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AL–SHABAAB: HOW GREAT A THREAT?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 3, 2013

Serial No. 113–86

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Seth Jones, Ph.D., associate director, International Security and Defense 

Policy Center, RAND Corporation ...................................................................... 6

Mr. Dan Borelli, chief operating officer, The Soufan Group ................................ 16

Mr. Mohamed Farah, executive director, Ka Joog ................................................ 21

Mr. Richard Downie, deputy director and fellow, Africa Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Seth Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 8

Mr. Dan Borelli: Prepared statement .................................................................... 18

Mr. Mohamed Farah: Prepared statement ............................................................ 23

Mr. Richard Downie: Prepared statement ............................................................. 26

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

(1)

AL–SHABAAB: HOW GREAT A THREAT? 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order at this time. 

Today we are going to meet to assess the threat—I will just ask 

all members to take their seats at this time. 

Today we are going to discuss the threat from al-Shabaab, which 

is al-Qaeda’s franchise in the Horn of Africa. We are going to discuss the threat that it poses to Somalia, the threat to the Horn of 

Africa, to the region, and the threat that it poses to the West, including the United States. 

Al-Shabaab translates to ‘‘the youth.’’ And that organization officially swore allegiance, if you will recall, last year in February to 

al-Qaeda, but the leadership for many years of al-Shabaab had 

been working closely with Osama bin Laden, and as a consequence, 

the roots there are very deep. 

Al-Shabaab has been primarily focused in the past on attacking 

the young Somali Government because the focus on al-Shabaab 

was the establishment of a very extreme form of Sharia in Somalia. 

And they continued their attacks on African peacekeepers that 

came into that region that were working to secure that country. 

But this is changing, this is evolving. And the dramatic attack 

on September 21st on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, 

Kenya, demonstrates al-Shabaab’s ability and demonstrates their 

desire to threaten civilians throughout East Africa. And in this 

plot, you had 70 killed, you had over 200 injured. It is very common knowledge, if you are going to attack a mall, most of the 

adults in a mall, over 70 percent, are usually female, and many of 

them are going to have children with them. So this planned attack 

obviously was focused on maximizing the psychological damage. 

Several Americans also were wounded there, as you might know. 

And this is not the first time that this group has carried out this 

type of deadly attack in the region. If you will recall the attack in 

Uganda, July 2010, there were a series of bombings against civilians watching the first World Cup match in Kampala, Uganda. 

Seventy-four were killed there by al-Shabaab, many more injured, 

including, by the way, one American killed there. Today we are 

2

joined by the FBI agent who lead the Bureau’s investigation into 

that deadly al-Shabaab attack in Uganda. 

Last year, about a quarter of al-Shabaab’s attacks took place in 

Kenya, so that is a significant increase. For al-Shabaab, these attacks are retribution for a neighboring country’s contribution of 

troops to the U.N.-authorized African Union peacekeeping mission 

in Somalia. This peacekeeping effort, which has made great strides, 

has been strongly backed by the United States, by the African 

Union, by the European Union. 

Of considerable concern, al-Shabaab has demonstrated a unique 

ability to recruit young members of the Somali diaspora community 

in Europe and in the United States and convince them to travel to 

Somalia, convince them to join the fight. U.S. Africa Command suggests that these foreign fighters, in their words, ‘‘remain the greatest threat to Western interests regionally and internationally.’’

One witness today called the United States a ‘‘primary exporter 

of Western fighters to the al-Qaeda-affiliated group.’’ Indeed, one of 

the first Americans to become a suicide bomber carried out his attack in Somalia. Online videos that are shown here in the United 

States and shown in the West, shown in Britain, promise potential 

recruits a glamorous new life. And we will hear today about one 

effort in the Somali-American community to counter such propaganda and recruitment. 

Needless to say, we need to be on top of this al-Qaeda-aligned 

group’s reach into the U.S. Al-Qaeda leadership recently encouraged sympathizers in the United States to carry out smaller but 

still deadly attacks as individuals or in teams of two or three. And 

such strikes on U.S. soil could be similar to the one al-Shabaab 

launched. 

Al-Qaeda elements have proven their ability to inspire and to 

train attackers, and they have done this primarily over the Internet, as demonstrated by the Boston Marathon bombers and the 

Fort Hood shooter. 

Two years ago, when Dr. Jones first appeared before the Terrorism Subcommittee that I chaired at the time to discuss the future of al-Qaeda, we discussed al-Shabaab. And, at that time, the 

head of Britain’s MI–5 was warning that, in his words, ‘‘It is only 

a matter of time before we see terrorism on our streets inspired by 

those who are today fighting alongside al-Shabaab.’’ That was the 

British view at the time. 

Given our support for the African peacekeeping mission and the 

fact that the U.S. remains a top al-Qaeda target, we need to get 

ahead of al-Shabaab’s efforts to radicalize vulnerable youth. And 

we need to do that before that statement applies to streets in the 

West. 

So I will now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Eliot Engel from 

New York, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. ENGEL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

And welcome to our panelists. 

We are here today to discuss al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based terrorist organization that continues to threaten the Horn of Africa 

and Western interests there. 

3

Two weeks ago, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, a group of 

heavily armed terrorists stormed the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, 

Kenya, intent on killing innocent civilians. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the heinous attack as punishment for Kenya’s involvement in the AU mission there. After a 4-day siege, the 

attackers were finally overpowered, but not before murdering at 

least 67 men, women, and children. Among them was the wife of 

a U.S. Foreign Service national, who was 7 months pregnant. 

While attacks by al-Shabaab in Kenya are not new, the Westgate 

Mall attack was particularly ruthless. It was the worst terrorist attack Kenya has seen since the 1998 al-Qaeda bombing of the U.S. 

Embassy. And it raises important questions for Kenya, the international community, and Members of Congress, as well, about alShabaab’s size, strength, and intentions. 

For many years, al-Shabaab controlled most of Somalia and imposed a brutal form of Sharia law. As just one illustration of their 

complete disregard for human life, al-Shabaab banned most international organizations from gaining access to large parts of the 

country during the devastating famine in 2011, leading to the 

deaths of thousands of Somalis. 

In late 2011, Kenyan forces joined AMISOM, the African Union 

mission to Somalia, and helped to finally turn the tide against alShabaab. AMISOM has had a number of successes against alShabaab, first by expelling the group from Mogadishu and later 

from Kismayo, a port that had provided a significant source of revenue for the terrorist group. 

Despite these successes, it seems that AMISOM has reached its 

physical limit of expansion in Somalia. While al-Shabaab has been 

deprived of valuable territory, it continues to cause military and civilian casualties inside Somalia with new guerilla tactics. And now 

we have this brazen attack by the group in Kenya’s capital. 

All of this must lead us to ask, is al-Shabaab as weak as we 

thought it was? Can we expect more attacks of this scale in Kenya 

and possibly other countries contributing to AMISOM, such as 

Uganda? Have internal struggles in al-Shabaab made the group 

more focused on global jihad today than in the past? 

I understand that it is difficult to say anything definitive about 

an organization as shadowy as al-Shabaab, but given this latest attack, I believe we must reexamine what we thought we knew about 

the organization. 

Finally, I would like to take a moment to highlight the significance of the very large Somali refugee population in Kenya, which 

represents another facet of this complex picture. After decades of 

war and instability in Somalia, it is not surprising that there are 

nearly between 1 million and 2 million Somalis living in Kenya 

today. 

It will be tempting for the Kenyan people in government to 

blame Somalia for their insecurity and call for Somali refugees to 

be sent home. I sincerely hope it does not come to this. Kenya has 

long been one of the world’s most generous host countries. The fact 

that the Dadaab refugee camp constitutes the second-largest city in 

the entire country is evidence of this. I hope Kenya will continue 

to provide a safe haven to those fleeing from violence, hunger, and 

constant fear. 

4

I mention this not only because of the humanitarian implications 

but also because it has a very real bearing on al-Shabaab’s ability 

to grow its network, recruit, and operate in Kenya. I think it will 

be valuable to hear from our panelists on what they think Kenya 

can do with respect to its Somali community that would help impair al-Shabaab’s operations and, conversely, what actions could 

make the terrorist threat even worse. 

So I would like to thank the chairman once again for holding this 

hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We will go now to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey for 1 minute. 

He is the Africa Subcommittee chair. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, last week, staff director Greg Simpkins and I 

were in Jos, Nigeria, and heard from Christians who were survivors of fire bombings and a murderous campaign by Boko Haram, 

a sister-type organization to al-Shabaab. 

We need to recognize more fully, I believe, the threat posed by 

these cowards, these terrorists, who are slaughtering people. And, 

as we all know, the reason why the Kenyans were targeted is because they have deployed peacekeepers to try to bring some kind 

of peace and stability to Somalia, which has suffered for so long 

under the grip of al-Shabaab. 

I would point out that there was a statement made by alShabaab pointing out that they will intensify. ‘‘We will strike 

Kenyans where it hurts, turn their cities into graveyards and rivers of blood,’’ which they say will flow in Nairobi. 

To its credit, Kenya has not turned and run. Strongly, Kenya’s 

President Uhuru Kenyatta has said, we will not be intimidated, we 

will not be cowed. And he talked about keeping his peacekeepers 

on the ground to try to bring some semblance to that war-torn 

country. We need to stand in solidarity with the Kenyans, Ugandans, who we all recall, just few years ago, while people were 

watching the World Cup, were slaughtered by al-Shabaab because 

Uganda had deployed peacekeepers as well. 

So we need to do more to support this, because this growing intolerance, this hatred, is spreading throughout Africa. Boko 

Haram, al-Shabaab, they have to be defeated. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Karen Bass of California, ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. I want to thank the chair and 

the ranking member for holding this hearing today. 

The crisis at the Westgate Mall is deeply troubling and represents a serious security concern to East Africa, our partners, and, 

by extension, our country. While al-Shabaab has been significantly 

handicapped by counterterrorism activities carried out by the African Union mission in Somalia and with support from our military, 

the events of last month are a cold reminder that we can’t lose 

focus in preventing and eliminating terrorist elements throughout 

the continent. 

I want to remind my colleagues that, while we are here to address al-Shabaab, there are similar concerns in West Africa that 

also require our attention. These groups are destabilizing factors on 

5

a continent that is, in fact, becoming more stable, peaceful, and is 

increasingly a target for economic investment. 

I also want to mention that on the news this morning I saw that 

al-Shabaab essentially has initiated another threat, saying that 

they intend to go back into Kenya. And I really hope that our witnesses have an opportunity to address this. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We will go now to Judge Ted Poe of Texas, chairman of the Terrorism Subcommittee, for 1 minute. 

Mr. POE. While the attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya was 

ongoing, the terrorist group responsible, al-Shabaab, was sending 

out tweets. Twitter knew about the al-Shabaab account a year before the attack, but Twitter refused to take it down. Unlike 

Facebook and YouTube that go after these terrorist sites, Twitter 

wants the FBI to tell them when to take down a particular site, 

and, apparently, the FBI remained silent for various reasons. 

It is against U.S. law to support terrorists, and Twitter claims 

it doesn’t allow terrorists to use the Twitter account. Twitter says 

that it has no way of knowing if an account is run by a terrorist 

group or not, but Twitter also has a rule, you can’t claim to have 

a false identity on Twitter. So, either way, Twitter should be taking 

down terrorists accounts. Either the terrorist group really is operating the account or it is not and somebody is misrepresenting it. 

It is time for Twitter to stop violating U.S. law and giving terrorists a free way to release their propaganda and hate to the world. 

I look for some answers today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Poe. 

This morning, we are joined by a distinguished panel to address 

this issue. 

We have Dr. Seth Jones back, associate director at RAND Corporation’s International Security and Defense Policy Center. Dr. 

Jones specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, with 

a particular focus on al-Qaeda. 

We also have Mr. Don Borelli, chief operating officer of The 

Soufan Group, a 25-year veteran of the FBI, former special agent 

in charge of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York. Mr. 

Borelli’s work at the FBI included investigations and research related to al-Shabaab, including leading the investigation of alShabaab’s 2010 World Cup bombing. 

Mr. Mohamed Farah is the executive director of Ka Joog, which 

means ‘‘stay away,’’ a Somali-American youth organization working 

to counter the negative influences of groups like al-Shabaab in Somali communities in the United States. Mr. Farah has been on the 

front lines of his community’s counter-radicalization efforts and 

was given the FBI Director’s Community Leadership Award in 

2012. 

Richard Downie is the deputy director of the Africa program at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Downie 

analyzes emerging political, economic, social, and security trends in 

Africa, with a particular focus on sources of instability on the subcontinent. 

6

Without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements will be 

made part of the record, and members may have 5 days to submit 

statements and questions and any extraneous material they want 

to put in for the record. 

And we will ask all of our witnesses, of course, to summarize 

their testimony to 5 minutes, if you would. 

And, Dr. Jones, we are going to begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF SETH JONES, PH.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, 

RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking 

Member Engel, and members of the committee. Thanks for inviting 

me and us in general to testify at this hearing, ‘‘Al-Shabaab: How 

Great a Threat?’’

As those of you who just spoke noted, the al-Shabaab attack at 

Westgate Mall and its follow-up attacks—because it conducted attacks later in and around the Kenya-Somali border—are a stark reminder that this Somali-based group, an al-Qaeda affiliate, remains lethal. Despite some losses—it has been pushed out of 

Mogadishu, the Somali capital, and Kismayo, a logistical hub for 

the group—the group does present, in my view, a significant terrorism threat in the region, including to United States Embassies 

and citizens in East Africa, the Horn, and potentially in other 

areas. 

At the moment, it is my judgment that al-Shabaab does not appear to be plotting attacks against the U.S. homeland, certainly not 

to the degree that an organization like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. But there are several reasons, in my view, why 

America should be concerned about al-Shabaab and recent developments. 

First, as we saw with the Westgate attack, al-Shabaab does have 

a competent external operations capability. The Westgate Mall attack was well-planned, well-executed, involved impressive intelligence collection, surveillance, reconnaissance of the target. It had 

operatives prepared to ask a range of questions to individuals before killing them or letting them go inside the mall. These skills 

obviously could be used to attack the United States and its interests in that region. 

Second, al-Shabaab officials have expressed an interest in targeting U.S. and other foreign targets in East Africa. They have also 

planned to kidnap Americans and other foreigners in the region. 

They have plotted attacks against malls, supermarkets, Embassies. 

Obviously, the U.S. Embassy was struck in 1998 by al-Qaeda in the 

same country. 

Third, and perhaps most concerning, Americans from cities like 

Phoenix and Minneapolis over the past several years have traveled 

to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab. We have had a number of suicide bombers. Other American cities—Boston; Seattle; Washington; 

San Diego; Columbus; Lewiston, Maine—have seen individuals either recruited or left for Somalia. 

Now, the FBI and law enforcement in a range of these cities have 

done an effective job over the past several years of wrapping up a 

number of these individuals. But the ability of the group to recruit 

7

in these areas, in particular reach out to individuals through social 

media, does pose a concern. 

Based on an examination of counterterrorism efforts against alQaeda more broadly since its establishment in 1988, I would suggest the U.S. consider several steps to help weaken al-Shabaab in 

this region, including, more broadly, in the United States. 

But in the region, the first is implementing what I would call a 

light footprint strategy that focuses on covert intelligence, law enforcement, clandestine, special operations forces—I covered alShabaab somewhat when I was in U.S. special operations—and 

then diplomatic efforts to work with the Somali Government and 

its neighbors, the good case, I think, of working with the Somali 

Government and its neighbors, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, in 

their efforts to counter al-Shabaab in its financial logistics and 

other networks in the region and in Somalia itself. 

This means, just to be clear about this, in my view, the United 

States should not consider and should certainly not deploy conventional U.S. forces to Somalia. Again, I think this is a good case of 

working with the Somali Government and local governments in the 

region to take the lead in this effort. The U.S. role should be what 

I would call a light footprint. I would be happy to spend more time 

talking about that. 

The second issue, and one that I think we have not done a particularly good job, is to aggressively undermine al-Shabaab and alQaeda’s, more broadly, extremist ideology. For al-Shabaab, the 

struggle to overthrow the Somali Government and establish an extreme version of Sharia is just as much an ideological as it is a 

military struggle. 

The U.S. over the past 2 decades has done things like disbanded 

the U.S. Information Agency. In my view, we have a very disjointed 

information campaign among multiple agencies. I think when we 

saw really one of the most effective efforts against the Soviet Union 

in the cold war, done, among others, by Ronald Reagan, it was a 

substantially increased overt and covert effort to combat the Soviet 

Union’s ideology. Again, I think we are weak here. 

Let me just close briefly with a statement from al-Qaeda leader 

Ayman al-Zawahiri back in 2005: ‘‘I say to you that we are in a 

battle, and more than half of this battle is in the battle of the 

media, and that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts 

and minds of our umma.’’

In conclusion, members of the committee, I would just like to 

highlight that al-Qaeda realizes this is an ideological battle. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

8


85104a-1.eps

Testimony 

The Terrorist Threat from AI Shabaab 

Seth G. Jones 

RAND Office of External Affairs 

CT-400 

October 2013 

Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 3, 2013 

This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates 

to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commiSSions and panels; and private review and oversight 

bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address 

the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 

Its research clients and sponsors. RAND@: IS a registered trademark. 
9


85104a-2.eps

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85104a-3.eps

Seth G. Jones 1 

The RAND Corporation 

The Terrorist Threat from AI Shabaab' 

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

United States House of Representatives 

October 3, 2013 

Chairman Royce. Ranking Member Engel. and members ofthe Committee. thank you for inviting 

me to testify at this hearing. "AI-Shabaab: How Great a ThreatT This is a timely hearing because 

of the recent attacks in East Africa, the movement of some Americans to Somalia to fight with the 

al-Qa'ida linked group al Shabaab (the Youth), and the accessibility in the United States of al 

Shabaab propaganda on social media sites. This testimony is divided into three sections. The first 

briefly examines the threat from al Shabaab. The second section discusses U.S. counterterrorism 

steps. And the third offers a brief conclusion, reiterating the importance of countering the ideology 

of al Qa'ida and its allies. 

Assessing the Threat from al Shabaab 

The al Shabaab terrorist attack at Westgate Mall in Kenya and its follow-up attacks are a stark 

reminder that the Somalia-based group remains lethal. Despite recently being pushed out of 

Mogadishu, the Somali capital, and Kismayu, a key logistical hub for the group, Shabaab 

presents a significant terrorism threat in the region, including to U.S. embassies and its citizens in 

East Africa. AI Shabaab, whose leaders publicly pledged allegiance to al Qa'ida in February 

2012, has been on the radar screen of U.S. counterterrorism officials for several years. As early 

as 2009, al Shabaab operatives began courting al Qa'ida, issuing recordings with such titles as 

"At Your Service Osama." 

AI Shabaab seeks to overthrow the Somali government and establish an Islamic emirate 

with an extreme version of shari a (Islamic law). Its leaders support al Qa'ida's ideology 

of re-establishing a caliphate, though they are focused on East Africa3 AI Shabaab has 

1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the authors alone and should not be 

interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the 

RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to 

federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-apPointed commiSSions and panels; and private 

review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective 

analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the 

world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 

2 This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT400.html. 

3 See, for example, AI Shabaab, Final Statement of the Conference of Islamic State Scholars in Somalia, 

December 3, 2011. 
11


85104a-4.eps

concentrated its attacks on the Somali government and neighboring states that are 

conducting military operations against al Shabaab, especially Kenya and Ethiopia. Since 

2007,85 percent of al Shabaab's attacks have taken place in Somalia, with another 12 

percent in Kenya, as highlighted in Figure I." 

Figure 1: AI Shabaab Attacks, 2007-20115 

140 

120 

'" 100 -u 

.. 

~ 80 

'0 

~ 60 .!l 

E 

::J 40 z 

20 

0 

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 

At the moment, al Shabaab does not appear to be plotting attacks against the U.S. homeland. But 

there are several reasons why America should still be concerned about al Shabaab. First, al 

Shabaab possesses a competent external operations capability to strike targets outside of 

Somalia. The Westgate Mall attack was well-planned and well-executed, and involved 

sophisticated intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance olthe target. These skills 

could be used for other types of attacks directly targeting the United States and its citizens. 

Second, al Shabaab officials, including leader Ahmed Abdi ai-Mohamed, have expressed an 

interest in striking U.S. and other foreign targets in East Africa, according to U.S. and Western 

government officials. They have also planned to kidnap Americans and other foreigners in the 

region, as well as plotted attacks against malls, supermarkets, embassies, and other locations 

frequented by Westerners. After all, al Shabaab leaders consider the United States an enemy 

4 The data is from the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the 

Study ofTerrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), accessed on September 27, 2013. 

5 Thanks to Nathan Chandler for help with the figure. The data is from the Global Terrorism Database at the 

University of Maryland's National Consortium forthe Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 

(START), accessed on September 27,2013. 

2 
12


85104a-5.eps

and its citizens as "kuffar," or apostates. 6 As one al Shabaab document noted, it is halal (lawful) 

to kill and rob non-Muslims: "The French and the English are to be treated equally: Their blood 

and their money are halal wherever they may be. No Muslim in any part of the world may 

cooperate with them in any way ... It leads to apostasy and expulsion from Islam." The document 

then added: "Ethiopians, Kenyans, Ugandans and Burundians are just like the English and the 

French because they have invaded the Islamic country of Somalia and launched war on Islam 

and Muslims.'" 

Third, and perhaps most concerning, Americans from cities like Phoenix and Minneapolis have 

traveled to Somalia over the past several years to fight with al Shabaab. Between 2007 and 2010, 

more than 40 Americans joined al Shabaab, making the United States a primary exporter of 

Western fighters to the al Qa'ida-affiliated group.' AI Shabaab has made an active and deliberate 

attempt to recruit young American men both in person and on the Internet. Shabaab recruitment 

in Somali-American communities began around the 2006 invasion of Somalia, a predominantly 

Muslim country, by Ethiopia, which has a large Christian population and is Somalia's historic 

enemy. Some ofthe initial recruiters had participated in earlier rounds of fighting in Somalia and 

returned to the United States as veterans with tantalizing war stories'" In addition to Minneapolis 

and Phoenix, al Shabaab recruiters have attempted to attract individuals in other American cities 

like Boston, Seattle, Washington, San Diego, Columbus, and Lewiston, ME. Many of these 

Americans transited through the U.S.-Mexican border, though others flew out of the United States 

legally by airplane. 

The experience of these Americans has been mixed. Some found Somalia an inhospitable 

environment and went elsewhere. Others became enmeshed in internal rivalries. The American 

operative Omar Shafik Hammami, for instance, was killed in an ambush in early September 2013 

by his former ex1remist allies. The son of a Southern Baptist mother and a Syrian Muslim father, 

Hammami was raised in Daphne, Alabama and later embraced Salafism before moving to 

Somalia in 2006 to fight for al Shabaab. And still others died in the fighting. One ofthe first 

Americans to become a suicide attacker, Shirwa Ahmed, joined al Shabaab and blew himself up 

in Somalia in October 2008. Another recruit, 22-year-old Abidsalan Hussein Ali from Minneapolis, 

agreed to be a suicide bomber and attacked African Union troops on October 29, 2011. 

6 AI Shabaab, The Experience of Our Brothers in Somalia, undated. 

7 Ibid., p. 6. 

8 Committee on Homeland Security, AI Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim 

American Community and the Threat to the Homeland (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 

July 27, 2011), p. 2. 

9 Brian Michael Jenkins, Stray Dogs and Virlual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist 

Terrorism In the United States Since 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA RAND, 2011), pp. 12-14. 

3 
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85104a-6.eps

In response to the movement of Americans to Somalia, the FBI spearheaded a nationwide 

counterterrorism effort to identify and arrest al Shabaab militants. With the help of local law 

enforcement and the Somali-American community, the FBI has arrested numerous individuals in 

the United States, such as Zachary Adam Chesser, for their involvement with al Shabaab. In May 

2013, for example, Omer Abdi Mohamed was sentenced to 144 months in federal prison; 

Abdifatah Yusuf Isse, Salah Osman Ahmed, and Ahmed Hussein Mahamud were each 

sentenced to 36 months in federal prison; and Mahamud Said Omarwas sentenced to 20 years 

in prison for involvement with al Shabaab.lO 

Americans need a sober understanding ofthe group. AI Shabaab does not appear to be plotting 

attacks against the U.S. homeland, and it has suffered a series of military defeats at the hands of 

Somali, Kenyan, and other African forces. But as the Westgate Mall attack shows, al Shabaab 

has the capability to conduct high-profile attacks in the region. The United States should be on 

high alert in East Africa. 

U.S. Counterterrorism Actions 

Based on an examination of counterterrorism efforts against al Qa'ida's since its establishment in 

1988, the United States can take two steps to help weaken al Shabaab in East Africa." The first 

is implementing a light footprint strategy that focuses on covert intelligence, law enforcement, 

clandestine Special Operations Forces, and diplomatic efforts to support the Somali government 

and its neighboring allies - especially Kenya and Ethiopia - in their efforts to counter al Shabaab 

and its financial and logistical support networks. A light footprint strategy means refraining from 

deploying conventional U.S. forces to Somalia. In cases such as Somalia, where terrorists do not 

pose an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, the United States should support local 

governments and allies who take the lead. The U.S. goal should be to support local civilian and 

security agencies capable of undermining al Qa'ida's ideology and capabilities. 

The second step is to aggressively undermine al Shabaab's - and al Qa'ida's - extremist 

ideology. For al Shabaab leaders, the struggle to overthrow the Somali government and establish 

an extreme version of sharia is just as much an ideological as a military struggle. As one al 

Shabaab document summarized, the group has a media arm that "produces and distributes the 

jihadist movies of the movement as well as meetings and speeches for the leaders and spreading 

10 U.S Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota, Four More Men Sentenced for Providing Material Support to 

Terrorists, May 14, 2013 

11 Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of AI Qa'ida Since 9111 (New York: w.w. Norton, 

2012). 

4 
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them across the World Wide Web with cooperation with the brothers in the Media Front.,,12 This 

explains why the turbaned al Shabaab gunmen that infiltrated the Westgate Mall arrived with a 

set of religious trivia questions. As terrified civilians hid in toilet stalls, behind mannequins, in 

ventilation shafts, and underneath food court tables, the assailants began a high-stakes game of 

twenty questions to separate Muslims from those they considered infidels. They asked captives to 

recite specific Quranic verses and to name relatives ofthe Prophet Muhammad, killing those who 

failed to provide the correct answers." 

Unfortunately, U.S. efforts against al Shabaab - and al Qa'ida more broadly - have been 

disjointed. In 1999, the State Department disbanded the U.S. Information Agency, which played a 

prominent role in countering Soviet ideology during the Cold War. Today, no U.S. government 

agency has the lead role for countering the ideology of al Qa'ida and its broader movement.'4 The 

State Department has the lead for public diplomacy, but has not developed a comprehensive 

inter-agency strategy to counter al Qa'ida's ideology. The CIA is involved in some clandestine 

activity, but most senior officials do not view undermining al Qa'ida's ideology as its core mission. 

The Department of Defense is also involved in some efforts, but they are dispersed among U.S. 

Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and other organizations. Ultimately, it is 

the President and the National Security Staffs responsibility to appoint a lead agency and hold it 

responsible. An effective campaign has to be done carefully, however, and led by credible 

Muslims. 

One of the most important battlefields against al Shabaab is on the Internet. After all, the struggle 

against al Qa'ida and its allies - including al Shabaab - is, in part, a struggle of ideas. Over the 

past decade, radicalization has become much less formal. The rise of the Internet and social 

media has fundamentally changed terrorist activities. Individuals like Anwar al-Awlaki (now 

deceased), Adam Gadahn, and Shaykh Abdallah Ibrahim al-Faisal have utilized YouTube, 

Facebook, Twitter, Internet chat rooms, and other forums to distribute propaganda, recruit new 

supporters, and seek financial aid. Some, like Awlaki before his death, were successful in 

motivating individuals to conduct terrorist attacks. Others, like Gadahn, largely failed. As one al 

Qa'ida communique blithely noted in 2011, "In today's world, there's a place for the underground 

rnujahideen who support the religion of Allah, men and wornen and youths in their cities and 

villages, and from their homes, and with their individual creativity and what is possible for them, 

12 AI Shabaab, The Experience of Our Brothers in Somalia, undated. 

13 Rukmini Calli machi, "Terrorists Used New Tactic to Spare Some Muslims," Associated Press, September 

29,2013. 

14 The United States also has the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an independent federal agency 

that oversees all U.S. civilian international media. But its effectiveness has been highly debate. 

Broadcasters within the BBG netNork include the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the 

Middle East Broadcasting Networks (Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa), Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba 

Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti). 

5 
15


85104a-8.eps

as long as they are parallel with the general plans of the mujahideen ... the arena of electronic 

warfare.,,15 

A Battle of Hearts and Minds 

In the end, the struggle against al Shabaab and the broader al Qa'ida movement will be decades, 

not months or years. Much like the Cold War against Marxism-Leninism, it is also predominantly 

an ideological struggle. When Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981, he substantially 

increased overt and covert efforts to combat the Soviet Union's ideology. In early 1982, for 

example, White House staffers drafted National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 32, which 

Reagan signed into law on May 20, 1982. It authorized broad-ranging information and other 

activities to "reverse" the expansion of Soviet control across the globe.'6 "Democracy triumphed 

in the cold war," Reagan wrote in the final chapter of his memoirs, "because it was a battle of 

values - between one system that gave preeminence to the state and another that gave 

preeminence to the individual and freedom.,,17 

While there are obvious differences between America's Cold War campaign against MarxismLeninism and today's struggle against al Qa'ida and other ex1remist groups, both involve 

ideological components. AI Qa'ida leaders are acutely aware of the importance of ideas. AI Qa'ida 

leader Ayman al-Zawahiri remarked in a 2005 letter to al Qa'ida in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab alZarqawi: "I say to you: that we are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is in the battlefield 

of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our 

Umma.,,18 

Since the struggle against al Qa'ida and its allies - including al Shabaab - is partly an ideological 

one, it is high time for the United States to put sufficient resources into undermining al Qa'ida's 

ex1remist ideology. 

15 As-Sahab Media, "You Are Held Responsible Only for Thyself - Part Two," June 2011. 

16 Ronald Reagan, An American Ufe: The Autobiography (New York Simon and Schuster, 1990). 

17 The White House, U.S. National Security Decision Directive Number 32, May 20, 1982. 

18 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005. Released by the Harmony Project, 

Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. 

6 
16

Chairman ROYCE. Let’s go now to Mr. Borelli. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAN BORELLI, CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, THE SOUFAN GROUP 

Mr. BORELLI. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today on 

such an important topic. 

As mentioned, I am a 25-year veteran of the FBI. My last position was assistant special agent in charge of the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force in New York. In that position, I was responsible for FBI 

international terrorism matters, including those involving Africa, 

and I led the team of more than 60 FBI agents to Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010 to investigate the simultaneous suicide bombing 

attacks during the World Cup soccer game, which was conducted 

by al-Shabaab. So I have firsthand experience in dealing with the 

atrocities committed by this terrorist group. 

Since leaving the FBI, as COO of The Soufan Group I have 

helped oversee our countering violent extremism, or CVE, research, 

including a recent study into countering the narratives of violent 

extremism. And I led our team to Minnesota, Kenya, and Uganda, 

focusing our research on al-Shabaab. I personally interview policymakers, community leaders, security officials, and young people in 

the cross-hairs of al-Shabaab recruiters. And that is what I would 

like to focus on today, is al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts, particularly those involving Western youth. 

It is important to note that al-Shabaab—their political agenda is 

divided into different factions: The nationalist agenda, which aims 

to fight against foreign troops in Somalia and to install a Shariabased government in Somalia; and the global jihad agenda, aligned 

with al-Qaeda and focusing its efforts against the West and its allies. 

This division of ideals within al-Shabaab is also reflected in alShabaab’s recruiting efforts. The narrative of the nationalist agenda uses reports of violence in Somalia, along with a compelling 

combination of propaganda that appeal to a sense of obligation to 

defend Somalia from foreign invaders. The global agenda is in line 

with the broader al-Qaeda message, claiming that the West is at 

war with Islam. 

After speaking with many members of the Somali-American community in Minnesota, we found that the narrative that resonates 

loudest with Somali youth is overwhelmingly political as opposed 

to religious. It focuses on the nationalist agenda and is driven by 

a deep nationalist concern for the future of Somalia. 

However, just because a young person might be enticed to join 

al-Shabaab to defend his Somali homeland doesn’t mean that he 

isn’t a threat to the U.S. Our fear is that, while Somalis here in 

the U.S. may travel to Somalia with a nationalist agenda to defend 

Somalia, they could be converted into following the global agenda, 

the al-Qaeda agenda, and return to the U.S. to launch attacks here. 

We have seen this pattern with other communities. The thwarted 

attack against the New York Subway system in 2009 illustrates 

this threat. Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan who traveled back to his 

homeland with the idea of fighting there, was co-opted by al-Qaeda 

17

and convinced he could do more good by taking the fight back to 

the U.S. 

So what, therefore, can we do to mitigate this threat and counter 

al-Shabaab’s recruiting tactics both here in the U.S. and abroad? 

Our strategy needs to be multifaceted. We need to continue to put 

pressure on al-Shabaab through military, law enforcement, intelligence, and economic resources. We need to expand our efforts in 

promoting education and critical thinking among would-be recruits 

for terrorist groups. 

As we have seen in Minnesota, many who join al-Shabaab to help 

their Somali homeland, they need to understand that al-Shabaab 

is not helping their homeland. Rather, it is committing atrocities 

against its own people. Potentially vulnerable recruits need to see 

how they are being manipulated by al-Shabaab. They need to understand that al-Shabaab will turn their attentions to help Somalia 

into a global terrorist agenda that aims to export violence and kill 

innocent people. 

How do we do this? We need to understand that extremists use 

local grievances as initial motivators to recruit, so the counter-narrative must take place at the local level. And we need to be very 

strategic in the medium, the message, and the messenger we use. 

Our focus should be on helping credible voices in the community 

counter the message of violent jihad offered by al-Shabaab, alQaeda, and the like. 

And the Internet needs to be an integral part of this strategy. As 

we have recently seen, al-Shabaab was bragging on Twitter about 

the attack on the Westgate Mall. We need to be just as effective 

using the Internet, if not more so. 

Lastly, we must not make the same mistake with al-Shabaab 

that we did with al-Qaeda, and that is viewing it as only a local 

or regional threat. In the early 1990s, many smart people ignored 

al-Qaeda because it was seen as a group only focused on the Middle 

East and Central Asia. We have seen how a terrorist organization 

gone unchecked can morph into a global threat. We must not let 

that happen with al-Shabaab. 

I look forward to expanding on these points and others during 

the question-and-answer period. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Borelli. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Borelli follows:]

18


85104b-1.eps

Don Borelli 

Chief Operating Officer, The Sou fan Group 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

October 3, 2013 

By way of background, I'm a 25-year veteran ofthe FBI. My last position was 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Joint Terrorism Taskforce in New York. The 

New York FBI office has extraterritorial responsibility for Africa; consequently, I 

was responsible for FBI international terrorism matters involving Africa. In that 

position, I led a team of more than 60 FBI Agents to Kampala, Uganda in July 2010 to 

assist the Uganda Police Force in their investigation of the simultaneous suicide 

bombing attacks during the final game of the 2010 World Cup Soccer game - which 

was conducted by al Shabaab. So I have firsthand experience in dealing with the 

atrocities committed by this terrorist group. 

Since leaving the FBI, as COO of The Soufan Group, I have helped oversee our 

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) research, including our recent year-long global 

study into Countering the Narratives of Extremism, which we launched on 

September 9th ofthis year. I led our team to Minnesota, Kenya and Uganda, focusing 

our research on Al Shabaab. And I personally interviewed policy makers, community 

leaders, security officials, and young people in the crosshairs of al Shabaab 

recruiters. And this is what I would like to focus on today: al Shabaab's recruitment 

efforts, particularly those focusing on Western youth. 

** 

While the September 21st attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, put al-Shabaab 

back into the international spotlight, it never left the lenses of security practitioners 

and CVE experts. Somalis here in the U.S.-not all of them being American citizensaccount for nearly a quarter of the terrorism indictments in the United States since 

2009. About two-thirds ofthese indictments were for traveling or attempting to 

travel abroad to fight in Somalia or to send others to fight, while the other third 

involve financing to al Shabaab. (Source - The Fordham Ledger: Facts and Figures in 

National Security) 

It's important to note that al Shabaab's political agenda is divided into different 

factions: the nationalistic agenda, which aims to fight against foreign troops in 

Somalia, regain lost territory within Somalia, and to install a sharia-based 

government in Somalia; and the global jihad agenda, aligned with al Qaeda and 

focusing its efforts against the West and its allies. This division of ideals is also 

reflected in al Shabaab's recruiting efforts. 

The narrative of the nationalist agenda uses reports of violence in their ancestral 

home, along with a compelling combination of propaganda, and accurate reporting, 

that appeal to a sense of obligation to defend Somalia from "foreign invaders." The 

1 
19


85104b-2.eps

global agenda, is in line with the broader al Qaeda message of a global Islamic 

caliphate. 

After speaking with many members of the Somali-American community in 

Minnesota, we found that the narrative that resonates loudest with Somali youth is 

overwhelmingly political as opposed to religious. It is focuses on the nationalist 

agenda, and is driven by a deep nationalist concern for the future of Somalia. 

However, just because a young person might be enticed to join al Shabaab to defend 

his Somali homeland, this doesn't mean he isn't a threat to the U.S. Our fear is that 

while Somalis here in the U.S. may travel to Somalia with a nationalist agenda, and 

intend to stay and fight there, they could be converted into following the global 

agenda-the al Qaeda agenda-and return to the U.S. to launch attacks here. 

We have seen this pattern with other communities. The thwarted attack against the 

New York subway system in 2009 illustrates this threat. Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan 

who traveled back to his homeland with the idea of fighting there, was coopted by al 

Qaeda and convinced he could do more good by taking the fight back to the U.S. And 

as we all know, stopping attacks from U.S. citizens and green card holders is a much, 

much, greater challenge than stopping attacks from foreigners. The Boston 

Marathon tragedy is a stark reminder ofthis threat. 

*** 

What, therefore, can we be doing to mitigate the threat and counter al Shabaab's 

recruiting tactics both here in the U.s. and abroad? 

Our strategy needs to be multifaceted. We need to continue to put pressure on al 

Shabaab through militarily, law enforcement, intelligence and economic resources, 

and we need to continue our support for the African Union and other forces 

attempting to rebuild Somalia. 

We need to expand our efforts in promoting education and critical thinking among 

would-be recruits for groups. As we have seen in Minnesota, many who join al 

Shabaab do so to help their Somali homeland. They need to understand that al 

Shabaab is not helping their homeland; rather, it is committing atrocities against its 

own people. Potentially vulnerable recruits need to see how al Shabaabb and its 

allies in Al Qaeda are manipulating them. They need to understand that al Shabaab 

will turn their intentions to help Somalia into a global terrorist agenda that aims to 

export violence and kill innocent people in so doing. 

So how do we do this? 

We need to understand that extremists use local grievances as initial motivators to 

recruit, so the counter-narrative must take place at the local level, and we need to be 

very strategic in the medium, the message, and the messenger we use. For example, 

where people are being recruited because of alleged (or even true) local or tribal 

grievances, it is community leaders and groups that need to be on the forefront of 

the response. Our focus should be on helping credible voices in the community 

counter the message of violent jihad offered by al Shabaab, al Qaeda, and the like. 

2 
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85104b-3.eps

And as we know, the Internet has created new challenges in combatting the violent 

extremist message. As recently as last week we saw al Shabaab bragging about the 

Westgate attack on Twitter. We need to be just as effective in using the Internet, if 

not more so. 

Lastly, we must not make the same mistake with al Shabaab that we did with al 

Qaeda-that is, viewing it as only a local or regional threat. In the early 1990s many 

smart people ignored al Qaeda because it was seen as a group only focused on the 

Middle East and Central Asia. We have seen how a terrorist organization gone 

unchecked can morph into a global threat. We must not let that happen with al 

Shabaab. 

I look forward to expanding on these points, and others, during our question and 

answer session. 

### 

3 
21

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Farah? 

STATEMENT OF MR. MOHAMED FARAH, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, KA JOOG 

Mr. FARAH. Bismillah, ir-Rahman, ir-Rahim. In the name of 

Allah, the most gracious, the most merciful. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would like to thank 

you for the invitation to talk about this important matter. Our 

community stands in solidarity with the people of Kenya and the 

folks that lost their loved ones in the recent attacks a week ago. 

My name is Mohamed Farah. I am the executive director of Ka 

Joog. I am here today as a concerned citizen of this great Nation 

and on behalf of the largest Somali-American youth organization in 

the United States. 

Ka Joog was formed in 2007 by a dozen students from highschool-level to college-level students who had few things in common, such as education, art, positive role models in the community, 

and proud citizens of a country with limitless opportunity for those 

who are willing to work hard. 

The term ‘‘Ka Joog’’ means to stay away or stay out, and the 

message behind that is to get youth away from any negative influences that hinders their success or reaching their best potential. 

We are all wondering the same thing in this room this morning: 

How is it that American youth can succumb to radical recruitment? 

Sure, any of us today sitting here would not dream of strapping explosives on, let alone even fight alongside extremists for whatever 

overly glorified cause. But why? Because we have all been educated, well educated, to understand that our human potential is 

worth far more than an explosive vest and that our human purpose 

transcends the murderous agenda of extremists. The number-one 

issue of our community is the recruitment of our youth. 

As Americans, we must constantly assure ourselves that these 

attempts made by al-Shabaab and their affiliate entities are acts 

of desperation. Religious scholars have already denounced their 

claim to legitimacy in the light of Islam. At this particular point, 

the veil slowly has been lifting to reveal the true agenda and political intent of this extremist group. 

We shall no longer be the victim of their terror. We shall no 

longer let their actions affect our children. And, most certainly, we 

shall not generalize by the actions of a few individuals who have 

tainted the name of the Somali people across this great Nation. 

Al-Shabaab has taken every possible measure in full capacity to 

cloak their ideology with an appealing message to our youth. They 

have targeted the disenfranchised, marginalized, and socially estranged youth with a message of restitution infused with religious 

righteousness. Those young men that left victim to deception are 

no longer with us today, and thus will be the same fate of so many 

more youth unless we act swiftly. Why is it that we spend millions 

of dollars on counterterrorism and still American citizens are disappearing and fighting alongside with al-Shabaab? 

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for the time to address 

this concern. I would like to finish by saying that this is an uphill 

battle, that we must call on the cooperation of all agencies, communities, and organizations who share a vested interest in the safety 

22

of our youth and who wish to seize the efforts of extremist entities. 

We must empower local partners to be more adequately equipped 

to deter youth from becoming radicalized and recruited. 

Ka Joog and the rest of our community lack the vital resources—

I will repeat again: Ka Joog and the rest of our community lack 

the vital resources to safeguard our children and, most importantly, to safeguard our freedoms here in the United States of 

America. Ka Joog and the community has been fighting since 2007, 

and I urge you, this committee and our Federal Government, my 

Government, to stand with us to fight al-Shabaab and eliminate 

this cancerous ideology and take this fight to Somalia. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Farah, very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]

23


85104c.eps

KAJOOG 

My name is Mohamed Farah. I am the Executive Director ofKa Joog. I am here today as a 

concern citizen of this great nation, and on the behalf of the largest Somali-American youth 

organization in the US., Ka Joog was formed back in 2007 by a dozen of students, from high 

school level to college students, who had few things in common such as education, art, positive 

role models in the community and proud citizens of a country with limitless opportunity for 

those who are willing to work hard. The term Ka Joog means to stay out or stay away, and the 

message behind that is to get youth away from any negative influences that hinders there success 

or reaching their best potential. 

We are all wondering the same thing in this room this morning. How is it that, our American 

youth can succumb to radical recruitment? Sure, anyone of us today sitting here wouldn't dream 

of strapping explosives on let alone even fight alongside extremists for whatever overly glorified 

cause. But Why?, Why, because we have been all well-educated to understand that our human 

potential is worth far more than an explosive vest, and that our human purpose transcends the 

murderous agenda of extremist The number one issue of our community is the recruitment of 

our youth 

As Americans we must constantly assure ourselves, that these attempts made by Al -Shabaab 

and their affiliate entities are acts of desperation. Religious scholars have already denounced 

their claim to legitimacy in the light of Islam. At this particular point the veil slowly has been 

lifting to reveal the true agenda and political intent of this extremist group. We shall no longer 

be victims of their terror, we shall no longer let their actions affect our children, and most 

certainly we shall not be generalized by the actions of a few individuals who have tainted the 

name of the Somali people. 

Al Shabaab has taken every possible measure in full capacity to cloak their ideology with an 

appealing message to our youth. They have targeted the disenfranchised, marginalized, and 

socially estranged youth with a message of restitution intused with religious righteousness 

Those young men that felt victim to deception are no longer with us today. And thus will be the 

same fate of so many more youth unless we act with swiftly. Why is it that we spend millions of 

dollars on counter terrorism and still American citizens are disappearing and fighting alongside 

with Al-Shabaab. 

In conclusion I would like to thank you for the time to address this concern I would like to finish 

by saying that this is an uphill battle that must call on the cooperation of all agencies, 

communities, and organizations who share a vested interest in the safety of our youth, and who 

wish to cease the etJorts of extremist entities. We must empower local partners to be more 

adequately equipped to deter youth from becoming radicalized and recruited. Ka Joog and the 

rest of our community lack the vital resources to safeguard our children and most importantly to 

safeguard of freedoms here in the United States of America. 
24

Chairman ROYCE. And we will go now to Mr. Downie. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD DOWNIE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

AND FELLOW, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. DOWNIE. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the threat posed by al-Shabaab. 

I will make some brief remarks about the evolution of this terrorist group, its current capabilities and objectives, and offer some 

thoughts on how its threats can best be dealt with by the United 

States and its allies in East Africa. 

Al-Shabaab is a fragmented group representing different interests and objectives. It began as the armed wing of a broader 

Islamist movement which briefly governed parts of Somalia before 

it was toppled by invading troops from Ethiopia in 2006. It gained 

popularity by presenting itself as a nationalist movement protecting Somalis from foreign aggression. Pragmatists within its 

ranks were quick to spot business opportunities as the group took 

more territory. Many of its foot soldiers tagged along in the hope 

of a meal or were coerced to join. 

But there has always been a faction within al-Shabaab that has 

harbored grander ambitions of waging international jihad. This faction now has control and has been strengthening its ties with alQaeda. 

The Westgate attack reflects this group’s ascendancy. Its leader, 

Ahmed Godane, said the aim was to avenge Kenya for its invasion 

and occupation of southern Somalia, launched 2 years ago to push 

back chronic instability from the two countries’ shared border. AlShabaab had a similar motive when it staged bomb attacks in 

Uganda in 2010. Uganda is the largest contributor to the African 

Union’s peacekeeping force in Somalia. 

But the targeting of the Westgate, a shopping mall packed with 

families from around the world, shows that al-Shabaab wished to 

make a broader statement, not only to the countries in the region 

but also to the Western allies which support them. 

There are some key points to bear in mind about the attack. 

First, we should be wary of using Westgate to draw broader conclusions about the risk posed by al-Shabaab to the U.S. homeland. 

The threat level is not substantially or necessarily changed by 

events in Nairobi, more than 7,000 miles away. 

The most alarming aspect of Westgate is that al-Shabaab has, 

from its perspective, scored a big hit with relative ease. It has realized that all it needs is a soft target, good planning, low-tech weaponry, plenty of ammunition, and determined attackers willing to 

die for their cause. We should expect attempts to repeat this method of attack. 

The Westgate attack also continues the operational shift of alShabaab toward an international agenda that aligns more closely 

with al-Qaeda. It is therefore more likely to look for targets beyond 

Somalia’s borders and seek opportunities to team up with likeminded groups in the broader region. There are suggestions, for example, that the Westgate attack may have been carried out with 

the help of a Kenya-based affiliate, al-Hijra. 

25

If U.S. citizens are found to have been involved in Westgate, the 

complexion of the attack changes significantly. We know that a 

small number of U.S. Citizens have supported al-Shabaab in the 

past, both physically and materially, but that support has tended 

to flow one way, toward Somalia. There is little evidence pointing 

toward any intent to attack the U.S. Homeland, but vigilance is required. Building trust with the Somalia community in the United 

States will be a critical part to the prevention strategy. 

However, the more immediate threat is not to the U.S. homeland 

but to the interests of the United States in East Africa, which are 

substantial. Therefore, I have some brief suggestions for the United 

States and its partners to consider. 

First, the U.S. should intensify efforts to help Kenya strengthen 

its ability to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Improving 

intelligence capacities is critical. So, too, is the need to improve 

communication and coordination among its security agencies. 

Instilling a security consciousness among the Kenyan public is 

another key way to bridge the intelligence gap. But it is a challenge, given the high levels of distrust in the police, who cannot be 

relied upon to act on information from the public. The U.S. should 

seek to build momentum behind efforts to reform and professionalize the Kenyan police, turning them into an organization that 

people respect rather than fear or deride. 

As the Kenyan authorities seeks to neutralize the threat from alShabaab, the assistance of Somali-Kenyans and Somalis living in 

Kenya will be critical. The United States should urge the Kenyan 

authorities to reach out to these communities and avoid heavyhanded actions that might alienate them, such as threatening to 

expel refugees. 

But, ultimately, the key to dealing with al-Shabaab will be found 

in Somalia. Therefore, removing the threat of al-Shabaab means 

isolating and relentlessly pursuing the most extreme wing responsible for the Westgate attack. 

As for the majority of al-Shabaab members, who joined for reasons other than the pursuit of international jihad, it may be possible to rehabilitate them through a combination of threats and inducements. They may even be persuaded to abandon violence and 

join the political process. 

More broadly, policy responses must be formulated to tackle the 

conditions of insecurity, economic hardship, and poor governance, 

which allowed extremism to take hold. The United States is an important funder of the Somalia Federal Government. It should use 

this influence to press for inclusive governance, improved security, 

and delivery of public services. 

I thank you for your attention and welcome your questions. 

Chairman ROYCE. We thank you, Mr. Downie. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Downie follows:]

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CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & 

INTERNATiONAL STUDIES 

Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

T 

A Statement by 

Richard Downie 

Deputy Director and Fellow, Africa Program 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 

October 3, 2013 

2170 Rayburn House Office Building 
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Statement for the Record 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for 

the opportunity to testify on the threat posed by AI Shabaab. I will make some brief remarks about the 

evolution of this terrorist group, its current capabilities and objectives, and offer some thoughts on how 

its threat can best be dealt with by the United States and its allies in the East Africa region. With your 

permission, I will submit a longer written statement for the record. 

Introduction 

The gun attack and four-day siege which left at least 67 people dead at the Westgate shopping mall in 

Kenya's capital, Nairobi, has focused minds on the threat posed by the Somalia-based terrorist group, AI 

Shabaab. The group was quick to claim responsibility for the atrocity. In an audio message, its leader 

Ahmed Godane, said the motivation was to avenge Kenya for its invasion of southern Somalia in October 

2011 and to put pressure on the Kenyan authorities to withdraw its troops, which remain in occupation 

of a large slice of Somalia's south-west, adjacent to Kenya's eastern border. If that was the objective, it 

appears to have backfired, at least for the time being. Kenyans have come together impressively in the 

days since the attack, from the long lines of volunteers giving blood to the wounded to the social media 

campaign organized on twitter under the hashtag, #WeAreOne. And while tough questions are being 

asked about the conduct of Kenya's security services before and during the attack, the government of 

Uhuru Kenyatta has vowed that its troops will not be deterred from their campaign in Somalia. 

The evolution of AI Shabaab 

AI Shabaab has undergone a steady evolution since it emerged as the extremist, armed wing of the 

Islamic Courts Union, a much broader based Islamist movement that established a modicum of security 

in parts of Somalia before it was swept aside by invading troops from Ethiopia-with tacit U.s. supportat the end of 2006. These events allowed AI Shabaab to present itself as a nationalist force bravely 

resisting aggression by Somalia's traditional enemy-Ethiopia-and vastly increased its support among 

ordinary Somalis, particularly as the occupation became prolonged and brutal. By the time the final 

Ethiopian troops withdrew in January 2009, AI Shabaab found itself in control of much of southern 

Somalia. 

Faced with the challenge of governing territory for the first time, AI Shabaab quickly resorted to harsh 

and intolerant tactics. Music was banned, women forced to cover themselves, children forcibly recruited 

to its fighting brigades, and stonings and amputations meted out to those who transgressed its extreme 

interpretation of Sharia law. At the same time, AI Shabaab's resistance to the Western-backed 

Transitional Federal Government in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, meant that no target was considered 

off limits. Revulsion at its tactics reached new heights when 19 of the country's brightest and best 

young people were blown up by a suicide bomber as a government minister addressed their graduation 

ceremony in December 2009. The nadir came in 2011 when famine befell areas of Somalia under AI 

Shabaab control because of the group's failure to respond to a chronic drought and its refusal to allow 

international humanitarian aid workers access to the needy. By the time the emergency was declared 

over, more than a quarter of a million people had died, half of them children under the age of six. 
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85104d-3.eps

In the meantime, AI Shabaab was pushed back by the combined pressure of a domestic backlash and 

foreign intervention. Most notably Kenya, which resolved to take action. It has become exasperated by 

the permanent insecurity on its shared border, apprehensive about the implications for its tourist 

industry and for a major intrastructural program that would extend across the country's northern 

region; and alarmed by the steady stream of Somalis crossing into its territory to take up residence in 

the world's largest refugee camp, Dadaab. Nearly 2,500 Kenyan troops invaded southern Somalia in 

October 2011, eventually succeeding in pushing AI Shabaab back from the border and ousting the group 

from its main stronghold-and economic lifeline-the southern port city of Kismayo. Under pressure, in 

retreat, and cut off from lucrative port revenues, AI Shabaab shifted tactics and retreated into 

asymmetrical warfare. 

Given this brutal history, how can we account for the residual appeal of AI Shabaab among some 

Somalis? The first thing to say is that the vast majority of Somalis revile the actions of this group. That 

said, AI Shabaab has had some success in presenting its activities as some kind of national resistance 

movement against what it sees as an illegitimate government in Mogadishu propped up by Western 

interests. The group has been adept at feeding off the internecine conflicts inherent in Somalia's clan 

structure, intervening in local level disputes and manipulating grievances to present itself as a force that 

champions the claims of citizens angry at their local, regional, or national governing authorities. 

The Westgate attack, however, suggests that different interests are now driving AI Shabaab's activities. 

While certain members may have nominally espoused the language of nationalist resistance and others 

have jumped aboard in the hope of making money or at least getting a daily meal, a third group is clearly 

driven by a desire to advance the cause of international jihad. This final faction is now in control of the 

movement. It is led by Ahmed Godane, a 36 year-old from Somaliland and a veteran of jihadist 

campaigns in Afghanistan and Kashmir. It is Godane who pledged fealty to AI Qaeda at the beginning of 

2010, formalizing the agreement in 2012, and who appears to have launched an internal purge of AI 

Shabaab members who reject his methods. Analysts have noted an exodus of foreign fighters from AI 

Shabaab in recent months, amid grumbles about Godane's leadership style. A succession of dissidents 

have been killed or gone missing. They include an AI Shabaab commander originally from Alabama, Abu 

Mansoor al-Amriki, who was killed last month along with a British member of the group. Meanwhile, 

the former spokesman of AI Shabaab, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, has disappeared, and Sheikh Hassan 

Dahir Aweys, considered the father of violent extremism in Somalia, has been detained by the 

authorities. Significantly, this purge appears to have brought Godane closer to some Kenya-based 

militants who may have provided assistance for the Westgate attack. 

Current capabilities of AI Shabaab 

What does the attack say about AI Shabaab, its current capabilities and its modus operandi? There has 

been a tendency in recent months to portray AI Shabaab as weak, fragmented, and under pressure. The 

Westgate attack does not necessarily contradict that analysis. After all, it does not require much 

beyond fanatical determination and good planning to attack a lightly-guarded suburban shopping mall 

full of families and children with guns and grenades. This was the ultimate soft target. The attack also 

follows a pattern of previous actions, both inside and outside Somalia, in which civilians have been 
29


85104d-4.eps

targeted. In 2010/ AI Shabaab bombs killed 76 people in Uganda as they watched the soccer World Cup 

final at two bars in the capital, Kampala. The stated motive for the attack was also consistent with 

Westgate; the involvement of foreign troops in Somalia, this time Ugandan contributors to the African 

Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. 

Furthermore, the Nairobi attack confirms the ascendancy within AI Shabaab of the hardcore 

internationalist wing aligned to AI Qaeda central that is committed to raising its profile and impressing 

its superiors with high-profile attacks on Western targets. This has regional implications given that this 

faction is more interested in looking beyond Somalia and cultivating links with terrorist outfits further 

afield. Groups in Kenya and Tanzania offer the most likely sources of support. Both countries have a 

small but growing problem with Islamist extremism, especially in the coastal regions and Zanzibar. In 

particular/ investigators are examining the possibility that the Westgate mall attack was a collaborative 

effort between AI Shabaab and a Kenyan affiliate, AI Hijra. According to the UN Monitoring Group on 

Somalia, there has already been some transfer of personnel between the groups, with members of AI 

Hijra taking part in operations in Somalia before returning home in 2012. 

This latest attack sounds a warning that further 'spectaculars' should not be discounted, given the 

apparent ease in which the Westgate operation was mounted. AI Shabaab appears to have settled on a 

frighteningly simple formula that takes a page from the playbook of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group 

which staged a coordinated attack on Mumbai in 2008. This approach does not require high explosives 

and suicide bombs. All that is needed is a soft target, a few guns, plenty of ammunition, and some 

willing 'martyrs.' In the absence of good intelligence/ there is little the authorities can do to prevent 

such atrocities. There are a multitude of potential targets and it is neither possible nor desirable to 

harden security at all ofthem to the extent that they could withstand an assault by determined 

attackers throwing hand grenades and firing guns. 

Responding to the threat: Supporting Kenya 

The United States has a close interest in ensuring that the perpetrators of the Westgate Center attack 

are held responsible. There are national security interests at stake/ not least because of the ongoing 

speculation that some of those involved may have been U.S. citizens. For the time being, and unless 

such links are confirmed, the Westgate attack neither raises nor lowers the threat posed by AI Shabaab 

to the U.s. homeland. The ability of a terrorist group to attack a shopping center more than 7,000 miles 

from the United States does not shed much light on its capacity to do so closer to home. 

Irrespective of the threat to the homeland, the United States has multiple, important interests in East 

Africa which must be protected from groups like AI Shabaab. Kenya has consistently been the United 

States/ strongest ally in East Africa. Nairobi is the economic hub of the entire region and a major 

contributor to the African growth story that is prompting the U.S Government to engage more heavily in 

the continent. The United States has important business interests in Kenya/ with IBM and GE among the 

corporate giants maintaining regional offices in the country. The U.S. embassy in Nairobi is its largest in 

Africa and the management headquarters for multi-billion dollar assistance programs covering the 

whole region. Moreover, the United States and Kenya are closely bound together by a shared exposure 

4 
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to terrorism dating back to 1998, when AI Qaeda blew up the former u.s. embassy building in Nairobi, 

killing 218 people. 

However, this latest attack comes at a time of strained bilateral relations. Kenya has already expressed 

its unhappiness with what it described as an "unfriendly" travel advisory issued by the State Department 

last Friday urging U.S. citizens in Nairobi and Mombasa to exercise caution. More broadly, bilateral 

relations have been unsteadied by the election earlier this year of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his 

deputy, William Ruto, who face charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court 

related to the outbreak of mass violence during and after the 2007 elections. Since the Westgate attack, 

President Kenyatta and others have argued that, at this time of crisis, the ICC trials will be a distraction 

with implications for national security. This presents the United States, which has urged Kenya to fully 

cooperate with the ICC, in an awkward position. However, the events of the past week do nothing to 

alter the seriousness of the charges faced by the president and his deputy, which deserve to be heard in 

full. 

Political differences aside, Kenya is-and should continue to be-an important security partner of the 

United States. In addition to providing assistance to the investigation into the Westgate attack, the 

United States has committed more than $90 million to building Kenya's counter-terrorism capacity. But 

early inquiries into the attack have exposed serious intelligence failures-both among Kenya's security 

services and by extension the main international counter-terrorism partners who support them-which 

underline the challenges of preventing such atrocities. 

One acute shortcoming is the endemic corruption in Kenyan public life. Too many public officials are 

willing to turn a blind eye to criminal conduct in return for a bribe. Press reports in Kenya suggest that 

vital information which may have prevented the Westgate attack or led to the capture of some of the 

key organizers was missed in this way. The Kenya police, an institution which has successfully resisted 

multiple attempts at reform, is particularly culpable. A U.S. initiative to improve professional standards 

among the police could significantly enhance Kenya's national security. 

Beyond the formal security apparatus, the Westgate attack underlines the important role the public can 

play in being the "eyes and ears" of the authorities in preventing terrorism. However, the public will 

only develop a security consciousness if they trust their police or intelligence officials to act on the 

information they give them. Two communities that can playa particularly important role in offering 

information are Somalis living in Kenya and Kenyans of Somali origin. It is therefore particularly 

important that the Kenyan authorities do not punish these communities for the actions of a few by 

launching heavy-handed security actions, making arbitrary arrests, and expelling or threatening to expel 

refugees. 

Responding to the threat: Supporting the Somali Federal Government 

Ultimately, however, the key to defeating AI Shabaab will be found in Somalia, not Kenya. AI Shabaab is 

an outgrowth of more than 20 years of chronic disorder in Somalia, and at least another 20 of misrule 

before that. Efforts to strengthen the embryonic capacity of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to 

restore security, stability, and consensual government to Somalia will be necessary initial steps toward 
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removing the conditions which allowed AI Shabaab to flourish. The SFG, with international support, has 

made modest progress since taking office one year ago. But it has many tasks to accomplish before its 

mandate expires in 2016, not least proving to a distrustful public that it is genuinely committed to 

governing in the interests of all Somalis. 

The Westgate attack suggests that for now, Godane's fanatical wing of AI Shabaab is in the ascendancy. 

He and his acolytes must be found and detained before they can strike again. The u.s. should be 

extremely cautious in taking the lead in any operation to neutralize Godane. U.S. airstrikes against AI 

Shabaab leaders have been hugely controversial in the past and carry high potential for popular 

backlash, collateral damage, or unintended longer-term consequences. Instead, the U.S. should support 

regionally-led intelligence and surveillance efforts and utilize existing policy tools to encourage Godane's 

capture and prosecution, including the State Department's Rewards for Justice Program, which has a $7 

million reward on offer for information leading to his arrest. 

In addition, the United States can continue to assist the African Union-led peacekeeping force which has 

put AI Shabaab on the back foot in recent months-and has in part prompted its resort to the 

asymmetrical tactics of bombings and hit-and-run attacks inside Somalia. The United States has been an 

important supporter ofthe AMISOM mission, which currently numbers approximately 17,700 troops 

from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone, providing more than $700 million since 2007. 

But AMISOM will not be in Somalia forever and is therefore no more than a temporary solution to the 

country's security problems. The Somali National Security Forces have a long way to go before they can 

be considered ready to meet the security needs of their citizens. They are under-resourced/ underequipped and ill-disciplined. The United States and other donors are trying to help by paying salaries and 

providing basic training to certain vetted units, but this effort will only bear fruit over the long term. In 

the meantime, constant vigilance will be required in order to ensure that human rights norms are 

respected. 

It would be a mistake to think that a military solution alone will remove the scourge of AI Shabaab. 

Efforts must be intensified to track the money that sustains AI Shabaab operations. Current efforts by 

leading international banks to stop doing business with the money transfer companies through which 

some of this funding is believed to flow are understandable, but misguided, because they are likely to 

drive the remittance process underground and cause serious damage to the legitimate Somali economy. 

More important than either security responses or financial transaction monitoring is the need for 

Somalia to pursue a political process to reach out to and potentially rehabilitate the broader swathe of 

AI Shabaab followers who are driven less by dreams of international jihad and more by the pursuit of 

local or national grievances or simply the next meal. There is scope, it seems, for the Somali Federal 

Government to negotiate with these people, and through a combination of threats and inducements 

persuade them to leave violence behind. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that the bulk of AI 

Shabaab could one day transition into formal politics. In its private conversations with the SFG/ the 

United States should discreetly encourage this process. 
32

Chairman ROYCE. Let me ask a question of Mr. Farah first, and 

that has to go to the question of young Somali-Americans that alShabaab attempts to recruit. 

Are there particular types of young men for which they have a 

greater instance of success when they try to recruit? What is the 

target? 

Mr. FARAH. Al-Shabaab is targeting the disenfranchised youth. 

That is their tactic. And that is the game that we need to—that 

we are playing here. We need to be able—the youth in the community, you know, there are a lot of underlying issues. Radicalization 

doesn’t happen overnight; it is a process. 

And so what we need to do is really try to engage the 

disenfranchised youth that are missing, whether it is jobs, whether 

it is lack of mentorship. Those are the youth that al-Shabaab is 

targeting, and that is the core issue here. That is what we need 

to target. 

Chairman ROYCE. I just finished Ed Husain’s book, ‘‘The 

Islamist.’’ I don’t know if you have read it yet, but it is a very interesting perspective on this issue. 

Let me ask you about how you would assess the U.S. Government’s anti-radicalization efforts. And I will probably ask Mr. 

Borelli the same question. 

Mr. FARAH. My assess in regards to what our Government is 

doing in terms of al-Shabaab, we are very good at, you know, the 

external work, you know, in terms of a military going after, you 

know, a terrorist across the world. But what we need to do is inside, within the community, our Federal Government must invest 

local entities like Ka Joog to do more engagement, more work. 

What happened over a week ago shows me and shows us in the 

community that we need to do more work. So what I would suggest 

is that our Federal Government must invest local entities and must 

empower local entities to do more work within the community and 

across the Nation. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Farah. 

Mr. Borelli, your thoughts on that? 

Mr. BORELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Number one, I do agree with Mr. Farah, in that the Federal Government needs to invest at the local level. We have seen that these 

recruitment efforts are hatched at the local level. They start with 

local grievances. And the best way to stop that message, to counter 

that message, is by credible voices in the community. 

I am not sure that the Federal Government has really a good 

strategic plan yet for doing that. In terms of, kind of, CVE, we have 

seen that many different agencies within the Federal Government 

have a role in the CVE, in countering this violent message, and, 

in some cases, it seems to be a bit disjointed and disconnected. 

We have also seen that a lot of this responsibility has been put 

on the backs of law enforcement, FBI and Homeland Security. And 

sometimes that may not be the best messenger to be working on 

CVE when, on one hand, you are trying to bridge this gap and 

build this trust and develop a dialogue on Monday and then on 

Thursday, you know, your counterparts from your same agency are 

in the community making arrests, putting sting operations together. 

33

So you have sometimes opposing forces that have different agendas but within the same agency. So I think this is something that 

we also should be looking at closely. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Borelli. 

Dr. Jones, in past hearings, we have learned of various networks, 

some of them affiliated with al-Shabaab, involved in smuggling Somalis into the United States. And I was going to ask you if this 

is still happening. And I was going to ask you, for what purpose 

would al-Shabaab smuggle people into the United States?

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is the pace of 

smuggling and actually individuals leaving the United States has 

likely decreased somewhat over the past probably 2 years. But I 

think there is an interest in recruitment and fundraising in the 

United States within the Somali community, the Somali-American 

community. 

So the primary reasons for bringing people in are to recruit, to 

go back to Somalia, and to fundraise and to ensure that there is 

money that is going into the pockets of some cash-strapped members of al-Shabaab. 

Chairman ROYCE. In the past, how were people brought into the 

U.S.? How did they make access into the——

Mr. JONES. One of the primary roots was through the U.S.-Mexican border, through the southern route. If somebody has a legitimate passport and the name does not come up, you can fly in. But 

other than that, a primary route is through multiple border crossings along the U.S.-Mexican border. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We are going to go to Mr. Eliot Engel from New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to refer back to a question I mentioned in my opening 

statement, and anyone that would like to answer this is welcome 

to. 

Could you discuss the relationship between the Kenyan security 

forces and the Somali population and provide analysis of what kind 

of engagement could be effective in combating al-Shabaab? 

Mr. Downie? 

Mr. DOWNIE. The relationship between the Kenyan security 

forces and Somalis has not been good, both inside Somalia and in 

Kenya as well. 

Inside Somalia, where Kenyan forces invaded the southern part 

of the country 2 years ago, there were growing suspicions that 

Kenya is not purely interested in pushing insecurity away from its 

border but that it is also pursuing political and, to some extent, 

business interests in southern Somalia. And that is clearly creating 

resentment within Somalia. 

Meanwhile, inside Kenya, there is a tendency when we have attacks like this for the Kenyan security forces to lash out somewhat 

indiscriminately, targeting members of the Somali-Kenyan community in Nairobi. And there is also, as we have heard, a large Somali 

refugee community. These are incredibly counterproductive measures because these are the two communities that the Kenyans have 

to rely most closely on for getting information about these sorts of 

attacks. 

34

Mr. ENGEL. Well, many observers have suggested that the attack 

at Westgate was a desperate attempt to bolster recruiting and provoke an overreaction against the Somali community in Kenya. Do 

you agree? And what sort of policy responses are to be avoided in 

order to avoid this scenario? 

Mr. JONES. Ranking Member Engel, I think there were probably 

multiple motivations for conducting the attack. I suspect, as we 

have seen with other organizations, not just al-Shabaab, overreaction would be welcomed by al-Shabaab. It would encourage recruitment. 

I suspect there were other reasons: A desire to exact revenge on 

Kenyan forces, which have conducted lethal operations against alShabaab training camps within Somalia; and also to get attention. 

They got 24/7 attention from multiple international media sites. So 

I think there were multiple reasons for doing that. 

I think, from an overreaction standpoint, I think one thing that 

we have to be careful about is we don’t encourage the Kenyans to 

overreact, conduct overt attacks within Somalia that are likely to 

walk into the same issues that several of our witnesses have talked 

about, that walk us into a nationalist problem which encourages 

recruitment within Somalia. 

Mr. BORELLI. If I may add one thing, Mr. Engel, is that I think 

the Westgate attack was very shrewd for recruiting. 

As I mentioned before, you have various factions within alShabaab. You have more of a nationalist faction, and you also have 

kind of the global jihad mentality. This attack seemed to appeal to 

both. You were able to launch an attack against Kenya and 

against, you know, the country that has boots on the ground of 

your country, so it appeals on one hand to that nationalist movement, but also by targeting Westerners and all of the media, the 

global media that was given to this attack, it has the broader appeal to the al-Qaeda-like faction. 

So I think, in that sense, it was very shrewd and could be a good 

recruiting tool.

Mr. DOWNIE. I might just add one thing, as well. Clearly, this 

was an attempt to get attention with the mother organization, with 

al-Qaeda. We have seen that, in the past, at least Osama bin 

Laden was somewhat dubious about al-Shabaab’s seriousness as an 

organization, even thought they were too indiscriminate in their attacks and that they were killing too many Muslims. There has been 

a conscious effort, at least in the way that al-Shabaab has presented this attack, that they tried to single out Christians. 

And I think we shouldn’t actually be taken in by this PR from 

al-Shabaab. You know, the single largest loss of life in the attack 

was at the beginning when a grenade was lobbed into a group of 

people, mothers and children watching a cooking demonstration, 

and a gunman open fire. This was a completely indiscriminate attack. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, since you mentioned al-Qaeda, let me just get 

one last quick question in. 

What is the relationship, the nature of the relationship, between 

al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab? Al-Shabaab we know in 2012 announced 

its formal merger with al-Qaeda, but what does that mean? Do 

35

they take directions from al-Qaeda? Do they get training? Do they 

get operational or financial support? 

Mr. DOWNIE. Frankly, it is hard to know. Certainly, the two 

groups have been moving closely together, particularly since 

Ahmed Godane became the emir, the leader of al-Shabaab. You 

know, he has been trying consciously to reach out and appeal to alQaeda. 

Whether, though, this attack involves substantial support, coordination with al-Qaeda funding, or even received a blessing from 

al-Qaeda, I certainly am not aware of that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel. 

We now go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairman of the Middle East 

Subcommittee. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, this horrible al-Shabaab attack, coupled with the closure of 

over 20 U.S. Embassies and consulates this past summer and last 

month’s targeted suicide bombings against Christians in Pakistan 

by an al-Qaeda-linked group, proves that terrorist groups are extremely active still and their influence is far-reaching. And the 

threats to our U.S. national security interests from extremist 

groups, such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, remain very real. 

The United States must not let down our guard. 

These groups, as you have pointed out, are attempting to 

strengthen their ties to communities here in the United States. 

And that must be of grave concern to all of us because it will 

spread their propaganda to recruit susceptible youths to join their 

ranks. And, as you had pointed out in your testimony, the youths 

recruited by al-Shabaab are more driven by nationalistic and political ideologies, rather than religious ones, but can easily be converted to a global al-Qaeda agenda. 

And if we know that al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda have been successful in recruiting these susceptible youths, what more can we do to 

target those communities in an effort to counter this influence? 

Also, if we are going to fight terrorism and their activities, we 

have to develop a comprehensive strategy that can disrupt their 

networks, prevent their operations from spreading. And one entity 

that can be of assistance to us is the U.S. Africa Command. But 

what we have seen is that this combatant command continues to 

lack the necessary assets, infrastructure, personnel, and resources 

to effectively fight terrorism successfully. 

Another key aspect to dismantling al-Shabaab’s activities is 

through the drug trade. We have known that the threat of narcoterrorism continues to grow. It is used by many terrorist organizations to finance their illicit activities and expand their networks. 

Last year, a senior DEA official testified that, as a result of drug 

trafficking, ‘‘Millions of dollars a year are being sent to Somalia 

and other countries in the Horn of Africa, some of which ends up 

in the coffers of terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab.’’

So, in conjunction with our regional allies, we need to fight this 

extremism head-on. We have to reassess our priorities, continue to 

use initiatives that are doing fairly good work but could be beefed 

up. The East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, the Trans-Sahara 

36

Counterterrorism Terrorism Partnership, they could help our allies 

in Africa more to protect national security interests and dismantle 

terrorist cells. But we have seen that these programs lack 

prioritization, they lack clear objectives, realistic benchmarks of 

what they can do to look at our progress in fighting these extremists. 

In your assessment, would you say that the United States has 

been giving the threat of al-Qaeda the attention and focus that we 

should? Do we need to reevaluate our assessment of these threats 

and our policies and programs in place to fight them? 

So U.S. communities and reassessing the threats, anyone who 

wishes to take any of these. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BORELLI. I will—thank you, Congresswoman. 

I think, to your point about stopping the threat and trying to target the threat against these young people in the communities, I 

think we do need to continue to evaluate our programs both locally 

and federally. And, as Mr. Farah pointed out, some very good work 

is being done inside the community, and we need to continue to 

support that. 

As an example, when I was in Minnesota visiting the local community and speaking with many of the young Somali people there, 

they had actually put together a YouTube video showing the atrocities committed by al-Shabaab and showing how al-Shabaab was 

manipulating people with a distorted message. And these are the 

type of programs that we can put forth to support, using the Internet, using the same social media that is recreating these people, 

use it as a counter-narrative. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Anyone else wish to comment? 

Mr. FARAH. Yep. If I may add to what my colleague here said, 

I think we definitely do need to reassess on moving forward in regards to the threats of al-Shabaab. In the recent attacks, what it 

shows us is that al-Shabaab is not weak as we think. We need to 

do more and more work within the community. 

And, you know, we have to understand that 99.99 percent of our 

community are law-abiding citizens. We are talking about a few individuals. But those few individuals are the ones that we need to 

target, that we need to go after, and those other ones that we need 

to engage——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. FARAH [continuing]. Before——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. I just ran out of time. Thank 

you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Sires of New Jersey, ranking member of 

the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this meeting. 

You know, as I listen to you, what is the main source of revenue 

of al-Shabaab? Where do they get their money? Is it through drugs, 

through——

Mr. JONES. My understanding is they have redundant sources of 

funding from illegal criminal activity, including involvement in the 

charcoal network, to kidnapping, to multiple other sources, including taxation in southern Somalia. 

37

So, redundant sources of funding, as well as funding from a diaspora population of Somalis across the globe, including from the 

U.S. 

Mr. SIRES. I assume we keep track, especially in the U.S., of people who are contributing to these people, somehow? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. And some have been arrested for that. 

Mr. SIRES. We have made arrests? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, we have made arrests. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. 

Mr. BORELLI. The thing is, it is very difficult to track the money 

once it gets to Somalia. There are many people in the Somali diaspora that send money to their families because they desperately 

need it. The problem is that, once the money gets there, it is hard 

to track if it is actually going to feed their relatives or if it is being 

diverted to go to al-Shabaab. And this is the challenge for law enforcement because, quite frankly, you know, some of those people 

need the money and it is sent there with good intent but it is diverted. 

Mr. DOWNIE. I might just add, this is a very live issue right now. 

Because of the difficulties of monitoring the money transfer services, where much of this money flows, a lot of banks are getting 

leery of doing business with these firms. 

The problem is—and it is certainly true that it is hard to monitor 

the flows, but by cracking down on these money transfers, you are 

also stopping vital sources of income for Somalis. And just at the 

moment where the country is starting to rebuild its economy to 

some extent, cutting off those flows could have a disastrous effect 

in the development prospects for Somalia. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Farah, how does the Muslim community in Somalia and Kenya view al-Shabaab? 

Mr. FARAH. I can—99.99 percent of the Somali diaspora across 

the world condemn the work of al-Shabaab. This is something 

that—al-Shabaab do not convey my image, they do not convey the 

image of the Somali communities across the United States, nor 

across the globe. 

Mr. SIRES. So I guess one way of tracking the money would be 

the community that sends the money making sure that the money 

goes to the relatives that it is intended to. 

Mr. FARAH. Definitely. And that is where we really have to take 

things back to Somalia and really empower the Federal Government and the regional government to really put laws, you know, a 

system that we can oversee where money is flowing. 

Mr. SIRES. Are the agencies in this country working with you on 

some of these issues? 

Mr. FARAH. Oh, definitely. Yep, everybody in the community is 

on board in terms of where al-Shabaab stands in the community, 

and that is—it doesn’t stand anywhere. I mean, it is condemned 

throughout—across the community. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We are going to go now to Mr. Christopher Smith, the chairman 

of the Africa Subcommittee. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

38

To our distinguished witnesses, I know you know this very well—

in 1998, Assistant Secretary Carpenter, our Assistant Secretary for 

Diplomatic Security, sat where you sat and said that the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were ‘‘soft targets.’’ And, of 

course, we have had a multiyear effort to harden those targets. 

No matter what we do, anybody in the world, there will never 

be a hardening of supermarkets, restaurants, and the like, which 

underscores the need to destroy these hideous terrorist organizations. Because they pick, through guerilla action, where they want 

to destroy people and destroy physical infrastructure. 

If you could tell us—you know, Dr. Jones, you said that unfortunately U.S. efforts against al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda more broadly 

have been ‘‘disjointed.’’

Mr. Downie, you said that current efforts by leading international banks to stop doing business with money transfer companies, through which some of this funding is believed to flow, are 

understandable but, your words, are ‘‘misguided.’’

And I am wondering, you know, when al-Shabaab was named as 

a foreign terrorist organization in March 2008, one of the mainstays of that law is to go after the financial transactions that keep 

them afloat and aid and abet their killing. How effective has the 

FTO designation been? How would you assess the weaknesses and 

strengths of the U.S. response? If you can go into some further 

elaboration. 

And while you are answering, Mr. Downie, you mentioned that 

Ahmed Godane is now in control of the movement and he is in ascendency. If you could elaborate on what that portends, in terms 

of further internationalizing the efforts. 

And, finally, if I could, many of us have met with Hassan Sheikh 

Mohamoud, the President of Somalia. How do you assess his work, 

his capabilities? He is trying, with U.S. and other support, to build 

up a military capability, hopefully with a strong emphasis on 

human rights. If you could speak to that, as well. 

Mr. DOWNIE. Thank you. I will tackle the last couple of questions 

there. 

The importance of Godane’s emergence as a leader, I think it is 

significant. He is, you know, on the very, very end of the scale in 

terms of extremism. Since his rise to the top of the organization, 

al-Shabaab has definitely tried to orient itself more closely with alQaeda. He is very much motivated by the international jihadist 

agenda. 

And he has been absolutely ruthless within al-Shabaab, as well. 

This is a very fragmented organization. And just in the last few 

months, he seems to have, through assassinations and other disappearances of potential rivals, some of whom disagreed with his 

methods, has consolidated his power and sort of strengthened those 

ties with al-Qaeda. So that has significance in terms of the group’s 

choice of targets and willingness to look at targets outside of Somalia. 

In terms of the new President of Somalia, President Mohamoud 

has been in office for a year now. Given the challenges that Somalia faces—more than 20 years without a functioning government—

he is doing okay. It is modest progress. 

39

In his favor, he is a serious person. He is not tainted by the politics of the past; he has come from outside of politics. He is trying 

his best. He has a technocratic government around him. But the 

challenges are immense. And one of them is the one you highlighted, and that is security. So efforts to strengthen the security 

services of Somalia are required. 

Mr. SMITH. Is the U.S. Government doing all that it can do? 

Mr. DOWNIE. I think one of the weak spots is the one you highlighted, is the financing piece. But there are no very easy solutions 

to that. By clamping down on the remittances, as I say, you are 

holding back the economic progress in Somalia, as well. So it is 

somewhat of a blunt tool. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. Yeah, I was just going to say more broadly on the 

FTO designation, when I look around the globe, look, there are 

some al-Qaeda affiliates, like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, which have 

clearly strengthened. Their control of territory has grown. 

Shabaab’s has decreased. So I think the efforts that the U.S. and 

some of the neighbors and the Somali Government have done to alShabaab have decreased its control of territory and put it on the 

run. 

It is not dead. And I think the lesson that we have learned over 

the past couple of weeks is, if we take our foot off the gas a little 

bit, this group does have the capability to strike. 

So I hope we come back to the ideological issue here because I 

would say that is the biggest weakness we have right now, and the 

FTO designation is—they are still recruiting. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to Mr. Faleomavaega of American Samoa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am curious, wanting to ask Mr. Farah, how come 88,000 Somali-Americans live in Minnesota? I was under the impression that 

Somalia is a very warm country. Do you have snow in Somalia, as 

well? I am curious. 

Mr. FARAH. Not that I am aware of. I don’t think there is snow 

in Somalia. 

However, there are a lot of reasons why Somalis move to Minnesota, and the same reason that I did. Really, Minnesota is very 

good when it comes to raising a family. The economy is much better compared to other States. And, really, in the Somali community, everything goes by referrals. And so, if a family calls, you 

know, another family and they say, ‘‘Hey, Minnesota is where you 

need to be,’’ that is where the bus is going, that is where they will 

be moving. 

And so that is where a lot of the—that is why you are seeing a 

large concentration of the Somalis living in Minnesota. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am also aware of the fact that I think 

quite a sizeable number of people from—the Hmong people from 

Vietnam——

Mr. FARAH. Definitely. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA [continuing]. Also live in Minnesota. 

40

And I’m just curious—maybe Mr. Borelli could help me—is there 

any particular reason? Economics? It seems that Minnesota is giving our country a good example for immigrants to come to, because 

they seem to be offering a lot better programs than other States. 

Is that the reason why so many of our Somalian-Americans live 

in Minnesota, Mr. Borelli? 

Mr. BORELLI. Based on my discussions with people in that community, that is, in fact, the case. It is very easy for people from 

other countries to go. They can get some programs that help them 

get on their feet, get established. And then it just becomes a very 

hospitable place for people from other countries to make it in the 

United States. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. There is a—I wanted just to get your response. You know, when we had the Oklahoma City bombing, there 

was an immediate profiling by Federal agencies as well as State 

enforcement officers in Oklahoma. Anybody with an Arabic surname was questioned, because the presumption being—and this is 

the stereotyping, the profiling, to say that this terrorist act must 

have been done by a Muslim terrorist. Well, it turned out to have 

been an American. 

And I am just curious, Dr. Jones, Mr. Borelli, have there been 

any incidents—Mr. Farah—that our Somalian-American community have been profiled since this incident took place in Nairobi, 

where serious questions have arisen about the loyalty of our Somalian-American community, an event of this terrorist act that took 

place in Nairobi? 

Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. I am not aware of any, but I don’t live in Minneapolis, so I would defer to my colleagues. 

Mr. FARAH. Thanks for the question. 

Since the incident happened in Kenya, there has been a lot of 

media throughout the community really scrutinizing the image of 

the Somalis. And, really, again, what we need to reiterate again 

over and over is that the majority of the community are law-abiding citizens. We are talking about a few individuals, and those few 

individuals do not convey the message or the image of the Somalis. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, it seems to me—and then correct me 

if I am wrong, our experts—I believe there are only, what, several 

hundred al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but we have al-Shabaab with 

some 5,000 members? Am I correct on the information that was 

given, that there are 5,000 members that make up the al-Shabaab 

organization? 

Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. That number sounds a little high now for full-time 

members. But I think you are correct to point out that the numbers 

of al-Shabaab are larger than the numbers of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Borelli? 

Mr. BORELLI. I believe Dr. Jones is right. 

And if I could kind of make a point on your other statement, I 

think we have learned lessons over the course of the years in law 

enforcement that—don’t jump to conclusions too quickly. We need 

to not look at the person’s last name or where they are from; we 

need to look at their actions and keep a very open mind. Because 

41

recruitment and radicalism and the opportunity to join a terrorist 

group and commit acts of violence transcends a person’s place of 

birth or their religion. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Just to note, Mr. Faleomavaega, I did extensive investigations on 

the Oklahoma City bombing, and I still believe that there was a 

Muslim connection to that. And it is all the way from Terry Nichols 

being down in Cebu City at the same time that Ramzi Yousef was, 

just a few weeks before the Oklahoma City bombing, would indicate that. But that has never been proven. 

Yeah, radicals, whether they are Anglos or whether they are 

Muslims, seem to have the same enemies, and that is decent people 

throughout the world and especially the United States of America, 

which is trying to ally ourselves with good and decent people of the 

world. 

Let me just note that we are talking about thousands of people 

in a terrorist organization, thousands of people. This is not an operation that can be financed through contributions from individuals 

who sympathize. 

What is the cost of a bullet in Somalia? I would say the cost of 

a bullet is probably around 10 to 25 cents a bullet. Not to mention 

the cost of an RPG or the cost of explosives or the cost of vehicles 

or the cost of training or the cost of recruiting. These are enormous 

costs. These are things that cannot be done by—and one of the 

problems we have here, Madam Chairman, in the United States, 

is our law enforcement is trying to find out somebody who has donated $100, some cab driver somewhere, to this terrorist network 

somewhere in the world. 

No, we need to get down to the nitty-gritty and find out who is 

providing the hundreds of millions of dollars to the terrorist operations throughout the world and who is spending the money to recruit these young people, who is providing that money. And, for 

some reason, I just have an inkling that they are people in the 

Middle East who make a lot of money from oil. I don’t know what 

countries they are, but I just have that inkling. 

And I would suggest that we could be able to prove that if we 

wanted to. But we have been keeping that information from the 

United States, as to who is pumping in millions, tens of millions 

of dollars into these terrorist operations. 

Now, am I off base when I think that? Mr. Jones? Gentlemen? 

Mr. JONES. Well, look, I think there is a lot of gray in how much 

and from where al-Shabaab gets all of its funding. But I would say 

it does get large amounts of funding from other locations in addition to the Middle East. Kidnapping actually can be quite profitable, as can illegal trafficking in a range of goods, including the 

charcoal smuggling, which, in some cases, is in the hundreds of 

thousands and, when you add it to kidnapping, in the millions of 

dollars. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So they have to put it in a bank, 

right? I mean, someone has to have those resources that you are 

42

talking about into a central location and then distribute it. So there 

are banks involved in this in some way. Is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. That is likely. Again, I am not a treasury expert, so 

would defer to those who have followed the banking more than I 

have. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Well, all I can suggest here, Madam Chairman, and what I am 

suggesting today is we have been—and I like that Mr. Borelli is 

talking about how we have to get down to some of the actual psychological and combat the recruitment of people in these communities. But we have ignored the big guys. 

You want to get to the source, the bottom, and cut them off, people with money, cutting them off from recruiting people. But we 

have been going after the little guys. We have been going after 

these people individually, when we have some very big players in 

international terrorism who, for some reason, we have not been 

willing to touch, whether they are big banks or whether they are 

somebody in Saudi Arabia who has $1 billion someplace and is 

pumping in $10 million to $20 million a year into these things. We 

are ignoring them. 

And I would hope that our Government, after this horrible massacre in Kenya, decides to focus on some of the big guys who are 

really financing all of this mayhem around the world. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Would you yield? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would be happy to yield. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could, has the indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta by 

the International Criminal Court in any way frustrated the U.S.’s 

ability to work side-by-side with the Kenyans? 

As you know, he has stated he will not be intimidated. He does 

have a large number of peacekeepers deployed in Somalia. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. That is a wonderful 

question, and we hope that they get the opportunity to answer it 

at some point. 

Now we will turn to Ms. Gabbard for her question and answer. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for sharing your insights with us here 

today. 

A couple of questions first for Mr. Farah with regards to the 

work that Ka Joog is doing. If you could give a couple of examples 

on the outreach that you are actually doing in the community, as 

well as your suggestions, both with the nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations within the Somali community can do, as well 

as law enforcement, in a proactive way to prevent these recruiting 

efforts. 

And secondly to that, if you could speak a little bit about how 

the Somali-American community views these recruiting efforts and 

what actions within the community, as well as externally, they are 

taking to denounce these efforts. 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you for the questions. 

In terms of Ka Joog, our mission is to really empower the youth 

to really stay away from all negativity, whether it is al-Shabaab or 

gangs. You know, we have to treat al-Shabaab like a gang, and 

that is exactly what they are. 

43

We do a lot of—art and education really go hand-in-hand in everything that we do. In terms of art, we are talking about spoken 

word and play. We use the arts to engage the youth. But, ultimately, education is the key. Tutoring and mentoring is the core 

of what we do. And recently we have created really the first-ever 

Somali Boy Scouts. That is something that we haven’t seen recently. Again, we are trying to integrate the youth to the greater 

society as best fit. 

There is a lot of great work in the community that is being done 

before us. What we need to do is invest in those programs, and that 

is what is missing here. Aside from what we are doing externally 

in the United States, we need to focus on what is going on in the 

community and empower local entities. 

I mean, Ka Joog is an all-volunteer-based organization. How can 

we fight al-Shabaab, when they have millions of dollars and you 

have entities like Ka Joog and others in the community who are, 

you know, who are running on E, pretty much, and our Federal 

Government is MIA, missing in action? 

In terms of the Somali community, they feel the same way across 

the board when it comes to al-Shabaab. You know, we condemn the 

work of al-Shabaab, and those few individuals don’t convey the 

message for the Somali community. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

And to the rest of the panel, I don’t know if you are able to estimate what percentage of the financing for al-Shabaab is coming 

from the U.S. or is coming from these remittances that you are 

talking about. 

And, secondly, those recruits that al-Shabaab is getting from the 

U.S., is it your understanding that their intent is largely to engage 

in fighting abroad or here? 

Mr. BORELLI. Based on the conversations that I have had in 

speaking with people in Minnesota, their intention is to fight 

abroad. But, as I mentioned, especially now with a change or consolidation of power and this more of a global jihad message, the 

fear is that they can be turned to come back and take the fight 

here in the U.S. 

With regard to your question about financing, I don’t have a 

number, a percentage—maybe one of my colleagues has—in terms 

of total remittances. 

Mr. DOWNIE. No, the subject matter is just so murky, given the 

way that money is transferred and the lack of transparency within 

that system. 

One thing I should say, and that is to follow up on Dr. Jones’ 

remarks earlier, is that a key source of financing for al-Shabaab 

until very recently has been from within Somalia itself, from taxation of populations in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, from controlling previously the largest port in the south of the country. So if 

there is a silver lining from any of this, it is that now that alShabaab has been pushed back from some of the territory it controls, its funding is being squeezed, as well. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

44

And now we are honored to recognize Mr. McCaul, the chairman 

of the Homeland Security Committee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to echo the gentleman from California’s remarks, Mr. 

Rohrabacher, about the funding issue. I got briefed yesterday, as 

I do, on the threats, and the majority of these threats, when you 

look at these organizations and you look at the funding streams, 

the majority of them tie back to the Saudi peninsula in terms of 

funding. And this is sort of the inconvenient truth that no one talks 

about, and no one wants to deal with it either. 

There was an article today; it says ‘‘$100,000 Sent from Gulf to 

Fund 25 Assassins’’ to the elite intelligence unit of the Somali terrorist organization al-Shabaab. 

This is something, Madam Chair, we are going to have to deal 

with at some point in time. And I know it has been something that, 

the Saudis being our ally, you know, presents a problem, and it is 

a challenge. But it is something I think we need to address and see 

it for what it really is. 

I do wear two hats, and I am concerned about the threat to the 

homeland with respect to these Americans. We had a hearing on 

the Homeland Security Committee in 2011. Up to 50 of these alShabaab members are from the United States. I think there are 

more than that. Fifty that we know about. 

So I think the first question is to Mr. Borelli. 

With your expertise with the FBI, what degree of confidence do 

we have on the identity of these Americans over there, in terms of 

who are they? Can we get them on the no-fly list? Are they on the 

no-fly list? What is the threat to the homeland with respect to 

them returning after being trained and recruited in the war on terror? 

Mr. BORELLI. I think with regard to your first question, in terms 

of being able to positively identify these individuals, get them on 

the proper watch lists, and so forth, a lot of progress has been 

made. I have been outside of the FBI for 3 years now, so I can’t 

speak to what has happened in that gap from when I retired till 

today. But I think, when I did leave the FBI, we had a fairly high 

degree of confidence. 

Nothing is 100 percent. Again, this is where we need to engage 

the community to help us help the FBI identify these people, to 

know when they leave the community, when they go off the grid, 

and confirm the fact that they have joined the ranks of al-Shabaab. 

Secondly, I would say to your other point, the risk to the homeland, I would say, is definitely there. I don’t know if it is higher 

today than it was a month ago. But, again, my fear is the 

Najibullah Zazi type of situation, where somebody leaves with the 

intent to fight abroad and they are co-opted to take the fight back 

home. And certainly these individuals, if they have been off the 

grid for a while, if they have a blue passport, they can get back 

into society, reintegrate, and then we have a very serious problem 

that can go undetected. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And to that point, within al-Shabaab we know 

there is a rift between the American from Alabama, Mr. 

Hammami, and Godane, who is the current leader. And the rift, as 

I understand it, is between whether they want to focus their interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\100313\85104 HFA PsN: SHIRL
45

ests regionally or whether they want to expand that, as you talked 

about external operations, beyond the region to Western targets 

and possibly the United States. Mr. Hammami was assassinated by 

Godane and his disciples a week before this shopping mall attack. 

The other thing that worries me about the shopping mall is it is 

a symbol of Western—it is sort of a Western target. So you put all 

that together, and that is very confusing and disturbing as well. 

And, Dr. Jones, what do you make of this rift within al-Shabaab 

and the assassination of Hammami? And were these Americans 

under Hammami’s control in any way responsible and complicit 

with this attack on a Western symbol, the Westgate shopping mall? 

Mr. JONES. I can’t speak to the degree of involvement by Americans. I mean, my understanding is that is still being looked at by 

our own agencies, to some degree. 

But what I would say is, (A), I would strongly support your point 

of notable rifts within the organization. (B), there has been encouragement, apparently from Ayman al-Zawahiri, to conduct attacks 

outside of just Somalia. 

And, (C), I would also note that what the U.S. does can influence 

it. Not just Zazi but Faisal Shahzad in 2010 was involved in an 

SUV attempted attack in Times Square. That organization, the 

Pakistan Taliban, was assessed earlier that year by our U.S. intelligence community not to be a threat to the homeland. We assassinated, the year before, the head of that organization with a drone 

strike. 

If we were to take those kinds of action in Somalia, my guess is 

they would be right back after us. So our actions also can impact 

where this goes forward. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I see my time has expired. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Vargas of California is recognized. 

Mr. VARGAS. Madam Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity. 

I do want to focus us a little bit on the United States. Obviously, 

I read here on page 4 that al-Shabaab has demonstrated a remarkable ability to recruit Somali-Americans since at least 2007. The 

epicenter of this effort has been Minnesota, where there is a large 

Somali-American population. 

I represent the area of San Diego, and we also have a fairly large 

Somali population. During the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, my wife 

and I decided we wanted to adopt a Muslim family that went 

through the horrors of that ethnic cleansing, so we did. And they 

lived with us for 2 years, and during those 2 years I got to meet 

many in the Somali community who had also been airlifted to California. 

Now, I have not heard of any recruitment in San Diego for alShabaab or any other terrorist organization. Could you comment on 

that? 

Mr. BORELLI. I would say the fear is that the Internet does not 

know the boundaries between San Diego and Minnesota. And we 

have seen that al-Shabaab is really very effective in using the 

Internet. Many of these young people get that message from the 

Internet. 

46

So, while there may not be boots on the ground and, you know, 

that type of recruiting, I think the fear is that you absolutely have 

recruiting in San Diego via the Internet. 

Mr. VARGAS. And then my follow-up question for you, and I think 

I heard it earlier, the notion that maybe Somali terrorists were 

coming across the Mexico-California or Mexico-Texas border, the 

border from Mexico and the United States. Do we have any evidence at all of that? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, in particular the movement of individuals from 

the United States south across the border. Some have returned. I 

am not aware of many that have returned that have been prepared 

to conduct attacks. But, yes, movement of individuals going in both 

directions. 

Mr. VARGAS. Because my understanding is that most of the Somalis that were brought here actually have permits to be here, 

have legalized status. 

Mr. JONES. The vast majority do. My only point earlier was that 

there is a human trafficking network that has moved Somalis out 

and into the United States via the U.S.-Mexican border. But that 

does represent a very, very small percent——

Mr. VARGAS. The reason I say that is because always the border 

seems to become the excuse, saying that the terrorists are coming 

across the border. And I have a very good relationship with the 

Border Patrol there; in fact, we met here last week. And they have 

not apprehended many terrorists coming across the San Diego-Tijuana border. 

It seems that most of the terrorists—and I do agree that there 

are a number of them, obviously, here; we have caught people, we 

have fined people—seem to have come here legally, either in an 

airlift, some humanitarian effort on the part of United States. They 

have permits to be here. Is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, that is the vast majority. But, again, I would 

also point out that some Americans, including Somali-Americans, 

have left to go fight in al-Shabaab through that border, as well. So 

it is not just the returning. 

Mr. VARGAS. So it is the exiting the United States, it is not the 

entering the United States, then. 

Mr. JONES. I don’t know the percentage that have entered via 

that way. I am——

Mr. VARGAS. Do we have any evidence of anyone that has entered that way? 

Mr. JONES. I can’t speak to that. 

Mr. VARGAS. Do you have any information of any name, any person that may have been arrested trying to enter the United States? 

Mr. JONES. I can check and get back to you on that. 

Mr. VARGAS. Would you, please? Because I would like to know 

that. Because it is usually used as an excuse, that the border is so 

porous, all these terrorists are coming through, and it seems to me 

that mostly landscapers are, you know, not many terrorists. 

It seems that most of the people who become terrorists are those 

that arrive in this country with some sort of visa, some sort of permit, where we, through our generosity as a Nation, take a look at 

some horrible event that is happening around the world and we 

allow people to come here on a humanitarian basis. And then, unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\100313\85104 HFA PsN: SHIRL
47

fortunately and scandalously and outrageously, they become terrorists or terrorist sympathizers. 

And I think that we should prosecute them and we should go 

after them and show them no mercy, really. You know, when the 

United States stretches out its hand for friendship, as we have historically, you know, we should not tolerate any sort of terrorist or 

terrorist activity or terrorist sympathizers. 

But, again, I just wanted to make the point that you hear it over 

and over, all these terrorists coming from Mexico or the southern 

border into the United States, and we don’t seem to have any information on that. We do have lots of information of terrorists who 

come from other parts legally into the country, become radicalized, 

go and fight somewhere else, and then they blame it on my hometown, where there is no evidence of it. 

Mr. JONES. Yeah. We will get back to you on that. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have three questions, gentlemen. First one: How does alShabaab use Twitter? And what do you understand Twitter’s policy, if any, is toward al-Shabaab? 

Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. My understanding is that they have used surrogates 

to send out messages on Twitter. But I cannot speak to Twitter’s 

policies on monitoring or targeting al-Shabaab on Twitter. 

I would also say that, much like a number of groups that we 

have seen, militant groups, including ones affiliated with al-Qaeda, 

they have become very active on multiple social media forums, including in this Twitter case, to get information out really as a propaganda tool. 

Mr. POE. Anybody else want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. DOWNIE. Only really to support that point and that, you 

know, al-Shabaab means ‘‘the youth.’’ It attracts a lot of young people who are media-savvy, and they have used those skills and familiarity with Internet, social media, to great effect, posting videos. 

And it is powerful recruitment tool, and I think we need to respond 

to that. 

It was very interesting——

Mr. POE. Excuse me for interrupting. What do you mean, ‘‘respond’’? What do you mean by ‘‘we need to respond’’? 

Mr. DOWNIE. Well, we need to be smart in how we use information, as well. 

Just to give you one example, as the Westgate attack was unfolding, al-Shabaab, or people purporting to be al-Shabaab members, 

were churning out messages goading the Kenyan authorities on 

Twitter feeds. The Kenyans were trying to respond through their 

own social media but were really a step behind the whole time, 

were flatfooted. And so it caused a lot of confusion. 

I think, as governments, we need to be a little bit smarter about 

how to respond to this threat. 

Mr. POE. What are the long-term goals, objectives, or policy of alShabaab? 

48

I would just open it up. Anybody who wants to weigh in on that? 

I will just start picking folks if nobody wants to weigh in. 

Mr. DOWNIE. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, al-Shabaab 

is a very broad organization. Clearly, the ascendant wing now is 

one that is committed to global jihad, that increasingly looks beyond the borders of Somalia to launch attacks, primarily within the 

East Africa region, targeting specifically those countries that have 

peacekeeping troops in Somalia, but, of course, on the lookout for 

soft targets that represent so-called Western interests. So that is 

why I think the Westgate Mall was, from their purposes, a perfect 

target to pick. 

Mr. POE. So their goals are just to cause chaos, worldwide jihad, 

murder, pillage? 

Mr. DOWNIE. Their goals have evolved throughout time. They 

started out almost as a nationalist armed wing opposing the Ethiopian invasion at that time. They went through a process, once Ethiopian troops left, of holding substantial amounts of territory in Somalia and tried, with disastrous consequences, to govern territory. 

Eventually, they were forced back, largely from other African 

peacekeeping troops in there. Now they seem to have pulled back 

and are pursuing this jihadist agenda. 

So when I hear people say that al-Shabaab is weak now, that 

might be true. They have narrowed down their agenda. But that, 

paradoxically perhaps, makes them more dangerous. They have 

channeled their objectives to narrower goals, and that is the 

jihadist terrorist attack agenda, I think. 

Mr. POE. In Africa, do we see al-Shabaab and other al-Qaeda affiliates growing in influence? Is their influence about the same, or 

is it diminishing? Is al-Qaeda’s influence diminishing in Africa? Increasing, the same, diminishing? 

Dr. Jones, I see you are pushing the button. 

Mr. JONES. I would say, across the board in Africa, when you include North Africa as well as the Horn, I would say there is a 

slight increase in influence of al-Qaeda and broader Salafi jihadist 

movements in countries like Libya, countries like Egypt now, and 

several other locations. 

Somalia, as I said earlier, again, it does appear over the past 2 

years that Shabaab’s control of territory has decreased. But if you 

are asking about Africa more broadly, I would say there has been 

a slight growth. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Anyone else? 

Mr. DOWNIE. Yeah, I would say the influence ebbs and flows 

across time. There has been a slight growth more recently, particularly in the Sahel region, this band of very vulnerable states just 

south of the Sahara, specifically in Mali, where an al-Qaeda affiliate actually took control of part of that country for a short time 

but has subsequently been pushed back, largely through a military 

intervention by France with some support from others. 

Another area of concern is northern Nigeria, with Boko Haram, 

an extremist movement, launching attacks and killing multiple 

people in that part of Nigeria. Although, primarily, the motives 

there seem to be domestic by nature, so I would not say that they 

necessarily pose a threat to the U.S. homeland, for example. 

49

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Lois Frankel from Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the panel for being here. 

You know, I think I share with Americans that what happened 

at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi was just horrible. And I know our 

heart goes out for the victims and their families. And now we see 

CNN and other media outlets have turned away to other stories, 

obviously. 

What I would like to ask you to do—and I am just going to ask 

a very, very basic question, which is, if you could lay out in as clear 

a manner as possible why Americans should be concerned about 

what happened, what is the potential threat from al-Shabaab not 

only in the region but beyond the region, here, that needs our attention, given what is happening internally in the United States. 

Mr. BORELLI. I will take the first crack at that. 

I think the biggest reason that we should be concerned, as Americans, is looking back at history and what happened with al-Qaeda, 

that we viewed originally al-Qaeda as being not a threat to America, as a regional problem, focusing its efforts on the Middle East 

and Central Asia. And we learned the lesson of how a terrorist organization can morph and change and become our number-one 

enemy. 

So, in my opinion, that is the biggest concern that we have with 

al-Shabaab, is that it can morph and change into more of a global 

threat than it is now. 

Mr. FARAH. If I can add to that, I think our biggest—we should 

be very concerned about al-Shabaab because it is not just a regional issue. I think their biggest goal is really to do us harm here 

in the United States if they are capable of doing that. Really, their 

main goal is really to attract disadvantaged youth and to really 

brainwash them. 

And that is really where we need to come in and stop that before 

that happens. And that really should be our main concern, is doing 

more work internally within the United States, and then treat alShabaab as, you know, as we are treating al-Qaeda. 

Mr. JONES. Very briefly, one, al-Shabaab has a capability to conduct external operations outside of Somalia. Two, they have an interest in targeting the United States, its Embassies, its citizens, 

kidnapping as well as killing. And, three, they have been recruiting 

in American communities, including over the Internet. 

So I think you put all three of those together, yes, there should 

be a concern. 

Mr. DOWNIE. I would just add, finally, we talked a lot about the 

potential threat to the U.S. homeland today, but there are very important substantial U.S. interests in East Africa, in Kenya, an important ally of the United States. Nairobi is home to the largest 

U.S. Embassy in Africa. It is the hub for important development 

programs that cover the whole region. Many big U.S. firms have 

regional offices in Kenya. 

So, irrespective of al-Shabaab’s capability to hit the U.S. homeland, they certainly have proven their ability to attack neighboring 

50

countries to Somalia. And that, by necessity, involves U.S. interests. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Borelli, did you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. BORELLI. No. I think all my colleagues summed up the situation very accurately. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chair, I waive my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. Very good question. 

We go now to Jeff Duncan of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me just remind the folks that al-Shabaab has been 

around for quite a while. They announced a merger in February 

2012 with al-Qaeda. So they are not just a franchise, they are actually part of the whole structure now. 

In past hearings, Mr. Chairman, we have learned of various networks, some of them affiliated with al-Shabaab, involved in smuggling Somalis into the United States through Mexico. 

Dr. Jones, is this still happening? And for what purpose do you 

think al-Shabaab smuggles people into the United States? 

Mr. JONES. My understanding is it is happening. I cannot give 

you specific numbers on how many may be smuggled right now. 

But I think your question on the purpose, there may be several 

purposes: People wanting to return home and people intent on recruiting or fundraising. I think those are the primary reasons. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. 

Would anyone else like to comment on that on the panel? 

Okay. Beside the 2010 attack in Kampala during the World Cup, 

al-Shabaab has focused much of its attention in Somalia. This attack in Kenya fits exactly the strategy that al-Zawahiri laid out 

just recently for al-Qaeda globally. 

Does the Westgate attack refute the claim that al-Shabaab is on 

the retreat? 

Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. I think one assesses the competence of terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab in several ways. One would look at their 

control of territory, which they have lost. But I think what they 

have demonstrated is, though they have lost ground—and I think 

that issue is important, because, you know, one of their goals is to 

attempt to overthrow the Somali Government. Their success on 

that part of their strategy has—they have not been victorious at recently. 

But what I think they have shown and what this does demonstrate is, even though they have lost some ground, they still have 

an attack capability. And I think if you look at the history of alQaeda, the strength and weaknesses of its affiliates and of the organization itself have ebbed and flowed in a series of waves. And 

even with a collapse of Shabaab into southern parts of Somalia, 

again, they are a dangerous organization. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Do you think that capacity extends beyond the African continent? Do you think Shabaab has the capacity to carry 

out this type of attack or a Mumbai-style attack somewhere else in 

the world? 

51

Mr. JONES. I think it is certainly feasible, I think, based on the 

fact that they have, again, conducted an external operation outside 

of Somalia, they have done the collection, analysis, reconnaissance 

of the target, they have moved people and fighters into place. 

What they would need in a specific country, let’s say the United 

States or in Europe or somewhere else, is they would need the people in place, the infrastructure in place to do that. If they had that 

and had an interest, they could do it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Do you think our focus, counterintelligence focus, 

being so singularly, almost, focused on al-Qaeda as a whole, do you 

think we have taken our eye off these smaller subgroups like 

Shabaab? Are there other subgroups that might be planning similar attacks that we need to focus on, as well? 

Mr. JONES. I think an important chunk of our intelligence community recognizes the threat from Shabaab. I can’t characterize 

whether they have—and I would say in response to that, you know, 

the FBI, among other organizations, has been very effective at penetrating them in the United States. 

So I do think we recognize the threat. Recently, whether we have 

laid off a little bit, that is a more interesting question. I mean, that 

is certainly plausible. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yeah. 

Yes, sir? 

Mr. DOWNIE. Could I just add, I don’t think we have taken our 

eye off the ball in terms of Shabaab, but we should be aware of potential other groups in the wider region. 

And what seems an alarming element of the Westgate attack is 

that it appears al-Shabaab may have fostered links with a Kenyabased group called al-Hijra, which emerged from an extremist 

mosque in Nairobi and may have had some involvement with this 

attack, although investigations obviously are ongoing. 

So I think we always need to be alert for the emergence of new 

groups and particularly their attempts to make contact with other 

broader terrorist groups in the region. Tanzania is another country 

where there is a small but growing problem with Islamic extremism in parts of that country, as well. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, guys. 

My time is about expired. I will yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

America provides advice to other countries on the rule of law and 

good government. We are now in a situation where many of us are 

embarrassed to be part of the Federal Government and its Congress. 

This shutdown, what effect has it had on our image, particularly 

in East Africa, as a country and a model to follow and our capacity 

to train, to gather information, to do the development projects that 

are aimed at hearts and minds? 

I realize this is a bit away from the questions you may have prepared for, but does anyone have an answer to how the shutdown 

is affecting our efforts in East Africa? 

Dr. Jones? 

52

Mr. JONES. Mr. Sherman, I don’t know what the perception is in 

East Africa. I would say my biggest concern, the longer this grows 

is—or at least one concern, I don’t know if it is the biggest—one 

concern is our ability to continue to monitor this threat from intelligence agencies if we have people that have been furloughed. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There are an awful lot of folks at the State Department, I happen to know, that are being furloughed right now. 

Trips to Africa have been cancelled just in the last 10 minutes. And 

this is no way to run a superpower. 

Dr. Jones, does al-Shabaab have important assets, strategic assets, that are amenable to destruction from the air by the Kenyan, 

British, or American airpower? 

Mr. JONES. They do have some. The Kenyans have used fixedwing aircraft, helicopters to target al-Shabaab camps, structures 

that they have established, such as headquarters. So, yes, they do 

have some facilities that can be targeted. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And is the Kenyan Air Force up to doing that 

which can be done? Or is there a lot that could be done by American airpower, British airpower that cannot be done by the Kenyan 

Air Force? 

Mr. JONES. I am not an expert on the Kenyan Air Force. I am 

not an expert on the Ethiopian Air Force. But I would say that 

they have been successful at helping the Somali Government push 

back Shabaab from several key areas, including Kismayo and 

Mogadishu. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Farah, I am very sure that the vast majority of SomaliAmericans are law-abiding and that only a tiny fringe is engaged 

in law-breaking in order to help al-Shabaab. 

My question to you is, does al-Shabaab have significant legal 

support? That is to say, people in the community rooting for them, 

praising them, condemning the efforts of the Ethiopian and Kenyan 

militaries. And are there Web sites based here in the United 

States, dot-org, dot-com, et cetera, that condemn Kenya’s actions in 

Somalia and/or praise al-Shabaab? 

Mr. FARAH. I can assure you that a great majority of the community is on the same page when it comes to al-Shabaab. You know, 

nobody goes out there and start—you know, gets excited, you know, 

when they hear al-Shabaab on the news or when they hear of attacks by al-Shabaab. Everybody in the community feels the same 

way as I do, which is, you know, condemning the——

Mr. SHERMAN. What about those Web sites? If I spoke Somali, 

could I find pro-Shabaab or anti-Kenya Web sites in the Somali 

language based here in the United States? 

Mr. FARAH. I am not aware of any Web sites of such. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

The Kenyan Government has painted a picture of 10 to 15 

attackers, one with a British and up to three with American citizenship. What is your best estimate, to anyone on the panel, as to 

how many attackers there were and how many of them had passports either from the United States or a visa-waiver country, which 

of course includes Britain? 

Mr. Downie? 

53

Mr. DOWNIE. We honestly have very little to go on right now. The 

Kenyan authorities have been very slow in providing information 

about the attack. We still don’t know some of the very basics: How 

many attackers, in what groups, how many escaped, were hostages 

taken. We have very, very little to go on, other than, and now it 

turns out, a fake Twitter account from al-Shabaab, which gave a 

list of names of people. And we just have no ability to——

Mr. SHERMAN. And we don’t think that is even al-Shabaab? 

Mr. DOWNIE. Well, al-Shabaab have said this wasn’t them. I 

mean——

Mr. SHERMAN. And, finally, does al-Shabaab have substantial 

support among Somalis who live in East Africa but outside the borders of Somalia—that is to say, Kenya, the Ogaden, Egypt, 

Djibouti, et cetera? 

Mr. DOWNIE. There are some sources of support from outside Somalia, particularly in Kenya, the main Somali district within 

Nairobi, called Eastleigh. The Kenyans have raised concern about 

the enormous refugee camp within the Kenyan border, just close to 

the Somali border, where 500,000 people now——

Mr. SHERMAN. And that is the second-largest city in Kenya. 

Mr. DOWNIE. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So the second-largest city in Kenya and a district 

in the largest city of Kenya not only contain Somalis but that there 

is some substantial support within those areas for al-Shabaab. 

Mr. DOWNIE. I wouldn’t say substantial. The Kenyan authorities 

certainly say so, but the Kenyans are obviously very concerned 

about this refugee camp. They have been hosting it for 20 years, 

and it is perhaps in their self-interest to talk up the threat. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Colonel Paul Cook of California. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Because of recent events, I am going to ask this question. Any 

indication that they could have access to chemical weapons from 

any source? 

Mr. JONES. I am not aware of any, Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. In your opinion, it would be a major game-changer if 

they could develop something like that, in terms of spreading terror 

in a place. I, quite frankly, expected something a long time ago, 

and nothing known from you? 

Mr. JONES. No, nothing I am aware of. Again, I would point to 

other groups where we have seen efforts, including Jabhat alNusra in Syria with a chemical program right now, including sarin, 

but not here. 

Mr. COOK. Well, that is what I am worried about, sarin and some 

of the other things, and maybe some other allies that might not 

have it now but in the future get access to that—Syria, et cetera. 

The weapons that were used in the attack, primarily small arms, 

AK–47s, let’s see, RPGs? Any mortars or rockets, anything that 

could elevate it a stage? Or no indication of that yet? 

Mr. DOWNIE. There is no indication right now. From what we 

have learned, and the information is still patchy, it was small arms 

and grenades. 

54

Mr. COOK. Okay. Do they have SA–7s, SA–9s, ASU–23/4s, antiaircraft capability at all, to the best of your knowledge? 

Mr. DOWNIE. No. 

Mr. COOK. And it goes back with that other question that was 

asked. Okay. 

I know I am throwing a lot of questions, but I usually don’t get 

a chance to ask so many questions, so I am going to make the most 

of it. 

It kind of looks like there is always a major event, obviously talking about the attack, in conjunction with the World Cup and the 

big mall. Has anyone looked at Sochi? I know it is the Winter 

Games. If it was the Summer Games in that area, I think—I don’t 

think the Somalian or the Kenyan bobsled team is going to be a 

target. But you look at the proximity to North Ossetia and the 

Caucasus and connections with other terrorist groups. 

That is 5 months, if my math is right, or 6 months, coming up, 

and we haven’t heard much about it. I am sure the Russians are 

going to have top security. But have you looked at that or heard 

of anything at all? 

Mr. DOWNIE. I have certainly not heard anything. All I would say 

is that I think al-Shabaab has a plethora of closer, easier targets 

to hit, and the Westgate Mall was evidence of that. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. I hope the Mall of America is not a target because of its location in Minnesota. But my question was, do they 

have a presence in Canada, which has different rules—I am talking 

about al-Shabaab getting in and out of the country. Or have you 

noticed any? 

Mr. FARAH. Nope. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. I just—I always look at a map and try and—

all right. 

My last question is, is there any presence of al-Shabaab in 

Djibouti or in Yemen in terms of arms-dealing? 

Mr. JONES. I would say in answer to that that there is and there 

has been a relationship between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, which is based in Yemen. They have 

conducted some training. They have conducted some shared tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. They are both al-Qaeda affiliates. That 

is the biggest link in the Gulf area. 

Mr. COOK. Nothing in Qatar? 

Mr. JONES. Other than funding, I am not aware. 

Mr. COOK. And they have gotten funding from Qatar? 

Mr. JONES. Well, they have gotten funding from the Gulf, from 

inside the Gulf. I can’t give you definitive answers on from which 

Gulf countries, other than, you know, I think it is certainly possible. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Cook. 

And we are pleased to recognize Dr. Yoho of Florida for his questions. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. 

55

Mr. Borelli, you said that the youth movement is politically motivated and not religious. Is there a way that you can separate that 

from the Muslim faith? I mean, don’t they kind of go hand-in-hand? 

Mr. BORELLI. They do go hand-in-hand, but in the conversations 

we had, the idea of this war against the West, this Islamic notion, 

did not come up in our conversations. I mean, it was primarily 

couched in a way that the youth were concerned that there were 

foreign troops on the ground in Somalia, and they felt it was their 

duty to go back to Somalia to defend their homeland. It wasn’t like 

a crusade war of the West against Islam. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you. 

And, Dr. Jones, again, I agree with my colleague, Jeff Duncan, 

over here about the smuggling of the Somalis into the United 

States through Mexico. And you agree that it did happen. And it 

doesn’t take many people to come in here to wreak havoc in this 

country. You know, it is like a cake mix. They say one drop of kerosene can ruin the cake. 

And so that is an issue of ours, where it is imperative that we 

secure the border. And would you agree with that, for that reason 

there? 

Mr. JONES. Absolutely. Sure. I mean, one of the things that came 

out of the bin Laden documents just in 2011 was an interest in getting somebody with a Mexican visa. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. And, you know, it is like a cancer that metastasizes, and it doesn’t take a lot. 

I want to direct these questions to you, Mr. Farah. Why do most 

of the Somali immigrants come to America, or a lot of them, I will 

say? 

Mr. FARAH. A lot of them come to America for a lot of reasons. 

Obviously, Somalia is in a state—I mean, was in a state of civil 

war back then. You know, education, job development, the American dream—I mean, that is just a couple options of why folks 

move. 

Mr. YOHO. That is a wonderful thing, isn’t it, the American 

dream?

Mr. FARAH. It is a wonderful thing. 

Mr. YOHO. Freedom? 

Mr. FARAH. It is a wonderful—freedom is a major, a major——

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Mr. FARAH. Yep. 

Mr. YOHO. Are the majority of the Somalis in America, are they 

practitioners of the Muslim faith? 

Mr. FARAH. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Do most Somalis adhere to the belief in the 

Sharia law or American law? Or is it a combination? 

Mr. FARAH. I mean, the majority of the Somali people across this 

Nation go by the laws that we have here on our land. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Let me ask you this. How well have the Somalis in Minnesota, 

which is my home State—I was born there, proud to be from 

there—how well have the Somali immigrants assimilated into 

America, as far as culture, ideals, beliefs, and, I think most importantly, loyalty to the United States of America? 

56

Mr. FARAH. They are very—well, let me say this. The Somali 

community, especially in Minnesota, are very loyal to this great 

Nation. 

In terms of the assimilation, to some extent, they have been assimilated to the greater society. However, we do need to do a lot 

more work. There is a lot more work ahead of us that—especially 

the youth. There are a lot of issues, especially identity. I mean, the 

new generation, are we Somalis? Somali-Americans? 

And that is what we are doing, you know, in terms of Ka Joog 

and our work, is really making sure that kids who—because they 

are not going back to Somalia. This is their home. This is my home. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. Well, and I commend you for the work you are 

doing with Ka Joog. 

Let me ask you this. What is the average age in the Minnesota 

region of the average Somali? I mean, is it thirty? Twenty-five? 

Mr. FARAH. The majority of the community is between 5 to 24. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. What is their graduate rate? 

Mr. FARAH. The graduation rate is very low. And that is what 

I was talking about earlier. There are a lot of underlying issues, 

such as a lack of education, lack of jobs. 

Mr. YOHO. Why is there a lack of education? 

Mr. FARAH. Well, because——

Mr. YOHO. If they are assimilating into our country. 

Mr. FARAH. To some extent, to some extent. We do need to do 

more work. I mean, there is a lot—in terms of, if you look at it gender-wise, females are doing great work. I mean, they are graduating far more than their counterparts. In terms of the males, 

there is a lack of mentorship. And that is where we come in. The 

high school rate is very low when it comes to boys, and so that is 

where we need to do——

Mr. YOHO. All right, let me ask you something before I run out 

of time. What is the employment rate with the Somali male? 

Mr. FARAH. Based on the research that I was recently reading, 

just within one of the main communities in the Somali—one of the 

main neighborhoods, it was well over 17 percent. And that is way 

higher——

Mr. YOHO. That is the unemployment rate. 

Mr. FARAH. That is the unemployment rate. That is way higher 

than the average of the State. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Madam Chair, I am out of time, but I have my questions that 

I will submit. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

And now we are pleased to recognize Mr. Weber for his questions. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Jones, in your—Dr. Jones—no kin to Indi, I presume—in 

your comments, you said that you doubted that al-Shabaab had 

competent external operations capability. 

Mr. JONES. Can you repeat that one more time? I argued earlier 

that they do have an external operations capability. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, well, I must have missed that. I thought you 

said you didn’t think they could export—basically, I took from that 

57

you didn’t think they could export their horrific deeds to the United 

States. You are saying you believe they can? 

Mr. JONES. Well, what I noted, and it is in the testimony, is that 

the mall attack does demonstrate an ability to conduct operations 

outside of Somalia. What I haven’t seen much is evidence of an interest in exporting those capabilities to the United States. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

So they have a recruitment system that they use, where they actually actively recruit people in person and then they do it on social 

media. Could you hazard a guess, is it 50/50, percentage-wise? Is 

it 10 percent in person, 90 on social media? 

Mr. JONES. I couldn’t give you a percentage. I would say it is 

probably quite large on social media. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. JONES. I could not give you a percentage, though. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

And, Mr. Borelli, I think you said that there is about—or I have 

seen the figure, there are 7,000 to 9,000 fighters, and I heard 5,000 

being bandied around as I came back in from getting some coffee. 

Is 7,000 to 9,000 fighters still an accurate estimate? 

Mr. BORELLI. I don’t believe I was the one who commented on 

the number of fighters——

Mr. WEBER. No? 

Mr. BORELLI [continuing]. So I will defer to my colleagues. 

Mr. WEBER. Anybody? 

Mr. DOWNIE. It is virtually impossible to know. I have seen various figures, ranging from 5,000 to 7,000. But this is a very amorphous organization, and people drift in and out. And the wing that 

we should be particularly concerned about, the international 

jihadist wing, would be much smaller than that, I would imagine. 

But these are guesstimates. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

And then also a question for you, Mr. Borelli. My youngest son 

is in the FBI, by the way. So we appreciate your service. 

Who monitors the historical schedule, if you will? Terrorism is on 

the rise. So there has to be a list, chart, call it whatever you want 

to, of the countries, you know, the incidents, who is involved, the 

number of deaths. Who monitors that? 

Mr. BORELLI. I think multiple agencies monitor that within the 

intelligence community. Certainly, FBI headquarters keeps statistics on all these—the number of terrorist groups and the number 

of estimated fighters and the different attacks that they have been 

responsible for. But also CIA, DOD, multiple agencies keep statistics on this. 

Mr. WEBER. There is a ranking of the most credible threats to 

the least credible, is there not? 

Mr. BORELLI. There is, and I believe that comes out under the 

authority of the DNI. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, who monitors that? As a group begins 

to move up that ranking, who gets that red flag? 

Mr. BORELLI. I think, and I will also defer to my colleagues, but 

it is constantly reassessed, at least on a yearly basis, where the intelligence community looks at all of the factors—you know, intent, 

capability, which groups are moving up, moving down—and they 

58

are constantly being reassessed for the priority and the amount of 

resources that we must direct at those groups. 

Mr. WEBER. And is that information, to your knowledge—or, Dr. 

Jones, would you like to weigh in on that? No? 

Mr. JONES. I think that is correct. 

Mr. WEBER. I am sorry? 

Mr. JONES. I don’t have anything further to add. 

Mr. WEBER. You think that is right. 

Mr. Downie? 

Okay. Is that information shared with other agencies? And I 

don’t mean just U.S.—well, I do mean U.S. agencies, of course, but 

I also mean internationally. 

Mr. JONES. I can’t comment on how much is shared internationally, with two exceptions. One is documents, obviously, in particular in the Four and Five Eyes communities, they are shared 

closer with the British, the Canadians, the Australians, and then 

New Zealand. 

I would also point out, at least when I served in government, 

there were regular national intelligence estimates on the threat to 

the homeland that were combined by the National Intelligence 

Council. And so it included the assessments of all agencies. 

Mr. WEBER. I was the vice chair of the Texas borders committee 

in the Texas legislature. And Steve McCraw, a former FBI guy, 

now director of DPS, said that there were 70, if I remember the 

numbers correctly, sects, s-e-c-t-s, of eastern religions coming 

across our southern border. 

Mr. Borelli, do you have any knowledge to that? 

Mr. BORELLI. I don’t have any knowledge to that. 

Mr. WEBER. Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. I can’t confirm that. I mean, we have a lot. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Weber. 

We thank our witnesses for their time today, and for their excellent testimony. This is obviously a serious threat we are going to 

stay on top of, and the committee will continue to monitor the situation. 

And, with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(59)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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85104n.eps

FlJLL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

October 3, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live via 

the Committee website at http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, October 3,2013 

1000 a.m. 

Al-Shabaab How Great a Threat? 

Seth Jones, Ph.D. 

Associate Director 

International Security and Defense Policy Center 

RAND Corporation 

Mr. Dan Borelli 

Chief Operating Officer 

The Soufan Group 

Mr. Mohamed Farah 

Executive Director 

KaJoog 

Mr. Richard Downie 

Deputy Director and Fellow 

Africa Program 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

By Direction of the Chairman 
61


85104m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF FULL COMc\1ITTEE HEARING 

D"y_----"1:'-'n"""'-'rs"'d"'a"-r_~Date __ ~1"'(I/I-"O-"-3/'-'1-"3 ___ R.oom __ __'2"'1'_'7_"'2 __ _ 

Starting Time lO:()7 A.M. Ending Time 12:13 P.M. 

Recesses <--to __ ) <--to ---l L-to __ ) <--to __ ) <--to __ ) <--to __ ) 

Presiding Member(,) 

Edward R. Royce, Chairman 

Rep. Ileana Bos-Lehtinen 

Check all ~f the fnllmving that apply: 

Open Session m 

Executive (closed) Session 0 

Televised m 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Al-Shabaab: How Great a Threat? 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See Attendance Sheet. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESEl'iT: 

None. 

Electronically Recorded (taped) m 

Stenographic Record [2] 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes[2J "100 

(If "no ", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

81' A1'EME:-.rTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

None. 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECOI\,7ENE ___ _ 

or 

TThill ADJOURNED 12:13 p.lIl. 

7 

Jean Marter, Director of Committee Operations 
62

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Present 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FilII Committee Hearing 

Memher Present Member 

Edward R. Royce, CA X Eliot L. Engel, NY 

Christopher H Smith, NJ X Eni FH. Faleomavaega, AS 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL X Brad Shennan, CA 

Dana RohrabacheL CA Gregory W. Meeks, NY 

Steve Chabot. OH X Albia Sires, NJ 

Joe Wilson, SC X Gerald E. Connolly, VA 

Michael T McCauL TX Theodore E. Deutch. FL 

Ted Poe, TX Brian Higgins, NY 

Matt Salmon. AZ X Karen Bass, CA 

Tom Marino, PA X William Keating, MA 

Jeff Duncan, SC X David Cieilline, RI 

Adam Kinzinger, IL Alan Grayson, FL 

Mo Brooks. AL X Juan Vargas, CA 

Tom Cotton. AR Bradley S. Schneider, IL 

Paul Cook. CA X Joseph P. Kennedy TTL MA 

George Holding, NC Ami Bera, CA 

Randy K. Weber, Sr., TX Alan S. Lowenthal, CA 

Scott Perry. P A X Grace Meng, NY 

Steve Stockman. TX X Lois FrankeL FL 

Ron DeSantis. FL X Tulsi Gabbard, HI 

Trey RadeL FL X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Doug Collins. GA 

Mark Meadows. NC 

Ted S Yoho, FL 

Luke Messer, IN