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BENGHAZI: WHERE IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT

ACCOUNTABILITY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013

Serial No. 113–93

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. 

Department of State ............................................................................................ 4

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy: Prepared statement .................................... 6

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 80

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 81

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 83

The Honorable Steve Stockman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 84

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 85

Written responses from the Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy to questions submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .............. 89

The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona .......................................................................................................... 98

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina .............................................................................................. 99

The Honorable Steve Stockman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas ................................................................................................... 102

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida ........................................................................................................... 106

(1)

BENGHAZI: WHERE IS THE STATE 

DEPARTMENT ACCOUNTABILITY? 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. The hearing of the committee will come to 

order at this time. 

Since September 11th of 2012, the committee has been focused 

on the tragedy in Benghazi, Libya, where terrorists killed four 

Americans that day, including our Ambassador, the first U.S. Ambassador killed in the line of duty since 1979. The focus of today’s 

hearing, which is our fourth, is the troubling lack of accountability 

we have seen within the State Department since that time. The 

bottom line is that over 1 year later no State Department personnel have been held accountable for the Department’s failure to 

protect the Benghazi consulate and the U.S. personnel there, not 

one. 

As we know, there were so many things with the State Department’s decision-making before the fatal attack. In the face of a 

glaring need, with violence in Benghazi mounting, critical security 

requests from the field were denied at State. The Department was 

asleep on 9/11, and this led to the Accountability Review Board to 

find, in their words, systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two State Department bureaus. But no State Department personnel have been fired or even 

disciplined. No one has missed a paycheck. 

Accountability can be painful. Those making bad decisions may 

have long and otherwise good records. But the Department cannot 

have a culture of accountability, which is what any well-functioning 

organization needs, and which is essential to protecting its personnel, if no one, literally no one, is held accountable for the mismanagement and poor leadership the ARB itself identified. 

Now, let’s look at how the Department’s review process has 

played out. The ARB failed to interview the Secretary of State and, 

improbably, kept responsibility at the Assistant Secretary level. 

Four officials have been placed on administrative leave in a process 

that appears to have violated State Department personnel policies. 

The former Secretary ceded her authority to take action against the 

four individuals, or others, to a new Secretary for his review. And 

2

finally, four officials on paid leave were reinstated and reassigned 

into unspecified positions at this review’s conclusion, while at least 

one individual connected with failed management policies has received a promotion. 

I wish I did, but I just don’t see the level of accountability that 

Benghazi warrants, indeed that Benghazi demands. And meanwhile not one terrorist perpetrator has been captured, not one terrorist perpetrator has been killed despite the President saying that 

that was a highest priority. 

The terrorist threat in much of the world, unfortunately, is only 

increasing. U.S. facilities, obviously, are tempting targets. The 

State Department, with this committee’s encouragement, has undertaken some important Embassy security reforms. We have put 

many of those reforms into legislation passed out of the committee, 

which also authorized the administration’s full funding request for 

Embassy security. 

But no amount of money will ever overcome poor management 

and poor management is a given without accountability. I would 

ask all committee members, are you comfortable with this process 

that has no State Department official being held accountable in 

any meaningful way? 

Other committees have been working on other aspects of 

Benghazi. Many questions have been answered. This committee 

will continue to focus on accountability, including legislation to reform the Accountability Review Board process so that it is truly 

independent and future Secretaries of State, of either party, cannot 

stack the deck. I would hope to have bipartisan support for that. 

As we hold this hearing we should focus on the facts, we should 

ask the difficult questions, but work in a way that is going to lead 

to the most productive outcome, and that is learning from mistakes 

and improving the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel serving 

overseas—many, by the way, in increasingly threatening surroundings. That is a committee goal I know we can all agree upon. 

And I will now turn to Ranking Member Engel for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And as 

I have said many times before, I would like to commend you for 

the bipartisan way that you have presided over the committee this 

year and that we have worked together in a very bipartisan way. 

Unlike some other committees, our members have consistently conducted themselves with dignity and decorum. And I hope we can 

really continue that today despite the strong feelings that many of 

us have, different opinions on both sides of the aisle. 

All of us agree that the deaths of four brave Americans in 

Benghazi on September 11th, 2012, were a terrible tragedy. In the 

aftermath of the terrorist attacks Secretary Clinton convened an 

Accountability Review Board, or ARB, to determine what went 

wrong and to make recommendations to improve security at our 

diplomatic posts. Among those chosen to serve on the ARB were 

Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Admiral Mike Mullen, two men 

with impeccable reputations and unparalleled experience. 

In its report submitted last December the Board found that there 

were, ‘‘systematic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus at the State DepartVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:31 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\091813\82842 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

ment,’’ that led to inadequate security in Benghazi. Secretary Clinton took personal responsibility for the attacks and accepted all of 

the recommendations of the ARB. The State Department, now 

under the leadership of Secretary Kerry, has implemented or is in 

the process of implementing all of the recommendations. 

To support the work of ARB and the efforts of the State Department I introduced the Embassy Security and Enhancement Act of 

2013. This noncontroversial legislation, much of which was incorporated into the State Department authorization bill that the committee recently passed, would help improve diplomatic security 

planning, strengthen physical security, and enhance security training. 

Mr. Chairman, our committee has a responsibility to ensure that 

our brave diplomats and aid workers have the security they deserve. At the same time, we must recognize, as Ambassador Chris 

Stevens surely did, that there is a certain amount of risk inherent 

in these occupations and that effective diplomacy cannot be conducted from behind the walls of a fortress. And I have heard a lot 

of things said about personal blame of President Obama, but let me 

say this: Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are no more responsible for what happened in Benghazi than George Bush was for 

what happened on 9/11 or that Ronald Reagan was for what happened to the murder of over 200 of our military personnel in Beirut. The Congress cut funding for Embassy security. There are lots 

of fingers to be pointed all the way around. But I think we 

shouldn’t point fingers, we should try to get to the bottom of it, 

hopefully in a nonpolitical way. 

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witness, Under 

Secretary of State Pat Kennedy, for whom I have tremendous respect, on how we should best manage and mitigate risk in our diplomatic posts around the world. I would also like to hear from him 

about the progress made in implementing the recommendations of 

the ARB and about the Department’s decision regarding the employment status of the four State Department officials identified in 

the ARB. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to reiterate my hope that 

we can manage a high level of civility in our discussions today and 

that we don’t engage in gotcha politics like some other committees 

do. And I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by the Under Secretary 

of State for Management, Patrick Kennedy. As Under Secretary for 

Management he is responsible for the people, resources, facilities, 

technology, financial operations, consular affairs, and security for 

Department of State operations, and is the Secretary’s principal advisor on management issues. 

Ambassador Kennedy welcome. 

Without objection the witness’ full prepared statements will be 

made part of the record. The members will have 5 days to submit 

statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record. 

And I would like to remind everyone, including our witness, that 

today’s hearing is part of this committee’s continuing investigation 

and review on these matters, thus any willful misrepresentation or 

4

false statement by a witness is a criminal offense under 18 U.S. 

Code Section 1001. Indeed, that is the case at all of our hearings. 

So I look forward to a full and frank exchange during our proceedings today. And, Ambassador Kennedy, would you please summarize your remarks at this time? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK F. KENNEDY, 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, 

Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members. Thanks for inviting me to testify about the tragic events of September 11, 2012, in 

Benghazi, Libya. 

The Department maintains a robust global presence at 285 locations, many in challenging security environments where U.S. national security interests are at stake. Every day we work to protect 

our people and missions by constantly assessing threats and our security posture. In all the discussions on overseas security over the 

past year one strong point of agreement is that America needs to 

have a robust presence abroad to advance our national security interests, even in dangerous places. The Department fights terrorism, 

enhances the rule of law, fights disease, and promotes fair trade. 

These myriad of activities are often accomplished by the whole 

of the United States Government. Over 30 different United States 

Government agencies have a presence overseas in a facility that 

the State Department manages and secures. Almost as long as the 

United States has sent its diplomats out into the world there have 

been those who abhor the freedoms that America represents and 

those who seek to do us harm. The attacks in Benghazi in September were a tragedy for the family and loved ones of these four 

patriots, for the Department of State, and for our Nation. As the 

President has made clear, the United States is committed to bringing the perpetrators to justice. 

We are also committed to taking necessary steps to prevent such 

tragedies in the future. While we can never eliminate all risk, our 

constant goal is to mitigate risk to the maximum extent possible. 

As described in my written statement, the Department mitigates 

risk in large part through two major security programs: Physical 

security upgrades and construction of new facilities by the Bureau 

of Overseas Buildings Operations, and technical, physical, and procedural security programs implemented by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 

Following the September attacks President Obama and Secretary 

Clinton immediately called on the State Department to review and 

improve security. State, with the assistance of the Department of 

Defense, deployed interagency security assessment teams to 19 

high threat posts to identify security improvements that could be 

enhanced and implemented both in the near and longer term. Per 

statute an independent Accountability Review Board was convened. 

On December 19, 2012, the ARB presented its findings and 29 recommendations to the Secretary of State. State has already addressed almost all of these recommendations and is working diligently with Defense and others to implement those that remain, 

5

those that require more time and resources, such as deploying the 

full contingent of Marine security guards. 

Of note, the Department has already created a Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for High Threat Posts who is responsible for focusing attention on those particular locations; ensured all high threat posts 

have adequate life safety equipment; design an intensive 10-week 

Arabic alert language course specifically for personnel in the security field that will begin next month. We are reinforcing throughout 

the Department’s workforce the predicate that security is everyone’s responsibility. Over the past year we have been working with 

Defense to establish 35 additional Marine security guard detachments to increase the size of existing Marine security guard detachments and to establish a rapid augmentation force in Quantico 

to add additional Marines to posts as the situation warrants. 

Following the ISAT efforts in the autumn of 2012 and the ARB 

report, the Department requested authority to transfer $1.4 billion 

from one account to another for an increased security proposal, and 

in the 2013 continuing appropriations act Congress funded this request, for which we are deeply grateful. These funds are being used 

to provide facilities for the additional Marine guard detachments, 

as well as for Embassy construction and security renovations. We 

have also begun the recruitment of 151 additional diplomatic security personnel, and 113 have already been hired. 

We have made implementing the recommendations of the ARB a 

priority so that we can better prevent similar tragedies in the future. That is where we are focused at the State Department, and 

I know this is your priority as well. 

The unfortunate fact is our diplomats and facilities abroad will 

face attacks again, as they just did last week in Herat, Afghanistan. Since the tragic attacks in Benghazi the tempo of threats and 

attacks against us has not diminished. We will do everything we 

can to deter and mitigate the effectiveness of any attack, but we 

will not, even with the most willing and capable governments as 

partners, ever stop terrorists or extremists from mounting attacks 

against us in all cases. And we must continue to operate in places 

where host governments may not always be as willing or capable 

of fully defending us as we would wish. The risks to the United 

States as a Nation, however, are greater if we withdraw than the 

risks that the brave U.S. diplomatic, development, and military 

personnel on the front lines of our foreign diplomacy efforts face. 

I appreciate that there is interest in Benghazi from security to 

ARB implementation to accountability, and I am here today to answer your questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. I would like to focus 

on the Benghazi Accountability Review Board, and I think the administration likes to characterize that as an independent board. 

But was that ARB board really independent? Because the Secretary of State selected four of the five members, the chairman of 

the Board, Ambassador Pickering, has told congressional staff that 

you asked him for recommendations as to who else might serve 

with him on the Board. Is that correct, you asked Ambassador 

Pickering for his recommendations as to who else might serve on 

the ARB board? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. There has also been reports that you played 

a role in selecting and assigning those Department employees who 

staffed the board and assisted with this investigation. Did you, in 

fact, supervise the assignment of State employees to assist? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I had absolutely nothing to do with the 

assignment of staff to the Board, sir, absolutely nothing. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, I thank you. But here is a concern that 

we have in terms of the way it was staffed: A well-conducted investigation demands that there be sensible limitations on who can 

serve as an investigator, and the Benghazi ARB members and staff 

had too many ties, very close working relationships with those officials that they were charged with investigating. 

Consider, I think, these points. The Assistant Secretary for Near 

Eastern Affairs, Elizabeth Jones, not only worked with Ambassador 

Pickering at the State Department, but also served with him on 

two nonprofit boards. The ARB’s lead staffer, also known as the 

ARB’s Executive Director, had previously served as Chief of Staff 

to Deputy Secretary William Burns and had worked closely with a 

number of other senior Department officials. These relationships 

can affect impartiality. And many State Department employees, including some who have testified before this Congress, have questioned the ARB’s ability and willingness to conduct a truly unbiased investigation. That goes to the question of whether this really 

was an independent report. And the other aspect of this that is 

concerning is the way it has been packaged: Packaged as independent. 

I think that in light of these facts it is important going forward, 

given the Department’s lack of accountability, that we change the 

procedure for the ARB so that, in fact, we have independent voices 

on it. Otherwise, you undermine the credible claims of independence and you create an environment that is too clubby. And I think 

that the legislation that we have put forward will change that. I 

wanted your observation, support, or opposition to the measure 

that we are proposing in order to change the way in which ARB 

boards are conducted in the future. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I believe that this was an 

independent investigation. If one reads, as I know you have, the 

very, very hard-hitting and very, very critical comments of the Accountability Review Board, as you noted in your opening statement, it is hard for me to accept the fact that the Board was 

stacked as a State Department-favorable Board when they rendered the very, very critical opinions that they did reach. Three 

members of the Board, Mr. Chairman, had no relationship at all 

33

with the State Department. All of the members of the Board had 

decades of experience working for both Republican and Democratic 

Presidents over the period of time. 

It is impossible, I believe, to find someone with State Department senior expertise who could be a member of the Board with 

the gravity of someone with many years of experience and who is 

retired who had not worked with people at the State Department. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, could I interrupt you just for a minute 

here? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Certainly. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are here today because at the end of the 

day no one is held accountable, and so that is contradictory to the 

thesis that you are advancing here. No one is held accountable. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully disagree 

about the subject of accountability. Four employees of the State Department were relieved of their senior positions as Assistant Secretaries or Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State and are no longer 

holding those senior positions. I submit, respectfully, Mr. Chairman, that accountability includes being relieved from your job and 

assigned to other positions. To me that is serious accountability. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, the reassignment—no one missed a paycheck, all right, no one has been held accountable, and the Board 

did not take this to the upper levels of management, where clearly 

for those who are observing from the outside many of these decisions were made. And indeed that is why we are here, is in order 

to try to change a system in which you have a hand in suggesting 

who does the investigation. 

It would be far wiser, and this is one of the most frustrating 

parts about dealing with this State Department, you went 4 years 

without the appointment internally of an investigator that would 

take on this responsibility. And in this process, we go through an 

ARB process in which you choose who is going to do the investigation, afterwards you move people from one position to another, they 

are on the paycheck, they are on the clock, whether they are working or not, through all of this, and there is no accountability in the 

process from our perspective in it. The idea that no one is held accountable at the end of the day is the problem, and reassignment 

just doesn’t cut it in terms of addressing that issue. 

We are going to go to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am more concerned with preventing another Benghazi-type attack in the future rather than worrying about who was brought to 

justice, so to speak, for what they did or didn’t do. I want to make 

sure that we do everything we can so that there are no future 

Benghazis. The State Department, led by Secretary Clinton and 

now Secretary Kerry, has put forward a lot of effort to improve how 

it plans and provides resources for diplomatic security over the 

past year. Bottom line, is the State Department doing a better job, 

in your opinion, at protecting the men and women serving around 

the world in dangerous locations than it was a year ago? And explain why. What have you learned? Obviously things were problematic. What have we learned from our Benghazi experience that 

could not be repeated today because we have made changes? 

34

Ambassador KENNEDY. Congressman, I think that one of the 

things that the Accountability Review Board called to our attention 

which was very critical was a question inherent potentially in the 

culture of the State Department, and it is, is the focus of security 

only a management responsibility or should the culture of responsibility extend to all elements of the State Department? In other 

words, is security everyone’s responsibility? 

I think, as the Accountability Review Board pointed out, that 

was an issue. And we have taken steps there through assigning 

diplomatic security agents to brief the Assistant Secretaries every 

day to be part of the Assistant Secretaries for the regional offices 

morning staff meetings, officers from all the regional bureaus attend the Diplomatic Security Director’s morning briefings that lays 

out all the security issues that we are facing around the world. We 

appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary in Diplomatic Security for 

high threat posts so that we can focus specifically on those posts 

that are particularly endangered, so to speak, because of the world 

events in that part of the world. And that obviously is not a static 

situation. The world conditions change and our focus here has to 

be changed. And so we have also built in an institutional program 

so the regular review of what are the highest and most threatened 

posts so that we can change our focus as the situation requires. 

Thanks to this Congress, we have achieved additional funding 

levels and we are deploying. We have already deployed a number 

of Marine security guard detachments in endangered periods. And 

working with the United States Marine Corps we are well on the 

road to increasing the number of Marine security guards to 35, and 

we have enhanced our training programs as well. 

So I think that there was a bell that was rung by the Accountability Review Board, and the State Department is taking many 

and varied steps to improve what we are doing, and many of those 

activities are already in place. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this. The Pickering-Mullen panel 

called for the establishment of multi-bureau support cells when 

opening or reopening a post, and legislation which I introduced 

which was included in the authorization bill passed by our committee last month reflects this procedure. Can you tell us a little 

bit about this? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. It is clear that when you are 

going to open a post in an endangered area, to achieve security 

with a small ‘‘s’’ it requires logistics, it requires construction, it requires telecommunications, it requires the right personnel with the 

right training. And these multiunit support cells have already been 

established and there is one already that it is working on the situation, for example, should we have to go back into Syria at some 

point, the multi-concept support cell has already stood up and 

working on that question. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you one final question. In your written 

testimony you quote from a report completed by the Best Practices 

Panel led by the former head of the Secret Service Mark Sullivan, 

and one of those recommendations is that the Diplomatic Security 

Bureau be elevated and a new Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security be created. A similar change approved by former Secretary 

of State Madeleine Albright following the east Africa bombings in 

35

the late 1990s. However, changes were not made. What do you 

think about this recommendation? And if a new Under Secretary 

is not created should the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security report directly to the Secretary? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. In the sense, Congressman, all Assistant 

Secretaries report directly to the Secretary. But given the demands 

on the Secretary of State’s time, which is not infinite, there are a 

number of Under Secretaries in the State Department who assist 

the Secretary of the State Department in various channels, whether they be international political affairs, international economic affairs, arms control and security. And so the Under Secretaries, in 

my humble opinion, form an important assistance function to the 

Secretary in order that he or she has the right amount of time to 

focus on the most critical issues. 

We are still reviewing the results of the Best Practices, the Sullivan panel. But I might make one comment on the rationale for 

the current structure in the State Department. Security is not just 

the responsibility of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Security 

needs new facility construction, it needs security enhancement, it 

needs medical support, it needs telecommunications, it needs training, it needs logistics, it needs the right kind of recruiting tools. All 

those activities that are carried on in the State Department under 

the auspices of the Under Secretary for Management form the platform that provides a robust security capability at a post. And I believe it is very important that there be, on behalf of the Secretary 

of State, a coordinator. That is why the Department has organized 

itself as it has. 

But we will be looking at the recommendation of the Sullivan 

panel. But that is the reason why the Booz Allen Hamilton report, 

which was really a report on intelligence and security, and that report, when it said an Under Secretary would have also taken the 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Counterterrorism Office and Diplomatic Security and put it all into one. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is indeed pathetic that still no one has been held accountable 

for the disastrous decisions that were made at the State Department before, during and after this terrorist attack. State continues 

to merely shuffle the deck chairs and employ officials who were 

part of the management deficiencies and systematic failures that 

were tragically made. Earlier this year two senior officials resigned 

over the IRS scandal, yet no one has resigned, no one has been 

fired at State for the misguided decisions related to the September 

11th, 2012, terrorist attacks. This is unacceptable and it is appalling. 

The administration is asking us to trust it when it says that it 

is doing everything it can to hold our people accountable for their 

pathetic roles in this tragedy and will bring those terrorists responsible to justice. Really? Who believes this? This is the same administration who deliberately politicized the talking points, set out a 

false narrative denying that this was a terrorist attack and attributing blame to a video maker. Secretary Panetta has said that 

36

there was little communication with the White House and President Obama during the night of the attack. 

In this time of great need was the President missing in action? 

The White House has failed to answer the question of where the 

President was, what he was doing during the attack, and why he 

failed to call for military backup. Greg Hicks, the former Deputy 

Chief of Missions in Libya, testified that the administration gave 

a stand-down order to prevent a rescue team from going into 

Benghazi to help. Who gave that stand-down order? Can you describe the coordination between the White House, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Panetta to give our personnel immediate support and assistance? Did anyone even lift a finger? 

Libya was a high threat post and this should have made continued security requests of our personnel an urgent priority within 

the Department and those requests should have been granted immediately. It was not a question of funding or capabilities. Their 

requests were not granted because people failed to do their job. 

What assurances can you give us that another high threat post 

as we speak is not currently urgently asking for additional security, additional support, and that they are being ignored as well? 

What protocols are now in place to prevent this from happening 

again? The ARB recommended that State establish a panel of outside independent experts with experience in high risk, high threat 

areas to identify best practices and evaluate U.S. security platforms. What are those recommendations? 

In January I asked Secretary Clinton for an itemized funding 

layout and justification of how the Department was going to enforce and implement, as she said, all of the 64 recommendations 

from the ARB. I have not received that detailed report. 

This summer, as we know, the Department closed over 20 Embassies and consulates in the Middle East and North Africa. We 

should condition aid to host nations based on their full cooperation 

with the U.S. on implementing a plan that will protect our Foreign 

Service officers and Ambassadors overseas. 

So I ask you, sir, what about the stand-down order? What was 

the coordination between the White House and Secretaries Clinton 

and Panetta? And what about the implementation of the recommendations, all 64? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Thank you very much. 

I hesitate to speak for the President of the United States, but 

what I have been briefed on is that this is what the White House 

has outlined: As soon as the President learned of the attack on our 

temporary mission facility in Benghazi he immediately acted to ensure that our military and national security staff could secure and 

assist our Embassies around the globe and reinforce our——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Can you answer who give the stand-down 

order? Do you have any information? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. There was no—there was no——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What about the coordination? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. If I could, ma’am, there was no standdown order. I would be glad to——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. What about the coordination between the Department of State, the White House and Secretary Panetta? 

37

Ambassador KENNEDY. There was coordination all night. The call 

came in at about 3:45 p.m. in the afternoon Washington time. And 

the State Department——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And who decided that there was no reason 

to help, or they had no capabilities, or they had no resources to 

help? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The U.S. military was put on alert, a 

FAST Marine platoon from one location. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. How long did this fire fight take place, this 

terrorist attack, how many hours? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The attack on the temporary mission facility——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Was it 8 hours? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, the attack on the temporary mission 

facility was about an hour, and then there was about a 6-hour lag, 

and then there was about a 15-minute second attack on the annex. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So 7 hours-plus. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And so during that time? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The nearest U.S. military forces were in 

Djibouti. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And in 7 hours——

Ambassador KENNEDY. The distance from Djibouti——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Really? 

Ambassador KENNEDY [continuing]. To Benghazi is about the distance from Washington to Dallas, to Dallas, Texas. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So it would have been impossible——

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, there were no—there were no——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In 7-plus hours——

Ambassador KENNEDY [continuing]. There were no——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. There was nothing that we 

could do. So that is the message that we are sending to our Embassies. When you are in trouble——

Ambassador KENNEDY. No. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. [continuing]. 7-plus hours, we are in the 

1930s, we can’t get to you. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, no, Congresswoman. We have been 

working with the Department of Defense, but there are only so 

many Department of Defense military installations around the 

world and the distances from those installations—the reason why 

that that is relevant and important goes to our request and help 

in increasing the funding to allow——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. As was pointed out, 

and I know I am over, this was not a problem of funding. And that 

ARB states it and every witness has said it, it was not a problem 

of lack of funding. It was a problem of lack of resolve to do something about the problem that lasted more than 7 hours. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And unfortunately, Ambassador Kennedy, all of what we have 

just heard in the line of questions that you just had we have heard 

it. They have been asked before at other hearings that we have 

had. ARB has covered it. So here we go again with the same quesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:31 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\091813\82842 HFA PsN: SHIRL
38

tions, the same thing again. And you were cut off, I don’t know, 

so to just give you an opportunity if there is something else that 

you want to say. I know you have heard these questions a thousand times and people just don’t want to know the correct answers, 

but if there is something else that you want to add on to that 

please do so. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Thank you, sir. I would like to cover the 

funding question, if I could. The Accountability Review Board was 

correct about funding, but there are two types of funding. There is 

sort of microfunding and macrofunding. The State Department responded to every single one of the requests for increased security 

enhancements in Benghazi, and I would be glad to submit for the 

record a list of all the security enhancements that we put into 

place in Benghazi. Increasing the wall. Alarm systems. Cameras. 

Barbed wire. Drop arm barriers to make sure that bomb-laden vehicles could not crash into the buildings. So all the micro-enhancements for Benghazi that they requested were attended to. 

Then there is there is the macro question, Congressman, and 

that is that the best defense is ability to construct the new facilities 

that you have provided us additional funds for. Subsequent to the 

attack on Benghazi there was a major attack on our compound in 

Tunisia and there was a major attack on our compound in Khartoum. Those buildings held out and not a single American was 

killed or injured for over 8 hours until host nation security forces 

mobilized to defend us. But those building, in Khartoum and in Tunisia, were the new, modern buildings that we have had the assistance of the Congress and the funding to build. It is just that on 

a macro sense, because of the increase in the value of the dollar 

and because of inflation worldwide, the program that we started 

after Nairobi and Dar es Salaam we were building eight Embassies 

a year then. Because of the decrease in funding we were building 

three. Thanks to your help the funding is now back up to 8. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. Now let’s just try to move forward a little bit. I mean, and I wish that this hearing was about moving forward and talking about how we can make sure that we can support 

our diplomats in a better way. And as the Department continues 

to implement recommendations of the ARB I was talking a number 

of diplomats seem to be worried about some of the new security 

protocols that may inhibit or limit their ability to engage with the 

local community, reach out to key contacts, and establish much 

needed relationships to do their jobs well. How can we balance the 

need for more security precautions and the ability of diplomats to 

reach the local community and do their jobs? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I think that is something that the State 

Department works very hard on. And there have been a number 

of articles in the popular press over the last few years that describe 

fortress Embassies that are unavailable to the local populace. I 

think they have actually the purpose and the operating style of an 

American Embassy and our diplomatic and other agencies abroad 

absolutely backwards. Our diplomats go out of the Embassy. We 

don’t, except for consular operations, we don’t demand that people 

come to see us in our homes, we go to their home. We go to the 

Foreign Ministry, we go to the Ministry of Education, we visit the 

journalists. So our people go out all the time. 

39

But if there is a crisis brewing in a country that comes up overnight, a coup or other dangers, what we need is a place that our 

diplomats can in effect hunker down in, and those are the new Embassy compounds that we have been building with your money. So 

the new steps we are taking, sir, combined with additional diplomatic security professionals and additional armored vehicles, will 

continue to allow our people to go out, but have a safe base. 

Mr. MEEKS. And let me just ask this in the few remaining seconds I have left. What about working, have we changed or have 

we—we have to work with host governments. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. MEEKS. And has the Department changed or implemented 

any new procedures in working with these host governments, because they have some responsibility for security also, especially 

how do we mitigate the risk of work in the country where there is 

ongoing conflict or instability? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. We work very closely with host nations. 

That is one of the principal responsibilities of our Regional Security 

Officers. We also partner with the Department of Defense, which 

has a number of programs which train local host nation security 

forces. The State Department also has under the Antiterrorism Assistance Program training programs between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that brings foreign national police leaders to the 

United States for training. So this partnership is ongoing and we 

are working to enhance it. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman ROYCE. Go now to Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. Let me ask you a few questions, if I 

could. Were you or Secretary Clinton aware of the compelling need 

for more diplomatic security? And this would parallel Secretary 

Madeleine Albright’s repeated denial of security requests which led 

to our Nairobi Embassy being bombed, as well as our Embassy in 

Dar es Salaam. As you recall, Ambassador Bushnell repeatedly 

asked for assistance and did not get it. The ARB did not interview 

Madeleine Albright, it did not interview her senior staff. It did 

interview you because you were Assistant Secretary at the time. 

And it seems to me that we stop at the Assistant Secretary level 

when the people who probably have even more knowledge and certainly are to be held for responsible accounting of what they did or 

did not do. 

I asked the Secretary of State a very straightforward question 

and she said the information did not come to her attention about 

the security needs. Is that true? And did you know about any of 

the requests through any means, whether it be cables or conversations about Ambassador Stevens’ request and others at the Embassy for more security help? You weren’t aware of it? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Congressman, except for one request, 

which I will touch on in a second, all the requests that were filed 

by our Embassy in Tripoli on behalf of the temporary mission facility in Benghazi were met. They asked for funding for concrete Jersey barriers to increase the perimeter, they asked for four steel 

drop arms in order to make sure that cars could not crash through 

40

the gate, they asked for increased compound lighting, they 

asked——

Mr. SMITH. Who knew about these requests? That is my only 

question, not what they asked for, who knew about it? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. These requests, since they were all met, 

I believe I was generally aware that they were——

Mr. SMITH. So there was no request that went unanswered you 

are saying? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Except for one. There was a request that 

was debated about whether or not we should erect massive guard 

towers. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Did the Secretary of State know about any of 

that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, because the requests were being met. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you, why wasn’t the senior staff and 

why wasn’t the Secretary of State interviewed by the ARB? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is a question——

Mr. SMITH. We have asked it. We have gotten poor answers from 

Ambassador Pickering. 

Ambassador KENNEDY [continuing]. Congressman, you will have 

to ask the ARB. 

Mr. SMITH. So did you convey any emails or any information you 

might have had to the ARB in any way? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Other than the reference of talking to 

Ambassador Pickering after he had been named chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. So you were interviewed informally? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. There are press reports that I was never 

interviewed. That is categorically false. I was formally interviewed, 

I think, for almost 2 hours. 

Mr. SMITH. Then why wouldn’t they include that. Are you listed 

on the list of interviewees? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Let me ask you, if I could, the deployment of 

foreign emergency support teams, who made that decision not to 

deploy? Was a request made, and who made the decision not to deploy? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I was asked did I, in my role as the management official of the State Department, need the FEST to be deployed, and I said no for two reasons. One, the FEST is not a military response unit, it is a command-and-control airplane, the kind 

that we did send to Nairobi after——

Mr. SMITH. So was a request made, and did you approve it or 

deny it? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The decision is an interagency decision. I 

was simply asked do I need the capabilities of the FEST. And since 

it did not bring any military assets to bear, it was based in the 

U.S. and would have taken at least 16 or 18 hours to get there, 

there was no need for it. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, because I don’t have much time, Mr. Ambassador, why was the CIA security team repeatedly ordered to stand 

down after the attack began? And who made that decision? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am not aware of any CIA security team 

being ordered to stand down, sir. 

41

Mr. SMITH. So why weren’t assets that were in close proximity 

to the attack deployed to try to assist our beleaguered and now 

murdered Ambassador. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. There was no stand-down order, sir, there 

was never a stand-down order. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you a question. How many Benghazi survivors were forced to sign nondisclosure agreements? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The State Department does not tell people to sign nondisclosure agreements. 

Mr. SMITH. Are you aware of nondisclosure agreements and how 

many are there? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am not aware of any nondisclosure——

Mr. SMITH. Can you tell us where the Benghazi survivors are, 

since access to them has been very, very difficult? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. One Benghazi survivor was seriously injured in the second attack and is still in the hospital. The other 

four have resumed duties around the world. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I ask you with regards to those who, as my colleagues, particularly Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and the chairman, have 

so eloquently stated, four people get censored, they apparently keep 

receiving a full pay for a vacation. You know, there was that famous scene in the fictional ‘‘Clear and Present Danger’’ where the 

President tells, in the Tom Clancy novel, it is the old Potomac twostep, people at a lower level take the hit while other people who 

were in the know or should have been in the know walk and are 

never even interviewed. 

How do you respond to that? I mean, to the American public and 

to members on both sides of the aisle we are concerned that the 

lessons learned, because I chaired the hearings on the ARB and actually wrote a law to beef up our Embassy security, I was the 

prime sponsor of it, and it is law, and yet we still have a situation 

where we haven’t learned more than a dozen years later and the 

very people who should be held accountable aren’t even interviewed. That is appalling. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. There are several questions there. Let me 

try to take them in sequence. 

You ask about accountability. With respect to the four individuals, I believe that they were held accountable by relieving them 

of their position. One of them actually resigned as Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. 

Mr. SMITH. So they got paid the whole entire time of their resignation? Where did they work? What did they do? Did they go 

home? Did they come to the Department every day? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Congressman, it is, I believe, an essential 

element of American fairness that I know this committee fully supports, because I have seen many of the legislation pieces that you 

have authored, that say that a person is entitled to review. And 

what Secretary Kerry did was engage——

Mr. SMITH. Now, did they initiate a review? You know, I am out 

of time. They themselves, did they initiate a review to say we have 

been fairly censored? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Not that I am aware of, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

42

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before the clock 

starts ticking I would request that I be granted the same amount 

of time as my colleague from New Jersey, Mr. Smith. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. I also want to thank the chair 

for the tone in which he began this hearing with a very thoughtful 

statement. He is quite correct. All committees of Congress, it seems 

to me, ought to follow your advice, which is try to understand what 

happened and try to make sure we take whatever measures we can 

to prevent this recurrence, not to exploit it for partisan political 

gain. 

I have been involved in this town for a long time. I was on the 

Senate committee staff when the tragedy of Lebanon occurred, 

where our Embassy blew up not once, but twice on Ronald Reagan’s watch. I don’t remember people calling for heads to roll, I 

don’t remember an ARB review of what happened, although there 

should have been one. We understood that was a national tragedy 

and we came together. I wish more of our colleagues would follow 

the spirit in which you have set the tone of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for doing so. 

I would ask unanimous consent also that my full statement, including the appendix, be entered into the record at this point. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. And by the way, part of that 

is a statement called ‘‘Fact Versus Fiction’’ prepared by the Oversight and Government Reform Committee staff that lays out many 

of the common, commonly repeated accusations about Benghazi 

that just aren’t true. 

By the way, my good friend from Florida, Ms. Ileana RosLehtinen, would have us believe money played absolutely no role 

in the decision about security allocations around the world. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If the gentleman would wield, that is not my 

statement. Those are the witness’ testimony and the ARB report 

itself. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would remind my colleague that she and I were 

actually at a briefing together where I put that very question to 

Ambassador Pickering, and he most certainly did acknowledge that 

of course money plays a role. Sometimes when people say it is not 

about money, it is about money. 

Let me just ask, Mr. Kennedy, have I got my facts right? In Fis- cal Year 2011 this Congress cut $327 million from the request for 

diplomatic security, construction, and maintenance? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I believe that is the correct figure. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. $327 million. The following fiscal year this same 

Congress cut another $183 million from the request. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I believe that is the correct amount. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And then in Fiscal Year 2013 it cut $145 million. 

Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I believe that is the correct amount, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And we kind of came to our senses only after the 

tragedy of Benghazi and restored some of those fundings and gave 

the State Department more flexibility in the end. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct and deeply appreciated. 

43

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The idea that money 

doesn’t play a role is simply not true. 

The chairman indicated in his opening statement that—and he 

is quite right about accountability, and I think all of us are a little 

troubled about that—but he also was talking about the follow-up 

to the Benghazi tragedy and he said no one has been captured or 

killed. And I deeply respect the chairman of this committee, but I 

find it ironic the implicit criticism of an administration that did 

what the previous administration could not do for 7 years, they 

captured and killed the man who perpetrated the tragedy of 9/11, 

the memorial of which we just remembered. 

What is the status of the Benghazi follow-up that you can share 

with us? We talk about accountability within the State Department, how about accountability for the terrorists who perpetrated 

this heinous crime and engineered the death of our four brave fellow Americans. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. As the President and the Secretary have 

said, we are engaged in every effort to bring the terrorists to justice. This is under the purview of the FBI, assisted by the State 

Department and by the Intelligence Community. And from the 

briefings that I have received, which, unfortunately, I cannot go 

into in detail in this setting, the FBI and others are engaged in a 

full court press on this, no one is leaving any stone unturned to 

bring these individuals to justice. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What about Libyan security? Part of the problem 

on that terrible day was, frankly, Libyan security, the responsibility of the host government, kind of dissolved. What is the status 

of that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The State Department and the Department of Defense are working with the Government of Libya to get 

them a security force that it is capable of doing the job that they 

are required to do under the Vienna Convention. But in the interim 

period of time, we have reinforced our Embassy in Tripoli with a 

significant number of State Department personnel and a significant 

number of U.S. military personnel, who are on scene now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And the status of our mission in Benghazi? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Our mission in Benghazi is closed. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is that because of the security status? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. It is because of the security situation. 

There is nothing that we could do at the moment to mitigate the 

security risk of a reopened presence there, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I think I still have more time. 

Yes, thank you. 

With respect to the ARB in your opinion this was a rigorous and 

hard-hitting report. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is there anything with respect to the recommendations or findings that the State Department is not following up on and not trying to implement? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. We are working through every 

single one. There are 29 recommendations, and as the representative from Florida indicated, we have broken that up into 64 different tasks in order that we can manage the process as efficiently 

and effectively as possible. And we are working through every sinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:31 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\091813\82842 HFA PsN: SHIRL
44

gle one of them. We have completed many of them. Others take 

time because they involve construction or other matters. But there 

is nothing that we are lagging on. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. By the way, this issue of whether an order was 

given to stand down the U.S. military, preventing the military from 

responding, and I have heard you say several times not true, no 

such order was ever given. I would just like to make a point for 

the record that our colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee this summer issued a press release from the majority staff 

that said in his testimony LTC. Gibson clarified his responsibilities 

and actions during the attack. Contrary to news reports, Gibson 

was not ordered to stand down by higher command authorities in 

response to his understandable desire to lead a group of three other 

Special Forces soldiers to Benghazi. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That statement has also been corroborated by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 

Dempsey, who has also testified that there was no stand down 

order given. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

We go now to Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, before my time starts running 

here, I would request to have the same amount of time as my good 

friend——

Chairman ROYCE. May I suggest that members on the Democratic and Republican side, I have kept copious notes here and I 

know exactly how much time everyone has gone over and we are 

dead even. And because we have a lot of freshmen on this committee, we are now going to hold everyone to 5 minutes. But I am 

going to start the clock right now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us hope that this hearing is a step forward in our effort to break down what I consider to be a wall of 

deceit and denial and an attempt to hide the truth from the American people about this Benghazi attack. It has been over a year and 

the American people have a right to know the truth and they deserve to know it. And this idea that there has been a full-court 

press going on. It is over a year now since our Ambassador was 

murdered, along with the other brave Americans who died that 

night. And don’t tell me that is a full-court press when we haven’t 

even pointed our finger at the people, at the organization, and the 

finger at the people who actually murdered these people. I don’t 

know what a full court press means with that. 

About funding, with all due respect to my friend from Virginia, 

Assistant Secretary Lamb, who was responsible for making the decisions as to security level in Benghazi, testified here, and I know 

because it was my question specifically, did budget considerations 

play any role in the decision as to what level security would be at 

in Benghazi. She said no. And just for the record, she, by saying 

no and making sure that it was a matter of policy and not budget, 

she has been one of the ones relieved of her position. Wonder why 

45

she got relieved of her position after she was able to testify something like that before Congress. 

Mr. Ambassador, we need to know a number of things. I am 

going to go through some questions for you. You know, was there 

an autopsy conducted on Ambassador Stevens’ body? Yes or no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes. It was conducted by the U.S. military at Dover Air Force Base, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. When there are homicides committed 

against American citizens, are those autopsies then permitted to be 

made public to, for example, congressional investigations? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The autopsy was turned over to the FBI, 

which was the investigating agency. I was informed by the FBI at 

one point that he died of smoke inhalation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am not asking what he died of. I am asking 

right now, if there is an autopsy, is that being kept from congressional investigators? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I will take that question back to the FBI, 

sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. When you talk about military units 

not being dispatched, that there was no stand-down order, but they 

weren’t sent because there wasn’t enough time, let me put myself 

on the record on this point. And that is, no one knew how long this 

attack was going to exist and go on, how long would this attack 

last. Anybody who did not dispatch troops or dispatch aid or assistance of some kind to our Ambassador who was under attack had 

no idea whether it was going to be a 1-hour battle, a 4-hour battle, 

or a 2-day battle. And for not dispatching help, that is a dereliction 

of some type of responsibility. 

You keep saying our military team was not ordered to stand 

down. Were there other American Government employees, perhaps 

of the CIA, in Benghazi at that time who could have gone to our 

Ambassador’s assistance? Were they ordered to stand down? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. There was a team from the annex that 

did go to the temporary mission facility and did relieve the pressure on that facility subsequently——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. And apparently those Navy Seals that 

got there were ordered not to go. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir, I am not aware of that at all. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. A quick reaction——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Not aware doesn’t mean no. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. I mean no. A quick reaction team 

went from the annex to the temporary mission facility main building, and then—all of them—and then the annex was reinforced by 

the five State Department security officers. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So there was no stand-down order even to 

CIA personnel who were there. Okay. 

Now, who made the choice to create this fictitious narrative that 

it was a demonstration that got out of hand and not a terrorist attack? Now, we know from the first minutes of this attack, we have 

been told they knew that this was a terrorist attack. Yet for a full 

week we had top-level people in this administration claiming it was 

a movie rage when a demonstration got out of attack. Who created 

that narrative? 

46

Ambassador KENNEDY. I don’t know if I can answer the question 

of who created. I can tell you, though, sir, that the narrative about 

the movie did cause an attack——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, fine. You can’t answer the question. 

Ambassador KENNEDY [continuing]. On the American Embassy 

in Cairo. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You can’t answer the question. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to have to go to Mr. Cicilline 

from Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ambassador Kennedy, for being here. And I have had 

the opportunity as others to listen to the testimony of Ambassador 

Pickering and Chairman Mullen, to review the report and the recommendations and to hear testimony in these last several hearings. And I thank you for your testimony today and for being here. 

And my first question is, the 29 recommendations that involved 

64 different tasks, which seem to me very comprehensive, I agree 

with your assessment that this was a hard-hitting report and really 

do respect the work that was done and the thoroughness of the report. And as those recommendations are being implemented and 

those tasks are being completed, are there any things we can do, 

Congress can do to facilitate the implementation of those recommendations or are there any obstacles presently in the way that 

we should respond to to be sure that the work you are doing, the 

Department is doing to implement those can continue appropriately? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I think the most important thing is to 

pass the President’s budget request for Embassy construction and 

security that is in the Fiscal Year 2014 budget request. That will 

give us the resources to continue implementing the ARB’s recommendation, including the necessary new construction and upgrades we need to protect our people. 

The second is we have the authority only in certain locations 

around the world do what is called best value contracting for 

guards. We now are forced in many locations to take the lowest 

bidder. Having that in an authorization bill that I know that this 

committee is working on would be very, very helpful to the Department and getting the best kind of local security force as possible. 

Mr. CICILLINE. You know, every time we have a hearing on this 

issue we have to always begin remembering the brave American 

heroes whose lives were lost and I think our solemn obligation to 

do everything that we can to prevent this kind of tragedy from ever 

occurring again and protecting individuals who are representing 

our country all over the world. 

And to follow up on my friend from Virginia’s point, the panel 

in this report found, and I quote, ‘‘a more serious and sustained 

commitment from Congress’’—and called on ‘‘a more serious and 

sustained commitment from Congress to support State Department 

needs which in total constitute a small percentage both of the full 

national budget and that spent for national security.’’ One overall 

conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its part to meet 

this challenge and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks and meet mission imperatives. 

47

And as an aside, in Fiscal Year 2011 the budget passed by our leadership on the House side provided $327 million less for State 

Department security than was proposed by the Senate, and in Fiscal Year 2012, the year of this attack, the House Republicans proposed almost $200 million less for State Department security than 

the Senate. So this notion that resourcing is important in keeping 

our diplomatic corps safe is something that was identified in the 

report, correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And finally, would you address for a moment, you 

know, the Department is obviously operating in very high-risk, 

high-threat locations all over the world, including places with a 

lack of clearly defined and capable security support from host nations and all of the problems that arise from that. And this raises 

security risks for our diplomatic corps and development experts, 

but also imposes particular strains on our existing resources. 

And should we as a Congress begin to think differently, working 

with the executive, about ways that we plan and appropriately 

manage these requirements, sort of in the changing landscape of 

the really high-risk, high-threat locations that we now serve all 

around the world? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I think this is an effort that has to be undertaken jointly by the executive branch and the Congress. The 

State Department—and I believe it is outlined in my longer statement—has made changes on how we look at high-threat, high-risk 

posts. And I think the two things that are needed there, as was 

pointed out, we need to continue to work with host nations to help 

increase their capability through additional training of their security forces in their capital cities or other places, and we need additional appropriations. And the bill that is passed out of the Appropriations subcommittee in the House does exactly that. Because if 

we can construct facilities of the like that we had in Khartoum and 

in Tunis in the attacks that took place right after 9/11, those buildings held off the attackers and our people will remain safe. 

Mr. CICILLINE. You know, it is important that we hold the terrorists responsible for this activity accountable, the State Department 

personnel who were relieved of their duties, but also Congress has 

a responsibility to fulfill our obligations in assuring that the resources are available to keep our diplomatic corps safe. And I 

thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go now to Mr. Steve Chabot 

of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to get right to some questions, but I do want to address 

something that has troubled me for some time. I am speaking 

about the hoops that this committee has had to jump through to 

get the facts surrounding the murders of four of our finest public 

servants. The State Department significantly delayed coming forth 

with information on this matter. When we were finally presented 

with some relevant data a few months ago it clearly amounted to 

what many would call a document dump. Thousands of pages of 

paper in wide disarray and in no particular order either in terms 

of relevance or chronology, making it very difficult to actually loVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:31 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\091813\82842 HFA PsN: SHIRL
48

cate documents that were helpful. I brought this up with Secretary 

Clinton. She wasn’t particularly responsive. You are welcome to 

weigh in if you would like to. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. As I understand it, sir, the State Department was asked for every document that it possessed which was 

relevant to Benghazi. And when we receive such requests, we try 

to give out everything for fear, to be blunt, of being accused of holding something back. So this generates, when you have worldwide 

security efforts in something as complex as Benghazi, this generates many, many cubic feet of documents——

Mr. CHABOT. All right. It was a total mess and not particularly 

helpful. Let me go on because I have limited time. On August 23rd 

the State Department sent a letter to the committee which stated 

the ARB was ‘‘very clear that the only people responsible for the 

lethal attack on our special mission compound in Benghazi were 

the terrorists who orchestrated the attack. These terrorists must be 

brought to justice. The entire U.S. Government remains committed 

to doing just that.’’

Now, no one will argue who was directly to blame for the attacks 

that resulted in the death of those four Americans. But as the ARB 

and numerous congressional hearings have revealed, there are 

other people who need to be held accountable for the fact that the 

terrorist attacks succeeded. By the language of this letter, does the 

State Department really want us to believe that the Department’s 

bureaucracy could have done nothing more to protect our diplomats? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That was not the finding of the ARB. And 

in the actions that are referenced in the August 23rd letter, sir, we 

are essentially reaffirming the findings and the recommendations 

of the ARB. Four individuals were held accountable because they 

were relieved——

Mr. CHABOT. All right. Well, we will get into that in a minute. 

Ambassador KENNEDY [continuing]. They were relieved of their 

positions and one of them resigned. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. When former Secretary of State Clinton 

testified in January, she stated repeatedly and took responsibility 

for the attacks. In fact, she stated, ‘‘As I have said multiple times, 

I take responsibility and nobody is more committed to getting this 

right.’’ Do you believe Secretary Clinton has been held truly accountable for failures under her watch? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I think what the ARB did was take from 

the original intent of the Congress, which established the ARB, because the Congress in the legislative history made it——

Mr. CHABOT. That is not what I asked you. I asked you if you 

thought that Secretary Clinton has been truly held accountable. 

Yes or no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. She said she was responsible, and I am 

not going to challenge her statement. 

Mr. CHABOT. Where is the accountability, though? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. There is in every organization, every Cabinet department, every agency in effect a line of authority. There 

are people who set the policy and there are those who then implement that policy or go back up to senior leadership and say the policy cannot be implemented. 

49

Mr. CHABOT. All right. Let me move on. Admiral Pickering described four State Department employees as having ‘‘failed in the 

performance of their duties’’ with respect to Benghazi. Now, let me 

get this straight. I know this has been covered before, but I think 

it is very important. The only disciplinary action meted out to the 

four who failed in the performance of their duties was being put 

on administrative leave for a while, then reassigned to other positions within the State Department. Now, their benefits as Federal 

employees continued during that time. Of course, they are going to 

be subject to Obamacare, so arguably that benefit is worse. They 

haven’t missed a paycheck. Is that about right? I mean, it seems 

like pretty pitiful discipline to me. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Sir, I believe that being an Assistant Secretary at any Cabinet office or being a Deputy Assistant Secretary 

to any Cabinet office is a senior position of grave and great responsibility. To be relieved of your position in that regard I believe is 

a serious act of accountability. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me conclude by saying that I think that failing 

to call Secretary Clinton to actually interview her was a gross oversight by the ARB and it is really almost incomprehensible that 

they didn’t call her as a witness. You don’t need to respond. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Just point of clarification, because this was 

brought up with Secretary Kerry when he was here. The comment 

that Mr. Chabot made about the documents—and this I think affects us all on the committee—we are still in a position where those 

documents, as you know, a copy is not made available to us. We 

can’t copy those documents. You can go down there, somebody can 

see a document. But we can’t make copies of them. We have asked 

for a set of those documents. And when we asked the Secretary of 

State, Secretary Kerry said that is no policy of mine when we 

raised our objection to this. This is one of the reasons this is ongoing, because we don’t have copies of those documents. So again, we 

would like to have copies of the documents turned over to this committee. 

Thank you, Ambassador. 

We go now to Mr. Alan Grayson of Florida. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Ambassador, I would like to ask you a few questions about Benghazi, the scandal that never was. Who decided 

that Ambassador Stevens go to Benghazi on September 11th, 2012? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. It was the Ambassador’s decision, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Now, was Secretary Clinton responsible in any 

way for reviewing and approving the in-country movements of U.S. 

Ambassadors, either Ambassador Stevens or anyone else? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. Under-departmental policy, Ambassadors only need Washington permission if they leave their 

country of assignment, not the capital city. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Now, did the Ambassador when he went to 

Benghazi have a normal security detail in accordance with the 

State Department procedures and rules at that time? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. He had two Diplomatic Security 

special agents who accompanied him from Tripoli to Benghazi. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Benghazi was a diplomatic post, not an Embassy, 

right? 

50

Ambassador KENNEDY. It was a temporary mission facility, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. All right. Is it even possible to provide the same 

kind of security at a temporary mission facility as we try to provide 

at our Embassies. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. We can never achieve the kind of perfect 

security that we need, other than a purpose-filled Embassy. We 

have a series of standards, and we were working through those 

standards. We are consistently adding. As I think in response to 

the gentleman from Virginia, I offered to submit for the record a 

list of all the improvements that we had made to the temporary 

mission facility in Benghazi. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Was there any money that was appropriated for 

the purpose of improving that post that was unspent at that time? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. There was no specific money appropriated for Benghazi, we were simply taking money from other 

locations. But all the requests that they put forward, as I mentioned, save one, which is the guard towers, which were determined 

to be unnecessary and potentially too attention-getting, all of their 

requests were fulfilled. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Now, with regard to the attack itself, approximately how long was it between the time that the attack began and 

the time of the Ambassador’s unfortunate death. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I would say it was probably somewhere—

it was definitely under 90 minutes. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Now, was there any kind of military force, substantial U.S. military force close enough to even engage the 

attackers within that 90-minute period? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Was there any force, even if there had been more 

time, that could have rescued the Ambassador, given the actual situation on the ground as it was? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Tragically, no, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Did the White House ever ignore any reports regarding this attack? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir, not that I am aware of. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Did Secretary Clinton ever ignore any reports regarding this attack? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. I personally spoke to Secretary 

Clinton that evening, and Secretary Clinton was being constantly 

briefed by our operations center all evening. 

Mr. GRAYSON. If you have been the President of the United 

States on that night, would you have done anything different? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. What I know that the President did was 

to say to the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff: Do everything that you can. And I think that is 

probably what I would have done, was turn to my senior military 

command authority and tell them to do whatever was necessary, 

which is what he did. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Regarding the Accountability Review Board report, did the Accountability Review Board find Secretary Clinton in 

any way liable for any kind of misconduct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

51

Mr. GRAYSON. Did the Board find the President liable for any 

kind of misconduct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Was it, in fact, within their powers to have done 

so if they felt that that were the case? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. They certainly could have found the Secretary of State, because their charge is to review State Department 

operations. I am not sure that their writ legislatively, legally extended outside the State Department. But it certainly extended to 

the Secretary of State. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Ambassador, are you familiar with the term second-guessing? Have you heard that term before? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. What about the term 20/20 hindsight? Have you 

heard that term before? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. And how about the Monday morning quarterbacking? Have you heard that term before? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Good. 

I yield the rest of my time. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We will go now to Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Royce, for your leadership to 

seek explanations for the murders of four heroic Americans in 

Benghazi. It is imperative that we fully understand where the systemic breakdown occurred within the State Department so that no 

more American Foreign Service members die while serving our 

country. I agree with Congressman Rohrabacher of California; 

there has been deceit and denial. 

Mr. Kennedy, I appreciate your attendance today. At a Senate 

hearing previously you acknowledged that you denied an extension 

of a 16-person security support team, SST. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. That was the team that was 

based in Tripoli, not in Benghazi, sir. It was a Tripoli assignment. 

They were never assigned to Benghazi. And if I might—I don’t 

want to take your time. 

Mr. WILSON. No, no, please. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. When we first went back into Tripoli, our 

Embassy had been burned out in Tripoli so we turned to the Department of Defense and asked them for assistance. Two of their 

officers went in with two of ours and we did a survey. We then 

asked for 16 Department of Defense personnel. And over the course 

of standing up the Embassy, those individuals worked themselves 

out of a job. And in fact, they sent medics, they sent communications personnel. We replaced them with State Department personnel. They sent someone to do helicopter landing zone surveys 

and to look for unexploded ordnance. They did their mission and, 

therefore, there was no mission left for them to accomplish. 

There were eight, in effect, security personnel. The State Department also replaced those security personnel with personnel on the 

State Department rolls. However, on the night in question, even 

though this is Tripoli, not Benghazi, six of those positions were still 

based in Benghazi performing—sorry, in Tripoli, in Tripoli, excuse 

52

me—performing other missions. And those are the six that several 

members have referred to. And so the six were still there. 

Mr. WILSON. And indeed we are talking about people within the 

same country. It is just really sad to me that there was not protection given or defense to the four Americans killed. Additionally, the 

security support team’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew 

Wood, testified before Congress last year the team was created ‘‘to 

meet the demanding security challenges facing the Department of 

State’’ and that they loaned considerable support to the State Department security position in this uncertain and volatile environment. Additionally, on October 2012, Regional Security Officer Eric 

Nordstrom stated that retaining the security team was a primary 

issue until other security resources became available. 

Given this testimony, what justification do you have for the denial of the extension of the security support team, given the commander and regional security officer’s belief that the team was a 

necessity? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. It is exactly what the regional security officer said: Until other resources became available. And the State 

Department replaced the security part of that team with State Department regional security officers and trained other personnel 

that we had on the Embassy compound. So they worked their way 

out of a job, which is the case when we borrow personnel from the 

Defense Department and then we replace them with State Department assets. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is hard to imagine they worked their way 

out of a job when four people died. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. But that was Tripoli, sir, not in Benghazi. 

Mr. WILSON. Same country. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. We are not in Benghazi. 

Mr. WILSON. Same country, and the availability should have 

been made possible. Additionally, I am very appreciative that 

Chairman Ed Royce has introduced an Accountability Review 

Board Reform Act of 2013, H.R. 1768. It is for effectiveness for future Accountability Review Boards. What is the State Department 

view of Chairman Royce’s bill? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. We have provided comments back, and I 

will be glad to make sure that I make a copy of that available to 

you, sir. 

May I say one more thing about Benghazi? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, please. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. If anybody had asked me to reassign the 

SST from Tripoli, 400 miles away, to Benghazi, I might have considered that. But since no one ever asked for that relocation, it was 

the question is had they completed their mission in Tripoli, and 

they had completed their mission in Tripoli, and no one asked for 

a reassignment to Benghazi. 

Mr. WILSON. Regardless of the assignment, within the same 

country now 400 miles, I just have to tell you that I would hope 

that every resource, whatever it is, of any means, that it would be 

provided to protect American lives and American Foreign Service 

employees so brave and heroic. 

Thank you. 

53

Ambassador KENNEDY. I certainly agree with that, sir. Thank 

you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Juan Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

Ambassador, thank you, too, for being here. My first question is 

this, and you have answered partially. We did have four lives that 

were lost, four American heroes. And you said that we were doing 

everything that we could to catch the perpetrators because the perpetrators here really are the terrorists. What can you tell us today 

that is unclassified that we are doing to try to catch them? Because 

that is I think where the American people are. What are we doing 

to catch these murderers? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The FBI, the Intelligence Community, the 

State Department are doing everything it can. And unfortunately 

the details, sir, would have to come from my colleagues at the FBI 

in closed session. But they are engaged in a total effort to catch 

them. 

Mr. VARGAS. That is I think the important thing, that there has 

to be a total effort. Because I think when I am back home, that is 

what they are asking. They see the bickering back and forth here, 

but they want to make sure that we are, in fact, trying to get the 

terrorists that committed these acts. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The President has said to State, Justice, 

the Intelligence Community, Defense, this is a task and we are on 

it. 

Mr. VARGAS. Let me go then to the ARB itself. There has been 

a lot of criticism here of the ARB, a wall of deceit, denial. I wrote 

down a whole bunch of notes here. The two people who headed it 

were Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mike Mullen. I remember 

Ambassador Pickering, of course, because he was the Ambassador 

to El Salvador for a while. I think he was appointed there by Ronald Reagan. I didn’t agree with the policies there at the time. I was 

a Jesuit at the time; I did not appreciate what we were doing. But 

anyway, that being said, I have followed his career, and he is somewhat of a Sergey Lavrov for Americans. He was probably our most 

sophisticated foreign policy expert. And there has been a lot of criticism of the ARB. Could you criticize or not criticize him or this 

ARB report? Because I find it somewhat interesting since he was—

I don’t know if he was a Republican or Democrat, but he seemed 

to be appointed mostly by Republicans. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I mean, I think the membership including 

an officer appointed by the Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador Pickering with his long service under, as you note, both 

Republican and Democratic Presidents, Admiral Michael Mullen, 

who rose through the ranks to Chairman of the Joints Chief of 

Staff, served under Republican, Democratic Presidents, Catherine 

Bertini, long service in both—I believe it was in the Bush administration, at the Department of Agriculture, and at the United Nations. And so this compilation of individuals represents the full 

spectrum, I believe. And as I mentioned earlier, when you read the 

report, it is not complimentary of the State Department. 

Mr. VARGAS. I did read the report. It was not complimentary. But 

do you think that Ambassador Pickering, then, was not up to the 

54

task here? Is there some reason why you would criticize him and 

say that they picked the wrong person, this is a person that is not 

capable of not doing a proper ARB? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. VARGAS. Why would you say no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Because of his experience serving as an 

Ambassador, as the Under Secretary of State, as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and in assignments as difficult as 

Israel, the then Soviet Union, El Salvador. 

Mr. VARGAS. Is he deceitful? Is he underhanded? Is he sly? Is he 

any of these other things? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. VARGAS. Let’s go to Admiral Mullen. And Admiral Mullen, 

do you think he was someone that was competent to serve on this 

board? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I have had the pleasure of working with 

Admiral Mullen somewhat when he represented the Department of 

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in senior-level meetings. And 

I find him to be a very hard-hitting, a very intelligent, and a very 

reputable person. 

Mr. VARGAS. Do you think he is underhanded, deceitful, sly, in 

any way trying to cover up here? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. VARGAS. Why do you say that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. It is the nature of his career and the position to which he rose to. 

Mr. VARGAS. Those are my questions. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

We go now to Mike McCaul from Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the chairman. 

And welcome, Ambassador. 

Prior to the attacks in Benghazi and the killing of our Ambassador, there were many warning signs and many cries for help. 

April 6, 2012, a crude IED was thrown over the wall of the U.S. 

facility in Benghazi. On May 22nd, Red Cross building attacked by 

the brigades of the blind Sheik, the 1993 World Trade Center mastermind. June 6, the consulate was targeted by an IED attack that 

blew a hole in the perimeter. Credit again by the brigades of the 

blind Sheik. And June 11th, the British Ambassador escapes a narrow death. March 28, then Ambassador Cretz sends a cable to Secretary Clinton requesting additional assets. That cable request is 

denied, and a plan to scale back security is made. 

Ambassador Stevens responds with a cable to Secretary Clinton 

requesting additional security resources. And you, sir, on May the 

3rd terminated effective immediately the U.S. mission to Libya use 

of a DC–3 to provide logistical support to Special Forces units assigned in Benghazi. We don’t know what could have been done 

with that on that fateful day. Ambassador Stevens responds, saying, please don’t scale these assets back. And he says again in July, 

the overall security conditions continue to be unpredictable with 

large numbers of armed groups and individuals not under the control of the central government. You, sir, formally denied that request. 

55

Finally, August 16th, a classified cable after an emergency meeting with the Ambassador, an extraordinary, not ordinary event, another request for additional security, saying the Embassy cannot 

withstand a coordinated attack. This final cry was not answered. 

Did you receive that cable, the August 16th cable, sir? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir, I did. And if I might——

Mr. MCCAUL. I have limited time. Did you respond in the affirmative or did you decline that request? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. This cable, I did not—we did not decline 

the request. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Was additional security provided on that day, 

weeks before the September 11th attack? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The cable, sir, and I have a copy in front 

of me, it closes with, ‘‘U.S. Mission Benghazi will submit request 

to U.S. Embassy Tripoli for additional security upgrades and staffing needs.’’ We never received that additional request. So there was 

no way I could respond to a request that had not yet been submitted. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Do you know if Secretary Clinton saw this cable? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I do not believe so. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me ask you something about a security waiver. 

On September 11, security at the consulate was deemed high on 

the State Department’s threat list. But yet it didn’t meet the minimum security standards as required by the Congress under the 

Secure Embassies Construction and Counterterrorism Act. Somebody at the State Department waived these standards known as 

the Inman standards for our presence in Benghazi. Do you know 

who waived those standards? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. It wasn’t the Inman standards, sir. The 

Inman standards only apply to buildings that we build. What I believe we are talking about here, sir, is what are called the OSPB, 

the Overseas Security Policy Board standards. These are the standards that we were using in Benghazi. But since we had to move 

in Benghazi and we did not have time either to build a new building or to take the months that it takes to retrofit, we took the 

Overseas Security Board standards as our goal. And as I mentioned in response to Mr. Connolly, we were running down those 

standards, adding additional items every day. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I have a memo that was sent to you from 

your staff saying that we needed to bring the facility up to an acceptable standard, to you, Mr. Ambassador. I don’t know what the 

action was. Apparently it was not approved. 

I would like to enter this memo, Mr. Chairman, into the record. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Finally, I have got limited time. I have talked to 

sources on the ground that fateful day when the Marines were deployed from Rota, Spain, into Tripoli and were asked to deplane 

and change into civilian clothing and that that mission was delayed 

by several hours. 

First of all, why wasn’t this plane with Marines that could respond possibly in a timely manner sent to Benghazi? Why wasn’t 

that done? And then, secondly, since it was sent to Tripoli, why 

was it delayed by hours so that they could deplane and change into 

civilian clothing? 

56

Ambassador KENNEDY. First of all, by the time the Marines were 

mustered and that plane was on route, we had already evacuated 

our personnel and we had closed our facility in Benghazi. So there 

was no purpose of them going to Benghazi because there were no 

Americans left there. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So the plane had gone straight from Rota to 

Benghazi, in the 8-hour span of the attack, you are saying to me 

that they could not have responded in a timely manner? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The plane, sir, was moving to Tripoli on 

the 12th, not on the night of the 11th. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me conclude that I think more people, higherups, should be held accountable for what happened that day. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go now to Mr. Joseph Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your service and for testifying 

today. If you needed a second to respond or to finish the question, 

I will give you that time. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. If I could add just two things to what Mr. 

McCaul asked. First of all, on the DC–3. The DC–3, sir, there was 

not in support of the Special Forces detachment. When we opened 

first in Benghazi and then later relocated to Tripoli there was no 

commercial air service available at all into Libya. No commercial 

air service. So we pulled an aircraft from Afghanistan and it was 

running shuttles into Iraq. It was never based there, it was based 

in Malta at that point. When commercial air service was established there was no longer a need for that aircraft. So it had nothing to do with support of the Special Forces, except when they 

came into Tripoli the first time they flew that plane in. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Thank you, sir. Thank you, 

Mr. Ambassador. And again thank you for your service. I want to 

just begin by recognizing the memory of four brave Americans who 

did give their lives in service to our country that day and say that 

I think the best thing we can do is, obviously, ask some very tough 

questions about what happened, why it happened, and what we 

can do to try to move forward. 

In that vein, if there are reforms that need to be made to our 

Embassies or our foreign policy and to the ARB process, we should 

make them. But the focus should be on lessons learned and moving 

forward, not focusing on perceived imperfections with and assigning political blame for the highlights of the day. 

And to that end, Mr. Ambassador, I was wondering if you might 

be able to enlighten me. I believe the ARB process began in 1986 

after legislation was passed. Is that right? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And, sir, do you know how 

many ARBs have been convened since then? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The count is either 18 or 19, depending 

on whether you count the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi as either two 

or one. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And, sir, if we are going with 

that 18 figure, how many of those were under Republican Presidents? Figure 13 sound okay? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I will accept that figure, sir. 

57

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Two under Ronald Reagan, 

Honduras and Greece; three under the first President Bush, Philippines, Bolivia, and, Peru; eight under the second President Bush, 

Jordan, Gaza, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That sounds correct, sir. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And, sir, do you have any idea 

during the course of this time of any major reform efforts that were 

done, initiated by Congress of the ARB process? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Okay. So, now, sir, if I can, 

turning to the witnesses, there have been a number of questions 

today about which witnesses were and weren’t called. Did you have 

any influence over which witnesses were called to testify over the 

ARB process? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. Once the ARB started, my only 

contact was to be a witness. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Did Secretary Clinton have 

any influence over who was called to testify before that process? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Did the administration attempt to influence that process in anyway? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Okay. Now, moving forward, 

you had mentioned, and it is been referenced several times today, 

29 different recommendations that the ARB found and recommended to State Department to try to implement, and you have 

broken that down to I believe it was 64 different action steps. 

Which, given that the focus I believe should be going forward what 

can be done to protect our diplomats as we are asking them to represent the United States in continually volatile areas of the world, 

what are the highlights, where should Congress be focused? If it is 

financially, where should those resources be directed? If it is 

through policy, what are those policies? If you can do that in a 

minute. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I think the two most important things 

are the ARB’s recommendation that there be capability of funding 

to construct new Embassies of the character and the quality of, 

say, a Tunis or a Khartoum, Sudan, which were able to withstand 

attacks until either our own military forces can arrive or until host 

nation forces muster and do that. And secondly is the issue about 

additional local guard capabilities. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Mr. Ambassador, I see in your 

testimony that you indicated that such an Embassy could take up 

to 4 years to site, plan, construct, and finish. Is there ways that 

we can speed that process up? Is that delayed because of bureaucracy? Trying to spend 4 years to build an Embassy seems like a 

long time. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That, sir, is the entire from finding the 

land—and you have to buy land overseas for this—through a complex process. An Embassy is not just like any old office building, 

as you can imagine, because of the security, both technical and 

physical, we build into the physical plant, and that simply takes 

longer, sir. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Thank you. 

58

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We now go to Mr. Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In its report of the attack, the Accountability Review Board 

found that there was ‘‘unsatisfactory leadership performance, systematic failures in leadership, and management deficiencies at senior levels.’’ It would seem to me in the normal world, which would 

be outside of government, if somebody reviewed a business or an 

entity and found that there were deficiencies and lack of leadership 

and lack of accountability, somebody would face the consequences. 

They would see the music. But not so with the government, especially the State Department. Four junior employees were placed on 

leave in December for their actions and their judgments related to 

Benghazi. But Secretary Kerry, when he came in, he said, oh, it is 

okay, come on back. In fact, Elizabeth Dibble has been promoted 

to Deputy Chief of Mission in London. No one has been held accountable for, as I have quoted the Accountability Review Board, 

‘‘unsatisfactory leadership performance.’’

And in this case it is not just like missing a memo. People have 

died. I know there are those in the administration who says that 

was a long time ago. But to those four families it was a death of 

four individuals. And when you mess up in leadership like this and 

people die it would seem to me somebody has to be, if we can use 

the word, punished for that. But no one has been punished at all 

in this situation. 

And then you look on the other side. To quote the President, here 

is what he said: ‘‘My biggest priority now is bringing these folks 

to justice.’’ Okay. That is what he said a year ago. ‘‘My biggest priority now is bringing these folks to justice.’’ It would seem to me 

that the President should be just as concerned about Americans 

dying in Libya as he is about Syrians dying in Syria. That seems 

to be the priority now, not bringing these folks to justice, because 

they haven’t been brought to justice. 

My background is as a prosecutor and a judge. I have seen a lot 

of cases made by a lot of law enforcement, and you are here and 

you have told us, I can’t tell you what the FBI, the DOD, and all 

of our intelligence agencies are doing to capture the bad guys because I assume it is classified. Well, after a year, we can’t find 

these people, but yet a CNN reporter can go to Benghazi at a hotel, 

at a coffee shop and have coffee with the suspected ringleader who 

has been indicted by our Government. Maybe the FBI ought to just 

ask the CNN reporter, how did you get ahold of this guy? Why 

don’t we bring him back? I am skeptical, and people I represent are 

skeptical about the administration, the State Department, and the 

FBI not bringing these killers to justice. 

My question to you: Do you believe Ansar al-Sharia was responsible for the attack on the Benghazi mission? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I think that is one of the questions that 

is still being sorted out. It is possible that it was. It is possible it 

was them and others. That is being sorted out. 

Mr. POE. Do you think they were involved? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. This was——

Mr. POE. You are the guy that should know. Do you think they 

were involved or not? 

59

Ambassador KENNEDY. I know that this was a terrorist attack. 

And it doesn’t matter to me whether it was Ansar al-Sharia or Al 

Qaeda or whoever. These were terrorists. And whatever organization they belong to, they are enemies of the United States and they 

must be brought to justice. 

Mr. POE. Do you think Ansar al-Sharia should be named as a foreign terrorist organization? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is not in my domain. 

Mr. POE. You have not thought about that. Okay. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. But I will take the question back to my 

colleagues. 

Mr. POE. Well, it would seem like you would want to know what 

group was involved, and it doesn’t make any difference to you. But 

do you believe it was terrorists that were involved in this murder. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I didn’t say I don’t care who was involved. I am saying that there were clearly a range of individuals 

who attacked our facility that night, and they were terrorists. 

Mr. POE. And you will get back with me on whether you think 

the Ansar al-Sharia should be a——

Ambassador KENNEDY. I will be glad to take that question. 

Mr. POE. You are aware, of course, on September the 12th, our 

time, they claimed responsibility for this, the next day, the next 

morning. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes. And then someone else claiming to 

be Ansar al-Sharia withdrew that claim. 

Mr. POE. But at the end of the day, here we are. Nobody has 

been taken out, nobody is in custody, nobody is in jail, and on the 

side of the State Department, nobody is in jail, accountable for the 

murder. So whether it is the people who were responsible for the 

killing or the people who may have made mistakes about the administration of this, nobody is in custody. 

Last question. Have people in the—may I ask the question, Mr. 

Chairman? 

Chairman ROYCE. I am afraid your time has expired, Mr. Poe. 

But——

Ambassador KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, can I respond to the previous question? 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, I am going to suggest that we go now to 

Lois Frankel. And, Mr. Poe, if you want to pass your question down 

to one of the other members on the committee, I am sure they can 

ask it. 

And, Ms. Frankel, if you want to allow the Ambassador to respond, I am sure he can do it. But we are going to stick to the 

clock. And we go now to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

very gracious way of handling these meetings. 

Mr. Kennedy, Ambassador, thank you for your service. And, 

please, if you want to answer. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. In response to the last question, Congressman, I believe that individuals of the State Department were 

held responsible. Being a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State or an 

Assistant Secretary of State is not, I humbly submit, sir, being a 

junior employee. Those are senior positions in the State Department. And for one of those individuals to resign as the Assistant 

60

Secretary and then all of them be relieved of their responsibilities 

is a serious act of accountability, to be relieved at that level. 

And, secondly, Benghazi has taken, even since the events of 9/11, 

has taken a serious turn for the worse. Yes, they will let journalists 

in, but they are not letting U.S. law enforcement in to arrest people 

there because the Government of Libya is not in control to that degree. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, sir. First, I wanted to start by saying 

I know everybody here shares the grief of the families who lost 

their loved ones in this tragedy. And I think we all recognize that 

it is in a large part the work that our diplomats do that plays a 

role in securing the freedoms that we enjoy, including this discussion which, with great respect and fondness for my colleagues, I 

don’t concur in some of the tone. 

With that said, I want to thank Mr. Joe Wilson and Mr. Dana 

Rohrabacher and, of course, our chair that allowed me to visit—Mr. 

Rohrabacher, we visited NATO, and I went with Mr. Wilson to 

AFRICOM. And I want to say that we did have discussions with 

the highest military commanders about Benghazi. And they were 

all unanimous in saying that there was no military action that they 

thought could have saved the day once attack began, which I think 

is what you did state to us. 

We keep hearing that no one is being held accountable. But I do 

want you to clarify one particular point, which is, did the ARB, did 

they conclude that no individual had breached their duty? Was that 

a finding? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct, Congresswoman. The 

ARB said that two individuals had not carried out their responsibilities in the way they could, but they did not find a breach of 

duty. And what Secretary Kerry’s decision was, was to validate the 

ARB’s decision, but actually go farther than the ARB’s decision and 

relieve all four of their senior-level positions. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And I don’t want anyone to forget, and I think we 

all understand that the responsibility, the sole responsibility, as 

ARB said, for this attack was on terrorists. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And I think you told Mr. Grayson that Mr. Stevens could move freely about in Benghazi in order to do—he was 

moving freely about in order to do his job. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes. Yes. He was authorized as an Ambassador to go to any location in his country of assignment without 

Washington approval. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And, of course, an attack could have taken place 

out in the field. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct. And there is an inherent 

danger to being a United States representative. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So my final question to you is, just what have we 

learned from this that helps us assess when the conditions are just 

too dangerous for a diplomat to remain? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Our position is—and this is something 

that we are constantly enhancing—is every day we review the 

threat levels at all posts in the world, not only the highest threat 

posts. And if we reach a point where we believe that the mitigation 

61

tools that are available to us cannot lower that threat level down, 

then we close the post. 

If I might offer you one example. We were in Damascus, Syria, 

continuing to operate there several years ago. We kept monitoring 

the situation. And one morning my Diplomatic Security colleagues 

and I concluded that, given the situation on the ground in Damascus, we could no longer mitigate the risk sufficiently. I went to see 

the Secretary of State, and she instantaneously gave me approval 

to suspend operations in Damascus and pull out our people. If 

there is intelligence or any other information available to us, that 

our mitigation strategies are no longer valid, then we suspend operations and remove our people. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. All right. We are going to Mr. Jeff Duncan of 

South Carolina at this time. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I yield some time to the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

One question, Mr. Ambassador. Has any State Department employees ever been asked to sign nondisclosure agreements after the 

Benghazi attack? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Not that I am aware of, sir, no. 

Mr. POE. So you don’t know whether they have or they haven’t. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The State Department does not use nondisclosure agreements. 

Mr. POE. So that is a foreign concept to you, nondisclosure agreements, with the State Department? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Well, obviously, we do sign agreements 

not to disclose classified information to individuals who do not have 

classified access. But that is different, I believe, than the thrust of 

your question. You are asking me did we put into place specific 

nondisclosure agreements after Benghazi, and I do not believe we 

did so, sir. 

Mr. POE. Classified or nonclassified? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, no, sir. 

Mr. POE. I yield back to the gentleman from South Carolina. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from Texas for an excellent 

line of questioning and points made about Americans being dismayed that no one has been brought to justice in Benghazi, the 

perpetrators, nor has anyone been brought to disciplinary action 

other than a slap on the hand within the Department of State. 

That needs to happen. Just being removed and reassigned to another position is not justifiable. People need to lose their jobs over 

the failures that were admitted to here today, were pointed out in 

the ARB report. 

And I want to thank the gentleman for mentioning and acknowledging that it was a terrorist attack. That is more than the former 

Secretary of State was willing to do, sitting in that very chair, Mr. 

Under Secretary. 

A lot of questions remain about Benghazi, questions that won’t 

be answered today, but questions that need to be asked. What was 

Ambassador Stevens doing in Benghazi on 11 September? Did he 

have a dinner or a meeting with the Turkish officials? What was 

62

the substance of those meetings? Was it funneling arms from the 

Libyan rebels to the Syrian fighters through Turkey? 

A great impact on regional security has been the proliferation of 

shoulder-fired missiles or MANPADS, Man-Portable Air-Defense 

Systems, leaking out of Libya since weapon depots were heavily 

looted during Libya fighting. Out of Libya’s 20,000 MANPADS inventory, how many are accounted for today? How many had been 

recovered under that mission going on in Benghazi? And how many 

were stored in Benghazi that ultimately fell in the hands of the 

Libyan rebels and possibly Al Qaeda? Can you answer that question? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I will have to get you that information for 

the record, sir. I don’t have that with me. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. The question that I have is, who knew what 

and when? You are familiar with the term NOIWON, sir? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. For the committee, that is a secure telephone conference call system between major Washington national 

security watch centers. It is used for rapid evaluation of a breaking 

crisis. Was there a NOIWON initiated by the State Department on 

or prior to 11 September, 2012? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I believe there was. I know there were 

massive interagency telephone calls going on. I can check that. But 

I know that I was on numerous calls with officials from other U.S. 

Government agencies. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I appreciate that. I am specifically talking about 

NOIWON. So I am going to make a formal request to you and the 

State Department today for the activity logs of the Department of 

State, its op center, and its Bureau of Intel and Research for any 

NOIWON activity prior to and during the 9/11/2012 timeframe for 

Libya and specifically Benghazi. I want to know who was on the 

call and what the substance of the call was. And we will put that 

in writing to you as well. 

There are so many questions that need to be asked and answered 

about the disciplinary action at the Department of State. Is it true 

that you required a daily report of the personnel in country and 

that you personally approved every official American who went to 

Tripoli or Benghazi either on official business or assignment or a 

TDY? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I set a cap for the number of personnel 

who were to be in Benghazi, and we controlled, because it was a 

post with——

Mr. DUNCAN. But did you require a daily report on all the personnel in country? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I don’t believe I got a daily report. I never 

remember getting a daily on everyone in country. I would get questions from time to time about adding or subtracting personnel. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Just the limited time. Gregory Hicks, former Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Tripoli, noted that in his testimony before. So my question is, do you require that for every country or was this is an obsession with Libya at that point in time? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. At certain posts which are either under 

evacuation or ordered departure status, we keep track down to the 

single number. 

63

Mr. DUNCAN. And I can see the merit there. So I am out of time. 

You will reply to my request on NOIWON. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Absolutely. And as you say, you have 

other questions. I would be glad to come see you or any other member of the committee individually and engage in a fuller discussion. 

Chairman ROYCE. We appreciate that. We also would appreciate 

those documents because we don’t know what legal standing you 

have not to turn them over to us. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Now we are going to go to Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There are three regrettable things with regard to Libya. First 

and most regrettable, we lost Ambassador Stevens and three others. We were in Benghazi at a time when it turned out not to be 

safe to be there on that day. Second, there was what I call talk 

show error as to the reason that the attack took place. And then, 

third, we haven’t been able to bring the culprits to justice. 

The gentleman from Texas points out that, well, CNN was able 

to talk to some terrorists in Libya, so why can’t we. I will point out, 

very often terrorists make themselves available in clandestine 

meetings with American journalists. Daniel Pearl was in just such 

a situation; it turned out the terrorists killed him. But terrorists 

may allow themselves to come into contact with journalists while 

hiding from our military. 

Has the Libyan Government authorized us to take kinetic action 

against terrorists in Benghazi if we believe that they are responsible for the death of Ambassador Stevens? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. We are working very, very closely with 

the Government of Libya. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Can you give me a yes or a no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Let me take that question for the record, 

sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would sure like to know the answer. Take for 

the record usually means never get an answer. Because I will point 

out that we were holding over $25 billion of Libyan assets. I and 

others urged that that money be held on to at least to cover our 

costs. Had we done so, we might have a little bit of leverage with 

Libya. Right now all we have is the gratitude of the Libyan Government, which wouldn’t exist without us. That gratitude seems to 

be insufficient for you to be able to give me a positive answer. 

These are murderers of Ambassador Stevens and you can’t tell me 

whether we have the right to bring them to justice should we be 

able to locate them and determine who is guilty. 

Now, as to the talk show error, I will simply point out that at 

my town halls, if you had to ask anybody which State Department 

person is responsible for stating on talk shows, for the fact that it 

was stated on talk shows that this was caused by a bad movie or 

a YouTube video, they would say, well, I turned on the TV, I saw 

Susan Rice. It turned out the statements she was making were not 

accurate. I don’t think there is anybody who observes Washington 

politics who doesn’t think Susan Rice has paid a price for the fact 

that those were the talking points she was given. And all of us who 

have to rely on others for the talking points we have know that it 

is our face that is there and if I make mistakes based on my staff, 

64

it is the voters who will not allow me to have an office. I think 

Susan Rice has paid a price. 

Now let’s talk about the most critical decision, and that was the 

decision to have Ambassador Stevens there. As I understand it, 

Ambassador Stevens was not just the authorized Ambassador, he 

was probably in the State Department the person most knowledgeable about Libya. Is that generally correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I think so, sir. He had served before as 

the Deputy Chief. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So if we had to have one person in the State Department decide whether to take the risk, Ambassador Stevens was 

equipped to do so; he was a hero, he knew the risk that he was 

taking. Now, all of us, every time a soldier goes to try to take a 

hill, they don’t know whether it is a 1 percent risk or a 99 percent 

risk, but they know it is a significant risk of their life. Ambassador 

Stevens knew he was risking his life. He was a hero in that he put 

his job first. And now we come back and say, well, with hindsight, 

it turns out to be a bigger risk than the Ambassador should have 

taken. 

Was there any pressure on Ambassador Stevens to go to 

Benghazi or to go to Benghazi knowing the number of security personnel that he would be taking with him? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. We put no pressure on Ambassador Stevens to go——

Mr. SHERMAN. So he knew where he was going, he understood—

it is very hard to understand Libya—but he understood as well as 

anybody in our government. He understood the number of security 

personnel that were already there. He understood the number of 

CIA personnel that were already there. He understood the number 

of security people he was taking with him. He understood Libya as 

well as possible. He decided to risk his life in the service of his 

country. And then we are told nobody paid a price for the decision 

to take that risk. I think Ambassador Stevens paid a price for his 

heroism. And it is very hard for me to say that there was anybody 

outside Libya who made the decision or should have been making 

the decision as to whether Ambassador Stevens went to Benghazi 

that day. Do you have a comment on that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, it is the job of an American Ambassador to go into harm’s way. We try every day to mitigate that risk 

to the maximum extent possible. But it is inherently dangerous, as 

you say, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Adam Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here. We appreciate it. I 

appreciate your service to your country. I also thank, you know, 

soldiers all around the globe for their service to their country and 

especially for those that were involved in this incident. 

And, you know, one of the things soldiers and airmen like I am 

are always taught is that your country will always be there. As I 

have said earlier, that your country will move heaven and earth to 

ensure that you will be protected, to ensure that if you find yourself under attack they will come and get you. 

65

I heard a colleague earlier mention that, you know, we need answers. This isn’t about exploiting this for political gain. Somehow 

implying that, you know, our side of the aisle is just interested in 

embarrassing the administration and just gaining in politics here. 

I take a huge exception to that. And I have to get this on the 

record. Because when four Americans die, and I see that there was 

7 hours before a first and a second attack, and I know that there 

were military assets nearby that within 7 hours could have responded, and I hear the Department of Defense even come out and 

say, well, we never could have made it by the 7th hour, but they 

had no idea that attack was coming. And hopefully they didn’t 

know that second attack was coming or there would be a whole line 

of questions about why there weren’t assets in place in the first 

place. But when I hear that it really bothers me, because my belief 

as an airman, as a pilot myself, and as just a member of the military, is that when people die and when there is not a serious military response, I would hope that if I was in that situation, the 

House Foreign Affairs Committees would keep having hearings for 

a year or two until they found out what really happened. So I think 

that is important. 

You also mentioned earlier, too, that it doesn’t really—and I 

know what you meant, but you said it really doesn’t matter who 

did it, just that was done, it was terrorism. I think it does matter, 

I think we need answers on that because ultimately it gives us a 

blueprint on who we need to kill or capture, which I think is very 

important. And I hope that that is done. 

I had another colleague earlier that asked you if there was any 

force nearby that could have responded between the beginning of 

the attack and by the time Ambassador Stevens was killed, and 

you said no, and that is probably true, there was about a 90-minute 

lag. Again, there were three other Americans that died 7 hours 

later. 

You also mentioned that the nearest military assets were in 

Djibouti. I have been to Djibouti as a Congressman. It is an important base and I appreciate that. Are you familiar with Aviano Air 

Base, sir? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am, sir. And if I said, the reason I cited 

Djibouti is that is what the Defense Department has told me. So 

that is not—I am quoting——

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. I got it. I am sure they are aware of 

Aviano as well. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KINZINGER. But it is 1,049 miles away from Benghazi direct 

flight. Those are F–16s, by the way. They can kind of haul. Dallas 

to Washington, which you mentioned, I think is 1,330 miles away. 

So actually Aviano is closer. And there is something that we can 

do called a show of force in which a plane comes in, flies very low, 

and scatters an enemy. And I have always wondered why in 8 

hours we couldn’t have made that happen. 

Now, the question on the SST. You made the decision to terminate the SST, I believe, and that was as of August 2012. Now, you 

testified today, I believe, that there was a replacement to the SST, 

correct? So that was not a loss of capacity? 

66

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct. The State Department replaced the capacities, and six of the billets that were part of the 

16 remained in country. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And they were based out of Tripoli. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. They were based in Tripoli. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Ultimately responded to Benghazi. So was there 

movement during the attacks from the replacement team to 

Benghazi? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir, they did. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And how did they get there? Did they charter an 

aircraft? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Charted an aircraft. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Didn’t we have a DC–3 that they could have 

hopped on? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, the DC–3 was—it was no longer 

there. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Why not? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. But the DC–3 was never based in Tripoli. 

The DC–3 was based in Malta. And so when we would have 

had——

Mr. KINZINGER. But our prior SST would have utilized that DC–

3, correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Who would have? Who is flying that? Not who 

is flying it, but what are we using it for? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The DC–3, in effect, ran a shuttle between the commercial airport in Malta and Tripoli before there was 

any commercial airline service established. Once commercial airline 

service was established, U.S. Government personnel moved between——

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. But we had to charter an aircraft to 

get that replacement team into Benghazi. And how long did that 

take, do you know? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I can look. I can look at the timeline. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, it took X amount of time. But they were 

able to respond in time—or they were able to respond, definitely, 

not probably in time. It is interesting that chartering an aircraft 

can actually be done faster than the military can have an aircraft 

on alert and respond to Benghazi in a short amount of time with 

F–16 power. So I thought that was interesting. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Randy Weber of Texas. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. WEBER. You remember that, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I don’t ever remember hearing the commercial, but I am well aware of it, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Who didn’t answer that call that night? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I believe that the call was answered, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Who didn’t keep Mary Stevens’—that is Chris Stevens’ mother’s son—safe? Are you convinced that we have gotten 

to the bottom of who is accountable? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir, I am. 

67

Mr. WEBER. Would you like the task of going to Mary Stevens 

and explaining to her that four people getting reassigned is paying 

a price? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Sir, they were not reassigned. They were 

relieved of their senior-level positions. That is a serious disciplinary 

action. 

Mr. WEBER. You said in your remarks that you presented to us, 

on page 6, that under the Vienna Convention of 1961, I am quoting 

you now, ‘‘We do our part.’’ And you kind of intimated, where necessary, ‘‘sending Marine security guards.’’ Who didn’t send the Marine security guards into Benghazi? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. We had at that point, we and the Department of Defense had only enough personnel to deploy 152 Marine 

security guard detachments and we had 285 posts. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you think that that is an acceptable explanation 

to Ms. Mary Stevens? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. It is the facts, sir. And it is also part of 

your helping us get the additional funding that is allowing us to 

increase security. 

Mr. WEBER. You answered the question. On page 9, you also said 

regarding the ARB recommendations, and I am quoting you, the 

Department has ‘‘created a Deputy Assistant Secretary for High 

Threat Posts.’’ And then you intimate, who undoubtedly will send 

Marines. Well, if the ARB has asked for a new post, whose responsibility was that before Benghazi happened? If we have created a 

post just to do that, whose responsibility was that? And then you 

went on to say that you believe it was everybody’s responsibility, 

security was everyone’s responsibility. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct, sir, I did say that. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So in the report you agreed with the fact that 

there are those who are—you say that were held accountable. I call 

it reassignment. I don’t recall your question. Was anybody denied 

pay or benefits of those four? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. What the Secretary of State was carrying 

out is a review, and under the American system of fairness, we do 

not, in effect, find someone guilty until the review is complete. 

Mr. WEBER. You said actually, I am quoting from you earlier, you 

said, ‘‘That is an essential element of American fairness.’’ That is 

what you said sitting in that chair. But let me tell you this: The 

American public expects that an essential element of fairness is 

that we get to the bottom of this and someone is held accountable. 

You said that the ARB report, and I am quoting what you said 

here today, is that no one had a breach of duty. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is what the ARB found, sir. That is 

what the statute——

Mr. WEBER. Yet you just sat there and retestified that security 

was everyone’s responsibility. What is the difference between responsibility and duty? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I don’t see a difference. 

Mr. WEBER. So there was a breach of duty then. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. There was not a breach of duty in your opinion? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No. 

68

Mr. WEBER. And you would be okay explaining that to Mary Stevens? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I believe, sir, that there was no breach of 

duty. The ARB found that and I concur——

Mr. WEBER. I am almost done here, Mr. Chairman. 

I would submit to you, Ambassador, that it is Congress’ duty, 

your duty, to get to the bottom of this and someone is held accountable. And if we don’t do that, then we, in essence, have had a 

breach of duty. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, thank you for being here. You are in an important 

position. I am sure you are busy. You are the Secretary for Management, correct, Secretary for Management? Under Secretary——

Ambassador KENNEDY. Under Secretary for Management. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes, thank you for the correction. Would you help a 

friend if a friend were in trouble? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Absolutely. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay, so I just want to point out for the record that 

the Secretary had a hand in appointing four of the members of the 

ARB, and according to your previous testimony and answers to the 

chairman that you made recommendations regarding those positions or those potential appointees. No question regarding that. Do 

you read your emails when a crisis situation is occurring? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I read every email before I go home in 

the evening, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. All right, thank you. Should the State Department, 

excepting issues of national security or operational security or classified information, be generally transparent? Should the Department of State be generally transparent, excepting those issues? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Absolutely. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. And should Foreign Service and military 

servicemembers have an expectation that the U.S. Government is 

going to do everything it can to ensure their personal safety? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Absolutely. 

Mr. PERRY. So when did you know based on solid intelligence 

that the rhetoric your agency and the administration was telling 

the American people and the world was incorrect? When did you 

know that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. After the television talk shows. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, they went on for weeks, so can you be specific? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The information that Ambassador Rice 

used on those television talk shows was based on information provided——

Mr. PERRY. Okay, so you are not going to be specific. I am holding up, and I am sure you won’t recognize this. First of all, you are 

far away, with all due respect. But second of all, this is a transcribed copy of an email in which you are included and it is as of 

12:46 or quarter to 1 on the 12th, so a day later, in which Ansar 

al-Sharia is noted by Assistant Secretary Beth Jones. So at that 

point, per your testimony, you knew by that afternoon, since you 

read your emails at the end of each day to be sure, that you knew 

at that point. 

69

What did you do——

Ambassador KENNEDY. If I might, sir, Ansar al-Sharia—later a 

spokesperson from Ansar al-Sharia said they were responsible. 

Mr. PERRY. I understand that. But at that moment—that is 

later—but at that moment, at that moment you knew——

Ambassador KENNEDY. The next day they withdrew. 

Mr. PERRY. But at that moment you knew. What did you do? 

What did you do? You are a manager. What did you personally do 

to set the ship straight on the talking points and the message that 

was going out to the American people and the world? What did you 

do? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I knew at that point that Ansar alSharia’s spokesman had withdrawn that claim. And I am, as you 

said rightly, sir, I am a management officer at the State Department. When you get complex issues like responsibility claims——

Mr. PERRY. When the government of the country understands 

and recognizes it was a terrorist attack, and you already said in 

this committee hearing, in this chair, in this hour that you recognized it as a terrorist attack, and you don’t do anything to change 

it. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The collectivity of the Intelligence Community concluded what they concluded. 

Mr. PERRY. That it is a terrorist attack. And for 3 weeks your 

administration, your Department put out to the American people 

that it was not. It was a spontaneous eruption of a demonstration. 

Let me move on. 

You are a manager. Again, you are a manager so you can get 

things done. You are at a high level. Why must this committee 

transcribe—this is an email to you, it is not an email form—why 

must we transcribe all the information that we get? Why can’t we 

get it and get copies of it? We will make the copies of it. Why can’t 

we? Why must we subpoena it? Why aren’t you forthcoming, you 

personally? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The chairman has already——

Mr. PERRY. I am asking you. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The chairman has already posed that 

question and I have taken the question. 

Mr. PERRY. And what was your answer? What are you doing 

about it? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am taking the question back to the 

State Department, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. But you are in a position of managing. What are you 

going to do? Instead of taking the question, what are you going to 

do to answer it right now? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am telling you, sir, that I am taking the 

question. 

Mr. PERRY. Listen, I don’t want to point fingers and it has been 

alleged here. I am not here to point fingers. But I think it is abundantly clear after a year to the American people what is happening 

here. This administration, and your Department in particular, are 

stonewalling. They don’t want to give up the information. They 

have been doing that since this began. They actively misled at the 

time and continue to mislead now regarding the facts. We just 

want the facts. 

70

It is apparent that the information that came out regarding the 

talking points did not comport with the President’s narrative, did 

not comport with the President’s narrative in election time with a 

Presidential election looming, and so they had to be changed. That 

is apparent. It is also apparent that the administration continues 

to hide this fact from the American people. 

And with regard to Foreign Service officers, it is apparent that 

if that happens again and it does not fit with the President’s narrative, they will be left to be killed, sodomized, and have their 

bloody bodies drug through the streets for all the world to see instead of having this administration find out what really happened. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, may I respond? 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Sir, I have been a Foreign Service officer 

for 40 years. We do everything we can, as I have outlined here, to 

attempt to mitigate the risk to our personnel overseas. But being 

a diplomat is an inherently risky activity. I cannot, nor can any of 

my colleagues, nor can I believe that anyone can end that risk. We 

do everything we can to mitigate that risk, but we cannot end the 

risk. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to Mr. Trey Radel from Florida. 

Mr. RADEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Could you tell me about the—we know that the four people are 

relieved of their senior positions. They essentially get reassigned 

somewhere else. Can you tell me what—you got Ray, Eric, Scott, 

Charlene who are the four here—what are they doing today? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. One of them has been reassigned to a 

lower-level position in the Bureau of African Affairs, one is the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, and the other two are in 

the process of being reassigned to positions of lesser responsibility 

with no worldwide purview. 

Mr. RADEL. So these, undoubtedly, unquestionably are not higher 

seniority levels, correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. They have been reassigned to positions of 

lesser responsibility, yes, sir. 

Mr. RADEL. Lesser responsibility. Okay. And quickly, with Mr. 

Raymond Maxwell, I don’t understand why he gets put on administrative leave when his duties do not include any review, approval, 

or even formations of recommendations regarding security resources in Libya. Why is this? How does this guy fit in? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Mr. Maxwell was the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs responsible for the Maghreb, meaning the band of countries across the 

North African littoral, including Libya; that Libya was within his 

purview——

Mr. RADEL. Within his purview. 

Ambassador KENNEDY [continuing]. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Maghreb. 

Mr. RADEL. So I think you would agree with me all of us here 

regardless of what side of the aisle we are on, we know that it is 

important to learn from our mistakes. Part of the improvements 

that we on this committee have done, we passed some legislation. 

I worked with Congresswoman Frankel on the Protecting AmeriVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:31 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\091813\82842 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cans Abroad Act, which allows State to hire the best of the best 

when it comes to security, not the cheapest. We are proud of that. 

We have a bipartisan committee here. And this is not political 

what we are doing here. 

We know that it is important to learn from mistakes, but we also 

need accountability, which is why we are here today. We need to 

show the American people who we are beholden to, taxpaying 

Americans, that we are responsible. But it also sends a message 

that being inept will not be tolerated and this will never, ever happen again. 

People are dead. There are four men who are dead. The young 

girls will never walk down their aisle with their father at their 

wedding, young boys will never be able to toss a football with their 

dad. And the people who are responsible for this have been relieved 

of their senior positions. 

You had said it earlier, reassignment equals accountability. It 

does not equal accountability. Reassignment does not equal accountability. They are reassigned. They are being put into another 

position where they have never missed a paycheck, where they are 

going to have their cushy government job, and they are still going 

to get a pension. 

In the real world, this would never happen. This would never, 

ever happen. They would be fired, they would be terminated because they failed. And four people, including an Ambassador, are 

dead. This is unacceptable. 

I hope that in a bipartisan fashion we can in some way, shape, 

or form actually have someone be held accountable, and that not 

only within our own Government, but let’s pray that we find the 

people that are responsible for this attack because everyone has 

blood on their hands. It is unacceptable. Reassignment does not 

equal accountability. 

Mr. Chair, I yield the rest of my time. My question was answered. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Kennedy, thank you for being here. I agree with the 

Congressmen on my left, or to the left over here, Engel, Meeks, and 

Connolly, that we should focus on making our Embassy and personnel safer around the world. However, in order to do that we 

must look at our failures of the past so we do not make those same 

mistakes again. And I want to kind of reference a report here: Deputy Chief of Missions for Embassy Tripoli Gregory Hicks stated 

that Secretary Clinton wanted Benghazi converted to a permanent 

constituent post. Ambassador Pickering, when he was asked by the 

ARB and when this was discussed, he kind of looked surprised, 

looked both ways. Does the seventh floor know about this? And it 

brought up questioning that they should look at this through the 

ARB, which stands for Accountability Review Board. 

In addition, looking back at the past, the 1999 ARB report states 

that the—issued response to the bombings of the U.S. Embassy in 

Kenya and Tanzania. This report urged that the Secretary of 

State—the Secretary of State—should take a personal and active 

role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of 

U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad. And the Board should have quesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:31 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\091813\82842 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tioned the extent to which the Secretary fulfilled or did not fulfill 

this mandate. 

And again, with Ambassador Stevens making multiple requests 

for security and being denied, in lieu of this report that looks in 

the past so that we don’t make those same reports again, would 

you agree that we should have probably questioned higher up in 

the chain of command? And I am going to do you a favor, my questions are going to be pretty much yes or no. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Your first question about the permanent 

post in Benghazi, the Secretary of State never said to me establish 

a permanent post in Benghazi. And I would have been the person 

who would have launched——

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Chairman, I have got this report here. I will submit it for questioning. Let me ask—okay, go ahead, the second one. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Your second one. The Secretary of State 

does take her responsibilities very, very seriously. As I mentioned 

earlier, when I went to the Secretary of State and said the situation in Damascus, Syria, had reached the point where we could no 

longer mitigate the risk, the Secretary instantaneously replied take 

the people out. 

We had no actionable intelligence, as the Director of National Intelligence had said, about this threat in Benghazi, and therefore, 

I never went to the Secretary of State and told her it was time to 

leave Benghazi. 

Mr. YOHO. All right, let me ask you this. I am going to cut you 

off. Do you think that the ARB should have questioned higher up 

its question? Yes or no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is a judgment for the ARB, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Who do you report to directly? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I report to the Secretary of State. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. So is it fair to say that you are accountable 

to the Secretary. You said yes. As the Under Secretary for Management you are responsible for the people, resources, budgets, facilities, technology, financial, operations, consular affairs, logistics, 

contracting, and security for the Department of State operations, 

and as the Secretary’s principal advisor on management issues. Is 

that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. The people under you report directly to you, 

correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. You oversee their day-to-day operations? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. They are accountable to you. And you said that is correct. If they fail in their job description and it affects your Department’s mission objective, would that ultimately be your responsibility? Yes or no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Absolutely. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Would it be a sign of lack of management? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Not necessarily. 

Mr. YOHO. Would it be a lack of failure of your job and responsibility? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Not necessarily. 

73

Mr. YOHO. Since you stated that you report directly to the Secretary and if you feel that your job duty or subordinates, you are 

saying it is not necessarily your superior’s fault either? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir, correct. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. For the record, Mrs. Clinton was the Secretary of State at the time. We all know that. The reports I have 

and when I was present with this committee and we interviewed 

Ms. Clinton, she stated that she requested personally for Ambassador Stevens to come to this post, to take this assignment. Are 

you aware of that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir, I am the one who set up the appointment between Chris and the Secretary. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. The reports I have said that the Embassy in 

Benghazi was understaffed and underprotected by the standards at 

the time. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is the ARB’s conclusion. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Also the reports I read said that Ambassador Stevens said there were increased tensions between the personnel and local Benghazi population. That is correct, isn’t it? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That was what Chris reported. But there 

were no threats against the U.S. temporary mission facility or 

against our personnel. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Reports also stated that Ambassador Stevens 

had requested increased security on more than one occasion, correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. That is correct. 

Mr. YOHO. Reports said that the request for increased security 

was turned down each time and we know that is correct. Who 

turned those down, do you know? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I reviewed the situation, and every request, as I have testified before, every request that was made for 

improvements were okayed and funded with the exception of the 

four guard towers which I mentioned earlier. 

Mr. YOHO. I yield back, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Meadows is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ambassador Kennedy, this gets down to two things. One is accountability and the second is trust, and we must have the accountability before we can restore the trust of the American people 

in terms of what happened in Benghazi or what may happen in the 

future. So I would like to refocus our attention on these four people 

that you say they have lost their titles. But let me be clear, they 

have not lost any money or any benefits, yes or no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So they have gotten paid. They got an 8-

month paid leave while the State Department has done their investigation, yes or no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Correct. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So they have been off for 8 months. I 

also serve on the Government Reform Committee and I know that 

we have made a number of requests that had gone unanswered, 

really. Were there any adverse—adverse, other than title changes 

74

and post changes—were there any adverse personnel actions that 

were taken against these four people that according to the ARB 

were systemically involved in mismanagement? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The ARB actually, sir, talked about two 

people specifically and two others. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. But those two people of being part of the 

four, but the two people, did any adverse actions happen to those 

two people other than title changes? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Sir, if I——

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. A title change——

Mr. MEADOWS. I understand in your opinion a title change is a 

big deal. But we are talking about four dead Americans, so let’s 

look at it. Anything other than that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Being removed as a Deputy Assistant 

Secretary is a major act. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. All right. Well, so let me go on. You mentioned the consideration of other posts and you mentioned two people. It is troubling for me to start to hear reports of where these 

two people are being considered for very high-profile, secure posts 

overseas. And knowing that the State Department takes about 12 

months to go through that, it means that that review process had 

to have started while they were on administrative leave. Are you 

aware of that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. You are correct, sir, that the process we 

assign in——

Mr. MEADOWS. So are you aware that they are being considered 

for high-profile, secure positions overseas? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No one——

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no, are you aware? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am unaware. They have not been assigned anywhere. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I understand they haven’t been assigned. You are 

avoiding my question. Are you aware that they are being considered for high-profile, secure positions overseas? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I guess the answer is no. I mean, obviously——

Mr. MEADOWS. It is either a yes or a no. Are you aware? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Obviously, sir, while this is pending, one 

has to look at the two——

Mr. MEADOWS. But you are in charge. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. But there are two options here. 

The Secretary of State, as he expressed in his letter——

Mr. MEADOWS. I don’t want a narrative. Are you aware, yes or 

no? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Obviously, we had to have options. The 

Secretary of State’s letter said he was either going to fire them or 

make another decision. Depending on what decision he makes——

Mr. MEADOWS. But this is a high-profile post. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am afraid I don’t know this level of detail——

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Well, are you willing as the person in 

charge, you just said you were in charge——

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir, I am. 

75

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. Are you willing to report back to this 

committee within 30 days to make us aware? And I am assuming 

from your response that you wouldn’t be supportive of any highprofile posting for these two individuals, is that correct? You would 

not be supportive of it. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I would not be supportive of any position 

in which these individuals had the same levels of responsibility. 

Mr. MEADOWS. No, that is not what I am asking. A high-profile 

post overseas, that is what I am asking, so you are supportive of 

it? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. No, sir, I am neither one nor the other. 

I am just saying, sir, that profile and responsibility are two different things. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, but that is a judgment call on your part. 

Well, let me go on a little bit further then. This report talks about 

bonuses, between $10,000 to $15,000 bonuses that are given to 

State Department. Up until 2011, those were disclosed publicly. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Right. 

Mr. MEADOWS. It now appears that either you or Secretary Clinton have made a decision not to disclose those. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am unaware of that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you are unaware of that. So you would be glad 

to support it. Because it has been suggested that some of these people in the ARB got bonuses and that now we are not disclosing it 

because it would look bad. You are not aware of that? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am also not aware that anybody in subject of the ARB got a bonus. I will confirm that, but I am not aware 

that they got bonuses. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So who made the decision, you or Secretary Clinton, to not be transparent with regard to bonuses? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I don’t think it was either of us, but I 

have to go back and find out. I may have done something, but that 

is a level of detail——

Mr. MEADOWS. If you will report back. 

I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. Stockman of Texas. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you. 

I have to say after that brief exchange with my colleague, Mr. 

Meadows, my earlier colleague asked if you knew some words. And 

what I am puzzled at is, you earlier mentioned that you hadn’t 

made a determination of what caused the attack, but on all of the 

talk shows we heard was video, video, video, video, including the 

President. But he was asking you if you knew some words, and I 

am going to ask you if you know some words. Yes or no. Do you 

know the word stonewalling? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Do you know the word cover-up? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Do you know the word scandal. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Okay. Well, I am going to yield the balance of 

my time to my good friend from California, Dana, because I feel 

76

that is what happened here today, and I think Mr. Meadows’ line 

of questioning fits those three questions or definitions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for yielding to me. 

Let me just note there are two distinct views of this whole episode in American history. We have you telling us that you believe 

that since that murder of our Ambassador and three other Americans, that terrorist attack, that there has been a full court press 

on the part of the administration to bring those to justice and to 

get the word out to the American people. The opposite view was 

just expressed by my friend Mr. Stockman, what it seems to be is 

a year of obfuscation, stonewalling, denial, and cover-up. I think 

that it is vital for the American people to understand the truth of 

which of these views reflects reality. 

Let me ask you just a couple of questions. How many government employees, including the agency and State Department, et 

cetera, how many Federal Government employees were in 

Benghazi the night of the attack? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I respectfully cannot answer questions that involve classified information in this session. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, would you be, if I could interrupt the 

gentleman, we could do that in a classified setting as early as tomorrow, the next day. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am prepared to appear before this committee at any time——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. All right. Okay. So let me ask you 

something. To your knowledge has any of these—because we have 

been told there are a number of figures out there in terms of 

maybe up to 40 people, 45 people present, some of whom or many 

of whom had skills enough to be engaged in defending our Ambassador and preventing that attack, or at least thwarting it—have 

any of those people, those who were there—of course you can’t tell 

us how many—have any of them been asked not to cooperate with 

congressional or media inquiries or to take lie detector tests? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am unaware of any State Department 

personnel being instructed like that, and the State Department 

does not utilize lie detector tests except in exceptional circumstances. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. I am very happy. You know, look, weasel words. I am unaware of State Department. Did I ask State Department? I didn’t. I don’t think I asked about the State Department. I asked do you have any knowledge of any of those people 

who were on the scene—now, you can’t tell us how many there 

were, but you know they were there—have any of them been told 

not to cooperate with a congressional investigation? Don’t hedge it 

with I don’t know the State Department people. That wasn’t the 

question. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. I am the Under Secretary of State for 

Management, sir, and can only answer questions about the State 

Department. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right, okay. Well, that is a good dodge as 

well. 

Let me ask you this. There is an Ambassador who has been murdered. We have three other people who have been murdered. It is 

a terrorist attack. Why is it the CIA, and why aren’t they the ones 

77

doing this investigation? Why is it the FBI? I thought the FBI was 

supposed to be doing internal domestic investigations. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. By statute, sir, the FBI is charged with 

the responsibility for the killing of any American citizen overseas. 

That is an FBI responsibility by statute. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The FBI obviously works with the CIA 

and works with the military, but that is a congressional statute 

that gives the FBI that responsibility. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Gives them the sole responsibility? 

Ambassador KENNEDY. The FBI is a law enforcement agency, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And this is not, and let me make it very 

clear, we are not talking about a crime in the United States. We 

are not talking about law enforcement. And this is one of the distinct differences between the administration and other people who 

disagree with its approach. What we are talking about here is a 

terrorist attack which is not a criminal matter, which is a matter 

of national security, which the CIA and all the rest of our intelligence agencies should have been involved in. Instead, we give it 

to people who are treating it as a crime, who don’t want to go into 

Benghazi because they haven’t been given permission. This is absolutely absurd, and I don’t think that that is lost on the American 

people. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. If I might, sir, the FBI is a member of the 

Intelligence Community. The FBI is both a national security, a law 

enforcement, and an intelligence agency. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, you described this as breaking of a law. 

There are also basic law enforcers. Terrorism and terrorism threats 

to the United States is a security issue, and if the CIA and these 

other people are giving it over to our law enforcement, FBI, it is 

a mistaken decision from the top. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. Yes, we want to thank Ambassador 

Kennedy for his time here today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, we do. 

Chairman ROYCE. As we have heard, the committee is deeply 

concerned with the lack of accountability at the State Department. 

Several members have outstanding questions. We have been trying 

for some time to get those documents directly. So we know that the 

Department will be answering those outstanding questions in a 

timely fashion, but again, we reiterate, we need those answers. We 

need those documents here at the committee. 

And we thank you again, Ambassador Kennedy, for your testimony today. We thank the members as well. We stand adjourned. 

Ambassador KENNEDY. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(79)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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Æ


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