U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

29–008

" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 108TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPT. 108–289

2003

Part 2

REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT TO TRANSMIT TO THE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ENTITLED ‘‘OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM STRATEGIC 

LESSONS LEARNED’’ AND DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY OF POST-WAR IRAQ

ADVERSE REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

H. RES. 364

together with

ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

OCTOBER 2, 2003.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed. 


congress.#13
(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JIM RYUN, Kansas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

KEN CALVERT, California 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

ED SCHROCK, Virginia 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

IKE SKELTON, Missouri 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

LANE EVANS, Illinois 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

TIM RYAN, Ohio

ROBERT S. RANGEL, Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Purpose and Background ........................................................................................ 1

Executive Communication ...................................................................................... 2

Legislative History .................................................................................................. 3

Committee Position ................................................................................................. 3

Committee Cost Estimate ....................................................................................... 3

Oversight Findings .................................................................................................. 3

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 3

Statement of Federal Mandates ............................................................................. 3

Record Votes ............................................................................................................. 4

Additional and Dissenting Views: 

Dissenting views of Marty Meehan .................................................................... 6

Additional views of Madeleine Z. Bordallo ........................................................ 8

108TH CONGRESS REPT. 108–289 " HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 1st Session Part 2

REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT TO TRANSMIT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF ENTITLED ‘‘OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM STRATEGIC LESSONS 

LEARNED’’ AND DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY OF POST-WAR IRAQ 

OCTOBER 2, 2003.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HUNTER, from the Committee on Armed Services, 

submitted the following 

ADVERSE REPORT 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H. Res. 364]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the 

resolution (H. Res. 364) of inquiry requesting the President to 

transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days 

after the date of adoption of this resolution the report prepared for 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff entitled ‘‘Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned’’ and documents in his possession on the reconstruction and security of post-war Iraq, having considered the 

same, report adversely thereon without amendment and recommend that the resolution not be agreed to. 

PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

House Resolution 364 requests the President to transmit to the 

House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of 

adoption of this resolution the report prepared for the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff entitled, ‘‘Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons 

Learned,’’ and documents in his possession on the reconstruction 

and security of post-war Iraq. 

H. Res. 364 is a resolution of inquiry, which pursuant to clause 

7 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives directs 

the committee to act on the resolution within 14 legislative days, 

or a privileged motion to discharge the committee is in order. H. 

Res. 364 was introduced and referred to the Committees on Armed 

Services and International Relations on September 9, 2003. The 

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resolution was ordered reported adversely by the Committee on 

International Relations on September 25, 2003, and the Committee 

on Armed Services on September 30, 2003. 

Under the rules and precedents of the House, a resolution of inquiry is one of the means by which the House may request information from the President of the United States or the head of one 

of the executive departments. It is a simple resolution making a direct request or demand of the President or head of an executive department to furnish the House of Representatives with specific factual information in the possession of the executive branch. It is not 

used to request opinions or to require an investigation on a subject. 

On September 9, 2003, Representative Wexler of Florida introduced H. Res. 364, a resolution of inquiry requesting the President 

to transmit to the House of Representatives the report and other 

documents relating to the reconstruction and security of post-war 

Iraq. 

The Joint Staff has informed the committee that the ‘‘report’’ in 

question is actually a briefing that is incomplete and still in draft 

form. According to the Joint Staff, the findings in this presentation 

will form the basis of a more complete written report that will be 

issued at a later date. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers provided a letter to the committee stating that 

once it is complete, the report will be provided to the committee. 

Because the document in question is incomplete and has not 

been reviewed, and General Myers committed to providing a report 

once it is complete, the committee ordered the resolution to be reported adversely. 

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 

Washington, DC, September 25, 2003. 

Hon. DUNCAN L. HUNTER, 

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to you concerning H. Res. 

364, which I understand is a resolution of inquiry requesting certain documents from the President. The resolution by its text requests the President to forward to the House a report prepared for 

the Joint Staff entitled ‘‘Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lesson 

Learned.’’

The specific document requested is still in draft form. It is being 

prepared as a briefing to be followed up by a complete written report at a later date. My intention is to ensure this report is as complete and comprehensive as possible. Copies will be provided to 

your committee as soon as each is completed. 

I will continue to work with your committee to ensure that Congress is completely informed on this and other important issues. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD B. MYERS, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H. Res. 364 was introduced on September 9, 2003, and referred 

to the Committees on Armed Services and International Relations. 

The resolution was reported adversely by the Committee on International Relations on September 25, 2003 by a record vote of 24 

ayes to 20 noes. 

On September 30, 2003, the Committee on Armed Services held 

a mark-up session to consider H. Res. 364. The committee reported 

adversely the resolution by a record vote of 29 ayes to 22 noes. 

COMMITTEE POSITION

On September 30, 2003, the Committee on Armed Services met 

in open session and reported adversely the resolution H. Res. 364 

to the House by a record vote of 29 ayes to 22 noes, a quorum being 

present. 

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 

Representatives, the committee estimates the costs of implementing the resolution would be minimal. The Congressional Budget Office did not provide a cost estimate for the resolution. 

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee reports that the findings 

and recommendations of the committee, based on oversight activities pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not include any new 

spending or credit authority, nor does it provide for any increase 

or decrease in tax revenues or expenditures. 

With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, performance goals and objectives cannot 

be explained, because the resolution does not require any new 

funding. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the committee finds that the rule does not 

apply because H. Res. 364 is not a bill or joint resolution that may 

be enacted into law. 

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES

Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104–4, this legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state, local, and tribal 

governments, nor with respect to the private sector. Similarly, the 

resolution provides no unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates. 

4

RECORD VOTES

In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee sets forth the following 

record vote that occurred during the committee’s consideration of 

H. Res. 364.

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(6)

DISSENTING VIEW OF REPRESENTATIVE MARTY MEEHAN 

I disagree with the decision to report House Resolution 364 adversely. This resolution would ask the President to send to the 

House of Representatives a report prepared by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff that has been widely reported in the press entitled Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, Strategic Lessons Learned. These are documents 

about the reconstruction and security of postwar Iraq, and it hardly 

seems unreasonable to ask the Bush administration to share them 

with Congress as we consider whether to approve an additional $87 

billion for this effort and what, if any, legislative modifications 

should be made to the postwar plan. 

This report was compiled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff with interviews from senior U.S. military officials, including 

Army General Tommy Franks, people who are uniquely qualified 

to provide insights into the problems that have beset the administration’s postwar planning for Iraq. 

Congress has a right and responsibility to be informed as to exactly what planning was done—or not done—for postwar Iraq. I 

voted for the resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq a year 

ago. At the time, I maintained that the challenge was not so much 

in the military mission in Iraq, but rather how to deal with the 

aftermath of the war. 

Nobody can seriously doubt that the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein in power. But the evidence is clear that if we 

are not careful, and if we do not ask questions, if we do not have 

inquiries, we risk turning Iraq into a breeding ground for terrorism. 

The question we face now is, how can we fix the problems with 

the stabilization and reconstruction campaign before more damage 

is done? There is good reason to think that this report, if made 

public, would help us to answer that question, because it looks at 

the planning for the war and its aftermath through interviews with 

senior military officials. 

I cannot understand why the Committee on Armed Services 

would not get a copy before we decide how to handle the administration’s request for yet another $87 billion to secure and rebuild 

Iraq. 

With everything we know now about the absence of intelligence 

on weapons of mass destruction and the failure to plan for a significant resistance, I do not think the administration is in any position now to ask us to trust them to give us the information that 

we need. All of us on the Committee on Armed Services have a responsibility to the Republic, to the Constitution, to get to the bottom of the Administration’s planning on Iraq and what went 

wrong. 

The committee needs the report now, before we make any decisions about another $87 billion as we are cutting back, this adminVerDate jul 14 2003 02:05 Oct 04, 2003 Jkt 029008 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\HR289P2.XXX HR289P2
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istration, cutting back on health care for Americans, cutting back 

on veterans’ services, $1.8 billion to make sure that we meet our 

commitment to veterans across this country, cutting back on Head 

Start and other programs. We ought to know what this report says 

before we move further. 

I am disappointed that the Committee on Armed Services did not 

report this resolution out favorably. I do not know why the information in this report should be withheld from Congress and from 

the public. The Bush administration does not seem to be interested 

in getting to the bottom of the problems in Iraq if they think it 

would not reflect favorably on the planning they did before the war. 

This is understandable, but Members of Congress have a responsibility to make sure that the Bush administration is not allowed to 

hide the truth at the expense of better decisions, including the decision before us on the Iraq supplemental. 

MARTY MEEHAN. 

(8)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE MADELEINE Z. 

BORDALLO 

The responsibility of the House Armed Services Committee to ensure civilian oversight of the military does not end when war begins. The United States wins wars not only because of the professionalism of our fighting force, but also because of the objective 

control we place upon the military. 

Given this responsibility, I support the repeated requests made 

by the Ranking Member, Congressman Ike Skelton to obtain a copy 

of the final draft report prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff titled 

‘‘Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned,’’ and the 

overt measure to achieve this offered by Congressman Robert 

Wexler. 

This request must not prejudice the willingness of the Pentagon 

to put down on paper frank assessments on their successes and 

failures in the conduct of war. The ‘‘lesson learned’’ from Vietnam 

is that the Department of Defense must be open with the American 

people on its assessments of the war from its onset. Being upfront 

regarding the difficulty of war removes false expectation about its 

duration and outcome. 

Our committee is uniquely capable of taking the lessons learned 

from Iraq and by authorizing legislation, ensuring the implementation of those lessons for the future. I believe one such lesson may 

be that the political anathema associated with the responsibility of 

‘‘nation building’’ may have caught the Department of Defense off 

guard when they were then assigned that task. Another lesson may 

be that the responsibility for post war planning should be shared 

at the earliest of stages with other government agencies such as 

the Department of State, to ensure that we are ready for the challenge. 

Concealing failure lessens our appreciation of our success. Operation Iraqi Freedom had many successes. It demonstrated the resolve of our nation to remove a tyrant who posed a threat security 

in the Middle East and the continued welfare of the Iraqi people. 

It demonstrated the best in our service men and women and now 

we must do our best in supporting them. 

Our review of this document will not lessen our support for the 

task of rebuilding Iraq, to which we have committed ourselves. 

Rather, it will deepen our appreciation of the difficulties presented 

by the task at hand. I therefore support the favorable reporting of 

the resolution and regret that we will not be able to have a broader 

discussion of its merits afforded to us by considering the resolution 

on the House floor. 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO.

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