Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders     .
Series: NIJ
Published: May 1996
13 pages
27,099 bytes

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Issues and Findings

Discussed in the Brief: An NIJ-sponsored evaluation
of the implementation of three demonstration
programs for male juveniles that explored how the
adult boot camp strategy could be modified to serve
the unique needs of juveniles.

Key issues: The three demonstration programs in
Cleveland, Denver, and Mobile (sponsored by the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention) were to serve as effective and
practical alternatives to institutionalization.
Soon after the demonstration sites were selected,
evaluation efforts were initiated to determine how
the sites were choosing and screening participants,
hiring and training staff, and establishing
programs. 

Key findings: The evaluation team's observations
and data indicated that planning and implementation
met the demonstration program's goals: 

o The sites formed active public-private
partnerships, developed and refined coherent
program rationales, and opened on schedule. 

o First-year boot camp completion rates were high,
ranging from 80 percent to 94 percent. 

o Youths improved in educational performance,
physical fitness, and behavior. Ratings of youths
in respect for authority, self-discipline,
teamwork, and personal appearance also improved
significantly.

o Youths who graduated from the 3-month boot camp
and remained in aftercare for at least 5 months
reported positive changes in attitudes and
behavior. 

o Estimates of daily costs per youth indicated that
the boot camps appeared to be more cost effective
than State or local correctional facilities. 

The evaluation found less success in these areas:

o Two programs were disrupted by high staff
turnover and all struggled to find appropriate and
effective disciplinary measures and a clear-cut
termination policy.

o Staff found it difficult to achieve a healthy
balance between programming emphasizing military
discipline and programming focusing on remedial
education and counseling. 

o The aftercare phase was hampered by high levels
of absenteeism and noncompletion. Nearly half of
the youths who entered aftercare dropped out, were
arrested for new offenses, or were terminated for
not complying with the programs' aftercare rules.

More information is needed on why aftercare is
hampered by high levels of absenteeism and
noncompletion and what can be done to lower those
rates. In addition, more information is needed on
recidivism over the long term as well as on the
costs of other alternatives to incarceration.

Target audience: Correctional officials,
policymakers, juvenile judges, probation officers,
and researchers.

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Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: An
Implementation Evaluation of Three Demonstration
Programs

Blair B. Bourque, Roberta C. Cronin, Daniel B.
Felker, Frank R. Pearson, Mei Han, and Sarah M.
Hill

Despite the rapid growth of boot camps for adult
offenders throughout the 1980's in the United
States' adult correctional system, the juvenile
system did not immediately adopt boot camps because
of questions about their appropriateness for young
offenders. But as the population of juvenile
offenders increased sharply and caused overcrowding
at facilities, correctional officials began to take
a hard look at boot camps as a way of preventing
less serious juvenile offenders from embarking on a
life of crime and institutionalization. 

Could the adult model be adapted to the unique
correctional needs of juveniles? To find out, the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) funded demonstration programs at
three sites to develop prototypical camps and
aftercare programs for male juveniles. Applicants
were selected in Cleveland, Ohio, Denver, Colorado,
and Mobile, Alabama, through a competitive
process.1 OJJDP directed the grantees to identify
adaptations of successful adult programming that
would make the boot camp sanction suitable in a
juvenile setting. Each site received an initial
18-month grant for planning and implementation
beginning in March/April 1992.

After OJJDP selected its demonstration sites, the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored a
2-year evaluation that focused on boot camp
implementation and the first-year experiences of
participants from April 1992 to March 1993.2 

This Research in Brief report discusses the
evaluation's methodology, the programs' goals, the
characteristics of participants, and each site's
implementation activities, including participant
screening, boot camp programming, and aftercare
services. Ideas are then offered for other
jurisdictions to consider when planning and
implementing juvenile boot camps.

Study method

The basis of the study was an analysis of data
collected about each site at five critical points: 

Intake. Information was collected on each
offender's demographic characteristics, delinquent
history, instant (current) offense, disposition of
current case, educational history, employment
status, living arrangements, and criminality of
family members and friends.

