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S. HRG. 113–136

EXAMINING ONGOING CONFLICT

IN EASTERN CONGO

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 16, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

(II)

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

Borello, Federico, director, Investments, Humanity United, Washington, DC .. 19

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21

Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement . 1

Dizolele, Mvemba, strategy and advocacy fellow, Eastern Congo Initiative, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona, opening statement ....................... 3

Muhigirwa, Father Ferdinand, director, Centre d’Etudes Pour I’Action 

Sociale, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo ............................................. 15

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17

Prendergast, John, cofounder, Enough Project, Washington, DC ....................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Paper by Anthony Gambino and Stephen Weissman submitted for the record 

by Federico Borello ............................................................................................... 44

Eastern Congo Initiative Report submitted for the record by Mvemba 

Dizolele .................................................................................................................. 52

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

EXAMINING ONGOING CONFLICT

IN EASTERN CONGO 

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:53 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons, Durbin, and Flake. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I would like to call this hearing of the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee for African Affairs to 

order. 

Good morning. Before we get started, of course, as we all know, 

yesterday three were killed and more than 140 injured when two 

bombs went off near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. I know 

yours does as well but my heart aches for everyone who has been 

affected by this tragedy. And as we look today at how violence

has devastated, has broadly affected the eastern Congo, we, in

the United States, are reminded that violence used as a tool of

fear all around the world has a horrible impact on families and 

communities. 

For every villain who would take a life to further their ends, 

there are heroes ready to stand up to them and to stand with those 

who are victimized. And I trust, as we hear today from our panel 

of witnesses about their work, about the work of the NGOs with 

which they are associated, and about the work of many brave 

heroes in the eastern Congo, that we will be reminded of that 

shared commitment to stand up to violence. 

Today the African Affairs Subcommittee will focus on the ongoing 

and deadly conflict in eastern Congo which has forced millions of 

innocent people from their homes and contributed to decades of 

human rights violations, mass atrocities, horrific and widespread 

sexual- and gender-based violence, and disputes over conflict 

minerals. 

Before we begin, I would like to welcome Senator Jeff Flake of 

Arizona who has joined the subcommittee as ranking member. 

Senator Flake brings with him great expertise on Africa-related 

issues, both from his time of service in the House of Representatives and from his personal and business experience. This is our 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

first hearing together of the 113th Congress, and I look forward to 

working in partnership with Senator Flake to advance our shared 

interests in promoting good governance, economic engagement, and 

security throughout sub-Saharan Africa over the next 2 years. 

I would also like to welcome our distinguished witnesses: John 

Prendergast, cofounder of the Enough Project; Mr. Mvemba 

Dizolele, strategy and advocacy fellow at the Eastern Congo Initiative; Mr. Federico Borello, a director of the Investment Team at 

Humanity United; and Rev. Ferdinand Muhigirwa—I am going to 

struggle, Father, aren’t I, to get that exactly right. [Laughter.] 

Director of the Center of Study for Social Action and who has 

traveled to be with us here today from Kinshasa. Thank you, 

Father, and all of our witnesses for your effort to be with us here 

today and, in particular, Father, to speak with us more directly 

about current conditions on the ground. 

Since April 2012, more than 650,000 men, women, and children 

have been displaced mostly by recent fighting between the M23 

rebel group and the Congolese Army in the North Kivu province of 

eastern Congo. The M23 has reportedly benefited from the illicit 

support of neighboring states, including Rwanda and to a lesser 

extent Uganda. There has been some accountability for such actions in the form of sanctions imposed by the United States and 

United Nations last year. I traveled to Kinshasa in February to 

learn more about this conflict, see the situation for myself, and 

support the regional framework for moving negotiations forward. 

The United States has made a substantial financial investment 

in addressing the ongoing humanitarian needs in the DRC, more 

than $4 billion since 2008, and we have a responsibility to ensure 

that money has been well spent and the gains that are being made 

are sustainable. It is essential the U.S. Government, in partnership 

with the international community and the regional governments 

and organizations, pursue an active policy to tackle the pervasive 

challenges endemic to eastern Congo. 

Unfortunately, instability and conflict are not new to the DRC. 

Estimates by NGOs indicate nearly 5.5 million people died from 

war-related causes in the DRC in the nearly decade from 1998 to 

2007 alone, making it the world’s deadliest documented conflict 

since the Second World War. 

The lack of effective governance has contributed to decades of 

sexual- and gender-based violence and misuse and abuse of vast 

mineral wealth, both of which have been particularly concentrated 

in the east. According to the United Nations, roughly 160 women 

are raped every week in North and South Kivu, with members of 

the army frequently among the perpetrators. Mineral extraction of 

tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold has also fueled the armed conflicts and human rights abuses in eastern provinces of the DRC 

and robbed the Congolese people of their opportunity for legitimate 

livelihoods. 

Despite this bleak context, of which these are just a few symptoms, the past few months now offer genuine reasons for hope and 

optimism. Since the signing of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation 

Framework in February, negotiations have continued. The United 

Nations has appointed a special envoy to the region and progress 

is being made to implement the framework. The U.N. Security 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

Council recently authorized the deployment of a regionally led 

intervention force to engage in targeted offensive operations in the 

east and to augment the ongoing peacekeeping efforts led by 

MONUSCO. If this new force is effective, it can help usher in sustainable security gains that will contribute to long-term stability. 

Fighting perpetrated by the M23 has slowed since its withdrawal 

from Goma in November, and in another striking and unexpected 

development in mid-March, one of M23’s commanders and indicted 

war criminal, Bosco Ntaganda, surrendered at the U.S. Embassy in 

Kigali and was transferred to the ICC at The Hague, a first in the 

history of the court. 

With the implementation of sanctions against M23 supporters, 

there has been accountability. With the Dodd-Frank legislation, 

there has been progress, and with reforms adopted by the European Union, these in combination have also helped to shift some 

commercial incentives for mineral extraction from conflict to business activities that are legal and peaceful I hope we will further 

examine today. 

This hearing will evaluate recent steps taken by the international community to mitigate conflict and examine the root 

causes of instability in the eastern Congo, as well as current 

United States and international efforts to counter support from the 

M23 from state and regional actors. We will hear from a distinguished group of witnesses about their view of U.S. policy and request their concrete recommendations for action. 

Following today’s hearing, I plan to present the administration 

with a list of key recommendations for changes or for a path forward to United States policy and to introduce a resolution calling 

for Secretary Kerry to appoint a special envoy to address the conflict in eastern Congo. That resolution will, hopefully, also call on 

the administration to do more to mobilize a comprehensive 

response in partnership with international and regional partners to 

move steadily toward peace and stability and to addressing root 

causes of conflict. 

I look forward to working with Senator Flake and hopefully other 

members of the subcommittee as well to further these efforts. 

And with that, I will turn it over to Senator Flake for his opening statement. 

Senator. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate 

the opportunity to be in this committee and to work with you. During my time in the House, I served on the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Africa Subcommittee most of that time, just taking 

a brief hiatus to be on the Appropriations Committee in the last 

2 years. So it is great to be back on the African Subcommittee and 

I look forward to these and other issues. 

With its vast resources, the DRC holds the promise of being a 

success story. Over the past couple of years, you have seen how 

resources can certainly contribute to the economic growth of these 

countries, and in the DRC, they had a growth rate of about 6.5 percent last year with the economy. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

That is about where the good news ends. Ongoing conflict 

between the DRC Government and rebel factions in the east, coupled with the central government that obviously needs some more 

serious reforms, has halted the development of the DRC in general. 

The problem is compounded by regional neighbors throwing their 

weight behind some of the warring factions to serve their own 

interests. Regional stability in the area of the Great Lakes threatens to be undermined by this persistent conflict as well. 

Given the resources that we have brought to bear directly in 

terms of bilateral aid and contributions to the United Nations, we 

need to take a look to see how we can do this better to make sure 

that there are not other ways that we could proceed that would be 

of benefit to the DRC. 

Our witnesses today bring a unique perspective to this issue. I 

have no doubt that they will contribute to this debate at hand. I 

look forward to the testimony and thank you for coming here. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

We are now going to turn to our panel of distinguished witnesses. We will work our way from right to left. And I would like 

to invite Mr. John Prendergast to make his statement to the subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, COFOUNDER,

ENOUGH PROJECT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, thank you so much, Senator Coons, for 

your leadership, and welcome to the African Subcommittee, Senator Flake. Thanks for being here on a difficult day for America. 

Like you, Senator Coons, I traveled to Congo earlier in the year, 

just a couple months ago, and I want to begin with a very simple 

proposition, but a potentially and hopefully powerful one. 

There now exists a better chance for peace in eastern Congo than 

at any time since the current deadly cycle of conflict began in the 

mid-1990s. I think there are a number of variables that contribute 

to that, and in my oral testimony, I would like to focus on the five 

main reasons that peace is possible now and then six quick recommendations for how a new United States envoy that hopefully will 

be appointed the day that you enter that resolution can support—

how that United States envoy can support peace in the Congo. 

The first reason why peace is possible, I think, is partly rooted 

in congressional action: the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals legislation; consumer pressure; and the resulting market adjustments. 

Market incentives for the warring parties are starting to shift away 

from the violent, illicit profiteering that has marked Congo’s natural resource exploitation for centuries to beginning to move 

toward legitimate trade. Just like with the blood diamonds story, 

the profit incentive is shifting from war to peace. It is messy but 

it has begun. And being on the ground in eastern Congo just a couple months ago, it was evident everywhere, talking to people on the 

ground, minerals traders, and commanders in armed groups, all 

the folks that are remotely connected to it. 

The second reason why peace is possible is donor and World 

Bank pressure on Rwanda for alleged cross-border support for the 

M23 rebel group has weakened the M23, helped foster those 

divisions that led to the Bosco’s move. And the main takeaway here 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

is that the cross-border military aid that has been flowing across 

the border into Congo destabilizing that country so terribly for

the last 15 or so years—that will never again go unnoticed, go 

unremarked, or go unaddressed. The new normal, I believe, is 

accountability, and that is partly due to the fact that this committee was so strong in its condemnation of that, particularly this 

last time. 

The third reason why peace is possible is that the International 

Monetary Fund has refused to renew aid to Congo until there are 

reforms that are enacted, transparency reforms. It gives a new 

impetus to addressing the governance issues within Congo. 

The fourth reason why peace is possible is, as you noted in your 

opening statement, Senator Coons, this new Peace and Security 

Framework that 11 countries have signed along with the United 

Nations Secretary General which basically provides a foundation 

for a sustained peace process. It is not a peace agreement. It is the 

basis of one and it just needs to be operationalized. 

The fifth reason why peace is possible in two words is Mary Robinson. I mean, I think that having a U.N. envoy of such stature 

and such commitment and a focus not just on peace but also on 

human rights and accountability is terribly important. 

So in the interest of time, I am just going to skip right to U.S. 

recommendations. Excited to hear, Senator Coons, that you are 

going to submit your own list to the executive branch following this 

hearing. So hopefully some of the stuff that we talk about here on 

the panel can make its way into your memo. 

So as a country with close relationships with all of the regional 

actors in the Great Lakes and continuing substantial international 

leverage, it is critical for the U.S. Government, I think, to play a 

more active role than we have in the past in any upcoming initiatives that are created out of that framework, out of what Mary 

Robinson does, and whatever follows from these Kampala talks. 

This is going to require far greater attention from senior policymakers and a step change in diplomatic engagement. 

Let us get to the recommendations. 

The first one. Help build a comprehensive peace process. We 

need an unrelenting investment in the creation of a legitimate 

peace process. There is going to be no solution without one, and it 

does not exist now. That should be a major focus of this subcommittee and this committee’s work with the executive branch, 

that that be the focus of what we are doing. 

The second recommendation I would make is to deploy that highlevel envoy quickly. We understand that there is someone that is 

on the radar, maybe even selected, maybe even agreed. If that is 

the case, deploy that person as soon as possible to the region, get 

them working with Mary Robinson, with the African regional 

states and the players on the ground to push the peace process 

forward. 

Third recommendation is sanctioning arms and minerals smugglers. We have just got to step up the game and create a cost for 

those that are going to undermine the effort to have peace in the 

region. We can provide you with names of all the people that are 

on various lists, U.N. group of experts list, even list of the NGOs, 

Human Rights Watch and others, that are working so hard to try 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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to collect data on who is doing what to whom and why these arms 

continue to flow so freely. 

Fourth recommendation I would make is to convene a responsible 

investment initiative. The United States, we think, should work 

with the European Union to convene all of these companies in the 

supply chain, the electronics, the gold, the smelting, the mining 

companies, socially responsible investors, and all the NGOs that 

care about this stuff in a responsible investment initiative aimed 

at addressing risks and identifying opportunities to conflict-free 

economic investment in the Great Lakes region. 

The fifth recommendation I would make is to support accountability for war crimes, and that is, I think, shared universally 

amongst all of us, but now that Bosco has come in, it gives a 

chance—an opportunity—for the United States to step up our 

efforts in support of international law. 

And then finally, to provide aid to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts, both the internal ones for the Congolese armed groups and the external ones for the Rwandans, the 

FDLR, that are destabilizing Congo today. We think that perhaps 

given this foreign intervention brigade’s deployment, that it is possible that a relationship similar to what the United States has provided the region, particularly the Ugandan Government, with 

respect to counter LRA operations, might be possible with respect 

to the FDLR and M23 having some kind of support, direct training 

and operational support to the efforts to try to counter any of the 

spoilers and stragglers who do not get on the peace train going 

forward. 

Thanks very much for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAS

Thank you, Chairman Coons and Ranking Member Flake, for the opportunity to 

testify at a crucial moment for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Africa’s Great 

Lakes Region. 

There now exists a better chance for peace in eastern Congo than at any time 

since the current deadly cycle of conflict began in the mid-1990s. A number of variables contribute to this unique opportunity. 

First, following the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals legislation, consumer pressure, 

and resulting market adjustments, the economic incentives of the warring parties 

are starting to shift away from illicit violent profiteering to legitimate trade. Just 

like with the blood diamonds saga, the profit incentive is shifting from war to peace. 

Second, donor and World Bank pressure on Rwanda for alleged cross-border support for the M23 rebel group has weakened that group, and rising calls for accountability for war crimes helped pave the way for the surrender of one of Congo’s worst 

warlords, Bosco Ntaganda. 

Third, the International Monetary Fund’s refusal to renew aid to Congo until 

reforms are enacted provides a window to finally address critical governance issues 

within Congo. 

Fourth, the new ‘‘Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic 

Republic of Congo and the Region,’’ signed by United Nations Secretary General 

Ban Ki-moon and 11 African heads of state in February, provides a foundation upon 

which a sustained peace process, led by African partners and the United Nations, 

can be operationalized. 

Fifth, the recent appointment of Mary Robinson as the new U.N. envoy, combined 

with the hoped-for naming of a significant U.S. Special Envoy, will provide a major 

external boost to African regional peace efforts. 

The mere signing of agreements of course does not end the war in Congo. Rather, 

it provides a starting point for a new, comprehensive peace initiative led by U.N. 

envoy Robinson and key African actors. The United States can play a vital role in 

shepherding a credible and transparent peace process, but with new personnel in 

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place or coming soon at the White House and Foggy Bottom, it will require a 

rethinking and expansion of the U.S. role in support of lasting peace in the Great 

Lakes. 

Why it’s different now 

Elaborating on the above, four important changes are underway in Congo today, 

giving an internationally supported peace initiative a much better chance than its 

more limited predecessors. 

First, U.S. and European consumer demands for a conflict-free minerals trade, the 

Dodd-Frank legislation on conflict minerals, and related corporate and regional reforms are making it harder to profit violently and illegally from mineral smuggling. 

For decades, all of the benefits of eastern Congo’s vast mineral resource wealth have 

gone to those with the biggest guns—the Congolese Army, local militias, or neighboring countries. These minerals include gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten, or 3Ts, 

used in cell phones, computers, and jewelry. Dodd-Frank has made the price of 

untraceable conflict minerals one-third the price of tagged, traceable minerals, and 

thus it is no longer profitable for many armed groups and their backers to trade 

in conflict minerals. The Enough Project found in a study last year that because of 

these economic changes, armed groups are now earning approximately 65 percent 

less from the minerals tin, tantalum, and tungsten. Gold still remains a challenge, 

however, because it is more easily smuggled, and this must be addressed through 

policy and corporate action, particularly from jewelers. If the commercial incentives 

for the minerals trade can continue to shift from violent, illegal extraction to peaceful, legal development, Congo could enjoy a transition similar to those experienced 

by West African countries plagued by blood diamond wars a decade ago. 

Second, for the first time, the international community is imposing meaningful 

consequences for cross-border support to armed groups and for a lack of reform. 

Regional support for armed groups inside eastern Congo has been a staple of the 

ongoing cycle of war. Rwanda strenuously denies involvement, but some donors have 

suspended certain aid programs to that nation and will continue to do so until the 

evidence shifts toward solutions. The International Monetary Fund’s refusal to 

renew aid to Congo until transparency reforms are enacted has placed Kinshasa 

under pressure to transform its economic policies and governing institutions. 

Third, calls for international justice have intensified inside Congo and beyond, 

and accused war criminals are beginning to face sanctions. Until recently, accountability for war crimes was a distant part of the discussion despite some of the worst 

crimes against humanity being committed globally. Bosco’s surrender ups the ante 

and provides some potential momentum for further action. 

Fourth, the reform of a U.N. peacekeeping mission that costs more than $1 billion 

is under way. A new force intervention brigade has been created, garnering troops 

from African nations to respond directly to the threat of illegal armed groups in 

eastern Congo. This brigade has been given a unique mandate by the U.N. to engage in offensive action against these groups in the name of stability and civilian 

protection. Refocusing the mission on eradicating the worst armed groups, demobilizing rank-and-file combatants and helping to reform Congo’s army would go much 

further than the present mandate. 

Despite the progress, closed-door talks are now taking place in Kampala, Uganda 

between Congo and the M23 rebel group – with no involvement of political parties, 

civil society elements (including women who have borne the brunt of the war), religious leaders, or other armed groups. Each time that rebels have taken or threatened Goma over the past decade, hasty backroom negotiations have produced deeply 

flawed deals that have reduced the military pressure on Congolese President Joseph 

Kabila’s weakened government and permitted the alleged Rwandan-backed rebels to 

administer strategic eastern zones and oversee taxation and resource looting. There 

is serious risk that a deal from the Kampala talks will resemble the failed deals 

that came before it through similar processes. The talks must be broadened into a 

wider peace process. 

A two-track peace process: regional talks and Congolese reform 

The U.N. Framework lays a foundation for a successful peace process that should 

contain two main elements: regional negotiations and institutional reform within 

Congo. The Framework commits Congo and its neighbors to deepen regional economic integration, increase judicial cooperation, and respect legitimate regional 

security interests. In order to turn these commitments into lasting change, Special 

U.N. Envoy Robinson and her African partners should lead regional negotiations—

particularly between Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda—over key economic, security, and 

accountability issues. Competition over control of natural resources has been a 

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ments have sustained themselves through profits from the illicit trade in natural 

resources. It will thus be critical to incorporate economic drivers into the regional 

talks, particularly on how Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda can cooperate to more fully 

cut off smuggling and boost the legitimate, conflict-free trade in natural resources 

and increase transparent government revenue flows that can benefit all three 

countries. 

Security issues will also be critical in the talks. Building on and in support of the 

U.N. Force Intervention Brigade agreed to by the U.N. Security Council on March 

28, the countries should discuss and agree on a comprehensive security strategy to 

deal with illegal militias. Finally, it is critical for the peace process to foster 

accountability for those who have committed mass atrocities. Rather than repeating 

the practice from past processes of allowing human rights abusers to gain positions 

of power in government or the military, the peace process should ensure that the 

region cooperates to bring to justice those most responsible for war crimes and 

crimes against humanity. A possible upcoming deal between Congo and M23 in 

Kampala is at risk of mirroring past agreements that reinforced impunity and led 

to renewed conflict. This deal must be different and leave out those most responsible 

for atrocities. 

The second track should focus on neglected issues within Congo that continue to 

drive the war at a deeper level. The U.N. Framework commits Congo to undertake 

institutional reform on critical issues that fuel continued instability, such as decentralization, security sector reform, and justice reform. To operationalize the Framework, a multifaceted reform process is needed with proposals from the Congolese 

Government, political parties, and civil society. To buttress this process and following President Joseph Kabila’s announced intention to initiate a national dialogue, there is a need for an impartially facilitated Congolese national dialogue that 

respects the Constitution and allows civil society, government, key armed groups, 

and political parties to discuss and debate reform proposals. This is critical to 

ensure that an eventual agreement might have the buy-in of a wide swathe of stakeholders. The U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General to Congo, or 

SRSG, mandated to help the Congolese reform process in the U.N. framework, 

should work closely with Kinshasa to ensure there is an impartial facilitator of the 

process and that it is inclusive, particularly with women and gender issues fully 

represented. 

Recommendations to the U.S. Government 

As a country with close relationships with all regional players and substantial 

international leverage, it is critical for the U.S. Government to play a much more 

active role in the upcoming initiatives. This will require far greater attention from 

senior policymakers, a step-change in diplomatic engagement in the region, and concentrated focus on areas of U.S. leverage, especially efforts to transform the trade 

in natural resources from a driver of violence into a catalyst for regional peace. 

Therefore, I strongly recommend that the United States urgently take the following steps:

1. Help Build a Comprehensive Peace Process: The Kampala-based talks are not 

enough. The U.S. should work with African partners, U.N. Envoy Robinson, and the 

U.N. SRSG in Congo to build a peace process to operationalize the commitments 

made in the U.N. Framework. Peace efforts need proper staffing and coordinated 

leverage, two areas for which the U.S. can provide key support. 

2. Deploy a High-Level Envoy Quickly: If Beltway whispers are true, a high-level 

U.S. envoy has already been selected. President Obama and Secretary Kerry should 

deploy that envoy as soon as possible to buttress U.N. Envoy Robinson and African 

efforts to build the comprehensive effort for peace. The envoy should use incentives, 

strong relationships, and leverage to help move the parties toward constructive 

engagement in the process. 

