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U.S. Army War College Press

BUILDING BETTER ARMIES:

AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF LIBERIA

Sean McFate

November 2013

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iii
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The author wishes to thank Bob Perito of the United States 

Institute of Peace (USIP). Since 2000, Bob has worked tirelessly 

to bridge the theory to practice gap in the field of security sector transformation. Currently, he is the Director of the Center of 

Innovation for the Security Sector Governance at USIP, which 

was established in January 2011 to build professional, sustaina-
v

ble, and locally supported security institutions that promote democracy and the rule of law. It is also dedicated to research and 

training that expands the cadre of practitioners who can perform 

these tasks.

ISBN 1-58487-599-2

vii

FOREWORD

We have long known that helping allies build better armies and police forces is a key to regional stability and the exit strategy for costly missions like Afghanistan in an “as they stand up, we stand down” 

approach. Yet the U.S. track record on this is unacceptably weak. The 2012 coup in Mali was staged by U.S. 

trained Malian soldiers. In Afghanistan, after years of 

training, the Pentagon assessed that only one of the 

Afghan National Army’s 23 brigades is able to operate 

independently. This does not augur well for U.S. troop 

withdrawal in 2014 or for the future of Afghanistan.

Nor is the United States alone. The United Nations 

has suffered similar setbacks in East Timor, Haiti, 

and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where 

ill-trained security forces have staged coups, preyed 

on the civilian population, and necessarily elongated 

costly peacekeeping missions. There are many reasons for these failures: Building professional security 

forces in conflict affected countries is hard to do; there 

is a significant theory to practice gap on how to do 

it; there are no comprehensive practitioner guides or 

field manuals; and few practical models exist. Worse, 

the de facto “train and equip” approach is ineffective, 

as it focuses too much on tactics and techniques and 

misses important intangibles.

This monograph fills a timely gap in our knowledge of security sector reform and offers a unique 

model to accomplish it. Liberia was once the epicenter 

of conflict and human rights abuse in West Africa, frequently at the hands of the military. Ten years later, 

Liberia is stable and even sending a peacekeeping 

contingent to Mali. This makes an excellent case study 

in how to build an army, as told by the program’s ar-
chitect. The author’s frank and critical analysis provides key insights into improving the U.S. capabilities 

in this crucial yet underserved area.

The author explains that a state must have the monopoly of force to uphold its rule of law. The two tools 

to accomplish this are disarmament, demobilization, 

and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform 

(SSR), which the author calls “gateway capacities” 

since security, law, and order are prerequisites of sustainable development and overall stability. He then 

explains how this was achieved in Liberia.

 Finally, this monograph is written by a practitioner for practitioners. The author concludes with 28 

concrete guidelines for practitioners seeking to implement DDR and SSR programs on the ground as well 

as six recommendations for the U.S. Army on how to 

improve its capabilities in this area.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SEAN MCFATE is an expert in security sector transformation. He is an assistant professor at the College 

of International Security Affairs, National Defense 

University and is an adjunct professor at the School of 

Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is also an 

adjunct social scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously, he was a Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow at the 

New America Foundation and also a program director of national security at the Bipartisan Policy Center, 

both think tanks in Washington DC. Before working 

in academia and policy, Dr. McFate was a program 

manager for DynCorp International, a company that 

provides technical services for the U.S. Government. 

There he helped create and manage unique programs 

in Africa, such as demobilizing and then rebuilding 

Liberia’s army “from the ground up” after the 14-year 

civil war and Charles Taylor’s exile in 2003. He also 

managed programs in the Great Lakes region and 

other parts of Africa. Prior to this, he was an officer 

and paratrooper in the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. After serving in the military, he advised Amnesty International USA on human rights and armed 

conflict issues. He was also an Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton and a business advisor at BearingPoint, 

now part of Deloitte Consulting. Dr. McFate’s forthcoming book is titled, The Modern Mercenary: Private 

Armies and What They Mean for World Order (Oxford 

University Press). He has published articles in Foreign 

Policy, African Affairs, Military Review, Royal United 

Services Institute Journal, and Review of African Political 

Economy. He has authored six book chapters in edited volumes on foreign affairs, special reports for the 

United States Institute of Peace and the Stanley Foun-
x

dation, and was a contributor to The Encyclopedia of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence and also War Crimes 

and Trials: A Historical Encyclopedia. He served on the 

editorial board of Millennium: Journal of International 

Studies (Sage Publications). Dr. McFate holds double 

BAs from Brown University, an MPP from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and 

a Ph.D. in international relations from the London 

School of Economics.
xi

SUMMARY

Recent events in Mali, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and elsewhere demonstrate that building professional indigenous forces is imperative to regional stability, yet few success stories exist. Liberia is a qualified “success,” and this case study explores how it was 

achieved. It was written by one of the architects of the 

program in Liberia, and is targeted specifically for the 

practitioner. Liberia suffered a 14-year civil war replete with human rights atrocities that killed 250,000 

people and displaced a third of its population. Following President Charles Taylor’s exile in 2003, the United States contracted DynCorp International to demobilize and rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia and its 

Ministry of Defence, the first time in 150 years that one 

sovereign nation hired a private company to raise and 

develop another sovereign nation’s military. This case 

explores the theory and practice behind the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

(DDR) of the legacy military and the security sector reform (SSR) that built the new one. Lastly, it considers 

some of the benefits and difficulties of contracting out 

the making of militaries. This is significant since the 

private sector will probably participate increasingly 

in security sector reform. The monograph concludes 

with concrete recommendations that should inform 

DDR and SSR planning and execution. It is written by 

a practitioner for practitioners.

xiii

GLOSSARY

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia 

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and 

 Reintegration

DDRR Disarmament, Demobilization,

 Rehabilitation, and Reintegration

DoD U.S. Department of Defense 

DoS U.S. Department of State 

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African 

States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of West 

 African States

IDIQ Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 

 Quantity Contract

IGNU Interim Government of National Unity 

INPFL Independent National Patriotic 

 Front of Liberia

LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation 

 and Democracy 

MOD Ministry of Defence 

MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia 

NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia 

NTGL National Transitional Government 

 of Liberia

PA&E Pacific Architects and Engineers

PRC People’s Redemption Council 

SRSG Special Representative of the 

 Secretary General 

SSR Security Sector Reform

TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission 

ULIMO United Liberation Movement of 

Liberia for Democracy

UN United Nations
xiv

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 

U.S. United States of America
1

BUILDING BETTER ARMIES:

AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF LIBERIA

INTRODUCTION

In March 2012, a group of mutinying Malian soldiers staged a coup that overthrew that nation’s 

constitutionally-elected government and attacked 

the presidential palace, state television, and military 

barracks. Soon after, mayhem followed. As the international community condemned the coup, the Taureg rebellion seized northern Mali and threatened to 

advance south, fuelled by small arms from Libya and 

al-Qaeda affiliates. Timbuktu and other towns in the 

north fell to the advancing rebels, and a strict version 

of Islamic law was imposed. Finally, the French intervened with military force and pushed the rebels out 

of the area. 

One disturbing story to this saga is the fact that 

the United States had been training the Malian armed 

forces for a number of years, including Captain Amadou Sanogo, who led the military coup. Reports indicate that Malian soldiers were overrun by rebels 

and even defected to the enemy side. General Carter 

F. Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), summed it up best: “[This is] very worrisome 

for us.”1

Nor is this worry limited to Africa. In 2012, one 

in seven of all North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) deaths in Afghanistan were at the hands of the 

very Afghan troops the coalition was training.2 These 

“green on blue” attacks describe an alarming series 

of incidents where seemingly rogue Afghan security 

forces turn their guns on their NATO counterparts. In 

order to prevent further attacks, NATO responded in 
2

September 2012 by halting joint operations with Afghan security forces, following the deaths of six International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops over 

1 weekend. A bleak Pentagon report found that only 

one of the Afghan National Army’s 23 brigades was 

able to operate independently without air or other 

military support from the United States and NATO 

partners.3

 This does not augur well for the Afghan security forces’ ability to take over after the United States 

withdraws in 2014, leaving a security vacuum in a 

volatile region. U.S. efforts in Iraq have been similarly 

frustrated as have United Nations’ (UN) experiences 

in the Balkans, Haiti, Timor-Leste, and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo. This bodes poorly for potential 

efforts in Syria and Libya. 

Helping allies build better armies and police forces 

is a strategic imperative. Operationally, building professional indigenous security forces is the exit strategy 

for costly stability operations like Afghanistan because 

it allows those countries to provide security for themselves rather than depend on the United States to do 

so. Strategically, helping fragile states professionalize 

their military and police promotes durable development, since corrupt security forces tend to devour the 

fruits of development. Additionally, the United States 

must help its partners develop effective security forces to contend with regional and transnational threats, 

or it will face a Hobson’s choice: Send in U.S. troops 

to do the job or permit minor threats to fester into 

major ones. 

Despite this strategic imperative, recent events in 

Mali, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere demonstrate that few success stories exist. There are numerous reasons for this: It is hard to do; there is a theory 

to practice gap on how to do it; there are no compre-
3

hensive practitioner guides or field manuals; and few 

practical models exist. The current “train and equip” 

model is ineffective, as it focuses too much on tactics 

and techniques and misses the important intangibles. 

Or as General Ham reflected after Mali: “We didn’t 

spend, probably, the requisite time focusing on values, ethics, and military ethos.”4

One alternate model and qualified success is Liberia. Ten years ago, it was one of the world’s worst 

post-conflict zones, and now its military is deploying to Mali in the peacekeeping mission. This is a remarkable transformation, given the fact that Liberian 

President Charles Taylor used much of the Liberian 

military as an instrument of terror. In 2012, the UNbacked Special Court for Sierra Leone at The Hague 

sentenced him to 50 years in prison for war crimes. 

Today, the military is seen as a relative success, and 

the program that built it is unique and unlike those 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, making it a good case study. 

This monograph explains how the Liberian armed 

forces were transformed from a weapon of terror into 

an instrument of security by one who helped design 

and implement this sui generis program. Whether one 

is raising an army of 2,000 or 200,000, the methods are 

essentially the same, differing only in scale and scope. 

The two tools needed to help a country acquire the 

monopoly of legitimate force are disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). This monograph explores the theory 

and practice behind these two programs, using the 

case of Liberia where national forces were complicit in 

atrocities and human rights abuses. 

The United States must develop a solid capability to build better armies, or it will remain mired in 

conflict affected countries like Afghanistan, face stra-
4

tegic surprises in places like Mali, and be powerless to 

prepare the future in countries like Libya and Syria. 

Helping allies help themselves is a force multiplier 

and a core pillar of U.S. national security strategy.

ESTABLISHING A STATE’S MONOPOLY 

OF FORCE

A state requires the monopoly of force within its 

territorial boundaries in order to uphold its rule of 

law and promote stability. However, the challenges of 

this are daunting in conflict affected countries because 

armed groups are the de facto institutions of power, 

and any attempt to alter them is deeply political. It 

is also dangerous. Convincing a general or warlord 

to put down his weapons and become a farmer may 

not be welcomed and may even provoke violence. In 

2002, the government of neighboring Côte d’Ivoire attempted to demobilize 750 soldiers, who, in response, 

staged a coup leading to a civil war that lasted for 

several years, despite a French and UN armed intervention to maintain peace. These programs are 

extremely political, and technical approaches alone 

court catastrophe.

Technically, the methods and processes for building effective indigenous security forces are the same 

for both small and large countries; they are DDR and 

SSR. DDR consolidates the state’s monopoly of force 

by disbanding the competition, such as militias and insurgents, who threaten the country’s ability to impose 

its governance. SSR professionalizes and strengthens 

the state’s statutory armed actors so that they can responsibly enforce the law of the land and defend it 

from armed threats. 
5

In theory, DDR and SSR work together in tandem 

to help uphold the state’s rule of law and are also 

gateway capacities, since security, law and order are 

prerequisites of sustainable development and overall 

stability. However, in practice, this is rarely done because DDR and SSR are difficult and dangerous. For 

example, in Liberia the state forces themselves were 

complicit in wide-scale atrocities and human rights 

abuses. How exactly does one transform the military 

from a symbol of terror into an instrument of democracy? How can one make a soldier someone a child 

would run toward for safety rather than away from 

in fear? 

DDR: Disbanding the Competition.

The first step in establishing a state’s monopoly of 

force is disbanding the competition. This means disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants 

safely into civil society and enabling them to earn livelihoods through peaceful means.5

 DDR is the fulcrum 

between war and peace. In the short term, those who 

do not find peaceful ways to make a living are likely 

to return to conflict or join gangs; in the long term, 

disaffected ex-combatants can challenge public order 

and polarize political debate, since they are often easy 

targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements. To date, the UN is the leader in developing and 

implementing DDR, with programs in Burundi, Côte 

d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, Nepal, the 

Solomon Islands, and Haiti.6

As the term implies, DDR is a three-stage process. 

The first stage involves disarming combatants, who 

report to a safe and secure cantonment site within the 
6

conflict zone to turn in their small arms, munitions, 

and light and heavy weapons. This is usually linked 

to a broader small arms and light weapons counterproliferation program that documents and destroys 

the weapons and munitions. The second stage demobilizes and disbands the armed nonstate groups, formally breaking up command structures and marking 

their official entry into civilian life. Lastly, ex-combatants are reintegrated into civil society to prevent 

another escalation of conflict. This typically is divided 

into two parts: initial rehabilitation and long-term 

reintegration. Initial rehabilitation entails giving excombatants short-term support packages and transporting them back to their homes to begin their new 

lives. Long-term reintegration involves job training 

and placement programs, working with communities 

to accept ex-combatants and monitoring progress in 

the difficult transition to civilian life. The overall goal 

of DDR is to ensure permanent demobilization and 

sustainable peace. 

DDR is fraught with operational challenges that 

can quickly backfire, possibly fomenting armed conflict. First, combatants often do not relinquish their 

weapons if they do not believe the peacekeeping force 

can ensure their safety. Owing to this, the peacekeeping force must be large enough to monopolize force 

and to be perceived as credibly neutral by all parties, 

which is tricky in a post-conflict country where distrust is ubiquitous. Second, armed groups generally 

hold back their best fighters and weapons as a hedge 

against others who renege on the peace agreement. 

This creates a prisoner’s dilemma that encourages 

preemptive defections from the peace process, as rebel groups fear that rivals will defect first and gain the 

advantage of surprise in a renewed war.7

 Mismanage-
7

ment of a DDR process—which is easy to do—creates 

a classic race to the bottom.

Third, a combatant group typically disarms only 

if all combatants disarm; otherwise, the disarmed 

are vulnerable to the armed, who may seek reprisal 

or gain against their defenseless enemies. Although 

simple in theory, simultaneously disarming tens of 

thousands of combatants in a highly chaotic and dangerous failed state with little logistical infrastructure 

and much unresolved bad blood is thorny in practice. 

Fourth, the victims of violence may not welcome DDR, 

as they may question why the worst actors in the war 

are rewarded with money and jobs, while the innocent get little or nothing—even if failing to transition 

combatants to civilian life almost guarantees more 

violence and victims. 

Lastly, a DDR process requires a reliable funding 

source. A program that runs out of money halfway 

through can be worse than no program at all, since a 

temporary or premature shutdown may provoke an 

attack by the armed on the unarmed or encourage excombatants to take up the gun again to make a living. 

Also, ex-combatants who are denied benefits might 

seek reprisals against DDR staff. Unfortunately, it is 

difficult to forecast DDR funding needs in conflicts 

like that in Liberia, where nearly everyone is a perpetrator of violence, a victim, or both. 

Owing to this, many DDR programs prioritize the 

DD to get the guns and gangs off the streets but leave 

the R to wither. The problem of the forgotten R—that 

is, not fully reintegrating ex-combatants into society—

involves them turning rogue again, perpetuating the 

cycle of violence as they earn a living or gain status 

through violent crime. This manifests itself most visibly in criminal gangs, which often form from demo-
8

bilized groups and can terrorize the population, hinder peace efforts, and challenge the new police and 

army’s legitimacy. Worse, unlike combatant groups, 

gangs cannot undergo DDR because they are a law 

enforcement problem and must be arrested, tried, and 

incarcerated within the criminal justice system.8

 In a 

failed state, this adds a layer of complexity to an already complex situation.

In Liberia, the UN and United States shared DDR 

responsibilities. The UN conducted the bulk of DDR 

as it disarmed the entire country and demobilized and 

reintegrated nonstate armed actors, such as Liberians 

United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and 

the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), as 

well as Liberian law enforcement. The United States 

demobilized and reintegrated the Armed Forces of 

Liberia (AFL). According to the UN, it disarmed and 

demobilized 101,495 combatants and received 28,314 

weapons and 6,486,136 rounds of small arms ammunition. Despite these numbers, the UN suffered setbacks, which is not surprising given the plethora of 

problems associated with DDR in failed states. There 

was a great deal of corruption and fraud regarding 

qualification for DDR benefits, resulting in incredibly high numbers of ex-combatants; many observers 

believe the number of actual combatants was closer 

to 38,000.9

Detractors also argue that the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began its program prematurely, in December 2003, before sufficient peacekeepers were on 

the ground to guarantee security. Serious riots erupted 

at the start of the program at Camp Schefflin, a DDR 

site just outside of Monrovia, and the camp was shut 

down. The riots were a planned attempt to disrupt 

UN efforts and create instability, largely to increase 
9

monetary profits for warring factions, and would have 

happened whenever the DDR program began.10 Four 

months later, however, the program resumed without 

incident and remains one of the most comprehensive 

programs of its kind. 

SSR: Acquiring the Monopoly of Force.

Working in tandem with DDR, SSR institutes the 

monopoly of force within a territory and enables the 

authority—government or otherwise—to enforce its 

rule of law. Broadly speaking, the “security sector” 

refers to those organizations and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats. 

SSR is the complex task of transforming the security 

sector into a professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable sector that supports the rule of 

law. Like DDR, SSR is deeply political, and technical 

approaches alone will fail. Program failure risks coup 

d'etat, war, or worse. 

To date, creating truly successful SSR programs 

remains a major unmet challenge for the international 

community, despite the growing prevalence of peacekeeping missions and nation building around the 

world. There are several reasons for this. SSR is difficult to do. Also, there remains a significant theory 

to practice gap.11 Consequently, there is no practicable 

doctrine, best practice, or even common terminology.12 The concept itself has no commonly accepted 

definition and has many names: security and justice 

reform, security sector governance, security sector 

development, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security system transformation. 

As efforts to re-establish the security sectors in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and elsewhere illustrate, few practical 
10

models for SSR have been developed, perpetuating cycles of violence in fragile states and prolonging costly 

peacekeeping missions. 

 While recognizing that many terms for SSR exist 

and connote subtle differences to academics, the basic 

purpose of the program remains the same to the practitioner: the reconstitution of a professional security 

sector that upholds the rule of law. However, before 

an explanation of what SSR is and how to do it, a few 

caveats are necessary. First, security in this context 

means “hard security”: physically protecting citizens 

and the state from threats that endanger normal life, 

public safety and survival. The development community has created a variety of “soft security” categories, such as food security and energy security. While 

lack of food and energy may be contributing factors 

to armed conflict, SSR should not attempt to rectify 

food shortages or energy blackouts: That would be an 

overreach of program scope. For an SSR program to 

be manageable on the ground, it must be limited to the 

security sector: those public organizations and government agencies with the primary mission of providing security such as the military and police. SSR seeks 

to transform these organizations and institutions into 

professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors that support the rule of law.

A second caveat is that although SSR seeks to uphold the rule of law, it should not be confused with 

justice sector reform (JSR). These two programs are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, but entail distinctly separate skill sets, tasks, and objectives. For example, an SSR program should not attempt to rewrite 

a country’s constitution, address past human rights 

abuses and crimes against humanity, or integrate indigenous systems of justice with international norms. 

Nor should a JSR program attempt to recruit and train 
11

military and police forces, determine weaponry and 

organizational structure of security forces, or draft the 

national security strategy. Despite this, theorists frequently merge JSR and SSR, which can lead to operational confusion on the ground for practitioners. Such 

an all-encompassing program would likely result in 

failure owing to a mismatch of ends, ways, and means 

across programs.13

That said, an SSR program operating without a corresponding JSR program will likely be unsuccessful. 

Without a functioning judiciary and appropriate laws 

to enforce, police functionality and legitimacy suffer; 

officers can end up being stooges of a corrupt legal 

system. Similarly, a JSR program operating without 

a commensurate SSR effort will probably fail because 

criminal justice systems require professional police, 

prisons, customs, and other instruments of law enforcement. SSR and JSR rise and fall together: Though 

operationally distinct, they should be conceptually 

integrated and closely coordinated. 

A third caveat is that SSR is more than a “train 

and equip” program, which, though necessary, only 

creates better-dressed soldiers who shoot straighter. 

SSR is more comprehensive than traditional train and 

equip programs since SSR encompasses creating new 

institutions, facilitating force structure14 decisions, 

formulating national security strategy and doctrine, 

recruiting and vetting new forces, constructing military bases and road infrastructure, selecting leadership, establishing oversight mechanisms within ministries and parliament, and many other complex tasks 

that go well beyond simply training and equipping 

troops. A train and equip campaign will not transform a security sector, and such programs alone will 

invite failure.
12

The security sector itself consists of three types 

of actors: operational, institutional, and oversight. 

Operational actors interact directly with the public on 

security matters and may include law enforcement, 

military and paramilitary forces, border control, customs, immigration, coast guard, and intelligence services. Institutional actors manage the policy, programs, 

resources, and general administration of operational 

actors and may include ministries of defense, interior, 

and justice. Oversight bodies monitor and supervise 

the security sector; they are ideally civilian led, democratically accountable to citizens, and able to ensure 

that the security sector serves the people and not vice 

versa. Oversight bodies may include the executive, 

legislative, and judicial branches of government as 

well as municipal and district authorities. One may 

conceptualize the security sector as a pyramid of actors (see Figure 1). Not included in the security sector 

are non-statutory security forces—that is, liberation 

armies, armed criminal gangs, guerrilla forces, insurgents, and political party militias. 

Figure 1. Taxonomy of the Security Sector.

Oversight

Bodies

Executive, congress or

parliament

Ministry of Interior

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Justice

Armed forces, 

law enforcement, 

border control, 

immigration, 

prisons, etc.

Institutions that

manage

operational actors

Operational actors in direct 

contact with the population
13

These three types of actors can, in turn, be grouped 

into security sub-sectors, distinguished from one another by unique objectives, technical knowledge, capabilities, best practices, institutional culture, and 

professional ethos. Sub-sectors can overlap and vary 

widely among countries and regimes, but the idea is 

useful to the practitioner designing and managing an 

SSR program. Taken together, the hierarchy of actors 

and security sub-sectors form a matrix of the security 

sector (see Table 1). 

Table 1. Analytical Framework 

of the Security Sector.15

Security 

Sub-Sector

Operational 

Actors Institutional Actors Oversight Actors

Military

Military, civil defense forces, 

national guards, militias, 

paramilitary

Ministry of 

Defense

Executive, 

Legislative, 

Parliament

Law 

Enforcement

Police, gendarmerie, prison, 

criminal justice, presidential 

guard

Ministry of 

Interior, Ministry 

of Justice

Executive, 

Legislative, 

Parliament, 

Judiciary,

Municipal and 

District 

Governments 

and Councils

Border 

Management

Border control, 

immigration, coast guard, 

customs authorities

Ministry of 

Interior, Ministry 

of Defense

Foreign 

Relations

Embassies, attachés, and 

security liaison officers

Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, 

Ministry of 

Defense

Executive, 

Legislative, 

Parliament

Intelligence Collection assets Intelligence 

agencies
14

This analytical framework will assist the planner 

categorize and understand the myriad elements of 

the security sector in any given country or governed 

area. This will also help the planner to task organize 

a tailored response for the SSR program. For example, 

if the U.S. Government is facilitating the program, 

it makes sense that the U.S. Department of Defense 

(DoD) would manage the military sub-sector among 

the operational and perhaps the institutional actors. 

Another organization like the National Democratic 

Institute (NDI) might work with the host nation’s parliament to establish viable oversight mechanisms. As 

the matrix suggests, building sub-sector capacity and 

professionalizing actors makes SSR a fundamentally 

“whole of government” and comprehensive effort, 

making it complicated to execute. 

There are several challenges to implementing SSR 

programs. First, though there is a growing consensus 

that early local ownership of SSR work is a critical 

component of its sustainability; translating this principle into concrete reality remains a challenge.16 Even 

the definition of local ownership is contested. Deciding which local leaders and political groups truly represent local aspirations may be difficult, fraught with 

uncertainty, and have political ramifications in both 

indigenous and international politics. Also, local actors 

often have competing visions and priorities; choosing local partners can be perilous in conflict-affected 

countries where there is often imperfect knowledge of 

parochial agendas. In addition, it may prove difficult 

to keep insurgents and spoilers out of the process. If 

they are deemed key stakeholders, they gain legitimacy and the ability to obstruct progress from within. 

Finally, measuring ownership is difficult. What metrics are appropriate? Should they privilege local or 
15

international values and priorities? Local ownership 

is sound in theory but ambiguous in practice. 

Second, as the security sector is comprised of various agencies and departments, successful SSR conceptually demands a whole of government response from 

donor nations. There are several reasons why this is 

seldom, if ever, done in practice. SSR is a relatively 

new idea, emerging after the Cold War, and consequently suffers from a dearth of coherent frameworks, 

common definitions, and technical expertise. On the 

practical level, SSR strategy demands cooperation 

from a wide range of agencies that often have conflicting perspectives, priorities, and objectives. The result 

is often competition between agencies and the uncoordinated and ad hoc implementation of SSR programs. 

Additionally, the lengthy time horizon for SSR to 

produce noticeable change may cause donors to lose 

interest or focus. 

Third, SSR is a political process that must be accomplished in partnership with the country undergoing the reform. Conflict-affected countries’ security 

forces, both statutory and nonstatutory, are the de 

facto institutions of power when the process begins, 

and altering them can provoke violent reactions and a 

relapse into armed conflict. It is difficult to persuade 

a general or warlord in Afghanistan or Liberia to put 

down the rifle and become a wheat farmer. International organizations or bilateral partners who ignore 

the political nuances of SSR and attempt to implement 

it in a purely unilateral and technical manner will fail. 

Fourth, SSR is difficult to operationalize. The majority of countries undergoing SSR are fragile or failed 

states emerging from armed conflicts. Operating in 

wrecked countries with ruined infrastructure and in 

areas where everything seems to be a priority is chal-
16

lenging. SSR processes are resource intensive, requiring significant numbers of trainers and staff, a large 

logistical footprint, and a programmatic robustness 

capable of training, equipping, fielding, and sustaining the new security force. It takes years and even 

decades to create a viable security sector.

Fifth, SSR programs have few good metrics for 

success. Even the definition of security is ambiguous. 

Does it refer to state security, regional security, or 

human security? If all three, how should they be prioritized and integrated? Many of the principles that 

inform different ideas about security may not easily 

translate into a coherent and actionable national security strategy. The human security perspective holds 

that a country is secure when individuals attain “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” How exactly should the armed forces and other instruments 

of national power provide this? 17

Finally, international donors are quick to resort to 

traditional train-and-equip programs in an effort to 

improve the operational effectiveness of local security 

forces and put new police on the streets and soldiers 

in the field. Such programs quickly produce visible 

results and clear statistics, including the number of 

trainees, uniformed personnel on duty, and operational vehicles. They do little, however, to transform 

institutions, establish government oversight, and create an appropriate civil-military relationship, which 

are the goals of SSR. 

Despite the challenges, SSR processes are an invaluable support for countries looking to move beyond conflict. They help the state consolidate the 

monopoly of force it needs to uphold the rule of law 

by assessing the current security sector in terms of 

capacity, efficiency, and relevance, and by support-
17

ing the creation of a balanced and effective security 

sector, informed by a clear understanding of its objectives, threats, and resources available. SSR work can 

reconstitute and professionalize security forces, such 

as the military and police; build civilian-led securitysector institutions, such as the ministries of interior, 

defense, and justice, which can manage security organs competently; and establish transparent oversight 

mechanisms for the security sector in the executive 

and legislative branches, providing capable security 

sector governance and making the security sector accountable to citizens through democracy. Finally, SSR 

processes can assist in developing a national security 

strategy that addresses the root causes of armed conflict and geopolitical threats as appropriate for that 

country, and translate national strategies down to 

local levels. 

However, SSR work must itself be part of a larger 

peacemaking effort. It cannot resolve ongoing armed 

conflicts or substitute for peace enforcement activities when those are required. Nor can it address past 

abuse and injustices or transform the justice sector; 

that is, managing transitional justice, writing laws, or 

redressing past security-sector crimes. Finally, it cannot transition combatants to civilian life—which is the 

province of DDR. 

DDR and SSR Linkages.

DDR and SSR should be naturally linked programs 

since they rise or fall together. DDR, encompassing 

the processes that safely transition combatants back 

to civilian life, and SSR, involving the reconstitution 

and professionalization of security institutions and 

actors, are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 

Working in tandem, they can enable countries emerg-
18

ing from conflict to provide for their own security and 

uphold the rule of law, an essential precondition of 

sustainable development and part of the exit strategy 

for costly peacekeeping missions. As such, politically, 

they rise or fall together. Without a monopoly on the 

use of force, a state has few ways to uphold the rule 

of law and protect citizens from threats.18 By definition, conflict-affected states have lost this monopoly, 

and the joint purpose of DDR and SSR programs is to 

restore or establish it by disbanding nonstate armed 

actors and reconstituting statutory forces. 

Beyond their shared political objectives, DDR and 

SSR are programmatically linked, as failure of one 

risks failure of the other. Ex-combatants who are not 

properly reintegrated into civil society through DDR 

can complicate and potentially compromise SSR. Excombatants who do not successfully transition to civilian life may take up arms again or form criminal 

gangs, challenging newly created security institutions 

and forces that may lack sufficient capacity to control 

such threats. As the population thus becomes vulnerable to violence, the state’s inability to protect its citizens undermines its legitimacy. 

Inversely, if DDR succeeds but SSR falters, then 

people begin to rely on nonstate actors—ethnicity- or 

religion-based militias or village self-defense forces—

for their security. In some parts of Afghanistan where 

the reach of national law enforcement is limited, Afghans have turned to tribal authorities or the Taliban 

to provide security and justice. Worse, such states can 

offer safe havens for armed opposition groups, insurgents, organized crime, and other armed nonstate actors that foment conflict and regional destabilization. 

Providing security is an essential component of governance, and states that cannot provide it are seen as 

inept and illegitimate.
19

DDR and SSR are also operationally linked, as 

many ex-combatants seek employment in the new security forces that SSR programs create. This transference from DDR to SSR occurs during the reintegration 

phase of DDR, making it the natural point of intersection between the two. That is, after being disarmed 

and demobilized, many ex-combatants may seek job 

training and reintegration in the new security sector 

as soldiers or policemen. They then fall under the 

SSR program, which vets them for past human rights 

abuses and assesses their qualifications for duty. No 

ex-combatant should ever be guaranteed a job in 

the new security sector without undergoing proper 

selection processes. 

Combining DDR and SSR, if done properly, reenforces the peace settlement by fortifying mutual trust 

among former enemies and encouraging followers 

to lay down their guns and enter civilian life. This is 

particularly true if ex-combatants perceive that they 

will have a substantive role in crafting and serving 

in the new government. If not done properly, many 

will seek employment in militias, organized crime, or 

private security companies, allowing them to legally 

carry weapons. This can result in reconstituted warring parties under new names—some of which will be 

licensed to employ lethal force.

Lastly, DDR and SSR jointly promote development, 

as economic growth depends on long-term security 

and stability, which DDR and SSR both provide when 

implemented correctly. This peace dividend manifests 

itself in preserving resources and infrastructure, freeing and managing labor, and furthering reconciliation 

that encourages investment and entrepreneurship. 

DDR and SSR processes also promote the interests of 

women, minorities, and child soldiers, who should 
20

be supported in a consistent manner within the two 

programs. A growing body of literature illuminates 

the strengths of considering gender in DDR and SSR, 

particularly if the programs are managed together so 

women can benefit from and contribute to both.19

Despite the fundamental linkages between DDR 

and SSR programs, they are often planned and executed disjointedly in the field, causing problems. It 

has been argued, in both the academic literature and 

manuals for practitioners, that DDR and SSR are separate and distinct processes involving different actors, 

priorities, timelines, and functions. The majority of 

scholarship on the topic deals with either DDR or SSR 

but rarely treats both in an integrated manner, resulting in disjointed approaches and mismatched conceptual frameworks on reestablishing the state’s monopoly of force.20 Practioner’s guides for field use tend to 

specialize in either one or the other but not both. For 

example, the UN, a leader in conducting DDR, issues 

DDR standards in relative isolation from SSR concerns. Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance 

Committee (OECD-DAC) issues a Handbook on Security System Reform that does not substantially address 

DDR.21 Both academia and practice generally assume 

DDR and SSR are separate and isolated programs, 

and that DDR is a relatively quick process followed 

sequentially by SSR, which plays out over time. 

Operationally, there are serious challenges to integrating them. There are several reasons for this. First, 

DDR and SSR programs are political, and changing 

power structures in a conflict-affected country is complex and dangerous. Reintegrating ex-combatants 

who may still harbor legitimate grievances against the 

government, or transforming security institutions into 
21

those that will lawfully use force, is understandably 

difficult and can easily provoke a relapse into armed 

conflict. The political concerns, priorities, and agendas 

of ex-combatants in DDR versus SSR processes may 

differ, making it challenging for program planners to 

adopt a unified approach to political issues.

Different levels of local support and ownership 

may exist for DDR versus SSR. A population traumatized by civil war may welcome the disarming 

of combatants, but may shun their inclusion in new 

security forces, especially if distrust of the police and 

military linger because of atrocities committed in the 

past. Conversely, local populations may not welcome 

ex-combatants into their communities, but strongly 

desire a new, professional police force. These different 

levels of local support can decouple DDR and SSR. 

Programmatically, DDR and SSR can be difficult to 

synchronize, owing to their differing priorities, objectives, and time horizons. DDR is complicated in that 

it is difficult, yet it has clear and achievable objectives, 

and a solution can be engineered. SSR, meanwhile, is 

complex in that there are no clear and achievable objectives that can reliably be measured, and a solution 

may not be obvious at first. Also, SSR programs take 

years and even decades to complete, while DDR generally takes months. 

Such a separation of functions, however, has deleterious effects on the ability of conflict-affected countries to recover and establish a viable security sector. 

Owing to their natural linkages, and in partnership 

with the host nation, DDR and SSR should be planned, 

resourced, implemented, and evaluated as a single entity. This involves several challenges, however, both 

in SSR and DDR as components, and in combining 

them as part of a larger process.
22

Therefore, embedding DDR within SSR and fully 

integrating the two programs is the best way to deal 

with these challenges, and as mentioned previously, 

the two processes even have a natural point of intersection: the reintegration phase of DDR programs, which 

can flow into longer-term SSR work as ex-combatants 

find legal and peaceful employment in the new security apparatus that SSR programs create. Problematically, however, reintegration is also often the most 

difficult aspect of DDR, owing to the aforementioned 

issue of the forgotten R. This makes reintegration both 

the best place to incorporate DDR into SSR and one 

of the clear sites where such an incorporation can fail. 

THE CASE OF LIBERIA

Monrovia is the capital of Liberia, a small West 

African country that, by the summer of 2003, had suffered 14 years of civil war epitomized by torture, rape, 

child soldiers, blood diamonds, and fratricide. The city 

is situated on the Atlantic Ocean and inhabits a peninsula parallel to the mainland with only three entrances: one road and two bridges. On July 18, 2003, the city 

was sealed off by rebels—from the east by LURD and 

from the south by MODEL. Ferociously defending the 

gateways to Monrovia were remnants of the AFL still 

loyal to President Taylor, a notorious warlord accused 

of war crimes and crimes against humanity.22 At the 

time, Liberia was more of a kingdom than a state. As 

one Liberian put it, “Ghankay [Charles Taylor] is our 

law. He understands that the man with the gun is a 

strongman.”23

Taylor has been accused of murdering and mutilating civilians during his reign from 1989 to 2003, illegally trafficking in diamonds and timber to enrich 
23

himself at the expense of the state, abducting women 

and girls as sex slaves, and forcing children and adults 

into pressed labor and fighting during the war in Sierra 

Leone.24 His militias chased down civilians and asked 

them if they wanted a long-sleeved or a short-sleeved 

shirt. For people who said long sleeves, the fighters 

hacked off their hands at the wrist with a machete. 

People who said short sleeves had their arms hacked 

off closer to the shoulder. To this day, people missing one, two, and even four limbs lie on the streets of 

Monrovia begging for money.25 Taylor also supported 

rebel groups in the adjacent countries of Guinea and 

Côte d’Ivoire to agitate ongoing conflicts there and 

destabilize his neighbors. In July 2003, those same 

countries returned the favor, helping unseat Taylor by 

aiding LURD and MODEL. In late 2002, The Economist

predicted that Liberia would be “the world’s worst 

place to live” that year.26 They were right.

The fighting was fierce, and all sides committed 

atrocities. Child soldiers were commonplace, the line 

between combatants and civilians blurred, and the 

laws of war were utterly ignored. The battles over the 

bridges into Monrovia were so intense that the road 

was paved in blood and brass shells; lampposts, road 

signs, and nearby buildings were riddled with bullet holes. As John W. Blaney, the U.S. ambassador to 

Liberia, later recalled in an interview: “It was really 

like a 14th-century siege. The two rebel armies had 

surrounded Monrovia with the government’s troops 

inside of Monrovia and the two rebel armies pressing 

hard outside.”27 Frustrated by AFL resistance, rebels 

started indiscriminately shelling the overcrowded 

inner city with mortars, killing more than 1,000 civilians.28 Liberians described the situation as “World 

War III” and began piling their dead at the gates of 

the U.S. Embassy in a macabre plea for help.29
24

Monrovia was already a humanitarian disaster, 

as hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Liberians had fled the fighting in the hinterlands for 

the capital, which could not accommodate them all. 

With no electricity, water, sewage, police, food, or any 

other accoutrement of modern life, the city became a 

massive slum of tin shacks, garbage, human waste, 

disease, and lawlessness. Liberia was once the jewel 

of West Africa and a popular international vacation 

destination: Pam Am airlines had flown directly from 

New York City to Monrovia three times a week.30 Now 

the country was apocalyptic. 

International pressure mounted as the siege went 

on, stretching from days into weeks. U.S. President 

George W. Bush twice demanded on international 

television that Taylor “leave Liberia” and stationed 

2,300 marines in three U.S. Navy ships off the country’s shore.31 Nigeria offered Taylor asylum if he left, 

shielding him from the machinations of international 

law.32 The UN Security Council authorized a multinational peacekeeping force in Liberia, citing its deep 

concern over “the humanitarian situation, including 

the tragic loss of countless innocent lives . . . and its 

destabilising effect on the region.”33 Meanwhile, the 

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional international organization, hastily 

assembled a force to relieve the city. 

With global pressure intensifying and rebels at the 

gates, Taylor finally yielded on August 11 and fled 

to Nigeria. He blamed Liberia’s problems on foreign 

meddling and cast himself the martyr: “Because Jesus 

died, we are saved today. I want to be the sacrificial 

lamb. I am the whipping boy. It’s easy to say ‘It’s because of Taylor’. After today, there will be no more 

Taylor to blame.”34 A few days later, the rebels lifted 
25

their siege, and 1,000 ECOWAS peacekeepers and 200 

U.S. Marines entered the city to provide emergency 

humanitarian assistance and prevent a relapse of violence. “God bless you, Oga,” women cried to convoys 

of Nigerians, using the Nigerian Yoruba word for 

“boss.” “God bless you, Marine,” they sang to other 

vehicles filled with American troops.35 On August 18, 

the two rebel groups and what was left of Taylor’s 

government signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) at Accra, Ghana, ending Liberia’s bloody 

civil war.36

However, a tragic legacy remained: After 150 

years of troubled history, 14 years of civil war, and 

horrific abuses of power, Liberia was shattered. Its infrastructure was beyond destroyed, any semblance of 

civil governance had been long since abandoned, and 

much of its population was either displaced or dead. 

To this day, Liberia is plagued by intense hunger and 

poverty, no central running water or sewage, no telephone landlines, and no electrical grid. Small generators power most of the country. 

The human cost was even greater. As a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) report describes, in a country of only three million: 

over 250,000 people, most of them civilian non-combatants, have lost their lives in the civil war. More than 

1.3 million have been displaced, including hundreds 

of thousands who fled the country. Abductions, torture, rape and other human rights abuses have taken 

place on a massive scale. It is estimated that at least 

one in ten children may have been recruited into militias at one time or another. A similar percentage has 

been traumatised by seeing their families and friends 

murdered and raped.37
26

Almost everyone in Liberia was affected by the 

war. Post-conflict polls show that 96 percent of respondents had some direct experience of the conflict, 

and, of these, an astonishing 90 percent were at one 

point or another displaced from their homes.38

Liberia is a stark example of post-conflict state 

disintegration; as Africa expert Peter Pham observes, 

“Tragically, the recent history of Liberia has been a 

case study par excellence of a failed state.”39 Beginning 

with the first coup d’etat in 1980, national authority—

if it even existed—rarely extended beyond Monrovia. 

Institutions were anemic, and those who possessed 

the means of violence served warlords such as Taylor 

rather than the state. Civilians were both the principal 

actors and targets of armed conflict, displacing nearly 

half the population and destabilizing the region. 

By 2003, there were no functioning public utilities, and most Liberians still have no access to electricity, water, sanitation facilities, or health care. Basic 

infrastructure such as roads and bridges—which aid 

workers, entrepreneurs, peacekeepers, and Liberians 

themselves all need, especially in rural areas—are in 

dire need of repairs. A whole generation of Liberians 

received no formal education, and the country suffered a brain drain of those that did. Liberia has no 

functioning judicial system, leaving it with a culture 

of impunity: Most courts have been destroyed, and 

trial by ordeal is not unheard of outside the capital. 

Historical Roots of the Conflict.

Like Ethiopia, Liberia never knew colonialization. Freed African-American slaves and abolitionists 

founded it in 1822 with the help of the United States 
27

as an outpost for other freed slaves returning from 

the Americas. The country’s name is derived from the 

Latin word liber, meaning free, and its capital Monrovia was named in honor of U.S. President James Monroe, who held office at the country’s founding and 

supported its creation. Liberia’s red, white, and blue 

flag is modeled on the U.S. flag, and its currency is the 

Liberian dollar. The country was an eager and willing 

U.S. ally during World War II and the Cold War.

Growing from an outpost to a commonwealth, Liberia achieved statehood in 1847 with the ratification 

of a constitution drafted at Harvard University. However, problems loomed. Few of the freed slaves who 

found new beginnings in Liberia were from that region of Africa, and they proceeded to treat local tribes 

in ways comparable to their own treatment in the 

Americas. Soon a rift developed between descendants 

of the freed slaves, known as Americo-Liberians, and 

the 14 or so indigenous tribes. This evolved into a hierarchical caste system with four distinct classes. At 

the top were the elites: Americo-Liberian officials of 

mixed black and white ancestry with light skin (also 

known as mulattos). Second were darker-skinned 

Americo-Liberians, consisting mostly of laborers and 

small farmers. Third were the “recaptives” or “Congos,” African captives on U.S.-bound slave ships who 

were rescued by the U.S. Navy and brought to Liberia. 

At the bottom of the hierarchy were the indigenous Liberians.40 The first three classes—comprising less than 

3 percent of the population—retained absolute political control, enjoyed a monopoly of social privilege, 

and benefitted substantially from the unequal distribution of power and wealth within the country. This 

tyranny of the elites went unabated until 1980, when a 

coup d‘etat irrevocably altered the national landscape. 
28

End of Americo-Liberian Rule.

The 1970s marked the beginning of the end for the 

elites’ 125-year rule. In 1971, William Tubman, Liberia’s president for 27 years, died while in office. His 

Open Door economic policy had proven a boon for Liberia, giving it the largest mercantile fleet and rubber 

industry in the world. The country also became the 

third-largest exporter of iron ore globally and received 

over $1 billion in foreign investment. Few, however, 

enjoyed the benefits, as the prospering Americo-Liberians tended not to share the wealth. This further 

widened the rift between the elites and the rest of the 

population, setting the conditions for revolt. 

Tubman’s vice president and successor, William 

Tolbert, attempted to ward off the crash course the 

country was on, but his own Americo-Liberian roots 

combined with the ensconced system of political and 

social elitism hindered his efforts. Adversaries almost 

immediately accused him of nepotism and cronyism. 

However, he also began to liberalize Liberia by introducing reforms to allow more indigenous Liberians 

in government and creating the first opposition party 

in the nation’s history, the Progressive Alliance of Liberia, to run against the Americo-Liberians’ old True 

Whig Party. Though re-elected in 1975, his government was criticized sharply for failing to address the 

deep economic disparities between the Americo-Liberians and the rest of the population. Social unrest began to swell as the majority felt change was occurring 

too slowly, while power-wielding Americo-Liberians 

felt it was too rapid.
29

Tensions came to a head in 1979. In April, Tolbert’s administration proposed to raise the price of 

government-subsidized rice by 50 percent, claiming 

it would promote more local farming, slow the rate 

of urban migration, and reduce dependence on imported rice. Opposition leaders claimed the measure 

was meant only to benefit the Tolbert family, which 

controlled the rice monopoly in Liberia. Hundreds 

of people marched through Monrovia, protesting the 

sharp rise in the price of rice. Tolbert ordered troops 

to fire on the demonstrators, killing some 70 people. 

So-called rice riots soon spread throughout Liberia, 

and government attempts to quash them by arresting 

the opposition leaders failed. Tolbert’s credibility was 

dealt a mortal blow, and the situation within Liberia 

continued to decay. 

On April 12, 1980, AFL Master Sergeant Samuel 

Doe, an ethnic Krahn, led a coup d‘etat, ending the 

133-year monopoly of power that the AmericoLiberians’ True Whig Party had enjoyed. The coup 

gained immediate popular acceptance, and Doe adopted the revolutionary slogan that “in the cause of 

the people, the struggle continues.” Doe personally 

disemboweled Tolbert in his bed and then ordered 

the public execution of 13 top-ranking ministers and 

members of the Tolbert family. They were tied to 

poles on South Beach in Monrovia and shot to death. 

Many ranking government ministers who survived 

were tried, tortured, and paraded naked through 

downtown Monrovia. African countries, allies, and 

trading partners widely condemned the coup; a flight 

of capital and the elites soon ensued, including future 

president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. 
30

The Reign of Samuel Doe: 1980–89.

Following the coup, Doe suspended the constitution and established the People’s Redemption Council 

(PRC) with full powers, consisting of 17 enlisted men 

headed by Doe. The PRC imposed a price freeze on all 

commodities, including imported foods, and doubled 

the salaries of civil servants and military personnel. 

Doe lacked formal education, and, by many accounts, 

he was illiterate when he assumed the presidency. After only 1 year, he executed five PRC members, including his vice head of state and coup comrade Thomas 

Weh-Syen, claiming they had plotted against him. As 

he grew increasingly paranoid regarding threats to 

his leadership, he placed members of his own Krahn 

ethnic group in key positions. Soon the Krahn dominated the government, and as Africa expert Peter 

Pham notes, “The new regime turned increasingly 

brutal and proved even less popular than its predecessors.”41 Doe’s inner circle became as disillusioned 

with the autocratic regime as was the general population. In November 1983, three prominent members of 

the PRC left Liberia: Thomas Quiwonkpa, who was 

the AFL’s commanding general; Prince Yormie Johnson, Quiwonkpa’s aide; and Charles Taylor, the head 

of the General Service Agency. All would eventually 

challenge Doe. 

Doe further solidified control by holding elections 

in 1985, which were characterized by widespread 

fraud. Before the election, more than 50 of Doe’s opponents were murdered, and most of the elected opposition candidates refused to take their seats. Liberia’s 

political situation continued to erode with increased 

human rights abuses, corruption, and ethnic tensions. 

On November 12, 1985, Quiwonkpa staged a coup 
31

with an estimated 500 to 600 people from neighboring 

Sierra Leone; the AFL killed them all, and Quiwonkpa’s body was dragged through Monrovia’s streets. 

The Krahn-dominated AFL then retaliated against the 

ethnic groups in Quiwonkpa’s native Nimba County, 

causing widespread loss of life within the Gio and 

Mano communities. 

Despite Doe’s poor human rights record and dubious democratic credentials, his regime enjoyed considerable U.S. financial and political support. Washington considered Monrovia an important strategic 

ally during the Cold War, and from 1981 to 1985, the 

United States gave Liberia $402 million in aid, more 

than Liberia had ever received before and more financial aid per capita than any other sub-Saharan country 

received during the 1980s.42 Doe even met with President Ronald Reagan twice, and some have speculated 

that the U.S. endorsement of the 1985 election results—despite international and domestic observers’ 

reports that it was compromised—may have led Doe 

to declare an unchallenged victory over his closest 

rival, Jackson F. Doe, whom many believed, and still 

maintain, was the true winner.43

The Reign of Charles Taylor: 1989–2003.

On Christmas Eve of 1989, Charles Taylor and approximately 100 fighters, some trained in Libya, invaded Liberia from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. Named the 

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), this rebel 

incursion initially enjoyed popular support within 

Nimba County, which had endured the majority of 

Samuel Doe’s wrath after the 1985 attempted coup. 

Within 6 months, Taylor’s forces reached the outskirts 

of Monrovia, but were stopped by AFL counterattacks.
32

A bloody civil war ensued, claiming hundreds of 

thousands of lives and displacing a million people 

in a country of only four million. The human toll of 

the 14-year war (1989–2003) is estimated at 270,000 

dead, 320,000 long-term internally displaced people, 

and 75,000 refugees in neighboring countries. Almost 

everybody in Liberia was touched by the war: A recent poll shows that 96 percent of respondents had 

some direct experience of the conflict, and of these, a 

shocking 90 percent were at one point or another displaced from their homes.44 The situation was so dire 

that ECOWAS, a regional international organization, 

intervened in 1990 under the premise of a cease-fire 

and peace deal, albeit without the NPFL. ECOWAS’s 

peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of 

West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 

prevented the NPFL from entering Monrovia. However, the NPFL ravaged the Krahn and Mandingo 

areas of Liberia, with widespread atrocities reported. 

Although reports vary, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was apparently affiliated with Charles Taylor’s movement.45

In July 1990, the NPFL splintered. Prince Johnson 

formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of 

Liberia (INPFL), which captured and killed Doe on 

September 9, 1990, torturing him on Monrovia’s beach. 

AFL soldiers fled to Sierra Leone and founded the new 

insurgent United Liberation Movement of Liberia for 

Democracy (ULIMO). Soon after, an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), with Amos C. Sawyer 

as its president, was formed in Gambia with ECOWAS support. However, Taylor did not recognize the 

IGNU, and the fighting continued. By 1995, Liberia’s 

civil war had grown to involve seven major factions, 

including the AFL, which acted as an armed political 

organ rather than a professional military. These seven 
33

factions joined to form the Liberian Council of State, 

in accordance with the 1995 Abuja Peace Accords. 

However, fighting still continued, and 1996 saw some 

of the war’s deadliest battles. 

Taylor finally agreed to a peace deal after more 

than a dozen peace accords and the exhaustion of his 

military power. A five-man transitional government 

was established, and warring factions were hastily 

disarmed and demobilized in advance of special elections, held on July 19, 1997. Taylor and his National 

Patriotic Party emerged victorious. Taylor himself 

won the election by a large majority, gaining 75 percent of the vote primarily because Liberians feared a 

return to war if Taylor lost. However, peace in Liberia 

did not last long. Taylor’s government did nothing to 

improve the lives of Liberians: Unemployment and illiteracy stood above 75 percent, little investment was 

made in the country’s infrastructure, reconciliation 

between factions was largely ignored, and rule of law 

was eclipsed by a patronage system that recognized 

Taylor as its supreme authority. 

Taylor’s actions not only exacerbated Liberia’s 

intractable civil war; they helped foment civil war in 

Sierra Leone. Taylor backed the Revolutionary United 

Front (RUF), a Sierra Leonean rebel group, and reportedly directed RUF operations from Liberia. He is 

accused of selling them weapons in exchange for diamonds, which they typically extracted with slave labor 

and under threat of maiming or death; hence the term 

“blood diamonds.” Owing to the UN embargo against 

arms sales to Liberia at the time, the weapons were 

purchased largely on the black market through arms 

smugglers such as Viktor Bout.46 Taylor is also charged 

with aiding and abetting RUF atrocities against civilians and assisting in the recruitment of child soldiers. 
34

Like Liberia’s war, Sierra Leone’s civil war was total. 

More than 200,000 of the country’s 2.6 million people 

were killed. Approximately 800,000 were internally 

displaced, and another 700,000 sought refuge in 

neighboring countries. The fighting destroyed much 

of the country’s infrastructure, including water and 

electricity. Sierra Leone’s war also left it a ward of the 

international community under the protection of the 

UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which had 

a Chapter VII mandate. The UN declared UNAMSIL’s 

mission complete in 2005, although the country remains precariously fragile.

Taylor’s misrule at home led to the resumption of 

armed rebellion among his former adversaries. LURD 

was formed in 1999 and engaged in sporadic fighting 

with the AFL in northern Lofa County, which borders 

Guinea. It was headed by Sekou Conneh, a businessman married to the daughter of Guinean president 

Lansana Conté. By 2000, it was believed that LURD 

controlled nearly 80 percent of the countryside. 

Throughout the fighting, both the AFL and LURD 

were accused of widespread human rights violations 

as well as child soldier recruitment. In 2003, MODEL 

formed as an offshoot of LURD in Côte d’Ivoire and 

enjoyed support in the southeastern counties of Grand 

Gedeh, Sinoe, and Grand Kru. By the spring of 2003, 

LURD and MODEL had advanced to the outskirts 

of Monrovia, and intense fighting took place in and 

around the city. Thus began the siege of Monrovia.

With fighting escalating, Taylor agreed to participate in an ECOWAS-sponsored peace summit in Ghana between the government of Liberia, civil society, 

and the LURD and MODEL rebel groups. In the hope 

that Taylor’s Ghanaian hosts would arrest him, the 

chief prosecutor of the UN-supported Special Court 
35

for Sierra Leone issued a press statement announcing 

the opening of a sealed March 7, 2003, indictment of 

Taylor for “bearing the greatest responsibility” for 

atrocities in Sierra Leone since November 1996.47 Reportedly caught by surprise and unwilling to arrest 

Taylor, Ghana refused to detain him. Within hours, 

Taylor returned to Monrovia, where the fighting continued and intensified, creating a massive humanitarian disaster. Rebels indiscriminately fired mortars into 

downtown Monrovia, and the bodies of the innocent 

began to pile up. 

U.S. Ambassador Blaney requested military assistance, and in response, the United States established 

Joint Task Force Liberia, comprised of three Navy 

ships and 2,300 troops of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. This force positioned itself off the West 

African coast and sent a small number of Marines to 

protect the embassy, which had come under attack. 

At this point, the rebels were on the mainland trying 

to cross the bridges to inner-city Monrovia, which 

was heavily defended by Taylor’s forces. During one 

of these firefights, Blaney walked onto the middle 

of a bridge and demanded both sides stop fighting. 

Amazingly, they did.48

Finally, on August 11, 2003, under intense international pressure, Taylor accepted an ECOWAS-brokered peace deal that offered him asylum in Nigeria. 

LURD, MODEL, and the Government of Liberia signed 

a comprehensive peace agreement in Accra, Ghana, 

on August 18, 2003, known as the Accra Accords. This 

paved the way for the deployment of what became a 

3,600-strong ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Liberia—ECOMIL—and also established a 2-year National 

Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), headed 

by Liberian businessman Gyude Bryant. 
36

The UN Takes Charge.

The UN took over security duties in October 2003, 

subsuming ECOMIL into UNMIL, which had an authorized strength of 15,000 UN blue-helmet military 

personnel and 1,115 police officers, making it the 

world’s largest UN peacekeeping mission at the time. 

UNMIL’s mission as established by Security Council 

Resolution 1509 and led by Jacques Paul Klein was 

to monitor the ceasefire agreement, but it rapidly 

evolved into a rebuilding of the country. In terms of 

priorities, everything was urgent in Liberia: security, 

humanitarian relief, good governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The 

NTGL nominally led Liberia as the UN prepared the 

country for elections in 2005, though many regarded 

the NTGL as a kleptocracy.49

The 2005 elections are considered the most free, 

fair, and peaceful elections in Liberia’s history. The 

October 11, 2005, presidential and legislative elections, 

and the subsequent November 8, 2005, presidential 

run-off saw the victory of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former World Bank official and human rights advocate, 

over George Weah, an international football star and 

former UN Children’s Fund goodwill ambassador. Inaugurated in January 2006, President Johnson-Sirleaf, 

nicknamed the Iron Lady, is Africa’s first democratically elected female president. Her government of 

technocrats draws from Liberia’s many ethnic groups 

and also includes members of the Liberian diaspora—that is, those who had fled the country earlier. In 

March 2006, her reversal of an earlier position led to 

Charles Taylor being turned over to the Special Court 

for Sierra Leone. 
37

The country has remained remarkably stable since 

the 2005 elections and may even serve as a model of 

post-conflict stability in a neo-medieval world. As 

Blaney and Klein observed in 2010: 

The country’s future may not yet be secure, and much 

progress has yet to be made, but most of those present 

in the immediate aftermath of the war in 2003 would 

agree that today’s Liberia is a comparative miracle.50

Johnson-Sirleaf has pursued an ambitious reconstruction agenda aimed at political stability and economic recovery, emphasizing job creation, education, 

attracting investment, and infrastructure repair, as 

well as restoration of public services, security sector 

reform, and a “government of inclusion.” She has bolstered public trust by taking a strong stand against 

corruption, which is endemic in Liberia’s political system. She has dismissed several government officials, 

including much of the Ministry of Finance, and supported experienced and technically competent senior 

officials. Her World Bank background has allowed her 

to forge strong relations with the international community and donor nations, which is crucial given Liberia’s dependence on foreign aid. 

Yet political conditions in Liberia are still perilous, 

as the roots of conflict have not been fully addressed, 

institutions are weak, development is still taking hold, 

the region of West Africa is unstable, and violence as a 

political solution is a precedent that cannot be ignored. 

To date, the UN ultimately guarantees Liberia’s security, and grave concerns remain about the country’s 

future once it departs. The country’s prospects remain 

uncertain given the government’s limited capacity, the 

dangerous geopolitical neighborhood it inhabits, and 

the many spoilers waiting in the wings. To survive as 
38

a state, a government needs a monopoly of force to 

uphold its rule of law and fend off armed threats to 

its existence.

SSR success is helped if it is required in formal 

peace treaties, giving it a clear mandate. In Liberia, the 

Accra Accords settled the civil war, and Part 4 specifically mandated SSR.51 In sharing responsibilities for 

the process, UNMIL assumed the restructuring of civilian elements of the security sector, and the United 

States the transformation of the military sub-sector, 

owing to its historical ties to Liberia and especially its 

defense. The U.S. Navy guaranteed security during 

the 19th century; the United States oversaw the creation of the Liberian Frontier Force in 1908, used Liberia as a strategic logistical supply node for the North 

Africa campaign of World War II, and gave substantial military aid to Liberia during the Cold War. Also, 

as an internal Department of State (DoS) document 

explained, the “International community expects the 

US to take the lead in this endeavor. No other country will do so.”52 This monograph focuses on the U.S. 

program to transform the defense sector and does not 

address the UN’s beleaguered efforts at reforming 

the Liberian National Police, which remains a critical 

problem today.

Outsourcing DDR and SSR.

The crucial task of rebuilding Liberia’s military was 

outsourced to DynCorp International, which worked 

in parallel with the UN but not under it. DynCorp is 

a private military company (PMC), sometimes also 

called a private security company. PMCs are conflict 

entrepreneurs that kill or train others to kill, usually 

in foreign lands.53 Contracting the wholesale reconstitution of a nation’s armed forces to a private firm 
39

had not been attempted since the early 19th century 

and remains one of the most controversial facets of 

Liberia’s recovery. 

However, outsourcing DDR and SSR is a trend that 

will likely grow since these are not core capabilities 

of the DoD, and USAID is prohibited by law from defense development. This has left a gap that the private 

sector has increasingly filled in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and it will likely continue 

to do so. Privatizing functions like DDR and SSR affects program outcomes, so it is important to assess 

the potential impacts of this trend towards privatization. This makes Liberia an especially apt case study 

since it is the first time in a century or two that a sovereign nation hired a private company to raise another 

sovereign nation’s armed forces. 

The Liberia program is unique even from the programs in Iraq and Afghanistan in that it was entirely 

outsourced to the private sector. This was not entirely 

a bad thing, contrary to some of the dire warnings 

from skeptics that outsourcing any military function is 

undesirable. DynCorp’s profit motive drove it to find 

innovative, efficient, and effective solutions to thorny 

security problems, and this accounts for some of 

Liberia’s success today. 

On the positive side, for example, the private sector brought a great deal of ingenuity to SSR. In 2004, 

there were no books, theory, best practices, military 

doctrine, compendia of lessons learned, or practitioners with significant experience on how to demobilize 

and rebuild an army. Scholarship was equally unhelpful, as it has always lagged behind practice in DDR 

and SSR. Owing to this, DynCorp’s team invented 

new solutions to its specific DDR and SSR problems, 

resulting in a sui generis program that could serve as 
40

an imperfect yet necessary model for future DDR and 

SSR programs, and it did so in a post-conflict setting, 

one of the most difficult operating environments in 

the world.54

On the negative side, using private means to 

achieve public ends can sometimes pit profit motive 

against policy goals, and this created problems in the 

public-private partnership between the United States, 

DynCorp, and Liberia. Perhaps the most significant 

fact of DynCorp’s work in Liberia is that the private 

sector can raise an army at all. This monograph does 

not fully explore these complex issues but does acknowledge them. 

Decision to Outsource.

The U.S. Government did not originally intend to 

make history by outsourcing the building of Liberia’s 

military; necessity drove the decision. The DoS was the 

client since it was responsible for managing U.S. commitments to Liberia as agreed to at Accra, including 

SSR for the AFL. To this end, the DoS organized a fiveperson SSR pre-assessment trip, made from January 

21 to 29, 2004, with members from the DoS and DoD. 

The purpose was to better understand the general requirements for Liberia’s military SSR in advance of a 

fuller assessment. After meeting with UN Chief Klein, 

U.S. Ambassador Blaney, Liberian Chairman Bryant 

(the title “President” was deemed inappropriate for a 

interim head of government), and leaders of the AFL, 

LURD, MODEL and others, the assessment team concluded that Liberia needed “a small, mobile defense 

force to provide border, coastal and internal security 

to support their mission” and estimated the size of the 

military should be from 3,000 to 6,500 personnel. 
41

The pre-assessment team also observed United 

Kingdom (UK) efforts to rebuild the military of neighboring Sierra Leone and determined not to use the 

British model of SSR, concluding that “while IMATT 

[UK’s International Military Assistance Training 

Team] was initially viewed as a success story in Sierra 

Leone, the UK now admit to many problems that they 

have yet to resolve.” One of the primary challenges 

was dismissing the combatants thought to be human 

right violators while incorporating the rest into the 

new security forces regardless of their faction, experience, capability, or the country’s security needs. Not 

surprisingly, this did not lead to SSR success.

This is the practice of lustration, and has been performed by the international community since at least 

World War II with mixed success. Lustration is the 

process of culling an existing security force, retaining 

desirable individuals, and dismissing the others. Examples include “denazification” (Entnazifizierung) of 

the German government after World War II, Greece in 

1973 after a junta took control of the government and 

dismissed approximately 100,000 individuals from 

government and the military, and former Communist countries after the 1990s, passing lustration laws 

to drastically reduce the size of their governments, 

including the security sector. Individuals not cut or 

“lustrated” from the security sector are often merged 

into a single security force. 

Lustration can be successful, as exemplified by 

denazification, or a failure, as demonstrated by “debathification” after the Iraq War. Sierra Leone was the 

latter. While lustration offers a convenient political 

solution for diplomats at the negotiation table, it creates significant problems on the ground, since former 

enemies are expected to function together as a fighting 
42

team in the new army. In Sierra Leone, it resulted in 

significant challenges in the quality control of troops 

and the sheer number of forces, which the government 

could not sustain. Also, which combatants should be 

kept as “good” versus those dismissed without vetting? No serious investigation was done of combatants in Sierra Leone, which permitted undesirable 

individuals in the ranks and defeated the purpose of 

the program. The UN favors lustration, which it used 

in the Balkans in the 1990s with mixed results. Not 

surprisingly, UNMIL later used lustration to rebuild 

the Liberian National Police force and achieved disappointing results, a stark contrast to the AFL.55 Owing 

to this, lustration is not recommended for SSR. 

Lastly, the team considered four options for who 

should conduct implementation: the U.S. military 

alone, the U.S. military with light contractor involvement, a contractor with light U.S. military involvement, or a contractor alone.56 They would let a second 

SSR assessment trip combined with budget considerations decide the matter. The second trip took place on 

May 19-26, and included some 20 experts drawn from 

the DoS, the DoD’s European Command (EUCOM, 

the unified command responsible for West Africa at 

the time), and three companies: DynCorp, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), and Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI).57

The purpose of this evaluation mission—during 

which one of the DoD civilian staff members was 

murdered—was to determine the operational requirements for SSR of the AFL and Ministry of Defence.58

At the conclusion of the trip, the team proposed to the 

U.S. embassy a restructured AFL, which it called the 

New Armed Forces of Liberia (NAFL). The NAFL’s 

mission would be “to defend and protect the people 
43

of Liberia and the sovereignty of the nation against external and internal threats and to effectively respond 

to humanitarian crisis.” To achieve this, it would require an armed force of 4,020 personnel, consisting of 

one light infantry brigade (three infantry battalions, 

one engineer battalion, and one base support battalion), one maritime patrol battalion, one aerial reconnaissance company, one military police company, an 

AFL headquarters company, and a military band.59

However, other than the NAFL’s mission and 

force structure, the U.S. Government team completely 

overlooked many thorny yet essential components of 

SSR, among them DDR for the legacy armed forces, 

a recruitment plan in a state with destroyed infrastructure and low literacy, a vetting plan for personnel in a country where war crimes were rampant and 

background checks nearly impossible, the restructuring of the Ministry of Defence, leadership selection, a 

national military strategy, fostering local ownership, 

and the domestic political ramifications of making a 

new military. There was no consideration for how Liberia’s population would receive the re-creation of the 

military; many would not welcome it, given the AFL’s 

troubled past, and the Accra Accords mandated that 

this be addressed. On June 10, DynCorp submitted its 

own 78-page assessment of SSR for the AFL to the DoS 

that addressed most of these concerns.

Following the assessment mission, the DoD quickly concluded it could not conduct the SSR program 

due to resource constraints and ongoing operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan.60 Consequently, the DoS was 

left with a Hobson’s choice: Either outsource the entire 

DDR and SSR program to the private sector or have no 

program for the AFL. The DoS chose the former and 

made history without meaning to. 
44

Purchasing a New Army.

On September 17, 2004, the DoS issued its Statement of Work (SOW) for rebuilding the Liberian military. It was only seven pages long. The objective and 

scope were deceptively simple: Assist the government 

of Liberia in recruiting, training, and equipping a new 

military beginning with 2,000 personnel. Consultations over the summer among the DoS, DoD, DynCorp, and others concluded that the AFL should be a 

2,000-person, all-volunteer force that could be scaled 

upward over time. It was acknowledged that 2,000 

soldiers could not defend the entire country should 

a full-scale war erupt, but the size was constrained 

by the government’s ability to regularly pay soldiers’ 

salaries, as precedent suggested unpaid soldiers were 

a greater threat to Liberia’s security than an invading 

army. Klein even suggested that Liberia abolish its 

military altogether, quipping that African armies “sit 

around playing cards and plotting coups.”61

DynCorp and PA&E both bid on the project and 

after reviewing both proposals, the DoS decided to 

divide the duties between the two contractors, giving 

them different roles based on their expertise. DynCorp 

would perform the bulk of the SSR at both the operational and institutional levels. At the operational level, 

it would rebuild the AFL from the ground up, which 

entailed the designing, recruiting, vetting, training, 

equipping, and fielding of the new force. At the institutional level, it would also create a new Ministry 

of Defence and establish systems for personnel management, intelligence, force integration and planning, 

resource management, communications, information 

management, public affairs, procurement and acqui-
45

sition, internal audit, and other ministerial functions. 

PA&E would build the logistical infrastructure, such 

as roads and military bases, necessary to support the 

AFL once the SSR was well under way, and also provide limited mentorship when the units were in place. 

Both firms were required to construct military bases 

and other facilities as needed, with DoS approval. Absent from the initial plan was the DDR of the legacy 

AFL, which was originally to be conducted by the Liberian government, but later fell to DynCorp owing to 

the Liberian government’s lack of capacity. 

In short, DynCorp was contracted to raise an army. 

The company was not contracted to perform SSR of 

the entire Liberian security sector, since UNMIL was 

transforming civilian actors, such as the police; and 

other entities were responsible for security sector 

governance, the legislature, and the national security 

strategy. DynCorp’s work was limited to transforming the institutional and operational actors of the 

military sub-sector. The envisioned end was as an 

ethnically balanced, properly vetted, professionally 

trained, civilian led, and apolitical military capable 

of “defending the national sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural disasters,” as called for by the 

Accra Accords.62

DynCorp Goes to Liberia.

Three individuals spearheaded DynCorp’s effort, 

including the author. Most of the first year was dedicated to designing the program, identifying implicit 

tasks, and engaging key stakeholders, with the assistance of the U.S. defense attaché to Liberia. Stakeholders included the legacy force, former rebels, the host 

government, the international community (those who 
46

were in Liberia), and civil society. Recent scholarship 

suggests that DynCorp did little or no outreach to Liberians to establish local ownership.63 However, this is 

incorrect: DynCorp’s chief interlocutor with Liberian 

civil society was appropriately the Liberian government, primarily through Minister of Defence Daniel 

Chea and later Brownie Samukai. 

By July 2005, a vision for the new AFL and Ministry of Defence emerged along with guiding principles 

for its reconstitution. Because the program was designed by a company and not the U.S. military, DynCorp resisted the temptation to build a large army in 

the U.S. image, as has occurred in Afghanistan and 

Iraq with mixed results. Instead, the firm sought to 

craft—in partnership with the United States and Liberia—an armed force tailored to Liberia’s unique 

regional needs. 

Blueprint for the New Army.

It is impossible to truncate a multiyear, highly 

complex program—with more than a few surprises—

into a monograph, and a brief timeline is included 

in an Annex to provide coherence. The original plan 

anticipated training beginning a few months after the 

National Training Program (NTP), but pre-program 

consultations and start-up operations took longer 

than expected. Working in a country as sacked and 

pillaged as Liberia is problematic; accomplishing even 

a straightforward task in a place without infrastructure, institutions, or social trust is grueling, like war itself. As Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, “everything 

in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”64
47

Demobilizing the Legacy Force and Raising a New One.

Owing to the AFL’s troubled legacy during the 

civil war and lack of records, lustration was viewed 

as sub-optimal since it was impossible to vet who 

was a “good guy.” Instead, it was agreed upon that 

the old AFL should be completely demobilized and 

rebuilt to ensure systematic human rights vetting of 

new recruits and also assure the population that this 

really was a new AFL. Though this was a controversial decision at the time, it later spared the AFL from 

some of the challenges experienced by the Liberian 

National Police, where UNMIL practiced lustration 

resulting in a quasi-corrupt police force. But a corrupt 

security force that has lost public trust and legitimacy 

is a problem not easily undone. Indeed, the Liberian 

National Police remain a key obstacle to peace and security in Liberia today.

The governments of Liberia and the United States 

agreed that the new AFL would be open to all Liberians regardless of sex, tribe, or religion, and selection 

and promotion would be based on merit rather than 

cronyism or nepotism. Recruitment would maintain 

a 12th-grade functional literacy standard and work 

to achieve a balanced ethnic and gender mix within 

the ranks. All candidates would be vigorously vetted 

for past human rights abuses on an individual basis. 

Training would foster an apolitical professional ethos, 

especially in the leadership, that respected the rule 

of law, cultivated an ethos of public service, and accepted civilian control of the military.65 Throughout 

the DDR and SSR process, DynCorp would manage 

a public sensitization program crafted mostly by local 

Liberians rather than international media consultants. 
48

One key advantage that Liberia had over Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and elsewhere is security. First, UNMIL maintained an overwhelming force in the small 

country, with over 15,000 peacekeepers who acted as 

deterrent and hammer. This is in contrast with Iraq 

and Afghanistan, where coalition forces were spread 

too thin across an immense landscape and could not 

control it, a clear violation of T. E. Lawrence’s “Algebraic Principle.”66 Also, Liberians genuinely had war 

fatigue, in the author’s opinion. Few desired to return 

to a state of unbridled horror as demonstrated by Doe 

and Taylor and were content to let the UN take over. 

Consequently, there was no significant insurgent 

movement to challenge the peacekeeping force. This 

might grimly suggest that post-conflict recovery best 

begins after war has run its course.

Human Security as Unifying Concept.

After DynCorp’s initial assessment of Liberia’s defense sector in May 2004, the company had judged that 

the greatest risks to Liberian security were not strong 

neighboring states with powerful armies threatening 

invasions, but rather violent street crime, criminal militias, disease and poverty, armed insurrection, food 

insecurity, lack of access to justice and political representation, terrorism, and a dearth of the basic necessities of life—all internally driven conditions arising 

from failures of development and good governance. 

Armed nonstate actors could exploit these public 

grievances for active or passive support. Examples 

of active support include providing logistical help or 

sanctuary to militias; passive support entails not cooperating with authorities regarding the whereabouts 

and activities of anti-government groups. Doe, Tay-
49

lor, LURD, and MODEL all depended on both types 

of support in their rise to power.

Based on this threat assessment, DynCorp believed 

Liberians (and the DoS) would judge the AFL’s success by its ability to secure development rather than 

repel invaders.67 Historically, when the U.S. military 

builds foreign armies, it attempts to create a force that 

mirrors its own: conventional units strong enough 

to physically defend the borders against armed aggressors and also project force abroad when needed. 

Strong armies are effective at waging regular warfare—interstate, military-on-military engagements, 

also known as “conventional war” like World War 

II—but less so when dealing with irregular threats 

and nonstate actors that gain support and sanctuary 

by exploiting popular grievances that stem from failures of development and good governance, as was the 

case in Liberia.68

Accordingly, DynCorp abandoned the regular approach to SSR and adopted a novel paradigm when 

designing the Liberian defense architecture and strategy—”human security”—marking one of the earliest 

attempts to operationalize this idea. The conventional 

model of “national security” privileges its namesake: 

states. Steeped in the Westphalian tradition, the primary geopolitical actor is the state, which survives by 

checking other states’ power though the Machiavellian calculus of national interests and balance-of-power politics, with military might as the ultimate arbiter. 

Westphalian warfare is the war of Clausewitz, World 

Wars I and II, nominally obeys the “laws of war,” and 

constitutes “regular” warfare. Such a paradigm holds 

that if one secures the state, then security will cascade 

from the state down to the regime, community, and 

finally the individual.
50

The human security paradigm is the exact opposite. It best suits the non-Westphalian world of Africa 

and elsewhere, where states did not develop organically as they did in Europe and North America but 

rather were invented by cartographers in London, 

Paris, Berlin, and other colonizing powers of the past. 

Not surprisingly, this is a world were “irregular” warfare is more regular than “regular” warfare, as nonstate actors fight without regard for the laws of war 

that regulate interstate conflict.

Human security was a concept first articulated in 

the 1994 UN Development Program’s (UNDP) Human 

Development Report and views security and development as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. 

The report argues that national security matters less 

when “several states are beginning to disintegrate,” 

and the primary threats to global insecurity stem from 

failures of development—drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation, and corruption—rather 

than strong rival states, as the Westphalian national 

security model presumes. These new threats “respect 

no national border,” and “the search for human security lies in development, not in arms.”69 Consequently, 

the human security approach holds that if the individual is secured, then security will emanate to the community, regime, and finally the state. The national and 

human security paradigms are opposite understandings on how human communities are best protected 

(see Figure 2). 
51

Figure 2. National Versus Human 

Security Paradigms.

Owing to the threat assessment, DynCorp believed 

the human security paradigm would be a more appropriate model for the design and deployment of the 

AFL than the conventional national security one. Specifically, this meant de-emphasizing traditional missions, like defending national borders with a massive 

military, and securing development as the unifying 

concept behind the new AFL. The DoS and the Liberian government agreed with this idea, and in 2006, 

the author assisted the Minister of Defence in drafting 

the National Defence Strategy (NDS) white paper based 

on human security, making Liberia one of the first 

countries to try to operationalize human security in its 

military. The first sentence of the draft reads: “There 

can be no development without adequate security, 

nor can security be maintained without development 

and the benefits it promises for our population.”70

From there, the strategy explained the relationship 

between security and development in the context of 

Liberia, identified Liberia’s core security interests in 

light of development, and outlined the principles that 

informed AFL SSR. Beyond this, the strategy remained 

National Security Model

Individual Security

Community Security

Regime Security

State Security

State Security

Regime Security

Community Security

Individual Security

Human Security Model
52

vague and not fully operational, and ultimately was 

transmuted into a more conventional defense strategy 

by external parties. However, human security ideas 

infused the SSR program, such as integrating civics 

and literacy classes as the major component of basic 

training, establishing an ethnically balanced force 

that is inclusive of women, creating an ombudsman 

position at Ministry of Defence, and holding peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance as central 

military missions.

The force structure of the new AFL and Ministry 

of Defence was designed to be strong enough to repel limited cross-border attacks but not so strong as 

to threaten Liberia’s neighbors. This entailed a small, 

basic, well-trained motorized light infantry regiment 

without heavy or expensive weaponry, such as artillery, armor, or fighter planes. The plan also proscribed 

the creation of special forces and other secretive, elite 

units that could easily become politicized killing machines, as the former Anti Terrorist Unit, the Special 

Anti Terrorist Unit, the Black Berets, the Special Security Service, and the Special Operations Division 

became during the civil war. Political leaders had 

abused these units in the past, using them as sectarian hit squads. The U.S. and Liberian governments did 

not wish to see a relapse of this tragic pattern.

On July 17, 2005, DynCorp proposed an initial 

force structure and table of organization and equipment (TO&E)—the blueprint for the new AFL—to the 

DoS. A TO&E is a master inventory of all personnel 

and equipment within the military, delineating for 

each unit the exact number, rank, title, and military 

occupational specialty of every individual and the 

name and quantity of each piece of equipment. Several 

models of the AFL and MOD were considered, includ-
53

ing ones with agricultural battalions so the AFL could 

source its own food (rejected because it could lead to 

corruption within the ranks) and a robust engineer 

battalion to help rebuild the country and strengthen 

bonds with the local populace (rejected because it was 

too expensive).

The initial blueprint presented to and approved 

by the DoS in 2005 called for an AFL of just under 

2,000 soldiers, comprising a brigade headquarters 

company, two light infantry battalions, an engineer 

company, a military police company, a training company, a military band, and three military personnel 

(in the Ministry of Defence). The Ministry of Defence 

was a lean 100 people, and all but three were civilians. 

This blueprint has changed over time, but the original 

concept for the AFL remains.

Program Stages.

The SSR program was originally envisaged as 

proceeding in several steps. In reality, the program’s 

progression was ambiguous and fluid due to intervening challenges, though in retrospect, it had three 

relatively distinct phases. During this time, security 

was provided by UNMIL’s large peacekeeping force. 

Phase I began when the DoS decided to outsource 

the SSR program to the private sector and involved a 

small team of contractors to design the program and 

meet with stakeholders. Phase II commenced on May 

15, 2005, when Chairman Bryant signed Executive 

Order Number Five authorizing the full demobilization of the legacy AFL on June 30, 2005.71 After this, 

the DoS issued DynCorp an NTP for the program in 

full, and the company began to recruit and train staff 

(both local and international), acquire compounds 
54

and equipment for operations, construct a customized DDR site outside of Monrovia, demobilize 13,770 

members of the legacy AFL, plan the public sensitization campaign regarding the AFL reconstitution, and 

formulate a systematic recruiting and vetting plan. 

Phase III began in January 2006 with the completion of the old force’s demobilization and the start of 

recruiting the new force. This phase involved a national public sensitization and recruiting campaign, 

rigorous vetting, creation of a basic training or initial 

entry training (IET) course, and Ministry of Defence 

training. It also required equipping the new force, legally purchasing and shipping arms to Liberia from 

Eastern Europe, and building the necessary bases. 

Determining entry standards for recruitment in the 

hopes of instilling a professional, apolitical ethos that 

placed service to the country above tribe or individual 

was problematic. Many Liberians were not sufficiently literate. Attracting women to the AFL was difficult 

because men historically filled the ranks. Vetting candidates and selecting leadership was complicated by a 

lack of public records. All AFL policies had to be created, while simultaneously transforming the Ministry 

of Defence, hiring and training all its civilian personnel, and synchronizing its development with that of 

the larger government. 

Phase IV entailed fielding the new force and program termination. PA&E was responsible for constructing all nontraining military facilities, settling individual soldiers into units once they left training, and 

providing unit mentors. In 2009, Liberia’s two infantry battalions underwent a certification exercise modeled on the U.S. Army Readiness Training Evaluation 

Program (ARTEP). The contract ended in 2010, and 

a team of 60 U.S. Marines begin a 5-year mentorship 
55

program with the AFL called Operation ONWARD 

LIBERTY.72 Today, the AFL continues its development, transformed from an instrument of terror into 

one of stability. The International Crisis Group (ICG), 

a watchdog nongovernmental organization (NGO), 

assessed that “the SSR program, in particular army 

reform, is a provisional success.”73

As with any complex, high stakes, post-conflict 

program, there were many problems. Problems internal to the program are examined in the text to follow. 

There were also many external surprises that slowed 

the program, costing the United States money, the 

company time, and Liberia its defense. Construction 

was expensive and delayed, as many materials had to 

be imported, theft was rampant, and concrete did not 

dry well in the monsoon-like rainy season from April 

to September. Building the new training base—and all 

training—was suspended for 8 months as Liberia, the 

United States, and UNMIL debated the base’s location. Finally, in July 2006, the former Voice of America transmitter site was selected at Careysburg and 

rechristened the Sandee S. Ware Military Barracks.74

DynCorp started construction once the occupying 

UNMIL units moved off site, which took much longer 

than expected. Another major surprise was the NTGL’s inability to safely demobilize the legacy AFL, as 

was originally planned in 2004. By the spring of 2005, 

it became evident to the DoS that the NTGL could 

not demobilize its own troops, so it asked DynCorp 

to do so. 

Chief among the challenges of Phase II was demobilizing Liberia’s standing army peacefully, while 

continuing to maintain security. This included determining who was eligible for demobilization benefits, 

finding donor money to pay for those benefits, trying 
56

to prevent fraud, and anticipating unwelcome public 

response amid fears that disgruntled demobilized soldiers would incite political violence. Building the site 

on the outskirts of Monrovia involved its own challenges: finding competent construction companies, 

theft of materials, and significant delays caused by the 

rainy season. Other unexpected obstacles arose.

Razing an Army: Que Sera Sera.

Demobilizing a standing African army is tricky. 

Few—if any—modern African armies have faded 

away peacefully, as demonstrated by Liberia’s neighbor, Côte d’Ivoire. Attempts by the U.S. military to 

retire forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have often led to 

greater insurgency and violence. In Liberia, there was 

no such resistance. By the time the UN intervened, 

there seemed to be genuine war fatigue in the country, 

but the lack of violence is also due to the manner in 

which DynCorp demobilized the old AFL.

On May 18, 2005, Chairman Bryant publicly proclaimed Executive Order Number Five at a national 

press conference in the presidential palace; as his entourage departed, the AFL band played “Que Sera 

Sera.” The order, which had the force of law, declared the entire AFL officially decommissioned on 

June 30, 2005. Afterwards, Minster of Defence Chea 

told reporters that the demobilization exercise would 

take place in the months ahead and would be done 

by DynCorp, expressing confidence in the company. 

At the time, there was a real fear that members of the 

AFL would dig up cached weapons and challenge the 

authority of the state or demand greater remuneration 

in exchange for cooperation. Luckily, no such violence 

occurred, but it was a constant worry: For example, 
57

in April 2006, 400 to 500 ex-soldiers threatened there 

would be “no Christmas” if they did not receive salary 

arrears for their service.75

Immediately following the chairman’s announcement, DynCorp got to work. First, it coordinated with 

UNMIL to provide security during the demobilization in case violence erupted—though the company’s 

small armed presence would have been insufficient to 

put down a large armed riot. Next, the company subcontracted a local architecture and engineering firm 

to custom build a demobilization site on the outskirts 

of Monrovia, which was close enough to the city to 

be accessible for the majority of the population yet far 

enough to contain a violent outbreak before it spread 

to the capital. DynCorp also began refurbishing the 

Barclay Training Centre, a former AFL base in downtown Monrovia, and would later build the larger 

training base in Careysburg. 

DynCorp’s ability to rapidly demobilize the legacy 

AFL was aided by circumstance since it did not have 

to disarm combatants or determine who was eligible 

for benefits, both dangerous and time-consuming issues. UNMIL’s DDRR (the extra “R” stands for Rehabilitation) program had already disarmed but not 

demobilized ex-AFL soldiers, who were confined to 

their barracks. However, as with LURD and MODEL, 

it was widely believed that the AFL’s best weapons 

remained hidden rather than surrendered to UNMIL 

as a hedge against future hostilities. UNMIL collected few heavy or crew-served weapons despite their 

prevalence during the civil war, casting a shadow of 

anxiety over the entire process.
58

The NTGL rather than DynCorp decided who was 

eligible for demobilization benefits. Based on available funding, DynCorp derived a points system to 

distribute payment to ex-AFL fighters based on time 

in service and rank, which the NTGL approved and 

adopted. The minimum payment to help soldiers reintegrate into civil society was $540 (about a year’s 

salary) and the maximum was over $2,000, substantially more than the flat $300 UNMIL offered nongovernment combatants in its DDRR program. Like so 

many other DDR programs, little was done to ensure 

long-term reintegration. Once individuals received 

their payments, they usually were offered transport to 

their home town and then forgotten. There was little, 

if any, serious job training, counseling, or similar assistance to prevent them from relying on violence to 

make a living. Also, there was no separate assistance 

for dependents of former soldiers, aside from the 270 

widows who received compensation only after vociferous and persistent political protests to the Liberian 

government. But to be fair to DynCorp, it was not 

contracted to provide long-term assistance for former 

soldiers, only to demobilize them safely.

Not surprisingly, many Liberians fraudulently 

claimed they were in the AFL and demanded payment; determining who was actually in the AFL was 

difficult. First, nearly all the AFL personnel records 

were destroyed in the war. Second, many combatants took a nom de guerre during the war: memorable 

warlords include General Cobra, General Mosquito, 

General Mosquito Spray, General Peanut-Butter (currently a senator), and General Butt Naked (currently 

a preacher), whose warriors fought au naturel. Lastly, 

there was widespread fraud and abuse during UNMIL’s DDRR process, as later vetting investigations 

revealed, giving precedent to cheating the system.76
59

In reference to the previous discussion, a large 

re-documentation exercise was launched to ascertain 

who was truly in the AFL, which the NTGL led and 

DynCorp operationalized. The executive order established a joint Demobilization Advisory Monitoring 

Committee (DAMC) to oversee the process, which 

did not include the firm.77 Initially, well over 15,000 

individuals claimed to be former AFL, but this list 

was painstakingly whittled down. UNMIL identified several hundred double dippers—Liberians who 

had already received benefits from UNMIL’s DDRR 

program posing as members of LURD or MODEL. 

These individuals were disqualified from receiving 

additional pay-outs. The AFL leadership also reconstructed former unit rosters drawn from fragments 

of surviving records and considered every claim individually, using eight criteria to validate a veteran’s 

identity.78 Suspicious candidates were quizzed on 

life in the AFL: which unit they were in, where they 

served, who were their commanding officers and first 

sergeants. By the end of July, the NTGL produced a 

list of 13,500 ex-AFL members eligible for benefits and 

added 270 widows later for a total of 13,770. 

Concurrent to these events, DynCorp and a senior 

member of the Ministry of Defence co-led a planning 

team of eight AFL officers that reported directly to the 

defense minister.79 The team issued a military operations order that provided a demobilization schedule 

for all 27 units, a three-stage plan of action for the process (identity verification, registration, and payment), 

and logistical requirements and taskings.80 Though 

successful, this hybrid team, led by a Liberian and a 

contractor, raised questions over where the NTGL’s 

influence ended and DynCorp’s began. The company 

had to manage significant portions of the process ow-
60

ing to the NTGL’s lack of capacity, which raised concerns over who truly controlled the process.

The NTGL and DynCorp imbued the process with 

dignity, which encouraged participation. After years 

of war rife with human rights violations, it was tempting to treat the AFL as criminals rather than soldiers. 

This would have been a mistake. First, not everyone 

in the AFL committed war crimes. Second, criminalizing the process only would have alienated former AFL 

and deterred their cooperation, which was essential to 

the program. DynCorp consciously framed the demobilization as a retirement, modeled on the U.S. Army’s 

own protocol, rather than a DDR pay-out to “thugs.” 

Every day, a unit mustered at the demobilization site 

to be honored with a formal ceremony replete with 

protocol, the AFL band, and a congratulatory speech 

by the Minister of Defence or similar dignitary. Individuals then began the demobilization process, which 

verified and logged their identity, took an identification picture, and electronically fingerprinted them 

(see Figure 3). Following this, ex-soldiers received a 

voucher for payment at a Monrovian bank as well as 

a demobilization certificate and a card indicating that 

they were either “demobilized” or “honorably retired” 

(for those whose service began before Taylor’s takeover). These documents were intended to provide a 

measure of closure and status to ex-combatants, but 

also, as official government papers, they represented 

the state’s reconstitution after a long absence. 
61

Figure 3. One of 15 Demobilization Stations 

with Biometric Capture at 

DynCorp’s Custom-Built Demobilization Site.

Cynics might argue this was merely political theater, yet, to date, it has been successful: The legacy 

military remains peacefully demobilized. Moreover, it 

was done safely and efficiently. By treating ex-combatants as soldiers rather than criminals, in 4 months 

and at a cost of only $15 million, one of the more notorious armies in Africa was completely and safely demobilized, a rare event in African history.81 DynCorp’s 

ability to demobilize an army exemplifies what the 

private military industry can do and perhaps where it 

is heading within the new neo-medieval order. In the 

new market for force, like the old, dismantling armed 

challengers is the first step to gaining a monopoly of 

force, whether it is for a client like Liberia—or the 

PMC’s own interests. 
62

Raising an Army in Five Steps.

DynCorp’s experience raising a small army for 

Liberia shows how PMCs today can build a military. 

Unlike PMC experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

DynCorp raised an army with no support from the 

DoD and minimal assistance from the U.S. Government, other than payment. This is significant because 

it demonstrates the capability of the private sector to 

generate security forces today. Nor is DynCorp unique 

in its capacity.

Raising an army is obviously complex, and a full 

analysis of how it is done is beyond the scope of this 

monograph. Instead, an overview of five key elements 

of army building, all managed by DynCorp in Liberia, 

are discussed: (1) public sensitization, (2) recruiting, 

(3) vetting, (4) training and equipping, and (5) formulating strategy and institutional support. 

Step 1: Alert the Public.

The first step in creating a new force—unless it is 

clandestine—is to alert the public. In Liberia, this was 

challenging, owing to the grim legacy of the former 

AFL in the war. Many Liberians, and even UNMIL’s 

Jacques Klein, did not welcome this development and 

thought the country ought to adopt the Costa Rican 

model of a robust national police force in lieu of a military. However, ultimately it was decided during the 

Accra Peace Accords that Liberia needed a military 

because of the dangerous geopolitics of West Africa. 

To help prepare the populace for this, DynCorp began 

planning a public sensitization program in early 2005. 

Major obstacles of any foreign-led messaging campaign are cultural and language barriers, and Liberia 
63

has 16 different tribes with their own customs and 

languages. The widely-spoken Liberian English is not 

easily recognizable to international English speakers, 

as it is a creole of Kru pidgin English and 19th-century 

African American vernacular English.82 Moreover, 

the 14-year dearth of education due to the civil war 

and resultant 75 percent illiteracy rate limited much 

communication to oral or pictorial transmission. Due 

to these challenges, DynCorp sought to partner with 

a local communications firm and employed Liberians 

to craft effective messages that would resonate with 

indigenous audiences. DynCorp’s role was confined 

mostly to logistical support and coordination with international community representatives in Liberia. 

The communications strategy was a combined sensitization and recruitment campaign targeting opinion 

leaders, civil society, and the AFL recruitment pool. 

It consisted of several parallel efforts. The first was a 

series of workshops for senior AFL officers, cabinet 

members, soldiers to be demobilized, the media, and 

civil society groups. The second was a broader outreach campaign to the public as a whole and involved 

members of the government and the AFL SSR program who gave interviews to the media, debated on 

radio talk shows, staged rallies featuring other senior 

members of the government (see Figure 4), produced 

radio dramas featuring the AFL, placed ads in newspapers, displayed large AFL billboards and murals 

(see Figure 5), and recruited tours in Liberia’s hinterlands (see Figure 6). DynCorp even commissioned 

AFL comic books titled Jackie’s Adventure and Liberia’s 

New Armed Forces for free distribution (see Figure 7). 

The company also set up two information booths in 

downtown Monrovia staffed by Liberians to answer 

any questions passers-by had regarding the AFL SSR 

process or how to enlist. 
Figure 4. The Liberian Minister of National Defence 

Brownie Samukai at a Rally for the AFL, 

Coordinated by DynCorp in Monrovia, 2006.

Figure 5. The Author Standing in Front 

of an AFL Billboard Alerting the Public to the 

New Armed Forces of Liberia.

64
65

Figure 6. Part of a DynCorp Recruiting Convoy into 

the Hinterlands of Liberia.

Figure 7. DynCorp commissioned comic books to 

reach low-literacy audiences aimed at sharing 

information regarding the new AFL as well as 

encourage recruitment, especially among 

women in this case.
66

Despite DynCorp’s efforts to localize the campaign by hiring locals to help design it, many Liberians found it bumbling and even insulting. The use of 

well-dressed and healthy-looking children on some of 

the AFL recruiting posters was not well received by a 

population traumatized by child soldiers. Many asked 

whether the children on the posters were American, 

given their health. This demonstrated a lack of cultural sensitivity on the part of the campaign designers, 

partly because the messages were not thoroughly tested on Liberian focus groups before they went public. 

