alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTONIO TONY LOZANO, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. RALPH M. DIAZ, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 12-55330D.C. No. 5:09-cv-01847-JSLMRW
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California J. Spencer Letts, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 17, 2014 Pasadena, California Before: SCHROEDER, PREGERSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Antonio Lozano appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, challenging his California second-degree murder conviction. Because the state court did not make an unreasonable determination of 

# FILED
DEC 05 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.the facts nor unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, we affirm. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner was convicted under a felony murder theory, predicated on his felony charge for grossly negligent discharg e of a firearm that could result in injury or death under California Penal Code § 246.3. Although the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Chun , 203 P.3d 425, 444 (Cal. 2009), indicates that negligent discharge of a firearm merges with the killing so a charge under § 246.3 cannot support felony murder, that decision came out after Petitioner’s conviction was final. Chunchanged the law because it overruled the California Supreme Court’s prior opinions in People v. Robertson , 95 P.3d 872 (Cal. 2004), and People v. Randle , 111 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2005), which were applicable when Petitioner’s conviction became final. Subsequent ch anges in state law cannot be grounds for federal habeas relief. See, e.g. , Kleve v. Hill , 243 F.3d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001). Recognizing this, Petitioner attempts to argue that the state courts made an unreasonable determination of the facts by finding he fired the shots with the collateral purpose of frightening the victims. To warrant relief, the state court’s factual determinations must be objectiv ely unreasonable, not merely incorrect or debatable. Wood v. Allen , 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Petitioner testified that he intended to frighten the victims, and under California law at the time of his 2conviction, this was a sufficient collateral purpose to prevent the shooting from merging with the killing for felony murder purposes. See Robertson , 95 P.3d at 881. The state court’s determination wa s not objectively unreasonable. Further, because this is a question of state law, Petitioner’s contention that the collateral purpose finding violated federal law is unavailing. See Butler v. Curry , 528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We are bound to accept a state court’s interpretation of state law, except in the highly unusual case in which the interpretation is clearly untenable . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not reach Petitioner’s uncertified issue. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED
.

3
# C_2007199EN.01002902.xml

| 25.8.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 199/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.8.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 199/29

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 11 July 2007 — Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council

(Case T-327/03) (1)

1

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism - Freezing of funds - Action for annulment - Statement of reasons)

(2007/C 199/54)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Stichting Al-Aqsa (Heerlen — Netherlands) (represented by: V. Koppe and L. Janssen, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bishop and S. Marquardt, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Annulment in part, first, of Council Decision 2003/480/EC of 27 June 2003 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2002/974/EC (OJ 2003 L 160, p. 81), and, second, of Council Decision 2003/646/EC of 12 September 2003 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Decision 2003/1480 (OJ 2003 L 229, p. 22).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls Council Decision 2006/379/EC of 29 May 2006 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2005/930 in so far as it concerns Stichting Al-Aqsa; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls Council Decision 2006/379/EC of 29 May 2006 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2005/930 in so far as it concerns Stichting Al-Aqsa;

| 2. | Declares that there is no need to rule on the claim for a declaration, pursuant to Article 241 EC, that Council Regulation No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 is unlawful; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Declares that there is no need to rule on the claim for a declaration, pursuant to Article 241 EC, that Council Regulation No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 is unlawful;

| 3. | Orders the Council to bear, in addition to its own costs, the costs of Stichting Al-Aqsa: |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Council to bear, in addition to its own costs, the costs of Stichting Al-Aqsa:

| 4. | Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 289, 29.11.2003.

1

---
# C_2015055EN.01000301.xml

| 14.2.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 55/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 55/3

---

Notice for the attention of certain persons subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine

(2015/C 55/03)

The following information is brought to the attention of Mr Sergey Valeryevich AKSYONOV, Mr Andriy PURGIN, Mr Denys PUSHYLIN, Mr Viacheslav PONOMARIOV, Mr Oleg TSARIOV, Mr Aleksandr Yurevich BORODAI, Mr Alexander KHODAKOVSKY, Mr Yurij IVAKIN, Mr Igor PLOTNITSKY, Ms. Ekaterina GUBAREVA, Mr Fedor BEREZIN, Mr Boris LITVINOV, Mr Arkady Romanovich ROTENBERG, Mr Miroslav Vladimirovich RUDENKO, Mr Andrey Yurevich PINCHUK, Mr Aleksandr KOFMAN, persons appearing in the Annex to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP (1) and in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (2) concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

1

2

The Council intends to maintain the restrictive measures against the abovementioned persons with new statements of reasons. Those persons are hereby informed that they may submit a request to the Council to obtain the intended statements of reasons for their designation, before 20 February 2015, to the following address:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| DG C 1C |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG C 1C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

---

(1)  OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16.

1

(2)  OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6.

2

---
graeffemploymentagreemen






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






 





 






     Exhibit A  Prior Awards  Type of Award Grant Date Total Number of  Shares in Grant  Performance-Based  Restricted Stock Unit Award  January 8, 2020 21,350  Time-Based Restricted Stock  Unit Award  January 8, 2020 39,650  Performance-Based  Restricted Stock Unit Award  January 27, 2021 22,727  Time-Based Restricted Stock  Unit Award  January 27, 2021 22,727  Performance-Based  Restricted Stock Unit Award  January 6, 2022 54,910  Time-Based Restricted Stock  Unit Award  January 6, 2022 54,910
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONALD JOSHUA SMITH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DHARMYIR SINGH, Doctor; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-15351 

D.C. No. 

2:20-cv-00101-TLN-JDP 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 27, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Donald Joshua Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to Defendant Dr. Dharmyir Singh.

1

 Smith alleges that Dr. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1 Smith’s motions for default judgment are DENIED. Dkt. Nos. 18, 20. To 

the extent Smith intends to invoke forfeiture, Dr. Singh had already timely filed an 

answering brief when Smith filed his motions. 

FILED

MAR 27 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Singh was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs while incarcerated 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 

2004), and we affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Dr. Singh because 

Smith presented no evidence that the treatment Dr. Singh provided “was medically 

unacceptable under the circumstances, and was chosen in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [his] health.” Id. at 1058 (quotation marks omitted). Dr. Singh 

saw Smith twice over two months for pain in his arm and back. Dr. Singh 

conducted physical examinations and reviewed an x-ray that showed no 

abnormalities. Dr. Singh ordered physical therapy, prescribed Tylenol, and 

changed Smith’s work classification to limited duty with weight restrictions. Dr. 

Singh diagnosed Smith with epicondylitis, or “tennis elbow,” which is supported 

by the physical therapy assessments. 

Smith argues that Dr. Singh should have ordered imaging and/or surgery and 

released him from work duties, but “[a] difference of opinion between a physician 

and the prisoner . . . concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount 

to deliberate indifference.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 

2016) (quotation marks omitted). 

Because we can affirm the grant of summary judgment solely on the ground 
3 

that Smith presented no evidence that Dr. Singh was deliberately indifferent to 

Smith’s serious medical needs, we need not consider the issue of qualified 

immunity. 

AFFIRMED.
Case: 2:12-cv-01180-EAS-EPD Doc #: 54 Filed: 11/15/13 Page: 1 of 1  PAGEID #: <pageID>

