IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Majeda Mohammad,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:12-cv-702

J.P. Morgan Chase National

Corporate Services, Inc.,

et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This is an action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1), 42

U.S.C. §1981, and Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112 by plaintiff Majeda

Mohammad against defendants J.P. Morgan Chase National Corporate

Services, Inc. (“Chase”)1 and Brad Arnold, a former operations unit

manager for Chase. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that the

defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race

(Arabic), national origin (Iraq), and religion (Muslim) in failing

to hire her for three positions for which she allegedly interviewed

with Arnold on August 16, 2011. This matter is before the court on

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The central issue is “whether the evidence presents a

1 Chase notes that its correct business entity name is JPMorgan Chase Bank,

N.A.

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 1 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). A

party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must

support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in

the record, by showing that the materials cited do not establish

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or by demonstrating

that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support

the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) and (B). In considering a

motion for summary judgment, this court must draw all reasonable

inferences and view all evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. 

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986); Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kentucky,

641 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2011).

The moving party has the burden of proving the absence of a

genuine dispute and its entitlement to summary judgment as a matter

of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

The moving party’s burden of showing the lack of a genuine dispute

can be discharged by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to

establish an essential element of his case, for which he bears the

ultimate burden of proof at trial. Id. Once the moving party

meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Id. at

322 n. 3. “A dispute is ‘genuine’ only if based on evidence upon

which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” Niemi v. NHK Spring Co., Ltd., 543 F.3d 294, 298

(6th Cir. 2008). A fact is “material” only when it might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id; Anderson, 477

2

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 2 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
U.S. at 248.

The nonmovant must “do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts[.]” Matsuchita,

475 U.S. at 586. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461,

464 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, the nonmoving party has an

affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific

portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a

genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(3)(noting that the court “need consider only the cited

materials”).

II. Factual Background

The record reveals that plaintiff completed an application on

Chase’s online career site expressing an interest in the positions

of Senior Operations Analyst, Operations Specialist - Foreclosure

(“Operations Specialist”); Senior Operations Specialist -

Foreclosure (“Senior Operations Specialist”), and Operations

Manager, Foreclosure (“Operations Manager”), for which interviews

were to be held at an August 16, 2011, hiring event or job fair at

the Westerville, Ohio location. The job description for the

position of Operations Specialist stated that previous experience

in mortgage banking and foreclosure or legal experience were

preferred qualifications. Doc. 20-3, Ex. C; Doc. 20-12, Aff. of

Chase Recruiting Officer Mary DeMello, ¶ 5. Plaintiff’s resume

indicated that: she had a B.A. in education and social studies from

the University of Baghdad, Iraq; she was currently enrolled in a

distance-learning program in early childhood education at Ashworth

University in Georgia; she is fluent in Arabic and English; she was

3

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 3 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
familiar with Microsoft Office; and that she had previously taught

social studies and provided translation services; that she was

currently the owner and operator of a learning center in Dublin,

Ohio; and that she had established and operated a refugee services

center which provided a variety of social services. Doc. 20-2, Ex.

B.

According to the affidavit of Brad Arnold, plaintiff was a

walk-in candidate at the Chase job fair. Plaintiff stated that she

wanted to interview for the positions of Operations Specialist and

Operations Manager. Doc. 20-10, Arnold Aff., ¶ 2. Arnold was

conducting interviews for the position of Operations Specialist. 

He determined that plaintiff was not on his interview schedule,

which meant that plaintiff had not been selected by Human Resources

for an interview. Arnold Aff., ¶ 2. He also noted that plaintiff

was not on the list for an interview for the Operations Manager

position, which meant that plaintiff had not been selected by Human

Resources to interview for that position. Arnold Aff., ¶ 3. Mr.

Arnold told plaintiff that he would interview her for the

Operations Specialist position. Arnold explained that he was not

qualified to interview her for the Operations Manager position, and

that if he determined that she might be qualified for that

position, he would let an assistant vice president or vice

president know so that he or she could decide whether to invite

plaintiff to interview for that position. Arnold Aff., ¶ 4. 

However, Arnold informed her that Chase would most likely be

seeking someone with prior mortgage or default experience, and

plaintiff had neither. Arnold Aff., ¶ 4.

Arnold further stated in his affidavit that, in an effort to

4

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 4 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
“break the ice” prior to the interview, he asked plaintiff about

her first name. She responded that she was from Iraq, and Arnold

stated that he had been there while serving in the army. Plaintiff

asked several questions about his experience there, and Arnold

responded, trying to speak positively, indicating that the people

were very friendly and that the physical landscape was beautiful. 

This discussion lasted a few minutes. Arnold Aff., ¶¶ 6-7. Arnold

then proceeded to interview plaintiff, asking her questions about

her previous experience and other job-related matters. Arnold

Aff., ¶ 8. Plaintiff stated that she was looking for a career

change, but admitted that she did not have any prior mortgage

banking or foreclosure experience, and she was not familiar with

the job responsibilities of the Operations Specialist position. 

Arnold Aff., ¶ 10. At the conclusion of the interview, plaintiff

stated that it was nice to meet someone who knew her home country,

and Arnold responded that he would like to go back to Iraq some day

as a tourist. He informed plaintiff that from that point on, he

would not be communicating with her; rather, Human Resources would

continue any discussions regarding the status of her application. 

Arnold Aff., ¶ 11. Arnold stated that he never discussed with

plaintiff any of his war-related experiences while in Iraq. Arnold

Aff., ¶ 12. Arnold further stated that although he knew that

plaintiff was originally from Iraq, he did not know her race or

religion, which were never mentioned during the interview. Arnold

Aff., ¶15. 

Arnold also stated that he was impressed with plaintiff, and

that he recommended plaintiff for the position of Operations

Specialist despite the fact that she did not have the preferred

5

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 5 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
qualifications for the position. Arnold Aff., ¶ 13. Arnold

interviewed two other candidates for the Operations Specialist

position on August 16, 2013, a Caucasian male and a Caucasian

female. Arnold did not recommend the male candidate, who had no

prior mortgage, finance or banking experience, and who, unlike

plaintiff, did not have the communication skills necessary for the

position. Arnold also did not recommend the Caucasian female

candidate, who did have prior mortgage and finance experience,

because he did not think that she was otherwise suited for the

position. Arnold Aff., ¶14.

Following the interview, Arnold sent a “Chase Retail Financial

Services-Offer/Decline” form recommending plaintiff for hire in the

Operations Specialist position, which he identified as Exhibit E to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, to Assistant Vice

President/Operations Manager Christina Lieb August. On that form,

he noted that “Majeda is looking to change careers away from

teaching, and would make a great addition to foreclosure.” Ex. E. 

Arnold also identified Exhibit D as his interview notes. Arnold

Aff., ¶ 13. This form indicated that the position being discussed

was “Senior Ops Specialist/Operations Specialist - Foreclosure

Department.” On that form, Arnold stated that plaintiff “was

unaware of the job responsibilities” but was “familiar with Chase.” 

In answer to the question “what makes a good employee” and a “good

manager,” plaintiff responded, “good communicator” and “patience.” 

Arnold noted that in response to a question about adapting to a

changing environment, plaintiff indicated that she “would prefer

change to stagnation.” Arnold also noted that plaintiff wanted to

“work her way up,” that she “owns a language school,” that there

6

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 6 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
were no gaps in employment, and that she was not on any type of

disciplinary action or probation. After sending Exhibit E to

Christina August, he had no further involvement in the hiring

process for the Operations Specialist position. Arnold Aff., ¶ 16.

Plaintiff’s version of the interview on August 16th differs

from that provided by Arnold. Plaintiff stated that Arnold’s first

question to her was about her nationality. After she informed him

that she was from Iraq, Arnold “proceeded with a one-sided

conversation about his war experience in Iraq going into detail

about working in the Taji prison and his war experience in the city

of Faluja.” Mohammad Aff., ¶ 8. She stated that Arnold’s

conversation was “condescending, disrespectful and arrogant” and

made her feel humiliated and embarrassed. Mohammad Aff., ¶ 9. 

Plaintiff stated that Arnold asked only two job-related questions

about her degree and why she taught social studies. Mohammad Aff.,

¶ 10. At the end of the interview, Arnold informed her that there

was only one position she might be qualified for, and when she

asked who she should contact to follow up on the interview, he

curtly responded twice, “Don’t call me.” Mohammad Aff., ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff claimed that Arnold took no notes during the interview,

and that he did not have Exhibit D, the interview notes, with him

at that time. Mohammad Aff., ¶ 12.

Mary DeMello, the Chase recruiting officer responsible for

evaluating the candidates interviewed at the August 16, 2011, job

fair, stated in her affidavit that she received a list of

candidates from Christina August. DeMello Aff., ¶ 2. Twenty-seven

candidates applied for twenty open positions, and it was DeMello’s

responsibility to determine who to hire. DeMello Aff., ¶ 3. 

7

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 7 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
DeMello found that plaintiff did not meet the minimum preferred

qualifications for the Operations Specialist position. Plaintiff

was not extended an offer because there were more recommended

candidates than open positions, and plaintiff did not meet the

preferred minimum qualifications for the position. DeMello Aff.,

¶ 4. At that time, DeMello had no knowledge of plaintiff’s

national origin, race or religion. DeMello Aff., ¶ 5.

Following the interview, plaintiff telephoned her to ask about

the status of her offer. At that point, DeMello informed plaintiff

that she had not yet received any feedback from the interviews,

that selected candidates would be notified by telephone, and that

non-selected candidates would be notified by e-mail. DeMello Aff.,

¶ 7. Later that day or the following day, plaintiff called again

to ask about her offer. DeMello returned the call and left a

message stating that the decision-making process was still ongoing. DeMello Aff., ¶ 8. Plaintiff called a third time and asked

to discuss the details of her offer. DeMello was taken aback by

this, as she had never indicated to plaintiff that she would be

receiving an offer. Plaintiff asked for the name and number of

DeMello’s manager. DeMello informed plaintiff that her manager was

John Morell, and that she would have him contact plaintiff. 

