U N C L A S S I F I E D

i

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Decade of War,

Volume I

Enduring Lessons from the 

Past Decade of Operations

15 June 2012

Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA)

A division of the Joint Staff J7 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 

OMB No. 0704-0188 

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the 

data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing 

this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-

4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently 

valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 

5b. GRANT NUMBER 

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 

5e. TASK NUMBER 

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT 

 NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 

 NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 

OF ABSTRACT 

18. NUMBER 

OF PAGES 

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area 

code)

Standard Form 298 (Re . 8-98) v Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

15 Jun 2012 Research report

Decade of War, Volume 1. Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of 

Operations

Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, Joint Staff, Suffolk, 

VADistribution Statement A - The Decade of War, Volume I report is approved for release and dissemination 

without caveat.

In October 2011, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a task to "make sure we actually learn 

the lessons from the last decade of war." In response, the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division reviewed 46 

lessons learned studies conducted from 2003 to the present, and synthesized the studies' 400+ findings, observations, and best 

practices into the 11 strategic themes described in this report. More than a "decade of war," the 46 studies covered a wide variety 

of military operations; from major combat operations in Iraq, to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the Philippines, to 

humanitarian assistance in the United States, Pakistan, and Haiti, to studying emerging regional and global threats. JCOA's initial 

analysis was further refined and discussed by subject matter experts from across the Department of Defense during a weeklong 

Decade of War conference in May 2012. This report represents the synthesis of those efforts, and while significant, is only the 

initial step in turning these critical observations into "learned lessons." The work that follows, integrating findings into a continuous 

joint force development cycle, will serve as an enabler to building a more responsive, versatile, and affordable force. This initial 

effort is envisioned to be the first volume in a sustained, multi-phased effort to identify critical, high-level lessons for the joint force. U U U

UU 50

jcoa@js.mil
U N C L A S S I F I E D

i i

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis

Mission: In support of the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned Program, and as directed, 

the Joint Staff J7 JCOA Division collects, aggregates, analyzes, and disseminates joint lessons learned 

and best practices across the range of military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities.



Address

Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA)

116 Lake View Parkway

Suffolk, Virginia 23435-2697

Requests for Information 

Requests for information can be sent to jcoa@js.mil (NIPRNET), jcoa@js.smil.mil (SIPRNET), 

or jcoa@usa.bices.org (NATO). We will respond to your request as soon as possible. Please indicate 

the type of information you require and the context of how the information will be used. If there is 

an urgent time requirement, please include that information as well. 

Websites 

NIPRNET 

https://www.intelink.gov/sites/jcoa 

SIPRNET 

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/jcoa 

NATO BICES/CRONOS

http://jcoa.act.nato.int/portal
U N C L A S S I F I E D

iii

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Decade of War Study

The Decade of War study is JCOA’s response to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s call 

for learning the lessons of the past decade of US military operations.1To conduct the study, the 

Decade of War study team reviewed 46 JCOA studies dating from the organization’s inception 

in 2003 through early 2012, examining over 400 findings, observations, and best practices in 

order to identify enduring lessons that can inform future joint force development.

2

This report

captures the major themes of the first phase of the study.

3

The study findings were vetted 

through the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade of War working group in May 2012; input from

working group members was consolidated into this report. Future phases of study are planned 

to identify additional issues not captured in the initial body of work.



 

1

GEN Martin E. Dempsey, CJCS, to LtGen George Flynn, “Chairman Direction to J7,” official letter, 6 October 2011.

2

The 46 studies are listed in Appendix A.

3

The Decade of War study, therefore, neither addresses every aspect of every operation over the past decade, 

nor is it a comprehensive analysis of lessons developed by other organizations.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

i v

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N T E N T I O N A L L Y B L A N K
U N C L A S S I F I E D

v

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Foreword

In October 2011, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a task 

to “make sure we actually learn the lessons from the last decade of war.” In response, the Joint 

and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division reviewed 46 lessons learned studies conducted 

from 2003 to the present, and synthesized the studies’ 400+ findings, observations, and best 

practices into the 11 strategic themes described in this report. More than a “decade of war,” 

the 46 studies covered a wide variety of military operations; from major combat operations 

in Iraq, to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the Philippines, to humanitarian assistance

in the United States, Pakistan, and Haiti, to studying emerging regional and global threats.

JCOA’s initial analysis was further refined and discussed by subject matter experts from across 

the Department of Defense during a weeklong Decade of War conference in May. This report 

represents the synthesis of those efforts, and while significant, is only the initial step in turning 

these critical observations into “learned lessons.” The work that follows, integrating findings into 

a continuous joint force development cycle, will serve as an enabler to building a more 

responsive, versatile, and affordable force.

The Decade of War, Volume I report is approved for release and dissemination without caveat. 

Additional themes and associated issues are expected to emerge as this study continues, and will 

be provided for review, resolution, and incorporation across the joint force. 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

v i

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N T E N T I O N A L L Y B L A N K
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Decade of War, Volume I

Introduction

The year 2001 began with the inauguration of a United States (US) president deliberately 

aiming to shift the use of the military away from the numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping 

interventions of the 1990s toward responding to and defeating conventional threatsfrom nation 

states. The mood was optimistic, with the new US national security strategy citing widespread 

financial prosperity and no sense of an imminent threat to the homeland.4But this situation proved 

to be fragile: the events of a single day, September 11, altered the trajectory of the US and the 

way it used its military over the next decade. A national strategy that had focused on countering 

regional aggressors and sophisticated attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was 

now confronted by an enemy that attacked the homeland with low technology in asymmetric 

and unexpected ways—individuals armed with box-cutters using hijacked civilian aircraft.

In the decade following 9/11, it became evident that the Cold War model that had guided 

foreign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fit the emerging global environment.

Key changes included:

 A shift from US hegemony toward national pluralism

 The erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states

 The empowerment of small groups or individuals

 An increasing need to fight and win in the information domain

In the midst of these changes, the US employed its military in a wide range of operations to 

address perceived threats from both nation-state and terrorist groups; to strengthen partner 

nation militaries; to conduct humanitarian assistance operations; and to provide defense support 

of civil authorities in catastrophic incidents such as Hurricane Katrina. This wide range of 

operations aimed to promote and protect national interests in the changing global environment.

In general, operations during the first half of the decade were often marked by numerous 

missteps and challenges as the US government and military applied a strategy and force suited 

for a different threat and environment. Operations in the second half of the decade often 

featured successful adaptation to overcome these challenges. From its study of these operations, 

JCOA identified overarching, enduring lessons for the joint force that present opportunities for 

the US to learn and improve, best practices that the US can sustain, and emerging risk factors 

that the US should address. These lessons were derived from JCOA’s 46 studies during this past 

decade and vetted through the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade of War working group in May 

2012; input from working group members was consolidated into this report.5This initial effort is 

envisioned to be the first volume in a sustained, multi-phased effort to identify critical, high-level 

lessons for the joint force. 

 

4

“A National Security Strategy for a Global Age,” White House, December 2000.

5

A list of JCOA’s 46 studies is provided in Appendix A.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2

U N C L A S S I F I E D

The Volume I report of the Decade of War study discusses the eleven strategic themes that arose 

from the study of the enduring lessons and challenges of the last decade:

 Understanding the Environment: A failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately 

define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, 

missions, and goals.

 Conventional Warfare Paradigm: Conventional warfare approaches often were 

ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders 

to realign the ways and means of achieving effects.

 Battle for the Narrative: The US was slow to recognize the importance of information 

and the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective 

in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states.

 Transitions: Failure to adequately plan and resource strategic and operational transitions 

endangered accomplishment of the overall mission.

 Adaptation: Department of Defense (DOD) policies, doctrine, training and equipment 

were often poorly suited to operations other than major combat, forcing widespread 

and costly adaptation.

 Special Operations Forces (SOF) – General Purpose Forces (GPF) Integration: Multiple, 

simultaneous, large-scale operations executed in dynamic environments required the 

integration of general purpose and special operations forces, creating a force-multiplying 

effect for both. 

 Interagency Coordination: Interagency coordination was uneven due to inconsistent 

participation in planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and differences 

in organizational culture.

 Coalition Operations: Establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challenge 

due to competing national interests, cultures, resources, and policies.

 Host-Nation Partnering: Partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier, and aided 

in host-nation capacity building. However, it was not always approached effectively 

nor adequately prioritized and resourced.

 State Use of Surrogates and Proxies: States sponsored and exploited surrogates and 

proxies to generate asymmetric challenges.

 Super-Empowered Threats: Individuals and small groups exploited globalized technology

and information to expand influence and approach state-like disruptive capacity.

In this report, we briefly summarize each of these strategic themes and provide recommendations 

for the joint force.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson One: Understanding the Environment

In operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and 

accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, 

missions, and goals. The operational environment encompasses not only the threat but also the 

physical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of the environment.6

Each of these elements was important to understanding the root causes of conflicts, developing

an appropriate approach, and anticipating second-order effects. Despite the importance of the 

operational environment:

 The US government (USG) approach often did not reflect the actual 

operational environment

 Different components of the USG had differing approaches, based, in part, on different 

understandings of the environment

 A nuanced understanding the environment was often hindered by a focus on traditional 

adversaries and a neglect of information concerning the host-nation population

 Over time, forces and leaders adapted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), 

organizations, and materiel solutions in order to better understand the environment 

There were a number of examples where the approach taken by the US military and other 

government agencies did not reflect the actual operating environment. Iraq in 2003 after major 

combat operations was one example of this: the US government moved to establish a new 

sovereign Iraqi government and focused on long-term, state-of-the-art national infrastructure 

while ignoring early signs of an insurgency. Another example of this occurred in Afghanistan, 

where the early focus on top-down governance approaches ignored tribal and cultural historical 

preferences as well as the practical advantages of a bottom-up approach. 

In some cases, separate elements of the US government had different approaches based 

on their views of the nature of the conflict and operational environment. In Iraq in 2003, 

military plans included assumptions regarding the rapid reconstitution of Iraqi institutions 

based on the understanding that national capabilities had to be rapidly reconstituted to promote

governance and stability. Yet, the first two orders issued by the civilian Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) unexpectedly removed both host-nation security forces and mid-level 

government bureaucrats, crippling Iraqi governance capacity and providing fuel for the 

developing resistance to the coalition.

7

These actions created a “security gap” that lasted for 

years and widened over time, reducing the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort, causing 

the population to lose trust in the coalition and Iraqi government, and allowing terrorist and 

criminal elements to thrive. Even two years later, civilian- and military-led reconstruction and 

 

6

The operational environment is defined in detail in Joint Pub 2-01.3, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment,” 16 June 2009.

7

CPA Order 1, issued 16 May 2003, removed all Iraqi government employees associated with the Ba’ath Party from 

current and future employment with the Iraqi government. CPA Order 2, issued 23 May 2003, dissolved the Iraqi 

Army and associated elements.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

4

U N C L A S S I F I E D

development efforts had different missions and perceived end-states, which led to large 

expenditures with limited return, as well as missed opportunities for synergy.

A complete understanding of the operating environment was often hindered by a focus on 

traditional adversary information and actions in the US approach to intelligence gathering.

This focus impacted the US effectiveness in countering asymmetric and irregular threats from 

insurgencies and mitigating terrorist and criminal influences. Further, shortages of human 

intelligence (HUMINT) personnel and interpreters needed to capture critical information from 

the population, and lack of fusion of this intelligence with other sources, exacerbated the 

problem. Other intelligence capabilities and platforms proved to be valuable but in short 

supply, but their numbers surged in both Iraq and Afghanistan as their value was recognized.

Similarly, recognizing an unmet requirement, manned expeditionary intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms were developed and fielded, including Task Force Odin and 

Project Liberty.

8, 9 Units also learned to employ different kinds of ISR capabilities according 

to their local environment.

Because the traditional intelligence effort tended to focus on enemy groups and actions, 

it often neglected “white” information about the population that was necessary for success in 

population-centric campaigns such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Local commanders 

needed information about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, and economics. 

Intelligence products provided information about enemy actions but were insufficient for other 

information needed at the local level. Furthermore, there were no pre-established priority 

intelligence requirements (PIRs) or other checklists or templates that could serve as first-order 

approximations for what units needed to know for irregular warfare. As a result, processes for 

obtaining information on “white” population-centric issues tended to be based on discovery 

learning, and were not consistently passed to follow-on units.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations similarly relied on information 

about the environment for success. Timely initial assessments were critical to an effective 

response. These assessments were used to determine command and control requirements, 

damage estimates (including the status of critical infrastructure), the size and type of required 

military response units, and their deployment priorities. In natural disasters, these assessments 

were often difficult to achieve due to limited availability of assets. While the US military had

significant capability for performing these assessments, the assets used for these assessments 

(usually air assets) were typically also in high demand for delivering aid and performing search 

and rescue missions.

In the latter part of the decade, forces learned to overcome the abovementioned challenges, 

gradually developing innovative, nontraditional means and organizations to develop a more 

nuanced understanding of the operational environment. These means included direct interaction 

with the local population through patrols, shuras, and key leader engagements (KLEs); the 

 

8

Task Force ODIN was established in 2006 as an expeditionary aviation battalion for providing ISR. 

9

Project Liberty featured modified C-12 aircraft with ISR capabilities. These aircraft were first fielded in 2009.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

5

U N C L A S S I F I E D

creation of fusion cells that coupled information from operations and intelligence; the expanded 

use of liaison officers (LNOs) to facilitate communication and coordination; and the practice 

of all-source network nodal analysis to guide actions and engagements. These efforts were 

supported by leaders and organizations taking on risk to lower classification of information to 

better share with GPF, interagency partners, host-nation forces, non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs), and academia. This information collectively informed a broad set of activities, including 

high-value individual (HVI) targeting, KLEs, development of host-nation capacity and rule of law, 

and reconciliation, enabling both the effective targeting of enemy organizations and resources 

as well as addressing underlying causes of insurgency or terrorism.

Similarly, senior leaders relied on many sources to increase their understanding of the 

operational environment and glean insights as to what approaches were successful, informing 

adaptation of their overall approach. These sources included interagency, coalition, and hostnation partners; think-tanks and academia; host-nation civilian advisors; commercial entities, 

and NGOs. Experts could provide insights into local issues, explain motivations, and help guide 

consequence management. Some also had local knowledge and contacts that aided coordination 

with the host nation. 

Forward presence was another key element in achieving an accurate understanding of the 

environment. In areas where US forces were not deployed in significant numbers, even a modest 

forward presence enhanced situational awareness and deepened relationships. One example 

of this was the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Moving from 

a robust, Panama-centric presence to a modest presence in the AOR presented challenges; 

however, SOUTHCOM worked to maintain forward locations and basing arrangements to sustain 

presence and access in the region despite the move of its headquarters. Similarly, US forward 

presence in the Philippines proved to be useful well beyond the narrow US counterterror (CT)

focus of their mission. Resultant relationships with host-nation forces at multiple echelons 

provided for improved exchange of information and strengthened understanding of terrorist and 

insurgent operations, as well as greater acceptance of US presence and opportunities for synergy 

in support of shared goals.

Way Ahead:

Improve assessments: Educate leaders on the importance of conducting assessments based 

on information, intelligence, and insights drawn from a wide variety of sources (KLEs, interagency 

subject matter experts [SMEs], academia, think-tanks, battlefield circulation, etc.).

Develop future requirements: Given the increasingly decentralized and joint nature 

of operations, develop a strategy for best meeting ISR and information requirements 

of military forces.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

6

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Promote fusion: Pursue policies and information technology (IT) solutions to promote 

information fusion and dissemination in support of operations and reduce compartmentalization/

stove-piping of intelligence and information across the interagency and among partner nations.

Revisit classification policies: Re-examine classification policies to preserve necessary operations 

security (OPSEC) but reduce unnecessary classification of information to promote information 

sharing and common understanding of the operational environment. 

Improve ISR support to operations: Increase access to expeditionary ISR platforms and 

improve training of personnel on available ISR capabilities to operations (e.g., to better enable 

conduct of focused, intelligence-driven operations, or to enable rapid assessments in support 

of HADR operations).

Build relationships: Bring in experts from all backgrounds—military, other interagency, NGOs, 

think-tanks, academia, private sector, and local nationals—and leverage their insights and 

expertise to inform and tailor approaches.

Improve language and cultural proficiency: Expand and incentivize language and cultural training 

across the force.

Leverage forward presence: Cultivate and leverage relationships and expertise on the operating 

environment that result from forward presence of military and other interagency elements.

Plan comprehensively: Conduct, refine, and update campaign planning, applying operational 

design that reflects an understanding of the environment, describes the problem, and outlines 

an approach to accomplishing strategic objectives.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

7

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Two: Conventional Warfare Paradigm

The two instances of major combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 were 

validation of the US ability to conduct such operations rapidly and surgically.

10 It is critical for the

US to retain this capability to provide overmatch capability in major combat operations against 

peers and regional aggressors. However, conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective 

when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and 

means of achieving effects. This was necessary in part because adversaries, seeing the overmatch 

capability of the US in conventional war, decided to employ asymmetric means instead of 

conventional force-on-force combat operations. 

Conventional warfare is exemplified by fighting in World War II, Korea, and Operation DESERT 

STORM. The paradigm of conventional war has been characterized as:

 Use of force against opposing uniformed military forces

 Centralized command and control (C2) and intelligence to support the massing 

of resources against the enemy center of gravity of enemy forces

 The purpose being to weaken the opposing military force until capitulation of the nation 

state is achieved

 The military force being the chief agent11

The past decade saw many operations other than major combat, such as counterinsurgency, 

stability, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, anti-piracy, and counternarcotics operations. Operations conducted in many locations, such as in the former Yugoslavia 

republic, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, Panama, Bosnia, Kosovo, Colombia, Somalia, 

Yemen, and the Philippines, suggest that operations other than conventional warfare will 

represent the prevalent form of warfare in the future. As evidenced by the last ten years, forces 

found success in employing different methods and resources for these other types of operations:

 Combining direct and indirect approaches for generating needed effects, leveraging 

a broad set of tools including precise force, money as a weapons system, and key 

leader engagements

 Empowerment of lower echelons, where tactical forces were empowered to act flexibly 

and decisively through decentralized C2 and pushing down joint assets to lower echelons

 Sustainability and capacity building, where success hinged on the sustainability

of achieved progress, achieved through building of host-nation capacity

 A partnered, whole-of-government approach12

 

10 Initial operations in Afghanistan could be regarded as a hybrid of major conventional war (because of the 

high intensity) and irregular operations (because of the low density of ground forces, many of them host-nation

guerilla-type forces).

11 Martin van Creveld, “Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview,” National Intelligence Council Workshop, 

25 May 2004. 

12 For example, “Unconventional Warfare,” Army Special Operations Forces, FM 3-05.130, September 2008; 

Major Anthony M. Henderson, “Command, Cooperation, and Control for Joint Distributed Operations,” Naval War 

College, 13 February 2006.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

8

U N C L A S S I F I E D

In conventional war, forces employed a direct approach in combat, using force against an enemy 

military to achieve objectives. In contrast, over the past decade, forces learned to combine both 

direct and indirect approaches for generating effects. The combination of these approaches

leveraged a broad set of tools including the use of precise force, money as a weapons system, 

information operations (IO), and KLEs to address threats both directly and indirectly. In particular, 

the indirect approach was able to target underlying root causes for the support of terror and/

or insurgency.

The use of force continued to be a critical tool in operations. Moreover, the use of precision 

engagements and avoiding collateral damage, especially noncombatant civilian casualties

(CIVCAS) became paramount in preserving necessary freedom of action.13 Efforts to be precise 

and discriminatory in engagements were aided by increasing availability of precision air- and 

ground-based weapons. In addition, units had increasing quantities of ISR support to determine 

positive identification and screen for potential collateral damage. Finally, leaders pressed units to 

take additional steps to avoid civilian casualties beyond those required by international law, such 

as tactical patience and looking for tactical alternatives (e.g., employing a sniper instead of using 

an airstrike against enemy taking refuge in civilian homes). Forces in Afghanistan discovered that 

there were win-win scenarios for the use of force and limiting collateral damage: forces could 

maintain or increase mission effectiveness while also reducing civilian casualties. Conversely, 

US forces found that insurgent groups were strengthened and US freedom of action could be 

curtailed when US forces caused civilian casualties, particularly when the incident took on 

political dimensions or was highlighted in the international news media.14

Conventional war features a hierarchical top-down command structure to manage the different 

forces and support the massing of major military elements against the center of gravity of enemy 

forces. Information and intelligence gained by tactical forces are fed back to the top where 

adjustments were made to the overall scheme of maneuver. In contrast, for other kinds of 

operations in the past decade, especially those featuring fleeting targets and population-centric 

campaigns, forces found this arrangement ineffective. Rather, flexibility and empowerment at the 

lowest appropriate level promoted success in these kinds of operations. Leaders deliberately 

decentralized authorities and capabilities to support a mission-type mode of command, providing 

the intent of the strategy and then allowing subordinate forces the freedom to innovate and 

explore tactical alternatives within given left and right limits. Later, when progress was evident 

but some areas presented persistent problems, forces developed flexible command and control 

arrangements that combined the strengths of decentralization with the ability to mass effects 

through centralization.

