[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10482

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WILLIAM DCORY MAURICE EASTERLY, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cr-00243-MHT-SRW-5

____________________

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 1 of 10
2 Opinion of the Court 21-10482

Before GRANT, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

William Easterly pleaded guilty after he was caught with a 

firearm while transporting nearly a kilogram of cocaine. On appeal 

he argues that the officer who arrested him violated his Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure when the 

officer prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of 

other criminal activity. Easterly also argues that his indictment 

should be dismissed because the magistrate below implicitly denied

his pro se motion to discharge his retained counsel. After careful 

review, we affirm.

I. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration began to investigate 

Easterly when a confidential informant reported that he was 

dealing cocaine by the kilogram. To learn more, the DEA recorded 

calls between Easterly and another individual, Jose OcampoGonzalez. The DEA had been monitoring Ocampo since it had 

learned that he was trafficking drugs at a large scale; the DEA had 

already arrested individuals who had been regularly purchasing

large quantities of cocaine from him. The DEA determined from 

Easterly’s calls that he was also purchasing cocaine from Ocampo. 

On one call Easterly used coded language to arrange a 

cocaine purchase. Instead of offering money for cocaine, Easterly 

offered “TVs.” And instead of asking how many kilograms of 

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 2 of 10
21-10482 Opinion of the Court 3

cocaine Easterly wished to buy, Ocampo asked him how many 

“hands” he wanted. But Ocampo failed to deceive law 

enforcement—they had cracked the code by interviewing 

Ocampo’s prior purchasers and by analyzing other coded calls. 

Easterly called Ocampo again a few days later to change his order 

from five kilograms to one and to say that he would come the next 

Sunday. 

The DEA prepared to intercept Easterly post-purchase. 

Ocampo was operating from his residence in Tuskegee, Alabama. 

The DEA predicted that Easterly would make the roundtrip from 

his home in Montgomery via the quickest route, Interstate 85. It

enlisted the help of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency to 

make a directed traffic stop. The DEA informed a state trooper 

that it expected Easterly would be transporting a significant 

amount of cocaine.

Before he left, Easterly called Ocampo to confirm his order 

and to mention that he would have his son with him. That same 

morning, a DEA agent observed a black Ford Expedition with a 

small LED light bar on the front grille parked at Easterly’sresidence

in Montgomery. A few hours later, DEA agents monitoring 

Ocampo’s residence observed Easterly and one passenger arrive in 

the black Expedition and then leave around an hour later. When 

Easterly left Ocampo’s property, he began driving back toward 

Montgomery on I-85, just as the DEA had predicted. 

A state trooper, James Hendrix, was positioned at an exit 

ramp further along I-85 as he waited for instructions. One of the 

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 3 of 10
4 Opinion of the Court 21-10482

DEA agents radioed Hendrix as Easterly passed that exit. Spotting 

the Expedition, Hendrix pulled onto the highway and began to 

follow it. He determined that Easterly was speeding and that the 

vehicle’s window tint was likely illegal as well. Hendrix activated 

his lights and initiated the traffic stop. 

As soon as he approached the Expedition, Hendrix noticed 

“a chemical smell coming from the vehicle.” Because of his 

extensive narcotics-enforcement experience, he associated the 

smell with hydrochloride—a cutting agent commonly used with 

cocaine. Hendrix verified Easterly’s license and then issued

warnings for the speeding and tint violations.

After issuing the warnings, Hendrix asked Easterly where he 

and his son were traveling, whether he was transporting anything 

illegal, and whether he could search the vehicle. Easterly initially 

consented to the search, but then began to act nervous. When 

Hendrix asked him to exit the vehicle, he stalled by asking 

questions. To Hendrix, this sudden nervousness indicated that 

Easterly had something illegal hidden in the vehicle. 

Because Easterly was stalling, Hendrix told him that he was 

going to bring his K-9 around the vehicle instead, but that he still 

needed Easterly to exit the vehicle. At this point Easterly let the 

officers know that he had a gun in his waistband, so Hendrix called 

over another trooper to retrieve the gun. After the weapon was 

secured, Easterly and his son exited the vehicle. The dog alerted to 

the scent of narcotics by the driver door. When Hendrix searched 

the vehicle, he found a compressed white brick of cocaine in a 

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 4 of 10
21-10482 Opinion of the Court 5

yellow plastic bag in the front center console. It weighed just under 

one kilogram.

Easterly was charged with conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, possession 

with intent to distribute controlled substances, and possession of a 

firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. See 21 

U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Easterly moved 

to suppress all the evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the 

traffic stop. He argued that Hendrix violated the Fourth 

Amendment when he kept investigating for narcotics after he had 

issued Easterly the warning tickets. The magistrate concluded,

“based on the totality of the circumstances and the collective 

knowledge of the law enforcement officers,” that the stop and 

search were lawful. The district court adopted the magistrate’s 

recommendation in full.

A few weeks before his trial was scheduled, Easterly filed a 

pro se motion to discharge his retained counsel. His counsel then 

moved to withdraw, noting that Easterly had instructed him to do 

so.

At the hearing on the motions, Easterly indicated that he 

would need appointed counsel if his motion was granted. The 

magistrate was “not inclined to grant the motion” given the 

“specific standards” she thought governed the discharge of retained 

counsel in favor of appointed counsel. The magistrate also noted 

that Easterly had to fill out a financial eligibility affidavit because 

he wanted to replace his retained counsel with appointed counsel. 

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 5 of 10
6 Opinion of the Court 21-10482

In the follow-up order, the magistrate clarified that the standards 

for discharge of appointed counsel she had been considering did 

not extend to retained counsel. The magistrate thus instructed 

Easterly to submit the affidavit.

Instead of filing the affidavit, Easterly (through his counsel)

moved to withdraw both his pro se motion to discharge and his 

counsel’s motion to withdraw; the magistrate granted both 

requests. Easterly then pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 

distribute controlled substances and possession of a firearm during 

and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.

After the guilty plea, Easterly’s relationship with his 

attorney continued to deteriorate. This time, his counsel moved 

to withdraw before Easterly filed a second pro se motion to 

discharge the attorney. In response, the magistrate appointed new 

counsel and permitted Easterly to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Easterly then moved to dismiss his indictment with prejudice, 

arguing that the magistrate’s “implicit denial of Easterly’s pro se

motion to discharge retained counsel” violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. The magistrate disagreed, pointing 

out that Easterly had withdrawn that pro se motion. The district 

court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and denied the 

motion.

Easterly again pleaded guilty, reserving the right—which he 

now exercises—to appeal the denials of the motion to suppress and 

the motion to dismiss the indictment. 

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 6 of 10
21-10482 Opinion of the Court 7

II. 

When a district court denies a motion to suppress, we 

review its findings of fact for clear error and its application of the 

law to the facts de novo. United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 

1235 (11th Cir. 2007). We construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party—the government. Id. at 1235. 

“We review the denial of a motion to withdraw as counsel for 

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 

1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016).

III. 

Easterly argues that Hendrix violated his Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure when 

Hendrix prolonged the traffic stop to investigate for drugs. He also 

claims that the magistrate violated his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel by her “implicit denial” of his request to replace his 

retained counsel with appointed counsel. Both arguments fail.

A. 

We first consider Easterly’s claim that the traffic stop 

evidence should have been suppressed because Hendrix 

unconstitutionally prolonged his traffic stop. Easterly does not 

dispute that Hendrix had authority to stop the vehicle initially for 

the speeding and tint violations. See United States v. Hernandez, 

418 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2005). And by the end of the stop, 

the positive alert of the drug detection dog provided obvious 

probable cause to search the vehicle. See United States v. Braddy, 

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 7 of 10
8 Opinion of the Court 21-10482

11 F.4th 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2021). So the only question is 

whether Hendrix had reasonable suspicion to justify the questions 

and dog sniff after he issued the traffic warnings.

An officer may legally prolong a traffic stop to investigate for 

other criminal activity when he has a “reasonable suspicion” that 

the individual is engaging in that criminal activity. See Hernandez, 

418 F.3d at 1209–10; see also Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 

348, 355 (2015). A suspicion is reasonable when the officer can 

provide “a minimal level of objective justification,” even if the facts 

and circumstances are insufficient to convince a reasonably 

prudent person to believe that a crime is being committed. Braddy, 

11 F.4th at 1310; cf. United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1494 

(11th Cir. 1985). We assess whether a suspicion is reasonable based 

on the totality of circumstances and give “due weight to the 

officer’s experience.” Braddy, 11 F.4th at 1310–11.

Officer Hendrix had several objective reasons to suspect 

Easterly of criminal activity. For one, the DEA had alerted Hendrix 

to its ongoing investigation into Easterly’s activities. The day 

before, a DEA agent had contacted him to request his assistance in 

stopping Easterly’s vehicle because they expected him “to be 

transporting narcotics.” Although the record does not show that 

the DEA shared the particular facts or circumstances of its ongoing 

investigation with Hendrix, he knew that the DEA was monitoring 

Easterly’s movement and had specific information about a 

narcotics transport the next day. The day of the stop, Hendrix 

knew that the DEA was actively tracking Easterly because an agent 

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 8 of 10
21-10482 Opinion of the Court 9

radioed him when Easterly passed his exit and instructed him to 

stop and search the vehicle if possible. As for Hendrix’s direct 

knowledge, as he approached Easterly’s vehicle he immediately 

identified a strong smell he associated with a chemical used to cut

cocaine. These objective facts generated a reasonable suspicion 

that Easterly was transporting cocaine. Hendrix thus had authority 

to prolong the stop, and the dog’s alert provided probable cause to 

search the vehicle. See Braddy, 11 F.4th at 1312. Hendrix therefore 

did not violate Easterly’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable seizure.1

B. 

Easterly also claims that the magistrate denied him his 

choice of counsel by failing to immediately grant his pro se motion 

to discharge his retained counsel. Although a criminal defendant 

must show good cause to replace appointed counsel, he has the 

authority to dismiss retained counsel without good cause. 

Jimenez, 820 F.3d at 1271. But before a court can grant a motion 

to dismiss retained counsel, it must determine that the defendant 

“either will be represented by counsel or has made a knowing and 

1 We conclude that the search and seizure were lawful for a different reason 

than the court below, which found that probable cause existed based on “the 

collective knowledge of the law enforcement officers.” Because the record 

does not demonstrate that the DEA shared all of the details of its investigation 

with Hendrix, we do not rely on that rationale. Even so, we may affirm a 

denial of a motion to suppress on “any ground supported by the record.” 

United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012).

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 9 of 10
10 Opinion of the Court 21-10482

voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 1272. If the 

defendant desires appointed counsel, the court should determine 

whether the defendant is eligible. Id.

Easterly argues that the magistrate implicitly denied his 

motion by mentioning at a hearing that she was unlikely to grant 

it. But after that hearing, the magistrate did not deny his motion—

she ordered him to provide an affidavit that proved he was eligible 

for appointed counsel. Easterly had communicated that he could 

not afford to retain another attorney, so the magistrate was right 

to assess whether he qualified for appointed counsel before ruling 

on his motion. See Jimenez, 820 F.3d at 1272. In the end, the 

magistrate was unable to grant the motion because Easterly 

withdrew it instead of submitting the affidavit.

* * *

Hendrix had a reasonable suspicion that Easterly was 

engaged in criminal activity, so he did not unreasonably prolong 

the traffic stop. And the magistrate did not prevent Easterly from 

discharging his retained counsel—she granted his motion to 

withdraw the request to discharge retained counsel. We thus 

AFFIRM the conviction.

USCA11 Case: 21-10482 Date Filed: 12/09/2021 Page: 10 of 10