Similarly, the comic books received mixed reactions; 

they were an effective tool for illiterate audiences but 

repelled some educated Liberians, who found them 

infantilizing. 

Worse, DynCorp’s attempt to combine sensitization and recruiting into a single campaign to conserve 

resources and time muddled messages and hampered 

the efficacy of both. In many ways, these two information efforts are incompatible. The objective of the 

sensitization program is to alert the public to the new 

military’s formation in the most transparent and neutral manner possible, whereas the purpose of recruitment is advocacy by framing information in a highly 

positive way to encourage enlistment. DynCorp chose 

to prioritize recruitment over sensitization, which 

should not be a surprise. After all, it was hired to raise 

an army, not facilitate a civil society discourse on the 

role of the new AFL: Too much indigenous criticism of 

what it was doing could have resulted in the DoS cancelling its contract. But this lack of transparency and 

civil society engagement is an important component 

of SSR, as it inculcates ownership and acceptance of 

the new AFL.
67

Step 2: Recruiting.

Recruitment for the new AFL began on January 18, 

2006, at the Barclay Training Center (BTC) in downtown Monrovia and attracted a great deal of attention, 

with a line wrapping nearly around the block (see 

Figure 8). Large groups of applicants even camped in 

front of the BTC for several nights before the opening 

day, and individuals travelled from outlying counties 

to stand for the chance to apply. In the first 2 months 

alone, DynCorp processed 4,000 applications. 

Figure 8. The First Day of Recruiting 

Attracted a Long Line of Volunteers.

Most of the recruiting took place at the BTC because a third of the population was encamped at 

Monrovia, making it fertile enlisting ground, and BTC 

also had the infrastructure to support the operation. 

Neither the Liberian government nor the DoS desired 

an all-Monrovian military, but access to Liberia’s interior was very limited. The few roads and bridges 

that existed were in poor shape, and some were im-
68

passable during the rainy season. To overcome this, 

DynCorp conducted large recruiting expeditions with 

the precision and robustness of a military operation. 

Each so-called forward recruiting convoy consisted of 

some dozen or so trucks, 50 staff, and all necessary 

equipment, including spare vehicles. They would deploy days and even weeks at a time to all 14 counties 

in Liberia and could process about 120 applicants a 

day. Like a military column, these forward recruitment operations consisted of several parts. Ahead of 

the main convoy, a reconnaissance team scouted the 

routes, conducted liaisons with relevant UN and Liberian authorities, and identified recruitment sites. 

Next, a public affairs team made radio announcements and distributed posters and comic books. 

Then the forward recruiting team’s main body arrived, making announcements over truck-mounted 

speakers while driving through population centers. 

In the first 6 months of 2006, DynCorp launched 28 

recruiting expeditions. 

The final phase of the recruitment campaign was, 

of course, the recruitment itself. DynCorp devised a 

four-stage recruitment process—enlistment, a literacy 

aptitude test, a physical fitness test, and a medical 

exam—to select the best candidates from the recruitment pool. The stages were sequential: Applicants 

had to pass minimum acceptability standards before 

advancing to the next stage. To save money, DynCorp 

conducted less expensive tests first when the applicant 

pool was large, and more costly tests last when the applicant pool was smallest. This process is illustrated 

in Figure 9.
69

Figure 9. Recruiting Process.

The first stage of recruitment was enlistment. Applicants had to be Liberian citizens between the ages 

of 18 and 35, functionally literate at a 12th grade level 

for enlisted soldiers and at a college graduate level for 

officers, physically fit and healthy, without a criminal record, and free of allegations of human rights 

violations, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. 

Applicants showed up at a recruitment station and 

were searched for weapons, then asked to read a few 

simple sentences to ensure basic literacy (a fuller literacy exam ensued later); 11.5 percent failed this and 
70

were escorted off the premises. Applicants who could 

read were briefed on the AFL and the recruitment process. If individuals wished to volunteer to serve, they 

filed an enlistment application, received an AFL recruitment identity card with their picture and unique 

tracking number, and were given a report date for the 

second stage. 

The second stage was assessing functional literacy. 

Soldiers had to be able to read and write orders, reports, maps, and other communications, a significant 

recruiting challenge in a country with 75 percent illiteracy. Because of this, DynCorp suggested a minimum 6th-grade reading level, but the Liberian government insisted on a 12th-grade level. Instead of 

relying on disparate and potentially fraudulent diplomas, DynCorp asked the West African Examinations 

Council (WAEC), a regional organization, to create 

an aptitude test that the company could administer. 

WAEC is a not-for-profit examination board that has 

administered standardized tests for 6th and 12th graders throughout the region since 1952. WAEC created 

a 90-minute aptitude test consisting of 30 multiplechoice questions and one essay to test for educational 

equivalency. If the applicant passed the aptitude test, 

he or she was invited to return the next day for a 

physical fitness test and medical exam; if the applicant failed the aptitude test, (s)he was given one more 

chance to retake the test in 28 days’ time. Female candidates tended to score higher than males, and unlike 

in a developed country, younger Liberians on average 

did worse than older applicants, owing to the lack of 

schooling during the 14-year civil war. Fifty-eight percent of applicants passed this stage.

The third stage assessed physical aptitude. Obviously, strong physical prowess is a prerequisite for 
71

soldiering, and DynCorp modified the U.S. Army’s 

physical fitness test to assess it, because the test required no special equipment or venue. To pass the 

test, applicants had to complete a minimum number 

of push-ups and sit-ups in a 2-minute time frame and 

run 1.5 miles in less than a specified time, depending on age and gender. Only 7.6 percent of applicants 

failed the fitness test, and these could retest in 28 days. 

Of those who failed, 58 percent failed to do the minimum required push-ups, 36 percent failed to complete 

the minimum required sit-ups, and 6 percent did not 

finish the 1.5 mile run in the maximum time allotted. 

Not surprisingly, applicants older than 34 had a higher failure rate than younger candidates, although the 

rate never exceeded 20 percent for any age group. Forty-eight percent of original applicants passed through 

this stage.

Next, applicants underwent a basic medical examination consisting of a general check-up, a drug screen, 

a tuberculosis test, and an HIV-AIDS test. Unlike the 

other tests, applicants who failed this exam were denied entry into the AFL unless it was for a temporary 

illness or the need of corrective lenses, in which case 

the applicant could return for a reexamination. Surprisingly, only 11.9 percent failed the medical examination during the first 6 months, mostly due to illegal 

drug use. Liberia has a relatively high HIV-AIDS rate, 

but the recruitment campaign’s active dissemination 

of minimum entry standards may have deterred those 

afflicted from volunteering. 

In sum, the purpose of the recruiting process is to 

select the best qualified individuals for service. However, this is not limited to technical skills alone. A key 

aspect of SSR is ensuring that no person of improper 

character is accepted into the new force, and this requires careful vetting of applicants.
72

Step 3. Vetting.

Vetting is perhaps the most important, yet inexplicably overlooked, element of raising security forces. 

Recruiting soldiers or policemen without proper background checks would be unthinkable in the United 

States, yet it has happened routinely in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflict affected states, which arguably 

need professional security services the most. The lack 

of rigorous vetting allows terrorists and criminals to 

easily infiltrate security forces and commit crimes in 

uniform, discrediting, and corrupting the force, while 

terrorizing the populace. On February 22, 2006, insurgents posing as Iraqi police destroyed the Golden 

Mosque in Samarra, one of Iraq’s holiest Shiite shrines, 

re-igniting long-standing violence between Sunni and 

Shia in Iraq. This problem became so widespread in 

the Iraqi national police that in 2007, the U.S. Congress 

appointed a high-level independent commission headed by retired general James Jones, the former NATO 

commander, to assess the situation. The commission’s 

recommendation was grim: “We should start over,” 

meaning the SSR of the Iraqi police. But as an earlier 

inspector general report on the same topic observed, 

a corrupt security force that has lost public trust and 

legitimacy is “a problem not easily undone.”83

One reason vetting is ignored is because it is hard. 

How does one conduct background checks in a failed 

state where there are few, if any, records kept? Background investigations normally rely on a plethora of 

records: criminal, commercial, financial, educational, 

and public. In a post-conflict failed state, such records 

may not have survived the war, if they existed in the 

first place; they also may be incomplete or not cred-
73

ible. In Liberia, what records remained were scant, incomplete, and generally untrustworthy, since forgery 

and identity theft were common. The AFL’s personnel or G-1 Section of the Ministry of Defence had lost 

most of its filing systems, including the 201 files of its 

Military Personnel Record Jacket, which had documents on each soldier. Compounding the issue was 

the sheer number of problematic candidates, where 

many people were perpetrators or victims (or both) 

of violence during the war. The lack of tools plus the 

large volume of troubled backgrounds made human 

rights vetting a daunting challenge.

Vetting was also dangerous. Many did not welcome unearthing the bloody past, especially violent 

individuals under investigation with something to 

hide. If the vetting process failed to safeguard the 

identities of victims and witnesses who helped identify perpetrators, then those victims or SSR staff could 

be intimidated, coerced, and even killed in reprisal. If 

the vetting process accidentally admitted a war criminal, it would discredit all vetted individuals and perhaps even provoke a violent backlash. Wrongful denunciations made against innocent individuals could 

generate antagonism in the community and discredit 

the SSR program as a whole, deterring people from 

enlisting in the new army and defeating the purpose 

of the SSR effort.

DynCorp thus created an entirely novel approach 

to human rights vetting in post-conflict countries 

which the ICG says is “a notable success—the best, 

several experts said, they had witnessed anywhere 

in the world.”84 It combined investigative techniques, 

international best practices, and human rights norms 

to judge a candidate’s character and capacity for a 

position of trust and to identify potential risks for 

security reasons. 
74

We would never put a policeman or a soldier on the 

streets of a U.S. city without a thorough background 

check, yet such precautions are frequently neglected in 

conflict zones. To date, no public military or government has developed a systematic method for vetting 

in fragile states, which accounts for difficulties in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, for instance, where insurgents easily 

infiltrate the security forces and commit crimes in uniform. To avoid spoilers subverting the AFL, DynCorp 

invested in developing a new vetting model and did 

so more efficiently than the U.S. military, taking just a 

few months with a handful of experts. The U.S. military did not rigorously vet individuals who wished to 

serve in the Afghan, Iraqi, or similar security forces, 

despite its centrality to effective SSR. 

The process utilized three methods: background 

checks, records checks, and public vetting. The vetting staff was compartmentalized from the recruiting 

office to avoid conflict of interest issues or selection 

bias. Once an applicant’s file was passed to the vetting office, it was assigned to a background investigator, who worked closely with Liberian colleagues. The 

purpose was to establish the overall truthfulness of the 

applicants’ claims about themselves and uncover evidence of past wrongdoing that would disqualify them 

from serving. During enlistment, applicants filled out 

a detailed questionnaire about their backgrounds, 

which included their age, schooling, work history, 

claimed special skills, a strip-map to their home (there 

are few street signs in war-ravaged Liberia), and any 

supporting evidence, such as certificates or diplomas. 

An investigator then verified the accuracy of this information; fraudulent claims and documents filed in 

the applications account for the majority of candidate 

disqualifications during the vetting process. 
75

The first vetting method is background checks. Conducting background checks in a post-conflict country 

is complex and absolutely requires local knowledge. 

Owing to this, each investigative team comprised 

one Liberian and one international investigator. This 

team interviewed people on conditions of anonymity 

who knew the candidate well for character references, 

which included the candidate’s references, neighbors, 

employers, co-workers, relatives, municipal authorities, teachers, community leaders, and local religious 

leaders (see Figure 10). To ensure interviews were controlled, confidential, and conducive to maximum disclosure, investigators tried to conduct them in private 

locations and use open-ended questions (e.g., “tell me 

about this man”). Because of the sensitive nature of 

investigating the past, local Liberian staff were vital as 

cultural interpreters and almost always accompanied 

the investigator. Without their support, competent investigations would not have been possible.

Figure 10. A DynCorp Vetting Team Comprising 

One International and One Liberian Expert 

Conducting Background Checks on an AFL 

Applicant in the Field.
76

Second, the vetting team ran a records check on 

the applicant, pooling what public records were available and prioritizing them by reliability and completeness. In its records search, DynCorp reached out to 

the full pantheon of neo-medieval actors in Liberia: 

the government of Liberia, UNMIL, and other international organizations as well as international and 

local NGOs.85 The West Africa Examinations Council 

(WAEC) maintained some of the best identity records 

in the country, with thousands of Liberian identities 

plus photographs on file. Despite the incompleteness 

of the records, they helped investigators verify facts 

and spot forged documents and falsehoods. 

Third, DynCorp conducted public vetting, a direct 

appeal to the population to solicit local knowledge 

of candidates’ past wrongdoings. The candidates’ 

pictures, names, and hometowns were publicized 

nationally to afford witnesses and victims an opportunity to identify undesirable candidates. Candidates 

were briefed of this procedure during enlistment and 

signed a release form authorizing DynCorp to broadcast their information. The company used posters, 

newspaper inserts, radio, and facebooks to disseminate the information and invited the public to provide 

feedback anonymously via telephone hotlines, an 

email address, or simply walking into an enlistment 

center. Additionally, some members of the public 

with special knowledge of past crimes, such as solicitors, academic researchers, civil society groups, and 

journalists, were, at times, asked to submit relevant 

information concerning the human rights records of 

persons named on the list. Not surprisingly, public vetting in Liberia attracted many false leads and 

fraudulent claims aimed at defaming candidates for 

unrelated reasons, but in a country with few public re-
77

cords, tapping the collective memory of the populace 

was an important vetting method. 

Applicants could be disqualified on substantial 

and/or procedural grounds. Substantial reasons involve credible evidence of past wrongdoing—criminality, human rights violations, drug use, mental 

instability, etc.—that would be undesirable behavior in the new security forces. To this end, DynCorp 

compiled a list of “core crimes” that would disqualify 

candidates. These were drawn from crimes commonly outlawed in humanitarian and human rights law, 

specifically genocide, crimes against humanity, war 

crimes, and grave human rights abuses. Examples of 

core crimes include murder, rape, and torture. Individuals who were members of security units with especially bad human rights records were not dismissed 

categorically: All applicants received a fair investigation. Procedural grounds entailed credible evidence of 

wrongdoing internal to the vetting process itself, such 

as cheating, lying, or noncooperation in course of the 

investigation. In other words, substantial grounds 

dealt with factors external to the vetting process, while 

procedural grounds dealt with issues internal to the 

process itself. Both assessed an individual’s integrity 

and character, and either justified the rejection of an 

applicant from the indigenous force.

What should be the threshold of evidence for disqualification? Theoretically, the threshold criteria for 

rejection of an applicant follow a simple formula: 

level of gravity of crime + level of evidence, balanced 

against other competing interests (e.g., member of an 

underrepresented ethnic group, applicant possesses a 

rare and needed skill set, etc.). Realistically, this is a 

tricky question and has no generalizable answer. Several standards exist for determining the quality or level 

of evidence, yet none are wholly satisfactory. Setting 
78

standards too low results in an “open door model” 

that risks insurgents and criminals easily infiltrating 

the force. Setting them too high creates a “trial model” 

that would be inappropriate and protract the process. 

Since vetting is used to determine an applicant’s 

suitability for military service rather than establishing guilt or innocence of crimes, DynCorp adopted 

a lower standard of proof than would courts of law, 

disqualifying candidates based on a preponderance of 

evidence or “balance of probability.” In other words, 

an applicant would be dismissed if he or she was more 

likely than not culpable in a crime. This standard is 

generally utilized for civil law trials and is widely accepted in adjudicating human rights cases, such as by 

the European Court of Human Rights. The “balance 

of probabilities” standard is an injunction to evaluate 

whether a given element is “more probable than not” 

and most suitable for SSR vetting.

When weighing the testimony of witnesses, DynCorp created a matrix that explained and ranked the 

trustworthiness of sources in four categories: identity, 

character, education, and professional experience. For 

each of these categories, the company gave guidelines regarding the types of persons who were most 

and least trustworthy. Strongly credible witnesses included people who knew the candidate well, such as a 

close relative or a friend who knew the candidate for 

15 years or more (e.g., spouse, parent, or old friend) 

or people in positions of authority over the individual 

(e.g., high school principal, church pastor, or boss). 

Weak witnesses only vaguely knew the candidate; 

in such cases, the investigator needed to substantiate 

the charge with at least two or three unrelated witnesses. Allegations with few credible witnesses were 

generally deemed not probable and did not disqualify 

the applicant. 
79

In addition to allegations of war crimes or human 

rights violations, histories of criminal behavior, poor 

reputations in the community, mental instability, and 

family violence, candidates could be rejected for procedural reasons that cast negative light on their suitability for soldiering. The top reasons for procedural 

disqualification included failure to reveal pertinent information during the procedure; evidence of threats, 

intimidation, or coercion of victims, references, or witnesses; lack of cooperation with or support for the vetting process; or aggressive, violent, insulting, or disrespectful behavior toward staff. In the first 6 months of 

recruiting and vetting, 1,080 candidates were investigated; of these, 335 were accepted and 205 were rejected, almost all for procedural rather than substantive 

reasons. This may be because the recruiting campaign 

stressed the need for candidates free of criminal or human rights violations in their background, and thus 

the applicant pool was self-selecting. It may also be 

because procedural problems were easier to unearth 

than substantive ones.

Importantly, DynCorp did not admit or dismiss 

any applicant based on vetting: This was the job of the 

Joint Personnel Board (JPB). Once a candidate passed 

all recruiting requirements and completed the vetting process, DynCorp scored their merit based on 

how well they did in each category, ranked them on 

an order of merit list, and then passed the candidate’s 

file to the JPB. Three individuals comprised the JPB: 

a member of the Liberian government (appointed by 

the Minister of Defence), a member of Liberian civil 

society (also appointed by the Minister of Defence),

and a U.S. Embassy official. After the JPB reviewed 

the applicant’s file, test results, and vetting findings, it 

then voted on whether to admit the candidate into the 
80

new AFL as a recruit. A simple majority won. Rejected applicants could appeal to a similarly constructed 

Joint Review Board (JRB), which had final determining authority. Recruits spent the first year of their service on probation, during which their performances 

were evaluated. At the end of this first year, the JPB 

convened to decide whether to retain or dismiss the 

soldier. UNMIL could observe the process but had no 

vote. DynCorp only acted as the administrative facilitator and also had no vote.

The recruiting and vetting campaign was fairly 

effective, given the high enlistment rate in the first 6 

months of recruiting. DynCorp received 4,170 applicants in the first 6 months of recruiting. The average 

age was 29 years, and there was a fairly even dispersion of tribal group. No single group accounted for 

more than 12 percent of the applicant pool, although 

some groups represented less than 1 percent, such 

as Sarpo, Bella, and Dei.86 No one was identified as 

Americo-Liberian or Congo, though .8 percent did 

not select a group on the enlistment application form, 

which asks individuals to identify their tribe rather 

than ethnic group. Neither Americo-Liberians nor 

Congo regard themselves as a tribe.

Two-thirds of all applicants resided in the county 

of Montserrado, where Monrovia is located, though 

because the war drove most of Liberia’s population to 

its capital, this should not be interpreted as reflecting 

applicants’ counties of origin. Most candidates were 

born in Montserrado (22 percent), Lofa (16 percent), or 

Nimba (14 percent), while the fewest came from River 

Gee (2 percent), Gbarpolu (1 percent), and Rivercess 

(1 percent). In general, the applicants were representative of the population, consistent with the DoS and 

the Liberian government’s desire for an ethnically 

balanced military. 
81

Curiously, only 772 applicants, or 18.5 percent of 

the applicant pool, claimed former military experience, either in the AFL or a rebel group. No doubt some 

withheld this information when applying, especially 

during the early days of recruitment when the SSR 

program’s reputation was still inchoate. Over half of 

these applicants claimed they served in the AFL, with 

the remainder more or less evenly divided among former LURD, MODEL, militia, and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, a rebel group led by Taylor during 

the First Liberian Civil War from 1989 to 1996. A small 

number of candidates claimed they served in special 

units created by Taylor towards the end of the war 

that terrorized the population and enemy alike, such 

as the Special Operations Division and Special Secret 

Service. No applicant was denied entry into the new 

AFL because they were part of a notorious unit; candidates were only rejected when background checks 

revealed participation in human rights violations or 

crimes. Applicants with former military experience 

scored substantially lower on vetting benchmarks 

than applicants without former military experience.

Both the Liberian government and the DoS had 

asked DynCorp to emphasize female recruitment, and 

in 2006, Johnson-Sirleaf astonishingly declared that 

20 percent of all soldiers in the AFL should be women, perhaps the highest percentage of women in any 

military.87 DynCorp correspondingly held women-only recruitment days, featured women soldiers in comics and billboards, and hired female veterans of the old 

AFL’s Women Auxiliary Corps to staff the AFL information booth in downtown Monrovia. Despite these 

efforts, only 130 of the 4,170 applicants were female, 

constituting 3.2 percent of the applicant pool. When 

asked, one woman said she did not want to join the 
82

military because it would make her “muscly” and “no 

man wants a woman muscly.” When it was pointed 

out to her that she—and many women in Liberia—

walked several miles a day with a few gallons of water 

or a sack of rice balanced on their head yet remained 

“unmuscly,” she simply grinned and left.88

Vetting is an area where the objectives of post-conflict security and justice can clash. Key to the success 

of the vetting program was guaranteeing the anonymity of people who gave information about applicants. 

Failure to protect the identities of witnesses and victims of crimes invited reprisals and even death: With 

a feeble judiciary and scant law enforcement, violence 

was never far beneath the surface. However, this was 

controversial because it meant that vetting must remain absolutely unconnected to instruments of postconflict justice, such as a truth commission or a war 

crimes tribunal. 

This became an issue in the summer of 2006 when 

Liberia’s nascent Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) demanded all of DynCorp’s vetting records for transitional justice purposes. By this time, 

DynCorp had amassed one of the most complete sets 

of records on individuals in the country, especially 

regarding ex-combatants. Causing controversy within 

UNMIL, DynCorp refused to hand over its records, 

since it would reveal the identities of witnesses as 

well as vetting sources and methods. If the TRC were 

to use the vetting records as evidence, making them 

public in the process or leaking them by accident, 

it would invite reprisals against the witnesses and 

also compromise the AFL SSR program, since no one 

would volunteer to join if they thought it would land 

them in front of the TRC. The objective of vetting is 

to assess suitability for service in a security force; it 
83

is not about determining guilt or innocence, and consequently should be disassociated from transitional 

justice efforts.

Clearly, it is desirable that potential perpetrators 

of violence be brought before the TRC. However, 

sometimes in volatile situations like post-conflict Liberia, the needs of transitional justice and security are 

at odds with each other, and leaders must choose between the two. The real tragedy is that the choice must 

be made at all, as Liberians deserve both. At the time, 

the immediate needs of security outweighed the need 

for transitional justice. As a PMC, it was easier for 

DynCorp to refuse the TRC than for the U.S. Government to do so, since the United States does not wish 

to be publically portrayed as retarding post-conflict 

justice, even when it is, at times, necessary. This may 

be an instance when plausible deniability afforded by 

private companies serves the employer’s interests. 

Now that the SSR program is complete, the Liberian government could choose to release the vetting 

records. As long as the TRC is not politicized, such an 

action could prove an important confidence building 

measure for the public and the AFL’s final step in becoming a full-fledged transparent army governed by 

civilian authorities and accountable to the rule of law. 

It would help dispel mistrust that the records are being concealed to protect the guilty, and that this AFL 

was truly “new,” removing the taint of the civil war 

once and for all. 

Step 4: Training and Equipping.

Training and equipping the force is the simplest 

part of building an army. Although military training 

varies from place to place, the principles involved 
84

in transforming civilians into soldiers are so timeless that they are practically clichés: intense physical 

conditioning and psychological hardening; breaking 

down individual egos and building them back up as 

a unit; bonding through mutual suffering; the more 

the recruits sweat in peace, the less they bleed in war; 

repetitive drills until soldiers can literally accomplish 

military tasks in their sleep. The foundational document of U.S. Army training—and now AFL training—is U.S. Army Regulation 350–1: Army Training and 

Leader Development (AR 350-1). DynCorp adopted the 

U.S. Army’s initial entry training (IET) program for 

the AFL’s basic training, modifying it for the needs of 

Liberia, and hired only ex-U.S. Army and Marine drill 

sergeants (see Figure 11) to transform the recruits into 

soldiers.89

Figure 11. AFL Basic Training with a 

DynCorp Drill Sergeant.
85

Grounded in AR 350-1, DynCorp planned four 

training courses for the AFL. Basic training—that is, 

IET—initially lasted 15 weeks but later was reduced 

due to lack of funding. Following this, recruits would 

undergo advanced individual training (AIT), which 

usually lasted 6 weeks and provided specialized 

training to soldiers based on their military occupation 

speciality (MOS), such as infantry, medic, or cook. Every member of the AFL undertook IET and AIT, but 

soldiers selected for leadership underwent additional 

training. Those selected as noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs, also known as sergeants) attended a basic 

NCO course (BNCOC, pronounced bee-knock) for 4 

weeks, and those selected as officers attended an officer basic course (OBC) for 6 weeks. Rather than examine each of these courses in depth, it may prove more 

useful to analyze one course, basic training, because 

it was the most widely attended and illustrates how 

DynCorp adapted U.S. military training to the AFL’s 

unique needs.

The original basic training program was revolutionary. Early planners at DynCorp believed that after 

14 years of civil war, most Liberians knew how to fire 

an AK-47 but did not know when or at what. Thus, the 

original basic training curriculum and first iteration 

reduced the number of hours AFL recruits spent on 

the range and added 3 weeks’ worth of civics classes, 

which taught the laws of war, ethics, and the like. The 

curriculum was designed in partnership with Liberian 

lawyers, historians, and educators, as well as DynCorp staff with backgrounds in international public 

law and military training. The 120 hours of civics instruction dwarfed all other training, with basic rifle 

marksmanship (BRM) coming in a distant second at 

under 50 hours. The firm also partnered with interna-
86

tional NGOs such as the International Committee of 

the Red Cross (ICRC) to deliver 8 hours of instruction 

on international humanitarian law and human rights. 

At the time, the volume of civics instruction was unprecedented in modern militaries, but few modern 

militaries face the challenges of the AFL.

Additionally, the civics instruction addressed vital 

concerns of the AFL such as federalism. As in most 

fragmented states, people in Liberia often identified 

first with their tribe and second with their state, which 

had corrupted the national military. As mentioned 

previously, Doe had replaced much of the AFL leadership with members of his Krahn tribe, turning the 

military into a sectarian war machine in the 1980s. To 

avoid this in the future, the Liberian government and 

the DoS demanded that DynCorp create an AFL with 

balanced ethnic representation in the ranks and also a 

strong national identity that superseded tribal loyalty. 

To answer its client’s demands, DynCorp dedicated 

significant time in the civics section to Liberian history, loyalty to the constitution, organization of the Liberian government, the civil-military relationship, the 

rule of law, and other topics that imbued a national 

consciousness and duty to state above all else.90 Designed and often delivered by Liberian professional 

educators, this curriculum aspired to engender respect for federalism within the ranks.

Another key challenge facing the AFL was literacy. 

Military leaders and ideally the entire force would be 

literate. But Liberia’s high illiteracy rate, combined 

with Taylor’s denial of education to his tribal enemies 

during the war, meant that some ethnic groups were 

less literate than others. This created a conundrum, 

since the DoS gave DynCorp the dual mandate of a 

literate and ethnically balanced military. To overcome 
87

this, DynCorp accepted some candidates from minority groups with lower literacy rates and embedded 

a literacy program into basic training for any recruit 

wanting or needing it. 

Infusing civics, federalism, and literacy instruction 

into the overall basic training framework is an excellent example of private sector innovation not found 

in similar public sector efforts. U.S. efforts at raising 

security forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali faced 

similar hurdles as were seen in Liberia, yet lacked any 

sort of systematic approach to instilling federalism, 

literacy, or respect for the rule of law. 

This failure stems, in part, from the U.S. military’s 

reluctance to abandon its doctrine when restructuring 

security forces, often to the detriment of those foreign 

forces—and unfortunately, like the market for force 

in the Middle Ages, the contractor is only as good as 

the client. After the first iteration of basic training, the 

DoS asked DynCorp to remove the 3 weeks of civics 

courses on advice from the DoD and to save money. 

Therefore, it is difficult to assess the efficacy of DynCorp’s civics program.

To save money, the DoS chose to shorten basic 

training by 3 weeks, which it did by removing all civics, human rights, and laws of war classes—perhaps 

the most important training for the new AFL, since 

most recruits already knew how to shoot an AK-47 

from the war. Industry critics might find this surprising, naturally assuming that the DoS would want the 

civics curriculum and that the PMC would have no 

interest in implementing it, which if true, would have 

been a classic case of the profit motive overriding 

policy concerns. 

In terms of equipping the recruits, conflict-zone 

logistics is the private military industry’s forte, as 
88

contractors manage the majority of DoD logistics requirements around the world. DynCorp’s team of 

ex-military and civilian logisticians at the company’s 

offices in Dallas equipped the AFL through the global 

supply chain. Since Liberia was under a strict UN arms 

embargo at the time, the DoS and DynCorp worked 

together closely in 2006 to purchase small arms in 

Eastern Europe and fly the weapons to Liberia via 

chartered cargo plane. To minimize ambush by clandestine rebel groups, the planes landed unannounced 

in the dead of night. The DoS arranged an exemption 

to the UN arms embargo, over-flight permissions, 

end user certificates, and money for the operation. 

DynCorp found the supplier, transacted the deal, and 

moved the weapons from Eastern Europe to Liberia. 

The deal was the first legal arms transaction to Liberia 

in nearly 2 decades. 

Step 5: Strategy and Institutional Support.

It takes more than soldiers and weapons to make 

an army. Therefore, DynCorp was also contracted to 

demobilize and rebuild the Ministry of Defence to 

develop defense strategy and manage the AFL’s human resources, public affairs, resource management, 

ombudsman, coordination with other ministries, and 

other vital functions. Because ministries of defense in 

fragile states are often bloated affairs, the DoS directed 

the company to create a lean organization of about 100 

people, almost all civilians and led by a civilian minister. Once AFL recruiting and training was underway, 

DynCorp undertook the creation of a small military 

civil service.

Rebuilding a ministry is far from a facile affair. 

Public sector militaries like the U.S. Army generally 
89

do not conduct institutional reform, as it is not seen 

as a core military function. Instead, development 

agencies such as USAID or the World Bank typically 

assist host nations with the work. However, development organizations are often prohibited from working 

with military institutions or shun doing so, and consequently transforming a ministry of defense in particular remains largely unmapped territory.91 This did 

not deter DynCorp, which sought out relevant experts 

and lured them to Liberia through competitive pay 

packages in a manner no state bureaucracy can afford 

or has the flexibility to accommodate. Because practice 

was ahead of theory in 2005, many of the experts were 

retired U.S. military officers and defense attachés with 

substantial experience working with African ministries of defense. 

Within months, the firm formed a 20-person team 

that devised a 17-week civil servant training course 

divided into 10 functional areas, followed by 16 weeks 

of on-the-job mentorship.92 The team also would help 

the fledgling Liberian ministry draft all plans, policies, 

and procedures for the AFL—a major task—as well as 

assist in formulating military strategy. Unfortunately, 

this plan never came to fruition due to contractual pay 

problems, so it is impossible to assess its effectiveness, 

although it could serve as a useful model for future 

efforts. Today the Ministry of Defence has mostly 

learned by doing, a less than ideal approach to ministerial development.

One interesting aspect of hiring a private company 

to conduct SSR rather than the DoD is that DynCorp 

was not beholden to any country’s military doctrine 

or textbook solutions. Instead, it could freely mold 

existing protocols without fear of institutional reprisal. Substantially modifying doctrine to fit the needs 
90

of a host nation is a departure from the U.S. practice, 

which, as recent experience suggests, tends to transpose—wholesale—its own military models onto foreign forces without consideration as to whether they 

are appropriate or not. Not surprisingly, these efforts meet limited success: U.S. solutions to Iraqi or 

Afghani problems have made for a poor fit. By contrast, in Liberia, DynCorp used U.S. Army training 

doctrine as a baseline for innovation rather than as an 

outright solution. 

Additionally, DynCorp’s bureaucratic outsider 

status allowed it to support Liberia’s interests in the 

back offices of the Pentagon and the DoS in Washington, DC, where Liberians could seldom venture. It became evident during the consultations that Liberians 

strongly advocated gender equality in the ranks, while 

the U.S. Government did not. Before the civil war, the 

AFL had an all-female unit called the Women’s Auxiliary Corps, which was well respected even in 2005, 

and during the civil war, some of the most feared warlords, such as Black Diamond, were women. Liberians 

understood that women could be effective warriors. 

However, until recently the U.S. military held that 

women were not fit for combat and therefore should 

not serve in front-line units, and it initially opposed 

including women in AFL infantry units.

DynCorp thus became an unwitting arbitrator in a 

debate between the defense establishments in Washington, DC, and Monrovia. As a nominal outsider in 

the process, DynCorp could credibly present ideas 

and recommendations to entrenched bureaucracies 

on both sides of the Atlantic without the burdens of 

institutional loyalty or prejudice. This helped drive 

the argument for gender parity, since key managers 

in DynCorp were persuaded by the Liberians’ case. 
91

Because the DoS managed the SSR contract, it had the 

final vote on the matter and opted for gender parity, 

overruling the DoD desire to use U.S. military templates and its bias against women in infantry units. 

Consequently, Liberian women may now enjoy greater equality in their military than do American women. 

By 2010, Liberia had a small fledgling army and, 

in 2013, it is preparing to possibly deploy to Mali for 

a peacekeeping mission, 10 years after Charles Taylor 

fled Liberia, and the AFL was widely viewed as a cause 

of conflict. It remains a qualified success compared to 

efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Côte d’Ivoire, 

and elsewhere where new security forces degenerated 

into sectarian killing machines or coup d’etat makers. 

One of the features that makes Liberia unique is that a 

PMC raised its army, revealing some of the good, bad, 

and ugly implications of today’s private military industry and the future of DDR and SSR, since many of 

these programs will likely be outsourced in the future.

Other Challenges.

As with any complex contingency operations, few 

things went as planned. Two especially difficult challenges for the operator on the ground are discussed. 

Erratic Funding.

The United States paid for the SSR program, except for the soldiers’ salaries, making progress vulnerable to the ebb and flow of DoS funding.93 Money for 

the DDR of 13,770 legacy soldiers was scarce, delaying their demobilization and placing the entire SSR effort—and arguably the country—in peril. In late April 

2006, 400 to 500 former AFL soldiers conducted a vio-
92

lent protest outside the Ministry of Defence, claiming 

nonpayment of salary arrears and retirement benefits, 

and clashed with UNMIL peacekeepers sent to quell 

the unrest.94

Erratic funding to other parts of the program resulted in inchoate outcomes. The Ministry of Defence 

reform program was prematurely terminated after the 

completion of a 17-week civil servant training course 

but before the implementation of a planned 5-month 

mentoring and on-the-job training phase. Consequently, new civil servants had no source of advice or 

assistance as they assumed their official duties in the 

new ministry, rendering it severely incapacitated.95

Lapses in client funding and Liberian capacity also 

created dangerous situations. Training was stopped 

for months due to lack of payment by the DoS, leaving 

new soldiers to sit idle while they waited for follow-on 

recruits to fill out their units. Making matters worse, 

the Ministry of Finance still did not have the capacity 

to pay soldiers in 2006, demonstrating that in recovering failed states, all institutions must work together. 

This created the dangerous situation of unpaid and 

disgruntled soldiers that the SSR program sought to 

avoid from the outset. 

Meanwhile, those ready to report to basic training were literally told, “Don’t call us, we’ll call you,” 

by frustrated SSR program staff. The program then 

consisted of nearly 100 international (U.S. and thirdcountry national personnel combined) and several 

hundred local national staff. Sending the international staff home and furloughing the local staff to save 

money would cause resentment among the locals, given Liberia’s 75 percent unemployment rate, and many 

of the international staff were specialists who were 

difficult to replace. 
93

Frustrated and fearing that it might have to leave 

Liberia for lack of payment—an option few public 

armies would consider—DynCorp urged its client to 

stabilize the funding stream. The high cost of paying 

expensive employees to sit idle in a country where the 

average person subsisted on $1.25 a day sent a cynical 

message to the population, already somewhat dubious over the new AFL. Also, it created a dangerous 

situation in an unstable state, as DynCorp was unable to store weapons and ammunition safely without 

an armory, which PA&E was scheduled to build but 

could not, because of lack of money. Worse, soldiers 

who completed training would have no military base 

to report to, as PA&E had yet to complete bases. This 

could prove a perilous situation for Liberian society 

and discredit the entire SSR program. As Mark Malan 

noted, “Weak and erratic funding from the U.S. Department of State is the main cause of the slow pace of 

AFL development.”96

Local Ownership and Contractors.

“Local ownership” has become a mantra in the international development community; it refers to local 

political and popular support for foreign assistance 

programs like SSR, and there is a growing consensus 

among scholars that early local ownership is crucial to 

program sustainability and legitimacy.97 The concept 

is simple enough: A foreign power that wields a heavy 

hand in transforming another country will likely 

alienate the very people it aspires to benefit, negating 

the purpose of the program. Or, as Laurie Nathan explains, “Experience shows that reform processes will 

not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms.”98
94

Because the AFL SSR process relied heavily on U.S. 

support, some scholars assert it lacks ownership, sustainability, and legitimacy.99 Morten Bøås and Karianne Stig sum up this collective critique when they 

claim that the lack of transparency, accountability, 

and participation of local Liberians in the SSR process 

led to a paucity of ownership of the program.100 Even 

the U.S. Congressional Research Service questions 

the balance between foreign support for and national 

ownership of security in Liberia and worries that lack 

of adequate public input has created an AFL where 

“political legitimacy might be called into question.”101

Contractors compound the quandary of ownership because, as Adedeji Ebo reasons, “There is no 

direct contractual obligation between the security 

contractor and the institutions and people of the reforming state.”102 Not even the Liberian Minister of 

Defence had a copy of DynCorp’s contract to transform the AFL he was to lead, demonstrating a lack of 

transparency in the process. This created a problematic situation. Liberians were neither an employer nor 

a signatory to the contract, even though they were the 

intended beneficiaries of the program. Consequently, 

the Liberian government had only limited ability to 

direct DynCorp; the company, in essence, was not 

accountable to the state, even as it was rebuilding its 

military forces. For Bøås and Stig, “This clearly represents a democratic deficit in the SSR.”103

However, critics’ conclusions may be overstated. 

Few Liberians seemed concerned about the U.S. role in 

the AFL SSR process, especially given the urgent need 

for military reform and the strong historical ties between the two countries. Nor were Liberians troubled 

by the presence of contractors: There were no riots, 

protests, violence, or other evidence of widespread 
95

PMC rejection. DynCorp’s frequent overtures to civil 

society—almost always through the government of 

Liberia—were met with general disinterest. The Liberian Minister of Defence had multiple occasions to join 

DynCorp on its recruitment trips starting in 2006, but 

chose not to accompany the firm until 2008.104 Additionally, the NTGL—and not DynCorp—determined 

who was eligible for demobilization benefits and who 

would be admitted into the new AFL. This indicates a 

lack of worry on the Liberian government’s part rather 

than a failure of transparency on DynCorp’s, as more 

recent scholarship confirms: 

The Liberian Ministry of Defence, the legislature and 

civil society have had opportunities to involve themselves more in the reform than they have done, thus 

suggesting that the reform is not proceeding as such 

a closed process as previous research on the SSR has 

argued.105

Other problems undermine academic critiques over 

ownership. Can foreign scholars really speak for Liberians on the question of local ownership? Can outside 

observers claim Liberia had no ownership of AFL SSR 

if its government had approved and accepted a gratis 

program that the United States provided through its 

contractors?106 Can simultaneous assertions that there 

was no local ownership and that ownership is necessary for success be made if Liberians have not rejected 

the AFL, and it is a success compared to the Liberian 

National Police and other elements of the security sector? On this last point, the ICG describes progress in 

Liberia’s security sector reform as “uneven”: While 

“the police are still widely considered ineffective and 
96

corrupt. . . . Army reform appears to be a provisional 

success.”107

Other researchers are more harsh in their critique 

of contractors in Liberia, inferring that they are mercenaries. As Malan writes, “In a country and region 

where recent history has been shaped by warlords and 

mercenaries, the U.S. Department of State has shown 

remarkable insensitivity by sending in contractors 

to shape the new army.”108 Unfortunately, Malan offers no further explanation or support for this serious 

claim. Comparing DynCorp to Liberian warlords and 

mercenaries without supporting evidence is irresponsible and absurd.

The concept of local “ownership” sits well among 

academics and policymakers, but the reality on the 

ground is more nuanced: How precisely does one 

translate this principle into practice? What does local 

ownership exactly look like? How do you know when 

you have achieved sufficient ownership? Even the 

definition of local ownership is disputed: Who gets to 

decide who the key stakeholders are when determining local ownership? Choosing which local leaders 

and political groups will represent local aspirations is 

difficult and fraught with uncertainty, and has political ramifications both within indigenous and international politics. Also, local actors often have competing 

visions and priorities, and selecting local partners can 

be perilous in conflict-affected countries where there 

is often imperfect knowledge of parochial agendas. 

It may prove difficult to keep insurgents and spoilers 

out of the process, and if they are deemed key stakeholders, it provides them a platform of legitimacy and 

the ability to obstruct progress from within, while 

making it difficult to expel them. Finally, measuring 

ownership is difficult. What exactly does one measure? Should metrics privilege local values and priori-
97

ties or international ones? Local ownership is sound in 

theory but nebulous in practice.

CONCLUSION

In 2003, Charles Taylor fled to Nigeria, ending a 

14-year civil war that left the country post-apocalyptic 

and the population traumatized. It became home to 

the world’s largest UN peacekeeping missions at the 

time that Nigeria began the hard work of resuscitating 

the country. Due to historical ties, the United States 

agreed to demobilize and rebuild the AFL, which 

was complicit in war crimes. In an interesting twist, 

the DoS outsourced this task to the private sector, 

the first time in 150 years that one sovereign hired a 

private company to raise another sovereign’s military. This is also significant because the private sector 

will likely play an increasing role in building security 

forces in the future, making Liberia a particularly apt 

case study. 

Liberia, and particularly the AFL, is an instructive case study of DDR and SSR since it is a qualified 

success. It bridges the theory and practice behind the 

DDR of Liberia’s legacy military and SSR that built 

a new one. Regardless of the size of the country or 

the security forces—from Liberia to Afghanistan—

the fundamental machinations of DDR and SSR are 

the same. 

DDR and SSR are important because they are gateway programs. In fragile states, the construction or 

reconstruction of the security sector is a precondition 

for development, since no other reform—political, 

economic, or social—can take root without security. 

Additionally, helping failed states recover is critical to 

global security, since they can constitute a chronic in-
98

ternational problem; induce regional instability; result 

in humanitarian tragedy; provide safe havens, training grounds, and bases of operation for global terrorists; and abet international criminal organizations that 

traffic in narcotics, people, small arms, terrorist skills, 

weapons of mass destruction, and other illicit products and services. Additionally, a competent indigenous security sector is essential for the exit strategy 

from costly peacekeeping missions.

Finally, as with all complex contingency operations, a certain degree of humility is required. As seen 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, excessively ambitious visions of what is achievable often achieve little. 

It is far superior to start with a modest vision and 

build from there. 

Liberia Lessons Learned.

At the International Level:

1. Political agreement. Ensure SSR and DDR have 

a clear mandate by including them in the peace agreement.

2. Inclusion of all warring parties. Every group that 

is expected to participate in DDR should be included 

in the peace agreement.

3. DDR and SSR are linked. They rise or fall together and should be planned, resourced, implemented, 

and evaluated as a single entity.

4. Comprehensive and synchronized approach. 

DDR and SSR require the close coordination of many 

agencies, such as the DoD, DoS, USAID, etc.

5. Sufficient funds and political will. Erratic support may result in a half developed security sector, 

which can be worse than none at all.

6. Lose the “train and equip” mentality. SSR is 

more than “train and equip” and involves engaging 
99

civil society, human rights vetting, and transformation across the security sub-sectors, operational actors, 

institutional actors, and oversight actors. Training and 

equipping alone is necessary but insufficient for SSR.

Host Nation Level: Institutional Actors and 

Oversight Actors.

1. All politics are local. DDR and SSR are political programs because they rewire de facto authority 

structures in conflict affected states. Consequently, 

technical approaches alone will likely fail.

2. Institute security sector management. Transform 

institutional and oversight actors, such as ministries, 

perhaps even starting with these organizations.

3. Develop a sensible security strategy. Work with 

the host nation to develop a National Security Strategy that uniquely addresses root causes of conflict, and 

avoid templating other countries’ strategies. In Liberia, the strategy and force structure should be focused 

on securing development and good governance rather 

than defeating foreign militaries.

4. All institutions must work together. Recognize 

that the army cannot get paid if the Ministry of Finance is nonoperational, as this will impact DDR and 

SSR success.

5. Instill, when possible, democratic principles; for 

example, civilian control of the military.

6. Cultivate professionalism. Transparency in 

oversight, accounting, promotion systems, and so 

forth will encourage a culture of merit.

7. Eschew ill-fitting doctrinal templates. What 

works for the United States may not work for the 

host nation.
100

Host Nation Level: Operational Actors.

 1. Sensitize the population to what is going on. 

Not everyone will welcome ex-combatants into their 

hometowns or the creation of a new army or police 

force, especially if the legacy forces were complicit in 

crimes. 

2. Spoilers. Be inclusive in planning and engage 

civil society, but manage spoilers effectively. If a spoiler is given a position of authority inside the program, 

then the DDR and SSR program may be undermined.

3. Demobilize with dignity. Combatants are more 

likely to cooperate if they are not treated like criminals. However, be prepared for opposition from international and domestic audiences, since many in the 

legacy security sector could, in fact, be criminals.

4. It may be necessary to start over. Avoid lustration and demobilize the entire force since it probably 

is not known who is “good” or who is “bad.” UNMIL 

used lustration to rebuild the Liberian National Police, which was unsuccessful and remains an obstacle 

to stability.

5. Vigorously vet all candidates. The United States 

would never put a cop on the street or enlist someone 

for the military without a thorough background check. 

To not sufficiently vet individuals in conflict countries 

is unacceptable. Use a “balance of probabilities” standard of evidence when adjudicating applicants’ files.

6. Instill professional values. Starting in basic training, instill respect for the rule of law, human rights 

norms and international humanitarian law, and allegiance to the constitution, rather than to an individual 

leader, in all training.

7. Force Structure is key. The force structure and 

security architecture must reflect the country’s needs. 
101

It should have a defense-oriented posture with limited force-projection capability: limited artillery, armor, 

intelligence, and fighter aircraft. Covert special operations units and their kindred should be avoided, since 

they tend to become manipulated by political factions, 

as was the case with police in East Timor.

8. Size is constrained by the government’s ability 

to pay salaries. Force size should be determined by the 

host government’s ability to pay salaries over the long 

term since unpaid soldiers are often a greater threat to 

insecurity than foreign invasion. This should be a core 

planning constraint when designing an SSR program.

9. A smaller, well-trained, volunteer force is preferable. It is easier to instill discipline andprofessionalism in a small force than in a larger one.

