J-A33023-16

2017 PA Super 120

HAROLD B. MURPHY, JR., WILLIAM J. 

MURPHY AND SIDNEY C. KARNEKE

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

STEVE KARNEK, KARNEK FAMILY 

PARTNERS, LP AND RANGE RESOURCES 

APPALACHIA, LLC

APPEAL OF: STEVE KARNEK, KARNEK 

FAMILY PARTNERS, LP

No. 438 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Dated February 29, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Civil Division at No(s): 2015-1827

HAROLD B. MURPHY, JR., WILLIAM J. 

MURPHY AND SIDNEY C. KARNEKE

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

STEVE KARNEK, KARNEK FAMILY 

PARTNERS, LP AND RANGE RESOURCES 

APPALACHIA, LLC

No. 550 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Dated February 29, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Civil Division at No(s): 2015-1827
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BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

OPINION BY SOLANO, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2017

Before the Court are consolidated cross-appeals filed by Appellants 

Steve Karnek and Karnek Family Partners, LP, and Appellees Harold B. 

Murphy, Jr., William J. Murphy, and Sidney C. Karneke from the trial court’s 

February 29, 2016 order disposing of the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment.1 We affirm.

This matter arises out of an intra-family dispute regarding ownership 

of oil and gas underlying a parcel of land in Washington County that the 

parties have referred to as the “Scott Heirs’ Farm.” Determination of the 

ownership interests depends upon a series of deeds and wills. The two 

documents at the center of this dispute are a deed to John and Mary Pirih 

(the “Pirih Deed”) and the will of Bessie Krynovske.

The Scott Heirs’ Farm was conveyed by members of the Scott family to 

Joe Krynovske and Bessie Krynovske, husband and wife, in 1931. The 

conveyance was by a general warranty deed that described the property as 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2136(a), the parties 

have agreed that for purposes of these consolidated appeals, Steve Karnek 

and Karnek Family Partners, LP will be designated as Appellants, and Harold 

B. Murphy, Jr., William J. Murphy, Sidney C. Karneke, and Range Resources 

Appalachia, LLC will be designated as Appellees. See Letter, 6/28/16. Range 

Resources has not actively participated in this case, either in the trial court 

or in this Court. 
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consisting of 137 acres 20 perches in Smith Township.2 The deed excepted 

certain mineral rights that are not at issue here. 

On September 1, 1938, the Krynovskes separated the oil and gas 

rights from the rest of the property by a series of transactions involving a 

third party, A. Kirk Wrenshall. First, as husband and wife, the Krynovskes 

conveyed the entire Scott Heirs’ Farm property to Wrenshall. Second, 

Wrenshall conveyed the Scott Heirs’ Farm back to Joe (but not to Bessie) by 

a deed containing the following clause: 

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING hereout and herefrom all the oil 

and gas in or underlying said parcel of ground, together with the 

perpetual and irrevocable right, privilege, and easement of 

entering upon said lands and searching for, drilling wells, sinking 

shafts, mining, digging, extracting, taking and carrying away all 

of the oil and gas in or under said lands, or that may be found 

therein or thereunder; and, also, the right of possession and 

use of so much of said premises at all times as may be 

necessary to the practical carrying out of the purposes and 

provisions of this exception, provided, however, that no wells 

shall be drilled within 200 feet of the buildings on said tract of 

land. 

Third, Wrenshall conveyed to Bessie “for and during the term of her natural 

life, with remainder over in fee to Joe Krynovske . . . ALL the Oil and Gas in 

and underlying all that parcel of ground [comprising the Scott Heirs’ Farm] 

. . . BEING the same Oil and Gas and rights as Excepted and Reserved in 

Deed of A. Kirk Wrenshall, unmarried, to Joe Krynovske, dated September 1, 

____________________________________________

2 A perch is 1/160th of an acre. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 

Some documents in the record locate the farm in Burgettstown.
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1938 . . . .” The parties agree that as a result of these transactions, (1) Joe 

owned the Scott Heirs’ Farm, but not the farm’s oil and gas and related 

interests (the “Oil and Gas”), and (2) Bessie owned a life estate in the Oil 

and Gas and Joe owned a remainder interest in the Oil and Gas.

In 1939, Joe and Bessie, as husband and wife, executed the Pirih 

Deed, which conveyed the Scott Heirs’ Farm to John and Mary Pirih. The 

Pirih Deed contained an “EXCEPTING AND RESERVING” clause that was 

identical to the clause in the Wrenshall deed to Joe. It stated: 

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING hereout and herefrom all the oil 

and gas in or underlying said parcel of ground, together with the 

perpetual and irrevocable right, privilege, and easement of 

entering upon said lands and searching for, drilling wells, sinking 

shafts, mining, digging, extracting, taking and carrying away all 

of the oil and gas in or under said lands, or that may be found 

therein or thereunder; and, also, the right of possession and 

use of so much of said premises at all times as may be 

necessary to the practical carrying out of the purposes and 

provisions of this exception, provided, however, that no wells 

shall be drilled within 200 feet of the buildings on said tract of 

land. 

The deed continued:

THIS CONVEYANCE is also made UNDER AND SUBJECT TO a 

deed of A. Kirk Wrenshall, to Bessie Krynovske dated September 

1

st, 1938 . . . by which conveyance all of the oil and gas rights 

were conveyed to the said Bessie Krynovske.

One of the issues in this appeal is whether the Pirih Deed somehow 

terminated Bessie’s life estate in the Oil and Gas and made Joe and Bessie 

owners of the Oil and Gas as tenants by the entireties.
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Joe died intestate in 1959. He was survived by Bessie and five 

children: Helen Goodman, Mary Krynovske, Olga Murphy, Joseph Karneke, 

and Steve Karnek, Sr. The parties agree that if Bessie still had a life estate 

in the Oil and Gas at the time of Joe’s death, then, under the then-prevailing 

law of intestacy,3 Bessie inherited one-third (5/15) of Joe’s remainder 

interest in the Oil and Gas and each of the five children inherited one-fifth of 

the remaining two-thirds (that is, 2/15 each) of the Oil and Gas.4

Bessie died testate on November 9, 1963. Her Last Will and 

Testament, dated June 9, 1962,5 provided in Paragraph SECOND: 

I give, devise and bequeath all my real estate property to my 

daughter, namely Helen Goodman. Property consists of on [sic] 

lot 30 by 150 feet of the Gordon Land Co. Plan, Lot #192, 

situated at 567 Buena Vista Street, Canton Twp., Washington 

County, Penna. She is to receive all royalties from 7 oil wells 

situated on John Scott’s heirs Farm, R.D. #3, Burgettstown, Pa. 

The wells are owned by Wolf Head Oil Refinery Co., Inc. Farm 

____________________________________________

3 The Intestate Act of 1947, 1947 P.L. 80 (Apr. 24, 1947), as amended.

4 Each of their interests in the remainder therefore was: 

Bessie: 5/15, or 33.333%;

Helen: 2/15, or 13.333%;

Mary: 2/15, or 13.333%;

Olga: 2/15, or 13.333%;

Joseph: 2/15, or 13.333%;

Steve Sr.: 2/15, or 13.333%.

5 The will was probated under the name “Bessie Krznovke a/k/a Bessie 

Krznovcke a/k/a Bess Krznovski.” The parties have acknowledged that the 

spellings of the principals’ names have changed over the years. See 

Appellees’ Brief at 5 n.4. No party contends that the different spellings of 

the names are material to this case.
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No. 1013S. Also Helen Goodman will be her sister, Mary 

Krynovske, guardian and she is to live in the house during her 

entire life.

The will contained no residuary clause. Although there is no specific 

discussion of the issue in Bessie’s will, the parties agree that one of Bessie’s 

objectives was to take care of her daughter Mary, who apparently was 

unable to care for herself, by providing her with a guardian, a house (the 

devised property in Canton Township), and income. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7; 

Appellees’ Brief at 23. The will appointed Helen as Mary’s guardian and 

required Helen to live in the house, apparently so that she could care for 

Mary there. Letters testamentary were issued to Helen, and on October 27, 

1964, the Orphans’ Court issued an Adjudication and Decree awarding Helen 

the Canton Township property; the decree made no mention of Oil and Gas 

rights on the Scott Heirs’ Farm or of royalties from those rights. See

Washington County Orphans’ Court Adjudication and Decree, No. 269 of 

1964. One of the questions in this appeal is what interests in the Oil and 

Gas rights, if any, each of Bessie’s children inherited upon Bessie’s death. 

Bessie’s five children all are now deceased: 

• Mary Krynovske died intestate in 1967. She was unmarried and 

had no children. 

• Helen Goodman died testate in 1987. She left the house and lot 

in Canton Township to Olga Murphy, and stated that “all the rest, 

residue and remainder” of her estate was bequeathed to her brother, 
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Steve Karnek, Sr. In a handwritten note at the bottom of her will, she 

explained: “My brother, Steve Karnek, Sr., deserves all of what little I 

possess as he and I cared financially (physically healthwise), to Bessie 

Krynovske, mother and Mary, sister — both ill. No other family 

member aided.” 

• Steve Karnek, Sr. died intestate in 1988, survived by his wife, 

Lucy Karnek, and his son, Steven Karnek, Jr. (referenced in the 

litigation as “Steve Karnek”). In 2010, Lucy and Steve conveyed their 

interests to Karnek Family Partners, LP, a limited partnership. In 2014, 

Karnek Family Partners leased its interest in the Oil and Gas under the 

Scott Heirs’ Farm to Range Resources Appalachia, LLC.

• Joseph Karneke died intestate in 1989, survived by his son, 

Sidney Karneke.

• Olga Murphy died testate in 2013. Her will left her entire estate 

to her two sons, Harold Murphy, Jr. and William Joseph Murphy.

On April 6, 2015, the heirs of Joseph and Olga — Harold B. Murphy, 

Jr., William Joseph Murphy, and Sidney C. Karneke (“the Murphy Plaintiffs”) 

— filed the instant quiet title action against Steve Karnek and Karnek Family 

Partners (“the Karnek Defendants”) and Range Resources in which they 

sought a declaratory judgment regarding ownership of the Oil and Gas. 

Specifically, the Murphy Plaintiffs asked the trial court to declare that Karnek 

Family Partners owns 50%, Harold and William Murphy each own 12.5%, 
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and Sidney Karneke owns 25% of those rights. They reached this result by 

assuming that (1) Bessie’s life estate and Joe’s remainder interest remained 

intact after execution of the Pirih Deed, (2) when Joe died, Bessie inherited 

one-third of Joe’s remainder interest and the five children equally divided the 

remaining two-thirds; (3) when Bessie died, the five children equally divided 

Bessie’s one-third interest among themselves; and (4) when each of the five 

children died, their interests then passed according to their wills or the 

intestacy laws.6 

____________________________________________

6 The Murphy Plaintiffs calculate each of the parties’ interests this way:

• After Joe’s death, Helen, Mary, Olga, Joseph, and Steve Sr. each owned 

a 0.13333 remainder interest in the Oil and Gas rights (see fn. 4, supra).

• Upon Bessie’s death, Bessie’s 0.33333 interest was divided equally 

among her five children, so that each received an additional interest of 

0.06667 (0.33333 ÷ 5). That meant that each child’s interest increased to 

0.20.

• Because Mary died first and intestate, her interest was divided among 

her four siblings, so that they each received an additional interest of 0.05 

(0.20 ÷ 4). That meant that each of the four remaining children’s 

interests increased to 0.25.

• Helen died second, and her will gave her 0.25 interest to her brother 

Steve Sr. as part of the residue of her estate. That increased Steve Sr.’s 

interest to 0.50 (0.25 + 0.25). Steve Sr.’s interest passed to his wife and 

son, who then conveyed it to Karnek Family Partners. The Murphy 

Plaintiffs therefore concluded that Karnek Family Partners’ interest is 50%.

• Joseph died next. His interest of 0.25 was inherited by his son Sidney 

Karneke. The Murphy Plaintiffs (which include Sidney Karneke) therefore 

concluded that Sidney Karneke’s interest is 25%.

• Lastly, Olga’s interest of 0.25 was inherited by her sons, Harold Murphy, 

Jr. and William Joseph Murphy, who therefore have an interest of 0.125 

(12.5%) each (0.25 ÷ 2). 
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The Karnek Defendants filed a counterclaim asking the trial court to 

quiet title in their favor, enter an order ejecting the Murphy Plaintiffs from 

any possessory rights in the Oil and Gas, and issue an order determining the 

rights of the parties to the Oil and Gas. They claimed that 100% of the Oil 

and Gas is owned by Karnek Family Partners. They reached this result by 

assuming that: (1) the Pirih Deed caused the Oil and Gas rights to be owned 

by Joe and Bessie as tenants by the entireties; (2) Bessie therefore inherited 

100% of those rights upon Joe’s death; (3) Bessie’s will devised 100% of 

those rights to Helen; (4) Helen’s will devised all of her rights to her brother 

Steve Sr.; (5) Steve Sr.’s interest was inherited by his wife and son; and (6) 

Steve Sr.’s wife and son ultimately conveyed their interests to Karnek Family 

Partners. 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.7 On 

February 29, 2016, the trial court issued an opinion and order in which it 

agreed with the Murphy Plaintiffs that following the execution of the Pirih 

Deed, Bessie continued to own a life estate in the Oil and Gas and Joe 

continued to own the remainder interest. When Joe died intestate in 1959, 

Bessie inherited one-third of Joe’s remainder interest and each of Joe’s five 

children equally divided the rest. Trial Ct. Op. at 2. The trial court then 

____________________________________________

7 Defendant Range Resources did not participate in the summary judgment 

proceedings. After becoming aware of the ownership dispute, Range 

Resources started paying rents and royalties into escrow while awaiting 

direction from the court. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. 
J-A33023-16

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departed from the Murphy Plaintiffs’ analysis and concluded that when 

Bessie died in 1963 and her life estate disappeared, her one-third interest in 

the remainder interest passed, pursuant to her will, to Helen, from whom it 

then ultimately passed to Karnek Family Partners. Id. at 5-7. Thus, the 

court determined the ownership interests in the Oil and Gas to be: 

 Harold Murphy – 1/12th (.08333, or 8.3%);

 William Murphy – 1/12th (.08333, or 8.3%);

 Sidney Karneke – 1/6th (.16667, or 16.7%);

 Karnek Family Partners – 2/3rds (.66667, or 66.7%).8

The trial court ordered Range Resources to distribute rents and royalties 

according to these shares. 

____________________________________________

8 The court announced its decision in terms of fractions of the estate, rather 

than percentages, but for ease of reference we shall employ decimals here. 

The court agreed that upon Joe’s death, each of the five children inherited a 

0.13333 interest in Joe’s remainder interest in the Oil and Gas rights. The 

court concluded that when Bessie died, Bessie’s 0.33333 interest went to 

Helen, increasing Helen’s interest to 0.46666. When Mary died, her 0.13333 

interest was divided equally among the remaining four children, adding 

0.03333 to each of their interests. Thus, Helen’s interest increased to 

0.49999. The other three children’s interests increased to 0.16666 (1/6th). 

That is the ultimate interest inherited by Sidney Karneke, Joseph’s son. 

That same interest was inherited by Olga and then split equally by her 

children, Harold and William Murphy, giving them each an interest of 

0.08333 (1/12th). Karnek Family Partners received the 0.16666 interest 

inherited by Steve Sr. and his heirs plus the 0.49999 interest that Steve Sr. 

inherited from Helen, for a total interest of 0.66665 (2/3rds). 
J-A33023-16

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Both the Murphy Plaintiffs and the Karnek Defendants filed appeals 

from the February 29, 2016 order, and this Court consolidated those 

appeals.

The Karnek Defendants, as designated Appellants, raise the following 

issues:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that Bessie Krynovske 

acquired a life estate and her husband, Joe Krynovske, held the 

remainder interest in the oil and gas following the conveyance to 

John and Mary Pirih in the deed dated [February 8,] 1939?

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to determine the true 

intent of Joe and Bessie Krynovske as to their type of ownership 

of the oil and gas based on the Pirih Deed EXCEPTION and 

RESERVATION clause?

3. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to hold the severance 

of the oil and gas estate in the Pirih Deed was a reservation of 

the oil and gas in the Grantors, Joe and Bessie Krynovske, as 

Tenants by the Entirety thereby extinguishing the life estate of 

Bessie Krynovske and the remainder interest of Joe Krynovske?

4. Whether Bessie Krynovske was a stranger in title in the Pirih 

Deed reservation thereby failing to vest entireties ownership of 

the oil and gas, in Bessie and Joe Krynovske?

5. Whether the Trial Court erred in ruling the Karnek Family 

Partners, LLP are owners of a two-thirds (2/3s) interest in the Oil 

and Gas Estate instead of owners of the entire estate?

Appellants’ Brief at 4-5.

In their cross-appeal, the Murphy Plaintiffs, as designated Appellees, 

raise the following issue:

Did the trial court err in holding the Will of Bessie Krynovske 

devised her 1/3 interest in the oil and gas underlying the farm of 

the Samuel Scott heirs to Helen Goodman when both her Will 

and the Decree of Distribution specifically described the real 
J-A33023-16

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estate being devised to Helen Goodman as “property consists of 

on lot 30’ by 150’ of the Gordon Land Co. Plan, Lot No. 192, 

situated at 567 Buena Vista Street, Canton Twp., Washington 

County, Penna.” And her Will specifically bequeathed only the 

“. . . royalties from seven oil wells situated on John Scott’s heirs 

farm . . .”

Appellees’ Brief at 2-3.9 In brief, the parties’ issues challenge the trial 

court’s interpretation of the Pirih Deed and Bessie’s will.

In reviewing an order granting or denying summary judgment, this 

Court applies the following principles:

Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or denying 

summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is 

clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is 

established that the court committed an error of law or abused 

its discretion. 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record clearly 

shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 

reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving 

party. Only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds 

could not differ can a trial court properly enter summary 

judgment.

Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 968-69 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

omitted). 

____________________________________________

9 The Murphy Plaintiffs also listed as an issue whether the trial court 

correctly ruled in their favor with respect to the Karnek Defendants’ issues. 
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The Pirih Deed (Appeal by the Karnek Defendants)

The parties agree that Bessie Krynovske had a life estate in the Oil and 

Gas underlying the Scott Heirs’ Farm after the September 1, 1938, deed 

from Wrenshall to Bessie that granted that interest. See Appellants’ Brief at 

12. The Karnek Defendants argue, however, that the Krynovskes’ deed of 

the Scott Heirs’ Farm to the Pirihs in 1939 somehow transformed the 

Krynovskes’ interest in the Oil and Gas from a life estate in Bessie and 

remainder in Joe, to a tenancy by the entireties in Bessie and Joe.10 They 

contend that this transformation occurred as a result of the “Exception and 

Reservation” clause in the Pirih Deed, which reads:

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING hereout and herefrom all the oil 

and gas in or underlying said parcel of ground, together with the 

perpetual and irrevocable right, privilege, and easement of 

entering upon said lands and searching for, drilling wells, sinking 

shafts, mining, digging, extracting, taking and carrying away all 

of the oil and gas in or under said lands, or that may be found 

therein or thereunder; and, also, the right of possession and 

use of so much of said premises at all times as may be 

necessary to the practical carrying out of the purposes and 

provisions of this exception, provided, however, that no wells 

shall be drilled within 200 feet of the buildings on said tract of 

land. 

THIS CONVEYANCE is also made UNDER AND SUBJECT TO a 

deed of A. Kirk Wrenshall, to Bessie Krynovske dated September 

1

st, 1938 and recorded in the Recorder’s Office of Washington 

County, Pennsylvania, in Deed Book Vol. 623, Page 251, by 

____________________________________________

10 Property held as a tenancy by the entireties is jointly owned by a husband 

and wife and passes to the surviving spouse upon the other’s death. See In 

re Estate of Bullotta, 798 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 2002), aff’d, 838 

A.2d 594 (Pa. 2003).
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which conveyance all of the oil and gas rights were 

conveyed to the said Bessie Krynovske.

See Appellants’ Brief at 10-11 (quoting second paragraph; emphasis in that 

paragraph added by Karnek Defendants). 

The Karnek Defendants’ argument is premised on the emphasized 

language in the foregoing provision, which states that Wrenshall’s deed to 

Bessie conveyed “all of the oil and gas rights . . . to . . . Bessie Krynovske.” 

The Karnek Defendants argue that the word “all” demonstrates that the 

Krynovskes did not intend “that Bessie’s ownership of the oil and gas be 

limited to a Life Estate interest” and that instead the intent was for Joe and 

Bessie to own “all” of the Oil and Gas as tenants by the entireties. See 

Appellants’ Brief at 13.

In support of this construction, The Karnek Defendants surmise that 

Joe “had to believe” that Wrenshall was a “straw party” used to sever the Oil 

and Gas rights so that the Krynovskes could sell the surface land to the 

Pirihs while retaining the Oil and Gas rights. The Karnek Defendants further 

surmise that Joe, “as a lay person, didn’t understand or agree with the legal 

concept of a Life Estate”; never intended “that Bessie’s ownership in the oil 

and gas be limited to a Life Estate interest”; intended, as shown by the Pirih 

Deed, “that Bessie be considered owner of all of the oil and gas”; and 

declared in the Pirih Deed “his and Bessie’s intent that they would own the 

entire fee in the oil and gas as Tenants by the Entireties.” Appellants’ Brief 

at 13 (emphasis in original). The Karnek Defendants argue that because 
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ownership of the Oil and Gas reverted to Bessie and Joe as tenants by the 

entireties, their survivor (who turned out to be Bessie) would be the sole 

owner of the Oil and Gas rights after the other died. 

When interpreting deeds, “the court’s ‘primary object must be to 

ascertain and effectuate what the parties intended.’” Mackall v. Fleegle, 

801 A.2d 577, 581 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting Brookbank v. BenedumTrees Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103, 107 (Pa. 1957)). The following rules of 

construction apply:

(1) the nature and quantity of the interest conveyed must be 

ascertained from the instrument itself and cannot be orally 

shown in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake and we seek 

to ascertain not what the parties may have intended by the 

language but what is the meaning of the words; (2) effect must 

be given to all the language of the instrument and no part shall 

be rejected if it can be given a meaning; (3) if a doubt arises 

concerning the interpretation of the instrument it will be resolved 

against the party who prepared it; (4) unless contrary to the 

plain meaning of the instrument, an interpretation given it by 

the parties themselves will be favored; (5) to ascertain the 

intention of the parties, the language of a deed should be 

interpreted in the light of the subject matter, the apparent object 

or purpose of the parties and the conditions existing when it was 

executed.

Mackall, 801 A.2d at 581 (quoting Brookbank, 131 A.2d at 107 n.6) 

(quotation marks and ellipses omitted)). As with any question of law, we 

review the trial court’s construction of a deed de novo.

We disagree with The Karnek Defendants’ interpretation of the deed, 

which appears to be based on mere speculation regarding Joe’s intent and is 

inconsistent with our rules of construction. See Mackall, 801 A.2d at 581 
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(“we seek to ascertain not what the parties may have intended by the 

language but what is the meaning of the words”). The Pirih Deed’s words 

explicitly recognize that the conveyance made by that deed is “UNDER AND 

SUBJECT TO” Wrenshall’s deed to Bessie that created Bessie’s life estate and 

Joe’s remainder interest in the Oil and Gas. The Pirih Deed’s “Exception and 

Reservation” Clause relating to Oil and Gas rights is identical to the clause 

excepting Oil and Gas rights in Wrenshall’s deed of the Scott Heirs’ Farm to 

Joe, showing that, just as Oil and Gas was excepted from the conveyance to 

Joe, it also was excepted from the conveyance to the Pirihs. The Pirih 

Deed’s language thus indicates that the parties’ intent was not to change 

the life estate in the Oil and Gas that Bessie had obtained under the deed to 

her from Wrenshall; the Pirih Deed says that explicitly. That the Pirih Deed 

described the deed from Wrenshall to Bessie as transferring “all” of the Oil 

and Gas rights to Bessie does not alter this conclusion; the Wrenshall deed 

did convey all of the Oil and Gas to Bessie — for her life.

For this reason, we disagree with The Karnek Defendants’ argument 

that the Exception and Reservation Clause in the Pirih Deed was a 

reservation of Oil and Gas rights to the Krynovskes, rather than an exception 

to the rights conveyed to the Pirihs. A reservation is the creation of a right 

or interest that did not previously exist; but if the thing or right exists at the 

time of conveyance, the deed’s language is treated as making an exception 

Ralston v. Ralston, 55 A.3d 736, 741 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here, Bessie’s 
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life estate existed before the conveyance to the Pirihs; the Pirih Deed 

therefore was excepting the Oil and Gas rights subject to that life estate, 

rather than creating a new right or interest in the Oil and Gas.

In this connection, the confusing discussion of the “Stranger in Title” 

rule that The Karnek Defendants have included in their brief is beside the 

point. “The common law rule is that generally a reservation/exception of 

rights in a stranger to a deed is ineffective to transfer any interests to the 

stranger.” In re Condemnation by County of Allegheny of Certain 

Coal, Oil, Gas, Limestone and Mineral Props., 719 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1998) (hereinafter Allegheny). The Karnek Defendants’ brief 

raises the specter of this “rule” by noting that “[o]ne could argue that Bessie 

was a Stranger in Title, which would make the Deeded interest null and 

void.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. The Karnek Defendants then contend that the 

Commonwealth Court in Allegheny “adopted a modified form of the 

common law principle requiring the Court [to] examine the Grantor[’]s 

‘Intent’.” Id. at 15-16. The claimed import in this case of both this “rule” 

and of the Commonwealth Court’s purported modification of it11 are not at all 

____________________________________________

11 We are not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court. Mariner 

Chestnut Partners, L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 283 n.12 (Pa. Super. 

2016). In any event, we disagree with The Karnek Defendants’ 

interpretation of Allegheny. That case did not disregard or reinterpret the 

stranger-in-title rule in order to effectuate the grantor’s intent. Rather, the 

court in Allegheny first held that an attempted reservation of mineral rights 

in a third party was ineffective. Allegheny, 719 A.2d at 3. In doing so, it 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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clear, but the Karnek Defendants apparently engage in this discussion to 

emphasize their desire that we examine the intent of the Krynovskes (and, 

in particular, that of Joe Krynovske) in signing the Pirih Deed. See id. at 17 

(Allegheny “emphasizes the obligation of this Court to closely examine the 

intentions of Joe Krynovske when he approved and executed the Pirih 

Deed”). 

We do not disagree with the importance of examining the parties’ 

intent. But, contrary to the Karnek Defendants’ argument, we discern the 

parties’ intent by looking to the language of the deed. See Mackall, 801 

A.2d at 581. Here, the plain language of the relevant clause in the Pirih 

Deed states that the deed is “UNDER AND SUBJECT TO” creation of the Life 

Estate in Bessie under the Wrenshall deed to Bessie. That clause is not 

ambiguous, and we therefore need look no farther to determine what the 

parties meant. The “Stranger in Title” rule and the Karnek Defendants’ 

argument regarding that rule thus have no bearing on this analysis. 

The Karnek Defendants also rely on Alexa v. Alexa, 23 Pa. D. & C. 3d 

164 (C.P. Beaver Cnty. 1982), for the proposition that, “[w]hen a wife joins 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

recognized that “there is a legal rule against attempting to accomplish by the

language herein utilized what the parties wanted to accomplish, namely, 

reserve/except an interest in a non-party to the deed.” Id. at 4. Then, the 

court examined the intent of the grantor when determining who owned the 

mineral rights in light of the failed reservation. See id. at 4 (holding that 

grantor retained interest). Allegheny, we conclude, has no bearing on 

discerning what the parties intended by the Exception and Reservation 

Clause at issue here. 
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her husband as a grantor in a deed to convey husband’s separately owned 

property, Pennsylvania courts have held that a new ownership interest can 

be created.” Appellants’ Brief at 16. We are not persuaded by Alexa. First, 

decisions of the courts of common pleas are not binding on this Court. 

Ambrogi v. Reber, 932 A.2d 969, 977 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 952 A.2d 673 (Pa. 2008). Second, the portion of Alexa Appellants 

cite is dicta. See In re Jacobs, 936 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(finding dicta from common pleas court decision “neither on point nor 

instructive”). Third, the dicta in Alexa concerned whether a new interest 

could be created where none existed before, while the issue in this case is 

whether a reservation in a deed, which expressly recognizes a prior deed, 

changes the interest created by the prior deed.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court correctly 

concluded that until Joe’s death, Bessie had a life estate and Joe had a 

remainder interest in the Oil and Gas.

Bessie Krynovske’s Will (Appeal by the Murphy Plaintiffs)

The Murphy Plaintiffs agree that the Pirih Deed did not alter Bessie’s 

life estate in the Oil and Gas. They also agree that when Joe died in 1959, 

Bessie retained her life estate in the Oil and Gas and Joe’s remainder 

interest passed by intestacy to Bessie and to his children, with Bessie 

receiving a 1/3rd interest in that remainder interest, and each of Joe’s five 

children receiving an equal share of the rest (that is, they each received a 
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2/15ths interest). See Trial Ct. Op. at 2. But the Murphy Plaintiffs disagree 

with the trial court’s holding about what happened to these interests when 

Bessie died. The trial court held that Bessie’s 1/3 interest passed to her 

daughter Helen under Paragraph SECOND of Bessie’s will, but the Murphy 

Plaintiffs contend that the will did not dispose of Bessie’s 1/3 interest and 

that the 1/3 interest therefore passed by intestacy to Bessie’s five children, 

for equal division among them. If the Murphy Plaintiffs are correct, Karnek 

Family Partners would end up with only one-half of the Oil and Gas rights 

and the Murphy Plaintiffs would divide the other half among themselves; 

under the trial court’s decision, however, Karnek Family Partners owns twothirds of the Oil and Gas rights and the Murphy Plaintiffs’ remaining shares 

are reduced accordingly.12

Paragraph SECOND of Bessie’s will devised and bequeathed “all of my 

real estate property” to Helen. It then said, “Property consists of” the lot 

containing the house in Canton Township and made reference to royalties 

from oil wells on the Scott Heirs’ Farm, but did not otherwise mention 

Bessie’s interest in the Oil and Gas underlying the Scott Heirs’ Farm. 

Therefore, the Murphy Plaintiffs argue that the real property devise to Helen 

____________________________________________

12 In the trial court, the Karnek Defendants took the position adopted by the 

trial court that, through her will, Bessie devised her Oil and Gas interest to 

Helen. See Karnek Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 13-15. They do not 

argue this issue in their brief to this Court, see Appellants’ Brief at 24 

(briefly mentioning will issue), and did not file a brief in response to the 

Murphy Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.
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under this paragraph was only of the Canton Township lot because only that 

lot was specifically described by the phrase, “[p]roperty consists of.” The 

Murphy Plaintiffs point out that the receipt of royalties can be held 

separately from any other interest in oil and gas, so that the will’s reference 

to those royalties does not encompass the underlying Scott Heirs’ Farm Oil 

and Gas rights. More generally, they argue that Bessie’s intent was to leave 

a house where Helen could take care of her disabled daughter Mary, and 

also to leave royalty income that Helen could use for Mary’s care. The 

Murphy Plaintiffs conclude that “[o]wnership of the gas in situ at the Scott 

Heirs’ Farm was clearly not on [Bessie’s] mind and irrelevant to her plan [to 

take care of Mary].” Appellees’ Brief at 23.

In interpreting a will, we are mindful of the following principles:

It is now hornbook law (1) that the testator’s intent is the 

polestar and must prevail; and (2) that his intent must be 

gathered from a consideration of (a) all the language contained 

in the four corners of his will and (b) his scheme of distribution 

and (c) the circumstances surrounding him at the time he made 

his will and (d) the existing facts; and (3) that technical rules or 

canons of construction should be resorted to only if the language 

of the will is ambiguous or conflicting or the testator's intent is 

for any reason uncertain.

In re Houston's Estate, 201 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1964) (citations omitted). 

Thus, the primary goal of the construing court is to effectuate the intent of 

the testator. “In order to ascertain the testamentary intent, a court must 

focus first and foremost on the precise wording of the will, and if ambiguity 

exists, on the circumstances under which the will was executed.” In re 
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Estate of Weaver, 572 A.2d 1249, 1256 (Pa. Super.) (citations omitted), 

appeal denied, 582 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1990). The words of a will are not to be 

viewed in a vacuum, and “specific words or phrases will be rejected when 

they subvert or defeat the testator’s whole testamentary scheme and divest 

the bounty from those whom he obviously intended to benefit.” Id. The 

interpretation of a will is a question of law, and thus our standard of review 

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In re Estate of McFadden, 

100 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).13

“One who writes a will is presumed to intend to dispose of all his 

estate and not to die intestate as to any portion thereof.” In re Grier’s 

Estate, 170 A.2d 545, 548 (Pa. 1961) (citation omitted). Moreover, the 

enumeration of particular items in a will, following a gift in general terms, 

does not reduce the effect of the general terms. See Risk’s Appeal, 1 A. 

85, 86 (Pa. 1885); In re Rzedzianowski’s Estate, 25 A.2d 600, 604 (Pa. 

Super. 1942); 31 Standard Pa. Practice 2d § 150:55 (2012) (“The mere 

designation or enumeration of particular property in a residuary clause of a 

will is generally held not to make the legacy or devise of such property 

specific rather than general”).

____________________________________________

13 In the absence of a contrary intention appearing in the will, a testatrix’s 

will is construed according to the law at the time of her death. In re Linn’s 

Estate, 258 A.2d 645, 648 (Pa. 1969).
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In Risk’s Appeal, the testator’s will stated, “For my wife, Mary E. 

Risk, to have all bonds and all the income thereof, and all money now on 

hand, and all the personal property is hers.” 1 A. at 86. The Court held that 

although some personal property was specifically mentioned, all of the 

testator’s personal property was included “under the general words, ‘all the 

personal property is hers.’” Id.

In Rzedzianowski’s Estate, the testator’s will stated that he left “all 

his modest property, consisting of fields and three lots” to one person, Anna 

Borkowska. 25 A.2d at 601. When the testator died, he had $2,267.66, 

which was not explicitly mentioned in his will. Id. This Court concluded that 

the phrase “all my modest property” was not restricted by the subsequent 

description of particular property (fields and three lots), and that Anna 

Borkowska thus inherited the $2,267.66. Id. at 604. The court reasoned 

that “[t]he enumeration in the will of particular items after the gift in general 

terms ‘of all my property’ by the use of the words ‘consisting of,’ etc., did 

not abridge or cut down the effect of the general words.”14

____________________________________________

14 The will in Rzedzianowski’s Estate also expressly stated the testator’s 

wish that his family receive nothing, thus overcoming the presumption that 

“an heir is never to be disinherited except by plain words or necessary 

implication.” 25 A.2d at 603. While there is no similar expression of intent to 

disinherit anyone in Bessie Krynovske’s will, we find Rzedzianowski’s 

Estate instructive in construing a general gift followed by the enumeration 

of specific items.
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Instantly, Bessie’s will stated in relevant part, “I give, devise and 

bequeath all my real estate property to my daughter, Helen Goodman.” 

Compl., Ex. B (emphasis added) (application for probate containing will of 

Bessie Krynovske). The trial court concluded that by devising “all” of her real 

property to Helen, Bessie intended Helen to receive her interest in the Oil 

and Gas. Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7. Oil and gas are “real property.” See

Duquesne Natural Gas Co. v. Fefolt, 198 A.2d 608, 610 (Pa. Super. 

1964) (“So far as the law of property is concerned the ownership of oil and 

gas is similar to that of coal, where there are three estates of land, the coal 

itself, the surface and the right of support”). Therefore, the trial court held, 

Bessie’s will conveyed the Oil and Gas rights to Helen, and that interest did 

not pass to her other children by intestacy. 

We agree with the trial court that the description of the Canton 

Township lot, which followed the gift of “all my real estate property,” did not, 

as the Murphy Plaintiffs argue, reduce the general devise. See Trial Ct. Op. 

at 7; Risk’s Appeal, 1 A. at 86; Rzedzianowski’s Estate, 25 A.2d at 601. 

The trial court’s interpretation of the will is also consistent with the 

presumption against partial intestacy. See Grier’s Estate, 170 A.2d at 548. 

Moreover, it is in harmony with Bessie’s general intent in drafting her will: to 

care for Mary by giving her a place to live and by giving Mary’s guardian 

(Helen) income to support them both. Trial Ct. Op. at 7 (“We will not read 

[the description of Bessie’s house] to immediately reduce what she had just 
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given to Helen, especially since she was attempting to give Helen an 

income”). Although the Murphy Plaintiffs contend that “[o]wnership of the 

oil and gas in situ at the Scott Heirs’ Farm was clearly not on [Bessie’s] mind 

and irrelevant to her plan,” Appellees’ Brief at 23, we agree with the trial 

court that giving Helen ownership of the Oil and Gas would further Bessie’s 

goal of providing income for Helen and Mary, especially since existing 

royalties were “based on [Bessie’s] life estate” and might no longer be 

available after Bessie’s death. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7. In sum, we discern 

no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Bessie’s will conveyed her 1/3rd 

interest in the Oil and Gas to Helen.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s February 29, 

2016 order disposing of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2017