DeMello Aff., ¶ 9.

Plaintiff was notified by e-mail on August 24, 2011, that she

was not selected for the Operations Specialist position. DeMello

Aff., ¶ 6; Doc. 20-6, Ex. F. The e-mail advised plaintiff that she

was not selected for the position of Operations Specialist. The email further stated that plaintiff’s profile would remain in the

system, and it encouraged plaintiff to continue to explore other

8

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 8 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
positions and to visit the career site from time to time to update

her profile.

On August 17, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint with Chase

concerning her interview with Arnold. Mohammad Aff., ¶ 13; Doc.

20-7, Ex. G. Plaintiff stated in her affidavit that on August 18,

2011, she received a message from DeMello wanting to talk about

“the problem.” When plaintiff called DeMello, she did not discuss

“the problem,” but rather asked her it she was still interested in

a job with Chase. Plaintiff said that she was, and DeMello

promised to get back with her in a few days. Mohammad Aff., ¶ 14. 

Plaintiff called DeMello on August 22, 2011, to ask about the job,

and DeMello replied, “Why are you in such a hurry? You just had

the interview on August 16, 2011.” DeMello said she would call in

a few days. Plaintiff further stated that when she called DeMello

on August 31, 2011, DeMello denied ever talking to her before, and

informed plaintiff that she had not been accepted in any position. 

When plaintiff asked for the name of DeMello’s supervisor, she

responded “John Morell” and stated that she would have Morell

contact her. When plaintiff did not hear from Morell, she sent him

a letter on September 5, 2011, complaining about her interview with

Arnold and her interactions with DeMello. Mohammad Aff., ¶ 17;

Doc. 20-8, Ex. H.

John Morell, Vice President/Recruiting Officer II for Chase,

stated in his affidavit that on August 17, 2013, he was given a

letter from plaintiff by Amal Aziz, a Chase employee and

plaintiff’s friend. In this letter, identified as Exhibit G,

plaintiff alleged that Arnold’s first question was about her

national origin, and that Arnold spent a great deal of the

9

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 9 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
interview talking about his war experience in Iraq. In her letter,

plaintiff claimed that Arnold “thought of me as a captive audience

on whom he can safely unload his ‘psychological burden of war.’” 

Doc. 20-7, Ex. G. Plaintiff stated that Arnold was “condescending,

disrespectful and arrogant” and that it was “very embarrassing and

humiliating.” Ex. G. Plaintiff alleged that Arnold told her that

she was not qualified for the position of manager, and that, of

twelve postings, she might qualify for one, but he refused to tell

her which position that was. Plaintiff stated that she asked

Arnold which job the interview was for, and he told her “None.” 

Ex. G. Plaintiff concluded that “strong elements of bias in Mr.

Arnold’s conduct and demeanor were filtering through his facade. 

Surely, Chase would not allow its reputation to be maligned as a

discriminatory organization.” Ex. G. Morell forwarded the letter

to Human Resources for investigation. Doc. 20-11, Morell Aff., ¶

2.

On September 5, 2011, Morell received an e-mail from plaintiff

complaining about her interactions with DeMello. Morell Aff., ¶ 3. 

He telephoned plaintiff on September 7, 2011, to acknowledge

receipt of her e-mail and to inform her that the matter would be

investigated. Both Arnold and DeMello were contacted by Human

Resources concerning plaintiff’s complaints. Arnold Aff., ¶ 17;

DeMello Aff., ¶ 10. Following the investigation, Morell was

informed by Human Services that Arnold and DeMello did not act

inappropriately. Morell Aff., ¶¶ 2, 4. On September 9, 2011,

Morell telephoned plaintiff and told her that her complaints had

been investigated and that Chase had found no evidence of

inappropriate or discriminatory practices in the hiring process. 

10

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 10 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
He also informed plaintiff that she was welcome to apply for other

positions at Chase. Morell Aff., ¶ 5. 

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission on October 4, 2011. The EEOC

issued a right-to-sue letter on or about May 16, 2012.

III. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Applicable Standards

Absent direct evidence of discrimination,2 plaintiff’s

failure-to-hire discrimination claims under Title VII, §1981 and

Ohio Rev. Code §4112.02 are governed by the burden-shifting

framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391

(6th Cir. 2008)(applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to Title VII

and §1981 claims); Laderach v. U-Haul of Northwestern Ohio, 207

F.3d 825, 828 (6th Cir. 2000)(Title VII standards apply to Ohio

discrimination laws)(citing Little Forest Med. Ctr. of Akron v.

Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 575 N.E.2d 1164, 1167

(1991)).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a

preponderance of the evidence. White, 533 F.3d at 391. To

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must

2 There is no direct evidence of discrimination in this case. Direct

evidence is evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful

discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions. Amini

v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2006). Where one must draw an

inference to determine the actor’s motivation, the evidence is not direct. 

Romans v. Michigan Dep’t of Human Services, 668 F.3d 826, 836 (6th Cir. 2012). 

Because it would be necessary to infer from Arnold’s inquiry about plaintiff’s

national origin and his discussion of his wartime experiences in Iraq that his

actions or decisions were motivated at least in part by a discriminatory animus

based on her national origin, his statements do not constitute direct evidence.

11

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 11 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
demonstrate: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2)

that she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that she was

qualified for the position; and (4) that another similarly-situated

candidate outside the protected class was hired or treated more

favorably, or that the employer continued to seek applications from

persons with plaintiff’s qualifications. Rodriguez-Monguio v. Ohio

State University, 499 Fed.Appx. 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2012)(citing

Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir.

2010)); Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court, 392 F.3d 151, 165-66

n. 12 (6th Cir. 2004).

Once plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden

shifts to the defendants to “offer evidence” of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. White,

533 F.3d at 391; see also Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 726 F.3d

851, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2013)(defendant’s burden is one of

production, not persuasion). If the defendants succeed in this

task, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

defendants’ proffered reason was not the true reason, but merely a

pretext for discrimination. Adamov, 726 F.3d at 854 (burden was on

plaintiff to demonstrate by competent evidence that the

presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a

coverup for a discriminatory decision); White, 533 F.3d at 391-92;

Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th

Cir. 1994). Although the burdens of production shift, the ultimate

burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendants

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all

times with the plaintiff. White, 533 F.3d at 392.

Pretext may be established by showing that the employer’s

12

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 12 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
stated reason for the adverse employment action either: (1) has no

basis in fact; (2) was not the actual reason; or (3) is

insufficient to explain the employer’s action. Imwalle v. Reliance

Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff

may demonstrate pretext by offering evidence which challenges the

reasonableness of the employer’s decision “to the extent that such

an inquiry shed light on whether the employer’s proffered reason

for the employment action was its actual motivation.” Wexler v.

White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 578 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove pretext, and to

survive summary judgment, she must provide evidence that could lead

a reasonable jury to find that the defendants’ proffered reasons

for declining to hire her were pretextual. Davis v. Cintas Corp.,

717 F.3d 476, 492 (6th Cir. 2013).

B. Defendant’s Knowledge of Plaintiff’s Membership in Protected

Groups

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff is a native of Iraq,

that her race is Arabic, and that her religion is Muslim. However,

in proving a case of discrimination, plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that the decision-maker for the employer had actual

knowledge of her membership in these protected classes. See

Prebilich-Holland v. Gaylord Entertainment Co., 297 F.3d 438, 443-

444 (6th Cir. 2002).

In this case, there is no evidence that Brad Arnold, the

person who interviewed plaintiff, or Mary DeMello, the recruiting

officer who made the decision not to hire plaintiff, knew that

plaintiff’s race was Arabic, or that she was a Muslim. Plaintiff

has provided no evidence that anyone at Chase commented on her race

13

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 13 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
or religion, nor does plaintiff claim that she and Arnold discussed

her race or religion during the interview. Because there is no

evidence in the record concerning plaintiff’s physical appearance,

it cannot be inferred that Arnold, in meeting plaintiff, would

think of her as anything other than Caucasian. Arnold also stated

in his affidavit that he did not know plaintiff’s race or religion. 

Arnold Aff., ¶ 15. The first time plaintiff referred to her race

and religion was in her September 5, 2011, e-mail correspondence to

DeMello’s supervisor, John Morell. This occurred after DeMello’s 

August 24, 2011, decision not to extend plaintiff an offer. See

Doc. 22-2, DeMello Aff. ¶¶ 14-15; Doc. 20-8, Ex. H.

DeMello, who reviewed the referrals from the interviews and

made the decision concerning which candidates would receive job

offers, stated that she had no knowledge of plaintiff’s race,

religion, or national origin at the time she made her decision. 

DeMello Aff., ¶¶ 3, 5. DeMello also stated in her affidavit that

she did not make any conclusions about plaintiff’s race, religion

or national origin based upon information provided in her resume,

such as where she attended college (Baghdad), the languages she

speaks, or her extracurricular activities. Doc. 22-2, DeMello

Aff., ¶ 14. Plaintiff’s name alone would not establish that

DeMello would have been aware of that information. The well-known

African-American boxer, Muhammad Ali, who changed his name from

Cassius Clay, is one example of how a Middle Eastern-sounding name

is not necessarily an accurate indicator of race or national

origin. In this day of global travel and interaction, it is not

unusual for individuals to live, work, marry or study outside their

native country.

14

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 14 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Arnold stated that he did know that plaintiff was from Iraq. 

Arnold Aff., ¶ 15. In view of Arnold’s knowledge of plaintiff’s

national origin, the relevant question is whether he took any

adverse action which influenced DeMello’s decision not to hire

plaintiff.

The first dispute of fact plaintiff attempts to raise concerns

the number of positions for which she actually interviewed. 

Plaintiff claims that she attended the August 16, 2011, hiring event

for the positions of Operations Specialist, Senior Operations

Specialist, and Operations Manager.3

 Mohammad Aff., ¶ 6. She

stated that she was interviewed by Arnold “for what I believed to

be all three job positions[.]” Mohammad Aff., ¶ 7. Plaintiff’s

subjective and conclusory allegations that she “believed” that she

was interviewing for all three positions when she talked with Arnold

are insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact in

regard to Arnold’s statement that he interviewed plaintiff only for

the Operations Specialist position. See Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d

795, 804 (6th Cir. 1996); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577,

584-85 (6th Cir. 1992)(“conclusory allegations and subjective

beliefs ... are wholly insufficient evidence to establish a claim

of discrimination as a matter of law”). Plaintiff’s affidavit is

also insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), as it fails to

disclose that she had any personal knowledge concerning Chase’s

interview practices and procedures. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584.

Defendant has presented evidence that plaintiff was not invited

3

 The job number 110067669 referred to by plaintiff in her affidavit as

being connected with the position of senior operations specialist was actually

the job requisition number for the position of Senior Operations Analyst. See

Doc. 20-1, Ex. A, p. 1.

15

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 15 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
by Human Resources to the August 16, 2011, job fair to interview for

any of the three positions. Plaintiff was interviewed by Arnold for

the position of Operations Manager as a walk-in applicant. Doc. 22-

2, DeMello Aff., ¶ 11; Arnold Aff., ¶¶ 2-4. Arnold explained to

plaintiff that he could only interview her for the position of

Operations Specialist because he was not qualified to interview her

for the management level position of Operations Manager. Arnold

Aff., ¶ 4. Exhibit E, the Offer/Decline Form Arnold forwarded to

Christina August, recommended offering plaintiff the position of

Operations Specialist, hiring number 110053989. The computer

printout of plaintiff’s job application file includes a note by

DeMello next to the position of Senior Operations Specialist, hiring

number 110053992, that plaintiff was interviewed on August 16, 2011,

but that note does not specifically state that plaintiff was

interviewed for the position of Senior Operations Specialist. 

Significantly, the entry for the Operations Specialist position for

which plaintiff was interviewed includes the notation “Offer 1 -

Created” dated August 18, 2011, but the record for the Senior

Operations Specialist position does not. See Doc. 22-7, Ex. B, pp.

32-34. The computer printout does not indicate that plaintiff

interviewed for any other positions on August 16, 2011.

Defendants have also presented additional evidence on the issue

of whether plaintiff interviewed for other positions. Assistant

Vice President/Foreclosure Manager Michael Fleshman stated in his

affidavit that Arnold did not conduct the interviews for the

positions of Operations Manager and Senior Operations Analyst;

rather, those interviews were conducted by Fleshman and other

employees. Doc. 22-1, Fleshman Aff., ¶ 6. The only rejection e16

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 16 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
mail sent to plaintiff which is included in the record is the August

24, 2011, e-mail referring to the Operations Specialist, hiring

number 110053989. See Ex. E.

The only evidence in the record concerning Arnold’s involvement

in the hiring process for the position of Operations Specialist is

that Arnold recommended plaintiff for hire for the Operations

Specialist position despite the fact that she did not have the

preferred qualifications for the position and had no relevant

experience. Arnold Aff., ¶ 13. Arnold identified Exhibit E as the

“Chase Retail financial Services-Offer/Decline Form he completed for

plaintiff, and Exhibit D as his interview notes. Arnold Aff., ¶ 13. 

After sending Exhibit E, the Offer/Decline form, to Assistant Vice

President/Operations Manager Christina Lieb August, he had no

further involvement in the hiring process. Arnold Aff., ¶ 16.

Plaintiff now seeks to raise a dispute of fact about the

authenticity of Exhibits D, E and F. In regard to Exhibit D,

identified by Arnold as his notes from his interview with plaintiff,

see Arnold Aff., ¶ 13, plaintiff claims that Arnold did not take any

notes during the interview. Mohammed Aff., ¶ 12. However, Arnold

did not specify that he wrote the notes during the interview; they

easily could have been completed afterward.

Plaintiff also challenges Exhibits E and F. Exhibit E is an

Offer/Decline Form for the Operations Specialist position, hiring

requisition no. 110053989, which is filled in by hand, with the

“OFFER” box checked. The form includes the date “07/27/2011" typed

at the top. Exhibit F is the rejection e-mail dated August 24,

2011, which informed plaintiff of her non-selection for the position

of Operations Specialist, no. 110053989. with no discussion of the

17

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 17 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
factual basis for her belief, plaintiff claims that these forms

related to a previous Chase job fair she attended on July 26, 2011,

when she allegedly interviewed with Mike Fleshman for the position

of Operations Specialist. Mohammad Aff., ¶¶ 3-5. Plaintiff suggests

that defendants are attempting to fraudulently substitute documents

from the earlier interview in an effort to falsely establish that

Arnold recommended her for hire, thereby minimizing Arnold’s

allegedly discriminatory actions.

Defendants note that although Exhibit E refers to a position

“Reporting To: Mike Fleshman,” Fleshman’s name does not appear

anywhere on the form as the interviewer. Fleshman stated in his

affidavit that he has never have any contact with plaintiff, has

never interviewed plaintiff for or in connection with any position

at Chase, and has never completed an Offer/Decline Form relating to

plaintiff. Fleshman Aff., ¶ 3. DeMello stated in her affidavit

that Chase did not hold any hiring event on July 26, 2011, and that

August 16, 2011, was the only time plaintiff interviewed for the

Operations Specialist position. Doc. 22-2, DeMello Aff., ¶ 16.

Even accepting plaintiff’s conclusory statement that she

interviewed with Fleshman on July 26, 2011, this evidence is

insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact concerning

the authenticity of Exhibit E as being the Offer/Decline document

prepared by Arnold following his interview with plaintiff, or of

Exhibit F as being the e-mail notification of non-selection relating

to the August 16th interview identified by DeMello. With their reply

memorandum, defendants have submitted additional evidence

establishing that Exhibit E was completed by Arnold following his

interview of plaintiff on August 16, 2011. Christina August stated

18

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 18 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
in her affidavit that she was responsible for compiling the

Offer/Decline Forms in connection with the Operations Specialist

position, job number 110053989. Doc. 22-3, August Aff., ¶ 3. She

identified Reply Exhibit A as an e-mail dated August 16, 2011, which

she received from Arnold with the subject line “Offer-Decline forms

8/16 hiring event: with “Majeda Mohammed [sic] - Offer 110053989"

as an attached document. The attached document is a typed version

of Exhibit E, the Offer/Decline Form, bears the correct interview

date of 8/16/2011, with plaintiff as the person being interviewed

for job number 110053989, and the “OFFER” box is checked. The date

on Exhibit E is “07/27/2011," not July 26, 2011, the date on which

plaintiff alleges that she interviewed with Fleshman. The Interview

Notes box includes the same language which was handwritten in that

box on Exhibit E, namely, “Majeda is looking to change careers away

from teaching, and would make a great addition to the foreclosure

department.” In addition, DeMello identified Exhibit F as the email plaintiff received informing her that she was not selected for

the position of Operations Specialist after DeMello evaluated the

candidates recommended for offers at the August 16, 2011, job fair. 

Doc. 20-12, DeMello Aff., ¶¶ 2, 4-6. 

There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Arnold

recommended that plaintiff receive an offer for the position of

Operations Specialist. There is also no evidence from which a jury

could reasonably find that any discriminatory animus Arnold may have

felt based on plaintiff’s national origin adversely impacted

DeMello’s decision-making process.

DeMello, who reviewed the referrals from the interviews and

made the decision concerning which candidates would receive job

19

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 19 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
offers, stated that she had no knowledge of plaintiff’s race,

religion, or national origin at the time she made the decision not

to hire plaintiff on August 24, 2011. DeMello Aff., ¶¶ 3, 5-6. 

DeMello also stated that on August 24, 2011, she was not aware that

plaintiff had any issues with her interview with Arnold. Doc. 22-2,

DeMello Aff., ¶ 15. DeMello was also unaware on August 24, 2011,

that plaintiff had any complaints about her interaction with

DeMello; plaintiff’s letter to Morell complaining about DeMello was

e-mailed to him on September 5, 2011. DeMello Aff., ¶ 15.

Plaintiff seeks to create a dispute of fact concerning

DeMello’s knowledge of her national origin, race or religion by

claiming that on August 18, 2011, she received a voice mail message

from DeMello stating that she wanted to discuss “the problem.” 

Plaintiff stated that when she returned DeMello’s call, DeMello did

not discuss “the problem” and only asked if plaintiff was still

interested in a job with Chase. Mohammad Aff., ¶ 14. Plaintiff

claimed that on August 31, 2011, after the rejection notice of

August 24, 2011, she called DeMello again and DeMello denied ever

having had a conversation with plaintiff. Mohammad Aff., ¶ 16. 

Even assuming that DeMello made the statements attributed to her by

plaintiff, there is no evidence that DeMello ever made any reference

to plaintiff’s national origin, race or religion in any of these

conversations. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that DeMello ever

explained what she meant by “the problem.” The nature of “the

problem” allegedly mentioned by DeMello in her phone message is

purely speculative. This vague reference to “the problem” is not

sufficient to raise an inference that DeMello was aware of

plaintiff’s national origin, race or religion, or that she had any

20

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 20 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
knowledge of plaintiff’s complaints concerning her interview with

Arnold.