Unlike conventional war, success in many of the operations over the past decade depended 

on building local capacity and sustaining gains that were made during operations. This focus 

on capacity building taxed the military and the US government overall, as they were often not 

 

13 The ability to conduct military operations in an area of operations without interference.

14 These events could create anger within the population, fueling insurgent or terror elements either directly 

by taking up arms or indirectly through the provision of shelter or money.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

9

U N C L A S S I F I E D

prepared for these tasks, especially on the scale demanded in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, 

the task of creating Iraqi military and police forces, along with their accompanying institutions, 

created a severe burden on both US military and civilian organizations. This burden was magnified

by the initial lack of preparation for this mission and compounded by the semi- to non-permissive 

security environment in which civilian agencies and departments did not normally operate. 

Conventional warfare and operations other than major combat have different means(“the use 

of force” versus “broader effects combining direct and indirect approach”) and ends(“capitulation 

of a military force” versus “sustainability and capacity building”). Because of these differences, 

operations other than major combat required a broader response than the military was prepared 

to provide, necessitating an effort that combined the strengths and capabilities of multiple USG

departments and agencies, as well as coalition partners and, in some cases, NGOs. Best practices 

and challenges regarding interagency unity of effort are included in thisreport in Lesson Seven, 

Interagency Coordination, and for coalition operations in Lesson Eight, Coalition Operations.

Way Ahead:

Retain overmatch capability: The US must maintain its overmatch in conventional warfare against 

peers and regional aggressors.

Capture TTP for rapid adaptation: Retain and refine the ability to rapidly adapt.

Institutionalize non-conventional warfare: Refine the ability of the military to conduct nonconventional warfare, identifying specific capabilities and adaptations developed over the past 

decade that must be sustained.

Update education and training: Incorporate key lessons from the past decade regarding 

non-conventional warfare into education and training.

Maintain flexibility of task organization: Be prepared to create, task, and resource tailored 

organizations to meet unique operational conditions and requirements.

Empower jointness: Provide necessary authorities, expertise, and access to joint enablers 

at the lowest appropriate level.

Leverage knowledge management: Promote common situational awareness, unified action, 

and swift learning of lessons through streamlined sharing and collaboration solutions.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 0

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Reorient intelligence: Be prepared to transition the intelligence paradigm from the traditional 

top-down flow to a bottom-up flow when necessitated by local conditions. Maintain the ability 

of GPF to conduct all-source network analysis.

Reassess force alignment and employment: Readdress force structure and related policy issues 

regarding active, Reserve, Guard, and civilian components to better leverage expertise and 

capabilities and allow more agile and tailored support to operations.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Three: Battle for the Narrative

Over the past ten years of military operations, adversaries of the US realized that physical 

victory on the battlefield was not the only way to meet their overall objectives; by influencing 

perceptions on a local or global scale, they could advance their interests. The US also had interests 

in shaping perceptions, and this resulted in a competition in the information domain. In this paper, 

we call this competition over influencing perceptions “the battle for the narrative.”15 Over the past 

decade, the US wasslow to recognize the importance of information and the battle for the 

narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in applying and aligning 

the narrative to goals and desired end states. In particular, the US response to the emergent battle 

for the narrative was characterized by:

 An initial lack of leadership emphasis and resources that addressed information 

as an instrument of national power

 The proliferation of technology that changed the paradigm of communication

and information flow

 Eventual adaptation, where the US developed best practices that allowed it to be more 

proactive in the battle for the narrative

 Increased transparency that benefited relationships and garnered external support 

for US efforts

 Continued challenges in matching words with deeds

In major combat operations, the US was successful in employing military power; however, other 

instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, and economic) became more important 

as operations shifted away from major combat. In particular, the US was challenged with 

providing accurate and timely information in the battle for the narrative. This was partially 

because the US did not appear to apply necessary resources and leadership emphasis on this 

aspect of operations. Additionally, both plans and staffs did not reflect a significant emphasis 

on communication in the first half of the decade.

The proliferation of the internet, social media, and personal electronic devices caused the 

paradigm of communication to shift: it was no longer possible for the military to tightly control 

and limit information.16 While the military was slow to adapt to these developments, the enemy 

was not, developing considerable skill in using these new means of communication to their own 

ends. In addition, the enemy was frequently unconstrained by the truth: for example, they could 

feed false information to the media through the use of news stringers on fast-dial from an 

insurgent/terrorist cell phone. This allowed the enemy to make the first impression, an 

impression that could be difficult or impossible to overcome, even when false. For example, 

a premature detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kandahar City, which resulted 

 

15 Under this definition, the “battle for the narrative” encompasses strategic communication and its key elements: 

public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations.

16 Instances of progress made through transparency put into question whether the paradigm of tightly controlling 

information is the best approach, even if it were still possible.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 2

U N C L A S S I F I E D

in many civilian casualties, was quickly (and falsely) reported to be a Predator strike. Though not 

true, years later, locals still believed the casualties came from a coalition airstrike. 

New advances in communication also impacted Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War. Initially, 

the Israeli military response to Hezballah was widely seen as justified, but as time progressed 

and Hezballah successfully manipulated print, broadcast, and online media, the world increasingly 

saw images of civilian casualties (both doctored and real) and the tide of public opinion turned.

There was a widespread sentiment regarding Israel’s “disproportionate response,” and Israel 

was not successful in turning this tide.

The US later adapted and developed best practices to be more proactive in the battle for the 

narrative. For example, Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) developed a cell that monitored 

both national and international media to understand trends and issues. This effort was directly 

supported by senior leaders so that the process could influence as well as inform. If an Iraqi 

government leader said something that was harmful to the coalition effort, the MNF-I

commander would promptly go meet with him and try to resolve the situation. Similarly, the 

Presidential Information Coordination Cell (PICC) in Afghanistan was established to manage 

communication and information between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

and the host-nation government. The PICC was often successful in resolving potentially negative 

issues before they became public. 

In addition, ISAF increased its transparency concerning the issue of civilian casualties, inviting 

in both governmental and non-governmental organizations to better understand ISAF efforts 

and allow these other organizations to provide input in a recurring, candid forum. Though this 

was slow to develop, increased transparency benefitted the relationship of ISAF both with the 

host-nation government and non-governmental organizations; these other organizations 

responded to this transparency by adopting more supportive and sympathetic positions

regarding ISAF operations that were positive contributions in the overall battle for the narrative. 

Finally, while managing information and communication was critical in the battle for the narrative, 

the past decade also showed that words alone were not sufficient; they had to be consistent with 

deeds. The image of the US wasfrequently tarnished by tactical actions that contradicted US values 

or strategy. The Abu Ghraib scandal in Iraq, documented in photos that were widely disseminated, 

undermined the mission and significantly marred the image of the US. Years later, terrorists in Iraq 

and Afghanistan cited the Abu Ghraib incident as their motivation for striking the United States.

In Afghanistan, the burning of Korans in spring 2012 created significant backlash. In that case, US 

personnel were taking actions to remove a variety of documents, including some religious texts, 

which had been altered by detainees. The context for these actions—that Korans had been cut up 

and written in by detainees in part to communicate messages—was not communicated, and the 

US forces’ action was perceived as religious persecution rather than countering insurgent efforts. 

Similarly, the negative sentiment concerning Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War, while exacerbated 

by an enemy IO campaign, was rooted in a heavy-handed Israeli approach that failed to adequately 

discriminate between combatants and noncombatants and went against international norms for 

the conduct of combat. 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 3

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Way Ahead:

Assess our ability to use information: Conduct a comprehensive examination and assessment 

of force structure, actors, and tools with regard to communication strategy. 

Update policy and doctrine: Expand policy and doctrine to encompass best practices and 

recent challenges. This should include an approach that leverages technology and new advances 

in social media. 

Tailor the communication strategy: Ensure communication strategy considers all relevant actors’ 

instruments of power; cultural, religious, and other demographic factors; and employs innovative, 

nontraditional methods and sources.

Increase transparency: While observing necessary OPSEC, aggressively share information with 

host nations, NGOs, and others to increase transparency and understanding of US positions.

Coordinate approach: Develop and execute a communication strategy with interagency, 

coalition, and when possible, host-nation participants.

Anticipate consequence management: Develop the communication strategy at each level for

the plan, branches, and sequels, anticipating the requirement for consequence management

to mitigate actual and alleged negative incidents.

Resource the IO effort: Ensure the right equipment and experienced, trained personnel 

are available to conduct information operations.

Proactive messaging: Develop innovative, nontraditional sources to “keep a finger on the 

pulse” of the operating environment and maintain an aggressive information assessment 

and analysis cycle.

Be fast and not wrong: Be “first with the truth” by using pre-planned messages and streamlined 

authorities for communication; at the same time, only report confirmed details to avoid 

retractions and a loss of credibility.

Build partner capacity: Help partners develop the capability to report responsibly in the media

and provide key enablers to help them execute this mission.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 4

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Reinforce words with deeds: Include a rigorous treatment of the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), 

ethics, civilian casualty consequence management, and cultural awareness as part of the 

“profession of arms” in training and leadership development.

Involve commanders: Ensure commanders at all levels know that the battle for the narrative

is “commanders’ business.” Leaders must both monitor for early warning indicators of potential 

issues that could negatively affect the narrative and look for good-news stories that reinforce 

the narrative.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 5

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Four: Transitions

All operations in the past decade featured important transitions, such as the transition from 

Phase III to Phase IV in Iraq, the transfer to Iraqi sovereignty (performed in two steps in 2004 and 

2005), the transition to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leadership in Afghanistan in 

2006, and the transition to host-nation responsibility during numerous HADR events (e.g., the 

Pakistan earthquake of 2005).

17 Transitions between phases of operations offer opportunities

for advancing our strategic interests if they are managed well; alternately, they are opportunities 

for the enemy or for the failure of our intended objectives if they are not. In the first half of the 

decade, failure to adequately plan and resource strategic and operational transitions 

endangered accomplishment of the overall mission. The US handling of transitions over 

the past decade was characterized by:

 Poor preparation, faulty assumptions, and inadequate branches and sequels

 Significant disconnects between military and civilian planning efforts

 Insufficient resourcing of key transitions

 Lack of guidance and unity of effort from strategic leadership

 An eventual improvement in our ability to conduct successful transitions later 

in the decade

Transitions were often poorly prepared for with regard to planning and training. Plansfor 

transitions did not include well-developed branch plansfor contingencies. In Iraq, while Phases II 

and III were meticulously planned and trained extensively, post-major combat operations were not. 

