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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 13, 2013

Serial No. 113–83

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Mr. Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran, Bureau 

of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................... 8

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Brett McGurk: Prepared statement ................................................................ 11

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 42

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 43

Responses from Mr. Brett McGurk to questions submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 45

(1)

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If the witnesses could take their spot on the 

dais. 

The subcommittee will come to order. I apologize for being late. 

So sorry. After recognizing myself and the ranking member Deutch 

for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize 

other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear 

from our witnesses and without objection, the witnesses’ prepared 

statements will be made a part of the record. Members may have 

5 days to insert questions and statements for the record, subject to 

the length limitation in the rules. 

Before we begin this afternoon’s hearing, I will hand Deputy Assistant Secretary McGurk an envelope, and ask that he please deliver it to Secretary Kerry. These are my previous letters to Secretary Kerry pleading for the United States to help the residents 

of Camps Ashraf and Liberty and to prevent another deadly attack 

like the one from September at Camp Ashraf which left 52 dead 

and 7 hostages who are still missing. 

Also, a video taken by the residents of Ashraf during the latest 

assault that I urge Secretary Kerry and all members of the subcommittee to view, and finally, a letter to Secretary Kerry regarding the return of Iraqi Jewish community artifacts that are now on 

display at the National Archives. 

In 2003, U.S. and coalition forces found a trove of Iraqi Jewish 

religious and cultural artifacts being warehoused in the basement 

of Saddam Hussein’s secret police headquarters, and the U.S. subsequently brought them here to the National Archives for restoration, preservation, and display. However, these artifacts are scheduled to be returned to Iraq where the government will claim possession of these artifacts that were unjustly taken from the Iraqi 

Jewish community. The U.S. Government must not return those 

stolen treasures to the Iraqi Government, but instead, should facilitate their return to their rightful owners or their descendants. 

Therefore, on behalf of me, Congressman Steve Israel, and over 

40 of our House colleagues, we ask you, Deputy Secretary McGurk, 

2

to personally deliver this letter to Secretary Kerry and the Department of State ensure that the Iraqi Jewish community does not get 

robbed again of its collective memory and treasures. Thank you, 

sir. The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Two years ago next month, the United States withdrew our last 

troops from Iraq, and the American mission in Iraq formally ended. 

Instead of leaving behind a residual force sizeable enough to help 

maintain the gains we made in Iraq, and to continue to assist the 

Iraqis as they made the important steps toward democracy, the administration dithered, failed to actively seek a resolution to extend 

our presence in Iraq, and withdrew completely rather than stay engaged. Yet, shortly after our last soldier left, President Obama addressed troops at Fort Bragg and said, ‘‘We are leaving behind a 

sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq.’’

However, what we have seen over the past 2 years, and it has 

been even more pronounced in the past few months, is that Iraq 

is far from stable, and it is only getting worse. Increasing sectarian 

violence, fueled by al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI, also known as the Islamic state of Iraq in al-Sham, is now at a level not seen since 

2008, and has led to rising civilian death tolls. 

According to multiple sources, so far this year, there have been 

over 7,000 civilian deaths, a number that is more than double for 

all of last year, and there are now an average 63—68, excuse me, 

car bombings a month, and multiple location attacks are occurring 

at a much greater frequency. The resurgence of AQI and the Shiite 

militias threatens to ignite an all-out civil war along ethnic and 

sectarian lines that could topple the Iraqi Government. The violence may spread across Iraq and Syria, and could enable al-Qaeda 

to establish a safe haven from which to attack U.S. interests and 

the interests of our allies in the region. And with the United States 

no longer there to act as a deterrent, Iran has quickly moved in 

to fill the void that we have left behind and has been exerting a 

great deal of influence over Prime Minister Maliki and many of the 

Shiite factions. This is a very serious cause for concern and a real 

threat to U.S. national security interest to the region. 

Maliki and his government have done little to prevent or stop 

Iranian arms supplies from being flown over Iraq to Assad and his 

murderous forces in Syria. I have repeatedly urged the administration to press Maliki to be more proactive in stopping these flights 

that carry military personnel, arms and equipment to Assad, yet 

the flights continue. 

Another example of Iran’s influence in Iraq is the continued attacks against the people of Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty, who, 

despite being guaranteed safety and security from the Government 

of Iraq and the United Nations, have faced several deadly attacks 

against their compounds this year. These anti-Iranian regime dissidents have been living in fear every day while agents of Tehran 

attack their camps without repercussions and without Maliki making any effort to stop the violence. The U.S. must press Maliki and 

the U.N. to live up to their obligations under the December 2011 

Memo of Understanding, and protect the residents of these camps. 

But there is still a chance to reverse course in Iraq. Next April, 

Iraq will hold national elections. The U.S. must work with Iraq to 

3

ensure that these elections are inclusive; that they are free, fair, 

and transparent. 

While Maliki was here to visit President Obama, he made it 

clear that he wants more U.S. military equipment to help fight the 

growing terrorist threat. The U.S. must not commit to increase security assistance until Maliki and the Iraqi Government show that 

they are serious about combating the terrorist threat, will provide 

security to the Camp Ashraf and Liberty residents, and are willing 

to implement the reforms needed in Iraq to bring democracy and 

stability while also securing U.S. national security interests. 

It is time for the administration to get serious about its commitment to a democratic and stable Iraq, and to increase U.S. influence in Iraq so that it does not even more closely align itself with 

Iran and our other enemies. And with that, I would like to yield 

to Mr. Cicilline, if he would like to represent the Democratic side. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for convening this hearing along with Ranking Member Deutch. Since 

U.S. combat troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, we have seen limited progress in building peace, democracy, and stability. I have 

very strong concerns about the violence and general unrest in Iraq, 

especially since Iraqi people have endured considerable hardships. 

The United States has worked to assist Iraq in these efforts, but 

internal and regional issues persist, including threats from alQaeda. Unfortunately, these are very real and very serious, especially as we continue to encounter and handle many complicated 

issues in the region, particularly Iran, and Syria. I believe the 

United States must work to forge a strong and allied relationship 

with Iraq as soon as possible, but also recognize the ultimate responsibility of the Iraqi people with stability, prosperity, and peace 

of their own nation. 

I look forward to hearing the perspective of the witnesses we 

have assembled to discuss the future relationship with Iraq, what 

we can learn from our actions over the last decade, and how they 

will help to shape our relationships with Iraq, and other nations 

in the region. I welcome the witnesses. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Chabot is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think we would be remiss if before I had my opening remarks if we could recognize our 

former colleague, Congressman Mike Flanagan from Chicago, Illinois, who served his constituents extremely well. Personally, when 

I first came up here in 1994, he is just one Great American there. 

Why don’t you stand up, Mike. Mike Flanagan. All right. 

And now my statement. The United States spent nearly a decade 

securing and helping to build the foundation of a prosperous and 

democratic Iraq. Thousands of American lives were lost, billions of 

dollars were spent. In 2011, when we were preparing for the transition from a Defense Department-led mission to a State Department-led mission, many of us in the Congress expressed concerns 

that a complete withdrawal of our Armed Forces personnel would 

be premature because Iraq did not appear to be ready to stand on 

its own, and that we ran the risk of squandering much of the 

progress that we had achieved. 

4

Having just returned from a recent visit there back in 2011, I 

was one of those Members who expressed that skepticism. When 

President Obama surprised nearly everybody, including our military leaders, and many of our diplomats by withdrawing all of our 

military personnel while the political situation in Iraq remained 

dangerously unstable, I am afraid our worst fears are being realized. Two years later, Iraq may well be on the verge of a civil war. 

I am looking forward to the testimony this afternoon with the hope 

that the administration can shed some light on its Iraq policy, and 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Mr. Vargas is recognized. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much again, Madam Chair, and 

Ranking Member for the opportunity to speak here today and for 

this important meeting. Nearly 2 years ago, as it was said, the 

United States withdrew our last troops from Iraq. The main territorial, political, and economic divisions within the country remain 

ripe and unresolved. Increased sectarian violence and the inability 

of the Maliki government to govern in a transparent and inclusive 

manner has left a power vacuum all too often filled by al-Qaeda 

and Iranian influences, and we see Iraq careening toward a civil 

war. And importantly now, too, the critical lessons that we learned 

or didn’t learn and the insights that we learned in Iraq will be important also as we advance our negotiations with Afghanistan toward a final bilateral security agreement and I do have to ask, as 

many of my constituents ask, was it all worth it? Was it worth it? 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Wilson of South Carolina 

is recognized. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you very 

much for having this hearing today. I am very grateful that over 

the years of my service I had the opportunity to visit Iraq 11 times. 

I am very hopeful for the people of Iraq, but I obviously am very 

concerned, and I certainly hope the administration is making every 

effort to avoid what we have already heard could be an impending 

civil war where you have the Sunni-Shiite divide, where you have 

an extraordinary example of progress that I have observed in the 

Kurdish region of Iraq; what a model hopefully for the rest of the 

country to be able to have diversity. It is also personal to me. My 

oldest son served for a year with the field artillery in Iraq, and he 

was military police and traveled the country in different convoys. 

Additionally, my second son has been a doctor serving with the 

rangers and the SEALS in Iraq, so our family wants success. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank for their service. And I am now 

pleased to yield 5 minutes for his opening statement to the ranking 

member of our subcommittee, my Florida colleague, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks for holding this hearing. First, I would like to recognize the Iraqi Ambassador who is here today. Thank you for being here, Ambassador. 

We look forward to working with you to help to ensure a stable and 

democratic Iraq. 

It has been 2 years since U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq and we 

would be remiss if we didn’t remember the tragic sacrifices that so 

5

many of our bravest have suffered. Eight long years of war resulted 

in the deaths of 4,500 U.S. troops, more than 32,000 troops were 

wounded, including thousands who are now living with brain and 

spinal injuries. Their sacrifices will always be remembered and 

greatly appreciated. Yet, since the troop withdrawal, sectarian violence has been spiraling out of control with violence at the highest 

level since 2006. This has left many wondering what exactly has 

changed in Iraq. Reports indicate that nearly 7,000 Iraqis have 

been killed this year with almost 1,000 killed in September alone. 

Many believe the rise in sectarian violence to be a result of efforts 

by Prime Minister Maliki to consolidate political power at the expense of Sunni and Kurdish opponents. 

This perspective, along with the dangerous reemergence of alQaeda in Iraq, has contributed to Sunni extremists targeting Shiite 

communities which in response, has led to government-run security 

operations in Sunni areas. All of that contributed to a violent cycle 

that appears to only be intensifying with no immediate solution in 

sight. Yet, we can’t look at U.S. policy toward Iraq in a vacuum. 

We must also do so in the context of the broader region. The 

United States has our fair share of challenges in the Middle East. 

But a constructive relationship with Iraq, one that is united in our 

fight against extremists and committed to upholding democracy can 

have significant impact on a region in turmoil. 

Iraq can play a critical role in resolving the conflict in Syria, 

stopping the spread of extremism, preventing a nuclear Iran, and 

encouraging new regional partnerships. Furthermore, by virtue of 

its geography and history, Iraq will arguably play the most important role in helping to address the alarming sectarian division between extremist Sunni and Shiite elements that are spreading 

throughout the region. But I am troubled that Prime Minister 

Maliki’s neutrality in the Syrian conflict, I am worried that Iraq is 

increasingly susceptible to Iranian influence. Earlier this spring, 

many of my colleagues joined me in sending a letter to Secretary 

Kerry that expressed our serious concerns that Iranian flights were 

continuing to use Iraqi air space to transport weapons to Assad’s 

forces in Syria. While the Iraqi Government responded after 

months of prodding by grounding several flights, it is unclear 

whether these Iranian flights continued to go unchecked, and I look 

forward to hearing whether there has been any progress on this 

issue. 

For the past decade, Iraq dominated U.S. foreign policy. We can’t 

allow it to now disappear into our rearview mirror. The challenges 

in stabilizing Iraq are great, but I believe the risk of letting Iraq 

devolve into al-Qaeda’s playground are even greater. I recognize 

that developing an effective and sustainable power-sharing agreement between the Shiite, Sunnis and Kurds is not easy, but we 

must encourage and promote dialogue. I also recognize that despite 

Iraq’s political challenges, it made drastic improvements in their 

economy. Iraq is now the second highest oil producer in OPEC and 

the GDP has increased about 10 percent per year since 2011. These 

are the kind of important gains that will be crucial to long-term 

stability. 

Another key benchmark in Iraq’s future will be the upcoming national parliamentary election scheduled for April 2014. It is my 

6

hope that elections will bring a new political order that works to 

govern inclusively and effectively. I look forward to hearing what 

the State Department is doing to help maintain an inclusive political process and to strengthen democratic institutions. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary McGurk, I hope that today you will 

be able to provide greater insight into the future of U.S./Iraq relations, and while there is no doubt, the current security situation is 

absolutely untenable, this relationship cannot be built solely on 

arms sales. We can strengthen economic and cultural ties that will 

help to provide a more prosperous future for all Iraqis, and we 

must promote a process that results in a lasting and equitable 

power-sharing agreement that is fair to all Iraqis. Madam Chairman, again, thank you for holding this hearing and I look forward 

to our discussion. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you for an excellent opening statement. We turn to Mr. Weber for any opening statement he 

would like to make. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have none at this time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We like to hear that. 

Mr. WEBER. I do, too. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me see. Mr. Meadows, is that who is next 

to you there? A good looking guy. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Very briefly, I just 

wanted to thank you for coming to testify. Obviously, we need to 

use all of our diplomatic tools necessary to avoid a civil war and 

prevent the spread of violence there in Iraq. And even though we 

have the oversight responsibility and connections with the U.S. 

Ambassador over key Iraqi developments and the sale of arms, et 

cetera, I look forward to your testimony on how we can best accommodate and work with what is happening on the ground there, 

work with the Iraqi people in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, 

and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Schneider is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I will be brief so 

we can get to our panel. But as we sit here 2 years after the last 

troops left Iraq, Iraq continues to be a linchpin in the Middle East, 

in many respects influencing the fortune of its neighbors. Thus far, 

Iraq has not used this opportunity well, and has engaged in behavior that shows regional instability rather than security. In April, I 

joined with many of my colleagues here in the Foreign Affairs Committee in writing a letter to the Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq asking that he do more to stop the illicit arms trafficking and Iranian 

weapons to the Assad regime in Syria. 

It remains unclear if Iraq continues to perform inspections of civilian aircraft, and may continue to promote regional conflict by allowing these arms to flow from Iran into Syria. I look forward to 

hearing from our panel what more can be done to work with Iraq 

to promote U.S. foreign policy goals in the region, including working toward long-term stability and security in Iraq. Thank you, 

Madam Chair, I yield back my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, 

Iraq is now an ally of the Iranian Mullah dictatorship. The Maliki 

7

Iraq regime is at best an accomplice to the murders of unarmed 

refugees at Camp Ashraf, and is a regime that has a disdain for 

the American sacrifice that gave them the sacrifice of our blood and 

our treasure that freed them from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. 

These ingrates should not receive one penny, not one red cent of 

American aid, and today we have with us, Madam Chairman, 

someone who exemplifies the actual horror story that it is under 

this regime. 

We have Afzal—and I hope I pronounce this right, Afzal Emadi, 

whose brother was among the 52 killed at Camp Ashraf and has 

a cousin who is now being held hostage by the Iraqi regime. He resides in my district and I would like him to stand now if he could. 

And we are sorry for your family, and they are in our thoughts as 

we preside over this hearing. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Ms. Meng is recognized. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and our distinguished panelist. It has been 2 years since 

the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. And while we have done 

much to give its fledgling democratic government a real chance of 

success in the upcoming 2014 national elections, there are still 

many challenges. Sectarian violence and regional conflicts remain 

rampant while our ability to work with the Iraqi Government 

through the office of security operation has greatly diminished, and 

with rising Iranian influence in Iraq, the need for a comprehensive 

and clearly defined foreign policy is vital. 

I am confident that today’s discussion of these issues will prove 

valuable in determining the appropriate role of the U.S. presence 

in Iraq going forward. Regarding the issue of Iraqi Jewish artifacts 

that are currently on display in the National Archives, I want to 

especially acknowledge and thank Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, 

Congressman Israel, and Senator Schumer for their leadership on 

this issue. Rescued from Baghdad in 2003, the collection of ancient 

artifacts include letters, books, and personal photos that were left 

behind by Jews after World War II who experienced extreme antiSemitism, including harassment and violence. 

It is imperative that these artifacts are returned to the descendants of the Jewish community from which they were wrongly confiscated, and not by the Iraqi Government. We want to ensure justice for the Iraqi Jewish community. I look forward to hearing Mr. 

Brett McGurk’s testimony on these issues. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And now our subcommittee is so pleased to welcome a gentleman who has an impressive resume, Mr. Brett McGurk, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran at the State Department. Prior to this, Mr. 

McGurk served as a special advisor to three U.S. Ambassadors to 

Iraq in the Obama administration, and as director for Iraq and 

Special Assistant to the President as well as Senior Director for 

Iraq and Afghanistan in the Bush administration. 

Welcome, Mr. McGurk. We look forward to your testimony and 

your full and complete statement will be made a part of record. 

You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir, welcome. 

8

STATEMENT OF MR. BRETT MCGURK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR IRAQ AND IRAN, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking 

Member Deutch and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

inviting me to discuss the situation in Iraq. My testimony this 

afternoon will focus on our efforts to safeguard U.S. interests in 

this important country bearing in mind our obligations to build on 

all that America sacrificed over the past decade. The challenges are 

daunting. Internally and regionally, pressure continues to build. 

The next year in Iraq may be pivotal, particularly with national 

elections now set for April 30, 2014. I look forward to working 

closely with this subcommittee as we navigate this difficult terrain 

and ensure that core U.S. interests are protected. 

Our policy is focused on these core interests and organized along 

the following five lines of effort. First, maintaining a unified and 

Federal Iraq; second, supporting increases in the production and 

export of oil resources; third, promoting Iraq’s strategic independence and regional integration; fourth, countering the reemergence 

of al-Qaeda in Iraq; and fifth, supporting Iraq’s democratic institutions and trajectory. 

I will review briefly our efforts along these tracks measuring 

progress from Secretary Kerry’s March visit to Baghdad. After that 

visit, the Secretary asked me to travel to Iraq and I have made 

four trips since with another scheduled for next week. I hope therefore to provide an overview of the situation as viewed from here in 

Washington, as well as on the ground in Iraq. The first line of effort is maintaining a unified and Federal Iraq. The focus here primarily is on relations between the central government in Baghdad 

and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, or IKR. When the Secretary visited Iraq in March, tensions were at a dangerous boil. Kurdish 

ministers and parliamentarians were boycotting Baghdad, and 

Kurdish Peshmerga forces faced off against the Iraqi Army in disputed boundary areas. Intensive diplomatic engagement led to a 

detente with both sides pulling back and disputes returning to the 

political arena where they belong. Since then, seven joint committees have been formed between Baghdad and Erbil. Prime Minister 

Maliki has visited Erbil and President Barzani of the IKR has visited Baghdad for the first time in 2 years. 

The second round of effort, importantly, is maintaining the increases in production and export of oil resources. Iraq is estimated 

to have the fifth largest proven oil reserves in the world. Last year 

it surpassed Iran as OPEC’s second largest producer. Earlier this 

year, Iraq surpassed Iran as a leading exporter to India and China, 

which has helped enforce robust international sanctions on Iranian 

oil exports. Today we are working with the Iraqis on a strategic vision for their national infrastructure, with export routes from the 

south in Basra, to the Red Sea and through Turkey to the Mediterranean. We are also working with all political blocks to pursue 

a long-term win/win agenda, with Iraq as a 6–10 million barrel per 

day producer with revenue sharing pacts and export routes to unite 

disparate interests in Iraq and regionally. 

The third line of effort is promoting strategic independence and 

regional integration. Iraq shares a 400-mile border with Syria and 

9

a 900-mile border with Iran, which we learned from hard experience can be difficult to control. In addition, at the time of Secretary 

Kerry’s visit to Baghdad, tensions with Turkey, lingering disputes 

with Kuwait, and strained relations with the GCC threatened to 

further isolate Iraq and widen the door to nefarious influences from 

other neighbors. Thus, beginning in March, we launched a quiet 

but active campaign to ease tensions with Turkey, settle accounts 

with Kuwait, strengthen ties with Jordan, and accelerate efforts to 

reintegrate Iraq with its Gulf neighbors. 

These efforts have seen some success. In June, the U.N. Security 

Council voted to normalize relations between Iraq and Kuwait. 

This week, Turkey’s foreign minister visited Baghdad for the first 

time in 2 years and both countries agreed to restore positive ties. 

Jordan and Iraq are now coordinating efforts to develop a pipeline 

from Basra to Aqaba, and next week, DOE will host a strategic dialogue between United States, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt. 

Iraq has also participated recently in regional military exercises 

in Jordan and Bahrain. While these are positive steps, Iraq’s full 

reintegration with Gulf partners will be influenced by its stance in 

the conflict in Syria, which is a daily topic of our discussion with 

Iraqi leaders. 

The fourth line of effort is countering the reemergence of alQaeda in Iraq. Everything I have just mentioned depends on Iraq 

stemming the rising levels of violence seen over the last year. So 

far this year, nearly 6,000 Iraqis have been killed compared with 

4,400 who were killed in each of the past 2 years. 

Nearly all high-profile mass casualty attacks, the vehicle and suicide bombs are perpetrated by terrorist groups now led by Iraq’s alQaeda affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL. 

ISIL is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a specially designated global 

terrorist under U.S. law who is now based in Syria. Earlier this 

year, Baghdadi announced a campaign of terror to include attacks 

against Iraqi security services, government targets, and civilians. 

Since then, we have seen upwards of 40 suicide bombers per month 

in Iraq, targeting playgrounds, mosques, markets, and funerals, in 

addition to government sites from Basra, to Baghdad, to Erbil. 

These attacks, in turn, have given rise to new calls from Shiite extremist militias, which had remained dormant since 2011. 

ISIL has benefited from a permissive operating environment due 

to inherent weaknesses of Iraqi security forces, poor operational 

tactics, and popular grievances which remain unaddressed in Sunni 

areas. 

Fortunately, we have defeated this enemy before through intelligence-driven security operations and mobilizing popular forces 

against extremist networks. Iraqi leaders today are working to develop this same approach, with our support, but not to our troops, 

and this remains a daily topic of our conversation with them from 

the prime minister on down. 

Finally, the fifth line of effort is supporting Iraq’s democratic institutions and trajectory, isolating extremists will be near impossible if the political process is not moving forward. The Iraqi Parliament just last week passed a long-delayed law to govern national 

elections which are now set for April 30, 2014. We have made clear 

to all Iraqi contacts that these elections must be on time, well-preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111313\85554 HFA PsN: SHIRL
10

pared, and designed to produce genuine and credible results. In the 

meantime we are engaged with all parties and blocks to facilitate 

progress in Parliament, and a package of laws to advance national 

reconciliation. 

In conclusion, vital interests are at stake in Iraq. Hearings like 

this are critically important to ensuring that we are doing all we 

possibly can to safeguard those interests and to ensure that we 

have built on the sacrifice we have made over the last decade. 

Thank you again for inviting me to speak with you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of McGurk follows:]

11


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Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Brett McGurk 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Hearing: Iraq 

November 13, 2013 

Chainnan Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the 

Subconm1ittee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the situation in Iraq. My 

testimony this aftemoon will focus on our efforts to safeguard u.s. interests in this 

important country, bearing in mind our obligations to build on all that America has 

sacrificed over the past decade. It is in the memory ofthose lost that we continue 

to make every effort to move Iraq forward, and in line with u.s. interests. 

The challenges are daunting. Intemally and regionally, pressures continue to build, 

exacerbated by a resurgent terrorist network led by al Qaida's Iraq-based affiliate, 

now known publicly as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (AQ/ISlL). The 

next year in Iraq may be pivotal, particularly with national elections now set for 

April 30, 2014. I look forward to working closely with this Subconunittee as we 

navigate this difficult terrain, and ensure that core U.S. interests are protected. 

Our policy in Iraq is focused on these core interests, and organized along the 

following five lines of effort: 

1. Maintaining a lmified and federal Iraq 

2. Supporting increases in production and export of oil resources 

3. Promoting Iraq's strategic independence and regional integration 

4. Countering the re-emergence of al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) 

5. Supporting Iraq's democratic institutions and trajectory 

My testimony will review our efforts along these tracks, measuring progress from 

Secretary Kerry's March 24,2013, visit to Baghdad. After that visit, the Secretary 

asked me to travel to Iraq, and I have made four trips since, with another plmmed 

for next week. I hope to provide an overview of the situation as viewed from 

Washington, as well as on the ground in Iraq, where extraordinary diplomats, led 

by Ambassador Beecroft, are serving our Nation with courage m1d distinction. 

Maintaining a Unified and Federal Iraq 

This first line of effort is focused primarily on relations between Baghdad and 

Erbil, the capital ofthe Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). As a recent study by the 
12


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Rand Corporation notes, tension between Arabs and Kurds has long been identified 

as among the greatest drivers of instability in Iraq. Should these tensions ever lead 

to conflict, it would have dire consequences for U.S. interests in Iraq and 

throughout the region. Accordingly, we have worked for a decade to dampen 

potential flashpoints and develop political structures for dispute resolution, 

pursuant to the framework established in the Iraqi constitution. 

When the Secretary visited Iraq in March, tensions between the IKR and the 

central govenm1ent in Baghdad were at a dangerous boil. Due to a series of 

disagreements over the Iraqi budget, and in the disputed boundary areas of 

northern Iraq, Kurdish ministers and parliamentarians were boycotting the central 

government, and its Peshmerga forces faced of I against Iraqi Anny units - with 

both sides daring the other to open fire. 

Fortunately, intensive diplomatic engagement led to a detente, with both sides 

pulling back and disputes returning to the political arena where they belong. On 

June 10, Prime Minister Maliki visited Erbil for the first time in two years; then, on 

July 7, IKR President Barzani visited Baghdad, for the first time since late 2010. 

As a result ofthese visits, the IKR and the central government established seven 

joint committees with mandates to address the most difficult issues of federalism: 

security cooperation, revenue sharing, and balancing powers between the central 

and regional governments. 

Since then, there has been progress in the area of security cooperation, and we are 

working to facilitate serious discussions on revenue sharing, to help ensure that all 

Iraqis - in all parts oflraq - benefit equitably from Iraq's national patrimony. This 

is the vision enshrined in the Iraqi constitution, and we believe it is critical to 

Iraq's long-term stability. These revenue sharing discussions may intensify in the 

weeks ahead, as the Iraqi cabinet, and then parliament, begin debate on a $150 

billion national budget. 

The U.S. will stand ready to work with all parties, as appropriate, to narrow areas 

of disagreement and build on areas of connnon ground. 

Maintaining Increases in Production and Export of Oil Resources 

Maintaining a lmited and federal Iraq - and ensuring the predictability of global 

energy markets - will require sOlmd development and management ofIraq's 

abundant natural resources. Iraq is estimated to have the fifth-largest proven oil 

reserves in the world. Last year, it surpassed Iran as OPEC's second-largest oil 

2 
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producer. It has also surpassed Iran as a leading exporter to India and China, 

which has been essential to enforcing robust international sanctions on Iranian oil 

exports, while also maintaining market stability. According to the International 

Energy Agency (TEA), Iraq may account for nearly half of anticipated growth in 

global oil output over the current decade, with revenues approaching $200 billion 

per year. I 

In short, Iraq's hydrocarbon sector is vital to U.S. interests in the region, and its 

development is essential to Iraq's long-ternl stability. These shared interests have 

led to a close and ongoing partnership as to how Iraq can best manage its abundant 

resources to generate increasing revenues and align the interests of disparate 

groups in a lmitied and federal Iraq. For example, four export platforms that came 

on line south of Basra in 2012 - each with capacity to export 900,000 barrels per 

day - were the result of joint efforts beginning in 2007 to address serious 

deficiencies in Iraq's infrastructure. 

Today, U.S. policy is focused on a similarly ambitious - and achievable -vision: a 

strategic pipeline from the super giant oil tields in Basra (with 80 percent ofIraq's 

proven reserves) to the Haditha refinery in Anbar province; southwest through 

Jordan to the Red Sea; and connected to the north, Turkey and the Mediterranean. 

These three export routes - the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, and Mediterranean - will 

build redundancy into Iraq's national export infrastructure, facilitate prosperity to 

all parts of the country, and align the interests of regional partners in a stable and 

prosperous Iraq. 

Coupled with this vision is a revenue sharing agreement to ensure that revenues are 

shared equitably, and, longer term, new legislation to manage the hydrocarbon 

sector and ensure legal predictability to market entrants. The United States wants 

to see Iraqi oil from all parts ofthe country - north to south - reaching global 

markets as soon as possible, and in a manner that reinforces stability. Iraq today is 

producing 3 million barrels-per-day, but the IEA projects under its central scenario 

potential increases to 6 million barrels-per-day by 2020, and 8 million barrels-perday by 2035, with revenues over this period approaching $5 trillion 2 

The United States does not take sides in the internal disputes regarding the 

distribution of revenues and management of oil resources. Instead, we focus on the 

principles enshrined in the Iraqi constitution and the maxim that it is always better 

1 See Iraq Energy Outlook, international ~'nergy Agency, Oct. 9, 2012, p. 12. 

2 See UL, at p. 11. 

3 
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to peacefully divide a large pie than to fight over a small one. Thus, we are 

focused on increasing production and exports, overcoming the hurdles companies 

face when operating in Iraq, reducing bottlenecks, and lending teclmical expertise 

as appropriate under our Strategic Framework Agreement. These efforts will 

accelerate over the coming months, including with ajoint coordination committee 

on energy cooperation early next year. 

Promoting Strategic Independence and Regional Integration 

Regional tensions have a direct impact on Iraq's internal stability. Political blocs, 

leaders, and non-state entities, including militias and terrorist groups, often find 

external sponsorship and support. Iraq also shares a 400-mile border with Syria, 

and a 900-mile border with Iran, which, we learned from hard experience, can be 

difficult to control. Tensions in recent years with Turkey, combined with lingering 

Gulf War era disputes with Kuwait, and lack of regular engagement with other 

Gulf Cooperation Council states, threatened to further isolate Iraq - and thereby 

widen the door to nefarious influences from other neighbors. 

Beginning in March, the United States launched a quiet but active campaign to 

ease tensions with Turkey, settle accounts with Kuwait, strengthen ties to Jordan, 

and accelerate efforts to reintegrate Iraq with its Gulf neighbors. These efforts are 

important to bolstering Iraq's independence, and, when combined with economic 

and security initiatives, aligning its long-term interests to ours. 

These efforts have seen some success. iraq and Kuwait settled key accOlmts dating 

to the 1991 Gulf War, and in June the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to 

finalize a process to norn13lize relations between both countries. Two weeks ago, 

the iraqi cabinet voted to open Kuwaiti consulates in Erbil and Basra. in April, the 

United States began a trilateral process with Iraq and Turkey, focused on mutual 

interests. This week, Turkey's Foreign Minister visited Baghdad for the first time 

in two years, and both countries agreed to restore positive relations. 

Jordan and Iraq, with our support, are coordinating efforts to develop the pipel ine 

project from Basra to Aqaba. in July, we began a strategic dialogue with Jordan, 

UAE, and Iraq, to focus on mutual interests, including security, energy, and 

economic interests. This group will convene again next week in Abu Dhabi, with 

the addition of Egypt. iraq has also participated in recent regional military 

exercises, including the Eager Lion exercise in Jordan this past summer, and the 

international mine countermeasures exercise in Balrrain. 

4 
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While these are positive steps, we continue to emphasize with Iraqi leaders that full 

re-integration with Gulfpartners will be influenced by Iraq's stance on the conflict 

in Syria. Iraq has sought to retain independence, expressing concern from the 

beginning about global jihadist groups that operate in the western parts ofTraq and 

eastern Syria. While these concerns are legitimate, it is equally legitimate to 

question Iraq's independence given Iran's ongoing use ofIraqi airspace to resupply the Asad regime. The frequency of flights is down since the Secretary's 

visit in March, but Iraq must do more to tighten its inspection procedures. We also 

remain watchful of Iranian efforts to use Iraq to circumvent international sanctions. 

Iraq's independence, finally, can be strengthened through ties to the U.S. private 

sector. We are working to promote US. exports to Iraq and working with US. 

companies - including Ford, Boeing, General Electric, and Citibank - doing 

business in Iraq. On September 18, Iraq launched a $357 billion five-year National 

Development Plan, with projects identified across multiple sectors: energy, health, 

agriculture, education, and transportation. The US. embassy provided technical 

advice for this program, and we hope where possible to match US. businesses with 

Iraqi development needs. This will be a key focus of "Iraq Business Week" to be 

held here in February, with Iraq's Minister of Trade leading the Iraqi delegation3 

Countering the Re-Emergence ofal Qaida in Iraq 

Everything I have just mentioned depends on Iraq stenuning the rising levels of 

violence seen over the past year. I was present in Iraq during the peak ofthe civil 

war in 2006 and 2007, and saw first-hand the devastating impact it had on Iraq's 

fragile social cohesion. The violence made politics and economic growth near 

impossible, as security became the first and only demand ofthe population. 

To address the security situation, it is important to precisely diagnose the source of 

the most devastating attacks. Iraq since the 2003 invasion has never been peaceful. 

In 2011 and 2012, among the quietest years on record, there were 100 attacks per 

week, with 4,400 casualties per year. Nearly all ofthese attacks were perpetrated 

3 The Iraqi parliament earlier this year ratified a bilateral Trade and Investment 

Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States. Iraq Business Week will focus on 

implementing the TTFA and matching Iraqi development needs with U.S. businesses. 

U. S. trade with Iraq last year increased to $21 billion. and maj or deals - such as the $5 

billion deal to provide Iraqi Airways with thirty Boeing 737s and ten 777s by 2017 - have 

closed with U.S. advocacy Such economic statecraft initiatives. together with 

educational exchanges and related programs under the Strategic Framework Agreement. 

remain central to our engagement \-\lith Iraq. 

5 
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by terrorist groups, led by al Qaida in Iraq (AQI). AQI is led by Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. 

We believe Baghdadi fled to Syria last year, expanding AQI's base of operation, 

and changing its name to the Islamic State ofTraq and the Levant (AQITSIL). 

Baghdadi early this year aml0unced a campaign ofterror against Iraq to include 

attacks against security services, government targets, and Shi'a civilians. In 

March, AQIISIL launched a coordinated attack with iive suicide bombers against 

the Iraqi Ministry of Justice building in Baghdad. In June, scores of well-trained 

and professional fighters assaulted the Abu Ghraib prison complex, freeing 

hundreds of i11111ates, including mid-level al Qaida leaders. Since then, we have 

seen upwards of 40 suicide bombers per month, targeting playgrOlU1ds, mosques, 

and markets, in addition to government sites from Basra to Baghdad to Erbil. 

AQ/ISIL has benefited from a pennissive operating environment due to inherent 

weaknesses of Iraqi security forces, poor operational tactics, and popular 

grievances, which remain unaddressed, among the population in Anbar and 

Ninewa provinces. It has also benefited from a sanctuary across the porous border 

in Syria, control oflucrative facilities there, such as oil wells, and regular 

movement of weapons and fighters between Syria and Iraq. The suicide bombers, 

we believe, are foreign iighters who travel to Syria to join AQ/ISIL, and are then 

directed toward Iraq for operations. 

We have defeated this enemy before, through a combination of devastating and 

relentless security operations, and mobilizing popular forces to isolate - and in 

some instances, fight - AQI networks. Today, we are working with Iraqi political 

and security leaders to develop a similarly holistic approach. We are also 

emphasizing the mgency, as the targeting of civilians in recent months by AQ/ISIL 

has given rise to dangerous calls to reconstitute Shi'a militias outside the control of 

the Iraqi government. Thus far, militia activity has been localized, but if suicide 

attacks continue, we are likely to see increasing calls for self-protection from local 

neighborhoods, and more room for militias to develop roots anlOng the population. 

While Iraqi secmity forces will never match what U.S. forces achieved at the 

height ofthe war, they have proven capable of conducting eilective operations 

when provided sound intelligence. In recent months, Iraqi civilian and military 

leaders have increasingly looked to us for advice and information sharing. This is 

partly to ensme - with pressme from us - that operations are targeted and precise, 

to avoid detaining innocent civilians. We have made clear to Iraqi commanders 

6 
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that some oftheir tactics over the past six months have been self-defeating, and it 

is time to draw on the lessons that we learned together five years ago. 

Among the central lessons was mobilizing the Sons ofTraq (SOT) to control the 

streets and work in coordination with government security forces. This was a 

regular topic during Prime Minister Maliki's meetings in Washington two weeks 

ago, and he pledged to more than double the salaries of the SOl, to flush resources 

to areas where AQIISIL is operating, and to ensure close and regular coordination 

between Iraqi security forces, local provincial councils, and tribal structures, 

particularly in Anbar and Ninewa provinces. 

In tum, we made clear to Maliki and other Iraqi leaders that the tight against 

terrorists and militias will require a holistic - security, political, economic -

approach. We believe we now have a conm10n roadmap for combatting this 

problem over the coming months, while anticipating inevitable setbacks. We have 

also made clear to Iraqi leaders that they must make extra efforts to protect the 

residents at Camp Liberty in Baghdad, while also pressing the international 

community to help with this urgent humanitarian situation. 

Finally, while security operations may not be the lead element of a holistic strategy 

against AQ/TSTL, they remain essential. Tn previous efforts with U.S. forces in the 

lead, we worked to ensure - through targeted and relentless military operations -

that AQI could not establish a sanctuary or staging presence in Iraq. Today, we 

believe AQ/ISIL is trying to establish camps and staging areas in Iraq's western 

border regions. Iraqi forces are working to target these camps. But they lack the 

equipment for relentless and effective operations in remote areas, and over the past 

few months, we have seen a number of unarmored helicopters shot by heavy 

machine glllS, and pilots - who we trained - maimed and killed4 

To combat this threat more effectively, the Iraqis hope to purchase U.S. equipment. 

We are confident that this equipment, pursuant to a holistic strategy that we have 

developed together, can be used etIectively and with precision against AQ/ISIL 

targets. The Iraqi delegation led by Prime Minister Maliki, in ajoint statement 

4 By way of recent examples. on October 2. an unarmored helicopter providing support to 

ground troops on a mission against AQ/TSTL targets was downed by heavy machine gun 

fire. Four crew members (2 pilots, I gunner, and I engineer) were killed. A week 

earlier, hvo unarmored reconnaissance helicopters providing over-watch for an ongoing 

operation were forced to land after being engaged by a concealed PKC machine gun. 

Based on our existing relationships with Iraqi pilots, reviews of operations have generally 

confirmed proficiency and adherence to rules of engagement. 

7 
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following their meetings at the White House, pledged "strict compliance with US. 

laws and reh'l.llations on the use of such equipment." By working with Congress, 

we further believe that sales of US. equipment will strengthen a long-tern1 

strategic relationship with the Iraqi military - through training, spare parts, joint 

exercises, logistics, and interoperability with U.S. forces and regional partners. 

Time may not be on our side. Iraq has acute demands, money to supply those 

demands, and while it prefers US. equipment and the multi-decade relationship 

that comes with our foreign military sales progran1, strategic competitors are now 

lining up to meet Iraqi demands if we cannot deliver. Case in point is the delivery 

earlier this month of four Russian Mi-35 attack helicopters. We believe that it is in 

America's strategic interest to supply military systems to Iraq, as opposed to 

Russia or other competitors, and we look forward to working with Congress to 

address all outstanding questions with respect to foreign military sales. 

Supporting Iraq's Democratic Institutions and Trajectory 

Shortly after Prime Minister Maliki's return to Iraq last week, the parliament broke 

a deadlock to enact the law to govern national elections in 2014. These elections 

are now set for April 30, 2014. This will be the third election for a full-term 

national parliament, but the first since the departure of US. forces in 2011. Thus, 

it is a critical test ofIraq's democratic process, and we have made clear to all Iraqi 

contacts that the elections must be on time, well prepared, and designed to produce 

a genuine and credible result. Our Embassy team is working closely with the 

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the Independent High 

Electoral Commission (IHEC) to ensure preparations remain on track. 

Iraq earlier this year held provincial elections in 14 provinces, and parliamentary 

elections in the IKR. Results ofthese elections have shaken local power dynan1ics. 

Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law coalition, for example, secured pluralities in 

Baghdad and Basra, but was then outmaneuvered in fonnation oflocal councils 

and lost governorships. In the IKR, the Patriotic Union of Kurd is tan (PUK) lost 

ground to the upstart Gorran party, which came in second behind the dominant 

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by TKR President Massoud Barzani. 

In the Sunni majority provinces ofNinewa and Anbar, provincial elections had 

been delayed due to security concerns. We were clear from the outset that this 

decision was unwise, and pushed to ensure the elections took place, which they did 

on June 20. The outcome led to a status quo in Ninewa, with the brother of 

Speaker Osama Nujaifi retaining the governorship; but new leaders emerged in 

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Anbar, and these new leaders, with our encouragement, are engaging the central 

government. Prime Minister Maliki met the new Anbar Governor, Ahmad Khalaf 

al-Dulaimi, before traveling to Washington, and we expect to see additional 

meetings soon, with a focus on coordinating security and political efforts. 

At the national level, we are engaged with political leaders, parties, and blocs, to 

facilitate progress in parliament on a package oflaws that are necessary to address 

legitimate grievances ofthe Sunni C0111111Unity. First in this package is ending once 

and for all the process known as "de-Ba'athification," which has grown so 

politicized that it now encourages the very fornls of intolerance it was intended to 

root out. We are encouraged by a law that passed the cabinet earlier this year with 

a time limit on the de-Ba'athification process, but the law has since stalled in 

parliament, and at present lacks support from any Shi'a or Kurdish blocs - each of 

whom want to add measures to address the concerns of their own communities. 

We will continue to encourage all sides to find a compromise to pass this important 

law, as we did most recently with respect to the election law. At the center ofthese 

etlorts will be Prime Minister Maliki, who, as the leader ofthe country, has 

responsibility to govern inclusively, and to build bridges from his Shi'a 

constituency to Slmnis and Kurds, even where doing so might engender political 

risk and backlash. For Iraq to progress, he must lead. 

There have been some encouraging signs at the national level, such as a 14-point 

Charter of Social Peace signed in September by leaders across the religious and 

political spectrum. This document, while symbolic, calls on its signatories to 

combat "militias and terrorists and all dimensions" - e.g., by addressing grievances 

that allow extremists to take root. It further calls on appropriate delegation of 

authority to provincial and local leaders, as well as arrangements to address the 

crimes ofthe Ba'ath Party, without impugning ordinary citizens who may have had 

tangential party connections. 

It will take generations for Iraq to overcome its legacy of dictatorship, wars, and 

isolation. We must be realistic about what is achievable. At the same time, we 

must continue to press all sides to compromise on issues that continue to divide 

Iraq. Where the leaders come together, such as through the Social Peace accord, 

we will exert every effort to seize the opportunity and press for concrete outcomes. 

Where they remain apart, we will continue our efforts to narrow areas of 

disagreement. In the end, the Iraqi people will have an opportunity to hold their 

national leaders accountable with elections now less than six months away. 

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Conclusion 

This overview does not do justice to the complexities we face in Iraq and the 

uncertain terrain we must navigate together. What is certain is that vital U.S. 

interests are at stake, and hearings like this are important to discuss the enonnous 

challenges ahead, and to ensure that those interests are safeguarded. Thank you 

again for inviting me to speak with you. I look forward to your questions. 

10 
21

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

And before I begin my questions, I would like to recognize Lieutenant Colonel Greg McCarthy, and Matt Zweig, two Iraqi war veterans who serve on our Foreign Affairs Committee. We thank you 

for your service. 

Mr. McGurk, thank you for your testimony. You testified in your 

written statement that it is legitimate to question Iraq’s independence given Iran’s ongoing use of Iraqi air space to resupply the 

Assad regime. Why is Iraq not doing more to stop the overflights 

to Assad? Is the Maliki government trying to use this issue as a 

means to try to coerce the U.S. and to provide Maliki more arms 

and advanced weapons systems? Also, you testified in your statement that the State Department is watchful of Iranian efforts to 

use Iraq in order to circumvent international sanctions. To what 

extent has Iraq been successful in that? 

Are there also fighters flocking into Syria to fight on—well, could 

be both sides—but really all sides of that conflict? There are reports that suggest that there are members of the Maliki government who are allowing some Iraqis to cross into Syria to join the 

fight. Why is the Iraqi Government unwilling to stop these extremists from joining ranks with those fighting in Syria, and does the 

Maliki government’s refusal to denounce Assad show that his ties 

with Iran run deep, and that he does not want to upset the regime 

in Tehran? 

And lastly, at the start of the hearing, I handed you an envelope 

filled with letters and a video, and I would like you to address the 

issues in the letters. Will the State Department reevaluate its decision to hand these Jewish artifacts over to the Iraqi Government, 

and instead, work to facilitate the safe and rightful return of these 

important artifacts to their rightful owners or their descendants? 

Also, the plight of the residents of Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty has been tragic, but the situation is getting worse. This year 

we saw several deadly attacks, including the previously mentioned 

attack at Ashraf in September that left 52 dead, and seven hostages captured. What has the U.S. done to ensure that the Government of Iraq lives up to its obligation to protect these residents, 

and why have we not insisted that the thousands of T–WALLs 

needed to protect the camp be installed? 

To date, I am told that only 192 of the 17,500 T–WALLs have 

been installed. This is woefully inadequate and more need to be installed by the end of this year. And I respectfully request and 

would appreciate a regular progress report to our subcommittee on 

the installment of these protective T–WALLs. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MCGURK. Madam Chairman, first I will make sure that your 

letter gets to the Secretary, and this is a daily topic of conversation 

with all of the issues in Iraq. But let me kind of go through issue 

by issue. I will start with the Jewish archives. As you know, the 

archives are now on display at the National Archives. I went to see 

them last week. It is really a remarkable display, both about the 

Jewish heritage and the tragic history of this community in Iraq. 

We are also in daily conversation with the Iraqi Government and 

with the Jewish community here in Iraq. This morning, I was in 

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22

cil. I have also been in regular conversation with Ambassador Faily 

who is here, representing the Iraqi Government. 

As you know, we have a commitment under an agreement from 

2003 to return the archives to Iraq next summer, by the end of 

next summer. We have paid for Iraqi archivists who are now here 

training with the National Archives to make sure that these archives are preserved and protected. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank you, sir. I know other members will 

follow up, but my time is so limited, about Iran, and Syria, and 

Camp Ashraf. 

Mr. MCGURK. I will stay just briefly on the archives. We are 

open to discussion about discussing the disposition of these archives and I know the Ambassador agrees with that. And I am 

happy to discuss that further. On the MEK, this is an issue that 

I am tracking every single day on the tragic attack on September 

1st. I went to Iraq shortly thereafter. We worked very hard to get 

the remaining survivors off of Camp Ashraf that were not safe. I 

visited the residents and the survivors at Camp Liberty. We are determined to keep them as safe as possible. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The T–WALLs? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes, thank you. I just spoke with Ambassador 

Beecroft this morning. There are about 1,400 large T–WALLs now. 

We want to get as many T–WALLs in as possible. Some of this 

comes down to logistics. Some of it comes down to getting the right 

contractor. Some of it comes down to getting the right median place 

for where the T–WALLs go. But there is no excuse. The T–WALLs 

need to move into the camp. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and on Iran’s influence in Iraq, 

and Syria. 

Mr. MCGURK. Iran has influence in Baghdad. We have influence 

in Baghdad. Other states in the region have tremendous influence 

in Baghdad. The issue of overflights, Madam Chairman, I would 

really welcome the opportunity to come and brief you in a classified 

setting. I can go into some detail on the numbers and the flights. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I welcome that. Thank you, and my time is 

up, but we will do that, sir. Thank you. Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would actually like 

to get back to the issue of the archives. You said that you are open 

to discussion. These are just a couple of observations, and I appreciate the attention that you paid to this issue already. Iraq, Babylon was the center of Judaism for 1,000 years, and these documents, tattered as they were, found now a decade ago, are, according to the agreement that was reached with the Provisional Authority, were supposed to be sent back to a place where the number 

of Jews, numbers perhaps in the single digits. Many of the documents are very personal in nature, records of the community, 

things that are of real value to the members of the community and 

their descendants who simply aren’t there. 

So help me understand. I understand what the agreement was. 

You also said you are now open to discussion. Can we explore that 

a little bit and if you can just continue where you left off? What 

discussion can we have, and what can we do? What would be the 

holdup to ensure that these items that are so personal to the comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111313\85554 HFA PsN: SHIRL
23

munity that is no longer living in the country can actually reside 

with the community where it now lives? 

Mr. MCGURK. All I will say right now is that first, I think everybody should go see the exhibit, and if you need the technicians who 

actually traveled to Baghdad in the heart of one of the worst periods of the war in 2003 to preserve these materials, it is really a 

truly remarkable effort by the National Archives. The State Department is proud to be a partner with them in that effort. They 

will be on display at the Archives. They will then be on display in 

New York. The commitment that we made in 2003, and that was 

a legal agreement to allow us to get them out of Iraq to preserve 

this important material. Without that agreement, the material 

never would have been preserved. They will be on display in New 

York and then under this commitment, they will transfer to Baghdad in the late summer of next year. 

All I can say is that we have an agreement with the Iraqi Ambassador here to begin a conversation about longer term loans here 

in the United States to make sure the people can view them. But 

that will be an ongoing course of discussion. It is November now. 

We have until the end of next summer so we do have some time 

to discuss this. We have heard very loudly and clearly the concerns 

from the community. We have listened to those and we have taken 

them to heart and we will see what we can do. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And I would just add to that, there are, as I understand it, some 2,700 books, tens of thousands of documents. It certainly seems that it would be possible to be able to have the ability 

to highlight the community that existed in Iraq in some fashion 

while still ensuring that the bulk of these records continue to stay 

with those who are the most closely affiliated with them, and 

whose lives they reflect. 

So I appreciate that, and to the extent that that conversation is 

ongoing, there are a lot of us here who offer ourselves up to be engaged in it. So I thank you for that. 

I also would like to just follow up. There was an op ed in The 

New York Times that coincided with the visits to the U.S. Prime 

Minister Maliki blamed the growing sectarian violence on alQaeda’s increased influence. And 2 weeks ago, the Washington Post 

reported growing concern over an al-Qaeda affiliated group of the 

Islamic State of Iraq in Syria that is described as more extreme 

than Jabhat al-Nusra. So what can the U.S. do to strengthen Iraq’s 

ability to counter these threats, and how do we foster the kind of 

dialog that ultimately is necessary for regional cooperation, in 

order to prevent the growing extremism, and can that be done at 

all and how do we lead it? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you. It is a critical question. One of the 

vital interests we face in Iraq is the reemergence of these al-Qaeda 

groups. We had very intense discussions with the prime minister 

when he was here last week about approaching this with a holistic 

strategy. The way we went at this in 2007, 2008, was by mobilizing 

popular forces, the Sons of Iraq in Anbar Province, for example. 

This cannot only be a security-driven exercise. We believe we now 

have an agreement with the Iraqis in terms of how to go about this 

problem, isolating these groups. But make no mistake, the Iraqis 

need security assistance. As I put in my written testimony, I deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111313\85554 HFA PsN: SHIRL
24

scribe what is happening now. We can help the Iraqis identify some 

of the al-Qaeda camps, and the camps do exist in the western regions of the country, but they are not able to effectively target 

those camps. They have unarmored helicopters. When they fly an 

unarmored helicopter to these camps, the helicopters are getting 

shot down. Pilots that we have trained are getting killed. Over the 

course of this year, about 938 members of their Iraqi security forces 

have been killed in action. 

So this is a very serious problem. While the security element of 

the strategy is not the lead element, it is an essential element. And 

that is why we need to help the Iraqis as best we can. We are helping them with information sharing and we are talking about training some of their forces in Jordan, and working with regional partners. The visit of the Turkish prime minister to Baghdad was very 

important. The strained relationship between Baghdad and Akra 

was having an impact on the internal environment of Iraq. 

So getting that relationship on a better track is very important, 

and we are going to keep working to isolate these groups. In terms 

of sectarian violence, the violence that we have seen in 2011, and 

2012; there were about 100 attacks a week and they were primarily 

conducted almost entirely by the Sunni extremists, al-Qaeda-type 

groups. What we have seen this year, the violence has gone up. 

And again, 40 suicide bombers a month. That is compared with 

about 5 a month in 2011 and 2012. And those suicide bombers are 

having a devastating effect because they are able to go in and target restaurants, and playgrounds, and just having a psychological 

effect on the country, and that is leading for a renewed call for 

Shia extremist militia to form to protect local neighborhoods, and 

this is extremely dangerous. We discussed it with the prime minister in great detail. He agrees that this is a very serious problem. 

He also agrees that we have to go about this politically, economically, and with information-driven, intelligence-driven security operations. So we think we have made progress about a common 

strategy to go after this, but this is going to be a day-by-day and 

very hard work. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Deutch. Mr. Chabot is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. McGurk, you mentioned in your testimony that Iraq may account for nearly half of 

the anticipated growth in global oil output over the current decade. 

Can we be sure that the existing agreements over oil production 

will be honored in the event of more domestic instability in Iraq, 

and can you elaborate on how Iraq’s oil production will be affected 

in the event social unrest continues to fester? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, it is an excellent, excellent, question, because the more the security situation deteriorates, that 

jeopardizes the ability of Iraqis to get that oil on to global markets. 

I want to say what we have been doing with the Iraqis is trying 

to focus them on using their abundant natural resources in a strategic way. The problems that beset Iraq are not problems that developed over the last year, even last decade, or 100 years. They go 

back, in some cases, 1,000 years. 

We are talking with the Iraqis and having a very good conversation with regional partners about how to harness their natural reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\111313\85554 HFA PsN: SHIRL
25

sources to align the interests both internally and within the region 

in a stable unified and Federal Iraq. For example, having strategic 

pipelines that run from Basra to the Haditha refinery in the heart 

of Anbar Province, and then south through Jordan to the Red Sea, 

unites the Shi’a in the south, the Sunnis in Anbar Province, Jordan’s real intense need to energy resources. Connecting that pipeline further, and this is a discussion that Foreign Minister 

Davutoglu had with the prime minister in Baghdad last week, from 

the Haditha refinery to the Basra refinery, also in Saladin Province 

and then to Turkey, unites the interest of Turkey all the way down 

to the south and southern Iraq. 

And that is something that the Turkish foreign minister also 

pointed out. We are also working with the Kurds and with the 

Iraqis in Baghdad to make sure this is done in a strategic way, and 

done with revenue-sharing pacts that all Iraqis can share in their 

national patrimony. But this is very difficult. The maxim we use 

and it is one that is really enshrined in Iraqi constitution is that 

all of the oil is owned by all of the Iraqi people, but that it is better 

to peacefully divide a large pie than to fight over a small one. Right 

now Iraq is producing about 3 million barrels a day. That is more 

than it has produced in almost 20 years. But there are projections 

from the International Energy Agency that if Iraq gets its act together and does some things right, it should be producing 6 million 

barrel as day by 2020, and we want to help the Iraqis get there. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me shift gears here. While Iraqi 

Christians find themselves in an increasingly hostile environment, 

the Kurdish region was seen as a safe haven for Christian refugees 

in Iraq. However, a number of bombings against Christians in the 

Kurdish region have changed the security situation for Christians 

and with reports of discrimination, Christians no longer feel safe 

even in the Kurdish region. What is the administration doing to 

help Christians and other minorities in Iraq and what is the Maliki 

government doing to protect Iraqi religious minorities? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, a very important question. And at the 

State Department, also we are focused on this every single day. I 

try to meet with the Iraqi Christian communities here in the 

United States. When I am in Iraq, I try to meet with the Christian 

leaders. Our Ambassadors engage with them on a regular basis. On 

my last trip, I met with Bishop Warda who is in Erbil in the Kurdish region and we asked him, what do you really need from us? 

And he needed some more facilitation with the Kurdish Government there to resolve some land disputes and they have now set 

up a joint commission to do just that. 

The prime minister met with Archbishop Sako, the main Christian leader in Iraq in early October to talk about the threats to the 

Christian community. The real problem in Iraq right now is that 

every community is under tremendous threat. The casualties that 

have taken place this year, are a threat to everybody, but the 

Christians in particular, and some of the other minority communities such as the Shabaks and the Yazidis are under a real threat 

from these al-Qaeda groups. 

We are talking with the Iraqi Christian community here and also 

Christian leaders in Baghdad about what we can do to harness 

local forces to protect their local communities and working with the 

26

Iraqi Government to get resources into those communities. And we 

have made some progress over the last 3 to 4 months, but I just, 

our eyes are wide open at how difficult this problem is, and again, 

the more that this al-Qaeda network gains strength and gains roots 

in Western Iraq, the greater the threat will be. That is why we 

have to go after that in a very serious way. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. What is the relationship, Mr. 

McGurk, in your view, between the government in Tehran, and Mr. 

Maliki’s government in Baghdad? 

Mr. MCGURK. It is a relationship that is really multifaceted. I 

mean, look at that border. Iraq is going to have cultural, religious, 

economic relations with Iran. That is something we recognize. 

Where we try to draw a line is any sort of security relationship 

with Iran and we have had some success in that area. My experience over the last decade in working with Iraqis, whether Shi’a, 

Sunni, Kurds, Christians everybody, is that there is really no love 

lost between Iraqis and Iran. They remember the very long Iran 

Iraq war in the 1980s, and that is really felt very deep in the psychology. Iraq also feels——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can I interrupt you 1 second? And you would say 

that that view is also shared by the Maliki government despite the 

Shia nature of that government? 

Mr. MCGURK. Sometimes it is a mischaracterization to say that 

Shia in Iraq are linked to Shia in Iran. But the Shia in Iraq and 

Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najov and his philosophy of quietism, 

is totally 180 degrees opposite to the philosophy of Khomeini and 

Khamenei in Tehran which is kind of clerical rule. Sistani’s view 

is that more of a democratic tradition, which we would recognize 

and which there should be separation from the top clerical leadership in the government. That is something that most Iraqis adhere 

to, and it is a critical distinction to really working with this problem. 

Make no mistake, Iranian influence in Baghdad is very strong. 

It is there every day. They have had a presence in Baghdad for 10 

years. They have had the same people there that have built relationships that are very deep, and it is something we need to deal 

with. We have to recognize they are going to have a relationship. 

It is drawing a line at the malign and the far east influences from 

Iran which we are trying to do. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. I think that is a really important distinction. I am glad you got it in the record. Kurdistan, the Kurdish 

area in the north has actually sort of had protected autonomy for—

going back to right after the first Gulf War of the United States. 

Is that not correct? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And it has actually flourished as a result, not 

only of our protection, but of its own enterprise and initiatives, is 

that correct? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And has largely been spared some of the violence 

in the rest of Iraq, both pre-, during, and post-U.S. invasion? 

27

Mr. MCGURK. Yes, correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Recently, the Kurds seem to have come to an 

agreement with the Government of Turkey to build a pipeline directly to Turkey to provide, I think, largely natural gas, is that correct? 

Mr. MCGURK. The pipeline—there is a debate whether it is going 

to go directly to Turkey or whether that is going to plug into the 

existing pipelines that exist already. The oil pipeline is going to 

plug into the existing Iraq/Turkey pipeline which is on the Kurdish 

side of the——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right, but the Turks and the Kurds have been 

talking about a direct pipeline that would actually bypass the national system in Iraq, if I understand it correctly. 

Mr. MCGURK. There has been a lot of discussion——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. MCGURK [continuing]. A lot of press reports and industry reports, but I think actually looking at where the pipelines are going, 

right now the oil pipeline is going to plug in on the Kurdish side, 

and we have not seen a clear indication that there is going to be 

an independent pipeline. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, those same reports you are referring to, 

Mr. McGurk, also report that the United States Government has 

been pretty active, if not animated on this topic, discouraging the 

bypassing of the national pipelines because your point earlier, it 

would diminish the Nation’s cohesion that we are trying to seek in 

Iraq. Would that be inaccurate? 

Mr. MCGURK. That is not entirely accurate and thank you for letting me address that. It is our position that as much oil and natural gas from the Kurdish region should get on the global markets 

as soon as possible, full stop. That is our position. We look at this 

very closely, though, and want to make sure that it is done in a 

way that does not have repercussion, or backlash that could jeopardize getting to the point where I talked about in my testimony 

that Iraq is a 6–10 million barrel-a-day producer, though that is a 

long-term vision, and this is a very politically fraught issue in Iraq. 

We don’t take sides. 

We look to the Iraqi constitution as the baseline. We try to make 

sure that this is being done and managed in a strategic way, but 

it is our position we want as much oil and gas from the Kurdish 

region getting on the global markets as soon as possible. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And presumably, one other factor is we also are 

not unsympathetic to our long-time ally, Turkey, in trying to secure 

its own fossil fuels. 

Mr. MCGURK. Absolutely right, which is why we are big supporters of a strategic pipeline going from Basra all the way up to 

Jahan in the Mediterranean through Turkey and having Kurdish 

pipelines plug into that national infrastructure. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MCGURK. It is a win/win vision. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Wilson is recognized. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, thank you 

for being here. As I mentioned, I am very, very grateful that I have 

had two sons serve in Iraq, Army, Navy. I am grateful that we 

28

have even had Members of Congress, my colleague, Congressman 

Kinzinger right here has served twice in Iraq. The American people 

have shed blood on behalf of the people of Iraq, and we want success and hope for success. 

Additionally, I have had the opportunity to visit the country 11 

times. I have been very impressed by the people I have met. And 

again, I am hopeful for the country. But a real tragedy has been 

the murders at Camp Ashraf. Since December 2008, before our 

Government turned over the protection of the camp to the Iraqi 

Government, Prime Minister Maliki has repeatedly assured the 

world that it would treat the residents humanely and protect them 

from harm. Yet, it has not kept the promise, as 111 residents have 

been murdered in cold blood and more than 1,000 wounded in 5 attacks, including the September 1st massacre. What is the United 

States doing to prevent further attacks and greater loss of life in 

terms of ensuring the safety and security of the residents? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, first let me say thank you for your 

service, and your family’s service. Speaking for myself and my 

team, who have spent many years in Iraq and have known friends 

of ours who we have lost in Iraq, it is something that we think 

about every day, and it inspires our work and our determination 

to do everything possible to succeed under very difficult circumstances. 

Regarding Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty, the only place for the 

MEK and the residents of the Camp Liberty to be safe, is outside 

of Iraq. Camp Liberty is a former U.S. military base. We lost Americans right nearby there as late as the summer of 2010. We lost 

a number of Americans to rocket fire and indirect fire attacks in 

our Embassy compound, one of the most secure facilities in the 

country as late as the summer of 2010. That is when we had about 

60,000 troops in the country doing everything we possibly could to 

hunt down the rocket teams that we knew were targeting us. 

There are cells in Iraq, we believe, directed, inspired from Iran, 

which are targeting the MEK. There is no question about that. And 

the only place where an MEK can be safe is outside of Iraq. That 

is why the State Department, the Secretary, has appointed a colleague of mine, Jonathan Winer to work this issue full-time, to find 

a place for them to go. Right now, there are about 2,900 residents 

at Camp Liberty, and Albania has taken in about 210. Germany 

has agreed to take in 100 and that is it. 

We need to find a place for these people to go, it is an urgent 

humanitarian issue, and an international humanitarian crisis. And 

I went to the camp to meet with the survivors and to speak with 

the families. And I promised to do everything I possibly could to 

get them to safety. And in the meantime, it is incumbent upon the 

Iraqi Government to do everything it possibly can to keep them 

safe, and that means the T–WALLs and sandbags and everything 

else. But the only place for the residents to be safe would be outside of Iraq. Since the tragic attacks at Camp Liberty on September 1st, 1,300 Iraqis were killed, 52 people were massacred at 

Camp Ashraf. 

This is a tragic, horrifying act. But since then, 1,300 Iraqis in the 

country have been killed. The country is incredibly dangerous, and 

29

for the MEK to be safe they have to leave Iraq and we want to find 

a place for them to go. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I appreciate your commitment to that. After 

the September 1st massacre, the State Department called for an 

independent investigation by the United Nations, 74 days on 

nothing’s been done, let alone an independent investigation. Could 

you tell this committee whether any independent probe has been 

carried out or not? If so, by whom, and what is the finding? If not, 

why not? Five attacks have been launched against the residents 

and not one person has been arrested. What do we do to maintain 

promises of protection? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, shortly after the attack, we worked 

with the United Nations to make sure that they got a team up to 

Camp Ashraf within 24 hours of the attack to document exactly 

what happened because there were a lot of stories of what happened. They went there, took photographs of the bodies to make 

sure that it was documented as to how these people were killed 

and there is no question about it. 

We have looked very closely at all of our information. I know I 

have had the opportunity to brief some members of the subcommittee in a classified setting, which I would be pleased to do 

again to update you on the information that we have. We did call 

for an investigation and for the U.N. to be involved in this process. 

The U.N. was also involved in making sure the survivors got out 

of Camp Ashraf and out of harm’s way to Camp Liberty. 

Again, Congressman, I would welcome the opportunity to come 

discuss with you in a classified setting exactly everything we know 

about what happened on September 1st. 

Mr. WILSON. And I have been to Camp Liberty many times, but 

I obviously am concerned. I appreciate your commitment and indeed, every effort should by made to protect those citizens. Thank 

you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Sherman of 

California is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the chair and ranking member for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. Maliki wants our weapons, 

yet he allows planes to go from Iran to Syria taking murderers, 

and thugs, and the IRGC and weapons with them. He says that he 

can’t defend his own air space, but he certainly has not invited 

Turkey, Saudi Arabia or the United States to defend that air space 

from these murderers that fly leisurely across Iraq and do their 

killing in Syria. 

I want to focus on finances. How much money are we scheduled 

to give Iraq this year? How much do they get from oil and are they 

pumping oil as quickly as they can or constraining their production 

in accordance with OPEC rules? 

Mr. MCGURK. In terms of money, we are not really giving Iraq 

much money at all anymore, our assistance levels have gone down 

dramatically. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But it is still well over $1 billion? 

Mr. MCGURK. No, I believe the most recent request is now under $1 billion. It has gone from about $1.5 billion last year to Fiscal 

Year 2013 to about $180 million. And I can again brief you on the 

glide path overall presence. 

30

In terms of oil, it is actually quite the opposite, the Iraqis done 

everything possible to get as much oil on to international markets 

as possible. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So they are pumping——

Mr. MCGURK. And the Iranian oil minister last week said that 

it was an unfriendly act what the Iraqis were doing in terms of getting that much oil on to Iraqi markets. As Iranian oil has come 

down, thanks to our sanctions by at about 1 million barrels a day, 

Iraqi oil has gone up by 800,000 barrels a day which has really 

helped stabilize global markets. 

Mr. SHERMAN. As it would be in production. 

Saddam Hussein’s government incurred tens of billions of dollars 

of borrowings, Saddam would have wanted to call it gifts from 

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and others in the Gulf which he used to 

fight the Iran-Iraq war. Has the Iraq Government made payments 

on this debt, renounced the debt or does it just kind of sit on their 

balance sheet with no particular explanation? 

Mr. MCGURK. These are the debts the Iraqis owe? 

Mr. SHERMAN. This is debts of the Iraqi Government to the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait incurred during the IranIraq war. 

Mr. MCGURK. Some of those debts, as you know, have been forgiven through Paris club commitments, other debts have not. I 

would have to get you the numbers. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Please get me information on that. 

Now I would like to join with Mr. Wilson and others in focusing 

on Camp Liberty. You had 101 members of the MEK there, 52 were 

killed, that is a 50 percent casualty rate for roughly a million times 

for the casualty rate that ordinary Iraqi civilians have faced in the 

unfortunate deaths that have occurred in Iraq. 

Included among those who died was the brother of Assaf al-Mia 

who I believe is in our audience today. The State Department has 

issued a statement saying, well, the Iraqi Government had nothing 

to do with it, which to me is an incredible indictment. They have 

an obligation to protect the residence of the camp, and according 

to our own State Department, did nothing. In fact, the assailants 

had to get past several checkpoints in order to carry out their murders. When we were at Camp Liberty, or when we were in Iraq, 

Camp Liberty had 17,000 of those T–WALLs that protect those who 

live in the camp from missiles and mortars. 

Now there are less than 200. What have we done to make it clear 

to Maliki that he has to put back the T–WALLs and provide the 

defense or will he keep the people there subject to attack and then 

disclaim any responsibility when they are, in fact, attacked? 

Mr. MCGURK. I just want to make clear what the U.S. position 

is, we looked at this very closely in terms of no credible evidence 

going all the way up to the top of the Iraqi Government in terms 

of this particular attack. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But you have no credible evidence that they lifted 

a finger to stop it? 

Mr. MCGURK. Iraq, as I said in my testimony, is an extremely 

violent place and a couple of months before the Ashraf attack the 

Abu Ghraib prison complex was attacked by hundreds of al-Qaedalinked fighters. And they took over the prison or, at least almost 

31

everyone in the prison. We think in that attack, there was no foreign knowledge from the highest levels of Iraqi Government, there 

was probably some complicity at a local level, and we think the 

Ashraf attack was similar. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Complicity at the local level? 

Mr. MCGURK. I think it is a reasonable assumption there was 

some. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What about complicity with the failure of Maliki 

to deploy the 17,500 T–WALLs? 

Mr. MCGURK. The T–WALLs—as you know, when the residents 

move into Camp Liberty, it had the same T–WALL configuration 

we had to protect troops, and the residents, and I can understand 

why, says this looks like a prison we want to get the T–WALLs out, 

and so all the T–WALLs came out. Given the threat they are under 

the T–WALLs have been moving back in. 

There are different numbers on the numbers of T–WALLs. I was 

just at the camp about a month about or so ago, or a couple of 

months ago, and saw with my own eyes. And I want to get more 

T–WALLs into the camp. I spoke with Ambassador Beecroft about 

this just today, and there is an agreement with the Iraqi Government, we have to get the right meeting and place the right people 

there for where the T–WALLs are going to go, and I think we will 

see more T–WALLs moving into the camp, but we are continuing 

to work as hard as we can. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We have fewer than 200, we need 17,500. I yield 

back. 

Mr. DESANTIS [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California. You are lit up. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. All right. Well, where 

do we start? I just, $880 million in aid after at least of the money 

we will be expending for Iraq after spending almost $1 trillion over 

a decade, and 6,000 lives for which I have seen no gratitude whatsoever from senior members of the Iraqi Government, nor from the 

Iraqi people. Why do we care anymore about whether or not alQaeda is operating and killing some of their soldiers? Why do we 

care? They don’t care for us, they are not grateful for what we have 

already done. Why should we be giving even more money to a country that is headed by people of that inclination? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, thank you. I just want to clarify, the $880 million is our operating request, the current budget for sustaining our presence in Iraq and doing various things we are doing 

there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right. So why should we do that? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, we have a vital interest at stake in Iraq, 

whether you measure it from al-Qaeda, whether you measure it 

from the oil production, whether you measure it from just the overall stability of the region. I think withdrawing from Iraq in terms 

of our overall diplomatic presence in what we are doing would have 

a really devastating consequence to our longer-term interest. I 

would point you to an important op ed the Iraqi Ambassador wrote 

on our Veterans Day thanking all the sacrifice in Iraq. I would like 

to see more as well. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will have to say that independently, I have 

never had an experience, I have been in and out of Iraq a number 

32

of times and been with a number of Iraqis. Not once that I have 

someone independently without being told to come up to me and 

say how grateful they are ever to suggest that. I would suggest it 

is a big stretch to say that things going on in some province in Iraq 

because there is some al-Qaeda element there murdering other 

Iraqis that we need to get involved in that any more than he have 

in the past. We are pouring more money down the rat hole, but 

also it really makes a mockery, this whole thing makes a mockery 

of the commitment we have had in the past. 

Let me just ask, you believe them from what you have said that 

there was legitimate security reasons that those T–WALLs have 

not been put up at Camp Liberty? 

Mr. MCGURK. No, I do not think they are legitimate security reasons the T–WALLs have not been put up. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It sounded to me when I was listening, and 

I listened very closely to what you said, that we can’t blame the 

leadership in the Maliki leadership for the lack of security at Camp 

Liberty? 

Mr. MCGURK. No, in fact, my conversation from Maliki on down 

is you need as many T–WALLs into that camp as possible, without 

any excuse. Full stop. So you may have heard me say something 

different. I want——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If I am misinterpreting what you said. Now, 

tell me this, those troops that came into Camp Ashraf murdered 52 

unarmed MEK refugees, you hold that this was done by a rogue 

element in the Iraqi army or do you think that Maliki regime is 

complicit in this murder? 

Mr. MCGURK. I don’t believe it was a rogue element. I think a 

lot of this goes back to the background of the situation. Camp 

Ashraf was seen as a forward operating base to the MEK——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I don’t need a background on it. I am trying 

to find out—it is clear that we had Iraqi soldiers going in there 

murdering people who were unarmed, tying their hands behind 

their back and then blowing their brains out. This is an atrocity, 

it is a crime against humanity. Now I don’t need a background to 

find out the background on Camp Ashraf. Do we hold the government responsible or was it a rogue element? And if it was a rogue 

element in the military, what has the Maliki regime done to deal 

with that? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, I would really welcome the opportunity to come speak to you in a classified setting and tell you everything we know about this attack including, who committed the 

atrocity. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, I am not asking for all the information that you know, I am asking who we are holding accountable, and we aren’t. Clearly, we are sending a message to the 

Maliki government that it is okay, because we are not doing anything about it. We have—here is a picture of a gentleman who used 

to work up here, I submit this now, Mr. Chairman, for the record. 

A gentleman who used to work right here on Capitol Hill representing the MEK, and we saw him on many occasions. And guess 

what, here is his body at Camp Ashraf where they have murdered 

him, brutally tied his hands behind his back and blown his brains 

out. 

33

We need to make sure—if we excuse this by lack of attention, we 

are sending our own message as to what values we have and we 

are sending other dictators and terrorists a message as well about 

American weakness. I am not satisfied with what this administration is doing on this issue. 

And one last note, Mr. Chairman, and that is, look, these people 

are under attack, I think at the very least, it is my opinion right 

now in this, we should take the people in at Camp Liberty, let’s 

just take them in. 

Is there a reason why—I am writing legislation that would grant 

these people asylum, obviously their lives are at stake and obviously, they are now unarmed refugees. Is there some reason that 

we should not give them political asylum? 

Mr. MCGURK. I will say——

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. Do you want—

maybe you can finish up on one of the other—I am going to move 

it along. I don’t see anybody here from the other side of the aisle, 

so I will recognize somebody from this side of the aisle. Next person 

in the queue is Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. McGurk, 

thanks for being here and thanks for your service to your country. 

I know it is not always easy but we appreciate what you are doing. 

Just a couple of questions as Mr. Wilson so kindly mentioned, I 

am a veteran of Iraq and saw quite a bit of sacrifice from the 

American side in terms of what was created there. In fact, I think 

one of the bravest political decisions, and frankly, military decisions that has been made in 50 years was the surge in Iraq. I 

heard a lot of people, including frankly the current administration 

oppose the surge, thinking that the war in Iraq is lost. I heard a 

very powerful person in the Senate say that the war is lost, it is 

time to go home. And we saw that despite that, a tough decision 

was made to surge. The surge, the addition of 20,000 additional 

troops helped, but what really helped was the message that the 

United States, the enemy knew we would never be defeated on the 

battlefield and we won’t be, the focus that we are committed. 

My good friend, Mr. Rohrabacher, I have to take slight exception, 

I think there is quite a bit at stake in Iraq. I think a resurgent 

al-Qaeda is extremely concerning in Iraq. I think resurgent alQaeda in a very frankly potentially powerful and oil rich Nation is 

not just not in the interest of the Iraqi people, it is not in the interest of the United States, it is not in the interest of the free world. 

And it is especially not in the interest of the 6,000 people that gave 

their lives to help create what was created over there. 

I was shocked frankly at the end of 2011 at the complete pullout 

of U.S. forces. I thought we could have negotiated much harder for 

residual force in Iraq. I think had we left the residual force in Iraq, 

we would not be seeing the kind of violence we do now. So that 

said, I don’t have a time machine and I can’t go back in time and 

convince the President that Iraq was in our interest to leave a residual force there. 

I do have a couple of questions about the resurgent AQI presence 

in Iraq. The President’s claimed numerous times that al-Qaeda’s 

been decimated, but that is not the case. Frankly anywhere around 

the globe or in Iraq, we are seeing sectarian violence in Iraq today 

34

at levels that we saw when I served there, which was completely 

incomprehensible. Has the administration, in your mind, underestimated the growth reached in capacity of the al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, first thank you for your service, and 

with all that you have seen, your experience is really critical to getting this right now. And so I think this dialog is very important. 

I don’t want to get into whether it is underestimated, I am really 

focused on my job on where we are now and we face a real problem. There is no question that ISIL is growing roots in Syria and 

in Iraq. And the one thing with this Iraqi Government, they want 

to go after this threat and we want to help them. We want to help 

them do it in an effective way. 

As you know from your experience, the reason the surge worked 

was not just the troops, it was the strategy. And the reason the 

sons of Iraq and the awakening worked was because of really three 

things: We trusted them, we paid them, and they believed they are 

going to win. Right now the Iraqis are telling us and the Minister 

of Defense, Sa’doun al-Dulaimi, who is from Anbar province. They 

will trust them, they can give them resources, but right now, they 

don’t think they are going to win because the al-Qaeda groups have 

better weapons and better resources, quite frankly, in some of 

these areas. So that is a problem we are trying to address. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, thank you. In shaping the future policy toward Iraq has the administration taken into account recent operations launched by AQI’s resurgent effort including breaking the 

walls the soldiers harvest campaign in which vehicle-borne IEDs 

have been used in staggering numbers? 

Mr. MCGURK. In my testimony, I discussed, I didn’t use the exact 

words, but that is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s strategy, he announced 

it and then he carried it out. The breaking walls campaign was 

about prison attacks and security forces, and others—his campaign 

was about attacking government targets including the Ministry of 

Justice building in downtown Baghdad in March. They attacked 

the intelligence headquarters in Erbil on September 21st. And they 

have attacked, particularly Shi’a civilians week after week after 

week trying to spark that cycle of sectarian violence that we saw 

at the worst phases of the war. So far, the Shi’a militia response 

has been localized and has not had a strategic effect but is something we are watching very closely. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you. And just in the last 30 seconds, 

I have, I just want to say for the record, I hope that the administration, and again, we can go back in time and argue whether we 

should have left a residual force, I have made my point on that. 

But I hope that in the future, we are acting very proactively to help 

the Iraq Government root out terrorism. I don’t know what that 

necessarily will involve, there are some things that I don’t want to 

say here, but I think an Iraq that falls prey to al-Qaeda, to lawlessness, frankly like we saw in the mid 2000s, would be tragic for the 

United States, for the whole region and for not only our reputation, 

but for a lot of people who just want to live in peace. And again, 

thank you for your service. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Madam 

Chair, I yield. 

35

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Mr. Kinzinger, we are proud of 

your valuable service. Thank you so much. We are very proud, we 

have many vets in our subcommittee, and we thank each and every 

one of them. Mr. DeSantis was one of them. Thank you for chairing 

while I was out. And Mr. DeSantis is now recognized. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I had kind of 

cut off your answer when I was chairman because we were way 

over time, so do you just want to answer the question Mr. Rohrabacher had asked you about the administration’s position on asylum for these folks? 

Mr. MCGURK. I will defer to the lawyers on some of this, but as 

a former terrorist organization, even though they are no longer designated an FTO, there are legal restrictions in terms of our ability 

to bring a large number of the group into the United States under 

existing laws. There are processes that are under discussion, and 

I am happy to discuss that with you in follow-up. But a legislative 

fix on some of these issues is something that we would look at. 

Mr. DESANTIS. When I was in Iraq, this was kind of right when 

the surge had started, back when I was on active duty. And as you 

know, you were part of that, you had AQI ascending, 2006 was a 

disaster. You also had Quds force and the Shiite militias wreaking 

havoc in other parts of Iraq. And the surge was very successful at 

quelling that, but then as I read what is going on now, it seems 

like a lot of what is going on is reminiscent of those years. So can 

you speak to, I know you talked about Iran does have a lot of influence particularly in Baghdad generally, what is the influence of 

Quds force and how are they interacting with the Iraqi Government, if at all? 

Mr. MCGURK. And again, you would recognize from your experience, Congressman, if you charted out right now the levels of violence on just al-Qaeda violence, suicide bombers and vehicle bombs, 

we are at a level not seen, as the chairman said earlier, since 2008. 

But if you look at overall violence, it is still down substantially and 

the reason for that is because the Shi’a militia violence which we 

were seeing in those days has not really responded in reciprocal titfor-tat way. So that is really significant. If we see that type of response, it will be very concerning. 

The Quds forces we see right now, they do not want Iraq to be 

destabilized. We do think however that they are working with certain Shi’a militia groups, including the top Hezbollah, Subil Hok 

and some of these other groups that you know well. And they are 

really focused, though, on a localized kind of mission-by-mission 

basis. 

All I can say is that in our conversations with the Iraqis, we 

share as much information as we possibly can and make very clear 

that they need to push back against this. Prime Minister Maliki 

does remind us that he did take on the militias in Karbil and 

Basra, and that he is ready to take them on again if necessary. But 

this is something that we just need to keep pushing. 

The Iranians have done very maligned things in Iraq, particularly when we were present there. Right now it looks like they 

don’t want to have a destabilized Iraq, but they are also responding 

to demands from particularly the Shi’a community for self-protection in ways that might not be particularly helpful. 

36

Mr. DESANTIS. So in terms of AQI, and I take your point about 

the level of violence not reaching those 2006 levels which is good, 

even though it has risen. Back then you had foreign fighters coming into Iraq fighting as a part of AQI. Now we know Syria is kind 

of a magnet for a lot of these folks. So is it safe to say that most 

foreign fighters are now going to Syria who were the Sunni-aligned 

foreign fighters? And if that is the case, are they going through 

Iraq, or are some of these AQI fighters in Iraq, I guess they are 

playing a pretty big role in facilitating those folks into Syria? 

Mr. MCGURK. The suicide bombers we believe are all foreign 

fighters, nearly all of them are foreign fighters, they are coming 

through the ISIL networks, and they are coming from Syria into 

Iraq. So we think what happens there are these young guys who 

are brainwashed to go fight a global Jihad. They show up in Syria, 

if you can fire a rifle you go fight, if you are a mechanic, you fix 

a truck, and if you are just indoctrinated, you go be a suicide bomber. And about 40 of them now a month are being directed toward 

Iraq. And the suicide bombers again, as I said, are having a real 

devastating effect. 

In terms of foreign fighters from Iraq going to Syria both—you 

have a youthful population, you have an underemployed population, and they are all watching this conflict unfold on YouTube 

with particularly gruesome videos. And that is having a militarizing, radicalizing effect, both within the Sunni community and 

the Shi’a community. That is one reason why my colleagues on the 

Syria side of the policy House here are trying to work so hard to 

settle that issue down. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And then my final question is does the Iraqi Government have a relationship in any way with Hezbollah? 

Mr. MCGURK. In terms of a formal relationship, none that we 

have seen in a formalized way. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank a lot. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. DeSantis, and we 

saved the best for last. A person who just knows that is the way 

it is. So pleased to yield 5 minutes to Judge Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Speaker or Madam Chair. I have 

been to Iraq a lot, I have seen a lot of people in Iraq, and I have 

met with Maliki. I was with Mr. Rohrabacher, we met with Maliki 

and we asked him this one question: Can we go see the people at 

Camp Ashraf and he said, absolutely not. In fact, he got so incensed that we asked that question when we were on a helicopter 

flying to the north to see the Kurds, he went to the State Department and asked us to leave the country, we were kicked out of the 

country. 

So when you see him get a little emotional and me as well, here 

we are giving billions to a country where the Prime Minister refuses to let Members of Congress see what is taking place in Camp 

Ashraf, that is the background. Five attacks on Camp Ashraf and 

Liberty, five, over a period of years. Not one criminal has been 

brought to justice, not one. We don’t even know their names or who 

they are. If the Iraqis were serious about investigating they would 

at least bring in somebody. If those investigators worked for me 

when I was a prosecutor they would have been fired several attacks ago. 

37

These people that are here, working people, Americans and they 

are concerned about people they love in Iraq. And they constantly 

are losing friends and family members to attacks. Meanwhile the 

United States, I am not sure what we are doing. I now understand 

that not any of the witnesses have been talked to about the latest 

attack. These are real people that are killed, and I am sorry for the 

graphicness of this poster but this has happened at Camp Liberty 

where the people were in the clinic and they were assassinated, 

they were tracked down and murdered. 

Now we would think, being the freedom-loving country we are, 

that we would be opposed to this type of activity and we would be 

a little bit more to pressure it because it is our responsibility. You 

have made the comment that we are not taking these people into 

the United States because they used to be a foreign terrorist organization, but the State Department, through the Secretary of State, 

can waive that as has been done with 12 previous people who came 

in. 

When I talked to other countries about why don’t you take these 

folks from the MEK, you know what the first thing they say is? 

United States is hypocritical. They say people ought to take them 

but you won’t take any of them. Got a good point. When we talk 

to the Germans and the French and the Brits, the people in the 

Netherlands that they ought to take former MEK members, they 

say, well, you are not taking any of them. Good, it is an excellent 

point. 

I find it hard to believe that the Iraqi security forces were unaware of this attack when they had to go through numerous checkpoints to get to the place where they murdered these folks. The 

Iraqis are responsible for guarding them, they were missing in action. They all went on a donut break at the time that these homicides occurred, they are always missing. 

And there is a debate about the seven that were taken and captured. I have become a real good fan of the French foreign affairs 

minister, especially with the last situation where he stopped this 

bad deal with Iran. But in a letter to some of his people in the Parliament, he makes the comment that as far as he is concerned, 

these seven are still in Iraq. My question is, have these seven people been rescued to your knowledge, no matter where they are? 

Mr. MCGURK. No. 

Mr. POE. Has anybody in the State Department interrogated the 

survivors as far as a criminal investigation going on? Have we seen 

in all of the investigators that we have, or any investigators to talk 

about who happened, what did these people look like, et cetera, et 

cetera? 

Mr. MCGURK. We have turned as much information as we possibly can to find out where these seven people are. I would be 

happy, as I have done with some members of the subcommittee, to 

brief you in a classified setting. 

Mr. POE. That is not my question. My question is have they been 

asked specifically about the murders in the camp that they survived, about who they were, what they looked like, what they said, 

what language they were speaking, have they been interrogated 

about those basic criminal investigation questions? 

38

Mr. MCGURK. We have asked our contacts with the MEK that we 

deal with to put their experts and those of information in touch 

with our experts, particularly at our Embassy to connect some of 

the dots. 

Mr. POE. We have waived 12 and allowed them to come into the 

United States, why haven’t we waived that for people? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, I want to be very precise in my language, when I mention that a legal fix would help given the FTO 

designation. We are deliberating internally about our policy regarding entry into the United States, a decision has been made that is 

why I cannot discuss that further here. 

Mr. POE. Well, it is the law, is it not, that the Secretary of State 

can waive that under the current law right now, that is not any 

big secret. 

Mr. MCGURK. There are mechanisms in which a limited number 

would be able to come into the United States, yes. 

Mr. POE. So what do we tell these folks, that freedom-loving folks 

that are just in a place where they don’t want to be, we won’t take 

them, we can’t get other countries to take them. And do you know 

what they are waiting for, the next attack, if we don’t hold Maliki 

accountable. I just want to make this comment. I don’t know if you 

have seen this letter or not, but 44 of us, 22 Democrats and 22 Republicans have sent a letter to the President of the United States 

saying no more money to Iraq until there is accountability for the 

murders in Camp Ashraf. Have you seen that letter? 

Mr. MCGURK. I have seen that letter, yes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You have to end the same way you always 

end. 

Mr. POE. And that is just the way it is. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I tease, we saved the best for last 

with Judge Poe, but now we have the best for last on the Democratic side, my good friend from Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee. I am 

going to let her take a breath here before she is recognized. Ms. 

Jackson Lee is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairwoman for her indulgence and as well as the ranking member for his indulgence as 

well. I would say, Mr. Secretary, many of us have been down this 

road before. And I must say that, I will say that in engaging the 

administration, I have received the 2 o’clock a.m. phone calls, I 

have seen phone calls from the envoy who was in Iraq on these crisis issues. And so I can say that I know that the heart of the administration is in the right place. I also know that there are families who have not been able to be engaged with their loved ones, 

there are families who have seen their loved ones dying in bloodshed they have not been able to protect. 

There have been promises made as the camps have been moved 

from one place to the next where we have thought that that would 

have been a safe location, a safe house, and come to find out the 

most recent attack, bloody attack that we have experienced has 

really had our ire be raised. 

Now let me just say this, I, along with, I know my colleague, the 

chairwoman during the heat of the Iraqi war, we have gone over 

many times. We have met with Maliki, we were the supporters of 

39

Iraq standing on its feet. We were the supporters, she had one position about the war, I had another position about the war, I opposed the war, but we were collectively supportive of Iraq being 

able to get on its feet, and Iraq being able to have a constitution. 

I was engaged in the discussions about women being included in 

the constitution. I take no back seat to trying to give Iraq every 

opportunity to be the kind of human rights, dignified democracy 

that they allege that they want to be, to allow everyone to live in 

dignity. This is not happening. 

What I want to focus on, as Mr. Wilson, Mr. Poe, Mr. Rohrabacher, on Camp Ashraf, all of them to put it in the way of my 

advocacy for the administration, for Secretary Kerry and the enormous work that is being done, and my hope for the success of his 

work, but there are hostages in Iraq that we must have now. There 

is documentation that those hostages are there by our French allies, by the United Nations and other supportive groups and information. 

I can’t imagine with the wealth of sophisticated intelligence authorities that we have, that we have funded, who have a vast array 

of information about Americans cannot pinpoint where starving 

Iranians, loved ones whose families are trying to save their lives 

after being on a hunger strike for 73 days. So I would ask this 

question of you, already knowing about your heart and your concern, I will not judge you, I already know that you are committed 

to getting this right. Will you, will you demand of Maliki not next 

week, not months from now, but can we expect in the next 48 

hours a call to the head of the Government of Iraq demanding the 

release of these hostages and demanding for their release now, or 

the documented undeniable evidence that they are not held within 

the bounds of Iraq. 

Second, would you be engaged with, or the Secretary be engaged 

with, and I have spoken to Secretary Kerry, I know his heart, with 

Maliki to demand the security of those in Camp Ashraf for now and 

forever until an ultimate solution of relocation to their homeland, 

a place of where their relatives are, or where they desire to be. Mr. 

McGurk, thank you for your testimony here today and I thank the 

gentlelady for yielding. I am short on this time, but I am hoping 

I will hear from you in a moment. 

Mr. MCGURK. Congresswoman, thank you and thank you for 

your engagement on all of these issues. I know we have had conversations at particularly difficult times. I want to thank you personally. 

We can’t pinpoint where the people are, and I would like to follow up with you on that. They are not in Iraq, the seven people. 

But I will guarantee that in my conversations with Maliki on down, 

the safety and security of Camp Ashraf, Camp Liberty of where the 

residents are, the Iraqi Government needs to do everything possible to keep those people safe but they will never be safe until 

they are out of Iraq. And we all need to work together, the MEK, 

us, the committee, everybody, the international community to find 

a place for them to go. 

There is now a U.N. Trust Fund, we have donated $1 million and 

we are asking for international contributions to that fund for countries like Albania that don’t have resources but are willing to take 

40

the MEK in, and we need to press foreign capitals to take them in 

because until they are out of Iraq, they are not going to be safe. 

And we don’t want anyone else to get hurt, we don’t want any more 

Americans to get hurt in Iraq, and we don’t any more residents of 

Camp Liberty to get hurt in Iraq. And until they are out of Iraq, 

they are not going to be safe. This is an international crisis and 

we need international help and support. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. May I just have a moment more to follow up, 

Secretary McGurk, I hear the passion in your voice. We are in an 

open hearing, you know where they are who is going to rescue 

them? Whose responsibility will it be to get them from where they 

are into safe haven? Because otherwise, we are leaving Maliki now 

without responsibility. We are saying, and you are documenting 

that they are not there. Let me just say that when my government 

speaks, I try with my best heart and mind to believe it. But I have 

got to see them alive and well to believe that they are not where 

I think they are, but they are in a—I am glad to hear that, I want 

them to be safe, but I want them to be in the arms of their loved 

ones or at least to be recognized by their loved ones that they are 

safe somewhere. So can that be done in the next 48 hours? Can we 

have a manner that indicates that they are safe? 

Mr. MCGURK. I will repeat here a statement that we issued on 

September 16th, and it is notable, I was going to mention this in 

my colloquy with the Congressman to my left, that within hours of 

the attack, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps issued a statement praising the attack. We issued a statement on September 

16th calling on the Government of Iran to use whatever influence 

it might have with groups who might be holding its missing persons to secure their immediate release. And I can talk more about 

details and about the status of these individuals and brief some 

members of the subcommittee. I would be happy to follow up. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. McGurk, thank youtestimony, thank all 

the witnesses in the audience for your participation and with that 

the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(41)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

42

f


85554n.eps

SlJBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

November 6,2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

AfIairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, to be held in Room 

2172 of the Rayburn House Otnce Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

vivvw.fQ[eignaffairsnQuse.J.QY): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Wednesday, November 13,2013 

2:00 p.m. 

US Foreign Policy Toward Iraq 

Mr. Brett McGurk 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran 

Bureau of Near Eastern AfIairs 

US. Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 
43


85554m.eps

COMI\HTTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

lvlINUTES OF SUBCO:v!MITTEE ON 

Day Wednesday lJate, ___ ,,1"'ll-'l.o:.3cell"'3'--__ Hoom ___ ""'2-'-1-'-'72"-__ 

SIal1ing Time _~?.:1,\'p.111L_Ending Time 4:08/1.m. 

Recesses 

Presiding Mcmbcr(s) 

Chairman Ros~Leht;'~eJl. Rep. DeSalt/is 

Chech lIll of the fallawing tiwi "pp/y: 

OpeIl S~SSiOll (]] 

ExecuH,. (closed) Session 0 Televised (]] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

u.s. Foreign Policy Tl)ward Iraq 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

(See attached) 

Electronically Recorded (taped) (]] 

Stenographic Record (]] 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Markwiih an" iOher are not members o(jidl committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes m NoD 

(Ij "no", please lzst heloH' and include title, agency, department. or OIxanization) 

STATEMENTS FOR TilE RECORD: (List any sia/ellle/its submitted/or the record) 

QFR - Rep. Sherman 

rIME SCm:DULlW TO RECOr\VENE 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 4:118 p.m. 
44

f


85554m-2.eps

Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Title: US Foreign Policy Toward Iraq 

Date: I 1113/2013 

NOllcommittee Members 

Member Present Member 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (FL) X Deutch, Ted (FL) 

Chabot, Steve (OH) X Connolly, Gerald (VA) 

Wilson, Joe (SC) X Higgins, Brian (NY) 

Kinzinger, Adam (LL) X 

Cicilline, David (Rl) 

Cotton, Tom (AR) X 

Grayson, Alan (FL) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) 

Weber, Randy (TX) X 

Schneider, Bradley (1L) 

Desantis, Ron (FL) X 

Kennedy, Joseph (MA) 

Radel, Trey (FL) X Meng, Grace (NY) 

Collins, Doug (GA) X Frankel, Lois (FL) 

Meadows, Mark (NC) X Sherman, Brad (CA) 

Yoho, Ted (FL) X Jackson-Lee, Shei fa (TX) 

Messer, Luke (IN) X 

Rohrabacher, Dana (CA) X 

Poe, Ted (TX) X 

Present 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
45


85554b-1.eps

Question 1: 

Question for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Brad Sherman 

To Deputy Assistant Secretary'/or Iraq and Iran Brell McGurk 

Saddam Hussein's regime incurred a large sum of debts, particularly to other Arab 

countries, during the Iran-Iraq War. Have these debts by Arab countries in the Gulf (and 

other Arab countries) been forgiven? Does Iraq owe anything still? If so, how much does 

Iraq owe and how much has been forgiven? To which countries and how much does Iraq 

owe money for debts incurred during the Iran-Iraq War? For these questions, please 

provide answers with regard to before and after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 

2003, where relevant. For example, did some Arab countries forgive Iraq's debt (and how 

much of it) after Saddam's fall? 

Iraq has taken significant steps to improve its standing in the region following the end of 

the Saddam Hussein era. To date, it has closed almost all Chapter VII obligations with Kuwait 

and has strengthened relations with neighbors like Jordan, Turkey, UAE, and Egypt. 

Following the 2003 collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, the Congressional Research 

Service estimated Iraq's foreign debt at $130 -140 billion, including Paris Club member debt 

(estimated at $42.5 billion), non-Paris Club bilateral debt (estimated at $67.4 billion), 

commercial debt (estimated at $20 billion), and multilateral debt (estimated at $0.5 billion). re 

closely following developments in conflicts around the world. Based on current assessments, 

our budget request includes the funding needs we anticipate for FY 2014. 

In 2004, the Paris Club's 19 members signed an agreement to reduce Iraq's external debt 

by 80% (approximately $32 billion). The United States forgave its Saddam-era debt, worth $4. I 

billion, in November 2004. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the primary source for 

Iraq's repayment information, estimated that, as of the end of 2012, Iraq's total remaining 

external debt was $60 billion (28% ofGDP), including about $42 billion to non-Paris Club 

creditors. 

We understand that the majority of the up to $130 billion in Iraqi external debt is 

attributed to debt incurred from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Precise figures for Iraq's foreign 

debt obligations, including to Arab countries for debts incurred during the Iran-Iraq War, are 

unknown. Iraq's external creditors do not routinely make their bilateral debt information public 

and portions of Iraqi debts have not been reported to debt monitoring bodies. Such concerns 

have led to calculation disparities in exactly what Iraq actually owes and how interest on this 

debt should be tallied. 

Below numbers reflect information available to us through both government and open 

source reporting (Note: information is current as of 2011). 
46

Æ


85554b-2.eps

Non-Paris Club Debt to Arab Countries 

(estimated) 

(in U.S. $ million) 

Saudi Arabia $30,000 

Kuwait $27,000 

Qatar $4,000 

United Arab Emirates $5,800 

Jordan $1,300 

Morocco $32 

Algeria $4 

The combined external debt owed by Iraq to other Arab countries, including Egypt and 

Sudan, was estimated to be below $1 million. Reportedly, the GOI has settled outstanding 

claims with Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen.