NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS 

Ten-Year Budget 

Estimates for 

Modernization Omit 

Key Efforts, and 

Assumptions and 

Limitations Are Not 

Fully Transparent 

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2014

GAO-14-373

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-373, a report to 

congressional committees

June 2014

NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Ten-Year Budget Estimates for Modernization Omit 

Key Efforts, and Assumptions and Limitations Are 

Not Fully Transparent

Why GAO Did This Study

DOE and DOD are undertaking an 

extensive effort to sustain and 

modernize the nuclear weapons 

stockpile, research and production 

infrastructure, delivery systems, and

the nuclear command and control 

system. Completing this effort is 

expected to cost hundreds of billions of 

dollars over decades. Congress 

mandated the development of an 

annual report on the departments’ 

plans and 10-year budget estimates for 

these efforts. Congress also mandated 

GAO to review the accuracy and 

completeness of the DOE and DOD 

report, with respect to the budget 

estimate contents and methodology. 

This report addresses whether DOE’s 

and DOD’s 10-year budget estimates 

for sustaining and modernizing the 

nuclear deterrent are consistent with 

their funding plans, including whether 

the report provides complete 

information and a transparent 

methodology. GAO analyzed the DOE 

and DOD plans and estimates as of 

July 2013, and the DOE and DOD 

guidance and methodologies used to 

prepare their budget estimates.

What GAO Recommends

To improve the completeness and 

transparency of subsequent joint 

reports, GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense direct DOD 

components to (1) include at least a 

range of potential 10-year budget 

estimates for projects and programs, 

based on preliminary cost information 

(this is consistent with a December 

2013 recommendation GAO made to 

DOE); and (2) document assumptions 

and limitations affecting its NC3 

funding estimates. DOD agreed with 

these recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Departments of Energy’s (DOE) and Defense’s (DOD) $263.8 billion, 

10-year estimates in their report to Congress for sustaining and modernizing 

U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities are generally consistent with their funding 

plans through fiscal year 2018. However, GAO identified shortcomings with 

respect to the completeness of the budget estimates and the transparency of the 

assumptions and limitations that underlie the 10-year estimate. Specifically: 

• Nuclear stockpile and infrastructure: Based on GAO’s recent review of DOE’s 

long-term plans and estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear 

enterprise, we found that DOE’s $97.5 billion estimate in the report includes 

less funding than will be needed through fiscal year 2018 to meet program 

milestones for planned nuclear weapon life extensions, and through fiscal 

year 2023 to meet milestones for constructing key facilities. 

• Nuclear delivery systems: DOD’s $125.5 billion estimate in the report does 

not include potential budget estimates for Air Force efforts to modernize 

intercontinental ballistic missiles or to develop a new bomber. Instead, DOD 

treated these efforts as zero-cost in the estimate. Consequently, DOD may 

be significantly underreporting its 10-year estimate, depending on the 

magnitude of the costs resulting from upcoming decisions about how to 

modernize these delivery systems. 

• Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3): DOD’s methodology 

for preparing its $40.8 billion estimate to sustain and modernize its system 

for assuring connectivity between the President and nuclear forces is not fully 

transparent because key assumptions and potential limitations are not 

documented in the report to Congress. As a result, Congress has a limited 

basis for understanding the estimate, or for comparing the estimates in one 

annual report to the next, as it assesses long-term affordability when 

allocating resources. 

The report omits estimates for certain programs, such as the new bomber, and is 

not fully transparent in describing key assumptions and limitations for estimating 

nuclear command, control, and communications system funding, which limits its 

utility for budgetary planning. Key principles that GAO derived from federal 

budget guidance stress the importance of including all relevant funding estimates 

in the plan, as well as documenting methodological assumptions and potential 

limitations. However, DOD did not specifically direct the Air Force to include a 

range of potential budget estimates in the report for developing a new 

intercontinental missile or bomber, where a firm estimate was unavailable. DOD 

also did not direct that key assumptions and limitations be documented in the 

report for preparing its NC3 estimates. GAO reported in December 2013 that 

DOE’s nuclear stockpile and infrastructure estimates did not include a range of 

preliminary budget estimates to account for known future expenses. GAO 

recommended that DOE include a range of potential budget estimates for 

preliminary projects and programs in future funding plans, and DOE generally 

agreed with this recommendation. Without a range of potential estimates and 

fully documented assumptions and limitations, the report is an incomplete tool for 

congressional oversight. View GAO-14-373. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov, or David Trimble at 

(202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Letter 1 

Background 5

DOE’s and DOD’s 10-Year Estimates Are Incomplete, and DOD’s 

Methodology for Preparing Some Estimates Is Not Fully 

Transparent 8

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 29

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 31

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Tables

Table 1: Department of Defense’s (DOD) Nuclear Delivery System 

Sustainment and Modernization Plans as of July 2013 13

Table 2: Department of Defense’s (DOD) 5-Year and 10-Year 

Nuclear Delivery System Sustainment and Modernization 

Estimates as of July 2013 16

Figures

Figure 1: Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) 10-

Year Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing the U.S. 

Nuclear Deterrent as of July 2013 7

Figure 2: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

Production Schedules for Planned Nuclear Weapons 

Life-Extension Programs as of July 2013 10

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Figure 3: Not All Nuclear Command, Control, and 

Communications Activities Were Associated with 

Department of Defense (DOD) Funding Plans 19

Abbreviations

C3 Command, Control, and Communications

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOD CIO Department of Defense Chief Information Officer

DOE Department of Energy

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

FYNSP Future Years Nuclear Security Program

NC3 Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

SLBM Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile

SSBN Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (ballistic missile

submarine)

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 10, 2014

Congressional Committees

The Department of Energy (DOE), through its National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA),1

The administration has laid out its plans to undertake this nuclear 

modernization effort in a number of different documents. The April 2010 

Nuclear Posture Review Report signaled the administration’s intent to 

make new investments in developing strategic delivery systems,

and the Department of Defense (DOD) are 

undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and modernize 

U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, including the nuclear weapons 

stockpile, research and production infrastructure, delivery systems, and 

nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system. Strategic 

missiles, submarines, aircraft, and the nuclear weapons they carry are 

aging, and both delivery systems and nuclear bombs and warheads are 

being deployed beyond their intended service lives. Key NNSA nuclear 

weapons research, development, and production facilities date back to 

the 1940s and 1950s, and, according to the administration, require 

renovation or replacement to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal for as long as such weapons exist. Completing this effort is 

expected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars over decades.

2 upgrade 

the NC3 system, and modernize NNSA’s government-owned, contractoroperated nuclear security enterprise.3

 

1

NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that is responsible for the 

management and security of DOE’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval 

reactor programs.

In a February 2011 letter to the 

2

Section 1070 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 

110-181 (2008) required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 

Energy and Secretary of State, to conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture 

of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years. DOD published the conclusions and 

recommendations from that review in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. 

3

NNSA oversees three national nuclear weapons design laboratories—Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory in California, Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 

Mexico, and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and California. It also oversees 

four nuclear weapons production plants—the Pantex Plant in Texas, the Y-12 National 

Security Complex in Tennessee, the Kansas City Plant in Missouri, and DOE’s Savannah 

River Site in South Carolina, which conducts tritium operations. NNSA also oversees the 

Nevada National Security Site, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site. 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

United States Senate,4 the President further certified this administration’s 

intent to modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery 

systems, which include a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, 

an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and a ballistic-missile 

submarine (SSBN) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). In 

NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, 

the administration renewed the Nuclear Posture Review Report’s

commitments to refurbish and modernize the nuclear bombs and 

warheads currently in the stockpile, and to construct new research and 

production facilities to support these stockpile refurbishments.5

GAO has assessed NNSA’s long-range plans and budget estimates for 

modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities.6 The Ike Skelton National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 mandated that GAO study 

and report annually on whether NNSA’s nuclear security budget materials 

provide for funding that is sufficient to modernize and refurbish the 

nuclear security enterprise.7 Under this mandate we annually review 

NNSA’s justification of the President’s budget request, which typically 

includes a Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP),8

 

4

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, letter to the Senate of the United States 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2011).

and have 

also reviewed NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, 

which provides information on modernization and operations plans and 

5

Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: June 2013). The Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan is NNSA’s formal means for communicating to Congress the status of 

certain activities and its long-range plans and budget estimates for sustaining the stockpile 

and modernizing the nuclear security enterprise.

6

DOE and DOD are undertaking these modernization efforts during a time of budgetary 

uncertainty. Since 2011, DOE has reprioritized its nuclear modernization programs in 

response to budgetary uncertainties, including delaying key infrastructure projects and 

nuclear weapons life extensions. In May 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated 

that defense budget options would be developed for budgets at 5 and 10 percent below 

current levels. 

7

Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 3113 (2011), as amended by Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 3132(a)(2) 

(2013). 

8

The NNSA’s annual justification of the President’s budget request, which typically 

includes the FYNSP, provides program information and budget estimates for the next 5 

years and is reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 

3253 (1999), as amended, requires NNSA to submit a FYNSP “at or about the time the 

President’s budget is submitted to Congress.” 
 

Page 3 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

budget estimates over the next 25 years. Our most recent report in 

response to this mandate was published in December 2013.9

Congress has also required reporting on DOD and DOE plans and 

estimates for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons 

capabilities. Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012, as amended, requires the preparation of an annual 

report coordinated with DOE and DOD (hereafter the “joint report”) 

regarding the plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, complex,10 delivery 

systems, and command and control system.11 The report is to include 

information on their 10-year budget estimates and nuclear sustainment 

and modernization plans.12 The July 15, 2013, joint report included a 10-

year sustainment and modernization estimate totaling $263.8 billion for 

both departments through fiscal year 2023, including $122.3 billion from 

fiscal years 2014 through 2018.13

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated 

GAO to annually review the accuracy and completeness of the joint report 

with respect to the budget estimate contents and methodology.14 This 

report assesses the extent to which DOE’s and DOD’s budget estimates 

in the July 2013 joint report are accurate and complete (consistent) with 

respect to their long-term nuclear modernization plans, including whether 

the report provides complete information and a transparent 

methodology.15

 

9

GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Budget Estimates Do Not 

Fully Align with Plans, GAO-14-45 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2013).

10Except when referencing the statutory requirement, this report hereafter refers to the 

“nuclear weapons complex” as the “nuclear security enterprise.”

11See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1043(a) (2011), amended by National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1041 (2013) and National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1054 (2013).

12See § 1043(a)(2).

13The first annual report prepared under this mandate was issued in May 2012.

14See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1041(a)(2) (adding § 1043(c)).

15In this report we use the term “budget estimates” to refer to estimates of future budget 

requests from DOE and DOD.
 

Page 4 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

To address our objective, we examined the departments’ plans and 

budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear deterrent in 

three areas: (1) DOE nuclear security enterprise modernization; (2) DOD 

nuclear delivery systems; and (3) the DOD NC3 system.16

• First, to assess the extent to which DOE’s and DOD’s budget 

estimates in the July 2013 joint report are consistent with respect to 

their long-term nuclear modernization plans, we obtained and 

analyzed the DOE and DOD plans and estimates from their July 2013 

joint report and compared them with each department’s fiscal year 

2014 budget-justification materials and internal funding plans. 

Drawing upon our recent work to review NNSA’s nuclear security 

budget materials, which resulted in our December 2013 report,

We applied a 

two-step approach:

17 we 

compared DOE’s estimates in the joint report through fiscal year 2018 

with the NNSA’s funding plans in the FYNSP, and compared 

estimates in the joint report for fiscal years 2019 through 2023 with

NNSA’s estimates in the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan. To evaluate DOD’s plans and estimates for 

nuclear delivery systems and the NC3 system, we compared DOD’s 

estimates in the joint report through fiscal year 2018 with the funding 

plans in its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).18

 

16The scope of the plans and estimates we reviewed was limited to those in effect at the 

time the joint report was released in July 2013. Some of these plans and estimates may 

have changed since that time. Although section 1043 requires information related to the 

nuclear weapons command and control system, DOD expanded the relevant portion of the 

report to include nuclear command, control, and communications.

Because DOD 

has not prepared formal funding plans used to formulate projected 

defense budget requests that extend beyond fiscal year 2018, we 

reviewed Air Force, Navy, and Defense Information Systems Agency 

(DISA) plans, and discussed DOD’s long-term budget estimates in the 

joint report with relevant DOD officials. We did not assess the overall 

reliability of the FYNSP or FYDP, or the departments’ underlying 

budget estimating processes, because such analysis exceeded the 

scope of our mandate.

17GAO-14-45. 

18We used the FYDP for our comparison of DOD’s estimates in the report because, like 

the FYNSP, the FYDP is used to formulate projected budget requests for the current year 

and at least 4 subsequent years. We refer to the FYNSP and FYDP in this report as 

“internal funding plans.”
 

Page 5 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

• Second, to assess whether the joint report includes complete 

information and a transparent methodology, we drew upon our 

December 2013 report and obtained new information from DOE about 

how it used the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan to prepare the plans and estimates in the joint 

report for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear security enterprise 

and nuclear weapons stockpile. We also obtained DOD guidance 

(provided in a series of e-mails and a briefing) and methodologies 

used to prepare the 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and 

modernizing nuclear delivery systems and the nuclear command and 

control system. We derived general principles for developing and 

preparing long-term funding plans by reviewing key federal and 

departmental guidance, standards, and practices for cost-estimating, 

budget preparation, financial planning, and public reporting.19

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details of our scope 

and methodology are included in appendix I.

We then 

used these derived principles as criteria for evaluating DOE’s and 

DOD’s guidance and methodologies for preparing the 10-year budget 

estimates in the joint report. To the extent we determined differences 

between the principles we derived and the departments’ guidance and 

methodologies, we discussed the causes and potential effects with 

relevant officials.

Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012 requires the President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense 

and Secretary of Energy, to submit a report on the plan for the nuclear 

weapons stockpile, complex, delivery systems, and command and control 

 

19Such federal guidance included the following: Executive Office of the President, Office of 

Management and Budget, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular 

No. A-11 (Washington, D.C.: July 2013); V 3.0 Capital Programming Guide: Supplement to 

Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, 

D.C.: July 2013); and Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, 

Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, accessed August 

14, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_final_information_quality_guidelines. 

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

system for each of fiscal years 2013 through 2019.20

• enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 

weapons stockpile;

Ten-year budget 

estimates are among several elements that Congress required in the joint 

report. The other required elements include detailed descriptions of 

DOE’s and DOD’s plans to

• sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex;

• maintain, modernize, and replace delivery systems for nuclear 

weapons;

• sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons command and control 

system; and

• retire, dismantle, or eliminate any nuclear weapons, delivery systems, 

or silos/submarines that carry such weapons or delivery systems.21

A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

expanded the reporting requirement under section 1043 with respect to 

costs.22 As amended, section 1043 requires the joint report to include a 

detailed estimate of the budget requirements associated with sustaining 

and modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent and nuclear weapons 

stockpile, including the costs associated with the plans outlined under the 

elements above, over the 10-year period following the date of the report.23

The joint report is also to include a detailed description of costs included 

in the budget estimates and the methodology used to create the 

estimates.24

 

20Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1043(a) (2011). The report is to be transmitted to the 

congressional defense committees, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs. § 1043(a)(1). The President has delegated this 

reporting function to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy. See 77 Fed. Reg. 

12,721 (Mar. 2, 2012).

DOE’s and DOD’s 10-year estimates for sustaining and 

modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities—including nuclear 

delivery systems, the nuclear command and control system, and the 

21§ 1043(a)(2).The report must also include a detailed description of the steps taken to 

implement the plan submitted in the previous year, including difficulties encountered in 

implementation. § 1043(a)(2)(G).

22See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1041(a)(1) (amending § 1043(a)(2)(F)).

23§ 1043(a)(2)(F). The budget requirements are to include applicable and appropriate 

costs associated with DOD’s procurement, military construction, operation and 

maintenance, and research, development, test, and evaluation accounts. Id. 

24§ 1043(a)(3).
 

Page 7 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

nuclear stockpile and nuclear security enterprise—total $263.8 billion 

through fiscal year 2023. These estimates are presented in figure 1.

Figure 1: Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) 10-Year Estimates for 

Sustaining and Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent as of July 2013

NNSA is required to submit the FYNSP to Congress at or about the same 

time as the President’s budget,25

The FYDP is DOD’s 5-year funding plan; it is updated annually and 

provides DOD’s current budget request and budget estimates for at least 

4 subsequent fiscal years. The FYDP includes thousands of discrete 

program elements, each of which may include funding projections for 

DOD’s appropriations accounts, including operation and maintenance; 

research, development, test, and evaluation; and procurement. The 

FYDP is maintained by DOD’s Director of Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation, who works with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

and it is typically included as part of 

NNSA’s annual budget-justification documents. NNSA’s Management and 

Budget office aggregated the FYNSP for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 

by incorporating inputs from relevant program offices, including the Office 

of Defense Programs, Office of the Chief Information Officer, and Office 

of Safeguards and Security.

 

25Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 3253 (1999) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2453).
 

Page 8 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

(Comptroller) to ensure that the data presented in the annual budgetjustification materials are equivalent to the FYDP estimates at the 

appropriation account level.

DOE’s and DOD’s $263.8 billion budget estimates in the July 2013 joint 

report are generally consistent with their internal funding plans through 

fiscal year 2018, but their overall estimates in the joint report are 

incomplete; although DOE’s methodological assumptions are transparent 

in the related Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Plan, key DOD methodological assumptions and limitations underlying 

some estimates are not documented in the joint report, limiting the 

report’s transparency. DOE’s $97.5 billion estimate in the July 2013 joint 

report is consistent with the budget estimates described in its Fiscal Year 

2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan; however, as we 

previously found, DOE’s budget estimates do not represent total funding 

needed over the 10-year period covered by the joint report for key areas 

of its modernization plans, and therefore do not fully align with aspects of 

these plans. In December 2013 we recommended that DOE include a 

range of preliminary budget estimates in future funding plans to improve 

alignment, and DOE generally concurred with this recommendation. In 

this review, we found that DOD’s $125.5 billion estimate for nuclear 

delivery systems is generally consistent with its budget-justification 

documents and funding plans, but DOD’s 10-year budget estimate did not 

include potential estimates for key Air Force modernization efforts. 

Additionally, in preparing the $40.8 billion estimate for sustaining and 

modernizing the NC3 system, DOD did not document key methodological 

assumptions and limitations or make them transparent in the report.

DOE’s $97.5 billion estimate in the joint report for sustaining and 

modernizing the nuclear stockpile and nuclear security enterprise is 

consistent with the funding plans in its FYNSP and its Fiscal Year 2014 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, and its methodological 

assumptions for preparing this estimate are transparent, but as we found 

in December 2013,26

 

26

these estimates are incomplete because they are 

less than what will be needed through fiscal year 2023 to meet the 

schedules of key modernization efforts. Within DOE, NNSA’s Office of 

GAO-14-45. 

DOE’s and DOD’s 10-

Year Estimates Are 

Incomplete, and 

DOD’s Methodology 

for Preparing Some 

Estimates Is Not Fully 

Transparent

GAO Previously Reported 

That DOE’s Budget 

Estimates for Certain 

Near-Term and Long-Term 

Modernization Efforts Are 

Incomplete
 

Page 9 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Defense Programs prepared the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan and its included budget estimates, which also form 

the basis for the budget estimates included in the joint report. As such, 

both documents used inputs from the FYNSP and other relevant offices.

DOE described its sustainment and modernization plans for the nuclear 

weapons stockpile and nuclear security enterprise in the June 2013 Fiscal 

Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, and in the July 

15, 2013, joint report. DOE’s plans focus substantially on efforts to 

refurbish various types of warheads and bombs associated with DOD’s 

weapon systems. Meeting production milestones for the planned scope of 

work requires significant advanced investment. In these plans, DOE 

stated its intentions to

• continue to produce refurbished W76-1 SLBM warheads through 

fiscal year 2019;

• in fiscal year 2019, begin producing refurbished B61-12 gravity bombs 

and replacing aging nonnuclear components in W88 SLBM warheads; 

both of these activities would take place through the early 2020s;

• in fiscal year 2024, begin producing a modernized cruise missile 

warhead; and

• in fiscal year 2025, begin producing an interoperable warhead—the 

W78/88-1—for use on ICBM and SLBM systems,27 as reported in the 

2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report.

28

NNSA’s production plans for nuclear weapons refurbishments, as of July 

2013, are summarized in figure 2. To support these nuclear weapons 

refurbishments, DOE’s plans also include constructing new plutonium and 

uranium facilities, which would replace existing facilities that are decades 

old, lack modern safety features, and are difficult and expensive to 

sustain.

 

27In June 2012, the DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council requested that the Air Force, 

Navy, and NNSA study the feasibility and costs of options to extend the service life of the 

W78 ICBM warhead, including options that would replace not only the W78 warhead, but 

also could replace the W88 SLBM warhead.

28The Nuclear Posture Review Report recommended a study of life-extension program 

options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the resulting warhead 

also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead types. 
 

Page 10 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Figure 2: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Production Schedules for Planned Nuclear Weapons LifeExtension Programs as of July 2013

a

The joint report does not explicitly discuss NNSA’s methodology for 

developing its plan and estimates, but the report refers to the Fiscal Year 

2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which provides 

information on how the estimates were developed. NNSA uses a system 

of planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation to develop its 

annual budget requests and to plan for future budget requests. As we 

reported in December 2013, NNSA incorporated an automatic increase of 

2 percent per year to account for inflation for those activities after fiscal 

year 2018 that were expected to continue to operate at the same level of 

effort as during the FYNSP period. Further, we reported that for activities 

where NNSA expected a change to the level of effort—such as lifeextension programs—NNSA instead used available planning data. In the 

case of life-extension programs, these data included cost estimates 

based on an improved cost model that, according to NNSA officials, is 

more likely to be accurate than estimates generated using the previous 

approach because they are based on the costs of a life-extension 

The “first production unit” is the first complete bomb or warhead from a production line that is 

certified for deployment.
 

Page 11 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

program that is in progress, rather than a program that was never 

executed.29

While DOE took steps to ensure that its total budget estimates for each 

life-extension program would cover the programs’ costs to achieve their 

first production units, in December 2013 we found that NNSA’s funding 

plans included in the FYNSP are less than what will be needed to meet 

schedules reflected in the joint report. DOE’s estimates in the joint report 

include $43.4 billion through fiscal year 2018, which is consistent with 

NNSA’s FYNSP and fiscal year 2014 budget submission.30

In our December 2013 report, we also noted additional shortcomings with 

the longer-term budget estimates in the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan. For example, we found that DOE 

incorporated about $320 million in fiscal year 2014, and $7.5 billion 

through fiscal year 2023, in cost savings in its funding plans that the 

agency expected to achieve through management efficiencies and 

workforce-prioritization savings, before fully assessing how to achieve the 

However, as 

we concluded in December 2013, to meet planned milestones for key 

warhead life-extension programs, additional funds above the estimates 

included in the FYNSP will be needed. For example, we found that the 

FYNSP understated NNSA’s budget estimates for both the cruise missile 

warhead life-extension program, and for the W78/88-1 (“interoperable 

warhead”) life-extension program, both of which, according to the joint 

report, are to begin production in the mid-2020s. An NNSA official told us

that the agency shifted funding within its budget estimates for these two 

programs beyond fiscal year 2019 to stay within guidelines set by the 

Office of Management and Budget for the FYNSP period. According to 

the official, the estimates beyond 2019 were not subject to funding targets 

to the same extent as the estimates were for fiscal years 2014 through 

2018. As a result, in December 2013 we concluded that DOE may need 

additional funding before fiscal year 2019 in order to prepare for these 

modernization efforts and meet its schedules.

 

29NNSA officials indicated that their cost-estimating methodology has further evolved to 

use previously unavailable actual historical costs for estimating life-extension program 

costs. GAO has ongoing work to assess NNSA’s cost-estimating practices; we expect to 

issue the final results of this work in the fall of 2014.

30NNSA’s top-line estimates in the joint report include an estimated $5.9 billion in budget 

authority transfer from DOD, which is identified in DOD’s FYDP but not reported in the 

joint report. 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

savings. We also found that NNSA excluded most of the budget 

estimates for a modernized plutonium capability, either for construction of 

a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility or an 

alternative to this facility.31 DOE officials told us that their plans were not 

yet developed enough to be included in the fiscal year 2014 budget 

justification materials or the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan. Moreover, the estimates were not included in the July 

2013 joint report because DOE officials told us that the department 

adopted guidance requiring that the estimates in the joint report be 

consistent with estimates in the budget justification and Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan. Key principles that we derived from 

federal budgeting and cost-estimating guidance indicate that long-term 

funding plans should include all relevant budget estimates of a program in 

order to assist decision makers on how to allocate resources. As we 

concluded in December 2013, in cases where complete budget 

information is not yet known, funding plans could include a range of 

potential budget estimates, based on preliminary cost information. We 

further recommended in our December 2013 report that, to improve future 

budget estimates, NNSA should include a range of potential budget 

estimates for projects and programs that the agency knows are needed, 

even when available budget information is preliminary; DOE generally 

concurred with this recommendation. By not including preliminary 

estimates or ranges for these projects and programs, DOE 

underestimated the total anticipated cost and limited the utility of the joint 

report.

 

31For recent GAO work on DOE’s plutonium plans see GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear 

Security Enterprise: Observations on NNSA’s Options for Meeting Its Plutonium Research 

Needs, GAO-13-533 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2013). NNSA did include plutonium 

funding in its FYNSP budget estimates to mitigate the effects of the planned closure of its 

existing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility in fiscal year 2019; however, we found 

that no funds were included for modernizing the plutonium capability for the fiscal year 

2019 through 2023 period covered by the joint report, even though preliminary schedules 

indicate funding will be needed during this period.
 

Page 13 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

DOD’s estimates through fiscal year 2018 in the joint report for sustaining 

the Minuteman III ICBM, heavy bombers, Ohio-class submarine, and 

related delivery systems are generally consistent with DOD’s funding 

plans and budget-justification documents for most appropriations 

accounts, but the 10-year, $125.5 billion estimate does not include 

potential budget estimates for Air Force efforts to modernize ICBMs and 

bombers. DOD’s sustainment and modernization plans are described in 

the joint report, in DOD’s fiscal year 2014 budget-justification documents, 

and other planning documents. These plans are summarized in table 1. 

Table 1: Department of Defense’s (DOD) Nuclear Delivery System Sustainment and Modernization Plans as of July 2013

Delivery system Service life Sustainment plan Modernization plan

Heavy bombers The Air Force expects the 

B-52 to be in service through 

at least 2040, and the B-2 

potentially until 2058

B-52: Improving tactical datalink and 

voice communications capabilities, 

weapons bay upgrades, and additional 

efforts that stem from the operation and 

maintenance of a 50-plus-year-old 

aircraft 

B-2: Improving avionics, 

communications, engines, armament 

systems, low-observable components, 

and other subsystems

Air Force developing a new 

heavy bomber, with initial 

operational capability expected 

in the mid-2020s

Air-launched cruise missile The Air Force plans for the 

AGM-86B air-launched cruise 

missile to be in service 

through 2030

Monitoring and addressing age-related 

issues in arming, fuzing,a Air Force completed analysis 

of alternatives in fiscal year 

2013 for a replacement option, 

with an initial operational 

capability planned for the mid2020s

navigation, 

electrical, and other subsystems

Intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM)

The Air Force plans for the 

Minuteman III ICBM to be in 

service through 2030

Replacing obsolete nuclear reentry 

system components; maintaining an 

engineering capability to address 

emerging issues in guidance, 

propulsion, reentry, command and 

control, and other subsystems; and 

replacing obsolete or nonserviceable 

weapon-system support equipment and 

flight-test equipment; and sustaining the 

UH-1N helicopter to improve security at 

ICBM sites for routine and emergent 

operations

Air Force analysis of 

alternatives to replace, 

recapitalize, upgrade, or 

evolve the Minuteman III 

expected to be completed in 

fiscal year 2014, with an initial 

operational capability planned 

for the mid-2020s

Dual-capable aircraft Currently fielded Air Force 

dual-capable fighter aircraft 

expected to be able to meet 

Allied commitments into the 

2020s

b Performing regular operations and 

maintenance for F-16 fighter squadrons 

in Italy 

Air Force developing a 

nuclear-capable variant of the

F-35 and a tail section for the 

B61-12 bomb that will increase 

the bomb’s accuracy, thereby 

allowing the refurbished bomb 

to be designed with a reduced 

nuclear yield 

DOD’s Delivery System 

Estimates Are Consistent 

with Its Funding Plans but 

Do Not Include Potential 

Estimates for Key Air 

Force Modernization 

Efforts
 

Page 14 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Delivery system Service life Sustainment plan Modernization plan

Fleet ballistic missile 

submarine (SSBN)

The Navy plans to retire the 

Ohio-class submarines at the 

rate of roughly one boat per 

year beginning in 2027

Performing intermediate maintenance 

and industrial support for the 

incremental overhaul, repair, and 

refueling of the remaining Ohio-class 

submarines; improving land-side and intransit security systems 

Navy planning to replace all 14 

Ohio-class submarines with 12 

new SSBNs, with initial 

operations expected in 2031 

following a decade of ship 

construction, testing, and crew 

and platform certifications

Submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM) 

The Navy plans for the 

Trident II SLBM to be in 

service through at least 2042

Developing nonnuclear components to 

improve the reliability, safety, and 

security for the W88 warhead’s MK5 

reentry system; redesigning and 

replacing missile guidance and 

electronic systems; sustaining other 

missile components reaching the end of 

their service lives; procuring additional 

missiles; executing capital maintenance 

projects at Navy-owned Naval Industrial 

Reserve Ordnance Plants

No plan to replace the Trident 

II until the 2040s

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. | GAO-14-373

a

A fuze is a nonnuclear component that helps to control the timing of the nuclear detonation.

b

The Air Force and Navy budget estimates in the joint report are generally 

consistent with DOD’s FYDP for operation and maintenance; research, 

development, test, and evaluation; and procurement accounts through 

fiscal year 2018. These estimates include

Dual-capable aircraft are fighter aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Currently the Air 

Force maintains F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft capable of delivering specific versions of the B61 

nuclear bomb.

• $26.9 billion—$15.2 billion for the Air Force,32

• $20.5 billion—$14 billion for the Air Force, and $6.5 billion for the 

Navy

and $11.7 billion for the 

Navy—in military personnel and operation and maintenance;

33

• $9.4 billion—$1.9 billion for the Air Force, and $7.5 billion for the 

Navy—in procurement and ship construction.

—in research, development, test, and evaluation; and

Although generally consistent with DOD’s funding plans through fiscal 

year 2018, the joint report does not include potential estimates for key Air 

Force modernization efforts that fall within the 10-year reporting period 

 

32This estimate does not include approximately $0.6 billion in funding for F-16 fighter 

aircraft with nuclear responsibilities.

33This estimate does not include approximately $0.8 billion in NNSA funding for nuclear 

reactor design for the Navy’s Ohio-replacement submarine.
 

Page 15 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

required for the report to Congress. As previously noted, key principles for 

preparing long-term funding plans that we derived from federal budgeting 

and cost-estimating guidance indicate that all relevant estimates should 

be included in the plan, even if they are preliminary, to help decision 

makers anticipate changes to the administration’s planned requirements 

over the long term. Absent such estimates, decision makers are left to 

speculate on those plans when assessing the estimates and considering 

the long-term affordability of the administration’s near-term programmatic 

decisions. However, the Air Force did not include potential estimates over 

the 10-year period for replacing the Minuteman III ICBM, or the potential 

estimates for developing and producing the new bomber that are likely to 

occur beyond the FYDP. Rather than provide potential budget estimates, 

DOD treated these efforts as zero-cost over the 10-year period of the 

report. Additionally, the extent to which the Air Force’s estimate includes 

all potential costs for replacing the air-launched cruise missile is uncertain 

because at the time the report was prepared, DOD had not yet developed 

its initial acquisition strategy for this program. Consequently, DOD’s 10-

year estimate in the joint report may be significantly underreported, 

depending on the magnitude of the costs resulting from upcoming 

decisions about how to modernize these delivery systems. DOD’s 5-year 

and 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing nuclear 

delivery systems are summarized in table 2.
 

Page 16 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Table 2: Department of Defense’s (DOD) 5-Year and 10-Year Nuclear Delivery 

System Sustainment and Modernization Estimates as of July 2013

Dollars in billions

Delivery system

Fiscal years 

2014-2018

Fiscal years 

2019-2023 Total 

Heavy bombers 

• B-2 and B-52 $12.9 $14.8 $27.7 

• New bomber 8.8 Not provided 8.8 

Cruise missiles 

• Air-launched cruise missile 0.3 0.4 0.7 

• Air-launched cruise missile 

replacement 1.0 1.7 2.7 

Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 

• Minuteman III 7.3 6.8 14.1 

• Minuteman III replacement 

Not provided Not provided

Not 

provided

Dual-capable aircraft 1.6 a 1.1 2.7 

Fleet ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) 

• Ohio-class submarine 7.0 7.4 14.4 

• Ohio-replacement submarine 8.4 b 19.4 27.8 

• Submarine-launched ballistic missile 

(SLBM) (Trident II) 12.8 13.8 26.6 

Total $60.1 $65.4 $125.5c

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. | GAO-14-373

Notes: Data are from the July 15, 2013, joint report.

a

Dual-capable aircraft are fighter aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Currently the Air 

Force maintains F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft capable of delivering specific versions of the B61 

nuclear bomb.

b

Includes $0.8 billion through fiscal year 2018, and $1.2 billion total funding, from the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) for nuclear reactor design.

c

Air Force officials told us that it would be premature to include potential 

budget estimates for development programs in their early stages because 

their long-term costs are uncertain. For example, at the time the joint 

report was published, the Air Force had not yet completed its analysis of 

alternatives for replacing the Minuteman III. As we reported in September 

DOD published in the July 2013 joint report a 10-year estimate for strategic delivery systems of 

$116.7 billion. However, DOD did not include $8.8 billion for research and development for a new 

bomber as part of the 10-year estimate published in the report, even though it had included this 

amount as part of the $60.1 billion estimate through fiscal year 2018.
 

Page 17 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

2013, the Air Force expects a wide range of costs for replacing the 

Minuteman III ICBM, depending on the replacement option that DOD 

selects.34 In contrast, the Navy’s Ohio Replacement Program included 

$27.8 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation and ship 

construction estimates over the 10-year period for a new SSBN. 

However, the Navy’s submarine-replacement program is further along in 

the acquisition process than either the Air Force’s ICBM-replacement 

effort, or its new bomber program. DOD officials told us that it would be 

highly speculative to include potential costs for replacing the Minuteman 

III ICBM because that program is not yet defined. An Air Force official 

added that specific estimates for the new bomber were considered too 

sensitive to include in the report.35 Moreover, in its guidance for preparing 

the joint report, provided in various e-mails and a briefing to DOD officials, 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy sought 

consistency with the President’s budget submission and DOD’s funding 

plans, without specifically directing the Air Force or the Navy to project 

potential budget estimates that would be required to bring such efforts to 

completion. However, as we concluded in December 2013,36 departments 

and agencies could include at least a range of potential budget estimates 

in their funding plans for preliminary projects, based on available cost 

information. By treating key Air Force modernization efforts as zero-cost, 

instead of including a range of potential budget estimates based on 

preliminary cost information, DOD limited the value of the joint report as a 

congressional tool for understanding the estimate or for assessing the 

long-term affordability of DOD’s modernization plans.

 

34GAO, ICBM Modernization: Approaches to Basing Options and Interoperable Warhead 

Designs Need Better Planning and Synchronization, GAO-13-831 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 20, 2013).

35Although estimated program costs are sensitive, DOD included rough estimates for the 

new bomber through fiscal year 2023 in its estimates for developing long-range strike 

capabilities in another unclassified report. See DOD, Annual Aviation Inventory and 

Funding Plan, Fiscal Years (FY) 2014-2043 (Washington, D.C.: May 2013).

36GAO-14-45. 
 

Page 18 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

DOD’s methodology for preparing its $40.8 billion estimate through fiscal 

year 2023 for sustaining and modernizing the NC3 system was not fully 

transparent because some assumptions and potential limitations are not 

documented in the joint report. Among other functions, the NC3 system is 

intended to enable informed and timely decisions by the President on 

whether to execute nuclear response options. The NC3 system is highly 

complex; it consists of satellites, early warning radars, aircraft, 

communications networks, and other systems that are managed by the 

Air Force, Navy, DISA, and other organizations. Moreover, many systems 

that make up the NC3 system also support nonnuclear military 

operations. DOD plans to enhance the NC3 system by improving its 

resiliency, investing in secure voice-conferencing capabilities, and 

modernizing aging systems so that they continue to meet operational 

requirements. For the joint report, the DOD Chief Information Officer 

(DOD CIO) prepared the plans and 10-year budget estimates for 

sustaining and modernizing the NC3 system because of the system’s 

crosscutting complexity.

Because of the complexity of the NC3 system, the DOD CIO made 

certain assumptions at the outset to simplify the development of its 

estimate. In particular, the DOD CIO used DISA’s October 2011 Nuclear 

Command, Control, and Communications (C3

) System Program Tracking 

Report as an authoritative source to begin identifying relevant programs 

in the FYDP, and determining how much funding from these programs 

should be allocated to the NC3 mission. However, the DISA report led to 

a key methodological limitation because it did not associate all projects 

and activities with specific FYDP programs. Specifically, the DISA report 

associated only 85 of 120 NC3 projects and activities (71 percent) with 

specific FYDP programs. As summarized in figure 3, the DISA report did 

not associate any of the operation and maintenance activities, and 

associated only 72 percent of the procurement activities directly to the 

FYDP, leaving the DOD CIO without the means to prepare budget 

estimates for these projects and activities directly. However, DOD did not 

document the DISA report’s limitation and its potential effect on the NC3 

estimate in the July 2013 joint report. Key principles for preparing funding 

plans, which we derived from several federal guidance documents, 

indicate that potential methodological limitations should be disclosed in 

order to enhance the quality of the funding plan.

DOD’s Methodology for 

Estimating NC3 

Sustainment and 

Modernization Costs Was 

Not Fully Transparent
 

Page 19 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Figure 3: Not All Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Activities Were Associated with Department of Defense 

(DOD) Funding Plans

Although DOD did not disclose the limitation in the joint report, the DOD 

CIO made further assumptions to overcome it, thereby covering all 

affected NC3 activities in its 10-year estimate in the joint report. However, 

in contrast to the key principles we identified, which indicate that key 

assumptions should be clearly stated and well documented, DOD’s 

guidance for preparing the joint report did not direct the DOD CIO to 

describe its methodology for preparing this estimate, nor did DOD 

document in the joint report the assumptions it made when preparing the 

analysis. As a result, it could be difficult for Congress to understand the 

basis for this estimate, or compare one year’s estimates to the next, as it 

assesses long-term affordability when allocating resources.

Sustaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear stockpile, nuclear security 

enterprise, nuclear delivery systems, and the NC3 system is a long-term, 

complex, multifaceted effort that requires resource planning and 

commitment by both the administration and Congress that could cost 

more than $250 billion over the next 10 years. The annual requirement for 

DOE and DOD to report on their plans and estimate their 10-year budgets 

is one means that Congress uses to gather information it needs to 

measure the administration’s progress from year to year, and to 

understand the administration’s plans to invest in nuclear deterrence 

capabilities over the long term, given the constrained budget 

environment. Under such circumstances, accurate and complete budget 

Conclusions
 

Page 20 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

estimates over the long term are needed to help decision makers assess 

affordability when making tradeoffs among requirements.

Under a separate statutory mandate, we reported on DOE’s plans and 

25-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear 

stockpile and nuclear security enterprise in December 2013. As we 

reported at that time, DOE’s estimates do not represent the total funding 

needed for nuclear weapons life-extension programs or infrastructuremodernization efforts. In that report we recommended that DOE should 

include at least a range of potential budget estimates for future projects 

and programs that it knows are needed. DOE generally concurred with 

our recommendation.

In reviewing DOD’s plans and estimates for sustaining and modernizing 

nuclear delivery systems, we found that DOD’s guidance for preparing the 

joint report sought consistency between the report’s estimates and the 

fiscal year 2014 budget submission and 5-year funding plans. However, 

this resulted in a missed opportunity to identify the potential long-term 

costs for these efforts. Unless the Secretary of Defense directs the

Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of the Navy to include in future 

reports at least a range of potential budget estimates for key 

modernization programs based on preliminary cost information, its 

estimates in subsequent annual joint reports will be incomplete and 

understated. 

Finally, estimating the costs for sustaining and modernizing the NC3 

system is perhaps the most difficult and challenging task that DOD faced 

in preparing its contributions to the report. The DOD CIO was able to 

simplify the complexity of the NC3 system in its estimates to some 

degree, but it did not describe the assumptions behind its analysis, nor 

did it characterize its potential limitations in the joint report. Unless the 

Secretary of Defense directs that key assumptions and limitations are 

documented in future reports, the basis for its NC3 estimates may not be 

adequately transparent for Congress to determine reasonable resource 

allocations, and Congress may not be able to identify changes in the 

estimates from one annual report to the next.

We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to 

improve subsequent joint reports to Congress on plans for sustaining and 

modernizing U.S nuclear weapons capabilities:

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 21 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

• To ensure the accuracy and completeness of DOD’s estimates for 

sustaining and modernizing strategic delivery systems over the 10-

year period covered in subsequent joint reports, we recommend the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and 

Secretary of the Navy, as appropriate, to include at least a range of 

potential budget estimates for projects and programs in future 

modernization plans that extend beyond the period covered by their 5-

year internal funding plans, based on preliminary cost information.

• To improve the transparency of the joint report’s methodologies, 

thereby assisting Congress in understanding the basis for DOD’s NC3 

estimates in subsequent joint reports, we recommend the Secretary of 

Defense direct the DOD CIO to document in the report the 

methodological assumptions and limitations affecting the report’s 

estimates for sustaining and modernizing the NC3 system.

We are not making recommendations to the Secretary of Energy because 

in our December 2013 report reviewing NNSA’s nuclear security budget 

materials we recommended that the Administrator of NNSA should 

include in future modernization plans at least a range of potential budget 

estimates for projects and programs that the agency knows are needed, 

based on available information about these projects’ and programs’ future 

costs. DOE generally agreed with this recommendation.

We provided DOE and DOD with copies of our draft report for their review 

and comment. In response, we received written comments from both 

departments, which are reprinted in appendixes II and III, respectively. 

DOD agreed with both of our recommendations. DOD also provided a 

document describing the methodology it used to prepare the estimates for 

sustaining and modernizing the NC3 system, and the limitations inherent 

in that methodology. We believe that had DOD included such 

documentation in the joint report, as we have recommended, it would

have helped Congress to better understand the assumptions and 

limitations that underpin these estimates. DOE neither agreed nor 

disagreed with our report, as we made no new recommendations to 

NNSA. Both departments also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and to the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; Secretary of the Air Force; Secretary of the Navy; Secretary of 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 22 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Energy; and Administrator, NNSA. This report is also available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov, or 

David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

John H. Pendleton

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

David C. Trimble

Director

Natural Resources and Environment
 

Page 23 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Chairwoman

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
 

Page 24 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

The Honorable Mike Simpson

Chairman

The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

We reviewed the July 15, 2013, joint report to Congress from the 

Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) that 

describes their plans and 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and 

modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and assessed whether 

their budget estimates in that report are accurate and complete 

(consistent) with respect to their long-term plans, including whether the 

report provides complete information and a transparent methodology, in 

three areas: (1) DOE nuclear security enterprise modernization; (2) DOD 

nuclear delivery systems; and (3) the DOD nuclear command, control, 

and communications (NC3) system. To address our objective, we 

obtained and analyzed the DOE and DOD plans and estimates from the 

July 15, 2013, joint report, and analyzed the DOE and DOD data and 

methodologies used to prepare their 10-year budget estimates. We 

compared their plans and estimates from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal 

year 2018 with their fiscal year 2014 budget-justification materials and

each department’s internal funding plans.

We performed our review at both DOE and DOD. For our review of DOE’s 

plans and estimates, we drew upon our December 2013 report.1 We 

compared DOE’s estimates in the joint report with the NNSA’s funding 

plans in the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) and the 

Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which 

includes estimated funding requirements for NNSA modernization that 

cover the time required for the joint report and beyond.2

 

1

GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Budget Estimates Do Not 

Fully Align with Plans, 

For our review of 

DOD’s plans and estimates for nuclear delivery systems and the nuclear 

command and control system, we used DOD’s fiscal 2014 budgetjustification submission and its funding plans in its Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP). Because DOD has not prepared internal funding plans 

used to project estimated budget requests beyond fiscal year 2018, we 

reviewed Air Force, Navy, and defense-wide plans, including the Air 

Force’s Core Function Master Plan for Nuclear Deterrence, the Navy’s 

long-range shipbuilding plan, DOD’s 30-year aviation inventory plan, and 

GAO-14-45 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2013).

2

Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: June 2013). The Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan is NNSA’s formal means for communicating to Congress the status of 

certain activities and its long-range plans and budget estimates for sustaining the stockpile 

and modernizing the nuclear security enterprise. The Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan includes 25-year budget estimates for NNSA’s plans. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 26 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

the Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) Nuclear Command, 

Control, and Communications (C3

) Program and Tracking Report. We 

discussed the consistency of the estimates in the joint report with the 

departments’ plans with DOE and DOD officials. We used the FYNSP 

and FYDP for our comparison of the fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 

2018 period because they are the internal funding plans that NNSA and 

DOD use to document their projected budget requests for the current year 

and at least 4 subsequent years.3 We did not assess the overall reliability 

of DOE’s and DOD’s internal funding plans themselves, or the 

departments’ underlying budget-estimating processes because such 

analysis exceeded the scope of our mandate. We also did not 

independently verify the reliability of DOD’s or DOE’s specific budget 

estimates, but rather determined the estimates to be sufficiently accurate 

and complete if the budget estimates in the joint report were consistent 

with their funding plans, including their respective budget-justification 

materials, FYNSP, and FYDP.4 GAO has previously reported on DOD’s 

and DOE’s challenges in generating reliable budget estimates and 

programming data.5

We relied on findings developed for our December 2013 review of 

NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

to identify reasons for any inconsistencies we identified when comparing 

relevant documents, and further discussed these causes and potential 

effects with NNSA officials. At DOD, we met with officials from a range of 

components responsible for developing and preparing the department’s 

 

3

DOD’s FYDP is a centralized DOD report that provides information on DOD’s current and 

planned out-year budget requests. DOE’s FYNSP is a similar document.

4

In our recent work assessing the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan, we assessed the reliability of DOE’s budget estimate data by 

interviewing knowledgeable agency officials about the data; reviewing their methodologies 

for using the data to construct their estimates; and conducting electronic tests of the data 

to identify missing values, outliers, or other anomalies. We determined that the data 

underlying the budget estimates were sufficiently reliable for our purposes when 

completing that review. See GAO-14-45. 

5

GAO, Department of Energy: Observations on Project and Program Cost Estimating in 

NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management, GAO-13-510T (Washington, D.C.: 

May 8, 2013); Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Reviews of Budget 

Estimates and Decisions on Resource Trade-offs Need Strengthening, GAO-12-806 

(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012); and DOD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-off 

Opportunities During Requirements Reviews, GAO-11-502 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 

2011).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 27 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

contributions to the joint report. In addition to the Air Force, Navy, and 

Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO), we met with 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from joint 

components, including

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Missile Defense Policy;

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and 

Tactical Systems;

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

Matters;

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller);

• Office of the Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation;

• Joint Staff, J5; and

• United States Strategic Command, J8.

To analyze DOE’s and DOD’s methodologies for preparing their 10-year 

estimates, we first obtained documentation of DOE’s and DOD’s 

methodologies and their source data for creating the 10-year estimates in 

the joint report. For DOE, we drew upon our December 2013 report to 

describe how DOE used the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan to prepare the plans and estimates in the joint report 

for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear security enterprise and 

nuclear weapons stockpile. We also met with NNSA officials to discuss 

how the joint report was prepared. At DOD, we obtained Air Force, Navy, 

and DOD CIO documentation of their methodologies used to create 

DOD’s 10-year estimates for sustaining and modernizing nuclear delivery 

systems and the nuclear command and control system. We also obtained 

guidance in the form of e-mails and a briefing from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, and interviewed officials from those 

offices and from U.S. Strategic Command. We then compared DOE’s 

information and DOD’s guidance and methodologies with the key 

principles for developing and preparing long-term funding plans that we 

derived by reviewing key federal and departmental guidance, standards, 

and practices for cost-estimating, budget preparation, financial planning, 

and public reporting. Such federal guidance included Circular No. A-11,

Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,6

 

6

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, 

Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular No. A-11 (Washington, D.C.: July 

2013).

Capital 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 28 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Programming Guide version 3.0,

7 and Guidelines for Ensuring and 

Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information 

Disseminated by Federal Agencies,

8 all published by the Office of 

Management and Budget, and the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment 

Guide.

9

 

7

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, V 3.0 Capital 

Programming Guide: Supplement to Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: July 2013).

To the extent we determined differences between the principles 

we derived and the departments’ guidance and methodologies, we 

discussed the causes and potential effects with relevant officials. We 

conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

8

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for 

Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information 

Disseminated by Federal Agencies, accessed August 14, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_final_information_quality_guidelines. 

9

GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 29 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Energy
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 30 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 31 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 32 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 33 GAO-14-373 Nuclear Weapons

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

In addition to the contacts named above, Penney Harwell Caramia, 

Assistant Director; Allison B. Bawden, Assistant Director; Hilary Benedict; 

Grace Coleman; Jennifer Echard; Bridget Grimes; Carol Henn; Kevin L. 

O’Neill; Karen Richey; Michael Shaughnessy; Michael Silver; and Amie 

Steele made key contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351853)
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