PERSONNEL SECURITY 

CLEARANCES

Actions Needed to Help 

Ensure Correct 

Designations of National 

Security Positions

Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management

Testimony before the Subcommittee on the 

Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal 

Programs and the Federal Workforce, 

Committee on Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

GAO-14-139T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-139T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on the Efficiency 

and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and 

the Federal Workforce, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

November 20, 2013

PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES

Actions Needed to Help Ensure Correct 

Designations of National Security Positions 

Why GAO Did This Study

Personnel security clearances allow 

individuals access to classified 

information that, through unauthorized 

disclosure, can in some cases cause 

exceptionally grave damage to U.S. 

national security. A sound 

requirements process to determine 

whether a national security position 

requires access to classified 

information is needed to safeguard 

classified data and manage costs. The 

DNI reported that more than 4.9 million 

federal government and contractor 

employees held or were eligible to hold 

a security clearance in 2012. GAO has 

reported that the federal government 

spent over $1 billion to conduct 

background investigations (in support 

of security clearances and suitability 

determinations—the consideration of 

character and conduct for federal 

employment) in fiscal year 2011. 

This testimony addresses policies and 

procedures executive branch agencies 

use when (1) first determining whether 

federal civilian positions require a 

security clearance and (2) periodically 

reviewing and revising or validating 

existing federal civilian position 

security clearance requirements. This 

testimony is based on a July 2012 

GAO report (GAO-12-800), in which 

GAO (1) reviewed relevant federal 

guidance and processes, (2) examined 

agency personnel security clearance 

policies, (3) obtained and analyzed an 

OPM tool used for position

designation, and (4) met with officials 

from ODNI and OPM because of their 

Directors’ assigned roles as Security 

and Suitability Executive Agents. 

Because DOD and DHS grant the most 

security clearances, that report 

focused on the security clearance 

requirements of federal civilian 

positions within those agencies.

What GAO Found

In July 2012, GAO reported that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), as 

Security Executive Agent, had not provided executive branch agencies clearly 

defined policy and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a 

personnel security clearance. Absent this guidance, agencies are using an Office 

of Personnel Management (OPM) position designation tool to determine the 

sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of 

investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency in these 

position designations, and some agencies described problems implementing 

OPM’s tool. For example, in an April 2012 audit OPM assessed the sensitivity 

levels of 39 positions, and its designations differed from the agency in 26 

positions. Problems exist, in part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI) did not collaborate on the development of this tool, 

and because their respective roles for suitability and security clearance reform 

are still evolving. As a result, to help determine the proper designation, GAO 

recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM, issue 

clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when 

determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. The DNI 

concurred with this recommendation. In May 2013, the DNI and OPM jointly 

drafted a proposed revision to the federal regulation on position designation

which, if finalized in its current form, would provide additional requirements and 

examples of position duties at each sensitivity level. GAO also recommended 

that once those policies and procedures are in place, the DNI and the Director of

OPM, in their roles as Executive Agents, collaborate to revise the position 

designation tool to reflect the new guidance. ODNI and OPM concurred with this 

recommendation and recently told GAO that they are revising the tool. 

GAO also reported in July 2012 that the DNI had not established guidance to 

require agencies to periodically review and revise or validate existing federal 

civilian position designations. GAO reported that Department of Defense (DOD) 

and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component officials were aware of 

the requirement to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum, but 

were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the 

security clearance needs of existing positions. GAO found that without such a 

requirement, executive branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial 

and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and 

security clearance requirements that do not reflect current national security 

needs. Further, since reviews are not done consistently, executive branch 

agencies cannot have assurances that they are keeping the number of positions 

that require security clearances to a minimum. Therefore, GAO recommended in 

July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM, issue guidance 

to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate 

the designation of all federal civilian positions. As of October 2013, ODNI and 

OPM are finalizing revisions to the federal regulation on position designation. 

While the proposed regulation requires agencies to conduct a one-time 

reassessment of position designation within 24 months of the final rule’s effective

date, it does not require a periodic reassessment of positions’ need for access to 

classified information. GAO continues to believe that periodic reassessment is 

important.

View GAO-14-139T. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 

farrellb@gao.gov.
 

Page 1 GAO-14-139T 

Chairman Tester, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss executive branch 

agencies’ requirements for personnel to have access to classified 

information. As you know, my recent testimony on the government-wide 

security clearance process before your Subcommittee on June 20, 2013 

included a discussion of our work on the steps that executive branch 

agencies use to first determine whether a federal civilian position requires 

access to classified information.1 Today, I am here to elaborate on that 

process and report on the extent of progress by executive branch 

agencies in implementing our recommendations.

Personnel security clearances allow federal government and industry 

personnel (contractors) to gain access to classified information that, 

through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally 

grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2008, I testified that 

developing a sound requirements process to determine whether a 

position requires a security clearance for access to classified information 

is important because unnecessary requests for clearances have the 

potential to increase investigative workload and related costs.2 As you 

know, a high volume of clearances continue to be processed and a sound 

requirements determination process is needed to effectively manage 

costs, since agencies spend significant amounts annually on national 

security and other background investigations.

In addition to cost implications, limiting the access to classified 

information and reducing the associated risks to national security 

underscore the need for executive branch agencies to have a sound 

process to determine which positions require a security clearance. In 

2012, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reported that more than 

4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were 

 

1

GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the Process 

and Realize Efficiencies, GAO-13-728T (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2013). 

2

GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security 

Clearance Processes, GAO-08-352T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008); GAO, Personnel 

Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process, GAO-08-776T

(Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008); and GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary 

Observations on Joint Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility 

Process, GAO-08-1050T (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-139T 

eligible to hold a security clearance.3 Furthermore, in fiscal year 2011, the 

federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million 

background investigations in support of both personnel security 

clearances and suitability determinations4 for government employment 

outside the intelligence community.

My statement today will primarily discuss our July 2012 report in which we 

evaluated federal government practices for identifying federal civilian 

positions that require personnel security clearances.5 Specifically, my 

statement will address policies and procedures that executive agencies 

use (1) when first determining whether federal civilian positions require a 

security clearance and (2) to periodically review and revise or validate 

existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements.

My statement is based primarily on our July 2012 report on defining policy 

for civilian position requirements.6 A list of products from our body of work 

focused on the personnel security clearance process appears at the end 

of my statement. As part of the work for our 2012 report, we reviewed 

relevant executive orders and federal guidance and processes, examined 

agency personnel security clearance policies, obtained and analyzed an 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) tool used for position 

designation, and interviewed executive branch agency officials. 

Specifically, the scope of our work focused on the security clearance 

requirements of federal civilian positions from selected components within 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), due to the volume of clearances that these two agencies process. 

Further, as part of our ongoing effort to determine the status of agency 

actions to address our prior recommendations, we reviewed the current 

proposal to revise a relevant federal regulation regarding position 

designation.

 

3

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012 Report on Security Clearance 

Determinations (January 2013).

4

Determinations of suitability for government employment in positions in the competitive 

service and for career appointment in the Senior Executive Service include consideration 

of aspects of an individual’s character or conduct that may have an effect on the integrity 

or efficiency of the service. 

5

GAO, Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining 

Civilian Position Requirements, GAO-12-800 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012). 

6

GAO-12-800. 
 

Page 3 GAO-14-139T 

The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details about the 

scope and methodology can be found in each of these related products. 

In light of delays in completing security clearance background 

investigations and adjudicative decisions, as well as a significant backlog 

of clearances to be processed, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),7 which set objectives and 

established requirements for improving the personnel security clearance 

process, including improving the timeliness of the clearance process, 

achieving interagency reciprocity, establishing an integrated database to 

track investigative and adjudicative information, and evaluating available 

technology for investigations and adjudications.

In July 2008, Executive Order 13467 designated the DNI as the Security 

Executive Agent, who is responsible for developing uniform and 

consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and 

timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating 

to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information and 

eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

8 Additionally, the order designated 

the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent. Determinations of 

suitability for government employment include consideration of aspects of 

an individual’s character or conduct. Accordingly, the Suitability Executive 

Agent is responsible for developing and implementing uniform and 

consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and 

timely completion of investigations and adjudications relating to 

determinations of suitability.

 

7

Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) (relevant sections codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3341). 

8

Positions designated as sensitive are any positions within a department or agency where 

the occupant could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse 

effect on national security. 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-14-139T 

The order also established a Suitability and Security Clearance 

Performance Accountability Council, commonly known as the

Performance Accountability Council,9 to be the government-wide 

governance structure responsible for driving implementation and 

overseeing security and suitability reform efforts. Further, the executive 

order designated the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) as the chair of the council and states 

that agency heads shall assist the Performance Accountability Council 

and Executive Agents in carrying out any function under the order, as well 

as implementing any policies or procedures developed pursuant to the 

order.

The relevant orders and regulations that guide the process for 

designating national security positions include executive orders and 

federal regulations. For example, Executive Order 10450, which was 

originally issued in 1953, makes the heads of departments or agencies 

responsible for establishing and maintaining effective programs for 

ensuring that civilian employment and retention is clearly consistent with 

the interests of national security. Agency heads are also responsible for 

designating positions within their respective agencies as sensitive if the 

occupant of that position could, by virtue of the nature of the position, 

bring about a material adverse effect on national security.10

In addition, Executive Order 12968, issued in 1995, makes the heads of 

agencies—including executive branch agencies and the military 

departments—responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective 

program to ensure that access to classified information by each employee 

is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. This order also 

 

9

The Performance Accountability Council is comprised of the Director of National 

Intelligence as the Security Executive Agent, the Director of OPM as the Suitability 

Executive Agent, and the Deputy Director for Management, OMB, as the chair with the 

authority to designate officials from additional agencies to serve as members. As of June 

2012, the council included representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, 

Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs, 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

10Sensitivity level is based on the potential of the occupant of a position to bring about a 

material adverse effect on national security. Some factors include whether the position 

requires access to classified information or involves the formulation of security-related 

policy. The sensitivity level of a position then informs the type of background investigation 

required of the individual in that position. The relationship between sensitivity and resulting 

clearances is detailed in Figure 1. 
 

Page 5 GAO-14-139T 

states that, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility for access to classified 

information shall only be requested and granted on the basis of a 

demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. Further, part 732 of Title 5 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations provides requirements and procedures 

for the designation of national security positions, which include positions 

that (1) involve activities of the government that are concerned with the 

protection of the nation from foreign aggression or espionage, and (2) 

require regular use of or access to classified national security 

information.11

Part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations also states that 

most federal government positions that could bring about, by virtue of the 

nature of the position, a material adverse effect on national security must 

be designated as a sensitive position and require a sensitivity level 

designation. The sensitivity level designation determines the type of 

background investigation required, with positions designated at a greater 

sensitivity level requiring a more extensive background investigation. Part 

732 establishes three sensitivity levels—special-sensitive, criticalsensitive, and noncritical-sensitive—which are described in figure 1. 

According to OPM, positions that an agency designates as specialsensitive and critical-sensitive require a background investigation that 

typically results in a top secret clearance. Noncritical-sensitive positions 

typically require an investigation that supports a secret or confidential 

clearance. OPM also defines non-sensitive positions that do not have a 

national security element, but still require a designation of risk for 

suitability purposes. That risk level informs the type of investigation 

required for those positions. Those investigations include aspects of an 

individual’s character or conduct that may have an effect on the integrity 

or efficiency of the service.

As previously mentioned, DOD and DHS grant the most security 

clearances. Figure 1 illustrates the process used by both DOD and DHS 

to determine the need for a personnel security clearance for a federal 

civilian position generally used government-wide.

 

11Those requirements in Part 732 apply to national security positions in the competitive 

service, Senior Executive Service positions filled by career appointment within the 

executive branch, and certain excepted service positions. 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-139T 

Figure 1: Departments of Homeland Security and Defense Security Clearance Determination Process for Federal Civilian 

Positions

a

A Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) is conducted so that an individual can obtain a top 

secret clearance (including Sensitive Compartmented Information) and includes a review of the 

locations where an individual has lived, attended school, and worked. In addition, an SSBI includes 

interviews with four references who have social knowledge of the subject, interviews with former 

spouses, and a financial record check.

b

An Access National Agency Check and Inquiries (ANACI) is used for the initial investigation for 

federal employees at the confidential and secret access levels. It consists of employment checks, 
 

Page 7 GAO-14-139T 

education checks, residence checks, reference checks, and law enforcement agency checks, as well 

as a National Agency Check, which includes data from military records and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s investigative index.

c

A Moderate Risk Background Investigation (MBI) includes an ANACI and provides issue-triggered 

enhanced subject interviews with issue resolution. DHS uses the MBI for non-critical sensitive 

positions when a position is first designated as high, moderate, or low risk.

During the course of our 2012 review, we found that the executive branch 

had not issued clearly defined policy guidance for determining when a 

federal civilian position needs a security clearance.12 In the absence of 

such guidance, agencies are using a position designation tool that OPM 

designed to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions 

that, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. Further, we found 

that OPM’s position designation tool lacked input from the DNI and that 

audits had revealed problems with the use of OPM’s tool, leading to some 

incorrect position designations.

The first step in the personnel security clearance process is to determine 

if the occupant of a federal position needs a security clearance to 

effectively and efficiently conduct work. However, we found in July 2012 

that the DNI had not provided agencies with clearly defined policy through 

regulation or other guidance to help ensure that executive branch 

agencies use appropriate and consistent criteria when determining if 

positions require a security clearance. According to Executive Order 

13467, issued in June 2008, the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, is 

responsible for developing uniform policies and procedures to ensure the 

effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and 

adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to 

classified information or to hold a sensitive position. Further, the order 

states that agency heads shall assist the Performance Accountability 

Council and Executive Agents in carrying out any function under the 

order, as well as implementing any policies or procedures developed 

pursuant to the order. Although agency heads retain the flexibility to make 

determinations regarding which positions in their agency require a 

 

12GAO-12-800. 

DNI and OPM are 

Collaborating to 

Finalize Clearly 

Defined Policy 

Guidance for 

Determining When a 

Federal Civilian 

Position Needs a 

Security Clearance

The DNI Has a Role to 

Guide Agencies in 

Designating Positions for 

Security Clearances, But 

Has Not Yet Provided 

Agencies with Clearly 

Defined Policy Guidance
 

Page 8 GAO-14-139T 

security clearance, the DNI, in its capacity as Security Executive Agent, is 

well positioned to provide guidance to help align the personnel security 

clearance process.

Determining the requirements of a federal position includes assessing 

both the risk and sensitivity level associated with a position, which 

includes consideration of whether that position requires access to 

classified information and, if required, the level of access. Security 

clearances are generally categorized into three levels of access: top 

secret, secret, and confidential.13 The level of classification denotes the 

degree of protection required for information and the amount of damage 

that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to 

national defense or foreign relations.

In the absence of clearly defined guidance to help ensure that executive 

branch agencies use appropriate and consistent criteria when 

determining if positions require a personnel security clearance, agencies 

are using an OPM-designed tool to determine the sensitivity and risk 

levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation 

needed. We reported in July 2012 that in order to assist with position 

designation, the Director of OPM—the Executive Agent for Suitability—

has developed a process that includes a position designation system and 

corresponding automated tool to guide agencies in determining the 

proper sensitivity level for the majority of federal positions.14 This tool—

namely, the Position Designation of National Security and Public Trust 

Positions—enables a user to evaluate a position’s national security and 

suitability requirements so as to determine a position’s sensitivity and risk 

levels, which in turn dictate the type of background investigation that will 

be required for the individual who will occupy that position.

 

13A top secret clearance is generally also required for access to Sensitive Compartmented 

Information—classified intelligence information concerning or derived from intelligence 

sources, methods, or analytical processes that is required to be protected within formal 

access control systems established and overseen by the Director of National Intelligence. 

14According to OPM’s Federal Investigations Notice No. 10-06, Position Designation 

Requirements (Aug. 11, 2010), the tool is recommended for all agencies requesting OPM 

investigations and required for all positions in the competitive service, positions in the 

excepted service where the incumbent can be noncompetitively converted to the 

competitive service, and career appointments in the Senior Executive Service. 

OPM Has Developed a Tool 

to Help Agencies 

Determine the Proper 

Sensitivity Level for Most 

Federal Positions; 

However the Tool Was Not 

Developed with Input from 

the DNI
 

Page 9 GAO-14-139T 

In most agencies outside the Intelligence Community, OPM conducts the 

background investigations for both suitability and security clearance 

purposes. The tool does not directly determine whether a position 

requires a clearance, but rather helps determine the sensitivity level of the 

position. The determination to grant a clearance is based on whether a 

position requires access to classified information and, if access is 

required, the responsible official will designate the position to require a 

clearance.

OPM developed the position designation system and automated tool for 

multiple reasons. First, OPM determined through a 2007 initiative15 that its 

existing regulations and guidance for position designation were complex 

and difficult to apply, resulting in inconsistent designations. As a result of 

a recommendation from the initiative, OPM created a simplified position 

designation process in 2008. Additionally, OPM officials noted that the 

tool is to support the goals of the security and suitability reform efforts, 

which require proper designation of national security and suitability 

positions.

OPM first introduced the automated tool in November 2008, and issued 

an update of the tool in 2010. In August 2010, OPM issued guidance 

(1) recommending all agencies that request OPM background 

investigations use the tool, and (2) requiring agencies to use the tool for 

all positions in the competitive service, positions in the excepted service 

where the incumbent can be noncompetitively converted to the 

competitive service, and career appointments in the Senior Executive 

Service.16 Both DOD and DHS components use the tool. In addition, DOD 

issued guidance in September 201117 and August 201218 requiring its 

personnel to use OPM’s tool to determine the proper position sensitivity 

 

15The Hadley-Springer commission was an initiative between OPM and the Assistant to 

the President for National Security Affairs that focused on simplifying the federal 

government investigative and adjudicative procedures to improve security requirements to 

determine eligibility for access to classified information, among other things. 

16OPM’s Federal Investigations Notice No. 10-06, Position Designation Requirements 

(Aug. 11, 2010). 

17DOD, Washington Headquarters Services, Implementation of the Position Designation 

Automated Tool (Sept. 27, 2011).

18DOD Instruction 1400.25, Volume 731, DoD Civilian Personnel Management System: 

Suitability and Fitness Adjudication For Civilian Employees (Aug. 24, 2012).
 

Page 10 GAO-14-139T 

designation. A DHS instruction requires personnel to designate all DHS 

positions—including positions in the DHS components—by using OPM’s 

position sensitivity designation guidance, which is the basis of the tool.19

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) officials told us that 

they believe OPM’s tool is useful for determining a position’s sensitivity 

level. However, although the DNI was designated as the Security 

Executive Agent in 2008, ODNI officials noted that the DNI did not have 

input into recent revisions of OPM’s position designation tool.

This lack of coordination for revising the tool exists, in part, because the 

execution of the roles and relationships between the Director of OPM and 

the DNI as Executive Agents are still evolving, although Executive Order 

13467 defines responsibilities for each Executive Agent. Accordingly, we 

found in July 2012 that the Director of OPM and the DNI had not fully 

collaborated in executing their respective roles in the process for 

determining position designations. For example, OPM has had longstanding responsibility for establishing standards with respect to suitability 

for most federal government positions. Accordingly, the sections of the 

tool to be used for evaluating a position’s suitability risk level are 

significantly more detailed than the sections designed to aid in 

designating the national security sensitivity level of the position. While 

most of OPM’s position designation system, which is the basis of the tool, 

is devoted to suitability issues, only two pages are devoted to national 

security issues. Moreover, OPM did not seek to collaborate with the DNI 

when updating the tool in 2010.

During our review completed in 2012, human capital and security officials 

from DOD and DHS and the selected components we examined affirmed 

that they were using the existing tool to determine the sensitivity level 

required by a position. However, in the absence of clearly defined policy 

from the DNI and the lack of collaborative input into the tool’s design, 

officials explained that they sometimes had difficulty in using the tool to 

designate the sensitivity level of national security positions.

OPM regularly conducts audits of its executive branch customer agency 

personnel security and suitability programs, which include a review of 

position designation to assess the agencies’ alignment with OPM’s 

 

19DHS Management Instruction 121-01-007, Department of Homeland Security Personnel 

Suitability and Security Program (June 2009). 

Audits Show Problems with 

Position Designation
 

Page 11 GAO-14-139T 

position designation guidance. In the audit reports we obtained as part of 

our 2012 review, OPM found examples of inconsistency between agency 

position designation and OPM guidance, both before and after the 

implementation of OPM’s tool. For instance, prior to the implementation of 

the tool, in a 2006 audit of an executive branch agency, OPM found that 

its sensitivity designations differed from the agency’s designation in 13 of 

23 positions.

More recently, after the implementation of the tool, in an April 2012 audit 

of a DOD agency, OPM assessed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions, 

and OPM’s designations differed from the agency’s designations in 26 of 

those positions. In the April 2012 report, the DOD agency agreed with 

OPM’s recommendations related to position designation, and the audit 

report confirmed that the agency had submitted evidence of corrective 

action in response to the position designation recommendations. OPM 

provided us with the results of 10 audits that it had conducted between 

2005 and 2012, and 9 of those audit reports reflected inconsistencies 

between OPM position designation guidance and determinations of 

position sensitivity conducted by the agency. OPM officials noted, 

however, that they do not have the authority to direct agencies to make 

different designations because Executive Order 10450 provides agency 

heads with the ultimate responsibility for designating which positions are 

sensitive positions. ODNI conducted a separate position designation audit 

in response to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.20 In 

that 2011 report, ODNI found that the processes the executive branch 

agencies followed differed somewhat depending whether the position was 

civilian, military, or contractor.21

During the course of our 2012 review, DOD and DHS officials raised 

concerns regarding the guidance provided through the tool and 

expressed that they had difficulty implementing it. Specifically, officials 

from DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement stated that the 

use of the tool occasionally resulted in inconsistency, such as over- or 

underdesignating a position, and expressed a need for additional clear, 

easily interpreted guidance on designating national security positions. 

DOD officials stated that they have had difficulty implementing the tool 

 

20Pub. L. No. 111-259 (2010).

21Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2011 Report on Position Requirements for 

Security Clearances, n.d. 

Agency Officials Raised 

Concerns with Designation 

Tool
 

Page 12 GAO-14-139T 

because it focuses more on suitability than security, and the national 

security aspects of DOD’s positions are of more concern to them than the 

suitability aspects.

Further, an official from DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness stated that the tool and DOD policy do not 

always align and that the tool does not cover the requirements for some 

DOD positions. For example, DOD’s initial implementing guidance on 

using the tool stated that terms differ between DOD’s personnel security 

policy and the tool, and the tool might suggest different position sensitivity 

levels than DOD policy required. Also, officials from the Air Force 

Personnel Security Office told us that they had challenges using the tool 

to classify civilian positions, including difficulty in linking the tool with Air 

Force practices for position designation. Moreover, an Air Force official 

stated a concern that the definition for national security positions is 

broadly written and could be considered to include all federal positions.

Because we found that the executive branch had not provided clear 

guidance for the designation of national security positions, we 

recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and 

other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined 

policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if 

federal civilian positions require a security clearance. In written comments 

on our July 2012 report, the ODNI concurred with this recommendation 

and agreed that executive branch agencies require simplified and uniform 

policy guidance to assist in determining appropriate sensitivity 

designations.

We routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior 

report recommendations. As part of that process, we found that a January 

25, 2013 presidential memo authorized the DNI and OPM to jointly issue 

revisions to part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which 

is intended to provide requirements and procedures for the designation of 

national security positions. Subsequently, ODNI and OPM drafted the 

proposed regulation, published it in the Federal Register on May 28, 

2013, and obtained public comment on the regulation through June 27, 

2013. ODNI and OPM officials told us they plan to jointly adjudicate public 
 

Page 13 GAO-14-139T 

comments and prepare the final regulation for approval from OMB during 

October 2013.22

In reviewing the proposed regulation, we found that it would, if finalized in 

its current form, meet the intent of our recommendation to issue clearly 

defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when 

determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. 

Specifically, the proposed regulation appears to add significant detail 

regarding the types of duties that would lead to a critical-sensitive 

designation, or those national security positions which have the potential 

to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Criticalsensitive positions detailed in the proposed regulation include positions

• that develop or approve war plans, major or special military 

operations, or critical and extremely important items of war,

• involve national security policy-making or policy-determining positions,

• with investigative duties, including handling of completed counterintelligence or background investigations,

• having direct involvement with diplomatic relations and negotiations,

• in which the occupants have the ability to independently damage 

public health and safety with devastating results, and

• in which the occupants have the ability to independently compromise 

or exploit biological select agents or toxins, chemical agents, nuclear 

materials, or other hazardous materials, among several others.

Further, we also recommended in 2012 that once clear policy and 

procedures for position designation are issued, the DNI and the Director 

of OPM should collaborate in their respective roles as Executive Agents 

to revise the position designation tool to reflect that guidance. ODNI 

concurred with this recommendation in its written comments on our report 

and stated that it planned to work with OPM and other executive branch 

 

22Part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations currently provides requirements 

and procedures for the designation of national security positions. OPM and ODNI are 

jointly reissuing and renumbering the proposed regulation in a new chapter IV, part 1400 

of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations.
 

Page 14 GAO-14-139T 

agencies to develop a position designation tool that provides detailed 

descriptions of the types of positions where the occupant could bring 

about a material adverse impact to national security due to the duties and 

responsibilities of that position. OPM also concurred with this 

recommendation, stating that it was committed to revising the tool after 

revisions to position designation regulations are complete.

The proposed revisions to part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations appeared in the Federal Register, but have not yet been 

issued, and we recommended that the position designation tool be 

revised once policies and procedures for position designation are issued. 

We note that the proposed regulation states that OPM issues, and 

periodically revises, a Position Designation System,23 which describes in 

greater detail agency requirements for designating positions that could 

bring about a material adverse effect on the national security. Further, the 

proposed regulation would require that agencies use OPM’s Position 

Designation System to designate the sensitivity level of each position 

covered by the regulation.

As part of our ongoing processes to monitor agency actions in response 

to our recommendations, ODNI and OPM officials told us that actions 

were underway to revise the tool. For example, officials stated that an 

interagency working group had been established to oversee the updates 

to the current tool, while also determining the way forward to creating a 

new tool, and that officials were developing a project plan to guide the 

revision process. We plan to continue to review OPM guidance on the 

Position Designation System and to review steps taken by OPM and the 

DNI to revise the associated position designation tool to determine if the 

revised regulation and actions taken to revise the tool meet the intent of 

our recommendation.

 

23OPM developed a process that includes a position designation system and 

corresponding automated tool to guide agencies in determining the proper sensitivity level 

for the majority of federal positions. OPM’s Federal Investigations Notice No. 10-06, 

Position Designation Requirements (Aug. 11, 2010), states that the tool is recommended 

for all agencies requesting OPM investigations and required for all positions in the 

competitive service, positions in the excepted service where the incumbent can be 

noncompetitively converted to the competitive service, and career appointments in the 

Senior Executive Service.
 

Page 15 GAO-14-139T 

In July 2012, we reported that the executive branch did not have a 

consistent process for reviewing and validating existing security clearance 

requirements for federal civilian positions.24 According to Executive Order 

12968, the number of employees that each agency determines is eligible 

for access to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required, 

and, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility shall be requested or granted 

only on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. 

Additionally, Executive Order 12968 states that access to classified 

information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need 

for access, and that requesting or approving eligibility for access in 

excess of the actual requirements is prohibited.

Also, Executive Order 13467 authorizes the DNI to issue guidelines or 

instructions to the heads of agencies regarding, among other things, 

uniformity in determining eligibility for access to classified information. 

However, we reported in 2012 that the DNI had not issued policies and 

procedures for agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the 

existing clearance requirements for their federal civilian positions to 

ensure that clearances are 1) kept to a minimum and 2) reserved only for 

those positions with security clearance requirements that are in 

accordance with the national security needs of the time. Position 

descriptions not only identify the major duties and responsibilities of the 

position, but they also play a critical role in an agency’s ability to recruit, 

develop, and retain the right number of individuals with the necessary 

skills and competencies to meet its mission. Position descriptions may 

change, as well as the national security environment as observed after 

September 11, 2001.

During our 2012 review of several DOD and DHS components, we found 

that officials were aware of the requirement to keep the number of 

security clearances to a minimum but were not always subject to a 

standard requirement to review and validate the security clearance needs 

of existing positions on a periodic basis. We found, instead, that agencies’ 

policies provide for a variety of practices for reviewing the clearance 

needs of federal civilian positions. In addition, agency officials told us that 

their policies are implemented inconsistently. DOD’s personnel security 

 

24GAO-12-800. 

The Executive Branch 

Does Not Have a 

Process for 

Periodically 

Reviewing and 

Validating Existing 

Security Clearance 

Designations for 

Civilian Positions
 

Page 16 GAO-14-139T 

regulation and other guidance25 provides DOD components with criteria to 

consider when determining whether a position is sensitive or requires 

access to classified information, and some DOD components also have 

developed their own guidance. For example, we found that:

• An Air Force Instruction requires commanders to review all military 

and civilian position designations annually to ensure proper level of 

access to classified information.26

• The Army issued a memorandum in 2006 that required an immediate 

review of position sensitivity designations for all Army civilian positions 

by the end of the calendar year and requires subsequent reviews 

biennially.27 That memorandum further states that if a review warrants 

a change in position sensitivity affecting an individual’s access to 

classified information, then access should be administratively adjusted 

and the periodic reinvestigation submitted accordingly. However, 

officials explained that improper position sensitivity designations 

continue to occur in the Army because they have a limited number of 

personnel in the security office relative to workload, and they only spot 

check clearance requests to ensure that they match the level of 

clearance required.

• Officials from DOD’s Washington Headquarters Services told us that 

they have an informal practice of reviewing position descriptions and 

security designations for vacant or new positions, but they do not 

have a schedule for conducting periodic reviews of personnel security 

designations for already-filled positions.

According to DHS guidance, supervisors are responsible for ensuring that 

(1) position designations are updated when a position undergoes major 

changes (e.g., changes in missions and functions, job responsibilities, 

work assignments, legislation, or classification standards), and 

(2) position security designations are assigned as new positions are 

 

25DOD 5200.2-R, Department of Defense Personnel Security Program (January 1987, 

reissued incorporating changes Feb. 23, 1996), as modified by Under Secretary of 

Defense Memorandum, Implementation of the Position Designation Automated Tool (May 

10, 2011). 

26Air Force Instruction 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management (Jan. 27, 2005). 

27Army Director of Counterintelligence, Human Intelligence, Disclosure and Security 

Memorandum, Civilian Position Sensitivity Review (Dec. 31, 2006). 
 

Page 17 GAO-14-139T 

created. Some components have additional requirements to review 

position designation more regularly to cover positions other than those 

newly created or vacant. For example,

• U.S. Coast Guard guidance28 states that hiring officials and 

supervisors should review position descriptions even when there is no 

vacancy and, as appropriate, either revise or review them.

• According to officials in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

supervisors are supposed to review position descriptions annually 

during the performance review process to ensure that the duties and 

responsibilities on the position description are up-to-date and 

accurate. However, officials stated that U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement does not have policies or requirements in place to 

ensure any particular level of detail in that review.

Some of the components we met with as part of our 2012 review were, at 

that time, in the process of conducting a onetime review of position 

designations. In 2012, Transportation Security Administration officials 

stated that they reevaluated all of their position descriptions during the 

last 2 years because the agency determined that the re-evaluation of its 

position designations would improve operational efficiency by ensuring 

that positions were appropriately designated by using OPM’s updated 

position designation tool. Further, those officials told us that they review 

position descriptions as positions become vacant or are created. Between 

fiscal years 2010 and 2011, while the Transportation Security 

Administration’s overall workforce increased from 61,586 to 66,023, the 

number of investigations for top secret clearances decreased from 1,483 

to 1,127.

Conducting background investigations is costly. The federal government 

spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations in fiscal year 

2011. Furthermore, this does not include the costs for the adjudication or 

other phases of the personnel security clearances process. DOD and 

DHS officials acknowledged that overdesignating a position can result in 

expenses for unnecessary investigations. When a position is 

overdesignated, additional resources are unnecessarily spent conducting 

 

28U.S. Coast Guard, CG-121, Civilian Hiring Guide for Supervisors and Managers, ver. 2 

(June 11, 2010). 
 

Page 18 GAO-14-139T 

the investigation and adjudication of a background investigation that 

exceeds agency requirements.

Specifically, the investigative workload for a top secret clearance is about 

20 times greater than that of a secret clearance because it must be 

periodically reinvestigated twice as often as secret clearance 

investigations (every 5 years versus every 10 years) and requires 10 

times as many investigative staff hours. The fiscal year 2014 base price 

for an initial top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM is 

$3,959 and the cost of a periodic reinvestigation is $2,768. The base 

price of an investigation for a secret clearance is $272. If issues are 

identified during the course of an investigation for a secret clearance, 

additional costs may be incurred.

Agencies employ varying practices because the DNI has not established 

a requirement that executive branch agencies consistently review and 

revise or validate existing position designations on a recurring basis. 

Such a recurring basis could include reviewing position designations 

during the periodic reinvestigation process. Without a requirement to 

consistently review, revise, or validate existing security clearance position 

designations, executive branch agencies—such as DOD and DHS—may 

be hiring and budgeting for both initial and periodic security clearance 

investigations using position descriptions and security clearance 

requirements that do not reflect national security needs. Finally, since 

reviews are not being done consistently, DOD, DHS, and other executive 

branch agencies cannot have reasonable assurance that they are 

keeping to a minimum the number of positions that require security 

clearances on the basis of a demonstrated and foreseeable need for 

access. 

Therefore, we recommended in July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination 

with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as 

appropriate, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to 

periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal 

civilian positions. In written comments on that report, the ODNI concurred 

with this recommendation and stated that as duties and responsibilities of 

federal positions may be subject to change, it planned to work with OPM 

and other executive branch agencies to ensure that position designation 

policies and procedures include a provision for periodic reviews. OPM 

stated in its written comments to our report that it would work with the DNI 

on guidance concerning periodic reviews of existing designations, once 

pending proposed regulations are finalized.
 

Page 19 GAO-14-139T 

ODNI and OPM are currently in the process of finalizing revisions to the 

position designation federal regulation. As part of our ongoing processes 

to routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior 

recommendations, we note that the proposed regulation would newly 

require agencies to conduct a one-time reassessment of position 

designations within 24 months of the final regulation’s effective date, 

which is an important step towards ensuring that the current designations 

of national security positions are accurate. However, the national security 

environment and the duties and descriptions of positions may change 

over time, thus the importance of periodic review or validation. The 

proposed regulation does not appear to require a periodic reassessment 

of positions’ need for access to classified information as we 

recommended. We believe this needs to be done and, as part of 

monitoring the status of our recommendation, we will continue to review 

the finalized federal regulation and any related guidance that directs 

position designation to determine whether periodic review or validation is 

required.

In conclusion, the correct designation of national security positions is a 

critical first step for safeguarding national security and preventing 

unnecessary and costly background investigations. We are encouraged 

that in response to our recommendations, ODNI and OPM have drafted a 

revised federal regulation and plan to jointly address comments and 

finalize these regulations. We will continue to monitor the outcome of the 

final federal regulation as well as other agency actions to address our 

remaining recommendations. 

Chairman Tester, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions that you or the other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have at this time.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S. 

Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be 

reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this testimony include Lori A. Atkinson (Assistant Director), Renee Brown, 

Sara Cradic, Jeffrey Heit, Erik Wilkins-McKee, Suzanne M. Perkins, and 

Michael Willems.

GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgement 
Related GAO Products

Page 20 GAO-14-139T 

Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality 

Throughout the Process. GAO-14-186T. Washington, D.C.: November 

13, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of 

Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. GAO-14-157T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the 

Process and Realize Efficiencies. GAO-13-728T. Washington, D.C.: June 

20, 2013.

Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals 

under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.: 

April 19, 2013.

Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for 

Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington, 

D.C.: July 12, 2012.

Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can 

Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. GAO-12-815T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2012.

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. 

GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to 

Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings. 

GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 

16, 2011.

Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to 

Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 21 GAO-14-139T 

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve 

Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. 

GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s

Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T. 

Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and 

Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide 

Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce 

Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain 

Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is 

Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. 

GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, 

Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed 

to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, 

D.C.: May 19, 2009.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 

2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint 

Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility 

Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance 

Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s 

Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. 

GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform 

Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 2008.
Related GAO Products

Page 22 GAO-14-139T 

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts 

to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T. 

Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable 

More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: 

February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation 

Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 

2007.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 

2007.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to 

Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, 

D.C.: September 28, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of 

Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments 

Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. 

GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles 

Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk 

Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 

2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to 

Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for 

Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.

(351874)
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