— 

Tschn~al Repon 403

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF

IMPROVED TACTICAL SYMBOL OGY

Donald S. Ciccone, Michael G. Samet, and

James B. Channor, Perceptronics , Inc.

EZT~

HUMAN FACTORS TECHNICAL AREA

DOG H

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: , U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

August 1979

App rovi d for public relsis.; distribution unlimited. -

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U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUT E

FOR THE BE HAVIORAL AN D SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating A gency under the Juris diction of the

L Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WILLIAM 1. HAUSE R

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Colonel . U S Army

Technical Director Commander

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

Perceptronics, Inc.

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this report hes been made by ARI. Pie.,. address corn ponden.~

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concerning distribution of reports to: U. S. Army Research Institut e for the Behevioral end Social Sciences. ATTN . PEAl- P . 5001 Eisenhowe r Avenue, AI

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QIL The findiflqs in this report era not to be constru d is art of ficiel 0 p.rtmint of the Army position, unless to delignls.d by ot her authori zed documen ts.

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Technical Report 403

4. TITLE (end Subtitle) S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

Annual Technical

~~~~ RAMEWORK FOR THE ~~~ 1ELOPMENT OF AN~~~~PROVED, Ma r. 16 , 1978 - Mar. 15 , 197 TACTICAL ~~~MB0LOGY - ________

~~ . PtRFO~~

4swe ORG. ~ EPO~ 7 NUMBER

_____________________________________________________ PATR— l

~ 63.-79—4~/J. 7. AUTHOR(.) I

~ CONTRAC’r0W~~WANT NUMOER(.)

~~ onald .)

~~~ccone , Michael G .j Samet ..~~~~~ /

~~ 1~mes~~~~~~~~ nnon ~~~ ~~ j

~~~ DABC l9-78_C4ØØl8 ,

9. PERFORMIN G ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 

- 

ID. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT , TASK

Perceptronics , Inc. - . 

q ~ 6271 Variel Avenue 

~ ~~~~

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~ Woodland Hills 2Q762722A765 / -. , CA 91367 “ .‘. . / -

I t. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS f”

~ 

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-R€POR~.4ATE

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behaviora j1 Aug..~~~~~~79,. and Social Sciences _______________

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14. MONITORING AGENCY SLAMS & ADORESS(H different from ConUolUng Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of thi. report)

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16 ~~r 78—15 Mar 79• ~~~~~ DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING

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Distribution unlimited; approved for public release. ‘

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te. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Technically monitored by Raymond C. Sidorsky , Human Factors Technical Area , ARI .

4 Ralph E. Geiselman , J. Thomas Murray , and Dennis R. Foley made contributions

to this report .

19. KEY WORDS (Continu, on river.. dde If n.c...ary end Identity by block number)

Battlefield information Situation displays Task—based analysis Graphic portrayal Symbols User requirements Information requirements Tactical displays

Maps Tactical information

Military symbols Tactics

20. AOSTRA CT Cant~~u. .. revere, .f* if n.c..omy end Identify by block ntmeber) 

~~ The utility of symbology would be increased by making it more compatible

with current and emergent tactical doctrine . A structured method~ioq~

7based on a role—playing exercise was developed for eliciting graphically related

tactical information requirements from experienced military tacticians . -

. ~~ ‘ ‘ -e —~~ . -

The methodQ~

Logy ,. involving a two~ star3~~elicitatjon process,/’emp~eys doctrinally—sanctioned information-processing guide ines to prompt participants

to generate task—related tactical questions (e.g., What is the princioal

DO ~~~~~~~~ 1473 EDSTIOW OF P NOV CS IS 0BS0LETE . Unclassified 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICAT IOM OP THIS PAGE (When Del. Entered)

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Unclassifi ed

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE(Wben Date Ent.r.d)

Item 20 (Continued)

.?deficiency of a specific enemy unit?) and candidate answers (e.g., mobility,

personnel). A pilot test used two experienced staff officers and a European

defensive scenario. The numerous question and answer sets obtained were

organized into 22 clusters (i.e., data structures) , with each one specif ying

questions in decreasing order of detail according to a common tactical theme

(e.g., immediate threat , enemy vulnerability , priority targets) . These data

structures represent categories of task-based information requirements which

can serve as potential bui],ding blocks in the development of a dynamic , flexible database for tactical symbology .

The framework also contains a preliminary analysis of symbol design

effectiveness based on a taxonomy of basic information—processing behaviors,

which include symbol discrimination , display search , and symbol 1earnability..~ Each of these processing components was used as a focus for examining relevant research literature and its implications; and as a result , preliminary

guidelines were derived for improving symbol design effectiveness (e.g.,

minimize the amount of feature similarity among different members of a symbol

set). Finally, to help monitor future synibology development efforts , a

multi—faceted evaluation strategy is outlined which calls for systematic attention to content—based , and tactical performance—based assessment criteria. 

ii Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OP THIS PAGE(Wlien DMa Entered)
Technical Report 403

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF

IMPROVED TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY

Donald S. Ciccone, Michael G. Samet , and

James B. Channon

Perceptronics , Inc.

Raymond C. Sidorsky, Team Chief

Submitted by: Edgar M. Johnson, Chief

HUMAN FACTORS TECHNICAL AREA

Approved by:

Milton S. Katz, Acting Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

‘JS ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SC!E1’~l.’L..

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria , Virginia 22333

Office , Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

August 1979

Army Project Number Information Processing

20762722A765

i

~ ,proved for public release ; distrib ution unlimited.

iii 

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______ ____________________ __________ _________ / ___ - -I
ARI Research Reports and Technical Reports are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and for other research and military agencies. Any findings ready

for implementation at the time of publication are presented in the last part

of the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task , formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

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FOREWORD

The Human Factors Technical Area of the Army Research Institute CARl )

is concerned with aiding users and operators to cope with the ever increasing complexity of the man—machine systems being designed to acquire ,

transmit , process , disseminate , and utilize tactical information on the

battlefield . The research is focused on the interface problems and interactions within cc*nmand and control centers and is concerned with such

areas as topographic products and procedures, tactical symbology , user—

oriented systems , information management, staff operations and procedures,

sensor systems integration and utilization, and issues of system

development.

The current symbology, as provided in FM 21-30 and FM 21-21 , is

widely agreed to be inadequate. As a result, a number of Army agencies

are working to evolve special sub-sets of new or modified symbols that

are better suited to their particular information-processing needs. In

the absence of a common frame of reference , these effor ts could result

in a proliferation of specialized symbols that meet the needs of some ,

but not all , potential users. The present publication tries to identify

and categorize the situational , information , and behavioral factors that

contribute to the effective design and use of visual symbols for representing the battlefield . This analysis is a necessary first step in the

development of a comprehensive framework , typology , and theory of tactical sytnbology.

Research in the area of tactical symbology is conducted as an in—

house effort augmented through contracts with organizations selected f or

their specialized capabilities and unique facilities. The present study

was conducted by personnel of Perceptronics , Inc., under Contract

DAHC19-78-C—00l8. This research is responsive to requirements of Army

Project 2Q762722A765 and related to special requirements of the Combined

Arms Combat Developments Activity , Fort Leavenworth , Kans. Special requirements are contained in Human Resource Need 78—98, Graphic Syinbology

for Automated Tactical Displays and 78-150, Optimizing Display of Topographic and Dynamic Battlefield Information .

JO EPH ZEIDNER

echnical Director

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A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IMPROVED TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY

BRIEF

Requirement:

To improve the effectiveness and enlarge the scope of the symbology

used to represent tactically significant objects and/or events on the

battlefield.

Procedure :

In order to develop a comprehensive framework for defining symbology

issues , an analysis was performed to identify, task-based information requirements. The analysis was based on four basic task dimensions consisting of (1) a user category——i.e., command group , combat support staff ,

and service support staff; (2) a task category-—i.e., assessment, planning, and tactical communications ; (3) a military operations category--

i.e., offense, defense retrograde , and special operations; and (4) an

information category--i.e., enemy situation , and terrain/weather.

Findings :

The task—based information analysis was demonstrated to be an effective means for eliciting from experienced tacticians many of the •‘questions” important to battlefield command and control operations .

These questions were categorized into three types : (1) those amenable

to expression via current symbology; (2) information deficiencies--i.e.,

tactical questions which current symbology has failed to answer; and

(3) inEormation imperatives——i.e., new questions which will require new

types of symbolization.

Utilization of Findings :

~ The products of this analysis will contribute to a methodology

which will aid in the development of new or modified tactical symbols

that portray the status of the battlefield more completely and

understandably.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. SUMMARY 1-1

1.1 Statement of the Problem 1-1

1.2 Technical Approach 1-2

1.2.1 A Framework for the Development of Improved

Symbology 1-2

1.2.2 Tactical Symbology: Selected Issues and

Analyses 1—2

1.2.3 A Query-Based Methodology for Content

Analysis 1—4

1.2.4 A Behaviora l Analysis of Symbol Design

Effectiveness 1-7

1.2.5 Toward Evaluating the Effectiveness of Tactical

Symbology 1-8

2. TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY : SELECTED ISSUES AND ANALYSES 2-1

2.1 Overview 2 1

2.2 Conventional Symbology 2-1

2.3 Toward Improved Symbology 2-3

2.3.1 Information Content 2-3

2.3 .2 Information Selection 2-16

2.3.3 Symbology Implementation Issues 2-20

2.4 Summary 2-22

3. A QUERY-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 3-1

3.1 Overview 3-1

3.2 Task Framework 3-2

3.3 Elicitati on of Content Requirements 3-4

3.3.1 First-Stage Elicitation 3-6

3.3.2 Second-Stage Elicitation 3-9

3.3.3 Organization of Requirements 3-11

• . 3.4 Application of Elicitation Methodology : A

Preliminary Study 3-13

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

3.4.1 Introduction 3-13

3.4.2 Methodology 3-14

3.4.3 Analysis 3-22

3.4.4 Results 3-24

3.4.5 Implications 3—25

3.4.6 Summary 3-26

EXHIBIT 3-1. CANDIDATE CLUSTERS OF TACTICAL QUESTIONS 3-29

4. A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF SYMBOL DESIGN EFFECTIVENESS 4-1

4.1 Overview 4-1

4.2 Behavioral Requirements 4—2

4.3 Discriminab ility 4-5

4.3.1 Overview 4-5

4.3.2 Confusability 4-7

4.3.3 Display Clutter 4-13

4.4 Search 4-17

4.4.1 Overview 4-17

4.4.2 Peripheral Cueing 4-17

4.4.3 Display Background 4-20

4.5 Learnability 4-20

4.5.1 Overview 4-20

4.5.2 Perceptual Learning 4-22

4.5.3 Association Formation 4-25

4.6 Sample Task Analysis 4—28

4.7 Summary 4-30

5. TOWARD EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY 5-1

5.1 Overview 5-1

5.2 Content-Based Cri teria 5-3

5.3 User-Based Cri teria 5-4

5.3.1 Overview 5-4

5.3.2 Some Experimental Paradigms 5-6

5.3.3 Mathematical /Analytical Methodology 5—7

5.4 Tactical Cri teria 5-9

5.5 Sumary 5-15

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Conti nued)

Pa ge

6. REFERENCES 6-i

APPENDIX A - ADP-RELATED ISSUES A-i

APPENDIX B - DEFENSIVE SCENARIO

EUROPEAN SETTING B-i

APPENDIX C - ELICITATION DATA C-i

APPENDIX D - A BEHAVIORAL REQUIREMENTS TAXONOMY FOR SYMBOL USE 0-i

APPENDIX E - SOME SYMBOL DESIGN CANDIDATES E-i

APPENDIX F - SPATIAL FREQUENCY ANALYSIS F-i

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LIST OF TABLES

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Table 2-1. Tac tical “Question s~’ for Convention al Symbology 2-2

3-1 . Doctrinal Prompts for Defense 3-18

4—1. Informa ti on Process i ng Ta sk An al ysis : Assess

Func tiona l Characteristics of Enemy Units 4-29

4-2. ‘ Con trasting ’ Symbol Desi gn Characteristics 4-32

5- 1. Task-Based Selection of Reference Measures 5-12

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1 . A Framework for the Development of Tactical

Symbology 1-3

2— 1. Basic Unit Structure 2-6

2-2. Cross-Attached Unit Structured 2-7

3-1. Parameters of Information Processing in the ‘OC 3-5

4-1. Psychological Dimensions of the Symbol-Use Process 4-6

4-2. Conventional Symbol Designs (FM 21-30) 4-9

4-3. Tactical Capability Symbology (TCS) 4-18

4-4. Displa y Background Structures 4-21

4-5. Illustration of Overlapping Symbol Configurations 4-24

5-1. An Overview of the Evaluation Process 5— 2

5-2. Samp le Conten t Assessment Matrix 5-5

xii

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A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY

1 . SUMMARY

1.1 Sta tement of the Problem

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The use of military symbols dates back at least to the days of Napo l eon.

Warfare has chan ged since that era and so have the methods by which the

battlefield environment is graphically portrayed . Yet the symbology used

to portray the tactical situation has remai ned the same for decades .

The fol l owing question therefore emerges: Is conventional symbology

ade qua te to meet the tact i cal needs of today ’s user? Conventiona l

symbology (as represented in Army Field Manual 21-30, Milita ry Symbols)

has been criticized for such reasons as: the l evel of detail is often

inappropriate ; the details of the code are hard to remember; the extraction of salient information is aifficu lt; and , the adaptation to automa ted

d isplays is cumbersome and inefficient. Consequently, there seems to be

a widespread concensus that the mechanics and utilit y of the current

symbol system are being severely strained by the increasing volume and

complexity of tactical da ta .

Fortunately, modern electronic storage and display systems are now available that may significantly reduce this info rmation processing burden.

In particular , it is now possible to look forward to the development of

improved symbology that is expressly designed to exploit the advantages

of computer technology . Whereas conventional symbology is static in

nature--requiring a one-to-one mapping of symbol-to—concept , improved

and new types of syrnbology may be dynamic--permi tting the form and content

of symbols to change in response to changing user requirements . Consonant

with this increase in information processing power and display, modern

symbology may come to assume a larger role in tactical assessment and

planning. Thus , to set the stage for these new developments , this report

attempts to establish a framework for considering the relevant issues and

1-1

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requirements as well as the design and evaluation pri ncipl es surrounding

improved , user-oriented tactical symbology .

1.2 Technical Approach

1.2.1 A Framework for the Development of Improved Symbology . The

development of a symbolic language for communicating tactica l information

entails the specifi cation of the tactical database (content) as well as

the identification of perceptually effective design criteria (form). Our

perception of the components in the development process and their interconnectedness are illustrated in Figure i-i. The organization of this

report begins with a discussion of selected issues that point to needs

and directions for improving tactical symbology (Chapter 2). The derivation of the content or information requirements of tacti cal symbology

is then the subject of a prototypical , task—based analysis described and

pilot-tested in Chapter 3. A complementary behavioral analysis of design

criteria for effective symbology follows in Chapter 4. Finally, evaluation procedures are required to monitor the progress of development

efforts ; Chapter 5 describes a diversifi ed set of assessment criteria

for evaluating the adequacy of info rmation content , the effectiveness of

symbol design , and the impact of symbology on tactical decision making.

The following paragraphs provide a brief summa ry of the objectives and

methodology for each area of program effort. The reader is referred to

appropriate chapters of this report for a detailed discussion of each

topic.

1.2.2 Tactical Symbology : Selected Issues and Analyses (Chapter 2).

Emerging doctrine and advancing technology call for the development

of improved tactical symbology . Although conventiona l symbology

(FM 21-30) can convey basic unit information (e.g., identity , function ,

size and weapon type), it cannot communicate a richness of detail

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CONTENT ANALYSIS ~ EVALUATION DESIGN

ISSUES REQUIRE- ~ — PROCEDURES — ANALYSIS

(Ch . 2) MENTS (CHAPTER 5) (CHAPTER 4) ~ (Ch. 3) ~

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SYMBOL

TACTICAL * ~~ DESI GN ~~~~~

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DATA BASE FEATURES

FIGURE 1-1 . A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY

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considered important by command personnel , and i t cannot accommodate most

of the new ~

‘imperatives ” of tactical doctrine (e.g., FM 100-5, ~p~rations) .

In contrast , an improved tactical symbology seems to require the ability

to portray additional dimensions of i nformation such as the dynamic

composition of units (e.g., combined-arms team), unit capability (e.g.,

threat , effectiveness , mobilit y, fi repower), informa tion dependability

(e.g., accuracy), and the updated nature of elements in the current

display (e.g., changes in unit position). Such parameters of information ,

which vary in their degree of abstractness , a ppear to be necessary for

sup porting modern tactical performance.

Another requ i rement to be considered in the framework for an improved

tactical symbology is the development of procedures for information

selection. Different groups of users (e.g., different echelon levels)

will require different subsets of inforriation to be displayed , and

different data will be important in different tactical situations (e.g.,

di fferent terrains or intensities of war). In this regard , advancements

in automated da ta-processing systems will likely impact upon the develo pmen t and implementation of a more dynamic and flexible symbology system.

The fulfillment of both the representation and selection requirements

carried by improved tacti cal symbology , however , must occur within

the limits of certain constrain ts , such as those im poc~d by user acce ptance , and in tersorvicc and i nternational (i.e., NATO) standardization.

1.2.3 A Query-Based Methodology for Content Analysis (Chapter 3).

One of the most basic ingredients of symbology development should be

the expansion of a tactical database (i.e., organized set of information

requirements) to accommoda te both the emergi ng principles of tactical

doctrine (e.g., FM 100-5) and the increased precision and range

of modern weaponry . With this goal in mind , a formal methodology

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was developed for elic iting candidate info rmat ion requirements from

experienced military tacticians. The approach addresses the problem

of elicitation and data analysis in the context of a structured roleplaying exercise . In essence, doctrinally— sanctioned information processing

gu i delines are used as “prompts” to elicit candidate requirements (e.g.,

FM iOO— 5 states “Cr~

ncentrate on the critical times and places ”). Each

prompt is embedded within a tactical scenario and presented , one at a

time , to partici pants in the elicitati on exercise. They are instructed

to generate tactical questions which if adequately answered , would permit

them to comply in full with doctrinal requirements . The implicit goal

of this procedure is to insure a correspondence between the functional

context in which symbology is used and the semantic content it offers

the user. In other words , we are suggesting that under ideal circumstances

improved tactical symbology should provide battlefield decision-makers

with accurate and timely “answers” to complex tactical “questions .”

Thus , decidi tiç what i nformation to include in improved symbology might

perhaps be approached by deciding what questions it should be able to

answer. Specifically, the process of question generation seems to

represent a more straight-forward and less ambiguous task than the direct

elicitation of lists of information requirements. Most likely, this is

because some form of self-interrogation always intervenes , either

covertly or overtly, when individuals try to identify their information

“ requirements .” Once a question is generated , i t can then be used as a

prompt in a second elicitation task designed to identify the range of

possible “answers.” The result of this follow-up elicitation is a set

of tactical concepts corresponding to candidate information requirements

(i.e., response categories). For example , a doctrinal prompt might

elicit the follow tactical question: What is the p rincipal deficiency

of a specific enemy unit? Later , this query would be used as an elicitation prompt to generate a set of possible answers (e.g., Mobility, POL,

Ammo, Personnel, Morale).

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Following an in-depth discussion of the two-stage elicitation method for

identifying information requirements , Chapter 3 describes an exploratory

study in which the feasibility of the technique was tested . Two

experienced Army staff officers participated in the study . In the

context of a tactica l scenari o involving command group decision making

for defensive operations in rural terrain , they were asked to generate

task-related questions in response to situational and doctrinal prompts .

The resulti ng questions were then used to facilitate the elicitati on

of corresponding information requirements (i.e., potential answers to

relevant questions).

The preliminary study was also intended to illustrate the important role

of data organization in efforts to develop an accessible database for

improved symbology . After being reduced and analyzed , the numerous

tactical questi ons elicited in the study were organized i nto a set of

22 clusters of questi ons (i.e., data structures), wi th each one reflecting

a different tactical theme. The data structures are task-oriented and

are designed so that they can be selectively accessed for retrieval of

information at different levels of tactical detail. For example , consider

the cluster of questions referring to “Type of Threat” . Under certain

circumstances , the user may only have time for a quick overview of the

situation --all combat-type vs. all support-type units . In another

context , the user may wish to conduct a more elaborate analysis by

selecting finer levels of information detail (e.g., by asking for “unit

composition ” or “special weapons ”). In effect, each data structure

represents a task-based category of information requirements which can

serve as a potential building -block in the development of a dynamic

database for tactical symbology .

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Each tactical question in the database , therefo re , can be answered at

different levels of specificity rang ing from abstract and summarized to

concrete and detai led . By restating questions at different levels of

abstract ion , the dimens ion of information summarization was exp lic itly

built -in to the content analysis. The overall objective was to generate

a set of representative informat ion requirements for symbology , and ,

in the process , illustrate the app licability of a task—based technique

for expanding current conceptual foundations.

1.2.4 A Behaviora l Analysis of Symbol Desigfl Effectiveness (Chapter 4).

To insure the usefu l ness of a tactical symbology which meets the challenges

of modern informationa l requ irements , the performance context in which the

symbology is to be used should be examined . Toward this end , a general

taxonomy of fundamenta l behavioral requirements was developed through

analysis of a task scenario. The task analysis suggested that the process

of using symbols has three basic components: discrimination , search , and

learnabi lity (symbol acquisition and retention). This taxonomy was then

used to organize available behavioral research literature in order to

derive some preliminary guidel i nes for symbol design. Specific guidelines

were offered toward the development of symbols which facilitate the

performance of each of the behavioral processes , for example:

DiscIminatio n

Minimize, to the extent possible , the amount of feature

similarity among different numbers of a symbol set.

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Search

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Mini-an-se the visua l 8ahi-ency of those features tha t

must remain redundant across members of a symbol set. H

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Learnabi lity

Take advantage of the user group ‘s prior learning and

conditioning to select symbol design features (e.g.,

iconicity, color) which enhance association formation.

For examp le, if the color “red ” is culturally identified

with the concept of danger , it mig ht be utilized in the

portrayal of enemy threat.

Overall , such guidelines are intended to help support future symbol

design efforts by codifying and applying some relationships between

design variables and user-based performance criteria.

1.2.5 Toward Eva l uating the Effectiveness of Tactical Symbology

(Chapter 5). The objective of this chapter is to establish a preliminary set of assessment procedures for evaluating the effectivness of

new symbology . Three major categories of assessment criteria were

identified : (1) Content—based criteria--standards for evaluating the

functional breadth and information depth of a candidate tactical

database; (2) User-based criteria--procedures for evaluating the

discrimi nabi lity , searchability and learnability of proposed symbol

designs; (3) Tactical criteria--a set of task—based procedures for

assessing the impact of symbology on tactical problem -solving and

decision -making . This multi -criteria approach carried out in a logical

sequence provides an evaluation framework to support the development and

improvement of tactical symbology .

1-9

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~~~~~~~~~ 

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~~~~~~~ 

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— 0 / ~~~~ 

p

__
2. TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY : SELECTED ISSUES AND ANALYSES

2.1 Overview

The contents of this chapter reflect the position that an improved tactical

symbology is necessary primarily to meet new user requirements that

accompany emerging tactical doctrine and advancing technology . Consistent

with this view , Sidorsky , Gellman , and Moses (1979) have developed the

following definition of tactical symbology that emphasizes command

functions :

“Tactica l symbo logy rcfe rs to the symbols used to portray

the information acquired , manipulated , and displayed by

a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in supporting the online information needs of a con2’nander engaged in planning

and/or conducting a combat operation. ”

In this cha pter , a discussion of requirements for an improved symbology

is preceded by a brief description of the limi ted breadth of conventional

symbology. The requirements are then elaborated and exami ned in the

context of implementati on issues for improved symbology , such as symbology

standardization and user acceptance .

2.2 Conventional Symbology

Conventional symbology (as documented in A rmy Field Manual 21— 30 ,

Military Symbols) has traditionally served a communication function (who,

what , and where ) and for this purpose its content or “database ” may , in

fact , be adequate. When used in conjuncti on with a battlefield situation

display , conventiona l symbology addresses a number of important tactical

questions . A representative list of these , presented in Table 2-1 , was

generated by reviewing FM 21-30 in consultation with the mi litary members

of our research team. This list suggests that conventional symbology is

2-1

4 - / -t

~~ ~ 4

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .
TABLE 2-1

TACTICAL “QUESTIONS” FOR CONVENTIONAL SYMBOLOGY

1. What types of enemy units

oppose me? (Infantry , Armor , etc.)

2. What is their identity? (101st Battalion , etc.)

3. Where are they located? (Precise or actual location , future

or proposed l ocation)

4. What size are they? (Division , Battalion , etc.)

5. What kind of mobi lity do

they have? (Foot mobile , Airborne , etc.)

6. Where are their con~

nand posts? (Present or actual location ,

future or projected location)

7. What operating boundaries exist? ( FEBA , rea r boundaries)

8. What control measures are known ? (Contact points , linkup points ,

release points , start points , delay

lines , fire coordination line)

9. What is their principal weapon

system? (Recoilless Rifle , Mortar , Howi tzer,

air defense machine gun)

_ 

2-2 

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capable of conveying the basic information required for coordinating and

supervising battlefield operations (i.e. , unit size , identity , and

function).

Perhaps the most obvious problem with the content of conventional

symbology is the narrow range of tactical concepts it can accommodate .

In thi s regard , Sidors ky (1977) comments :

“The current military symbo logy of FM 21-30 is a very

efficient method for describing the adninistrative makeup of a unit. A lot of information about the composition

of the unit can be packed into a small space. Unfortunately, however, most of this information is of little

direct value to the processe s of situational analysis,

problem solving, decision making and other higher level

cognitive activities associated with comnw-id and control.

The current symbo logy does a good job of identify ing a

unit but it doesn ’t tell anything about the uni /- ’

~ a /ui l

status or capabilities .”

Several problems related to the issue raised by Sidorsky are discussed

in detail in the following sections which focus on the development of

improved tactical symbology .

2.3 Toward Improved Symbology

This section descri bes selective issues that appear worthy for conside ration by any program designed to develop improved tactical symbology .

These issues have been divided into two major classes - information

content and information selection.

2.3.1 Information Content. To improve the efficiency of battlefield

operations , a new symbology should have the capability to represent the

combined-arms compos ition of friendly and enemy units , the functional

combat capabilities of these units , the probable accuracy of the

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battlefield intelligence portrayed , the updated nature of battlefiel d

information , and critical aspects of the terrain. Each of these issues

is d iscussed here, followe d by a brief look at the challenges offered

by recent advances in military technology and doctri ne .

Combine d Arms Forces. Current U.S. Army tactical doctrine (FM 100-5 ,

Operations ) favors the use of a combi-ned arms force. A combined arms force

can be define d as “a team of two or more arms , each su pp lementin g the

other ’ s capabilities , to accomplish an assigned mission ” (u.s. Army

Reference Book 100-7, The Common Lan guages of Tactics) . More specifically,

it has recently been written (Hardy , Patrick , and Georgian , 1976):

common practice is to take a tank company and attach

it to an infantry battalion and take a company from that

infantry battalion and give it back to the tank battalion.

The resulting combined arms force then still has three

line companies, but, to distinguzsh it from its un-crossattached form, it is generall y referred to as a task force.

There is nothing ri g id in the one-for-one exchange idea.

What units are cross-attached and how they are cross-attached

is determined based on t

~ie tactical situation. The one-forone system is the most common and the resulting task force

would be designated tank-heavy or infantry-heavy, depending

on whether there are more tank or infan try companies in

the task force . . . .As the system is envisioned , it is quite

possible for a tank battalion to actually end up an infant n:,’-

heavy task force. ”

Thus , in keeping with emerging tactical doctrine , a bas i c requ i rement of

tactical symbology is that it accu rately portray the current functional

character of a militar y unit.

An underlying assumption of conventional symbology (FM 21-30) is that a

military unit is relatively homogeneous with respect to function . For

example , an armored unit is assigned a specific symbol to distinguish

its function from that of the infantry . With the advent of combined

I

2-4

____

.; - 

~~~~~~~~~~ ‘

_________________
arms, however , the assumption of fixed unit function is now open to

question . The problem is that dynamic cross-attachment destroys the

funct i onal inte grity of a military unit . For exam p le , consider two

f i ctitious battalions descr ib ed in Figure 2-1 . Each is i ntact and

consists of three l ine companies. When fielded , however , each battalion

may assume a dramatically di fferent functional character. Consider the

same two battalions with cross-attached units as described in Figure 2-2.

The 3rd Tank Batta li on when fiel ded i s funct i onall y an infantry unit ,

while the 5th Infantry Battalion is functionally an armored unit. Each

battal ion retains its original designati on , however , des p ite its change

in funct ional status. This practice can be referred to as the historical

approach to symbolic portrayal. The underlying assumption is that the

ori gin of a unit i s more important to portray than its current func tional

capability .

The symbolic portrayal of histor i cal function increases the i nformation

processing burden on the symbol user by requiring him to “update ” symbols

pr ior to interpreting their tactica l significance. If the histcrica l

app roach i s cont i nued , the amount of preprocessing required to interpret

a situa tion display will necessaril y increase as the use of combined arms

tactics becomes more prevalent. The impact of cross-attachment can ,

however , be minimized by simply reassigning unit designati ons as required

to match current uni t function. Unit identification , required to esta blish

chain of command , would of necessity be represente d by means other than a

function or duty symbol.

The symbolic portrayal of historic vs. current unit function represents

a procedural issue which has long range implications for developing improved

symbology as wel l as immediate implications for conventional symbology.

Existing unit symbols can be reassigned under dynamic battlefield conditions

to portray current functional status without any changes in actual graphic

-I

2—5

- 

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~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

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L 5TH

MECHANIZED

INFANTRY

BATTAL I ON

I ______

HQ 1 MECHANIZED

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COMPANY I_ I ~~~ At]] 

SUPPORT

3RD

TAN K

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FIGURE 2-1. BASIc UNIT STRUCTURE

2-6

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5TH

MECHAN I ZED

INFANTRY

BATTALION

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HQ MECHANIZED TANK

COMPANY INFANTRY i COMPAN Y B I SUPPORT

COMPANY A L 

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3RD

TA NK

BATTAL ION

HQ I TANK MECHANIZED

COMPANY I COMPANY A I INFANTRY 1 SUPPORT I _____ _____ 

FIGURE 2-2. CROSS-ATTACHED UNIT STRUCTURE

2-7

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design. Similarly, a major requirement of improved symbology may be that

it provide updated functional information to reflect the changing composition of a combined arms force.

L

The effective use of combined arms will require milita ry units to adopt a

more fluid structure both during training and on the battlefield. Combined

arms forces will typically be performing a diveristy of functions which

cut across two or three traditional unit designations. These changing

military task requirements pose a major problem for improved unit symbology .

If the relative mix of unit types within a combined arms force is prone

to frequent change , improved symbology must provide a built -in mechanism

for communicating this change rapi.dly and accurately to command and control

personnel . This is especially important when units are not easily characterized by a single functional desi gnation. In particular , the symbolic

portrayal of a combined arms force may be required to identify both the

functional character of each attached unit and the size of each attachment

in relation to the unit as a whole.

Unit Capabilities. Aside from the need for an adequate representation of

a unit’ s composition , it would be extremely useful to be able to specify

more abstract information using a new tactical symbology , such as a unit’ s

functional combat capabiliti es. In this regard , several authors have noted

- 

in papers dealing with current tactical doctrine that a unit’ s composition

and location comprise only part of the information necessary for effective

decision making . For example , Channon (1976), has referred to the strength

and reach of an enemy unit as essential i nformation , Middleton (1977a) has

- called for the adoption of combat effectiveness indicators , and Moses (1977)

has stated that a unit’ s threat value should be represented in a new

display symbology .

2-8

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Since FM21-30 symbology cannot represent unit capability directly,

capability information must be inferred . For example , a brigade commander

can infer that he is at a disadvantage if he is facing two enemy divisions.

The same commander may in fact be in a superior position to the enemy if

he is defending a narrow pass with fresh troops against an enemy who has

suffered high casualties attacking the pass over a number of days . Neither

of these situational and dynamic tactical information scenarios can

presently be displayed . A new system might relieve some of the enormous

burden placed on commanders ’ memories , but such a capability , of course ,

remains to be demonstrated.

The issues concerning the graphic portrayal of unit capability information

can be discussed in terms of the types of requirements that a capability

symbology might ful fill. Such requirements have been put forth by different

writers and they can be conveniently presented in the form of specific

tactical questions. In addition , suggestions have been made for how the

graphic representation of unit capability i nformation might be approached .

For example , Channon (1978) has provided the following as key questions

in determining what’ s important about the capabilities of an enemy unit:

(1) Is it a striking unit?

(2) How powerful is it?

(3) With what force and range can it strike?

(4) Is it moving now?

(5) Is it changing its structure (e.g., assembl i ng into a

combined arms formation)?

Channon considers these questions to be so important that they should take

precedence over other related i nformation requirements such as , for example ,

order-of-battle details.

—

. 

-

0

/
Sidorsky (1977) has proposed a specific list of eight tactical variables

that might be included in the portrayal of unit capability information.

These can be phrased in question format as follows :

(1) Threat. What is the overall tactical threat posed by an

enemy unit or what is the overall capability needed by a

friendly unit to counter enemy actions?

(2) Effectiveness. What is the combat readiness of enemy and

friendly units? This includes such factors as combat

experience , training , fatigue , morale , exposure , etc .

(3) Mobility . How mobile are friendly and enemy units? This

variable includes mobility factors inherent to the unit

such as motor and air transport as well as the available

road network , obstacles , minefields , etc.

(4) Firepower. What is the sum total of a friendly or enemy

unit’ s available direct and indirect operational weaponry

than can be employed in accomplishing the mission?

(5) Logistics. What is the relationship of the unit to its

source(s) of essential supplies at the present time or at

some future time predicated on an assumed scenario of

future action?

(6) Terrain. What tactica l advantage/disadvantage does a unit

have as a result of the terrain it occupies and/or as a

- result of probable avenues of approach and/or maneuveri ng

area?

2-10

- ----- ____- - -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - / _______ _____ - --
(7) Support. To what degree can a given unit be supported by

other elements such as artillery coverage , protected flanks ,

air support (fixed wing or helicopter , radar coverage ,

communication services , etc.)?

(8) Density. How massed or dispersed are a unit’ s elements and

as a result , what is a unit ’ s ability to launch or withstand

either a conventional or nuclear attack?

Although the sets of questions pointed to by Sidorsky ’s scheme differ in

scope and specificity from those generated by Channon , both writers have

the same goal in mind -- namely, to focus attention to the need for

graphic portrayal of directly usable unit capability information. Given

the conceptual overlap between the two sets of questions , when taken

together they raise significant issues concerning what type of capability

summary should be conveyed to the user.

Toward the graphic representation of responses to unit capability

questions , Channon (1978) has suggested certain desi gn features that he

thinks modern tactical symbology should have . Some of the features that

might be included in his system are the following:

(1) figurative symbols which would mimetically reflect unit

type (e.g., a tank silhouette to portray a tank unit).

(2) a “size is strength” concept so that if a unit is powerful ,

it is visually shown as bigger and/or brighter.

(3) a “dynamic movement line ” so that if a unit is on the move ,

it can be depicted as moving in the direction reported .

(4) a “combined arms indicator ” so that units determined to be

operating with a combi ned arms framework at a recognized

greater strength will be so represented .

(5) a “striking reach indicator” (e.g. , vector) so that a unit’ s

shooting range is made immediately obvious .

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(6) an “~ptional OB disp 1a~y”~ so that alpha-numeric information

(e.g., unit identifi cation number) can be displayed on call.

These features are all designed in the spirit of overcomi ng apparent

L shortcomi ngs with current symbology , that is that the FM 21-30 symbols

are abstract , of uniform size , static , restricted to single—unit function

description , and cluttered with numerical desi gnators.

Another i nnovative approach to the graphic portrayal of the degree of real

or perceived unit capabilities has been proposed and developed by Sidorsky

(1977). He has recommended the design of a “doughnut” symbol with eight

different positions on the doughnut representing each of the eight capability

descriptions , respectively. The positions are spaced according to clock

positions at 90 minute intervals , i.e., ~

20O hours , 1300, 1500, 1 630, 1800,

1930, 2100, and 2230. At each position five different strength levels

from “very h i gh” to “very low” can be represented . Thus , a sin gle symbol

can portray , for example , a unit which has a “high” level of overall

threat, a “normal” level of effectiveness , a “very low level ” of mobility,

etc . Sidorsky ’ s prototype symbology includes other features such as the

typing of unit size (echelon) and the grouping of individual units; however ,

its effectiveness for communicating unit capability information remains

to be empirically demonstrated.

The importance of representing unit capability graphically is evidenced

by the fact that researchers in the field are already proposing ways

toward meeting the challenge. However , at the present stage of symbology

development , the work of Channon (1978), Sidorsky (1977) and others (e.g.,

the USAICS group effort on Combat Power Symbology ) is more si gnificant in

terms of the information requirements that they set down for unit capability

rather than for their specific graphic recommendations of how the information

might be portrayed .

I

2-12 

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Information Dependabi li-~

y. Much of the information stored in a tactical

data base is inevitably less than perfectly trustworthy (i.e., accurate

reliable , creditable , and the like). That is , data may not be valid in

the sense that they do not validly represent the true state of the worl d

- - (Samet, 1975). This phenomenon results from a variety of reasons ranging

from the time-lag between data observati on and data availability of

errors and inaccuracies in the way the data is observed , collected ,

transmi tted , processed , stored , etc . Whatever the source of data

fall ibility , however, there is no doubt that it should have a very

definite impact on how the data is interpreted and converted into usable

information (e.g., Johnson , Spooner , Cavana gh , an d Same t , 1973) . In this

regard , Halpin , Moses and Johnson (1978) found that one-half of the

variability among analysis in assigning qualitative ratings to intelligence reports can be attri buted to perceived di fferences in the truth

value of the reports. No other factor (such as importance , clari ty,

scope , expectedness , and threat) could account for more than about

one-quarter of the variance . Therefore, an important issue becomes

whether it would be desirable to graphically portray data validity

parameters; and , if so, effective ways must be sought to graphically

portray such information.

An issue closely related with that of the evaluation of data dependability

concerns the apparent consistency of data . Are the data under evaluation

or interpretation consistent with known states , events , trends , motives ,

etc.? Does confi rming or highly correlated data exist? Are the data

contradicted by other accepted data?.. .Answers to such questions have

become easily manageable by recent advances in the development of

relational data management systems, including for example , the conceptual

design of MIQSTURE , an experimental online language for ARMY tactical

intelligence information processing (Katter , 1978). However , again , the - 

issue becomes whether it would be desirabl e to graphically portray the

respective answers to questions of data consistency ; and , if so, how

- 

might such graphic portrayal be approached?

2-13

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Updated Information. Tactical decisions consistent with a rapidly

changing battlefield situation require attention to a succession of

events , as opposed to a static view of the current composition and

position of friendly and enemy forces. Considering the recent technological advancements in military operations , it is conceivable that the

need to keep track of the dynamic aspects of a battlefield may tax the

decision maker ’s cognitive abilities . Consequently, it would be useful

to portray graphically recently updated informati on as such on tactical

battlefield displays.

Vicino , Andrews and Ringel (1965) found that even though extracting and

assimilating changes in the battlefield situation should be more diffi cult

as the amount and extent of battlefield alteration is increased , this

degradation of performance can be reduced by increasing the saliency of

updated symbolic information of the revised battlefield replica. In

this regard , multiple cues were clearly superior to unitary cues . One

complication not addressed by these authors is that if certain symbolisms

are used to denote updated information, this reduces the number of available symbol types that can be manipulated to represent other information ,

such as the qualitative and quantitative attributes of combat forces .

One alternative possibility would be to use fl ash coding to draw

attention to recently altered information , such as that used in displays

designed to facilitate tracking performance (Ziegler , Reilly and Chern i koff ,

1 966) or that used in the Map—Scholar system to focus a student’s attention

on relevant map information (Collins , Adams and Pew, 1976).

New Technology . The content of imp roved symbology , apart from redressing

past deficiencies , requires expansion to accomodate new tactical doctrine

and modern weapons systems. Recent papers by Mi ddleton (l977b) and

Doughty and Holder (1978) provide a thought provoking glimpse of the

battlefield of the future . For example , consider the following hypothetical scenario:

2-14

- _ I - 

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7

— 

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--- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ 

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~~

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~~~~ 

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“Project yourself forward in time ten years and assume

that 25% more of Western Europe has been urbanized.

~

‘-i~~- , consider the throw-distance, accuracy and

lethality of all weapons systems has increased 50%.

The battlearound ~

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the Black-hawk, dune buggy , trai l bikes, XMl and IFV.

Therefore, mobility will have increased 20%. Hypothesize

concommitant increases in all electronic acquisition,

fire-control and fire and forget sensor systems .”

Advances in long-range weaponry capabilities will expand the width and

breadth of the combat zone and electronic reconnaissance devices will

vastly increase the amount of information availabl e for assessment of

the enemy. In the development of graphic display requirements , it is

essential to recognize the changing nature of the battlefield with

respect to new doctrinal concepts and sophisticated weaponry , and to

utilize and incorporate these advances.

Long-range weaponry , in particular , has complicated tactical assessment

and p lanning by substantially augmenting the “reach” of modern attack

units. Staging areas formerly used to marsha ll tanks for an attack are

now fair game for precision weapons that strike out many kilometers

forward of the line-of-contact with deadly effect. This suggests new

i mperatives for military planners , and by implication , for symbol users

as well. Another major change in tactical thinking is that a conventional

war with the Soviets would probably require NATO combined arms teams to

fight outnumbered and outgunned. This imbalance woul d create a new

requirement involving the ability to destroy specifi c enemy targets

rather than to fi re indiscriminately at the mass of targets that will

— surely appear. It means the situation map and its symbolic notations

must be a “window on the battlefield” with sufficient resolution to

match critical targets with appropriate firepowe r resources with a larger

enemy , we can no longer afford the luxury of imprecision .

2-15

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Additional technology—based tactical issues are emerging continuousl y

which will impact directly upon the graphic portrayal of battlefield

information. For example , there may be a shift away from the doctrine of

large units (e.g., battalions , brigades) to small unit tactics. In this

regard , Brigadier General Doyle (1978) has suggested that the XM 1/IFV

(infantry fi ghting vehicle) team “will be the hub around which modern

battle p lanning and operations will revolve. ” Another issue emanates

from commanders attitudes toward the attack helicopter. Though the attack

helicopters are anti—tank weapons and maneuver units , they tend to be

viewed as support units . Currently, maneuver units are generally regarded

as ground units , and air units are viewed as support . To effectively

utilize attack helicopters as maneuver units , the commander could be

assisted by the graphic portrayal of these units.

Whether the symbolic portrayal of XM1/IFV teams and/or attack helicopters

is feasible or even desirable is an issue which requires further investigation . Finally, the expanded dimensions and increased precision of

battle are joined by the new time dimensions of battle. The imperative of

“seeing the battlefield” deeply enough and early enough to ascertain where

and when the main effort may come has become the critical dimension in war.

An appropriate tactical response strategy is rooted in our ability to sort

out the macro-formations leading to the point of penetration . Simply said ,

the map/symbol system must provide a more timely and clear picture of the

enemy in depth .

2.3.2 Information Selection. As i de from addressing issues that pertain

to the kinds of tactical information that should be represented in an

improved symbology , formal and detailed account should also be taken of

procedures for information selection . The requi rements for such procedures

are exami ned here in the form of specialized user group requirements . This

section also includes a discussion of the notion that , with advanced systems ,

data selection becomes a question of data organization.

2-16

.—.

.

- ~~~~~~~~~

- 

. 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ W r.w ‘ U- __- _
~pecialized User Requirements. There currently exists no agreement as

to what information should be displayed in a tactical symbol ogy which

would serve di fferent user groups at various echelons . There is a

general concensus that commanders at various levels have different

informational requirements (Middleton , l977a). For instance , captains

at company level need intelligence information covering at least 5 km

beyond the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) . Col onels at Battalion

and Brigade level need information covering 50 km beyond the FEBA .

Finally, generals at Corps and Division level need information covering

150 km beyond the FEBA. Each echelon will therefore prefer a different

scale of map; the higher the echelon , the smaller the scale preferred.

Similarly, the level of detail requi red for symbology varies with echelon .

Corps commanders are interested in representing divisions , regiments ,

and brigades . Battalion commanders have little need to represent units

larger than brigades or smaller than platoons or companies . Genera l

guidelines such as these , however , do not solve the persistent problem

of determining the critical information needed to plan and execute

military operations. To this end , Colson , Freeman , Mathews , and Stettler

(1974) have developed an informational taxonomy of visual displays to

portray the different information needs of personnel within a given

command. Additionally, more recent work which addresses differences

in graphic requirements across command levels within the Tactical Ope rations System (lOS ) is also available (Modisette , Mi chel , and Stevens ,

1978). —

Processing all the information attendant to tactical decision making is

difficult at any level. To be sure , even at the battalion level , as many

as a half a dozen separate acetate drops might be necessary to “build”

a comprehensive picture of the battlefield and the operational events

planned. Occas onally, the chore of sorting out the detail can be a

problem. Nevertheless , the number of symbols arrayed wi thin the area

of operations for a battalion is relatively finite .

2-17 

—.—~~~ —.-—--.

-—--~ ..

/
At division and corps level , problems of clutter , abstract functional

symbols , and info rmation overl oad have taken on serious proportions .

The num ber of information sou rces available has more than doubled , and

the total number of symbols to be interpreted may have increased tenfold.

Thus , corps and division represent priority targets for improved

symbology development. The sheer volume and complexity of information

processed at this level , as well as its tactical irgency , impose a

considerable burden on command staff personnel .

Several specialized symbology systems are currently being developed ,

such as the Army Terrain Information System (ARTINS) proposed by

the Engineerin g Topographic Laboratories (ETL), Intelligence Preparation

of the Battlefield (IPB) (Gaun , 1976) and Combat Power Symbology (CPS)

(Colanto , 1 977). The major difficulty with specialized systems , tailore d

to meet the needs of various user groups , is that communication among users

and echelons would be strained in the absence of a common l anguage of

symbolo gy . On the othe r hand , the development of a large an d comp rehens ive multi-purpose symbology is not wi thou t its problems . Users would

be expected to learn an enormous amount of information ; and in trying to

serve “most of the users most of the time ,” the symbology would necessarily

have to give up some degree of detail. Some comp romi se , there fore , between

the global an d . specialized positions must be achieved before new forms of - 

symbology can be developed and implemented.

Tactical ~Situatio n Requirements. Aside from standard differences in user

needs , a different level of detail of symbolized information is required

in di fferent tactica l situations. For example , though unit designations

may be necessary for some battlefiel d tasks , such as communication , it

may be viewed as clutter in other tasks , Such as situation assessment. - 

Also , Coates and McCourt (1976) found that although intelligence on enemy

disposition was rated as valuable in all conditions of war evaluated ,

the perceived value of logistics i ntelligence increased with increas ing

2-18

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~~~~~~~

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-

- - f

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________ __ 

~~~~ U~~~W - -~
intensities of war , while the value of tactics and training was greater

in low-intensity conditions. Thus , it is clear that what should be

represented in a tactical battlefield display is dependent upon tne

situation demands ,; and therefore , a new symbology should have the

capability to portray tactical information at different levels of detail.

Another aspect of the tactical situation i~ the specific battlefield

terrain and how it interacts with the tactical circumstances. Gaun (1976)

and Maggart (1978) have emphasized the need to analyze the relative

advantages and limitations of the terrain in comparing possible courses

of action. Though important aspects of the terrain have typically been

represented on a maplike display , this method raises the issue of the

distinctiveness of symbols in relation to a multicoded background .

Aside from the question of symbology-background compatibility , the

portrayal of topographic features on a maplike background leaves this

information relatively unanalyzed with respect to its effect on the

current tactical situation. A supp l emental approach is to (a) portray

a unit’ s terrain mobility as part of the unit ’ s symbol as suggested by

Sidorsky (1977), and (b) specify the enemy’ s avenues of approach on an

overlay with broad arrows , as is currently done.

For a given situation , how can essential tactical information be

differentiated from that which is merely useful? Depending on symbology

formats , the problem may be partiall y or even completely sidestepped .

The advent of computer-based display systems raises the possibility

that improved symbology may be dynamic rather than static in nature .

Whereas static symbology requires a one-to-one mapping of symbol-toconcept , a dynamic system is more flexible because it would permit

the content of a symbol to change in response to changing user

requirements. This adaptive capability of a computer-based symbology

could effectively simplify the identification of essential information .

The problem , in this context , will no longer be one of data compression--

2-19

gr—~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -. - 
since comp u ter-based display systems can store and process vast amounts

of tactical information--but rather one of data organization and access.

There is a growing literature describing rapid advances in automated

data-processing (ADP ) systems that allow for powerful graphic capabilities

- that are both efficient and economic. For example , recent research has

provided the capability to analyze sightings of enemy forces automatically

(Cooper, Reed , Kroger , Van Gorden , Aldrich , Hayden , and Mayhew , 1975 ;

Moses and Vande Hei , 1978). These anal yses include (a) chronological

unit tracking, which provides information regarding the direction and

speed of enemy unit movement as well as past changes in location , and

(b) warnings of significant clusters of enemy activity (i.e., tactical

indicators ). Such techniques will likely facilitate the development and

implementation of sophisticated improvements in tactical symbology to

simplify the p roblems of information selection. A brief discussion of

some general ADP-related issues is presented in Appendix A. However ,

the feasibility of implementing viable ADP systems to support graphic

portrayal may well depend on whether the graphic codes used to express

different kinds of information and levels of detail pose a perceptual

problem for the symbol user. A detailed analysis of the behavioral

i ssues in symbol design and util i zat i on is presented i n Chapter 4.

2.3.3 Symbulogy Imp l ementdtion Issues

This section describes two basic restrictions on the manner in which

tactical information shoul d be represented: inter-service and internation standardization , and user acceptance .

Symbology Standardization. Symbology development must satisfy a number

of information exchange factors . First , even though there is little

overlap in info rmation requi rements among services in the United States ,

an inter-service symbology would probably enhance communication (Middleton , I

2-20

~-: - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -

-. 

~~~~~~~~~~ .

~L U~~L ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — -
l977a). Currently, there is some liaison work between the Army and Air

Force in thern development in weather information requirements . Second ,

a tactical symbology must be standardized among NATO countries and their

allies. Any new NATO symbology will have to be approved by NATO Panel

— 

. XIII (NATO Document , AC/225, 1977), and such standardization is a lengthy

process. Changes from STANAG 2019, which was introduced in 1 962, have

been kept to a minimum. Thus , it would be useful to consider the lik lihood

that a new symbology would be accepted by NATO. However , there is no

formal organization to insure symbology standardization among non-NATO

allies.

User Acceptance. In the development of a new tactical symbology , potential

resistance to extensive change , especially among users who have invested

considerable time and effort in mastering the FM 21-30 system , should be

considered. This resistance points to the need to draw upon the

strengths of the old system , when possible , and to augment these

components with improvements to meet new requirements and considerations .

With this approach , the user would not be asked to totally unlea rn his

previous training, and acceptance would be more likely.

Fortunately, it appears that most of the improvements must be developed for

use by staff a genc i es durin g the i r assessm ent an d p lann i n g phases . So ,

perhaps the changes in symbology that do occur will only impact on staff

officers and probably only at headquarters levels where electronic

displays will also be available. The doctrinal symbology now used to

communicate and direct tactical actions can and should continue to serve

that function . Assessment and planning at division and corps , on the

other hand , might be facilitated by a specialized symbology designed

especially for command staff personnel . In this way , the large majori ty

of the tactical symbol users need not experience any future shock.

2— 21

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-- - - / - - - _•

_ /

___ 

VI—
Many tacticians have expressed concern that high resolution and detailed

electronic symbols won ’t work because we can ’t expect soldiers to

duplicate these communications with a grease pencil on a map. While

this is in fact a legitimate basis of concern , the graphic language used

by upper echelon staff technicians need not necessarily be imposed upon

subordinates who must execute tactical operations . Conventional

symbology can be retained for purposes of tactical communication and

coordination , while new symbology could , at least initially, be used

exclusively by upper echelon personnel concerned wi th tactical planning

and assessment.

2.4 Summ~~

The preceding analysis of selected issues regarding tactical symbology

apears to have converged on a number of broad generalizations. These are

listed below in summa ry form :

(1) Convention al symbology (FM 21-30) is able to portray

only a fraction of the tactical information conside red

valuable by TOC personnel , and it does not accomodate

most of the new “imperatives ” of tactical doctrine

(e.g., FM 100-5).

(2) Improved tactical symbology should be di rected to

serve a diversity of purpose and communicate a richness

of detail (e.g., combined—arms composition , unit

capability , information dependability ) that is far

beyond the scope of any contemporary system.

(3) Improved tactical symbology should offer the user a

flexible system capable of adapting to different levels

2-22

- :;

~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1” ~~~~~~~~~~~~

T F - - -
of information selection (i.e., detail) to meet

different user requirements and changing task

requiremen ts.

(4) Implementation of an improved symbology will necessarily

occur wi thin the limits of user acceptance and

interservice and international standardization .

I

I ;

- I,

- 2-23

- 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
3. A QUERY-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

3.1 Overview • -

This chapter will describe a methodology for eliciting and analyzing an

expanded tactical database which could contribute toward the development

of improved tactical symbology . The objective is to generate a broad

sample of “concepts ” that might be expressed in graphic form to facilitate

the performance of complex and/or time-consuming tactical tasks. In order

to insure a working relationship between the content and function of

improved forms of tactical symbology , a concerted effort is required to

establish a prospective set of task boundaries . We need , therefore, to

decide what “questions ” we want symbology to “answer. ” Once we have

elicited a set of candidate questions from the military coriviunity , a

second-stage elicitation can be conducted focusing more directly on

task-based information requirements . This two-stage elicitation process

represents a basic formula for the methodology that will be elaborated

on in subsequent sections.

Our view is that content analysis shoul d focus , at least initially, on

eliciting meaningful tactical questions rather than declarations of

support for one or more information categories. The goal , in other words ,

is to establish the functiona l breadth of tactical symbology in explicit

task-based language. This objective will be made somewhat more manageable

in the present analysis by focusing strictly on division - and corps-level

comand and control tasks. Even with this restriction , however , there

remains a diversity of potential applications for new symbology. In

order to delimi t these task boundaries still further , therefore, a genera l

framework for information processing was conceptualized for the upperechelon Tactical Operating Center (TOC). This scheme attempts to identify

the major parameters of task activity in the TOC and make it possible for

the elicitation procedure to focus on one set of tactica l circumstances at

L 

1 3—1

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .

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a time . After selecting a particular set of task parameters , the next -• 

step is to structure the elicitation procedure using both situational

and doctrinally-sanctioned information prompts. The objective here is

to stimulate the generation of candidate questions by focusing attention

on the fundamentals of tactical decision-making (e.g., “Understand the

Enemy ”). Finally, the questions resulting from this eliL tation process

must be organized into thematically-related clusters .

3.2 Task Framework. The appa rent concensus among militar y observers

is that information processing at both corps and division has been

severely strained in recent years due to the increasing availability of

tactically relevant battlefield information . This suggests that improved

military symbology will probably have its largest impact on high- l evel

assessment and planning within upper-echelon tactical operating centers

(TOC ’s). The objective of the current effort, therefore, is to devel op

a methodol ogy for sampling the critical “questions ” facing personnel

within this highly pressured tactica l context.

Our starting point was a simpl e task analysis , designed to identify those

variables which regulate graphicall y-related information processing in

the TOC environment. The following three components seem to capture the

major dimensions of task activity :

(1) User Group - the military identity of the symbol user

(e.g., Conmand Group ).

(2) Mi litary Operation - the tactical objective (e.g., Defense).

(3) Battlefield errain - the principal geography of the

battle area (e.g., Ru ral).

A large number of subcategories can be identi fied with in each of these 1 

maj or dimensions to define a wide range of tactical activity . The

following sections describe these subcategories in some detail.

3-2 -

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User Group . Three broad categories of symbol users can be identified

within the TOC :

(1) Coiiiiiand Group - personnel who plan , supervise , and coordinate

milita ry operations including : Coniiiander; Intelligence

Staff (G2); Operations Staff (G3).

(2) Combat Support Staff - coordinators of field and/or air

support operations including: Tactical Air Support Element;

Ai rspace Control Element; Fire Support Element; Electronic

Warfare Element; and Combat Engineer Element.

(3) Service Support Staff - coordinators of logistical and/or

maintenance operations including : Personnel Officer (Gl);

Logistics Officer ~

G4); and Military Civilian Operations

Offi cer (G5).

Military Operation. The tactical objective represents the first major

task dimension . Four types of milit ary operation can be distinguished :

(1) Offense - range of offensive scenarios includes : movement

to contact; hostile attack; deliberate attack; exp-loitation ;

and pursuit.

(2) Defense - includes the defensive operations of: defend

in place and delay .

(3) Retrograde - includes : del ay; wi thdrawal ; and retirement.

(4) Special Operations - includes a number of highly specialized

operations , including: nuclear , biol ogical , and chemi cal (NBC);

psychologica l warfare; river crossing; airl i ft; airmobile;

ranger; and night operations .

3-3

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Battlefiel d Terrain. Four major categories of battlefield terrain can be

ident i fied :

(1) Rural - Characterized by hills , varying types of vegetation ,

rivers , streams, and lakes (e.g., Fulda Gap region of

West Germany).

(2) Urban - Centra l cities as well as suburban areas cha racterized

by extensive road networks and buildings .

(3) Desert - Chiefly characteri zed by sand dunes and sparse

vegetation (e.g., Middle East).

(4) Mountainous - Sparsely vegetated , extremely rugged land

characterized by high steep regions (e.g., Korea).

The identity of the symbol user , the tactical objective , and the

geographical enviro nment all combine to determine rel evant i nformation

requirements. Each of these task variables can be integrated within

a multi-dimensiona l framework to guide the process of task generation

and analysis. One such framework is offered by the gross model

illustrated in Figure 3-1 . This model serves to organize major task

parameters within a singl e unified system; these pa rameters establish

the bounda ry conditions within which representative symbol-use tasks

can be systemati cal ly sampled . The i nner-most cluster of task components

collectively define an “active ” set of tactica l task parameters . For

example , the active parameters illustrated in Figure 3-1 specify Command

Gr~~ as the user group, Defense as the milita ry opration , and Rura l

as the battlefield terrain. These task variables can be systematically

permuted to generate a large number of different tactical environments.

3.3 Elicitation of Content Requirements

The next step is to structure the actual elicitation process by providing

analysts with set—inducing prompts to help stimulate the generation of

3-4

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candida te requirements. As mentioned previously, a two-stage elicitation

procedure will help insure a linkage between the potential applications

of new symbology and the derivation of content requirements . The first

and perhaps the most diffic ul t stage of the elic itati on process is the

generation of candidate tactical questions. Initiall y, a situational

prompt is given to establish a tactical frame of reference and is then

followed-up by doctrinal prompts to focus attention on relevant decisionmaking imperatives . The analysts are instructed to imagine themselves •

in the tactical circumstances specifi ed by the situational prompt and

to formulate tactical questions that would permit them to comply fully

with each doctrinal requirement. Further , they are encouraged to disregard

current technological limitations and ask questions as though they had

access to an omniscient tactical computer sys tem. In the second stage ,

candidate questions (generated duri ng the first-stage) are used as

prompts to elicit corresponding tactical information requirements. The

analyst’s task here is to generate a set of mutuall y excl usive information

categories that represent the range of answers to each question .

3.3.1 First Stage Elicitation. The elicitation of candidate tactical

questions can be facilitated by two forms of instructional prompt:

(1) Situational Prompt - prior to the question generati on task ,

• analysts are given a detailed briefing designed to illustrate

a specific set of model parameters (User-by-Operation-byTerrai n).

(2) Doctrinal Prompt - fundamental tenets of tactica l doctrine

are presented one-at-a-time to focus the analyst’ s

attention on critical dimensions of battle.

The initial selection of tactical task parameters (User, Operation , and

Terrain) serves to define the basic elements of a situationa l prompt .

3-6

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Each parameter is incorporated within a concrete tactical scenario

designed to set the stage for the question elicitation task that is

to follow. At a minimum , each scenario contains the fol l owing basic

ingredients:

(1) A mission statement describing the general tactica l

objectives (offense , defense , etc.).

(2) An account of the events leading up to the present

tactical situation .

(3) A topographic map background of an appropriate type

(mounta i ns, desert, etc.) and scale.

(4) A situation overlay at the division or corps-level

which identifies an area of responsibility and illustrates

a typica l alignment of enemy and friendly units.

The description of a relatively specific tactica l setting serves to

impose broad restri ctions on the analyst ’s question-generation strategy

and hopefully will facilitate elicitation by focusing attention on a

concrete set of “facts.”

In summary, after receiving the scenario briefing, analysts are instructed

concerning the proper response format for the generation task. Specifically, they are told to phrase all requests for information as tactical

questions (e.g., Where are the enemy’ s coninand and control centers?) since

this is the only form of input acceptable to the “computer.” In order

to stimulate the generation process , the analysts are also instructed

to formulate their questions in response to particular doctrinal prompts.

Eac h prompt is in the -form of a statement describing doctrinally-sanctioned - decision-making “fundamentals ” and is derived directly from either FM 100-5

(Operations ) or FM 71-100 (Armored and Mechanized Division Operations).

I

3-7

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As an example , Chapter 5 of FM 71-100 presents a fairly detailed account

of certain fundamental principles that are said to govern the conduct of

defensive operati ons. The fi rst decision principle is to “Understand the

Enemy” . Specifically, the manual states :

“Commanders must be thoroug hly familiar with the capabilities

and limitations of enemy weapons and equipment. They must

know how enemy units are organised, how the enemy organizi-~s

for combat and dep loys, and how the enemy fights - in other

words, the echelonment and tactics of enemy units... ”

“

... the division commander and his staff must also have a

sound understanding of where enemy field and air defense

artillery, combat service support, and critical command

control facilities can be found. These are the systems

the division must destroy so battalion task forces, attack

helicopter units, and USAF air support can operate successfully against enemy tactical formations.”

The preceding quote serves to illustrate a doctrinal prompt that can be

used to remind the analysts of a basic principle underlying defensive

operations. A series of such prompts can be deri ved for each of the

major types of tactical operations and used to structure the elicitation

of tactical questions .

In the case of defense , for example , doctrinal prompts can be used to

specify (in some detail) the fol l owing information processing requirements

(FM 71—100):

(1) Understand the Enemy

(2) See the Battlefield

(3) Concentrate at the Critical Times and Places

(4) Fight as a Combined Arms Team

(5) Exploit the Advantages of the Defender

3-8

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Each prompt represents a detailed account of current decision-making •

requirements and can be presented one-at-a—time to stimulate the question

- generation process. Elicita tion instructions can encourage analysts to

generate all the tactical questions they can think of to comply in full

with each requirement. The only restriction on the generation task will

be imposed by the situationa l framework in which the analyst is assumed

to be operating.

3.3.2 - Second-Stage Elicitation. The output of the initial elicitation

p~

roct?ss - is a set of candidate tactical questions corresponding to a

sequence of doctrinal prompts . The issue then for the second-stage

elicitation process becomes the translation of these candidate questions

into corresponding information requirements. The procedure for accomplishing this is to present analysts with their own (previously generated)

questions in an effort to elicit candidate answers . Each response should ,

theoretically, represent a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive information categories corresponding to the range of possible answers . For

example , an analyst may have asked the following tactical question during

ini ti al elici tation : “What is our present mobility status?” As it stands ,

the question is ambiguous since the info rmation required to answe r it can

range from a relatively specifi c qualitative concept (e.g., AH6 or attack

helicopter) to a relatively summarized estimate of overall mobility

(e.g., 50%). The second-stage elicitation process has therefore been

designed to clari fy these ambiguitities and simultaneousl y define a set

of candidate information requirements.

After prompting the analysts with a question and receiving a candidate

set of “answers” , the intermediator firs t attempts to verify that the

proposed info rmation categories are in fact mutually exclusive and that

they exhaust the set of possible answers . These two cri teria - exclusivity and exhaustiveness - represent minimum standards for acceptin g

3 9

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a category set as a valid response. For example , in response to the

mobility question an analyst may generate the following set of candidate

categories : Wheels; Tracks; Rail; Air; AH6 . The intermediator would

then ask whether the “Air ” and “AH6” categories overl ap or are , in fact ,

independent (i.e., “Ai r” , in the mind of the responder , may refer to

both fixed wing and rotary aircraft and therefore overlap with “AH6”).

After defining each such response concept the intermediator goes on to

ask whether any other categories can be thought of which also represent

possible answers to the question . Each tactical question generated

during stage-one can be filtered through both of these validation cri teria

in order to:

(1) clari fy the level of information detail required for an

acceptable response

(2) operationally defi ne a candidate set of mutually exclusive

and exhaustive respotise categories

The output of this second-stage elicitation is a set of candidate questions

along with a corresponding set of candi date answers . The idea is that

each candidate information category (e.g., AH6) could ultimately be

considered in the assignment of unique graphic codes (i.e., symbols) in

the development of new systems of tactical symbology .

Summary of Elicitation Technique. The e1icitation technique can be

applied in an iterative fashion to elicit candidate requirements over

a wide range of task domains. A brief review of the sequence of steps

required to implement the technique is as follows :

(1) Select and recruit a small group of militar y experts to

serve as analysts .

3-10

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~~~~~~ 
(2) Administer first-stage elicitation instructions to the

group (i.e. ,~describe the question -generation task).

(3) Administer second-stage elicitation instructions (i.e.,

describe answer-generation task).

(4) Start by selecting one set of task parameters (using the

model in Figure 3-1) and then systematically vary other

pa rameters .

(5) Present situational prompt based on selected parameters

(i.e., induce an appropriate tactical frame of reference).

(6) Present first doctrinal prompt (taken from FM 71-100).

(7) Elicit candidate questions (first stage).

(8) Elicit candidate answers (second stage).

(9) Review each set of questions and answers (modify , add ,

delete , as necessary).

(10) Add new acceptable questions to existing question set.

(11) Present next doctri nal prompt.

(12) Repeat Step 7 through 11 until all prompts have been

presen ted.

(13) Return to Step 4, or exit if all desired task parameter

combinations have been exhausted.

Finally, the advantages of this elicitation technique can be summarized

in terms of its breadth; namely, tha t it accounts for variations in user

functions , operational objectives , and situational variables including

battlefield terrain.

3.3.3 Organization of Requirements. After completing the two-stage

elicitation task , the analysts ’ questions can be sorted into thematically

• related clusters . For example , one doctri nal prompt may lead analysts

to ask “Which are the combat units?” , while later another prompt may

elicit , “What type of combat units are they?” . Each of these tactical

3-11 -

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questions is thematically related since each pertains to an analysi s of unit

function. At the most abstract level , one may simply wish to know whether

combat or support-type units are being faced , while under a different set

of circumstances one might wish to draw more precise functional distinctions (e.g., mechanized infantry vs. armor). At a still more detailed

level , one may even want to know the cross-attachment structure or the

special weapons that have been assigned. Each of these different levels

of information detail could conceivably be appropriate depending on the

tactical circumstances . Different users at different echelon levels , or

with different objectives , might each require information at different

levels of specificity . The result would then be a variety of questions

on the same topic generated by different users under similar circumstances

or by the same user at different times.

The problem at hand then becomes the organization of these subjectgenerated questions into themati cally-related clusters . Each cluster

could ideally contain a sequentially ordered set of questions corresponding to di fferent level s of tactical analysis or , alternatively, to

diffe rent levels of information sumarization . For example , consider

a sample sequence of tactical questions pertaining to “unit function ” .

Level 1: Which are the combat units?

Level 2: What type of combat units are they?

Level 3: What is their composition?

Level 4: What is their special weapon capability ?

The questions in this particular example are ordered along an underlying

dimension of summarization . As one moves down the list of questions ,

each one entails successively more detailed answers . Under certain 

circumstances , the symbol user mi ght require an overview of the tactical I

situation , vis-a-vis unit function , and so limi t himself to asking only

3-12

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~
one or two highly summarized questions. On the other hand , the user

might wish to pursue the analysis down to the l owest possible level of

detail. The ultimate objective of content analysis , therefore, could be

the derivation of tactical data structures that offer the symbol user

- selective access to different levels of information detail.

Several methodologies , both informal and formal , may be employed to

determine categories of thematically related questions and the perceived

importance of the ~

questions within categories. The informal techniques

are based largely on the capability of the research investigators to

rationally organize and structure questions. The more forma l , empirical

methods range from factor analysis to multidimensional scaling and

hiera rchical cluster analysis. Factor analysis requires the collection

of importance ratings using scales of the attribute dimensions while

scal ing require s assessments of perceived similarity among questions ; the

simplest approach involves the deri vation of measure s of similarity or

relatedness for the questions. This could be accomplished by having

analysts sort questions into conceptually related sets. Whatever the

case , an analysis could be designed to identify the basic conceptual

dimensions of tactical information (by sorting questions into clusters),

as well as the relative priori ty of information within each dimension

(by rank-ordering questions within each cluster). The outcome would be

a set of multi -leveled data structures that operationally define prospective content requirements for improved tactical symbology . For

example , clusters entailing tactical vulnerability , capability , threat ,

mobility , etc. might result.

3.4 Application of Elicitation Methodolo gy : A Preliminary Study

3.4.1 Introduction. The objective of this section is to explore the

feasibility of applying a query-based approach to the elicitation of

3- 13

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-

~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ rw~~~~i

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ - -- - ~~~-
candidate information requirements for tactical symbology . An informal

pilot study was conducted , using the milit ary members of our research

team as participants , and , as a result , a preliminary set of tactical

data structures was defi ned. The scope of this initial inquiry was

restricted to a single triad of tactical task parameters : Command Groupby-Defensive Operation-by -Rural Terrain. These parameters serve to

prescribe an especially i mportant tactical setting :

Division- level command personne l using s1,mbology to e~~-~~ the enemy situation and plan appropriate countermeasures in

an active defense of Western Europ e .

The selection of these particular task variables was intentional , since

they collectively represent the most challenging set of circumstances

likely to confront the military decision-make r (cf. the “Eu ropean ”

scenario as descri bed by General Starry, 1978). They are also the

circumstances most often assumed during battle simulations at the Command

and Genera l Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth (e.g., CATTS; BATTLE;

etc.).

3.4.2 Methodology . The research plan for the present study was based

on the two-stage elicitation process descri bed in the previous section

(3.3). The participants were initially instructed to generate candidate

tactical questions in response to a set of situational and doctrinal

prompts. The resulting questi ons were then used to facilitate the elici -

tation of corresponding information requirements. - -

Participants. Two A rmy officers , both with extensive experience as

teachers and developers of tacti cal doctri ne at CGSC , participate ~

d as

analysts . One is an LTC with a background in Intelligence , while the

other is a Major with a background in Operations . The former was an

Instructional Designer at CGSC from 1972-1978 and was responsible for

3-14

- - - • ~~~~~ - -----~ -‘- • - - ~- — -——

.- /~~~~‘ ;

‘i~~~~’ -

3-.- _ _

~~~

_

- -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - ,‘ - - -

~

-

~

:5 -Y~~ 1 4

- -~~ 

-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — — - -- 

• ‘ _ i _ _ _ 

P-’.’~~~~ w~~’----- - ~~~- --- — 

-
enhancing the tactica l validity of various battle simulations (e.g., CATTS;

White Knuckles ; Battle; Indian Ri ver I, II, and III; and Goldfi re I). The

latter was responsible for aiding the devel opment of the above battle

simulations and evaluating the performance of student decision-makers in

related simulation exercises.

First-Stage Elicitation. As previously defined , the task variables at

issue in the present study were: Command group personnel conducting

a defensive operation in rural terrain. A tactical scenario based on

these parameters has been developed by CGSC faculty and is currently

used in a semester-length cou rse entitled “Forward Deployed Force Operations (European Setting)” . The scenari o specifies a set of strategic

developments leading to an outbreak of hostilities between NATO and the

Warsaw Pact nations . It also includes a description of enemy and friendly

forces along the international border in the Fulda Gap region of Germany .

Briefly, the 10th U.S. Corps , consisting of the 23rd Armored Division and

the 52nd Mechanized Division , is assumed to be opposing elements of the

First Zapadnian Front (a vastly superior enemy force). In the present

context , this scenario was used as a situational prompt to help the

analysts adopt the desired “mental set” . Each analyst was given a small

booklet containing a description of recent strategic events ; an analysis

of friendly and enemy forces; and a situation overl ay (acetate) on a

1:250,000 scale map of the area (USACGSC 250-138). A copy of this

scenario and the situation overl ay are presented in Appendix -B. Since

both analysts used in the present study were already familiar wi th this

material , time required for indoctrination was minimal.

The next step was to administer the following set of elicitation task

instructions:

3— 15

t ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

- __

___________ _____ 

f~ t4

~~i4r~ 

4 ______ -.

_,,

~

,-

- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~1up)L ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

-

,

.

--. 

• 

- - 

/
“It is now 0430 on 21 August 1979. As the G2 (G3) section

TOC duty officer of the 23rd Armored Division, it is your

respon8 ibility to prepare situation swninari es and fo rmulate

recommendations for future operations. The dep loyment of

friendl y and enemy forces shown on your situation disp lay

is now approximately 4 hours old. Recent developments may

have altered the situation. The division commander has

ordered you to:

(02) Prepare an update briefing on current enemy threat.

(03 ) Recommend friendl y troop dep loyment against potential

enemy threat.

In order to help you in this task , imagine that you will have

access to a new conrputer system capable of answeri ng any meaningfu l tactica l question you can imagine. This computer is

linked to a conrp rehensive intelligence-gathering system and

can provide you with up-to-the-minute information about either

the enemy situation; your own for ces; or current terrain

conditions. In short , you can ask for any type of information

or overlay tha t you might find useful. The onl y restriction

is tha t your inquiry must be stated in clear operationa l

language. For example, you cannot ask “What is the enemy ’s

combat effectiveness?” since the term “effectiveness ” as used

here is not clear ly defined. If you ask a question calling

for summarized information like an estimate of overall effectiveness, you must first define the concepts you think should

be included. For examp le , it is permissible to ask “Wha t is

the current ratio of enemy to friendly firepower effectiveness

in terms of weapon range and ~

onmunition available?”

Remember you can ask for detailed information or any form of

grap hic overlcy that mig ht help you to assess the situation

or p lan for future operations. On the following pages , you

will find a list of doctrina l requirements that may he lp you

think of questions to ask. Please read each statement care -

fully and then write down all the questions you can think of

that might help you to comp ly with each requirement. ”

One ana lyst, the intelligence officer , was given instructions relating

to the G2 task , while the other analyst , the operations officer , wa~ given similar instructions but relating to the G3 task (indicated ~~ ve

in parentheses). Each analyst was then given a response booklet contam ing a set of doctrinal prompts (one per page) relating to the

fundamentals of defense. Each prompt represented a doctrinally-sanctioned

3- 16

- I 

- 

___ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _____ ~~~~ i- 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 

~~~~- ~~~~~~~~~ - . 

- 

~~
guideline for information processing by comand-level personnel. Table

3-1 lists each of these prompts in the order in which they were presented

(each was excerpted directly from FM 71-100).

L. Second-Stage Elicitation. The second elicitation task was conducted ten

days after completion of the fi rst elicitati on task . Each analyst was

given a response booklet containing his own tactical questions (typed four

to a page ) and asked to generate a set of possible “answers ” . The

instructions were as follows :

“Your Jc~~t -ivc on this task is to generate a set of “responses ” corresponding to each of your tactica l questions. In other

words, try to identify the range of possible answers you would

expect in response to each of the questions. For exam p le , -in

order to answer “What is the enemy ’s principal areas of

deficiency?” , the following set of responses might be necessary :

POL; Anrmo; Peop le; Mobility; Morale. These five concepts may

or may not exhaust the set of possible answers, the point is

that you should generate all the answers tha t are of interest

to ~~ j. Perhap s you ’re only interested in two or three

possib le answers and if so just list these. Besides listing

the range of answers for each question, try to make sure tha t

the set of answers you select are all roug hly at the sane leve l

of de tai l and that each is independent of the other. Consider

the previous question once aga in: “What ’s the enemy ’s principal

source of deficiency?” The set of answers he re can rang e from

a few rather summarized (or abstract) responses to a larger

number of detailed responses. The following represent two

possib le sets of rep lies: (1) combat arms deficiency; combat — support deficiency; service support deficiency; (2) POL; Ammo;

People; Mobility ; Morale. Either set of answers may be valid

and/or useful depending on the level of detail you require to

perform your task. For each question listed in the booklet,

p leas e generate one set of responses which you think represents

the level of detail required to provide a useful and satisfactory

answer to the question. If more than one set of responses seems

necessary to you, then list each one separately. ”

As in the previous elicitation task , each participant worked independently

wi th no pre-established time limi tation .

3-17

— —-— -,.--;.

~ ~

- .

~ 

— _____

~~~~~~~~~ 

9 - 

~

-,- _~I_~ ’

.

~~~ ~ - -

~ - -L~ - /

/ -
TABLE 3-1

DOCTRINAL PROMPTS FOR DEFENSE

1. UNDERSTAND THE ENEMY

Commanders must be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations

of enemy weapons and equipment. They must know how enemy units are

organized , how the enemy organizes for combat and dep loys, and how the

enemy f i g hts--in other words, the echelonment and tactics of enemy units.

As in offensive operations , the division commander and his staff must

also have a sound understanding of where enemy field and air defense

artillery , combat service support , and critica l command control facilities

can be found. These are the systems the division must destroy so

battalion task forces, attack helicopter units, and USAF air support can

operate successfully against enemy tactical formations.

2. SEE THE BATTLEFIELD

Prior to the battle , the defending com m ander must organize to defeat

different types of likely attacks from several feasible directions. He

must then undertake aggressive operations to learn where the enemy is,

how he is organized, which way he is moving, and what his strength is.

As the battle unfolds he must seek to establish a continuous flow of

in formation, and must deny the enemy similar information about his own

forces as he maneuvers to counter the enemy and seek an opportunity to

attack.

Battalion task force and brigade commanders can seldom see beyond

terrain features to their immediate front. A brigade commander needs

information about second echelon regiments, while the division commander

needs information about second echelon regiments and divisions. To

get such information the division commander will turn to his own

co l lection means. Despite his best efforts though, the division

commander will a lmost always have to make decisions based on incomplete

data. Therefore, the more he knows about enemy weapons and supporting

systems, tactics, psychology, and the terrain, the better his decision

will be. -

3-18

--- - -

______________________________
3. CONCENTRATE AT THE CRITICAL TIMES AND PLACES

The commander must decide exactly when and where he will concentrate

his forces; hopefully, he does this based on the satisfactory results

of his combat information and intelligence-gathering operations. He

must also decide how much force will be required to defeat the enemy

within the terrain and space limitations of the defensive area.

To defend against enemy breakthrough tactics, the commander must not

only concentrate forces at the right time and p lace, but he must also

take risks on the flanks.

It may be necessary to concentrate up to six or eight maneuver

battalions on one-fifth of the division ’s front to meet breakthrough

forces which may number 20 to 2.5 battalions. Remaining ground is then

covered with air and ground cavalry, remaining bat talions, and attack

helicopter units.

The division con~ ander must aggressively use the high mobility

of his armored and mechanized forces to build up forces rap idly, using

units from adjacent areas and from less threatened flanks. With ground

units he must make the decision to concentrate fairly early, but not too

early . If he makes a mistake and starts to concentrate at the wrong place, he may countermarch his mobi le elements r

~

-

~

zn~ ~i’~

1- -s try ing to rectify the

error. The high mobility of attack helicopters permits the commander to

move them quickly, concentrating first at one point , then another, without

disruptive “-ounter-marching. ” Th-is fac t makes attack helicopter units

ideal outfits to go find the enemy early, signal his approach, and fight

him--disrupting his attack whi le the rest of the f o rc e concentrates.

Concentration of fie ld artillery is equally important. Field artillery

fire can often be concentrated without moving batteries. In extended

areas, however, field artillery batteries must be moved to positions

within range of the main battle .

Ai r defense batteries and p latoons pose a special p roblem. The first

priority for dep loyment of division air defense batteries in the

defense should be protection of the division command control facilities

and operations in the division support area. Some Vulcans may be used

to protect forward brigades.

4 . .. . Close air support must be applied in mass, -i-n time, and at the

critical point, supported by a well p lanned and conducted air defense

suppress ion op eration.

3-19

-3 ______ -

- 1

~ ‘

~- ~~~~~~~ 

— ~~~~~~~~~~~~ -

-

~~ .

t

~~

?~~- ~~~~

4 

/
4. FIGHT AS A COMBINED ARMS TEAM

As friendly units converge on the critical battle site, commanders commit

them to combat according to their weapons ’ capabilities and movement of

the enemy force.

The first increment of combat power available is usually the massed fire

of all field artillery in range. Even if artillery fire does not

destroy large numbers of armored vehicles, it causes tank crews to

button up, reducing their effectiveness. Field artillery can effectively

discourage ener-nj infantry from dismounting to attack defending dug-in

antitank weapons. Field artillery can also smoke overwatching forces

covering the enemy attack. -

The second increment of combat power available could be attack helicopters.

Reinforcing at speeds of 125 knots, attack helicopters have a high probaL)~ lity of killing enemy tanks at ranges bey ond 3000 meters. Attack

helicopters will be most useful when the enemy has moved out from under,

at least part of, his air defense umbrella and beyond his prep lanned

artillery fires.

A s the battle develops, the commander must move defending forces

from one position to another to take maximum advantage of h-is weapons,

the terrain, and mines or obstacles that he has been able to emp loy.

Combat vehicles must be refueled , rearmed , and repaired as far for ward

as possible and quickly returned to batt le .

5. EXPLOIT ADVANTAGES OF THE DEFENDER

The defender ’s advantages are numberous and permit a numerically inferior

j ~ rce to defeat a much larger attacker. Perhap s the defender ‘s greatest

advantage is the opportunity to become intimately fa miliar with the

terrain p rior to the battle. The attacker cannot do this. The defender

can prepare the ground in advance, building obstacles, firing positions,

and improving routes between battle positions. The attacker can on.ly

gue.~

s at these. The defender can fight from cover while the attacker is

in the opeli. The defender can shoot first and force the attacker to

react. The defender can shoot from stationary p latforms or positions

whi le an attacker must move . The defender can shift forces from prepared

position to prepared p osition swiftly to concentrate for successive

engagements. The (zttacker must feel his way over the terrain, seeing

each new compartment for the first time. The defender can p lan communications, contro l measures, fires, and log istical support in advance to

3-20 -

___ 

- 

/

- - -
fit many predictable situations. The attacker must adhere to a predetermined course of action and risk being out-maneuvered , or must alter his

p lans as the battle develops and suffer from uncoordinated effort.

Each position should combine the best characteristics of a defense and

an ambush. Several positions designed for mutual support should be used

to multiply the strength and value of each. The combination of all

these advantages repeated in each set of positions in depth, supported

by field artillery , offensive air support, and attack helicopters, should

enable the defender to inflict very high losses on an attacking enemy .

L I.

4: -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

- -

~~~~

- - -

~~~~~~~ -

-

- ,

~~~~ 

—- 

~-9-- .r • -

~~~~

-—

~

——-- - - - -- 

“

V

______ - -r- ~~~~ r - - ‘V
3.4.3 Analysis. Both analysts were able to generate a subctantia l

number of candidate questions during the first-stage elicitation procedure

(a complete list of responses for each subject is provided in Appendix C).

The fi rst step in reducing these data was to identify and eliminate those

questions that seemed to be redundant. This was accomplished first on a

within-analyst basis and then on a between-analyst basis. The procedure

was to informally compare the similarity of the answers given to each

question and eliminate those which seemed to overlap. After eliminating

redundant questions both wi thin and across analysts , each of the 72

remaining candidate questions was then typed on a separate index card .

Both participants were then each given a complete deck of questions and

instructed to sort them into meaningful clusters or “chunks ” of tactical

info rmation. No restrictions were placed on the number of clusters that

could be used or on the selection of an organizational strategy . After

the sorting task was completed , subjects were instructed to generate a

“label ” for each cluster to i dentify the theme or underly ing dimension

on which the sorting judgment was based.

The results of the sorting task revealed some disagreement among the

participants as to the number of tactical clusters necessary to organize

the candidate questions. The “G2” subject generated 19 different clusters ,

while the “G3” generated 15. The contents of each cluster as well as

- 

the perceived “theme” also varied from one analyst to the other. However,

12 clusters were roughly synonomous in theme , yet of these , only 3

contained identical tactical questions .

Since the number of participants (only two) did not permi t a formal

statistical approach to resolving differences of opinion , an effort was

made to achieve an informal concensus on each cluster through group

discussion with an intermediator. With this objective in mind , the

sorting task was performed a second time in a group setting. The

3-22

- ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~-

~~—-——- —--—- —~~~~.-. ________

~~~~~~~ -/..!.-~

k

~ ~~;

~;-~~~ -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -w~.I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~.- -

~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ -- ~~
sorting rule was that both experts had to agree before a candidate

question could be assigned to any tactical cluster. After the group

sorting was completed , a group labelling procedure was undertaken to

clearly specify the tactical theme of each cluster (both participants

• . had to agree before a particular labe l was “accepted”).

Next , the individual questions within each cluster were rank-ordered

(again in a group setting) to produce a sequence of successively more

detailed tactical questions. The objective was to construct a hierarchy

of tactical analysis for each cluster (i.e., a tactical data structure).

Instructions specified that questions calling for sumarized infoniiation

should be ranked higher than related questions calling for more detail.

A number of clusters , however , were relatively homogeneous with respect

to the level of detail variable. The instructions , therefore , also

emphasized that ranking should reflect the temporal sequence in which

the questions should be asked. In other words , the objective was to

construct a coherent sequence of questions wi thin each cluster corresponding to an orderly analysis of tactical information .

