1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MILA KRUPNICK : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:12-CV-273 

 : 

 v. : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 : 

ARCADIS OF U.S., INC., : Magistrate Judge Abel 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

OPINION AND ORDER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant 

ARCADIS of U.S., Inc. (“Motion for Summary Judgment”). (Doc. 26). For the reasons set forth 

below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Plaintiff, Mila Krupnick, (“Plaintiff” or “Krupnick”) began working for Malcolm Pirnie, 

a company that developed and engineered water and waste water treatment plants, around 

October 1997. Krupnick was hired as a level five engineer,1

 and was later promoted to level six 

engineer, where she remained until 2009. In late 2009, ARCADIS of United States, Incorporated 

(“Defendant” or “ARCADIS”) acquired Malcolm Pirnie, which became the Water Division of 

ARCADIS. Following the acquisition, Defendant reclassified the engineer levels, and Plaintiff 

                                                            

1

 Malcolm Pirnie categorized its engineers into different levels, ranging from level one to level six. Within the 

engineers, level one engineers were paid the least, while level six were paid the most. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 1 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
2 

became a level nine engineer. Krupnick worked as a level nine engineer from 2010 until her 

termination in September 2011. 

Level nine engineers are considered to be senior engineers. Their responsibilities include 

designing electrical circuits, signing and sealing drawings, classifying electrical environments, 

performing short circuit coordination studies, and performing specification edits. Senior 

engineers have the added responsibilities of preparing job proposals, working as lead electricians 

and monitoring the electrical group’s budget, and interacting with clients. 

Krupnick worked in Defendant’s Electrical Section of the Building Design Group 

(“group”), located in Columbus, Ohio. She was part of an electrical group comprised of five 

engineers, of whom she was the oldest by approximately fifteen years. Plaintiff’s group included 

James Steed and Roger Harris, both level nine engineers; Arvin Kasyouhanan, a level seven 

engineer; and Brendan Bartelt, a level one engineer.2

 The group reported to Glenn Myres, its 

immediate supervisor. Myres reported to Frank Barchok, Resource Manager, who was 

responsible for managing a staff of engineers and technicians. In turn, Barchok reported to 

Richard Herriott, Senior Vice President of the Central Region Design Group. 

During the final two years of Plaintiff’s employment, Myres and Krupnick had a few 

conversations about retirement. Some of their conversations were casual. Myres intended to 

retire in March 2011, and since Krupnick was around his age, it was occasionally brought up in 

casual discussions. On certain occasions, however, Myres approached Krupnick, and inquired 

about when she intended to retire. In one instance, Krupnick responded that she intended to 

work for two more years. During a separate discussion, after asking Krupnick about her 

                                                            

2

 At the time of Plaintiff’s termination, Bartelt was a level three engineer. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 2 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
3 

intended retirement timeline, Myres stated that his wife would jump at the chance to be able to 

retire. 

In July 2011, Myres again asked Krupnick when she was going to retire. Myres initiated 

this specific conversation because he was aware that Krupnick had been selected for termination. 

In discussing her retirement date, Myres hoped that Krupnick would have changed her mind, and 

chosen to retire within three to six months, rather than maintaining her original intended 

timeframe of working for two more years before retiring. If Plaintiff had stated that she planned 

to work for only a few additional months, Myres, who was largely involved in the decision to lay 

off Plaintiff, claims that he would have attempted to use that as leverage to reverse the 

termination decision. 

The decision to terminate Krupnick was made by Barchok, Myres, and Herriott, though 

Myres was chiefly responsible for the final decision. In narrowing down who would be selected 

for termination, Myres determined that it would necessarily come down to one of the three level 

nine engineers in Krupnick’s group. Barchok, Myres, and Herriott ultimately determined that 

Krupnick would be the level nine engineer to be terminated. Krupnick was laid off on 

September 1, 2011. 

B. Procedural Background 

Krupnick filed her Complaint on March 29, 2012. (Doc. 2). On May 24, 2012, she filed 

her Amended Complaint, alleging age discrimination pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 

4112.02 and 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 

(“ADEA”). (Doc. 14). Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on May 9, 2013. 

(Doc. 26). On March 6, 2014, this Court held oral argument on Defendant’s Motion for 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 3 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
4 

Summary Judgment, and counsel for all parties participated. This matter is, therefore, ripe for 

review. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material if proof of 

that fact would establish one of the elements of a claim and would affect the application of 

governing law to the rights of the parties. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 

1984) (citing Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867, 872 (1975)). 

 A movant for summary judgment meets its initial burden “by ‘showing’ – that is, 

pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party's case.” Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 216 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986)). At that point, the non-movant must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). It is not, however, the role of the trial court to 

“resolve factual disputes by weighing conflicting evidence because it is the jury's role to assess 

the probative value of the evidence.” Kraus v. Sobel Corrugated Containers, Inc., 915 F.2d 227, 

230 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 782 F.2d 609, 615 n. 5 (6th Cir. 

1986); Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 1980)). All evidence and 

reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. Pucci, 628 F.3d at 759 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 4 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
5 

Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against based on her age, pursuant to the 

ADEA and O.R.C. § 4112.02. Under the ADEA and O.R.C. § 4112.02, employers are 

prohibited from discharging an individual based on her age. See Campbell v. PMI Food Equip. 

Grp., Inc., 509 F.3d 776, 785 (6th Cir. 2007). Age discrimination claims arising under O.R.C. § 

4112.02 are analyzed under the same standard as claims arising under the ADEA. Blizzard v. 

Marion Technical Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2359, 185 

L. Ed. 2d 1068 (U.S. 2013); see e.g., Wharton v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 309 F. App’x 990, 995 (6th 

Cir. 2009); Bohichik v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 04-CV-1148, 2006 WL 3506427, at *2 (S.D. 

Ohio Dec. 4, 2006). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state claims shall be analyzed under the same 

framework as her federal claims. McKinley v. Skyline Chili, Inc., 543 F. App’x 461, 464 (6th 

Cir. 2013). 

In age discrimination cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to “show that 

‘age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.’” Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 283 (citing 

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009)). A plaintiff can demonstrate an ADEA 

violation by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 

614, 610 (6th Cir. 2009). In cases where plaintiff, however, does not present direct evidence of 

discrimination, her claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework. See Norbuta v. Loctite Corp., 1 F. App’x 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2001); Campbell, 509 

F.3d at 785. In the case sub judice, Plaintiff proffers direct evidence to support her claims, as 

well as circumstantial evidence. The Court presents each analysis separately herein. 

A. Direct Evidence of Discrimination

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 5 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
6 

A plaintiff may present direct evidence of age discrimination. Direct evidence is 

“evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a 

motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Id. at 312; see also Conley v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 

211 F. App’x 402, 405 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 

564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003)). If that evidence is credible, “discriminatory animus may be at least 

part of an employer's motive, and in the absence of an alternative, non-discriminatory 

explanation for that evidence, there exists a genuine issue of material fact suitable for submission 

to the jury without further analysis by the court.” Id. (citing Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 

F.2d 703, 707-712 (6th Cir.1985)). Comments or remarks that “require a factfinder to draw 

further inferences to support a finding of discriminatory animus” do not constitute direct 

evidence. Daughtery v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 708 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). 

In determining whether an employer’s action was motivated by an age bias, the Court 

considers four factors: 

(1) whether the statements were made by a decision-maker or by 

an agent within the scope of his employment; (2) whether the 

statements were related to the decision-making process; (3) 

whether the statements were more than merely vague, ambiguous 

or isolated remarks; and (4) whether they were made proximate in 

time to the act of termination. 

Skelton v. Sara Lee Corp., 249 F. App'x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Peters v. Lincoln Elec. 

Co., 285 F.3d 456, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted)). While “none of these 

factors is individually dispositive of age discrimination,” the Court must consider them in the 

aggregate, “taking all of the circumstances into account.” Peters, 285 F.3d at 478. In order “to 

prevail on direct evidence at the summary judgment stage, it seems that plaintiffs must prove ‘by 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 6 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
7 

a preponderance of the evidence...that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged employer 

decision.’” Sharp v. Aker Plant Services Group, Inc., 726 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Bartlett v. Gates, 421 F. App’x 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2010)). If Plaintiff can do so, “‘the burden [of 

production and persuasion] shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible motive.’” Skelton, 249 F. 

App’x at 454 (quoting Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 763 (6th Cir. 2005)). 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to offer any direct evidence of age discrimination. 

Though Plaintiff alleges that Myres’ discussions to Krupnick concerning retirement are direct 

evidence of discrimination, Defendant disagrees. Defendant states that retirement was a 

commonly discussed topic among older workers, and those brief communications do not 

demonstrate any discriminatory intent. Additionally, Defendant claims that Myres’ remarks 

about his personal plans to retire were meant only to communicate his excitement about the 

prospect of retiring. Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff interpreted Myres’ remarks to be 

joking, it further demonstrates a lack of discriminatory animus. 

 Defendant next addresses Myres’ refusal to let Plaintiff attend solar training. When 

Myres denied Plaintiff’s request to attend the training session, he commented that Kasyouhanan 

or Bartelt would attend rather than Myres, because they were the future of the company. This 

remark, according to Defendant, was not discriminatory, but was instead based on Kasyouhanan 

and Bartelt’s technical proficiency and ability to grasp the concepts of solar engineering more 

rapidly than Plaintiff. Though no one ultimately attended the solar training, Defendant notes that 

Myres’ choice to select Kasyouhanan or Bartelt was based on efficiency and cost-effectiveness, 

since they were both junior level engineers. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 7 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
8 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s argument, that Myres’ comments were isolated and 

harmless, is not persuasive. Plaintiff contends that, because Myres had managerial authority, and 

was purportedly the most influential person in the termination decision, his remarks hold a great 

deal of weight. In addition, Plaintiff states that Myres’ comments about the younger engineers 

being the future of the company, taken with his questions about Plaintiff’s retirement, suggest 

that Plaintiff’s age played a role in her termination. According to Plaintiff, most telling of all is 

Myres’ admission that he believed Krupnick was being honest in her perception of the 

comments, which Krupnick stated made her feel pressured. 

 Applying the comments to the four direct evidence factors set out by the Sixth Circuit, 

this Court finds that they may rise to the level of direct discrimination. Plaintiff meets the first 

factor, because the comments were made by Myres, who was a decision-maker. Plaintiff also 

meets the fourth factor, as the comments were made within proximate time of Krupnick’s 

termination, and the final conversation about Krupnick’s retirement timeline was in July 2011, 

less than two months before her termination date. Plaintiff, however, has failed to demonstrate 

that the evidence presented meets the two outstanding factors. 

 Plaintiff does not meet the second factor—statements were related to the decision making 

process—because she has not shown sufficient evidence to suggest that the retirement questions 

and the comments concerning the solar training were related to Krupnick’s termination. Though 

questions about retirement could be considered suspect, Plaintiff has failed to offer any 

additional support to indicate that the short conversations between Krupnick and Myres, in which 

they discussed retirement, were related to the decision to terminate Plaintiff. See Lefevers v. 

GAF Fiberglass Corp., 667 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2012) (“questions concerning retirement 

plans alone do not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination”) (internal citation omitted); 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 8 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
9 

see also Scott v. Potter, 182 F. App’x 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (to conclude that the remark 

“Why don’t you just retire and make everyone happy?” was direct evidence of age 

discrimination would require an inference to be drawn, because “[the words] ‘retire’ and ‘age’ 

are not synonyms,”) (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)). 

As to the third factor—whether the statements were more than merely vague, ambiguous, 

or isolated remarks—Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that Myres’ remarks about 

retirement were not ambiguous, isolated, or vague. While Myres broached the topic of 

retirement on a few occasions with Krupnick, Plaintiff has not shown that those discussions were 

anything more substantial than casual conversation. The Court considered allegedly stray 

remarks in Sharp, in which Sharp and his supervisor, Hudson, had a few conversations 

concerning Sharp’s termination, and how age had factored into that decision. 726 F.3d 789. 

During two conversations with Sharp, Hudson specifically stated that age had played a role in the 

decision, referencing the benefits of bringing on younger employees, as well as making note of 

Sharp’s age. Id. at 794-96. The Court found that Hudson’s remarks were not merely stray 

remarks, but rather “explain[ed] the very decision at the heart of [the] lawsuit,” because they 

“specifically described... [the] rationale in choosing which employees to fire and which to 

retain.” Id. at 798. Here, Plaintiff has neglected to articulate how Myres comments rise beyond 

the level of stray remarks or general comments, thereby failing to meet the third factor of the 

direct evidence standard. Id.; see also Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 708 (“general, vague, or 

ambiguous comments do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination”). 

Moreover, the July 2011 conversation in which Myres and Krupnick engaged in a brief 

conversation about Krupnick’s retirement, suggested that, rather than using retirement as a 

catalyst for termination, Myres hoped to use Krupnick’s retirement plans as a way to prevent her 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 9 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
10 

impending termination. (Myres Dep. at 75-77, Doc. 29-9). In Lefevers v. GAF Fiberglass 

Corporation, the Court noted that a regional manager’s statement, “I don’t understand why you 

older employees—old employees think we’re trying to get rid of you. We need you to run this 

plant,” showed a “desire to retain, not to terminate” older employees. 667 F.3d at 724. Here, 

Myres’ July 2011 conversation with Krupnick is analogous. Myres posed the questions about 

retirement to Krupnick after the termination decision had been made, and, according to his 

testimony, did so in an effort to save her position, not as a means of ensuring her termination. 

 The Court drew a more distinct line between what is and is not considered direct 

evidence in Hale v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 503 F. App’x 323, 330-32 (6th Cir. 2012). The 

Hale Court examined direct evidence offered by the plaintiff in support of his age discrimination 

claim. Plaintiff cited four instances of alleged direct evidence of age discrimination: two general 

inquiries from Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, regarding Plaintiff’s plans to retire; a sudden 

escalation in criticism of Plaintiff’s work, which coincided with the retirement inquiries; and a 

statement in which Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor stated, “[h]e is going to leave here when he 

is 62. I am going to see to it. He has been here long enough, and he is going to go on his social 

security.” Id. at 330. The Court found that neither the questions about Plaintiff’s retirement nor 

the increased scrutiny with which the inquiries correlated were direct evidence, because neither 

piece of evidence “‘prove[d] the existence of a fact without requiring any inferences.’” Id. at 

331 (quoting Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

The Hale Court, however, found the statement referencing Plaintiff’s age required the 

conclusion “that being 62 was a precipitating factor of Hale’s termination.” Id. at 332. In so 

finding, the Court distinguished Hale from Scott, noting that “[w]hile the Scott Court reasoned 

that the statement ‘retire’ and ‘age’ are not synonyms, ‘62’ is synonymous with ‘age.’” Id. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 10 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
11 

(citing Scott, 182 F. App’x at 526). Perhaps more notably, the Court found that Hale’s 

supervisor’s statement showed that her decision was based on age itself, rather than an “agecorrelated factor,” like retirement, as was the case in Scott. Id. 

The Scott and Lefevers Courts clearly stated that conversations regarding retirement are 

not inherently discussions about age. Scott, 182 F. App’x at 526; Lefevers, 667 F.3d at 724. In 

Scott, the Court found that a mere statement regarding retirement did not equate to a statement 

about age. Id. Here, Myres’ brief retirement conversations with Krupnick are analogous to the 

comment analyzed in Scott. As noted by the Scott Court, age and retirement are not 

synonymous. Id. There is no basis to conclude that a reference to retirement is ispo facto

evidence of age discrimination. 

The Court’s reasoning in Lefevers, that questions about retirement plans alone do not 

amount to direct evidence of age discrimination, supports the finding of no direct evidence of age 

discrimination in this case. Lefevers, 667 F.3d at 724. In Lefevers, the Court found that a 

discussion about retirement can be initiated for other than a discriminatory purpose, and not rise 

to the level of age discrimination. There, the issue of retirement was raised in an effort to retain 

the employee. Id. (finding that the regional manager’s statement, “I don’t understand why you 

older employees—old employees think we’re trying to get rid of you. We need you to run this 

plant,” showed a “desire to retain, not to terminate” older employees). Here, Myres’ third, and 

final, conversation with Krupnick concerning her retirement was held after the decision to select 

her for termination had been made. The evidence presented by Krupnick does not show that the 

conversation was initiated with discriminatory animus. Rather, similar to Lefevers, the impetus 

behind the discussion was Myres’ goal of circumventing Krupnick’s termination based on her 

retirement plans. Myres raised the questions about Plaintiff’s retirement in a last ditch effort to 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 11 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
12 

save her from termination. He stated: “if she had changed her mind and said, ‘well, I decided 

I’m going to retire in three months or four months or six months, I would have done anything I 

could with management and with the people above me to try to find some way to hold onto her 

so that she didn’t have to be let go.” (Myres Dep. at 76-77, Doc. 29-9). 

Without more sufficient evidence that demonstrates a discriminatory animus as 

motivation for the remarks, Scott and Lefevers counsel this Court to find that the comments at 

issue do not rise to the level of direct discrimination. 

The case sub judice can be distinguished from Hale. The Hale Court found that the 

specific discussion of Hale’s age, discussed in conjunction with a desire that he leave the 

company at age 62, required the conclusion that age was the primary factor in Hale’s 

termination. Hale, 503 F. App’x at 332. Moreover, the Hale Court did not have to draw any 

inferences in finding that the statement at issue was evidence of age discrimination. Id. Here, 

Myres’ discussions with Krupnick concerned retirement, but never involved discussion of 

Krupnick’s age. Unlike in Hale, finding that Myres’ conversations with Krupnick demonstrated 

that age was a primary factor in the termination decision would require this Court to draw an 

inference that general discussions of retirement merely blanketed age-based discrimination. 

Drawing such an inference would be to ignore the clear language of the Sixth Circuit in 

comparable ADEA cases. 

Neither the few remarks about retirement, nor the isolated remark about Plaintiff’s 

coworkers, can be considered direct evidence of age discrimination without this Court so 

inferring. Plaintiff is, therefore, unable to demonstrate direct evidence of age discrimination. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 12 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
13 

Notwithstanding this Court’s finding that Plaintiff has failed to present direct evidence of age 

discrimination, an analysis of her prima facie case follows herein. 

B. Prima Facie Case 

The framework applied to analyzing age discrimination claims under Ohio law and the 

ADEA is the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 

283 (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The McDonnell 

Douglas framework is used in cases where the plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination. Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Products, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008). 

Under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of age discrimination. 

Conley, 211 F. App’x at 405. If Plaintiff is able to establish her prima facie case, “the burden of 

production shifts to Defendant to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its 

action].’” Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 491-92 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If Defendant meets its burden of production, the burden 

then shifts back to Plaintiff, who must “demonstrate that Defendant’s ‘proffered reason was not 

the true reason for the employment decision.’” Id. (quoting Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 

474 F.3d 307, 320 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

To establish a prima facie case of age-based discrimination, Plaintiff must show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that: “(1) he or she was part of a protected class (i.e., age forty or 

over); (2) he or she was qualified to perform the job; (3) he or she was discharged; and (4) the 

employer replaced him or her with a younger individual.” Conley, 211 F. App’x at 405 (citing 

Scott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 F.3d 1121, 1126 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing McDonnell 

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802)). If, however, the discrimination allegations arise from a workforce 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 13 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
14 

reduction, the fourth requirement is altered “so that the plaintiff must also demonstrate some 

‘direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out 

the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.’” Campbell, 509 F.3d at 785 (quoting 

Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1023 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted)). 

In the case sub judice, Defendants do not argue, and therefore concede, the first and third 

elements, of the prima facie case. This Court, then, must address the second and fourth 

requirements, as well as discuss the possibility that Plaintiff’s termination was the result of a 

workforce reduction. 

1. Qualification for the Position 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails on the qualification prong of the prima facie case 

because she was not meeting Defendant’s legitimate expectations for a level nine engineer. 

Defendant states that specific limitations prescribed to Plaintiff by Myres are clear 

demonstrations that Krupnick did not meet the objective standard for a level nine engineer. 

Defendant points to Plaintiff’s limited client interactions, alleging that Myres had to limit 

Krupnick’s internal client interactions in their entirety, based on complaints from project 

managers. Defendant notes that Plaintiff’s performance reviews in 2009 and 2010 were lower 

than Harris and Steed, the other level nine engineers in her group. In addition, Defendant states 

that Plaintiff had a difficult time managing the budget on her projects, and often lost profit on the 

projects on which she was the lead engineer. Further aggravating Plaintiff’s budgeting issues, 

according to Defendant, was Plaintiff’s choice to use senior level engineers, who billed at a 

higher rate, over junior engineers, when the tasks assigned to senior engineers could have been 

accomplished by junior engineers. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 14 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
15 

Plaintiff makes one argument in support of her qualification. She cites to Myres’ 

deposition, in which he states that Krupnick never “fell below the company’s expectations based 

on [the company] metrics.” (Myres Dep. at 83, Doc. 29-9). Myres also concedes that Plaintiff 

never received discipline or corrective action. Id. Plaintiff claims that Myres’ deposition 

satisfies the qualification prong of the prima facie case. 

Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden as to this element. She relies on an outdated 

definition of what is required to meet this element, stating that Plaintiff need only demonstrate 

that she possesses the basic skills necessary to perform her job. The Sixth Circuit, however, set 

forth exactly what is required for a plaintiff to satisfy the qualification prong of the prima facie

test in Wexler. 317 F.3d at 575-76. In determining whether Plaintiff has satisfied the 

qualification prong at the prima facie stage, the Court must focus on Plaintiff’s objective 

qualifications. Hale, 503 F. App’x at 333 (citing Wexler, 317 F.3d at 574-76). Plaintiff’s burden 

“can therefore be met by presenting credible evidence that [her] qualifications are at least 

equivalent to the minimum objective criteria required for employment in the relevant field.” 

Wexler, 317 F.3d at 575-76. While specific qualifications vary based on the job, “the inquiry 

should focus on criteria such as the plaintiff’s education, experience in the relevant industry, and 

demonstrated possession of the required general skills.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff neglected to set forth any information supporting her job qualifications. 

She has failed to show any such evidence that points to her education, experience, and 

possession of the required general skills in support of her prima facie case. Though she very 

well may possess the objective skills required to meet the qualification element, this Court 

cannot simply make an inference as to their existence. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not raise an 

issue of material fact. Plaintiff, therefore, fails to establish a prima facie case. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 15 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
16 

2. Whether Plaintiff Was Replaced With a Younger Individual 

Even if Plaintiff had raised an issue of material fact as to her qualifications, she would be 

unable to establish a prima facie case under the fourth element. As stated supra, Section IV.B., 

the fourth element under the McDonnell Douglas framework in an age discrimination case is 

whether Plaintiff was replaced by a younger individual. Here, Defendant argues that the 

termination was necessitated by a reduction in force (“RIF”). In cases where there has been a 

reduction in force, however, the pleading standard is slightly heightened, and the fourth element 

is altered: 

[i]nstead of establishing that he was replaced by a substantially 

younger worker, the plaintiff who is discharged as part of a RIF 

must present “additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical 

evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the 

plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.” 

Schram v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc., 124 F. App'x 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Barnes 

v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990). An action is considered a RIF case “when 

business considerations cause an employer to eliminate one or more positions within the 

company.” Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465. Here, Defendant has demonstrated that, based on a 

reduction in available hours, it had to eliminate certain positions, and did so with two other 

employees.3

 Plaintiff unsuccessfully tries to refute that evidence by misquoting deposition 

testimony. This Court, therefore, will analyze the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test as 

a RIF. 

                                                            

3

 Though Myres was not terminated, he left ARCADIS in September 2011, and his retirement was factored into the 

termination decision and the assignment of hours. 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 16 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
17 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails on this element because she cannot proffer any 

evidence that demonstrates that Defendant singled her out for termination based on 

impermissible reasons. Much like the arguments raised under the qualification prong, Defendant 

reiterates Plaintiff’s issues with work performance, conflicts with project managers, low 

performance review ratings, and Plaintiff’s costly use of high-level engineers in place of lowlevel engineers. Additionally, Defendant states that Plaintiff did not have an engineer’s license 

in any state, unlike her level nine colleagues, Harris and Steed. Though Defendant admits it is 

not a determinative factor, without such a license, Plaintiff was unable to stamp drawings. 

Furthermore, Defendant claims that an engineers’ license was going to be required of level nine 

engineers in the future, which is why Plaintiff’s lack of one was considered in the termination 

decision. 

 Plaintiff argues that Myres’ comments constitute discriminatory remarks, thereby 

showing that Defendant’s choice to terminate Plaintiff was based on her age. Plaintiff also cites 

to her coworkers’ testimony about project budgets, alleging that she was not the only person in 

the group who had difficulties staying within her project budgets. Plaintiff claims that her 

colleague, Harris, had received complaints about his budgeting and had been removed from a 

particular project, and that he demonstrated negative personality traits that Myres had noticed. 

According to Plaintiff, because the issues with Harris did not result in his termination, it is a 

clear indication that Krupnick was unfairly singled out based on her age. 

 In Williams v. General Electric Company, this Court discussed the heightened pleading 

standard applied in RIF cases, stating that Plaintiff must present probative evidence that would 

allow the factfinder to believe that the employer intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff 

based on her age. 269 F. Supp. 2d 958, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2003). Williams considered an employee 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 17 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
18 

who had, after a long tenure in one position with General Electric (“GE”), been demoted and 

eventually fired from his lower position. In discussing evidence Plaintiff could use to show 

evidence of discrimination in a RIF case, the Court suggested that Plaintiff present evidence that 

he was more qualified than younger workers whom GE did not terminate. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of material fact under this fourth element, as 

she has not presented enough evidence to demonstrate that employer singled her out for 

impermissible reasons. Defendant cites various reasons for choosing Plaintiff for termination, 

each of which is grounded in permissible reasoning. Though Plaintiff alleges that the same 

conversations she presented as direct evidence constitute probative evidence to show that 

Defendant acted in a discriminatory manner, she has not adequately demonstrated that she was 

unfairly singled out. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of age 

discrimination. 

C. Defendant’s Reason for Termination

In the interest of being thorough, the Court will address the final two parts of the 

McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test, as though Plaintiff had established her prima facie case. 

If Plaintiff is able to prove her prima facie case, the burden then shifts to Defendant to “articulate 

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Skelton, 249 F. App’x at 459 

(internal citations omitted). Here, Defendant has stated that there was a drastic decrease in 

electric engineering work during 2011, which resulted in a reduction in workforce. Defendant, 

after eliminating two other workers, determined that the other employee to be eliminated would 

have to be one of the three level nine engineers. Defendants considered a number of factors, and, 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 18 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
19 

using an objective evaluation standard, ultimately found that Krupnick had the lowest overall 

performance when compared to Harris and Steed. 

Plaintiff concedes, and this Court agrees, that Defendant has articulated a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for Krupnick’s termination. 

D. Pretext

Once Defendant demonstrates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden then 

shifts back to Plaintiff to show that Defendant’s reasons were pretextual. Plaintiff reiterates her 

arguments for the fourth prong of the prima facie case, citing her conversations with Myres, her 

coworkers’ budgeting issues, and Harris’s negative traits as proof that Defendant singled her out 

for her age. In addition, Plaintiff claims that ARCADIS was a discriminatory atmosphere, citing 

to two coworkers’ testimony in support. Plaintiff argues that Myres’ reasons for selecting 

Krupnick for termination had no basis in fact. Plaintiff, without citing to any testimony, claims 

that Myres, Barchok, and Herriott did not present consistent testimony when asked about the 

reasons behind selecting Krupnick for termination. Finally, Plaintiff points to the termination of 

a co-worker, Mark Meinhart, who specialized in computer-aided design and occasionally 

assisted Krupnick’s group on projects. At the time of his termination, Meinhart was 59 years 

old, which Plaintiff argues bolsters her claim that she was laid off based on her age. 

To show that Defendant’s proffered reasons for discharge were pretextual, a plaintiff may 

show that employer’s proffered reasons: “1) [had] no basis in fact; 2) did not actually motivate 

the employer’s challenged conduct; or 3) [were] insufficient to motivate the employer’s 

challenged conduct.” Skelton, 249 F. App’x at 460 (citing Wexler, 317 F.3d at 574). Here, 

though Plaintiff presents arguments to suggest that there may have been other reasons behind 

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 19 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>
20 

Defendant’s decision, she fails to show that those reasons were not based in fact, did not actually 

motivate Defendant’s termination decision, or were insufficient to motivate Defendant’s 

decision. Plaintiff’s proffered reasons do not overcome Defendant’s grounds for selecting 

Krupnick for termination. In failing to present any issues of material fact as to this final step in 

the McDonnell Douglas test, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons were merely a pretext. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 

GRANTED. This case is hereby DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Algenon L. Marbley 

 ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 13, 2014

Case: 2:12-cv-00273-ALM-EPD Doc #: 35 Filed: 03/13/14 Page: 20 of 20 PAGEID #: <pageID>