Plaintiff also attempts to discredit DeMello by claiming that

DeMello went on-line and cancelled out each of the positions that

plaintiff applied and interviewed for with Arnold on August 16,

2011. However, DeMello stated that each position was assigned both

a sourcing requisition number (when the position was opened in the

system by the recruiter assigned to fill the position in

anticipation of the one-day hiring event) and a hiring requisition

number. Doc. 22-2, DeMello Aff., ¶¶ 5, 7, 10. After the hiring

event was concluded, the sourcing requisition numbers were no longer

relevant, and DeMello cancelled them on August 23, 2011. DeMello

Aff., ¶ 8. The hiring requisition number for the position of

Operations Specialist, 110053989, remained in the system, and was

used to hire individuals for the open Operations Specialist

positions. DeMello Aff., ¶ 9. The deletion of the sourcing

requisition numbers by DeMello fails to prove that DeMello acted

improperly during the hiring process.

The evidence fails to show that DeMello, the person who

ultimately decided not to extend plaintiff a job offer, had any

knowledge of plaintiff’s national origin, race or religion or was

negatively influenced by Arnold or anyone who had such knowledge. 

No genuine dispute of material fact has been shown to exist in that

regard, and plaintiff has not established the first element of her

prima facie case.

C. Qualified for the Position

The second element of the prima facie case requires evidence

sufficient to prove that plaintiff was qualified for the job. The

21

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 21 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
job description for the position of Operations Specialist states

that mortgage banking experience was preferred, and that previous

foreclosure or legal experience was preferred. Doc. 20-3, Ex. C. 

Plaintiff admitted to Arnold that she did not have any prior

mortgage banking experience or previous foreclosure experience. 

Arnold Aff., ¶ 10. Plaintiff’s resume reflects no mortgage banking,

foreclosure or legal experience and plaintiff has presented no other

evidence that she has any such experience. See Doc. 20-2, Ex. B. 

However, without discussing the factual basis for her knowledge,

plaintiff now argues that when she completed the on-line application

process and received an acknowledgment of receipt of her

application, she was automatically pre-qualified for the positions

for which she applied.

There is no evidence in the record to support plaintiff’s claim

that she was pre-qualified for these three positions prior to her

interview. DeMello stated in her affidavit that Chase’s on-line

application process uses information provided by the applicant to

automatically generate computer notifications of open positions for

which an applicant may want to apply. Doc. 22-2, DeMello Aff., ¶

3. If the applicant receives a job posting notification, that does

not mean that the applicant is pre-qualified for the position. At

the time such notices are sent, no Chase recruiter has reviewed the

applicant’s qualifications, and Chase does not pre-qualify any

applicant for a position. DeMello Aff., ¶ 4.

The language of the computer notifications sent to plaintiff

speaks for itself. The notice acknowledged that each of plaintiff’s

applications expressing an interest in the positions of Operations

Specialist, Senior Operations Analyst and Operations Manager “has

22

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 22 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
been successfully received.” The notices further stated that “[a]

member of our Staffing department will review your qualifications. 

Those candidates with the experience and qualifications that

correspond to our requirements may be contacted by a member of our

Staffing department.” See Doc. 22-8, Reply Ex. C. There is no

evidence that plaintiff was ever contacted by a Staffing member. 

According to DeMello, plaintiff was not pre-qualified for any

position for which she received a job posting notification or for

which she applied, and Chase did not invite plaintiff to attend the

August 16, 2011, job fair. DeMello Aff., ¶¶ 4, 11. DeMello also

determined that plaintiff did not meet the minimum preferred

qualifications for the Operations Specialist position. DeMello

Aff., ¶ 13.

The evidence is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of

material fact in regard to whether plaintiff was qualified for any

of the positions for which she applied.

D. Adverse Employment Action

The third element of the prima facie case is that plaintiff

suffered an adverse employment action. The evidence shows that

plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action when she was not

hired for the Operations Specialist position. Therefore, this

element of the prima facie case is satisfied. However, because the

evidence is insufficient to show the existence of a genuine dispute

of material fact in regard to whether plaintiff interviewed for the

positions of Senior Operations Specialist, Senior Operations Analyst

and Operations Manager Foreclosure, or whether she received notice

of her non-selection for those positions, her claim of

discrimination based on Chase’s failure to hire her for those

23

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 23 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
positions fails.

E. Similarly-Situated Persons Outside Protected Group Were Hired

The fourth element of the prima facie case requires plaintiff

to prove that another similarly-situated candidate outside the

protected class was hired or treated more favorably, or that the

employer continued to seek applications from persons with

plaintiff’s qualifications. See White, 429 F.3d at 242 (in order

to satisfy the fourth prong, plaintiff must establish that she and

the non-protected person who ultimately was hired for the desired

position had similar qualifications). Plaintiff acknowledges that

she has no direct evidence indicating that comparable, non-protected

persons were treated more favorably. Doc. 21, p. 12. However, she

claims for the first time in her memorandum contra defendants’

motion for summary judgment that she does not have this information

because it is in the defendants’ possession.

Defendants note that plaintiff and her counsel never requested

the production of information concerning the other individuals who

were hired for the Operations Specialist position following the

August 16, 2011, job fair in the discovery phase of this case. 

Chase provided answers, responses and objections to plaintiff’s

First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of

Documents, see Doc. 21, Ex. 3, and Arnold provided answers,

responses and objections to plaintiff’s Request for Admissions,

Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, see Doc.

22, Ex. D. Eve M. Ellinger, co-counsel for defendants, stated in

her affidavit that at no time did plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel

contact her or Chase to complain that Chase’s discovery responses

24

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 24 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
were deficient in any way. Doc. 22-5, Ellinger Aff., ¶ 3. She also

stated that plaintiff and her counsel never contacted her regarding

taking depositions, and never sent a notice for depositions.

The scheduling order entered by the magistrate judge on

November 14, 2012, set a discovery deadline of May 7, 2013, thus

allowing almost six months for discovery. The record reveals that

plaintiff never moved to extend that deadline, and never filed a

motion to compel discovery or a notice of deposition. Under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(d) (formerly Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)), a nonmovant may

show by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it

cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, and

request that the court allow time for additional discovery. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(d)(2). Plaintiff never filed a motion under Rule

56(d). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), a party moving for

summary judgment may rely on a variety of materials in the record,

including documents, electronically stored information, and

affidavits. Defendants were under no obligation to schedule

depositions on their own initiative, with no request from plaintiff,

in order to provide plaintiff with discoverable information.

Having failed to fully take advantage of the discovery process,

plaintiff cannot excuse her failure to provide evidence sufficient

to establish the fourth element of her prima facie case by saying

that the information is in the custody of the defendants. Because

there is no evidence that other similarly-situated applicants

outside plaintiff’s protected class were hired for the Operations

Specialist positions, plaintiff has failed show that she could prove

the fourth element of her prima facie case.

F. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason for Failure to Hire

25

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 25 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Even assuming that plaintiff had established a prima facie

case, defendants have advanced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for not hiring plaintiff. The job description for the

Operations Specialist position stated that mortgage banking

experience was preferred, and that previous foreclosure or legal

experience was preferred. Doc. 20-3, Ex. C. Plaintiff did not have

these qualifications. Doc. 20-3, Ex. B; Arnold Aff., ¶ 10. DeMello

stated that there were twenty-seven candidates who were interviewed

on August 16, 2011, and who were recommended to receive offers. 

Doc. 20-12, DeMello Aff., ¶ 3. DeMello determined that plaintiff

did not meet the minimum preferred qualifications for the Operations

Specialist position. Plaintiff did not receive an offer because

there were more recommended candidates than open positions, and

plaintiff did not meet the preferred minimum qualification for the

position. DeMello Aff., ¶ 4. In plaintiff’s computer file, DeMello

noted On August 24, 2011, in connection with the Operations

Specialist position, number 110053989, that plaintiff “lacks

foreclosure/mortgage exp.” Doc. 22-7, p. 32.

Although plaintiff acknowledges that defendants’ burden is one

“of production, not persuasion[,]” plaintiff argues that defendants

“offer little to this court to prove that their reason was

legitimate and non-discriminatory[.]” See Doc. 21, pp. 14-15. 

Defendants were only required to “offer evidence of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” White,

533 F.3d at 391; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.

133, 142 (2000)(the employer’s burden is one of production, not

persuasion). The defendants have offered competent evidence in the

form of affidavits and documentary evidence sufficient to meet their

26

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 26 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
burden of producing evidence of a legitimate reason for Chase’s

reason not to hire plaintiff. 

G. Proof of Pretext

Pretext may be established by showing that the employer’s

stated reason for the adverse employment action either: (1) has no

basis in fact; (2) was not the actual reason; or (3) is insufficient

to explain the employer’s action. Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 545. 

Plaintiff has not met this burden. She does not dispute that she

has no prior mortgage banking, foreclosure or legal experience. 

Plaintiff has produced no evidence that her lack of these

qualifications has no basis in fact or was not the actual reason for

Chase’s failure to hire her. She has offered no evidence that her

lack of these qualifications was insufficient to explain Chase’s

action.

Plaintiff argues that defendants were required to show that the

twenty applicants who were awarded Operations Specialist positions

had prior mortgage banking, foreclosure or legal experience. This

mischaracterizes the defendants’ burden and improperly shifts the

burden of showing pretext away from plaintiff. See Adamov, 726 F.3d

at 854. It is plaintiff “who needed to ‘demonstrate by competent

evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for [her] rejection

were in fact a coverup for a ... discriminatory decision.’” Id.

(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805); see also Davis, 717

F.3d at 492 (to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must provide

evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to find that the

defendants’ proffered reasons for declining to hire here were

pretextual). Plaintiff has not met her burden in this case.

IV. Conclusion

27

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 27 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>
The court concludes that no genuine dispute of material fact

has been shown to exist in this case, and that defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims. The defendants’

motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) is granted. The clerk is

directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants on all of

plaintiff’s claims.

Date: October 28, 2013 s/James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge 

28

Case: 2:12-cv-00702-JLG-NMK Doc #: 23 Filed: 10/28/13 Page: 28 of 28 PAGEID #: <pageID>