10. The force should mirror society. The new force 

should be inclusive of all groups, ethnicities, and 

women. This will help ensure it does not become a 

sectarian instrument of power, as the AFL was under 

Doe’s regime. Create an ombudsman or similar office 

to mediate ethnic disputes within the ranks.

11. Selection for leadership is difficult. It takes 20 

years to achieve the rank of colonel in the U.S. Army, 

yet conflict countries cannot wait that long. New forces like the AFL will initially be an “army of privates.” 

The international partner may recommend senior 

leaders, but the host nation must select them. Beware 

of cronyism and nepotism.

12. Literacy is important. Leaders need to read and 

write orders. It may be necessary to include literacy 

courses in basic training.

13. Be aware of inherent dilemmas. For example, 

sometimes one must choose between security versus 

development. In DDR, do you grant amnesty to potential war criminals to encourage them to participate 
102

in the program? In SSR, do you turn over vetting records to a TRC, risking reprisals against witnesses 

who spoke with the vetting teams? Another example: 

Do you prioritize ethnic inclusion or literacy? An ethnically balanced force is a guiding principle of SSR, 

yet in places like Liberia, some ethnic groups were 

denied access to education and were functionally illiterate. Building a literacy program into the training, as 

was the case in Liberia, helps mitigate this challenge, 

but such programs cannot lift an individual from a 6th 

to 12th grade reading level in a few months.

14. Contractors are good if you know how to manage them. DynCorp invested in innovative ideas like 

human security and created a unique human rights 

vetting program because it was not beholden to the 

bureaucracy and was motivated by profit to innovate. 

However, it may have overstepped its bounds due to 

poor government oversight on the ground. Harness 

the power of the private sector but develop the management skills to do so.

15. Lastly, be humble. SSR is a marathon and not 

a sprint. It involves political bargaining, operational 

surprises, and imperfect outcomes. Ensure expectations are managed, especially one’s own.

Six Recommendations for the U.S. Army.

The U.S. Army has long been associated with Liberia’s military, given the historical ties between the 

two countries. It helped establish the Liberia Frontier 

Force in 1908, Liberia’s first national security force 

and forerunner of the AFL. Composed of 500 men 

and later led by American army officers, its mission 

was originally “to patrol the borders in the hinterland 

[against British and French territorial expansion] and 
103

to prevent disorder.” U.S. military advisors continued 

to work closely with the Liberian armed forces during 

the interwar years and Cold War.

Despite the U.S. Army’s long history of military 

assistance in Liberia and elsewhere, conceptual understanding of SSR remains limited, and many still 

view SSR activities as a second order mission. Such an 

approach is strategically myopic, given the expanding 

threat-set of transnational actors, civil war, and spillover from conflict affected states. Unless the United 

States wishes to deploy American boots on the ground 

to every strategic hot spot in the world, it needs to 

buttress allies’ security sectors to deal with emerging 

problems before they become crises. DDR and SSR are 

tools that accomplish this, and the U.S. Army should 

hone these instruments since partners’ land forces 

typically deal with most threats. Here are six recommendations that will help the U.S. Army improve this 

skill set.

1. Break the “train and equip” mentality regarding 

SSR. Historically, the U.S. Army largely treated the 

formation of foreign forces as a foreign internal defense (FID) mission. FID is an ill-fitting model for SSR; 

it is a Cold War concept informed by Maoist irregular 

warfare operations rather than SSR principles. In a 

traditional FID mission, special forces units covertly 

train and equip pro-American guerrillas in communist 

countries (e.g., the Montagnards in Vietnam) and help 

friendly governments defeat communist insurgents 

(e.g., El Salvador) in proxy wars between the United 

States and Soviet Union. These were essentially tactical train and equip missions that did not entail institution building, much less wholesale SSR, as is required 

in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, 

many national security thinkers remain paradigm 

prisoners of the “train and equip” mentality, often cit-
104

ing as SSR progress the number of indigenous soldiers 

or police trained and equipped—a clever metric that 

never diminishes (hence insinuates progress) nor tells 

you anything about the quality of the security forces 

being produced. Training and equipping only produces better dressed soldiers who shoot straighter; it 

does not create an army. 

2. The U.S. Army must balance its SSR efforts between operational and institutional actors. Because of 

the “train and equip” mentality, the military has traditionally emphasized generating indigenous “boots 

on the ground” at the expense of civil servants in ministries. However, an army of infantry squads without 

the requisite institutional backing is merely a militia. 

This unbalanced approach undermines the hard-won 

tactical gains that must be sustained by a partner 

state’s defense institutions. Contractors are capable 

of filling this gap as they did in Liberia, but the U.S. 

Army should have an organic capacity to conduct this 

mission and not overly depend on the private sector 

to provide SSR. One promising development is the 

Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program. Established in 2010, it allows the U.S. Army to draw on 

civilian expertise to transform ministerial actors, and 

it should be expanded. 

3. Draft mature doctrine on DDR and SSR. Currently, there are no doctrine or field manuals (FMs) 

dedicated to these operations despite the fact that the 

U.S. Army has been actively engaged in DDR and SSR 

undertakings in Iraq and Afghanistan for 10 years. 

Doctrine is needed because, as this monograph demonstrates, these are complex tasks requiring a comprehensive approach well beyond “train and equip” 

methodologies. Unfortunately, most SSR related doctrine remains mired in this tactical approach to SSR: 
105

Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense; U.S. Army 

and U.S. Marine Corps FM 3-24/MCWP3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, chap. 6; and U.S. Army FM 3-07, Stability 

Operations, chap. 6. After several years of FID failure in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military finally drafted 

more inclusive doctrine on SSR called security force 

assistance: U.S. Army FM 3-07/1, Security Force Assistance. Though a significant improvement, this model 

does not address the full spectrum of SSR needs, such 

as human rights vetting, and creates foreign militaries 

in the image of the U.S. Army, which is inappropriate. 

The U.S. Army should develop doctrine and publish 

a field manual dedicated to DDR and SSR as linked, 

modular, and scalable programs that can be tailored 

to unique host nation needs. Good doctrine should 

scope and frame ideas to make them operational and 

avoid what Frances Z. Brown, a development expert, 

terms “romantic capacity-building projects.”109

4. Link security with justice. A U.S. congressional 

investigation into a $2.16 billion contract called Host 

Nation Trucking, which protects overland supply 

lines in Afghanistan, found that many subcontractors 

hired to provide armed protection of the trucking convoys were Afghan warlords and their militia. In some 

ways, this arrangement worked well: It effectively 

supplied most U.S. combat outposts across difficult 

and hostile terrain, while only rarely needing the assistance of U.S. troops. However, the report, Warlord, 

Inc., also discovered that:

the principal private security subcontractors on the 

[Host Nation Trucking] contract are warlords, strongmen, commanders and militia leaders who compete 

with the Afghan central government for power and 

authority. Providing “protection” services for the 
106

United States supply chain empowers these warlords 

with money, legitimacy, and a raison d’etre for their 

private armies.110

Empowering local warlords, thugs, criminals, and 

others reviled by the local population compromises 

the larger aims of the mission: building a just society 

that upholds the rule of law. As the congressional report concluded, “The logistics contract has an outsized 

strategic impact on U.S. objectives in Afghanistan.”111

5. The United States needs a Stability Police Force 

or similar instrument to accomplish DDR and SSR. 

Core to SSR is policing because it has the power to 

prevent conflicts, preserve social stability during crises, and support post-conflict rehabilitation. Policing 

is also critical for development. According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 

(OSCE), “Effective policing helps create an environment where sustainable development can flourish.”112

Yet the United States lacks an expeditionary police 

force, probably because there is no national police 

force to draw from, and prefers to rely on contractors like DynCorp International for police in stability operations. But depending on contractors makes 

the United States overly exposed to the private sector 

for success in DDR and SSR. Instead, the U.S. Army 

should create an organic capacity by expanding the 

Military Police Corps to include these functions or instituting an expeditionary Stability Police Force. 

6. Do no harm. On May 29, 2006, bloody riots tore 

through Kabul, the deadliest street violence since the 

defeat of the Taliban. In response, the U.S. military 

and Afghan authorities created an elite gendarmerie 

called the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police 

(ANCOP). The U.S. military recruited from among 
107

the top officers currently serving in the Afghan Uniformed Police, depleting it of its best and brightest. A 

key criterion for selection was a 6th-grade level of literacy, an extremely high standard since more than 80 

percent of the police were functionally illiterate. However, the inclusion of only literate police officers in 

ANCOP had unintended consequences for the overall 

police development program. Withdrawal of the few 

literate members from nearly every police unit in the 

country deprived those units of essential personnel. 

Worse, there was no way to replace this capacity since 

there was no force-wide literacy training program, as 

there was in Liberia. ANCOP soon suffered the curse 

of competence and was overutilized, resulting in high 

attrition levels and a brain drain to the overall detriment of the Afghan National Police.113 Like war itself, 

building security forces is complex and risks unintended consequences. 

Stability operations have become an inescapable 

reality of U.S. foreign policy, and key to mission success is DDR and SSR. Assisting strategic allies improve their military capabilities serves U.S. national 

interest because it enables partners to engage regional 

threats so that U.S. troops do not have to engage. Also, 

helping a fragile state establish the monopoly of force 

to uphold its rule of law strengthens it and promotes 

durable development, since a wanton security sector tends to devour the fruits of development. Lastly, 

building professional indigenous security forces is the 

exit strategy for costly stability operations and peacekeeping missions because it allows the host nation to 

secure itself. 

In sum, DDR and SSR is a strategic imperative that 

has long been neglected despite its centrality to mis-
108

sions like Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It must 

not remain so. The United States must develop a solid 

capability to build better armies, or it will remain 

mired in conflict affected countries like Afghanistan 

or face strategic surprises in places like Mali.

ENDNOTES

1. Tyrone C. Marshall, “AFRICOM Commander Addresses 

Concerns, Potential Solutions in Mali,” American Forces Press Service, January 24, 2013.

2. “Green-on-Blue Blues: Afghan Soldiers Increasingly Turn 

on their NATO Colleagues,” The Economist, September 1, 2012. 

Green indicates Afghan forces, and Blue coalition ones.

3. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

December 2012.

4. Marshall.

5. Sometimes extra “Rs” are appended to DDR for “Rehabilitation” (DDRR) or “Repatriation” (DDRRR). However, these 

functions are normally included in typical DDR programs. Consequently, this monograph will treat DDR as all inclusive.

6. The UN defines DDR as a process that “deals with the 

post-conflict security problem that arises when combatants are 

left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital 

period stretching from conflict to peace, recovery and development.” See: “UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS),” No. 24, 

New York: United Nations, available from unddr.org/iddrs.aspx.

7. The prisoner’s dilemma is a fundamental problem in game 

theory that demonstrates why two people might not cooperate, 

even though it is in both their best interests to do so.

8. For more information on this problem, see Michael J. 

Dziedzic et al., Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-Au-Prince, 

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008.
109

9. The number of demobilized fighters (101,495) is debatably 

high. During the 2003 CPA talks with LURD and MODEL faction 

leaders, the number of combatants, including the AFL, had been 

put at approximately 38,000. Furthermore, less than 30,000 weapons were submitted, and the majority of DDR recipients qualified 

through the submission of ammunitions. Lastly, Liberians reported that widespread fraud was committed during the DDR process. See Josef Teboho Ansorge and Nana Akua Antwi-Ansorge, 

“Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force: DDR-SSR Liberia,” Melanne Civic 

and Michael Miklaucic, eds., The Monopoly of Force, Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, 2011, pp. 265-284.

10. John Blaney et al., “Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia,” Policy Analysis Brief, Muscatine, 

IA: The Stanley Foundation, 2010, p. 5.

11. SSR theory is generally conceived by academics, human 

rights lawyers, and international development specialists who 

produce normative SSR frameworks espousing human rights, democracy, and sometimes a near-utopian end state for the world’s 

most dangerous places. To achieve this SSR vision, the UN, donor 

states, and a pantheon of global actors involved in SSR must work 

together in a holistic and seamless manner, and will require, as 

Mark Sedra explains, “a radical change in the modus operandi 

of donor states in how they provide assistance” (p. 17). For examples of this SSR approach, see Mark Sedra, ed. The Future of 

Security Sector Reform, Waterloo, Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010, and its authors; Organisation 

for Economic Co-operation and Development and Development 

Assistance Committee et al., The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, Paris: France, 

OECD, 2007. Such a vision is impracticable. Absent from this idealization are the voices of practitioners, such as military professionals, who are often too busy in the field to attend academic 

conferences on SSR. Unfortunately, they tend to treat SSR as a 

train-and-equip exercise and ignore its other vital roles, which is 

equally untenable, as demonstrated by U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), April 30, 2004, 

available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA434396&

Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 
110

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency, chap. 6; U.S. Army FM 

3-07.1: Security Force Assistance, Washington, DC: Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, 2009. Some theorists have challenged 

the orthodox theory of SSR and advocate for pragmatic SSR that 

deals with discrete elements of the security sector, occupying a 

middle ground between the sweeping all-or-nothing approach 

of academic idealists and the narrow train-and-equip thinking of 

practitioners. See Eric Scheye, “Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development,” Paris, France: OECD, 2010.

12. Attempts have been made to formalize and operationalize 

SSR best practices, but serious problems persist. For one, SSR is 

a complex process that requires the close integration of security 

and development organizations, yet most attempts to conceive 

SSR are conducted by either security or development agencies, 

but not both. The result is conceptual incoherence. Security organizations tend to fold SSR into combat doctrine under the nebulous rubric of stability operations. For example, the U.S. Army 

devotes but a single chapter to this complex topic in both FM 

3-24, Counterinsurgency, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations, and 

only discusses abstract principles of SSR rather than operationalizing the idea, which is the singular purpose of military field 

manuals. Similarly, development agencies tend to propagate legalistic and donor-oriented methods, focusing on standards and 

norms rather than advancing concrete methods or strategies for 

conducting SSR on the ground. See, OECD DAC Handbook on 

Security Sector Reform. To date, neither the UN nor any other international organization, NGO, or country has developed a comprehensive approach to SSR capable of being operationalized.

13. For an explanation of “ends, ways, and means” as a strategic construct, see Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Strategy and the 

Strategic Way of Thinking,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 60, 

No. 4, 2007, pp. 111-124; Harry R. Yarger, “Towards A Theory of 

Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” 

J. Boone Bartholomees, ed., Guide to National Security Policy and 

Strategy. Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008, pp. 43-49.

14. In military parlance, a “force structure” is the organization and hierarchy of units within an army, from the general staff 

down to the basic infantry squad. It is similar to a massive organi-
111

zational chart for an army, and it outlines how military personnel, 

weapons and equipment are organized for the operations.

15. This table serves only as an example, as every security sector is unique, although most have a military, police, and 

other elements.

16. For more information on this topic, see Liz Panarelli, “Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform,” Peace Report, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009; Marc J. Cohen 

and Tara R. Gingerich, Protect and Serve or Train and Equip? U.S. 

Security Assistance and Protection of Civilians, Washington, DC: Oxfam America, 2009.

17. It remains unclear how operational human security is. 

How exactly should a military guarantee “freedom from fear” and 

“freedom from want,” a twin mandate of human security? See the 

1994 UNDP report that popularized the human security concept 

and borrows these phrases from U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous Four Freedoms speech of 1941, in which freedom 

from want is characterized as the third, and freedom from fear the 

fourth fundamental and universal freedom. See United Nations 

Development Program (UNDP), “New Dimensions of Human 

Security,” Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1994, p. 3.

18. The concept of a monopoly on the use of force or violence 

is derived from German sociologist Max Weber’s classic definition 

of the state as “a human community that claims the monopoly of 

the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” See 

Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. 

Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 

New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 77.

19. See, e.g., Camille Conaway and Salome Martinez, Adding 

Value: Women’s Contributions to Reintegration and Reconstruction in 

El Salvador, Washington, DC: Hunt Alternatives, 2004; Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek, eds., Gender and Security Sector Reform 

Toolkit, Geneva, Switzerland: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, and UNINSTRAW, 2008.
112

20. Notable exceptions include Atsushi Yasutomi, “Linking 

DDR and SSR in Post-conflict States: Agendas for Effective Security Sector Reintegration,” Central European Journal of International 

and Security Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 2, May 2008; Owen Greene and 

Simon Rynn, “Linking and Coordinating DDR and SSR for Human Security after Conflict: Issues, Experience and Priorities,” 

Working Paper 2, Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Center for 

International Cooperation and Security, July 2008; Michael Brzoska, “Embedding DDR Programme In Security Sector Reconstruction,” Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi, eds., Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, London, UK: Geneva Centre 

for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)/Transaction Publishers, 2005, p. 104; Alan Bryden, “Understanding The 

DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa,” Second 

International Conference On DDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, June12–14, 2007 (OSAA/

DRC), Issue paper, June 2007; Jeremy Ginifer, “Support For DDR 

and SSR After Conflicts in Africa: Lessons Learnt and New Agendas in Africa, Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction 

in Africa,” Paper 3, A joint project of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for International Cooperation 

and Security, Helsinki, Finland: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 

Finland, 2007; Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration 

Program (MDRP) Secretariat, “Linkages between Disarmament, 

Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Security 

Sector Reform,” October 2003.

21. See, e.g., United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration Resource Centre (UNDDR), UN Integrated 

DDR Standards (IDDRS), available from unddr.org/iddrs.aspx;

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), OECD DAC 

Handbook on Security System Reform, Paris, France: OECD, 2007, 

available from oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbookon-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en.

22. Many members of the AFL remained in their barracks and 

did not partake in the fighting. Not everyone in the AFL supported Taylor.

23. Quoted in William Reno, “Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor’s Liberia,” Third World Quarterly, 

Vol. 16, No. 1, 1995, p. 109.
113

24. Sixth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court 

for Sierra Leone, Freetown, Sierra Leone: Special Court For Sierra 

Leone, 2009. 

25. Interview with an ex-combatant, Monrovia, Liberia, May 

12, 2004. Other accounts of gruesome acts from eyewitnesses include human heads on chairs and tables in the middle of the road 

as a warning to others; stringing human entrails across concertina 

wire to make an ad hoc road block at which cars would be stopped 

and robbed and perhaps passengers raped or killed; combatants 

would capture a pregnant woman, bet on the gender of her baby, 

and then find out.

26. “The World’s Worst: Liberia,” The Economist, 2002.

27. John Blaney, interview by Ky Luu, Disaster Resilience 

Leadership Academy, YouTube Upload, September 11, 2009, 

available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdGGs6QGaCU. 

28. “U.S. Military Experts Confront Carnage in Liberia,” Associated Press, July 9, 2003.

29. Ibid.

30. According to a 1963 Pan American (Pan Am) airlines brochure describing Liberia, “Tourists are welcome here and are 

treated with great friendliness and courtesy. The coastal area 

on the Atlantic Ocean has beautiful beaches and good fishing.” 

See Matt Jones, “Moved2Monrovia,” available from 3.bp.blogspot.

com/_nAWhnWKWr-w/THZicXetaMI/AAAAAAAAAoc/qqZrx-kxqY0/s1600/PANAM+LIBERIA.jpg.

31. Scott Lindlaw, “Bush Approves Small Peacekeeping Contingent for Liberia,” Associated Press, July 6, 2003.

32. “Transcript: U.S. Debating Sending Troops to Help Liberian Civil War,” CNN, July 2, 2003. However, in March 2006, Nigeria handed Taylor over to Liberian authorities for trial, who in 

turn handed him over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This 

court was set up jointly by the government of Sierra Leone and the 

UN to try those most responsible for serious violations of interna-
114

tional humanitarian law during the civil war there (1991–2002). 

See Stephen Faris, “War Returns to Monrovia,” Time Magazine, 

July 20, 2003; Sixth Annual Report of the President of the Special 

Court for Sierra Leone. 

33. UN Security Council (S/RES/1497 [2003]), “Resolution 1497 (2003): Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4803rd 

Meeting, on 1 August 2003,” August 1, 2003, available from securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20SRES%201497.pdf.

34. Stephan Faris, “Charles Taylor Leaves Liberia,” Time Magazine, August 11, 2003.

35. Glenn Mckenzie, “Rebels Lift Siege of Liberia’s Starving 

Capital, U.S. Marines Land,” The Associated Press, August 14, 2003; 

“Rebels Lift Siege of Starving Monrovia,” RedOrbit.com, August 

14, 2003, available from www.redorbit.com/news/general/14811/rebels_lift_siege_of_starving_monrovia/.

36. “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 

Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties,” August 18, 2003, available 

from www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/

liberia_08182003.pdf.

37. “Overview of Activities in Liberia,” Washington, DC: 

United States Agency for International Development, May 4, 2004. 

38. International Monetary Fund, “Liberia: Interim Poverty 

Reduction Strategy Paper,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2007, p. x; 

IDP Advisory Team Policy Development and Evaluation Service, “Real-Time Evaluation of UNHCR’s IDP Operation in Liberia,” Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR), 2007, p. 7; UNHCR, “Liberia: Regional 

Operations Profile - West Africa,” available from www.unhcr.org/

cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e484936#; International Committee 

of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Liberia: Opinion Survey and in-Depth 

Research,” Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC, 2009, p. 1. For more on the 

significance of the data, especially in post-conflict Liberia, see Josef Teboho Ansorge, “The Technics of Politics: Information Tech-
115

nology in International Relations,” doctoral book, Cambridge, 

UK: University of Cambridge, 2011, pp. 205-225.

39. J. Peter Pham, Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State, Gainesville, 

GA: Reed Press, 2004, p. 191.

40. Robin Dunn-Marcos et al., The Liberians: An Introduction 

to Their History and Culture, Washington, DC: Center for Applied 

Linguistics, 2005, p. 9.

41. Pham, p. 7.

42. Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Roots of an African Civil War, London, UK: 

Hurst & Co Ltd, 2001, p. 63; Reed Kramer, “Liberia: A Casualty 

of the Cold War’s End,” Africa Notes, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 1995, p. 3.

43. Ibid., p. 59. 

44. “Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” p. x; 

“Real-Time Evaluation of UNHCR’s IDP Operation in Liberia,” p. 

7; “Liberia: Regional Operations Profile—West Africa”; “Liberia: 

Opinion Survey and in-Depth Research,” p. 1.

45. In 2009, Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 

listed President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as one of 52 people who 

should be sanctioned for committing war crimes but then retracted the report just hours before publication on its website. See 

Glenna Gordon, “In Liberia, Sirleaf’s Past Sullies Her Clean Image,” Time Magazine, July 3, 2009; Kate Thomas, “Liberia Truth 

and Reconciliation Commission Retracts Controversial Report,” 

Voice of America, July 2, 2009.

46. Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death: 

Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007, p. 167.

47. David Crane, “Press Release: Statement on International 

Women’s Day,” Special Court for Sierra Leone - The Office of the 

Prosecutor, Freetown, Sierra Leone, March 8, 2003.
116

48. “U.S. Ambassador to Liberia Urges Rebels to Leave Capital,” The New York Times, July 28, 2003.

49. On February 27, 2007, Bryant was charged with embezzlement. His government is alleged to have stolen at least $1 million at a time when the annual gross national income per capita 

was $116 (2011 U.S.$). See Joseph Winter, “Africa - New Front in 

Drugs War,” BBC News, July 9, 2007. Data from “Liberia,” United 

Nations Statistics Division, available from data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Liberia.

50. Blaney et al.

51. “Part Four: Security Sector Reform, Article VII Disbandment of Irregular Forces, Reforming And Restructuring of the 

Liberian Armed Forces,” in Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for 

Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 

Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties. 

52. “USG Pre-Assessment Trip to Liberia on Security Sector 

Reform,” Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, January 2004.

53. This definition is the author’s.

54. Failed states and conflict-affected areas are settings of extreme poverty, lacking infrastructure, law, and security. Simply 

moving across the country can become a daunting expedition 

involving robust security convoys, careful route reconnaissance, 

resupply points, spare vehicles, air medical evacuation support, 

river-crossing capabilities, disciplined staff, and significant contingency planning. Other factors that affect operations include 

institutionalized corruption, exotic diseases, prevalent traffic accidents, lack of logistical resupply, wild animals, and high rates of 

crime. Even amenities such as potable water, electricity, and shelter cannot be assumed. Staff must be prepared for possible lack of 

cooperation from authorities, the novelty of the procedure for the 

population, absence of precedents, and cultural misunderstandings that could be disastrous. In light of this backdrop, DynCorp’s 

achievements are all the more notable.
117

55. Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, Africa Report No. 148, New York: International Crisis Group, 2009.

56. Offering no U.S. support for Liberia SSR was also considered, but dismissed. “USG Pre-Assessment Trip to Liberia on Security Sector Reform,” Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 

January 2004. 

57. DynCorp International and MPRI are private security or 

military companies, while PA&E is focuses on construction work, 

specializing in conflict zone operations. At the time, PA&E personnel did not carry weapons or train others how to use them.

58. Robbers killed John Auffrey, a DoD civilian, in his room at 

the Mamba Point Hotel, Monrovia, on May 23, 2004. At the time, 

he was the security assistance program administrator at the U.S. 

Embassy in Namibia.

59. “New Armed Forces of Liberia Force Opt Working Brief,” 

Paper presented at the SSR Assessment Mission, Monrovia, 2004.

60. It may also have something to do with the DoD’s general 

aversion to all things African following the 1993 Somalia disaster.

61. Klein suggested that Liberia could make do with a decent police force and a well-trained border security force of 600 

to 700 men. The actual statement was made on November 5, 2003. 

“Liberia: US Hires Private Company to Train 4,000-Man Army,” 

IRIN Africa, Nairobi, Africa: Integrated Regional Information 

Networks, February 15, 2005. His opinion may have also been 

informed by UNMIL’s civilian police (CIVPOL) commissioner, 

Mark Kroeker, who told U.S. State Department personnel that Liberia needed a robust police force and not a military. “USG PreAssessment Trip to Liberia on Security Sector Reform,” Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, January 2004.

62. AFL mission statement taken from the CPA. See “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconcilation and Democracy 

(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 

and Political Parties,” Part Four, Article VII, Para. 2.c.
118

63. For example, see Morten Bøås and Karianne Stig, “Security 

Sector Reform in Liberia: An Uneven Partnership Without Local 

Ownership,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 4, No. 3, 

2010, pp. 285-303; Adedeji Ebo, “Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing 

SSR to Foreign Companies,” Laurie Nathan, ed., No Ownership, No 

Commitment. A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform, 

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2007; Mark Malan, 

“Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results From Humble 

Beginnings,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2008.

64. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1976, p. 119. The original DoS plan specifies that 

training begin within 3 months of the contract award, meaning 

that basic training would commence in January 2005. In reality, 

the first basic training class started in July 2006. 

65. National Transitional Government of Liberia, Executive 

Order No. 5: Demobilisation and Retirement of Soldiers, Monrovia, Liberia: National Transitional Government of Liberia, 2005; 

National Transitional Government of Liberia, AFL Restructuring 

Policy, Monrovia, Liberia: National Transitional Government of 

Liberia, 2005; Government of Liberia, Liberian National Defense 

Strategy (Draft), Monrovia, Liberia: National Transitional Government of Liberia, 2006.

66. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, London, UK: 

Wordsworth Editions, 1997.

67. This should not be confused with counterinsurgency 

(COIN) operations, which seek to provide short-term remedies to 

popular grievances long enough to establish control over an area. 

COIN is not sustainable development nor necessarily supports it. 

68. True, the United States builds more than just conventional 

forces units. In recent years, the United States has helped partners 

develop counterterrorist special forces units, but these are primarily assault forces that do little to remedy the source of many internal threats: the failures of development, bad governance, and 

violent ideologies. These are threats that special forces units can 

repress, but not resolve. 
119

69. UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 2. See also Francis Mading Deng 

et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, 

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996; Neil Macfarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006.

70. Government Of Liberia, Liberian National Defense Strategy (Draft).

71. National Transitional Government of Liberia, Executive 

Order No. 5.

72. Although DynCorp was not quite out of Liberia yet. In a 

new task order (worth $20 million if all options were exercised), 

DynCorp was selected to provide the AFL with operations and 

maintenance services. This task order was awarded under the new 

5-year State Department Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity 

(IDIQ) contract called the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP), contract solicitation number SAQMMA08R0237. Awardees 

under AFRICAP include DynCorp International, PA&E Government Services, AECOM, and Protection Strategies Incorporated.

73. Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, p. 9. 

74. Voice of America is the official external broadcast institution of the U.S. Federal Government. During the Cold War, Voice 

of America maintained a large facility in Liberia, but the facility 

was sacked during the Liberian Civil War.

75. In late April 2006, 400 to 500 former AFL soldiers conducted a violent protest outside the ministry and clashed with 

UNMIL peacekeepers sent to contain the unrest. They claimed 

nonpayment of salary arrears and retirement benefits and demanded back pay, which some reportedly received while others 

did not. See Ansorge and Antwi-Ansorge, “Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force”; “President Authorizes Defense Ministry to Pay Salary Arrears to Former Soldiers,” UNMIL (media summary citing 

ELBS Radio and Star Radio), June 14, 2006; Brownie J. Samukai, 

Jr., “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. 

Samukai, Jr.,” United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 

May 11, 2007; “Leadership of Demobilized AFL Soldiers Assure 
120

President Sirleaf of Unwavering Support,” Executive Mansion, 

Press Release, February 24, 2010; Nicholas Cook, Liberia’s PostWar Development, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Footnote 75.

76. Ansorge and Antwi-Ansorge, “Monopoly, Legitimacy, 

Force.”

77. The DAMC included representatives from the Executive 

Mansion, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Liberia, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Planning, U.S. Embassy, UN, Economic Community of West African 

States, the African Union, and the International Contact Group on 

Liberia. See National Transitional Government of Liberia, Executive Order No. 5, clause 3.

78. The criteria used to screen applicants were personal data 

(some fields in the database have no information); date of birth 

(DOB) versus date of entry (DOE) into the AFL (those with DOBs 

after 1973 were disqualified from joining the service, since AFL 

standards required rigid application of a minimum entry age of 

17); DOE versus training base (the AFL had fixed official training 

bases, and some of them were not operational at certain times); 

whether the re-documentation form was personally filled in, as required by the process (questions were raised if another person did 

the writing for a lettered personnel); a cross-check with DDRR list 

from UNMIL resulting in “double dipping” (AFL personnel processed through the UNMIL DDRR program were excluded from 

the AFL demobolization process); a cross-check with the MOD insurance benefit list (no impersonation of dead service personnel); 

commander certification (each unit commander was required to 

review and certify the accuracy and completeness of the respective unit rosters under penalty of perjury and possible loss of all 

benefits and exclusion from possible re-entry consideration in the 

new AFL); and a photo check (all re-documented personnel had 

photo forms; there was a facial check at time of payment).

79. Each senior officer was chief of the following military staff 

offices: G1 (personnel), G3 (operations), G4 (logistics), adjutant 

general, engineers, chief information officer, signal, assistant G1, 

and brigade element.
121

80. National Transitional Government of Liberia-Ministry of 

Defense, Operation Order 001-Operation Demobilization, 2005.

81. The $15 million cost number comes from: Cook, 

Footnote 75.

82. For example, instead of saying “He bothers me,” one 

would say “He vexes me,” delivered in heavy patois. M. Paul 

Lewis, ed., Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th Ed., Dallas, TX: 

SIL International, 2009.

83. Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training: Joint Inspector General Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State and 

Department of Defense, 2005, p. 22.

84. ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform. For 

more information on this vetting technique, see Sean McFate, 

“The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments,” Military Review, July/August 2007, pp. 79-97.

85. DynCorp approached several organizations for vetting 

purposes. The government of Liberia, such that it was, provided 

limited information through its Ministry of Justice and Liberian 

National Police (for criminal records); Ministry of Education (for 

verification of education level and identity); Ministry of Health 

(for verification of date and place of birth, citizenship, and identity); Ministry of Defence (for prior record of service in the AFL, 

re-documentation exercise, surviving records, and demobilization exercise); and Ministry of Gender (for rape and other gender-related allegations). The UN and UNMIL’s various agencies 

provided records regarding identity, human rights violation allegations and war crimes, child soldiers, witness testimony from 

IDP camps, criminal activity, and combatant demobilization lists. 

NGOs proved an excellent source on human rights violation allegations, and included international organizations such as the 

ICRC, ICG, IRC, and WAEC. Local NGOs also provided excellent 

information on human rights violation allegations and included 

the National Human Rights Centre of Liberia, National Human 

Rights Commission, National Association of Female Lawyers, Liberia National Law Enforcement Association, Methodists Human 

Rights Commission, and Catholic Justice and Peace Commission.
122

86. The tribal or ethnic groups are Kpelleh, Bassa, Gio, Kru, 

Grebo, Mano, Krahn, Gola, Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, Dei, Bella, 

Mandingo, Mende, and Sarpo.

87. However, this directive probably served political rather 

than operational purposes. By comparison, women comprise 14.5 

percent of the U.S. military, 13 percent of the Australian Defence 

Force, and 9.6 percent of the UK armed forces. See “Statistics on 

Women in the [U.S.] Military,” Arlington, VA: Women In Military 

Service For America Memorial Foundation, September 30, 2010, 

available from www.womensmemorial.org/Press/stats.html; 2005–06 

Defence Annual Report, Canberra, Australia: Australian Defence 

Force, 2006, p. 281; “Table 3a-Strength of UK Regular Forces By 

Sex,” London, UK: UK Ministry of Defence, available from www.

dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/www/apps/publications/pubViewFile.php?content=170.131&date=2011-05-12&type=html&PublishTi

me=09:30:00.

88. Author interview, Monrovia, Liberia, June 5, 2006.

89. DynCorp’s AFL basic training program was informed by 

the following U.S. Army training doctrine and best practices: the 

U.S. Army model of basic combat training (BCT), influenced by 

the U.S. Army’s 1983 and 1985 study and subsequent reviews of 

the BCT program; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

TRADOC Regulation 350-6: Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET) 

Policies and Administration, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003; and the U.S. Army’s program of instruction for basic training at Ft. Jackson, SC. U.S. Army and AFL 

basic training relies on a three-phase “soldierization” process. 

Phase I plunges recruits into regimented army life and organizes 

them into 30-man platoons. Phase II continues the enforcement of 

standards and begins combat training, such as basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) and physical training, and creates a company 

mindset, whereby all rise or fall together. Phase III concentrates 

on individual tactical training, movement techniques, small unit 

tactics, map reading, land navigation, first aid, and other soldier 

skills. Transitioning from one phase to another was treated as a 

rite of passage as the training cadre evaluated and counseled each 

recruit regarding his or her performance and determined whether 

he or she should “recycle” the phase or advance to the next one. 

Basic training culminated with a tough field training exercise 
123

(FTX) that, like a final exam, amalgamated all previous tactical 

training, plus a 20-kilometer forced march. If recruits passed, they 

graduated to Advanced Individual Training (AIT).

90. Some topics, such as civil disobedience, were omitted 

from the civics curriculum for obvious reasons.

91. For more on the challenges of ministerial transformation 

in SSR, see Elizabeth Panarelli, The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in 

Security Sector Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009; Robert M. Perito, 

The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform, Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009; Susanna Bearne, National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform, Cambridge, UK: Rand Europe, 2006.

92. DynCorp identified 10 functional areas for the Liberian 

MOD: operations; policy and plans; personnel and administration; resource management, fiscal acquisition/logistics; facilities; 

legal counsel; comptroller and budget planning; inspector general; protocol; and office administration.

93. At the time, much DoS peacekeeping operations (PKO) 

funding was being diverted to stem the worsening situation in 

Darfur among other priorities.

94. Total demobilization costs totalled approximately $15 million. Cook, p. 22.

95. Thomas Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: 

An Assessment of Defense Reform, Issue Paper No. 2008, Carlisle, 

PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2008, p. 3.

96. Malan, p. x. See also Cook, p. 23.

97. Despite this growing consensus, ownership remains a contested concept, and how one translates this principle into practice 

is challenging. For more information on this topic, see Elizabeth 

Panarelli, Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform, Washington, 

DC, United States Institute for Peace, 2009; Marc J. Cohen and 

Tara R. Gingerich, Protect and Serve or Train and Equip? U.S. Secu-
124

rity Assistance and Protection of Civilians, Washington, DC: Oxfam 

America, 2009.

98. Nathan, p.1.

99. Ebo, “Liberia Case Study”; Bøås and Stig; Louise Andersen, Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership: The Case of Liberia, Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute 

for International Studies, 2006.

100. Bøås and Stig, p. 286.

101. Cook, p. 26.

102. Ebo, “Liberia Case Study,” pp. 154-155.

103. Bøås and Stig.

104. Ibid., p. 289.

105. Ibid. Other references cited include Ebo, “Liberia Case 

Study”; Adedeji Ebo, “The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia,” Occasional Paper No. 

9, Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control 

of Armed Forces, 2005, pp. 1-28; Alexander Loden, “Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia: Painting 

a Moving Train Without Brushes,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2007, pp. 297-307.

106. Status of Forces Agreement NTGL/MFA/0212/2-2/05: 

Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America 

and the National Transitional Government of Liberia Concerning Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia: 

Liberian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005.

107. ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, 

pp. i-ii.

108. Malan, p. 69.

109. Frances Z. Brown, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, Again,” 

The American Interest, November/December, 2012, p. 46.
125

110. Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan: Report before the Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Cong., June 22, 2010, p. 2.

111. Ibid.

112. “The OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit,” Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, October 3, 2008, available from www.osce.org/spmu/13732.

113. Robert M. Perito, Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police Victim 

of Its Own Success, Washington, DC: United States Institute of 

Peace, 2012.
126

January 2003

DynCorp International (DynCorp) and Pacific Architects and Engineers 

(PA&E) are both awarded a State Department 5-year IDIQ contract to support 

peacekeeping and security efforts in Africa (contract solicitation number 

S-LMAQM-03-C-0034). Its minimum guaranteed expenditure is $5 million 

and maximum is $100 million, later expanded to $500 million. 

August 2003

Charles Taylor flees Liberia, and 1,000 ECOWAS peacekeepers and 200 

U.S. troops arrive. The interim government and rebels sign the CPA. Gyude 

Bryant is chosen to head the NTGL under the title “Chairman” rather than 

“President.”

September–

October 2003

U.S. forces pull out, and UNMIL begins the peacekeeping mission, deploying 

thousands of troops and encompassing the ECOWAS forces.

December 2003

UNMIL begins DDRR for rebel combatants only. AFL personnel are disarmed, 

but not demobilized, rehabilitated, and reintegrated. After riots at one DDRR 

site, UNMIL shuts down the program.

January 2004

U.S. sends a six-person SSR pre-assessment team to Liberia, January 21–29. 

The U.S. is responsible for the SSR of the AFL, as agreed to at Accra during 

peace talks. The DoS is the lead agency within the U.S. Government.

February 2004 International donors pledge more than $500 million in reconstruction aid to 

Liberia.

April 2004

UNMIL commences the DDRR process, and it continues without serious 

incident. UNMIL also begins SSR for civilian elements of the security sector, 

such as the Liberian national police. The DoS plans an SSR assessment 

mission to Liberia involving DoS, DoD, and contractors. 

May 2004

DoS leads a 10-day assessment mission of SSR for the AFL. The team 

consists of experts drawn from DoS, DoD, and two contractor teams: 

DynCorp and PA&E. Additionally, PA&E subs MPRI because of its PMC 

expertise (PA&E is a GC firm whereas DynCorp and MPRI are PMCs with 

relevant SSR expertise). DDR of the AFL is not considered because the NTGL 

is responsible for this. A member of the assessment team is murdered in his 

hotel room while being robbed.

June 2004

DoD determines it cannot conduct the SSR program, and the DoS decides to 

outsource the SSR program entirely to the private sector. Accordingly, it asks 

both DynCorp and PA&E to submit their assessments and recommendations 

for SSR.

ANNEX

LIBERIA MILITARY PROGRAM TIMELINE
127

July 2004

After reviewing the assessments, DoS decides to divide SSR responsibilities 

between the two companies based on their expertise. DynCorp is responsible 

for reconstituting the AFL and MOD. PA&E is tasked with constructing 

most of the military bases and also providing specialty training, equipment, 

logistics, and base services.

September 2004

DoS tenders a task order RFP and SOW to DynCorp and PA&E entitled 

“Liberia Security Sector Reform.” The SOW states that they must create a 

2,000-person military, scalable to 4,300 personnel if funding permits, and an 

MOD.

October 2004

DynCorp and PA&E submit their proposals to DoS on October 7. DoS awards 

the task order to both companies with a division of labor as outlined in July. 

DynCorp is required to be on the ground initially, with PA&E to follow once 

sufficient units are fielded. Riots in Monrovia leave 16 people dead; UNMIL 

says former combatants and AFL veterans were behind the violence.

January 2005

DoS authorizes DynCorp to deploy a small planning team to Liberia to engage 

stakeholders and design the SSR program. It becomes clear that the NTGL 

lacks the capacity to conduct DDR of the AFL, and DoS asks DynCorp to take 

on this task. UNMIL imposes a curfew on several southeastern provinces 

owing to ritual human sacrifices and cannibalism, including the involvement 

of provincial governors.

February-March 

2005

Consultations are held with major stakeholders regarding the mission and 

composition of the future AFL. This includes civil society, the standing AFL, 

former warring parties and political factions, UNMIL, the NTGL, civil society 

through the NTGL, and other entities. A comprehensive recruiting and vetting 

plan is devised intended to screen out human rights abusers from joining the 

AFL. 

April 2005

The NTGL releases its AFL Restructuring Policy. Consultations with 

stakeholders continue. Topics include mission and force structure of the 

future AFL, location of training bases, sensitization campaign for civil society, 

and arrears owed unpaid AFL veterans. 

May 2005

The demobilization plan is drafted and presented to Chairman Bryant. 

He signs Executive Order Number Five on May 15, authorizing the full 

demobilization of all legacy AFL units as of June 30, 2005. The DoS issues 

DynCorp a formal task order for the demobilization of the AFL, releasing full 

payment to the contractor. DynCorp makes preparations for DDR operations 

outside of Monrovia and plans to conduct the demobilization, recruiting staff 

both locally and internationally, and builds up its program (and presence) 

in Liberia. PA&E is to begin its portion of the program once training 

commences.
128

July 2005

DynCorp builds a demobilization site outside Monrovia. The demobilization 

and reintegration of the legacy soldiers commences. The U.S. Government 

approves DynCorp’s blueprint for the new AFL’s force structure and TO&E in 

Washington, DC. Construction of AFL training facilities starts but is slowed by 

the heavy rainy season.

September 2005 The NTGL agrees to allow the international community to supervise its 

finances in an effort to reduce corruption.

October 2005 Recruiting and vetting for the new AFL begins. Over 12,000 applicants will be 

processed in the next 2 years. 

November 2005 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf becomes the first woman to be elected as an African 

head of state. She takes office the following January. 

December 2005

Construction of the new training base remains suspended as Liberia, the 

United States, and UNMIL debate over its location, costing the program 

money and time.

January 2006

DDR of 13,770 AFL soldiers is completed. Recruiting and vetting begins at 

the Barclay Training Center (BTC) in downtown Monrovia. Johnson-Sirleaf is 

sworn in as President, and the NTGL is abolished. Brownie Samukai replaces 

Daniel Chea as Liberian Minister of Defence.

February 2006

The demobilization of the AFL is successfully completed, perhaps the first 

time in modern African history that an entire standing military was safely 

demobilized without significant incident.

March 2006

Johnson-Sirleaf calls for Nigeria to hand over Taylor, which it does. Upon 

his arrival in Monrovia, he is transferred to the custody of UNMIL and 

immediately flown to Sierra Leone to stand trial before the UN-backed Sierra 

Leone Special Court on charges of crimes against humanity. 

April 2006

MOD transformation begins at BTC. Approximately 400–500 former AFL 

soldiers conduct a violent protest outside the MOD, claiming nonpayment of 

salary arrears and retirement benefits, and clash with UNMIL peacekeepers 

sent to contain the unrest. Taylor appears before the Sierra Leone Special 

Court. 

May 2006

Samukai spends a week in Washington, DC, with the DoS, DoD, and DynCorp 

to discuss the progress of SSR and formulation of the Liberian National 

Defence Strategy. 
129

June 2006

DoS issues an updated SOW. DynCorp assists the MOD in a first draft of 

the national defense strategy. It is written based on the concept of human 

security, seeking to align the AFL’s mission with the goals of development for 

durable stability and security. Progress is limited because the NTGL, UNMIL, 

the United States, and others are delayed with the national security strategy. 

The UN Security Council eases a ban on weapons sales so that Liberia can 

import small arms for government purposes only. An embargo on Liberian 

timber exports is lifted shortly afterward. A TRC is set up to investigate 

human rights abuses between 1979 and 2003. Tensions transpire between 

the TRC and SSR program as the TRC requests access to SSR vetting 

records, but the SSR team denies this request since it might compromise 

sources and methods, possibly resulting in reprisal killings of victims who 

spoke to the SSR vetting team on condition of anonymity about human rights 

abuses of some AFL candidates. The ICC at The Hague agrees to host Taylor’s 

trial. 

July 2006

The first class of AFL basic training or IET begins at BTC. It comprises 

110 candidates, most of whom are selected for their potential to fill the 

leadership ranks first. The former U.S. Voice of America transmitter site 

is finally selected as the AFL’s main training base, located at Careysburg 

and rechristened the Sandee S. Ware Military Barracks. DynCorp begins 

construction once the occupying UNMIL units move offsite. Construction is 

slowed by the heavy rainy season. DynCorp begins the process of purchasing 

and importing arms into Liberia for the AFL. President Johnson-Sirleaf 

switches on generator-powered street lights in the capital, which has been 

without electricity for 15 years.

August 2006 DynCorp orchestrates the first major shipment of arms, which arrives at 

Monrovia for the AFL. It is the first legal shipment in over 15 years. 

November 2006 The first AFL basic training class of 102 graduates. AFL training of future 

classes is halted owing to U.S. funding shortfalls.

March 2007

119 civilian MOD employees graduate from a 17-week SSR program training 

course. Following this, the MOD reform program is prematurely terminated 

because of U.S. funding shortfalls.

April 2007

The UN Security Council votes to lift its ban on Liberian diamond exports. The 

ban was imposed in 2001 to stem the flow of blood diamonds, which helped 

fund the civil war.

May 2007 The UN urges Liberia to outlaw trial by ordeal.

June 2007 Taylor’s war crimes trial begins at The Hague, where he stands accused of 

instigating atrocities in Sierra Leone.

September 2007

639 total personnel are trained. Owing to cost overruns, DoS shortens IET 

from 11 weeks to 8 weeks by cutting 3 weeks that were devoted to human 

rights, civics, and laws of war training. 
130

January 2008 1,124 total personnel are trained.

April 2008 1,634 total personnel are trained.

September 2008 2,113 total personnel are trained.

JanuaryDecember 2009 PA&E conducts unit training for the battalions, culminating in an ARTEP.

December 2009 The TRC releases its final report.

January 2010

DynCorp’s and PA&E’s contract for SSR ends, and a team of 60 U.S. Marines 

begin a 5-year mentorship program with the AFL in Operation ONWARD 

LIBERTY. In a new task order (worth $20 million if all options are exercised), 

DynCorp is selected to provide the AFL with operations and maintenance 

services. This task order is awarded under the new 5-year DoS IDIQ contract 

called the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP), contract solicitation 

number SAQMMA08R0237. Awardees under AFRICAP include DynCorp 

International, PA&E Government Services, AECOM, and Protection Strategies 

Incorporated. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Sean McFate

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil