1... See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

2... TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 22.011(a)(2) (Vernon 2003).

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-07-274-CR

VICTOR VEGA APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

Appellant Victor Vega appeals his convictions for sexual assault of a

child. We affirm. 2
3... Id.§ 22.011(a)(2)(A),(B). 

4... See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.08(a) (Vernon 2006).

5... Rippee v. State, 384 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964);

Rangel v. State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 537 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006), pet.

dism’d, improvidently granted, 250 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

6... TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 13.17 (Vernon 2005).

2

Appellant met the complainant on the internet when she was fourteen or

fifteen and he was in his thirties. Over the course of the next six months to a

year, he had sex with her multiple times in his Denton County apartment.

After a two-day jury trial, appellant was found guilty on three counts of

sexual assault of a child. Upon hearing additional evidence and argument, the 3

jury assessed punishment at fifteen years’ confinement on count one and

twenty years’ each on counts two and three. The trial court sentenced

appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict and ordered the sentences

stacked. 

4

In point one, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove

venue in Denton County. Evidence is sufficient to prove venue if the jury may

reasonably conclude that the offense was committed in the county alleged.5

Venue need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. 

6

The complainant testified that appellant had vaginal and oral intercourse

with her eight to ten times in his apartment. The manager of the apartment
3

complex where appellant lived during the time testified that the apartment was

located in Denton County. This evidence is sufficient for the jury to reasonably

conclude that the offenses occurred in Denton County. Point one is overruled.

Under his second point, appellant contends in two subpoints that the trial

court abused its discretion in admitting in evidence the complainant’s e-mail to

the Dallas police and her sworn written statement.

The complainant’s e-mail, State’s Exhibit 4, was admitted for the record

only. The following portions were read to the jury:

I’m not entirely sure to whom I should be sending this. My name is

[D.R.], and I live in Denton, Texas. I’m 20 years old and a new

mother, something which has really given me reason to reopen the

past I have been trying to forget. When I was 14 years old, I met

Victor Vega online, who said he was 30, and we decided to meet

up to have sex. He showed me some, and he asked me to pose for

him to take pictures alone and with him, which I did.

. . . .

I don’t know his address, but I do know that he is the owner of

WolfPaw Hosting, http:\\www.wp.com. If I sent this to the wrong

people, I apologize. If I can provide any more help, let me know.

But, please, if anything at all can be done this many years after the

fact. I can’t stand the thought of my daughter going through the

same things I did because of that. I only wish I had said something

earlier instead of caring so much about whether my parents would

find out. Thank you, [D.R.]. My address.

Appellant contends in subpoint 2A that these excerpts should not have

been admitted because they contained hearsay; they did not satisfy the rule of

optional completeness; and they harmfully bolstered the complainant’s
7... Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998);

Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978 [Panel Op.]).

4

testimony. Our review of the record, however, reveals that the facts contained

in the excerpts were admitted elsewhere during trial without objection. The

complainant testified, without objection, to her name and age; that she lived in

Denton; that her new motherhood led her to talk to the police about appellant;

that she was born in 1985 and met appellant online in 2000; that he was in his

thirties; that they exchanged nude photographs; that they met to have sex; and

that he owned a web-hosting site named WolfPaw. 

A trial court’s decision “overruling an objection to evidence will not result

in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection either

before or after the complained-of ruling.” Because the same facts contained 7

in complainant’s e-mail were admitted in evidence during trial without objection,

appellant’s complaint is waived. Subpoint 2A is overruled.

In subpoint 2B, appellant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting the entire written statement the complainant gave to the

Dallas Police Department, State’s Exhibit 5, because it exceeded the scope of

cross-examination, was unfairly prejudicial, and constituted bolstering. At trial,

however, appellant merely objected to this statement on hearsay grounds.
8... See Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004).

9... See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); In re J.B.W., 99 S.W.3d 218, 225 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

10... Heidelberg, 144 S.W.3d at 537. 

5

Therefore, the complaint is waived because it does not comport with the

objection at trial. Subpoint 2B is overruled. 8

In point three, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting during the punishment phase two computer disks seized from

appellant’s apartment because they were not properly authenticated and were

unfairly prejudicial under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. Appellant cites no

authority for his complaint that the exhibits were improperly authenticated. The

complaint is, therefore, waived because it is inadequately briefed. Appellant’s 9

complaint that the exhibits were unfairly prejudicial under rule 403 is also

waived because appellant did not raise this objection to the exhibits at trial.10

Point three is overruled.

In point four, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying a mistrial during the punishment phase after an officer gave a

nonresponsive answer to a question from appellant’s counsel. During

appellant’s cross-examination of Detective LeFlore, the following exchange

occurred:
11... Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

12... Ridyolph v. State, 545 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

13... Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

14... O’Dell v. State, 651 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983,

pet. ref’d).

6

Q. I see Detective Cox’s name in some of your reports. Did you

work with Detective Cox on this?

A. I did.

Q. Is it fair to say you did the bulk of the investigative work

here?

A. As far as this case goes, correct. Detective Cox was

working on the child pornography case against Mr. Vega.

Counsel for appellant objected on the ground that the detective’s answer was

nonresponsive. The trial court sustained the objection, instructed the jury to

disregard the detective’s remark, and denied appellant’s motion for mistrial.

Mistrial is an extreme remedy the denial of which is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Generally, an instruction to disregard cures any prejudice 11

resulting from a nonresponsive answer. A jury is presumed to follow the trial 12

court’s instructions.13 We have held that an instruction cured prejudice from

a police-officer witness’s nonresponsive answer during the punishment phase

where there was no evidence of bad faith.14
7

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial.

Appellant does not allege, and we find no evidence showing, that the detective

acted in bad faith, and we find nothing in the record to rebut the presumption

that the jury followed the trial court’s prompt instruction to disregard. 

Furthermore, there is ample evidence in the record establishing that

appellant engaged in child pornography. Appellant had created his own DVD

showing him engaged in sexual acts with the complainant when she was

fifteen. Computer discs containing child pornography were found in appellant’s

apartment and representative of hundreds of similar discs. In view of the

evidence that appellant had engaged in child pornography, the officer’s mere

mention that the police had investigated a child pornography case against

appellant was not unfairly prejudicial. Point four is overruled.

Having overruled all of appellant’s points, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 14, 2008