Beginning of boot camp. When possible,
participants' performance was rated in a number of
areas, including behavior, attitudes and values,
literacy and education, and physical fitness.

End of boot camp. Staff at each site reported
participants' dates of graduation or reasons for
leaving the program prematurely; measured any
change since the beginning of camp in behavior,
attitudes and values, literacy and education, and
physical fitness; and noted participants'
requirements for special services.

Five months after graduation. Staff reported on how
participants were faring in aftercare. Of
particular concern was why graduates who were no
longer participating in aftercare had dropped out,
their residence and educational placement during
aftercare, and disciplinary action in response to
serious misconduct or lack of attendance. Active
participants in aftercare were asked to rate their
experiences and describe changes that had occurred
in their attitudes and values, behavior, and
expectations.

End of the demonstration's first year. Boot camp
and aftercare staff reviewed the performance of
first-year platoons, and gave descriptive
evaluations of offenders who completed both the
boot camp and the aftercare phase, as well as those
who did not.

Data collection covered all youths admitted to the
sites in the demonstration's first year. Although
as much information as possible was collected on
participants in the areas listed above, some sites
were not able to measure progress in physical
fitness and educational achievement.

Boot camp and aftercare staff designated at each
site to help gather information also aided in
resolving inconsistencies among data sources. To
supplement their efforts, the evaluation team made
an average of five visits to each site to observe
the camps' operation and interview participants,
administrators, staff, and other grantee
representatives. The evaluation team also kept in
frequent contact with key boot camp and aftercare
staff by telephone.

Program goals

The agenda for the demonstration programs was
ambitious. It mirrored that of adult boot camps in
that adjudicated, nonviolent offenders were placed
in an environment emphasizing discipline and work,
but it also required that treatment and
rehabilitation be the ultimate objectives of all
boot camp and aftercare activities. More
specifically, the programs were to:

o Serve as a cost-effective alternative to
institutionalization.

o Promote discipline through physical conditioning
and teamwork.

o Instill moral values and a work ethic.

o Promote literacy and increase academic
achievement.

o Reduce drug and alcohol abuse.

o Encourage participants to become productive,
law-abiding citizens.

o Ensure that offenders are held accountable for
their actions. 

Characteristics of participants

During the first year, the Cleveland site admitted
119 youths, the Denver program admitted 76, and the
Mobile site admitted 122. Nearly 80 percent of
recruits in Cleveland and 64 percent of recruits in
Mobile were African American, with the remainder in
both programs primarily white. Denver's first-year
population was more diverse, with 35 percent
African American, 35 percent white, 22 percent
Hispanic, and 8 percent Native American and other.
The programs chose to serve the broadest range of
juveniles stipulated by OJJDP--youths 13 to 18
years old. 

In keeping with OJJDP guidelines, the programs
targeted male delinquents likely to become further
involved in the juvenile justice system and
excluded youths with violent criminal histories.
Most youths selected for the programs had committed
a property, drug, or other felony involving no
injury and relatively small dollar loss. Youths in
Cleveland had more instances of previous
involvement with the juvenile justice system and
had committed more serious offenses than had youths
in Denver or Mobile. Many participants in Denver,
however, had previously served short sentences in
detention facilities, and a number of youths in
Mobile had attended a 2-week mini-boot camp shortly
before the demonstration program began.

Only Cleveland's program was voluntary, and only
Cleveland exclusively targeted youths who otherwise
would have been confined in a State or county
facility. Mobile targeted youths who had failed on
probation, and Denver targeted juveniles awaiting
placement in the State Department of Youth Services
and those under probation supervision by the local
juvenile court.

As was expected, records of a large percentage of
participants in the demonstration reported multiple
factors in their lives associated with delinquency:
single-parent families, low income, poor school
attendance, delinquent siblings or peers, gang
involvement, drug or alcohol use, and a record of
disciplinary problems at home or at school.
Moreover, most youths entering the camps had a
record of school failure; many were far behind
grade level or had dropped out of school. 

