United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ALSTOM S.A., ALSTOM GRID, INC., PSYMETRIX, 

LTD., ALSTOM LIMITED,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1778

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California in No. 2:12-cv-06365-JGBRZ, Judge Jesus G. Bernal.

______________________ 

Decided: August 1, 2016 

______________________ 

 SYED A. HASAN, Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, 

Glendale, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by DAVID A. DILLARD, KYLE WAYNE KELLAR. 

 ANGELA DAWN MITCHELL, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, 

LLP, Kansas City, MO, argued for defendants-appellees. 

Also represented by PETER EMANUEL STRAND, CHRISTINE 

A. GUASTELLO; JAMIE KITANO, San Francisco, CA.

______________________ 

Before TARANTO, BRYSON, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
2 ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

This case involves the eligibility for patenting, under 

35 U.S.C. § 101, of certain claims of three of Electric 

Power Group, LLC’s patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,233,843; 

8,060,259; and 8,401,710. Those patents describe and 

claim systems and methods for performing real-time 

performance monitoring of an electric power grid by 

collecting data from multiple data sources, analyzing the 

data, and displaying the results. See ’710 patent, col. 1, 

lines 27–30; id., col. 2, lines 43–49. Electric Power Group 

sued Alstom S.A., Alstom Grid, Inc., Psymetrix Limited, 

and Alstom Limited (collectively, Alstom) in the Central 

District of California, alleging infringement of various 

claims of the three patents. The district court granted 

Alstom summary judgment that the subject matter of 

Electric Power Group’s asserted patent claims fails the 

tests for patent eligibility under governing precedent. 

We affirm. Though lengthy and numerous, the claims 

do not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and 

display of available information in a particular field, 

stating those functions in general terms, without limiting 

them to technical means for performing the functions that 

are arguably an advance over conventional computer and 

network technology. The claims, defining a desirable 

information-based result and not limited to inventive 

means of achieving the result, fail under § 101.

I 

Claim 12 of the ’710 patent is representative of the 

asserted claims.1 It reads:

 

1 The claims asserted are claims 4, 7, 9, 12, 19, and 

24 of the ’843 patent; claims 1, 5, 18, 21, 38, 49, and 53 of 

the ’259 patent; and claims 9, 12, and 17 of the ’710 

patent. See J.A. 32–39 (setting out claims). 
ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 3

12. A method of detecting events on an interconnected electric power grid in real time over a 

wide area and automatically analyzing the events 

on the interconnected electric power grid, the 

method comprising: 

receiving a plurality of data streams, each of the 

data streams comprising sub-second, time 

stamped synchronized phasor measurements 

wherein the measurements in each stream are 

collected in real time at geographically distinct 

points over the wide area of the interconnected 

electric power grid, the wide area comprising 

at least two elements from among control areas, transmission companies, utilities, regional 

reliability coordinators, and reliability jurisdictions;

receiving data from other power system data 

sources, the other power system data sources 

comprising at least one of transmission maps, 

power plant locations, EMS/SCADA systems;

receiving data from a plurality of non-grid data 

sources;

detecting and analyzing events in real-time from 

the plurality of data streams from the wide area based on at least one of limits, sensitivities 

and rates of change for one or more measurements from the data streams and dynamic 

stability metrics derived from analysis of the 

measurements from the data streams including at least one of frequency instability, voltages, power flows, phase angles, damping, and 

oscillation modes, derived from the phasor 

measurements and the other power system data sources in which the metrics are indicative 

of events, grid stress, and/or grid instability, 

over the wide area;
4 ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 

displaying the event analysis results and diagnoses of events and associated ones of the metrics from different categories of data and the 

derived metrics in visuals, tables, charts, or 

combinations thereof, the data comprising at 

least one of monitoring data, tracking data, 

historical data, prediction data, and summary 

data;

displaying concurrent visualization of measurements from the data streams and the dynamic 

stability metrics directed to the wide area of 

the interconnected electric power grid;

accumulating and updating the measurements 

from the data streams and the dynamic stability metrics, grid data, and non-grid data in real time as to wide area and local area portions 

of the interconnected electric power grid; and

deriving a composite indicator of reliability that 

is an indicator of power grid vulnerability and 

is derived from a combination of one or more 

real time measurements or computations of 

measurements from the data streams and the 

dynamic stability metrics covering the wide 

area as well as non-power grid data received 

from the non-grid data source.

’710 patent, col. 30, line 66, through col. 31, line 50. The 

district court treated claim 12 as representative, and so 

may we. On appeal, Electric Power Group’s opening brief

neither argues for the validity of any other claim if claim 

12 is invalid nor presents any meaningful argument for 

the distinctive significance of any claim limitations other 

than those included in claim 12.

On Alstom’s motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the asserted claims do not define 

subject matter that is eligible for patenting under § 101. 
ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 5

The court concluded that the claims are directed to “the 

abstract idea of monitoring and analyzing data from 

disparate sources.” J.A. 27. The court then determined 

that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept in the 

application of that abstract idea, observing in particular 

that the “most significant additional limitations . . . are 

those that limit the claim[s] to monitoring and analyzing 

data in the context of electric power grids.” J.A. 28. 

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). We review the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment of ineligibility de novo. Enfish, LLC 

v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

II

Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 

improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 

subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 

35 U.S.C. § 101. The provision, however, “contains an 

important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural 

phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice 

Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). The 

Supreme Court, setting up a two-stage framework, has 

held that a claim falls outside § 101 where (1) it is “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, i.e., a law of nature, 

natural phenomenon, or abstract idea, and (2), if so, the 

particular elements of the claim, considered “both individually and ‘as an ordered combination,’” do not add 

enough to “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a 

patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2355; see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 

1297–98 (2012). 

The Supreme Court’s formulation makes clear that 

the first-stage filter is a meaningful one, sometimes 

ending the § 101 inquiry. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; see 

Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., No. 2015-
6 ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 

1570, 2016 WL 3606624, at *6 (Fed. Cir. July 5, 2016); 

Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. At the same time, the two 

stages are plainly related: not only do many of our opinions make clear that the two stages involve overlapping 

scrutiny of the content of the claims, e.g., TLI Commc’ns 

LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 

Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1375 

(Fed. Cir. 2016), but we have noted that there can be close 

questions about when the inquiry should proceed from the 

first stage to the second, Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339; see 

Rapid Litig., 2016 WL 3606624, at *6–7 (explaining that 

stage-two analysis would reach same conclusion as 

reached at stage one); Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. 

v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 2015-1763, 2016 WL 3514158, 

at *5 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2016). Reflecting those points, 

we have described the first-stage inquiry as looking at the 

“focus” of the claims, their “‘character as a whole,’” and 

the second-stage inquiry (where reached) as looking more 

precisely at what the claim elements add—specifically, 

whether, in the Supreme Court’s terms, they identify an 

“‘inventive concept’” in the application of the ineligible 

matter to which (by assumption at stage two) the claim is 

directed. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36; Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 

(Fed. Cir. 2015); cf. Bascom, 2016 WL 3514158, at *5 

(“basic thrust”). 

A 

The claims in this case fall into a familiar class of 

claims “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. The focus 

of the asserted claims, as illustrated by claim 12 quoted 

above, is on collecting information, analyzing it, and 

displaying certain results of the collection and analysis. 

We need not define the outer limits of “abstract idea,” or 

at this stage exclude the possibility that any particular 

inventive means are to be found somewhere in the claims, 

to conclude that these claims focus on an abstract idea—

and hence require stage-two analysis under § 101. 
ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 7

Information as such is an intangible. See Microsoft 

Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007); 

Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we have treated collecting 

information, including when limited to particular content 

(which does not change its character as information), as 

within the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Internet 

Patents, 790 F.3d at 1349; OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Digitech 

Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 

1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 

Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In a 

similar vein, we have treated analyzing information by 

steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental 

processes within the abstract-idea category. See, e.g., TLI 

Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 613; Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351; 

SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. 

App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. 

Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 

1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011); SiRF 

Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 

(Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301; Parker 

v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). And we have recognized that 

merely presenting the results of abstract processes of 

collecting and analyzing information, without more (such 

as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis. 

See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

Here, the claims are clearly focused on the combination of those abstract-idea processes. The advance they 

purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing 
8 ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 

information of a specified content, then displaying the 

results, and not any particular assertedly inventive 

technology for performing those functions. They are 

therefore directed to an abstract idea.

The claims here are unlike the claims in Enfish. 

There, we relied on the distinction made in Alice between, 

on one hand, computer-functionality improvements and, 

on the other, uses of existing computers as tools in aid of 

processes focused on “abstract ideas” (in Alice, as in so 

many other § 101 cases, the abstract ideas being the 

creation and manipulation of legal obligations such as 

contracts involved in fundamental economic practices). 

Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36; see Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–

59. That distinction, the Supreme Court recognized, has

common-sense force even if it may present line-drawing 

challenges because of the programmable nature of ordinary existing computers. In Enfish, we applied the distinction to reject the § 101 challenge at stage one because 

the claims at issue focused not on asserted advances in 

uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put, 

but on a specific improvement—a particular database 

technique—in how computers could carry out one of their 

basic functions of storage and retrieval of data. Enfish, 

822 F.3d at 1335–36; see Bascom, 2016 WL 3514158, at 

*5; cf. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (noting basic storage 

function of generic computer). The present case is different: the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement 

in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.

B 

When we turn to stage two of the Alice analysis and 

scrutinize the claim elements more microscopically, we 

find nothing sufficient to remove the claims from the class 

of subject matter ineligible for patenting. Most obviously, 

limiting the claims to the particular technological environment of power-grid monitoring is, without more, 
ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 9

insufficient to transform them into patent-eligible applications of the abstract idea at their core. See Alice, 134 S.

Ct. at 2358; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Bilski v. Kappos, 

561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 

175, 191 (1981); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 

1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). More particularly, a large 

portion of the lengthy claims is devoted to enumerating 

types of information and information sources available 

within the power-grid environment. But merely selecting 

information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, 

and display does nothing significant to differentiate a 

process from ordinary mental processes, whose implicit 

exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based 

category of abstract ideas.

The claims in this case do not even require a new 

source or type of information, or new techniques for 

analyzing it. See, e.g., ’710 patent, col. 8, lines 51–62 

(referring to existing phasor data sources); J.A. 6969–71 

(describing workings and history of phasor data use); 

Electric Power Group Br. at 21–22; Reply Br. at 5 (new 

algorithms not claimed). As a result, they do not require 

an arguably inventive set of components or methods, such 

as measurement devices or techniques, that would generate new data. They do not invoke any assertedly inventive programming. Merely requiring the selection and 

manipulation of information—to provide a “humanly 

comprehensible” amount of information useful for users, 

Reply Br. at 6; Electric Power Group Br. at 14–15—by 

itself does not transform the otherwise-abstract processes 

of information collection and analysis.

Inquiry therefore must turn to any requirements for 

how the desired result is achieved. But in this case the 

claims’ invocation of computers, networks, and displays 

does not transform the claimed subject matter into patent-eligible applications. The claims at issue do not 

require any nonconventional computer, network, or 

display components, or even a “non-conventional and non-
10 ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 

generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but 

merely call for performance of the claimed information 

collection, analysis, and display functions “on a set of 

generic computer components” and display devices. 

Bascom, 2016 WL 3514158, at *6–7. 

Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for 

gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information. That is so even as to the claim requirement of 

“displaying concurrent visualization” of two or more types 

of information, ’710 patent, col. 31, line 37, even if understood to require time-synchronized display: nothing in the 

patent contains any suggestion that the displays needed 

for that purpose are anything but readily available. We

have repeatedly held that such invocations of computers 

and networks that are not even arguably inventive are 

“insufficient to pass the test of an inventive concept in the 

application” of an abstract idea. buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 

1353, 1355; see, e.g., Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice 

Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 

792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Internet Patents, 790 

F.3d at 1348–49; Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–48. 

Two of our decisions that rejected § 101 challenges are 

materially different from this case. The claims at issue 

here do not require an arguably inventive device or technique for displaying information, unlike the claims at 

issue in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 

1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (at JMOL stage finding inventive concept in modification of conventional mechanics 

behind website display to produce dual-source integrated 

hybrid display). Nor do the claims here require an arguably inventive distribution of functionality within a network, thus distinguishing the claims at issue from those 

in Bascom, 2016 WL 3514158, at *6 (at pleading stage 

finding sufficient inventive concept in “the installation of 
ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 11

a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the endusers, with customizable filtering features specific to each 

end user”). The claims in this case specify what information in the power-grid field it is desirable to gather, 

analyze, and display, including in “real time”; but they do 

not include any requirement for performing the claimed 

functions of gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real 

time by use of anything but entirely conventional, generic

technology. The claims therefore do not state an arguably 

inventive concept in the realm of application of the information-based abstract ideas.

The district court in this case wrapped up its application of the Supreme Court’s framework by invoking an 

important common-sense distinction between ends sought 

and particular means of achieving them, between desired 

results (functions) and particular ways of achieving 

(performing) them. The court identified the problem 

addressed by the patents: “Here, the problem is the need 

to monitor and analyze data from multiple distinct parts 

of a power grid.” J.A. 30. But, the court reasoned, “there 

is a critical difference between patenting a particular 

concrete solution to a problem and attempting to patent 

the abstract idea of a solution to the problem in general.” 

Id. Electric Power Group’s asserted claims, the court 

observed, do the latter: rather than claiming “some specific way of enabling a computer to monitor data from multiple sources across an electric power grid,” some 

“particular implementation,” they “purport to monopolize 

every potential solution to the problem”—any way of 

effectively monitoring multiple sources on a power grid. 

Id. Whereas patenting a particular solution “would 

incentivize further innovation in the form of alternative 

methods for achieving the same result,” the court concluded, allowing claims like Electric Power Group’s claims 

here would “inhibit[] innovation by prohibiting other 

inventors from developing their own solutions to the 

problem without first licensing the abstract idea.” Id.
12 ELECTRIC POWER GROUP, LLC v. ALSTOM S.A. 

The district court did not set forth that description as 

a freestanding basis for its ineligibility holding, independent of the framework for analysis established under the 

Supreme Court’s authority. Moreover, the district court 

phrased its point only by reference to claims so resultfocused, so functional, as to effectively cover any solution 

to an identified problem. The court’s description is one 

helpful way of double-checking the application of the 

Supreme Court’s framework to particular claims—

specifically, when determining whether the claims meet 

the requirement of an inventive concept in application. 

Indeed, the essentially result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a frequent feature of 

claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in the area 

of using generic computer and network technology to 

carry out economic transactions. See Loyalty Conversion 

Sys. Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 829, 

837–38, 840, 843, 845 (E.D. Tex. 2014). In this case, the 

district court’s wrap-up description confirms its, and our, 

conclusion that the claims at issue fail to meet the standard for patent eligibility under § 101. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court.

AFFIRMED