRR tracks (FRA accident report number 0608RS008, occurring on 

June 14, 2008). Between January 2004 and December 2009, there were no bicycle/train 

accidents on the UPRR or BNSF tracks within the F-B LGA study area. Appendix 3.11-A, Safety 

and Security Data, of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS (Authority and FRA 2014)

provides information on the at-grade crossing accidents. 
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Schools

Figures 3.10-1, Sheets 1 to 14, in Section 3.10, Hazardous Materials and Wastes, of this Draft 

Supplemental EIR/EIS show the locations of educational facilities within 0.25 mile of the F-B LGA 

construction footprint. Table 3.11-3 lists schools within 0.25 mile (1,320 feet) of the F-B LGA

construction footprint. As shown, 16 education facilities (defined as colleges, high schools, 

elementary schools, preschools, or nursery schools) are within 0.25 mile of the construction 

footprint for the proposed F-B LGA. Two of these educational facilities are located in the 

construction footprint.

Table 3.11-3 Educational Facilities within 0.25 Mile of the F-B LGA Construction Footprint 

Facility Distance from 

Footprint 

(miles)

Direction from Centerline County Status

Free Will Christian Academy 0.00 Within construction footprint, 

northeast of F-B LGA

Kern Active

Richland Junior High/Redwood 

Elementary School

0.04 Southwest of F-B LGA Kern Active 

Shafter Kiddie Kollege 0.07 Northeast of F-B LGA Kern Active 

Beardsley Junior High 0.03 East-northeast of F-B LGA Kern Active

Valley Oaks Charter School 0.00 Within construction footprint, 

northeast of F-B LGA 

Kern Active

Stella I. Hills Elementary School 0.14 Northeast of F-B LGA Kern Active

Longfellow Elementary School 0.07 Northeast of F-B LGA Kern Active

Bakersfield Adult School (F Street 

Campus)

0.04 South of F-B LGA Kern Active

Kelly F. Blanton Education Center 0.20 South-southwest of F-B LGA Kern Active 

Williams Elementary

School/Williams Head Start 

Preschool

0.22 North-northeast of F-B LGA Kern Active

Bakersfield Play Center 0.11 North-northeast of F-B LGA Kern Active 

Ramon Garza Elementary School 0.08 North of F-B LGA Kern Active

Sierra Middle School 0.12 North of F-B LGA Kern Active

Legacy Christian Academy 0.12 West of F-B LGA Kern Active 

Bethel Christian School 0.06 South of F-B LGA Kern Active 

Bright Futures Preschool 0.11 North of F-B LGA Kern Active 

Source: California Department of Education, 2016

F-B LGA = Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

High-Risk Facilities and Fall Hazards

High-risk facilities and fall hazards (such as industrial facilities with tall structures like silos and 

distillation columns) could pose threats to the operation of the F-B LGA in the event of a disaster 

at those facilities. High-risk facilities in and near the construction footprint are discussed in 

Section 3.6, Public Utilities and Energy, and Section 3.10, Hazardous Materials and Wastes, of 

this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS. Fire and rescue agencies follow their own standard emergency

response protocols for industrial sites when responding to emergencies at high-risk facilities (Hall 

2010, Maletta 2010).The following high-risk facilities (all in Bakersfield) pose fire, explosion, and 

hazardous materials incidents threats along the F-B LGA alignment: 
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• Halliburton Facility

• Rain-for-Rent Facility

• Golden Empire Gleaners Parcel

The stature of industrial facilities may pose a safety hazard because of the proximity of large 

industrial process machinery and/or tank storage, including silos, distillation columns, and 

multistory buildings (all considered tall structures) that are several hundred feet in height. Tall 

structures pose a safety hazard because of their potential to topple onto HSR facilities due to 

accidents, severe weather, or terrorist acts. Such tall structures along the F-B LGA (from north to 

south) include the following (Figure 3.11-4): 

• Lattice antenna tower located on Shafter Avenue, Shafter, California (Assessor’s Parcel

Number [APN] 02601029).

• Monopole antennae attached to a structure located at 812 Walker Street, Shafter, California

(APN 02735004).

• Monopole antenna tower located at 34718 7th Standard Road, Bakersfield, California (APN

48205030).

• Industrial silo/grain elevator located at 34716 7th Standard Road, Bakersfield, California

(APN 48207024).

• Utility line tower located southwest of the Coffee Road/7th Standard Road intersection in the

City of Bakersfield, California (APN 49203040).

• Freestanding monopole occupied by antennae located at 7812 Fruitvale Avenue, Bakersfield,

California (APN 49202033).

• Water tower located at 5600 Norris Road, Bakersfield, California (APN: 36301144)

• Decorative (nonfunctional) Oil Derrick Tower located at 3404 State Road, Bakersfield,

California (APN 11607015).

• Water tank located at 811 Nadine Lane, Bakersfield, California (APN 11512009).

• Decorative tower at the Tower Motel located at 3215 Chester Avenue, Bakersfield, California

(APN 00230001).

• Lattice antenna tower located on the southwest corner of the King Street/Sumner Street

intersection in Bakersfield, California (APN 01607010).

• Monopole cell phone tower located at 1347 Ogden Street, Bakersfield, California

(APN 13832007).

• Lattice antenna tower located at 2128 Mount Vernon Avenue, Bakersfield, California (APN

13838108).
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Figure 3.11-4 Location of Tall Structures and High Risk Facilities along the May 2014 Project and F-B LGA Alignments

(Sheet 1 of 2)
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Figure 3.11-4 Location of Tall Structures and High Risk Facilities along the May 2014 Project and F-B LGA Alignments 

(Sheet 2 of 2)
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3.11.4 Environmental Consequences

This section summarizes the potential environmental consequences and impacts resulting from 

the May 2014 Project, then describes the environmental consequences and impacts related to 

safety and security associated with construction and operation of the F-B LGA. Project features, 

plans, and protocols developed as part of the HSR project and implemented for the F-B LGA

would avoid or minimize most adverse safety and security effects. Proposed mitigation measures 

to address the remaining adverse/significant impacts are discussed in Section 3.11.5, Mitigation 

Measures and Avoidance, and Minimization Measures. 

3.11.4.1 Summary of Analysis for the May 2014 Project

This section provides a summary of those effects of the May 2014 Project using information from 

the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS.

Overall, the May 2014 Project could increase demand for local emergency responders around the 

Truxtun Avenue Station as well as in the study area. Construction of the May 2014 Project would 

only contribute a temporary increase in emergency response times, and as part of the Project 

design the Authority would develop a construction transportation plan with local jurisdictions to 

minimize project effects on emergency response times. Avoidance and minimization measures, 

mitigation measures, plans, and protocols developed in the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final 

EIR/EIS would be implemented as part of the May 2014 Project to avoid or minimize most 

significant safety and security impacts. A direct comparison of safety and security issues between 

the May 2014 Project and the F-B LGA are further summarized in Table 8-A-29 Safety and 

Security Impact Comparison between the F-B LGA and May 2014 Project in Technical Appendix 

8-A Comparison of Alternatives of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS. Analysis was also conducted 

for the Safety and Security thresholds and similar to the F-B LGA impacts were determined to not 

to be significant or were determined to be less than significant. 

3.11.4.2 Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

A complete definition of the F-B LGA is provided in Chapter 2 of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS. 

Construction Period Impacts

Construction of the F-B LGA could result in accidents at construction sites and in temporary 

increases in risks to motor vehicles, pedestrians, and bicycle safety from traffic detours, as well 

as increased response times for law enforcement, fire, and emergency services personnel. For 

the impacts identified in the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS (Authority and FRA 

2014), only additional information pertaining to the F-B LGA is included in the following impact 

discussions. 

Impact S&S #1 – Accidents and Accidental Releases at Construction Sites

The safety of construction workers and the public could be compromised during construction of 

the F-B LGA, potentially resulting in accidental injuries and deaths. Work site safety in California, 

including construction work site safety, is regulated by provisions of Cal. Code Regs. Title 8 and 

is overseen by Cal-OSHA. Title 8 requires compliance with standard procedures to prevent 

construction work site accidents and requires a written workplace Injury and Illness Prevention 

Program to be in place (Authority and FRA 2014, page 3.11-26). 

The Authority will require its design-build contractor to develop a Site-Specific Health and Safety 

Plan that identifies the local conditions and requirements peculiar to the site, work to be 

performed, and is in compliance with the above regulations. As an example of conditions that 

might be included in a Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, the Authority has approved a SiteSpecific Health and Safety Plans for Construction Package 1 (Tutor Perini, Zachry, Parsons 

March 2013) which covers construction activities in and around Fresno. That Site-Specific Health 

and Safety Plan identified safety goals, policies, procedures, and standards for preventing 

accidents and injury including:
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• Site safety orientations for all personnel assigned to the project prior to start of work

• Drug and alcohol testing for all personnel permanently assigned to the project

• Safety meetings, including daily crew meetings, tool box safety meetings, and weekly

supervisor meetings

• A meeting to review safety appraisal findings and status, project incident reviews and data,

and monthly “all hands” meetings

• Site safety appraisals, which include both scheduled and unscheduled appraisals conducted

daily and weekly, with findings and corrective actions

• Incident and accident investigation, reporting and record keeping

• An Emergency Response Action Plan

• Safety education and training

• The use of job hazard analysis and risk assessments

The implementation of these Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan goals, policies, procedures, 

and standards during F-B LGA construction in compliance with legal requirements would reduce 

risks to human health during construction by establishing protocols for safety awareness 

meetings and training to establish a safety culture among the construction workforce. Therefore, 

the frequency of construction site accidents is expected to be low and impacts would be less than 

significant under CEQA for the F-B LGA. 

As discussed in Section 3.9 of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS (Authority and 

FRA 2014), the alternatives for the Fresno to Bakersfield Section would pass close to numerous 

active and abandoned oil and gas fields. The F-B LGA crosses the North Shafter Oil Field for 

approximately 1.11 miles, the Rosedale Ranch Oil Field for approximately 0.63 mile, the Kern 

Front Oil Field for approximately 0.74 mile, and the Fruitvale Oil Field for approximately 1.88 

miles. Section 3.9, Geology, Soils, Seismicity, and Paleontological Resources, of this Draft 

Supplemental EIR/EIS describes a total of nine oil and gas wells that are within the F-B LGA 

study area or 150 feet of the study area. Any abandoned oil or gas wells would be assessed and 

plugged by the Authority in coordination with the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources 

(DOGGR), and any active wells or wells encountered during construction would be abandoned 

and plugged in accordance with DOGGR standards. As described in the Fresno to Bakersfield 

Section Final EIR/EIS (Authority and FRA 2014: page 3.9-33), unless existing oil and gas wells as 

well as ancillary and appurtenant facilities necessary to maintain oil field operations are identified 

and remediated within the project study area, they could be disrupted and have environmental 

consequences during construction. Contractors would use safe and explosion-proof equipment 

during project construction in areas where explosion hazards exist, and would test for gases 

regularly. Therefore, the risk of accidents associated with project construction encountering any

plugged and abandoned or unrecorded oil or gas well would be less than significant under CEQA. 

Construction activities have the potential to generate exposure to the fungus Coccidioides spores 

that cause Valley Fever via inhalation of fugitive dust and soil. Valley Fever tends to infect people 

with jobs requiring digging in soil that contains the fungus. The fungus enters a person’s lungs 

causing cold and flu-like symptoms and occasionally rashes. The Authority reviewed the potential 

of this occurring in the San Joaquin Valley, specifically in the area where HSR construction would 

occur. In response to comments concerning the risk of increased exposure to Coccidiosis spores 

that cause Valley Fever, the FRA and the Authority, in coordination with the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency and the California Department of Public Health, revised the avoidance and 

minimization measures in the Mitigation Monitoring and Enforcement Plan to incorporate additional 

best practices to minimize exposure to those at risk from construction activities disturbing these 

naturally occurring Coccidioides spores (Section 3.11.5 S&S-AMF #4b and S&S-AMF #4c).

Because the Authority would implement these avoidance and minimization measures related to 

reducing the potential exposure of construction workers to Valley Fever during construction of the 

F-B LGA, the resulting impacts would be less than significant under CEQA for the F-B LGA. 
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As discussed in Section 3.10, Hazardous Materials and Waste, of this Draft Supplemental 

EIR/EIS, there is one closed waste disposal facility (West Oildale Burn Dump) located within the 

construction footprint for the F-B LGA, and three closed waste disposal facilities (Ceres West 

Compost Operation; McCoy’s Tire; Kern County Transit Co., Inc.) located adjacent to the study 

area. There is one active waste disposal site located within 0.25 mile of the project (Valley Tree & 

Construction Disposal) which is in the unincorporated community of Saco approximately seven 

miles northwest of Bakersfield. No active landfills are located within 1,000 feet of the F-B LGA 

study area or construction footprint. Therefore, there is a low potential for landfill gas release and 

the existing regulatory framework minimizes explosion risk. Therefore, the risk of project 

construction activities igniting methane releases from nearby landfills would be a less than 

significant impact under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #2 – Accidents Associated with Construction-Related Detours 

Table 3.11-4 summarizes the number of roads that would be temporarily closed during 

construction of the F-B LGA. A few roads within the F-B LGA study area would be closed where 

they cross the HSR alignment, but most public roads crossing the HSR alignment would be 

grade-separated typically with a road overcrossing or undercrossing. The road crossings would 

be built at the same locations as the existing roads, which would have to be closed, and traffic 

would have to be detoured onto other roads during construction of the road crossings. These 

closures would typically last two to three months; in a worst-case scenario, the road could be 

closed for 15 months. At these sites, lane closures and detours could potentially create a 

distraction to automobile drivers, pedestrians, and cyclists. Distraction and unfamiliarity with 

detours could lead to accidents. In addition, the road closures, detours, and localized automobile 

congestion could temporarily increase the response time for law enforcement, fire, and 

emergency services personnel and school buses. Emergency evacuation times could also 

temporarily increase. 

Table 3.11-4 Temporary Road Closures for the F-B LGA

Road Name Location 

7th Standard – Lane Closures Only Shafter

Coffee Road – Realigned Shafter

Verdugo Road Shafter

Zerker Road Shafter

Zachary Road Shafter

Driver Road Shafter

Cherry Avenue Shafter

Riverside Street Shafter

Beech Avenue Shafter

Los Angeles Avenue Shafter

Walker Street – Temporary Lane Closures Shafter

Mannel Avenue – Temporary Lane Closures Shafter

E Lerdo Highway – Temporary Lane Closures Shafter

W Tulare Avenue – Temporary Lane/Shoulder Closure Shafter

Shafter Avenue – Temporary Lane/Shoulder Closure Shafter

Fresno Avenue – Temporary Lane Closures Shafter 

Poplar Avenue Shafter

Sumner Street Bakersfield
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Road Name Location 

Edison Highway – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield

Webster Street Bakersfield

Exchange Street Bakersfield

Mt. Vernon Avenue – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield

Chamberlain Avenue Bakersfield

Ogden Street Bakersfield 

Washington Street Bakersfield

Beale Avenue – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield

Union Avenue – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield 

SR 178 – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield 

F Street Bakersfield

Airport Drive On-/Off-Ramps Bakersfield

State Road Bakersfield

Chester Bakersfield

Baker Street Bakersfield

34th Street Bakersfield 

K Street Bakersfield

204 – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield

Olive Drive – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield

SR 99 – Lane Closures Only Bakersfield

Knudsen Drive Bakersfield

Total Number of Temporary Road Closures for F-B LGA 39

Source: Authority and FRA, 2016 

F-B LGA = Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

SR = State Route 

Such impacts would be minimized through a detailed construction transportation plan and a traffic 

control plan (described further in Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority and FRA 

2014], Section 3.2, Transportation, page 3.2-122) that would require coordination with local 

jurisdictions on emergency vehicle access and would reduce the likelihood of construction-related 

traffic accidents. 

The plan would also include a traffic control plan that establishes procedures for temporary road 

closures, including: access to residences and businesses during construction, lane closure, 

signage and flag persons, temporary detour provisions, alternative bus and delivery routes, 

emergency vehicle access, pedestrian access, and alternative access locations. Construction of 

road crossings would be staggered so that the next adjacent road to the north and south of a road 

temporarily closed for construction would remain open to accommodate detoured traffic. This 

would typically result in 1 to 2 miles of out-of-direction travel during temporary road closures. 

Because the F-B LGA would implement a construction transportation plan (see Section 3.11.5 

S&S-AMF #1) and associated traffic control plan thus reducing construction related traffic in the 

Project area, resulting impacts would be less than significant under CEQA for the F-B LGA

Impact S&S #3 – Crime at Construction Sites

Criminal activity around the F-B LGA construction sites would be typical of the types of crimes 

that occur at other heavy construction sites, such as theft of equipment and materials, or 
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vandalism after work hours. The Authority would institute security measures common to 

construction sites, including, but not limited to: securing equipment and materials in fenced and 

locked storage areas; using security personnel after work hours; and, installing security lighting 

that would be focused on the site, minimizing light spillage onto neighboring properties. For 

example, the Authority approved a Safety and Security Management Plan submitted by the 

Design-Build contractors completing civil construction work north of the F-B LGA study area. Both 

plans include the development of a Site-Specific Security Plans with measures specific to each 

construction site. Similar measures would be implemented during F-B LGA construction as part of 

a standard term included in the construction contract. Therefore, resulting impacts from 

implementation during F-B LGA construction would be less than significant under CEQA because 

crime at construction sites would be minimized. 

Project Operational Impacts

Although there would be many benefits, such as fully grade-separated rail tracks and updated 

safety, signaling, and automatic train control systems, as well as conflict prevention with other 

vehicles, pedestrians, and bicyclists, HSR operation could result in inadvertent impacts on public, 

passenger, and employee health and safety, such as increased response time by law 

enforcement, fire, and emergency services personnel. The HSR Systems Operation Control 

Center (OCC) would operate and maintain a comprehensive communication system, allowing for 

wireless communication between the OCC, trains, and system staff during emergency situations, 

as well as routine operations.

Impact S&S #4 – Train Accidents

The types of accidents that could be associated with an HSR System can be broken down into 

train-to-train collisions; collisions between an HSR and objects entering the HSR corridor, such as 

vehicles from adjacent highways or trains from adjacent freight lines; and HSR derailments. 

These types of accidents are described in the following discussions. 

Current practice in the U.S. to ensure safety of passengers in the event of a conventional train-totrain collision is to provide locomotives with sufficient weight and strength to protect the trailing 

passenger cars. This enables the lead vehicles, or locomotives, to withstand the impact of a 

collision, thereby strengthening the crashworthiness of the train to protect its occupants (Fresno 

to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority and FRA 2014], Section 3.11, Safety and Security, 

page 3.11-29). The HSR System takes a different approach known as collision avoidance. During 

collision avoidance, the HSR System takes advantage of a system-design approach in which the 

HSR, the automatic train control system, the electrification system, and the rail infrastructure 

include automation that will control or stop the trains without relying on human involvement. The 

general approach for the automatic train control system is to monitor the location and speed of all 

trains on the high-speed network and to coordinate and maintain enough physical separation to 

allow safe braking. If a fault occurs within the HSR network (i.e., intrusion, derailment, significant 

natural event such as earthquake), the automatic train control system will immediately slow or 

stop the train and minimize or eliminate a potential hazard. As a result of implementing features

such as automatic speed reduction supporting a collision-avoidance strategy the likelihood or 

probability of a train-to-train collision is reduced. Such a reduction would result in impacts that are 

less than significant under CEQA. 

Safety considerations are also included in the design of the HSR alignments with regard to 

proximity of the HSR line to other transportation facilities, including other railroads or highways 

(Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority and FRA 2014], Section 3.11, Safety and 

Security, page 3.11-30). The primary safety concern is that a derailed train or errant vehicle

would enter the HSR corridor and foul the line. Because a portion of the F-B LGA of the HSR 

System would operate adjacent to either the BNSF or UPRR, there is a risk of a conventional 

passenger or freight train derailing, entering the HSR trackway, and obstructing or impacting an 

HSR.
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Risk can be reduced if there is sufficient horizontal or vehicle separation between these facilities, 

and/or by use of a physical barrier to separate the facilities. Separation requirements, described 

in Technical Memorandum 2.1.7: Rolling Stock and Vehicle Intrusion Protection for High-Speed 

Rail and Adjacent Transportation Systems (Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority 

and FRA 2014], Section 3.11, Safety and Security, page 3.11-30), were developed specifically for 

the California HSR System. A horizontal separation of approximately 102 feet between the 

centerlines of adjacent conventional and HSR trackways has been determined to be a distance 

sufficient to require no additional protection (Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS, Safety 

and Security, page 3.11-30). This minimum separation distance includes the distance of the 

maximum practicable excursion of the longest U.S. freight railcar from the center of track, plus an 

allowance for overhead catenary system masts. A car body length of 89 feet for the freight railcar 

displacement, plus an allowance of 12.5 feet to include an overhead catenary system mast 

foundation, results in a minimum separation distance, without an intrusion protection barrier, of 

101.5 feet, rounded up to 102 feet. The guidance for intrusion protection generally follows the 

recommended practices described in the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-ofWay Association Manual and the design standards developed specifically for the construction and 

operation of HSRs, based on international practices.

If a railroad line is less than 102 feet from an HSR track and both are at ground level, additional 

protection is required. The need and type of protection is subject to the distance between tracks 

and the risk of a derailment. Earth berms can be used as intrusion protection for tracks with 

centerline separation of 45 to 102 feet (Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority and 

FRA 2014], Section 3.11, Safety and Security, page 3.11-30). A minimum of 29 feet of separation 

is required between the centerlines of the HSR and adjacent railroad tracks, and this separation 

requires a physical intrusion barrier. When intrusion protection is needed, the minimum total 

height must be 10 feet with either a ditch plus berm, concrete wall plus screen, or only a concrete 

wall. When an HSR track is adjacent to a highway or roadway, a barrier is typically required 

where the roadway is less than 30 to 40 feet from the HSR access control fence. Depending on 

the highway facility, the barrier can range from a standard concrete barrier to a taller barrier that 

protects against errant commercial trucks and trailers. Where the separation is greater than 30 to 

40 feet, barriers may be considered, subject to a risk assessment.

The BNSF track parallels the F-B LGA from just northwest of the Poplar Avenue/SR 43 

intersection to just southeast of the E Los Angeles Street/SR 43 intersection. From this point, the 

F-B LGA begins to turn northeast and no longer parallels the BNSF track. The BNSF track, along 

this length of F-B LGA, at its closest approach is approximately 132 feet from the centerline of the 

F-B LGA track. Therefore, additional intrusion protection would not be required with 

implementation of the F-B LGA. 

In Bakersfield, the F-B LGA would be located on a viaduct along Sumner Street and Edison 

Highway. The F-B LGA track on the viaduct would be as close as 140 feet from the nearest 

UPRR ground level track along Sumner Street and as close as 70 feet from the nearest UPRR 

ground level track along Edison Highway. Since the F-B LGA would be on viaduct and the UPRR 

would be on ground level additional protection would not be required. 

In certain areas along the F-B LGA (specifically along Sumner Street in Bakersfield), roadways 

would be at ground level and the F-B LGA would be on a viaduct passing overhead, providing 

vertical separation between these two transportation facilities. Vertical separation such as this 

can provide protection from vehicles intruding into the F-B LGA right-of-way; however, vehicles 

could still impact the F-B LGA right-of-way if a supporting column of the viaduct is struck. 

Consistent with standard railroad practice, where the F-B LGA track would be on a viaduct, 

transportation facilities (such as roads) would be at least 25 feet from the nearest supporting 

column face of the HSR. Where 25 feet of clearance is not available, a barrier would need to be 

installed to protect the supporting columns of the viaduct. This type of protection is to be 

assessed following the Authority’s Roadway Vehicle Hazard Assessment methodology (TM 

500.08), which addresses the risk of various adjacent roadway hazards for vehicles entering the 

HSR F-B LGA right-of-way. 
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Implementation of standard design practices (see Section 3.11.5 S&S-AMF #8) would reduce the 

potential of vehicle-to-HSR collisions and other train-to-HSR collisions; therefore, the potential 

intrusion of motor vehicles or trains into the HSR corridor under the F-B LGA would be a less than 

significant impact under CEQA. 

The California HSR System (applicable to the F-B LGA) would be designed to contain train sets 

within the operational corridor (Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority and FRA 

2014], Section 3.11, Safety and Security, page 3.11-21). Strategies to ensure containment 

include operational and maintenance plan elements that would ensure high-quality tracks and 

vehicle maintenance to reduce the risk of derailment. Also, physical elements, such as 

containment parapets, check rails, guard rails, and derailment walls, would be used in specific 

areas with a high risk of or high impact from derailment. These areas include viaducts and 

approaches to conventional rail and roadway crossings. The concrete derailment walls are similar 

to tall curbs that run close to the train wheels. In the event of a derailment, these walls keep the 

train within the right-of-way and upright. Implementation of standard design practices (see 

Section 3.11.5 S&S-AMF #7 and S&S-AMF #8) would reduce the potential for train derailment 

along the HSR; therefore, the potential for derailments along the F-B LGA would be a less than 

significant impact under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #5 – Motor Vehicle, Pedestrian, and Bicycle Accidents Associated with HSR

Operations

Project design addresses motorist, pedestrian, and bicyclist safety in several ways, including HSR

grade separation from automobile and pedestrian traffic and roadway improvements. The HSR 

tracks would be located in a dedicated right-of-way, eliminating potential conflict with automobiles, 

bicycle, and pedestrian traffic. Roadway improvements included in the project, such as overpass 

construction (see Chapter 2, F-B LGA Description, of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS), would 

improve vehicular and pedestrian safety through associated street widening, traffic restrictions, 

and/or new traffic signals. The HSR tracks would be grade-separated, and the roadway 

improvements near the F-B LGA and along the alignment would comply with design standards for 

pedestrian and bicycle safety. As stated under Impact S&S #4, this type of protection is to be 

assessed following the Authority’s Roadway Vehicle Hazard Assessment methodology (TM 

500.08). As a result of the grade separated design and roadway design improvements the, 

impacts to motor vehicle, pedestrian, and bicycle safety under the F-B LGA would be less than 

significant under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #6 – HSR Accidents Associated with Seismic Events

Section 3.9, Geology, Soils, Seismicity, and Paleontological Resources, of this Draft 

Supplemental EIR/EIS indicates that the F-B LGA is located in a seismically active area. The F-B 

LGA would therefore be constructed consistent with seismic specifications, which would require 

construction measures so that the HSR would be capable of withstanding defined levels of 

seismic activity without incurring structural failure. The F-B LGA would be built to meet

specifications contained in the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials guidance, Federal Highway Administration guidance, American Railway Engineering and 

Maintenance-of-Way Association Manual, California Department of Transportation design 

standards, California Building Code, and International Building Code accounting for seismic 

activity. The F-B LGA would also implement operational procedures to protect passenger and 

employee health during and after seismic events. The F-B LGA would also have a seismic 

monitoring system of sensors that would automatically stop trains approaching or operating in

areas of seismic activity in order to minimize the possibility of a derailment due to a seismic 

event. The monitoring system would be connected to an alert warning system at the OCC, so that 

OCC staff and train crews could take action to reduce the impacts from a seismic event. 

Following a seismic event, inspections of track, structures, bridges, and other system elements 

along the F-B LGA would be a priority, and the necessary repairs and operational precautions, 

such as service suspension or speed restrictions, would be implemented as necessary and 

prudent. Construction consistent with seismic specifications and structural design features 
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combined with appropriate operational procedures would reduce impacts of seismic events on the 

HSR system; therefore, the resulting potential impacts would be less than significant under CEQA

with F-B LGA implementation.

Impact S&S #7 – Risk of Fire and Explosions at Specific Parcels

The F-B LGA would include project elements that have a potential risk of fire and related hazards, 

including station facilities, passenger vehicles, maintenance facilities with fuel storage, traction 

power and paralleling stations, and the OCC. These elements have electrical equipment and/or 

combustible materials and thus represent a fire and explosion risk. The F-B LGA project design 

would include a number of layered safety and security systems, including closed-circuit television, 

access control, intrusion protection, fire warning and suppression systems, such as sprinklers, as 

well as emergency exits and notification systems, consistent with the requirements of the National 

Fire Protection Association Safety Code and Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger 

Rail Systems, the California Building Standards Code, and the International Building Code.

The F-B LGA would occupy parcels that have been identified by the Authority as a potential 

safety and security concern, specifically with the potential for fire and explosions that could 

impact the HSR operation. Parcels of concern are the Halliburton Facility (34722 7th Standard 

Road), the Rain-for-Rent Facility (3404 State Road), and the Golden Empire Gleaners Facility 

(1326 30th Street), all of which are in the City of Bakersfield. The Authority prepared Hazard and

Vulnerability Analysis reports to determine potential impacts to these site-specific parcels due to 

F-B LGA implementation and also identified measures to reduce potential impacts. The following 

provides a summary of the Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis reports prepared for the Halliburton 

Facility, the Rain-for-Rent Facility, and the Golden Empire Gleaners Parcel. 

The Authority prepared a Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis Report for the Halliburton Facility in 

July 2015 (Authority 2015).The F-B LGA would be developed as a viaduct over a portion of the 

Halliburton Facility parcel located on 7th Standard Road north of Bakersfield. North to south, the 

F-B LGA viaduct is planned to pass over an access road leading to a neighboring property 

occupied by an explosives bunker. In the older, south section of the Halliburton Facility parcel, the 

F-B LGA viaduct will pass directly over three permanent structures identified as: (1) an office 

building, (2) an acid dock, and (3) a truck wash. These structures will require relocation to another 

area on the Halliburton Facility parcel. Three additional permanent structures, which would not 

need to be relocated to other areas (as they are not beneath the F-B LGA viaduct) of the 

Halliburton Facility parcel, were identified as: (1) a truck fueling facility, (2) a nitrogen storage 

tank, and (3) a radioactive material bunker.

Under existing conditions, security at this facility is provided by a contract security service with a 

24/7 on-site presence. One security guard is located at the main gate shack for the main office 

building and north yard, with line-of-sight visibility to the south yard. A closed-circuit television 

system is in place to provide surveillance coverage for the entire facility. One roving security 

guard is assigned to check the perimeter and facility on a regular basis. The perimeter of the 

Halliburton Facility parcel is fully enclosed by a chain-link and barbed-wire fence, with two primary 

gate entrances from the main access road. Staff at Halliburton reported to the Authority that no 

significant security breaches of the facility have occurred in recent memory. An additional layer of 

security is in place for the explosives compound, including the explosives shop where the guns 

are packed and stored. Entry at the secondary gate to the explosives compound sends an alert to 

the on-site local security force as well as Halliburton’s main office in Houston, Texas, and facial 

recognition for vehicle drivers is implemented.

The Authority, in collaboration with Halliburton, has expressed a desire to allow Halliburton to 

remain in operation at the Bakersfield Facility with the F-B LGA viaduct passing directly over the 

portions of the facility. Implementation of F-B LGA Mitigation Measure Safety and Security #2

(MM S&S #2) would allow for Halliburton’s continued operation with implementation of the F-B 

LGA on a portion of its property. 
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The Authority prepared a Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis Report for the Rain-for-Rent Facility 

in February 2016 (Authority 2016a).The F-B LGA viaduct would traverse a portion of the Rain-forRent property on State Road in the City of Bakersfield. This facility supports the Rain-for-Rent’s 

national accounts with large-scale water pump setups, piping, and a foundry for custom-order 

aluminum pipe fittings. Directly across State Road is a separate Rain-for-Rent facility that 

supports local customers with materials. This second facility will not be affected by the F-B LGA 

viaduct. From north to south, the F-B LGA viaduct would pass over an open material storage 

area, an employee parking area, the main entrance to the facility, and more employee parking 

before crossing the State Road right-of-way. The F-B LGA viaduct would be constructed with a 

height clearance underneath of approximately 40 feet and viaduct column spacing of 

approximately 100 feet. The Authority examined other structures on the Rain-for-Rent Facility to 

determine their potential impact to the F-B LGA viaduct. The material warehouse and foundry are 

both located in the eastern portion of the parcel, and all material deliveries to these locations 

must pass through the main gate. In addition, two above-ground diesel and propane storage 

tanks are located adjacent to the foundry. These fuel tanks support the truck and forklift 

operations occurring at the Rain-for-Rent facility and they appear to be located at a sufficient 

distance from the F-B LGA viaduct so as not to pose a hazard to the HSR operation. 

Under existing conditions, the Rain-for-Rent Facility appears to be secure. A combination chainlink and barbed-wire fence surrounds the facility and grounds, except in the immediate vicinity of 

the office buildings and main gate, where a welded-wire mesh and wrought-iron fence gate 

combination provides a higher level of protection. All gates on the parcel are secured and include 

signage. Vehicles and persons cannot enter the facility without acknowledgement and permits 

from the administrative staff operating the main gate. After-hours security measures include a 

24/7 security guard stationed at the guard shack to operate the main gate and whom also makes 

hourly rounds of the facility and logs his/her activities. A closed-circuit television camera is in 

place at the main gate to capture vehicle identifications, but no other closed-circuit television 

systems exist at the facility. Rain-for-Rent staff reported only occasional breaches of the security 

fencing for theft of materials, with no significant security incidents occurring.

The Authority, in collaboration with Rain-for-Rent, has expressed a desire to allow Rain-for-Rent 

to remain in operation at its current location, with the F-B LGA viaduct passing directly over the 

portions of the facility as described above. Rain-for-Rent would like the ability to store 

nonflammable materials and to park employee vehicles underneath the F-B LGA viaduct. 

Implementation of F-B LGA Mitigation Measure Safety and Security #3 (MM S&S #3) would allow 

Rain-for-Rent to continue operating with implementation of the F-B LGA on a portion of its 

property. 

The Authority prepared a Site-Specific Hazard Analysis (SiSHA) Report in September 2016 for 

the Golden Empire Gleaners Food Bank Facility in Bakersfield (Authority 2016b). Implementation 

of the F-B LGA would require an elevated viaduct crossing above the parcel occupied by the 

Golden Empire Gleaners Food Bank Facility. Golden Empire Gleaners has provided not-for-profit 

food bank services from the 30th Street facility in Bakersfield for the past 10 years and is 

operated by 6 full-time and up to 20 part-time or casual employees seven days per week. The 

viaduct associated with the F-B LGA (from north to south) is planned to pass over Chester 

Avenue, the office wing, and the Golden Empire Gleaners warehouse. The viaduct would be 

constructed at a height that allows for approximately 40 feet of clearance underneath and column 

spacing of approximately 100 feet (viaduct support columns would be situated so as to avoid 

direct impacts to the existing structure, with several placed in the parking lot immediately south of 

the warehouse). 

The SiSHA requires approval by the Safety and Security Committee of the Authority due to two 

separate issues with regard to the Golden Empire Gleaners Food Bank Facility: 
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1. The contemplated use of a nonpublicly owned business using the building requires a waiver

as it deviates from the Elevated Structure Policy adopted by the Authority for use under

elevated structures.

2. The residual security risk would remain high, requiring Safety and Security Committee

signoff, but could be reduced to an acceptable level with implementation of Mitigation

Measure (MM) S&S #4.

The Safety-Hazard Analysis portion of the SiSHA prepared for the Golden Empire Gleaners 

Facility indicated that the risk to the F-B LGA from hazardous materials does not currently exist 

on-site. Therefore, fire is the principal safety risk to be mitigated. The Security – Threat and 

Vulnerability Analysis of the SiSHA indicated that the current security program at the facility is 

minimal, as the property, although fenced, has unrestricted vehicle access to the parking lot and 

truck unloading area via an ungated driveway entrance from 30th Street. The most significant 

security risk at the facility is the potential for use of a large truck in and around the F-B LGA 

viaduct, which could bring or hold explosives in close proximity to the F-B LGA viaduct. The

current open-access condition would need to be upgraded to a restricted-access program, with 

vehicles checked in and inspected prior to entry to the area immediately adjacent to the F-B LGA 

viaduct.

In order to reduce security and safety hazards at the Golden Empire Gleaners Facility and allow 

for safe operation of the business and the F-B LGA, the Authority recommends conditions that 

must be met. These conditions are identified in Mitigation Measure MM S&S #4. 

Without site-specific mitigation measures implemented at the Haliburton Facility, Rain-for Rent 

Facility, and Golden Empire Gleaners parcel impacts associated with development of the F-B 

LGA would result in significant impacts under CEQA. With implementation of MM S&S #2, MM 

S&S #3, and MM S&S #4, the F-B LGA would have a less-than-significant impact under CEQA

because the risks to human health resulting from fire and explosion would be reduced.

Impact S&S #8 – Increased Response Times for Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Services 

from Permanent Road Closures

Road closures and modified traffic routing along the F-B LGA could result in increased response 

times for emergency responders. Chapter 3.2, Transportation, of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS 

indicates existing roads would either remain unchanged where elevated track would cross them 

or would be modified into overcrossings (a total of 40 for the F-B LGA) or undercrossings (a total 

of 2 for the F-B LGA) where at-grade track would conflict with them. Road segments that would 

be permanently closed are typically short (less than 1 mile), and access to properties adjacent to 

these closed roads would be accessible from other roads. The 10 roads that would be 

permanently closed due to F-B LGA implementation include: 

• Madera Avenue (Shafter)

• Gold’s Avenue (Shafter)

• Orange Avenue (Shafter)

• Mendota Street (Shafter)

• Golden State Frontage South (Bakersfield)

• Golden State Frontage North (Bakersfield)

• H Street (Bakersfield)

• 24th Street (Bakersfield)

• Miller Street (Bakersfield)

• Haley Street (Bakersfield)

Under existing conditions, the only fire station (Kern County Fire Station 32) in the City of Shafter 

is located south of the BNSF, at 325 Sunset Avenue; therefore, responses to emergencies by fire 

personnel north of the BNSF have the potential for delayed response if trains are crossing under 

existing conditions. However, the F-B LGA design in Shafter would eliminate conflicts between 

BNSF train crossings and emergency responses north of the BNSF. The F-B LGA would be atgrade in Shafter until reaching the Poplar Avenue BNSF crossing. Poplar Avenue would be raised 

in place to cross over SR 43, the BNSF, and the F-B LGA. Beginning near the Poplar Avenue 
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overhead crossing, both the BNSF track and the F-B LGA would begin rising in order to eliminate 

the existing at-grade crossings in Shafter. The following at-grade crossings would be eliminated 

in Shafter: Fresno Avenue, Shafter Avenue, Central Avenue, and E Lerdo Highway. The BNSF 

and F-B LGA bridges would be constructed at these locations, and in-between the underpasses, 

the BNSF and F-B LGA would be built on retained fill. A retaining wall would be constructed along 

the BNSF/SR 43 right-of-way, and another retaining wall would be built along Walker Street. After 

crossing E Lerdo Highway, the BNSF profile would be lowered to match the existing track profile 

at E Los Angeles Avenue, while the F-B LGA would remain on an elevated fill section. The 

existing crossing at E Los Angeles Avenue would be closed and traffic routed onto Beech 

Avenue. The F-B LGA would provide openings/undercrossings at Riverside Street and Cherry 

Avenue in Shafter. Additionally, Riverside Street would be raised in place to cross over SR 43 

and the BNSF, then lowered back to match existing elevations, allowing the F-B LGA to pass 

over. Such design of the F-B LGA in Shafter is not anticipated to increase response times of 

emergency services in the area. Additionally, such design features implemented in Shafter would 

result in benefits for emergency evacuation routes and emergency response plans by eliminating 

conflicts between the BNSF and emergency responders. 

In the city of Bakersfield just north of SR 99, the F-B LGA would change to a viaduct. At State 

Road, a cul-de-sac would be realigned to pass between the viaduct columns. Further south on 

State Road near Pierce Road, State Road would be realigned under the viaduct and between 

viaduct columns. The F-B LGA viaduct in this area would be supported on straddle bents over the 

realigned roadway. A portion of Nadine Lane (private roadway) would be used to connect an F-B 

LGA access road. No modifications to Nadine Lane would be required except to provide a 

driveway connection. Continuing south, 34th Street would be realigned from approximately L 

Street to the F Street Station site. To get over the UPRR, the profile of 34th Street would rise to 

the maximum allotted 6 percent grade and Chester Avenue would be raised over the UPRR. K 

and L Streets would be modified to meet the new 34th Street profile. To be used as an access 

road, 32nd Street would be realigned within the F Street Station property, and 24th Street would 

be closed at Golden State Avenue. Sumner Street would be modified and realigned between 

Sonora Street to Haley Street and the F-B LGA would curve to parallel the existing street 

alignment after Haley Street. Sumner Street would be narrowed to support a 12-foot-wide lane 

and up to an 8-foot-wide shoulder on each side of the viaduct columns. Between viaduct columns 

along Sumner Street, a raised median would be installed. Inyo Street, Tulare Street, Kern Street, 

King Street, Owens Street, and Gage Street would be converted to right-turn-in and out at 

Sumner Street. Full access would be maintained at Beale Avenue. Miller Street and Haley Street 

would be closed at Sumner Street by installing cul-de-sacs. The F-B LGA parallels Edison 

Highway on the south side of the road from Washington Street to just north of Quantico Avenue. 

Just north of Quantico Avenue, the F-B LGA viaduct would transition to the south side of Sumner 

Street, to Oswell Street to the south. Steel Avenue would be closed at Edison Highway. Such 

design of the F-B LGA in Bakersfield and associated road closures and modifications is not 

anticipated to increase response times of emergency services in the area. 

The Authority would coordinate with emergency responders to incorporate roadway modifications 

for the F-B LGA that maintain existing traffic patterns and fulfill response route needs (see MM 

S&S #1). Implementation of such roadway modifications that maintain existing traffic patterns and 

fulfill response route needs for emergency services for the F-B LGA would result in a less than 

significant impact under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #9 – Increased Response Times for Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Services

Associated with Access to Elevated Track

The F-B LGA design would include embankments as tall as 60 feet through Shafter and viaducts

as tall as 65 feet above ground through Bakersfield (Figure 2-1, provided in Chapter 2, F-B LGA 

Description, of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS). The embankments and viaduct of the F-B LGA 

would not be as tall as the elevated track features of the May 2014 Project (as tall as 80 feet 

above ground level in Bakersfield). 
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These elevated sections could be difficult to evacuate and difficult to reach by emergency

responders in case of emergencies during which a train is stopped. The F-B LGA embankment

and viaduct includes a walking surface and a lateral safety railing, in accordance with standard 

engineering design requirements (Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority and 

FRA 2014], Section 3.11, Safety and Security, page 3.11-35). The design also would include 

ground access from the elevated tracks at regular intervals along the F-B LGA embankment and 

viaduct, allowing for emergency passenger evacuation if needed, as well as for routine track 

maintenance. Incorporation of walking surfaces, lateral safety railing, and ground access from 

elevated tracks along the F-B LGA would facilitate safe evacuation of individuals using the HSR

System. Therefore, with implementation of ground access design features and features that allow 

for emergency passenger evacuation from portions of the HSR System that would be elevated, 

the potential for delayed or hampered response to emergencies on elevated track portions of the 

F-B LGA be less than significant under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #10 – Need for Expansion of Existing Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Services 

Facilities

Implementation of avoidance and minimization measures would minimize the potential for train 

accidents; therefore, local response to train accidents is not expected to be required, because 

any incident would be rare. For emergency preparedness, however, the Authority would 

collaborate with local responders to develop a Fire and Life Safety Program for emergency 

response in case of an accident or other emergency (please see Sections 3.11.6, Project Design 

Features, and 3.11.7 Mitigation Measures of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS

[Authority and FRA 2014]). With such measures in place average response times are not 

anticipated to increase directly or indirectly due to implementation of the F-B LGA and the need 

for additional emergency staff for local fire departments and emergency service facilities would 

not increase. Consequently, new or physically altered government facilities (such as fire stations, 

emergency service facilities, ambulance stations, etc.) that would create physical impacts on the 

environment are not anticipated to occur. Impacts would be less than significant under CEQA with 

F-B LGA implementation. 

As described in Sections 3.12 and 3.13 of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS

(Authority and FRA 2014), any station selected would introduce more consumers and promote 

economic development into downtown Bakersfield, which could increase demand for local 

emergency responders.

However, the indirect impacts of economic revitalization in the F Street Station area would be less

than significant impact under CEQA because the station would have on-site security patrols

(consisting of both sworn and non-sworn officers) and because development and expanded 

facilities would comply with local site development and permitting processes, including impact 

fees and CEQA analysis. However, similar to the May 2014 Project, the impact on emergency

response due to the increase in population under the F-B LGA would be significant under CEQA.

Impact S&S #11 – Accident Risks to Airports, Private Airstrips, and Heliports

As indicated in Table 3.11-2, the F-B LGA would be within 2 miles of one public service airport

and three heliports. The F-B LGA would not intrude upon the Part 77 airspace surfaces, San 

Joaquin Community Hospital heliport, the Kern Medical Center heliport, or the Memorial Hospital 

heliport. The F-B LGA falls within the southern area of the traffic pattern zone for Meadows Field 

Airport. The traffic pattern zone represents those areas within the Part 77 defined “Horizontal 

Surface” for the airport. The Part 77 Horizontal Surface of Meadows Field Airport begins 150 feet 

above the airport elevation of 507 feet above mean sea level, at 657 feet above mean sea level. 

The average elevation of the F-B LGA in this area is approximately 495 feet above mean sea 

level (which includes an average ground level elevation of 450 feet plus 60 feet for the F-B LGA 

retained fill structure), approximately 162 feet below the Meadows Field Airport’s horizontal 

surface. The F-B LGA would therefore not penetrate the airport’s Part 77 airspace surfaces. 

The Kern County Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan was used to determine if the F-B LGA 

would be located within a land use compatibility zone of Meadows Field Airport. The F-B LGA 
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would be located in Zone C of Meadows Field Airport. According to the Kern County Airport Land 

Use Compatibility Plan, Zone C is defined as “the outer boundary area where aircraft are 

commonly below 1,000 feet above ground level (i.e., the traffic pattern and pattern entry points). 

This area is considered to extend 5,000 feet laterally from runway centerline. Length along the 

runway’s axis will vary from 5,000 to 10,000 feet from the end of the runway’s primary surface. 

The length depends upon the runway classification (visual versus instrument), and the type and 

volume of aircraft accommodated. For runways having an established track solely on one side, 

the shape of the zone is modified accordingly.” Appendix D of the Kern County Airport Land Use 

Compatibility Plan identifies specific allowable land uses that are permitted in Zone C. Railroad, 

and public transit facilities are a compatible use in Zone C of Meadows Field Airport; therefore, 

the F-B LGA would be an allowable use in Zone C. 

Implementation of the F-B LGA would not increase risks to people in the vicinity of Meadows 

Field Airport. Therefore, there would be no increased accident risk to these facilities and the 

impact would be less than significant under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #12 – Hazards to the HSR from Nearby Facilities

Tall structures pose a safety hazard to the F-B LGA because of their potential to topple onto HSR

facilities or to affect them because of explosions resulting from accidents, severe weather, or 

terrorist acts. Many tall structures such as silos and elevators are located adjacent to railroads 

and highways throughout the Central Valley, including those along the F-B LGA. There is no 

available information to indicate that any of these facilities have undergone a catastrophic failure 

in the past several decades, let alone a failure that toppled the structure onto a transportation

corridor. Because the likelihood of a catastrophic tall structure failure adjacent to the F-B LGA is 

low, the hazards from nearby tall structures are considered to be less than significant under 

CEQA. Since the Authority will contact property owners with these types of facilities prior to rail 

operations, it will be able to take appropriate measures to minimize risk to passengers and 

employees should an incident occur along the F-B LGA alignment. Should an incident occur 

adjacent to the F-B LGA, appropriate measures (such as but not limited to shutting down HSR 

operation and cordoning off the location) would be taken to minimize risk to passengers and 

employees.

Nearby facilities and parcels have the potential to impact the F-B LGA, as identified by the 

Authority. The F-B LGA would cross at least three properties that are occupied by facilities, which 

may impact operation of the HSR System. Impact S&S #7 provides a detailed analysis on these 

facilities as well as a discussion on mitigation measures that would be implemented by the 

Authority specifically for the F-B LGA, which would reduce potential impacts to the HSR System

and allow the facilities to continue to operate. The analysis determined that the resulting impacts 

would be less than significant under CEQA. 

The F-B LGA would pass through California DOGGR District 4, which contains a high number of 

active, producing oil wells. Additionally, the F-B LGA traverses multiple oil and natural gas

pipelines; however, no active oil refinery properties have been identified within the F-B LGA study 

area. According to the Oil Well Map Book prepared for this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS, there are 

no oil and gas wells within the F-B LGA study area. 

In conjunction with complying with federal safety directives for the HSR, the Authority has 

established a risk-based hazard management program for the statewide HSR System (Fresno to 

Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS [Authority and FRA 2014], Section 3.11, Safety and Security, 

page 3.11-40). As part of this program, the Authority prepared a preliminary hazard analysis, as 

identified in Chapter 2 (page 2-5) of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS, to consider 

risks to HSR operations that may be posed by oil and gas wells adjacent to the HSR right-of-way. 

The preliminary hazard analysis assessed both the probability and consequence of the risks, with 

a main focus on well blowouts. Blowouts occur when a pressurized underground zone is 

encountered while drilling and the weight of the drilling mud in the wellbore is insufficient to hold 

back the pressure. The consequences of a blowout range from a spray of crude oil over the 

surrounding area and the displacement of earth around the wellbore, to a large-scale explosion 

and fire. A review of oil and gas well blowouts in the F-B LGA region from 1991 to 2008 revealed 
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that the occurrence of any level of such an event can be characterized as highly unlikely (Fresno

to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS, Section 3.11, Safety and Security page 3.11-40).1 Highspeed trains will pass through areas at speeds up to 220 mph, so the presence of an HSR train 

near any one nearby oil or gas well will be only for a matter of seconds. Moreover, the HSR 

includes automatic train control, which has been an effective technological measure to ensuring 

the safety of train passengers and crew by providing for the ability to halt the HSR train quickly in 

the event of a nearby well blowout (Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS, Section 3.11, 

Safety and Security, page 3.11-40). Because the likelihood of a well blowout is extremely unlikely 

on its own, and is even more unlikely for a major well blowout occurring at the precise time of a 

passing train, and because of the HSRs safety features which would be implemented as part of 

the F-B LGA, the potential for hazards to HSR passengers and crew from nearby oil and gas 

wells would result in a less than significant impact under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #13 – Hazards to Residences from HSR Derailment

A basic design feature that would be implemented as part of the F-B LGA is to contain train sets 

within the operational corridor. Thus, if a derailment were to occur in a residential area, the train 

would remain within the F-B LGA right-of-way. The train sets used on the F-B LGA would not 

carry cargo that would increase the risk of fires or explosions (fuel, oil, explosive compounds, 

etc.) since the trains would be operated electrically and passengers and luggage would be the 

primary cargo. Because the train would be contained in the F-B LGA right-of-way and it would not 

contain cargo or fuel that would result in a fire or explosion, implementation of the F-B LGA would 

not substantially increase hazards to nearby residents. Thus, the resulting impacts are less than 

significant under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #14 – Safety Impacts to Schools

Cal. Code Regs. Title 5, Section 14010, provides siting standards for new schools. These 

standards are only applicable for school facility locations; however, they provide an indication of 

when safety impacts may occur to school employees and students.

Cal. Code Regs. Title 5, Section 14010c, calls for a separation between schools and power 

transmission lines of 100 feet for 50- to 133-kilovolt (kV) lines, 150 feet for 220 to 230 kV lines, 

and 350 feet for 500 to 550 kV lines. The F-B LGA would be powered by a 25 kV system; 

therefore, the electrification of the trains itself would be a negligible safety hazard to schools. The 

F-B LGA would require modification of existing transmission lines with a maximum transmission 

of 133 kV in five locations. The schools that are listed in Table 3.11-3 (except for those identified 

within the F-B LGA study area) would be located more than 100 feet from the transmission lines 

that would be modified under the F-B LGA. For these reasons, the electrification of the F-B LGA

would have no safety impact on school employees and students.

Cal. Code Regs. Title 5, Section 14010d, requires a safety study for school sites within 1,500 feet 

of a railroad track easement. Because the F-B LGA would carry passengers and be electricpowered, there would be no safety hazard associated with F-B LGA cargo or fuel. The hazard 

associated with the derailment of a train along the F-B LGA is the physical mass and speed of the 

train colliding with a structure or people, which could only occur adjacent to the right-of-way.

Valley Oaks Charter School and Free Will Christian Academy are located within the F-B LGA 

study area. A basic design feature that would be implemented as part of the F-B LGA would

contain train sets within the operational corridor. Since HSRs began operating in 1964 (on a 

worldwide basis), there has only been one case where a train within a dedicated HSR right-ofway has left the operational corridor: in China in 2011. A formal government investigation 

identified the cause of the accident as a system-wide lack of emphasis on safety, both in terms of 

1 California Department of Conservation, Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) District 4 covers 

Tulare, Kern, and Inyo counties. This district encompasses most of the oil wells in the Fresno to Bakersfield Section. 

Between 1991 and 2008, there were 108 well blowouts in District 4. During this period, the number of well blowouts per 

year declined by approximately 80 percent despite increased numbers of production wells because of advances in 

technology and well management. As a result, the well blowout rates from 2001 to 2008 were 1 per 100,000 well-years for 

active thermal-recovery wells and 1 per 520,000 well-years for inactive/abandoned wells.
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equipment development and operating personnel training, by the management of China’s HSR 

System. Where industry standards for design, maintenance, and operation have been employed, 

this type of accident has not occurred over the four decades of HSR operation. Therefore, if a

derailment along the F-B LGA were to occur next to either of the two closest schools identified 

above, the train would remain within the F-B LGA right-of-way. Because the train would be 

contained in the HSR right-of-way and would not contain cargo or fuel that would result in a fire, 

explosion, or the release of toxic substances, the F-B LGA would not substantially increase 

hazards to nearby schools. Resulting impacts are considered to be less than significant under

CEQA. 

Impact S&S #15 – Hazards to HSR Passengers and Employees from Flooding

As discussed in Section 3.9, Geology, Soils, Seismicity, and Paleontological Resources, of this 

Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS, the failure of Isabella Dam could result in inundation of the F-B LGA, 

putting people traveling on the train at risk.

The California Water Code entrusts the regulation of large dams to the Department of Water 

Resources. The Department of Water Resources created the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) 

to administer the dam safety program. DSODs mission is “[T]o protect people against loss of life 

and property from dam failure.” DSOD imposes dam safety guidelines on all large dams in 

California, including Lake Isabella Dam. DSOD engineers inspect over 1,200 dams each year to 

ensure they are performing and being maintained in a safe manner. These inspections include 

thorough review of operational records, as well as site inspections of the dams and abutments, 

outlet works, spillways, and other critical structures. If deficiencies or potential problems are 

identified, interim remedial measures are typically directed, such as lowering the reservoir level, 

until permanent repairs, if needed, can be designed and implemented. Dam owners must submit 

any proposed structural or operational changes to DSOD for review and approval before they can 

be implemented. Because of this dam safety program, the potential risk of inundation of the F-B 

LGA due to failure of the Isabella Dam is considered to be small. Therefore, the impacts of this 

hazard with implementation of the F-B LGA would be less than significant under CEQA. 

Impact S&S #16 – Criminal Activity aboard Trains at the F Street Station

Criminal activity, such as theft and violence, could occur on F-B LGA trains and at the F Street 

Station. Terrorists could target the F Street Station, tracks, or trains for the potential to inflict mass 

casualties and disrupt transportation infrastructure. The F-B LGA design would include access

control and security monitoring systems that could deter such acts and facilitate early detection

and response. They would also help to mitigate suicide attempts. The system features include 

sensors on perimeter fencing, closed-circuit television, and security lighting where appropriate. 

The Authority and FRA are in discussions with the Transportation Security Administration 

regarding security controls at stations. While the Transportation Security Administration has not 

prescribed security standards for HSR stations, station design incorporates security controls and 

procedures recommended for transit application by Transportation Security Administration and 

industry standards. The station will include security monitoring systems and security personnel

(consisting of both sworn and non-sworn officers much like existing conventional train stations to

deter criminal and terrorist activity. These system features would reduce the potential for 

successful criminal and terrorist acts on the F-B LGA and F Street Station to a less than

significant impact under CEQA. 

3.11.5 Avoidance and Minimization Measures

All of the avoidance and minimization measures listed below and described in Section 3.11.6 of 

the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final EIR/EIS (Authority and FRA 2014: pages 3.11-43 through 

3.11-45) (where they are referred to as project design features) are applicable to the May 2014 

Project and the F-B LGA. The applicable list is provided in Technical Appendix 2-G: Mitigation 

Monitoring and Enforcement Plan of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS. Technical Appendix 2-H 

describes how implementation of these measures reduces adverse effects on safety and security. 

Descriptions of how these measures reduce adverse effects are also included in the individual 

impact analysis in Sections 3.11.12.1 and 3.11.12.2. 
Section 3.11 Safety and Security

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• S&S-AMF #1: Emergency Vehicle Access. Development of a detailed construction

transportation plan that would include coordination with local jurisdictions on emergency

vehicle access.

• S&S-AMF#2: Operation and Transportation Hazards. Engineering design and construction

phases include preliminary hazard analysis, collision hazard analysis, and threat and

vulnerability assessment methods.

• S&S-AMF#3: Criminal and Terrorist Acts. Implement threat and vulnerability assessments

that establish provisions for the deterrence and detection of, as well as the response to,

criminal and terrorist acts for rail facilities and system operations.

• S&S-AMF#4: Construction Safety Plan. Development and implementation of Construction

Safety and Health Plans to ensure safety during construction activities.

• S&S-AMF#4b: Valley Fever. Provide a qualified person dedicated to overseeing

implementation of Valley Fever prevention measures to encourage a culture of safety of the

construction contractors and subcontractors.

• S&S-AMF#4c: Valley Fever. Addition of measures to the requirements of the Construction

Safety and Health Plans regarding preventive measures to avoid Valley Fever exposure.

• S&S-AMF#5: Fire/Life Safety Programs. Development of Fire/Life Safety Programs

implementing the requirements set forth in the Federal Rail Safety Act, which addresses the

safety of passengers and employees during emergency response.

• S&S-AMF#6: System Security Plans. Development and implementation of Safety and

Security plans that address design features intended to maintain security at the stations,

within the track right-of-way, and onboard trains.

• S&S-AMF#7: Operating Procedures. Development and implementation of standard

operating procedures and emergency operating procedures that include industry best

practices, such as the FRA-mandated Roadway Worker Protection Program.

• S&S-AMF#8: FRA Requirements. Implementation of FRA requirements for safety and

security, including System Safety Program Plans and compliance with FRA requirements for

tracks, equipment, railroad operating rules, and practices, including the Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards, Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Guidelines for the High-Speed

Passenger Rail, and track safety standards.

• S&S-AMF#9: Worker Safety. Implement worker safety in the workplace through Cal-OSHA

standards and regulations.

• S&S-AMF#10: Environmental Design. Implementing HSR urban design guidelines that

require implementation of the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design.

3.11.6 Mitigation Measures 

3.11.6.1 Mitigation Measures Identified in the Fresno to Bakersfield Section

Final EIR/EIS

The following mitigation measure was identified in the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Final 

EIR/EIS and approved under the Fresno to Bakersfield Section Mitigation Monitoring and 

Enforcement Plan (Authority and FRA 2014). Mitigation Measure S&S MM #1, shown in Table 

3.11-5, is applicable to the May 2014 Project and the F-B LGA. The mitigation measure would 

require the Authority, during project construction and operation, to monitor response times of local 

fire, rescue, and emergency services to ensure that the proposed project is not directly impacting 

response times. The Authority would also provide a fair share of cost of services to local 

jurisdictions operating emergency services. 
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Table 3.11-5 Mitigation Measures Applicable to the F-B LGA 

Number Description

S&S MM #1 The Authority, annually, during construction/post-construction and operational activities, would 

monitor the response of local fire, rescue, and emergency service providers to incidents at stations 

and provide a fair share of cost of service. Upon approval of the Fresno to Bakersfield Section, the 

Authority will monitor service levels in the vicinity of the Fresno, Kings/Tulare, and Bakersfield 

stations to determine baseline service demands. “Service levels” consist of the monthly volume of 

calls for fire and police protection, as well as city- or fire protection district-funded EMT/ambulance 

calls that occur in the station site service areas. Prior to operation of the stations for HSR service, the 

Authority will enter into an agreement with the public service providers of fire, police, and emergency 

services to fund the Authority’s fair share of services above the average baseline service demand 

level for the station and HMF1 service areas (as established during the monitoring period). The fair 

share will be based on projected passenger use for the first year of operations, with a growth factor 

for the first five years of operation. This cost-sharing agreement will include provisions for ongoing 

monitoring and future negotiated amendments as the stations are expanded or passenger use 

increases. Such amendments will be made on a regular basis for the first five years of station 

operation, as will be provided in the agreement. To make sure that services are made available, 

impact fees will not constitute the sole funding mechanism, although impact fees may be used to fund

capital improvements or fixtures (police substation, additional fire vehicle, on-site defibrillators, etc.) 

necessary to service delivery. After the first five years of operation, the Authority will enter into a new 

or revised agreement with the public service providers of fire, police, and emergency services to fund 

the Authority’s fair share of services. The fair share will take into account the volume of ridership, past 

record, and trends in service demand at the stations and HMF site; new local revenues derived from 

station area development; and any services that the Authority may be providing at the station.

1 The F-B LGA does not include an HMF; therefore, this portion of S&S MM #1 would not apply to the F-B LGA. 

Authority = California High-Speed Rail Authority

EMT = emergency medical technician

F-B LGA = Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

HMF = heavy maintenance facility

HSR = high-speed rail

Mitigation Measure S&S MM #1 is intended to ensure that local emergency services continue 

providing adequate response times and staffing during project construction and once the project 

is operational. Annual monitoring of response times will determine the impact, if any, that the 

proposed project will have on emergency services in the project area. A fair share of cost of 

service will be provided by the Authority to offset any potential impact the proposed project may 

contribute to emergency services in the area. 

Similar to the May 2014 Project, implementation of S&S MM #1 under the F-B LGA would result 

in no impacts. If the F-B LGA requires funding of additional public-service facilities, such as a 

police substation, mitigation may result in secondary impacts on the physical environment. Those 

secondary impacts would include emissions and fugitive dust from construction equipment, 

construction-related noise, visual impacts associated with new structures, and impacts on 

biological and cultural resources that may be present on the site of new structures. Any new or 

expanded government facilities would be designed and constructed to be consistent with local 

land use plans, and would be subject to separate site-specific analysis under CEQA, including 

measures to mitigate impacts to a less-than-significant level. For this reason, it is expected that 

impacts of mitigation for secondary physical impacts would be less than significant under CEQA. 

3.11.6.2 Mitigation Measures Specific to the F-B LGA

With the implementation of Mitigation Measure S&S MM #1 adverse effects associated with 

emergency service response times and staffing would be mitigated by monitoring to determine if 

additional fire/police/emergency service personnel or structures would be required on a projectspecific level. Further, this mitigation measure identifies responsible parties (the Authority) for 

each project phase (pre-construction, construction, and operation), to ensure that standards are 

appropriately maintained. 
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In addition, to ensure continued operation of specific parcels (the Halliburton Facility, Rain-forRent Facility, and Golden Empire Gleaners Facility) the F-B LGA crosses, S&S MM #2, S&S MM 

#3, and S&S MM #4 would also be implemented. These mitigation measures are new and 

specific to the F-B LGA and are intended to reduce impacts associated with the placement of the 

F-B LGA alignment on the specific parcels occupied by the above-identified facilities and allow for 

their continued operation. Table 3.11-6 provides a description of S&S MM #2, S&S MM #3, and 

S&S MM #4. 

Table 3.11-6 Mitigation Measures Solely Applicable to the F-B LGA 

Number Description

S&S MM #2 The following site-specific mitigation shall be implemented based on the Authority’s Policy for 

Elevated Structures to allow continued use of the Halliburton Facility with development of the F-B 

LGA over a portion of the facility’s parcel: 

• The Authority shall be required to purchase the property underneath the F-B LGA viaduct, plus a

10-foot maintenance access buffer on each side of the viaduct. An easement will then be

negotiated with Halliburton for its continued use of the parcel, subject to conditions set forth by

the Authority. The easement negotiated with Halliburton shall include the following stipulations:

– Relocation of all privately controlled structures such as the old office building, acid dock, and

truck wash from underneath the F-B LGA viaduct.

– Relocation of all hazardous materials from underneath the F-B LGA viaduct. This includes the

diesel fuel storage tanks, the nitrogen tank, the radioactive material bunker, the acid dock,

and all of the storage of hazmat totes.

– The existing height of the barrier for the explosives bunker shall be increased to provide lineof-sight protection for the HSR trainway on the F-B LGA viaduct, per Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives regulatory requirements.

– Maintenance of the space underneath the F-B LGA viaduct to remove all hazardous materials

and to minimize combustible materials such as wood, debris, and vegetation.

– Allow audits of security protocols and processes to ensure security measures continue the

level of protection warranted.

– Allow HSR security personnel access, with notice, to the grounds around the F-B LGA viaduct

to ensure security measures are being followed.

– Allow only trucks that can be visually verified to be empty may be parked under the F-B LGA

viaduct. These trucks include flatbeds and trucks with equipment that would not allow hidden

materials.

– Notice must be provided to the Authority by Halliburton in the event of any missing explosives

or shortage in explosives inventory.

S&S MM #3 The following site-specific mitigation shall be implemented based on the Authority’s Policy for 

Elevated Structures to allow continued use of the Rain-for-Rent Facility with development of the F-B 

LGA over a portion of the facility’s parcel: 

• The Authority shall be required to purchase the property underneath the F-B LGA viaduct, plus a

10-foot maintenance access buffer on each side of the viaduct. An easement will then be

negotiated with Rain-for-Rent for its continued use of the parcel, subject to conditions set forth by

the Authority. The easement negotiated with Rain-for-Rent shall include the following stipulations:

– Restriction against storage or temporary location of regulated quantities of hazardous

materials from underneath the F-B LGA viaduct.

– Maintenance of the space underneath the viaduct to eliminate all flammable and hazardous

materials.

– Allow the Authority to audit Rain-for-Rent security protocols and processes to ensure security

measures continue the level of protection warranted.

– Allow HSR security personnel access, with notice, to the area around the F-B LGA viaduct to

ensure security measures are being followed.
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Number Description

– Allow only trucks that can be visually verified to be empty may be parked under the F-B LGA

viaduct. These trucks include flatbeds and trucks with equipment that would not allow hidden

materials.

– Allow only passenger cars and small trucks and vans to be parked in the employee parking

under the F-B LGA viaduct on the Rain-for-Rent parcel.

S&S MM #4 The following site-specific mitigation shall be implemented in all subsequent property transactions for 

the Golden Empire Gleaners Facility: 

• Upgrade of the fire alarm and suppression system to current fire code regulations, per Office of

State Fire Marshall requirements and approval.

• Prohibition of regulated amounts of hazardous materials in the structure.

• Annual inspection by the Office of the State Fire Marshal.

• Public ownership and control of the entire facility. This could be Authority ownership, or City of

Bakersfield ownership with restrictions on use and access of the facility to enforce the above

mitigations. Note: State owned property requires additional conditions by the Office of the State

Fire Marshal that must be incorporated.

• Restrict access to the facility by uncontrolled or uninspected trucks or step vans.

• Allow audits of security protocols and processes to ensure security measures continue the level

of protection warranted.

• Allows HSR security personnel access, with notice, to ensure security measures are being

followed.

• Allow only trucks that can be visually verified to be empty may be parked under the F-B LGA

viaduct. These trucks include flatbeds and trucks with equipment that would not allow hidden

materials.

• Only passenger cars and small trucks and vans can be parked in the employee parking under the

structure.

• Any change of use would require reassessment and approval.

Authority = California High-Speed Rail Authority

F-B LGA = Fresno to Bakersfield Locally Generated Alternative

HSR = high-speed rail

In accordance with Mitigation Measures S&S MM #2, S&S MM #3, S&S MM #4 where the F-B 

LGA alignment crosses the parcels occupied respectively by the Halliburton, Rain-for-Rent, and 

Golden Empire Gleaners facilities, the Authority will implement measures to reduce impacts and 

allow for continued operation. These requirements ensure that implementation of the F-B LGA 

would not result in significant adverse impacts to the facilities nor significant adverse impacts to 

the F-B LGA with continued operation of these facilities. With implementation of these mitigation

measures impacts would be less than significant under CEQA. 

Implementation of Mitigation Measures S&S MM #2, S&S MM #3, and S&S MM #4 are not 

anticipated to have secondary impacts on the physical environment.1 Typical secondary impacts 

associated with implementation of Mitigation Measures include, but are not limited to, air resource 

impacts, noise impacts, and transportation/circulation impacts. Implementation of Mitigation 

Measures S&S MM #2, S&S MM #3, and S&S MM #4 would not in themselves cause secondary 

impacts as these mitigation measures are focused on allowing continued operation of the facilities 

similar to existing conditions during development and operation of the F-B LGA. For these 

reasons, it is expected that secondary impacts due to implementation of the above identified 

Mitigation Measures would be less than significant under CEQA.

1 These mitigation measures are site-specific for parcels where the F-B LGA would potentially interfere with day-to-day 

operational activities of the businesses associated with the specific parcels. A discussion of the impacts associated with 

affected businesses is discussed further in Section 3.12 of this Draft Supplemental EIR/EIS.
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