Implementing the boot camps

All of the sites implemented 90-day residential
programs that put youths through an intensive daily
regimen of military drills and discipline and
physical conditioning. To greater or lesser
degrees, the sites also offered more traditional
rehabilitative activities, including remedial
education, life skills education and counseling,
and substance abuse education. Other features
shared by the programs included:

o A platoon structure in which 10 to 13 youths
entered the program every 4 to 6 weeks and were
expected to graduate together.

o Spartan facilities located on the grounds of an
existing correctional facility.

o Onsite drill instructors, teachers, and case
managers.

o Staff with military backgrounds.

o Intensive training for staff before the boot
camps opened.

o Military-style uniforms for youths and drill
instructors and use of military jargon, customs,
and courtesies.

o An exhausting daily routine, starting at 5:30 or
6 a.m. and ending with lights out at 9 or 10 p.m.

o Summary punishment for minor breaches of rules
and a progression of sanctions, culminating in
removal from the program, for serious misconduct.

o A public graduation ceremony. 

What distinguished the programs from one another
were the correctional philosophies they adopted
within that general structure. The Cleveland site
stressed building healthy, prosocial norms in a
safe, comfortable environment that was given order
through military regimentation. It was the only
site to make therapeutic counseling a central part
of its programming. The Denver and Mobile programs,
however, deliberately departed from the more
traditional treatment-centered approach to juvenile
justice and focused on a military model that taught
socially acceptable behavior while emphasizing the
consequences of deviance. Of the three sites,
Denver devoted the most time to military drill,
fitness, and hard labor, and spent the least time
on education and life skills. Although the Mobile
program was also militaristic, its participants
were offered more educational programming.

Each site's approach to staffing reflected their
differing philosophical approaches. The program in
Cleveland sought out a staff with both counseling
and military backgrounds as a check against
unhealthy bias toward unstructured treatment or
overstructured military drill. Denver and Mobile,
on the other hand, preferred all staff to have
military experience, particularly drill
instructors. Denver avoided instructors with
counseling or therapy backgrounds for fear that
they would have difficulty with the more
militaristic aspects of their programs.

High percentages of first-year youths completed the
residential phase of boot camp, ranging from 94
percent in Cleveland to 82 percent in Mobile and 80
percent in Denver. The majority of youths not
completing the programs were terminated for
noncompliance or attempting to escape. One-third of
Denver's dropouts, however, left boot camp for
medical reasons. 

Overall, administrators and staff at each site
reported that implementation of the camps proceeded
smoothly. Interviews with a sample of youths from
early platoons suggests that while youths initially
found it difficult to adjust to the camps'
demanding regimen, many viewed the programs as a
challenge and a positive influence on their lives,
and particularly enjoyed being in better physical
condition and mastering military drills. 

However, two sites, Cleveland and Mobile, were
hampered by high staff turnover attributed to
burnout and low salaries. For these programs,
having to replace and train new instructors was a
significant disruptive factor. 

Staff also reported that the programs had some
difficulty achieving a healthy balance between
adhering to the strict requirements of a military
model and addressing the unique correctional needs
of juveniles. Instructors and counselors with
military backgrounds, for example, cited the
frustration of trying to adjust to youths who were
younger, more defiant, and less accustomed to
structure than military recruits. On the other
hand, staff without military experience were not
familiar with military procedures and drills, and
many favored rehabilitation over the military
model. 

All of the programs struggled to find disciplinary
measures and a clear-cut termination policy that
would not only have an impact on juveniles'
negative behavior and attitudes, but would also
contribute to their genuine rehabilitation. To that
end, Cleveland and Mobile used a setback sanction
that recycled unresponsive youths through parts of
the program before their graduation or termination.

Aftercare services

In recognition of the crucial role aftercare
services play in the rehabilitation of delinquent
youths, aftercare programming was an integral part
of the programs. In designing that phase, OJJDP
stipulated that the sites utilize their community's
employment, education, and drug testing and
treatment resources and orient the program to
continue enforcement of the discipline and
character instilled in youths during the boot camp
phase.

The sites differed widely in the type of aftercare
services they offered their graduates. In Cleveland
and Denver, youths attended aftercare centers
created for them by the programs, while in Mobile,
graduates were "main-streamed" to seven local Boys
and Girls Clubs. Denver's aftercare services
focused on academic instruction and were offered in
an atmosphere resembling a small private school.
Youths were referred to other providers for
nonacademic services such as drug counseling.
Cleveland's center, on the other hand, was the hub
of daily counseling and support services in
addition to operating an alternative school. Youths
in Mobile were expected to participate in
afterschool and evening activities at their
neighborhood Boys and Girls Club. There was no
centralized aftercare center.

Overall, of the three sites, Cleveland offered its
graduates the most comprehensive aftercare program,
reflecting that site's greater commitment to
rehabilitation and counseling. Cleveland also was
the only site to employ a full-time vocational
services counselor and a family services counselor.

Impact on behavior and costs

The demonstration programs met their most important
objectives: they showed that the boot camp model
can be adapted to the juvenile justice system, that
it can be implemented in different areas of the
country, and that it can serve a range of ages.
What the demonstration did not conclusively show is
that the programs were effective.

Boot camp phase. The demonstration did indicate
that short-term success was possible in the
residential phase. Data suggest that youths
improved their educational performance, physical
fitness, and behavior, and most participants
graduated at each site. In Cleveland and Mobile,
where staff tested educational achievement at entry
and at graduation, youths gained an average of one
grade level or more over the 90-day term. Drill
instructor ratings of participants' respect for
authority, self-discipline, team work, and physical
appearance also improved substantially,
particularly in Denver and Mobile. More important,
youths surveyed shortly before they returned to the
community and entered aftercare believed that they
had significantly changed the direction of their
lives.

Aftercare phase. What appeared to be a promising
prognosis for youths' adjustment during the
residential phase changed when they returned home.
Without the 24-hour surveillance and regimentation
of boot camp, youths soon reverted to old patterns
of behavior.

All three programs reported high attrition rates
for noncompliance, absenteeism, and new arrests. No
site graduated more than 50 percent of its
aftercare participants, and half of all
terminations were caused by new arrests. In Denver,
the first-year failure rate of youths in aftercare
reached nearly 71 percent. Mobile terminated fewer
youths in aftercare and had fewer rearrests than
the other sites, most likely because they selected
youths with less serious delinquent histories than
did Denver and Cleveland.

One factor in this lackluster performance was the
programs' inability to keep graduates involved in
activities. None of the aftercare programs found
effective incentives to attract regular attendance,
and absenteeism was a significant problem at each
site. In Mobile, case supervision in aftercare
remained the responsibility of participants'
probation officers and court-assigned case
managers, making it difficult to identify youths
not attending their assigned clubs and to take
effective remedial action. 

Moreover, the programs did not maintain the
intensive discipline and regimentation of the boot
camp phase, the withdrawal of which was associated
with the breakdown in graduates' focus and
motivation. Most military elements of the camps
were abandoned, with the exception of a few
military-style courtesies and titles and leadership
training materials in Cleveland and Denver, and
regular physical training in Denver. Youths who
went on to aftercare and remained in the
demonstration for at least 8 months reported that
their attitudes and behavior had changed for the
better in nearly every category surveyed. These
findings were based on a small sample, however, and
responses may have been biased toward socially
acceptable answers.

Costs. Only rough estimates of the programs' daily
costs, which ranged from $75 per youth in Cleveland
to $66 in Mobile, were possible. They indicate,
however, that the daily operating costs of boot
camps were less than those of alternative State and
local facilities. Ohio estimated the average daily
cost of State institutionalization at $99, and
Denver's higher security and community residential
facilities averaged $138 and $92, respectively, per
day. 

Considerations for future juvenile camps

The NIJ evaluation identified a number of areas in
which the experience of the demonstration programs
could benefit the planning and implementation of
other boot camps for juveniles. 

Developing an effective program rationale. Because
this sanction's main objective is changing the
behavior of young offenders, juvenile programs
should develop a strong rationale for each of their
program activities and clear expectations of what
those activities are to accomplish. 

To run smoothly, a program's staff and participants
need to understand and support its design and
purpose. In programs that have multiple agencies
monitoring youths, the responsibilities need to be
spelled out in detail, and youths must know who
will hold them accountable for misconduct. 

Balancing militaristic and rehabilitative elements.
A military structure gives youths the discipline
and structure they need to focus on changing their
behavior and attitudes. Some youths are more
accepting of treatment if it is delivered in a
tightly controlled environment. However, without
also addressing the educational, psychological, and
emotional needs of youths within that structure,
rehabilitation cannot be a realistic objective of
any juvenile sanction. The effects of discipline,
an important motivating tool when youths can be
closely monitored, may quickly dissipate once
offenders leave the boot camp environment.

Selecting appropriate youths. Juvenile programs
should carefully define and select their target
populations in light of program goals for
rehabilitating offenders, reducing recidivism, and
containing costs. Judging from the camps'
graduation rates, it appears that the criteria
successfully identified many youths who could
tolerate the boot camp regimen. It was found,
however, that youths with prior incarcerations were
less likely to survive in aftercare. 

The high attrition rates raise questions as to
whether these programs struck the appropriated
balance in selecting more and less serious
offenders. 

Two of the programs may have included too many
serious offenders, while the third camp appeared to
have included too many youths for whom less
restrictive and cheaper probation sanctions would
have been more appropriate.

Training staff. Continuous training is needed to
prevent disruptions when staff leave the program in
midterm. New programs must anticipate high turnover
rates and build frequent training sessions into
their workplans.

Rethinking aftercare. The demonstration's aftercare
programs need to be rethought and possibly
restructured. The transition from boot camp to
aftercare should be less abrupt, building on the
structure, discipline, and experiences of the
residential stage.

It is also critically important at this stage to
define more clearly expectations for behavior and
guidelines for graduated sanctions. The question
remains of how to effectively discipline youths in
aftercare while retaining their support and
attendance. Staff expressed widespread support for
stiffer participation requirements and for more
intensive supervision in the period immediately
following release from the residential programs.

The evaluation team could not draw any conclusions
about the programs' long-term ability to change
offenders' behavior or to save money and space for
the country's overburdened juvenile justice system.
Postprogram recidivism was not tracked and
recidivism in aftercare was studied only to the
extent that a rearrest prompted a juvenile's
termination from the program. Until more
information is available on recidivism and the cost
of alternatives to institutionalization, the impact
of juvenile camps on correctional crowding and
skyrocketing costs will be difficult to determine.
It is doubtful, however, given the much shorter
sentences juvenile offenders typically serve, that
a juvenile program could match the potential
savings of adult camps.

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Notes

1. The applicants selected were the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas in Cleveland, Ohio, in
association with the North American Family
Institute; the Colorado Division of Youth Services
in Denver, Colorado, in association with New Pride,
Inc.; and the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater
Mobile, Alabama, in association with the Strickland
Youth Center of the Mobile County Juvenile Court
and the University of South Alabama.

2. NIJ's primary grantee during the first year of
the evaluation was the Institute for Criminological
Research (ICR) at Rutgers University, New
Brunswick, New Jersey, with the American Institutes
for Research (AIR), Washington, D.C., as the
subcontractor. This relationship was reversed in
the second year.

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Blair B. Bourque is a senior research scientist at
the American Institutes for Research (AIR) in
Washington, D.C. At the time of this evaluation,
Roberta C. Cronin was a principal research
scientist at AIR. Daniel B. Felker is a senior
research fellow at AIR. Frank R. Pearson was an
associate research professor in the department of
sociology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New
Jersey. Mei Han is an associate research scientist
at AIR. The AIR report was prepared with the
assistance of Sarah M. Hill, a student intern.

The full report of this project is available from
the National Criminal Justice Reference Service,
P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849-6000; tel: 800-
851-3420 or e-mail askncjrs@aspensys.com. Ask for
NCJ 157316.

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Supported under award #92-DD-CX-K043 from the
National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of
view in this document are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the official position
of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

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The National Institute of Justice is a component of
the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims
of Crime.

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NCJ 157317
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