No. 86-520
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1987

JOHN F. SCOTT, Claimant and Respondent,-vsUTILITY LINE CONTRACTORS, Employer, and
STATECOMPENSATION INSURANCEFUND, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: TheWorkers' Compensation Court,The Honorable Timothy Reardon,Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
ForAppellant: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson,Toole & Dietrich;John T. Dyre,Billings,Montana
For Respondent: Geoffrey R. Keller, Billings,Montana

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 5, 1987 Decided: March 18,1987 

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## 1987.Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinionof the Court.

The State Compensation Insurance Fund (State Fund) appeals a summary judgment of the Workers1 Compensation Court. The court ruled that claimant John F. Scott had met the statutory requirements for making aworkers1compensation claim within one year by obtaining medical help which was billed to the Division of Workers1 Compensation, and by assisting his employer in completing an Employer's First Report form. We affirm. The issue iswhether theWorkers1Compensation Courtwas correct in determining that Mr. Scott had made a "claim" within one yearunder § 39-71-601,MCA. A stipulated set of facts was submitted to the court below. On October 10, 1982,Mr. Scott injured his right arm and shoulder while shoveling heavy mud for his employer, Utility Line Contractors, in Colstrip,Montana. He did not seekmedical help until October 13, 1982, when he went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital in Billings, Montana. The State Fund paid that medical bill. On November 2, 1982, Mr. Scott assisted his supervisor in completing an Employer's First Report form,which was then forwarded to the Division ofWorkers1Compensation. Mr. Scotthas not completed a Form 54 claim and presented it to the DivisionofWorkers' Compensation. A Form 54 is the usual form filed by claimants to present their claims. Mr. Scott filed a petition for hearing before the Workers' Compensation Court on July 1, 1986. An issue arose as to whether he had met the one year limitation period set forth in S 39-71-601, MCA. Mr. Scott moved for summary judgment on this issue, with briefs and supporting exhibits filedby both parties. The courtgra-ntedsummary judgment to Mr. Scott,and the State Fund appeals.Thepreliminary question ofwhether the summary judgment is now appealable isaddressed in the State Fund's brief. It points out the usual requirement for Rule 54(b)

## ,M.R.Civ.P., certification of appeal of a partial judgment. However, the procedural rules of the Workers' Compensation Court do not allow for such certification. The StateFund argues that the factors usually considered by district courts ruling on Rule 54(b) certifications support consideration of this appeal
now. These factors include separability of this issue and the remaining unadjudicated issues, little possibility for a need for a second reviewof this issue,absence of a counterclaim set-off factor, and considerations of delay and judicial economy. We conclude there is no just reason for delay in consideringthis issue. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in determining that Mr. Scott had made a "claim" within one year under § 39-71-601,MCA? Section 39-71-601,MCA,provides:

Statute of limitation on presentment of claim 

## -- waiver. (1) In case of personal injury or death, all claims shallbe forever barred unlesspresented in writing to the employer, the insurer, or the division, as the casemay be,within 12months from the date of the happening of the accident, either by the claimant or someone legally authorized to act forhim in hisbehalf. (2)The division may, upon a reasonable showing by the claimant of lack of knowledge of disability, waive the time requirement up to an additional 24 months. There has been no allegation of a lack of knowledge on the part of Mr. Scott of his disability so as to waive the time requirement. Therefore, the question is whether Mr. Scott presented his claim within 12 months of the accident.The State Fund contends that determining Mr. Scott met the statutory requirement for presenting a claim is contrary to this Court's opinion in Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Co.

(Mont. 1985), 697 P.2d 909, 42 St.Rep. 388. In that case, the claimant was injured at work in June 1973. He filed a claim for compensation after the accident. He was again injured in July 1974. He did not file a claim for compensation after that accident. In 1976, the claimant sawa doctor for medical problems he described as arising out of the 1973 accident. In 1982,claimant's counsel brought an action for disability from the 1974 accident. The company denied liability because no claim had been filed within the one-year statute of limitations. The claimantargued that the company knew about the 1974 injury because his boss had filled out a. "Report of Alleged Injury" and he had seen a doctor shortly after the accident. Claimant asserted that these facts showed either that the companyhad accepted liability or that the statutory period was waived. This Court analyzed the elements of equitable estoppel and concluded that they were notmet. Specifically, itheld that therewas no duty of the employer to advise the claimant of the availability of the compensation claim procedure. Since the employer was not therefore estopped from asserting the one-year bar, the bar
was applicable. Here, the issue is not whether the employer is estopped from asserting the one-year bar. The Workers' Compensation Courtdecided thismatter on anotherbasis

## - that the actions taken were sufficient to constitutepresentment of the claim within theyear, as required by statute. Mr. Scott did not file the standard workers' compensation claim form for this injury. He did, however, seek medical care three days after the injury, and had the bill sent to the Workers' Compensation Division. He also helped.his employer fill out the employer's report form, which included his name, social security number, address, date of birth, and wages; information abouthow the accidentoccurred and how he was injured; the name of a witness; the name of the physician and the place the injury was treated; and information about the employer. On the bottom of that form appears an "Employee's Claim for Compensation" form, also denominated Form 54. That portion, which Mr. Scott did not complete, requests the claimant's education, other types of work which claimant has done,number ofmembers in claimant's family, and information on former industrial injuries. The claimant argued, and the Workers' CompensationCourt agreed, that the purpose of S 39-71-601, MCA, was met under the circumstanceshere presented. That is,notice has been given to the employer to allow it to investigate and prepare to defend on the claim. We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court was correct in determining that Mr. Scott presented his claim within one year. The Employer's First Report form completed by Mr. Scott and his supervisor contained ample information to clearly inform the employerand thedivisionof the nature and basis of Mr. Scott's possible claim. Themedical report prepared three days after the injury also gave indications that a claim could likely result out of this injury. This contrasts with the situation in Wassberq,where the claimant did not clearly show that the employer and the divisionwere aware of his possible claim from the 1974 injury. Further, in Wassberg, the claimant had one year previously filed a claim for injury, yet failed to do so for the injury in question. This indicated that he knew how to file,but did not do so. That factor isnotpresent here.We hold that the Workers' Compensation Court correctly determined that Mr. Scott met the presentment requirement of § 39-71-601, MCA.

We Concur: