Defense Science Board 

Task Force 

on 

Deployment of Members of the 

National Guard and Reserve in 

the Global War on Terrorism 

September 2007 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to 

the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this 

report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

The DSB Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve 

in the Global War on Terrorism completed its information gathering in May 2007. 

This report is UNCLASSIFIED and releasable to the public.




TABLE OF CONTENTS I v

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary.......................................................................................vii

Chapter 1. Introduction..................................................................................1

Task Force Challenge...............................................................................4

Chapter 2. The Current Environment..........................................................6

Increased Use of Reserves.......................................................................6

Mobilization Status ...................................................................................8

Chapter 3. Impact of Increased Operational Tempo 

 on the Armed Forces...................................................................... 11

End Strength Achievement .................................................................. 11

Mental Health, Earnings, and Dependent Care ................................ 14

Preserving Force Structure and Mission Capability.......................... 16

Civil Support Missions .......................................................................... 17

Chapter 4. Optimal Length and Frequency of Deployment...................20

Utilization of the Total Force Policy................................................... 20

The New Policy is Not Feasible .......................................................... 23

Rethinking the Future Total Force Structure .................................... 23

Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations.......................................27

Appendix A. Terms of Reference ...............................................................31

Appendix B. Panel Membership..................................................................34

Appendix C. Presentations to the Task Force...........................................35

Appendix D. Mobilization Statutes.............................................................37

Appendix E. Utilization of the Total Force...............................................38

Appendix F. Impact of Increase in BCTs on Dwell Time......................41

Appendix G. Glossary ..................................................................................43

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I vii

Executive Summary 

Use of the reserve components in support of overseas contingencies 

has increased significantly since September 11, 2001 and the U.S. invasion 

of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the number of reserve component 

members on active duty has declined over the past few years, from a peak 

in May 2003, the current level still remains far higher than in decades past. 

This level of effort is expected to continue as long as the reserves are 

used as part of the rotational force supporting these ongoing operations. 

These circumstances have evoked considerable concern over whether 

such use can be sustained by the service members called to duty and, 

equally important, whether such use might affect the viability of the allvolunteer force over the long run. Thus, the Defense Science Board, 

under direction by Congress, examined the issue of length and frequency 

of the deployment of members of the National Guard and reserves in the 

global war on terrorism. 

The findings and recommendations resulting from this study are 

as follows: 

 The task force was impressed with the dedication and 

professionalism of the members of the National Guard and 

reserves. They are performing to a very high standard under 

great strain. The task force is very concerned for their future if 

the strain is not relieved. 

 Given current levels of operational demand, today’s Army 

active, National Guard, and reserve force structure will not 

support DOD’s policy mandating dwell times of one year 

deployed and two years not deployed (1:2) for the active force 

and one year mobilized and five years not mobilized (1:5) for 

the reserve components. End-strength increases currently 

authorized will not be sufficient to meet the established goals. 

 Task force discussions with representatives of the National 

Guard, the reserves, employers, family members, and the state 

governors demonstrated a consensus that 1:5 dwell time would 

satisfy their needs for predictability and sustainability. 
viii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 The DOD policy mandating a 1-year maximum mobilization 

period for guard and reserve units demands that the maximum 

possible pre-deployment training occur at home station. At the 

least, this policy will result in substantially increased costs for 

equipment to enable home station training. Additionally, 

mechanisms will have to be established to facilitate this 

increased pre-mobilization training, adding to costs and family 

disruption. It is unclear how much training can be conducted in 

the pre-mobilization period, but best estimates are 70–80 days 

in the year prior to mobilization. 

 DOD should consider establishing health care savings accounts 

for mobilized reserve members to allow a choice of either using 

the reservist’s employer-sponsored health plan for family 

members or transitioning the family into TRICARE for the 

period of mobilization. This is a benefit already enjoyed by 

mobilized civilians employed by DOD. 

 The task force recommends that the current Army force 

structure be reviewed in light of the increased use of the guard 

and reserve and the dual mission of the National Guard for 

homeland security and civil support. 

 The task force believes that concern over insufficient National 

Guard and reserve equipment available to meet domestic 

emergency requirements can be alleviated by the use of 

innovative contracting mechanisms between the Department 

of Homeland Security and the private sector. 
INTRODUCTION I 1

Chapter 1. Introduction 

America’s all-volunteer force (AVF) serves the nation with 

distinction. Its genesis in the aftermath of the Vietnam War reflected 

many of the lessons learned from using conscription in an unpopular 

war. Given the size of the American population and the force 

requirements of the Department of Defense after Vietnam, it was no 

longer possible to have conscription that in any way asked for an equal 

sacrifice of all draft-eligible citizens. Moreover, key decision-makers 

recognized that the support of the American people would be essential to 

the success of any future conflict, so the force was structured in such a 

manner that it was almost impossible to conduct major combat 

operations without mobilizing the National Guard and reserves. Over the 

next few decades the AVF in both the active and reserve components, 

with lower turnover and higher retention, developed into a superb 

professional force However, at the time it was instituted it was generally 

not expected that an all-volunteer force could be sustained during a 

protracted period of combat. A fundamental question today is: can it be? 

The cornerstone of the military after Vietnam was the all-volunteer 

force and a total force policy that gave due consideration to the costs and 

capabilities of active, National Guard, and reserve forces. For the Army, 

the division became the “coin of the realm.” Army leadership wrestled 

with force design problems associated with creating 18 divisions out of a 

force of 780,000 active component soldiers. The solution was to better 

integrate active and reserve forces with National Guard units as “roundout brigades” within selected divisions. This solution did two things: it 

allowed greater combat strength at fixed cost (reserve component units 

are less expensive in peace time) and it provided a structure that 

promised to take hometown USA to war with the military. 

Compared to today, during the Cold War the nation committed a 

higher percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense with 6.2 

percent generally representing the buildup in defense spending under 

President Ronald Reagan. From 1972 to 1989 the post-Vietnam “hollow 

force” was completely rebuilt—its people, equipment, training, and, most 

importantly, its professionalism. The cost of the total force was relatively 

high. After the Cold War some looked for a peace dividend. Between 
2 I CHAPTER 1 

1989 and 2001 the percentage of GDP committed to defense fell to 4.8 

percent, while spending on entitlements (Medicare, Medicaid, and Social 

Security) rose from 6.7 percent of GDP to over 8 percent over the same 

period. However, even as the nation’s commitment of resources to the 

military has decreased since 1989, the world has become even more 

unstable and unpredictable, with the frequency of deployments far 

exceeding the operational pace of the Cold War. 

Operation Desert Shield provided the first real test of combat 

operations for the all-volunteer force. While the efficacy of the round out 

brigade concept for no-notice operations was problematic, the results 

were overwhelmingly positive. Improvements in developing a 

professional military allowed leaders at all levels to quickly grasp changes, 

adjust their plans, and execute based upon the superb training they had 

received. The emphasis on jointness with joint war fighting seminars 

improved individual service understanding of the geometry of the joint 

battlefield which, in turn, enabled improved joint operations. While not 

perfect, Operation Desert Storm generally exceeded expectations and set 

a high standard for future operations. 

Since Desert Storm, facing reduced budgets and the lack of analysis 

associated with a quantifiable threat, the military entered a period of 

transformation from a threat-based force to a capabilities-based force. 

Various initiatives such as the “base force” attempted to limit force 

reductions. However, pressure to cut taxes and balance the budget 

restricted the size and capabilities of the force. To cope with the 

increased demands and reduced resources the services developed new 

and innovative programs, such as the Air Expeditionary Force 

developed by the Air Force. The primary objective of these changes 

was to preserve maximum military capabilities for the nation given a 

reduction in resources of over $750 billion (actual versus planned 

spending) in the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

The military adjusted. Plans changed and priorities shifted to better 

reflect the new world. Available resources limited modernization 

programs but training was sustained. Operations in areas such as Bosnia 

reflected the reality of a changed world. Indicators were monitored to 

ensure the quality of personnel entering the force did not slip below 

acceptable levels. 
INTRODUCTION I 3

One of the functions of the U.S. military, and embedded in the 

capabilities-based force, is to provide military support to civilian 

authorities during periods of crisis. Force structure allocation rules 

never took into consideration the requirements for military support to 

civilian authority because it was impossible to predict; but historically 

force structure size had been sufficient to address these requirements—

that is, it was always considered “the lesser included case.” The 

National Guard, because of its flexibility under titles 10 and 32 U.S. 

Code, has always been the lead component for the military in this 

critical mission. However, the other two components—active and 

federal reserve—have been used as required. 

No force in history has been more capable of conducting classical 

military operations than the force that secured Baghdad in 2003. 

Experienced leadership, superbly trained troops, and the best 

equipment in the world enabled this force to achieve its assigned 

military objectives relatively quickly. The challenge was not as much 

about winning the war as it was about securing the peace—what has 

become known as stability operations. 

This fundamental issue has been debated in various circles since the 

end of the Cold War. Many argue that conducting stability operations, 

to include rebuilding nation states, is not a job for the military. Rather, 

military capabilities should be preserved to win the nation’s wars. As 

the nation has discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, wars are rarely won 

simply by defeating enemy forces. They are normally won only when a 

stable set of political circumstances is created in the aftermath of an 

enemy’s defeat, and this usually will require a period of post-conflict 

stabilization. The facts are that instability threatens both the global 

order and the global economy. This instability has to be dealt with and 

the military must take a leading role in addressing that challenge. Peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and other terms have become a part of 

military vocabulary and doctrine. Interagency cooperation and capacity 

are recognized as vital, but difficult and expensive to attain. 

Large-scale stability operations, such as those ongoing in 

Afghanistan and Iraq today, call into question the structure, alignment, 

and mix of the AVF. The joint combined arms team, while ideal for 

military operations, is not well suited to provide security and establish 
4 I CHAPTER 1 

the basic structure of civil government. The standard U.S. Army 

division, so important during the Cold War, had to be adapted to meet 

the specific requirements of stabilization missions. Most importantly, 

this force was not designed to conduct these types of operations over a 

sustained period of time. Personnel policies tend to work against unit 

cohesion, and measures to mitigate these policies such as “stop loss” 

tend to be wildly unpopular. More of the defense budget is being spent 

on recruiting and retaining this force, calling into question the balance 

between manning and equipping the force. 

Nonetheless, the nation is committed to maintaining an allvolunteer force even as it must be adapted to meet the demands of the 

security environment today and into the future—particularly if one 

agrees, as does this task force, that stability operations will remain a 

significant part of the military’s mission. This report addresses one 

aspect of the challenges faced by the U.S. military today that has many 

implications throughout the force—the impact of deployment demands 

on the reserve components.1

Task Force Challenge 

Subsequent to Hurricane Katrina, Senator David Vitter (R-Louisiana) 

inserted language in the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense 

Authorization Act tasking the Defense Science Board (DSB) to conduct 

a study on the impact of deployment of members of the National Guard 

and reserves in the global war on terrorism.2 The deployment of the 

Louisiana National Guard brigade combat team to Iraq at the time of 

Hurricane Katrina motivated this request. 

 

1. There are seven reserve components: Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force 

Reserve, Air National Guard, Navy Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve, which are part of the 

Department of Defense. The seventh component is the Coast Guard Reserve, which is part of 

the Department of Homeland Security but works closely with DOD. Together these seven 

reserve components comprise 1.1 million members; in comparison, approximately 1.4 million 

members serve in the active components. Data in this report reflect the DOD reserve 

components, unless otherwise noted. 

2. A complete terms of reference and task force membership are in Appendices A and B. 
INTRODUCTION I 5

The legislation directed the task force to address four specific issues: 

1. Identify the current range of lengths and frequencies of 

deployments of members of the National Guard and reserves. 

2. Assess the consequences for force structure, morale, and 

mission capability of deployments of members of the National 

Guard and the reserves in the course of the global war on 

terrorism that are lengthy, frequent, or both. 

3. Identify the optimal length and frequency of deployments of 

members of the National Guard and reserves during the global 

war on terror. 

4. Identify mechanisms to reduce the length, frequency, or both of 

deployments of members of the National Guard and reserves 

during the global war on terrorism 

This report responds to the congressionally directed request and 

presents the findings and conclusions of the study. 
6 I CHAPTER 2 

Chapter 2. The Current Environment 

In March 2003, U.S. forces invaded Iraq in what became known as 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. American forces included both active duty 

and reserve forces. The original plan was for U.S. forces to be 

withdrawn quickly after hostilities had ended, much as they had in 

Desert Storm in the early 1990s. Indeed by May 1, 2003, President Bush 

declared the end of major combat operations. But the planned decrease 

in the U.S. forces did not take place. An insurgent operation developed 

with increased sectarian violence as ethnic groups gained new freedom. 

To meet this new and prolonged threat, the U.S. military rotated units 

and even individual service members, both active and reserve, serving 

in Iraq. Today some soldiers and Marines are on their third, fourth, and 

even fifth rotation. 

Over time, the frequency of deployments and the time between 

deployments, or dwell time as it has become known, has become a point 

of deep concern both in and outside the military. What impact will the 

frequent deployments and short dwell times have on the morale and 

health of both active and reserve soldiers and their families? 

Increased Use of Reserves 

Figure 1 shows the number of reserve members mobilized each 

month to support the Afghanistan and Iraq operations and how 

mobilization levels changed over time. Over 575,000 National Guard and 

reserve members have been mobilized since September 11, 2001 (as of 

May 31, 2007) in support of the attacks of September 11 (Operation 

Noble Eagle), operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), 

and operations in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom). After September 11, 

75,835 members were mobilized at the height of operations in 

Afghanistan. At the close of major combat operations in Afghanistan, 

troop levels began to decline, only to spike to more than 213,000 troops 

when the United States invaded Iraq. Since then, numbers of reserves on 

active duty in support of these operations have risen and fallen in 
THE CURRERNT ENVIRONMENT I 7

response to changing requirements, but overall show a slowly declining 

trend in mobilization levels to 99,697 troops in May 2007. 

Note: Data show reserve members activated under title 10 USC 12301(d) or 12302 in support of 

Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, through May 2007. 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Figure 1. Reserve Component Members on Active Duty

Although all the reserve components have contributed to these 

operations, the largest impact has fallen on the ground forces, principally 

the U.S. Army. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are the 

largest of the reserve components, totaling 538,971 soldiers—nearly 65 

percent of the selected reserve (832,116 members).3

 Thus, this report 

focuses primarily on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, as it is 

 

3. The 1.1 million members of the seven reserve components are distributed as follows: 

832,116 selected reserve and 256,367 individual ready reserve (May 31, 2007). All are subject 

to mobilization. The members of the selected reserve are drilling, paid reservists; the 

individual ready reserves are non-unit manpower that can be used to individually augment 

units. 
8 I CHAPTER 2 

the Army that is under the most operational stress, requiring high use of 

the reserves. That said, many of the same issues discussed in this 

report—equipment, cross-leveling, recruiting and retention concerns, 

medical, employers, and family—are currently also of interest to the U.S. 

Marine Corps Reserve and may be future issues for the Air Force and 

Navy as well. So the conclusions and recommendations in this report 

have applicability across the reserve components. 

 

Table 1. Selected Reserve Personnel Activated since September 11, 2001 

Total Mobilized 

Service Component Number Percent 

Mobilized 

Once 

Mobilized 

More Than 

Once 

Not 

Mobilized 

Total 

Strength 

Guard 168,213 47.9% 134,499 33,714 183,187 351,400 Army Reserve 92,812 49.5% 72,492 20,320 94,759 187,571 

Navy Reserve 21,092 30.6% 18,681 2,411 47,833 68,925 

Marine 

Corps 

Reserve 21,305 54.9% 16,567 4,738 17,475 38,780 

Air Guard 45,712 43.4% 24,315 21,397 59,629 105,341 

Force Reserve 34,472 47.8% 14,210 20,262 37,713 72,185 

TOTAL

Selected 

Reserve 383,606 46.5% 279,214 104,392 440,596 824,202 

Note: Data indicate reserve component members mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle, 

Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, as of May 31, 2007. 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Mobilization Status 

The reserves can be called to long-term active duty under five 

different statutes, as authorized in title 10 of the U.S. Code. They range 

from full mobilization (U.S.C. 12301[a]), which requires a declaration of 

war or national emergency by the Congress, to reserve component 

volunteers (12301[d]), which requires consent of the individual reserve 

component member and consent from the governor to activate 

individuals in the National Guard. The various mobilization statutes 
THE CURRERNT ENVIRONMENT I 9

determine how many reservists can be called up, to whom the call up 

applies, and the duration of the call up.4

 

To support the national response to the attacks of September 11, 

2001, and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of 

Defense was authorized, under Executive Order 13223 (September 14, 

2001) to activate the National Guard and reserves under partial 

mobilization authority. Partial mobilization requires a declaration of 

national emergency and applies to the ready reserve. Not more than a 

million members of the reserve components can be called up under this 

authority and they may not serve for more than two years. Prior to 

January 2007, DOD policy authorized these involuntary call ups for 

cumulative periods up to 24 months. 

The Army, because of its policy dictating standard tour lengths for 

active and reserve component units, has been calling up reserve 

component units for 16-18 months. This allowed for four months of predeployment training for the unit in the continental United States under 

the auspices of the First Army, 12 months of “boots on the ground” in 

Iraq or Afghanistan, and time for post-deployment leave and 

demobilization. Two Army National Guard brigade combat teams 

(BCTs) were mobilized for 21 months because of required training to 

transition to new equipment prior to deployment. Two National Guard 

BCTs have been called-up for a second time as of May 2007, four 

additional National Guard BCTs, or parts thereof, have been alerted for a 

potential second mobilization and deployment, if necessary, in the first 

half of calendar year 2008. 

Although the current demand for deployed combat forces in Iraq 

and Afghanistan is relatively high, approximately 55 percent of Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve personnel and approximately 35 

percent of the Army active component personnel have not been 

mobilized for deployments to the Central Command theater of 

operations.5

 In addition, some units have not been mobilized because 

 

4. Appendix D contains an overview of the title 10 mobilization statutes. 

5. These are individual mobilizations, not unit mobilizations. The reasons for the disparity are 

not clear but may be due to a greater proportion of the skill sets in the reserve components that 
10 I CHAPTER 2 

their members have specialties that are not required in active theaters. 

There are also deployment requirements outside the continental United 

States for which reserve component units have been mobilized—the 

Sinai battalion and presence in Kosovo are two examples. 

With this brief overview as a backdrop, the next chapter examines the 

impact of this increased operational tempo on reserve component members. 

 

have no utility in the Central Command area of responsibility during the current phase of 

operations. 
IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL TEMPO I 11

Chapter 3. Impact of Increased Operational 

Tempo on the Armed Forces 

The task force examined a number of issues to gain an understanding 

of the impact this increased use of the reserve components has had on 

the military departments as well as the individual servicemen and women 

and their families. The sections that follow provide an overview of these 

issues, which include end strength achievement; mental health, earnings, 

and dependent care; preserving force structure; and civil support missions. 

The chapter also provides recommended policy changes, where appropriate. 

End Strength Achievement 

The reserve components, across all the services, were able to 

achieve approximately 97 percent of authorized end strength in fiscal 

year 2006. This success represented a reversal of the downward trend of 

the previous two years. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 

the largest of the reserve components, achieved 98.9 percent and 92.7 

percent of authorized end strength, respectively, as shown in table 2. 

Table 2. Army National Guard and Reserve Strength (end of fiscal year 2006)

Authorized 

Strength

Assigned 

Strength

Percent 

Achieved

Army National Guard 350,000 346,288 98.9 

Army Reserve 205,000 189,975 92.7 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

The Army National Guard end strength grew from 333,000 to 

346,000 in fiscal year 2006, while the Army Reserve has remained 

steady at roughly 190,000. (The Army Reserve authorized end strength 

was reduced from 205,000 to 200,000 in fiscal year 2007, but 

subsequently has been raised for fiscal year 2008 to 205,000; the Army 
12 I CHAPTER 3 

National Guard authorized end strength has increased to 351,300, both 

on the basis of recruiting success in fiscal year 2006.) 

The retention of reserve component members was the highest since 

fiscal year 1991, as a result of increases in reenlistment bonuses in fiscal 

year 2006. The Army National Guard total reenlistment bonuses grew 

from $27 million in fiscal year 2004 to $308 million in fiscal year 2006, 

and the Army Reserve bonus pool grew from $3 million to $140 million 

over the same period. The increase in bonuses was only the direct cost 

the government paid for higher retention. Service members who 

reenlisted in theater do not pay income tax on their reenlistment 

bonuses, which enhanced the value of the bonuses to the service 

members reenlisting. However it also increased the cost of the program 

to the government through the loss of the tax revenues usually paid on 

reenlistment bonuses. 

Similarly, reserve component recruiting fared well in fiscal year 2006 

due in part to increased use of enlistment bonuses (table 3). Between 

fiscal years 2004 and 2006, the cost of enlistment bonuses for the Army 

National Guard grew from $74 to $174 million and the Army Reserve 

enlistment bonuses grew from $35 to $71 million. Although the Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve are recruiting fewer “prior-service” 

recruits than they have traditionally, this could be a result of high 

retention rates in the Army’s active component. Thus, the pool of 

available prior service personnel is smaller than it would be under normal 

conditions. Current “prior service” enlistments are approximately 38 

percent for the Army National Guard, down from 61 percent in the mid 

1990s. Army Reserve prior service enlistments have dropped as well, 

falling from nearly 60 percent in the mid 1990s to 51.9 percent in 2006. 
IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL TEMPO I 13

Table 3. Army National Guard and Reserve Recruiting (fiscal year 2006)

Accession 

Goal

Accession 

Achieved

Percent Goal 

Achieved

Army National Guard 70,000 69,042 98.6 

Army Reserve 36,032 34,379 95.4 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Whether current recruiting success can be sustained into the future 

is in question. Recruiting and retention data, as collected, are not 

perfect predictors of an impending shortfall in end strength 

achievement. Youth propensity data can, however, provide some 

indication of the future recruiting environment. June 2006 Youth Poll 

data showed a 33 percent decline in the propensity of young men 

wanting to join the military from 21 percent in 2005 to 14 percent in 

2006—substantially below the 26 percent level of the mid-1980s. This 

decline in propensity for young men has driven total propensity, for 

men and women combined, to 10 percent, the lowest recorded level in 

more than two decades.6

 

Department of Defense polling data also show a decline in the 

number of parents who would recommend military service to youth. 

The percentage of parents, with children between the ages of 12 and 21, 

who say they are likely to recommend military service to their children 

fell from 70 to 40 percent between 2001 and 2002, and dropped to 

nearly 20 percent in June 2006—largely fueled by the ongoing conflict 

in Iraq.7

 These statistics suggest that a challenging recruiting 

environment is likely to persist for some time. 

 

6. Barbara A. Bicksler and Lisa G. Nolan. Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force: The Need for 

Sustained Investment in Recruiting Resources, Arlington, Va.: Strategic Analysis, Inc., 

September 2006. 

7. Kristen Roberts, “Military Sees Parents as Big Recruiting Barrier,” Reuters, Washington, 

May 11, 2007. 
14 I CHAPTER 3 

Mental Health, Earnings, and Dependent Care 

The impact that mobilization and deployment have had on mental 

health, earnings, and dependent care has also been discussed in the 

press. 

There have been stories in the media about post-traumatic stress 

disorder experienced by active duty and reserve members returning 

from deployments. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research has 

been tracking this issue and reports the rate of post-traumatic stress 

disorder for soldiers between 10 to 15 percent, occurring 3–12 months 

after a tour in Iraq. Moreover, post traumatic stress disorder can appear 

many years after actual exposure to combat. In fact, 15–30 percent of 

soldiers who experience combat will suffer some level of post-traumatic 

stress disorder during their lifetime.8

There is no evidence that reserve component soldiers are less 

mentally healthy than active soldiers; however, reserve soldiers report 

higher rates of concern about their mental health than do active soldiers 

when interviewed during their three-month post-deployment health 

assessments. The Walter Reed Institute attributes this disparity to the 

following: 

 Active component soldiers continue to work full time with their 

units, whereas reserve soldiers demobilize and lose the day-today support from unit peers. 

 Active component soldiers have steady access to the Army’s 

health facilities, while reserve component personnel often live 

far from Veterans Administration (VA) facilities, and may face 

legal barriers to receiving care if they fail to report problems 

soon after return from active service. 

 Reserve component soldiers face other stressors, such as sudden 

change after long deployment back to a full time civilian job. 

 

8. Briefing to the task force from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, February 2007. 
IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL TEMPO I 15

Recognizing the existence of long-term mental health 

problems among reserve members, DOD should support easing 

access to VA mental health facilities for members of the National 

Guard and reserve who have deployed to combat zones, even long 

after their deployment. 

A second area of concern has been a reported loss of earnings by 

some reserve component soldiers as a result of mobilization. A recent 

RAND study, however, using Social Security earnings, reports that 

earnings during mobilization for the average reserve component member 

was equal to or even greater than their pre-mobilization earnings. While 

some soldiers in highly skilled occupations and/or senior management 

positions may suffer a pay loss, the majority of reserve soldiers (over 80 

percent) do not, and some number actually experience an increase in 

compensation. Base pay, along with the special pay and bonuses for 

deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the tax-free status of the pay 

and bonuses while in a war zone, more than offset the civilian pay loss 

for the majority of mobilized guardsmen and reservists. 

A third concern is dependent care, particularly health care. Reserve 

component soldiers may not be able to take advantage of the many 

family support mechanisms enjoyed by active component soldiers 

simply because they may not reside near military facilities. Maintaining 

continuity of health care can be one of the most significant concerns 

because reserve soldiers may not be able to maintain the family health 

care plan provided by his/her civilian employer, thus forcing the family 

into the TRICARE network while the member is mobilized. 

DOD should consider maintaining a member’s civilian health 

plan while mobilized (that is, paying the full cost of the 

premium), just as the Department does now for its civilian 

employees who are mobilized. One possible mechanism for 

implementation could be to establish health care savings accounts for 

mobilized reservists to allow a choice of either using the reserve 

member’s employer-sponsored health plan for family members or 

transitioning the family into TRICARE for the period of mobilization. 

This change would considerably reduce the stress on family members 

who would not have to face a change in provider networks during the 

mobilization of their spouse or parent. 
16 I CHAPTER 3 

Preserving Force Structure and Mission Capability 

The military services have a number of management tools that can 

be used to sustain the reserve component force structure and mission 

capability in the face of increased op tempo. In fact, the services have 

taken a number of actions to reduce the current operational tempo and 

associated mobilization issues. 

Past Service Actions 

DOD explains the frequent deployments for some reserve units 

by saying that there are few of these types of units in the active 

components and the reserve forces have had to take up the workload. 

The military services have started to rebalance the mix of U.S. military 

capabilities within and between the active and reserve components to 

create more high demand units in the active components, reducing 

pressure on the National Guard and reserve. Between fiscal years 2003–

2006, about 89,000 personnel spaces were rebalanced across all the 

services. Rebalancing initiatives are expected to continue in the future, 

with an additional 36,000 spaces to be rebalanced between fiscal years 

2007–2012. 

The Department has also recommended a number of legislative 

changes designed to simplify manpower management rules, streamline 

personnel rules to provide seamless transitions, tailor compensation, and 

establish a sliding scale of benefits. The goal of these efforts is to make it 

easier for current service members to move from active to reserve status 

as the needs and preferences of their personal lives dictate. The hope is 

that a simpler system with greater options might encourage members to 

extend their service careers in part-time status—and perhaps even return 

to full-time status later—rather than leave the force. Further, the 

Department is also working to create new affiliation programs to broaden 

opportunities for individuals to contribute to DOD missions. Alternative 

types of affiliation for varying periods of time might be attractive to 

individuals for whom the traditional active and reserve affiliation is not. 

Other mitigating actions to increase the pool of available personnel 

include the creation and use of provisional units by drawing on 

underutilized skills to meet certain mission requirements. Drawing from 
IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL TEMPO I 17

underutilized skills sets in other components has also been employed. 

More effective use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is yet another 

option. The IRR offers an important resource and can be employed to 

augment deploying units while mindful of the need for unit cohesion. 

Other Management Tools 

“Stop loss” is a procedure to involuntarily keep a member on active 

duty beyond the separation date specified in their enlistment contract. 

Most of the time stop loss is used to prevent separation during 

deployment. “Stop movement” prevents a reserve component member 

from changing units if his or her unit has been alerted for mobilization. 

While these tools can be effective in preserving unit integrity prior to 

and during a mobilization, their use can be unpopular with the 

individuals affected. 

An additional option for a unit commander prior to a mobilization 

is “cross leveling.” Under this practice, a unit commander can solicit 

“volunteers” from other units to fill a unit vacancy. This practice has a 

waterfall effect in that it then leaves the providing unit with a vacant 

billet if it is mobilized. 

Civil Support Missions 

The National Guard has both federal and state missions—

responsible to the federal government for national security missions, 

such as the war in Iraq, as well as to the governors of each state for 

state missions. Principle state missions include disaster response and 

support to law enforcement activities as prescribed by state law. 

Because the genesis for this study was the National Guard response to 

Hurricane Katrina, at a time when many of the state’s guardsmen were 

deployed to Iraq, the task force examined the effect that the deployed 

troops had on the Hurricane Katrina response efforts. Had the 

deployment hampered response efforts in Louisiana? Has it had a 

significant impact on other natural disasters in recent years? 

The military response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest and 

fastest response to a natural disaster in the history of the United States. 

Within 11 days of landfall, more than 45,000 National Guard soldiers 
18 I CHAPTER 3 

from every state in the nation and more than 20,000 active duty soldiers 

deployed to the Gulf Coast to assist the response effort. During the 

response to Hurricane Katrina, states used the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC), a legal framework established in the wake 

of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, to flow National Guard soldiers and other 

first responders into the region from states across the country. 

Through use of EMAC, Louisiana and the other Gulf States were 

able to compensate for the absence of substantial numbers of their own 

guard troops who were deployed to Iraq and elsewhere. While it could be 

argued, in some circumstances, that out-of-state units may not be as 

timely, there are many factors that determine speed of deployment, 

including timeliness of decision-making and the readiness and training of 

units in and around affected areas. Further, the task force examined the 

recent availability of National Guard personnel and observed that in most 

states, at least 85 percent of the guard was available (as of May 31, 2007).9

 

Although the response to Hurricane Katrina was not impeded by a 

shortage of available personnel, equipment levels for non-deployed 

guard units have declined as a result of operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, which may have hindered the effectiveness of response 

operations. Not only has organic equipment been shipped with 

deploying units, some of that equipment is being left in theater when 

the unit returns. And even if the resources are authorized to replace 

equipment losses, it will take time to do so. Thus, concerns about 

declining equipment levels in the National Guard will continue to be a 

significant issue in terms of the nation’s preparedness to respond to 

domestic catastrophes in the future. 

The task force learned during its deliberations that the state adjutants 

general are unanimous in their view that the real issue is the lack of 

equipment, not the capabilities of the National Guard. The Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in January 2007 concluding 

that Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have significantly 

decreased the amount of National Guard equipment in the continental 

 

9. Exceptions were Minnesota (78%), Connecticut (76%), Kentucky (81%), South Carolina 

(83%), Alaska (81%), Nebraska (82%), Arizona (80%), and Guam (76%). 
IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL TEMPO I 19

United States. The GAO’s January 2007 report is one of many it has 

issued raising concerns about National Guard equipment levels and their 

impact on the readiness of the guard to conduct civil support missions 

since the start of operations in Iraq in 2003. 

At the time of this report, 88 percent of the non-deployed Army 

National Guard units are reporting “not operationally ready” due to 

equipment shortfalls. The Army has programmed $23 billion across the 

future years defense plan to increase the equipment levels in the guard 

to reduce shortfalls and to allow its members to train using the same 

equipment they would operate if mobilized and deployed. 

If the nation expects its reserve components to be used repeatedly 

in the years ahead, Congress and DOD must ensure that this $23 billion 

remains a high priority so that the guard can remain responsive to both 

its federal and state missions. 

Determining whether the National Guard has sufficient manpower 

and equipment to conduct civil support missions is difficult because the 

Department of Defense has not clearly articulated the military 

requirements for civil support missions. Multiple outside organizations, 

including the Defense Science Board, have highlighted the 

Department’s failure to address civil support requirements sufficiently 

in light of the post 9/11 security environment.10 Although the military 

response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest and fastest in the nation’s 

history, for those Americans waiting to be rescued days after landfall, 

the response effort fell far short. Until the Department, working closely 

with the Department of Homeland Security, defines requirements for 

civil support missions, it will be difficult to determine definitively 

whether the National Guard is sufficiently manned, postured, or 

equipped to respond to the full range of potential catastrophes, as 

envisioned in the fifteen National Planning Scenarios published by the 

Homeland Security Council. 

 

10. See for example: The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, The Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, July 2006; Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic 

Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60, January 26, 2007. 
20 I CHAPTER 4 

Chapter 4. Optimal Length and 

Frequency of Deployment 

The task force evaluated what might be “optimal” in terms of length 

and frequency of deployment of the National Guard and reserves. To 

gain an understanding of the issues, the members met with the senior 

leadership of the guard and reserve for all the services, the active duty 

organizations who employ the reserve units in current contingencies, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, family support organizations, employer support 

associations, and the National Governors Association. 

Among the people and organizations with whom the task force 

conferred, there was a clear consensus that that the mobilization of 

reserve forces should be: 

 predictable 

 no more than one year mobilized in every six 

 of no more than 12 months 

 with minimum cross-leveling to preserve unit cohesion 

While this very closely parallels the new reserve component 

mobilization policy issued by the Secretary of Defense, the task force is 

unaware of any analysis to see under what conditions all of these items 

can be met simultaneously. To put it another way, given the current 

situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not at all clear if any of these 

conditions can be met and also meet the operational requirements of 

commands for “boots on the ground.” 

Utilization of the Total Force Policy 

On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense signed out a new 

policy for the “Utilization of the Total Force” (a copy of the policy 

memo is at Appendix E). This new policy was intended to achieve several 

objectives: 1) develop a sustainable force rotation policy for the long 
OPTIMAL DEPLOYMENT I 21

term; 2) spread the burden of operational demands across all 

components—active, guard, and reserve; 3) provide predictability to 

service members, family members, and employers; and 4) maintain the 

all-volunteer force for the long war. 

The key features of the new policy are: 

 Set planning objectives: 

- goal for active component units and members of one year 

deployed and two years non-deployed 

- goal for reserve component units and members of one year 

deployed and five years demobilized. 

 Minimize stop loss for both active duty and reserve forces. 

 Establish a new program to compensate and provide incentives 

to active and reserve members required to deploy/mobilize 

early or often, or extend beyond new rotation goals. 

 Provide hardship waivers that recognize exceptional 

circumstances facing members and families of mobilized/ 

deployed members. 

 Manage mobilization of reserve component ground forces on a 

unit basis. 

 Limit involuntary mobilizations of reserve component units and 

members to a maximum one-year. 

There are many implications of this new policy for the reserve 

component. The most prominent change will be to the Army Reserve 

training and “boots on the ground” cycles for deployment to Iraq 

and Afghanistan. First, the previous practice of mobilizing troops for 16–

18 months allowed four months of unit training and 12 months of 

deployed time. Under the new policy, with involuntary unit mobilizations 

limited to a maximum of one year, some portion of that four months 

training will have to be conducted in the year prior to mobilization. 

The Army is in the process of developing a new mobilization training 

model that moves about three quarters of the required training formally 

done after mobilization to the year before mobilization. The goal is to 
22 I CHAPTER 4 

limit post-mobilization training to just 45 days, allowing for 320 days of 

deployed “boots on the ground” in county. It is still not clear how the 

Army will accomplish this, and issues, such as how a unit’s premobilization training will be validated, remain in question. Success of the 

plan will rely in part on stability of personnel within the units during the 

year prior to mobilization and may require some form of “stop loss.” 

A second issue is the availability of equipment needed for the 

Army National Guard and Army Reserve units to accomplish the 

required pre-mobilization training at their home station. As discussed in 

the previous chapter, the Army has programmed $23 billion across the 

future years defense plan (FYDP) to upgrade equipment levels in the 

guard. But it is the task force’s understanding that this was to replace 

equipment lost and worn out in Iraq and Afghanistan and does not 

include new equipment for pre-mobilization training. Moreover, the 

new training equipment will be needed immediately if the new policy is 

to go into effect. 

The Deputy Commander of the First Army, the unit charged with 

managing the pre-mobilization training, indicated that at least two 

months of the former four-month training cycle would be shifted to the 

pre-mobilization year. This additional training, even if it is done locally 

at state training facilities, will take soldiers away from their families and 

their civilian jobs and is still a “mobilization absence.” The task force 

did not understand how this materially reduced the stress on service 

members, their families, and their employers. 

A third issue is the how the new plan will meet the combatant 

commander’s requirements for brigade combat teams and support 

brigades. A full-up BCT requires a National Training Center (NTC) 

rotation in addition to the normal unit pre-deployment training. It 

appears that current requirements are for units to achieve proficiency up 

to the level of counterinsurgency missions rather than full-spectrum 

combat. However, if the combatant commander determined that full-up 

BCTs are needed, under the new policy that requirement could only be 

met by active component units, that have the time to train at the NTC. 
OPTIMAL DEPLOYMENT I 23

The New Policy is Not Feasible 

The task force has concluded that the new policy is not feasible. 

The current operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with 

other overseas requirements, has resulted in a dwell time—that is, time 

between deployments—of about one year for the active component 

(one year deployed and one year at home) and about three years for the 

reserve component (1:3). With a current active force structure of 42 

BCTs and a National Guard force structure of 32 BCTs, the new total 

force utilization policy goals of two years dwell time for active forces 

(1:2) and five years dwell time for reserve members (1:5) is not 

achievable without a substantial reduction in deployed tempo. Even 

with a planned increase in total BCTs to 76 (48 in the active and 28 in 

the reserve component) the dwell time goals cannot be achieved.11 

Unfortunately, the task force has no answer today to the question 

of whether current requirements in Iraq will remain constant or change, 

and when or for how much longer. Nor can the task force predict the 

long-term impact on the force, of a shorter dwell time then that set by 

the new policy. Some experts that talked to the task force, however, are 

concerned that if the force begins to wear down from the stress of 

current operations, the Department will have little warning, and once 

such a problem becomes apparent, it will be very difficult to reverse. 

Rethinking the Future Total Force Structure 

Currently, the Army has allocated more than 50 percent of its 

combat structure in its reserve components—principally in brigade 

combat teams in the National Guard. During peacetime, maintaining 

such a large percentage of force structure in the reserve component 

made sense. The nation paid for just enough readiness for those reserve 

units to keep them available with some level of additional training prior 

to deployment. Today, reserve units are being used at a much higher 

 

11. The reduction in National Guard BCTs from 32 to 28 was recommended in the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review. Appendix F contains an analysis of the number of BCTs 

required to meet current requirements within the conditions set out in the Secretary’s new 

policy. 
24 I CHAPTER 4 

operational tempo than envisioned—they are part of the rotation base 

for sustained overseas operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 

fact, the Army leadership claims that the guard and reserve are now 

“operational” reserve forces instead of the “strategic” reserve forces of 

previous years. The task force saw no evidence to suggest that the 

Army has taken any steps to enable its reserve force to actually achieve 

operational reserve status. 

Because reserve component brigades rotate less frequently than 

those in the active component, and because the new DOD force 

utilization policy ensures that they deploy for less than the year in which 

they are mobilized (because some of that year will be spent in predeployment training), it takes several reserve component brigades to 

give the nation the same level of deployment time that it gets from a 

single active component brigade. Some studies suggest that the nation 

may pay even more to keep a reserve brigade deployed for a year than 

for an active component brigade, depending on how often units are 

actually deployed.12 This outcome suggests a need to rethink how force 

structure is allocated between the active and reserve components for 

the global war on terrorism, which could involve lengthy stabilization 

and reconstruction periods following combat. The challenge the Army 

faces is buying forces based on whatever “future” they are planning for. 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Missions 

The observation of rebalancing the total force between active and 

reserve components was also made in the Defense Science Board 2004 

Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities. That study observed: “In 

fact, if, as has been the case since the end of the cold war, the United 

States becomes involved in a new and additional stabilization and 

reconstruction operation every two years, and if, as history has shown, 

it typically takes five to eight years to disengage from a stabilization and 

reconstruction activity—and sometimes longer—there is an 

accumulating need for skilled personnel stationed abroad.” The impact 

of such a trend is notionally depicted in figure 2. 

 

12. Briefing to the task force by RAND Corporation, May 2007. 
OPTIMAL DEPLOYMENT I 25

Source: Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities

Figure 2. Human Resource Requirement for Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations

This task force supports two other observations from that study: 

1. “The force sizing construct used since World War II needs to be 

changed... A smaller force may be needed to defeat opponents 

than that needed for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) 

operations.” Stabilization and reconstruction operations are 

manpower-intensive, and thus usually require a larger deployed 

force than most conceivable major combat operations. Further, 

stabilization operations tend to last a long time, and thus require 

a rotation base that is larger than the deployed force. 

2. “The implication for force structure is significant.... 

Tomorrow’s force (active and reserve components) needs a 

much stronger set of capabilities directed toward S&R, 

particularly knowledge of culture.” 

Clearly a reduction in the U.S. effort in the global war on terrorism 

would significantly reduce the demands on the reserve components. 

However, the Army cannot rely on such a change in national policy to 

resolve force utilization challenges. Moreover, its implication would 
26 I CHAPTER 4 

extend well beyond the frequency and/or length of reserve component 

deployments. Instead, the Army must give closer consideration to what 

force structure distribution will be better able to respond to future 

demands on the force, however they evolve. 

A change in the size of the force, already authorized, can have some 

impact. The Army’s active component is to grow in end strength at a 

rate of 7,000 service members per year through 2012. This increase 

should reduce some of the pressure on the reserve component. But a 

redistribution of the total force is probably required to achieve reduced 

utilization. For example, the majority of the Army’s combat support 

and combat service support is in the Army Reserve, and some portion 

of this capability would have to be put into the active component if 

demands on the Army Reserve are to be lessened. And while there are 

many reasons why 55 percent of reserve members have not deployed to 

Iraq and Afghanistan, one likely explanation is that the skill mix in the 

reserve component is not well matched to the needs of the ongoing 

operations. Both of these points suggest the need for a fundamental reexamination of the distribution of the force structure and individual 

skills across the Army’s total force. 
CONCLUSIONS I 27

Chapter 5. Conclusions and 

Recommendations 

Based on its study, described in the previous chapters, the task 

force offers the following conclusions: 

 If the global war on terrorism continues to require current or 

higher levels of operational tempo for the Army, the planning 

objectives for deploying the National Guard and Army Reserve 

in the new Secretary of Defense policy cannot be achieved with 

the current force structure. Even the additional authorized end 

strength for the active component will not make this policy 

achievable. 

 If the operational tempo decreases to allow achievement of the 

new policy goals, the guard and reserve forces might well cost 

more than they have traditionally because of equipment 

procurement, operation, and maintenance at the unit level for 

pre-mobilization training. Any additional costs will compete 

with the cost “to reset” the Army, recapitalize the other 

services, and support a larger active force structure in the Army. 

 Achieving the new policy goals will require a new mobilization 

training model and procurement of additional equipment for 

training. Much remains to be done to work though all aspects of 

this new training model to include pre-mobilization training 

time and the cost of remote training. 

 There is a fundamental tension between the Secretary of Defense 

guidance to minimize both “cross leveling” (through unit 

mobilizations versus individual mobilizations) and “stop loss.” 

Minimizing “stop loss” will create more unmanned spaces in units, 

thus calling for more cross-leveling as units prepare to deploy. 

 The current use of the National Guard is not placing the states 

in intolerable conditions concerning personnel availability. The 

compact among the states to support each other for major 

events is working. The issue for the states is the lack of 

equipment for use when needed. Thus, the states may need to 
28 I CHAPTER 4 

consider alternatives to relying on DOD equipment if a high 

operational tempo for the reserve components continues for 

the long run. 

 If the Department believes that the Global War on Terror is a 

generations-long conflict, the Army should examine the balance 

of its “total force” structure if it wishes to move toward 

meeting the policy objectives of the Secretary. 

Recommendations 

To ensure the new Secretary of Defense total force utilization 

policy can be achieved when operational demands are reduced, the 

Department should: 

 Capitalize on certification for individual and collective training 

during the pre-mobilization phase to the maximum extent 

possible. 

 Ensure adequate funding of individual and collective training 

during the pre-mobilization phase. 

 Ensure units are adequately equipped for training and deployment. 

 Consider alternative models to ensure minimum equipment sets 

are available for civil support missions. Having the Department of 

Homeland Security purchase equipment sets dedicated to the 

homeland defense/civil support mission is one such idea, possibly 

with pre-arranged contracts for civil operations, if needed. Another 

is to arrange for access to equipment through the use of innovative 

contracting mechanisms between the Department of Homeland 

Security and the private sector. 

 For mobilized members of the reserve component, conduct a 

study to determine the feasibility of funding the family 

employer-provided health care plan rather than forcing the 

family into the TRICARE network for the period of the 

mobilization. This is the same policy used for DOD civilian 

employees who are mobilized with the reserve component. 

This DSB task force supports the conclusions of the 2004 Defense 

Science Board summer study that the Army force sizing construct, used 
CONCLUSIONS I 29

since World War II, needs to be changed. However, the task force did 

not conduct any analysis to determine what total reallocation should look 

like, but observed that 28 BCTs of the Army total force of 70 BCTs are 

in the National Guard—the same force that has the dual mission of 

support of the states for homeland security and domestic catastrophes. 

The men and women of the National Guard and reserves are critical to 

the future of the all-volunteer force. Serving alongside their counterparts 

in the active component, they have become an essential element of the 

total force, contributing to operational missions around the world. In 

addition to its federal mission, the National Guard serves a state mission 

as well, responding to the needs of governors across the country. 

The role of the guard and reserve in the total force most certainly 

will continue, even with force restructuring. As such, it must be 

adequately resourced, as described in the pages of this report. Even 

with a decline in operational tempo, adequate resources for personnel, 

equipment, and training must be planned for and budgeted. These 

actions are essential to ensure the future of the all-volunteer force. And 

this realization is one not only for the Department of Defense, but for 

the nation as a whole—requiring support of the Congress, the executive 

branch, and the American public. 
30 I CHAPTER 4 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 31

Appendix A. Terms of Reference 


34 I APPENDIX B 

Appendix B. Panel Membership 

CHAIRMEN 

Name Affiliation

ADM Donald Pilling, USN (Ret.) LMI 

Gen Michael Williams, USMC (Ret.) LMI 

PANEL MEMBERS 

Gen Edward Eberhart, USAF (Ret.) AFBA 

MG Ron Harrison, AUS (Ret.) Harrison and Associates LLC 

LtGen Jan Huly, USMC (Ret.) Private Consultant 

Dr. Tom McNaugher RAND Corporation 

GEN Dennis Reimer, USA (Ret.) DFI International 

Dr. Bernard Rostker RAND Corporation 

Ms. Christine Wormuth CSIS 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

LtCol Greg Bennett, USMC Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs 

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPRESENTATIVE 

CDR Clifton Phillips, USN Defense Science Board Office 

ADVISORS 

Ms. Karen Heath Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

STAFF 

Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
PRESENTATIONS I 35

Appendix C. 

Presentations to the Task Force 

Name Topic

NOVEMBER 28, 2006 

DOD Standards of Conduct Ms. Judy Kim 

 Office of the General Counsel, Office of the 

 Secretary of Defense 

Discussion Hon. Thomas F. Hall 

 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Panel Discussion on Reserves LTG Jack Stultz 

 Chief, Army Reserve 

VADM John Cotton, USN 

 Chief, Navy Reserves 

MajGen Cornell Wilson, USMC 

 Director of Reserve Affairs 

Brig Gen Charles Ethredge, USAF 

 Deputy Chief, Air Force Reserves 

Panel Discussion on National Guard BG James Nuttall 

 Deputy Director, Army National Guard 

Maj Gen Richard Platt 

 Director, Air National Guard 

JANUARY 3–4, 2007 

Panel Discussion on Operational 

Requirements for Reserve Components 

in the Army 

Major General Michael Walter Symanski, USAR 

 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 (IMA) 

 Mobilization and Reserve Affairs 

Panel Discussion on Operational 

Requirements for Reserve Components 

in the Navy and Air Force 

Rear Admiral Timothy M. "Tim" Giardina 

 Director of Information, Plans, and Security, 

 OPNAV 

Maj. Gen. Dick Newton 

 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and 

 Information Operations, Plans and Requirements 

Impact of Deployment on Dependents Joyce Raezer and Kathleen Moakler 

 National Military Family Association 

The Future of the National Guard and 

Reserves 

Christine Wormuth 

 CSIS 

Discussion Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman 

 The Commission on the National Guard and 

 Reserves 
36 I APPENDIX C 

Joint Staff Perspective on Operational 

Requirements for the Reserve 

Components 

MG Tommy Dyches, USAF 

 Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

 of Staff for Reserve Matters 

MG Michael Sumrall, ARNG 

 Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

 of Staff for National Guard Matters 

FEBRUARY 5–6, 2007 

Mental Health of Activated Reservists COL Charles Hoge, USA 

 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 

Earnings of Activated Reservists Dr. Jacob Klerman 

 RAND 

Current Challenges Facing the National 

Guard 

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum 

 Chief, National Guard Bureau 

Operational Requirements for Reserve 

Components in the Marine Corps 

Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski 

 Deputy Commander for Plans, Policies, and 

 Operations 

Total Force Utilization Policy Hon. Thomas F. Hall 

 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Purpose of the Study Senator David Vitter 

 U.S. Senate 

Employer Perspective on Use of the 

Guard and Reserve 

Mr. Phil Pope 

 Deputy Executive Director, National Committee for 

 Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 

MARCH 20, 2007 

National Guard Gen Timothy Lowenberg 

 The Adjutant General, State of Washington 

Post-Mobilization, Pre-Deployment 

Training 

BG C. Stewart Rodeheaver 

 Deputy Commanding General, First Army 

APRIL 17, 2007 

Discussion Hon. Thomas F. Hall 

 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Discussion Vice Admiral. Harvey Johnson 

 Deputy Director, FEMA 

Army’s Response to Katrina Dr. Lynn Davis 

 RAND 

MAY 15, 2007 

State Use of National Guard Forces Nolan Jones 

 National Governors Association 

Cost of the Reserves Jacob Klerman 

 RAND 
GLOBALIZATION I 37

Appendix D. 

Mobilization Statutes 

The reserves components can be activated under five different title 

10 statutes as described in table D-1 below. 

Table D-1. Title 10 U.S. Code Mobilization Statutes 

Statute Authority Required Who Affected

12301 (a)

Full Mobilization 

• Requires congressional 

declaration of war or 

national emergency 

• Requires Congress to be in 

session 

• All reservists including members 

in an inactive status and required 

members 

• No number limitation 

• Duration of war or emergency 

plus six months 

12302

Partial 

Mobilization 

• Requires declaration of 

national emergency 

• Report to Congress every 

six months 

• Ready Reserve 

• Not more than 1,000,000 

members 

• Not more than 2 years 

12304

Presidential 

Reserve 

Call-up 

• Requires presidential 

signature 

• Notification of Congress 

• No congressional action 

required 

• Selected Reserve, with up to 

30,000 Individual Ready Reserve 

• Not more than 200,000 members 

• Not more than 365 days 

• Not for domestic emergencies 

except weapons of mass 

destruction 

12301 (b)

15-day Statute 

• Service secretaries may call 

Ready Reserve up to 15 

days per year 

• Annual training 

• Operational missions 

• Involuntary 

12301 (d)

Reserve 

Component 

Volunteers 

• Requires consent of 

individual reserve 

component member 

• Governors must consent to 

National Guard activation 

• All reservists 

• No number limitation stated 

• No duration stated 
38 I APPENDIX F 

Appendix E. 

Utilization of the Total Force 


UTILIZATION OF THE TOTAL FORCE I 41

Appendix F. Impact of Increase in BCTs 

on Dwell Time 

This appendix addresses two questions raised during the task force 

deliberations: 

1. What is the impact on dwell time of the six additional BCTs 

currently authorized? 

2. How many active component BCTs are required to meet the 

two-year dwell goal? 

Table F-1 indicates the total number of BCTs currently in the force 

and planned changes. Reserve component BCTs are being reduced from 

32 to 28. Active BCTs will increase from 42 to 48 by fiscal year 2011 as 

authorized increases in end strength take place. 

Table F-1. Current and Future Brigade Combat Teams

Active 

Component 

Reserve 

Component Total 

Current BCTs 42 32 74 

Future BCTs (FY 2011) 48 28 76 

Assumptions 

 Based on RAND model as briefed by Jacob Klerman 

- reserve component units are 8 months boots on the ground; 

active component units are 12 months boots on the ground 

- does not account for turn-over overlap in theater 

 Does not account for additional BCT requirements such as Korea 

 The requirement for reserve component BCTs in CENTCOM 

remains fixed at three BCTs or less and is based on dwell 
42 I APPENDIX F 

supportability. Note, that in fiscal year 2009, it is anticipated 

that five reserve component BCTs will be deployed. 

Results 

Table F-2. Active Component Brigade Combat Teams

Demand 

Dwell 

Unit 

Supply 

(Total Units) Dwell Time 

Time (months) 12 24 36 

Ratio (deployed/dwell) 1 2 3 

Current 25 17 42 0.68 

Future (FY 2011) 25 23 48 0.92 

Ideal 25 50 75 2.00 

 BCT Unit Shortfall 27 

Table F-3. Reserve Component Brigade Combat Teams

Demand* 

Dwell 

Unit 

Supply 

(Total Units) Dwell Time 

Time (months) 8 64 72 

Ratio (deployed/dwell) 1 8 9 

Future (FY 2011) 3 25 28 5.2 

Ideal 3 24 27 5.0 

* Based on 8 months boots on the ground. 

Conclusions 

 The increase in six BCTs in the active component will increase dwell 

time by 2-3 months and will not achieve the goal of two years. 

 To achieve the two-year dwell, an additional 27 active 

component BCTs, beyond the six already planned, will be 

required to meet current Central Command requirements. 
GLOSSARY I 43

Appendix G. Glossary 

AVF all-volunteer force 

BCT brigade combat team 

DSB Defense Science Board 

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

FYDP future years defense plan 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GDP gross domestic product 

IRR Individual Ready Reserve 

NTC National Training Center 

S&R stabilization and reconstruction 

VA Veterans Administration