Foreword

The United States will continue to lead an expansive international effort in 

pursuit of a two-pronged vision: 1) The defeat of violent extremism as a threat to 

our way of life as a free and open society; and 2) The creation of a global 

environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.1 

— President Bush September 2006 

 In February 2006, the Combating Terrorism Center released Harmony and 

Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities. Its authors analyzed 

declassified internal al-Qa’ida documents captured during operations in support of the 

Global War on Terror and maintained on the Department of Defense’s Harmony 

Database. These declassified documents, which are corroborated by multiple open source 

materials, provide evidence that al-Qa’ida struggles with many of the same issues and 

challenges that all organizations in the private and public sectors confront. The 

Combating Terrorism Center recommended that effective strategies to defeat al-Qa’ida 

and likeminded groups should include measures that leverage and heighten their 

dysfunctional structure, competition, and behavior. 

 In Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, the Combating Terrorism 

Center’s team of area experts and terrorism scholars analyzed al-Qa’ida’s attempts to 

establish bases of operations and recruit followers in the Horn of Africa. According to a 

new set of recently declassified documents from the Harmony Database, al-Qa’ida 

operatives encountered significant problems as they ventured into the foreign lands of the 

Horn. The environment was far more inhospitable than they anticipated. The same 

conditions that make it difficult, or in many cases impossible, for state authorities to exert 

control in this region—poor infrastructure, scarce resources, competition with tribal and 

other local authority structures—were significant problems for al-Qa’ida as well. 

 The theories and case evidence presented in this report indicate that the second part of 

the President’s vision—creating a global environment inhospitable to extremists and their 

supporters—can be well served by recognizing, understanding, and reinforcing local and 

regional suspicions and often outright hostility to an unknown group of foreign, religious 

extremists. As the report’s authors argue, we should neither assume that al-Qa’ida’s 

members are any more adept at operating in foreign countries than we are nor should we 

inflate the appeal of their rhetoric or the resonance of their extremist ideology. In Africa, 

the U.S. and al-Qa’ida are in an ideological struggle and experience similar advantages 

and disadvantages; however, the U.S. has more (but not unlimited) resources and options 

at its disposal. The key is to efficiently apply these resources in a manner that is 

appropriate, sustainable, and does not strengthen al-Qa’ida’s appeal. Crucial to this effort 

is a low-to-invisible American profile in the region. The report’s specific 

recommendations—informed by al-Qa’ida’s internal deliberations and formulated by 

counterterrorism practitioners and area experts—are a major contribution to this end. 

 

 

1 National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006; http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/ 
 Sun Tzu warns that, “He who attempts to defend everywhere defends nowhere”; yet 

this is largely the challenge that confronts us in our current worldwide struggle against 

radical Islamist Jihadis. This report draws on the lessons learned from al-Qa’ida’s 

experiences in the Horn to focus U.S. resources on those areas with the largest payoff in 

order to more efficiently allocate our scarce resources so that this country can sustain this 

generational struggle. 

 

 

 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 

the Department of the Army or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 
Executive Summary 

During the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida was beginning to coalesce as an organization, honing 

its operational techniques and dealing with its first internal conflicts. Its private 

deliberations during this period are revealed by a trove of documents captured in the 

course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror and maintained in the 

Department of Defense’s Harmony Database. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn 

of Africa, by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, draws on recently

declassified Harmony documents, predominately from the 1992-1994 time period, 

original field work by CTC personnel and careful country studies to enrich our 

understanding of the terrorist group’s early successes and failures in the Horn of Africa. 

The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qa’ida’s first efforts 

to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan. As recounted by its leaders and operatives, alQa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region and use it as a base for attacks 

against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. Conventional wisdom suggests 

that Somalia, a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qa’ida. Our analysis, 

however, indicates that weakly governed regions such as coastal Kenya, not failed states 

like Somalia, provide an environment more conducive to al-Qa’ida’s activities. In 

Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague 

Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and betrayal, found 

themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible (to them) clan conflicts, faced 

suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical 

constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction. 

In Kenya, by contrast, the state’s poor governance, combined with relative 

stability and basic infrastructure, created a potential base area from which to support 

operations in more unstable regions like Somalia and a favorable operational 

environment to attack lucrative targets within Kenya. More importantly, outside military 

forces could not conduct operations because of Kenyan sovereignty, yet the state had 

little ability to interdict the terror group’s actions or effectively police its activities. 

Evidence from Harmony, open sources and recent in-country interviews support these 

conclusions. Based on this analysis, we believe coastal Kenya is the decisive arena in the 

fight against al-Qa’ida and associated movements in the Horn. More generally, our 

analysis shows that weakly governed states–not failed ones–provide the optimal 

operational environment for al-Qa’ida and similar terrorist organizations. 

 This report assesses al-Qa’ida’s operations in the Horn of Africa using a similar 

approach to Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational 

Vulnerabilities, the CTC’s first report based on the Harmony documents. We identify the 

organizational challenges al-Qa’ida faced in managing the jihad in the Horn. We also 

examine the individual motivations of the Somali clans and people that largely resisted 

al-Qa’ida’s recruitment efforts in the region. Our most important new finding is that alQa’ida failed to gain traction in Somalia in the early 1990s because: (1) its members were 

perceived as foreigners; (2) it significantly underestimated the costs of operating in a 

failed state environment; and (3) its African vanguard did not understand the salience of 

iii
either local power structures or local Islamic traditions. In a region dominated by clanbased authority structures and moderate Sufi Islam, the benefits of joining a foreign 

Salafi terrorist organization paled next to the costs of leaving one’s clan. 

After reviewing al-Qa`ida’s Horn operations from a theoretical standpoint, we 

analyze al-Qa`ida’s prospects in two key Horn countries: Somalia and Kenya. The 

nations composing the Horn of Africa are often aggregated into one overall 

counterterrorism strategy. However, each Horn country and even sub-regions within 

these countries present a unique set of socioeconomic, political and religious factors that 

create specific challenges and opportunities to both al-Qa’ida and to counterterrorism

forces. Effective and efficient counterterrorism efforts in the Horn require tailored 

strategies that exacerbate the endemic challenges that al-Qa’ida encounters in this 

inhospitable region and minimize friendly government vulnerabilities. 

We conclude this study by identifying concepts and techniques that may be 

applicable in other regions based upon al-Qa’ida’s experiences in the Horn. Our primary 

conclusion is that the U.S. and its coalition partners should prioritize counterterrorism 

efforts on weak states–not failed ones. Both types of states demand attention but require 

different policy solutions. Effective and sustainable counterterrorism in failed states 

requires engaging with sub-state authorities to give them the means and the motivation to 

resist foreign intrusion. In weak states, successful counterterrorism policies must address 

core institutional and governance problems that render such states unable or unwilling to 

fully deal with the threat. Perversely, U.S. support to state and local counterterrorism

efforts can create incentives to tolerate low levels of terrorism, a problem best addressed 

by conditioning aid on counterterrorism effort rather than on the presence of a threat. 

To ensure Somalia remains an inhospitable location for foreign terrorists, we 

suggest four principles that should guide counterterrorism policy: (1) prevent the creation 

of a Somali state based on jihadi ideology, in part by leveraging the divisions between 

Somalis and foreign jihadis created by differences in Islamic ideology; (2) selectively 

empower local authority structures; (3) publicize the elitist nature of al-Qa’ida fighters 

and their disrespect for Somalis; and (4) maintain the capacity to interdict high value alQa’ida targets and provide humanitarian support, but minimize foreign military presence 

on the ground in the region. 

In the past, al-Qa’ida has sought to draw the U.S. into entanglements where it can 

bleed the U.S.’s military and economic resources. In Somalia, al-Qa’ida encountered an 

entanglement of its own. Policy makers must understand how places like Somalia–where 

al-Qa’ida became plagued by clan conflicts and excessive operational costs–provide 

opportunities to employ an economy-of-force strategy whereby U.S. forces contain and 

monitor al-Qa’ida. This graduated containment approach to dealing with Somalia and 

other failed states would build rings of security around the failed state through diplomatic 

engagement with nation-states and local authority structures, increased military capability 

within states and economic development. 

iv
To reduce the attractiveness of Kenya as a venue for terrorist activity, U.S. policy 

should seek to implement the following measures: (1) focus on coastal Kenya where alQa’ida finds a Muslim populace that is distrustful of the central government and is 

tolerant of al-Qa’ida’s ideology; (2) use targeted aid to raise al-Qa’ida’s operating costs 

in at-risk areas; (3) support non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental 

organizations promoting democratic values among Muslim political parties and 

candidates in order to provide an ideological counter-weight to jihadi appeals; (4) 

subsidize efforts to address non-terrorism concerns, such as property crime and poor 

health care, in order to bolster government legitimacy and increase citizens’ willingness 

to work with government on security issues; and (5) realign counterterrorism funding 

such that it increases state capacity without creating incentives for the Kenyan 

government to tolerate low levels of terrorism. 

Given the Horn of Africa’s history as a venue for terrorist attacks, and its 

potential value as a base area for jihadi operations, continued vigilance is required. By 

focusing efforts on weak states, working through local allies at the lowest possible level 

and supporting institutional reforms that eliminate incentives to tolerate low levels of 

terrorism, policy makers can efficiently ensure a greater threat does not develop in this 

important region. 

Part II of the report provides summaries and full English translations of the 

twenty-seven recently declassified Harmony documents used in the study. The translated 

documents and the complete, un-translated originals are accessible at 

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq.asp. Key authors of these Harmony documents and terrorist 

groups operating in the Horn are profiled in the Appendices. 

Work for this project contributes to the CTC’s mission to prepare current and 

future leaders to better understand and respond to the terrorist threats facing our nation. 

As part of the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, research

conducted by the CTC faculty and staff is integrated into the Academy’s curriculum and 

supports outreach efforts to inform military and civilian leaders engaged in formulating

and executing counterterrorism policies. Please direct specific questions on this report or 

the CTC’s Harmony Project in general to Clint Watts, CTC Executive Officer, or LTC 

Joe Felter, CTC Director. They can be reached by email at clinton.watts@usma.edu, or 

phone: 845-938-8495. 

 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the 

Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

 

v
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary i 

Foreword iii 

Part I

1. Introduction: al-Qa’ida’s Operational Plan in the Horn of Africa 1 

2. Theoretical Framework: The Challenges of Weak and Failed States 9 

3. Case Study: Somalia 29 

4. Case Study: Kenya 47 

5. Conclusion: Key Issues and Policy Recommendations 63 

Appendices to Part I

Appendix A: Case studies of regional terrorist groups 75 

I. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) 77 

II. Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EJIM) 83 

Appendix B: Cast of Characters from the Horn of Africa 87 

I. Abdullah Muhammed Fazul 89 

II. Abu Hafs al-Masri 107 

III. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys 113 

IV. Saif al-Adel 119 

IV. Lesser Members/Affiliates of al-Qa’ida 131 

a. Aden Hashi Fara Ayro 

b. Gouled Hasan Dourad 

c. Abu Talha al-Sudani 

Appendix C: Notes and Interviews from Kenya 135 

 I: Notes on Ras Kiamboni 137 

 II: Sample of Kenyan Muslim views 143 

 III: Confession of Omar Said Omar 147 

 IV: Written Statement of Mombasa Muslim Leaders 169 

Part II

Introduction to the Harmony Database and Ongoing Efforts 173 

Harmony Document List and Summaries 175 
1. Introduction

The Horn of Africa has been an important area of operations for al-Qa’ida and the 

jihadi movement1

 since the early 1990s. Recent information campaigns by Ayman alZawahiri and other jihadis demonstrate al-Qa’ida’s desire to make Somalia a new front 

for jihadis to face off against the West. For example, in early 2007, Zawahiri called for 

attacks on Ethiopian forces in Somalia using “ambushes, mines, raids and martyrdomseeking raids to devour them as the lions devour their prey,” which strongly suggests that 

al-Qa’ida desires to use the Horn as a theater of operations.2

 The degree to which alQa’ida has actually established a foothold in the region–and why–is the subject of 

significant debate among analysts and policy makers. Much of this debate has focused on 

the potential threat from terrorism in the region, without paying sufficient attention to the 

operational challenges al-Qa’ida and other groups have faced when operating in the 

Horn. Taking these challenges into account, we find that in this region al-Qa’ida has been 

moderately successful when operating in weak states like Kenya but has largely failed to 

establish itself in failed states like Somalia. 

To better understand al-Qa’ida’s successes and failures in the Horn of Africa, we 

analyze and incorporate information from 27 newly declassified internal al-Qa’ida 

documents related to the region. These documents were captured during operations in 

support of the Global War on Terror and are maintained in the Department of Defense’s 

Harmony Database. The vast majority of these documents provide detailed accounts of 

al-Qa’ida’s efforts in Somalia between 1992 and 1994. This report builds on the 

theoretical framework presented in the CTC’s study, Harmony and Disharmony: 

Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities,

3

 and provides recommendations 

for effective counterterrorism policies informed by these new insights into al-Qa’ida’s 

early operations. We begin the report by developing a theoretical lens to assess terrorist 

operations in this region and in general. Next we present case studies that assess alQa’ida’s operations in Somalia and Kenya–both of which have experienced significant 

al-Qa’ida activities, and whose unique local conditions each presented the terrorist 

network with a different set of underlying challenges and opportunities. Al-Qa’ida’s 

successes and failures in the context of these African states have significant implications 

for developing more effective methods to reduce the threat of transnational terrorism in 

both weakly governed states and failed states, in this region or wherever similar 

governance conditions exist. 

Our approach to understanding the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa is to 

carefully analyze the tasks that terrorists must accomplish and ask how the situation in 

the Horn makes these tasks easier or harder. Our starting point is that terrorist 

 

1 We use the term as it is widely used in both the Western counterterrorism community and the Arab media. 

See William McCants, Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 2006), 5. 2

 Ayman al-Zawahiri audio tape, January 5, 2007. See translation at “Al Zawahiri Audio Urges Somalis, 

Muslims to Fight Ethiopian Forces,” What Extremists Say, U.S. Central Command. Available at

http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/What%20Extremists%20Say/AlZawahiriAudioUrgesSomalis,MuslimsToFightEthiopianForces2.aspx [accessed 25 February 2007]. 3 Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: U.S. 

Military Academy, 2006). Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq.asp. 

1
organizations may seek to use the Horn of Africa in two ways. First, they may use it as a 

place from which to operate, as a base of support. Here we can think of how al-Qa’ida 

used Khartoum as a place to maintain training camps and to conduct fundraising 

enterprises from 1992 to 1996, or of the al-Qa’ida militants who sought refuge in Somalia 

after the fall of the Taliban regime.

4

 Second, they may use the Horn as a theater of 

operations. Al-Qa’ida did this in 1998 when it attacked American embassies in Nairobi 

and Dar es Salaam and again in 2002 when it attacked the Paradise Hotel and a jet 

leaving the Moi International Airport in Kenya. 

Because a core constraint facing all terrorist organizations is maintaining an 

acceptable level of security, the different types of environmental conditions and 

government capacity within the Horn mean the threat from terrorism varies dramatically 

across the region. For example, areas such as Nairobi may be safe-albeit-expensive places 

for terrorists to engage in logistical tasks, but mounting terror attacks there may be 

relatively challenging to the extent that the Kenyan government decides to crack down.5

In contrast, areas like Lu’uq in Somalia may be weakly governed, and hence a good place 

to locate military training camps, but the infrastructure is so poor that logistical 

challenges essentially eliminate the area’s military utility.6

 Moreover, the lack of a strong 

central Somali government means that regional enemies have free rein to engage in crossborder military operations.7

 

To date, the details of terrorist operations in the Horn of Africa have been largely 

misunderstood. The Harmony documents in this study outline al-Qa’ida’s operational 

environment in the early 1990s and suggest that common assumptions about the Horn as 

an operational environment and base of support are largely mistaken. In particular, the 

anarchic conditions in Somalia that many believe serve al-Qa’ida’s purposes turned out to 

be as challenging for al-Qa’ida as for the Western organizations seeking to help Somalia. 

Al-Qa’ida’s experiences in Somalia and Kenya illustrate the underlying conditions that 

have made the Horn of Africa more or less suitable for al-Qa’ida. In these two Horn 

countries, we find significant al-Qa’ida activity over the past fifteen years, as illustrated 

in the documents from the Harmony database. However, each exhibits a different mix of 

al-Qa’ida activity, government capacity and counterterrorism response. While al-Qa’ida 

has operated elsewhere in the Horn, our case studies of these two countries–supported by 

new evidence from the Harmony database–yield strikingly different conclusions from

conventional thinking on the region. 

 

4 The Sudanese government laid out the welcome mat for a wide variety of Islamic militants in the first half

of the 1990s, leading the U.S. State Department to designate Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism in August

1993. However, as soon as Sudan began to face real costs for its support of militancy–following the failed 

June 1995 assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak–its leaders became very careful 

about which groups they would support, avoiding links with transnational groups. In recent years Sudan has 

been applauded by the State Department for its cooperative stance against transnational terrorists despite 

once being the global headquarters for al-Qa’ida. 5

 On surveillance of Arabs in Nairobi making operations difficult see Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597, 7. 6

 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 5. 7

 Ethiopia effectively crushed the Islamic Union of Western Somalia (al-Ittihad al-Islami, or AIAI) in a 

series of raids from August 1996 through January 1997 against bases in Lu’uq and Buulo Haawa; see 

International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report No. 100 (Nairobi andBrussels: International 

Crisis Group, 2005), 9. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3830&l=1. 

2
For example, a number of analysts have argued that al-Qa’ida has deep, longstanding ties to Islamic militants in Somalia and could draw on these ties to use Somalia 

as a staging ground for further attacks.8

 Chapter 3 of this report disputes that conclusion. 

Both the Harmony documents and recent journalistic and academic research suggest that 

the links are actually quite tenuous. Within Somalia, a failed state allegedly ideal for 

terrorist organizations, al-Qa’ida struggled to build a coalition in 1993-1994. Moreover, 

al-Qa’ida had little success forging alliances with local militias in Somalia9

 and its 

involvement in attacks against Western forces in Somalia was tangential at best.10

Finally, foreign militants operating in Somalia are exposed to constant risk of detention

and arrest by Western counterterrorism efforts.11 Our analysis, informed by the 

documents from the Harmony database, reveals that while Somalia provided occasional 

passage and temporary refuge to al-Qa’ida, the country’s lawlessness and isolation–

which many cite as ideal for al-Qa’ida’s efforts–were seen by the group as constraining 

their ability to create a secure base for operations. 

In contrast to Somalia, analysts assessing the threat of terrorism in Kenya often 

portray it as being smaller than it truly is. Kenyan counterterrorism efforts, supported by 

generous Western assistance, have been at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive. In Kenya, a democratic nation with relatively weak counterterrorism

capacity, al-Qa’ida operatives moved freely into Somalia during the early 1990s, 

conducted attacks against the U.S. Embassy in 1998 and continued to launch attacks 

against Western targets as late as 2002. Despite extensive U.S. support for countering alQa’ida within the country, Kenyan efforts have likely increased the alienation of the 

country’s minority Muslim community, while Western aid has done little to increase 

popular confidence in the Kenyan authorities–especially given the economic and political 

conditions in their country. Taken together, these circumstances suggest that Kenyans are 

more likely to ignore foreign terrorists operating in their midst. Moreover, we find a 

pernicious pattern in Kenya. For the population, the threat of terrorism is a low priority 

relative to other security concerns. For the government, having some alleged terrorist 

activity in Kenya brings substantial Western military assistance that may outweigh the 

costs in terms of lost tourist revenue. In Chapter 4, we examine how this unique situation 

makes crafting effective counterterrorism policy extremely problematic for the U.S. 

government. 

Our theoretical framework and case studies support a number of conclusions and 

policy recommendations for fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa as well as globally. 

 

8

 A typical example is James Phillips, “Somalia and al-Qaeda: Implications for the War on Terrorism,” 

Backgrounder no. 1526 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002). Available at 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1526.cfm. 9 Chapter 3, below, discusses this problem at length. 10 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 188-9. 11 Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, Africa Report No. 95 (Brussels: International 

Crisis Group, 2005), 9-13. This otherwise excellent report includes some odd conclusions about the 

potential for Somalia as a staging ground for terrorism elsewhere. The report argues that “Somalia’s lack of 

a functioning central government, unpatrolled borders, and unregulated arms markets make it a useful

platform for actions aimed at foreign interests elsewhere in the region.” (Counter-Terrorism in Somalia, 6)

This conclusion does not follow from the facts presented in the report, which details the myriad problems

jihadi terrorist have faced in Somalia. 

3
In Chapter 5, we discuss several different approaches that Western nations might use in 

dealing with failed and weak states. Our analysis suggests that weak states, not failed 

ones, provide the greatest potential terrorism threat. In weak states, groups like al-Qa’ida 

find a target-rich environment where they are protected from Western counterterrorism 

efforts and yet not significantly interdicted by the state’s law enforcement and 

intelligence apparatus. Meanwhile, in failed states like Somalia, al-Qa’ida suffers from 

logistical constraints, a hostile set of clans and other local powers and relatively 

unrestricted Western counterterrorism efforts. Our analysis thus reveals the peculiarities 

of the weak-versus-failed state dynamic and suggests a host of political, economic and 

military techniques that might be used in the Horn of Africa and globally to deny alQa’ida safe haven. 

The appendices of the report provide valuable additional details on specific 

terrorists and terrorist groups active in the Horn. Throughout the study, we make use of 

newly declassified documents from the Harmony database. These documents support and 

deepen the observations provided in our theoretical and case study sections. Part II of this 

report contains summaries and English translations of these newly declassified 

documents, which can inform future research and provide more insight into al-Qa’ida’s 

weaknesses as well as methods for exploiting these shortcomings. 

The Africa Corps: al-Qa’ida’s Operations in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa presents the U.S. and its coalition partners with a diverse set of 

regional and country-specific challenges. Understanding the threat from terrorists 

operating in the Horn requires an appreciation of how terrorists’ core organizational 

challenges play out in light of the peculiar history of the region. For more than 40 years, 

the Horn has been plagued by strife and conflict. Civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia and

Sudan have been compounded by several interstate wars between Ethiopia and Somalia 

(the 1977-1978 Ogaden War) and between Ethiopia and Eritrea (the 1998-2000 border 

war). Additionally, understanding the terrorist threat to this region is made more 

challenging by the numerous insurgent organizations that have been created to fight as 

proxy armies or have arisen to represent the interests of various populations.12 Many of 

these organizations have shifted ideologically over the years, moving from nationalism to 

Marxism-Leninism to Islamism. In the Horn, by and large, groups like the Eritrean 

People’s Liberation Forces (EPLF) choose their ideology to maximize the flow of outside 

resources–thereby maximizing their chances for military success in the name of larger

political goals. Thus, what appears to be a Salafi-jihadi organization committed to 

supporting attacks against the West may in fact be a localized insurgent group seeking to 

wrap themselves in an ideological mantle to secure funds from wealthy foreign militants. 

This backdrop–as well as the varying levels of government control and 

government corruption that exists throughout the region–creates unique challenges for 

both Western governments and al-Qa’ida in the Horn of Africa. The Harmony documents 

provided in Part II of this report describe al-Qa’ida in its infancy and in its first 

 

12 For a useful summary of competing local interests see International Crisis Group, Somalia: The Tough 

Part is Ahead, Africa Briefing No. 45(Nairobi and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007), 4-6. 

Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4630&l=1. 

4
operational theater. In 1992, Osama bin Laden moved his operations to Sudan and 

immediately initiated a series of business developments in and around Khartoum.

13

Within months, bin Laden had deployed cadres of operatives into the Horn of Africa in 

an effort to spread Salafism and the doctrine of jihad, but al-Qa’ida’s Africa Corps 

ultimately failed to create a lasting front on the continent. The challenges of logistics,

distance and culture that have undermined many foreign endeavors into rural Africa 

plagued al-Qa’ida’s operations as well. By 1996, bin Laden and his Africa Corps had 

been run out of Sudan and were headed back to Afghanistan.14

The Harmony documents made available for this project provide a glimpse into 

the operational planning of the Africa Corps and specifically their efforts in Somalia. 

Although bin Laden’s initial activities in Sudan were focused on military training and 

business ventures in the Horn, he was infuriated with the continuing presence of U.S. 

military forces in the “holy land” of Saudi Arabia and could not remain a mere Khartoum

businessman. By the end of 1992, he began openly discussing the issue of U.S. troops in 

Somalia. Together with his religious advisor, Mamdouh Salim (aka Abu Hajer al-Iraqi), 

bin Laden began a campaign to recast the “far enemy” of Islam as the United States. With 

the fall of the communist regime of the Soviet Union, he and Salim turned their sights on 

the United States as the main international thief of Muslim oil wealth, occupier of the 

holy land and embodiment of corrupt Western values.15 Unable to operate in Saudi 

Arabia, al-Qa’ida turned to Somalia as a possible base from which to strike the 

Americans and drive them out of the Middle East.16 From Khartoum, al-Qa’ida deployed 

teams of operatives led by senior members with experience in military operations, 

logistics, religion, propaganda and negotiation. The Africa Corps, led by Mohammed 

Atef (aka Abu Hafs), ventured into Somalia with high hopes for jihad and redemption.17 

The mission of what we will call al-Qa’ida-Somalia began in late-January 1993 

when Abu Hafs designated a team of veterans to conduct operation “MSK” (an Arabic 

word meaning ‘holding’ or ‘grabbing’). These veterans immediately began preparing for 

deployment to Africa. Beginning on 4 February 1993, al-Qa’ida members departed for 

Nairobi, Kenya. Abu Hafs tasked them to: “1- Find a location for military operations that 

would replace Afghanistan.... 2- [T]he location must be near the Arab region.... 3- 

[A]ttempt to help the brothers in Somalia and Ogaden.”18 Al-Qa’ida believed that 

Somalia would provide another safe haven for their operations, allow them to target the 

U.S. in both Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula and provide a steady flow of recruits. 

None of these hopes came to fruition. 

As described in the Harmony documents, the first elements of al-Qa’ida-Somalia 

departed from Peshawar, Pakistan through Kenya en route to Somalia on 4 February 

1993. The group behaved much like a traditional special-forces operation. The initial 

group of twelve senior al-Qa’ida operatives was broken into two- and three-man teams

 

13 See Wright, The Looming Tower, 165. 14 Ibid., 219-222. 15 Ibid., 170-175. 16 The first al-Qa’ida attack was in December 1992 against U.S. troops in Yemen who were traveling to 

Somalia. 17 See Appendix B-II. 18 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 1.

5
for the mission. Prior to departing, the teams went through intensive training, learning 

how to blend into their future environment, reviewing travel and transportation 

procedures and preparing for reconnaissance operations. Upon arriving in country, alQa’ida-Somalia began establishing three training camps with the agreement of the 

General Islamic Union, the Somali militant group better known as al-Ittihad al-Islami 

(AIAI).19 The first two camps were established in Lu’uq and Bussaso, and a third was 

established later in the Ogaden region. In Nairobi, al-Qa’ida’s ominously named “Team 

Green,” led by Saif al-Islam, received new members from bases of operation in Pakistan 

and Sudan.20 Al-Qa’ida-Somalia used an air infiltration route from Wilson Airport in 

Nairobi,21 a water route from Lamu, Kenya, and at some point an overland route from

Djibouti across the Ethiopian Ogaden region.22 Al-Qa’ida’s Africa Corps operations 

appear to have been headquartered in Khartoum from 1993-1994. Cells operating in the 

region maintained communications with personnel in camps in Afghanistan as well.23

The Harmony documents reveal that over a roughly 18 month period, al-Qa’ida 

found more adversity than success in Somalia. In order to project power, al-Qa’ida 

needed to be able to promote its ideology, gain an operational safe haven, manipulate 

underlying conditions to secure popular support and have adequate financing for 

continued operations. It achieved none of these objectives. 

In pursuit of its first objective, al-Qa’ida-Somalia tried to promote its ideology 

through propaganda and by establishing administrative offices in each military training

program. However, the Salafi message largely fell on deaf ears. While the military 

training was of value to members of AIAI, it did not ensure their loyalty to the greater 

jihadi movement. Al-Qa’ida-Somalia likewise failed to achieve its second objective as it 

faced constant security headaches in the seemingly anarchic environment of clandominated Somalia. Making matters worse, the challenges of long, insecure lines of 

logistics seriously hampered operations. Gaining local support was no easier. At one 

point al-Qa’ida operatives were so frustrated that they listed going after clan leaders as 

the second priority for jihad after expelling Western forces.24 Internal discussions identify 

the lack of adequate communication equipment as an obstacle to building a coalition 

among Somalia’s diverse Muslim clans.25 Finally, insufficient financing ultimately made 

operations impossible to sustain on a long-term basis.26

Al-Qa’ida’s failures in Somalia and elsewhere in the region are every bit as

instructive as its tragic successes in Kenya. Weak states in this region provided terrorists 

with much greater opportunities than failed states. This pattern suggests that key 

adjustments to counterterrorism policy are in order at both the strategic and operational 

 

19 See Appendix A-I for more in-depth background on AIAI. 20 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 2-4. 21 This facility is used primarily for small aircraft for local and regional flights, including tourist charters. 22 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600113, 1-3. 23 See Harmony, AFGP-2002-800081, which shows the routes that al-Qa’ida members took to South Asia. 24 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800600, 2. 25 The next chapter discusses the underlying conditions that worked to the disadvantage of al-Qa’ida 

throughout their campaign in the Horn. 26 For detailed accounts of Somali training camps, refer specifically to Harmony documents AFGP-2002-

600053, AFGP-2002-600104, AFGP-2002-800597 and AFGP-2002-800640. 

6
levels. At the strategic level, security assistance should focus on improving 

counterterrorism and governance in weak states, not on bringing order to failed states. At 

the operational level, engaging with local allies, often non-state actors, may very 

efficiently deny terrorists the use of ungoverned regions. Our careful examination of alQa’ida operations in the Horn, informed by internal documents that provide a window 

into the group’s thinking, suggests that the Horn was a very difficult place for al-Qa’ida 

to operate. 

In the following chapter, we explain why the Horn was such a difficult 

environment for al-Qa’ida, drawing on key insights gained from the group’s internal 

documents and our previous analysis of organizational weaknesses in terrorist groups. 

We then use case studies of Somalia and Kenya to understand both al-Qa’ida’s past 

experiences in this region and the prospects for future jihadi operation in Somalia, Kenya 

and the rest of the Horn. Finally, we develop a set of options for policy-makers seeking to 

ensure that the Horn and similar regions remain inhospitable to transnational terrorists. 

7
Figure 1. The Horn of Africa 

8
2. The Challenges of Weak and Failed States 

Weak and failed states present important policy challenges to both terrorists and 

governments. Failed states offer two potential advantages to terrorist groups. First, they 

may provide a safe haven for hierarchical systems that ease terrorists’ core organizational 

problems. Second, the economic conditions that accompany state failure may create a 

favorable labor market for recruiting militants. The challenge for terrorists is that these 

advantages do not exist in all failed states. Despite the group’s high expectations, 

operating in the Horn of Africa provided neither advantage to al-Qa’ida. On the 

government side, the challenge lies in getting weak states to spend scarce resources on 

counterterrorism. The challenge is not simply that governments in weak states may prefer 

to spend money on economic development or traditional military activities; it is that such 

governments can have strong incentives to maintain at least some level of terrorism in 

their country. 

This chapter provides a theoretical perspective for understanding how to make the 

policy challenges harder for terrorists and easier for government. Section I outlines the 

core organizational challenges for terrorists. Section II shows why failed states may not 

be very helpful for solving these. Section III uses a labor economics perspective to 

examine why terrorists expect failed states to be a good recruiting ground. Section IV 

details why Somalia was not a good place for al-Qa’ida to recruit. Section V analyzes the 

problem of motivating weak states to take terrorism as seriously as Western governments 

would like. 

I. Organizing Terror 

Terrorists’ core organizational task is simple to describe: the controlled application of

violence in the service of political goals. Hitting the wrong targets, or conducting too 

many attacks, can be just as damaging to the group’s political cause as doing too little.1

The organizational challenge is that leaders need to work with others to conduct attacks, 

raise funds, and spread their ideological message. This creates a classic agency 

relationship in which the principal, the political or ideological leader, sets the goals and

delegates operational activities to agents, the rank-and-file terrorists, to achieve these 

goals.2

 Working directly with operational elements is dangerous for obvious reasons and 

is simply not feasible if a group wants to conduct more than a few operations at a time or 

operations over a wide area. 

 

1

 Examples of counter-productive attacks abound. Indeed, there is evidence that members of al-Qa’ida

considered the 9/11 attacks to have been counter-productive. See for example the June 2002 Al Adl Letter 

from the first Harmony report. 2

 This does not assume any particular level of formalization. An individual motivated by video tapes of 

Osama bin Laden and who operates outside of any formal organization is still Osama’s agent. Likewise, an 

individual operating under the command of Seamus Twomey in the quasi-military hierarchy of the Belfast

Brigade of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (P-IRA) in August 1971 is still the agent of the P-IRA

leadership council. The key difference is that Osama bin Laden has much less ability to monitor and control 

his agent. On the P-IRA see Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Corgi,

1994), 171. 

9
The problem with delegation for terrorists is that there are a host of reasons that 

the rank-and-file will want to do things differently than leaders might like. Essentially, 

the preferences of the agents will differ from those of the principals. Scholars who have 

done extensive interview work with terrorists report their organizations are torn by strife 

and disagreement.3

 Supporting this view, the Harmony documents are full of sometimes 

vitriolic letters flying back and forth as members of al-Qa’ida debate ideology, strategy, 

and tactics.4

 Even when there is no conflict within groups, leaders often engage in costly 

efforts to monitor their agents, suggesting the potential for disagreement exists.5

 

Historically, the most prominent cause of disagreements between leaders and their 

agents is the correlation between preferences over violence and skill at conducting violent 

actions. Simply put, those who are effective at conducting attacks often want to do more 

violence than is politically optimal. Marxist organizations such as the Russian Social 

Democratic Labor Party had regular problems in the 1890s and 1900s with local cells 

conducting revenge attacks that could not be justified by Marxist theory.6

 In like fashion,

the Provisional IRA suffered repeated problems with Active Service Units (ASU), made 

up of combat specialists, pushing for violence when the organization as a whole wanted 

to limit attacks.7

 As we’ll see later, a similar problem creates headaches today for leaders 

among the foreign elements of the Iraqi insurgency.8

Unless their political goals are truly transcendent, terrorist leaders would like to 

exercise some control over their agents, but doing so is problematic. Controlling the 

lower levels of an organization entails two tasks: (1) monitoring agents, so that 

undesirable behavior is detected; and (2) punishing them for not behaving as principals 

would like. Both of these present specific challenges for terrorist organizations. 

Monitoring reduces leaders’ security because it entails additional communications and 

creates links between leaders and those most likely to be identified and captured by 

government. Moreover, the nature of the task means leaders can’t monitor perfectly even 

if they want. Lastly, there is a huge random component in whether or not an attack 

succeeds. Leaders watching a cell have an inherent difficulty in figuring out if the cell 

 

3

 See for example J. Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel

Ecosystem,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3:1 (Spring 1989): 15-43; Colin

Crawford, Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 4

 Hassan al-Tajiki’s Third Letter to the Africa Corps is typical. Hassan writes, “Here once again I remind 

you of one of your fatal mistakes, which is the quick changing of strategic targets, whereby now every 

action is tactical and improvised.” Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 25. 5

 For example, some leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah required members to report their travel expenses in order 

to know if there was any corruption. That they never had problems with corruption could mean agents did 

not have different preference from the leaders, or that the monitoring deterred corruption. Author interview, 

Jakarta, February 20, 2007. We also see this reporting in Africa. See Harmony, AFGP-2002-800573. 6

 Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1993), 49-50; Anna Geifman, “Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism:

The Socialist-Revolutionary Combat Organization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 2 (1992): 28-

29. 7

 Bishop and Mallie, op. cit., 203; M.L.R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish

Republican Movement (New York: Routledge, 1995), 120-121. 8

 Excessive violence at the operational level is a problem for senior leaders in al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia. In 

2005 they instructed a cell operating in Ramadi to be more careful in whom they kill or else “[the] people 

will start fighting us in the streets.” Harmony, IZ-060316-02.

10
failed because it was not operating faithfully – perhaps because the member in charge of 

logistics was misappropriating resources9

 – or because government got lucky.10 Even 

when leaders can monitor, punishment is costly because the agents whom leaders want to 

control wield two threats over the leadership. First, they are specialists in violence. They 

can attack the leadership. Davie Ervine, a former bomb maker for the Ulster Volunteer 

Force, a loyalist paramilitary, described the problem as follows: “In a military 

organization, the Admiral doesn’t have to worry about the sailor getting off watch and

shooting him. My admiral did have that concern.”11 Second, members unhappy with their 

punishment can go to the government. Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl who testified in the Africa 

Embassy bombings case followed this path. He had stolen money from al-Qa’ida, got 

caught, went on the run, and approached the U.S. government asking to join the witness 

protection program.

12

Mechanisms that minimize preference divergence are costly and may create 

security risks for them.

13 For example, many groups use screening strategies to mitigate 

the preference divergence which creates agency problems. Here leaders require 

prospective members to participate in time-consuming or dangerous initiation rites, such 

as demanding that recruits engage in lengthy ideological debates.14 Essentially, timeconsuming debates make the costs of participation too high for anyone not extremely 

committed to the cause.

15 However, Iraqi insurgent recruiting manuals warn, this strategy 

can weed out people with useful skills who have neither the patience for lengthy doctrinal 

debates nor the education to participate in them.

16 Other screening strategies include 

 

9

 A problem for al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. See Harmony, AFGP-2002-800581. 10 This kind of measurement problem is a motivation for vertical integration in business firms. The 

organizational implications of this kind of uncertainty for terrorist financial systems is explored in Jacob N.

Shapiro and David A. Siegel, “Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly

51 (2007): 405-429. 11 Author interview, March 8, 2006. 12 Jane Mayer, “Junior: The clandestine life of America’s top Al Qaeda source,” The New Yorker

(Septermber 11, 2006). 13 For discussions of the problems inherent in other screening strategies see Joseph Felter et al., Harmony 

and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point N.Y.: United States 

Military Academy, 2006). See also Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Terrorist’s Challenge: Security, Efficiency, 

Control,” Manuscript, Stanford University, 2006; and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Terrorist Organizations’ 

Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies: A Rational Choice Perspective,” in Harold A. Trinkunas and Jeanne K.

Giraldo, eds. Terrorist Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspecitve (Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2007). 14 Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), an Algerian terrorist organization, uses just

such a recruitment system in expatriate Algerian communities in France. See Mohamed Sifaoui’s 

journalistic account of his penetration of a GSPC fundraising and recruiting cell in Paris, in, Inside AlQa’ida: How I Infiltrated the World’s Deadliest Terrorist Organization (New York: Thunder’s Mouth

Press, 2003). 15 For a discussion of how education serves as a similar screening mechanism for business firms see A. M.

Spence, “Job Market Signaling,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (1973): 355. 16 Of course, as one Yemeni militant notes, groups do need some members who are educated to carry out 

effective operations. Harmony, AFGP-2002-800517, 37. On Iraq see Harmony, ISGZ-2004-M1000074-

0148. A related problem experienced by Russian Marxist terrorist organizations is the frequent need to

lower standards of ideological purity in order to bring in more recruits. Doing so increases the frequency of 

counterproductive actions and reduces security by bringing people into the group who are susceptible to

monetary inducements from government agents. See Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill, 160-162. 

11
requiring prospective members to attend arduous training camps or demanding they 

commit violent acts to prove their allegiance to the group.17 Unfortunately for terrorist 

groups, both of these strategies create predicate offenses that make it more likely that law 

enforcement officials will identify operatives. 

Taking these organizational challenges into account makes it clear that terrorist 

groups and other covert organizations face two fundamental trade-offs. The first is 

between operational security and operational control. Here agency problems and other 

group dynamics lead to counterproductive violence. Strategies to mitigate these problems 

through greater control entail security costs for groups as a whole. The second trade-off is 

between security and financial efficiency. Here problems of trust and control—agency 

problems—create inefficiencies in resource allocation. Strategies to mitigate these 

problems all entail security costs. 

At the most basic level, this analysis presumes that organizations configure 

themselves and operate in ways that seek to maximize their utility given their cognitive 

constraints and limited information about the world. 18 At a minimum, we assume terrorist

organizations, or at least their leaders, intend to be rational in their decision making.19 For 

business firms, such rationality usually means attempting to maximize utility measured in 

terms of profit. For terrorist organizations, political impact is the goal. As this perspective 

suggests, we see many examples of terrorist organizations struggling to find the 

appropriate means, in terms of targets and organizational structures, to meet their political

ends.20

 

17 On al-Qa’ida’s use of training camps as a screening mechanism see “Testimony of FBI Agent John 

Anticev on Odeh,” United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 5 (7) 98 Cr. 1023, 27 February

2001, 1630-1638. On the logic behind requiring members to commit violent acts see Sun-Ki Chai, “An 

Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence,” Comparative Politics 26:1 (1993). 18 Recent research by Scott Atran and others shows that the most committed terrorists - failed suicide 

bombers - exhibit the minimum requirement for this type of rationalist approach (“consistent transitive 

preferences”) when discussing how to achieve their ends. However, they demonstrate irrational,

“intransitive preferences” when discussing the morality of their chosen method or the theological 

justifications for their ends. Since this paper is concerned here with organizations making adjustments to

achieve exogenously defined goals, Atran’s results suggest the analysis rests on solid behavioral grounds. 

Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Martyrdom: Instrumental Reasoning vs. Sacred Values,”

paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, St.

Louis, Feb. 19, 2006. 19 Terrorist organizations clearly make many decisions in a rational fashion. When one type of attack 

becomes more difficult, terrorists switch to another type and the baseline rate of attacks remains relatively 

consistent. Most evidence suggests terrorist leaders demonstrate exactly the kind of consequentialist logic 

required for intendedly rational behavior. On substitution effects see Walter Enders and Todd, “Patterns of 

Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates” International Studies Quarterly

46 (2002):145-65. On consequentialist decision making in al-Qa’ida, see many examples in Rohan 

Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). On rational reactions to

political competition between terrorist groups, see Mia M. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Alllure of Suicide 

Terror, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). On terrorist decision-making more generally, see 

Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 473-

507. 20 For a lengthy example of such analysis, see Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, trans. William

McCants (West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). For an analysis of terrorist groups’ 

12
With this basic rational choice-theory approach in mind, we can identify 

conditions under which groups will prefer to exercise central control over operations or

finances. If these conditions exist, groups face agency losses but must balance their desire 

for control against the security costs it entails. 

The security-control trade-off becomes especially challenging when: 

• Preferences over tactics are not perfectly aligned, so that some agents want to 

attack different targets or want to conduct more or fewer attacks than leaders 

want.21 

• It is costly to monitor agents’ tactical planning or use violence to condition 

them.

22

• Leaders’ political goals are being placed at risk by the freelancing of 

operational elements. 

The security-efficiency trade-off becomes especially challenging when: 

• Agents below the leadership are less than perfectly committed.23 

• Principals cannot perfectly monitor their agents’ uses of money or punish 

them for observed infractions. 

• Resources are sufficiently constrained that leaders won’t just accept the 

financial inefficiencies created by agency problems. 

Both trade-offs are minimized to the extent that terrorist organizations have a 

place where they can build the kinds of hierarchical structures that traditional 

organizations use to solve agency problems. Al-Qa’ida tried to use Afghanistan for this 

purpose from the mid-1990s through late 2001, just as the P-IRA used the Republic of 

Ireland as a safe haven until the mid-1990s.24 Captured documents and public web 

 intendedly rational choice of organizational structures, see Jacob N. Shapiro, “Organizing Terror,” 

manuscript, Stanford University, 2006. 21 This can occur for two reasons: (1) because operatives have different preferences over violence than

leaders; or (2) because leaders and their operatives receive different information about the appropriate 

targets. 22 It’s important to keep in mind that the costs to monitoring/punishment don’t just arise from government

action. The need to maintain cohesion within groups can also limit leaders’ options. Again quoting Davie 

Ervine: “We had some really heinous, counter-productive stuff going on. But we couldn’t put a stop to it

because we needed to keep the hearts and minds within the organization.” Author interview, March 8, 

2006. 23 The agents can have the exact same preferences as the leaders, but the leaders have a problem unless 

everyone below them is perfectly committed. No matter what their preferences are between spending on 

attacks and allocating resources to salaries or other private goods, leaders want every cent passed down 

allocated to achieving political impact, often through violent operations. 24 Just how far they moved towards having functioning hierarchical structures is a matter of debate, but the 

Harmony data show a clear intent to move in that direction. On al-Qa’ida’s use of Afghanistan see Felter, 

Harmony and Disharmony, 9, 37. See also Shapiro, “The Terrorist’s Challenge,” 4. On the P-IRA, note the 

group’s use of the border counties for military training and indoctrination from the 1970s onwards. See also

Shapiro, “Organizing Terror,” 23.

13
postings demonstrate that al-Qa’ida has been thinking about the necessity to exploit such 

weakly-governed spaces since their organizational founding. The importance of safe 

havens is evident in the documents where jihadi commanders argue for the need to 

preserve strong, secure rear areas in places like Sudan and Afghanistan while launching 

offensive strikes into Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.25 In the context of the theoretical 

framework presented here, the existence of usable security vacuums greatly eases groups’ 

organizational trade-offs. If there is a safe rear area for the hierarchy, then exercising a 

given level of control has much smaller security implications. 

II. Failed states: an (un)safe haven for terrorists. 

Do failed states actually serve as an effective safe haven for terrorists? There are a 

number of reasons to suspect not. In the first place, areas without functioning state 

institutions do not provide safety for their residents. The security vacuum creates 

problems for the terrorists too.26 As a result, terrorist strategists do not think such spaces 

are very useful.27 Here two documents are instructive. The first, from Somalia, identifies

a five-point strategy to unite Somali forces and create an Islamic national front.28 The 

author argues for: (1) expulsion of the foreign international presence; (2) rebuilding of 

state institutions; (3) establishment of domestic security; (4) comprehensive national 

reconciliation; and (5) economic reform and combating famine. This approach parallels 

that of the June 2005 Zawahiri letter addressed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.29 In that 

letter, Zawahiri argues that jihad in Iraq should proceed incrementally, according to the 

following phases: (1) expel the Americans from Iraq; (2) establish an Islamic authority or 

emirate, then develop it and support it; and (3) extend the jihad wave to the secular 

countries neighboring Iraq. 

Notice that what is important to these thinkers is not the existence of a security 

vacuum but what comes next: establishing functioning state institutions under jihadi 

control.30 What made Afghanistan so useful to al-Qa’ida from 1995 onwards was not an 

absence of state institutions; it was that al-Qa’ida could operate under the protection of a 

sovereign state, relying on that state’s sovereignty to shield its infrastructure from

potential attack by Western forces. Operating in a security vacuum, where training camps 

and the like can be more readily attacked directly by the United States and indirectly by 

local allies, is much less attractive.31 In fact, existing security vacuums have not proven 

 

25 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053. 26 In a series of reports form Somalia in the 1990s, Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs) details the 

challenges of operating in a failed state. Prominent among these are problems with local bandits, the costs 

of corruption in neighboring states, and the ability of Western forces to act in ungoverned spaces. See 

Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, AFGP-2002-600110, and AFGP-2002-800597. 27 For a thorough development of this argument by a very influential jihadi thinker, see Abu Bakr Naji, The 

Management of Savagery, trans. William McCants (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). 28 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 6. 29 Available online at: http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html [accessed April 27, 2006]. 30 A similar argument is made in Naji, The Management of Savagery. The core argument there is that the 

jihadi movement should win public support by showing it can manage state institutions and provide public 

goods such as order and contract enforcement more effectively than secular governments. 31 For example, in 1996 Ethiopian forces entered Somalia to conduct an offensive against Islamist forces in

the Gedo region. In the same year the Ethiopians used a local proxy force, the Secularist National Front, to

take a number of towns where foreigners had been operating. Harmony, AFGP-2002-600110, 1-2. 

14
to be a viable base for exporting attacks abroad. No major international attacks have been 

supported out of Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia since the US military operations began in 

2001. From this perspective, policy-makers should be concerned with ungoverned spaces 

only so far as they are allowing terrorists to operate openly and at reasonable expense. 

The Horn of Africa does not afford terrorists such benefits. The Harmony 

documents reveal four problems al-Qa’ida and like-minded groups have had operating in 

the Horn. The first problem was that the lack of government-enforced order in many 

areas imposed what was effectively a tax on all operations. This tax came in two forms: 

(1) the need to provide security against local bandits,32 and (2) the increased cost of 

getting personnel and resources into poorly governed areas.33 The second problem was 

the unreliability of local allies.34 The third problem was that the better an area was for 

training, the more remote and sparsely populated it was and thus the harder it was to meet 

basic sustenance needs.35 The fourth problem was the challenge of getting fiscal 

resources in place. Financial services in the region were and continue to be weak, and 

groups did not seem able to effectively use the hawaladars who provide key financial 

services in weakly governed areas of the Horn. 

In fact, these problems were so bad that after visiting the training camps his 

personnel established in Lu’uq, Somalia, Abu Hafs writes back to his superiors and 

suggests: 

“We found out that it is difficult to do this in the areas that we visited because of 

dangers pertaining to security. This is why it is preferred that the courses be done 

by you in Khartoum. As a result this will save us transportation expenses and 

others.”36

As we will see in our country study of Somalia, there is little reason to think this 

region has become any more hospitable to jihadis since Abu Hafs rendered his judgment. 

So while the Horn should remain an area of concern, the implication is not that Western 

governments must take on the impossible task of preventing ungoverned spaces from

emerging throughout the region. That would take immense resources and might produce 

unintended benefits rather than costs for terror groups. 

 

32 In August 1994, Saif al-Islam writes a journal of his trip to Somalia to establish training camps on behalf 

of Abu Hafs, a senior al-Qa’ida military leader. Saif describes how it took a caravan of 80 local men to

guard 8 Arabs on the trip through the Ogaden region to Lu’uq, Somalia. Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 4. 33 In fact, the logistical challenges of moving from Kenya into Somalia were so great that in January 1994

al-Qa’ida operative Saif al-Adel suggested buying a boat for transportation and to raise funds through

fishing. The biggest challenge he notes is that because the local can’t be trusted, the group will have to train 

one of their own as a sailor. Harmony, AFGP-2002-600114, 1-2. Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 5. 34 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800640. 35 For a description of some of the challenges of operating in Somalia see AFGP-2002-600104, 5. On the 

problems of moving during the rainy season in areas with few paved roads, see AFGP-2002-600114, 5. In a 

March 1993 letter to “Brother Othman,” Saif al-Islam describes the poor food in camps in the Ogaden, 

camps whose major expenditure was on food. Harmony, AFGP-2002-800621, 4. 36Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597. 

15
Denying terrorists the benefits of ungoverned spaces in the Horn is a much more 

feasible strategy. The massive troop deployment in Iraq has so far denied terrorists the 

use of that country as a staging ground for attacks in the West. Meanwhile, terrorists are 

denied the benefits of a potential Afghan security vacuum with the deployment there of 

only 22,000 troops. A mere 1,600 troops based in Djibouti, Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), have effectively denied Islamic terrorists the use of 

Somalia and the rest of the Horn of Africa.37 In all three cases, these deployments are far 

less resource-intensive than would be required to actually impose government or support 

effective control by a central government. A more cost-effective strategy is thus to 

maintain the capability to act decisively when necessary while cultivating local allies who 

will monitor these spaces. Such a strategy prevents ungoverned spaces from easing 

terrorists’ fundamental organizational challenges. 

III. Why Terrorists Choose Failed States: A Labor Economics Perspective 

In the first release of Harmony documents, we found that al-Qa’ida faced a familiar set of 

organizational challenges, leading to a trade-off between operational security and control 

of outlying agents acting on behalf of the organization. This perspective helped explain 

problems within the organization. However, it provided limited leverage for 

understanding why the organization made particular strategic choices, like trying to 

establish operations in the Horn of Africa. A labor economics perspective can be useful 

here in explaining why al-Qa’ida ventured into the Horn and why it faced such 

difficulties recruiting there despite poor economic conditions.

