IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL E. WRIGHT, 

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:12-cv-614

v. JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp

COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for consideration of a motion for summary judgment filed

by Defendant Adam Barton. (ECF No. 14.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the

motion well taken.

I. Background

On May 17, 2012, Defendant Adam Barton, a City of Columbus police officer, was on

patrol in a marked police cruiser. Shortly before 11:00 p.m., Barton and other officers were

dispatched to a Columbus location on a “shots fired” report. Upon arriving at the area, a known

drug locale to which Barton had been dispatched before for other shots fired calls, Barton

noticed a silver Chevrolet Impala traveling quickly from the location. Barton pulled his cruiser

in front of the vehicle to effectuate an investigatory stop. As Barton walked toward the

Chevrolet Impala, however, the vehicle pulled away despite the officer’s commands to stop.

The driver of the Chevrolet Impala was Plaintiff, Michael Wright. Employing their

overhead lights, several police cruisers followed Wright. Barton took the lead position in the

pursuit, which lasted for approximately three minutes. During this time, Wright ran four red

lights, reached speeds in excess of 60 miles per hour, went left of double yellow lines, cut

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through a gas station at a high rate of speed, and drove through a construction zone at a high rate

of speed. Wright then turned into a driveway, exited his still-running vehicle, and proceeded

toward a house despite Barton ordering him to stop. Wright testified at his deposition that he

emerged from his vehicle with his hands raised. Videotape evidence submitted by Barton,

however, indicates that after Wright exited the Chevrolet Impala, he did not raise his hands and

in fact kept one hand near the waistband of his pants while he went toward and then into the

house. 

The officer pursued Wright into the house, where Wright sat on a couch and put his

hands between the couch cushions. At that point, Barton advised Wright that he was under arrest

and allegedly ordered Wright to show his hands and to get on the ground. When Wright did not

comply, Barton grabbed Wright’s right arm to handcuff him. Wright did not comply with orders

to place his hands behind his back. Barton then punched Wright two to three times and took the

man to the floor, but Wright continued to keep his left arm under the couch cushion and pulled

his right arm away from the officer. At that point Barton used his flashlight to strike Wright

twice in the supra scapula nerve area of his right shoulder. Wright put his hands behind his back,

and Barton handcuffed him.

Barton and another officer escorted Wright from the house. Wright, proceeding as dead

weight, stumbled and fell to the ground. The officers picked him up and moved him to Barton’s

cruiser, where Wright stiffened his body and refused to get into the cruiser. Wright was then

placed into the cruiser, and once inside he refused to identify himself or speak to the officers. 

The officers eventually identified Wright and proceeded to take him to police headquarters,

where he refused to be fingerprinted and photographed. Wright ended up in jail.

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An inventory search of Wright’s impounded vehicle resulted in the discovery of the

lower receiver of a hand gun, two magazines with 26 rounds of ammunition, and a bag of

marijuana. Wright was charged with a number of crimes under the Columbus City Code and

eventually pled guilty in state court to the charge of resisting arrest. Thereafter, Wright,

proceeding pro se, filed the instant action in July 2012. Seeking damages in excess of $10

million, Wright asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Columbus Police Department

and Barton, as well as an unidentified officer, for false arrest and for excessive force.1 (ECF No.

3.) Barton filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Wright failed to file a response.2

(ECF No. 14.) The period for briefing on the motion has closed, and the motion is ripe for

disposition. 

II. Discussion

A. Standard Involved

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the

1

 The Complaint does not specifically reference § 1983, but both this Court and Barton

have broadly construed the pro se pleading to present the claims identified. Wright did not file a

response to the motion for summary judgment disputing this construction. 

2

 The Court notes that although only Barton is listed as the movant on the motion for

summary judgment, the motion asserts that the Columbus Police Department “is not sui juris and

is, therefore, not a party to this action.” (ECF No. 14, at Page ID # 65.) It is correct that a police

department cannot sue or be sued. But rather than simply declaring itself a non-party and

deciding that it consequently need not do anything in a case, surely the better practice for a

police department named as a defendant is endure the distinctly meager inconvenience of joining

in or filing its own motion. Other police departments have, for example, taken the time to file a

motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Saunders v. Whitehall Police

Dep’t, No. 2:11-cv-00517, 2013 WL 146369, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2013); Lathan v. City of

Cleveland, No. 1:12 CV 37, 2012 WL 1708762, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2012); Yahnke v.

Nixon, 2010 WL 3420650, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2010); Hale v. Vance, 267 F. Supp. 2d

725, 727, 737 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Jones v. Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d 991, 997 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 

Because the motion sub judice raises the dispositive defense, the Court will construe the motion

as encompassing the Columbus Police Department as well.

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movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may therefore grant a motion

for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that party’s case. 

See Muncie Power Prods., Inc. v. United Tech. Auto., Inc., 328 F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 2003)

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). 

In viewing the evidence, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party, which must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986)); Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 234 (6th Cir. 2003). A

genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Muncie, 328 F.3d at 873 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Consequently, the central issue is “ ‘whether the evidence

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided

that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Hamad, 328 F.3d at 234-35 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 251-52).

B. Analysis 

Section 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

. . . .

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in order to prevail on his § 1983 claims, Wright must show that, while

acting under color of state law, Defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Federal

Constitution or laws of the United States. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir.

2003).

Wright cannot prevail on either of his § 1983 claims due to the doctrine of qualified

immunity. Such immunity operates under certain circumstances to shield from civil liability

governmental officials, such as police officers, who are performing official duties. Sinick v.

Summit, 76 F. App’x 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2003). The affirmative defense is meant to safeguard an

official’s proper decision-making process and offers that party potential relief from frivolous

suits. See D’Agastino v. Warren, 75 F. App’x 990, 993 (6th Cir. 2003). It “shields government

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” 

Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In addition to shielding officials

from liability, qualified immunity may entitle the official not to stand trial or face the other

burdens of litigation. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to use a distinct analysis to determine

whether the application of qualified immunity is warranted. In addressing the potential

applicability of qualified immunity, courts therefore traditionally followed a sequential inquiry:

“First, the court considers whether, on the plaintiff’s facts, there has there been a violation. 

Second, the court considers whether that violation involved ‘clearly established constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460,

465 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1996)); see

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also Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2008). This analytic approach has at

times also been characterized by various appellate panels as a three-part inquiry in which a court

must ask:

1) has a constitutional violation occurred; 2) was that right a clearly established right

of which a reasonable person would have known; and 3) has the plaintiff alleged

sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively

unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights?

Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). See also Parsons v. City of

Pontiac, 533 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2008) (restating test); Wegener v. City of Covington, 933

F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1991) (“A public official is entitled to qualified immunity for conduct in

performing discretionary functions so long as that conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known.”). Other

appellate panels have found the third step to be redundant. Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 F.

App’x 595, 598 n.7 (6th Cir. 2010). Regardless of this latter point, courts are now permitted to

depart from the sequential analysis and address either prong of the two-part qualified immunity

inquiry first. Williams v. Ingham, 373 F. App’x 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2010); Kijowski, 372 F.

App’x at 598.

It is also important to note that the doctrine of qualified immunity recognizes that an

official can be found to have violated the constitution, but still be granted immunity for

reasonable mistakes as to the legality of his or her action. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206

(2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). The

reasonableness of such mistakes is inherently dependant upon the clarity of the legal constraints

governing the particular conduct involved. The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear

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that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right. Id. at

202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

The Court will therefore begin its excessive force analysis by examining whether a

constitutional violation has occurred. The Sixth Circuit has long recognized that “[i]t is well

established that any arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.” Thacker v.

City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Crockett, 316 F.3d at 580). Thus, a

lack of probable cause to arrest Wright would mean that a constitutional violation had occurred. 

There is no dispute that at the time of the incident at issue, the right to be free from an arrest

without probable cause was a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have

known. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90-91 (1964) (recognizing that an arrest without

probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment); Parsons, 533 F.3d at 504 (same). 

There is no constitutional violation upon which Wright can sustain his false arrest claim.

As noted, he pled guilty in the state court to resisting arrest. Accordingly, Wright is estopped

from asserting his claim for false arrest. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994);

Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1988). Absent limited exceptions that are not

asserted in this case, an undisturbed conviction creates a presumption of probable cause that

vitiates a false arrest claim. See, e.g., Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 520-21 (6th Cir. 2008)

(malicious prosecution); Jacob v. Township of West Bloomfield, 192 F. App’x 330, 334 (6th Cir.

2006) (illegal search and seizure); Shelton v. City of Taylor, 92 F. App’x 178, 183 (6th Cir.

2004) (malicious prosecution); Short v. Tackett, 100 F.3d 957, 1996 WL 637497, at *2 (6th Cir.

1996) (unpublished table decision) (illegal search and seizure). Even if Wright’s guilty plea (and

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its admission of the facts underlying that crime) did not conclusively resolve the false arrest

claim, however, Barton would still be entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 

This is because either probable cause to arrest Wright existed or Barton was objectively

reasonable in thinking it did. For probable cause to arrest to exist, the “facts and circumstances

within the officer’s knowledge [must be] sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of

reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is

committing or is about to commit an offense.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 580

(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)); see also Hinchman v.

Moore, 312 F.3d 198, 204 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th

Cir. 1988)). Put simply, “[a] police officer has probable cause if there is a fair probability that

the individual to be arrested has either committed or intends to commit a crime.” Fridley v.

Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Even an

arrest based upon probable cause where the suspect is later found to be innocent will not meet

the criteria for a § 1983 action. See Criss, 867 F.2d at 262 (citing United States v. Covelli, 738

F.2d 847, 854 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 867 (1984). 

Whether there exists a probability of criminal activity is assessed under a reasonableness

standard based on “ ‘an examination of all facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge

at the time of an arrest.’ ” Crockett, 316 F.3d at 580 (quoting Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167

F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999)). “Probable cause does not require the same type of specific

evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). The existence of probable cause is a jury question, unless

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there is only one reasonable determination that is possible. Crockett, 316 F.3d at 581;

Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000).

Only one reasonable determination is possible here. Wright fled from the police,

disobeyed orders to stop, and then disobeyed orders to cease resisting arrest, which engendered

the resisting arrest charge. But even if there was lack of probable cause to support this charge,

Barton would still be entitled to qualified immunity.

If Wright’s arrest were indeed a reasonable mistake on the part of Barton, the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. The Sixth Circuit has explained

that “probable cause determinations, even if wrong, are not actionable as long as such

determinations pass the test of reasonableness.” Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380, 381 (6th Cir.

1993). Thus, “under § 1983, ‘an arresting agent is entitled to qualified immunity if he or she

could reasonably (even if erroneously) have believed that the arrest was lawful, in light of clearly

established law and the information possessed at the time by the arresting agent.’ ” Parsons, 533

F.3d at 501 (quoting Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2008)). A great deal of

discretion is afforded police officers when evaluating reasonableness in such situations so that

“[i]f the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable . . . [he] is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Magrum v. Meinke, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (N.D. Ohio 2004). See also

Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A police officer may be entitled to

qualified immunity, obviously, even though he has in fact violated the plaintiff's rights;

‘reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.’”

(citations omitted)). 

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Because a reasonable officer in Barton’s position could have believed that he had

probable cause to arrest, Barton remains entitled to qualified immunity. See Pray v. City of

Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1159 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that qualified immunity existed where a

an officer acted reasonably, even if erroneously). It is Wright’s burden to show otherwise, and

based on the evidence and arguments before this Court, Wright has failed to demonstrate that

Barton is not entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim. 

Wright’s guilty plea does not bar Wright’s excessive force claim. McCartt v. Keyes, 194

F.3d 1313, 1999 WL 1000829, at *5 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). This claim

nonetheless also fails due to qualified immunity. 

Prior to the events at issue in this case, the United States Supreme Court established that

the use of force is unconstitutional if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). It was thus settled that at the time of the

underlying events here that the use of force must be reasonable; if no force was required, then no

force was necessary. See id. at 394; Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1104 (6th Cir. 1997)

(citing Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 384-85 (6th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, to determine

whether qualified immunity applies, this Court must determine whether police conduct here was

reasonable. Courts have indicated the difficulty of this determination, stating that 

ascertaining the reasonableness of force used is not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application, [and] the analysis focuses on the specific facts of each case,

“including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Magrum, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The Magrum court goes

on to state that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the

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perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Id.

Thus, a determination of whether the amount of force used was unreasonable “requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of

the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 

Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at

396). See also D’Agastino, 75 F. App’x at 994. The “objective reasonableness standard”

applied in this inquiry asks whether a reasonable officer would conclude that the level of force

used was appropriate. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. This standard balances the cost to the

individual against the government’s interest in effectuating a seizure; it contains a built-in

measure of deference to the officer’s on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary in

light of the circumstances of the particular case. Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir.

2002) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ).

Here, Barton and his fellow officers were dispatched to a known drug area on a shots

fired call. This presents circumstances in which a serious crime could likely be at issue. As

soon as the officers encountered Wright, he fled. A high speed case ensued in which Wright

actively attempted to lose the officers and evade capture and arrest. Once out of his car, Wright

continued to disobey officer commands to cease his flight, to stop resisting arrest, and to show

his hands. Wright’s refusal to show his hands, when viewed in the context of the shots fired call

and his attempt to evade contact with the police, reasonably suggested that Wright posed an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. It is no stretch to say that Wright’s 

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noncompliant conduct suggested that he possibly had a gun in his waistband or between the

couch cushions. Barton’s on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary in light of

these particular circumstances warrants deference. His judgment was reasonable, even if no gun

was discovered on Wright inside the house.

The Sixth Circuit has cautioned that “[s]ummary judgement on a claim of excessive force

is inappropriate where the parties dispute virtually all of the essential facts surrounding the

excessive force claim because it impossible to determine whether the force used was reasonable

without choosing between the parties sharply different factual accounts.” Jackson v. Hoylman,

933 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir. 1991). But there is no real dispute here over virtually all of the

essential facts involving Barton’s application of measured, progressive force used to obtain

compliance and negate a potential threat situation. In determining whether a defendant is

entitled to qualified immunity, “[t]he ultimate burden of proof is on [the plaintiff] to show that

[the defendant is] not entitled to qualified immunity.” Wegener, 933 F.2d at 392. See also Russo

v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992). Wright has produced no evidence

and has not even filed a response to Barton’s motion seeking qualified immunity. Moreover,

even if Barton erred in his handling of the incident, any possible error was understandable in

light of the uncertainties that pervaded the situation so that no reasonable juror could conclude

based on these facts that his actions were objectively unreasonable. In other words, qualified

immunity applies.

Barton is thus entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that the amount of force

involved here was reasonable, thereby precluding any deprivation of a constitutional right, and

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on the grounds that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim asserted against him in his

individual capacity. 

III. Conclusion

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 14.) The Clerk shall

enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case on the docket records of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

GREGORY L. FROST

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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