In addition, pre-deployment training focused on major combat tactics and maneuver of large-sized 

forces, not contingency or stability operations. The joint and Service training centers prepared

forces for major combat operations, while planning and rehearsal for post-combat conditions were

far less comprehensive. Non-combat skills, to include civil affairs, were not adequately rehearsed 

alongside combat, war-winning skills, making it more difficult to incorporate them into operational 

units. It was not until later that training centers tailored pre-deployment training to integrate 

lessons on stability and counterinsurgency tasks. 

In addition, the post-major combat plan for Iraq was reliant upon civilian elements of the USG and 

based upon assumptions of a stable security environment and a capable Iraqi government and 

security force. Despite the significant role that USG civilian elements had to play, they were not 

significantly involved in early planning efforts. This contributed to significant disconnects between 

planning assumptions used in military- and civilian-led efforts; as previously described, these 

disconnects were exacerbated by CPA actions in the summer of 2003, as well as divergent military 

and civilian reconstruction approaches over the following several years. 

Similarly, during the transition to NATO leadership in Afghanistan in 2006, military planning 

assumed that the chief duties of ISAF would be reconstruction and the provision of humanitarian 

 

17 Phase III refers to major combat operations, while Phase IV refers to post-major combat operations.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 6

U N C L A S S I F I E D

aid. This faulty assumption caused a mismatch between ISAF policies and actual, on-the-ground 

mission requirements.

One reason for faulty planning assumptions was that the planned end states were based largely 

on US expectations instead of those consistent with the host nation and mission. For example, 

the planned end state for Afghanistan was envisioned to be a strong central government, despite 

no record of such a government in Afghan history and lack of broad popular support for that 

system of governance. Another was the lack of anticipation of operations shifting from a military 

LOAC framework to a warrant-based law enforcement framework as host-nation sovereignty 

increased. These faulty assumptions led to mismatches in approaches that were later overcome 

by adaptation. The approach that envisioned a strong central government in Afghanistan was 

later combined with efforts to develop local governance and security (e.g., Village Stability 

Operations/Afghan Local Police [VSO/ALP]), while the transition from a LOAC framework was 

addressed through ad hoc approaches to address requirements for warrants and evidentiary 

support to satisfy the host nation and preserve freedom of action.

Transitions tended to be poorly resourced and lacked adequate numbers of personnel with 

sufficient expertise or training. For example, shortly after the end of major combat operations in 

Iraq, the V Corps commander arrived in theater to assume command of Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTF) 7, having trained for division-level combat operations and not as a joint task force that would 

lead national-scale reconstruction and stabilization. His staff was not manned, equipped, or

resourced to accept these responsibilities, as many experienced and theater-acclimated forces 

and support assets were redeployed after major combat operations. Civilian manning for CPA also 

remained low throughout 2003. Over the ensuing years, Embassy and Provincial Reconstruction 

Team (PRT) partners gradually increased in number, but they often lacked the necessary expertise 

and experience. 

In the first half of the decade, strategic leadership repeatedly failed to properly guide and 

execute transitions. In Iraq 2003, the transition plans were changed drastically at the last 

minute, requiring V Corps to take the unexpected role described above and develop plans 

on the fly.

Lack of unity of effort between civilian and military organizations tended to be a key component 

of transition challenges.18 The rapid transfer from military to civilian leadership in summer 2003 

repeated a lesson seen from previous operations over the history of the US: premature transition 

to civilian agencies.19 Similar challenges were observed in the hand-over of sovereignty to Iraq 

 

18 Hindrances to unity of effort included unequal tour lengths of civilian and military personnel, lack of 

comprehensive, preparatory war-gaming for the whole-of-government team; institutional barriers; and lack 

of understanding of counterpart cultures and bureaucratic processes. This issue is discussed in more detail 

in Lesson Seven, Interagency Coordination.

19 Defense Secretary Stimson, “If there is one outstanding lesson to be gained from prior American experiences in 

military government, it is the unwisdom of permitting any premature interference by civilian agencies with the Army’s 

basic task of civil administration in occupied areas... in those important American experiences in military government 

(Civil War, Philippine War, and WWI) where civilian influence was permitted to be exercised, the results were, 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 7

U N C L A S S I F I E D

in June 2004. The two senior leaders were replaced simultaneously, when GEN Casey succeeded 

LTG Sanchez and AMB Negroponte succeeded AMB Bremer. Several critical organizations were 

also created during this time, including Multi-National Force – Iraq, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), and the US Embassy. These changes in key leaders and 

organizations during the transition added to the challenges.

Transition timelines that were politically-driven exacerbated the lack of resources. For example, 

in Iraq in 2004, civilian and military organizations had only just sorted out their respective 

responsibilities for training, equipping, and supporting operational employment of the Iraqi security 

forces when the US executed the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. The transition, coupled with the 

delay in establishing these responsibilities, pushed the Iraqi security forces into a role for which 

they were not yet ready, degrading security and further challenging the effort to build these forces. 

While the US will not always have control of timelines for transition, the timelines under US control 

should be informed by accurate assessments that include risk to the mission. For timelines not 

under US control, senior leaders can still work to maintain necessary influence to keep transition 

timelines as realistic as possible.

Many of these transition challenges described above were remedied during important transitions 

in the latter half of the decade. Leaders learned critical lessons and worked to understand the 

operational environment; they designed transitions to be more conditions-based to reflect this 

understanding. Likewise, an awareness of specific weaknesses of host-nation militaries and 

governments facilitated the use of tailored enablers to prop up host-nation capabilities and 

promote success during key transitions. Transitions were planned and resourced appropriately, 

with key staff retained through the critical transition periods.

Other operations demonstrated the importance of unity of effort and integrated leadership 

to successful transitions. For example, in Haiti humanitarian assistance/peacekeeping operations 

in 2004, SOUTHCOM benefited from pre-existing relationships with interagency partners that 

helped them overcome the challenges arising from the ad hoc nature of and wide variety of 

participants in the operation. Within days of the deployment of US troops to Haiti, SOUTHCOM 

leveraged its joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) to provide a forum for discourse 

between the various USG elements involved in the region. Again, after the Haiti earthquake 

of 2010, the robust integration of interagency representation at SOUTHCOM gave the command 

an enhanced ability to gain situational awareness and provide focused aid in the challenging 

environment, promoting successful transition of responsibilities to the variety of civilian agencies 

and international organizations working on behalf of the Haitian government.

 

respectively, demoralizing, costly, and ludicrous.” Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become 

Governors, Center of Military History, 1992.

.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 8

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Way Ahead:

Plan the transitions: Because phases are not discrete events, transitions must be planned 

for ahead of time and properly resourced.

Understand, influence, and enable: Understand the capabilities, authorities, and restrictions 

of the government agency, coalition partner, or host nation to whom responsibilities are being 

transferred, and work to maintain influence and to enable their success. 

Manage the transitions: Clearly define desired end states for transitions, develop an assessment 

process to provide feedback to inform the transition, and ensure continuity through transitions 

by avoiding major changes to leaders, staff, and organizations during significant transition events. 

Tailor training: Continue to develop innovative training and education approaches that enhance 

individual, unit, and leader preparation for civil-military team transition environments.

Codify the comprehensive approach: Establish civil-military organizational structures and 

doctrinal-type guidance to support a comprehensive approach to transitions that is conditionsbased yet acknowledges politically-determined milestones.

Leverage a variety of sources to improve situational awareness: Continue to develop innovative, 

nontraditional methods and sources to maintain situational awareness, a key requirement for 

transitions as resources/force levels change. 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

1 9

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Five: Adaptation

Adaptation is an essential part of the military profession and of military operations. At the same 

time, adaptation must be balanced with the requirement to appropriately train and equip forces 

in order to keep adaptation and resultant risk at manageable levels. In the course of operations, 

especially in the first half of the decade following 9/11, DOD policies, doctrine, training,

and equipment were often poorly suited to operations other than major combat, forcing 

widespread and costly adaptation, and in the process, threatening the mission. For example, 

doctrine voids were exposed during this time, as evidenced by the amount of important doctrine 

that was created in the second half of the decade to compensate.20 Similarly, forces were trained 

to win against another nation’s armed forces, and were not prepared to combat adaptive 

insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Equipment suited for conventional war was not always 

suited for COIN or stability operations, resulting in many urgent operational needs voiced in 

theater for required capabilities. 

Fortunately, the challenge of inadequate planning and preparation was matched by widespread 

and often successful adaptation at all levels. Forces on the ground learned from challenges and 

adapted their approaches to compensate, developing:

 New organizations

 New TTP

 Rapid fielding and innovative use of tailored materiel solutions

 Adaptive leadership approaches

 Agile workarounds for the passing of and acting upon lessons

While this adaptation was generally successful, it was also costly in terms of time and 

resources expended. 

Since forces were primarily organized for major combat operations, there was a necessity 

to develop new types of organizations at all echelons to address the changed environment. 

This included organizations at the strategic headquarters in Iraq such as the Force Strategic 

Engagement Cell (FSEC) that worked toward reconciliation of insurgents, the PRTs that worked 

at the regional level to extend governance capacity of the host-nation government, and the 

Human Terrain System that developed human terrain teams (HTTs) working at the local level to 

provide subject matter expertise on local culture. Similarly, forces developed in-theater initiatives 

such as the COIN Academy, which provided near-term, tailored training to fill identified gaps

while the schoolhouses adjusted their curricula to better match the operational missions. At the 

same time, advisor and lessons learned organizations were used to identify and overcome tactical 

and operational shortfalls across a broad set of missions. 

Forces also adapted TTP to promote success in this kind of environment. One example was the 

F3EAD (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate) targeting approach superseding the 

 

20 For example, JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, 5 October 2009; JP 3-07 Stability Operations, 29 September 2011;

and JP 3-26 Counterterrorism, 13 November 2009. Each of these doctrinal publications had significant updates during 

this time period.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 0

U N C L A S S I F I E D

decide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A) approach. SOF used the F3EAD approach in HVI targeting 

against insurgents, and over time this TTP was increasingly used by GPF in their targeting 

operations as well. This TTP proved effective against enemies who did not wear uniforms and hid 

among the population. As host-nation judicial systems matured, forces adapted their targeting 

toward a warrant-based approach in order to reinforce rule of law and model law enforcement 

for the host nation. Another new organizational structure, fusion cells, provided an institutional 

structure through which this TTP could be learned. Other tailored and adaptive TTP in Iraq 

and Afghanistan included KLEs, sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and CIVCAS battle damage 

assessments (BDA) (geared towards identifying the presence and scope of civilian harm).

