CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director

U.S. Congress

Washington, DC 20515

www.cbo.gov

October 7, 2009

Honorable John F. Tierney

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In February 2009, President Obama described his strategy for ending the war in 

Iraq and announced that all U.S. combat operations there would cease by the end of 

August 2010. Based on that timeline, the size of the U.S. military force in Iraq would 

decrease from roughly 140,000 troops in the spring of 2009 to no more than 

50,000 by the end of August 2010. In accordance with the Status of the Forces Agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in November 2008, the remaining 50,000 

U.S. troops must leave Iraq by the end of December 2011.

In response to your request, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated 

the future costs under the Administration’s plan for conducting military operations in 

Iraq and for the repair and replacement of equipment used or lost in Iraq. Moreover, 

as you requested, CBO examined three options under which forces would be withdrawn sooner than under the Administration’s plan and starting from two different 

dates. To reflect the possibility that conditions might delay the planned withdrawal, 

CBO also analyzed a fourth option, which would provide for a slower schedule for 

withdrawing military personnel than that planned by the Administration. Finally, 

CBO compared the costs under the four options with those of the Administration’s 

plan.
Honorable John F. Tierney

Page 2

If you would like more information about this analysis, we would be pleased to 

provide it. Frances Lussier of CBO’s National Security Division is the staff contact. 

Sincerely,

Douglas W. Elmendorf

Director

Attachment

cc: Honorable Jeff Flake

Ranking Member
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

October 7, 2009

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq: 

Possible Timelines and Estimated Costs

Summary and Introduction

President Obama has announced that all U.S. combat operations for the war in 

Iraq—also called Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—will cease by the end of 

August 2010. According to the timeline described by Administration officials, the 

approximately 128,000 U.S. military personnel currently in Iraq would remain there 

through the Iraqi elections scheduled for January 2010. After that, U.S. forces would 

decline to no more than 50,000 troops by the end of August 2010. In accordance 

with the Status of the Forces Agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in 

November 2008, the remaining 50,000 U.S. troops must leave the country by the end 

of December 2011. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that to comply with that timeline, the Administration will need to withdraw military personnel 

from Iraq in two stages: one between the Iraqi election and August 2010, when almost 

80,000 U.S. troops would be removed over a period of seven months, and the other 

before the end of calendar year 2011, when 50,000 troops will need to be withdrawn.

CBO estimated two broad categories of costs under the Administration’s plan and 

under several alternatives. Some of those costs—which the Department of Defense 

(DoD) calls operations costs—including incremental military personnel costs attributable to the war in Iraq and costs for fuel, transportation, and maintenance of equipment in Iraq, would decrease proportionately with the number of service members in 

the country. Such costs, therefore, would be essentially zero by fiscal year 2013 when, 

under the Administration’s plan, no U.S. forces would remain in Iraq. CBO estimated 

other costs, for activities that DoD labels “equipment reconstitution,” that would not 

decrease proportionately with the number of troops: costs to repair equipment that is 

used in the war and returned to the United States and costs to replace equipment lost 

in the conduct of the war. CBO estimates that costs for operations and equipment 

reconstitution under the Administration’s plan would total $51 billion in 2010 and 

would decline to $3 billion by 2013.

At the request of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and 

Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

CBO examined several alternative timetables for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. 
2

CBO

Three options would withdraw all U.S. forces before the end of December 2011, as 

planned by the Administration:

B Option 1 would remove U.S. forces beginning in October 2009 at a rate of 14,400 

troops per month to complete the withdrawal by the end of June 2010. 

B Option 2 would draw forces down more rapidly—at a rate of 17,500 service members per month—starting in October 2009 and removing all troops by May 2010.

B Option 3 would conduct the withdrawal at the same rate as Option 2—17,500 

troops per month—but begin after Iraq’s elections, scheduled for January 2010. 

Under this option, withdrawal would be complete by September 2010.

CBO also examined another plan, Option 4, that would withdraw U.S. troops more 

slowly and steadily than under the Administration’s plan, at a rate of 5,500 service 

members per month over 23 months beginning after the Iraqi elections, with all 

troops withdrawn by the end of December 2011.

As it did for the Administration’s withdrawal schedule (set to begin after the Iraqi elections in January 2010), CBO identified how some annual costs associated with OIF 

would change from 2010 through 2014 under the four alternative timetables. CBO 

estimates that costs over the period from 2009 to 2014 would be $156 billion under 

the Administration’s plan but $50 billion to $54 billion less if troops began to withdraw in October 2009, as they would under Option 1 or Option 2 (see Table 1). 

The greatest savings would be realized under Option 2, which provides for a faster 

withdrawal, removing 17,500 troops per month over 8 months. Savings relative to the 

Administration’s plan would be smaller if the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq 

did not begin until after the elections—approximately $34 billion if troops were 

withdrawn by September 2010, as called for under Option 3. A more gradual withdrawal CBO analyzed—Option 4—would cost about $5 billion more than the 

Administration’s plan.

CBO did not evaluate the operational or security disadvantages associated with 

drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq earlier or more rapidly than planned by the 

Administration. The withdrawal of significant numbers of U.S. military personnel 

before the Iraqi elections could increase security risks during a time of high tensions in 

Iraq. And removing U.S. forces and their associated equipment faster than the 

Administration has planned could place U.S. forces that remain in Iraq at greater risk 

of attack and result in the buildup of equipment at Kuwaiti ports awaiting shipment 

to the United States or at U.S. ports awaiting transportation to bases in the United 

States.
3

CBO

Table 1.

Military Personnel and Costs of Operations and Equipment Reconstitution in 

OIF Under the Administration’s Plan and Alternative Timetables, by Fiscal Year

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: OIF = Operation Iraqi Freedom; n.a. = not applicable; * = less than $500 million. 

Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding. Costs for 2009 and for the Adminstration’s plan for 2010 reflect 

actual budget requests. A brigade equivalent is considered to be a unit with an average of 3,500 military personnel 

equipped with approximately 1,000 military vehicles.

a. Withdrawal of about 10,500 U.S. military personnel per month.

b. Withdrawal of about 14,400 U.S. military personnel per month.

c. Withdrawal of about 17,500 U.S. military personnel per month.

d. Withdrawal of about 5,500 U.S. military personnel per month.

e. These activities include force protection, the Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat program, the Military Intelligence 

Program, Iraq security forces, coalition support, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and military 

construction. The Administration could request additional budget authority in future years for those or other purposes, 

but CBO did not estimate those amounts.