3. Sanction Arms and Minerals Smugglers: The U.S. Government and U.N. Security Council should place targeted sanctions against officials and arms and minerals 

smugglers in Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda that are violating the U.N. arms embargo on Congo. In particular, the U.S. should press to have the owners of gold smuggling businesses on U.N. and U.S. lists sanctioned, as they continue to aid and abet 

violence by M23, the FDLR, and other armed groups. There are five key gold smugglers that have easily gotten around sanctions on their businesses by changing business names, so it is time to sanction the owners of these companies. 

4. Convene a Responsible Investment Initiative: The U.S. should work with the 

European Union to convene key electronics, gold, smelting, and mining companies, 

socially responsible investors, and NGOs in a responsible investment initiative 

aimed at addressing risks and identifying opportunities to conflict-free economic 

investment in the Great Lakes region. This should take place parallel to the peace 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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1Salili Tripathi and Canan Gu ̈ndu ̈ z, ‘‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for Third-party Mediation,’’ background paper, The Oslo Forum Network 

of Mediators, 2008, available at http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Salil Tripathi Mediation Business 

WEB.pdf (accessed March 2013); Mats Berdal and Nader Mousavizadeh, ‘‘Investing for Peace: 

The Private Sector and the Challenges of Peacebuilding,’’ Survival Vol. 52, No. 2 (April-May 

2010). 

talks through a series of minisummits and a high-level conference and build on lessons from Northern Ireland and Central America.1 The initiative would gather

potential investors in natural resources, infrastructure, and financial services and 

design further responsible trade partnerships, as well as identify obstacles to

responsible investment and brainstorm solutions. With such a process going on parallel to the peace talks, the African governments would see outside interest in a

responsible economic trade, thus creating further incentives for progress in the 

talks. The Public Private Alliance might be a good vehicle for helping to organize 

this. 

5. Support Accountability for War Crimes: In the aftermath of Bosco Ntaganda’s 

surrender, the Obama administration should increase support to the International 

Criminal Court to investigate and indict additional leaders of the M23, FDLR and 

other armed groups most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, 

and the administration should work with regional partners to facilitate their arrest 

upon indictment. 

6. Provide Aid to DDR Efforts: The U.S. should work with the U.N. to develop 

enhanced disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement programs, or DDR/RR, and provide special forces training to enhance the 

capacity of the new U.N. force intervention brigade, along the lines of the model for 

the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

CONCLUSION

After nearly 20 years of war, peace will not come overnight to eastern Congo. It 

has been one of the world’s most protracted conflicts, but there may finally be a 

glimmer of hope to end it because the policy context for the war is changing. 

Ntaganda’s surrender, the new economic realities for armed groups, and the signing 

of the U.N. Framework can lay the groundwork for a peace process, if the international community sufficiently invests in such an initiative. The issues to be dealt 

with in a genuine peace process are complex, and it will require painstaking mediation work to hammer out agreements on economic, security, and political issues 

that continue to drive conflict. Such an effort will require the sustained attention 

of actors from the U.N. Secretary General to local civil society activists. The U.S. 

role will be key in creating coordinated international leverage and buttressing the 

forces for peace on the ground in Congo. 

The reward of these trials and tribulations will be great: peace in eastern Congo, 

one of the most convoluted and destructive conflicts the world has ever known.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast, for those particularly spirited and focused remarks and recommendations. 

Mr. Dizolele, we welcome your comments. 

STATEMENT OF MVEMBA DIZOLELE, STRATEGY AND ADVOCACY FELLOW, EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, on

behalf of Eastern Congo Initiative, I thank you for the invitation 

and honor to testify before your subcommittee. I commend you for 

your continued interests in developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and appreciate your continued support of the people 

of Congo. 

Mr. Chairman, after two decades of violence and political 

upheaval in DRC, we realize how easy it might be for U.S. leaders 

and the world to give up on Congo. From MONUSCO to the 

FARDC to the Congolese Government, it seems as though none of 

the major institutions are functioning well or are truly committed 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10

to lasting peace. But I want to begin my testimony today by offering a slightly different perspective. 

From ECI’s view on the ground in Goma, the reality is more 

hopeful than the headlines suggest. The Congolese are among the 

world’s most resourceful people and a people who refuse to be defined by circumstance or history. They are committed to a positive 

change in their country and demonstrate that commitment every 

day. The massive political mobilization and voter turnout during 

the 2011 elections, despite overwhelming challenges, including 

physical intimidation in some areas, is a testament to their desire 

to shape a better future for themselves and their families. 

DRC is home to a vibrant civil society that is second to none in 

Africa. Civil society and faith-based groups have been substituting 

for this dysfunctional state across Congo throughout many years of 

crisis. Not only do civil society organizations provide services, they 

mobilize the population for political change. 

And ECI today is an investment in their vision. This is why 

ECI’s work is focused on developing and strengthening partnerships with civil society organizations and providing them with technical and financial support as they strive to overcome the circumstances that impede their growth. We are not alone in this, as 

there are many other foreign organizations working with individual 

civil society entities, and the results are palpable. 

So on behalf of ECI, I am here to ask the United States Senate 

to stand alongside civil society heroes in Congo. We are not asking 

for more money. However, we are asking for American leadership, 

particularly more leadership, as it will take that to bring all parties 

together for peace and end this instability in the region. 

Last April, Eastern Congo Initiative and a coalition of Congolese 

and international NGOs published a report called ‘‘Taking a Stand 

on Security Sector Reform.’’ Mr. Chairman, with your permission, 

I will ask consent to submit the report and my written remarks for 

the record today. 

Senator COONS. Without objection, they will be included. Thank 

you. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. The story of M23 offers three simple but important lessons. The first lesson is that rushed, ad hoc, and partial 

security sector reform does not work. 

The second lesson is that military integration of rebel groups 

cannot be a substitute for a real peace process. We are here 

because of a botched peace process that quickly integrated groups 

that should not be integrated. 

The third lesson is, therefore, that unless the structural problems 

are addressed, the FARDC is unlikely to ever evolve into a professional and effective military. 

While it is true that much of the responsibility for lack of 

progress on SSR rests with the Congolese authorities, MONUSCO 

bears part of the responsibility. The fall of Goma last year is the 

apex of a long string of U.N. peacekeepers’ failure to protect civilians, despite a clear and strong mandate to do so. 

Beyond the United Nations, the international community also 

has largely failed to act, despite widespread agreement that military reform is the foundation for progress across all conflict resolution, state-building, and development objectives in the DRC. Over 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11

the past decade, security sector reform has been crippled by poor 

coordination among donors who are driven primarily by competing 

short-term imperatives and objectives. 

But despite our dismal progress on SSR, we are seeing glimmers 

of hope that a changing international political environment may 

open opportunities for real reform. 

The magnitude of the task ahead requires that it be a joint effort 

and that all partners pull their weight. Donors must build momentum toward progress by making high-level political commitments to 

support military reform and back them with immediate, practical, 

coordinated support. The road to successful security sector reform 

goes through the following steps. 

The United States should unambiguously support MONUSCO to 

fulfill its mandate as expanded in U.N. Resolution 2098, particularly the appointment of the special envoy who needs our full 

support. 

In the region, members of the Contact Group need to convene an 

immediate meeting of an expanded Contact Group which will include the Southern African Development Community, the African 

Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to 

discuss the implementation of the renewed military reform, but 

also the meeting could serve as a platform and a forum for Mary 

Robinson to discuss her plan of action and engage the leaders in 

a formal setting. 

In the meantime, the United States should engage the Government of DRC, in partnership with MONUSCO and other donors, to 

draw up a comprehensive security sector reform blueprint in a 

practical and inclusive process which involves civil society and

establishes a robust working-level coordination and followup 

mechanism. 

In support of that SSR blueprint, the United States should 

encourage our NATO allies and other key partners to provide police, judicial, and military training to the DRC to help bolster its 

capacity to protect its people and preserve its territorial integrity. 

U.S. Africa Command successfully trained a battalion that performed well in LRA-affected areas in Orientale province. As part of 

the comprehensive SSR blueprint, the United States should increase its military assistance to DRC, including training of more 

units of FARDC and greater access to United States military training institutions for Congolese officers. 

At the same time, the DRC Government has to learn from past 

failures and avoid easy, expedient stop-gap measures that reduce 

tensions in the short run but worsen the crisis in the long run. The 

M23 may be reintegrated into the FARDC. For many, this will be 

the third time they join the FARDC only to subsequently desert. 

War criminals should not be integrated into the Congolese military. 

The DRC cannot import rebel unit structures and chains of command into the FARDC and expect different results. 

And finally, the Government of DRC, the regional states, and 

moderators of the Kampala talks have to ensure that the terms of 

any peace deal with the M23 respect human rights considerations 

and break parallel chains of command. 

With recent commitments from the United Nations, we as a community of nations have an opportunity to ensure that 2013 is not 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12

another year lost for the Congolese people. Both through our 

Embassy in Kinshasa and here in Washington, the United States 

can use its political, diplomatic, and moral capital to invest in a 

people who continue to show courage, determination, and commitment to build a better future for their country. ECI believes there 

is no better investment we can make than the success of the Congolese people. 

I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MVEMBA PHEZO DIZOLELE

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Africa, on behalf of Eastern Congo Initiative, I thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your subcommittee. I commend you for your 

continued interest in developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and I 

appreciate your continued support of the Congolese people. 

Mr. Chairman, after two decades of violence and political upheaval in DRC, we 

realize how easy it might be for U.S. leaders and the world to give up on Congo. 

From MONUSCO, to the FARDC to the Congolese Government, it seems as though 

none of the major institutions are functioning well or are truly committed to a lasting peace. But I want to begin my testimony today by offering a slightly different 

perspective. 

From ECI’s view on the ground in Goma, the reality is more hopeful than the 

headlines suggest. The Congolese are among the world’s most resourceful people, 

and a people who refuse to be defined by circumstance or history. They are committed to positive change in their country and demonstrate that commitment every 

day. The massive political mobilization and voter turnout during the 2011 elections 

despite overwhelming challenges, including physical intimidation in some areas, is 

a testament to their desire to shape a better future for themselves and their 

families. 

DRC is home to a vibrant civil society that is second to none in Africa. Civil society and faith-based groups have been substituting for the dysfunctional state across 

Congo throughout the many years of crisis. Not only do civil society organizations 

provide services, such as education, health, economic development and justice, 

where the state fails, they mobilize the population for political change. Civil society 

organizations are at the forefront of the struggle for a robust democratic process. 

They drive the vote, shape the political debate and induce reforms, including legislation against sexual violence, the audit of mining contracts, the revision of the mining code, and the restructuring of the national electoral commission. They envision 

a better future for their country and they are doing everything they can to craft it 

by their own hands. 

ECI is an investment in their vision. This is why ECI’s work is focused on developing and strengthening partnerships with civil society organizations, and providing 

them technical and financial support as they push to overcome the circumstances 

that impede their growth. We are not alone, as there are many other foreign organizations working with individual civil society entities, and the results are palpable. 

Our partners in the agricultural sector, amid a culture of corruption and the constant threat of violence, have trained smallholder farmers in improved techniques 

and built capacity to improve the quality and yield of their crops. This kind of 

progress may seem incremental, but those increments mean that many will be able 

to afford better health care for their families and schooling for their children. If 

properly farmed, DRC could feed one-third of the world’s population, and we believe 

if these farmers are given a chance, it can become the breadbasket of Africa. 

And when M23 overtook Goma last fall, it was not MONUSCO or FARDC who 

guided civilians to safety, but courageous and resourceful citizen-journalists. For 2 

days straight, the 14 staff members of ECI’s partner, Mutaani FM, locked themselves in their station and remained on-air as an independent source of information 

for the city and surrounding communities. Mutaani also opened the airwaves for listeners to share real-time updates from their neighborhoods, and send messages of 

reassurance to those whose homes were suddenly at the center of a battlefield. During this time of crisis and in the absence of government support, Mutaani broadcasts became a timeline of trusted information and a lifeline of human contact. 

These are community leaders who, with limited resources, are literally saving 

lives and keeping hope from fading. Progress is possible, but without lasting governFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13

ment reform civil society’s progress is palliative care for a failing state. Community 

organizations can’t raise an army or maintain law and order in their society. 

On ECI’s behalf, I am here today to ask that the United States Senate stand 

alongside of these heroes. Finding a lasting solution to the cycle of violence and creating an environment in which the Congolese can grow and thrive does not require 

the expenditure of large sums of money or the deployment of boots on the ground. 

It does, however, require American political leadership—moral leadership even—to 

bring the parties together to address the larger sources of instability in the region. 

The crisis that we are here today to discuss is a direct result of DRC’s lack of 

competent and adequate security and law enforcement institutions. The ensuing 

insecurity affects all of DRC, taking different forms in various regions of the country. Recent events in Lubumbashi, where over 200 Mai-Mai militiamen armed with 

rudimentary weapons walked mostly unopposed past security forces to the U.N. 

headquarters, underscore the pervasiveness of insecurity. That these bandits 

breached the security of DRC’s second-largest city and most important mining hub 

so easily is worrisome and may augur more such disturbing developments. 

Still, to date the most violent expression of insecurity centers in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Orientale, where successive waves of foreign 

invasions and the continued emergence and recycling of militias have caused the 

death of millions, displaced around 2 million civilians, and led to an overwhelming 

incidence of sexual violence and rampant looting of mineral resources. This brutal 

manifestation of state dysfunction and militia rule now also affects the civilian populations of northern Katanga. 

This reality shapes the daily lives of millions of Congolese across the country and 

exposes the pressing need for greater commitment to security sector reform. Practically all stakeholders, including President Joseph Kabila, the DRC Minister of 

Defense, the FARDC chief of staff, DRC’s neighbors and the U.N. Secretary General 

have recognized the importance of security sector reform. This reform is often mentioned as a top priority by donors, and was named as the first commitment asked 

of the DRC Government in the Addis-Ababa framework agreement signed in February this year by 11 regional leaders. 

Last April, Eastern Congo Initiative and a coalition of Congolese and international NGOs called donors to action in a report titled ‘‘Taking a Stand on Security 

Sector Reform.’’ A year later, almost nothing has been done. A followup report card 

on the recommendations of that report will be published this month by Eastern 

Congo Initiative—it reveals failing grades. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would ask consent to submit the report 

and my written remarks for the record. 

The rhetoric of stakeholders and donors voicing support for security sector reform 

is no doubt genuine, but it is not matched by progress on the ground. The continued 

imperative for meaningful change—and the price of doing nothing—could not be 

clearer, tragically underlined by the events of 2012. The M23 rebellion was born in 

April 2012 following the desertion of hundreds of soldiers from the FARDC, in part 

over poor conditions—notably lack of pay and food, and political considerations. The 

new rebellion was led by individuals with long and bloody histories of desertion and 

abuse, who had been allowed to avoid justice and maintain parallel command structures inside the FARDC—most notoriously Bosco Ntaganda. The Congolese defense 

forces proved unable to defeat M23, despite an enormous advantage in numbers, 

their effectiveness limited by poor support to troops in the field—some were 

reported to lack food on the front lines—incoherent leadership and poor morale, forcing them to desert their posts in the name of self-preservation. 

The cost has yet again been borne by Congolese civilians, hundreds of thousands 

of whom have been displaced by fighting. Many others were raped or killed. As the 

U.N. Secretary General has recognized ‘‘. . . the recent crisis in eastern Democratic 

Republic of the Congo has again underlined the need to reform the security sector, 

notably the FARDC.’’ It is time to revisit the issues. 

The story of the M23 offers three simple, but important lessons. The first lesson 

is that rushed, ad hoc and partial security sector reform does not work. The successive attempts to integrate former rebels—the Rassemblement Congolais pour la 

De ́mocratie-Goma (RCD–G) and the Congre`s National pour la De ́fense du Peuple 

(CNDP)—ducked the most difficult and most important issues. Former rebels were 

not vetted for human rights abuses or other crimes. No coherent rationalization of 

rank for newly integrated fighters was undertaken. Like other FARDC soldiers, 

former rebels were not given sufficient material support or pay. Perhaps most importantly, former rebels were not inserted into a clear and well-respected command 

structure, allowing parallel loyalties and chains of command to persist. 

The second lesson is that military integration of rebel groups cannot be a substitute for a real peace process. Past attempts at integration were a product of ad 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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hoc peace deals reflecting the immediate imperative of conflict resolution and 

behind-the-scenes political compromises. The ‘‘mixage’’ process for instance reflected 

the CNDP’s refusal to disperse its fighting strength, and the Congolese Government’s need to end the chaos and humiliation of fighting in the East. Likewise, the 

integration of the CNDP following the agreement of March 23, 2009, was a product 

of hidden negotiations between the Rwandan and Congolese Governments that 

allowed the CNDP to retain considerable influence in the East independent of formal FARDC command structures. In both cases, the fix was only temporary, buying 

a brief period of uneasy calm before fighting resumed. 

The problems highlighted above apply to the whole of the FARDC, not just to 

newly integrated elements. There are continual defections from the FARDC across 

the whole country, and the ill-discipline and abuses by FARDC personnel is welldocumented and pervasive. Frightened communities with no protection are more 

likely to mobilize around a militia, causing further violence and chaos. 

The third lesson is therefore that, unless these structural problems are addressed, 

the FARDC is unlikely to ever evolve into the professional, effective military that 

all actors, Congolese and external, want to see. 

With regard to Security Sector Reform, 2012 was a lost year. In DRC, it had been 

anticipated that the 2011 elections would consolidate the democratic gains of 2006 

and open up a political opportunity to move forward on much-needed reform. But 

the last elections were highly contested, creating tension between the majority in 

power and the opposition that have severely limited the government’s ability to act, 

much less tackle the difficult challenges of security sector reform. 

While it is true that much of the responsibility for the lack of progress on SSR 

rests with the Congolese authorities, MONUSCO bears part of that responsibility. 

The fall of Goma last year is the apex of a long string of U.N. peacekeepers’ failures 

to protect civilians despite a clear and strong mandate to do so. Without an effective 

peacekeeping presence, stabilization and security sector reform cannot take hold. 

Beyond the United Nations, the international community has also largely failed 

to act, despite widespread agreement that military reform is the foundation for 

progress across all conflict resolution, state-building and development objectives in 

the DRC. Over the past decade, security sector reform has been crippled by poor 

coordination among donors, who are driven primarily by competing short-term 

imperatives and objectives. This approach has yielded piecemeal interventions, and 

the resulting failures have led many to give up on systemic reform altogether. 

Despite our dismal progress on SSR to date, we are seeing glimmers of hope that 

a changing international political environment may open opportunities for real 

reform. 

First, following the recent violence, regional actors—notably, the Southern African 

Development Community—have collectively engaged in the DRC at a level not seen 

since the end of the transition in 2006. Second, Mary Robinson’s appointment as the 

U.N. Special Envoy can provide a much-needed focal point and energy at the precise 

moment when the U.N. Security Council has unambiguously placed SSR at the 

heart of its work in the DRC. 

The magnitude of the task ahead requires that it be a joint effort and that all 

partners pull their weight. Donors must build momentum toward progress by making high-level political commitments to support military reform, and back them with 

immediate practical, coordinated support. The road to successful security reform 

goes through the following steps:

• The United States should unambiguously support MONUSCO to fulfill its mandate as expanded in U.N. Resolution 2098. The U.N. system, particularly the 

permanent five members of the Security Council, must ensure that MONUSCO 

and the U.N. Special Envoy have full support and all the necessary resources 

to fulfill their mandates. • In the region, members of the Contact Group need to convene an immediate 

meeting of an expanded Contact Group, to include the Southern African Development Community, the African Union, and International Conference on the 

Great Lakes Region, to discuss the implementation of renewed military reform. 

The meeting may also serve as a platform and forum for Mary Robinson, the 

newly appointed U.N. special envoy for the Great Lakes Region, to present her 

plan of action to the Contact Group. 

• In the meantime, the U.S. should engage the Government of DRC, in partnership with MONUSCO and other donors, to draw up a comprehensive security 

sector reform blueprint in a practical and inclusive process, which involves civil 

society and establishes a robust working-level coordination and followup mechanism. 

• In support of that SSR blueprint, the U.S. should encourage our NATO allies 

and other key partners to provide police, judicial, and military training to the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15

DRC, to help bolster its capacity to protect its people and preserve its territorial 

integrity. 

• U.S. Africa Command successfully trained a battalion that performed well in 

LRA-affected areas in Orientale province. As part of a comprehensive SSR blueprint, the U.S. should increase its military assistance to DRC, including training of more units of FARDC and greater access to U.S. military training institutions for Congolese officers. 

• EUSEC and MONUSCO need to support the Government of DRC in implementing a surge of support to the FARDC in the field. The ISSSS has a remit 

to improve security and stability across the East. MONUSCO has a mandate 

to protect civilians and collect information on human rights abuses. A coordinated surge of practical measures to improve the conduct and morale of the 

FARDC is a vital factor in creating the conditions for effective reform. 

• At the same time, the Government of DRC has to learn from past failures and 

avoid easy, expedient stop-gap measures that reduce tensions in the short run 

but worsen the crisis in the long run. The M23 may be reintegrated into the 

FARDC. For many, this will be the third time they join the FARDC, only to 

subsequently desert. War criminals should not be integrated into the Congolese 

military. DRC cannot import rebel unit structures and chains of command into 

the FARDC and expect different results. 

• And finally, the Government of DRC, Regional States, and Moderators of the 

Kampala talks have to ensure that the terms of any peace deal with the M23 

respect human rights considerations and break parallel chains of command.

With recent commitments from the U.N., we as a community of nations have an 

opportunity to ensure that 2013 is not another year lost for the Congolese people. 

Both through our Embassy in Kinshasa and here in Washington, the U.S. can use 

its political, diplomatic, and moral capital to invest in a people who continue to 

show courage, determination and a commitment to build a better future for their 

country. ECI believes there is no better investment we can make than in the success 

of the Congolese people.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Dizolele. 

And I would like to welcome Senator Durbin who has joined us 

for the hearing. 

Father Muhigirwa, we welcome your testimony now. 

STATEMENT OF FATHER FERDINAND MUHIGIRWA, DIRECTOR, 

CENTRE D’ETUDES POUR I’ACTION SOCIALE, KINSHASA, 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 

Father MUHIGIRWA. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Coons, 

Ranking Member Flake, members of the Subcommittee on African 

Affairs, thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before 

your committee. I come before you as a Congolese Jesuit priest, and 

the views expressed in this statement are mine alone. 

This present hearing is in a particular way timely and critical for 

the DRC due to three very recent events: the adoption of the Peace, 

Security and Cooperation Framework; the appointment of a U.N. 

special envoy for the Great Lakes; and the passage of a U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098. 

Noting that after two decades the eastern Congo is continuing to 

suffer from a recurring cycle of violence and conflict by armed 

groups, both Congolese and foreign, what should be done to put an 

end to these recurring cycles of violence? My statement is a contribution to this question and sharing briefly my insights on the 

three key issues of electoral reform, peace and security, regional 

cooperation for economic development. 

First, electoral reform. Given the lack of a credible electoral process in November 2011, the Government in Congo does not have the 

full legitimacy to resolve this crisis. Thus, what is urgently needed 

in 2013 is a reform of the national electoral commission called the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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CENI, the training in civic and voter education of the CENI members and those of the civil society leaders through the electoral 

training school in central Africa to ensure a real independence, 

fairness, and transparency of the provincial and local elections are 

hopefully held in November 2013. In November 2016, only Presidential and legislative elections will take place. The United States 

and other international partners should ensure that the electoral 

process is financed, logistically assisted, monitored, and evaluated 

closely with clear benchmarks and appropriate followup measures 

and results. 

Second, peace and security. In DRC, there are two priorities in 

the area of peace and security: ending impunity for sexual violence 

and neutralizing the M23 rebels. Without equitable and restorative 

justice, there is no genuine and lasting peace. Rapes and sexualbased violence continues to occur because there is a widespread 

culture of impunity. So this reform is needed to respect the rule of 

law, to end impunity, and to get the rebels cumulative force and 

of sexual violence. In this context, the role of the Congolese Government and army is clear. 

The United States Congress can help by calling on the Congolese 

Government to undertake the following specific and concrete 

reforms: to organize the army and the police and improve the living 

conditions of the soldiers and police; to establish a viable and professional army and police force that respects human rights and the 

rule of law; to create a rapid reaction force according to Resolution 

2098; to pave the way for an efficient military administration; to 

allow the police to play its role in the establishment of public order. 

Third, regional cooperation for economic development. Regional 

cooperation should be grounded in regional economic projects for 

sustainable development with special considerations to the management of natural resources because this has historically been one 

of the key drivers of conflict. In the Great Lake region, regional cooperation for economic development has failed. Why? Because there 

is lack of political will, lack of strategic vision for development of 

the region, and no sufficient financial support from the U.S. Government and from the financial institutions and bilateral partners. 

The U.S. Government can promote and support financing from the 

World Bank of regional economic projects in the area of roads, rail, 

electricity, oil, and gas. These projects will become also a factor of 

political stability and social reconciliation among the people in the 

Great Lakes region. 

Mr. Chairman, my hope, my prayer is that the full implementation of the United Nations framework and Resolution 2098 by all 

the stakeholders will put an end to recurring cycles of violence in 

eastern Congo, promote peace and security for provincial and local 

elections, strengthen the cooperation for sustainable economic 

development for DRC and the entire region. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present my insights on this important issue. I welcome the engagement of the subcommittee and 

the U.S. Congress and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Father Muhigirwa follows:]

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REV. PROF. MUHIGIRWA RUSEMBUKA FERDINAND SJ 

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, members of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your committee. 

I come before you as a Congolese Jesuit priest. The views expressed in this statement are mine. This present hearing is particularly timely and critical for the 

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) due to three very recent events: the adoption 

of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework; the appointment of a U.N. Special Envoy to the Great Lakes; and the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2098. 

From 1996 to 2013, the suffering in Congo has included 5.4 million people dead, 

2 million refugees and IDPs, and an untold number of rapes, killings, and other 

human rights violations. Congo is thus the ‘‘home of the deadliest conflict since 

World War II.’’ The conflict is complex but the fundamental problems remain the 

same: poor governance, unresolved grievances, competition for natural resources, 

and outside interference. There is a new window of opportunity due to recent events 

that offers the United States, the United Nations, and the rest of the international 

community the chance to help end this terrible conflict for good. 

The important and positive recent events started on February 24, 2013, in Addis 

Ababa, when a Peace, Security, and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and 

the region was signed by 11 Heads of States or their Representatives, together with 

the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Chairperson of the African Union, 

the Chairperson of the Southern African Development Community and the Chairperson of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. To fulfill one of 

the recommendations of the PSC Framework, former Irish President Mary Robinson 

was appointed as a high-level U.N. Special Envoy in the Great Lakes Region. On 

March 28, 2013, the Security Council voted for U.N. Resolution 2098, which demonstrates the Council’s solidarity and wish to work for peace and security in the 

Great Lake Regions. 

The United Nations has taken the lead on a new approach to the ongoing conflict 

in Congo by proposing a framework agreement among 11 countries in the region 

(known as the ‘‘11+4 mechanism framework’’) to promote peace, security, and cooperation for DRC and the region, to put an end to recurring cycles of violence, and 

to promote cooperation and economic integration in the Great Lakes Region. 

While this evolving framework is a positive step, it is crucial that it does not fall 

back on the half-measures of past initiatives. A comprehensive, holistic, and synchronized approach is needed for the implementation of this framework. 

From 1997 to December 2012, 15 UNSC resolutions have been made, and 7 peace 

agreements have been signed. All of these resolutions and peace agreements have 

failed to bring lasting peace for many reasons: lackluster implementation, lack of 

political will, lack of strategic vision for the development of the region, and no sufficient financial support from the multilateral financial institutions or bilateral partners. This is why peace, security, and cooperation for the DRC and the region are 

more remote today than 15 years ago. 

In this statement, I will share my insights on the three key issues: peace and 

security; democracy, provincial and local elections; and regional cooperation for sustainable development. And lastly, and perhaps most relevant to this committee, I 

will offer specific recommendations to the DRC and U.S. Governments. 

1. PEACE AND SECURITY

There are two key priorities in the area of peace and security—ending impunity 

for sexual violence and demobilizing M23. 

In the context of Congo, the first priority for the restoration of the State is the 

establishment of the rule of law through justice. Why? Because without equitable 

and restorative justice, there can be no genuine and lasting peace and no economic 

development. Sexually based violence continues to occur because there is a widespread culture of impunity. Perpetrators of sexual violence are not held accountable, 

thus they do not fear repercussions and the victims of sexual violence continue to 

suffer. 

Obviously, one of the most pressing challenges is the demobilization of the M23 

and other armed groups, in the context of a renewed stabilization strategy which 

should also include armed groups active in the provinces North Kivu, South Kivu, 

Katanga, and Orientale. 

In this context, the role of the Congolese Government and Army is clear. The 

government must undertake specific and concrete reforms to organize the army and 

improve the living conditions of the military. The government in Kinshasa must also 

pave the way for an efficient military administration to allow the police to play its 

role in the establishment of public order. They must also strengthen local governFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ance and resolve customary conflicts and land issues. Again, it is also important 

that the DRC Government proactively begins to fight impunity and arbitrariness in 

all its forms. 

It is imperative that no deal includes amnesty for war crimes or crimes against 

humanity. Another aspect of regional engagement should be a ramped-up effort for 

dealing with the FDLR based on elements of the 2007 Nairobi Communique ́. 

2. DEMOCRACY, PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

Given the lack a credible electoral process in November 2011, what is urgently 

needed is the restoration of the confidence of the Congolese people in the electoral 

process through the restructuring of the electoral commission to ensure real independence, fairness, and transparency of the provincial and local elections. 

The delay in holding local elections hinders the emergence of grassroots democracy. Without local governance, there is a significant negative impact on peoples’ 

perceptions of the authority of the State, leading to an identity crisis, hindering the 

social reintegration of demobilized combatants and the fight against the proliferation of armed groups. 

The U.S. Government has an important role to play in ensuring that the DRC 

Government reestablishes its legitimacy. First, we must work with them to establish 

in an inclusive manner a realistic and credible timeline for the elections and to ensure that the electoral process is monitored and evaluated closely. One particular 

thing to flag is that we must be sure the political space is open and that the political 

opposition is allowed to operate and air their views freely. 

DR Congo is engaged in a process of restructuring the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). We must learn from the faulty 2011 elections and build 

the capacity of the new CENI in order to establish a credible and realistic timetable 

for local and provincial elections, taking into account the financial and logistical constraints and the stipulations of the electoral cycle. We also must promote the participation of all stakeholders and develop a rigorous scheme for electoral integrity. 

The U.S. message should be clear: the Government of DRC must use 2013 to prepare and organize to hold both provincial and local elections in 2014—ideally at the 

same time. In November 2016, only the Presidential and legislative elections will 

take place. 

The major financing of the elections will be provided by the DRC Government, but 

the support of the international community should be complementary and should 

specifically include the following: support for training through the electoral training 

school in Central Africa (EFEAC); civic and voter education; supporting election 

monitoring by civil society and political parties; strengthening the capacity of those 

mechanisms charged with electoral dispute resolution and media regulation; and 

lastly, logistical support to CENI. 

3. REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Regional cooperation should be based on regional economic projects for sustainable development. The U.S. can promote and support financing (through international financial institutions) for those economic regional projects that incorporate 

the regional interests of all parties. If well-conceived and well-managed, Economic 

Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) projects in the area of roads, rail, 

energy, gas, oil, mining, and fisheries could reduce tensions, competition, and become an important factor in stabilization and economic development. This process 

should also seek input from the AU, the ICGLR, SADC, and Congolese civil society. 

4. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To the U.S. and the broader international community 

In 2006, the U.S. Senate passed the ‘‘Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, 

Security and Democracy Promotion Act.’’ (Public Law 109–456, SEC 101 and 102) 

When considering recommendations for the United States Government, many of the 

priorities outlined in this legislation still resonate today. That law specifically mentioned the need for rehabilitation of the national judiciary to enhance the rule of 

law, the importance of combating corruption and the need to institute economic reforms to promote development. The legislation also mentioned the need for the U.S. 

to support security sector reform, including the army, military, justice system, and 

police force. These are still the key necessary preconditions for peace and stability 

in the region. 

Taking that into consideration, the U.S. and broader international community 

should:

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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—Support the Peace, Security and Cooperation framework by financing integrating 

projects between the DRC and neighboring countries; 

—Organize a donors’ conference on the DRC and the Great Lakes Region where the 

international community would demonstrate its financial commitment to support 

institutional reforms and cross-border economic initiatives; 

—Sustain a renewed commitment by bilateral partners to remain engaged in supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, including with 

appropriate means to ensure long-term sustainability; and 

—Assist the DRC Government in developing a robust monitoring and evaluation 

mechanism for assessing progress. 

2. To the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo 

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo should:

—Create a robust monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess progress in a 

transparent manner by a multistakeholder group, including the international 

partners of the DRC and DRC civil society; 

—Promote a concerted effort by governments and companies to demilitarize mining 

areas in the Kivus to promote clean trade, which should comply with the ICGRL 

measures, OECD and U.N. standards, governments, and companies to deny funding to belligerents, create better working conditions for artisanal miners and build 

investor confidence; 

—Expand use of the credible mechanism for certification and traceability to monitor 

conflict-free minerals to export to downstream and end-users. This mechanism for 

certification and traceability to monitor conflict-free minerals is financed by 

USAID and BGR and coordinated by the ministry of mines and PROMINES. 

Work has shown that 55 artisanal mine sites out of 82 assessed have been validated as free from child labor and illegal taxation.

Thank you for the opportunity to present my perspective on this important issue. 

I welcome the engagement of this subcommittee and the U.S. Congress and I look 

forward to your questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Father, for your testimony today. 

Mr. Borello. 

STATEMENT OF FEDERICO BORELLO, DIRECTOR, 

INVESTMENTS, HUMANITY UNITED, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BORELLO. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, Senator 

Durbin, on behalf of Humanity United, a private philanthropic 

institution that tries to build peace and advance human freedom, 

I thank you very much for inviting me to testify on the critical situation in eastern Congo. 

After years of international apathy toward the region, a new crisis, provoked by the M23 and supported by Rwanda, seems to have 

shaken concerned international policymakers into action. Like my 

colleague and like you, Chairman, I welcome the Peace and Security Framework, the appointment of Ms. Mary Robinson, and the 

renewed mandate and enhanced mandate from MONUSCO. However, very little has changed on the ground yet. 

In the past, the United States and the international community 

have prioritized reactive and short-term initiatives and refrained 

from confronting the deep and uncomfortable political issues that 

are at the root of the region’s ongoing conflict. We must not let that 

happen again. We cannot choose among the full range of recommendations that are contained in my written statement, many of 

which have been already mentioned by my colleagues, although in 

each of these areas, there are concrete and realistic first steps that 

could be taken to make progress. Only by addressing all these 

issues simultaneously and comprehensively can we support the 

Congolese people to break this 20-year-old cycle of violence. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Let me outline a few key areas including reforms needed at the 

regional, national, and local level. 

First, regional issues must be addressed. The noninterference 

pledge formalizing the framework must be fully implemented and 

Rwanda’s determination to create and support abusive rebel groups 

in the Congo must be broken at all costs. In parallel, significant 

efforts are needed to promote greater regional economic progress 

along the line of what my colleague, John Prendergast, has suggested and to address Rwanda’s concerns with the FDLR rebel 

group based in eastern DRC according to a DDR plan that I outlined in my written testimony. 

Second, national issues must be addressed. The increasing focus 

on Rwanda’s role does not excuse the Congolese Government’s near 

total failure in fostering good governance and the rule of law. The 

following reform needs to be urgently launched: security sector 

reform, accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity, 

comprehensive land reform, and a democratization process as 

described in a recent paper by Gambino and Weissman that I respectfully request be added to the records of this hearing. 

Senator COONS. Without objection. 

Mr. BORELLO. Thank you. 

Third, local issues must be taken head on. Offensive military 

operations by the new MONUSCO Intervention Brigade must be 

accompanied by a revamped disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration program, and most importantly, by a state-sponsored 

intercommunity dialogue process in the Kivus. Ultimately, it is up 

to the Congolese Government, civil society, and people to identify 

the solution to the violence that continues to plague their country 

once external interference ceases. However, the international community and the United States in particular can play an important 

role in facilitating this process. My testimony outlines 10 recommendations for the United States which I hope we can discuss during the hearing. But let me highlight five in particular. 

First, as already mentioned first by you, Chairman, and by my 

colleagues, a high-level envoy is urgent and the No. 1 priority, 

someone with the political stature, experience, and skills necessary 

to engage at the highest level with regional Presidents and the 

U.N. envoy. 

Second, the United States must fully support Ms. Mary Robinson 

as she tries to hold governments accountable to their pledges and 

closely coordinate in the development of benchmarks for both 

regional and national commitments as outlined in the Peace and 

Security Framework. 

Third, the United States, under the leadership of its own envoy, 

should redefine its political and aid strategy toward the region and 

hold the DRC and Rwanda accountable to agreed-upon benchmarks. 

Four, the United States, in close coordination with the United 

Nations and other donors, must commit to technical and financial 

support for long-term and sustainable security sector reform in the 

DRC. 

Five, the United States should continue to provide strong support 

to the creation of an internationalized judicial mechanism to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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prosecute serious human rights abuses, including sexual- and gender-based violence, in the DRC. 

In conclusion, in diplomatic circles, one often hears that we have 

tried everything in the Congo and nothing works. I strongly reject 

this defeatist attitude. We have not tried everything. 

Since 2006, after a relatively successful electoral process, the 

international community has drifted toward purely military and 

technocratic solutions to deep-seated political problems. We have 

prioritized an increasing militarization of MONUC and MONUSCO 

and its checkered relationship with the Congolese military and 

powerlessly witnessed the creation of new armed groups and the 

continuing abuses of the Congolese Army. We have built buildings 

to house institutions, but forgot to build the institutions themselves. We have rightfully applauded Rwanda’s spectacular recovery from the ashes of genocide, but we have stayed silent for too 

many years about its abuses in the Congo. We have provided technical and financial support to the 2011 DRC elections but silently 

witnessed as massive fraud voided them of any significance. For 

these reasons, we failed the Congolese people. 

We now need a comprehensive process that creates incentives for 

Rwanda to stop supporting armed proxies, for the Congolese Government to start the overdue process of reforming its ailing 

national institutions, and for local communities in eastern DRC to 

stop supporting armed groups to further their grievances. For this, 

a sustained, robust political process led by the U.N. envoy and supported by the U.S. Government and this committee is the best hope 

we have had in a decade to help move this region and its people 

toward peace and prosperity. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Borello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FEDERICO BORELLO

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and other members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you very much for inviting me to testify on the 

critical situation in eastern Congo and for your continuing attention to the plight 

of ordinary men, women, and children in this troubled part of the world. 

My name is Federico Borello, and I am Director of Investments at Humanity 

United, a private philanthropic institution that strives to build peace and advance 

human freedom. I have been working on and in the Great Lakes Region of Africa 

since 2002, in the fields of human rights promotion, transitional justice, and conflict 

prevention. 

After years of international apathy toward the region, a new crisis, this time provoked by a rebel movement known as M23, seems to have shaken concerned international policymakers into action. Now is the time to turn promising but vague commitments and principles into action. Though this crisis manifests itself acutely in 

eastern Congo, where civilians have lived in an almost perpetual state of violence 

since 1993, the solution to the problem lies in a sustained and comprehensive 

approach that looks at the regional, national, and local dimensions of this conflict. 

Three recent developments have helped to shape the current opportunity for 

progress. First, the recent Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (hereby ‘‘the 

framework’’ or ‘‘11+4 framework’’) signed in Addis Ababa on February 24, 2013, 

though it has its weaknesses, correctly identifies the need for such a comprehensive 

approach. Second, the appointment as U.N. Special Envoy to the region of former 

Irish President Mary Robinson, a proven leader with the appropriate political stature, experience, integrity and commitment to human rights and accountability, 

could prove a vital contribution to the cause of bringing peace to the region. Finally, 

the redefinition of the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) and 

its newly enhanced strength can help the battered peacekeeping mission to become 

more effective in protecting civilians and bringing stability to the region. Combined, 

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these measures offer an unprecedented opportunity to comprehensively tackle the 

root causes of conflict and violence. 

However, very little has changed on the ground yet, and there is a serious possibility that the United States and the international community will repeat past mistakes. There is a real risk that the international community will not fully attend 

to all critical aspects of the crisis, squandering this opportunity by continuing to engage in a superficial and reactive way, taking cosmetic, short-term, and half-hearted 

initiatives but refraining from focusing on the deep and uncomfortable political 

issues that have defeated all efforts to bring peace to the region until now. This has 

been the modus operandi of the international community over the last two decades 

in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), one of reacting to the symptoms, rather 

than the causes, of the problem, and always focusing on short-term measures in 

reaction to successive crises, rather than seeking to implement durable solutions. 

This scenario would be a new variant of past attempts and would result in the 

resumption of aid to Rwanda, the restoration of legitimacy to a much-weakened 

President Kabila, and the rehabilitation of the public image of MONUSCO. The 

Congolese people, however, would see no end to their misery. Further, the U.S. taxpayer would have to shoulder the burden of paying for MONUSCO for years to 

come, given that the perpetuation of conflict in this context is almost inevitable. 

Today, we are not one day closer to MONUSCO’s safe withdrawal than we were in 

2006 when Congo held relatively successful national elections. 

The U.S. Government and others in the international community must not allow 

this unfortunate scenario to happen. The administration and Congress must reevaluate the current approach by the United States and move away from ineffective 

and short-term policies toward a long-term strategy. Deep and sustained political 

and economic engagement is sorely needed by the U.S. Government, the U.N., the 

African Union (AU) and the donor community, to gradually but radically change 

regional, national, and local dynamics and incentives for governments and communities in the region. 

In my testimony, I will lay out the steps that must be taken at the regional, 

national, and local level to create a sustainable resolution to the challenges in the 

DRC, and I will conclude with a series of recommendations for the U.S. Government. 

Unfortunately, we do not have the choice to prioritize among these recommendations, or the other elements I will address in my testimony. Only by addressing 

them simultaneously and comprehensively can we support the Congolese people to 

break the 20-year-old cycle of violence. 

I. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

A. Implementation of noninterference pledge 

The 11+4 framework is very clear: all countries in the region have committed ‘‘not 

to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring countries’’ and to ‘‘neither tolerate 

nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups.’’ 

Rwanda is the unnamed main target of this provision, having been the primary 

supporter of some of the largest insurrections in eastern Congo over the past two 

decades. After 15 years of regrettable tolerance, reports documenting the extent of 

the Rwandan Government’s support to the M23, including in its creation and the 

occupation of Goma, coupled with reports documenting the extent of M23’s atrocities 

against civilians, led to an unprecedented wave of international condemnation, and 

the suspension of aid by several donors. These decisions by members of the international community were initially met with defiance by the government in Kigali. 

In recent months, however, we have seen signs that international pressure in general—and these sanctions in particular—are starting to produce the intended effect, 

and may eventually produce lasting change in the Rwandan Government’s attitudes 

and actions in the region, provided that pressure and intense scrutiny are maintained over the next few months and years by the international community. On the 

one hand, there has been no major Rwanda-supported military offensive by the M23 

since the occupation of Goma, but on the other hand there have been credible reports over the past 2 weeks about the movement of armed troops and supplies from 

Rwanda to Congo in support of the M23. In this context, the surrender of Bosco 

Ntaganda to the International Criminal Court through the good offices of the United 

States was a notable success of this pressure, but it would be premature to declare 

victory and assume that Rwanda’s determination to support abusive armed groups 

in Congo has been broken. 

