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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CIMONE SILVERIO DE BASTOS,

Respondent,

v.

DEAN SCOTT DRAGO,

Appellant.

DIVISION ONE

No. 80592-4-I

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEACH, J. — Dean Drago appeals a domestic violence protection order 

entered against him for his former wife Cimone Bastos and her two children, which 

includes the parties’ ten-year-old son. Drago claims the trial court should have 

granted his request for a continuance to obtain an attorney. He argues he had a 

fundamental right to a continuance to obtain an attorney under article 1, section 10 

of the Washington State Constitution. But, his request for continuance was 

confusing, and he ultimately indicated he wished to proceed with the hearing. 

Drago fails to show a violation of article 1, section 10 or an abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s decision to proceed with the hearing.1 We affirm.

 1 Counsel for Drago did not serve Bastos with filings in this court at her 

address disclosed in trial court. On September 4, 2020, after this case had been 

set for consideration, Bastos filed a notice of appearance and a declaration 

informing this court she had not been served and was not aware of this appeal 

until August 31, 2020. By ruling of September 8, 2020, this court directed Drago’s 

counsel to serve all appellant’s filings on appeal on Bastos at the address provided 

in her notice of appearance. In light of the outcome of this appeal, we determined 

a response brief from Bastos was unnecessary.
No. 80592-4-I/2

2

FACTS

Bastos and Drago met in Brazil. They have a ten-year-old son together. At 

the time of entry of the protection order at issue, they had just divorced.

Drago has a history of serious assault against Bastos. In November 2008, 

Drago, then 49 years old, pleaded guilty to felony second degree assault domestic 

violence committed against Bastos who was then 22 years old. According to the 

certification for determination of probable cause, Drago physically and sexually 

assaulted Bastos and strangled her into unconsciousness. His judgment and

sentence included a no-contact order to protect Bastos for 10 years. The

protection order expired on December 12, 2018.

On August 28, 2019, Bastos filed a petition for a domestic violence 

protection order against Drago in King County Superior Court. Bastos later filed 

an amended petition. But the amended petition, which was expressly considered 

by the trial court for its decision, is not in the record because Drago did not 

designate it as part of the record on review.2 In her original petition, Bastos alleged 

Drago had been stalking her and that he called and threatened to kill her fiancé

the day before the filing of her petition threatening her fiancé was “dead.” On 

August 28, 2019, the trial court entered a temporary protection order and set a 

hearing for September 11, 2019.

3

 2 The trial court docket also shows a declaration filed by Bastos and a 

Renton Police report. The police report was mentioned by the trial court at hearing. 

These documents are not in the record provided by Drago. 3 The trial court later issued an order modifying the temporary protection 

order. The modified order is not in the record provided by Drago. Drago does not 

cite the Domestic Violence Prevention Act chapter 26.50 RCW under which the 

protection order was issued nor does he cite to case law under the act.
No. 80592-4-I/3

3

On September 11, 2019, the court conducted a hearing with a Portuguese 

language interpreter. Both Bastos and Drago appeared pro se. It appears Bastos 

requested the interpreter. Drago questioned the need for the interpreter stating he 

understood “perfect English.” At the hearing, both parties presented conflicting 

testimony about what had happened. After the hearing, the court entered a one

year domestic violence protection order against Drago that protects Bastos, the 

parties’ ten-year-old son, and Bastos’ younger daughter she has with her fiancé. 

The protection order suspended the parties’ parenting plan while providing for four 

hours per week of supervised visitation with professional supervision to be 

obtained at Drago’s expense.

ANALYSIS

Drago argues the domestic violence protection order should be reversed 

because the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance to obtain an 

attorney. He contends he had a fundamental right to a continuance to obtain an 

attorney under article 1, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution and that 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. Drago fails to show

a violation of article 1, section 10 or an abuse of discretion.

First, Drago fails to show he had a fundamental right to a continuance, in 

order to obtain an attorney, in this case under article 1, section 10 of the 

Washington State Constitution, which provides: “Justice in all cases shall be 

administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.” None of the cases relied 
No. 80592-4-I/4

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on by Drago mandates a continuance to secure an attorney in a civil case.4

Second, Drago fails to show an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

decision to proceed with the hearing after he requested a continuance. Drago 

acknowledges whether to grant or deny a motion to continue a trial or a hearing is 

within the trial court’s sound discretion.

5 The trial court’s discretionary ruling will 

not be disturbed on review absent “a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, 

discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for 

untenable reasons.”6 Drago argues the trial court should have continued the 

hearing because he repeatedly requested an attorney and expressed confusion 

about what was happening. He argues a continuance would not have prejudiced 

Bastos because the court could have simply extended the temporary protection 

order. He argues the hearing without a continuance to obtain an attorney resulted 

in “a limitation on his personal freedoms” and “a restriction and contraction of [his]

custodial rights”, regarding Bastos and their son. 

Although Drago asked for a continuance, and later reminded the court about 

this, his request was confusing. He ultimately indicated he wished to proceed with 

the hearing. Drago initially requested a continuance to obtain a “criminal attorney”

stating: “This has turned into a criminal case.” The trial court asked Drago 

questions about why he believed the case had turned into a criminal case. Drago 

 4 Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932); Doe v. 

Puget Sound Blood Center, 117 Wn.2d 772, 780-81, 819 P.2d 370 (1991); King v. 

Olympic Pipeline Co., 104 Wn. App. 338, 348-68, 16 P.3d 45 (2000); 1519-1525

Lakeview Blvd. Condominium Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 101 Wn. App. 923, 

933-37, 6 P.3d 74 (2000).

5 State v. Miles, 77 Wn.2d 593, 597-98, 464 P.2d 723 (1970).

6 In re Schuoler, 106 Wn.2d 500, 512, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986).
No. 80592-4-I/5

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testified he had not been arrested or charged with any crime at this time. When 

asked whether he was under any criminal investigations, Drago stated he had just 

received a “temporary NCO for 14 days and then temporary hold of parenting 

plan.” When asked whether he meant a temporary protection order entered in this 

case, Drago stated: “I believe so. I’m not positive because I’m not an attorney. 

That’s why I’m asking for a continuance to get an attorney.” The court explained 

the temporary protection orders entered in the case were “not criminal NCOs” but 

were “civil orders.” The court then asked Drago to clarify the reason for his 

continuance request, and Drago stated he was going to file a criminal action. The 

court indicated a criminal action would not be a reason to continue the hearing:

Court: The issue in front of the Court is the petition for 

protection. You have asked for a continuance based 

on a criminal action but I can find nothing that is 

pending. And it sounds like you don’t believe there is 

criminal action that has been filed against you.

Drago: No. I’m going to be filing a criminal action.

Court: I see. That wouldn’t be a reason to continue this 

hearing. It’s a separate matter entirely.

Drago explained if he told the court about “the whole process, then the prosecution 

would know.” He added he had “documentation of perjury” by Bastos. The court 

asked Drago if he wished to proceed with the hearing, reminding him of its limited 

time on the calendar that day, and after discussion with the court about the process

Drago answered yes:

Court: So the question this morning is whether you want to go 

forward in responding to this petition?

Drago: Is there a petition of me seeing my son in there?
No. 80592-4-I/6

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Court: The petition, which you got a copy of, describes the 

event that occurred on August 27, 2019. That, in part, 

forms the basis for the request to suspend your contact 

with your son.

Drago: Okay. The report that you have does not explain what 

happened on that day. It does not have one word 

about what I want to say about it. Everything in there 

is - - it’s completely incomplete. It only has many false 

allegations. It has none of what I - - you know, my side 

of the story in there. So all you’re reading is one side. 

You’re not - - so you have no idea what the other side 

is because I didn’t put one word of my side of the story 

into the report.

Court: That’s why you’re both sworn under oath, and this is 

your opportunity to describe your side of the story.

Drago: Okay.

Court: However, that being - -

Drago: The whole side?

Court: That being said, I do have other cases on the calendar, 

and you do have to be mindful of your time. Do you - -

Drago: Okay.

Court: Do you want to explain what you believe happened on 

that day?

Drago: Yes.

After providing confusing reasons for requesting a continuance, Drago indicated 

he wished to proceed with the hearing and presented his side of the story. Under 

these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with 

the hearing.

We find the cases cited by Drago distinguishable. They do not support his 
No. 80592-4-I/7

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abuse of discretion claim.7 Drago fails to show a constitutional violation or an 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to proceed with the hearing. We 

affirm.

WE CONCUR:

 7 State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 579-81, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001); State v. 

Hurd, 127 Wn.2d 592, 593-94, 902 P.2d 651 (1995); Schuoler, 106 Wn.2d at 512-

13; Miles, 77 Wn.2d at 597.