UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHELLE MATHIS, 

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:12-cv-358

JUDGE SMITH

Magistrate Judge Preston Deavers

-vDOCTOR’S HOSPITAL (WEST), et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report and

Recommendation and Motion to Change Venue and for Recusal (Doc. 6). For the reasons that

follow, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to

Change Venue and for Recusal.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on April 23, 2012, against Doctor’s Hospital (West),

Riverside Methodist Hospital, Ohio Health Corporation, Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare

(“Twin Valley”), and Franklin Township, asserting federal civil rights and state-law tort claims

arising out her involuntary commitment and treatment. On May 15, 2012, the Magistrate Judge

issued an Order and Initial Screen Report and Recommendation (“Report and Recommendation”)

recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s purported federal causes of action for failure to

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state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims, dismissing these claims without prejudice.

In making her recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the doctrine of res

judicata or claim preclusion operates to bar Plaintiff’s federal claims against Doctor’s Hospital

(West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s claims

against Ohio Health Corporation are untenable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she fails to allege

facts upon which this Court could conclude that this defendant acted under the color of state law

and because allegations against this defendant are “clearly irrational or wholly incredible.” (Doc.

3, p. 7, quoting Reynosa v. Schultz, 282 F. App’x 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2008)). The Magistrate

Judge also could not discern a cognizable claim flowing from Plaintiff’s allegation against Twin

Valley concerning her probate court hearing held at this facility. Lastly, the Magistrate Judge

concluded that Plaintiff’s federal claims against Franklin Township necessarily fail because she

does not allege that a Franklin Township policy caused her alleged injury. Based on her

recommendation to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Magistrate Judge further

recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s statelaw tort claims.

On May 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Objections to the Report and Recommendation and

Motion to Change Venue and for Recusal. The Court first will address Plaintiff’s Motion for

Recusal and then will address the merits of her Objections to the Report and Recommendation.

II. Motion for Recusal

Federal law requires a federal judicial officer to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The bias or prejudice

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that mandates recusal, however, must be wrongful or inappropriate, i.e., either relying on

knowledge acquired outside the proceedings or displaying deep-seated and unequivocal

antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540

(1994). A disqualifying prejudice or bias must ordinarily be personal or extrajudicial. United

States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1990); Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246,

1250 (6th Cir. 1989). That is, it “must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion

on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.”

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). Ultimately, the test for whether

recusal is warranted or required under § 455 is what a “reasonable person knowing all the relevant

facts would think about the impartiality of the judge.” Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th

Cir. 1980).

In this matter, Plaintiff challenges the impartiality of the undersigned judge and Magistrate

Judge Preston Deavers on the basis that adverse decisions or recommendations have been made

against her in this case and in a related case. In essence, Plaintiff seeks recusal because she

believes that these adverse rulings or recommendations somehow demonstrate impermissible bias

or prejudice toward her and her claims. But Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction regarding legal rulings or

recommendations is not a valid basis to request recusal as it does not show an extrajudicial or

personal prejudice or bias. Because Plaintiff does not point to any fact or circumstance that

reasonably suggests a reason to question the impartiality of the undersigned judge or the

Magistrate Judge, her Motion for Recusal is DENIED.

III. Objections to Report and Recommendation

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When objections are received to a report and recommendation on a dispositive matter, the

District Judge “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has

been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After review, the District Judge “may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that res judicata operates to bar

Plaintiff’s federal claims against Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital. To

apply res judicata, the Sixth Circuit requires proof of the following four elements: (1) a final

decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the

same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the subsequent action which was litigated or which

should have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action. Kane v.

Magna Mixer Co., 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff argues that not all of the elements required under the doctrine of res judicata are

present here. In particular, Plaintiff argues that there was no final judgment on the merits in the

previous case she filed, and that the previous case is only similar to the case at bar. Two months

prior to initiating the case at bar, Plaintiff brought a nearly identical action: Mathis v. Doctor’s

Hospital West, Case No. 2:12-cv-156 (“156 Case”). Both of these cases arise from Plaintiff’s

involuntary commitment and treatment in January and February 2012. Plaintiff suggests that the

undersigned judge did not evaluate the merits of the 156 Case and therefore there was no final

judgment on the merits. Plaintiff is incorrect as the federal claims in the 156 Case were dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and final judgment was entered on April 16, 2012. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not explain why the currently pending claims against Doctor’s

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Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital are distinguishable from those against these

defendants in the 156 Case. Therefore, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly

concluded that the doctrine of res judicata operates to bar Plaintiff’s federal claims against

Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital.

Plaintiff generally objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss her federal

claims against Ohio Health Corporation and Franklin Township. Plaintiff argues that she has

stated viable claims against these defendants. Plaintiff does not, however, present any argument

repudiating the Magistrate Judge’s well-articulated bases for why these claims should be

dismissed. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ohio Health

Corporation fail because Plaintiff does not allege facts upon which this Court could conclude that

this defendant acted under the color of state law. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that a

policy of Franklin Township, which is a local government entity, caused her injury. Instead,

Plaintiff relies on the doctrine of respondeat superior. However, local governments are only

liable for “their own illegal acts.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (citing

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). Thus, they are not

vicariously liable for their employees’ actions. Id. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s objections as to

Ohio Health Corporation and Franklin Township are without merit.

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss the claims against

Twin Valley, arguing that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly determined that the only allegation she

makes concerning Twin Valley is that her probate court hearings were held there. The Court has

carefully reviewed the Complaint and agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the only

factual allegation Plaintiff makes regarding this defendant concerns the fact that probate court

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hearings were held at the facility. This allegation is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Furthermore, while Plaintiff makes other references to Twin Valley in the

Complaint, these are part of conclusory statements that are unsupported by any plausible facts. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection regarding Twin Valley is unpersuasive.

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) in this

case. Section 1915(e)(2) provides that any case reviewed under the initial screening procedure

must be dismissed if the “court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or

malicious . . . [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Plaintiff argues that

the Magistrate Judge improperly recommended that the federal claims be dismissed under §

1915(e)(2) because this statute is only applicable to prisoners. Plaintiff’s argument is meritless,

however, because the Sixth Circuit has specifically stated that § 1915(e)(2)’s initial screening

requirement applies to complaints filed by non-prisoners as well as prisoners. Baker v. Wayne

County Family Independence Agency, 75 F. App’x 501, 502 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The statute

requires courts to dismiss in forma pauperis complaints that fail to state a claim, and applies to

complaints filed by non-prisoners as well as prisoners.”).

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge improperly recommended that the

Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law tort claims. In

support of this contention, Plaintiff seems to argue that her state-law tort claims are really federal

claims under § 1983. Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, her state-law tort claims do not arise

under federal laws or the Constitution. As such, this Court does not have federal question

jurisdiction over these claims. Thus, the issue resolves to whether the Court should exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law tort claims. As the Magistrate Judge

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noted, while dismissal of the federal claims does not divest this Court of subject-matter

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, it does require this Court to exercise its discretion

to determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When

all federal claims are dismissed before trial, state claims generally should be dismissed as well. 

Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009). Because all of Plaintiff’s federal claims must

be dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons expressed herein, the Motion for Recusal is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s

objections (Doc. 6) are OVERRULED. Furthermore, because this case must be dismissed, the

Motion to Change Venue is DENIED as moot. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 3) is

ADOPTED and AFFIRMED, and this action is hereby DISMISSED. 

The Clerk shall remove this case from the Court’s pending cases list.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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