The fielding of new equipment aided the innovative TTP described above. For example, forces 

employed new ISR assets and capabilities to augment intelligence collection. As these ISR assets

were fielded in increasing numbers, they could then be provided to lower echelons to better 

find and fix terrorists/insurgents, minimize civilian harm during engagements, engage with the 

population, and pursue reconciliation efforts. Other equipment was fielded to provide enhanced 

force protection against asymmetric threats (e.g., mine resistant ambush protected vehicles 

[MRAPS] and electronic countermeasures). While providing needed capability rapidly, challenges

with accelerated development and rapid fielding included forces not being able to train on 

these capabilities prior to their deployment, as well as the possibility that vulnerabilities, 

interoperability problems, and maintenance issues were not identified until capabilities were 

already fielded. 

Leaders blended historical good ideas with current, successful adaptation by tactical forces 

to modify their overall approaches. One example was the reconciliation initiatives in Al Anbar 

Province, Iraq. After then-LTG Odierno heard of the successes coalition forces were having 

in Al Anbar, he broadened and adapted their reconciliation efforts into an Iraq-wide movement. 

Underlying this expansion was the recognition that success required a change in focus from 

understanding the threat to understanding the environment. This broader understanding was 

necessary for success acrossthe range of coalition force missions, including providing security, 

pursuing reconciliation, mentoring host-nation security forces and ministries, influencing the 

population to support the host-nation government, and targeting insurgent and terrorist networks. 

Sometimes, adaptation led to the discovery that the old model was preferable. For example, 

SOUTHCOM adapted a functional organizational model that departed from the previous J-code 

structure. This new model was not successful in dealing with the crisis of the Haiti earthquake 

response in 2010, so SOUTHCOM quickly reverted back to its original J-code organization, 

confirming the value of this organizational construct. 

While units learned and adapted to their operating environments, their experiences, best 

practices, and lessons were not always shared, either within theater or with the larger DOD 

institutions. Although there were many Service lessons learned organizations with active data 

collection efforts operating in theater, their efforts tended to stay in their respective stovepipes 

and were rarely integrated across the joint force. Service lessons learned efforts generally 

supported adaptation at the Service tactical level, which was their chartered mission, but joint 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

tactical, operational, and strategic-level lessons were often unaddressed unless specifically 

requested by commanders. The smaller, more agile, and better-resourced SOF lessons learned 

organizations tended to be more focused and their processes were designed for a quick 

turnaround to forces in theater. A number of ad hoc mechanisms were established to improve 

the effectiveness and timeliness of the lessons learned process, including the Army’s Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) Lessons Learned Forum and the Joint Staff CIVCAS Working Group. 

These mechanisms helped provide focus and sharing of lessons for key operational challenges.

Way Ahead:

Plan to adapt: Continually challenge assumptions and requirements; put mechanisms in place 

to adapt quickly.

Foster adept leaders: Develop and promote leaders who remain flexible, question existing 

paradigms, assume risk, and foster interorganizational collaboration.

Capture successful adaptation: Identify the best examples of adaptation over the past decade 

and incorporate them into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

Sustain doctrine’s relevance: Ensure doctrine remains pertinent; increase knowledge and use 

of its principles through training and education.

Broaden solution sets: Develop SME networking capabilities to augment adaptation in the field; 

involve experimentation and concepts in solving time-sensitive problems.

Energize the lessons learned process: Mandate, codify, and execute a standard process to collect 

lessons from current operations; rapidly disseminate and incorporate those lessons, making them 

available to a worldwide audience.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 2

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Six: SOF-GPF Integration

In Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple, simultaneous, large-scale operations executed in dynamic 

environments required the integration of SOF and GPF, creating a force multiplying effect 

for both. The relationship between SOF and GPF elements developed over time:

 Initially SOF and GPF were not well coordinated and sometimes were working 

at cross purposes

 Localized efforts to integrate SOF and GPF capabilities proved successful, creating 

a blueprint for a synergistic approach to targeting

 SOF-GPF integration were also critical to large-scale development of host-nation security 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan

 This integration was promoted by SOF leaders and their commitment of personnel 

and resources

While SOF and GPF initially experienced friction operating together, through deliberate efforts 

and experience they developed means of effective integration that enhanced the collective 

mission sets of both.

In post-2003 Iraq, SOF operations were not always well coordinated with GPF. This led to 

situations where GPF, as the battlespace owners (BSO), were left managing the second-order 

effects of SOF targeting operations. GPF complained about not receiving notice of impending 

operations, not receiving intelligence that came from SOF operations, and significant disruption 

of their battlespace in the aftermath of those operations. Similar complaints were made by GPF

in Afghanistan through 2008. For Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) forces

in Iraq and Afghanistan, one factor for poor coordination was the Theater Special Operations 

Command (TSOC) being unable to provide effective representation at senior levels. This was 

later addressed in Afghanistan through creation of an in-theater, flag-level command, Combined 

Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), to better integrate 

SOF activities into an overall strategic campaign.

Over time, SOF and GPF elements worked to integrate and take advantage of SOF capabilities

and GPF capacities. An early example of this integration was among Task Force Freedom and SOF

operating together in Mosul, Iraq in 2005. These elements combined assets and target lists to 

create an integrated force to combat the enemy. This approach was later expanded into other 

areas of Iraq and institutionalized into Intelligence Fusion Cells. These fusion cells allowed 

expansion of the total set of actionable targets—a set that was too large to be handled by a single 

force—as well as a synergistic approach to actioning those targets. By the end of 2008, dramatic 

progress in security had been made: attack levels were the lowest since the summer of 2003. 

The integrated targeting effort between SOF elements and GPF were a significant component 

of this success.

In Afghanistan, SOF and GPF integration improved considerably from 2009-2010. SOF operations 

were better coordinated with BSOs, and SOF provided support to consequence management 

when necessary. At the same time, communication increased regarding targeting, and SOF 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 3

U N C L A S S I F I E D

focused more on targets that hindered BSO freedom of maneuver. In 2011, SOF elements began

conducting pre-deployment training with GPF in order to accelerate integration when in theater. 

SOF and GPF also collectively contributed to developing host-nation security forces in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. All forces moved to a partnered approach to operations, collectively boosting hostnation capability and providing enhanced freedom of action. GPF focused on the regular army 

and police forces, while SOF focused on host-nation Special Forces and army and police

counterterrorism units. Collectively, again, SOF and GPF combined to address training and 

partnering requirements that were beyond the scope of what was manageable by either 

force independently. 

While an early example of progress (i.e., Mosul 2005) was accomplished through cooperation 

at the working level, many of the later improvements were driven by SOF senior leaders as they 

emphasized the importance of integration with GPF. The creation of fusion cells in Iraq involved 

a commitment of SOF personnel and ISR resources, and additional personnel were devoted to 

initial reconciliation efforts as well. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF also used their resources 

to create a network of LNOs to provide a direct conduit between SOF and GPF in order to 

improve communication and collaboration.

Way Ahead:

Expand leader understanding: Provide SOF-GPF leaders with an expanded understanding of each 

force’s capabilities and limitations.

Establish habitual training and mission relationships: Maintain events that allow SOF-GPF 

to train together, expand those events beyond pre-deployment training, and develop GPF 

with a regional focus and a habitual relationship with corresponding theater special 

operations commands. 

Institutionalize best practices for optimal ISR use: Capture TTP and best practices for ISR 

employment developed by SOF and GPF during operations over the past decade. 

Institutionalize collaboration best practices: Promote policies and mechanisms for rapidly 

sharing information and enabling SOF-GPF collaboration based on best practices from the 

past decade.

Codify collaborative targeting approach: Document and maintain a methodology 

for collaborative SOF-GPF targeting.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 4

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Improve rapid fielding of capabilities: Maintain the GPF’s ability to rapidly obtain and field 

capabilities (weapons, equipment) to promote integration with SOF.

Improve joint manning processes: Ensure GPF force manning processes are tailorable and 

responsive, and personnel are properly prepared.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 5

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Seven: Interagency Coordination

In the wide range of operations conducted over the previous decade, interagency coordination 

was uneven due to inconsistent participation in planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; 

resources; and differences in organizational culture. Similarly, the military was challenged in 

working with NGOs, a type of organization that interacts frequently with some elements of the 

interagency but less commonly with the military. Overall, during the previous decade: The US 

interagency was unable to harness the full extent of national capabilities to meet requirements

early on

 Over time, military and civilian organizations learned to better leverage each other’s 

strengths and capabilities, despite institutional barriers to cooperation

 Interagency action plans were created for some missions, but the interagency lacked 

an overall blueprint for unified action

 Coordination with NGOs was also generally beneficial, though relationships were 

challenged by a mutual lack of understanding

Initially in Iraq and Afghanistan, interagency unity of effort was a resounding failure.21 DOD 

partnering with other US departments and agencies during the first half of the decade 

consistently failed to harness the strengths and resources of the respective organizations. In fact, 

several JCOA studies reported that the biggest lesson for the US from the first five years of war

in Iraq was “the inability to apply and focus the full resources and capabilities of the US in a 

concerted and coherent way.”22 Despite the criticality of unity of effort among elements of the US 

government for these operations, it was slow to develop and was largely personality-dependent. 

In fact, in Iraq, the notable unity of effort that was finally achieved was largely because of 

deliberate efforts of both military and civilian leaders. 

Over time, military and civilian staffs learned to leverage each other’s strengths and communicate

more effectively, lessening the need for leadership to be a forcing function for collaboration. 

In the early years of the decade, successes were more commonly seen at the tactical level 

between elements that were forward-deployed. Later, civilian and military senior leaders 

embraced the need to integrate and became forcing functions for integration within their 

respective staffs. Nevertheless, these deliberate efforts had to overcome institutional barriers 

to cooperation such as:

 Disparate organizational cultures and visions: Differences between the planning and 

action-oriented military and the collaborative and longer-term thinking Department 

of State (DOS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel, each 

with different missions, led to friction.

 

21 The challenge of interagency operations is not a new lesson. A Joint Staff memorandum from 50 years ago 

pointed out this lesson: “In the past it has been extremely difficult to achieve interdepartmental planning... these 

inhibitions of other governmental agencies must in some way be overcome.” Joint Staff Memorandum, 

20 March 1961.

22 “Transition to Sovereignty, Joint Lessons Learned for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,” JCOA Report, April 2007.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 6

U N C L A S S I F I E D

 Different levels of resources: The military’s budget and manpower pools were usually 

considerably larger than those of DOS, complicating partnering efforts and clouding 

responsibilities for areas where DOS had overall organizational primacy.

 Different lexicons: Differences in language and the absence of interagency “doctrine” 

complicated joint collaboration.

 Security: There were differing abilities to deploy and operate in challenging 

security environments.

 Training: Military training focused on traditional warfighting and produced personnel 

with strong planning skills; civilian training and education focused on their respective

tasks, not in collaboration with the military.

Despite these challenges, an increasingly expeditionary mindset became resident in a number 

of interagency organizations over the past decade. This progress may be temporary, however, 

since it is based on experiences and personalities and not on any institutional imperative for 

integration derived from US law or policy.

For some specific missions such as counterterrorism, the US government created action plans 

that described roles and missions for specific elements of the interagency. While these were

useful for laying out how different departments and agencies interacted in general, they lacked

specificity. Overall, there was a lack of interagency “doctrine.” Service/department/agency 

doctrine and TTP were not necessarily applicable during interagency operations. Joint Interagency 

Task Force – South (JIATF-S) provides a model for how such interagency guidance could be 

created: over time, JIATF-S developed common TTP across its components by bringing together 

a group of personnel from different organizations, each accustomed to its own terminology and 

approach. JIATF-S then created a standing operating procedure (SOP) for the organization that

established common terminology and TTP to be used by all interagency team members.23 This 

SOP also clearly delineated existing authorities, rules of engagement (ROE), and restrictions that 

needed to be considered in the interagency and multinational context. Similar efforts for the 

interagency could provide a foundation for unified effort in future operations.24

Another set of organizations that were present during operations were NGOs. While some 

elements of the interagency routinely work with NGOs, the military often lacked experience 

working with those organizations, further complicating DOD coordination efforts. Coordination 

between the US military and NGOs was generally beneficial for US efforts.25 At the same time, 

these relationships were challenged by a mutual lack of understanding, the military’s tendency 

to try to be directive with regard to NGO activities, and the desire of some NGOs to retain an air 

 

23 Military units and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) in Iraq also created joint action plans called 

Unified Command Plans (UCPs) to guide their collective actions. The development of such interagency plans is a best 

practice, whether in the field or in support of larger institutions.

24 At the same time, JIATF-S is a special case. All participants have both a common mission and statutory authority 

to accomplish that mission—elements that are not always present in other interagency efforts. 

25 Note that this cannot be said for Israeli military efforts—there are documented cases where NGOs worked against 

Israeli interests during military operations.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 7

U N C L A S S I F I E D

of neutrality and maintain humanitarian space to conduct their operations. For Iraq, NGOs 

provided important contributions for reconciliation and aid to the Iraqi people. 

One helpful contribution of NGOs was improving civilian protection during combat operations. 

In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, NGOs highlighted instances of civilian harm and brought them 

to the attention of the military. In Iraq, these were largely instances of escalation of force against 

civilians from military convoys. The military made adjustments and significantly decreased civilian 

harm from this cause starting in 2005. Similarly, NGOs and the United Nations Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan (UNAMA) highlighted instances of civilian harm from airstrikes in Afghanistan, 

which prompted ISAF leadership to adjust overall guidance to compensate. Some NGOs continue 

to work with ISAF, serving as a community of interest to advocate for the reduction of civilian 

harm. Consequently, recent reporting of ISAF has become more positive, reflecting progress in 

this area. In Libya, NGO inputs calling for assessments of civilian casualties after airstrikes were 

not addressed. This lack of response had a lasting negative impact on the battle for the narrative.

A common challenge in working with other interagency partners and NGOs was information 

exchange, where unity of effort was often hindered by those other organizations having limited 

or no access to DOD networks. The use of a non-DOD network to facilitate needed information 

exchange helped to overcome this. One example was the use of Harmonieweb in the response 

to the tsunami in 2004. A collaborative network was established on a non-DOD domain that could 

be accessed by all organizations contributing to the disaster relief effort. Similarly, SOUTHCOM 

employed All Partners Access Network (APAN) during disaster relief operations in Haiti in 2010. 

These IT solutions fostered information exchange and collaboration between the USG (including,

but not limited to, DOD) and any external country, organization, agency, or individual that did not 

have access to established DOD systems and networks. 

Way Ahead:

Develop senior-level support: Ensure senior leaders stress the necessity and value of interagency 

coordination at all levels of operations.

Make interagency coordination mandatory: Pursue development of a Goldwater-Nichols-type 

act to mandate and develop a framework for increased interagency coordination for a whole-ofgovernment approach.

Properly resource the interagency: Prioritize budgets to appropriately resource the interagency 

to ensure a whole-of-government approach for contingencies. Continue to use DOD personnel 

to meet near-term requirements. 

Operationalize the interagency: Develop policies for greater inclusion of interagency involvement 

in planning, training, and execution to increase interagency contributions, including expansion of 

their expeditionary capabilities.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 8

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Routinely test interagency integration: Plan for instances where interagency integration is 

critical, and evaluate policies, approaches, and information technologies to be used that address 

identified lessons and challenges. Ensure these lessons can be shared effectively with appropriate 

elements of the interagency.

Improve understanding of roles and responsibilities: Initiate DOD-wide programs (e.g., 

interagency exchange tours) to expose military and civilian personnel to a range of interagency 

organizations to better understand organizational cultures, equities, traditional roles, capabilities, 

and limitations.

Promote and improve interagency and NGO participation in training and education: Promote 

and improve incorporation of interagency partners into training and education to increase 

effectiveness of USG efforts and build relationships within the interagency. Key NGOs should 

also be invited to participate when appropriate.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

2 9

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Eight: Coalition Operations

In the past decade, the US was involved in a number of coalition operations. Establishing and 

sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challenge due to competing national interests, cultures, 

resources, and policies. Critical challenges when operating with coalition partners included:

 National caveats

 Interoperability

 Training and TTP

 Resources

 National interests

 Culture

 Information sharing and inclusion in planning

Despite these challenges, the US learned to operate more effectively with coalition partner 

militaries over time, promoting US objectives.

National caveats were a significant challenge in coalition operations over the past decade. 

Different nations limited their potential actions and missions based on policy decisions in the 

form of national caveats. Collectively, national caveats became a patchwork of rules that both 

confused forces and limited overall unity of effort. For example, aircrews cited the difficulties in 

providing air support when aircrews from different nations had different caveats limiting what 

actions they could support. Some restrictions were formal policy caveats, while others were 

effective differences in how a nation operated but not captured as a caveat. One illustration of 

this was the US self-defense criteria in the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) in Afghanistan. 

This policy effectively served as a national caveat, since it was a departure from ISAF ROE, but it 

was not reflected in compilations of national caveats.

Interoperability was another challenge within coalitions. Use of different and non-interoperable 

systems limited the utility of available capabilities. For example, digital data linksin Iraq did not 

consistently exchange information among coalition nations, leading to incomplete operating 

pictures, reduced battlespace awareness, and increased risk to forces. Friendly fire was observed 

to result in cases where information on friendly force location was available but not presented 

to operators due to lack of interoperable systems.

Another challenge to coalition operations was differing training and TTP. Coalition forces often 

used their own unique TTP and approaches, so that coalitions did not interface with host-nation

militaries or populations uniformly. For example, in Afghanistan, different nations employed 

differing escalation of force (EOF) TTP, which could lead to civilian casualties; Afghan civilians, 

used to TTP from one ISAF nation’s forces, would travel to a different area of Afghanistan where 

another nation employed different TTP and were often confused and uncertain how to respond. 

Compensation policies for civilian harm were also different for different nations, resulting 

in nonstandard treatment and frustration among the population.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 0

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Disparate resources also complicated coalition operations. Different nations had different and 

uneven levels of capabilities. For example, in Libya operations, the US had the majority of certain 

valuable types of ISR assets as well as precise, low collateral damage weapons. The lack of these 

assets in other coalition countries limited their scope of contributions and/or increased risk 

of negative second-order effects. Similarly, in Afghanistan, some partner nations lacked ISR 

capabilities and air power which limited both mobility and responsiveness to threats.

26

Coalition operations were also influenced by the national interests of participating nations. 

Different nations had differing interests that affected the missions they chose to conduct,

as well as how they conducted them. For example, France had financial interests in Iraq that 

were a disincentive for their involvement in major combat operations in 2003. Similarly, 

Japan and Norway chose roles in Afghanistan that focused on reconstruction vice the larger 

counterinsurgency mission because of their national interests.

In addition to national interests, participating nations had cultural differences that influenced 

both the roles they would take and the way they would conduct their given missions. In 

Afghanistan, individual nations valued different elements of the overall campaign strategy.

The effect was the conduct of differing sub-campaigns in different geographic areas, limiting 

complete implementation of the entire theater strategy. In addition, some nations were more 

willing than others to conduct offensive operations. Since offensive targeting of malign elements 

was an integral element of the campaign plans for Iraq and Afghanistan, this uneven approach 

within the coalition impacted the conduct of these campaigns.

Poor information sharing hindered effective coalition operations. Non-US members of coalitions 

frequently cited poor information sharing as a limitation to their inclusion in planning and 

execution. Classification issues and lack of coalition-wide secure information systems limited the 

ability to share needed information and intelligence. Over-classification and slow foreign release 

of classified information contributed to these challenges.

Even with these challenges, the US learned to operate more effectively with coalition partner 

militaries over time. Working within a coalition provided the US with multiple benefits:

 Enhanced force levels and resources

 Political credibility and legitimacy from having multiple countries with a united position 

on the use of military forces27

 Different sets of ideas on how to confront problems and the ability to leverage the 

respective strengths of different nations. For example, the UK brought a wealth of 

experience from its experiences in Northern Ireland which informed reconciliation efforts 

 

26 In some ways this situation reinforces itself, since many nations plan on operating within coalitions and deliberately 

develop their own capabilities to be complementary, rather than duplicative, of US capability.

27 In some cases, coalition nation roles were based on political imperatives rather than practical considerations. 

For example, in the Haiti earthquake response, Guatemala provided limited airlift capability compared to other 

contributors. From a military logistics perspective, their contribution did not necessarily make sense, but their 

involvement was desirable from a strategic perspective.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

in Iraq as well as their counterterrorism operations in Helmand and Basra. Similarly, Italy 

led the development of the Afghan police due to its experience with its own Carabinieri

 Increased experience and proficiencies of national partners. For example, the Georgian 

military gained considerable combat experience from their deployments in support 

of ISAF

These benefits are compelling reasons that suggest the US will continue to operate in a coalition

environment in the majority of future operations.

Way Ahead:

Refine DOD’s contribution to the interagency approach to building and sustaining coalitions:

Develop policies and processes to better coordinate interagency efforts to build and maintain 

coalitions for a range of military operations. 

Increase engagement and training: Identify key potential partners and increase the level 

of engagement and frequency of training; build relationships and opportunities for influence

through theater security cooperation initiatives.

Accommodate and anticipate national caveats and rules of engagement: Understand, 

acknowledge, and plan for differences in national caveats and ROE, including US SROE 

for self-defense.

Resolve knowledge management and interoperability challenges: Develop policies, procedures, 

and systems to rapidly and effectively share information and intelligence across the spectrum of 

coalition partners.

Build common basis for action: Sustain efforts to develop common doctrine, TTP, and policies 

with the spectrum of coalition partners. 

Avoid over-classification: Classification policies should be realistic in terms of the potential harm 

of sharing information, with leaders proactively sharing needed information with partners.

Expand language and cultural expertise: Increase foreign area, language, and cultural expertise 

in all Services.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 2

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Nine: Host-Nation Partnering

Partnering between the US and host nations was essential for the US to achieve its strategic goals

and promote a number of key objectives. First, partnering enabled the host nation to develop 

a sustainable capacity to provide security and counter threats. This provided an exit strategy

for the US and offered an alternative to sustaining a large US footprint on the ground. Second, 

partnering enhanced the legitimacy of US operations and freedom of action. Finally, partnering 

built connections between the US and host-nation security forces, increasing opportunities for 

influence both within respective militaries and with other sectors of government and society.

Partnering offered the US a way to advance its objectives through influence rather than through 

direct action.

In many of the operations over the past decade, partnering was a key enabler and force 

multiplier, and aided in host-nation capacity building. However, it was not always approached 

effectively nor adequately prioritized and resourced. The past decade featured some critical 

lessons for partnering and building host-nation capacity:

 Inadequate planning, prioritization, and resourcing of partnering and capacity building 

slowed progress, jeopardizing the sustainability of gains made during US operations

 Partnering with host-nation security forces presented both opportunities and pitfalls

 Relationships and requirements for working with host-nation forces changed over time

 Working with host-nation security forces, despite challenges, improved host-nation 

effectiveness and advanced US objectives

While security force assistance (SFA), foreign internal defense (FID), and building partner capacity 

were essential to strategic goals and offered alternatives to a large US footprint, these activities 

were not adequately planned, prioritized, or resourced. Partnering was an inherently interagency 

activity, but there was an overall lack of unity in these efforts. In Iraq, the scope and mission of SFA 

needed in light of the CPA’s decision to disband the Iraqi security forces were not anticipated in 

planning. Sufficient institutions to address the SFA requirements were not established until the 

following year, and resources were slow to be provided, both in terms of trainers and needed 

equipment. For example, weapons for the Iraqi forces were difficult to procure because of US 

export legislation that did not consider large-scale urgent SFA requirements. 

Host-nation security forces brought both strengths and challenges for partnered operations. 

Host-nation forces tended to have an increased awareness of cultural cues that helped them 

to discriminate between threats and noncombatants. In addition, they tended to excel at SSE, 

tactical questioning, and communication with local nationals in general. Local nationals tended 

to be more responsive to host-nation forces and gave them more deference in conducting 

operations. Host-nation forces were force multipliers, augmenting US forces on the ground. 

Challenges encountered with partnering with host-nation forces included a lack of proficiency and 

experience, as well as corruption, infiltration, lack of accountability to international norms for the 

use of force, and resource constraints. In Afghanistan, the possibility of green-on-blue incidents 

undermined trust in some cases, hindering partnering efforts. 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 3

U N C L A S S I F I E D

The US also had challenges that complicated partnering. One challenge was a propensity for the 

US to shape host-nation institutions after its own image, rather than allowing the host nation to 

make such decisions consistent with its own history, culture, and traditions. Another was a lack 

of strategic patience, where a desire for quick results at times drove the US to lead the partnering 

relationship, rather than operating by, with, and through host-nation forces to build long-term 

capacity. Thirdly, general purpose forces did not always respond positively to cultural differences

of the host nation, leading to reduced effectiveness due to less positive partnering and advisory 

relationships. However, in spite of existing challenges for both the host nation and the US, 

partnering was an essential element of a viable exit strategy as well as critical to maintaining

freedom of action.

Partnering relationships tended to change over time as host-nation capabilities matured. 

For example, partnering in Iraq and Afghanistan transitioned from US-led operations, with Iraqi 

or Afghan forces being mentored during those operations, to partnered operations where hostnation forces participated in planning and execution alongside US forces. This then transitioned 

to host nation-led operations where the US or coalition provided key enablers that the host 

nation did not possess, such as air support, logistics, or ISR capabilities. Similarly, in the 

Philippines, early US partnering focused on tactical operations and later transitioned to 

operational-level support as Philippine security forces became more tactically proficient.

Resourcing for FID and SFA was complicated by a number of different and partially overlapping 

authorities and funding streams. In Iraq and Afghanistan, myriad elements of building partner 

capacity were conducted by different organizations with distinct missions and little integration

of their efforts. 

Though partnering between the US and host nations helped to promote US objectives, narrowly 

defined missions limited the utility of US efforts and caused friction with the host nation. For 

example, in Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P), the mission was limited to 

targeting terrorist organizations that were affiliated with Al Qaeda (e.g., Jemaah Islamiyah [JI]

and the Abu Sayyaf Group [ASG]). US support did not extend to Philippine efforts to address 

the foremost threat to the Philippine government, the Communist Party of the Philippines New 

People’s Army (CPP-NPA), because they were not affiliated with al Qaeda. This created friction 

between host nation and US forces and also limited the ability of the US to promote the host 

nation’s capacity to achieve long-term security. 28, 29 Similarly, in Plan Colombia, helicopters 

supplied by the US were only authorized to be used against counter-narcotics targets. This 

created frustration and confusion about their use, since many targets were tied to counternarcotics objectives in some way. This limitation was evident in a high profile Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) attack on Colombian police, where several police were killed 

because they ran out of ammunition. US-supplied helicopters were nearby but not employed 

 

28 This friction was mitigated through personal relationships and multiple training events.

29 COL(R) David Maxwell, “Foreign Internal Defense: An Indirect Approach to Counter-Insurgency/Counter Terrorism, 

Lessons from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Philippines (OEF-P) for dealing with Non-Existential Threats to the United 

States,” Paper, 6 December 2011.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 4

U N C L A S S I F I E D

to protect the police because of US-imposed restrictions on their use. This incident surfaced 

the nature of the restrictive guidance, and procedures were put in place to allow more flexibility 

in their use.30 

Despite these challenges, SFA, FID, and building partner capacity improved the host nation’s 

ability to provide security and advance US objectives. In Iraq and Afghanistan, these tasks were 

essential both to provide near-term security in order to set the conditions for longer-term 

stability and to develop host-nation security forces that could sustain security in the absence 

of US and coalition forces. In other countries such as the Philippines, small investments of US 

Special Forces served as enablers to enhance host-nation effectiveness through FID. In Colombia, 

a combined US-Colombian investment in the form of Plan Colombia helped to turn the tide 

of Colombia’s dire internal security situation. The US partnered with Colombia to develop their 

security capacity to the point where Colombia is now a provider of training for others in the 

region. US presence and partnering also helped to focus attention on target sets that were 

US priorities while avoiding the requirement for US unilateral operations.

Way Ahead:

Continue theater security cooperation activities:

 Strengthen existing relationships: Build on existing political, military, and economic 

relationships in order to strengthen relationships, sustain influence with key partners, 

and build capacity.

 Develop new relationships: Identify key potential partners, initiate engagement, 

and routinely train with them.

Re-establish training for effective partnering and advising: Re-establish a Military Assistance

and Training Advisory (MATA) course to promote effective partnering and advising. This 

course should capitalize on recent lessons and Special Forces expertise with regard to FID 

and SFA operations. 

Promote and enhance SFA and FID training and expertise: Develop a framework to improve 

SFA and FID training effectiveness across the spectrum of host-nation requirements. This should 

include considerations for developing the accountability and legitimacy of host-nation forces.

Plan for an SFA surge: Develop plans for an effective SFA surge capacity to support a large-scale 

capacity-building mission, including needed resources and authorities.

Shape public opinion: Develop a communication strategy that emphasizes the positive aspects 

of partnering, increasing support and legitimacy for the US and host nation.

 

30 David E. Spencer, et al, “Colombia’s Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010,” Center for Hemispheric 

Defense Studies, 17 June 2011.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 5

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Assess efforts: Employ a comprehensive framework for conducting assessments of relevant 

US and host-nation variables to understand conditions, requirements, and progress necessary 

to meet national security objectives and promote needs of the host nation.

Streamline authorities for FID and SFA: Consolidate and streamline the many authorities

and funding mechanisms to better support FID and SFA activities.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 6

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Ten: State Use of Surrogates and Proxies 

After the US demonstrated its ability to quickly and effectively conduct major combat operations 

in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, states sponsored and exploited 

surrogates and proxies to generate asymmetric challenges. Surrogates and proxies opposed

US interests and objectives by leveraging:

 The resources provided from state sponsors 

 The nexus of criminal, terrorist, and other interests

 The use of inexpensive, asymmetric approaches to counter US capabilities

Surrogates and proxies gave nation-states options for opposing US interests and objectives 

without direct action. For example, one nation deliberately funded and supplied insurgent groups 

in Iraq with significant capabilities beyond what they had organically, challenging the coalition 

and causing greater US casualties. In order to oppose Israel, Hezballah was similarly supplied with 

advanced capabilities, such as a missile inventory that rivaled that of many nation-states. Other 

nations similarly oppose ISAF in Afghanistan by providing resources and support to terrorist and 

insurgent groups operating in the country.31

The overlap of crime, terror, and non-state actors continued to increase and empower all parties. 

The movement of money and contraband, a specialty of criminal elements, also had applicability 

for terror groups acting as proxies, and the latter could leverage these criminal elements at the 

right price. Successful efforts considered this overlap: for example, JIATF-S focused on countering 

narcotics trafficking, but it also included countering terrorist activities because of the significant 

overlap between drug and terrorist networks and finances.32 However, despite the global 

importance of law enforcement and non-military organizations in combating proxies and 

surrogates, the military lacked authorities to train or provide information to these non-military 

entities. In addition, a regional focus on these issues—especially when different departments 

and agencies used differing geographic boundaries—created gaps and seams that the enemy 

could exploit.

Because of US overmatch in military capability, the enemy tended to shift to the use of 

inexpensive, low-technology approaches and/or TTP (often provided by sponsor nations) to foil 

high-technology US capabilities that had been designed to counter conventional peer-on-peer 

threats. One example was the wide use of IEDs against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

While coalition armored vehicles were designed to resist significant damage even when fired 

upon by similarly designed vehicles, they were vulnerable to IEDs exploding underneath the 

 

31 For example, “Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops 

and civilians as well as US soldiers.” Statement of Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Afghanistan and Iraq, 22 September 2011. 

32 “JIATF-S focuses on the planning and execution of operations to interdict narcotics smuggling and human trafficking 

as well as terrorist-related activities.” Emphasis added. JINSA Group Visits U.S. Southern Command and the Joint 

Interagency Task Force South, 3 September 2008, http://www.jinsa.org/events-programs/regional-programs

/florida/jinsa-group-visits-us-southern-command-and-joint-interagen, accessed 9 February 2012.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 7

U N C L A S S I F I E D

vehicle; with simple tools and at a low cost, insurgents and terrorists could cause significant 

casualties and damage to US vehicles. 

In some cases, the US successfully worked with partner nations to develop their capability 

to counter internal and regional threats. In effect, this amounted to the creation of US proxies 

to combat threats. Through training, provision of key enablers, and through additional measures 

such as the Rewards for Justice Program, partner nations were increasingly effective at 

countering threats to US objectives.

33 These efforts are discussed in more detail in Lesson 

Nine, Host-Nation Partnering.

Way Ahead:

Improve targeting of threat finance and other support: Work with international partners, 

and increase US military authorities, to disrupt states’ ability to finance and support proxies.

Expose sponsor/proxy relationships and promote fissures: Use communication to expose 

state/proxy relationships, and foster and exploit state/proxy differences (e.g., ideology, culture, 

sectarianism, operational approach).

Align geographic regions and plans: Encourage alignment of the DOD, DOS, and intelligence 

community (IC) geographic regions of responsibility and planning efforts to facilitate improved 

coordination and unity of effort.

Build and/or strengthen external partnerships: Identify, prioritize, and authorize the 

exchange of intelligence and other support between partners, including host-nation

non-military organizations.

Anticipate asymmetry: Proactively anticipate asymmetric approaches and identify means 

to mitigate their impact.

Combine the direct and indirect approaches. Oppose proxies and surrogates through a global 

campaign that combines direct action and law enforcement with indirect approaches that 

address the factors that fuel support for terrorism.

Increase internal coordination: Solidify integration within the interagency and others 

(e.g., law enforcement agencies) to enhance unity of effort.

 

33 This is a program operated by the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. This program offers “rewards 

for information that leads to the arrest or conviction of anyone who plans, commits, or attempts international terrorist 

acts against U.S. persons or property, that prevents such acts from occurring in the first place, that leads to the location 

of a key terrorist leader, or that disrupts terrorism financing.” http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page

=Rewards_program&language=English, accessed 21 May 2012.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 8

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Lesson Eleven: Super-Empowered Threats

Terrorism has long featured individuals or small groups exerting disproportionate influence 

through their actions. However, in the past decade, individuals and small groups increasingly

exploited globalized technology and information to expand influence and approach state-like 

disruptive capacity. This was largely due to:

 Commercially available technologies with the capability to create mass casualties

 Transnational criminal networks, terrorist groups, and nation-states enabling small groups 

or individuals to execute attacks with global impact

 Technology enabling enhanced communication and information operations

 The internet facilitating recruiting, training, financing, and command and control

Commercial technologies made weapons of mass effect achievable by small individuals 

or groups—for example, DNA sequencing equipment to create lethal viruses such as smallpox 

or the Spanish flu. Critically, the cost of these technologies has decreased by orders of magnitude 

over time, and access to these technologies is much easier to obtain. Coupled with transnational 

criminal networks, both to obtain necessary equipment and to allow terrorists or materials to slip 

in unobserved into the US or other areas of concern, these technologies could enable individuals 

or small groups to generate mass casualties and disruption.34

As discussed in the previous section of this report, the risk is compounded by external sponsors, 

either national sponsors or other terror groups, providing advanced technologies and capabilities 

to insurgent groups and terrorist organizations. For example, one national sponsor provided 

advanced IED technology to terrorist organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing them to 

penetrate armored vehicles and cause casualties beyond their organic capabilities. Hezballah 

also benefitted from support from a national sponsor, thus approaching the disruptive 

capabilities of a nation-state. Similarly, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines benefitted 

from members of Jemaah Islamiyah who provided material support for terrorist attacks.

Information operations and media manipulation were significant combat multipliers, adding 

to the super-empowerment of non-state entities. These groups excelled in rapidly transmitting 

images to the media as well as their own forums. Rapid transmission allowed these groups to 

make the first impression on the world stage, which proved effective as the first impression 

often became the version many believed. At the same time, these groups were largely 

unconstrained by the truth, and could adapt the facts to further their cause.35 In fact, some 

groups manufactured evidence or doctored images (“fauxtography”) to further their own 

information operations. One example was Hezballah during the 2006 Lebanon war, using a single 

 

34 One example is the Aum Shinrikyo subway attack in 1995. This organization had over $1 billion in assets and 

developed its own capability to manufacture sarin and other biological agents. The mailing of anthrax bacterium 

in the US in 2001 also displayed the disruptive effect the use of such materials can have. 

35 In fact, an Al Qaeda manual provides guidance on using information: “spreading rumors and writing statements 

that instigate people against the enemy.” Al Qaeda manual, Manchester police, United Kingdom. 
U N C L A S S I F I E D

3 9

U N C L A S S I F I E D

corpse and taking it to different Israeli strike locations to provide “evidence” of Lebanese civilian 

casualties and a disproportional response by Israel.

36

The internet was another enabler for super-empowerment, facilitating recruiting, training, 

financing, and command and control for terrorist individuals and groups. Recruiting was achieved 

through forums that tended to be sympathetic to their causes. Insurgent websites offered 

propaganda, training materials, and guidance to direct and encourage other attacks. Financing 

was accomplished both through Internet sites and other nontraditional banking mechanisms.

Video clips posted on terrorist websites also tended to be used in mainstream Arab media.

Way Ahead:

Geographic Combatant Commands, in conjunction with other organizations, develop 

capabilities to:

 Define the network: Identify the links between terrorists, insurgents, criminals, 

and governments, among others

 Exploit friction points: Identify and exploit fissures where found or created

 Maintain pressure: Sustain operational tempo to limit the threat’s ability to organize, 

assess their activities, train, perform planning functions, and conduct operations

Leverage law enforcement as an aspect of national power: Promote a common understanding 

of existing authorities for action among US interagency and foreign partners; combine this with 

effective fusion of intelligence, law enforcement information, and private industry data.

Disrupt enemy information operations: Disrupt the threat’s ability to conduct information 

operations (e.g., propaganda, media manipulation, fauxtography, and internet forums). Provide 

an effective competing message by being first and not wrong.

Leverage local knowledge and expertise: Operate by, with, and through partners with localized

knowledge of the grievances, conflicts, and drivers of stability.

Deny sanctuary: Contest ungoverned spaces, to include the Internet, and enable local populations 

to deny safe havens.

Improve response to the threats: Deconflict, coordinate, validate, and exercise federal, state, 

local, and private sector authorities/plans to preempt and/or respond to attacks.

 

36 “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict,” Shorenstein Center 

on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, 18 February 2007.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

4 0

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Conclusion

This report describes the eleven strategic themes derived from the enduring, joint lessons from 

the past decade of war, as culled from the 46 studies conducted by JCOA since its inception 

in 2003. This product was refined using additional inputs from the combatant commands and 

Services, including a collaborative process before and during the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade 

of War Lessons Learned Working Group in May 2012. The process will continue with additional 

lessons being developed and discussed in future efforts. The goal is to continue to identify key 

lessons and recommendations that can help guide joint force development to promote mission 

effectiveness of the US military in the next decade and beyond.
U N C L A S S I F I E D

4 1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Appendix A: JCOA’s Body of Work

Iraq

2004 Joint Combined Combat Operations 

2005 Synchronizing Counter-IED Efforts in Iraq

2006 Task Force Freedom, Mosul, Iraq: A Best Practice 

Transitions of Authority 

Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency 

2007 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Transition to Sovereignty 

Emerging Solutions: al Anbar Best Practices

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Counterinsurgency Operations

Operation AL FAJR: Fallujah II 

2008 Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Joint Tactical Environment

Command and Control Transformation 

2009 A Comprehensive Approach: Iraq Case Study 

Iraq Information Activities 

Strategic Communication Best Practices 

2010 Transition to Stability Operations in Iraq 

Afghanistan

2006 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 

2008 Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Police Reform Challenges

2009 Civilian Casualties in Counterinsurgency 

2010 Joint Civilian Casualty Study

2011 Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police: Now and Future 

Adaptive Learning for Afghanistan 

2012 Civilian Casualties Update Study 

Other Combat Operations

2004 Joint Lessons Learned: Kosovo 

2011 Operation ODYSSEY DAWN
U N C L A S S I F I E D

4 2

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Irregular Warfare

2005 Modern Irregular Warfare

2007 Second Lebanon War: Applied Lessons on Irregular War 

Global War on Terrorism II

2008 Georgia – Russia Conflict

Techno-Guerilla: The Changing Face of Asymmetric Warfare 

2009 Irregular Warfare in Gaza: Operation CAST LEAD

The Super-Empowered Threat

Sri Lanka: Perspectives on Counterinsurgency Operations

The Mumbai Techno-Guerilla Terrorist 

2011 Partnered Counterterrorism Operations in the Philippines

HADR

2006 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations in Pakistan

Guatemala Disaster Relief 

2007 International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations 

2009 Haiti Stabilization Initiative 

2010 Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE: Haiti Earthquake Response 

Homeland Security

2006 National Response to Catastrophic Events: Hurricane Katrina 

2008 National Response to Biological Contagion 

2010 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Improvised Nuclear Device Baseline Analysis 

Emerging Threats

2011 Emerging Threats Study: al-Houthi 

Emerging Threats Study: al-Shabaab

Emerging Threats Study: The Taliban
U N C L A S S I F I E D

4 3

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Appendix B: Abbreviations

AOR Area of Responsibility

APAN All Partners Access Network

ASG Abu Sayyaf Group

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BSO Battlespace Owner

C2 Command and Control

CIVCAS Civilian Casualties

CFSOCC-A Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

COIN Counterinsurgency

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CPP-NPA Philippines New People’s Army

CT Counterterror

D3A Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess

DOD Department of Defense

DOS Department of State

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, 

and Facilities

EOF Escalation of Force

F3EAD Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia

FID Foreign Internal Defense

FSEC Force Strategic Engagement Cell

GPF General Purpose Forces

HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

HTT Human Terrain Team

HUMINT Human Intelligence

HVI High Value Individual

IC Intelligence Community

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IO Information Operations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

JI Jemaah Islamiyah 

JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group
U N C L A S S I F I E D

4 4

U N C L A S S I F I E D

JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force – South

KLE Key Leader Engagement

LNO Liaison Officer

LOAC Laws of Armed Conflict

MATA Military Assistance and Training Advisory 

MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OEF-P Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Philippines 

OPSEC Operations Security

PICC Presidential Information Coordination Cell

PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

ROE Rules of Engagement

SFA Security Force Assistance

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SOUTHCOM US Southern Command

SROE Standing Rules of Engagement

SSE Sensitive Site Exploitation

TSOC Theater Special Operations Command

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UCP Unified Command Plan

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

US United States

USAID US Agency for International Development

USG US Government

VSO/ALP Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction