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*********************************************** 
MARILYN WOODEN, EXECUTOR (ESTATE

OF LONNIE THOMAS, SR.) v.

DINANYELLY E. PEREZ

(AC 44301)

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, the executor of the estate of the decedent T, sought a right

to title by adverse possession of a strip of the defendant’s property

located adjacent to certain real property that T owned at the time of

his death. A was thereafter substituted as the plaintiff after he was

appointed the successor administrator of T’s estate. The trial court

subsequently granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the action and

rendered judgment thereon on the basis that A lacked standing to pursue

an action on behalf of the estate, because the estate had no interest in

T’s property. On A’s appeal to this court, held that the trial court correctly

determined that A lacked standing because T devised the property to

a trust for the benefit of his children, and, therefore, only the trustees

of that trust, and not the executor or administrator of T’s estate, had

standing to prosecute the action: it was the owner of the property that

stood to benefit from a resolution of the action, and, thus, that had the

necessary personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, it was

undisputed that T devised the property to a trust, and, accordingly, on

T’s death, title to that property immediately passed to that trust; moreover, A’s attempt to assert standing on a theory of statutory aggrievement

arising out of language in the applicable statute (§ 45a-321) was likewise

unavailing, because there was no allegation that the property was needed

to satisfy the debts of the estate, and, therefore, A failed to allege the

necessary factual predicate to demonstrate that he was the proper party

to invoke judicial resolution of any adverse possession claim.

Argued October 20, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

Procedural History

Action seeking to quiet title to certain real property,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the defendant filed

a third-party complaint against First American Title

Insurance Company; subsequently, the court granted

the plaintiff’s motion to substitute Anthony E. Monelli,

administrator of the estate of Lonnie Thomas, Sr., as

the plaintiff; thereafter, the court, Pierson, J., granted

the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which the substitute plaintiff appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

Steven P. Kulas, for the appellant (substitute plaintiff).

Ian Cole, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this adverse possession action, the

substitute plaintiff, Anthony E. Monelli, as administrator of the estate of the decedent, Lonnie Thomas, Sr.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting

the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Dinanyelly

E. Perez, on the ground that the substitute plaintiff

lacked standing to maintain the action.1 The substitute

plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly determined

that he lacked standing to pursue the adverse possession claim because the decedent had devised the property at issue to a trust for the benefit of his children

and, therefore, only the trustees of that testamentary

trust, and not the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate, had standing to prosecute the present

action. We disagree with the substitute plaintiff and,

accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.

The record reveals the following relevant procedural

history and undisputed facts. In the underlying action,

the substitute plaintiff claimed, on behalf of the decedent’s estate, a right to title by adverse possession of

a strip of the defendant’s property that was adjacent

to property at 116 North Prospect Street Extension in

Ansonia, which the decedent had owned at the time

of his death in 1989. According to the complaint, the

decedent and his successors in interest had used that

portion of the defendant’s property as a driveway and

for other purposes for more than fifteen years. The

decedent died testate, and his will, which was admitted

to probate, provided in relevant part: ‘‘As to my property

known as 116 North Prospect Street Extension, Ansonia, Connecticut, the family homestead, I hereby devise

and bequeath to Larry Thomas and Marilyn Wooden,

in trust for all my following [named] children . . .

share and share alike. That said Trustees shall maintain

said family homestead until, in their judgment, they

determine it can be liquidated or purchased by one or

more of my children.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

On March 11, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to

dismiss the adverse possession action, asserting that

the substitute plaintiff lacked standing to pursue such

an action on behalf of the estate with respect to the

116 North Prospect Street Extension property because

the estate has no interest in that property due to the

express devise in the decedent’s will, which passed

legal title to the property to Marilyn Wooden and Larry

Thomas as cotrustees of a trust benefiting the decedent’s children. The substitute plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Although he did not dispute any of the relevant factual

allegations in the defendant’s motion to dismiss, he

asserted by way of legal argument that, until the estate

finally was administered, the estate continued to have

an interest in the property, and, therefore, he, in his

capacity as administrator of the estate, had standing to
pursue the adverse possession claim. The defendant

filed a reply memorandum responding to the substitute

plaintiff’s objection.

On September 18, 2020, the court, Pierson, J., issued

an order granting the motion to dismiss. The court held

that the substitute plaintiff was the substituted executor

of the decedent’s estate, not a trustee of the testamentary trust that owns the subject property. Moreover,

the court stated that ‘‘the [substitute] plaintiff has not

demonstrated, and the court does not find, that he has

a direct and personal interest in the subject property or

the claims asserted in this action.’’ The court concluded

that the principal case relied on by the substitute plaintiff in support of his position that he had standing,

O’Connor v. Chiascione, 130 Conn. 304, 33 A.2d 336

(1943), was readily distinguishable because ‘‘that case

does not involve a testamentary trust, nor does it stand

for the proposition that an administrator or executor

has standing to pursue a legal action affecting land

owned or claimed by a testamentary trust. Moreover,

and as correctly pointed out by the defendant,

[although] General Statutes § 45a-321 (a) provides that

the fiduciary of an estate ‘shall, during settlement, have

the possession, care and control of the decedent’s [real]

property’, it also contains the relevant qualification,

‘unless such real property has been specifically devised

. . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis altered.) In light of that qualifying

language, and because the 116 North Prospect Street

Extension property was specifically devised in the decedent’s will to a trust, the court concluded that the substitute plaintiff’s reliance on § 45a-321 was misplaced and

that he had demonstrated no other interest in the property as executor that was sufficient to confer standing.

This appeal followed.

‘‘The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion

to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-31 (a). [I]t is the burden

of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in

his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that

he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the

dispute. . . . Because a determination regarding the

trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction raises a question

of law, our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 63–64,

946 A.2d 862 (2008); see also Johnson v. Rell, 119 Conn.

App. 730, 734, 990 A.2d 354 (2010) (‘‘[i]n an appeal from

the granting of a motion to dismiss on the ground of

subject matter jurisdiction, this court’s review is plenary’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Our Supreme Court repeatedly has stated ‘‘that

[s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep

aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to

ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits

brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that
judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others

are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and

vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are

ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant

makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered

or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative

capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of

concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . .

‘‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement

exist, classical and statutory. . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must

demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in

the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to

a general interest that all members of the community

share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the

[alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected

that specific personal or legal interest. . . .

‘‘Statutory aggrievement [however] exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts

of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory

aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to

those who claim injury to an interest protected by that

legislation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

McWeeny v. Hartford, supra, 287 Conn. 64–65.

On the basis of our review of the record and briefs,

and consideration of the parties’ legal arguments, we

conclude that the substitute plaintiff lacks standing to

pursue the adverse possession action and, therefore,

the court properly granted the motion to dismiss. The

present action was brought on a theory of adverse possession and sought essentially to quiet title to a strip

of land adjacent to 116 North Prospect Street Extension.

Accordingly, it is the owner of the 116 North Prospect

Street Extension property that stands to benefit from

a favorable resolution of the action and, thus, has the

necessary personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to confer standing under a theory of classical

aggrievement. It is undisputed in the record that the

decedent devised all of his title in 116 North Prospect

Street Extension to a testamentary trust with Marilyn

Wooden and Larry Thomas named as cotrustees. Thus,

upon the decedent’s death in 1989, legal title to 116

North Prospect Street Extension immediately passed

to that trust. See Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn. App. 309,

321, 830 A.2d 304 (explaining that fiduciary of decedent’s estate possesses only limited statutory right

regarding property devised in will, legal title to which

vests in devisees upon death of testator), cert. denied,

266 Conn. 929, 837 A.2d 804 (2003). Accordingly, the

trust, not the estate, was the owner of the property and

the party with the specific legal interest in any adverse

possession claim benefitting the property.

As stated by the court, the substitute plaintiff’s

attempt to assert standing on a theory of statutory
aggrievement arising out of language in § 45a-321 likewise is entirely unavailing. Section 45a-321, by its

express terms, has limited applicability with respect to

real property that has been specifically devised. Further, the substitute plaintiff’s reliance on the statute’s

‘‘possession, care and control’’ language is misplaced.

In Brill v. Ulrey, 159 Conn. 371, 377, 269 A.2d 262 (1970),

our Supreme Court held that an executor of an estate

lacked standing to institute and to maintain an action

to quiet title to real estate if the complaint contained

no allegation that the property at issue was needed to

satisfy claims of the estate. The court explained that,

in O’Connor v. Chiascione, supra, 130 Conn. 306–308,

it had described the interest that an executor or administrator of an estate had in real estate that was owned

by a decedent at the time of his death as follows: ‘‘On

the death of an owner, title to real estate at once passes

to his heirs, subject to being defeated should it be necessary for the administration of the estate that it be sold

by order of the court, and subject to the right of the

administrator to have possession, care and control of it

during the settlement of the estate, unless the [P]robate

[C]ourt shall otherwise order. . . . The administrator

does not have title to the real estate [and] his rights in

it cease at the settlement of the estate . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Brill v. Ulrey, supra, 159

Conn. 375. The court in Brill continued: ‘‘The O’Connor

decision makes it clear that the power of ‘possession,

care and control’ granted to an executor under General

Statutes § 45-252 [now § 45a-321] over real estate during

the settlement of an estate is given only to protect the

rights of creditors. . . . The executor’s power is in

derogation of the rights of the heirs, and since it is so

limited in purpose, it is properly exercised only when

the exigencies of the estate so require. [If] . . . no allegation is made that the property is needed to meet

claims against the estate, there can be no occasion to

permit the exercise of the executor’s power.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 375–76; see also Zanoni

v. Lynch, supra, 79 Conn. App. 321 (‘‘the fiduciary of

a decedent’s estate possesses a limited statutory right

to interfere with the passage of title to a devisee’’).

In the present case, in addition to the fact that the

estate has no legal title as a consequence of the specific

devise of the subject property to the trust, the complaint

contains no allegations that the 116 North Prospect

Street Extension property is needed to satisfy the debts

of the estate. Any claim of adverse possession to the

adjacent property, therefore, should have been brought

by the trustees. Because the substitute plaintiff, as the

administrator of the estate, failed to allege in the pleadings the necessary factual predicate to demonstrate that

he is the proper party to invoke judicial resolution of

any adverse possession claim pertaining to 116 North

Prospect Street Extension, the court properly granted

the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that
the substitute plaintiff lacked standing.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 The underlying action originally was commenced by Marilyn Wooden

solely in her capacity as the purported executor of the decedent’s estate.

The trial court later granted Wooden’s motion to substitute Monelli as the

plaintiff after the Probate Court appointed him as the successor administrator of the estate.

We note that Perez filed a third-party complaint against her title insurance

company, First American Title Insurance Company. The third-party defendant, however, did not participate in the present appeal, and all references

to the defendant in this opinion are to Perez only.