UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ERNELL HAILES,

Plaintiff,

 Civil Action 2:12-cv-00687

v. Judge Michael H. Watson

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

CORBY FREE, et al.

 

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Ernell Hailes, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding in forma pauperis and without

the assistance of counsel, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendants, Mr. Elam, Mr. Collier, Dr. Krisher, Mr. Artrip, Ms. Carter and Corby Free. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants Elam and Collier retaliated against him for his religious practices in

violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Elam deprived him of his personal property in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Krisher, Artrip and Carter acted with deliberate

indifference toward his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Free acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s prison grievance

claims. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Free processed his prison grievances unfairly and in

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. This matter is before

the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A. At this time the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed with his claims against Mr. Elam

and Mr. Collier for retaliation. For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the

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Court DISMISS the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim. Additionally, the

Court acknowledges receipt of Plaintiff’s September 13, 2012 correspondence to the Clerk. 

(ECF No. 5.) 

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes for purposes of the initial screen that the following allegations

contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint are true. Plaintiff, an inmate of the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Corrections, is a practicing Seventh Day Adventist. Plaintiff’s religious

beliefs prohibit him from working on Saturday. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Elam and

Collier, both prison corrections officers, retaliated against him for his religious practices. 

According to Plaintiff, on Saturday, January 14, 2012, Defendant Elam awoke Plaintiff at 2:00

a.m. and demanded “with great hostility” that Plaintiff work snow-removal detail. (Compl. 6, ¶

5, ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff “respectfully explained” that his religion prohibited him from working

on Saturday, and “promptly presented” his accommodations paperwork. Id. at ¶ 6. Elam

became visibly upset and hostile, and threatened to throw Plaintiff “in the hole” if he did not

comply. Id. at ¶ 7. Elam then had Plaintiff escorted to Defendant Lieutenant Collier’s post. 

Collier demonstrated the same hostility toward Plaintiff, and allegedly called Plaintiff a “[b]aby

raper/sex offender.” Id. at ¶ 8. Collier told Plaintiff that he deserved to remain in the hole until

his release date and rot there. Plaintiff was thereafter sent to isolation, where he remained for a

week. While in isolation, Plaintiff was forced to live among rats and worms with “little to no

heat during the winter months.” Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff allegedly suffered back and shoulder pain

from sleeping on a steel bed without a mattress. Prison officials later found Plaintiff “Not

Guilty” of any rule infractions. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Elam failed to follow prison policy when gathering

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Plaintiff’s personal property after sending him to isolation. (Compl. 7, ¶ 14.) Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that Elam did not permit Plaintiff to observe the collection of his property. 

Plaintiff’s property was allegedly later stolen by other inmates. Id. at 14. 

Plaintiff also alleges that prison medical staff acted with deliberate indifference toward

his serious medical needs. One of Plaintiff’s legs is three-eighths of an inch shorter than the

other.1 As such, Plaintiff experiences difficulty climbing the stairs to reach his housing unit. 

Plaintiff also finds it difficult to climb up to the top bunk without a ladder or other device to aid

him. Additionally, Plaintiff is required to walk three quarters of a mile each way to the eating

area for each meal. Plaintiff has had surgeries in the past that cause him to experience chronic

pain. 

Plaintiff sought medical attention on March 3, 2012 and was sent to see Defendant

Carter. Plaintiff alleges that Carter, who “is not a board certified Doctor, but a Nurse

Practitioner,” “knowingly decive[d]” him into believing that she was a doctor. Id. at 8, ¶ 1. 

Carter measured the irregularities in Plaintiff’s legs and ordered him a shoe-lift. Carter also

noted in Plaintiff’s file that Plaintiff has a prosthetic elbow and hip. According to Plaintiff,

Carter “was the only person who conducted a more thorough examination” of his injuries. Id. 

She “completely contradicted the erroneous assessment given by [Defendant] Artrip” over the

course of the previous year. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Carter later retracted her order for a shoelift due to budget cuts, “and by undue influence from [Defendant] Krisher.” (Compl. 8, ¶ 4.) 

1

 Plaintiff alleges that one of his legs is “3/8ths shorter” than the other. (Compl. 8, ¶ 3.) 

Because the relief Plaintiff seeks includes a shoe-lift, the Court presumes that Plaintiff meant to

allege that one leg is three-eighths of an inch shorter than the other. 

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During a subsequent medical appointment, Defendant Artrip, who is also a nurse

practitioner allegedly “perpetuating a fraud as [a] licensed doctor,” stated that he would schedule

Plaintiff to be measured for special shoes. Id. at 8-9, ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff has yet to be measured for

the shoes. 

On April 29, 2012, Plaintiff again sought medial attention and was sent to see Defendant

Krisher. Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Krisher is “not credentialed to manage patients with chronic

phsycicalities, [as] he is only a licensed surgeon.” Id. at 9, ¶ 9. Krisher had watched Plaintiff

walk across the yard from the parking lot, and questioned the validity of Plaintiff’s claim that he

was in pain. Plaintiff alleges that Krisher acted with hostility and in a manner “unbecoming of a

professional health care provider.” Id. Krisher advised Plaintiff to purchase Tylenol from the

commissary. When Plaintiff told Krisher that he could not visit commissary for another two

weeks and that the dose of Tylenol sold there was insufficient to relive his pain, Krisher

allegedly told Plaintiff that he “would just have to deal with it.” Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff attempted

to explain how difficult it was to access the top bunk, Krisher, however, yelled at him to “to get

out of his office.” Id. at 11, ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that the primary concern of the prison medical

staff is not to ensure the proper care of Plaintiff or his fellow inmates, “but for the sole purpose

to cut cost.” Id. at 10, ¶ 15. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Free acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s

prison grievance complaints. Plaintiff utilized the prison grievance process to address the

alleged retaliation and deliberate indifference to his medical needs set forth above. Plaintiff

contends that Free, the chief inspector in charge of reviewing Plaintiff’s complaints, routinely

misstated facts related to the complaints. Free allegedly “failed to accord any real meaningful

and fair review” to Plaintiff’s claims. (Compl. 7, ¶ 12.) 

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Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Free processed his grievances unfairly and in violation of

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that

Free acted with bias toward prison staff, and that Free customarily decides in favor of prison

officials. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, the federal in forma pauperis statute,

seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court

costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain

from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)2

 as part of

the statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- 

***

(B) the action or appeal--

 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

(requiring the Court to screen a prisoner’s complaint “as soon as practicable” and dismiss any

portion of a the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim). Thus, §§ 1915(e)

and 1915A require sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the

2

 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

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action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Although

this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers

‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is

insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders

‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

In considering whether this facial plausibility standard is met, a Court must construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual allegations as

true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning

Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations

omitted). Additionally, the Court must construe pro se complaints liberally. Younis v. Pinnacle

Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court is not required, however, to accept

as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

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III. ANALYSIS 

The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted with regard to his claims against (1) Defendant Elam for deprivation of property

rights; (2) Defendants Carter, Artrip and Krisher for deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs; (3) Defendant Free for deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s prison

grievances; and (4) Defendant Free for processing Plaintiff’s prison grievances unfairly and in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Undersigned, therefore, recommends that these

claims be dismissed. 

A. Deprivation of Property Rights 

 The Undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Elam for

deprivation of property rights. Plaintiff alleges that Elam failed to comply with prison policy

when he gathered Plaintiff’s personal property after sending Plaintiff to isolation. Specifically,

Elam did not permit Plaintiff to observe the collection of his property. Plaintiff’s property was

later stolen by other inmates. Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, he has failed to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted because he has not alleged that the remedies available

to him under Ohio law are inadequate. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in

part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In

Paratt, the United States Supreme Court held that the existence of adequate post-deprivation

state remedies eliminates any due process claim arising from the negligent deprivation of a

prisoner’s property. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539–44. The Hudson Court extended Parratt’s

application to all § 1983 due process claims involving deprivation of property, regardless of

whether the deprivation is negligent or intentional. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533–36. Cf. Jefferson v.

Jefferson County Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2004) (“If satisfactory state

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procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no constitutional deprivation has

occurred despite the injury.”). Following Parratt and Hudson, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that in a § 1983 case “claiming the deprivation of a property

interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state

remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065–66

(6th Cir. 1983). Where a plaintiff fails to do so, dismissal for failure to state a claim is

appropriate. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1993) (dismissal of

procedural due process claim upheld where the plaintiff had “not pled or shown that [the state]

judicial remedies are inadequate . . .”); Ruiz v. Fisher, No. 96-4212, 1998 WL 661139, at *5 (6th

Cir. Sept. 2, 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim of either intentional or

negligent deprivation of property where he had not pled “that state remedies for redressing the

wrong [were] inadequate”). 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that the remedies available to him under Ohio law are

inadequate to redress his claim. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir. 1999)

(citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534–36) (“State tort remedies generally satisfy the postdeprivation

process requirement of the Due Process Clause.”) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. 

B. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs 

The Undersigned also recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. It is well established that “[t]he Eighth Amendment

forbids prison officials from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting

with deliberate indifference toward [his] serious medical needs.” Jones v. Muskegon County,

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625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A claim for

deliberate indifference “has both objective and subjective components.” Alspaugh v. McConnell,

643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has

explained the analysis as follows:

The objective component mandates a sufficiently serious medical need. The

subjective component regards prison officials’ state of mind. Deliberate indifference

entails something more than mere negligence, but can be satisfied by something less

than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that

harm will result. The prison official must be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference. 

Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 787–88 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). The Sixth Circuit has also noted that in the context of deliberate indifference claims:

[W]e distinguish between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of

medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate

medical treatment. Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he received

was inadequate, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical

judgments. However, it is possible for medical treatment to be so woefully

inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.

Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169 (internal quotations and citations ommitted). Along similar lines,

“[o]rdinary medical malpractice does not satisfy the subjective component.” Grose v. Corr.

Med. Servs, Inc., 400 F. App’x 986, 988 (6th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, “a difference of opinion

between [a prisoner] and the prison health care providers and a dispute over the adequacy of [a

prisoner’s] treatment . . . does not amount to an Eighth Amendment claim.” Apanovitch v.

Wilkinson, 32 F. App’x 704, 707 (6th Cir. 2002).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege a complete failure of care. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the

care he receives “falls below [the] Constitutionally mandated” standard of care. (Compl. 10, ¶

12.) Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead both the objective and the subjective components of an

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Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Although Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently

plead one of these components is dispositive, the Undersigned nonetheless addresses both

components for the sake of completeness.

i. Objective Component 

Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish the objective component of a deliberate

indifference claim. Plaintiff’s disagreement with Dr. Krisher’s advice to take Tylenol for pain

management does not amount to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Apanovitch, 32 F. App’x at

707. Plaintiff’s contention that he should have been examined by more qualified medical

professionals rather than two nurse practitioners and a surgeon likewise fails to meet the

objective component. Plaintiff has not alleged circumstances indicating an objective need for

more qualified doctors. As set forth above, Plaintiff sought medical attention for pain associated

with prior surgeries and for a shoe-lift. These symptoms do not evidence an obvious immediate

need for a special type of doctor. In fact, Plaintiff admits that Defendant Carter conducted a

“thorough examination” of his injuries. (Compl. 8, ¶ 1.) Carter also ordered Plaintiff a shoe-lift. 

Likewise, Defendant Artrip planned to have Plaintiff measured for special shoes. Although

Plaintiff has yet to receive the shoes because of budget concerns, objectively the prison medical

staff is adequately addressing Plaintiff’s medical needs. Additionally, even if Carter and Artrip

did lead Plaintiff to believe that they were doctors, Plaintiff’s claim nevertheless fails. 

Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations bear no relation to Plaintiff’s medical condition. Nor has

Plaintiff alleged that they caused him to suffer injury. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to offer

verifying medical evidence demonstrating that any of the alleged actions of defendants have

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caused serious medical injury.3

 

ii. Subjective Component

Plaintiff also fails to allege facts sufficient to establish the subjective component of an

Eighth Amendment claim. Although Plaintiff recites the elements of a deliberate indifference

claim in his Complaint (Compl. 10, ¶ 13), he alleges no facts indicating that Defendants

perceived a “substantial risk” to his health or that they “disregarded that risk.” Comstock, 273

F.3d at 703. Rather, the crux of Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendants have yet to provide him a

shoe-lift. Plaintiff, however, acknowledges that Carter retracted her order due to “budget cuts.” 

Id. at 8, ¶ 4. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are primarily concerned with cost

management. The delay in getting Plaintiff his shoes because of budget cuts does not violate the

Eighth Amendment.4

C. Deliberate Indifference Toward Plaintiff’s Grievances 

The Undersigned also recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Free

for deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s prison grievances. State prisoners do not have a

constitutionally protected right to prison grievance procedures. Walker v. Michigan Dept. of

Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569-70

(6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no inherent constitutional right to an effective prison grievance

3

 Plaintiff also appears to take issue with the requirement that he pay a $2 co-pay for

medical visits. Id. at ¶ 7. Although a prison must provide its inmates with adequate medical

care, it is important to note that this care does not necessarily have to be free of charge. See

Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (“If a prisoner is able to pay for medical

care, requiring such payment is not ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’”). 

4

 Although Plaintiff alleges that “undue influence from [Defendant] Krisher” contributed

to Carter’s decision to retract the order for the shoe-lift, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to

support this general assertion. Id. at ¶ 4. The Undersigned cannot, therefore, reasonably infer

that anything other than concerns of cost management motivated Carter’s decision. 

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procedure.”); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A] state’s inmate

grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 

Thus, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure at all. Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

D. Equal Protection Violation 

Finally, Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment

prohibits states from denying any person “equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held “[t]he Equal

Protection Clause prevents states from making distinctions that (1) burden a fundamental right;

(2) target a suspect class; or (3) intentionally treat one individual differently from others

similarly situated without any rational basis.” Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir.

2010).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the three prohibited distinctions exist in this

case. Indeed, the first prohibited distinction cannot exist because Plaintiff has no fundamental

right to a prison grievance procedure. Plaintiff does not allege that the prison grievance

procedure in any way targets a suspect class. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Free treated him

differently from other similarly situated inmates. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Free “acts with

bias[], and customarily decides in favor of staff.” (Compl. 10, ¶ 2.) Even if true, this allegation

simply does not amount an equal protection violation.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE TO THE CLERK

The Court acknowledges receipt of Plaintiff’s September 13, 2012 letter to the Clerk. 

(ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff will receive proof of service on Defendants Elam and Collier after they

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are served in accordance with this Order. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted with

respect to his claim against Defendant Elam for deprivation of property rights. Plaintiff has also

failed to state a claim against Defendants Carter, Artrip and Krisher for deliberate indifference

toward his serious medical needs. Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendant Free for

deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s prison grievances. Finally, Plaintiff failed to state an

equal protection claim against Defendant Free. It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the

aforementioned claims be DISMISSED. At this time, the Court will permit Plaintiff to proceed

on Claim One against Defendants Elam and Collier for retaliation for engaging in religious

practices only. 

Assuming Plaintiff has provided sufficient service materials, the United States Marshal is

DIRECTED to serve by certified mail upon Defendants a summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order. Each Defendant is ORDERED to answer or otherwise respond to the

Complaint within FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS after being served with a copy of the Complaint

and summons. Furthermore, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a courtesy copy of the Complaint

and this Order to the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. 

VI. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

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Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation

omitted)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: September 24, 2012 /s/ Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 Elizabeth P. Deavers

 United States Magistrate Judge

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