Our approach can be contrasted to rank ordering on the basis of perceived

tactical “importance .” We reasoned that an “importance ” ranking is

necessarily context-bound and will probably fail to generalize over

di fferent situations. For example , depending on the circumstances ,

a user may or may not have sufficient time to pursue a particular line

of analysis down to the l owest level of detail. If future symbology is

to offer the user a tactical database that he can adapt to meet his

changing needs , then access to qUestions within the database should

-probably not be “fixed” to refl ect static information priorities. Rather~

questions might better be arranged along a “levels of analysis ” dimension

to offer more -flexibility across a wide range of tasks and situations.

3-23 

-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~~~~ 

-
3.4.4 Results. A total of 22 candidate clusters , each centered on a

different tactical theme, resulted from the group sorting task. A

description of these clusters appea rs in Exhibit 3-1 (presented at the

- 

end of this chapter), with one cluster shown on each page of the exhib it.

The presentation format fora cluster begins with a heading which labels

the theme or concept represented , followed by a key tactical question

addressed by the cluster. Next , a brief rationale for supporting the

tactical need and relevance for the question cluster is provided .

Finally , an ordered set of constituent questions and answers (i.e., the

data structure ) is portrayed . In certain cases , it should be noted , conventiona l tactical questions considered by the pa rticipants (e.g., what

type of enemy units oppose me?.. .what size are they? - see Table 2-1)

were not inc l uded in the data structures since their information requirements are already well known .

Each cluster presented in the exhibit represents a set of candidate

questions pertain i ng to a comon tactical theme . The objective of the

present methodology , as described previously, is to operationally define

each cluster in terms of an ordered list of tactical questions -and-answers ,

that is , in terms of a tactical data structure . The data structure concept ,

as illustrated by each page of the exhibit , represents the basic building -

block of a tactical database. It explicitly identifies a set of tactical

tasks that a new symbology might accommodate (in the form of questions) and ,

in so doing, defines a corresponding set of candidate information requirements (in the form of answers). The depth of each structure , tha t ~s , the

number of questions it conta i ns , reflects the depth of tactical analysis

which it addresses . The breadth of each structure , on the other hand ,

reflects the range of responses it can provide. Each one , in effect , represents a model of information that could , if expressed graphically, provide

an easy-to-understand format for tactical assessment and planning.

3-24

.

. 

-

— —~~~-— — — - _j ’ _ ’
3.4.5 Implications. The use of automated systems to process , store ,

and d is p lay battlefield information may effectively expand the role of

m i l i tary symbolo gy in combat operations. A basic requirement of such

automa ti on , however , i s that tac tical i nforma tion be or ganize d i n to

meanin gful an d readily accessi ble structures or “ chunks ” . The preceding

set of query-based data structures represent one way in which tactical

information can be chunked and stored for rapid retrieval. Each structure

is task-oriented and can be selectively accessed to retrieve information

at different levels of tactical detail. For example , cons id er the anal ysi s

of “Type of Threat” (Item 2 in the exhibit). Under certain circumstances ,

the user may onl y have t ime for a qu i ck overview of the situation - all

combat-type vs. all support-type units . In another context , he may w i sh

to con duc t a more ela bora te anal ysis by selec tin g finer levels of informa tion detail (e.g.. by ask i ng for “unit composition ” or “spec i al wea pons ”).

In effec t, each data structure represents a potential building -block in

the develo pment of a dynam i c data base for tactical symbolo gy .

The preceding discussion suggests that data organization will play a

fundamental role in determining the effectiveness of new symbology .

Ideally, the database should be compatible with the military , user ’ s own

men tal or ganization of tactical knowle dge . Specifically , in or der to

a dd ress the database , a user must fi rst un derstand: (a) the relationship

between the specific tactical task requirements and the available

corresponding database structures , and (b) the inherent organization of

data within each structure . In other words , the user must be able to

translate his/her current task objectives into a corresponding set of

tactica l questions.

Each question offers the user an opportunity to bridge the gap between

task demands and the location or “address ” of required information. In

practical terms , the firs t step for the user is to i dentify the tactical

3-25

/ - 

,

-1

- .
theme to be pursued (e.g., Type of Threat) and then the level of detail

at which the user wishes to operate. These two decisions define the

database coordinates at which the user enters the system. Ultimately,

the dynami c symbology corresponding to the activated data structu re may

then provide the user with a graphic read-out of the requested information.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the data structures presented in the

exhibit are intended to be illustrative since they are based on elicitation

data~ from only two military analysts. It is quite conceivable that other

analysts would have generated different questions , answers , and patterns of

data organization . Eventually, however , it will be essential for all

useful da ta structures to reflect the best judgment of the Army ’s tact i cal

community at large . -

3.4.6 Summary. Given the far-reaching potential of improved symbology

for graphically communicating tactical information , a task-oriented

doctrinally -based elicitation procedure was developed to obtain diverse ,

representative information requirements that mi ght ultimately be served

by modern tactical symbology. These requirements were determi ned i. n the -

form of candidate questions and answers which would likely emerge in a

goal-directed , typical TOC-level tactical assessment and planning exercise.

To test the practicality of the query-based procedures , data were elicited

from two experienced tacticians in the context of a defensive , tactical - -

scenario. These data (questions and answers ) were then systematically

organized into cl usters of thematically related , ordered information

(i.e., tactical data structures). -

The problem of selecting essential information requirements may eventually

be dominated , in the case of computer-based symbology , by the problem of

organizing data into meaningfu l “chunks. ” In this regard , tactical data

structures (i.e., clusters of related tactical questions) appear to provide

3-26

___ 

- - .

~~~~~~~~

-

-

~~~ -~~~~~~~ -~~~~

-

-- -

- - •---- -

~~~~~~~~~ 

_ i -

I -- :‘

~~~~~- -~~~~. 4 - _ _ ,~ ‘/. . .,

V

~ 4~

- _-- .

~~~~~_ _

- —.—-—-

- 

. g - j ~~~4~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ V
a useful tool for representing the info rmation content of improved

- symbology . These structures can be defined in terms of their depth--the

level of detail at which concepts are specified , as well as their breadth--

— the range of concepts they address at each level. The data structures are

task oriented and are designed to permit selective retrieval of information

at different levels of tactical detail.

I 3-27 ¶ _______ 

_______ 

-

. 

:

~

;:T

~

:

~

:L4:. -

- ~~~ ~~~ /

1i

~

L ~~~~~~~~ i w ~~~~—--~ -

~~~~~~~ ,.-—----
EXHIBIT 3-1

CANDIDATE CLUSTERS OF TACTICAL QUESTIONS

I

I

I 

_ 

J

______ _______ 

~~

-

,

_____
1. IM~

IEDIATE THREAT

Key Question:

“Which enemy units are closing in the fastest?”

Rationale:

Very seldom does the resolution of reports about enemy activity

manifest itself on the battlefield display system. As the staff

goes busily about planning , communicating, and reacting to radio

requests , the focus of response often centers on the movement of

friendly units rather than actions taken to destroy enemy units . If at anytime a commander glanced at the situation display and

could see which enemy units were currently moving toward him , and , further which ones should be dealt with first, then his priorities

would be more clear. If the enemy is doing something dynamic

then that action should be comunicated dynami cally on the display . Static reports and displays cannot keep pace with modern battle.

Data Structure :

TOW ARDS US? 

MOVING 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ E

MEING 

E

MEING ETS 

NOT

W~~ I UNITS ARE ~~~~~~~ S CLOSES~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ S CLOSE ~~~~~~~~~~ AT ~~~~~~~~~~~FAR

CI OSEST TO US NOW? TO US ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ t FROM~~S )

~ T E O 

TACTICAL EE

~ 

ENAISSANcE

3-30

-V 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - 

- - 

- ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ - - /~
2. TYPE OF THREAT (UNIT FUNCTION )

Key Question: -

“Where are the prepo nderence of the enemy ’s combined arms strike forces?”

Rat i onale:

“What are we up against?” So often, using the current map -display symbol

system, it is near impossible to sort out those enemy units that have

“teeth” and those who don ’t. Further , it is useful for the intelli gent

selection of firepower resources to know exactly what kind of weapon

systems you face. Th i s k i nd of display woul d permit pr sion counterpunching as wel l as the efficient use of resources in an ant~r1pated

conflict where we are to be outnuithered and outgunn~ 1 .

Data Structure:

W III CH ARE T H E COMBAT ~~~~~~~~~ BAT

~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

ER 

(

~~~~~~~TRY ~~~~~~~~~~~~ I E R Y 

ERY ENtER

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

INE L INE ~~~~~ [ T M J,,. WIIA T IS TIll lB COMI’O I I ION? I

ARM lIlT ARM

ARM HRM~~~~~ [

~~~~~~~~~ 

V

W I IA T IS TIII VIR SPEC IAI V 106 G [

~~~2 IIO~~~~~~ j MII 

~

.[ IROG 

~~~ 

I-Il

3-31

fT 

__________ _____

- -~~~-—-~~~~ -- • -.-- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -V~

~~~ ~~~ ~~

~~~~~~ __ 

- 

/
3. POTENTIAL OF THREAT (UNIT CAPABILITY )

Key Question:

“Just hoz,, strong are the enemy units?”

Rationale:

If we ’ re faced with an armored regiment bearing down on us then it

makes a great dea l of difference to us to know if he ’ s l ame , or low

on gas or at only 50% strength. The Order of Battle unit designator

may be “regiment” but if it only has the punch of a “battalion ” then

that status is critical information , and it shoul d be accurately

displayed for each of the enemy ’s dimensions of potential.

Data Structure :

3. POT EN’!AL OF THR EA T (UNIT CAPAB I L ITY )

~ POL [ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ pt opu [ ,Osii~~~~~~ - I (SP

~~~~ ~~~~~ [Acc ~~~~~~~~~~

~~P E 0 0 0

3-32

- - - : - ‘

~ °~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -

I V

______ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - — -- V
4. PRIORITY TAR GETS

Key Question:

“Where are the critical enemy targets such as the corr~nand posts, fire

direction centers and communication centers?”

L

Rationale:

There is a need for priority targets to be seen as standing out from

the maze of enemy units . Using the current map symbol system , it is

extremely difficult to pick out those enemy targets where fire should

be concentrated .

Data Structure:

~~

_

~~~~~~~cA L EOEAT ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ EF

A ULA~~ 101 100 M ?oo N (00 M •50 N III M

3-33

.:; ~

.: 

-

~~~~~ 

- _________

__ ______ / ~LL- — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
5. ENEMY VULNERABILITY

Key Question:

“What is the nature of the enemy ’s weakness?”

Rationale:

What makes an enemy force a vul nerabl e target? When deciding which —

enemy force to comit the bul k of our assets against , it makes a real

difference at a tactical level to know the unit’ s current situational

status. Is he operating on defensible terrain? Is he obscured by

smoke? Is he imobilized by an obstacle and in the open ? What about

his back up firepower? These conditions surrounding his ability to

protect himself will often be too temporary to recode on a display , but since that is not always the case some provision should be made

within the symbol language to accomodate same .

Data Structure:

5. J

~

LMY VULNERABILITY V

~

r

~ R~~~~~~~ R~ IN? 

çT

IN ~~~~~~~ED 

~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~

AFF ORDED BY ~~~~~~~~IGHT CAIN ~~~~~~~~~~~OK[ ~~~~~~~~~~ Oc

~

IA1 VU LNLRABIL I1Y 

c

’

~~~~~~~iLE 

(

~~~~rE ~~~~~ ILF

WAM~~~~~ERA8! TY IS 

~~~~~~~ FR~~~tn ~~~~~~EW RNDS 

~~~~~~WA1 c2ING ~~~~~~~~ 1N~NC

3-34

--—.--—~----

~~-

- -

- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ---- —-——-— —-----~ - V ——— - -——-

I ~~~~ ~~ /

___ — 

-.V

~~~~~~

, 

~~~~
6. REACH OF THREAT

Key Question:

“What is the BtrT-king distance of enemy units?”

Rationale:

What an enemy unit can do to us is a function of his mobility and the

range of his firepower. It is not enough for the battle staff to be

able to know where along their front the enemy is likely to stri ke;

the staff must know the depth current opposing forces can penetrate

as their capability changes. Looking at a conventional display there

is no indication that a friendly command post is in jeopardy . Defensive

responses must be made in-depth when using the active defense.

Data Structure:

~~~1

I

~~ F

T

~

1

~~EMY ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (

‘

~~~~~~~~~ LE ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TI MIC IIAYI /F0 

~~ ~~~~ I1A1IONS ~~~~~~~~ ,,Ir~ t (I, - 

~~ V~

A - ~

1T) (TT~

I IAT .T)

~~~~~~~~

P

~

NGF OF WtBP OPI 

~

:—III:-I-I::

OUt I 201(C) 

~

M 1 0110 M — 20(1(1 M 5(10 — 111(V) I 0—51)0 P

4

3-35

—V -V.-—— -~- —.- 

-

*_ ~ -p----

~ —s.- -

~~

- .- -

~

; ‘-I

_____________________ - -‘5~A - ~;.- V 

~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -- -
7. SOURCE AND ACCURACY OF DATA V

Key Question:

“Which intelligence collection source provided the symbolized information,

and what is the current assessment as to the reliabitity of the source

and accuracy of its information?”

Rationale:

The quality of the data displayed remains a critical discriminator for

the tactical decision maker. Unfortunately , the current display system

has no ready way to annotate the known reliabilit y of the source of

information nor the fact that the specific report displayed may have

or not have been corroborated by other intelligence.

Data Structure:

~~~~~ - (

~~) (f’

- (

~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~N) 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~U~~~L) ~~~l( I

~~

Q 

~

k

~

’ ~~~~

II ( ( t1( 

- E~

: I.

~~~~

) 

(u

~~~~~~ I (nL

) 

~~~~~) 1:)

I I

3-36

-

. 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

-- .

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

4

___ - 

- 

~~~~~~~~ - - “ 

~
8. EARLY WARNING

Key Question:

“Are there any cri tical ear ly moves sugge sting a potential enemy attack? ”

Rationale: V

The concept of the active defense is predi cated on early warni ng. Moving

our soldiers to their forward battle positions , drawing the necessary V

ammunition and meeting the enemy as far forward as possible are the

pivotal components for the success of such a tactic. Minutes are

critical here and every command staff should be able to see the key

indicators as they are reported.

Data Structure :

(1FFIC~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ M ENT ® ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ,

/

IN T O ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

(

~~~~ U!l~~1FNT

3-37 

V - 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

______— ___ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .

~~~~~~ 

____ 

. 1

____ 

7 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ “ 7

/

______ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -
9. POINT OF PENETRATION

~ y Questi on:

“Where are the like ly points of enemy penetrati onP ’

Rationale:

Since it is a known tenant of the active defense that we can only man

selected portions of any forward front line , then it is obvious that

the defensive positions occupied must inc l ude the point of enemy

penetration . Therefore, it is critical to be able to clearly see

this poi nt on the display system in the early phases of battle.

Data Structure S

C ) RIFNTA T I ON l EA D I N G TOWAROS1 ( lEA DING lIE/WING 1 I____~~:

_

~

_ 1 f I l MY UNIT C ENT ER OF LEFT or RIGHT OF AN OT II(.P UNITS

~~~~~~~~~ 

~r~~~~

I’

~ [

~_ SECTOR CENTER CENTER SI LTQR

R~~~1I0~~ 0 H 0 0

- W IIIPE AR E ( T A O

AT IAC Y REG IMENTS

GOIN G 10 INTER- —-

SEC F THE AVENUE

OF APPROACH?

WHERE IN OUR

REAR HAS HE

P Rt P OSIT ION E D V IT C I)

3-38 -

V _ _

-

4
10. OBJECTIVE OF PENETRATION

Key Question:

“What is the objective of the enemy penetration? ”

Rationale:

Knowing at what point along the line of contact we can expect an enemy

penetration is only the fi rst raw data needed to respond tactically.

Soon the enemy penetration will take on an elongated shape as it reaches

into our area of operations. To properly respond to that threat in-depth , we should be able to anticipate the length , width and azimuth of that

penetration. One solid way to assess this is by studying the objectives

that would be most lucrative for the opposing force, checking those

against their known reach and then plotting the anticipated penetration

on a display . In this way , forces can be moved laterally i nto the

breach before the momentum of the penetration makes res ponse impossible.

Data Structure :

~~~~~~ ~~~E CTlYL? ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ES ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~ 

~~~~~~I? 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

3-39

*4-. — 

V

•~l ~~~~~~~~~~~ ir - ‘~‘~~~~~~~~~~

.

, 11- ~~~~~~~~~~

_______________ / - .

.

-- .

~.-, - - - ~~~

- - — - .

_ -V
11 . AREA OF OBSCURATION

Key Question:

“What areas of the battlefield are obscured by smoke?”

Rationale:

At the fighting echelons below bri gade , there are many sophisticated

weapons that are designed to work best at ranges up to 3 km. These

systems , however , are dependent on the gunner ’ s ability to visually

acquire and track enemy targets at that distance. Since the battle

staff must recommend where additional weapons of this kind might be

used to reinforce our defense , they should be clearly aware of where

they will be most effective. So , if the display could reflect those

portions of the battlefield currently obscured by smoke , dust , or fog

then good locations of where to employ these weapons would surface.

This situation applies to the employment of other systems like

gunships or CAS (close air support) as well. The obscured areas

dimensions and longevity would be useful .

Data Structure:

W HA T AREA DOES TUE

SMOKE CIRCUMSCRIBE ? AREA

~ EN L

~~1___ ___ ___ ___

Mt NUlL S

I i I2 I

~~~~~~~ ,[ V 

_

~ i_______ _______ 

6~~~~~~~[ 

~~~~~~

3-40

Tj~~~c ~~ - 

-

-. / ~_~~ j __ - 

4
12 . INTERV ISABILITY IN METERS

• Key Question:

“What is the current intervisibility for our direct fire weapons?”

Rationale:

In concert with the display of any major area of obscuration , it is

important to know the intervisabil-i ty characteristics of every known

avenue of approach. One can only shoot as far as one can see. Defiles , trees , built -up areas and many other factors effect how line of sight

really works on the ground . As a commander fights rearward and must

analyze engagement locations not previously wargamed , an area intervisability index woul d be a key source of information in order to

intelligently select weapons and match them to terrain.

Data Structure:

U ( T IPVIS IITT L ITY? 

~

IIII cr:c::

~ <Z

OVER 2000 M 1500 

M\ 

T000 N S00 M 250 U TOO N

~~~b~~~~~T0 Q 

~ 01 TIlE TIME? 1(0 A 

3

LITTLE SOME A LOT 

- 

YES

3-4 1

• e_-, - . ---- — -- - -

_ _________ /_

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ r. -
13. AIR AVAILABIL iTY

Key Question:

“Wha t is the currcnt station time remaining for our avai lable air

assets? ”

Rat i onale:

Often , in the heat of battle , a firepower resource can be overlooked . Close air support , whether from fighter type aircraft or army attack

helicopters is a useful resource. But this resource can only hang

around waiting to be employed for a limited time . Fuel and enemy

air defenses are two reasons for that. The point is that if there

were a visual reminder on the battl e display system , the staff

woul d probably use these resources well. The reminder need only

identify the resourc e and the time it has remaining on sta t i on .

If the resource carried any special weapons , that inform at i on

m i ght also be include d .

Data Structure:

(

V M 

(

V~~~~~~;

(

~

) 

- 

(--b

““ (

-V

~~~~I ( ) ( I’

~ ~ (

~~~~~;_ _ ~_ (

~~~~~~~~~

‘

V.~~~~~~~ ) 

( I ~~~~~ ) (

~

_

~ ~~~~~~ 

( )

t 3-42

4 .. 

~

V - — 

~~~

____
14. LATERAL ENGAGEMENT TIME

Key Question:

“What is the vector and time of closure for any unengaged unit to move

into the breach of the identified pene tration?”

Rationale:

In any given sector, the response time for units to move laterally

across the battlefield is critical to the active defense. Traditionally

lines of communication from front to rear have occupied planners ’ attention. But , in the active defense one of the fundamental tenants

involves the defenders requirement to quickly shift forces , within the

battle area , in order to place them directly in front of any enemy

penetration effort. Therefore, a relative index by sector for lateral

trafficability and mobility expressed in time would be critical.

Data Structure:

C ~ 

((1 ~~~~~

)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

)

~~~~ _fVV V__V__ J V VVV_._ V_ .3 

~~~—— —_+—-_---——-1 V— —I ~~~~~—I r i i —— I c ,M “P II) P11 II ~fl • ~ ~ 2S PM P

(

~~~~~N 

e C)

3-43

______ _____ -

-. ~~~~~~

- 

•
15. PREEMPTIVE STRIKE

Key Question:

“Can we conduct a preemptive (has ty) attack on enemy forces?”

Rationale:

Shoul d enough early warning be available , a commander might decide to

conduct a preemptive (hasty) attack on massing enemy forces or some

other cri tical objective like the control of a key choke point on the

enemy ’s side of the fence. In this case the commander and staff shoul d

be able to display their reach and punch as it has been marshalled at

that point in time so that they might intelligently weigh the advantages

and disadvantages of such a move .

Data Structure:

Wll fl l IS Till

ill A ilITfl~~~? 

T 100~ i5~- 50% ~~~ 0

W IIEE (V S~~~~ TRACV RAIL ‘

~

pr ~

i[LIBORN~~~. 

~~~~

I1 1 V

• OF ATTAC V 

~~LII~LL~~t ~I’ 

LV±_ FM [ 

~~~ ____

- 

I I 

~~ ~

T~~~~~~ - * / •

~~ - - 2~~~Vf I e -.~~~~,

____ ___ - v

i

— -
16 . ATTRITION ZONE STATUS 

C

Key Question:

“How can we keep track of autonomous tank killer teams in designated

areas of operation?”

Rationale:

An attrition zone defense will include hundreds of small semi-autonomous

anti-tank teams. When these teams are deployed in enemy occupied

terri tory, there must be a way of keeping track of teams which are

still active.

Data Structure:

(J IM ~~ ~

1I(f5 1

~ 

I I FOR L - - J fl 

~

J L [L1i1

IONS ED , E00T11

/

L - 

~

I

TI2~I~~ 

P1,(, IVF((I 6:

~~) 

~~~~~~

- i V

3-45

___ 

__ _ 

V - - -

~ - - - 

~ / • ~~ • ~~~~~~~~

- -

~-T~? ,

~ • V~~~ç~~~~ j~~ j V~~ • - fi - • , W ~~4~

~~~~~~~

— --- 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

-

~~
- 17. AIR ATTACK LANES

Key Question:

“Where can our aircraft fly to avoid enemy air defense weapons?”

Rationale:

Seeing air defense range fans associated with the enemy units located

would aid in identifying the gaps to fly through. The current symbol

system allows the identification of air defense artillery units. The

critical feature of these units , namely the range of their weapons-,

is not provided .

Data Structure:

( ((JON

) 

( ) ~~~~~ 

( ,, ) ~~~~~

~A W( ~~~~~~ CD ED 

~~~~~ 

0 S~~JP (CP H

(

V. 

)

(NIb I PA/I I IN” III ~

I/NI ( I t A lIC ~IPPI Moth

I /VI Al 

:

,

~~ I (J :~) (

~~~~~~~) (~~~~~~)

3-46

t

~~~ C~~~~~~~~~V~~~~~~~~~~~ ?~T7 - - --- - -

/

____________________________________________
18. MUTUAL SUPPORT

Key Question:

“How do we know if we have the synergistic power of a combined arqmi

team?”

Rationale:

The combat power of a properly integrated mix of combat and combatsupport units is significantly more pungent when they work in concert . Ideally, INF , ARMO R , AIR DEF , AVIATION and ENGINEERS are blended to

ma ke this kind of combined arms team . Therefore , i t would be useful

to be able to check the task organization of any unit and eval uate the

degree to which those units are in fact combined arms teams .

- Data Structure

WH A T ~ OF OUR

THEIR FOREC AST 0% 25% 50% 75% iooz

DEFENSE POSh /WA S?

I i

(•

:

‘E

~

::

~ 

~~ 50%

25% (

‘

~

‘

~~~

‘

~ c:E:

~

T) ~~

I.

~~~~~~ 

3-47

FY~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

V.— - 

V

- - - ___________ ~~ -r l ’

~~~~~~~’U~~~.w - - - -p
19. DEFENSE READINESS

Key Question:

“How do we know the relative defensive readiness of our units at

a glance?”

Rationale:

Since we may be fighting outnisubered and outgunned , it’ s important to

have an assessment of the readi ness of our units . Some simple rating V

scheme could be devised to rate the degree to which our units had

gotten to their defensive position and begun digging in. Ideally,

the units won ’t get a full readiness mark until they are preparing

positions and have dispatched recon patrol s and OP’s.

Data Structure:

~II~

UP

~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~ 

[ z~

’

~

c

~

1Y

~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~(

~~~~~ V~

I

~~

’

I’ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ [:-:;;;

~

;•EVVIIPPPIPIP~

3-48

- s:’ -; - F ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ V

- ‘

~ •4~/4fl~ -

~ -~ i 

~

t / ___ - ~~ ~~~~ ~ :
20. TYPE OF AIR THREAT

Key Question:

“1/ow can we counterpunch enemy aircraft if we don ‘t know what type

are (5om1~

flg ?”

Rationale:

Getting alerted to enemy attack aircraft is important. However , the

real requirement then is to match the attack aircraft with the

corresponding ground counter-punchin g system.

Data Structure:

WIIIIU Aol 

I? ( i

~~~~~~~~~ 

~

i

±T’

~ 

~~~~~~~~~~ IIiiiUI1 

(

~~~~~t cI NIt 

~~~~~~~ RVAiI 0 N

V 

~~~~f ~~

(

~~~~~ R Y ? 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I 400 + YNOES ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ KNOTS _______ 200 KNOTS E~~~ loll INIJCS

• 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ IIIi

~

iIIIII

~ ~~~~ 

(

>

~~~~~RRA I 

•

3-49

— 

‘

— --V. V._~ ~~• -V.-- ~~~ — ,--~~~~~ _ — -- —-— - - -

~~~~ 

-______ - V
21. AUGMENTATION

Key Question:

“How can we show when an enemy unit has been augmented with special •

equipment or special troops since it may tip-off expected missions?

Rationale:

Ocassionall y enemy units have been issued special equipment or troops

that become a clear tip-off as to their next type of mission. Usually,

these augmentations can be expressed in terms of a change in mob ility

or a change in firepower.

Data Structure :

1IJ~~ lbC i T BEEN -

EQU I PMENT VEH ICLES WEA PON S SPE CI AL

I. THERE A CHANGE EEED

iIlA lIGF

~~~~N A IR MSAUF I 

~~~~~~ ABIII1R% ~~~~~~ A IIIIITIES ~~~~~~~~~~~~ I(
22. BATTLEFIELD MULTI PLIERS

~~y~~~~~~on:

F/OW can W( a hOW OUr’ actions to thwart enemy movemerL~- by ob~tacles

• 

(

~onL~

tr~c t , l on the battlefield?

Rationale:

A key conce pt i n destroying a masse d tank format i on i s tha t of placin g

“glue ” on the battlefield. Glue can be mines or obstacles of any

sort that allow the period of target servicing to be extended . So any

depiction of fires should include both the means used to keep the

enemy within the kill zone and the expected delay factor.

Data Structure :

~: ~ i

~~~i:

,

Ii ‘

l

’

~ A I ~~~~~ PI 

~

) ( :~

: ) ( I

~~ . III~~ )

o ’

~ I

~~~~~ i II PP IPp( ~ (

V V. 

(

~~

.) ( - ‘ ~ “) (

:A1) (

~~

V

~~~~~~

- )

(I

~ I I I ~ l~

)

~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ t

_

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~ V1V._V~

. _ ~~~~ , ‘ ‘ I V — • p4~ fl (II M III I V V MI - I J

~~ flflfl I V _ I 0 +1101* .

3

__ - - ~~* V ~~~~W - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ V V L - - 

— - -- I

; 

~~~~~ ~~ -+ 

~ t * f 

- - 

/
4. A BEHAVIORA L ANALYSIS OF SYMBOL DESIGN EFFECTIVENESS

4.1 Overview

The im pact of modern symbo logy on tactical decision making will depend ,

to a large extent , on how readily it can be perceived and how easily it

can be interpreted . Unfortunately, our knowled ge of the pr i nc i ples

un derlying effective symbol design is rather l imited . The following

quote aptly sumarizes the current situation :

“The universal criticism . . . was that there was lots

of ha rdi,are info rmation but no criteria upon which one

could base a sound design. Thoug h one could learn all

about the size and brightness of various disp lays, one

could not form any judgment about how effectively the

display transferred information to an observer. ”

-from the Preface of Percep tion of Disp layed Information

by L.M. Biberman, 1973

One objective of this chapter is to offer a set of guidelines for

optimizing symbol design effectiveness over a wide range of user-based

performance cr i ter i a . Each guideline will be in the form of a “design

rule ’ for meeting a prescribed set of behaviora l criteria. For example ,

a guideline for enhancing symbol discriminability might be: ~11?. -

~~~ I~~: : ,

* 

I - / ~‘ ~~~~ ~ • ~~. .

- 

~/ . zr’ f j il] I ii; ~-/ iJ fl JI ~~ /;/.~ i’,-:~ rvi~~~~ j r ,n/ i ’:, of the ~~

p Ub!, 

~~

o’/- -l •;r t . Our fi rs t ste p i n the der i va tion of such gui del i nes was

to identify the same fundamenta l behaviora l skills that are essential

to the effective use of symbology . We reasoned that a taxonomy of

relevant behavioral criteria would provide a coherent basis for organizing

the available research literature and deriving guidelines for symbol

design . As it turns out , similar--or even identical guidelines —- occasion -

ally result from the anal yses of the different behavioral processes.

4-1

_ ____ _____ 

& - 

—— -

~~~~~~~~ — V— ~~V_V_ V.

~~V - -r~r - - ~- -~~~~- - %

____ 

~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~mi- ~~u r j ~r

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - V~~~
A behavioral taxonomy was developed by analyzing a typical sequence

of tactical task requirements. These requirements were embedded within

a task “scenario ” developed in consultation with experienced military

symbol users . Each task described in the scenario was used to identify

a corresponding set of user—based be haviora l requirements . The resulting

taxonomy was then used to organize a selective review of the literature

in visual perception , cognitive psychology , and human factors . Finally ,

basic empirical findings in each task -related area (e.g., visual

discrimination ) were used to evaluate a sample 0-f current symbol design

candidates and formulate tentative guidelines for improving symbol -use

performance.

The development of a behav i ora l taxonom y throu gh analys i s of a task

scenario is a plausible procedure ; but a useful set of behavior requirements could , in our view , be alternatively derived from an inductive

anal ysis of a variety of literature sources . These sources include

behaviora l and milita ry literature , studies on the development of a

taxonomy of huma n performance (see Fleishrnan , 1975 for a review ), as

well as additional literature in cognitive psychology . As an illustration ,

a tentative taxonomy was derived using this alternative met hod , and it

is presented in Appendix D .

4.2 Beha v iora l Requirements

A sample task scenario was developed to provide a concrete description

of the symbol-use process and a realistic context for the present

psycholo gical analys i s. Th is scenario was based on conventiona l symbol—

use tasks (as listed in Table 2-1) and was designed to reflect a rather

typical pattern of interaction between a symbol user and a standard

situation display . As illustra ted below , the task selected for analysis

is a relatively complex one and invo l ves many important elements of the

symbo l-use process.

4-2

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . I - .

____ — ~~~-

~~—--~~-
T ok Requirement: Detcr’m-im- where 1k- enemy is liki /

~i

to conduct his breakthrough attack.

Task Scenario: The situation map is ;

~~rnnod ~

-o iccoto

the pr cpond er ’ance of the enemy ‘o forward ‘r ~~’-i~~~Twd arms

units. This ‘oroh proce ss is corirp liorztcd by tho fact

• that attack uni t symbols arc ( o—m l Vng Zr!d wi th ; upr ort

unit symbols of Various l*?Jpo:~. After !oco tLkq a

threatening mass of battaiion:~, an aceta 1c a t/ ’r o k

temp late V~~5 p l000(i over them to see ii ’ the formation

has adopted the classic attack posture. A (.h~ - .k I:;

then made of annotated (textual) reports on the

enemy ’s rear to see if they have connected with 1-h if o rward concentration. Next , the Order of Battle

book is checked to see if the cdjcci-nt unit- had

previously parti cipa ted ~n maneuvers as a p er etr a t V/ o~ for~c. Finally, the r/ ge and striking 4istcnce:

~ of

these units are calculated using enemy doctrzoa l

manuals, and a line is ih-~~

m from susp r- - ~ted attacking

reg iments to their ~~spec ted objectives in our oW~’1

area of operati ~

on. The points where these lines cr-osth~

i- border rep resi -nt the best guoss es to the points of

P~

-

~~

- ’ rat- -ton.

The p reced i n g sequence of ev ents serves to illus tra te some of the essen ti al

user-based requirements for effective symbol use. The first task requirement is simply to establish the location of “combined arms ” un its. This

requirement , however , presupposes a knowled ge of the symbolic code

corresponding to eac h type of combined arms unit. In effect , the user

must previously have acquired a vocabulary of symbolic code and learned

to translate each element of that code into a corresponding tactical

concept. Th i s ra i ses the issue of symbol learnability : What des ig n

criter i a are associated w it h ease of lea rning ? Next , the user i s requ i red

to search throu gh a relatively structured situation display to locate a

small set of tar get symbols: What des ig n criter i a ar ~~~ ç~~sar to

effec ti v ely “cue” the sea rch process and what are the effects of map

disp lay background on sea rch efficiency? Another factor complicating

the search process is that the user encounters difficulty making

4-3

- 

* 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —~~ .— —-- -.V ~V V V *~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~V V*_ ~~~ -- -
discriminations between visually similar combat and support unit symbols:

What design features are correlated with ease of discrimin abi lity

especially on a cluttered situation display ?

L.

After completing the search , the user si4per- fmposes an acetate template

on the map to enhance his ability to detect an attack configuration .

The ability to see complex patterns involving more than a single unit

raises still another major issue : Can symbols be designed to facilitate

user recognition of tactical formations? After determining the enemy’s

formation status , the user has to disrupt his visua l analysis of the

disp lay to obtain related info rmation from a textual source (namely,

the recent history and current mobility of enemy striking units). Upon

completing this task , another non-display effort is unde rtaken to

estima te the range of enemy weaponry and compute their doctrina l striking

range (i.e., their reach). These activities illustrate the time-consuming

and distracting nature of tactical questions that cannot , at present , be

“answered ” using a purely graphic information resource. Such questions

clearly have a negative impact on the user by: (1) placing a burden on

his limi ted-capacity short-term memory (since he has to remember and

integra te information from both visual and textual media) and (2)

requiring him to synthesize or sumarize details in order to infer

informati on essential to the on-going assessment process.

The preceding analysis of display- related task requirements has identifi ed

a number of information processing probl ems--both cognitive and perceptual--

that may befall the tactical symbol user. The cognitive problems--namely

those relating to short-term memory and inference--appear to be partly

due to a deficient tactical database and will not be addressed here since

they are not strictly a function of deficiencies in symbol design. It

should be noted , however, that an expanded database--one incorporating

relevant textual data and offering information at multiple levels of

4-4

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I ~~

- 

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detail--might help overcome most of the major cognitive problems posed

by the current map/symbol system. The focus of the current analysis ,

therefore, is for the most part limited to perceptual problem s arising

from built-in sensory and/or capacity limi tations of the user.

L

Symbols can and should be designed to complement rather than inhibit

the processes of discrimination , search , and iearnabi lj~y. These three

processes--each manifested in the preceding task scenario--represent

basic behavioral requirements of the tactical symbol-use process. Symbol

designs might be judged effective to the extent that they can maximize

performance along each of these fundamental task-related dimensions.

Design features that are correlated with ease of learning, for example ,

may or may not minimize confusability during symbol discrimination.

A mo re detailed model of behaviora l requirements is presented in Figure

4-1. This scheme will be used to organize the following discussion of

major psychological issues in symbol design effectiveness. The objective

is to derive preliminary design guidelines for enhancing performance

along each of the major psychologica l dimensions. Each guidel ine is

obtained by evaluating current symbol design candidates in the context

of available psychological knowl edge. An analysis of concrete symbol

use “problems ” should help to stimulate the development of remedial

strategies for overcoming or minimizing perceptual bottle-necks in the

symbol-use process.

4.3 Discriminability

4.3 .1 Overv iew. The ability to visually distinguish among members of

a symbol set represents a basic component of the symbol-use process. The

ease wi th which such distinctions can be drawn often depends on the

distribution of feature similarity among members of the symbol set. It

is well-known , for exampl e, that ratings of visual similarity can be used

4-5

;

4

—.-———-——-————.-——-——----.--—- I ~

-———————-——-—----—---—--—------

~—--~ ~~~

— -- -
-

~ LU:~~~D SEARcH ~~~~~~~~~~~~

R

~

fftl

PERCEPTUAL LEARN IN

G I

~~ LEA RNAB1 L~TY

ASSOCIATI ON FO RMATION

FIGURE 4-1. PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SYMBOL-USE PROCESS

4-6

~~~~~~ 

1

~~~~ : 

~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

“ 4 

//
to effectively predict performance on a test of symbol discr imir iabi lity

(e.g., Cannon , 1977). For purposes of the present discussion , two

related issues in visual discrimination are considered . The first

concerns an impairment in discrimination due to feature similarity

(referred to as “confusability ”), while the second concerns a related

performance impairment due to feature competition (or, in the present

context , “display clutter ”). The discussion of symbol confusability

includes a brief statement of the strengths and weaknesses of using

different general types of codes (iconic , color , alphanumeric , or

multidimensional).

4.3.2 Confusability . A high degree of feature redundancy among members

of a symbo l set is known to impair discrimination both in terms of

confusion errors (Cannon, 1 977) and response latency (Egeth , 1 966).

For example , the lines forming the perimeter of each symbol in Figure

4-2 contain i dentical visual features . Therefore, for the purpose of

discriminating unit function , the “box ” that surrounds each symbol seems

to place an unnecessary processing burden on the user. The user ’ s

discrimination task is made more difficul t (especially at the peripher y)

and , coincidentally, the features in question convey absolutely no

tactical information. This perceptual problem is further compounded

by the fact that the visual system is most sensitive to box-type

features because of their horizontal and vertical orientation (Dodwel l ,

1970). In sumary , the box format of conventional FM 21-30 symbology

may impair the identification and/or discrimi nation of unit function

by maximizing similarity among visually salient design features. For

this reason , it may be noted that current Army development concerning

tactical symbology have endorsed and experimented with “boxless ”

conventional symbols (see Sidorsky , Geliman , and Moses , 1979).

4-7

/ —

L~L ~~~~~~-

~~~~~ r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The preceding analysis suggests the following tentative design guidelines :

(1) Minimize, to the extent possible, the am ount of feature

similarity am ong different members of a symbol set.

L

(2) Minwn~

ze the perceptua l saliency of the feature s tha t

must remain redundant across members of a symbol set.

(3) Maximize the discriminability of those grap hic features

used to code important tactical information . For

examp le, horizontal and vertical lines should be more

salient than those with an oblique orientation.

The perceptual analysis can be extended to include those features residing

in the interior of each symbol . It is wel l established that thick lines

conveying basic “shape” information are perceptually more salient than

thin lines conveying fine “detail” (Yoel i & Loon , 1972). Thus , the thick

lines depicting “military police ” in Figure 4-2, will be more easily

perceived than the thin lines representing either infantry or armor and

this discrepancy will increase the more peripherally they are viewed .

Obviously the differential salience among these unit representations does

not reflect realistic task priorities . Now consider the armor symbol in

Figure 4-2 which has been filled-in. This simple modification increases

its visual salience above that of the military police symbol . The point

to be made here is that a perceptual analysis of symbol design features

can help to operationally specify cri teria for enhancing performance in

symbol-use tasks.

Extensive research effort has been directed toward the understanding of

the perceptibility and discriminability of different types of display

symbols in portraying tactical information (for an independent review ,

see Shackel & Shipley , 1 970). The types of codes that have been examined

i nc l ude iconic codes , color codes, alphanumeric codes, and multidimensional

codes. The strengths and weaknesses of using each of these types of codes

in a new symbology will be discussed in turn .

4-8

~

~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~

4 -

____________________________
>< MP

INFANTRY MILITARY POLICE

ARMOR ARMOR

(MODIFIED )

FIGURE 4-2. CONVENTIONAL SYMBOL DESIGNS (FM 21-30)

~~~1

4-9

_________________ 

H

____ /
4

Iconic Codes. Iconic symbols have been found to be recognized more

accurately and more quickly when (a) they are filled in as compared to

when they are open (Chainova , Komarova , & Zonabend , 1 974; Voeli & Loon ,

1972), and (b) when they are drawn as simple silhouettes , without great

detail (Chainova et al., 1974; Fol ey and Wa llace , 1974). Therefore,

h ’hen iconic symbols are used, solid forms without

unnecessary detail are preferred.

One potential probl em with using iconic symbols in a new tactical

symbology is that they are not readily amenable to the portrayal of

combined arms forces. However, this problem can be circumvented by

using overlapping symbols to represent the components of a combined

arms army . This technique will be discussed later in the context of

reducing display clutter. One advantage gained through the use of

i conic symbols is an increase in learn abi lity and standardization of

the symbol set. This advantage will also be discussed subsequently in

greater detail.

Color Codes. A few major reviews of the literature involving the use

of color codes in visual displays are available , including those prepared

by Christ (1975), and Wagner (1977), and Krebs , Wolf , and Sanding (1978).

Christ reports the minimum loss or maximum gain with colors as target

• codes relative to when certain achromatic coding dimensions are used .

Data are presented separately for target identification tasks and for

search performance tasks , and a careful examination of these data combined

with cost considerations should help in deciding when to use color displays .

Christ concluded that colors can be identified more accurately than shape

or form parameters , especiall y with cluttered displays (Christ & Corso ,

1 975), but less accurately than alphanumeric symbols. Wheatley (1977),

on the other hand , found that numeric symbols also comprise a less salient

4-10

4 

~~~~~~~ 

/
dimension than color. On the negativ e side , Christ reportt d that

i rrelevant co1o’~

s in a display have been seen to interfere with a

subject’s abilit y to identify achromatic target features.

In an investigation by Sidorsky (1976), a nunter of coding schemes were

tested in tasks of varying complexity in which operators had to manipulate

certain tactical elements . The major co~

’lciLsion was that color coding

is of some benefit in terms of processing times and error rates , but

only if color aids the analyst in the initial grouping of the symbols.

Thus , Sidorsky ’s conclusions were similar to those of Christ (1975) that

color can help in i dentification and searching tasks ; but color has little

effect on , and might actually degrade performance in tasks that depend

on non-color properties of the symbols as well.

In a recent design for color displays , Krebs et al., (1978) summarize

the situation as follows :

The question of whether or not to use color in various

display app lications is currently one involving some

controversy . Data that can support either side of the

issue can be selected from the literature. A careful

review and analysis of the color literature reveals

that the issue of color utility is not a simp le one.

The value of color as a coding method is entirel y

dependent on its effective use in a specifi c app lication.

That is, it can be beneficial, neutral, or distracting .

Which of these outcumes will occur is a function of how, • 

• where~ and when it is w’ed. The operator task, the

environment, the display medium and the sp ecific way

in which color coding is applied are all important. (p. 2)

However , with respect to tactical symbology , it seems reasonabl e to advise

• that :

I 4-11

41. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — 

~ ~ -• ~- ~~~ ~~~~~ ‘— — —.- .— —

/ 

~ ,

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - •
Color codes, because of their apparent ability to

differentiall y enhance symbol saliency, should be

used to denote the most impor tant or most frequently

used tactical information.

In general then , the use of colors to represent information in symbolic

displays has met with mixed success. In this regard , Wong and Yaciinelos

(1973) found that accuracy and speed in identifying symbols from a maplike display was not affected by whether the map was displayed in color

or in black and white. Nevertheless , subjects usually find color displays

to be less monotonous (Christ , 1975).

Alphanumeric Codes. Nawrocki (1972) found that in tasks where performance

was not heavily dependent upon a subject’s memory, display s using alphanumeric symbol s resulted in faster and more accurate identification

performance than did displays involving standard military symbols (FM 21-

30). Though Nawrocki did not consider other forms of geometric codes ,

Christ (1975) also noted an advantage of alphanumeric symbols in his

review paper. In addition , Weitman and Helgesson (1972) found that lowercase letters are more discriminable than upper-case letters . This is

probably because lower-case letters show greater variability in shape.

Thus ,

When letters are used, perhaps to annotate geometric

• display symbols, lower—case letters should be used

to improve discriminability.

Multidimensiona l Codes. Ericksen (1954) found that mul tidimensional

symbols are more easily discriminated than are symbols that differ on

a single dimension. The dimensions used were size, hue , and brightness.

Also , Wheatley (1977) demonstrated that abstract information such as

threat can be judged more reliably when represented in multidimensional

• form , though subjects usual ly perceive one of the dimensions used to be

most salient. Andrews , Vicino and Ringel (1968) have noted that the

H 4-12

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ t 

~~ 

/ ___________________ - 

- --
perception of updated info rmation as such in a battlefield display is

superior when two alterations are made in symbols representing changed

information rather than just one . This is especially true when the

amount of information presented is increased (Vicino , Andrews , & Ringel ,

1965). These results suggest that multidimensional symbols are preferable

to unidimensional symbols; but much difficulty has been encountered in

defining enough dimensions to display relevant information . Hence ,

Given that a sufficient number of dimensions are

avai lab le to portray recp~ired information parameters,

multi-dimensional disp lay codes are desirable.

The use of redundant codes, consequently, may not be possible in an

efficient , information-rich tactical symbology .

4.3.3 Display Clutter. As noted by Potash (1977), many investigations

of behavioral considerations lack generalizability because only one aspect

of a display is exami ned in isolat ion , whereas symbols must certainly

interact in the contt~

xt of the total display . One of the most common

criticisms of current tactical displays is the problem of clutter. The

cluttered appearance of battlefield display s makes the rapid extraction

and comprehension of tactical information di fficult (e.g., Middleton , l977a).

In dealing wi th the problem of clutter , some researchers have noted methods

to avoid it , whereas other researchers have suggested ways to overcome it.

To avoid display clutter , Simonsen (1977) has argued for reduced detail

in the display symbol s used; and Channon (1976) has suggested that only

critical units be portrayed. The critical units would most often be the

maneuver units with the support units noted only in abbreviated , or

sumarized form. To overcome display clutter , Andrews and his associates

(Andrews & Ri ngel , 1 964; Andrews , Vicino , & Ri ngel , 1 968) have suggested

that important battlefield changes mi ght be doubl e coded to increase their

perceptual salience. Also, Christ and Corso (1975) have concluded that the

use of col or i mproves search and identifi cati on performance when clu tter

exists .

4— 1 3

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The most obvious solution to the problem of clutter ‘

~~~~~, of course , to

simply increase the size of the display used . Oversized maps would

allow for greater detail without additional clutter. However , since

there are practical limitations on the maximum size of a display used

in conjunction with an automated data processing system , the user can

necessarily view only pa rt of the map at a time . The effects of this

limitation on the internal representation of maps has not been studied

extensively (Jansses & Michon , 1973). Furthermore , there is a consensus

of opinion that the clutter problem is particularly acute when using

automated grahics systems. In fact, the transition to ADP systems

depends , in part , on a viable resolution to the clutter problem .

When a number of characters , symbols , or shapes are simultaneously

present in the visual field , they usua l ly interfere 6r “compete ” with

one another (e.g., Mackworth , 1965; Estes , 1972). Furthermore , the

degree of interference among characters inc reases with their feature

similarity (Bjork and Murray , 1977) and foveal eccentricity (Mackworth ,

1965). This interference effect can be simply understood in the

following manner. Structural components of the visual processing system

seem to be adapted for detecting specific visua l features . In addition ,

the evidence suggests that each specialized feature detector has a

limited capacity for the number of characters it can process at a given

time (Bjork and Murray , 1 977). Since symbols containing similar

features draw on common limited-capacity feature analyzers , visua l

similarity increases the interference and “clutter ” arising irom adjacent

characters . A clea r demonstration of this is that the identification of

a single letter presented on a CRT disp lay can be reduced to nearly chance

levels when two instances of ie same letter are simultaneousl y presented

in adjacent positions , i.e., the presence of one letter can inhibit the

detection of the other.

4-14

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~~~ •
The preceding discussion suggests a number of important implications

for designing symbols that attempt to convey tactical information along

more than a single dimension (e.g., function along one dimension and

capability along another). In particular , to reduce the perceptua l

. • clutter of a battlefield display , it seems desirable to:

(1) Minimize the visual similarity among design features

corresponding to different tactical information

dimensions. For example, in order to code mobility

vs. firopower information, f&~dur .

~~

.

~houZcl ho

selected at different orientations to minimize

visual interference among symbol components .

(2) Maximize the distance - within each symbol - between

similar visual features because interference due to

visual similarity decreases with distance.

(3) Minimize the grap hic detail in the sym bols used.

(4) Portray only critical units in the display.

Interference due to visual similarity among adjacent symbols increases

in the periphery of the visua l field. This interference has been shown

to produce a “tunnel vision ” effect (Mackworth , 1965). The user viewing

a display containing numerous similar symbols will be able to extract

crucial tactical information only when he fixates directly on its

disp lay location. For example , the feature similarity of FM 21-30 “box ”

symbols is particularly effective for producing this tunnel vision

effect. The undesirable consequences of this problem are especially

apparent when searching the display to locate a specific i tem of

information. The following quote by Mackworth (1965) describes the

general impact of feature similarity on a display search task:

“Selective visual attention usually involves direct

movements of the fovea from one rich source of data

to another. The most frequent choice ever made is

where to look next. The fovea is such a buoy sensor • that it has to samp le only essential data almost

4-15

_____________________________________ - -~ -, - ~~~~~~~~~~

• 

~

/ ~~~•~ :

;•~ •

- 

- 

/
continuously. To reduc e random search, eye movements

must often be planned from data acquired by the

perip heral retina. The main contention is tha t the

addition of visua l noise in the form of u~

vanted

signals can destroy the vital perip heral matching .

Pattern recognition is impaired because similarities

can no longer be recognized quickly between wanted

foveal and perip heral items - and the fovea must

therefore be used more often. ”

In sunmary, the research literature suggests that visua l similari ty

within as wel l as between tactical symbols , generally impairs search

by reducing the discrimi nability of peripheral design features. A more

detailed discussion of the symbol search process is presented in the

next section.

An issue related to the problem of displ ay clutter is the information

and computational overload experienced by the user of a tactical display .

Information overload appears when the amount and detail of tactical

information presented to a commander exceeds his i nformation-processing

capacity. This can occur even when viewing a clutter-free display,

since i nformation overload descri bes a burden on higher-level cognitive

processes and not on l ower-l evel perceptual processes . A case in point

is the processing of updated information , which becomes more difficult

with a greater number of battlefield changes (Andrews and Ringel , 1964). 

Computational overload pertains to the number of computational steps 1

required to convert i nformation into plans for action . For exampl e,

Rosenberg (1978) has noted the multitude of procedural steps that must

be foll owed to estimate relative combat power. Therefore, an additional

suggestion toward the construction of a more useful tactical display

symbology is to:

Develop swl7naiy b’ymbols , and symbols that represent

important tactica l indicators , to reduce the number

of computationa l steps required in pre-decisi onal

pr ocessing .

4-16

- —
4.4 Searc h

• 4.4.1 Overview. The objective of this section is to provide an analysis

of symbol design criteri a as they interact with the visual search process.

As a vehicle for analysis and discussion , we will focus on Tactical

Capability Symbology (TCS) developed by Sidorsky at the U.S. Army Research

Institute (ARI). The first issue addressed is the impact of peripheral

discriminability on the visual search process. Next , the effects of display

background on the selecti on of an efficient search strategy are considered .

4.4.2 Peripheral Cuing . Visual search performance appears to be

heavily dependent upon the periphera l discriminability of symbol design

features (e.g., Bloomfield , 1975). That is , the search process is viewed

as a systematic series of eye fixations where the location of each

fixation is cued or guided by peri pheral perception of the visual

features processed during a previous fixation (Erickson , 1 964; Johnston ,

1 965; Bloomfield , 1970). Symbol design efforts , therefore, could benefit

from a knowl edge of the detectability and discriminability of graphic

features in peripheral vision . Furthermore , peripherally discriminable

design features shoul d be used to code those tactica l concepts which most

often motivate the visual search task (e.g., unit function).

To illustrate , let’ s examine the extent to which some TCS design features ,

shown in Figure 4-3, function as peripheral cues during search. The goal

of TCS (See Section 2.3 .1) is to portray tacti cal information along a

number of orthogona l design dimensions. For example , the outer circle

is used to code various aspects of unit capability (e.g., threat , mobility ,

• logistics , etc.) while the interior of the symbol conveys uni t function.

As mentioned above , research suggests that thin or dotted lines are

significantly less salient than thicker solid lines (e.g., Voel i & Loon ,

1972). The implication for TCS is that “division ” symbols (solid circles )

4-17

________ 

___________________________

• —.——-—— .— -. —

~~

,

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~~~~~~~~~

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— - - - -- ---

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INFANTRY

DIVISION

ciii

ARMOR ARMOR

DIVISION COMPANY

— / ~~ 

—

• 

(c~~~~~~~

5’

AIRBORNE INFANTRY MECHANIZED INFANTRY

COMPANY COMPANY

FIGURE 4-3. TACTICAL CAPABILITY SYMBOLOGY (TCS)

I
are more likely to be discriminable in the periphery than “company ”

symbols (dotted circles). This is entirely consistent wi th the assumed

task priority of locating larger tactical units. The use of solid lines

to represent the division level , however , may impair the peripheral

detectability of important functional information (located in the interior

of the symbol). The reason is that solid outer lines are visually salient

and may effectively defi ne basic shape information in the periphery of the

visual field. The use of dotted lines to represent companies , on the

other hand , would probably not impair the detection of function as much

since their outer circles are less salient and play a smaller role in

determining symbol shape.

In the example just considered , it turns out that a choice was made ,

either implicitly or explicitly, to emphasize the peripheral detectability

of unit size. This decision can be rationalized quite easily since the

search process should be directed toward the identification of larger

or riore important tactical units. The advantage given to the size dimension , however , was “paid for” by decreasing the peripheral salience of

functional information. Fortunately, this presents no problem to the

symbo l user who has located a division level symbol since the user can

easily perform a functional discrimination using foveal vision . Design

trade-offs such as these will need to be clearl y defined and objectively

resolved to further the development of improved military symbology .

A second design issue regarding TCS concerns its potential for producin g

a “tunnel vision ” effect. The high degree of visual similarity which

results from its concentric circle design may significantly degrade

peripheral discriminability and thus accentuate the need for foveal c ,e

fixation during search. An analysis of this design problem suggests that

as feature similari ty among members of a symbol set increases , especially

among salient design features , so does the opportunity for tunnel vision .

A simple method of avoiding this effect therefore , is to:

4—19

______________________________ ____________________________ _____ ______ - 

— — r — -—

_ _1 ~~~~~~~ r — - - — ______ ______ —

• • ~~~~~~~ .

. 

/ •

~~~~~~ — -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —- - - ~~~~ -

‘

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T - - -

Minimize the visual saliency of those features that

must remain redundant across members of a symbol set.

4.4.3 Display Background. At present, relatively little is known about

the effects of display baclground on visua l search. Oddly enough , most

L research dealing with the perceptability of symbols has been conducted

using a clear background (cf. Yoeli and Loon , 1972). A recent study by

Zohar (1978), however, indicates that perceptually salient global features

of the background significantly infl uence the user ’s search strategy. The

display backgrounds used in Zohar’s study are illustrated in Figure 4-4.

Panel A illustrates a map-type background , while Panel B resembles a

circuit board . The map display produced significantly better performance

on a complex visual search task. This result can be attributed to the

fact that horizonta l and vertical lines on the circuit display are more

salient than curved lines on the map display . This increased salience

apparently impairs search by degrading periphera l discrimi nability among

symbols.

The preceding example illustrates the potential impact of display background

on the user ’s ability to search the display foreground (i.e., to perform

a symbol search task). A design guide for tactical symbology displays

which follows logically from the analysis is:

Minimize use of salient horizontal and vertica l lines

in disp lay background.

4 .j Learnability

4.5.1 Overview. Up to this point , the range of behavioral criteria has

been restricted to perceptually-based tasks . At issue in this section ,

by contrast , is the effect of learning on tactical symbol use. Two basic

components of the learning process can be distinguished (e.g., Underwood ,

1957). The first focuses on memory for a set of symbol designs (perceptual learning), while the second describes symbol-to-concept relationships

4-20

P~~

• • -• ~ -%x~

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~ •~‘

.

~~~~- •

~~~~~ —~~ ------ ~~

- 

~~ a~~~~~~ w1’rw~~~~~~~o.r - -- 

- - 

- / I
PANEL .4

MAP BACKGROUND

• (

H __ 

—

PANEL B 

[J

C IRCU IT BOARD BACKG ROUND

• FIGURE 4-4. DISPLAY BACKGROUND STRUCTURES

[Adapted from Zohar , 1978]

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~~~~~~ 4 f ~~~~~~~~~~~~

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- -
(association formation). Typically, both perceptual learning and association formation occur simu l taneously but , if necessary , they can be

separated to independently assess the impact of symbol design on each

task component. The present analysis will focus on the role of both

L perceptual learning and association formation in the symbol use process.

4.5.2 Perceptual Learning . It has long been known that perception plays

a fundamental role in the learning process. Complex figures , for example ,

are more difficult to learn than simpler geometric shapes (Attneave , 1957).

At issue in the present section , however , is the converse process - the

influence of prior learning on the perceptual salience of symbol desig n s.

A recent study by Shurtleff (1974) suggested that well-learned symbols

may effectively overcome degraded viewing conditions. Military symbols

were systemdt ically reduced in size and used as stimuli in a recognition

memory task. Those symbols which had been reduced most drastically were

initially most diffi cult to i dentify . After considerable practice on the

task , however , the latency of response for correct identi fi cations was

significantly l ower. Similarly, Howell and Fuchs (1961) have shown that

well-learned i conic symbols are recognized with fewer errors under

degraded viewing conditions than other less well-known symbols. The

implication seems to be that i conic familiarity can , to a certain extent ,

overcome perceptual problems posed by visua l degradation of graphic code .

This represents an especially significant finding for the tactical symbol

user since he may , for a variety of reasons , be exposed to less than

optimal viewing conditions. In summary , lea rnabi lity has important

practical consequences for the effectiveness of tactical symbology .

The preceding discussion suggests that easy-to-learn iconic symbols may

afford the user considerable resistance to visua l distortion . On the

other hand , Hemingway , et al. (1978) have suggested that iconic symbols •

“create more clutter than most existing symbologies .” These conflicting

4-22

• - 

• 

~~~~~~~~~ - 

~~

- —--- - - -

I

_______ 

1ljvluui

I~ ~~~~~~ -
speculations can be exami ned in the context of a concrete example.

Consider the symbols and overlapping configurations illustrated in

Figure 4-5. It seems from the example that iconic symbols , rather than

producing clutter , can perhaps assist the user in unravelling the contents

of a cluttered display.

One reason for the apparent problem with conventional symbols is that

they consist of simpl e geometric forms. When such forms are super-imposed

on each other , they combine to produce complex shapes which may obscure

the identi ty of component symbols. Iconic designs , by contrast , are

complex at the outset but since they are also well-learned their features

can serve as discriminative cues. It appears that complex iconic patterns

may be “unitized” and stored as discrete shapes in the user ’s visual

memory (LaBerge , 1976). A good example of unitization is the finding

that words can be identified more readily than individual letters

(Reicher , 1969). In an analogous way, iconic symbols m~y be easier to

distinguish than simpl er but less well-known shapes . This advantage

apparently due to prior perceptual learning, may be particularly

important in overcoming the probl em of display clutter. Thus , the

guideline that emerges is as follows :

To minimize distortion (especially under degraded viewing

conditions), use well-learned or unitized symbo l designs.

The perceptual advantages of iconici ty symbols do not necessarily extend

-to peripheral discrim inab ility . An iconic silhouette drawn wi th thin

lines , for example , may be difficult to distinguish in the peri pheral

visual field. If the silhouette is filled in to compensate for this

• deficiency , the advantages of prior perceptual learning may be diminished

or even lost. However, the use of thick lines along the periphery of an

outline figure may serve to improve saliency while restoring the benefits

of prior unitization. This notion illustrates the complex trade-offs

t

4-23

~~~~~~~~~ ____ •—•— •__ _I

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1

~

, 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ /

/

_________ 

-

_ -
ICO N I C IC ON I C

OUTL INE SOLID

CON VE ’I TI ON AL SI LHOUETTE SI LHUL’ETTE

N F A N T N / 

~~~~~~ ‘

~~~~~~~~~

“

ARMOR 

_______________ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

41 R CA v.; LA 

~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~#

OVE RLAPPED ____ 

I

FIGURE 4-5. ILLUSTRATION OF OVERLAPPING SYMBOL CONFIGURATIONS

4-24

! 

~ •

•

~ — 

~

-— — -- - - l’

~~~:~~~’ - 

_____ _____ 

- • ~ 1i’~~ 4 ~

iL

~6 ~~~~~~~~~—~

‘-

~~~ 

-

~~~~~~~~

-

~~~

- 

~~~~~~~~~~

-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- 

___ 

—
that can be made to optimize both learning and perception by systematically

adjusting symbol design components .

4.5.3 Association Formation. The acquisition of a symbolic language

is a two-stage process. The user must not only become familiar with the

display elements for perceptua l recognition ; but also , the user must

learn the appropriate associations between the display elements and the

concepts that they are meant to portray. It is this second stage of the

symbolic language-acquisition process , association formation , that is

the focus of this section.

The most obvious influence on association formation is prior learning.

Al though there is currently no conclusive empirical support for the

assumption that symbols selected for ease of association with milita ry

concepts enable the user to make decisions faster or with greater

accuracy , the assumption is certainly a plausible one (Foley and Wallace ,

1 974; Middleton , 1977a). Also , in today ’ s Army , there is a rapid turnover

of personnel at many echelon level s which creates a situation where new

personnel must continually be trained to use military symbology . Nevertheless , the symbolic language used by NATO forces (STANAG 2019) continues

to be composed of symbols that have little obvious association to their

referents.

One investigation of the strength of association between graphic symbology

and military information was conducted by Bersh , Moses , and Maisano (1978).

In this study , enlisted men were asked to rank order battlefield concepts

(e.g., firepower) on the basis of their apparent association with certain

sets of symbols. It was found that approximately half of the correspondencies between symbols and concepts were unamDiguous . This suggests

• that “natural” associations can be identified . For example , color was

found to be unambigur’usly associated wi th “danger. ” Furthermore , in

4-25

y

~

.

I d?-; ~~~~1 /
another study (Levine and Mallamud , 1978), specific colors have been

reliably associated (i.e., scaled ) according to degrees of perceived

“threat” .

In a related investigation , Hemingway, et al., (1978), milita ry personnel

• were asked to rank symbols on the basis of how meaningfully the symbols

represent a particular military designation. Pictora l symbols were

ranked higher than the current U.S. Milita ry symbols (FM 21-30) , and

geometric symbol s were , in turn , ranked higher than Soviet symbols .

It is interesting to note that pictoral symbols , shown by Hemingway ,

e1 al ., to be most conducive to association formation , constitute a form

of representation that transcends language barriers such that the

problem of standardization would be minimized .

In addition to rank-order methods for determining the strength of prior

associations , relevant military personnel could be asked to produce

their own symbols to represent concepts (c.f., Berry and Horowitz , 1961).

This method has the advantage of not limiting the potential alternatives ,

but it raises the problem of clustering the forms obtained to permit a

frequency count. Perhaps a feature analysis woul d render this weakness

more manageable.

In an attempt to capitalize upon pre-existing associations to simplify

symbology acquisition , Machover (1977) has proposed that greater effort

be given to the development of real-world models , where vehicles look

like real vehicles (i.e., symbols would be three dimensional). This

approach , according to Machover , woul d possibly reduce the need for

further discussion about desirable symbology . However , it woul d appear

difficult to represent such attributes as combat effectiveness or hostility

(Wheatley , 1 977) in a real -world replica . Also , the emerging symbologies

have a certain amount of summarization quality , whereas a real -world model

would not .

(

4-26

I __.~

• • • ~~~~~- - • •

~ • —--—- — -

~

•

$~~~ % 4

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ - -
From this discussion , the association-formation stage of symbolic-

• language acquisition can be simplified by adherence to the following

guideline:

Take advantage of the user group ‘s prior learning and

conditioning to select symbol design features (e.g.,

icon-icity, color) which enhance association formation.

For excvnple, if the color “red ” is culturally identified

with the concept of danger, it might be uti lized in the

port rayal of enemy threat.

It is acknow l edged , however, that this guideline cannot be followed in

isolation . That is , other factors , such as display clutter , must be

monitored such that ease of learning the symbology is not offset by

an increased difficulty in utilizing the symbology .

Another important link that must be optimized is that between a symbol

and an i nternalized mental representation of the symbol (i.e., a menta l

image). The imageability of a symbol is the ease with which an accurate

mental image of its visual form can be generated . Symbols with high

imageability can be located more readily in a complex display because

the user can construct a veridi cal mental template to guide the search.

Since the complexity and detail that can be generated in a menta l image

is sharply limited , the following guidelines for symbol design can be

specified :

( 1) Unnecessary complexity should be avoided.

(2) Unnecessai ~

y detail should be avoided.

i.3) The Gestalt lc&a of Pragnanz for fig ural goodness

(Koff ka , 2.

~

i35) should be followed when approp riate.

4-27

~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

._b.

~~~~~~~ i1~~_~ rLi~L -~,-.-~--~ .wr ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -- - -
Note that these three guidelines complement the suggestion to use i conic

• symbols in that the possible clutter problem wi th iconic symbols is

acknowledged and possibly minimized.

4.6 Sample Task Analysis

Early in this chapter (Section 4.2), an informal analysis was described

of a typical task requirement (i.e., de •:inc where the enemy like ly

to (I) ~~cZUCt his breakthroug h attack); the task was decom posed into ~ sequence

of steps involving the perceptual use of symbols and the analytical

manipulation of related tactical data . Such an analysis can be undertaken

at an even more detailed level with emphasis placed on perceptualcognitive activities . Once the specific behavioral processing requirements for a given task are identified , it becomes possible to associate

them with related behaviora l effects which have been established in the

research literature . These effects of symbo l and display variables on

human information processing capabilities , in turn , suggest design

guidelines whose implementation migh t ult imately enhance performance

with respect to the required symbol-use activities . To demonstrate the

conceptual links between processing requirements , behaviora l effects , • 

I

and design guidelines , a sample task will be analyzed accordingly.

Consider , for example , a commander or intelligence officer (G2) who must

cwsess the functiona l characteristics (c~;;

~ , weap onry , L ’f/ t ~i / inunt) oj~

enemy un-its from a a~ tuation display . This requirement , which might be

a subtask within some more general task--e.g., !

~ i - ~ ~~ •

~~~ ~ ;

~

• -

~ ~~~~~ 

~~~ ~~~~ -

~~~ ~~ ~~ 

~~~~ in 1

~~ , ;~~ 1~~ i;~~~

-

/

~~ ~

‘ - , .i- (as described earl ier)

involves each of the key behavior components--symbol discriminabi lity ,

display search , and symbol learnability (acquisition) --to some degree .

More specifically, four behavioral processing stens required for task

completion are listed in the left column of Table 4-1 ; for example ,

4-28
TABLE 4-1 

INFORMATION PROCESSING TASK ANALYSIS: 

ASSESS FUNCTIONAL CHA~ACTERISTICS OF ENEMY UNilS 

t.~-.~ l.c!f r e t•ltlol) code a!OSOClited 

whl• e ne•y/fdcndly 91 t phl c 

dls t I ne t tw1 . 

\f!tln.h ,l h ld• v l or Ctn!MY uu lt 

~r-t->•1 \: 

(•) wiSUd lly ViUi tli-.pl Pty until 

a uult -.y ... t.ul h tk!ttct ed . 

(b) •"•" vlsu•l \ lool•rlly of pP;rre ,tu.~t cCJde \lorcd I•• 

.... .,,ry h••e !a.t~t• I) to 

llcr•.i"i 'll!tl tJ•·•vhi c code. 

A•.CC)\ fuuc t looil coucc1•t 

i\C.Ot.lille d wt th each unit 

\~.0 1. 

lflre urul .. lt•.l luth llomt l unit duu aLlerhllt.s In _. ... ,.)' . 

~!!~Y ~! IJ.Hf 1 

Acccs. I btl ily to f"'r<•i•luol u•clo! tnn ·ca .. ~·. as a func tion of : 

(I) Visua l \looll•rlty of •1••1•hlc 

code t o tact tell rt:fertnlt 

(1) Visu•l dl<>l•tlol"ily of tloe 

,,,.~phlc code\ rcpt'e\Cf'ltlntt 

dl ffcrent lat.t l t4tl n~ ft!rt~ ts . 

~ ... ch t ~ to f lud a unt t \ ylftl•h l 

IHCf flo11-tC5o a\ ,, func. Liou of v h ual 

!.l•ila rlty hehK!Cn )"'I~•• amJ l..ld.-

•J,.ound. 

[ott-..y/1.-Jendly oJ ho.riOtlllllhl l ily 

ln ~er, i S l hc fM...,ter of fea tures tn...,n tn OOth decrrase\. 

l 

l•lentlco l to tit~ v.orl•ble\ St>ec trled j oltOve for Step 1. 

"'

-. .. 

nno

.ar

r

y 

y eru 

lr•.:td 

odh•CJ 

decn.•.nes 

r .• t.e (I .e .~cs , •~ •·

lf

· 

W1 

l m~r o f lltW\ •n•Utkt•l •it.! t! \~\ . 

for e a .... • I t, ft t'flttent r.rO'O\il t ach -

..:tut of uni t .. 1y ~tt· .. llv f"At.NHI !.hurt -

1M • CdJiacl ty. 

4-29 

(•) ·r Jt, , ,,d,.,VJII.I(J•J v f tJ.IJ uu•••• !J'""'I' 'o Jwi..,r (l•tw •tiii:J mt•l 

,., ,, r' •i•I:J l o tlf•f, o•l !JMI I ,/.mty•• ftJ<Iflll'oJII f ···'.J · , 

; ,.,,.,; ,.; Ly, oJ1•hn•J uld,•ll ,.,,J,,,,""' W ltlo., i tt I ; , .,, {vt mll io•l. 

(lJ) Hltt i,.i::t•, l o• llh . .' o•rl oJOII f •.;•lwi/ o/o •, ll1•t l ll/lo.IU•I I o f f•.:cll /11'• 

lll14ilnr•ity ~'~ fl ,/iff•••.,'''' U.. 'fnl~<u'll .. f '' H!lfllll'l ·l 1h•t . 

(t ) Ni •tif'li:hJ tim l'tJ I"•'•'t•luotl /iom ·y 1.1{ tlw /o•t tiiU'I'Q th11. 

" :till I l 'itlfUitl l "iJ./U•I.I /fltll tfo'I\'LHI lf~t'IPt ,. /1 tJ/ ff !JI~I() / 11t:f . 

(d) H.u· imi:;,J ,,,.., cl io.•••iMi'"'l•i/,' t y t•j' tlu,, r ',}1\lfJIIit · f.:.rl ,,·, u u:to•,/ I t• ,.,,.J,J ihf'l"•rt.Jul i •. •,,/ infu tWiliOfl. 

(a) an•l (lo) abov~. 

Hi•liMi:to• IUi ol Df llt"t/iu ut J,,,,•inrurl ol/ olll• l l '•' t'Lio•otl ltllo'll i u 

,Ji ,,,., •1!1 "·· ·kt~l' "' · 

(d) •Ito••· 

(a ) , (It). (<). """ (<I) aho v<•. 

l1tlf1ot/ ,•t • tl,o''" "'!l !J"• ~oo l:t , ,,.,,/ n[ltoJI .. , Iu lhtl t't.l/ ' ' '•''" ' '41 

r't>f,.•l'tof"l l , t o:liol ol/ i u./i,,,,,,,,.,, ld l'o'o iU•' i ' ll1o • llltl'llotJI' 

·•f ~ .. ,..,,,,,,·,,,.-,, utur" ,., .• ,,.; ,,.,/ ;, /•l'oJ -,J.•,•iuit""'' 

1' 1\._:.wulu :l · 
Step 1 is to 11 access the perceptual code associated with the enemy!

friendly graphic distinction .” Correspondin g to this process , two

variables involving similarity/dissimilarity which affect accessability

L 

to perceptual codes are cited; these are listed in the center column of

the ta ble . Finally, in view of these performance effects , one or more

of the design guidelines previously presented in this chapter are

enume rated i n the ri ght column of the ta ble; the gu id elines selec ted

are those that offer design principles in the direction of humanfactoring the symbol/display for improved task performances. Thus ,

i n the case of Step 1 , design features (such as i con icity ) are recommended which enhance association fo rmation.

By breaking down representative tasks into step-wise information

-

‘ processing components , consi derable insight can be gained toward

defining descriptive models of the perceptual -cognitive processes

involved in the use of tactical symbols. However , for the near term ,

this methodological approach holds much practical significance for

isolating and treating potential human factors bottlenecks in the

symbol-use process. Specifically, a list of requ i red task behaviors

af for ds the oppor tunit y to i dentify those human resource limitations

which may sign ificantly impede successful task perfo rmance . By determin ing relevant human factors and/or display variables capable of

minimizing or attenuating perceptual -cognitive load , design guidelines

may be suggested which have the potential for helping to remediate

task-specific information processing deficits.

4.7 Summa~y~

The preceding analysis has uncovere d a number of design featu res and

problems associated with representatives from conventional as well as

newly proposed tactical symbology (some additional examples of symbols

4-30

_____

.0 • 

~ .• 4

-‘ — •— — . 00 - f

5— ‘ W~ U%S~%~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - --
which incorporate various design features are presentaed in Appendix E).

For example , Table 4-2 provides a summary of the contrasting features of

conventional symbology (FM 21-30) and potential i conic symbology .

Although the comments provided in this chapter must be regarded as tentative in the absence of empirical veri fi cation , the issues raised do seem

both important and readily generalizable to other symbol desi gn candidates .

~

4 second and perhaps more important product of the preceding andlysis has

been the development of preliminary symbol design guidelines. The

intention here was to help support future symbol design efforts by

codify ing, an d illustrating the application of, some relationships

between design variables and user-based performance criteria.

4-31

— —.•-— — —.—. — ——•— —I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘

~ ~~~ * I ~~~~~~~~~ ~ 

— ,a.a, — — —•— ——— —I,—-——— — — — 

—

~

- . 

‘I -

‘ 

~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -
TABLE 4 -2 . CONTRASTING SYMBOL DESIGN CHARACTER ISTICS

(lillftff llffPIAI YttlIlt A ( tM 21 111 ) — lIOfltC Y r t

~ I

fIr fp, ’ 1 I .1114 v ,-rf tat ftoe ~ alon g th e per u r eter Ill’ cal l, synh nt Icon i, cyoll.n l5 1,1 ,ei ,y, ’al off er I he ,,oe, a~ ‘t~ n ,iintm,r

( ifs Al,. ’) oly ,,oI,—a’ . -’ I’ no ftical,f lily lit m l t f l I t cul by of 11150 l’I~ll i n a t in ,’ f lie’ , . 0f11I f f 1 I Ii Sf jIll ~~I ~~ lil y Is

n fl ” ,,’, ni, tIl e 11,1 1 la r ,ty i

~f cnh i e , ,t desi gn f e at h I m ’ ’ . In add i tio n , less aff nrt c,I b y fIfe ni’ili ,l l ,Il’ , l ,,l tffl fl r esI l t f , l .if trim,

lint , ,‘,ntal and v e r ti ,a t tines are especially s al lent and the re— Itis p l ay system f,.u l i,, ,’s.

I ‘ - i’ c wnpn’in’f tIle disc rimi n a ffit fly proble m ,

con ic s i f h o,,e t lec are easi est to dis , I imi o ,it e III f l f vpat

tfi, ~f, si n , i t a ’ ’ity 11 0111,1 ed fl ~ f if,l t “bo x ” 5)InIltllS nI rei ,ses (he vision 1011011 fi t I e ~l ’ i n ; 11,1 1 lif e f Info-It ‘‘i ., ’ lv,,. as

IlIcItI MlayftI f ~~ pnf .n f at lIfl “ t oi ,nel 0 f~~ i’l’f ’’ eufe r t s ( t a 1 ’b iff dis ‘ni li. t lIf ity - o a l i , ’I , l 0 I ‘al — al vlsi ll ~I ; 11, 111 ‘‘‘ill 1111’

t~~r i lih e~ a l vis I o n ) , Ibis p rohlc-n 1,01 0,10’, once SerlIco. as tf rli dl ,l ’e ,ntn nn eti atn tenets ft ‘1, 1 r l rni ,la t, ll i l y

SfflllOl 11 , 115 i ty for. i’ ‘ui

Act alt nit IrA, it somf ,,Il -i ,IeI neas e f5.Ilmb n ,,I,t 1, f

~

, f ’ y

‘Ini if ,, ‘

,y.,, f ,iil r t , arac , t e rict f l c : ‘ ‘ f l i l it o y l’ot i ,e ” 1 1111 l o I n s c , ,t ,rof flIt teasin g (el lob- siii ,iI,,, 1 / a,..’’’ f in- rI!,,’,’ I, I a

cml ,., p’ ol ,,rh nate if n,, , ,’ 1 ict r i , , ,j, , o t h In IliaI , rnndl at sy,,l,fll

m.,ne,iver ‘.f If ~

l

~

i ,IS (011t h as ano Int ); “ fi el,I A , t Illl ’ I y ’’ Is TorI’ d i d ri

.,,,na f.l, Ih,1to 01st ,,th er syoii~

o f n tiI,e to lie sal 11.1,1 - fi t (nIf i n

ri, In in th e rei , !ef “ Infant ry ’ s ’ dia qn ,,.o l line’ , han ’ t,,w 1,Tlte,,le

.11111 nbty yuldtir e fore relog n ili nn elton than ninsf uft,r, cy inI,.ilc

I ,,.,,,nt 0151110 y t o lll f lOlt fly l ,fl it “11111 ” 5/I f i fi ol s will in lp_li r se ar ri , I i flo,t’ In I r oni c cIlf ,,, ,m,— t, le cal,’ eea ’ti ly f lIlffl f 11,11,10 i.

et f i I l eff . n I . I if d tsn r inlill a llifity II lie perI p hery alc e o ttf ,f t oc the Ileri lihery a,ld ttfi ’ l i’fI l, ’e .,00i ,Ie s o I l. ’ ’ I f f lOS

the t,,t, - ‘f l oca l disi ril n i na t Inn ,,rnf sl ows cearl h m r unit dire ni the ccar rh lirol ess; 11.10c r sal Core Il l i,, tt l,,e

fli T , li on , ci lf n,i , et i ec ,I,’ , t e ,~d f ’’, ce.lrl Ii etti c l eory , “ I API i f

fe, ~ ,,c.’ highl y sal lent fea(I,re S de,tralle search effl r inor y whe ~ I hey

a fe lint the target of Ike c t - g r r f l . f lifl h salien ce of unIt ‘lOI n ”

s$l f lio t s play a l l/ve In intla i r search to, ,,t her s ym illlf Ic nodes.

,m~,le qennTlnt I’ll for ms have a low acd, ,t fat IIln to c lf rrrcpn ,nll ng t he l e r rept ion of well- leai’tned I. onic s

~~

nf ’ok is tess

fart ira f rmelni’I’ls —- the y may not t ,roe ide th ,’ re sic ta r o r n’ lv O f tAr ted by tIle nis na t c yst no ’ s I init ell a. n l fy If, f,n f h

v I sua l ,li.,f o t i , fn afforded by w e t t - I earn et l sy n~

h otc. fo n m ’a t and pci (f o a l vislv,i .

Irt ONlI t IlItTY

The bu,l, degre e of 1le~ rep tu al teai’ nI ,n j acco l iate’f w it h lc ,tn Ic c

~~nf,n Is an ooerc ,11e tn SlOw’ Ce (cit tt le “ I l

~m i t er ’

ca u sed when ~ onfInls opal lot ty ,nerlap on Ike di c~i lay

4-32

-

A /

___________
5. TOWARD EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF TACTICAL SYMBOLOGY

5.1 Overview

A comprehensive methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of new

s,ymbology will require the development of:

(1) Con tent-based Criteria - standards for evaluating the

functional breadth and information depth of a candidate

database (Section 5.2).

(2) User-based Criteria - procedures for evaluating the

discrim inabi lity , searchab ility ,

and learnabi lity of proposed

symbol designs (Section 5.3).

(3) Tactical Criteria - a set of task-based procedures

for assessin g the impact of alternative symbolog ies on tactica l

problem -solving and/or decisionmak ing (Section 5.4).

The objective of this chapter is to identify representative criteria

within each of these three categories and describe how each can be used

to evaluate tactical symbology (an overview of evaluation considerations

is illustrated in Figure 5-1). In the interests of efficiency , contentba

~

ed and user-based cri teria should be applied early in the development

process to screen-out those symbology candidates failing to meet certain

minimum standards of acceptability . The objective of this screening

approach is to minimize the number of tactical simulations or field tests

that have to be conducted since such tests are often both time-consuming

and expensive . An even better justification , however, is that specification

of explicit content and design criteria may effectively guide future

development efforts.

5-1 

__ _ 1 a.—’—— — ,— —-‘ ‘ ~ , i .a.~O .__ _.____ ____~~~~ L,

~~

S.

~

. . . , ” - ‘.‘m, —a—

,

~~~:. ‘ .

~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • ‘ O %.sac,~~%c , /

- ~~~~- ‘— -~ -, 

- 

0

~~~~
I..

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~TION CONSIDERATIONS

STEP 1 STE P 2 STEP 3

r

~~~CONTE IT BAS ED USER-BASED TACTICAL

CRITERIA C~~I1ERIA ‘PITEP A

_ __ _

DATABASE COMPLETENESS DESI GN EF FECTIVENES S TACTICAL E F~~~T HE N ESS

FIGURE 5-1. AN OVERVI EW OF THE EVALUATION PROCESS

- 

H

- 

5-2 

/

, ~~~~~~~~d 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~LL ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 

- , 

I
5.2 Content-Based Criteria

The most fundamental requirement of improved symbology is that its database (i.e., portrayal capability ) be broad enough and deep enough to offer

the user a significant amount of tactical information . As described in

Section 3.4.4, the breadth dimension is the number of different questions

a database is designed to answer. Information depth , on the other hand ,

refers to the various levels of information detail at which an answer

can be specified. Unfortunately, precise specifications as to what

questions symbology must answer and at what level of detail have y’~t to

be established. Chapter 3 of this report , however , identified a number

of candidate data structures which could be presented to ippropriate

groups of military experts for review and analysis.

The goal of the review process would be to reach a concensus of expert

opini on as to the content and organization of an expanded database for

tactical symbology . In reviewing the proposed data structures , the

experts should , at a minimum , consider such criteria as the following:

(1) accuracy and comprehensiveness in view of current doctrinal requirements ; (2) adaptability to future doctrinal requirements ; and (3) compatibility with NATO doctrina l requirements (interoperability). An i nterative

se ri es of such review procedure s coul d produce a greement as to wha t

tactical questions new or modified symbology would have to address as well

as what l evel of detail it should offer the user. Thus , the da ta struc ture

approach to information analysis provides an objective format for discussion

and serves to clarify ma ny of the complex issues involved in defining

abstract tactical concepts.

In the absence of doctrinally specified requirements , the current distinction between information breadth and depth also can be used to compare

the conceptual dimensions of proposed symbol systems . Consider the sample

c. I

1L~ ~~~~ -

~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ W~~~~~~~~—_-- ~ °‘

____ - ‘-- 

I ‘ , 

~~~~~~~~~ - ‘ . - ‘

~~~~~ , 

~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1ijJ Lon’-J

~~~ W ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - ‘• .
assessment matrix illustrated in Figure 5-2. A set of illustrative

tactical information concepts or categories are listed in the left-hand

column . These categories operationally define the breadth-of-function

dimension associated with tactical symbology . The columns of the matrix

L show various tactical symbologies (conventional and proposed ) which can

be checked against each information category . As indicated in the figure ,

a positive response , I, for “satisfies requirement” , can be entered when

the respective symbology has the capability to portray the respective

information category ; similarly, a 7 for “uncertain ” and a blank fo-

“does not satisfy requirement” can be entered . To the extent that the

information dimensions evaluated are representative of the entire set

required by doctrine , this tabulation can provide a summary measure of

the portrayal completeness of a symbol ogy (dimensions can also be updated

to reflect changing requirements).

Content comparisons of this type may help to narrow down the number of

symbology representations by eliminating those which fail to meet even

margi na l standards of database adequacy. Those candidates which satisfy

minimum “breadth” criteria can be subjected to further analysis using

database structures to further define their content deficiencies.

5.3 User-Based Criteria

5.3.1 Overview. The impact of symbology on tactical decision making will

depend on the extent to which it can be perceived and i nterpreted by the

user. This section , therefore, describes a methodo l ogy for evaluating

symbol design effectiveness in terms of user-based performance criteria.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the symbol use process consists of three basic

task components: (1) discrimination ; (2) search; and (3) learning . The

following sections will address each of these performance criteria , within

an experimental and a mathematical/analytic evaluation framework.

~~~

T4

no , I, 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

I

__ --
ALTERNAT I’/E SYMBOLOG’(

NFORMATION CONVENTIONAL ~

‘1ODIFIED COMBAT POWER COMBAT

3I,MENS IJ N (FM 21—30 ) CONVENTIONAL (USAICS) CAPAB ILIT’f

(A R. :.)

JNI T SEE I ,

u /

i

~~ IT :

~ E ) T : ” I

’ / , 

xi

H

~~ oP:~ ” 

~~

/ 0

I 1 - ~E~~C ” OF RE~~

T

SC~JRCE ~ lD

REL:~ Bt L :T 1

OF J ATT j __________________

III I 

- 

r ’ l

’I

’ ,’

FIGURE 5-2. SAMPLE CONTENT ASSESSMENT MATRIX

I

ii 

_______ 

5-5

L

~~~~~~~~~~~

____
5.3.2 Some Experimenta l Paradigms. The perceptua l features of symbol s

can be assessed using a variety of reliable experimenta l procedures .

Weltma n and Helgesson (1972), for examp le , have used the visual search

paradigm of Neisser (1967) to assess the legibility of commercial designs .

Subjects were presented wi th an array of five design alternatives and a

single target design. Their task was to locate the alternative which

matched the target. A reaction time measure was then used to identify

the most readily recognizable desi gn. This procedure can be modified

to provide a sensitive measure of the perceptual saliency associated

with each tactical symbol.

Distinctiveness can also be i nvestigated using ratings of perceptual

confusability (e.g., Miller and Nicely, 1956; Sattath and Tversky , 1977).

Pairs of tactical symbols could be presented to each subject with instructions to make a same/different judgment. The latency associated with each

response coul d then be used to measure confusability . Multidimensional

scaling procedures can also be applied to the resulting subject x symbolpair matrix to identify and eliminate perceptually cbnfusable symbols.

The ease with which symbols are learned can be assessed by pairing each

one with a corresponding verba l description. When presented with a symbol ,

subjects can then be required to provide its correct verba l description ,

and conversely, when given a verbal description they can be required to

select the appropriate symbol from a set of alternative targets. With

this paradigm , the number of trials to reach a given criter ion may be

used to i ndex symbol learnability . Once symbols have been learned ,

subjects may be tested for retention at various time delays . In this way ,

the memorability of symbols is assessed . Memorability is defined in two

ways: first , learners are given a symbol and must provide its associated

verbal description , and second , they are given a verbal description and

must choose the correct symbol from a set ‘ of alternatives . - 

‘

5-6

4

~~ ~r ,’ ’

_______________ 

/

,

-— dl ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A second set of tasks can be designed to assess the impact of semantic

factors on the perceptual distinctivenes s and recognizability of the

symbols. A task similar to that described previously can be used . Users

who have learned symbols and associated symbo l names can be given a

symbol description. They would then be required to identify the correct

symbol from a set of alternatives . Performance is then eval uated using

a reaction time measure .

5.3.3 Mathematical /Analytical Methodology . The development of spatial

frequency analysis , includin g Fourier Transforms , offers a potential

al ternative to standard experimental evaluation . A brief introduction

to the spatial frequency approach and the use of Fast Fourier Transforms

(FFT ’ s) is provided in Appendix F. THe following sections will describe

how a Fourier analysis might be used to assess symbol discriminabil ity ,

display search , and finall y, symbol learnability .

Symbol Discrimi nabi lit y . The Fourier technique described here for assessing

‘symbol discrim inab ili ty and/ or confusabflity uses readily available FF1

programs (e.g., Cooly-Tukey FF1 algorithm). The first step is to digitize

the spatial distribution of light intensity associated with , each member of

the symbol set and enter the di g itized representation into the FFT program.

There are two general methods for accompl ishing this goal:

(1) Measurement of the symbol ’ s spat i al intensity distribution

with a photometer and entering the measurements into the FFT

via a computer terminal .

(2) Use of a TV camera of image processor wi th an appropriate AID

converter which automa tically digitizes and enters each

symbol ’ s intens ity distribution into the FFT . The digitized

representations are then broken down into their Fourier

5..7

_ ____ _____ 

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~~~~~~~~ T’ l , ‘4n~~

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i

~~~~~~~~~’:-

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components and compared using either correlationa l or

multidimensional scaling techniques . This provides an

objective measure of symbol confusability which can be

calculated selectively for either low or high frequency

components to assess both peripheral as well as fovea l

discrim inabi ii ty.

The relative detectability of a symbol can also be calculated using the

FF1 output obtained above. The procedure is to simply use the visual

sensitivity function illustrated in Appendix F as a guide to the ease

with which each symbol or symbol component could be detected . Only

seven bandwidths of spatial frequency are relevant to the assessment of

human visual sensitivity.

Display Search. Search efficiency is known to be determined by a symbol’ s

periphera l detectability and discriminability . Since periphera l vision

is primaril y sensitive to low frequency information , search efficiency

can be measured by the amount of low frequency similarity among members

of the symbol set. This measure of low frequency similarity can also

be used to assess “tunnel vision ” effects. The procedure is to sample

symbol discriminability values at different levels of display density .

Thus , a relative comparison of the search efficiency associated with each

set of symbology to be evaluated can be obtained wi thout collecting any

human performance data . 

I

The effects of display background on search efficiency also can be assessed

using the Fourier technique. One simple procedure is to compare the

spatial frequency components of all foreground information (unit symbols)

with that of all background information (display structure). The resulting

measure of discrimi nability may then be used to identify those display

variables which enhance the salience of certain unit configurations (e.g.,

attack formations).

5-8

* .—-----‘

I / ‘ -

~~~~‘~~. 1-- ’ff I ,

________________________________ - ‘-
Symbol Learnability . A large number of standardized techniques are

available for the assessment of symbol learnability (recognition memory -

LaBerge , 1976; coding preference - Wheatley , 1977; symbol-to-concept

association formation - Howell & Fuchs , 1961). A more interesting and

perhaps more important question is the identification of those design

components wh i ch facil it ate learn i ng. Since spatial frequency components

correla te highly with human discrimination performance , they may have

i mportant i mp li cations for learna bi lity as well. There is ev id ence , for

example , to suggest that complex figures (i.e., those conta i ni ng multiple

orientation components) are more difficult to learn than simple shapes

(Attneave , 1957).

In order to predict the rate of learning for iconic-type symbols , however ,

it may be necessar y to obta i n a somewhat different measure of symbol desi gn.

One possibility that may correlate highly with learning is the rated

visual similarity of a symbol to its referent. Subjects may find it

easier to ‘learn ° symbols to the extent that they match visual codes they

have previously stored in memory . This hypothesis seems consistent with

the relatively low learning rates associated with abstract as compared to

iconic symbology (Howel l and Fuch , 1961). In any event , the develo pment

of a measure capable of predicting learnability could be exploited in

future efforts to design more effective symbology . Moreover , such a

measure would permit the assessment of symbol learnability without the

necessity of human experimentation (e.g., spatial frequency analysis or

rated similarity may serve to define learnability criteria).

5.4 Tactical Criteria

The present section provides a set of task-based performance criteria for

evaluating the effectiveness of new symbology . Prior to reaching this

stage in the evaluation process , it is assumed that candidate symbols have

already been screened for content adequacy and design acceptability .

5-9

— i t.ia,~0I’ - ~~

‘ 

C ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

I - ~~~~~ ‘ - /

/ __ ______________ ___ - - i - 

—
The objective of the present methodol ogy , therefore, is to assess the

impact of a symbology on user performance under representative tactical

conditions. The most important measure of effectiveness seems to be

one of processing efficiency : How accurately and at what response

latency does a symbology permi t the user to “answe r” important tactical

questions? The actual decision reached may not be nearly as revealing

as the strategy of info rmation processing adopted by the user.

To the extent that a symbology attempts to prescri be info rmation priorities ,

it may also become imperative to assess the sequence in which the database is accessed. In genera l , it appears that a tactical evaluation

scenario may be developed within the following set of methodologi cal

recommendations :

(1) The symbo l system should be tested for its power as a

language to present the kind of classic situations

tha t ba ttle sta ff may be expected to face.

(2) Since the battlefield is complex and will undoubtedly

become more so , complex tactical situations which tax

the capability of modern battlefield decision makers

should be presented.

(3) An electronic display should probably be used in order

to generate all of the symbol parameters and task

dimensions necessary for adequate testing.

(4) Since assessment and decision -making are not made in a

sterile , quiet and uninterrupted environment , a symbol

system should be tested in a realistic command post

environment (an environment like that in CATTS at Ft.

Leavenworth would be suitable).

5-10

_

ii- _____ 

/
(5) The information requirements derived to generate the

symbol system should be used as the test cri teria for

evaluatin g tact i cal decis i on mak i ng performance .

Eac h of these metho dolo gi cal recommenda ti ons can be amp lified further .

For example , consider the last i tem in the list: it calls for the

selection of operational criteri a (i.e., dependent measures) which are

sensitive to the task performance under evaluation. By i temizing taskspecific requirements (e.g. , a

~~~’~~ threat du ,- ~~~ I ru ’

~~’ i 1. c~~cmii

explicit , quantifiable measures of performance can be systematically

defined (e.g., w-~ura j and time liness of loca1~

ion and/or ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

o rrioO ~~nj L’nem!j u n i ts) . Some examples of representative tasks and

corresponding perfo rmance measures are presentaed in Table 5 -1. The

point to be made here is that the analysis of information requirements ,

as discussed previously in this report , can be employed to develop a

functionally-based approach to symbo loqy assessment.

Sample Evaluation Scenario. The preceding discussions stress the

importance of tactical realism and information processing complexity .

One tactical problem that seems to satisfy both of these requirements

is that of an active defense against overwhelming enemy strenqth.

Modern doctrine emphasizes the importance of “counterpunching ’ during

such an operation and this creates new information imperatives for the

tactical decision maker. Essentially, the dec i sion maker is requ i red

to locate the point of enemy penetration and determine the enemy ’ s

likely objectives. An appropriate response strategy would require

an assessment of enemy vulnerability and a corresponding selection

of an appropriate weapon system. Each of these tasks can and should

be effectively facilitated by improved tactical symbology .

5—1 1

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.

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TABLE 5-1

TASK-BASED SELECTION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES

L. REPRESENTATIVE

SYMBOL-USE TASK PERFORMANCE MEASURES

(1) Assess functional characte ristics Specification of the functional

of enemy units. components of an enemy force.

(2) Assess threat due to recent Location and/or identification

enemy movements , of mov ing enemy units .

(3) Assess ‘-each of enemy ground Estimation of the distance at

support . which enemy ground support units

will no longer be effective.

(4) Assess likel ihood that enemy Estimation of similarity between

is aligned in combined arms doctrinal attack template and

attack formation . current disposition of enemy

units .

(5) Assess firepower of enemy Integration of doctrinal firing

striking units . range data with current knowl edge of unit size and density

to produce a numeric estimate .

(6) Identify high priori ty enemy Location and/or identification

targets. of enemy command , control , and

communications centers .

5-12

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A sample appropriate test scenario , therefore , might require the symbol

user to:

(1) ‘ Find the point of enemy penetration .

L (2) Determine logical enemy objectives in our rear.

(3) Structure the attack vector.

(4) Select uncomitted friendly unit.

(5) Select efficient “kill” zone in enemy sector.

(6) Determine friendly movement time to kill zone.

(7) Plot point of intersection and select unit.

This set of tasks defines an entire tactical exercise and encompasses

many of the data structures presented in Exhibit 3. The objective of

the scenario , therefore , would be to embed a complex sequence of tactical

decision making and assessment tasks into an integrated structure which

can be presented to battlefield decision makers in.the context of a

problem -solving/decision -making exercise.

The particular sequence of tasks listed above is highly representative

of those practiced by students at the Command and General Staff College .

In fact , it can be argued that collectively these tasks represent an

especially challenging set of circumstances likely to confront the

tactical decision maker. A scenario such as this can also serve to

( a ) refine the analysis of information requirements , and (b) suggest

adjustments in the display system and/or modifications of symbol design.

In sumary, the prima ry advantage of a task-based evaluation is that

it extends well beyond the traditional applications of symbology and

assesses the impact of graphic portrayal over a wide range of tactical

- functions.

5-13

ret- — —~~~~ ‘

~~—--‘-‘-~~ ‘- - ‘- ‘ ?‘~~ ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ — ----

——

/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

___ - - 

a”
Sample Experiment. To illustrate a task-based methodology for evaluating

the effectiveness of selected symbol design features , a sample experiment

is outlined here . Assume that a preliminary analysis of alternative

features may suggest that symbol i conicity wi th opposing orientation and

vector representation (innovative design features ) combined with alphanume ric annotation (a conventional design feature) may effectively

facilitate the identification of enemy breakthrough points. An experimental test of this hypothesis requires that each task component be

operationally defined in terms of one or more performance measures.

For example , consider the question of I-low far can the enemy shoot into

I~~~~~~’ 81-etor? The ability of a user to answer this question can be

objectively measured by presenting a sample situation display (on paper)

and instructing participants in an experiment to circle all friendly units

within range of enemy fi repower. Another basic subtask requires the

partici pant to i ndicate where the enemy is likely to cross the PEBA .

In this case, participants can again be given a sample situation display

alon g w ith instructions to place an “X” at those points along the FEBA

where they would most expect the enemy to attack. The lat~gç~ or time ‘

required for each task as well as the accuracy with which each is

accomplished represent objective indices of performance .

In addition to objective performance criteria , an experimental test of

the effects of symbol i conicit y and vector representation also requires

the development of prototype symbology to illustrate the graphic concepts

at issue . A sample situation display using conventional symbology is

illustrated in Figure 5-3. A comparable display that combines opposing

iconicity with a vectorized reach indicator is illustrated in Figure 5-4.

An experimental comparison of the two displays requires a sample twogroup (conventional vs. prototype) design with both groups having access

to an equivalent amount of tactical information . In order to equate the

5-14

~~ ~~~~~~~ - /
groups , participants viewing the conventional display would also receive

text descriptions of firepowe r ranges for each enemy unit; current

intelligence reports on unit movement; etc.

L The experimental procedure would begin by explaining and then illustrating

each subtask requirement of the breakthrough analysis (i.e., the response

measures descri bed above). Each group would then be given a set of simulated situation displays (on paper) along with supporting text materi al in

the standard symbology condition. Accuracy and latency measures for

each task could be used to assess any performance advantages produced

by the design features under investigation . For the purposes of illustration , this sample experiment combines different symbol design features

into one display ; however , when developing an actual experimental test

plan , the independent and combined effects of separate features could

be investigated and isolated through appropriate experimental designs.

5.5 Summarj

This chapter has presented a three-stage approach to the evaluation of

tactical symbology . The fi rst stage attempts to insure that certain

minimum content requirements are satisfied. The prima ry issues are

conceptual rather than perceptual in nature , pertaining to the comprehensiveness , adaptability , and interoperability of a proposed database

for symbology . Once these minimum standards of database adequacy have

been met, the assessment of the perceptual effectiveness of candidate

symbol designs can begin. There appear to be at least three psychological dimensions underlying the effective use of tactica l symbols:

symbol discriminability ; display search; and symbology learnability

(acquisition). User-based performance criteria can be developed along

each of these basic dimensions . The present discussion illustrated a

number of alternative approaches to design evaluation , drawing a

-

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FI GURE 5-3. SAMPLE SITUATiON DiSPLAY: CONVENT iONAL SYMBOLOGY

I

5-16 

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FIGURE 5-4. SAMPLE SITUATION DISPLAY: PROTOTYPE SYMBOLOGY

III

II

5-17

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~- --~~~~ — ~“ I
distinction between empiri cal! experimenta l methods , on the the one

hand , and mathematical/analytic techniques , on the other.

Finally, the third stage in the eva l uation effort is designed to address

L the tactical effectiveness of a candidate symbol system. This stage is

reached when proposed symbology is in an advanced state of development

(i.e., when well-defined rules are available for mapping symbol design

features onto underlying tactical concepts). At issue is the pragru1atic

value of the symbol system as a graphic aid for improving complex

tactical decision-makin g, planning, situation assessment , etc . The

preferred methodological approach , advocated in this chapter. is to

employ a tactical simulation testbed in which realistic command and

control tasks would be presented along with graphic situation displays .

The accuracy and timeliness of task performance of participants working

with experimental symbologies would then provide objective indices of

symbology effectivensss , re’

lative to a control group using the conventional map/symbol system.

5-18

C 

/ 

~IØ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

I I -
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r

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—

~~ —-—- —

f

t - Ô -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - .- - 

/‘ k- j
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of Stimulus Material . Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1969, 81 , 274-280.

Rosen berg, R.G. Relative Combat Power. Mil itary Review , 1978, LV III

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1977, 

~~~ 

319-345.

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6-5

I ) - _____ 

_____________ ___

___________ - 

~

_ om~~~- ’.-~

--- -

C . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ II

~~ - - -

—--- —- 

- - I

. - - -; - / - 

“

~~~~~a- ~~~~ 

%~ -*~~~~ W-- ~~~~~~~~~~~ -

~~~ ------ ~~

‘- 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -. —
Sidorsky , R .C., Gellman , L .H . and Moses , F.L. Survey of Current

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6-6

¶ 

——~~~~~ ~~~~~ .___

- -‘ 

-
Yoeli , P. and Loon , J . Map Symbols and Lettering: A Two Part Report :

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• Part II , The Logic of Automated Map Lettering . European Research Office

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Model . Techion - Israel Institute of Technology (Haifa , Israel),

Unpublished Manuscript , 1978.

\

1.

6-7

a

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~ 

- ~~~~~‘ - ~~~~ 

I
APPENDIX A

ADP-RELATED ISSUES

______ _______________ —-____ - ~~ - 

~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~ 

— — - _____

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~ ~~~~ - •

_______ 

-Iti._ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - — ~~~~ — -- - — -
Overview

Rapid advances in automatic data processing (ADP ) technology , particularly

electronic display media , allow for powerful graphic capabilities that

are both efficient and economic. These techniques promise to facilitate

the development and implementation of sophisticated improvements for

computer-displayed tactical symbology. In turn , such developments

should hopeful ly aid command and control personnel to gain a significantly

better view and understanding of the battlefield situation . However , the

development of symbology for upper echelon C3 centers , requires strict

adherence to the technical specifi cations of automated display sys tems .

This appendix , therefore , provides a brief introduction to significant

graphics display constraints as they relate to electronic picture and

object representation :

~1) Effects of graphics display color and resolution

on symbol clarity and variation .

(2) Display time requirements as a function of symbol

population and level of detail in a displayed frame .

(3) Symbol control information - e.g., , zoom parameters ,

colors , display status , decluttering conditions , etc .

(4) Symbol creation , manipulation , modification and

retainment capabilities . • (5) Access to a symbol’ s associated info rmation .

(6) Symbol transmission via graphics exchange communication

protocols.

Color and Resol ution

Color graphics display systems commonly generate sepa rate red , green ,

and blue (RGB) video signals which can combinatorily produce the

— 

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- • 

‘

~~~~ ~

-.

~

: : -- • 

—

~~~ I-~~~~ • 

C / ________________ - ‘
following colors on a color monit~

or: white , green , yellow , cyan ,

magenta , red , blue , and black. Generally, resolution is 512 x 512 rasters

and the monitor is refreshed at 30 times per second . The availability

of eight colors provides good flexibility in designing meaningful tactical symbols. However, a standard paper map symbol can be represented

by a greater number of incremental changes than its electronically

displayed counterpart . Certain geometrical shapes--e.g., curvi-linear

shaded areas and symbols composed of curved lines , are not easily

displayed in 512 x 512 space. Thus , the resolution constraint requires

greater investigation and experimentation to find appropriate symbol

representations.

Display Time

Acceptable display generation time is a function of the symbol

population and l evel of detail displayed in a frame . Display time

ranges from “real-time” for simple symbols with some detail overl aying

a projected or already displayed i

~

opogra~ l... r:.

~, to “slow-time ” for

displays dense with symbols ari d detail. ~

-~

c - -~ i ;

~

e may be from 3 to

10 seconds , depending on symbo i comple;- - t y and 1

~~a base access time .

A critical factor of course is the tinw require d o display complete

topographic data -from a digital data b s a--e.g., vegetation , hydrography ,

man-made objects, etc . Display time 1uld be as ni~

ich as 5 mi nutes or

more to produce a highly detailed frai -. - One {

~asY . - e alternative to

a complete digita l data base is the int~y 1tion ~ - -‘ • -: video—disk ,

containing randomly accessible nap frames -. igital symbology

data base. Both would be controlled by lntC i

~ .t1on with a computerbased symbology management system . Map frames coullIl be quick’ y accessed

from a video—disk and the output ii’ixed ‘ii4h the coinpv •

~ - generated

symbology corresponding tc the referenc€- c’ I

~~ 3~~ area ; th total data

configuration would then be disp 1~yed on a • --nitor.

I - - 

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~~ 

-•

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7

/

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- 

-- —- 

-
Symbol Control

In contrast to historical information which maintains a static

existence in the database , control information such as symbol type,

zoom parameters, colors , display status, location , decluttering

conditi ons , etc., are dynamic entities related primarily to the display

lifetime of the symbol unless a frame is saved for later viewi ng. High

speed computation and analysis of these “atomi c ” items are required to

rapidly generate and manipulate a display wi th a number of independent

symbols. The control-information requirements for a symbology are very

complex and difficult to design into an efficient digital representation .

Symbol Operability

The capability for the creation (definition), manipulation , modification ,

and retainment of symbols should be embodied in powerful yet easy-to-use

procedures . Such procedures should be an integral part of the graphics

system software. The higher the level of the graphics language , the

higher the potential degree of symbol operability .

Associated Information

Symbols not only consist of geometri cal properties , but usually have

other information associated with them—-e. g., name , location , components,

condition . This information should be readily available in the database

and dynamically accessible when varying levels of detail are requested .

This requi res an overall structure or “template ” that is consistent

across symbols i n order to allow rapid acc ess , manipulation and

modifi cation.

A-3

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- - - 

- 

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Symbol Transmission

Graphics exchange /communication protocols require evaluation for their

impact on the design of tactical symbol s and their historical information

and control structures. Transmission of symbol information should be

independent of any hardwa re that processes it or any terminal that will

display it. Symbol design must adhere to “informati on packet” specifications that will carry the symbol from one location to another. For

instance , the Network Graphic Group, a working group of ARPA Network

Members , has , with considerable thought and hard work , developed a

Network Graphics Protocol covering graphics standards and graphics

ccmunication.

•1

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- - - 

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APPENDIX B

DEFENSIVE SCENARIO

I 

- EUROPEAN SETTING

~

1

1~~~~~~~ 

- 

.

____ _ wr ____ ~~~~~~ -
STRATEGIC SCENARIO

Strategic Environment

The reality of deployed NATO and Warsaw Pact forces In Northern

and Central Europe inexorably poses the threat of tension and crisis

escalating to war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have

vital national secur ity i nterests i n Europe that are dramatically

reflected in their military contributions in the two op posing alliances.

Combined wi th military forces of other alliance/pact members , the European theater is composed of large, modern , and potentially destructive

forces unparallel ed i n the history of war fare .

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE NATO WARSAW PACT

Combat and direct support troops availabl e 625,000 895 ,000

Tanks 7 ,000 19 ,000

Tactical aircraft 2 ,050 4 ,025

Nuclear weapons 7,000 3,500

Strategic Devel~pments

It i s now 6 August 1979. Amid a background of steadil y deteri-

- • orating relations between NATO and the Communist powers and increasing

global tens i on , mi n i sters of the Warsaw Pact nations meet wi th the

Politburo an d agree to attack West Germany. East Germany , Poland , and

Czechoslovakia are most receptive , and their forces are called on to

participate in the offensive. Hungary, Bulgaria , and Romania will move

forces to the borders of the southern NATO countries to prevent NATO

from reinforcing central Europe. Covert preparations are -Initiated , to •

• . include the assembly of rollIng stock and Increasing units to full

strength.

_ 

.• ~~~~~~~ •

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

‘4 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ S

I 1 II — - - -
Subsequent chronological events l eading to hostilities are :

(1) On 8 August , Warsaw Pact na tions i n it iate full mobilization.

Pact nations make every effort to limi t NATO intelligence

operations and thus hope to complete substantial military

preparations without permitting a fi rm indication of their

i ntent.

(2) On 9 August , Moscow publ i cl y announces a for thcom i ng field

exercise to test Warsaw Pact defense plans , and at the same

time a res tr i cti on on fore ig n travel w it h i n Warsaw Pac t

countri es is invoked .

(3) On 10 August , In tell i gence re por ts i nd i ca te tha t Sov i et

m ilitary traffic from western USSR to Poland and East

Germany i s unusuall y heav y and appea rs excess i ve to the

needs of ~he prev i ousl y announced fi el d exerc i se. Su pr eme

Allied Comander Europe (SACEU R ) or ders a sta te of M i l itar y

Vigilance .

(4) By 11 Augus t, the Warsaw Pact buildup in Communist Europe

is appa rent to the West. Increased rail , road , and a i r

activities , as well as the arrival of several Soviet

divisions -in East Germany have been confirmed. SACEUR

requests authority to declare Simple Alert .

(a) The request is transmitted to the NATO Secretary Genera l ,

who chairs the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). This

committee cons i sts of the permanen t re presen tat i ves to

the NATO council , with the excep ti on of France and

Greece , and i s ves ted w ith au thor ity over the ma jor

NATO commanders (SACEUR , SACLANT , and CINCHAN ).

B- 2

- - 

/ H
After cons ulting wi th thei r national governments as

well as their permanent representatives to the NATO

Military Commi ttee , the permanent representatives to

tne DPC voice no objection to SACEUR ’s re ques t when

polled by the Secretary Genera l, who then authorizes

the declaration of Simple Alert .

( b ) As a resul t, SACEUR alerts his allied force headquar ters i n nor thern , cen tral , and sou thern Euro pe.

Head quar ters , All ied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT),

in turn , places its two Army groups and Headquarters ,

Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) , along wi th

its two Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF’s) on

i ncrease d aler t.

(5) On 1 3 August , because 0-f the increased pace of the Warsaw

Pact buildup, SACEUR issues plann i ng gu i dance and re ques ts

authori ty to declare Reinforced Alert . The DPC , now in

continuous session , approves the request. Efforts by the

UN to halt the Warsaw Pact buildup continue to be unsuccessful . CINCENT issues theater guidance.

( 6) On 14 Au gust, evidence is received that Warsaw Pact forces

are mobilizing and will soon attack. As a result , SACEUR

receives authorization from the DPC to declare ~eneral Alert.

NATO forces begin moving to their assigned emergency defense

positions . Obstacle construction is initiated. The U.S.

Congress declare s a state of nationa l emergency and orders

un its and members of the Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve

to active duty . The President orders the deployment of dualbased forces to Europe . Other NATO nations commence

mobilization at the same time .

— ___ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~— 1

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~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ 1

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(7) On 15 August , an i ncrease i n tactical air movement is

detected - generally to bases in the vicinity of known

training areas in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

(8) On 16 August, Soviet fo rces con tinue to deploy i nto East

Germany and Czechoslovakia.

( 9) By 18 August , a major portion of the Soviet theater

reserve forces has arrived in western Poland and are

deployed along lines of communication that would facilitate

their rapid movement into East Germany.

(10) On 20 August, Pact units are detected moving toward the

western borders of East Germany and Czechos1ova ’~

ia. NATO

un its patrolling border areas report the evacuation of

civilians and other noncombatants.

(11) On 21 August at 0320, enemy units are detected 1-2 KM from

the internationa l border along much of the sector assigned

to the lOt-h (U.S.) Corps (a sketch of CENTAG dispositions

and an enemy situation map are attached). At 0330, heavy

artillery and mortar fire is received by several elements

of the 10th (U.S.) Corps positioned near the international

border. At 0345, a BN size reconnaissance -force is seen

moving across the border at coordinates NB 6730 (see Enemy

Situation Map).

B-4

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•HANN0vER

OORTMUN Q )

KASSEL .

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ASCI4AFFENBURG

• HEIOEL.BERG N UER NBERG • \

/ •srurrGART

FIGURE B-i. SKETCH OF CENTAG DISPOSITIONS

B-5

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FIGURE B-2. SITUATION OVERLAY

B-6

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MISSION : DEFENSE OF SECTOR FROM NB486505 TO NB42512O

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Comparison of Forces

Fri endly Force:

The 23d Armore d Division will be operating as part of the 10th Corps

in the assigned sector as depicted on the situation display . The division

is at full strength , their task organization is gi ven in Table 8— 1.

All TOE equipment has been issued , no major equipment shortage exists.

Troops have been undergoing intensive combat training. Moral is good.

Enemy Force :

The forces opposing the 23d Division are elements of the enemy Fi rst

Zapadnian Front. The front is composed of a shock army, two combined

arms arm ies , and two tank armies. This front consists of approximately

11 motorized ri fl e di visions and 12 tan k di visions. When the enemy

attack , it is estimated that nine of these di visions (3 motorized ri fle

and 6 tank) will be employed against the 10th Corps. The fi rst echelon

will consist of 3 motorized ri fle and 2 tank divisions , with 4 tank divisions

in the second echelon (see Table B-2).

As normal , the front has an additiona l Army, presently being mobilized ,

that coul d be emp l oyed in the U.S. sector.

As part of the enemy ’s stra teg i c reserve , up to 5 airborn e divisions could

be employed by the centra l front against the 10th Corps sector.

B-8

/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~-m ~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

-
TABLE B-I. TASK OR GANIZATION : 23d ARMORED DIVI SION

1ST BRIGADE

1-91 Mech

1-95 Mech

1-13 Armor

1-15 Armor

TF 2-18 Armor (2T, lM )

1-50 FA (DS)

l /A/440 ADA (atchd for CFA opn)

l/B/23d CEWI

( 6 GSR Tm , 3 REM S Tm)

1 IPW Tm/2 3d CEWI

1 OPSEC Tm/23d CEWI

A/23d Engr (+) (OS ) - -

A/5l Oth Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (+) (OPCON)

2D BRIGADE

1-92 Mech

1-93 Mech

1-10 Armor

1-12 Armor(-)

1-14 Armor

1-201 Armd Cay Regt

1/5021 Engr Co

TF 2-142 Mech (2M, iT)

B/l-ll A rmor

1— 51 FA (OS )

2/A/440 ADA Catch for CEA opn)

2/B/23d CEWI

(9 G~R Tm , 4 REM S Tm)

1 IPW Tm /2 3d CEW I

1 OPSEC Tm/23d CEWI

Tas k Force 510 En gr ( OS)

510th Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (-)

B/23d Engr (OPCON )

D/23d Engr (OPCON)

3D BRIGADE

1-94 Mech -

1-11 Armor (-)

1-22 Cay

B/1-12 Armor

1-52 FA (OS)

3/A/440 ADA (atchd for CFA opn)

3/ B/23d CEWI

(3 GSR Tm , 3 REMS Tm)

1 IPW Tm/2 3d CEW I

1 OPSEC Tm/2 3d CEW I

C/ 23 Engr (-) (OS )

C/510 Engr (-) (OPCON )

8-9

- -

~~~T~~ ~~~~~~~~~

- .— - - --I- . ~~~~~~~~ :. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —I-- - - - —

I -:. I~~~~~T I I~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~ 

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____________________ / p
TABLE B-2. FIRST ZAPADN IAN FRONT

CODE NAME ORO

CODE NUMBEF751568 -

AREA OF OPERATIONS Central Europe

UN IT COMMANDER CODE NO.

CG Marshal DZIEDZIC 

Co fS 

H&S Bn 

12th Shock Army 339994

2d CM Gen Cal PESTEL 200711

8th Gds 1k Army Gen Col MURAVIEV , 0 439276

5th Gds 1k Army 505722

20th CM 

35th SSM Bde Gen Maj BIBIKOV , G 528620

31st £ngr Const Regt Col KUTUZOV , J 

19th Engr Pan Regt 

44th Sig Regt . . . . 129th Med Regt 

Cml B de 

EW Bn 

Sig Intep Regt 

Intel Regt 

2d Arty Div 

4th MT Bn 

18th Engr Pipelaying Bde 

B-i 0

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C / ~~ Ø~~~~~~~ 4~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

J

~~~~bj~

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APPENDIX C

ELICITATION DATA

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______ ULi.L ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ w-m-

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~ ~

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~~~~~~1
PARTICIPANT: G-2 (INTELLIGENCE)

PROMPT 1: UNDERSTAND THE ENEMY

Which are the combat units?

Which type of combat units?

What is their composition?

What is their special weapon capability?

What is their percent of combat effectiveness?

What -is principal area of deficiency ?

To what degree is this area depleated?

What vulnerability is afforded by the terrain?

What vulnerability is afforded by visability?

What vulnerability is afforded by lack of mobility ?

What vulnerability is afforded by ldck of fi repower?

PROMPT 2: SEE THE BATTLEFIELD

What units are moving towards us?

What units are moving fastest toward us?

What units are closest to us now?

What kind of threat mus t we respond to?

What is the range of enemy striking units?

Will terrain limi tations alter range for weapons platform?

Will POL limi tations alter range for weapons platform?

What i s added ran ge of wea pon itself?

What is the source of information?

How reliable is the information?

How accurate is the i nformation?

Is there an increase in activity ?

Is there movemen t i nto attack forma tion?

What area does the smoke prescribe?

In which direction is it moving?

How long will it rema i n?

C-I

—-—-.-— ~~~~~—---

~~~~~~ J

~~ C f _____ ____________________________________ 

~ ,

/

-

-- - 

- a
PROM PT 3: CONCEN TRATE AT T HE CRITICAL TIME S AND PLA CE S

Where are the enemy ’ s tactical nerve centers?

Where is the heart of the target?

What is the area of the target?

L Wha t is orientation of mass of enemy units reported moving across FEBA?

What log i cal avenues of approach are available in that direction?

Where are lead attack regiments going to intersect the avenue of approach?

Where in our rear has he prepositioneci a raid?

What is the primary objective?

What route will he take?

What is the range of intervisability ?

Is the terrain undulating to obscure the target part of the time?

Which are the strike aircraft?

What is their target category ?

What is their target speed?

What is the prima ry friendly counter weapon?

PROMPT 4: FI GHT AS A COMBIN ED ARM S TEA ~

-l

What type of air support is available?

How much time is remaining on station?

What type of attack capability is present?

How many sortees are available?

What is the percent of our unit readiness?

What type of mobility do we have?

What angle of attack shall we use?

What is the direction of response?

How much distance is to be traveled?

What is the elapsed time estimated for closure?

What is the area of operation boundaries for our autonomous tank kifler teams?

Where are the presen t locations and status of the teams ?

What is the res i stance sta tus of the teams?

C- 2

I —

I 

C ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I - 

-

—r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — -- -, ~
— I - - - - ____-_____-

~~~~--- 

Where are the enemy air defense units?

What is the range fan of the AD units?

Do the ranges overlap?

What is the least risky path through the overlap to our objective?

L.

PROMPT 5: EXPLOIT THE ADVANTAGES OF THE DEFENDER

What percent of our units are in their forecast defense positions ?

What percent of our units have improved their positions and dressed them

wi th fresh camouflage?

Wha t percent of our units have operations and patrols out and active?

I-low can we tell when our units are mutually supporting?

What degree of combined arms status have they achieved?

What is the fire relationship between/among units?

I

~

I

II

C-3

_____ -, ~ - I - 

-,
PARTICIPANT: G-3 (OPERATIONS )

PROMPT 1: UNDERSTAND THE ENEMY

- Where are the combat units?

What type of comba t units are they?

Have any of the units been augmented with special troops?

Has the augmentation changed the enemy mobility or expertise?

Do the combat units have any special weapons?

Are the enemy units unique combinations of combined arms forces?

Is the enemy vulverabie due to a lack of mobility?

Is the enemy vulnerable due to a lack of fi repower?

PROMPT 2: SEE THE BATTLEFIELD

Which enemy units are moving?

In which direction and how fast are they moving?

Are the units moving into an attack formation?

Can enemy artillery hit any of our units?

Is there smoke obscuring parts of the battlefield? If so , where and how

long is it expected to last?

PROMPT 3: CONCENTRATE AT THE CRITICAL TIME AND PLACES

Where are the regimental and higher echelon command and control centers?

How much area do these centers occupy?

Where is the enemy going to cross the FEBA?

Which avenues of approach will the enemy take?

PROMPT 4: FIGHT AS A COMBINED ARMS TEAM

- - What is the degree of our unit readiness?

What type of mobility is available?

Is there air support available? If so , what type?

How long will the air support be available?

C-4

- - 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- _________

~- - -~~-~ ~~

III

~ - - — -
How far do our units have to travel to contact the enemy?

What is the estimated time of closure ?

PROMPT 5: EXPLOIT THE ADVANTAGES OF THE DEFENDER

What type of defensive positions have our units established?

Are the units camouflaged?

Where on the battlefield can we place obstacles?

What types of obstacles are available?

Are the obstacles in place , under construction or pending delivery?

What is the expected delay factor created by the obstacles?

Is there coordinated fi re between and among our units?

C- 5

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~~~~~~ - - I

C ~~~~ 

/

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

- 

-

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I

APPENDIX 0

A BEHAVIORAL REQUIREMENTS TAXONOMY FOR SYMBOL USE I

- 

I

I -

i

~~~~~~~I- - ~~~~~~~~~~ 

-

-

-

-- - - I ~~ ~~~

~~~~~~~~~

___ 

-

~~~~~~ - -- - I
Overview

This taxonon~

y, which was deri ved from an inductive analysis of a variety

of literature sources , assumes that in order to use tactical symbols ,

the user must fi rst acquire knowledge about them , and then interact with

them behaviorally at the level of a single symbol , or at the leve l of

a collection or pattern of symbols.

A. Symbol Acquisition

The acquisition of a symbolic language is a two-stage task. Fi rst , the

user must learn the stimulus elements (perceptual learning), and then the

user must learn the appropriate associations between the stimulus

elements and the concepts that they are said to portray . Thus , the -

acquisition of a symbolic language is a task of paired-associate

learning (Greeno , 1970).

(1) Perceptual Learning - the acquisition of a code necessary

for future recognition of a form.

(2) Association - the acquisition of a mental lin k between a

form and the concept that it portrays.

B. Processing Individual Symbols

The utilization of individual symbols is also , in general , a two-stage

- process. A symbol must be detected and then it must be identified.

However , tracking (sustained detection) and updating (re-identifi cation)

are additional behaviors that are ccmmon in processing symbols in a

tactical display .

D-l

____ — 

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____ 

p7

,]
(1) Detection - the acknowledgment of the presence of a form

or class of forms.

(2) Identifi cation - the interpretation of a detected form.

(3) Tracking - the sustained detection of a mobile form .

(4) Updating - the acknowledgment of an alteration of a form.

C. Processing Multiple Symbols

In processing multiple symbols , the user could be searching for diffe rences

or similarities among the symbols. In the case of searching for similarities , the most comon form of sumarization is counting. These proceses ,

discrimination and counting, are said to follow the detection and identification of individual symbols. In addition , for the skilled user ,

meaningful spatial patterns of the symbols could probably be i dentified in

much the same way that a chess master interprets the configuration of the

pieces on a chessboard.

(1) Discrimination - the acknowledgment of di ffe rences among two

or more identified forms.

(2) Counting - keeping track of the number of instances of a

given form class encountered.

(3) Spatial Pattern Recognition - the interpretation of the

spatial arrangement of two or more identified forms .

-

.

- - ~~ 1 . I 

__ 

C

1

~~~~~~~~~~~

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I
APPEND IX E

SOME SYMBOL DESIGN CANDIDATES

Modified Conventional Symbology Figure [-1

Tactical Capability Symbology (TCS) Fi gure . E-2

Combat Power Symbology (CPS) Figure E-3

Iconic Symboiogy :

Armor Figure E-4a

Mechanized Infantry Figure E-4b

Infantry Figure E-4c

Air Cavalry Figure E-4d

‘ I _ -

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I

I I

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I- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - I —-

141 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C 

I 

I

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INTRODUCTION

On the pages to follow , examples of some proposed symbol design

candidates are provided . For each symbology represented , a brief

description of its rationale and design features is given followed by

illustrative drawi ngs of some sample symbols.

E—l

_ I- I ___-I- -I- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MODIFIED CONVENTIONAL SYMBOLOGY

A slight modification of conventional symbology will permi t the

graphic portrayal of combat effectiveness (Middleton , 1977a). Proportional shadin g within the double box can be used to reflect any desired

percent level of combat strength. This symbology has the advantage of

dis playing the unit effectiveness dimension without requiring retraining

on the part of the user.

E-2

I. 

/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~ 

I - I -

- - 7
_ 

H

ARMOR INFANTRY

100% STRENGTH 50% STREN GTH

I

~

I

MECHANIZED INFANTRY ~~~~ AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

75% STRENG TH 100% STRENGTH

• 

1— I l’]

FIELD ARTILLERY ENGINEER

50% STRENGT H 25% STRENGTH

r~~~I P.[ [-1. MODIFIED CONVENTIONAL SYMBOLO GY

E-3 

1

~

.

I 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

- ____

— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -: - - 

-

/ 

-
I TACTI CAL CAPABILI TY SY MBOLO GY (TC S)

TCS was developed by Dr. Raymond C. Sidorsky at the U.S. Army

Research Institute (ARI) as a supplement to conventional unit symbology

(Sidorsky , 1977). TCS allows for the graphic representation of both

unit function and capability . This is accomplis~hed by assigning specifi c

capability dimensions to each of eight diffe rent points along the circumference of a circular unit symbol. These dimensions include : threat ,

effectiveness , mobility , fi repower, logistics , terrain , support and

density . The prima ry objective of this symbology is to provide current

capability estimates using a readily accessible graphic format (See

Section 2.3.1).

As an illustration of the type of information conveyed by this

symbology and the manner in which it is portrayed , consider the sample

in the top-left corner. It illustrates an a rmor unit (horizontal line

within inner circle) possessing high threat (outward extended line at

12 o ’clock), excellent mobility (outward extended line at 3 o ’ clock),

poor logistics (line between circles at 6 o ’ clock), and good terrain

positioning (outward extended line at 7:30 o ’clock). The other capability dimensions for this unit (i.e., effectiveness , firepower , support ,

and density ) are all at normal levels and therefore , no lines are

indicated at their respective clock positions.

E-4

_.-/-

~

-- -- —- -II I

C / ~~~ 
0

ARMOR UNIT MECHANIZED INFANTRY

HIGH THREAT NORMAL THREAT

0

INFANTRY ANTI-TAN K GUN

VERY LOW THREAT VERY LOW THREAT

a

FIELD ARTILL ERY GUN AIR DEFENSE ARTILLER Y GUN

NORMA L THREAT HIGH THREAT

FIGURE E-2. TACTICAL CAPABILITY SYMBOLOGY (TCS)

E-5

/ ___ 

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—

~~

--— ------~~~-------—-—- -

COMBAT POWER SYMBOLOGY (CPS )

Combat Powe r Symbology (CPS) was developed at the U.S. Army

In telligence Center and School (USAICS) to provide a graphic portrayal

of enemy threat (Colanto , 1977). The objective of CPS is to provide an

ADP compatible symbology for displaying selected aspects of combat

power such as those relating to the number , type , range and mobility

of certain key maneuver elements (armor, motorized rifl e, field artillery ,

air defense and anti-tank). In addition , certain electronic support

equipment (radars) and command and control elements are depicted.

An empirical study was performed to evaluate the “intuitive”

threat associa ted with various geometric shapes. The rationale was to

portray the most threatening enemy unit with a psychologically

“threatenin g ” unit symbol . For example , the di amond was observed to

be most “threatenin g,” and was therefore used to depict an armor unit.

Although a num ber of design candidates have been generated using this

approach , the effectiveness of CPS has yet to be systematically evaluated.

I

E-6

- I I ~ - I -
: 

_

FIELD FIELD ARM OR MOTORIZED ANTI- ARTILLERY ARTILLERY RIFLE TANK TUBE ROCKET

ADA ADA SIGNAL RADAR NUCLEAR

TUBE MJSSLE

H

SUPPORT COMMAND AVIATION ENGINEER

POST I ‘ I

FIGURE E-3. COMBAT POWER SYMBOLOGY (CPS)

-: - 

E -7 

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~ .‘
ICONIC SYMBOLOGY

Milita ry personnel may find it relatively easy to learn symbols which

L “match” visual codes they have previously stored in memory . The use of

iconic images , therefore , may effectively evoke corresponding tactical

concepts without extensive training. Symbol iconicity can range from

photographic reproduction to abstract approximation . For example , the

detailed “tank” symbol presented at the top of Figure E-4a probably contains

more info rmation than is required for efficient and accurate recognition.

The detailed silhouette design on the left-hand side of the figure contains

fewer visual cues but seems sufficient to insure rapid recognition. An

event simpler iconic approximation is the “blocked” design on the righthand side . The primary advantage of the block or quasi-iconic symbol is its

relative compatibility wi th an automated display system. Each block figure

shown in Figure E-4 was drawn using a 12 X 28 dot matri x (it is estimated that

the corresponding detailed silhouette would require a field 3 to 4 times as

large). In summary , Figure E— 4 illustrates two versi ons of the i conic

silhouette techni que (detailed vs. blocked) for each of the following unit

functions: armor; mechanized infantry; infantry ; and air cavalry.

E-8

I

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I ___

C f ~~~~~~~~~~~~ I :~~~~~ II ..
-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ICONIC IMAGE

DETAILED SILHOUETTE BLOCKED SILHOUETTE

- 

“

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (F I L LED)

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~~ FIGURE E—4a . ICONIC SYMBOLS : ARMOR

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____ - -
I

ICONIC IMAGE

DETAILED SILHOUETTE BLOCKED SILHOUETTE

(FILLED)

I 

_ _

(OUTLINE)

FIGURE E-4b. ICONIC SYMBOLS: MECHA NIZED INFANTRY

E— 1O

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ICON IC I MAGE

DETAILED SILHOUETTE BLOCKED SILHOUEJITh.

(FILLED ) I I I I I

(OUTLINE ) 9

FIGURE E-4c . ICONIC SYMBOLS: INFANTRY

H E~11

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ICONIC I MAGE

DETAILED SILHOUETTE BLOC KED SILHOUETTE

(F I LLED)

(o UTL I NE) ______

FIGURE E-4d . ICONIC SYMBOLS: AIR CAVALRY

E-12

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APPENDIX F

SPATIAL FREQUENCY ANALYS IS

- 1

I)

i ___ ___ 

___

__ 

7 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview

The objective of this appendix is to descri be a newly-developed cost

- effective technique which may prove useful in integrating a number of

seemingly inconsistent empirical research results and may provide a

i... sound basis for future symbol design efforts. This technique--known

as Fourier analysis--represents a convenient mathematical structure for

simplifying complex wave patterns such as the visual information

contained in a tactical symbol design . The problem addressed by the

procedure become s evident from the fol lowing quote :

“One mig ht present subjects with visual displays consisting

of every shape , intensity, size, etc., that one can think

of, and catalog the resulting judgments of bri ghtness.

However, since there is no limit to the number of shapes

tha t one can invent, the research and the catalog would

never be completed. Obviously, it -is necessary, instead ,

to try to find some re lative ly small set of relationships

cv-nong the relevant variables.., tha t will predict accurately

the results of any possible experiment. ” (Cornsweet , 1970)

Toward alleviating this problem , the Fourier approach does in fact seek

to identify and analyze such relationships.

Fourier Analysis of Two-Dimensional Shapes. When an orchestra plays

a chord , the sound that is created can be analyzed or broken down into

its component tones. In an analogous way , a visual scene can be broken

down into its components . The method that is used to do this is Fourier

analysis , which is a mathematical process that can be closely approximated

by computer programs known as Fast Fourier Transforms , or FFTs.

• Once a scene has been broken down into its components , it can be manipulated . In particular , the transfo rmed representation can be fi l tered ,

• and a visual scene reconstructed with some of its components missing. A

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recent application of this technique has been developed by Arthur Ginsburg

at Wright-Patterson , A .F .B . Briefly, he performed a digita l conversion

on the photograph of a woman ’ s face and entered the data into an FFT

program. After the transform was completed , the result was a di gitized

L. rep resentation of the components of the portrait. These components were

then fi l tered into seven different channels. The fi rst channel contained

only the l owest frequency information , the second the very low frequency

i nforma ti on , the thir d low , the fourth middle , the f i fth hig h , the sixth

very high , and the seventh hi ghest. These seven transformed , filtered

representations were themselves entered into the FFT program to reconstruct their corresponding visual images. The results were seven versions

of the or igi nal portra i t , each containin g only a limited amount of the

original information . It can be seen from the seven versions that:

(1) Very low frequency info rmation is about the form of the

object; the shape of the head and p lacement of eyes , nose ,

and mouth . The portrait is recognizable as “a face” .

(2) Low frequency information is sufficient to identify the

face. A person acquainted with the subject of the portrait

would recognize her in this version.

(3) Higher frequency information is about details. Texture

and finally edges are represented. This information is

not necessary for recognition of the face , although it

might show details important for some other purpose.

In creating each of the seven vers ions , fi lters of two-octave bandwidth

were used. Filters narrower than this do not produce versions of the

portrait that are useful to the human visual system .

F- 2

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A further demonstration by Ginsburg shows the power of this technique

applied to problems of human image processing . Most theories of visual

func tioning cannot explain common illusions . An example is the

Poggendorff i llus i on : 

,

,

J

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Al though the two diagonal line segments fall on the same plane , they

seem to be offset. By transforming a sketch of this illusion , retaining

onl y the low frequency i nforma ti on , and again using a two-octave bandpass

fil ter , the illus ion can be explained. Di rect measurements on the

recons tructed version of the sketch show the line segments to be representea as offset. This has important consequences for understanding

human visual processing. It seems that people typically use a two-octave

wide band of low-frequency information in analyzing a visual scene .

Hi gh-frequency , i.e ., fine detail , i nforma ti on is much less sal i ent.

Four i er analys i s has also been appl i ed successful ly to al phanume ri c

symbol discrimi nation. The FFT technique provides a straightforward

measure of the visual similarity among letter characters . This measure

can be used to predict human performance on discrimination tasks , and

in fact the FF1 computer measure of similari ty provides a better prediction

of human v i sual discrimina tion performance than does a measure based on

ratings of similarity by human subjects . This is an extremely important

result. Similarity measures derived from subject ratings are very

expensive and time-consuming to obtain. The FF1 measure is not only

inexpensive and fast but also provides a better predicto r of performance .

The following experiment by Ginsburg (1978 ) illustra tes the use of

Four ie r anal ys i s in the con tex t of letter di scrimi nation . Snellen

eye-chart letters were digitized and entered into the FF1 program. The

F-3

/ I

I 1 ~~~~~~ _~~~~_
transformed representations of the letters were then compared pair-wise.

For each pa i r, a correlation-like measure of similarity was calculated.

This measure was compared to a measure deri ved from subject ratings and

to actual performance on a discrimination , or confusability task. The

L FF1 measure could account for 90% of the discrimi nation data, far more

than the subject rating measu re was able to predict.

As the preceding experiments suggest, it is now possible to i dentify

the fundamental components (spatial frequencies) of a visual form. In

addition , psychophysical experiments conducted over the past ten years

(Cornsweet, 1970) have also established the visual sensitivity function

illustrated in Figure F— i . This figure depicts the contrast sensitivity

for each spatial frequency component and shows that the human visual

system “fi l ters” (is less sensitive) to both high and very low frequencies.

The visual sensitivity function changes depending on whether a scene is

viewed centrally (foveally) or peripherally.

When an image is focused on the fovea, the eye is most sensitive to

frequencies between 3 and 5 cycles per degree. When the image is focused

in the periphery , the eye is most sensitive to still l ower frequencies

(1 cycle/degree and less , depending on how far into the peri phery one

goes).

The verbal labels gi ven to certain aspects of a visual scene can be

defined more precisely using Fourier components. What is often called

“form” in vision is the information contained in the low frequency

Fourier components. What is called “detail” is the information contained

in the high frequency components. For instance , a face can be recognized

as a face when the only describable information to be seen is the shape

of the head and the existence of eyes, nose , and mouth . This information

resides in the l ower frequency Fourier components . Form is a crucial
>-

I-

— —.

I.- W — U

LU

_J ~~

SPATIAL FREQUENCY (cycl es/degree)

FIGURE F-i. SENSITIVITY OF THE VISUAL SYSTEM TO STIMULI OF

DIFFERENT SPATIAL FREQUENCIES V IEWED FOVEA LLY

(ADAPTED FROM CORNSWEET , 1970).

)

F— 5

4~. 

T

11 ____
aspect of a visual scene for three reasons: (1) it can be detected

both centrally and peri pherally, (2) it can be detected at both high

and low contrast levels (development of this fact is not relevant

to this report) and (3) less information is needed and so less processing

capacity is used to obtain form information .

As an example , consider the line letter B and the block letter B of

the same size :

EBB P R

The block letter will be more visible at the fovea and especially in the

periphery, because it contains more low spatial frequencies than does the

line letter (the reader may verify this by viewi ng the page from the

peri phery of his/her visual field). It will also be easier to see the

block letters in dim light as well as easier to disti nguish a block B

from a block R , than a line B from a line R.

In suninary, the fol l owing generali zati ons have emerged from research

using spatial frequency analysis:

(1) The human visual system is most sensitive to low spatial

frequenci es carrying “form” information (Cannon, 1977).

(2) High spatial frequencies convey “detail” information

(thin lines and sharp edges) dnd these have the l owest

sensitivity .

(3) Fourier components with hori zontal and vertical ori entations

are relatively more detectable than those with oblique

orientations (Dodwel I , 1 970).

F-6

~~~~~~~~~~~~ :

~~~~ :~~~~~ i ___

____ - 

~

Mr

~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ 

TU~~ —. .,-~~~~~ ur - 

- .‘ J
(4) As one moves away from the foveal region , the sensitivity

of low frequencies becomes greater relative to that of

high frequencies (although all frequencies decrease in

sensitivi ty). This means that peripheral vision is

primarily sensitive to form information .

L

Using Fourier Analysis in Symbol Design Research. Fourier analysis

appears to provide a powerful research tool for i dentifying the spatial

frequency components of symbol design candidates . By analyzing each

design into its constituent visual features, this technique can be used

to obtain an accurate measure of:

(1) The detectability of symbols and their visual components

in all portions of the visual field.

(2) The discriminabi lity or confusability among symbols.

(3) The minimu m level of perceptual detail and resolution

required for perceptually effective battlefield displays .

~

4) The perceptual components of display cl utter.

In sum , the Fourier method can be used to i dentify the perceptual

strengths and weaknesses of actual symbol designs.

C - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --- -“

___ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DISTRI B UTI ON

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1 USA War College , Carlisle Barracks , ATIN: iii

~ 1 COR , HO Ft Huachuca , ATIN: Tech Ret Div

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1 USA Conce pt Anal Aqcy . Bethesda , ATTN: MOCA MR 1 HO, ICATA . ATTN AT CAT OP.O. Ft Hood

I USA Concept Anal Aqcy , Bethesda, AIIM: MOCA-JF 1 USA Recruitin g Cmd, Ft Sheridan. AITh: USARCPM-P

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1 USA Armament Cmd. Rock Itiend, AIIM: AMSAR-IOC 1 Marine Corps Inst., ATIN: Dean-MCI

I FAA.NAFEC , Atlantic City, AIIM: Library 1 HO. USMC. Commandant. AIIM: Code MTMT

I FAA NAFEC . Atlantic City, AIIM: Human Engr Br 1 HO. USMC. Commandant. AIIM: Cod. MPI-20-2b

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6 USATRADOC . Ft Monroe, AIIM: AIPR AD 1 Militaerpsykologitk Ijeneste, Copenhagen

1 USAIRADOC. Ft Monroe, ATTN: ATIS- -EA I Military Attache. French Embassy. AIIM: Doe Sec

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1 USA Aviation Sch , Ft Rucker , AIIN: P0 Drawer ~ I Ministeris van Defend.. 000P/KL Aid Socisal

1 HOUSA Aviation Sys Cmvi, St Louis , AIIM: AMSAV— ZDR Psychologische Zaken, The Hague, Netherlands

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1 USA Aviation SePt. CO. Ft Rucker, AIIM: AISI—D—A

1 HO, DARCOM. Alex andria. AIIM: AMXCI) -IL

1 HO , DARCOM. Alexandria. ATIN: COB

1 US Military Academy, West Point, AIIN: Serials Unit

1 US Military Academy, West Point, ATTN: Ole of Mill Ld’slip

1 US Military Academy. Wiret Point , AIIM: MAOR

I USA Standa,di,ation Gp, UK, EPa NY , AIIM: MASE—GC

1 Ole of Naval Rsch , Arliuigton. ATIN: Code 452

3 Ole of Naval Rsch, Arlington , AIIN: Code 458

I Ole of Naval Rsch, Arlington. AIIN: Coils 450

1 Ole of Naval Rsch. Arlington. AIIN: Code 441

1 Naval Aer.spc Med Res Lab, Pensacola, AIIM: Acous Sets Div

I Naval Aeroslir Med Bee Lab. Perisacc,la . AIIM: dode L5I

I Naval Aerospc Med Ret Lab, Pensacola, A fl’N: Code LB

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1 NAVAIRSIA, Norfolk . ATIN: Safety Ctr

1 Na, Oceanographic, DC, ATIN: Code 6251. Charts & Tech

1 Center of Nasal Anal, AIIN: Doe Ctr

1 NavAirSysCom, ATTN: AIR--5313C

1 May BuMed, AIIN: 713

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1 AFHRL (FT) Williams AFB

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3 AMRL (HE) WPAFB , OH

2 AF Inst of Tech , WPAFB , OH , AIIM: ENE/SL

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1 NavPostGraSch, Monteuiry, AIIM: Code 5BAa

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1 US Dept of Labor. DC, AIIM: Manpower Admun

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