FILED

July 10, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JOHN ROBERTSON, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

) Marshall Circuit

VS. ) No. 12591

)

TENNESSEE WALKING HORSE ) Appeal No.

BREEDERS’ AND EXHIBITORS’ ) 01A01-9610-CV-00456

ASSOCIATION, )

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR MARSHALL COUNTY

AT LEWISBURG, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE LEE RUSSELL, JUDGE

For Plaintiff/Appellant: For Defendant/Appellee:

Donald E. Parish Marc O. Dedman

Ivey, Parish & Johns Julie-Karel Elkin

Huntingdon, Tennessee Spicer, Flynn & Rudstrom

Nashville, Tennessee

Diane Segroves

Bobo, Hunt & Bobo

Shelbyville, Tennessee

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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O P I N I O N

This appeal arises from a breeder’s expulsion from the Tennessee Walking

Horse Breeders’ and Exhibitors’ Association. The Association revoked the breeder’s

membership and permanently suspended his horse registration privileges for

registering a false pedigree for two horses. The breeder sued the Association in the

Circuit Court for Marshall County alleging wrongful expulsion and defamation and

seeking reinstatement. After considering the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment, the trial court granted the Association’s motion and dismissed the case.

On this appeal, the breeder asserts that the Association failed to follow its own

bylaws and thereby deprived him of a valuable property right without adequate

notice. We have determined that the Association substantially complied with its

bylaws and rules and provided the breeder with fair notice and an opportunity to be

heard. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the Association’s

summary judgment motion. 

I.

John Robertson breeds and exhibits Spotted Tobiano walking horses. He has

bred walking horses on his farm near Camden, Tennessee since 1957. Before his

expulsion, he was a member of the Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders’ and

Exhibitors’ Association, a nonprofit corporation whose purpose is to protect the

industry by maintaining a registry of the pedigrees of Tennessee walking horses. As

a member of the Association, Mr. Robertson had the privilege of registering his

walking horses’ pedigrees which substantially increased their sale prices and stud

fees.

In 1985, the Association began a new program requiring blood typing for each

stallion foal and stallion used for production before an owner could register their

offspring. Five years later, the Association began requiring that stallion foals be

checked or qualified to their sire, which means that each colt’s blood type would be

checked against its sire’s blood type. The Association broadened the rule in 1993 to

require verification of the sire and dame of each foal before it could be registered. 
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The Association first became concerned about Mr. Robertson’s registration

practices when the purchaser of one of his horses, a horse named Rock N Roll

Parader, attempted to register one of Rock N Roll Parader’s foals. When blood tests

revealed that Rock N Roll Parader could not be the foal’s sire, the Association

compared a photograph of Rock N Roll Parader submitted with his original

registration documents with a photograph of the foal’s sire and determined that the

photographs were of two different horses. 

In order to rule out the possibility of a mistake, the Association tested Mr.

Robertson’s only other spotted stallion, a horse named Paint Me Delight. The results

of these blood tests were identical to the tests of another horse named Romeo’s Jet.

Even though the registration of Romeo’s Jet listed Delight’s Romeo as the sire, the

blood testing ruled out the possibility that Delight’s Romeo could be the sire of

Romeo’s Jet. The Association also discovered that the photographs attached to the

registration papers for both Rock N Roll Parader and Paint Me Delight depicted the

same horse, although one of the photographs had been altered slightly.

This information prompted the Association to suspect that Mr. Robertson had

provided false blood samples, false information, and false photographs to the

Association when registering Rock N Roll Parader and Paint Me Delight. Since this

false registration affected not only Rock N Roll Parader and Paint Me Delight but

also their offspring and other breeders, the Association informed Mr. Robertson by

letter dated May 12, 1994, that disciplinary proceedings had been commenced and

that he had been charged with possible fraudulent registration of Rock N Roll Parader

and Paint Me Delight. This letter also informed Mr. Robertson that there would be

a hearing and that he had a right to be represented by counsel and to call witnesses.

It explained to him the possible penalties that could be imposed if he was found to

have violated the Association’s registration rules.

The Association wrote Mr. Robertson another letter on June 1, 1994 informing

him of the date, time, and location of the hearing and again advising him of his

procedural rights. The Association’s executive director wrote a third letter to Mr.

Robertson on June 17, 1994, reminding him of the allegations against him and

enclosing a copy of the Association’s rules and bylaws. At the June 27, 1994 hearing,

Mr. Robertson chose to appear without counsel and declined the Association’s offer
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to continue the proceedings. On June 28, 1994, the Association informed Mr.

Robertson that his membership had been revoked for violation of the Association’s

registration rules and that he could no longer register horses with the Association.

On May 8, 1995, Mr. Robertson sued the Association in the Circuit Court for

Marshall County seeking reinstatement and damages for defamation. Mr. Robertson

moved for a partial summary judgment on his reinstatement claim, and the Association

responded with its own summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of all claims.

The trial court granted the Association’s summary judgment motion, and Mr.

Robertson has appealed. While he does not contest the dismissal of his defamation

claim, he takes issue with the dismissal of his claim for reinstatement as a member of

the Association.

II.

An order granting a motion for summary judgment enjoys no presumption of

correctness on appeal. SeeCity of Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 938 S.W.2d 408, 412

(Tenn. 1997); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn.

1996). Accordingly, reviewing courts must make a fresh determination concerning

whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. See Hunter v.

Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472

(Tenn. 1997). Summary judgments are appropriate only when there are no genuine

factual disputes with regard to the claim or defense embodied in the motion and when

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Tenn. R. Civ. P.

56.04; Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); Carvell v. Bottoms, 900

S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995).

When reviewing an order granting a summary judgment motion, an appellate

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

must also draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. See

Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); Mike v. Po Group, Inc., 937

S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, a summary judgment should be granted only

when the undisputed facts reasonably support only one conclusion – that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d

150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d at 26. A party may obtain a
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summary judgment by demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove

an essential element of its case, see Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 212-13 (Tenn.

1993), because this defect necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. See

Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. 1993);

Strauss v. Wyatt, Tarrant, Combs, Gilbert & Milom, 911 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1995).

III.

The courts are generally reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of private

organizations and clubs. See Original Lawrence County Farm Org., Inc. v. Tennessee

Farm Bureau Fed’n, 907 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Moran v. Vincent,

588 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). It is only when a case involves fraud,

lack of jurisdiction, or an invasion of property rights that the courts will intervene in

a dispute between an association and one of its members. See Tennessee Secondary

School Athletic Ass’n v. Cox, 221 Tenn. 164, 174, 425 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1968). When

a member has been expelled, suspended, or excluded from membership for cause, a

court should look no further than necessary to establish that the procedure involved

was fair and reasonable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-56-302 (1995); Original

Lawrence County Farm Org., Inc. v. Tennessee Farm Bureau Fed’n, 907 S.W.2d at

422.

Mr. Robertson argues that the Association failed to follow its own Rule 19

which provides, in part: 

19.03 A complaint may be filed by any member of the

Association with the Executive Secretary as follows:

A. In writing.

B. Contain a reasonably clear description of the offense

and cite the Rule(s) allegedly violated.

C. Be signed by the member.

D. State the full name and address of the respondent.

E. Be accompanied by a deposit of $25 which will be

refunded only if the complaint is sustained.

19.04 The Executive Secretary shall immediately notify the

respondent of the complaint and send a copy, set a

hearing date, notify the parties of the date.

19.05 The hearing shall be conducted within 40 days of the

receipt of the complaint.

19.06 The hearing shall allow each party to fairly and

adequately present their case.
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19.07 The decision shall be made on the date of the

conclusion of the hearing. The deliberations shall be

in private and the parties notified by mail.

He asserts that the Association’s failure to provide him with a written complaint

signed by an Association member and the Association’s failure to identify the person

who lodged the complaint undermined the fairness of the proceeding. He also asserts

that the Association’s failure to inform him of the identity of the person who lodged

the complaint or to state precisely how the two registrations were fraudulent misled

him into believing that the proceeding was not governed by the disciplinary rules and

confused him about the need to retain counsel. 

The Association’s investigation was not commenced because of a member’s

complaint but rather because of registration discrepancies the Association itself

discovered while processing the registration of a horse thought to be the foal of Rock

N Roll Parader. We do not read Rule 19 as the exclusive method by which the

Association may discipline its members. Rather, it provides a procedure for

processing complaints made by one Association member against another. The rule

does not preclude the Association itself from investigating and filing charges against

one of its members based on information it has discovered on its own. 

Mr. Robertson had adequate notice of the charges against him, the hearing date,

the possible penalties, and the procedure provided by the rules. The Association sent

him three letters informing him that he had been charged with possible fraudulent

registration of Rock N Roll Parader and Paint Me Delight, and that he had the right to

be represented by counsel and to question witnesses at the hearing. He was also

provided with notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing, an explanation of

the possible penalties that could be imposed, and a copy of the Association’s rules

and bylaws. 

Mr. Robertson attended the hearing without counsel and specifically declined

an offer of postponement. At that hearing, it was established that Mr. Robertson had

sold Paint Me Delight to another Association member and that he had later agreed to

take the horse back when it did not qualify to its named sire. Mr. Robertson replaced

Paint Me Delight with Rock N Roll Parader. After Rock N Roll Parader produced four

foals, retesting revealed that he was not the same horse that had been originally

registered as Rock N Roll Parader. At this point, Mr. Robertson permitted Paint Me
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Delight to be blood typed, and this test revealed that the animal was actually Romeo’s

Jet. These facts, together with the statement in the Association’s correspondence that

the “Enforcement Committee . . . has lodged a complaint concerning the possible

fraudulent registration” of Paint Me Delight and Rock N Roll Parader put Mr.

Robertson on fair notice of the charges against him. Accordingly, like the trial court,

we have determined that the Association substantially complied with its disciplinary

rules and that Mr. Robertson was given fair notice of the charges against him and a

fair opportunity to be heard before the Association revoked his membership.

IV.

We affirm the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Robertson’s claims against

the Association and remand the case for whatever further proceedings may be

required. We tax the costs of this appeal to John Robertson and his surety for which

execution, if necessary, may issue.

______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

_______________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE 

_______________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE