Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1606-CR-1305 | April 12, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Evan K. Hammond

Grant County Public Defender

Marion, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Melanie Marie Thinnes,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 12, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

27A02-1606-CR-1305

Appeal from the Grant Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

27D01-1410-FB-48

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Melanie Thinnes (“Thinnes”) appeals her convictions by jury of Class B felony 

causing death when operating a motor vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled 

substance in the blood;1 Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious 

bodily injury;2 Class D felony causing bodily injury while operating a motor 

vehicle while intoxicated with a Schedule I or II controlled substance;3two 

counts of Class D felony possession of a controlled substance;4 and Class A 

misdemeanor possession of marijuana,

5 as well as the sentence imposed 

thereon. Thinnes specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying her motion for a mistrial and in sentencing her. Concluding that the 

witness’ testimony did not place Thinnes in a position of grave peril and that 

Thinnes’ sentence was not against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the trial court, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and 

sentence.

[2] We affirm.

 

1

IND. CODE § 9-30-5-5

2

IND. CODE § 35-42-2-2.

3

I.C. § 9-30-5-4.

4

I.C. § 35-48-4-7.

5

I.C. § 35-48-4-11.
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Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Thinnes’ motion for a mistrial.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her.

Facts

[3] At approximately 7:30 a.m. on June 27, 2014, Robert Sater (“Sater”) was 

driving northbound on 400 East near Gas City when he noticed that twentytwo-year-old Thinnes, who was approaching him in the southbound lane in a 

Jeep, appeared to be falling asleep. As Thinnes’ Jeep crossed the centerline into 

his lane, Sater swerved and drove off the road into the front yard of a nearby 

home. Chelsea Blackburn (“Blackburn”) and her boyfriend, Derek Comer 

(“Comer”), had been driving a short distance behind Sater. Blackburn was 

driving, and Comer was in the front passenger seat. After Sater swerved off the 

road, he looked up at his rearview mirror and saw Thinnes’ Jeep collide with 

Blackburn’s van. Comer, whose legs were crushed, was unable to get out of the 

van. Rescue workers were able to extricate him; however, he died at the scene. 

Blackburn was taken to the hospital with a broken ankle and dislocated wrist. 

[4] The impact of the collision sent Thinnes’ Jeep into a culvert at the side of the 

road. Sater, who smelled gasoline in the area of the Jeep, yelled at Thinnes to 

get out of the car. Thinnes crawled out of the Jeep’s window and pulled herself 

up to the roof of the car. She was crying and stated that this crash was just like 

a previous crash in which she had been involved.
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[5] Thinnes was taken to the hospital for a blood draw, and the police interviewed 

her later that day. During the interview, Thinnes mentioned the prior crash in 

which she had been involved. Someone had died in the crash, but no charges 

had ever been filed against Thinnes. Also during the interview, Thinnes 

explained that she had been up all night with a friend the previous night and 

had taken an Adderall at approximately 3:00 a.m. to help her stay awake. 

Thinnes did not have a prescription for Adderall. She also admitted that she 

had smoked marijuana at some point in the recent past. Thinnes’ blood tests 

were positive for THC and THC carboxy, the active ingredient in marijuana 

and its metabolite, and amphetamines. A search of her car revealed a partially 

burned marijuana cigarette as well as an amphetamine tablet and a Xanax

tablet together in a small plastic bag.

[6] Four months after the accident in October 2016, the State charged Thinnes 

with: (1) Class B felony causing death when operating a motor vehicle with a 

schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood for causing Comer’s death; (2) 

Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury for 

injuring Blackburn’s ankle and/or wrist; (3) Class D felony causing serious 

bodily injury when operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a schedule I or II 

controlled substance for injuring Blackburn’s ankle and/or wrist; (4-5) two 

counts of Class D felony possession of a controlled substance for possessing the

amphetamine and Xanax tablets; and (6) Class A misdemeanor possession of 

marijuana for possessing the partially burned marijuana cigarette.
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[7] Before trial, Thinnes filed a motion in limine wherein she asked the trial court 

to order counsel and all witnesses to refrain from mentioning her prior car 

accident. The trial court granted the motion. In order to comply with the trial 

court’s order, the State told its first witness, Sater, not to mention the prior 

accident. However, during direct examination, while Sater was describing 

Thinnes’ appearance and actions immediately after the accident, Sater 

mentioned that Thinnes said, “this is the same thing that happened . . . .” (Tr. 

60). The State promptly interrupted Sater and clarified that it only wanted to 

know about Thinnes’ appearance after the accident. Outside the presence of the 

jury, Thinnes moved for a mistrial based upon the violation of the motion in 

limine. Specifically, Thinnes argued that “the words ‘this same thing 

happened,’ . . . would suggest to the jury that . . . she had a significant collision 

before. . . .” (Tr. 63). The State responded that Sater never mentioned a crash, 

and even if the jury made an inference that there as a prior crash, Sater never 

mentioned that someone else had died. The trial court took the matter under 

advisement, and after a short recess, denied Thinnes’ motion. The trial court 

specifically explained that there “was no elaboration on ‘thing,’ or even if it 

[had] happened to . . . [Thinnes].” (Tr. 66). At Thinnes’ request, the trial court 

admonished the jury to disregard the last answer given by the witness. 

[8] The evidence presented at trial revealed that Blackburn, who was Thinnes’ 

cousin, had had plates and screws placed in her ankle and that her ankle was 

still swollen two years after the accident. In addition, medical testimony 

revealed that a compound fracture in Comer’s thigh bone tore the blood vessels 
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behind his knee and caused him to bleed to death. Specifically, the Grant 

County Coroner testified that Comer “bled out from injuries that he received 

during the collision.” (Tr. 121). The jury convicted Thinnes of all charges. 

[9] At the sentencing hearing, Thinnes testified that she had an almost one-year-old 

son and that she took care of her father for four to eight hours per day. Thinnes 

also testified that she had completed substance abuse treatment in Florida after 

the accident. According to Thinnes, the treatment program had changed her 

life. However, she had not followed the treatment program recommendations 

after she returned to Indiana. 

[10] At the end of the sentencing hearing, the trial court pointed out that in her 

police interview shortly after the accident, Thinnes was “haughty, disdainful, 

offhanded, and [had no concern for [anything that was] important or serious.” 

(Tr. 396). The trial court further doubted that Thinnes had changed because 

she had not followed through with recommendations after being discharged 

from the Florida treatment program. The trial court explained that if it could 

pick a sentence “based upon emotion only and not the law,” it would give 

Thinnes the maximum sentence because her actions resulted in the death of 

another human being. (Tr. 397). However, the trial court pointed out that it 

would not so sentence her because her actions were not the worst of the worst. 

Specifically, the trial court explained that it found the following mitigating 

circumstances: (1) Thinnes did not have a juvenile or criminal history; (2) a 

long period of imprisonment would be a significant hardship on her young child 

and father; and (3) Thinnes was young and more likely to learn from her bad 
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choices. The court further found as an aggravating circumstance that the 

imposition of a sentence less than the advisory sentence would depreciate the 

seriousness of the crimes. 

[11] The trial court also explained that because of the aggravating circumstance, and 

despite the mitigating circumstances, the court would sentence Thinnes to the 

advisory sentence on each count. The court therefore sentenced Thinnes as 

follows: (1) ten years with two years suspended for the Class B felony 

conviction; (2) four years for the Class C felony conviction; (3) one and one-half 

years for each of the three Class D felony convictions; and (4) one year for the 

Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court further ordered all of the 

sentences to run concurrently to each other for a total executed sentence of 

eight (8) years in the Department of Correction. In addition, the trial court 

noted that it would recommend that Thinnes be sentenced to a “purposeful 

incarceration.” (Tr. 399). The trial court explained that this was a program in

the Department of Correction that would provide her with addiction and 

mental health treatment. The trial court further explained that it would 

consider modifying her sentence once she had successfully completed the 

program and been incarcerated for six years. Thinnes now appeals her 

convictions and sentence.

Decision

[12] Thinnes argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion 

for a mistrial and in sentencing her. We address each of her contentions in 

turn.
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1. Denial of Mistrial

[13] Thinnes first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her 

motion for a mistrial. The grant or denial of a mistrial lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Brittain v. State, 68 N.E.3d 611, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2017). We reverse a trial court only when an abuse of discretion is clearly 

shown. Id. We afford the trial court such deference on appeal because the trial 

court is in the best position to evaluate the relevant circumstances of an event 

and its impact on the jury. Id. at 620. The declaration of a mistrial is an 

extreme action that is warranted only when no other action can be expected to 

remedy the situation. Kemper v. State, 35 N.E.3d 306, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), 

trans. denied. 

[14] To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for a mistrial, the appellant 

must demonstrate that the statement or conduct in question was so prejudicial 

and inflammatory that she was placed in a position of grave peril to which she 

should not have been subjected. Brittain, 68 N.E.3d at 620. We determine the 

gravity of the peril based upon the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct 

on the jury’s decision rather than upon the degree of impropriety of the 

conduct. Id. 

[15] Even if evidence of uncharged misconduct is heard by the jury, a prompt 

admonishment to the jury to disregard the improper testimony is usually 

enough to support the denial of a motion for mistrial. Greenlee v. State, 655 

N.E.2d 488, 490 (Ind. 1995). To determine if testimony of prior uncharged 
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misconduct should warrant a new trial, the circumstances must be analyzed as 

to whether the evidence was intentionally injected or came in inadvertently and 

as to what degree the defendant was subjected to improper speculation by the 

jury. Id. 

[16] At trial, Sater testified that after the accident, while Thinnes was sitting on the 

roof of her car in the gulley, she stated, “this is the same thing that happened . . 

. .” (Tr. 60). The trial court immediately admonished the jury to disregard the 

last answer given by Sater. This admonishment, together with the strong 

presumption that juries follow courts’ instructions and that an admonition cures 

any error, supports the trial court’s denial of Thinnes’ motion. See Lucio v. State, 

907 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. 2009).

[17] Further, the parties agree that this was inadvertent testimony by a civilian 

witness, that no other witness provided any evidence regarding Thinnes’ 

statement during the three-day trial, and that the State made absolutely no 

reference to this statement in its closing statement to the jury or at any other 

time during the trial. We agree with the State that the “statement was isolated, 

brief, and vague, and that the State did not emphasize or exploit it in any way.” 

(State’s Br. 10). Based on these facts and circumstances Thinnes was not placed 

in a position of grave peril, and the trial court did abuse its discretion in denying 

her motion for a mistrial. See Lucio, 907 N.E.2d at 1011.

2. Sentence
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[18] Thinnes also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her.6 

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is 

within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. 

Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, 

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 491. A trial 

court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to 

enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that 

includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; 

(3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported 

by the record, or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that 

are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. 

[19] Thinnes alleges none of the possible abuses of discretion that are set forth in 

Anglemyer. Instead she argues that she “should have been sentenced to the 

minimum sentence based on the court identified mitigating factors.” (Thinnes’ 

Br. 15). According to Thinnes, “[i]t is clear from the record that more 

mitigating factors were identified; however, Thinnes received a sentence above 

 

[1] 6 We note that despite stating the issue in her appellate brief as whether her sentence is inappropriate, 

Thinnes does not cite to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that this Court may revise a sentence

authorized by statute if we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender. In addition, Thinnes presents no argument whatsoever addressing either the nature 

of her offense or her character. Thinnes has, therefore, waived any argument that her sentence is 

inappropriate. See Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
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the minimum.” (Thinnes’ Br. 15). This is essentially an argument that the trial 

court improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. However, 

Anglemyer makes clear that, when imposing a sentence, a trial court “no longer 

has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each 

other” and thus “a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion 

in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Id. at 491. Thinnes’ argument 

therefore fails. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing her.

[20] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.