Donors, including the U.S. Government, are mulling over the appropriate benchmarks that need to be agreed upon to resume aid to Rwanda. Some donors have 

prematurely already partly restored aid. I would strongly urge that the United 

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States and the members of this committee make the dissolution of the M23 the 

main precondition for restarting aid. As has been documented by the U.N. Group 

of Experts and various nongovernmental organizations, the M23 has been created, 

trained, supplied, and directed by Rwandan officials, and its leaders regularly travel 

to Kigali when summoned. It is now the Rwandan Government’s responsibility, and 

fully within its power, to push their proxy group to depose of their arms. This is 

not in any way a call for the Rwandan Army to go back into Congo, as it did in 

2009, and arrest M23 leaders, but rather a call for Kigali to use its considerable 

political leverage to convince the M23 to lay down their arms. The M23 should go 

through a rigorous Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, 

just like any other armed group, in accordance with the principles outlined in section III below. 

Several times in the past, Rwanda formally committed to not create or support 

armed groups in eastern DRC, but it has repeatedly broken these promises. Using 

this diplomatic window of opportunity, we must now ensure that this is the last 

time. The U.N. Group of Experts will continue to be a vital source of information 

on documenting outside support to armed groups, and its mandate will need to be 

renewed for at least another few years. 

In order to address Rwanda’s legitimate security concerns, a renewed effort for 

dealing with the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, from its French 

acronym) rebellion, which continues to be based in the eastern Congo and terrorizes 

civilians, should be launched. The new MONUSCO Intervention Brigade (IB) could 

be tasked with conducting targeted operations against the FDLR leadership, in 

strict compliance with international humanitarian law and with MONUSCO’s protection of civilians mandate. However, a purely military solution would be insufficient, and the governments of the DRC and Rwanda should launch a new, comprehensive process to address this challenge. This should include:

• The publication of the list of suspected genocidaires by the Rwandan Government (as agreed in a 2007 agreement between the Governments of Rwanda and 

DRC); 

• The possibility of third-country resettlement for leaders not charged with genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity; 

• Supporting the return, demobilization, and safe reintegration of the FDLR to 

Rwanda if they have not committed crimes; 

• Better information-sharing between the United Nations, the Congolese Government, and Rwanda regarding the remaining FDLR troops; 

• Public denunciation and, if appropriate, prosecution of FARDC officers collaborating with the FDLR; and 

• Ramping up U.N. sensitization efforts of FDLR combatants to induce them to 

demobilize and reintegrate civilian life.

Finally, the international community needs to be mindful of other regional players, such as Uganda. Uganda’s historical involvement in the eastern Congo is wellknown. Though Rwandan influence has been the largest factor in the development 

of the M23, we need to ensure that other countries do not fill what they may perceive to be a vacuum and benefit from a decreased footprint by Rwandan actors. 

B. Regional economic progress 

In parallel, significant efforts are needed to promote greater regional economic 

progress. The international community should back projects that demonstrate the 

benefits of regional peace and stability and help create mutually beneficial economic 

interdependence, possibly through the creation of a World Bank Fund. Such a Fund 

could help countries in the region adopt a common legal framework to facilitate 

cross-border trade and provide funding for projects that would benefit the entire 

region, such as in the electricity and mining sectors. 

Developing new approaches to further economic progress in DRC and Rwanda 

needs to be done in consultation with local communities along the two sides of the 

border and not imposed through a top-down approach by regional governments and 

foreign donors. The 11+4 process needs to develop new solutions to the needs of 

these communities and generate a win-win mentality over the riches that should 

bring prosperity in both countries. As Ms. Robinson carries out her work, she needs 

to be particularly cognizant of the concerns of local communities in Congo in this 

regard. Given that the conflict has led to individuals outside these communities benefiting from the wealth of eastern Congo, proposals to foster improved economic cooperation will be greeted with concerns that they are, in fact, an effort to normalize 

an unfair status quo. Communities in eastern Congo need to be convinced that any 

economic arrangement is in their long-term economic interest and will help both 

their own peace and prosperity. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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II. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The increasing focus on Rwanda’s role in destabilizing its neighbor should not 

lead us to be oblivious to the Congolese Government’s near total failure in creating 

functioning institutions and establishing at least the foundations of the rule of law. 

Eliminating Rwanda’s destabilizing influence in the east is merely a necessary precondition to resolving the internal root causes of the conflict, which lie in longstanding governance failures. 

The November 2012 rape of at least 126 women in Minova, South Kivu province 

by retreating Congolese army units, and the most recent involvement of other units 

in ethnic clashes in Kitchanga, North Kivu, which left at least 55 civilians dead, 

prove once again that the Congolese Army (know by their French acronym, FARDC) 

are as abusive as any armed group roaming eastern DRC and terrorizing the civilian population. 

The following reforms need to be urgently launched: 

Security sector reform: The reform of the security sector, starting with the army 

and the police, is the most urgent priority. Bilateral train-and-equip approaches, 

including the U.S. Government’s, should be reevaluated and where appropriate suspended, in order to forge a multilateral, comprehensive reform strategy. The Congolese Government, supported by the U.N. Envoy, MONUSCO, and its main donors, 

should develop a comprehensive proposal to create an effective and accountable 

security sector, in consultation with wide sectors of civil society. Any effort must 

include, and possibly start with, a vetting process to exclude alleged human rights 

abusers from all security services. The development of a concrete, realistic, and 

participatory army and police reform plan should be the first benchmark against 

which Kinshasa’s commitment to the 11+4 framework should be evaluated. 

Judicial reform and accountability: Bosco Ntaganda’s recent surrender to the 

International Criminal Court was an important development for justice and 

accountability for the DRC. However, it is just the tip of the iceberg. The creation 

of an internationalized judicial mechanism to end impunity for serious human rights 

violations should also be a top priority for Kinshasa. It is clear that, despite the 

competence and the valiant efforts of some of its members, the Congolese judiciary 

still does not have sufficient capabilities, resources, and independence to resolutely 

break the cycle of impunity, which is closely correlated to the cycle of violence. 

National legislation on mixed Congolese-international chambers within the DRC’s 

judicial system should be supported and funded so such a mechanism can be established at the earliest possible time. This should be a second benchmark. 

Democratization, decentralization, and local elections: The complete stalemate in 

the democratization agenda, and the failure to hold local elections are also a cause 

of serious concern. I would like to refer to an excellent paper recently published by 

Anthony Gambino and Stephen Weissman, which includes concrete and practical 

recommendations, and respectfully ask that this paper be included in the record of 

this hearing. 

Land reform and natural resource management: Some of the other urgent priorities are comprehensive land reform and the creation of a more accountable and 

transparent natural resource management system. Donors should support the nascent land reform process led by the Congolese Ministry of Land Affairs, which was 

launched in July 2012 with USAID support. In the context of this process, the government has developed a roadmap and is setting up a Steering Committee that 

would oversee the reform process, whose ultimate goal is to give land tenure security to individuals and businesses. It is also imperative that donors coordinate their 

efforts among themselves, and ensure that this process is ultimately structured to 

deliver security of tenure over land to the largely agrarian poor communities in 

eastern DRC, thus eliminating a major grievance of many such communities, which 

often leads them to lend support abusive armed groups. 

President Kabila, by signing the framework agreement, has formally committed 

to undertake most of these reforms. However, there are few reasons to assume that 

the Congolese Government, after stalling on these reforms for a decade, will suddenly take a keen interest in their implementation. Its main diplomatic offensive 

during the negotiations of the framework agreement has been aimed at excluding 

donors and civil society from the proposed ‘‘national oversight mechanism,’’ set up 

under the framework to monitor the Congolese Government’s compliance with its 

obligations to conduct a set of crucial institutional reforms. The revised mechanism 

includes only the Congolese Government, which is now solely responsible for overseeing itself. In my view, this weakened method to monitor the Congolese Government’s performance of the benchmarks in the framework agreement is a notable 

flaw in an otherwise important step toward regional peace. It is imperative, regardless of the terms of the agreement, that donors and civil society be brought back 

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into this mechanism, or that an alternative and truly independent and effective 

monitoring mechanism is set up to review the DRC Government’s compliance with 

its obligations under the framework and agree on consequences to be imposed for 

failure to meet those obligations. 

The role of Ms. Robinson in overseeing the implementation of the entire framework, and not only of the commitments of regional governments, is therefore crucial 

to ensure the success of the 11+4 framework. With no progress at the national level, 

any progress made on other levels will be undermined, if not lost altogether. 

III. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Cutting Rwanda’s support for illegal armed groups and launching crucial reforms 

at the national level are necessary but insufficient measures to bring peace to eastern Congo. The lawlessness and proliferation of armed groups require energetic 

measures to restore security to Congo’s eastern provinces. 

Three simultaneous local-level processes are needed to bring some stability to 

eastern DRC: (1) military operations by the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade; (2) 

a revamped Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process; and (3) 

a serious intercommunity dialogue process. 

The creation of the new MONUSCO Intervention Brigade, authorized in the recent U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098 on MONUSCO, can prove to be a positive development, and there are already signs that armed groups are concerned 

about its imminent deployment. The Brigade’s military operations, to be conducted 

in strict compliance with international humanitarian law and with MONUSCO’s 

protection of civilians mandate, should target the leadership of all armed groups 

(M23, FDLR, Congolese Mai-Mai groups, other foreign groups). In execution of the 

new MONUSCO mandate, the IB should also conduct targeted operations to arrest 

those against whom authorities in Congo or elsewhere have issued arrest warrants. 

However, it is necessary to learn lessons from past failed attempts to use foreign 

forces to bring peace and stability to this troubled region. 

First, absent any serious reform and sufficient accountability for past human 

rights violations, MONUSCO should carefully reevaluate its support to the FARDC 

and joint operations with them, particularly because this army continue to behave 

just like many other armed groups in the region. The Brigade may want to consider 

conducting operations on its own, at least until concrete safeguards are created

to prevent the FARDC from perpetrating abuses during or after joint military 

operations. 

Second, any purely military approach is destined to fail. Such targeted military 

operations would weaken and demoralize armed groups members, and encourage 

them to lay down their weapons. However, it is imperative that a new DDR program is conceived and implemented, ideally prior to the beginning of the IB’s military operations. Such a program would organize the combatants’ vetting, training, 

integration, and deployment, and offer alternative opportunities to rejoin civilian 

life, such as road construction projects or other work opportunities. These projects 

should be funded by the international community in part for several years, and include a mix of former combatants and civilians, so that the perception is not created 

that economic opportunities are reserved for former combatants, but are rather 

available to communities as a whole. 

A new DDR program and strategy should also ensure that those responsible for 

serious abuses are not integrated into the army but instead arrested and brought 

to justice. Finally, those who do wish to join the army and fit the criteria should 

be trained and then deployed into army units throughout the country; they should 

not remain in units operating in their former area of operation as an armed group. 

Finally, a serious process of intercommunity dialogue is necessary to address the 

legitimate community grievances that have previously moved many communities to 

lend support to abusive armed groups. Such a process, if accompanied by the crucial 

reforms mentioned in section II above (particularly land reform and decentralization) would focus on cutting the links between communities and armed groups and 

work to prevent future instances in which communities resort to violence to accomplish their interests. Local, mostly NGO-led initiatives have tried to stimulate intercommunity dialogue. The government, with the support of the international community and MONUSCO in particular, should institutionalize and expand such dialogue 

initiatives, within the framework of the revised International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), a joint U.N./donors effort that serves as the 

main vehicle for international support to the DRC’s own Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC), launched in June 2009. The 

ISSSS, revised in 2012, is a program aimed at supporting the establishment of sustainable security forces and the consolidation of state authority in eastern Congo. 

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All donors wanting to contribute to the stabilization effort in eastern DRC are 

expected to do it within the ISSSS framework. 

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Ultimately, it is up to the Congolese Government, civil society and people to find 

a solution to the lack of governance and violence that continues to plague their 

country, once external interference ceases. Only a national process of dialogue over 

reform and reconciliation, in which all actors assume their responsibilities and 

decide to work toward peace, can change the current dynamics and move the country closer toward peace. 

Nonetheless, the international community and the United States in particular can 

play an important role in facilitating this process. 

1. The U.S. should appoint a high-level Presidential Special Envoy to the Great 

Lakes Region, with the political stature, experience, and skills necessary to engage 

at the highest levels with regional Presidents and the U.N. Envoy. Given the relatively neutral profile of the United States in the region’s history and strong relations with the key parties, the appointment of a high-level U.S. Envoy would signal 

a renewed and stronger political engagement with the crisis to regional governments. Such a position would enable the United States to develop a long-term strategy and policies tailored to the regional dynamics that require complex solutions. 

The Special Envoy must closely coordinate with U.S. embassies in the region to 

ensure that the position would enhance, rather than hinder, coordination across the 

U.S. Government. This position must have broad authorities, sufficient staff in 

Washington as well as in the region, and resources to execute their duties both bilaterally and multilaterally. Ultimately, the right U.S. Special Envoy can be a force 

multiplier, tipping the scales where Ms. Robinson needs support and helping to coordinate donors who need to be brought along to influence the DRC and Rwandan 

Governments. It should be noted that there is strong bipartisan support in both the 

Senate and the House of Representatives for the appointment of a Presidential Special Envoy. 

2. The United States and its allies in the international community must fully support Ms. Mary Robinson as she tries to hold governments accountable to their 

pledges. Given that the lack of political will in both Kigali and Kinshasa is the main 

obstacle to peace, a political process led by an experienced and principled politician 

is sorely needed. The U.S. Government, therefore, should insist that both the regional and the national processes fall under Ms. Robinson’s watch. While it is clear 

that she will preside over the regional oversight mechanism, the language in the 

framework is more ambiguous when it comes to the national reform process, which 

is probably more important and complicated than the regional process. 

3. The U.S. should closely coordinate with Ms. Robinson in the development of 

benchmarks for regional and national commitments. In the case of national commitments, Ms. Robinson should develop these benchmarks in cooperation with 

MONUSCO, and in both cases in full consultation with governments and civil society in the region as well as with key donor governments, including the United 

States. The benchmarks must be public and transparent. A wide variety of stakeholders, particularly local civil society groups, should be able to submit observations 

through clear mechanisms on the countries’ progress in meeting the benchmarks. 

Donors should also be part of the process of developing benchmarks and monitoring 

progress, possibly through the already existing International Contact Group on the 

DRC. 

4. The United States, under the leadership of its own Special Envoy, should redefine its political and aid strategy toward the region. In this regard, the U.S. Government and other donors, acting in a coordinated way, must be prepared to hold all 

governments, particularly the DRC and Rwanda, accountable to their pledges and 

the agreed-upon benchmarks, if necessary by suspending or modifying aid programs. 

Aid to Rwanda should not resume until the M23 threat has come to an end, and 

all future aid should be tied to Rwanda’s commitment not to support armed groups 

in neighboring countries. Evidence of such support gathered by the U.N. Group of 

Experts or other reliable sources should then automatically trigger the suspension 

of U.S. aid again. The United States should also be ready to sanction Rwandan officials found to be responsible for supporting rebel groups. In the case of Congo, aid 

should be tied to progress in the benchmarks on national reforms identified above. 

5. The United States should never again refrain from airing publicly its concerns 

over current and future violations of international obligations by all governments in 

the region. The policy of quiet diplomacy initially employed by the United States visa-vis Rwanda in mid-2012 proved to be ineffective. After months of ignoring private 

threats and warnings by their international partners—and indeed even increasing 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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support to the M23—it was only when public denonciation was stepped up, including through a publicized phone call from President Obama to President Kagame, 

that Rwanda started to respond to international pressure. 

6. The United States should strongly encourage President Kabila to include donor 

governments and civil society in the national oversight mechanism envisaged in the 

framework agreement. This is absolutely necessary to lend credibility, competence, 

and legitimacy to the national reform effort. 

7. The United States, in close coordination with the U.N. and other international 

donors, must commit to supporting sustainable security sector reform, both technically and financially, over the long-term, as described in the section above. The 

U.S. focus on ‘‘train and equip’’ programs and policies must be rigorously reassessed 

and, if necessary, halted in order to support a multilateral, comprehensive reform 

strategy. The current limited efforts at retraining some units to be deployed in strategic parts of the country, in the absence of a coherent vision on the future of the 

institution as a whole, have not produced any lasting improvement, as we have seen 

once again in recent months. 

8. The United States should also provide strong support to the creation of mechanisms for accountability in the DRC, such as the internationalized mixed chambers 

described above. The existing leadership of Ambassador Rapp in spurring the Congolese Government to action on this point is noted and appreciated, and the 11+4 

framework provides a new opportunity to make further progress on this key issue. 

9. The United States should use its influence at the World Bank to ensure that the 

Bank’s decisions and policies are coordinated and aligned with the broader international effort. While the Bank is often reluctant to engage in political processes, 

this is a unique and concerted multilateral effort to which regional governments 

agreed, and the World Bank is crucial in this regard. Ms. Robinson needs to know 

that every major international player will rally behind her efforts, or else the 

chances for her success will decrease dramatically. 

As part of its work with the World Bank, the United States should support the 

establishment of a fund to assist the development of the region, particularly with 

joint projects that can encourage a ‘‘win-win’’ mentality. 

10. The United States should use its influence to ensure that an appropriate new 

Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General, or SRSG, is chosen by the U.N. 

to replace the outgoing Roger Meece. In such a delicate phase, the mission will need 

to be led by someone with political skills and clout in the region. The context calls 

for someone with the profile of Ambassador William Swing, the former well regarded SRSG during the Congolese transition of 2003–2006. 

CONCLUSION

In diplomatic circles, one often hears that ‘‘we have tried everything in the Congo, 

and nothing works. The conflict is just too complicated.’’ I strongly reject this defeatist attitude. 

We have not tried everything. Since 2006, after a relatively successful electoral 

process, we have privileged purely military and technocratic solutions to fundamentally political problems. We have supported an increasing militarization of MONUC/

MONUSCO and its checkered relationship with the FARDC, and silently watched 

the creation of new armed groups and the continuing abuses by the Congolese 

Army. We have constructed buildings to house institutions, but forgot to build and 

develop the institutions themselves. We have rightfully applauded Rwanda’s spectacular recovery from the ashes of genocide, but have tragically stayed silent for too 

many years about its abuses in the Congo. We have provided technical and financial 

support to the 2011 elections, but witnessed with impotence as massive fraud voided 

them of any significance. For these reasons, and because Congo has a tragic history 

of extremely poor leadership, we have failed the Congolese people, but there is nothing inevitable in this. 

We should learn not only from failures, but also from past success stories. In 

2006, the Congo held relatively successful elections, against all odds and predictions. 

That happened for two reasons: first, the determination of the Congolese people to 

go to the vote despite all barriers; and second, the determination of the international community to make those elections a success. Donors remained focused and 

politically engaged, MONUC led and coordinated the effort and the messaging, and 

relatively free and fair elections took place. 

We now need a comprehensive process that creates incentives for Rwanda to stop 

supporting armed groups once and for all, for the Congolese Government to start 

the long-overdue process of reforming its ailing national institutions, and for local 

communities in eastern DRC to stop supporting armed groups to further their grievances. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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For this, a sustained political process, led by the U.N. Special Envoy, and supported by the United States and this committee is the best hope we have had in 

more than a decade to help move this region toward the peace and prosperity that 

its people deserve.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Borello, and thank you so much 

to all the four witnesses who have testified today. 

We are now going to begin 7-minute rounds of questions. 

And after all those different recommendations, comments, observations, I am encouraged that all four of you have as a common 

theme the idea that this is a moment—a moment when peace is 

possible, when with a disciplined and engaged and thorough international support and engagement, we might really see the beginning of the end of what has been decades of horrible challenge and 

conflict in the Great Lakes region in eastern DRC. 

So I am going to ask just a few focused questions, if I could, to 

make sure I have got your recommendations clearly. If I might first 

to Mr. Prendergast and Mr. Borello. Should the United States 

appoint a special envoy? Would it make a real difference? What difference would it make in U.S. policy and what would you expect 

that envoy to do that would change the future path of the DRC? 

Mr. Prendergast. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks. I think it would make a huge difference. My understanding is that the executive branch is pretty 

far along in deciding who they want, and that is great news. As 

everyone has said and would say, if they had the time to elaborate, 

it has to be a very high-level person with stature so that it would 

be taken seriously in the region. 

What to do, though? That is the key question of the four you 

asked. And I feel the United States has leverage that we are leaving on the table by not engaging more deeply. And I think the 

leverage comes in the form of positive incentives and real costs; 

positive incentives for peace and real costs for those undermining 

peace. 

In a couple of sentences, the positive incentives can include 

implementation of the legislation that this very Congress passed 2 

years ago in the Dodd-Frank. By ensuring that the regulations that 

the SEC has put forward are implemented creates positive incentives for companies to ensure that on the ground, they are not 

going to buy minerals that are mined illegally and violently. It is 

a very simple concept. It is supply and demand. If the demand is 

there for clean, peacefully mined minerals, you are going to get a 

reaction on the ground, and that is already happening. Having 

traveled there extensively in eastern Congo earlier this year and 

seen the effects, already, of how people are trying to reorganize, we 

are going to see that increasingly. 

And if the envoy as well can work to push forward working with 

the companies, I think it is very important that we work very 

closely—government works with the private sector and civil society 

on the ground in eastern Congo—to figure out how responsible investment can be organized because we want to see the development 

of the natural resource sector in eastern Congo. It is going to be 

the engine of development, as Ranking Member Flake said in his 

opening statement about the enormous potential of this country. It 

is going to be only unlocked if those natural resources are exploited 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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properly. And so having some kind of an initiative that focuses on 

joint efforts to define the rules of the game—there are no rules. 

There have not been rules for centuries in Congo. People just take 

what they want and with horrible cost to the Congolese people. 

That is the incentives. 

On the cost side, continuing to stand against cross-border support for armed groups. If any government in the region provides 

assistance to any armed group, then there has to be a cost in terms 

of budget support and other assistance. The IMF and the World 

Bank—we need to use our leverage in those institutions. And we 

need to use our leverage to promote transparency within Congo so 

that all of the governance reforms that my colleagues talked about 

internally within Congo have a better chance—stand a better 

chance, and they do not unless there is some work done by the 

external aid agencies, particularly the multilateral bodies, in encouraging those reforms to occur. 

Senator COONS. Mr. Borello, should we appoint a special envoy? 

Mr. BORELLO. Yes, thank you, Chairman. 

Yes. I think the United States should appoint its own envoy provided that that envoy has the necessary political stature to engage 

directly with Presidents and with Ms. Mary Robinson. And from 

what we hear, that is the kind of level that the administration is 

considering. 

First of all, such an envoy, as I said before, should redefine a real 

long-term strategy for the United States. The United States, like 

its international partners, have been reactive. Every time there 

was a crisis, there was intense engagement. Then when there 

seemed to be a truce or not real peace, attention went down, and 

we do not have a coherent regional strategy for the region. 

Second, Ms. Mary Robinson brings an enormous political experience and integrity and commitment to human rights. But there is 

also suspicion in the region about the United Nations and about 

the role of the United Nations. There needs to be some help from 

the United States to such a process to make sure that the process 

led by Ms. Mary Robinson succeeds. 

Finally, the issue in the region is really political will. Both President Kabila and President Kagame have shown in the past that 

President Kabila is not interested in reforms and President 

Kagame or the Rwandan Government is not interested in stopping 

to destabilize the Congo. 

Just to bring you an example, as an observer of the region, I also 

read the Congolese and Rwandan press. When President Obama 

called President Kagame, the change in the actions of the Rwandan 

Government happened overnight. All the articles in the Rwandan 

press, the coordinator of the group of experts—that very belligerent 

and aggressive tone was really measured and toned down as a 

result. 

Senator COONS. In your view, our intervention, in terms of

accountability for Rwanda’s role in this, has made a difference. 

Mr. BORELLO. It has been. It could have been stronger. I think 

the aid suspended was only $200,000, but combined with the 

actions taken by the World Bank, by DFID, the U.K. development 

agency, and others have started to change——

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator COONS. And a key role a special envoy could play is to 

insist on accountability for the DRC and for Rwanda and to implement this regional peace. 

Mr. BORELLO. Exactly. 

Senator COONS. If I might, Father Muhigirwa, before I run out 

of time in my first round. A number of witnesses have testified 

about the importance of Dodd-Frank of U.S. action on conflict minerals. What role are the NGOs—the nongovernmental organizations—on the ground in eastern Congo playing in moving away 

from a conflict-based extractive mineral system that fuels and 

funds rebel groups toward one that is more sustainable, more legal, 

and contributes to the regional economic development you spoke of? 

Father MUHIGIRWA. Thank you for the question. 

The first thing I would say is that when the Dodd-Frank Act was 

published, we had a meeting in Kinshasa with the bishop conference and some NGOs, and it was welcomed because in a way, 

in Dodd-Frank you have this provision that is going to bring peace 

by cutting the source of financing the rebel groups. 

But what we have seen is that some mining companies mainly 

from the United States taking into account that they had to report 

to the Security Exchange Commission, according to what was in 

the law. Somehow it happened—a kind of embargo. People were 

afraid that when they will take the minerals from the eastern 

Congo, it was not sure that this mineral will be free from conflict. 

So there had been the discussion from the promulgation of the law 

and the regulations. 

And what we have noticed is that now there is a progress from 

what is going on on the ground. We know that the work being done 

by USAID and especially their section on mining and also 

PROMINE that is working with the World Bank and the Minister 

of Mines—we know that there are mining sites that today are free 

from conflict, that we have, I think, 52 out of 82 that are—you do 

not have children who are being employed. And also those minerals 

that are being exploited are free from conflict, and also there is no 

illegal taxation. So I think there is progress going on, and this 

should be, let us say, reinforced. What could be then also is the 

building capacity of the people who are involved in this area. That 

means the mining companies and also civil society. 

Senator COONS. Father, could a partnership between—Mr. Prendergast suggested a responsible investment initiative of investors 

from the United States and outside. Could that, in partnership 

with NGOs and with the good work USAID is doing—could that 

make further progress toward producing a conflict-free mineral 

system? 

Father MUHIGIRWA. Yes, I would think so because when you see 

what is going on in Katanga, for example, where you have people—

Freeport McMoRan and when you see what is going on in the 

South Kivu with Banro, the Canadian mining company, you have 

in North Kivu not a single mining company. And this is why there 

is a lot of trouble going on. This is why rebel groups are coming 

in, and they are occupying mainly where you have the mines. And 

so I am thinking that—and I am recommending this—if you can 

have major U.S. mining companies coming into North Kivu and 

investing, it will be a way of also bringing peace in the region. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator COONS. Thank you, Father. 

I am out of time. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. I enjoyed the testimony. 

With regard to the United Nations and their presence, you mentioned that MONUSCO’s mandate had been changed. Mr. Dizolele, 

what was the mandate and what is it now? How has it changed? 

And with the new mandate, would the United Nations have been 

able to help prevent the situation in Goma? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you very much, Senator Flake. 

The mandate has primarily changed. One, it has been extended. 

Typically that is what we do every 6 months. But two, the key 

change is the setting up or the pending setting up of an intervention brigade which will use force to go after targeted militias. This 

will be a force that will be made of primarily African countries but 

under the leadership of the United Nations. And then the appointment of the special envoy for the Great Lakes region, the former 

Irish President, Mary Robinson. 

The challenge, of course, moving forward is that in many ways 

the United Nations always had this mandate to protect civilians. 

It is called Chapter 7 mandate. And over the years, they have not 

been successful in applying it for various reasons. We hope that the 

appointment or the raising up of this new force will come with 

enough backing of the United States and the other members of the 

Security Council so that it performs the work that it is supposed 

to perform. Otherwise, it will raise false hope for the people of the 

region. 

Senator FLAKE. What precedent do we have with this kind of 

more engaged force? I spent a year in Namibia when UNTAG was 

there in a peacekeeping role. They did well in that role. But the 

notion that they would have had an expanded role to be more 

engaged would have been kind of contrary or certainly without 

precedent from what the United Nations has been involved in in 

terms of peacekeeping efforts. Are there are other areas in Africa 

or elsewhere where we have had this kind of mandate given to 

U.N. forces? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Senator Flake, in DRC we have stories of success 

right in DRC. So in 2004, 2003, in Ituri, right just above North 

Kivu, in Orientale province, there was a European Union mission 

called Artemis—Operation Artemis—in Bunia, but then you had a 

minigenocide underway between the Hemas and the Lendus fighting each other, and the United Nations was paralyzed, could not 

do anything to help the civilian populations. 

So under the leadership of the French, the EU appointed a specific—they raised a force called Artemis led primarily by the 

French but also supported by other countries. There were special 

forces from Sweden. I think the United States actually lent some 

support. And within a matter of a month, they cleared that section. 

During the elections in 2006, the international community was 

worried about violence in Kinshasa. They raised a force called L4, 

which was led by Germany, and actually kept the peace in 

Kinshasa. 

So in DRC itself, we have precedents of success stories that we 

should look at as you plan to support this new brigade. Thank you. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator FLAKE. Any others want to comment on that? Go ahead, 

Mr. Borello. 

Mr. BORELLO. Yes. I would like to point another important development in the your solution which is a specific mandate to arrest 

people indicted for war crimes—crimes against humanity—by an 

international or a national court. 

But I also would like to say that we welcome the creation of this 

brigade. We think it can be beneficial particularly because it comes 

at the same time as the political process. Where we need to be 

really aware is that a purely military solution will fail. So we need 

the military pressure employed by the brigade, hopefully with targeted operation against the leadership of these armed groups that 

would aim to arrest these leaders, demoralize troops, and basically 

encourage them to join a DDR program. 

However, we have no real DDR program yet. So one thing that 

the United States could do is to encourage both the Congolese and 

the Rwandan Government for Congolese and Rwandan armed 

groups to set up a new true DDR program that would welcome or 

would be an alternative for these combatants. 

And finally, a real intercommunity dialogue process because we 

also have to be aware that many communities are supporting 

armed groups to further their grievances related to land, to their 

security, and to other issues. And unless we also tackle that root 

cause, we are going to see new armed groups coming up every year 

in the next future. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Father, go ahead and answer that question, and then I have one 

more followup for you. Go ahead. 

Father MUHIGIRWA. Thank you. 

I would like just to say that there seem to be kind of shifts in 

the U.N. mandate from the intervention—from the position to the 

Intervention Brigade Force. 

And I would add two more to what my colleagues have said. I 

think this brigade will play a major role in the protection of civilians, Congolese civilians. I think up to now, MONUSCO has done 

quite a good job, but still there is a lot to be done in the protection 

of the civilians. So one of the roles that this special force will be 

doing is to protect more of the civilians in the area where you have 

conflicts. 

And the second one, which is in the Resolution 2098, is to neutralize the M23 and the other rebel groups, as Federico has just 

said. I think that is very, very important to neutralize those groups 

that are really active in the area and that are bringing a lot of 

human rights abuses, threats, and sexual violence. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. 

I will ask this of Mr. Prendergast. With regard to U.S. companies, Father mentioned that it seemed to be a positive presence or 

can be from the presence of U.S. mining interests. What has been 

the history—recent history—and is there anything we ought to do 

here with regard to the actions of the U.S. mining interests in the 

DRC to encourage them or encourage them strongly to help out the 

situation? What is your feeling as to their role so far? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. There has been a great evolution, I think, 

over the last few years. As consumer pressure has increased, you 

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have these conflict-free campus initiatives all over the United 

States, sort of the inheritors who have saved our foreign invisible 

children, another student-based movement that is focused on electronics companies, as well as faith-based groups. So a number of 

companies have started to respond to that pressure. As Father was 

saying, some responsible investment initiatives now have created 

connections from all the way down to mines. So you can get a secure pipeline, supply chain of conflict-free, legally mined minerals 

ending up in our computer products, our cell phones, and all the 

other things that we buy. So that is just beginning. Just beginning. 

So that is our hope is that you are going to see expansion of that 

because people that are mining there, the Congolese that are mining there are getting fair value, market value for what they mine. 

Those that are selling to sort of rogue Chinese traders and others 

who are undermining and supporting this sort of de facto boycott, 

are getting one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth of the price that they 

were getting before. So I think good practices in this case are going 

to incentivize because the profits are going to incentivize additional 

expansion of the zones where conflict-free mining can occur. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. My time is up. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

This is very encouraging testimony. It broadly reflects what I 

saw on the ground in Kinshasa, the great work by USAID and the 

beginnings of real progress in conflict minerals. 

I am pleased that Senator Durbin has joined us who played a 

very central role in ensuring that the conflict minerals provision 

was enacted in Dodd-Frank. 

Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Flake and the witnesses who are here today. 

I have a couple observations and then a general question. 

On the conflict minerals issue, Mr. Prendergast, I was one of the 

authors with several colleagues on Dodd-Frank calling on the Securities and Exchange Commission to set up a mechanism whereby 

we could trace the conflict minerals and to encourage American 

companies to do the same to reduce the likelihood that the mining 

of these minerals would, in fact, finance the killing and rape that 

is going on in DRC. It is unsettling not to know whether I am carrying a conflict mineral in my pocket, and it is important that we 

come to a place where responsible corporate leaders around the 

world feel that this is absolutely nonnegotiable. They have to deal 

with this. 

I am saddened that the SEC rule, which took way too long to 

promulgate, is now being challenged in court by the U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the 

Business Roundtable. But I am encouraged by the fact, as you have 

reported here in The Enough Project’s report, that there are 

responsible corporate leaders who are voluntarily moving forward 

to rid their companies of conflict minerals. 

We have your publication from August of last year, and I would 

like to ask you, separate and apart from this hearing, if there could 

be an update so that we know which companies are making a good 

faith effort and, conversely, which ones are not. So if I could ask 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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you to put that on your list of things to do, it would be helpful for 

us who are very sensitive to this issue. 

Mr. Borello, I have been going back and forth on this debate 

about the role of Rwanda in the problems in Kivu province in DRC 

to the point where I think I am wasting my time. I concede your 

point that when we get directly engaged with Rwanda, good things 

seem to happen. That to me is proof positive there is some linkage 

here. But I will not get deep into this argument about the role of 

Rwanda other than to say I do believe they play an important part 

in resolving the conflict in DRC, which leads me to another point 

I would like to make. 

I want to talk about M23, but before I do that, I want to say a 

word, a positive word, about Dr. Denis Mukwege, who returned to 

Bukavu after an assassination attempt. He is one of the heroes in 

this conversation, risking his life for the women who have been so 

brutally raped and assaulted in DRC. I have met him. I respect 

him so much. He has testified before our committee, and to think 

that he has gone back after literally facing an armed invasion, an 

attempt to take his life, is just an incredible act of caring and faith 

in the future. 

I also want to add, of course, the Lusis and Heal Africa in Goma. 

Losing Lyn Lusi at one point was terrible, but I know that her husband Jo continues the great work that they are engaged in. 

Let us go to M23. When I was in Uganda February 19, I met 

with the Minister of Defense, Crispus Kiyonga, who was involved 

in negotiations with M23. And I basically asked him if the West 

was all wrong in its view of M23 because both at the United 

Nations and in measures that I have sponsored in the Senate, we 

have tried to exclude M23 in terms of travel, in terms of their 

assets, in terms of where they can be, branding them as war criminals. Now, Mr. Ntaganda stepped forward and surrendered himself 

at this point. 

But I really would like to know if there is a feeling here that engaging M23 in negotiations is critical to finally resolving the political issues and military issues of this region or whether they should 

be excluded as war criminals. There seems to be a real difference 

of opinion. I do not know if anyone here would like to comment on 

it, but I would like to hear your testimony. The floor is open for 

anyone who would like to. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I think everyone wants a shot at this one. 

How do you want to go? Left to right or right to left? 

Senator DURBIN. Go ahead. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, gee whiz. Thank you. 

Let me just say one thing. Thank you so much for your leadership on that conflict minerals stuff. We will put an update to you, 

Senator, in the near future on the companies. A quick note. Motorola Solutions, Philips, are now doing what I described, direct supply chains. Apple is working on it. Steve Jobs, before his death, 

was instrumental in changing the company’s policy on this, and 

now Tim Cook has carried it forward. With respect to the jewelers, 

Tiffany’s has taken the lead, not unsurprisingly. So there are beginning to be real champions standing up in the corporate sector. 

I wish Senator Flake could be here because I know that he has 

worked a long time with those guys. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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On the M23 question, as Mvemba said, my colleague said, you 

know, every one of these peace processes up till now has been 

exactly what is going on right now in Kampala today, an attempt 

at a back room deal where they are going to reintegrate some of 

these human rights abusers, some of these rebels, back into the 

Congolese Army, making it impossible to reform the Congolese 

Army, creating this kind of a division within the army that will 

break away again 3 years from now when someone else has an 

issue. That kind of peacemaking, that strategy of peacemaking has 

been proven over and over again to not work. 

That is why it is so important for us to have a special envoy from 

the United States to be working in support of the building of a 

comprehensive peace process, where civil society is at the table, all 

the different groups that represent constituencies of the Congo are 

at the table, and the region is involved because the region is a 

major player in undermining stability and peace in the Congo and 

could be a major player in helping to support it. It really is such 

a central issue. I want to just leave it there. 

The United States has to be a force for building a comprehensive 

peace process and not allowing these kind of side, back room deals, 

the side deals with one particular faction trying to buy them off 

with positions and reintegration, no vetting for human rights 

issues whatsoever, just reinfecting the Congolese Army with a real 

serious human rights problem and just continuing the kind of 

disempowerment of a strong security sector that is needed for the 

building of the Congolese state. 

Senator DURBIN. If any others would like to respond. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you, Senator Durbin. 

I think, of course, we need to talk to the M23 like we need to 

talk to everybody else. In that sense; yes. But I think focusing on 

one rebel group in a country that has myriad of them is a mistake. 

I mean, if we are talking about Mary Robinson being a special 

envoy, if we are talking about a comprehensive peace process, it 

has to have the country as a whole as its objective. You know, just 

a few days ago, Lubumbashi was attacked. So if we give such privilege and prominence to groups like M23, which by the way has a 

long and bloody history—before the M23, we had the CNDP. Before 

that, we had the RCD. This is just the pedigree of one group without counting the others. 

So I think it will be very dangerous for us to go down this road 

where group X sees how we treated the M23 and they say, well, 

why cannot we do the same thing. So we will just go back and 

fight. An initiative like Dodd-Frank will not succeed if we take this 

path because while we make progress on one front, everything will 

be a rival on the other fronts. 

So I will say to your team we thank you for your engagement. 

We think we should go further. We should do the same principle 

we applied in Liberia and Sierra Leone. One of the reasons that 

the Kimberly process worked was just not cleaning the blood out 

of the diamond, but it was going after the bad guys in Sierra Leone 

and in Liberia, going after Charles Taylor for his involvement in 

Liberia, the Royal Marines coming to Liberia to support that. So 

it has got to be a convergence of something. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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So the M23 is not special. If anything, we should make sure that 

they do not have that platform anymore. It undermines the framework in Addis Ababa. Thank you. 

Father MUHIGIRWA. I will just add something on what he already 

has just said. When we see the history of M23, in fact, from RCD 

to CNDP to M23, from the beginning I think it was a middle group, 

and because of, I would say, the killing, the rapes, the violation of 

human rights, it has been known as a negative force by the AU 

and the SADC organizations. And I would say that the dialogue 

going on now between the delegates of the DRC Government and 

the M23, I do not—that is my own personal view. I do not expect 

much from that dialogue because when you see carefully the 

revindication of M23, there were 21 revindications in the reports 

from the 23rd of March 2009. And when you analyze them, 20 out 

of 21 revindications have been fulfilled on the side of the DRC Government. So in fact, it is empty. There is no revindication. And this 

is why when you see the discourse and the speech of the leader of 

the 23, they are moving from one revindication to the other. They 

even think to bring other agenda which were not in the 2009 

revindications. And so I would say the outlook can be there, but 

one has to take into account all those different type of groups being 

in the area. There are more than 30. I mean, I was in Katanga 

when the Mai Mai, the Katanga started. And so if you start with 

one group, you have to take into account the others. And we know 

that will come out—will be revindication at the political side that 

they will want to be but of the government and also to be having 

grades and promotion in the army. And that has been done for 

many years, and it is not bringing peace. 

Senator COONS. Let me, if I might, break in and we will have a 

chance to continue on that. 

On the specific issue of gender violence, of the use of rape as a 

tool of war, if I could, Father, I would be interested in your views. 

How do we accomplish restorative justice? How do we accomplish 

accountability and the end of impunity for gender violence? This is 

a critical piece of this cycle through which all sorts of different 

rebel groups and the FARDC are engaged in violating human 

rights and in creating an environment of impunity and of abuse. 

How do we achieve justice and accountability for gender-based 

violence? 

Father MUHIGIRWA. Thank you for this question. Again, I would 

like to praise Dr. Mukwege who is doing a lot in this. Three years 

ago, there was a meeting here on global Congo action. He spoke 

about what was going on about sexual violence. And Archbishop of 

Bukaba talked about peace. And myself—I gave a speech on the 

governance of natural resources. 

And I think one of the key points will be, as I have mentioned 

as a recommendation, to reform the judicial system because rape 

and sexual violence is really evolving in a culture of impunity. I do 

not know a single Congolese who has been condemned or jailed 

because he has raped. 

Senator COONS. And, Father, how has the 2006 sexual violence 

law affected this? Has it had any impact at all, or the lack of 

enforcement, the lack of training and support and engagement by 

the police and the judicial system—is that the core problem? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Father MUHIGIRWA. Yes, I think that is the problem. We have to 

go to reinforce this, to train, and to install, even criminals specialized in this field, as we are doing for the trade, for, I do not know, 

other field. And this is going on and it is really growing. As you 

mentioned, you have more than 170 or 180 rapes every week. And 

so the people who are raping—they feel free. They are not, let us 

say, troubled. They are not afraid of justice. So this will be going 

on for many years. 

But once justice is doing its job and once we see—because this 

is a matter of education also. When people in Congo in communities will start seeing people who have been jailed, that will be 

already a way of educating. And also naming—when you are naming someone, when you put him on the front and this is really 

someone who is raping, someone who is condemned by the community, I think it will start helping even those who are raping the 

women and the girls. So I think there is a lot to be done, but it 

is still a long way. 

Senator COONS. If I might, Mr. Dizolele, Mr. Borello, what role 

does achieving justice in gender-based violence have in achieving 

accountability and some sort of demobilization process for all the 

different rebel groups from M23, FDLR, others throughout the 

broader region? How critical is achieving this kind of justice? 

Mr. Dizolele. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the programs that Eastern Congo Initiative is involved 

with is called Access to Justice. And what Eastern Congo does is 

run clinics to give women access to just that, justice. This will be 

the core, if you will, the tipping point to end sexual violence. That 

will be justice because the day we go after the bad guys, either 

through setting up tribunals, special tribunals for this where it is 

a mixed court and others by punishing the chains of commands of 

these various militia groups including the FRDC, then we will see 

that change. Until that happens—in fact, the DRC is in dire need 

of troop reconciliation and justice. These are two things that rarely 

come up in discussions like this. But those are key, along with the 

political process, in order for us to see a turning point in the development of DRC. 

Senator COONS. So to your point, security sector reform cannot 

just be the reintegration of those who have been bad actors who 

need to be held accountable. 

Mr. Borello. 

Mr. BORELLO. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. 

The accountability question is really close to my heart and to my 

work. I worked for 10 years specifically on accountability in the 

DRC with the United Nations and with an NGO. So it is something 

I feel very strongly about. 

First of all, on the rebel groups, we have what is known as the 

revolving door for rebel groups, continued integration, and the 

criminals get always the best positions. And that is what the M23 

is about. If we look at the number of officers formerly of CNDP, 

many of them have not defected, have stayed loyal. Who has 

defected? Those with the worst human rights record, those with the 

criminal smuggling networks that need to protect their networks. 

So I agree with all my colleagues. We have to deal with M23 as 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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like with any other rebel group with accountability and a DDR program for combatants who have not committed abuses. 

On this global accountability question, I have worked for many 

years with the Congolese judiciary, and there are a lot of people in 

the Congolese judiciary who are brave and competent and would 

like to hold people accountable. However, I have heard many times 

that that general is protected by this other general and we cannot 

go after him, but we can go after this guy. 

So the United Nations Human Rights Mapping Report has 

recommended in 2010 the creation of internationalized mixed 

chambers, which means chambers in the judicial system of Congo 

composed by Congolese and international judges, Congolese and 

international prosecutors, and Congolese and international investigators that would work together, thus building capacities and 

other resources to the Congolese judiciary. As you know, the criticism of the Rwandan and Yugoslavia tribunal when they were sitting outside, but at the same time giving the judges and the prosecutors that political coverage to go after everyone. 

Ambassador Rapp has been leading this effort in the international community. Now is the time. There is a law in the Congolese Parliament that was almost adopted in 2011. It is the time to 

push for that and to push President Kabila through our special 

envoy to do just that. 

And if you allow me just 1 more minute, I would like to thank 

you and Senator Durbin for the National Defense Authorization 

Act and the provisions on accountability. And our own special 

envoy could identify the names of the people who then should be 

included in this list for sanctions. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

I hear a continuing theme that appointing a capable, high-level 

special envoy. Empowering them to continue to engage broadly in 

a regional, meaningful peace process but insisting on accountability 

for gender violence, for war crimes and investing in a strategic 

minerals system that is conflict-free could all, in combination, 

really open up a positive future. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Prendergast, what leverage do we have or 

does anybody have with Rwanda to get them to cooperate here? 

What in their national security interest can they identify to cooperate? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, I think the United States has a pretty 

special relationship or has had a pretty special relationship with 

Rwanda post 1994. I think that President Clinton, in the aftermath 

of the genocide, worked very hard. President Bush continued that. 

The relationship not only was national to national but head of state 

to head of state. The Obama administration has tried to do that as 

well. 

I think the last chapter of the saga of cross-border support from 

Rwanda to armed groups inside Congo in the form of this M23 

chapter was just overreach, was a bridge too far, was a slap in the 

face of everyone. Having worked so hard for peace in Congo, the 

United States investing almost $1 billion a year of humanitarian 

and peacekeeping, all other kinds of assistance into Congo, to have 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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that all jeopardized and undermined and all kinds of intelligence 

leading to that, it was just too much. And I think it has affected 

the relationship quite substantially in the short run between 

Rwanda and the United States. 

The leverage, however, is retained in a number of things. 

First, there are tremendous relationships built up over the years 

between people in the Rwandan Government and people in the 

United States Government. That should not be discounted. Anyone 

who has worked in government understands those relationships 

can have a major influence over policy. 

Second, though, I think the stand that the United States took, 

even though it was a small one and a somewhat symbolic one, of 

suspension of certain forms of assistance and then working within 

the World Bank to suspend the budget support to Rwanda I think 

made a very strong statement that business as usual, which had 

been allowed for a long time for many reasons—well, we are trying 

to counter the FDLR and all these other reasons—was no longer 

acceptable. And so I think that maintaining that principle and 

standing for principle on the part of the United States that there 

cannot be interference across borders in the affairs of neighbors in 

the Great Lakes, the volatility is just too high as a precondition for 

normalized relations I think is the key point of leverage. And it 

does not always have to be a public one. It can be a very important 

private one, as evinced by President Obama’s discussions on the 

phone with President Kagame. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Dizolele, do you see a desire to have a good 

relationship with the United States and the aid that follows in connection with that—does that outweigh their desire to have a more 

friendly government on its borders? Or is the incentive there? Is it 

in their national security interest to cooperate, aside from relationships or incentives, like I said, in terms of aid and whatever else? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Senator, you mean for Rwanda. 

Senator FLAKE. Yes; for Rwanda. I am sorry. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Well, it is hard to answer that because only 

Rwandans can really answer that. But if we can look at the history, it has been complicated because the Rwandans are not forthcoming with the reasons of their involvement in DRC. They have 

used the premise of going after the militias. If that was the case, 

then when you consider the lengthy involvement of Rwanda in 

DRC, which started in 1996, this issue should have been resolved 

a long time ago. So it would have been great if Rwanda will come 

and be much more bolder and say exactly what in DRC. Is it 

because of minerals? 

You know, Germany and France started their cooperation after 

World War II over economics. It was about coal mining. So there 

is actually opportunity for Rwanda to build a great partnership 

with DRC that is not based on this partner military approach. 

So we should encourage that and I think we have heard that 

theme today as well. Encourage Rwanda in becoming more forthcoming and not playing this game of we are part of the solution. 

Yes, you can be part of the solution, but for the last 20 years, they 

have not really been part of that solution. So we need to push them 

on that economic front as well, have the transparency where you 

are looking at the issues, economic interests. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Thank you. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Borello, quickly on that. 

Mr. BORELLO. Yes; very quickly. 

Yes; regional economic integration I think is the answer. And one 

idea would be to encourage the World Bank to set up a Great 

Lakes fund that would look at cross-border projects, road building, 

mining, hydroelectric that would create that interdependence that 

is based on legitimate trade and legitimate economic interests that 

would then create a strong disincentive from continuing to support 

armed groups because that would disrupt those economic activities. 

Senator FLAKE. Father, you had mentioned that electoral reform 

is needed in the Congo. What incentive there does Kabila have to 

move ahead? Obviously, that might affect his ability to perform in 

the next election. So what are our limits there in terms of encouraging electoral reform? How receptive will the government be? 

Father MUHIGIRWA. I think there is the necessity to call for this 

electoral reform because it is needed and we are waiting for it since 

we had only regime Presidential and legislative elections. And we 

have not yet had the provincial and the local elections. And if we 

go back to the history, even in 2006 election, we had only Presidential and provincial elections. So Presidential, legislative, and 

provincial elections. So up to now, we have not yet had local elections. That means the gradual democracy, local, I would say, governance in terms of democracy have not yet been really rooted or 

grounded into the local population. 

So the push would be to say, OK, there is an urgency of doing 

that. And as I was saying in my statement, the first thing to do 

is to push quickly this reform of the electoral commission. We know 

what has happened with the November 2011 elections, and we 

know that there should be and there should be a reform of the electoral commission, the CENI. And also the composition of the members of the CENI—we cannot have an independent electoral commission with four members of the majority political parties and 

three from the opposition party. It cannot be independent. And this 

is why there is a move and a push from the civil society to have 

more civil society people in the electoral commission, and I think 

that could bring—I will say that it will be less politicized—the electoral commission—and it could go forward. 

So I think that the law, the electoral reform law, has been 

passed by the Parliament. It is now on the table of President 

Kabila. It went to the Court of Supreme Justice. So it is in conformity of the Constitution, and it is waiting for the promulgation 

by the President. And what the Catholic bishop said or suggested 

to the President is to have more civil society people in the actual 

composition of the electoral commission, and I think that would 

help. 

Senator FLAKE. I hope we can do that. Typically those who win 

elections do not believe there is any need for electoral reform. It is 

those who lose who do. So it is a difficult subject I know. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

If I might, I have a last question I would like to ask the whole 

panel to speak to. Part of the purpose of my visit to Kinshasa was 

to urge President Kabila to travel to Addis and to sign the Peace, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41

Security and Cooperation Framework and to actively participate. 

That happened not as a result of my visit, I know, but that 

happened. 

What is it that the United States and, more broadly, the international community can be doing to support this agreement and to 

ensure that the peace process that should follow, the negotiations 

should follow are inclusive, transparent, meaningful, and actually 

move us toward a real peace process? 

Several of you have referenced that the previous efforts at peace 

have been rushed, have been militarized, have been short-term, 

have not addressed the underlying reasons for conflict. And we 

have discussed at length gender violence, rapes and sexual violence, conflict minerals, the repeated challenges to the region, 

DRC’s failures of governance, Rwanda’s interventions, all the different things that contribute to sustaining decades of horrible conflict in the region. 

What are the things the United States can do now that will 

make the biggest difference in ensuring that this peace process is 

different, that this peace process works and it addresses the underlying causes of conflict? If you might, just from right to left. That 

may be our closing comments from each of the witnesses. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks very much again for the thoughtful 

questions. 

I think two things for the United States. 

First, it is the envoy when, not if, that person gets appointed, 

they help support Mary Robinson and the key actors in the Great 

Lakes to create a new forum, a comprehensive forum that 

addresses some of these interstate problems. That does not really 

exist. Francis Dangler has come here before, the South Sudanese 

diplomat, and said what is not said is what divides. And these real 

serious economic issues—I am going to get to this point in a second—are underlying issues between the two states and security 

issues between the three states actually, Uganda, Rwanda, and 

Congo, need to be addressed and there needs to be external support 

and facilitation for those new agreements to operationalize what 

this framework says. 

But I wanted to double back again and pound another point 

home, if I can. The biggest incentive for peace I think that exists 

for both Rwanda and Congo and for Uganda, for that matter—the 

biggest incentive for those folks, the leaders in those countries to 

move toward a peace process—and this is where the United States 

holds a lot of cards and has not been playing any of them—is to 

promote sustainable and responsible investment, bringing the companies together, the private sector, bringing the civil society, the 

NGOs together and bringing those governments together to talk 

about, well, what would the risks and opportunities be for responsible investment in eastern Congo. How can we create policy incentives that will help support responsible investment to allow for 

these countries. 

The engine for development of the Congo is obviously natural 

resources, but that is also the engine of development for future 

economic growth in Rwanda. It is cross-border. It is like Mvemba 

said. The economic—and Father said—the economic support 

through transportation, through cross-border trade, electricity, all 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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these kinds of issues, but more importantly through the exploitation of resources. The private sector has a huge role to play in 

that. American private sector, European private sector, bringing 

them together and helping to support a responsible investment initiative. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast. Thank you for your 

leadership and for your testimony. Thank you for that insight. 

Mr. Dizolele. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again 

for hosting us today and for your continued interest. 

I think I started by saying that the case is not all lost, especially 

when you look at the role of the civil society in DRC. We believe 

at Eastern Congo Initiative that our grantees and our partners in 

the region will not know peace until the political crisis is solved. 

And it is imperative for us as the United States to look at Congo 

as a whole. We work in eastern Congo, but the problem that we 

are facing in eastern Congo are symptoms of the larger problem. 

And civil society across the country has been working at this. So 

encourage the United States to continue putting pressure on our 

actors in this framework of peace to live up to the obligation they 

have agreed to live up to. 

Congo is a big country with nine neighbors. So there is obviously 

a problem if continuously the only two neighbors that are at loggerheads with the Congolese causing all this death that we have been 

talking about, this kind of calamity. So we need to put pressure on 

those neighbors, continued pressure. They have maybe some legitimate concerns. But like Father was saying earlier, most of these 

concerns are not so clear and, to use the vernacular, are bogus. So 

we need then to support the Congolese people in diffusing the crisis, and the crisis will be diffused—start being diffused not only 

with security sector reform but with the political reform. We need 

to hold the elections, municipal and provincial, to help reestablish 

some legitimacy to the process. And then the Congolese can take 

care of what they need to take care of. 

We need to push our diplomatic mission in Kinshasa to step up 

to the plate. Over the years, traditionally Kinshasa had been a 

very important posting for diplomats. We used to send our best diplomats there. People like Melissa Wells, people like Robert Oakley, 

they serve in Congo. But we have seen over the years that the diplomatic post has not received the same attention. So to support this 

process that we are talking about, we need to raise that power that 

the U.S. Embassy has and start acting like it is representing the 

United States. 

So I thank you again for your support, and I think that will be 

enough from me. Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Father Muhigirwa. 

Father MUHIGIRWA. Thank you, Chairman, for the question. 

I would add only two things. 

The first one will be to implement the DRC Relief, Security and 

Democracy Promotion Act in section 102 which says that the 

United States is called to support the security reform, including the 

army, military, and justice system and the police force in DRC. I 

think if that is implemented, it will help to bring up a lasting 

peace. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

43

The second recommendation would be in the Resolution 2098, it 

asked the DRC Government to create the rapid reaction force. I 

would recommend that the United States help the DRC Government to create, to establish this rapid reaction force. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Father. 

Mr. BORELLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The framework requires the creation of clear benchmarks, both 

for the implementation of regional and for national commitments. 

I think the United States should support Ms. Robinson in developing such clear benchmarks with the participation of local civil 

society. So Ms. Robinson should be encouraged to go during her 

trips to the region to really consult civil society on the development 

of these benchmarks. And then we need to help her to have the 

governments of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and others accept these 

benchmarks. And finally, we have to monitor compliance with such 

benchmarks and be prepared to impose consequences for lack of 

compliance. 

Let me give you just one example. We, at Humanity United, are 

trying to think for Ms. Robinson some of these benchmarks. For 

example, the FDLR Rwandan rebel group. What could these benchmarks be? Well, Rwanda should publish the list of people suspected 

of genocide from 1994, thus making it clear to the FDLR who is 

wanted and who is not. Then the Congo should publicly denounce 

its own army’s alliance with the FDLR and arrest and prosecute 

its own officers if they are found. Sensitization efforts with the 

FDLR should be ramped up, et cetera, et cetera. These are clear 

and concrete benchmarks that could be agreed and the United 

States could help and then their implementation could be 

monitored. 

And finally, we need to make sure that the United Nations appoints the right team to support Ms. Mary Robinson. She cannot 

do it alone, as we know. And so we need to be sure that proper 

experts and the appropriate number of experts are appointed to her 

team. 

Thank you very much for your attention. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. I would like to thank all 

four of our witnesses, those who have traveled long distances and 

those who have come from nearby, for your engagement, your service, your leadership, and your insight on these issues. 

I would like to thank Senator Flake and Senator Durbin who 

joined us today. And I very much look forward to working together 

to address these pressing and important issues in the very near 

future. Thank you very much. 

We will leave the record open for a week for any members of the 

committee who were not able to join us who wish to submit questions for the record. 

With that, this hearing is hereby adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PAPER BY ANTHONY GAMBINO AND STEPHEN WEISSMAN SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY FEDERICO BORELLO

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


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DRC2.eps

realizing them. I This paper is an effort to understand what has gone wrong and to 

recommend changes in policy that would better advance American objectives. 

U.S. Interests 

As is often said, the DRC is the largest sub-Saharan African state with the third biggest 

population, is potentially rich due to its plentiful natural resources, contains the second 

largest rain forest in the world with implications for climate change, and shares borders 

with nine other countries. State weakness and low political legitimacy have led to 

recurrent violence, often spilling over into neighboring states, as well as numerous 

foreign interventions by Western and African countries. 

The U.S., as a world power, has a national interest in improving political and economic 

relations with Africa, as well as important global interests relating to the environment and 

appropriate exploitation of natural resources. For all these reasons, the U.S. should give 

high priority to promoting a strong legitimate state in the Congo. 

Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, the demise of the decrepit Mobutu regime and 

the full emergence of the DRe as a "failed state," an increasing number of Americans 

have become sensitized to the enormous humanitarian costs of its seemingly endless 

conflicts. Since 1998, over 3 million people have died, rape has become endemic, and the 

Congo's famous minerals -- including those in our ccll phones -- have become the objects 

of blood-soaked political struggle. 

u.s. Objectives Imperiled 

In a February 2013 speech, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson 

outlined the goals of American policy in the DRe. In addition to supporting the ongoing 

peace process to reduce violence in the East, he emphasized "two primary areas in which 

reforms must take place," The DRC Government must "expand democratic institutions 

across the country including working to address the most salient issues of governance in 

the East," and "overhaul its security sector including the army, military, justice system 

and police forcc." Thesc priorities match up nicely with the widely known ills of the 

Congolese polity. Assistant Secretary Carson did not dwell upon the U.S.'s continuing 

failure to make progress on these same priorities. 

Developments on the ground over the past four years have been largely negative. In 2006 

the DRC, under a new Constitution, held its first free national elections in 46 years. But 

the winner, President Joseph Kabila, set about centralizing power in his own office. His 

"victory" in the 2011 elections lacked credibility according to respected international 

monitors. This damaged his regime's legitimacy and threatens its future. The 

lOur thinking has benefited from solid independent analyses of DRC developments 

publishcd by others including the International Crisis Group, the Carter Center, Enough 

Project, Eastern Congo Initiative, Jason Stearns, and Professor Severine Autessere, as 

well as our own first hand experiences with the DRC and with u.S. policy making there. 

2 
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DRC3.eps

administration and army are run on the basis of a patron-client system reminiscent of 

Mobutu's that spurns "good governance" (efficiency, effectiveness, rule of law, 

transparency, accountability. participation) and spawns massive corruption. And the two 

combustible Kivu Provinces in the East have been wracked with military conflict and 

resource-plundering involving a Tutsi ethnic faction supported by Rwanda, other ethnicbased militia, a Rwandan I-Iutu force and the DRC army itself. 

The Failures of U.S. Policy 

The U.S. Government is a principal international donor to the Congo, providing an 

estimated $700 million in Fiscal Year 2012 including $400 million towards the 23,000 

member (military and civilian) U.N. Peacekeeping Force, MONUSCO. Together the U.S . 

and other donors provided $3.5 billion in Official Development Assistance to the DRC in 

2010 alone, accounting for 29% of its Gross National Income. There is significant U .S.-

influenced international leverage in the DRC. 

Nevertheless, the U,S. has failed to make any significant progress towards its "primary" 

goals over the last four years. It would be easy to cast all the blame on the longstanding 

dysfunctionalism of tIle Congolese political system. But such a diagnosis would miss the 

mark as it is clear that the U.S. and other international donors missed opportunities to 

promote better and more democratic governance. 

The U.s. failed to provide crucial support/or democratic elecfions and institutions. 

After helping bankroll and supervise the successful 2006 national elections, the U.S. and 

the international community did not follow through. For example, they did not lean on 

the Government when it removed dissenters from parliamentary positions and engaged in 

rampant legislative bribery. Instead of pursuing their advantage, the donors drastically 

reduced their financial support of and, especially their engagement with, the 20 II 

elections. The U.S. Govemment was silent when the Government forced a constitutional 

change through parliament, using bribery as its main tool of persuasion, that eliminated a 

likely fun-off between President Joseph Kabila and the main opposition leader, Etienne 

Tshisekedi. It did not weigh in diplomatically against the pro-Government biases of the 

Election Commission or the Goverrunent's packing of the Supreme Court with loyalists. 

It did not even press its own initiative for an independent review of the election results. 

after the Congolese government objected to such a review. In the face of the 

Government's continual postponement of constitutionally-mandated provincial and local 

elections and its resistance to meaningful electoral reform, the U.S. remains nearly silent. 

In short. since 2007 the U.S. has sent a consistent message to the DRC that the cost of 

rigging elections and avoiding democratic accountability will be low. 

The U.S. failed to hold !he DRC accountable for its unwillingness to implement "good 

governance" in both civil and military affairs; moreover its own initiatives to improve 

governance have been largely ineffective. 
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The U.S. has not put pressure on the Government to implement constilutional provisions 

providing for government decentralization (40% of resources are supposed to go to the 

provincial governments and other local authorities). Nor has it condemned the growth of 

parallel decision-making networks in the President's Office that obviate constitutional 

checks and balances and evade legal rules for awarding large business contracts and 

running the armed forces. The U.S. has not pressed the Government to adopt and 

implement a real pl an and budget for army and other security sector reforms. 

Moreover the hostile environment of corruption plaguing international programs ha s 

seriously undennined some U.S.-backed programs to improve governance. For example, 

an October 20 12 International Crisis Group (lCG) r.eport on the U.S.-supported U.N. 

International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (lSSSS) for war-affected areas 

in the eastern Congo concludes that there has been "a lack of consultation, especially 

with the benefic iary populations. a prevalence of material construction over governance 

reform." While the project has built roads, police barracks and customs otlices, "police 

and customs ol1icials are either not in place or unqualified:' After a one-year ti'nnk 

review of its shortcomings, the U.N. recently reformulated this program to emphasize 

"democratic dialogue" between local civil society and provincial administrators. But its 

success will ultimately depend on the cooperation of the national government, and the 

intemational community has heretofore fai led to leverage this cooperation despite the 

$350 million disbursed under the ISSSS framework to date. 

In similar fashion. ICG reports that U.S. and other military training efforts have been 

hampered by weak logistical SUpp011 frol11 the Government (which operates an 

"informal" procurement system) and the Generals' habits of levying "taxes" on their 

soldiers' already low wages. Despite modest progress in several international training 

programs, the DRC still lacks the military capacity to stop the advance of a 1,000-3,000-

man force, like the recent Rwanda-supported M-23 rebellion in North Kivu, or even to 

defeat smaller, rapacious militias. Training battalions in the absence of holistic SSR that 

addresses accountability and civilian control of the anned forces is, at best. a poor 

allocation of scarce resources. 

nUi US. has failed 10 support a sustainable program fo curb violence in Ihe volalile 

North and South Kivu Provinces areas/ern Congo. 

for more than two decades the Kivus have experienced serious violence stemming partly 

from local struggles over land and power. In recent years the Rwandan Government has 

provided military support to Congolese Tutsi-Ied groups seeking political and economic 

int1uence - spreading more violence and predation. The Rwandan justification for this 

intervention has long been the presence of Rwandan I-lutu rebels in eastern Congo. This 

is largely a smoke-screen. obscuring Rwanda's economic and other agendas in the 

eastern DRC - and its logic is further undercut by reductions in Hutu ranks. Too many in 

power in Kigali continue to think of the region as a quasi-protectorate - as Rwandan 

support of the M-23 army mutiny dramatically illustrates. 

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The U.S. response to this destabilized political situation has been extremely weak, 

although there have been some recent positive developments. In the last four years it has 

mainly consisted of ad hoc diplomatic action that calms things down temporarily but does 

not confront the fundamental problems. The U.S. has not vigorously pressed MONUSCO 

10 caITY out its mandate to protect civilians. It opposed release of a U.N. report 

documenting Rwandan aid to the M-23 rebellion, delaying a necessalY public shaming. 

Even worse, it succeeded in deleting an explicit reference to Rwanda in a U.N. Security 

Council Resolution concerning the current crisis. Recently however the U.S. has 

cautioned Rwanda's leader and suspended its small military training program in Rwanda. 

And it has declared its support for a planned regional intervention force to bolster U.N. 

capacity and for the designation of a U.N. Special Envoy . The former President of I reJand 

and U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, recently was named 

the U.N. Special Envoy. 

An Alternative Policy 

While U.S. officials have articulated reasonable primary o~jectives. their policies have 

foundered on over-optimistic expectations concerning the "political will'" of ORC 

President Joseph Kabila. The USG and others engaged in the Congo have tried to do it 

the easy way - assuming that eventually the Congolese government will do the right 

things. In addition, progress in discrete initiatives, such as contlict minerals disclosure 

and sexual violence reduction. depends significantly on success in advancing 

comprehensive democratic and governance reforms. 

The U.S. Government, working with other donors. need to fundamentally revise its 

policies. We recommend the tollowing priorities and operational examples; 

1. Promote greater democratizatioll - ill the broadest sellse of the IVord - liS tire 

celltral threlld of AmericlIlI policy 

Virtually every analyst of the ORC's performance emphasizes the Government's "lack of 

political will" to tmdertake democratic and governance reforms. The root of the problem 

is the Government's vested interest in its corrupt, patrimonial system of rule. A 

government more open to forces from below would be under greater pressure to utilize its 

democratic institutions and rneet the demand for effective public services. 

Fot the U.S. and other donors, the inos( fundanlenlal task in (he DRC is 10 help create 

political Jpace for democralic forces Ihat can, over lime, change (he Government's 

"political will. " This includes not only pressing for free and fair elections but also 

helping develop democratic parties, an effective legislature, more power/i.il civil society 

interest groups and a ireer, more professional media. If significant gains cannot be shown 

in this area. those in other sectors will not be sustained. 

We understand the importance of economic growth in helping Congo become mote stable 

and support activities by bilateral and multilateral donors, and by legitimate private 

businesses, to promote economic growth. Our thesis is that fundamental improvements in 

5 
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democratic governance are essential for sustainable progress in this and all other critical 

areas. We reject the theory that the Congolese must wait until their country reaches a 

'<sufficient" level of national income until real democracy becomes viable. 

Operalionaf Exirmpfes: 

Press for the holding of long-delayed provincial elections in 2014, to be 

followed by local elections. A technical team from the National 

Democratic and International Republican Institutes and their European and 

African counterpart organizations should be sent to Congo to help 

determine a reasonable timetable. 

Publicly support reforms necessary to make the " Independent National 

Election Commission"" truly independent including a revamping of its 

leadership, drawing from positive models in other African countries. 

Re-locus MONUSCO on becoming more active in support of elections. 

Start preparations for a parallel vote tabulation for the 2016 national 

elections by beginning discussions with other donors and relevant 

Congolese and international NGOs. 

Hold regular U.S. Embassy meetings with major opposition parties to 

listen to their views and oller support for the development of democracy. 

Speak out publicly when the Congolese Government violates human 

rights. 

Provide continuing in-country technical assistance (not just periodic 

conferences) in support of the democratic structuring of political parties 

and improved legislative efTectiveness. 

Strengthen journalism that can help hold Government accountable. 

2. Promote improved civilian govemallcewitlltlterecogllitiontftatall).illitiatives 

wi/I ellcollllter all wifavorable ellvirOllllleltt alld require illtellse illtel'lIatiollul 

supervisiOIl (IIul fil/ullcial support. 

The U.S. should keep pressure on the DRC to implement governance reforms. However, 

pending increased democratization and greater effective demand for improved 

governance. the U.S. cannot simply rely on the DRC Government to provide adequate 

support for specific U.S. programs. The donors must also build community consultation 

into both the conception and the implementation of programs. Given the cUlTent difficulty 

of pursuing effective governance reforms in the DRC. they should be pursued only in 

carefully selected areas. 

Operalionaf Examples: 

Lead in a coordinated etlort with the IMF and World Bank to hold the 

Congolese Government to standards it already has endorsed for budget 

transparency and levels of government expenditure for key sectors, such 

6 
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as justice and social services and devolution of tax receipts to the 

provinces. 

Provide both financial and diplomatic support to the restructured U.N . 

stabilization strategy for eastern Congo. 

Build on the existing USAID program of aid to local civil society groups 

that have had some success in increasing provincial transparency and 

influencing budgets; expand this program to the national level. 

• Conduct regular Embassy meetings with identified reformers within the 

Government. 

Press the DRC to implement legislation on decentralization. 

Put greater pressure on the Congolese government to increase 

transparency in the mining sector based on u.s. laws and Congolese 

membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 

Publicly call out the Goverrunent when major issues of corruption arise 

and look for opportunities to support anti-corruption initiatives in 

parliament or elsewhere. 

Ensure genuine community consultation informs U.S.-assisted governance 

programs. 

3. Promote improved military govemallce with the recognition Iflat aflY initiatives 

will encOilIlter all unfavorable environment and require coordinated 

ifltematiollal supervision and final/cial support. 

Operational Examples: 

Press the DRC Government to adopt a concrete plan and budget for 

security sector reform as emphasized by the U.S. and Congo NOO 2012 

report, 'Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform." 

Consider, in the context of other international efforts, U.S. training 

assistance to select DRC army units. particularly in the troubled eastern 

Congo, but only when a comprehensive Army refonn program initiative is 

underway that begins to deal with deficiencies in Defense Ministry 

logistical and other support, payment of regular and adequate salaries, and 

provide U.S. regular military as trainers to mentor and monitor 

performance with an emphasis on protecting the human rights of civilians. 

4. Promote conflict resolution ill tire Kiv/ls, including tire withdrawal of aff 

Rwandan assistance to military factions. 

Operational Examples: 

As violence subsides, work with the DRC Government and representative 

local actors toward the establishment of a fair process to dispose of land 

issues. 

Support local conflict resolution programs. 

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Strengthen MONUSCO's will ~nd capacity to protect civilians including 

the incorporation of the planned regional intervention force. 

Use all mcans available. including diplomatic pressure. international aid 

leverage and el;onOlllic sanctions to put an end to Rwandan assistance to 

militarized factions. (Remember thaI however helpful Rwunda may be to 

the U.S. in particular situations. e.g. providing peacekeeping forces in 

Darfur, U.s. interests in the ORe require ~ul;h an approach.) 

5. Measure progress towards each of tile ubaW! objectivl'S witlt mtllnillg{u/ 

qllalltitatil'e alld qlfl/Jitl/til'e "bellchmarks " for "sigllificullt progl"ltss"; r/fld be 

prepared to adjllst U.s. progrulIIs IIccordingly. Olltside of IlIlIIlllIlitllrillll 

a.f.fisliIllCe, IIlId support to muiti-cllllfllle/ democratic il/s1i111tion blll'Millg, all 

ollrer U.S. aid shoilid be cOlldif;olled on pel/orn/allce. 

Operali()lIu{ Examples. 

Co nclusio n 

Benchmarks should refer to OIl/comes. nOI outpllt~·. It is not enough thaI 

the Government has taken "bold measures" if they havc not bcen 

implemented or if they have provcn incffective. 

"Significant progress" towards the objectives means that it is not eoough 

to show "some progreS5" as has happened in the past. In detcrmining 

whether there has been "signilicant progress," the views of independent 

experts and civil society organizations should wcigh heavily. 

While it is recognized that some objectivcs are lotlger-tenn than others. 

evaluations of progress should occur annually. 

Despite the existence of significant U.S.-influenced intemational leverage in the ROC. 

the policies of the las! fOUf years have done little to advance U.S. objectives. It is time for 

a new approach. Thc Executive Branch. Congress and nongovernmental organizations all 

have important roles to play in establishing a new Congo policy. 

Anth(Jny W. Gambillo is (III independent con.l"Ul/(ml wilh !flng experience in rhl? DRC He 

,fax USAfl) Mission DireG"/o/" ill Ihe ConK/) Fom 200f-Q.I ond presently is AlijUIIC/ 

Prq{essor at Georgetown Unil"e/"Sily '.f Schoof oJForei~1l Service. 

Stephen R. WeisJ"/IIan is a fon~time academic speciali.~t on Amerit'(J/I Foreign Policy 

/()I\"ords the Congo. He ,,·tlS Sfajf Associate and Sloff Dire<:rQr lI"ilh lh(' V.S /IQuse of 

RepH·senf(jtin~.~· Suhcommitlee 0/1 Africa (/979-91) mul VSAID Sellior Adl'iser Oil 

Ikmoc,.0fY ill Afrko (/995-96). 

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52

EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE REPORT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY MVEMBA DIZOLELE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

1. The 2006 elections were a moment of great hope for the DRC, as the country and its people 

moved out of the shadow of one of the most destructive conflicts the world has known. The 

inwrnational community has invested heavily in the years since. Official development assistance 

since the end of the post-war transition totals more than $14 billion1

• External funding makes 

up nearly half of the DRC's annual hudget'. The UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, costs 

mare than $1 billion a year'. The international financial institutions have buttressed the DRC's 

economy, most importantly through writing off' $12.3 billion debt and granting access to lMF 

loans. Trade deals, notably the one struck with China', push the aggregaw figure up still further. 

2. Taking stock of progress as the DRC moves through its second post·war electoral cycle is 

sobering. Investment has not resulwd in me81ling£ul change in the lives of ordinary Congolese. 

The country is now in last place in the 81lnual UNDP development l'ankings, 187th out of 187 

countries'. Despite slight improvements, life expectancy and child mortality are below average 

for the region. National income per capita is less than 50 cents a day7. The DRC will miss all of its 

Millennium Development Goals. 1.7 million Congolese are displaced", a further 500,000 refugees 

outside the country". There are worrying signs of renewed conflict in the East. The investment of 

billions of dollars has had little impact on the average Congolese citizen. 

3. The central cause of this suffering is continued insecurity. The Congolese government's inability 

to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else. An effective 

security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted· is essential to solving problems 

from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers 81ld gender-based violence, to economic 

growth or the trade in conflict minerals. This is not a new finding. The imperative of developing 

effective military, police and judicial structures has been repeatedly emphasized. Yet, far from 

showing sustained improvement, Congolese security forces continue posing a considerable 

threat to the civilian population rather than protecting them 1 • • The recent allegations of an 

army Colonel leading Iris troops to engage in widespread rape and looting of villages near Fizi 

in 2011 underscores the fact that failed military reform can lead to human rights violationslI. 

The military - the Forces Armees de In Republique Diimocratique du Congo (FARDC) . has 

been accused of widespread involvement in the most serious human rights violations. Police 

corruption is endemic, and almost any form of judicial protection out of reach for the vast 

majority". 

4. The root of the failure to implement security sector reform (SSR) is a lack of political will at the 

highest levels of the Congolese Government. Rather than articulating a vision for Congolese 

security and marshaling assistance to achieve it, the Government has instead encouraged 

divisions among the international community and allowed corrupt networks within the security 

services to flourish, stealing the resources intended to pay basic salaries or profiting from 

exploitation of natural resources. Unless this is changed. sustainable reform will be impossible. 

The investment made by Congo's partners could be wasted, and Congo's people will continue to 

suffer. 

5. The international community also bears significant responsibility. The DRC's international 

partners have been politically incoherent 81ld poorly coordinated. Little has been spent on 

security sector reform, despite its paramount strategic importance· official development aid 

disbursed for conflict, peace and security totaled just 5530 million between 2006 and 2010, 

roughly 6% of total aid excluding debt relief. Spending directly on security system management 

and reform is even lower, 584.79 million over the same period, iust over 1%1'. A lack of political 

cohesion after 2006 undermined effective joint pressure on the Congolese vernment~. Poor 

coordination resulted in piecemeal interventions driven by competing short-term imperatives. 

The resulting failures have led many to give up on systemic reform altogether. 
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6. This is unsustainable and unacceptable. The DRC's external partners, old and new, nmst take a 

stand on SSR. As the dust settles after the 2011 presidentisl elections, many of the DRC's partners 

are reassessing their progrrunsffi• The international community must take this opportunity to be 

more forceful in pressing the DRC government to engage in reform. If international donors acted 

in concert, and effectively capitalized on their political and economic investment in the DRC, they 

could positively influence DRC government behavior. Their full weight needs to be brought to bear. 

7. The international community therefore needs to create a new pact with the Congolese 

government, one that puts in pJace dear conditions and benchmarks for progress on achieving 

army reform and minimizing harm to the population in return for continued assistance and 

recognition. These benchmarks must be based on positive efforts to achieve change. A strategic 

plan for military reform must be implemented, and ahigh·leve1 body to coordinate on-going 

programs set up. And steps must be taken to improve the protection of Congolese civilians, 

through minimizing human rights abuses carried out by the securityiorces, and prosecuting 

the worst offenders. 

8. This new pact must transcend traditional donors. China will need peace in the DRC for 

future generations to reap the rewards from its investment. South Africa also has huge and 

growing economic interests in the DRe. Angola has pressing issues of national security at 

stake. All need the stability that can only come from effective SSR. 'fhe international financial 

institutions (IFD have rewarded the stabilization of Congo's macro-economic situation with 

significant support". They must recognize that continued growth will be dependent on new 

investment, which in turn demands security. Regional organizations, most importantly the 

African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SAD C), need to play 

an active role in marshaling effective pressure, and providing a framework for discussion. 

Critically, this pact must also include the Congolese population. Congolese civil society must 

have a key voice in defining a global vision for Congo's security, and connecting high·Jevel 

reform processes with those that matter most, Congo's people. 

9. And the new pact must happen now. Flawed presidential elections have been completed. The 

DRC's relations with its neighbors have improved significantly in recent years. Though security 

in the DRC is precarious, and there are worrying signs of a resurgence of violence in the East, 

challenges to the Congolese .govel·nmen! from non·state armed actors have receded. In fact, the 

biggest threats perhaps now come from within the army itself. 'I'he government needs effective 

SSR, particularly of the military, to rebuild its reputation at home and abroad, an imperative 

reflected by President Kabila in his speech to the UN General Assembly in November 201117• 

Since the elections there have been some promising signs of greater receptivity on the part 

of the Congolese government". The opportunity to engage in an honest dialogue with the 

Government must not be missed. 

10. Though the picture painted above is bleak. it is leavened with hope. There are signs that, with 

the right will and appropriate support, change is possible. Increased numbers of prosecutions 

for sexual violence (including of a senior officer") and the reintegration of child soldiers show 

that justice can be done. FARDC formations trained by the US, South Africa and Belgium 

have performed well in intervening in delicate domestic environments. A census of military 

personnel is nearly complete. If these glimmers of hope are to be sustained and magnified, 

robust action is necessary. With the right political will in Kinshasa, endemic corruption can be 

tackled, salaries paid, and the worst abusers removed. Once the right conditions are in place, 

the long term and large scale work so clearly necessary ~ reducing the size of both police and 

military through retirement or new demobilization programs, vetting, .reinforcing capacity and 

increasing the combat effectiveness of troops - can begin in earnest. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 

To the Congolese Government 

Recognize the urgent need for serious reform to create an effective, professional security 

sector, especially the military. Overcome previous suspicions and engage positively with the 

international community in building a new coalition to assist with SSR efforts. Ensure that the 

voices of the Congolese people are heard in elaborating a new vision for security in the DRC. 

1. Renew political commitment to security sector reform at the highest levels. Make military 

reform a top political priority of the new government. Remove from office those individuals 

that are obstructing SSR and take all necessary steps to achieve effective reform. 

2. Urgently develop and implement a global vision for security and defense in the DRC in 

collaboration ffith Parliament and Congolese civil society, and implement a strategic action 

plan for achieving the vision of the FARDC sot out in legislation. Request international 

expertise or assistance as appropriate. 

3. Positively engage with international partners, notably in a high.level international forum 

on security sector reform, including though allocating a senior co·Chair, and agree on 

transparent, measurable benchmarks for progress. 

4. Collaborate with international partners in re-launching a working.Jevel cooperation body for 

military reform, based in Kinshasa, inciudingthrough nominating a high-level co-Chair. 

Agree on an international partner to provide appropriate technical and administrative 

support. 

5. Take urgent action to address the most pressing short-term requirements for ameliorating 

the per formanc e of the security sector, notably the progressive demilitarization of the East, 

effective action to end corruption in the security services, and bringing the worst military 

human l'ights abusers to justice, including through requesting appropriate international 

support to meet short·term resource gaps. 

To all DRC's international partners20 

Overcome the legacy of frustration and failUTe built up since 2006, and use political space 

opening up in Kinshasa and the new government's need for support to generate new political 

ffill on security sector reform. Provide high-level political commitment and coordination, 

including the appointment of sufficiently senior officials to provide momentum and leadership. 

Robust benchmarks and nuanced conditionality will be essential. Assistance must be sustained 

for the long term, and founded on a realistic understanding of what is possible. 

6. Re·energizc efforts and cooperation on security sector reform in the DRC through concerted 

pressure at the highest level for Congolese Government commitment to effective security 

sector reform. 

7. Collaborate in a broad·based coalition of international and regional actors engaged in the 

DRC, notably through the launch of a high-level forum on security sector reform in the DRC. 

8. Agree benchmarks for progress with the Congolese government, to include; progress on the 

human rights record of the security services, development of a global vision for security and 

a strategic reform plan for the military; and the establishment of an effective coordination 

body on military reform. Put in place a binding series of conditions for on.going political and 

programmatic support. 

9. Ensure that the imperative of effective SSR, and the benchmarks and conditions agreed at the 

high-level forum, are reflected in any new programming decisions or bilateral agreements. 

lO.Assist with short-term quick-win projects to raise confidence and open space for broader 

reform, notably progl'essive demilitarization of conflict-affected areas, anti-corruption 

activities and effective judicial action against human rights abuses committed by the 

security forces, as requested by the Congolese Government, and urge for long·term, 

sustained reform efforts. 
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To the Great Lakes Contact Group (US, UK, EU, UN, 

France, Belgium and the Netherlands) 

11. Catalyze diplomatic efforts to build a new coalition on SSR, though pro-active high level 

diplomatic contacts with key partners, notably Angola, South Africa, China, the AU and 

BADe, and their inclusion in an expanded Great Lakes Contact Group. 

To the UN Security Council and MONUSCO 

12. Generate renewed engagement on security sector reform through an urgent debate on the 

issue_ Encourage, in parallel with the AU, the organization of a high-level forum on security 

sector reform in the DRC_ 

13. Amend the mandate ofMONUSCO to include assisting the DRC government on all aspects of 

SSR, including military reform. 

14. Increase the resources allocated to the MONUSCO SSR unit, notably in fulfilling its 

mandated task of collating information on existing and planned SSR programs. Remind all 

member states of their responsibility to share informatinn. 

15. Extend the UN sanctions regime to include politicaJ and military Icadel's impeding effective 

SSR and direct the group of experts to provide information about the identity of these 

individuals. 

16. Ensure that the UN system has sufficient in-country resources to make a comprehensive 

assessment of the human rights performance of the Congolese security services. 

To the EU 

17. Renew the mandates of EUSEC and EUPOL, and l'eflect the imperative for progress on SSR 

in the planned 2012 program review. Stand ready to offer technical assistance to the DRC in 

elaborating a strategic reform plan for the army. 

18. Extend targeted sanctions to individ\l.als hindel'ing effediveSSR. 

To the AU 

19. Encourage, in parallel with the UN, the organization of a high-level forum on security sectoI' 

reform in the DRC 

20. Participate actively in the high-level forum and technical cooperation mechanism, including 

through agreement of benclunarks and conditions. 

To the World Bank and IMF 

.21. Expand the assessment criteria for on-going support to the DRC, notably access to the IMF 

loans, to include progress on security sector reform and budget allocations to key priority 

areas, especially justice. 
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--....... -......... . -

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4 .... .,.... by CO<IroI< .. _urit)' ........... tondo boyood 

immodiatoly «IIl.l!i<WfI«\od --. Tho obu .. hao _ moo. vUibIo in .... b ..... l.~ <lpotitieol_ ... in .... noI 

un_. -.bIy in tho ,uwreooiO<l otthe I\v....., dis Konro 

(JW" u.e ="'i". ot MLC """ .. IoyooI1<>Je .... Piern s.... ... 
58

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


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...... 1Id Ibo 2OUoIe<tio<!o. 11 ...... 100 _ fell In tlIo . "' .... >1 

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6. 'l'hi' \0 .... . .... ~ '!'be • ..t.obIioIIlDm, or,. offeeUo< 

MClIn\), _ \0 Ibo lu"" ....... 1.01 ,t.ep 1O.....u ... 011_ 

oI>i«u-. f __ ~t.botro_ nariano:rW.. ~ 

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~ .... _ f""" eoctJoUok- Meq ........... rity It wOle\1 

"""~odlObo ~~«<>DOmi<.nd~ 

'mpon.\i> •. '!'be~ .. Gt.vsm1DO!!Il"OCOpi...i 110 ~IUn __ l.\he~II<.eo..,J>oct ilprodueed 

,"'l:nO<!i.,ely .n. u.. 2006 .Iec!lor!,-. ~ _ 10 '" 

----=-_ .. -. ..... _ ........ ---~-... ... _.-_ .. _-- -----

P ........... KobiIo i. his _ ... ,ho UN 10 N~, iOU" • 

AII...;or lrOot..nI.nd mWtilotoralo<""" how! ~ b> . 