We can think of al-Qa’ida as a firm that produces terrorism against Western 

nations, specifically the United States.

38 Attacks require a combination of two factors of 

production: capital and labor.39 For al-Qa’ida, capital includes durable goods like 

weapons and vehicles, training facilities, and the good will of local governments like 

Somali clans or the governments of Sudan and Afghanistan. 40 Labor is the individual 

terrorist recruits who provide services in exchange for wages and non-pecuniary 

compensation. 

Just as firms locate themselves where they can minimize costs and maximize 

production and profits, terrorist groups choose operational venues in an essentially 

 

37 Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism (Routledge, 2004). 38 Wright’s The Looming Tower provides a very effective discussion of the evolution of al-Qa’ida’s 

strategic doctrine, including the relevant importance of attacks on Western targets versus providing 

militants to fight in defense of Islamic communities. 

39 In traditional firms, capital includes “inventory (stock) of a plant, equipment, and other (generally

durable) productive resources held by a business firm, an individual, or some other organization.” William

J. Baumol and Alan S. Binder, Economics: Principle and Policy, 9th ed. (Mason, OH: South-Western,

2003). 40 Sometimes the connection is very clear. A cornerstone of al-Qa’ida’s operations in Sudan was the 

establishment of business endeavors to finance operations and earn the support of local leaders. Upon 

arrival in Khartoum, Sudan in 1992, Osama Bin Laden quickly established himself as a businessman as

much as a terrorist leader. He invested heavily in the construction and agriculture industry and became “a 

generous employer by Sudanese standards, paying $200 per month to most of his workers, with senior 

managers making from $1,000 to $1,500.” Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 168. 

16
rational fashion.41 The Horn of Africa presented important production advantages for alQa’ida. The Sudanese government provided safe harbor for operational planning, thus 

easing security concerns. Additionally, the Sudanese economy was very weak in the early 

1990s, so labor was cheap. Bin Laden hired more than five hundred people in Sudan and 

“those employees who were actual members of Al-Qaeda received a monthly bonus 

between $50 and $120.”42 The Horn of Africa also presented al-Qa’ida with opportunities 

to strike against the United States. Bin Laden, still angered by the “continued presence of 

American troops in Saudi Arabia,” felt compelled to take action against American forces 

that were present in Somalia as part of a UN Peacekeeping mission.43 Al-Qa’ida leaders 

also thought Somalia would present a good environment in which to produce attacks 

against the U.S. and continue to grow its movement. They expected security costs to be 

low because of the lack of a central government and, on account of the pervasive poverty, 

they looked forward to a large pool of recruits. Neither expectation was met.44 

Al-Qa’ida’s reasons for venturing into the HOA appear obvious. However, 

analysts and pundits rarely reverse the question and attempt to determine whether 

individuals from the Horn of Africa would want to be part of al-Qa’ida and the broader 

Salafi-jihadi movement. In Somalia, those with the skills for militancy are in demand as 

the lack of a central government has led to a proliferation of militias. In this competitive 

labor market, al-Qa’ida had to provide a competitive compensation package to attract 

good recruits. While the average Somali’s economic prospects were, and still are, 

undoubtedly very bad, it is not clear that this was true for those who would make good 

terrorist recruits. 

Following the labor economics perspective, we assume individuals decide to work 

as terrorists based on a perceived level of compensation consisting of wages and 

intangible benefits.45 When the compensation for joining the jihad exceeds that of the 

next best option, individuals join.46 In the first set of Harmony documents, we found alQa’ida in the 1990s had clearly outlined its compensation package, understanding it had 

to provide wages to recruit and maintain its work force. These pecuniary benefits are 

stated outright in al-Qa’ida’s employment contract where “the salary of a married 

Mujahed is 6500 Pakistani Rupee, and 500 Rupee for every newborn ... [and] the salary 

of the bachelor Mujahed is 1000 Pakistani Rupee.” Total compensation for an al-Qa’ida 

member included in-kind benefits, such as vacations, as well as wages. The group’s 

 

41 For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (P-IRA) in the 1970s chose rural, less populated 

areas of the Republic of Ireland for training operations. When a P-IRA training officer was captured with

documents describing training facilities in County Galway and County Mayo, the groups leaders decided to 

move training in the Republic of Ireland to County Kerry and to prohibit other activities in that area. Sean

O’Callaghan, The Informer (London: Bantam Press, 1998), 97-99. 42 Wright, The Looming Tower, 169. 43 Ibid. 44 There is an important point here; terrorist organizations have a limited ability to understand their 

operational environment, even when they are operating as openly as al-Qa’ida in the early 1990s. 45 Rogert G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy, 9th ed. 

(Boston: Pearson/Addison Wesley, 2006), 170. 46 This perspective is consistent with the enlistment process described in Marc Sageman’s Understanding

Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). The over-educated, underemployed, socially-isolated ex-patriots that became involved in al-Qa’ida and its affiliates are people for 

whom the non-pecuniary benefits of terrorism were quite powerful. 

17
contract for new recruits states, “the married have a vacation by rotation for a week every 

three weeks.... A bachelor can have a vacation by rotation for five days every month.”47

Al-Qa’ida also helps its members with consumption smoothing, routinely providing loans 

to its employees for things ranging from basic necessities to alimony.48 The provision of

non-salary benefits is not unique to al-Qa’ida. Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indonesian jihadi 

organization, provides death benefits to its members’ families, but only when they are

killed while on assignment for the group.49 Terrorist groups compete for labor with both 

the legitimate economy and with like-minded militant organizations. 

Terrorists receive a unique set of non-pecuniary benefits from joining al-Qa’ida, 

distinguishing it from other militant organizations in the Horn. In particular, al-Qa’ida’s 

religious doctrines provide members with an attractive set of spiritual benefits. Moreover, 

relying on these spiritual benefits as part of the compensation package effectively 

provides a screening mechanism that eases the organizational challenges identified 

above.50 The group’s media campaigns bring the terror recruit a sense of purpose, being 

part of a team, unparalleled adventure, and often fame. As the organization’s stature 

increases in recruits’ communities, the non-pecuniary benefits of participating increase, 

easing the problems of recruiting members.51 From this perspective, the group’s devotion 

to create an image as an elite institution is driven as much by the exigencies of the labor 

market as anything else. 

The challenge for groups like al-Qa’ida is that other institutions also provide 

valued non-pecuniary benefits. Societies in the Horn of Africa present a complex set of 

overlapping motivations which made al-Qa’ida’s recruitment efforts more difficult than

the group anticipated. In many cases, the individual motivations of local Somali residents 

diverged from the group motivations and core tenets of al-Qa’ida. This meant there was 

a mismatch between the value of the non-pecuniary compensation package al-Qa’ida 

thought it was offering and what local Somalis perceived as the benefits to joining alQa’ida. The result was poor recruitment and excessive operational costs for the Africa 

Corps.52

 

47 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600045, 3. 48 In the most recent documents, for example, we find what might be a bank document in the U.S., where, 

“Brother Omar Tajuddin has received the sum of 2,000 Bir to pay his personal debts.” Harmony, AFGP2002-800573, 21. 49 Author interview, Jakarta, February 21, 2007. 50 An excellent overview of the economics of religious militancy is presented in Laurence R. Iannaccone 

and Eli Berman, “Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly,” Public Choice 128 (2006):109-

129. 51 This pattern holds true across groups. In the late 1980s the leaders of the Ulster Defense Association 

were replaced by younger members unhappy with the old leadership’s focus on lining their own pockets. 

Once it became known that a new leadership committed to violence against Catholics was in charge, the

group began to get more high quality recruits. Crawford, Inside the UDA, 157-8. 52 The labor economics approach used here is adapted from a larger work. See Clinton Watts, “Jihadi

Seeking Challenging Martyrdom Opportunity; Will Travel,” (Working Paper, Combating Terrorism Center, 

May 2007).

18
IV. Al-Qa’ida’s franchise in Somalia 

Analysis tends to focus on whether al-Qa’ida wanted to operate and expand into the Horn 

of Africa. The information in these documents overwhelmingly supports the notion that it 

did. Al-Qa’ida leaders like Abu Hafs clearly expected that Somalia would provide a low 

cost recruiting ground where a disaffected and isolated people would gladly come under 

the Salafi banner. Al-Qa’ida expected Somalis to join the fight to expel foreign occupiers 

in the form of the UN peacekeeping mission. In the mind of the al-Qa’ida leadership,

Somalia represented a new safe haven for planning and operating terrorist attacks. With 

little or no functioning government and a poor Muslim populace, Somalia appeared on

the surface to be another Afghanistan. Confident from their recruitment success in the 

Pakistan-Afghan tribal regions, al-Qa’ida ventured into Somalia with mujahideen visions 

reminiscent of the 1980s. 

But reality turned out to be far different from their expectations. Three major 

themes emerge from our analysis. First, al-Qa’ida leaders greatly underestimated the 

costs of operating in Somalia. Second, they overestimated the value to Somalis of their 

version of jihad, of the non-pecuniary benefits they were offering. Labor markets have 

two sides, supply and demand. On the supply side, we need to ask “Do people from the 

Horn of Africa want to be part of al-Qa’ida?” It is on this score that al-Qa’ida’s 

expectations and the realities of Somalia diverged in 1993 and 1994. Third, where alQa’ida did find success in Somalia, it was by providing local order and not ideological 

motivation. By providing security, al-Qa’ida fulfilled the functions normally reserved for 

clan militias.

The difference between al-Qa’ida headquarters’ perception and on-the-ground 

reality is clearly illustrated by the disparity between the guidance from Afghanistan and 

reports coming from the operational team leaders. In September 1993, Abu al-Waleed 

writes to Saif al-Islam, his team leader in Somalia, from the Jihad Wal training camp in 

Afghanistan. He suggests that “the political effort is clearly there and effective ... [and] 

likewise, the military effort is simple, effective, and inexpensive.”53 When Saif has 

trouble motivating the Somalis during military training, he reports asking them, “don’t 

you want us to come here and do this training in your poor country? You have no [other] 

opportunities here.... They said yes.”54 Despite this apparently pleasing response, Abu alWaleed seems surprised by reports from Saif about materiel shortfalls, commenting, “I 

learned from your letter that there are very few weapons or ammunition in the area.... I 

recall when the events began many weapons were readily available and cheap.... Where 

did they go?”55

The low operational costs expected by the Somali franchise never materialized. 

Abu Hafs, the overall expeditionary leader, repeatedly discusses the high operational 

costs in Somalia, writing about a “brother” who “is in desperate need for the monies 

because he did not receive the amount of $21,600.”56 These high costs were encountered 

 

53 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 3. 54 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 13. 55 Ibid. 56 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597, 9.

19
within Somalia and en route. Abu Hafs cites Kenya as an expensive route of transit for 

mujahideen and lists Djibouti as having an “abnormal high cost of living,” where 

“Brother Khaled has no money ... [and] his debts reached $4000.”57

The documents suggest two reasons for this pattern. First, getting in and out of 

Somalia was very expensive. Abu Hafs refers to this problem in stating, “the operation 

pertaining to the transfer of the brothers from Nariobi to Luuq will be costly: $150 for 

rent per person, and the roadways are not good.”58 The transportation costs for operating 

in this region were substantial and paralyzing for the Somali franchise. Accounting 

documents reveal that shipping and transportation costs consumed a vast amount of their 

resources.59 The very reasons that al-Qa’ida sought Somalia- an isolated safe haven for 

preparing and conducting terrorist operations- also made it nearly impossible to sustain 

operations.60 

Second, the poor security environment and unreliable allies effectively imposed a 

tax on all operations. For example, getting into the Ogaden region of Somalia apparently 

came at great risk and with large financial costs. Abu Bilal describes movement through 

this area with an Islamist group: “I was saying to the leader of [the] caravan that the road 

is dangerous (unintelligible) let us choose another road, and he was saying that all these 

tribes here are Somali and are sympathetic to us.”61 Shortly after this discussion, the 

group becomes engulfed in a roadside ambush. According to Abu Bilal, they ultimately 

win this skirmish but still sustain casualties. The route from Djibouti through the Ogaden 

to Somalia proves difficult since the Islamist tribes lack vehicles that can traverse the 

terrain and they lack “a good and sharp guide of the region.”62

In addition to these shipping costs, the firm sustained continual leakage through 

extortion from local clans and unintended losses during transportation as convoys and 

clan movements fell victim to banditry.63 Greed and theft routinely enter the equation, 

leading Saif al-Islam to bitterly criticize the Somalis: 

“...even though the thorny trees I described have sap and gum, no one uses them

for anything. All the people there prefer to subsist off wheat and camel milk, and 

because of this, they are stingy and greedy. There are some stories so you can 

know about these people, such as the one about the man who left his wife to die of 

hunger because he wouldn’t slaughter a camel from his herd of more than 100. If 

they see a caravan of fair skinned-people approaching them, they will welcome 

them if the caravan looks rich. You would think this is so they can offer the 

caravan some hospitality, but it is exactly the opposite.”

64

 

57 Ibid., 11. 58 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597, 10. 59 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800621, 4. 60 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 17. 61 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800640, 7. 62 Ibid., 6. 63 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800573. 64 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 7.

20
An additional, somewhat surprising expense was incurred because of Somali clan 

leaders’ parochial concerns. Although many Somali clan leaders wanted to expel foreign 

occupiers, their first goal ultimately was always the security of their clan against local 

competitors. Abu Hafs routinely runs into difficulties building consensus among Somali 

leaders to focus on foreign occupiers instead of other Somalis. He has to spend scarce 

resources to create and maintain alliances between the tribes. Saif al-Islam complains, 

“we had Abd al-Salam [in the Revolutionary Council], who had taken $20,000 from Abu 

Fatima (aka Abu Hafs) on behalf of the council! As for military affairs, they didn’t even 

have any maps with enemy locations and movements.”65

While the costs for operating in Somalia were greater than expected, the value of

al-Qa’ida’s compensation package to the locals was much lower than expected. The two 

major practical benefits al-Qa’ida offered to local allies were money for tribes and 

military training. The group’s accounting records reveal that funding went to expected

expenses such as individual salaries, personal loans, and a host of equipment needs such 

as socks, shoes, dishes, and camels.66 Saif al-Islam outlines that meeting basic needs for 

“every individual will cost $1.50 daily- $45 monthly.... [T]herefore the camp force (30) 

will cost $13,500 per month.”67 But operating his camp for three months will cost a 

minimum of $130,000, and “this does not cover the administration, media and the tribe’s 

expenses.”68 Clearly al-Qa’ida had to do more than just offer training; it had to directly 

pay “tribe’s expenses”. 

Indeed, pecuniary benefits were the anchor for gaining support with the locals. 

Omar al-Sumali, a.k.a. Saif al-Adl, the expeditionary commander for Ras Kamboni, begs 

for resources with which to provide pecuniary benefits. He writes, “Give this locality a 

chance by supporting it financially and supplying good personnel. The potential is very 

good. We should move very quickly, and seize this opportunity for Jihad. It is a good 

locality, from which we can establish the expected (base for) work in Somalia.”69 The 

idea seems to have been to use pecuniary benefits as a foothold to begin providing the 

non-pecuniary benefits of Salafism and jihad. 

Al-Qa’ida expected it to be quite easy to win the locals with money; after all, their 

country was poverty-stricken. However, once on the ground, al-Qa’ida’s leaders realized 

that they had competition in Somalia. Their offer of pecuniary benefits bought only 

temporary commitments from the Somali clans. Even in the unstable environment of 

early-1990s Somalia, businessmen were a threat to al-Qa’ida’s ability to recruit. Saif alIslam explains how “a man came from Jarbo with money to distribute to the people, 

especially the tribal Sheikhs.... [H]e said that, ‘we don’t want political parties in our 

countries, and weapons either.... Our best interests are not being followed because the 

Islamic Union is here’.”70 Saif responds by recalibrating the al-Qa’ida strategy, 

establishing new “priorities of the jihadist effort: (which is) specify the primary enemy 

 

65 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 19. 66 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800573. 67 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800621, 13. 68 Ibid. 69 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600113, 7. 70 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 21. 

21
(the businessmen), and postpone [efforts against] other groups.”71 By eliminating 

business people Saif seeks to reduce the value of the pecuniary benefits he must offer to 

gain local recruits. Essentially draining an area of all outside financial support is seen as a 

way to increase al-Qa’ida’s leverage in recruiting individual terrorists and co-opting other 

groups to their cause. However, the group clearly recognized that to maintain the loyalty 

of the people, such a strategy must be followed by “supervision of liberated areas and 

securing of lives, funds, and property of all members of the populace.”72

Once financial benefits gained a foothold, the group planned to use the ideas of 

Salifism and violent jihad to provide non-monetary motivations for continued support. 

However, al-Qa’ida encountered unexpected challenges in winning the hearts and minds 

of Somalis. First, the majority of Somalis are Sufi and not Salafi. Saif al-Islam writes, 

“this problem [of Sufi vs. Salafist] was beginning to chafe me – I had heard about it 

before – and the day began in a very unsatisfactory way for me.”73 In Somalia, overtaking 

traditional Sufi doctrine proved difficult for two reasons. First, the non-pecuniary benefits 

that Salafism offered did not exceed the tradition older Somalis valued in Sufism. 

Second, al-Qa’ida’s non-pecuniary membership benefits were less than the costs of 

leaving one’s clan. Even if they did find value in Salafism, individual recruits found the 

opportunity cost of leaving their established place in a clan far greater than the benefits of 

employment with al-Qa’ida. As Abu Bilal describes, “each member of the movement is 

fanatically attached to his tribe.”74 The risks of joining al-Qa’ida were high as a new 

recruit could not be: (1) certain that he would not be severely punished for leaving the 

clan; (2) sure that al-Qa’ida would not be overwhelmed by surrounding tribes; nor (3) 

certain that al-Qa’ida would continue to operate in Somalia for the long term, especially 

if foreign interventions were eliminated. 

In the final analysis, al-Qa’ida’s efforts to move into Somalia fell short for many 

of the same reasons that Western interventions there failed. Like United Nations and U.S. 

forces that ventured into Somalia, al-Qa’ida did not understand the political, economic 

and social dynamics of the country. The costs of this misunderstanding were felt in two 

ways. First, the lack of any form of governance created excessive operational costs for alQa’ida in Somalia. Instead of finding a safe haven like the tribal areas of Pakistan, alQa’ida in Somalia found a lawless land of shifting alliances, devoid of Sunni unity. 

Second, the Somali laborers ultimately placed a lower-than-expected value on the 

compensation package al-Qa’ida had to offer. The group could not provide benefits 

sufficient to overcome local loyalties. Although al-Qa’ida was successful in buying their 

way into a few tribes, the benefits of Salafism in 1993 did not outweigh the cost of tribal 

exclusion. The primacy of tribalism in Somalia ultimately frustrated al-Qa’ida’s efforts to 

recruit long term and develop a unified coalition against foreign occupiers. Al-Qa’ida 

mistook its call for jihad in Afghanistan as a universal motivator for which Muslims in 

Somalia would join at an equal rate. In 1993 Somalia, this call fell on somewhat deaf ears 

as survival against local competitors trumped jihad. 

 

71 Ibid., 23. 72 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 3. 73 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 21. 74 Ibid., 5.

22
Al-Qa’ida did find success in certain distinct areas which may provide some

clarity for analyzing the threat from foreign terrorists operating in Somalia today. One 

area where al-Qa’ida was successful was in recruiting some youth away from clans in 

1993 and 1994. There are three reasons for this success. First, the call to jihad resonated 

more with younger individuals seeking adventure. Secondly, the costs for youth to leave 

the clan were markedly smaller than for more elder individuals. The longer one has been 

in a tribe or clan, the more benefits, tangible and intangible, the clan member gains from 

remaining in the tribe. Recognizing the vulnerability of the youth to recruitment 

techniques, al-Qa’ida sought “to establish a coordination and communications center to 

connect the youth in the different areas in and out of the country.... [I]t is important to 

strengthen the unity between the people.... [T]his is very important in Jihad.”75 Thirdly, 

successful jihadi operations resonated more with young people. Saif found that after 

conducting operations, “now many Muslim youth from the surrounding cities want to 

join up with them [al-Qa’ida in Ras Kamboni].”76

More interestingly, in the one area in Somalia where al-Qa’ida may have 

established an enduring presence, it did so by providing local order. Omar al-Sumali won 

one village over by providing security and then immediately began ideological efforts. 

He writes, “we already formulated a political program for the Bajuni and the region ... 

[and] next week we will ask Sheikh Hassan to adopt the plan.”

77 Al-Qa’ida was 

apparently able to effectively provide law and order near Ras Kamboni. The Bajuni, a 

tribal population of the east African coast, residing in the vicinity of Ras Kamboni, 

actually requested that al-Qa’ida operatives “stay and govern, and secure the city.” As 

Omar al-Sumali explains, the Bajuni: 

“...have noticed that the presence of the brothers prevented the 

highwaymen from entering the city, and the fishermen began coming to 

the shore to spend the night in the city.... [T]hey told our people that they 

do not want them to leave. They await the arrival of our wives and 

children. They freely gave fish to our people, and our people guarded the 

well while reading the Koran, and helped the fisherman get water.”

78

Today, Ras Kamboni is considered a hotbed of radical Islam and a stronghold of 

the Islamic Courts Movement. Since 2001, numerous reports suggested that Ras 

Kamboni served as a terrorist training camp and that jihadis from outside Somalia have 

taken over the area.79 In interviews with Kenyan fishermen, there were people in Ras 

Kamboni that “were not locals, but rather, Arabs and other more ‘European-looking type 

people’ but who were Muslims.”80 Over the past two years, the Union of Islamic Courts 

essentially took control of many parts of Somalia due to its ability to provide law and 

order. The nature of its very name, “Islamic Courts,” suggests that the benefits of 

security may be the foothold that al-Qa’ida can use in an attempt to spread its ideology. 

 

75 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800640, 3. 76 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600113, 6. 77 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600113, 3. 78 Ibid. 79 Author interview, Kenyan fisherman, 28 September, 2001. See Appendix C-I. 80 Ibid. 

23
However, despite the apparent local successes of Islamic militants, the dangers of

operating in a failed state were dramatically illustrated during the recent Ethiopian 

invasion into Somalia. On January 8-10, 2007, American forces conducted a series of air 

raids on the area around Ras Kamboni in attempt to kill al-Qa’ida operatives seeking 

sanctuary there.81 Such attacks are much less likely to occur against operatives working 

under the umbrella of state sovereignty. 

V. Weak states and counterterrorism. 

The basic problem faced by developed nations seeking to support 

counterterrorism in weakly governed states is that these weak states often derive benefits 

and positive externalities from tolerating some degree of terrorist activity within their 

borders. The overall utility for weak states is not always reduced as the level of terrorism

decreases. This leads to an agency problem similar to that faced by terrorist leaders. 

Low Terrorist 

Activity

Utility of

target state

High

High

Low

 In an ideal world, donor and recipient states would strictly prefer less terrorist 

activity to more, thus deriving the highest level of utility when no terrorism exists and

incrementally less as terror levels increase. The utility curve for this hypothetical state is 

depicted in Figure 2.82 This 

relationship seems intuitive. 

Terrorism and the reputation for 

being at risk for terrorism inflict 

serious costs on a state. Domestic 

sources of terror can destabilize the 

government, call into question its 

legitimacy, and degrade its ability to 

govern effectively. Terrorists inflict 

casualties on civilians and the 

members of the military, police and 

internal security forces trying to 

combat the threat. Foreign investors, wary of the risks of investment in terrorist-prone 

states, are encouraged to move capital to safer, more stable markets. The economies of 

states that depend on tourism—like Kenya—are especially hard hit when their state is

considered at risk for terrorism and subject to travel advisories initiated by foreign 

governments. Terrorism is detrimental to states’ interests on many levels and its 

downside effects are quite evident.

Figure 2 

Unfortunately, the impact of terrorist problems on important actors in a number of 

states is not always strictly negative. In some cases, local government officials, internal 

security organizations and other institutions derive benefits from tolerating a certain level 

of terrorism. In other cases, leaders may experience strong domestic political pressure to 

tolerate or condone some limited presence and activity of groups that enjoy popular 

support, despite the fact that they meet or approach threshold U.S. definitions of a 

 

81 “Somalia says al-Qaida embassy bombing suspect believed killed,” The Guardian, January 10, 2007. 82 The following figures and analysis are adapted from Joseph H. Felter, “Aligning Incentives to Combat 

Terror,” in Rohan Gunaratna, ed., Combating Terrorism (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005). 

24
terrorist organization.83 Ultimately, it may not be politically viable for some state leaders 

to move from T* to T0 as depicted below given the internal demands and aggregated 

interests of their constituents (See Figure 3). In such states, the optimal level of terrorism

from the government’s perspective is greater than zero. 

T0 T* Terrorist 

Activity

Utility Assumed

Real

Figure 3 

Disaggregating the state to its institutional components helps reveal factors that 

could modify a state’s commitment to “finishing the task” of defeating the terrorist threat 

within its borders. Consider the institutional interests and biases of a state’s military, 

particularly in states like Kenya that have serious internal security threats and where the 

military is employed to maintain order. The military may secure a larger portion of the 

central government’s expenditures, maintain higher force levels, and enjoy greater 

institutional prestige and autonomy if an internal threat such as terrorism exists. Thus 

members of organizations responsible for maintaining internal security may prefer a level 

of terror T* to no terror at all.

When the actual level of terror is greater than the ideal level for a given state or 

key institutions within the state (TActual > T*), external assistance to combat terrorism can 

complement and empower the state’s efforts to reduce terror. While the assistance for 

combating terror may not be used as efficiently as the provider desires, the target state 

does have the incentive to implement strategies to reduce the overall level of terrorism to 

its ideal point T*. 

 

 

83 Consider for example the Indonesian government’s tepid response to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and their 

less-than-aggressive pursuit of Abu Bakar Bashir, the former emir of Jemaah Islamiyah who was released

from prison in June 2006 after serving a reduced sentence for his role in inspiring the 2002 Bali bombings. 

25
The challenge for effective strategies to combat terror from an external state’s 

perspective arises when the actual level of terror approaches a given state’s ideal level of 

terrorism. This shift in incentive compatibility is depicted at Figure 4.

 

T0 T* Terrorist

Activity

Utility Ideal

Real

TActual

External Assistance Complements

State Incentives to Combat Terror

Resistance to

External Efforts

Figure 4 

When the actual terrorist presence or level of activity in a state ( TActual ) is

reduced to a point close to T*, a rational state leader or influential stakeholder within the 

government will resist efforts to reduce the level of terror beyond T*. Reductions beyond 

this point may be in the interests of the aid provider but not the target state. Strategies

intended to reduce terror further must anticipate the fact that leaders and key institutions 

may reach a point where they face negative returns from continued cooperation. 

The dynamic described in Figure 4 confronts bilateral cooperation efforts in a 

variety of other circumstances beyond combating terror. For example, U.S. initiatives to 

assist and cooperate with other states to interdict threats from drugs, transnational crime, 

and insurgency also meet resistance when the incentives to cooperate diverge. 

Since 9/11, divergent incentives between provider and recipient states have 

become an obstacle to combating terrorism. The United States-led Global War on Terror 

initiated a huge increase in foreign aid disbursed to states cooperating in efforts to defeat 

terrorist threats. Table 1 depicts some of the largest increases in foreign appropriations 

from the beginning of U.S. operations through the end of 2003. Clearly many countries 

have received a significant windfall from U.S. aid provided to support this effort. 

26
Table 1: Foreign Appropriations (in millions) 

Country 

2001 

(Pre 9/11) 

Post 9/11 

-2003 Real Increase

Pakistan $3.50 $1,293.50 $1,290.00 

Colombia $4.67 $573.18 $568.51 

Uzbekistan $28.10 $171.10 $143.00 

Georgia $4.98 $116.30 $111.32 

Philippines $7.40 $82.90 $75.50 

Tajikistan $16.70 $70.40 $53.70 

Kyrgystan $35.30 $87.80 $52.50 

Yemen $5.30 $38.60 $33.30 

Nepal $0.20 $29.50 $29.30 

Indonesia $49.90 $76.90 $27.00 

Turkmenistan $7.30 $19.20 $11.90 

Djibouti $0.60 $6.40 $5.80 

Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project.

84

This windfall has in turn created a set of perverse incentives for states with a 

terrorist presence.85 Consider two states, a recipient and a donor. The donor state 

conditions its assistance on the level of terror observed in or projected from the recipient 

state. The donor state provides more assistance to states experiencing greater terrorist 

threats. Knowing it will get more aid in the future if it does not fully eradicate the 

terrorist threat, the recipient state has strong incentives to maintain some level of 

terrorism. This dynamic played out in the Philippines where local government officials 

profited from various terrorist activities by the Communist Terrorist Movement and later 

the Abu Sayyaf Group. Incentives to tolerate—in some cases even promote—a certain 

level of terrorism at local levels challenges efforts by the central government to combat 

the threat.86

 84 Pre-9/11 figures reflect all sources of aid appropriated by the Foreign Operations and Appropriations Act 

for the year 2001. Post 9/11 figures include two supplemental appropriations acts passed in late 2001 and in

2002 as well as the aid included in the 2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. Some aid was given to

states to interdict terrorists with links to al-Qa’ida within their borders, e.g. Georgia, Philippines, and 

Yemen, while other states were cooperating with the U.S. in its operations in Afghanistan as part of 

Operation Enduring Freedom. In cases such as Colombia, special aid to interdict narco-terrorists was 

provided. This table was adapted from data compiled by Tamar Gabelnick and Matt Schroeder of the 

Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project and published in the January/February

2003 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 85 For a game-theoretic analysis of this problem see Felter, “Aligning incentives.” 86 This agency problem between the Philippine central government and local officials stemmed from how 

resources were allocated by the central government to address terrorist challenges. Resources were 

committed based on the presence and level of terrorist activities in a certain area. This created perverse 

incentives to promote/signal a level of terrorist activity that could capture government rents conditioned on

such activities. The increase in external assistance provided by the United States following 9/11 made this 

particularly problematic as good governance at local levels was in a sense being punished while the

27
The conditions for states to prefer a non-zero level of terrorism are likely to occur 

in states like Kenya where terrorism ranks low on the list of internal security problems, 

where the state faces no significant external threat, and where the presence of terrorism

leads to large aid flows. In such states, providing economic and security assistance to 

combat terrorism based on the presence of terrorists, or the severity of its threat, actually 

risks increasing the expected future level of terror in that target state. Aid conditioned on 

level of terror provides a perverse incentive to tolerate more terror with the expectation of

receiving even greater aid in the future. Conditioning foreign aid on the amount of 

measurable effort a state makes to combat terror, however, provides states the incentives 

to actively reduce their terrorist threats. Ultimately, states interested in combating 

terrorism are better off not providing any additional foreign aid to a state than they are 

disbursing aid based on the target state’s level of terrorism or terrorist activity. 

Successful counterterrorism assistance to weak states requires creating incentives 

that promote effective internally generated and sustainable counterterrorism measures. To 

do this, cooperative bilateral and multilateral efforts to help weak states must be based on 

how hard states try to fight terrorism. Basing such efforts on the threat of terrorism

creates perverse incentives that may lead local officials to prefer low levels of terrorism

to no terrorism at all. 

 opposite was rewarded. See Joseph H. Felter, “Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: A Case for Empirical Study 

of Counterinsurgency” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2005).

28
 

3. Case Study: Somalia 

I. Introduction: The Somali Context 

An essential point of departure for understanding current manifestations of radical 

Islamism and jihadi violence in Somalia is an examination of the historical, cultural, 

environmental, and social context of the country. This section explores key aspects of this 

Somali context. The core thesis is that the Somali context has generally tended to inhibit 

and constrain the rise of radical Islamism (specifically, Salafi Islam) in both its nonviolent and jihadi manifestations. Specifically, the practice of Sufi Islam and its deep 

integration into Somali culture; the enduring salience of clannism; and Somalia’s 

pragmatic political culture have all inoculated Somali society to some degree from

radicalism. Conversely, several newer features of the Somali context, including the 

diasporization of Somali society, rapid urbanization, and fifteen years of war and state 

collapse, have eroded some of these inhibitors to radicalism.

Sufi Islam. Traditionally, the practice of Islam in Somalia has been described as 

moderate–a “veil lightly worn.” Islam was and remains integrated into local customs. 

The strict, conservative Wahhabist practice of Islam in neighboring Gulf States was 

largely unknown in Somalia and considered foreign to Somali culture. 

Sufi brotherhoods are the oldest and most widespread Islamic organizations in 

Somalia, and also cut across clan affiliations. These religious orders are moderate and 

embrace peaceful co-existence with secular political authorities. The Qadiriya, Salihiya, 

and Ahmadiya sects–found worldwide–are the most influential in Somalia today. Of 

these, only the Salihiya sect is distinguished by its involvement in modern politics – it 

was the sect of Said Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, the “Mad Mullah,” who waged a twenty 

year war of resistance against British and Italian colonial rule in northern Somalia. It is 

noteworthy that the two times in Somali history when Islamic identity was successfully

mobilized for jihad were both anti-foreign, anti-Christian liberation movements–one, that 

of Said’s anti-colonial resistance and the other a 16th-century jihad against Abyssinian 

conquest led by Imam Ahmed Gurey. 

Clannism. Somalia is a lineage-based society, where virtually all members of society are 

identified in part by their clan family. Somali clannism is fluid, complex, and frequently 

misunderstood. At the risk of oversimplification, one can make the case that clannism–

especially since the collapse of the state in 1991–forms the basis for most of the core 

social institutions and norms of traditional Somali society, including personal identity, 

rights of access to local resources, customary law (xeer), blood payment (diya) groups, 

and social support systems. Islamic identity is one of several “horizontal identities” that 

cut across clan lines, but in a manner which tends to be subordinate to or which 

complements rather than challenges the primacy of clannism. Religious leaders are often 

quite influential, but their authority is generally limited to their own clan. Beyond their 

clan, their role shifts to that of ambassador or negotiator representing their clan’s 

interests. Likewise, sharia law has historically never been a primary source of law, but 

aspects of sharia were assimilated within xeer, the indigenous Somali justice system. 

 29
 

Somali sheikhs and religious leaders have traditionally controlled limited judicial 

functions–typically “family law,” including divorce and inheritance disputes; respected 

sheikhs are also called upon as arbitrators or peacemakers (nabadoon). Despite the 

ascendance of a political Islamic movement in contemporary Somalia, clannism remains 

the dominant political logic within which Islamists and sharia courts are generally 

constrained. Because clan is the principal source of individual and household security, it 

tends to be especially mobilized in a context of state collapse, lawlessness, and chronic 

insecurity. This works against trans-clan movements like political Islam. 

Pastoralism. Historically, most of the Somali population was pastoral or semi-pastoral. 

Though Somalia has in the past four decades experienced rapid urbanization, an 

estimated 50-60% of the population is pastoral or agro-pastoral. Pastoral populations are 

typically difficult to organize politically, for obvious reasons. This constitutes a 

constraint on Islamist movements seeking to mobilize communities. Pastoral mobility is 

an additional constraint on any movement seeking to establish a secret base–nomads are 

quick to learn of movements of strangers on their territory, and will contest any presence 

they deem contrary to their interests. An important part of Somali pastoral culture is also 

information sharing–what some have termed the “bush radio.” News and rumors are 

rapidly spread by word of mouth, making it difficult for both Somalis and foreigners to 

maintain secrecy. 

Cultural pride/suspicion of outsiders. Perhaps more than most societies, Somalis tend to 

be suspicious of the motives of foreigners and quick to take offense at perceived 

imposition of foreign values. This can manifest itself in a fierce sense of national pride, 

as well as in a tendency towards xenophobia. This has historically served to insulate 

Somali Islam from Salafi influences, which are viewed by Somalis as “non-Somali,” 

Saudi Wahhabism. 

Pragmatism. For a variety of reasons, Somali political culture is exceptionally pragmatic. 

Some observers link this to the physical environment itself, a harsh semi-arid 

environment which leaves little margin for error for pastoralists hoping to survive the dry 

season. Somalis have been especially expedient with foreign ideologies, adopting them 

when beneficial and discarding them the moment they become a liability. Related to this 

is a culture of negotiation that permeates Somali society and encourages Somalis to 

recalculate their bargaining position in partnerships on a daily basis. This aspect of

Somali political culture provides little traction for movements based on sustained 

commitment to an abstract cause. 

Diasporization of Somali society. More recent changes in the Somali context–especially 

since 1990–are making Somali society somewhat more susceptible to radical Islam. The 

first is the transformation of Somalia into a diasporic nation. Beginning in the 1970s, 

growing numbers of Somalis traveled to the Gulf States or Egypt as migrant laborers or 

students, where they were exposed to Salafi teachings of Islam. Many of the leaders of 

Somalia’s multiple Islamist groups share this background. Since the onset of Somalia’s 

civil wars in the late 1980s, over one million of the country’s 8-9 million people fled as 

refugees, settling in Europe, North America, and in countries in Africa and the Middle 

East. The diaspora today plays a powerful and complex role in Somalia’s economy and 

its political life. Remittances total up to one billion dollars annually, keeping the 

 30
 

economy afloat. Many if not most of the key leaders in secular political groupings, 

Islamist movements and civil society organizations are diaspora members. Some of the 

hardline Somali Islamists are diaspora members as well. Islamists have successfully 

recruited young Somali diaspora members to return to Somalia to join jihadi militias. 

Urbanization. Though Somalia remains a mainly rural society, with about 60% of the 

population engaged in pastoral, agro-pastoral or farming activities, Somalia’s urban 

centers have exploded in growth over the past twenty years. Mogadishu, which was home

to only 40,000 inhabitants in the 1940s, is now a city of over one million. Hargeisa, 

capital of the secessionist state of Somaliland in the north, is the fastest growing large

city in Somalia and is expected to reach one million people in coming years. Several 

small cities–including Bosaso, Galkayo, and Burao–have also seen dramatic growth since 

the outbreak of war in 1991. Each new humanitarian crisis and war in Somalia produces 

another wave of displaced rural dwellers into towns and cities; most do not return to rural 

life. For a variety of reasons, settled urban populations are easier to reach for Islamist 

movements, making this growing portion of the Somali population more susceptible to 

recruitment. 

II. The Context of State Collapse 

Somalia has been without a functional central government since January 1991, making it 

the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in post-colonial history. This 

unique context of state collapse has been an important factor in the evolution of both nonviolent and jihadi Islamic movements in the country. 

Over a dozen national peace conferences have been launched unsuccessfully over 

a fourteen year period, including the sustained efforts of a large UN peacekeeping 

mission in 1993-95 (UNOSOM). The latest reconciliation effort produced the 

Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was declared in October 2004. At 

present, the TFG’s prospects do not look good. But even in a best-case scenario, the TFG 

will possess only modest and loose control over the country. For the next several years, 

Somalia will remain a de facto collapsed state. 

Governance without Government. Contrary to much of what is written in the popular 

press, the prolonged collapse of central government has not led to complete anarchy. 

Important changes have occurred since the early 1990s in the nature of armed conflict, 

governance and lawlessness, rendering the country less anarchic than before. 

Contemporary Somalia is without government but not without governance. Armed 

conflict is now more localized, less lethal, and of much shorter duration. Criminality, 

though still a serious problem, is much better contained than in the early 1990s, when 

egregious crimes could be committed with impunity. A variety of local forms of 

governance have emerged to provide Somali communities with at least minimal levels of 

public order. Informal rule of law has emerged via local sharia courts, neighborhood 

watch groups, the reassertion of customary law and blood compensation payments and 

the robust growth of private security forces protecting business assets. More formal 

administrative structures have been established at the municipal, regional and transregional levels as well. Somaliland in the north is by far the most developed of these 

polities, and has made important gains since the late 1990s in consolidating rule of law, 

 31
 

multi-party democracy, functional ministries and public security. Other sub-state 

administrations have tended to be vulnerable to spoilers and internal division or have had 

only a weak capacity to project authority and deliver core services. Collectively, these 

informal and formal systems of governance fall well short of delivering the basic public 

security and services expected of a central government, but they provide a certain level of 

predictability and security to local communities. 

Interests and State Collapse. This phenomenon of “governance without government” has 

been driven by gradual shifts in the interests of key local actors and in the manner in 

which they seek to protect and advance those interests. The general trend is toward 

greater interests in improved security, rule of law and predictability. This shift in interests 

can be traced to the inadvertent impact of the UNOSOM presence in Mogadishu in 1993-

1994. Though the intervention itself was a failure, the large UN operation poured an 

enormous amount of money, employment and contract opportunities into the country, 

which helped to stimulate and strengthen legitimate business, shifting business activities 

away from a war economy toward construction, telecommunications, trade and services. 

In the process, it helped to reshape local interests in security and rule of law, and 

eventually local power relations as well. It also helped give rise to a business community 

in Mogadishu which by 1999 broke free of local warlords and bought militiamen out 

from beneath them. The result is that today the businessmen’s private security forces are 

the largest and best-armed militias in the city, and warlords, though still potential 

spoilers, are not nearly as powerful as before. 

The evolving interest in rule of law and predictability is not only an agenda

increasingly embraced by businessmen. It is also actively promoted by neighborhood 

groups, who have formed local security watch groups to patrol their streets. These groups 

consist of professionals, especially in education and health sectors, who are at the 

forefront of Somalia’s nascent “civil society;” clan elders, who are seeking to recoup 

their traditional role as peacemakers; and even many militiamen, who over time prefer 

the stability of a paid job in a private security force to the dangers of banditry. In many 

instances these changes constitute potential opportunities for reconciliation and statebuilding. 

It is important to recognize, though, that some Somali constituencies which have a 

growing appreciation for improved public security are not necessarily strong advocates of 

a return to centralized government. A revived central state poses a potential threat–to

impose taxes, restrict or regulate certain types of economic activities, and potentially turn 

into an instrument of predation and dominance that empowered clans and groups will 

wield at the expense of their rivals. The collective Somali experience of the central state 

has not been a positive one and tends to produce “zero-sum” thinking about a revived 

state. This tends to multiply the number of spoilers when peace talks reach discussions of

power-sharing. 

The rise of non-state actors as essential components of informal governance and 

security systems in Somalia has posed a challenge to external organizations accustomed 

to dealing only with state counterparts. Over the past fifteen years, most development 

agencies have learned to adapt to this unusual operating environment by creating 

Memoranda of Understanding with whatever local authorities they encounter on the 

 32
 

ground. These MOUs range from agreements or provision of security to international aid 

workers to procedures for hiring and allocation of contracts. The UN Department of 

Safety and Security (UNDSS) oversees MOUs with local authorities and militias on 

security matters; and neighboring states Ethiopia and Kenya routinely conduct diplomacy 

with clan leaders in border areas to manage cross-border security issues. These 

relationships are fragile and if mishandled can compromise local counterparts. The ability 

of external actors to partner with local non-state actors remains a challenge and a work in 

progress. 

Both progressive and hard-line Islamic movements have benefited from the 

prolonged collapse of the central state in Somalia. The complete collapse of government 

social services, for instance, has provided Islamic charities the opportunity to become the 

primary provider of education and health care services. The absence of a formal judiciary 

has enabled local sharia courts to step into the vacuum at the neighborhood level. For the 

most part, these social service providers and local sharia courts were and are not radical. 

Most sharia courts are controlled by clan elders and businessmen and operated by 

traditional Sufi clerics, while most of the Islamic social services are associated with more 

progressive Islamists. 

However, hardline Islamists have also exploited the prolonged collapse of the 

state in Somalia. As discussed below, hardline Somali Islamists were able to capture 

control of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in 2006 and drive that umbrella movement 

into increasingly radical and ultimately self-destructive policies. These Islamists also 

forged links to foreign al-Qa’ida affiliates in the 1990s and later provided several terror 

suspects safe haven in Somalia. Hardline Islamists in Somalia were very successful at 

exploiting two commodities which Somali communities desperately craved after fifteen 

years of civil war and state collapse–a sense of public security and a sense of unity. By 

providing impressive levels of public order and policing in Mogadishu, and by appealing 

to a common identity as Somali Muslims rather than clans, the CIC attracted a 

considerable amount of public support from Somalis at home and abroad. They solidified 

this public support still further by tapping into strong anti-Ethiopian sentiments. By 

declaring jihad on Ethiopia, they successfully conflated Somali nationalism, antiEthiopianism and Islamism, mobilizing support from a broad range of Somali society,

even those who were uncomfortable with some aspects of their Islamist agenda. 

The balance of power between “moderates” and “hardliners” among Somali 

Islamists has been in a constant state of flux and is shaped principally by a combination 

of access to resources, coercive capacity to intimidate and the broader political context. 

Generally, situations marked by heightened external threats play to the interests of

hardliners, while conditions favoring negotiations, compromise and normalization play 

into the hands of moderates. Not surprisingly, Islamist hardliners have sought to 

manufacture conditions of jihad with Ethiopia as a means of consolidating power and 

marginalizing moderate rivals. 

State collapse and terrorist safe havens. It is often claimed that zones of complete state 

collapse are ideal safe havens for al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups. The case of 

Somalia suggests a more complex relationship between “ungoverned space” and terrorist 

activity. Recent research reviewing empirical evidence of Islamic terrorist activity in the 

 33
 

Horn of Africa demonstrates that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in the Horn have found 

Kenya a much more conducive country from which to operate than state-less Somalia. 

Somalia, it is argued, plays a niche role for terrorists–mainly as a transshipment point for 

men, money and materiel into east Africa, and in a small number of cases as a safe haven 

for al-Qa’ida operatives fleeing from the law in Kenya. But Somalia’s condition of 

lawlessness and complete state collapse produces constraints and dangers for terrorist 

cells just as it creates what aid agencies refer to obliquely as a “non-permissive 

environment.” Foreign terror suspects operating in Somalia are prone to extortion and 

betrayal; can get caught up in clan conflicts; are easily visible in a context of few foreign 

visitors; and face difficulties of communication, transportation, disease and access to 

clean water. The Harmony documents provide an excellent opportunity to test these 

claims in the existing literature. 

III. Islamic Radicalism and al-Qa’ida Activity in Somalia since 1990

Political Islam in Somalia–that is, any movement expressing overt political objectives

organized around the identity and principals of Islam–has been through two full cycles of 

ascendance and collapse since 1990. This section provides a brief overview of the main 

trends driving the rise and fall of radical Somali Islamic movements and related al-Qa’ida 

activities. More detailed studies of Somali Islamists and foreign al-Qa’ida activities are 

available in published studies such as the excellent series of reports put out by the 

International Crisis Group. 

Two points must be made at the outset. First, most manifestations of Islamist 

revival in Somalia cannot be considered radical. The al-Islah Salafi movement, for 

instance, is generally considered to be a progressive and relatively moderate movement, 

despite efforts by critics to tar it with the same brush as al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI). 

Others, such as Tabliq, are missionary movements promoting rigid and strict adherence to 

Salafi interpretations of Islam but are focused on social, not political transformation. 

Graduates from Tabliq madrassas are nonetheless much more inclined to embrace radical 

and even jihadi agendas, making the distinction between “non-political” and “political” 

Islam difficult; equally problematic is drawing a meaningful distinction between 

“moderates,” “radicals,” and “jihadis.” 

Second, the dozens of Somali Islamist movements which sprang up in the late 

1980s and early 1990s emerged independently of al-Qa’ida support. Al-Qa’ida began 

expanding cooperation with AIAI only after the group had already been engaged in 

several losing battles in the Somali civil war and after one branch of AIAI established 

control over the district of Lu’uq near the Ethiopian border. Most of the top leadership of

AIAI had served as heads of precursor Islamist organizations as far back as the early 

1980s.1

 AIAI was, in sum, a relatively established, independent organization and one 

with a leadership complex that was set in place. Non-Somali al-Qa’ida operatives were 

not therefore in a position to dictate terms to AIAI, and had only marginal influence over 

the national leadership. There were multiple tensions within AIAI–vertical tensions 

 

1

 International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report No. 100 (Nairobi and Brussels:

International Crisis Group, 2005), 3. Available at 

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3830&l=1. 

 34
 

involving disputes between top leaders and field commanders, and horizontal fissures that 

tended to manifest themselves along clan fault lines. The vertical tensions produced a 

context in which the problem of “agency” existed on multiple tiers. While al-Qa’ida 

sought to shape and direct AIAI activities in Somalia, it confronted internal AIAI 

problems of agency pitting Islamist leadership against local jihadi commanders. 

The First Wave: 1990-1992.

The dozens of small Islamist movements which arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s 

coalesced into the AIAI movement. The Islamist movement briefly enjoyed rapid growth 

and strong support from cadres across clan lines in 1991, at one point boasting over a 

thousand men under arms and control of key seaports at Merka and Kismayo. The 

movement nearly took control of the northern seaport of Bosaso as well, but a 

combination of poor command and control, inexperience and clan divisions helped to 

produce serious setbacks which convinced most of the members that Somalia was not 

ready for an Islamic state and that da’wa, or preaching and proselytizing, was needed 

rather than jihad. 

In the period from April 1991 to mid-1992, AIAI suffered two major setbacks. 

First, in April 1991, mainly Darood clan AIAI fighters fought a losing battle north of 

Kismayo against the forces of General Mohamed Farah Aideed. The Islamist fighters 

were convinced to protect the city by their clan elders, who duplicitously promised to set 

up an Islamic emirate in Kismayo in return for AIAI’s protection. At the time, senior 

AIAI leaders urged the fighters to fall back from the Jubba Valley to avoid a calamity, 

but the AIAI youth were intent on fighting and refused the more cautious council of the 

leadership.2

 This was the first of what would become a series of differences in opinion 

between the more cautious national leadership of AIAI and militant commanders in the 

field. In the aftermath, AIAI restructured decision-making in an attempt to concentrate 

power in the hands of senior figures. 

The second setback for AIAI occurred in Bosaso, Puntland, in 1992. There, the 

AIAI (including many fighters returning from Kismayo) settled and created what one 

analysis describes as a state within a state in Northeast Somalia, taking over control of

seaport revenues.3

 AIAI briefly took control of all main towns in the region and declared 

an Islamic administration, but the dominant Mijerteen clan in the Northeast assembled a 

militia which routed the Islamists. An estimated 600 died and the rest fled into the remote 

coastal settlement of Los Qorey in Somaliland. Thereafter the main unit of AIAI 

gradually dispersed back into their own communities. With the exception of two branches 

of AIAI–the mainly Marehan clan unit that controlled the town of Lu’uq, and the mainly 

Ogaden clan movement based in Ethiopia–the rest of AIAI dissolved itself, becoming 

what some analysts refer to as an “alumni network.” 

 

2

 Ibid., 5. 3

 Ibid., 6. 

 35
 

Ebb Tide: 1992-2000. 

Following the dissolution of AIAI in Los Qorey, the movement continued to operate as a 

discrete organization in two areas–Lu’uq, a stronghold dominated by Islamists mainly 

from the Marehan clan in the Somali region, and Ethiopia, where mainly Ogaden clan 

members of AIAI operated. Terrorist attacks against government and civilian targets by 

the Ethiopian branch of the AIAI in 1995 produced an Ethiopian crackdown on Islamists 

in the Somali region and also resulted in Ethiopian military attacks on Lu’uq, which was 

believed by the Ethiopians to have provided logistical support for the Ethiopian-based 

AIAI. Islamists fled Lu’uq and dispersed back to their own communities. AIAI was 

described at this point as a “spent force” in Somalia. 

Though this appeared to be a low water mark for Islamism in Somalia, it was 

actually an important period of rebuilding and regrouping. Ex-AIAI members established 

themselves in business networks, in education, the media and the judiciary, building a 

base which would later prove critical to the new Islamist movement. An impressive 

network of Islamic schools, hospitals and charities sprang up, especially in Mogadishu. 

Locally, communities began to establish neighborhood, clan-based sharia courts to 

provide for themselves a modicum of rule of law. These sharia courts were not radical–

they were funded by businesses, overseen by clan elders, and operated by traditional 

clerics. But they would later be used as a base for more politically minded Islamists. By

2000, political Islamism in Mogadishu was clearly an ascendant force. But the particular 

manifestation of political Islam that would emerge–progressive, moderate Islamism or 

radical jihadi Islam–was not a foregone conclusion. 

The Second Wave: 2000-2006. 

Since 2000, Islamist leaders with clear national ambitions–including Hassan Dahir 

Aweys–have resurfaced and used a succession of Islamic court umbrella movements as a 

platform to advance their national political aspirations. This period of recent Islamic 

ascendance is well-known and extensively documented and need not be repeated here.4

What is important to stress is that the umbrella movement of sharia courts (which 

eventually became known as the Council of Islamic Courts, or CIC) developed its own

financial support from local businesses and contributions from abroad; developed the 

most powerful, committed and well-trained militia in the country; attracted support from

across a range of different clans; and at a fairly early stage struggled with an internal split 

between moderates and hard-liners, including a jihadi militia unit known as the shabaab

which conducted a dirty war of political assassinations in Mogadishu from 2004 to 2006. 

The jihadis within the movement were also responsible for providing safe haven to a 

small number of foreign al-Qa’ida figures wanted for the 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. 

Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. 

It was the CIC which decisively defeated the U.S.-backed Alliance for the 

Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism in June 2006, expanding its control over all 

of Mogadishu and most of south-central Somalia. Over the second half of 2006, the CIC 

veered increasingly into more radical social and foreign policies, including declarations 

 

4

 See the series of International Crisis Group reports since 2002. 

 36
 

of jihad on neighboring Ethiopia. By fall of 2006, war between Ethiopia and the Courts 

was viewed as likely if not inevitable. The fear was that war was exactly what the jihadis 

wanted, and that they would use a protracted urban guerilla war against Ethiopia to 

generate backing from throughout the Islamic world. 

Ebb Tide or Tsunami? 2007 and Beyond. 

The war did take place, but not as most expected. Ethiopia’s decisive rout of the CIC 

forces in initial battles, and the subsequent decision to dissolve the CIC and return militia 

and weapons back to clan elders in Mogadishu, precipitated a dramatic and sudden 

collapse of what had appeared to be a robust and politically ascendant Islamist 

movement. For the third time in fifteen years (1991-92 in Kismayo and Bosaso, in 1996 

in Lu’uq, and in 2006 in Mogadishu) an Islamist movement in Somalia appeared to make 

fatally poor tactical choices, producing military defeats that exposed the thinness of their 

public support. If past trends are to hold, we can expect the Islamists to disperse, focus 

again on da’wa and building business and social networks within their communities, and 

wait before attempting another political or jihadi initiative. But at least some indicators 

suggest that this time the loss at the hands of the Ethiopians could produce a quick 

resurgence of radicalized jihadi violence in Somalia. 

IV. Assessment of Harmony Documents on Somalia

Somalia is a prominent topic in the translated documents, comprising several hundred 

pages of transcripts, released for this report. All but one of these documents is sourced to 

al-Qa’ida operatives.5

 All but two documents are dated, or appear to have been written,

between 1991 through 1995. This was a period of enormous upheaval in Somalia, and 

included the following events: 

• a prolonged crisis of state collapse, civil war, and famine (January 1991-

December 1992); 

• the U.S.-led UNITAF humanitarian intervention (December 1992-May 1993); 

• the handover to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the protracted 

armed clashes pitting the UN and U.S. forces against the militia of General 

Mohamed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu, culminating in the “Black Hawk Down” 

battle of October 3-4, 1993 (June-October 1993). 

• the subsequent period of failed UNOSOM efforts to broker a deal to revive a 

Somali state, ending with the UNOSOM withdrawal (October 1993-March 1995). 

This was also a period when al-Qa’ida was first attempting to forge cooperative 

relations with Somali Islamists, establish training camps in Somalia and the Ogaden 

region of Ethiopia (known today as the “Somali region”), develop cells and a regional 

base of operations in Kenya and, upon the announcement of a U.S.-led humanitarian 

 

5

 The exception is a secret letter from the Intelligence Service of the Iraqi Embassy in Djibouti to the 

Director-office of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, regarding radical Islamist activities in Djibouti and

Somaliland, October 2001. Harmony, ISGQ-2005-00024493. 

 37
 

intervention in Somalia in late November 1992, target U.S. and UN forces in Somalia. 

Most of the Somalia documents in the Harmony project thus reflect the concerns and 

preoccupations of al-Qa’ida at a very particular moment in the group’s recent history in 

Somalia, a period defined by preliminary assessments, initial forays and, not surprisingly 

given the operational challenges that Somalia posed to all outsiders, initial mistakes. 

An important backdrop to the Somalia Harmony documents of 1991-1994 is the 

relocation of Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan to Sudan in 1992, and the rise of Sudan 

as a major terrorist safe haven throughout the early to mid 1990s. Al-Qa’ida’s increased 

penetration of East Africa, and its preoccupation with derailing the U.S. and UN 

intervention in Somalia, is in part a function of al-Qa’ida’s physical presence in Sudan at 

the time. 

Appropriate caution must be used in reaching unqualified conclusions about alQa’ida and Somali Islamists on the basis of this collection. First, the documents 

themselves are often fragmentary, due to damage or illegible handwriting. Second, they 

constitute only a small portion of the correspondence al-Qa’ida operatives certainly 

produced during this period. Third, some of the reports appear to make questionable 

claims of responsibility for events that al-Qa’ida may not have had a hand; in the 

potential for self-promotion and inflated claims in these communications must be 

considered.6

 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, at least some of the al-Qa’ida figures 

who produced these reports were new to the region, resulting in reports that are often 

simply mistaken about everything from basic Somali geography and clans to explanations 

of Somali politics. 

That said, much can be gleaned from these documents, which are a treasure trove 

of invaluable evidence of al-Qa’ida’s involvement in and perceptions of Somalia. They 

are equally valuable as glimpses into the internal debates and power struggles of the 

Somali Islamists themselves. Much of the documentation from this collection serves to 

reinforce widely held views about the nature of Islamic radicalism in Somalia; in some

cases the documents challenge conventional wisdom. 

In this section, observations about what the Somali Harmony documents tell us 

are broken down by topic. 

Objectives of al-Qa’ida in Somalia. 

The initial objective of al-Qa’ida, as it made preliminary contacts with Somali Islamists, 

was to explore an alternative base of operations to Afghanistan. Presumably the 

arrangement struck with the government of Sudan in 1992 reduced the urgency of this 

objective. Thereafter, the primary mission appears to be to promote recruitment and 

establish training bases in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and inside Somalia in support of 

the Somali “mujahideen.” Expeditions and training exercises are conducted in the Somali 

region of Ethiopia; exploratory missions are sent to Ras Kamboni along the southernmost 

 

6

 Such claims present leaders with a real problem. They cannot observe whether their operatives in Somalia 

are working hard to make alliances with problematic clan leaders or not. This may be one reason al-Qaida

leaders required extensive reporting despite the obvious security risks this entailed.

 38
 

Somali coast; and frequent flights to Lu’uq, the town held by AIAI from 1991 to 1996, 

are made for meetings with AIAI leadership.7

 

That the period of 1991-93 constituted an early, exploratory phase for al-Qa’ida in 

Somalia is clear from documents discussing the initial establishment of an operational 

base in Kenya and from the very rudimentary, often glaringly inaccurate knowledge that 

the al-Qa’ida operatives have of Somalia (discussed below). 

The wildcard that transforms al-Qa’ida objectives in Somalia is, of course, the 

sudden announcement of the U.S.-led humanitarian intervention into Somalia in 

December 1992. Thereafter, the abiding preoccupation expressed in the documents is the 

need to attack and derail the U.S./UN mission. On this count the Harmony documents 

confirm existing evidence from the USA vs. Usama bin Laden et al. trial, in which alQa’ida views the intervention in Somalia as a first step by the U.S. toward Sudan. In this 

sense, Somalia is a subsidiary priority for al-Qa’ida–the main objective is to thwart a 

dangerous precedent of American armed intervention in the Horn which could endanger 

al-Qa’ida’s base in Sudan. Ironically, Somalia was a subsidiary priority for the United 

States as well, which intervened in Somalia, according to then Acting Secretary of State 

Larry Eagleburger, “because it wasn’t Bosnia”–in other words, to set a precedent for 

robust UN peace enforcement in a place where it appeared doable. 

The fact that al-Qa’ida had established working relations with Somali Islamists in 

1991 and 1992, and earned at least a modest working knowledge of the country during 

that time, is recognized by al-Qa’ida operatives as a major advantage once the U.S. 

“Operation Restore Hope” forces arrived. “Your early arrival on Somali soil ahead of the 

enemy America gave you an excellent opportunity to gain knowledge of the battleground 

... and understand ... the social and political situation,” notes the author of “The Third 

Letter to the African Corps.”8

The longer-term objectives of al-Qa’ida in Somalia appear to get lost once the 

American and UN presence is established there, at which point the sole preoccupation of 

the movement becomes striking at the enemy. The longer-term dispensation of Somalia is 

not given much attention, to the chagrin of one al-Qa’ida observer writing in 1995: 

The West was defeated and fled Somalia.... [But] the original problem that you 

went to address still exists. What happened to the Somali Salafia and where is it 

now...? Did you suddenly go to Somalia and suddenly withdraw, as happened in 

Afghanistan, without accomplishing any clear objective or follow up the victory 

and benefit from it to accomplish additional victories?

9

 

Agency Problems. 

One of the most fascinating findings emerging from review of the Harmony Somalia 

documents is the tensions within the triangular relationships involving the foreign alQa’ida operatives, the national-level AIAI leadership and the local Islamist commanders. 

 

7 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104; Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597; Harmony, AFGP-2002-600113. 8

 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 13. 9

 Ibid., 14. 

 39
 

The tensions in these relations, which occasionally express themselves in incentives in

some of the documents, arise from problems of agency. 

The first sign of a power struggle between AIAI leadership and militant field 

commanders occurred in 1991 outside of Kismayo where, as was noted above, AIAI 

senior officials argued in vain for a withdrawal. Following the crushing defeat of AIAI in 

Bosaso in 1992, national leadership of AIAI no longer sought to hold territory and no 

longer saw jihad as an appropriate tactic. AIAI’s top leaders believed instead that 

Somalia was unprepared for an Islamic state and required da’wa, or preaching, first. This 

position reflected the fact that AIAI leadership itself had concluded that the contextual 

factors noted in the first section of this chapter were indeed real constraints on political 

Islam and required a generational project of resocializing and preparing Somali society. 

This long-term and more incremental vision clashed with the desires of the more militant 

field commanders, especially those in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The Harmony 

documents capture this tension repeatedly. 

In one of the best-developed examples, an al-Qa’ida operative, Saif al-Islam, is 

providing training to a unit of Ethiopian Somali Islamists in a remote camp in Somali 

region in July 1993. After first dealing with his own problems of “agency’ (his al-Qa’ida 

superior repeatedly postpones committing to assistance to the Somali Ethiopian cell, and 

drags his feet on bestowing upon Saif the right to represent al-Qa’ida in discussions with 

AIAI), Saif must manage an emerging split between the more militant Ethiopian wing

and their AIAI leaders in Somalia proper. The Ethiopian AIAI wing issues a decree 

which commits them to continued jihad against the government of Ethiopia, and which 

decides to separate from the General Islamic Union in Somalia (AIAI) due to its decision 

“to abandon jihad for the pursuit of peaceful solutions.” The Ethiopia wing also confided 

to Saif that AIAI leadership “was angry with us when we contacted you in Sudan.”10 

What emerges from the collection of Harmony project documents is a tense 

triangular relationship in which the foreign al-Qa’ida operatives and the militant field 

commanders tend to share a common set of interests and perspectives in opposition to the 

AIAI leadership, which is perceived as too cautious and political. The position of the 

AIAI leadership accurately reflects the Somali penchant for pragmatism and risk aversion 

described earlier in this chapter. 

Problems of Preference Divergence.

Al-Qa’ida operatives clearly desire jihadi attacks against the “enemy” (the U.S./UN in 

Somalia, Ethiopian forces in Ethiopia). Those high-risk preferences based on a global 

agenda diverge from the agenda of the AIAI leadership, which seeks power nationally 

and is less inclined to take on the risks of attacking the U.S. military. In one report, alQa’ida operatives meet with AIAI leader “Sheikh Hassan Tahir” (Hassan Dahir Aweys)11

in 1993 and promise to fund “all operations” of AIAI if it engages in military operations 

against the U.S.; otherwise, al-Qa’ida will continue to aid the secular resistance forces

 

10 Harmony, AFGP 2002-600104, 15. 11 See Appendix B-III for a more in-depth discussion of Aweys. Also, see Harmony, AFGP-2002-800611

for a Kenya Visa Application with the name of Hassan Aweys. Ironically, this document was seized by

U.S. Forces in Afghanistan during the 2002 timeframe. 

 40
 

(factional militias). Sheikh Hassan’s response is that “the time is not right to start 

conducting jihad” and that “they must work against the Americans through political 

means.”12 In a separate communication, this preference on the part of the top AIAI 

leadership to avoid or postpone jihad is treated with contempt by an al-Qa’ida official, 

who concludes that “only a coward or scoundrel would say such a thing.” He continues: 

“I have no doubt that even Saddam Hussein, Aideed, Arafat, Sayyaf, Hikmatyar, and 

Burhan have more manhood than they have. Like the latter, they are useless. Beware of 

them.”13

Clannism. 

The Somali Islamist movement in 1991-96 was divided to some degree by clan, and at 

any rate was forced to operate in a context in which clannism was a highly mobilized and 

politically exploited identity. This confronted al-Qa’ida with horizontal as well as vertical

cleavages in its local ally. Most of the al-Qa’ida operatives who write in these documents 

were new to Somalia and were poorly equipped to understand the complexities of Somali 

clannism. Their reports are littered with crude, inaccurate descriptions of Somali lineages 

and express the same level of bewilderment over clannism that one frequently hears from

international aid workers and diplomats. Clannism is said by the al-Qa’ida reporters to 

infuse the Islamic movement itself. “Each member of the movement is fanatically 

attached to his tribe,” complains one entry.14 Another entry, from the Somali region in 

Ethiopia, reveals the extent to which the Islamists were unwelcome by local clans. 

In several instances, documents reveal that al-Qa’ida encounters difficulties 

because its local Islamist allies are predominantly from one clan and are resisted by rival 

clans. Here al-Qa’ida runs into the same difficulty that so many international NGOs have 

faced in the field–the prospect of being “captured” by one clan and earning the emnity of 

others in the process. 

Leadership and Organization. 

A major complaint of the foreign al-Qa’ida figures writing in the Harmony documents is 

the poor leadership and organization of the Somali Islamic movement. At the time most 

of these documents were produced, AIAI had more or less dissolved itself as a formal

organization, operating more like a loose network. Hence it is not surprising that alQa’ida discovers a lack of organization. It specifically complains about corruption and 

financial mismanagement,15 and lack of chain of command. “How is it,” one entry chides, 

“that military force is employed by order of civilians and the military commander doesn’t 

even know about it?”16 The disastrous early military losses by AIAI in Kismayo and 

Bosaso are also assessed as the result of faulty leadership. Interestingly, Hassan Dahir 

Aweys, the CIC leader who was a principal architect of the disastrous Islamist war with 

Ethiopia in December 2006, was a commander in both of those early losses. 

 

12 Harmony, AFGP 2002-600110, 8-10. 13 Harmony, AFGP 2002-600053, 4. 14 Harmony, AFGP 2002-800640, 5. 15 Harmony, AFGP 2002 600104, 19; 16 Ibid., 23. 

 41
 

Islamic Charities. 

Following the 9/11 attacks, a number of Islamic charities operating in Somalia and Kenya 

were shut down on the grounds that they were being used as fronts for al-Qa’ida. The 

Harmony documents do not provide any specific evidence to back up charges against 

particular Islamic NGOs, but several passages allude to al-Qa’ida’s use of charities. In 

one instance, an al-Qa’ida operative reminds his Somali counterparts that “jihad brings a 

lot of money from charities.”17 In another entry, an al-Qa’ida operative assesses the level 

of corruption and competence of relief agencies they have penetrated along the SomaliKenya border, noting that “the situation of the relief agency in Lipouy [Liboi] is not yet 

corrupted, unlike that of Mandeera which is a hopeless case.”18

Sufi Opposition. 

In some cases foreign al-Qa’ida operatives appear stunned at the depth of resistance they 

face from Sufi clerics. In the Somali region of Ethiopia the al-Qa’ida operative describes 

with shock the “level of cunning and hatred” toward the Islamic Union; when one local 

cleric preached at mosque the local people kick the Islamic Union out of their village.19

Lack of Mass Support. 

One of the more revealing and insightful criticisms of the Somali AIAI is the charge 

leveled by on al-Qa’ida official that the movement is too elitist and cut off from the 

masses. “A movement that is isolated from its masses,” he argues, “that is suspicious of 

its people, and whose people are suspicious of it, can achieve nothing but destroy 

itself.”

20 This was in fact precisely one of AIAI’s biggest problems–it was a movement

of educated, well-traveled elites, who did not speak the same political language of the 

average Somali. Ironically, however, the AIAI leadership’s decision to focus on da’wa, to 

socialize Somali society and prepare it for Islamic rule, was an implicit recognition of the 

gap that existed between the AIAI leaders and the people. 

Al–Qa’ida Pragmatism/Instrumentalism. 

This same al-Qa’ida official argues that al-Qa’ida has erred in seeking out appropriate 

allies in Somalia. “Al-Qa’ida’s Salafia tendencies have led it to search for a political ally 

in Somalia with an identical intellectual focus,” he opines. “This is the greatest 

calamity.”21 In his view, Somalis are merely temporary allies of expedience, tools to use 

in the battle against the “Knights of the Cross.” To that end, he argues for greater 

partnership with secular Somali factions (presumably General Aideed and the SNA) 

which may be more effective in battling American and UN forces. In a remarkably 

candid and pragmatic passage, he notes that “nearly everywhere your situation and ours 

has no place for the ideal; just for that which is the least bad.... You must find men you 

can deal with, even if they are not from our venerable forefathers.... I do not mind 

 

17 Harmony, AFGP 2002-6000104, 17. 18 Harmony, AFGP 2002-600113, 7. 19 Harmony, AFGP 2002-600104, 21. 20 Harmony, AFGP 2002-600053, 1. 21 Ibid. 

 42
 

cooperating with Aideed if you have made sure that what he is doing with the Americans 

is not staged....”22 

Al-Qa’ida Confronting Somali Culture. 

Some of the culture clashes captured in the documents are predictable and sound 

remarkably similar to after-hours complaints by new aid workers about “ungrateful 

locals.” “The strange people who received us were lukewarm and wary towards us,” 

complains one al-Qa’ida entry. “They are stingy and greedy.”23 But setting aside the 

numerous disparaging remarks about Somalis that appear in these entries, the more 

significant complaint was over Somali decision-making. The Somali practice of 

inclusive, consensus-oriented decision-making (traditionally, the male elders gathering in 

a “shir” or assembly) collided with the need for rapid, streamlined command, and 

resulted in complaints about the lack of secrecy in Somalia.24 This last point is 

particularly important because it points to the fact that local decision-making norms

influence the value of areas as terrorist safe havens. 

 AIAI Terrorism.

AIAI was designated as a terrorist organization in late 2001, on charges that it was behind 

a series of lethal bombings and assassination attempts in Ethiopia in 1995. For years, 

Somali members of AIAI have argued that by 1995 AIAI was a very decentralized 

organization and that the Ethiopian Somali AIAI conducted those attacks on their own, 

against the wishes and advice of the AIAI groups inside Somalia. It was unfair, these exAIAI members claimed, to brand the whole organization as terrorists when they 

disagreed with the acts committed. The Harmony papers help to document the growing

split between the Ethiopian and Somali-based AIAI in the early 1990s, and the clear 

militancy of the Ethiopian Islamists compared to their colleagues in Somalia. That

heightened militarism on the part of the Ethiopian wing of the AIAI was no doubt linked 

to the fact that the AIAI in Ethiopia was fighting for very different objectives than the 

AIAI wing inside Somalia. The Ethiopian wing of AIAI was part of a long-standing 

irredentist armed insurgency by Somali Ethiopians. The movement’s aim of imposing an 

Islamist state over all of Somali-inhabited East Africa required armed violence against 

one of Africa’s largest and most seasoned militaries. By contrast, the AIAI wings inside 

Somalia were preoccupied with expanding their control in a country where they faced no 

government at all.25

Logistical Obstacles and Constraints Faced in Somalia and the Ogaden. 

The Harmony documents present compelling evidence to support the thesis that foreign

terrorists find remote zones of state collapse and armed conflict relatively inhospitable 

and challenging operating environments, not “safe havens.” Field reports are replete with 

complaints about poor food, unsafe water, uncomfortable shelter, heat, disease, biting 

insects, defective vehicles and poor tires. The physical constraints are vividly presented 

 

22 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, 2 23 Harmony, AFGP 2002-6000104, 5. 24 Harmony, AFGP 2002-800640, 17, 19. 25 For more on AIAI, see Appendix A-I. 

 43
 

in an entry describing the condition in the remote, swampy, forested coastal area of 

Badadhe, near the Kenyan border. 

Hassan Dahir Aweys.

The U.S. government placed Hassan Dahir Aweys on a designated list of terror suspects 

for his alleged links to al-Qa’ida and for his sheltering of several foreign al-Qa’ida 

operatives in Mogadishu. Aweys has repeatedly denied that he has ties to al-Qa’ida or has 

provided safe haven to terrorists, and his supporters have argued that there is no evidence 

to back up these charges. Some well-placed analysts have argued that Aweys is actually a 

moderate voice within the current Islamist discourse in Somalia, and that he is fighting a 

rear guard battle against young, radical jihadists in the shabaab militia. 

Intriguingly, the Harmony documents provide evidence to back both of those 

claims. If repeated references to Sheikh Hassan and Sheikh Hassan Tahir refer in fact to 

Aweys and not someone else–and the contextual evidence in the documents points to 

Aweys26–then it provides a clear picture of regular, routinized contact between al-Qa’ida 

operatives and Aweys on matters of mutual cooperation. This includes early references to 

him traveling to Sudan,27 and being present in Ras Kamboni while al-Qa’ida was 

establishing a training camp there in 1993.28 He can, perhaps, deny that these contacts 

were consequential, but not that that they occurred. 

At the same time, Aweys comes across in these documents as an Islamist leader 

who has tactically rejected the use of jihad during the period 1993-95. His al-Qa’ida 

contacts quote him as saying that the time is not yet right for jihad. He and other leaders 

of AIAI are the target of withering criticism by militant Somali commanders in the field, 

and by some al-Qa’ida operatives as well, for being a “coward.” This portrait of a 

hardliner who is nonetheless viewed as a constraining force on younger, less patient 

jihadis is remarkably similar to the portrait some observers have painted of Aweys in

recent times.

Use of Contractors. 

One concern about al-Qa’ida’s use of Somalia as a transshipment point for short-term

operations into East Africa–for movement of money, men, and materiel–is the fact that 

terrorists need not locate fellow believers to conduct these operations, but that most any 

Somali businessman is willing to conduct a transaction for a fee with no questions asked. 

This fear is confirmed in one of the Harmony documents describing al-Qa’ida’s rental of 

a boat and its Bajuni captain to ship them from Lamu to Ras Kamboni. The al-Qa’ida 

operative writing this report describes his Bajuni sea captain as one of those with “low 

morals and big egos. Cigarette smoking, chewing qat, chasing women and lying, etc., are 

common among them.” While acknowledging that “we don’t trust him,” the operative 

 

26 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800611. 27 Harmony, AFGP 2002-800600. 28 Harmony, AFGP 2002-600113, 6.

 44
 

concludes that, “as far as his skills are concerned he is excellent. I traveled with him

previously; he knows the best ways to approach shores.”29

Use of Kenya as a Base of Operations. 

The Harmony documents reinforce the observation that while Somalia was a target of alQa’ida efforts to establish training bases and project influence, Kenya proved to be a far 

more conducive setting to base al-Qa’ida operations. Multiple al-Qa’ida cells operated 

unimpeded throughout the country (mainly in Nairobi and Mombasa). Harmony 

documents paint a remarkable portrait of al-Qa’ida cells freely operating in Kenya, with 

few expressed concerns about being monitored or detained by Kenyan police or security 

forces. The ease with which they chartered small planes to fly in and out of Lu’uq, 

Somalia, in 1993, during a period when that town was controlled by AIAI, with no hint of 

authorities checking on their activities, is especially revealing, as is their transaction to 

hire and purchase boats on the coast for travel into coastal Somalia. Indeed, the only 

anxiety expressed in Harmony document communications is a complaint in 1993, during 

the worst moments of political crisis in Kenya, that “Kenya is not a good place.... [T]he 

cost of living is high, plus corruption is dangerously prevalent – there is theft, house 

break-ins, no political stability, and it is possible there will be an explosion in the 

country.”30 We explore al-Qa’ida’s fascination with Kenya in greater detail in chapter 4 

of this report. 

Somalia Today.

Current events in Somalia are hard to interpret. In December 2006 it appeared that 

business leaders and clan elders in Mogadishu essentially told the CIC not to return to the 

city to wage a protracted guerrilla struggle. This interpretation of events is hard to 

reconcile with recent fighting in Mogadishu. One interpretation is that the violence is 

driven by rivalries between clan leaders, some of whom are deeply dissatisfied with the 

Transitional Federal Government's efforts to assert control over economic activity and so 

are giving free rein to their fighters.31 So far there is simply insufficient evidence to fully 

understand the dynamics of this rapidly evolving situation. However, it does highlight the 

fact that a desire among Somali business and clan interests to end civil conflict does not 

necessarily mean they will support or tolerate a strong central state that could impinge on 

their prerogatives. 

 

29 Harmony, AFPG 2002-600114. 30 Harmony, AFPG 2002-800597. 31 Journalists have suggested the violence is being driven by Hawiye clan leaders unhappy with increased

import duties imposed by the new government. See "A failed state that threatens the region," The

Economist, 7 April 2007, 43. Others suggest the violence is driven by rivalries between the Hawiye clan

and the Darood clan of interim President Abdullahi Yusuf. See Jesse Nunes, "Fighting between Ethiopians

and Somali insurgents escalates in Mogadishu," Christian Science Monitor, 30 March 2007; 

and Abdurrahman Warsameh, "Somali chaos: Clans, Islamists, foreigners," ISN Security Watch, 29 March 

2007, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17430.

 45
 

 46
 

4. Case Study: Kenya 

I. Introduction 

Of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, Kenya boasts the most stable, most effective, and most 

democratic government. Kenya has also experienced the most terrorist attacks against Western 

targets and has been the most useful operational base for al-Qa’ida.1

 This “Kenyan Paradox” is 

driven by the convergence of four factors. First, Kenya provides a target-rich environment for 

terrorists because of its relatively advanced economy and its long-standing ties with the United 

Kingdom, United States, and Israel. Second, Kenya maintains a functioning sovereign 

government, one increasingly subject to public opinion. The former limits the operational 

freedom of Western intelligence and counterterrorism units, and the latter heightens the cost of 

being seen to be doing others’ bidding in the “War on Terror.” Third, Kenya suffers from weak 

governance in a number of critical areas, including security and the criminal justice system. This 

discourages those Kenyans who might have relevant information from providing it to the 

authorities. Fourth, the presence of a disaffected minority Muslim population,2

 especially along 

the Kenyan coast, provides al-Qa’ida operatives an environment in which they can operate with 

less security pressure than elsewhere in the region.

3

 Simply put, Kenya is an attractive place for 

al-Qa’ida to operate.4

 The level of development and stability have increased the density of 

targets and logistical convenience of conducting operations in Kenya while the combination of a 

more responsive political leadership and weak governance reduce the security costs of doing so.5

Some of these factors can be ameliorated by adjusting existing policies to account for the 

complex forces at work in Kenya. Others are background conditions that cannot be changed but 

must be understood. Section II begins our analysis by reviewing Kenya’s history as a target for 

terrorist activity. Section III examines structural factors that make Kenya an attractive place for 

terrorists. We focus mainly on the governance challenge in Kenya, drawing on theoretical 

insights developed in the last section of Chapter 2. The next two sections draw on a series of 

recent interviews along with other sources. Section IV looks at the historical and current status of 

Kenyan Muslims. Section V briefly reviews how current counterterrorism initiatives are 

 

1

 Since 1990 Kenya has suffered seven terrorist attacks, three of which were conducted by al-Qa’ida. The other four

have not been linked to foreigners, or even specifically to Muslims. During the same period there were: four terrorist 

attacks in Eritrea, none of which involved al-Qa’ida; 34 attacks in Ethiopia, only two of which are attributable to

jihadi groups, the rest being conducted by groups involved in political or territorial struggles with the Ethiopian

state; and 21 attacks in Sudan, all of which were committed by groups involved in the Sudanese civil war or other

local conflicts in which Sudan was involved. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, available at http://www.tkb.org

[accessed March 30, 2007]. 2

 Various surveys put the country’s Muslim population at 8-10 percent, though (as noted below) with particular and 

significant regional concentrations. 3

 In the documents surveyed for the two Harmony reports, al-Qa’ida operatives in the 1990s reported greater 

security pressure in Nairobi and in Somalia than along the Kenyan coast. 4

 For a somewhat different take on al-Qa’ida’s experiences in Kenya and the recruiting potential for East Africa, see 

William Rosenau, “Al Qa’ida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28

(2005): 1-20. 5

 See Chapters 2 and 3 for a summary of the disadvantages of operating from a failed state. At the same time, alQa’ida documents reveal considerable concerns with both the level of criminal-insecurity in Kenya and its potential 

for (eventual) political instability, if not an actual “explosion.” Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597, 7.

 47
 

perceived by both the incumbent government and its citizens. Section VI attempts to explain the 

complex set of policy games played in Kenya. Section VII concludes by discussing the future 

prospects for terrorism in Kenya. 

II. Terrorism in Kenya: A Brief History 

Until very recently, terrorism in Kenya was mostly a foreign affair.6

 Operatives from elsewhere 

saw Kenya as a permissive, target-rich environment. The first major attack of the modern era 

was the Norfolk Hotel bombing in December, 1980, which killed sixteen people and injured 

more than one hundred. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility. 

Most believe the attack served as retaliation for Kenya’s decision to allow the launch of the 1972 

Israeli military raid on Entebbe, Uganda from Kenyan soil.7

Nearly two decades later, on August 7, 1998, al-Qa’ida attacked the American Embassy 

in Nairobi with a truck-bomb. This attack killed some 220 people and injured roughly 5,000 

Embassy staff, passers-by and people in neighboring buildings.8

 Al-Qa’ida simultaneously 

attacked the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 and injuring another 70. An 

attempt to destroy the American Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, was reportedly foiled on this 

same date.9

 All three embassies were accessible and relatively unprotected, making them 

particularly attractive targets. The Kenyan attack also produced the first known al-Qa’ida 

operative from Kenya, Sheikh Ahmad Salem Swedan, from Mombasa, as well as Abdullah 

Muhammad Fazul (henceforth ‘Fazul’), a Comorian who reportedly holds a Kenyan passport, 

though his legal citizenship remains unclear.10

Al-Qa’ida executed Kenya’s third major terrorist attack on November 28, 2002. Two 

SAM-7 missiles were fired at, but narrowly missed, an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Moi 

International Airport in Mombasa. Five minutes later, a truck-bomb detonated just outside the 

lobby of the Israeli-owned and frequented Paradise Hotel in Kikambala along the beach north of 

Mombasa. Fifteen people were killed and another 35 injured in that attack.11 Clearly, in this case 

 

6 We use “terrorism” with reference to Islamic “extremism,” but recognize the high level of violence associated with 

the Mau-Mau uprising/“freedom-struggle” of the 1950s. 7

 The choice of the specific target appears to reflect the fact that the hotel was then owned by a well-known JewishKenyan family; ironically, today it is owned by a prince in the Saudi royal family. 8

 The bomb-laden vehicle attempted to enter the underground parking area, but security guards prevented it from

doing so. Had they not, the number of Embassy casualties would have been far higher, and the “collateral damage” 

far less. 9

 All 20 people arrested in connection with the alleged Kampala plot were apparently released after being held for a

month. “All but one of nine arrested over blasts to be released,” Agence France Press: International News, February

17, 1999; Arye Oded, Islam & Politics in Kenya (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000); 82. 

David H. Shinn, “Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn,” Foreign Service Journal (September, 2004). 10 Swedan was among those indicted, as was Fazul. United States of America vs. Usama Bin Laden, et al., 

Indictment S (9) 98 cr. 1023 (LBS), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/binladen/indict.pdf. Both of 

these individuals remain at large. See Appendix B-I for an in-depth profile of Fazul. 11 The truck had just crashed through the entrance barrier after being denied entry by security guards. Most of the 

casualties were local dancers performing a welcome dance for the tourists; three Israelis were killed. For a detailed

picture of the devastating economic impact of this attack on the local victims’ families and the surrounding area, see 

Susan Richards, “More trouble in paradise,” OpenDemocracy (Internet), 17 December, 2002. 

 48
 

al-Qa’ida’s attention shifted from the U.S. to Israel with the perceived vulnerability of both 

targets a clear incentive for their selection.12

Shortly thereafter, in June 2003, Kenyan authorities foiled a plot to attack the temporary 

U.S. Embassy in Nairobi using a truck-bomb and an explosive-laden plane. The plane was to be 

taken from Nairobi’s Wilson Airport. This same airport acted as the staging base for al-Qa’ida 

operatives’ entry flights to Somalia in the early 1990s.13 One of the suspects arrested by Kenyan 

police indicated a number of the same individuals involved in the November 2002 attacks on the 

Paradise Hotel planned this failed attack.14

A final incident, not associated with al-Qa’ida, occurred on May 12, 2006, when three 

assailants fire-bombed the Nairobi offices of the Christian radio station Hope-FM after gaining 

entry to the station’s premises by killing a private security guard. An inner security door 

prevented the attackers from reaching the upper floor where several staff members were hiding. 

Little is known about their identity, but their motives appear less opaque. The station’s weekly 

program, “Jesus is the Way,” which many believe was explicitly designed to win converts to 

Christianity from the Muslim community, had just been aired.15 Although minor in scale, this 

attack marked Kenya’s first entirely domestic case of Muslim-based terrorism.

16

Despite two major al-Qa’ida attacks on Western targets in 1998 and 2002, the group’s 

operatives continued to move about the country freely, establish businesses in Mombasa, Nairobi 

and Lamu, operate Islamic charities, find local brides, rent light aircraft to come and go from

Somalia, hold meetings, communicate with al-Qa’ida figures outside the country, transfer 

money, stockpile weapons and engage in years of undetected reconnoitering of possible targets.17

The next two sections explore the factors which make Kenya a relatively safe haven for alQa’ida. 

 

12 The killing of a policeman in Mombasa on August 1, 2003 is also connected to these twin attacks. An alleged

accomplice of Fazul (the latter wanted in connection with the making of the bombs used in both the U.S. Embassy 

attack and that of the Paradise Hotel; see Appendix B-I) set off a grenade as he was about to be seated in a police 

vehicle, killing a police officer. According to a local press report, he was Feisal Ali, “the son of a prominent 

businessman in Kenya” and a Yemeni national whose wife is described as of “Somali origin.” Reportedly, Fazul and

Ali, “escaped in the confusion.” “US lauds Kenya’s fight against terrorism,” East African Standard (Internet 

Edition), August 5, 2003. 13 Matthew Rosenberg, “Al-Qaida plotted to destroy U.S. Embassy in Kenya in June,” Associated Press, October 24, 

2003; Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, 3. 14 See Appendix C-III, the disallowed confession of Omar Said Omar, a suspect in the 2002 attacks. As a result of 

this information, the Embassy was closed during June 20-24, 2003. A U.S. “terrorist alert” had been issued the

previous month when Fazul was reportedly sighted in Mombasa; Desmond Butter, “Threats and Responses: 5-Year

Hunt Fails to Net Qaeda Suspect in Africa,” The New York Times, June 14, 2003. 15 According to reports and conversation with the station’s staff, text-message cell-phone threats had been received 

at the station during the program’s broadcast. In addition, several guests on the program were recent converts from

Islam, who explained why they had decided to change faiths and encouraged Muslim listeners to do the same, 

mainly by extolling the Bible while disparaging the Koran. 16 On the other hand, religious conflict–on occasion of a violent nature–is not unheard of in Kenya’s recent past. 

David C. Sperling, “Islam and the Religious Dimension of Conflict in Kenya,” paper presented at USAID 

Conference on Conflict and Conflict-Resolution in Kenya, Nairobi, May, 1998. 17 Appendix B-I and Appendix C-III detail how Fazul, an indicted al-Qa’ida operative, operated in Kenya from 1998 

until very recently. 

 49
 

III. Why Foreign Terrorists Like Kenya 

Though few in number, the above attacks demonstrate Kenya’s significance in terms of recent 

global terrorism. Moreover, the scale and complexity of attacks in Kenya strongly suggests a 

permissive environment exists for terror group operations. Understanding what it is about 

democratic, economically successful Kenya that makes it a relatively frequent target of jihadi 

terrorism is of paramount importance. A combination of international and domestic factors result 

in Kenya’s targeting. Two specific international factors enhance Kenya’s attractiveness. First, the 

country’s foreign policy reflects a long history of close relations with the United States and 

Israel, as well as the United Kingdom–the former colonial power. Both the United States and 

Israel maintain a significant official and private-sector presence in Kenya.18 In addition to current 

foreign policy issues, these historical relationships provide both an ideological justification for 

attacks in Kenya and a range of targets. The use of Mombasa as a supply-station for Western 

military operations and patrols in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf brought increased attention 

from al-Qa’ida beginning in the early 1990s.19 During his infiltration into Somalia, Saif al-Adel 

illustrates his interests in a trip report along the Kenyan coast. Here he describes Mombasa as, 

“an island that teems with foreigners who stroll all over the place. It is said that the American 

army soldiers take their R&R there. Mombasa’s security situation is terrible.”20

Second, the country’s geography puts it in close proximity to long-running conflicts in 

northern Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Kenya’s porous borders permitted alQa’ida operatives to enter and leave the country clandestinely. However, the expense of doing so 

may explain why most al-Qa’ida operatives traveled to and from Kenya using normal channels.21

The exception was travel to Somalia. Throughout the early to mid-1990s, members of al-Qa’ida 

traveled to Somalia from Kenya by sea and land through the coastal route of Mombasa-WituKiunga in Kenya to Ras Kamboni, Somalia.22 

 

18 See Oded, Islam & Politics in Kenya; and Erik E. Otenyo, “New Terrorism, Toward an Explanation of Cases in

Kenya,” African Security Review 13: 3 (2004). Kenya also has a tiny but visible Jewish community. In recent years, 

some “surveillance” of the Nairobi synagogue has occurred but no specific threat of an attack has materialized. 

Author interview, Nairobi, March 23, 2007. In his confession statement, Omar refers to instructions from his alQa’ida mentors “to fight all Americans, British, Israelites and Australians,” the latter presumably because of their 

contribution to current operations in Iraq (See Appendix C-III).

19 Otenyo, “New Terrorism”; Johnnie Carson, “Kenya: The Struggle Against Terrorism,” in Robert Rotberg, ed.,

Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 173-192. Carson

notes the U.S. military Access Agreement with Kenya for naval facilities there, in place since 1980. 

Well before the 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassy, al-Qa’ida operatives recorded their observation of American 

forces using the port city for “R & R,” and their view of the security situation as being extremely lax. See Harmony, 

AFGP-2002-600111, 2. 20 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600113, 3. 21 As both the trial transcript from the 1998 embassy bombings trial and the Harmony documents show, al-Qa’ida 

operatives tended to move in and out of Kenya, with the exception of trips to Somalia, via commercial airlines. See

“FBI Trial Transcripts,” U.S. Federal Court, Southern District of New York. See also United States of America vs. 

Usama Bin Laden, et al., S (9) 98 cr., 1023, 1301, 1302, 1305. Even though they had problems using commercial air

travel with forged passports, traveling by land from Kenya does not appear to have been a common practice for

foreign jihadis. See also Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, AFGP-2002-600113, AFGP-2002-800081, AFGP-2002-

800083, AFGP-2002-800088, and AFGP-2002-800089. 22 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104 and AFGP-2002-600113. In the words of former Kenya International Security 

Permanent Secretary Dave Mwangi (at least as of 2003), “our most serious vulnerability is that we are neighboring

the Somali Republic, a land with no government” (Butler, op. cit.).

 50
 

Turning to domestic factors, Kenya appears, at first glance, to be an unattractive 

environment for terrorists. In contrast to neighboring Somalia, Kenya boasts a relatively robust 

state equipped with a national police force, capable intelligence services, and a pervasive system

of provincial administration.23 Its overwhelmingly Christian population would also seem to 

bolster its capacity to deter terrorist activity. 

Yet a number of domestic factors appear to trump such disincentives, making Kenya a 

more positive environment for al-Qa’ida. One is the presence of small but significant Arab, 

Arab-Swahili and Somali minorities concentrated in coastal Kenya, Nairobi and several other 

urban centers.24 Some of these, especially those with Arab lines of descent, maintain closer ties 

with their home countries. Indeed, many residents of Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu hold stronger 

ties with the Arabian Peninsula than with Kenya’s own interior.25 These historical connections

and the cover provided by a diverse population significantly reduce the visibility of foreign 

operatives. 

Deep-rooted and continuing shared economic interests strengthen the coastal Kenya-Arab 

relationship still further.26 The centuries-old maritime culture along the East African coast has 

given rise to many interlocking networks of kinship and commerce that the “modern” national 

borders of the Comoros, Zanzibar, mainland Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Yemen have 

not obliterated. 27 Further, modern transportation and communication that fosters rapid and 

detailed transmission of both political and religious information and messages significantly 

bolster this situation.28 The net effect of all the above is that al-Qa’ida operatives have been able 

to employ a mixture of “mosque, madrasah, marriage”29 and money to move about relatively 

freely while establishing more permanent local roots.30 

Beyond these regional, historical and demographic factors, Kenya’s weak governance 

climate makes a considerable contribution to the country’s terrorist threat. Central here is its lack 

of effectiveness in investigating, arresting and convicting terrorists as well as more ordinary 

 

23 Indeed, it may be this very stability, accommodating, among other things, an extremely high U.S. diplomatic 

interest and presence that has served to attract terrorists. See Carson, op. cit., 178 and 192. On terrorists, see Otenyo, 

“New Terrorism,” 8. 24 North Eastern Province, inhabited almost entirely of ethnic Somalis, has apparently produced no al-Qa’ida 

outposts or associates, possibly due to the relative dearth of attractive targets. 25 Carson, “Kenya,” 186. 26 Such shared interests sometimes overlapped with terrorist connections. Omar Said Omar had a “friend” from his 

home city of Mombasa (Issa Osman Issa) who “had relatives in Somalia.” The friend took him to Mdoa where the 

two set up a lobster business in 1998. “Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar,” Recorded by Superintendant

John Mulalulu, Kenya Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, n.d. (but almost certainly August, 2003). See Appendix C-III. 27 On historical ties, see R. A. Obudho, “Urbanization,” in J. Hoorveg, D. Foeken and R. A. Obudho, eds., Kenya 

Coast Handbook (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2000), 85-97. 28 The influence of external Islamic teaching is described in Mohamed Bakari, “The New ‘Ulama in Kenya,” in

Mohamed Bakari and Saad S. Yahya, eds., Islam in Kenya: Proceedings of the National Seminar on Contemporary

Islam in Kenya (Nairobi: Mewa Publications, 1995), 168-193. 29 See Andrew England, “FBI’s most wanted leader of al-Qaida cell indicted for U.S. Embassy bombings, escaped,” 

Associated Press, June 14, 2004. 30 Recall here the case of one of the first al-Qa’ida operatives in Kenya, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh (see below), a 

Palestinian from Jordan who arrived in the mid-1990s. He settled in Witu, Lamu District. He later married there and

set up a seafood supply business, obtaining a supply contract at Nairobi’s 5-star Grand Regency Hotel. He was 

arrested in Pakistan the day after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing, having flown out of Kenya the day before, and

later convicted in connection with that attack at a trial in New York. 

 51
 

criminals. While mundane bureaucratic ineptitude no doubt accounts for some of this, the 

general “culture of impunity” that has been said to reign in Kenya may be equally responsible.31

For example, not a single (credible) conviction has been obtained with regard to the several 

assassinations and mysterious deaths of leading political figures.32 The same applies to the 

“mass” killings of the 1990s that killed 1,500 and displaced several hundred thousand, as well as

to the countless victims of torture in various detention centers and police cells, beginning after 

the failed Air Force coup attempt of 1982 and continuing well into the 1990s.33 The current 

government shelved recommendations from a recent Presidential Commission for a “transitionaljustice” process of exposure, confession and national healing.34 In addition, despite local and 

diplomatic demands, the Kenyan government provided no explanation for either the March 2006 

police raid on the offices of The Standard newspaper and its sister company Kenya Television 

Network, or for the breach of security at Nairobi’s international airport several months later. At 

the airport, the same pair of mysterious “Armenian brothers” who led The Standard raid–

allegedly business partners of Kibaki family members–stormed the Customs area to insure that 

associates arriving from abroad would not have their luggage searched.35 

This history of impunity extends in particular to those involved in large-scale corruption. 

Kenya repeatedly finds itself among the most corrupt countries in the world. According to 

Transparency International, bribery “costs Kenyans about US $1 billion each year, yet more than 

half live on less than US $2 per day.”36 No senior public figure in either politics or the civil 

service has ever been convicted, let alone gone to prison, for abuse of office.

37 The current 

government’s own former anti-corruption “czar” now resides in self-imposed exile in the UK, 

having feared for his life as he attempted to investigate corruption among the very government 

he was serving.38 Corruption also makes it easier for terrorists to use airports and other official 

 

31 Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya After Moi,” Foreign Affairs 83:1 (2004): 87-101. 32 Prominent examples are: Pia Gama Pinto (a key advisor to Kenya’s first vice-president, Oginga Odinga, in 1965);

Tom Mboya (Minister for Economic Development, in 1969); J. M. Kariuki (‘renegade’ MP and President

Kenyatta’s former Personal Secretary, in 1975); and Robert Ouko (Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 1990). 33 Peter M. Kagwanja, Killing the Vote: State-Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya (Nairobi: Kenya 

Human Rights Commission, 1998); Republic of Kenya, “Report of the Judicial Commission appointed to inquire 

into tribal clashes in Kenya” (Nairobi: Government Printer, 2002); People Against Torture, Never Again: Profiles in 

Courage (Nairobi: People Against Torture, 2005). 34 Republic of Kenya, “Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth Justice and Reconciliation

Commission” (Nairobi: Government Printer, 2003). The commission’s recommendations were reportedly never 

even brought to Cabinet for discussion. 35 The police raids involved the roughing-up of staff, destruction and theft of valuable equipment, and burning of

newspapers. See John Kamau and Cyrus Ombati, “Armenians: The Inside Story.” Sunday Standard, June 11, 2006;

“Artur brothers arrested after airport gun drama,” Saturday Standard, June 10, 2006. 36 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, 3 (6 November 2006). Available at: 

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006. 37 Ironically, al-Qa’ida operatives in Kenya during the early 1990s complained about the costs imposed on them by

corruption: “Kenya is not a good place ... as the cost of living is high, plus corruption is dangerously prevalent” 

(Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597, 7). 38 John Githongo, former Executive Director of Transparency International-Kenya. For details on corruption issues 

during Kibaki’s first two years in office, see S. Kichamu Akivaga, “Anti-Corruption Politics in the Post-KANU 

Era,” in Ben Sihanya, ed., Control of Corruption in Kenya: Legal-Political Dimensions, 2001-2004 (Nairobi: 

Claripress, 2005), 242-283. Regarding the Kibaki government’s failure (so far) to hold to account former President

Moi or anyone connected with his 24-year rule, see Thomas P. Wolf “Accountability or Immunity?: Daniel 

Toroitich arap Moi, Kenya’s First Retired President,” in Roger Southall and Henning Melber, eds., Legacies of 

Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics, (Upsalla: Nordic Africa Institute, 2006) 197-

 52
 

border points and to obtain identity papers and travel documents.39 Testimony in the 1998 

Embassy bombing trial revealed that Mohamed Sadeek Odeh used fake travel documents 

obtained at a government Immigration office to leave Kenya the night before the attack.40 Omar 

Said Omar, one of those allegedly involved in the 2002 coast attacks, also claimed he used a fake 

Ethiopian passport to get back into Kenya in December 2001 after completing his al-Qa’ida 

weapons training in Mogadishu.41

Corruption may also have played a part in the failure to arrest and/or prosecute non-alQa’ida terrorists and other international criminals. Two examples stand out. The first is Abdallah 

Ocalan, for many years the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the main Kurdish rebel 

group. According to reports, a foreign security team arrested him while he was being escorted to 

Nairobi’s airport to board a “safe flight” out of the country. Reports alleged that two senior 

figures in the Moi government received $40 million from the Turkish government for allowing 

this.42 The second example is Felicien Kabuga, previously Rwanda’s wealthiest private 

businessman and today its most wanted genocide fugitive.43 Despite a large U.S. government 

bounty of $5 million for his arrest, Kabuga reportedly made his home in Kenya for many years 

with the knowledge and support of senior figures in first the Moi government, and now that of 

his successor Kibaki.44 

The examples above, taken together with Kenya’s weak record in apprehending, holding 

and prosecuting high-profile terrorism suspects,45 apparently serves as a serious disincentive for 

Kenyans contemplating going to the authorities, whether with regard to issues of general “public 

safety”46 or indeed, their own problems.47 A final governance issue that also seems to contribute 

to the government’s inadequacies in this area, is, ironically, a reflection of the recent expansion 

 232

39 See Harmony, AFGP-2002-800611, for an example of a Kenyan document seized in Afghanistan. 40 U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(9) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y, Indictment, 29-31. 41 See his confession-statement in Appendix C-III. 42 Author interview, Nairobi, October 12, 2006. Another analyst claimed that Turkey paid an unnamed private 

mercenary group to capture Ocalan. Eric Margolis, “Freedom, Not Fake Autonomy for Kosovo,” February, 1999.

Available at www.ericmargolis.com/archives/1999/02. 43 He is also said to have been one of the main sponsors of the Hutu Interahamwe killing-squads who, by some

accounts, were involved in the pre-election killing-raids at the Kenya coast in August, 1997; Human Rights Watch, 

Playing With Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya (New York: Human

Rights Watch, 2002), 55-56. 44 “Disguised Kabuga still hiding in Kenya,” Weekly Citizen, 10:14 (14-19 March 2007): 2; Evans Wafula, Africa 

News, February 21, 2007; Dedan Walsh, “Informant killed in failed sting to trap genocide suspect,” The

Independent, January 22, 2003. 45 The case of Fazul’s escape a day after his June 2004 arrest in Mombasa is relevant here (England, op. cit.), as is 

the acquittal of all suspects in the twin 2002 Coast attacks. See “A Year Later, Two Mombasa Attacks Suspects 

Released,” IslamOnline.net, Article 2,November 28, 2003. See also Republic of Kenya, Criminal Division, High

Court of Kenya, “Ruling,” Criminal Case No. 91 of 2003, June 8, 2005. 46 Whether the recent arrest of a high-profile al-Qa’ida suspect in Mombasa marks a change in this regard remains to 

be seen. In this case, a foreign-exchange dealer pressed a “panic” button because of “nervous behavior” of the 

customer in front of him. See “Kenyans make arrest in 2002 Israeli plane, hotel attacks,” CNN.com (AP), March 19, 

2006. Identified in this report as Saleh Ali Nabhan, it later emerged he was Mohamed Abdul Malik, identified by

Omar as the driver of the vehicle involved in the missile attack on the Israeli airliner in 2002. See Appendix C-III, 

and below. 47 A nationally representative survey undertaken on behalf of the government found that only 40 percent of the 

victims of all types of crime report these to the police, for a variety of reasons. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of

Justice and Constitutional Affairs, “GJLOS National Household Baseline Survey,” 2006, 49. 

 53
 

of the country’s “democratic space.” Kenya returned to competitive, multi-party politics in 1992 

after more than three decades of either de facto or de jure one-party rule. Over the last three 

national elections, intense competition for votes in both parliamentary and presidential contests 

reflects in part the country’s highly fluid partisan political landscape. According to Kenyan 

election law, victory in presidential contests requires a candidate obtain both an overall plurality 

and a minimum of 25 percent of the vote in at least five of Kenya’s eight provinces. Muslims 

currently hold a great deal of collective political “clout” as they constitute at least 90 percent of 

inhabitants in North Eastern Province and over a quarter of the population in Coast Province. 

Because any incumbent or would-be government can ill-afford to ignore Muslim voters, 

counterterrorism policies that antagonize this section of the population are unlikely to be pursued 

with anything but considerable reluctance. 

This issue of political sensitivity may well have influenced the government’s response to 

one of the attacks described above: that on the HOPE-FM station in May 2006. Notwithstanding 

its clearly religious overtones, the official government spokesman, Dr. Alfred Mutua, called the 

attack “normal thuggery,” going on to claim the attackers were the “same gang” that had been 

“molesting motorists” in the area, a view immediately disputed by the Minister for Information.48

Although Mutua simultaneously promised “a thorough investigation,” nothing more has been 

heard of the matter.49 In this context, one Western diplomat may be justified in his view that, 

“even if the Kenyan government were seriously committed to apprehending and convicting these 

terrorists, whether they are foreigners or locals, it fears antagonizing the entire Muslim 

community.”50

One particular element of the reform program with which the current Kibaki government 

came to power appears particularly relevant to terrorism. In July 2003, new rules of evidence 

were established for criminal trials setting stricter requirements for the admission of confessions 

as evidence in court. Specifically, the rules require that these confessions be made before judges 

and magistrates (and only before the former, in the case of murder), rather than before police 

officers, who were said to commonly use torture. This new requirement resulted in the 

prosecution’s main evidence in the 2002 Coast attacks case, a confession made to the police by 

one of the suspects during the first week of August, being thrown out after it was challenged by 

the defense attorneys.51

IV. The Wider Context: The Muslim Situation in Kenya 

Previously, we noted that foreign jihadis can move relatively unnoticed and may receive at least 

some sympathy for their objectives from certain parts of the Kenyan population.52 This section 

takes a more focused look at the political character of Kenya’s Muslims, especially at the coast. 

Much of this population nurses a profound sense of grievance against the Kenyan state. While 

 

48 Cyrus Ombati, “Hooded thugs strike radio station, kill guard,” Sunday Standard, May 14, 2006. 

49 In this case, it was reported that several Christian and Muslim leaders were brought together by the Mombasa 

police to “deal with this matter quietly.” Exactly what was resolved remains unclear. Author interview, Nairobi, 14

March 2007. 50 Author interview, Nairobi, February 20, 2007. 51 The law came into effect on July 25. How soon the police learned about this change, and whether during the 

course of the trial any attempt was made to have the accused re-state this confession in accordance with the new 

rules, is not known; for other aspects of this issue, see a copy of this confession in Appendix C-III. 52 Certain portions of the population may support the ends but not necessarily the means of foreign terrorists. 

 54
 

most assert that terrorists tend not to be especially disadvantaged, there is some connection 

between such grievances and support for terrorism in cross-national studies.53 At the very least, 

such disaffection increases the probability that foreign jihadis will be tolerated. 

The poverty affecting so many Kenyans combined with the history of the coast in 

relation to the rest of Kenya comprises the root of this disaffection.54 Its foundation lies in 

the “status inversion” that an important section of the coastal community experienced 

following the transition from colonial rule to independence.55 To simplify a very complex 

reality, its Arab and Arab-Swahili leadership went from being highly privileged under the 

British, to being subjects of a largely alien, up-country, and non-Muslim political elite.56

A critical aspect of this reversal of relative status was the aversion to Christian missiondominated education, so that Muslims became, in retrospect, “the first to read (i.e., the 

Koran), but the last to go to school.” This placed Muslims at a distinct disadvantage in 

the post-independence competition for formal employment in both the public and private 

sectors.57 

More recently, the opening up of the political space since the return to multi-party 

politics in 1992 has had an ambiguous effect on Kenya’s Muslims. On the one hand, it led to 

increased participation in public life through attendance at public meetings and demonstrations, 

the initiation of civic education programs, and contributions to the effort to revise or replace the 

country’s constitution.58 Such opportunities give Muslims greater influence in national political 

life, and thus should reduce the frustrations of exclusion and marginalization. However, given 

the community’s inferior competitive power, especially in the economic sphere, it is unclear 

whether increased “voice” will lead to more radicalism as a consequence of the frustration of

popular demands, or more support for the current system.

59 

That some Kenyan Muslim leaders, such as Mombasa Imam Sheikh Ali Shee, call bin 

Laden “a hero” should not be taken as a sign that a radicalization process that legitimizes 

 

53 For a good recent piece of research on grievances, poverty, and support for terrorism see C. Christine Fair and

Bryan Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries,” Studies in Conflict and 

Terrorism 29 (2006): 51-74. 54 Over half of the population is said to remain below the official poverty line. 55 Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, “Coping With the Christians: The Muslim Predicament in Kenya,” in Holger Bernt 

Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., Religion and Politics in East Africa, (London: James Currey, 1995), 204, 201-2. 56 Thomas P. Wolf, “Contemporary Politics,” in Hoorveg et al., op. cit., 129-155. 57 Some have also argued that the academic burden of following two courses of study at the same time (one in

school, the other in the madrasa) also constitutes an impediment to secular educational success. 58 Mohamed Bakari, “A Place at the Table: The Political Integration of Kenyan Muslims, 1992-2003,” paper 

presented at the International Conference on “The Political Economy of Kenya,” St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, 

June, 2004. This is so notwithstanding the government of Kenya’s refusal in the early 1990s to register the coastbased Islamic Party of Kenya that nevertheless found opportunities to determine a number of races through an

alliance with another (non-sectarian) political party. Thomas P. Wolf, “Contemporary Politics,” in Hoorveg et al., 

op. cit., 141-143. 59 Both currents were clearly visible in the recent constitutional reform debates concerning a number of issues, 

including both the secular one of devolution, and the religious one of the position of the qadis’ courts (i.e., the 

sharia courts).

 55
 

violence is winning out.60 In the view of one Western scholar who has spent considerable time

among the coast’s Muslim community: 

Bin Laden may have garnered admiration in Tanzania and Kenya, but he has not 

won the sympathy of Muslims.... [H]e symbolizes for East African Muslims the 

resistance against the global political and economic hegemony of the United 

States. Bin Laden is known as someone who has dared to stand up on his own 

against the world’s No. 1 superpower. The people praise his courage, but not his 

actions. They admire him as a pop icon, but not as a “holy warrior.” How strongly 

Bin Laden’s Islamic legitimization for terror is rejected in the East African region 

is reflected in the fact that Kenyan and Tanzanian Muslims continue to argue that 

the true perpetrators of the World Trade Center attack could never be Muslims, as 

Islam prohibits such violence.61

Few Kenyan Muslim leaders or their followers appear willing to condone 

violence.62 Indeed, they see it as inimical to their individual and collective purposes, if 

not simply morally wrong. Yet the perceived lack of integrity in the country’s security 

and judicial apparatus, combined with an antipathy to being seen as a partner with “the 

enemies of Islam” makes a true partnership with the government on the terrorism issue 

even more problematic. 

Despite the basically pacifistic inclinations of most of the population, the Kenyan 

coastal Islamic “sea” is certainly one that a few stealthy al-Qa’ida zealots used to good 

advantage. Taking this portrait into account with the inciting impact of external issues,63

one might ask why so few attacks have occurred in Kenya and why so few Kenyans have 

been involved; rather than why they have occurred at all.64

 

60 Ironically, Shee is among a select group of Kenyans selected as “Democracy Fellows” during the 1990s by a 

USAID-funded study program in the U.S. aimed at acquainting current and potential future leaders with the 

institutions and processes of American democracy. 61 Rudiger Seeseman, “East African Muslims After 9/11,” paper presented at the African Studies Association

Annual Conference, New Orleans, November 17-20, 2004. At the same time, it could be argued that an even greater

distancing from at least the methods employed by al-Qa’ida would be needed before these same people were to

accept that the perpetrators of these attacks were Muslims, and then disown them. 62 The recent interviews transcribed in Appendix C-II provide a portrait of Kenyan Muslims’ views on

relevant issues. Comparing these interviews with the results of other surveys of this section of the Kenyan 

population contributes to a more accurate and nuanced understanding of Muslim grievances in Kenya. 63 Oded notes three factors he considers more salient here: the oil boom of the 1970s and concomitant petro-dollars 

in the hands of Arab/Muslim benefactors for supporting communal causes throughout the Islamic world; the 1979

Iranian revolution with its impact on Islamic expansionist activity generally; and Kenya’s own more recent process 

of democratization, in which the mobilizing of public support behind all issues becomes a more valuable “good.” 

Oded, op. cit., 8. Other factors include the ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict and the highly visible (and

controversial) use of American military power in such settings as Kuwait (1991), Afghanistan (2001-present), and

Iraq (2003-present). 64 For an analysis of this question with regard to the U.S. itself, see John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?:

The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 85:5 (2006): 2-8.

 56
 

V. The US-Kenya Anti-Terror Partnership: Protecting Kenyans, or Targeting Kenya’s 

Muslims? 

United States counterterrorism efforts in Kenya expanded significantly after the 1998 Embassy 

bombing.65 In addition to joint military training exercises in North Eastern Province and in the 

Coast Province’s Lamu District, U.S.-Kenyan counterterrorism efforts include: the establishment 

of the National Security Intelligence Service with support from the U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Assistance (ATA) Program; creation of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 1998, a Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003;66 and 

the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) in 2004. Altogether, these measures aimed 

to improve Kenyan capacity to investigate incidents, identify operatives and coordinate relevant 

work across agencies involved in counterterrorism.

67 Additional measures include participation 

in the U.S. Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides technology to screen travelers 

arriving at airports and border crossings. With support from the Federal Aviation Administration, 

Kenya has improved airport security and worked with Uganda and Tanzania to harmonize 

regional aviation security regulations. Kenya also ratified or acceded to all twelve United 

Nations conventions on terrorism and continues to submit regular reports to the UN CounterTerrorism Committee. Finally, beyond its bilateral cooperation with the United States, Kenya 

continues as an active member of the African Union. In this endeavor, Kenya reaffirmed its 

commitment to the 1999 Organization of African Unity Convention on Preventing and 

Combating Terrorism and established the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism. 

However impressive this list may appear, it is not clear how deep the Kenyan 

government’s participation in the “War on Terror” can actually be. Kenyan leaders must take 

into account a key issue that goes beyond “security”: their political standing among their own 

citizens, both Muslim and non-Muslim.68 Close cooperation with America creates serious 

political liabilities stemming from a number of grievances.69 First, the periodic and visible 

presence of FBI agents and U.S. Marines along the coast has left many Muslims feeling targeted 

by U.S. policy. Recent U.S. military actions just over the Kenyan border in Somalia, combined 

 

65 Beth Elize Whitaker, “Reluctant Partners: The United States and Kenya in the War on Terror,” paper presented at

the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Chicago, February 28-March 3, 2007; Carson, op. cit., 

176-80. 66 The JTTF basically ceased to function after the Kenya Commissioner of Police, General Hussein Ali, removed the 

Anti-Terrorist Police Unit from it in 2005, to the dismay of American and several other diplomatic missions. Author

interview, Nairobi, March 24, 2007. 67 It is likely that absent these steps, the planned June 2003 attack on the U.S. Embassy would not have been foiled.

A Western diplomat who has followed more recent anti-terrorist efforts of the Kenyan government was unimpressed 

with them, though he was unable to explain their general failure in terms of a single factor. “More likely,” he said, 

“it is a combination of (1) turf-struggles between competing bureaucratic (and thus financial) interests and thus an

inability to concentrate decision-making authority effectively in one place, (2) incompetence in terms of insufficient 

resources, and (3) corruption.” Author interview, Nairobi, February 9, 2007. 68 In a recent nationally representative public opinion poll, the government received a combined positive rating of 42 

percent (“very satisfied”; “satisfied”) on its handling of terrorism issues. This constituted 9th place out of the 15 

policy-areas so ranked. “March SPEC Poll,” The Steadman Group, Nairobi, 2007. 69 Much of the following material is taken from Beth Elize Whitaker, “Reluctant Partners: The United States and 

Kenya in the War on Terror.”

 57
 

with the Kenyan government’s unsympathetic response to Somalis seeking refuge in Kenya, 

reinforce this sentiment.70

Second, there is lingering bitterness about the level of compensation for the Kenyan 

victims of the 1998 Embassy bombing. This relates to the more general conviction among 

Kenyans that their country has become a terrorist target specifically because of its close 

relationship with the United States. Reflecting this belief, 5,000 Kenyans filed a class action 

lawsuit in a U.S. district court in 2002 seeking compensation for their losses.71 

Third, the focus on terrorism angers Kenyans who see their country suffering 

from a variety of ills. Of these ills, terrorism places low on their list of concerns.72 The 

U.S. State Department’s frequent travel advisories reinforce this grievance. Many 

Kenyans see them as economic punishment to their tourist industry, now the country’s 

leading foreign-exchange earner, while serving to divide Kenyans on a sectarian basis.73 

Fourth, the perceived hand of the U.S. in the Kenyan government’s efforts to steer 

unpopular anti-terrorism legislation through the National Assembly has not made open 

cooperation easier. Many Kenyans viewed the initial version of the bill as an effort to roll back 

vital human rights gains of recent years. Even after heated protests from both Muslim and nonMuslim human rights organizations led to the removal of its most abrasive provisions, resistance 

to the bill remains sufficient to deter the government from backing it with any real 

commitment.

74 Nevertheless, the association of such legislation with U.S. policy damages the 

credibility of both the American and Kenyan governments. 

The final issue concerns just how much information about the two countries’ anti-terrorist 

efforts should be made public. American officials seem inclined towards more disclosure than 

their Kenyan counterparts. Given that any successes achieved constitute clear political gains for 

Washington, this is not surprising. However, when Kenya is seen to be “caving-in” to pressure 

by violating Kenyan law, the cost is considerable. The recent capture of M.A. Malik, a 

participant in the 2002 Paradise Hotel attack, provides an illustrative example of this 

phenomenon. Reportedly, Malik’s transfer to American custody for relocation to Guantanamo

 

70 Numerous press reports detailed both the military action, the plight of the refugees, and the public (including

Muslim) reaction. These were expressed by several speakers and numerous members of the audience at a recent 

public event. Kenya National Commission of Human Rights’ forum, Hilton Hotel, Nairobi, February 9, 2007. Out 

of 76 cases tracked, 17 of these refugees are known to have been “deported” to Somalia (most to unknown fates both

there and in Ethiopia to which a number were subsequently sent), with the remainder still in Kenyan custody, as of

the end of January (“Somali Crisis: Arrests Data”, Muslim Human Rights Forum, Nairobi, n.d.). 71 The suit was thrown out on the grounds that the claimants had provided no proof that the U.S. was 

responsible or had violated a specific law or policy. Similar unhappiness remains among those affected by

the Kikambala hotel bombing, though in this case it is directed at Israel. Author interview, Majengo, 

Kikambala, March 8, 2007. 72 Beth Elize Whitaker, “Reluctant Partners,” 23. 73 Salim Lone, “Terror alerts provide cause to alienate some communities,” Daily Nation, March 9, 2007, 11. The 

advisories do not seem to be having much of an effect; according to just-released figures, 78,000 Americans arrived 

in Kenya last year, an all-time high; Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs, R. Tuju, on the Nation TV (NTV) 

program, “On the Spot,” 8 March, 2007. 74 Whitaker, “Reluctant Partners,” 11-13. Ironically, according to a prominent human rights lawyer-activist, it is the 

very absence of such a law that, however onerous, has encouraged even more deleterious consequences, as the

Kenyan police operate “totally outside current law” as they pursue “a U.S.-driven agenda.” Author interview,

Nairobi, March 9, 2007.

 58
 

Bay came with an understanding that the transfer would not be made public. Malik’s arrival in 

Cuba became headline news triggering considerable outrage in Kenya.75 Likewise, Malik’s arrest 

reportedly led to the discovery of plans to stage an attack in Mombasa during the international 

cross-country championships to be held there a few days later.76 The U.S. Embassy felt obliged 

to announce the possibility of “a serious terrorist threat” during the forthcoming event. 

However, Kenya’s Internal Security Minister, with his eyes clearly on the international gallery 

associated with the event, rejected the warning as without justification.77 

Altogether, such issues underscore the divergence of interests between Kenya and the 

U.S.78 As Whitaker points out, the U.S., in deed if not in word, “has made clear that its top 

priority in Kenya is counter-terrorism.” 79 However, most Kenyans seek a combination of 

improved security regarding “normal” criminal activity, economic development, and further 

consolidation of their fledgling democracy.80 Even when U.S. support for these other goals is 

forthcoming, the American focus on counterterrorism encourages cynical Kenyans to see any 

investment in these areas as diplomatic-donor “bribery.”81

VI. Different Games in the War on Terror 

One way to think about the War on Terrorism in Kenya is as a set of three related games. In one 

game, the players are the U.S. and Kenyan governments. For the U.S., the game is about 

undermining al-Qa’ida and its local adjuncts. In Kenya, this entails convincing the Kenyan 

authorities and ordinary people of the importance of American anti-terrorism objectives. For 

Kenya, this game is more problematic. On the one hand, Kenya seeks to maximize the material 

benefits derived from its partnership with the United States which they employ for wellestablished neo-patrimonial purposes.82 At the same time, however, Kenya seeks to minimize 

three accompanying costs: (1) the loss of political support from its citizens in an increasingly 

 

75 “Family demands suspect’s return: Pentagon confirms man in Cuba as US envoy in Nairobi alleges speculation,” 

Daily Nation, March 29, 2007. 76 Author interview, international news agency representative, Nairobi, March 26, 2007. 77 “Kenya indignant over U.S. terror alert ahead of global sports event,” People’s Daily Online (Xinhau), March 8,

2007. The attack plans were never made public. The fact that no incident occurred made the Americans look unduly 

alarmist, and thus uncaring about the positive publicity Kenya would gain from the successful holding of this event. 

However, the possibility of an attack might have been quite likely. See Appendix C-IV for an account of Muslim

grievances and its relation to this event. 78 Such divergence has not gone completely unrecognized. The U.S. military commander in Djibouti is reported as 

having resolved “never to use the word ‘terror’ in meetings with African security heads.” Rather, “he speaks only 

about ‘insecurity’ and ‘extremism’ when he meets such officials.” Author interview, Nairobi, March 23, 2007. 79 Whitaker, “Reluctant Partners,” 23. 80 In a recent national survey undertaken on behalf of the Ministry of Justice’s Governance, Justice, Law and Order 

Sector (GJLOS) program, not one of the 12,442 respondents mentioned terrorism as a threat, even in Coast

Province. This includes all responses grouped in the “other” category as well. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of 

Justice and Constitutional Affairs, GJLOS National Household Baseline Survey, 2006, 56. See the largely similar 

results in Volker Krause and Eric E. Otenyo, “Terrorism and the Kenyan Public,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

28:2 (2005): 99-112. 81 Whitaker, ”Reluctant Partners,” 5. 82 Kenya was one of only 5 states to receive special training through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program in the 

2005 budget. The program divided $88 million among these states in 2005 and $122 million was requested for the 

program in the 2006 budget. Kenya was the only country in the Horn to receive these funds. See 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60647.pdf [accessed March 31, 2007]. On this phenomenon more 

generally in Third World states, see, Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (London: Croom

Helm, 1985). 

 59
 

competitive electoral environment;83 (2) their higher profile as a legitimate target which

accompanies close association with the U.S.; and (3) the concern that too much of a “buy-in” to 

terrorism concerns will hurt the vital tourism industry .

84

Less visibly, reducing cooperation with American anti-terrorism efforts may also be a 

card to be played with regard to other distant issues. The Commissioner of Police in 2005 pulled 

the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit out of the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Some saw this as a jab at 

the U.S. and its allies who were pressuring the Kibaki government to move firmly against 

corruption involving some of his closest associates.85 Kenya successfully parlayed its centrality 

in the War on Terror into other diplomatic advantages. In mid-2005, Kenya refused to ratify a 

bilateral immunity agreement promising not to turn American citizens over to the International 

Criminal Court in The Hague. In response, the Bush administration initially mandated substantial 

cuts to military and governance programs in Kenya. Later, the U.S. restored much of the money 

in late 2006.86 As these examples show, the Global War on Terror provides a most welcome 

resource-pool. However, Kenya’s incentives in that war are not fully aligned with those of the 

U.S. 

The second game occurs between the Kenyan government and the Muslim community.87

For its part, the Government would prefer to avoid antagonizing its Muslim citizens. Beyond the 

obvious electoral disadvantages, officials fear that doing so will make Kenyan Muslims more 

sympathetic to the terrorists’ agenda(s). For their part, significant sections of the Muslim 

leadership see the often-clumsy efforts of the Government’s security apparatus and its 

partnership with the U.S. more generally as a useful means of bolstering their own status as 

defenders of Islam and Muslims’ human rights. That no Kenyan has yet been convicted on any 

charge directly related to the terrorist attacks that have occurred makes such posturing much 

more credible.88 At the same time, playing the role of sectarian defender attracts applause and 

valuable resources from certain philanthropic individuals, organizations and even governments 

 

83 With the opposition quick to call for greater attention to national pride and “sovereignty” in Kenya’s relations 

with foreign powers, aggressively supporting American counterterrorism efforts risks alienating several important

voting blocs. Non-Muslim aspirants are equally adept at taking advantage of such grievances, as opposition

presidential aspirant M. Mudavadi did recently at a public rally in Lamu Town. Public Rally, Orange Democratic 

Movement-Kenya, Lamu Town, March 4, 2007. 84 It’s not clear that close U.S. allies are targeted more often, but this is certainly the perception in Kenya, especially 

in light of the Madrid and London attacks which appeared to be clearly linked to support for U.S. policies. 85 This came in the wake of anti-corruption ”czar” Githongo’s flight into exile. “Clay’s Parting Shot,” The People 

Daily, July 2, 2005. Indeed, some well-placed individuals even viewed the government’s “mis-handling” of the

Mombasa/Kikambala attacks’ trial as a “lesson to the Americans” in these terms. Author interview, Nairobi, March

26, 2007. More generally, such distaste for the West’s governance agenda has been evident in efforts to develop ties 

with China. Leading government figures have recently boasted that Western donors’ contribution to the Kenyan

budget has been reduced to only about 5 percent. 86 Whitaker, op. cit., 15-17; Africa Research Bulletin 16639. 87 Although there is some overlap, there are actually three largely separate games involved: with the ethnic Somali 

population of North Eastern Province, the mainly ethnic Somali (and Somali refugee) population of the Eastleigh

section of Nairobi, and the coastal Swahili and Arab communities, both of which have their own important

boundaries/divisions. See Appendix C-IV for a Mombasa example of the rhetoric employed by Muslim leaders in 

their exchanges with the government. 88 This failure made it possible for one Nairobi-based Muslim NGO official to claim, for example, that “we did our

own investigation of the Mombasa attacks and found that no Kenyans were involved.” (Author interview, Nairobi, 

March 2, 2007). 

 60
 

in the wider Islamic world.89 Taken together, this implies that Kenya’s Muslim terrorism threatlevel is not without some benefit to its Muslim leaders (whether or not this is consciously 

recognized as such). That is, the Government’s propensity to engage in or allow periodic 

provocative actions provides various opportunities for them to mobilize their followers.

90

The U.S. and Kenyan Muslims play a third game. American intelligence forces are 

presumably trying to penetrate certain sections of the country’s Muslim communities so as to 

discover and apprehend terrorists and their sympathizers. Meanwhile other American agencies 

seek to mollify the Muslim population at the coast and elsewhere, through a combination of 

community aid projects, meetings with local leaders and more general public pronouncements.91

Such efforts appear to be generally appreciated. Most Muslims are not averse to receiving 

material assistance from the U.S.92 At the same time, as with the Kenya government, Muslim

leaders know they can gain extra points among their followers and foreign benefactors by 

“standing up” to U.S. actions when provided with opportunities that encourage them to do so. 

In each game, there are strong reasons why the best outcome from a counterterrorism

perspective is unlikely to occur. However, some repackaging of desirable policies can reduce the 

incentives for Kenyan leaders, both in the government and in Muslim communities, to behave 

differently than the U.S. would like. In Chapter 5, we will outline some recommendations the 

U.S. might consider when designing policy with regard to Kenya. 

VII: Conclusion: A Fragile Present and an Uncertain Future 

Kenya’s location on the map of international terrorism is not likely to change in the foreseeable 

future. Kenya remains only peripheral in al-Qa’ida’s grand scheme, seen more as a battlefield 

than a future stronghold. The goal in Kenya seems limited to attacking symbols of “enemy” 

power and conducting logistical operations. Notwithstanding such modest aims, their capacity 

for attacks remains considerable, especially when compared with other Horn of Africa settings. 

Kenya provides attractive and numerous Western targets in a vulnerable security and governance 

environment. With rampant corruption, porous borders, weak investigative and prosecutorial 

systems, and a population within which foreign jihadis can move with a fair degree of anonymity 

while finding some sympathy for their causes, Kenya hosts all the necessary elements for a 

terrorist safe haven. 

While investment by the United States can increase the Kenyan government’s 

counterterrorism capacity, its commitment to this agenda remains somewhat equivocal. The 

central dilemma is that the incentives of the two governments are not aligned. As described in 

Chapter 2, efforts to combat terrorism generate a considerable supply of resources for the 

Kenyan government. Because aid appears to have been pegged to the perceived terrorism risk 

 

89 Not all such philanthropists feel this way. One group in the Gulf was hesitant to help fund a new Islamic 

University at the coast without U.S. Embassy assurances that this would not be seen as support for “Islamic

radicalism” in Kenya. Author interview, Nairobi, August 4, 2006. 90 See Appendix C-IV for a copy of a letter from the Council of Imams in Mombasa to the Kenyan Minister of

Defense. 

91 Most recently, this involved arranging discussion-meetings between New York Times analyst and author Thomas 

Friedman and various Muslim leaders. Author interview, April 3, 2007. 92 Several civic leaders and other respondents in Lamu recently expressed nothing but satisfaction with the projects 

undertaken by U.S. Marines in the area which mainly involve physical repairs/improvements to local schools and 

health centers. Author interviews: Mombasa, March 8, 2007; Lamu, March 5, 2007. 

 61
 

rather than to the level of counterterrorism effort, Kenyan officials have incentives to tolerate a 

low level of terrorism. Moreover, close cooperation with the U.S. entails significant costs for the 

Kenyan government.93 Terrorism is simply a much higher priority for the U.S. and certain other 

Western diplomatic missions in Kenya than it is for Kenyans themselves.94 For them, insecurity, 

disease, and above all, poverty are the most ominous threats. Addressing these threats more 

aggressively may pay great counterterrorism dividends by reducing the political costs of 

supporting U.S. policy and thereby aligning the preferences of the Kenyan and American 

governments which would also be most welcomed by the Kenyan people. 

Even if few Kenyans have joined the jihadi cause (some have), others are likely to 

continue to do so. But this seems to depend much more upon issues and contacts elsewhere than 

inside Kenya itself. To this extent, efforts to ameliorate the conditions in which Kenyan Muslims 

find themselves may bear little fruit in terms of direct deterrence. Similarly, it is not clear 

whether socio-economic improvement per se would eliminate the kind of religious motivation 

that prompted the HOPE-FM attack, the only entirely indigenous attack to date. 

One final issue bears consideration. In the previous Harmony report, we stressed the 

importance of efforts that would help alienate terrorists from the local population. The lack of 

consideration given to local Muslims by the perpetrators of the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania 

suggests the willingness of jihadis to exploit African Muslims. Any terrorist could have predicted 

that there would be some fellow Muslims among the casualties, and there were. That the attacks 

went ahead suggests the perpetrators held the local Muslim population in low regard given the 

primacy of the wider, global goals. Alternatively, they may have expected that either: (1) since 

the vast majority of those killed would be non-Muslims, the attacks would create exploitable rifts 

between the local Christian and Muslim populations; or (2) a clumsy, heavy-handed response 

would further alienate Muslims, thus increasing the pool of local recruits. Our analysis suggests 

both, which bodes poorly for future efforts to deter jihadis from exploiting Kenya as an 

operational base on account of any such “sympathetic consideration” to their local coreligionists. 

Painting Kenya as a stronghold for al-Qa’ida and other terrorist activity is an 

overstatement. In many ways, it remains East Africa’s leader in both political and economic 

terms. Yet it is Kenya’s very stature that makes it such a decisive battleground between al-Qa’ida 

and the West in the Horn of Africa as a whole. Its track record as a target for terrorists, combined 

with the underlying conditions of weak governance and religious-ideological influence on the 

coast, suggest that future terrorist attacks are likely. Efforts to defeat al-Qa’ida will require the 

U.S. and its allies to wade through a complicated set of actors and issues. Without the predictable 

operating environment offered by Kenya, it is unlikely that al-Qa’ida would have been able to 

mount effective operations in the Horn in the past. We therefore believe Kenya is the decisive 

point in the Horn of Africa. 

 

 

93 The policy concessions required to sustain Kenyan cooperation on counterterrorism issues also cut against other 

U.S. priorities such as promoting human rights and exempting military personnel from the International Criminal 

Court. 

94 This minimal level of concern reflects the fact that the targets have been largely foreign, though the vast majority 

of the victims are Kenyan, and that attacks have been infrequent enough so as not to damage the economy.

 62
5. Conclusion: Key Issues and Policy Recommendations 

I. Conclusions 

Al-Qa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in the Horn of Africa and use it as a base for 

attacks against Western targets were largely a failure. Their only significant successes in 

the Horn were in Kenya, where the state’s poor governance capacity combined with 

relative stability to create a favorable operational environment. In Somalia, unfavorable 

operating conditions prevented al-Qa’ida from achieving any of its significant objectives. 

Al-Qa’ida failed in Somalia for three reasons. First, their arguments about 

fighting a foreign occupier did not resonate with locals because they too were seen as a 

foreign force. Second, they significantly underestimated the costs of operating in a failed 

state environment. Third, they could not recruit at a sufficient level to sustain operations 

because the benefits of membership were perceived as low in comparison to the costs of 

leaving one’s clan or tribe. 

The key strategic lesson from our analysis of al-Qa’ida’s experiences in the Horn 

of Africa is that the threat from terrorists operating in weak states is greater than from

those operating in failed states. This implies the need for a much greater focus on 

supporting counterterrorism in Kenya than has been the case so far. At the operational 

level, we conclude that effectively reducing terrorist threats requires carefully tailored 

policies that only rarely involve a direct foreign military intervention. In weak states like 

Kenya, direct military involvement may not be an option. Foreign military presence in 

weak states can actually discredit government counterterror efforts and risks creating 

incentives for the host government to tolerate low levels of terrorist activity. In failed

states like Somalia, empowering local authorities and clans who can police their territory 

and compete with terrorist organizations for local support may yield even greater 

dividends in fighting terrorism. Maintaining and demonstrating the ability to judiciously 

strike emerging terrorist targets of opportunity also reduces these regions’ value as safe 

havens. 

Al-Qa’ida learned two distinct lessons in Somalia. First, they discovered that the 

youth were more attracted to the benefits of joining the jihad than others. Throughout the 

Harmony documents in this report, al-Qa’ida operatives discuss the zeal with which 

youth participated in jihadi operations and their relative susceptibility to propaganda and 

recruitment. However, the enthusiastic reactions of a few young men did not translate 

into wide-spread recruiting success for a variety of reasons discussed in Chapter 3. 

Second, al-Qa’ida, like other terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, 

learned that providing social services in the form of security and economic favors helped 

build a base of support for jihadi efforts. But competition to provide such services from

clans and other local powers made it prohibitively expensive for al-Qa’ida to win 

widespread support through this strategy.1

 

 

1

 Harmony, AFGP-2002-6000053, 5-6. See also Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, trans.

William McCants (West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). Al-Qa’ida strategists recognize 

the importance of providing social services in weakly governed areas in gaining legitimacy and popular 

63
Conditions in the Horn of Africa may preclude the slow creep of al-Qa’ida and 

other associated movements without any overt actions on the part of the U.S. or other 

friendly governments. With the possible exception of Kenya, the Horn of Africa has been 

an inhospitable environment for jihadi organizations.2

 Multiple internal documents used 

in this study suggest that local conditions will likely thwart al-Qa’ida’s efforts. In fact, 

open and well-publicized U.S. initiatives in the area could possibly enhance al-Qa’ida’s 

efforts rather them weaken them. There are subtle initiatives that can make it more 

difficult for terrorists to operate in or from the Horn and magnify the challenges this 

environment poses. The next section provides specific recommendations on how the U.S. 

and other nations can enhance efforts to prevent terrorism in the Horn of Africa and 

elsewhere. Our final section identifies several key issues for the future.

II. Policy Recommendations 

Our analysis of al-Qa’ida’s experiences in this region, informed by primary source 

evidence from the Harmony database, leads to a number of regional and country-specific 

recommendations for the Horn. This section first identifies three general prescriptions for 

combating terrorism in the region and globally. We then detail a series of measures for 

combating terrorism in failed states and a separate set of measures for weak states. 

A. General Policy Prescriptions Generated by al-Qa’ida’s Experiences in the Horn of 

Africa

1. Prioritize counterterrorism efforts on weak states–not failed ones.

Failed states are difficult places for terrorists to operate. Security is problematic, local 

allies are unreliable, transportation and supplies are expensive and Western 

counterterrorism forces can operate freely.3

 For a variety of reasons, weakly governed 

states often provide a more conducive environment for terrorists. Their sovereignty 

provides a measure of protection against strikes by Western forces. They often have a 

richer target set than failed states which have been abandoned by tourists and businesses. 

Their weak law enforcement capacity does little to increase operational risks to the 

terrorists. 

2. Strike an effective balance between security and development.

Finding the proper balance between security and development continues to dog U.S. 

policy and programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most current nation-building efforts focus 

 support. However, the security risks such higher profile activities currently entail inhibit al-Qa’ida from

aggressively pursuing them. 2

 Al-Qa’ida’s failure to sustain its presence in Sudan is another example from the region. In this case, 

tactical overreach, exacerbated by inhospitable local conditions, led to al-Qa’ida’s demise. Although Hasan 

al-Turabi’s Islamist government invited bin Laden to Sudan in 1992, it turned on him as soon as his 

presence threatened the value of controlling the Sudanese state. Later, the regime kicked Ayman alZawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad out of Sudan for posing a threat to their control of the state by usurping

the prerogatives of the Sudanese intelligence services. Relatively strong states like Sudan may provide the 

best safe havens, but they often rapidly turn on organizations operating from their territory when such

organizations become too strong or begin to bring unfavorable outside pressure. 3

 Security concerns and logistical expenses are the main reasons that Abu Hafs suggested holding training 

courses in Khartoum after visiting newly developed camps in Somalia. Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597, 1. 

64
on incremental military efforts to secure areas followed by slow, subsidized economic 

advancement. These efforts take large amounts of time, money and will. The reverse 

paradigm is also problematic. Resources devoted to economic improvement are quickly 

seized by criminal elements and rival factions in the absence of adequate security. 

One way to strike the proper balance is to focus more on improving the capacity 

of local business interests to develop their own security infrastructure. The Somali case

provides an example of how this can work. In late 2006, Somali clan leaders and 

businessmen in the Mogadishu area determined that a protracted guerrilla war against the 

advancing Ethiopian Army would be “bad for business.” In order to protect their 

economic interests, they prevented the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) from reentering 

the capital in December 2006. While the CIC was accepted so long as it provided order, 

Somali business interests kept it out when it did not.4

 Rather than focusing on building a 

security architecture that secures an unemployed, poor and restless populace ripe for 

radical recruitment, more pragmatic aid policies might support local actors with an 

economic interest in imposing favorable security conditions. 

3. Sponsor efforts in weakly governed states that create the right incentives to effectively 

combat terrorist threats.

Successful counterterrorism policies in weakly governed states prone to corruption must 

address the challenge that governments in such states have strong reasons to prefer a low 

level of terrorist activity over no activity.5

 Simply put, low levels of terrorism often bring 

significant security assistance from Western nations but do little to reduce economic 

activity or hurt the political prospects of incumbent leaders. External assistance 

conditioned solely on the presence of terrorism in effect rewards state failure to invest in 

the types of local activities needed to effectively address the problem.

6

 Overcoming these 

challenges requires creating incentives that promote effective, internally generated and

sustainable counterterrorism measures tailored to unique local conditions. There are three 

steps to crafting the right policies. 

 

4

 Recent events are hard to interpret, but do not dramatically change our core assessment that Somali 

business interests prevented the CIC from returning to the capital. Two possibilities seem most likely with

respect to current events: The first is that the recent violence in Mogadishu is being driven by clan leaders 

deeply dissatisfied with the Transitional Federal Government’s attempts to assert control over economic 

activity. The second is that the violence is driven by competition between the Hawiye clan and the Darood

clan of interim President Abdullahi Yusuf. While there is simply insufficient evidence to fully understand 

the dynamics of this rapidly evolving situation, it does highlight the fact that a desire among Somali

business and clan interests to end civil conflict does not necessarily mean they will support or tolerate a 

strong central state that could impinge on their prerogatives. For a good summary of conflicts that could be 

driving current violence see Harun Hassan and Cedric Barnes, “A Return to Clan-Politics (or Worse) in

Southern Somalia?” Social Science Research Council, March 27, 2007. 5

 Chapter 2 outlines this dynamic and Chapter 4 explores how it creates problems in Kenya. 6

 A similar dynamic is seen in the history of the West’s efforts to address poverty and bring economic

development to these same weak states. For example, African countries receiving the most economic aid in

the 1960’s remain the poorest, most poverty stricken nations. Influxes of aid to corrupt central governments 

rarely translated into effective programs tailored to local conditions. See William Easterly, The White 

Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New

York: Penguin, 2006). 

65
First, use low-level engagement to determine why weak states tolerate terrorism. 

Leaders and institutions in weak states at both state and local levels have a variety of 

reasons to prefer low levels of terrorist activity rather than eradicate it completely, such 

as opportunities to use counterterrorism assistance funds to buy political allies and the 

ability to use support for Western counterterrorism policy priorities to ward off 

diplomatic pressure on issues like democratization and economic reform. Because no 

senior officials will admit having any tolerance for terrorism, high-level diplomatic 

contacts or military exchanges between senior officers will not provide an accurate 

picture. Active engagement at mid and lower institutional levels is necessary. 

Second, promote activities that target the sources–not just the symptoms–of state 

incentives to tolerate terror. As the level of terrorism in weak states declines, the weight 

of economic and security assistance should shift to activities that help reduce corruption 

and improve the professionalism and competence of state internal security and law 

enforcement capacity.7

 Third, condition counterterrorism assistance on demonstrated 

effort to combat terror. 8 Conditioning aid on the level of the terrorist threat in a given

target state creates perverse incentives to reduce terrorism only to the point where the 

gains from reducing terror are offset by the loss in aid that will follow from fully 

eradicating the threat. Conditioning aid on a reduction of terrorism also has drawbacks. 

States may avoid efforts to get tough on terror which “stir the hornets’ nest” and increase 

the level of terrorist activities in the short term. Assistance strategies that reward a state’s 

effort to combat terrorism avoid both problems.9

 

 

7

 For example, Philippine Ramon Magsaysay, Philippine Defense Secretary and later President, is credited

with turning the tide of the 1946-1954 Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion, an early incarnation of what is known

now as the Communist Terrorist Movement in the Philippines. Magsaysay shifted from the more 

indiscriminate “Mailed Fist” policies favored early on by President Manuel A. Roxas, and instead focused 

on institutional reform within the Philippine constabulary and military to enhance effectiveness and reduce 

corruption that was challenging efforts to address the Huk rebels at local levels. 8

 The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) used to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. security 

assistance disbursements is one example of the type of initiative needed to achieve this. Beginning in 2003, 

PART indicators were developed by region to measure the overall performance of recipients of military

assistance. In Latin America, for example, the success of military assistance was measured using indicators 

that included: (1) number of terrorist attacks against the Cano Limon pipeline; (2) percentage of countries 

that volunteer for coalition operations when requested by the United States; and (3) percentage of U.S. 

security assistance recipients that have civilians in senior defense and leadership positions. U.S. 

Department of State report on Military Assistance accessed at 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28973.pdf. Another way to credibly condition aid would be 

to ensure legislation funding counterterrorism assistance requires regular low-level evaluations of

supported states’ counterterrorism efforts. For example, legislation funding the $135 million AntiTerrorism Assistance program could be written to prohibit providing aid to states that received a negative 

evaluation for effort in the previous fiscal year. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of AntiTerrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA) teams implementing the program in various countries would be 

responsible for the evaluation. For details on similar such restrictions see P.L. 87-195, Sections 571-574. 9

 Emphasis on providing counter terrorism training is key to effective security assistance efforts. The 

appropriate mix of CT and other professional military and police training versus provision of weapons and 

equipment must be carefully assessed. Arming and equipping corrupt military and police forces is

inherently risky and often leads to unintended and dangerous consequences. 

66
B. Countering Terrorism in Failed States: The Case of Somalia

Countering terrorism in failed states presents a unique set of problems that are quite 

different from those in weak states. In many cases, preventing the rise of terrorism in 

failed states may require little action on the part of the U.S. and other Western nations. 

The case study in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the threat of terrorism from Somalia has 

yet to materialize as predicted. We believe the inherent challenges of operating in a failed 

state combine with specific local factors to make Somalia an unfavorable place for 

foreign terrorists to operate in or from. There are a number of policies that can ensure that 

Somalia remains an inhospitable place for jihadis. Some of these concepts may also be 

applicable to other failed states around the globe. 

1. Prevent the creation of a Somali state based on jihadi ideology, accept one based on

Islam.

Any functioning Somali state is likely to be highly religious. However, it need not be a 

threat. Indeed, even the CIC initially said it would not allow its territory to be used as a 

staging ground for international jihad. One way to ensure a favorable outcome may be to 

provide aid resources through clan leaders who may be intensely religious but who are 

too pragmatic to allow their territory to be used for transnational jihad. Doing so has the 

added benefit of reinforcing patrimonial behavior that, as our case study of Somalia 

shows, inhibits terrorist recruitment. This policy may be inefficient in terms of delivering 

aid to individual Somalis, but it is the most feasible alternative in the absence of any state 

method for distribution of aid and provisions. 

Another method to reduce the chances of a jihadi state emerging in Somalia is to 

leverage the divisions between Somalis and foreign jihadis created by differences in 

Islamic ideology. The Somali version of Sufi Islam proved incompatible with the 

puritanical Salafi Islam preached by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. One reason al-Qa’ida 

encountered such difficulties in Somalia is that the locals were largely uninterested in the 

ideology al-Qa’ida was promoting. Policy makers might look to support this bulwark 

against jihadi ideology by working through intermediaries to support appropriate Somali 

Sufi sects. Doing so would require a better understanding of subtle ideological 

differences than currently exists within the U.S. government. Limited intelligence and a 

dearth of experts on the ideological alignments of Somali clans make this task difficult to 

accomplish but it is nevertheless essential. 

2. Selectively empower local authority structures in failed states.

Empowering local authorities in failed states can be problematic. Many such authorities 

are undemocratic, disrespect human rights, engage in irredentist politics and exploit local 

resources for illicit purposes.10 However, some local authorities also provide effective 

governance, greatly enhancing the welfare of the people living under their control and 

stability in the area. Whatever the merits of their rule, local authorities often have strong 

reasons to oppose those who would upset local conditions by doings things like using

 

10 E.g., the Afghan drug trade, the trade in diamonds that funded local militias during the civil war in Sierra

Leone, or the tacit support Kurdish rebels fighting in Turkey received during the mid-1990s from the 

leaders of what is now Iraqi Kurdistan.

67
their territory to attack Western targets.11 Groups like al-Qa’ida pose a competitive threat 

to local leaders’ ability to tax the population, bring the threat of increased external 

attention and, as the Somali experience shows, risk being labeled as unwelcome foreign 

occupiers. Local authorities can be so effective at inhibiting foreign terrorists that in 

February 1993 one al-Qa’ida operative writes that in the Somali jihad, “The second 

period will be all against tribe leaders....”12 Al-Qa’ida’s recruitment efforts continue to 

target youth in failed states. The most effective way to fight these efforts is to minimize 

the benefits of membership in al-Qa’ida and raise the benefits of remaining loyal to their 

clan leaders or other local authorities. 

Development in poor areas might reinforce loyalty to clan and local leaders. 

However, it is not clear that Western nations know how to foster state-centric economic 

development in failed states. A more pragmatic approach might be to reinforce the kinds 

of clan and tribe loyalties that prevented al-Qa’ida from making significant recruiting 

inroads in Somalia. Economic aid, and potentially security assistance, should be directed 

to those clans that: (1) maintain an ideology counter to Salafi-jihadi doctrine; (2) provide 

effective and non-oppressive governance over their people; and (3) have the ability to 

provide a security buffer against terrorist interests. The U.S. and its allies should avoid 

overtly employing military forces to implement any such development strategy. Instead, 

they should work with NGOs and other development institutions that are better suited for 

providing aid, understand local power structures and have regional and country experts 

on hand to monitor program effectiveness. From a counterterrorism perspective, 

empowering local leaders, especially when it comes at the expense of an ineffectual 

central government, may actually reduce terrorists’ operational freedom. 

Respect for state sovereignty and international law will prevent the U.S. from

supporting separatist or irredentist claims. Short of endorsing their political agenda, 

however, the U.S. should support local leaders who exhibit greater potential to provide 

good governance than the central state. Doing so may yield more effective policing of a 

given territory and deny terrorists safe haven. In Somalia, such a policy would mean 

supporting locally generated government in the absence of governance from the center. 

For example, there are counterrorism benefits to be gained by working through the 

United Nations to establish Somaliland and Puntland as effectively governed autonomous 

regions and providing targeted international aid and assistance to these areas. In addition 

to supporting the relatively responsible leaders who have made things better for their 

populations, such a strategy can help isolate and contain the more dangerous potential 

safe haven of southern Somalia. 

3. Publicize the elitist nature of al-Qa’ida’s fighters and their disrespect for Somalis. 

It is clear that on several occasions al-Qa’ida’s Arab operatives thought themselves 

superior to the native Africans they encountered. We see this in the cavalier attitude taken 

towards Kenyan and Tanzanian Muslims in the 1998 Embassy bombings. Working to 

 

11 Indeed, in 1997 the Taliban leadership allegedly invited Osama bin Laden to move from Jalalabad to

Kandahar so that they could more effectively monitor his activities. Wright, The Looming Tower, 226, 245,

247. 12 Harmony, AFGP-2002-800600, 2.

68
publicize the derisive attitude many al-Qa’ida operatives have towards the locals may 

reduce the ability of foreign jihadis to operate in African countries. Any U.S. efforts to 

directly promote this discussion through Western media outlets will likely be seen as 

propaganda. However, facilitating the discussion of this issue through academic and 

political forums in Africa and the Middle East may be possible. There are many 

journalistic and academic accounts of al-Qa’ida’s disdain for segments of the African 

population. Bringing these discussions forward through the funding of debates and 

research initiatives may assist in shedding more light on this cleavage. 

4. Work through surrogates whenever possible to provide interdiction and maintain the 

capability to conduct covert and/or clandestine surgical strikes against high value targets.

Whenever possible, the U.S. and its allies should rely on countries within the region to 

deal with terrorism within their own borders. Any large scale U.S. military action is 

likely to create more terrorists than it eliminates and will serve to confirm al-Qa’ida’s 

claims that the U.S. has imperialistic ambitions in the region, claims which appear to be 

viewed with skepticism by many Africans. Moreover, regional military interventions that 

cross state borders may fare no better. Recent violence against Ethiopian troops in 

Somalia suggests that any foreign force, be it American, African or jihadi, will meet 

strong local resistance in Somalia. Engaging at the lowest possible level, often with substate actors, may be the most effective approach to putting military pressure on terrorists 

operating in failed states. However, as recent actions in Somalia demonstrate, a capacity 

for U.S. or U.S.-sponsored overt, covert and/or clandestine surgical strikes raises the risks 

for al-Qa’ida and associated movements to operate in Somalia. 

5. Implement strategies of graduated containment around failed states.

Somalia demonstrates that al-Qa’ida is likely to flounder in areas where: (1) it is difficult 

and costly for any organization to operate; (2) Salafi ideology clashes with local strains of 

Islam; and (3) clan and familial powers are likely to resist the expansion of al-Qa’ida’s 

influence. When al-Qa’ida ventures into such regions, efficient strategies to degrade alQa’ida’s effectiveness may entail refraining from hunting al-Qa’ida directly and instead 

seeking to contain and monitor it in those areas. 

In the Horn, such a strategy of graduated containment would create a ring of 

security around the failed state of southern Somalia such that al-Qa’ida may be able to 

enter the region but will not be able to project any power from it nor sustain long-term 

operations. The outer ring would involve continued diplomatic engagement and civil 

society capacity-building in Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya. The next ring would 

include enhanced border controls, law enforcement efforts and economic development in 

the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and on the coast of Kenya. The final ring would include 

supporting autonomy for Somaliland and Puntland. These two states-within-a-state treat 

their people well by regional standards and can be used as buffer zones against the failed 

state of southern Somalia. By granting them a measure of recognition, it becomes easier 

to support economic development as well as their efforts to secure their borders, thereby 

narrowing al-Qa’ida’s operational space. 

69
C. Countering Terrorism in Weak States: The Case of Kenya

Weak states pose a unique policy dilemma for Western counterterrorism efforts. Because 

they are sovereign the U.S. and other nations cannot directly intervene. Instead, the U.S. 

and others must rely on weak states’ efforts to serve a global end. However, these states 

lack sufficient capacity to fully interdict terrorists’ efforts. Additionally, weak states 

provide a plethora of Western targets which, combined with a permissive operating 

environment, presents terrorists with a distinct advantage over U.S. counterterrorism

forces. Dealing with weak states in the Horn and globally will require a delicate 

assessment of each country’s dynamics, capacity and motivation. 

1. Focus efforts on coastal Kenya as a key battle ground against al-Qa’ida.

The Kenyan coast provides the best opportunity in the Horn for al-Qa’ida and its 

associated movements to operate and project force. Not as anarchic as Somalia, coastal 

Kenya provides a permissive environment for jihadis. Terrorists operating there are 

shielded from U.S. military action by Kenyan sovereignty and find a sympathetic 

population from which to draw support. While casting Kenya as a terrorist stronghold 

would be an overstatement, the internal divisions between Kenya’s coastal population 

and Kenya’s central government do provide a mobilizing issue for Islamist terrorism. 

Elements of the disaffected population of Mombasa, a recurring location for terrorists 

seeking safe haven, may tolerate the presence of al-Qa’ida and AIAI operatives. At the 

very least, they will be slow to report suspicious activity to the central government, which 

Muslims believe to be corrupt and repressive. 

2. Use targeted aid to raise al-Qa’ida’s operating costs in at-risk areas in weak states. 

Pursuing development and foreign aid that helps rural disaffected populations in coastal 

Kenya will not only earn good will and legitimacy for the central government, but will 

also increase the price terrorists need to pay to buy local assistance and acquiescence.

Removing local tolerance of al-Qa’ida activities and preventing the emergence of safe 

havens requires persistent development and law enforcement efforts. 

Current efforts by the U.S. military are popular among local Muslims but are seen 

as too small in scale and clearly tied to counterterrorism and not economic development. 

The U.S. should increase economic development and government capacity beginning in 

Lamu and working back along the coast towards Mombasa. A sustained commitment to 

improving the economic status of coastal Kenyans is likely to produce three benefits. 

First, it will increase intelligence on terrorist activities. Second, it will decrease the 

political costs Kenyan politicians pay for supporting U.S. counterterrorism priorities, and 

so increase their level of cooperation. Third, increased economic aid raises the cost to 

terrorists of providing social services as a buy-in mechanism for their larger goals. 

One area of common interest which would indirectly support counterterrorism

efforts is counter-narcotics operations. Kenyan Muslim leaders have grown increasingly 

concerned with the influx of illicit drugs along the coast.13 By working with coastal 

Muslims to counter narcotics, the U.S. would: (1) illustrate that it respects the values of 

 

13 Author interview, Nairobi, March 9, 2007. 

70
the Muslim religion; (2) assist Kenya in reducing criminal activity; (3) improve border 

control thus minimizing the ability of terrorists to move through Kenya; and (4) improve 

the reputation of Kenyan law enforcement. The U.S. could provide police and customs 

advisors to the Kenyan Coastal Police for improving law enforcement and interdiction 

capacity as well as transparency. 

3. Promote greater pluralism and participation in the political process by engaging

Muslim political parties and candidates through NGOs and IGOs.

Kenya boasts a lively democratic political process. Although a minority, Muslims 

actively seek government office along Kenya’s coast. An effort that might truly 

undermine terrorist ideology is the support of Muslims seeking elected office.14 U.S. 

support should be directed to NGOs that assist Muslim political organizations, which 

have often been unrepresented in Kenyan government and discouraged by their lack of

access to the democratic process. Doing this will make support for U.S. counterterrorism

priorities among Kenyan politicians more viable. These activities should aim to: (1) 

garner support for Muslim politicians who reject the Salafi ideology of al-Qa’ida and 

like-minded terrorist groups; and (2) elevate the capacity, education and rights of coastal 

Muslims, who have had limited opportunity to date, thereby making them less likely to 

tolerate a jihadi presence. 

4. Identify and subsidize institutional reforms that will reap indirect rewards in 

counterterrorism.

The greatest threats to the security of Kenyan citizens are disease and crime. Helping the 

Kenyan government address these top concerns, especially on the coast, will make 

Kenyans more likely to report suspicious activities and might encourage them to more

aggressively oppose terrorist influences. Improving health care and criminal justice may 

thus do more to combat terrorism than policies that specifically seek to enhance 

“counterterrorism” or “antiterrorism” capacities. Two policy efforts that would meet this 

goal are: (1) conditioning security assistance on criminal justice reforms such as 

increased professionalism among police officers and prosecutors; and (2) focusing aid on 

the health care system. 

5. Condition security assistance on Kenyan effort to combat terrorism. 

The massive amounts of counterterrorism-related funding provided by the U.S. means 

Kenyan officials may actually gain from having a continuing terrorist threat in their state. 

There are two ways to ease this problem. First, security assistance can be refocused to

areas which offer fewer opportunities for patronage than direct payments for military 

hardware, such as increased police training, governance training and anti-corruption 

efforts. Second, policy-makers can take advantage of low- and mid-level contacts with 

the Kenyan security service to evaluate how counterterrorism funding is actually being 

used by the Kenyan government. If it turns out that Kenyan government institutions are 

less than fully devoted to counterterrorism or are using security assistance funds for 

 

14 In Lamu district, there is currently at least one female Muslim candidate running for office and she 

appears to be both well respected and receiving some base of support. 

71
patronage purposes, future security assistance should be explicitly linked to improved 

effort. 

III. Future Prospects for Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

Outside of Kenya, the prospects for a serious terrorist threat to emerge in the Horn of

Africa seem quite low. The region has consistently proven much less hospitable to 

foreign jihadis than conventional wisdom has suggested. Engaging with sub-national 

authorities in failed states like Somalia will ensure this remains the case. A strategy of

graduated containment can effectively minimize the threat when such engagement fails. 

Inside Kenya, institutional reforms in the law enforcement sector and economic 

development on the coast are the key to preventing the emergence of terrorist safe 

havens. Direct military assistance will have limited impact given the political constraints 

on the Kenyan government. Moreover, substantial military assistance conditioned on the 

threat of terrorism creates counter-productive incentives to tolerate low levels of jihadi 

activity because fully eradicating the threat means losing the security assistance. Instead, 

counterterrorism efforts should focus on reducing the factors–weak police capacity and 

disgruntled citizens willing to tolerate the presence of foreign militants–that make Kenya, 

or any weak state for that matter, a valuable operational haven for terrorists. 

Elsewhere in the Horn of Africa, the potential for terrorism directed at Western 

targets seems low. There are few lucrative targets and local insurgent organizations have 

few incentives to attack Western targets. They also have few incentives to ally 

themselves to the global jihadi movement. Doing so would bring a dramatic increase in 

security pressure without a concomitant increase in resources or recruits. However, given 

the region’s history as a venue for terrorist attacks, continued vigilance is required. The 

policy recommendations outlined in this report provide guidance for how best to pursue

this goal. By focusing efforts on weak states, working through local allies at the lowest 

possible level and supporting institutional reforms that eliminate incentives to tolerate 

low levels of terrorism, policy makers can efficiently ensure that a greater threat does not 

develop in this important region. 

72
Appendices to Part I

A. Case Studies of Regional Terrorist Groups 

B. Cast of Characters from the Horn of Africa 

C. Notes and Interviews from Kenya 

73
74
APPENDIX A 

CASE STUDIES OF REGIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS 

I. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) 

II. Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EJIM) 

75
76
I. Somalia's al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI; Islamic Union) 

The Rise of al-Ittihad al-Islami

Al-Ittihad al-Islami (The Islamic Union) is one of the most widely discussed Islamist 

groups from the Horn of Africa, yet its ties to the global jihadi movement remain 

obscure. The lack of clarity stems from the fluidity of organizational alliances in 

Somalia; it is often difficult to confirm formal ties between jihadi groups, and this is 

particularly true in the Somali landscape. Despite that fact, AIAI it is known to have had 

ties at the highest levels of leadership to global jihadi groups, including al-Qa’ida. 

Now essentially defunct, the group rose to prominence in the 1980s and its 

influence peaked in 1992; yet its leadership remains active in Somalia and does present a 

threat for further al-Qa’ida influence in the country. Al-Ittihad was established in the 

early 1980s through the merger of Salafi groups that enjoyed popularity in Somalia in the 

1960s and 1970s, largely as a result of their attempts to regain lost Somali land after 

independence and resistance to dictator Siad Barre and Western influence. As such, they 

gained the support of the Somali people through nationalist causes more than through a 

common affinity for Salafism; indeed the ideology was widely unpopular in the county in 

previous years. 

Salafi ideology was first introduced to Somalia in the 1940s by scholars trained in 

Saudi Arabia. Somali Muslims were predominately Shafi`i Sunnis and there was a longstanding tradition of Sufism in the Horn of Africa, making it initially a difficult grounds 

for the ideology to spread. Local scholars issued fatwas banning Salafi ideology from 

being propagated. With independence in 1960, however, political tendencies had 

changed. The Somali government looked to the West for technical assistance in 

modernizing as Islamic revivalist movements influenced by Salafism, namely the Muslim 

Brotherhood, called for resistance to Western influence, coinciding with traditional 

scholars' frustration with Western involvement in the country. 

The oil boom of the 1970s and 80s brought Somali workers to the Gulf, the 

majority of them to Saudi Arabia. Reportedly thousands of Somalis were also offered 

scholarships during these years to study at Saudi institutions, and most ended up at the 

three most prominent Salafi educational institutions—the Islamic University of Medina, 

Umm al-Qura` in Mecca and Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh. This 

development, along with the changing internal dynamics in Somalia, transformed the 

country from one hostile to Salafi thought into one receptive to its order, militancy, and 

vision for a rigid implementation of Islamic law. 

Some of the nascent Salafi centers, in the suburbs of Mogadishu and in northern 

Somalia in particular, began to gain a steady following of worshippers, coming to daily 

prayers but also seeking instruction on tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis), and regular lectures on 

a variety of religious, social and political issues. Like most other Salafi movements, these 

were focused on doctrinal matters and attempting to instill an understanding of the 

shari`a in its followers, creating a loyal segment of Somali society dedicated to the 

77
eventual implementation of Islamic law in Somalia. Chief among these organizations was 

al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya. 

It is common among militant Salafi groups for the leadership to have studied at 

Salafi institutions in Saudi Arabia while rejecting the legitimacy of the Saudi royal 

family. Somali Islamist groups have been no exception. Leaders such as Shaykh `Ali 

Warsame were training in Saudi Salafi institutions while working with social-activist 

minded Islamists akin to the Muslim Brotherhood movement. His group, Wahdat alShabab al-Islamiyya (Unity of Islamic Youth), partnered with al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya 

and, at the same time between 1982-84, the leadership of these two organizations merged 

and renamed itself al-Ittihad al-Islami. Warsame became a key leader in the new 

organization, and the leadership from the parent organizations largely remained unique. 

The Global Jihadi Presence in Somalia

The early 1990s brought further chaos and violence to the country, especially northern 

Somalia and Mogadishu, with the fall of the Siad Barre regime. Al-Ittihad had been 

openly denouncing the Barre regime, and amid the onset of civil war and growing 

lawlessness, the organization was transformed from one spreading the message of Salafi 

Islam to one engaged in armed conflict. Another key development that occurred during 

this time was the emergence of Dahir Hasan Aweys as the leader of the military wing of 

al-Ittihad, waging battles against rival clans and warlords fighting for control of the 

country. He was one of the group's leaders to establish ties with other militant Islamist 

groups, including al-Qa’ida members based in Sudan. Al-Ittihad enlisted thousands of 

fighters during the early 1990s. 

Following a conference in 1991 (during which time al-Ittihad was attempting to 

exercise control in the power vacuum of Somali politics), `Ali Warsame was serving as a 

head of the group with Aweys as the leader of the military wing. From this point forward, 

al-Ittihad began receiving substantial funding from wealthy Saudi individuals and 

ostensibly charitable organizations like the Muslim World League and the International 

Islamic Relief Organization—two organizations known to be financial supporters of alQa’ida. 

Al-Ittihad militants attacked foreign aid workers in Somalia and continued to 

launch attacks against rival factions. They took over and maintained control of some 

areas of Somalia and implemented strict versions of Islamic law there. Members of the 

group traveled freely throughout the Horn and established an extensive network in 

Kenya. 

While al-Ittihad was attempting to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, al-Qa’ida 

was sending funding, arms and fighters to support the Islamists, and shared the same 

goal—the creation of an Islamic state in Somalia—although their support was not solely 

directed toward the al-Ittihad organization. Bin Laden acknowledged in two interviews 

that he supplied arms and training to the mujahidin who killed 18 American soldiers 

during Operation Restore Hope in October, 1993. Reports published by CNN and others 

78
indicate that bin Laden provided these materials to the fighters under the warlord 

Muhammad Farah Aideed, who had affiliated himself with al-Ittihad. (Aideed plotted the 

coup against Siad Barre, and also switched his loyalties among various Islamist and tribal 

groups in Somalia during the early 1990s.) Such links were typical of al-Qa’ida’s 

involvement in Somalia, given the fluidity of leadership and organizational structure 

among the militant groups. 

Beginning in 1992, Muhammad Atef (aka Abu Hafs al-Masri) made multiple trips 

to Somalia from al-Qa’ida's base in Khartoum and met with militant leaders, accessed 

capabilities and made connections to provide training and arms to fighters there. The aim 

of these visits, according to the indictment against him by the U.S. Department of Justice, 

was to support local forces in attacking U.S. and UN forces in Somalia. It also coincided 

with a fatwa from bin Laden in 1993 calling for attacks on Western interests in Somalia. 

This culminated in the deaths of 18 U.S. military personnel on October 3-4, 1993, when 

three helicopters were downed by al-Qa’ida trained Somali militants. 

Some analysts believe bin Laden devoted up to $3 million towards the 

establishment of an Islamic state administered by al-Ittihad al-Islami. The purpose of this 

investment can be understood in terms of bin Laden's and his senior aides' desire to find 

alternate bases for their operations. Despite denials from bin Laden and Somali militants 

at various times of al-Qa’ida involvement in these battles, it is hard to deny the group's 

participation at some level in Somali militancy during this time, or the fact that bin Laden 

and others eyed Somalia as a potential safe haven for their organization. 

In the following years, al-Ittihad was greatly weakened and began dissolving. 

One of the group's long-term aims was to reclaim Ogaden, the Somali-inhabited land in 

eastern Ethiopia, yet the group seems to have underestimated the resolve of the Ethiopian 

military, which determined to eradicate al-Ittihad in 1996. Although some members 

participated in the Islamic Courts Union that came to power a decade later, this was more 

a matter of leadership regrouping than a continuation of the at-Ittihad organization. 

According to one analyst: 

“Al-Ittihad al-Islami is now largely defunct. It never 

recovered completely from Ethiopia's cross-border rout 

of the organization in 1996. While some members of 

AIAI joined the Islamic courts, most notably Aweys, the 

courts movement was distinct from AIAI and should not 

be considered a reincarnated version of it.”1

 

Despite questions about the level of al-Qa’ida's involvement in Somalia since the 

early 1990s, the statements by the group's senior leaders and strategists make clear the 

importance placed on Somalia for the global jihad movement. Additionally, during the 

late 1990s, mid-level operatives such as Harun Fazul and Wadih al-Hage were active in 

the Horn of Africa, in Nairobi and Mogadishu, while plotting the U.S. Embassy 

 

1 Marquardt, "Al-Qaeda's Threat to Ethiopia."

79
bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Indeed, the lack of attacks on Western interests 

in Somalia is probably due to the fact that very few of them exist there, and the impact of 

actions are felt far greater on targets in other countries. 

80
Sources:

“Al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Federation of American Scientists <http://www.fas.org/> 

Accessed 11 February 2007. 

“Al-Zawahiri yatahadi Bush fi al-`Iraq wa yatawa`id al-Ithiubiyin fi al-Sumal.” Elaph, 

January 23, 2007. 

Boukhars, Anouar. “Understanding Somali Islamism.” Terrorism Monitor 4:10 (2006). 

Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. London: I.B. Taurus, 2003. 

“Hargeysa Judicial Court Acquits ‘Hassan Dahir Aweys’ Of Terrorism.” Somaliland 

Times, December 9, 2006. 

“Hikmatiyar: Sa`adna bin Ladin `ala al-farar min Tura Bura; najat qiyadi: al-Qa`ida alkibar fi al-Sumal.” Al-Sharq al-Awsa, January 12, 2007. 

International Crisis Group, “Somalia's Islamists.” Africa Report N°100 (2005). 

Marquardt, Erich. “Al-Qaeda's Threat to Ethiopia.” Terrorism Monitor, 3: 3 (2005). 

Sii'arag, Duale A. “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited 

Regions in the Horn of Africa.” <http://www.somaliawatch.org> Accessed 12 February 

2007. 

“Somali Fighters: We'll Heed al Qaeda's Call.” CNN. January 6, 2007. 

 

Terdman, Moshe, and Deborah Touboul. “Al-Qaeda in Africa.” Islam in Africa 

Newsletter 2:1 (2007). 

U.S. Central Command. Al-Qaeda Leaders, Jihadist Websites on Somali Islamists. 

<http://www.centcom.mil/> Accessed 10 February 2007. 

Winter, Joseph. “Profile: Somalia's Islamist Leader.” BBC News. June 30, 2006. 

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5120242.stm> 

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82
II. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EJIM) 

Eritrean separatism began in earnest during World War II, as Eritrea passed from Italian 

to British rule in 1941 and remained under British administration until 1950. The initial 

constitution in 1952 was ratified by Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, but Eritrea and 

Ethiopia were linked through a federal system, under the sovereignty of the emperor. 

Eritreans resisted Ethiopian rule and began armed struggle for their independence in 

1958. 

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) began activity in 1975 when a 

group of Islamist-minded guerrillas split off from the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) that 

had been fighting since the beginning of the Eritrean independence movement. The EIJM 

was formally established in 1980. Since independence in 1993, the EIJM (and its 

factions) have been the principal Muslim opposition group in Eritrea, seeking the violent 

overthrow of the ELF government led by President Isaias Afewerki. EIJM claims to only 

target the Eritrean government and its apparatus in the country, not Western targets, and 

seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Eritrea. 

The group is based in Sudan and is made up primarily of dissidents from the ELF, 

conservative Eritreans (and some other Muslims from Horn of Africa countries), and a 

Muslim youth network. The group is also known by a variety of other names—the 

Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement, the Abu Suhail organization, the Eritrean Islamic 

Salvation Movement, and the Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development—but 

many of these appear to be break-away groups that operate with some degree of 

autonomy. 

This is reflective of the climate for political and militant Islamic organizations in 

the Horn of Africa. Like other neighboring countries during the last three decades, Eritrea 

saw a number of Salafi organization rise to popularity, where before the mid-1950s the 

ideology had been largely alien to this region. In the 1980s, the Jabhat Tahrir al-Iritriyya 

al-Islamiyya al-Wataniyya (The National Eritrean Islamic Liberation Front), the 

Munzzamat al-Ruwwad al-Muslimin al-Iritria (The Organization of Eritrean Pioneer 

Muslims), al-Intifada al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening) and others were founded, some 

in Sudan. By 1988, these organizations merged to form the EIJM. 

This union of militant Islamists, however, continued to fragment. Within five 

years, a militant Salafi faction emerged under Shaykh Abu Suhail (also known as 

Muhammad Ahmad), who participated in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. He is 

mentioned as the leader of the Eritrean Jihad movement in documents captured from alQa’ida in Afghanistan2

. It is from this connection that some allege EIJM has ties to alQa’ida; its operations in Khartoum may also have put members in contact with al-Qa’ida, 

 

2

 See "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities", Harmony, 

AFGP-2002-801138. 

83
which was also based in Sudan during the early- to mid-1990s. A more moderate faction 

calling for dialogue and reconciliation also emerged within the EIJM opposed to Abu 

Suhail. 

Currently led by Khalil Mohammed Amer, the EIJM today falls under the 

umbrella of opposition group known as the Eritrean National Alliance. This can be a near 

dizzying array of organizations and factions in the Eritrean Islamic scene, but over the 

past decade, they have carried out relatively few successful operations. In 2003 EIJM 

claimed responsibility for a hotel bombing and an ambush killing 46 Eritrean military 

personnel. The group was initially blamed for the 2003 killing of British geologist 

Timothy Nutt, but EIJM denied the claims and reaffirmed its goals only to target the 

Eritrean government. In March 2006, a reincarnation of the EIJM, renamed the Harakat 

al-Islah al-Islamiyya al-Iritri, issued a statement claiming responsibility for five attacks 

over a one month period on Eritrean forces which resulted in the death of five soldiers. 

With its base in Khartoum, the EIJM runs most of its operations in western Eritrea 

near the Sudanese border. Ethiopia temporarily allied with Sudan in the 1988 war 

between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Kalashnikovs and RPGs originating in Sudan have 

been found on EIJM rebels. Sudanese support has not been unconditional or long-term, 

however. While Hasan al-Turabi ruled most of Sudan in the early 1990s, he cracked 

down on some of the EIJM members and closed some of its offices and operations. Sudan 

hosts tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees, and as with other refugee diasporas, there 

was likely fear that they could influence Sudanese politics. 

The main EIJM body led by Khalil Muhammad Amer, as described by its deputy 

Abu al-Bara' Hasan Salman in a 1998 interview with the now-defunct Islamist magazine 

al-Nida', aims to carry out: "Armed struggle and training youth; da`wa [outreach] and 

education... [W]e accompany the Qur'an and Sunnah and aim to fulfill as a group all the 

aims therein and to realize our position as servants of Allah, and to establish the Islamic 

State." He states, "The Islamic Jihad Movement is striving against two groups, the 

Christian regime and the hypocrites. The movement also represents the only military 

option which had proved its fortitude in confronting the Christian regime in Eritrea." 

Salman went on to say, regarding the "external front," which is "very sensitive ... 

from the aspect of our strategic security," that they aim to "exchange our experience and 

expertise with other Muslim organizations which also work to challenge the various 

corrupt regimes in the region... Strive to generate the suitable opportunities to support 

our Jihad through Islamic means; and [m]ove around neighbouring countries and expose 

the corruption of the Eritrean regime and its danger over the entire region on the 

religious, security, and political fronts." 

As is clear from this description, the group has aspirations for uniting with likeminded Islamist groups (the majority of them militant Salafi) and moving toward the 

establishment of an Islamic state. There is thus a legitimate concern that the EJIM would 

seek to cooperation with al-Qa’ida, though the former remains ostensibly dedicated to 

only attacking Eritrean targets. 

84
The Eritrean jihad movements are highly active online, promoting their message, 

providing extensive news coverage of developments and information condemning the 

Eritrean regime in three languages. Websites connected to or maintained by Eritrean 

Islamic Jihad include: (the now defunct) www.eijm.org, www.alkhalas.org (the Eritrean 

Islamic Salvation Movement, renamed the Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and 

Development), www.islaher.org (the Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement), and the more 

moderate news portal awate.com. 

Given the high degree of fragmentation, illustrated by the proliferation of factions 

and continual renaming of the organization, the movement remains ineffective, but not 

inactive. There is a shared set of ideology and goals between al-Qa’ida and the Eritrean 

Jihad movement, but given the absence of high-impact Western targets and the 

disharmony among Eritrean Islamist, it is unlikely al-Qa’ida or the wider global jihad 

movement would become seriously involved in Eritrea. 

Sources:

“Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM).” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database. 

<http://tkb.org> Accessed 19 February 2007. 

“Interview with the Deputy Amir of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - Abul Bara' 

Hassan Salman.” Al-Nida` Magazine (2007). 

Iyob, Ruth. “Shifting Terrain: Dissidence versus Terrorism in Eritrea.” Terrorism in the 

Horn of Africa. United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 113. Washingtno, 

D.C.: USIO Press, 2004. 

Markakis, John. “The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea.” The Journal of Modern African 

Studies, 26:1 (1998): 51-78.

“A Military Statement of the Islamic Eritrean Reform Movement to the Islamic Nation 

and a List of Five Operations Executed in Eritrea.” SITE Institute. 

<http://siteinstitute.org> Accessed 21 February 2007. 

“New Rebel Force in Eritrea.” BBC News. May 2, 2003.

Rabasa, Angel, Chalk, Peter, et al. “Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Islamist 

Universe.” 2 vols. Santa Moncia, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006.

85
86
APPENDIX B 

CAST OF CHARACTERS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA 

I. Abdullah Muhammad Fazul 

II. Abu Hafs al-Masri 

III. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys 

IV. Saif al-Adel 

V. Lesser Members/Affiliates of Al-Qa’ida 

a. Aden Hashi Fara Ayro 

b. Gouled Hasan Dourad 

c. Abu Talha al-Sudani 

87
88
I. Abdullah Muhammad Fazul 

 

Childhood and Adolescence1

Abdullah Muhammad Fazul Husseine Mullah Ati2 (عبد االله محمد فاضل حسين ملا اتي :Arabic (

was born in the district of Magoudjou3 in the town of Moroni, the capital city of Grande 

Comore, the largest of the four4

 Comoros Islands, a tiny former French colony off the 

northeastern coast of Mozambique. Though he has used February 25, 1974 and 

December 25, 1974 as dates of birth on various documents, it is likely that his true date of 

birth is August 25, 1972, a date also used in some documents.5 He was the youngest of 

six children, and his parents separated during his infancy over his father’s decision to 

take a second wife. Not long after in 1975, the Comoros declared its independence from 

France, and it has been politically and economically unstable ever since. There have 

been no fewer than nineteen coups or attempted coups on the islands since independence, 

and lacking any natural resources or industries, the tiny nation is extremely poor.6 There 

are no post-secondary educational institutions on the islands, and all who would seek 

higher learning must do so overseas. 

 

1

 The following sketch of Fazul’s early life is based on information derived from these sources: Hirschkorn, 

“Elusive Al Qaeda Operative”; McNeil, “Assests of a Bombing Suspect”; “On the Trail of Man Wanted for 

Bomb Blast”; Vick, “FBI Trails Embassy Bombing Suspect”; “What Turns a Boy into a Terrorist?” 

2

 Name at birth from wanted poster here: http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=Fazul. 

In the autobiographical document described in “On the Trail of Man Wanted for Bomb Blast,” Fazul gives 

his name at the beginning of the document as follows: “Abdullah Muhammad, a.k.a. `Ali Fadil Husayn 

Mulla Ati, a.k.a. Harun Fazul.” 

3

 “On the Trail of Man Wanted for Bomb Blast.” The Nation (Nairobi), May 13, 2006. 4

 In addition to the three islands under its current jursidiction, the Comoran government lays claim to the 

island of Mayotte, though the latter is currently a French overseas territory. 

5

 Hirschkorn, “Elusive.” His current age is almost invariably cited in media reports in accordance with the 

’72 birthdate – e.g., recent reporting (early 2007) on Fazul gives his age as being 34. When referring to his 

early life, however, different writers give different ages for significant events – thus, different sources give 

his age when first travelling to Pakistan as somewhere between 14 and 18, with a plurality of sources citing 

16. This variance is probably due to the different dates of birth used by Fazul in various documents. 

6

 “Comoros,” C.I.A. World Factbook, < https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/cn.html> 

Accessed 20 February 2007. 

89
 In relative terms, Fazul’s family appear to have been among the small middle 

class of Moroni. One of Fazul’s sisters owned a clothing shop on Magoudjou Street in 

Moroni and his uncle Sagaff Abdullah had a mattress shop on the same street, opposite 

the largest hospital in the Comoros. Fazul’s father was a well-known and respected 

preacher in the islands. Several of the members of Fazul’s father’s family moved to 

Pakistan in the 1970s; such a move would have been far beyond the means of most of the 

islands’ inhabitants. The Moroni home of Fazul’s late mother (d. 1997), where Fazul 

lived during his childhood, is described as “a sizable masonry home in a neighborhood 

where other houses are made of galvanized tin or palm leaves.”7

 In a home video taken 

when Fazul was fifteen years old, one can see that he and the other people in the video 

are well-dressed-Harun wears slacks and a button-up shirt-and that the home is wellappointed; women and men are visible mingling together at the gathering, and none of 

the women wear any kind of head covering.8

 This provides some indication that the 

maternal branch of Fazul’s immediate family was Islamically liberal, which is true of the 

majority of Comoran Muslims.9

 

Fazul had close and enduring relationships with his family, with the exception of 

his father; interviewed at his apartment in central Moroni in 1998, his father claimed to 

have rarely seen his son since childhood.10 Throughout his adult life, Fazul made 

frequent trips home to visit with his mother’s family as well as that of his father-in-law, 

who is Fazul’s paternal uncle. Fazul wrote letters to his family as well, and in at least one 

letter to his brother Omar, who is five years older, he frankly discussed his turn to 

Islamist terrorism. In 1996, Fazul paid for his mother to be flown to Paris for cancer 

treatment; on the very day of the embassy bombings, 7 August 1998, Fazul arranged for 

his father-in-law to be flown from a hospital in Nairobi back to Moroni.11 Despite the 

fact that he has constantly been on the move since joining al-Qa’ida, Fazul has managed 

to keep his wife and children with him for much of the time. 

 

As a child and young teen, Fazul appears by all accounts to have been precocious 

but otherwise normal. He played soccer and the flute, enjoyed dancing to popular music 

-several people remembered him dancing like Michael Jackson-and liked to show off his 

prowess at twirling around kung fu fighting sticks. When playing with others he 

 

7

 Vick, “FBI Trails.” 

8

 “What Turns a Boy Into a Terrorist?” 

9

 The Comoros Islands are 98% Sunni Muslim, though it is common to see women in public there without 

any head coverings. Qat and alcohol are available in shops, and Islamist parties have consistently done 

miserably at the polls in the elections that have punctuated the many Comoran coups. Local people 

interviewed about Fazul generally view him as a villain, and the traditional Muslim leadership there has 

expressed alarm and disapproval at the Saudi-funded incursion of Wahhabism there. The islands’ grand 

mufti stated in 1998, referring to Hasan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front, which had offered 

“scholarships” to Comorans for study at madarasas abroad since the mid-1980s, “We are openly against 

this organization. They are looking for people who are not well in the mind, who are poor, who need new 

visions” (Vick, “FBI Trails Embassy Bombing Suspect”). 10 Vick, “FBI Trails Embassy Bombing Suspect.” 

11 Fazul’s father-in-law died soon thereafter; already in the late stages of a terminal illness, he died of 

injuries sustained when Comoran police tipped him out of his bed during a search following the embassy 

bombings. 

90
sometimes pretended to be James Bond. In other words, he was exposed to and enjoyed 

the kind of Western cultural productions that are anathema to Salafis. 

 

Fazul received a traditional Islamic education in his early years. At the age of 

four he began basic Qur’an studies with an uncle and at seven began attending the 

madrasa of Fundi12 Twawilou Abdulfateh. By age 9 he had memorized much of the 

Qur’an and began in this year to appear on Radio Comoros, reading instructions on 

prayer and other Islamic matters prepared by his Qur’an teacher. At 13, he began to read 

instructions and advice on the radio that he prepared himself. By this point, Fazul had 

learned Swahili, Comorian (related to Swahili), French and Arabic, and had had a good 

deal of exposure to English as well. As an adult he would become fluent in all of these 

tongues. 

 

His first madrasa teacher, Fundi Twawilou, remembers Fazul fondly, recalling 

that he was exceptionally bright; Fazul was two levels ahead of one of his sisters, though 

she was the elder by several years. But Fundi Twawilou also saw the beginnings of 

Fazul’s propensity for violence. He recalls that Fazul often had bouts of rage; he would 

pick fights with older boys on the soccer field, and sometimes administered his own 

corporal punishment to classmates for mistakes in reciting the Qur’an, slamming them 

down in their chairs. At the local French-language public school, Fazul was expelled for 

striking his French teacher. At age 11, he cut the ear of one of Fundi Twawilou’s charges 

for making a mistake in Qur’an recitation and the teacher asked Fazul to leave the 

school.13

 

At this point, Fazul began attending the classes of an older teacher, Fundi 

Muhammad Ali, who remembers Fazul as “brilliant, respectful to others, deeply religious 

and very calm.”14 Friends who knew him in these years generally corroborate this view. 

One former schoolmate recalls that Fazul was “a bit reserved. In fact, a recluse of sorts. 

Only arguments on matters of religion seemed to interest him. Then he could argue with 

heated passion.”15 Another former classmate and congregant at the same mosque that 

Fazul frequented remembers his unusual intelligence and breadth of knowledge – he said 

that Fazul “knew more than the average Comoran boy,” and that he “was always quoting 

this or that philosopher or ‘religious leader’” – but also“ his bitterness about the 

tumultuous politics of the islands.” Saying that Fazul was an “unhappy young man who 

was always complaining,” this person remembers Fazul as being a fierce critic of the 

French and of the founding president of the independent Comoros, Ahmed Abdullah.16 

 

12 “Fundi” is Swahili for a skilled person, expert, or teacher, in this instance roughly equivalent to the 

Arabic “sheikh.” 

13 McNeil, “Assests of a Bombing Suspect.” Elsewhere in the same article McNeil describes this event in 

slightly different terms; he calls Fazul a “brilliant student of the Koran who was thrown out of religious 

school for caning a lazy pupil hard enough to draw blood.” 

14 Ibid. 

15 “On the Trail of Man Wanted for Bomb Blast.” 

16 Ibid. 

91
This angry interest in domestic politics is evident in the letter that Fazul wrote to his 

brother Omar in 1991.17

Radicalization

Though clearly religious in childhood, there are no indications that Fazul held radical or 

even particularly conservative beliefs up to this point.18 This definitely changed, 

however, when Fazul, at age 16, left the tutelage of Fundi Muhammad Ali for that of 

Soidiki M’Bapandza, the islands’ most prominent Salafi/Wahhabi sheikh. Fundi Soidiki, 

who was once a leader of an Islamist opposition party in the Comoros, runs a number of 

madrasas in the Hadoudja district of Moroni that teach a Saudi-designed curriculum in 

place of the government-approved curriculum taught at the other Comoran madrasas. 

Unlike the other madrasas, at Soidiki’s school the sexes are strictly segregated and girls 

must fully cover their heads. The local Muslim establishment expresses suspicion about 

Soidiki and his school; he and his students do not attend the public mosques or join the 

wider community in religious festivals, and it is well known on the islands that he is 

supported by Saudi money. In fact, soon after Fazul enrolled in Soidiki’s school it began 

to receive financing from the al-Haramayn Foundation,19 an organization which was 

functionally an extension of al-Qa’ida, and one with which Fazul would work closely on 

a number of occasions in his subsequent career as an al-Qa’ida operative. This was one 

of the earliest financing ventures of the organization outside of South Asia, and began 

even before al-Haramayn moved its headquarters from Karachi to Riyadh in 1992. 

 

Fazul apparently spent two years studying with Soidiki. His future wife also 

studied at the school, though on account of their age difference they did not attend the 

madrasa at the same time. At age 18, at the end of his course of study with Soidiki, Fazul 

received a scholarship to study abroad. It may be that this money came from alHaramayn, though a Comoran official and members of Fazul’s family told one reporter in 

1998 that the money had come from a Sudanese group called al-Jabha, or “The Front,” 

which is very likely none other than the National Islamic Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiyya alQawmiyya) of Hassan al-Turabi, which in the following year would become the host of 

Osama bin Laden.20 Either way, Fazul would have been traveling on al-Qa’idaconnected money. 

 

17 Fazul refers in that letter to four Comoran politicians, one of whom (Moustoifa Said Cheikh, leader of the 

Front Démocratique des Comores) he claims attempted to encompass the death of his teacher Soidiki, and 

implies his desire to kill these men. When police searched the Fazul family home in Moroni in Sept. 1998 

they found a “list of prominent Comorans who would have to be killed to make way for fundamentalist 

rule” (McNeil, “Assets of a Bombing Suspect”). 

18 In the autobiographical manuscript described in “On the Trail of Man Wanted for Bomb Blast,” however, 

Fazul says that he knew what he wanted to do from a very young age. One might also consider his 

response to classmates who mispronounced words from the Qur’an as an early indication of his willingness 

to turn to violence in defence of Islam. 

19 Pérouse de Montclos, Profile of the al-Haramayn Foundation. 

20 Vick, “FBI Trails Embassy Bombing Suspect.” This information is somewhat dubious, however, since 

these same sources told Vick that the money was for study in Sudan, and that Fazul went to study there. 

There is no doubt that Fazul went to Pakistan on his scholarship, not Sudan, though he may have told some 

people he was going to Sudan to hide his intentions to join the jihad in Afghanistan. In his letter to his 

92
 

Given Soidiki’s profile and his financial connections with al-Qa’ida-affiliated 

organizations, it is probable that Fazul’s radicalization occurred while studying with this 

teacher. In his 1991 letter to his brother Omar as well as in the autobiographical 

manuscript discovered by police in 2005, Fazul clearly indicates that he brought his 

radical beliefs with him when he first left for Pakistan. 

Joining al-Qa’ida

 Fazul flew to Karachi, Pakistan in 1990, soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet 

army from Afghanistan. He enrolled as a medical student in an un-named Pakistani 

university, switched almost immediately to Islamic studies, and was recruited before the 

end of his first year of studies to train to become a mujahid (holy warrior) in Afghanistan. 

He does not name the person who connected him to the mujahidin, but within his first 

year in Pakistan he found himself at the Bayt al-Ansar in Peshawar, founded by Osama 

bin Laden and `Abdullah `Azzam. Fazul writes that he saw both of these men lecture at 

the Bayt al-Ansar during his time there.21 This was the first “guest-house” that foreign 

fighters would stay at in Peshawar before being taken to a first-level training camp in 

Afghanistan. Those who stood out in the initial training would be invited to receive more 

advanced training at further camps. Fazul was selected in this manner and given two 

months of training in small arms, heavy weapons, explosives and bomb-making, 

surveillance evasion, guerrilla warfare and even “how to kill a president in full view 

while he’s with his bodyguards.”22 Among his trainers was Ali Abdelsoud Mohammad, 

the former major in the Egyptian army who later joined the U.S. Army and attempted to 

infiltrate the FBI and CIA as a double agent; Ali admitted to having trained Fazul in 1991 

and 1992.23 

 

In his 1991 letter to his brother Omar, Fazul says that he has “joined their group,” 

that he “got confirmed” with al-Qa’ida. It was not long before he was given his first 

mission – help train the Somali Islamist militias that were opposing the United Nations 

intervention there.24 This was in early spring of 1993, and Fazul was sent with a larger 

group of operatives that included Ali A. Mohammad, Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri, 

Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, Muhammed Atef, and Saif al-Adel. Ali Mohammad was sent 

to Nairobi to case targets, and the U.S. Embassy there was identified as a future target at 

this time.25 In his 1997 report on the East Africa al-Qa’ida cell, Fazul refers to the fact 

that this team sent to Somalia in 1993 was directly involved in the so-called Battle of 

Mogadishu of October ‘93, during which two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters were shot 

 brother Omar, he asks that Omar not tell the rest of the family that he’s in Afghanistan, writing that “it is 

totally normal in the face of God to lie – it is for the good of Muslims.” 21 “On the Trail of Man Wanted for Bomb Blast.” 

22 Fazul, letter to his brother Omar, 1991. 

23 Weiser, “U.S. Charges Ex-Soldier”; on Ali Mohammad, see Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 179ff. 24 U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(9) 98 Cr. 1023, Indictment, pp. 16f. 25 International Crisis Group, “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia,” p. 7. 

93
down and 18 U.S. soldiers were killed.26 The Somali group that these al-Qa’ida 

operatives worked most closely with was al-Ittihad al-Islami, which was partly funded by 

the al-Haramayn Foundation.27 The leadership of this group went on to lead the Council 

of Islamic Courts (CIC, a.k.a. Islamic Courts Union), which recently controlled much of 

Somalia and offered refuge to al-Qa’ida; in January of 2007 the CIC was routed by the 

Ethiopian Army, with support from the U.S. 

 

The following year Fazul returned briefly to the Comoros. He asked his father to 

take him to his uncle’s house on one of the other islands. Fazul asked his uncle for his 

cousin Halima’s hand in marriage; Halima was 17 at the time, was still studying at 

Soidiki’s madrasa, and had never met Fazul before then. In her deposition to a Comoran 

magistrate, Halima gives the date of their marriage as April 4, 1994. Three weeks later 

they moved to Kenya, remaining there until December of that year; at this time Fazul 

assumed the pseudonym Haroun Fazul. Also in 1994, Fazul accompanied Wadih al-Hage, 

who was working as Osama bin Laden’s secretary in Khartoum, to the wedding in 

Mombasa of Mohammad Siddiq Odeh. These three would later be part of the cell that 

organized and carried out the bombings of the Kenyan and Tanzanian U.S. Embassy in 

1998. 

1994-1998: Bombing the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi

The embassy bombings took nearly five years of preparation and planning, and Fazul was 

centrally involved at every step along the way. Following Ali Mohammad’s targetidentification activities in Nairobi, an apartment was rented there in January of 1994; 

Fazul lived there for much of the year, and his new wife Halima joined him in May. 

Fazul was a relatively low-level al-Qa’ida operative at this stage and would remain so 

until after the embassy bombings. He was directed by Wadih al-Hage and Abdullah 

Ahmed Abdullah, and, beginning with his 1997 promotion to media and communications 

officer for the East Africa cell, he communicated with the al-Qa’ida high command via 

the London-based Khalid al-Fawwaz.28

 

At the end of 1994 Fazul moved his family to Khartoum, joining the contingent of 

al-Qa’ida families that had relocated there from South Asia with Osama bin Laden. From 

this point to the spring of 1996 Fazul moved relatively frequently between Khartoum, 

Nairobi and Mogadishu, undertaking a variety of tasks related to the plot. Travel 

between these points was facilitated by the existence of an underground transportation 

network used in the movement of qat (also spelled khat), a plant chewed for its narcotic 

properties.29 In Nairobi he worked under the cover of a bogus charity founded there by 

 

26 In that report Fazul writes that his cell is likely in danger of being targeted by agents of the U.S. “since 

America knows well that the youth who lived in Somalia and were member’s of the Shaykh’s [sc. 

Usama’s] cell are the ones who killed the Americans in Somalia.” 

27 International Crisis Group, “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia,” pp. 2ff.; Pérouse de Montclos, Profile of the 

al-Haramayn Foundation. 

28 Fazul refers to his appointment to this position by Fawwaz in his 1997 report. 

29 Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, p. 45. Odeh testified in U.S. court that he traveled between Nairobi and 

Mogadishu on the airplanes of qat smugglers. Because qat must be chewed within days of harvest for the 

active ingredient to work, the smuggling infrastructure has to be quick and reliable. 

94
Wadih al-Hage with the morbidly ironic name of Help Africa People. The Nairobi cell 

also worked very closely with Mercy International Relief Agency, an organization run by 

the Salafi ideologue Safar al-Hawali, and the Nairobi branch of the al-Haramayn 

Foundation; both of these groups supported the Ittihad al-Islami group.30 Fazul also had 

courier responsibilities, ferrying money between different members of the African cells; 

Fazul carried money from Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri to several members of the Nairobi 

group at various times.31 In 1996 he and Wadih al-Hage transported $7,000 from Osama 

to a contact in Mombasa.32 Key leaders of al-Ittihad al-Islami (and later of the Somalian 

Council of Islamic Courts), including Hassan Dahir Aweys and Hassan Turki, were also 

involved in the preparations, and helped provide shelter, identity and travel documents 

and access to the massive Somalian arms market.33

 

In May of 1996, when al-Qa’ida closed up shop in Sudan and Osama returned to 

Afghanistan, Fazul returned with his wife to the Comoros; around this time their first 

child was born, a daughter whom they named Afiya.34 Fazul stayed for most of May 

before returning to Kenya, and his family joined him there later that summer.35 Fazul’s 

early return was eventuated by the 21 May sinking of a steamship on Lake Victoria, one 

of whose passengers was senior al-Qa’ida military commander Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri 

(a.k.a. Adel Habib). Joined by Wadih al-Hage and other operatives, Fazul stayed in 

Mwanza, Tanzania for several days to confirm that Banshiri had died, and then reported 

the news back to Osama. 

 

In 1997 things became more difficult for the Nairobi cell. Fazul wrote during that 

summer that Osama’s declaration of war upon America put the cell at serious risk of 

capture, and complained that he had had to learn of it from CNN.36 He also wrote of his 

alarm at seeing a CNN report about the capture of an al-Qa’ida operative close to bin 

Laden; Fazul correctly believed this person to be Abu al-Fadl al-Makki, though he was 

not thus identified in the press. In response to this, Fazul gathered Wadih al-Hage’s files 

and hid them somewhere in Nairobi.37 Also that summer, the FBI raided Wadih alHage’s home, seizing a large amount of digital and paper data, but due to lack of Arabicspeaking resources, the material was left mostly untranslated. Around the same time, the 

CIA raided the Nairobi offices of the al-Haramayn Foundation, but soon thereafter the 

agency dropped its investigation.38

 

30 International Crisis Group, “Counter-terrorism in Somalia,” p. 7. 

31 U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y., testimony of Sikander Juma (a.k.a. Ashkaf 

Hussein), trial transcript of day 31, April 18, 2001, p. 4287.

32 U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(9) 98 Cr. 1023, Indictment, p. 23. 33 International Crisis Group, “Counter-terrorism in Somalia,” pp. 7f. 

34 They had a son (Lukman) the following year and another daughter (Sumeiya) in 2002. 

35 Halima Fazul, deposition. 

36 Fazul, August 1997 letter to “brother Sharif.” 

37 Details about the contents of these files can be found in U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(9) 98 Cr. 1023, 

Indictment, p. 28. 

38 Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, p. 30. 

95
After these near misses, the cell went ahead with the execution of the bombing 

plot. Fazul made frequent trips between Nairobi and Khartoum during this period.39 On 

May 1, with the help of a local named Sikander Juma, Fazul rented a large walled villa in 

the suburbs of Nairobi, at 43 New Runda Estates. Though he told the property owner 

(one Tamarra Ratemo) that he needed the large house for his family and business guests, 

in fact his family lived with the Jumas and at Wadih al-Hage’s home in Nairobi; the villa 

was used as the bomb factory for the Nairobi embassy bombing. Throughout the spring 

and summer, Fazul was one of the key players in the lead-up to the bombing, and on the 

morning of August 7, 1998, he drove a white pick-up truck ahead of the bomb truck to 

the embassy. At 10:45 AM local time, two vehicle-borne bombs were detonated outside 

the U.S. Embassy, killing 224 and wounding more than 4000 people. Later that day 

Fazul arranged for his family and father-in-law to fly to the Comoros, and that evening he 

arranged for the keys of the villa to be handed over to the owner, having already hired 

local people to clean it out. He stayed on in Nairobi for another week, and on August 14 

flew to the Comoros; on the 22nd he left the Comoros for Dubai and from there most 

likely proceeded to Pakistan.40

The leadership of the East African cell up to this point had been provided by 

Wadih el-Hage and then, after al-Hage’s return to the U.S. in 1997, Abdullah Ahmed 

Abdullah. On August 1, 1998, the latter directed all al-Qa’ida personnel to leave Kenya 

by the 6th of that month. This provides an indication of Fazul’s “rank” in the organization 

at this time. The last to leave Nairobi, a full week after the bombing, Fazul had an 

intermediate position between the administrative leadership, which came to Nairobi in the 

week before the bombing to oversee the final preparations, and the foot-soldiers, who 

were all supposed to die in the attacks (Rashid al-Owhali survived and was later arrested). 

His letter of 1997 included the statement that “we do not want to know the operations 

plans since we are just implementers.” After the summer of 1998, this began to change, 

and ultimately Fazul would take over the leadership of al-Qa’ida’s operations in East 

Africa. 

1999-2001: al-Qa’ida, Liberia and West African Blood Diamonds41

In the year following the embassy bombings Fazul became one of the key players in alQa’ida’s entry into the blood diamond business. After the embassy bombings, the U.S. 

began to take steps to freeze al-Qa’ida’s assets, and in response al-Qa’ida began to sink 

millions of dollars into West African blood diamonds, an ideal way to launder, protect 

and increase its financial resources. Fazul would spend the bulk of this period in West 

Africa as a protected guest of Charles Taylor and one of the two al-Qa’ida members who 

oversaw the organization’s end of Taylor’s diamond business. 

 

 

39 According to U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(9) 98 Cr. 1023, Indictment, pp. 26ff., Fazul flew from 

Khartoum to Nairobi on March 4, April 28 and May 10 of 1998. 

40 A detailed timeline of the embassy bombings can be found in Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, pp. 63ff. 41 A much more detailed account of al-Qa`ida’s relationship to the West African diamond trade can be 

found in Douglas Farah’s Blood From Stones. 

96
The relationship began in 22 September 1998, less than two months after the 

embassy bombings, when Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah arrived in Monrovia, Liberia, to 

meet with Ibrahim Bah, a Senegalese soldier of fortune who was part of Taylor’s inner 

circle and had the rank of general in the Sierra Leonian Revolutionary United Front 

(RUF), which was controlled directly by Taylor.42 Bah introduced Abdullah to senior 

RUF commanders, including Sam Bockerie, and it was agreed that Abdullah would later 

send al-Qa’ida representatives with cash. In March of 1999, Fazul and Ahmed Khalfan 

Ghailani43 came to Liberia and spent several days touring the diamond fields in Sierra 

Leone controlled by the RUF. They met with Bockerie in Foya, Liberia and gave him 

$50,000 in cash; they were given a package of diamonds in return, and then made calls by 

satellite phone to Belgium and Pakistan. They then met with Taylor at his Congo Town 

home and gave him half a million dollars in cash. 

In December of 2000, the two met with the Lebanese diamond dealers Samih 

Ossaily and Allie Darwish in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and another large transaction was 

made. On January 22, 2001, the two Lebanese dealers signed a three year lease on a 

large house in Monrovia that would become the headquarters of Fazul and Ghailani on 

their frequent trips to Liberia in this period. They came on March 3 using Yemeni 

passports and stayed on through the mining season, to the end of summer; during this 

period al-Qa’ida cornered the market on Liberian and Sierra Leonean diamonds, which 

are among the highest quality diamonds in the world. In late June, along with a female 

al-Qa’ida operative using the pseudonym Feriel Shahin, Fazul and Abdullah flew to 

Karachi, stayed several nights at the Shaharah-e Faisal hotel, and then proceeded to 

Quetta. 

In July 2001 Fazul and Abdullah returned to West Africa, staying initially at the 

presidential complex of Blaise Campaore in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. In that same 

month, Aziz Nassour, another Lebanese diamond dealer and cousin of Ossaily, flew from 

Beirut to Dubai to pick up $1 million in cash; this was then delivered to Taylor as an upfront payment for offering the two al-Qa’ida operatives a safe haven. Once the cash was 

delivered, the two moved from Burkina Faso to a military camp near Taylor’s private 

farm called Camp Gbatala, where Liberia’s elite Anti-Terrorism Unit trained with South 

African mercenaries. They remained in hiding there until at least December of 2001. In 

late November, on the basis of European intelligence indicating that the two were in 

Camp Gbatala, the DIA stood up a snatch team of Special Forces, but, unable to confirm 

the identifications, the team was told to stand down a week later. 

The relationship with Taylor and his RUF allies maintained by Fazul and 

Abdullah was hugely successful for al-Qa’ida. More than $20 million was moved by alQa’ida in this way, and firm ties were made with important actors in the international 

 

42 Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamon Trade.” Bah fought with Senegalese separatists in the 1970s, 

went on to train with Qaddafi in Libya, fought with the mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s (where he 

made his initial contacts with future al-Qa`ida leadership), and later trained a number of people who 

became West African warlords, including Taylor and Foday Sankoh, founder of the RUF. As of the late 

1990s, Bah was in charge of Taylor’s diamond-related activities and was the conduit point between RUF 

commanders and al-Qa`ida and Hezbollah diamond buyers. 

43 Ghailani was arrested in Pakistan in 2004. 

97
black market in blood diamonds and weapons. There is evidence that suggests the two 

bought weapons through Nassour and Ossaily, possibly even SA-8 surface-to-air 

missiles.44 The large sum paid to Taylor to protect Fazul and Abdullah, probably in 

anticipation of a worldwide manhunt in the wake of 9/11, is an indication of Fazul’s rise 

in the organization, or at the very least shows that he was recognized by this point as an 

extremely valuable asset. 

2002-2007: Leading the East Africa cell

`Fazul’s next assignment was to assume a leading role in al-Qa’ida’s East Africa 

operations. His base of operations for 2002 was the village of Siyu on the Lamu 

Archipelago on the northern coast of Kenya, where he lived under the pseudonym 

Abdulkarim.45 In that remote village of around 2,000 people Fazul set up shop as a 

preacher and madrasa teacher, establishing his own madrasa for this purpose. He was 

joined there by a number of other operatives who would go on to participate in an attack 

in Mombasa towards the end of the year; some of them worked as fishermen, others 

worked with Fazul as preachers and missionaries. Their message as preachers was 

predictably Salafi in tone; the village chief later testified that “they were teaching against 

the celebration of Maulid (the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad) and the people were 

not pleased with it.”46 Fazul also married a local girl in Siyu, 16-year-old Amina 

Kubwa,47 and recruited her father, brother and one of her cousins to help with the 

November bombings.48 In July of 2002 Fazul was arrested by Kenyan police for credit 

card fraud, but he escaped after only one day in custody; the Kenyan authorities claim 

they didn’t recognize him.49

The beginnings of the bombing plot of 2002 began in November of 2001, when 

several members of the team gathered in Mogadishu and began training in rented 

apartments in small arms and explosives.50 Throughout the year, Fazul would 

occasionally come in to Mogadishu to oversee the progress of the team there. By April 

2002 the targets were identified and by August the group had smuggled a number of SA7b Grail missiles and shoulder-launchers into Kenya from Somalia by sea; the weapons 

had been earlier bought in Yemen.51 On November 28, the team split into four groups; 

one group stayed in Mombasa, one went to Mombasa to suicide bomb the Paradise 

Hotel,52 one went to Lamu to prepare an escape boat, and the final group, led by Fazul, 

carried out the failed missile attack on an Israeli passenger plane as it left Moi 

 

44 Farah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda.” 45 Interestingly, Fazul’s association with Lamu goes back much further; he listed it as his birthplace in a 

Kenyan identity card that he illegally obtained in 1996 (Vick, “FBI Trails Embassy Bombing Suspect”). 

46 “Witness tells of terror suspect’s marriage.” 

47 Mutonya and Munene, “Woman helps identify bomb raid suspects.” Muiruri, “Most wanted terrorist 

named,” writes that she was 14 at the time of marriage. 

48 These were Kubwa Muhammad, Muhammad Kubwa and Abud Rogo Muhammad, respectively (Lacey, 

“Kenya to Charge 4”). 

49 “Bush should heed Hempstone’s advice.” 

50 Peleman et al., Report of the Panel of Experts, p. 29. 51 Ibid. 

52 A three-man team drove an explosives-laden SUV onto the lobby steps of the hotel; the detonation killed 

13 and injured 80 people. 

98
International Airport in Mombasa. The following day Fazul returned with some of the 

team to Lamu and escaped by boat, most likely to Somalia. 

The following two years had Fazul planning further bomb attacks in the area. In 

early 2003 he was sighted at a mosque in Mogadishu, and in May he was spotted in 

Mombasa. The CIA contracted with Muhammad Dheere, a warlord based north of 

Mogadishu, to try to capture Fazul after these sightings, but the operation instead netted a 

lesser al-Qa’ida operative, a Yemeni by the name of Sulayman Abdullah Salim Hemed.53 

He informed police that Fazul was planning an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, 

and it subsequently closed down for a week.54 The following year communications from 

Saleh Nabhan, a senior member of al-Qa’ida’s East Africa cell, were intercepted, leading 

ultimately to the uncovering and therefore thwarting of a plot to bomb the new U.S. 

Embassy in Nairobi sometime in 2004. The plan was to drive a bomb truck into the 

Embassy and at the same time to fly a chartered airplane into the building. 

Following this unsuccessful plot, nothing is known about Fazul’s operational 

activities, though he does appear to have had a high-level position within the Council of 

Islamic Courts in Somalia since at least 2005, possibly as head of intelligence.55 He was 

spotted during March of that year taking a kwassa kwassa (a kind of boat) from Moroni 

to the island of Mayotte.56 He continued to work with the CIC in Somalia through 2006, 

and at the end of December had his wife Halima and their three children join him in 

Mogadishu from Pakistan.57

On January 8 and 9, 2007, at least one U.S. C-130 gunship attacked targets in 

Somalia in an attempt to kill Fazul and two other senior al-Qa’ida operatives.58 It was 

initially reported that Fazul had died, but this was later retracted. On January 11, Kenyan 

police captured Fazul’s wife and three children, along with other operatives and their 

family members attempting to flee Somalia. The group initially included Fazul; they 

stopped for the night in a forest in Kiunga on the Kenyan border, and Fazul and three 

other men set off alone. The rest of the party was arrested there in the morning. Fazul’s 

wife was arrested with his laptop computer and more than $5,000 in cash. According to 

Kenyan police, who managed to bypass the password protect on the laptop in late January, 

the computer contained “vital information on terrorism training and intelligence 

collection including spying.”59 Members of the elite U.S. anti-terrorism Task Force 88 

are currently on the ground in East Africa searching for Fazul. According to a 

Madagascar newspaper, there had been claims of a sighting of Fazul at Majunga, a port 

 

53 Butler, “5-Year Hunt Fails to Net Qaeda Suspect.” Hemed was captured in June of 2003. 54 “Target of U.S. strike wanted for multiple attacks.” 

55 “Computer May Hold Clue on Terror Suspect.” 

56 Rodier, “Chasse aux djihadists”; D.H., “Un lieutenant de Ben Laden à l'île de Mayotte?” 

57 “Computer May Hold Clue on Terror Suspect.” 

58 U.S. military assets were already active in the area in support of the Ethiopian army’s invasion force that 

ousted the CIC from its areas of control beginning in December 2006 and continuing to the present date 

into early 2007. 

59 “Kenya: We have hacked al-Qaida laptop.” 

99
city on the northwest coast of Madagascar, in the weeks following the U.S. bombing 

operation in Somalia.60

Though the chances of catching Fazul are as good now as they’ve ever been, it 

won’t be easy. He has used dozens if not scores of pseudonyms,61 has extensive contacts 

with virtually every kind of criminal underground in the region, and, as the photographs 

at the head of this profile attest, he is skilled at disguising his appearance. In his alQa’ida career he has successfully passed as a Kenyan, a Somali, a Sudanese, a Moroccan, 

a Yemeni and a South Asian, and he has command of at least five languages. Highly 

intelligent and thoroughly trained, he is one the most dangerous international terrorists 

alive today.62

 

60 “Qaida-Terrorist versteckt sich in Madagaskar.” 

61 In addition to the many permutations of Abdullah Muhammad Fazul, his known pseudonyms include the 

following: Abu Aisha, Abu Luqman, Abu Sayf al-Sudani, Harun al-Qamar, Ahmad Hassan, Abdulkarim, 

`Ali Fadil Husayn and Fu’ad Muhammad. 

62 Harmony documents pertaining to Fazul are: AFGP-2002-800080, AFGP-2002-800081, AFGP-2002-

80083, AFGP-2002-800084, AFGP-2002-800086, AFGP-2002-800087, and AFGP-2002-800089.; also see 

Appendix C-III. 

100
Sources:

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(Nairobi), January 24, 2007. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200701240090.html> Accessed 

14 February 2007. 

“Alphabetical Listing of Blocked Persons, Specially Designated Nationals, Specially 

Designated Terrorists, Specially Designated Global Terrorists, Foreign Terrorist 

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Register 69 (27 May 2004): 30361-30551, at 30363. 

Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An In-Depth Investigation Into the 1998 Bombings of the 

U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Matthew B. Ridgway Center for Security 

Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2005. 

Bender, Bryan. “Liberia’s Taylor Gave aid to Qaeda, UN Probe Finds.” The Boston 

Globe, August 4, 2004. 

<http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2004/08/04/liberias_taylor_ga

ve_aid_to_qaeda_un_probe_finds/> Accessed 13 February 2007. 

Bentham, Jonathan, and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan. The Charitable Crescent: Politics of 

Aid in the Muslim World. London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2003. 

Bonner, Raymond. “Public Face of Terror Suspect: Low-Key Family Man.” The New 

York Times, September 27, 1998. 

“Bush Should Heed Hempstone’s Advice.” The Nation (Nairobi), September 30, 2005. 

Butler, Desmond. “5-Year Hunt Fails to Net Qaeda Suspect in Africa.” The New York 

Times, June 14, 2003. 

Campbell, Greg. Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most 

Precious Stones. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004. 

De Bruycker, Agim, et al. Case LIBI. Unpublished report of the Belgian Federal Police, 

GDA Antwerp, Diamond Section.63

D.H. “Un lieutenant de Ben Laden à l'île de Mayotte?” Le Quotidien des Nouvelles de 

Mayotte, 23 May 2005. <http://www.jir.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?pid=2055> Accessed 13 

February 2007. 

Davies, Hugh. “Saudis Detain Member of anti-American Terror Group.” Daily 

Telegraph (UK), August 2, 1997. 

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1997/08/02/wsaud02.html

> Accessed 15 February 2007. 

 

63 Kindly shared with the CTC by Bryan Bender, a journalist at the Boston Globe. 

101
Duhul, Salad. “Top al-Qaida Suspect Killed as US strikes Continue, say Somali Official 

and Witness.” Associated Press, January 10, 2007. 

“Fact Sheet: Somalia – Eliminating Terrorist Threat.” US Fed News, January 25, 2007. 

Farah, Douglas. “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade.” The Washington Post, 

November 2, 2001. 

-----. Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror. New York: 

Broadway Books, 2004. 

-----. “Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda Terror Assets Hidden in Gem-Buying 

Scheme.” The Washington Post, December 29, 2002. 

Fazul, Abdullah Muhammad. Letter to Omar Muhammed Fazul, n.d. 

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/fazul/letter.html> Accessed 13 

February 2007. 

-----. Letter to “Sharif,” August 4, 1997. 

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/computer.html> 

Access 15 February 2007. 

Fazul, Halima Badroudine. Deposition given to the Court of Appeals of Moroni, 

Comoros Islands, Cabinet of Examining Magistrate Mr Djaffar, 18 September 1998. 

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/fazul/depo.html> Accessed 13 

February 2007. 

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. 

Cell Blocks?” Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs 

Committee, September 19, 2006. 

Hirschkorn, Phil. “Elusive Al Qaeda Operative was ‘Real Deal’.” CBS News, January 10, 

2007. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/10/world/main2347258.shtml> 

Accessed 14 February 2007. 

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Africa Report, no. 95, July 11, 2005. 

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Brotherhood. Trans. George Holoch. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002. 

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102
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January 16, 2007. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200701161506.html> Accessed 14 

February 2007. 

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Accessed 14 February 2007. 

Lacey, Marc. “Kenya to Charge 4 in Attacks Last Fall at a Beach Resort.” The New 

York Times, June 24, 2003. 

-----. “Siyu Journal: Why a Village Well is a Weapon in the War on Terror.” The New 

York Times, April 30, 2004. 

-----. “Terrorists in Kenya Killings Posed as Fishermen, a Report Says.” The New York 

Times, November 6, 2003.

Lacey, Marc, et al. “New Militant Leader Emerges in Mogadishu.” The New York Times, 

June 26, 2006. 

McNeil, Donald G., Jr. “Assets of a Bombing Suspect: Keen Wit, Religious Soul, Angry 

Temper.” New York Times, 6 October 1998. 

Muiruri, Stephen. “Most Wanted Terrorist Named.” The Nation (Nairobi), August 26, 

2003. 

<http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/26082003/News/News2608200312.ht

ml> Accessed 16 February 2007. 

Mutonya, Njuguna, and Mugumo Munene. “Woman helps identify bomb raid suspects.” 

The Nation (Nairobi), March 21, 2003. 

<http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/21032003/News/News10.html> 

Accessed 16 February 2007. 

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<www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16531987/> Accessed 16 February 2007. 

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103
Pflanz, Mike. “Somali Government Closes in on al-Qa`eda Stronghold.” Telegraph

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Accessed 15 February 2007. 

“Qaida-Terrorist versteckt sich in Madagaskar.” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 5, 

2007. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,464299,00.html> Accessed 14 

February 2007. 

Rice, Xan. “Somalia air Strike Failed to Kill al-Qaida Targets, says US.” Guardian 

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<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1988300,00.html> Accessed 14 

February 2007. 

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9.php> Accessed 13 February 2007. 

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February 2007. 

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February 2007. 

Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor. “Presence of al-Qaeda in West 

Africa.” Unpublished report, 2004.64

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<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16537225/> Accessed 15 February 2007. 

“The 22 Most Wanted Suspects, in a Five-Act Drama of Global Terror.” The New York 

Times, October 14, 2001. 

Tomlinson, Chris. “Target of U.S. air Strike on Somalia has Long Been one of the FBI’s 

Most Wanted.” Associated Press, January 9, 2007. 

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109/20070109?hub=TopStories> Accessed 16 February 2007. 

U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y. 

 

64 Kindly shared with the CTC by Bryan Bender, a journalist at the Boston Globe. 

104
U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(9) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y.65

Vick, Karl. “Assault on a U.S. Embassy: A Plot both Wide and Deep.” The Washington 

Post, November 23, 1998. 

-----. “FBI Trails Embassy Bombing Suspect.” The Washington Post, September 17, 

1998. 

Weiser, Benjamin. “A Bin Laden Agent Left Angry Record of Gripes and Fears.” The 

New York Times, December 2, 1998. 

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Times, May 20, 1999. 

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65 All court documents from U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al. can be found online here: 

http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-dt.htm. 

105
106
II. Abu Hafs al-Masri 

 

Judging by the praise heaped upon him by other jihadis, Abu Hafs al-Masri66 was one of 

al-Qa’ida’s most talented, trusted, and militant members. Truly in Osama bin Laden’s 

inner circle, he had been involved with al-Qa’ida since its inception and served as its 

military commander and security chief.67 He was present at several key moments in the 

formation of al-Qa’ida and even sat at bin Laden’s side during his infamous press 

conference in 1998 when bin Laden formally established the formation of the “World 

Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.”68 As al-Qa’ida’s military 

commander, Abu Hafs’ key duties were recruiting, vetting, and training new al-Qa’ida 

members as well as planning and facilitating terrorist attacks. He was involved in 

organizing some of the groups more spectacular attacks, including the U.S Embassy 

bombings in East Africa and 9/11. His importance and influence on Osama bin Laden 

and the al-Qa’ida organization cannot be overstressed. In fact, ten months before Abu 

Hafs’ death, bin Laden personally nominated him as his replacement.69

While little is known about his childhood years, it is believed that Abu Hafs was 

born in Menoufya, Egypt on June 17, 1944. Little else is mentioned about his 

upbringing or teenage years. Most information about him begins as a young adult when 

he lived in the Asyut region of Egypt. There he was briefly a student at Asyut University, 

but soon dropped out after he became involved with the militant Islamist group Egyptian 

Islamic Jihad (EIJ). In 1980, he entered the police force with the intention of infiltrating 

its ranks in order to help EIJ militants seize weapons for their struggle against the 

government. Fearing eventual capture and exposure as an EIJ member, he moved to 

 

66 He is most commonly referred to as Abu Hafs and Muhammed Atef . Allegedly his real name is Subhi 

Abu-Sittah, but his other aliases include Subhi Abd-al-Aziz Abu-Sittah, Sheikh Tasser Abdullah, Taysir, 

Abu Fatima and Al Khabir. 

67 Abu Hafs’ daughter married Osama bin Laden’s son Mohammed in February, 2001, further cementing 

their strong personal and professional relationship. 

68 Wright, The Looming Tower. pp. 131-133. 

69 “Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri,” Al Jeezera.net, May 10, 2004, 

http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=2379.

107
Cairo where he was eventually imprisoned and sentenced to five years for his subversive 

activities.70 

Although much of the information available supports the assumption that he was 

indeed an Egyptian policeman and a member of EIJ, some dispute these claims. For 

example, in a 2001 Guardian interview, Montasser al-Zayat, an Islamist lawyer and 

former associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri, suggested that Abu Hafs was not one of the EIJ 

members swept up after the assassination of Sadat. In the same article, Egyptian Interior 

Ministry officials state that Abu Hafs was never a policeman and had no arrests prior to 

leaving for Afghanistan.71 Regardless of what the truth is about his background, Abu 

Hafs eventually left Egypt to travel to South Asia in order to join the anti-Soviet jihad, 

and later, al-Qa’ida. 

Abu Hafs likely arrived in Pakistan and later Afghanistan during the mid-1980s. 

Once in Peshawar, Pakistan, he linked up with Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam 

and became involved in their Maktab al-Khidmat, or Services Bureau, which facilitated 

jihadis’ travels to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Bin Laden personally authorized a 

$200-a-month salary for Hafs’ work at the Services Bureau starting in early 1987.72 

However, he was not satisfied with just playing a supporting role in the jihad and 

eventually decided to join the fighting in Afghanistan. Bin Laden, Abu Hafs and several 

other Arab jihadis left Peshawar and established one of the first all-Arab camps in Jaji, 

Afghanistan called the Masada (Lion’s Den). The camp was located in close proximity 

to a large Soviet Army garrison and eventually Soviet forces attacked the Lion’s Den in 

mid-1997. A month-long battle ensued with the Soviets initially gaining the upper hand, 

but they eventually retreated after several counterattacks by the Arabs. It was after this 

battle that Osama bin Laden, Abu Hafs, Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri, and other AfghanArabs began attracting widespread attention in the Arab world for their “heroic efforts.”73

Already battle-proven and fully dedicated to jihad, Abu Hafs undoubtedly made a huge 

impression on Osama bin Laden. Perhaps as a reward and a token of gratitude, bin Laden 

then designated him as al-Qa’ida’s security chief responsible for bin Laden’s safety and 

the screening of guests. During this period of time, Abu Hafs also held the role of the 

number two military commander behind Abu Ubaydah.74 

 Abu Hafs followed bin Laden to the Sudan in 1992, where he continued to help 

actively plan and coordinate training, plot terrorist attacks, and set up al-Qa’ida cells. In 

 

70 Zaynah, “Muhammed Atif, Defendant Accused of Planning the 11 September Attacks and Al-Aq`ida 

Organization’s Military Official,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 8, 2001; “Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri,”; 

“Atef, Muhammed, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database, January 16, 2007, 

http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=5823. 71 Dawoud, “Mohammed Atef,” The Guardian, November 19, 2001, 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,,597355,00.html; Muhammed Salah, “Egypt Supplies 

United States with Information About ‘Abu-Hafs,’” Al-Hayah , December 6, 1998; 72 A raid on the al-Haramayn office in Sarajevo in 2002 produced a document from a laptop that supports 

the claim that Abu Hafs was one of the first, future members of al-Qa`ida to be involved in the Services 

Bureau; Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, p. 77. 73 Wright, p. 116-120. 

74 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “An Insider’s Guide to bin Laden’s Shadowy Cabinet,” The Sunday Times, 

September 30, 2001. 

108
1992 and 1993, bin Laden sent him to Somalia to make contact with local tribes and give 

them assistance in their fight against United Nations and U.S. forces involved in 

Operation Restore Hope. Abu Hafs apparently returned to Peshawar sometime in 1993, 

where he tasked and prepared several al-Qa’ida members for missions into Kenya, 

Somalia, and Ogaden to recon sites and establish training camps. He then returned to 

Africa where he visited his teams in Somalia and offered help to the Somali Islamic 

Union.75 However, in late 1993, Abu Hafs ordered some of those same camps closed due 

to security and other problems.76 He also helped establish cover companies in Nairobi 

and Mombassa, Kenya, in order to fund al-Qa’ida’s African operations.77 Abu Hafs 

often met and guided other top al-Qa’ida members and trainers while in Africa and 

helped plot the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Although five years before the act

attacks occurred, Abu Hafs met with Ali Mohammed, another Egyptian al-Qa’ida 

member, and Osama bin Laden in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1993 to discuss Mohammed’s 

recon efforts of Western embassies in Nairobi.

ual 

rimary 

k to Afghanistan. 

 

78 In 1996, Abu Hafs became the p

military commander of al-Qa’ida after Abu Ubaydah died in a ferry accident on Lake 

Victoria. In that same year, al-Qa’ida was kicked out of the Sudan and moved its 

operations bac

During his tenure as military chief in Afghanistan, Abu Hafs’ main 

responsibilities were to oversee the training at terrorist camps and make decisions 

regarding which trainees would receive additional instruction (in assassinations, urban 

warfare, bomb and poison making, etc.) after their initial training. He also hand-picked 

the operatives who would take part in suicide attacks, as well as the bodyguards for bin 

Laden.79 Abu Hafs paid special attention to Western converts, Muslims from Western 

European countries, and non-Arab trainees as they possessed freedom of movement 

through their home countries that other members did not. He met with Jose Padilla 

several times, tasking him first with exploding apartment buildings in the US.80 Abu 

Hafs also met with John Walker Lindh and sent Zacarias Moussaoui to Malaysia to work 

with Jemaah Islamiah.81 Lastly and most ominously, Abu Hafs was one of the most 

adamant members concerning the group’s procurement, production, and use of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD). Although it probably did not take too much effort, he 

eventually convinced Osama bin Laden to pursue the procurement and production of 

WMD agents.82 

In mid-1996, Abu Hafs and Osama bin Laden met with Khalid Sheikh 

Muhammed (KSM) in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. Although he was not an “official” alQa’ida member at the time, KSM discussed several possible plots, including using 

75 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104. 

76 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600110; Harmony, AFGP-2002-800597. 

77 Bergen, pp. 211, 214-215, 221; Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, eds., Anti-American Terrorism and the 

Middle East, p. 211; USA vs. bin Laden et al. 78 Rubin, p. 209. 

79 Bergen, p. 264. 

80 Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey Regarding Jose Padilla, June 1, 2004, 

http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm. 81 Bergen, p. 277; The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 151. 82 Wright, p. 304. 

109
airplanes as missiles, to attack targets inside the United States. KSM’s ideas must have 

struck a cord with Abu Hafs, who two years later, would push Osama bin Laden to act on 

KSM’s vision. This plan, obviously, became the 9/11 attacks. In fact, Abu Hafs, Osama 

bin Laden, and KSM were the only al-Qa’ida members to be involved in target selection 

for 9/11.83 

Fortunately, Abu Hafs was killed in an al-Qa’ida safehouse in Kabul, Afghanistan, 

in November of 2001, when it was bombed by coalition aircraft. This was a significant 

blow to al-Qa’ida, as they lost one of their most stalwart and capable members. 

Moreover, it was a huge loss to bin Laden who lost not only his senior military 

commander, but also a close companion who had been with him since the very beginning 

of the al-Qa’ida organization.84 

 

83 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, pp.148-150; Wright, pp. 307-308; Bergen, pp.300-301. 84 Other Harmony documents that contain information on Abu Hafs: AFGP-2002-003677 and AFGP2002-800573. 

110
Sources:

“Atef, Muhammed.” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database, January 16, 2007. 

<http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=5823> 

Bergen, Peter. The Osama bin Laden I Know. New York, NY: Free Press, 2006. 

Dawoud, Khaled. “Mohammed Atef.” The Guardian, November 19, 2001. 

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,,597355,00.html> 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 9/11 Commission 

Report: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2004. 

“Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri.” Al Jeezera.net, May 10, 2004. 

<http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=2379> 

Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey Regarding Jose Padilla, June 1, 2004. 

<http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm> 

Rubin, Barry and Judith Colp Rubin, ed. Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East.

New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. 

Salah, Muhammed. “Egypt Supplies United States with Information About ‘Abu-Hafs,’” 

Al-Hayah, December 6, 1998. 

U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y. 

Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower. New York, NY: Borzoi Books, 2006. 

Yusufzai, Rahimullah. “An Insider’s Guide to bin Laden’s Shadowy Cabinet.” The 

Sunday Times, September 30, 2001. 

Zaynah, Abduh. “Muhammed Atif, Defendant Accused of Planning the 11 September 

Attacks and Al-Aq`ida Organization’s Military Official,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 8, 

2001. 

111
112
III. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys 

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was born in the Galgaduud region of Somalia between 1935 

and 1943. He is a member of the Ayr sub-clan of the Habargadir group of the Hawiye 

clan. Although not the most powerful sub-clan in Somalia, Ayr is reportedly one of the 

most powerful clans in Mogadishu.85 

Aweys began preaching Wahhabi ideology in the late 1970s, but he first achieved 

notoriety as a Somali colonel decorated for bravery in 1977 during Somalia’s war with 

Ethiopia.86 Several sources indicate that he was a “prisons Colonel,” 87 although his 

citation for bravery and his later position as Military Chief of al-Ittihad al-Islami suggest 

that he assumed an operational role during wartime. 

Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Unity, AIAI), established in the early 1980s, was one 

of several Islamist organizations that sought to overthrow Siad Barre, Somalia’s dictator 

of 22 years. The organization began its ascent in the Gedo region of Somalia, a 

crossroads for Islamic fundamentalists.88 In the absence of effective government services, 

AIAI offered protection for businesses and localities, established schools, and provided 

rule-of-law in a country ravaged by warlords. Sheikh Hassan Aweys served as both a 

spiritual and military leader for the increasingly profitable and powerful organization. In 

both of his roles, Aweys promulgated AIAI’s ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic 

caliphate in the horn of Africa governed exclusively by sharia law. 

 

85 “Somalia Government Tries to Confirm Terrorist's Death,” Voice of America, January 10, 2007. 86 Winter, “Profile: Somalia’s Islamist Leader,” BBC News, June 30, 2006, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5120242.stm. 

87 Sii'arag, “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited Regions in the Horn of 

Africa,” Nzwili, “Terrorism Focus: Leadership Profile: Islamic Courts Union.” 88 Ibid. 

113
AIAI rose to prominence in the early 1990’s upon Siad Barre’s ouster. The 

organization claimed responsibility for two fatal attacks in 1996: the shooting of two 

Ethiopian businessmen in Somalia and the bombing of a hotel in Addis Ababa that killed 

4 and injured 20 civilians.89 AIAI has also been implicated in a second 1996 bomb attack 

in Ethiopia, the assassination and attempted assassination of Ethiopian cabinet ministers, 

support of al-Qa’ida’s 1998 embassy bombings, and a suicide-bomb attack on the 

Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in 2002.90 

While serving as AIAI’s Military Chief in the 1990’s, Aweys maintained a 

relationship with Adan Hashi Ayro. Ayro was trained in Afghanistan, served as a militia 

commander in AIAI and later in the Council of Islamic Courts, and reportedly sustained 

direct ties to al-Qa’ida.91 The exact nature of Aweys’ relationship to Ayro is unclear; the 

Jamestown Press reports that Aweys mentored Ayro, planned military operations in 

conjunction with him, and organized terrorist training camps with him.92 Although 

Ethiopian military strikes reduced AIAI’s size and potency in 1997, both Aweys and 

Ayro continued to play prominent leadership roles through the establishment of Islamic 

courts and their associated militias. 

Sheikh Hassan Aweys established the first Islamic court in the southern region of 

Mogadishu following AIAI’s retreat from Gedo. In 1999, he became the head of the 

Southern Mogadishu Islamic Courts, and used the courts to promote Islamist goals 

similar to those of AIAI.93 On June 24, 2006, Sheikh Hassan Aweys was appointed to 

the senior leadership role in the Council of Islamic Courts (formerly referred to as the 

Islamic Courts Union), a collection of previously disassociated courts.94 The Council of 

Islamic Courts has two administrative bodies: an executive committee of 8 persons 

recently headed by the more moderate Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, and an 80 person shura, or 

decision-making body, led by Aweys.95 In this position, Aweys was one of the most 

influential individuals in Somalia. He used his position to contest the transitional 

government in Somalia, prior to the Ethiopian-backed military intervention which 

expelled the Islamists from Mogadishu in December. 

With the status of the Council of Islamic Courts in flux, and Sheikh Hassan Dahir 

Aways’ personal future in jeopardy, his next role is uncertain. In February, 2006, on a 

jihadi website, Aweys purportedly authorized the use of suicide terrorism to attack targets 

in Ethiopia and Kenya.96 More recently, however, Aweys has consistently disavowed 

any personal links to al-Qa’ida or terrorism. It is difficult to predict whether or not 

 

89 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Group Profile: al-Itihaad al-Islami, 

http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4329. 

90 Rabasa et. al, Beyond Al Qaeda, p. 132. 91 On January 7, 2006, a U.S. Special Operations-coordinated air strike targeted and killed Ayro in Somalia 

near the Kenyan border. Gordon and Mazzetti, “US Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda.” 92 Nzwili, op.cit 93 Sii'arag. 

94 “Somalia’s Islamic Courts name Radical Cleric as Head of New Parliament.” 95 Shinn, “Somalia: US Government Policy and Challenges.” 

96 “Somali Islamists threaten suicide attacks in Kenya, Ethiopia.” 

114
Aweys will overtly support jihad in the near future, but he is unlikely to back down from 

his vocal pursuit of an Islamic state.97 

 

97 Harmony documents concerning Aweys are: AFGP-2002-600114, AFGP-800611, and AFGP-2003-

001293H. 

115
Sources: 

Gordon, Michael, and Mark Mazzetti. “US Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda.” 

New York Times, February 23, 2007. 

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/africa/23somalia.html?pagewanted=2&ei=5

070&en=87bf9b45bd98f2fb&ex=1172898000&emc=eta1> 

“Islamists Half-Ready for Holy War.” The Economist, October 12, 2006. 

<http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_RDPTTQT&lo

gin=Y> 

Kaplan, Eban. “Backgrounder: Somalia’s High Stakes Power Struggle.” Council on 

Foreign Relations, August 7, 2006. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11234/> 

MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. “Group Profile: al-Itihaad al-Islami.” 

<http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4329> 

Nzwili, Fredrick. “Terrorism Focus: Leadership Profile: Islamic Courts Union.” 

Jamestown Press 3: 23 (2006). 

Rabasa, Angel, et al. “Beyond Al Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement.” 2 vols. Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006. 

Reeve, Simon. “US Returning to the Nightmare Called Somalia.” The San Francisco 

Chronicle, December 16, 2001. 

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2001/12/16/MN115486.DTL> 

Shinn, David H. “Somalia: US Government Policy and Challenges.” Hearing before the 

Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 

Senate, July 11, 2006. 

Sii'arag, A. Duale. “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited 

Regions in the Horn of Africa.” Wardheer Press, November 13, 2005. 

“Somali Islamists Threaten Suicide Attacks in Kenya, Ethiopia.” Agence France-Presse, 

November 2, 2006. <http://www.intellnet.org/news/2006/11/02/25033-1.html> 

“Somalia Government Tries to Confirm Terrorist's Death.” Voice of America, January 10, 

2007. 

“Somalia’s Islamic Courts Name Radical Cleric as Head of New Parliament.” Voice of 

America News, June 25, 2006. 

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/06/mil-060625-voa03.htm> 

Winter, Joseph. “Profile: Somalia’s Islamist Leader.” BBC News, June 30, 2006. 

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/51202>

116
117
118
IV. Saif al-Adel 

[Saif al-Adel, used in US wanted posters] 

Life in Egypt

Saif al-Adel (العدل سيف ;also spelled Sayf al-`Adl, Seif al-Adil)98, often called the thirdranking official of al-Qa’ida, is a man about whom there is extremely little that is known 

with certainty.99 His date of birth is April 11, 1960 or April 11, 1963. Since the identity 

behind his nom de guerre is unknown, it is impossible to say anything about his family or 

childhood. There is some indication that he did not have a traditional Islamic education, 

or if he did that it was not very extensive; in his 2005 memoir about Abu Mus`ab alZarqawi, Saif writes that he is partly using an abundance of free time to memorize the 

Qur’an, a task to which primary Islamic education is almost exclusively devoted.100 In 

the same memoir, Saif writes that “God guided me to comprehend pure Islam in the early 

1980s,” an indication that his turn to radical Islamism occurred in his early twenties. 

 

At that time Saif had probably already begun his career in the Egyptian army, 

since by 1987 he had achieved the rank of colonel in the Special Forces.101 In the Spring 

of 1987 Saif was arrested and charged in Cairo in what was called National Security Case 

 

98 Though sometimes conflated, Saif al-Adel is not the same person as Sayf al-Islam al-Misri or Sayf al-Din 

al-Ansari. The former is an al-Qa`ida colleague of Saif al-Adel and the author of a 1994 report on alQa`ida operations in Somalia and Ethiopia called “The Ogaden File,” Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104, in 

which Sayf al-Islam mentions attending a meeting at which Saif al-Adel was also present. Sayf al-Din alAnsari is a jihadi ideologue and part of the circle of Saudi jihadi authors that includes Abu Sa`d al-`Amili, 

Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi and Abu Ayman al-Hilali; his specific relationship with al-Qa`ida is unclear. One 

of the more prominent conflations of these individuals appears in the MSNBC profile of Saif al-Adel, 

where his full name is given as “Saif al-Din al-Ansari al-Adel” (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8336988/). 99 For the purposes of this profile, “known” refers to what is available in open source documents and in 

declassified documents from the Harmony database; some of the latter used in this profile are not currently 

available to the public. 

100 Saif al-Adel, “Detained Al-Qa’ida Leader Sayf al-Adl Chronicles Al-Zarqawi’s Rise in Organization,” 

hereafter “Zarqawi memoir.” The Arabic original of this memoir can be found at numerous websites and 

was published in Husayn, al-Zarqawi al-jil al-thani li’l-Qa`ida. An English translation can be found here: 

http://atc2005.blogspot.com/2006/06/al-zarqawi-second-generation-of-al.html. 

101 According to his Zarqawi memoir. 

119
401, in connection with which thousands of Islamist activists were arrested, and was 

charged with the crime of attempting to revive the Jihad Organization (tanzim al-jihad), 

which six years earlier had been responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President 

Anwar Sadat, and of attempting to assassinate former Egyptian Interior Minister Hasan 

al-Basha and journalist Makram Muhammad Ahmad.102 It was also claimed at the trial 

that he had been involved in a plot to destroy the Egyptian Parliament building by 

simultaneously driving a bomb-laden truck into the building and crashing a hijacked 

airplane into it as well. On May 6, with more than 400 others charged in the case, Saif 

was sent to prison; in his Zarqawi memoir he states that one of his fellow inmates was 

Major Muhammad al-Baram of the Special Forces and Special Guard. 

 

Already at this point in his jihadi career Saif exhibited a tendency toward 

independence of mind and divisiveness. He writes that, at the time of Case 401, 

“I found that the brothers at the Al-Jihad movement and the Islamic 

Group lacked practical experience that could enable them to achieve 

the desired change [of society]. In my opinion and the opinion of 

some brothers, this was due to over-enthusiasm that resulted in hasty 

action or recklessness at times.”103

This disagreement with the Egyptian Islamist groups, along with the growing success of 

Egyptian and Jordanian security services in infiltrating such groups, led Saif to leave 

Egypt for Saudi Arabia in 1988, travelling from there to Pakistan.104

1990s: Military Trainer for al-Qa’ida

 Soon after travelling to South Asia Saif became directly involved in the activities 

of the nascent al-Qa’ida movement. In the first two years of the 1990s he was based in 

Peshawar, Pakistan, making trips across the Afghan border to serve during this period as 

a trainer at the Jihad Wal camp, near Khost, Afghanistan. L'Housseine Kherchtou 

testified to having received explosives training from Saif there in 1991 or ’92.105 At 

some point in 1992, Saif travelled to Khartoum and conducted explosives training at the 

Damazine Farm.106 In late 1992 Saif told Mohammed Odeh that, as the war in 

Afghanistan was winding down, al-Qa’ida was going to “move the jihad to other parts of 

 

102 In an interview with the newspaper al-Wasat in November 1993 

(http://www.metransparent.com/texts/makkawi_interview_november.htm), Muhammad Makkawi stated 

that the group responsible for this assassination attempt was called al-Najun min al-Nar (“Saved from the 

Fire”). Saif may have been a member of this group. (The question of whether Saif is or is not Makkawi is 

controversial and involves much conflicting information.) 

103 Zarqawi memoir. Saif would later and on numerous occasions criticize the senior al-Qa`ida leadership 

for the same faults; see al-Shafi`i, “al-Usuliyun yuhasisun,” and “Al-Adl Letter,” 

http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/Al%20Adl%20Letter_Translation.pdf. 104 “al-Qa`id al-`askari al-jadid.” This is also said of Muhammad Makkawi, and it may be that this date and 

itinerary are true of the latter and not of Saif, who may very well have travelled to Pakistan in 1989 or ’90. 105 U.S. vs. Usama Bin Laden, et. al, day 8, February 21, 2001, p. 1134 106 U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, day 2, February 6, 2001, pp. 244f. 

120
the world,” and he directed Odeh to go to Somalia via Kenya.107 This is a clear 

indication that Saif had attained a relatively high position within the organization by this 

time, and indeed Kherchtou testified that Saif was then already a member of al-Qa’ida’s 

military committee.108 On January 20, 1993, along with seven other operatives, he was 

present at a meeting in the home of Abu Hafs to discuss a plan to establish training camps 

in Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.109 Sayf al-Islam al-Misri was given the 

task of leading the first team into Somalia, while Saif al-Adel remained in Pakistan; Sayf 

al-Islam left for Africa on February 4.110 Later that Spring Saif al-Adel journeyed there 

as well. 

 

The first datable piece of evidence for placing Saif in Somalia is a letter by Abu’lWalid addressed to him from Jihad Wal, dated 30 September 1993.111 This letter 

mentions the fact that two prior letters from Saif in Somalia were received by Abu’lWalid. The latter writes as Saif’s superior, refers to Saif as “young man,” and signs off 

“your uncle.” Abu’l-Walid, whose real name is Musatafa Hamid (حامد مصطفى(, was 

joined to Saif by marriage at some point during the 1990s.112 Abu’l-Walid opens his 

1993 letter “greetings to you and to your dear family,” perhaps indicating that Saif’s wife 

and children113 had accompanied him to Africa. Abu’l-Walid’s letter alludes to the fact 

that Saif’s earlier letters had dealt with matters of a “military aspect,” including the 

observation that there was a shortage of weaponry and ammunition in the region at the 

time. Abu’l-Walid refers to the recent arrival of U.S. forces in Somalia and urges Saif to 

strike at the “bald eagle.”114

 

In a report dated 17 January 1994 and signed “Saif al-Adel,” Saif describes some 

of his operations in Somalia, recommends that al-Qa’ida purchase a launch in order to 

unload materiel from an awaited ship, discusses the feasibility of establishing an 

operational and training camp in the al-Hadidiyah forest, and comments on the strengths 

and weaknesses of the local Islamist leadership that his cell was working with in the 

 

107 U.S. vs. Usama Bin Laden, et. al, day 12, testimony of Special Agent John Anticev, pp. 1642f. Odeh 

went from Pakistan to Nairobi in March of ’93. 

108 U.S. vs. Usama Bin Laden, et. al, day 8, February 21, 2001, p. 1123. 109 Sayf al-Islam, “The Ogaden file.” Also present at the meeting were Abu Qutayba al-Maghribi, Abu 

Jihad al-Nubi, Abu Yusuf al-Maghribi, Abu Thammam, Abu Islam al-Saghir and Abu Khalid al-Misri. 110 Ibid. 111 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600053, the first of five letters to the Africa Corps. 112 Shafi`i, “al-Zarqawi yukashif,” on the basis of information provided by Nu`man bin `Uthman, a Libyan 

Islamist and former jihadi based in London. See also al-Shafi`i, “al-Usuliyun yusahihun ma`lumat.” 

113 In the Harmony document known as the “Al Adl Letter” 

(http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/Al%20Adl%20Letter_Translation.pdf), probably by Saif though signed ‘Abd alHalim al-`Adl and dated 13 June 2002, he refers to a private letter addressed to Abu’l-Walid in which he 

asks the latter to pass on “greetings and kisses to my children.” This letter was posted to the Internet in 

early 2002, but is no longer online. I was unable to locate a cached or archived copy of that letter at the 

time of writing, but according the the “Al Adl Letter” it included the names of Saif’s children. 114 Kherchtou’s testimony corroborates Saif’s presence in Somalia during this period; he testified that Saif 

was among those “from al-Qaeda who were working in Somalia and that were traveling through Nairobi,” 

and that it was Saif who informed the members of the cell in Kenya about the drowning of Abu Ubayda alBanshiri in May of 1994 (U.S. vs. Usama Bin Laden, et. al, day 8, February 21, 2001, pp. 1173 and 1264-

6). 

121
area.115 In an undated letter written in the same period and signed “Omar al-Sumali, 

formerly known as Saif al-Adel,” he provides a detailed geographical and ethnographic 

description of the Nairobi-Kamboni route and of the southern region of Somalia, 

including the tribal structure, briefly describes six small-scale terrorist operations carried 

out in the area, and ultimately recommends that al-Qa’ida establish a lasting presence in 

the area.116 This letter also evidences some degree of friction between Saif and his 

addressee, inasmuch as he asks toward the end of the letter that his correspondent “not 

delay, as you usually do, in making the appropriate decisions” regarding his 

recommendation to establish an al-Qa’ida base in the area. 

 

The next piece of evidence for Saif’s whereabouts puts him in the Gulf; Khalid 

Sheikh Muhammad claims to have met with Saif in Yemen in 1995.117 There is a letter 

from Saif to “Qari Saahib” dated 19 November 1997, asking for help in getting four 

people out of prison, but it does not mention where Saif is writing from.118 We next find 

him in South Asia, and he appears to have operated out of Afghanistan until the U.S.-led 

invasion in late 2001. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad admitted to having met with Saif and 

Muhammad Atef a number of times in Afghanistan in 1997 and ’98, “assisting them with 

computer and media projects.”119 In 1999, Saif worked as a trainer at the Mes Aynak 

training camp near Kabul, which had begun operations in the same year. Saif offered an 

advanced commando training course there.120

 

It was also in 1999 that Saif began his–and al-Qa’ida’s–relationship with Abu 

Mus`ab al-Zarqawi (d. 6/7/2006). In his Zarqawi memoir Saif writes that he had learned 

about Zarqawi from articles by Abu Qatada al-Filistini in the latter’s London-based 

magazine al-Minhaj, and that he subsequently followed the news of the court case and 

imprisonment of Zarqawi and other Jordanian and Palestinian militants. Upon his release 

from Jordanian prison in 1999 Zarqawi moved to Peshawar, and soon thereafter travelled 

to Kandahar, Afghanistan to meet with al-Qa’ida officials. After meeting with Zarqawi 

and finding that he was a “hardliner” and in disagreement with certain aspects of alQa’ida’s ideology and practice, Saif asked Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri for 

the task of liaising with Zarqawi and overcoming their differences. The two al-Qa’ida 

chiefs appointed him to this task, and it was later agreed that al-Qa’ida would provide 

support for Zarqawi to establish an independent but al-Qa’ida-associated training camp in 

Herat, Afghanistan.121 This location was chosen because of its proximity to Iran, since it 

had become easier by that time for mujahidin to enter Afghanistan through Iran than 

 

115 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600114. 116 Harmony, AFGP-2002-600113; though not dated, it is very probable that this was written prior to the 

letter dated 17 January 1994, since the latter assumes a commitment on al-Qa`ida’s part to set down stakes 

in the area, while in the former Saif recommends that they do so. 

117 9/11 Commission Report, p. 489n. 9. Khalid disclosed neither the nature of their meeting nor whether 

he had any knowledge of Saif’s purpose in being in Yemen. 

118 Or at least the English summary of the letter does not mention this; see p. 9 of Harmony, AFGP-2002-

003677. 

119 9/11 Commission Report, p. 149. 120 9/11 Commission Report, p. 157. 121 It was at this camp that Zarqawi established his Jund al-Sham, a jihadi militia composed of people 

drawn from Jordan, Syria, and other central Arab lands traditionally know as al-Sham; this group was 

infiltrated by Jordanian intelligence and scattered before the U.S. invasion. 

122
through Pakistan. Saif established connections with sympathetic parties in Iran and set 

up way stations in Tehran and Mashhad for mujahidin bound for Afghanistan. Saif made 

frequent trips from Kandahar to Herat to observe and assist with Zarqawi’s operations. 

He also used these opportunities to deepen his contacts in Iran, though he says that these 

were with “virtuous people” in Iran and not with the Iranian government.122

2000s: 9/11 and the Iranian Refuge(?)

According to the Australian Federal Police, Saif was involved in early 2000 in the 

development of a plot to assassinate Australian mining magnate and orthodox rabbi 

Joseph Gutnick.123 As he notes in his Zarqawi memoir, Saif and the rest of the al-Qa’ida 

leadership were also engaged in planning the 9/11 operation throughout the final years of 

the ‘90s and during the beginning of the new millennium. The planning was not always a 

harmonious process, however. In July of 2001, after it became known to the al-Qa’ida 

leadership that Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad `Umar was opposed to al-Qa’ida 

carrying out a direct attack on the United States, a split emerged between a number of the 

senior leaders. According to interrogations of several al-Qa’ida detainees, Saif was 

among those who agreed with Mullah `Umar and opposed Bin Laden.124 Abu’l-Walid 

was also opposed to Bin Laden in this matter, according to writings of his discovered by 

the U.S. military in Kandahar.125

 

Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001, Saif initially took 

a leading role in directing al-Qa’ida human resources in fighting the U.S. and Coalition 

forces. The Australian jihadi David Hicks–who was screened by Saif and Muhammad 

Atef in the Spring of 2001 before training at Tarnak Farms–reported to Saif in Kandahar 

in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and was directed to fight at the Kandahar 

Airport.126 According to his Zarqawi memoir, it was soon decided that al-Qa’ida 

personnel should evacuate from Kandahar and go into hiding. While some of the 

leadership fled to the mountains on Afghanistan’s eastern border, some went over the 

western border into Iran. Saif was in charge of this contingent, and he was assisted in 

Iran by members of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami.127 Using money provided by 

supporters from the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Saif rented apartments in Iran for 

al-Qa’ida members and their families. 

 

 

122 Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi memoir. 123 Symons, “Brigitte link to Gutnick death plot.” 124 9/11 Commission Report, p. 251. He was apparently joined in this opposition by Abu Hafs the 

Mauritanian and Shaykh Sa`id al-Misri. 

125 Shafi`i, “Shaqiqa zawja.” 126 “Charge sheet: Allegations against Hicks.” See also the U.S. press release regarding its case against 

Hicks (available here: http://cryptome.quintessenz.org/mirror/usa-v-hicks.htm), where it is stated that Saif 

“was assigning individuals to locations where they were to fight alongside other al Qaida associates against 

U.S. and Coalition forces.” 

127 Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi memoir. Hekmatyar had gone into exile in Iran in 1996 and was there until the 

Iranian government shut down the offices of Hezb-i Islami and expelled him in February of 2002, around 

the same time that it began to arrest al-Qa`ida membership then in the country. 

123
Soon thereafter Saif reestablished contact with the al-Qa’ida leadership in 

Afghanistan and began to organize groups of fighters to return there and support the 

insurgency. Zarqawi and his group of Palestinian and Jordanian jihadis–the remnants of 

his Jund al-Sham–planned to make their way to Iraq, where the Ansar al-Islam group had 

offered support.128 In the first months of 2002, however, under pressure from the United 

States, the Iranian authorities began to detain some members of these groups, causing 

Saif to abort his activities and leading to the arrest of “up to 80 percent of Abu Mus`ab’s 

group.”129 Zarqawi managed to make his way to Iraq, and, writing in 2005, Saif stated 

that he had “not met Abu Mus`ab since he left Iran,” one of several indications that Saif 

remained in that country. 

 

It is unclear whether Saif remains in Iran to this day, and if he is there, what his 

level of freedom of movement might be. In early 2003, Iran publicly admitted that it had 

numerous al-Qa’ida members, including members of the leadership, in custody, but it 

would not publicly name any of these people.130 In May of 2003, when directly asked in 

an ABC News interview whether Iran was holding Saif, Iranian Ambassador to the 

United Nations Javad Zarif would neither confirm nor deny it, saying that Iran held more 

al-Qa’ida personnel in captivity than any other country and that because these people 

generally had multiple passports Iran was unable at the time to positively identify 

them.131 In early February 2007, however, a number of U.S. government officials, 

speaking on the condition that they not be identified, told a reporter at the Washington 

Post that American intelligence did know the precise identities of those held in Iranian 

custody, and that Iran had provided U.S. intelligence with their names, photographs and 

fingerprints before 2003.132 In early 2005 the German journalist Bruno Schirra claimed 

to have been shown by a Western intelligence service a list of the al-Qa’ida operatives 

held in Iran; the list included Saif.133 According to a “former senior U.S. 

counterterrorism offical,” Saudi intelligence detected communication in early 2003 

between al-Qa’ida leaders in Iran and an al-Qa’ida cell in Saudi Arabia and, after 

demanding that Iran do something about this, Iranian authorities went on to detain 20 to 

25 al-Qa’ida officials under house arrest.134 It is said that they were detained at two 

locations, both guarded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards: one in villas in the Namak 

Abrud region on the Caspian coast and the other in Lazivan, a region northwest of Tehran 

that houses a large military complex.135 In February of 2007 a woman claiming to be the 

sister-in-law of Abu’l-Walid stated that her sister–Abu’l-Walid’s wife–had recently 

 

128 The details of this account, as given by Saif in his Zarqawi memoir, are corroborated in `Abd al-Rahim 

`Ali, “al-Muqatilun al-`arab fi’l-`Iraq,” though in that article Saif is referred to as Colonel Makkawi. 129 Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi memoir. 130 La Guardia, “Iran holding ‘big time’ members of al-Qa`eda”; “Iran: We’ve got Qaeda Bigs.” In his 

letter to Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri rhetorically asks: “do the brothers forget that we 

have more than one hundred prisoners - many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their 

countries - in the custody of the Iranians?” 

131 “Ma bish az har keshvar-i digar al-qa`ida ra asyar kardim.” This is a Persian translation of the ABC 

interview, an English transcript of which does not appear to be available online. 132 Linzer, “Al-Qaeda Suspects.” 133 Schirra, “Wie gefährlich ist Iran?” 134 Windrem, “Al-Qaida reportedly finds safe haven in Iran.” 135 Ibid. 

124
telephoned her from Tehran and told her that Abu’l-Walid’s family, Saif and others were 

under house arrest there, in the custody of the Revolutionary Guards.136

 

Whatever his whereabouts, Saif did not cease his al-Qa’ida activities during this 

period. It is believed that in April of 2002 Sa`d bin Laden, who was part of the al-Qa’ida 

contingent in Iran led by Saif at the time, organized from inside Iran the truck bombing of 

a synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia.137 In June of 2002, Saif apparently wrote a letter to 

“brother Mukhtar” under the name `Abd al-Halim `Adl, in which he bemoans the losses 

that al-Qa’ida had incurred since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, expresses strong 

disapproval of Osama bin Laden and his leadership, and mentions a private letter which 

he’d tried to send to Abu’l-Walid but which was instead posted on a jihadi web forum.138 

The contents of the letter make clear that Saif was still very much involved in the day-today operational affairs of the organization at that time. In 2003, according to Saudi and 

U.S. intelligence, Saif was in communication with the al-Qa’ida cell in Riyadh that 

carried out the bombings of the Dorrat al-Jadawel compound in Riyadh on May 12 of that 

year.139 During the same spring Saif was in touch with the Arabic-language newspaper 

al-Sharq al-Awsat, telling them that he believed that around 350 “Afghan Arabs” had 

been killed in Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion, and that around 180 of them had been 

captured.140 December of 2003 saw the inception of “Mu`askar al-Battar,” a jihadi 

magazine published under the auspices of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula; in every 

issue Saif contributed an article in the section “al-Amn wa’l-istikhbarat” (“Security and 

Intelligence Operations”).141 In 2004 a diary of Saif’s was recovered during a raid in 

Saudi Arabia.142 He was last heard from in 2005, when he contributed the already-cited 

memoir on Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi upon the solicitation of the journalist Fu’ad Husayn. 

 

136 al-Shafi`i, “Shaqiqa zawja.” 137 Windrem, “Al-Qaida reportedly finds safe haven in Iran.” 138 “Al-Adl Letter,” http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Al%20Adl%20Letter_Translation.pdf. Apparently Saif’s 

children were with Abu’l-Walid at that time, since he asked in the letter that Abu’l-Walid pass along his 

affectionate greetings to them. The letter was posted to alneda.com, though I have as of yet not been able 

to locate it on the Internet Archive (www.archive.org). 

139 Sherwell, “Teheran ‘providing refuge’”; according to un-named U.S. intelligence officials cited in 

Linzer, “Al-Qaeda Suspects,” “there are suspicions, but no proof” that such communication took place. 140 “Al-mas’ul al-`askari li’l-qa`ida.” 141 Available at various internet sites; what looks like a complete run of the journal can be found here: 

http://www.qa3edoon.com/BattarFullWEB/contents.htm. Some analysis of Saif’s writings in “Mu`askar alBattar” can be found in Ulph, “Al-Qaeda’s Online Publications” and Scheuer, “Assessing London and 

Sharm al-Sheikh.” 

142 “Verbatim Transcript,” p. 4. 

125
Sources:

Akel, Pierre. “Man huwa al-masdar al-haqiqi li’l-ma`lumat al-mutadawala hawl khalifa 

al-Zarqawi?” (“Who is the real source of the information circulating about al-Zarqawi?”) 

Middle East Transparent, May 29, 2005. 

<http://www.metransparent.com/texts/pierre_akel_who_is_real_source_of_information_o

n_zarqawi.htm> Accessed 7 March 2007. 

“Al-mas’ul al-`askari li’l-qa`ida: 1900 `adad al-afghan al-`arab fi afghanistan qutila min 

hum 350 wa usira min hum 180 fi’l-hamla al-amirkiya.” (“Al-Qa`ida’s Military Leader: 

Of the 1900 Afghan Arabs in Afghanistan 350 were killed and 180 were captured during 

the American offensive.”). al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 10, 2003. 

<http://www.asharqalawsat.com/print/default.asp?did=157037> Accessed 5 March 2007. 

“Al-Qa’id al-`askari al-jadid li-tanzim al-Qa`ida kana dimn tanzim misri hawal tartib 

inqilab `am 1987.” (“The new military leader of the al-Qa`ida organization was part of 

the Egyptian group that attempted a coup in 1987.”) al-Sharq al-Awsat no. 8400, 

November 27, 2001. 

Ali, Farhana. “Jihadists Remain Strong After Death of al-Zarqawi.” Terrorism Focus

3:23 (2006). 

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2370026> 

Accessed 7 March 2007. 

`Ali, `Abd al-Rahim. “al-Muqatilun al-`arab fi’l-`Iraq.” (“Arab fighters in Iraq.”) alSharq al-Awsat no. 9670, May 20, 2005. 

Blanchard, Christopher. “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology.” Congressional 

Research Service, June 20, 2005. 

<http://images.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050622/alqaeda_crs.pdf> Accessed 5 

March 2007. 

“Charge Sheet: Allegations against Hicks.” The Australian, March 2, 2007. 

<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21312534-601,00.html> Accessed 

5 March 2007. 

Coughlin, Con. “Iran ‘is Training the Next al-Qa’eda Leaders’.” The Telegraph (UK), 

November 15, 2006. 

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/14/wiran214.xml> 

Accessed 5 March 2007. 

Estate of John Patrick O’neill, Sr. vs. The Republic of Iraq et al., D.C., August 20, 2003. 

“Film qadim li’l-BBC yukashif an Sayf al-`Adl al-mas’ul al-`askari li’l-Qa`ida laysa al-

`Aqid Makkawi kama taz`um al-FBI.” (“Old BBC footage reveals that Saif al-Adel, alQa`ida military chief, is not Colonel Makkawi as claimed by the FBI.”) Middle East 

126
Transparent, n.d. <http://www.metransparent.com/texts/seif_makkawi_intro.htm> 

Accessed 5 March 2007. 

Husayn, Fu’ad. al-Zarqawi al-jil al-thani li’l-Qa`ida. Beirut: Dar al-Khayal, 2005. 

“Iran: We’ve Got Qaeda Bigs.” CBS News, July 23, 2003. 

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/07/world/main561909.shtml>. 

La Guardia, Anton. “Iran holding ‘big-time’ members of al-Qaeda.” The Telegraph

(UK), August 3, 2003. 

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/07/24/wiran24.xml> 

Accessed 2 March 2007. 

Linzer, Dafna. “Al-Qaida suspects color debate over Iran.” The Washington Post, 

February 10, 2007. < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/09/AR2007020902294.html> Accessed 5 March 2007. 

“Ma bish az har keshvar-i digar al-qa`ida ra asyar kardim.” (“We have more members of 

al-Qa`ida in captivity than any other country”). Iran no. 2478, 9 Khordad 1382/30 May 

2003. <http://www.irannewspaper.ir/1382/820309/html/nation.htm>. 

Moubayed, Sami. “Abu al-Ghadia to Build on al-Zarqawi’s Legacy in Iraq.” Terrorism 

Focus 3:26 (2006). 

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2370052 > 

Accessed 7 March 2007. 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 9/11 Commission 

Report: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2004. 

Saif al-Adel. “Detained Al-Qa’ida Leader Sayf al-Adl Chronicles 

Al-Zarqawi’s Rise in Organization,” FBIS Report - GMP2005060637100, May, 2005. 

Originally published in al-Quds al-`Arabi, May 21-22, 2005. 

Sayf al-Islam. “The Ogaden File.” Harmony, AFGP-2002-600104. 

Scheuer, Michael. “Al-Qaeda’s Next Generation: Less Visible and More Lethal.” 

Terrorism Focus 2:18 (2005). 

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2369797> 

Accessed 7 March 2007. 

-----. “Assessing London and Sharm Al-Sheikh: The Role of Internet Intelligence and 

Urban Warfare Training.” Terrorism Focus 2:15 (2005). 

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2369764> 

Accessed 7 March 2007. 

127
Schirra, Bruno. “Wie gefährlich ist Iran?” Cicero, November 2005. 

<http://www.cicero.de/839.php?ausgabe=11/2005> Accessed 5 March 2007. FBIS 

translation available online here: <http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/007690.php> 

Shafi`i(al-), Muhammad. “al-Usuliyun yusahihun ma`lumat al-mubahith al-amirkiyya 

`an shakhsiyati Sayf al-`Adl al-qa’id al-`askari li’l-Qa`ida wa’l-`aqid Makkawi.” alSharq al-Awsat no. 9257, April 2, 2004. 

-----. “al-Zarqawi yukashif `an ism khalifatih fi shahada Sayf al-`Adl al-qa’id al-`askari 

lil’-Qa`ida.” (“al-Zarqawi’s successor’s name revealed in a writing of al-Qa`ida military 

commander Saif al-Adel.”) al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 29, 2005. 

<http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issue=9679&article=302318>. 

-----. “Shaqiqa zawja munazzir al-Afghan al-`Arab: Abu’l-Walid al-Misri wa `a’ilatih 

mu`ataqalun fi Iran.” (“Sister-in-law of ‘Afghan Arabs’ writer: Abu’l-Walid al-Misri and 

his family are prisoners in Iran.”). al-Sharq al-Awsat no. 10294, February 3, 2007. 

-----. “Usuliu London yushakukun fi riwaya al-sultan al-jurjiyya `an i`tiqal Sayf al-Islam 

al-Misri wa taslimihi ila Washington.” (“London Fundamentalists cast doubt on report 

from Georgian president on the arrest of Sayf al-Islam al-Misri and his transfer to 

Washington.”) al-Sharq al-Awsat no. 8730, October 23, 2002. 

<http://www.asharqalawsat.com/print/default.asp?did=131522>. 

Sherwell, Philip. “Teheran ‘Providing Refuge for al-Qaeda Terrorists.” The Telegraph

(UK), November 5, 2005. 

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/11/06/wiran106.xml > 

Accessed 2 March 2007. 

Symons, Emma-Kate. “Brigitte link to Gutnick death plot.” The Australian, February 10, 

2007. <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21201453-601,00.html> 

Accessed 27 February 2007. 

“The US Case Against Him.” Herald Sun (Australia), March 3, 2007. 

<http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21811,21315823-662,00.html> Accessed 5 

March 2007. 

Ulph, Stephen. “Al-Qaeda’s Online Publications.” Terrorism Focus 1:5 (2004). 

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2368625> 

Accessed 7 March 2007. 

U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y. 

Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10013 

[Ramzi bin al-Shib]. March 9, 2007. < http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/pdf/alshib_transcript_031507.pdf> Accessed 15 March 2007. 

128
Windrem, Robert. “Al-Qaida Finds Safe Haven in Iran.” NBC News, June 24, 2005. 

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8330976/> Accessed 27 February 2007. 

Zawahiri, Ayman. Letter to Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005. 

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawiletter_9jul2005.htm> Accessed 28 February 2007. 

Zaydi, Mshari. “Superficial Comparisons.” al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 8, 2007. 

<http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=7926> Accessed 27 February 2007. 

129
130
V. Lesser Members/Affiliates of al-Qa’ida 

A. Aden Hashi Farah Ayro 

Ayro, a member of the Ayr clan and thought to be 29 or 30 years of age, is one of 

the most violent Salafi militia leaders and a protégé of Aweys. His extremism seems 

similar to that of the late al-Qa’ida leader Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, in that he alienated his 

fellow clansmen by the specter of violence he created. He also lacks serious religious 

credentials and, which combined with his youth, make it unlikely for him to inherit the 

leadership of a major Salafi organization in Somalia. 

Ayro was appointed by Aweys to head the Hizb al-Shabab, or youth wing of the 

Islamic Courts Union, and is also the leader of other militias, although it is not entirely 

clear what groups he heads within Somalia or what their political agendas are. His group 

has been linked to the killings of four foreign aid workers and a dozen or more Somalis 

who had been working with Westerners. He received military training in Afghanistan 

prior to the U.S.-led invasion and has ties to al-Qa’ida operatives Abu Talha al-Sudani 

and Ahmed Abdi Godane. He was also among the Somali delegation of mujahidin that 

traveled to Lebanon in July 2006 to fight Israeli forces. 

 B. Gouled Hasan Dourad 

Dourad was born in Somalia in 1974 and is currently detained by the United 

States in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He lived in refugee camps in Germany following civil 

war in Somalia and eventually received asylum from Sweden. According to the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence, Gouled was the head of a division of al-Ittihad alIslami (AIAI) that supported al-Qa’ida members in Somalia, working for the leader of alQa’ida's East African cell, Abu Talha al-Sudani. In this capacity, he procured safe houses 

and weapons for al-Qa’ida militants, and did reconnaissance for a proposed suicide attack 

on the U.S. base Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. 

The imam of his mosque in Sweden put him and an associate in touch with 

individuals who sent him to Afghanistan, where he trained in explosives and weaponry at 

al-Qa’ida's Khaldan camp. He returned to Somalia in 1996 and joined the fighting against 

Ethiopians in Ogaden, working with both AIAI and al-Qa’ida members. He continued 

these activities as al-Ittihad was becoming defunct, although its leaders remained active 

and attempted to continue operations. 

C. Abu Talha al-Sudani (Tariq `Abd Allah) 

Abu Talha is an al-Qa’ida operative with extensive explosives training, and 

alleged to be close to bin Laden. He was born in Sudan and married a Somali woman, 

and they resided in Somalia beginning in 1993. He is also an associate of Gouled Hasan 

Dourad, working with the Mogadishu cell of AIAI that was responsible for supporting alQa’ida members. 

131
He, along with Fazul and Salih `Ali Salih Nabhan were the targets of the 

American air strikes on Somalia in January 2007. According to the testimony of Jamal alFadl, he received explosives training from Hizbollah in southern Lebanon in the early 

1990s. He is believed to have assisted Fazul in the car bombing and attempted attack on 

the Israeli airliner in Kenya in 2002. 

Following the 1998 embassy bombings, a number of the East African cell 

members involved in the attack were arrested. The remaining members at large, including 

Fazul, were assisted financially by Abu Talha, who was traveling frequently between 

Somalia and the United Arab Emirates at the time. 

Sources:

“Al-Ittihad al-Islami.” Federation of American Scientists <http://www.fas.org/> 

Accessed 11 February 2007. 

“Al-Zawahiri yatahadi Bush fi al-`Iraq wa yatawa`id al-Ithiubiyin fi al-Sumal.” Elaph, 

January 23, 2007. 

Boukhars, Anouar. “Understanding Somali Islamism.” Terrorism Monitor 4:10 (2006). 

Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. London: I.B. Taurus, 2003. 

“Hargeysa Judicial Court Acquits ‘Hassan Dahir Aweys’ Of Terrorism.” Somaliland 

Times, December 9, 2006. 

“Hikmatiyar: Sa`adna bin Ladin `ala al-farar min Tura Bura; najat qiyadi: al-Qa`ida alkibar fi al-Sumal.” Al-Sharq al-Awsa, January 12, 2007. 

International Crisis Group, “Somalia's Islamists.” Africa Report N°100 (2005). 

Marquardt, Erich. “Al-Qaeda's Threat to Ethiopia.” Terrorism Monitor, 3: 3 (2005). 

Sii'arag, Duale A. “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited 

Regions in the Horn of Africa.” <http://www.somaliawatch.org> Accessed 12 February 

2007. 

“Somali Fighters: We'll Heed al Qaeda's Call.” CNN. January 6, 2007. 

 

Terdman, Moshe, and Deborah Touboul. “Al-Qaeda in Africa.” Islam in Africa 

Newsletter 2:1 (2007). 

U.S. Central Command. Al-Qaeda Leaders, Jihadist Websites on Somali Islamists. 

<http://www.centcom.mil/> Accessed 10 February 2007. 

132
Winter, Joseph. “Profile: Somalia's Islamist Leader.” BBC News. June 30, 2006. 

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5120242.stm> 

133
134
APPENDIX C 

NOTES AND INTERVIEWS FROM KENYA 

I. Notes on Ras Kiamboni 

II. Sample of Kenyan Views 

III. Confession of Omar Said Omar 

IV. Written Statement of Mombasa Muslim Leaders

135
136
APPENDIX C-I: 

NOTES ON RAS KIAMBONI:1

THE `ALI-ITIHAD MILITARY BASE AND TRAINING CAMP’ 

Part I: Mr. A. A., Local Fisherman/Seafood Businessman

Introduction

On 28 September I had a conversation with Mr. A. A., a member of Kenya’s Orma

community from Tana River District in Coast Province. He claims to have direct and 

indirect information on an “Islamic terrorist training base-camp” located at Ras 

Kiamboni, a coastal town some 10-20 kms. north of Kiunga at the Kenya-Somalia 

border. He did not offer the name of their organization, but other sources suggest this 

settlement-facility belongs to Ali-Itihad.2

A. A. served for about 12 years in the Kenya Army (he showed me his discharge 

document) and for the last several years he has operated a fish buying and selling 

business between the north Kenya coast and Malindi/Mombasa, buying fish, crabs, 

prawns and lobster from local fishermen. He has also just registered the North Coast 

Construction Limited, a company he intends to use to try and get public works 

construction contracts, mainly in his native Tana River District. (He showed me the 

registration certificate.) 

The following notes are taken from this conversation, translated from Swahili. 

Ras Kiamboni: The Location and Fishing Business 

Ras Kiamboni is a small town, larger than Garsen, but much smaller than Lamu

Town. During the rule of Said Barre, it had its own district commissioner/governor. 

By motorized fishing boat, it is about 30 minutes north of the border at Kiunga, where 

there is also a Kenya Customs post. 

Various tribes are found in the surrounding coastal and interior areas, on both sides of

the border. These are: Galjel Somali, Bajuni, Pate, Boni and some Orma; the latter 

two groups engage mainly in livestock grazing. Most of the fishing is done by the 

Bajuni, many of whom are Kenyan. They tend to prefer to fish north of the border, 

and especially opposite the inland creek just above Ras Kiamboni that is fed by some 

fresh water, for two reasons: this combination of water is ideal for prawns and there 

are more fish and lobster in this area in general, and because catch from across the 

border is not subject to Kenya Fisheries’ taxation. 

 1

 This spelling is based on the informant’s pronunciation; the author is aware of alternative spellings, 

especially ‘Kambooni’ (seen in the Project Harmony translated al-Qa’ida documents). 2

 For an alternative view regarding this group’s possible linkages to international terrorism, see 

Dowden (2002). 

137
A. A. has therefore been active in this area for some time; he has a residence (rented?) 

in Lamu Town as well as in Bura in Tana River. He hires a boat or boats to fish, 

and/or buys directly from local fishermen. He was last in this area in January of this 

year. 

Arrival of Newcomers and the Establishment of the Training Camp/Base 

At that time he went as far as Ras Kiamboni where he has been going for this purpose 

for some time. From 1996, he noticed and was told about new, strange people who 

had recently arrived from unknown places. According to his fishermen contacts and 

own observations, they were not locals, but rather, Arabs and other more “Europeanlooking type people” but who were Muslims. On this occasion, he was told there 

were only about 30 of these new-comers. 

Over the last few years, their presence has increased, and he has continued to hear 

stories about them, including how they have completely taken over the area, 

especially since the departure of General Morgan (Barre’s in-law) from the Kismayu 

area farther north and who then passed into Kenya via Ras Kiamboni itself; he later 

returned to Kismayu before being driven out again, supposedly into Ethiopia. It 

appears his forced eviction reflected the desire of these newcomers to have no rival 

authority in the area, and apparently none has existed since that time. 

Their numbers now appear to include Indonesians and other “Asian-looking people” 

as well as Arabs. From their arrival, they are said to have recruited a number of local 

Somali male youth to help them in language translation and menial tasks. They also 

built an impressive religious education center (madrassa) where these youth are being 

sent. Here they receive instruction in a particularly harsh and puritanical from of 

Islam; these teachings, and the changed resultant behavior, is said to have completely 

cut them off from their own families. According to locals, these newcomers are their 

“new parents.” Even local women who have been taken as wives are said to have 

broken off with their natal families. For example, it is claimed that the locals do not 

correctly follow Islamic slaughtering ritual, so that eating local food with local people 

who have prepared such food is ‘haramu’, or unclean. Such social exclusiveness has 

caused both resentment and fear among the local population. 

This version of Islam is not imposed only on those closely associated with the 

newcomers, however. Local people who have been warned to stop smoking or 

chewing miraa and have then been found to continue to doing this have been 

summarily executed, “even later on the same day; you are given no time to change 

your way of life.”3

 In A. A.’s view, what they have imposed is not Islam, but “a form

of devil-rule.” 

In addition to the Islamic education center, there is also a military camp that appears 

to be the main residential area for these newcomers; it is about a five minute walk 

from Ras Kiamboni town center and about ten minutes from the sea front. During 

 3

 A Somali businessman who had “taken refuge” in Nairobi later described how much of the local

support that does exist for more ascetic versions of Islam stemmed originally from the reaction to the 

attempts to impose ‘European culture’ as part of the country’s adoption of ‘socialist’ following the 

1968 coup. Especially important here were efforts to elevate the status of women that “violated our 

Somali culture.” 

138
1996-97, the main structures there were cloth tents, but over the last several years, 

permanent (cement) structures have been erected. There is also a large footpath 

leading from this camp into the Boni Forest. It is said there are additional facilities 

there, but A. A. is unaware of what these might be. He has seen only three LandCruiser vehicles, but does not rule out the presence of others, especially in the thick 

forest area. He has not seen aircraft there, but they have many boats, including 

motorized sea-bikes that they use to move quickly from the shore to larger vessels offshore. 

During his last visit, in January of this year, he saw about 200 of them jogging on the 

beach with rifles, what he perceived to be AK-47s. This was quite obviously military 

drilling. This group was comprised mainly of (non-local) Arabs, Indian-looking 

people, some Somali, and even one European. 

Another reason for local resentment is the control they have imposed over the local 

fishing business. In 1997, while A. A. was in Kiunga, his hired boat and crew were 

apprehended by one of their sea-patrols. He was informed about this and had to pay 

$800 to have them released. (This figure was based on the size of the catch; A. A. 

changed Kenya currency in Kiunga to get this money. He says there is a great deal of

money-changing in this border area; I did not ask him what the rate was/is.) Payment 

is by the weight of the catch. Records are kept, so that if a boat leaves with catch that 

cannot be paid for, the boat is seized whenever it comes back if its crew does not 

make the required payment at that time. According to A. A., if payment is not made, 

“the boat owner could even be shot.” 

On certain days, fishing is prohibited altogether; crews are told to just stay away from

the area. 

At the same time, it seems those in the camp are extremely well-financed from

external sources, since they send personnel to Kiunga and Lamu to buy provisions in 

great quantities. Some of these people have been seen with Kenya identity cards and 

even passports; though it is clear to locals they cannot be Kenyans. 

According to local informants, Ras Kiamboni is the “central base” for operations 

covering a much wider area of Somalia. They are said to have other camps/bases in 

Gedo, Bardere, Luk, Bula-Hawa, and another across the Kenya border at Mandera. It 

is also said they have presence in El-Wak, Mogadishu and in northern Puntland (near 

the border with Yemen), where tribal leader Abdulahi Yusuf accommodates them for 

payment. 

Before the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi, some Lamu residents had come to 

know the Arab who had married locally and started a fish business, eventually 

obtaining a contract to supply the Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi. He also sold 

provisions directly to the Ras Kiamboni base. 

Conclusion 

Mr. A. A. expressed great concern about the presence of this facility and community. 

This seemed to reflect both annoyance with the interference in access to preferred 

fishing grounds and the very ascetic/harsh form of Islam that has been imposed, and 

139
to Kenya’s - and the wider world’s – security. Several times he referred to the US 

Embassy bombing and the recent terrorist attack in the US. He is convinced people 

connected to this group/settlement are involved whether directly or indirectly. He 

also expressed frustration that Kenyan security around the Kiunga border area seems 

to be so lax and porous: “The Kenya Police take no notice of them; when we 

complain or try to get their interest, they say that is not their concern since it is all 

outside Kenya.” He is not aware of any particular interest that has been taken either 

by the local District Administration or by the KANU political leadership in Lamu

District over this presence. 

Part II: Report from a British Journalist 

Introduction

I had a separate conversation with A. B., a reporter for UK newspaper. He had 

spoken with a European source at the UN offices in Nairobi, following the evacuation 

of their food-relief program in the southern Somalia area which took place after the 

attack in the US. The following summary contains some of the information he 

obtained. 

Ras Kiamboni and Ali-Jihad 

The UN has had to evacuate in food-relief work from southern Somalia. At least two 

people of European origin have been killed in this area since 1995. Recently the UN 

mission was told no “white face” will be tolerated there again. 

The UN received reports that an Ali-Jihad base had been established at Ras Kiamboni, 

but that Osama bin Laden has also been seen there, along with “many Afghans and 

Pakistanis.” Al-Qaeda is also said to have bases in various parts of Somalia, 

including Mogadishu, where two of bin Laden’s sons are said to be currently living. 

They also have a center in Puntland. 

In several big towns in Somalia where Ali-Jihad is active they are active in the 

transport, banking and mobile phone businesses. 

The UN source denied the allegation that some 500 local Somali staff had been 

infiltrated by Al-Qaeda.

Part III: Comment from a Lamu Tour Operator/Local Kanu Official 

 Introduction

I spoke with O. F., an old friend from Lamu who runs a tourist business and is also a 

local KANU branch official. His family’s original home is the Kiunga area; they 

were displaced by the Shifta attacks about 40 years ago. 

Insecurity and Fears 

O. F. attends District Development Committee meetings and has urged for increased 

security along the Kiunga border, both to combat general outlaw-robbery and to 

140
prevent incursions from “this camp” that many people have heard stories about across 

the border. Given the absence of any recognizable authority in Somalia, he feels this 

should be a priority. However, government officials have yet to show any perceptible 

interest in these matters.

He fears that due to the high dependence of the Lamu economy on tourism, its people 

– whether seen collectively or as individuals – might be targeted by antiWestern/radical Islamic elements who view such close relations with non-Muslims as 

anathema. Only one such attack could kill the local tourist industry for ever, he feels. 

He claimed not to have any direct knowledge of the Ras Kiamboni base-camp. 

However, due to his family ties and business relations with numerous local fishermen, 

he offered to find out what he could. 

141
142
APPENDIX C-II: 

A SMALL, UNREPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF MUSLIM VIEWS 

I served my constituents for fifteen years, many of them Muslim. And 

I’ve lived in Mombasa since my school days, so I know these people very well. 

They are very good people, and they voted for me, even more than for Muslim

candidates. 

But there is one thing about them that is very bad. If I, as a Christian, 

commit a crime, even my friends who are Christians will say I did wrong, 

because what I did was criminal. But with Muslims, they will say: “What he did 

doesn’t matter, because he is a fellow Muslim.”

That is why terrorists can operate in Mombasa. I don’t believe any 

Kenyan Muslim could do such thing; but they can know who these people are, 

and keep quiet, even if they don’t support what they want to do, and some of 

them do support it [Interview, Former (non-Muslim) Member of Parliament from

Mombasa; Nairobi, 13/02/07]. 

While it was not possible to conduct an actual survey to explore the distribution of 

particular attitudes1

, it was possible to interview a small number of Muslims (all 

either living at the Coast or having done so for a considerable period in the past) 

and to ask them how they thought members of their population (and specifically 

not themselves in terms of their own, personal views), selected randomly, would 

answer questions that explore them “if all those interviewed were being 

completely honest.” 

This Appendix includes results obtained from seven such individuals, although 

not all questions were asked in each case. These are presented below, together 

with a brief description of the individual, without (as promised prior to the 

interview) revealing his/her identity. Without exception, however, those chosen 

for interviews are long-standing friends of the author, so that their candid 

cooperation was assumed, and was almost entirely forthcoming. Due to individual 

sensitivities to the topic, not every interviewee was asked every question. 

Note, also, that since particular questions were dropped and added in the course of 

arranging and conducting these interviews, not all questions have the same 

number of responses. Finally, even some questions that were retained in the 

questionnaire were not asked in every case, depending upon their perceived level 

 

1 Predictable self-defensive hostility resulted from the discovery (through one of the field-interviewers) in

May, 2006, that a survey was being designed (on behalf of an anonymous client) of Muslims at the Coast 

regarding a number of public issues, as well as their views towards and level of engagement in various 

religious practices. After a draft questionnaire reached the CIPK (i.e., the Council of Imams and Preachers 

of Kenya), a front-page announcement-article appeared in a local weekly Muslim newsletter issue warning 

Muslims not to participate in the survey, as it was clearly “part of a campaign to fight Muslims,” probably 

instigated by “foreign forces” (The Friday Bulletin: The Muslim News Update, 2006: 1-2). 

143
of sensitivity for the particular respondent, and how much time there was for the 

interview. 

Interview Introduction

“Thank you for helping me. Of course, it will not be possible to conduct a survey with 

these questions, but let us suppose it were possible to pose them to Kenya’s adult Muslim

population, or at least those living in and around Mombasa (and perhaps also in North 

Eastern Province). If people answered honestly, what percent do you think would agree 

(“Yes”), disagree (“No”), or would not be sure (“Don’t know”) to each one?” 

Brief Comment

As pointed out above, the small size of this ‘sample’ has not allowed for a more reliable 

set of ranges in terms of the responses to particular questions. Likewise, individual 

responses are likely to have been somewhat affected by the particular relationship each 

respondent has with the author. 

Notwithstanding these severe limitations, several fundamental facts are evident. Among 

them, one is the universal agreement that Muslims in Kenya are denied the rights and 

respect they feel they deserve. Looking elsewhere, there is a marked pessimism about the 

prospects for peace in the Middle East, as long as Israel continues to exist. 

Turning specifically to terrorism, acceptance of the involvement of Kenyans is seen as 

minimal. At the same time, however, there is little faith that were local Muslims to 

become aware of terrorist activity they would report this to the authorities. Finally, there 

appears to be some belief amongst Kenyans that Muslims might participate in a terrorist 

attack. 

At the same time, there was widespread agreement that the history of terrorism in Kenya 

has affected fellow Muslims for the worse; a striking lack of agreement was evident,

however, in terms of the likelihood of future attacks. 

Altogether, and again keeping in mind the very ‘unscientific’ nature of this exercise, the 

results do highlight key issues relevant to this study, and should at least provoke further 

consideration of them as well as future areas of research. 

144
Respondent

Question: Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? 

Do you approve of America’s foreign policy towards Muslims?

5 90 5 8 90 2 5 94 1 0 50 0 

Do you think Israel has a right to exist, even within its pre-1967 borders?

30 40 30 20 20 60 10 85 5 40 45 15 

Do you think Kenya is safer with US military forces here? 0 95 5 0 80 20 20 80 0 20 60 20 40 50 10 30 70 0 Do you think Muslims in Kenya are given the respect and rights they deserve from other Kenyans and from the Kenya government?

15 80 5 0 100 0 5 95 0 15 80 5 30 60 10 20 80 0 

Do you think those Muslim terrorists who have operated in Kenya have had at least some local Kenyan Muslims?

15 60 25 20 65 15 5 95 0 30 60 10 

If you came to know anyone planning a terrorist attack in the name of Islam, would you report this to the Police?

20 70 10 10 35 55 25 75 0 35 55 10

Would you be willing to participate in a terrorist attack against US, UK or Israeli interests in Kenya, even if you knew doing so might cost you your life?

25 55 20 70 5 25 65 25 10

 Would you be willing to participate in such an attack if you could be certain that only the people you had targeted would die?

99 1 0 80 20 0

Would you be willing to participate in such an attack against US, UK or Israeli facilities, interests and/or personnel in Kenya as long as doing so would not put your own life in danger?

25 55 20 50 50 0

 Do you think it is likely that there will be another terrorist attack against the US or its allies and/or the Kenya government within the next 1-2 years?

65 25 10 10 90 0 

5 6 

Former Member of 

Parliament (Coast Kenya)

Nairobi-based Senior 

Islamic NGO Official

Nairobi-based Senior 

Islamic NGO Official

Woman ProfessionalNE Province Nairobi-based Professional Woman Present Member o

Parliament, Coas

1 2 3 4
Respondent

Question: Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? Yes No ? 

For the next two ?'s % % % % %% Do you think the main interest of the US in its “war against terrorism” is to:

Weaken Islam 85 75 60 80 

Gain economic benefits 15 0 10 20 2

defend itself against future 

attacks 0 10 30 

not sure 0 15 0 

Do you think the attacks that have occurred in Kenya have made the overall position of Muslims in Kenya:

better 0 20 30 

worse 100 80 70 

about the same 0 0 0 

56 

Former Member of 

Parliament (Muslim, Coast 

Nairobi-based Senior 

Islamic NGO Official

Nairobi-based Senior 

Islamic NGO Official

Woman ProfessionalNE Province Nairobi-based Professional Woman Present Member o

Parliament, Coas

1 234
APPENDIX C-III: 

THE (DISALLOWED) CONFESSION OF OMAR SAID OMAR1

Anyone who followed the case and heard the evidence in court could see 

that (Omar Said) Omar was involved; it was just because of bungling, starting 

from the evidence-gathering, that they couldn’t make the connection between 

what was found in his house and the hotel bombing [Confidential Interview, 

Western diplomatic official, Nairobi, 24 February, 2007]. 

 

It was clear these people were innocent, or at least that the government 

had no convincing evidence. Even the weapons used to convict Omar appeared 

to have been planted by the Police, since they were only discovered after he was

taken into custody. 

It seems they wanted to please the Americans and the Israelis by showing 

that at least they could convict somebody. 

These were not educated people. No evidence was presented that they

held any particular or religious views, let alone that they had spent any time 

outside Kenya. So as far as I can tell, no Kenyans have really been shown to

have participated in any terrorist attacks here [Confidential Interview, local 

stringer for an international news agency who covered the trial of the suspects 

charged over the Coast attacks of 2002, Nairobi, 18 February, 2007].

As noted in the main text, new rules of evidence made the following statement 

inadmissible in court. Omar Said Omar was initially arrested for his involvement in the 

twin al-Qa’ida attacks of 28 November 2002 on the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya 

and an Israeli airliner departing from Moi International Airport in Mombasa, Kenya. 

Omar was later cleared of all charges pertaining to his alleged involvement in these 

attacks. This inadmissible confession reiterates how al-Qa’ida operates in Kenya. Their 

activities in the recently declassified Harmony documents were remarkably similar to 

their operations along the coast of Kenya in 2002 and 2003. 

 

1

 This document was made available to journalists (who sought it from the Court Clerk) after it was 

submitted, but before the judge had ruled on its admissibility. 

147




















APPENDIX C-IV: 

Written Statement of Mombasa Muslim Leaders 

Contents: 

The following two pages are a letter from Mombasa Muslim Leaders addressed to the 

Honorable Njenga Karume, Kenya Minister for Defense. The letter is dated 25 

February, 2007. 

Background: 

Following several mass-demonstrations and recent threats by Muslim leaders in 

Mombasa to disrupt the international cross-country championships held in the coastal 

city on 24 March 2007, the Minister of Defense, Hon. Njenga Karume, met with 

representatives of the Mombasa Muslim community. Under the aegis of the Council 

of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (‘CIPK’), they evidently took advantage of this 

opportunity to present him with the following statement setting out a broader set of 

issues and grievances. 

169



Al-Qa’ida’s (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa 

Part II: Al-Qa’ida “In Their Own Words” 

The Harmony Documents

 

 The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the responsibility 

to plan and synchronize efforts across the Department of Defense for the war on terrorism. 

In conducting their operations over the past several years—particularly Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—representatives of 

USSOCOM have uncovered scores of documents authored by members of al-Qa’ida. 

These documents, which currently reside in a classified database called “Harmony,” shed 

important new light onto the inner workings of the organization as well as the 

personalities and preferences of their authors. The database houses thousands of items 

with a wide range of content, including loose papers, multimedia, and personal letters. 

 In the latter half of 2005, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point was 

given access to a small subset of recently declassified Harmony documents and asked to 

provide an analysis of potential network vulnerabilities and conflicts of interests within 

the organization. The CTC was chosen to conduct this study based partly upon its 

expertise in analyzing al-Qa’ida’s strategic texts, jihadi images, video clips, and other 

materials distributed on the Internet. The documents used in this study were initially 

identified, processed and translated based upon criteria established to support military 

planning efforts, including: 

• al-Qa’ida documents (media, letters, loose papers) discussing ideology, tactics, 

techniques, procedures, strategy, and operations; 

• Taliban documents discussing prior or future terrorist actions in Afghanistan or the 

region and the interaction/coordination with al-Qa’ida; 

• any material related to al-Qa’ida extremist ideology, training, recruiting, and 

logistics flow; 

• documents discussing any al-Qa’ida operation; and 

• any dialogue from al-Qa’ida that threatens another country/group or its leadership. 

The initial 28 documents extracted from the Harmony database that met combinations of 

the search criteria described above range from single page letters to 70+ page excerpts 

from larger jihadi texts, and were authored both before and after September 11, 2001. 

Every document released to the CTC from the Harmony database is included on the 

173
enclosed CD-ROM in both original Arabic text and English translation and is posted on 

the CTC website at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq.asp. 

Harmony: Al-Qa’ida’s (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa

In late 2006 and early 2007, USSOCOM released another 24 documents to the 

CTC. This iteration of Harmony focuses on al-Qa’ida’s continuing organizational, 

operational, personnel and pecuniary challenges in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Although 

most terrorist groups seek out and thrive in ungovernable spaces, the HOA countries pose 

greater challenges to al-Qa’ida than one might expect. The HOA is a surprisingly difficult 

area in which to operate, especially for an organization that relies on secrecy, deception, 

and the loyalty of its operators and affiliates. The area is ripe with political turmoil, 

corruption, and poverty and these local concerns sometimes trump or hamper al-Qa’ida’s 

efforts to wage their global jihad. 

As in the first Harmony study, these newly released documents reveal a different 

side of al Qa`ida that is often not shown in traditional media reporting and literature. 

Harmony HOA continues to show that oftentimes so-called al-Qa’ida allies and 

sympathizers do not necessarily want automatic subjugation to the group, do not share the 

same religious fervor, and often desire some kind of compensation before providing 

operational security or support. These documents demonstrate that although al-Qa’ida did 

have some success in terms of planning and executing attacks, raising funds for 

operations, and establishing contacts throughout the region, they also expose their 

failures and frustrations. 

Though Harmony illustrates that al-Qa’ida faced significant challenges in the 

HOA, it is not the intent to discount its ability to adapt to its operational environment. 

On the contrary, these documents reflect how the organization overcame obstacles and 

remained steadfast in its efforts. Moreover, they are testimony that some senior 

operational leaders of al-Qa’ida in the HOA (most notably Abu Hafs al-Masri, Saif alAdl, and Abdullah Muhammad Fazul) were extremely talented and resourceful. Unlike 

some ‘adventurers’ from the Middle East and elsewhere who went to Pakistan and 

Afghanistan for vacation during the Soviet occupation to claim jihadi credentials, there is 

no question the senior members of al-Qa’ida were deadly serious about their mission in 

the HOA, and that their jihadi status was unfortunately well-earned. 

Thankfully, al-Qa’ida has not been successful in generating wide-ranging support 

of local populations or securing wide swaths of territory even though they have 

maintained a continuous presence in the HOA for almost 15 years. Recent alleged alQa’ida activity in Somalia and US counterterrorism actions throughout the HOA further 

reinforce this point. Indeed, the HOA will indeed be a place of interest for both al-Qa’ida 

and the United States for many years to come. 

 

 

174
HARMONY DOCUMENT LIST 

Letter from the Taliban 179 

AFGP-2002-003297 

Ciphers and Status of bin Laden’s Security 180 

AFGP-2002-003677 

Statement Concerning the Assassination of brother “Abi Tarek” 182 

AFGP-2002-003705 

The Five Letters to the African Corps Letter 1 183 

AFGP-2002-600053 

The Five Letters to the African Corps Letter 2 184 

AFGP-2002-600053 

The Five Letters to the African Corps Letter 3 185 

AFGP-2002-600053 

The Five Letters to the African Corps Letter 4 187 

AFGP-2002-600053 

The Five Letters to the African Corps Letter 5 188 

AFGP-2002-600053 

The Ogaden File: Operation Holding (Al-Msk) 189 

AFGP-2002-600104 

Saif Al Islam’s Report on the Jihad-Wal Camp 191 

AFGP-2002-600108 

Situation Report from Somalia 192 

AFGP-2002-600110 

Trip Report and the Situation in the Southern Region 194 

AFGP-2002-600113 

A Report from Saif Al-Adl 195 

AFGP-2002-600114 

 

Photographs of Fazul Abdellah Mohamed 197 

AFGP-2002-800080 

175
Kenya Airways Ticket 1 198 

AFGP-2002-800081 

Kenya Airways Ticket 2 199 

AFGP-2002-800083 

Fazul’s Travel and Educational Documents 200 

AFGP-2002-800084 

Student ID Card for Said Bakar 201 

AFGP-2002-800086 

Passports of Fazul and Maimouna Mohammed 202 

AFGP-2002-800087 

Somalian Passport of Halimo Farah Abdillah 203 

AFGP-2002-800088 

Comoros Passport of [Fazul] Abdallah Mohamed 204 

AFGP-2002-800089 

Ziad Barre and Events in Somalia 205 

AFGP-2002-800517 

Invoices for al-Qa’ida and Islamic Union Expenses 208 

AFGP-2002-800573 

Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi Reports from Afghanistan 209 

AFGP-2002-800581 

Abu Hafs’ Report on Operations in Somalia 210 

AFGP-2002-800597 

Report on the Needs of the Mujahidin in Somalia 212 

AFGP-2002-800600 

Hassan Aweys Kenya Visa Application 213 

AFGP-2002-800611 

Letters on al-Qa’ida’s Operations in Africa 214 

AFGP-2002-800621 

A Quick Review of the Current Political Situation 216 

AFGP-2002-800639 

176
Abu Belal’s Report on Jihad in Somalia 217 

AFGP-2002-800640 

Political Difficulties and Current Events in Ethiopia 219 

AFGP-2002-800641 

Meeting Notes and a Letter from Al-Wali 221 

AFGP-2003-001293H 

Iraqi Intelligence Service Reports on Al-Qa’ida Threats in Djibouti 222 

ISGQ-2005-00024493 

177
178
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003297 

Author: Unknown 

Title: Letters from the Taliban 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 3 pages 

Synopsis 

The document contains only one-line summaries of papers related to the Taliban. 

Key Themes 

The document itself consists of one-line summaries of papers from another (not included) document. In the 

referenced document, there is a detailed map and description of the Battle of Khaled in Hira. There is also 

a possibly forged Taliban government stamp from its Khartoum embassy, and an official letter from the 

Taliban government official al-Haj Mullah ‘Abd al-Jalil to 'Abdallah. 

179
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003677 

Date: 1996-1998 

Author: Multiple and unknown 

Length: 11 pages 

Title: Ciphers and Status of bin Laden’s Security 

Synopsis 

A series of incomplete documents that consist of (1) codewords and ciphers used by al-Qaeda; (2) an 

assessment of Osama bin Laden's personal security situation; (3) letters primarily concerning the 

disposition of three prisoners held by Iran that are important to al-Qaeda; (4) a letter discussing the 

frustrating situation on the front lines in Afghanistan, and the foreign fighters there. 

Key Themes 

The first part of the handwritten document is a table of contents, apparently for another missing document, 

discussing training camps and operations conducted by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, including 

Hezbollah. 

Next, the document contains a cipher, with letters that corresponds to numbers. 

It then lists code words to be used for countries and cities within al-Qaeda's anticipated sphere of 

operations, certain key people, and a variety of other key words, including nuclear, biological and chemical 

weapons vocabulary. 

Ciphers and codewords for the times of meetings and operations are also covered, with examples. 

The writer negatively assesses the security of the location and food for Osama bin Laden's weekly lunch 

meetings, in light of possible American attempts to assassinate him. 

1. The source of the food is not secure. 

2. The food is not distributed securely. 

3. It is obvious which plate Osama bin Laden will receive. 

4. Osama bin Laden drinks water from a general guard. 

There follow several letters, one a thank-you letter, and another enquiring about the possibility of obtaining 

the release of several prisoners. 

Letter to Abu Ibrahim, from Muhammad Atif: This letter provides updates on several financial transactions, 

and a number of associates. 

A lengthy letter discusses the status of three al-Qaeda prisoners of the Iranians. The letter reports that the 

prisoners, along with other Arabs, Afghans, and Pakistanis, have been moved to Iran through Tajikistan 

after several failed attempts, including the use of Masoud's airplane, and a truck that rolled over. The writer 

suspects that 'they' might actually be trying to eliminate them. 

The writer then lays out three options for obtaining the release of the prisoners from Iran. 

A. Direct and indirect mediation with the Iranians, using a combination of diplomacy and threats. This is 

the recommended solution. 

180
B. Taking several Iranians hostage to exchange for the prisoners. This will have complex consequences, 

and will serve to divide up the Muslim world, but is worth discussing with the Taliban. 

C. Bomb Iranian interests abroad until they release the prisoners. 

The writer also requests the return of 'the Pakistani' so that training and operations can begin. 

Letter to Sheik Abu Hafs: This letter continues discussing the prisoner situation. The writer has discussed 

the situation with a Taliban commander, who requests a car, and warns of not being bothersome to the 

Taliban. 

The letter then provides news on the prisoners. Three of the prisoners are alive. A fourth was killed. 

Several Pakistanis have been released after their relatives intervened, or after they bought their way out. 

Letter to Abdul Aziz: The writer provides updates and instructions on various operations, and expresses 

concern about the security situation. 

The final letter describes the situation on the front lines in the fighting between the Taliban and Mas'oud 

(presumably the Northern Allliance). The writer is frustrated at the back-and-forth nature of the fighting, and 

believes that the Taliban have lost their will to fight. Many foreign fighters have abandoned the front lines in 

despair, and the writer then provides status updates on those that remain. Some refuse to fight, some want 

to leave for personal reasons, or to engage in projects elsewhere, including in Saudi Arabia. A small 

number are staying on the front, including a group at Bagram, some Jordanians, and an Iraqi. 

There are also two brothers from Ogadin (Ethiopia), one of whom wants to get married, and the other to be 

part of the Eritrea security group. 

181
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003705 

Length: 4 pages 

Title: An explanatory statement concerning circumstances surrounding the assassination of brother “Abi 

Tarek” 

Author: The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Secretariat 

Date: Sha'aban 22, 1417H (January 2, 1997) 

Synopsis 

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement denounces the assassinations of Abi Tareq and Sister Zubaidah, and 

connects them with a series of attacks and plots by the Popular Front in Eritrea to divide the Eritrean 

opposition, sever their connections with their supporters, and obstruct da'wa and jihad. 

Key Themes 

On December 21, 1996, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement had issued a statement condemning the 

assassination of Abi Tareq and Sister Zubaidah. 

According to the document, the Popular Front has seized on divisions within Eritrea's revolutionary 

organizations and begun assassinating, or attempting to assassinate key figures within the movements, 

including the Liberation Front and jihad movements. It has also accused Arab countries of supporting the 

jihad groups, and has tried to turn international opinion against the jihadists. At first the groups blamed one 

another, which increased their internal dissension. 

The Popular Front assassinated the following people: 

1. Mohamoud Hasab in Kasala 

2. Idris Hanqala in Kasala 

3. The assassination of Sa’eed Saleh in Kasala 

4. The assassination of ‘Uthman ‘Ajeeb in Khartoum. 

It also attempted to assassinate the following people: 

1. ‘Abdulla Idris, president of the Eritrean Liberation front in Khartoum. 

2. ‘Abd Al-Qader Jailani, president of the Eritrean Liberation Front - the National Council in Kasala. 

After the attack on Jailani, the Sudanese government discovered that the 'popular front' was behind the 

attacks. The Aforqi regime [perhaps another name for the Popular Front] has also conducted attacks on 

civilians and blamed them on the Mujahideen. 

The Popular Front designed the assassination of Abi Tareq and Sister Zubaidah to accomplish several 

objectives. 

1. To create conflict between the Eritrean opposition and Sudan, which is hosting them. 

2. To exacerbate pre-existing problems within the Jihad movement. 

3. To hurt the international reputation of the Jihad movement. The timing of the assassinations was 

designed to the Jihad movement just as it was canvassing for support abroad at the beginning of 

Ramadan. 

4. To obstruct da'wa and jihad that had been increasing among the Eritrean opposition after the 

Sudanese government relaxed restrictions. 

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad movement prefers clear ideology, dialogue, moderation, and reform to physical 

violence. 

182
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter One) 

Date: Mid 1990s 

Author: “Your Uncle” 

Length: 32 pages 

Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps I 

Synopsis: This letter is addressed to “Dear Brother Saif” and signed by “Your Uncle.” The author 

has prepared a lengthy response to issues raised in two previous letters (not included in this 

collection) sent by Saif from Somalia where he is in charge of Al-Qa’ida activity. Uncle gives frank 

observations about the prospects for jihad in Somalia. 

Key Themes: Uncle believes that Somalia is not ready for classic jihad and that Al-Qa’ida will not 

be able to find an ally with an identical intellectual force. The goal is to expel crusader forces from 

Somalia even if a semi-Islamic, semi-democratic government were to gain power. 

Saif is warned that the Somali movement he is working with is in danger of isolating itself from the 

masses, and if the masses become suspicious of a movement it has no prospect for success. 

The U.S. invasion of Somalia presents Saif with a golden opportunity to strike at the “bald eagle” 

now that it has landed unexpectedly in his sights. 

Flexibility is required. If Al-Qa’ida could work with Sayyaf, Hikmatyar, and Burhan to achieve it 

purposes in Afghanistan, then Saif can work with Aideed, Mahdi, and Kharteet in Somalia. The 

Somali leadership, however, must be bolstered since they have even less manhood than Saddam 

Hussein and Arafat. 

Uncle proposes a 5 point strategy to unite Somali forces and create an Islamic national front: 

1. Expulsion of the foreign international presence. 

2. Rebuilding of state institutions. 

3. Establishment of domestic security. 

4. Comprehensive national reconciliation. 

5. Economic reform and combating famine. 

The message ends with encouragement to persevere through financial difficulties and act 

according to the traditions “of our noble Messenger.” Uncle cites God feeding Quraysh and the 

great Badr raid as examples of victories that come through the “confident belief that God will grant 

victory.” 

183
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Two) 

Date: September 30, 1993 

Author: Hassan al-Tajiki 

Length: 11 pages 

Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps II 

Synopsis: The letter provides an update and analysis concerning jihad activity in Tajikistan, 

Afghanistan, Russia, and China. 

Key Themes: Tajikistan is judged to be a challenging but not hopeless area for jihad activity. 

Russia is in chaos and the former republics of the Soviet Union are weak. America is preparing to 

fill the power vacuum in the region. 

In Afghanistan America is supporting warlords and exploiting Civil War to neutralize opposition to 

its control of the region. 

China is a rising power where future relations with the Islamic world will be of great importance. 

The letter concludes with an upbeat assessment for future jihad operations in Tajikistan. 

184
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Three) 

Date: May 24, 1994 

Author: Hassan 

Length: 36 pages 

Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps III 

Synopsis: Congratulations for the victory in Somalia and a strategic review of worldwide jihad 

operations. Success of the Africa Corps is contrasted with the difficult position of the Asian Corps. 

Key Themes: Hassan begins by expressing his congratulations to the Africa Corps for their great 

victory in Somalia. He would like to join them is having difficulties traveling because he is now 

wanted for security reasons in Pakistan. 

He asks the questions: “So how were our amazing Corps and its starving African Muslim allies able 

to be victorious over the greatest power in the world today?” The answer lies in the power of God, 

because “When we are truly fighting in the name and on behalf of God, we have nothing to fear...” 

In Somalia, Islamic forces were able to exploit America’s Vietnam Complex, because the 

American’s fear getting bogged down in a real war. Al-Qa’ida needs to develop a tactical doctrine 

to exploit the weakness of its great enemy, and a Counter-Intelligence strategy to confront the 

power of the American security agencies. 

Victory in Somalia must be followed up to avoid giving the defeated foe time to regroup. The 

strategy of the “Jewish West” is to strike at the periphery of the Muslim lands. The original 

crusaders tried to strike at the center of the Islamic lands, but were defeated. The Crusaders 

adapted, conquered the periphery, and were then able to control the Arabian Peninsula and 

Palestine. 

Somalia represents a victory for Al-Qa’ida on the periphery. The hour for regaining the heartland 

has arrived, but much training is required before this phase can begin. 

While the Africa Corps has been successful, the Asian Corps is very weak with only 5 members. 

Yemen is described as a crucial battlefield, an auspicious location for declaring jihad in the Arabian 

Peninsula. 

More effective radio broadcasts are needed to launch a propaganda campaign in Yemen and 

Somalia. Demands should include: 

Evacuation of the Crusaders, Jews, and infidel forces from the Peninsula. 

Destruction of churches and Jewish and Buddhist temples. 

Hassan observes that radio stations are more powerful than atomic bombs and that several dozen 

committed young believers can bring correct teaching to the whole area. Martyrdom attacks in 

Yemen create an auspicious opportunity to declare jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. 

185
Next comes a review of lessons learned in Tajikistan. Serious errors have been committed by the 

Nahdha who have relinquished their Islamic identity. Nahdha like Saddam Hussein exploits Islam 

to gain popular support, but by no means expresses true adherence to Islam. 

In Kabul, warlords who pursue their own agendas are weakening the work of jihad. 

186
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Four) 

Date: May 24, 1994 

Author: Hassan 

Length: 14 pages 

Title: The Fourth Letter about Jihad in the Caucasus 

Synopsis: Hassan is writing from an Al-Qa’ida training camp and relates his disappointments 

concerning reverses Al-Qa’ida has experienced in Central Asia. He also seeks to apply lessons 

learned from the arrest of international terrorist Carlos. 

Key Themes: In Tajikistan Al-Qa’ida has been outmaneuvered by the Nahdha movement and 

Ahmad Shah Mas’oud who have been able to extract arms and ammunition from Al-Qa’ida without 

providing training. Demoralized Mujahideen have been leaving the movement. 

Arab fighters in northern Afghanistan are loathed by Mas’oud and his commanders and in Pakistan 

Arab fighters are restricted and harassed by Pakistani authorities. Combating Islam is now both a 

state motto and policy in that country. In Pakistan Islam is a “folkloric” religion. 

Hassan states that Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan is besieged and that “All we have is the beleaguered 

space between our camp and Kabul in which to move with relative freedom.” 

Jews are gaining strength in Russia. Hassan engages in the eschatological speculation that the 

Jewish nuclear project will prepare the way for Armageddon and the rule of King Anti-Christ. He 

proposes bringing the jihad to Moscow with the ultimate objective of bringing jihad to Jerusalem. 

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are essential fronts for fighting to overcome the developing American 

blockade in Central Asia. 

The extradition of Carlos emphasizes the need for preserving strong, secure rear areas in Sudan 

and Afghanistan. 

Hassan says that he is bored in Afghanistan and want to relocate his family to Sudan. 

187
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Five) 

Date: 1994? 

Author: Hassan al-Tajiki 

Length: 14 pages 

Title: The Fifth Letter to the Africa Corps 

Synopsis: An analysis evaluating the impact of jihad in the Caucasus. Written while fighting is 

raging in Grozny, Hassan sees this struggle holding great promise for the future of jihad. 

Key Themes: The Soviet Union collapsed as a direct result of the war in Afghanistan. This left the 

U.S. to run the world in an autocratic manner. The U.S. alliance of Western states is fragile, 

however, due to the warfare inherent in the capitalist system. 

The new world order is America against everyone, and everyone against the Muslim. The Jews 

have succeeded in creating a Crusader alliance among Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic 

churches. Then they added Hindu and Confucian Buddhist power in India, China, and Japan. 

This alliance is fragile and just as the 11th and 12th century Crusaders succumbed to infighting, so 

too will this alliance. Jihadists can look forward to Russian gangs selling nuclear weapons and 

ultimately providing nuclear arms for the jihad. 

The Caucasus is a strategically important zone because it provides access to the West. The U.S. is 

attempting to use Turkey and Pakistan to isolate the region, but the Chechens are rugged warriors. 

Furthermore, harsh Russia violence in the region means only opportunities for martyrdom and 

paradise for Muslims. The Crusader strategy will backfire because the “bloody governing” of the 

Russians will result in a disaster inflicted by Islamic forces. 

Al-Qa’ida can best support Chechen rebels by striking in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Arab fighters 

are at a disadvantage in the area since they do not know the language and culture. 

In an aside, Hassan comments that the jihadi missionary must be patient. Most Muslims will not 

pick up a weapon and declare jihad “unless he has tasted killing and felt the knife as it passed 

across his throat.” 

Therefore the Crusader wars are welcomed, but the” armed missionary must realize that his 

moving amongst Muslims whose Islam exists in Name only.” Apostasy reigns, not only in Turkey 

and Pakistan, but also in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The challenge for Al-Qa’ida is to unite the rising 

jihadi spirit in Arab lands with that in the Caucasus. The regions of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia, 

and Azerbaijan are fruitful areas for expansion because of the hostility toward Russia in those 

areas. 

188
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600104 

Length: 20 pages 

Author: Sayf al-Islam 

Date: August 1994 (regarding events occurring from January 20, 1993 to December 31, 1993) 

Title: The Ogaden File: Operation Holding (Al-Msk) 

Synopsis 

What is apparently a personal narrative by Sayf al-Islam that describes how Abu Hafs of al-Qa'ida sent him 

and a team of al-Qa'ida operatives to Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to construct training 

camps, train members of the General Islamic Union in military tactics and ideology, and to assist them in 

fighting the enemy. 

 

Key Themes 

Going to Ogaden 

Abu Hafs sent a team of al-Qa'ida operatives in January 1993 from Peshawar, Afghanistan to Nairobia, 

Kenya to train the General Islamic Union in Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which had been 

promised by Abu Ubaydah, who was based in Kenya. 

Prior to departure, the al-Qa'ida operatives received training in ideology and travel procedures. They wore 

European clothes, and traveled in groups of two or three, always with one person in the group who spoke 

English. The operatives had a three-fold mission: 

1. To find and establish a new base for military operations. 

2. To find a base area that was as close to the 'Arab region' as possible. 

3. To train Somalian and Ogaden jihad forces. 

Upon arrival in Nairobi, Sayf al-Islam and the other operatives met with Abu Ubaydah, and the Green Team 

agreed to go to Ogaden, partly in order to honor the agreement between Abu Ubaydah and the General 

Islamic Union. Sayf al-Islam had doubts about the feasibility of Ogaden due to its isolation and rough 

terrain. In Nairobi, the Green Team wrote a plan to train supported guerrilla platoons. 

The Green Team traveled to Ogaden by hiring a small private plane from Kenya that landed at the village of 

Luuq in Somalia, where they were met by representatives of the General Islamic Union, and transported by 

armed convoy to the camp in Ogaden. 

Sayf al-Islam provides a detailed topographical and ethnographic description of the region, probably in part 

to fulfill the first mandate for the al-Qa'ida mission. 

In Ogaden 

In Ogaden, the Green Team found that the camp of the local General Islamic Union branch, headed by Abd 

al-Salam Uthman, was primitive, unprotected, and strategically poorly placed. After meeting with a second 

group, headed by Abdullah Mohammed Ira, they eventually built a new camp, protected by two perimeters, 

on a nearby mountain. In describing the site selection and camp construction process, the author is keenly 

aware of the strategic importance of topography and natural resources, and describes the layout of the 

camp and its location in some detail. 

189
Apparently another file describes the training program in detail, but in this document, Sayf al-Islam 

summarizes a three-step training program. While Sayf al-Islam was in Ogaden, the camp graduated two full 

classes, totaling approximating 460 recruits. 

1. Use of different types of weapons, discipline, adapting to military life (5 weeks). 

2. Specialist training in various units (recon, command, administration, combat) (2-3 weeks) 

3. Recruits grouped into supported guerrilla platoons (2-3 weeks) 

Between the second and third phases, Abu Hafs came to the region from Pakistan to discuss al-Qa'ida help 

with the revolutionary council (of the General Islamic Union). Although they were not able to agree on aid to 

the Somalis, Sayf al-Islam was appointed al-Qa'ida's representative to the General Islamic Union. 

Sayf al-Islam was soon forced to deal with a planned separation of the Ogaden branch of the General 

Islamic Union from the main Somali organization, on the grounds that the main organization had 

abandoned jihad, and refused monetary and military support to the Ogaden branch. Sayf al-Islam managed 

to convince the Ogaden branch to stay, in part due to dangling the presence of al-Qa'ida in Somalia. 

However, Abd al-Salam Uthman went abroad, despite Sayf al-Islam's advice against it (as the timing was 

not right), to rally support unsuccessfully for the Ogaden branch's jihad. 

Sayf al-Islam continued the training program despite an attack from the enemy in August, which was 

successfully repulsed. The author also describes dealing with an incident where members of the General 

Islamic Union requisitioned a car from a group of Sufis, and as a result caused a rift between Sufis, and 

Salafists in the region. Sayf al-Islam was worried that this split would open up a second front, and mediated 

a face-saving end to the conflict. 

Sayf al-Islam also describes the battle of Da'rduur in September 1993, where the mujahideen use their new 

training to stop the enemy's advance, and push them back. After the recruits' graduation, as military 

advisor, Sayf al-Islam organized a series of meetings among the Ogaden commanders where they created 

an operational plan to take advantage of their new training, and advance against the enemy. As a result, 

the Ogaden jihadists successfully began advancing in October 1993, and Sayf al-Islam returned to Beled 

Huwa' to meet with Abu Fatima. He suggests learning from the experiences of the battles, forming 

leadership, and investigating how to shape and liberate the region. 

On several occasions, Sayf al-Islam mentions hearing news of events outside of the region, including the 

killing of 18 US soldiers in Somalia and the attack on the Russian Parliament, the Oslo Accords, and a 

referendum in Egypt. 

190
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600108 

Title: Saif Al Islam’s Report on the Jihad-Wal Camp 

Author: Saif Al Islam Almasri 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 3 pages 

Synopsis 

Saif Al Islam Almasri writes an exit report from his time as 'ameer' of Jihad-Wal camp in Afghanistan, 

providing reasons for his failures, and suggesting what can be done so that those mistakes are not 

repeated again. 

Key Themes 

Saif Al Islam Almasri looks back on the two years and ten months he spent as leader ('ameer') of Jihad-Wal 

camp in Khost, Afghanistan. In his report, he attempts to write down lessons learned, but hopes that the 

recipient has been reading and storing all the previous letters he sent. He claims that he will discuss a 

number of topics, but there is only one topic discussed in the document: 

Receiving and delegating responsibilities 

There were two main problems with the way in which Saif received the ameership, First, the responsibilities 

(over more than four camps) were greater than originally envisioned. Second, and more importantly, the 

previous ameer and other brothers had left their posts without providing guidance to Saif. As a result, he 

had no idea how to deal with 'outside entities' and many predicaments arose. Saif did in fact seek help from 

previous ameer, but many problems cropped up after the previous ameer was no longer available. So that 

this unfortunate situation will not happen again, Saif suggests three policies be implemented: (1) The old 

ameer must be present when the new ameer takes over; (2) The old ameer must explain the working of the 

camp, and the nature of all the relevant relationships; (3) The new ameer must receive an archive of all 

documents used since the beginning of the camp. 

191
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600110 

Length: 5 pages 

Date: 1993, 1996, 1997 

Title: Situation Report from Somalia 

Author: Various 

Synopsis 

A number of disparate reports that detail the financial and living situation prevalent in the organization's 

projects in Somalia, and describe the situation in Somalia in the face of Ethiopian attacks, attempts by the 

Somali tribes to unify, and cooperation with the Ittihad. 

Key Themes 

The first news report (dated 7 September 1996, written by correspondent Harun Khan Amin) describes a 

military attack by Ethiopian forces and their secular Somali allies against the forces of the Islamic Union (alIttihad al-Islami) and the Ogaden fundamentalists (presumably they are a branch of the Islamic Union – see 

AFGP-2002-600104), who had taken shelter and were using training camps in the Gedo region of Somalia. 

After a series of bomb attacks in Addis Ababa against a bus, a hotel, and a bridge, as well as an 

assassination attempt against the Ethiopian Minister of Transportation, Ethiopia convinced the leader of the 

Marehan tribes, as well as the leader of Somali secular forces, General Masali, to attack the Ogaden 

fundamentalists in the wake of Farrah Aidid's death. The combined Ethiopian-Somali National Front swept 

the fundamentalists from three cities, Balad Huwa, Luuq, and Dalo. The fundamentalists condemned the 

attack, and vowed to continue to fight within Ethiopia, but were thrown into confusion for a time. Kenya also 

condemned the attack, saying that one of its soldiers was killed in cross-border violence. 

The second news report (dated 7 September 1996, written by correspondent Shu'ayb al-Salihi) describes 

events in the Lower Juba region during the Gedo offensive. Marghan, a Somali leader based in Kismayo, 

moved with his tribesmen toward Kenya in an attempt to unite the Darud tribe (it has three constituent 

groups, the Mujirtin, the Ogaden, and the Marihan). He also attempted to retrieve weapons that he had left 

in Kenya in the face of attacks from Aideed three or four years ago, but was blocked by the 'Abdallah tribe. 

A number of Somali leaders and tribes are mentioned in the report, especially Ogaden leaders. 

A financial report, wrriten by Mukhtar Husayn Kaim on 16 January 1997, describes the costs associated 

with a pond project, which has a budget of $10,000 

The third news report (dated 1 February 1997, written by Shu'ayb al-Salihi) describes the current situation 

in the Lower Jubbah region of Somalia. Engineers from the Gulf have arrived to gather information. AlAkhwan are present in Kambooni. A technical director for the 'farm' has been appointed, money has been 

set aside for buying 'agricultural necessities', and the workers have not yet been trained [The translation 

seems to be using code words for weapons, fighters, and training camps]. The Ethiopians continue their 

attacks, but have been double-crossed by 'Ali Mahdi, who sold 70 tons of weapons he received from them 

in Mogadishu. 

 

The next report (by Nur al-Din al-Bahar) describes the financial situation of the Fishing Project. The 

engineers have purchased boats and refrigerators, but do not have enough money for necessities in the 

face of the failure of the 'plan'. They will try to sell some boats and refrigerators to raise capital. 

 

The following report (by all the engineers, Khalid Mukhtar, Tawfiq al-Mumbasi, Nur al-Din al-Malindi, and 

192
Shu’ayb al-Malindi) describes the dire living situation in what they find themselves. 

Finally, there is a report from Salih ‘Abd-al-Wahid to Sheikh Abu-Hafs on 1 December 1993. Three days 

earlier, Salih met with Sheikh 'Abdallah Sahl, Hasan Tahir, and 'Uthman, and discussed several points 

amid a concern for secrecy. 

1. They needed to strike UN forces, and more specifically American forces in Somalia. 

2. If the Ittihad carries out a military operation, Salih's group will rally the Mujahidin to work for the 

Ittihad, otherwise Salih's group will continue to help the secularist groups. 

3. Salih's groups is willing to pay all expenses. 

Sheikh Hasan advocated continuing to use political means until they had built up a sufficiently large and 

trained military force, to which Salih responded that the Sheikh had not sent any forces for training to the 

camps already open. Sheikh Hasan replied that the camps were vulnerable to air attack, and the Shura 

council preferred in-house training in Mogadishu. Abu Hafs agreed to close the camps. Sheikh Hasan has 

not been in Ittihad for two years, but maintains strong ties. 

193
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600113 

Date: Unknown 

Author: Omar al-Sumale 

Length: 6 pages 

Title: A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi to Cape Kambooni and the Situation in the Southern 

Region 

Synopsis: Omar describes the tribal population, the region’s cities, and the topography. He also 

writes about the schedule of future work, provides some examples of terrorist operations that his 

group carried out, and gives his opinion on the location and the future of the operation. 

Key Themes: The notes made in the first section represent a terrorist scouting report for the 

Kenyan coast popular with tourists. Special attention is given to the areas where tourists 

congregate, and the patrols conducted by the police. Tactics for avoiding police detection are 

described as well as navigational details for moving by ship along the coast. 

The second part of the document begins with ethnographic information about Bajuni, Ogaden, and 

Jal Jaal people of coastal northern Kenya and Somalia. Political programs were established with all 

three to promote their cooperation with Al-Qa’ida. 

Operational requirements for the region are established, and the results of two operations analyzed. 

Ambush of Belgian Patrol. Al-Qa’ida supported forces in Somalia are credited with killing a Belgian 

soldier in an ambush and driving the Belgians out of the region. 

Attacks against Indian forces. Al-Qa’ida supported forces are credited with a successful attack 

against the Indian Army encampment at Bols Quqani, and in another operation driving the Indian 

out of Kambooni. 

Omar has a high opinion of the local fighters who have proven to be successful and have inspired 

many Muslim youth to sign up and be fighters. 

194
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600114 

Length: 7 pages 

Author: Saif Al-'Adl 

Title: A Report from Saif Al-'Adl 

Date: January 17, 1994 

Synposis 

Saif al-'Adl suggests, after a thorough investigation, that al-Qa'ida buy a launch in Somalia. He also 

evaluates the Al-Hadidiyah forest as a base for the organization, and gives a positive report on the local 

leadership, in the form of Sheikh Hasan and his Deputy ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, and their recent tour to gather 

support from local tribes. 

Key Themes 

About buying a launch 

Saif Al-'Adl begins by discussing in detail the possibility of buying a launch, and recommends buying it. The 

first issue is whether the venture will actually succeed. Major concerns include: 

1. The height of the waves as the launch approaches shore, which should be overcome by buying a 

fiberglass boat. 

2. Coast guard patrols, which should not be a problem once the launch passes Lamu island, and 

heads toward Kionja. 

3. Finding expert sailors who are not also morally reprehensible. Al-'Adl suggests Yemeni Muhammed 

'Aboh as trustworthy. 

4. Finding an expert captain to bring the ship back [it is unclear whether this is the launch or the ship 

that meets the launch]. Again, Al-'Adl's contact is an expert, but not trustworthy. 

The second issue is the ability of the launch to transport equipment from the ship to shore. Al-'Adl describes 

the technical specifications of the launch, and pronounces it large enough to be useful. He is in the process 

of attempting to bargain the owner down to 800,000 shillings, but leaves the decision to the recipient of the 

letter depending on the price. 

The third issue is the possibility of using the launch as a profitable venture. Al-'Adl calculates in detail the 

potential costs and benefits of transporting and selling fish, and concludes they can make a profit on their 

investment. Strategically, a successful fishing company can also establish a controlling presence on the 

coast. 

About Al-Hadidiyah forest 

Saif Al-'Adl reports on the advantages of using Al-Hadidiyah forest as a location for refuge and training. The 

extreme density of the trees, an insect that drives animals insane, and the impassibility of routes into the 

forest during the rainy season all mean that it is difficult for people to live there. A ravine with water and 

fish, protection from air attack, and varied terrain useful for most kinds of training are positive reasons to 

use the area. Al-'Adl describes the area's location relative to other important points, as well as a visit to a 

training camp on a beach of Wadi al-Jihad. 

About the existing local leadership 

Saif Al-'Adl positively rates the leadership capability of the local jihad leaders, Sheikh Hasan, who excels in 

da'wa and political matters, and his deputy ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, who excels in military matters. Al-'Adl 

compliments the leaders' loyalty and dedication, and notes that they desperately need help with military 

195
organization and administration. The local leaders understand the al-Qa'ida is currently short of funds, and 

has not asked for any. 

About a leadership tour 

Sheikh Hasan met in Kelpeo with the sheikhs of Kelpeo and Patato, in order to announce the new 

movement and introduce the Brother. Most of the sheikhs agreed to cooperate in jihad. 

196
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800080

Author: None 

Title: Photographs of Fazul Abdellah Mohamed 

Date: None 

Length: 2 pages 

Synopsis 

This document contains various photographs of Fazul Abdellah Mohamed. The names Ghazi and Abdellah 

are also written in Arabic. 

197
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800081

Author: None 

Title: Kenya Airways Ticket 1 

Date: 4 November 1997 

Length: 2 pages 

Synopsis 

This is a photograph of a passenger ticket and baggage for passage on Kenya Airways for Fazul Abdalla, 

from Nairobi to Khartoum to Dubai to Karachi, and back to Nairobi. 

198
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800083

Author: None 

Title: Kenya Airways Ticket 2 

Date: 3 May 1998 

Length: 2 pages 

Synopsis 

This is a photograph of a passenger ticket and baggage for passage on Kenya Airways for Fazul Abdalla, 

from Khartoum to Nairobi to Moroni, Comoros on flight #321. 

199
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800084 

Author: Various 

Title: Fazul’s Travel and Educational Documents 

Date: Various 

Length: 17 pages 

Synopsis 

These are travel and educational documents for Fazul Abdallah. 

Key Themes 

There are a number of duplicate documents, but these are the most important. 

1. Certificate from Lycee D'Etat in Moroni, Comoros, where Fazul Abdallah from 1987 to 1988. 

2. A document certifying that Fazul Abdella Mohammed studied Apple Macintosh computers in 1995, 

and did well in the course. 

3. A foreign transaction certificate issued by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry in 1995, and 

authenticated by the Sudanese Attorney General's office. A similar certificate appears later in the 

document as well. 

4. A document certifying that Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali completed a course in English typewriting 

at the same time as the Apple Macintosh course. 

5. An entry certificate for Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali from 'the second degree' cycle in the Comoros, 

from 1991. 

6. A 'baccalaureate' graduation certificate for Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali from 1994. 

7. A document certifying that Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali successfully passed an Arabic typewriting 

course at the same time as the Macintosh and English typewriting courses. 

8. Prior to these courses, there is another document indicating that Fazul Abdul Mohamed Ali 

completed a course in DOS and Windows programming, and did well. 

 

200
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800086 

Author: None 

Title: Student ID Card for Said Bakar 

Date: 1991 

Length: 2 pages 

Synopsis 

This document is a student ID card for Said Bakar, who is listed as being a 15 year-old student at Jamia 

Farooquia, Shah Faisal Colony in Karachi, Pakistan. 

201
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800087 

Author: None 

Title: Passports of Fazul and Maimouna Mohamed AIi 

Date: Various 

Length: 5 pages 

Synopsis 

This document contains images of the passports of two citizens of the Comoros, Abdullah Mohammed 

Fazul, and Maimouna Mohammed Ali. 

Key Themes 

The first passport, for Abdullah Mohammed Fazul, shows that he was born in 1974 in Moroni, Comoros, 

and works as a computer engineer. He has two children, Assiya Said, and Loutfi Said, born in 1995 and 

1996, respectively. 

The second passport, for Maimouna Mohammed Ali, lists the holder as a student born in 1976 in Moroni, 

Comoros. According to the passport's stamp pages, the holder left the Comoros, and spent ten days in 

Tanzania before returning in August and September 1998. The numbers for both passports are the same, 

suggesting they are either one passport, or they are a family. 

 

202
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800088 

Author: None 

Title: Somalian Passport of Halimo Farah Abdillahi 

Date: Issue 21/11/1999 

Length: 5 pages 

Synopsis

The document contains the passport (issued in Sana'a, Yemen in 1999) of Halimo Farah Abdillahi, a 

Somalian housewife born in 1975 in Kismayo, Somalia, and currently a resident of Mogadishu, Somalia. 

203
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800089 

Author: None 

Title: Comoros Passport of [Fazul] Abdallah Mohamed 

Date: Issued 

Length: 15 pages 

Synopsis 

This is the Comoros passport of [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed. 

Key Themes 

The document is the Comoros passport of [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed, a pupil who was born in 1972 in 

Moroni, Comoros. The passport was originally issued in 1990 in Moroni, and renewed in Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia in 1996. Using the passport, [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed traveled to Mauritius in 1990, to Tanzania 

in 1994 and 1995, to Sudan several times in 1995, to Yemen in 1995, and to Kenya in 1993 and several 

times in 1994 and 1995. He was also a resident of Pakistan for one year in 1991-1992 (probably longer, 

since he entered Pakistan in 1993 as well). Finally [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed received visas to Djibouti 

and India. 

204
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800517

Author: Various and unknown. 

Title: Zaid Barre and Events in Somalia 

Date: Various. 

Length: 38 pages. 

Synopsis 

A number of different documents are thrown together, covering 1) the Patani United Liberation 

Organization's fight for independence from Thailand; 2) the predicament faced by the Islamic Front for the 

Liberation of Oromia, and proposals by the new leadership on how to fix their problems; 3) a report 

analyzing the war in Somalia since the fall of Ziad Barre in 1991; 4) regulations for Ansa'ar Allah Base, and 

an associated security committee; and 5) a report from Yemeni border officials on a secret training mission. 

Key Themes 

The document consists of several collections of documents that cover different topics. They are not in 

order, but are arranged thematically here. 

Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 

Patani is completely different from the rest of Thailand in terms of race, language, religion and education. 

Its main industry is rubber production, but it is also self-sufficient in rice. 

Later in the document, the PULO media unit releases a report from a Thai newspaper (13 August 1995) 

which claims that the Thai government discovered unexploded bombs planted by PULO. Further, the Thai 

military would like to classify PULO as a terrorist group, and claims that the leader of PULO, Kabir Abdul 

Rahman, is sick, a charge PULO disputes. 

In the next section, the PULO media office in Sudan writes to the people of Sudan on the occasion of 

PULO's 28th anniversary. In 1993 and 1994, PULO representatives met with the Thai government, and 

demanded a treaty between PULO and Thailand, as well as self-determination for Patani. PULO's overall 

goal is an independent democratic state in Patani based on Islamic 'instructions'. The Thai Prime Minister, 

Banhan Salafa Aaja, rejected these demands. As a result, PULO continues to fight, and asks for the 

support of all freedom-loving peoples, especially Islamic nations. 

Next, the PULO media unit announces that Kabir Abdul Rahman has visited the International Islamic World 

Organization for Human Rights and discussed the plight of the people of Patani. 

In the final section of the document, Abdul Kadir Rahman writes to Abu Obaida and tries to arrange a 

meeting with him. 

Presidential address, Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia 

The President of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia gives a speech in he notes that the Front 

was established in 1969, but earlier fought slavery in 1964-1965 in Bali, Harar, and ‘Arsa provinces. The 

Front has faced many obstacles, including the confiscation of all their weapons coming across the Red 

Sea, and the martyrdom of many fighters. Nevertheless, the Oromiyan people's faith has not been shaken 

in the face of many crimes, resulting in hope to other oppressed peoples and fear to colonizers. 

205
The Front welcomed the fall of the Aldirgh government in Ethiopia, attended the reconciliation conference in 

1991, and participated in the security and governance preparations for the transitional government. 

Problems arose in the implementation – the different fronts in Oromia began fighting each other over which 

one was the legitimate representative of the Oromiyan people. The Front and the Revolutionary Democratic 

Front for Ethiopian Peoples (RDFEP) began fighting, due to language problems and other 

misunderstandings, and tensions remain high. The proposed solution is peaceful negotiation and patience, 

yet while the RDFEP asked for negotiations, the Front's [previous?] leader refused, leading to war. As a 

result, all gains of the previous years were lost. The previous leader made decisions for his personal 

benefit, to the detriment of the Front. The new leadership has no objection to staying within Ethiopia 

provided the rights of the Oromiyan people are respected. The leadership further pledges not to engage in 

conflict due to religious differences, not to favor any particular area, and not to let the gains from jihad be 

lost. 

Organizational Predicament of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia 

The author describes how the Front came to be in its current predicament. The original leadership became 

rigid, and did not heed the opinions of others. Decisions were random and harmful to the Front as a whole, 

the Oromiyan people saw their dreams dashed, and the strength of the Front actually decreased. The 

author proposes a general representative conference to outline a political program, create a vision for the 

Front, and generally reform the organization. 

The political program should include measures to encourage multi-party democratic practices, nondiscrimination on the basis of religion or nationality, and self-determination by referendum for the Oromiyan 

people. The economic program would encourage light industry, improve transportation and utility 

infrastructure, husband natural resources, and modernize agriculture. The educational program would 

make most education free, establish new schools and scholarships, and encourage the use of the 

Oromiyan language. The social program's goals are to provide health care for Oromiyans, improve public 

health and nutrition, and end antiquated marriage and work practices. The national defense program would 

enlist all males ages 18 to 30 into the regional army. In terms of foreign policy, the Front supports peaceful 

resolutions to problems, welcomes helpful organizations, and encourages other peoples' self-determination. 

How did the new events start in Somalia? 

The author describes how Ziad Barre instigated a conflict within Mogadishu that quickly spiraled out of 

control. The USC was successful in driving Ziad Barre from power, but could keep control itself, and the 

uprising turned into a war between the rival tribes Hawi and Darood. The author concludes that this was 

Ziad Barre's intention all along, since he could use the violence 1) instigate a tribal war where he would 

come out ahead, and 2) inflict suffering on Somalia such that people will long for the days of Ziad Barre. 

The author argues that Ziad Barre largely succeeded. 

Although the combatants might at times divide themselves into Hawi and Darood, the groups within the 

tribes often fight each other, and the identities themselves are but covers for hatred, prejudice, and 

ambition, all of which have led them away from Islam. These divisions are new and complicated – 

previously Somalia had been one nation, one people, one language, and one religion. The author goes into 

depth as to the various combatants within the Hawi and Darood parties, and explains their complexity. He 

decries the chaos and violence of present-day Somalia, and finds the hidden hand of Western powers, 

particularly the United States (whose diplomats were trained in Italy regarding Somali tribes), in the 

violence. The only solution is a strong Islamic central state with shari'a. 

206
Ansa'ar Allah Base 

This document lays out some of the duties involved in running this training camp and the organization in 

general. The security committee is responsible for the physical security of the camp, and of the personnel 

training within the camp, as well the mental 'security' of trainees and other personnel. This particular 

protection can be accomplished through the interception of hostile media, lectures, and training sessions. 

The security committee also engages in counterintelligence work within the organization, collects 

intelligence, conducts police investigations, coordinates with Islamic intelligence services (this is shelved for 

the present time), and takes part in covert action. The chairman of the security committee should have 

been a member of the organization for five years, of sound religion, and have sufficient military and security 

experience. 

Yemen Democratic People's Republic Ministry of State Security 

A 1985 letter to high-level officials in the Yemen Democratic People's Republic from Yemeni border security 

officials clarifies some points about a top secret training mission. The training mission involves a number of 

different aspects, including anti-personnel training, and anti-'military machineries' training. There was a 

problem with leaks from within the mission, and as a result, those in charge have taken steps to train 

participants on the importance of security. The group cooperated with Khubra during the training, and took 

a number of lectures. Unfortunately, many of the recruits had never used the weapons before, and their 

literacy and educational levels were extremely low. Finances were also so tight that they were forced to 

take out personal loans to cover costs. The authors propose that a secret training area for application and 

weapons training be designated, and groups trained in 1986 (the next year). They also propose to assign 

the leaker somewhere out of the country so as not to cause problems. Finally, they suggest storing the 

weapons in a secure area, and raising the salaries of the workers. 

207
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800573 

Author: Various 

Title: Invoices for al-Qa`ida and Islamic Union Expenses 

Date: 1993 

Length: 14 pages 

Synopsis 

The document mostly consists of a large number of invoices for money spent by al-Qaeda and the Islamic 

Union in Somalia and Ogaden to support training, living expenses, and military operations in 1993. 

Key Themes 

In the first letter, Saiful-Islam writes to Brother 'Omar details how he spent the money given to him, and 

notes that Abu Hafs refused to send his passport because he was afraid it would be lost. 

The second item is a list of budget items including food, shipping, travel, shoes, socks and personal use) in 

both Somalian shillings and Ethiopian bir. 

The bulk of the document consists of short statements by al-Qaeda operatives or members of the Islamic 

Union in Somalia and Ogaden attesting to the fact that they have received money (in either bir or shillings) 

from the local al-Qaeda accountant (generally, but not always, Zachariah al-Maqdesi), or 'Omar Tajuddin, 

Commander of the Preparation Branch. 'Abdullah Irad, Commander of the Jihad Office, and 'Abdullah 

'Omar, Commander of the Islamic Union, and 'Omar Tajuddin himself, were frequent recipients. 

The money loaned out was used for the following activities: 

1. Medical treatment for one of the brothers 

2. Fuel for the rations vehicle; diesel fuel 

3. Alimony for a woman 

4. A brother visiting his family 

5. Assisting the brothers in traveling to the Abagro River 

6. Military operations and supplies on the southern, northern, northeastern, and eastern fronts, as 

well as in Gedo 

7. Camels, both for travel and for meat 

8. Shipping 

9. Food and drink 

10. Paying off debts 

The final two items are somewhat different. The first item is a detailed budget of travel and supply 

expenses. The second item identifies some of the key people in budgetary operations, and who has debts 

in what amounts. Ahmed Karaghai is the courier who came from Addis Ababa. Ahmed Diri Sheikh Rasheed 

and Mohammed 'Atya are in charge of purchasing. 'Abd Al-Salam 'Othman took $5000 from Djibouti without 

permission. 

208
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800581 

Author: Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi 

Title: Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi Reports from Afghanistan 

Date: September 4, 1994 

Length: 3 pages 

Synopsis 

Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi reports in a letter the situation before he and other al-Qaeda operatives leave 

Afghanistan. He expresses satisfaction that Fayez Muhammad is experiencing problems after causing alQaeda hardship in some way, and asks to be allowed to finish the Furqan project by training a group of 

Uzbeks before he leaves Afghanistan for Sudan. 

Key Themes 

Al-Sharqi acknowledges the order to evacuate Afghanistan, and thinks the order is for the best. He is sorry 

to leave, regarding Afghanistan as a paradise, with ample opportunities to see the fruits of their labors 

(comparable to Sudan), but also as a place with difficult conditions. 

Three recent incidents have made Al-Sharqi happy: 

1. The Vice President of Al-Jama't Al-Islamiyah visited Al-Badr Camp, and agreed with Al-Sharqi and 

his associates that "such incidents" should not happen, nor is this the way they should 

communicate. He would go to Al-Ghond himself to resolve the situation. 

2. Al-Sharqi and his associates visited Kabul and Hikmetyar's headquarters to deny that al-Qaeda had 

given any weapons to Massoud (it had actually gone to Al-Nahda party), and to discuss their 

problem with Al-Ghond. Hikmetyar's people agreed that Fayez Muhammad (apparently the person 

behind the "incident") was corrupt, and might have to be killed. 

3. Fayez Muhammad was protecting fellow Manakel tribe members built houses in violation of the 

government of Khost's regulations, but backed down in the face of the government's threats to 

attack Matoon citadel and kick the party out of Khost. 

Al-Sharqi expresses his satisfaction that Fayez Muhammad is experiencing such misfortune in light of what 

he did to them. 

The Al-Qaeda operatives' mission was to help with the Furqan project. Previously, they had trained a class 

of Tajiks at al-Farouq camp, and had the opportunity to train Uzbeks as well. Abu Walid, an associate of AlSharqi, is strongly in favor of training the Uzbeks since the opportunity may not arise again. Eventually, 

they agree to do it as long as the Uzbeks arrive within two months, pending a decision from the al-Qaeda 

leadership, which Al-Sharqi asks for. He asks the recipient of the leader to prepare a stand or cart for him 

(for business) in Khartoum in anticipation of his arrival there. 

209
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800597 

Author: Abu Hafess (probably Abu Hafs AKA Muhammad Atef) 

Title: Abu Hafs’ Report on Operations in Somalia 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 9 pages 

Synopsis 

Abu Hafs submits a report on the al-Qaeda operations in Somalia, Ogaden, Kenya, and Djibouti, and lists 

budget needs. Luuq camp has a great location, but is short on many supplies. The situation in the Ogaden, 

currently under the purview of Saif al-Islam, is going well, but needs money. The Kenya office is has a 

central logistical and administrative function, but suffers from security problems. Finally, the Djibouti office 

needs a married operative who will not be corrupted. 

Key Themes 

Abu Hafs rejects doing Brother Anass's courses in the areas he visited for security, and suggests Khartoum 

instead. He then gives code words the recipients of the report should use for Sudan and Somalia, and the 

times and days that certain frequencies can be used to contact him via wireless communications. 

The next section is a detailed description of Luuq Camp. The camp's location is good for using as a 

springboard for guerrilla warfare, since the mountainous terrain makes it hard for outside forces to 

penetrate, especially during the rainy season, when the camouflage is thicker. Marehan tribes (the tribe of 

Seyad Barre) live in the area, but the actual area around the camp is sparsely populated, and many of the 

people are supporters of the Islamic Union. Abu Hafs rates the security situation as good, and military 

supplies are mostly good, with the exception of clothing, shoes, canteens, RPGs, ammunition for artillery, 

and vehicles (two cars are needed, if possible). As for the training, it is going well, especially given the 

horrible condition many of the recruits were in at the beginning. Trainers are needed. 

Abu Hafs met with Professor Mahmood, and it became clear to him that the coaltion in Luuq lacks decisionmaking ability, and defers to the central authority, which is non-confrontational in incidents with the 

Americans and Kenya. Abu Hafs senses this may be a problem in the future. 

Regarding communications, Abu Hafs triumphantly notes that Saif in Ogaden, and Omar in Laascaanood 

(of the "Sudanese Agricultural Equipment Division") were contacted using a "faraway-communications 

wireless system." It will be cheaper than phones, but requires codes. The group still needs devices with 

repeaters, and several high frequency devices, although it is unclear how they will transport the devices to 

the needy areas. 

The goal of the brothers in Luuq is two-fold: to form a guerrilla force, and to discover and collect information 

on the enemy for use in the future. 

Abu Hafs then goes on to describe the situation in the Ogaden. He notes that he was able to make contact 

with Saif. Saif is doing well, prior reports that the Ogaden camp was surrounded are untrue, and he is 

desperate need of money. Abu Hafs wants to go to Ogaden, probably via the Luuq route, and met with 

Sheikh Saley and Sheikh Abdellah Omar, where he encouraged them with the group's logo: "Make me 

achieve my earnings under the shadow of my arrow." 

210
Abu Hafs continues with a discussion of the Kenya office. The purpose of the Nairobi office (which is in a 

rented house) is to receive, prepare, equip, and supply brothers going to the camps in Luuq or Ogaden. 

The actual cost of transporting people from Nairobi to Luuq is high. The security situation is poor – crime is 

high, and the political situation is unstable, possibly even explosive. Furthermore, Arabs in particular are 

subject to extreme surveillance. 

Djibouti has an al-Qaeda operative in the form of Brother Khaled, but he must be removed immediately 

because he is susceptible to Djibouti's corruption as a single male, and replaced with Abu Ahmed Al-Radji, 

who is married. 

Abu Hafs then lists the fixed budget for the Kenya/Luuq operations, and mentions that Brother Khaled is 

$4000 in debt. The trainers would also like good salaries as they would like to get married, and low salaries 

would apparently present obstacles to doing hat. 

Finally, Abu Hafs met with Abu Khadija al-Zahri, and confirmed that the evacuation of Laasqoray was not 

about a lack of food after all. 

211
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800600 

Title: Report on the Needs of the Mujahidin in Somalia 

Author: Unknown 

Date: February 19, 1993 

Length: 3 pages 

Synopsis 

A letter to Ottman or Abu Baqar that details the current needs of the mujahidin in Somalia, and negatively 

assesses the personality of the Islamic youth, the current state of jihad and the leadership of the local jihad 

movement. 

Key Themes 

The first section is a list of requested items, with costs, for the mujahidin: Kalashinovs, BKMs, and RPGs, 

as well as rice, dates, and semolina. The leader also requests five open-backed Toyota Land Cruisers, 

communications devices, 

The author then negatively assesses the youth involved in the movement. They are rash, shallow, have no 

preparation, and foolishly rushed into the city. 

The author divides the fight in the Mogadishu and Luuq regions into at least three steps. The first step is 

unintelligible. The second period [but not step] involves attacking the leaders of the tribes, hopefully by 

finding some way of turning tribal allies (presumably of al-Qaeda) against other members of their tribes. 

This will likely be difficult. The second step [but not period] consists of fighting from within the cities, using 

different types of cells – ambushes, light arms, hand guns, explosives, etc. The third step is quick 

occupation of the cities by special forces in case the Americans leave, after which the group's forces will 

target Somali authorities and tribal leaders. The author doubts that the Americans will ever leave. 

After much unintelligible writing, the author assesses the state of the jihad movement and its leadership. 

The leadership is terrible, and the author does not expect this to change, even with the new shura council. 

He suggests entering the political arena themselves, connecting with the base, and preparing some youth 

groups in the face of the poor leadership. The brothers have good intentions, including assassinations, and 

training in the cities, but they need encouragement. These brothers have an extremely low opinion of the 

leadership, blame it for the failure of jihad, and are threatening to leave the movement. 

212
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800611 

Author: Hassan Dahir Haji Aweis 

Title: Hassan Aweys Kenya Visa Application 

Date: 9 March 1993 

Length: 2 pages 

Synopsis 

The document is a Kenyan visa application, dated 9 March 1993, filled out by Hassan Daih Haji Aweis. The 

author describes himself as a Somalian merchant, born in 1944 in Dimaree, and currently resident in 

Mogadishu, with a passport issued by the Internal Ministry of Somalia in 1990. He intends to visit the 

Tanfeeq Trading Company in Nairobi on business for a month's duration. 

213
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800621 

Author: Various and unknown 

Title: Letters on al-Qa`ida’s Operations in Africa 

Length: 6 pages 

Date: 1993 

Synopsis 

A series of letters from various authors that discuss al-Qaeda's operations in Africa, specifically Somalia 

and Ogaden. In the first and fourth letters, the authors discuss their failure to get from Nairobi to Luuq and 

Mendira, The author of the third letter offers his help with African travel document. In the second letter, the 

author negatively assesses the current state of the Islamic Movement in Somalia, and in the fifth letter, Saif 

al-Islam gives a status report on his efforts in Ghar Shaigut camp. 

Key Themes 

The first letter, to Abu AbdAllah, is a report of an operative's arrival and activities in Nairobi in support of alQaeda's operations in Somalia and Ogaden [Ugadin]. The trip itself was expensive, and the author 

delivered $2500 to Abu Tariq, who handled expenses and logistics. The al-Qaeda team met with Ugadin 

allies, and tried and failed to get to Mendira or Luuq, Somalia via plane – it was stymied by government 

regulations and inappropriate facilities in Luuq. 

The second letter is a report of the state and history of the Islamic movement in Somalia. In southern 

Somalia, Algamaa Al-Islamiah, led by Mahmud Isa, broke off from al-Ahl, led by Abdelqadir Shaikh Edris. In 

the north, the Islamic Youth Group The structure of the Islamic movement mirrors that of the Muslim 

brotherhood, with national and local executive councils and advisory councils, although many decisions are 

made in the mosques and streets. The Afghan Jihad-influenced youth of the movement rose up to defend 

Kismayo from Aideed's advancing forces, but were defeated, and driven back. The author blames the 

movement for bad planning and preparation, little money, and little connection between the leaders and the 

base. 

The third letter is from Abu Abd-Allah Althani Alfa Ibrahim to Abi Ab-Allah Saad Alsaad. The author regrets 

that circumstances prevent him from making a trip to Africa, but since he's free at the moment, he would be 

happy to help African brothers obtain documents from Guinea, Liberia, Ivory Coast, or Sierra Leone. 

The fourth letter, to Abu Abd-Allah, is similar to the first letter in describing the failure to get to Luuq or 

Mendira. The author provides intelligence on the movement of US forces to meet with Somali leaders in 

Luuq, and lists concerns he has about the operation, such as the airport, time for more training, 

establishing more training center, and relations and coordination with the Ugadin tribes, as well as other 

operatives. 

In the fifth letter, dated 19 March 1993, Saif al-Islam, the main al-Qaeda operative in Ugadin, writes to 

Brother Othman, and describes the situation in Ghar Shaighut, the training camp he helped to establish. 

Camp resources are low, food, weapons and ammunition must be purchased in nearby villages, and the 

brothers are weak. Nonetheless, Saif al-Islam judges the time good to collect weapons and train as the 

enemy is weak and non-confrontational. The local allies (under Abd al-Salam Othman Abd al-Salam) are in 

charge of political, administrating and daawi operations, but al-Qaeda has assumed responsibility for 

training. Saif al-Islam ends with a discussion of the monetary needs of the local allies, and puts forward 

214
with his estimated required budget, which totals $64000 for three months' supply of the camp force alone, 

and $130,000 per month for 600 people to be trained. 

215
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800639 

Title: A Quick Review of the Current Political Situation 

Author: Unknown 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 4 pages 

Synopsis 

The author discusses Aideed's ascendancy in Somali, attacks against the US and UN, and the situation 

among the brothers in other regions in the Horn of Africa. 

Key Themes 

The author writes to Abu Abdalla, Abu Obaida, and unnamed others, and gives a situation report for 

operations in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia. 

Aideed has large amounts of support in the region. The Ali Mahdi coalition is thinking of allying with him, 

while the main opposition coalition is fracturing. The UN, for its part, has moved out of Mogadishu in order 

to support anti-Aideed factions via money and humanitarian aid. Even so, Aideed has become a hero to 

those looking for an effective leader, and he can overcome opposition in Mogadishu and Kemayo. As for 

Islamic Unity, they are apparently requesting people in Jeddo, and continue training in Mogadishu. 

After a missing page, the document picks up with a list of attacks in Somalia. American and UN forces have 

suffered a number of casualties due to attacks. The Americans are afraid, and asked Aideed's forces to 

investigate, but Aideed denies any wrongdoing. Aideed's group called Sheikh Abdulla Sahal, threatened his 

followers, and began looking for the brothers in order to stop the attacks. There will be a discussion about 

security even though there are only five brothers, led by Abu Ahamd Al Masri. 

As for Dubli, Saif is trying to get there to assess the situation. The brothers tried only one failed RPG attack 

against a UN helicopter. In Ojadeen, the brothers have arrived safely. Sheikh Abdulla Omar asked for 

engineers, but none are available right now. There is nothing new to report in Jeddo. 

216
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800640 

Author: Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and others 

Title: Abu Belal’s Report on Jihad in Somalia 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 10 pages 

Synopsis 

Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and possibly others describe the jihad situation in Somalia, an 

ambush against allied forces, the problems faced by the local movements, and what is needed for jihad. 

 

Key Themes 

The first section of the document appears to be a highly fragmented letter from Omar Taj Al Dein Bin 

Abdullah "Abu Belal" and possibly others describing the jihad situation in Somalia, and updating the 

recipient on the organization's activities. 

Jihad in Somalia was started by the youth without any planning or coordination, against the advice of shura 

councils outside of Somalia. America is getting closer, and there is a danger of the money being misspent. 

Now is not the time for jihad, but for da'wa (prosletyzation). Each member of the movement is still too 

attached to his tribe rather than Islam. As a result, the Executive Council should participate, and military 

operations need to be planned. Military forces are apparently not up to standards, and information is spotty. 

'Abdu Rahman in Djibouti is mentioned several times as being involved. 

The next several pages describe a battle. The author was in a caravan that stopped in a potentially hostile 

area against his advice. The enemy then ambushed them, and the author (called "Muhammad" by one of 

the soldiers) took charge. The ambushed forces successfully prevented the enemy from encircling them, 

cut off the enemy's routes, and deployed an anti-tank force to protect them [the author provides a map]. 

Eleven 'Muslims' and about fifty enemy soldiers died. The author's allies want to return by the same way 

they had come, but the author told them not to make the same mistake twice. Instead, they returned a 

different way, and faced a confrontation with local Somalis that failed to escalate. 

The author mentions that he is sending Abu Salman with more details, and asks for money for expenses. 

He proposes setting up a company in (Baru?) region to support operations in Ogaden. Preferably the office 

will be led by a Somali, and will not cost too much. It is possible to buy very cheap weapons. The author 

also mentions a split among the ranks of the Al-Wadi Company [probably a specific jihad group], Al-Cabal 

Company, and Al-Ittihad Company. 

There are a number of positive aspects of the Al-Sharika movement, notably the large numbers of 

members, and the mutual respect the members have, but they need to organize military forces, and 

representative councils. In terms of negative aspects, the movement is not prepared for jihad. In terms of 

willingness to engage in jihad, ability to gain the support of the Somali people, ability to train young people, 

and authority of the leaders, the movement is still lacking. In general, the movement's leaders have not 

successfully coordinated jihad, da'wa, and other religious work, do not court outside opinions when 

necessary, and simultaneously seem to have no desire for jihad, yet a certain amount of impatience and 

agitation. 

Finally, the author wants to know about the disposition of the enemy, both external, and internal groups that 

are against a foreign presence. 

217
The last section is possibly unrelated to the beginning of the document. A number of tribes would like to 

regain authority from the Hawi tribe. There is only one Muslim group in the area. It has a camp in "Bu Saso" 

where brothers who left Afghanistan train recruits. There are also a large number of Muslim youths in 

Mogadishu belonging to a number of different movements. The 'brotherhood' and Al-Ittihad apparently have 

camps in the city itself. The author asks for mujahidin brothers to supervise the intellectual aspects of the 

movements, and a coordination and communication center that will connect and strengthen the youths, and 

the unity of the people in order to carry out jihad. 

Northern Somalia is controlled by the Somali National Movement, which refuses to join the rest of Somalia. 

There are two Islamic movements, the Islamic Union, and the Unity movement, but neither has been able 

to establish camps. 

218
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800641 

Title: "Political Difficulties that Face the Organizations Representing Islamic Nationalists in Ethiopia" and 

"Brief Report on Current Events in Ethiopia" 

Author: Unknown 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 7 pages 

NB: The pages in the document are not in order. The document itself is translated poorly, and is 

incomplete. 

Synopsis 

The author describes the previous problems, the current challenges, and the future opportunities for 

Muslims and the organizations posed by the transitional government in Ethiopia. 

Key Themes 

The current regime in power in Ethiopia (Al Dargh) has some flexibility, and provides more political 

opportunities to Muslim nationalities in Ethiopia than previous regimes did. Unfortunately, Muslim nationalist 

organizations were often not in a position to take advantage of these opportunities. The population was in 

many cases stopped from economic production, and discriminated against for opportunities (which were 

given to non-Muslim organizations). In addition conflict was increased among different nationalities, 

journalists' opportunities were limited, and education and organizational opportunities were curtailed after 

the author's organization moved in. 

With that said, opportunities for Muslim now exist. 

1. Muslim nationalists were able to take control of their own areas. 

2. Some Muslim nationalist organizations were able to return and contact their populations. 

3. International Islamic organizations were allowed into Ethiopia. 

4. Muslims are enthusiastic. 

5. The youth of Ethiopia are eager to hear about Islam. 

The author makes seven suggestions to improve the situation of Muslim organizations in Ethiopia: 

1. Conducting a study of the reasons for the weakening of Muslim nationalists. 

2. Having an urgent meeting among the region's group to resolve problems. 

3. Taking advantage of the opportunities for political participation offered by the transitional 

government. 

4. Providing the political and financial knowledge to take advantage of the opportunities, given a three 

month time limit. 

5. Raising the leadership standards of the Islamic organizations. 

6. Pressuring the president of the Islamic front to accept the opportunities. 

Elsewhere, the author makes more detailed suggestions. 

1. Conduct a conference to deal with the Islamic front's internal divisions. 

2. Try to find unity among the various factions. 

3. Try to coordinate among Somali and Oromi organizations to confront Islam's enemies. 

4. Take advantage of current opportunities by acknowledging that the Christians of Ethiopia are 

merely a ship floating in a sea of the rising Muslim population, establishing political parties that 

represent all Muslims, and financially supporting media outlets to prepare Muslim psychologically. 

5. Resolve problems with the transitional government to avoid war. 

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6. Raise the economic and educational level of local Muslims. 

The author also provides a report on current events in Ethiopia. He expresses astonishment that the 

Ethiopian government was previously overthrown by such puny means. The new transitional government's 

extension of opportunities to Muslims, namely the right to rule themselves, participate in the government, 

and broadcast their own media, is welcome, but it is ultimately a deceptive plot. 

The author describes Islamic nationalities in Ethiopia, including the Oromo (who have 3 Islamic 

organizations, and 2 non-Muslim ones), the Ofar, Somalis, the Bani Shangool, and the Adra. 

Expected dangers involve a betrayal by non-Muslims, who could deprive Muslim organizations of their 

military and political gains following the elections if they choose military confrontation. 

220
Doc ID: AFGP-2003-001293H 

Author: Al-Wali 

Title: Meeting Notes and a Letter from Al-Wali 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 1 page 

Synopsis 

The document consists of notes or the agenda from a meeting on the situation in the Horn of Africa, and a 

letter from Al-Wali on training. 

Key Themes 

The first part of the document appears to be either notes from a meeting, or the agenda for a meeting. The 

meeting apparently revolves around the relationship with Sheik Hassan, the military situation in Kismayo, 

the disposition of al-Qaeda operatives in the region, especially Ogaden. 

In the section part, Al-Wali writes a letter to Maurib, in which he suggests to Maurib that he arrange for two 

hours off every day for training for the Arab brothers. Yusif Jan Muhammad Ahmed is never to compete 

with the Afghans, although training is fine. 

222
Doc ID: ISGQ-2005-00024493

Author: Unknown 

Title: Iraqi Intelligence Service reports on Al-Qa`ida Threats in Djibouti 

Date: September-October 2001 

Length: 8 pages 

Synopsis 

The Djibouti station of the Iraqi Intelligence Service reports on threats by Al-Qaeda to blow up foreign 

companies in Djibouti, and on the activities of Islamist groups in Djibouti and Somaliland. 

Key Themes 

23 August 2001 – This is the report indicating that Al-Qaeda has made threats against foreign companies 

(some of which contain Jewish members) for cooperating with the US. 

25 August 2001 -- Al-Qaeda has delivered messages in Arabic and French, signed by Osama bin Laden, 

that threaten to blow up certain foreign companies in Djibouti at the end of August unless they cease 

cooperating with the US. In response, the French military has increased its security around its military 

hospital, and air and naval bases, and the US embassy has built fortifications. The Djibouti government is 

concerned about the blow to investment that such threats could entail. 

1 September 2001 – The previous report is reiterated in a slightly different form. 

6 September 2001 -- The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) orders the Djibouti station to follow up on certain 

reports. 

25 October 2001 – The Djibouti station responds. The Al-Tabligh and Al-Da'wah groups are active in 

Djibouti – twelve members were arrested, but were released for lack of evidence. According to the Libyan 

Charge d'Affaires, most of the members of the groups' cell, which is headquartered at 'Uthman bin 'Affan 

mosque in Djibouti and led by Ahmad Tahir 'Umar, are Arabs. The Libyan government is monitoring the 

group due to the presence of Libyans. There is a camp in Ber'u in Somaliland where Arabs of various 

nationalities (but no Iraqis) receive 'professional' training in weapons and forgery. The camp is run by the 

Al-Qaeda-related Al-Jihad Organization, headed by Ibrahim Hasan Sultan. 

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