Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-121 | May 5, 2020 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

William D. Dillon

Dove & Dillon, P.C.

North Vernon, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Sierra A. Murray

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Yeager,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 5, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-121

Appeal from the

Jefferson Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Donald J. Mote, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

39C01-1911-F3-1322

Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] The State charged John Yeager with four Level 3 felony offenses, alleging that 

he battered the two-year-old son of his girlfriend. After the trial court set bail at

$250,000 cash only, Yeager filed a motion to reduce his bail. Although the 
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pretrial director recommended that Yeager be released to pretrial supervision 

with the added condition of electronic monitoring and Yeager presented 

evidence that he had no criminal history besides underage drinking, lived in the 

area his whole life, lived in the same house (which he was buying) for twelve 

years, had a job to which he could return, and had a good relationship with his 

family (who also lived in the area and was supportive of him), the court denied 

his motion. Yeager now appeals.

[2] Because Yeager presented evidence of substantial mitigating factors showing 

that he recognizes the court’s authority to bring him to trial and there is no

evidence that Yeager poses a risk to the physical safety of the victim or the 

community, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Yeager’s motion to reduce his $250,000 cash-only bail. We therefore reverse 

the trial court and remand with instructions that Yeager be released to pretrial 

supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 14, 2019, the State charged Yeager with Level 3 felony 

aggravated battery, Level 3 felony battery on a child less than fourteen years 

old, Level 3 felony domestic battery, and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent, 

accusing him of battering J.G., the two-year-old son of his girlfriend. The trial 

court issued a warrant for Yeager’s arrest and ordered that he be held without 

bail until his initial hearing. 
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[4] The initial hearing was held on November 18. According to the Jefferson 

County Pretrial Assessment Report filed that day, Yeager’s Indiana Risk 

Assessment Score (IRAS) was “0 (Low).” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 40. The

Jefferson County Pretrial Director recommended that Yeager “be released to 

pretrial supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring.” Id. 

The trial court, however, set Yeager’s bail at “$250,000 cash only.” Id. at 55. 

The court also issued a no-contact order for J.G. Id. at 48-49.

[5] The next day, Yeager filed a motion to reduce his bail. At the bail-reduction 

hearing held on December 30, Yeager, who was thirty-five years old, testified

that he had lived in Jefferson County and neighboring Jennings County his 

“entire life” and that he had lived in the same house in Madison (Jefferson 

County) for twelve or thirteen years. Tr. p. 10. Yeager said he was buying the

house. Yeager said he had a good relationship with his parents, who were 

married and lived in Jennings County, and his sister (his only sibling), who was 

living in his house while he was incarcerated. In addition, Yeager testified that 

he worked at McCubbin Motors in Madison before he was arrested and that his 

job was still available for him if he was released on bail. Yeager said the only 

other time he had been in trouble with the law was for underage drinking when 

he was twenty years old. According to Yeager, he never missed a court hearing

and paid a fine. Yeager agreed with the issuance of the no-contact order and 

said there was no reason for him to have contact with J.G. or his family. 

Yeager told the court that he would like to be released on bail so he could work 

to pay for his defense counsel and hire an expert. Yeager said if the court 
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ordered him to be on electronic monitoring, he could pay that cost. Finally, 

Yeager’s mother testified that she and her husband would make sure that 

Yeager attended his court hearings. The State did not dispute any of this 

evidence. Instead, the State presented photographs of the injuries to J.G., 

evidence that medical staff believed J.G.’s injuries were non-accidental, and 

evidence that J.G. was in Yeager’s care at the time of his injuries. 

[6] The trial court denied Yeager’s motion to reduce his bail because (1) the nature 

and gravity of the alleged offenses was “serious,” and Yeager faced a sentence 

up to thirty-two years1 and (2) it was not “confident public safety c[ould] be 

reasonably assured if [Yeager’s] bail were to be reduced.” Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II pp. 100-01. 

[7] Yeager now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[8] Yeager appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce bail. The amount 

and manner of executing bail is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and is reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Perry v. State, 541 

N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ind. 1989); Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. Ct. 

1 The trial court arrived at thirty-two years by running the sentences consecutively. In doing so, the court did 

not take into account “double jeopardy concerns under Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999).” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 100. We believe that there may be double-jeopardy considerations at play and 

therefore have doubts that Yeager’s maximum sentence is thirty-two years. 
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App. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. 

Sneed, 946 N.E.2d at 1257.

[9] Yeager argues that “the bail as set was excessive. The trial court’s decision 

refusing to lower it and fashion a reasonable method for posting was an abuse 

of discretion.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. The Indiana Constitution prohibits 

excessive bail. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 16. “A decision upon the question of 

excessiveness must be based upon two basic and related considerations: (1) The 

object of bail itself, and (2) the financial ability of the accused to provide the 

required amount of bail.” Samm v. State, 893 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008) (quotation omitted). “The object of bail is not to effect punishment in 

advance of conviction.” Id. “Rather, it is to ensure the presence of the accused 

when required without the hardship of incarceration before guilt has been 

proved and while the presumption of innocence is to be given effect.” Id.

[10] Indiana Code section 35-33-8-5 governs the modification of bail and provides in 

part:

(a) Upon a showing of good cause, the state or the defendant 

may be granted an alteration or revocation of bail by application 

to the court before which the proceeding is pending. . . .

* * * * *

(c) When the defendant presents additional evidence of 

substantial mitigating factors, based on the factors set forth in 

[Indiana Code section 35-33-8-4(b)], which reasonably suggests 
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that the defendant recognizes the court’s authority to bring the 

defendant to trial, the court may reduce bail. However, the court 

may not reduce bail if the court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that the factors described in IC 35-40-6-6(1)(A) and IC 

35-40-6-6(1)(B) exist or that the defendant otherwise poses a risk 

to the physical safety of another person or the community.

Section 35-33-8-4(b) sets forth these factors:

(1) the length and character of the defendant’s residence in the 

community;

(2) the defendant’s employment status and history and the 

defendant’s ability to give bail;

(3) the defendant’s family ties and relationships;

(4) the defendant’s character, reputation, habits, and mental 

condition;

(5) the defendant’s criminal or juvenile record, insofar as it 

demonstrates instability and a disdain for the court’s authority to 

bring the defendant to trial;

(6) the defendant’s previous record in not responding to court 

appearances when required or with respect to flight to avoid 

criminal prosecution;

(7) the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential penalty 

faced, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of 

nonappearance;
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(8) the source of funds or property to be used to post bail or to 

pay a premium, insofar as it affects the risk of nonappearance;

(9) that the defendant is a foreign national who is unlawfully 

present in the United States under federal immigration law; and

(10) any other factors, including any evidence of instability and a 

disdain for authority, which might indicate that the defendant 

might not recognize and adhere to the authority of the court to 

bring the defendant to trial.

[11] Here, Yeager presented evidence of substantial mitigating factors showing that

he “recognizes the court’s authority to bring [him] to trial,” as required by

Section 35-33-8-5(c). Yeager has no criminal history besides underage drinking

and has never failed to appear at a court proceeding. In addition, Yeager has 

lived in the Jefferson County/Jennings County area his entire life and in the 

same house for twelve years. Yeager had a steady job to which he could return 

and was paying for his house. Yeager’s family also lives in the same area and is 

supportive of him. Although Yeager faces four Level 3 felony charges for 

allegedly battering a two-year-old (and a potentially lengthy sentence if he is 

convicted), this does not mean that Yeager presents a risk of not appearing. 

Indeed, the Jefferson County Pretrial Director found no risk. 

[12] As for the trial court’s finding that Yeager poses a risk to the physical safety of 

J.G. and the community, Yeager claims that the fact that he “has merely been 

accused, cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to 

the alleged victim or the community.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 7. We agree. 
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As Yeager points out, besides the accusations themselves, no evidence was 

presented “as to how he could possibly constitute a threat to anyone.” Id. The 

only evidence the State cites in its brief to show that Yeager is a danger to J.G. 

and the community is J.G.’s injuries. See Appellee’s Br. p. 11. But this violates 

the presumption of innocence to which Yeager is entitled. See Samm, 893 

N.E.2d at 766. Again, the Jefferson County Pretrial Director recommended 

that Yeager be released to pretrial supervision with the added condition of 

electronic monitoring. Without any evidence to show that Yeager is a danger, 

we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Yeager’s 

motion to reduce his $250,000 cash-only bond. We therefore reverse the trial 

court and remand with instructions that Yeager be released to pretrial 

supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring. See Ind. Code §

35-33-8-11(a). The no-contact order shall remain in place. See Ind. Code § 35-

33-8.3.6. 

[13] We note this result is consistent with the new evidence-based risk-assessment

system that Indiana has adopted. Effective January 1, 2020, Indiana Criminal

Rule 26(A) and (B) provides:

(A) If an arrestee does not present a substantial risk of flight or 

danger to themselves or others, the court should release the 

arrestee without money bail or surety subject to such 

restrictions and conditions as determined by the court except 

when:

(1) The arrestee is charged with murder or treason.
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(2) The arrestee is on pre-trial release not related to the 

incident that is the basis for the present arrest.

(3) The arrestee is on probation, parole or other 

community supervision.

(B) In determining whether an arrestee presents a substantial risk 

of flight or danger to self or other persons or to the public, the 

court should utilize the results of an evidence-based risk 

assessment approved by the Indiana Office of Court Services, and 

such other information as the court finds relevant. The court is 

not required to administer an assessment prior to releasing an 

arrestee if administering the assessment will delay the arrestee’s 

release.[2]

(Emphasis added). See also Ind. Code §§ 35-33-8-3.8, 0.5. According to the 

executive director of the Indiana Office of Court Services, which oversaw the 

development of the new evidence-based risk-assessment system, “Under 

Criminal Rule 26, counties will use the IRAS Pretrial Assessment Tool to assess 

risk of failure during the pretrial period.” Mary Kay Hudson, Smart on Crime: 

Stakeholders Attend Pretrial Summit, Indiana Court Times, Dec. 20, 2019, 

http://indianacourts.us/times/2019/12/smart-on-crime-stakeholders-attendpretrial-summit/[https://perma.cc/36L8-24JC]. The purpose of this new 

system is “maximizing public safety, maximizing court appearance, and 

maximizing pretrial release.” Ind. Office of Court Servs., About,

2

Indiana Criminal Rule 26(A) and (B) went into effect in 2016 for eleven counties that were selected to pilot 

the pretrial services program. Jefferson County was one of these counties. 
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https://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/3900.htm [https://perma.cc/BP54-

DQRA]. 

[14] Notwithstanding Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), this opinion is effective 

immediately, and the trial court need not await a certification of this opinion by 

the Clerk of Courts before releasing Yeager to pretrial supervision with the 

added condition of electronic monitoring. See Ind. Appellate Rule 1 (“The 

Court may, upon the motion of a party or the Court’s own motion, permit 

deviation from these Rules.”); see also Town of Ellettsville v. Despirito, 87 N.E.3d 

9, 12 (Ind. 2017) (making opinion effective immediately notwithstanding 

Appellate Rule 65).

[15] Reversed and remanded.

May, J., and Robb, J., concur.