,.;0. .. riel, oroe<llrity _ ..ro.",~. """, ... poeit)' 

bulkli"" in ""juoliDo_ .. nbIIild"", ""Iaf~ ..... 

"" .... i.i ... mmuryond polito. n.. UN ~ SSR 10 be lbe _ 01 f1IlI. "",,,,,, offeclm ODd ......"tobIo I<Cllrity In 

• cou.otry and \he .... -....ioo oI" ... u,it, inotituli<m 10 

malle them mono ~I ond man O«.'OWIlOb/o-. Soeuri\J 

i...titutiooM co." inchulo the oomod _. poIloo. jodiciaryood 

6

-. retc!<opilO " Ibis _ milito" roIo:m efT ...... b_ f.oilod. 

bo<h cIu~"" ..... ,,""".nd . fterwu<!o. Tl>oy ..... 'oilo<!,... 

t"" primary '" ........ '\'be fin, ",tho Iotk otpolitleol orilI "" tho 

"""ofth< Coa&oIooo..,...rnmont;""--.I ;"odoqo. u and 

_Iy.-dio01o<l ....... ..,.f"""thodooo, rommu....,.. 

Congoleec Government: 

Insuflident Political Will 

1. '\'be~ GOftm""'nt bu Ia<keeI ,Ioo.m \0 lollth"",p with -... .... Ibo M<I1rit,J _. __ bI;J 

the ",IIi"". A briJlook ... \he.- of rri>rm foWl9 

cIea>oo.o .... ta IMI«IVOr1lIIIOn,h .. !><It ... O!!Ud 0 p_ioDOI 

and """,,Iiw mlliLa.., ... it wouIcI """"'~ .... 0 'MM' 10 tho 

.. ~poliIIul »d~In_o(u..Coo"""" 

elil .. n pecioJIy u.o..UOIlnd Il1o c...,..,a- I'rftidePt. Tbe 

Coo>roIo .. .,.....,..,...,t ... IIodDO_.,.~ .. b1 

bodiN. wlod .... _. worbbIo . .... ....., bI...-pri<K lot .. ,_ 

Ot etfo<\~ iI>Ilow up .,..... ........... """"~ • ....bled Ot 

tu"""' . bIi!o<l.,. .. ~.deIo)'tdw»&O h'Col' ''''''UO l 

IofioIoIlooo. ond. ~ """-ioo<l doo>cw.-.li .. lio<t. 

8. T!>" ..... i .. po.>1""' .. . lod:o( .. l*ily. "" . "'r)' .... ~ .. Ior~n..j"~Iio~ot/ar ..... l>.UI_\.O 

iDt.o ....;.6ed "'ilicuy """' pol;'" """,,"rH dorinllbo .... noition. . ......... u .... n ... \no,...,.., ..... ",T\.i&I and 

i...,.f .......... Po...n.l wi .. or"""",.".! ",,,,,,,",, with", t.bo 

otm)' ood otIIot ..... rily OIN<IU ..... M 10", o(_nel, 0( 

~.IO .... oiood ~ ...,_.naod (!'OIIpl. Gooenw.e", 

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poo~2006 "' .. I._tion Pnmtdiotely rottd . -'et, 0( 

.,mod _ ..... Addit_u,.. _"tivity 10 ioteontlioonol 

~on ..... rity ;"_""""IO·Ibt.Iooe~ 

lbat tlIo lnImootion<ol """"", ... ity Nd .....t.ed d"~ tho 

!nnOilio<t. embodied jo ClA,....Dd MO!'lL'C. bod ..... . ""'''''' 

0I_~ fnmrotion • ..on Iwmlli>tioo. M._ 01 

WVlimo 0<tI!pati00 ...... virid, '" _ """"'" peT<Cioed 

~ riPUY Ot ~ + 10 booetia.l: Of! bohollol elem<oo\.O 0( 

tho ""eruotional COIOmun,.,.... n.. _'I1l00''' is_ 

of ita ".\onOm1 .• nd ... .., of doaIl"", coIlectmly with tho 

intomo,1onol «XD"",.itjr. 
59

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


DRoC8.eps

---_ .... .. -~ _ --....... _ _---. .. _- ~, Bu'.-_ ..... much ..... ltol""'ti ....... l.i ....... oI 

SSR .. \boy ... 1M ...... ~ and \boy <10 .... _., ...... 1' .. __ 10 ~ tII.o ~ f ... SSR. Tbo lid r-..ino that tho 

CoacoIooo."...,._ """oj.......,. l. ilocllO rio< ...tIicieat 

poI~ioal ......... Ior __ cI>&qo._~,ir.diol_ 

t&ko ...... 10 """ c:onuptioro. rn..IiocipIiDo &Del wall <oXIlIDODd 

""""'"" "JI6ef .. i~int:...son. e/Jon.o i. tho -"';11_. 

o...pito ~ Kobila·. ~lo docIontioo. 01....., 

toIenDOO' for oeon>al rioIeoco .nd """"ptioro in hI,. 2009, 

""'-" 11M cho.,od "" 11M ,-nd. S_IO;..tQ. 

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_,.nd"'I!"'<1"""tintto",proIkl'-~ 

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illepl .. i..u.c.In.Io ... ~~ 

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__ "" pob:joo. ~ UN Se<uritrCOU .... lu..iot.-.nd "'" 

...,p/wIio pI-.! ... SSR ill ""'..,............ itooIf. A bIutpri., for"'" c..-lOiHu,.,. Ito, I>«.~. ofter .... "y 1.100 

......... &Dd 11M Iln.oll)' 1>00.0 .n-Ioplloundotioo with tho 

promulptiool. in 2OU. of m\lOh ~ ~"_ 

"joiN -...iuec ... juoU<o,..l<>m> __ forrnod ill _. tho 

'ComlIo 1.1 .... <Ie 10 ",",w·. to-<tu.iNd by"'" M1..;. .... 01 

J.11i<o &Del 0 ....... diplomot. oDd 0 tlu'NjfO&f 'priori\)-...... 

pion' "'" thojomice _ _ lAotIdood in 200'1. A «><>r<Ii_ 

body lor poIio:o """ .... tho 'Comite <Ie SuM <Ie Ia Rofor_ <Ie 10 

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lL t'bouP tJ..,--' pooitioe __ rd. theoo bodioo 

... ~ly ol "'iM<Ieff«ti_ . ...ne.I.--"" 

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port of ~ ""'I<D Ox M<Wit)-. no. Oroqr.-OI 

pion 11M ""' __ ""..;u, ~I pIo""",-1or 

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..... in compIeteIJ- " __ . Solorieo "'" polioe.Dd 

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, Dd IornIo-l """' ....... """' ..... . .. routI~ by~ . 

DRoC9.epsFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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61

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


DRoC10.eps

---"'--"- 18. The ... uh Uo bouo ........ ~ di-..<>O<tod biloLo..J 

i~itWiwo on tr";.w.,. HnSi ..... tioo., W .... tructure 

~D"'~ybWldina'.n....b'''''''''D_ 

-. -.lib in roIotion to> jIuLioo.no! poia'". *'>d in II>e 

peri<In!> ...... of_ ",Ilitory' ""' ... ~ ""nY ...... _ . 

l;...!.duo"' , ,,,,,,,,,,,,,""'loclat .. wort·--'tioo.. 

oquip....,'.Dd _no. -0< tho bruk-up of unita. Someofltn oftra;Di ... ___ .. !;nu"' __ .... . ...... """' .... 

....... incidlo. 'fbo.oo 1>0.. _ . ' .... fIU to _ .. ill> 

....... ,W'1ll w_ Mlhin II>e fAKDC u_""" bJ MQl>IUOCO" 

..... EUSEC. o ",*"">oftho [.,,,.,.'" UDion~in 

'.lOO5. Jm"OM ... _11 .uD"l\>o<o at.."b<d<\od EuropH" oI'IIe.n. 

[USEe has bad..,.,..._ ill .... atioo to tho ·"".in of 

_"..,,\0' - ...... riD,. Ion.. ..,~ indi.idu. loo!o:bm - . oct ,. --"'<Ii ... . __ "" of fARIlC _no!. .. ...n u ill 

odmirti ................. But whi. tho .. iIIitiatioooo "" ....... 

".IuabIe, they . 1< not ",J1id.", 10 bri ... .-.".t=ic ~ 

19. ",,. .. by..,.,._ tho..m..;." ........,.;tril~y of-" Ao ."""".-. aU coordin ....... \UornJ>!O ouffortdl.- ... l<II»o<l.O<Ioo."" ....... _, . ... poJiti<rol~~ 

tho c...,.....uthoritioor. TbiJ hu boon _ oart<Iy fdr. II, 

tho UN. Tho _abo ....... M ..... to><any_ tho roIo d 

i • ......"tryo:>o<dio.tioo.;. M<»IUSCO. Bu, ""a., It .... . ..mt 

.-..- 10 SSII •• nd ho' .... " mondoted br thoS«..nt, Cow><il 

to>_ .. ooordiootor ond 'nlOr ... """ t..>b 1Ii_ 2008. ~ .. !lOt _ .. rlicieolly..u _~ .... "' .. onwnotioal\r 

u''':I .... niro<d'''' ~_", .... ''"'' ...... forthoUN to> pIq ouch 0 promi"... roIo, MQNUSCO .....,\io1Jy ouwed 

f..,;litoti .. _dioooo ..... ""SSR IoIIow; ... II>e_* ot 

.... Alnbouo.odO<. r on>." which lwo boot> ~ """'" 2/)ID." <u"""tb'~ .. DO monda .. I0 ....... iD ",ilito.'l''-'" 

The Shared Imperative o( SSR 

20. I. """' ....... tioo.. thooo fa<toro h.o .. ..,ltod In tho ........... , 1_e:.r...-.. ....... , ily Heloo", .... porticularl;y ito milita'l' •• ro 

oimplytoodyo(uncUoul for rdotm to be .. hiovod. The ..... lt 

.... hom OD il><fNOi ... _ ..... ' on SSR. Support r ... ",il i .. 1')' 

..-.. _ fwru,ootb' ouboumod u ....... idor ..... h .. """ 

,"""",,.0< framod ... .... _ to. opo<ili.< w-. N<h ...... 

US JII'Oio<,to> ... in uDitJ to taeld. tho LIlA", Thou", """"""'" 

JII'Oio<Io . .. .,,-"" ..... i.,p"",,, tho iuoti<o.,...... . ... \1<1;1<1 

poIioteopocit,... ond OOIDO -.-......... """"'. tho_ 

~ 

nt _ ,. foci ... tho ..,..nl:J' ... mol, oyma,ic 

altho .. ilitory . .... larJ<Iy boftI.boodoood. 

1Aitiati, ...... l.oryt'4eOlo FAROC tra;nirla'reduad Iotho poi'" 

thotoaly ..... blloterol_""", were....-led 10 bo~ 

irI ...... ry'W1 . 

21. nuo w«<npw""'" bJlI>e ...... !hot puohu-.,1I>e DftC -" ........ __ » 100 ... _.., ...... "'- that.n:..:tiw 0A<ICti0n0 ..... 1<1 _ • political bodJoob. dNonrpt 

biI.ot....:l......",~ oM riok -.. CIIUtioye< ..... ,_. 

".. io _~tho .... i>I_Io",tmd>ed_ ___ .... tho impunity oftb< _ u.w.....o orar<rinoinolo. 

22. Butth'n ............ loGprbo.U" .. ed to>dorrrilWllo. Tho 

.... "" ..... al fo;[ed _ .. . ..t_tJ.dJ"""'-1"~_ 

fupuWdan"ro. Tho .... '... rtilXon'ridld...",.,..,] .....1IicI __ .. iWD thoCoqale ...... ritr_;u.Jf, 

..,....,..".,,,,t<>ronU'd 

p&Ytioulo>\y tho FARDC" 

ito 

.

... 

.... 

.....,. 

from 

e< 

tho 

p<1IO«t 

ioobili'yallho 

its poq>Io"

~ 

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tho ~ ..... riP al;~" f . . ......... Tho ~uman. poWool 

.00:1 5n.onc:ioJ -,allbo DRe ap,in oo!Io ....... b.rd; into wto, ,, difIku~ to 10"""". 
62

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


DRoC11.eps

23. V .. II>ooo_IO-,1d be"kbyallol'!boO&C~ .. ! .. .oaI 

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- !n .... ." lor Ioq-<eno""",u '" ~ ""-"I ............ "'I<Dd .... _.I.I<,.oaI.Dd ....... 1 

_ily ... m be.;,oJ for Ih'. <lN1 "'_ '" frullioD. 

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OIlC IU"od O<I"OA c-raI Alrico .ill be vkol for iu 1IIq ...... 

_P<riI1". And ........... u.. OIlC"t. Ny ~ ...... riIJO 

P"flNt.--...t.-_u.._'obe, ..... Ih ... ' 

to ilo ~ -,<";!T'. !! too -.d . ... eJfoe\i¥eConcoleoo • taII. AU_ ....... havo.lNody~ .. bilolttoJ -.. ond _ .. am,. 

20. R....,I ...... _ .. _iIDpO<Uml;yu..Alri<t.o 

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.. wort to II>e MC ....-_". 

. 

..... ....

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yield .... I."" Iutl<>I .... u.lto. The '''''''_ ..... , ... ...ceriood by _to pOIilicol <»rape<jtioa .... _ ... nimo ...... .. 

... ....t..d I. n """!oldy politi<tol .1N<Illn. The,...,. 

im_io<elr &tto,r ..... . f"~"". _"'"", thai .... ... by ....... ....! • .,.1....,.. • ..-._ ....... .. ...... ..,.'t"""I1"" "'" poHibIlilln for reIor .. " . 

lit. n...... ...... tro.i .... .. _ 100. ""'t<. eo...-...... ototo .,1IIt'd f_ lI>O)" be r<dU<>O<l in DIImbor &Dod _ ". 

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i.!M .-Ol". """'Ih bo!lI ..... hI. ~ Ib, .. ,to 

clviUO ....... u-_th ... _~u.e,,_d"'t.. 

.... ionoJ _ol>ll_my, ... '" tho 1'1 .. ,,"," _ • ....,.... 

Tho' politieol 000_' hu.1oo w...,.r. I'rooidoo, K. bi .. ,.,.I 

hI...,......",..". .... 1.001 .......... ot !oritim.oc:J. Tho' tOll 

.... """. __ odly,rilioi>«l byitll«~ ""C""", 

oItction lDIMliton, &Dod _l~tlo _"ruodibility. Tho ....... 

_ teIll".mp UUIt u..,.,.........",.....Jd Iab!o m..iIcI ito 

~ .. "'-"'" ob.oo4. ."" '" i_tho 101 0I 1lIe _ .. tio .. -.Id bo '" o.>dor<oh ......"..,r..l ..... oItho -..m,.~ n.... ___ ~ .. oip. 

........u,r. r", ... mpia. thoC-............ Gaoenl 0I 1bo Notioaol 

PoIIoo .. Nord! 2012 pobIlo:Iy au..! u.o;.,~,."..;".w _".., 

fo< oooIotOD<O in OIIIIlploti .. "'" po&. rofonn _-. 

n "111&"""'"", .... _ for ..... in,ful SSII ... _ be 

_1ioPH. "!"he.-. io l _ "'''IV 01 1>IIC<ftto _ tho 

1~"""..,.Jt 1U"od tho ORe', .... hbort._i< 

po,! ..... ...r _10""". Tbolim'" i. rip!.. II win "". ""' • 

• nd diffi<:ult.....t, 0., tM~ ... 1 """ \0 unlocld "" ...... "-1'ul 

Muro lor Lhe _Iotlon II olmpio.. 1M eo...-l" ... nIMD' 

"Iu" tob reoFlO<lOibilitl' lb. w-\oao. .... tol....! ond .... , ..... 

.-... .-rti<u"rIy "'tho militoi")', bocI:t!d by poIiticol 

...... ilment at tho -.oT7 hiPOOI-.. 

2!, Tbo i" ............ l ....... unily ...... '.....,.,u.. thio 

1_.t .... I1 ....... t ... i~ A.U othu~

IuuIuuo!torloa, _""""'tol «OBO<I>io "' I«l>rit.)"'~ 

- wiU bo difli .. dt 0' ,,,,,,,,,olb!o \0 .. hieoo. .. i\buut ~ 

!>SR. Tho'llIlC" ........... l"""-. .... '.... . ooIlo<Ilw ItO"" ""'-""', MCllrily __ .. Iorm, bo!lI ",_Do, 

poIitiooJ .. UI "'" \0 ",_, ... oJ'"'- CoqoLooo"""'" ___ Tboc<!OO ...... ~_.'I>l'..........soipi!l<o1ll 

fiAu<i.l.ocI diplotootio •• p;IO<l,u-lhtm:l 01 tho "". The 

wol,lIt "'tl>eot ....... 1_ ..... t be ~ to boo •• 
63

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


DRoC12.eps

---"--'-'" -.,"'_ . _ .... -.._ ... M ... 

... 

.. _ -.~ ...... _... ' ... --""- A New Deal On SSR 

29, 1\ io . ..... poIltaI """, .. _fit""" io u....,.q"""", 

....... ll,oobocb.-'Ihob:. ............ l~ 

oIIooold __ "'..,.;ko ...... oollooetivo ""'" with thoc...,.,..,. 

ao-n ...... ""SS!I. Thio.....t..,. '-"""tho_ .... 

olIo<oIIoo ot""'i~" ...... ..,......l~ .... .-olpoliliul 

orill.o..od .... ~ol-.iplOUll<tU .... ~""" 

-",no. could bo """' ..... ~...p,..; .. I'll""""'" thai _ 1O .. _""'I'!I'........-.ll>otoI:hl~ __ .wilI 

c:onalnl;yhe-.,... _,","" .. SSR __ he~ 

",tho.bon· ........ 

30. _. po<!. _1<1 _ politl<al 1>o<1i ....... _ .... ted, 

.. rco«dPfOl'1l ..... LIc """"""_opdlW~ 

Iood.oohlpoad_b<o>oltma.b ... _,..-..do 

muUlaU, .. ....,.[_1&. l,..,..)d ..,..] to i ........ oil ;" ............ 1 

_.oppoI", tho ORe. t..ducliq-tho 1ftIoi;oloo.oldoo.or 

..... """'ity. _ ............... 1 octon loelodi ... Chi ... nd 

SowhA&ri.IhoDRC\~_~",""""" 

...,.;o.w <>qUIi"';"'. V.U or><! SA.0Cl. or><! .... illtCmolioo.al 

1\~.!>Cialin~I. __ r.:I~ •• '.'u'.II-. 

~.r.:I """"""o". tloD. _. bondtmarlto. 0Jld 

lJ"~. _6deno:o .. ioinc~ 

31. It ...... 1cI ... 1 .. O<hed i • • .op\<itollno .. old 

ooIlabo<o1loft, _aLti .. tho, ...... off"""" SSM io . aood 

.... '*" ","tho c...a-.............. ~;u poopa., ond ollot;", _i<.d~ r.:I~'I"'rtnen.fI.~ 

_f..-..iocalocUt""""'thoputoltho~ 

"""' .... ..,. ooWd ...... . ... heJplul J>Oliti<.t boaluh 

-....,...; ........... ...ul~ ............... _""'«1 

diplomoc)o .• r.:I. Io.di.ol "","10 bt ~ 1>1' AI""". 0<\0n. Blo. _U,,""_ ...... lcIbt~ .. r . lQ'ilIuoOoon .. lOdifIIcultiot.lUt. 

..uJ_ .. btf....t - thoroio ............. llttto~_ 

..tor.. ",11>0 DRC. II"",",,, ....... od politioe!oxu.i ..... '" 

obo....u. Tbtn .. al be dlsai_ with eon..... 

GtnwoOlflll, .... __ .. ol .... i........-l 

""" ..... ~1._ • ....u.wilJ_ ... ~~politlcoJ 

"""""'_.oad_bo_ ... bJ~_itioo.a. 

c..ordln.", . Dd CGmomnkau 

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ANNEX I - OECD statistics on spending in the DRC 

Fig I. OECD ~velopment spending 2006·2010" 

2234.573 lH8.l51 1928.99CI 2548.201 

W .. 

5912.131 

-, 

14.132.064 

13,1~.1 

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2(l()ij ond ~OIO. 

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""".Iy • .,......".. .. ""'ott« !low •. 

Fig 2. OECD developUlent spending 2006·2010 (excluding debt)" 

n98.1'29 1156.323 1754.161 2333.246 2116.93 11,101;< .3915 

1183.808 1740.224 209\1.748 2939.14 2282.966 JO.'iM.6liJ 

NQIl-del>t uW od deYoIop",."t ""'" ml""."", "",,10<1 1"<1\1,.,1)-

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o )'Ml". Th;' ~ndine; ""'" ~h.lminrl1'" prOjo<t.id. Offl .. ol dMb..rocd b,.d,. • ...",..._ .... ;.. .. ttl; ... au .... 

1M" 5.S,"" I ... "ly fro", the IMF and EU iB 2009.nd 2010 ••• 

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- ~, 

·c".,ni<t, Po_ ond Be- ~.~ ".~ -." <uri'y" 

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mont nnd Refo, .,· 

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Fig 4. MONUC/MONUSCO budget*" 

""",," 

1112.739 

, ... "" 1181.678 

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1<> ... 10<1 18-099 biU"", between July 2006 .ndJu\y 201.1. 

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.....-tbo ..... poriod. ,ho UK paid 8.1~. or $499 .. Ulion. 

".d Fro_ paid 1.6",-, 01" S463 million . 

,~ ,. .. ,-, U~ 14t.az 530.51 

21.48 ~ M.~ 

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Fig 5. T(lp ten OECO bilate~al dono .. to ORC 2010 (disbuuement, nch,djllg debt"') 

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rIg. 6 Development spending by Contact Group core members, 2006-2010 

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