(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST ET AL. v. DRIEHAUS ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 13–193. Argued April 22, 2014—Decided June 16, 2014 

Respondent Driehaus, a former Congressman, filed a complaint with

the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that petitioner Susan B. Anthony List (SBA) violated an Ohio law that criminalizes certain false

statements made during the course of a political campaign. Specifically, Driehaus alleged that SBA violated the law when it stated that 

his vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)

was a vote in favor of “taxpayer funded abortion.” After Driehaus 

lost his re-election bid, the complaint was dismissed, but SBA continued to pursue a separate suit in Federal District Court challenging 

the law on First Amendment grounds. Petitioner Coalition Opposed 

to Additional Spending and Taxes (COAST) also filed a First

Amendment challenge to the Ohio law, alleging that it had planned 

to disseminate materials presenting a similar message but refrained 

due to the proceedings against SBA. The District Court consolidated 

the two lawsuits and dismissed them as nonjusticiable, concluding 

that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury for purposes

of standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on ripeness 

grounds. 

Held: Petitioners have alleged a sufficiently imminent injury for Article

III purposes. Pp. 7–18.

(a) To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show, inter 

alia, an “injury in fact,” which must be “concrete and particularized”

and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560. When challenging a law 

prior to its enforcement, a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges “an intention to engage in a course of 

conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution 
 

 

 

 

 

2 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Syllabus 

thereunder.” Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298. Pp. 7–11.

(b) Petitioners have alleged a credible threat of enforcement of the

Ohio law. Pp. 11–17.

(1) Petitioners have alleged “an intention to engage in a course of 

conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest” by pleading

specific statements they intend to make in future election cycles. 

Pp. 11–12. 

(2) Petitioners’ intended future conduct is also “arguably . . . proscribed by [the] statute.” The Ohio false statement statute sweeps 

broadly, and a panel of the Ohio Elections Commission already found 

probable cause to believe that SBA violated the law when it made

statements similar to those petitioners plan to make in the future. 

Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, is distinguishable; the threat of 

prosecution under an electoral leafletting ban in that case was wholly

conjectural because the plaintiff’s “sole concern” related to a former

Congressman who was unlikely to run for office again. Here, by contrast, petitioners’ speech focuses on the broader issue of support for

the ACA, not on the voting record of a single candidate. Nor does 

SBA’s insistence that its previous statements were true render its

fears of enforcement misplaced. After all, that insistence did not prevent the Commission from finding probable cause for a violation the

first time. Pp. 12–13. 

(3) Finally, the threat of future enforcement is substantial. 

There is a history of past enforcement against petitioners. Past enforcement against the same conduct is good evidence that the threat

of enforcement is not “ ‘chimerical.’ ” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 

452, 459. The credibility of that threat is bolstered by the fact that a

complaint may be filed with the State Commission by “any person,” 

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.153(A), not just a prosecutor or agency. 

The threatened Commission proceedings are of particular concern 

because of the burden they impose on electoral speech. Moreover, the 

target of a complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources to hire legal counsel and respond to discovery requests in the 

crucial days before an election. But this Court need not decide 

whether the threat of Commission proceedings standing alone is sufficient; here, those proceedings are backed by the additional threat of

criminal prosecution. Pp. 14–17.

(c) The Sixth Circuit separately considered two other “prudential 

factors”: “fitness” and “hardship.” This Court need not resolve the 

continuing vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine in this case because those factors are easily satisfied here. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 

v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. ___. Pp. 17–18. 

525 Fed. Appx. 415, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–193 

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
 

STEVEN DRIEHAUS ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 16, 2014] 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Petitioners in this case seek to challenge an Ohio statute that prohibits certain “false statements” during the

course of a political campaign. The question in this case

is whether their preenforcement challenge to that law is 

justiciable—and in particular, whether they have alleged a

sufficiently imminent injury for the purposes of Article III. 

We conclude that they have. 

I 

The Ohio statute at issue prohibits certain “false statement[s]” “during the course of any campaign for nomination or election to public office or office of a political party.” 

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.21(B) (Lexis 2013). As relevant here, the statute makes it a crime for any person to

“[m]ake a false statement concerning the voting record of a 

candidate or public official,” §3517.21(B)(9), or to “[p]ost,

publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a 

false statement concerning a candidate, either knowing 

the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether 
 

 

 

 

2 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

it was false or not,” §3517.21(B)(10).1 

“[A]ny person” acting on personal knowledge may file a

complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission (or Commission) alleging a violation of the false statement statute.

§3517.153(A) (Lexis Supp. 2014). If filed within 60 days

of a primary election or 90 days of a general election, the 

complaint is referred to a panel of at least three Commission members. §§3517.156(A), (B)(1) (Lexis 2013). The 

panel must then hold an expedited hearing, generally 

within two business days, §3517.156(B)(1), to determine 

whether there is probable cause to believe the alleged 

violation occurred, §3517.156(C). Upon a finding of probable cause, the full Commission must, within 10 days, hold 

a hearing on the complaint. §3517.156(C)(2); see also Ohio

Admin. Code §3517–1–10(E) (2008).

The statute authorizes the full Commission to subpoena 

witnesses and compel production of documents. Ohio Rev. 

Code Ann. §3517.153(B) (Lexis Supp. 2014). At the full 

hearing, the parties may make opening and closing statements and present evidence. Ohio Admin. Code §§3517– 

1–11(B)(2)(c), (d), (g). If the Commission determines by 

“clear and convincing evidence” that a party has violated 

—————— 

1Section 3517.21(B) provides in relevant part: 

“No person, during the course of any campaign for nomination or

election to public office or office of a political party, by means of campaign materials, including sample ballots, an advertisement on radio or 

television or in a newspaper or periodical, a public speech, press release, or otherwise, shall knowingly and with intent to affect the

outcome of such campaign do any of the following: 

. . . . . 

“(9) Make a false statement concerning the voting record of a candidate or public official;

“(10) Post, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a

false statement concerning a candidate, either knowing the same to be

false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, if the

statement is designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of

the candidate.” 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

the false statement law, the Commission “shall” refer the 

matter to the relevant county prosecutor. Ohio Rev. Code 

Ann. §§3517.155(D)(1)–(2) (Lexis Supp. 2014). Alternatively, the Commission’s regulations state that it may 

simply issue a reprimand. See Ohio Admin. Code §3517– 

1–14(D). Violation of the false statement statute is a firstdegree misdemeanor punishable by up to six months of 

imprisonment, a fine up to $5,000, or both. Ohio Rev. 

Code Ann. §§3599.40 (Lexis 2013), 3517.992(V) (Lexis

Supp. 2014). A second conviction under the false statement statute is a fourth-degree felony that carries a mandatory penalty of disfranchisement. §3599.39. 

II 

Petitioner Susan B. Anthony List (SBA) is a “pro-life 

advocacy organization.” 525 Fed. Appx. 415, 416 (CA6

2013). During the 2010 election cycle, SBA publicly criticized various Members of Congress who voted for the 

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In 

particular, it issued a press release announcing its plan to

“educat[e] voters that their representative voted for a 

health care bill that includes taxpayer-funded abortion.” 

App. 49–50. The press release listed then-Congressman

Steve Driehaus, a respondent here, who voted for the 

ACA. SBA also sought to display a billboard in Driehaus’ 

district condemning that vote. The planned billboard 

would have read: “Shame on Steve Driehaus! Driehaus 

voted FOR taxpayer-funded abortion.” Id., at 37. The 

advertising company that owned the billboard space refused to display that message, however, after Driehaus’ 

counsel threatened legal action. 

On October 4, 2010, Driehaus filed a complaint with the

Ohio Elections Commission alleging, as relevant here, that

SBA had violated §§3517.21(B)(9) and (10) by falsely 
 

 

 

4 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

stating that he had voted for “taxpayer-funded abortion.”2 

Because Driehaus filed his complaint 29 days before the 

general election, a Commission panel held an expedited 

hearing. On October 14, 2010, the panel voted 2 to 1 to 

find probable cause that a violation had been committed. 

The full Commission set a hearing date for 10 business 

days later, and the parties commenced discovery.

Driehaus noticed depositions of three SBA employees as 

well as individuals affiliated with similar advocacy groups.

He also issued discovery requests for all evidence that 

SBA would rely on at the Commission hearing, as well as

SBA’s communications with allied organizations, political

party committees, and Members of Congress and their 

staffs. 

On October 18, 2010—after the panel’s probable-cause

determination, but before the scheduled Commission 

hearing—SBA filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that

§§3517.21(B)(9) and (10) violate the First and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution. The 

District Court stayed the action under Younger v. Harris, 

401 U. S. 37 (1971), pending completion of the Commission

proceedings. The Sixth Circuit denied SBA’s motion for an 

injunction pending appeal. Driehaus and SBA eventually

agreed to postpone the full Commission hearing until after 

the election. 

When Driehaus lost the election in November 2010, he 

moved to withdraw his complaint against SBA. The 

Commission granted the motion with SBA’s consent. Once 

the Commission proceedings were terminated, the District

Court lifted the stay and SBA amended its complaint. As 

—————— 

2The dispute about the falsity of SBA’s speech concerns two different

provisions of the ACA: (1) the subsidy to assist lower income individuals in paying insurance premiums, and (2) the direct appropriation of

federal money for certain health programs such as community health 

centers. See Brief for Petitioners 4–5. 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

relevant here, the amended complaint alleged that Ohio 

Rev. Code Ann. §§3517.21(B)(9) and (10) are unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Specifically, the complaint alleged that SBA’s speech about Driehaus had been 

chilled; that SBA “intends to engage in substantially 

similar activity in the future”; and that it “face[d] the

prospect of its speech and associational rights again being 

chilled and burdened,” because “[a]ny complainant can 

hale [it] before the [Commission], forcing it to expend time

and resources defending itself.” App. 121–122.

The District Court consolidated SBA’s suit with a separate suit brought by petitioner Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes (COAST), an advocacy organization that also alleged that the same Ohio false 

statement provisions are unconstitutional both facially 

and as applied.3 According to its amended complaint,

COAST intended to disseminate a mass e-mail and other 

materials criticizing Driehaus’ vote for the ACA as a vote

“to fund abortions with tax dollars,” but refrained from 

doing so because of the Commission proceedings against 

SBA. Id., at 146, 148, 162. COAST further alleged that it

“desires to make the same or similar statements about 

other federal candidates who voted for” the ACA, but that 

fear “of finding itself subject to the same fate” as SBA has

deterred it from doing so. Id., at 149, 157.4 

—————— 

3Petitioners also challenged a related “disclaimer provision,” App.

126–127, 156–157, under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.20, and COAST

raised pre-emption and due process claims. Reply Brief 21, n. 7. 

Petitioners do not pursue their “disclaimer,” pre-emption, or due

process claims before us. Ibid. We also need not address SBA’s separate challenge to the Commission’s investigatory procedures; petitioners have conceded that the procedures claim stands or falls with the

substantive prohibition on false statements. Ibid.; see Tr. of Oral Arg.

19. Finally, the parties agree that petitioners’ as-applied claims “are

better read as facial objections to Ohio’s law.” Reply Brief 19. Accordingly, we do not separately address the as-applied claims. 4SBA named Driehaus, the Commission’s members and its staff at-
 

6 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

The District Court dismissed both suits as nonjusticiable, concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury for purposes of standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on ripeness grounds. 525

Fed. Appx. 415. The Court of Appeals analyzed three 

factors to assess whether the case was ripe for review: (1)

the likelihood that the alleged harm would come to pass; 

(2) whether the factual record was sufficiently developed; 

and (3) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief were 

denied. 

Regarding the first factor, the Sixth Circuit concluded

that SBA’s prior injuries—the probable-cause determination and the billboard rejection—“do not help it show an

imminent threat of future prosecution,” particularly where

“the Commission never found that SBA . . . violated Ohio’s 

false-statement law.” Id., at 420. The court further reasoned that it was speculative whether any person would 

file a complaint with the Commission in the future, in part

because Driehaus took a 2-year assignment with the Peace

Corps in Africa after losing the election. Finally, the court

noted that SBA has not alleged that “it plans to lie or 

recklessly disregard the veracity of its speech” in the 

future, but rather maintains that the statements it intends to make are factually true. Id., at 422. 

As for the remaining factors, the court concluded that

the factual record was insufficiently developed with respect to the content of SBA’s future speech, and that withholding judicial relief would not result in undue hardship 

because, in the time period leading up to the 2010 election, 

SBA continued to communicate its message even after 

Commission proceedings were initiated. The Sixth Circuit 

—————— 

torney (in their official capacities), and the Ohio Secretary of State (in

her official capacity) as defendants. COAST named the Commission, 

the Commission’s members and its staff attorney (in their official

capacities), and the Ohio Secretary of State (in her official capacity) as

defendants. All named defendants are respondents here. 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

therefore determined that SBA’s suit was not ripe for 

review, and that its analysis as to SBA compelled the 

same conclusion with respect to COAST.

We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2014), and now 

reverse. 

III
 

A 

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of 

federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U. S. 

Const., Art. III, §2. The doctrine of standing gives meaning to these constitutional limits by “identify[ing] those 

disputes which are appropriately resolved through the 

judicial process.”5 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 

555, 560 (1992). “The law of Article III standing, which is 

built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent 

the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of

the political branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 

U. S. ___, ___, (2013) (slip op., at 9). To establish Article 

III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in fact,” 

(2) a sufficient “causal connection between the injury

and the conduct complained of,” and (3) a “likel[ihood]”

that the injury “will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Lujan, supra, at 560–561 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

This case concerns the injury-in-fact requirement, which

helps to ensure that the plaintiff has a “personal stake in

the outcome of the controversy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 

—————— 

5The doctrines of standing and ripeness “originate” from the same

Article III limitation. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 

335 (2006). As the parties acknowledge, the Article III standing and 

ripeness issues in this case “boil down to the same question.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 128, n. 8 (2007); see Brief 

for Petitioners 28; Brief for Respondents 22. Consistent with our 

practice in cases like Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 

U. S. 383, 392 (1988), and Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 299, 

n. 11 (1979), we use the term “standing” in this opinion. 
 

 

8 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

U. S. 490, 498 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

An injury sufficient to satisfy Article III must be “concrete

and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Lujan, supra, at 560 (some internal question marks omitted). An allegation of future

injury may suffice if the threatened injury is “certainly

impending,” or there is a “‘substantial risk’ that the harm 

will occur.” Clapper, 568 U. S., at ___, ___, n. 5 (slip op., at 

10, 15, n. 5) (emphasis deleted and internal quotation

marks omitted). 

“‘The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 

burden of establishing’ standing.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at

12). “[E]ach element must be supported in the same way 

as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence 

required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 

supra, at 561. 

B 

One recurring issue in our cases is determining when

the threatened enforcement of a law creates an Article III 

injury. When an individual is subject to such a threat, an

actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action is

not a prerequisite to challenging the law. See Steffel v. 

Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary 

that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or

prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he 

claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights”); see 

also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 

128–129 (2007) (“[W]here threatened action by government

is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis 

for the threat”). Instead, we have permitted preenforcement review under circumstances that render the 

threatened enforcement sufficiently imminent. Specifically, 

we have held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

requirement where he alleges “an intention to engage in a

course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional 

interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a 

credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Babbitt v. 

Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979). Several of our 

cases illustrate the circumstances under which plaintiffs 

may bring a preenforcement challenge consistent with

Article III.

 In Steffel, for example, police officers threatened to

arrest petitioner and his companion for distributing handbills protesting the Vietnam War. Petitioner left to avoid 

arrest; his companion remained and was arrested and

charged with criminal trespass. Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that the trespass statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.

We determined that petitioner had alleged a credible

threat of enforcement: He had been warned to stop handbilling and threatened with prosecution if he disobeyed; he 

stated his desire to continue handbilling (an activity he

claimed was constitutionally protected); and his companion’s prosecution showed that his “concern with arrest” 

was not “‘ chimerical.’” 415 U. S., at 459. Under those 

circumstances, we said, “it is not necessary that petitioner

first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be

entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the 

exercise of his constitutional rights.” Ibid. 

In Babbitt, we considered a preenforcement challenge to 

a statute that made it an unfair labor practice to encourage consumers to boycott an “agricultural product . . . by 

the use of dishonest, untruthful and deceptive publicity.’” 

442 U. S., at 301. The plaintiffs contended that the law

“unconstitutionally penalize[d] inaccuracies inadvertently

uttered in the course of consumer appeals.” Ibid. 

Building on Steffel, we explained that a plaintiff could 

bring a preenforcement suit when he “has alleged an

intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably af- 
 

 

 

10 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

fected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a 

statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution 

thereunder.” Babbit, supra, at 298. We found those circumstances present in Babbitt. In that case, the law “on 

its face proscribe[d] dishonest, untruthful, and deceptive 

publicity.” 442 U. S., at 302. The plaintiffs had “actively 

engaged in consumer publicity campaigns in the past” and

alleged “an intention to continue” those campaigns in the

future. Id., at 301. And although they did not “plan to

propagate untruths,” they argued that “‘erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate.’” Ibid. We concluded 

that the plaintiffs’ fear of prosecution was not “imaginary

or wholly speculative,” and that their challenge to the 

consumer publicity provision presented an Article III case 

or controversy. Id., at 302. 

Two other cases bear mention. In Virginia v. American 

Booksellers Assn. Inc., 484 U. S. 383 (1988), we held that 

booksellers could seek preenforcement review of a law 

making it a crime to “‘knowingly display for commercial 

purpose’” material that is “‘harmful to juveniles’” as

defined by the statute. Id., at 386. At trial, the 

booksellers introduced 16 books they believed were covered by the statute and testified that costly compliance 

measures would be necessary to avoid prosecution for 

displaying such books. Just as in Babbitt and Steffel, we 

determined that the “pre-enforcement nature” of the suit

was not “troubl[ing]” because the plaintiffs had “alleged an 

actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced 

against them.” 484 U. S., at 393. 

 Finally, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 

U. S. 1 (2010), we considered a preenforcement challenge 

to a law that criminalized “‘knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.’” Id., at 8. The plaintiffs claimed that they had 

provided support to groups designated as terrorist organizations prior to the law’s enactment and would provide 
 

 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

similar support in the future. The Government had 

charged 150 persons with violating the law and declined to

disavow prosecution if the plaintiffs resumed their support 

of the designated organizations. We held that the claims 

were justiciable: The plaintiffs faced a “‘credible threat’” 

of enforcement and “‘should not be required to await and 

undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.’” Id., at 15. 

IV 

Here, SBA and COAST contend that the threat of enforcement of the false statement statute amounts to an 

Article III injury in fact. We agree: Petitioners have alleged a credible threat of enforcement. See Babbitt, 442 

U. S., at 298. 

A 

First, petitioners have alleged “an intention to engage in 

a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional 

interest.” Ibid. Both petitioners have pleaded specific 

statements they intend to make in future election cycles.

SBA has already stated that representatives who voted for

the ACA supported “taxpayer-funded abortion,” and it has

alleged an “inten[t] to engage in substantially similar 

activity in the future.” App. 49–50, 122. See also Humanitarian Law Project, supra, at 15–16 (observing that plaintiffs had previously provided support to groups designated 

as terrorist organizations and alleged they “would provide

similar support [to the same terrorist organizations] again

if the statute’s allegedly unconstitutional bar were lifted”).

COAST has alleged that it previously intended to disseminate materials criticizing a vote for the ACA as a vote “to 

fund abortions with tax dollars,” and that it “desires to 

make the same or similar statements about other federal 

candidates who voted for [the ACA].” App. 146, 149, 162.

Because petitioners’ intended future conduct concerns 
 

 

12 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

political speech, it is certainly “affected with a constitutional interest.” Babbitt, supra, at 298; see also Monitor 

Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political 

office”). 

B 

Next, petitioners’ intended future conduct is “arguably. . . proscribed by [the] statute” they wish to challenge. 

Babbitt, supra, at 298. The Ohio false statement law 

sweeps broadly, see supra, at 1–2, and n. 1., and covers 

the subject matter of petitioners’ intended speech. Both 

SBA and COAST have alleged an intent to “[m]ake” 

statements “concerning the voting record of a candidate or

public official,” §3517.21(B)(9), and to “disseminate” 

statements “concerning a candidate . . . to promote the

election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate,” 

§3517.21(B)(10). And, a Commission panel here already 

found probable cause to believe that SBA violated the 

statute when it stated that Driehaus had supported 

“taxpayer-funded abortion”—the same sort of statement

petitioners plan to disseminate in the future. Under these 

circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that petitioners’ intended speech is “arguably proscribed” by the 

law. 

Respondents incorrectly rely on Golden v. Zwickler, 394 

U. S. 103 (1969). In that case, the plaintiff had previously 

distributed anonymous leaflets criticizing a particular

Congressman who had since left office. Id., at 104–106, 

and n. 2. The Court dismissed the plaintiff ’s challenge to

the electoral leafletting ban as nonjusticiable because his

“sole concern was literature relating to the Congressman

and his record,” and “it was most unlikely that the Congressman would again be a candidate.” Id., at 109 (emphasis added). Under those circumstances, any threat of 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

future prosecution was “wholly conjectural.” Ibid. 

Here, by contrast, petitioners’ speech focuses on the 

broader issue of support for the ACA, not on the voting 

record of a single candidate. See Reply Brief 4–5 (identifying other elected officials who plan to seek reelection as

potential objects of SBA’s criticisms). Because petitioners’

alleged future speech is not directed exclusively at 

Driehaus, it does not matter whether he “may run for

office again.” Brief for Respondents 33 (internal quotation

marks omitted). As long as petitioners continue to engage

in comparable electoral speech regarding support for the 

ACA, that speech will remain arguably proscribed by 

Ohio’s false statement statute. 

Respondents, echoing the Sixth Circuit, contend that

SBA’s fears of enforcement are misplaced because SBA 

has not said it “‘plans to lie or recklessly disregard the

veracity of its speech.’” Id., at 15 (quoting 525 Fed. Appx., 

at 422). The Sixth Circuit reasoned that because SBA 

“can only be liable for making a statement ‘knowing’ it is 

false,” SBA’s insistence that its speech is factually true 

“makes the possibility of prosecution for uttering such 

statements exceedingly slim.” Id., at 422. 

The Sixth Circuit misses the point. SBA’s insistence 

that the allegations in its press release were true did not 

prevent the Commission panel from finding probable

cause to believe that SBA had violated the law the first 

time around. And, there is every reason to think that 

similar speech in the future will result in similar proceedings, notwithstanding SBA’s belief in the truth of its allegations. Nothing in this Court’s decisions requires a

plaintiff who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a 

law to confess that he will in fact violate that law. See, 

e.g., Babbitt, 442 U. S., at 301 (case was justiciable even 

though plaintiffs disavowed any intent to “propagate 

untruths”). 
 

 

14 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

Finally, the threat of future enforcement of the false

statement statute is substantial. Most obviously, there is

a history of past enforcement here: SBA was the subject of

a complaint in a recent election cycle. We have observed 

that past enforcement against the same conduct is good

evidence that the threat of enforcement is not “‘ chimerical.’” Steffel, 415 U. S., at 459; cf. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 12) (plaintiffs’ theory of standing was 

“substantially undermine[d]” by their “fail[ure] to offer

any evidence that their communications ha[d] been monitored” under the challenged statute). Here, the threat is 

even more substantial given that the Commission panel 

actually found probable cause to believe that SBA’s speech

violated the false statement statute. Indeed future complainants may well “invoke the prior probable-cause finding to prove that SBA knowingly lied.” Brief for Petitioners 32. 

The credibility of that threat is bolstered by the fact that 

authority to file a complaint with the Commission is not

limited to a prosecutor or an agency. Instead, the false 

statement statute allows “any person” with knowledge of 

the purported violation to file a complaint. §3517.153(A). 

Because the universe of potential complainants is not

restricted to state officials who are constrained by explicit 

guidelines or ethical obligations, there is a real risk of 

complaints from, for example, political opponents. See 

Brief for Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, as 

Amicus Curiae 8 (hereinafter DeWine Brief); see also id., 

at 6 (noting that “the Commission has no system for weeding out frivolous complaints”). And petitioners, who intend to criticize candidates for political office, are easy 

targets.

Finally, Commission proceedings are not a rare occurrence. Petitioners inform us that the Commission “‘handles about 20 to 80 false statement complaints per year,’” 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

Brief for Petitioners 46, and respondents do not deny that

the Commission frequently fields complaints alleging 

violations of the false statement statute. Cf. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 16 (noting that there had 

been numerous prior prosecutions under the challenged

statute). Moreover, respondents have not disavowed 

enforcement if petitioners make similar statements in the

future. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–30; see also Humanitarian 

Law Project, supra, at 16 (“The Government has not argued to this Court that plaintiffs will not be prosecuted if 

they do what they say they wish to do”). In fact, the specter of enforcement is so substantial that the owner of the 

billboard refused to display SBA’s message after receiving 

a letter threatening Commission proceedings. On these 

facts, the prospect of future enforcement is far from “imaginary or speculative.” Babbitt, supra, at 298. 

We take the threatened Commission proceedings into

account because administrative action, like arrest or 

prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficient to justify preenforcement review. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. 

Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U. S. 619, 625–626, 

n. 1 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a

ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the

administrative action threatening sanctions in this case 

does not”). The burdens that Commission proceedings can 

impose on electoral speech are of particular concern here. 

As the Ohio Attorney General himself notes, the “practical 

effect” of the Ohio false statement scheme is “to permit a 

private complainant . . . to gain a campaign advantage 

without ever having to prove the falsity of a statement.” 

DeWine Brief 7. “[C]omplainants may time their submissions to achieve maximum disruption of their political

opponents while calculating that an ultimate decision on

the merits will be deferred until after the relevant election.” Id., at 14–15. Moreover, the target of a false statement complaint may be forced to divert significant time 
 

 

 

 

16 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

and resources to hire legal counsel and respond to discovery requests in the crucial days leading up to an election.

And where, as here, a Commission panel issues a preelection probable-cause finding, “such a determination itself 

may be viewed [by the electorate] as a sanction by the

State.” Id., at 13. 

Although the threat of Commission proceedings is a 

substantial one, we need not decide whether that threat 

standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury. The 

burdensome Commission proceedings here are backed by

the additional threat of criminal prosecution. We conclude 

that the combination of those two threats suffices to create 

an Article III injury under the circumstances of this case.

See Babbitt, supra, at 302, n. 13 (In addition to the threat 

of criminal sanctions, “the prospect of issuance of an administrative cease-and-desist order or a court-ordered 

injunction against such prohibited conduct provides substantial additional support for the conclusion that appellees’ challenge . . . is justiciable” (citations omitted)).

That conclusion holds true as to both SBA and COAST. 

Respondents, relying on Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 

(1971), appear to suggest that COAST lacks standing 

because it refrained from actually disseminating its

planned speech in order to avoid Commission proceedings 

of its own. See Brief for Respondents 26–27, 34. In 

Younger, the plaintiff had been indicted for distributing 

leaflets in violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism

Act. When he challenged the constitutionality of the law 

in federal court, several other plaintiffs intervened, arguing that their own speech was inhibited by Harris’ prosecution. The Court concluded that only the plaintiff had

standing because the intervenors “d[id] not claim that 

they ha[d] ever been threatened with prosecution, that a

prosecution [wa]s likely, or even that a prosecution [wa]s 

remotely possible.” 401 U. S., at 42. 

That is not this case. Unlike the intervenors in Younger, 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

COAST has alleged an intent to engage in the same 

speech that was the subject of a prior enforcement proceeding. Also unlike the intervenors in Younger, who had 

never been threatened with prosecution, COAST has been 

the subject of Commission proceedings in the past. See, 

e.g., COAST Candidates PAC v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 

543 Fed. Appx. 490 (CA6 2013). COAST is far more akin 

to the plaintiff in Steffel, who was not arrested alongside 

his handbilling companion but was nevertheless threatened with prosecution for similar speech. 415 U. S., at 

459. 

In sum, we find that both SBA and COAST have alleged 

a credible threat of enforcement. 

V 

In concluding that petitioners’ claims were not justiciable, the Sixth Circuit separately considered two other 

factors: whether the factual record was sufficiently developed, and whether hardship to the parties would result if

judicial relief is denied at this stage in the proceedings. 

525 Fed. Appx., at 419. Respondents contend that these

“prudential ripeness” factors confirm that the claims at

issue are nonjusticiable. Brief for Respondents 17. But 

we have already concluded that petitioners have alleged a 

sufficient Article III injury. To the extent respondents 

would have us deem petitioners’ claims nonjusticiable “on 

grounds that are ‘prudential,’ rather than constitutional,” 

“[t]hat request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that ‘a federal court’s obligation to

hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction ‘is virtually

unflagging.’” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6) (quoting Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. ___, 

___ (2013) (slip op., at 6); some internal quotation marks

omitted).

In any event, we need not resolve the continuing vitality 
 

 

18 SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Opinion of the Court 

of the prudential ripeness doctrine in this case because the 

“fitness” and “hardship” factors are easily satisfied here. 

First, petitioners’ challenge to the Ohio false statement 

statute presents an issue that is “purely legal, and will not 

be clarified by further factual development.” Thomas v. 

Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U. S. 568, 

581 (1985). And denying prompt judicial review would 

impose a substantial hardship on petitioners, forcing them

to choose between refraining from core political speech on 

the one hand, or engaging in that speech and risking 

costly Commission proceedings and criminal prosecution 

on the other. 

* * * 

Petitioners in this case have demonstrated an injury in 

fact sufficient for Article III standing. We accordingly 

reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a 

determination whether the remaining Article III standing 

requirements are met. 

It is so ordered.