NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 18-1385

________________

CHUN YAO LIN,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A200-174-211) 

Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 27, 2018

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Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, RESTREPO, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 20, 2019)

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OPINION

____________

 

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Chun Yao Lin petitions for review of the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal of the IJ’s 

decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 

petition for review. 

The Attorney General may grant asylum to a refugee who can show that he is 

unable or unwilling to return to his country because of a “well-founded fear of 

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.”1 To establish such a fear, the refugee must demonstrate both 

a subjective, genuine fear of persecution and, “objectively, that ‘a reasonable person in 

the alien’s circumstances would fear persecution if returned to the country in question.’”

2

To satisfy the objective prong, the refugee “must show she would be individually singled 

out for persecution or demonstrate that ‘there is a pattern or practice in his or her country 

of nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant 

on account of[,]’” inter alia, “religion.”3

 

1 Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 534–35 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(42)(A)). 

2

Id. at 536 (quoting Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003)).

3

Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)).
3

The standard for withholding of removal is similar to, but higher than, the standard 

for asylum.4 Accordingly, any petitioner who fails to satisfy the standard for asylum 

necessarily cannot meet the standard for withholding of removal.5

Finally, an applicant who seeks to remain in the United States under the CAT must 

establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the 

proposed country of removal.”6 Torture is defined as

[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 

or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 

purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person 

information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act 

he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of 

having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a 

third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 

kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 

instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 

official or other person acting in an official capacity.7

After reviewing this record, we are satisfied that the BIA’s denial of the petition 

for relief is supported by substantial evidence.8 Petitioner has not established that he 

 

4 Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 

329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003)).

5

Id. (quoting Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 182).

6

Id. at 325 (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 172 (3d Cir. 2002)).

7 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

8 See Shardar, 382 F.3d at 323 (“Whether a petitioner has demonstrated past persecution 

or a well-founded fear of future persecution is a factual question that is reviewed by this 

Court under a substantial evidence standard, and will be upheld to the extent it is 

supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a 

whole.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). The scope of review under the 

substantial evidence standard is narrow, and we will not disturb the conclusions of the 

BIA “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Id.

(quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–84 (3d Cir. 2001)).
4

would be singled out for his Christian beliefs or that he would be subjected to a pattern or 

practice of persecution. He could not identify a church he would attend in China, there 

was no evidence in the record of persecution towards Christians in his home province, 

and even the reports he relied upon indicate that membership in “unregistered” churches 

is “tacitly approved of” in certain areas of the country.9 We also agree that Petitioner has 

not demonstrated that he would proselytize when he returned to China as there is 

insufficient proof of his proselytization efforts in the United States.10

Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown he identified evidence 

compelling a conclusion that he will be subject to persecution or torture, and we will 

therefore deny the petition for review of the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of 

relief. 

 

9

JA 244.

10 Lin asserts that the BIA and IJ incorrectly discounted his testimony despite finding him 

credible. We disagree. Although the IJ found that Lin was credible “in a general sense,” 

JA 71, he also concluded that much of Lin’s testimony was not substantiated. See, e.g., 

JA 72–73.