This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CARMEN WILSON, f/k/a 2 CARMEN HUMPHREY, 3 Plaintiff-Appellant, 4

v. No. 32,081 5 BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 6 OF SANDOVAL COUNTY, 7 Defendant-Appellee. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY 9 Louis P. McDonald, District Judge 10 Carmen I. Wilson 11 Jemez Springs, NM 12 Pro Se Appellant 13 Law Office of Jonlyn M. Martinez, LLC 14 Jonlyn M. Martinez 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellee 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 SUTIN, Judge. 192 {1} After a four day trial, th e jury determined that De fendant, the Board of County 1 Commissioners of Sandoval County, was not ne gligent, contrary to Plaintiff Carmen 2 Wilson’s claim that it was. Plaintiff fell into a dumpster at Defendant’s dump station, 3 the Cañon Convenience Center, when throwing trash into the dumpster from her 4 pickup truck. The case was fully tried, and both parties were represented by counsel 5 in the district court proceedings. Plai ntiff appeals, pro se, from the judgment 6 dismissing her case with prejudice. She contends that the court erred with respect to 7 jury instructions and evidentiary rulings. 8
{2} Plaintiff’s appellate points and argumen t suffer in varying degree from a lack 9 of clarity. We read four of her five points to be that the court erred (1) in giving and 10 denying certain jury instructions, depriving her of a fair trial; (2) in failing to resolve 11 a foundational issue of law, and failing to carry through withinstructions on the law 12 to be applied to the facts; (3) in allowing evidence in violation of the collateral source 13 rule, thereby depriving her of a fair trial; and (4) in allowing hearsay and denying 14 relevant evidence, denying her a fair trial. Weread her fifth point to be that the jury’s 15 verdict was unsupported by substantial evidence. 16
{3} Before reaching Plaintiff’s arguments, we note that our review of the appeal is 17 hampered by her deficient briefing. Problem atic from start to finish in Plaintiff’s 18 briefing is her substantial disregard for appellate rules and brie fing requirements. To 193 begin with, throughout Plaintiff’s brief-in-ch ief and reply brief, she fails to comply 1 with the requirement in Rule 12-305(C)(1) NM RA of fourteen point or larger font. 2 Further, contrary to Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA, Plaintiff fails to set out an applicable 3 standard of review for the issues she rais es, to cite to the record for the facts, 4 testimony, argument, and circumstances she draws on to support her appellate 5 arguments, and fails, in regard to each i ssue raised, to demonstrate preservation. 6
{4} Preceding her summary of proceedings, Plaintiff sets out three pages of 7 background, containing the factual circum stances of the occurrences at the 8 convenience center without a single citation to the record. Her summary of 9 proceedings does not comply with Rule 12-213(A)(3), but instead consists of her 10 unsupported characterizations of selected parts of her testimony and the testimony of 11 several witnesses, her concerns about the dismissal of jurors, instructions to which she 12 claims she objected, and selected closi ng argument statements. Additionally, the 13 summary of proceedings is defi cient as to cites to the r ecord proper or transcripts of 14 the proceedings. See id. 15
{5} Several of Plaintiff’s arguments l ack the clarity n eeded to facilitate 16 understanding of her points. Contributing to the lack of cl arity is the fact that in the 17 limited instances in which Plaintiff has cited case law as authority for an issue, she 18 fails to provide pinpoint cite s and parentheticals showing where in the case we are to 194 locate support for her point or explaining inwhat manner the case supports the points 1 of error that she is raising. Further ex acerbating the lack-of-clarity issue is the fact 2 that Plaintiff selected for transcription for appeal only selected portions of the 3 proceedings, precluding inclusion of th e substance of evidence bearing on 4 propositions she has advanced in violation of Rule 12-213(A)(3). 5
{6} The rule violations and other serious in adequacies in Plaintiff’s briefing are too 6 egregious to overlook, and on that basis al one, we are under no obligation to consider 7 her points and arguments that she raises on appeal. See Rule 12-213(A)(3), (4); Santa 8 Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm’n , 1992-NMSC-044, ¶ 11, 114 N.M. 9 103, 835 P.2d 819 (holding that where a party fails to cite any portion of the record 10 to support its factual allegations, an appellate court need not consider its argument on 11 appeal); Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Ma ch. & Fabricating, Inc. , 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111 12 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063 (stating th at appellate courts presume the district court is 13 correct and the burden is on the appellant to clearly point out how the district court 14 erred); Muse v. Muse , 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M . 451, 200 P.3d 104 (“We will 15 not search the record for facts, arguments , and rulings in order to support generalized 16 arguments.”); Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 17 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (stating that this Court w ill not consider unclear or undeveloped 18 arguments); Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue , 2005-NMCA-022, 195 ¶ 14, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273 (“[O]n appeal , the party must specifically point out 1 where, in the record, the party invoked the court’s ruling on the i ssue. Absent that 2 citation to the record or any obvious preservation, we will not consider the issue.”); 3 In re Estate of Heeter , 1992-NMCA-032, ¶ 15, 113 N.M. 691, 831 P.2d 990 (“This 4 [C]ourt will not search the record to find evidence to support an appellant’s claims.”); 5 Woolwine v. Furr’s Inc. , 1987-NMCA-133, ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d 717 (“To 6 preserve an issue for review on appeal, itmust appear that [the] appellant fairly 7 invoked a ruling of the trial court on the samegrounds argued in the appellate court.”); 8 see also Bruce v. Lester , 1999-NMCA-051, ¶ 4, 127 N.M. 301, 980 P.2d 84 9 (explaining that in regard to compliance w ith briefing requirements, we treat pro se 10 parties no differently than we treatparties represented by lawyers). 11
{7} Notwithstanding these deficiencies, and although Plaintiff’s briefs leave us 12 under no obligation to do so, we proceed to ex amine the issues raised by Plaintiff. In 13 so doing, we do not attempt to supply the critical missing links by searching the record 14 on Plaintiff’s behalf or by making arguments for her. Rather, we show that even 15 considering the merits of Plaintiff’s points as she has presented them, we nevertheless 16 affirm the district court’s judgment. 17 I. INSTRUCTIONS 186 {8} Plaintiff complains that the court failed to present the complete general 1 instructions for slip and fall cases, improperly presented hypothesized facts in the jury 2 instructions, failed to include the res ipsa loquitur instruction Plaintiff requested, and 3 failed to provide a brief set of instructions upon which the parties agreed. 4 A. The District Court’s Instruction No. 14 5
{9} Plaintiff appears to complain about the court having changed UJI 13-1318 6 NMRA (slip and fall) in giving an instruc tion on Defendant’s duty. Plaintiff’s sole 7 reference to the record is to the court’s Instruction No. 14 regarding the duty that an 8 owner of a premises owes a visitor. That instruction, as given, reads: 9 An owner owes a visitor the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep 10 the premises safe for the visitor’s us e. This duty applies whether or not 11 a dangerous condition is obvious. In performing this duty, the owner is 12 charged with knowledge of any c ondition on the premises which was 13 caused by the owner or its employees. 14
{10} Plaintiff states that she was “severely prejudiced by the omission of the [c]ourt 15 to clearly notify the [j]ury of the duty of [Defendant] to keep the premises safe for the 16 Plaintiff’s use whether or not a dangerous condition is obvious, and charge[d] 17 [Defendant] with knowledge of any condition that it would have discovered upon 18 reasonable inspection.” She continues: 19 Failure in the duty to keep the premises safe constitutes evidence of 20 primary negligence on the part of . . . Defendant. Without complete and 21 unobstructed instruction that . . . De fendant’s duty applies, whether the 22 hazard is obvious and whether [Defendant] has notice, Plaintiff is 237 deprived of an important part of the theory that . . . Defendant was 1 negligent. 2
{11} It appears that Plaintiff’s sole point of error is that the court did not include 3 bracketed language in the uniform instruc tion saying that Defendant was charged with 4 knowledge of any condition that it would have discovered upon reasonable inspection 5 and that this deprived Plaintiff of a theory of her case. See UJI 13-1318 (stating in 6 part that “the owner . . . is charged w ith knowledge of any condition on the premises 7 of which the owner . . . would have ha d knowledge had . . . it made a reasonable 8 inspection of the premises or which was caused by the owner . . . or its employees” 9 (alterations omitted)). 10
{12} We hold that Instruction No. 14 fairly presents the issues and adequately covers 11 Plaintiff’s theory of negligence and the law to be applied. Pl aintiff does not provide 12 a persuasive explanation of why the adde d language would havemade a significant 13 difference in her theory, why she was prejudiced by the omission of the bracketed 14 language in regard to inspection, or w hy the omission caused a fundamentally unjust 15 result. In re Convisser , 2010-NMSC-037, ¶ 24, 148 N.M. 732, 242 P.3d 299 16 (recognizing that “an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice”); Vigil v. 17 Miners Colfax Med. Ctr. , 1994-NMCA-054, ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 665, 875 P.2d 1096 18 (noting that “absent prejudice, minor deviati ons [from] . . . Uniform Jury Instructions 19 [do not constitute] reversible error”). 208 {13} Nor does Plaintiff set out how the facts inthis case necessitated this additional 1 language. We cannot say that the court erred in determining that the bracketed 2 language was not applicable in this case. See Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft , 1984-NMSC-065, 3 ¶ 11, 101 N.M. 462, 684 P.2d 1127 (“It is not error to deny reque sted instructions 4 when the instructions given adequate ly cover the law to be applied.”); Diversey Corp. 5 v. Chem-Source Corp. , 1998-NMCA-112, ¶ 16, 125 N.M . 748, 965 P.2d 332 (stating 6 that jury instructions are to be read as a whole and when they fairly present the issues 7 and the applicable law in light of the eviden ce presented at trial, they are sufficient); 8 Gutierrez v. Albertsons, Inc. , 1991-NMCA-135, ¶ 17 n.1, 113 N.M. 256, 824 P.2d 9 1058 (recognizing that jury instructions not objected to become the law of the case). 10 B. The District Court’s Alleged Hypothesi zing of Facts in Jury Instructions 11
{14} Plaintiff points to Instruction No. 7, paragraph 4 as impermissibly being 12 “modified to hypothesize without any evidence.” The instruction as to which Plaintiff 13 complains substantially tracks the language of UJI 13-302A to 13-302D NMRA. See 14 id. (exemplifying the manner in which the statement of issues may be presented to the 15 jury). 16
{15} Plaintiff implies that the court erroneouslyfailed to give the uniform instruction 17 as written, but she fails to id entify any particular deficien cy, and she fails to explain 18 why any alleged deficiency or alleged modification in the uniform instruction made 199 or would have made a significant difference in the outcome in th is case or how the 1 instruction, as given, caused an unjust result. Nor does sh e show how she was 2 prejudiced. See Vigil , 1994-NMCA-054, ¶ 19 (noting that “absent prejudice, minor 3 deviations [from] . . . Uniform Jury Instru ctions [do not constitute ] reversible error”). 4 In sum, Plaintiff’s argument fails to demonstrate a basis for reversal. 5 C. The District Court’s Alleged Failure to Include Plaintiff’s Requested Jury 6 Instruction 7
{16} Plaintiff asserts that the court erred inrefusing her “tendere d jury instruction 8 that included the [r]es [i]psa [l]oquitur that allows . . . Plaintiff to meet [her] burden 9 of proof[,]” claiming that this constitute d a theory of her case and that she “was 10 severely prejudiced” by the refusal. Plainti ff’s argument is not clear. Plaintiff fails 11 to explain why refusal of a res ipsa loquitur instruction was error, was prejudicial to 12 her case, or caused a fundamentally unjust re sult; nor does she set out how facts in the 13 case necessitated the instruction. We declin e further review of Plaintiff’s unclear and 14 inadequately developed res ipsa loquitur argument. See Headley , 2005-NMCA-045, 15 ¶ 15 (stating that this Court will not c onsider unclear or undeveloped arguments). 16 D. The District Court’s Alleged Failure toProvide a Brief Set of Instructions 17 Upon Which the Parties Agreed 18
{17} Plaintiff complains that the court erroneously allowed changes and 19 modifications to jury instructions and allowed additional instructions over Plaintiff’s 2010 objections, and that “the ‘agreed to’ jury in structions were completely obscured.” She 1 also complains that she was not “provided the opportunity to properly object[.]” 2 Plaintiff fails to set out any facts, proceedings, arguments, objections, or 3 circumstances to support her assertions. It is entirely unclear what Plaintiff means in 4 her bold heading statement that the court failed to provide a brief set of instructions 5 upon which the parties agreed, and she fails to provide any ar gument or authority 6 clarifying and supporting her broad-scale attack on the court’s manner of settling 7 instructions. We do not attempt further revi ew of Plaintiff’s unclear argument in this 8 regard. See id. 9 II. Plaintiff’s Argument that Questions of Law Must be Determined by the 10 Court 11
{18} Plaintiff’s point on appeal titled “questi ons of law must be determined by the 12 court” attacks the court’s allowance of Defendant’s questioning of witnesses and 13 arguments in regard to the applicability of 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (2012) to the Cañon 14 Convenience Center operate d by Sandoval County. See Occupational Safety and 15 Health Standards (OSHA), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1 (2012) (stating the purpose and scope 16 of Part 1910 of Title 29 of th e Code of Federal Regulations ). Plaintiff attacks the 17 court’s “fail[ure] to decide or provide instruction to the jury on these questions of 18 law.” She complains that Defendant presented argument and evidence that was 19 “reasonably calculated with the sole purpose of bringing the jury issues of law that are 2011 outside the role of the jury to decide.” She asserts that Defendant presented 1 “testimony [that] was extremely prejudicial, confusing, and misleading to the jury as 2 supported by the post-trial interviews where several members of the jury stated that 3 they felt that federal safety guidelines in OSHA did not apply to Sandoval County in 4 general and the convenience center specifi cally.” She argues that the improper 5 arguments and improper use of the evidence improperly influenced the jury verdict 6 and constituted reversibleerror. Plaintiff faults the court for not deciding issues in 7 regard to the application of federal and state safety laws as questions of law, not fact. 8
{19} Plaintiff’s sole citation to the record is to a single, innocuous statement of 9 Defendant’s counsel during questioning of an e xpert witness. Other than to assert that 10 the applicability of the safety laws was a question confined to the court and not the 11 jury, Plaintiff does not provide record citations to the testimony, argument, and rulings 12 that, in her view, improperly influenced the jury verdict. Apparently in support of her 13 allegation of prejudice, Plaintiff refers to the not-of-record post-verdict interviews 14 with jurors. Rangel v. Save Mart, Inc. , 2006-NMCA-120, ¶ 36, 140 N.M. 395, 142 15 P.3d 983 (recognizing that “[t]his Court will not consider and couns el should not refer 16 to matters not of record in their brie fs” (internal quotati on marks and citation 17 omitted)). 1812 {20} We decline further review of Plai ntiff’s inadequately supported and 1 undeveloped argument regarding the appli cability of OSHA, its applicability in this 2 case, and any alleged OSHA-re lated error made by the district court. Proper review 3 of this issue would require this Court to search the record for evidence of error, to 4 develop Plaintiff’s arguments for her, and to rule upon the argument that we had 5 developed; this we will not do. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock , 2013- 6 NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (explaining that the appellate court will not rule on an 7 inadequately briefed issue that would re quire the appellate c ourt do an appellant’s 8 work for them by developing arguments on their behalf b ecause doing so would strain 9 judicial resources and lead the court to promulgate case law based on our own 10 speculation of what a party’s argument might be rather than the parties’ carefully 11 considered arguments). 12 III. Plaintiff’s Collateral Source Argument 13
{21} Plaintiff complains that the district court improperly allowed evidence 14 regarding outside financial sources in vi olation of the collateral source rule. See 15 Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Co-op., Inc. , 2013-NMSC-017, ¶ 48, 301 16 P.3d 387 (“The classic statemen t of the collateral source rule is that compensation 17 received from a collateral source does not operate to reduce damages recoverable from 18 a wrongdoer.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). She argues 1913 that the evidence was “misleading, and severely prejudicial against [her] as supported 1 by post[-]trial statement by the jurors that they felt . . . Plaintiff was misleading the 2 jury about the damages.” She also ascribes improper motivation on the part of the 3 defense in getting into the collateral sources in closing argument, contending that the 4 purpose of doing so was to get the jury to feel that Plaintiff was misleading the jury 5 about the damages. 6
{22} Plaintiff does not cite to Defendant’s closing argument. Nor does she provide 7 any evidence of the not-of-record post -trial discussions with jurors. See Rangel , 2006- 8 NMCA-120, ¶ 36 (stating that “counsel should not refer to matters not of record in 9 their briefs” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). She does not explain in 10 what manner the evidence was improperly admitted, nor does she provide authority 11 to support her position. Moreover, she fails to adequately show how the evidence 12 improperly prejudiced her case. Plainti ff merely relies on an unsupported assertion 13 that “[t]he improper use of such eviden ce is, by definition, reasonably calculated to 14 improperly influence the verdict.” 15
{23} Plaintiff’s argument, unsupported by authority or by citations to the record 16 proper, and failing to demonstrate prej udice, provides no basis for reversal. See In re 17 Convisser , 2010-NMSC-037 ¶ 24 (noting that “an assertion of prejudice is not a 18 showing of prejudice”); Headley , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 (recognizing that “we have 1914 no duty to entertain arguments when facts are cited without citation to the record, and 1 no authority is presented in support of an argument”). 2 IV. Plaintiff’s Arguments Related to theRules of Evidence and the Sufficiency 3 of the Evidence 4
{24} We will do our best to attempt an understanding of Plaintiff’s arguments with 5 respect to her remaining points on appeal. Wenote in advance that Plaintiff concludes 6 her discussion of these arguments with th e following, which appears to encapsulate 7 what she is attempting to get across. 8 In determining whether these errors committed by the trial court are 9 NOT harmless, the Court of Appeals looks at three things: (1) the 10 verdict IS NOT supported by substantial evidence without reference to 11 the improperly admitted evidence; (2) there IS NOT a disproportionate 12 amount of permissible evidence that the improperly admitted evidence 13 appears minuscule in comparison; and (3) there IS substantial conflicting 14 evidence to discredit th e permissible evidence. 15 Plaintiff does not cite any authority in s upport of this statement. And she fails to 16 interweave into her arguments her view of what we look at in a substantial evidence 17 appeal in order to attempt topersuade us that the district court committed reversible 18 error. We shall briefly identify each of these unclear and undeveloped arguments as 19 we interpret them from Plaintiff’s brief. 20 A. Plaintiff’s Argument as to Improper Admission of Hearsay Evidence 21
{25} Plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in allowing tw o defense witnesses, 22 Robert Sanchez and Paul Martinez, to provide hearsay evidence regarding the 2315 accident, the condition of the convenience cen ter in question and its similarity to 1 another waste site, the Conejo Convenience Station in Valencia County. Plaintiff 2 does not explain in what manner the evid ence was inadmissible hearsay and in what 3 manner she was prejudiced by th e evidence and therefore did not receive a fair trial, 4 as such, we decline further review of this issue. See Headley , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 5 (recognizing that this Court has no duty to entertain unclear arguments and arguments 6 for which the appellant has failed to provide authority). 7 B. Plaintiff’s Argument as to Improper Denial of Evidence 8
{26} Plaintiff apparently unsuccessfully attempte d to have the jury consider “relevant 9 evidence” and “critical evidence” of a Vale ncia County court case involving the site 10 about which Sanchez and Martinez testified. Plaintiff does not explain in what 11 manner the excluded evidence wa s critical evidence, she does not address the basis for 12 the court’s ruling, nor does she demonstrate how she was prejudiced by the court’s 13 ruling or why the alleged error deprived her of a fair trial. We will not review 14 Plaintiff’s undeveloped argument. See id. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Argument That Defendant De nies That It Was Negligent and 16 States That Plaintiff Caused Her Own Injuries When She Opened the 17 Tailgate of Her Vehicle 18
{27} It appears that Plaintiff’s argument is that Defendant’s only witness, Russell 19 Crockett, testified that hefailed to perform his own duties, including the duty of 2016 spotter/attendant, to ensure public safety and that, if he had done so, Plaintiff would 1 not have parked as she did, which was too close to the dumpster to safely open the 2 tailgate of her truck. Plaintiff sets out a few lines of Crockett’s deposition testimony 3 and some of the testimony of Sanchez aboutCrockett’s duties to prove the point. 4
{28} It is impossible to determine how Plai ntiff gets from the testimony she sets out 5 to the assertion that Defendant’s evidence did not support the verdict. Our reading of 6 the testimony that Plaintiff sets out does not raise a reasonable inference that the 7 evidence in any way precluded a jury determination that Defendant was not negligent. 8 Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain how the testimony supports an argument of 9 insufficient evidence or denialof a fair trial. Plain tiff’s undeveloped argument does 10 not demonstrate a basis for reversal. See id. 11 D. Plaintiff’s Argument That Defendant De nies That Any Other Convenience 12 Centers in New Mexico Follow Standards to Protect the Public 13
{29} This argument is unclear. She appear s to argue that Defendant’s evidence, 14 position, and argument relating to other conve nience centers and lack of notice of any 15 hazard was such that (1) she was not given any opportunity to rebut it, and (2) that 16 Defendant had a duty to Plaintiff whether or not a dangerous condition was obvious. 17 Plaintiff does not explain how she did not have or receive an opportunity to rebut the 18 evidence and argument, nor doe s she explain how her view of duty has any relevance 1917 or logical or rational relationship to whatev er her point is intended to be. Plaintiff’s 1 unclear and undeveloped argument does not demonstrate a basis for reversal. See id. 2 E. Plaintiff’s Argument That Defendant States That Sandoval County 3 Convenience Stations Are Not Required to Follow the Safety Laws in 29 4 C.F.R. § 1910 5
{30} Plaintiff refers to a motion in limine f iled by Defendant “in regard[] to allowing 6 photos of Conejo Convenience Station to the objection of . . . Plaintiff” and sets out 7 what she represents, with no citation to the record, to be a transcript involving 8 testimony and discussion between counsel and the district court in regard to an OSHA 9 regulation and its application to convenien ce centers. Plaintiff does not explain how 10 anything she sets out shows any conceivabl e error. As such, Plaintiff’s argument 11 provides no basis for reversal. See Elane Photography , 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70 12 (stating that the appellate c ourt will not make arguments on behalf of the appellant or 13 guess at what a party’s argument might be). 14 CONCLUSION 15
{31} We affirm the judgment of the district court. 16
{32} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

__________________________________ 18 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 1918 WE CONCUR: 1

_________________________________ 2 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 3

_________________________________ 4 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 5