ANTHONY A. v

. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION* (SC 19565)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Robinson, Js.*

Syllabus

The petitioner sought a writ ofhabeas corpus, claiming that the respondent Commissioner of Correction had incorrectly classified him as a sex offender without providing procedural due process as required under the federal constitution. The petitioner had been convicted of unlawful restraint in the first degree, failure to appear and violation ofprobation. Prior to the petitioner’s incarceration, the state entered a nolle prosequi

as to a charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship after the petitioner’s wife recanted her statement to the police that the petitioner hadsexuallyassaultedherduringthe sameincidentthatformedthebasis for the charges of which he was convicted. Thereafter, the respondent classified the petitioner as a sex offender, even though the petitioner

was never convicted of a sex offense and had no prior history as a sex offender. As aresult ofthat classification, the Department ofCorrection required the petitioner to participate in sex offender treatment or risk forfeiture of supervised community release, parole and the opportunity to earnriskreduction earned credit. Thepetitionerrefusedtoparticipate in treatment. The habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that, because the petitioner failed to allege a protected liberty interest, the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction. On the granting ofcertification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the habeas court’s judgment and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits. The Appellate Court concluded that the petitioner’s allegations establishedaprotectedlibertyinterestunderthe stigmaplustestapplied by the federal courts to determine whether an inmate who challenges, inter alia, his allegedly wrongful classification as a sex offender has established such an interest. On the granting ofcertification, the respondent appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner’s allegations in the habeas petition, which this court was required to accept as true, were sufficientto allege aprotectedlibertyinterestthat conferredjurisdiction

on the habeas court, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court properly reversedthe habeas court’sjudgment; the petitioner satisfied his burden of establishing a protected liberty interest under the applicable stigma plus test, as the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had improperly classified him a sex offender established stigma, and his allegation that he was required to participate in sex offender treatment or risk forfeiting parole eligibility, community release, and good time credits established that he suffered negative consequences as a result of that allegedly erroneous classification inthatthe consequences were qualitatively different from the punishments usually suffered by inmates such that they constituted a major change in the conditions of confinement that amounted to a grievous loss. Argued February 23—officially released August 29, 2017

Procedural History Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Sferrazza, J .; judgment dismissing the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting ofcertification, appealedtotheAppellate Court,Alvord, Sheldon and Norcott, Js., which reversed the habeas court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, and the respondent, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Edward Wilson, Jr., assistant attorney general, withwhom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Terrence M. O’Neill and Steven R. Strom, assistant attorneys general, for the appellant (respondent).
Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellee (petitioner).Opinion ESPINOSA,J. Thepresentappealrequiresusto determine the appropriate test for resolving whether an inmate’sprison classificationimplicates aprotectedlibertyinterest. The respondent, the CommissionerofCorrection, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Courtreversingthejudgmentofthehabeascourt, which dismissed the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus filed bythe petitioner, AnthonyA., for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction.1 Anthony A

. v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 Conn. App. 226, 242, 122 A.3d 730 (2015). The respondent claims that, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Court, the habeas court properly dismissedthepetitiononthebasisthatthepetitionerfailed to allege a protected liberty interest. The petitioner responds that the allegations in the petition, which claimthathewasincorrectlyclassifiedasasexoffender and that he suffered negative consequences as a result of that erroneous classification, sufficiently alleged a cognizable liberty interest to conferjurisdiction on the court. We agree with the petitioner and affirm thejudgment of the Appellate Court.
Because this appeal arises from the habeas court’s ruling dismissingthe petition onthe basis thatthe court lackedjurisdiction, wetakethe factstobe those alleged inthepetition, includingthose facts necessarilyimplied from the allegations, construing them in favor of the petitioner for purposes of deciding whether the court had subject matterjurisdiction.2 See Dorry v. Garden, 313 Conn. 516, 521, 98 A.3d 55 (2014). The allegations in the petition and attachments thereto establish that the petitioner is an inmate who was convicted after pleading guilty to unlawful restraint in the first degree, failure to appear and violation of probation. Initially, the victim, the petitioner’s wife, also told the police that the petitioner had sexually assaulted her, but she subsequently recanted that statement, and the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship. Upon the petitioner’s incarceration, he was classified pursuant to an administrative directive of the Department of Correction (department), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each inmate under the custody of the Commissioner of Correction shall be classified to the mostappropriate assignmentforsecurityandtreatment needstopromote effectivepopulationmanagementand preparation for release from confinement and supervision.

. . .’’ Department of Correction, Administrative Directive 9.2 (1) (effective July 1, 2006) (Administrative Directive 9.2). An inmate’s classification depends on his risks and needs scores, each of which is evaluated pursuant to specific factors. Administrative Directive 9.2 (8) (A) and (B).3 Those scores and the resulting classification determine the inmate’s ‘‘appropriate confinement location, treatment, programs and employ-ment assignment whether in a facility or the community.’’ Administrative Directive 9.2 (3) (A).
The department classified the petitioner as a sex offender, despitethefactthathehadnotbeenconvicted of a sex offense and had no prior history as a sex offender.4As aconsequence ofthe erroneous classification, the petitioner was offered a choice. He could participate in ‘‘sex treatment’’ that was recommended by his offender accountability plan or risk forfeiture of supervised community release, parole and the opportunity to earn risk reduction earned credit (good time credits). He refused to participate in treatment.
The petitioner subsequently filed this petition, claimingthathe hadbeen classified as asex offenderwithout being provided procedural due process. At the hearing
on the petition, the court first heard argument as to whether it had jurisdiction. The petitioner argued that he had alleged sufficient facts to establish a cognizable liberty interest. Specifically, he argued that the classification had been predicated on erroneous facts, stigmatized him, and that he had been materially burdened by the classification.
As to those material burdens, the petitioner alleged that he suffered several negative consequences as a result of the classification. He alleged a direct causal link between the classification and his increased securitystatus. He allegedacontingentrelationshipbetween the classification, the recommendedtreatmentplanand his eligibility for good time credits, parole and community release. That is, he claimed that the department had notified him that if he did not participate in the recommended sex offendertreatment, he riskedforfeiting all three ofthose benefits. That claim finds support in the department’s offender accountability plan that
was attached to the petition and provides: ‘‘Failure to comply with [the plan’s] recommendations

. . . shall negatively impact your earning of [good time credits]

. . . and/or chances of [department] supervised community release and/or parole.’’ (Emphasis added.) Finally, although the petitioner did not allege in the petition that he actually suffered harassment as aresult ofthe classification, he did claim in an inmate administrativeremedyformthathehadsubmittedtothe department that the sex offender classification had the ‘‘potential’’ to prejudice prison staff and other inmates against him.5 The habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that because the petitioner failed to allege any protected liberty interest, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Upon the habeas court’s grant of certification to appeal, the petitioner appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court first considered whether the petition had been rendered moot by the petitioner’s release from prison prior to oral argument. AnthonyA.

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 159 Conn. App.232–33. The court observed that the petitioner had informed the court that, after his release, he had been arrested in connection with new charges and was being detained at New Haven Correctional Center. Id., 232. Because of the petitioner’s new arrest, the Appellate Court reasoned thatthere was ‘‘areasonable possibility that, should he return to prison, he will again be classified as being in need ofsex offender treatment because the department assigned him a sex offender treatment needscorewitharecommendedsexoffendertreatment referral during his previous incarceration.’’ Id., 234. The court concluded, therefore, that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applied.6 Id., 233. Turning to the merits of the petitioner’s claim, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court on the basis ofits conclusion that the petitioner’s allegations established a protected liberty interest underthe stigmaplus test applied bythe federal courts, which it found to be appropriate under the facts ofthe present case. Id., 238–40. The court concluded that the petitioner’s allegation that the department had falsely labeled him a sex offender established stigma, and that the petitioner’s allegation that he had been coerced to participate in sex offender treatment on the basis of that erroneous classification established the ‘‘plus’’ element of the test. Id., 240–41. This certified appeal followed. ‘‘In order to state a claim for a denial of procedural due process

. . . a prisoner must allege that he possessedaprotectedlibertyinterest, andwasnotafforded the requisite process before being deprived of that liberty interest.

. . . A petitioner has no right to due process

. . . unless a liberty interest has been deprived

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Colemanv. CommissionerofCorrection, 111 Conn. App. 138, 141, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905, 962 A.2d 793 (2009). Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether the petitioner has alleged a protectedlibertyinterest. That questionimplicatesthe subject matterjurisdiction of the habeas court. See Baker

v. CommissionerofCorrection, 281 Conn. 241, 261–62, 914 A.2d 1034 (2007) (holding that habeas court lacked subject matterjurisdictionbecause inmate did not have cognizable liberty interest in parole eligibility status).
The parties disagree as to the applicable testto determine whether the petitioner’s allegations are sufficient to establish that the respondent’s actions implicated a protected liberty interest. The respondent, relying on this court’s decision in Wheway v. Warden, 215 Conn. 418, 431, 576 A.2d 494 (1990), argues that because he enjoys full discretion in assigning classification and needs scores to inmates, such classifications cannot,
as a matter oflaw, give rise to a protected liberty interest. The petitioner contends thatbecause the classifica-tion stigmatized him and because he suffered negative consequences, he has satisfied his burden of establishing a protected liberty interest under the stigma plus test. We agree with the petitioner that the stigma plus test applies under the circumstances of the case, and
we conclude that his allegations sufficiently allege a protected liberty interest.
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477–84, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995), the United States Supreme Court reviewed its earlier decisions that had considered under what circumstances allegations by inmates were sufficient to establish that state action had implicated a protected liberty interest. In the earliest case in that line of cases, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), the court addressedwhetherthe revocation ofparole implicated a liberty interest. The court rejected the traditional view that the question turned on whether parole
was avestedrightoraprivilege. Id., 481–82. The inquiry, the court stated, should instead center on both the weight of the loss and the nature of the interest implicated. Id., 481. That is, only state action that threatens to inflict a ‘‘grievous loss’’ to an interestthatfalls within the parameters of the ‘‘ ‘liberty or property’ language of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment’’ will trigger the right to procedural due process. Id., 481–82. Because revocation ofparole satisfied both ofthose criteria, the court reasoned, it called for ‘‘some orderly process, however informal.’’ Id., 482.
In its next decision addressing inmates’ due process rights, the court shifted the inquiry away from the nature ofthe interest affected to the nature ofthe state action taken. In Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), Nebraskainmates challenged disciplinary sanctions withholding good time credits. The applicable state statutes specifiedthat good time credits were to ‘‘be forfeited onlyforserious misbehavior.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 557. The court recognizedthatthe dueprocess clause doesnotdirectly guarantee aprisonergoodtime credits. Id. By expressly limiting the withholding of good time credits to instances of ‘‘major misconduct,’’ however, Nebraska’s statutehadgivenrisetoa‘‘state-created’’ libertyinterest that was protected by the due process clause. Id.
The court elaborated on both the grievous loss and state created liberty interest inquiries in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976), in which the court rejected the prisoners’ claim thatatransferto aMassachusettsprisonwithlessfavorable conditions implicated a protected liberty interest. The court acknowledged that the transfers had a ‘‘substantial adverse impact’’ on the prisoners. Id., 224. Whether the prisoners had suffered a grievous loss of liberty due to the transfers, however, must be understood in the context of their status as individuals whohave beenincarceratedfollowing aconviction. Because prisoners have already had their liberty greatly curtailed, such transfers do not constitute agrievous loss. Id. The court further observed that the federal constitution does not require a state to have more than one prison, nor does it guarantee placement in a particular prison. Id. The transfers, therefore, fell within the ‘‘normal limits or range ofcustody which the conviction has authorized the [s]tate to impose.’’ Id., 225. If the court
were to afford due process protection to every substantial deprivation suffered by prisoners, it reasoned, that would risk subjecting ‘‘to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than ofthe federal courts.’’ Id. As to whether a state statute had created alibertyinterest, in dictum, the courtrelied
on the broad discretion that Massachusetts prison officials had to transfer an inmate ‘‘for whatever reason
or no reason at all’’ to reject the proposition that the prisoners had a state created due process right in avoiding the transfers. Id., 228. In contrast to the facts of Wolff , the court observed, there were no state laws that circumscribedthat discretion orsubjected itto any conditions. Id., 226.
The court’s subsequent decisions had picked up on the theme sounded in the Meachum dictum, focusing the inquiry on the extent to which state laws had cabined the discretion ofstate actors. The court in Sandin viewedthis line ofcases as adigressionfromtheproper inquiry—intothe nature ofthe interestandthe extent of the loss suffered—infavorofanunhelpful, ‘‘mechanical dichotomy’’ of mandatory versus discretionary decisions. Sandinv. Connor, supra, 515 U.S. 479. For example, in Greenholtz v. Inmates ofthe Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11–12, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979), the court concluded that the applicable state statute, which provided that the board of parole ‘‘shall’’ order a prisoner’s release on parole ‘‘unless’’ it found one of four exceptions to be proven, created an ‘‘expectancy of release’’ in the inmates that gaveriseto alibertyinterest. Thefixationonthis dichotomy resulted in prisoners ‘‘comb[ing] regulations in search ofmandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges.’’ Sandin

v. Connor, supra, 481. Courts responded accordingly, centering their due process analyses entirely on the language ofstate statutes and regulations. Id.; see, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 470–71, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (relying on mandatory language in state regulations to conclude that administrative segregationimplicatedprotectedlibertyinterest, despite also concluding that such confinement fell within conditions ‘‘ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence’’). This approachwasparticularlyproblematic in light of the fact that prison regulations, on which both litigants and the courts were relying to infer statecreated rights, were not ‘‘designed to confer rights on inmates,’’ but, rather, were ‘‘primarily designedto guide correctional officials in the administration ofaprison.’’ Sandin v. Connor, supra, 481–82. As a result, the mandatory versus discretionary approach to identifying inmates’ liberty interests created a disincentive for states to enact regulations and encouraged courts to micromanage prisons. Id., 482.
Sandin represented the court’s return to the original focus of the liberty interest inquiry—the nature of the interest involved and the extent of the loss suffered. The prisoner in Sandin alleged that being placed in administrative segregation for misconduct implicated his right to due process. Id., 476. The decision articulated two separate inquiries for determining whether a prisoner has alleged a protected liberty interest, either
one created directly by the due process clause itself,
or indirectly as a state created right. An independent federal constitutionalinterestis implicatedwhenconditions are imposed on an inmate that ‘‘[exceed] the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of its own force

. . . .’’ Id., 484. State created constitutional interests are ‘‘limited to freedom from restraint which

. . . imposes atypical and significanthardship onthe inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’’ Id.
Sandin also acknowledged that, in ‘‘certain situations,’’ a different inquiry is appropriate to determine whether the due process clause directly ‘‘confers a liberty interest’’ on inmates. Id., 479 n.4. Specifically, the court cited to its decision in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1980), for the propositionthatwhere astate action has ‘‘ ‘stigmatizing consequences’ ’’ for a prisoner and results in a punishment that is ‘‘ ‘qualitatively different’ ’’ from that ‘‘characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime,’’ the protected liberty interest arises from the due process clause directly. Sandin v. Conner, supra, 479 n.4. In Vitek, the court held that an inmate who had challenged his involuntary transferto a mental hospital had
a cognizable liberty interest in not being transferred to the hospital and subjected to mandatory psychiatric treatments without adequate due process. Vitek v. Jones, supra, 494. The court recognized that the stigma sufferedbypersons committedto amentalinstitution—
aswellasthe accompanying, significant, negative social consequences—is indisputable. Id., 492. Involuntary commitmentto amentalhospital, moreover, was ‘‘qualitatively different’’ from the punishments usually suffered by prisoners. Id., 493. The transfer, therefore ‘‘constituted a major change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a grievous loss

. . . .’’7 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 488; see also id., 492.
Courts have referred to this third inquiry as the

‘‘ ‘stigma plus’ ’’ test. See, e.g., Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d77, 81 (2d Cir. 2010). It doesnot appearthattheprisoner in Vitek challenged the determination that he was mentally ill, and, accordingly, the court did not consider the veracity ofthat classification in concluding that he had alleged a protected liberty interest. We agree with the lower federal courts, however, that an inmate raising a due process claim pursuant to the stigma plus testin Vitekalsomustallegethefalsehoodofthestigmatizing label or classification.8 Id. Under the facts of the present case—where the petitioner has alleged that he
was stigmatizedwhenthe respondentwrongfullyclassified him as asex offender, and alleges as the ‘‘plus’’ that he suffered various negative consequences, including being compelled to participate in treatment or risk forfeiting good time credits and parole eligibility—the stigma plus test is the best fit. Our inquiry, therefore, focuses on whether the allegations ofthe petition demonstrate that the classification was wrongful and stigmatized the petitioner, and that the consequences suffered by the petitioner were ‘‘qualitatively different’’ from the punishments usually suffered by prisoners, so that they constituted a major change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a grievous loss.
Thefederalcourts ofappealshave arrivedatthe same conclusion, applying the stigma plus test to determine whetheraprisonerwho challenges his allegedlywrongful classification as a sex offender has established a protected liberty interest. We agree with the federal courts that the first part of the test—whether it is stigmatizing to be classified as a sex offender—may be dispatched with ease and relatively little analysis. That classification is uniquely stigmatizing. As the United States Court ofAppeals forthe Ninth Circuit explained: ‘‘We can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing
more stigmatizing consequences than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.

. . . One need only looktothe increasinglypopularMegan’sLaws, whereby statesrequiresexoffenderstoregisterwithlawenforcement officials who are then authorized to release information about the sex offender to the public, to comprehend the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997). As farasthe petitioner’s burden to demonstrate that the classification is wrongful, for purposes of jurisdiction, that requirement is satisfied by effective pleading and verified in a threshold inquiry—the petitioner simply must claim that the classification is false. At least one court has rejected a petitioner’s claim on the basis that he failed to do so. See Vega v. Lantz, supra, 596 F.3d 77 (concluding that petitioner failed to establish threshold requirement of alleging that classification as sex offender was false). In the present case, the petitioner has satisfied this requirementby claimingthathe didnot sexuallyassault his wife and pointing to her retraction of her initialstatements to the contrary.
The weightierproblem is resolving whether aprisoner’s allegations have established the ‘‘plus’’ factor. A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court highlightsthe difficulty ofdetermining what constitutes
a qualitative difference or major change in the conditions ofconfinement amounting to a grievous loss. One cannot do so without reference to what constitutes ‘‘typical’’ or ‘‘ordinary’’ conditions of confinement for
aprisoner. In Wilkinsonv.Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2005), the courtfound that the extreme conditions experienced by prisoners placed in a super maximum securityprison easily satisfied the ‘‘atypical and significant hardship’’ inquiry, an inquiry that is very similar to the ‘‘plus’’ portion of the stigma plus test. The court explained that ‘‘the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions ofconfinementisnotthelanguage ofregulations regarding those conditions but the nature ofthose conditions themselves in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 223. The extreme isolation and indeterminate length ofconfinement in asuper maximum security facility, the court held, established
a ‘‘dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotationmarksomitted.) Id. Whatmustbe determined, the court explained, is the degree of departure from the ‘‘baseline.’’ Id. The court in Wilkinson acknowledged that the lower federal courts have not arrived at
a uniform method of determining what the baseline is, but declined to resolve the question because it was unnecessary, given the extreme nature of confinement in a super maximum security facility. Id.
The emphasis in Wilkinson on the need to first determine the baseline requires that our inquiry be a pragmatic one, aimed at determining the degree to which the conditions alleged bythe petitioner depart from the expected norm ofprison confinement. For that reason, although the Supreme Court expressly has stated that dichotomies such as mandatory/discretionary and rights/privileges are not determinative as to whether a petitioner has established a protected interest; Sandin

v. Connor, supra, 515 U.S. 479; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. 483–84; such distinctions remain helpful to the extent that they are relevant to determining (1) what a prisoner ordinarily should expect from prison confinement, and (2) the degree to which particular conditions impose a hardship on a prisoner. For instance, in determiningwhethertherefusalto consider
an inmate eligible for parole or the denial of good time credits constitutes a major change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a grievous loss, it is relevant to consider the degree of discretion accorded to the officials makingthose decisions. The greaterthe discre-tion, the more difficult it becomes to establish a departure from the norm. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, supra, 427 U.S. 226–27 (finding no protected liberty interest in avoiding transfer to maximum security prison because officials had broad discretion to transfer inmates and prisoners had no right to be in particular prison).
Federalcourtshave consideredaninmate’sallegation that he was compelled to participate in sex offender treatment sufficient to satisfy the ‘‘plus’’ factor. See, e.g., Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 326–27 (3d Cir. 2010) (likening sex offender treatment program to forced transfer to mental institution in Vitek). Courts have found such treatment programs to be compulsory when the receipt of benefits, such as parole or good time credits, is conditioned on participation in treatment. See, e.g., Colemanv. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2004) (conditioning parole on sex offender registrationandtreatmentrenderedfacts ofcase ‘‘materially indistinguishable from Vitek’’); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 1999) (making sex offender therapy prerequisite for parole eligibilityrenderedtherapy ‘‘compelledtreatment’’ akin to ‘‘mandatory behavior modification’’ programs at issue in Vitek); Chambers v. Colorado Dept. ofCorrections, 205 F.3d 1237, 1239–41 (10th Cir.) (reduction of good time credits for failure to participate in sex offender therapy was ‘‘coercive consequence’’ establishing ‘‘plus’’ factor), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 974, 121 S. Ct. 419, 148 L. Ed. 2d 323 (2000). Courts have held to this rule notwithstanding the representations ofprison officials that participation in sex offender treatment is voluntary. Rather than rely on such characterizations, courts consistently have looked to whether significant negative consequences flowed from failure to participate in a ‘‘recommended’’ treatment program. See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, supra, 131 F. 3d 822, 829 (rejecting claim by prison officials that participation in treatment
was merely recommendation and voluntary, where treatment was condition of parole eligibility). By contrast, courts have found no protected liberty interest where an inmate has been labeled a sex offender and providedwitharecommendationforsex offendertreatment, but has been unable to demonstrate that he suffered any negative consequences for failure to participate in treatment. See Toney v. Owens, 779 F.3d 330, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2015).9
Connecticut law is not to the contrary. Although this court has addressed inmates’ claims that state action implicated a protected liberty interest, this appeal presents the first instance in which we are called upon to apply the stigma plus test in resolving that question. In fact, the two instances in which this court has considered the question ofwhether the actions ofprison officials gave rise to a protected liberty interest, the court resolved the issue by relying on authority that predated and was disapproved by Sandin

. Those cases, there-fore, are not controlling. Specifically, in Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 281 Conn. 243, we rejected the petitioner’s claim that he had been denied parole eligibility status on the basis of his improper classificationasaviolentoffender, concludingthatConnecticut’s statutory scheme does not create a cognizable liberty interest in parole eligibility status. The court in Baker restricted its discussion, however, to state created rights decisions thatthe United States Supreme Court subsequently criticized in Sandin

. Id., 253–54. The court in Baker did not discuss Sandin, and it does not appear that the petitioner claimed that he was stigmatizedbythe classification. Earlier, in Whewayv. Warden, supra, 215 Conn. 423, this court addressed the questionofwhetheraninmate’s classificationasamaximum security prisoner solely on the basis of a parole violation detainer implicated a protected liberty interest. Wheway was decided well before Sandin

. In concluding that the prisoner had no protected liberty interest in his classification, the court in Wheway relied exclusively on the level ofdiscretion enjoyed by prison officials in making the classification determination; id., 431; an approach that was subsequently criticized in Sandin

. Sandin v. Connor, supra, 515 U.S. 479. Turningto thepetitioner’s allegations, whichwe have noted must be accepted as true, we conclude that they
are sufficient to allege a protected liberty interest, thus invoking the jurisdiction ofthe habeas court. The petitioner alleged that he was classified as a sex offender, and that he was required to participate in sex offender treatment, or risk forfeiting parole eligibility, community release, and good time credits. These allegations
are precisely ofthe type that the majority ofthe courts of appeals have found to be sufficient to allege a protected liberty interest, such that a hearing now may proceed on the merits. See, e.g., Coleman v. Dretke, supra, 395 F.3d 222–23. The allegations are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the habeas court.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of victims of sexual assault, we decline to identify the alleged victim or others through whom her identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

* The listing ofjustices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
1 We granted the respondent’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly reverse the trial court’sjudgment based on its determination that the trial court improperly held that it lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s habeas petition challenging his prison classification of sexual treatment needs?’’ Anthony A. v. Commissioner of Correction, 319 Conn. 934, 125 A.3d 208 (2015).

2 On appeal, the respondent now seeks to dispute the facts as alleged in the petition. For example, the respondent argues in his brief to this court that the petitioner was merely assigned a ‘‘ ‘sexual needs treatment score,’ ’’ whichtherespondentcontendsisnotthe equivalentoflabelingthepetitioner

a sex offender. Even if we were not required on appeal to take the facts as alleged in the petition for purposes of determining whether the court had jurisdiction, the respondent waived this claim at the hearing on the petition.At that time, the respondent had the opportunity to contest the petitioner’s allegation that he had been labeled a sex offender. The respondent failed to do so. Specifically, during the hearing, the court asked the respondent whether he had any objection to the court taking the facts from the allegations in the petition for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner had alleged a cognizable liberty interest, and the respondent answered: ‘‘No objection, Your Honor.’’ Later, the court stated: ‘‘I’m prepared to rule on this matter and in my ruling I’m going to assume for purposes of this ruling that the factual allegations by [the petitioner] are correct, in that he has been classified as a sex offender when he was not really a sex offender.’’ At that point, the respondent could have disputed the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had classified him as a sex offender, but he elected not to do so. Therefore, the respondent effectively has waived—at least for purposes of determining whether the court has jurisdiction—any disputes he may have as to the facts alleged in the petition.

3 For the risk assessment, the following factors are considered: ‘‘(1) [h]istory of escape; (2) [s]everity/violence of the current offense; (3) [h]istory ofviolence; (4) [l]ength ofsentence; (5) [p]resence ofpending charges, bond amount and/or detainers; (6) [d]iscipline history; and, (7) [s]ecurity [r]isk [g]roup membership.’’ Administrative Directive 9.2 (8) (A). For the needs assessment, the following factors are considered: ‘‘(1) [m]edical and health care; (2) [m]ental health care; (3) [e]ducation; (4) [v]ocational training and work skills; (5) [s]ubstance abuse treatment; (6) [s]ex offender treatment; and, (7) [c]ommunity resources.’’ Administrative Directive 9.2 (8) (B).

4 It appears that, on July 7, 2012, a hearing was held to determine the petitioner’s classification. The petitioner represents that he was not present at the hearing, as was his right pursuant to the department’s Objective Classification Manual, and was informed of his classification as a sex offender only after the issue had been resolved.

5 In his trial brief, the petitioner claimed that he had been ostracized and harassed as a result ofthe erroneous classification. He conceded, however, that he could not prove that he had been harassed.

6 The petitioner’s current status is not clear from the record. That is, the record does not reveal whether the petitioner was convicted of the new charges, and, if so, whether he was sentenced to a term of incarceration and once again classified as a sex offender. It remains possible, however, that the respondent could, if the petitioner is again incarcerated, classify him as a sex offender because the previous classification establishes that he now has aprior history as an alleged sex offender. Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Court that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

7 The court also concluded that the relevant Nebraska statutes had given rise to a state created liberty interest. Vitek v. Jones, supra, 445 U.S. 488– 91.That analysis is not relevant to the present case.
8 Those courts have imported that requirement from Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976), in which the court first set forth the stigma plus test, albeit in a different context. See, e.g., Vega v. Lantz, supra, 596 F.3d 81 (citing to decisions, includingPaul, forproposition that‘‘[t]o establishastigmaplus claim, aplaintiffmustshow (1) theutterance of a statement sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable ofbeingprovedfalse, and that he or she claims isfalse, and (2)

amaterial state-imposedburden or state-imposed alteration ofthe plaintiff’s status or rights.’’ [Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.]) InPaul, an individual’s name and photograph appeared on a law enforcement flyer that was captioned ‘‘ ‘Active Shoplifters’ ’’ and distributed by the police to local retailers. Paul v. Davis, supra, 695. The court, holding that the individual’s due process claim against the police was not cognizable, explained that an individual alleging defamation type claims against public officials must prove not only stigma, but also the ‘‘plus,’’ i.e., that a ‘‘right

or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished’’ in connection with the alleged defamation. Id., 711–12. Because the case arose in the defamation context, litigants asserting a stigma plus claim pursuant toPaul have been requiredto allege the falsity ofthe governmental statements or classifications. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to allege government action imposing tangible and material burden, in connection withfalse statement that damaged reputation).

9 The onlycourtofappealsthathasarrivedatthe opposite conclusionisthe United States Court ofAppeals forthe Seventh Circuit, which, in Grennierv.Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 2006), rejected a claim by a Wisconsin inmate that his wrongful classification as a sex offender, taken together with the conditioning of parole eligibility on his participation in a sexual disordertreatmentprogram, implicatedaprotectedlibertyinterest. Although the inmate’s claim set forth a classic stigma plus claim, the court concluded that no protected liberty interest was implicated because parole for inmates serving life sentences in Wisconsin is wholly discretionary, as compared to inmates with fixed terms, who are presumptively entitled to parole after serving two-thirds of their sentences. Id., 444. Grennier, however, relies primarily on the line of cases; id., 444, 446; that Sandin expressly criticized

as establishinga ‘‘mechanical dichotomy’’ ofmandatoryversus discretionary decisions. Sandin v. Connor, supra, 515 U.S. 479.