U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

34–908PS 2008

TRANSITIONING THE ENVIRONMENTAL

MEASUREMENTS LABORATORY TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND

OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 3, 2007

Serial No. 110–25

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BART GORDON, Tennessee

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

TOM FEENEY, Florida

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director

EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member

DOUG PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member

KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member

STACEY STEEP Research Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

May 3, 2007

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 8

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10

Statement by Representative Michael T. McCaul, Acting Ranking Minority

Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on

Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................. 11

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12

Prepared Statement by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Ranking

Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ................. 12

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 13

Panel 1:

Mr. Charles F. McBrearty, Jr., Former Director of Materials Technology,

Air Force Technical Applications Center, Patrick Air Force Base

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 14

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15

Biography .......................................................................................................... 17

Dr. M. Anthony Fainberg, Former Program Manager, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures, Office of Research and Development, Science and

Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20

Biography .......................................................................................................... 25

Ms. Lynn Albin, Radiation Health Physicist, Office of Radiation Protection,

Washington State Department of Health

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 28

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 30

Biography .......................................................................................................... 34

Mr. Jonathan A. Duecker, Assistant Commissioner, New York City Police

Department, Counterterrorism Bureau

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36

Biography .......................................................................................................... 38

Discussion

Air Force Programs With the Environmental Measurements Laboratory

(EML) ................................................................................................................. 38

EML’s Role in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) .......................... 40

EML and Counterterrorism in New York City .................................................. 41

DHS’ Decision to Close EML ............................................................................... 42

More on Air Force Programs With EML ............................................................ 44

EML’s Global Sensors: North Korea ................................................................... 45

Page

IV

New York City First Responder Community ..................................................... 46

EML Funding ....................................................................................................... 47

The Neutron Ship Effect ...................................................................................... 48

Dirty Bombs .......................................................................................................... 49

The Quality Assessment Program (QAP) ........................................................... 49

Panel 2:

Dr. John F. Clarke, Deputy Director, Office of National Laboratories, Science

and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 51

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 52

Discussion

More on DHS’ Decision to Close EML ................................................................ 57

The National Nuclear Security Administration ................................................ 58

More on DHS’ Decision to Close EML ................................................................ 59

Limited DHS Science & Technology Directorate Funding ............................... 61

More on the First Responder Community in New York City ........................... 63

More on DHS’ Decision to Close EML ................................................................ 65

Panel 3:

Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 68

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 68

Biography .......................................................................................................... 70

Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate,

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 70

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 72

Biography .......................................................................................................... 73

Discussion

DHS’ Assessment of EML .................................................................................... 73

Appendix: Additional Material for the Record

Documents for the Record ....................................................................................... 80

(1)

TRANSITIONING THE ENVIRONMENTAL MEASUREMENTS LABORATORY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Transitioning the Environmental

Measurements Laboratory to the

Department of Homeland Security

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007

10:00 A.M.–1:30 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML), located in New York City,

was transferred from the Department of Energy to the Department of Homeland Security’s Science & Technology Directorate in 2003, under Section 303 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The laboratory—established in 1947—was ostensibly

transferred because of its expertise in low level radioactive measurements, analysis

and assessments and its ability to significantly contribute to the S&T Directorate’s

responsibilities as envisioned in Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002

to develop countermeasures to radiological and nuclear terrorist threats; conduct

basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities relevant to DHS; detect, prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist attacks; and to transfer relevant technologies or abilities to Federal, State, local governments and private sector entities.

When Congress transferred this laboratory from DOE to DHS, there was a logical

expectation that a lab which specialized in radiation detection and supported the

work of State and local officials and first-responders would be a natural fit with an

agency which was charged with protecting the country from radiological threats.

Having a federal radiation detection laboratory located in the heart of New York

City, which after the 9/11 attack was clearly in the top tier of potential targets for

terrorists, seemed like an important asset for DHS.

Yet since its transfer to DHS, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory has

largely been left to flounder. Rather than exploiting and expanding the unique skills

and capabilities of the laboratory that could have clearly contributed to some of

DHS’ most important work, DHS has terminated, transferred and curtailed key

EML programs. Top management at DHS also spent an inordinate amount of time,

energy and resources planning for the lab’s ultimate closure. By 2007, the DHS

Science & Technology Directorate had stripped the lab of its radioisotope chemical

analysis labs critical for the continuation of its radiochemistry Quality Assessment

Program (QAP) praised by both State and federal participants as directly contributing to homeland security efforts. Other projects EML initiated with local first responders in New York City, including a network of roof-top radiation sensors, have

been halted. Other programs have been started, stopped and then transferred. In

one of DHS’s most astounding decisions, it terminated the lab’s entire global radiation monitoring network—in existence since 1963—and halted plans to install a

new EML built radiation monitor in China, near the North Korean border in October 2005. This occurred one year before the North Korean nuclear test.

Congress never intended for the lab’s programs to be disbanded, or that the laboratory be closed. The detailed plans to close the lab, first initiated in 2005, were

never signed by the Under Secretary of Science and Technology, Charles McQueary.

Admiral Jay Cohen, who took over that post last August, has told the Committee

staff that he now intends to put the lab on a new path and anticipates making it

a valued DHS asset.

In the 107th Congress, the Committee on Science played a key role in drafting

the legislation that established the Department of Homeland Security, particularly

in creating the S&T Directorate. As a result, the Subcommittee’s oversight role regarding the S&T Directorate is particularly important. Up until now, the seemingly

intentional actions by DHS to strip the Environmental Measurements Laboratory—

a critical national asset—of its programs, projects and activities have occurred withVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
4

in the inner sanctum of the S&T Directorate without any explanation to Congress

or the public of the rationale for these inexplicable actions. In fact, even as the S&T

Directorate was drafting plans to close the laboratory and DHS-hired contractor

Booz Allen Hamilton was writing up a ‘‘communications plan’’ on the ‘‘message’’

DHS was planning to disseminate to both Congress and the public about why the

lab was being closed, the S&T Directorate was telling Congress that they expected

the EML to ‘‘serve an enduring role’’ in supporting DHS.

The Subcommittee hearing will seek to obtain a fuller public disclosure of how

and why DHS terminated many of the lab’s programs, why the S&T Directorate was

unable—or unwilling—to chart a new course for the Environmental Measurements

Laboratory and who was responsible for undermining the success of the EML since

it was transferred to DHS. The Subcommittee hearing will fully examine the issues

that have led to the termination and transfer of some of the lab’s programs that

could have played a critical role in both homeland and national security-related

issues. The conditions leading to the laboratory’s current state need to be examined,

resolved and prevented from occurring again. Although Admiral Cohen has recently

pledged not to close the lab, it is important that the Subcommittee ensure that the

S&T Directorate has a detailed strategic plan and clear vision for the lab that will

ensure they fully utilize the EML in the future.

Background of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory

The Environmental Measurements Laboratory—which has undergone several

name changes since it was first established in 1947 as the Medical Division of the

Atomic Energy Agency—moved into its current location in Manhattan in 1957.

Within the Department of Energy the small laboratory moved from the Office of Energy Research to the Office of Environmental Management in 1997 to focus on environmental monitoring, decommissioning and decontamination efforts around the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Unlike the much larger DOE laboratories, including

Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the

EML has always received much less notice, financial support and attention. To some

degree, it was never able to compete with these other larger, better equipped, multipurpose laboratories within the DOE complex. Still, the EML developed world renowned capabilities in low-level radiation measurements and has been praised by

State and federal officials for their contribution to both homeland security and national security-related programs.

The lab’s scientists and engineers have designed and fabricated unique radiation

detection instruments, played a major role in evaluating the impact of environmental contamination from nuclear weapons fallout and developed a global network

of radiation sensors that performed a critical role in U.S. and international nuclear

non-proliferation efforts. In the 1970s the EML established a radiochemistry Quality

Assessment Program (QAP) that grew to include the participation of more than 150

labs, and they provided a support role for DOE’s Nuclear Emergency Search Teams,

whose task is to locate and disable nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices

in the U.S. and abroad.

But one walk down the lab’s hallways today and it is evident the lab has received

only minimal upgrades since it moved to its current location five decades ago. Its

peak staff of about 120 employees also dropped by half by the time it was transferred to DHS in 2003. The cost of maintaining the large facility in Manhattan has

been significant. In addition, some employees who were nearing retirement had become stagnant in their positions. Yet, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory

developed an unquestioned world renowned reputation for radiation analysis. Its

non-proliferation and quality assurance programs, which began in the 1960s and

1970s and were still active when the lab moved to DHS, had no equals either in

the Federal Government or commercial sector.

Quality Assessment Program (QAP)

The Environmental Measurements Laboratory established the Quality Assessment Program (QAP) in 1976 to perform ‘‘quality assurance’’ or ‘‘performance evaluation’’ tests designed to assess the accuracy of radiological measurements reported

by radiochemistry laboratories. Department of Energy contractor laboratories were

required to participate in the program. But other non-DOE laboratories, including

federal agencies, commercial laboratories and State public health labs from California, Washington, Wisconsin, Texas, Tennessee, Illinois, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,

New York and New Jersey, also participated, 150 laboratories in all. When EML

was transferred to DHS, EML scientists attempted to sharpen the QAP’s focus on

emergency response capabilities, rather than routine environmental analysis. But

DHS terminated the program in 2004. Most disturbing is that in interviews with

Subcommittee staff Caroline Purdy, Former Acting Director of the Office of National

5

Laboratories in the S&T Directorate, who directed that the program be closed, was

completely unaware of what the Quality Assessment Program actually did or how

it might play a role within DHS. ‘‘I don’t remember any meetings discussing QAP,’’

said Purdy. She said that QAP was an ‘‘old program’’ that had been around a long

time and that her ‘‘general assumption was that the DOE National Labs would do

this.’’ John Clarke, Deputy Director of the Office of National Laboratories, also

clearly saw no value in the QAP or its relevance to homeland security issues and

also seemed unclear on what the program actually did. His justification for seeking

its closure was that it was another ‘‘self generating’’ task that EML had developed.

Ironically, the S&T Directorate began the shut down of QAP and EML’s chemistry

laboratories at a time when DHS was standing up a new interagency organization

dubbed the Integrated Consortium Laboratory Network or ICLN. Government officials from the Department of Energy, National Institutes of Standards and Technology and Environmental Protection Agency told Subcommittee staff that they believe EML’s Quality Assessment Program would have been a key asset and perfect

fit in the newly formed ICLN organization to coordinate proficiency testing at

radiochemistry labs.

The Environmental Measurements Laboratory’s QAP chemistry labs are now in

the final stages of decommissioning. In the process the lab has donated or disposed

of more than $1.7 million worth of equipment. The Food and Drug Administration

and U.S. Secret Service took some of the radiation samples and the EML donated

$6,000 of brand new flasks and beakers to Stuyvesant High School in New York

City. Dr. Damon Chaky, a scientist at the Pratt Institute received two gamma radiation detectors valued at $20,000 each.

Global Monitoring Program

Since 1963, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory had developed, fabricated and maintained a global network of low-level radionuclide sensors. The EML

monitoring system was the most extensive and comprehensive low-level radionuclide

sampling network in the world, comprised of a Global Fallout Program, Surface Air

Sampling Program (SASP) and Remote Atmospheric Measurements Program

(RAMP). The network included more than 70 monitoring sites in the U.S. and

abroad, including Antarctica, Australia, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, China, France,

Greenland, Panama, Singapore, South Africa, Turkmenistan, the United Kingdom,

Uruguay and Venezuela. The network has been used extensively by scientists to

validate global meteorological and atmospheric transport models. But the system

also collected data that assisted U.S. and international nuclear non-proliferation efforts, helping to rapidly identify any new sources of radiological activities due to accidental releases or nuclear weapons tests.

In January 2002 EML established a monitoring station in Guiyang in southwest

China and in April 2002 it established a second site at Mt. Waliguan. In August

2003, EML also installed a RAMP system in Ryori, Japan. The lab had plans to install a new radiation detector at Long Feng Shan in China, near the North Korean

border that would have been installed in early 2006. But DHS terminated the lab’s

entire global radiation monitoring program in October 2005, including its plans to

install a new detector near the North Korean border. This was particularly unfortunate, since North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test in October 2006. Although portions of the program were classified, the significance of the program to

U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts would have appeared obvious to anyone who

had looked.

The EML sent e-mails to the sites maintaining the radiation detectors and informed those involved that they should dispose of the EML radiation sensors in accordance with local laws. Much of the equipment was old and it would have been

too expensive to pack them up and return them to EML. The new radiation sensor

that EML had planned to install at Long Feng Shan, China, near the North Korean

border was never fully assembled and pieces of that planned detector remain at

EML today.

With the specialized skills that the lab’s core group of scientists and engineers

possessed and their ability to design, fabricate and manufacture unique radiation

sensors and their history of developing and producing plans and protocols for measuring and identifying radioactive isotopes it is particularly disturbing that S&T

Managers could not envision how this laboratory—based in the heart of Manhattan—could have contributed to DHS. Instead, the lab’s newly proposed projects were

rejected, its former programs were terminated and its ability to function at virtually

any level was micromanaged to the extreme. No one, it seems, in the S&T Directorate had a clear understanding of what some of the lab’s most impressive programs did or how they might play a role in homeland security. Instead, they were

6

viewed as not being part of the ‘‘DHS mission’’ and were terminated. The leadership

chasm that existed in the S&T Directorate was chilling.

In fact, it is not clear how the S&T Directorate expected EML to thrive, even function, within the Department of Homeland Security given the constraints that were

placed on them. It’s extraordinarily telling, for instance, that the lab had no computer access to the DHS Intranet until 2005, two years after EML transferred to

DHS. Even then, EML was only provided with four computers that could access the

DHS Intranet and one printer, despite the fact they had more than 40 employees.

John Clarke also prevented DHS employees from attending conferences and routinely questioned their travel plans. Documents DHS provided to the Subcommittee

show Clarke did this because of concerns over the laboratory’s financial management. But even Marc Mandler, former Technical Director of the U.S. Coast Guard

Research & Development Center, who was detailed to DHS for a short four month

tour in 2004 and reviewed the lab’s capabilities, along with Clarke, believed the financial microscope that was placed on EML was ‘‘very extreme,’’ he said. ‘‘They

could not even buy toilet paper,’’ said Mandler, half-joking.

In the critical Mandler/Clarke review that was concluded in October 2004, Marc

Mandler says he provided an honest assessment of what he encountered during his

short tenure at DHS, but acknowledges that he did not speak to individuals outside

of EML to get their perspective on the lab or work the lab had done for them.

Mandler, who is well respected, said he felt that many of the EML employees were

steadfastly resistant to change and unable to tailor their work towards their new

mission at the Department of Homeland Security. But he did believe the staff that

was willing to move in this direction were technically proficient, could contribute to

homeland security efforts and that the lab had strategic value because of its location

in the midst of New York City. Mandler says he respected John Clarke, but also

says that the way the DHS S&T Directorate managed the Environmental Measurements Laboratory had a lot to be desired. ‘‘It was micromanagement without direction,’’ said Mandler.

Witnesses

The Subcommittee hearing will use three separate panels to tell the story of the

Environmental Measurements Laboratory and to explore and explain the systemic

mismanagement that occurred on the part of the Science & Technology Directorate

in supervising, managing and leading the laboratory.

Panel 1 will be composed of individuals from local, State and Federal Government agencies that have utilized the services of EML as well as a former DHS official in the S&T Directorate who quit over the way, he believed, the laboratory was

being mistreated. Two of these witnesses have had programs they relied on with the

EML terminated by the Department of Homeland Security. Mrs. Lynn Albin, Radiation Health Physicist, Office of Radiation Protection, Washington State Department of Health, utilized EML’s QAP for nearly two decades. She will address the

significance this program had on preparing her agency for the DHS-led TOPOFF2

counterterrorism exercise in 2003. Mr. Charles F. McBrearty, Jr., Former Director of Materials Technology, Air Force Technical Applications Center, Patrick Air

Force Base, Florida, just retired last month from the Air Force. He had a relationship with EML for nearly three decades and took a trip to DHS Headquarters in

D.C. to make the case that EML was a critical asset and that in his experience they

were ‘‘the masters of the universe in terms of radiation measurements.’’ Despite

that, DHS terminated all of EML’s work for the Air Force. Assistant Commissioner Jonathan A. Duecker, New York Police Department, Counterterrorism Bureau, will describe the work that EML has been performing for first responders in

the New York region since 9.11. Dr. Tony Fainberg, Former Program Manager,

Radiological & Nuclear Countermeasures, Office of Research and Development,

Science & Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, will describe

how he believed many of EML’s programs could have benefited DHS. Fainberg witnessed many of the lab’s programs killed off by the S&T Directorate and he eventually quit when he concluded that the directorate was intent on closing the laboratory.

The sole witness for Panel 2 is Dr. John F. Clarke, Deputy Director, Office of

National Laboratories, Science & Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland

Security. Clarke is a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory employee detailed to

the S&T Directorate, and is a key player in the ultimate degradation of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory’s capabilities and programs.

Panel 3 will look ahead to the Environmental Measurements Laboratory’s future.

Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Department

of Homeland Security and Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection

7

Office, Department of Homeland Security will both discuss what role they see for the

lab moving forward.

Conclusion

The history of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory—in the four years

since it was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security—should serve as

a case study of government mismanagement and incompetence. Once a valued critical asset, the lab has been stripped of some of its most successful and important

programs and sorely mischaracterized by a small handful of officials in the S&T Directorate. John Clarke particularly served as a funnel through which information

about EML flowed to many others within the S&T Directorate. His motivations may

never be clear, but Clarke’s mischaracterization of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, the skills of its staff and the lab’s programmatic capabilities are

unmistakable. Subcommittee staff found that he has misconstrued conversations

with both local first responders and non-DHS federal agencies about their stated positions regarding specific EML projects that Clarke eventually terminated. Even

worse, Maureen McCarthy, Clarke’s supervisor and the former Director of the Office

of Research and Development (ORD) within the DHS S&T Directorate told Subcommittee staff that John Clarke had no ‘‘programmatic role’’ in the S&T Directorate. If he was involved in making programmatic decisions about the EML, said

McCarthy—which he clearly and repeatedly was—this was outside of his set of responsibilities.

But McCarthy had been made aware of Clarke’s propensity to overstep his lines

of authority, particularly when it came to management of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, by at least two DHS officials in 2005, including Tony

Fainberg. Responsibility for reigning in the detrimental actions by John Clarke regarding EML clearly fell to her. While McCarthy says she spoke to Clarke about

some of his actions, it clearly had little if any impact. Clarke managed to terminate

EML’s work for the Air Force, for example, even after those conversations. In fact,

Tony Fainberg ended up quitting his position in the S&T Directorate partly because

of the actions of John Clarke and partly because no one above Clarke was willing

to prevent him from essentially destroying the programs, resources and morale at

the Environmental Measurements Lab.

Admiral Cohen has told Subcommittee staff that he has no plans to close EML.

He intends to maintain the lab’s presence in New York City and to re-emphasize

the lab’s core mission towards the Testing & Evaluation (T&E) of equipment. This

is a role the lab has taken on since 9.11 on an ad hoc basis for the New York and

New Jersey first responder community in any event. Admiral Cohen sees EML becoming one of the premier testing and evaluation centers for DHS nationwide, he

says. In addition, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) intends to utilize

about ten of the EML staff in the Countermeasures Test Bed (CMTB) and other related efforts that focus on the detection and identification of radiological threat material in the New York area.

It is encouraging that after more than four years the S&T Directorate seems to

finally have some direction for the Environmental Measurements Laboratory. Up

until now the laboratory has been left rudderless without a paddle. Admiral Cohen

has emphasized that he wants to maintain the intellectual capital of EML’s employees. Unfortunately, many of the lab’s cadre of scientists and engineers have already

retired or resigned since the lab was transferred into DHS. When the lab was transferred to DHS they had 54 employees, 12 with Ph.D.s and 18 with Master’s degrees.

Today the lab has 35 employees, seven with Ph.D.s and 11 with Master’s degrees.

Damage to the intellectual capital of the laboratory has already occurred, but Admiral Cohen can still help stem the flow.

The S&T Directorate—led by Admiral Cohen—now has an opportunity to clearly

lead the lab into the future by providing them with clear guidance, renewed encouragement about their ability to contribute to the Nation’s security and by obtaining

a much clearer understanding of the skills and abilities of the lab’s remaining personnel and how they can be utilized to their full potential. The lab has been left

to wither for too long, staff has fled and critical programs have been inexplicably

terminated. Admiral Cohen has an opportunity to curtail the damage that has already been done and begin a positive path forward that will benefit the lab, its employees, DHS and the Nation.

8

Chairman MILLER. Good morning. The Committee will come to

order for the hearing on transitioning the Environmental Measurements Laboratory to the Department of Homeland Security.

We learned from Hurricane Katrina that we were woefully unprepared for an entirely foreseeable natural disaster. The failures

of our response expose the sorry state of our emergency preparedness. Many of us wondered what else was suffering from similar

neglect that we might only learn of if something goes horribly

wrong?

Today the Subcommittee is going to review the management of

the Environmental Measurements Lab by the Department of

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate. It appears that we have stunningly neglected our obvious national security and homeland security need to detect and measure radiation,

hindering our ability to respond to nuclear proliferation around the

world and here in the United States, to prevent and respond to the

detonation of a dirty bomb, a promise that terrorist groups have

telegraphed for years. And while we are spending billions to develop the technology to intercept a missile in the air, to hit a bullet

with a bullet, a task that many think is a fool’s errand, we have

shortchanged research to develop the technology to prevent a nuclear device from being smuggled into the United States and detonated in an American city, a far more likely event.

EML has specialized in radiation detection analysis for 60 years.

It traces its roots to the Manhattan Project. It should have been

a welcome asset and a natural fit for an agency chartered with protecting our country from radiological threats. Instead, detailed

plans to close the lab were concealed from both the EML staff and

Congress. Critical national security programs at the lab were terminated and the lab’s employees to be left to wonder about their

future for the past four years without any clear direction or decisions from the Department of Homeland Security.

When the Environmental Measurements Laboratory was transferred to Homeland Security from the Department of Energy in

2003, Congress expected that the laboratory would add value. Beginning with the work on the Manhattan Project, EML scientists

developed a world-renown expertise in low-level radiation measurement, a skill that would be of critical value to both help prevent

and respond to potential radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. Instead of exploring and expanding unique skills and the capabilities

of the laboratory in a strategic location in Manhattan, Homeland

Security’s S&T, Science and Technology, Directorate soon proceeded to reject the lab’s proposals for future work and terminated

its existing programs.

S&T managers downplayed, dismissed, disparaged the capabilities of the lab, arguing that it had no real unique skills, had low

credibility in the view of local first responders, and could not compete with other larger national laboratories. Our first panel today

is composed of local, State and federal, officials and a former DHS

manager. They will provide a contrary view to that assessment. We

will also examine some of EML’s key programs that were terminated. One of those was the lab’s worldwide radiation monitoring

program.

9

Beginning in 1963, EML had built a global network of low-level

radiation sensors that were used by scientists to validate global atmospheric transport models. But the system also played a key role

in nuclear nonproliferation efforts, rapidly identifying any new

sources of radiological activities from nuclear weapons tests. The

lab had installed two radiation monitors in China in 2002 and had

plans to install a new one, a new detector in China, near the North

Korean border, in early 2006. But on October 1, 2005, the program

was terminated by DHS. Almost exactly a year later, on October

9, 2006, North Korea carried out a nuclear weapons test. It is hard

to know how valuable the EML’s Global Monitoring Program, and

particularly its new radiation sensor, would have been in helping

determine the sophistication of the North Korean nuclear test. We

only know that because of DHS’s action, the sensor was not in

place and remains unassembled at EML today.

In 2005, DHS also stripped EML of its radioisotope chemical

analysis labs, critical for the continuation of its radiochemistry

Quality Assessment Program. That is pronounced QAP. It sounds

like Elmer Fudd using a mild profanity—QAP. It is praised by both

State and federal participants as directly contributing to homeland

security efforts. This program helped ensure the results produced

by radiochemistry tests by radiochemistry labs, whose task is to

analyze radioactive samples whether from a nuclear facility or in

response to radiological attack, were accurate.

Some projects EML initiated with local first responders in New

York City, including a network of rooftop radiation sensors, were

halted by DHS. Other programs were started and stopped and then

transferred. The way the EML has fared since being transferred to

DHS shows an appalling lack of leadership at DHS S&T Directorate. The lack of clear decisions and direction regarding EML

permitted a haphazard approach and its programs to fester within

the S&T Directorate. And as a result, the lab’s programs were decimated and its staff demoralized and a seemingly reckless disregard

for how the lab’s skills and projects could have benefited DHS,

other federal agencies or the Nation.

Top S&T managers responsible for terminating some of the lab’s

key programs had no idea what those programs actually did and

had no discussions about how they might benefit DHS. In addition,

S&T managers squandered an inordinate amount of time and effort

planning for the demise of the EML laboratory, rather than attempting to determine how the lab might be effectively used and

its staff successfully employed to contribute to DHS. Because of all

of these actions, the lab has been left in limbo. Many of its programs have been terminated, new projects halted, the skills and capabilities of its employees disparaged, and its staff reduced by a

third.

The Subcommittee hopes that EML and the leadership of S&T

Directorate have turned the corner and we can now expect some

positive change in the future. Our last panel today will look at the

lab’s future role in DHS. The vast majority of those actions did not

occur under Under Secretary of Science and Technology Admiral

Cohen’s watch. The Subcommittee is pleased that the new leadership of the S&T Directorate appears willing to utilize a lab that

many have referred to as a national asset. Again, we appreciate

10

that the S&T Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office will work together to employ fully the skills of the staff at the

Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

And now I would like to recognize the Ranking Member, Mr.

McCaul, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

Good morning.

We learned from Hurricane Katrina that we were woefully unprepared for an entirely foreseeable natural disaster. The failures of our response exposed the sorry

state of our emergency preparedness.

Many of us wondered what else was suffering from similar neglect that we might

only learn of if something else goes horribly wrong.

Today, the Subcommittee is going to review management of the Environmental

Measurements Laboratory (EML) by the Department of Homeland Security’s

Science & Technology Directorate. It appears that we have stunningly neglected our

obvious national security and homeland security need to detect and measure radiation, hindering our ability to respond to nuclear proliferation around the world,

and here in the United States to prevent or respond to the detonation of a ‘‘dirty

bomb,’’ a punch that terrorist groups have telegraphed for years. And while we are

spending billions to develop the technology to intercept a missile in the air, we have

shortchanged research to develop the technology to prevent a nuclear device from

being smuggled into the United States and detonated in an American city, a far

more likely event.

EML has specialized in radiation detection and analysis for 60 years. It traces its

roots to the Manhattan Project. It should have been a welcomed asset and natural

fit for an agency charged with protecting the country from radiological threats. Instead, detailed plans to close the lab were concealed from both the EML staff and

Congress, critical national security programs at the lab were terminated and the

lab’s employees have been left to ponder their future fate for the past four years

without any clear direction or decisions from DHS.

When the Environmental Measurements Laboratory was transferred to Homeland

Security from the Department of Energy in 2003, Congress expected that the laboratory would add value. Beginning with their work on the Manhattan Project, EML’s

scientists developed a world renowned expertise in low-level radiation measurement,

a skill that would be of critical value to both help prevent and respond to a potential

radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. But, instead of exploiting and expanding the

unique skills and capabilities of the laboratory and its strategic location in New

York City, Homeland Security’s S&T Directorate soon proceeded to reject the lab’s

proposals for future work and terminated its existing programs.

S&T managers downplayed, dismissed and disparaged the capabilities of the lab

arguing that it had no unique skills, had low credibility in the view of the local first

responders it worked with and could not compete with other larger national laboratories. Our first panel today is composed of local, State and federal officials and a

former DHS program manager. They will provide a contrary view to that assessment.

We will also examine some of EML’s key programs that were inexplicably terminated. One of those was the lab’s worldwide radiation monitoring program. Beginning in 1963, EML had built a global network of low-level radiation sensors that

was used by scientists to validate global atmospheric transport models. But the system also played a key role in nuclear non-proliferation efforts, rapidly identifying

any new sources of radiological activities from nuclear weapons tests. The lab had

installed two radiation monitors in China in 2002 and had plans to install a new

detector in China near the North Korean border in early 2006. But on October 1,

2005, the program was terminated by DHS. Almost exactly a year later, on October

9, 2006, North Korea carried out a nuclear weapons test. It is hard to know how

valuable the EML global monitoring program and particularly its new radiation sensor that the lab had planned to install near the North Korean border would have

been in helping to determine the sophistication of the North Korean nuclear test.

We only know that, because of DHS’s actions, the sensor was not in place and sits

unassembled at EML today.

In 2005, DHS also stripped EML of its radioisotope chemical analysis labs critical

for the continuation of its radiochemistry Quality Assessment Program (QAP)

praised by both State and federal participants as directly contributing to homeland

security efforts. This program helped ensure that the results produced by

11

radiochemistry labs—whose task is to analyze radioactive samples whether from a

nuclear facility or in response to a radiological attack—are accurate. Some projects

EML initiated with local first responders in New York City, including a network of

roof-top radiation sensors, were halted by DHS. Other programs were started,

stopped and then transferred.

The incomprehensible way the Environmental Measurements Laboratory has

fared since being transferred to DHS is testimony to an appalling lack of leadership

at the S&T Directorate. The lack of clear decisions and direction regarding EML

permitted a haphazard approach to the EML and its programs to fester within the

S&T Directorate. As a result, the lab’s programs were decimated and its staff demoralized with a seemingly reckless disregard for how the lab’s skills and projects

could have benefited DHS, other federal agencies or the Nation as a whole. Top S&T

managers responsible for terminating some of the lab’s key programs had no idea

what these programs actually did and held no discussions on how they might benefit

DHS. In addition, S&T managers squandered an inordinate amount of time and effort planning for the demise of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory rather

than attempting to determine how the lab could be effectively utilized and its staff

successfully employed to contribute to DHS.

Because of all of these actions, the lab has been left in a disturbing state of limbo.

Many of its programs have been terminated, new projects halted, the skills and capabilities of its federal employees disparaged and its staff reduced by one-third. The

Subcommittee hopes that the EML and the leadership at the S&T Directorate have

finally turned the corner and that we can expect positive change to be forthcoming.

Our last panel will look towards the lab’s future role in DHS. The vast majority

of these actions did not occur under Under Secretary of Science & Technology, Admiral Cohen’s watch. The Subcommittee is pleased that the new leadership at the

S&T Directorate appears willing to utilize a laboratory that many have referred to

as a national asset. We anticipate that the S&T Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office will work together to fully employ and exploit the skills of the

staff at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Miller. As I said, it is your

lucky day. I am filling in for Mr. Sensenbrenner today. I want to

welcome our witnesses and those out there. I want to thank the

Chairman for holding this hearing on the Department of Homeland

Security’s Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

As the Ranking Member on the Homeland Security Committee’s

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science

and Technology, I am particularly interested in the future of the

Department’s national labs. To that end, I hope the witnesses before us today can help us understand what EML’s capabilities are

and how they can best fit into DHS. Any time a facility is transferred from one agency to another, there is understandably a realignment of work in order to serve the agency’s and the Nation’s

best interest. EML is no exception. They will have to adapt to their

new homeland security mission, which will likely mean a different

focus and direction for the lab. In identifying this new path, we

should also be mindful of other work EML does that may not be

in line within the DHS structure and mission and make sure that

we don’t lose a national capability just because of turf considerations.

That being said, I am confident that there is a safe place for

EML in DHS, after all, EML is a unique asset located in the heart

of downtown Manhattan. They have built up a strong relationship

with State and local entities there and are undisputedly experts in

low-level radiation analysis, clearly a high priority for DHS. As I

said, I look forward to the testimony. I hope this will be a productive hearing and we will leave here with a better understanding of

how EML can best be utilized in the future. And with that, I yield

back, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:]

12

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

Thank you, Mr. Miller. I will be filling in for Mr. Sensenbrenner today as Ranking

Member. I want to welcome our witnesses here today and thank the Chairman for

holding this hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s Environmental

Measurements Laboratory. As the Ranking Member on the Homeland Security

Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cyber Security, and Science and

Technology, I’m particularly interested in the future of the Department’s national

labs.

To that end, I hope the witnesses before us today can help us understand what

EML’s capabilities are, and how they can best fit into DHS. Anytime a facility is

transferred from one agency to another, there is understandably a realignment of

work in order to serve the agency’s, and the Nation’s, best interests. EML is no different. They will have to adapt to their new homeland security mission, which will

likely mean a different focus and direction for the lab. In identifying this new path,

we should also be mindful of other work EML does that may not be aligned with

the DHS mission and make sure that we don’t lose a national capability just because of turf considerations.

That being said, I am confident that there is a place for EML in DHS. After all,

EML is a unique asset: Located in the heart of Manhattan, they have built up

strong relationships with State and local entities, and are undisputedly experts in

low-level radiation analysis—clearly a high priority for DHS. I look forward to all

of our witnesses’ testimony—particularly Under Secretary Cohen’s and Mr. Oxford’s.

I hope this will be a productive hearing, and that we will all leave here with a better understanding of how EML can best be utilized in the future.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. If there are other

Members—Mr. Rothman is welcome to submit any kind of opening

statement for the record, which he has shaken his head to show

that he does not.

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am very

interested in today’s hearing, period.

Chairman MILLER. The Chairman welcomes similar opening

statements from the Members of the Committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.

RANKING MEMBER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

Sensenbrenner Lauds Value of

Environmental Measurements Laboratories

Washington, May 3, 2007—As the Ranking Republican on the House Science and

Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R–MI) made the following comments following today’s Subcommittee

hearing on Environmental Measurement Laboratories (EML), and its transition

from the Department of Energy to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS):

‘‘If an American city was a victim of a dirty bomb attack, our lack of preparedness

would affect our ability to triage medical care and limit panic,’’ said Sensenbrenner.

‘‘Proper equipment and training would allow experts to quickly assess and disclose

the levels of radiation and the risk to the public, allowing people who are not at

risk to be put at ease and freeing emergency responders to focus on those people

most in need of care.’’

‘‘After a Subcommittee investigation that has spanned the past several months,

it is clear that DHS has, thus far, struggled to fully realize the value of EML’s expertise,’’ Sensenbrenner continued. ‘‘It is equally clear that EML, which specializes

in low-level radiation measurements, can have a valuable place within DHS and can

help prepare America to respond to a catastrophic attack.’’

A supervisor with the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, Lynn West, worked

with EML through its Quality Assessment Program (QAP) before that program was

terminated by DHS. Ms. West explained that while America has done a lot to prepare for a full-scale nuclear disaster, it has lagged in its preparedness to respond

to lower-level radiological emergencies, like a dirty bomb.

13

‘‘There is currently no program, federal or otherwise, focused on developing the

ability of radiochemistry labs to respond to radiological emergencies. The QAP program, had it not been terminated, would have helped in this area,’’ Sensenbrenner

concluded.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Good morning. Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing to receive testimony from witnesses on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)’s Science

and Technology Directorate Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML).

In the 1970s, EML established a radiochemistry quality assessment program that

grew to include the participation of more than 150 labs. They have provided a support role for the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Search Teams, whose

task is to locate and disable nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices in the

U.S. and abroad.

EML was transferred from the Department of Energy to the DHS’s Science and

Technology Directorate in 2003, under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Since its

transfer to DHS, programs at EML have been terminated and curtailed in order to

plan for the lab’s ultimate closure. The reasons for shutting down the lab are not

clear and the Science and Technology Directorate within the DHS has not provided

an explanation to Congress or the public of the rationale for closure.

I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses in order to obtain full disclosure on what happened with the EML and why Congress was not made aware of

the systemic mismanagement that occurred in supervising, managing, and leading

the laboratory.

Chairman MILLER. We would now like to introduce our panel of

witnesses. On the first panel is Mr. Charles McBrearty, former Director of Materials Technology, Air Force Technical Applications

Center, Patrick Air Force Base in Florida; Dr. Tony Fainberg,

former Program Manager, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures, Office of Research and Development, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security; Lynn Albin,

Radiation Health Specialist or Physicist, Office of Radiation Protection, Washington State Department of Health; and Assistant Commissioner Jonathan Duecker with the New York Police Department

Counterterrorism Bureau. You can all take your seats. Thank you.

Your oral testimony is limited to five minutes. All of you have

submitted written testimony which will be placed in the record and

without objection, we may enter various documents in the hearing,

whether identified or not during the hearing. I assume that is

without objection. So after the entire panel has given your fiveminute testimony, the Members of the Committee will have five

minutes each to ask questions. I will try to be fairly strict about

that, although Mr. McCaul has not been an offender in that regard.

And we do swear the witnesses, so it is our practice to do so. Do

any of you have any objections to being sworn in, to taking an

oath? You also have the right to be represented by Counsel. I know

hearing that does not necessarily put you at your ease. There is no

reason. None of us anticipate that you need Counsel, but you may

have Counsel if you want it and none of you have Counsel today.

Okay, if you would all now please stand and raise your right

hand.

[Witnesses sworn]

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. McBrearty. You

may begin.

14

Panel 1:

STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES F. MCBREARTY, JR., FORMER

DIRECTOR OF MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY, AIR FORCE TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER, PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE

Mr. MCBREARTY. I appreciate the opportunity to represent the

Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) at this hearing

on the transition of EML. A detailed response to the questions you

asked me, sir, is in the written testimony that I provided. I will

just give a quick summary of some of those points and would be

happy to answer and elaborate.

The mission of AFTAC is to provide the national authorities

quality technical measurements to monitor nuclear treaty compliance by foreign nations, and to develop advanced proliferation technologies which are vital to the national security. In terms of this

Committee’s inquiry, AFTAC had maintained an outstanding relationship with the Environmental Measurements Laboratory for almost four decades. In 2005, when Dr. Clarke of DHS informed

AFTAC that EML would be closing, I traveled to the DHS offices

to personally discuss the matter with him. My purpose was to emphasize the importance of the work that EML was doing for

AFTAC, as well as my view of the potential value, an important

value EML represented to the new department.

The DHS decision did not change as a result of that mission

meeting, so AFTAC proceeded to transfer its nuclear monitoring

support functions, which we’re doing on at EML, to Los Alamos National Laboratories and its engineering and nuclear analysis sampling technology evaluation support functions to Pacific Northwest

Laboratories, two laboratories which, again, we have had and do

have long-term relationships with.

The termination of AFTAC’s efforts at EML created a short-term

impact on our programs during the transfer of the analysis work

to the other laboratories. Based on the DHS decisions, we adjusted

our operations and today are generally comfortable with the new

arrangements. Because of this decision, or the threat of it, key

EML staff scientists have moved on or retired and specialized

equipment has been transferred. Thus the core of the capability of

great value to AFTAC no longer currently exists at EML.

From my position as a customer of EML and versed and experienced with about 38 or so years in this field, I believe that the intangible worth of EML’s excellent technical experience and contacts

within the international radiation measurements community were

not fully appreciated. We did appreciate them and made great use

of all of those contacts in matters like the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty and things of that nature.

However, that said, the ultimate decision of whether or not to

continue EML’s operations was one ultimately DHS had to make.

Our operations only funded a small portion of the work that went

on there, so we had no choice once the decision was apparently

made to terminate other than to move on, move our stuff onwards.

If you have any other questions, I will be happy to answer them.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McBrearty follows:]

15

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES F. MCBREARTY, JR.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to represent the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) at this

hearing on the transition of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) to

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The mission of AFTAC is to provide

national authorities quality technical measurements to monitor nuclear treaty compliance and develops advanced proliferation monitoring technologies to preserve our

nation’s security. In terms of this committee’s inquiry, AFTAC had a long and valued association with the Environmental Measurements Laboratory going back over

three decades. During that period, EML provided services to AFTAC through the

Department of Energy (DOE) ‘‘Work of Others Program.’’ These efforts consisted of

task-order based, technical support and consulting services associated with the area

of their expertise, the measurement of radioactivity in the environment. EML also

provided AFTAC with assistance on other national security projects that we will not

be able to discuss in today’s open hearing.

EML Program Support to AFTAC

At the time the EML was transferred to the DHS, we were maintaining a rel- atively small effort (on the order of $200K–$300K per year) with the laboratory. The

focus of that work was largely for trace radionuclide analysis of specific samples collected by the United States Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS) operated

by AFTAC. EML performed this analysis on gas samples collected by AFTAC’s Nuclear Debris Collection and Analysis (NDC&A) program to monitor provisions of the

Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

In addition, AFTAC made good use of EML’s scientific expertise and excellent connections/reputation in the International Community. We routinely asked their advice, support, and assistance in tasks associated with the enhancement of the

USAEDS, innovative sampler design and development, and consulted closely on

matters of common interest with regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT).

During development of CTBT protocols in the mid 1990’s AFTAC, strongly recommended that EML be designated as the U.S. ‘‘States Party’’ radionuclide analysis

laboratory. They were subsequently so designated.

Dr. John Clarke of the DHS notified AFTAC in September 2005 that, ‘‘Our yearlong review has now concluded and the programmatic decision has been made to

close the EML.’’ He also informed EML and AFTAC that the DHS would no longer

accept funding for this work. Dr. Clarke noted in that e-mail that he had contacted

both Mr. Scott Smith, the AFTAC Project Officer, and I and stated, ‘‘They both understand and accept that the nature of future radiation measurement work at EML

is still under review in DHS and that DHS cannot commit to a new contract with

their organization at this time.’’ AFTAC worked with EML over the next seven

months to relocate the government furnished equipment needed to perform our nuclear treaty monitoring mission to Los Alamos National Laboratory. AFTAC also assisted EML in relocating their sample inventory to qualified sample management

facilities at AFTAC and AFTAC-sponsored laboratory facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

Value of EML Activities to AFTAC and Support to National Security

We highly valued the work of EML. Not only was the laboratory a reputable and

highly respected analytical facility from whom we could always count on quality and

cost effective work, they were unmatched in their understanding of the operational

realities of sample collection operations. The culture that had evolved at the laboratory was, in my view, one of seeking practical, rugged and sustainable collection systems and collection concepts.

Again, we cannot go into the details of the national security work performed by

EML in this environment. While we had significantly reduced the amount of national security work being performed by EML under this portion of the effort, some

aspects were quite valuable to the USAEDS treaty monitoring efforts.

The engineering and nuclear debris sampling and radiometric technology evaluation support was of high value to AFTAC. The EML scientists, as federal employees,

were noted for impartial and independent judgment on nuclear measurement related issues.

The radiometric measurements on gas samples collected by AFTAC’s NDC&A program were of very high value to AFTAC. Many of the national laboratories could

perform these types of radiometric measurements, but EML was unique in its proximity to our gas sample processing laboratory in New Providence, NJ. Samples could

be driven to EML in less than an hour if required and time is often of the essence

for measuring the short lived isotopes associated with nuclear weapons testing.

16

AFTAC’s Efforts to Persuade DHS to Maintain EML Programs

I was initially quite pleased to learn that a decision had been made to transfer

EML to the DHS. My organization and I highly regarded the expertise and competence of EML in the field of trace radionuclide detection, and I believed those

same capabilities that were of such value to AFTAC could also be of great help to

the new Department. EML’s excellent national and international reputation in a

field of critical need by DHS (trace radioactive materials detection and expertise in

sample collection, data analysis and quality control) were, in my mind, extremely

valuable assets.

I was surprised when I learned that closure of the laboratory was being considered. When we received clear indication from the new program office in DHS that

closure was planned, I made a special trip to Washington to discuss the issue, its

implications for my programs, and expressed my opinion of the inherent value EML

capabilities represented to DHS.

During this visit in September 2005, I meet with Dr. John Clarke and discussed

these topics. Dr. Clarke indicated that actions were underway to close the lab and

that unless we wanted to pick up the tab for the operation, (a sum of about $10M

per year as I recall), we should plan on moving our work elsewhere. I expressed my

surprise at the proposed decision and emphasized my view that a credible, unbiased

resource for testing, reviewing, and quality control of the plethora of radiation detection concepts being pushed by numerous commercial enterprises as well as the National Laboratories themselves. . .capabilities I believed resided in EML. . .was

critically needed.

DHS’s response to my points was that ‘‘EML was quite costly and did not fit into

their ‘Business Model’.’’

AFTAC’s Response to DHS’s Decision to Halt EML Support to AFTAC

After being notified of the DHS programmatic decision to close EML, AFTAC considered a number of possible alternatives to continue the national security portion

of the effort. Dr. Clarke offered to assist AFTAC in finding an organization within

the Federal Government that could take over this effort. Based upon the new capabilities, either already in place or scheduled for being operational with the next two

years, AFTAC decided to terminate the national security effort rather than attempting to transition that effort to another organization.

The majority of the remaining engineering and nuclear debris sampling and radiometric technology evaluation support transitioned to Pacific Northwest National

Laboratory, another long-term USAEDS mission partner for AFTAC. This work is

sponsored by both AFTAC and the DOE Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development. AFTAC particularly valued the ability to consult with EML as an honest

broker for engineering advice and technical evaluation. AFTAC successfully

transitioned the gas sample radiometric measurement effort to Los Alamos National

Laboratory, a long-term USAEDS mission partner for AFTAC, in the spring of 2006.

EML requested permission to discontinue operating and maintaining these systems,

and AFTAC approved this request on 14 March 2006. Personnel from EML and Los

Alamos packed up the detectors and other Air Force government-furnished equipment and shipped them to Los Alamos in late April 2006.

Conclusion

AFTAC had maintained an outstanding relationship with the Environmental

Measurements Laboratory for four decades. When Dr. John Clarke, DHS, informed

AFTAC that DHS would be closing EML, I traveled to DHS to personally discuss

the matter with him. The DHS decision did not change as a result of that meeting,

so AFTAC proceeded to transfer its nuclear treaty monitoring support functions to

Los Alamos National Laboratory and its engineering and nuclear debris sampling

and radiometric technology evaluation support functions to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. AFTAC terminated its support for the national security work due

to increased capabilities elsewhere and other priorities.

The termination of AFTAC efforts at EML created short-term impact on our program during the transfer of analysis work to other laboratories. Based on the DHS

decisions, we adjusted our operations and today are generally comfortable with the

new arrangements. Because of this decision (or threat of it), key EML scientific staff

have moved on or retired and specialized equipment has been transferred. Thus, the

core of the capability of value to AFTAC no longer exists at EML.

From my position as a customer of EML’s, I believe the intangible worth of EML’s

excellent technical experience and contacts within the international radiation measurements community was not fully appreciated. From AFTAC’s perspective, this

was important, and in my view was, in many ways, a unique national asset representing an experience base unlike any other laboratory in the DOE complex. HowVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
17

ever, in the larger picture, DHS as the parent agency, the primary designated customer of EML’s output and the agency which was funding the bulk of EML’s activities was better positioned than we, as occasional users, were to make the final funding decision. Ultimately, we—AFTAC—made our own decision as to whether or not

to support a wider range of activities than we had historically supported in order

to keep EML together, and we, too, decided that we couldn’t provide that level of

support.

Thank you for your attention. If you have any questions, I would be happy to address them.

BIOGRAPHY FOR CHARLES F. MCBREARTY, JR.

Charles F. McBrearty, Jr., retired as the Director of Materials Technology at the

Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Patrick Air Force Base, Florida

on 30 April 2007. Prior to his retirement, Mr. McBrearty directed AFTAC’s largest

product area with an annual program budget of more than $140 million and directed the work of over 200 scientific and engineering personnel. He was responsible

for the management of a network of 13 analytical laboratories engaged in trace nuclear and non-nuclear materials analysis, in support of AFTAC’s global treaty-monitoring tasking to detect, collect, and analyze nuclear material associated with nuclear tests. He guided AFTAC’s research and development programs exploring new

technologies to enhance and assist treaty verification and efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. His responsibilities covered diverse sciences and technologies ranging from nuclear engineering, chemistry, and meteorology, to collection and analysis technique development. Mr. McBrearty directed AFTAC nuclear analysis and evaluation support to

the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of State, in their monitoring of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Mr. McBrearty has served in a variety of leadership, academic and technical positions in government and industry. He entered the Air Force in 1967 as a distinguished graduate of the Texas A&M University Reserve Officer Training Corps

(ROTC) program and served as a commissioned officer until 1991.

He held two command positions with AFTAC, taught at the Air Force Academy,

and served in numerous staff and scientific positions. Following his retirement from

active duty, he managed NASA’s Toxic Vapor Detection Laboratory supporting

Space Shuttle operations at Kennedy Space Center.

Mr. McBrearty returned to federal service in 1993 to assume his current position

and was appointed to the Air Force Senior Executive Service in 1998. He was

awarded The Presidential Rank, Meritorious Executive Award in 2005.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. McBrearty. Remarkably, you

had a minute and 45 left. Dr. Fainberg.

STATEMENT OF DR. M. ANTHONY FAINBERG, FORMER PROGRAM MANAGER, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR COUNTERMEASURES, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT

OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Dr. FAINBERG. Mr. Chairman and Congressman McCaul, thank

you and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity

to discuss my experiences with EML and my views on that lab

today. I wish first to state that while I happen to be adjunct staff

member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, my views are entirely personal and no way reflect any positions taken by that organization. I will try quickly to cover several topics requested by

Committee staff.

My background and training is as an experimental physicist and

I recently retired from the government after 20 years of service. In

2003, for the first few months at DHS, I was responsible for both

administrative and programmatic oversight of EML and the DHS

Office of Research and Development within the S&T Directorate.

18

Later on, I managed radiation detection and explosive detection research at national labs and at EML.

While at DHS, I visited the lab several times to learn about its

history and resources. Its work had been mainly in the area of

radiochemistry and low-level radiation measurements. There was

some mismatch between some of their activities and DHS needs,

but I judged that, in the field of radiation detection, their experience would be useful for DHS. My initial assessment was that the

lab space was in sad condition, rented from GSA at far too high a

price. There were 60 staff members, down from over a hundred

some years earlier. DOE had left the lab as a neglected backwater,

perhaps because of DOE’s recently declining emphasis on environmental cleanup, which had become the lab’s chief area of responsibility. However, although the lab had been in decline, staff welcomed and indeed embraced the chance for a rebirth as part of a

mission in which they held a strong and vital interest. Located

about a mile north of the World Trade Center, they were strongly

and viscerally affected by 9/11 and were extremely motivated to become part of the global anti-terrorism effort.

Regarding the staff, some had been employed a task that had not

changed much for decades and appeared ready for retirement. On

the other hand, a large fraction of the technical staff, of varied

ages, impressed me as highly motivated, energetic and very capable

in their areas of expertise. Upon moving to DHS, EML management had transitioned their work to projects that it felt would be

useful to and welcomed by DHS. One example of this activity was

a New York area science and tech working group which held seminars for first responders in the area on radiation and operating radiation detection equipment. I learned later from some participants

that these sessions were well attended and appreciated.

I found several projects to be of interest. They are written about

more in my remarks, but one that particularly struck me was an

experiment related to the so-called neutron ship effect, carried out

by a physicist of national stature, Dr. Paul Goldhagen. This involved measurements of neutrons generated by cosmic rays striking

large structures such as ships. It was directly relevant to determining whether it would be useful to try to detect nuclear material

in containers bound for the United States on cargo ships.

Overall, I would like to make one comment. Since, upon its creation, the S&T Directorate had willingly accepted EML as part of

its new organization, it was clearly incumbent on S&T management to establish that lab’s new mission. In fact, one would have

thought S&T would have had some idea of how the lab would be

useful to them before agreeing to accept them. However, I saw little evidence that serious thought had been given to this matter. Indeed, after a year or two, I heard grumbling in headquarters that

EML had no idea of what its mission should be, as though this

were not the responsibility of S&T itself.

Committee staff have asked me to explain why I resigned from

S&T. The matter is not that important, except that the reasons reveal some existence of management issues and without going into

too many details, I had some disagreements with Dr. John Clarke,

who was supposed to be responsible for facility management, over

projects at EML. After a series of meetings with him, I suggested

19

that he manage the programs himself, except for those that had already been approved at a higher level by the Office Director of

ORD. He agreed but shortly thereafter he came to me and tried to

block this neutron ship effect project, for which I had a certain

amount of interest and respect. I had asked my management after

that for—well, I appealed to my management after that for help because they had previously approved that project and my management chain was entirely deaf to my e-mails, all of them, except at

one point the Deputy Office Director, Robert Hooks, told me that

we should fix the matter ourselves.

Since they ignored my pleas to reaffirm their earlier commitments on this project, and since I was having a very difficult time

keeping other projects there alive and functioning, I submitted my

resignation, deciding that management was broken. Management

proved later to me, three days, that it was broken, because my immediate supervisor, Dr. Gerald Parker, came to me and handed me

a letter of counseling, which was a reprimand, for daring to resign

and then he threatened me with sanctions if I continued such bad

behavior. This divorcement from reality, I thought, was noteworthy

and complete.

Naturally, I left ORD as soon as I could, within about two working days, I think it was, and was able, fortunately, to join the DHS

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office for my remaining federal service, where I found the working environment quite satisfactory. The

ship project went forward eventually, but it is kind of interesting

that I had to be forced to resign to accomplish this.

From my perspective, I concluded, then, that S&T management

was trying to squeeze EML out of existence by turning off or crippling projects, one by one, so that it could be finally asserted that

the lab had no function. I do not know why this was done. Several

other projects I had thought useful had also been rejected earlier

by my superiors. I cannot prove there was an overt intent to close

the lab. Indeed, Mr. Hooks assured me, at this time, that such was

not the case. However, in spite of such an assurance, the facts indicated to me that an intention to shut down the lab was the simplest explanation for what was going on.

My view is that S&T should have realized it was fortunate in acquiring an asset in New York City, which is a prime terrorist target. The lab had, on its own, established excellent working relations with city officials and could have functioned as S&T’s presence in the area and these relations could have facilitated communication and cooperation between federal and State and local homeland security officials, at least in the radiological arena. This opportunity to take advantage of a ready-made local asset was unfortunately missed by S&T.

As to what should have been done with EML, my suggestions

would have been to allow it to continue some of the local projects

in which it had been engaged. I would have supported continual

global monitoring, thinking that, in 2004, it was not impossible

that it might be useful to have some detectors near North Korea.

I would have had it fully engaged in supporting the rest of DHS

and the local radiological projects. And finally, I would have authorized the hiring of some young scientists with recent degrees to

reinvigorate what had been a leading radiation laboratory some 20

20

to 30 years earlier. Briefly, I would have decided that, although the

lab had some issues that needed to be fixed, it would have been

worthwhile rebuilding it into a high-profile DHS S&T facility in

New York. It may be too late for some of these thrusts, but on the

whole, the lab still can and should be resuscitated. I am very glad

to learn that finally this may happen.

To save time, I have dropped some other remarks from my oral

presentation regarding another S&T lab, the Transportation Security Lab in Atlantic City, with which I have some acquaintance

over a decade or two. This lab is the Nation’s premier source of expertise in explosives detection and in development of detection

equipment, particularly regarding aviation security. Practically everything you see in terms of security equipment at U.S. and many

foreign airports has been developed at that lab. This lab has suffered from devastating institutional buffeting since 9/11, transferring between agencies twice, having its budget rocket up by factors

of two and three and then drop by factors of four. I feel we may

be in danger of losing this major national asset that helps protects

us from terrorist attack.

I would be happy to respond to questions about this lab as well

as about EML. Thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Fainberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF M. ANTHONY FAINBERG

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sensenbrenner, I thank you for the opportunity to

discuss my experiences with the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) in

New York City, as an official who was present at the stand-up of the Department

of Homeland Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003.

I had actually begun work with the predecessor of the Science and Technology

(S&T) Directorate—the Transition Planning Office (TPO)—a few months before

stand-up, in December 2002. At the time I began work there, I had over 17 years

of experience in government. I had been an analyst, in areas where science and national security policy intersect, and a program manager, overseeing research and development programs for the Federal Aviation Administration and the Defense

Threat Reduction Agency. As an analyst for the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, I had, in 1990–1991, written the first detailed analysis of the

potential uses of technology in countering terrorism. My training is as an experimental physicist in the field of high energy physics, in which I received a doctorate

in 1969.

When I began at the TPO, later the S&T Directorate, there were very few people

on staff, perhaps some 25. That number ramped up quite quickly in the months

after March 2003. At first, many of us shared duties; I was in charge of the Explosives Countermeasures Portfolio for a few months and at the same time responsible

for overseeing EML, this latter task only for a few months. In addition, I worked

in the Radiation and Nuclear Countermeasures Portfolio group as well. My efforts

to understand EML were aided by the presence of two EML staff, who were on detail to the TPO and subsequently to S&T.

By summer 2003, things had settled down a bit, and I had just a dual responsibility: Program Manager for Radiation and Nuclear Countermeasures and Program

Manager for Explosives Countermeasures in the Office of Research and Development (ORD). In these roles, I was responsible for research programs that were carried out by the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Laboratories, and those carried out by EML. Nearly all of my efforts were devoted to the large National Laboratories, as their projects consumed nearly all the budget allocated to my Program.

EML Programs at Transition to DHS

My responsibilities regarding EML began soon after departmental stand-up, with

administrative and programmatic oversight. During the time that I had this broad

responsibility, I visited the site, became acquainted with current projects and staff

and learned about the lab’s capabilities, which they were trying to adapt to DHS

needs.

21

It was clear that there would be some mismatches in capabilities relative to the

new DHS needs. Their previous work centered around low-level radiation measurements. These were in support of environmental clean-up and monitoring and of global monitoring for fallout from nuclear weapons testing. However, I judged that their

abilities in the area of radiation detection were adaptable to DHS requirements.

EML staff also worked on or led activities that provided the environmental monitoring community with manuals on procedures and protocols for environmental sampling. This work could have some application for DHS, for example, in providing advice for clean-up after a dirty bomb attack.

Another major line of work at EML was the Quality Assurance Program (QAP),

which vetted scores of radiological laboratories, in the United States and also in

other countries, to determine the quality of their analytical practices. This was a

service provided by EML, earlier funded by DOE, but in which DHS had no interest

at the time (I understand that recently, S&T is setting up an Integrated Consortium

of Laboratory Networks, in which the QAP might have been a useful component).

Unfortunately, this service, which was used by many State and local laboratories,

and, to my knowledge, was widely appreciated, disappeared when DHS decided to

end funding for it. I understand that a commercial laboratory is now providing a

similar service, but at significant cost.

Overall Assessment of EML at Transition

My assessment of the laboratory and its potential uses for DHS were as follows.

First, the laboratory space, rented from the General Services Administration, was

in sad condition, depressing, and barely functional. The rent paid was far too high

for the quality of the plant. About 60 staff members were on the payroll, down from

about 120, a decade or two earlier. DOE had clearly left this laboratory in a neglected state, as a backwater, perhaps because emphasis on DOE clean-up activities

dropped in recent years. The lab was in a clear decline, but welcomed and embraced

the chance for a rebirth as part of a mission in which they had a strong and vital

interest. The lab is located only about a mile from the World Trade Center, and staff

were strongly and viscerally affected by 9/11. They were extremely motivated to become part of the global anti-terrorism effort, as well as to be in a position to take

practical steps to aid in protecting New York against future attacks.

Some of the technical staff had been employed at tasks that had not changed

much for several decades. Many appeared ready for retirement, and, indeed, in the

following years, a large number did retire. Some retirements, however, especially in

2005 and beyond, were apparently occasioned by disappointment, if not outrage, at

the treatment they felt EML was receiving from DHS Headquarters.

On the other hand, a large fraction of the technical staff, of varied ages, impressed me as highly motivated, energetic, and very capable in their areas of expertise. The laboratory had transitioned their work over to projects that they felt would

be useful and welcomed by DHS.

One activity, the NY Area Science and Technology (NYAST) Working Group, held

seminars for New York Metropolitan Area first responders: police, firemen, medical

technicians, and civilian staff from the Office of Emergency Management. Lessons

were given these non-scientists about understanding radiation, the dirty bomb

threat, and how to use radiation measuring equipment. In talking with some participants on later occasions, I learned that these sessions were appreciated and considered very useful. They were quite well attended.

Another project of interest to me and to New York City officials was the Comprehensive Radiation Sensor Program, which deployed a small number of inexpensive but effective gamma ray detectors on rooftops in Manhattan. This network was

intended to send data back via a wireless connection to a command center at the

lab. The project was meant to function as an early prototype for a detection architecture that would produce relatively inexpensive monitoring of selected areas of the

city, in the case of a radiation release. City officials at the Office of Emergency Management were enthusiastic about this program (as long as they did not have to fund

it). This project was scheduled to be halted at the time I left, and headquarters

funding was cut off, but it has been resurrected since, paid for only by staff salaries

and time.

A third project, extremely interesting to me, was run by an EML physicist of national stature, Paul Goldhagen. Dr. Goldhagen was measuring the spectrum of neutrons from cosmic rays, in order to understand better the ‘‘ship effect.’’ If we understood this effect, it might enable us to reject this background and be able to detect

radiological material in containers on ships, as they traveled across oceans to

United States ports. This was basic research with a clear and vital connection to

homeland security needs, and only a very few researchers in the country were involved in similar work.

22

Finally, there was program of global atmospheric monitoring, which had national

security implications. It was co-funded by DOE/NNSA and the USAF, and provided

useful, near-real time sets of atmospheric data.

By summer, I had transitioned to my program management role, and had no further oversight over the lab as a whole, except insofar as they carried out projects

for me.

My View of the Proper Role for EML

Since, upon its creation, DHS had willingly accepted EML as part of its organization, it was clearly incumbent upon DHS management to establish that lab’s new

mission, of course with input from and in collaboration with lab management. Indeed, DHS should have had an idea how the lab would be useful to them before

accepting it on board. I saw no evidence that serious thought was given to this. Indeed, after a year or two, I heard grumbling among S&T management that EML

had no idea what its mission should be, as though this were not the responsibility

of S&T itself. Actually, EML had proposed some ideas for the proper scope of their

activities, but none was accepted. I was concerned that there appeared to be no

meaningful dialogue between S&T and EML to address the lab’s mission. During

this period, EML tried to conduct its own planning, work, and outreach without

much help or, indeed, interest from S&T.

My view, then and now, is the following: DHS was fortunate in acquiring an existing laboratory asset located in New York City, a prime target of international terrorists. The lab had, on its own, developed excellent working relations with city officials and could function as S&T’s presence in the area. These relationships could

have greatly facilitated communications and cooperation between federal and local

homeland security officials, at least in the radiological area. The opportunity to use

a ready-made asset in this way was unfortunately missed by S&T.

The laboratory had both negative and positive aspects: some staff were old and

tired, but others were extremely energetic and effective. The physical plant was in

bad shape, but could be improved or else the lab could be moved, perhaps to an existing DHS facility in the area, where the cost of rental would not be an issue. Finally, some excellent capabilities existed at the lab, which could have been expanded

upon. Some of these were:

• the atmospheric monitoring project;

• the neutron ‘‘ship effect’’ work;

• a strong operational and statistical understanding of low-level radiation contamination measurements;

• the vetting of a nationwide network of radiochemical laboratories;

• the development of an inexpensive distributed network of radiation detectors;

• and, most importantly, a cadre of willing and active scientists who were anxious to help, for example, with developing, operating, and staffing a radiation

measurement test bed in New York.

This last item was fortunately accomplished: EML scientists became an integral

part of DHS’s Countermeasures Test Bed, operationally testing radiation detection

equipment that was deployed at air- and seaports in the New York area.

Unfortunately, most other items were not accomplished.

Had I had the authority, I would have tried to have EML both engage in the

above work and also support the rest of DHS fully in other radiological projects in

the New York area. I would have considered trying to provide some of the services,

such as the QAP, for the good of the community of radiochemical laboratories in the

country, probably in collaboration with DOE. And I would have kept some of the

atmospheric monitoring work that was useful for other U.S. Government agencies,

even though it did not fit within the prevailing definition of DHS responsibilities.

Further, I would have authorized the lab to hire some young scientists with recent degrees, to reinvigorate what had been a leading radiation measurements laboratory, some 20–30 years earlier. Many such newly-minted Ph.D.s would, in my

opinion, have been keenly interested in contributing their knowledge and talents to

defending the Nation against the terrorist threat. Briefly, I would have decided that

although the lab had some issues, it would have been worth rebuilding it into a high

profile DHS/S&T facility in New York.

Apparently, DHS management did not share my feeling.

Proposals and Rejections

During 2003, S&T management wisely decided to permit ongoing projects to continue. In 2004, management naturally and correctly wanted to develop a program

plan for EML that corresponded more to DHS needs and requirements. EML proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
23

posed several projects, working with me as appropriate, but very few of these met

approval from management above my level. The Comprehensive Radiation Sensor

project, for example, was disapproved, even though NY City officials were very interested in it. Management decided that many projects were not within DHS’s mission, and, indeed, this might have been true in some cases, although I disagreed

with their assessments in others. At this point, I sensed a growing difficulty in the

relations and communications between EML and S&T’s management.

By spring 2005, as we were still working on programs and budgets for FY05,

which had begun six months earlier, little remained of what EML had initiated post

9/11. Technical assistance and training for local officials was cut back by two-thirds.

Other proposals were rejected in their entirety.

In addition, a bit later, a new project, involving EML, was requested by S&T ’s

Portfolio Manager for Radiation and Nuclear Countermeasures, Dr. Sonya Bowyer.

This effort was called ‘‘reachback.’’ It proposed using EML scientists (together with

scientists from Brookhaven National Laboratory in Long Island) to provide assistance to local officials and responders, when their radiation monitoring equipment

produced alarms. The general idea, which had been conceived much earlier, was to

have a process in place to deal quickly with inevitable false alarms. Experts from

the labs would provide advice to the responder in real time in analyzing the alarm.

On those few occasions where they could not resolve the alarm, another level of

reachback would be provided by the national weapons laboratories. This program

was to serve the New York region. There were efforts to make similar arrangements

with other laboratories for other regions of the country.

Fortunately, reachback has now been resurrected by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), located within DHS, but independent of S&T. I understand that

this work is about to be realized, both regionally and nationally. However, I am told

that there are still problems in that EML was experiencing difficulties in getting

approval to purchase a few hundred dollars of equipment to enable their participation. I hope this has been resolved.

My Resignation from S&T

Committee staff have requested that I recount the story of my resignation from

S&T. In most respects, this is not an important matter. However, the reasons that

led me to resign may be of interest. With your forbearance and for the record, here

is the long story.

In March and early April of 2005, I had to spend much time explaining the detailed costs of several EML projects. I was asked to justify detailed expenditures,

at a minute level, for several proposed ideas. This was demanded by an ORD colleague, Dr. John Clarke, who was supposedly in charge of EML as a facility. It was

disturbing to me that the facility manager was deciding at such a nickel and dime

level how much each R&D project should cost and whether it should proceed, since

this should reasonably have been the purview of the program manager. However,

to maintain comity, I took time away from far more complex and larger projects at

other laboratories, for which I was also responsible, to try to accommodate his requests. In the end, since I had those other demanding tasks to take care of, and

since this exercise was draining my time over relatively small matters, I suggested

that Dr. Clarke take over the whole set of EML projects, with the exception of a

few that I had been told (by Robert Hooks, Deputy Director of ORD) had already

been approved at the Office Director level.

One of the exceptions was the ‘‘ship effect’’ project, being handled by the excellent

physicist I mentioned above. I had approved the project, but Dr. Clarke somehow

was able to place a hold on the money, because he objected to the purchase of a

neutron detector that was included as part of the work. Dr. Clarke insisted that he

had this right. He further stated that he could not approve such an expense unless

we could show that the detector could be used after the project’s end. This demonstrated that Dr. Clarke had no idea of how research and development is carried

out: if a project is approved, you buy the necessary equipment to carry it out, whether or not you can find another use for it later. The cost and need of equipment are

factored into the approval process. Indeed, one usually can find another use for

equipment and this case was not an exception: we could have. The impression was

clearly that Dr. Clarke was trying even to derail a project already approved at the

highest appropriate level.

Having vociferously defended this project earlier, and since I had been previously

assured by Mr. Hooks that this project had indeed been approved at the Office Director’s level, I was quite properly outraged. I sent e-mails that included my direct

supervisor, Dr. Gerald Parker, and his supervisor, who was Mr. Hooks, but they

brought no response. Finally, I received a response from Mr. Hooks on March 28,

2005, to the effect that Dr. Clarke and I had to work this out. This contradicted

24

what Mr. Hooks had told me about the project’s approval a week or two earlier. A

further request to Dr. Parker for clarification elicited no response whatsoever.

At this point, I decided that S&T/ORD management was broken to the degree

that I could no longer perform my job, and I had to leave my position. On April

4, I sent an e-mail with my resignation to my chain of command, including Dr.

Parker, Mr. Hooks, and the Office Director, Dr. Maureen McCarthy.

It turned out that I was correct in determining that management was broken:

within three days, Dr. Parker summoned me to his office and handed me a ‘‘Letter

of Counseling’’—essentially a reprimand—for daring to resign, and threatening me

with reprisals if I continued such unreasonable behavior. I was also chastised for

objecting to Dr. Clarke’s overstepping his authority. This divorcement from reality

was noteworthy.

Incidentally, in nearly 20 years of government service, I had never before received

a reprimand of any sort. I have, however, received a number of commendations for

my work, both verbal and written.

Naturally, I left S&T as soon as I could, within two working days, and accepted

a position with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, remaining there for the rest

of my federal service, and retiring on September 30, 2005. Indeed, most radiological

work was already being transitioned from S&T to this new office. The working environment there was quite satisfactory.

Afterwards, I was happy to discover, the ‘‘ship effect’’ project had been approved

in its entirety, probably as a result of the furor. But, to keep the project going as

it should have, I had been forced to resign in order to draw sufficient attention to

the matter.

Conclusions

It appeared to me that in 2005, S&T management was trying to squeeze EML

out of existence by turning off projects one by one, so that it could finally be asserted that the lab had no function. It became increasingly difficult to obtain approval for any expenditures beyond the basic minima of salaries and benefits, heat,

light, and rent. Further, EML was not permitted to replace staff departures, and

the number of personnel has shrunk from 60 in 2003 to 34 today. I cannot prove

there was an overt intent to close the lab; indeed, Mr. Hooks assured me at the time

I left that this was not the case, but Occam’s Razor (adopt the simplest hypothesis

that satisfies all the known data) indicated to me strongly that this was, in fact,

what was happening.

EML still exists, to my knowledge, in great part because DNDO is using some

of their personnel for projects in the New York area. Perhaps, since responsibility

for radiological and nuclear issues has transitioned to DNDO, it might be appropriate for EML to come entirely under its aegis.

If EML were to remain in existence, my remarks above contain some ideas on

what I feel it might do, and how it might make a significant contribution to homeland security. Even at its current, depressed, levels, it can be successfully resurrected, if a clear mission is articulated and appropriate management is applied. I

do think this is possible. Some changes will be needed, of course: for one thing, it

should probably move to a new venue in the New York area, perhaps, as I noted

above, within a DHS-owned facility.

If its mission would include functioning as the focus of DHS’s technical capabilities in the New York area, beyond radiological and nuclear issues, it would be necessary to hire some new scientists and engineers with expertise in chemical and biological countermeasures. This would transform EML into a broader and more capable organization. One could also imagine adding collaborative efforts with another

S&T laboratory, the Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, about 100

miles to the south. TSL specializes in explosives detection, and joint work in testing

this sort of equipment in New York City would probably be a useful synergy. If

EML were to be broadened in this way, one could argue that it should remain within S&T, which, having recently been reorganized, might be more receptive to such

a concept than it was in the past.

An Additional Observation

There may be a broader issue here.

In 2003, two laboratories, EML and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center

(PIADC), were relocated from other agencies to S&T, a new organization within a

new organization. I understand from the press that there are now plans to close

Plum Island and relocate its activities elsewhere, probably with a largely new staff.

It is not surprising that, amidst all the difficulties of establishing new, nested structures, and under the watchful eye of a fearful public following 9/11, these two labVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
25

oratories have experienced serious difficulties while trying to fit into a new Department and to develop missions rather different from their previous ones.

However, I am also concerned about a third laboratory, the above-mentioned

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), also involved in post-9/11 turmoil. TSL

has just (2006) transitioned to S&T from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is, of course, also within DHS.

TSL is not a minor player: it is the world’s gold standard for developing and certifying explosives detection equipment, especially as applied to transportation security. Virtually all security technology in U.S. (and in many foreign) airports today

have been developed there. Vitally needed improvements are being developed there

right now. The lab and its staff are impressive: I urge the Committee Members to

visit it.

Unfortunately, in the bureaucratic turbulence following 9/11, TSL has been moved

between agencies twice. Its budget has undergone wild fluctuations, both up and

down. This year, I am told, their budget has dropped by a factor of two from last

year. This unstable situation, both institutional and fiscal, is destroying morale

there; some scientists have left, others may well leave soon. Staff have been reduced

from about 80, a few years ago, to 54 now. Like EML, they have not recently been

able to hire new scientists or engineers. There are rumors that its equipment certification unit, which has been looked upon to provide aviation security equipment

standards around the world, may be asked to raise money from vendors to continue

its effective existence, beyond the fees currently levied on those asking for certification. There are other rumors that this federal laboratory, staffed by federal employees, may be required to compete for its existence with national laboratories (that

have relatively immense levels of staffing, much other funding and other missions)

and with the private sector.

I hope these tales aren’t true. The Federal Government’s ability to issue standards for explosives detectors should not depend on a revenue stream. Moreover, TSL

and other federal laboratories are part of the federal infrastructure: they are federal

assets, run by federal employees, who have loyalty to the mission, and who do not

have to keep an eye out for profits or for obtaining the next contract. This laboratory

is especially needed to provide for the Nation’s security, particularly regarding air

travel, where we all know there is a serious, ongoing terrorist threat.

I trust and hope that DHS will now be able to provide TSL with steady and predictable funding and a consistent vision, so that it may continue its excellent work.

I fervently hope that TSL will not be subject to the same perturbations that the

other two laboratories within DHS have endured during this difficult period of adjustment.

BIOGRAPHY FOR M. ANTHONY FAINBERG

Upon retiring from federal service after twenty years, Dr. Fainberg recently became a Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. At retirement, Dr.

Fainberg was Director of the Office of Transformational Research and Development

of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office of the Department of Homeland Security.

At the Department of Homeland Security, he had previously been Program Manager

for Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures and for Explosives Countermeasures in

the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department. Earlier, he served as Director for Federal Laboratories in that Directorate. Previously, he was Division

Chief at the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction

Agency, Department of Defense, and before that, he held the title of Director of the

Office of Policy and Planning for Aviation Security in the Federal Aviation Administration.

After receiving his training and degrees in experimental particle physics, Dr.

Fainberg worked as a researcher and university lecturer for eleven years, producing

some 40 technical publications. His experience includes work at U.S. National Laboratories; at CERN, the international nuclear laboratory in Geneva; and at universities in the U.S. and Italy. He turned to applied physics in 1977, entering the field

of nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation at Brookhaven National Laboratory,

where he was responsible for projects involving technical, systems, and policy issues.

In the course of his duties at Brookhaven, he worked with officials at the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

In 1983, Dr. Fainberg became a Congressional Science Fellow of the American

Physical Society and spent a year as a legislative aide in the office of a U.S. Senator. Following the fellowship, he joined the staff of the Congressional Office of

Technology Assessment, where he specialized in national security issues. He worked

for several years in analyses of missile defense technologies. Later, he worked on

26

projects dealing with the Department of Energy nuclear weapon complex, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has originated and directed projects

on terrorism and on technologies of use in military operations other than war.

Dr. Fainberg has frequently testified before Congress and has briefed both congressional staff and the media in his areas of expertise; he has appeared on National Public Radio, CNN, BBC, CNBC, and other outlets. He has also briefed National Academy of Sciences panels on aviation security matters. Dr. Fainberg is also

active in the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and has co-edited a book on energy supply and demand.

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., 1969, University of California, Berkeley; High Energy Physics.

A.B., 1964, New York University; Magna cum Laude, Physics.

EXPERIENCE:

Currently: Adjunct Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, researching

issues related to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, risk analysis in the context of homeland security, and problems at the intersection of

technology and counterterrorism.

2005: Director of Office of Transformational Research and Development, Domestic

Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security. Develops and implements research program to produce breakthroughs that radically improve on

current radiation detection technologies and methods.

2004–2005: Program Manager for Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures and

for Explosives Countermeasures in the Office of Research and Development of

the Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

Structures and manages about $50 M of research and development programs

in these two areas. Most of this work is implemented by the laboratories internal to the Department, including those parts of the Department of Energy laboratories that now function as part of the Homeland Security research and development complex.

2003: Director for Federal Laboratories, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. Responsible for oversight of the federal laboratories that are part of the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department.

2002: Special Assistant for Technology, Office of Policy and Planning for Civil Aviation Security, Transportation Security Administration. Planning and analysis of

science and technology approaches to improving transportation security.

1999–2001: Division Chief, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat

Reduction Agency. Planning and overseeing projects with long-term impact

studying the reduction of threats to the United States from weapons of mass

destruction and establishing criteria for future U.S. nuclear forces structure.

Preceptor, Georgetown University, Program in Science, Technology, and International Affairs.

1996–1999: Director, Office of Policy and Planning for Aviation Security, Federal

Aviation Administration. SES-level position responsible for overseeing aviation

security research and development; promulgating rules and regulations governing civil aviation security; and developing policies and procedures for assuring security at FAA facilities.

1995–1996: Self-employed consultant, national security analyst specializing in

counterterrorism, nuclear safeguards, remote sensing technology. Clients included Department of Defense, Brookhaven National Laboratory, National

Academy of Sciences, George Washington University, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and other research organizations.

1985–1995: Senior Associate and Project Director, Office of Technology Assessment,

U.S. Congress, Washington, DC. Areas of expertise: technology and terrorism;

ballistic missile defense; nuclear proliferation; proliferation and the former Soviet Union; science policy. Most recent project: international peace support operations.

1991–1992: Visiting Fellow, Center for International Security and Arms Control,

Stanford University, worked on issues in nuclear non-proliferation.

1983–1984: Legislative Aide, Office of Senator Jeff Bingaman, Washington, DC.

Handled foreign policy issues as well as technical matters related to arms conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
27

trol; worked in areas related to Armed Services Committee, foreign policy, and

science policy.

1977–1983: Physicist, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York. Responsibilities included technical and systems studies of problems in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation.

1977–1978: Adjunct Associate Professor of Physics, Syracuse University, Syracuse,

New York. Responsible for developing proposals for experiments in particle

physics.

1973–1977: Research Assistant Professor of Physics, Syracuse University, in residence at Brookhaven National Laboratory. Research in particle physics and

teaching, directed small teams of physicists and technicians.

1970–1972: Staff Physicist, Italian National Institute of Nuclear Physics, Turin,

Italy. Engaged in particle physics research at European Centre for Nuclear Research, Switzerland.

LANGUAGES:

Fluent French, Italian, German, conversational Spanish.

HONORS, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, and OFFICES:

Member, American Physical Society (APS), American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Fellow, APS. Congressional Science Fellow, APS, 1983–

1984. Past Chair, Forum on Physics and Society of APS; Vice-Chair, APS Panel on

Public Affairs.

CLEARANCES:

Top Secret, Q (Dept. of Energy).

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS, 1985–present

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) publications:

‘‘Improving the Prospects for Future International Peace Operations,’’ September

1995.

‘‘Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency,’’ May 1995.

‘‘Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union,’’ September 1994.

‘‘Technology and Terrorism: Structuring Security,’’ January 1992.

‘‘Technology and Terrorism: The Federal Effort,’’ July 1991.

‘‘Review of the Department of Energy Modernization Plan,’’ September 1989.

‘‘The Potential Biological and Electronic Effects of EMPRESS II,’’ November 1988.

‘‘SDI: Technology, Survivability, Software,’’ May 1988.

‘‘A Treaty-Compliant Accidental Launch Protection System,’’ April 1988.

‘‘Permanently Orbiting Space Cyclers Between Earth and Mars,’’ April 1986.

‘‘Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies,’’ September 1985.

Non-OTA publications:

‘‘National Comparative Risk Assessment Pilot Project,’’ IDA Document D–3309,

2006.

‘‘Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Past Performance, Future

Prospects, and Technical Issues,’’ Paper presented to The First Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Center for Asian Terrorism Research, October, 2005,

Denpasar, Indonesia, The Anatomy of Terrorism and Political Violence in South

Asia, Proceedings published as IDA Paper P–4096.

‘‘Aviation Security in the United States: Current and Future Trends,’’ Transportation Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1998.

‘‘Technology for International Peace Operations,’’ (Washington, DC: The Institute for

Technology Assessment, March 1998).

‘‘Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Lessons from Iraq,’’ (Stanford, CA: Center for

International Security and Arms Control, May 1993).

‘‘Explosives Detection for Aviation Security,’’ Science, 20 March 1992.

‘‘How Soviet, U.S. Scientists Could Cooperate on Research,’’ op-ed, San Francisco

Chronicle, January 22, 1992.

With Ruth Howes, co-editor, The Energy Sourcebook, (New York: American Institute

of Physics, February 1991).

28

‘‘Fossils Fuels: Coal, Petroleum, Natural Gas’’ in The Energy Sourcebook, R. Howes

and A. Fainberg, co-editors (New York: American Institute of Physics, February

1991).

‘‘SDI: How Much Should the Public be Told?’’ Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, Spring 1990.

‘‘ALPS and the ABM Treaty,’’ Arms Control Today, April 1989.

‘‘Observations on the Feasibility and Survivability of Near-term Strategic Defense,’’

in Nuclear Arms Technologies in the 1990s, eds. Hafemeister, D. and Schroeer, D.,

(New York: American Institute of Physics, 1989).

Book Review of ‘‘Lost at the Frontier: U.S. Science and Technology Policy Adrift,’’

by R. Roy and D. Shapley in BioScience, May 1986.

With E.V. Weinstock, ‘‘Verifying a Fissile-Material Production Freeze in Declared

Facilities, with Special Emphasis on Remote Monitoring,’’ in Arms Control

Verification, ed. Tsipis, K., Hafemeister, David W., and Janeway, P., (PergamonBrassey’s: Washington, DC), 1986.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Fainberg. Ms. Albin.

STATEMENT OF MS. LYNN ALBIN, RADIATION HEALTH PHYSICIST, OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION, WASHINGTON

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Ms. ALBIN. Chairman Miller, Congressman McCaul and Committee Members, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the experience of Washington State in our environmental

radiation monitoring efforts following the termination of EML’s

Quality Assurance Program. I have worked for the Washington

State Department of Health for 21 years. I began as a radiochemist

with the responsibility to provide accurate analysis of radioactive

contaminants in environmental samples. Presently, I am a health

physicist with the Department of Health, where I use the data to

assess public and environmental health risks and to provide oversight of federal and State licensed facilities that could potentially

release radioactive contaminants into the environment. I am also

responsible for analyzing radiochemical data to determine its quality and its validity.

The Washington State Department of Health has operated in environmental radiation monitoring programs since 1961. All of the

samples collected by the Department of Health are analyzed by the

Public Health Laboratory. This laboratory has the capability to

analyze for very low levels of naturally occurring radionuclides,

mixed fission products and source materials in any environmental

media.

Of particular interest to the Department of Homeland Security,

the Public Health Lab analyzes the air we breathe, the water we

drink, the soil in which we grow our food, the food we eat and the

external radiation levels that surround us. The laboratory uses

rapid methods to screen deposition samples to quickly identify contaminants. The data provides the basis of environmental assessments and decisions that are made during radiological emergencies. I can’t emphasize enough how important it is that we are

confident that the data is both accurate and precise when we make

public health decisions.

When it was part of the Department of Energy, EML provided

performance testing samples for exactly the type of work the Public

Laboratory performs. This program was available at no charge to

the Public Health Laboratory and was an important component of

quality assurance.

29

QAP provided a link to the scientists within the Environmental

Monitoring Laboratory. Radiochemists who develop many of the

classical methods of analyzing radionuclides in the environment

worked for EML. These methods were complied into a manual that

is widely regarded as the standard of radiation measurement techniques. As a new radiochemist, I was handed the manual as a basis

of understanding radiochemistry. This practice continues today.

It wasn’t only the EML performance testing samples and the

radiochemistry manual that benefited the quality of measurements.

It was also that the scientists themselves were easily approached

to assist Public Health Laboratory chemists in solving questions regarding radiochemistry. Radiochemistry is part science and part

art. The science behind the chemistry allows separation and concentration of specific radionuclides, but there is also an art that requires experience to correctly interpret resulting data. It takes

years of experience to be proficient in radiochemistry. The EML assisted the Public Health Laboratory whenever called upon.

Performance testing is important for assessment of laboratory capabilities, as well as important to the Department of Health’s

credibility when we use lab data to support decisions. The value of

the performance testing comes into play when data or decisions are

questioned. From Washington State’s point of view, the more performance tests we have to support our data the better.

Two examples of how QAP helped prepare Washington State to

respond to an actual emergency are the state’s response to fires on

the Hanford nuclear site in 2000 and the Department of Homeland

Security’s TOPOFF2 exercise in 2003. During the Hanford fire, the

state mobilized field teams to collect samples. As the fire burned,

wind created the concern that soil surface contamination would be

blown offsite. The Department of Health analyzed soil, airborne

particulates and charred vegetation samples. Sampling results

showed that first responders were not working in a radiologically

hazardous environment and no offsite public or environmental

health impact existed.

It is just as critical that decision-makers are confident that the

laboratory has reached appropriate detection limits, even in cases

where the data reveal no impact. QAP provided an independent

evaluation of lab performance that specifically supported the credibility of Washington State protective actions. Performance testing

is essential in assuring that if results are questioned, there is a reliable method to verify data. Washington State, since losing the

program, participates less often in performance testing programs

because of budget considerations.

During TOPOFF2, Washington State had to make quick assessments of radiological conditions following a simulated terrorist attack. Although unplanned, samples collected by other agencies, including the EPA and the Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center, were also brought to the Public Health Laboratory for

analysis. The lab’s strong quality assurance program gave confidence that the initial assessments were correct, even though samples were not commonly analyzed at the laboratory. It further provided evidence to other agencies that lab services had documented

verification and it was capable of accurately and precisely measuring radioactive contamination in environmental samples. Once

30

again, the data reported by the Public Health Lab was used to support protective action decisions. Confidence in that data was essential.

In 2003, the department participated in a performance test sponsored by NIST, designed to test the capability and capacity of laboratories to quickly measure radioactive contaminants in environmental media as well as synthetic urine and feces. One of the findings of the study was an appreciation for the analytical uncertainty

in the reported result, which was much higher than for traditional

performance tests. This gave rise to questions of how good is good

enough for emergency samples, how do we communicate analytical

uncertainty to decision-makers, and how, in turn, will that uncertainty be factored into protective action? These are all questions

that remain unanswered and could be a starting point for future

EML support to states for homeland security-related emergencies.

As a person who reviews data validity, I must be confident that

I am handing the best information to the decision-makers. The welfare of the public, emergency workers and the environment rely on

the quality of laboratory data. These results for the basis for decisions concerning health risk, food embargoes and population relocation. Performance testing supports data quality assessment by providing an independent evaluation of lab capability. This independent review helps defend data, whether they support recommended protective actions that may impact someone’s life, or

whether they lend confidence to a recommendation of no action.

In conclusion, accurate, defensible data improves environmental

assessments and enables managers to make better and more costefficient decisions. The termination of the QAP affects Washington

State because we can’t guarantee the level of participation in the

private laboratory replacement programs due to costs. Cutting performance programs weakens the defensibility of the data. We are

also missing the solid technical support to the Public Health Laboratory provided by the Quality Assurance Program and the scientists at Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Albin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LYNN ALBIN

Dear Chairman Miller and Ranking Member James Sensenbrenner,

Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the experience of Washington State in our environmental radiation monitoring efforts following the termination of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) Quality Assurance

Program (QAP). My name is Lynn Albin and I have worked for the Washington

State Department of Health for 21 years. I began as a radiochemist with the responsibility to provide accurate analyses of radioactive contaminants in environmental

samples. Presently, I am a radiation health physicist with the Department of

Health’s Office of Radiation Protection. My responsibilities include using

radiochemical analyses to assess public and environmental health risks and to provide oversight of federal and State-licensed facilities that could potentially release

radioactive contaminants in the environment. Additionally, I am the liaison between

Office of Radiation Protection and the Department’s Public Health Laboratory

(PHL). In this capacity, I am responsible for analyzing radiochemical data to determine its quality and validity.

The Washington State Department of Health has operated an environmental radiation monitoring program since 1961. The early program looked primarily at atmospheric fallout from nuclear weapons tests. The program expanded to evaluate offsite environmental impacts related to operations of nuclear facilities and to provide

readiness for assessment in case of a radiological emergency. An essential part of

the assessments is the independent analysis of environmental samples.

31

All of the samples collected by the Department of Health are analyzed at the Public Health Laboratory. The Laboratory has the capability to analyze for very low levels of naturally occurring radionuclides, mixed fission products and source materials

in any environmental media.

Of particular interest to the Department of Homeland Security, the Public Health

Laboratory analyzes the air we breathe, the water we drink, the soil in which we

grow our food, the food we eat and the external radiation levels that surround us.

The Laboratory also uses rapid methods to screen deposition samples to quickly

identify radioactive contaminants. The data provided is the basis of environmental

assessments and decisions made during radiological emergencies. I cannot emphasize enough how important it is that we are confident that the data is both accurate

and precise when we make public health decisions.

When it was part of the Department of Energy, the Environmental Measurements

Laboratory, provided performance testing samples for exactly the type of work the

Public Health Laboratory performs. This program was available at no charge to the

Public Health Laboratory and was an important component of laboratory quality assurance. Through this program, the Public Health Laboratory was supplied with environmental samples that contained well-quantified amounts of radionuclides. The

Laboratory analyzed the samples and reported the results back to EML. EML would

then evaluate the data and document the accuracy of the submitted result against

the known value and against the mean value submitted by all participating laboratories.

As far as I know, all radiochemistry laboratories supporting environmental monitoring in the Northwest participated in the Quality Assessment Program. Because

the QAP results for all laboratories were included in the summary reports, I was

able to use these reports when reviewing performance of other Northwest environmental radiochemistry labs.

Additionally the QAP provided a link to the scientists within Environmental Monitoring Laboratory. Radiochemists who developed many of the classical methods for

analyzing radionuclides in environmental samples worked for EML. These methods

were compiled into a manual that is widely regarded as the standard of radiation

measurement techniques. As a new radiochemist, I was handed that manual as the

basis of understanding radiochemistry. This practice continues today.

It wasn’t only the EML performance testing samples and the radiochemistry manual that benefited the quality of measurements; it was also that the chemists themselves were easily approached to assist Public Health Laboratory chemists in solving

questions regarding radiochemistry. Radiochemistry is part science and part art.

The science behind chemistry allows the separation and concentration of specific

radionuclides but there is also an art requiring experience to correctly interpret the

resulting data. It takes years of experience to be proficient in radiochemistry. The

Environmental Measurements Laboratory assisted the Public Health Laboratory in

evaluating the ability to correctly interpret spectral data through consultation and

through their Gamma Spectrometry Data Evaluation Program. This program provided simulated spectral data to the Laboratory to test the accuracy of the gammaray spectrometry software and the ability of the chemists to correctly interpret the

results of their own software. There is no replacement for this program.

The Quality Assurance Program was one of several performance testing programs

in which the Public Health Laboratory participated. Table 1 attached to this testimony summarizes the history of those programs. When the QAP program terminated, the Department of Health lost a cost-effective resource for evaluating laboratory performance as well as the resource provided by EML scientists themselves.

The Public Health Laboratory replaced the QAP with a performance testing program provided by a private laboratory and augmented tests from an existing program. This private laboratory provides the same environmental media and tests

that were previously provided by QAP. The disadvantage of the new program is that

it is expensive. In fact, this year the Public Health Laboratory could not afford to

fully participate in this performance testing program.

While there is no legal requirement to participate in all performance tests, laboratories cannot be certified by EPA to analyze drinking water samples or be qualified

to perform environmental measurements in support of the Department of Energy’s

Environmental Management’s activities without successfully passing a minimum

number of tests. Performance testing is important for assessment of laboratory capabilities as well as important to the Department of Health’s credibility when we use

laboratory data to support decisions. The value of the performance testing program

comes into play when data or decisions are questioned. From Washington State’s

point of view, the more performance tests we have to support our laboratory results,

the better.

32

Two examples of how the Quality Assurance Program helped prepare Washington

State to respond to actual emergency situations are the State’s response to the fires

on the Hanford Nuclear Site in 2000 and the Department of Homeland Security’s

TOPOFF2 exercise in 2003.

During the Hanford fire, the State mobilized field teams to collect samples. The

Laboratory provided quick-turnaround results and health physicists interpreted results and guided decision-makers regarding protective actions. As the fire burned,

wind created concern that soil surface contamination would be blown offsite. The

Department of Health analyzed soil, airborne particulates and charred vegetation

samples. Sampling results showed that the first responders were not working in a

radiological hazardous environment and no offsite public or environmental health

impact existed.

It is just as critical that decision-makers are confident that the laboratory has

reached appropriate detection limits even in cases where data reveal no impact.

QAP provided an independent evaluation of laboratory performance that specifically

supported credibility of Washington State protective actions. Performance testing is

essential in assuring that if results are questioned, there is a reliable method to

verify data. Washington State, since losing the program, participates less often in

performance testing programs because of budget considerations.

During TOPOFF2, Washington State had to make quick assessments of radiological conditions following a simulated terrorist attack. The first samples analyzed

by the Public Health Laboratory were non-standard media: deposition collected on

tape and soiled bandages from a victim of the initial simulated blast. These samples

provided the hazard description and were followed by the customary environmental

samples such as air particulates and soil. Although unplanned, samples collected by

other agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center were also brought to the Public Health

Laboratory for analysis. The laboratory’s strong quality assurance program gave

confidence that the initial assessments were correct even though the samples were

not commonly analyzed at the laboratory. It further provided evidence to other

agencies using the State’s laboratory services that the laboratory had documented

verification that it was capable of accurately and precisely measuring radioactive

contamination in environmental samples. Once again the data reported by the Public Health Laboratory was used to support protective action decisions. Confidence in

that data was essential.

In 2003 the Department of Health participated in a performance test sponsored

by the National Institute of Science and Technology designed to test the capability

and capacity of the laboratories to quickly measure radioactive contaminants in environmental media as well as in synthetic urine and feces. This was the first such

performance test and Washington State was one of two states that participated. The

samples were a challenge to complete within the designated time and required adjustments in measurement protocol. One of the findings of the study was an appreciation for the analytical uncertainty in the reported result which was much higher

than for traditional performance tests. This gave rise to questions of how good is

good enough for emergency samples, how do we communicate analytical uncertainty

to decision-makers and how, in turn, will that uncertainty be factored into protective actions? These are all questions that remain unanswered and could be a starting point for future EML support to states for homeland security-related emergencies.

As the person who reviews the data validity, I must feel confident that I am handing the best information to the decision-makers. The welfare of the public, emergency workers, and the environment rely on the quality of the laboratory data.

These results form the basis for decisions concerning health risk, food embargoes,

and population relocation. Performance testing supports data quality assessment by

providing an independent evaluation of laboratory capability. This independent review helps defend data, whether they support recommended protective actions that

may impact someone’s life or whether they lend confidence to a recommendation of

no action.

In conclusion, accurate, defensible data improves environmental assessments and

enables managers to make better and more cost-effective decisions. The termination

of the QAP affects Washington State because we cannot guarantee the level of participation in the private laboratory replacement program due to costs. Cutting performance programs weakens the defensibility of the data. We also are missing the

solid technical support to the Public Health Laboratory provided by the Quality Assurance Program and the scientists at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

33

34

BIOGRAPHY FOR LYNN ALBIN

Lynn Albin is a Radiation Health Physicist with the Washington State Department of Health. She has 21 years experience in the environmental radiation field

assessing public and environmental health. She began her career analyzing plutonium in coral soils from the United States nuclear testing ground in the Marshall

Islands. As part of her graduate studies in Radiation Ecology at the University of

Washington, Ms. Albin studied the removal rates of radioactive contaminants from

the Marshall Island Atoll ecosystem.

Ms. Albin was influential in initiating environmental monitoring at the University

of Washington to assess radioactive fallout following the 1986 fire and explosion of

the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukraine. The Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (later the Department of Health) also responded

to the accident. In addition to monitoring fallout in air, rainwater and ambient radiation levels, the Department monitored for contamination in milk, food and other

environmental media. In June of 1986, Ms. Albin joined the chemists at the State’s

Public Health Laboratory to assist with their response to the Chernobyl accident.

In 1988, Ms. Albin transferred within the Department of Health to the Office of

Radiation Protection. As a senior Radiation Health Physicist, her duties include environmental oversight of radiological monitoring programs within Washington State

including the US Department of Energy’s Hanford Site and the Energy Northwest

nuclear power plant. She provides technical support in radiological site assessment

and radiological risk evaluation and leads quality assurance activities within the Office of Radiation Protection.

Ms. Albin is the laboratory liaison between the Office of Radiation Protection and

the Department of Health’s Public Health Laboratory. She is responsible for analyzing radiochemical data to determine validity, quality and scientific significance

related to public health and the environment.

Ms. Albin is member of the Department of Health’s Emergency Response Team.

In this capacity she uses her expertise to provide support at the project level to ensure sampling design and analysis criteria are appropriate and technically defensible. She has participated in numerous emergency response drills and exercises including TOPOFF2 and has also responded to actual emergencies such as the fire

on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Hanford site in 2002.

Ms. Albin is a member of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors’

G–2 Committee on Ionizing Measurements.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Ms. Albin. Assistant Commissioner Duecker.

STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN A. DUECKER, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

COUNTERTERRORISM BUREAU

Mr. DUECKER. Good morning, Chairman Miller and Members of

the Committee. My name is Jonathan Duecker. I am the Assistant

Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the New York City Police

Department and previously, I was the Director of the Office of

Homeland Security of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. I am

pleased to be here today and I thank you for the opportunity to

speak to you about something that is of vital importance to both

the city and State of New York as well as the United States.

When Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly took office in January 2002, the pyre in the grounds of the World Trade Center was

still burning. He made his personal mission to ensure that New

York City would never fall victim to such an event again. Commissioner Kelly’s leadership and vision was the nascence of the

NYPD’s Counterterrorism Bureau. The mission, to make New York

City inhospitable to terrorists, to their sympathizers, their supporters and their facilitators.

Fortunately, New York City and the NYPD has thwarted more

than one plot against New York since September 11, 2001. One

widely supported success was the investigation, the arrests and the

35

convictions of terrorists planning to blow up the Herald Square

subway station two weeks before the Republican National Nominating Convention. In addition, the NYPD’s robust deterrence and

counter-surveillance program has proved its success, confirmed by

Khaled Sheik Mohammed himself, who cited NYPD deployments as

the sole reason that an Ohio truck driver, Iyman Farris, presently

serving a prison sentence for his role in the plot to demolish the

Brooklyn Bridge, decided that he would, in fact, not carry out that

plot.

In New York City, we are combating terrorism aggressively. We

acknowledge and welcome the synergy that comes with joining

State, regional and federal partners, all of whom bring resources

and expertise to the fight. Over the past few years, our relationship

with the Department of Homeland Security has matured. I can say

that, despite differences that have cropped up from time to time,

the level of cooperation we presently enjoy has never been better.

It is in the spirit of cooperation and collaboration that I ask you

today to ensure that the critical federal resources are neither

squandered nor withdrawn from New York City. I am talking

about the yeoman’s work taking place at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory located in Manhattan.

The EML has distinguished roots dating back to the Manhattan

Project. It enjoys a renowned reputation as a subject matter expert

in all things nuclear and radiological, from detection to testing to

measurement and assessment. Although EML moved organizationally from under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission to

the Department of Energy and then to the Department of Homeland Security, it never left its home in New York City.

The NYPD has found EML to be a responsive neighbor and partner. A few years ago, when we determined that we needed to purchase small, portable but reliable radiation detectors, we asked our

federal colleagues to recommend a laboratory capable to testing the

products then available on the market. We were told that we would

have to travel across the country to the northwest, where testing

would consume a year’s time. EML stepped in and performed the

testing for us in a few weeks and made recommendations that

work for us to this day.

As a result, the NYPD has acquired approximately 700 handheld gamma monitors and 120 gamma neutron detectors to detect

potential radiological weapons of mass destruction. They have been

deployed throughout the department and are in daily use throughout Manhattan and access points to the city. In addition, advanced

gamma detectors and Geiger counters have been assigned to specialized units such as the Emergency Service Unit and the Bomb

Squad. The department continues to seek out and acquire new

technologies to aid us in the war on terror. In the future, we plan

to procure additional nuclear, biological and chemical detection

monitoring devices. EML has been instrumental in helping us

make wise choices from among the available technology and the

available products.

Now, however, the importance of keeping a vibrant EML in New

York City is more important than ever. Secretary Chertoff announced last year that the Securing the Cities Initiative, STC,

would be inaugurated in New York City. Under STC, the Domestic

36

Nuclear Detection Office at DHS has been tasked with developing

and implementing the deployment of a system to detect the introduction of nuclear material into our cities for illicit purposes. The

EML plays a pivotal role in STC in New York City, providing technical and management roles.

The Acting Director of EML, Dr. Adam Hunter, has served as a

key liaison between DHS and the myriad of federal, State and local

partners that comprise the STC partnership. He has served as a

mentor to jump start initiative activities and has been a key advisor on technical details regarding the acquisition, evaluation and

operation of radiological detection equipment, and he has provided

critical guidance on the operational exercise activities currently underway in support of these initiative goals. Without Director Hunter’s guidance and assistance from his laboratory, the STC goals of

creating a formidable, in-depth defense of New York City and the

region from radiological or nuclear attack would be severely degraded.

In fact, EML stood next to New York City in our early efforts to

establish a defense of the city through the successful Regional Radiological Pilot Project. That program yielded significant research

and funding, which led to the fielding of discrete radiological detection equipment currently used to locate and identify radiological

source material.

Clearly, EML’s work in the New York region has been tremendously successful and has provided a substantial credibility for federal, State and local agencies to join in a coordinated defense

against a terror threat of the radiological or nuclear attack against

the New York region. In fact, more assistance from EML would be

welcome and would help consolidate the initial success achieved

through the programs, such as Securing the Cities. The outcome of

that program will result in a significant increase in the number of

detection equipment deployed by STC partners, equipment which

will need precision calibration and support going forward.

Also, private industry is rising to the challenge to enhance the

sensitivity and capabilities of radiological detection equipment and

we look to EML to provide further guidance on acquisition, evaluation and operational deployment on technologies yet to be identified. The question is not whether EML has been a success in answering the threat posed by international terrorism; rather, the

question is whether EML stands ready to expand its efforts going

forward. The success of STC in New York is important to the entire

Nation and we expect it to be a model for implementing similar initiatives throughout the country.

I would be delighted to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duecker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JONATHAN A. DUECKER

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner and Members

of the Committee. My name is Jonathan Duecker and I am the Assistant Commissioner of the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) Counterterrorism Bureau

(CTB). I was previously the Director of the Office of Homeland Security for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. I am pleased to be here today and I thank you for this

opportunity to address your committee on a matter that is vital to the health and

welfare of, not only the State and City of New York, but our nation.

When Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly took office in January of 2002, the

pyre on the grounds of the World Trade Center was still burning. He made it his

37

personal mission that New York City never fall victim to such a calamity again.

Commissioner Kelly’s leadership and vision was the nascence of the NYPD

Counterterrorism Bureau. The mission: make New York City inhospitable to terrorists, and to their sympathizers, their supporters, and their facilitators.

Fortunately, the NYPD has thwarted more than one plot against New York City

since September 11, 2001. One widely reported success was the investigation, arrests and convictions of terrorists planning to blow up the Herald Square subway

station two weeks before the Republican National Nominating Convention. In addition, the NYPD’s robust deterrence and counter-surveillance program has proved its

success, confirmed by Khaled Sheik Mohammed himself, who cited NYPD deployments as the reason that an Ohio truck driver, Iyman Farris, presently serving a

prison sentence for his role in the plot to demolish the Brooklyn Bridge, decided that

he could not carry out the plot.

In New York City, we are combating terrorism aggressively. We acknowledge and

welcome the synergy that comes with joining State, regional and federal partners,

all of whom bring resources and expertise to the fight. Over the past few years, our

relationship with the Department of Homeland Security has matured. I can say

that, despite differences that crop up from time to time, the level of cooperation we

presently enjoy has never been better. It is in this spirit of cooperation and collaboration that I ask you today to ensure that critical federal resources are neither

squandered nor withdrawn. I am talking about the yeoman’s work taking place at

the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) located in Manhattan.

The EML has distinguished roots, dating back to the Manhattan Project. It enjoys

a renowned reputation as the subject matter expert in all things nuclear and radiological, from protection to testing to measurement and assessment. Although EML

moved organizationally from under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission

to the Department of Energy and then to the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), it never left its home in New York City.

The NYPD has found EML to be a responsive neighbor and partner. A few years

ago, when we determined that we needed to purchase small, portable but reliable

radiation detectors, we asked our federal colleagues to recommend a laboratory capable of testing the products then available on the market. We were told that we

would have to travel across the country to the Northwest, where testing would consume a year’s time. The EML stepped up and performed the testing for us in a few

weeks and made recommendations that work for us to this day. As a result, the

NYPD has acquired approximately 700 hand-held gamma monitors and 120 gamma

neutron detectors to detect potential radiological weapons of mass destruction. They

have been deployed throughout the Department and are in daily use throughout

Manhattan and access points to the city. In addition, advanced gamma detectors

and Geiger counters have been assigned to specialized units such as the Emergency

Service Unit and the Bomb Squad. The Department continues to seek out and acquire new technologies to aid us in the war on terror. In the future, we plan to procure additional nuclear, biological, and chemical detection and monitoring devices.

EML has been instrumental in helping us make wise choices from among available

products.

Now, however, the importance of keeping a vibrant EML in New York City is

more important than ever. Secretary Chertoff announced last year that the Securing

the Cities (STC) initiative would be inaugurated in New York City. Under STC, the

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at DHS has been tasked with developing

and implementing the deployment of a system to detect the introduction of nuclear

material into our cities for illicit purposes. The EML plays a pivotal role in STC–

NY, providing technical and management roles.

The Acting Director of EML, Adam Hutter, has served as the key liaison between

DHS and the myriad groups of federal, State, and local partners that comprise the

STC partners. He has served as a mentor to jump-start initiative activities and has

been a key advisor on technical details regarding the acquisition, evaluation and operation of radiological detection equipment and he has provided critical guidance to

the operational exercise activities currently underway in support of initiative goals.

Without Director Hutter’s guidance and assistance from his laboratory, the STC

goals of creating a formidable, in-depth defense of the New York region from radiological or nuclear attack would be severely degraded.

In fact, EML stood next to New York City in our early efforts to establish a defense of the city through the successful Regional Radiological Pilot Project. That program yielded significant research and funding which led to the fielding of discrete

radiological detection equipment currently used to locate and identify hostile radiological source material.

Clearly, EML’s works in the New York region have been tremendously successful

and have provided a substantial capability for federal, State, and local agencies to

38

join in a coordinated defense against the terrorist threat of a radiological or nuclear

attack against the New York region. In fact, more assistance from EML would be

welcome and would help consolidate the initial success achieved through programs

such as Securing the Cities. The outcome of that program will result in a significant

increase in the numbers of detection equipment deployed by STC partners, equipment which will need precision calibration and support. Also, private industry is rising to the challenge to enhance the sensitivity and capabilities of radiological detection equipment and we look to EML to provide further guidance on acquisition, evaluation, and operational deployment on technologies yet to be identified. The question is not whether EML has been a success in answering the threat posed by international terrorism; the question is whether EML stands ready to expand its efforts

going forward.

The success of STC–NY is important to the country—it is expected to be the

model for implementing similar initiatives throughout the country.

I would be delighted to answer any questions you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR JONATHAN A. DUECKER

Assistant Commissioner of Counterterrorism Jonathan Duecker graduated from

the United States Naval Academy in 1986 and was commissioned an Ensign in the

U.S. Navy. After attending Navy flight school at Pensacola, FL, and receiving his

Naval Flight Officer wings, he was assigned to the EA–6B ‘‘Prowler’’ tactical electronic warfare community and flew electronic countermeasures missions from several fleet aircraft carriers. After his initial sea tour, Assistant Commissioner

Duecker was assigned as the Electronic Warfare Range Officer at the Atlantic Fleet

Weapons Training Facility at Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, PR, where he was responsible for all aspects of operational electronic warfare training of surface, subsurface, and aviation units prior to their deployment overseas.

Assistant Commissioner Duecker attended the University of Wisconsin Law

School where he received his Juris Doctor, and was admitted to the Wisconsin Bar

in 1995. He attended the U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Basic Agent Training at Quantico, VA, and was ultimately assigned as

a Special Agent to the Mobile Enforcement Team in the DEA Philadelphia Field Division.

Immediately after September 11, 2001, Assistant Commissioner Duecker was assigned by the DEA to the Philadelphia FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. Subsequently, he was mobilized to active duty to the Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) providing

counterterrorism intelligence analysis in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. While at the DIA, Assistant Commissioner Duecker was responsible for creating the Homeland Defense Division, which monitors the transnational

terrorist threat to the continental U.S.

Assistant Commissioner Duecker was demobilized at the end of 2002. In 2003, he

was appointed the Deputy Director of the Pennsylvania Office of Homeland Security

by Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, and in 2004, was elevated to Director. He

served in that position until October 2005. Assistant Commissioner Duecker is currently a Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve assigned to the DIA in Washington

DC.

DISCUSSION

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. And before beginning with the

questioning, I mentioned earlier that there would be various documents, but there is a specific set of documents that have been provided to the Minority staff and I now ask unanimous consent to

enter that set of documents in the record. Thank you.

[The information referred to appears in Appendix: Additional

Material for the Record, Documents for the Record.]

AIR FORCE PROGRAMS WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL

MEASUREMENTS LABORATORY (EML)

Chairman MILLER. And now the Chair recognizes himself for five

minutes of questions. Mr. McBrearty, beginning with you. I underVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
39

stand that the Air Force has had a longstanding relationship with

EML, and the lab has participated in various nuclear nonproliferation-related programs. I understand that some of the work, some

of the arrangements, some of what EML has done may be classified. Obviously, if we ask a question that would lead you into disclosing classified information, do not answer that. If it is necessary

that we know that to understand the answer to the question, we

may make other arrangements to get that information from you.

Mr. MCBREARTY. That would be perfectly fine.

Chairman MILLER. But in this setting, do not.

Mr. MCBREARTY. Right.

Chairman MILLER. Obviously, do not disclose classified information. And that goes for anyone else who has classified information.

Mr. McBrearty, is AFTAC now engaged in any program or project

with EML?

Mr. MCBREARTY. We had terminated all the activities that we

had with them. So currently, no, we have none going on.

Chairman MILLER. Why is that?

Mr. MCBREARTY. Well, at the time we had both—some of the

points made here were excellent. We used their quality control and

the engineering support to a large extent and used them as advisors to our activities. The major reason is that we had—the small

project that we did have was approximately $400,000 a year. It was

the level-of-effort project. The reason we terminated the activities

was, as I sort of alluded to and made mention in my written testimony, upon notification by DHS that there was an intention to

close the laboratory, it was absolutely necessary that we move

these important activities to other laboratories within our United

States Atomic Energy Detection System Network. We had to make

that move upon the notification that the laboratory was to be

closed. So while we value it, as I said, very much, what they are

capable and have been able to do, it was necessary for us to move

on.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And again, how did you learn that

there was a decision to close EML?

Mr. MCBREARTY. In about 2005, in the fall, my project officer got

a call from, I think, Dr. Clarke or people in the DHS office, notifying us that the laboratory was—they were planning—that DHS

had planned to terminate the laboratory and that it would be necessary for us to move our work elsewhere. Or the other option

given to us would be to pick up the tab for it. DHS did not seem

interested in the laboratory or what it had for their particular job

that they had identified.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And I understand that EML that—excuse me. The e-mail that you have referred to is one of the documents that we——

Mr. MCBREARTY. Yes. We have that exchange of e-mails. It was

absolutely essential for us to move quickly and over the course of

the next year, we transitioned the equipment and a large portion

of the sample library, which is a nice national asset in some respects, to our other laboratories.

Chairman MILLER. Right. And Mr. McBrearty, I understand that

you were not pleased with that decision to close EML. What did

you do about it, if anything?

40

Mr. MCBREARTY. I personally came up here from Florida. It is always an interesting trip to come from Florida up here, so it was

important for me to do so. I came up to talk with the people at the

Department to explain the importance of the work that we saw

going on, albeit small, with regard to EML, but more importantly,

to sort of touch on some of the points that were made in here. As

I said in my written testimony, I was initially extremely pleased

to hear DHS had picked the EML up, because the DOE had not

really had a lot of use for them, as the transitions from environmental measurements and things were going on. The focus, as has

been identified, was more toward the larger laboratories. EML has,

and had had in the past, large assets that were rather unique in

the system. So in seeing DHS pick this little laboratory, but a very

competent laboratory, up, I was initially extremely pleased.

As was mentioned by Mr. Duecker, there has been a plethora of

what I call Tricorders created for detection of radiation, and the entrepreneurship that is out there on the market to sell these things

is huge. Quality control, measurements, validation and testing of

these sorts of things, so that you have compatibility and things actually work, is critical. And to me, that was a job that EML has

shown capability to do in the past.

So my initial impression when I heard they were being picked up

by DHS was great, this is a good location. I was disappointed, obviously, when the decision was made, or indications of that decision,

from two perspectives. One, we had to do some moving and shuffling of stuff, which was an impact which we have recovered from.

But I think, as has been mentioned here, the intangibles are the

things that worried me most.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. I have further questions, but in order

to set an example for the Committee, I will now recognize Mr.

McCaul.

EML’S ROLE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

(DHS)

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Fainberg, I want

to—if you could, tell us about EML’s infrastructure capabilities and

morale prior to its transfer to DHS. I wonder if you could expand

beyond that, whether you think these capabilities fit within the

DHS mission.

Dr. FAINBERG. As to the morale before it transferred, I was not

directly aware of it. I didn’t have close contact. The morale shortly

after transition I can talk about. People were very happy to be

away from DOE and within DHS. Regarding their infrastructure,

as I said, their plant, their lab space was fairly depressing and

barely functional. However, they did have laboratories within that

lab space that they did keep functioning quite well, supporting the

QAP program, for example.

And they had quite a bit of capability in radiation detection technologies. Their development of—I think it was a called comprehensive monitoring system—was kind of interesting. This was a set of

gamma ray detectors they had assembled from parts on the market, but at much cheaper prices than you could buy assembled detectors on the market. That became the core of their rooftop sensor

system. Hooking that all into a central command room at DHS

41

was—at EML was quite a useful thing to do as a demonstration for

what one might do in the future, putting a radiation monitoring

system in a large city. What you have to be careful of, you don’t

want to put a million monitors out there, because you will never

be able to manage that, but you could think of putting maybe 50

or 100 monitors in strategic places. And this kind of work was an

interesting pilot for that.

As I also indicated in my remarks, some of the people there were

clearly ready for retirement. However, I identified at least a quarter of the technical staff who I thought were extremely active, up

with current technologies and good and many of them, in fact, were

useful to the comprehensive—the monitoring test bed that was set

up by other elements in DHS in New York City. They assisted with

that, where they were out on bridges and tunnels at all hours of

the day, taking measurements, testing out systems and running

down alarms. What they could be useful for in the future, all of

that expertise in radiation detection still is there. I am not sure

how many people remain in the radiochemical area. Reconstituting

that certainly is possible, but it is not certain to me that the cost

benefit analysis would favor reconstituting laboratories that were

there. It would be useful, however, I think, to use those people who

are still in the system, who are still federal employees there, and

their expertise in helping other laboratories do quality assistance—

quality assurance work. I think that could be done. There is a lot

that can be done there and if S&T wanted to establish a serious

technological presence in New York City, nothing would prevent

them from hiring a few more people, as I said, younger people, to

reinvigorate it.

I would also suggest that they are really being ripped off by GSA.

That is not a good place to be and the prices, I understand, are

going up for the rental, because the prices in Greenwich Village,

where this is located, are going up and GSA is able to match rental

to local market values. If it were up to me, I would try to put them

in another facility in the New York area, perhaps in Lower Manhattan, owned by other elements at DHS. That probably would be

a lot more——

EML AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN NEW YORK CITY

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you for raising that point and it is a good

transition. I was going to ask Mr. Duecker the value of having the

DHS Science and Technology footprint in Manhattan or where you

are located, in response to Dr. Fainberg’s comments, but also what

role they can play to better assist your counterterrorism efforts in

New York.

Mr. DUECKER. Yes, sir. In your opening remarks, you commented

that this was critical for national security purposes, it was a critical resource. We take a very parochial approach to that in that regard and we look at this as a very critical local resource. They provided us significant test and evaluation capabilities, as I mentioned, looking at the rad pagers that we currently have on the

street. And as was mentioned, there is so much technology out

there nowadays that making sure that what our cops on the streets

carry, in terms of detection equipment, in fact, is going to detect

something that we should be watching for, is of critical importance.

42

There is a lot of technology out there and frankly, the New York

City Police Department isn’t—we are not the subject matter experts on test and evaluation of this kind of equipment. We rely on

our partnership with EML. And having them local to Manhattan,

and having them basically a partner within the city, has become

something that we rely on to a great degree. Otherwise, we would

either have to go further up on eastern Long Island to BNL, which

is a laboratory about 65 miles outside the city, or elsewhere outside

the region.

And in terms of the threat to the city, the rad threat and nuke

threat to the city, that is just not a workable solution for us. So

we look at the partnership that we have with EML, Dr. Hunter,

in particular, as being something that has been good in the past

and we are looking to grow that in terms of the Securing the Cities

Initiative that we currently have. Ultimately what we want to do

is we want to create a ring of sensor technology around the region

to protect to New York City, because, as we know, New York City

is the primary threat set for the threats

Mr. MCCAUL. In your experience, has the transition from EML

to DHS been a smooth one? Is it a positive experience or what

could be done to make it better assist you?

Mr. DUECKER. We have always asked for more. You know, if the

New York City Police Department constantly asks—requests for

items and we get a portion of those and we are happy with those,

but we are always constantly asking for more. I can’t really speak

to the transition from DOE to DHS in that term, but I can tell you

that, since about 2004, the relationship that we have had with

them has been growing since 2003, and we would like for them to

stay in New York City and greatly enhance their capabilities in

New York City, so that as we go forward with the rad detection

system that we envision, we have a partner that is right there that

we can work with that is local. I mean, one of the things that we

rely on in New York City is that we don’t have to rely on folks in

Washington, D.C. or outside the region. We like to interact with

them right there in the city.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. I see my time has expired.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. There should be ample time for

all of us to have a second or even a third round of questions. Mr.

Rothman.

DHS’ DECISION TO CLOSE EML

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you

for holding these hearings this morning. Let me just start by saying, not surprisingly, as a Representative from the northern part

of New Jersey, across the George Washington Bridge from Manhattan, representing that district, I am a firm believer that the number one target of terrorists, New York City and the New York metropolitan area, should be given the commensurate amount of the

Homeland Security funding and counterterrorism funding, because

it is justified on the basis of risk.

In addition, because of the quality of the work of the New York

Police Department and the other law enforcement, the first responders in New Jersey and New York, we have come up with

great approaches to the threats and have invented the wheel, so to

43

speak, and so other targets around the Nation can come to us, as

they often do, as the model for programs and it is a more efficient

use of the Nation’s national security or Homeland Security funding.

So the burden of proof, in my mind, should be on any agency or

individual who would withhold funds or close Homeland Security

projects in New York City, or New York metropolitan area, to prove

why that is a good thing or necessary.

Here is my general question to any of the panel members or all

of you who want to answer. I look forward to hearing from Dr.

Clarke and I have read his testimony. Is the closing or the decision

to close EML, was that simply a good faith decision that people can

disagree with, but nonetheless, was it a good faith effort on their

part to best manage the taxpayers’ funds, yet accomplish its mission? Or did it evidence some bias or poor judgment or pattern of

bad management decisions that you would like to comment on?

Dr. FAINBERG. Well, Congressman, sympathetic to where you

come from, I grew up in Hackensack and my parents are still

there.

Mr. ROTHMAN. My constituents.

Dr. FAINBERG. That is a coincidence. I had no idea of this beforehand.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay.

Dr. FAINBERG. I was told, as I said in my testimony, that there

had been, in May of 2005, no plan to close the laboratory and in

fact, there had been talk of establishing, sort of in its place or

transitioning it into something called a technical liaison office,

which I never understood and it didn’t make any sense to me, but

maybe you can hear about that from later witnesses. It appeared

to me that there was a decision to close it down and I do not know

why. I don’t know what caused it, if there were bad feelings that

had been generated by earlier miscommunications between laboratory management and headquarters. I don’t know if it was just,

and I suspect this is what it is, the difficulties of starting a new

organization, S&T, within another new organization, DHS, and assimilating pieces and laboratories from elsewhere and the confusion that reigned at that point. It may well have been a good faith

effort. I wouldn’t question that. I do think it was a very poor judgment and that is all I can say about it.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Any other panel members wish to comment?

Mr. MCBREARTY. Yes, sir, I guess I would throw a little into this,

too. Was there a decision to close? Yes, we had the impression

there was a decision to close the place. Was there bias? Two parts

to your question. Bias, I don’t know that that was the case. I simply feel that there was a lack of appreciation of the intangible values that were embedded in this small laboratory located in New

York City. Two, it was very costly. You have heard indications of

the cost of doing business in the city and I guess that comes with

the territory. But it was viewed as a costly operation vis-a ́-vis the

new organization and I don’t think the new organization appreciated that it could utilize those—that it had those talents.

Mr. ROTHMAN. But you don’t see a bias or an under-appreciation

of the threat that New York City and its surrounding areas were

under, vis-a ́-vis the corn fields of Iowa or the sheep farms in Montana, who are getting a disproportionate share of DHS money?

44

Mr. MCBREARTY. Well, sir, I don’t know how the distributions go,

but I will say this, as I said earlier, I thought it was good that they

had been picked by DHS, because they were in the location that

needed some help. There is analog to the DHS/New York City thing

in the Argonne National Laboratory located in Chicago. The synergy that is derived by the presence and working closely with first

responders, the homeland security kind of initiatives that Chicago

has developed has made great use of Argonne and to me, that

model was one I thought was going to prevail in the EML relationship.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Rothman. Mr. McBrearty,

you described DHS, the S&T Directorate not really understanding

what they had. The image that comes to my mind is the last scene

in the Raiders of the Lost Ark, where the Ark of the Covenant is

in a crate being loaded into a warehouse on top of other crates by

a forklift, and I have the sense that they don’t—they didn’t quite

comprehend what they had, from what you have said, and that is

your impression as well. You said you came to Washington to discuss the value of the lab. Did you give a classified briefing to Mr.

Clarke or anyone else?

Mr. MCBREARTY. No, sir. During that visit, the venue was not

available for a classified briefing. However, the importance of EML

to us, in any unclassified venue, there are relationships with the

international community, our associations with them in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty development, development of samplers,

those sort of things, those values that we derive from this little entity, those were those sorts of things I imparted.

Another particular bias of mine, perhaps, is that I valued EML

and AFTAC valued EML, too. It is a small government laboratory

as opposed to a DOE facility. Now, we love the DOE laboratories.

We have great associations with them and a lot of work that goes

on. But what EML uniquely provided, in my opinion and it is in

my written testimony, is the ability to independently assess technologies and do so in a very capable manner. So in that regard,

they were—that was part of the value or pitch that I thought EML

represented to the DHS.

MORE ON AIR FORCE PROGRAMS WITH EML

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. We have been called to a vote. We

will continue for a while. We all have a very good idea of exactly

how long it takes us to get to the Floor and we have 15 minutes

and we should be able to at least complete my round of questions.

Did the decision by DHS force you to terminate any of your programs?

Mr. MCBREARTY. Is that directed to me, sir? Yes?

Chairman MILLER. Yes. I am sorry. Yes.

Mr. MCBREARTY. Well, actually, we had some activities with

which EML assisted us that we were not able to carry out. So I

will have to leave that at that point.

Chairman MILLER. Is that because of the nature of the information?

Mr. MCBREARTY. Yes, and——

Chairman MILLER. Okay.

45

Mr. MCBREARTY.—I would rather not go into that.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. And at that point, did you have

any plans to transfer or terminate or halt or cancel any of the programs until you got the e-mail telling you that EML was going to

be terminated?

Mr. MCBREARTY. No, sir, not at all. We and my staff had full impressions that we would continue operations into the future pretty

much as we had in the past.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And if EML employees were told that

the Air Force was not any longer interested in working with them,

was that—that was inaccurate?

Mr. MCBREARTY. Oh, absolutely. We were basically told that we

needed to find other places for our work, because there was an intention to close the laboratory. We were also told that it was considered private information and that we were asked not to discuss

the issue with EML staff. We respected the fact that the decision

had not been made and we made no contact to any of the employees, per se, regarding that.

EML’S GLOBAL SENSORS: NORTH KOREA

Chairman MILLER. Okay. One last question and I think we will

all go to vote and then we will be in recess and come back and complete the hearing, and I apologize for the herky-jerky nature of

this. It is simply what our schedules are like. But one last question, Mr. McBrearty, and I know that probably you more than any

other witness have to tread carefully to avoid disclosing classified

information. But I know that you must have been aware of EML’s

network of global sensors.

Mr. MCBREARTY. Yes, sir, very much so. In fact, we were close

with them on that and appreciated the work that they did in developing that network, because it gave the monitoring community at

large a better capability.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And EML had installed two radiation

sensors in China in 2002 and had plans to install a third sensor

near the North Korea border in 2005, just before DHS shut down

that program. From the technical expertise you have in this area,

what would have been the value of the information gained from

those sensors?

Mr. MCBREARTY. As part of the expansion of an international

network of samplers and a national or international——

Chairman MILLER. I am sorry. Excuse me.

Mr. MCBREARTY. That is a hard question to answer directly, but

always more samplers, more locations, more interplay between

these networks, samplers within a network, is of value. So from

AFTAC’s perspective, with its job of worldwide nuclear test monitoring, we have always been interested in the advancements at

EML and the associations that they had with these things. To have

a sampler closer to Korea, given those things, a joint operation

with the Chinese and the United States through EML, was certainly a valuable undertaking and we were quite interested in seeing that as means of improving the ability to globally monitor those

things that all the nations who have signed up to this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have expressed a utility in.

46

Chairman MILLER. And I know my time has expired and we need

to go vote, but just one last question. I know there are other

sources of information about the detonation of a nuclear device

anywhere in the world. Was the information you would have gotten

from those sensors duplicative? Would it have been helpful additional information?

Mr. MCBREARTY. It could have been supplemental, sir. AFTAC is

the operator of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System.

We are the ones that provide that information and did detect and

report it on that nuclear test. For those sorts of things, we look at

the entire suite of systems available, both United States, international and those that EML would have had and it could—those

things could help under certain circumstances. In the North Korean test, they would not have helped because the situation is that

the samplers that are involved or were involved, whether worldwide RMP, or Remote Monitoring Program, have to do with monitoring particulate debris as opposed to the noble gases that actually

came out of the tunnel. In that particular case, we, AFTAC, collected the gases using our aircraft. So those samplers, per se, were

not—would not have, in hindsight, been useful in that case. However, if the event that occurred had vented, had thrown particulate

debris into the atmosphere, depending on the meteorology, depending on where the sample was transported to, they could have indeed played a part, but that is a scenario that did not occur. However, the more is always better.

Chairman MILLER. All right, thank you. Okay, again, I apologize

to all of the witnesses, but we do need to stand in recess to allow

us to vote and we will back as quickly as we can. Thank you.

[Recess]

Chairman MILLER. The Committee will be back in order. Any

moment, Mr. Rothman will be prepared to ask some questions. Mr.

Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commissioner

Duecker or Duker?

Mr. DUECKER. Duecker.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Duecker. Thank you for your service, first of all,

and please convey our thanks to all the men and women that you

serve with on NYPD.

Mr. DUECKER. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Mr. ROTHMAN. You just do a great job and thank you for your

work with New Jersey’s finest and bravest and all of our first responders.

Mr. DUECKER. We were out with them yesterday carrying the

Cities Initiative. We were with Passaic and Bergen Counties. It

was the second phase to the Securing the Cities Initiative. There

is going to be quite a few more phases going forward, but yesterday

was a good day for us.

NEW YORK CITY FIRST RESPONDER COMMUNITY

Mr. ROTHMAN. Great. As you know, many people in my district

work in Manhattan and many of our first responders were the ones

who came into New York City to help out, as well as doing a lot

of the medical care at Liberty State Park.

47

Commissioner Duecker, there was apparently a report prepared

by the employees of DHS that evaluated EML. I think the report

is 2004–2005. That report painted a portrait of the New York City

first responder community as being lukewarm in its feelings about

EML. Do you recall if that is an accurate statement of the feelings

of the New York City first responder community at that time?

Mr. DUECKER. I don’t know what comprises the first responder

community to which you refer. I don’t know how broad that was.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right.

Mr. DUECKER. I don’t know to what degree the New York City

Police Department was involved in that assessment or that survey.

I can tell you that, with respect to the relationship that we have,

and it is evolutionary with EML, it is evolutionary because the

technology that we see in terms of rad and nuke detection devices,

that is evolutionary. Our relationship with them has grown. It has

grown more in the last year, I think, than it did in the two or three

years previous to that. A lot of that has to do with the leadership

of Dr. Hunter, as I mentioned, and his willingness to be a partner

in the Securing the Cities Initiative and understanding that. Instead of having technology drive operations, I think he is willing

to allow operations to drive technology and he is——

Mr. ROTHMAN. Commissioner, how long have you been aware of

the workings of EML?

Mr. DUECKER. I have been with the NYPD for about a year and

a half, so it has been—I was aware of the rad issues as soon as

I got there and the fact that EML played a pivotal role in the testing of the rad detection devices that we have on the street.

EML FUNDING

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay, thank you. Dr. Fainberg, Dr. Clarke’s prepared testimony, in it he says that a review of EML found no S&T

project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006 and any

other activity, other than the CMTB, Countermeasures Test Bed

Project. You were the Program Manager for radiological and nuclear countermeasures in the DHS S&T Directorate at the time.

Did you plan to fund any projects at EML beyond 2006?

Dr. FAINBERG. Yes, I was Program Manager until—I believe it

was late April of 2005.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right.

Dr. FAINBERG. At that time, we were not planning anything very

much in the fiscal 2007 timeframe for EML or for any of the labs.

We were kind of consumed with doing fiscal 2005 and 2006. My intention had been to propose continuing funding in a number of

areas. I had not been asked, at least I do not recall having been

asked, if I intended to fund them beyond fiscal 2006. Had I been

asked, I would have said yes, I would have.

Mr. ROTHMAN. In your experience, decades of experience in your

field, is it customary to—or for people to ask about projects and

their longevity several years beyond the present?

Dr. FAINBERG. It can be. I mean, some projects by their nature

are large, long-term projects.

Mr. ROTHMAN. But your testimony is you just weren’t asked?

Dr. FAINBERG. Yes, I do not recall having ever been asked if I—

what I wanted them to do in 2007. In documentation that we were

48

supposed to provide each year for the research plan, there was a

list of projects and how long they would last and how long we anticipated they would last. Some of the ones I had down, like the

ship effect, was supposed to finish in 2006, but there was a possibility it might have continued into 2007, for example. Other things

that were going on, like the New York area Science and Tech working group, were ongoing things which I would have wanted to keep.

I wanted to keep the global monitoring, for example. But a number

of these projects that I had wanted to keep, I had been told at a

higher level, not by Dr. Clarke, but by other people who had responsibility up the chain, that they were not going to be approved.

THE NEUTRON SHIP EFFECT

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may, just one other question. The neutron

ship project.

Dr. FAINBERG. Yes, neutron ship effect.

Mr. ROTHMAN. That ultimately was worked on by some other

group?

Dr. FAINBERG. Well, no, it is worked on by Dr. Goldhagen, even

today, I believe, in collaboration with RSL, a laboratory at the Nevada Test Site. It also has interest in it. But Dr. Goldhagen, I believe, is still working on that today.

Mr. ROTHMAN. So just forgive me. Was he at EML?

Dr. FAINBERG. Yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. And then——

Dr. FAINBERG. As far as I know, he still is.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Oh, he still is?

Dr. FAINBERG. Yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. So that work continued——

Dr. FAINBERG. That work——

Mr. ROTHMAN.—at EML?

Dr. FAINBERG. That work did continue, yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Then I must have misunderstood you. Was there

some slowing down or hindrance of that work?

Dr. FAINBERG. Oh. Dr. Clarke wanted to prevent the acquisition

of a detector that was vital to do the work properly. After people

at the higher level, the office director, had approved it and it was

over this issue that I resigned. I said it seems to me that you are

trying to block something that you don’t have competence to do. I

went to my management and I said, why are you allowing this, and

my management ignored me.

Mr. ROTHMAN. And how long after you resigned did the equipment get approved?

Dr. FAINBERG. I don’t know. Probably within a month or two, but

I don’t know. I was told within a few weeks that it would be or it

had been.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, you believe there was a causal relationship

between your resignation and the acquisition of this equipment?

Dr. FAINBERG. I think so, yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

49

DIRTY BOMBS

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. I understand Mr. McCaul has no

further questions of this panel. I do have a few more of Ms. Albin.

Ms. Albin, I mentioned in my opening remarks that one of the most

likely terrorist events, one that has been amply telegraphed, is a

dirty bomb. Could you describe what role EML might play in the

event of a dirty bomb or any other kind of radioactive event?

Ms. ALBIN. So far, we have been talking and implying that the

events that would be covered, people would be able to carry instrumentation into the area and say whether or not it is safe or not

safe, kind of go or no go. Those hand-held instruments are good for

that, good for looking at first responder safety and good for making

a quick call if you need to evacuate an area.

In the case of dirty bomb, those instruments have limited capabilities and it really is going to be the radiochemical analysis of

samples that are going to give us the information we need to know

what is the extent of the contamination, if it was a dirty bomb and

unsafe. Can they come back to their houses, if they have been evacuated? And for us, and a lot of people in the trenches, we are the

people that are doing that analysis and we are handing our results

off to government officials that are going to make decisions and we

need to have the credibility and make sure that we are doing the

best we can do. So if we are analyzing samples and we are giving

data and we tell people, you know, you need to stay away, that is

one problem. But if we are also telling people it is okay to go back,

it is safe to come back, there is no hazard here, those no-action decisions require that we have a lot of confidence in our data and

that is where the performance testing, like the QAP program

helped us, because it independently verified the work that we do

and independently gave us that assurance that the data that was

being produced by the Public Health Laboratory can be used by decisions makers to address those problems.

THE QUALITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (QAP)

Chairman MILLER. Okay. You mentioned the Quality Assessment

Program, QAP, and as I understand it, it set standards for laboratories to verify the reliability of their detection equipment. Can you

describe how Washington State’s involvement with QAP at EML

helped your programs?

Ms. ALBIN. Well, the QAP program was directly providing our

samples that were directly related to the type of work we do, lowlevel radiochemistry analysis, so that is how we used them with

the QAP program. But EML also had other programs. They sponsored an international inter-comparison to look at external radiation levels, and there was another program where they tested the

ability for the analysts to correctly look at spectral data, and there

was a lot of interaction with EML, from the QAP program as well

as availability of the scientists to answer questions, to collaborate

on what to do if we get into a situation and we have a problem

analysis.

Chairman MILLER. I feel like I am talking to you by cell phone.

You are kind of going in and out.

Ms. ALBIN. Oh, sorry. How is that?

50

Chairman MILLER. Oddly enough, the Science and Technology

Committee does not always have the best technology. And oddly

enough, our witnesses are sometimes worse than Congress in using

the technology. I don’t know if you have answered this, but now

that QAP has closed, what do you do? Who do you go to for what

QAP formerly did?

Ms. ALBIN. We participate in other performance testing programs

and one of them is through a mixed—it is a program that is sponsored by a DOE lab in Idaho and it is developed for mixed waste

and they augmented their program to include some of the radionuclides and the work that the QAP program was doing and their

performance and distribution schedule. And there is also a private

laboratory that has picked up quality assurance for environmental

samples. And the difference is that we cannot fully participate in

the private laboratory’s program because of costs and we are limited by costs and the government samples or the samples from

EML were at no charge to us. And the Idaho laboratory samples

are similar but they lack some of the natural products and things

that were provided by the QAP program.

Chairman MILLER. Your answer to this question seems evident,

but if the QAP program were reconstituted in EML would you use

it again?

Ms. ALBIN. We would use it again, yes.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. I think we are fine now with this

panel. Thank you all very much for your testimony. Mr. McCaul,

I know you need to leave shortly. If we could maybe take a shorter

break than we would ordinarily take and we could have you ask

questions first.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. The next panel is not really a panel.

It is Dr. Clarke. So if we could just take a couple, three minutes

to stretch and let people reposition ourselves, we could begin with

Dr. Clarke.

[Recess]

Chairman MILLER. Okay, the Committee has now reconvened

and Dr. Clarke is our next witness. Dr. John F. Clarke is the Deputy Director of the Office National Laboratories, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. As you

know, Dr. Clarke, your testimony will be limited to five minutes,

but you have submitted a written statement which has become part

of the record. And after you have given the testimony, each of the

Committee Members will have five minutes. We may have more

than one round and we will call on Mr. McCaul first to accommodate his schedule. We do swear our witnesses, Dr. Clarke, if you

would stand. Do you have any objection to being sworn?

Dr. CLARKE. No.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And you also have a right to Counsel.

If you could raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn]

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Dr. Clarke, you may begin.

51

Panel 2:

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. CLARKE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL LABORATORIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Dr. CLARKE. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member

Sensenbrenner and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It

really is a pleasure to be here today. I want to thank you for holding this hearing and specifically for inviting me to testify. I think

that your oversight is providing the catalyst for key decisions by

the leaders of the Department of Homeland Security that I hope

will allow the EML staff to develop a more productive role within

the department.

I have been honored to serve in the Department of Homeland Security since July of 2004. Like many of my colleagues in Homeland

Security, I was moved by the events of 9/11. I interrupted my career to devote time to national security. Now, for me, the motivation was quite personal. I am a New Yorker. Eleven people with

my family name and 69 fellow Fordham University alumnae died

on that day and that was basically my motivation for coming to

Homeland Security. I was very fortunate to find the Office of Research and Development and they gave me the opportunity to

apply my 37 years of research and management experience to assist in the integration of the DOE national laboratories and the

specialized DHS organic laboratories into a complex, a laboratory

complex that would serve the need of homeland security.

Now, you have asked me to testify regarding the termination or

transfer of programs, projects or activities at one of these labs, the

EML. You wanted to know how these decisions were made and the

impact of these decisions. My written testimony addresses these

issues in context and I apologize for the length, but it is a historical

record based on extensive written documentation—and it has been

entered in the record. Now, the extensive Science and Technology

reviews in which I participated found that the EML had serious

challenges, let me put it that way, to overcome with regards to

matching their legacy capabilities with the current missions of the

Department of Homeland Security.

I assure you that to properly address this kind of issue, the transition of a laboratory, involves people and their past experience and

many, many factors. You have to approach it with frankness and

candor in order to make realistic management decisions about the

future of the institution. And these judgments and findings are

summarized in my testimony for the record. But I wanted to do is

to assure you that throughout the process of investigation, review

which went on for oh, well over year, perhaps 18 months, the leaders within the Science and Technology Directorate at that time always acted with great empathy for the people, the individuals at

the EML who, after all, had been caught up in a difficult transition

which was not of their making. Nonetheless, the Under Secretary

and his predecessors are pursuing an important national mission

with limited resources. They have attempted to tackle the difficult

challenges associated with the EML forthrightly, honestly and in

my view, courageously in order to blend the EML capabilities with

52

the national needs served by the Department of Homeland Security.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to answer questions.

[The prepared statement Mr. Clarke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN F. CLARKE

Introduction

Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee I am John Clarke, Deputy Director of the

Office of National Laboratories in the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. I

would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss the transition of

the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) from the Department of Energy (DOE) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Science and

Technology (S&T) Directorate’s management of EML since its transfer in March

2003.

In particular, you have asked me to testify regarding the termination or transfer

of programs, projects or activities at the EML, how these decisions were made, and

the impact of these actions. In previous correspondence, the Committee inquired

about the period FY 2002 through the present, part of which predated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), so the prior history of EML within DOE is relevant to subsequent DHS management decisions.

In 2004 the Office of Research and Development conducted a series of reviews

concerning the EML. I was only peripherally aware of the EML during my service

in the Department of Energy. Consequently, when I was asked to participate, I consulted EML staff and also talked to current and former DOE officials in the Office

of Science (OS), the OS Office of Health and Environmental Research and the Office

of Environmental Management who had managed, and had personal knowledge of,

EML from the late 1970’s until its transfer to DHS.

Background on EML

The EML is located in a General Services Administration (GSA) office building

in lower Manhattan. It was transferred from the Department of Energy to the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003 by the Homeland Security Act of

2002.

The current EML evolved from the Health and Safety Laboratory (HASL) of the

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). HASL contributed significantly to various national programs during the ‘‘Cold War.’’ However, the laboratory’s size and the

uniqueness of its capability declined as the global nuclear industry matured and national priorities changed. With the formation of the Department of Energy (DOE)

in 1977, the HASL was renamed to EML to reflect its narrower focus on the measurement of low level environmental radiation.

In subsequent years, continued changes in national priorities led to a decline in

EML’s technical capability relative to the private sector and other DOE National

Laboratories all of whom possessed broader scientific and engineering capabilities

and missions. According to officials in the DOE Office of Science and its Office of

Health and Environmental Research, during the 1990’s, the DOE Office of Energy

Research struggled to decide whether to close the facility or to find a viable mission

for EML. Finally, in 1997, the EML was transferred to the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) where it provided radiation measurement and quality

control services supporting DOE’s internal environmental monitoring, decommissioning, decontamination, and remediation mission. Periodically, EML also provided

radiation measurement services to the National Nuclear Security Administration

(NNSA) and, through an Interagency Agreement between the Air Force and DOE,

it provided similar services to the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC),

both of which were concerned with nuclear non-proliferation.

Immediately following its transfer to DHS in 2003, the EML continued to work

on the internal DOE Quality Assessment Program (QAP), which supported DOE environmental site cleanup, some radiation detector projects and two small and intermittent measurement activities related to non-proliferation. By 2004 when the S&T

reviews began, EML was supplying a few staff to provide local support to the S&T

Directorate Standards (∼1.5 FTE) program and Counter-Measures Test Beds

(CMTB) project (∼4.8 FTE) in its testing of radiation and explosive detectors, performing two radiation monitoring projects and offering advice and seminars to local

first responders.

53

Science & Technology Directorate Management Reviews of EML:

Since its transfer to DHS in March 2003, the S&T Directorate’s Office of Research

and Development (ORD) had numerous meeting with the EML’s Director and staff

of the EML to inform them about the evolving S&T program. ORD also provided

funding to EML to support transition planning and the Director had weekly discussions with the ORD Director. In 2004, growing concerns about EML’s progress in

transitioning its capabilities to support S&T programs, led to a series of reviews by

ORD. The first was conducted by Dr. Mark Mandler, who, at the time was the Technical Director of the Coast Guard Research & Development Center on assignment

to S&T to assist with lab transitions.

Dr. Mandler’s review of the FY 2005 EML Facilities Plan revealed that the EML

had a carryover from FY 2004 of 42 percent in their O&M budget and 26 percent

in their assigned project funds. This increased S&T concerns about EML’s progress

in managing its transition to DHS. Further, Dr. Mandler’s review also found that,

despite the EML’s large FY 2004 under run, the EML Director’s funding projections

for FY 2005 staff were significantly overestimated and also contained inflated funding for self-initiated EML projects. It concluded that EML management did not understand the organization’s actual capabilities and entertained unrealistic expectations of its potential role within DHS. The final conclusion of Dr. Mandler’s review

was that S&T needed to reassess how it could utilize the EML. After review and

acceptance by the Under Secretary, these conclusions led to the initiation of a more

comprehensive Top-to-Bottom ORD management review of the EML.

My personal involvement in the management of the EML began in the fall of 2004

when I was tasked by the ORD Director to work with Dr. Mark Mandler in performing this Top-to-Bottom review.

The Top-to-Bottom management review was to examine whether EML staff could

provide more support to the S&T Directorate projects such as the ongoing CMTB

project, which was S&T’s largest operational activity in New York and New Jersey.

It was also to examine what other work was ongoing at EML, what S&T programs

it served, what new work was proposed and what priority these EML activities had

within DHS. Finally, and most importantly, it was to determine how S&T could best

apply the resources invested in maintaining the EML to support the science and

technology needs of DHS components as well as the local agencies in the New York

area.

The Top-to-Bottom review followed a systematic data gathering process to answer

these questions. This included visiting EML, talking to EML staff, examining EML

progress reports with S&T project managers, reviewing its quarterly cost reports

with S&T Chief Financial Office (CFO) staff, discussing EML’s role and contributions with CMTB management and S&T Project Managers, consulting DOE officials

familiar with EML and reviewing EML’s new and existing work proposals in context

of the program plans of S&T managers. The review was completed by late October

of 2004. At that time, it was decided by the ORD Director that the results of the

review should be presented to EML’s management. The conclusions are summarized

below.

An S&T team consisting of Dr. Parker, Mrs. Alyce Bridges from S&T Human Resources and I visited EML on Dec. 17, 2004. We met with Dr. Erickson and his senior managers and reviewed the S&T Directorate’s mission and goals with them. We

informed them of the conclusions of the Top-to-Bottom review and reminded them

of ORD’s expectations for EML.

After reviewing S&T’s current and future program directions, it was noted that

the CMTB, which utilized some of the EML staff, seemed to be the closest match

to the EML’s radiation measurement competency. However, Dr. Parker also warned

the EML management team that, even within the CMTB, change was coming. We

further noted that the ongoing CMTB test and evaluation program required more

than experience in radiation measurement and, as it developed, it would need core

competencies in field operations, pilot deployment and consequence management.

We informed them that ORD expected EML management to engage in a serious assessment of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and barriers to its success in

identifying and serving DHS customers such as CMTB project.

We then reviewed the detailed findings of the Top-to-Bottom Review on each of

the currently funded activities at the EML. The review had found that in the area

of standards development, urban atmospheric circulation measurements and radiation monitoring development activities, S&T program managers believed that EML

was not competitive with other institutions. Consequently, these managers expected

that current EML activities in these areas would be completed by 2005 with little,

if any, follow-on work. The review had not found any S&T project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006 in any activity other than the CMTB project.

54

The review had also gathered mixed reviews of the EML relationships with local

New York area government agencies. EML was recognized for holding seminars for

local government personnel, for answering their questions related to radiation measurement and for the contributions of their staff to the CMTB test program. However, the review found that Homeland Security support to local government agencies

was multi-faceted and required not only a broad range of technical expertise but significant skills in relationship management with both S&T, other DHS components

and local agencies, skills which EML had not exhibited outside of the CMTB test

program.

Based on overall DHS goals, we told the EML managers that creating an operational platform to coordinate the development, operational testing and transfer of

homeland security technology to local government agencies was potentially a critical

success factor for S&T. The CMTB fulfilled part of these functions and EML was

already contributing to its test and evaluation program. However, this participation,

while certainly valuable, employed only a fraction of the EML staff and was not sufficient by itself to justify the existence of EML. We informed the EML managers

that ORD would be performing a market survey of S&T technology suppliers and

potential users in New York to determine a concrete value proposition for such an

operational platform. ORD expected to evaluate EML’s future role based on their

institutional strategic and business plans and the results of the DHS market survey.

Following this meeting, S&T together with a team of organizational management

experts from Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), conducted dozens of interviews with potential customers for, and suppliers of, science and technology services in New York

for the purpose of determining a vision and value proposition for S&T activities in

New York. The teams also gathered information from several DOE National Laboratories, other government laboratories, DHS component agencies and local agencies

both at Headquarters in Washington, DC and in New York.

The teams identified S&T operational activities in New York of value to a broad

cross-section of homeland security technology suppliers and operational users. These

activities fell into four categories: 1) Providing operational liaison to maintain interactive communication between developers and operators; 2) Identifying opportunities to exploit emerging science and technology; 3) Spiral development to evaluate

developmental technology in an operating environment and; 4) Providing continuous

technical support during technology test and evaluation, insertion and deployment.

The team briefed ORD management throughout the process and by the summer

of 2005, the ONL team was instructed to developed strategic and business plans for

an operational platform to perform these identified functions: the Technology Liaison Office (TLO). The TLO’s value proposition focused on providing relationship

management between technology developers and potential users to coordinate operational test and evaluation and on providing interactive communication and mutual

support between potential users and S&T developmental technology programs.

As recommended by the Top-to-Bottom review, ONL then evaluated EML’s potential future role in S&T based on its staff capabilities, its institutional strategic and

business plans and the results of the DHS market survey and resulting value proposition. The EML’s leadership of the CMTB local support activities (4.8 FTE) fell

within the scope of the TLO value proposition. Unfortunately, when ORD compared

the range of professional skills required to achieve the TLO value proposition with

those skills extent at EML, it found only this small overlap.

This led to a recommendation to ORD management that the EML should be

phased out as an institution because its capabilities were neither competitive nor

necessary to the mission of the S&T Directorate. Furthermore, it had no prospects

of future S&T R&D program support, the skills of most of its staff were not suited

for a useful S&T operational role in New York, and its operating costs were high

and rising. The team also recommended that a TLO serving the identified customer

needs in New York be established and that EML staff and capabilities be

transitioned as far as possible.

ORD management accepted this recommendation in the summer of 2005. ONL,

S&T Human Resources and Congressional Relations were then tasked to prepare

detailed transitions plans for the EML staff and facilities. This work was completed

during September 2005 and Under Secretary McQueary was briefed on the results.

He commented on ORD’s thorough and systematic preparation for a difficult decision. He verbally agreed that phase-out of the EML was the right thing to do and

asked that a final decision package be prepare for Secretarial approval. The Secretarial decision package was completed by ONL and forwarded to the Under Secretary by ORD.

Under Secretary McQueary announced his resignation shortly thereafter and the

Secretarial decision package was put on hold pending the arrival of his successor.

After Dr. Runge was named Acting Under Secretary, he received a memo from Dr.

55

Vayl Oxford, Director of the Domestic Unclear Detection Office (DNDO), noting that

DNDO was planning a regional reach back initiative and proposed to use staff from

Brookhaven National Laboratory and EML as its staff on a part time basis. This

request required modification of the plan for the EML phase out and the startup

of the TLO. A second Secretarial decision package with these modifications was prepared for Acting Under Secretary Runge. However, when Retired Rear Admiral Jay

M. Cohen was nominated to be Under Secretary of the S&T Directorate, this second

package was held pending his confirmation.

S&T Management Actions and Rationale:

While the options for the future of EML were being developed and reviewed, a

number of S&T management actions were taken to address concerns identified during the Top-to-Bottom Review. The overall intent was to increase EML’s focus on

transitioning its staff to viable missions within Homeland Security.

First ORD conducted a detailed review of the EML Program Execution Plan (PEP)

for FY 2005. This review was conducted for Dr. Parker and coordinated with S&T’s

Chief Financial Office (CFO), the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the project

managers who were currently funding activities at EML. For this purpose, ONL

supported Dr. Parker.

With respect to the EML operation and maintenance budget, the PEP Review

found that most of the cost was due to EML occupying space equivalent to more

than an entire city block—with most of the space unused for years. For instance,

EML had six chemistry labs that were utilized over decades on various DOE programs—primarily for sample preparation prior to analysis and data acquisition for

DOE programs. As the programs were reduced or terminated by DOE, the need for

maintaining these labs no longer existed but they were, nonetheless, maintained by

EML management. The review also identified traditional EML expenditures that

were no longer necessary, such as a special EML security guard, in a federal building already secured by the Federal Protective Service—for which EML was also paying. It also found that EML was requesting project funds for activities that involved

little more than staff time, which was funded separately.

The review recommended specific operating budget reductions to eliminate these

and other unnecessary expenses. The review also recommended that the unused

EML space and facilities be decontaminated in anticipation of returning the excess

space to GSA.

The ORD Director reviewed the recommended budget and decided that it contained sufficient funds to allow EML to carry out all activities proposed in the EML

PEP that had any relationship to DHS goals. She adjusted the EML budget request

accordingly and reserved the savings for EML cleanup purposes. The result of this

review was to focus EML staff on actual DHS goals and ORD management was able

to redirect nearly a million dollars to initiate decontamination and disposal of unused and unneeded space at EML.

As part of the cleanup of the unused EML Chemical laboratories, all unused reagents, materials, and equipment of value were sorted and offered to other research

institutions (i.e., DHS labs, other federal labs, State labs, universities, and GSA).

Any mixed waste or radioactive waste was collected and disposed of by Brookhaven

National Lab. The empty lab spaces, including fume hoods, benches, storage cabinets, and other physical structures that are not removable, are being surveyed and

decontaminated for ‘‘free-release’’ by a subcontractor through the U.S. Army Field

Support Command. Other unused areas of the approximately 96,000 sq. ft. occupied

by the EML were also surveyed and are being decontaminated.

Given additional concerns with EML’s management raised by the findings of the

budget review, the ORD Director assigned ONL to monitor future EML operating

expense requests, including requests for travel, new staff, facility modifications and

information technology equipment. The travel review was directed at eliminating

unnecessary expenses related to the continuation of their former DOE activities by

EML staff.

The IT review, which was done in conjunction with the S&T Chief Information

Officer (CIO), was aimed at eliminating unreasonable expenses given the limited

EML activities. The CIO reviewed EML IT needs and provided connectivity to the

DHS network through four, rather than the requested forty, computers. These computers were to be used for EML travel, financial and procurement activities and active CMTB business. The existing EML computer network was found adequate to

be used for all other business. Blackberries were provided to EML management personnel and those who were active on DHS projects outside of EML.

Much of EML’s nominal budget in FY 2004 was actually procurement or ‘‘passthrough’’ for work at other laboratories, rather than to support local EML activities.

When the procurement warrant holder who resided at EML retired, the S&T CFO

56

and the DHS Office of Procurement Operations (OPO) determined that it was not

practical or cost effective to replace him and that procurements could be handled

through S&T/OPO. As a result, for FY 2006 CMTB major procurements were handled through S&T/OPO and minor purchases made through the EML purchase

cards. From that point on, major CMTB procurements and funds for the Urban Dispersion Project was routed directly through the UDP Principal Investigator to the

multiple laboratories actually carrying out the project. The effect of these decisions

was to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort. However, they did not in any

way reduce the technical capability of the EML.

The Top-to-Bottom Review had found that a serious impediment to the transition

to DHS was that some EML personnel were adhering to their former roles within

DOE. As a result of reviewing the proposed EML travel, ONL advised individual

EML staff to phase-out their roles on various DOE related interagency committees

and activities that required travel without a DHS justification. Any travel that related to active DHS functions was approved immediately. Compared to the other

ONL management responsibilities with respect to other DHS Laboratories, this

travel monitoring did not involve a great deal of money. However, it was extremely

important to refocus EML staff from their identification with their former roles in

DOE upon their current DHS situation.

Similarly, the Acting Deputy Director of ORD, Dr. Carolyn Purdy, detailed the

EML Director to Washington to strengthen his understanding of S&T programs. He

is currently supporting the S&T Infrastructure and Geophysical Division. Dr. Adam

Hutter, who had successfully managed EML support of S&T CMTB activities, was

asked to serve as Acting EML Director. Mr. Hutter has taken on the EML Director’s

assignment of defining a strategic and business plan for EML and has been working

very successfully with DNDO in developing expanded EML support of their regional

reach-back and testing activities.

Project Closures at EML:

Aside from these internal S&T management actions aimed at eliminating unnecessary expenditures and redirecting EML’s focus to actual DHS requirements, there

have been a number of unrelated project changes or closures at the EML. The Committee has inquired specifically about four of these: the Global Monitoring Activity,

the Quality Assessment Program (QAP), the Urban Dispersion program (UDP) and

a Reach-Back Pilot Program (RPP). Even though I have generalized knowledge

about these programs through my responsibilities in the ONL, I was neither the

program manager for any of these projects nor did I direct any actions be taken in

connection with any of these programs.

The first two items, the Global Monitoring Activity and QAP, were never DHS

programs and decisions on their funding were made independently by their sponsoring agencies.

The third program, the UDP, is a DHS research program that was started, successfully executed and is in the process of transferring its results to the intended

recipients.

The last program, the RPP, was discussed by the S&T Portfolio Manager as a concept but never approved or funded. Under Secretary Cohen has addressed each of

these programs in his letter to Chairman Miller dated March 13, and since I did

not have programmatic oversight over those programs it would be more appropriate

for others to comment on the specific facts associated with any particular project.

Conclusion:

Unfortunately, despite S&T’s identification of several valuable functions for an

operational presence in New York and the joint S&T/EML efforts to address the

problems that the Top-to-Bottom review identified in 2004, by the Fall of 2005 the

EML had not been able to find a function within DHS that matches the size and

capabilities of the majority of its existing staff. This led Under Secretary McQueary

to make a preliminary program level decision that a phase-out of the EML was in

the best interests of both S&T and the EML staff. Changes in the S&T Directorates

management delayed the transmittal of S&T’s recommendation to the Secretary of

DHS for a final decision.

Of course, this delay has been extremely stressful to the people at EML. A year

ago, one of the EML professionals advised our Human Resources office that the lack

of decision was hurting EML’s professional demeanor, impacting mental health, and

hurting people in their home life. He was speaking for himself as a professional who

only wanted a significant job to perform but he also said that the situation was impacting everyone at EML including the large support staff. S&T management was

aware of, and very sensitive to, the difficult situation that the transfer to DHS had

created for the people at EML.

57

S&T management was, and continues to be, sympathetic to the difficult situation

of the EML staff. Since the transfer of EML in March 2003, the S&T Directorate

has tried to provide responsible management which balanced concern for the people

at EML with stewardship of the mission and public resources with which we are

entrusted.

Some progress has been made in the one area where EML capabilities matched

the Homeland Security needs that the review identified in New York. The Acting

EML Director, Mr. Hutter, has been doing a commendable job in providing EML

support for the S&T radiation detection test and evaluation activities, which have

since been transferred from S&T to DNDO. He has also been working with

Brookhaven National Laboratory to provide support for the DNDO regional initiative in New York and in examining the potential technology liaison activities that

might be addressed by his staff.

Under Secretary Cohen has indicated a commitment to right-sizing the EML facilities and workforce. This will include both supporting those individuals working

on the DNDO activities and transitioning the remaining staff to a productive roles

working on S&T programs. We all look forward to assisting in this transformation.

DISCUSSION

MORE ON DHS’ DECISION TO CLOSE EML

Chairman MILLER. Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Chairman for accommodating my

schedule. Dr. Clarke, there has been a lot of controversy in terms

of how you handled EML at the transition time. We heard from

Mr. McBrearty that, in his testimony, that you notified AFTAC in

December of 2005 that DHS had made the programmatic decision

to close EML and my question is who actually made that decision?

Dr. CLARKE. Well, perhaps could I just clarify?

Mr. MCCAUL. Sure.

Dr. CLARKE. Dr. McBrearty’s statement. In fact, the AFTAC contacted the Science and Technology Directorate and myself in an email, which I have, and this e-mail said that they were preparing

their fiscal year 2006 budget and they needed to know what the

status of our review was. This was a little difficult because our review was not completed, which I told them. The process of getting

a decision through the Department of Homeland Security had not

been completed. However, at the programmatic level, in the Officer

of Research and Development, the decision had been made to close

the laboratory; not to withdraw from New York, but to close this

specific laboratory called EML.

Mr. MCCAUL. Who made that decision?

Dr. CLARKE. Oh, sorry. To answer your question, it was Dr.

McCarthy, who is the Director of the office, after many, many briefings.

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. Do you know if this decision ever rose to the

level of the Under Secretary?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, I do. After the final decision was made at the

programmatic level, and I emphasize this was not a Homeland Security decision because that has to go through the Secretary. But

at the programmatic level in the Office of Research and Development, I was instructed to prepare a package that would go from the

Under Secretary to the Secretary and that package contained our

plans for, as I say, the closure of the institution called the EML

and simultaneously the standup of a new organization that would

satisfy the value proposition that we had identified for S&T activities in New York.

58

Mr. MCCAUL. And again, did this rise to Under Secretary

McQueary’s level?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, it did. I was present at the briefing.

Mr. MCCAUL. And did he basically approve this decision?

Dr. CLARKE. He agreed that this was the right thing to do and

he was the one who requested that the decision package be prepared through Dr. McCarthy.

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. And the decision was to close, just to explain

the decision, itself. How is it going to change the role of——

Dr. CLARKE. Well, as I stated in my testimony, this process went

through three stages. First was the review of what the reality of

EML was, which was very staggering. The second review was, well,

since the reality of EML, as it stood at that time, was not contributing much. They did contribute some, but they weren’t contributing anything commensurate with the cost of maintaining the laboratory, that we better do an investigation and find out what would

be valuable in Manhattan. Dr. McCarthy was very determined that

if possible, if we could a valuated mission that we would maintain

a capability in Manhattan. We did this.

We consulted widely across the department with all of our coast

and border protection, the FEMA, all of the agencies within Homeland Security to see what they thought they needed in terms of

technology support in Manhattan. We consulted with the Office of

Emergency Management in New York. We consulted with our

agencies both in New York and in Washington. We consulted widely with everybody that we could think of and we came up with a

value proposition. The value proposition was basically the types of

things that Commissioner Duecker was talking about, supporting

the first responders with certain types of technology support, including the Countermeasures Test Beds. That was one of the

things that we found that was obviously of benefit.

But it only involved, at that time, 4.8 full-time equivalents out

of a laboratory which has over 40 people and costing us in excess,

at the time, of, as I recall, $7 million a year. So you see, that was

the reason behind all of this. We were trying to find a cost-effective

method of supporting both DHS operations and the first responders

in New York.

Mr. MCCAUL. And so that is a value added that remained in the

mission.

Dr. CLARKE. Exactly.

THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. MCCAUL. And what happened to the other core missions?

Dr. CLARKE. Well, let us get back to that. The only other core

missions that EML had, you have heard the testimony about the

QAP program, the AFTAC program and you haven’t heard about

the NNSA program. That was also supporting this counter-proliferation mission. In the spring, I believe, of 2005, in the preparation for her decision, before she made the decision, Maureen

McCarthy asked us to consult with these small programs. As you

heard from Dr. McBrearty, $400,000, involved basically one fulltime staff member to service that program. And the NNSA program was a few sample measurements during the year; it didn’t

amount to very much. But she was thorough and she asked us to

59

consult with these agencies to see if we made a decision, at that

time, on EML, what would be the effect on their programs. We

didn’t want to disrupt the valuable programs of other agencies.

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. I see that my time has expired. Thank you.

MORE ON DHS’ DECISION TO CLOSE EML

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Clarke. Dr. McQueary is from

Greensboro, which is in my district and he is well regarded in that

community. He is regarded as very competent and has a high reputation for integrity. So this is not, the question is about these decisions are not personal attacks, but they really do go to the correctness of the decision. Your testimony just seems to be irreconcilable to the testimony of all the other witnesses that we have heard

from today and I think we will hear from in a later panel. I know

that others were involved in the decision, from your testimony. You

heard Mr. McBrearty testify that there was no classified briefing,

that he did come to Washington to complain, to protest what was

happening to EML and to explain that it had an important role in

AFTAC and other programs by the Air Force, but that there was

no classified briefing, is that correct?

Dr. CLARKE. No, it is not correct.

Chairman MILLER. It is not correct?

Dr. CLARKE. No.

Chairman MILLER. Okay.

Dr. CLARKE. Now, I have no personal knowledge of this and that

I did not participate in the briefing, but I was told by Dr. Parker.

Chairman MILLER. Who is Dr. Parker?

Dr. CLARKE. Dr. Parker was the head of research and development in the Office of Research and Development. He reported to

Dr. McCarthy. He told me that he had a classified conversation

with AFTAC. Now, that is all I know about it. I don’t know who

he talked to or whatever, but you know, that was a classified discussion.

Chairman MILLER. And at that point, then you understand that

AFTAC conveyed to the Air Force—conveyed to DHS the nature of

the programs of its programs that EML contributed to and that it

would be disrupted by the closing of EML, is that right?

Dr. CLARKE. No, that is—I just testified that I don’t know what

the content of that discussion was.

Chairman MILLER. Okay.

Dr. CLARKE. Because it was a classified discussion, I was not involved with it.

Chairman MILLER. I assume you have security clearance. You

could be in a classified.

Dr. CLARKE. I could have been and yet I was not invited.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Well, it was our impression the reason

you are sitting there today is that we understood that there was

no one at DHS who knew more about EML than you did. Is that

wrong?

Dr. CLARKE. Well, Mr. Chairman, before I was assigned to this

task by my management, I had—I knew EML just by the name.

I had no knowledge of it. But when I was assigned this management review task, I did due diligence and I talked to people in the

Department of Energy who had managed this EML throughout the

60

decades and you know, so I learned a great deal about EML. So

I suppose that statement is true, that I was—I knew more about

it than anybody else, but it was only because of the reviews that

I was conducting for the Department.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Did you know, from Mr. McBrearty,

that there were programs, AFTAC and others, that he regarded as

important to national security that would be disrupted by closing

EML?

Dr. CLARKE. I did not talk to Mr. McBrearty, initially. I contacted the AFTAC Program Manager when, as I said, I was requested by my management to find out the effect of any change in

EML on their programs. I talked to a Mr. Scott Smith and we later

exchanged e-mails and it was in that conversation that—well, let

me back up. The conversation was about a proposed trip of an EML

staff member to China. I inquired about whether this trip was, in

fact, requested by AFTAC. In the course of that conversation, I

mentioned that we were reviewing the EML and its role in S&T,

and then I proceeded to the question that I was tasked to ask,

which was, in the event that a decision was made to change EML,

and at that time, of course, no decision was made of closure or otherwise, if a decision was made, what effect would it have on your

program? Mr. Smith told me at that time that it would have minimal effect. He mentioned, if I recall correctly, five other laboratories that could do the work that EML was doing and that——

Chairman MILLER. And which work is that we are talking about?

Dr. CLARKE. We are talking about the AFTAC work and Mr.

Smith was their Program Manager. Dr. McBrearty was the head

of the materials division in AFTAC. This is the man directly in

charge of the program. And that occurred in the summer, before

the discussions that Dr. McBrearty was talking about.

Chairman MILLER. Did either Mr. McBrearty or anybody else discuss with you the national security implications, the importance for

monitoring of nuclear proliferation of the sensors in China.

Dr. CLARKE. Yes. I don’t believe this—well, I am not sure whether that was mentioned specifically. As Dr. McBrearty testified, he

did come to see me in Washington. He was actually there, as I understand it, for a meeting at DHS and he stopped in and we talked

for about an hour and our conversation was pretty much as he indicated, that he expressed his, just as in his testimony, he expressed his personal confidence in EML. He expressed his opinion

that EML was a valuable resource. I gave him the situation. I described to him the situation that we had with a laboratory that was

costing the Department of Homeland Security millions of dollars

servicing a $400,000 program, as he described it, which took up, as

I understand it, one full-time equivalent in EML.

It was servicing some episodic measurements for the National

Nuclear Security Administration, which took up a few staff hours

several times a year. That is what we discussed and I just put it

to him, I said it is costing us a lot of money. Your programs are

being conducted under an agreement with the Department of Energy, not with Homeland Security. The Economy Act, in the event

that something is done with the laboratory, the Economy Act would

cause us to charge you a lot more than you are paying now because

61

there are no other DHS activities that are being supported. That

was my half of the conversation.

Chairman MILLER. And did he say if you charge him more we are

not going to do it?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, he was astonished. He was astonished at the

costs that I related to him from the laboratory. Now, he had no

idea about what else was going on in the laboratory, so when I told

him, basically, what is in my testimony, that we had not identified,

you know, work for this laboratory after 2006 and he recognized

that this was reality. This was not my choice, not his; this was the

Economy Act.

Chairman MILLER. My time is up and I do want to recognize Mr.

Rothman, but a year ago I was in Hawaii on a Congressional delegation from this Committee, to the South Pole, to Antarctica. But

while we were in Hawaii on the way, we saw the device, the floatation device that was to be towed and positioned. It is a massive device with radar equipment and other sensing equipment to be

towed and positioned in the Bering Sea to support our technology

that has yet to succeed in intercepting a missile and I don’t know

how much we are spending on that, exactly, but I assume it is

many billions.

So the amount of money that you are talking about for this lab,

which would help us respond to a dirty bomb; would help us identify a dirty bomb before it detonated; would help us identify or had

the potential, if we furthered the research, to identify if a ship was

carrying a nuclear device, which strikes me as a much more likely

threat to the United States than a missile from the soul of another

country; that had the ability to tell us more about nuclear detonations in the region of the world where we are most worried about

proliferation, that adjoins North Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan. It

seems to me that no, this lab is not that expensive. Mr. Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Clarke, do you

know how much the review and analysis of EML costs, this 18

month review?

Dr. CLARKE. How much it costs?

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes.

Dr. CLARKE. No, I really don’t. It was some of my time. This was

not my full-time activity. Some of Dr. Mandler’s time.

Mr. ROTHMAN. You hired a firm called Booz Allen?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, Mr. Hooks, our Deputy Director had a contract

with Booz Allen, it is our ASETA contract for technical support and

he arranged to have a team of about four people, but they didn’t

work full-time on this.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Can we get that for the record? Is it possible——

Dr. CLARKE. I don’t have that information, but I am sure it can

be provided.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Can you provide it?

Dr. CLARKE. I cannot provide it. It wasn’t my contract.

LIMITED DHS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE

FUNDING

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. Doctor, you said that S&T was, I believe

you were referring to S&T, was involved in an important national

mission with limited resources.

62

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, sir. My personal view, but——

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes. Do you think it is being under-funded by the

Congress?

Dr. CLARKE. Congressman, that is a policy question. It is way

above my pay grade.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Do you have an opinion?

Dr. CLARKE. On whether——

Mr. ROTHMAN. It is under-funded.

Dr. CLARKE. Let me put it this way. I attend reviews of the programs that we have. I look at the yearly budgeted activities and

there are always projects that appear to be very, very worthwhile

projects that fall above the funding level that the directorate has.

Now, they say that is a policy issue. That is not for me to decide.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Have you ever gone to your superiors and said

there is a program that needs to be funded and for whatever reason they have said we don’t have the money for that?

Dr. CLARKE. No, sir. I have not had any programmatic responsibility while I was at Science and Technology directorate. I offered

management advice and analysis to my superiors when asked.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Did you call those resources limited? I suppose it

just—you meant nothing by that?

Dr. CLARKE. Well, what I meant was what I just said, that I see,

in the budget process every year, projects that look like they are

worthy projects that have been requested by customers for the

Science and Technology directorate and they are not funded. That

is what I meant.

Mr. ROTHMAN. But it hasn’t been under your jurisdiction to——

Dr. CLARKE. No, not my responsibility.

Mr. ROTHMAN.—to comment on their being not funded?

Dr. CLARKE. No, sir.

Mr. ROTHMAN. I think I followed the chronology in your written

testimony and in the remarks that you made. If I have got it correct, at some point new people came in and changed the decision

that had been made with regards to EML? Is that a fair characterization or how would you characterize it?

Dr. CLARKE. Actually, that is a very good question and if I may

just respond completely. I don’t want to waste your time if you

have others, but there seems to be a misunderstanding about the

term closure. I tried to indicate before, in my previous remarks,

that when we were using the work closure, we were using that

with respect to an organizational entity with the title Environmental Measurements Laboratory because frankly, even that title

is not appropriate for this department.

Mr. ROTHMAN. No, I understand. I am not asking about the closure.

Dr. CLARKE. Okay.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Whatever changes you were going to make with

regards to EML. Apparently, some or all of those decisions were revoked, made null and void, find new leadership? Can you comment? Is that true?

Dr. CLARKE. I would say not. If you look at the value proposition

that we identified through all of our work in New York, which is

recorded in my testimony, and then you look at the decisions that

will be discussed by Admiral Cohen and Mr. Oxford, you will see

63

that there is a strong overlap. Supporting the testing and evaluation that Mr. Duecker talked was in there, that was part of our

value proposition.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Excuse me, Doctor. Just refer, if I may, to part

of your written testimony. At several different places in your written testimony you say that because an under secretary or somebody retired or resigned, new people were coming in, that recommendations to the Secretary were never acted upon.

Dr. CLARKE. Um-hum, that is correct.

Mr. ROTHMAN. So is it fair to say, then, that those recommendations that you made have still not been acted upon?

Dr. CLARKE. That is correct, yes. Yes. At least at the Secretarial

level. That is correct, yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. They haven’t been acted upon, period? They

haven’t been effectuated.

Dr. CLARKE. That is correct.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Please go ahead.

Dr. CLARKE. No, I thought you were asking me, at least what I

heard was that you said that the recommendations were revoked

and——

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay.

Dr. CLARKE.—the decision didn’t go forward. What I was trying

to emphasize was——

Mr. ROTHMAN. They just haven’t been effectuated.

Dr. CLARKE. That is correct.

Mr. ROTHMAN. The 18 months’ review and the recommendations

have never been effectuated by DHS.

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you.

MORE ON THE FIRST RESPONDER COMMUNITY IN NEW YORK

CITY

Chairman MILLER. A few more questions, Dr. Clarke. One of the

reasons that you have consistently given was the relatively low

value assigned to EML. It had little credibility among first responders in New York. We asked the police to send us someone to

testify. They sent us Deputy Commissioner Duecker and the gist

of his testimony was we love those guys. I understand, from our

staff, that we have talked to that they have talked to all the first

responders; the police, the fire, the EMS, in New York City and adjoining areas and consistently they hear the same thing, that Mr.

Duecker said today, which was that they thought that EML’s work

was outstanding. It was the gold standard in radiation monitoring

and detection and analysis. From whom did you hear that EML

had a poor reputation, it had little credibility among first responders?

Dr. CLARKE. From the people that we interviewed. From the

FEMA Director in New York, from the people in the Office of

Emergency Management. Let us be clear. What Mr. Duecker was

talking about was the work that was supervised by Adam Hunter

in the Countermeasure Test Bed doing testing and evaluation of

radiation detectors, which he feels is so important for the City of

New York. That work was never questioned. That work was never

intended to be closed down. But that work was a very small part

64

of what we are talking about here, which is the larger EML. The

management issue that we had was what do we do with this larger

part of the EML which is not being employed, with no disrespect

and a great deal of respect for the productive activities led by Dr.

Hunter.

Chairman MILLER. And did you talk to the first responders personally or you kind of heard it through the grape vine?

Dr. CLARKE. I didn’t talk to first responders. I mean, there are

40,000 police in New York and——

Chairman MILLER. No, did you talk to the leadership of the first

responders, the emergency response folks?

Dr. CLARKE. I talked to operational DHS elements in New York

and the Office of Emergency Management, which has the job of coordinating all first response in New York. I did not talk directly to

the police or the fire department.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And can you identify, for our staff,

after this hearing, the folks that you did talk to and if you had correspondence by e-mail, can we see the e-mail exchange?

Dr. CLARKE. Well, you should have it. I gave you everything that

I had in my computer.

Chairman MILLER. Have we gotten that? Okay. Mr. Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. I have another meeting of a bunch of folks on another important matter, but Mr. Chairman, I thank you for allowing me to ask this question. Dr. Clarke, do you have an opinion

about as to whether the, as a consequence of the 18 month review,

the work of EML was affected positively, negatively, no effect, hurt

their operations, slowed them down or not? And if so, could you

share that with us, your opinion?

Dr. CLARKE. Actually, I was very pleased to hear Mr. Duecker’s

testimony in which he said that the contact and the support from

EML to the New York Police Department greatly accelerated over

the last year and a half and I believe that is in the record from

his testimony. So in the area in which the EML was making a positive contribution, namely, the test evaluation work led by Dr.

Hunter, that work has improved.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, he only was there for a year and a half, so

he said for the year and a half he was there they worked well together.

Dr. CLARKE. I am working from memory here but we can look at

what he said. I believe that is what I heard.

Mr. ROTHMAN. I think he has only been there a year and a half.

Dr. CLARKE. But then he did say that it had accelerated over

that period.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Over this last year and a half.

Dr. CLARKE. Which is what you asked me, whether as a result

of our actions, I could venture an opinion.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, when were the recommendations shelved or

that you made not acted upon? If you will understand what I mean.

I can go back into your testimony, if you don’t remember.

Dr. CLARKE. I do.

Mr. ROTHMAN. You do?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, the first package we submitted was in December.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes. Of what year?

65

Dr. CLARKE. Of 2005.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right.

Dr. CLARKE. That was when Secretary McQueary was still the

Under Secretary. In planning for the transition of EML, we had to

figure out how to preserve the valuable sections of the laboratory

and what we should do about the people that——

Mr. ROTHMAN. But is it fair to say that your 18 month review

concluded in December of 2005 or no?

Dr. CLARKE. I would say so, yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. And that is about the time he got his job,

Mr. Duecker?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. So during the 18 months that preceded December 2005, do you have an opinion as to whether that review

process affected EML during that time up to December 2005?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes. Now, this is a much narrower answer because

it is with respect to the management of a small special purpose laboratory. In my view, it did improve. When we began this review,

there were a number of EML staff who were traveling around,

spending public money on behalf of their interests in carrying out

the roles that they had formerly been responsible for in the Department of Energy. That was stopped. And my own opinion, based on

a certain amount of experience in management is that this was

good for the staff because it focused their attention on their new

role in the Department of Homeland Security, rather than their old

role.

Mr. ROTHMAN. So overall, would you say this 18 month review

had a positive, negative or neutral effect on EML?

Dr. CLARKE. Overall, I would say, taking account of the stress on

the staff from the lack of decision, I would say that it was a terrible burden on the staff.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I am allowed to come back by

my staff, I would like to ask that question of the next panel. If not,

Mr. Chairman, if it is possible for somebody to ask that same question to the next panel? I appreciate your testimony, Doctor, and

thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MORE ON DHS’ DECISION TO CLOSE EML

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Rothman. Just a couple more

questions, Dr. Clarke. Dr. Fainberg testified here this morning that

he fought to fund various projects at EML. The global radiation

monitoring program, their rooftop radiation sensors—and I think

others, and he testified that he consistently advocated for that and

resigned out of frustration. And your testimony was, today, your

written testimony is that there was no project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006. No S&T project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006 and any activity other than the

Countermeasure Test Bed project. Now, Dr. Fainberg was an S&T

project manager, isn’t that right?

Dr. CLARKE. That is correct.

Chairman MILLER. Is his testimony incorrect?

Dr. CLARKE. Well, in part and I believe he said that he was never

asked or he couldn’t remember whether he was asked and he certainly was. One of the first stops when Dr. Mandler and I were

66

conducting the initial review of EML was to interview him because

he was funding most of the ongoing activities at EML. And at that

time, he gave us some very frank evaluations of the worth of the

projects. Now, what he said in his testimony was that he felt they

had some value. Well, as I testified, the competition for funding of

worthwhile projects in Science and Technology is very fierce and

just because something has some value doesn’t mean that it necessarily will be approved. Now, I personally did not make any decisions on the funding of any project at EML. Those decisions were

made by Dr. Jerry Parker.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Clarke, I am just struck by the fact that

you and I seem to have heard different testimony just an hour or

so ago. I didn’t detect any ambivalence in Dr. Fainberg’s testimony

about the value of EML’s programs. I detected in him great frustration and that certainly is consistent with the e-mail that he sent,

resigning, in which he said John Clarke is reaching into my program, preventing me from carrying it out under the guise of exercising his authority over EML. He has a clear aim of eliminating

as much of EML’s work for me as he could. It goes on and on. I

am sure you must have seen this e-mail.

Dr. CLARKE. I have seen several e-mails, yes.

Chairman MILLER. Well, this is actually to Maureen McCarthy.

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

Chairman MILLER. It does not show a cc to you. It does show to

Dr. Parker and Robert Hooks and Carol Linder, but I assume

that——

Dr. CLARKE. Dr. Parker shared this with me after the fact and

so what he says in this e-mail is not correct.

Chairman MILLER. Is that your testimony?

Dr. CLARKE. No, I am not challenging Dr. Fainberg’s opinions.

They are his opinions. His opinions were not accepted by management, not accepted by Dr. Parker or Carolyn Purdy, for example.

They were present at the final discussion that led to Dr. Fainberg’s

decision. I was not involved. I was not there. I was informed after

the fact. So I am not challenging his opinions, but they are his

opinions.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. It seems that that is a very different

take, that he had opinions that you considered but rejected, rather

than what you—it sounded to me like you said, a moment ago, that

he candidly talked about the programs of questionable value.

Dr. CLARKE. We are talking about a period of about four months

and what I just said about the initial interview between myself and

Dr. Mandler and Tony Fainberg, and there was another person

present, the contractor, whose name escapes me. We had a very

frank discussion about the value of these programs. The issue we

are talking about now occurred four months later and it was between Dr. Parker, Dr. Purdy and apparently Dr. McCarthy. I had

nothing to do with that.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Is it true that Dr. Fainberg wanted to

continue funding and increase funding for the EML labs, for the

EML programs? That he advocated for that?

Dr. CLARKE. Yes. He mentioned a couple of specific projects. A

neutron ship effect which was, in fact, continued. It is still ongoing.

He commented on the—if I remember correctly and I am just workVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
67

ing from memory, he commented on the seminars that were held

for the New York first responders. Those programs were continued

and are continuing today. There was one just recently. I can’t remember what else he commented on specifically. So those programs, that I recall, that he was in favor of, were, in fact, continued.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Clarke, you said that in addition to the

lack of credibility that the lab had, it was simply a cost concern

and I certainly applaud every agency of government looking for

ways to spend money and not feeling like they had to spend everything that they have got, but this a lab that total funding was $7

million. I think we heard $10 million, but $7 million to $10 million.

You know, again, a good deal less than that contraption I saw in

Hawaii that was hauled away to the Bering Sea.

Dr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

Chairman MILLER. And according to the S&T Directorates, budget information in fiscal year 2005 there was $505 million at the end

of the year in un-obligated funds, in other words money that had

been appropriated, not spent. I applaud savings, frugality. In fiscal

2006, $51 million in un-obligated funds or money that is appropriated but not spent and right now, for fiscal year 2007, for $223

million in un-obligated funds or money that is appropriated but not

spent. Are those figures correct?

Dr. CLARKE. That is above my pay grade. I had fiduciary responsibilities in one small area and that is what I was addressing.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Well, I have no further questions, but

I encourage frugality in all of the Federal Government, but I am

sure that FEMA saved a lot of money in the time leading up to

Katrina. In retrospect, that appears to be penny wise and pound

foolish. And the money that the S&T Directorate saved on EML,

I fear greatly, is going to appear at some point in the future to be

penny wise and pound foolish if we are not ready to prevent and

respond to a radiological attack. Thank you, Dr. Clarke.

And we will take a five minute recess so everyone can stretch

and refocus and attend anything else that needs attending to, and

we will reconvene shortly.

[Recess]

Chairman MILLER. The Subcommittee has reconvened. The hearing is in order again and I will now call our third panel, Admiral

Jay M. Cohen, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology,

Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director

of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security.

And you all have been here for the other panels, so I am sure

you know that you have five minutes to present all testimony. Your

written testimony has already been placed in the record and after

you have given your testimony, each Member of the Committee,

which may be just me, will have five minutes to ask questions. Or

Mr. Rothman may be able to return.

And we do place everyone under oath. Do either of you have any

objection to taking oaths, being sworn? And you also are entitled

to counsel, if you want it. Do you have counsel or do you wish counsel? And both of you are already raising your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn]

68

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Mr. Oxford.

Panel 3:

STATEMENT OF MR. VAYL S. OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC

NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. OXFORD. Good afternoon, Chairman Miller. I would like to

thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss how DNDO has

worked with EML in the past and our plans for working with them

in the future. I am pleased to appear in front of you with my colleague, Under Secretary Cohen.

EML has been an important partner for us and support us in

three core areas; the Securing the Cities Initiative that you heard

about; a testing series underway at the New York Container Terminal, as well as providing technical reach back within the Northeast region. They also perform a variety of other technical support

efforts to include the neutron ship effect program that we have

heard about this morning.

First let me talk about Securing the Cities. DNDO established

the Securing the Cities initiative to equip the New York region

State and local personnel with radiation detection capabilities and

develop a defensive architecture for the protection of New York

City. EML personnel, using their experience with radiation detection systems and the relationship with the New York regional law

enforcement agencies, are supporting these federal efforts. They

provide subject matter expertise on detection system performance

to the regional partners and participate in the development of conceptive operations.

Second, DNDO is currently testing its next generation systems

called Advanced Spectroscopic Portals at the New York Container

Terminal. The results of the testing done at NYCT will help DNDO

determine if these systems are ready for full reproduction. EML

provides the test director for this effort, oversees data quality management, and leads the multi-lab team to complete this test series.

Third, to support the deployment of detection systems into the

field, DNDO provides training, response protocols, and technical

reach back capabilities to assist federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and response personnel in resolving detector

alarms. EML provides technical support to the deployments we

have throughout the Northeast. Their spectroscopic expertise is

available 24 hours a day, seven days a week to provide technical

support for alarm resolution.

In conclusion, DNDO sees EML as an important partner in our

development, test, and deployment activities and projects. There

will be an enduring need for EML into the foreseeable future.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your attention. I will be glad to

answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VAYL S. OXFORD

Introduction

Good afternoon, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am Vayl Oxford, the Director of the DoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
69

mestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and I would like to thank the committee

for the opportunity to discuss how DNDO has worked with the Environmental

Measurements Laboratory (EML) in the past, and our plans for working with them

in the future. EML is a federally owned and operated DHS laboratory, located in

lower Manhattan. It was a Department of Energy research facility with competencies in low level radiation detection and monitoring, and was transferred to

DHS S&T in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

As Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), my office is responsible for developing new technologies, as well as ensuring that we deploy detection

systems properly across the domestic nuclear detection architecture. EML has been

an important partner for us, particularly because they provide technical support in

the New York City metropolitan area, where there are three ongoing DNDO efforts.

Of the 25 technical staff present at EML, currently, nineteen support DNDO in various capacities at a level of effort equivalent to about 9.5 full time equivalents.

The three core areas where we receive support from EML are: Securing the Cities

(STC), test support at the New York Container Terminal (NYCT), and technical

reach-back. EML provides a combination of regional experience with radiological

and nuclear subject matter expertise. Specifically, EML personnel serve as the focal

point in New York for regional federal, State and local partners, federal technical

participants, and industry/facility operators. This has resulted in a strong and trusted partnering among federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and the various technical Subject Matter Experts. Through EML, we have developed excellent

working relationships with end users such as the Port Authorities of New York &

New Jersey; New York Police Department; Fire Department of New York; New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, including the New Jersey State

Police; New York Office of Homeland Security, including the New York State Police;

New York City Office of Emergency Management; and local Customs and Border

Protection, among others.

I would like to take a moment to go into more detail about some of the specific

DNDO programs that EML supports.

Securing the Cities

To help address the threat of a radiological or nuclear attack against urban area

targets, DNDO established the STC initiative to equip State and local personnel

with radiation detection technologies and develop a defense-in-depth architecture for

the protection of the New York City area. EML personnel, using their experience

with radiation detection systems and their established relationships with New York

City metropolitan area law enforcement agencies, are supporting the federal participation. They are also helping us integrate DNDO Regional Reach-back into STC activities and procedures. Moreover, they are providing subject matter expertise on detection system performance and capabilities to STC regional partners, as well as

participating in the development of concept of operations.

Test Support at the New York Container Terminal

DNDO is currently testing its next-generation systems called Advanced

Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) at NYCT. The results of the testing at NYCT will be

part of a larger data set that will help DNDO determine if our ASP systems provide

significant improvements in performance over current generation systems to support

the Secretary’s certification decision, as required by the DHS FY 2007 Appropriations Act, prior to a full-rate production decision. As you can see, this is an important task, and EML provides the Test Director for this effort and is part of the

multi-lab team that we are relying on to get this task completed. Other participating labs include Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Brookhaven National

Laboratory (BNL).

Technical Reach-back

We often use a four-factor formula to define success at DNDO—successful encounter, detection, identification, and interdiction. If any of those factors are unsuccessful—for example, you mistakenly dismiss a threat—you are looking at the possibility

of mission failure. Therefore, in support of the deployment of detection equipment

into the field, DNDO is developing and implementing a technical reach-back capability to assist federal, State, and local law enforcement and response personnel in

understanding and resolving detector alarms.

EML, along with Brookhaven National Laboratory, provides technical support to

the deployments we have in the Northeastern region. Regional reach-back

spectroscopists—the people who can look at alarm data and determine the presence

or absence of a threat—are available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.

They work with DNDO’s Joint Analysis Center (JAC) to provide technical support

to federal, State and local personnel if a detection incident occurs that requires furVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
70

ther investigation and analysis. The laboratory spectroscopists evaluate the data

provided through the JAC in order to determine what material(s) have been detected by the equipment, and provide other technical assistance as needed, such as

answering questions about equipment, commodity shipping, or radiation safety.

Other Efforts

In addition to these three key areas, EML has played a technical advisory role

to DNDO’s Assessments Directorate. They have helped us with test planning and

execution, assisted in the planning and execution of our pilot programs, and provided quality assurance and data quality management for our test and evaluation

activities. Also, EML is participating in one of our Transformational Research and

Development projects that will help DNDO determine the physical limits of detecting nuclear materials and devices while a cargo ship is in transit. This type of research may lead to detection solutions that enable us to push out our borders and

intercept threats well before they reach U.S. shores.

Conclusion

In conclusion, DNDO sees EML as an important partner in our research, development, and test, and deployment support activities. We are especially aware of the

relationships they maintain with federal, State and local law enforcement and first

responder personnel in the New York metropolitan region. Combined with their subject matter expertise in the rad/nuc field, we see those that currently support the

DNDO mission at EML as valuable assets.

This concludes my prepared statement. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and

will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR VAYL S. OXFORD

Mr. Vayl Oxford was appointed Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

(DNDO) in September 2005, reporting to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with responsibility for the establishment of the new, jointly staffed office and for directing all activities associated with the organization.

Prior to his appointment to DHS, Mr. Oxford served as the Director for

Counterproliferation (CP) at the National Security Council.

Before his assignment to the White House, Mr. Oxford was the Deputy Director

for Technology Development at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

From 1993 to 1998, Mr. Oxford served at the Defense Nuclear Agency, and, then,

the Defense Special Weapons Agency as the Director for Counterproliferation.

During his Air force tenure, Mr. Oxford held several positions associated with aircraft and weapons development, and war plans analysis in Europe and the Pacific.

He also served as an Assistant Professor of Aeronautics at the United States Air

Force Academy from 1982 to 1986.

Mr. Oxford is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and the Air Force

Institute of Technology and the recipient of numerous military awards. He received

the DOD ACTD Technical Manager of the Year Award in 1997. He was appointed

to the Senior Executive Service in 1997 and received the Meritorious Executive

Presidential Rank Award in 2002.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Oxford. Admiral Cohen.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY,

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Admiral COHEN. Chairman Miller, it is a great honor, as always,

to appear before the Science and Technology Committee and I

wanted to let you know personally how much I appreciate the professionalism of the Committee staff in this matter.

Science and technology has and will change the world and it

holds the potential to make our nation safer. I grew up in the shadow of the EML building in Lower Manhattan and fully appreciate

both its strategic location and its capabilities. I assumed my duties

as Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of

Homeland Security on the 10th of August. You may remember that

was the day of the London liquid explosives plot. Immediately

71

thereafter, on the 11th of August, I established a rapid response

team similar to what I had done in Navy and then after 9/11.

The very first thing we did was to convene and at that time we

did not have a means to have a secure video teleconference, so we

just had a conference call with all of my organic labs, including the

Environmental Measurements Laboratory and all of the Department of Energy laboratories, which the enabling legislation so wisely allowed me to leverage. I challenged them with their diverse

backgrounds and talents, especially the DOE labs, with all the

class chemistry and physics capabilities to help us solve the problems associated with liquid explosives on the aircraft.

Within two months those efforts allowed TSA to establish the 3–

1–1 rule, which is the three ounces in one bag per person, and get

our aircraft back to some normalcy. I found that, in August, with

the bipartisan support of the Congress and the Administration, I

immediately went about aligning my directorate for success as I believe the enabling legislation wisely envisioned. I established what

I call the Four Gets. I had to get the organization right; I had to

get the people right; I had to get the books right; and I had to get

the content right. And along with these I established what I believe

to be the principle threats or as I call it, the Four Bs; bombs, border, bugs and business where business represents the underlying

cyber that enables our whole society and our economy.

The organization was approved the first week of September 2006.

The president’s fiscal year 2008 budget was realigned to the new

six division customer outward focused model that I put in place.

And in October, the Congress, in a bipartisan way, asked me to realign the fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security appropriations law to the new model. The status of my directorate at

that time was clearly documented in fiscal year 2007 legislation.

The Transportation Security Lab’s assignment to the Department

of Homeland Security S&T versus TSA was in doubt. The universities’ Centers of Excellence were at risk, moral was low and good

people were leaving my directorate.

Congress was on the verge of cutting my fiscal year 2007 budget

by $200 million. As I previously testified, Mr. Chairman, it took

great courage on both sides of the aisle in an election year to restore those monies, as you did so late in the year and I am very

appreciative of that. Over the last eight months, we have, with the

help of Congress, largely achieved the Four Gets. Included in that,

government service scientists and engineers who had left my directorate last spring, last fall asked to come back and we welcomed

them with open arms and they are now part of my team.

The final piece of that effort was bringing the full integration of

both my organic DHS labs with national Department of Energy

labs, as well as university Centers of Excellence, to provide the two

pillars of basic research so important to our national safety. I have

some charts, should you ask questions, that will allude to how we

have done that.

Finally, Vayl Oxford and I are military and naval academy graduates who understand the meaning of leadership responsibility and

accountability. For all my DHS S&T mandated missions, the buck

stops with me. People are the most valuable asset. The Nation is

in crisis in science and technology. No one knows that better than

72

the Science and Technology Committee and I salute your efforts in

the stand and so many other initiative areas and we want to be

part of that.

I regularly meet with and listen to all of my people. I have

worked to make amends to them for any perception that they were

not fully valued and appreciated at the Department of Homeland

Security. I can assure you they are. Mr. Chairman, Members of the

Committee, we can and will do better for the Nation. I welcome

your oversight and your questions and I will look forward to working with your Committee and your staff. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAY M. COHEN

Good Morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today

to update you on the Department’s plans for the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML).

The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is committed to serving our customers, the components that comprise the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS)—and their customers—the hardworking men and women on the front lines

of homeland security, especially the first responders, who need ready access to technology and information to perform their jobs more efficiently and safely. I am honored and privileged to serve with the talented scientists, engineers and other professionals who support these dedicated Americans in our shared mission to secure our

homeland and defend our freedoms. Many of those talented people work at our organic DHS laboratories, the Transportation Security Lab, Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and EML.

EML is a federally owned and operated DHS laboratory, located in lower Manhattan. It was a Department of Energy research facility with competencies in low level

radiation detection and monitoring, and was transferred to DHS S&T in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. EML has currently 35 federal employees. Twenty-five are

technical with backgrounds in radiation health physics, dosimetry, atmospheric

transport, radio-chemistry, and nuclear spectroscopy. There are also ten administrative support employed at EML. Since coming to DHS, EML staff has provided support to the S&T Directorate and, since its inception in April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).

DNDO was established pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14

and Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–296). Section 501

of the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109–347)

statutorily established DNDO, and amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002 removing all radiological or nuclear responsibilities and authorities from the Under

Secretary for Science and Technology. Although the laboratory is managed within

the S&T Directorate, EML has applied its staff’s radiation detection expertise and

operational testing experience primarily to support DNDO programs. Currently,

nineteen EML staff members support DNDO at level of effort equivalent to about

9.5 full-time employees. DNDO director Vayl Oxford and I have discussed DNDO’s

requirements and have agreed that this is approximately the long-term workload

that EML can expect in support of DNDO programs.

EML staff has also been involved with radiation and explosives detection Test &

Evaluation (T&E) involving a number of federal, State, and local end-users; and

with standards development, including program management and working group activities. As the Homeland Security Act of 2002 also assigned me the responsibility

of coordinating all T&E activities of the Department, together with my DHS S&T

Directorate T&E Director and EML leadership, I am personally and actively working to identify an appropriate T&E role for the remainder of the EML workforce.

The President’s Budget Request for FY 2008 reflects my expectation that DNDO will

continue to require the current level of support from EML, and that we will be able

to productively utilize the remainder of the workforce in a meaningful DHS T&E

role.

EML currently leases ∼96,000 sq. ft. in the GSA building at 201 Varick Street

New York, NY. The leased space includes basement storage, a four bay garage and

loading dock, and a rooftop platform. The current lease expires at the end of FY

2008 and the rent is expected to increase in 2009. I will work to ‘‘right size’’ both

leased floor space at the current EML location and a sustainable technical and adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
73

ministrative workforce that will ensure EML’s new role in supporting both DHS

S&T and DNDO in making the Nation safer. EML will be fully integrated into my

organic and DOE laboratory governance model designed to align my supporting laboratories to the current DHS S&T Directorate organization, similar to the alignment

being accomplished with DHS S&T university Centers of Excellence. I greatly respect the invaluable contribution that the intellectual capital our S&T workforce of

scientists, engineers and associates at EML (and all other S&T activities supporting

DHS missions) make through discoveries and inventions to equip our DHS components and First Responders with cutting edge technology to protect America well

into the future.

I appreciate the many demands on the taxpayers’ precious dollars. You have my

commitment that the S&T Directorate will be wise stewards of the public monies

you have provided to serve the best interests of the Nation by investing in the talent

and technology that will provide America with a sustainable capability to protect

against acts of terror and other high-consequence events.

Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to meet with you

today to discuss this important matter. I welcome your interest and oversight. I look

forward to working with you and your dedicated staff throughout the 110th Congress.

BIOGRAPHY FOR JAY M. COHEN

Department of Homeland Security, Under Secretary for Science and Technology,

Jay M. Cohen is a native of New York. He was commissioned in 1968 as an Ensign

upon graduation from the United States Naval Academy. He holds a joint Ocean

Engineering degree from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole

Oceanographic Institution and Master of Science in Marine Engineering and Naval

Architecture from MIT.

His early Navy assignments included service on conventional and nuclear submarines. From 1985 to 1988 Cohen commanded USS HYMAN G. RICKOVER (SSN

709).

Following command, he served on the U.S. Atlantic Fleet as a senior member of

the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, responsible for certifying the safe operation of nuclear powered ships and crews.

From 1991 to 1993, he commanded USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS 36) including a deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation DESERT STORM.

After Spear, he reported to the Secretary of the Navy as Deputy Chief of Navy

Legislative Affairs. During this assignment, Cohen was responsible for supervising

all Navy-Congressional liaisons.

Cohen was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October 1997 and reported

to the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations responsible to the President and

DOD leaders for strategic weapons release authority.

In June 1999, he assumed duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office responsible

for transitioning all Navy computer systems into the new century.

In June 2000, Cohen was promoted in rank and became the 20th Chief of Naval

Research. He served during war as the Department of the Navy Chief Technology

Officer (a direct report to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and

Commandant of the Marine Corps). Responsible for the Navy and Marine Corps

Science and Technology (S&T) Program (involving basic research to applied technology portfolios and contracting), Cohen coordinated investments with other U.S.

and international S&T providers to rapidly meet war fighter combat needs. After

an unprecedented five and a half year assignment as Chief of Naval Research, Rear

Admiral Cohen retired on February 1, 2006.

Under Secretary Cohen was sworn in to his current position at the Department

of Homeland Security on August 10, 2006.

DISCUSSION

DHS’ ASSESSMENT OF EML

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Admiral Cohen. I do have a few

questions for each of you. Mr. Oxford, in your testimony this morning, mixed testimony. It was skills, the strengths, the capabilities

of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory and obviously

there were some people, at least within the S&T Directorate, who

74

did not believe that the lab had any unique skills, it did not have

any qualities, that its programs could be easily replicated in other

labs and then others on the first panel this morning who took, in

my hearing, a very different point of view. What is your own assessment of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory?

Mr. OXFORD. We have, Mr. Chairman, found them to be very

adaptable and responsive to the changing landscape. When I was

first standing up DNDO, the view in S&T at the time was that the

Countermeasures Test Bed would draw upon them to continue the

efforts. We actually contemplated moving the Countermeasures

Test Bed to DNDO because it had been predominately a rad nuke

related activity with EML providing some of the support, but the

vision of S&T at the time was to broaden that into explosives and

chemical support work within that region so we chose to leave

Countermeasures Test Bed within S&T and just leverage that.

As we revisited the needs within DNDO, we realized we needed

strong State and local partnerships and regional partnerships and

with the emergence of things like the test series, the Securing the

Cities initiatives I talked about, we recognized the presence of

EML and the support they had already provided in the past was

a very valuable activity. I had heard some rumblings that there

were studies underway within S&T to maybe change that landscape. I cautioned against that. I even had a short discussion with

the Secretary, suggesting that this needed to be fully vetted before

any action was taken.

I later found that there was a briefing and it was in preparation,

I think you heard reference to it this morning, to make a recommendation from the Under Secretary at the time to go to the

Secretary to possibly make a recommendation to close the lab.

Within that briefing, when I got a copy of it, it said that there had

been no near-term requirements identified for the laboratory and

specifically cited DNDO as one of those entities that had no nearterm requirements. I had not been personally consulted at the

time, so that was when I wrote the letter to the acting Under Secretary at the time, outlining what we thought our specific needs

were, which equated at the time between nine and twelve people

to provide the support to the three programs I mentioned in my

opening statement. So we have found them to be more than competent in the changing landscape that we confront right now in the

New York region.

Chairman MILLER. And I know it sounds redundant, but they

had skills, they expertise that was important to your office, important to what you were doing?

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely. I am a big believer in bringing together

the combination of technologists and operators, and by having people that have the trust of the New York City officials, as you heard

from Assistant Commissioner Duecker this morning, the bridge

that the technical expertise—there are vendors in this world, as

you probably know, with the committee oversight that you have,

that will sell almost anything to anybody and the operators are

particularly prone to that kind of marketing. EML helps provide

the bridge between my office and the New York City officials who

are deluged with these kind of marketing schemes to provide technical assistance on a daily basis to make sure that as we develop

75

systems and they acquire systems, they get the right equipment,

so it was very valuable.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And we have heard different testimony

about how EML was regarded by first responders. I understand

that your office works closely with the first responders, the first responder community, particularly in New York. Do you know, based

on your own dealings with the first responder community, how

EML is viewed by New York’s first responders?

Mr. OXFORD. As you say, Mr. Chairman, we work very closely

with the State and local community up there. I have developed personal relationships through the Securing the Cities relationship

with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Office

of Emergency Management, the fire department, as well as regional partners in New York State and New Jersey State, as well

as Connecticut. This is all under the umbrella of the Securing the

Cities and the police commissioner.

However, I can tell you that they call upon EML on a daily basis

to provide the technical consultation that I have talked about, not

only in the development of systems, but also in looking at a regional deployment architecture where detection systems may be

the most efficient and effective, as well as to provide this technical

support; if they ever do get alarms, how fast can we respond?

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Oxford, and I hope

that, under your leadership, we can make EML an asset to our national security and our homeland security.

Admiral Cohen, thank you also for being here and I know that

we talked this morning about what has happened in the past with

respect to EML and the problems and I certainly hope that you can

get things on track. You apparently share the view that things

have gone off track with respect to EML and that EML is a value

to the Nation’s security and homeland security. Am I correct in

taking your testimony today as a pledge to make the EML an

asset, a contributor to our response to the threats that we face?

Admiral COHEN. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. If I may just follow

up a little bit on Mr. Oxford’s testimony of the value of EML to

New York and also to homeland security and the first responders

in the tri-state area, when I was Chief of Naval Research, about

a month after the tragic events of 9/11, I was asked by the Police

Commissioner of New York to come up to his office, look at Ground

Zero, which of course, we did, and as Mr. Oxford has indicated, so

many people offered so many solutions; Radiacs, and we saw this

after 10 August where I was inundated with handheld devices for

liquid explosives.

In the enabling legislation here at DHS, not only am I the executive for Science and Technology for the Department, but you have

given me two department-wide responsibilities in addition, which I

value very much. One is the Test and Evaluation Executive setting

the policy throughout the Department and the other is for standards, working alongside the National Institute of Standards and

Technology. This is an area that was not widely exercised before

my arrival as part of the realignment that we talked about and we

have that all in writing in what I call the STORM, the Science and

Technology Regulations Manual, so everyone knows what their reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:06 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 034908 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\050307\34908 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
76

sponsibilities are, what the chain of command is, that for the liquid

explosives, we asked people to come in.

We sent them to Sequoia, New Mexico shortly after 10 August.

We actually did standardized testing and no surprise, I think Mr.

Oxford would agree with these statistics. We found about half

didn’t work even though they looked very good on CNN. And the

other half, some variation of those were easily spoofed, putting a

liquid dye in a clear liquid. When the liquid was clear, they could

determine what it was, but once you put a dye in it, they couldn’t.

And so about a month after 9/11, I was invited, as Chief Naval Research, in a naval research laboratory right here on the Potomac

reported to me at that time to go to New York.

The police commissioner takes me into a room, table about twice

this size, and it is just full of handheld Radiac, these are radiation

detection devices. And he said Admiral, he said we—and Mr.

Chairman, you have to remember at this point, the anthrax attacks

are continuing. You don’t know when the next shoe is going to fall.

And so he says we want to equip all of our squad cars with a Radiac and he said we don’t know what to buy. Admiral, would you

help me? And I said absolutely. I said if you will just have a qualified patrolman, whoever you want, bring these to the Potomac

Naval Research Lab. I will test them compared to what the manufacturer says they are going to do and I will let you know. I will

not, however, make recommendation.

We did that for the New York City Police Department, so it is

no surprise to me, when I came into this new job, not having prior

knowledge of EML, to know that we had a group there where when

you looked at the concentration of people, the efforts that DHS and

other activities government agencies are making, the high probability of the threat to the tri-state area, that this was a jewel that

we needed to maintain, but as been testified to earlier, we needed

to work with EML so that they could support both DNDO and its

very important areas which I no longer, based on the fiscal year

2007 legislation, have responsibility for nuclear radiological. All

those reside with DNDO. And in my area, especially if test and

evaluation for many of the different sensors that we are bringing

to bear, as Mr. Oxford indicated, we want to expand that not just

from nuclear, but to include chem, bio and explosives, which are

my responsibility. So I am committed to it, sir, but it does take

time to change the culture of a land.

Chairman MILLER. Admiral Cohen, unless you just especially

want to show us your charts, I am happy to excuse the two of you

now.

Admiral COHEN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. OXFORD. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. I want to thank all the witnesses. I have to

say I am disappointed in the way the EML has been regarded in

the last few years. I am glad that I am able to express disappointment rather than outrage, as we piece together, months after a radiological attack, what might have been done different. And I hope

that the errors that we have made at this point we can correct and

I appreciate the commitment by Mr. Oxford and Admiral Cohen to

correct those errors. My able staff, the able staff of our committee,

when they heard me talking about the contraption that I saw in

77

Hawaii, through the wonders of the Internet were able to find out

what the contraption was. And it is massive. Admiral, I don’t have

a chart for you.

It is a heavy lift vessel, the Blue Marlin, and on a deck and that

is where I saw it. I saw it on the Blue Marlin. The Sea-based Xband radar, as it completed the photograph, as it completed the

1600 mile journey from Corpus Christi, Texas and then it would go

on from there to the Bering Sea. According to Wikipedia and so we

assume that no one had gone on Wikipedia and changed the numbers. At that point, this one contraption had cost $900 million.

That does not count the annual operating cost. That is the radar

to support a missile defense system that we have never made work.

It seems to me that it is very unlikely that our nation will be

struck by a nuclear weapon fired from a missile from the soil of another country.

It is not unlikely because we will intercept it out of the air, that

we will hit that bullet with a bullet. It is unlikely because the Nation that fired the missile would cease to exist because of retaliation. They say that if you owe a bank $20,000 you have got a problem; if you owe a bank $200 million, the bank has got a problem.

It appears that if your program is $7 million a year and not many

people have heard of it, it pretty much doesn’t matter what it does,

what its value is, that program is at risk. If you spend $7 billion

on a program, almost despite the evidence that that program is

never going to do anything, it never goes away.

I hope that we do go forward and recognize that this lab, although small, although before this hearing it may be even with this

hearing, obscure, does play an important role in our ability to respond to the most likely threats we face. To prepare for, we hope,

we pray to prevent and then to respond to the most likely threats

that we face; a dirty bomb; God forbid, a nuclear device, not fired

from the soil of another country, but in a freighter, smuggled into

the United States in a truck. And that the neglect that we have

shown to this lab in the next three years will not be something that

we review again, wondering what if, whether these three years or

four years of neglect would not have led to a different result. But

thank all of you for being here and thank you for your testimony

today.

Admiral COHEN. Mr. Chairman, if I just may, what you see here

is a picture of a meeting that we had. I believe it is the first ever

meeting on the 1st of May, just two days ago. These are all of the

lab directors, principals only of all the DOE labs, as well as my organic labs. You can see Adam Hunter. He is standing just to the

left of the fellow in the light shirt. Adam is the Acting Director of

EML. He, Transportation Security Lab, my End Back and my Plum

Island labs were sitting at the table. Thirty-five people, 35,000 people. They had the same vote and we are now aligned as we have

aligned the Centers of Excellence and we appreciate so much North

Carolina’s contribution to that, so that we are supporting, in the

basic research area, those critical initiatives to make the Nation

safer. So this meeting was scheduled long before we had knowledge

of this hearing. It is the last piece of the puzzle, in my alignment,

and now it is up to me, working with Vayl, to make it a reality and

we look forward to working with you, sir.

78

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Admiral Cohen. I am delighted

that you were able to use the easels that you brought here this

morning.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(79)

Appendix:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

80

DOCUMENTS FOR THE RECORD

1. E-mail message on the decision to close EML from John Clarke to Scott

Smith (September 14, 2005).

2. E-mail message on Dr. Fainberg’s resignation from Tony Fainberg to

Maureen McCarthy (April 4, 2005).

3. Top Down Review of EML PowerPoint presentation by Marc Mandler and

John Clarke (October 28, 2004).

4. E-mail messages on EML FY05 Budget including John Clarke, Mitchell

Erickson, Catherine Klusek, etc. (April 2005).

5. Summary for MAPEP Survey of DOE Quality Assurance Stakeholders.

6. Mr. Joseph Bruno, New York City Office of Emergency Management letter

to Dr. Charles McQueary, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (December 21, 2004).

7. E-mail messages on the Technology Liaison Office (TLO) between Kevin

Clark and John Clarke (November 21, 2005).

8. E-mail on Clarke re: EML including Maureen McCarthy, Huban Gowadia

and Adam Hutter (April 4, 2005).

9. Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) Communications Plan (November 3, 2007).

10. Closure of EML Human Resource Plan, Alyce Bridges (June 30, 2005).

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

Æ