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2015-05-11T16:30:42-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
```

[104th Congress Public Law 219]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

<DOC>
[DOCID: f:publ219.104]

[[Page 110 STAT. 3022]]

Public Law 104-219
104th Congress

                                 An Act

 
 To clarify the rules governing removal of cases to Federal court, and 
         for other purposes. <<NOTE: Oct. 1, 1996 -  [S. 533]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REMOVAL.

    The first sentence of section 1447(c) of title 28, United States 
Code, is amended by striking ``any defect in removal procedure'' and 
inserting ``any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction''.

    Approved October 1, 1996.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 533:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 104-799 (Comm. on the Judiciary).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
                                                        Vol. 141 (1995):
                                    June 30, considered and passed 
                                        Senate.
                                                        Vol. 142 (1996):
                                    Sept. 17, considered and passed 
                                        House.

                                  <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Tom Arbino, :

Plaintiff, :

v. : Case No. 2:12-cv-705

 : JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

State of Ohio, Magistrate Judge Kemp

:

Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court to consider a Report and

Recommendation which was filed on August 13, 2012, and which

recommended dismissal of this case. Plaintiff, Tom Arbino, has

not filed objections to the Report and Recommendation although it

specifically notified him of the need to do so within fourteen

days. He did recently file a motion asking the Court to clarify

certain aspects of the order which transferred this case from the 

Western Division of this Court at Cincinnati to the Eastern

Division at Columbus, but that motion (which the Magistrate Judge

has ruled on) did not contain anything which can be construed as

an objection to the Report and Recommendation. 

The Court has independently reviewed the Report and

Recommendation, and agrees that dismissal is appropriate. The

only named defendant, the State of Ohio, is immune from suit in a

federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution. This Court has no power either to grant

injunctive relief against the State or to enter a money judgment

against it. Mr. Arbino has requested such relief, but it is

simply not available to him here. See Seminole Tribe of Florida

v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (“the relief sought by a

plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the

Case: 2:12-cv-00705-GLF-TPK Doc #: 7 Filed: 09/18/12 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment”); In re Ayers, 123 U.S.

443, 505 (1887)(““The very object and purpose of the 11th

Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to

the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of

private parties”).

For these reasons, the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 4) is

ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. This action is dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution. The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the

complaint and this dismissal order to the plaintiff and to the

Attorney General of the State of Ohio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

GREGORY L. FROST

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-2-

Case: 2:12-cv-00705-GLF-TPK Doc #: 7 Filed: 09/18/12 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
#### UNITED STATES, Appellant v. WILLIAM JOSEPH TAYLOR, Private, U. S. Marine Corps, Appellee

5 USCMA 528, 18 CMR 147

*524No. 5746

Decided March 4, 1955

Cdr George H. Rood, USN, for Appellant.

Cdr James A. Brough, USN, for Appellee.

Opinion of the Court

ROBERT E. Quinn, Chief Judge:

A board of review set aside the accused’s conviction by a special court-martial for disobedience of a lawful order and for two separate unauthorized absences, in violation of Articles 90 and 86, respectively, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 USC §§ 684, 680. The board of review based its action on the ground that certain entries in the accused’s service record, which were admitted as evidence of his unauthorized absences, were signed by the officer who later acted as the convening authority. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy asked us to review the legal correctness of the board of review decision.

In United States v. McClenny, 5 USCMA 507, 18 CMR 131, which was consolidated for argument with this case, we held that a convening authority does not retroactively become an accuser when he appears at the trial as a witness against the accused. His status as an accuser must be determined as of the time he convenes the court. However, consideration may be given to testimony which he gives at the trial to determine whether he had a personal interest in the outcome of the case at the time he convened the court. If his testimony does not show such interest, and there is no other evidence from which such interest may be inferred, his authority to convene the court is unassailable. At the same time, we pointed out that if the convening authority later acts as the reviewing authority, the nature of his testimony, in relation to the other evidence, may so affect the impartiality of the review as to require that he be disqualified. At that stage of the proceedings, the test is whether a reasonable person would impute to the reviewing authority a personal interest in the outcome of the review. In McClenny, we found such a personal interest.

In this case, the testimony of the reviewing authority consists solely of official records. The accuracy of those records is unquestioned. More than that, the accused in his own testimony admitted that he was, “over the hill” for the periods set out in the specifications of the charge. Hence, there is no basis for imputing a personal interest in the outcome of the review on the part of the reviewing officer. This case is, therefore, distinguishable from *Mc-Clenny,*and requires a different conclusion.

The decision of the board of review is reversed. The record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General *525of the Navy for action consistent with this opinion.

Judge LatimeR concurs.

BROSMAN, Judge

(concurring):

I concur. See my brief memorandum in United States v. McClenny, 5 USCMA 507, 18 CMR 181.
# C_2008322EN.01001201.xml

| 17.12.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 322/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 322/12

---

NOTICE OF OPEN COMPETITION EPSO/AST/76/08

NOTICE OF OPEN COMPETITION

(2008/C 322/07)

The European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) is organising open competition EPSO/AST/76/08 to recruit social welfare assistants (AST 1).

The competition notice is published in English, French and German only, in Official Journal C 322 A of 17.12.2008.

Further details can be found on the EPSO website: http://europa.eu/epso

---
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v FEDERICO ADAME, Jr., Private, U. S. Marine Corps, Appellant

20 USCMA 573, 44 CMR 3

No. 23,973

May 28, 1971

*Lieutenant Arthur H. Rainey,*JAGC, USNR, was on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Commander Michael F. Fasanaro, Jr.,*JAGC, USN, was on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

Quinn, Chief Judge:

At the accused’s trial by a special court-martial, certain exhibits relating to a previous conviction were supposed to be admitted into evidence during the sentence proceedings, but they are not included in the transcript. This deficiency might normally be correctable by appropriate remand. See United States v Norwood, 16 USCMA 310, 36 CMR 466 (1966). However, it further appears that the decision of the United States Navy Court of Military Review, dated October 20, 1969, was not served upon the accused until February 16, 1971. See United States v Ervin, 20 USCMA 97, 42 CMR 289 (1970). The period of confinement as suspended has long since expired, as has the probationary period for remission of the bad-conduct discharge. Under the circumstances, “no useful purpose is served by continuing the proceedings.’’ United States v Fortune, 20 USCMA 293, 43 CMR 133 (1971).

The decision of the Court of Military Review is reversed. The findings of guilty and the sentence are set aside and the charges are ordered dismissed.

Senior Judge FERGUSON concurs.

DARDEN, Judge

(dissenting):

In my view Adame has suffered no harm from the delay in the appellate review of his case. United States v Prater, 20 USCMA 339, 43 CMR 179 (1971); United States v Davis, 20 USCMA 541, 43 CMR 381 (1971). But if there were need to correct the deficiency complained of, a rehearing on the sentence would be appropriate. The appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses charged, and, unlike the accused in United States v Ervin, 20 *574USCMA 97, 42 CMR 289 (1970), and United States v Fortune, 20 USCMA 293, 43 CMR 133 (1971), remains on active duty. There is therefore no reason to set aside the findings of guilty and to dismiss the charges.
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Leslie Hayton 

Managing Director

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