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Administration's Plana

Withdraw 3 brigade equivalents per month, 

February 2010 through August 2010 and

August 2011 through December 2011 140,000 95,500 47,500 2,500 0 0 n.a.

Alternative Timetables

Option 1: Withdraw 4.1 brigade equivalents per 

month, October 2009 through June 2010b 140,000 42,500 0 0 0 0 n.a.

Option 2: Withdraw 5 brigade equivalents per

month, October 2009 through May 2010c 140,000 34,000 0 0 0 0 n.a.

Option 3: Withdraw 5 brigade equivalents per

month, February 2010 through September 2010c 140,000 76,500 0 0 0 0 n.a.

Option 4: Withdraw 1.6 brigade equivalents per

month, February 2010 through December 2011d 140,000 111,500 47,000 1,500 0 0 n.a.

Administration's Plana 69 51 27 6 3 * 156

Alternative Timetables

Option 1: Withdraw 4.1 brigade equivalents per 

month, October 2009 through June 2010b 69 27 7 2 0 0 106

Option 2: Withdraw 5 brigade equivalents per

month, October 2009 through May 2010c 69 24 7 2 0 0 102

Option 3: Withdraw 5 brigade equivalents per

month, February 2010 through September 2010c 69 41 7 4 0 0 122

Option 4: Withdraw 1.6 brigade equivalents per

month, February 2010 through December 2011d 69 56 27 6 3 * 161

Memorandum:

Costs for Activities Other than Operations and

Equipment Reconstitutione 18 10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

2009–2014

Total,

Average Number of U.S. Military Personnel in Iraq

Annual Cost (Billions of dollars in budget authority)
4

CBO

The Administration’s Plan for Withdrawal of U.S. Forces

In November 2008, Iraq and the United States signed an agreement stipulating that 

all U.S. military forces would be out of the country by the end of December 2011.1

To meet that deadline, the United States must, by December 31, 2011, withdraw all 

of the roughly 140,000 military personnel that were in the country in March 2009. 

According to Administration officials, U.S. forces in Iraq decreased by roughly 10 percent to 128,000 service members by the end of September 2009 and are likely to 

remain at about that number to provide security for the elections in January 2010. 

President Obama announced that combat operations in Iraq would cease by the end 

of August 2010; after that, no more than 50,000 U.S. military personnel would 

remain in Iraq to train and advise Iraqi security forces, conduct counterterrorism 

operations, and provide force protection for remaining U.S. personnel.2

Using those waypoints as guides, CBO has estimated the number of U.S. troops that 

would stay in Iraq each month between September 2009 and January 2012—remaining at 128,000 through the election in January 2010, then dropping to 50,000 by the 

end of August 2010, and finally to zero by the end of December 2011 (see Figure 1). 

The highest rate of withdrawal under the Administration’s plan will occur in the seven 

months from the beginning of February 2010 to the end of August 2010, when 

almost 80,000 U.S. military personnel will leave Iraq.3

 Another significant drawdown 

is scheduled for the end of calendar year 2011, when the remaining 50,000 U.S. 

troops will leave Iraq.

CBO estimates that, as forces are withdrawn, some of the annual costs associated 

with the war in Iraq could change from amounts requested for 2010. Not all funds 

that the Administration has requested for OIF—$61 billion in 2010—are related 

directly to the size of U.S. military forces there (all costs are presented in terms of 

budget authority).4 Roughly $10 billion of the $61 billion was requested for items

1. Because the agreement covered U.S. military forces in Iraq and not those supporting Operation 

Iraqi Freedom from nearby countries (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia), this discussion 

concerns only the forces in Iraq. U.S. forces in the area surrounding Iraq have averaged about 

20 percent of force levels in Iraq.

2. Catherine Dale, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress, 

CRS Report for Congress RL34387 (Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2009), p. 1, 

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf.

3. To some defense analysts, the term “plan” implies a detailed scheme for removing specific units on 

a specific timetable. In contrast, a “schedule” implies provision of broad guidance for withdrawal. 

In this discussion, CBO uses the terms “Administration’s plan” and “Administration’s schedule” 

interchangeably to refer to the broad outline that has been presented by the Administration for the 

withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of December 2011.

4. The request submitted by the Administration in May 2009 was intended to cover expenses for all 

of fiscal year 2010. In previous years, the Administration has requested supplemental funding later 

in the year.
5

CBO

Figure 1.

Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces from Iraq Under the 

Administration’s Plan

(Thousands of U.S. military personnel) (Brigade equivalents)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: The actual numbers of military personnel are shown for March through September 2009; 

thereafter, the numbers are CBO’s estimates.

or activities that are not necessarily tied to the number of U.S. military personnel in 

Iraq. For example, funds were requested for protective countermeasures for helicopters and intelligence capabilities. CBO concluded that funds for two categories—

operations and equipment reconstitution—identified in the Administration’s request 

for funds for OIF could be tied directly to the number of U.S. military personnel in 

Iraq. Those categories represent $51 billion, or 85 percent, of the $61 billion 

requested for 2010.5

 (See Appendix A for a discussion of costs associated with the war 

in Iraq, including a listing in Table A-1 of funds requested for 2009 and 2010. For a 

discussion of how the coming withdrawal might proceed and a brief review of two 

past U.S. withdrawals from the region, see Appendix B.)

5. CBO’s estimates of the funds needed to support the war in Iraq after 2009 include only the 

amounts for operations and equipment reconstitution as defined by DoD. CBO’s calculations 

did not include the costs for the Military Intelligence Program, force protection, the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program, the Defeat Improvised Explosive Devices program, or coalition 

support. Those costs totaled $10 billion in the 2010 request and might or might not decrease as 

U.S. military forces withdraw from Iraq.

Mar.

2009

June

2009

Sept.

2009

Dec.

2009

Mar.

2010

June

2010

Sept.

2010

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2010

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45

January 2010 August 2010

Elections in Iraq

U.S. Combat Operations Cease

All U.S. Forces Must Be Withdrawn
6

CBO

As the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq declines to zero by the second quarter of 2012, so too should the annual operations costs associated with those forces. On 

the basis of the Administration’s schedule for withdrawal, CBO estimates that those 

costs would decrease after 2010 in proportion to the average number of U.S. military 

personnel in Iraq (see Appendix A, Table A-2). Even though all U.S. military forces 

are scheduled to be out of Iraq by the end of calendar year 2011, some U.S. military 

forces will remain behind for the first quarter of fiscal year 2012 (fiscal year 2012 

begins October 1, 2011) and some residual operations costs will accrue—roughly 

$1 billion—for 2012. Thereafter, no significant annual costs should accrue for OIF 

operations.

DoD requested $9 billion in 2010 for “reconstitution”—replenishment, replacement, 

and repair—of equipment used in Iraq. As the United States reduces its forces in Iraq, 

costs for reconstitution also will decline, although more slowly. CBO anticipates that 

such costs could continue to accrue for two years after all U.S. forces are withdrawn 

from Iraq. CBO estimates that annual costs for repair and replacement of equipment 

used in Iraq would decline from $9 billion in 2010 to $3 billion in 2013 and to less 

than $500 million in 2014 (see Table A-2). Thereafter, CBO estimates, no further 

costs would be incurred.

When the two types of costs associated with OIF are combined, the total declines 

from $51 billion in 2010 to $27 billion in 2011 and to $6 billion in 2012, followed 

by a gradual decrease to less than $500 million in 2014 (see Table 1). 

The Feasibility of Faster Schedules for Withdrawal 

Several defense analysts and members of Congress have called for a faster end to the 

war in Iraq and for a quicker withdrawal of U.S. forces from that country. To determine what rates of withdrawal might be possible, CBO examined two instances 

within the past 20 years in which large numbers of U.S. military personnel were 

moved very quickly (see Appendix B).

However, there are some logistical constraints on how rapidly U.S. forces and their 

associated equipment and supplies can be withdrawn from Iraq and transported back 

to U.S. military bases. Another area of concern is the ability of the Iraqi government 

and its security forces to assume and maintain control of the political environment in 

Iraq, which also could slow the withdrawal of U.S. forces. CBO, however, did not 

examine in any detail how a more rapid drawdown would affect the political environment or security conditions in Iraq.

The Logistics of Removing U.S. Forces and Their Equipment from Iraq

To determine the scope of the task facing the military, CBO had to identify what 

must be moved from the theater, how to accomplish the move, and what assets would 

be available to do it.
7

CBO

Military Equipment to Be Removed from Iraq. Recent Army briefings and reports 

from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the RAND Corporation 

identify some likely challenges of withdrawing U.S. forces and associated equipment 

from Iraq.6 Those documents list large quantities of military and contractor-operated 

equipment at hundreds of forward operating bases and thousands of tons of ammunition and supplies that potentially must be accounted for and transported out of Iraq. 

To minimize the amount of equipment and supplies that must be sent to bases in the 

United States and other countries, the Army and DoD plan to ship only what has 

potential military value for future operations—that is, equipment that is standard 

military issue and that is not worn out from use in Iraq. However, even if DoD succeeds in reducing the amount of supplies and nonmilitary equipment that must be 

transported home, removing military equipment will be a substantial undertaking.

According to the most recent data available to CBO, the United States had about 

140,000 military personnel in Iraq as of March 2009. That translated to 14 brigade 

combat teams and their associated support units or to 40 brigade equivalents, 14 of 

which were combat brigades.7 U.S. military forces in Iraq include a large number 

of personnel and large quantities of equipment—including vehicles, communications 

gear, generators, and supplies—that accompany and support the combat units.

CBO estimates that the United States had roughly 37 brigade equivalents in Iraq as of 

September 2009. Removing the equipment associated with those units from Iraq will 

require moving roughly 37,000 military vehicles—including trucks of all sizes and 

mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles; almost 400 helicopters; and large quantities of communications gear, small arms, and medical equipment.8 The equipment 

associated with forces in Iraq as of the fall of 2009 could weigh 750,000 tons and 

could fill between 37 and 74 large sealift ships.9

 In addition, transporting the roughly 

13,500 tons of usable ammunition that might need to be removed from Iraq could 

require 3 additional ships in the strategic sealift fleet that are configured to carry 

ammunition. All told, in addition to 128,000 military personnel, and considering 

6. Lieutenant General Mitchell Stevenson, “HQDA Logistics Update” (briefing to the Sustainment 

Commanders Conference, June 16, 2009); Government Accountability Office, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DoD Planning for Reposturing U.S. Forces from Iraq, 

GAO-08-930 (September 2008), www.gao.gov/new.items/d08930.pdf; and Walter L. Perry and 

others, Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies

(report prepared by RAND Corporation for the Department of Defense, 2009), www.rand.org/

pubs/monographs/MG882/.

7. A brigade combat team consists of 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers equipped with about 1,000 vehicles 

and, in some cases, an additional 300 or more armored vehicles, such as tanks and personnel 

carriers. (Although only the Army identifies units as brigade combat teams, CBO uses the term 

to refer to Army and Marine Corps combat units that include roughly the same number of 

personnel.) The term “brigade equivalent” is sometimes used to refer to any type of unit with 

an average of 3,500 military personnel and equipped with approximately 1,000 vehicles.

8. That estimate includes only standard military equipment assigned to military units.

9. One brigade equivalent’s worth of equipment weighs roughly 20,000 tons, and transporting it 

requires one or two of the large ships the United States maintains in its strategic sealift fleet.
8

CBO

military assets only, up to 80 shiploads of material weighing more than 750,000 tons 

could need to be moved from Iraq to the United States, Europe, or South Korea.10

Moving Equipment from Iraq to the United States. The personnel and equipment 

in units leaving Iraq must first move to Kuwait to be processed for transport to home 

stations or other destinations in the United States. For Army equipment, which 

accounts for the bulk of U.S. military equipment in Iraq, the process can take 

150 days from departure from the operating base in Iraq to arrival at a home station 

in the United States. 

There are two points in the process that have been identified as limiting the number of 

vehicles—and therefore units—that can be shipped out of Kuwait each month. First, 

only one major highway from Iraq into Kuwait has been cleared for convoys, so border 

crossings are limited to a single point. The capacity of wash racks in the Kuwait staging area to clean vehicles before they are loaded onto ships presents a second constraint. (In contrast, the pier capacity of the commercial port in Kuwait and the deck 

capacity of the strategic sealift fleet’s large ships are more than adequate to handle and 

transport many vehicles in a short time.)11 Army estimates of the maximum capacity 

for removing units from Southwest Asia have cited the limits of three brigade equivalents per month for the road network and four brigade equivalents per month for the 

wash racks and customs inspections at the port in Kuwait.12 As redeployment after 

Operation Desert Storm and in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, however, the operation can move more rapidly. (Specific ways to alleviate some 

of the constraints are discussed under “Alternative Schedules for Withdrawal.”)

Past Redeployments

Twice within the past 20 years the United States has withdrawn large numbers of 

U.S. forces from operations in Southwest Asia more quickly than constraints identified by the Army would indicate is possible (see Appendix B). The first was after 

Operation Desert Storm, when 130 brigade equivalents were removed in 4 months, 

for an average rate of 114,000 military personnel per month. The first rotation of 

U.S. forces in and out of Iraq, from December 2003 through May 2004, offers a 

more recent example: The equivalent of 37 brigades (a force equal to that in Iraq in 

September 2009) was returned home over 6 months—far shorter than the 30 months 

identified in the Administration’s schedule. Thus, it is possible that people and 

equipment could be withdrawn from Iraq faster than the Army has estimated.

10. In making these estimates, CBO assumes that DoD will succeed in carrying out its plans to minimize the amount of material that needs to be transported out of Iraq (see Appendix B).

11. Each ship, which can carry at least half of a brigade equivalent’s worth of equipment, can take 

three days to load.

12. The capacity of the road network is attributable in part to the need to provide security escorts for 

convoys, to the practice of loading U.S. military vehicles onto trucks for transit out of Iraq, and to 

the need to pass through the single border crossing into Kuwait.
9

CBO

That said, conditions in Iraq in 1991 and 2004 were different from the current situation. In neither case was it necessary for the United States to clean up and close forward operating bases. (In 1991, U.S. forces were not in Iraq long enough to establish 

such bases. In 2004, because U.S. forces were not leaving Iraq permanently, there was 

no need to close bases.) Moreover, after Operation Desert Storm and during the first 

OIF rotation, security measures currently used to protect convoys of U.S. military 

vehicles had not been instituted.

Alternative Schedules for Withdrawal

The two historical examples suggest it would be possible to withdraw U.S. military 

forces from Iraq more rapidly than the Administration has planned, although deteriorating security within Iraq or logistical complications might necessitate a slower withdrawal. CBO examined three schedules that would remove U.S. forces from Iraq 

more rapidly than the Administration’s plan and one that would proceed more slowly. 

The first, Option 1, would have all forces withdrawn by the end of June 2010. Both 

Option 2 and Option 3 would withdraw 5 brigade equivalents per month, but each 

would begin and end on different dates—Option 2 would begin the withdrawal in 

October 2009 and conclude in May 2010; Option 3 would begin in February 2010, 

after the Iraqi elections in January 2010, and finish in September 2010. Under 

Option 4, U.S. forces would withdraw steadily over 23 months, beginning after the 

elections and concluding at the end of December 2011, a pace of withdrawal that is 

slower than under the Administration’s plan. CBO has estimated the costs for operations and equipment reconstitution in OIF from 2010 through 2014 for each option.

CBO estimates that the costs of the withdrawal—for transporting equipment and 

personnel out of Iraq and for cleaning up and closing forward operating bases—

would be essentially the same under the Administration’s plan and the options discussed here. In each case, the amount of materiel removed and transported to its 

ultimate destination would be the same and the methods of transport would be the 

same, so there would be no difference in the cost.13 Similarly, there is no difference in 

the number of forward operating bases that will need to be closed and cleaned up 

under the Administration’s plan and under any option presented here.14

On the basis of redeployments in Operation Desert Storm and the early stages of OIF, 

and drawing from solutions proposed by various defense analysts, it seems plausible 

that the capacity of the road network and of facilities for cleaning vehicles could be 

13. CBO estimates the cost to move 1 brigade equivalent’s worth of materiel and personnel from 

Iraq to the United States to be roughly $50 million. (Personnel would move by air, equipment by 

sea.) The cost to move 37 brigade equivalents’ worth from Iraq is included in CBO’s estimates of 

the operations costs of OIF.

14. According to Army estimates, as of February 2009, the cost to clean up 65 forward operating bases 

in Iraq—9 large, 17 medium, and 39 small bases—would be $400 million to $750 million.
10

CBO

increased.15 The rate at which U.S. units leave Iraq could be accelerated by any of 

several means:

B U.S. military vehicles (except for tracked vehicles) could be driven from Iraq to 

Kuwait, rather than loaded onto trucks,

B More wash racks could be built in Kuwait to process more vehicles per month, and

B More space could be obtained in Kuwait for storage of vehicles as they await shipment out of the area.

If military units leave Iraq before the bases at which they are stationed can be properly 

cleaned up and closed, it could be possible to leave skeleton crews and contractors to 

complete those tasks.

CBO estimates that the total increased cost to implement those measures—primarily 

to build more wash racks—would be less than $100 million.

Option 1: Withdraw All U.S. Military Forces by June 2010

One alternative CBO examined was the possibility of withdrawing all U.S. military 

forces from Iraq by the end of June 2010. If the withdrawal began in October 2009, 

4.1 brigade equivalents—or 14,400 military personnel—would be removed each 

month, roughly 30 percent faster than during the most demanding portion of the 

Administration’s schedule (see Figure 2). By withdrawing all U.S. forces by the end of 

June 2010, however, Option 1 would reduce the cost of operations and equipment 

reconstitution by about $50 billion from 2010 through 2014, mostly in 2010 and 

2011 (see Table 1).

Ultimately, the rate of withdrawal and the amount of savings realized will depend on 

when the United States begins the withdrawal. If withdrawal begins after October 

2009, the pace must increase and savings relative to the Administration’s plan will 

decrease if the June 2010 deadline is to be met (see Table 2). If the United States 

does not begin the withdrawal until November 2009, the pace will need to rise to 

4.6 brigades (16,000 military personnel) per month. And because more U.S. forces 

would be in Iraq longer, CBO estimates, the costs of operations and equipment reconstitution from 2009 through 2014 would increase by $2.5 billion (and the savings 

15. Lawrence J. Korb, Sean E. Duggan, and Peter M. Juul, How to Redeploy: Implementing a 

Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Center for American 

Progress, updated August 2008), pp. 14–18, www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/7757; and 

Perry and others, Withdrawing from Iraq, pp. 44–47.
11

CBO

Figure 2.

Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces from Iraq Under the 

Administration’s Plan and Option 1

(Thousands of U.S. military personnel) (Brigade equivalents)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: The actual numbers of military personnel are shown for March through September 2009; 

thereafter, the numbers are CBO’s estimates.

compared with the Administration’s plan would fall from $50 billion to $48 billion). 

If the start of withdrawal is delayed past the beginning of December 2009, the rate 

required to withdraw all U.S. forces by June 2010 would exceed 5 brigade equivalents 

per month, and each month’s delay would reduce savings by $2.5 billion.

Options 2 and 3: Withdraw U.S. Forces at a Rate of Five 

Brigade Equivalents per Month

CBO examined the implications of withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq at 5 brigade 

equivalents—or roughly 17,500 service members—per month, a rate similar to that 

recommended by the Center for American Progress.16 Withdrawal at that rate would 

be faster than at any time under the Administration’s scheduled drawdown, but it 

would be slower than the movement of U.S. forces out of Kuwait after Operation 

Desert Storm or during the early rotations of OIF. CBO considered two start dates for 

the withdrawal of U.S. forces: Option 2 would begin in October 2009 and Option 3

16. Korb, Duggan, and Juul, in How to Redeploy, recommended withdrawing 140,000 U.S. military 

personnel over 8 to 10 months. The options described here would require 8 months but start with 

slightly fewer personnel.

Mar.

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January 2010 August 2010

Elections in Iraq

U.S. Combat Operations Cease

All U.S. Forces Must Be Withdrawn

Administration's Plan

Option 1
12

CBO

Table 2.

Effect of Various Starting Dates on Troop Withdrawal and 

Savings for Option 1

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Under Option 1, all U.S. military personnel would be withdrawn from Iraq by June 2010. 

A brigade equivalent is considered to be a unit with an average of 3,500 military personnel 

equipped with approximately 1,000 military vehicles. Savings are in budget authority over 

the period from 2009 through 2014.

would begin after Iraq’s elections in January 2010. In each case, withdrawal would be 

completed 8 months later, in May 2010 for Option 2 and in September 2010 for 

Option 3 (see Figure 3). 

The largest savings compared with the Administration’s plan would be achieved by 

pursuing Option 2, initiating a rapid drawdown in October 2009. CBO estimates 

that option would produce savings of $54 billion from 2009 through 2014. Fully 

half—$27 billion—would be realized in 2010. The costs under that timetable would 

be slightly less than the costs under Option 1.

However, starting the withdrawal of troops before the elections scheduled for January 

2010, and doing so rapidly, would raise the risk of undermining the stability of the 

country at a politically difficult time. If withdrawal was delayed until after the elections, the cost would be higher but still about $34 billion less than under the Administration’s plan (see Table 1).

Disadvantages of Withdrawing Troops Faster than Under the 

Administration’s Plan

Withdrawing U.S. forces faster than planned by the Administration could cause difficulties that CBO has not quantified. Among the areas of concern are the availability 

of adequate facilities and services for returning U.S. military personnel and for 

demobilizing and processing returning reservists. During the early stages of OIF, the 

press reported on substandard temporary housing for U.S. military personnel returning from Iraq and awaiting medical treatment. An assessment of those problems is 

not within CBO’s areas of expertise, but some observers assert that such problems 

could exist for several months as DoD processes large numbers of returning military 

personnel.

Withdrawal Rate Savings from Administration's Plan

(Brigade equivalents per month) (Billions of dollars)

October 2009 4.1 50

November 2009 4.6 48

December 2009 5.2 46

January 2010 6.1 43

February 2010 7.3 41
13

CBO

Figure 3.

Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces from Iraq Under the 

Administration’s Plan and Options 2 and 3

(Thousands of U.S. military personnel) (Brigade equivalents)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: The actual numbers of military personnel are shown for March through September 2009; 

thereafter, the numbers are CBO’s estimates.

Security concerns also have been identified as areas for consideration in assessing alternative plans for removing vehicles from Iraq or closing forward operating bases. To 

avoid creating more U.S. military targets, the current practice is to place U.S. military 

vehicles on commercial flatbed trucks or on military trucks driven out of Iraq by contractors. If U.S. soldiers drive from Iraq to Kuwait there is a greater—and potentially 

unacceptable—risk of exposure to attack. Similar concerns have been raised about the 

security of U.S. forces remaining in Iraq to clean up and close forward operating bases 

if most military personnel have already left. Although it is possible for skeleton crews 

to oversee contractors who might complete the process, those crews could be without 

adequate protection in the face of a threat.

A final area of concern involves a possible lack of planning time and the inability to 

fully account for equipment if its departure from Iraq is rushed. GAO and RAND 

emphasized that orderly withdrawal requires thorough planning and scheduling of 

departures.17 Without adequate time to plan, to monitor arrivals and departures 

of U.S. military equipment at the port in Kuwait, and to label all equipment in transport, the arrival of each piece of equipment on schedule at its appropriate destination

17. See Government Accountability Office, Operation Iraqi Freedom; and Perry and others, 

Withdrawing from Iraq.

Mar.

2009

June

2009

Sept.

2009

Dec.

2009

Mar.

2010

June

2010

Sept.

2010

Dec.

2010

Mar.

2011

June

2011

Sept.

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Dec.

2011

0

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40

60

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100

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160

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45

January 2010 August 2010

Elections in Iraq

U.S. Combat Operations Cease

All U.S. Forces Must Be Withdrawn

Option 3 Administration's Plan

Option 2
14

CBO

Figure 4.

Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces from Iraq Under the 

Administration’s Plan and Option 4

(Thousands of U.S. military personnel) (Brigade equivalents)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: The actual numbers of military personnel are shown for March through September 2009; 

thereafter, the numbers are CBO’s estimates.

is not assured. Similar concerns were raised following the rapid withdrawal of U.S. 

forces from Southwest Asia after Operation Desert Storm.18

Option 4: Withdraw U.S. Military Forces More Slowly than Under the 

Administration’s Plan

The security considerations and potential logistical complications discussed above 

might cause the Administration to withdraw forces from Iraq more slowly than it currently plans. Therefore, CBO analyzed an option that would withdraw U.S. forces at 

a steady rate of 1.6 brigade equivalents—or about 5,500 personnel—per month 

beginning immediately after the Iraqi elections and concluding at the end of December 2011. Such a plan would maintain a larger presence from February 2010 through 

March 2011 than the Administration’s plan now foresees (see Figure 4). By CBO’s 

estimates, the costs would be about $5 billion more than the corresponding costs for 

OIF under the Administration’s plan and almost $60 billion more than the costs 

under Option 2 (see Table 1).

18. See General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Materiel 

During Redeployment, GAO/NSIAD-92-258 (September 1992, p. 3), http://archive.gao.gov/

d35t11/147771.pdf. 

Mar.

2009

June

2009

Sept.

2009

Dec.

2009

Mar.

2010

June

2010

Sept.

2010

Dec.

2010

Mar.

2011

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2011

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2011

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2011

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40

45

January 2010 August 2010

Elections in Iraq

U.S. Combat Operations Cease

All U.S. Forces Must Be Withdrawn

Administration's Plan

Option 4
15

CBO

Appendix A: 

Costs Associated with 

Operation Iraqi Freedom

In its analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) compared actual or estimated 

costs for operations and equipment reconstitution for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 

for the period from 2009 through 2014 under the Administration’s plan and for 

several alternatives. The Administration’s full request for funds for 2009 and 2010 was 

examined by functional category, and CBO estimated costs for operations and 

equipment reconstitution for 2010 through 2014.

Categories of Funds Requested for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom in 2009 and 2010 

Funds requested by the Department of Defense (DoD) for the war in Iraq for 2009 

and 2010 are divided into several categories (see Table A-1), which DoD defined in 

summary justification materials that accompanied its budget request for fiscal year 

2010. (Those categories do not correspond to appropriations titles used in the 

department’s annual “Green Book” to describe its budget requests).1

CBO’s Estimates of Costs Related to U.S. Military 

Forces in Iraq

CBO estimated the costs for two categories that could be related directly to the 

number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq—operations and equipment reconstitution—for the Administration’s plan from 2011 through 2014 and for alternative 

withdrawal timetables for 2010 through 2014. 

Operations Costs

Operations costs include incremental costs for military personnel and costs for 

operation and maintenance (O&M) associated with U.S. forces conducting the war 

in Iraq.2

1. See Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification (May 2009, 

pp. 4-1 to 4-54 and 5-17 to 5-20), www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/

fy2010_SSJ.pdf; and Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010 (June 

2009), www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/Green_Book_Final.pdf. 

2. “Operations” includes activities listed in the Department of Defense’s request for funds for 

overseas contingency operations. See Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request 

Summary Justification, pp. 4-10 to 4-15. 
16

CBO

Table A-1.

Categories of Funds Requested for OIF for 2009 and 2010

(Billions of dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 

Request Summary Justification (May 2009), p. 5-19.

Notes: OIF = Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding. Amounts shown are for budget 

authority requested for the fiscal year. 

Incremental Military Personnel Costs. Incremental military personnel costs include 

special pay and benefits for deployed military personnel, such as combat pay; food 

served in dining facilities and rations for deployed personnel; and full-time pay for 

activated reservists. Military personnel costs should be directly related to the number 

of U.S. forces in Iraq and to the number of military personnel outside Iraq directly 

supporting OIF. In estimating annual incremental personnel costs for the war in Iraq, 

CBO assumed that the number of U.S. military personnel deployed in Southwest 

Asia outside of Iraq directly involved in supporting the war will decrease in proportion to the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq. As a consequence, CBO estimates that overall annual military personnel costs associated with the war will decrease 

proportionately with the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq.

Operation and Maintenance Costs. CBO also estimates that costs for operation and 

maintenance included in the Administration’s “operations” category would decline as 

forces are withdrawn. O&M expenses include fuel and spare parts for equipment in 

military units and for transportation of personnel and equipment to and from Iraq; 

contract labor in Iraq to feed, house, and guard U.S. forces there; and maintenance 

and repair of military equipment such as Stryker vehicles and the large number of 

high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. O&M funds also pay for the activities 

of civilian and contractor personnel in areas surrounding Iraq and in the United States 

to the extent that they support the war in Iraq. 

CBO estimates that the O&M costs per service member would increase no faster than 

the overall rate of inflation during the remainder of the U.S. military involvement in 

2009 2010

Operations 52.4 41.9

Equipment Reconstitution 16.5 9.4

Force Protection 9.6 7.4

Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat Program 2.7 0.8

Military Intelligence Program 3.2 1.0

Iraq Security Forces 1.0 0

Coalition Support 0.4 0.1

Commander's Emergency Response Program 0.7 0.3

Military Construction 0.1 0 ____ ____

Total 86.5 60.8
17

CBO

OIF. From 2003 through 2007, the per-person O&M costs of overseas contingency 

operations increased faster than general inflation from year to year.3 Since 2007, 

however, O&M costs and the number of U.S. military personnel involved in overseas 

contingency operations—including both Iraq and Afghanistan—have remained 

relatively constant.

CBO estimates that the costs associated with contractors supporting the war also 

would decline in proportion to the decrease in U.S. military forces in Iraq. This 

relationship should remain valid even if the costs associated with some types of contractors increased as the military presence in Iraq declined. For example, the number 

of contractor personnel supporting OIF decreased from 133,000 in March 2009 to 

120,000 in June 2009 as the U.S. military presence in Iraq declined. Nevertheless, the 

number of private security contractors hired by the Department of Defense to provide 

security at specific sites increased from 10,700 to 13,200 over the same period.4

Although that trend runs counter to CBO’s overall assumption, the size of the contract for the private security forces (with annual obligations of about $250 million) is 

not large enough to reverse the overall trend that the size and cost of contractor 

support decreases as the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq declines.

Total Costs of Operations in OIF. Separate costs for DoD’s operations category for the 

war in Iraq have been identified only for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Before that, 

the information available covers combined operations costs for all overseas contingencies. Those combined costs have remained relatively constant, after adjusting for inflation, as the number of personnel involved in overseas contingencies also has remained 

relatively stable. However, the funds requested by DoD for operations for OIF for 

2009 and 2010 do not decrease proportionately with the planned reduction in personnel involved, even after adjusting for inflation. Nevertheless, when estimating costs 

associated with the war in Iraq for years after 2010 for the Administration’s plan and 

after 2009 for alternative timetables, CBO assumed that the cost of operations would 

decline in proportion to the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, after adjusting 

for inflation. (See Table A-2 for CBO’s estimates of operations costs under the 

Administration’s plan and the four options.)

Equipment Reconstitution Costs

“Equipment reconstitution” includes three broad categories: replenishing expendable 

items, such as ammunition and missiles; replacing equipment—such as helicopters

3. See Congressional Budget Office, “Analysis of the Growth in Funding for Operations in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Elsewhere in the War on Terrorism,” letter to the Honorable Kent Conrad 

(February 11, 2008).

4. See Walter Pincus, “With U.S. Forces in Iraq Beginning to Leave, Need for Private Guards 

Grows,” Washington Post (September 8, 2009), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/

2009/09/07/AR2009090702242.html.
18

CBO

Table A-2.

Annual Costs of Operations and Equipment Reconstitution in OIF Under the 

Administration’s Plan and Alternative Timetables, by Fiscal Year

(Billions of dollars in budget authority)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: OIF = Operation Iraqi Freedom; * = less than $500 million. 

Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding. Costs for 2009 and for the Administration’s plan for 2010 reflect 

actual budget requests. A brigade equivalent is considered to be a unit with an average of 3,500 military personnel 

equipped with approximately 1,000 vehicles.

a. Withdrawal of about 10,500 U.S. military personnel per month.

b. The Administration requested $18 billion in 2009 and $10 billion in 2010 in budget authority for items other than operations 

and equipment reconstitution, including force protection, the Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat program, the Military 

Intelligence Program, Iraq security forces, coalition support, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and military 

construction. The Administration could request additional budget authority in future years for those or other purposes, 

but CBO did not estimate those amounts.

c. Withdrawal of about 14,400 U.S. military personnel per month.

d. Withdrawal of about 17,500 U.S. military personnel per month.

e. Withdrawal of about 5,500 U.S. military personnel per month.

Administration's Plan: Withdraw 3 Brigade Equivalents 

Per Month, February 2010 Through August 2010 and

August 2011 Through December 2011a

Operations 52 42 20 1 0 0 115

Equipment reconstitution 17 9 7 5 3 * 41 __ __ __ _ _ _ ___

Totalb 69 51 27 6 3 * 156

Option 1: Withdraw 4.1 Brigade Equivalents Per Month, 

October 2009 Through June 2010c

Operations 52 18 0 0 0 0 70

Equipment reconstitution 17 9 7 2 0 0 36 __ __ _ _ _ _ ___

Total 69 27 7 2 0 0 106

Option 2: Withdraw 5 Brigade Equivalents Per Month,

October 2009 Through May 2010d

Operations 52 14 0 0 0 0 67

Equipment reconstitution 17 9 7 2 0 0 35 __ __ _ _ _ _ ___

Total 69 24 7 2 0 0 102

Option 3: Withdraw 5 Brigade Equivalents Per Month

February 2010 Through September 2010d

Operations 52 32 0 0 0 0 84

Equipment reconstitution 17 9 7 4 0 0 37 __ __ _ _ _ _ ___

Total 69 41 7 4 0 0 122

Option 4: Withdraw 1.6 Brigade Equivalents Per Month

February 2010 Through December 2011e

Operations 52 47 20 1 0 0 120

Equipment reconstitution 17 9 7 6 3 * 42 __ __ __ _ _ _ ___

Total 69 56 27 6 3 * 161

Alternative Timetables

Total,

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009–2014
19

CBO

and trucks—that has been destroyed or severely damaged; and repairing and restoring 

equipment returning from Iraq to its predeployment condition. The cost for equipment reconstitution is related both to the number of military personnel conducting 

operations in Iraq and to the amount of equipment returning to home stations. As 

U.S. forces are withdrawn, the number of missiles and the amount of ammunition 

expended; the number of aircraft, trucks, and other items destroyed; and the quantity 

of equipment being returned to home stations in any one year also should decline.

But the requirement for funds to replace and repair equipment is not likely to fall as 

quickly as the withdrawal occurs, for several reasons. Requests for funds to replace 

equipment cannot be made until after the equipment is destroyed, and it could take 

until the next fiscal year to put in a request to replace a piece of equipment. Similarly, 

requests to replace expended munitions generally are made on the basis of the prior 

year’s expenditures, and it can take a full year to make such requests. Finally, repair 

costs could accrue for as long as two years after forces are withdrawn because it can 

take up to six months after a unit has left Iraq for its equipment to reach the home station or a repair depot. In addition, significant amounts of some types of equipment 

used in Iraq, such as trucks, remain there for use by replacement units.5

 Thus, some 

equipment could remain in Iraq or Kuwait after all major U.S. forces have left Iraq, 

awaiting shipment back to the United States.6 For all of those reasons, CBO estimates 

that costs for repair and replacement of equipment used in Iraq will decrease as the 

number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq declines, although with a delay of two 

years. (See Table A-2 for CBO’s estimates of equipment reconstitution costs under the 

Administration’s plan and the four alternative timetables.)

5. All helicopters and almost all major weapons, such as tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and Stryker 

vehicles, return to their home stations when their associated units leave Iraq.

6. The Army asserts that costs to repair and replenish its equipment would continue for at least 

two years after all U.S. forces are removed from Iraq. 

21

CBO

Appendix B: 

The Process of Withdrawing 

U.S. Forces from Iraq

The complex process of withdrawing U.S. forces and their associated equipment from 

Iraq is examined in this appendix. In addition to establishing specific processes for 

returning personnel and equipment, the Department of Defense (DoD) also has 

identified ways to minimize the amount of materiel that must be removed from Iraq 

and transported to the United States. Two instances from the past 20 years provide 

examples of occasions on which DoD has returned large numbers of U.S. military 

personnel and equipment to the United States in relatively short periods of time.

Withdrawing Personnel and Equipment 

Once a unit in Iraq is designated for withdrawal from the country, the troops and 

equipment must make their way to staging areas in Kuwait. Depending on where the 

unit is stationed, that can take up to three days. During the move, all vehicles are 

loaded onto trucks driven by contractors.1 All U.S. Army convoys have military escorts 

for security and all of them use a single designated route out of Iraq to Kuwait. One 

last constraint is the sole checkpoint at the Iraq–Kuwait border. Those considerations, 

according to one Army estimate made in the fall of 2008, limit the pace of units exiting 

Iraq to three brigade equivalents—or roughly 10,500 troops—per month.

After all elements of a unit have arrived at the staging area in Kuwait, the equipment 

is prepared for shipment to the United States, Europe, or South Korea—a process that 

can take from 30 to 50 days. During that time, equipment is accounted for, identified 

with a unit, and labeled for transport to its destination. All equipment is washed and 

sterilized so that no pathogens are transported out of the country. After inspection 

and clearance by customs officials and employees of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the equipment is transferred to sterile yards to await loading onto ships.

From then on, equipment and personnel take separate paths to their destinations. 

Personnel from the unit fly from Kuwait City International Airport back to a home 

station, and transport ships generally set off with the equipment for ports in the 

continental United States. After arrival at U.S. ports—about a month after leaving 

Kuwait—the equipment is loaded onto railcars for transport to Army depots or the 

unit’s home station for repair. The time elapsed between the equipment’s arrival in a 

port and at its ultimate destination can be another three weeks.

1. Heavy equipment with tracks, such as tanks, is moved on transporters that are too wide to pass 

one another on the main highway leading from the Kuwait border to the staging area.
22

CBO

Disposition of Equipment 

To minimize the amount of materiel that must shipped from Iraq to the United 

States, Europe, or South Korea, DoD plans the following actions, as appropriate:2

B Supplies and ammunition in Iraq as of the summer of 2009 would be consumed in 

Iraq; shipments of supplies into Iraq from outside the country would slow in anticipation of the planned drawdown. 

B Equipment that can be deployed in Afghanistan or used to replenish the Army’s 

prepositioned stocks either in Kuwait or at sea would be transferred to the appropriate location rather than transported back to the United States.3

B Equipment currently in Iraq that the United States deems no longer useful—

for example, some of the thousands of armored high mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicles purchased early in the war and subsequently replaced by mineresistant ambush-protected vehicles—would be sold to other countries, such as 

Iraq, for use by their armies. 

B Equipment that is not standard military issue—including computers, telephones, 

equipment for gyms built at forward operating bases, and some 30,000 vehicles 

purchased by the U.S. government but operated by contractors—would be sold or 

donated to the Iraqi government or other DoD-approved recipients.4

Past Withdrawals of U.S. Forces from Southwest Asia

Two examples from the past 20 years demonstrate that the rapid withdrawal of large 

numbers of U.S. military personnel and their equipment is possible.

Return from Operation Desert Storm

Both the buildup and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Southwest Asia associated with 

Operation Desert Storm were substantial and rapid. During the 6 months before 

February 1991, the United States transported 500,000 military personnel and more 

2. Lieutenant General Mitchell Stevenson, “HQDA Logistics Update” (briefing to the Sustainment 

Commanders Conference, June 16, 2009); Government Accountability Office, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DoD Planning for Reposturing U.S. Forces from Iraq, 

GAO-08-930 (September 2008), www.gao.gov/new.items/d08930.pdf; Michael Cervone, 

“Drawdown and Redistribution Policy Guidance for Major End Items” (information brief to the 

Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, May 18, 2009); Fawzia Sheikh, “Pentagon Likely to 

Remove Most U.S. Gear from Iraq in Coming Years,” Inside the Army (March 23, 2009); and 

Michelle Tan, “Drawdown of 2.8 Million Pieces of Equipment May Cost Tens of Billions,” Army 

Times (August 24, 2009), p. A18.

3. To speed the response of U.S. military units in the event of a crisis, the Army stores equipment in 

Kuwait, at other locations around the world, and on ships.

4. The vehicles that contractors use but that are owned by the U.S. government include pickup 

trucks, sport utility vehicles, and trailers that are not standard military vehicles. 
23

CBO

than 4 million tons of supplies and equipment to Saudi Arabia and surrounding 

areas.5

 At the end of the operation, when the ceasefire had been signed, almost twice 

as much time—11 months from March 1991 through January 1992—was needed to 

remove roughly the same amount of equipment from the area.6

Because the United States had not built any operating bases in Kuwait and had agreed 

with Saudi Arabia that there would be no American presence in that country after 

the conflict, the U.S. military leadership determined to withdraw military personnel 

from the theater as quickly as possible.7 In the first month after the ceasefire, about 

165,000 military personnel were flown home; another 200,000 military personnel 

went home in the next two months. Using the brigade equivalent (3,500 people) as a 

guide, those rates of redeployment translate to 35 brigade equivalents per month with 

a surge rate of 47 brigade equivalents in the first month.

The pace of removal of equipment and supplies, although not as rapid, nevertheless 

was relatively fast. To accelerate the removal of equipment from Kuwait, wash rack 

capacity near the ports in Kuwait after Operation Desert Storm was increased to 

2,000 vehicles—or 2 brigade equivalents—per day. (This compares with the current 

estimated surge capacity of 4 brigade equivalents per month.) Almost 130,000 vehicles were cleaned and shipped out of the theater in four months, for an extended rate 

of removal of 33 brigade equivalents per month. The large stocks of ammunition were 

the last materiel to be removed from the theater. Over nine months, 320,000 tons of 

ammunition—more than 20 times the amount currently estimated to be in Iraq—

was cleaned, packaged, and removed from the theater.

First Rotation In and Out of Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom

The first rotation of U.S. forces occurred over the six months from December 2003 

through May 2004. During that exchange, about 130,000 U.S. military personnel—

representing 37 brigade equivalents—and their associated equipment left the theater 

and returned to their home stations.8

 That exchange of troops represented 

the removal of 6 U.S. brigade equivalents per month.

5. David Kassing, “Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert: An Annotated Briefing,” RAND Note 

N3-508/AF/A/OSD (prepared for the Department of Defense, 1992), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA428172&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

6. Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in 

Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992).

7. Ibid., p. 156.

8. Lawrence J. Korb, Sean E. Duggan, and Peter M. Juul, How to Redeploy: Implementing a 

Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Center for American 

Progress, updated August 2008), p. 7, www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/7757.